Are Young People Turning Away from Democracy?

A Comparative Study of Youth Disengagement in Advanced Democracies

Intifar Sadiq Chowdhury

January 2023

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of
The Australian National University

For my brother,

Late Tahsab Asgar Chowdhury,

who has always encouraged me to write.

Declaration

I, Intifar Sadiq Chowdhury, declare that this PhD thesis entitled *Are Young People Turning Away from Democracy? A Comparative Study of Youth Disengagement in Advanced Democracies* contains no material that has been submitted previously, in whole or in part, for the award of any other academic degree or diploma. Except where otherwise indicated, this thesis is my own work.

Most of my empirical chapters have been presented as conference papers in various domestic and international conferences from 2019 to 2022. In 2021, a modified draft of Chapter 9 was published as a journal article in the *Australian Journal of Political Science*. I was the sole author of the paper and have substantially revised the material for inclusion in this thesis. All the chapters are entirely my own work, except where due reference is made in the text.

Intifar Sadiq Chowdhury

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like to express my very great appreciation to my supervisor, Professor Ian McAllister. Ian has provided excellent guidance throughout the PhD process. It has been a true privilege to work with Ian. I am tremendously grateful for all the time he has invested in reviewing drafts and for the consistently clear advice over many years. Thanks, and appreciation also go to my panel members Dr. Svitlana Chernykh and Dr. Jill Sheppard for their professional guidance and mentorship throughout this project.

Many other faculty members at the ANU School of Politics and International Relations (SPIR) are deserving of thanks. Associate Professors Annika Werner, Jana von Stein and Tracy Fenwick made valuable suggestions and insights from their academic career that helped in the completion of this project. I am also grateful for the technical advice and emotional support given by Dr. Marija Taflaga, Dr. Sarah Cameron, and Dr. Feodor Snagovsky.

Beyond SPIR, I extend my thanks to Judith Ireland, political editor at *The Conversation* and Megan Dingwall and James Giggacher at *The ANU Media* who have provided journalistic support in disseminating my research to the Australian public, particularly during the 2022 federal election. I am grateful for support from the London School of Economics (LSE) where I spent a month in 2019 to sharpen my quantitative methods skills, especially pertaining to survey design and analysis. Throughout my PhD program, I partook in various other online methods courses including the GESIS Summer School in Survey Methods (Longitudinal survey analysis) and the Essex Summer School in Social Science Data Analysis (Multi level modelling and its practical applications). ANU SPIR has been very generous in providing support for conference attendance and other opportunities.

I would like to offer my special thanks to various others for their contribution to this project: my colleagues and mentors at the ANU Centre for Social Research and Methods (CSRM), particularly, Dr. Steve McEachern, Professor Ben Edwards and Professor Matthew Gray who have allowed me to take time off work to edit my thesis and have always taken a keen interest in my professional development; the collaborators of reputable surveys, including the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), the Australian Election Study (AES), whose hard work in collecting reliable data for public use has made my research possible; Dr. Thuy Do, from the ANU Crawford School for her useful advice on writing and editing well; and my inner circle, Zunayed Tarafder, Claire Cronin, Sabah Noor, Eve Cheng, Rabab Hussain, Sarah Mehruba and Dominik Koll for believing in me.

Finally, I wish to thank Mom and Papa for their unparalled support and uncountable sacrifices for securing my higher education.

Abstract

In light of the dramatic decline in electoral turnout in advanced democracies, youth disengagement has surfaced as a salient concern. Despite being better-educated, younger cohorts appear to be less committed to democracy than their older counterparts. Previous research has examined this youth disengagement puzzle to warn that younger generations are also culpable for rejecting the foundational values of democracy as they turn away from traditional democratic processes. A more optimistic camp has suggested that youth support for democratic ideals is unchanged as they move away from traditional institutions. Considering both sides of the debate, this study asks the questions: are young people turning away from democracy? If so, why?

To investigate whether young people are turning away from the principles and/or processes of democracy, I use survey data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES, 1996-2016) for a comprehensive empirical inquiry on which of the three time effects- age, period or cohort (APC)- drives youth disengagement in 35 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. I employ hierarchical modelling techniques and other quantitative methods to isolate the highly collinear APC effects and test a number of theories regarding the effects of various individual and context-level factors on youth democratic engagement.

My study finds that younger generations are moving away from traditional democratic practices, such as voting and party alignment, but their commitment to key democratic principles remain comparable to older generations. It confirms that the changing social context is characterised by long-term societal transformations that accumulate modernisation resources across generations, facilitating youth withdrawal from traditional democratic processes. Looking into various micro and macro-level components of modernisation, this study elucidates the impacts of the decline in religion, increase in media use and institutional design factors on youth generational disengagement. It reveals that traditional institutions have not evolved to cater for newer generations with different cognitive resources, abilities and concerns. Overall, this research a) provides a methodologically sound clarification of the exact nature of the youth disengagement problem by accounting for competing time effects; b) makes a theoretical contribution by showing how gradual decline in engagement is a product of continuous process of societal transformations across generations, rather than a one-off generational feature; and, c) provides nuanced results of how disengagement can be sensitive to the micro and macro environment of the youth. In doing so, it cautions that youth disengagement is a clear symptom (not a cause) of democratic distress; and, wrongly holding an already marginalised group culpable for rejecting the foundational values of democracy may further push the future custodians away from the political system.

Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Abbreviations

ABS	Asian Barometer Survey
AES	Australian Election Study
APC	Age-Period-Cohort
CCREM	Cross-Classified Random Effects Model
CSES	Comparative Study of Electoral Systems
CV	Compulsory Voting
DV	Dependent Variable
ESS	European Social Survey
EPE	External Political Efficacy
EVS	European Values Study
HAPC	Hierarchical Age-Period-Cohort
IMD	Integrated Module Dataset
IPE	Internal Political Efficacy
IV	Independent Variable
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
PR	Proportional Representation
SES	Socioeconomic Status
SWD	Satisfaction with Democracy
TV	Television
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
WVS	World Values Survey

"…And these children that you spit on
As they try to change their worlds
Are immune to your consultations.
They're quite aware of what they're going through…"

- *Changes*, David Bowie

Introduction

"Young people are so bad at voting – I'm disappointed in my peers"
- Parkinson (2016)

Are young people rejecting democracy? Among tumultuous debate about whether democracy is in decline (Diamond 2015; Levitsky and Way 2015; Plattner 2015; Foa et al. 2020), a concerning observation is that the future custodians may be turning their backs to democracy (Kitanova 2020; Wenger and Foa 2020). The dramatic decline in electoral participation has been concentrated among young people in advanced democracies (Blais and Rubenson 2013; Klingemann 2014). Worrying are events like the 2016 Brexit referendum, where millennials had the lowest turnout despite being the generation due to endure the future political and economic implications of Britain leaving the European Union (Parkinson 2016). It is surprising that younger cohorts - with higher education levels and thus better cognitive tools to make rational electoral choices - appear to be less supportive of such democratic practices (Klingemann 2014). Indeed, the political culture today looks different from what Almond and Verba (1963) envisage in their book *The Civic Culture* where younger and more educated citizens are expected to value civic participation and become more supportive of the governmental system.

Existing empirical research provides a mixed reading of this puzzle. Some scholars insist that while young people's style of engagement has changed with the value changes in modern society (Norris 2003; Spannring et al. 2008; Kestilä-Kekkonen 2009; Sloam 2016), their commitment to democratic ideals remain intact (Ferrín and Kriesi 2016; Voeten 2016). Others fervently disagree: young people are not only shying away from all sorts of participatory avenues (Grasso 2014; Fox 2015), but also apparently rejecting key democratic principles that set democracy apart from its authoritarian alternatives (Foa and Mounk 2016; 2017). These differing ideas about youth disengagement from the principles and/or the practices of democracy yields different implications of the problem. A decline in electoral participation could indicate that young people are causing a crisis of democracy by rejecting its foundational values. On the other hand, changing preferences of participation may pose no threat to democratic ideals but may rather be a symptom of deeper problems in existing, traditional institutions. That is, youth disengagement is not a cause but a symptom of the crisis of democracy.

These contradictory conclusions stem from varying research design, including dissimilar conceptualization of 'democracy' and 'young people', and a disproportionate focus on individual-level over context-level determinants of engagement. First, an excessive attention on electoral participation as the fundamental aspect of democracy means that youth disengagement from traditional channels is being read as an absolute rejection of democracy.

Whereas an absolute rejection would entail disengagement from both the principle and process dimensions of democracy. Second, young people can represent individuals who are young in age (e.g., 18, 30) or those who belong to a younger generation (e.g., Gen Z, millennials) (Mannheim 1928). Most studies fail to control for confounding time effects. Third, there is a lack of account for macro factors, such as institutional design features, in explaining how accessible and engaging politics is to young people. All these uncertainties in the current literature warrant a rigorous comparative study which spells out the nature and then investigates the root causes of the youth disengagement problem. My dissertation seeks to do so by first examining both lifecycle and generation effects on both the principle and process dimensions of democracy.[1] It then digs deeper to investigate the micro and macro-level factors that inform youth democratic engagement.

This introduction has three parts. The first part outlines the youth disengagement problem and its significance. The second section identifies the gaps in our existing understanding of the problem and outlines the contributions of the current dissertation in filling those gaps. The final section signposts the overall structure and implications of the thesis.

Recent research recognises that democracy is in stress - most unexpectedly in advanced societies. While some countries in Africa, Asia and the Arab world have opened up to democracy in the past decade, in other countries where democracy has deeper roots, disillusionment with the political process has crept to worrying heights (Kurlantzick 2013). Dissatisfaction in the developed world rose from a third to half of all citizens in the last quarter of the century, with disconnect from democratic institutions the starkest in the United States and Great Britain (Foa et al. 2020). There are also signs of erosion of freedom in advanced societies. This comprises an increase in authoritarian nostalgia, rising popularity of populist and far-right parties with little commitment to democratic norms, a public distaste for democratic institutions, and governments who are willing to crack down on activists, especially during global crises like the GFC and COVID-19 pandemic (Fukuyama 2020). In Europe, countries like the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia - which were once regarded democratic success stories (Kurlantzick 2013) - show clear signs of democratic malaise today. In Orbán's Hungary, press freedom rates are comparable to when it was under communist rule. In France, racist offences and hate crimes threaten foundational principles of democracy. In the US, a racist, sexist, xenophobic and solipsistic president has misused democratic instruments to its very disadvantage (see Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018) in what was once considered the grand

[1] Younger generations are reinventing political activism: "…post-industrial societies, where traditional agencies have becomes less popular, have seen the rise of alternative avenues through protest politics, reinventing activism Demonstrations, aligning petitions, and consumer boycotts have become far more common since the mid-70s. Engagement in new social movements, exemplified by environmental activism, has flowered in affluent societies" (Norris 2002, p. 4). Norris purports that there is much evidence for the evolution, transformation, and reinvention of civic engagement than to its premature death. This resonates with the core enquiry of my comparative study: does a decline in popularity of traditional agencies equate to a premature death of civic engagement? In other words, does a decline in traditional democratic participation mean that younger generations are giving up on democratic ideals?

architype of democracy. Among these troubling trends, a decline in youth engagement in advanced democracies is ominous of a perilous future of democracy.

A leading indicator is the precipitous decline in electoral participation among young people in advanced societies (Blais and Rubenson 2013; Klingemann 2014). Recent research by the Centre for the Future of Democracy at the University of Cambridge shows that the millennial generation is the most dissatisfied with the performance of democracy compared to previous cohorts (Foa et al. 2020). In democratic frontrunners, such as the US, UK and Australia, millennials are less likely to engage in formal politics, such as voting or joining political parties, yet are more likely to complain about the results (Wenger and Foa 2020). The gap has worryingly enlarged: Gen X in their 30s were satisfied with democracy whereas millennials take the contra view.

This is problematic: when young people refuse to exercise control over their own future, they not only harm the legitimacy and superiority of the democratic regime, but also fall out of representation from the policies that govern them. The risk of underrepresentation makes youth disengagement even more surprising, especially if youth disengagement is not just a passing phase (i.e., lifecycle effect) but is also a lasting change for the lifetime (i.e., generation effect). Young people play a pivotal role in maintaining the health of democracy, not only in the present but also the future. They are contributing agents to the civic culture, which plays a major role in stabilising democracies (Almond and Verba 1963). Democratic regimes are expected to consider an individual, young or old, equal to other individuals in the citizenry and therefore equip them with the same tools to shape their lives. Democracy's commitment to self-determination and equality sets it apart from non-democracies (see also, Christiano 2018). When citizens participate in the democratic process, they do so with a shared intention to maintain control over and shape the decisions which have profound effects on their lives (Nguyen 2014).

But before drawing hasty conclusions about young people, it is important to understand the youth disengagement problem, and how and why it occurs. Incorrect and negative stereotyping of younger cohorts as apathetic, disinterested or anti-system can be 'dangerous' to the health of democracy (Stoker et al. 2017) – breaking the link between the future electorate and the rules that govern it. When debating about the next generation's interactions with politics, we converge on the term 'youth engagement' (YouthSense 2017). Obviously, young people appear to be turning away from the ballot box, yet the term has a negative connotation to it and is thrown around sparingly. It is an observation which warrants explanation in detail. To gauge the consequences of this phenomenon, it is important to first unpack the nature of the problem, how it presents and why it presents the way it presents. This leads to the central research questions of the current dissertation: Are young people turning away from democracy? If so, why?

Young people may be fuelling a crisis of democracy. Foa and Mounk (2016) firmly believe that citizens' reluctance to stick with establishment parties and the precipitous decline in trust in democratic institutions (such as the court and parliament) are signs of an impending crisis. Using consolidated democracies in three waves of the WVS (1992-2015, waves 3-6), they claim that their use of four indicators of regime legitimacy prove that citizens are turning away from democracy as a system of government. That is, they are rejecting the basic principles. Since this rejection is concentrated among young people, particularly millennials, they are culpable for instigating this crisis of democracy.

The post-materialist argument propagated by leading scholars like Inglehart (1997), Norris (2002) and Dalton (2008) provide a more optimistic reading of generational changes. The core of their argument is that post-materialist values have consequences for political participation amongst younger generations, which means they will have a higher affinity to issue-based and non-electoral forms of participation. They interpret a simultaneous rejection of traditional institutions as benign indicators of politically sophisticated younger generations who are critical to the actions of the traditional elites. Referring to the distinction David Easton (1975) made, decline in government legitimacy does not equate to decline in regime legitimacy. People may be weary of the performance of the government of the day but being able to protest against the government and remove them from office are virtues of democracy. According to this line of thought, youth disengagement is not a cause but rather a symptom of poor performance of democratic institutions.

Contemporary electorates, by the virtue of expanding political skills and resources, are expected to turn to unconventional avenues of participation, such as signing petitions, protesting, engaging in internet activism, and engaging with local communities or local agencies for local issues. Recent years has shown how the internet can be used for and how social networks lead to participation (Vromen et al. 2018). This resonates the idea of 'critical citizens' among younger cohorts who have reached higher levels of education and are more familiar with new technological tools. It appears that postmaterialism has led to an increase in 'elite-challenging', at the expense of 'elite-directed', political participation (Inglehart 1990; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).

Such fluctuations in participation may pose no threat to the foundational values of democracy. In a follow-up analysis, and using Foa and Mounk's (2016) data, Voeten (2016) systematically disapproves their claim. He shows that support for democracy and non-democratic alternatives have been static for the last twenty years. Procedural preference, he argues, may be changing but there is no question on the legitimacy of the regime (see also, Ferrín and Kriesi 2016). A descriptive analysis in Figure I using data from 35 advanced democracies in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) across 20 years bolsters this line of argument. That is, support for democratic principles remain intact whereas engagement with processes, more or less, increase over the lifetime as younger people grow old to accrue resources – such

as stable income, residence and family- that are conducive to political engagement (Franklin 2004).



Source: 35 OECD countries in CSES IMD (1996-2016)

Figure I: Age-based variation in two democratic attitudes and two democratic behaviours

Although, in face value, the graph in Figure I captures a lifecycle (or age) effect, these trends are not isolated from confounding generation (or cohort) and period effects. Here, we are presented with the identification problem where the three time effects are exact linear functions (Period – Age = Cohort) (Yang and Land 2006; 2008). This means a robust analysis would attempt to estimate the unique effect of one while controlling for the other two. Although existing studies provide theoretically robust explanations for youth political behaviour, there is a lack of methodologically rigorous enquiries on which of the three time effects- age, period or cohort (APC)- drives youth interaction with democracy.

Most theoretical discussions of youth disengagement propose generational explanations. One answer may lie in the 'silent revolution' (Inglehart 1977) which characterises a cultural shift from a materialist to post-materialist society in the past decades. In post-industrial welfare societies, economic prosperity and high education levels has brought existential security; thus, beyond survival values, people focus on post-materialist values which emphasize on individual autonomy and self-expression (Inglehart and Welzel 2010; Inglehart and Norris 2017). The intergenerational shift toward postmaterialist values have created newer generations of 'critical' (Norris 1999a) and 'assertive' (Dalton and Welzel 2014) citizens who cognitively mobilise (Dalton 1984). That is, they do not need to rely on traditional, elite-directed channels

to understand and participate in politics. To these democrats, citizenship is a right and not a duty (Dalton 2007). By the virtue of their enhanced cognitive resources, citizens of modern societies are more critical of the workings of their government (Dalton 2007; Ferrin and Kriesi 2016; Norris 1999a). Simply put, beyond basic economic and physical securities, citizens attach more importance to other conflicting values, such as identity and autonomy in politics.

Modernisation theory, however, does not explain why citizens in a democracy would reject its core principles. Political socialisation theory may provide a more plausible explanation for the erosion of democratic norms: certain cohorts may have little regard for democratic principles based on their historical context. For example, cohorts who socialised – or had their most impressionable formative years - under non-democratic regimes and lived through the horrors of military rule may display greater commitment to democratic values than other cohorts (Fuks et al. 2018). Further, recent challenges faced by young people have protracted the period of transition to adulthood among younger generations (Flanagan et al. 2012). Therefore, their commitment to democracy may not be as strong as those who socialised in a less challenging economic and social environment.

Admittedly, younger generations have socialised in an environment facing a plethora of challenging issues such as climate crisis, student loans and housing affordability- all of which are symptoms of a protracted period of transition to adulthood. Wenger and Foa (2020) agree, "an examination of millennial life trajectories makes clear the reasons for this generational disconnect." US millennials in their 30s form about a quarter of the population, yet just own 3% of the wealth. Baby Boomers, in contrast, owned 21% at the same age. Similarly, in Britain, this cohort earns less than their parents and grandparents. In Southern Europe, the youth unemployment rate is three times the national average. Therefore, it is not surprising that millennials are checking out from mainstream democratic politics. All the zeal with which the youth cheered for moderates, such as Barrack Obama and Justin Trudeau, has transformed into angst over unsustainable debt, high rent and low-paying jobs and a looming climate crisis. However, it is unclear whether this disconnect means a rejection of the core values of democracy.

Further, the answer to whether young people are turning away from democracy may be sensitive to context. Comparative political scholars have paid more attention to individual-level factors in explaining youth attitudes and behaviours. Nevertheless, in a real society there exists a macro-micro nexus, which mirrors the traditional *person* x *context* interaction model (see, for example, Lewin 1935). In such models, people are nested in contexts, i.e., they think and make choices in a macro environment (Anderson and Singer 2008, p. 568). These come as either formal institutional rules or economic, political, and social conditions which influence people's interpretations and actions. So, where one is situated is important because when contexts vary across time and space, they produce differential costs and incentives for individuals. For example, some institutional rules make it harder for people to vote in some

countries compared to others. This means that there are two kinds of heterogeneity – one at the individual level and one at the country level- that explain differences in people's attitudes and behaviours. Although, a growing discussion asserts the importance of political context on democratic citizenship (Norris 2003; Spannring et al. 2008; Dalton 2009; Sloam 2013; 2016), a focus on young people - let alone in a comparative research design setting - has been quite scarce.

This discussion reveals three gaps in the existing scholarship. First, who are the young people? When we talk about the youth do you refer to age categories, generational cohorts or period groups across time? A study on time effects must be mindful of the confounding effect of each of these on the others. Second, once we have a solid understanding of the youth, we must ask: what are young people disengaging from? Is it the principles or the processes of democracy or both?[2] Finally, what micro and macro-level factors explain the trends in youth disengagement from the principles and/or processes of democracy in advanced democracies? The generalisability of much published research on the said issue is problematic as they either focus on single cases or otherwise ignore the effect of context in comparative research.

Being mindful of these lacunas in the literature, this dissertation aims to address the gaps in order. Chapter 1 explores the various dimensions of democracy to develop a suitable definition to answer the central questions of the thesis. Chapter 2 elucidates the attitudinal and behavioural concepts that represent interaction with the principles and processes of democracy. Chapter 3 theorises youth disengagement, acknowledging the changing social context and how different theories aim to explain its effect on young people's attitudes and behaviours. Chapter 4 justifies the data and the methods chosen to examine the youth disengagement problem, especially while tackling the age-period-cohort (APC) identification problem. Chapter 5 presents the first empirical analysis of whether younger people are turning away from democracy and which of the three time effects explains the disengagement. It finds that younger generations are turning away from traditional democratic practices while their commitment to democratic ideals is on par with their predecessors. That is, youth disengagement pertains to the process dimension. Carrying this key result forward, Chapters 5 to 8 asks why? They empirically consider both individual-level and macro-level, institutional determinants of youth democratic behaviour. Chapter 9 is a single case analysis in Australia, particularly to ascertain the importance of context in answering the central questions of the thesis. The dissertation closes with a brief discussion of the broad implications of the findings. The excerpts below briefly discuss the aims, results, and implications of each chapter.

[2] Considering extant literature on voter dealignment (Van der Brug and Rekker 2021; Lisi et al. 2021; Díaz Jiménez 2022; Rekker 2022; Lisi 2022; Kiess and Portos 2023) and the movement to issue-based non-electoral forms of participation, the question I ask in my thesis about electoral and elite-based traditional participation is a prior question that needs to be asked before enquiring where young people are exactly going. I fervently acknowledge that an in depth analysis on how participatory preferences are shifting is an important future enquiry which will definitely benefit from citing my comparative analyses.

Chapters 1 starts by acknowledging that multiple definitions of the multidimensional concept 'democracy' yields dissimilar answers to the same question. Following a review of the theoretical understanding of democracy in the existing literature, here, I define democracy as a system of government where all eligible citizens have the perpetual power to influence the rules that affect their lives in order to ensure that their rights and liberties are provided and protected. This definition hinges on two aspects of democracy: citizens belief of core democratic ideals such as equal rights and their provision to enact changes by employing participatory instruments. In simpler words, it refers to the principles and processes of democracy. Democratic principles or ideals form the foundation of any democracy. How democracy is done can be considered as the processes or procedures of democracy. These processes produce outcomes of the system, which directly or indirectly affect the citizens. Overall, this chapter introduces citizens attitudes towards democratic principles and engagement (or behavior) with democratic processes as the two major classes of dependent variables of this study.

Chapter 2 conceptualises citizens interactions with the principles and processes of democracy. After defining democracy as a form of government with two crucial dimensions in Chapter 1, this chapter proposes that citizens' principle-based attitudes towards democracy can be one of two types: normative conceptualisations of the core principles and evaluations of the realisation of those principles (or principle-based outcomes). Citizens' attitudes have behavioural consequences. Particularly, a discrepancy in what democracy should be and what democracy is affects the extent and mode of participation. The distinction between conceptions, evaluations and engagement is crucial to assess the dimension of democracy, if any, that young people are turning away from.

Chapter 3 theorises youth disengagement. More specifically, it develops the theoretical framework for this study, discussing and then nominating the potential predictors for youth (dis)engagement from the principles and or processes of democracy. It builds on the idea that young people today are different from young people 20 or 30 years ago. Consulting the scholarly debate on the youth disengagement problem and following a rigorous review of the concepts of 'generation' and 'young people', this chapter proposes two competing generational hypotheses – modernisation and socialisation – to answer whether young people are turning away from democracy. It infers that empirical support for modernisation theory will mean that societal change across generations is a long, continuous evolutionary process (and that the retract from democracy would then be due to lasting generational characteristics) while support for socialisation theory will mean that social change is a fragmented process (where retract is unique to just one cohort that fades away in subsequent cohorts). Next, to answer 'why' younger generations may be retracting from democracy, this chapter also discusses the crucial components of social change and introduces a key hypothesis for each empirical chapter.

In chapter 4, I develop an approach to test these hypotheses. Given the subjective nature of the outcome variables in this study, the task of asking citizens to share their opinions and then later analysing those opinions is challenging indeed. So, I first identify and assess the quality of the items (or questions) commonly used in major surveys to tap into the subjective dependent variables of interest. Next, I briefly discuss the demographic variables used to measure the more objective attributes of the survey respondents. This includes a discussion of the micro and macro-level intervening variables which mediate the relationships between the independent and dependent variables. Then, I draw attention to the age-period-cohort (APC) identification problem which plagues studies inquiring the highly collinear time effects of aging. Here, I explain that hierarchical modelling using repeated cross-sectional survey data is a leading method to solve the identification problem. Considering the discussion on survey items and the APC identification problem, I choose the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) integrated module dataset (IMD) as a suitable data source for my study. Finally, I present the whole suite of variables that my thesis draws upon from the CSES dataset to represent the hypotheses introduced in Chapter 3.

Chapter 5 investigates whether young people are turning away from the principles or the processes of democracy or both? Social modernisation theory hypothesizes that gradual value change withdraws younger and more educated cohorts from the traditional processes - but not the core principles- of democracy. By contrast, political socialisation theory suggests that each cohort has distinct attitudes and behaviours based on the political and social context of their formative years. I test these two theories using survey data from advanced democracies in the CSES Integrated Module (IMD) between 1996-2016. When controlling for age and period effects, the findings suggest that support for democratic principles remain unchanged across generations, while modernisation theory best explains youth disengagement from traditional processes of democracy. They confirm that the changing social context is characterised by long-term societal transformations that accumulate modernisation resources across generations. This sets the stage for further analyses, in the next three chapters, about how some key components of societal modernisation –such as associational membership, consumption of media for political information, and institutional factors such as electoral system– may explain differences in democratic engagement among younger generations.

Given the growing unpopularity of civic associations among younger people, Chapter 6 focuses on religion and how its relationship with democracy may have evolved across generations. With the dramatic decline in religion - especially among young people (Pew Research Centre 2018) - has there been a corresponding decline in democratic engagement? Existing scholarship suggests a positive effect of religion on the entire electorate (Norris and Inglehart 2011; Arikan and Bloom 2019; Dalton 2009) - is this true for young people as well? Using the CSES IMD again, this chapter investigates the impact of religious affiliation on two measures of youth engagement: turnout and party identification. The findings show that religious affiliation has an independent positive effect on democratic engagement. That is, religion facilitates

engagement among the old and the young alike. However, the religious context of the country in question moderates this relationship: the positive effect only applies in secular environments where being religiously affiliated is more distinctive. These results are in line with the social network theory, implying that religious social networks in advanced societies can facilitate youth engagement with democracy.

Chapter 7 inspects the impact of media use for political news. Research suggests consuming political news in the media facilitates democratic engagement (Bakker and de Vreese 2011; Boulianne 2009; Cho et al. 2009; Gainous and Wagner 2011). Considering the dramatic decline in electoral engagement among younger generations, does the news media have a similar positive effect on youth engagement? Using survey data from CSES module 5 (2016-2021) collected in 24 advanced democracies, this chapter reassesses the democratic potential of the news media among young people. The findings show that, across all generations, political news consumption facilitates electoral behaviours. Further, the positive effect is stronger among politically interested individuals. These results provide support for the mobilisation theory which contends that an access to a large amount of political information increases political awareness and sophistication - and thus, mobilises citizens both cognitively and behaviorally. More importantly, this chapter highlights the potential of the news media in revitalizing youth electoral participation in advanced democracies.

Chapter 8 investigates macro-level determinants of engagement. It builds on the premise that individual citizens are nested in larger, cross-nationally variable macro environments (Anderson and Singer 2008) and that institutional design effects vary across democracies (see, for example, Kostadinova 2003). There is a lack of consensus regarding the effects of most macro-factors and the mechanisms through which they manifest. For instance, some scholars argue that power-sharing institutions such as a proportional (instead of majoritarian) electoral system facilitate turnout (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Selb 2009), others contend that the same mechanism depresses turnout (Jackman 1987; St-Vincent 2013). Although previous chapters acknowledge generation (Chapters 3-5) and cultural (Chapter 4) groupings, this chapter uses CSES IMD to drill deeper into the variance in the dependent variables created by higher-level factors - particularly power-sharing/concentrating features, regime age and registration systems - across different countries. The results suggest that although macro institutional factors impact democratic citizenship, generational attributes drive most institutional explanations. This chapter highlights the need to address institutional barriers -which currently fail to cater for younger generations - in stimulating democratic engagement.

Chapter 9 goes a step further to demonstrate how youth disengagement problem may vary across countries due to dissimilar context. Following the international debate on youth disengagement in advanced democracies, this chapter investigates whether the Australian youth is also turning away from democracy in a country which strictly enforces compulsory voting. In doing so, it explores which of the three -age, period, and cohort- effects explain youth

disengagement, if any, from democratic principles and processes (both offline and online) in Australia. Defying international trends, the major finding is that young Australians are no different from older Australians or older generations in their commitment to both democratic principles and processes. Instead, period effects – that is, short-term political, economic, and social context –best explain the transient fluctuations in democratic attitudes and behaviours among Australians.

The final chapter concludes by briefly discussing the implications of the results on the future on democracy. My dissertation emphasises that before fixing the youth disengagement problem, we must understand its true nature, because a possible misreading of a politically marginalised group runs the risk of further disenchanting the future custodians of democracy. To this end, it conducts a thorough analysis across multiple advanced democracies, examining generational engagement while accounting for confounding time and context-specific effects. This thesis, therefore, makes both empirical and methodological contributions to the scholarly discussion of a topical concern during an era of democratic distress. As such, it has implications for how advanced democracies perceive and act to reverse youth disengagement in the future.

Chapter 1
Defining Democracy

"Democracy should be seen as an ideal and a process: democracy is an idea in action"
- Nguyen (2014, p. 11)

To investigate whether young people are distancing themselves from democracy, it is important to first elucidate what democracy means. Although scholars largely acknowledge that youth disengagement is a salient concern, there is an ongoing disagreement on the precise nature of the problem. This disagreement, seemingly, stems from the different perceptions of what young people are exactly turning away from. Democracy has often been understood in terms of the process of elections. And therefore, the debate on youth interaction with democracy has been mostly restricted to political participation, feeding into a popular belief that decline in electoral participation is a symptom of democratic deconsolidation. More recently, another scholarly camp contends that a move away from traditional democratic processes does not mean a rejection of the foundational values of democracy.[3]

To investigate whether young people are distancing themselves from democracy, it is important to first clarify what democracy means. Because conceptualising democracy is a major site of scholarly contention, in this chapter, I review the existing understandings of democracy to finally provide a working definition for my dissertation. I argue democracy comprises two core platforms with which its citizens can interact. First, it rests on basic foundational principles - acknowledged across all forms - that set it apart from non-democratic alternatives. Second, it is run by a set of processes or procedures to produce principle-driven outcomes of the system. In sum, I highlight both the key principles and processes of democracy before investigating whether young people are turning away from any or both in the following chapters.

1.1. What is Democracy?

Since the inception of the idea of democracy in the 5th century BC, the practice of democracy has evolved and diversified. Then, democracy took a direct, exclusive form where all adult males with Athenian ancestry formed the legislative assembly (Grinin 2004). Men had the right

[3] The main aim of this thesis is to enquire what democratic disconnect looks like. Since the debate about youth disengagement (Norris 2003; Spannring et al. 2008; Kestilä-Kekkonen 2009; Sloam 2016; Foa and Mounk 2016; 2017) features traditional forms of (electoral) participation, I use that as a class of dependent variable to show that such a disconnect does not happen concurrently with a rejection of democratic ideals. Meaning, young people's move away from electoral participation is not equal to a rejection of the foundational values of democracy.

to express and vote in the assembly, which decided on the laws of the city-states (ed. Rhodes 2004, p. 3-4). Democracy was based on the core belief that the rules and procedures, which were designed to safeguard human rights and civil liberties, reflected the citizens' will. Although this core principle of democracy remains unchanged today, the Athenian democratic process is alien to us today because, for example, it excluded a large proportion of the population - women, immigrants and slaves (Rhodes 2004, p. 3). Today, for example, the modern liberal democracy is far from the Athenian form emphasizing on the core themes of representation, free and fair elections, accountability and so on. This means the Athenian pilot project underwent historic evolution, branching into various forms of contemporary democracy where new democratic principles and procedures compounded the base idea of self-governance.

Given there are different ideals and processes of democracy, it is unsurprising that scholars rarely agree on their definitions of democracy. To understand the definitional complexity of this multidimensional concept, I compare it to the elephant in the parable *Blind Men and An Elephant*. The story depicts a group of blind men who have never come across an elephant before; and when they do, they conceptualise it by each touching a different part of the elephant. Because each man touches only a part of the elephant (like its belly or the trunk), their descriptions are limited and distinct. Democracy, like the elephant, is often conceptualised based on limited, subjective knowledge. That does not mean that other's limited, subjective definitions are not true (see, for example, Coppedge 2012). Like the blind men, we are blinded by our experiences, environment, culture and so on.

However, these subjective ideas often lead to varied conceptualisations, measurements and conclusions about democracy, even when we study the same cases, events and behaviours. This is evident in the debate about youth disengagement from democracy with scholars reaching dissimilar conclusions based on their understanding of what comprises democracy. Of course, there is no right or wrong way to define democracy. But there are many ways and thus, studies of democracy must precede with a clear definition before making claims. In this section, I explore existing definitions of democracy before identifying its core dimensions that are relevant to this thesis.

Let's start with the simplest definition: democracy is government by popular consent. Democratic theory claims that "democracy induces governments to be responsive to the preferences of the people" (Stokes 1999, p. 243; see also, Dahl 1971). Beyond this basic idea, there is a perennial debate among philosophers and political scientists about how democracy should be conducted. For example, the classical doctrine of democracy - whereby citizens exercise their common will to elect representatives and to realise the common good – narrowly focuses on elections. This is particularly true in a representative democracy where citizens are inherently free and transfer some of their rights to the government for the pursuit of a secure and stable life. Schumpeter's (1942, p. 250) modern doctrine of democracy is a similar

minimalist model: he asserts that the "democratic method" as an institutional arrangement of competitive election. Likewise, Dahl (1971; 1989) defines democracy as polyarchy where inclusive, free and fair elections appoint high officials. More recently, Przeworski and colleagues (2000, p. 5) take a similar procedural approach of defining democracy focusing on how democracy is done: "Democracy is a regime in which those who govern are selected through contested elections." Although the public periodically gets a chance to legitimise the government and hold them accountable, the decision-making is pretty much in the hands of the political elites and not of the people. The public has a very little participatory role with limited power.

Others fervently reject Schumpeter's leadership democracy. Mackie (2009), for example, reasons that although competitive election is a necessary condition of democracy, it is not sufficient. The electoral dimension is just one of the many important dimensions of democracy (Ringen 2007, p. 22). Elections have attained a high status in the democratic discourse because citizens have good reasons to trust those that they elected and remove them if needed. However, the election method is still just a method; there could be other methods that could produce the same results. The election definition suggests that one must look at the political machinery (and if there are elections) to decide if a polity is a democracy. In Switzerland, although there are elections, a supreme method of making decisions is via referenda: in a direct democracy, decisions are made democratically without elections. This is also practiced at a local level at New England in the US (Bryan 1999).

The election-focused definition of democracy is, at least theoretically, wrong; having elections do not necessarily mean that a given regime is a democracy, especially when it does not preserve the legitimacy and respect the fundamental characteristics or purposes of democracy (Diamond 2002). Some hybrid regimes have elections, but they are so volatile and turbulent that they seem to be a regime of their own type- for example, "dysfunctional democracies" in Latin America (Whitehead 2003). Although most above-mentioned definitions have an institutional focus (i.e., are process or means-focused), it is also fruitful to include what democracy is for (i.e., the end). The principle of self-government, Ringen (2007, p. 25) implies, should be a key definitional dimension. He suggests that democracy is "a structure of power" rather than just a "procedure or method". He adds, "a polity[4] is democratic if its citizens hold the ultimate control over collective decisions in a securely institutionalised manner". This is required to acquire citizens' trust on the decision-making which will act for their interests. Ringen's definition goes beyond electoral democracy; and it is a substantive approach of defining democracy, which centres on the results that the democratic process generates. It is a test of whether the system realises the desired principles of democracy.

[4] A polity is a community, of any size or kind, with collective decision-making (Ringen 2007).

Yet, Ringen's is a minimalist definition, which specifies only the minimum conditions-without any further particulars of the political regime- required for a polity to be considered a democratic regime. Of course, democracy is a multi-dimensional concept, and any one definition rarely covers all the possible dimensions. A thin concept of democracy encompasses a few facets and characteristics of democracy. A thin conceptual scheme to distinguish democratic and autocratic governments, based on elections and participation, may cover many cases but may omit principles such as the rule of law. However, "thin concepts are more theoretically adaptable" (Coppedge 2012, p. 22). That is, they allow themselves to be used more easily for a diverse range of theories.

But, in reality, democracy is a thick concept, meaning it has descriptive as well as evaluative characteristics (see, for example, van der Weele 2021). Acknowledging this, Held (1996) presents twelve possible typologies referring to seventy-two different democratic characteristics (e.g., regular election, free-market society, public debates, etc.). His model comprises two elements: the principles ("chief elements of a democratic form") and the processes ("underlying structure of relations") of democracy. Nguyen (2014) argues that the underlying structure consists of the conducive environment - economic, social and cultural - that support the construction of the democratic principles. In a similar vein, Keane's (2009, p. 865) definition of democracy-as the "self-government of equals"- implies these two core aspects of democracy. Nguyen (2014, p. 11) draws the two core aspects from Keane's definition as well, elucidating the following: first, democracy is a form of government (process); second, it is also a way of life which upholds the basic liberties of equal citizens (principle). He adds "democracy should be seen as an ideal and a process: democracy is an idea in action." Tying together both the institutional and individual dimensions, Diamond and Morlino (2004, p. 22) also assert that a good democracy constitutes legitimate, lawful and stable institutions (processes) which ensure that citizens are free, politically equal and have control over the law and the lawmakers (principles). Overall, "democracy can be seen as a set of practices and principles that institutionalise and thus ultimately protect freedom" (Kekic 2007).

For the purposes of research, here I consider all the above debates to reach an inclusive, working definition of democracy. My definition, like Schumpeter (1942), Przeworski et al. (2000) and Dahl's (1961), describes representative democracy. However, unlike them and similar to Ringen (2007), it goes beyond electoral democracy. I define democracy as a system of government where all eligible citizens have the perpetual power to determine the rules that affect their lives such that that their rights and liberties are provided and protected. Explicitly, the key components of this definition are: a) democracy describes a representative government, which in some ways has been put in place by the participation of eligible citizens in the democratic process; b) this participation need not be confined to elections and can include other forms such as referendum or deliberate discourse; c) everyone, excluding foreigners (without citizenship of a sovereign country) and children under voting age, is an eligible citizen; d) all eligible citizens have an equal, inherent power to influence the political

decision-making process; e) this power is perpetual in the sense that it will be periodically exercised to turn government over (in other words, no permanent government); f) the democratic system ensures the fundamental, political, social and economic rights and liberties of all eligible citizens. Although it is not a perfect definition that encompasses all possible dimensions of democracy, it is general enough to describe different forms of democracy and stringent enough to rule out those authoritarian regimes with a democratic facade.

Evident in this definition are core principles of democracy – the idea of self-governance, the belief of equality and the preservation of freedom and rights. These foundational ideals are similar across most democracies (Nguyen 2014). The means to the end of achieving a society which respects the core principles of democracy are the processes of democracy. How democracy is practiced can therefore be considered as the processes or procedures. These processes produce outcomes of the system, which directly or indirectly affects the citizens. The outcomes of the system, in turn, is judged and weighed against the values or principles of democracy. Hence, citizens can interact with democracy in both the principle and the process platforms.

1.2. The Principles of Democracy

Although the meanings of democracy are contested, it rests on certain key principles that are more or less acknowledged across all forms (Ferrin and Kriesi 2016). These principles or ideals form the basic foundation of any democracy. That is, the "core spirit remains constant" (Nguyen 2014, p. 11). For the current youth study, it is important to fully understand this crucial dimension of democracy as a rejection of key democratic values is truly a rejection of democracy. I broadly discuss some common principles of democracy which are inextricably tied to the democratic discourse:

Self-Governance

People's say in the government is a key feature of democracy, which makes it unique in comparison to other regime types. The UN Human Rights Commission's General Comment 25 for Article 25 of the International Covenant on the Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) recognises the right of citizens to take part in the public affairs and to freely choose their government (UNHRC 1996; Rich 2001). Self-governance hinges on the internationally recognised right to self-determination. This provides power to the individual to shape the decisions which bind her to the society. These overarching decisions or rules ensure cooperation such that life and everyday business operate normally. The binding decisions are needed because citizens are always in danger of decisions not being made, implemented or obeyed (Ringen 2007, p. 29). Absence of decisions render them vulnerable where liberties are not protected, and people become threats to each other. In short, self-governance is opposite to exploitative and oppressive governance.

Although it is desirable that people directly play a role in political decisions, it is almost unachievable in countries with a large population. As the population increases, it is important that the number of rulers diminish through the establishment of a representative process (Rousseau 1762 in *Du Contrat Social*). In theory, only a small country can come close to a direct democracy with a large number of magistrates. It is important to get citizens to indirectly participate; this is often done by citizens selecting delegates amongst themselves to bear the responsibility of making representative decisions (Locke 1689; Schumpeter 1942; Przeworski et al. 2000; Dahl 1961). These representatives are expected, as precisely as possible, to reflect the interests and deliver the opinions of those they represent. Representatives acting without the consent of the people violates the ideals of representation. To prevent representatives from misusing their powers and acting people against the common will and interest, democracies have punishments for non-compliance, and these keep the rulers accountable.

Equality

The Athenian democracy emerged as a political ideal that extended power across the noble to all (eligible) citizens. They were considered politically equal. Today, the equality principle of democracy is the idea that all individuals are not only politically, socially and economically equal but also equal before the law (rule of law) and in opportunity (minority rights).

Political equality entails equality in the democratic process, equality to be able run for office, and the equality of political influence. Notably, in electoral democracy, equality in the democratic process refers to equality at the ballot box, while voting entails the ability to cast a vote of equal weight according to will and at a place which is easily accessible. However, factors such as age, citizenship and the population of districts can create roadblocks to political equality. There may be other limitations in place as well- such as owning a specified amount of property, belonging to a certain religious group, race, gender and so on. There may also be informal racial, sexual or other types of discrimination in the electoral process. Some people may choose not to vote when such costs outweigh their motivation to vote. For example, first-time voters who are transitioning to adulthood may be disadvantaged by self-initiated enrolment systems, which put the onus of registration on the voter. Such systems present additional barriers to engagement during a transient life stage where young individuals are already undergoing a complex transitory phase.

Freedom, Liberty and Rights

Another common theme of modern liberal democracy is freedom - often used interchangeably with liberty and rights. A free life could possibly be an easy life because one can make decisions as they choose. John Stuart Mill's (cited in Ringen 2007, p. 6) very liberal definition of freedom explains it as the liberty to do as one wants without interference or coercion. Many theorists like John Locke (1689) posit that, irrespective of the government or society, every individual is

entitled to certain unalienable rights that can never be given up or taken away. The most basic right is the right to self-preservation which entails the necessary food, clothing and shelter required to live in each society. Protecting liberties remains a central part of the democratic theory and a primary duty of democratic political systems.

Basic liberties or freedoms in a democracy can be divided into seven areas: the right to vote or participate in the democratic process, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of movement and freedom from arbitrary treatment by the political and legal system. The right to partake in a political process empowers the citizens with the key ability to change the system. The vote, for example, can be defined as an ultimate check on government and a true guarantor of freedom. Freedom of speech is considered to have a special place in democracy- the right to vote means very little if it is impossible to hear opposing views and express one's opinions. That is, it relates to the right to vote as it includes the right to free information and the free expression of oral and written opinions. Expectedly, freedom of speech overlaps other rights such as the freedom of press and of assembly.

Freedom of speech almost essentially require the freedom to have an audience. Meeting to discuss political issues, make decisions and choose a candidate area all essential to a functioning democracy. In addition to providing freedom of speech, democracies are also expected to be tolerant towards all religions and provide freedom of assembly for citizens to worship together. Freedom of movement is less commonly included in the basic freedom list. International travel requires passports and visas in some cases, agencies and services increasingly require identification documents during registration. However, in a democracy travelling within borders do not require prior permission from the government. Freedom from arbitrary treatment ensure that individuals are fairly treated by the system. This encompasses right to fair trial, toleration (accepting another person to believe or do something one believes to be wrong) and the silence of the law and unenforceability.

Democracy aims to have built-in safeguards to ensure that individual rights are protected and no one's freedom is restricted. Of course, it is not possible to reach complete equality or complete freedom. More so, no one knows at what level these principles are fully satisfied. There is no such thing as complete freedom, for instance; some rights may conflict with other rights. Yet, a democratic society is expected to be fairly free rather than controlled. And, regardless of the institutions put in place to achieve all these principles of democracy, a collective, positive attitude towards these principles is an imperative for the health of a democracy (Griffith et al. 1956; Ebenstein and Fogelman 1980).

1.3. The Processes of Democracy

The institutions put in place to achieve the principles-based outcomes of democracy can be defined as the processes of democracy. Who makes the democratic decisions? How do they come to power? And how do they make these decisions? These are questions which elucidate the way democracy is practiced in a country. Today, as democracies face some serious threats – both external (Merkel and Lührmann 2021) and internal (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018)- it is more urgent than ever before to understand how democracy works and assess its performance against the outputs it is imputed to produce. More so, for the purposes of the current study, it is important to understand how the processes differ from the principles, to then assess how young people may be disengaging from democracy. Below I review some democratic processes in detail:

Structure of Government (Presidential vs Parliamentary)

In today's representative democracies, elected officials are given the political power that is not directly available to the constituents. Although this power can be removed through the electoral process, it is meanwhile held by a group of elites who directly participate in the decision-making process to the extent of the power vested in the office. These individuals may exercise leadership by informing the interests of the constituents or by working towards issues and particular positions that are significant to them (see Ludwig 2002). Concerned about the latter, James Madison (1787)- an important figure in framing the US Constitution-suggested the separation of powers among the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. This is done in one of two ways in modern democracies. Tsebelis (1995, p.325) precisely draws the distinction between the two types of government: "[in] parliamentary systems the executive (government) controls the agenda, and the legislature (parliament) accepts or rejects proposals, while in presidential systems the legislature makes the proposal and the executive (the president) signs or vetoes them". Parliamentary democracies are characterised by the fusion of executive and legislative powers whereas presidential systems are characterised by the separation of those power. Parliamentarism is based on a majoritarian imperative; the government must secure the confidence of the legislature and support of the majority to attain and maintain power. The head of the executive, i.e., the president, is directly elected by the mass people in presidential systems. The legislature is selected separately and as such two opposing parties can have control over separating branches of government. These basic procedural differences in these institutions lead to radically varied behaviours and outcomes in these two forms of government (Cheibub and Limongi 2002).

In terms of outcomes, parliamentary systems are usually deemed to produce more democratic outcomes. Linz (1978) first argued that parliamentary institutions are superior to presidential counterparts in terms of stability and performance. Instability of the presidential systems stems from the decentralisation of decision-making powers. Government in the parliamentary

regimes, by the virtue of fusion of powers, are more capable of governing with a majority support from the parliament. Highly disciplined parties, which is also a characteristic of parliamentarism, are more prone to cooperation and thus produce highly centralised decisions. Parties enforce discipline in the members of the parliament such that they support the government propositions and office-seeking members in turn have incentives to cooperate to remain in power as their government maintains majority. In contra, presidentialism generate presidents as the head of government who cannot always count on a majority of seats in the legislature. Congress comprises of individual legislatures who do not necessarily have an incentive to cooperate with one another, their parties or the executive (Cheibub and Limongi 2002, p.152). The weak political parties and stalemates between the President and the legislature inflicts instability in presidential systems. (Linz 1994; Valenzuela 1994, p. 136; Linz and Stepan 1996, p. 181; Huang 1997, pp. 138–139; Ackerman 2000, p. 645).

Not all scholars agree on the superiority of parliamentary systems. Although different constitutional principles form the foundations of these democratic regimes, the operations of these system cannot be entirely based on the mode of government formation. Cheibub and Limongi (2002, p. 153) assert that other provisions, constitutional and otherwise, can interact with the workings and counteract some tendencies that we commonly predict off these two democratic systems. There are many other factors such as coalition governments, non-office seeking party members, judicial powers, and so on, that can bend outcomes from the expected from these two types of governments. The main takeaway is that varying practices within a democratic regime can lead to varied outcomes for the citizens.

Electoral Processes

In representative democracies, choosing representatives is a central process in making democracy work. The electoral process—the time of election, provision of being re-elected, office tenure, percentage of vote required to win, number of election rounds and so on—has a significant effect on the outcome of the election and ultimately on the outcome of democracy. Across advanced democracies, political parties have a huge influence on the system. It is as such that citizens have to become active in or with the party to be able to influence the selection of candidates. Among many ways, conventionally citizens get involved by voting, donating money or campaigning for shortlisted candidates.

The number of candidates and the amount of information available about them are crucial factors, which can influence the average voter's vote. Suppose there are two candidates and their policies do not align with voter X. Say, both engage in dirty campaign. X might decide to not vote for either; this is hardly surprising. However, by not voting the voter gives the decision-making power to others. It is easy to suppose that ones who do not vote do not care but it might as well be the case that they do not prefer either of the two candidates. In this case, having more than one candidate can be advantageous. This scenario shows how structure of

the electoral process and the information available can affect how citizens participate and interact with the democratic system.

The way candidates assume office is another important aspect of the democratic process. In some countries, candidate with the most votes win. 50%+1 becomes complicated when there are more than 2 sides. With more candidates, it is difficult to ascertain a majority. To avoid this problem, governments have resorted to proportional representation (PR) where individuals or parties are allocated seats in the legislature based on the proportion of votes acquired. These variations in electoral mechanisms have direct effects on representation - on who is represented and who is not.

Political Parties

Political parties take an organisational role in aggregating voters' preferences and inducing responsiveness in democracies. Political parties are promoters of the public good- an essential link between the citizen preferences and government policies. Parties ensure the stability of legislative politics (Aldrich 1995; Stokes 1999), allow representation of the minority (as parties can emerge from social cleavages, see Kalyvas 1996), reduce the problem of multidimensional issue space (Cox 1990; Hinich and Munger 1994) and present voters with an object to hold to account (Stokes 1999).

Modern day democracy is unthinkable without political parties (Schattschneider 1942). Yet, the institutionalisation and structures of parties vary considerably across continents and nations. Broadly speaking, political parties can be conceptualised in two dimensions- the internal structure of the party (unified/divided) and the objective of the party (winning office/pursuing policies) (Stokes 1999, p. 251). Further, various models differ in who controls the party platform, the power of activists in moderating effects of public opinion on parties, the mechanism of control over the incumbent and so on (for more on these models see Stokes 1999, p. 259). Consequently, many theories have explained how variations in political party structures and objectives can affect government responsiveness, ultimately influencing how citizens interact with the political outcomes.

Regardless of the party structure, in democratic governance, political parties aim to establish linkage between society and politics (Celis et al. 2016). They are intermediary actors channelling citizens demands to their political representatives: they afford citizens some degree of choice and control over political elites, just as they foster accountability through elections. Political parties are a key linkage institution – along with interest groups, elections and media. - allowing individuals to communicate their preferences to policy makers, providing them with opportunities for participation and influencing how they relate to the government (Webb 2009).

Recently, however, there has been concerns about political parties failing to perform their democratic functions. This relates to the notion of a crisis in representative democracy (Przeworski et al., 1999): that is, there is a distortion in the 'substantive linkage' between what representatives do in the name of the people, and the extent to which it reflects their interests (Celis et al. 2016). Critics present widespread disconnect, alienation and apathy among citizens, especially among younger generations (CIRCLE 2018) and across multiple democracies, as evidence for the claim (Webb 2009). Political parties continue to attract many expressions of dissent and disapproval, criticised for offering weaker participatory linkage. Given the focus of younger people in the thesis, the weakening linkage between the youth and an imperative institution of democracy is an important issue to consider. Over time and across cohorts, parties may have become less relevant in providing political cues to better-educated citizens. This widening gap with the electorate, in turn, may have reduced their representative roles on the ground.

Cross-national evidence from established and new democracies, however, shows that political parties still dominate the electoral process in shaping the discourse of campaigns and the selection of candidates, and by mobilizing citizens to vote (Dalton et al. 2011). Moreover, parties link citizens preferences to the choice of representatives, with striking congruence with voter and parties left/right positions (a la Powell, 2004). The key point being critics have overlooked parties' ability to adapt to changing conditions to continue performing their linkage functions. Dalton et al. (2011) writes, "As the context of politics and societies have changed, so too have political parties." That is, parties evolve over time as a form of linkage between governments and its citizens. Their role as intermediaries between the two units can change.

Individual parties have extraordinary capacities for adaption and flexibility, to continue to reflect the nature of the system and its systemic changes (Merkl 2005, p. 4). These linkages are intertwined with the prevailing social structures in a polity. Lawson (1980, p. 8) theorises that the linkage type depends on which side instigated the linkage and between what units. Linkage can be directive or authoritarian (where governors desire to mobilise political support to shore up their own legitimacy) or could be participatory (characterising protest movements or bottom-up explosive demands for responsive actions from the government). There are two types of party networks that facilitate these linkage processes – environmental relations of parties with others in the social environment and internal relations within parties among its network elements (Schwartz 2005). From a different perspective, Celis et al. (2016) highlights that party linkages can be based on traditional cleavages (for blue-collar workers and employers) or on identity (for highly politicised groups such as women, young people and the elderly). All in all, these various linkages underscore how parties have adapted to cater to societal makeup.

1.4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I review the various understandings of the multidimensional concept 'democracy' to ultimately reach a working definition for the purposes of my thesis. Hereafter, I refer to democracy as a system of government where eligible citizens have the power to influence the rules that affect their lives in order to ensure that their rights and liberties are provided and protected. In this chapter, I unpack this definition to argue that citizens can interact with this system of government in two platforms- the principles and the processes of democracy. The foundational ideals or principles- broadly, self-governance, equality and freedom/rights- form the essence of the democratic regime type, setting it apart from other non-democratic systems. The institutions put in place to achieve the principle-based outcomes of democracy can be defined as the processes of democracy. In short, these procedures describe how democracy is done in a country or polity. These processes include the electoral processes, the structure of the government as a decision-making unit and so on.

The division between the ideals and functioning of democracy can be applied to the topic of young people to understand the exact nature of their interaction with this system of government. Are young people turning away from the basic tenets of democracy? Or the traditional processes of democracy? Or are they dissatisfied with the workings of their government or political parties? Young people's attitude towards the democratic principles is an important aspect to consider before arguing that, say, decline in electoral turnout is a threat to democracy. If the youth is turning away from such basic principles, then only are they truly turning away from the democratic system.

After defining democracy based on its two key dimensions here, in the following chapter, I explore the concepts which represent citizens' interaction with both the principles and processes of democracy. The premise of the next chapter is that citizens may interact incongruently across the two dimensions- and the aim is to present a mind map of how citizens attitudes towards democratic principles and behaviours with democratic processes can vary. This discussion is expected to lead to the dependent variables of the study.

Chapter 2
Citizens' Interactions with Democratic Principles and Processes

"…in many of the oldest and most stable democratic countries, citizens possess little confidence in some key democratic institutions. Yet most citizens continue to believe in the desirability of democracy"
- Dahl (2000b, p. 35)

This chapter explores citizens' perceptions of and actions within a democracy. The division between the ideals and the functioning of democracy is crucial to understand public opinion. Before addressing a central question of this thesis – which dimension of democracy, if any, are young people turning away from? - it is important to understand citizen interactions with their political system. In other words, it is crucial to understand how citizens view democratic principles and how they engage with democratic processes. This will allow a more nuanced analysis of the youth disengagement problem.

International evidence suggests that there is no lack of democratic citizens who endorse democratic principles but may have little regard for the democratic institutions (Welzel 2013; Ferrín and Kriesi 2016). Dahl (2000b, p. 35) accurately describes this as the "democratic paradox" in advanced societies: "in many of the oldest and most stable democratic countries, citizens possess little confidence in some key democratic institutions. Yet most citizens continue to believe in the desirability of democracy". This means that citizens see democracy in two ways: first, "as an ideal to be attained" which characterises a highly desirable goal used to judge political systems; and, second, "as a set of actual practices and institutions" to achieve that goal (ibid, p.37). This highlights a very important point: despite being dissatisfied, when citizens still value democracy, they are not rejecting the system of government. This might apply to young citizens as well: that is, those turning away from the ballot box may still endorse the rights and opportunities provided by the democratic system but disapprove of the performance of the government and institutions.

This chapter explores the various concepts (conceptions, evaluations, and engagements) relating to how citizens interact with the principle and process dimensions of democracy. Thereby it derives and defines the key outcome variables that can be used to represent the base concepts of this thesis. It is structured as follows: first, it presents a theoretical model of citizens interaction with democracy; second, it further discusses the two classes of attitudes towards democracy – normative conceptions of the principles and assessments of the realisation of those principles; next, it outlines the behavioural implications of these attitudes

in the process dimension. The second and the third section also elaborates the attitudinal and behavioural measures used to describe how citizens view and act within a democracy.

2.1. Concept Map of Citizens' Interactions with Democracy

Existing literature conceptualises citizens' interactions with their system in multiple ways. Some scholars communicate them as feelings about the procedures within a democratic system, while others see these as engagements with the various processes within the system (Ferrín and Kriesi 2016). Some consider these as support for the normative ideals of democracy or for the features which set democracies apart from autocracies (Figueiras et al. 2014). Whereas others categorise these as judgements or evaluations of the outputs generated by the system (van Ham and Thomasson 2012).



Figure 2.1 Concept map of citizen interactions with democracy

I present a concept map in Figure 2.1 to summarise citizens' interactions with the principles and processes of democracy. I classify these interactions into the following two: a) citizens' attitudes towards the democratic ideals and the realisation of these ideals; and, b) their behaviours involving the democratic institutions. Attitudes can be towards two types of political objects. First, democratic ideals comprise the type of political objects which are the fundamental features or principles of the democratic system, in contrast to other systems of government. These foundational values are (more or less) universal across democracies and citizens' attitudes towards these are termed as normative conceptions. Second, the realisation of these principles, however, are objects which vary across democracies. If the political system

does not produce an output (a political object) which is expected from the system, then citizens' attitudes towards that performance may invoke negative evaluations.

Citizens' behaviours are interactions with a different type of political object, namely democratic practices, or the ways in which democratic institutions are run. These processes determine the performance or output of the system, generating evaluations which influence actions (behaviours and engagements). Democratic institutions are political objects which vary greatly across democracies; this is because each institution (e.g., elections) has several ways of being run (e.g., direct voting to make laws or representative elections to elect political elites to make laws). In short, institutions are responsible for creating principle-based outcomes and a discrepancy between the expected and the reality shapes attitudes, which in turn shape behaviours.

2.2. Democratic Attitudes

The attitudinal dependent variables can be grouped into two categories: the views or conceptions of democracy "which refer to the citizens' normative ideal of democracy, their ideas about what democracy should be" and the evaluations of democracy which "refer to the citizens' assessment of the way the democratic principles have been implemented in their own country…" (Ferrín and Kriesi 2016, p. 10). In theory, citizens' attitudes towards democracy are their interactions with the principles dimension- be it conceptions of the principles or assessments of the realisation of those principles.

This distinction in attitudes has two implications. First, the comparison between the ideals and the workings of democracy shapes judgement about the regime legitimacy (van Ham and Thomasson 2012, p. 9). To Max Weber (1972, p. 124), legitimacy is the willingness of the people to follow the rules resting on a "legitimacy belief" (Legitimitätsglaube) (cited in Weßels 2016, p. 236). If norms and realities match, then the regime is considered legitimate and worth following. If they do not match, then there will be a legitimacy or democratic deficit (Norris 2011). Ferrín and Kriesi (2016) insist that legitimacy is a sum of the two concepts -views (normative yardsticks against which reality is evaluated) and evaluations (assessment of how democracy works)- of democracy. However, if citizens are simply wary of the functioning of their democracies, then these scholars are in fact mistaking government legitimacy for regime legitimacy. This simply means that democracy, as a regime type, remains the first preference, even for citizens who are dissatisfied with the incumbent (Easton et al. 1995; Welzel 2013).

Existing literature uses multiple measures to represent attitudinal concepts, including, but not limited to, political support, trust/confidence, efficacy, and satisfaction. Oftentimes these terms are used interchangeably while other times they are presented distinctly. It is important to understand when and how each of these terms are used and when they crossover. Given

the two categories of attitude, below, I explore these terms in detail as I group them as conceptual or evaluative measures.

The first measure on focus is political support. Political support "refers to the way in which a person evaluatively orients himself to [a political] object through either his attitudes or his behaviour" (Easton 1975, p. 436). According to this definition, support can be both attitudinal and behavioural; one can have feelings which support an aspect of democracy or can act in support of another. The democratic dimension this taps into depends on the political object that one aligns themselves with. For example, an individual may endorse the democratic principle of equality (equal rights for all citizens), including aboriginals, while she may behaviorally act in support of the principle by voting in favour of extending equal rights to indigenous people in a referendum. Following Easton's pioneering work on political support, many scholars have presented their ideas on political support in a variety of ways (Norris 1999a; 2011; Dalton 1999; 2004; Booth and Seligson 2009; Campbell 2011). Figueiras et al. (2014), for example, categorise support as an attitudinal measure with two orientations. The more axiological and normative orientation encompasses the adherence to democratic values whereas a more pragmatic orientation comprises evaluations of democratic institutions. Following this, I classify political support as an attitudinal measure of democracy.

The literature review reveals two issues about political support. First, the object of support (incumbent government, regime, political community) and the type of support (diffuse/direct) are not always clear. Easton (1975, p. 445) says that "whereas specific support is extended only to the incumbent authorities, diffuse support is directed towards offices themselves as well as towards their individual occupants. More than that, diffuse support is support that underlies the regime as a whole and the political community." However, others point out that every political object can garner both types of support (Dalton 2004; Montero and Torcal 2006).

The second issue relates to the confusion around how different types of support and attitudes towards democracy relate to each other. When a person professes support for democracy as an ideal, it does not necessarily mean that they support the specific democratic government in their democracy (Inglehart 2003; Canache 2006). Given the lack of consensus on what the concept means, the operationalisation of political support has been difficult (Canache et al. 2001). Moreover, contextual factors greatly shape one's support for democracy (Canache 2012a, 2012b; Carlin and Singer 2011; Chu et al.2008; Diamond and Plattner 2008; Moreno and Welzel 2011; Schedler and Sarsfield 2007; Shin et al. 2007). Depending on context and experience, it might well be that citizens have several theoretical models of democracy in mind when thinking about political support.

A brief discussion about supporters is warranted here. Supporters can be of two types depending on their demands, i.e., the number of components they think constitute liberal democracy. The 'minimalist' citizen requires only a basic number of elements whereas a

'maximalist' requires a lot more components of the basic model (Kriesi et al. 2016, p. 65). In a European study, Hernández (2016, p. 53) find that Europeans seem to share a common understanding of democracy where two elements- free and fair elections and the rule of law- are regarded as the most important in both absolute and relative terms. In other words, they are cornerstone of liberal democracy, widely diffused as universal across European nations. This finding is consistent with Fuchs' (1999, p. 125) indispensable components- or what I call the principles- of the normative models of democracy. All features of democracy form a hierarchical structure in a citizen's brain. An individual who requires a more demanding feature of democracy such as media freedom also demand essential features like the rule of law, and not the other way around (Kriesi et al. 2016, p. 68). All things considered, to better understand the concept of political support, it is important to ask about the object of support, the type of support and the type of supporter.

Another commonly used attitudinal concept is political trust. Although support can be both a conceptual or an evaluative measure, political trust or confidence is oftentimes an evaluative measure for assessing democratic institutions and governments. Political trust "refers to government action perceived as being more in the public interest than as a product of popular demand" (Craig 1979, p. 229). The more trusting citizens become, the less they will demand off democracy because of the belief that institutions will do their jobs duly. As such they are less likely to make social justice demands. Then, there is no need for governments to justify their stance to voters and for citizens to deliberate prior to voting. But such trusting citizens happen to live in countries where social justice problems are addressed and thus citizens do not feel that any social justice component is ever missing in their democracies. Ceka and Magalhães (2016, p. 98) urge caution in interpreting whether trust is a cause or consequence of a democratic society.

There is, however, widespread consensus that trust in political institutions is important for political legitimacy in any given polity (Markowski 2016). This means that trusting citizens are more likely to endorse their political system and genuinely believe that the system is taking care of their needs. Context, however, modifies this relationship. In affluent and egalitarian societies, the relationship is weaker and confidence in institutions matter less for legitimacy. However, in impoverished countries and in unequal societies, this impact of political trust is pronounced on legitimacy.

Moving on to the concept of political efficacy, a noteworthy theoretical contribution comes from Easton and Dennis' work (1967, p. 26). This seminal piece focuses on the normative dimension of political efficacy. That is, citizens should feel that they are able to ensue effective political action and that decision makers should be sensitive to their demands. This highlights that there are two points to consider: the feelings of the ruled and the responsiveness of the ruler. Similarly, some earlier works divide political efficacy into two components: internal efficacy characterises a personal dimension of beliefs about one's political competency,

"regardless of political circumstances" (Balch 1974, p. 24; Converse 1972; Craig 1979); and, external efficacy refers to the individual's perception of the system's potential "responsiveness to popular demand" (Pollock 1983, p. 403). Internal efficacy is different from one's evaluation of the political system and is rather one's perception of her political competence.

Prior to the emergence of the normative dimension, scholars in the 1950s and 1960s displayed excessive curiosity with the psychological dimension of political efficacy (Pateman 1971). Although earlier works suggest that political efficacy amongst individuals stem from political self-esteem (which can be traced back to the childhood), Pateman (1971) disagrees. She believes political efficacy is rather a multidimensional concept with a cognitive as well as a psychological dimension (see also, Easton and Dennis 1967). Absence of external efficacy, or the feeling that the system is responsive, is a consequence of experiences with and the operations of the political structure. This relates to more cognitive than psychological factors. In this regard, opting out of the political process may also be a logical response to a structural stimulus (Pateman 1971, p. 298).

Culture also conditions a person's political efficacy. Post-materialisation theory explains both the absolute and relative values of the two components of efficacy in a country's youth (Inglehart and Baker 2000). In post-industrial societies, there has been a cultural value shift driven by social change, especially in the younger generations. In line with economic and social evolution, post-materialistic, emancipatory values and self-expressive activities are given more weight than economic aspects, conformist values (e.g., familism and patriotism) and civic organisations. Modernisation, which arises from education, may coexist with high internal efficacy. It also encourages critical attitudes towards established institutions and traditional processes: this would perhaps cause lower external efficacy in modern societies than culturally less-modernised ones. The discussion on political efficacy suggests that internal and external efficacies can be both conceptual and evaluative measures. These measures may also be interlinked as one's conception of efficacy may influence their evaluation or vice versa.

One last attitudinal concept that is worthy of discussion due to its immense popularity is satisfaction with democracy (SWD). SWD is a notoriously contested concept hidden under the euphemism of being 'challenging'. Grouping it as a conceptual or evaluative measure is a task riddled with unsettling debates. This is simply because dissatisfaction could be a symptom of anything- "a lack of freedom, the poor functioning of the rule of law, the lack of regulations to control the representatives, or any other aspect" (Gómez and Palacios 2016, p. 158). Which democratic standard are scholars measuring when they are assessing the level of SWD? The theoretical status of SWD as a measure for generalised support for the political system is uncontroversial. Some, however, argue, it measures specific support (Schmitt 1983, p. 365; Merkl 1988, p. 23) while others suggest that it captures diffuse support (Weil 1989, p. 690; Widmaier 1990, p. 23).

Given this ambiguity around SWD, some studies radically question the basis of the concept. Canache et al's (2001, p. 511) work, for example, stands as a warning for political scientists. According to them, the two drawbacks of the measure are: a) citizens within and across countries and time dissimilarly understand the concept of satisfaction; and, SWD could measure different political objects ranging from support for incumbent government (Dalton 1999) to support for political institutions (Fuchs 1999; Klingemann 1999) to summary measure of approval of the existing democratic system (Clarke et al. 1993). Consequently, SWD lacks both construct validity (i.e., we do not know what it measures) and measurement validity (because it could measure more than one aspect) (Canache et al. 2001, p. 525-6; Anderson 2002).

Moreover, the object of evaluation varies considerably within (Haerpfer 2007) and across countries (Klingemann 1999; Norris 2011, p. 77-9). In terms of support for political regime, SWD has been used to measure various, dissimilar political objects (Ferrín 2016, p. 285-6): satisfaction with how the democratic processes work in practice (Dahlberg and Holmberg 2012); evaluation of the performance of the institutions (Bernauer and Vatter 2012); approval of the democratic process (Singh et al. 2011); support for the overall regime (Finkel et al. 2001; Hofferbert and Anderson 2001; Hofferbert and Klingemann 2001; Norris 2011); evaluations of the performance of the system (Anderson and Tverdova 2001); satisfaction with regime performance (Lühiste 2013); generalised support for the democratic system (Fuchs et al. 1995; Erlingsson et al. 2014); and, finally, a summary indicator of people's overall judgments about the way democracy functions in their country (Clarke et al. 1993; Kornberg and Clarke 1994; Wagner et al. 2009; Campbell 2013). Yet, at face value, SWD mostly appears to be an evaluative measure of attitudes towards democratic outputs.

Although, SWD has been the dominant measure for citizens' support for the performance of the regime (Norris 2011, p. 28), there remains another question to consider: what does SWD evaluate? Torcal and Trechsel's (2016, p. 209-10) comprehensive study presents three categories of explanations for Europeans' evaluation of democracy: attitudes towards the input side of the political system, attitudes towards the output of the political system, and attitudes based on the respondent's socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics. A similar study by Dahlberg et al's (2013) of dissatisfied democrats show that overall satisfaction depends on evaluation of government performance. This means that the output side of policymaking may be more important than the input side of democratic politics. SWD can also be dependent on respondent's conceptions of democracy (Fuchs and Roller 2006; Ferrín 2016): SWD is lower among those with broad conceptions than those with restricted conceptions. That means, from a comparative lens, SWD is overestimated in countries with predominantly non-demanding citizens and underestimated otherwise. As Canache et al. (2001) critiques, the validity of the measure is compromised when satisfaction differs with conception.

The discussion on attitudinal concepts- of both normative and evaluative categories – show how citizens interact with the principles of democracy. This can present as normative conception of ideals of the democratic system (political support, trust and efficacy) or evaluations of principle-based outcomes within a system (e.g., SWD). Of course, the categorisation of these attitudinal concepts in either of the two normative or evaluative categories is arguable; but, the main aim is to distinguish attitudinal concepts (which pertain to the principles dimension) from behavioural concepts (which pertain to the processes dimension) of democracy.

2.3. Democratic Behaviours

I now turn to behavioural concepts that represent procedural engagement with democracy. Political participation first comes to mind when thinking about engagement with the processes of democracy. Verba et al (1995, p. 38) define participation as "an activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action- either directly by effecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies". Once limited to voting, participation takes many forms in today's world. Over time, high initiative conventional activities like direct contacts to public official to elite-challenging actives such as demonstrations and signing petitions were added to the political repertoire of democratic citizens. Despite having a long history of spurring social conflict, activities such as boycotts, strikes and consumer actions, are now viewed as parts of citizens repertoire of political action (van Deth 2001; Norris 2002).

A historic focus on voting in the democratic participation literature argues that it as the most important, if not the most effective, form of participation (Schumpeter 1942; Przeworski et al. 2000). But, objectively speaking, effectiveness depends on the characteristics of the voting system which may produce varied outcomes of the process. What complicates things is that the same acts may have different connotations in different contexts (Verba 1967, p. 58). Further, these outcomes may have varying success levels: when participatory acts have no measurable effects on those with decisional powers, they are classified as unsuccessful acts. Between successful and unsuccessful acts are those interim acts that have some effect; the decision may be altered, delayed, reconsidered, debated and kept in mind during future policy-making. The level of the individual's contribution or effects in the decision-making process is sometimes measurable (letter writing) and sometimes it gets lost in the collective (voting, demonstrations).

Another way of categorising the various modes of participation is through their ability to communicate citizens' will to the decision maker. The vote, for example in its aggregate form, is powerful but blunt; that is, it provides very little information and does not directly guide the behaviour of the elected. Of course, one would not have the chance to make decisions if they were not elected in the first place. For the individual, the vote is weak as she cannot

disaggregate the effectiveness of her vote in terms of the extent to which she moved the decision makers to align with her preferences (Verba 1967, p. 73). In contra, participation in activities that do not aim to achieve a policy but rather bring benefits to a certain group or individual may not be as powerful in the aggregate sense. Yet, it is powerful for the group or individual in terms of conveying a specific message. And this is why parties with permanent minority positions stick around in the political sphere despite their inability to derive power from elections (Rokkan 1966).

It is impossible to keep political parties out of a discussion about political participation in advanced democracies. Partisan attachment is an important tool for the average citizen- it acts as a "valuable guidepost" for understanding the intricacies of politics. It provides low-cost cues to the unsophisticated individual (Converse 1975, p. 111-34). Beyond this cue-giving function, which simplifies the act of voting, partisanship also provides a reference-group function for evaluating political issues and actors (Miller 1976; Baker et al. 1981, pp. 212-21). This is because everyday political positions, actions and behaviours are presented in partisan terms. Additionally, partisanship also has a mobilizing function, which draws party affiliates into the political process (King 1969, pp. 123-28; Converse and Dupeux 1962; Verba et al 1978, ch. 6). Given these functions, party identification has been associated with plethora of participatory acts, including voting behaviour, interest in politics, engagement in political campaigns and similar.

Despite these functional values, there is an overabundance of evidence that suggests that the importance of political parties for guiding voting behaviour, evaluating political issues and mobilising voters is in the decline (Dalton 1984, p. 265). Although many still rely on decisional cues from partisan ties, the need for such ties decline as the voter acquires political skills, which decrease the cost of information (Shively 1979). This can be attributed to the dramatic increase in education in advanced democracies, which is bringing about a qualitative change in these societies (Inglehart, 1977, chs. 11-12; Dalton 1984). Mass media also reduces information cost substantially. Because of these resources, voters do not need to rely on party cues to deal with the complexities of politics and derive their political decisions.

Contemporary electorates, by the virtue of expanding political skills and resources, are turning to unconventional avenues of participation, such as signing petitions, protesting, engaging in internet activism, and engaging with local communities or local agencies for local issues. Recent years has shown how the internet can be used for and how social networks lead to participation. The pollical arena now has new types of political campaigning and organisation which facilitate innovative digital tools. There has been a boom in the number political organisations which primarily exist online. Recently, online donations and fundraising has become a cornerstone of contemporary campaigning, displaying a necessary use of sophisticated technology and databases for accurate tracking and data targeting (Vromen et al. 2018).

This shift to the online platform is particularly salient when talking about youth participation. From 2013 to 2015 a comparative project called The Civic Network sought to understand how the internet and social media were transforming youth engagement in Australia, the USA and the UK (Vromen et al. 2018). The study shows that in all three advanced democracies that young people are no longer mainly engaged in the offline for most of the conventional, electoral, participatory activities - such as contacting leaders and trying to influence how others might vote. The same project analysed how young people in the three countries were using Facebook and Twitter for political engagement at the time. Among respondents aged 16 to 29, over 90 per cent used Facebook for several political activities such as following links to news or reposting political information posted by others into their newsfeed. Up to 40 per cent were doing symbolic work of liking and sharing the political views and posts of others on Facebook. While a third also posted comments on politics or social issues. Such symbolic acts communicate young people's identity and world views within the semi-public networks of extended friends and family, suggesting that it has become a normalised space for everyday discussion and debate for politically engaged young people (Rainie and Wellman 2012; Loader et al. 2014).

In sum, there are many forms of democratic participation, including those that were previously considered undemocratic, such as attending a demonstration or protesting for social issues that divide the society. Measuring participation levels are somewhat easier than capturing attitudinal values which reside on people's minds. In the next chapter, I consider the various challenges researchers face while using some indicators for participation over others. Although there are large amounts of data on voting and its correlates (Scammon 1967), there are data availability issues for participation which occurs in multiple levels of the government (e.g., local and state) and new forms of dynamic and amorphous, unconventional forms of participation.[5]

Having discussed citizens views of democracy (attitudes) and their actions within a democracy (behaviours), it is worth noting how these concepts may interact with each other (Figure 2.1). Here, I would like to highlight the behavioural consequences of inconsistent combinations of attitudes (similar to Dahl 2000b's "democratic paradox"). An individual's attitude towards the principles of democracy (conceptions of ideals) and outcomes of democracy (evaluations of performance) determines her behavioural interaction, or participation, with democratic processes or institutions. A classic example is the engagement with democratic elections: consider an individual who harbors a normative conception about free and fair elections, and thus the mechanism of representation, as an essential feature of liberal democracy. However, she does not feel represented by the way this feature is implemented in her country. This is because she aligns with a minor party which never gets a seat in the legislature. Her country employs disproportional representation instead of a PR electoral system, and here, it is harder

[5] A focus on electoral participation, in light of the extant literature, does not mean that the dissertation does not acknowledge youth affinity towards other forms of political participatory avenues.

for minor parties to translate votes into seats in the legislature. Despite her conceptualisation of the principle of representation, she develops a perception or assessment that her vote has no impact on the election results. An institutional design feature diminishes her external political efficacy and satisfaction with democracy, which in turn affects her political behaviour. She does not cast a ballot.

This example highlights that the decision to engage- for instance, to vote or not vote, to protest or not protest- is contingent upon a multitude of attitudinal factors. Taken together, the levels of these predictor variables determine the type of participation (conventional/non-conventional) (Aberbach 1969; Miller and Miller 1975; Pollock 1983). In chapter 1, I introduced the various forms of democratic participation. To reiterate, democratic participation comprises the various acts or processes by which citizens who are not empowered to make decisions influence the behaviours of those with decisional powers (Verba 1967). Participatory acts can go beyond voting. Today, there are different modes of participation that can occur in various levels of the government. Engagement has become postmodern, meaning more diverse and unconventional, these days (Amnå et al. 2004). But why would individuals prefer one form of engagement over the others?

The answer may lie in citizens' attitudes. Gamson's (1968) "mistrust-sense of political efficacy" hypothesis deserves an explicit mention here. Gamson's formula links cynical combination of attitudes to both conventional and unconventional activism. In support of this hypothesis Pollock 1983 (p. 400) suggests that high efficacy, but low trust rejects allegiant forms of participation, such as voting. Craig 1980 (p. 198) finds similar; a combination of low external efficacy (cynical assessment of the responsiveness of the system) and high internal efficacy (high personal political competence), may foster elite-challenging behaviour or unconventional, non-conformist modes of participation (e.g., protests, boycotts). Individuals with efficacious and mistrusting attitudes also participate in high initiative conventional forms of participation (e.g., communal and campaign activities, contacting authorities), as opposed to low initiative ones (e.g., voting) (Pollock 1983; see also Shingles 1981). In this regard, although the original hypothesis is Gamson's (1968), he fails to acknowledge the variety in conventional behaviours and narrowly focuses on allegiant vs non-allegiant forms of participation.

Predictably, those who harbor feelings of low self-competence (low IPE) and also regard the political system as unresponsive (low EPE) withdraw from political processes. Those with high values for both the variates are virtually "complete participators" in conventional politics (Pollock 1983, p. 404). Those with low IPE but nonetheless believe that the pollical system is responsive express their allegiance to traditional, symbolic participation like voting (Milbrath and Goel 1977, p. 69-70; Pollock 1983, p. 405; also consider Dalton's (1984) ritual partisans who score less in the cognitive dimension). On the other hand, high IPE-low EPE combination optimises the potential for non-conformist participation.

Among individuals with lower education levels, the IPE/EPE combination plays a more discriminatory role in determining participation. They are more likely to harbor allegiant beliefs than the more educated (Pollock 1983, p.406). Further, unlike their educated counterparts, they only approve of protests when high IPE is combined with low EPE. Those with higher education levels are more prone to both forms of participation, despite their beliefs (Pollock 1983, p.405). For these people who are already motivated to participate by the virtue of their education, external efficacy has a less mobilising effect than those individuals with less prior motivation (Shingles 1981, p.79-80). Hence, education appears to be a moderating variable: for less educated individuals, the combination of beliefs leads to distinct activities.

As discussed above, the discrepancy between expectations and the outcomes of democracy has participatory consequences. This is good news for researchers who worry about the crisis of democracy. Citizens may negatively assess the outputs of their democratic systems but that does not necessarily make them non-democratic citizens who have turned their backs on democratic principles. For example, it has been well known since the 1980s that political trust is declining (Pollock 1983, p.400). But even today, there remains a question of whether this equates a fundamental rejection of democratic principles or a less durable disapproval of government elites and policies (Abramson and Finifter 1981; Ferrin and Kriesi 2016). Cynical perceptions of the political system do not necessarily equate to an increased potential for extremist, authoritarian behaviours (Pollock 1983, p. 406). However, it may highlight a changed preference for participation. As Dalton (2008, p.78) contends, "changing norms reinforce a new style of political action". All in all, the principle-process dichotomy, the attitude-behaviour distinction is crucial for assessing whether and how young people are rejecting democracy.

2.4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I present a conceptual map to describe citizens' interactions with democracy, which is crucial to nominate the dependent variables of this study. Exploring the existing literature on citizens' perceptions of and actions within a democracy, I draw the attitude-behaviour distinction with respect to the principle-process dichotomy. Citizens' principle-based attitudes towards democracy can be one of two types: normative conceptualisations of the core principles and evaluations of the realisation of those principles (or principle-based outcomes). Citizens' attitudes have behavioural consequences. Particularly, a discrepancy between 'what democracy should be' and 'what democracy is' affects citizen participation. This is important when discussing young people because changes in participation may be triggered by poor institutional performance, for example, but may not necessarily mean that young people are rejecting core democratic ideals.

In other words, the distinction between conceptions, evaluations and engagement is crucial to assess the dimension of democracy, if any, that young people are turning away from. The

division between the ideals and functioning of democracy, which I establish as the principles and processes dimensions, is crucial to answer the central question of this thesis: which dimension of democracy, if any, are young people turning away from? As discussed earlier, the real threat to democracy is when young citizens, or any citizen as a matter of fact, reject the core principles of democracy. In other words, a crisis of democracy is when citizens actively stand against the core principles that set the democratic regimes apart from its alternatives. Dissatisfaction with political institutions, leaders and policy outputs are not anti-democratic behaviours. Despite being dissatisfied, when citizens still value democracy, they are not rejecting the system of government. This might apply to young citizens as well: that is, those turning away from the ballot box may still endorse the rights and opportunities provided by the democratic system but disapprove the performance of the government and institutions.

After discussing the concepts that will serve as key dependent variables for this dissertation, it is now time to turn to the existing literature to explore factors which explain why young people may be interacting differently with democracy. First, who are the young people? How do we define 'youth'? Second, are young people actually turning away from democracy? If so, which dimension of democracy- principles or processes – are they turning away from? Last, which factors drive the interaction between the youth and democracy? The next chapter develops the theoretical framework for this study, discussing and then nominating the potential predictors for youth (dis)engagement from the principles and or processes of democracy.

Chapter 3
Theorising Youth Democratic Disengagement

This change may "be a lasting characteristic of democratic mass publics and not just a sudden surge in political involvement bound to fade away as time goes by'.
- Barnes et al. (1979, p. 524)

In this chapter, I review the existing theoretical and empirical works with the purpose of deriving testable hypotheses for the two central questions of this thesis – are young people turning away from democracy? If so, why? It builds on the premise that young people today are different from young people 20 or 30 years ago. That is, the social context in which the electorate currently engages with democracy is different.

Focusing on the first question of whether young people are in fact turning away from the principles and/or processes of democracy, existing literature mostly emphasise generational disengagement from democracy when talking about youth disengagement. Two dominant theories – modernisation and socialisation theories – produce different predictions about whether youth disengagement is a gradual process across generations or whether disengagement is dictated by one-off generational features. Both of these theories acknowledge that there are certain societal changes or transformations that result in generational cohorts to interact differently with democracy. But what factors do this process comprise? And would these factors explain why young people may potentially be turning away from the principles and/or processes of democracy?

This chapter explores the ways in which the social context has changed to then vary democratic engagement across generations. First, it conducts a theoretical review to hypothesise youth disengagement from the principles and processes of democracy. Then, it explores the concept of 'generation': both modernisation and socialisation theories define young people in terms of generational membership, rather than by age or period definitions. Third, it discusses how societal change could be either a continuous evolutionary process (where disengagement results from lasting generational characteristics) or a fragmented process (where disengagement is unique to just one generation and fades away in subsequent cohorts). Last, it discusses the crucial components of social change, including socio-demographic factors such as education. Based on a stronger understanding of the components of societal transformations, this chapter identifies gaps in the literature that could explain the variation in engagement beyond socio-demographic factors. This chapter finds that existing youth participation literature lacks a systematic understanding of how three factors – religion, media

use and political institutions - impact youth engagement. As such, it justifies the topics and presents major hypotheses for the upcoming empirical chapters.

3.1. Rejecting Principles or Processes?

Despite considerable critical attention (Grasso 2014), the exact nature of the youth disengagement problem remains unclear: are young people rejecting fundamental principles of democracy or are they turning away from certain democratic processes? Earlier empirical investigations have proven that younger cohorts are gradually rejecting traditional democratic practices such as voting and party affiliation (Blais and Rubenson 2013; Dalton 2007). The debate, however, lies in whether this trend goes hand in hand with a rejection of democratic principles such as the rule of law.

A growing body of literature recognises that changing preferences of participation pose no threat to the key values of democracy (Nguyen 2014; Ringen 2007). Ferrín and Kriesi (2016) argue that, although democracy is a contested concept, its ideals are more or less universal across democratic societies. Citizens' attitudes towards these ideals are termed as normative conceptions, which comprise views of how democracy ought to be. For democracy to become consolidated, support for the principles - such as tolerance and respect for civil rights- is imperative (Diamond 1999, p. 175; Linz and Stepan 1996, p. 5; Rose et al. 1998, p. 92). Despite procedural differences of how democracy works or the outputs it produces, attitudes towards these guiding principles are expected to remain staunch to prevent deconsolidation (Foa and Mounk 2017). If young people start discarding these principles, notwithstanding their participatory preference, then the future of democracy is truly in trouble.

Are young people turning away from the principles of democracy? Leading scholars like Dalton (2008), Inglehart (1997a) and Norris (Norris 2002; 2011) provide an optimistic reading (see also Dalton and Welzel 2014; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). They interpret the rejection of traditional institutions as benign indicators of politically sophisticated younger generations who are critical of the actions of the traditional elites. Referring to the distinction Easton (1975) makes, decline in government legitimacy does not equate to decline in regime legitimacy. Critical citizens are committed democrats who want more robust outcomes from democracy. People may be weary of the performance of the government of the day and as a result refrain from voting; but that does not necessarily translate to their disapproval of the foundational values of democracy.

Some contemporary scholars disagree: young people, particularly millennials, are instigating a crisis of democracy by replacing democratic values with non-democratic ideals (Foa and Mounk 2016; 2017). Using four indicators of regime legitimacy as opposed to government legitimacy from the WVS (1992-2015, waves 3-6), Foa and Mounk (2016) show that citizens are turning away from the democratic regime by rejecting its basic principles. Disconcertingly, this

weakened sense of attachment to democracy is concentrated among younger people. One noteworthy finding (from the 2006 and 2011 waves combined) is that 72 per cent of US respondents born before World War II thought it was “absolutely important” to live in a democracy whereas only 30 percent of the millennials (born since 1980) shared this view, perhaps because they have not lived in anything other than a democracy (Fuks et al. 2018). Foa and Mounk warn that erosion of support for democratic norms across generations is a sign of an impending crisis in politically stable regions of the world.

In addition to this debate, existing theoretical literature also lacks a consensus on why young people would disengage from democracy. Several studies turn to time effects to explain youth disengagement (Blais and Rubenson 2013; Grasso 2014). Most of these follow some version of the generational replacement phenomenon, which capitalize on earlier works (Dalton 2008; Inglehart 1977; Klingemann 2014; Norris 2011): younger cohorts with distinct characteristics replace their older counterparts in the electorate. In terms of the vote, for instance, the stability in the individual’s propensity to vote throughout their life indicate a generational effect (Blais and Rubenson 2013; Clarke et al. 2004; Putnam 2000; Wattenberg 2003).

Two theories are relevant to the current study. First, social modernisation theory emphasizes a gradual increase in generational gaps due to subsequent value change. Younger cohorts are more economically affluent- meaning they are more educated, politically sophisticated, socially independent, critical citizens who have post-materialist values compared to survivalist values. Citizenship, to them, is a right and not a duty (Dalton 2007). Hence, abstention is less stigmatising. Abstention occurs because these cohorts, by the virtue of their enhanced cognitive resources, are more critical of the workings of their government (Dalton 2007; Ferrin and Kriesi 2016; Norris 1999a). Their increasing share in the electorate will progressively reduce turnout.

The modernisation account can be extended to include cognitive mobilisation thesis which explains decrease in party identification. According to Inglehart (1970, p. 47), cognitive mobilisation is the process where formal education "increases the individual’s capacity to receive and interpret messages”. Cognitive mobilisation in advanced industrial democracies lead to the increase in the number of apartisans (Dalton 1984; 2007). These are sophisticated individuals with no party ties; they have enough cognitive resources (from formal education) to grapple with the complexities of politics. Despite their limited electoral experience, cognitive mobilisation is expected to be higher in the younger generations. The cognitive mobilisation thesis indicates a generational component (Dalton 1984, p. 286): younger citizens have higher education levels compared to their elders and therefore can better engage with political information (more easily available through mass media; Baker et al. 1981). From the modernisation thesis, I derive the first hypothesis to answer whether young people are turning away from democracy:

H5.1 (modernisation hypothesis): Each subsequent cohort engage less with the traditional processes of democracy compared to previous cohorts.[6]

As previously noted, political socialisation theory also provides an explanation for youth disengagement. It posits that participation is contingent on historical context. That is, rather than a subsequent decline across generations, there will be a decline in some generations based on the experiences during formative years vis-à-vis those coming of age in other eras (Grasso 2014, p. 65; Mannheim 1928, p. 232). Political socialisation, unlike modernisation theory, attempts to provide a convincing explanation as to why younger generations may be unwilling to support democratic principles. For instance, those who came of age after the Cold War (i.e., 90s generation) have never faced a real threat to their system of government and hence do not support liberal democracy with the same fervor. Those cohorts which socialised under non-democratic regimes and lived through the horrors of military rule may display greater commitment to democratic values than other cohorts (Fuks et al. 2018). I derive the following hypothesis from the socialisation theory:

H5.2 (socialisation hypothesis): Each cohort has distinct attitudes towards both the principles and engagement with the processes of democracy.

3.2. Defining 'Young' People

As the above section demonstrates, the existing theories mostly provide generational explanations to explain youth democratic disengagement. But what constitutes 'young' generation is considerably different from one study to another. What really is a generation? Is it a product of aggregation of social structures across time or is it an ethos or culture particular to a time? In this section, I revisit the concept of generation.

There are multiples ways the concept of generation has been defined in social sciences. This is because of its high correlation with other time factors, namely age and period. Based on Troll's (1970) categorisation, and García-Albacete's (2014) more recent review, Table 3.1 presents the five common utilisation of the term 'generation' in the discipline. First, generation as *ranked descent* refers to the intergenerational gap and political socialisation patterns as political values flow from parents to children (Jennings and Niemi 1981; Percheron and Jennings 1981; Jennings et al. 2009).[7] This is, however, not relevant to the current study because we know that the resulting levels of engagement of the children of a highly politically

[6] Please note the hypotheses in this dissertation are numbered based on the chapter in which they are tested. For example, the mobilisation hypothesis is numbered H5 as it is tested in chapter 5.

[7] Gordon and Taft (2011) draw upon the experiences and narratives of teenage activists throughout the Americas, highlighting the role of peers (i.e., other young people) in socialising each other for political engagement. This qualitive enquiry provides a rich nuance to youth civic and political participation by examining the roles young people themselves play in the processes of political socialisation.

mobilised generation is not as high as expected (and is rather low) as those of their parents (for a review, see, Jennings et al. 2009).

The second is the use of *age groups* or categories to derive generational interpretations. This is a highly flawed practice as it simply refers to stages of the life cycle instead of generational differences. Similarly, there has been reference to generation as *developmental stage* relate to the idea that political involvement is not the same during youth and adulthood. For instance, involvement in politics increases with the accumulation of resources as one approaches middle-age and then decreases again with certain events like retirement.

Another common practice to define generations is by the division of the population according to birth years in equal intervals of time (say, every 10 or 15 years), assuming that changes take place due to the natural process of birth and death of individuals. This interpretation of generation as a *time span* is a common shortcut to address social change without further distinction of the differences between specific cohorts. Finally, generation as a *Zeitgeist* consists of members who socialised in the same historical period, facing the same concrete historical problems in the same region.

Table 3.1. The concept of generation

Generation as…	Meaning…	Examples
Ranked descent	Intergenerational relationships between, for example, daughter, mother, grandmother, great-grandmother	Parent-child socialisation
Age group	14–24 (youth) 25–39 (adults) 40–65 65 + (aging)	Inverted 'U' relationship between vote and age
Developmental stage	Life stages: Childhood Adolescence, Maturity, Middle age, Old age	Inverted 'U' relationship between vote and age
Time span	Birth cohorts	Born between 1930 and 1939
Zeitgeist	(in America) Horatio Alger Gray flannel suit Activism and hippies Political generations OR Sociological/political cohorts:	Hippies Citizens socialized before or after WWI Values shift

Source: adapted from Troll's (1970, p. 200) categorisation and García-Albacete's (2014) review

Among these five conceptual variations of the term generation, the two theories discussed above refer to generation as a time span (or birth cohort representing social change) and as a *Zeitgeist*. The latter - akin to Mannheim's (1927; 1959) generational unit, or García-Albacete's (2014) cohort - has its own unique characteristics that distinguish it from earlier cohorts. This

is due to the unique context in which members socialise politically. Societal transformations are responsible for developing their orientations, which differ from those of their parents and persist over the course of the individual's life (Ryder 1965, p. 848).

A generational unit comprises members who develop distinctive world views during late adolescence and early adulthood (typically between the ages 18-27). There are two premises embedded in this argument (García-Albacete 2014). First, young people are more susceptible to their political context and influenced by societal transformations during their formative years. If one socialised in an era where women in the workforce is a norm rather than an exception, then they will demand more women's right or are more likely to be sensitive to violations of such rights. Second, values, orientations and attitudes formed during this time will persist[8] over the course of the individual's life. So, for example, if youth disengagement from traditional democratic processes is due to certain cohort characteristics, then we can expect a long-term change in the participation of citizens in advanced democracies.



Figure 3.1. 'Generation' as an aggregation of social structures vs an ethos

A generation may be an aggregation of social structures across time, or it may be an ethos or a culture a particular time. Figure 3.1 displays these two popular depictions of 'generation' in the recent literature on youth disengagement from democracy (Dassonneville 2013; Grasso 2014; Foa and Mounk 2016). In this study, I argue that cohorts[9] differ due to slow evolutionary change (Ryder 1965, p. 851). The underlying mechanism is accumulation of certain characteristics due to societal transformations such as rise in education and the development of new technologies. Note that these transformations are different from disruptive events like a war or pandemic, and that they accumulate permanent resources across generations.

[8] Persistence refers to the tendency of structuring inputs, as well as rejecting dissonant items, based on previous cognitive design (Ryder 1965, p. 856).

[9] Unlike García-Albacete (2014, p. 54), I use the terms 'cohort' and 'generation' synonymously. To the former, these are analytically different concepts. Political generations are groups demarcated by concrete political events, which are often country-specific (e.g., the Spanish Civil War) but can also affect several countries (e.g., WWII). García-Albacete's (2014) cohort is another distinct concept of Troll's (1970) *Zeitgeist*, which result from slow evolutionary changes like the rise in education and the development of new technologies.

Period effects, of course, can also impact democratic attitudes and behaviours but these effects influence the entire population rather than people who are in their formative years at the time. Therefore, there is a distinction between lasting characteristics and sudden change in political behaviour that is particular to a cohort and fades away in subsequent cohorts. For the latter, it is difficult to identify and detect events or situations that are most likely to influence citizens' political behaviour. It obviously requires a strong understanding of how socialisation occurs and how a period or an event may lead to differentiated generations. Periods can influence individuals through a myriad of processes that occur during socialisation, through diffuse and indirect mechanisms (Beck and Jennings 1991, p. 742). Add to that the peculiarities of each country's historical legacy that can lead to heterogeneous classifications across countries (Albacete 2014, p. 102).

A good example of this distinction is young people's participation in protests in the late 1960s and early 1970s – where conventional participation was supplemented by unconventional forms because of macro-societal developments. These developments include the rise of economic well-being and education levels, the shift from materialist to postmaterialist values and the spread of mass communication systems, such as the television (Barnes et al., 1979, p. 524). And these macro changes remained, becoming norms of the society, where upcoming generations were accumulating more of these resources. As Barnes et al. (1979, p. 524) accurately supports, 'We interpret this increase in potential for protest to be a lasting characteristic of democratic mass publics and not just a sudden surge in political involvement bound to fade away as time goes by'. This expectation was corroborated in subsequent works (Kaase 1990; Topf 1995; Norris 2002).

Consequently, each cohort has socialised with more of these recourses in their formative years, impacting their political outlook for a lifetime. As these resources have become more available across time, the process of modernisation has created more of certain values and less of other values in the electorate, which led to decline in traditional engagement across generations. Although the socialisation process is unique to each cohort during their formative years, the uniqueness comes from the 'amount' of modernisation resources available to each cohort, with more recent cohorts having more of these resources and, subsequently, less of those values (or more of certain values) that facilitate traditional democratic (dis)engagement. The next section further explores what these resources, values and characteristics are and how they are concentrating among younger generations.

3.3. Young People and Changing Social Context

Which characteristics differentiate younger generations from their earlier counterparts? As discussed in section 3.1, both modernisation and socialisation theories acknowledge that societal transformations/differences across generations are responsible for differentiated

democratic engagement across generations. But, while modernisation theory suggests that these societal transformations are a continuous process leading to a gradual decline in engagement, socialisation theory implies a more fragmented process. This section examines these societal changes that have occurred over time.

A common finding across the advanced society is that the globalisation of markets, trades and communication has challenged the state-defined concept of citizenship where young people are steering away from mainstream politics. Many studies, especially in Europe, argue various reasons for this change: participation can be influenced by socio-economic resources (Finnish case, Nygard et al. 2016); civic education (Polish case, Slomczynski and Shabad 1998); (youth) unemployment rates (EU-Member states, Greece, Spain, Portugal in Tosun et al., 2019; see also Sotiris, 2010; Sakellaropoulos, 2012; Zamponi and Gonzalez, 2017); institutional structure (post-communist countries, Roberts 2003, in Letki 2004; Bulgarian case in Ådnanes 2004; central and Western European cases UK, France, Spain, Austria, Finland and Hungary in Cammaerts et al. 2014); and, depends on type (Swedish case, Coe et al. 2016, p. 6; Belgian case in Hooghe et al. 2004, Quintelier and Hooghe 2011) and mode of participation (Espinar-Ruiz and GonzalezRio 2015; Calenda and Meijer 2009). These studies have focused on different contexts from West to East, North to Southern parts of Europe - across countries with different socio-political histories, different access to resources and with various new spaces available for youth participation. One thing is clear in all these studies, and that is participation in "older" spaces or institutionalized forms of participation is increasingly becoming unpopular for young people (Weiss 2020).

Social transformations such as the increase in education levels, development of new technologies and the rise of economic wellbeing has given rise to higher levels of cognitive engagement among younger cohorts. This has also paralleled decline in traditional political participation. Dalton (1984; 2007; 2012) and Norris' (1999) answer to the paradox implies that citizens in advanced democracies possess skills and resources needed to politically engage and, hence, do not need traditional institutions like parties to provide strong cues. This process of cognitive mobilisation has increased apartisans - sophisticated citizen who pay more attention to the performance of the government and react to it. This idea of 'critical citizens' is more applicable to younger cohorts who have reached higher levels of education and are more familiar with new technological tools. Therefore, the modernisation process has led to an increase in 'elite-challenging', at the expense of 'elite-directed', political participation (Inglehart 1990; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).

But what exactly are the modernisation resources that accumulate across generations? The cognitive mobilisation thesis, which is part of the societal modernisation process, argues that accumulation of cognitive resources across time increases the number of high cognition apartisans and cognitive partisans in a society. This thesis emphasises two key features of modernisation theory: significant increase in overall levels of education and better access to

information, which, in a period of high economic prosperity, have inculcated different values and interests among younger cohorts. Earlier studies have attested to how these are crucial prerequisites for both voting (Campbell et al. 1960) and other forms of participation (Barnes et al. 1979). Intergenerational societal developments have facilitated citizen's access to information, and increased education levels have given them the abilities to process this information. The combination of both results in higher levels of cognitive engagement (Barnes et al. 1979).

Speaking of intergenerational societal developments, there appears to be an instillment of progressive ideas over time across generations. Evidence from the United States (Baldassarri and Park 2020) shows that the process of issue partisanship—the sorting of political preferences along partisan lines—may apply in economic and civil rights domains. But, when it comes to moral issues, both Democrats and Republicans are adopting more progressive views, albeit at a different rate. This surprising trend indeed provides evidence for that younger generations are more socially liberal than older generations.[10] The authors attribute this change to secularization, brought about by demographic replacement over extended periods of time: younger and more progressive generations - triggered sometimes by social diffusion dynamics that rely on media, opinion leaders, or network influence - are replacing older and more conservative ones (i.e.,'the culture wars').[11]

The civic voluntarism model emphasizes on the lack of other resources to explain political inactivity among young people. These resources can be time, money or civic skills which are attained through engagement with the community (Schlozman et al. 1998). Younger people, especially first-time voters who are undergoing an important transitional life stage from school to post-school adult life, tend to have weaker psychological engagement or fewer roots to the community. Building on the standard socio-economic model, civic voluntarism model suggests that resources can be accrued, and political engagement can be learnt, as people age.

Although the civic voluntarism model suggests a lifecycle effect, long-term societal transformations may account for the differences between young people then and young people now. Scholars have long-ago identified the delayed transition to adulthood or the expansion of the youth phase: today, in an in era of social and demographic fluidity, the youth phase is a relatively longer and more complex transitory life stage (Jennings 1979, p. 770). These transformations, observable as delays in entering the labour force, getting married or having children, is evident in many countries.

[10] Snell (2010) conducts a mixed-methods study examining political disengagement among emerging adults aged 18 to 24. She finds voluntary association participation, religious practices, political affiliation, and parental political engagement as insufficient explanations. Rather, individualized moral beliefs are a significant predictor of political engagement.

[11] Evidence from Australia also suggests that young people are getting older, but not more conservative (Read 2022). Although lifecycle theories oppose this idea and predict people become more conservative as they age, this may not apply to millennials and younger people (Jackman 2022; Chowdhury 2023).

A protracted period of transition to adulthood (Flanagan et al. 2012) can be attributed to another societal transformation - change in the labour market. A high level of flexibility in the labour market has led to more demanding working and lifestyle conditions, giving rise to increase in individualism, where citizens with less time and money do not invest as much in citizenship commitments, whereas their engagement is driven by specific issues salient to the individual (Bennett 1998; Schmitter 2008). The increased complexity of the transition to adulthood, and changes in the welfare state, have led to young people disengaging from politics (Sloam 2007). Politics is far away from their immediate life, since they have to take care of their own prosperity in terms of employments, relationships and so on. As a result, there is also lower engagement in collective action and weakening ties to the community (Pattie et al. 2004, p. 280).

This brings us to another important feature of the changing social context - mobilising agents. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993, p. 25) refer to 'mobilisation as the process by which candidates, parties, activists and groups induce other people to participate'. Young people have fewer links to these simply because of being young. Add to that the negative image of political parties and politicians as the 'necessary evil' (Dalton and Weldon 2005): citizens are aware of their need but do not necessarily like or trust them (Mair 2008, p. 230). So, another explanation as to why young people fail to engage is the weakening link with a key mobilising agent, political parties (Henn et al. 2005).

Lifecyle literature suggests that this link will strengthen as young people age, but societal modernisation as an evolutionary process may also have a generational effect: young people today do not develop affective attachments to political parties as older cohorts did. There are two reasons for this. There has been a general trend of professionalisation of political parties at the expense of grassroots bases (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Sloam (2007) claims that political parties focus more on older people's issues, especially because it is more work to address the diverse range of issues that concern the newer cohorts. This increases the gap between newer cohorts and traditional institutions (Henn et al. 2005).

Looking into other mobilising agencies, civic organisations are mobilising agents that provide democracy with many benefits (Morales 2004). Religious and ethnic associations, for example, provide a dense network of social exchange that instil trust and norms of reciprocity, facilitate communication, improve the flow of information, and serve as a template for future collaboration (Putnam et al. 1993, pp. 170–6). These associations help create, aggregate and translate demands into political institutions, and thus help relay information between members, decision-making institutions and the general public. They also provide members with skills and resources that promote political participation.

According to social capital theorists, younger generations do not get involved with these in a regular or enduring fashion as earlier cohorts (Putnam 2000; Jennings and Stoker 2004; García-Albacete 2014). Putnam (1995, p. 185) attributes the many problems encountered by modern democracies to a decline in civic associations. The decline has resulted from societal transformations such as movement of women into the labor force, the decline in residential stability, demographic transformations such as such as fewer marriages, fewer children, and the technological transformation of leisure time (Putnam 1995; Bennett 1998). Decline in real wages, increasing working hours and work instability – such as unemployment, under-employment, part-time, and temporary contracts – also means that social life has become more unbalanced and stressful. This mostly impacts young people who enter the labour force during these societal transformations. Due to the uncertainties when they come of age, new cohorts have fewer incentives to participate in community activities. Recent individualisation, together with loose attachment to society, reduces the pressure of social norms or the sense of duty among younger cohorts, lowering the incentives to collectively participate. Consequently, young people may not be getting the skills and experience that more traditional associations promote.

In an era of declining control of political parties, the ever-evolving communication media has provided broadened opportunities for mobilisation (Kriesi 2008, pp. 156–7). High hopes have been placed on new technologies as quick, low-cost and suitable channels for mobilising citizens (Norris 2002, pp. 207–12). Social media, for example, provides a powerful tool for organising protest rallies and petitions, lowering the costs – both time and money wise - of mobilising people.[12] It has hosted and provided exposure to various social movement organisations, which tackle a variety of issues relevant to younger people. This media environment is characterised by less distinct boundaries between political and non-political activities, lowering the thresholds of engagement (Ekström and Shehata 2018). The various media environments and social networks also provide scope and opportunities to gather political information both actively and incidentally.

[12] Social media has become a space for new forms of participation (Loader et al. 2014; Xenos et al. 2014). These are distinct and disassociated from traditional participatory acts and institutions, proving to be more favourable among young people (Veneti 2020). But, the theory of digitally networked action - that is collective action in the social networks where individuals can contribute to a collective cause when seeking public goods (e.g., democratic reforms) - highlight the potential of social media in revitalizing youth political participation (Bennett and Segerberg 2012). This explains how citizens who are far removed from politics have found ways to mobilise in the pursuit of political causes (Veneti 2020). Along with recent developments in participations with an emphasis on individualisation and personal values, digital media technologies play a significant role to organise 'individualised collective action' (Bennett 2012). Social media is therefore an organising agent, defined as the 'logic of connection action' (Bennett and Segerberg 2012) where there is an erosion of boundaries between the public and the private. Social media sites such as facebook and twitter facilitate self-motivating participation where one can share personalised, expressive content, forming communities that can quickly trigger unconventional forms of political action, such as demonstrations (Ahlqvist et al. 2010; see also, Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2012).

Lastly, it is important to acknowledge that, contrary to many claims about generational differences in advanced democracies made in studies that generalise country-specific findings, youth engagement may vary significantly across countries. Youth political participation is deeply connected to the social environment as well as political structure of the country (Roberts 2003). A priori, electoral laws and party systems – which are the same for all in each country- were not expected to have age or generational effects. Franklin (2004) shows how the closeness of a given election can have varying effects on turnout levels depending on the life stage a citizen is at: younger citizens have less political experience and are more influenced by the concrete characteristics of the election. Furthermore, certain institutional changes such as introduction (e.g., Australia 1924) or end of compulsory voting rules (e.g., Netherlands 1967), and the reduction of the legal voting age (in several European countries during the 1970s) might have caused cohort-specific effects on participation.

The positive impact of established institutions on youth participation is evident across advanced democracies, especially in Europe. Even in post-communist countries, Ådnanes (2004), for example, find that young Bulgarians with a high degree of formal education consider migrating partly because they are unsatisfied with their political system and perceive their ways of participation as restricted. In the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Austria, Finland, and Hungary, existing political structures make adolescents mainly feel excluded from the political system (Cammaerts et al. 2014). Municipalities in the UK and the Netherlands do not seem to offer enough entry points for young adults to contribute to or participate in political debates or the democratic process in general (Timmerman 2009). Other scholars found similar results in Germany, France (Hooghe and Stolle 2003) and Belgium (Hooghe et al. 2004; Quintelier and Hooghe 2011).

Taken together, the above review highlights that some key components of societal modernisation are the lack of resources for a longer period of time, weaker links to traditional mobilisation networks and growing significance of the communication network, which can vary according to institutional context across advanced democracies.

Did these transformations result in distinctive cohort characteristics? Donovan (2017) reasons there are three possible scenarios in which cognitive mobilisation occurs. Under the first scenario, there was a finite period of societal transformations after WWII, but this ran its course, producing contemporary, better-educated, and more-interested cohorts. Donovan refers to this as the ceiling effect, meaning there were limits to how many people experienced the major transformative political effects of education and innovations in media. There may have been a phase shift which was limited to the mid-20th century, where local prints and radio mediums provided wide and novel access to global perspectives. For example, a person's access to information about the Vietnam war may have been fundamentally different from a similar person's access to information about WWII, but not all too different (or of lower quality) compared to information about the Iraq war.

The second scenario is an ongoing, continuous process of political transformation where increasing proportion of citizens in the established democracies continue to become more educated and more interested in politics. Indeed, in his recent work, Dalton refers to "a changing public" (Dalton 2013, p. 29). It is a dynamic process where the "the need for [partisan] cues declines as the political skills of the voters increase and information costs decrease," and where "the dramatic spread of education" is leading to an expansion of political sophistication (Dalton 1984, p. 265). This process may have started at the post WWII time when very few people had access to quality secondary or tertiary education. This changed over time where a larger proportion of a country's population was experiencing more education. This means that it could take several generations, or centuries, for most or all citizens to reach higher levels of cognitive sophistication that result from increased access to education.

The changes in mass media can also be seen as a continuing process. In the 1950s, print newspapers and radio were replaced by broadcast televisions as a lower-cost medium to access political information. By the 1990s, cable televisions and global satellite technologies outperformed broadcast television in scope, quantity, immediacy and cost-effectiveness of information. What further transformed and broadened access to political information is the growth of mobile devices, internet and social media in the 21st century. Undoubtedly, social networking sites like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and TikTok have changed the modern political campaigning scene. New media, for example, has been instrumental in destabilising authoritarian regimes during the Arab Spring. As a continuing transformation, advents in technologies are increasing the proportion of people who are interested and involved with politics.

Finally, under the third scenario, cognitive mobilisation is a process unique to a particular generation, where at some point in the past young people may have become less partisan but more interested in politics, but those generational differences are no more evident. Donovan (2017) argues that whereas the first two scenarios reflect broad social forces affecting many countries simultaneously in the same manner, unique cohort-effect scenarios could be more idiosyncratic. He uses the US example: social and political changes during the post-WWII through to the 1960s period shaped a generation with high distrust of government. This was precipitated by the Vietnam war and the Watergate scandal experienced by the first wave of first-generation university students coming of age at that time. Or there may have been influence of forces such as a short-term sorting in the two-party system bolstered by the civil rights era. Consequently, the proportion of highly interested (young people) might increase - but as this generation ages and is replaced, the changes that might be attributed to cognitive mobilisation could decay over time.

The above theoretical review leads us to some crucial considerations about societal transformations: Did greater formal education and use of mass media after the 1950s leave

advanced democracies with new batches of high cognition apartisans and cognitive partisans (where countries quickly reached a fairly static new equilibrium mix of traditional partisans, cognitive partisans, and apartisans)? Or are electorates, over time, increasingly defined as being cognitively mobilised such that traditional partisans are gradually being replaced by apartisans? The key question here is whether cognitive mobilisation is a continuous process or a one-off generational feature.

3.4. Key Components of Long-Term Societal Change

Both modernisation and socialisation theories attest to societal transformations which may explain generational (dis)engagement with democracy. However, testing the modernisation and socialisation hypotheses will give us a clearer understanding of whether the changing social context is a continuous or a fragmented process. Both ways, it is important to drill deeper into what entails these societal transformations. What factors are we talking about? The section above identifies that differences in democratic engagement among younger cohorts can be explained by socio-demographic factors like education, gender, income, mobilisation factors like associational membership, consumption of media for political information, and institutional factors like electoral system. In this section, I discuss the importance of each of these topics before justifying the need to better understand the role of religion, media use and institutional factors to explain generational differences in democratic engagement.

Young people's political views are linked to their social backgrounds and life experiences. Young people are not a monolithic entity and the amount of resources they have depend on their class background. Evans and Tilley (2017) argue that people from middle class or professional and managerial class backgrounds in particular are more likely to be politically active than those from lower or working classes. This is because higher status is linked to more time, money and access to information – all things which are known to sustain political engagement (Dalton 2017). More recently, in a majority of nine European countries, Grasso and Guigni (2022) also find intra-generational political inequalities (which exist within a generation) by resources for more institutional or conventional forms of engagement (such as attending meetings of a political organisation or party, contacting a politician, donating money to a political organisation or party, and wearing a political campaign logo/badge).

In earlier times institutions, such as religion and trade unions ironed out inequalities from social status. Today, as these institutions are on the decline, this may be linked to falling group mobilisation amongst individuals with lower resources. Therefore, there is further compounding inequalities in political action by social status, especially if individuals with more resources are also the ones who are more likely to engage in organisations (Dalton, 2017). Therefore, there is a need to also look into the role of declining associational memberships on youth engagement.

Considering other demographic variables such as gender, males and females engage dissimilarly with democracy. Albacete (2014) highlights the differential effects - or rather the rarer effect - of the transition to adulthood on women than men. Young women's lifecycle hardly impacts their participation in a large majority of European countries. However, type-specific gender differences appear especially when differentiating between institutional, non-institutional, and expressive participation (Pfanzelt and Spies 2019). Although women are generally equally willing to engage politically, there is a variance in preference between the sexes. While young men are more likely to become involved in institutional and expressive forms of participation, young women tend toward non-institutional, protest-oriented activities. Coffé and Bolzendahl (2021) finds similar 'private' vs 'public' kinds of participation.

Socialisation environment, rather than socioeconomic resources, may better explain gender differences in political participation. Two dissimilar cases - German (a country with strong gender equality; Pfanzelt and Spies 2019) and Italy (one of the European countries with the highest levels of gender inequalities; Albanesi et al. 2012)- have attested to this notion. Women not only experience less political support from their schools, peers, and parents, they also show significantly less confidence in their own skills, specifically in politically relevant skills. Lower feelings of self-efficacy result in gender differences in institutional participation, even in the most favourable setting of equality. Specific gender socialisation processes that begin at home are crucial in the explanation: Albanesi et al. (2012) highlight that the gender roles that young people experience and observe at home - where they are still confronted with (unequal) labour division - influence their political orientations (see also, Gordon 2008). All these studies however find limited effect on political participation in terms of outcome.

The effect of gender on political participation can also be moderated by other individual factors such as political knowledge. Ondercin and Jones-White (2011) refer to a more nuanced relationship between political knowledge and political participation that reduced the gender gap. Women who are less informed do not participate in politics, but women with higher levels of political knowledge attempt to influence a vote, attend political meetings, and donate money to a political/social cause like men (see also Torney-Purta 2009). Bernstein (2005) finds consistent gender differences between college students with men displaying greater political interest, discussion, and information-seeking behaviours because of greater exposure to newspapers than women. Cicognani et al. (2012) confirms a similar existence of gender differences in adolescence related in particular to political interest and to the use of the internet for political participation (both are higher among male youths). Another study shows that the internet has begun to serve as an information resource and as a tool for civic and political participation among young Americans, being used in particular to gather political information (Rainie et al. 2005). Indeed, it is likely that the online world has pull apart gender and traditional leadership, allowing more girls into leading positions while reducing many gender stereotypes. This justifies the need to investigate how media use impacts youth traditional participation.

Even when accounting for the above-mentioned socio demographic factors, Grasso and Guigni's (2022) cross-national study finds that generational coefficients remain and do not lose significance. This means that socio demographic factors do not explain all the variation in youth traditional participation. Some studies goes as far to argue that, in today's context of a media-saturated cultural sphere, where identities are liquid, and under constant re-evaluation (Henn & Foard 2014), variables such as gender, social class and ethnicity may have lost their influence over political engagement (Giddens 1991; Beck et al. 1994). In a period of late modernity, young people find it increasingly difficult to relate their own life experiences to those who are similar to them in position and experiences. As a results, factors such as class and gender lose significance as predictors or manifest in new ways (Furlong and Cartmel 2012, p. 14). There is therefore a need to look beyond the common socio demographic factors to explain youth political engagement. Although this section highlights many associations, below I identify three factors which present three unique research puzzles in relation to youth disengagement from democracy.

In an era of secularisation, the first factor is religion. Although not always political in nature, civic associations- such as religious institutions - function as a means for social engagement with like-minded people and thus promote political engagement (de Tocqueville 1969). Despite a paucity of explicit religious issues and lack of religious campaigns in recent times, religion remains a strong determinant of political behaviour, such as party choice in European elections (van der Brug et al. 2009). In stable and affluent societies, religion is a powerful predictor of political behaviour, including party alignment (Bruce 2003) and has a positive 'spillover' effect on political activism (Peterson 1992; Verba et al. 1995). Considering the positive effect of religion on democratic citizenship (Norris and Inglehart 2011; Arikan and Bloom 2019; Dalton 2009), the disproportionate electoral disengagement among younger generations in advanced democracies (Blais and Rubenson 2013) may be driven by their detachment from religion. Deductively speaking, it would not be surprising if less religious young cohorts are not as engaged as their older counterparts. Could the decline in religion then be responsible for young people's disengagement from democracy? Chapter 6 tests the following hypothesis:

> *H6 (religion hypothesis): Religiously affiliated young people are more democratically engaged than the non-affiliated.*[13]

With the growing influence of the ever-evolving communication media, the second factor is media use for political information. Media is an important mobilising agent as it is a source of information which bridges the communication gap between governments and citizens in democracies. Political information obtained from both traditional (physical) and new (digital)

[13] Please note the hypotheses in this dissertation are numbered based on the chapter in which they are tested. For example, the religion hypothesis is numbered H6 as it is tested in chapter 6.

media outlets – including the radio, newspaper, television (TV) and internet- can penetrate interpersonal discussion, alter people's interest in politics and consequently affect their political engagement (Eveland 2004; Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2012). The mechanism behind the relationship is driven by the political learning process.

Previous studies concur that media use for political purposes facilitates democratic attitudes and behaviours (Bakker and de Vreese, 2011; Boulianne 2009; Cho et al. 2009; Gainous and Wagner 2011). Recently, this idea is being revisited due to the increase in media use (particularly via the internet) among young people – a trend which surprisingly coincides the decline in youth electoral participation in advanced democracies (Blais and Rubenson 2013; Foa and Mounk 2016). Does this mean that, when it comes to young people, the democratic potential of the communication media disappears? To answer this, Chapter 7 investigates the following:

> *H7 (media hypothesis): Young people who use the media for political information are more democratically engaged than non-users.*

Third, although institutional design factors vary across democracies (see, for example, Kostadinova 2003), whether these factors impact young people differently is an unexplored topic. Democratic theory suggests that macro-level, institutional factors matter because democratic institutions carry important messages that shape citizens' attitudes and behaviours. Do certain political structures lead to poorer government performance and hence drive younger generations (who tend to demand more from democracy) away from elite-directed, traditional democratic processes?

Certain institutions, such as a proportional representation (PR) rather than majoritarian electoral system (Blais and Aarts 2006), parliamentary instead of presidential system (Norris 2008), and unitary instead of federal systems (Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2010) are known to represent the electorate better and hence facilitate engagement with traditional democratic processes. Age of democracy is another important institutional feature where citizens with a stronger democratic political culture are expected to engage more (Linz and Stepan 1996). Finally, institutional design features such compulsory voting and state-facilitated registration systems increase the cost of disengagement and lower the cost of engagement, respectively (Lijphart 1997; Rosenberg and Chen 2009, p. 11). Although pioneering works by Riker (1980) and North (1990) well-established the role of institutional features in shaping individual attributes, there is a gap in the literature concerning the differential effects, if any, on younger people. Chapter 8 explores the effect of context in a comparative enquiry,

> *H8 (institutions hypothesis): Young people are more democratically engaged in a) power-sharing systems; b) older democracies; and, c) state-initiated registration systems.*

while Chapter 9 zooms into a single (Australian) case to see how youth disengagement can be sensitive to the (compulsory voting) context. The hypothesis to test here is:

> *H9 (Australia hypothesis): Youth disengagement from the principles and processes of democracy is sensitive to the political context in which it occurs.*

Overall, this section explores the various factors related to societal progress which may explain generational variation in democratic engagement. While looking into existing literature, it reiterates the importance of socio-economic variables but also highlights the importance of considering other mobilising, associational and contextual factors to answer the question of *why* younger generations may be turning away from democracy. It settles for religion, media use and institutional design factors due to the research puzzles arising from their relationships with young people. Right after answering whether young people are in fact turning away from democracy in Chapter 5, the following empirical chapters (6-9) tackle these puzzles accordingly. Table 3.2 summarises the research questions, the hypotheses derived from the theoretical review above and the respective empirical chapters that they are tested in. Much of this will be discussed in further detail in the individual chapters.

Table 3.2. Summary of theories and hypotheses

Research Question	Independent Variable	Theory	Hypothesis		Chapter
			Attitude towards democratic principles	Behaviour with traditional democratic process	
Are young people turning away from democracy?	Generation*	Political socialisation	Each generation has a distinct attitude based on conditions during their formative years (18-27)	Each generation engages distinctly based on the conditions during their formative years (18-27)	5
		Social Modernisation (+ Cognitive Mobilisation)	-	Each subsequent cohort engages less compared to previous cohorts	
If so, why?	Religion	Social Network	-	Religiously affiliated young people are more engaged than the non-affiliated	6
	Media Use	Mobilisation	-	Young media users are more engaged than non-users	7
	Political Institutions (regime type, regime age, registration system)	Signaling	-	Young people are more engaged in - power-sharing systems - older democracies - state-initiated registration systems	8
			-	Young people engage differently in a compulsory voting setting (Australia)	9

Note: *while accounting for age and period effects

3.5. Conclusion

Voters in advanced democracies are different today than they were in say the 1950s, 70s or 90s. A larger proportion of citizens have high educational attainment, while access to mass media is fundamentally different. Parties play a different role. These societal transformations may have resulted in differentiated younger cohorts. Members with higher levels of education and broader cognitive skills are more demanding and critical of the performance of political leaders and institutions. The consequence is that they are less willing to participate in traditional agencies and more likely to opt for specific issues and activities relevant to their lives. But is this hindering their commitment to democracy? More specifically, are better-

educated and better-informed younger cohorts turning away from both the principles and processes of democracy?

This chapter conducts a theoretical review of existing literature to derive suitable hypotheses as answers to the research question posed above. Affirming changing social context due to the considerable expansion of education and information access, two lines of generational explanations attempt to answer this question. Modernisation theory hypothesises a decline in engagement with traditional democratic processes due to a gradual change in values across generations. On the other hand, political socialisation theory proposes that each generation engages distinctly with the principles and processes of democracy based on the conditions during their formative years. While modernisation theory implies that the society is undergoing a continuous process of societal transformations, political socialisation refers to these societal transformations as one-off generational features. By testing the modernisation and socialisation hypotheses, this study will thus provide a clearer picture of whether the changing social context is a continuous or a fragmented process.

Acknowledging that the two leading theories provide generational explanations for youth disengagement, this chapter also highlights the need for a clearer understanding of what the concept of 'generation' means. It explores all possible definitions of 'young people' to then identify several key factors which comprise the societal transformations mentioned above. Observing exactly how electorates are changing in advanced democracies, the last section underscores the need to test the effects of three factors – religion, media use and political institutions - beyond socio-economic determinants of engagement, which present three distinct puzzles relating to youth disengagement. The upcoming chapters investigate the extent to which these factors account for generational variations, while controlling for key socio-demographic variables, such as education. Finally, after the theoretical parsing, it is also important to consider the ways these concepts are operationalised; because of considerable crossovers, this is a challenging but crucial exercise. In the following chapter, I discuss the commonly used indicators in large-*n* surveys, along with their advantages and disadvantages, before choosing the most suitable measures for the research work at hand.

Chapter 4
Data, Measurement and Method

"…to speak with precision of public opinion is a task not unlike coming to grips with the Holy Ghost"
- Key (1961, p. 8)

How can we accurately measure youth democratic attitudes and behaviours? Building on the discussion of the previous chapters, which explored and developed theoretical explanations as to how young people may be engaging differently with democracy, this chapter develops an approach to test these theories empirically. We know that accurately measuring public opinion is not an easy task. The reason for this is simple- opinion is subjective and verifying the true opinion in people's heads is impossible. Therefore, the most suitable method to gauge public opinion is to directly ask citizens about what is going inside their heads. This renders the survey method suitable for studying public opinion.

The secondary analysis of public opinion surveys helps researchers bypass the data collection step when answering a scientific question. But there is a catch. They must make do with the available survey items and settle with the closest possible measure to represent their construct of interest. However, a quality assessment helps to keep potential limitations and biases into consideration during analysis. In this chapter, I do so. Following a review of the reliabilities and validities of these measures in common public opinion datasets, I choose the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) integrated module dataset (IMD) as a suitable data source for my study. In the next section, I discuss the CSES variables that tap into the subjective dependent variables of interest. This also includes a discussion of the micro and macro-level predictors of youth disengagement from democracy. Finally, in the methods section, I draw attention to the age-period-cohort (APC) identification problem which plagues studies inquiring the highly collinear time effects. Here, I explain that hierarchical modelling using repeated cross-sectional survey data is a leading method to solve the identification problem.

4.1. Data

Since their emergence in the 1930s, and beyond turnout statistics, public opinion surveys have been the dominant method to measure and understand support for democracy. Accurately measuring subjective attitudes towards an abstract concept, such as democracy, is a complex exercise. Yet, when compared to the "blunt instruments of electoral returns", the polling enterprise provides a nuanced picture of the political views of the mass public (Berinsky 2017, p. 310). When investigating youth disengagement, it is important to also measure attitudinal support for democratic principles, which may not necessarily coexist with more tangible democratic behaviours. That is, a young person may believe that democracy is the most

superior form of government (principle), but they may also prefer to not engage in the blunt method of voting (process).

Although this subjective nature of public opinion poses challenges to the survey method, good survey design helps circumvent much of these challenges. A cornerstone to high quality survey design is to carefully consider *who to interview* and *what questions to ask them*. Inherently, these two design aspects form the two major sources of survey errors, which can be explained using the *Total Survey Error* paradigm (Anderson et al. 1979; see Figure 4.1). According to Groves and Lyberg (2010, p. 849), the total survey error framework "is a conceptual framework describing statistical error properties of sample survey statistics." Error components are divided into two branches of inferences, namely representation and measurement (analogous to *who to interview* and *what questions to ask them*). Measurement inference relates to a single respondent responding to a question which aims to measure the value of an underlying concept of interest. The second inference, representational inference, relates to an estimate based on a group of respondents from the population of interest (e.g., target population).



Source: Groves et al. (2004)

Figure 4.1. Total survey error components

Here, I use the total survey error framework (Anderson et al. 1979)[14] as a guide to perform a quality check on pre-existing survey items. That is, I take a theoretical approach - using theoretical reasoning to assess and critique the quality of commonly used survey items to measure the variables of interest. Good quality items yield reliable data and accurately measure the construct of interest. Good questions are easily interpreted and have clear

[14] See 'Total survey error components' in appendix (p. 234) for a brief discussion on survey variances and biases.

response options. By contrast, poor questions lead to: confusion and frustration amongst respondents; compromises in reliability; and, systematic biases in measurement and analysis (Pasek and Krosnick 2010, p. 30). Taken together, good questions motivate respondents to be optimisers rather than satisficers[15]. Following Pasek and Krosnick's (2010, p. 34) basic rules for optimal survey questions, in my quality check of existing surveys, in the following section I assess whether survey questions are easy for optimisers to answer and discourage satisficing.

Recall that the dependent variables in this study are two concepts: first, attitudes towards the principles of democracy and, second, behaviours involving the institutional processes of democracy. As I detail in Chapter 2, the attitudinal dependent variables- political trust, confidence, efficacy, and satisfaction with democracy- are subjective phenomena. That is, they can only be measured by citizens' description of their political thoughts. In contrast, the behavioural dependent variables- voting, party membership and other direct and non-conventional forms of participation- are objective and observable. Table 4.1 outlines the core measures used by major cross-national surveys to operationalise the attitudinal and behavioural concepts of interest. What follows is a comparative assessment of the relevant questions and their response options.

[15] See 'Optimisers and satisficers' in appendix (p. 235) for a further discussion on respondent types.

Table 4.1. Existing Measures for Democratic Attitudes and Behaviours

Survey	Target Population	Attitudinal Variables		Behavioural Variables
		Normative Conceptions of Principles	Evaluations of Principles-based Outcomes	Engagement with Institutional Processes
Afrobarometer	Citizens aged 18 years and over in participating African countries	- Approval for undemocratic* forms of government - Preference for democracy amongst others - Meaning of democracy	- SWD - Trust in democratic institutions - Corruption perception of democratic institutions	- Voting - Contacting elites - Engaging in unconventional forms of participation because of dissatisfaction
Arab Barometer	Citizens aged 18 years and over in the MENA region	- IPE and EPE - Essential characteristics of democracy - Democracy suitable for country - Perception of the democratic system	- Trust in democratic institutions - Satisfaction with current government's performance	- Voting - Engaging in unconventional forms of participation - Party closeness
Asian Barometer Survey (ABS)	Citizens of voting age in participating East and South Asian countries	- Regime preference - Essential characteristics of democracy - Preference for democracy amongst others - Superiority of democracy despite flaws - Approval for undemocratic* forms of government - IPE and EPE	- SWD - Trust in democratic institutions - Support for current system of government - Quality of governance	- Voting - Voting frequency - Party membership - Party closeness - Campaigning during national elections - Other forms of participation**
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)	Citizens of voting age in participating countries all over the world	- Efficacy – Who's in power makes a difference - Efficacy – Who people vote for makes a difference	- SWD - Government performance	- Voting - Party identification- close to any party - Party identification- closer to a particular party

European Election Study (EES)	EU citizens aged 18 years and over (16 years in Austria and Malta).	- Commitment to freedom, civil liberties and equal rights - Attitudes towards independent judges and media, towards protests, strong leader - Importance to live in a democracy	- SWD - Trust in National and European parliaments - Government approval	- Voting	
European Social Survey (ESS)	European citizens aged 15 and over	- IPE - EPE - Commitment to freedom and equality - Commitment to rule of law - Tolerance towards migrants/ethnic groups/poor citizens	- Satisfaction with government - SWD - Trust in democratic institutions	- Voting - Party membership - Other forms of participation*	
LatinoBarometer	Latin Americans aged 18 years or older	- Support for democracy - Democracy best form of government - Tolerance towards immigrants	- SWD - Confidence in democratic institutions	- Voted for winning/losing camp (no direct voting question) - Party Alignment	
World Values Survey (WVS)	World population aged 18 years or older	- Attitudes towards democratic and undemocratic* forms of government - Essential characteristics of democracy - Importance to live in a democracy - Tolerance and commitment to equal rights	- Confidence in institutions	- Voting in local and nation election - Party Membership Non-conventional forms of participation	

Notes:

a) EPE = External Political Efficacy; IPE = Internal Political Efficacy; MENA = Middle East and North Africa; SWD = Satisfaction with Democracy

b) The categorisation of the above survey items into principles and processes dimension is based on the discussion in Chapter 2.

c) Afrobarometer items are taken from the merged Round 6 Codebook (Afrobarometer 2016); Arab Barometer items are from the Wave V Questionnaire (Arab Barometer 2019); Asian Barometer items are from the Fourth Wave, Core Questionnaire (ABS 2020b); and, CSES items are from the Integrated Module Dataset (IMD) (CSES 2019); EES items are from the 2019 Voter Study (Schmitt et al. 2019); ESS items are from the Politics theme of the core questionnaire (ESS 2020c); Latinobarometer items are from the 2018 English Codebook (Latinobarometer 2018); WVS items are from the Wave 6 Official Questionnaire (WVS 2012).

d) All surveys are administered face-to-face. CSES, however, employs other modes such a telephone interview (see GESIS 2019 for a comprehensive overview of the sampling method, countries involved and special topics in comparative surveys worldwide)

e) * Undemocratic ways to rule include army, technocrat or strong-leader rule.

f) All but one item (Meaning of democracy in Afrobarometer 2016) is closed.
**Other forms of participation include both traditional (but more direct than the vote) and non-conventional forms of participation like contacting a politician, government or local government official, working in a political party or action group, wearing a campaign badge/sticker, signing a petition, taking part in a lawful public demonstration, boycotting certain products, deliberately buying certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons, donating money to a political organisation or group, participating in illegal protest activities and so on.

Attitudinal Measures

Thus far, I have established that attitudes towards democracy and hence support for democracy has two orientations. The more axiological and normative orientation encompasses adherence to democratic values whereas a more pragmatic orientation comprises trust and evaluations of democratic institutions (Figueiras et al. 2014). That is, there is a distinction between how citizens think their democracy should be and how it actually is. Below are some examples of how these attitudes are operationalized in major surveys.

Political Trust/ Confidence (Evaluative)

Political trust is an evaluative, attitudinal concept. It "refers to government action perceived as being more in the public interest than as a product of popular demand" (Craig 1979, p. 229). Generally speaking, most surveys ask about trust or confidence in a number of democratic political institutions (parliament, government, courts, police, civil society organisations) using the following question:

> *I'm going to name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me how much trust do you have in them? Is it a great deal of trust, quite a lot of trust, not very much trust not very much trust, or none at all?*

This is a closed, multi-item battery which means that the same question gauges sentiments toward several political objects. Closed questions, as opposed to open-ended questions, give respondents a list of response options. Although closed items are easier to administer, code and analyse, the latter capture the sentiments of respondents about the specific topic without coloring their political considerations with response selection. These questions also capture responses that may not necessarily be available in response options or may lie between discreet response options in closed items. A concern about the trust/confidence item is that it encourages satisficing, and hence leads to measurement error. It faces the double danger: a) closed items force respondents to settle for the most "appropriate-sounding answer" (Pasek and Krosnick 2010, p. 34); b) batteries may 'bore' the respondent in leading them to straight-lining (choosing the same response point for all institutions) or, worse, item non-response (not responding to the trust/confidence question).

A closed, multi-item battery with a rating response scale is less suitable than one without a rating scale. As the above question spells out, there are four nominal response options; this is the response format in almost all surveys but the ESS (2020). The ESS provides a rating scale, which is a continuum of response options from 0 *Not at all* to 10 *Completely*. The number of options in the scale is crucial here. Too little response choices can make it hard for respondents to translate their evaluations into responses. On the other hand, the meanings of the several scale points may be unclear and respondents may not uniformly interpret them (Pasek and Krosnick 2010, p.34). ESS's 11-pt scale, where only the poles are labelled, is open to subjective

interpretation. This means that one person's 8 may be another person's 6. Further, rating scales in battery items encourages satisficing by non-differentiation: for example, an individual may straight-line and choose the same rating point in the rating scale (say point 7 in a 1-10 scale of importance of X). One can straight-line in the mid-points and avoid taking a stance (5 for *neither believe*, nor *disbelieve*). This yields misleading data (Alwin and Krosnick 1985).

Political Efficacy (Normative)

Political efficacy is a less common attitudinal concept measured in public opinion surveys. Perhaps the reason for this is that it is often considered a correlate to political trust/confidence in institutions. However, as I have established in Chapter 2, political trust taps into the evaluative dimension of democratic attitudes while political efficacy can be categorised as a normative conceptualisation. It is true that efficacy highly correlates with political trust (Craig 1979, p. 229; Pollock III 1983, p. 403); although they are empirically related, they are conceptually different. Craig (1979) draws a clear distinction: trust differs from (external) efficacy as "the anticipated quality of government outputs" and not "the degree to which an individual perceives his political actions as being (potentially successful)". Quality of government outputs obviously depends on the government of the day and its performance. Political efficacy, on the other hand, is a perception- a conception that one can affect the political system and that the system will be responsive. Therefore, I treat it as a separate class of attitudinal variable.

Saris and Torcal (2009) show the two components of political efficacy - image of self and of the democratic government (Lane 1959, p. 150) – are better measured using direct questions than by batteries with agree/disagree items. Internal efficacy or subjective competence vs external efficacy or system responsiveness can be empirically distinguished (Balch 1974) and should be treated as different variables (Saris and Torcal 2009, p. 15). While the former "should be measured by believes about personal abilities to participate in political activities", the latter "should be measured by believes about the system's reaction to political activities of citizens" (ibid, p. 15).

However, most surveys measure IPE and EPE as objects under the same battery question. Apart from the problems of satisficing discussed earlier, measuring IPE and EPE together may confuse and deviate respondents from the central concept of interest. This leads to measurement errors. Consider the following multi-item battery from the Arab Barometer (2019):

> *Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?*
> *The government does all it can to provide its citizens with necessary services.*
> *Citizens must support the government's decisions, even if they disagree with them.*
> *Political leaders are concerned with the needs of ordinary citizens.*
> *The state has the right to demand that citizens pay taxes without giving them a role in important state decisions.*

Because different concepts are lumped together, it is impossible to motivate respondents to think about system responsiveness and subjective competence only (and not, say, trust). The agree/disagree response options in a Likert scale can cause acquiescence response bias because of a number of reasons: a) conversational conventions force people to be polite and agreeable (Campbell et al. 1960); b) people tend to agree with people higher up in the hierarchy (e.g., researchers) than themselves (Carr 1971); and, c) a satisficer is more likely to agree to a statement than otherwise (Krosnick 1991). Thereupon, and commenting on the low reliability of the agree/disagree items, Saris and Torcal (2009) suggest using direct questions with other nominal response options.

It is worth noting that two surveys- CSES and ESS- deviate from this lumping practice. Rather, they use single items to gauge efficacy. In the ESS (2020), three single items (with 5-pt nominal response options) capture IPE:

> *How often does politics seem so complicated that you can't really understand what is going on?*
>
> *Do you think that you could take an active role in a group involved with political issues?*
>
> *How difficult or easy do you find it to make your mind up about political issues?*

while two single items (with 11-pt rating scale and poles labeled) capture EPE:

> *How much would you say the political system in [country] allows people like you to have a say in what the government does?*
>
> *And how much would you say that the political system in [country] allows people like you to have an influence on politics?*

The CSES (2019) only measures EPE with two single items (5-pt rating scale with extremes labelled):

> *Some people say that it doesn't make any difference who is in power. Others say that it makes a big difference who is in power.*
> *Using the scale on this card, (where ONE means that it doesn't make any difference who is in power and FIVE means that it makes a big difference who is in power), where would you place yourself?*
>
> *Some people say that no matter who people vote for, it won't make any difference to what happens. Others say that who people vote for can make a big difference to what happens. Using the scale on this card, (where ONE means that voting won't make any difference to what happens and FIVE means that voting can make a big difference), where would you place yourself?*

A drawback of this closed item with numeric options is that respondents might be confused about what in-between options (i.e., 2, 3 and 4 in a 5-pt scale) mean. Particularly, the

interpretation of the midpoint of the scale is tricky: does 3 mean *undecided*, *middle stance between the extremes* or *don't know*. Therefore, it is better to have nominal responses rather than unlabeled numeric options. It clarifies what the numbers in the middle of the scale mean and how each response point is different to others.

Satisfaction with Democracy (Evaluative)

Despite its prevalence in public opinion surveys, the SWD question - *Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]?* - is a controversial indicator of democratic support. The main disagreement stems from the uncertainty about the dimension(s) of support it captures. One school of thought argues that it emphasizes the performance of the incumbent authorities (Dalton 1999). The explanation behind this view lies at the key phrase 'how democracy works' in the SWD question: it cues respondents to think about the output of the government. Another view purports that, irrespective of opinions on the incumbent performance, the SWD item captures system support, meaning satisfaction with the country's system of government (including political institutions, constitutions and similar) (Easton 1965; Anderson and Guillory 1997; Fuchs 1999; Klingemann 1999). Since SWD has no mention of political parties, leaders, or institutions, it cannot be an indicator for authorities (Fuchs et al. 1995; Toka 1995). As Lockerbie (1993, p. 282) notes, the question "clearly asks the respondents to evaluate the political regime rather than particular individuals or party(ies) holding power."

Early empirical studies have attempted to settle this debate by correlating the SWD item with other support indicators. Klingemann (1999) shows that SWD correlates to the four-item regime performance scale at a 0.46 level: this is, however, too mixed evidence that the indicator taps into either of system support or incumbent support (Canache et al. 2001). Fuchs (1993), on the other hand, finds the SWD item correlates with items which ask for attitudes towards: a) formal structure of the regime at a 0.49 level; and, b) towards incumbent authorities at a 0.50 level. That is, SWD captures both the objects of support.

Another influential work advance a similar perspective that the SWD indicator is a summary measure which captures attitudes at multiple levels (Clarke et al. 1993). This study finds SWD equally correlates with support for the regime, the political community, and the present government. Although the authors are convinced that SWD "provides a useful overall summary measure of satisfaction with existing democratic political systems" (ibid, p. 1003), a summary measure may discount an individual's inconsistent views when she supports the regime but not the incumbent authorities. Indeed, one cannot differentiate -amongst a respondent's mixed consideration- the level of support for each sub-item. Given the findings, these attempts to iron out the scholarly differences on the SWD item has further intensified the confusion about this controversial indicator.

Even today, the SWD controversy thrives. If we take the easy route to consider it a summary indicator, the SWD item - for any single dimension of support- lacks both construct validity (i.e., we do not know what it measures) and measurement validity (because it could measure more than one aspect) (Canache et al. 2001, p. 525-6; Anderson 2002). Canache et al. (2001, p. 512) reminds us that validity not only requires that the indicator measures the construct in question but also that it only measures that construct: SWD as a summary indicator fails to meet the second validity criterion. This severely jeopardises inferences derived from SWD data. Hence, some surveys totally avoid the SWD question (e.g., Arab Barometer 2019; WVS 2012; see also, suggestion by Canache et al. 2001) while others include an explicit question about satisfaction with (e.g., Arab Barometer 2019) or approval of (e.g., EES, see Schmitt et al. 2019) the current government or government performance (e.g., CSES 2019).

Other Attitudinal Variables

Other attitudes towards democracy are also categorised as *normative conceptions* and *evaluations* of democracy in Table 4.1. These survey items are more direct questions which ask respondents to express their feelings about the concept of democracy or evaluate the institutions of democracy.

Among normative attitudes towards democracy - or how democracy is viewed or should be as a system of government- are:

- approval for undemocratic forms of rule (WVS 2012; Afrobarometer 2016; ABS 2020b),
- preference for democracy (Afrobarometer 2016; ABS 2020b), support for democracy (Latinobarometer),
- essential characteristics or meaning of democracy (WVS 2012; Arab Barometer 2016; ABS 2020b),
- attitude towards or commitment to equal rights, rule of law and other core principles (WVS 2012; Schmitt et al. 2019 (EES); ESS 2020),
- and, tolerance towards outgroups and minorities, which captures commitment to a core democratic principle (WVS 2012; ESS 2020; Latinobarometer 2018).

All but the questions which explicitly enquire on commitment to democratic principles gauge abstract support for democracy. Citizens tend to respond affirmatively when asked about support for democracy (Inglehart 2003; Chu et al. 2008). When answering a question about a concept with positive connotations (such as democracy), respondents may intentionally report wrongly to appear more socially admirable- causing the so-called social desirability bias. The overwhelmingly favourable response across all cultural, institutional and socio-economic contexts raises the question of whether the expressed support is genuine (or valid).

This is the problem of 'regime abstraction' (Kiewiet de Jonge 2016). It occurs when the response does not capture how democracy is actually performing in a country but rather reflects the respondent's perception of an ideal form of democratic governance. Kiewiet de Jonge (2016, p. 712) continues that these abstraction biases can cause statistically significant effects in aggregate survey data. To reduce such biases, Schwertheim (2017) insists that questions prime respondents to think in lines of performance and trust rather than their ideal prototype of democracy. However, I disagree with this view of discounting items which tap into citizens' ideal version of democracy. It is in fact very important to measure expectations and perceptions of reality, particularly to understand how and why the 'democratic paradox' (Dahl 2000b) presents in a polity (see also, Chapter 2).

Given the positive connotations attached to the word 'democracy', the above items on preference, support or meaning of democracy also fall prey to social desirability bias. As I indicated earlier, this may lead citizens to overstate their support. One way to avoid this is to use commitment items which avoid the word democracy (Afrobarometer 2016; ABS 2020b; EES Voter Study 2019 Schmitt et al. 2019).

Behavioural Measures

Behaviours are observable political concepts. As I discuss in Chapter 2, the discrepancy between one's expectations relating to the principles of democracy and the actual realisation of these principles (outcomes) greatly shapes their behaviour and engagement with democratic institutions. Engagement with the processes of democracy is much easier to measure compared to attitudes towards abstract and subjective concepts like trust. Obviously, the reason for this is that actions are more noticeable than thoughts. In other words, it is impossible to observe what is in one's mind rather than what one does. To this end, I assume that achieving construct validity between behavioural constructs and measures is not as challenging as it is for subjective attitudinal variables. Below, I briefly discuss how procedural engagement is operationalised in major surveys (see also Table 4.1):

Voting

The turnout question is straightforward. The question about voting – such as, *did you vote* or *did you cast a ballot*- is a single item with yes/no response options (Arab barometer 2019; CSES 2019). However, the voting question is prone to both acquiescence response bias (affirmation bias) and social desirability bias. In an interview setting, people tend to agree to hierarchies (like the researcher/interviewer); this leads to affirmation bias. A solution for acquiescence bias in yes/no or true/false questions (Fritzley and Lee 2003) is to change question wording to include all the possible views. Some surveys do this (e.g., WVS 2012):

> *When elections take place, do you vote always, usually or never? Please tell me separately for each of the following levels [local level; national level]*

Social desirability bias ensures when people's answers are distorted by social norms, such as the view that good, dutiful citizens always vote. A classic example is lying about voting: individuals claim to cast a ballot when in reality they did not. They lie to appear to have fulfilled their civic duty (Evans et al. 1977). Some surveys use a priming sentence to indirectly inform respondents of the fact that many others may not vote, and they are not 'alone' (ESS 2020):

> *Some people don't vote nowadays for one reason or another. Did you vote in the last [country] national election in [month/year]?*

while ABS (2020b) spell out the (valid) reasons as to why one may not be able to vote:

> *In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people were not able to vote because they were away from home, they were sick or they just didn't have time. How about you? Did you vote in the election [the most recent national election, parliamentary or presidential] held in [year]?*

and the Afrobarometer (2016) allows respondents to choose from a list of multiple statement options as reasons for abstention:

> *Understanding that some people were unable to vote in the most recent national election in [year], which of the following statements is true for you?*
> *You were too young to vote*
> *You were not registered to vote*
> *You voted in the elections*
> *You decided not to vote*
> *You could not find the polling station*
> *You were prevented from voting*
> *You did not have time to vote*
> *You did not vote because you could not find your name in the voters' register*

Other surveys totally avoid asking a direct voting question. Latinobarometer (2018), for instance, instead, ask respondents to report on the party they would vote for in an upcoming election' and whether they voted for the winning or losing party in the past election. These questions kill two birds with one stone: within the single item, respondents have to reveal whether they voted (or would vote) and, if so, report on the party they voted for (or would vote for).

Partisan Alignment

Partisanship or alignment with a political party is measured using very different items across the surveys reviewed above. Some surveys measure proximity or closeness to a political party (ABS 2020b; Arab Barometer 2019): the question of 'Which party if any do you feel closest to?' also identifies non-partisans or apartisans. With a slight variation to this question, CSES (2019) measures whether an individual is close to any or one particular political party, without

requiring the mention of political party. Other surveys ask about party membership using a multi-item battery involving a list of voluntary organisations (WVS 2012; ABS 2020b; ESS 2020). Most, if not all, of these questions are well-designed and the wording is explicit enough for respondents to identify and comprehend the underlying concept of interest.

Other forms of democratic participation

Other forms of participation include both traditional but direct forms of participation (such as contacting a politician and rallying in a political campaign) and unconventional forms of participation (such as boycotting and protesting). Survey items which enquire about other forms of participation are often multi-item batteries with 3 to 5-pt response options. These questions face two notable problems. First, questions about disruptive political action such as protests, and demonstrations can be categorised as sensitive questions and citizens may lie about their involvement. This may particularly be true in situations where the respondent does not approve of the government or is wary of the democratic outputs of the system or simply fears about 'being exposed'. Second, there is a social desirability bias inherent to some of the words used in these questions. Unconventional forms of participation, which may not necessarily be democratic, such as 'illegal protests' (ESS 2020) incline people to deny participation.

So far, in this section I have investigated common surveys to identify and critique the operationalisation of the dependent variables of interest. The review shows that there are several candidates in existing surveys that can represent the outcomes variables in this study. I have chosen the CSES integrated module dataset which provides a time-series of the five standalone modules (CSES 2019). The reasons for this are four. First, since this study focuses on advanced democracies across the world, the only surveys (amongst the ones discussed earlier in this chapter) suitable to represent multiple regions are the CSES and WVS. These rules out the regional barometers. Second, the CSES comprises an array of both micro and macro-level data; the latter is important to investigate the mediating effects of institutions on youth (dis)engagement in advanced democracies. Next, most of the CSES items are single, direct questions instead of multi-item batteries. This means that the survey items are of better quality because they are designed to discourage satisficing. Finally, the CSES is a repeated cross-sectional survey, consistently asking the same questions to multiple cohorts. It provides a long span of reliable data on young people, particularly younger cohorts. This is essential for hierarchical APC modelling to isolate the unique effects of age, period and cohort (Yang 2008; Yang and Land 2006; 2008; Smets and Neundorf 2014; Bell and Jones 2015; Yang and Land 2016), which I discuss in detail in the upcoming methods section.

4.2. Measurement and Variables

This section introduces the CSES variables used in this study. For an enquiry on advanced industrialised democracies, I subset the CSES dataset to include respondents from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. As both economical and industrial frontrunners and consolidated democracies, these countries provide the best cases for the question in hand which looks at youth disengagement in advanced democracies. These countries have experienced similar socio-historic transformations and political arrangements. This is important to assume that individuals from the same generations underwent similar experiences in their formative years across the different countries. Out of the thirty-six current members (OECD 2019), thirty-five countries[16] are chosen based on their availability in the integrated CSES IMD[17] and their Freedom House status (at least partially free)[18]. Having mentioned the cases for the study, in the following paragraphs, I introduce the dependent and independent variables for this study.

A unique feature of this study is its principle versus process approach.[19] From the CSES dataset, the two principle-based variables are: *Who is in power makes a difference?* and *Who people vote for makes a difference?* These are efficacy-based questions where respondents place themselves in a 5-point scale (1 meaning it does not make a difference and 5 meaning it can make a big difference). I transform these into dichotomous scales for reasons of parsimony. I argue that they capture the attitude towards the principles of democracy because efficacy refers to citizens' faith and trust in their system and their own belief that they can understand and influence political affairs. Campbell et al. (1954, p. 187) defines the sense of political efficacy as "the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, i.e., that it is worthwhile to perform one's civic duties. It is the feeling that

[16] The thirty-five OECD countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Great Britain, and the United States. The only OECD country absent in the dataset is Luxembourg.

[17] The CSES IMD dataset comprise of 274,099 observations. Here, a 30% random sample is taken for purposes of multilevel model parsimony. Sampling has been done by country in order to preserve the percentage of respondents in each country group from the original dataset. This truncates the dataset into 63,235 identifiable respondents from the 35 OECD countries.

[18] Out of the thirty-five OECD countries, all but two countries are *Free*. Mexico and Turkey were *Partly Free* in the time period in question (Freedom House 2019a; 2016). Freedom House is a substantive measure of democracy which codes based on a comprehensive list of questions on political rights and civil liberties outcomes in a country (for methodology, see Freedom House 2019b).

[19] The main aim of this thesis is to enquire what democratic disconnect looks like. Since the debate about youth disengagement (Norris 2003; Spannring et al. 2008; Kestilä-Kekkonen 2009; Sloam 2016; Foa and Mounk 2016; 2017) features traditional forms of (electoral) participation, I use that as a class of dependent variable to show that such a disconnect does not happen concurrently with a rejection of democratic ideals. Meaning, young people's move away from electoral participation is not equal to a rejection of the foundational values of democracy. I

But, a focus on electoral participation, in light of the extant literature, does not mean that the dissertation does not acknowledge youth affinity towards other forms of political participatory avenues..

the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change." More specifically, here, both of these variables relate to the self-governance principle of democracy; that is, each individual has the power to shape the decisions which bind her to the society.

The two process-based response variables are turnout and party identification. These are democratic institution-based questions: *Did you cast a ballot?* and *Do you feel close to a political party?* They both are dichotomous variable with yes/no responses. The turnout variable reports yes when the respondent casts a vote in any of the following elections: main election, presidential elections in round 1 or 2 in the survey year, elections in the lower or the upper house. The party identification variable reports yes to any of the following questions: *Are you close to any political party?* or *Do you feel closer to one party?* Because these questions inquire about engagement in the procedural aspects of democracy, they belong to the process category of dependent variables.

The main independent variables are the time-related factors, namely age, period and cohort (or generation). The age variable represents the biological process of aging. For the purposes of the analysis, those below the age of 18 and over 90 are removed such that all respondents have had an opportunity to participate. Younger citizens have very little chance to participate while older people have mobility issues (Grasso 2014, p. 69). To avoid issues from multicollinearity, I replace the age variable with a mean-centred age-squared term (age-47.55 squared). When fitting a regression model, multicollinearity- when predictors are highly correlated- can be problem. This can make the estimates very sensitive, which may erroneously change in response to minor changes in the model or the data. None of the other predictors are highly correlated except for age and cohort, obviously because both, one's age and the generation one is in, depends on their birth year. Mean-centring the age-squared variable reduces Pearson's correlation coefficient, *r*, from 0.91 to 0.11. This transformation is useful also because there is an expected curvilinear relationship of age, especially with turnout (Smets and Neundorf 2014, p. 45).

Previous studies have employed multiple ways of operationalising the generation variable. The biggest challenge is when we apply boundaries to slice cohorts. There is an inevitable risk of losing information by applying ambiguous cuts or wrong boundaries (Spitzer 1973 p. 1358; Rosow 1978 p. 69). Here, following Grasso's (2014) theoretically-sound splicing method, I transform the continuous year of birth/age variable into a four-category cohort variable. Using generalise additive mixed models (GAMMs), Grasso (2014) provides empirical robustness check for the cohort categorisation to show that the theoretically informed cut-offs are free from bias. Similarly, here (see Table 4.2), the five cohorts are: Post-WWII generation (birth year: 1926-1945, era: 1946- 1965); 60s-70s generation (birth year:1946-1957, era: 1966-1977); 80s generation (birth year: 1958-1968, era: 1978-1988); 90s generation (birth year:1969-1979, era: 1989-1999); and, 00s generation (birth year: 1980-1998, era: 2000-

2008/16). Splitting year of birth into five-category cohort variable is an imperative strategy to estimate the otherwise collinear APC effects.

Table 4.2. Summary of political generations

						Democratic Attitudes		Democratic Behaviours	
	n	Birth years	Formative years	Age range during CSES surveys	Major political experiences when young	Power makes a difference? (%)	Vote makes a difference? (%)	Cast a ballot? (%)	Feel close to a political party? (%)
Generation									
Post - WWII	14, 162	1926-1945	1946- 1965	51- 90	Reconstruction	78.91	81.30	86.58	67.94
60s - 70s	14, 163	1946-1957	1966-1977	39- 70	Affluence, radicalism	78.61	82.21	85.89	65.83
80s	13, 502	1958-1968	1978-1988	28- 58	Crisis, individualism	78.65	81.69	82.48	61.85
90s	11, 527	1969-1979	1989-1999	17- 47	Pragmatism, terrorism, financial crisis	80.82	81.76	77.51	57.31
00s	7, 882	1980-1998	2000-2008/16	0-36	Networked individualism, global recession, climate change	80.10	82.35	70.36	56.77

Source: CSES IMD (1996-2016) and adapted from Grasso (2014, p. 66)

Notes: Age when the CSES (1996-2016) surveys were on the field does not mean that members from the generation were all part of the target population. In post-electoral surveys, only eligible citizens of voting age are interviewed. Percentages for the DVs report affirmative responses for those who reported on the items (e.g., among those who reported on the turnout question 'Did you cast a ballot?', 77.51% of the 90s respondents said 'Yes').

Democratic engagement is not solely influenced by time factors. In order to isolate both generational differences, it is important to control for individual level factors[20] such as gender, household income, rural residency and political ideology, some of which account for socio-economic status (Verba et al. 1995; Solt 2008). The household income variable reports the income quintiles based on the gross annual income, before tax and deductions, from all sources of all members in the family. Political ideology reports the respondent's self-placement in the ideological scale (left, centre or right). Education attainment is a categorical variable based on the highest educational attainment and not enrolment (none, primary, high secondary, post-secondary (non-university), university (and beyond)).[21] Education is well-regarded as a key factor which boosts support for democratic principles and practices; in order to investigate whether education has an independent effect on the dependent variables or it moderates the relationship between generations and the dependent variables, I also include an interaction term in my models in Chapter 5. Strong socio-structural predispositions are expected to lead to stable vote choices and party affiliations (Lachat 2007). Therefore, I expect a positive relationship between the dependent variables and the controls.

[20] In all cases, I recoded 'don't know' and 'refused' responses as 'missing'.
[21] CSES surveys do not record post-graduate studies as an independent category.

Prior research has paid little attention to cross-national impact of certain micro and marco-level factors in a multi-level framework. Previously, I have justified the need to test three factors – religion, media use and political institutions - beyond socio-economic determinants of engagement that present three distinct puzzles relating to youth disengagement. In this study, I leverage on a longer span of cross-sectional data available today in the CSES Integrated Module Database (IMD) between 1996-2016 to test the hypotheses presented in Chapter 3.
To evaluate the effect of religion in Chapter 6, I created the *religious affiliation* variable - a dummy which records 1 for individuals following any religion (*religious*) and 0 for those following no religion (*non-religious*). This chapter focuses on religious attitude and not practice due to the unavailability of data on religious attendance. A justification of this research design is that, religious affiliation has been previously identified as a predictor for religious and civic participation (Smidt 1999).

This chapter also investigates the effect of context on the relationship between religion and democratic engagement using two macro-level variables. The first context-level variable records the *proportion of religious people* in the sample in each country (no. of religious people/total no. of self-proclaimed religious + non-religious people). The second macro variable, *cultural cluster*, groups the 35 OECD countries into cultural zones based on Inglehart-Welzel's cultural map of the world scatterplot (2005, p. 64, based on the World Values Surveys). This map is seminal to identify cultural schisms among the global society. It depicts two distinct dimensions of cross-cultural variance: "traditional values versus secular-rational values and survival values versus self-expression values". Inglehart and Welzel group countries into meaningful cultural clusters, based on the assumption that attitudes are highly correlated with the philosophical, political, and religious ideas historically and distinctly dominant in each of these regions (Welzel 2013). Inglehart and Welzel (2005) assert that, in order to determine a country's location, its religious and cultural historical heritage are as important as its socio-economic status. Further detail about these 'contextual variables' can be found in the appendix (p. 236).

In Chapter 7 the main independent variable is media use for political reasons. The CSES item which captures this concept asks '*And how closely do you follow politics on TV, radio, newspapers, or the Internet? Very closely, fairly closely, not very closely, or not at all?*' [22]. Two points about this survey item are noteworthy. First, it specifically asks respondents about their politically motivated media use. However, I assume it also captures some incidental and 'soft' exposure to political information (Baum and Jamison 2006), which is particularly known to benefit young people who are less interested in traditional politics and are thereby not necessarily looking for information about public affairs via hard news (Boyd 2008).

[22] Please note, unlike other empirical chapters which use CSES IMD (1996-2016), Chapter 5 uses data from 24 OECD countries available in CSES Module 5 (2016-2021) because of the unavailability of the appropriate media use items in the IMD.

Second, this survey item aggregates consumption across all media types. It limits this chapter's ability to comment on, say, the varying potential of the traditional and new digital media in revolutionizing youth engagement. Yet, this catch-all variable is valid to test the effects of political media use - irrespective of the media platform - on youth democratic behaviours. In addition, the chosen survey item clearly controls for the motivation of media use. Oftentimes, survey items focus more on the medium of the message rather than the nature of the message. Bimber and Copeland (2013) argue that, for this reason, the relationship between technology use and participation is not consistent and robust longitudinally. Using the CSES item, which asks respondents to report on their media use for political reasons, circumvents this problem.

What further homogenises and justifies the CSES item for measuring the independent variable is that, to younger generations, the internet may not necessary be a 'new' news source. Using factor analysis that included various news sources, Baumgartner and Morris (2010) show that to young adults in the US, not all internet news sources are the same and they consider reading news on the internet as a 'traditional' method of news gathering. For a generation which has never lived in a world without the internet, this is unsurprising (Jennings and Zeitner 2003; Swigger 2013). And considering the broader population, some earlier works highlight that internet news seem to complement traditional news and not replace them as people may seek for political information (in political blogs, web pages of candidates and advocacy organisations) that they have come across in traditional news media (Althaus and Tewksbury 2000). Curran et al. (2013), in a comparative study, similarly show that the online and offline news mediums are very similar since media conglomerates extend their reach across mediums. All these media outlets have one thing in common: while people learn civic-style facts in textbooks, information about current affairs come from the news media (Jerit et al. 2006).

Chapter 8 acknowledges that individuals are nested within countries. The key institutional factors used in this chapter are: *electoral formula* (in the lower house), *type of executive*, *constitutional federal structure*, *power-sharing index* (an additive index of the first three, à la Norris 2008; Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2010), *age of current (democratic) regime* and the *registration system*. The models in this chapter also employ a number of institutional controls: *compulsory voting*, *compulsory registration*, *number of parties participating in elections*, *party system* and *voting age*. Among these, the *party system*, *compulsory registration*, *registration system* and *voting age* variables are not present in the CSES IMD dataset. For each country, I coded these variables using fact sheets. For further details, see Table A in appendix (p. 237).

Among the CSES coded variables, *electoral formula* denotes whether the country uses a majoritarian, proportional or a mixed formula in the lower house. A political regime is parliamentary if executive (Prime Minister and Cabinet) is accountable to an elected legislative body - otherwise, it is presidential (with an elected chief executive/President) or mixed (with an elected President and a Prime minister whose executive power is derived from the

legislature). Among the two *constitutional federal structures*, federations are "compound polities, combining strong constituent units and strong general government, each possessing power delegated to it by the people through a constitution and each empowered to deal directly with the citizens in the exercise of the legislative, administrative, and taxing powers, and each directly elected by the citizens" (Watts 2008, p. 12). The *number of parties participating in elections* variable reports about participating political parties in the main election, excluding independent candidates and separately counting member parties of coalitions. This variable, along with the *party system* variable, is added in the models to test whether PR systems facilitate turnout (or other DVs) because of the presence of more parties (party mobilisation mechanism).

Turning to *regime age*, some studies define it as a binary variable distinguishing old from new democracies (Huntington 1991; Muhlberger and Paine 1993; Dunn 2005; Kitanova 2020) However, the question now is what distinguishes an old from a new democracy. Past studies have stamped a polity as an old democracy if it had twenty years of continuous functioning of the democratic process (Nohlen 2022; Karp and Banducci 2007). Nový and Katrnak (2015, p. 3) criticise this dichotomy and opt for a continuous scale because the former scale wrongly categorises newer democracies as old. They turn our attention to Spain, Portugal and Greece – the three Southern European post-authoritarian states which have undergone the process of transition in the late 1970s. These countries, under the dichotomous scale, can be considered the rightful members of the old club, alongside countries like the United States which has had democracy established more than two centuries ago. Additionally, post-communist countries which democratised after the Cold War may also be considered old democracies, despite the politics in these polities being diametrically different from older Western democracies (Rose 2009; Kostadinova 2003; Pacek et al. 2009). Bearing this erroneous process in mind, I follow the latter operationalisation of the variable.

Another control variable, *compulsory voting (CV)*, warrants attention here. Voting is compulsory in a country where all eligible citizens are obligated to exercise their right to vote. Among the 35 cases, only Australia and Belgium strictly enforce compulsory voting with sanctions. Evidently, compulsory voting increases turnout. From a rational choice perspective, introducing sanctions into the voter's utility calculation increases the cost of abstention. CV is also argued to increase popular legitimacy of governments, ensuring that politicians reach out to and public policies are attentive of historically marginalised groups, such as young people (Smith 2016). That is, an element of compulsion is also placed on the politicians: they are forced to address issues which concern young people in order to gain their votes. In addition to behaviour, CV impacts voter attitudes by normalising voting and spurring interest in politics (Hill 2010). It challenges citizens to be politically involved. For instance, Australia, a similar parliamentary system to the UK but one that exercises compulsory voting, has younger people who take greater interest in politics (Smith 2016; Chowdhury 2021). Hill (2010) suggests that the Australian youth grow up appreciating voting as a social obligation. This is in line with

Franklin's (2004) work which highlights that when young people vote in their first eligible elections, they are more likely to continue doing so in subsequent elections. That is, the first vote, and that too in a compulsory voting setting, kick-starts a lifelong habit of voting. Considering this discussion, it is important to control for CV in the following models. Table 4.3 summarises all the variables discussed thus far.

Table 4.3. Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	St. dev.	Min.	Max.
Survey Year	2005.68	5.79	1996	2016
Demographic				
Age	47.55	17.20	18	90
Age^2	296.00	311.00	0.20	1802.00
Generation/Cohort	2.76	1.34	1 (post-WWII)	5 (00s Generation)
Gender	0.52	0.50	0 (Male)	1 (Female)
Household Income	2.94	1.38	1 (Lowest Quintile)	5 (Highest Quintile)
Education level	3.17	1.19	1 (None)	5 (University)
	5.08	1.94	0 (None)	9 (Highest ISCED level)
Religious Affiliation	0.82	0.38	0 (No religion)	1 (Religion)
Proportion of religiously affiliated	0.76	0.13	0.48	0.94
Culture Clusters	2.74	1.71	1 (Protestant Europe)	8 (Baltic)
Internal Efficacy	0.78	0.41	0 (No)	1 (Yes)
View Represented by Party?	0.59	0.49	0 (No)	1 (Yes)
Political Interest	0.64	0.48	0 (No)	1 (Yes)
Use of Media to Follow Politics?	2.37	0.85	1 (Very Closely)	1 (Not at All)
---binary	0.57	0.49	0 (No)	1 (Yes)
Macro institutional variables				
Compulsory Voting	3.63	0.85	1 (Strictly Enforced)	4 (No CV)
Electoral Formula	2.04	0.65	1 (Majoritarian)	3 (Mixed)
Type of Executive	1.99	0.50	1 (Presidential)	3 (Mixed)
Constitutional federal structure	0.38	0.48	1 (Unitary)	2 (Federal)
Party System	1.83	0.38	1 (Two Party)	2 (Multi Party)
Number of parties participating in election	22	17.1	6	121
Registration Compulsion	0.81	0.39	0 (No)	1 (Yes)
Registration System	0.88	0.32	1 (Self-initiated)	2 (State-initiated)
Age of Current Regime	64.0	51.4	0	203
Voting Age	18.0	0.25	16	19
Power-sharing index	5.05	0.52	4 (Low)	6 (High)
Response				
Attitudes Towards the Principles of Democracy				
Who is in Power Makes a Difference?	0.79	0.41	0 (No)	1 (Yes)
Who People Vote for Makes a Difference?	0.82	0.39	0 (No)	1 (Yes)
Engagement with the Processes of Democracy				
Turnout	0.82	0.39	0 (No)	1 (Yes)
Party Identification	0.63	0.48	0 (No)	1 (Yes to either)

Source: CSES IMD (1996-2016)

Finally, Chapter 9 presents a unique empirical analysis in Australia using the Australian Election Study (AES) data. The suite of independent (time variables), dependent and control variables are operationalised almost the same as above, with obvious nuances particular to the

Australian context. For the sake of parsimony and to avoid unnecessary confusion in the reader's mind, I revisit these data particulars again in Chapter 9.

4.3. Methods of Analysis

I employ quantitative methods to conduct the analysis using the Stata15 software program. In the initial instance, before conducting regression analyses, I present descriptive statistics to provide visual insights about how each independent variable impacts youth democratic attitudes and behaviours in advanced democracies.

On this section of methods of analysis, a brief discussion on the highly correlated time factors and the methodological problem that they present is warranted. This is because it has direct implication on the choice and analysis of a long span of survey data. As introduced earlier, the main independent variables of interest in this study are the three features of time progress. The age variable represents the biological process of aging. Cohort or a generation is defined as a group of individuals who were born at the same time and had formative ages in the same political, economic and social context (Mannheim 1928). A period influence, like the year of the election and therefore the year the survey was organised, effects all ages in the same way and varies independent of individuals. In this study, young people refer to both individuals belonging to newer cohorts and individuals who are relatively in an earlier stage of ageing. It is, however, the aim of this study to figure out which of the two - of lifecycle or generational effect, while controlling for period effects- shape democratic attitudes and behaviours amongst young citizens.

Like any project on time effects, this study faces the classic challenge of disentangling age, period and cohort effects (Mason et al. 1973; Riley 1973; Glenn 1976; 2005). The age-period-cohort (APC) identification problem (Harding 2009, p. 1450) arises because the three are exact linear functions. It has fuelled a vivid methodological debate and scholars have suggested different ways of tackling it (Glenn 2005; Mason et al. 1973; O'Brien, Hudson, and Stockard 2008). One method is to apply functional restrictions on the models with a continuous age variable and dummies to capture period and cohort effects. This commonly used approach, however, makes nearly implausible assumptions about the relationship between the variables. Another approach is to include proxies for these variables. This method also has its limitations as one particular variable cannot fully capture the whole cohort effect that a researcher is interested in. Furthermore, this does not solve the collinearity problem because if the proxy variable perfectly captures cohort effects, then it will intrinsically relate to other time-related variables (Vallée-Dubois, Dassonneville, and Godbout 2020). The APC debate is far from settled as new methods to solve the problem are still being developed (Neundorf and Niemi 2014).

Studies using traditional statistical methods have faltered to statistically estimate the unique effect of one while controlling for the other two. Today, however, the advance in social

statistical literature suggests that hierarchical modelling, using repeated cross-sectional survey data, solves this problem (Yang 2008; Yang and Land 2006; 2008; Smets and Neundorf 2014; Bell and Jones 2015; Yang and Land 2016). In this study, I follow Yang and Land's (2006, 2008) suggestion and use hierarchical APC (HAPC) models. In repeated cross-sectional surveys, individual respondents from the same sampling frame (i.e., countries) are surveyed repeatedly over time (after each national election). Individuals are clustered in cells cross-classified by two types of social context, namely cohorts and periods (Yang and Land 2008, p. 86). This allows to test the effect of macro variables-measured for specific cohorts or periods (survey years)-on an outcome. Fixed models fall short in accounting for the hierarchical structure of the data (Yang 2008, p. 212). In contrast, multi-level mixed models acknowledge the hierarchy whereby individuals sharing the same context are nested in cohorts and periods. Here, the HAPC models[23] with random intercepts account for error-correlation (Dassonneville 2013; Smets and Neundorf 2014, p. 43). This successfully breaks the linearity of the APC model.



Figure 4.2. The HAPC model.

Notes: Individuals of different ages are nested within period or cohort (or generation) groups. This is a cross-classified model because there is no strict hierarchy; periods do not nest within cohort groups and vice versa (Bell and Jones 2014; 2015). Such an analysis therefore requires a long time span (usually over 10 years) to avoid high correlation between age and cohort groups.

An HAPC cross-classified random effects model (CCREM) for a dichotomous dependent variable can be specified as a logistic regression model as follows:

$$\log (\pi_{ijk} / 1- \pi_{ijk}) = \beta_{0jk} + \beta_1 * \text{Age}^2 + \Sigma \beta_m * X_{mi} \quad (1)$$

where p is the probability of a yes response in a survey of the ith respondent for $i = 1,\ldots,n_{jk}$ individuals within the jth cohort for $j = 1,\ldots, J$ cohorts and the kth time period (survey year)[24] for $k = 1,\ldots,K$. Further the model controls for m individual characteristics ($m = 1,\ldots,M$) X such as gender, religiosity, income and others described previously. The model includes a random intercept β_{0jk} (equation 2), which specifies that the overall mean of the dependent variable of interest varies from cohort to cohort and from period to period. The following equation elaborates this:

[23] The HAPC cross-classified random effects model (CCREM) for a dichotomous dependent variable can be specified as a logistic regression model.
[24] Or election year because both are almost perfectly correlated.

$$\beta_{0jk} = \beta_0 + u_{0j0} + v_{00k} + e_{ijk} \quad (2)$$

where β_0 is the mean effect of all time periods across all cohorts. u_{0j0}, v_{00k} and e_{ijk} represent the random effects while all other components of equation 1, including β_0 in equation 2, refer to the fixed effects. All these error terms are separately independently normally distributed with mean zero and some variance parameter which is estimated. u_{0j0} denotes a cohort-specific error term ($u_{0j0} \sim N(0, \sigma_{0j0}^2)$) and v_{00k} a time-specific error term ($v_{00k} \sim N(0, \sigma_{00k}^2)$). e_{ijk} denotes the individual level error ($e_{ijk} \sim N(0, \sigma_{ijk}^2)$).

A similar hierarchical modeling approach is imperative in Chapter 8, which acknowledges that individuals are nested within countries. In this chapter, beyond HAPC models, it is also important to consider the group effects that arise country membership. Here, I employ multilevel modelling[25] with logit link function where the responses are modified to be binary. This modelling technique is suitable because of its ability to combine common characteristics from the micro dimension with those from the macro dimension while assuming that the variation in the response comprises two parts- the within- and between-group components (Nový and Katrnak 2015, p. 6).

Overall, this chapter broadly justifies the data and method chosen for the research in hand. First, since I am not designing my own survey to collect data, I resort to a quality check to assess whether existing survey items are suitable to represent the concepts of interest. Following a discussion on sources of survey errors, this quality assessment is based on whether questions discourage satisficers and encourage optimisers to produce valid and reliable responses. Next, I discuss the dependent and independent variables chosen from the CSES dataset. An issue to look out for in this study of young people is the APC identification problem. Disentangling the three-time effects have been an enduring methodological struggle: traditional statistical methods have faltered to estimate the unique effect of one while controlling for the other two. But hierarchical modelling techniques using repeated cross-sectional surveys overcome this problem, which renders the CSES the most suitable dataset for my study on youth disengagement. With this methodological setup, the next chapter tackles the first question of the thesis: are young people turning away from the principles or the processes of democracy?

[25] A point to note is that MLM models in comparative politics are different from those employed in education research, where the estimation techniques were originally developed and applied (Anderson and Singer 2008, p. 571). Particularly, it is important to remember that these were designed for a large number of higher-level cases (e.g., schools) and a moderate number of lower-level cases (e.g., individuals). In political science, however, the number of macro-level cases are often smaller (ranging between 15 and 25) while the number of micro-level cases are larger (>1,000 per country). Although there are no strict rules in the number of cases, Steenbergen and Jones's (2002) piece which introduces the technique to political science uses 13 cases. Anderson and Singer (2008, p. 571) stress that a macro-level *N* of 15 means that the degrees of freedom diminish quickly and should prompt us to think how comfortable we are with regressing country-level with such an *N*.

Chapter 5

Are Young People Turning Away from Democracy?

"But there is simply no evidence in the current set of studies
that the public in consolidated democracies is turning against democracy"
- (Voeten 2016, p. 12)

Are younger people turning away from democracy? Over the past decades, the decline in electoral turnout has been disproportionately concentrated amongst young people (Blais 2000; Blais and Rubenson 2013; Klingemann 2014; Stoker 2006). Although classical theorists predicted that younger and more educated citizens will value civic participation and become more supportive of the democratic system, the political culture today looks quite different (Almond and Verba 1963; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba et al. 1995). However, scholars are divided on whether youth disengagement from electoral aspects of democracy should be considered a symptom of disregard for democratic values (Foa and Mounk 2016; Voeten 2016). This debate raises the question: are young people rejecting the fundamental principles of democracy or are they disengaging from the traditional, institutional processes?

Social modernisation theory hypothesizes that gradual value change removes younger and more educated cohorts from the traditional processes - but not the core principles- of democracy. By contrast, political socialisation theory suggests that each cohort has distinct attitudes and behaviours based on the political and social context of their formative years. Both these theories acknowledge that societal transformations or differences across generations are responsible for differentiated democratic engagement across generations. But, while modernisation theory suggest that these societal transformations are a continuous process leading to a gradual decline in engagement, socialisation theory implies a more fragmented process. In this chapter, I test generational interpretations of modernisation and socialisation theories using multilevel models to isolate and control for age and period effects.

My findings suggest there is no generational difference in the commitment for the core principles of democracy in advanced democracies, while modernisation theory best explains youth disengagement from the procedural aspects of democracy. In the second section, I review the debate on youth disengagement, focusing on the two major gaps in the literature- namely, the conceptualisation of 'democracy' and of 'young' people- that are responsible for the lack of scholarly consensus. Next, using results from hierarchical APC models, I discuss how the changing social context is a continuous and not a fragmented process. And that societal modernisation is an evolutionary process of many long-term societal transformations that differentially distributes resources across generations. This sets the stage for further analyses, beyond generational enquiries, about how some key components of societal modernisation

may explain differences in democratic engagement among younger cohorts. The final section concludes.

5.1. Youth Disengagement – An Unresolved Puzzle

There is no consensus about youth disengagement in advanced democracies due to two main reasons. First, the very conceptualisation of the key concept – democracy- is the crux of the matter. Democracy has multiple dimensions beyond its electoral domain. Which dimension, if any, are young people turning away from? To answer this question, one must acknowledge the principles (central tenets of democracy that set it apart from its alternatives) and the processes (the institutions in place to meet principle-based expectations and reach democratic outcomes) dimensions of democracy.

Although many studies suggest that young people are turning away from traditional procedures of democracy, it still unclear whether they are rejecting the principles of democracy. One side of the debate argues that when citizens disengage from the institutions, it does not necessarily translate into their disapproval for the principles of democracy (Norris 2002; Dalton 2008; Voeten 2016). On the other hand, Foa and Mounk (2016) claim that young people- particularly the millennial generation - are discarding both the principles and the processes of democracy. However, this study, and hence the claim, has three shortcomings. The first critique is that there has been a selective presentation of data. When compared with their parents and grandparents, there is evidence in Anglo - American democracies that millennials express weaker approval of democratic values. But this is not a consistent pattern across two - dozen diverse Western democracies; elsewhere, in several countries such as Spain and France, there are no significant trends by birth cohort. Furthermore, there are problems in their measurements. People are asked to place themselves on a 10-point scale where 1 meant that living in a democracy is “not at all important” and 10 “absolutely important.” Foa and Mounk’s (2016) visual representation of disengagement only plots the percentage of people who answered 10. The graph treats the people who place themselves at 1 as having the same commitment to democracy as those who answer 9.

Second, what Foa and Mounk (2016) find may be a lifecycle pattern rather than a generational effect. The WVS did not ask the exact same question in previous versions of the survey and authors do not use longitudinal survey data where the same questions are measured over many years. The authors use cohort analysis without accounting for lifecycle effect. This critique will be clearer when I unpack time-related effects in some upcoming paragraphs. The third critique is that, can they even compare the cohorts? Support ratings for democracy are largely incomparable across birth cohorts. The moral values on which people base their democratic support have turned dramatically more liberal over the generations. As a consequence, support for democracy has changed its meaning: while older generations

continue to endorse illiberal notions of democracy, younger generations support an unequivocally liberal notion.

Using the same dataset as Foa and Mounk (2016), a recent study systematically disapproves the claim that young people have become more cynical about the value of the democratic regime (Voeten 2016). This study shows that support for democracy and non-democratic alternatives have been static for the last twenty years (see also, Norris 2017). Procedural preference may be changing but there is no question on the legitimacy of the regime. This is in line with another recent work which finds that variations in participation pose no threat to the foundational values of democracy (Ferrin and Kriesi 2016).

The existing explanations, which deal with why one would disengage from the processes and principles of democracy, are largely based on generational or cohort analysis. Societal modernisation account posits that younger cohorts with higher levels of education and post-materialistic values are more likely to shun hierarchical, elite-directed institutional activities such as voting (Inglehart 1977; 1990; Grasso 2014). Therefore, each younger cohort is expected to engage less in institutional activities compared to the previous cohorts. In contrast, according to political socialisation theory, both attitudes towards the principles and engagement with processes of democracy depends on the political and social context where one spends their formative years. For example, the cohort which had formative years in the 60s and 70s may have a higher proclivity to protest because of the highly politicised environment then.

Cognitive mobilisation thesis, in a similar vein to societal modernisation, suggests that contemporary electorates do not need to rely on partisan cues anymore because of expanding political skills and resources (Dalton 1984; 2007). Both of these accounts are in line with the natural process of generational replacement: economic affluence results in younger cohorts with more educated, politically-sophisticated and socially-independent citizens (Inglehart 1977; Norris 1999a). Each new cohort view citizenship more as a right than as a duty and thus feel little remorse in abstention. Their realistic, and perhaps cynical view of politics explains the disengagement from traditional democratic processes. It is important to highlight that cognitive mobilisation provides an adequate explanation to the puzzle that better educated younger generations (cf. Almond and Verba 1963) are turning away from certain democratic processes due to their rich cognitive resources. These resources allow engagement in politics without the reliance on traditional institutions of democracy (like political parties).

Some scholars challenge the generational interpretations (Franklin 2004; Franklin et al. 2004). This ties into the second issue which prevents the lack of consensus regarding youth democratic disengagement. And it relates to the conceptualisation of the term ‘young’. So far, in this chapter, I have discussed generational explanations for disengagement, but Franklin argues that changes in procedural engagement occur due to the changes in the newly

enfranchised group which has recently reached voting age (see also, Plutzer 2002). That means, he proposes differences among age groups and not generations (lifecycle vs cohort effects). Although older people have acquired a habit or an inertia to vote or to abstain, irrespective of what happens in each campaign, new voters are open to new information and will make electoral decisions based on the context. Franklin identifies two culprits responsible for lower engagement among young people. The first is the lowering of voting age from 21 to 18 which means that new voters have just left home, do not have a fully established social network and, thus, do not fully get a chance to socialize to become habitual voters. The second reason for low turnout is the changes to electoral competition. Franklin (2004) shows that parties with a majority status produce clearer outcomes than coalition government and this makes it easier for new voters to make electoral decisions. Johnston et al. (2006) find similar results in Canada. Although these studies signal both lifecycle and period effects, they do not include any (convincing) control for generational effects.

In fact, most studies on young people overlook the age-period-cohort (APC) identification problem which explains a lack of consensus around the generational interpretations of youth disengagement. The APC identification problem (Harding, 2009, p. 1450) arises because age, period and cohort are exact linear functions. While traditional statistical methods have failed to estimate the unique effect of one while controlling for the other two, hierarchical modelling using repeated cross-sectional survey data tackles the problem (Bell and Jones 2015; Smets and Neundorf 2014; Yang and Land 2016). Using multilevel models to control for age and period effects, I test the following generational hypotheses:

> *H5.1 (modernisation hypothesis): Each subsequent cohort engages less with the traditional processes of democracy compared to previous cohorts.*
>
> *H5.2 (socialisation hypothesis): Each cohort has distinct attitudes towards both the principles and engagement with the processes of democracy.*

5.2. Age, Period and Cohort Analysis of Youth Disengagement

The aim of this section is to test the modernisation and socialisation hypotheses to answer whether and how young people are turning away from democracy. In other words, how does youth democratic disengagement exhibit – is it disengagement from the principles and/or processes of democracy? And who exactly is disengaging - is it people who are young in age or younger generations?

Prior to estimating the multilevel models, here I present a descriptive analysis of the variations in the dependent variables by age, cohort and period. Figure 5.1 reports the evolution in response in each of the principle and process variables. The y axes measure the mean of each dependent variable calculated based on each category of the independent variable. The first

plot shows that the average support for democratic principles (*power makes a diff? and vote makes a diff?*) remains more or less same throughout the lifecycle. However, looking at the process variables, voting behaviour follows a curvilinear pattern. Turnout appears to stabilize at its peak propensity of approximately 85 per cent between the ages 55 and 75.

These observations are consistent with previous studies: voting stabilises in middle-age as people settle down, buy a house and start a family. Many of these processes demand time and involvement with organisations and communities which enhance political mobilisation (Kinder 2006). On the two extremes of the life-cycle are young people and older people. Young people have low attachment to civic life as they are preoccupied with completing education, finding a partner and building a career. Oftentimes, they are politically inexperienced and lack the skills to participate (Jankowski and Strate 1995, p. 91). On the other end are older people whose participation levels falter as they retire and experience health problems and lower household income.

Consistent with early findings, the first plot in Figure 5.1 also shows that party alignment increases throughout the voter's adult years (Campbell et al. 1960; Shively 1979). Abramson (1976) challenged this prevailing view contending that partisanship is not acquired through a life-cycle process but rather occurs due to generational change; however, he implicitly assumes that period effects were negligible (Glenn 1972). Converse (1976) finds that period effects overwhelm all other effects while a generational interpretation is implausible. Taken together, early debates demonstrate that all these studies are plagued with the APC identification problem.

Turning to the second plot, there is no fluctuation in average support for democratic principles across generations. For example, those who had their formative years in the 90s are no different in their commitment to the principles of democracy from those who had their formative years in the 80s or before. Here again, there is a gradual decline in engagement with the processes of democracy across generations: younger generations are less likely to vote and align with a political party. The third plot in Figure 5.1 traces the evolution of support for the dependent variables over time. Because the dataset comprises thirty-five polities, it is difficult to pinpoint the exact events responsible for this context-sensitive plot. Nonetheless, one observation stands out: compared to all other dependent variables, partisan alignment has been consistently low in advanced democracies. In particular, the two years that draw attention are 2000 and 2016 with the lowest recorded alignment with a political party across advanced democracies.



Source: CSES IMD (1996-2016)

Figure 5.1. APC effects on democratic attitudes and behaviours.

Note: The plots present attitudes towards two democratic principles (*Who's in power can make a difference?* and *Who people vote for can make a difference?*) and engagement with two democratic processes (*Did you cast a ballot?* and *Do you feel close to any political party?*).

Cross-classified multilevel models distinguish generational effects from period effects, while also taking into account age differences in attitudes and behaviours towards democracy. In each model in Figure 5.2, age is a fixed effect (same regression intercept for all individuals) whereas generations (cohorts) and election years (period) are specified as random effects (where regression intercepts vary among groups).[26] Each ordinal response variable has been re-coded as binary variable for the sake of parsimony; hence, all models are regressed as logit

[26] Variance partition coefficients (VPCs) tell us the proportion of the observed variation in response that lies at each level of the model hierarchy (Leckie, 2013). Therefore, VPCs allow us to establish the relative importance of individuals, cohorts and survey years as sources of variation of democratic behaviour. In logit models it is calculated as [(random effects variance)/ (random effects variance+3.29)] *100. The VPCs for survey year in the cross-classified models of the DVs are: VPC_{power} = 2% , VPC_{vote} = 1%, $VPC_{turnout}$ = 3% , $VPC_{partyidentification}$ = 2%.

models.[27] Only the fixed effects of the four models are presented in coefficient plots in Figure 5.2: here, the estimated coefficient of each variable (with 95% confidence intervals) shows how the effect of each predictor differs from zero. Those in the zero-line have no significant association with the outcome variables.

In all cases, the age-squared term[28] sits on the zero line, meaning that there is no association between one's age and their democratic attitude and behaviour. This suggests no lifecycle effect: people with a lower age are no different from those who are older. Therefore, some other time effect is at play here. It is evident, however, that generational differences are significantly different from zero for the process variables, but not for the principles of democracy.[29] This is strong evidence in support of H5.1 – the modernisation hypothesis - which proposes that each subsequent cohort disengage from the processes, but not the principles, of democracy.

Among socio-demographic traits, females have a significantly higher odds than males in believing that power and vote makes a difference (i.e., the principles). In terms of processes, females have lower odds of voting (although not significant) and aligning with a political party. Respondents from the upper household income quintiles have higher odds of having pro-democratic attitudes and of engaging in democratic procedures compared to those with a low household income. These results are as expected (Lachat 2007).

It is evident from the models in Figure 5.2 that education has a positive but independent effect on each generation. The interaction variable is insignificant for all the outcome variables. It is noteworthy that all education levels (except primary education) are a significant positive predictor of the process variables when compared to the reference category of having no education. Furthermore, among all education levels, university education has the largest positive association with both democratic attitudes and behaviours.

[27] The Likelihood Ratio (LR) tests for each multi-level model returns a p value < 0.001, meaning the null hypothesis that a single-level logistic model fits better than a multi-level model can be rejected.

[28] The age term is removed from all the four models to avoid multicollinearity (high correlation with the cohort variable).

[29] Table B in appendix (p. 241) details the estimated odds ratios with standard errors for fixed effects and variance components with standard errors for random effects. Figure A (p. 242) displays marginal fixed effects for generations from the same models.



Source: CSES IMD (1996-2016)

Figure 5.2. Socio-demographic predictors of democratic attitudes and behaviours.

Notes: Coefficient plots with 95% confidence intervals for fixed effects from cross-classified hierarchical models (CCREMs).

A comparison of random effects from the above hierarchical models[30] in Figures 5.3 and 5.4 reveal that random period effects are more important than random cohort effects. The standard error bars illustrate the 95 percent confidence intervals. When the bars touch the zero-line, support for the dependent variable in each cohort (or period) is not significantly different from average levels of support across cohorts (or periods). Again, because the dataset comprises thirty-five polities, it is difficult to pinpoint the exact events responsible for the variations in the period plots. However, the important takeaway from this finding is that external events of the time – irrespective of the age and generational membership of the individual- can affect an individual's commitment to democratic principles and processes. This finding supports earlier research which goes as far to suggest that period effects overwhelm all other time effects (Converse 1976).

[30] Initially, I ran HAPC models with only time variables. The models fit better (i.e., increased *LL* scores) with the addition of each socio-demographic variable. I also ran single-level logit models to check if they fit better than multilevel models; although there were no significant changes in the coefficients of the fixed effects, these models do not control for APC effects.



Figure 5.3. Random effects for cohorts from CCREMs.



Figure 5.4. Random effects for periods from CCREMs.

To summarise, the results support a generational interpretation of youth disengagement in advanced democracies, even when controlling for lifecycle and period effects: younger generations are rejecting the traditional processes of democracy (à la Blais and Rubenson

2013), whereas their support for principles is no different to previous cohorts. This is strong evidence in support of the societal modernisation theory.

Although education has an independent positive effect on all outcome variables, the current study demonstrates that decline in democratic participation occurs even amongst the better educated. In line with modernisation theory, the cognitive mobilisation thesis explains this surprising trend. Dalton (2007) insists that cognitive resources can shape both engagement and disengagement. Focusing on partisanship, he distinguishes two groups with high cognitive resources based on their affinity to political parties. They are cognitive partisans and apartisans (Dalton 1984, 2007). Cognitive partisans have strong party ties together with psychological involvement in politics in places where party cues lack. Despite their limited electoral experience, cognitive mobilisation is higher in younger generations (Dalton 1984, p. 268): younger citizens have higher education levels compared to their elders and therefore can better engage with the political information (Baker et al. 1981). As such, one might expect cognitive partisans to engage in traditional activities such as voting as well.

But what explains disengagement better than cognitive partisans is the second group- the apartisans. Apartisans have high cognitive resources like higher education but lack party ties. Although these individuals do not need party cues to make political decisions, it does not necessarily mean that they will not engage in electoral processes. It is true, nonetheless, that cognitive resources such as higher education allows one to distinguish between effective and inactive participation. The vote, for example, in its aggregate form is powerful but blunt; that is, it provides very little information and does not guide the behaviour of the elected. For the individual, the vote is blunt because they cannot disaggregate the effectiveness of their vote in terms of the extent to which they moved the decision makers to align with their preferences (Verba 1967, p. 73).

In contrast to voting, participation in activities that do not aim to achieve a policy goal - but rather bring selective individual or group benefits - may not be as powerful in the aggregate sense. Yet, it is powerful for the individual or the group in terms of conveying a specific message. It appears that better-educated younger cohorts are reluctant to engage in processes that have unclear policy implications (although I refrain from making any claims about what processes they are actually engaging in, if any). Overall, because education levels have direct influence on cognitive mobilisation quotient of an individual (Dalton 1984), it can explain why one would both engage or disengage with democratic processes.

5.3. Youth Disengagement from Traditional Democratic Processes – But Why?

We now know that each subsequent cohort engages less with traditional, elite-directed practices of democracy, such a casting a ballot, compared to previous cohorts. Since there is

no disengagement from the principles of democracy, hereafter I will only discuss and analyse democratic processes. This section further discusses the results in Section 5.2 in relation to the theoretical propositions considered in Chapter 3.

Chapter 3 raises two important questions, which this chapter provides clear answers to. First, what is a generation? Previously, I discussed five conceptual variations of the term generation (Troll 1970; García-Albacete 2014). The key finding in this chapter– that each younger cohort significantly have lower odds of engaging with the traditional practices compared to older generations - provides evidence for generation as time span (or birth cohort representing social change) and *Zeitgeist*, which - akin to Mannheim's (1927; 1959) generational unit, or to García-Albacete's (2014) cohort - has its own unique characteristics. These unique traits distinguish each generation from earlier ones by the context in which members have socialised politically. Young people participate differently because of lasting generational characteristics and that the withdrawal from traditional practices is not a sudden change in political behaviour, which is particular to a cohort and fades away in subsequent cohorts.



Source: Figure 3.1

Figure 5.5. 'Generation' as an aggregation of social structures (top) vs an ethos (bottom).

Notes: Each generation here is presented as birth cohorts representing social change (à la theoretical splicing in Grasso 2014): post-WWII generation (birth year: 1926-1945, era: 1946-1965); 60s-70s generation (birth year:1946-1957, era: 1966-1977); 80s generation (birth year: 1958-1968, era: 1978-1988); 90s generation (birth year:1969-1979, era: 1989-1999); and, 00s generation (birth year:1980-1998, era: 2000-2008/16).

A 'generation' can be depicted as an aggregation of social structures across time versus an ethos or culture particular to a time (Figure 5.5). This chapter finds evidence for the first interpretation of 'generation'. Here, I argue that cohorts differ due to slow evolutionary change (Ryder 1965, p. 851). The underlying mechanism is accumulation of certain characteristics due to societal transformations such as rise in education and the development of new technologies. Note that these transformations are different from disruptive events like a war or pandemic and accumulates permanent resources across generations.

Each cohort has socialised with more of certain recourses in their formative years, impacting their political outlook for a lifetime. As these resources have become more available across

time, the process of modernisation has created more of certain values and less of other values in the electorate, which led to decline in traditional engagement across generations. Although the socialisation process is unique to each cohort during their formative years, the uniqueness comes from the 'amount' of modernisation resources available to each cohort, with more recent cohorts having more of these resources and consequently less of those values (or more of certain values) that facilitate traditional democratic (dis)engagement.

Therefore, societal transformations have resulted in distinctive cohort characteristics. Dalton (1984; 2008) has long maintained that cognitive mobilisation is a constant (continuous) process where forces of change continue to disrupt especially younger cohorts. But does he then refer to social transformations as a long term evolutionary societal change continually concentrating postmaterialist values in the electorate? Are these linear developments different from period effects brought about by major historical events, which have country-specific impacts on generations and thus are separate from societal transformations that could have affected several countries?

This brings us to the second question that Chapter 3 raises: What are the specific components of societal change? Looking into the results in Figure 5.2, among all factors, university education has the largest positive association with both democratic behaviours. Previous studies have similarly shown how across all predictors, education – both whether or not respondents have remained in full-time education, as well as level and type of educational qualifications- has the most bearing on engagement (Henn and Foard 2014). Full-time education has an important bearing on political outlook; especially experience in tertiary education is likely to lead to exposure to forms of political socialisation not available to other young people (Flanagan et al. 2012). Those in possession of higher educational qualification are more confident in their knowledge and understanding of politics than their less qualified counterparts. They also are more likely to feel that voting and elections offer valuable avenues towards representation, despite holding an antipathy towards political parties and professional politicians. This leads to the conclusion that young people are disenchanted by their recent experiences of formal politics, demanding more but receiving less across generations, and as a result withdrawing from democratic institutions.

Although education is a key driver of the societal modernisation thesis, Section 5.2 shows that even when controlling for education and other socio-economic factors, a generational effect on traditional democratic behaviours is quite substantial. That means education does not explain all the variation. Particularly, if the rise in education levels – which is a key driver of modernisation – does not explain all the variations in engagement, then, what other components are we missing? In fact, recall the starting puzzle for this thesis: even the better educated in younger generations are electorally disengaging despite early expectations of a more invigorated civic culture (Almond and Verba 1963; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba et al. 1995). Notably, the results suggest that education has a positive but independent effect

on each generation: an *edu*cohort* interaction variable yields insignificant coefficients for both turnout and party alignment, meaning that the effect of education is the same across all birth cohorts. Yet, there is something beyond education, because when we isolate education from generational effects, there are still fixed generational effects. This means that there is some other factor(s) driving societal modernisation.

The unexplained variation in traditional engagement can be interpreted in different ways. One explanation is that the models presented earlier did not capture all the relevant characteristics of the recent cohorts. There are many associations, but in previous theoretical discussions, I have singled out three factors that present unexplained puzzles in relation to young people. Some crucial differences in the newer cohorts - such as that they are less tied to mobilising agents (Jennings and Stoker 2004) or their access to more information (Norris 2002) or their various institutional context (Sloam 2016)- have not been included in the models presented in the current chapter. And there are reasons to expect they play a role in explaining the participatory gap across generations.

5.4. Conclusion

This chapter sets out to answer the first research question of this thesis: are young people turning away democracy? Despite the rise in education levels, there has been a dramatic decline in electoral turnout among young people in the advanced democracies. This has fuelled the debate on whether the move away from traditional processes of democracy also reflects declining support for the core principles of democracy. Two generational interpretations have been offered for the youth disengagement problem: modernisation theory proposes that recent generations have different values that make them less inclined to the traditional processes of democracy; whereas socialisation theory suggests that each generation has unique values that make them less inclined to both the principles and processes of democracy.

While testing the two theories, this chapter investigated whether younger generations are rejecting both the principles and processes of democracy, even when controlling for lifecycle and period effects. My findings provide support for the modernisation account: although younger cohorts are disengaging from the traditional processes of democracy, they still endorse the principles of democracy. In advanced democracies, post-materialist values are changing how younger generations participate. In other words, it is clear that modernisation – i.e., economic progress, rise in education levels and subsequent value change across generations- is responsible for the changing affinity towards traditional democratic processes. It creates the so-called 'critical' (Norris 1999a) and 'assertive' (Dalton and Welzel 2014) citizens who simply want more from the democratic system. Given this inevitable process of generational replacement, it appears as though higher education can do little to recover engagement with the processes of democracy. As Dalton (1984; 2007) shows, cognitively

mobilised individuals may not necessarily require traditional cues to participate in politics anymore.

Although this chapter finds strong support for societal modernisation theory, it comes with another puzzle: when controlling for age and period effects, along with a suite of socio-demographic factors like education, the findings show that the 'generation' explains a substantial variation in the engagement with two democratic processes - casting a ballot and aligning with a political party. So, what specific characteristics differentiate younger generations from their earlier counterparts? The gradual decline in engagement across generations provides support for societal modernisation, which is a continuous process of societal transformations, rather than a one-off generational feature. But it is still unclear what these societal transformations are? Some key components of societal modernisation are the lack of resources for a longer period of time, weaker links to traditional mobilisation networks and growing significance of the communication network, which can vary according to institutional context across advanced democracies. More specifically, three factors – religion, media use and political institutions - beyond socio-economic determinants of engagement, present three distinct puzzles relating to youth disengagement.

After showing that young people are turning away from the traditional processes of democracy, and not the key principles, the following empirical chapters proceed to test whether other micro and/or macro level factors are driving the generational withdrawal from the procedural conventions of democracy.

Chapter 6
Religion and Youth Disengagement

"Young people may have less crystallised attitudes, since they have less experience with institutions."
- Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan (2011, p. 256)

Although the previous chapter finds that generational disengagement is from the traditional processes of democracy like voting and party membership, other micro or macro level factors may be responsible for this generational withdrawal. Chapter 3 reasons that although there are many candidates for further enquiry, three factors– religion, media use and political institutional design- present unique puzzles when it comes to youth disengagement. In an era of secularisation, the first factor which warrants attention is religion. Considering the positive effect of religion on democratic citizenship (Norris and Inglehart 2011; Arikan and Bloom 2019; Dalton 2009), the disproportionate electoral disengagement among younger generations in advanced democracies (Blais and Rubenson 2013) may be driven by their detachment from religion. Existing evidence suggests that young people are less religious than older people (Pew Research Centre 2018) and that religious people are more likely to be committed to democracy than non-religious people (Bolzendahl et al. 2019; van der Brug et al. 2009). Deductively then, it is not surprising if less religious young cohorts are not as democratic as their older counterparts. For example, in the United States, the least religious millennial generation (born between 1982-2000) is also the least engaged with traditional democratic practices such as voting (Blais and Rubenson 2013; Foa and Mounk 2016). Could secularisation be responsible for young people's disengagement from democracy?

Two dominant lines of thoughts suggest dissimilar expectations about the role of religion in (youth) democratic behaviour. Societal modernisation (and secularisation) has led to an intergenerational shift towards postmaterialist values like individual liberty which are incompatible with norms of obedience and deference to authority that most religions instil (Ammerman and Davie 2018). The socialisation of younger generations in 'religion-lite' environments (Hadaway and Marler 1993; van der Brug et al. 2009) means that younger generations possess more of those values that are conducive to democracy. On the other hand, social network explanations suggest that this withdrawal of religion erodes religious networks, which otherwise generate social capital (Putnam 1993, p. 35) and promote values that are closely related to citizenship – such a political deliberation and participation in community activities (Lewis et al. 2013; Bloom and Arikan 2012). According to this explanation, the political consequence of the decline in religion would be negative on the entire electorate. That is, social network theory proposes an independent effect while socialisation theory argues a moderating effect, where religious people in younger generations engage differently to their religious counterparts in older generations.

This chapter explores where religion fits in the causal mechanism of youth disengagement from traditional democratic processes. In the second section, I review the existing literature on the link between religion and democracy. Third, with a focus on young people, I extend the theoretical review and the religion hypothesis (H6)[31] presented in Chapter 3 to capture the nuances of the relationship at both the individual and context-levels. Next, I test these expectations using data from the CSES (1996-2016) in 35 OECD countries. The key finding is that, notwithstanding age and generation membership, religious affiliation has an independent positive impact on democratic engagement. However, this influence at the individual level is moderated by religious context: the strong positive effect only holds in a secular environment with low proportion of religiously affiliated individuals. These results provide support for social network theory which suggests that religious networks promote political engagement and increase the political salience of group identities (Lewis et al. 2013; Norris and Inglehart 2011; Ben-Nun Bloom et al. 2021; Putnam and Campbell 2010).

6.1. Religion and Democracy

To gain a better understanding of why religious young people may engage differently than their non-religious compatriots (H6), it is first important to understand how religion in general influences democratic engagement. Existing empirical evidence suggests a positive link between religious involvement and democratic beliefs and behaviours: cross-nationally, individual level religiosity is positively associated with the strength of democratic citizenship norms (Denters et al. 2007; Bolzendahl and Coffé 2009; Dalton 2009), support for democracy (Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan 2012; Vlas and Gherghina 2012; Smidt 2013), civic engagement (Ruiter and De Graaf 2006; Putnam and Campbell 2010; McAndrew and Voas 2014; Smidt 2013) and an array of electoral and non-electoral political participation (Norris 2002; Driskell et al. 2008; Smidt 2013; Arikan and Bloom 2019; Norris and Inglehart 2011). Marody (1997, p. 305) reasons that religious beliefs influence the social identities of an individual and hence, directly, or indirectly, affect their political opinions and actions.

The specific effect of religion on democratic citizenship depends on how one conceptualises religion. Religiosity has two important aspects to it– a religious community or denomination that an individual is affiliated to and how religious the person is independent of the denomination (attendance and belief) (van der Brug et al. 2009). An individual may be affiliated to a particular religion or religious tradition based on shared worldviews with the religious group (Smidt et al. 2009). Religious belief refers to the acceptance of the presence of a higher divine power, but believers do not always adhere to religious practices (such as praying, worshipping, etc). Religious service attendance refers to the frequency of engagement in formal religious community and the intensity of religiosity (how willing an individual is to spend

[31] *H6 (religion hypothesis): Religiously affiliated young people are more democratically engaged than the non-affiliated.*

time and effort in being involved in organised religion). Layman (2001, p. 55) refers to belief, attendance and affiliation as believing, behaving, and belonging, respectively - the "three major components of religion that are potentially important for politics". Notwithstanding the dimension of religion, a vast amount of literature shows that religiosity impacts democratic citizenship.

Generally speaking, affiliation promotes values which are closely related to citizenship and allows individuals to acquire practical knowledge and skills required to become citizens (Smith 2014; Smidt 2013; Wald et al. 2005; Sherkat and Ellison 1999). Religious affiliation has also been previously identified as a predictor for both the time spent in community participation and the valuation of helping the needy (Smidt 1999). These micro-level processes enable social learning (Seymour et al. 2014) and help acquire organisational skills to understand and influence politics. It provides opportunities to practice these skills (organising a committee or a fund-raiser, taking a position, bargaining negotiations) which can be applied to the political life (Smidt 1999, p. 178).

Although not always political in nature, civic associations- such as religious institutions - function as a means for social engagement with like-minded people and thus promote political participation (de Tocqueville 1969). Despite a paucity of explicit religious issues and lack of religious campaigns in recent times, religion remains a strong determinant of political behaviour, such as party choice in European elections (van der Brug et al. 2009). In stable and affluent societies, religion is a powerful predictor of political behaviour, including party alignment (Bruce 2003) and has a positive 'spillover' effect to political activism (Peterson 1992; Verba et al. 1995).

Therefore, resonating with social network theory, religious affiliation leads to attendance in religious services which provide opportunities to create social and political networks. Such network-based interactions may include political deliberation and engagement in community activities (Lewis, et al. 2013; Bloom and Arikan 2012). Religious networks help generate individual social capital: that is, religion encourages people to interact creating "…norms and trust that facilitate action and cooperation for mutual benefit" (Putnam 1993, p. 35). Taken together, these social organisational norms and engagement are conducive to democracy. Social network explanations indicate that the effect of religion may be independent of one's age. In other words, the religious part of the entire electorate is more democratically engaged than its non-religious counterpart. If this is true, then among young people, I expect to see the same. This leads to the first hypothesis:

> *H6.1: Religious individuals are more democratically engaged than non-religious individuals.*

6.2. Religion and Democratic Engagement across Generations

Existing scholarship, however, suggests that a person's religious affiliation is a function of their generational membership (Hadaway and Marler 1993; van der Brug et al. 2009; Manning 2019). Starting with the Baby Boomer generation, there has been a decline in the number of voters raised in a religious setting. For example, a recent US study by the Pew Research Centre shows that about one third of Gen Z members, on par with millennials, have no religion compared to 23, 17 and 11 per cent of Gen X, Baby Boomers and the Silent Generation, respectively (Lipka 2015). Members of the most recent generation, Gen Z, seem to have the weakest ties with religion, but are also the most tolerant (Manning 2019; Lipka 2015).

Modernisation, involving the shift in societal focus from material to post-material values, may explain these generational trends. Inglehart (1990, p. 11) writes that younger generations are less willing to prioritise economic and physical security at the expense of their individual autonomy. The citizens of advanced industrial democracies are more likely to take these kinds of security for granted. Instead, they accord a high priority to self-expression both in their personal and in political lives. This process of individualisation has "undermined the taken-for-granted status of religious meanings in individual consciousness" (Berger et al. 1977, p. 77). Religious definitions of social (and political) matters have lost their certainty and have become matters of choice.

In today's modern and secular setting, political socialisation theory further explains a generational retreat of religion in political considerations. Political and social values acquired during the most impressionable years (between ages 18 and 27) solidify and persist for a lifetime. As Franklin (2004, p. 216) asserts, people get 'set in their ways'. It makes sense if older generations, who politically socialised during the age of cleavage politics, base their electoral decisions on religious denominations. This means, when older generations are replaced by younger generations, this leads to a decline in denomination, or religious, vote. In other words, younger generations are not making their electoral choices based on religion.

The above review highlights a moderating effect of religion in the relationship between generations and democratic engagement. That is, religious people in younger generations engage differently to their religious counterparts in older generations. If religion matters less in younger generations, I test the following hypothesis:

> *H6.2: The religious/non-religious gap in democratic engagement is smaller in younger generations than in older generations.*

There are, however, two other confounding effects to consider while testing these generational explanations. First, youth disengagement from both religion and democracy can also be due to lifecycle (age) effects. Young people grow old to accumulate resources - which

make electoral participation more relevant to their lives (Franklin 2004)- and embrace religion as they approach the end of life. However, if religion subsequently becomes more politically salient within each generation due to a lifecycle effect (van der Brug et al. 2009, p. 1271), then the overall strength of the religious effect on the vote remains stable over time. If we do not account for other time effects, we may wrongly conclude that the effect of religion has remained stable. To date, there is no systematic comparative study on religion that controls for other time effects when testing generational explanations of youth disengagement.

Survey evidence from 41 countries shows a clear age gap in religious affiliation (Pew Research Centre 2018). Particularly, in Europe and the Americas, younger adults (18-39 years) are significantly less likely than older adults (40+ in age) to be affiliated with a religious group, to consider religion 'very important' and to attend weekly/daily prayer services. However, in other parts of the world, such as the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and sub-Saharan Africa, younger adults are not less affiliated. In the Asia-Pacific region, three advanced democracies (Australia, Japan and South Korea) of the 20 countries surveyed defy the regional trend and show a significant age gap in affiliation. Although the study does not control for confounding generation effects, it suggests that the age gap in religiosity is more pronounced in advanced, post-industrial societies.

The above trends thus lead to the second consideration: it is important to enquire whether varying regional context may alter the link between individual religiosity and democratic citizenship (Lim and MacGregor 2012; Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan 2012). Contextual effects are multi-level phenomena (Burbank 1997, pp. 114-5). That is, to fully account for the political effect of the context, information is required at two levels. At the macro level, this effect stems from the social composition of the area. Figure 6.1 below depicts the moderating effect of religious context. In addition to direct effect on democratic attitudes and behaviours from both the levels, context may also moderate/condition the influence of individual-level religiosity (Bolzendahl et al. 2019; Olson and Li 2015; Hill 2014; Merino 2010). As such, the context as a moderator should affect the direction and/or strength of the relationship between predictor and outcome variables (Baron and Kenny 1986, p. 1174).



Source: adapted from Goldberg (2014, p. 312)

Figure 6.1. Moderating effect of religious context

When there is a general saturation of religiosity in a country (widespread religiosity), it may cease to be a predictive factor for democratic commitment (Bolzendahl et al. 2019). That is, if everyone is religious then the choice of being religious could become less meaningful and religious teachings and values may dissuade interest in political matters (Rink 2018), marginalise those who are more weakly tied to the church (Lim and MacGregor 2012), and/or place more socio-political issues under clerical control (Buckley 2016). In contrast, in a secular environment, being religious may be more distinctive: it may instil a sense of 'embattlement' and promote the need for activism on behalf of unpopular, countercultural values (Bolzendahl et al. 2019, p. 582). To test whether religiosity strongly relates to political involvement in places where religious adherence is less common, I test the following hypothesis:

> *H6.3: The relationship between individual-level religiosity and democratic engagement is weaker in more religious countries.*

6.3. The Effect of Religion on Youth Disengagement

Before estimating the multilevel models, here I present a descriptive analysis of the variation in the dependent variables by *age* and *cohort* (or generation) categories in Figure 6.2. The *y* axes measure the mean of each dependent variable[32] calculated based on each category of the independent variable by each category of the *religious affiliation* variable. Looking at the top

[32] A note of caution is due here regarding the form of political participation in focus. In this thesis, I enquire on youth engagement with the traditional processes of democracy. Findings from this chapter does not apply to the relationship between religion and non-electoral participatory behaviours. Although past evidence shows that non-electoral forms of political participation are much more conducive to secularism (Norris and Inglehart 2011), this is a question beyond the scope of this dissertation.

row, religious people in all but one age category (60-90) appear to be more democratically engaged than their non-religious counterparts. The religion gap in democratic engagement, in face value, appears to be the widest among the youngest age group (18-30). It is evident that religious young people are more democratically engaged than non-religious young people in advanced democracies. Therefore, these results provide support for H6.1. These are also consistent with Grundel and Maliepaard's (2012) case study in Netherlands: it shows that, compared to non-religious adolescents, Christian and Muslim adolescents tend to have more democratic attitudes, democratic skills and reflect more on democratic matters. That is, they think and act more democratically.



Source: 35 OECD countries in CSES IMD (1996- 2016)

Figure 6.2. Variations in democratic behaviours based on religious affiliation

Turning to the bottom row in Figure 6.2, notable is also the gap between religious and non-religious peoples' democratic engagement in the most recent generations (90s and 00s). That is, religion has a stronger effect on younger generations than on older generations. As such, Figure 6.2 provides no support for H6.2, which suggests the religion-driven gap in engagement is smaller in younger generations. A possible explanation for this is that the traditional/secular-rational value gap (Inglehart 1990) between religious and non-religious individuals in younger generations is more pronounced than the value gap between the two groups in older generations. Attributing this to the process of secularisation in modern, industrialised societies,

a religious young person's tendency towards traditional, elite-directed institutional practices is substantially in contrast to a secular young person's tendency against them. The age plots somewhat mirror the generation plots in Figure 6.2: given the high collinearity between the time variables, it is important to isolate them to figure out which, if any, is driving youth disengagement.

Religion is associated with democratic behaviour. Table 6.1 presents two sets of models. The first two columns are single level logit models, which present fixed effects of age and religious factors on two binary engagement variables. The second set of hierarchical cross-classified multilevel logit[33] models distinguish lifecycle effects from the cohort and period effects on both measures of democratic engagement. In these models, age is a fixed effect (same regression intercept for all individuals), generations (cohorts)[34] and election years (period) are specified as random effects (where regression intercepts vary among groups). In both the single level and multi-level models, I control for a number of socio-demographic characteristics which are known to impact democratic citizenship (Burns et al. 2001; Dalton 2008; Bolzendahl and Coffé 2009).

Table 6.1. Religious determinants of democratic behaviours

	Logit Models		Hierarchical Logit Models	
	Cast a Ballot?	Feel close to a Political Party?	Cast a Ballot?	Feel close to a Political Party?
Fixed Effects				
Age	1.02 (0.00) ***	1.01 (0.00) ***	1.03 (0.00) ***	1.01 (0.00) ***
Female	0.96 (0.03)	0.86 (0.02) ***	0.99 (0.03)	0.86 (0.02) ***
Household Income	1.22 (0.01) ***	1.11 (0.01) ***	1.19 (0.01) ***	1.10 (0.01) ***
Education	1.21 (0.02) ***	1.07 (0.01) ***	1.35 (0.02) ***	1.10 (0.01) ***
Religious Affiliation	1.17 (0.04) ***	1.20 (0.03) ***	1.12 (0.04) **	1.17 (0.03) ***
Proportion of religiously affiliated	0.40 (0.05) ***	0.31 (0.03) ***	1.47 (0.24) *	0.73 (0.09) *
Constant	0.87 (0.10)	1.43 (0.13) ***	0.21 (0.04) ***	0.72 (0.10) *
Random Effects Variance				
Generation			0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Survey Year			0.12 (0.04)	0.07 (0.02)
-Log Likelihood	15880	22442	13728	20401
AIC	31774	44898	27475	40821
N	35,359	35,359	32,637	32,637

Source: CSES IMD (1996 – 2016)

Notes: Entries are odds ratios. Standard errors between brackets. Significance: *** < 0.001, ** < 0.01, * < 0.05. Method used: Cross-classified random effects two-level model in Stata; Missing values dealt with complete case analysis.

But how does the effect of religion play out when considering the time effects of age, period and generational memberships? Looking at the single level logit models in the first two columns, age has a significant but almost negligible positive effect on both forms of engagement. Those who are religiously affiliated have higher odds of voting and aligning with

[33] The *Likelihood Ratio (LR)* tests for each multi-level model returns a p value < 0.001, meaning the null hypothesis that a single-level logistic model fits better than a multi-level model can be rejected. Multi-level models also significantly improve the *Log Likelihood* scores.

[34] Generations are not included as fixed-effect components because of high collinearity with the age variable.

a political party than non-affiliated people. This may seem to apply to young people as much as the entire electorate (i.e., provides support for support for H6.1, and for the broad religion hypothesis, H6) but it would be hasty to use single level models and assume that the effect of religious affiliation is independent of generation membership. The last two columns in Table 6.1 present the hierarchical models to test if the effect of age and religious affiliation persist when between-cohort and between-period random effects are controlled for at a group level. Again, there is a small positive effect of age but this is not substantial. Although the coefficient for *religious affiliation* decreases slightly with the addition of group controls, there is still a substantial and significant positive effect on both dependent variables.[35] The *proportion of religiously affiliated* variable does not provide much meaning in these models and an interaction term with *religious affiliation* would better capture the hypothesised moderating effect of context on individual-level religiosity and democratic engagement (H6.3 tested in Table 6.3).

As the results in Table 6.1 provide no evidence for a substantial lifecycle effect on engagement and because it was not possible to estimate generational fixed effects due to its high collinearity with the age variable, I used an adapted method of analysis in Table 6.2. I focus on each generation to investigate whether religion matters less in younger generations. To do so, I subsetted the sample into generation categories and ran separate single level logistic regressions without an age variable. For the sake of parsimony, the socio-demographic factors controlled for in these models are not presented here.[36]

Table 6.2. Effect of religious affiliation on democratic behaviours across generations

	Engagement with the Processes of Democracy	
	Cast a Ballot?	Feel close to a Political Party?
Generation		
Post - WWII	1.07 (0.09)	1.09 (0.06)
60s - 70s	1.08 (0.08)	1.05 (0.06)
80s	1.19 (0.08) **	1.11 (0.06) *
90s	1.34 (0.08) ***	1.15 (0.06) **
00s	1.29 (0.09) ***	1.02 (0.06)

Source: CSES IMD (1996 – 2016)

Notes: Entries are odds ratios for the *religious affiliation* binary variable and each cell represents a separate regression analysis. Standard errors between brackets. Significance: *** < 0.001, ** < 0.01, * < 0.05. Method used: Single level logit model in Stata; Missing values dealt with complete case analysis. Data: CSES IMD, 1996 – 2016.

It is clear from Table 6.2 that, for all generations, religiously affiliated individuals have higher odds of engaging than their non-affiliated peers. Therefore, there is no support for H6.2, which hypothesises that the recency in generational membership decreases the religious-secular gap

[35] A z-test (by dividing variance by standard error) can reveal if any of the higher order effects are significant (if quotient > 1.96). Among the level 2 variance components, there is no between-cohort effect but there are significant between-period effects. It is beyond the scope of this study to pinpoint the exact events driving the period effects across 35 countries.

[36] For a detailed version of Tables 6.2, see Table C in appendix (p. 243).

in engagement. This finding contradicts socialisation theory which proposes a depressed effect of religion on younger generations: that is, the religious/non-religious gap would be smaller for more recent generations which socialised in a 'religion-lite' environment (Hadaway and Marler 1993; van der Brug et al. 2009). Contrary to expectations, across generations, there appears to be an overall increase in the coefficient values: the gap in the likelihood to engage, between someone who is religious versus someone who is not, seems to be larger in younger generations (except party identification for the 00s generation, but this does not reach statistical significance). A note of caution is due here as there is no statistically significant clear upwards trend (and as older generations do not yield statistically significant results). Yet, with all coefficients > 1, it is at least clear that religion continuous to be conducive to democracy, with a significant positive effect among younger generations.

Does context moderate the association between religious affiliation and democratic citizenship? Table 6.3 tests the effect of higher order variables at two levels: at the individual level, I explore the interaction between *religious affiliation* and *proportion of religiously affiliated*[37] people. This interaction variable asks whether an individual is religiously affiliated in an environment with high or low saturation of religiosity. At a group level (i.e., level 2), I present the random effects of Inglehart-Welzel cultural clusters on democratic engagement. These zones have distinct religious and cultural historical heritage and hence it is important to enquire on the random effects of cultural clusters in models on religiosity.

Table 6.3. Multi-level effect of religion and cultural zones on democratic behaviours

	Hierarchical Logit Models	
	Cast a Ballot?	Feel close to a Political Party?
Fixed Effects		
Female	0.93 (0.02) **	0.83 (0.02) ***
Household Income	1.15 (0.01) ***	1.08 (0.01) ***
Education	1.23 (0.01) ***	1.09 (0.01) ***
Religious Affiliation * Proportion of religiously affiliated (ref. Non-religious * Low Proportion)		
Non-religious * High Proportion	0.56 (0.03) ***	0.42 (0.02) ***
Religious * Low Proportion	1.41 (0.06) ***	1.51 (0.05) ***
Religious * High Proportion	0.84 (0.03) ***	0.63 (0.02) ***
Constant	2.22 (0.32) ***	1.73 (0.26) ***
Random Effects Variance		
Cultural Clusters	0.14 (0.08)	0.16 (0.08)
-Log Likelihood	22266	31392
AIC	44549	62801
N	50,228	50,228

Source: CSES IMD (1996 – 2016)

Notes: The *cultural clusters* variable comprises eight categories of cultural zones in the Inglehart-Welzel cultural map. The clusters are English-Speaking (15,315), Catholic Europe (17,178), Protestant Europe (18,820), Latin America (5,073), Islamic (651), Jewish (1,334), Confucian

[37] For the purposes of these models, the *proportion of religiously affiliated* variable has been sliced at the mean (0.76) and binarised (Low < 0.76 and High >= 0.76) to test the interaction effect with another binary variable, *religious affiliation*.

(3,361) and Baltic (1,503). Entries are odds ratios. Standard errors between brackets. Significance: *** < 0.001, ** < 0.01, * < 0.05. Method used: Random effects two-level model in Stata; Missing values dealt with complete case analysis.

The interaction term in Table 6.3 provides clear evidence for H6.3, which states that the relationship between individual-level religiosity and democratic engagement is weaker in more religious environments. A combination of being religious and residing in a relatively secular environment yields the highest odds ratio compared to any other combination of the two variables, individual-level religious affiliation and proportion of religiously affiliated in the country. This is in line with existing literature: when there is widespread religiosity in a country, religion ceases to be a predictive factor for democratic commitment (Bolzendahl et al. 2019). In contexts with high religious saturation, religion is less meaningful and religious teachings and values may dissuade interest in political matters (Rink 2018). By contrast, in a secular environment, being religious may be more distinctive: such an environment promotes the need for activism on behalf of unpopular, countercultural values (Bolzendahl et al. 2019, p. 582). Notably, in both secular (low proportion of religiously affiliated) and religious (high proportion of religiously affiliated) environments, the religiously affiliated have higher odds of engaging democratically than their non-religious counterparts. This provides further support for H6.1, which hypothesises that religious individuals are more democratically engaged than non-religious individuals.

The cultural heritage of a region can have group effects on its members' political engagement. In fact, in Table 6.3, the random effect variance components from *cultural clusters* variable are quite large for each dependent variable. The random effects are best examined visually: Figure 6.3 displays the random effect of each value of the *cultural clusters* variable. The standard error bars illustrate the 95 percent confidence intervals. When the bars touch the zero-line, support for the dependent variable in a given cultural zone is not significantly different from average levels of support across cultural zones. The English-Speaking, Catholic European, Confucian and Baltic zones lie below the average value of engagement whereas Protestant Europe, Islamic and Jewish clusters lie above the average for all dependent variables. The Latin American zone lies above average for turnout and slightly below average for party alignment. All in all, Figure 6.3 confirms that religious and historic heritage of a zone has significant influence on its citizens' democratic engagement.



Source: CSES IMD (1996 – 2016)

Figure 6.3. Random effects of cultural clusters from hierarchical models.

Figure 6.3 should be cautiously read as only a broad snapshot of the fact that there are group effects to consider in religious studies. Of course, since there are so many factors that constitute the cultural heritage of a country, it is almost impossible to point out how they interact to lead to the outcome. Despite sociological theorisations of religion as culture (Astor et al. 2017), not all clusters in the culture map are defined by religion only. Hence, the religion aspect of the regions may not necessarily be driving the random effects on democratic engagement. Certainly, in English speaking and European nations, the influx of refugees and immigrants from all over the world has contributed to the religious diversity in these clusters.

An American case study reminds us of how theological exclusivity in a 'Christian Nation' has a strong negative impact on tolerance and acceptance of Muslims and Hindus in community life (Merino 2010). Further, a cross-national analysis across 69 countries shows that countries which are both highly religious and religiously heterogeneous (diverse) have lower levels of generalised social trust (a strong predictor of political behaviour) than countries with any other combination of those variables (Olson and Li 2015). There is, therefore, rich scholarly evidence suggesting that macro-level religious factors and their interactions influence political behaviour at the individual level. Then, steering back to Table 6.3, a robust finding is the strong and significant effect of the interaction between individual religiosity and religious saturation

on democratic engagement, even when controlling for the random cluster effects shown in Figure 6.3.

Figure 6.3 highlights another crucial point: Islam is not incompatible with democratic citizenship at the context level. This outcome is contrary to Huntington (1996), who contends that the clash of civilisations between Islam and Christianity threatens democratic institutions. While contemporary Christianity endorses the independence of the church from the state, the Islamic world advocates a greater fusion of power. The popular idea is that Muslim majority countries are incompatible with democratic governance because of the overlap of religious and political power (Huntington 1996; Fukuyama 2006). Islam provides a complete guide to life, with rules for both the private and public sphere. Here, God is the sole source of authority, including political authority (Anderson 2007; Tessler 2002). The significance given to God's law and strict conformity to certain rules and practices can be problematic to modernisation and hence democratisation (Bruce 2003). Contrastingly, secularism does not derive political authority from religion. Similar to my findings, however, survey research finds that Muslims and religious members from other religions show same support for democratic ideals and leadership (Inglehart and Welzel 2005).

These results need to be interpreted with caution for two reasons. First, Islam is not monolithic across the world. Muslim countries have experienced 'multiple modernities' (Eisenstadt 2000) and this may influence individual attitudes. Most of the Muslim respondents in this study are from one country, Turkey, which is a vehemently secular society (Ciftki 2010). The historical context of the country (the importance of state in Turkey) may be moderating the relationship between religion and democratic citizenship (Ciftci 2010, p. 1459). Second, although Muslims show positive attitudes towards democratic ideals, they are less positive about social issues such as abortion, divorce, gay rights and so on. Norris and Inglehart (2003) find evidence for a lack of support of human rights issues (such as gender equality, divorce, and abortion) among Muslims in both western and non-western countries. Reviewing Huntington's (1996) thesis, they highlight a new variable - namely sex - contending that the cultural faultline between the West and the Muslim world is not about democracy but about sex. Future cross-national studies on the current topic -using more nuanced dependent and independent variables- are therefore recommended.

To summarise, the results highlight two important points. First, notwithstanding age and generation membership, religious affiliation has an independent positive association with democratic engagement. Second, this relationship is moderated by context: religious people in places with high religious saturation are less likely to democratically engage than religious people in places with low religious saturation.

6.4. Conclusion

With religion declining at a greater rate among the young than ever before, this chapter set out to investigate the role of religion in young people's engagement with democracy. Multiple previous studies have established a positive relationship between religion and democracy; deductively then, the coincidence of the decline in electoral participation with the decline in religion among younger cohorts should not be a surprise. Yet, existing literature provides arguments against this notion. On the one hand, the socialisation of younger generations in 'religion-lite' environments means that they have more postmaterialist values, like individual liberty, that are conducive to democracy. Socialisation theory indicates a negative effect of religion on democracy, with its decrease among the youth being good for democracy. On the other hand, social network explanations suggest that this withdrawal of religion erodes religious networks, which otherwise generate social capital and promote values that are closely related to citizenship. According to this view, the entire electorate would undergo the negative political consequence of the retract of religion. While social network theory proposes an independent effect, socialisation theory argues a moderating effect of religion on youth democratic engagement.

The findings suggest that, despite a decline in religious affiliation and attendance across age groups and generations, religiosity remains a key determinant of democratic citizenship. Multiple regression analysis revealed that religiously affiliated individuals are more likely to democratically engage than their non-religious compatriots, irrespective of their age and generational membership. However, this relationship is moderated by context: individual religious affiliation matters more in secular environments where it is more distinctive. Religious affiliation instils a sense of embattlement and provides a political uniqueness among the many who are not religious. It presents as a distinctive feature of the political identity of the religious individual.

The evidence from this study confirms that religiosity is conducive to democratic citizenship across the generations. Although younger generations are less religious (Lee 2014; Manning 2019), the effect of the religious-secular gap in democratic engagement is comparable across generations. Instead of supporting the socialisation thesis, these findings support social network explanations of how religiosity is linked to democratic citizenship. It equips individuals with the practical knowledge and skills required to become citizens (Sherkat and Ellison 1999; Wald et al. 2005; Smidt 2013) while religious networks help generate individual social capital. That is, religion encourages people to interact, creating ideals and trust which promote cooperation for mutual benefit (Putnam 1993). Although there are other explanations as to why democratic disconnect from traditional practices is concentrated amongst younger generations (e.g., Blais and Rubenson 2013), the decline in religion does not make it better. That means, antagonistic attitudes towards religious ideals, practices and organisations may

potentially drive young people further away from democracy. In a similar vein, the next chapter examines the effect of media use on youth disengagement.

Chapter 7
Media Impact on Youth Disengagement

"…young people are the most avid information and communication technologies users and the most susceptible to the influence of various socialization experiences."
– Quintelier and Visser (2008, p. 411)

With the growing influence of the digital communication media among young people, the second factor which warrants attention in this study of generational decline in traditional democratic behaviour is media use. Previous studies concur that media use for political purposes facilitates democratic attitudes and behaviours (Bakker and de Vreese 2011; Boulianne 2009; Cho et al. 2009; Gainous and Wagner 2011). Recently, this idea is being revisited due to the increase in media use (particularly via the internet) among young people – a trend which surprisingly coincides the decline in youth electoral participation in advanced democracies (Blais and Rubenson 2013; Foa and Mounk 2016). Does this mean that, when it comes to young people, the democratic potential of the communication media disappears?

Although there is much scholarly attention paid to the media-democracy nexus (Almond and Verba 1963; Mattes and Bratton 2007; Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2012), the overall influence on young people is still a matter of debate. Media malaise theory argues that media use – such as watching television or surfing the internet- has an adverse effect on democracy. It leads to the loss of social capital and takes away from the time available for meaningful civic and political engagement (Edelman 1988; Negrine 2003; Nie and Erbring 2002; Putnam 2000). In contrast, mobilisation theory asserts that the news media creates politically informed citizens and mobilises them, both cognitively and behaviorally. Especially in highly educated electorates in advanced western democracies (Dalton 1996; Inglehart 1990), the news media provides access to a large amount of political information which evokes mass public awareness, interest, and ideological sophistication. Mobilisation theory suggests a positive effect of media use on the entire electorate. Socialisation theory adds a nuance to this expectation: when it comes to younger generations, which attained political maturity in the digital context, online socialisation plays an important role in intellectual development and maturation (Jennings and Zeitner 2003; Swigger 2013; Loader et al. 2014). This raises an unexplored question of whether younger generations behave in support of the media malaise theory or the mobilisation theory.

This chapter investigates the effect of media use (television, radio, newspaper, or internet) for political purposes on two measures of conventional democratic behaviours (turnout and party

identification)[38]. What follows this section is a theoretical review of the extant literature. In the third section, with a focus on young people, I extend the theoretical review and the media use hypothesis (H7)[39] presented in Chapter 3 to outline the plausible effects of media use with a note on other factors that might influence the relationships in question. Next, I test these expectations using data CSES Module 5 (2016- 2021) in 24 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. The key finding is that, across all generations, media use for political reasons fosters offline electoral engagement. Notably, political interest greatly affects the strength of the relationship between political media consumption and youth democratic engagement.

7.1. Media Use and Democracy

Media is an important source of information which provides a link between governments and citizens in democracies. Political information obtained from both traditional (including the radio, newspaper and the television) and new (digital) media outlets (i.e., the internet) can penetrate interpersonal discussion, alter people's interest in politics and consequently affect their political engagement (Eveland 2004; Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2012). The mechanism behind the relationship is driven by the political learning process. Scholars highlight that media use exposes citizens to democracy, in both principle and practice (Almond and Verba 1963; Mattes and Bratton 2007). In this section, I review the existing literature for media effect on the general population before I zoom into young people in the next section. The review suggests that, overall, using media to follow politics facilitates political learning (including factual learning, Scheufele 2000) and thereby empower citizens with information and tools to shape their political attitudes and behaviours.

Whether these political attitudes and behaviours support democracy has been a topic of perennial debate. There are at least two theoretical explanations. First, media malaise theory argues that news media undermines democratic values (de Vreese and Semetko 2002; Mutz and Reeves 2005). In an environment of market competition and in search for a bigger audience, the media has long been claimed to dwell on dramatic, negative news about crime, conflict, war, death, political incompetence, corruption, sex and scandal (Edelman 1988). Kerbel (1995) asserts that the media blows up negative information: it exaggerates and creates conflict, even when little conflict exists. Patterson (1994) argues that in the political sphere, attack journalism vilifies political leaders and institution: this encourages politicians to respond with negative campaigning, attacking others rather than highlighting their own positions. This combination of bad news, attack journalism and negative politics create a pervasive sense of

[38] Please note that there is much evidence that social media is associated with non-electoral forms of political engagement. I, however, do not investigate this relationship in this chapter because the question the thesis aims to answer pertain to youth disengagement from the traditional processes of democracy.

[39] *H7 (media hypothesis): Young people who use the media for political information are more democratically engaged than non-users.*

cynicism, distrust and suspicion of political leaders and institutions (Blumler and Gurevitch 1995; Fallows 1997). Subsequently, this malign effect of mass media on political attitudes makes it difficult to educate and mobilise citizens.

Malaise theorists, however, focus more on the television rather than the print media. The argument is that it is not the television content rather than the form that makes it impossible to educate and mobilise public (Kanervo et al. 2005). It can at best entertain and muse its audience and at worst confuse and alienate it, undermining the legitimacy of democracy (Fallows 1997). Robinson (1976) points out that those who incidentally come across the news are more likely to suffer from video malaise because they lack the background from a good newspaper or discussion with peers to help interpret the news. Those who turn the TV for news are more likely to be better equipped to interpret and access the quality of news. Further, a similar time displacement theory, adds that the TV pulls people away from community and voluntary associations- this leads to civic disengagement, loss of community and the privatisation of the modern life. In modern times, the resemblance of the internet media to the TV medium – but with greater autonomy to control content - implies similar, if not amplified, negative effects (Nie and Erbring 2002; Putnam 1995; 2000). If media use has increased over the years, then it would not be surprising if younger generations are more susceptible to this malaise.

Mobilisation theory provides an alternative explanation to the media malaise theory. It contends that the rise in education levels and an access to a large amount of political information mobilise citizens both cognitively and behaviorally. This theory is similar to the virtuous circle theory, which explains the exposure of political information in media outlets generates a virtuous circle that enhances people's interests and facilitates engagement (Aarts and Semetko 2003; Newton 1999; Norris 2000; 2011). Referring to advanced western democracies, Dalton (1996) and Inglehart (1990) highlight an increase in mass public awareness, interest, and ideological sophistication. Norris (1996, p. 478) finds that watching television news is strongly associated with higher levels of political knowledge, participation, and subjective efficacy (see also, Shah et al.2005). As such, she disproves Putnam's (1995) claim that television is the root cause of the erosion of confidence and trust in the United States. Newton (1999), in a similar vein, finds little support for the media malaise hypothesis and furthers the mobilisation thesis.

Beyond the TV, other traditional forms of media use, such as newspaper use, has been positively associated with various forms of political participation (Jeffres et al. 2007; Scheufel 2000). Further, there is a positive relationship between attention to campaign news in newspapers and voting (see, for example, Mcleod et al. 1999). Both cross-sectional and longitudinal studies have consistently found a positive association of newspaper reading with political engagement (Mcleod et al. 1999; Norris 1996; Shah et al. 2001). Although, newspaper readership has attenuated over the years due to the rise of the internet, young citizens are

more frequent users of online news overall, with the frequency of online political expression (such as searching/sharing political info and reading/commenting on political blogs) negatively related to age (Boulianne and Shehata 2021). There is, however, little research on young consumers usage of online newspapers compared to other news sites (Lee and Wei 2008).

Given the rapid development of the internet and the concept's relative newness in social sciences, research designs and findings vary considerably. The development of internet has raised divergent expectations about its political potential.[40] Advocates of the so-called utopian view highlight its ability to aid political engagement (Gil De Zúñiga et al. 2009; Kaufhold et al. 2010). By contrast, supporters of the dystopian view consider the internet as a social threat, which disconnects people from "real" life (Kraut et al. 1998; Nie and Erbring 2002) and endangers key elements of a healthy democracy (see, for example, Barnhurst 2011). However, recent empirical works have not found solid evidence for either camp on offline forms of participation. For instance, Boulianne's (2009) meta-analysis of 38 studies and 166 effects in the United States (1995-2005) show a positive, albeit small, effect of internet use on citizen engagement. More recently, using panel data, Kruikemeier and Shehata (2017) find mixed effects. All in all, as the debate penetrates all media platforms, there is a need for a systematic cross-national analysis. To this end, I propose the following hypothesis to first assess the overall influence of media use on the general electorate:

H7.1: Media use has a positive effect on democratic engagement.

7.2. Media Use and Democratic Engagement across Generations

The effect of media use may vary depending on one's generational membership. When it comes to younger generations, which attained political maturity in the digital context, online socialisation plays an important role in intellectual development and maturation (Jennings and Zeitner 2003; Loader et al. 2014; Swigger 2013). Compared to a substantial share of the adult population, those who attained political maturity in the 2000s do not consider the internet as 'new media' (Jennings and Zeitner 2003). They are not aware of a world without the online media. Therefore, they have come of age at a time where social interactions require them to share their thoughts and life experiences (Swigger 2013). The question then is, does a ubiquitous media use among young people facilitate or undermine democratic behaviours.

The merit of the internet to revitalize youth political engagement has been a particular focus of contemporary literature (Bakker and de Vreese 2011; Bennett et al. 2009; Boulianne 2015;

[40] Given the societal transformation potential of social media (Ahlqvist et al. 2010), social networks have become a platforms for new forms of participation (Loader et al. 2014; Xenos et al. 2014). These are distinct and disassociated from traditional participatory acts and institutions, proving to be more favourable among young people (Veneti 2020).

Livingstone et al. 2005; Quintelier and Vissers 2008). Case studies in the US (Pasek et al. 2006), Netherlands (Bakker and de Vreese 2011) and Belgium (Quintelier and Vissers 2008) report the positive association of informational internet use with various indicators of youth democratic engagement, both online and offline. Concurrently, news consumption via traditional mass media retains its positive democratic implications (Östman 2012), which is true across all generations (Shah et al.,2001), although young people are less likely to read the newspaper (Pap and Ham 2018; Zhang et al. 2010). A recent stream of literature shows media exposure enhances people's interests and leads to more positive attitudes toward political institutions (Aarts and Semetko 2003; Norris 2000; 2011), ultimately facilitating engagement with these institutions. This line of evidence supports the mobilisation thesis and rivals the media malaise theory. Given the accelerated access and enhanced exposure to media news among younger generations, and considering a more pronounced association, the hypothesis to test is:

> *H7.2: Media use has a more positive effect on democratic engagement of younger generations.*

For more recent generations, the internet and the network communication technologies play a central role in shaping modern citizens. According to the model of 'networked individualism' (Rainie and Wellman 2012), youth attitudes and behaviours are informed less by social ties with the family, neighbourhood etcetera, but more so by how they interact in social networks "which they themselves have had a significant part in constructing" (Loader et al. 2014). Today's youth is interested in non-hierarchical, project-oriented, lifestyle politics that has direct relevance to their daily lives. In a social media networked environment, there has been a reflexive shift in participatory preference, away from hierarchical politics.

Is media use then contributing to youth disengagement from traditional channels of democracy? Is it taking away from offline participation? The traditional citizenship rhetoric exhorts young people to be dutiful and adhere to participatory norms put in place by elders – i.e., they should vote, join political parties and volunteer in civic community activities. However, young people's attitudes are increasingly characterised by a less differential and more individualised (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991; Inglehart, 1990), more critical (Norris, 2002) and more self-actualizing norms (Bennett et al., 2009), which depart from traditional citizenship duties (Dalton, 2008). Today's "networked young citizen" is reflective of "cultural changes in political participation" (Loader et al. 2014, p. 144). An important point to note here is that media use may not be the key reason for these generational shifts, but given distinctive characteristics of each generation, the effect of media use may vary across generations.

Although some existing studies find that the internet has positive effects across cohorts, as a matter of fact, younger generations are less attracted to traditional forms of engagement (Phelps 2004; Zukin et al. 2006). There is a push and a pull factor at play here. The push away from traditional channels may not be due to media use but the online media is certainly a

crucial pull factor. Online media use for political reasons, in and on itself, can be considered a form of political participation (Livingstone et al. 2005; O'Toole et al. 2003; Russell 2004; Verba et al. 1995). The internet medium provides digital, accessible, and low-cost alternatives to participate in politics such as political blog-posting, researching political information, accessing online news, participating in forums, political tweeting, organising/signing online petitions and discussing politics in social media.

Research, however, shows that digital participation may spur offline engagement as well. For example, Bode (2012) finds that, among college undergraduates, facebook usage translates into offline political participation. Social networks influence political participation by creating networks similar to traditional, face-to-face, offline social networks (Bode 2012). These networks promote the transfer of personal information from trusted individuals, create community norms and generate social capital. Social interactions entail conversations, exchange of information, which in turn has the potential to shape preferences and tendency to participate (Mcclurg 2003). This extends Putnam's (2000) view that social networks enhance participatory behavior and contradicts conventional wisdom of the negative role of the media in driving young people away from participation (Robinson 1976; Nie and Erbring 2002).

There is mixed evidence of how media use impacts youth engagement with democracy. Although the above-reviewed literature mostly provides evidence for the mobilisation theory (a positive effect), it also indicates a suppressed effect of media use on traditional modes of participation among younger generations. Comparing to the broad media use hypothesis (H7 introduced in Chapter 3)[41], I propose to test the following hypothesis:

> *H7.3: Compared to older generations, media use has a less positive effect on democratic engagement of younger generations.*

There are, however, some confounding effects to consider while testing for generational variations. Many studies have established that media effects are often indirect and mediated by other psychological and socio-structural factors (Cho et al. 2009; Eveland 2004; Shah et al. 2005; Xenos and Moy 2007). They imply that media consumption may not have an 'independent' effect, but may simply correlate with democratic behaviours, owing to an endogenous factor which leads to both the supposed predictor and outcome variables. The causal pathway informing the link between media use and democratic engagement is not only complex but also remains unclear.

One line of study suggests that news-mediated increases in political knowledge may vary across social classes (Kim 2008). That is, the political knowledge one acquires from news media

[41] *H7 (media hypothesis): Young people who use the media for political information are more democratically engaged than non-users.*

is dependent on their social class. Early studies advise that, since people with higher socioeconomic status (SES) acquire media-transmitted information at a faster rate than lower-status segments of the population, this may be translated into a gap in political knowledge (Tichenor et al. 1970; Viswanath and Finnegan 1996). Tichenor and colleagues (1970) provide two explanations as to why this is the case. First, the upper class has more at stake- both economically and politically- and, thus, rely more on media-based information for knowledge. The second explanation has to do with the way in which the different classes process political information. Effective online search and newspaper reading is dependent on literacy level, searching with a purpose, evaluating source credibility, and constructing interpretive frames (Bonfadelli 2002). Most upper and middle class have higher cognitive skills - due to high education levels - to grapple with the complex political information. Members, thus, gain more from political news (Eveland and Scheufele 2000).

But studies on both the TV (Holbrook 2002) and internet media (Xenos et al. 2014) indicate that frequent media use is rather a 'knowledge leveler' between high and low SES today. Focusing on young people in three advanced democracies (Australia, UK and US), Xenos and colleagues (2014) show how the new form of digital media is 'the great equalizer' of political inequality in participation among young people. Given the widespread use of the Internet, the knowledge gap hypothesis may not stand anymore. This is because it makes political information more readily available, accessible, and cheap for uneducated lower classes (Dyson 1997; Gates 1995). Nevertheless, it is important to control for the much-theorised effect of SES, such as that of education level, to extract the direct effects of media use on democratic engagement.

Another variable which may mediate the relationship between media use and democratic behaviour is political interest. Political interest refers to "a citizen's willingness to pay attention to political phenomena at the possible expense of other topics" (Lupia and Philpot 2005). A healthy democracy comprises an electorate which is interested in the political process. It is positively linked to political knowledge, which in turn promotes active political participation (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1992). Interested individuals obtain political knowledge through education, interpersonal discussion, and the news media (Kenski and Stroud 2006). This explanation suggests that interest comes prior to access of media for acquiring knowledge. Such a confounding effect means that political interest is the key independent variable.[42] Providing support for a mediating effect, Shah et al. (2009) shows that exposure to new media has a positive association with political interest (which in turn effects democratic attitudes and behaviours). On the other hand, political interest may well just be an independent covariate strengthening the relationship between media use and democratic citizenship (Keating and

[42] In a British study, Veneti (2020) explores whether political experiences on social media have encouraged young people to participate in traditional avenues. Findings from a thematic analysis of eight semi-structured interviews, conducted with university students, suggest that prior interest in and knowledge of politics is the key determinant in whether young people partake in traditional participatory acts.

Melis 2017; Morris and Forgette 2007). To test the connection between the said variables, I suggest the following:

> *H7.4: Politically interested media users are more democratically engaged than uninterested non-users.*

7.3. The Effect of Media Use on Youth Disengagement

To assess whether media usage among the youth inform their democratic behaviours, I now turn to descriptive analyses of the variation in the dependent variables by age and generation categories in Figure 7.1. It is apparent that, irrespective of generation membership, media users are more engaged than non-users. As such, there is some but not specific support for the broad media hypothesis (H7) which proposes that young media users are more engaged than non-users. Further, this finding provides support for the mobilisation theory and against media malaise theory (i.e., support for H7.1).



Source: 24 OECD countries In CSES Module 5 (2016-2019)

Figure 7.1. Variations in democratic behaviour based on media use

Going from older to younger age groups and cohorts, there is an evident increase in engagement with the traditional processes of democracy. This holds for both media users and non-users. What is striking for both the 'cast a ballot' and 'feel close to a political party' variables is that media users moderate the declining trends (less steep decline, less gradient, among users). In other words, media use among young people seem to positively contribute to their offline engagement (some support for H7). At face value, this underscores the merit of the media in reviving youth political engagement (Bakker and de Vreese 2011; Bennett et al. 2009; Livingstone et al. 2005; Quintelier and Vissers 2008). Of course, these results should not be generalised without significance testing and without controlling for potential confounding variables such as political interest (Chang 2018; Cho et al. 2009; Levy et al. 2016). Models in Table 7.1 take these into account.

Table 7.1 presents findings from two models which regress the extent of media use (ordinal) variable against the dependent variables. Since each response variable has been re-coded to be binary, all models are regressed as logit models. The generation categories are all compared to the reference category, *Post-WWII* generation. Across generations, there is an overall decrease in traditional democratic behaviour. As mentioned above, the push away from traditional democratic behaviours may not be due to media use, but when controlling for these generation effects, a positive association is evident in Table 7.1.

Compared to all other categories of the (ordinal) media use variable, those who follow politics very closely in the media have higher odds of turning out to vote and aligning with a political party. This is visually represented in Figure 7.2, which presents marginal plots with 95% confidence intervals from the single level logit models in Table 7.1. The media use variable shows that users are significantly more likely to engage than non-users. The likelihood of each dependent variable decreases with decreasing 'closeness' of media use. However, since each category of the 'media use' variable is compared to the reference category (*very closely* follow the media), it is not wise to compare coefficients across other categories. Yet, there is ample support for (H7.1) the democratic merit of the media here.

Table 7.1. Effect of media use on traditional democratic behaviours

	Engagement with the Processes of Democracy	
	Cast a Ballot?	**Feel close to a Political Party?**
Generation (ref. Post -WWII)		
60s -70s	0.94 (0.09)	0.91 (0.06)
80s	0.73 (0.07) **	0.75 (0.05) ***
90s	0.52 (0.05) ***	0.69 (0.05) ***
00s	0.43 (0.04) ***	0.71 (0.05) ***
Female	1.26 (0.06) ***	0.99 (0.03)
Household Income	1.25 (0.02) ***	1.03 (0.01) *
Education	1.08 (0.01) ***	1.05 (0.01) ***
Internal Efficacy	1.36 (0.07) ***	1.30 (0.06) ***
View Represented	2.92 (0.14) ***	5.40 (0.19) ***
Political Interest	1.76 (0.11) ***	1.84 (0.09) ***
Media Use (ref. Very Closely)		
Fairly Closely	0.86 (0.06)*	0.83 (0.04) ***
Not Very Closely	0.70 (0.06) ***	0.77 (0.05) ***
Not at All	0.38 (0.04) ***	0.42 (0.03) ***
Constant	1.89 (0.23) ***	0.84 (0.08)
-Log Likelihood	7331	11119
AIC	14690	22265
N	24,380	24,380

Source: 24 OECD countries In CSES Module 5 (2016-2019)

Notes: Entries are odds ratios. Standard errors between brackets. Significance: *** < 0.001, ** < 0.01, * < 0.05. Method used: Single level logit model in Stata; Missing values dealt with complete case analysis. Data: CSES Mod 5 (2016-2021).



Source: Table 7.1

Figure 7.2. Margins plot for media use with 95% confidence intervals.

It is evident from the coefficient estimates that the effect of media use is substantial and significant for democratic behaviours. Previous studies provide at least two reasons for this. First, political information in media outlets invoke a virtuous circle which boosts people's interests in political institutions and, thus, facilitates engagement (Aarts and Semetko 2003; Norris 2011). Second, mobilisation thesis explains that mass media, in conjunction with rising education levels, help to inform and mobilise people (Dalton 1996; Inglehart 1990). Taken

together, both Figures 7.1 (and 7.2) and Table 7.1 disprove the media malaise theory, which suggests that the media invokes negative attitudes and drives people away from participation (Edelman 1988; Fallows 1997).

In terms of socio-demographic controls, which are known to impact democratic behaviours (Bolzendahl and Coffé 2009; Dalton 2008), Table 7.1 reinforces the strong positive association between:

i) political interest and both democratic behaviours (Bimber et al. 2015; Boulianne 2011; Chang 2018; Strömbäck et al. 2013).
ii) internal efficacy, or believe that one can affect political change, and democratic behaviours (Jennings and Zeitner 2003; Lee 2006).
iii) presence of a political party that represents the respondent's view and their behaviours (Schaffner and Clark 2004).

All in all, it is important to control for these variables as they can cause both the predictor and outcomes variables and thus confound the relationships in question.

Although the models in Table 7.1 estimate the independent effects of generations and media use across the sampled population, they do not specifically tell us how media use and generations interact to affect democratic engagement. Moreover, the models do not control for the 'age' variable due to high multicollinearity with the 'generation' variable. One way of estimating the between-generation effect, is to specify the cohort variable as a level 2 factor in a multilevel model. A hierarchical age-period-cohort (APC) analysis also allows to disentangle the highly correlated time effects. Considering age, generation and period effects manifest into highly collinear time effects (Dassonneville 2013; Grasso 2014), it is important to isolate them when studying young people.

However, in this chapter it is not feasible to conduct a hierarchical APC analysis. This limitation arises from the lack of availability of a long span of data in the chosen dataset. At the time of writing, it contained only four data points for the period variable (election years 2016-2019). A small *n* for a level 2 predictor compromises the reliability of the hierarchical APC models (Austin and Leckie 2018; McNeish and Stapleton 2016). Instead, here I take an alternative approach of slicing the existing dataset into five generational subsets and run separate but the same regression models for each dependent variable and compare the coefficients to capture the differences of media effects across generations. I do so while acknowledging that this is one of the many existing methods of addressing the identification problem. Table 7.2 presents results from these models. For the sake of parsimony, the socio-demographic factors (including age) controlled for in these models are not presented here.[43]

[43] For a detailed version of Table 7.2, see Table D in the appendix (p. 244).

Table 7.2. Effect of media use on traditional democratic behaviours across generations

	Engagement with the Processes of Democracy	
	Cast a Ballot?	Feel close to a Political Party?
Generation		
Post - WWII	1.72 (0.36) *	1.42 (0.22) *
60s - 70s	1.31 (0.20)	1.22 (0.13)
80s	1.62 (0.21) ***	1.25 (0.12) *
90s	1.10 (0.14)	1.25 (0.12) *
00s	1.54 (0.015) ***	1.12 (0.09)

Source: 24 OECD countries In CSES Module 5 (2016-2019)

Notes: Entries are odds ratios for the media use binary variable and each cell represents a separate regression analysis. Standard errors between brackets. Significance: *** < 0.001, ** < 0.01, * < 0.05. Method used: Single level logit model in Stata; Missing values dealt with complete case analysis.

Across all generations, media users consistently have higher odds of turning out to vote and aligning with a political party. But not all coefficients reach statistical significance. Looking down the columns, there is no clear trend in the increase or decrease in gap between media users and non-users. Therefore, it would be hasty to comment on how these results relate to H7.2 (more positive effect on younger generations) and H7.3 (less positive effect on younger generations). This compels a more nuanced analysis.

To this end, the models in Table 7.3 focus on the interaction between media use (binary) and political interest.[44] Here, I test for moderation - when the effect of X on Y is different for different values of Z[45]- by including an interaction term between the X and Z variables. Across all generations, media users who are interested in politics have higher odds of democratically engaging. This provides evidence for H7.4, which suggests that politically interested media users are more engaged than those with any other combination of political interest and media use. This is true across all generations (except for the 60s-70s generation, where interested non-users are more likely to vote than interested users; but both the groups are more likely to vote than non-interested non-users).

Existing literature reminds us that the democratic potential of media use is often moderated by individual political characteristics (Abdulrauf et al. 2017; Kim 2008). Other studies, contrarily, imply that political interest is a mediating variable, whereby media use affect democratic citizenship through political interest (i.e., X affects Y through Z (political interest);

[44] In models without the interaction, I found individual positive effects for both the *extent of media use* (ordinal) and *political interest* variables. By the way of robustness checks, the logit models fit better (improved log likelihood scores) with the addition of *media use × political interest* interaction, *internal efficacy* and *view represented* variables; For a detailed version of Table 7.3, see Table E in the appendix (p. 246).

[45] A moderator can affect the direction and/or strength of the relation between predictor and outcome variables (Baron and Kenny 1986, p. 1174).

Yamamoto et al. 2017). Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to test for the mediating effect of political interest, it is clear that the Z variable is definitely a moderator.

Table 7.3. Effect of media use and political interest on democratic behaviours across generations

		Engagement with the Processes of Democracy	
		Cast a Ballot?	Feel close to a Political Party?
Generation			
	Media Use x Political Interest *(ref. No Media Use – Not Interested)*		
Post - WWII	No Media – Interested	1.80 (0.63)	2.11 (0.56) **
	Media – Not Interested	2.03 (0.57) *	1.47 (0.30)
	Media – Interested	2.38 (0.47) ***	2.80 (0.41) ***
60s - 70s	No media – Interested	3.39 (0.92) ***	2.91 (0.48) ***
	Media – Not interested	2.30 (0.54) ***	1.41 (0.21) *
	Media – Interested	2.68 (0.32) ***	3.04 (0.31) ***
80s	No Media – Interested	1.85 (0.33) **	2.02 (0.27) ***
	Media – Not interested	1.69 (0.32) **	1.26 (0.18)
	Media – Interested	2.90 (0.37) ***	2.51 (0.23) ***
90s	No Media – Interested	1.62 (0.27) **	1.40 (0.18) **
	Media – Not interested	0.89 (0.15)	1.25 (0.19)
	Media – Interested	2.21 (0.26) ***	1.74 (0.16) ***
00s	No Media – Interested	1.92 (0.23) ***	2.29 (0.24) ***
	Media – Not interested	1.39 (0.19) *	1.18 (0.15)
	Media – Interested	3.24 (0.30) ***	2.47 (0.19) ***

Source: 24 OECD countries In CSES Module 5 (2016-2019)

Notes: Entries are odds ratios for the media use binary variable and each generation block represents a separate regression analysis. Standard errors between brackets. Significance: *** < 0.001, ** < 0.01, * < 0.05. Method used: Single level logit model in Stata; Missing values dealt with complete case analysis.

Again, since there is no clear pattern of increase or decrease of coefficients down the columns, it would be unwise to comment on H7.2 (more positive effect in younger generations). Therefore, there is no concrete evidence for the socialisation theory. But it is safe to say that, among younger generations, media use does not have a more negative effect and a less positive effect on traditional democratic behaviours (H7.3). Regardless, the most import takeaway is that media use has a positive effect on democratic behaviours (H7) and this effect is reinforced by political interest (H7.4).

7.4. Conclusion

Existing studies differ on whether news media facilitates or undermines youth engagement with the traditional processes of democracy. This chapter has set out to determine the democratic potential of media use on youth behaviours in 24 advanced societies. The results highlight three important findings. First, media users are more likely to turnout to vote and align with a political party. Second, these effects are independent of the generational membership of an individual and, third, they are strengthened by political interest.

Existing literature theorises two different types of association between media use and democratic behaviour. On the one hand, mobilisation theory suggests a positive effect on the entire electorate: media use – such as watching television or surfing the internet- provides access to a large amount of political information which evokes mass public awareness, interest, and ideological sophistication. This means that the news media creates and mobilises politically informed citizens. By contrast, media malaise theory argues that media use has an adverse impact on democracy. It leads to the loss of social capital and takes away from the time available for meaningful civic and political engagement. When enquiring about younger people, socialisation theory adds a nuance to these expectations: when it comes to younger generations, which attained political maturity in the digital context, online socialisation plays an important role in intellectual development and maturation. The gap in the literature is, therefore, whether younger generations - compared to older generations – behave in support of the mobilisation or media malaise theory.

The decline in youth participation in traditional channels of democracy (as seen in Chapter 5) questions the well-tested positive effect of news media on the youth population. The news media matters for the general population, but does it have a similar positive effect on all generations? This chapter confirms the independent positive association of the news media with democratic engagement. An enquiry on interaction effects show that, across all generations, media use helps to inform and mobilise people (Dalton 1996; Inglehart 1990) instead of invoking negative attitudes which drive people away from participation (Edelman 1988; Fallows 1997). This confirms the mobilisation theory. Although there are other explanations to why democratic disconnect from traditional practices is concentrated amongst younger generations (e.g., Blais and Rubenson 2013), political communication platforms do not add to the decline in engagement. This means that political institutions and leaders should focus on specifically targeting young people and addressing their grievances through suitable media platforms.

Chapter 8
Political Institutions and Youth Disengagement

"Electoral institutions shape the potential costs and benefits of participation."
– Kittilson and Anderson (2009)

The design of political institutions matters for citizen engagement with democracy. Democratic theory suggests that macro-level, democratic factors shape citizens' attitudes and behaviours. But do these institutions affect young people differently to other groups in society? Although pioneering works by Riker (1980) and North (1990) well-established the role of institutional features in shaping individual attributes, there is a gap in the literature concerning the differential effects, if any, on younger people.

Although the current study elucidates the nature of the youth disengagement problem – from traditional processes of democracy- so far there has been little discussion about the effect of institutional context. It is known that institutional design factors vary across democracies (see, for example, Kostadinova 2003), but whether these effects exhibit differently among young people is an unexplored topic. Although, noteworthily, a few existing studies investigate the potential effects of institutional design factors on youth outcomes (Fieldhouse et al. 2007; Grimm and Pilkington 2015; Soler-i-Marti and Ferrer-Fons 2015; Sloam 2016), these are case studies which rarely pay attention to the APC identification problem. Consequently, there is a lack of consensus regarding the effects of most macro-factors and the mechanisms through which they impact political behaviours. This chapter aims to address this gap by exploring the effects of political institutions on both younger age groups and generational cohorts.

It builds on the premise that individual citizens are nested in larger, cross-nationally variable macro environments (Anderson and Singer 2008). Although previous chapters acknowledge the effect of generational membership and cultural groupings, this chapter goes further to explore the effects of higher-level institutional factors across different countries. It contains four sections. First, I briefly introduce the concept of institutions and their role in driving democratic citizenship. In the second section, with a focus on young people, I extend the theoretical review and the institutions hypothesis (H8)[46] presented in Chapter 3. Here, I zoom into the lifecycle and generational theories explaining the influence of institutional features – particularly power-sharing/concentrating features, regime age and registration systems- on

[46] *H8 (institutions hypothesis): Young people are more engaged in a) power-sharing systems; b) older democracies; and, c) state-initiated registration systems.*

young people's engagement with the processes of democracy. Next, I test these expectations using data from the CSES IMD (1996-2016). The results suggest that although macro institutional factors impact democratic citizenship, generational attributes drive most institutional explanations (i.e., institutional effects lose significance when controlling for generations). I close by discussing the implications of this key finding, especially in addressing institutional barriers to youth democratic engagement.

8.1. The Political Institutional Context

Although contextual approaches to behaviour have had a venerable tradition across social studies, comparative political scholars have paid more attention to individual-level factors in explaining citizens' attitudes and behaviours. The reason for this neglect stems from the behavioural focus in survey research and its export from the University of Michigan (Anderson and Singer 2008, p. 567). This micro-level focus, in other words, can be attributed to the success of the Michigan school which was primarily used in psychological concepts to explain autonomous behaviour. By implication, albeit inadvertently, this means that political contexts of the neighbourhood, communities and countries have been neglected.

Furthermore, there was also a lack of measures which were collected in similar points in time (e.g., post-election) across multiple years and countries. However, this started to change in the 1980s. With the emergence of several collaborative cross-national survey projects (Kittilson 2007), researchers were then allowed to compare attitudes and behaviours around the world. That is, they began to examine differences in macro-level manifestations of behavior (Inglehart 1983). This revolution in survey data collection and the ability to conduct systematic cross-national comparisons fortuitously coincided with several other trends: there was a rapid expansion of electoral democracies in the 80s and 90s, advancement of computer technology and emergence of powerful statistical methods to conduct multilevel research (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Zuckerman 2005). Taken together, these intellectual, technological, and real-world trends have created an upsurge of scholarships concerning the interaction of individual behaviour with macro-political features (Anderson and Singer 2008, p. 568; Klingemann 2009, pp. 3-27).

The logic underlying the macro-micro nexus mirrors the traditional *person x context interaction* model, which has long been the basis of research in social psychology (see, for example, Lewin 1935). In such models, people are nested in contexts, i.e., they think and make choices in a macro environment (Anderson and Singer 2008, p. 568). These come as either formal institutional rules or economic, political and social conditions which influence people's interpretations and actions. So, where one is situated is important because when contexts vary across time and space, they produce differential costs and incentives for individuals. For example, some institutional rules make it harder for people to vote in some countries compared to others. This means that there are two kinds of heterogeneity – one at the

individual level and one at the country level- that explain differences in people's attitudes and behaviours.

In the past decade, a growing discussion about the importance of political context on democratic citizenship has mostly focused on voter turnout. A stream of papers has repeatedly shown how contextual factors -such as federal structure, executive type, electoral system, registration rule and similar- substantially enrich individual-level explanations as to why people vote (Andiuza Perea 2002; Jusko and Shively 2005; Fieldhouse et al. 2007; Anderson 2007; Gallego 2010; Rocha et al. 2010; Quintelier et al. 2011; Dalton and Anderson 2011; Singh 2011; Söderlund et al. 2011). In most of these cases, the focus on young people - let alone in a comparative research design setting - has been quite scarce. The next sections aim to fill this lacuna.

8.2. Young People in Various Institutional Settings

Democratic institutions have heretofore been overlooked in explaining youth democratic citizenship. In general, political context is known to matter when it comes to engagement in politics (Klingemann 2009) and it is reasonable to suggest that socialisation in a particular environment or cultural setting would shape a young person's views and actions as well (Snell 2010). It is, therefore, crucial to consider context in young people's politics (Torney-Purta 2009).

The mechanism through which institutional design factors affect youth democratic engagement may pertain to the lifecycle and generational characteristics of younger age groups and cohorts, respectively. One line of thought implies a lifecycle effect: the lives of the youngest voting group (18-30) are characterised with a lack of routine and a greater mobility than older groups (Flanagan et al. 2012). Democratic institutions may not necessarily cater directly to the uncertainties of younger people, particularly during a transition to adulthood. This period is characterised by a great deal of mobility in every aspect of life: combining studies with work and or family commitments and moving places between academic and personal residences. In such situations, for example, living in a polity where the onus of enrolling to vote is completely on the voter, may make it difficult for a young person without a permanent long-term residence to register to vote. This example highlights how a country's registration system might disadvantage a particular age group.

Another explanation highlights how differences among generations, arising from the variances in the environment that members spent their formative years in, may reflect a longer transition to adulthood for younger cohorts. It takes longer for young people today to attain the various markers of adulthood: this "protracted period of transition to adulthood" has implications on their civic participation (Flanagan et al. 2012; Arnett 2014; Settersten et al. 2005). Compared to earlier cohorts, younger generations take longer to attain employment, establish household

and families and plant themselves firmly in local communities. Further, young people today are balancing between multiple job, work and study schedules. Whereas previously, completing education preceded steady work, contemporary youth do not follow this 'normal' sequence (Flanagan et al. 2012, p. 34). They chart their own course– meaning, this peripatetic nature of young adulthood includes both the freedom to choose, but also challenges of balancing time demands and of being proactive to participate in civic life. This lack of routine along with issues of mobility are common attributions among the disengaged youth.

Arguably, youth engagement has declined not because the youth is 'deficient' but because there are institutional barriers which incapacitates advanced democracies to facilitate engagement (see, for example, Edwards 2007). That is, there is a mismatch between the developmental obligations of a particular stage in life and the institutional opportunities to support that. In other words, institutions have not adapted to cater for the changing realities of the protracted transition to adulthood (Riley et al. 1994; Hamilton and Hamilton 2009). Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2010) suggest that researchers must consider the direct effects of institutions rather than assume that they only have indirect roles in the process of engagement. Below, I discuss some common institutional features and how variations in them can be hypothesised to stimulate or impede youth engagement with the processes of democracy.

Power-sharing vs. power-concentrating institutions

Young people in certain electoral settings are expected to be more engaged with the political process. Based on the distribution of power created by political institutions, prominent theories have largely considered democratic systems in two categories, power-sharing and power-concentrating (Norris 2008).[47] Power-sharing systems prioritise democratic ideals such as inclusion and wide representation and, thus, encourage governments to represent a broad spectrum of interests (Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2010, p. 991). By contrast, power-concentrating systems focus on rule by the party which wins majority, resulting in the concentration of power in the hands of a few political actors who are expected to generate efficient, accountable rule (Lijphart 1984; 1999; Powell 2000). With an aim to maximise participation in decision-making, power-sharing systems often employ institutions such as proportional representation (PR) electoral system, parliamentarism, and federalism (Norris 2008). Power-concentrating democracies, on the other hand, rely on (single-member district) plurality electoral rules, zero-sum presidential elections, and unitary government.

Compared to power-concentrating systems, power-sharing systems are expected to instil more pro-democratic attitudes among citizens, including young constituents. Citizens in power-sharing systems have greater satisfaction with democracy (Klingemann 1999; Lijphart 1999)

[47] Other conceptualisations - such as Lijphart's (1999) consensus vs majoritarian and Powell's (2000) proportional vs majoritarian visions of democracy- capture similar distinctions.

and greater support for the legislature (Norris 1999b; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005) than their majoritarian counterparts. Anderson and Guillory (1997) find that such systems also iron out the satisfaction gap between electoral winners and losers. A later study on a broad range of democratic attitudes attribute power-sharing institutions to a narrowed gap for evaluations of system performance, responsiveness, fairness, and overall support for democratic principles (Anderson et al. 2005). Wells and Krieckhaus (2006) similarly stress on the importance of proportional systems for democratic satisfaction over other factors such as economic performance and corruption. Notably, all these effects are both immediate and lasting (reviewed in Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2010, p. 991).

Political institutions serve as political symbols, which have psychological effects on engagement, especially for underrepresented groups such as young people. For example, a particular institutional design may signal to the citizens the importance of inclusiveness in the system. Subsequently, it may influence political engagement. Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2010) test the viability of this signalling theory by using data from the WVS (2000-2002) in 34 democracies. They find that underrepresented groups such as women are differentially affected by the way power is shared in these institutions and that the gender gap in political engagement is small in jurisdictions with proportional electoral rules. The same rationale could be applied to other marginalised groups such as young people, who have been historically excluded from the political process.

In a society where young people continue to feel socially and politically marginalised (Henn et al. 2005), power-sharing institutions signal that long-standing, old male-dominated political environment is open to representation and inclusion of all groups. Power-sharing institutions, therefore, carry salient signals encouraging more citizens to get involved in politics. In conceptualising and distinguishing power-sharing versus power-concentrating Institutions, Norris (2008) focuses on three institutions- the electoral system, type of executive, and whether a state is unitary or federal. Below, I discuss these three institutions and how they are theorised to effect (young) citizens in power-sharing vs concentrating systems.

First, electoral systems are examples of structural features of politics that produce different attitudinal and procedural outcomes (Anderson 1998; Miller and Listhaug 1999; Mishler and Rose 1997). Due to biased electoral processes, political systems may produce inegalitarian outcomes, and this may be reflected in citizens' views and actions. Some studies use explanations that are grounded in rational actor theory to describe the link between electoral institutions and political participation (Anderson and Singer 2008). For example, seminal works by Powell (1986), Jackman (1987) and Boix (2003) provide empirical support for the link between proportionality and higher turnout. In proportional representation systems, potential voters perceive that there are fewer wasted votes for smaller parties and therefore have greater incentive to turn up to vote. As these systems provide more opportunity for representation, comparative scholars have long raved about their potential in fostering

participation. Explaining the mechanism driving this, Karp and Banducci (2008) contend that proportionality fosters stronger party preferences and efficacy, which in turn spur engagement.

Why is turnout expected to be higher in PR systems? Two main reasons are adduced in the literature (Blais and Aarts 2006, p. 183-84). The first reason is that PR systems produce more parties (Cox 1997; Duverger 1954), which provide voters with more choice. That is, voters are more likely to align with a party which defends their interests and/or values. Because more choice is offered, more citizens feel represented and feel less alienated. With more parties, there is a greater amount of party mobilisation during election campaigns.

The second reason is that PR systems produce more competition, which leads to higher turnout. This occurs because of two reasons: on the supply side, parties invest more in mobilisation efforts simply because there are fewer safe seats, and, on the demand side, when there is a close race, voters are more likely to consider their votes as more useful and decisive. In single-member constituencies, there are many safe seats, meaning there is little uncertainty about the winner, and this decreases efficacy among citizens. A lack of proportionality in the system is expected to exacerbate the feeling of not being represented. In contrast, in PR systems, small parties have a better chance of winning a seat, and therefore, fewer people have the impression that their votes are worthless. In support of this view, a Canadian survey study reports that about two thirds of its respondents were at least "somewhat supportive" of introducing a proportional representation system for federal elections in Canada (Pammett and LeDuc 2003).

Although the above-mentioned reasons are the most-evoked in the literature when it comes to explaining the electoral system-turnout link, some scholars contend that PR might as well depress turnout by the very mechanism that it is applauded to increase turnout. Jackman (1987) points out that more parties in PR systems mean that they are more likely to form coalition government (see also, St-Vincent 2013). Such structures, he suggests, endanger the decisiveness of elections. The argument is that, in single-member plurality systems, there is a direct link between the outcome of election and formation of government. Simply put, the party with the most votes forms government.

In PR systems, it is not so straight-forward: the distribution of votes and seats sometimes depends on the country's constitution and also depends in part on the backroom deal among victorious parties. Voters have no say on the actual coalition formed after the election. This means that voters perceive the elections to be less decisive and hence have less incentive to vote. Even the safe seat explanation (Franklin 2004) is not free from flaws. PR systems also have safe seats, and it is yet to be determined whether non-PR systems have more safe seats. In sum, the theoretical literature proposes three reasons – two positive and one negative – for the consequences PR systems could have on turnout (Blais and Aarts 2006, p. 184).

Second, distinguishing the types of executives, Norris classifies parliamentary systems as power-sharing institutions, which provide opportunities for "checks and balances on political leaders," cabinet accountability to the legislature, "flexibility in the prime minister's tenure," and "incentives for cooperation and consultation between the executive and legislature" (2008, pp. 155–56). These attributes are likely to promote a more accommodating system than otherwise. Parliamentary system's vision of shared governance signals a strong cue to citizens that politics is more consensual and less of a zero-sum game. It also signals that the political process is open to all citizens, not just the more powerful majority. For historically marginalised groups, what boosts engagement is an environment that accommodates and compromises rather than one based on competition and majority rule (Norris 2008, p. 156).

Third, the geographical distribution of power in a country – whether it is unitary or federal- is also an important institutional feature (Norris 2008). While proportionality refers to power sharing among social groups and parliamentarism embodies horizontal power sharing between branches of government, federalism symbolises vertical power sharing (Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2010, p. 994). Federal systems disperse powers to subnational governments whereas unitary systems concentrate power. A distribution of political power across state and local levels provides alternative access points for citizens to interact with the government, encouraging more engagement. This signals an attempt to include all. Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2010, p. 994) purport that women may perceive these signals more strongly than men given their historical exclusion at both the national and sub-national levels. The same mechanism may apply to young people, a historically marginalised group across all levels of political decision-making. Power-sharing systems may signal to young people that their views matter and their vote, for example, can be decisive. As such, this may invoke a feeling of being better represented than in power-concentrating systems. Considering the existing literature, and as a component of the broad institution hypothesis (H8), I propose to test whether power-sharing institutions boost political engagement among young people:

> *H8.1: Young people in power-sharing systems (PR, parliamentary and federal) engage more with democratic processes compared to young people in power-concentrating systems (majoritarian, presidential, unitary).*

Regime Age

Given numerous institutional differences between old and new democracies, it is plausible to expect that young people in older democracies engage differently than those in new democracies. Intuitively, the most successful transmission of democratic believes will occur in regimes with a vast majority of citizens socialised in a democratic milieu. The older the democracy, socialisation agents are highly experienced with and used to the democratic processes and the democratic polity is the only game in town (Linz and Stepan1996). Whereas

in emerging democracies, some proportions of these agent have socialised under a non-democratic atmosphere and their chances of being successfully socialised into the democratic process is not as in long-standing democracies (see Sapiro 2004).

Empirical analysis shows that this is true among young people. Following earlier works by Huntington (1991), Muhlberger and Paine (1993) and Dunn (2005), Kitanova's (2020, p. 826) comparative study identifies new democracies as countries which democratised post-1988. In line with existing literature on democracy maturity (Nový and Katrnak 2015), Kitaniva (2020) finds that the age of democracy effects youth (18-30-year-olds) participation in the EU. Young individuals in older democracies are more likely to be politically active compared to those in recently democratised, post-communist societies (Barnes 2004; Bernhagen and Marsh 2007). Considering the political history of post-Communist countries, this finding is not surprising. As these countries democratised, they underwent single-party rule, state ownership and a highly centralised economy. Further, they experienced industrialisation, nation-building and the emergence of civil society and the occurrence of civil society in later years (Kitanova 2020).

Also, compared to older democracies, the levels of socio-economic development and confidence in institutions are different in newer democracies. In post-communist societies, people would not necessarily have developed a habit of voting because the democratic experience is relatively new (Kitanova 2020, p. 823). New democracies are typically more likely to be highly centralized with low levels of freedom: some citizens have already been socialised into non-democratic values, making it harder for them to develop basic orientations and practices among younger citizens in their formative years (Sapiro 2004). Whereas established democracies have more favourable environments for values which are congruent with democracy.

The process of political socialisation- the developments of political orientations and practices for the lifetime- is therefore not the same in all democracies. Almond and Verba's (1963) seminal book, *The Civic Culture*, underlines the importance of the congruence between citizens' psychological orientations to the political institutions to ensure regime stability and durability. In stable democracies, a political culture – which entails attitudes towards the systems and towards the self in the system- must be inculcated by the agents of the political system. The relationship between civic values and democratic age resides in the socialisation process and the agents - such as family, peer groups, mass media and school- are responsible for the success of the process (Nový and Katrnak 2015, p. 3). These agents provide a variety of context in which people in their formative years develop norms and behaviours to support the political system. In other words, the socialisation agents disseminate dissimilar messages to citizens under different contexts (Sapiro 2004; Gimpel et al. 2003; Pacecho 2008).

Interestingly, these agents can be traced back to the public sector - especially when family members, peer groups and media workers are all educated in schools which are mostly funded

by the state. That is, the state has a say in what teachers teach and pupils learn in school. The process of political socialisation is thereby primarily influenced by the national political arena. As Nový and Katrnak (2015, p. 3) aptly put, "Due to the pivotal role of schooling, the lower levels of the context in which individuals are nested (groups, households etc.) are substantially affected by the national level (cf. Gimpel et al. 2003; Pacheco 2008; Almond and Verba 1963)." Considering the literature on the effect of regime age on democratic citizenship, I test the following hypothesis:

> *H8.2: Young people in older democracies engage more with democratic processes compared to young people in newer democracies.*

State-initiated vs. self-initiated registration system

Electoral registration systems can either facilitate or undermine a young person's opportunities to engage with the electoral process. Simple and effective registration mechanisms are required to promote the inclusion of all qualified voters in the voter register. Electoral registers provide a catalogue of valid citizens who fulfil the legal requirements of voting in an electoral territory. They generate certainty in the voting process and, thus, consolidate the democratic process. A well-designed and sophisticated register can lead to enthusiastic engagement of citizens with the electoral processes. Whereas inaccurate voter registers can disenfranchise voters and undermine public confidence in election results.

Electoral registers can be of many kinds depending on the nature of the voting system and the electoral authority in charge of creating and updating the voter register. Registers may be mandatory or voluntary, centralised, or de-centralised, permanent or non-permanent, independent or dependent of higher electoral authorities. For the purposes of this chapter, I broadly focus on two kinds of voter registers. The active or affirmative type require citizens to register as voters. In passive or state-initiated systems, the voter register is automatically compiled from existing residency or citizenship registers, such as a national registry.

Registration systems may work to the detriment of young people. For instance, when 16 or 17-year-olds become eligible to vote, they leave home and change residences. They may be inadvertently disenfranchised by not making it to the registers. Therefore, effective procedures are required to ensure the inclusion of constituents who have recently attained voting age and those who will reach voting age between registration and polling days. States which do not allow pre-registration or do not assist with registration may lose these potential voters. Allowing 16 to 17-year-olds to register to vote has already proven to increase voter registration (McDonald 2009). Pre-registration increases youth turnout through the driver's license mechanism whereby young people with no prior knowledge of the program can enter the political realm with minimal effort (Edwards 2007). This may also consequently incite a lifelong

habit of political participation, particularly amongst disenfranchised groups who are under-represented in the current electorate.

Focusing on the United States – which is almost alone among advanced industrial nations in putting the onus of registration on individual voters - Cherry (2012) highlights an important point: given the percentage of registered youth who turn out to vote is high in the United States, with proper assistance and opportunities to register, young citizens will vote. This means that the biggest roadblock to electoral participation is not the unwillingness of the registered voter to vote but rather the current voter registration system (Cherry 2012, p. 482). Compared to all other age groups, 18-24-year-olds are significantly less likely to register, and thus vote. Among various reasons for low youth registration rates, Lijphart (1997) confirms "burdensome registration requirements" in the US is a "major institutional deterrent to voting".

Within the voluntary registration system, young people are especially disadvantaged since new eligible voters are often unfamiliar with the registration system, including how and where to register to vote. Consequently, many confused ineligible voters inadvertently miss voter registration deadlines (McDonald 2009). Strate (1989, p. 443, 450) highlights that young adults are politically inexperienced, lacking “civic competence”, which is the lack of "knowledge and habits of knowledge acquisition relevant to politics”. His empirical enquiry establishes that political experience, which comes with age, leads to higher levels of civic competence, and thus greater electoral participation (Strate 1989, p. 451). Young people lacking civic competence require extra assistance to vote for the first time.

To add to the barriers, political candidates often turn their campaigning focus to already-registered voters, ignoring unregistered young people (McDonald 2009). Consequently, young people receive lesser opportunities to receive assistance in registering, especially in their very first election, in which they are eligible to vote but lack the civic competence to do so. As they fall out of the vision of the party-funded registration drives, they risk the failure to develop the habit of voting – a tendency which carries on till later in life.

State-initiated, rather than self-initiated registration systems, may facilitate youth participation. Australia, a country with a compulsory and automatic registration system, provides a unique example. Australia’s election agency records potential young voters by accessing data from various agencies such as motor vehicle license registration and the tax authority (Rosenberg and Chen 2009). If an individual is identified to be eligible but is unregistered, the electoral officials send them a voter registration form with a pre-paid return envelope. Australia ensures the addition of first-time voters by allowing and encouraging pre-registration at the age of 17. When an individual pre-registers, they are listed with a special designation in the voter database which is updated when they turn 18, the legal voting age. The electoral officials, based on the information obtained by the state departments of

education, send birthday cards with an enclosed registration form (Rosenberg and Chen 2009. p. 11). Election officials also conduct targeted outreach to young voters by, for example, sponsoring week-long registration campaigns in high schools across the country every year or by attending orientation weeks in universities. There they register new voters and collect address updates from students who had previously registered at other addresses. So, in this case, young people could have been potentially disadvantaged if registration were self-initiated and not facilitated by the state. This discussion leads to the following hypothesis:

> *H8.3: Young people in state-initiated registration systems engage more with democratic processes than young people in self-initiated registration systems.*

8.3. The Effect of Institutions on Youth Disengagement

So far, I have focused on micro level factors to examine their roles in the generational withdrawal from the traditional processes of democracy. Now, I focus on higher level contextual factors to investigate whether institutional features impact young people's engagement with democracy.

Before estimating the multilevel models, below I present descriptive analyses of the variation in the dependent variables by age and generation categories for each institutional factor. Note that all hypotheses in this chapter (H8.1-3) refer to young people and not to age groups and generations specifically. While testing these broad hypotheses, however, I drill deeper to investigate whether the institutions-DV links are driven by lifecycle or generation effects.



Source: 35 OECD countries in CSES IMD (1996-2016)

Figure 8.1. Variations in democratic behaviours based on electoral system

Those in the mid-age categories in proportional systems are more likely to cast a ballot compared to their counterparts in majoritarian systems. The age plots in the top row of Figure 8.2, however, shows no effect of PR systems on voter turnout. When it comes to party alignment, there is a striking effect on the youngest age group (18-30). Surprisingly, young people in majoritarian systems seem to be more aligned than those in proportional systems. The graphs provide evidence against H8.1 - young people in power sharing (PR) systems engage more with democratic processes compared to young people in power concentrating (non-PR) systems.

Looking at the generation plots in the bottom row of Figure 8.1, the differences in engagement in each generation between majoritarian and proportional settings appear to be negligible. The youngest generation (00s) is slightly more likely to cast a ballot and align with a political party in a PR system than in a non-PR system. The 80s and 90s generations are less likely to align with a party in a PR system. In face value, there is mixed evidence for H8.1: it would be a hasty conclusion to declare PR systems to be better at engaging the youth without disentangling cohorts from lifecycle and period effects in a hierarchical model.



Source: 35 OECD countries in CSES IMD (1996-2016)

Figure 8.2. Variations in democratic behaviours based on executive type

Turning now to the type of executive, the top row of Figure 8.2 shows that all age groups in parliamentary systems are more engaged with the voting process then their counterparts in presidential systems (left plot). But there appears to be minimal differences among presidential and parliamentary systems across each age group for the party alignment variable (right plot). Comparing each cohort across the two systems at the bottom row of Figure 8.2, at least the two youngest generation are less committed to both the processes of democracy in parliamentary systems. This is a striking observation given the popular expectation is that power sharing institutions facilitate pro-democratic engagement (Norris 2008).



Source: 35 OECD countries in CSES IMD (1996-2016)

Figure 8.3. Variations in democratic behaviours based on constitutional federal structure

Compared to their counterparts in a unitary system, the youngest age group (18-30) appears to be voting more in federal systems. The top row in Figure 8.3, however, shows that this group is aligning similarly with political parties across the two systems. Tentatively, there is little but some evidence for H8.1: young people in power sharing federal systems engage more with democratic processes compared to young people in unitary systems. Looking now at the bottom row in Figure 8.3, all generations in unitary systems are more committed to the processes of democracy than their counterparts in federal systems. There is no evidence in support for hypothesis H8.1, which claims that young people in federal systems engage more with democratic processes compared to young people in unitary systems. Again, this is not particular to younger generations but apply also to all other generations.



Source: 35 OECD countries in CSES IMD (1996-2016)

Figure 8.4. Variations in democratic behaviours based on regime age

Although party alignment has a positive relationship with regime age, citizens in older democracies (roughly over 100 years old) are turning away from the ballot box. The graphs in Figure 8.4 look quite similar to those produced when the dependent variables are regressed against regime age for only the youngest age group (18-30) and the youngest generation categories (90s, 00s). This preliminary finding raises an important question of whether citizens of older democracies are becoming too complacent since younger generations there never had to experience the horrors of authoritarian rule (Fuks et al. 2018).



Source: 35 OECD countries in CSES IMD (1996-2016)

Figure 8.5. Variations in democratic behaviours based on registration system

Compared to its counterpart in self-initiated registration systems, the youngest age category (18-30) in state-initiated systems is more likely to vote. The top row in Figure 8.5 does not show much difference among the youth in the two systems when it comes to following a political party. Given the inconsistencies in results across the dependent variables, it would be too hasty to comment on hypotheses H8.3, which insist that young people in state-initiated registration systems are more committed to democratic processes than young people in self-initiated registration systems.

Looking at the bottom row in Figure 8.5, among the youngest generation, those in state-initiated registration systems are less likely to engage with the processes of democracy. There is no evidence for hypothesis H8.3 here. This is a rather surprising finding given there is staunch praise in the current literature about the advantages of state-initiated registration when it comes to encouraging young people to, at least, vote (Rosenberg and Chen 2009; McDonald and Thornburg 2010; Cherry 2012; Singh et al. 2019). However, the descriptive analysis above does not account for country effects. In this dataset, only France, Mexico and United States have a self-initiated registration system: this means that respondents in this category of registration system may be underrepresented in the CSES sample. This issue highlights the importance of controlling for country effects.



Source: 35 OECD countries in CSES IMD (1996-2016)

Figure 8.6. Mean turnout as a percentage of registered voters among age categories[48]

Figure 8.6 considers group (country) effects while comparing age categories in their voting behaviour, a key democratic process. Each country presents a cluster of bars with each bar representing an age category (from left to right: 18-30, 31-45, 46-60, 60-90). When looking at the mean turnout as a percentage of registered voters between 1996-2016, although there are huge variations across countries (among clusters), there is little variation across age categories (within clusters). That is, overall, in each country, registered voters in all age categories turnout at a similar percentage. Looking closely, once registered, younger people in Ireland, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Portugal, Slovenia, and Great Britain have cast a ballot at a higher percentage (descending cluster) than older people. Overall, younger people are not much different from older people in their own countries than they are from younger people in other countries. In other words, the graph suggests that between-country variations are more pronounced than within-country variations (among age groups).

[48] There are some limitations to using registered voters as opposed to all young people in the population, These downsides, such as the oversampling of politically interested people who are more likely to respond to a survey, are inherent limitations of the survey method. Notably, in a youth study, the most notable issue is that surveys are likely to suffer from poor response rates from youngest age groups. However, defining young people as both age groups and generational cohorts, and adding various demographic controls - that is known in the literature to impact response rate and democratic engagement - address some of this concern.



Source: 35 OECD countries in CSES IMD (1996-2016)

Figure 8.7. Mean turnout as a percentage of registered voters among generations

Next, I consider group (country) effects while comparing cohorts in their voting behaviour. In Figure 8.7, each country corresponds to a cluster of bars with each bar representing a generation (from left to right: Post-WWII, 60s-70s, 80s, 90s, 00s). Similar to the above graph, between-country variations appear more pronounced than the within-country, between-generation variations. Slightly different from above graph, there are visible variations within and among clusters. There has been a generational decline in turnout among registered voters (descending cluster) in Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia and Great Britain. On the contrary, registered voters in the youngest generation are more engaged in Hungary, Ireland, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. Interestingly, in the US – where the onus of registration is completely on the citizens- once registered, younger generations have voted with a similar or higher percentage than older generations. This suggest that the biggest barrier to electoral participation might not be the unwillingness of registered youth to vote (Cherry 2012).

A comparison of Figures 8.6 and 8.7 reveals that, although the youngest age group in Israel, Japan, South Korea, Slovenia and Great Britain have actually cast a ballot at a higher percentage than older age groups, younger generations in the same countries have cast a ballot at a lower percentage than older generations. This means that registration systems may elicit both lifecycle and generation effects. This, together with the plethora of micro and macro factors

working in tandem across various jurisdictions, justifies using hierarchical modelling to disentangle variations in the DVs.

Table 8.1. Effect on institutional design on democratic behaviours (APC)

	Engagement with the Processes of Democracy	
	Cast a Ballot?	Feel Close to a Political Party?
Fixed Effects		
Age	1.03 (0.00) ***	1.02 (0.00) ***
Female	0.96 (0.04)	0.84 (0.02) ***
Education	1.43 (0.03) ***	1.15 (0.02) ***
Household Income	1.22 (0.02) ***	1.12 (0.01) ***
Macro institutional variables		
Compulsory Voting (ref. Strictly Enforced)		
Weakly Enforced	0.08 (0.03) ***	0.62 (0.14) *
No Sanctions	0.08 (0.02) ***	0.06 (0.01) ***
No CV	0.04 (0.01) ***	0.10 (0.01) ***
Electoral Formula (ref. Majoritarian)		
Proportional	0.09 (0.03) ***	1.67 (0.29) *
Mixed	0.21 (0.06) ***	2.33 (0.41) ***
Type of Executive (ref. Presidential)		
Parliamentary	0.34 (0.10) ***	1.40 (0.19) *
Mixed	0.38 (0.11) **	1.22 (0.19)
Federal	0.57 (0.04) ***	0.51 (0.02) ***
Multi Party	21.1 (7.06) ***	0.90 (0.18)
Number of parties participating in election	1.00 (0.00)	1.00 (0.00) ***
Compulsory Registration	0.33 (0.04) ***	2.32 (0.19) ***
State-initiated Registration System	4.99 (1.42) ***	0.13 (0.02) ***
Age of Current Regime	1.00 (0.00) ***	1.00 (0.00) ***
Voting Age	1.08 (0.11)	0.39 (0.03) ***
Constant	0.93 (1.77)	0.00 (0.00) ***
Random Effects Variance		
Cohort	0.001 (0.002)	0.006 (0.005)
Survey Year	0.141 (0.061)	0.112 (0.048)
-Log Likelihood	9810	14556
AIC		
N	24,555	24,555

Source: CSES IMD (1996-2016)

Notes: Entries are odds ratios estimated by a mixed generalised linear model. Standard errors between brackets. Significance: *** < 0.001, ** < 0.01, * < 0.05. Method used: Cross-classified random effects two-level model in Stata; Missing values dealt with complete case analysis.

Table 8.1 presents the findings from two cross-classified multilevel models which distinguish generational effects from period effects, while also considering age differences in two democratic behaviours. Even when controlling for several institutional factors, between-cohort and between-period effects, there is a slight but significant positive increase in engagement with the processes of democracy with age. Table 8.1 also shows that a lower voting age corresponds to low engagement (except for party alignment). But this finding warrants caution as the current sample consists of just one country with voting age 16 (Austria) and one with 19 (South Korea) - so this variable may be capturing country effects. State-initiated registration systems encourage turnout but depress party alignment. Another striking but unsurprising finding is that respondents in strictly enforced compulsory voting systems are more likely to engage than in any other category of voting system.

Contrary to the dominant notion in existing literature, proportionality depresses turnout, whereas it increases alignment with political parties. An interesting finding in tandem to this is that multi-party as opposed to two-party systems substantially increases turnout. A line of thought in the literature is that PR fosters turnout by allowing multiple parties to assume power, making the citizenry feel more represented (see review by Blais and Aarts 2006; also, Norris 2002; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998). Most parties have a higher chance to win at least one seat, meaning that people preferring smaller parties will not fear that their vote is being wasted. Results in Table 8.1, however, paint a different picture. Although PR does not seem to foster turnout, multiple parties have a positive effect on it.

In total, although the multiple party mechanism does have a positive effect, there is something about proportional systems that hinders electoral engagement. Yes, multiple parties can give voters more scope for representation, when it comes to government formation, but it also means that PR systems are more likely to form coalition government (Jackman 1987; St-Vincent 2013). Such structures endanger the decisiveness of elections. In single-member plurality systems, there is a direct link between the outcome of election and formation of government. Here, the party with the most votes forms government. So, when it comes to voting citizens in PR systems, multiple parties and fuzzy lines of accountability may depress turnout.

Providing no support for hypothesis H8.1, Table 8.1 also suggests that parliamentary systems need not necessarily have a positive association with processes of democracy. Similarly, considering the last feature of power-sharing systems, federalism depresses engagement with the processes of democracy. These two variables do not reach statistical significance in Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer's (2010) models as well (see also Norris 2002). Parliamentary systems do not yield higher engagement than presidential or mixed systems and federal systems do not yield higher engagement than unitary systems (Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2010, p. 998).

The null finding for these two institutions is not surprising for two reasons. First, although earlier works by Lijphart (1999), Powell (2000), and Norris (2008) identify several different sets of power-sharing institutions, they all argue that the nature of the electoral system is perhaps the most important power-sharing institution. Most of Powell's (2000) book focuses on the electoral system. Second, these institutions distribute power in different ways: some electoral rules may send signals for engagement to the citizenry directly whereas others distribute power sharing across government, indirectly reaching the masses or sending signals to geographically-based groups. Federalism works based on the principle of representing territorially based interests. Its effects on citizens, therefore, depends upon the density of marginalised groups located in specific geographic areas (Elkins and Sides 2007). So, the effects of federalism may be limited to geographically-concentrated, underrepresented groups and may not apply to all citizens or be specific to young people. This resonates with Htun's (2004) point: minorities may be considered underrepresented groups in politics, but they should not be theorised to think or act in the same ways in response to political stimuli.

Having looked at the separate components of power-sharing systems, Table 8.2 uses a power-sharing index to investigate the overall effect of three power-sharing/concentrating units. It appears, in comparison to power-concentrating systems, power-sharing systems do not facilitate democratic behaviours. This result is most significant in terms of turnout.

Table 8.2. Effect on power-sharing institutions on democratic behaviours (APC)

	Engagement with the Processes of Democracy	
	Cast a Ballot?	**Feel Close to a Political Party?**
Fixed Effects		
Age	1.03 (0.00) ***	1.01 (0.00)
Female	0.98 (0.04)	0.87 (0.03) ***
Education	1.41 (0.03) ***	1.17 (0.02) ***
Household Income	1.24 (0.02) ***	1.009 (0.01) ***
Macro institutional variables		
Power-Sharing Institutions Index	0.26 (0.03) ***	1.00 (0.08)
Compulsory Voting	12.2 (2.57) ***	26.1 (3.06) ***
Regime Age	1.01 (0.00) ***	1.00 (0.00) **
Number of parties participating in election	0.99 (0.00) ***	1.02 (0.00) ***
Multi Party	2.47 (0.32) ***	4.92 (0.45) ***
State-initiated Registration System	12.5 (2.85) ***	0.06 (0.01) ***
Constant	7.39 (2.48) ***	1.20 (0.37)
Random Effects Variance		
Cohort	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Survey Year	0.27 (0.12)	0.14 (0.06)
-Log Likelihood	6796	10217
AIC	13618	20461
N	16,961	16,961

Source: CSES IMD (1996-2016)

Notes: Entries are odds ratios estimated by a mixed generalised linear model. Standard errors between brackets. Significance: *** < 0.001, ** < 0.01, * < 0.05. Method used: Cross-classified random effects two-level model in Stata; Missing values dealt with complete case analysis. Compulsory voting here codes 1 only for countries which strictly enforce it.

Looking at the random effects variance components in Table 8.2, there are no substantial and significant between-cohort effects. However, a *z*-test suggests that there are significant period (or between-survey year) effects (when coef. /std. er. < 1.96). Even when controlling for period effects and a plethora institutional variable, a small age effect persists for the turnout variable. This implies that a lifecycle mechanism may be at play when looking at the association between institutional variables and turnout. The current literature attributes this trend to the peripatetic nature of young adult transition and the lack of stability during this period. When compared to majority of non-voting younger people (<18 yos) whose lives are more structured and a majority of adults with a steady work, family and community connection, young people in the transition years have less predictable and episodic lives in terms of their institutional connection and social roles (Flanagan et al. 2012, p. 30). All these competing social demands lead to a failure to register and to vote.

This ties into another key finding in support of hypothesis H8.3: a state-initiated registration system substantially increases engagement with the voting process than self-initiated system. This is consistent with previous findings (Singh et al. 2019). Transition to adulthood is characterised with a great deal of mobility in every aspect of life. On top of this, registration rules may make it difficult for young people -without a permanent long-term residence - to

register to vote. Broadly speaking, in self-initiated system, there is a structural lag which fails to elicit appropriate institutional response to the prolonged transition to adulthood.

State-initiated registration systems appear to have a negative effect on party alignment. As young people have more exposure to the political system while registering, they may be exercising their right to vote but might be reluctant to commit to a particular political party or political elite. This, however, would be a generational feature: younger generations are more educated and more critical of hierarchies and workings of the government.

It is evident from Table 8.2 that regime age has a small effect on the response variables. This is contrary to popular thought that older democracies have a stable political culture where democratic norms and processes are embedded into the daily lives of the citizenry (Mishler and Rose 2001; Jackman and Miller 2004; Kitanova 2020). However, given Table 8.2 does not control for country effects, various political, economic and socio-cultural differences may be clouding the results. To this end, Table 8.4 looks at country effects.

Two-party systems have lower odds than multi-party systems in engaging citizens with both the processes of democracy. Number of parties (and also multi party systems) are considered to produce two sets of contradictory consequences. The popular view is that more parties allow for more choices and thus more candidates, ultimately fostering pro-democratic electoral behaviour. But, this also leads to coalition governments, which are particularly known to depress turnout (Blais and Aarts 2006). One solution to this problem is to compare multi-party systems with and without coalition governments (Blais and Aarts 2006, p. 185). This is beyond the scope of the current study.

Table 8.3. Effect of institutional factors on democratic behaviours across generations

		Engagement with the Processes of Democracy	
		Cast a Ballot?	Feel Close to a Political Party?
Generation			
Post - WWII	Power-Sharing Index	0.17 (0.04) ***	0.69 (0.10) *
	Regime Age	1.01 (0.00) ***	1.00 (0.00)
	State-initiated Registration System	7.20 (3.72) ***	0.06 (0.02) ***
60s - 70s	Power-Sharing Index	0.16 (0.03) ***	1.60 (0.26) **
	Regime Age	1.01 (0.00) ***	0.99 (0.00) ***
	State-initiated Registration System	11.2 (4.38) ***	0.05 (0.02) ***
80s	Power-Sharing Index	0.21 (0.04) ***	1.08 (0.15)
	Regime Age	1.01 (0.00) **	1.00 (0.00)
	State-initiated Registration System	3.75 (1.36) ***	0.04 (0.01) ***
90s	Power-Sharing Index	0.29 (0.05) ***	1.06 (0.16)
	Regime Age	1.00 (0.00) *	1.00 (0.00)
	State-initiated Registration System	1.72 (0.58)	0.05 (0.02) ***
00s	Power-Sharing Index	0.41 (0.07) ***	1.37 (0.28)
	Regime Age	1.00 (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)
	State-initiated Registration System	1.76 (0.57)	0.03 (0.01) ***

Source: CSES IMD (1996-2016)

Notes: Entries are odds ratios. Standard errors between brackets. Significance: *** < 0.001, ** < 0.01, * < 0.05. Method used: Single level logit model in Stata; Missing values dealt with complete case analysis. The models in this table also control for gender, education, household income, CV, no. of parties participating in election and party system.

Although Table 8.1 and 8.2 present APC models, these do not specifically tell us how institutional factors may affect engagement with democracy across generations. To this end, in Table 8.3 I add fixed effects for generations. For the sake of parsimony, the socio-demographic and other institutional factors controlled for in these models are not presented in Table 8.3. It is clear that across all generations, a) power sharing depresses turnout; b) regime age has a negligible effect on the DVs; and, c) state-initiated registration systems lead to significantly higher odds of voting but lower odds of aligning with a political party than self-initiated systems. Therefore, the effect of institutions is not particular to younger generations- it effects all generations in similar ways.

Table 8.4. Multi-level effect of institutions and country on democratic behaviours

	Engagement with the Processes of Democracy	
	Cast a Ballot?	Feel Close to a Political Party?
Fixed Effects		
Generations (ref. Post-WWII)		
60s-70s	0.75 (0.05) ***	0.85 (0.05) **
80s	0.53 (0.04) ***	0.61 (0.03) ***
90s	0.39 (0.03) ***	0.48 (0.03) ***
00s	0.29 (0.02) ***	0.49 (0.03) ***
Female	0.97 (0.04)	0.89 (0.03) **
Education	1.40 (0.03) ***	1.16 (0.02) ***
Household Income	1.22 (0.02) ***	1.11 (0.01) ***
Macro institutional variables		
Power-Sharing Institutions Index	0.30 (0.13) **	1.01 (0.43)
Compulsory Voting	30.84 (29.82) ***	9.83 (9.32) *
Regime Age	1.01 (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)
Number of parties participating in election	1.00 (0.01)	1.00 (0.00)
Multi Party	11.6 1 (9.12) **	2.99 (2.23)
State-initiated Registration System	2.08 (2.11)	0.13 (0.13) *
Constant	29.91 (53.38)	3.17 (5.60)
Random Effects Variance		
Country	0.52 (0.19)	0.53 (0.19)
-Log Likelihood	7279	10098
AIC	14589	20225
N	17,378	17,378

Source: CSES IMD (1996-2016)

Notes: Entries are odds ratios. Standard errors between brackets. Significance: *** < 0.001, ** < 0.01, * < 0.05. Method used: Random effects two-level model in Stata; Missing values dealt with complete case analysis.

From Table 8.4 it is clear that younger generations are turning away from the traditional processes of democracy, even when controlling for institutional factors. When controlling for country effects, most institutional factors lose significance compared to the main APC models in Tables 8.1 and 8.2. Throughout the analyses, compulsory voting, unsurprisingly, is the only institutional design feature which emerges as a significant positive predictor of engagement with the processes of democracy. However, it is important to bear in mind that, given only two countries in the CSES dataset enforce compulsory voting strictly, this result may be an over-representation. However, given the large magnitude of the effect, the statistically significant positive effect may be considered quite reliable.

It is evident from Tables 8.3 and 8.4 above that generational membership explains the bulk of variation in youth engagement. In other words, institutional factors are not necessarily eliciting

an independent effect on the dependent variables in question. Rather they may be interacting with attributes which are characteristic to younger age groups (Table 8.2) and younger cohorts (Table 8.4). Today, young people's lives are highly transient, meaning they are more likely to relocate between the ages 18 and 34 than at any other time in their lives, compared to younger people in older generations (Benetsky et al. 2015). In the context of today's societal demands, this is unsurprising given younger people move out to attend college and also more frequently change jobs. Furthermore, they are inexperienced and lesser-informed of the labyrinth-like registration systems of being added to the electoral rolls (Singh et al. 2019). Institutions, in addition to this, are not designed to cater for these challenges. Overall, although the institutional hindrances are not direct effects, they sure do impede commitment and engagement with democracy (Table 8.2).

Taken together, much of the variance is among individuals (fixed effects), whereas a smaller proportion is across countries (random effects). Anderson and Singer (2008, p. 573) finds similar and contends that this is unsurprising given the data is measured at an individual level in a set of democracies with relatively similar background characteristics (see also, Steenbergen and Jones 2002, p. 231). Hence, the individual level explains most of the variance than do the country-level variables. But this need not mean that we are to ignore the country -level variances. As Table 8.4 clearly demonstrates, they are there, and they contribute to explaining democratic engagement.

8.4. Conclusion

Dominant explanations for youth disengagement focus on individual-level micro factors (Norris 2003; Spannring, Ogris, and Gaiser 2008; Dalton 2009; Sloam 2012; 2013; 2016). This chapter contributes to the youth engagement literature by empirically investigating the macro-determinants of engagement with the processes of democracy. It focuses on three key institutional factors – regime type, regime age and registration system- because they have not been examined comparatively while researching youth behaviour. Previously, such research designs were challenging due to the lack of coherent survey data and statistical power. In the past decades, however, there has been much progress in our ability to connect higher-level structural variables to cross-national attitudinal and behavioural measures. Today, cross-national enquiries allow for variation in institutional setting, enabling scholars to test institutionally driven explanations.

Among the three broad institutional factors, the registration system appears to be the most important predictor of the level of youth engagement. Admittedly, in countries where registration and voting are self-selective and non-compulsory, pre-registration can never be the complete solution to low youth participation (Cherry 2012, p. 492). At a minimum, however, state-facilitated pre-registration captures those who do wish to vote but may take

several years to register and vote otherwise. It also captures those who might not have the motivation to register but might do so anyways as the process is so convenient.

However, when controlling for country and generation-level fixed-effects, most institutional effects lose significance. This highlights that fact that institutional factors do not independently influence democratic behaviours but rather interact with lifecycle and generational characteristics to elicit an effect. This combination of findings provides some support for the conceptual premise that institutional and structural lag may be hindering younger age groups and generations from establishing a staunch stance at the political domain. Given the protracted transition to adulthood and the further difficulties that current periods bring to younger generations (Flanagan et al. 2012), it is important to pay closer attention to institutional design features which will cater to the transition. Hopefully, that will encourage engagement with conventional democratic practices like voting and party alignment.

Chapter 9
Youth Disengagement in Australia?

"…there is cross generational solidarity over attitudes towards democracy…
Whether young, middle-aged or old, Australians would like to see the practice of democratic politics improved."
-Stoker et al. (2017, p. 233)

We now know that the youth disengagement problem may vary across countries due to dissimilar political contexts. This chapter presents an Australian case study to further demonstrate why political institutional design factors are crucial to understand the shades and tones of the youth disengagement problem. Among the OECD cases examined in the previous chapters, Australia provides an idiosyncratic case because of its political institutions, particularly a strictly enforced compulsory voting system. For a thorough analysis, this chapter reprises the principle/process debate[49] and tackles the age-period-cohort (APC) identification problem in the Australian context to examine whether youth disengagement is sensitive to the political context in which it occurs.

Compared to international standards, turnout in the Australian federal elections has been consistently high due to enforced compulsory voting (Hannan-Morrow and Roden 2014). However, since the advent of compulsory voting in 1924, the 2019 election recorded the lowest voter turnout of 91 per cent; Wright and Koslowski (2019) argued that this happened as young people seemingly "turned their back on democracy". Beyond electoral disengagement, survey research also shows that young Australians harbour more negative attitudes towards democracy compared to older people- although not significantly so (McAllister 2014; Oliver 2013). This raises the question of whether Australia is following the worldwide trends of youth disengagement from (the principles and) processes of democracy (Blais and Rubenson 2013; Foa and Mounk 2016; 2017; Klingemann 2014; Stoker 2006).

The APC identification problem- i.e., high collinearity between the age, period, and cohort variables- lies at the heart of the youth disengagement debate. In Australia, some studies show that engagement is dependent on age where younger people in every generation have almost the same likelihood to abstain in their 20s (Hannan-Morrow and Roden 2014; Smets and van Ham 2013). Generational interpretations, on the other hand, argue that the progressive change in values shape the political outlook, and hence the democratic engagement, of each

[49] Note that in the religion, media use and institutions chapters (6-8), the principle/process debate was dropped as it was settled in Chapter 5. Chapter 5, in a comparative context, finds that youth disengagement occurs at the process dimension of democracy and that there is cross generational support for the principles of democracy. However, in the single case analysis of Australia, I re-examine the principle/process debate to provide a robust investigation of whether a particular political context yields varied results.

cohort. Although one[50] study finds that the millennial generation (born between 1980-1994) is not "particularly interested in democracy" (Oliver 2013), another work contends that there is cross generational solidarity towards democratic politics in Australia (Stoker et al. 2017). In contrast, period effects temporarily impact the attitudes of all members of the society, irrespective of their ages and generational memberships (Inglehart 2008, p. 135). All in all, it is unclear which of the three time effects best explains youth disengagement in Australia.

This chapter presents a case study which applies the age, period, and cohort explanations for youth disengagement in Australia, while accounting for the APC identification problem. In the second section, I review the debate on whether young people are rejecting the principles and/or processes of democracy in Australia. Next, as an extension to the Australia hypothesis (H9)[51] presented in Chapter 3, I discuss the competing age, period, and cohort explanations of youth disengagement. In the following section, I test these three explanations: here, I use multilevel models and repeated cross-sectional survey data from 2001 to 2019 in the Australian Election Study (AES) to isolate the unique effect of each time variable (Bell and Jones 2014; 2015; Smets and Neundorf 2014; Yang and Land 2016). This rich dataset also tracks online engagement with democratic processes, allowing a more nuanced examination of the principle/process debate. The final section concludes. My findings suggest that, defying international trends (Chapter 5), there is no youth disengagement in Australia. That is, young people and younger cohorts are no different from their older counterparts in their support for democratic principles and processes (both traditional and contemporary). Rather, period effects largely explain the variations across historical points in time. These results bolster the idea that context can greatly shape how young people engage with democracy.

9.1. Rejecting Principles or Processes?

The distinction between the principle and process dimensions of democracy dictates how we interpret youth disengagement. A democratic regime is expected to operate and perform differently to its authoritarian alternatives. That means, it must comprise core, foundational principles (e.g., equal rights and the rule of law) which guide political institutions to reach certain principle-based outcomes (e.g., when all citizens have equal rights and are equal before the law). Citizens' attitudes towards these principles are normative conceptions of how democracy ought to be (Ferrin and Kriesi 2016). Despite procedural differences of how democracy works or the outputs it produces, citizens are expected to remain committed to the guiding principles in order to prevent deconsolidation (Diamond 1999, p. 175; Linz and Stepan 1996, p. 5; Rose et al. 1998, p. 92). If young people start rejecting these principles,

[50] Thus far, I analysed disengagement from the offline, traditional processes of democracy using the CSES. This chapter uses AES and, by the virtue of the dataset, investigates another set of democratic processes, that occur in the online space.

[51] *H9 (Australia hypothesis): Youth disengagement from the principles and processes of democracy is sensitive to the political context in which it occurs.*

notwithstanding their participatory preferences, then the future of democracy is truly in trouble.

Although the worldwide decline in electoral turnout has been disproportionately concentrated amongst young people (Blais 2000; Blais and Rubenson 2013; Klingemann 2014; Stoker 2006), it does not mean that young people are also rejecting fundamental democratic principles. Indeed, Ferrin and Kriesi (2016) argue that democratic ideals are more or less universal across democratic societies. In contrast, by using four indicators of regime legitimacy from the World Values Survey (WVS 1992-2015, waves 3-6), Foa and Mounk (2016) show that citizens are turning away from the democratic regime by rejecting its basic principles. However, Voeten (2016) has systematically disproved their claim: using the same dataset, he demonstrates that support for democracy and non-democratic alternatives have been static for the last twenty years (see also, Norris 2017). Preference for procedural engagement, he argues, may be changing, but there is no question on the legitimacy of the regime.

The shift from traditional to contemporary forms of participation has been attributed to the societal shift from material to post-materialist values across time (Inglehart 1990). In particular, the globalisation of markets, trades, communication and mobilisation has challenged the state-defined concept of citizenship. A line of literature suggests that young people are coping with these socioeconomic changes by becoming 'self-actualizing citizens' (Bennett 2013) or 'everyday makers' (Bang 2004).[52] Steering away from mainstream politics, they are 'personalizing politics by emphasizing their own behaviour in terms of taste, lifestyle, consumption and leisure' (Harris et al 2010, p. 13). Conditions of risk, insecurity and individualisation has led them to express themselves through transient and self-expressive behaviour. In short, young people have developed a 'new biography of citizenship' (Vinken 2005, p. 155), which comprise individualized forms of activism such as culture jamming, computer hacking, recycling and similar.[53]

But the principle/process debate might may play out differently in different political contexts. This may be due to varying institutional design across countries. The electoral systems, party make up, type of executive government and similar features influence the political culture and thus the democratic experiences of the citizens within each polity. Further, these experiences may vary across groups. For example, as this study has previously shown, institutional design features can interact with generational attributes to elicit different political behaviour among

[52] Vromen et al. (2016, p. 513) studies the 'everyday maker' describing how "young people use social media to do politics: share information, express themselves, and take action." This mixed-method approach - using data from Australia, US and the UK -attests to how social media platforms can mobilise young people into offline participation.

[53] Collin (2008) conducts youth interviews in Australia to demonstrate how the internet is a unique and autonomous platform for the realisation of project-based political identities. She further shows how it is a legitimising space for new political practices popular among the youth, and how it can address some economic-structural barriers to participation.

young people. This means that in a country that strictly enforces compulsory voting, for example, the youth may exhibit attitudes and behaviours that may well significantly delineate from the average trends in the existing literature and found in Chapter 5. In other words, context matters.

With its compulsory voting electoral system, Australia provides a special case where democratic disconnect from both the principles and processes of democracy would be rather surprising. Compulsory democratic engagement has created a positive political structure (McAllister 2011) where pro-democratic behaviour is expected to shape pro-democratic attitudes. As previous works advise, institutional contact provides a school of democracy where people gain knowledge about and internalise democratic attitudes (Putnam 2000; Schlozman et al. 2012). A 2013 Lowy Institute poll, however, suggests that democratic values may be under threat as 48 per cent of Australian millennials did not believe that democracy is superior to other forms of government (Oliver 2013). Further, the 2019 election not only recorded the lowest voter turnout since the advent of compulsory voting (Wright and Koslowski 2019), but also was characterised by citizen detachment from political parties (Cameron and McAllister 2019, p. 28) and voter distrust in government (Cameron and McAllister 2019, p. 99).

Despite the decline in engagement with the traditional institutions over the past two decades (Cameron and McAllister 2019), Stoker et al. (2017) are convinced that young Australians are doing their politics differently[54]. While turning away from mainstream politics, they are engaging more with the contemporary processes of democracy, concentrated in the online platform. These include contributing to blogs, discussing politics in social media and joining an online advocacy group (Stoker et al. 2017). Before investigating whether young Australians are turning away from the principles and/or the (traditional or contemporary) processes of democracy, it is important to understand what constitutes 'young people' in Australia. The following section explores this concept in relation to the three time-related explanations of youth disengagement.

9.2. What Explains Youth Disengagement in Australia?

This chapter reprises the principle/process debate and tackles the age-period-cohort (APC) identification problem in the Australian context. It aims to test whether youth disengagement from the principles and processes of democracy is sensitive to the political context in which it

[54] Young people in Australia have also shown their interest in issue-based politics. The 2017 same-sex marriage postal survey is a noteworthy example of a single-issue mobilisation. Despite being a voluntary process, it did not stop young Australians from participating (Oliver 2017). For example, in the postal survey, the participation rate of 18-19 year olds (78.2%) was higher than in the 2016 federal election (66%). Further, Wright and Koslowski (2019) pointed out that after enrolling in droves for the postal survey, young people were not as engaged in the 2019 federal election. This highlights youth preference for issue-based movements in Australia.

occurs (i.e., H9: Australia hypothesis). To this end, this section reviews the various explanations for youth disengagement in Australia.

The age (lifecycle) effect

A large body of literature finds that younger people have different attitudes towards politics than older people (Bessant 2004; O'Toole et al. 2003). This stems from two perceptions about where young people are in their lives. First, younger people, roughly between the ages 18 to 30, feel irrelevant to politics: since the world of politics is mostly dominated by older adults, it appears foreign and complacent to their needs (Nie et al. 1974; O'Toole et al. 2003). Second, older people feel that younger people are irrelevant to politics: even when they are engaged, they may be regarded as amateur citizens who do not have 'cognitive, social and ethical abilities' to participate (Bessant 2004). Henn et al. (2002) stress that non-participation is a by-product of negligence of the political leaders to address the issues that concern young people. This shapes their thoughts of efficacy and the ability to influence the rules that affect their lives.

In terms of traditional democratic participation, age has always been regarded a significant factor. A comprehensive meta-analysis of 90 papers and 170 determinants of turnout finds that age consistently has an impact on turnout (Smets and van Ham 2013). Despite compulsory voting, there is evidence of the lifecycle effect in Australia: a study commissioned by the Australian Election Commission shows that turnout in federal elections are dependent on age - not generations- where younger people in every generation have almost the same likelihood to abstain but resume voting past their 20s (Hannan-Morrow and Roden 2014).

Explaining these trends, many studies argue that young people are at a point in their lifetime where they possess less of those factors which promote participation - such as a stable residence, children and a permanent job (Quintelier 2007) and electoral maturity (Franklin 2004). As young people get older, they gain more education, political experience and all those resources that older people have accumulated throughout their lives. Younger people, who often lack these factors, as a result also have less social and political ties which foster traditional participation.

However, the lifecycle narrative falls short in explaining young people's engagement with contemporary, democratic processes such as online activism, e-campaigning and political blog-posting. Young people are not poor in online resources. In fact, the online platform provides an easier, individualised and effective means to participate in politics (Harris et al. 2010). However, due to the lack of data over a long time span (Martin 2012), our knowledge about youth engagement in the online platform has been limited. Today, considering both traditional and online processes of democracy, I propose to re-test the following lifecycle hypotheses, while controlling for period and cohort effects:

H9.1: Younger Australians are less supportive of democratic principles and engage less with democratic processes than older Australians.

The cohort (generation) effect

An alternative theory contends that democratic values in advanced democracies do not vary with age (Inglehart 2008, p. 131): rather, values formed during formative years persist throughout one's life (Sears and Brown 2003). This idea of persistence is central to the political socialisation theory which stresses that adolescent to pre-adult period is the most impressionable time for changing and consolidating political attitudes (Dinas 2013, p. 2).

Recent works, following the 2022 Australian federal election, provide much evidence for generational replacement than for lifecycle effects. An analysis of the latest enrolment data from the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) shows that millennials and Gen Z make up about 43% of the electorate (Chowdhury 2023). This indicates a major generational replacement as the polls are being populated with more progressive, younger voters. Although lifecycle theories oppose this idea and predict people become more conservative as they age, this may not apply to millennials and younger people. Evidence from the AES suggests millennials are not becoming more conservative as they get older and are sticking with left-of-centre parties (Jackman 2022). Against lifecycle theories -where younger voters tend left/centre-left and voters become more conservative with age - results from the 2022 federal election only bolster the argument that younger generations are getting older, but not more conservative (Read 2022).

In line with socialisation theory, Mackay (1998) describes how experiences of the formative years shaped the political attitudes and behaviours of three generations in Australia. The children of the Great Depression or the War generation (born 1920s and came of age during WWII) went through hardships during their childhood and had to be prudent and cautious to plan their future. Postwar Baby Boomers (born 1946-61) saw unprecedented material growth from the construction, manufacturing and mining boon during their formative years. The Rising generation or generation 'X' (born in the 1970s) grew up in a fast-paced environment characterised by rapid social, cultural and economic changes. This is also the generation of emancipation, women empowerment, postponed commitment, and slacktivism with a wait-and-see approach. The distinct experiences across generations led to differences in political perceptions: for instance, older generations perceive traditional tools of engagement to be more effective (Stoker et al. 2017). Although older generations rarely deviate from their partisan alignments, younger generations may have completely turned their backs on such traditional forms of engagement (Stoker 2006).

It is still unclear, however, whether younger generations are rejecting the core principles of democracy in Australia. Referring to the millennial generation, a Lowy Institute poll suggests that young Australians value their democracy less than their counterparts in less consolidated democracies such as Indonesia and India (Oliver 2013). The poll finds that only 48 per cent of the millennials conceded to the superiority of democracy over other forms of government. A quarter of them even said that 'for someone like me, it doesn't matter what sort of government we have' (Oliver 2013). Stoker et al. (2017) challenges that there is cross generational solidarity towards democratic politics in Australia, meaning younger generations admire the stability and benefits of the democratic regime. However, negative stereotyping of the younger generations (see, for example, Foa and Mounk 2016; Oliver 2013) create aversion from main-stream, elite-directed procedures of engagement (Stoker et al. 2017). Following this debate, and while controlling for period and cohort effects, I re-test the generational hypotheses below:

> *H9.2: Younger cohorts are less supportive of democratic principles and engage less with democratic processes than older cohorts.*

The period (contextual) effect

Although age and cohort effects have been extensively studied, the effect of specific contextual factors within a polity on youth disengagement remain largely unexplored. A period effect temporarily impacts the attitudes of all members of the society, irrespective of their generational memberships (Inglehart 2008, p. 135). Political and economic crises are considered contextual factors which shape political outlook and behaviour of citizens. In a Western European study, Inglehart (2008) finds that these factors have the potential to transiently alter people's value priorities. Certain political, social and economic events have also had similar effects in Australia (McAllister 2003; McAllister and Bean 2000).

Thus far, previous studies in Australia demonstrate the importance of both economic and non-economic issues on the result of the federal vote (McAllister and Bean 2000; McAllister 2003). Although abstention is rare in this compulsory voting environment, period effects have long influenced 'how' Australian's engage with formal democratic institutions. In 1998, for example, the Goods and Service Tax (GST), which was significant in the Liberal tax reform agenda, gained the Liberal-National Coalition a narrow electoral advantage (McAllister and Bean 2000, p. 398). Economic evaluations were important in this election particularly because of the economic volatility from the previous decade. The effect of the 1973 Arab embargo culminated in the 1980s (Weatherford 1984). Privatization of government-owned assets and the shrinkage of the public sector in the late 1980s had considerable consequences on the structure and composition of the workforce: unemployment levels in the 80s and 90s were comparable to the Great Depression decade. In the 1990s, perceptions of economic insecurity became a major issue particularly among the young who were hit hard by the economic changes of the preceding decade (McAllister and Bean 2000). Finally, in the 1998 election, fringe parties like

One Nation appealed to individuals (last-minute defectors) who were disaffected by the economic policies of the major parties.

Turning to non-economic period effects, two issues on border protection – namely, the asylum seekers crisis and the 2001 war against terror - dominated the 2001 election. Using 2001 AES data, McAllister (2003) shows that Labor lost its voters to the Coalition due to its position on terrorism and to the Democrats/Greens due to its position on refugees and asylum seekers. Similar to the situation in the United States, the external threat benefitted the incumbent as voters, regardless of partisanship, rallied around the government on the issues of national security (Goot 2002). Acknowledging that the direction of the period effect is subject to the type of event in question, I present the non-directional contextual hypotheses below:

> *H9.3: Economic, social and political events influence Australians' support for democratic principles and engagement with democratic processes.*

Taken together, most of the above studies on age, period and cohort effects do not agree with each other because they independently look into either of the three time effects. In other words, an important limitation of existing works is that they do not address the APC identification problem. Although there have been some attempts to isolate the effect of one while controlling for the other two time effects (Grasso 2014; Smets and Neundorf 2014), such enquiries remain absent in Australia. In this chapter, I address this limitation.

9.3. APC Analysis of Youth Disengagement in Australia

Although this chapter uses data from the Australian Election Study (AES, 2001-2019), much of the methodological design is similar to the other empirical chapters of this thesis. However, there are some notable differences, which are discussed below.

There are three classes of dependent variables in this chapter- attitudes towards the principles, engagement with traditional processes and engagement with online processes of democracy.[55] The 'principle' variable was produced by combining two moderately-correlated (r = 0.5-0.7) variables: *Who is in power makes a difference?* and *Who people vote for makes a difference?* In these questions, respondents place themselves in a 5-point scale (1 meaning it does not make a difference and 5 meaning it can make a big difference, with no middle categories

[55] The time period for this study (2001-19) was chosen based on the consistent availability of all three categories of principle and process variables in the AES datasets.

labelled).[56] The 'principle' variable is a dichotomous variable[57], which records 1 for all those respondents who return 1 in either of the 'power' and 'vote' questions.

The 'traditional processes' variable records 1 for participation in any of the following: discussing politics over phone/face-to-face; persuading others to vote for a party/candidate; attending political meetings and rallies; and, contributing money to a political party/campaign. Before combining, each of these variables were binarized by grouping 'Frequently' and 'Occasionally' responses as 1 and 'Rarely' and 'Not at all' responses as 0. The 'traditional processes' variable does not include the turnout variable: although many countries use it as a proxy for gauging political engagement, enforced compulsory voting in Australia captures very little variations in the variable. The 'traditional processes' variable also does not include the enrolment variable. Since the direct update and direct enrolment legislation was passed in June 2012, it allows the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) to directly update and enrol any eligible person based on information that the person had provided to an agency approved by the AEC (2013). Based on the involuntary nature of the variable, it has not been considered here.

The 'online processes' variable records 1 for participation in any of the following: discussing politics via email or in a social network site like Facebook or Twitter; contributing money to a political party using the internet; accessing election information from official party/candidate sites, mainstream media sites, federal parliament site, AEC website, voting advise websites such as VoteCompass or SmartVote; signing up to receive party/candidate information on social network sites; sharing campaign/political information on blogs or social network sites; and, joining or creating a political group on a social network site. All the dependent variables have been binarized because ordinal multilevel models were complex, took longer to converge and were not significantly different from logistic models.

Model 1 for each outcome variable has three independent variables- age, period and cohort. 'Age' is a continuous variable ranging from ages 18 to 90, 'periods' are defined as survey or election years (Dassonneville 2013; Grasso 2014; Smets and Neundorf 2014), and 'cohorts'

[56] A drawback of closed items with numeric options is that respondents might be confused about what options 2, 3 and 4 mean between 1 (no diff) and 5 (big diff). Particularly the interpretation of the midpoint of the scale is tricky: does 3 mean 'undecided', 'middle stance between the extremes' or 'don't know'. Therefore, I decided to binarize each item by combining categories 1 and 2 as 0, categories 4 and 5 as 1 (to retain as many respondents as possible) and dropping category 3 altogether. Of course, one might argue that 4 and 5 are not the same levels of efficacy, but it is safe to assume that someone who thinks power/vote makes some difference (say, 4), cannot be put in category 2. However, the final 'principle' variable is created with an 'OR' command rather than a 'AND' command. This is a way of ensuring that 1 in either of the questions will be recorded as support for a principle of democracy; hence, it is a means of retaining as much information as possible.

[57] Upon comparing ordinal regression models (with 5 categories of the DV) with logistic regression models (only 2 categories of the DV), I found no significant difference between the two. Compared to logit models, the complex ordinal regression models did not significantly improve the log likelihood scores and, further, took longer to converge. Therefore, for reasons of parsimony, I decided to code the 'principle' variable as a dichotomous variable.

are operationalised as roughly 15-year birth-year groups. Cohorts are defined by placing theoretically informed cuts on birth years.[58] Those born in 1917-29 form the 'War' generation as they had their formative years during the inter-war period and experienced the Great Depression; those born in 1930-45 represent the 'Builder' generation who played a role in rebuilding Australia after the second world war; those born in 1946-60 are the 'Baby Boomers' who have seen unprecedented material growth from the construction, manufacturing and mining boom; those born in 1961-79 form Generation 'X' which had its formative years around the Cold War and faced the economic hardships flowing on from the Arab Oil embargo; those born in 1980-94 are the so-called millennials or Generation 'Y' which experienced rapid technological and social structural changes in family and work lives; and, finally, those born in 1995-2010 represent Generation 'Z' which is the uber-connected generation with widespread access to internet and the new (social) media.

Model 2 adds socio-economic controls- gender, gross annual income, tertiary education, marital status and home ownership- which are known to influence individual-level engagement (Quintelier 2007; Verba et al. 1995). Table 9.1 provides a table of descriptive statistics of all the variables used in this chapter.

Table 9.1 Descriptive statistics in Australia

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Survey year (period)	2010	5.67	2001	2019
Age	54.8	16.5	18	90
Generation (cohort)	3.16	1.08	1 (oldest)	6 (youngest)
Female	0.53	0.50	0 (male)	1 (female)
Tertiary education	0.60	0.49	0 (no)	1 (yes)
Marital status	0.68	0.47	0 (not married)	1 (married)
Home ownership	0.77	0.42	0 (no)	1 (yes)
Income	10.8	5.90	1 (lowest bracket)	23 (highest bracket)
Dependent Variables				
Principles	0.72	0.44	0	1
Traditional processes	0.75	0.44	0	1
Online processes	0.35	0.48	0	1

Source: AES (2001-2019)

Prior to estimating the multilevel models, here I present a descriptive analysis of the variation in the dependent variables by age, cohort and period. Figure 9.1 reports the evolution in response in the principle and process variables. The y axes display the mean of each dependent variable calculated based on each category of the independent variable. The first plot shows that the average support for democratic principles remains similar throughout the lifecycle. There is a slight increase in traditional participation from the youngest age category through

[58] Generational splicing in this chapter is slightly different compared to other empirical chapters. Previous studies have established that theoretically sound splicing is one the most difficult tasks in cohort studies because it always has a risk of losing information (Spitzer 1973, p. 1358; Rosow 1978, p. 69).; in this chapter, I do so by acknowledging the splicing in Australian literature (Mackay 1998).

to the middle-aged category and then to the 60s. This slightly decreases as one becomes elderly. Contemporary online engagement is concentrated among the youngest age group and this decreases to stabilise among the middle-aged.



Source: AES (2001-2019)

100. APC effects on democratic attitudes and (traditional and online) behaviours

Although less pronounced, these observations are consistent with previous studies: electoral engagement (not just voting) stabilises among the middle-aged as people settle down, buy a house and start a family (Hannan-Morrow and Roden 2014; Quintelier 2007). At one end of the life-cycle spectrum are young people who have low attachment to civic life: they are mostly preoccupied with building a family and career (Hannan-Morrow and Roden 2014). Effective and individualised forms of contemporary engagement appeal more to youngsters (Harris al. 2010). On the other end of the life-cycle spectrum are older people whose participation levels fall as they retire and experience health problems and lower household incomes.

Turning to the generation graph in Figure 9.1 (bottom left), there appears to be no fluctuation in average support for democratic principles across generations. For example, those who had their formative years in the 90s are no different in their commitment to the principles of democracy from those who had theirs in the 80s or before. Notably, relative to other generations, the War generation engaged less, and the Baby Boomers engaged more with the

traditional processes of democracy. This is not surprising given the economic hardships and economic prosperity of these generations, respectively (Mackay 1998). The minimal fluctuation in the Australian data contradicts robust international finding on generational replacement: for example, Blais and Rubenson (2013) shows that post-boomers are less likely than pre-boomers to engage in traditional processes. This finding is also against the average finding for 35 OECD countries in Chapter 5 – meaning that country level effects can vary youth outcomes. Notably, in terms of engagement with the online processes of democracy, there is a clear upward trend across generations. Again, this finding is expected as each subsequent cohort had better internet access, expanded cellular networks and enhanced social-media exposure.

The third plot in Figure 9.1 traces the evolution of support for the dependent variables over time. Compared to all other survey years, the 2001 survey records the lowest support for democratic principles which recovers in the following 2004 election (or survey). 2001 also records the lowest engagement with the processes of democracy. A plausible explanation for this may be that the national security crises on asylum seekers and war on terror may have mobilized Australians against major parties (McAllister 2003, p. 445). The dip in support for principles in the 2010 election, in face value, may be attributed to the global financial crisis (GFC). However, other factors such as relaxed border protection, delayed climate change action and the controversial leadership spill from Rudd to Gillard within the incumbent Labour party may have influenced Australians' political attitudes and behaviours (McAllister et al. 2012). In terms of engagement with online processes, there is a sharp increase across time with the increase of internet access and new media influence (Boulianne 2015; Loader et al. 2014). This period plot appears to somewhat mirror the generation plot: given the high collinearity between the three time variables, it is important to isolate the three and identify which effect is most responsible for the trends of engagement in Australia.

Next, I present multilevel models which simultaneously consider age, period, and cohort effects to test whether the findings in the existing literature hold across a more appropriate model specification. In these models, age is a fixed effect (same regression intercept for all individuals), generations (cohorts) and survey/election years (period) are specified as random effects (where regression intercepts vary among groups). As each response variable has been re-coded as a binary variable, all models are regressed as logit models. Table 9.2 presents the CCREM of support for democratic principles and processes. Note that Model 1 for each response variable only include time variables. Here, when controlling for cohort and period effects, I observe no significant relationship between age and any of the response variables. This suggests no lifecycle effect: people with a lower age are no different from those who are older. Since I find no evidence for the lifecycle hypothesis (H9.1), some other time effect is at play here. This contradicts previous findings both in international (Franklin 2004; Quintelier 2007) and Australian (Hannan-Morrow and Roden 2014) literature on participation.

Table 9.2. Determinants of youth attitudes and behaviours in Australia

	Model 1			Model 2		
	Principles	Traditional Processes	Online Processes	Principles	Traditional Processes	Online Processes
Fixed effects						
Constant	2.61 (0.34)***	2.82 (0.40)***	0.72 (0.31)	1.49 (0.22)**	1.26 (0.18)	(0.26) 0.10)**
Age	1.00 (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)	0.99 (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)
Female				0.92 (0.04)*	1.09 (0.04)*	0.87 (0.03)***
Tertiary Education				1.39 (0.06)***	1.48 (0.06)***	1.99 (0.09)***
Married				0.95 (0.04)	0.91 (0.04)	0.92 (0.05)
Home ownership				1.14 (0.06)*	1.05 (0.06)	0.59 (0.03)***
Income				1.03 (0.00)***	1.05 (0.00)***	1.08 (0.00)***
Random effects (variance components)						
Cohort	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)	0.13 (0.09)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)	0.07 (0.06)
Period	0.07 (0.04)	0.04 (0.02)	0.96 (0.52)	0.07 (0.04)	0.01 (0.01)	0.83 (0.45)
N	15,883	15,883	15,883	14,207	14,207	14,207
-Log Likelihood	9309	8953	9058	8127	7669	7715
AIC	18,627	17,915	18,124	16,271	15,356	15,449
BIC	18,658	17,945	18,154	16,340	15,425	15,517

Source: AES (2001-2019)

Notes: Entries are odds ratios estimated by a mixed generalised linear model. Standard errors are between brackets. Significance: *** < 0.001, ** < 0.01, * < 0.05. Method used: Cross-classified random effects two-level model in Stata; Missing values dealt with complete case analysis.

Along with the random effects variance components in Model 1 (Table 9.2), between-cohort and between-period effects in level 2 can be best understood by plotting them.[59] Figures 9.2 (cohort effects plot) and 9.3 (period effects plot) show that a larger share of variation for each dependent variable can be attributed to period effects rather than cohort effects. The standard error bars illustrate the 95 per cent confidence intervals. When the confidence bars cross the y-axis at zero, support for the dependent variable in each cohort (or period) is not significantly different from average levels of support across cohorts (or periods). Figure 9.2 confirms past findings that there are no significant generational variations when it comes to attitudes towards democratic principles in Australia (Ferrin and Kriesi 2016; Nguyen 2014).

[59] The best way to understand the level 2 variance components (i.e. between-cohort and between-period effects) is to plot them (as done in Figures 9.2 and 9.3). A quick z-test (by dividing variance by standard error) can reveal if any of the higher order effects are significant (if quotient > 1.96). However, this does not quite say if some cohort/period categories are significantly different from the average while others are not.



Source: AES (2001-2019)

Figure 9.2. Random effects for cohorts from CCREMs in Australia

Regarding traditional and online processes of democracy, Figure 9.2 shows that some cohorts deviate from the average level of engagement across generations. First, Baby Boomers engage more with the traditional processes of democracy. Second, the War generation engages more while the Builders engage less with the online processes of democracy. Some generational observations can be explained using political socialisation theory: attitudes and behaviours in some generations are based on the experiences during formative years vis-à-vis those coming of age in other eras (Grasso 2014, p. 65; Mannheim 1928, p. 232). Since Baby Boomers grew up in an era of economic growth, increased support for liberal democratic practices is not surprising.

What is surprising is the War generation's enhanced engagement with online processes, given that the internet media has really been the tool for tech-savvy newer generations. However, in the pooled sample for this generation, there are twice as many respondents who did not (698) participate online than who did (306). A possible explanation for this unexpected result is that random intercepts of the group themselves are correlated with each other. That is, the intercept of War generation is related to each of the cohorts analysed and only gives an incomplete picture of what the model is predicting for each group. Nonetheless, there is no

evidence for generational hypothesis (H9.2) that younger cohorts are less committed to democratic principles and processes.



Source: AES (2001-2019)

Figure 9.3. Random effects for periods from CCREMs in Australia

Figure 9.3 provides strong evidence for the contextual hypothesis (H9.3), which propose that external events influence Australians' support for the principles and engagement with the processes of democracy. Looking at the first plot, Australians' endorsement for the principles of democracy were above average level in the 2004, 2007 and 2019 elections whereas it was below average in the years 2001, 2010 and 2016. Turning to the process plots, engagement with traditional processes were below average in 2001 and 2004 and above average in 2019. In terms of online processes, there has been an increase in engagement over time. Notably, response for all the outcome variables were below average for the 2001 election and above average for the 2019 election. Without a systematic empirical investigation, it is difficult to pinpoint the exact events responsible for the variations in the period plots in Figure 3. However, the conclusion is that external events of the time – irrespective of the age and generational membership of the individual- can affect an individual's commitment to democratic principles and processes.

Although Model 1 for each dependent variable illustrates that the three time-related factors are important in explaining variations, it is worth looking into whether the variations can be attributed to over-time shifts in the composition of the population under study rather than exogenous factors. To this end, I add socio-demographic variables in Model 2 for each response variable. Females significantly have lower odds than males when it comes to endorsing democratic principles and engaging with online processes. However, they are more likely to engage with the traditional processes. Previous Australian studies have shown that gender-based political behaviour depends on the political context (Denemark et al. 2012; McAllister and Bean 2000) and hence a cross-sectional analysis may not capture the nuances that are relevant at each time point.

Among socio-demographic predictors, being married does not significantly affect democratic attitudes and behaviours in Australia. Homeowners have higher odds in endorsing democratic principle but lower odds in engaging with online processes. This is expected as most young people are not homeowners and represent the demographic that engages mostly with online platforms of participation. Since the models control for age, further theoretical enquiry is required to explain these results. Tertiary education and higher income have a significant positive influence on democratic attitudes and behaviours across both traditional and online platforms. These findings coincide those in existing literature (Lachat 2007).

To summarise, the results indicate that previous studies may have overestimated the effect of age and cohort variables by not considering the effect of context. The current chapter provides strong evidence for the notion that youth disengagement from the principles and processes of democracy is sensitive to the political context in which it occurs (i.e., H9, Australia hypothesis). Contextual factors effect engagement of all Australians, irrespective of their ages and generational memberships. This finding contradicts the 2013 Lowy Institute poll, which insists that the current generation is dismissive of democracy. Reporting the responses of 18–29-year-olds, Oliver (2013) concludes that the millennial generation is not particularly interested in democracy as the superior form of government. Arguably, the crude results from the poll are confounded by both age and period effects. The results are misleading because the report points a finger at the millennial generation without conducting an APC analysis and, further, without comparing it with previous generations over a long span of time. Given the findings of the current paper, there is a possibility that the poll results are influenced by period effects from when it was conducted.

9.4. Conclusion

Following the international debate on youth disengagement in advanced democracies, this chapter has investigated whether Australian youth is also turning away from democracy. In doing so, it explored whether age, period and cohort effects explain youth disengagement, if any, from democratic principles and processes in Australia. Defying international trends, the

major finding is that young Australians are no different from older Australians or older generations in their commitment to democratic principles and processes. Another significant finding is that period effects best explain the transient fluctuations in democratic attitudes and behaviours among Australians. These effects are significant over a certain short-term period but influence individuals across all ages and cohorts (Inglehart 2008). That means these transient changes are not exclusive to young people. Here, I show that context matters and that we must drill down into individual countries to wholistically understand how other factors may interact with lifecycle and generational attributes to shape youth attitudes and behaviours.

Taken together, these results support the idea that negative stereotyping of younger cohorts as apathetic, disinterested, or anti-system may be 'dangerous' to the health of the Australian democracy (Stoker et al. 2017). As the current study showed young Australians believe in democratic values and engage with both traditional and contemporary channels of participation. Therefore, considering younger generations responsible for eroding democratic norms might actually push young people away from the traditional channels of participation, which is the case in other advanced democracies (Blais and Rubenson 2013; Klingemann 2014; Stoker 2006). This may be further exacerbated by the fact that online activities are seen as easier, flexible, and more effective forms of participation (Harris et al. 2010; Skoric et al. 2009).

The results presented here offer some important insights about how Australians engage in politics. First, being responsive to short-term political and social stimuli might mean that Australians are quick to hold political actors/institutions accountable for their actions. Compulsory voting might tie citizens to the political system, but by the way of public opinion, majority of all generations fear that big businesses and media have too much power. They fear the practice of democracy is concentrated in the hands of these institutions (Stoker et al. 2017). There has been a significant decline in trust in politicians and political parties and a lack of confidence in the government's capacity to meet people's concerns (Hollo 2019). This means that Australians are wary of the performance of the key political actors and institutions. This dissatisfaction may not show in Australians' commitment to democratic principles, but it is evident in citizens' detachment from major political parties and a rise in voter instability over the years (Cameron and McAllister 2019, p. 21). Following on from this chapter, a future comparative analysis may explore the short and long-term effects of compulsory voting on democratic attitudes and behaviours towards political institutions.

Chapter 10
Conclusion

Young people have developed a "new biography of citizenship"
-(Vinken 2005, p. 155).

Are young people turning away from democracy? The purpose of the current study is to determine the nature of youth disengagement in advanced democracies. Using survey data across 35 OECD countries, this study finds that younger generations are moving away from traditional democratic practices, such as voting and party alignment, but their commitment to key democratic principles remain comparable to older generations. It further confirms that among the three time effects -age, period, and cohort/generation - generational explanations best explain youth disengagement, even after controlling for a number of individual and aggregate-level factors. One of the more significant findings to emerge from this dissertation is that context plays a major role in explaining how young people behave within the unique political structural setting of their countries. Overall, this research not only makes a theoretical and methodologically sound clarification of the exact nature of the youth disengagement problem, but also provides nuanced findings of how (dis)engagement can be sensitive to micro and macro environment of the youth.

This dissertation starts with the youth disengagement puzzle. In recent years, the precipitous decline in youth voter turnout (Blais and Rubenson 2013; Klingemann 2014) has been a surprising trend contra to the political culture envisaged by Verba and Almond (1963) in their book *The Civic Culture*. They predicted that younger and more educated citizens will value civic participation and become more supportive of the governmental system – not turn away from it. Some scholars read this trend as an ominous indicator for the crisis of democracy where the future custodians of democracy are rejecting its foundational values. Others offer a more optimistic discussion arguing that changing preferences of participation may pose no threat to democratic ideals but may rather be a symptom of deeper problems in existing, traditional institutions. What further complicates our understanding of the youth disengagement problem is that while people may declare allegiance to the concept of 'democracy', they may simultaneously be rejecting many key norms and institutions that have traditionally been regarded as necessary ingredients of democratic governance.

Indeed, an extensive review of the literature reveals that these contradictory conclusions stem from varying research designs, including dissimilar conceptualisations of 'democracy' and 'young people', and a disproportionate focus on individual-level over context-level determinants of engagement. Hence, the current study systematically addresses these gaps to better understand and settle the youth disengagement debate. It finds that young people in

advanced democracies are not rejecting democracy. But there is certainly a move away from traditional democratic processes. This concluding chapter draws out its implications in three parts. Reminding the reader about the aims, the first section reminds the main findings of each chapter in this dissertation while highlighting the theoretical, empirical, and methodological contribution to existing literature. This section also discusses the limitation of the methodology and other biases of the research design that may affect interpretation of the findings. The second section contextualises the results by further discussing what they mean in terms of current era of democratic distress. The final section concludes with some further work recommendations especially on the pull factors towards alternative modes of democratic participation.

10.1. Overview of Findings, Contributions and Limitations

This dissertation provides clear insights into the exact nature of the youth disengagement problem. There exists a high level of diversity around the perception of the problem because studies differ in how they define democracy and youth. It raises concerns about whether this diversity is obscuring rather than enlightening our understanding of youth disengagement from democracy. To address this issue, one of the first tasks of this research endeavour was to explore the definitions of the two key concepts. First speaking about 'democracy', earlier studies have disproportionately focused on the electoral dimension of democratic participation. Defining democracy by the process (of election), which the public practices to set up governmental rule, is a narrow way of defining the concept. This study reminds the reader that, democracy, at the very least, should be defined in terms of two fundamental dimensions: principles and processes. The principles- broadly, self-governance, equality and rule of law- form the essence of this regime type, setting it apart from other non-democratic systems. The institutions put in place to achieve the principle-based outcomes of democracy can be defined as the processes. Preceding the analyses with an explicit definition is imperative because varied conceptualisations and measurements of the multidimensional concept 'democracy' yields dissimilar answers to the same question. In other words, this definition directs my findings and indeed has implications on the interpretation of the findings.

Next, turning to 'young people', a thorough methodological discussion unveils a crucial gap in the literature: youth studies are plagued by the high collinearity of the three time effects. The problem stems from how we define young people. When we talk about the youth do you refer to age categories, generational cohorts or period groups across time? A study on time effects must be mindful of the confounding effect of each of these on the others - that is, age-period-cohort (APC) identification problem. Here, I explain that hierarchical modelling using repeated cross-sectional survey data is a leading method to solve the identification problem. As such, this thesis makes a methodological contribution. Prior to this study it was difficult to make confident conclusions about which of the three time effects drive youth disengagement in

advanced democracies. Now, we can say that generational effects are the most statistically significant.

With more clarity of what democracy is and who the young people are, I ask the first question of the thesis. How are young people disengaging: are they abandoning the principles of democracy, the processes of democracy or both? Multilevel regression models - with an effort to isolate highly collinear time effects - suggest that support for principles remain unchanged across generations, while there is a generational disengagement from traditional democratic processes. More specifically, younger generations are less likely to cast a ballot and align with a political party. All in all, because younger cohorts still endorse the key principles, they are not necessarily turning their backs on democracy.

The answer to whether young people are turning away from democracy provides support for modernisation theory as opposed to socialisation theory (see Table 10.1). The shift in procedural preference is a symptom of a societal move from material to post-materialist values across time (Inglehart 1990). The globalisation of markets, trades, communication, and mobilisation has challenged the state-defined concept of citizenship where young people have developed a "new biography of citizenship" (Vinken 2005, p. 155). Young people today are adopting individualised forms of activism to cope with socioeconomic changes. Steering away from mainstream politics, they are becoming "self-actualizing citizens" (Bennett 2013) or "everyday makers" (Bang 2004) "personalizing politics by emphasizing their own behaviour in terms of taste, lifestyle, consumption and leisure" (Harris et al. 2010, p. 13). Conditions of risk, insecurity and individualisation has led them to express themselves through transient and self-expressive behaviour, which is not defined by traditional structures, institutions, or traditional actors like politicians.

This analysis makes a theoretical contribution as it sheds new light on the changing social context across generations. The gradual decline in engagement across generations provides support for societal modernisation, which is a long, continuous process of societal transformations, rather than a one-off generational feature. The process accumulates modernisation resources across generations. The withdrawal from traditional practices is due to lasting generational characteristics and this withdrawal is not unique to just one cohort. Meaning, it does not fade away in subsequent cohorts. But at this stage of the enquiry, I faced another puzzle. Younger generations are less likely to engage with traditional democratic processes in advanced societies, even when controlling for socio-economic factors such as higher education and income. Particularly, if the rise in education levels – which is a key driver of modernisation – does not explain all the variations in engagement, then what other components are we missing? What else then explains this generational disengagement?

What features distinguish generations? Are there certain resources that younger generations lack or have more of, compared to their predecessors? My study entails a thorough

examination of societal transformations. Existing literature suggests that some key components of societal modernisation are weaker links to traditional mobilisation networks (such as in civic organisations) and growing significance of the communication network (such as social media), which can vary according to institutional context (such as different electoral systems) across advanced democracies. Looking into various micro and macro-level components of modernisation, I find impacts of the decline in religion, increase in media use and institutional design factors on youth generational disengagement in two measures of youth engagement -turnout and party identification. Table 10.1 summarises the extensive theoretical contributions that the thesis makes to the existing literature on youth politics.

Table 10.1. Overview of findings and theoretical contributions about youth disengagement from democratic processes

Research Question	Independent Variable	Key Finding	Support for theory…	Chapter
Are young people turning away from democracy?	Generation*	Each subsequent cohort engages less with the traditional processes of democracy compared to previous cohorts	Social Modernisation (+ Cognitive Mobilisation)	5
If so, why?	Religion	Religiously affiliated young people are more engaged than the non-affiliated	Social Network	6
	Media Use	Young media users are more engaged than non-users	Mobilisation	7
	Political Institutions	Young people are more engaged in state-initiated registration systems	Signaling	8
		Young people engage differently in a compulsory voting setting. In Australia, period effects are the most important.		9

Source: adapted from Table 3.2

Note: *while accounting for age and period effects

By addressing the question of whether the marked decline in religion is contributing to a corresponding decline in youth democratic engagement, this thesis contributes to settling the religion-democracy debate. It confirms that religiosity is conducive to democratic citizenship across generations. Although younger generations are less religious (Lee 2014; Manning 2019), the effect of the religious-secular gap on democratic behaviour is comparable across generations. Instead of supporting the socialisation thesis, these findings support human capital explanations of how religiosity is linked to democratic citizenship. Resonating with social network theory, religious affiliation leads to attendance in religious services which provide opportunities to create social and political networks. Such network-based interactions may

include political deliberation and engagement in community activities (Bloom and Arikan 2012; Lewis et al. 2013). However, since this study is limited to a religious affiliation measure and does not use religious attendance as a proxy for religiosity here, it would be a thoughtless generalisation to assume that religiously affiliated individuals are always regular attendees to religious services.

Considering the effect of media use on political engagement, this study makes a theoretical contribution by providing evidence for the mobilisation theory as opposed to the media malaise theory. Although previous studies have shown that media use for political purposes facilitates democratic attitudes and behaviours, the decline in youth electoral participation among young people corresponds with growing popularity of the internet. The key finding is that, irrespective of age group or generational membership, media use for political reasons fosters both democratic attitudes and engagement in offline processes. Media use helps to inform and mobilise people (Dalton 1996; Inglehart 1990) instead of invoking negative attitudes which drive people away from participation (Edelman 1988; Fallows 1997). Since media has spread to most aspects of people's lives, particularly among younger generations, a socially desirable goal is to enhance youth participation through it. For instance, social media has become an important political communication platform, which allows political institutions to communicate with voters (Stieglitz and Dang-Xuan 2013).

The findings here are robust as the study also considers the macro environment as well as contextual factors. While investigating the macro-level determinants of engagement, it builds on the premise that individual citizens are nested in larger, cross-nationally variable macro environments and that institutional design effects vary across democracies. The results suggest that although macro institutional factors impact on democratic citizenship, generational attributes drive most institutional explanations. This means that how an institutional feature impacts an individual is dependent on their age and generational membership. Further, this study demonstrates how plausible institutional variations across countries that might influence the relationships in question.

To this end, it drills deep into the Australian case to examine the trends of youth engagement in a compulsory voting system. Contrary to the international trends, young Australians are no different from older people and older cohorts in their commitment to principles and both traditional and contemporary (online) processes of democracy. Instead, period effects – that is, short-term political, economic and social context – best explain democratic attitudes and behaviours in Australia. This analysis offers some important insights about how Australians engage in politics. First, being responsive to short-term political and social stimuli might mean that Australians are quick to hold political actors/institutions accountable for their actions. Compulsory voting might tie citizens to the political system, but by the way of public opinion, most of all generations fear that big businesses and media have too much power. They fear the practice of democracy is concentrated in the hands of these institutions (Stoker et al.

2017). There has been a significant decline in trust in politicians and political parties and a lack of confidence in the government's capacity to meet people's concerns (Hollo 2019). This means that Australians are wary of the performance of the key political actors and institutions. Overall, this final analysis focusing on Australia draws our attention to the importance of context reminds us to think harder about the questions of when, where, and on what premises citizens behave in the ways they do.

Despite the various contributions, this study has three limitations pertaining to generalisability, which arise from the chosen dataset, CSES IMD. First, for the concept of religion, it only records religious denomination but not attendance. Religious affiliation (derived from denomination) as a measure for religiosity taps into just one aspect of religion. Alternatively, religious salience, beliefs, intensity, practices may yield different results. Several previous works have demonstrated how religious participation has a positive spillover effect on democratic participation (Peterson 1992; Verba et al. 1995; Smidt 1999). Although attendance is frequently used in the literature, it is important to acknowledge its selection and reporting biases (e.g., among more conscientious people) and its significance to more specific religious cultures (i.e., towards congregation-based religions) (Bolzendahl et al. 2019: p. 559). But, given younger generations are turning away from traditional modes of participation, it is still worthwhile to consider a future enquiry on whether the decline in religious attendance plays a role in youth disengagement.

Second, the analysis on media-engagement nexus is also restricted by the unavailability of more specific data. The most important limitation lies in the fact that it does not test for the differential effects of the various media types. The CSES media variable captures media use in at least one of four traditional (physical) and new (digital) media outlets (radio, newspaper, TV and internet). While media forms like the TV make users passively absorb information, social-networking sites allow users to generate content and interact with the contents produced by others (Swigger 2013). There is a time lag in enacting TV-generated information, and this difference between the TV and internet is not captured by the CSES item. However, it is important to note that the item specifically asks respondents to report their usage based for political purposes. Of course, the internet is not a single, unidimensional entity (Shah et al. 2005): that said, young people who frequent in this medium are also likely to be exposed to incidental political news, which is less likely to happen in traditional news outlets. Overall, there is need for targeted survey data collection and further empirical enquiries on the varying effects of specific media use on youth engagement.

Third, it is important to consider the effect of context on the relationship between media use on democratic engagement. Undoubtedly, countries have distinct political histories and socio-cultural idiosyncrasies in media use (see, for example, Placek 2017; Bratton et al. 2005; Xenos and Moy 2007). These can be captured, for example, by using macro concepts such as age of democracy (new vs old, Bratton et al. 2005), media ownership (public or private, Cushion

2012), quality of national news media (Dimock and Popkin 1997), internet penetration (the percentage of the population who are internet users, Nisbet et al. 2012) and similar. Disentangling the individual effects of these variables is beyond the aims of this thesis, especially considering the limited availability of valid survey measures in the current CSES module.

An alternative way to consider context is by designing single cases studies. The current cross-national analysis has shown the potential of media use in revitalising youth engagement in democracies. A natural next step would be to zoom into specific countries to better understand how a plethora of factors interact with the communication media to mobilise young citizens. Such a study can afford a more nuanced analysis considering various media outlets and different sorts of democratic (offline and online) participation. Of course, not all participatory behaviours are democratic. For example, voting is a democratic exercise but voting for a party or candidate who undermines democratic principles is not necessarily so. Although setting up the research in advanced democracies somewhat alleviates this problem of measurement validity in the current study, these polities still have candidates and parties with illiberal agendas. This is where the power of case studies come in, which allow researchers to account for country-specific distinctions. I discuss more about future directions in the last section of this chapter.

10.2. Implications for Democracy

Younger generations are turning away from traditional democratic processes. What are the practical implications of this finding in advanced democracies? Extant literature suggests that changing preferences of participation may pose no threat to democratic ideals but may rather be a symptom of deeper problems in existing, traditional institutions. My thesis finds that youth disengagement is a manifestation - an indicator - of deeper problems in existing democracies. I have not shown what these problems are, but I have shown how there is a crucial lag between the expectations of citizens and performance of the system. I have shown that with progression of society, traditional institutions have not evolved to cater for newer generations with different cognitive resources, abilities and concerns.

Youth disengagement is nonetheless a clear symptom that democracy is in trouble. Many studies have written about the challenges of democracy. Early writings of Plato, Aristotle, and Polybius to more modern works by Tocqueville, Marx, and Weber provide some form of diagnosis on the crisis of democracy. Among many cited reasons in the crisis literature, some common themes are high levels of citizen disaffection with politics (Campus and Andre 2014), low levels of satisfaction and trust in governments and politicians (Hay and Stoker 2009; Warren 2009), the decline in membership of political parties (Whiteley 2009), and the failure, or ineffectiveness, of representation (Shields 2006). And there is plenty of evidence for this widening gap between the rulers and the ruled in representative democracies. While some

countries in Africa, Asia and the Arab world have opened up to democracy, in other countries where democracy has deeper roots, disillusionment with the political process has crept worrying heights (Kurlantzick 2013). The current empirical study shows how younger generations, with comparable commitment to democratic principles as their predecessors, are gradually moving away from elite-involving democratic processes such as voting and aligning with a political party. Relating to some common definitions of democratic crisis, youth move away from key, albeit classical, democratic practices like voting to elect representatives is no good news.

Although it is not the focus of this thesis to elucidate the meaning of 'crisis of democracy', it would be overly sanguine to conclude that youth disengagement from democratic processes does not further threaten liberal democracy. As contemporary democratic theories suggest participation and representation are complementary forms of citizenship (Urbinati and Warren 2008). That means participation is essential to maintain representation in the governing decisions made in the system. Here, a politically marginalised group is turning away from the mainstream political institutions, risking further political underrepresentation. So much so that they have been nominated for being responsible for instigating a crisis by actively rejecting democratic principles (Foa and Mounk 2016). Obviously, that is not true: my findings attest to a cross-generational solidarity for democratic ideals along with a rather critical attitude towards democratic processes and outcomes among younger cohorts. According to democratic theory then, commitment to moral foundations and desirability of democracy is not compromised here (Laurence 2015). Rather, young people are dissatisfied with the performance of mainstream parties and politician - with how actual democracies function. They feel increasingly neglected, with their economic, social and political woes being inadequately addressed. But, young people are not compromising democracy.

With an issue concerning the future custodians of democracy, we find ourselves in a highly sensitive situation where wrongly holding an already marginalised group culpable for fuelling the crisis of democracy will further push them away from the political system. The root cause of youth disengagement from traditional procedures is that generational changes with progression of society did not see subsequent political reforms, widening the gap between elites and the under-represented. But we must also acknowledge, disengagement in any shape or form is not good news for democracy. Young citizens may choose to disengage and remain apathetic, perhaps because of the reduced sense of efficacy. However, what happens when a populist leader appeals to these apathetics and suddenly their apathy is transformed into antipathy, into an active challenge to the existing system. This antipathy challenges not only the legitimacy of the incumbent or the existing government but also the legitimacy of democracy as 'the' system of government. Although youth disengagement is not necessarily an active threat to the democratic system from younger constituents, it is nonetheless a problem.

Youth retract from electoral processes is rather bleak because, in representative democracies, parliaments, political parties, and elections play a crucial role in aggregating citizens wishes into policies (Downs 1957; Schumpeter 1976; see Dean et al. 2019 for a more recent, thorough discussion). Youth disengagement may well translate into youth underrepresentation as young voters check out from the aggregation process. Martin (2014) contends that there is no replacement for electoral participation, and that young people are a little neglectful of it. And this is a concern for political parties too as they can no longer rely on party loyalties and habitual voters as younger generations replace the older in the electorate. The youth disengagement problem manifests as a generational issue, meaning over time the electorate is changing. Redundant is the cliché that young people are not competent yet or do not have the capacity to be involved in political decision-making (contra to early ideas from Plato and Aristotle ref. McAllister 1991). But today's young people are different: they are better educated; they are more critical. Youth disengagement from traditional modes of participation means that young people are doing their bit right. Politicians and political institutions are not.

So, what can be done to fix this problem? In light of the findings of my dissertation, I will briefly mention two possible solutions for policy makers - one pertaining to maximising individual resources and the other relating to institutional reforms that will encourage participation. First, a sound solution is to focus on factors that are known to facilitate youth political engagement at the individual level. For instance, better access to tertiary education and more fair and equitable access to political news in trustworthy media outlets may invigorate democratic engagement with traditional channels. Another factor to focus on is religion, especially in secular societies. Although there are other explanations to why democratic disconnect from traditional practices is concentrated amongst younger generations (e.g., Blais and Rubenson 2013), the decline in religion does not make it better. Since religion is generally conducive to democratic engagement, my research indicates that religious exposure in various social domains (like in schools) can help revert the decline in youth democratic engagement. As such, among many, some notable implications are contributions to larger debates about government funding to religious schools, religious education in (public) schools, the portrayal of religion in the media and among politicians and democratic integration of young immigrants and refugees in largely secular democracies. Given there is a positive association between religion and democracy, antagonistic attitudes towards religious ideals, practices and organisations may potentially drive young people further away from democracy.

Second, it is important to consider how institutional factors hinder political participation. Today, young people's lives are highly transient, meaning they are more likely to relocate between the ages 18 and 34 than at any other time in their lives, compared to younger people in older generations (Benetsky et al. 2015). In the context of today's societal demands, this is unsurprising given younger people move out to attend college and also more frequently change jobs. Furthermore, they are inexperienced and lesser-informed of the labyrinth-like

registration systems of being added to the electoral rolls (Singh et al. 2019). Traditional institutions, in addition to this, are not designed to cater for these contemporary challenges.

It is true that younger generations are faced with a plethora of challenging issues such as the climate crisis, student loans and housing affordability- all of which are symptoms of a protracted period of transition to adulthood (Flanagan et al. 2012). Discussing similar generational trends as found in the current study, Wenger and Foa (2020) agree, "an examination of millennial life trajectories makes clear the reasons for this generational disconnect." US millennials form about a quarter of the population, yet just own 3% of the wealth. Baby Boomers, in contrast, owned 21% at the same age. Similarly, in Britain, this cohort earns less than their parents and grandparents. In Southern Europe, unemployment the youth unemployment rate is three times the national average. Therefore, it is not surprising that millennials are checking out from mainstream democratic politics.[60] All the zeal with which the youth cheered for moderates, such as Barrack Obama and Justin Trudeau, has transformed into angst over unsustainable debt, high rent and low-paying jobs and a looming climate crisis.

This dissertation argues that although the institutional hindrances are not direct effects, they impede engagement with democracy. This finding provides some support for the conceptual premise that institutional and structural lag may be hindering younger age groups and generations from establishing a staunch stance at the political domain. For example, self-initiated registration systems, as opposed to state-initiated registration systems, has the potential to deter young voters to enrol to vote as it presents an extra barrier in their highly uncertain, mobile, and transitory life stage. Given the protracted transition to adulthood and the further difficulties that current periods bring to younger generations (Flanagan et al. 2012), it is important to pay closer attention to institutional design features which will cater to the transition. Hopefully, that will encourage engagement with conventional democratic practice like voting and party alignment.

Additionally, contemporising the ways elites reach young people may also help close the gap between political elites and the youth. That is political parties need to revaluate their connections with voters as newer generations replace older counterparts in the electorate. This will entail using online platforms to talk with, listen to and address grievances of young constituents. Using the new media to this end may be a good strategy. However, this will

[60] Indeed, this is what is predicted by the postmaterialist account. Inglehart, Norris and Dalton have extensively written about how changes in societal values due to the increase in education and other resources, such as better access to (political) information, will lead to future electorates with higher cognitive resources and, consequently, shift the procedural engagement preference from elite-directed to elite-challenging modes of participation. There is much evidence in the contemporary literature that participation preference has changed among the youth whereby the vote and party-related engagement is being replaced by social-media activism, single-issue movements and similar (Dassonneville 2013; Rainie and Wellman 2012; Loader et al. 2014; Grasso 2014; Vromen et al. 2018).

require a thorough examination of the various digital networks and modes through which young people today prefer to engage with politics.

The final point about institutions comes from the single case analysis of a compulsory voting system, in Australia. The current study provides some policy insights to Australian political leaders on how to particularly address youth concerns. Learning that the Australian people somewhat have a 'short-term' memory and that the period of the current election matters, political elites should pay close attention to the issues that concern young voters. It is even more important in a context that enforces compulsory voting. This is because young voters are more likely to vote here than in other advanced democracies. Catering to the specific needs and grievances of a group of voters, who are less likely to be loyal partisans, could sway and win their votes. In the simplest terms, swing voters are very important in a compulsory voting context, like in Australia. Of course, this implication can be further explored in an empirical research enquiry, which compares young voters in compulsory and non-compulsory settings.

10.3. Future Directions

Young people, at the very least, are dissatisfied with politics. They are increasingly disenfranchised as politicians not only neglect their woes, side line their concerns but also seem to erode any prospect of a safe and secure future. But does that mean that they are yearning for an alternative system or for a change within the current system? My study has found that younger generations are checking out from mainstream democratic politics because generational changes that came with progression of society are not catered for by the existing infrastructure. I have shown how the youth disengagement problem manifests itself– that younger generations are rejecting traditional processes not principles. Hence youth disengagement is a symptom rather than a cause of democratic distress. I have also shown what factors can help alleviate this problem. But I have not shown where young people are going as they move away from traditional processes of democracy.

Although it is beyond the scope of my research, it is common knowledge that young people are more attracted to digital, contemporary forms of civic and political participation. The changes in preference for modes of participation broadly stem from: a push away from conventional, traditional processes; and a pull towards more effective, relevant, and low-cost digital alternatives. This means that generational replacement may be demanding procedural replacement. Democratic institutions may need to change in response to the changing values in society. Certainly, it is reassuring that commitment to democratic ideals remain unabridged across generations. But without responsive reforms in how democracy works, it is hard to say how long democratic ideals can sustain in a society. This is because what people gather from their own behaviour can shape their attitudes and emotions. As previous works suggest, institutional contact provide a 'school of democracy' where people gain knowledge about and internalise democratic attitudes (Putnam 2000; Schlozman et al. 2012). That means that we

have a problem if traditional participation is not replaced by other forms of participation, but rather by no participation at all.

Despite the promising results of the current study, questions remain. While replacing traditional processes, what sort of democratic activities are young people engaging in? Future research might explore where the procedural preference of younger cohorts lies and how effective and efficacious these processes are. Many studies have shown that participation preference has changed among the youth whereby the vote and party-related engagement is being replaced by social-media activism, single-issue movements and similar (Dassonneville 2013; Grasso 2014). Although this renaissance in modes of engagement may not highlight democratic deconsolidation, a follow-up enquiry is required to assess how the new modes of participation may impact the political institutional landscape in the future.

For instance, although young people are more interested in non-electoral politics, there is a risk of resource inequalities being exacerbated in this space. Speaking of political engagement in the Australian context, Martin (2014) shows that political participation will increasingly become the province of the resource rich. That is, as the youth is amenable to different types of political participation, non-electoral forms of participation will be a provision of the privileged. But commenting on the same context, Vromen (2018) argues that youth engagement in politics in the digital space has increased political equality by allowing more voices in the public landscape. The idea of engaged citizenship – characterising processes of personalisation and storytelling – is replacing norms of dutiful citizenship with set allegiances and ideologies. The internet now features as a mobiliser or space for participation. New advocacy organisations have emerged which not only utilise digital tools to engage young people but also challenge traditional politics.

The severance from traditional forms of participation may continue to create opportunities for other organisations to mobilise the youth. The political engagement marketplace is more crowded and competitive than it was ever before: once upon a time parties were the sole conduits for political activity, but with increasing amounts of people not needing partisan cues to base their political decisions on, there are new rivals to traditional avenues of participation. That means, mainstream political parties, political institutions, advocacy, and interest group sectors need to think more broadly about how they can activate their membership and use contemporary (online) channels to communicate with young people. That is, political institutions will need to 'contemporarise' their methods of interacting with young people. To produce effective and efficacious strategies of such communications require concerted research including young people and youth researchers. To some extent, this is a more challenging research as new forms of participation are highly dynamic and hard to form an understanding of before they change again. Current survey data does not measure all the popular, amorphous, and anonymous forms of participation and organisations which facilitate them. Add to that the fact that the global pandemic must have had a significant impact on how

people - not just young people – engage with politics. And for this, unfortunately we just need more time to understand how the digital platform is evolving. Then, we can find ways to contemporise and revive conventional forms of engagement.

References

Aarts, K. and Semetko, H.A. (2003), 'The Divided Electorate: Media Use and Political Involvement', *The Journal of Politics* 65(3), 759–784.

Aarts, K. and Thomassen, J. (2008), 'Satisfaction with Democracy: Do Institutions Matter?', *Electoral Studies.* 27(1), 5–18.

Abdulrauf, A.A., Abdul Hamid, N. and Ishak, M.S. (2017), 'Cognitive engagement and online political participation on social media among youths in Malaysia: The moderating role of political knowledge', *SHS Web of Conferences* 33, 1–7.

Aberbach, J.D. (1969), 'Alienation and political behavior', *American Political Science Review*, 63(1), 86-99.

Abramson, P.R. and Finifter, A.W., (1981), 'On the meaning of political trust: New evidence from items introduced in 1978', *American Journal of Political Science* 25(2), 297-307.

ABS (2020a), 'Introduction', Asian Barometer, viewed 29 February 2020, <http://www.asianbarometer.org/intro>.

ABS (2020b), 'Core Questionnaire: Fourth Wave', Asian Barometer, viewed 29 February 2020, <http://www.asianbarometer.org/pdf/core_questionnaire_wave4.pdf>.

Ackerman, B. (2000), 'The New Separation of Powers', *Harvard Law Review* 113(3), 642–727.

Ådnanes, M. (2004), 'Exit and/or voice? Youth and post-communist citizenship in Bulgaria', *Political Psychology* 25, 795–815.

AEC (2013), 'Direct Enrolment and Direct Update: The Australian Experience', Australian Electoral Commission, viewed 28 December 2022, <https://www.aec.gov.au/About_AEC/research/direct.htm>.

Afrobarometer (2016), 'Merged Round 6 Codebook', Merged Data, viewed 28 February 2020, <https://www.afrobarometer.org/data/merged-data>.

Ahlqvist, T., Bäck, A., Heinonen, S. and Halonen, M. (2010), 'Road-mapping the societal transformation potential of social media', *Foresight* 12(5), 3-26.

Albanesi, C., Zani, B. and Cicognani, E. (2012), 'Youth Civic and Political Participation through the Lens of Gender: The Italian Case', *Human Affairs* 22 (3), 360–74.

Althaus, S. and Tewksbury, D. (2000), 'Patterns of Internet and Traditional News Media Use in a Networked Community', *Political Communication* 17(1), 21-45.

Aldrich, J.H. (1995), *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Almond, G.A. and Verba, S. (1963), *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey.

Alwin, D.F. and Krosnick, J.A., (1985), 'The measurement of values in surveys: A comparison of ratings and rankings', *Public Opinion Quarterly* 49(4), 535-552.

Ammerman, N.T. and Davie, G. (2018), 'Is Religion Bad for Democracy?', *The Conversation*, viewed 31 December 2022, <http://theconversation.com/is-religion-bad-for-democracy-97351>.

Amnå, E., Munck, I. and Zetterberg, P. (2004), Meaningful Participation? Political Efficacy of Adolescents in 24 countries, *in '*European Consortium for Political Research General Conference Joint Sessions of Workshops', Uppsala, Sweden.

Anderson, C.J. (1998), 'Parties, Party Systems, and Satisfaction with Democratic Performance in the New Europe', *Political Studies* 46(3), 572–88.

Anderson, C.J. (2002), 'Good Questions, Dubious Inferences, and Bad Solutions: Some Further Thoughts on Satisfaction with Democracy', University of Binghamton Working Paper Series.

Anderson, C.J. (2007), The Interaction of Structures and Voter Behavior, in R.J. Dalton and H.D. Klingemann, eds, 'The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior', Oxford University Press, New York.

Anderson, C.J., Blais, A., Bowler, S., Donovan, T. and Listhaug, O. (2005), *Loser's Consent: Elections and Democratic Legitimacy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Anderson, C.J. and Guillory, C.A. (1997), 'Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems', *American Political Science Review* 91(1), 66–81.

Andersen, R., Kasper, J.D. and Frankel, M.R. (1979), *Total survey error*, Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco.

Anderson, C.J. and Singer, M.M. (2008), 'The Sensitive Left and the Impervious Right Multilevel Models and the Politics of Inequality, Ideology, and Legitimacy in Europe', *Comparative Political Studies* 41(4–5), 564–99.

Anderson, C.J. and Tverdova, Y.V. (2001), 'Winners, Losers, and Attitudes about Government in Contemporary Democracies', *International Political Science Review* 22(4), 321–38.

Anduiza Perea, E. (2002), 'Individual Characteristics, Institutional Incentives and Electoral Abstention in Western Europe', *European Journal of Political Research* 41 (5), 643–73.

Arab Barometer (2019), 'Arab Barometer Wave V: Questionnaire 2018-2019', Arab Barometer, viewed 29 February 2020, <https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/ABV_SourceQuestionnaire_ENG_Public-Opinion-2018-2019.pdf>.

Arab Barometer (2020), 'Methodology', Arab Barometer, viewed 29 February 2020, <https://www.arabbarometer.org/survey-data/methodology/>.

Arikan, G. and Ben-Nun Bloom, P. (2019). 'Religion and Political Protest: A Cross-Country Analysis', *Comparative Political Studies* 52 (2), 246–76.

Arnett, J.J. (2014), *Emerging Adulthood: The Winding Road from the Late Teens Through the Twenties*, Oxford University Press, New York.

Astor, A., Burchardt, M. and Griera, M. (2017), 'The Politics of Religious Heritage: Framing Claims to Religion as Culture in Spain', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 56 (1), 126–42.

Austin, P. C. and Leckie, G. (2018), 'The effect of number of clusters and cluster size on statistical power and Type I error rates when testing random effects variance components in multilevel linear and logistic regression models', *Journal of Statistical Computation and Simulation* 88(16), 3151–3163.

Baker, K., Dalton, R. and Hildebrandt, K. (1981), *Germany Transformed*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

Bakker, T. P. and de Vreese, C. H. (2011), 'Good News for the Future? Young People, Internet Use, and Political Participation' *Communication Research* 38(4), 451–470.

Balch, G.I. 1974, 'Multiple Indicators in Survey Research: The Concept of 'Sense of Political Efficacy', *Political Methodology* 1(2), 1-43.

Baldassarri, D. and Park, B. (2020), 'Was there a culture war? Partisan polarization and secular trends in US public opinion', *The Journal of Politics* 82(3), 809-827.

Barnhurst, K.G. (2011), 'The New "Media Affect" and the Crisis of Representation for Political Communication' *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 16(4), 573–593.

Barnes, S.H. (2004), 'Political Participation in Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe', Paper 04'10, Center for the Study of Democracy.

Barnes, S.H., Allerbeck, K.R., Farah, B.G., Heunks, F.J., Inglehart, R.F., Jennings, M.K., Klingemann, H.D., Marsh, A. and Rosenmayr, L. (1979), *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies,* Beverly Hills, Sage.

Baron, R.M. and Kenny, D.A. (1986), 'The Moderator–Mediator Variable Distinction in Social Psychological Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical Considerations', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 51 (6), 1173–82.

Bang, H.P. (2004), 'Everyday Makers and Expert Citizens: Building Political Not Social Capital', PhD thesis, Australian National University, Canberra, <https://openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/42117/2/Henrik.pdf>.

Baum, M.A. and Jamison, A.S. (2006), 'The Oprah Effect: How Soft News Helps Inattentive Citizens Vote Consistently' *The Journal of Politics* 68(4), 946–959.

Beck, U. (1992), *Risk society: Towards a new modernity*, Sage Publications.

Beck, U., Giddens, A. and Lash, S. (1994), *Reflexive modernization: Politics, tradition and aesthetics in the modern social order*, Stanford University Press, California.

Beck, P. A. and Jennings, M.K. (1991), 'Family traditions, political periods, and the development of partisan orientations', *Journal of Politics* 53(3), 742–63.

Bell, A. and Jones, K. (2014), 'Another 'Futile Quest'? A Simulation Study of Yang and Land's Hierarchical Age-Period-Cohort Model', *Demographic Research* 30, 333–60.

Bell, A. and Jones, K. (2015), Age, Period and Cohort Processes in Longitudinal and Life Course Analysis: A Multilevel Perspective, *in* C. Burton-Jeangros, S. Cullati, A. Sacker and D. Blane, eds, 'A Life Course Perspective on Health Trajectories and Transitions', Springer, Cham, 197-213.

Benetsky, M.J., Burd, C.A. and Rapino, M.A. (2015), 'Young Adult Migration: 2007-2009 to 2010-2012', American Community Survey Reports, viewed December 29 2020, <https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/acs/acs-31.pdf>.

Bennett, W.L. (1998), '1998 Ithiel De Sola Pool Lecture: The uncivic culture: communication, identity, and the rise of lifestyle politics', *PS: Political Science & Politics* 31(4), 741–61.

Bennett, W.L. (2012), 'The personalization of politics: Political identity, social media, and changing patterns of participation', *The annals of the American academy of political and social science* 644(1), 20-39.

Bennett, W.L. (2013), Civic Learning in Changing Democracies, *in* P. Dahlgren, ed., 'Young Citizens and New Media: Learning for Democratic Participation', Routledge.

Bennett, W.L. and Segerberg, A. (2012), 'The logic of connective action: Digital media and the personalization of contentious politics', *Information, communication & society* 15(5), 739-768.
Bennett, W.L., Wells, C. and Rank, A. (2009), 'Young citizens and civic learning: Two paradigms of citizenship in the digital age', *Citizenship Studies* 13(2), 105–120.

Ben-Nun Bloom, P. and Arikan, G. (2012), 'A Two-Edged Sword: The Differential Effect of Religious Belief and Religious Social Context on Attitudes towards Democracy', *Political Behavior* 34(2): 249–76.

Ben-Nun Bloom, P., Arikan, G. and Vishkin, A. (2021), 'Religion and Democratic Commitment: A Unifying Motivational Framework', *Political Psychology* 42, 75-108.

Bernstein, A.G. (2005), 'Gendered characteristics of political engagement in college students', *Sex roles 52*(5), 299-310.

Berinsky, A.J. (2017), 'Measuring Public Opinion with Surveys', *Annual Review of Political Science* 20, 309-329.

Bernauer, J. and Vatter, A. (2012), 'Can't Get No Satisfaction with the Westminster Model? Winners, Losers and the Effects of Consensual and Direct Democratic Institutions on Satisfaction with Democracy', *European Journal of Political Research* 51(4), 435–68.

Bernhagen, P. and Marsh, M. (2007), 'Voting and Protesting: Explaining Citizen Participation in Old and New European Democracies', *Democratization* 14 (1), 44–72.

Bessant, J. (2004), 'Mixed Messages: Youth Participation and Democratic Practice', *Australian Journal of Political Science* 39 (2), 387–404.

Bimber, B. and Copeland, L. (2013), Digital Media and Traditional Political Participation Over Time, U.S. *Journal of Information Technology & Politics* 10(2), 125–137.

Bimber, B., Cunill, M.C., Copeland, L. and Gibson, R. (2015), 'Digital Media and Political Participation: The Moderating Role of Political Interest Across Acts and Over Time', *Social Science Computer Review* 33(1), 21–42.

Blais, A. (2000), *To Vote Or Not to Vote?: The Merits and Limits of Rational Choice Theory*. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh.

Blais, A. and Aarts, K. (2006), 'Electoral Systems and Turnout', *Acta Politica* 41 (2), 180–96.

Blais, A. and Dobrzynska, A. (1998), 'Turnout in Electoral Democracies', *European Journal of Political Research* 33(2), 239–61.

Blais, A. and Rubenson, D. (2013), 'The Source of Turnout Decline: New Values or New Contexts?', *Comparative Political Studies* 46 (1), 95–117.

Blumler, J.G. and Gurevitch, M. (1995), *The Crisis of Public Communication*, Routledge, London.

Bode, L. (2012), 'Facebooking It to the Polls: A Study in Online Social Networking and Political Behavior', *Journal of Information Technology & Politics* 9(4), 352–369.

Bolzendahl, C. and Coffé, H. (2009), 'Citizenship beyond politics: The importance of political, civil and social rights and responsibilities among women and men', *The British Journal of Sociology* 60(4), 763–791.

Bolzendahl, C., Schnabel, L. and Sagi, R. (2019), 'Religion and Democratic Citizenship: A Multilevel Examination', *Politics and Religion* 12(4), 577–605.

Bonfadelli, H. (2002), 'The Internet and Knowledge Gaps: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation', *European Journal of Communication* 17(1), 65–84.

Booth, J.A. and Seligson, M.A. (2009), *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Nations*, Cambridge University Press, New York.

Boulianne, S. (2009), 'Does Internet Use Affect Engagement? A Meta-Analysis of Research', *Political Communication* 26(2), 193–211.

Boulianne, S. (2011), 'Stimulating or Reinforcing Political Interest: Using Panel Data to Examine Reciprocal Effects Between News Media and Political Interest', *Political Communication* 28(2), 147–162.

Boulianne, S. (2015), 'Social media use and participation: A meta-analysis of current research', *Information, Communication & Society* 18(5), 524–538.

Boulianne, S. and Shehata, A. (2022), 'Age Differences in Online News Consumption and Online Political Expression in the United States, United Kingdom, and France', *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 27(3), 763–83.

Boyd, D. (2008), 'Can social network sites enable political action?' *International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics* 4(2), 241–244.

Braconnier, C., Dormagen, J.Y. and Pons, V. (2013), 'Voter Registration Costs and Disenfranchisement: Experimental Evidence from France', *American Political Science Review* 111(3), 584–604.

Bratton, M., Mattes, R. and Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2005), *Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Reform in Africa*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Bruce, S. (2003), *Politics and Religion*, Wiley.

Bryan, F.M. (1999), *Direct democracy and civic competence: the case of town meeting*, Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania.

Buckley, D. (2016), 'Demanding the Divine? Explaining Cross-National Support for Clerical Control of Politics', *Comparative Political Studies* 49(3), 357–90.

Burbank, M.J. (1997), 'Explaining Contextual Effects on Vote Choice', *Political Behavior* 19(2), 113–32.

Burns, N., Schlozman, K.L. and Verba, S. (2001), *The Private Roots of Public Action*, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts.

Cameron, S. and McAllister, I. (2019), 'The 2019 Australian Federal Election: Results from the Australian Election Study', Australian National University, Canberra, <https://australianelectionstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/The-2019-Australian-Federal-Election-Results-from-the-Australian-Election-Study.pdf>.

Cammaerts, B., Bruter, M., Banaji, S., Harrison, S. and Anstead, N., (2014), 'The myth of youth apathy: Young Europeans' critical attitudes toward democratic life', *American Behavioral Scientist* 58(5), 645-664.

Campbell, R. (2011), 'Social Capital and Political Support: A Reassessment of the Putnam Thesis in East and West Germany', *German Politics* 20(4), 568–90.

Campbell, A., Gurin, G. and Miller, W. (1954), *The Voter Decides*, Row, Peterson and Company, New York.

Campbell, A., Converse, P.E., Miller, W.E. and Stokes, D.E. (1960), *The American Voter*, Wiley, New York.

Campbell, B.C. (2013), *Representative Democracy*, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts.

Campus, A.S. and André, J.G, (2014), *Challenges to Democratic Participation. Antipolitics, Delibertive Democracy and Pluralism,* Lexington Books, Lanham.

Canache, D., (2006), Measuring Variance and Complexity in Citizens' Understandings of Democracy, *in* 'LAPOP–UNDP Workshop: Candidate Indicators for the UNDP Democracy Support Index (DSI)', Vanderbilt University, Nashville.

Canache, D., (2012a), 'The Meanings of Democracy in Venezuela: Citizen Perceptions and Structural Change', *Latin American Politics and Society* 54(3), 95–122.

Canache, D., (2012b), 'Citizens' Conceptualizations of Democracy Structural Complexity, Substantive Content, and Political Significance', *Comparative Political Studies* 45(9), 1132–58.

Canache, D., Mondak, J.J. and Seligson, M.A. (2001), 'Meaning and Measurement in Cross-National Research on Satisfaction with Democracy', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 65(4), 506-528.

Cannell, C.F., Miller, P.V. and Oksenberg, L. (1981), 'Research on Interviewing Techniques', *Sociological Methodolog*y 12, 389-437.

Carlin, R.E. and Singer, M.M. (2011), 'Support for Polyarchy in the Americas', *Comparative Political Studies* 44(11), 1500–26.

Carr, L.G. (1971), 'The Srole Items and Acquiescence', *American Sociological Review* 36(2), 287-293.

Ceka, B. and Magalhães, P.C. (2016), 'How People Understand Democracy: A Social Dominance Approach', *in* M. Ferrín and H. Kriesi, eds, *How Europeans View and Evaluate Democracy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 90-110.

Celis, K., Schouteden, A. and Wauters, B. (2016), 'Cleavage, ideology and identity. Explaining the linkage between representatives and interest groups', *Parliamentary Affairs* 69(2), 348-365.

Chang, W.C. (2018), 'Media Use and Satisfaction with Democracy: Testing the Role of Political Interest', *Social Indicators Research* 140(3), 999–1016.

Cheibub, J.A. and Limongi, F. (2002), 'Democratic Institutions and Regime Survival: Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies Reconsidered', *Annual Review of Political Science* 5(1), 151-179.

Cherry, C. (2012), 'Increasing Youth Participation: The Case for a National Voter Pre-Registration Law', *University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform* 45(2), 481-516.

Cho, J., Shah, D.V., McLeod, J.M., McLeod, D.M., Scholl, R.M. and Gotlieb, M.R. (2009), 'Campaigns, Reflection, and Deliberation: Advancing an O-S-R-O-R Model of Communication Effects', *Communication Theory* 19(1), 66–88.

Chowdhury, I.S. (2021), 'Are Young Australians Turning Away from Democracy?', *Australian Journal of Political Science* 56(2),171-188.

Chowdhury, I.S. (2023), 'Young people may decide the outcome of the Voice referendum – here's why', *The Conversation*, February 16, viewed 27 May 2023, <https://theconversation.com/young-people-may-decide-the-outcome-of-the-voice-referendum-heres-why-199599?fbclid=IwAR2X8tNhzLt2Ossr_k52OS-CWaA9CNkns-oYIwT206JYwF-I7Rvbcsd9Mn4>.

Christiano, T. (2018), *The rule of the many: Fundamental issues in democratic theory*, Routledge, New York.

Chu, Y., Bratton, M., Lagos, M., Shastri, S. and Tessler, M. (2008), 'Public Opinion and Democratic Legitimacy', *Journal of Democracy* 19(2), 74–87.

Chu, Y., Diamond, L., Nathan, A.J. and Shin, D.C., eds (2008), *How East Asians View Democracy*, Columbia University Press, New York.

Cicognani, E., Zani, B., Fournier, B., Gavray, C. and Born, M. (2012), 'Gender differences in youths' political engagement and participation. The role of parents and of adolescents' social and civic participation', *Journal of adolescence* 35(3), 561-576.

Ciftci, S. (2010), 'Modernization, Islam, or Social Capital: What Explains Attitudes Toward Democracy in the Muslim World?' *Comparative Political Studies* 43(11), 1442–70.

CIRCLE (2018), 'Young People's Ambivalent Relationship with Political Parties', Centre for Information & Research on Civic Learning & Engagement, viewed 29 December 2022, <https://circle.tufts.edu/latest-research/young-peoples-ambivalent-relationship-political-parties>.

Clarke, H.D., Dutt, N. and Kornberg, A. (1993), 'The Political Economy of Attitudes toward Polity and Society in Western European Democracies', *The Journal of Politics* 55(4), 998–1021.

Clarke, A.S., Clarke, H.D., Sanders, D., Stewart, M.C. and Whiteley, P. (2004), *Political Choice in Britain*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Coe, A.B., Wiklund, M., Uttjek, M. and Nygren, L. (2016), 'Youth politics as multiple processes: how teenagers construct political action in Sweden', *Journal of Youth Studies* 19(10), 1321-1337.

Coffé, H. and Bolzendahl, C. (2021), 'Are all politics masculine? Gender socialised personality traits and diversity in political engagement', *European Journal of Politics and Gender* 4(1), 113-133.

Collin, P. (2008), 'The internet, youth participation policies, and the development of young people's political identities in Australia', *Journal of Youth Studies* 11(5), 527-542.

Converse, P.E. (1972), Change in the American Electorate, *in* A. Campbell and P.E. Converse, eds, 'The Human Meaning of Social Change,' Russell Sage Foundation, New York.

Converse, P.E. (1975), 'Public Opinion and Voting Behavior, *in* F. Greenstein and N. Polsby, eds, 'Handbook of Political Science: Nongovernmental Politics. Vol. 4. Reading', Addison-Wesley, Massachusetts.

Converse, P.E. (1976), *The Dynamics of Party Support: Cohort-Analyzing Party Identification*, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills and London.

Converse, P.E. and Dupeux, G. (1962), 'Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States', *Public Opinion Quarterly* 26(1), 1-23.

Coppedge, M. (2012), Defining and Measuring Democracy, *in* M. Coppedge, 'Democratization and Research Methods', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Cox, G. (1990), 'Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems', *American Journal of Political Science* 34(4), 903–35.

Cox, G.W. (1997), *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Craig, S.C. 1979, 'Efficacy, Trust, and Political Behavior: An Attempt to Resolve a Lingering Conceptual Dilemma', *American Politics Quarterly* 7(2), 225-39.

Craig, S.C. (1980), 'The Mobilization of Political Discontent', *Political Behavior* 2(2), 189-209.

CSES 2019, 'Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES): Integrated Module Dataset (IMD)', Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, <https://cses.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/10/csesIMD_codebook_part2_variable-description.txt>.

Curran, J., Coen, S., Aalberg, T., Hayashi, K., Jones, P. K., Splendore, S., Papathanassopoulos, S., Rowe, D. and Tiffen, R. (2013), 'Internet revolution revisited: A comparative study of online news', *Media, Culture & Society* 35(7), 880–897.

Cushion, S. (2012), *The Democratic Value of News: Why Public Service Media Matter*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

Dahl, R.A. (1961), *Who Governs? Power and Democracy in an American City*, Yale University Press, New Haven.

Dahl, R.A. (1971), *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, Yale University Press, New Haven.

Dahl, R.A. (1989), *Democracy and its Critics*, Yale University Press, New Haven.

Dahl, R.A. (1998), *On Democracy*, Yale University Press, New Haven.

Dahl, R.A. (2000a), *On Democracy*, Yale University Press, New Haven.

Dahl, R.A. (2000b), 'A Democratic Paradox?', *Political Science Quarterly*, 115(1), 35–40.

Dahl, R.A. (2006), *A Preface to Democratic Theory, Expanded Edition*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Dahlberg, S. and Holmberg, S. (2012), 'Understanding Satisfaction with the Way Democracy Works: Democracy versus Bureaucracy', Working Paper Series 2012, University of Gothenburg, Sweden.

Dahlberg, S., Linde, J. and Holmberg, S. (2013), 'Dissatisfied Democrats. A Matter of Representation or Performance?' Working paper series, QOG–The Quality of Government Institute, University of Gothenburg, Sweden.

Dalton, R.J. (1984), 'Cognitive Mobilization and Partisan Dealignment in Advanced Industrial Democracies', *The Journal of Politics* vol. 46(1), 264-284.

Dalton, R.J. (1988), *Citizen Politics in Western Democracies: Public Opinion and Political Parties in the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, and France*, Chatham House, New Jersey.

Dalton, R.J. (1996), *Citizen politics in western democracies*, Chatham House, New Jersey.

Dalton, R.J. (1999), 'Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies', *in* P. Norris, ed., 'Critical Citizens', Oxford University Press, Oxford, 57–77.

Dalton, R.J. (2004), *Democratic Challenges Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Oxford University Press, New York.

Dalton, R.J. (2007), 'Partisan mobilization, cognitive mobilization and the changing American electorate', *Electoral Studies* 26(2), 274–286.

Dalton, R.J. (2008), 'Citizenship Norms and the Expansion of Political Participation', *Political Studies* 56(1), 76–98.

Dalton, R.J. (2009), *The Good Citizen: How a Younger Generation is Reshaping American Politics*, CQ Press, Washington DC.

Dalton, R.J. (2013), *The Apartisan American: Dealignment and Changing Electoral Politics*, CQ Press, Washington DC.

Dalton, R.J., Farrell, D.M. and McAllister, I. (2011), *Political Parties and Democratic Linkage: How Parties Organize Democracy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Dalton, R.J. and Anderson, C.J. (2011), Citizens, Context, and Choice, *in* R.J. Dalton and C.J. Anderson (eds), 'Citizens, Context, and Choice: How Context Shapes Citizens' Electoral Choices', Oxford University Press, Oxford, 3-30.

Dalton, R.J., Shin, D.C. and Jou, W. (2007a), 'Popular Conceptions of the Meaning of Democracy: Democratic Understanding in Unlikely Places', Center for the Study of Democracy, UC Irvine.

Dalton, R.J., Shin, D.C. and Jou, W. (2007b), 'Understanding Democracy: Data from Unlikely Places', Journal of *Democracy* 18(4), 142–56.

Dalton, R.J., and Weldon, S.A. (2005), 'Public images of political parties: a necessary evil?', *West European Politics,* 5(5), 931–51.

Dalton, R.J. and Welzel, C., eds (2014), *The Civic Culture Transformed: From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens*, Cambridge University Press, New York.

Dassonneville, R. 2013, 'Questioning Generational Replacement: An Age, Period and Cohort Analysis of Electoral Volatility in the Netherlands, 1971–2010', *Electoral Studies*, 32(1), 37-47.

Dean, R., Gagnon, J-P and Asenbaum, H (2019), 'What Is Democratic Theory?', *Democratic Theory* 6(2), v–xx.

Delli Carpini, M.X., and Keeter, S. (1992), The public's knowledge of politics, *in* J.D. Kennamer, ed., 'Public opinion, the press, and public policy', Praeger, Connecticut, 19–40.

Denemark, D., Ward, I. and Bean, C. (2012), 'Gender and Leader Effects in the 2010 Australian Election', *Australian Journal of Political Science* 47 (4), 563–78.

Denters, B., Gabriel, O. and Torcal, M. (2007), Norms of Good Citizenship, *in* J.W. Van Deth, J.R. Montero and A. Westholm, eds, 'Citizenship and Involvement in European Democracies: A Comparative Analysis', Routledge, New York, 88–108.

de Tocqueville, A. (1990), *Democracy in America*, Vintage, New York.

Diamond, L. (1999), *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.

Diamond, L. (2002), 'Thinking About Hybrid Regimes', *Journal of Democracy* 13(2), 5-21.

Diamond, L. (2015), 'Facing Up to the Democratic Recession', *Journal of Democracy* 26 (1), 141–55.

Diamond, L. and Morlino, L. (2004), 'The Quality of Democracy', *Journal of Democracy* 15(4), 20-31.

Diamond, L. and Plattner, M.F., eds (2008), *How People View Democracy*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.

Díaz Jiménez, O.F (2022), 'Political engagement or disaffection? The impact of partisan dealignment and cognitive mobilization on Mexicans' political attitudes in the 2018 presidential campaign', *Comunicación y sociedad*, 19.

Dimock, M., and Popkin, S. (1997), Political Knowledge in a Comparative Perspective, *in* S. Iyengar and R. Reeves, eds, 'Do the Media Govern?', Thousand Oaks, California, 217–224.

Dinas, E. (2013), 'Opening 'Openness to Change': Political Events and the Increased Sensitivity of Young Adults', *Political Research Quarterly* 66 (4), 868–82.

Donovan, T. (2017), Cognitive Mobilization, *in* K. Arzheimer, J. Evans, and M. Lewis-Beck, 'The SAGE Handbook of Electoral Behaviour: Volume 2', SAGE Publications Ltd, London, 313–36.

Downs, A. (1957), *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, Harper and Row, New York.

Driskell, R., Embry, E. and Lyon, L. (2008), 'Faith and Politics: The Influence of Religious Beliefs on Political Participation*', *Social Science Quarterly* 89 (2), 294–314.

Duch, R. and Stevenson, R. (2008), *The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Dunn, J. (2005), *Democracy: A History*, Atlantic Monthly, New York.

Duverger, M. (1954), *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State,* Methuen, London.

Dyson, E. (1997), *Release 2.0: Design for living in the digital age,* Broadway Books, New York.

Easton, D. (1965), *A System Analysis of Political Life*, Wiley, New York.

Easton, D. (1975), 'A Reassessment of the Concept of Political Support', *British Journal of Political Science* 5(4), 435–57.

Easton, D. and Dennis, J. (1967), 'The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy', *American Political Science Review* 61(1), 25-38.

Easton, D., Gunnell, J.G., and Stein, M.B. (1995), *Regime and Discipline: Democracy and the Development of Political Science*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Ebenstein, W. and Fogelman, E. (1980), *Today's Isms: Communism, Fascism, Capitalism, Socialism*, Prentice Hall, New Jersey.

Edelman, M. (1988), *Constructing the political spectacle*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Edwards, K. (2007), 'From Deficit to Disenfranchisement: Reframing Youth Electoral Participation', *Journal of Youth Studies* 10(5), 539–55.

Eisenstadt, S.N. (2000), 'Multiple Modernities', *Daedalus* 129(1), 1–29.

Ekström, M. and Shehata, A. (2018), 'Social media, porous boundaries, and the development of online political engagement among young citizens', *New Media & Society*, 20(2), 740-759.

Elkins, Z. and Sides, J. (2007), 'Can Institutions Build Unity in Multiethnic States?', *The American Political Science Review* 101(4), 693–708.

Erlingsson, G.O., Linde, J. and Öhrvall, R. (2014), 'Not so Fair after All? Perceptions of Procedural Fairness and Satisfaction with Democracy in the Nordic Welfare States', *International Journal of Public Administration* 37(2), 106–19.

Espinar-Ruiz, E., and Gonzalez-Rio, M.J. (2015), 'Spanish young people's internet use and political practices', *Convergencia* 22(69), 13–38.

ESS (2020), 'Politics (Core- All Modules): Data by Theme', European Social Survey, viewed 1 March 2010, <https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/themes.html?t=politics>.

Evans, R.I., Hansen, W.B. and Mittlemark, M.B. (1977), 'Increasing the Validity of Self-Reports of Smoking Behaviour in Children', *Journal of Applied Psychology* 62(4), 521-523.

Evans, G. and Tilley, J. (2017), *The new politics of class: The political exclusion of the British working class*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Eveland, Jr., W.P. (2004), 'The Effect of Political Discussion in Producing Informed Citizens: The Roles of Information, Motivation, and Elaboration', *Political Communication* 21(2), 177–193.

Eveland, W.P. and Scheufele, D.A. (2000), 'Connecting News Media Use with Gaps in Knowledge and Participation', *Political Communication* 17(3), 215–237.

Fallows, J. (1997), *Breaking the News: How the Media Undermine American Democracy*, Vintage, New York.

Fieldhouse, E., Tranmer, M. and Russell, A. (2007), 'Something about Young People or Something about Elections? Electoral Participation of Young People in Europe: Evidence from a Multilevel Analysis of the European Social Survey', *European Journal of Political Research* 46 (6), 797–822.

Ferrín, M. 2016, An Empirical Assessment of Satisfaction with Democracy, *in* M. Ferrín and H. Kriesi, eds, 'How Europeans View and Evaluate Democracy', Oxford University Press, Oxford, 283-306.

Ferrín, M. and Kriesi, H., eds (2016), *How Europeans View and Evaluate Democracy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Ferrín, M. and Kriesi, H. (2016), Introduction: Democracy- the European Verdict, *in* M. Ferrín and H. Kriesi, eds, 'How Europeans View and Evaluate Democracy', Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1- 20.

Figueiras, R., Santo, P.E. and Cunha, I.F. (2014), *Democracy at Work: Pressure and Propaganda in Portugal and Brazil*, Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra/Coimbra University Press, Portugal.

Finkel, S.E. (2007), Linear Panel Analysis, *in* S, Menard, ed*.,* 'Handbook of Longitudinal Research: Design, Measurement, and Analysis*'*, Elsevier, New York, 475–505.

Flanagan, C.A., Gallay, F.L. and Kim, T. (2012), 'Political Incorporation and the Protracted Transition to Adulthood: The Need for New Institutional Inventions', *Parliamentary Affairs* 65(1), 29–46.

Foa, R.S., Klassen, A., Wenger, D., Rand, A. and Slade, M. (2020), 'Youth and Satisfaction with Democracy: Reversing the Democratic Disconnect?' Bennett Institute for Public Policy, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, <https://www.bennettinstitute.cam.ac.uk/publications/youth-and-satisfaction-democracy/>.

Foa, R.S. and Mounk, Y. (2016), 'The Democratic Disconnect', *Journal of Democracy* 27(3), 5-17.

Foa, R.S., and Mounk, Y. (2017), 'The Signs of Deconsolidation', *Journal of Democracy* 28(1), 5–15.

Fox, S. (2015), 'Apathy, Alienation and Young People: The Political Engagement of British Millennials', PhD thesis, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, <http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/30532/1/Final%20Corrected%20Version%20-%20Apathy,%20Alienation%20and%20Young%20People%20The%20Political%20Engagement%20of%20British%20Millennials.pdf>.

Franklin, M.N. (2004), *Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established Democracies Since 1945*, Cambridge University Press, .

Franklin, M.N., Lyons, P. and Marsh, M. (2004), 'Generational Basis of Turnout Decline in Established Democracies', *Acta Politica* 39(2), 115–151.

Freedom House (2016), 'Freedom in the World 2016: Turkey', viewed 27 May 2019, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/turkey>.

Freedom House (2019a), 'Freedom in the World 2019: Mexico', viewed 18 May 2019, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/mexico>.

Freedom House (2019b), 'Methodology', viewed 24 April 2019, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/methodology-freedom-world-2019>.

Fritzley, V.H. and Lee, K. (2003), 'Do Young Children Always Say Yes to Yes–No Questions? A Metadevelopmental Study of the Affirmation Bias', *Child Development* 74(5), 1297–313.

Fuchs, D. (1999), The Democratic Culture of Unified Germany, in P. Norris, ed., 'Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government', Oxford University Press, Oxford, 123–45.

Fuchs, D., Guidorossi, G. and Svensson, P. (1995), Support for the Democratic System, *in* H.D. Klingemann and D. Fuchs, eds, 'Citizens and the State', Oxford University Press, Oxford, 323–53.

Fuchs, D. and Roller, E. (1998), Cultural Conditions of Transition to Liberal Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, *in* S.H. Barnes and J. Simon, eds, 'The Postcommunist Citizen', Erasmus Foundation, Budapest, 35–77.

Fuks, M., Paulino, R.O., Casalecchi, G.A., Fuks, M., Paulino, R.O., and Casalecchi, G.A. (2018), 'Socialization and Political Regimes: The Impact of Generation on Support for Democracy in Latin America', *Brazilian Political Science Review* 12(1),

Fukuyama, F. (2006), 'After Neoconservatism', *The New York Times*, viewed 31 December 2022, <https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/19/magazine/after-neoconservatism.html>.

Fukuyama, F. (2020), '30 Years of World Politics: What Has Changed?', *Journal of Democracy* 31(1), 11–21.

Furlong, A. and Cartmel, F. (2012), 'Social change and political engagement among young people: Generation and the 2009/2010 British election survey', *Parliamentary affairs* 65(1), 13-28.

Gainous, J. and Wagner, K.M. (2011), *Rebooting American Politics: The Internet Revolution*, Rowman and Littlefield, Maryland.

Gallego, A. (2010), 'Understanding Unequal Turnout: Education and Voting in Comparative Perspective', *Electoral Studies* 29(2), 239–48.

Gamson, W.A. (1968), *Power and Discontent*, Dorsey Press, Homewood.

García Albaceta, G.M. (2011), 'Continuity or Generational Change? A Longitudinal Study of Young People's Political Participation in Western Europe', unpublished PhD thesis, School of Social Sciences, Universität Mannheim, Germany.

García-Albacete, G.M. (2014), *Young People's Political Participation in Western Europe*, Palgrave Macmillan UK, London.

Gates, B. (1995), *The road ahead*, Viking Press, New York.

Giddens, A. (1991), *Modernity and Self Identity,* Polity Press, Cambridge.

Gil de Zúñiga, H., Jung, N., and Valenzuela, S. (2012), 'Social Media Use for News and Individuals' Social Capital, Civic Engagement and Political Participation', *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication* 17(3), 319–336.

Gil De Zúñiga, H., Puig-I-Abril, E., and Rojas, H. (2009), 'Weblogs, traditional sources online and political participation: An assessment of how the internet is changing the political environment', *New Media & Society* 11(4), 553–574.

Gimpel, J.G., Celeste, J.L. and Schuknecht, J.E. (2003), *Cultivating Democracy: Civic Environments and Political Socialization in America,* Brookings Institution Press, Washington.

Glenn, N.D. (1972), Cohort Analysts Futile Quest: Statistical Attempts to Separate Age, Period and Cohort Effects, *Social Science Quarterly* 53(3), 494–519.

Glenn, N.D. (1976), 'Cohort Analysts Futile Quest: Statistical Attempts to Separate Age, Period and Cohort Effects', American Sociological Review 41(5), 900–904.

Glenn, N.D. (2005), Cohort Analysis, *Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, second ed., vol. 5*, Sage, Thousand Oaks, California.

Gómez, B. and Palacios, I. (2016), Citizens' Evaluations of Democracy: A Microscope with Quality Seal, *in* M. Ferrín and H. Kriesi, eds, *How Europeans View and Evaluate Democracy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 155-177.

Goot, M. (2002), 'Turning Points: For Whom the Polls Told', in, J. Warhurst and M. Simms, eds, '2001: The Centenary Election', University of Queensland Press, St Lucia.

Gordon, H.R. (2008), 'Gendered Paths to Teenage Political Participation: Parental Power, Civic Mobility, and Youth Activism', *Gender & Society* 22 (1), 31–55.

Gordon, H.R. and Taft, J.K. (2011), 'Rethinking youth political socialization: Teenage activists talk back', *Youth & society* 43(4), 1499-1527.

Grasso, M.T. (2014), 'Age, Period and Cohort Analysis in a Comparative Context: Political Generations and Political Participation Repertoires in Western Europe', *Electoral Studies* 33, 63-76.

Grasso, M. and Giugni, M. 2022, 'Intra-Generational Inequalities in Young People's Political Participation in Europe: The Impact of Social Class on Youth Political Engagement', *Politics* 42(1), 13–38.

Griffith, E.S., Plamenatz, J. and Pennock, J.R. (1956), 'Cultural Prerequisites to a Successfully Functioning Democracy: A symposium', *American Political Science Review* 50(1), 101-137.

Grimm, R., and Pilkington, H. (2015), ''Loud and Proud': Youth and the Politics of Silencing', *The Sociological Review* 63(S2), 206–30.

Grinin, L.E. (2004), 'The Early State and Its Analogues: A Comparative Analysis', *in* L.E. Grinin, R.L. Carneiro, D.M. Bondarenko, N.N. and A.V. Korotayev, eds, 'The Early State, Its Alternatives and Analogues', Uchitel Publishing House, Russia, 88-136.

Groves, R., Fowler, F., Couper, M., Singer, E. and Tourangeau, R. (2004), *Survey Methodology*, Wiley, New York.

Groves, R.M. and Lyberg, L. (2010), 'Total Survey Error: Past, Present, and Future', *Public Opinion Quarterly* 74(5), 849-879.

Grundel, M. and Maliepaard, M (2012), 'Knowing, Understanding and Practising Democratic Citizenship: An Investigation of the Role of Religion among Muslim, Christian and Non-Religious Adolescents', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 35(12), 2075–96.

Hadaway, K.C., and Marler, P.L. (1993), 'All in the Family: Religious Mobility in America', *Review of Religious Research* 35(2), 97–116.

Haerpfer, C.W. (2007), Political Support for Democracy and Satisfaction with Democracy in European Political System, *in* 'Midterm Conference on European Citizenship—Challenges & Consequences', Roskilde University, Denmark, 1–3 June.

Hamilton, S. and M. A. Hamilton. (2009), The Transition to Adulthood: Challenges of Poverty and Structural Lag, *in* R. Lerner and L. Steinberg, eds, 'Handbook of Adolescent Psychology: Contextual Influences on Adolescent Development, 2nd ed.', New Jersey, Wiley, 492–526.

Hannan-Morrow, S. and Roden, M. (2014), 'Gender, Age and Generational Effects on Turnout in Australian Federal Elections', *SSRN Electronic Journal*.

Harding, D.J. (2009), 'Recent Advances in Age-Period-Cohort Analysis. A Commentary on Dregan and Armstrong, and in Reither, Haus and Yang', *Social Science and Medicine* 69(10), 1449–1451.

Harris, A., Wyn, J. and Younes, S. (2010), 'Beyond Apathetic or Activist Youth: 'Ordinary' Young People and Contemporary Forms of Participation', *YOUNG* 18(1), 9–32.

Hay, C. and Stoker, G. (2009), 'Revitalising politics: have we lost the plot?', *Representation 45*(3), 225-236.

Held, D. (1996), *Models of Democracy*, 2nd ed., Polity Press, Cambridge.

Henn, M. and Foard, N. (2014), 'Social Differentiation in Young People's Political Participation: The Impact of Social and Educational Factors on Youth Political Engagement in Britain', *Journal of Youth Studies* 17(3), 360–80.

Henn, M., Weinstein, M. and Wring, D. (2002), 'A Generation Apart? Youth and Political Participation in Britain', *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations* 4(2), 167–92.

Henn, M., Weinstein, M. and Forrest, S. (2005), 'Uninterested Youth? Young People's Attitudes towards Party Politics in Britain', *Political Studies* 53(3), 556–78.

Hernández, E. (2016), Europeans' Views of Democracy: The Core Elements of Democracy, *in* M. Ferrín and H. Kriesi, eds, 'How Europeans View and Evaluate Democracy', Oxford University Press, Oxford, 43-63.

Hill, L. (2010), 'On the Justifiability of Compulsory Voting: Reply to Lever', *British Journal of Political Science* 40(4), 917–23.

Hill, J.P. (2014), 'Rejecting Evolution: The Role of Religion, Education, and Social Networks', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 53(3), 575–94.

Hinich, M. and Munger, M. (1994), *Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.

Hofferbert, R.I. and Anderson, C.J. (2001), 'The Dynamics of Democratic Satisfaction: Introduction', *International Political Science Review* 22(4), 299–301.

Hofferbert, R.I. and Klingemann, H.D. (2001), 'Democracy and Its Discontents in Post-Wall Germany', *International Political Science Review* 22(4), 363-378.

Holbrook, T.M. (2002), 'Presidential Campaigns and the Knowledge Gap', *Political Communication* 19(4), 437–454.

Holbrook, A.L., Krosnick, J.A., Carson, R.T. and Mitchell, R.C. (2000), 'Violating conversational conventions disrupts cognitive processing of attitude questions', *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 36(5), 465-494.

Hollo, T. (2019), 'Australians' Faith in Politics Has Collapsed – How Can We Reimagine Democracy?', *The Guardian*, July 19, viewed 31 December 2022, <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/commentisfree/2019/jul/19/australians-faith-in-politics-has-collapsed-how-can-we-reimagine-democracy>.

Hooghe, M. and Stolle, D. (2003), 'Age matters. Life cycle and cohort differences in the socialisation effect of voluntary participation', *European Political Science* 3(2), 49-56.

Hooghe, M., Stolle, D. and Stouthuysen, P. (2004), 'Head start in politics the recruitment function of youth organizations of political parties in Belgium (Flanders)', *Party Politics* 10, 193–212.

Htun, M. (2004), 'Is Gender like Ethnicity? The Political Representation of Identity Groups', *Perspectives on Politics* 2(3), 439–58.

Huang, T. (1997), Party Systems in Taiwan and South Korea, in L. Diamond, M.F. Plattner, Y. Chu, H. Tien, eds, 'Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives', Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 135–59.

Huckfeldt, R.R. and Sprague, J. (1995), *Citizens, Politics and Social Communication: Information and Influence in an Election Campaign*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Huntington, S.P. (1991), *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.* University of Oklahoma Press, Oklahoma.

Huntington, S.P. (1996), *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon and Schuster, New York.

IDEA (2022a), 'ICTS in Elections Database', Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, viewed 26 December 2022, <https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/icts-elections>.

IDEA (2022b), 'Compulsory Voting: Fourth Wave', Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, viewed 26 December 2022, < https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout/compulsory-voting>.

Ikeda, K.I., Kobayashi, T. and Hoshimoto, M. (2008), 'Does Political Participation Make a Difference? The Relationship between Political Choice, Civic Engagement and Political Efficacy', *Electoral Studies* 27(1), 77-88.

Inglehart, R. (1977), *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Politics*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey.

Inglehart, R. (1983), Changing paradigms in comparative political behavior, *in* A.W. Finifter, ed., 'Political science: The state of the discipline', American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 429-469.

Inglehart, R. (1990), *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey.

Inglehart, R. (1997), Postmaterial Values and the Erosion of Institutional Authority, *in* J.S. Nye, P.D. Zelikow and D. King, eds, 'Why People Don't Trust Government', Harvard University Press.

Inglehart, R. (2003), 'How Solid is Mass Support for Democracy: And How Can We Measure it?', *Political Science and Politics* 36(1), 51–7.

Inglehart, R.F. (2008), 'Changing Values among Western Publics from 1970 to 2006', *West European Politics* 31 (1–2), 130–146.

Inglehart, R. and Norris, P. (2003), 'The True Clash of Civilizations', *Foreign Policy* 135, 63–70.

Inglehart, R., and Norris, P. (2017), 'Trump and the Xenophobic Populist Parties: The Silent Revolution in Reverse', *Perspectives on Politic* 15(2), 443–54.

Inglehart, R. and Welzel, C. (2005), *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*, Cambridge University Press, New York.

Inglehart, R. and Welzel, C. (2010), 'Changing Mass Priorities: The Link between Modernization and Democracy', *Perspectives on Politics* 8(02), 551–67.

Inglehart, R. (2016), 'The Danger of Deconsolidation: How Much Should We Worry?', *Journal of Democracy* 27(3), 18–23.

Jackman, R. (1987), 'Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in Industrial Democracies', *American Political Science Review* 81, 405–23.

Jackman, R.W. and Miller, R.A. (2004), *Before Norms: Institutions and Civic Culture*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.

Jackman, S. (2022), 'Millennials and gen Z have deserted the Coalition', *The Guardian*, December 5, viewed 27 May 2023, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/dec/05/millennials-and-gen-z-have-deserted-the-coalition-this-could-be-dire-for-the-opposition>.

Jankowski, T.B. and Strate, J.M. (1995), 'Modes of participation over the adult life span', *Political Behavior* 17(1), 89–106.

Jeffres, L.W., Lee, J.W., Neuendorf, K. and Atkin, D. (2007), Newspaper Reading Supports Community Involvement, *Newspaper Research Journal* 28(1), 6–23.

Jennings, M.K. and Niemi, R.G. (1981), *Generations and politics. A panel study of young adults and their parents,* Princeton University Press, New Jersey.

Jennings, M.K. and Stoker, L. (2004), 'Social trust and civic engagement across time and generations', *Acta Politica* 39(4), 342–79.

Jennings, M.K., Stoker, L. and Bowers, J. (2009), 'Politics across generations: Family transmission reexamined', *The Journal of Politics* 71(3), 782-799.

Jennings, M.K. and Zeitner, V.(2003), 'Internet Use and Civic Engagement',, *Public Opinion Quarterly* 67(3), 311–334.

Jerit, J., Barabas, J., and Bolsen, T. (2006), 'Citizens, Knowledge, and the Information Environment', *American Journal of Political Science* 50(2), 266–282.

Johnston, R., Matthews, J.S. and Bittner, A. (2006), 'Alienation, indifference, competitiveness and turnout: Evidence from Canada, 1988–2004', *Electoral Studies* 26(4), 735–745.

Jusko, K.L. and Shively, W.P. 2005, 'Applying a Two-Step Strategy to the Analysis of Cross-National Public Opinion Data', *Political Analysis* 13 (4), 327–44.

Kaase, M. (1990), Mass participation, *in* M.K. Jennings and J.W. van Deth, eds, 'Continuities in political action. A longitudinal study of political orientations in three Western democracies', De Gruyter, Berlin and New York, 23–64.

Kalyvas, S. (1996), *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe*, Cornell University Press, New York.

Kanervo, E., Zhang, W., and Sawyer, C. (2005), 'Communication and Democratic Participation: A Critical Review and Synthesis', *Review of Communication* 5(4), 193–236.

Karp, J.A., and Banducci, S.A. (2008), 'Political Efficacy and Participation in Twenty-Seven Democracies: How Electoral Systems Shape Political Behaviour', *British Journal of Political Science* 38(2), 311–34.

Kaufhold, K., Valenzuela, S. and de Zúñiga, H.G. (2010), 'Citizen Journalism and Democracy: How User-Generated News Use Relates to Political Knowledge and Participation', *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 87(3–4), 515–529.

Keane, J. (2009), *The life and death of democracy*, Simon and Schuster, United Kingdom.

Keating, A., and Melis, G. (2017), 'Social media and youth political engagement: Preaching to the converted or providing a new voice for youth?', *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 19(4), 877–894.

Kekic, L. (2007), 'The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy', *The Economist* 21, 1-11.

Kenski, K., and Stroud, N.J. (2006), 'Connections Between Internet Use and Political Efficacy, Knowledge, and Participation', *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media* 50(2), 173–192.

Kerbel, M. (1995), *Remote and Controlled: Media Politics in a Cynical Age*, Westview, Tennessee.

Kestilä-Kekkonen, E. (2009), 'Anti-party sentiment among young adults: Evidence from fourteen West European countries', *Young 17*(2), 145-165.

Kiess, J. and Portos, M. (2023), 'Eppur si Muove! Young People, Issue Salience and Volatility in Nine European Countries', *Government and Opposition*, 1-22.

Kieweit de Jonge, C. (2016), 'Should Researchers Abandon Questions About "Democracy"?', *Public Opinion Quarterly* 80(3), 694–716.

Kim, S.H. (2008), 'Testing the Knowledge Gap Hypothesis in South Korea: Traditional News Media, the Internet, and Political Learning', *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 20(2), 193–210.

King, A. (1969), 'Political Parties in Western Democracies', *Polity* 2(2), 112-41.

Kitanova, M. (2020), 'Youth Political Participation in the EU: Evidence from a Cross-National Analysis', *Journal of Youth Studies* 23(7), 819–36.

Kittilson, M.C. (2007), 'Research Resources in Comparative Political Behavior', *in* R.J. Dalton and H.D. Klingemann, eds, 'Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior', Oxford University Press, New York, 865–95.

Kittilson, M.C. and Anderson, C.J. (2009), Electoral supply and voter engagement, *in* 'American Political Science Association meetings', Toronto, ON, Canada, 3-5 September.
Kittilson, M.C. and Schwindt-Bayer, L. (2010), 'Engaging Citizens: The Role of Power-Sharing Institutions', *The Journal of Politics* 72(4), 990–1002.

Kinder, D.R. (2006), 'Politics and the Life Cycle', *Science*, 312(5782), 1905–1908.

Klingemann, H.D. (1999), 'Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis', *in* P. Norris, ed., 'Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance', Oxford University Press, Oxford, 31–56.

Klingemann, H.D., ed. (2009), *The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Klingemann, H.D. (2014), Dissatisfied Democrats: Democratic Maturation in Old and New Democracies, *in* R.J. Dalton and C. Welzel, eds, 'The Civic Culture Transformed: From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 116–57.

Klingemann, H.D. and Weßels, B. (2009), How Voters Cope with the Complexity of their Political Environment: Differentiation of Political Supply, Effectiveness of Political Institutions, and the Calculus of Voting, *in* H.-D. Klingemann, ed., '*The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems'*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 237-265.

Kornberg, A. and Clarke, H.D. (1994) 'Beliefs about Democracy and Satisfaction with Democratic Government: The Canadian Case', *Political Research Quarterly* 47(3), 537–63.

Kostadinova, T. (2003), 'Voter Turnout Dynamics in Post-Communist Europe', *European Journal of Political Research* 42(6), 741–59.

Kostadinova, T. (2009), 'Abstain or Rebel: Corruption Perceptions and Voting in East European Elections', *Politics & Policy* 37(4): 691–714.

Kostelka, F. and Blais, A. (2019), The Generational and Institutional Sources of the Global Decline in Voter Turnout, in 'Canadian Political Science Association Conference', Vancouver, Canada, June.

Kraut, R., Kiesler, S., Boneva, B., Cummings, J., Helgeson, V. and Crawford, A. (1998), 'Internet paradox: A social technology that reduces social involvement and psychological well-being?', *American Psychologist* 53(9), 1017–1031.

Kriesi, H. (2008), 'Political mobilization, political participation and the power of the vote', *West European Politics* 31(1), 147–68.

Kriesi, H., Saris, W. and Moncagatta, P. (2016), 'The Structure of Europeans' Views of Democracy: Citizens' Models of Democracy', *in* M. Ferrín and H. Kriesi, eds, 'How Europeans View and Evaluate Democracy', Oxford University Press, Oxford, 64-89.

Kriesi, H., and Saris, W. (2016), 'The Structure of the Evaluations of Democracy', *in* M. Ferrín and H. Kriesi, eds, 'How Europeans View and Evaluate Democracy', Oxford University Press, Oxford, 178-205.

Krosnick, J.A. (1991), 'Response Strategies for Coping with the Cognitive Demands of Attitude Measures in Surveys', *Applied Cognitive Psychology* 5(3), 213-236.

Krosnick, J.A. (1999), 'Survey Research', *Annual Review of Psychology* 50(1), 537–67.

Kruikemeier, S., and Shehata, A. (2017), 'News Media Use and Political Engagement Among Adolescents: An Analysis of Virtuous Circles Using Panel Data', *Political Communication* 34 (2), 221–42.

Kurlantzick, J (2013), 'One Step Forward, Two Steps Back', *Foreign Policy*, April 3, viewed 31 December 2022, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/04/one-step-forward-two-steps-back/>.

Lachat, R. (2007), *A Heterogeneous Electorate: Political Sophistication, Predisposition Strength, and the Voting Decision Process (Vol. 7),* Nomos, Baden-Baden.

Lane, R. (1959), Political Life: *Why People Get Involved in Politics*, Free Press, Toronto.

Latinobarometer (2018)*, '*Latinobarometer 2018 Codebook: English', Latinobarometer, viewed 1 March 2020, <http://www.latinobarometro.org/latContents.jsp>.

Latinobarometer (2020), 'Latinobarometer Corporation', Latinobarometer, viewed 28 February 2020, < http://www.latinobarometro.org/latContents.jsp>.

Laurence, M. (2015), *Democratic Theory*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Lawson, K. (1980), *Political Parties and Linkage: A Comparative Perspective*, Yale University Press, Connecticut.

Layman, G. (2001), *The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party Politics*, Columbia University Press, New York.

Leckie, G. (2013), 'Module 12: Cross-Classified Multilevel Models', Centre for Multilevel Modelling, Bristol, United Kingdom.

Lee, K.M. (2006), 'Effects of Internet Use on College Students' Political Efficacy', *Cyber Psychology & Behavior* 9(4), 415–422.

Lee, A. (2014), 'Godless Millennials Could End the Political Power of the Religious Right', *The Guardian*, October 26, viewed 31 December 2022, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/26/millennials-godless-politics-religous-conservatives>.

Letki, N. (2004), 'Socialization for participation? Trust, membership, and democratization in East-Central Europe', *Political Research Quarterly* 57(4), 665-679.

Levitsky, S. and Way, L. (2015), 'The Myth of Democratic Recession', *Journal of Democracy* 26 (1), 45–58.

Levitsky, S. and Ziblatt, D. (2018), *How Democracies Die*, Broadway Books, New York.

Levy, B.L.M., Solomon, B.G. and Collet-Gildard, L. (2016), 'Fostering Political Interest Among Youth During the 2012 Presidential Election: Instructional Opportunities and Challenges in a Swing State', *Educational Researcher* 45(9), 483–495.

Lewin, K. (1935), *A Dynamic Theory of Personality,* McGraw-Hill, New York.

Lewis, V.A., MacGregor, C.A. and Putnam, R.D. (2013), 'Religion, Networks, and Neighborliness: The Impact of Religious Social Networks on Civic Engagement', *Social Science Research* 42(2), 331–46.

Lijphart, A. (1984), *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries,* Yale University Press, Connecticut.

Lijphart, A. (1999), *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, Yale University Press, Connecticut and London.

Lim, C. and MacGregor, C.A. (2012), 'Religion and Volunteering in Context: Disentangling the Contextual Effects of Religion on Voluntary Behavior', *American Sociological Review* 77(5), 747–79.

Linz, J. (1978), *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.

Linz, J.J. (1994), 'Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it Make a Difference?', in J.J. Linz and A. Valenzuela, eds, 'The Failure of Presidential Democracy: The Case of Latin America', Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 3–87.

Linz, J.J. and Stepan, A. (1996), *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.

Lipka, M. (2015), 'Millennials Increasingly Are Driving Growth of 'Nones'', *Pew Research Center*, <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/05/12/millennials-increasingly-are-driving-growth-of-nones/>.

Lipset, S.M. and Rokkan, S. (1967), Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction, *in* S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, eds, 'Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives', The Free Press, New York, 1–64.

Lisi, M. (2022), 'Age, period and cohort effects in a dealigned electorate: comparing late deciders and vote switchers', *Swiss Political Science Review* 28(4), 728-749.

Lisi, M., Quaranta, M., Real-Dato, J. and Tsatsanis, E. (2021), 'Assessing the impact of age, cohort and period effects on partisanship and support for mainstream parties: evidence from Southern Europe', *South European Society and Politics* 26(2), 239-270.

Livingstone, S., Bober, M. and Helsper, E.J. (2005). 'Active participation or just more information?: Young people's take-up of opportunities to act and interact on the Internet', *Information, Communication & Society* 8(3), 287–314.

Loader, B.D., Vromen, A. and Xenos, M A. (2014), 'The networked young citizen: Social media, political participation and civic engagement', *Information, Communication & Society* 17(2), 143–150.

Locke, J. (1689), *Two Treatises of Government*, Awnsham Churchill, England.

Lockerbie, B. (1993), 'Economic Dissatisfaction and Political Alienation in Western Europe', *European Journal of Political Research* 23(3), 281-93.

Ludwig, A.M. (2002), *King of the Mountain: The Nature of Political Leadership*, University Press of Kentucky, Lexington.

Lühiste, K. (2013), 'Social Protection and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Multi- Level Analysis', *Political Studies* 62(4), 784–802.

Lupia, A. and Philpot, T.S. (2005), 'Views from Inside the Net: How Websites Affect Young Adults' Political Interest', *The Journal of Politics* 67(4), 1122–1142.

Mackay, H. (1998), 'Three Generations: The Changing Values and Political Outlook of Australians', Papers on Parliament 31, Australian Parliament, viewed 31 December 2022, <https://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/senate/pubs/pops/pop31/pop31.pdf>.

Mackie, G. (2009), 'Schumpeter's Leadership Democracy', *Political Theory* 37(1), 128-153.

Madison, J. (1787), 'Federalist 10', The Federalist Papers, 10.

Mair, P. (2008), 'The challenge to party government', *West European Politics* 31(1), 211–34.

Mannheim, K. (1928), *The Problem of Generations Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*, Routledge, London.

Mannheim, K. (1927), Das problem der generationen, *in* C. Eckert and L. von Wiese, 'Kölner Vierteljahrshefte für Soziologie', Leipzig, Germany, 2-3.

Mannheim, K., (1959), *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*, translated from German by L. Wirth and E. Shils, 1936, New York.

Manning, C.J. (2019), 'Gen Z Is the Least Religious Generation. Here's Why That Could Be a Good Thing', *Pacific Standard*, viewed 22 December 2022, <https://psmag.com/ideas/gen-z-is-the-least-religious-generation-heres-why-that-could-be-a-good-thing>.

Marody, M. (1997), 'Religion - For or Against Democracy', *Polish Sociological Review* (120), 305–11.

Martin, A. (2012), 'Political Participation among the Young in Australia: Testing Dalton's Good Citizen Thesis', Australian *Journal of Political Science* 47(2), 211-226.

Martin, A. (2014), 'Political Engagement among the Young in Australia', Papers on Parliament 60, The Commonwealth Parliament of Australia, Australia.

Markowski, R. (2016), Determinants of Democratic Legitimacy: Liberal Democracy and Social Justice, *in* M. Ferrín and H. Kriesi, eds, 'How Europeans View and Evaluate Democracy', Oxford University Press, Oxford, 257-282.

Mason, K.O., Mason, W.M., Winsborough, H.H. and Poole, W.K. (1973), 'Some Methodological Issues in Cohort Analysis of Archival Data', *American Sociological Review* 38 (2), 242-258.

Massicotte, L. and Blais, A. (1999), 'Mixed Electoral Systems: A Conceptual and Empirical Survey', *Electoral Studies* 18(3), 341–66.

Mattes, R. and Bratton, M. (2007), 'Learning about Democracy in Africa: Awareness, Performance, and Experience', *American Journal of Political Science* 51(1), 192–217.

McAllister, I. (1991), 'Party Elite, Voters and Political Attitudes: Testing Three Explanations for Mass-Elite Differences', *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 24(2), 237–68.

McAllister, I. (2003), 'Border Protection, the 2001 Australian Election and the Coalition Victory', *Australian Journal of Political Science* 38(3), 445–63.

McAllister, I. (2011), *The Australian Voter: 50 Years of Change,* University of NSW Press, Sydney.

McAllister, I. (2014), 'The Politics of Lowering the Voting Age in Australia: Evaluating the Evidence', *Australian Journal of Political Science* 49(1), 68–83.

McAllister, I. and Bean, C. (2000), 'The Electoral Politics of Economic Reform in Australia: The 1998 Election', *Australian Journal of Political Science* 35 (3), 383–99.

McAllister, I., Bean, C. and Pietsch, J. (2012, 'Leadership Change, Policy Issues and Voter Defection in the 2010 Australian Election', *Australian Journal of Political Science* 47(2), 189–209.

McAndrew, S. and Voas, D. (2014), 'Immigrant Generation, Religiosity and Civic Engagement in Britain', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 37(1), 99–119.

Mcclurg, S.D. (2003), 'Social Networks and Political Participation: The Role of Social Interaction in Explaining Political Participation', *Political Research Quarterly* 56(4), 449–464.

McDonald, M.P. (2009), 'Voter Preregistration Programs 24', George Mason University. https://cses.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/CSES_2009Toronto_McDonald.pdf>.

McDonald, M.P. and Thornburg, M. (2010, 'Registering the Youth through Voter Preregistration', *N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation & Public Policy* 13, 551-572.

Mcleod, J.M., Scheufele, D.A. and Moy, P. (1999), 'Community, Communication, and Participation: The Role of Mass Media and Interpersonal Discussion in Local Political Participation', *Political Communication* 16(3), 315–336.

McNeish, D. and Stapleton, L.M. (2016), 'Modeling Clustered Data with Very Few Clusters', *Multivariate Behavioural Research* 51(4), 495–518.

Merino, S.M. (2010), 'Religious Diversity in a 'Christian Nation': The Effects of Theological Exclusivity and Interreligious Contact on the Acceptance of Religious Diversity', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 49(2), 231–46.

Merkel, W. and Lührmann, A. (2021), 'Resilience of Democracies: Responses to Illiberal and Authoritarian Challenges', *Democratization* 28 (5), 869–84.

Merkl, P.H. (1988), 'Comparing Legitimacy and Values among Advanced Democratic Countries', *in* M Dogan, ed., 'Comparing Pluralist Democracies: Strains on Legitimacy', Westview, Colorado.

Merkl, P.H. (2005), Linkage, or What Else? The Place of Linkage Theory in the Study of Political Parties, *in* A. Römmele, D.M. Farrell and P. Ignazi, 'Political Parties and Political Systems: The Concept of Linkage Revisited', Greenwood Publishing Group, Connecticut.

Milbrath, L.W. (1965), *Political Participation: How and Why do People Get Involved in Politics?*, Rand, McNally, Chicago.

Milbrath, L.W. and Goel, M.L. (1977), *Political participation: How and why do people get involved in politics?*, Rand McNally College Publishing Company, Illinois.

Miller, W. (1976), The Cross-National Use of Party Identification as a Stimulus to Political Inquiry, *in* I. Budge, I. Crewe and D. Farlie, eds, 'Party Identification and Beyond', Wiley, New York.

Miller, A.H. and O. Listhaug (1999), Political Performance and Institutional Trust, *in* P. Norris, ed., 'Critical citizens: Global support for democratic governance', Oxford University Press, Oxford, 204-216.

Miller, A.H. and Miller, W.E. (1975), 'Issues, Candidates and Partisan Divisions in the 1972 American Presidential Election', *British Journal of Political Science* 5, 393-434.

Ministry of Interior (2022), 'Electoral Rolls', Hellenic Republic, viewed 26 December 2022, <https://www.ypes.gr/en/electoral-rolls/>.

Mishler, W. and Rose, R. (1997), 'Trust, distrust and skepticism: Popular evaluations of civil and political institutions in post-communist societies', *The Journal of Politics* 59(2), 418-451.

Mishler, W. and Rose, R. (2001), 'What Are the Origins of Political Trust?: Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-Communist Societies', *Comparative Political Studies* 34(1), 30–62.

Montero, J.R. and Torcal, M. (2006), 'Political Disaffection in Comparative Perspective', *in* J.R. Montero and M. Torcal, eds, 'Political Disaffection in Contemporary Democracies: Social Capital, Institutions and Politics', Routledge, London, 3–19.

Morales, L. (2004), 'Institutions, mobilisation, and political participation: political membership in Western countries', PhD thesis, Universidad Autonoma de Madrid and Instituto Juan, Madrid.

Moreno, A. and Welzel, C. (2011), 'How Values Shape People's View of Democracy', viewed 31 December 2022, < https://www.democracy.uci.edu/files/docs/conferences/2011/Moreno%20Welzel_Chapter.pdf>.

Morris, J.S. and Forgette, R. (2007), 'News Grazers, Television News, Political Knowledge, and Engagement', *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 12(1), 91–107.

Muhlberger, S. and Paine, P. (1993), 'Democracy's Place in World History', *Journal of World History* 4(1), 23–45.

Negrine, R.M. (2003), *Politics and the Mass Media in Britain*, Routledge, London.

Neundorf, A. and Niemi, R.G. (2014), 'Beyond Political Socialization: New Approaches to Age, Period, Cohort Analysis', *Electoral Studies* 33, 1–6.

Newton, K. (1999), 'Mass Media Effects: Mobilization or Media Malaise?', *British Journal of Political Science* 29(4), 577–599.

Nguyen, H. (2014), 'On Democratic Theories', *Philosophy Now* 101, 11-13.

Nie, N. and Erbring, L. (2002), 'Internet and mass media: A preliminary report', *IT & Society* 1(2), 134–141.

Nie, N.H., Verba, S. and Kim, J. (1974), 'Political Participation and the Life Cycle', *Comparative Politics* 6(3), 319–40.

Nisbet, E.C., Stoycheff, E. and Pearce, K.E. (2012), 'Internet Use and Democratic Demands: A Multinational, Multilevel Model of Internet Use and Citizen Attitudes About Democracy', *Journal of Communication* 62(2), 249–265.

Nohlen, D. (2002), Political Participation in New and Old Democracies, *in* R.L. Pintor and M. Gratschew, eds, 'Voter Turnout since 1945: A Global Report', International IDEA, Halmstad, 13–19.

Norris, P. (1996), 'Does Television Erode Social Capital? A Reply to Putnam', *PS: Political Science and Politics* 29(3), 474–480.

Norris, P. (1999a), Introduction: The Growth of Critical Citizens, in P. Norris, ed., 'Critical Citizens', Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 1–27.

Norris, P. (1999b), 'Institutional Explanations for Political Support', in P. Norris, ed., 'Critical Citizens', Oxford University Press, Oxford, 217–35.

Norris, P. (2000), *A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Postindustrial Societies*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Norris, P. (2001), 'Global Governance and Cosmopolitan Citizens', in J.S. Nye, Jr. and J.D. Donahue, eds, ' Governance in a Globalizing World', Brookings Institution, 2001, 155-177.

Norris, P. (2002), *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Norris, P. (2003), Young People and Political Activism: From the Politics of Loyalties to the Politics of Choice?, *in* 'The Council of Europe Symposium', Strasbourg, France.

Norris, P. (2004), *Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior*, Cambridge University Press, New York.

Norris, P. (2008), *Driving Democracy: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work?*, Cambridge University Press, New York.

Norris, P. (2011), *Democratic Deficit, Critical Citizens Revisited*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Norris, P. (2017), 'Is Western Democracy Backsliding? Diagnosing the Risks', *SSRN Electronic Journal.*

Norris, P. and Inglehart, R. (2011), *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*, Cambridge University Press, New York.

North, D.C. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press, New York.

Nový, M. and Katrňák, T. (2015), 'Democratic Maturity, External Efficacy, and Participation in Elections: Towards Macro-Micro Interaction', *Austrian Journal of Political Science (OZP)* 44 (3), 1- 20.

Nygard, M., Soderberg, P., and Nyman-Kurkiala, P. (2016), 'Patterns and drivers of political participation among ninth-graders: evidence from a finnish regional survey', *Young* 24, 118–138.

O'Brien, R.M., Hudson, K. and Stockard, J. (2008), 'A Mixed Model Estimation of Age, Period, and Cohort Effects', *Sociological Methods & Research* 36(3), 402–28.

OECD (2019), 'List of OECD Member Countries—Ratification of the Convention on the OECD', Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, viewed 31 December 2022, <http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/list-oecd-member-countries.htm>.

Oliver, A. (2013), 'More Young Australians Dismissing Democracy', *Herald Sun*, June 26, viewed 31 December 2022, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/more-young-australians-dismissing-democracy>.

Oliver, A. (2017), 'Same-Sex Marriage Survey: Gen Y Got Involved and the Pollsters Got It Right', *The Interpreter*, November 15, viewed 31 December 2022, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/same-sex-marriage-survey-gen-y-got-involved-and-pollsters-got-it-right>.

Olson, D.V.A. and Li, M. (2015), 'Does a Nation's Religious Composition Affect Generalized Trust? The Role of Religious Heterogeneity and the Percent Religious', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 54(4), 756–73.

Ondercin, H.L. and Jones-White, D. (2011), 'Gender jeopardy: What is the impact of gender differences in political knowledge on political participation?', *Social Science Quarterly 92*(3), 675-694.

Östman, J. (2012), 'Information, expression, participation: How involvement in user- generated content relates to democratic engagement among young people', *New Media & Society* 14(6), 1004–1021.

O'Toole, T., Lister, M., Marsh, D., Jones, S. and McDonagh, A. (2003), 'Tuning out or left out? Participation and non-participation among young people', *Contemporary Politics* 9(1), 45–61.

Pacheco, J.S. (2008), 'Political Socialization in Context: The Effect of Political Competition on Youth Voter Turnout', *Political Behavior* 30(4), 415–36.

Pammett, J.H. and LeDuc, L. (2003), 'Confronting the Problem of Declining Voter Turnout Among Youth', Youth Participation in Elections, Canada.

Pap, A. and Ham, M. (2018), 'Does social media usage influence youth's interest in politics?', *International Journal of Multidisciplinary in Business and Science* 4(5), 84-90.

Parkinson, H.J. (2016), 'Young People Are so Bad at Voting – I'm Disappointed in My Peers', *The Guardian*, June 28, viewed 14 April 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/28/young-people-bad-voting-millennials-eu-vote-politics>.

Pasek, J., Kenski, K., Romer, D., and Jamieson, K.H. (2006), 'America's Youth and Community Engagement: How Use of Mass Media Is Related to Civic Activity and Political Awareness in 14- to 22-Year-Olds', *Communication Research* 33(3), 115–135.

Pasek, J. and Krosnick, J.A. (2010), 'Optimizing Survey Questionnaire Design in Political Science: Insights from Psychology', *in* J.E. Leighley, ed., 'Oxford Handbook of American Elections and Political Behavior', Oxford University Press, New York, 27-50.

Pateman, C. (1971), 'Political Culture, Political Structure and Political Change', *British Journal of Political Science* 1(3), 291-305.

Percheron, A. and Jennings, M.K. (1981), 'Political continuities in French families: A new perspective on an old controversy', *Comparative politics* 13(4), 421-436.

Peterson, S.A. (1992), 'Church Participation and Political Participation: The Spillover Effect', *American Politics Quarterly* 20(1), 123–39.

Patterson, T.E. (1994), *Out of Order*, Vintage Books, New York.

Pattie, C., Seyd, P. and Whiteley, P. (2004), *Citizenship in Britain: Values, Participation and Democracy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Pew Research Center 2018, 'Young Adults around the World Are Less Religious', Religion & Public Life Project (blog), Pew Research Center, June 13, viewed 31 December 2022, <https://www.pewforum.org/2018/06/13/young-adults-around-the-world-are-less-religious-by-several-measures/>.

Pfanzelt, H. and Spies, D.C. (2019), 'The Gender Gap in Youth Political Participation: Evidence from Germany', *Political Research Quarterly* 72(1), 34–48.

Phelps, E. (2004), 'Young Citizens and Changing Electoral Turnout, 1964–2001', *The Political Quarterly* 75(3), 238–248.

Placek, M.A. (2017), '#Democracy: Social media use and democratic legitimacy in Central and Eastern Europe', *Democratization* 24(4), 632–650.

Plattner, M.F. (2015), 'Is Democracy in Decline?', *Journal of Democracy* 26 (1), 5–10.

Plutzer, E. (2002), 'Becoming a Habitual Voter: Inertia, Resources, and Growth in Young Adulthood', *American Political Science Review* 96 (1), 41–56.

Pollock III, P.H. (1983), 'The Participatory Consequences of Internal and External Political Efficacy: A Research Note', *Western Political Quarterly* 36(3), 400-409.

Powell, G.B. (1986), 'American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective', *The American Political Science Review* 80(1), 17–43.

Powell, G.B. (2000), *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions,* Yale University Press, Connecticut.

Powell, G.B. (2004), 'Political Representation in Comparative Politics', *Annual Review of Political Science* 7(1), 273–96.

Przeworski, A., Stokes, S.C.S., Stokes, S.C. and Manin, B., eds (1999), *Democracy, accountability, and representation (Vol. 2)*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M.E., Cheibub, J.A. and Limongi, F. (2000), *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (Vol. 3)*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Przeworski, A. (2009), 'Self-Government in Our Times', *Annual Review of Political Science* 12, 71-92.

Putnam, R.D. (1993), 'The Prosperous Community', *The American Prospect* 4(13), 35–42.

Putnam, R.D. (1995), 'Tuning in, tuning out: The strange disappearance of social capital in America', *Political Science & Politics* 28(4), 664-683.

Putnam, R.D. (2000), *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, Simon and Schuster, New York.

Putnam, R.D. and Campbell, D.E. (2010), *American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us*, Simon and Schuster, New York.

Putnam, R.D., Leonardi, R. and Nanetti, R. (1993), *Making democracy work. Civic traditions in modern Italy*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey.

Quintelier, E. (2013), 'Socialization or Self-Selection? Membership in Deliberative Associations and Political Attitudes', *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 42(1), 174–92.

Quintelier, E. (2007), 'Differences in Political Participation between Young and Old People', *Contemporary Politics* 13(2), 165–80.

Quintelier, E. and Hooghe, M. (2011), 'Television and political participation among adolescents: The impact of television viewing, entertainment and information preferences', *Mass Communication and Society* 14(5), 620-642.

Quintelier, E. and Hooghe, M. (2012), 'Political Attitudes and Political Participation: A Panel Study on Socialization and Self-Selection Effects among Late Adolescents', *International Political Science Review* 33(1), 63–81.

Quintelier, E., Hooghe, M. and Marien, S. (2011), 'The Effect of Compulsory Voting on Turnout Stratification Patterns: A Cross-National Analysis', *International Political Science Review* 32(4), 396–416.

Quintelier, E. and van Deth, J.W. (2014), 'Supporting Democracy: Political Participation and Political Attitudes. Exploring Causality Using Panel Data', *Political Studies* 62(S1), 153-171.

Quintelier, E. and Vissers, S. (2008), 'The Effect of Internet Use on Political Participation: An Analysis of Survey Results for 16-Year-Olds in Belgium', *Social Science Computer Review* 26(4), 411–427.

Rainie, L., Horrigan, J., Cornfield, M. (2005), *The Internet and Campaign 2004,* PEW Internet and Family Life, Washington DC.

Rainie, L. and Wellman, B. (2012), *Networked: The New Social Operating System (Vol. 42),* MIT Press, Massachusetts.

Read, M. (2022), 'Millennials are getting older, but not more conservative', *Australian Financial Review*, December 5, viewed 27 May 2023, <https://www.afr.com/politics/millennials-are-getting-older-but-not-more-conservative-20221205-p5c3na>.

Rekker, R. (2022), 'Young trendsetters: How young voters fuel electoral volatility', *Electoral Studies* 75, 102425.

Rich, R. (2001), 'Bringing Democracy into International Law', *Journal of Democracy* 12(3), 20-34.

Riker, W.H. (1980), 'Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions', *American Political Science Review* 74(2), 432–46.

Riley, M.W. (1973), 'Aging and Cohort Succession: Interpretations and Misinterpretations', *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 37(1), 35–49.

Riley, M.W., Kahn, R.L. and Foner, A., eds (1994), *Age and Structural Lag: Society's Failure to Provide Meaningful Opportunities in Work, Family, and Leisure,* John Wiley & Sons, New York.

Ringen, S. (2007), *What Democracy is For: On Freedom and Moral Government*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey and Oxford.

Ringen, S. (2007), How Good Are the Good Democracies?, *in* S Ringen, *'What Democracy Is For: On Freedom and Moral Government'*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey.

Rink, A. (2018), 'Do Protestant Missionaries Undermine Political Authority? Evidence from Peru', *Comparative Political Studies* 51(4), 477–513.

Rhodes, P.J., ed. (2004), *Athenian Democracy*, Oxford University Press, New York.

Roberts, K. (2003), 'Change and continuity in youth transitions in Eastern Europe: Lessons for Western sociology', *The Sociological Review* 51(4), 484-505.

Robinson, M.J. (1976), 'Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise: The Case of "The Selling of the Pentagon." ', *The American Political Science Review* 70(2), 409–432.

Rocha, R.R., Tolbert, C.J., Bowen, D.C. and Clark, C.J. (2010), 'Race and Turnout: Does Descriptive Representation in State Legislatures Increase Minority Voting?', *Political Research Quarterly* 63(4), 890–907.

Rokkan, S. (1966), Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism, *in* R.A. Dahl, ed., 'Political Oppositions in Western Democracies', Yale University Press, New Haven, 89-135.

Rose, R., Mishler, W. and Haerpfer, C. (1998), *Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies,* John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.

Rosenberg, J.S. and Chen, M. (2009), 'Expanding Democracy: Voter Registration Around the World', Brennan Centre for Justice, New York, <https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/expanding-democracy-voter-registration-around-world>.

Rosenstone, S.J. and Hansen, J.M. (1993), *Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America,* Longman, New York.

Rosow, I. (1978), 'What is a Cohort and Why?', *Human Development* 21(2), 65–75.

Rousseau, J.J. (1762), *Du Contrat Social, ou, Principes du Droit Politique*, France.

Ruiter, S. and de Graaf, N.D. (2006), 'National Context, Religiosity, and Volunteering: Results from 53 Countries', *American Sociological Review* 71(2). 191–210.

Russell, A. (2004), 'The truth about youth? Media portrayals of young people and politics in Britain', *Journal of Public Affairs* 4(4), 347–354.

Ryder, N. (1965), 'The cohort as a concept in the study of social change', *American Sociological Review* 30, 843-861.

Sakellaropoulos, S. (2012), 'On the causes and significance of the December 2008 social explosion in Greece', *Science & Society* 76(3), 340-364.

Saris, W.E. and Torcal, M. (2009), 'Alternative Measurement Procedures and Models for Political Efficacy', RECSM Working Paper Number 3, Research and Expertise Centre for Survey Methodology, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona.

Sapiro, V. (2004), 'Not your parents' political socialization: introduction for a new generation', *Annual Review of Political Science* 7, 1–23.

Scammon, R.M. (1967), 'Electoral Participation', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 371(1), 59-71.

Schaffner, B.F. and Clark, J.A. (2004), Macrotrust: Partisanship and the dynamics of trust in government, in 'Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association', New Orleans, Los Angeles.

Schattschneider, E.E. (1942), *Party Government*, Rinehart, New York.

Schedler, A. and Sarsfield, R. (2007), 'Democrats with Adjectives: Linking Direct and Indirect Measures of Democratic Support', *European Journal of Political Research* 46(5), 637–59.

Scheufele, D.A. (2000), 'Talk or Conversation? Dimensions of Interpersonal Discussion and Their Implications for Participatory Democracy', *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 77(4), 727-743

Schlozman, K.L., Verba, S. and Brady, H.E. (1995), 'Participation's Not a Paradox: The View from American Activities', *British Journal of Political Science* 25(1), 1-36.

Schlozman, K.L., Verba, S. and Brady, H.E. (2012), *The Unheavenly Chorus: Unequal Political Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey.

Schlozman, K.L., Verba, S., Brady, H. and Erkulwater, J. (1998), Why can't they be like we were?: Understanding the generation gap in participation, *in* 'American Political Science Association: Political Socialization Subcommittee Meeting', Washington DC.

Schmitt, H. (1983), 'Party Government in Public Opinion: A European Cross-National Comparison', *European Journal of Political Research* 11(4), 353–76.

Schmitt, H., Hobolt, S.B., van der Brug, W. and Popa, S.A. (2019), 'European Parliament Election Study 2019, Voter Study', European Election Study, viewed 1 March 2020, <http://europeanelectionstudies.net/european-election-studies/ees-2019-study/voter-study-2019>.

Schmitter, P.C. (2008), 'The changing politics of organized interests', *West European Politics,* 31(1), 195–210.

Schumpeter, J.A. (1942)*, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy,* 1st edn, Harper and Brothers, New York.

Schumpeter, J.A. (1976), Part II. The Process of Creative Destruction, *in* J.A. Schumpeter, 'Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 1942', Routledge, London, 145-50, viewed 31 December 2020, < https://media4.manhattan-institute.org/sites/as/files/SKM_C45818012317090.pdf>.

Schwartz, M.A. 2005, Linkage Processes in Party Networks', *in* A. Römmele, D.M. Farrell, and P. Ignazi, eds, 'Political Parties and Political Systems: The Concept of Linkage Revisited', Greenwood Publishing Group, Connecticut, 37-60.

Schwindt-Bayer, L.A. and Mishler, W. (2005), 'An Integrated Model of Women's Representation', *The Journal of Politics* 67(2), 407–28.

Sears, D.O. and Brown, C. (2003), Childhood and Adult Political Development', *in* D.O. Sears, L. Huddy and J.S. Levy, eds, 'Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*',* 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Selb, P. (2009), 'A Deeper Look at the Proportionality—Turnout Nexus', *Comparative Political Studies* 42(4), 527–48.

Settersten, R., Furstenberg, F. and Rumbaut, R., eds (2005), *On the Frontier of Adulthood: Theory, Research, and Public Policy,* Chicago University Press, Chicago.

Seymour, J.M., Welch, M.R., Gregg, K.M. and Collett, J. (2014), 'Generating Trust in Congregations: Engagement, Exchange, and Social Networks', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 53(1), 130–44.

Shah, D.V., Cho, J., Eveland, W.P. and Kwak, N. (2005), 'Information and Expression in a Digital Age: Modeling Internet Effects on Civic Participation', *Communication Research*, 32(5), 531–565.

Shah, D.V., Kwak, N. and Holbert, R.L. (2001), ' "Connecting" and "Disconnecting" With Civic Life: Patterns of Internet Use and the Production of Social Capital', *Political Communication* 18(2), 141–162.

Shah, D.V., McLeod, J.M. and Lee, N. (2009), 'Communication Competence as a Foundation for Civic Competence: Processes of Socialization into Citizenship' *Political Communication*, 26(1), 102–117.

Sherkat, D.E. and Ellison, C.E. (1999), 'Recent Developments and Current Controversies in the Sociology of Religion', *Annual Review of Sociology* 25(1), 363–94.

Shin, D.C., Dalton, R.J. and Jou, W. (2007), Popular Conceptions of Democracy, *in* 'Political Concepts Committee on Concepts and Methods', Working Paper Series 15, Centre for the Study of Democracy, UC Irvine.

Shingles, R.D. (1981), 'Black Consciousness and Political Participation: The Missing Link', *American Political Science Review* 75(1), 76-91.

Shively, W.P. (1979), 'The Relationship Between Age and Party Identification: A Cohort Analysis', *Political Methodology* 6(4), 437–446.

Shugart, M.S. and Wattenberg, M.P. (2001), Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: A Definition and Typology', *in* M. S. Shugart and M. P. Wattenberg, eds, 'Mixed-Member Electoral System—The Best of Both Worlds?', Oxford University Press, Oxford, 9–24.

Singh, A., Souza, B. and Root, D. (2019), 'Pro-Voter Reforms Were Key to Young Americans Voting in the 2018 Elections', Center for American Progress, February 21, viewed 31 December 2022, <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2019/02/21/466450/pro-voter-reforms-key-young-americans-voting-2018-elections/>.

Singh, S.P. (2011), 'Contradictory Calculi: Differences in Individuals' Turnout Decisions across Electoral Systems', *Political Research Quarterly* 64(3): 646–55.

Singh, S.P. (2019), 'Politically Unengaged, Distrusting, and Disaffected Individuals Drive the Link Between Compulsory Voting and Invalid Balloting', *Political Science Research and Methods* 7(1), 107–23.

Skoric, M.M., Ying, D. and Ng., Y. (2009), 'Bowling Online, Not Alone: Online Social Capital and Political Participation in Singapore', *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication* 14(2), 414–33.

Sloam, J. (2007), 'Rebooting democracy: Youth participation in politics in the UK', *Parliamentary affairs 60*(4), 548-567.

Sloam, J. (2012), ' 'Rejuvenating Democracy?' Young People and the 'Big Society' Project', *Parliamentary Affairs* 65(1), 90–114.

Sloam, J. (2013), ' 'Voice and Equality': Young People's Politics in the European Union', *West European Politics* 36(4), 836–58.

Sloam, J. (2016), 'Diversity and Voice: The Political Participation of Young People in the European Union', *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 18(3), 521–37.

Sloam, J. and Henn, M. (2019), The Silent Revolution in Youth Political Engagement, *in* J. Sloam and M. Henn, 'Youthquake 2017' Springer International Publishing, Cham, 43–69.

Slomcyznski, K.M. and Shabad, G. (1998), 'Can support for democracy and the market be learned in school? A natural experiment in post-Communist Poland', *Political Psychology* 19(4), 749-779.

Smets, K. and Neundorf, A. (2014), 'The hierarchies of age-period-cohort research: Political context and the development of generational turnout patterns', *Electoral Studies* 33, 41–51.

Smets, K. and van Ham, C. (2013), 'The Embarrassment of Riches? A Meta-Analysis of Individual-Level Research on Voter Turnout', *Electoral Studies* 32(2), 344–59.

Smidt, C. (1999), 'Religion and Civic Engagement: A Comparative Analysis', *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 565 (1), 176–92.

Smidt, C.E. (2013), 'Do the Promises of Religion to Democracy Still Hold?', *The Review of Faith & International Affairs* 11(3), 20–39.

Smidt, C.E., Kellstedt, L.A. and Guth, J.L. (2009), 'The Role of Religion in American Politics', *in* J.L Guth, L.A. Kellstedt and C.E. Smidt, eds, 'The *Oxford Handbook of Religion and American Politics'*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Smith, C., ed. (2014), *Disruptive Religion: The Force of Faith in Social Movement Activism*. Routledge, New York.

Smith, J. (2016), 'An Analysis of the Effect of Compulsory Voting on Youth Political Apathy', *Wales Institute of Social & Economic Research, Data & Methods* (blog), November 15, viewed 31 December 2022, <https://wiserd.ac.uk/news/analysis-effect-compulsory-voting-youth-political-apathy>.

Snell, P. (2010), 'Emerging Adult Civic and Political Disengagement: A Longitudinal Analysis of Lack of Involvement With Politics', *Journal of Adolescent Research* 25(2), 258–87.

Söderlund, P., Wass, H. and Blais, A. (2011), 'The Impact of Motivational and Contextual Factors on Turnout in First- and Second-Order Elections', *Electoral Studies* 30(4), 689–99.

Soler-i-Martí, R. and Ferrer-Fons, M. (2015), 'Youth Participation in Context: The Impact of Youth Transition Regimes on Political Action Strategies in Europe', *The Sociological Review* 63 (S2), 92–117.

Solt, F. (2008), 'Economic Inequality and Democratic Political Engagement', *American Journal of Political Science* 52(1), 48-60.

Sotiris, P. (2010), 'Rebels with a cause: The December 2008 Greek youth movement as the condensation of deeper social and political contradictions', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 34(1), 203-209.

Spannring, R., Ogris, G. and Gaiser, W. (2008), *Youth and Political Participation in Europe.* Results of the Comparative Study EUYOUPART, Barbara Budrich, Opladen.

Spitzer, A.B. (1973), 'The Historical Problem of Generations', *American Historical Review* 78(5), 1353–1385.

Steenbergen, M.R. and Jones, B.S. (2002), 'Modeling Multilevel Data Structures', *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (1), 218–37.

Stieglitz, S. and Dang-Xuan, L. (2013), 'Social media and political communication: A social media analytics framework', *Social Network Analysis and Mining* 3(4), 1277–1291.

Stoker, G. (2006), *Why Politics Matters: Making Democracy Work*, Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Stoker, G., Li, J., Halupka, M. and Evans, M. (2017), 'Complacent Young Citizens or Cross-Generational Solidarity? An Analysis of Australian Attitudes to Democratic Politics', *Australian Journal of Political Science* 52(2), 218–35.

Stokes, S.C. (1999), 'Political Parties and Democracy', *Annual Review of Political Science* 2(1), 243-267.

Strate, J.M., Parrish, C.J., Elder, C.D. and Ford, C. (1989), 'Life Span Civic Development and Voting Participation', *The American Political Science Review* 83(2), 443–64.

Strömbäck, J. and Shehata, A. (2010), 'Media malaise or a virtuous circle? Exploring the causal relationships between news media exposure, political news attention and political interest', *European Journal of Political Research* 49(5), 575–597.

St-Vincent, S.L. (2013), 'An Experimental Test of the Pivotal Voter Model under Plurality and PR Elections', *Electoral Studies, Special Symposium: The new research agenda on electoral integrity* 32(4), 795–806.

Swigger, N. (2013), 'The Online Citizen: Is Social Media Changing Citizens' Beliefs About Democratic Values?', *Political Behavior* 35(3), 589–603.

Tessler, M. (2002), 'Islam and Democracy in the Middle East: The Impact of Religious Orientations on Attitudes toward Democracy in Four Arab Countries', *Comparative Politics* 34 (3), 337–54.

Tichenor, P.J., Donohue, G.A. and Olien, C.N. (1970), 'Mass media flow and differential growth in knowledge', *Public Opinion Quarterly* 34(2), 159–170.

Tilley, J. (2002), 'Political Generations and Partisanship in the UK, 1964–1997', *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society)* 165(1), 121–35.

Timmerman, G. (2009), 'Youth policy and participation: An analysis of pedagogical ideals in municipal youth policy in the Netherlands', *Children and Youth Services Review* 31(5), 572-576.

Toka, G. (1995), Political Support in East-Central Europe, *in* H.D. Klingemann and D. Fuchs, eds, 'Citizens and the State', Oxford University Press, New York.

Topf, R. (1995), Electoral participation, *in* H.D. Klingemann and D. Fuchs, eds, 'Citizens and the State', Oxford University Press, New York, 27–51

Torcal, M. and Trechsel, A.H. (2016), Explaining Citizens' Evaluations of Democracy, *in* M. Ferrín and H. Kriesi, eds, 'How Europeans View and Evaluate Democracy', Oxford University Press, Oxford, 206-234.

Torney-Purta, J.V. (2009), 'International Psychological Research That Matters for Policy and Practice', *American Psychologist* 64(8), 825–37

Tosun, J., Hörisch, F. and Marques, P. (2019), 'Youth employment in Europe: Coordination as a crucial dimension', *International Journal of Social Welfare* 28(4), 350-357.

Troll, L.E., 1970. Issues in the study of generations. *Aging and Human Development*, 1(3), pp.199-218.

Tsebelis, G. (1995), 'Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism', *British Journal of Political Science* 25(3), 289–325

UNHRC (1996), 'General Comment No. 25: The Right to Participate in Public Affairs, Voting Rights and the Right of Equal Access to Public Service (Art. 25')', United Nations, Human Rights Commission, 2 July, viewed 26 March 2019, <https://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/general%20comment%2025.pdf>.

Urbinati, N. and Warren, M.E. (2008), 'The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory', *Annual Review of Political Science* 11(1), 387–412.

Valenzuela, A (1994), Party Politics and the Crisis of Presidentialism, *in* 'Chile: A Proposal for a Parliamentary Form of Government', in J.J. Linz and A. Valenzuela, eds, *The Failure of Presidential Democracy: The Case of Latin America*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 91–150,

Vallée-Dubois, F., Dassonneville, R. and Godbout, J.F. (2020), 'About Time: Age, Period, and Cohort Effects on Support for Quebec Sovereignty', *Nations and Nationalism* 26(2), 344–65.

van der Brug, W., Hobolt, S.B., and de Vreese, C.H. (2009), 'Religion and Party Choice in Europe', *West European Politics* 32(6), 1266–83.

Van der Brug, W. and Rekker, R. (2021), 'Dealignment, realignment and generational differences in The Netherlands', *West European Politics* 44(4), 776-801.

van der Weele, S. (2021), 'Thick Concepts in Social Research: What, Why, and How?', *International Journal of Qualitative Methods* 20 (1), 160940692110661.

van Deth, J.W. (2001), Studying Political Participation: Towards a Theory of Everything?, paper presented at the 'Joint Sessions of Workshops of the European Consortium for Political Research', Grenoble, 6-12 April.

Van Ham, C. and Thomassen, J. (2012), A Legitimacy Crisis of Representative Democracy?, stimulus paper for the 'Expert Meeting about the (presumed) legitimacy crisis of representative democracy in advanced industrial democracies', Netherlands Royal Academy of Sciences, Amsterdam, November.

Verba, S. (1967), 'Democratic Participation', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 373(1), 53-78.

Verba, S., Nie, N. and Kim, J. (1978), *Participation and Political Equality*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Verba, S., Schlozman, K.L. and Brady, H.E. (1995), *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

Verba, S. and Nie, N. (1972), *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality*, Harper and Row, New York.

Veneti, A. (2020), 'Social media and political participation among British youth', *Journal of Promotional Communications* 8(1), 41-59.

Vinken, H. (2005), Young People's Civic Engagement: The Need for New Perspectives, in H. Helve and G. Holm, eds, 'Contemporary Youth Research: Local Expressions and Global Connections', Ashgate, Aldershot, 147–57.

Viswanath, K. and Finnegan, J.R.Jr. (1996), The Knowledge Gap Hypothesis: Twenty-Five Years Later, in B.R. Burleson, ed., 'Communication Yearbook', Vol. 19, Sage, California,187–227.

Voeten, E. (2016), 'Are People Really Turning Away from Democracy?', Georgetown University, 10 December, viewed 25 March 2019, <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2882878>.

Vlas, N. and Gherghina, S. (2012), 'Where Does Religion Meet Democracy? A Comparative Analysis of Attitudes in Europe', *International Political Science Review* 33(3), 336–51.

Vromen, A., Loader, B.D., Xenos, M.A. and Bailo, F. (2016), 'Everyday making through Facebook engagement: Young citizens' political interactions in Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States', *Political Studies* 64(3), 513-533.

Vromen, A., Xenos, M.A. and Loader, B.D. (2018), 'The Civic Network: A Comparative Study of the Use of Social Media for Enhancing Young People's Political Engagement, Australia, United Kingdom and United States', 4 May, ICPSR, University of Michigan, viewed 31 December 2022, <https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/web/civicleads/studies/37023>.

Wagner, A.F., Schneider, F. and Halla, M. (2009), 'The Quality of Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy in Western Europe — A Panel Analysis', *European Journal of Political Economy* 25(1), 30–41.

Wald, K.D., Silverman, A.L. and Fridy, K.S. (2005), 'Making Sense of Religion in Political Life', *Annual Review of Political Science* 8(1), 121–43.

Warren, M.E. (2009), 'Two trust-based uses of mini-publics in democracy', *in* 'American Political Science Association'*, Toronto Meeting Paper*, Canada.

Wattenberg, M.P. (2003), 'Electoral Turnout: The New Generation Gap', *British Elections and Parties Review* 13(1), 159–73.

Watts, R.L. (2008), *Comparing Federal Systems*, 3rd ed. Queen's Policy Studies, McGill-Queen's University Press, Montréal.

Weßels, B. (2016), Democratic Legitimacy: Concepts, Measures, Outcomes, *in* M. Ferrín and H. Kriesi, eds, *How Europeans View and Evaluate Democracy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 235-256.

Weatherford, S.M. (1984), 'Economic 'Stagflation' and Public Support for the Political System', *British Journal of Political Science* 14(2), 187–205.

Webb, P. (2009), 'The failings of political parties: reality or perception?', *Representation* 45 (3): 265–75.

Weber, M. (1972), *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Siebeck, Tübingen.

Weil, F.D. (1989), 'The sources and structure of legitimation in Western democracies: A consolidated model tested with time-series data in six countries since World War II', *American Sociological Review* 54(5), 682-706.

Weiss, J. (2020), 'What is youth political participation? Literature review on youth political participation and political attitudes', *Frontiers in Political Science* 2, 1-13.

Wells, J.M. and Krieckhaus, J. (2006), 'Does National Context Influence Democratic Satisfaction? A Multi-Level Analysis', *Political Research Quarterly* 59(4), 569–78.

Welzel, C. (2013), *Freedom Rising Human Empowerment and the Quest for Emancipation*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Wenger, D. and Foa, R.S. (2020), 'Young Voters Are Disconnecting from Democracy – but Who Can Blame Them?', *The Guardian*, October 23, viewed 31 December 2022, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/oct/23/young-voters-disconnecting-democracy-centre-politics>.

Whiteley, P. (2009), 'Where have all the members gone? The dynamics of party membership in Britain', *Parliamentary Affairs* 62(2), 242-257.

Widmaier, U. (1990), 'Political Stability in OECD Nations', *International Political Science Review* 11(2), 219–42.

Wright, S. and Koslowski, M. (2019), 'Voter Turnout at Record Low after Young People Disengage', *Sydney Morning Herald*, May 31, viewed 31 December 2022, <https://www.smh.com.au/federal-election-2019/voter-turnout-at-record-low-after-young-people-disengage-20190530-p51sol.html>.

WVS (2012), 'Wave 6 Official Questionnaire: v4', World Values Survey, viewed 1 March 2020, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp>.

Xenos, M. and Moy, P. (2007), 'Direct and Differential Effects of the Internet on Political and Civic Engagement: Direct and Differential Effects of the Internet', *Journal of Communication* 57(4), 704–718.

Xenos, M., Vromen, A., and Loader, B.D. (2014), 'The great equalizer? Patterns of social media use and youth political engagement in three advanced democracies', *Information, Communication & Society* 17(2), 151–167.

Yamamoto, M., Kushin, M. J. and Dalisay, F. (2017), 'Social Media and Political Disengagement Among Young Adults: A Moderated Mediation Model of Cynicism, Efficacy, and Social Media Use on Apathy', *Mass Communication and Society* 20(2), 149–168.

Yang, Y. (2006), 'Bayesian Inference for Hierarchical Age-Period-Cohort Models of Repeated Cross-Section Survey Data', *Sociological Methodology* 36(1), 39–74.

Yang, Y. and Land, K.C. (2006), 'A Mixed Models Approach to Age-Period-Cohort Analysis of Repeated Cross-Section Surveys: Trends in Verbal Test Scores', *Sociological Methodology* 36(1), 75–97.

Yang, Y. (2008), 'Social Inequalities in Happiness in the United States, 1972 to 2004: An Age-Period-Cohort Analysis', *American Sociological Revie*w 73(2), 204–226.

Yang, Y. and Land, K.C. (2008), 'Age-Period-cohort Analysis of Repeated Cross-section Surveys: Fixed or Random Effects?', Sociological Methods and Research 36(3), 297-326.

Yang, Y.C., Frenk, S.M. and Land, K.C. (2009), Assessing the Significance of Cohort and Period Effects in Hierarchical Age-Period-Cohort Models, in 'American Sociological Association Annual Meeting', San Francisco.

Yang, Y. and Land, K.C. (2016), *Age-Period-Cohort Analysis: New Models, Methods, and Empirical Applications*, Chapman and Hall/CRC, New York.

Yuchtman-Ya'Ar, E. (2002), 'Value Priorities in Israeli Society: An Examination of Inglehart's Theory of Modernization and Cultural Variation', *Comparative Sociology* 1(3–4), 347–67.

YouthSense (2017), 'Where Does The Problem Of Youth Disengagement Stem From?', *YouthSense (blog)*, August 21, viewed 31 December 2022, <https://youthsense.com.au/educators/problem-youth-disengagement-stem/>.

Zamponi, L. and González, F.J. (2017), 'Dissenting youth: how student and youth struggles helped shape anti-austerity mobilisations in Southern Europe', *Social Movement Studies*, 16(1), 64-81.

Zhang, W., Johnson, T. J., Seltzer, T. and Bichard, S.L. (2010), 'The Revolution Will be Networked: The Influence of Social Networking Sites on Political Attitudes and Behavior', *Social Science Computer Review* 28(1), 75–92.

Zuckerman, A.S. (2005), *The Social Logic of Politics: Personal Networks as Contexts for Political Behavior,* Temple University Press, Philadelphia.

Zukin, C., Keeter, S., Andolina, M., Jenkins, K., and Carpini, M.X.D. (2006), *A New Engagement?: Political Participation, Civic Life, and the Changing American Citizen,* Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Appendix

Total survey error components

The total error survey pioneers, Anderson et al. (1979), categorise the survey error components to principal groups - variance and bias. Variances occur because the sample is a subset of the population and each random sampling will return a slightly different statistic value, all around the true population parameter. This is also known as sampling error. Biases occur when the measure fails to achieve the 'true' value of a concept. This includes non-sampling errors such as errors due to faulty planning or definitions, response errors, coverage errors, classification errors, compiling/processing errors and publication errors (Groves and Lyberg 2010, p. 853).

Two non-sampling error components of the total error survey framework are of particular interest (in this study of subjective DVs)– construct validity and measurement error. The gap between the construct and the measurement is referred to as validity (Groves et al. 2004). When a survey question (or measure or scale or test) accurately captures the true theoretical meaning of the concept of interest (or construct), then it is valid. For example, if a question intends to measure a student's intelligence and asks for the length of their index finger, then the measure is invalid (for obvious reasons!). In this case, it is important to define the construct and a subjective construct (lacking a definitional consensus) often poses a challenge.

Measurement errors occur when the response or the recorded value is not the true value pertaining to the respondent. This may be due to interviewer effects, the mode of data collection or merely because of poor questionnaire design (Groves and Lyberg 2010, p. 855). For the above example, if the intelligence test uses a number of questions to return an intelligence score, but a student answers option A to all answers because they are bored or in a hurry, then the test does not accurately capture their intelligence level. Measurement errors, along with systematic biases due to the lack of construct validity, can seriously jeopardise the quality of survey indicators. So, these pitfalls need to be identified early in the design stage of the survey.

Optimisers and satisficers

Here, I present a brief discussion on the distinction between survey optimisers and satisficers. While responding to a survey question an optimiser diligently goes through four stages: a) reads and listens to the question carefully to understand the question's intent; b) delves into his or her memory to look for relevant information; c) evaluates the available information and forms a summary judgment; and, d) translates the judgment into one of the response alternatives (Cannell et al. 1981; Krosnick 1991; Pasek and Krosnick 2010). In contrast, a satisficer bypasses the search for or evaluation of information steps and jumps straight to the last step of reporting. Such cognitive gymnasts either report on the most readily available information, or, worse, look for cues in the question to lead to easy-to-select answers which require minimal cognitive effort (Pasek and Krosnick 2010, p. 31). Their answer may, at best, loosely relate to the construct of interest, if not completely unrelated to it.

Poor question designs are barriers to optimal response. Krosnick (1991) identifies that satisficing is encouraged when: a) the task of answering is difficult; b) when the respondents lack the skills to produce an optimal answer; and, c) the respondent is unmotivated. The task of responding may become difficult when questions break conversational norms and conventions (asking, 'are you *against* or *for* X?' rather than 'are *you* for or *against* X?'). In such cases, respondents become confused and frustrated, and this compromises the speed and validity of response (Holbrook et al. 2000). Sometimes the topic of the survey may discourage respondents from producing an optimal answer. For instance, respondents with low political knowledge may lack the skills to respond in a survey full of political jargons and unfamiliar nomenclatures. Satisficing is greatly encouraged when respondents cannot find relevant information to what they are being asked. Complicated phrases and awkward sentences which are hard to comprehend may unmotivate respondents. These not only encourage satisficing but also encourage item and unit non-response.

Contextual variables

The *proportion of religiously affiliated people* variable excludes countries with <100 observations in any of the religious or non-religious groups to avoid sample bias. The excluded countries are Austria, Chile, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Turkey. The 21 included countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, South Korea, Latvia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Great Britain and United States.

The *cultural cluster* variable codes Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain, US, Canada and Ireland as English-Speaking (1), France, Belgium, Austria, Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland as Catholic European (2), Germany, Finland, Netherlands, Switzerland, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden and Norway as Protestant European (3), Chile and Mexico as Latin American (4), Turkey as the sole Islamic (5), Israel as the sole Jewish (6), Japan and South Korea as Confucian (7) and Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia as Baltic (8) societies.

The original scatterplot (Inglehart and Welzel 2005) does not have Israel placed in the map. Although the Jewish state has made an effort to become a modern, post-industrial society, it still carries a unique historical narrative which comprise a collective memory of anti-Semitism and discrimination. As a result, Israel is more survivalist than most of its Confucian and historically Catholic and Protestant counterparts (Yuchtman-Ya'Ar 2002). Considering both survivalist and secular values, and its post-industrial characteristics, Yuchtman-Ya'Ar (2002, p. 13) places Israel amongst the Catholic, Confucian and Ex-communist borders. Given the drastic differences between the value priorities of these three clusters, in my study, I refrain from grouping Israel into either and consider the Jewish state to be its own unique cultural cluster.

Table A. Political institutional features across OECD countries

Country	Electoral formula	Type of executive	Constitutional Federal Structure	Power-sharing index	Party System	Is registration compulsory?	Registration System (Self-initiated or state initiated)	Voting system	Voting Age
Australia	Majoritarian	Parliamentary	Federal	5	Two-party	Yes	Links to applications for government services; Registration by voters at registration offices; Door-to-door registration campaign; Registration by mail; Mobile election registrar; Internet registration	Compulsory with strictly enforced sanctions	18
Austria	Proportional	Mixed	Federal	-	Multi-party	No compulsory till 2003; free of mandatory voting since the 2010 Presidential election	Links to police records of residence	Not compulsory	16
Belgium	Proportional	Parliamentary	Federal	6	Multi-party	Yes	Links to national population records	Compulsory with strictly enforced sanctions	18
Canada	Majoritarian	Parliamentary	Federal	5	Two-party	No	Links to national population records; Links to applications for government services; Registration by mail; Internet registration	Not compulsory	18
Chile	Proportional	Presidential	Unitary	4	Two-party	Yes	Registration in the electoral roll is automatic since 2011	Compulsory without sanctions for violation	18
Czech Republic	Proportional	Parliamentary	Unitary	5	Multi-party	Yes	Links to police records of residence	Not compulsory	18
Denmark	Proportional	Parliamentary	Unitary	5	Multi-party	Yes	Links to national population records	Not compulsory	18
Estonia	Proportional	Parliamentary	Unitary	5	Multi-party	Yes	Voters are registered in the population register.	Not compulsory	18
Finland	Proportional	Mixed	Unitary	-	Multi-party	Yes	Links to national population records	Not compulsory	18
France	Majoritarian	Mixed	Unitary	-	Multi-party	Yes, but no sanctions to non-registered voters	Registration by voters at registration offices Election officials automatically register 18 year olds using information compiled by the department of defence for military conscription purposes (Rosenberg and Chen 2009)	Not compulsory	18
Germany	Mixed	Parliamentary	Federal	-	Multi-party	Yes	Registration by voters at registration offices; Registration by mail Local election officials automatically generate voter lists from larger population databases maintained	Not compulsory	18

							at the municipal level. Inclusion on the municipal database is mandatory (Rosenberg and Chen 2009)		
Greece	Proportional	Parliamentary	Unitary	5	Multi-party since 2012	Yes	Both (Ministry of Interior, Hellenic Republic 2022)	Compulsory without sanctions for violation	18
Hungary	Mixed	Parliamentary	Unitary	-	Multi-party	Yes	Links to national population records	Not compulsory	18
Iceland	Proportional	Parliamentary	Unitary	5	Multi-party	No	Links to national population records	Not compulsory	18
Ireland	Proportional	Parliamentary	Unitary	5	Multi-party	No	Registration by voters at registration offices; Door-to-door registration campaign; Registration by mail	Not compulsory	18
Israel	Proportional	Parliamentary	Unitary	5	Multi-party	Yes	The registry is prepared automatically and includes all those with the right to vote.	Not compulsory	18
Italy	Proportional	Parliamentary	Unitary	5	Multi-party	Yes	Links to national population records	Compulsory with weakly enforced sanctions	18
Japan	Mixed	Parliamentary	Unitary	-	Multi-party	Yes	Links to applications for government services; Internet registration	Not compulsory	18
South Korea	Mixed	Presidential	Unitary	-	Multi-party since 2009	Yes	Every resident in Korea is registered in a district office of their residence. Registration information includes date of birth, sex, address, etc. Authorities in charge of preparing voters' list make new voter's list for each election by using this readily available information.	Not compulsory	19
Latvia	Proportional	Parliamentary	Unitary	5	Multi-party	Yes	State-initiated; Extracted from a population/civil registry	Compulsory without sanctions for violation; Not compulsory	18
Lithuania	Mixed	Mixed	Unitary	-	Multi-party	Yes	Links to national population records; Links to police records of residence	Not compulsory	18
Mexico	Mixed	Presidential	Federal	-	Multi-party	Yes	Registration by voters at registration offices; Door-to-door registration campaign Although most voters are required to register in-person at local election offices, the government deploys mobile units to register voters in rural areas and other places with historically low registration rates (Rosenberg and Chen 2009)	Compulsory without sanctions for violation	18
Netherlands	Proportional	Parliamentary	Unitary	5	Multi-party	Yes	Links to national population records	Not compulsory	18
New Zealand	Mixed	Parliamentary	Unitary	-	Multi-party	Yes	All electors are required to register in the Parliamentary Electoral Roll. Fine for failure to register.	Not compulsory	18
Norway	Proportional	Parliamentary	Unitary	5	Multi-party	Yes	Links to national population records	Not compulsory	18
Poland	Proportional	Parliamentary	Unitary	5	Multi-party	Yes	Links to national population records	Not compulsory	18
Portugal	Proportional	Mixed	Unitary	-	Multi-party	Yes	Registration by voters at registration offices	Not compulsory	18

Slovakia	Proportional	Parliamentary	Unitary	5	Multi-party	Yes	Enrolment in the Electoral Register is automatic (https://eportugal.gov.pt/en/cidadaos/votar). Links to national population records; Links to police records of residence; Links to applications for government services	Not compulsory	18
Slovenia	Proportional	Mixed	Unitary	-	Multi-party	Yes	Extracted from a population/civil registry	Not compulsory	18
Spain	Proportional	Parliamentary	Federal	6	Multi-party	Yes	Links to national population records	Not compulsory	18
Sweden	Proportional	Parliamentary	Unitary	5	Multi-party	Yes	Links to national population records	Not compulsory	18
Switzerland	Proportional	Parliamentary	Federal	6	Multi-party	Yes	Links to police records of residence	Not compulsory	18
Turkey	Proportional	Parliamentary	Unitary	5	Multi-party	No	Door-to-door registration campaign; Extracted from a population/civil registry	Compulsory with weakly enforced sanctions	18
Great Britain	Majoritarian	Parliamentary	Unitary	4	Two-party	Yes	Citizens are legally obliged to respond to requests for registration information from their local electoral registration office. If they do not respond, or if they provide false information, they may receive a £1,000 fine. Not being registered may also affect their credit rating [reword]. Door-to-door registration campaign; Registration by mail; Registration by mail	Not compulsory	18
United States	Majoritarian	Presidential	Federal	4	Two-party	No	Self-initiated, no centralised voter system	Not compulsory	18

Source: IDEA (2022a; 2022b), CSES (1996-2016)

Notes:

a) *Party system* is a binary variable classifying countries based on whether there are two or more major parties competing for government. Among the 35 cases, only Australia, Canada, Great Britain and United States are two party system.
b) Voter registration is compulsory in all jurisdictions but Austria, Canada, Iceland, Ireland, Turkey and United States.
c) Registration is state initiated in all jurisdictions but in France (but 18 yos automatically), Mexico and United States, where it is self-initiated (Braconnier et al. 2013).
d) Young people become eligible to vote when they turn 16 in Austria, 19 in South Korea, and 18 in all other cases.
e) Most studies make the simple distinction between PR and non-PR (majoritarian) systems, however, that is being increasingly blurred by the rising number of mixed systems which combine PR and plurality and systems (Massicotte and Blais 1999; Shugart and Wattenberg 2001). Although creating a third category is an option, Blais and Aarts (2006, p. 184) consider this a moot solution since the relative importance of PR varies incredibly across mixed systems. Another solution is to construe some of these mixed systems, while others as plurality or majority systems. In some of my models including the power-sharing index, I excluded mixed systems.
f) The power-sharing index (4=Low, 6 =High) is created as per Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2010).

Table B. Determinants of democratic attitudes and behaviours

	Attitudes towards the Principles of Democracy		Engagement with the Processes of Democracy	
	Power Makes a Difference?	Vote Makes a Difference?	Cast a Ballot?	Feel Close to a Political Party?
Fixed Effects				
Intercept	1.99 (0.18)***	2.55 (0.24)***	4.72 (0.48)***	1.72 (0.14)***
Age^2	1.00 (0.00)***	1.00 (0.00)**	1.00 (0.00)***	1.00 (0.00)*
Female	1.10 (0.03)***	1.07 (0.03)*	0.97 (0.03)	0.87 (0.02)***
Household Income	1.13 (0.01)***	1.15 (0.01)***	1.16 (0.01)***	1.10 (0.01)***
Cohort (Post-WWII ref.)				
60s-70s	1.12 (0.06)*	1.02 (0.05)	0.71 (0.04)***	0.82 (0.03)***
80s	1.07 (0.07)	0.90 (0.07)	0.49 (0.03)***	0.69 (0.04)***
90s	1.08 (0.10)	0.84 (0.08)	0.37 (0.03)***	0.61 (0.04)***
00s	1.04 (0.13)	0.87 (0.11)	0.30 (0.04)***	0.62 (0.06)***
Education (None ref.)				
Primary	0.95 (0.06)	0.88 (0.06)	1.07 (0.07)	1.04 (0.06)
High Secondary	1.15 (0.09)	1.06 (0.09)	1.53 (0.12)***	1.19 (0.07)**
Post-Secondary	1.32 (0.13)**	1.20 (0.12)	1.78 (0.18)***	1.26 (0.09)**
University	1.69 (0.20)***	1.49 (0.19)**	3.25 (0.42)***	1.55 (0.14)***
Cohort × Education	0.99 (0.01)	1.00 (0.01)	1.00 (0.01)	0.99 (0.01)
Random Effects Variance				
Cohort	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Survey Year	0.06 (0.02)	0.05 (0.02)	0.10 (0.03)	0.07 (0.02)
Log Likelihood	-17, 419	-16, 470	-19, 534	-29, 684
AIC	34, 867	32, 971	39, 097	59, 397
N	35,415	36, 146	47, 138	47,138

Source: CSES IMD (1996-2016)

Notes: Entries are odds ratios estimated by a mixed generalised linear model. Standard errors between brackets.
Significance: *** < 0.001, ** < 0.01, * < 0.05. Method used: Cross-classified random effects two-level model in Stata; Missing values dealt with complete case analysis. Data: CSES IMD, 1996 – 2016.



Source: CSES IMD (1996-2016), models from Table B.

Figure A. Marginal plots for generations with 95% confidence intervals.

Table C. Effect of religious affiliation on democratic behaviours across generations

		Engagement with the Processes of Democracy	
		Cast a Ballot?	Feel close to a Political Party?
Generation			
	Religious Affiliation	1.07 (0.09)	1.09 (0.06)
	Female	0.76 (0.04) ***	0.83 (0.04) ***
	Household Income	1.23 (0.03) ***	1.16 (0.02) ***
Post - WWII	Education	1.34 (0.04) ***	1.15 (0.02) ***
	Constant	2.15 (0.26) ***	1.13 (0.10)
	-Log Likelihood	4082	6690
	N	11,156	11,156
	Religious Affiliation	1.08 (0.08)	1.05 (0.06)
	Female	0.95 (0.05)	0.87 (0.04) ***
	Household Income	1.25 (0.03) ***	1.11 (0.02) ***
60s - 70s	Education	1.31 (0.03) ***	1.10 (0.02) ***
	Constant	1.52 (0.18) ***	1.18 (0.02)
	-Log Likelihood	4211	7029
	N	11,368	11,368
	Religious Affiliation	1.19 (0.08) **	1.11 (0.06) *
	Female	0.95 (0.05)	0.81 (0.03) ***
	Household Income	1.20 (0.02) ***	1.14 (0.02) ***
80s	Education	1.30 (0.03) ***	1.07 (0.02) ***
	Constant	1.09 (0.12)	0.95 (0.08)
	-Log Likelihood	4830	7205
	N	11,119	11,119
	Religious Affiliation	1.34 (0.08) ***	1.15 (0.06) **
	Female	0.93 (0.05)	0.87 (0.04) **
	Household Income	1.09 (0.02) ***	1.05 (0.02) **
90s	Education	1.34 (0.03) ***	1.06 (0.02) **
	Constant	0.89 (0.03)	1.03 (0.09)
	-Log Likelihood	4670	6196
	N	9,274	9,274
	Religious Affiliation	1.29 (0.09) ***	1.02 (0.06)
	Female	0.93 (0.06)	0.89 (0.05) *
	Household Income	1.06 (0.02) **	1.09 (0.02) ***
00s	Education	1.37 (0.04) ***	1.05 (0.03)
	Constant	0.70 (0.09) **	1.13 (0.13)
	-Log Likelihood	3233	3778
	N	5,693	5,693

Source: CSES IMD (1996 – 2016)

Notes: Entries are odds ratios. Standard errors between brackets. Significance: *** < 0.001, ** < 0.01, * < 0.05. Method used: Single level logit model in Stata; Missing values dealt with complete case analysis. Data: CSES IMD, 1996 – 2016.

Table D. Effect of media use on traditional democratic behaviours across generations

		Engagement with the Processes of Democracy	
		Cast a Ballot?	Feel close to a Political Party?
Generation			
	Age	0.95 (0.01) **	1.01 (0.01)
	Female	1.02 (0.16)	0.85 (0.10)
	Household Income	1.19 (0.09) *	1.10 (0.06)
	Education	1.12 (0.05) *	1.06 (0.03)
	Internal Efficacy	1.44 (0.26) *	1/80 (0.24) ***
Post - WWII	Views Represented	2.89 (0.47) ***	5.29 (0.62) ***
	Media Use	1.72 (0.36) *	1.42 (0.22) *
	Political Interest	1.40 (0.30)	1.97 (0.31) ***
	Constant	54.0 (67.6) **	0.19 (0.20)
	-Log Likelihood	642	994
	N	2,501	2,501
	Age	1.07 (0.02) ***	0.98 (0.01)
	Female	1.27 (0.15) *	0.99 (0.08)
	Household Income	1.31 (0.06) ***	1.05 (0.03)
	Education	1.09 (0.04) *	1.09 (0.02) ***
	Internal Efficacy	1.37 (0.18) *	1.11 (0.11)
60s - 70s	Views Represented	3.52 (0.43) ***	5.00 (0.40) ***
	Media Use	1.31 (0.20)	1.22 (0.13)
	Political Interest	1.73 (0.27) ***	2.44 (0.26) ***
	Constant	1.73 (0.27) ***	1.31 (0.98)
	-Log Likelihood	1166	2096
	N	4,999	4,999
	Age	1.03 (0.02)	0.99 (0.01)
	Female	1.33 (0.14) **	1.01 (0.07)
	Household Income	1.30 (0.05) ***	1.01 (0.03)
	Education	1.03 (0.03)	1.03 (0.03)
	Internal Efficacy	1.29 (0.16) *	1.33 (0.12) **
80s	Views Represented	3.12 (0.34) ***	5.59 (0.41) ***
	Media Use	1.62 (0.21) ***	1.25 (0.12) *
	Political Interest	1.79 (0.24) ***	2.00 (0.20) ***
	Constant	0.19 (0.16)	0.99 (0.61)
	-Log Likelihood	1421	2436
	N	5,247	5,247
	Age	1.05 (0.01) **	1.01 90.01)
90s	Female	1.31 (0.13) **	0.93 (0.07)
	Household Income	1.35 (0.05) ***	1.01 (0.03)

	Education	1.10 (0.03) **	1.03 (0.02)
	Internal Efficacy	1.29 (0.15) *	1.60 (0.15) ***
	Views Represented	2.79 (0.28) ***	5.46 (0.41) ***
	Media Use	1.10 (0.14)	1.25 (0.12) *
	Political Interest	2.02 (0.26) ***	1.40 (0.14) **
	Constant	0.06 (0.04) ***	0.35 (0.17) *
	-Log Likelihood	1556	2373
	N	4,886	4,886
	Age	1.02 (0.01)	0.98 (0.01) **
	Female	1.24 (0.09) **	1.06 (0.07)
	Household Income	1.15 (0.03) ***	1.03 (0.02)
	Education	1.13 (0.02) ***	1.06 (0.02) **
	Internal Efficacy	1.69 (0.14) ***	1.41 (0.11) ***
00s	Views Represented	2.89 (0.22) ***	5.86 (0.38) ***
	Media Use	1.54 (0.015) ***	1.12 (0.09)
	Political Interest	2.08 (0.20) ***	2.20 (0.18) ***
	Constant	0.19 (0.04) ***	0.51 (0.09) ***
	-Log Likelihood	2535	3240
	N	6,747	6,747

Source: 24 OECD countries In CSES Module 5 (2016-2019)

Notes: Entries are odds ratios for the media use binary variable and each generation block represents a separate regression analysis. Standard errors between brackets. Significance: *** < 0.001, ** < 0.01, * < 0.05. Method used: Single level logit model in Stata; Missing values dealt with complete case analysis.

Table E. Effect of media use and political interest on democratic behaviours across generations

		Engagement with the Processes of Democracy	
		Cast a Ballot?	Feel close to a Political Party?
Generation			
Post - WWII	Female	1.01 (0.16)	0.85 (0.10)
	Household Income	1.20 (0.09) *	1.10 (0.06)
	Education	1.13 (0.05) **	1.05 (0.03)
	Internal Efficacy	1.46 (0.27) *	1.79 (0.24) ***
	View Represented	2.91 (0.47) ***	5.29 (0.62) ***
	Media Use x Political Interest (ref. No Media Use – Not Interested)		
	No Media – Interested	1.80 (0.63)	2.11 (0.56) **
	Media – Not Interested	2.03 (0.57) *	1.47 (0.30)
	Media – Interested	2.38 (0.47) ***	2.80 (0.41) ***
	Constant	1.09 (0.25)	0.38 (0.07) ***
	-Log Likelihood	646	994
	N	2,501	2,501
60s - 70s	Female	1.25 (0.14)	1.00 (0.08)
	Household Income	1.29 (0.06) ***	1.06 (0.03)
	Education	1.08 (0.04) *	1.09 (0.02) ***
	Internal Efficacy	1.34 (0.18) *	1.10 (0.11)
	View Represented	3.68 (0.45) ***	4.97 (0.40) ***
	Media Use x Political Interest (ref. No Media Use – Not Interested)		
	No media – Interested	3.39 (0.92) ***	2.91 (0.48) ***
	Media – Not interested	2.30 (0.54) ***	1.41 (0.21) *
	Media – Interested	2.68 (0.32) ***	3.04 (0.31) ***
	Constant	0.90 (0.16)	0.38 (0.05) ***
	-Log Likelihood	1168	
	N	4,999	4,999
80s	Female	1.32 (0.12) **	1.01 (0.07)
	Household Income	1.29 (0.05) ***	1.00 (0.02)
	Education	1.02 (0.03)	1.03 (0.02)
	Internal Efficacy	1.30 (0.16) *	1.32 (0.12) **
	View Represented	3.15 (0.34) ***	5.57 (0.41) ***
	Media Use x Political Interest (ref. No Media Use – Not Interested)		
	No Media – Interested	1.85 (0.33) **	2.02 (0.27) ***
	Media – Not interested	1.69 (0.32) **	1.26 (0.18)
	Media – Interested	2.90 (0.37) ***	2.51 (0.23) ***
	Constant	0.89 (0.15)	0.44 (0.06) ***
	-Log Likelihood	1423	2437
	N	5,247	5,247
90s	Female	1.31 (0.13) **	0.93 (0.07)
	Household Income	1.36 (0.05) ***	1.01 (0.03)
	Education	1.08 (0.03) **	1.03 (0.02)
	Internal Efficacy	1.30 (0.15) *	1.60 (0.15) ***

	View Represented	2.81 (0.28) ***	5.47 (0.41) ***
	Media Use x Political Interest (ref. No Media Use – Not Interested)		
	No Media – Interested	1.62 (0.27) **	1.40 (0.18) **
	Media – Not interested	0.89 (0.15)	1.25 (0.19)
	Media – Interested	2.21 (0.26) ***	1.74 (0.16) ***
	Constant	0.52 (0.26) ***	0.46 (0.06) ***
	-Log Likelihood	1560	2373
	N	4,886	4,886
00s	Female	1.26 (0.09) **	1.05 (0.07)
	Household Income	1.17 (0.03) ***	1.02 (0.02)
	Education	1.14 (0.02) ***	1.05 (0.02) **
	Internal Efficacy	1.71 (0.14) ***	1.40 (0.11) ***
	View Represented	2.83 (0.22) ***	5.91 (0.38) ***
	Media Use x Political Interest (ref. No Media Use – Not Interested)		
	No Media – Interested	1.92 (0.23) ***	2.29 (0.24) ***
	Media – Not interested	1.39 (0.19) *	1.18 (0.15)
	Media – Interested	3.24 (0.30) ***	2.47 (0.19) ***
	Constant	0.35 (0.04) ***	0.34 (0.04) ***
	-Log Likelihood	2541	3245
	N	6,747	6,747

Source: 24 OECD countries In CSES Module 5 (2016-2019)

Notes: Entries are odds ratios for the media use binary variable and each generation block represents a separate regression analysis. Standard errors between brackets. Significance: *** < 0.001, ** < 0.01, * < 0.05. Method used: Single level logit model in Stata; Missing values dealt with complete case analysis.

End of thesis
This page is intentionally left blank