India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs

<http://iqq.sagepub.com/>

Delinking Destiny from Geography : The Changing Balance of India–Pakistan Relations

Ramesh Thakur

India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 2011 67: 197

DOI: 10.1177/097492841106700301

The online version of this article can be found at:

<http://iqq.sagepub.com/content/67/3/197>

Published by:

<http://www.sagepublications.com>

On behalf of:

[Indian Council of World Affairs](#)

Additional services and information for *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs* can be found at:

Email Alerts: <http://iqq.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts>

Subscriptions: <http://iqq.sagepub.com/subscriptions>

Reprints: <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav>

Permissions: <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav>

Citations: <http://iqq.sagepub.com/content/67/3/197.refs.html>

>> [Version of Record](#) - Sep 7, 2011

[What is This?](#)

Delinking Destiny from Geography

The Changing Balance of India–Pakistan Relations

India Quarterly
67(3) 197–212
© 2011 Indian Council
of World Affairs (ICWA)
SAGE Publications
Los Angeles, London,
New Delhi, Singapore,
Washington DC
DOI: 10.1177/097492841106700301
<http://iqq.sagepub.com>

Ramesh Thakur

ramesh.thakur@anu.edu.au

Abstract

The November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai are analysed through six changing equations in India–Pakistan relations. The balance between military response and inaction is shifting towards the former. India has a vested but no longer critical interest in a strong and stable Pakistan. Pakistan's deniability has been based on separation between the government, army, ISI and terrorists whose plausibility is fading. To reverse the worsening security situation, Pakistan's military must be brought under full civilian control. Failing that, India will have to acquire the military capacity and political will to destroy the human and material infrastructure of terrorism in Pakistan. Finally, the rewards for Pakistan's contributions to the war on terror in Afghanistan exceed penalties for its fuelling of terror in India. The structure of incentives and penalties must be reversed.

Keywords

India, Pakistan, ISI, terrorist attacks, nuclear stalemate, incentive structure, escalation dominance

Great power status is not for the faint of heart. The difference between India aspiring or merely pretending to be a global power will depend in part on its capacity and willingness to use military force. Historically, great powers use force in distant geographical theatres far from home. That is no longer necessary or desirable. But no country that lacks the will and ability to use force when challenged and provoked in its immediate neighbourhood can claim to be a major power or will be respected as one. This is especially relevant for India because, of all the present and emerging great powers, it is situated in the most fraught geopolitical environment and at the centre of a constellation of fragile states at grave risk of becoming failed states. In *Foreign Policy's* (2010) current failed states index, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Burma, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka (in order) rank in the top 30 risk group.

On this criterion, successive Indian governments have flattered to deceive. If each US president makes his predecessor look good, each Indian prime minister makes his predecessor look decisive. India has worked hard to earn the sobriquet of a soft state (Myrdal 1969). Nowhere is this more apparent than in the failure to deal with the cross-border terrorism. Former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran (2011) has noted that India's restraint wins it rhetorical plaudits from the international community but convinces Pakistan that the nuclear equation has stymied India from effective military retaliation (Khan 2009).

India suffered seven terrorist attacks from November 2007 to November 2008. Of these, six were planned and executed by Indian terrorists operating in India, acting either alone or with the help of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in Pakistan or the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami in Bangladesh. The seventh attack was planned in and directed from Pakistan and carried out by Pakistani militants. An initial cadre of 32 suicide terrorist recruits was trained in Pakistan in how to make bombs, survive interrogation and fight to death (Sengupta 2009). After training, the group was pruned to 10 and set sail from Karachi on 22 November using GPS coordinates. On 23 November, it took over an Indian fishing trawler, all of whose crew were eventually killed, and sailed across to Mumbai, arriving on its outskirts at about 4 pm on 26 November. Taking instructions from handlers in Pakistan, the 10 terrorists came ashore in a motorised dinghy at about 8:30 pm and attacked five targets in two-man teams: Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus railway station, Leopold Cafe, Chabad House Jewish centre, and the Taj and Trident-Oberoi luxury hotels. Over the next 60 hours, one terrorist was captured and nine killed, but only after their killing spree had left more than 160 dead, including several foreigners and many Muslims.

The organisation in charge of training the 10 terrorists for the Mumbai operations was the banned LeT. Pakistan's Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had shared intelligence with and provided protection to the LeT (Burke 2009; Schmitt et al. 2008). Based in Pakistan, the LeT has evolved from a Kashmir-focused to a globally oriented terrorist organisation. The radical Sunni-Deobandi groups are 'simultaneously fighting internal sectarian jihads' that pose a threat 'to the Pakistani citizen and state', and 'regional jihads in Afghanistan and India and a global jihad against the West' (ICG 2009: i). The saturation coverage by the world's leading media for the first time brought home to a global audience that India is a frontline state against international terrorism. The impact of the real-time saturation coverage on public and political opinion was such that '26/11' marks a watershed as India's own '9/11'.¹

The US and its allies were relieved that the attacks did not precipitate a war between India and Pakistan and praised New Delhi for its restrained response. According to the most comprehensive public report on 26/11, 'the Mumbai attack remains a pivotal and delicate issue in relations among the United States, India and Pakistan, despite the diplomatic sensitivities' (Rotella 2010). I argue that war clouds will not dissipate, for three key equations are changing: the balance between no action and some military response by India; India's waning interest in a stable Pakistan; and the putative rogue tendencies of Pakistan's notorious ISI. Also, while India's *preference* is to help in the establishment of civilian supremacy over the army and the intelligence in Pakistan and consolidate the institutions of good governance (democracy, rule of law, judiciary and civil society), if the Pakistan government itself is uninterested in this agenda, then *of necessity* India will have to acquire the capability for limited air strikes and commando operations against terrorist infrastructure and operatives hiding in Pakistan. I conclude with the need for the US as well as India to change one final equation, namely, the balance of rewards and punishment for Pakistan for its contradictory roles in fighting versus fomenting terror on its western and eastern borders.

From Inaction to Military Response

As terrorists have attacked India repeatedly with planning, training and financing based in Pakistan, the balance between some military response and inaction has shifted. Pakistan's military-intelligence-jihadist complex has been lethally effective in privatising terrorism as an instrument of policy; India's

policy of offshoring the response by appealing to the nebulous 'international community' has been ineffectual. India's muddled 'shaming campaign' against Pakistan elicits contempt and pity in India, Pakistan and overseas.

The Mumbai attacks underlined the indivisibility of South and Southwest Asian terrorism. The 9/11 attacks were planned in the mountainous caves of Afghanistan where the Taliban regime, in part a creation of the US and Saudi-backed mujahideen against the Soviet-installed regime, had nurtured them as a potent weapon against all infidels. For years India had warned that the epicentre of international terrorism had shifted from the Middle East to Southwest Asia. Like the warnings of Pakistan as the centre of nuclear proliferation, these were dismissed as the self-interested rants of the regional hegemon. Yet reminders of the enduring relevance of the India equation to Pakistan's actions in Afghanistan came when US intelligence confirmed the links of Pakistan's ISI to the terrorist attacks on the Indian embassy in Kabul on 7 July 2008, in which more than 40 people were killed (Mazzetti and Schmitt 2008; Warrick 2008).

Pakistan has been triangulated historically by the three 'As': Allah, the army and America. Washington and NATO are most interested in cajoling Pakistan to fight the militants in the Afpak battle space and secure their logistical supply route through Pakistan without the added complication of India–Pakistan rivalry. Russia has no leverage over Pakistan. Arch-rival China has a history of using Pakistan to trap India in a subcontinental straitjacket, including assistance with its nuclear weapons programme since the 1980s (Smith and Warrick 2009). Pakistan's first nuclear test was conducted for it by China in 1990 (Reed and Stillman 2009). Outsiders' neglect of India's sensitivity could result in a double blow: a costly India–Pakistan war and the intensification of Pakistan-based Islamist terrorism as the country falls apart. Pakistan's security elite could fall into the familiar trap of mistaking a democratic neighbour's reluctance to go to war for weakness while ignoring the history of democracies as 'powerful pacifists' once their peoples are roused and fully mobilised (Lake 1992; Rosato 2003).

The Mumbai attacks were notable for their savagery, audacity, choice of targets and duration. Indians were as contemptuous of their own politicians as they were angry at Pakistan. New Delhi's intelligence failures, internal security shortcomings and bumbling diplomatic response were amplified by politicians' tone deaf comments. Part of the reason for the public anger is that political leaders are provided with a disproportionately large number of the elite protective force, often as a competitive status symbol rather than to counter genuine threats. There was an unprecedented frozen anger in India at a government that is all bark and no bite. Eventually, unvented rage could morph into rejection of democracy as limp and corrupt.

A Strong and Stable Pakistan

India still has a vested interest in a strong and stable Pakistan. But this is no longer critical to India's own prospects. India would be better off with such a neighbour, just as all South Asians benefit from a vibrant India. For outsiders as for Pakistanis, the choice has often seemed to be between an intolerable status quo and the nightmare of a militantly Islamic, 170-million strong, nuclear-armed failed state at the strategic crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East. That is, in the case of Pakistan the bad is at least the enemy of the worst. Indians shared the dismay of many Pakistanis at their government's effort

in early 2009 to buy peace with the militants by acquiescing to the Talibanisation of Swat and Bajaur, but the agenda was rejected by voters at the ballot box.

Kashmir has badly corroded India's democratic, secular and humanist values and institutions, and hobbled its globalist aspirations. India should look to resolve it for reasons of self-interest. That said, the core issue bedevilling India–Pakistan relations is not Kashmir but the nature of the Pakistani state and its obsession with parity vis-à-vis India. Naive Westerners may believe that Pakistan wresting Kashmir from India will buy peace in the subcontinent. There is little to suggest that Islamists are appeased by such 'victories'. Rather, they are emboldened to launch even more audacious attacks on their infidel enemies.

Born amidst the mass killings of partition in 1947, Pakistan has rarely escaped the cycle of violence, volatility and bloodshed. It lies at the intersection of Islamic jihadism, international terrorism, nuclear proliferation and the struggle between democratic forces and military dictatorship. It was an artificial creation with a million butchered as 'collateral damage' in the great partition of modern times in which Hindus and Muslims seemed determined to outmatch each other's savagery.

Pakistan had two founding principles, neither of which is a viable basis for a modern state. First, its primary validating argument was negative: the Muslims of the subcontinent cannot be ruled by a Hindu-majority government. Rather than be swamped by Hindus, Muslims wanted their own country. The incompatibility thesis has proven true of Pakistan but not of India. The proportion of Muslims in India today is higher than the corresponding figure after partition. The reverse is true of Pakistan. In marked contrast to Pakistan's core identity being 'not India' (Shaikh 2009), a fundamentalist, anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistan posture is irrelevant to the idea of India (Khilnani 1997).

Pakistan's independence was led by the professional elite rather than a mass political movement as in India. There was no political party, like Congress in India, with deep political roots in society. The country remained more feudal socially than India, with politics controlled by the military and the civil service. The army's stronghold over the state is explained by Pakistan's weak colonial legacy, weak political parties, social conservatism and foreign influences (Oldenburg 2010). Enmity with India gave the military the alibi to establish ascendancy over all civilian competitors and also to spread its tentacles into virtually every aspect of national affairs (Nawaz 2008). M.J. Akbar (2009), one of India's most distinguished Muslim public intellectuals, comments:

Multi-religious, multi-ethnic, secular, democratic India was an idea that belonged to the future; one-dimensional Pakistan was a concept borrowed from the fears of the past. India has progressed into a modern nation occasionally hampered by backward forces. Pakistan is regressing into a medieval society with a smattering of modern elements.

Beyond the anti-Hindu and anti-India negative points of reference, the only other glue that could bind the new country together was Islam. Pakistan is the only country to name its capital after a religion: it was founded as a fortress of the faith. The ruling elite has traditionally viewed Pakistan as the custodian of all Islam, not just as the land for the subcontinent's Muslims. And, much as the Arab and Islamic world regard Israel as a state created by the theft of Palestinian land by Europeans and Westerners, some Pakistanis believe that India was their patrimony from the Mughal Empire, stolen from them by the British in order to bequeath it to the undeserving Hindus. This is why the leaders of the LeT and the Jaish-e-Muhammad dream of unfurling the Islamic green flag in the Red Fort in Delhi as well as in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.

Where most countries comprise nations accommodated in one state, Islam is a community divided into several states. In 1971 Islam proved insufficiently strong to hold Pakistan together as the eastern wing seceded to become Bangladesh. It was always unrealistic to believe that a common religion could offset the fissiparous tendencies of a country separated geographically by the width of India as well as by language and culture. Yet the 1971 generation of the Pakistani elite neither accepted internal failures of governance as the primary cause of Bangladeshi secession nor forgave India for being midwife to Bangladesh's independence.

Moreover, even the rump modern Pakistan is artificial: there never was any such country at any point in history. Much more so than in India, the real identities are Punjabi, Sindhi, Balochi and Pashtun. Fearing for ripple effects on its own many potential separatist movements, India has often professed having a vested interest in preserving a united and stable Pakistan. Traditionally for Indians the question is: What kind of Pakistan does India want—one that is on the brink of state collapse and failure, splintered into multiple centres of power, with large swathes of territory under the control of religious zealots and terrorists; or a stable, democratic and economically powerful Pakistan minus the influence of the three 'Ms': the military, militants and mullahs? For India the answer to this question is no longer as straightforward as it used to be. Traditionally, those who believed that a final victory for India lies in the withering away of Pakistan were considered to be delusional. Little do they realise, critics said, that having a nuclear Somalia for a neighbour would not be the end of India's Pakistan problem but rather the beginning of India's woes.

Yet for over a decade, even as Pakistan teeters on the brink of collapse and disintegration, India has prospered and emerged as a major player in world affairs. Prakash Shah, former Indian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, describes the belief of Pakistan's stability being essential for India's progress as the first of several 'flawed assumptions and myths of the 20th century on which our Pakistan policy is based' (Shah 2008). A former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan similarly argues that the claim that 'a rising India cannot assert its rightful place in the comity of nations without good relations with Pakistan' is 'factually incorrect' and undermines Indian diplomacy: 'We can "rise" in the world with or without Pakistan's cooperation' (Parthasarathy 2009).

Four Degrees of Separation

Pakistan's record of double dealing, deceit and denial of Pakistan-based attacks, in Afghanistan and India alike, has been based on a four degrees of separation—between the government, army, ISI and terrorists—whose plausibility is fading as it is exploited as a convenient alibi to escape accountability. The combination of training, selection and advance reconnaissance of targets, diversionary tactics, discipline, munitions, cryptographic communications, false IDs and damage inflicted in the Mumbai attacks is more typically associated with special forces units than terrorists. After Mumbai's three-stage amphibious operation, even US agencies concluded that the LeT is a more capable and greater threat than previously believed (Schmitt et al. 2008). The plot was hatched and launched in Pakistan and while the operation was underway in Mumbai, it was masterminded and controlled from Pakistan.

That Pakistanis in general might harbour goodwill and friendship towards India is irrelevant if they have little say in making policy. The enmity with India also explains the role of the army as an enduring

force of Pakistani politics that rules the country even when civilians are in office. The threat from India validates its size, power and influence, dwarfing all other institutions. The difference of scale between Pakistan and India is comparable to that between New Zealand and Australia or Canada and the US. Unlike the other two pairs, Pakistan has always thought of itself as India's equal in every respect. At the heart of this emotional parity lies the ability to match India militarily. This could not have been done without alliance with the US to begin with, and then sustained subsequently with a *de facto* alliance with China.

While the US viewed Pakistan as an ally against international enemies, the alliance was useful to Islamabad principally in an India-specific context. The two imperatives intersected with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Saudi financing and American arms and training built up the mujahideen as a potent force to bleed the Soviets in Afghanistan. Over time this built up a battle-hardened jihadist army, including Osama bin Laden, which exported terror from Afghanistan to make common cause with Islamist struggles all over the world. Yesterday's anti-Soviet mujahideen in Afghanistan is today's anti-Western jihadist everywhere.

To Pakistan, control over Afghanistan, first through the mujahideen and then the Taliban, gave it strategic depth against India but pitted it increasingly also against Iran. The Saudi connection led to a spurt of madrasas spewing hatred against Jew, Christian and Hindu with equal venom. The army harnessed Islam against civilian political parties at home, to maintain control over Afghanistan and against India. After 9/11, world attention returned firmly to Pakistan because of its shared border with Afghanistan, even though its intelligence services had created and supported the Taliban. When President Pervez Musharraf abandoned the Taliban and joined the US war on terror, the world held its nose and accepted him as a crucial ally.

In power for nine years (1999–2008), controlling both the country and the military, General Musharraf failed to deliver Pakistan from the scourge of terrorism in part because success against the jihadists would end his utility to the West. On all three critical issues—fighting Islamic terrorism, curbing nuclear proliferation and promoting democracy—progress was minimal or negative. In a pathology common to military regimes (Heeger 1977), Musharraf could not tolerate political opponents with a mass following. Former prime ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto were exiled and the two main political parties—the Pakistan Muslim League and the Pakistan People's Party—wedged by cutting deals with religious parties who moved to fill the political vacuum. In this Musharraf followed the footsteps of previous US-backed dictator General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq during whose rule the military was Islamicised. Musharraf cut deals with extremists in the restive northwest regions of Pakistan, from where the regrouped Taliban and al-Qaeda launched increasingly deadly assaults into Afghanistan.

The nightmare scenario of nuclear weapons coming under the control of Islamists has come ever closer to reality (Sanger 2009). The treasure trove of classified US embassy cables published by WikiLeaks demonstrate the depth and extent of concerns about Pakistan's continuing links with terrorist groups with the attendant risks of nuclear materials being stolen or diverted for use by terrorists in an illicit nuclear device. A suicide attack on a bus in Rawalpindi on 2 July 2009 was the first to single out workers of Pakistan's nuclear laboratories (Masood 2009). Abdul Qadeer Khan established a global nuclear bazaar that did lucrative business with Iran, Libya and North Korea (Albright 2010; Armstrong and Trento 2007; Clary 2004; IISS 2007; Levy and Scott-Clark 2007). The government was complicit, connived and facilitated, or at the very least knew about and tolerated the existence and activities of the network. When caught out, the 'hero of the nation' was placed under a comfortable version of house

arrest by his 'friend' Musharraf. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Americans have not been permitted to interrogate Khan. Arguably, the Khan network is still active and Pakistan's nuclear weapons are not safe (Frantz and Collins 2007; Harrison 2008, 2010).

Washington—President Barack Obama as much as George W. Bush—never confronted the core of Pakistani duplicity. The release of secret US embassy cables from around the world by WikiLeaks clearly showed that Pakistan's ISI remains the Taliban's most important accomplice (Buncombe 2010; Miller 2010), a point made also by Matt Waldman (2010) of Harvard University's Carr Center. If Pakistan successfully eliminated the threat of Islamists, its utility to Washington and the fear of the alternative would disappear and the flow of US money would stop. If it failed to show any tangible progress, it would be have been toppled. So it plays both ends against the middle brilliantly. But the policy contradictions ripened and threatened to burst. The Islamists survived, regrouped, built up their base and launched more frequent raids across the border in Afghanistan but also increasingly deep into the heart of Pakistan itself. Slowly but surely, Pakistan descended into the failed state syndrome where the Koran and Kalashnikov culture reign supreme (Rashid 2008). Almost every incident of international terrorism, including 9/11 and the failed Times Square bombing in 2010, has had some significant link to Pakistan.

Against this backdrop, the 26 November Mumbai attacks presented India with a policy dilemma of heads they win, tails we lose. No effective response by New Delhi keeps India bleeding at a cost-free policy for Pakistan. A military response would allow Pakistan's army to break from fighting the Islamist militants that deepens the army's unpopularity, assert dominance over the civilian government, regain the support of the people as the custodian of national sovereignty and internationalise the bilateral dispute.

Civilian Supremacy

To escape from the dilemma, one or both of the equations in the following need to change. Pakistan's military must be brought under full civilian control and the military and intelligence services' links to the Islamist militants must be totally and verifiably severed. This cannot be done unless and until the government accepts the evidence of the connections to Pakistan from the captured terrorist as well as satellite and cellular phone logs and intercepts.² Outsiders, including India, cannot help if the government persists with denial well past the point of plausibility. The dossier provided by India, assembled with the help of the forensic skills of American and British agencies, was compelling. There is justification for Secretary Madeleine Albright's description of Pakistan as 'an international migraine' (*Hindu* 3 December 2008), and the more popular label of it as the world's terror centre.

The standard of proof for protection from foreign attacks cannot be the same as in national courts of law: 'Beyond reasonable doubt' has a different connotation in the two contexts. The West was right to reject demands from Afghanistan's Taliban government for 'proof' after 9/11; the same applies to similar demands from Pakistan. British and American leaders have become increasingly open in affirming a connection between the 26/11 terrorists and elements of the Pakistani state. Recognising Pakistan's political difficulty in giving access to Indian security officials for investigations on Pakistani territory, India hoped that the investigations could be carried out there by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) instead. India also acknowledged that the FBI has more sophisticated technical equipment with which to

mine the information from the recovered satellite and cellular phones. Their investigations broadly concurred with the Indian conclusion about the links to Pakistan. Britain's new Prime Minister David Cameron provoked a diplomatic row with Islamabad by accusing elements of the Pakistani state of promoting the export of terrorism, insisting that the country could no longer 'look both ways' by tolerating terrorism while demanding respect as a democracy (Watt and Dodd 2010).

Long after Pakistan's own investigation began to confirm substantial links between the 10 gunmen who attacked Mumbai and the LeT (Hussain et al. 2008), the government kept pressing the restart button on the policy of total denial. Far from accepting the evidence and showing the intent to act on it, the government sacked its National Security Adviser, retired Major-General Mahmud Ali Durrani, when he acknowledged that the captured tenth terrorist was indeed a Pakistani national. Speaking in parliament, Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani dismissed India's dossier as information, not evidence. This only served to demonstrate Pakistan's habitual pattern of evasiveness and reinforced doubts about its willingness to cooperate in tackling and eliminating the common threat of terrorism. Gilani also questioned the world's double standards for silence over the 'immense torture' of innocent Kashmiris and the killings of children and women in Gaza while exaggerating and raising a hue and cry over the single incident in Mumbai (Subramanian 2009b).

As a former Indian foreign secretary comments, in the wake of Mumbai, 'Victim India has been reduced to petitioning for justice from guilty Pakistan' (Sibal 2009a). Islamabad managed to reduce Mumbai 'to a debate on evidence, stretching it out to release pressure for quick redressal by subjecting it to a process... The strategy is to buy time, knowing that as it elapses, urgency is lost and the world's attention moves elsewhere' (Sibal 2009b). It was not until 12 February that Interior Minister Rehman Malik admitted that 'some part of the conspiracy has taken place in Pakistan' and that six suspects had been arrested while two others were still at large (BBC News 2009).

The trouble with the Balkans, it is said, is that they produce more politics than they can consume. It might be said similarly that the trouble with Pakistan is that it produces more terrorism than can safely be exported. Serial attacks might wound India, but Pakistan itself will be consumed by the furies it has created before India is destroyed. In a statement in January 2009, human rights activists, women's rights activists, teachers, labour leaders and journalists expressed alarm at the loss of life, denial of education to girls and large-scale displacement of civilians in Pakistan's northwest frontier regions (Subramanian 2009a). They regretted the 'total absence of a cohesive policy by the government of Pakistan to protect its own citizens or any strategy to challenge militant outfits that operate with impunity within and outside the country'. The government of Pakistan, they said, 'must no longer stay in a state of self-denial'. Winking at the existence of terrorist outfits within Pakistan 'will amount to self-annihilation and greater isolation from the comity of nations'. 'Quite ironically', they noted, 'terrorism, which should have brought India and Pakistan together to defend peace and people's security, pushed them to the brink of a mutually destructive war'.

On 3 March 2009, terrorists struck the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore in an attack that was eerily reminiscent of Mumbai. Both represented a shift in tactics from suicide bombs to a commando-style military assault with a small team of well-trained, heavily armed, physically fit and highly disciplined operatives: 10 in Mumbai, a dozen in Lahore. There were similarities in the choice of locations: dense urban centres that are relatively unprotected where the terrorists established strategic choke points to impede counter-offensives by the security forces. Both entailed advance reconnaissance of targets and

locations and coordination of dispersed cells through basic technology like cell phones (Mumbai) and two-way radio (Lahore). Both groups of young males were calm, focused, methodical and unhurried. Both groups carried a generous supply of food and drugs in backpacks to enhance performance and sustain stamina. And both hit high value targets in the upmarket tourism and international sporting sectors. Moreover, the choice of targets in both cases gave the lie to any simplistic linkage of the attacks with grievance over Kashmir.

In the aftermath of the Mumbai and Lahore attacks, the LeT has to be considered to be as dangerous a threat as al-Qaeda to the US and British interests. Investigations by US agencies turned up a total of 320 potential overseas targets on the LeT's hit list, of which only 20 were in India. Others included British, US, Australian and Indian embassies, government buildings, tourist sites and global financial centres. According to Charles Faddis, a retired CIA chief of counterterrorist operations in South Asia, 'It was a mistake to dismiss it [Lashkar] as just a threat to India' (Rotella 2010).

The brazen occupation of a police academy on 30 March 2009 by heavily armed gunmen in Lahore in which 27 policemen and several militants were killed confirmed that the spectre of Islamist terrorism had fanned out from the northwest tribal belt to threaten political stability in Pakistan's heartland (Constable 2009; Tavernise et al. 2009). Reaping a bloody harvest in Lahore, the Swat valley and elsewhere from having supped with the extremist devil, Pakistan has temporarily narrowed the definition of its security interests with India's (and the West's) in facing the threat of terrorism.

In an interview, Prime Minister Singh said that India's position remains that 'no effective action has been taken [by Pakistan] to control terror' and Islamabad is either 'unable' or 'unwilling' to crack down on the militant groups (Lamont et al. 2009). Pakistani authorities were deliberately tardy in preparing their case against LeT founder Hafiz Muhammad Saeed in the lead up to his release by the Lahore High Court in June. During her 2009 visit to India, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that the planners of 9/11 were now sheltering in Pakistan; the Pakistani foreign ministry issued an immediate rebuttal (Schmitt and Perlez 2009).

In July 2009, during a meeting with former senior civil servants, for the first time Zardari admitted that militants and extremists were 'created and nurtured' by Pakistan 'as a policy to achieve some short-term tactical objectives'. He added that 'The terrorists of today were the heroes of yesteryears until 9/11 occurred and they began to haunt us as well' (Subramanian 2009c; *Times of India* 9 July 2009). Unfortunately, the president cannot be presumed to be speaking for the military which is the stronger centre of power.

Christine Fair argues that 'successive Pakistani governments have successfully wagered that chronic instability and the imminent dangers of terrorism and nuclear black-marketeering would leave the world with no choice but to bail them out, regardless of their failures'. Since 2001, Washington has provided more than \$20 billion of military and economic assistance to Pakistan. Yet at the end of it Hillary Clinton still declared Pakistan to be a mortal threat to international security. 'The massive infusion of foreign aid has also allowed Pakistan to avoid having to choose between guns and butter'—choices that define the democratic process (Fair 2009). Washington must confront the moral hazard of continuing—even increasing—international aid, being tantamount to Pakistan reaping an ever-growing terrorist dividend.

US officials have begun to communicate more openly to the press their frustrations with Pakistani tardiness in dealing with 'the full array of Islamic militants using the country as a base'. The two 'allies' differ over whether the Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar is in Pakistan or Afghanistan;

whether Sirajuddin Haqqani, whom US intelligence holds responsible for the 2008 bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul, poses a threat; and whether LeT founder Saeed is merely an ideologue without an anti-Pakistan agenda who deserved to be freed by the courts instead of being kept in custody (Buncombe and Waraich 2009; Schmitt and Perlez 2009).

Taking the Fight to the Enemy

The solution should be attempted only if the establishment of civilian supremacy over Pakistan's military-intelligence services proves impossible. The state of extreme denial of the government does not inspire confidence that Pakistan will depart significantly from its modus operandi of initial denials, grudging acceptance in the face of incontrovertible evidence in due course, doing the absolute minimum necessary to absorb and deflect international pressure for action against the perpetrators, promising to stop future attacks and then going back to business as usual.

India still has several options to explore before having to confront the need for some overt military or covert intelligence action. It could restrict commercial transport and tourist links with Pakistan or downgrade diplomatic relations. India could urge arms exporting countries and firms not to sell armaments to Pakistan. If they disregard the request, they could be blacklisted from bidding for the supply of armaments to India, one of the most lucrative arms market in the world. India could become far more aggressive against Pakistan in international lending institutions. Several UN-specific measures could be pursued by India against Pakistan as a state sponsor of Islamist terrorism. Drawing on the 13 UN conventions against terrorism, India could mobilise the Sanctions Committee established under Security Council Resolution 1267 and also maintain pressure for action under Resolution 1373, adopted after 9/11, that requires all states to take forceful action against terrorist groups with respect to their finances, arms, movements, etc. Non-compliance or inaction could be met by the threat and imposition of 'smart sanctions' such as travel bans on the political and military leadership and arms embargoes that would hurt the military the most.

President Reagan was ultimately proved right in his strategy of bankrupting the Soviet Union: Moscow simply could not match the US capacity to accelerate its arms inventory. India has not used its superior economic dynamism and vibrancy to similar ends and effect. Deteriorating bilateral relations will lead to a rise in security and defence expenditure and put a huge strain on public finances. This would put at risk Pakistan's ability to meet fiscal deficit targets and jeopardise IMF loans and foreign direct investment alike to fill the domestic saving/investment gap.

In the event that none of this leads to demonstrable action and measurable progress within a reasonable time frame, the question of unilateral action will become inescapable. Like the Americans firing missiles into Pakistan from unmanned drones, India could adopt the policy of taking the fight into neighbouring territory from where terror attacks originate. It could take out the human leadership and material infrastructure of terrorism through surgical strikes and targeted assassinations. If India does not have such intelligence and military capacity today—the Mumbai police used World War II vintage rifles and even elite commandos lacked night vision equipment that is standard issue for major metropolitan police forces in the West—then it could invest all means necessary to acquire it forthwith. It can be combined

with escalation dominance capability: the enemy should know that any escalation from the limited strikes will bring even heavier punitive costs from a superior military force.

For more than a decade, lacking a coherent vision or strategy on how to deal with the dilemma of quasi-official complicity in cross-border terrorism and flat official denial, at best India has managed to cobble together a muddled 'shaming campaign' against Pakistan as it solicits international censure of terror-tolerant postures by Pakistan. At worst it elicits embarrassed contempt, not sympathy and support, for hand-wringing appeals to others to sort out the mess in its own neighbourhood. In a perverse and stubborn pattern of not letting national interests come in the way of abstract principles and noble ideals, India persisted in publicly criticising Israel for its military campaign against Hamas in the Gaza shortly after the Mumbai attacks (*Hindu* 4 January 2009). This when Israel is the only other country that can compare and empathise with India's predicament and policy dilemma in facing the threat of serial terror attacks planned, organised and launched from neighbouring territories. By contrast, Israel's ambassador to India Mark Sofer refused to advise or criticise India on its approach, pointedly noting in an interview that 'India lives in a shocking neighbourhood, very much like Israel. It is not easy being in such a neighbourhood. That is why Israel has stood steadfast by India during and after the Mumbai terror attacks. We hardly even changed our travel advisory' (Sinha 2009).

Of course, there are differences. For one, Israel's dilemma is not as sharp because the Palestinians do not constitute a nuclear-armed state (which should make Indians sympathise with the Israeli fear of an Iranian bomb). For another, India does not have Israel's total local air dominance. But the geopolitical, demographic and terrorist infrastructural differences also mean that India can avoid the disproportionate and heavy civilian casualties that major Israeli strikes entail.

That is, to the extent that terrorism is used by Pakistan as a continuation of war by other safer and less costly means, India has to fashion a robust response within a clear vision and a hard-nosed strategy of turning terrorism back into warfare that imposes heavier, not lighter, penalties and damage. This is emphatically not an aggressive but a defensive policy: no terrorist action, no military retaliation. Conversely, should the Arab Spring spread eastward, Pakistan's educated middle class reclaim ownership and control of the nation's destiny, and civilian rule and secular democracy take hold there, other than Pakistanis themselves, Indians will be the happiest in the world and ready to embrace their neighbours most warmly.

The policy dilemma facing India is that it cannot persuade the US and Europe to act decisively against Pakistan, despite the evident failure by them to take effective measures to destroy all terrorist networks and apprehend or neutralise all terrorist personnel based on its territory. Because in one of his unilateral and non-reciprocal goodwill gestures towards Pakistan, Prime Minister Inder K. Gujral ordered the dismantlement of India's covert retaliatory capability and assets in Pakistan in 1997 [Raman (India's former counter-terrorism head) 2009], India lacks the capacity to take calibrated retaliatory measures short of the open use of military force. And to resort to overt war is to risk all the dangers that are inherent in this final and ultimate option.

There is no national or international security crisis so grave that it cannot be made worse by going to war, with a full range of unpredictable and perverse consequences (known and unknown unknowns, in Donald Rumsfeld's marvellously evocative language). The first is the risk of failure, that is military defeat, for only the battlefield can test a country's investment in weaponry, equipment, training and doctrine against the likely enemies. Short of that, there are the risks of political and social upheavals in

one's own country, including an inevitable rise in Hindu–Muslim tensions in any war with Pakistan. There are the matching risks of the domestic and policy consequences in Pakistan, including the strengthening of the military vis-à-vis the government and civil society, a nationalistic unity behind the government as it faces the historic enemy, a decision to reinvest in and even expand covert and clandestine assets and operations against India with the help of Islamist militants, and an escalation to a nuclear exchange with all the attendant dangers (Thakur 2000).

To walk away from the war option in perpetuity is to give free rein to Pakistan to engage in serial provocations as a low-cost,³ moderate-value, long-term strategy. Given these costs, risks and constraints, India's fourfold policy imperative is to institute new and effective security measures to prevent and defeat terrorist attacks on its soil, develop intelligence capability to detect and disrupt plans for terrorist strikes, create a credible yet deniable capability to pre-empt or retaliate against attacks from beyond its borders, and avoid having to go to war by convincing Pakistan (and Washington)—through military modernisation, doctrines and deployments—of its ability and determination to do so. As a corollary, Pakistan's fourfold policy imperatives are 'to exercise effective control over Jehadi groups, sustain influence over a Talibanised Afghanistan as strategic depth for Pakistan, milk the US for billions of dollars and succeed in continuously bleeding India through a thousand cuts' (Subrahmanyam 2009).

The only decade of peace between India and Pakistan was after India's decisive military victory in the Bangladesh war of 1971, when India enjoyed unquestioned supremacy in the bilateral military equation. This changed with renewed US aid to Islamabad after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Pakistan aided and abetted the insurgency in Kashmir whose root causes lie in New Delhi's interference in Kashmiri provincial politics and an increasingly brutal Indian security presence there. In 2009 the Obama administration's so-called AfPak strategy confronted Indian policy makers with the prospect of an unwelcome shift from de-hyphenation with Pakistan to bi-hyphenation with Afghanistan and Pakistan that would link the volatile Afghanistan–Pakistan border to the unsettled India–Pakistan border.

Reversing the Structure of Incentives for Backing and Fighting Terrorists

The bilateral relationship, burdened by decades of conflict (Ganguly 2001; Paul 2005; Wolpert 2010), remains politically fraught. Yet there is a desperate need for all countries of the region to cooperate in ridding South Asia of the deadly virus of terrorism, and peace between India and Pakistan might be indispensable for that. Pakistan's contributions to the war on terror on its western front are of lesser import than its fuelling of terror on its eastern front. Yet the rewards for the former exceed penalties for the latter. And much of the US military aid has been directed by Pakistan at India, not the Taliban. Pakistan has also been rapidly adding to its nuclear arsenal, raising questions about how much of the US military assistance might be diverted to the country's nuclear programme (Shanker and Sanger 2009). Pakistan today has the world's fastest growing nuclear arsenal as well as the most terrorists per square mile (Riedel 2011). By January 2011, its nuclear arsenal of more than 100 deployed weapons exceeded India's (DeYoung 2011; Sanger and Schmitt 2011). Uniquely among all nuclear armed states, Pakistan's nuclear policy, programme and weapons are under military control; it hosts and supports terrorist and insurgent groups as instruments of security policy; and it is a revisionist and irredentist state. As a result, unlike other dyadic nuclear rivalries that focus on managing stability, Pakistan seeks 'managed instability' which is poorly understood, analyzed and theorized (Gregory 2011).

In 2009–10 it became increasingly clear that unable to win on the battlefield in Afghanistan, yet unwilling to acknowledge defeat and confronting an American public growing increasingly war weary and restive, the Obama administration was seeking face-saving extrication from the costly entanglement. Both to control and influence events in Afghanistan post-NATO withdrawal and to use the militants as a strategic asset—and Afghanistan as a strategic sanctuary for them—against India, Pakistan has an interest in preventing their complete destruction and elimination. ‘While the Obama administration sees the insurgents as an enemy force to be defeated as quickly and directly as possible, Pakistan has long regarded them as useful proxies in protecting its western flank from inroads by India, its historical adversary’ (Brulliard and DeYoung 2010). Moreover, if the threat of Pakistan-based militancy evaporated and Afghanistan was stabilised, Pakistan’s utility to Washington would fade and the aid and possible lever of US pressure on India on Kashmir would disappear (Ganguly and Kapur 2010). On balance, therefore, the compromise policy that Pakistan followed—do enough to appease Washington while still preserving a viable cadre of Islamic militants for future deployment as and when and wherever necessary—made eminent strategic and political sense. This is why, as one frustrated US official complained, while American generals ‘want to talk about the next drone attacks’, Pakistan’s powerful army chief General Ashfaq ‘Kayani wants to talk about the end state in South Asia’ (quoted in Brulliard and DeYoung 2010).

There are three possible explanations for why the US continues to accept its military assistance to Pakistan being bent to counter the perceived threat from India in addition to, and sometimes instead of, targeting the threat from extremists. It might be afraid that increased pressure could make Pakistan cease cooperation completely. It believes that India will continue to make perfunctory protestations but can do little else. Or, it reflects the influence of the military–industrial complex that has no wish to see its profit volumes decline. Whatever the explanation, India has had only limited leverage in shaping the calculus of US arms sales and military assistance to Pakistan.

Pakistan’s policy ‘trilemma’ may be simply stated: it must secure itself against its internal terrorist enemy; it must protect itself against its external enemy India, including by safeguarding Afghanistan as a strategic depth sanctuary; and it must stay engaged with the US (Siddiqi 2011). India and the US, acting together in close concert, need to reverse the structure of incentives and penalties. Failure by India to respond forcefully and effectively will embolden and inspire terrorist actors in Pakistan and their sympathisers-cum-supporters inside the military and intelligence agencies that the benefits of attacking high-value targets in India of political (parliament), commercial (financial capital), cultural (Jewish centres), religious (Hindu temples and festivals) and symbolic (iconic hotels) significance far outweigh pinprick costs. Echoing this argument, former US ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad (2010) insists that ‘Washington must offer Islamabad a stark choice between positive incentives and negative consequences.’ So must India.

Notes

1. The two acronyms reflect the respective dating conventions: 26 November 2008 in India, September 11, 2001 in the US.
2. The obverse is also true. The frequency, geographical spread across India, scale and sheer audacity of the terrorist attacks suggest the existence of wide sympathy and support networks inside India rooted in indigenous grievances.
3. The cost is low only in relation to India’s limited retaliatory options, but very high once the rise and spread of militancy within Pakistan is factored in.

References

- Akbar, M.J. 2009. A flawed idea. *Times of India*, 8 March.
- Albright, D. 2010. *Peddling peril: How the secret nuclear trade arms America's enemies*. New York: Free Press.
- Armstrong, D. and Trento, J.J. 2007. *America and the Islamic bomb: The deadly compromise*. Hanover, NH: Steerforth.
- BBC News. 2009. Pakistan admits India attack link, 12 February. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/7885261.stm (accessed on 12 February 2009).
- Brulliard, K. and DeYoung, K. 2010. U.S. efforts fail to convince Pakistan's top general to target Taliban. *Washington Post*, 31 December.
- Buncombe, A. 2010. Pakistan spies have 'seat on Taliban council'. *Independent*, 14 June.
- Buncombe, A. and Waraich, O. 2009. Pakistan plays dangerous double game. *Independent* (London), 29 June.
- Burke, J. 2009. Pakistani intelligence services 'aided Mumbai terror attacks'. *Guardian*, 19 October.
- Clary, C. 2004. Dr. Khan's nuclear WalMart. *Disarmament Diplomacy*, 76 (March/April), 31–35.
- Constable, P. 2009. Insurgent threat shifts in Pakistan. *Washington Post*, 31 March.
- DeYoung, K. 2011. New estimates put Pakistan's nuclear arsenal at more than 100. *Washington Post*, 31 January.
- Fair, C.C. 2009. A better bargain for aid to Pakistan. *Washington Post*, 30 May.
- Foreign Policy 2010. The Failed States Index 2010. Retrieved from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/2010_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings (accessed on 1 March 2011).
- Frantz, D. and Collins, C. 2007. Those nuclear flashpoints are made in Pakistan. *Washington Post*, 11 November.
- Ganguly, S. 2001. *Conflict unending: India–Pakistan tensions since 1947*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Ganguly, S. and Kapur, S.P. 2010. The sorcerer's apprentice: Islamist militancy in South Asia. *Washington Quarterly*, 33, 47–59.
- Gregory, S. 2011. Pak toxic chaos plan changes nuke debate. *Times of India*, March 6.
- Harrison, S.S. 2008. What A. Q. Khan knows. *Washington Post*, 31 January.
- . 2010. US aid fuels dangerous deal in Pakistan. *Boston Globe*, 29 June.
- Heeger, G.A. 1977. Politics in the post-military state. *World Politics*, 29, 242–62.
- Hindu. 2008. Albright terms Pakistan an international migraine. *Hindu*, 3 December.
- . 2009. India condemns Israeli ground attack in Gaza. *Hindu News Update Service*, 4 January. Retrieved from <http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/002200901041820.htm> (accessed on 27 July 2009).
- Hussain, Z., Rosenberg, M. and Wonacott, P. 2008. Pakistan's probe finds local links to attacks on Mumbai. *Wall Street Journal*, 31 December.
- ICG. 2009. *Pakistan: The militant jihadi challenge*. Brussels: International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 164, 13 March.
- IISS. May 2007. *Nuclear black markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks—A net assessment*, Strategic Dossier. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.
- Khalilzad, Z. 2010. Get tough on Pakistan. *New York Times*, 20 October.
- Khan, S. 2009. *Nuclear weapons and conflict transformation: The case of India–Pakistan*. London: Routledge.
- Khilnani, S. 1997. *The idea of India*. London: Hamish Hamilton.
- Lake, D. 1992. Powerful pacifists: Democratic states and war. *American Political Science Review*, 86, 24–37.
- Lamont, J., Russell, A. and Kazmin, A. 2009. India's economy more durable than China. *Financial Times*, 31 March.
- Levy, A. and Scott-Clark, C. 2007. *Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the secret trade in nuclear weapons*. New York: Walker.
- Masood, S. 2009. Attack in Pakistani garrison city raises anxiety about safety of nuclear labs and staff. *New York Times*, 5 July.

- Mazzetti, M. and Schmitt, E. 2008. C.I.A. outlines Pakistan links with militants. *New York Times*, 30 July.
- Miller, G. 2010. U.S. officials say Pakistani spy agency released Afghan Taliban insurgents. *Washington Post*, 11 April.
- Myrdal, G. 1969. *Asian drama: An inquiry into the poverty of nations*. London: Penguin.
- Nawaz, S. 2008. *Crossed swords: Pakistan, its army, and the wars within*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Oldenburg, P. 2010. India, Pakistan, and Democracy: Solving the puzzle of divergent paths. London: Routledge.
- Parthasarathy, G. 2009. Why 'business as usual' with Pak? *Tribune*, 23 July.
- Paul, T.V. (ed.) 2005. *The India–Pakistan conflict: An enduring rivalry*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Raman, B. 2009. Indo-Pak relations: The roller coaster ride. South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 3261, 19 June. Retrieved from <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers33/paper3261.html> (accessed on 25 July 2009).
- Rashid, A. 2008. *Descent into chaos: The United States and the failure of nation building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*. New York: Viking.
- Reed, T.C. and Stillman, D.B. 2009. *The nuclear express: A political history of the bomb and its proliferation*. Minneapolis: Zenith Press.
- Riedel, B. 2011. *Deadly embrace: Pakistan, America, and the future of global jihad*. Washington: Brookings Institution.
- Rosato, S. 2003. The flawed logic of democratic peace theory. *American Political Science Review*, 97(4), 585–602.
- Rotella, S. 2010. On the trail of a terrorist. *Washington Post*, 14 November.
- Sanger, D.E. 2009. Obama's worst Pakistan nightmare. *New York Times Magazine*, 11 January.
- Sanger, D.E. and Schmitt, E. 2011. Pakistani nuclear arms pose challenge to U.S. policy. *New York Times*, 1 February.
- Saran, S. 2011. A different dialogue this time round? *Business Standard*, 16 February.
- Schmitt, E. and Perlez, J. 2009. Pakistan objects to U.S. plan for Afghan war. *New York Times*, 22 July.
- Schmitt, E., Mazzetti, M. and Perlez, J. 2008. Pakistan's spies aided group tied to Mumbai siege. *New York Times*, 8 December.
- Sengupta, S. 2009. Dossier from India gives new details of Mumbai attacks. *New York Times*, 7 January.
- Shah, P. 2008. Letter to Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee, 10 December. (copy given to author by Ambassador Shah).
- Shaikh, F. 2009. *Making sense of Pakistan*. London: Hurst.
- Shanker, T. and Sanger, D.E. 2009. Pakistan is rapidly adding nuclear arms, U.S. says. *New York Times*, 18 May.
- Sibal, K. 2009a. Mumbai attacks: Anatomy of a failed strategy. *Hindu*, 10 February.
- . 2009b. Passing the buck back. *Daily News & Analysis*, 20 February.
- Siddiqi, A. 2011. Pakistan's counterterrorism strategy: Separating friends from enemies. *Washington Quarterly*, 34, 149–62.
- Sinha, A. 2009. We can't say what India must do: Israel. *Indian Express*, 5 January.
- Smith, R.J. and Warrick, J. 2009. A nuclear power's act of proliferation. *Washington Post*, 13 November.
- Subrahmanyam, K. 2009. Moment of reckoning for Pakistan. *Daily News & Analysis*, 4 March.
- Subramanian, N. 2009a. Pakistan's civil society urges government to come out of denial. *Hindu*, 5 January.
- . 2009b. Gilani equates Mumbai attacks with Gaza. *Hindu*, 11 January.
- . 2009c. Heroes until 9/11: Zardari. *Hindu*, 9 July.
- Tavernise, S., Gillani, W. and Masood, S. 2009. Rampage in Pakistan shows reach of militants. *New York Times*, 1 April.
- Thakur, R. 2000. 'The South Asian nuclear challenge', in J. Baylis and R. O'Neill (eds), *Alternative nuclear futures: The role of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world* (pp. 101–24). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Times of India*. 2009. Pakistan created and nurtured terrorists, admits Zardari. *Times of India*, 9 July.

- Waldman, M. 2010. *The sun in the sky: The relationship between Pakistan's ISI and Afghan insurgents*. Destin Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics, Crisis States Discussion Paper 18, June. Retrieved from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/fp_uploaded_documents/100613_20106138531279734lse-isi-taliban.pdf (accessed on 1 March 2011).
- Warrick, J. 2008. U.S. officials: Pakistani agents helped plan Kabul bombing. *Washington Post*, 1 August.
- Watt, N. and Dodd, V. 2010. Cameron sparks diplomatic row with Pakistan after 'export of terror' remarks. *Guardian*, 29 July.
- Wolpert, S. 2010. *India and Pakistan: Continued conflict or cooperation?* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Ramesh Thakur is Professor of International Relations at the Australian National University. He was previously Senior Vice Rector of the UN University and a UN Assistant Secretary-General. Among other works, he is the author of *The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect* (Cambridge University Press, 2006), *Global Governance and the UN: An Unfinished Journey* (with Thomas G. Weiss) (Indiana University Press, 2010) and *The Responsibility to Protect: Norms, Laws and the Use of Force in International Politics* (Routledge, 2011).