The process of post-tsunami recovery and reconstruction in Aceh will take considerable time and is not easy. This book is an attempt at providing helpful background information on Acehnese history, politics and culture, which would benefit expatriate aid workers as well as foreign and domestic scholars in their dealings with the people of Aceh. It is written by specialists in Indonesian and Acehnese studies from a number of countries, together with Acehnese scholars. As the region was not accessible for decades, this book represents in many aspects a new, pioneering endeavour in Acehnese studies. The chapters cover many important aspects of history, such as the female Sultanahs of Aceh, Aceh’s Turkish connection and the Dutch Colonial War in Aceh. The main emphasis of the book is on relevant contemporary developments in the economy, politics, Islam, and the media, as well as painting, music, and literature.
The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) was established as an autonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional centre dedicated to the study of socio-political, security and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its wider geostrategic and economic environment. The Institute's research programmes are the Regional Economic Studies (RES, including ASEAN and APEC), Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS), and Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS).

ISEAS Publishing, an established academic press, has issued more than 2,000 books and journals. It is the largest scholarly publisher of research about Southeast Asia from within the region. ISEAS Publishing works with many other academic and trade publishers and distributors to disseminate important research and analyses from and about Southeast Asia to the rest of the world.
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For Southeast Asian Muslims, the faraway Ottoman Dynasty in Turkey represented a dream: a longing for Islamic power at a time of Islamic political decline. However, there were important moments when that dream had immediate political effects.

When the last fully independent Muslim state in Southeast Asia, Aceh, was attacked by the Dutch in 1873, it appealed to all the great powers of the time to come to its aid—Britain, France, United States, and Italy. As fellow colonial powers, all refused to break ranks with Holland. Only Ottoman Turkey took up the cause with the capitals of the world, going so far as to issue a formal offer of mediation to bring about peace in Sumatra, which was of course rejected by the Dutch. The most striking feature of this mediation offer was the grounds on which Turkey presumed to intrude into an area where the big powers were desperately discouraging intervention. Turkey claimed to have been the suzerain—the overlord—of Aceh since the sixteenth century, when the Ottoman sultans had accepted the tribute offered by Aceh in return for military protection. This overlordship had been renewed on both sides as recently as 1850, as the letter pointed out in its highly diplomatic language. Wrangled over between diplomatic chanceries for months before it was finally issued, the letter offering mediation hearkened back to a time when the Ottomans conquered the area around the Red Sea in the 1520s.

The Acehnese sent a delegation to the feet of the conqueror, recognized the supremacy of the powers inherent in his title of Caliph, made an act of
submission into the hands of the famous Sinan Pasha, raised the Ottoman flag in their ports and on their vessels, declared themselves vassals of Sultan Selim and asked in return for his high protection. Sultan Selim received these offers favourably. By his orders the Vezir Sinan Pasha sent to the vassal Sultan the cannons and swords of honour which are still to be seen in Aceh (Waltzing 1962, p. 612).

RAJA RUM

In many Southeast Asian traditions of the fifteenth to nineteenth centuries, "Rum" features as a mysterious amalgam of powers in the West, conflating Rome, Constantinople, and Alexander the Great. Mythologies of the Peninsulas and Sumatra associate Raja Rum, the great king of the West, with Raja Cina (China), the great king of the East. According to one origin myth of Johor, Iskandar Daul Karzain (Alexander the Great) had three sons by the daughter of the King of the Ocean. After a contest between the three brothers in the Singapore Straits, the eldest went to the West to become Raja Rum, the second East to become Raja Cina, while the third remained in Johor, to begin the later Minangkabau Dynasty (Marsden 1811). In the eighteenth century, rulers of Minangkabau styled themselves younger brothers of the rulers of Rum and Cina (ibid., pp. 338–41).

One Gayo origin myth also goes back to a shipwrecked child of Raja Rum. Among Baraks, his name was still so mythically powerful in 1890 that the Italian traveller Elio Modigliani, having admired he came from Rome, found himself acquiring followers as the word spread that he was an envoy, or perhaps incarnation, of the magically powerful Raja Rum.1

However, in the sixteenth century it became clear to Muslim Southeast Asian leaders, at least, that the Ottoman sultans were this Raja Rum of shadowy memory. Paradoxically, it was the Portuguese invasion of the Indian Ocean in 1498 that put Aceh directly into contact with Turkey. In the fifteenth century, Sumatra’s pepper had mostly gone to China, and what westward trade there was from Southeast Asia to the Mediterranean — in cloves, nutmeg and other luxury tropical products — was broken up into separate stages. Sumatrans had then been in direct contact only with South India, while the onward stage to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf ports was in the hands of Arabs and Gujaratis.

PEPPER

The Portuguese disrupted Islamic shipping in the years after 1500, and in particular attacked ships travelling from India to the Red Sea (heading for
Mecca or Cairo). They also conquered Melaka (in 1511), and greatly interfered with the activities of the pepper-producing sultanes on the north coast of Sumatra.

The Muslim traders regrouped around states strong enough to protect them, notably Aceh in Southeast Asia, Calicut in South India, and Turky, which expanded its control to the Red Sea ports in the reign of Selm I (r. 1512–20). It became dangerous even for Muslim shippers of Indian pepper from Kerala to defy the Portuguese predators to try to reach the Red Sea and from there, Cairo, Alexandria and Venice. Hence, an alternative Muslim pepper supply route developed, whereby Gujarati, Arab, Turkish and Acehnese traders shipped Southeast Asian pepper and other spices directly from Aceh to the Red Sea, without having to go near areas of Portuguese naval strength in India. The earliest European reports of such shipments reaching the Red Sea date from around 1530. By the 1560s, as much pepper was being shipped that way to Europe as was being hauled by the Portuguese around the Cape to Lisbon. Aceh and Turky shared an economic as well as a religious motive to resist and, if possible, crush their Portuguese rivals in the pepper trade.

The strongest of the Ottomans, Sultan Suleiman "the Magnificent" (r. 1520–66), was the first to extend Ottoman power into the Indian Ocean. In 1537, he instructed his governor of Egypt, Suleiman Pasha, to equip a powerful fleet to demolish Portuguese naval power in the Indian Ocean. This fleet reached Gujarat, and besieged the Portuguese in Diu for a few months in 1538, but achieved nothing militarily. Nevertheless, there seem to have been soldiers of this fleet who reached Southeast Asia, since Mendez Pinto referred to them as greatly strengthening Aceh in its wars against the Bataks and Portuguese, and also helping Demak in similar wars in Java (Reid 2004, pp. 74–78).

In the 1560s, the pepper link was at its peak, and we have Venetian, Turkish and Acehnese sources all mentioning the envoys who travelled from Aceh to the Red Sea with the pepper ships. The first well-documented Acehnese mission to Istanbul occurred round 1561–62. In response to this appeal, Turkish gunners were sent to Aceh at least by 1564, and were gratefully acknowledged by the Acehnese in a letter recently rediscovered in the Ottoman archives.

Another mission, led by an envoy called Husain, which probably covered the years 1566 to 1568, came close to achieving more spectacular success. He carried an appeal for help, in January 1566, from the Acehnese sultan, Alau'd-din al-Khatar, to the Caliph, protector of all Muslims, which is also preserved in the Ottoman archives. The Aceh ruler acknowledged the self-arrival of eight Turkish gunners sent in response to an earlier request. He appealed repeatedly to the Turkish sultan to come to the aid of Muslim pilgrims and merchants being attacked by the "infidel" Portuguese as they travelled to the Holy Land. "If Your Majesty's aid is not forthcoming, the wretched unbelievers will continue to massacre the innocent Muslims." (Farooqi 1986, pp. 267–68).

After a delay caused by the death of Suleiman the Magnificent in 1566, his successor, Selim II, energetically took up the project of extending Turkish power into the Indian Ocean. In a series of decrees in 1567, he not only ordered a fleet of fifteen galleys and two barges to be sent to assist Aceh, but also instructed the governor of Egypt to construct a canal at Suez so that his warships could go back and forth to the Indian Ocean on a regular basis. However, a serious revolt in Yemen interrupted these plans and the designated fleet was diverted to suppressing it, and only a few guns and gunsmiths appear to have reached Aceh (Reid 2004, pp. 79–87; Reid 1993, pp. 146–47).

Nevertheless, these contacts made a big impression in Southeast Asia, and especially in Aceh. In the years following this initiative, a pan-Islamic sense of solidarity against the infidels was probably stronger than at any time before the modern era. Aceh used its Turkish arms against the infidels for the first time against the Portuguese at the battle of Foro and in Aceh in 1570, and again in 1573; the second time apparently coordinating with the four South Indian Muslim sultans — Bijapur, Golconda, Bidar and Ahmadnagar — who had already buried their differences to attack Portuguese Goa (Smith 1958, pp. 298–99; Eaton 1978, pp. 83–85). In Maluku at the same time, Sultan Baib Ullah of Ternate (r. 1570–83) threw out the Portuguese and launched a crusade against them in the spice islands.

**MEMORY**

The strong direct connection between Turkey and Aceh lasted less than a century. The Dutch and English ships that began making the journey around Africa in 1600 were far more numerous and efficient than the Portuguese, and by 1630, the Muslim-Venetian pepper route, from Aceh to the Mediterranean, was no more. Even Istanbul needed to get its pepper from the Dutch and English after that. The most prominent pilgrims to Mecca in the rest of the seventeenth century went on Dutch or British ships as far as Surat (Gujarat), and then took Indian ships to the Red Sea.

Nevertheless, the memory remained, especially in Aceh, where it was kept alive by the presence of the Turkish flag, adopted as Aceh's, by the enormous cannons which remained at the capital, and by the popular mythologies that
formed around these items. The chroniclers of Aceh, including the famous Nurud-din ar-Raniry, attempted to record the history behind these items:

He [Sultan Ala'ud-Din Ri'ayat Shah al-Kahar]...When the Caliph of Diyarbakr sent the envoy to a vassal while he was on a visit to Paris, he sent an impressive state letter to Aceh, and instructed him to ask for a contribution to the latest war in Europe via the Straits. Sultan Ibrahim of Aceh sent a contribution of 10,000 Spanish dollars to his Ottoman counterpart to show his loyalty and solidarity against the Russians. He received in return a contribution of 50,000 French francs as a symbol of Turkey's lost greatness (Reid 2004, pp. 171-74).

Sultan Abdul Mejid of Turkey issued two decrees (firmans) in 1850: one renewing Turkish protection over Aceh, and the other confirming Ibrahim as a vassal ruler.1 Ghauth was sent back to Aceh in style, with a recommendation to the viceroy (Khedive) in Egypt, and instructions to the Turkish governor of Yemen to send the envoy safely home. The Turkish connection returned to the centre of Acehnese thinking. When the Crimean War began in 1853, Ibrahim...
Sayyid, Habib Aburahman al-Zahir, prime minister of Aceh before the war, made Istanbul his chief target once it became clear the British would do nothing to help Aceh, despite much support to do so in Penang. For most of 1873, the Habib was in the Turkish capital, drumming up support among reformists and pan-Islamists alike. He and his Turkish sympathizers located in the Turkish archives evidence of Ottoman suzerainty over Aceh from both the sixteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries. The Dutch pulled out all stops to prevent a painfully weak Turkey from doing anything that would stir up Acehnese and Southeast Asian resistance, and in the end, only a polite diplomatic offer of mediation was forthcoming; equally politely declined by the Dutch. Rumours circulated of Turkish help for the Acehnese, or for other potential rebels in restive parts of Indonesia, but it was nothing as frightening as the Dutch had feared.

Palembang and Jambi were also sites of resistance to Dutch advances in the mid-nineteenth century — a resistance which became more religious as it became more desperate. A new sultan of Jambi, Taha Safi'ud-din, neglected to declare his allegiance when he ascended the throne in 1855, and resisted Dutch attempts two years later to negotiate a more binding treaty with him. While envoys from Baravia were trying to win him round, Taha appealed to the Ottoman sultan for a document declaring Jambi to be Turkish territory in which foreigners had no right to interfere. Taha entrusted this letter to his connections in Singapore, one of whom was provided with 30,000 Spanish dollars to undertake the journey to Constantinople. The emissary, Sharif Ali, apparently travelled only as far as Mecca, where he acquired forged letters from the Caliph authorizing the expulsion of the Dutch from Southeast Asia. Taha's letter did, however, reach its destination. The Turkish grand vezir asked the Dutch ambassador whether Jambi was independent, and when assured that it was part of Netherlands Indies, he promised to give no reply.

In November 1858, a Dutch expedition occupied Taha's capital and installed a new sultan. Taha escaped, and after the withdrawal of the Dutch troops, he remained the de facto ruler of Jambi for almost half a century. For several years, he continued his attempts to have Jambi recognized as Turkish territory, backed by his agents in Singapore, who were reported to be raising money and arms for him there. One Arab who had been active in his cause in Singapore went to Mecca in 1861, possibly with another appeal to the Caliph.

**PAN-ISLAM, JIHADISM AND THE OTTOMANS**

A mindset which we might today call “jihadist” or Islamist, and attribute to the global projection of struggles in Palestine and Iraq, does in fact have a long history in Southeast Asia. The twentieth-century rise of nationalism not only marginalized such thinking, which colonial writers labelled “pan-Islamic”, but made it seem quixotic; its importance exaggerated by colonial paranoia. A century later, with nationalism again vigorously challenged by concepts of solidarity with a global Muslim community (ummah), the situation looks very different. This current must be seen as a continuing one within the Islamic world, emerging with far greater salience at some periods, such as the present, than at others.

The period between 1870 and 1918 was another such time of Muslim frustration, when the solidarity of the ummah loomed particularly large in the region, with some very specific consequences. At the point of their terminal decline, paradoxically, the Ottoman sultans were a central part of this mindset. Especially during the reign of the last Ottoman sultan, Abdul Hamid II (r. 1876–1908), the movement for a universal and effective caliphate received consistent encouragement from the top. After the disastrous Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78, Abdul Hamid turned his back on the West and suspended the liberal constitution of 1876. Encouraged by the sympathy he received from all over the Muslim world, including Southeast Asia, he hoped to make up in Asia for the influence he had lost in Europe. The Sultan made clear that he wished to be regarded as a sort of pope and protector for Sunni Muslims everywhere, and the Turkish press reflected this change in mood (Arnold 1924, pp. 173–77; Snouck Hurgronje 1915, pp. 23–27).

Pan-Islamic hopes were more than ever focussed on Turkey in this period, as the only Islamic power, the claimant to the caliphate, and also the nominal overlord of Mecca and of most Arabs. Southeast Asian Arabs would readily claim to be Turkish subjects when it seemed likely to benefit them. The Arabs of Singapore, in particular the most prominent Abogoff and al-Junied families, as well as their close confidant Sultan Abu Bakar of Johor, not only travelled to the Middle East and made the pilgrimage to Mecca but also visited Istanbul, and took a substantial interest in Turkish affairs. They also sympathized with the Acehnese and other Indonesian Muslims that they thought were being oppressed by the Dutch. The actions of Turkey in Asia, however symbolic, assumed greater importance through the mediation of such men, and their counterparts throughout the archipelago.

**TURKISH CONSULATES**

Neither Britain nor the Netherlands liked the idea of Turkish consuls in their colonies, because of their fear that they would become the focus for pan-Islamic agitations. However, since both London and The Hague wanted the right to
appoint consuls in places like Alexandria, Tunis, Aleppo and Damascus, they had to make some concessions in their own empires.

When Britain allowed Turkey to have its first consul in Singapore in 1864, the Dutch were particularly alarmed. He was the wealthy Hadhrami merchant Sayyid Abdallah al-Junied. As they feared, the Indonesian pilgrims to Mecca who travelled via Singapore, as well as other prominent Muslims, tended to regard him as the spiritual and political representative of the Caliph. At his death in 1865, therefore, the Dutch requested that London forbid the appointment of another Muslim as consul, because the British and Dutch had a common interest, they argued, to guard against "the smouldering and easily inflammable element of fanaticism" among Southeast Asian Muslims.6

Istanbul had apparently intended to appoint Abdallah's brother, Sayyid Junied al-Junied, to the vacant office, but when Britain deferred to Dutch pressure, Turkey agreed to leave the position vacant. Nevertheless, Sayyid Junied was regarded locally as the honorary consul or, as the Dutch complained, as "a sort of acting consul for Turkey" for several years thereafter.7 In other words, Britain supported the Dutch to the extent of not officially recognizing Junied's consular status, but not to the point of preventing him from acting in Turkey's interests. Sayyid Muhammad Alsagoff, the most influential of Singapore's Muslims in the 1880s and 1890s, assumed the same role at that time (Reid 2004, pp. 232–33, 267–72).

Dutch agents and spies in Singapore reported a great deal of Turkish meddling in Southeast Asia in this period, perhaps partly because they were paid to do so by the Dutch consulate. In 1881, two prominent inamrs from Mecca sailed to Singapore with what the British and Dutch thought was some kind of political mission to Java and Palembang. It may have been intended mostly to gain support for Turkish causes, but undoubtedly had the effect of raising the hopes of Muslims in Sumatra for help in their own struggles.8 The inamrs were prevented from sailing to Palembang, but two Turkish ex-army officers did apparently get there, and allegedly inspired a group of thirty Palembang conspirators, including several members of the former royal dynasty, to plan the murder of all the Europeans in the town. All were rounded up by the Dutch before anything of the sort could happen.9 Under interrogation, some of them revealed their understanding that Javanese Muslims were being aroused for the same cause, and that visits to Java by Muhammad Alsagoff and the Sultan of Johor in 1881 were meant to have similar incendiary effects. Dutch Consul General W.H. Read also harboured deep suspicions of Muhammad Alsagoff, whom he claimed had offered hospitality to several of those involved in the Palembang conspiracy.10

In 1890, a Turkish warship on a visit to Japan created great excitement in Singapore, and the local Muslim community passed news of its arrival to Sumatra. The hopes of the Acehnese of help from that quarter revived, and an Aceh envoy was sent to Singapore with letters requesting that both the Turkish warship's commander and Sayyid Muhammad Alsagoff bring Aceh's plight to the attention of the Caliph. The Turkish warship had long departed by the time the letters arrived, but Alsagoff received the letters, and raised Acehnese expectations by leaving soon after on a tour of Europe. On his return to Singapore in 1892, Alsagoff sent a personal envoy to Aceh, after attempting to quieten Dutch alarm by telling their consul that he was simply passing on Turkish advice that Aceh should submit to Dutch rule. The mission apparently had the opposite effect, however, and indeed, the website of the current Alsagoff family in Singapore remembers with pride that their famous forebear "helped the Acehnese people to fight against the Dutch."11 At any event, preparations were soon made for an Acehnese diplomatic mission to Constantinople. The envoy, Teuku Laota, was equipped with a Turkish sword and decoration as tokens of Turkey's earlier recognition of Aceh's status as a Turkish protectorate.12

Laota appears to have travelled no further than Singapore, where he may have been discouraged in his efforts by more realistic Muslims.13 Instead, the Acehnese sultan wrote directly to Constantinople at the end of 1893. His letter fell into Dutch instead of Turkish hands (Goebe and Adriaanse 1957–59, pp. 153–57), and there is no record of further attempts in this direction. Britain's patience, with Dutch sensitivity about allowing an official Turkish consul in Singapore had worn particularly thin once they saw a Turkish consul in Batavia. In July 1901, therefore, they allowed a Turkish official, Haji Atsuallah Effendi, to take up the job. In 1903, this consul received an appeal from Sultan Taha of Jambi, who had been defying the Dutch in the interior for nearly fifty years. He must have forwarded it to his government, since Turley made representations on Taha's behalf to The Hague shortly thereafter (Goebe and Adriaanse 1957–59, p. 1662; Smit 1957, pp. 271–74, 328–29, 364–66, 443–45). The Dutch were sufficiently aroused by the dangers such involvement represented to pursue and kill Taha the following year. A few months thereafter most of the Jambi nobility was again in revolt, apparently incited to action by a Hungarian officer in the Turkish army, who claimed to have a special commission from the Caliph to assist in the defence of Jambi. He was quickly arrested, nineteen chiefs were captured and exiled, and Jambi was again gradually subdued during the following two years.14 Britain did not again allow an Ottoman consul in Singapore.
Meanwhile, the Netherlands Indies government had allowed a Turkish consul general in Batavia since the 1880s, on the grounds that they could better control any pan-Islamic activity on their own territory than that which operated out of Singapore.

This assumption went somewhat awry, however, with Muhammad Kiamil Bey, the consul general in Batavia from 1897 to 1899. He was far more zealous than his predecessors, notably in encouraging Arabs in the Indies to regard themselves as Turkish subjects and to bring their grievances to him. He sent eleven young Arabs for schooling in Constantinople between 1898 and 1904, and they came back with Turkish passports which they claimed entitled them to "European" status (which had been given to the Japanese a few years earlier) (Gobée and Adriaanse 1957–59, pp. 1617, 1619–20, 1737–38). The Dutch finally threw him out when they caught him offering assistance to Indonesian rulers, including the Acehnese sultan who had just submitted to the Dutch (ibid., p. 1662). Turkey transferred him to Singapore, but Britain refused to give him an exequatur. Besides his excessive enthusiasm in colonial eyes, he was said to have offended some of the Johor royal family by marrying Abu Bakar's widow.

The most important result of Kiamil Bey's sojourn in Batavia was to foster closer links between Southeast Asian Arabs and the Middle Eastern press. Towards the end of 1897, the Arabic al-Ma'amun of Constantinople, the Thammat al-Fusum of Beirut, and several Egyptian newspapers had all acquired correspondents in Batavia or Singapore, who regularly complained about the injustices to which Muslims in general, but Arabs in particular, were subjected by the Dutch. This press campaign aroused high hopes that Turkey would intervene to push the Dutch to give "European" status to Netherlands Indies Arabs. The campaign alarmed Batavia for a time, but faded somewhat when The Hague mobilized diplomatic pressure on Istanbul (Reid 2004, pp. 243–45).

THE CALIPH AND THE GREAT WAR

The First World War, which pitted Turkey for the first time against the colonial powers — Britain, France and Russia — was potentially the most dangerous moment for European colonial rule over Asia's Muslims. Although there were some, largely German-inspired, attempts to use the idea of a holy war on behalf of the Caliph, it was not pursued with much commitment or imagination by the Turks themselves. The Young Turks were in the process of redefining themselves as the most secular of nationalists, and would succeed in ending the absolute monarchy in 1918.

Many of their erstwhile Arab subjects, meanwhile, turned nationalist and anti-Turkish at British urging.

Nevertheless the idea of the Ottomans as the hope of Muslims had enormous and often fatal attraction. In the Singapore mutiny of February 1915, the most singular anti-colonial act in Singapore history, there was again a Turkish theme. On 15 February 1915, only three months after Turkey entered the war, 815 Indian troops and 100 Malays of the Malay States Guides rebelled, tried to release 300 imprisoned Germans, largely from the capture of the Enzeler, and killed 33 British military men and 18 European civilians before reinforcements arrived in the city to combat them. The governor's letter analysing the events noted the unfitness within largely Muslim units, "at a time when Great Britain was at war with Turkey, whose ruler is looked up to as the spiritual head of the Mohammedan religion, was without doubt the principal cause of the mutiny." A Singapore Gujarati merchant, Kasim Ali Mansoor, one of the few Singapore civilians executed over the mutiny, had sought to provide a link between Turkey and the Malay States Guides, who in December 1914 refused orders to proceed to East Africa. His letter to his son in Rangoon had been intercepted that same December. It proved to contain an appeal, meant to be forwarded to the man thought to be the Turkish consul there (though the consulate had ceased to exist with Turkey's entry into the war), to send a warship to Singapore, to take the Malay soldiers to somewhere where they could fight for the Turks instead of against them (Kuwajima 1988, p. 83; Harper and Miller 1984, pp. 204–06; Saracen 1995, p. 11).

Needless to say, the dream of a strong, progressive Muslim power has continued to inspire Muslims everywhere who feel themselves weak and dominated. The Ottomans were at the heart of that dream for 400 years.

Notes

4. Heldewier to Gericks, June 19 and 26, 1873, Buitenlandse Zaken Dossier Atjeh.


6. Van de Putte to Cremers, Jan. 4, 1866; also Read to Cremers, July 31, 1865; ARA, B.Z. Dossier 3076.

7. Read to Loudon, June 23, 1873, copy Koloniën to B.Z., Sept. 6, 1873, Buitenlandse Zaken Dossier Atjeh.


