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ABSTRACT

Engagement is a multi-layered, multi-dimensional process, that extends beyond those official relations which occur at the government-to-government (or Track 1) level, to encompass a wide spectrum of people-to-people contacts and personal linkages. Many of these interactions and activities occur at the so-called ‘Track 2’ level—a term that is used to describe unofficial activities involving academics, think tank researchers, journalists, and former officials, as well as current officials participating in their private capacities. This paper documents and evaluates Australia’s and New Zealand’s existing Track 2 engagement with Asia: it identifies those Track 2 institutions and networks with an Asian focus that exist in the Asian region with which Australia and New Zealand either are or could be engaging; and it assesses the relative importance of these institutions and networks in order to ensure that Australia and New Zealand are in fact engaging with the most productive ones. Against that backdrop, the paper concludes with a series of suggestions as to how Australia and New Zealand might best go about sustaining and potentially strengthening their existing Track 2 engagement with the Asian region.

This paper represents the authors’ views alone. It has been drawn entirely from open sources, and has no official status or endorsement.
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Brendan Taylor, Anthony Milner and Desmond Ball
Canberra
May 2006
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ABAC  APEC Business Advisory Council
ACC   Australia China Council
AFTA  ASEAN Free Trade Area
AIC   Australia-India Council
AII   Australia-Indonesia Institute
AIIA  Australian Institute of International Affairs
AJIA  Australian Journal of International Affairs
AJF   Australia Japan Foundation
AKF   Australia Korea Foundation
AMI   Australia Malaysia Institute
ANU   Australian National University
APEC  Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
AP-NET Asia Pacific Business Network
APT   ASEAN Plus Three
ARF   ASEAN Regional Forum
ASC   APEC Study Centre
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEAN-BAC ASEAN Business Advisory Council
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN BIS</td>
<td>ASEAN Business and Investment Summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN-CCI</td>
<td>ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN-ISIS</td>
<td>ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEM</td>
<td>Asia-Europe Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASPI</td>
<td>Australian Strategic Policy Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATI</td>
<td>Australia-Thailand Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AusAID</td>
<td>Australian Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aus-CSCAP</td>
<td>Australian Committee of CSCAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSPECC</td>
<td>Australian Committee of PECC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDIPSS</td>
<td>Brunei Darussalam Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BFA</td>
<td>Boao Forum for Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAAR</td>
<td>Council for Australian Arab Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAEC</td>
<td>Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANCAPS</td>
<td>Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>COALAR</td>
<td>Council on Australian Latin America Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSBM</td>
<td>Confidence and Security Building Measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCAP-NZ</td>
<td>New Zealand Committee of CSCAP</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEAC</td>
<td>Council on East Asian Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CER</td>
<td>Closer Economic Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CICP</td>
<td>Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIISS</td>
<td>China Institute for International Strategic Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCAP</td>
<td>Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Centre for Strategic and International Studies (Indonesia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CYDECO</td>
<td>International Youth Cooperation Development Center (Vietnam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRM</td>
<td>Dialogue and Research Monitor</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East Asia Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EASG</td>
<td>East Asia Study Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAVG</td>
<td>East Asia Vision Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDSS</td>
<td>Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (Singapore)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFA</td>
<td>Institute of Foreign Affairs (Laos)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCC</td>
<td>Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIR</td>
<td>Institute for International Relations (Vietnam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IISS</td>
<td>International Institute for Strategic Studies (United Kingdom)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISDS</td>
<td>Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (Philippines)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS Malaysia</td>
<td>Institute of Strategic and International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS Thailand</td>
<td>Institute of Security and International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCIE</td>
<td>Japan Center for International Exchange</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFIR</td>
<td>Japan Forum on International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIIA</td>
<td>Japan Institute of International Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFAT</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (New Zealand)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEACD</td>
<td>Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEAT</td>
<td>Network of East Asian Think Tanks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZAI</td>
<td>New Zealand Asia Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZAID</td>
<td>New Zealand’s International Aid and Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZIIA</td>
<td>New Zealand Institute of International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZPECC</td>
<td>New Zealand Committee of PECC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAFTAD</td>
<td>Pacific Asia Free Trade and Development Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBEC</td>
<td>Pacific Basin Economic Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>PECC</td>
<td>Pacific Economic Cooperation Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>SARS</td>
<td>Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCS</td>
<td>South China Sea</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDSC</td>
<td>Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (Australia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIIA</td>
<td>Singapore Institute of International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIIS</td>
<td>Shanghai Institute of International Studies (China)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOM</td>
<td>Senior Officials Meeting</td>
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By almost any indicator, engagement with Asia is a seemingly unavoidable national policy priority for both Australia and New Zealand. In terms of trade, for instance, two thirds of Australian and one third of New Zealand exports are destined for Asia.¹ Approximately 23 percent of New Zealand’s inbound tourism comes from Asia, while within the next five years China alone is set to become Australia’s largest source of tourists.² Seventy percent of the overseas students currently studying at Australian tertiary institutions and just over 80 percent attending those in New Zealand come from the Asian region.³ Likewise, in demographic terms, one in every 20 Australians and one in every 15 New Zealanders (including a startling one in nine in the city of Auckland) is of Asian ethnicity—a figure that is projected to rise in the years ahead.⁴

For a variety of historical, cultural and geographic reasons, however, both Australia and New Zealand have traditionally tended to face an uphill struggle in their efforts to engage with the Asian region. This is not only a product of how the region views these two countries, but also one of how Australians and New Zealanders perceive themselves and their place in this part of the world. The American political scientist Samuel Huntington, for instance, has
described Australia as a ‘torn country’, a people who, in his words, are ‘divided over whether their society belongs to one civilisation or another’. In similar vein, Rochelle Bright has reflected that since their first arrival in New Zealand in the mid-nineteenth century, the new settlers, and their offspring, have long struggled with their European origins and their isolated geographical location in what is now often termed the Asia-Pacific, trying to balance their loyalty to the British Crown and the practicalities of operating in the Asia-Pacific region.

In recent years, these difficulties have been compounded by a number of factors. First, by shaking their confidence in the momentum of Asian ‘development’ and promoting suspicion of Western governments in Asian societies, the 1997–1998 Asian Financial Crisis presented enormous challenges for Australia’s and New Zealand’s economic and trade linkages with the region. Added to this, the 11 September 2001 attacks on the American homeland and the subsequent onset of the ‘Global War on Terror’ had the effect of diverting much of Canberra’s and Wellington’s attention toward Western nations and away from Asia. Gradually, however, concerns began to mount in both capitals as to the potentially deleterious economic and national security effects of this worsening ‘drift’ from the Asian region.

The Howard and Clark Governments have each subsequently responded by initiating a new phase of engagement activism in their respective foreign relations with countries in the Asian region. These efforts were epitomised by the participation of both Australia and New Zealand in the inaugural East Asia Summit of December 2005. At the bilateral level, the Australian Government has invested considerable effort into building what Prime Minister Howard terms ‘an enduring relationship with China—a relationship that is mature, practical and substantial’. In August 2004, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer acknowledged the political implications of this China orientation, when he indicated that the United States could not automatically expect Australia’s support in the event of a war with China over Taiwan. Australia’s relationship with East Asia’s other
historical great power, Japan, is also deepening. This is evident in the elevation to Ministerial level of the Trilateral Security Dialogue between the United States, Japan, and Australia and by the fact that Australian troops continue to protect Japanese engineers in Iraq. Meanwhile, New Zealand has signed new Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with Thailand, Singapore and Brunei, while also embarking upon FTA negotiations with China, Malaysia and ASEAN. The Clark Government has also established a Ministerial Task Force intended to build on these economic breakthroughs in New Zealand relations with Asia.

Although state-led responses such as these are critically important, Asian engagement clearly extends beyond those official relations which occur at the government-to-government (or Track 1) level. Engagement, after all, is a multi-layered, multi-dimensional process that also encompasses a wide spectrum of people-to-people contacts and personal linkages. Many of these interactions and activities occur at the so-called ‘Track 2’ level—a term that is used to describe unofficial activities involving academics, think tank researchers, journalists, and former officials, as well as current officials participating in their ‘private’ capacities. As discussed further in chapter 2, a defining characteristic of these second track processes is the existence of some linkage to Track 1, either through the participation of officials and/or institutionalised reporting arrangements.

Against that backdrop, this study documents and evaluates Australia’s and New Zealand’s existing Track 2 engagement with Asia: it identifies those Track 2 institutions and networks with an Asian focus that exist in the region with which Australia and New Zealand either are or could be engaging; and it assesses the relative importance of these institutions and networks in order to ensure that Australia and New Zealand are in fact engaging with the most productive ones.
The paper is divided into a further four chapters. Chapter 2 provides a definition of ‘Track 2’, specifically in terms of how it is typically understood and applied in an Asia-Pacific context. It undertakes a brief review of the scholarship and also discusses the relative strengths and weaknesses of Track 2 as a method of diplomacy. Chapter 3 identifies the leading Track 2 institutions and activities that exist in the Asian region and describes the extent of Australian and New Zealand involvement in these. Chapter 4 documents and evaluates a number of additional Australian and New Zealand-based institutions and activities that exhibit an Asia focus and that also contribute to Track 2 processes. Finally, chapter 5 provides a series of conclusions and recommendations as to how Australia and New Zealand might best go about sustaining and potentially strengthening their Track 2 engagement with the Asian region.
CHAPTER 2

TRACK 2 DIPLOMACY—A CRITIQUE

What is Track 2 Diplomacy?

The term ‘Track 2’ now has a generally accepted meaning in the Asian region—a meaning that is not necessarily completely synonymous with usage in other regions. Track 2 refers to unofficial activities, involving academics, think tank researchers, journalists, and former officials, as well as current officials participating in their private capacities. This is distinct from ‘Track 1’, which is defined as official, government-led multilateral organisations and processes such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and multilateral defence cooperation programs. A defining characteristic of Track 2, however, is the existence of some linkage to Track 1, either through the participation of officials and/or institutionalised reporting arrangements, such as have been formed between the ARF and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP).

The essential elements of second track diplomacy are evinced in the establishment of CSCAP, which has emerged as one of the leading Track 2 institutions in the region.10 Three themes permeated
the discussions that attended its establishment. The first was that the Council should be a non-governmental institution, yet involve government officials, albeit in their private capacities. Although it was considered essential that the institution be independent from official control in order to take full advantage of the extraordinary vitality and intellectual richness of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) engaged in the second track process, it was also recognised that official involvement was necessary in order to attract government resources and to ensure that the value and practicability of the NGO efforts secured official appreciation. In other words, the prospects for implementation should count for as much as the intrinsic worth of any ideas generated in the second track process. It was considered important that the official involvement include senior military personnel as well as defence civilians and foreign affairs officers.

The second theme derived from the experience of NGOs such as the Pacific Asia Free Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD) and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC) in the promotion of Asia-Pacific economic cooperation throughout the 1970s and 1980s. These NGOs contributed to the regional economic cooperation process in several important ways. To begin with, they developed and disseminated the ideas and stimulated the discussion that engendered the process. They conducted the technical economic studies and analyses which showed the benefits of liberalisation of trade in the region, either through formal free trade arrangements or, more recently, the concept of ‘open regionalism’. They demonstrated to government officials that meaningful and productive dialogue on complex and important policy matters is possible, notwithstanding the extraordinary disparity in the sizes and interests of the numerous parties involved. By providing forums for official but ‘unofficial’ dialogue, the NGOs contributed to greater official interaction and enhanced mutual confidence, as well as providing a sound ‘building block’ for supporting cooperative arrangements at the governmental level itself.
The third theme in the foundation of CSCAP was the acceptance of the need to build on existing arrangements in the region wherever possible rather than constructing new structures and processes. In practice, this meant building upon the arrangements and processes developed by other leading Track 2 institutions—namely the ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS)—which were the most advanced in the region in terms of both their infrastructure and their co-operative arrangements and practices.

The terminology of Track 1 and Track 2 has also been extended to include Track 1½ and Track 3 processes. Track 1½ are officially sponsored, the participants include a large proportion (typically a majority) of officials, usually in their official capacities, but non-officials from Track 2 (and sometimes even Track 3) processes are also included; while the activities generally involve exchanges of views, and are usually exploratory rather than conclusive with regard to policy outcomes. Track 3 is defined as those other organisations and individuals (including academics and many NGOs) that are active in the security domain, but not directly concerned with influencing official government policies.

A Review of the Scholarship

The literature on Track 2 diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific can be separated into two distinct strands. The first is general, consisting of efforts to document the proliferation of second track processes in the region and to identify broader trends in the evolution of these. The pre-eminent attempt of this kind is the *Dialogue and Research Monitor (DRM)*. The DRM (initially called the *Dialogue Monitor*) was established in 1994, with Ford Foundation funding, by Paul Evans and a group of researchers at York University, Canada. Its primary aims were to catalogue multilateral dialogue on Asia-Pacific security issues and to produce an annual report identifying any shifting trends. When Ford Foundation funding expired in 1998, ongoing financial support for the project was provided through the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE). The JCIE subsequently took responsibility for administering the DRM in 2003, after practicalities
dictated that an Asian institution would be best positioned to undertake future monitoring of regional dialogue activity.\textsuperscript{12}

The DRM built upon work undertaken by Evans during the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{13} Whereas cataloguing is the primary function of the DRM, a number of other overviews of Track 2 diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific have tended to place greater emphasis upon interpreting trends in second track activities and evaluating the ‘impact’ of these processes. Brian Job’s outstanding chapter in the third volume of Muthiah Alagappa’s equally impressive \textit{Asian Security} series is by far the most comprehensive and sophisticated assessment of this kind.\textsuperscript{14} Charles Morrison’s description and assessment of Track 2 networks which assist in promoting economic security in the region also makes a useful contribution.\textsuperscript{15}

Efforts have also been undertaken to catalogue the various institutes and think tanks in the region—such as the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore), the Shanghai Institute of International Affairs and the JCIE—which engage in Track 2 activities. The most ambitious of these attempts is a volume edited by Tadashi Yamamoto during the mid-1990s, which surveys a range of NGOs, research institutions and philanthropic organisations from throughout the Asia-Pacific region.\textsuperscript{16} Helen Nesadurai and Diane Stone have also contributed an oft-cited piece of research examining the policy influence of Southeast Asian think tanks.\textsuperscript{17}

The second strand of scholarship on Track 2 diplomacy in the Asian region is more specific. It examines the impact and importance of particular institutions or activities. Much of this work has concentrated on CSCAP. Evans was once again a pioneer in terms of initiating research on CSCAP, drawing upon his personal involvement in this process to write during the mid-1990s on its origins and prospects.\textsuperscript{18} Building also upon his earlier research\textsuperscript{19} and close association with the establishment of CSCAP, Ball has produced the most comprehensive study of the organisation in the form of his critical review of CSCAP’s record and future prospects.\textsuperscript{20}
The other major contributor to the study of CSCAP is the American academic Sheldon Simon, who has produced at least two influential articles. The first is a study written under the auspices of the National Bureau of Asian Research which investigates the relationship between CSCAP and the ARF, specifically in terms of how ASEAN Leaders view the utility of this Track 2 process. The second—intended, in Simon’s terms, to complement Ball’s larger study through interviews with CSCAP and ARF members—examines CSCAP activities and evaluates their impact at the Track 1 level.

ASEAN-ISIS has received a similar level of analytical attention. A number of scholars, including Mely Cabellero-Anthony, Carolina Hernandez and Pauline Kerr, have undertaken research drawing upon both the CSCAP and ASEAN-ISIS experiences. Perhaps the most insightful and innovative work exclusively on ASEAN-ISIS, however, has been produced by the Filipino defence analyst Herman Kraft. Kraft’s study of ASEAN-ISIS has shed particular light upon the so-called ‘autonomy dilemma’ of Track 2 security dialogue in Asia (see below). A more recent contribution comes in the form of Hiro Katsumata’s examination of the ASEAN-ISIS role in developing security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. Katsumata’s study examines the commonly accepted contribution of ASEAN-ISIS in the establishment of the ARF—specifically in terms of how the Track 2 level introduced and promoted an important set of ideas on regional security cooperation.

The third dialogue activity to receive attention as a case study is the so-called South China Sea (SCS) Workshop process. Much of the analysis examining the SCS Workshops has actually been undertaken by the founders of this dialogue, Ambassador Hashim Djalal of Indonesia and Canadian academic Ian Townsend-Gault. In an edited volume published by the US Institute of Peace in the late 1990s, for instance, Djalal and Townsend-Gault contributed an excellent chapter examining the SCS Workshops as an exercise in preventive diplomacy. This broad-ranging study analyses the origins and evolution of the process, before assessing its contributions and
taking stock of what lessons may be gained from these. Djalal went on to produce a short Indonesian perspective on the objectives, approaches and achievements of the SCS Workshops and Townsend-Gault a useful chapter on the process as part of a widely circulated CSCAP Working Group report on Preventive Diplomacy. Another notable contribution is Yann-Huei Song’s short monograph, which provides a Taiwanese perspective on the evolution of the SCS Workshops.

Why Track 2 Diplomacy?

Drawing in part from the above literature, second track processes can be seen as having a number of beneficial characteristics. Some of these are intangible and, therefore, not readily quantifiable.

First, Track 2 institutions and activities can serve as a useful source of advice to governments. Typically the most helpful advice pertains either to relatively new or longer term issue areas, upon which government agencies rarely have either the time or the resources to quickly develop a substantial base of expertise. In this regard, second track processes can act as a useful mechanism for building capacity. A very clear case in point is the ASEAN-ISIS role in the building of ASEAN. Since 1993, senior ASEAN officials have met annually with the leaders of this second track institution and have also asked for studies to be conducted by the organisation on a regular basis.

Second, Track 2 processes can provide a ‘laboratory’ of sorts, where new ideas can be generated and tested. Often the ideas in question are simply too sensitive or controversial to be discussed at the Track 1 level. The Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) serves as an appropriate example of this useful ideational function. As Stuart Harris, an individual closely associated with the development of this highly influential institution, reflects:

The overall purpose was to have unofficial channels of dialogue on economic matters where analysts and others close to
government could discuss economic issues and policy options in a more exploratory manner and with greater frankness than is normally possible for government officials as officials. Its specific role was to develop and disseminate ideas and stimulate discussion about economic issues and specific processes of economic cooperation in the region. ... Out of the PECC process came ideas on open regionalism, the need for greater harmonisation of standards and regulatory processes affecting international trade, and the need for an investment code in the region.²⁹

Third, second track processes are seen as providing an alternative diplomatic route when progress at the first track level stalls or becomes deadlocked. The SCS Workshop process provides a useful example of where Track 2 diplomacy has performed such a role. Since January 1990, this initiative has sought to provide a forum where the countries in the South China Sea region can meet to discuss the potential for cooperation in areas where it is functionally and legally required (such as environmental protection, search and rescue at sea, and environmental monitoring). The highly acrimonious nature of claims over the Spratly and other islands in the region initially rendered discussion of such cooperative possibilities problematic at the Track 1 level. Indeed as Townsend-Gault recalls:

When we started, contact between some of the governments of the South China Sea region were either nebulous or nonexistent. Vietnam was slowly emerging from a long period of isolation, and Cambodia and Laos were further behind in this regard. The then six members of ASEAN did not regard the countries of Indo-China as fully part of the region. This changed with a rapidity that startled many observers, but when the project began, it cannot [sic] be said that we were building on an established network of connections at the political and professional levels among the jurisdictions of the region.³⁰

A fourth benefit of Track 2 institutions and activities is the useful ‘brokerage’ role they are often able to perform by serving as a conduit between government, on the one hand, and a broad range of
potentially useful Track 3 processes, NGOs, specialist organisations and academic institutions, on the other. Track 2 institutions and organisations that are consistently able to perform this function effectively will be valued at the first track level, partly because of their capacity to tap a wide range of expertise—to bring new voices, new ideas, new knowledge to the attention of government.

Finally, it has been posited that Track 2 processes can perform a range of broader ‘socialising’ functions. At a basic level, second track activities provide an opportunity for potential adversaries to meet and get to know one another, which otherwise would not be the case. CSCAP Study Group meetings, for example, allow policy experts from China and Taiwan to interact and exchange views in both formal and informal settings. In the process, it is likely that they will gain a greater appreciation of each other’s respective national standpoints and gradually begin to develop certain shared understandings. As has been the case in Europe, the growing conversation—not only the identifying of commonalities, but also the acknowledging of difference—can also contribute critically to the substance of regionalism.31

Some analysts of second track diplomacy qualify this observation by suggesting that frequent participants in Track 2 processes will gradually develop an affinity for a particular international institution or activity. As Dalia Dassa Kaye has argued:

In the process of developing greater understanding about one’s adversary and building a common set of knowledge, many participants begin to identify themselves as part of a track two group. To be sure, national identities never recede and sometimes are reinforced in such processes, but over time some participants have observed that they feel they are now part of a group which thinks differently than those who are outside the process.32

Other versions of these ‘socialisation’ arguments suggest that involvement in Track 2 institutions and activities will ideally not only impact upon the views of the individual participants in question, but that the greater exposure to international and regional norms which
occurs in the process may exert a positive influence in shaping the foreign policy orientation of the country they represent. In recent years, such arguments have typically been made with reference to China as a result of the marked expansion which has occurred in its participation in regional multilateral activities at both the Track 1 and Track 2 levels. Some analysts have even gone so far as to suggest that the idea of cooperation can, over time, become learnt across entire regions.

Notwithstanding the obvious benefits which second track institutions and activities are generally assumed to bring to the economic and strategic environment in the Asian region, however, these processes also exhibit a number of commonly acknowledged limitations.

First, most if not all second track processes face severe funding constraints. In his recent evaluation of security diplomacy in the Asia Pacific Sheldon Simon documents this problem with reference to CSCAP. Simon points out that even the wealthiest member committees, such as US CSCAP, confront financial difficulties. Because participants are required to pay for their own travel expenses, this can often lead to a situation where the most appropriate experts for a particular issue area are unable to participate in CSCAP Study Group activities. Likewise, where a proposal is put forward for the initiation of a new study group, the member committee proposing it must be prepared to meet the costs involved in running it. This is clearly problematic for less affluent CSCAPs and, as Simon goes on to observe, those who do not enjoy direct links to governments or private foundations.

The need to secure government funding contributes toward a second limitation which, as noted previously, Kraft has labelled the ‘autonomy dilemma’ of Track 2 diplomacy in the Asian region. According to Kraft, many second track institutions in this part of the world have gradually become too closely aligned with their Track 1 counterparts. This is not an altogether negative development, in that it has allowed Track 2 diplomacy access to otherwise privileged
information, along with a direct channel of influence into the official policy process. At the same time, however, Kraft’s concern stems from the fact that the growing intimacy between the first and second tracks limits the capacity of the latter to engage in critical thinking and analysis. He suggests that this tendency has even begun to impact upon some of the leading Track 2 processes in the region, such as ASEAN-ISIS. Along similar lines, Joseph Camilleri has suggested that too close an alignment between Track 1 and Track 2 will often lead to a replication of the very geopolitical dynamics of the Track 1 level which second track processes are designed to circumvent. Camilleri also maintains that those second track institutions and activities which marry their fortunes too closely to the Track 1 level will invariably tend to limit the strategic options available to them.

A third common limitation facing second track processes in the region is their lack of capacity to move as quickly as Track 1 on a pressing issue. Track 2 institutions must therefore carefully choose the issues to which they devote time and resources. This typically means that the subject matter nominated for consideration is often more academic in nature. In the interests of making the most effective and efficient use of the resources at their disposal, second track institutions will also tend to adopt quite a measured and strategic approach to these issues. From the perspective of the practitioner, however, this creates a twofold problem. On the one hand, the immediate policy relevance of this work is not always obvious. At the same time, when the first track does eventually decide to move quickly on one of the particular issues under consideration, second track processes are invariably going to struggle to keep pace.

This latter observation exposes a fourth limitation of second track institutions and activities in the Asian region. In many regards, these processes can sometimes become victims of their own success. When a new economic or security challenge emerges, for instance, it is not uncommon to find government officials turning to the second track for policy advice, in view of the fact that their own agencies may not yet have had an opportunity to build sufficient policy expertise
on the issue in question. Yet, as this expertise develops, the interest of the first track in obtaining policy information and guidance from the second track is likely to diminish. While this should not be viewed as an inherent weakness of second track processes, it is certainly a factor limiting their capacity to make a sustained contribution, particularly on issue areas where their resource capabilities are likely to be gradually superseded by those at the disposal of the first track. In the final analysis then, perhaps the real message is that effective Track 2 organisations must have the flexibility and the capacity to focus on new issues, at the time they are passing older issues over to Track 1.
This chapter documents and evaluates the leading second track processes in the Asian region. It also describes the extent of Australian and New Zealand participation in these. As the preceding chapter demonstrates, while some useful previous reviews of Track 2 diplomacy in the Asian region have covered parts of this purview, no comprehensive collation and assessment of the type attempted here has thus far been undertaken. Toward that end, a primary objective of this chapter will be to identify those institutions and activities which appear to be having the greatest impact upon the trade, economic, political or security environment in the Asian region. Where a relatively new or emerging process exhibits the potential to meet these criteria over the longer-term, it is also documented here.

In documenting and evaluating the leading second track institutions and activities in the Asian region, the following seven factors are taken into consideration:

1. *Purpose*: The circumstances giving rise to a second track process and the reasons for its establishment need to be taken into account. In particular, what are its core priorities and focus?
It is equally important to take note of any instances where a particular Track 2 institution or activity achieves its objective(s) as originally stated, or where subsequent developments force a recalibration of its basic mission in order for the process in question to retain a sense of purpose and relevance.

2. **Membership:** In addition to identifying the range of countries represented in the Track 2 process, the number and composition of those individuals belonging to and/or participating in it also need to be considered. In particular, the balance between official and non-official members/participants has to be taken into account. This should provide useful insights into the nature of the relationship between Track 2 and Track 1, particularly in terms of the level of autonomy that the former enjoys from the latter.

3. **Organisation:** How a Track 2 institution is organised can offer useful insights into its importance and level of impact. A high level of institutionalisation, for instance, will usually connote a process that is well established and which has been undertaking sustained activities over a number of years. At the same time, however, a high level of institutionalisation can also act as an impediment to both the progress and the effectiveness of the Track 2 process in question.

4. **Administration:** Where a particular Track 2 institution or activity is located or administered from will often serve as a guide to its level of import—particularly if it is based at a prestigious think tank or academic institution—as well as offering further insights into its proximity to Track 1. Likewise, where a particular Track 2 institution or activity is based will often provide an indication as to the main drivers behind the process.

5. **Meeting Arrangements:** The frequency, nature and scope of meetings held under the auspices of a particular Track 2 institution or activity can provide an indicator regarding the health of the process in question, as well as better illuminating its impact. A sharp decline in the number of meetings held or in the numbers
of those attending, for instance, could signal that the process is not travelling particularly well. Conversely, if a Track 2 process has formalised or institutionalised meeting arrangements with the Track 1 level, this will usually mean that it is more likely to exhibit a high level of importance and influence.

6. **Funding:** As noted previously, few if any Track 2 processes do not face resource constraints of one form or another. Nevertheless, the level of funding available for a Track 2 institution or activity, coupled with the primary source of this, is a key variable in determining what it is ultimately able to accomplish. A second track process with a steady revenue stream, for instance, is obviously going to find it easier to operate in a more strategic manner, over a sustained period of time. This, in turn, will have a clear bearing upon its perceived importance and level of influence. At the same time, a Track 2 institution or activity which receives its primary funding from government sources is more likely to be seen as having an insufficient degree of independence from the Track 1 level.

7. **Interaction with Track 1:** The very existence of Track 2 processes is ultimately contingent upon their symbiotic relationship with Track 1. As Morrison observes, ‘Track 2 would have been a sterile exercise but for its impact on Track 1. In fact, almost by definition Track 2 cannot exist without a Track 1’. Documenting and evaluating the level and impact of interaction—both formal and informal—of the second track processes in question with the Track 1 level, therefore, clearly represents a critical facet of the current study. Toward this end, it will be useful to consider the extent to which individual participants in Track 2 institutions and activities can be said to have any degree of influence with government, either as leading members of that government or as prominent private sector, academic or media figures.

The ‘Asia focus’ of the second track processes in question will, of course, be an important factor in deciding which particular institutions and activities require analysis. As such, important Track
2 processes such as the Australia-US Leadership dialogue and the Australia-New Zealand Leadership Forum will not be considered, given that these do not exhibit either a strong or specific ‘Asia Focus’. Finally, it should also be noted that the institutions and activities covered in the report are listed alphabetically and do not necessarily appear in order of significance.

**APEC Business Advisory Council**

The APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC) was established in November 1995 by APEC Leaders at the APEC Summit in Osaka, Japan. Its initial brief was ‘to provide advice on the implementation of the Osaka Action Agenda and on other specific business sector priorities, and to respond when the various APEC fora request information about business-related issues or to provide the business perspective on specific areas of cooperation’.39

The ABAC is made up of three senior business representatives from each APEC economy: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, the United States and Vietnam. All three representatives are political appointments. The ABAC is administered through an international secretariat based in Manila, the Philippines. Funding for this secretariat is provided by a system where each economy is required to make a financial contribution. Consistent with the APEC formula, this annual due is structured to reflect the size of the economy in question.

The ABAC meets formally as a group four times per year. Most of its work is undertaken by task forces and working groups covering a range of issues, including global trade and investment, corporate governance and transparency, regulatory frameworks, labour movements, e-commerce, and cargo security. The ABAC also produces an annual report and meets formally each year with APEC Leaders. It participates in the APEC Senior Officials’ Meeting and in
the sectoral ministerial meetings. From time to time, the ABAC also issues statements on issues of contemporary concern.

Australia’s three ABAC representatives are appointed by the Prime Minister and serve a three year term. They typically meet at least once before each of the quarterly ABAC meetings, although significant email liaison typically occurs between representatives during the interim. Australian ABAC representatives have also been involved in the annual APEC Business Forum, which is arranged by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and hosted by the Minister for Trade. ABAC in Australia is funded by DFAT.

ABAC New Zealand is administered through an office based at the Asia New Zealand Foundation in Wellington. Its expenses, including travel, accommodation and administrative costs, are met by the New Zealand Government. New Zealand ABAC representatives are appointed for a two-year term, which is often renewed in order to maximise experience and maintain continuity. They enjoy relatively strong links with the Track 1 level and will typically interact—both formally and informally—with senior government officials on a weekly basis.

In terms of impact at the Track 1 level, however, there is little evidence suggesting that the ABAC as a whole has had a substantial degree of influence on policy. This is partly a result of the fact that business, while undeniably important, is but one amongst a range of constituencies whose views governments must take into account. Particularly during the ‘War on Terror’ period, the increasing relevance of political and security issues as items on the APEC agenda has had the effect of further increasing the number and range of constituencies with which the ABAC must now compete.40

**APEC Study Centres**

The APEC Study Centres (ASC) consortium was established in 1993 after the APEC Leaders Summit agreed to establish an ASC in each APEC member economy. The purpose of the ASC was to facilitate
educational exchange between APEC member economies, to encourage NGOs, media and the business sector to engage in dialogue and study relating to APEC, and to assist the APEC process by encouraging advanced, collaborative research on issues of importance to it. There are now 19 ASC throughout the Asia Pacific region. Each participates in an annual ASC consortium meeting and undertakes a range of other research activities.

The New Zealand ASC is based at the University of Auckland. Its activities include research on APEC-related issues, the facilitation of information flows between overseas ASC and interested parties in New Zealand, the administration of a program of APEC research scholarships, and the organisation of seminars, conferences, workshops, and public lectures on APEC-related themes. The New Zealand ASC enjoys particularly close linkages with the University of Auckland’s Economics Department and the New Zealand Asia Institute.

The Australian ASC undertakes a similar range of activities and is based at Monash University in Melbourne. The Chairman of the Australian ASC is Alan Oxley, previously the Ambassador to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the predecessor to the World Trade Organisation) and one of Australia’s most respected commentators on international trade matters.

The ASC network performs a range of useful functions, including the facilitation of research on APEC and improving intellectual awareness in the process. Overall, however, the network has failed to live up to expectations, with considerable confusion remaining over its appropriate role. Indeed as Morrison, a former Director of the ASC at the East-West Center in Hawaii, has recently argued, for the most part, the APEC Study Center network simply added more confusion to the webs of non- and quasi-governmental research and educational institutions associated with the regional economic cooperation processes.41
ASEAN Business Advisory Council/ ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry

The ASEAN Business Advisory Council (ASEAN BAC) was launched by the ASEAN Leaders in April 2003. It comprises prominent regional businesspeople selected by ASEAN Leaders and subsequently approved by national Chambers of Commerce and Industry. Its role is to serve as the primary channel for private sector feedback and guidance to ASEAN on matters of economic integration and competitiveness. It is also tasked to identify areas for the consideration of the ASEAN Leaders. The ASEAN BAC formally submits its recommendations to the annual ASEAN Leaders Summit.

Each year, the ASEAN BAC organises a major ASEAN Business and Investment Summit (ASEAN BIS). The stated objectives of this gathering are to: foster an exchange of views and perceptions between the private sector and government within ASEAN; facilitate trade and transaction between the business community within ASEAN; and explore intra-ASEAN and ASEAN-plus business and investment opportunities. The ASEAN BIS is designed to complement the Track 1 ASEAN Summit. The first ASEAN BIS was held in Bali in 2003 and attracted over 700 business leaders from throughout the region and beyond. ASEAN BIS 2004 was held in Vientiane, Laos and brought together approximately 500 business leaders, while ASEAN BIS 2005 was held in December 2005 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Funding for this initiative is provided by the ASEAN Secretariat and a range of corporate sponsors, including DHL, Proton, Keppel Corporation, Lane Xang Minerals Ltd, Beer Lao and Mastercard.

Prior to 2003, the ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASEAN-CCI) served as the main channel for private sector participation in ASEAN. The ASEAN-CCI is a regional network of peak business organisations from each ASEAN member state. Its role is to represent the Chambers of Commerce and Industry of the ASEAN countries and to support the objectives of ASEAN in its pursuit
of effective measures for regional economic cooperation. Toward this end, it strives to foster closer relations and cooperation among its constituent members, as well as with those regional and international organisations which have similar aims and objectives. These include a number of foreign private sector networks which also engage in a range of second track activities, such as the US-ASEAN Business Council, the ASEAN-EU Business Council, the ASEAN-Japan Business Council, the ASEAN-Korea Business Council and the ASEAN-China Business Council. The ASEAN-CCI also has regular contact with New Zealand and Australia through its links with the AFTA-CER Business Council—an organisation established in 2002 with a view to reducing impediments to trade and lowering business costs in a number of areas between the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (CER).

ASEAN-CCI is a co-organiser of ASEAN BIS. It also holds its own ASEAN-CCI conferences and council meetings. The organisation is financed through subscriptions from constituent members and corporate associate members. ASEAN-CCI is administered through a secretariat which is based in Singapore. In terms of interaction with the Track 1 level, ASEAN-CCI receives invitations to attend all ASEAN Senior Economic Officials meetings, relevant working group meetings and ministerial meetings as required. In recent times, however, it has been less active in terms of producing and tabling reports than the ASEAN BAC.

**ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies**

ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) began its activities in 1984. Its stated purpose is to encourage cooperation and coordination of activities among policy-oriented ASEAN scholars and analysts, and to promote policy-oriented studies of, and exchanges of information and viewpoints on, various strategic and international issues affecting Southeast Asia’s and ASEAN’s peace, security and well being.
It remains one of the most influential second track institutions in Asia. Indeed, Kraft goes so far as to suggest that ‘track two in Southeast Asia is largely synonymous with ASEAN-ISIS’.45

ASEAN-ISIS has nine member institutions: Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Indonesia; Brunei Darussalam Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies (BDIPSS), Brunei Darussalam; Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP), Cambodia; Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA), Laos; Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia; Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS), Philippines; Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), Singapore; Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS), Thailand; and the Institute for International Relations (IIR), Vietnam. ASEAN-ISIS is administered through a secretariat based at CSIS in Jakarta.

ASEAN-ISIS is responsible for organising a number of significant meetings. Each year it runs the Asia-Pacific Roundtable, a major Track 2 event at which over 250 scholars, journalists, and civilian and military officials meet to discuss regional peace and security matters. Since 2000, it has hosted the ASEAN People’s Assemblies—an event which brings together approximately 350 NGO leaders and representatives of grassroots organisations from throughout Southeast Asia and a small number of senior ASEAN officials.46 ASEAN-ISIS also runs regular seminars with counterpart institutions in China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, India and Europe. Although no Australian or New Zealand institution is formally a member of ASEAN-ISIS (due to the fact that only research institutions based in ASEAN member countries may join), Australian second track personnel are frequently invited to attend or participate in ASEAN-ISIS activities. New Zealanders and Australians also regularly participate in the Asia-Pacific Roundtable.

The influence of ASEAN-ISIS has been considerable on a number of fronts. Among its most significant achievements was the seminal role it played in establishing the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and CSCAP. Since 1993, the Heads of ASEAN-ISIS have also met with
ASEAN Senior officials on an annual basis, reflecting the strong formal and informal linkages of this institution with the Track 1 level. Indeed, not only does the record show that ASEAN has adopted the overwhelming majority of recommendations made to it by ASEAN-ISIS, but also that the ASEAN Secretariat continues to commission ASEAN-ISIS to undertake studies on a wide range of issues. Taken together, these outcomes illustrate the degree to which ASEAN-ISIS has been effective in directly influencing the foreign policymaking bodies of ASEAN, as well as several other governments in the Asia-Pacific region.47

**ASEAN-affiliated Non-Governmental Organisations**

Since the mid-1980s, a number of NGOs have established formal relations with ASEAN. Most of these are regional professional and industry associations, including associations of bankers, public relations organisations, radiologists and other medical professionals, teachers, and consulting engineers. The number of such organisations to have formally affiliated with ASEAN totals 57. Of these, only ASEAN-CCI and ASEAN-ISIS enjoy regular interaction and consultation with the Track 1 level. Nevertheless, a number of others engage in activities exhibiting a definite second track ‘flavour’. A complete listing of these organisations, including their contact details and primary objectives, can be found on the ASEAN website.48

**Boao Forum for Asia**

The Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) was established in February 2001 with a view to fostering greater economic interaction and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. It is a Chinese initiative based in the city of Boao, Hainan province. There have been suggestions that the BFA aspires to ultimately become Asia’s version of the World Economic Forum.

Each year, the BFA holds a major conference. The first of these annual conferences took place in April 2002. Chinese President Hu Jintao delivered a keynote address at this event, which was attended
by over 1,000 senior politicians (including a number of world leaders), diplomats, business and industry leaders, journalists, academics and representatives from international agencies, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. The 2005 BFA annual conference addressed a number of issues including the ‘new role’ of Asia, energy cooperation, and tsunami aid. Australian Prime Minister John Howard, Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, acting Hong Kong Chief Executive Donald Tsang and former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew were all in attendance.

In addition to its annual conference, the BFA organises a number of other events. In November 2005, for instance, it hosted the inaugural Boao CEO Summit in Shenzhen. Approximately 700 entrepreneurs and 200 members of the media were present at the meeting, which was attended by the Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Issues discussed included logistics, energy and rising property prices.

The BFA receives strong financial support from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Government. Indeed, while the BFA has been explicitly designated as an NGO, some analysts regard its close proximity to the Track 1 level as a factor potentially inhibiting its progress. However, the BFA has attracted sponsorship from a number of major companies, including TNT, Merrill Lynch, BMW and the German oil and gas producer Woodside. It has also signed an agreement with the World Bank, which provides US$1.25 million in assistance.

Opinion remains divided as to whether the BFA will attain a status comparable to that of the World Economic Forum. Some observers suggest that its importance will likely grow in the future, particularly as China’s economic and political weight continues to increase. Others, however, argue that the forum is beginning to show signs of losing momentum, with fewer and fewer national leaders attending BFA meetings due largely to the demands of having to attend similar gatherings elsewhere in the region and beyond. For this reason, there have been suggestions that the BFA will begin to focus more
on hosting business activities. Either way, as long as this process continues to enjoy strong PRC Government backing, it is likely to remain a fixture on Asia’s second track diplomatic scene.

**Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation**

The Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation (CAEC) was established in May 1996 following a request at the inaugural Track 1 level Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) for greater interaction between Asian and European scholars and policy specialists. The primary function of the CAEC is to facilitate such interaction and, through its work, to inspire the ASEM process.

The membership of the CAEC comprises a network of Asian and European think tanks. Its Asian members include the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (Jakarta), the Ilmin International Relations Institute (Seoul), the Institute for Asia Pacific Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Beijing), the Institute of Policy Studies (Singapore), the Institute of Strategic and Development Studies (Manila), the Japan Center for International Exchange (Tokyo) and the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University (Canberra).

Its European members include the Center for East Asian and Pacific Studies (Trier), the Stockholm School of Asian Studies (Stockholm), the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (Warwick), the German Council on Foreign Relations (Berlin), the Institut Francais des Relations Internationales (Paris), the International Institute for Asian Studies, Leiden University (Leiden) and the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London).

The CAEC is managed by a steering committee comprised of representatives from the research institutes listed above. Its Asian Secretariat is located at the JCIE, while the European Secretariat is based at the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin.
The CAEC has thus far been unable to establish itself, in any official sense at least, as the second track counterpart of ASEM. An additional shortcoming is that it does not maintain an up-to-date website. On the plus side, it does produce a number of high-quality task force reports which are widely distributed amongst relevant scholars, journalists and government officials in advance of ASEM Summits.

**Council on East Asian Community**

The Council on East Asian Community (CEAC) is a Japanese initiative which was launched in May 2004. Its establishment apparently reflects growing concerns that Japan is falling behind China and other key Asian nations in its preparedness for the proposed formation of an East Asian economic bloc. In particular, its establishment appears to have been strongly influenced by the Chinese-led second track initiative discussed later in this chapter—the Network of East Asian Think Tanks (NEAT).

The primary aim of the CEAC is to strengthen intellectual collaboration, build intellectual foundation, and facilitate the sharing of strategic ideas amongst a group of Japanese business people, government officials and academic leaders with a common interest in the concept of an East Asian community. Japan’s leading 12 think tanks belong to the CEAC, which also consists of 15 corporate members and 65 individual members comprising a mixture of scholars, journalists and politicians. A number of government ministries, including representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry have also joined the activities of CEAC in the capacity of ‘Counsellors’.

The instigator of this new grouping is the president of the Japan Forum on International Relations, Kenichi Ito. Ito has also been named as president of the CEAC, which is chaired by former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone.
CEAC is administered through a secretariat based at the JFIR and engages in a range of second track activities. It holds an annual plenary meeting, which is expected to form the basis of a policy report that is issued at the end of each year. This policy report is initially drafted by a task force, which also assists in the deliberations of the plenary meeting. In addition, the CEAC organises a number of international exchanges, which have included a Japan-China dialogue (September 2004), a Japan-Korea dialogue (April 2005) and a Japan-ASEAN dialogue (June 2005). In August 2004, CEAC also sent a delegation of 10 members to attend the NEAT conference in Bangkok.

**Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific**

The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) was set up in 1992–1993 with a view to providing ‘a more structured regional process of a non-governmental nature … to contribute to the efforts towards regional confidence building and enhancing regional security through dialogues, consultation and cooperation’. Its primary mission is to provide studies on security matters for its Track 1 counterpart, the ASEAN Regional Forum.

CSCAP has 22 member committees located in Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, Europe, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, North Korea, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam. The Pacific Islands Forum is an Associate Member. CSCAP is guided by a steering committee comprising representatives from each of these members and is administered through a secretariat located at Malaysia’s Institute of Strategic and International Studies.

CSCAP-NZ is New Zealand’s Committee of CSCAP. It is administered through the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand, which is part of the School of Government at Victoria University of Wellington. CSCAP-NZ relies on annual funding from the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the New Zealand
Defence Force and the New Zealand Ministry of Defence. It also receives support for salary and overhead costs from Victoria University.

Meetings of the CSCAP-NZ member committee are held twice yearly. In recent times, a concerted effort has been made to involve younger scholars and specialists in these activities. CSCAP-NZ has also worked hard to forge a closer relationship with its Australian counterpart, Aus-CSCAP, with New Zealand representatives regularly attending the six-monthly committee meetings of this body. Consistent with its mandate, CSCAP-NZ is an active participant in CSCAP activities throughout the Asian region, having taken the lead in a study group addressing ‘Security in Oceania’ and playing a productive role in several others. It also produces and distributes some very useful publications, including recent edited volumes addressing human security in the Asia-Pacific and security in Oceania.53

The Australian Committee for CSCAP, Aus-CSCAP, has approximately 90 members. This membership comprises a mix of academics, journalists, government officials and private sector representatives, in addition to a range of retired diplomats, politicians and defence officials. A new initiative is also underway to include postgraduate students as observers at Aus-CSCAP meetings. These meetings are held twice a year, usually in February and August.

Aus-CSCAP is administered through an office based at the Australian National University’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. Its primary annual funding is provided by the Australian Department of Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The Australian Federal Police and the defence contractor Tenix also provide ongoing financial support.

Beyond this, Aus-CSCAP obtains funding for particular projects as required. By way of example, Aus-CSCAP, in collaboration with the Australian National University’s Faculty of Asian Studies, is currently undertaking a major project examining Islam in Southeast
Asia. The project has two interlinked components: a two-day conference and the production of a sourcebook on Islam in Southeast Asia. It is funded by AusAID—an Australian Government Agency within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. This project involves a number of partner institutions from across the region, including CSIS Jakarta and the State Islamic University, Jakarta. The Australian Government also underwrote participation with Indonesia in the first CSCAP General Conference, which was held in Jakarta in December 2003 and attended by a number of high-ranking government officials, including the Indonesian and Australian Foreign Ministers and other ministers from Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Japan and Timor Leste. With such support, it can be argued that Aus-CSCAP has been able to help the Australian Government to promote Australia’s bilateral relations with Indonesia. As Rowan Callick suggested at the time, ‘determining the agenda of such a meeting of regional security heavyweights, and doing so hand-in-hand with the Indonesians, is clearly a considerable asset for Australia’.54

The biennial CSCAP General Conference is fast emerging as one of the region’s leading security dialogues. Much of the institution’s output, however, is produced by eight study groups that work on discrete issue areas and run for a two-year period. Funding for these and the larger CSCAP enterprise is often problematic, particularly for less affluent members. Some of the wealthier member countries are able to rely on foundation grants, while others—such as Australia and New Zealand—have been able to attract government subsidies. Issues of funding will often determine which countries and individuals are able to attend CSCAP meetings, with the attendance of some less wealthy members contingent upon obtaining financial assistance from the relatively more affluent CSCAP member committees.55

In terms of interaction with and influence at the Track 1 level, CSCAP’s relationship with the ARF has been considerably strengthened over the last few years. There are now fairly regular communications between CSCAP co-chairs and the ARF senior officials, while CSCAP is linked to Track 1 processes at steering
committee, working group and member/national committee levels. There is close interaction, for instance, between the Indonesian and Malaysian CSCAP leaderships and their respective national governments. The Australian CSCAP co-chairs have regular meetings with Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade officials, and also fairly regular discussions with relevant government ministers.

CSCAP has clearly made an impact at the first track, most notably when it assisted the ARF to develop a working definition of preventive diplomacy during the late 1990s. A CSCAP working group on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) has continued to work closely with the ARF on this subject and it is probably the CSCAP work which has been most appreciated by the ARF. Likewise, CSCAP working group and study group meetings on maritime cooperation have produced a number of excellent edited volumes and memoranda, rendering it one of the most important second-track activities concerning maritime security matters in the region. More recently, CSCAP has also been intimately involved in the development of measures to further institutionalise the ARF.

Finally, in evaluating the impact and importance of CSCAP, it is worth reflecting upon the many high-profile individuals who have been intimately involved in the continuing development of this institution: these include SR Nathan (President of Singapore), Han Sung-Joo (former South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs), Jim Kelly (former US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs), Yukio Sato (Japan’s former Ambassador to the United Nations), Jusuf Wanandi, the late Tan Sri Noordin Sopiee, and Stuart Harris (former Secretary of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade).

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Initiated in 2002, the Shangri-La dialogue is an Asian security and defence conference held in Singapore. It is organised by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) of the United Kingdom and is modelled on the Wehrkunde Conference series, which since the 1960s has been the premier gathering each year
on NATO security issues. Approximately 200 Defence Ministers, Deputy Defence Ministers and civilian and military officials from throughout the Asia-Pacific region attend the Shangri-La Dialogue. Scholars from around 20 countries are also present by invitation.

The Shangri-La dialogue receives generous funding from the Australian, Japanese, Singaporean and UK governments. In addition to its significant financial contribution, the Singaporean Government also covers the considerable costs associated with the necessarily tight security arrangements surrounding the gathering.

Although the Shangri-La dialogue ostensibly combines Track 1 and Track 2, its underlying function is to provide an opportunity for regional Defence Ministers to meet coincidentally in the more relaxed setting of an academic conference. As such, while providing a good networking opportunity, the process provides minimal opportunity for any extensive interaction between Track 1 and Track 2—not least due to the security issues associated with ensuring the safety of some of the more high-profile attendees. These have previously included US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz.

While efforts have been undertaken previously to institute a more formal gathering of Asia-Pacific Defence Ministers, these initiatives have consistently aroused regional sensitivities. By organising ‘break-out’ sessions where Ministers have time for private discussions, the Shangri-La dialogue appears to have gone part of the way in circumventing these. It could also be argued that this process has assisted in accelerating the political will to establish a more formal gathering of Defence Ministers at some point in the future. At the same time, however, a European institute has taken the initiative of facilitating a process (which was regarded as a logical ‘next step’ for the ARF) and this has created a degree of reticence among some Asian governments.
China’s participation has also proven problematic in recent times. Indeed, the future of the entire IISS Shangri-La Dialogue came under a cloud in 2004 after Beijing refused to participate fully due to a disagreement regarding Taiwanese involvement. The IISS and the Singaporean Government, however, have since arrived at an agreement that will facilitate a continuation of the process.

In terms of New Zealand and Australian participation, both countries send delegations to the Shangri-La Dialogue. Australian members of the IISS Council, in particular, were intimately involved in the development of initial proposals which prompted the idea. Likewise, Australian participants have played very substantial roles in the dialogues which have occurred thus far. By way of example, Ross Babbage made the suggestion at the inaugural Shangri-La Dialogue that regional governments might cooperate to better manage the consequences of a mass terror attack. This idea generated a high level of interest among conference participants, was discussed informally by some of the ministers and other delegation leaders, and subsequently was developed into a written proposal distributed via the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s publications program.58

**Network of East Asian Think Tanks**

The Network of East Asian Think Tanks (NEAT) is a relatively new, yet significant, initiative. It was created through the ASEAN-Plus Three process and as a direct result of proposals contained in the reports of the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) and the East Asia Study Group (EASG), which convened under the auspices of the ASEAN-Plus-Three Summit Meeting. The purpose of NEAT is to promote the notion of an East Asian Community (EAC). While its primary focus has thus far been economic, as with the EAC idea, NEAT also purports to address political, socio-cultural and security issues. As the official Track 2 analogue for the ASEAN-Plus-Three process, its main functions are to provide intellectual support and policy recommendations on issues of East Asian cooperation, as well as to research issues raised during the ASEAN-Plus-Three Summit and from the EASG.
China has been a key player in this initiative. It is currently the general coordinator for NEAT, which is administered through a Central Secretariat based in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The first annual conference of NEAT took place in Beijing in late September 2003 and was attended by approximately 100 participants from ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea. The second was held in Bangkok, Thailand in August 2004. Under the theme ‘Towards an East Asian Community’, this gathering discussed issues of economic cooperation, political and security cooperation, socio-cultural cooperation, and institutionalisation. The second annual conference also covered a number of issues relating to the organisation and development of NEAT, including the adoption of a set of ‘Basic Rules and Framework of the NEAT’, and agreed that a Memorandum Paper incorporating policy recommendations from the conference would be submitted to the November 2004 ASEAN-Plus-Three Summit meeting.

The establishment of NEAT has raised concern amongst some analysts, particularly from outside the immediate East Asian region, who view it as a potential (Chinese-led) challenge to more established second track processes, such as CSCAP. Japan has also displayed an acute degree of apprehension over the establishment of NEAT, as reflected in the launching of its own East Asian Community-focused institution, the Council on East Asian Community (CEAC). Interestingly, however, the third Annual Conference of NEAT was held in Tokyo in August 2005. This gathering was attended by 96 participants, including 37 from Japan. Its most significant achievement was the tabling of reports by NEAT’s six recently formed Working Groups. The next Annual Conference of NEAT is scheduled to be held later this year in Malaysia.

Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue

The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) was founded in 1993 by Professor Susan Shirk, who was the Director of the University of California’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) from 1991 until 1997. Its stated purpose is ‘to reduce the
dangers and enhance cooperation in Northeast Asia, in the absence of even an informal consultative process to advance these interests.’ The NEACD is funded by the US Department of State and administered through the IGCC. The JCIE became the Asian Secretariat for the NEACD in 2005. Although neither Australia nor New Zealand are formally members of this process, Australian individuals have participated in a number of NEACD activities on a variety of occasions.

At its meetings (16 of which have been held), foreign and defence ministry officials, military officials (all attending in their private capacities) and academics from China, Russia, South Korea, Japan and the United States discuss Northeast Asian regional security issues. North Korea was also a founding member of this dialogue, but has not attended meetings other than the initial planning session, as well as the 13th and 14th sessions of the NEACD, which were held in Russia (September/October 2002) and China (September 2003) respectively. Interestingly, however, North Korea has requested documentation from all of the meetings which it has not attended, as well as sending letters of support to a number of these. While a case could be made that North Korea’s non-attendance does not necessarily constitute an inherent shortcoming of the dialogue—Cossa, for instance, suggests that ‘its absence probably contributes to the frankness and openness of debate among the remaining five’—NEACD statements have consistently encouraged DPRK participation as an ‘indispensable’ component of the process.

NEACD gatherings are typically held every eight months, with hosting duties rotated amongst the member countries. The centrepiece of each NEACD meeting is a presentation by a representative from each of the parties—usually a foreign ministry official—outlining their country’s national perspectives on the Northeast Asian security situation, specifically in terms of what has changed most in the preceding eight months. However, while security issues are the primary focus of the NEACD, a session is always included addressing a sectoral issue—such as the environment,
economic complementarily, food and agriculture, and energy—
premised on the idea that these ostensibly less-confrontational topics
will assist in building the trust required to tackle more sensitive
issues. The NEACD has also run a number of study projects
addressing defence information sharing, mutual reassurance
measures, regional energy cooperation, and principles governing
state-to-state relations in Northeast Asia.

In terms of influence at the Track 1 level, the NEACD is often
regarded as a Track 1½ mechanism due to the high level of official
involvement in the process. Cossa makes the observation that

although this sort of representation can inhibit debate by locking
participants more closely to government positions than at other
track-two forums, it is also one of the NEACD’s strengths, since it
comes close to serving as the Northeast Asian governmental forum
that most nations want but have been unable thus far to achieve.61

Indeed, it is interesting to note that the NEACD aspires to eventually
become a Track 1 process. According to its website, ‘over the long
run, this forum may move toward an official multilateral process’.62

Whether the NEACD is ever able to realise this aspiration,
however, remains heavily contingent upon the fate of the so-called
‘Six-Party Talks’ process. Some, such as Frances Fukuyama, have
suggested that this latter forum could gradually evolve into a much
needed Track 1 security institution for the Northeast Asian sub-
region.63 Were such an outcome to eventuate, a decision would
ultimately need to be taken as to whether the two processes could
continue to co-exist; whether the NEACD might be formally
(re)established as the Track 2 analogue of this new body; or whether
the NEACD should be discontinued as a direct result of this
development.

**Pacific Asia Free Trade and Development Conference**

Pacific Asia Free Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD) is
an informal, private academic conference series. It was first held in
Japan in 1968, as a response to growing concerns amongst the economically-advanced Asia Pacific nations—including Australia and New Zealand—regarding the trade implications of the newly established European Economic Community. It was initially intended to be a one-off event.

However, 30 PAFTAD conferences have since been held, with participants composed primarily of leading economists and individuals with national and regional influence. New Zealand usually sends a representative to these conferences. Australia has offered particularly strong intellectual and some political support for PAFTAD during the time since its inception, with the economist Sir John Crawford playing an influential role during its early days and others such as Professors Peter Drysdale and Ross Garnaut of the Australian National University continuing to make an active contribution. Many PAFTAD participants, such as Drysdale and Garnaut, are also members of other prominent Track 2 institutions, such as PECC. Previous PAFTAD conferences have addressed a wide range of topics, including employment, mineral resources, technology transfer, structural change and financial reform.

PAFTAD is guided by an international steering committee, which identifies conference themes, defines research plans, and commissions research papers. PAFTAD is administered through an International Secretariat, which is located at the Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government, Australian National University. As a privately organised and operated conference, PAFTAD is heavily reliant upon external funding, which it receives from a range of private organisations (such as the Ford Foundation) and government agencies (such as the Australian Agency for International Development and the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

With respect to impact at the Track 1 level, the influence of PAFTAD participants tends to vary from country to country. Overall, although PAFTAD remains a significant intellectual network, the interviews undertaken for this paper suggest that its influence is
largely indirect and that its importance in official circles has diminished somewhat following the emergence of new second track processes with an economic focus, such as PECC and ABAC.

**Pacific Basin Economic Council**

The Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) is an association of senior business leaders from throughout the Asia-Pacific region. It was founded in 1967 and met formally for the first time in 1968. Initially, PBEC served primarily as a forum where business leaders could network, exchange perspectives, and do business. It was not until the creation of APEC in 1989 that PBEC members became more interested in influencing policy directly. Unlike PECC and the ABAC, however, PBEC does not participate formally in the APEC process.

PBEC has member committees in 20 economies throughout the region. These are Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Columbia, Ecuador, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, and the United States. PBEC is administered through its international headquarters, which are located in Hong Kong.

PBEC hosts a major business conference each year, at which business leaders, government officials, journalists and other delegates from around the region meet to discuss business opportunities and challenges facing the region. The most recent of these, the 38th Annual International General Meeting of PBEC, was held in Hong Kong in June 2005. It was attended by approximately 500 participants.

Despite being the region’s oldest regional business organisation, however, the PBEC process has grown increasingly moribund in recent years. Attendance rates at its meetings are well down, some of its member committees throughout the region have essentially become inactive, and PBEC has been forced to borrow against its
Special Fund in order to meet the costs associated with a number of its activities. The PBEC New Zealand Member Committee is among those really struggling at the present time. An inability to attract and sustain private sector funding has been a major contributing factor, as indeed is the case with the organisation as a whole. The establishment of competing mechanisms, such as the ABAC, has also played a part in undermining the influence and importance of PBEC.

**Pacific Economic Cooperation Council**

The Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) process began in September 1980. Its first meeting, originally dubbed ‘the Pacific Community Seminar’, was held in Canberra. This meeting proposed the establishment of a regional institution designed to advance economic cooperation and market-driven integration. PECC’s stated aim since has been ‘to serve as a regional forum for cooperation and policy coordination to promote economic development in the Asia-Pacific region’.64

PECC has 25 member committees from Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Columbia, Ecuador, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Pacific Islands Forum, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam. France (Pacific Territories) and the Mongolian National Committee on Pacific Economic Cooperation are associate members. Each member committee comprises a unique tripartite combination of representatives from business and industry, government and academia.

NZPECC is New Zealand’s Committee for PECC. It has approximately 200 members, comprising an even spread of representatives from academia, business, and government officials acting in a private capacity. Membership of NZPECC is by invitation only and there is no fee involved.
Funding for NZPECC is provided primarily by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, with additional financial support given by the Ministry of Economic Development and a number of New Zealand businesses. New Zealand businesses also provide considerable support in kind—namely through the provision of conference and catering facilities. Academic institutions and other research institutions support the work of NZPECC by providing support for staff members’ research time.

NZPECC typically holds at least two general meetings per year—one in Auckland, and one in Wellington. These are often held in collaboration with other like-minded organisations, such as ABAC New Zealand. NZPECC also maintains extremely close links with the Track 1 level in New Zealand.

AUSPECC is Australia’s Committee for PECC. Its stated role is ‘to combine the interests of Government, Business and Academia in providing input into PECC and through PECC to APEC, ensuring practical policy outcomes for Australia in the Asia-Pacific region’. AUSPECC members are appointed by the Minister for Trade. This is nominally for a period of two years. The current AUSPECC membership comprises 21 senior academic, government and business figures, many of whom contribute directly to the PECC process as well as to AUSPECC.

AUSPECC is administered through a secretariat based at the Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government at the Australian National University. Until 1997, an annual allocation of secretariat funding was made available to AUSPECC by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. AUSPECC was advised in May 1997, however, that this arrangement would cease. Since that time, the secretariat has been funded primarily by consulting work carried out by Professor Christopher Findlay, who is the Vice Chair of AUSPECC and also the Chair of the PECC Coordinating Group. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade continues to meet the cost of AUSPECC’s annual contribution to the PECC International Secretariat, which in 2004 was US$24,600.
AUSPECC maintains a close working association with a number of like-minded institutions, such as ABAC Australia. Informal discussions have also taken place with NZPECC to explore ways in which AUSPECC and NZPECC might cooperate more effectively so as to add to their individual contributions to PECC. Not least due to the composition of its membership, AUSPECC also has strong relations with Australian Government and business.

As a region-wide institution, PECC is governed by a standing committee, which meets twice a year. A coordinating group, which meets more regularly, is responsible for the day-to-day development of the organisation, while administrative matters are handled through an international secretariat based in Singapore. PECC holds a general meeting every two years, which constitutes its major forum. However, most of PECC’s materials and recommendations are produced by task forces, fora and project groups. PECC member committees are primarily responsible for funding the fora, task forces and project groups which they elect to organise. Because these activities are essentially self-financing, one of the major difficulties PECC has encountered in recent years is that of imposing organisational discipline over them.

A PECC fund does exist which enables representatives from member committees in developing countries to participate in PECC activities. The PECC fund also finances the operation of the international secretariat.

In terms of interaction with Track 1, PECC has formal observer status in the APEC process. It continues to be regarded by many as the Asia-Pacific region’s most influential second track policy network. This is not least due to the central role PECC played during the 1970s and 1980s in terms of providing a basis from which the APEC process eventually developed. Having facilitated that outcome, however, PECC is reported to have struggled somewhat over the ensuing one-and-a-half decades to establish a clear vision of the organisation’s future role.66
South China Sea Workshops

Formally known as the ‘Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea’ process, the South China Sea (SCS) Workshops were established by Ambassador Hasjim Djalal of Indonesia and Canadian academic Ian Townsend-Gault in 1990. As an exercise in preventive diplomacy designed to reduce the chances of armed conflict and promote the idea of maritime cooperation between the countries of the SCS region, the workshops initially had two basic objectives: first, ‘to manage the potential conflicts by seeking an area in which everyone could cooperate’; and second, ‘to develop confidence building measures or processes so that the various claimants would be comfortable with one another, thus providing a conducive atmosphere for the solution of their territorial or jurisdictional disputes’. 67

The first SCS Workshop was held in Bali in January 1990. Only participants from ASEAN were invited to attend this meeting. Funding for the process was provided by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Participants from other countries in the SCS region were gradually invited to attend and the process enjoyed relatively close linkages with the Track 1 level as it began to gather momentum.

Associated groups of expert meetings, technical working groups and study groups were also established. These have examined a wide range of issues including legal issues, marine scientific research, safety of shipping navigation and communications, environmental protection, hydrographic data and information exchange, resource assessment, and zones of cooperation in the SCS. 68

As so-called ‘non-littoral’ states, participants from Australia or New Zealand were never intended to play a role in the SCS Workshop process. Although China was initially extremely strict in vetoing the participation of ‘non-littoral’ people, Commodore Dr Sam Bateman of the University of Wollongong did attend one SCS Workshop as a
‘resource person’ in the late 1990s, in addition to a number of other technical meetings addressing issues of marine education, training, hydrography and marine safety.

In recent years, the momentum of the SCS Workshops has slowed significantly. A major factor here appears to have been the March 2001 decision by CIDA to withdraw funding for SCS Workshop participants. The gradually improving security environment in the SCS region has also played a role. That said, the SCS Workshop process continues to function and there can be little disputing the positive contribution it has already made to stability in this part of the world.69

United Nations Centres

Various UN Centres engage in second track processes with an Asia focus. The UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific serves as a useful example. Created by UN General Assembly Resolution in 1987, the Regional Centre became operational in January 1989. Its initial brief was to ‘provide, on request, substantive support for initiatives and other activities mutually agreed upon by Member States of the Asia-Pacific region for the implementation of measures for peace and disarmament’.70 The headquarters for the Regional Centre are located in New York. The Centre is funded solely from voluntary contributions of UN Member States and other interested organisations, with the Japanese Government providing particularly generous financial support.

The Regional Centre is responsible for running a number of regular Track 2 dialogues. The centrepiece of these is the so-called ‘Kathmandu process’, at which delegates from throughout the Asia Pacific region meet to discuss issues that are deemed to be of current importance in the field of disarmament and arms control. The idea for the creation of a UN Register of Conventional Arms was initially proposed within this forum. Each year, the Regional Centre also organises the ‘Kanazawa Symposium’, at which government officials, UN representatives, journalists, academics and
other policy experts from around the region meet to discuss a range of regional disarmament and security issues. As its name suggests, this forum is held in Kanazawa, Japan and entered its tenth year in 2004. At least two Australian academics, Professor James Cotton of the Australian Defence Force Academy and transnational crime expert John McFarlane, are regular attendees. The Centre also co-organises an annual regional disarmament meeting with the government of South Korea. This is attended by approximately 20 people, comprising government officials participating in their private capacity, academics, representatives of international organisations and representatives from NGOs from throughout Asia.

In addition to these major gatherings, the Regional Centre organises a further 2-3 one day symposiums each year addressing disarmament issues. It is also interesting to note that in March 2001 the Centre ran a conference on disarmament in the Pacific region which was held in Wellington, New Zealand. In total, approximately 1,800 people have attended the dialogues and activities organised by the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific since its inception.

**The Williamsburg Conferences**

The Williamsburg Conference is an annual event organised by The Asia Society, a New York-based non-governmental organisation established in 1956 by John D. Rockefeller III. The Asia Society’s aim is to broaden understanding between Asian and American peoples, as well as to facilitate high-level networking activities.

The Williamsburg Conference brings together leaders in government, business, academia, civil society and journalism from throughout the Asia-Pacific to discuss a range of economic and security issues. Meetings are held at different locations throughout the region, with the most recent taking place in Siem Reap, Cambodia, in March 2005.
The first Williamsburg Conference was convened in 1971 by John D. Rockefeller III with a view to promoting greater US-Asian understanding. The process is now convened by distinguished individuals from the United States and Asia (such as Carla Anderson Hills, Chairman of Hills & Company and former US Trade Representative; Tommy Koh, Ambassador-at-large to the Foreign Ministry of Singapore; and Minoru Murofushi, Chairman of ITOCHU Corporation and Chairman of the Japan Foreign Trade Council). It is sponsored by the Lee Foundation and the Starr Foundation. The Williamsburg Conferences also receive contributions from a range of private companies, primarily from Japan.

Participation in the Williamsburg Conference is limited to approximately 60 individuals. The seniority of participants and the presence of government officials ensures that it does have some impact. Both Australian and New Zealand representatives have attended previously. Interestingly, however, the Australian Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs Kevin Rudd was the only representative from either country to attend the most recent Williamsburg Conference.
CHAPTER 4
AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND-BASED TRACK 2 INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

In addition to those second track processes documented in the previous chapter, a number of Australia and New Zealand-based institutions and activities with an Asia focus perform a Track 2 role. These also require consideration.

The Asialink ‘Conversations’

The Asialink ‘Conversations’ are an Australia-ASEAN dialogue. They are a private and non-government initiative led by Baillieu Myer and Carrillo Gantner (of the Myer family), in cooperation with Professor Tony Milner and Jenny McGregor (Executive Director of the Asialink Centre). The Asialink Centre was initiated by the Myer Foundation and is based at the University of Melbourne.

The Asialink ‘Conversations’ were developed with the support of the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Australia and involved close cooperation with Australian embassies and high commissions in ASEAN countries. The aim of the Conversations, which were developed in 2001, was to counter the perception that Australia had ‘turned its back on Southeast Asia’, to identify new methods for strengthening relations between Australia and ASEAN, and to foster
long-term personal relationships between younger Australian leaders and their counterparts in the ASEAN region.

Two rounds have taken place thus far. The first was held in 2002 in Lindenberry, Victoria, Australia. The second took place in August 2004 in Langkawi, Malaysia and was co-hosted by ISIS Malaysia. This second round received particularly favourable media coverage and appears to have played a constructive role in the improvement of Australian-Malaysian relations. It involved a valuable meeting with the Malaysian Prime Minister and other senior Malaysians.

**Asia New Zealand Foundation**

The Asia New Zealand (Asia:NZ) Foundation (formerly known as the Asia 2000 Foundation) was established in 1994. It is the peak Asia-focused Track 2 institution in New Zealand. The Foundation strives to promote initiatives which deepen understanding and relationships between New Zealanders and the peoples of Asia. Toward this end, it engages in a broad range of Track 2 activities in the areas of education, business, culture, research and policy studies.

The Asia:NZ Foundation is well-known throughout the Asian region and networks extensively with a number of counterpart institutes in this part of the world. These include prominent regional think tanks, such as the Shanghai Institute of International Affairs and the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). Asia:NZ Foundation representatives also participate in a number of prominent regional second track processes. Each year, for instance, the Foundation sends representatives to the Asia-Pacific Roundtable in Malaysia. It is represented on the CSCAP-NZ National Council. As noted previously, the Asia:NZ Foundation also hosts an ABAC New Zealand representative at its Wellington offices.

The Asia:NZ Foundation runs a burgeoning publications program. A recent addition to this program is a series of research papers called *Outlook*. The immediate aim of this promising initiative is to strengthen New Zealand’s research and policy analysis capability;
to stimulate debate among policymakers; and to improve dialogue between researchers, policymakers and practitioners. It is hoped, however, that this new series will gradually contribute toward the larger goal of building a ‘virtual’ cluster of experts on topics relating to the Asian region, leading eventually to the creation of a ‘virtual’ centre of Asian expertise in New Zealand.

**Asia Society Australasia Centre**

In addition to its New York headquarters, The Asia Society has regional centres in Washington DC, Houston, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Manila and Melbourne. The latter, known as The Asia Society Australasia Centre, supports the Society’s activities by providing a range of forums, facilitating private meetings, and organising lectures, seminars and other special events.

The Asia Society Australasia Centre was launched by Prime Minister Howard in 1997. Amongst the many activities it runs is a CEO Asia Update Forum, at which Australian and Asian business leaders address a business audience on emerging regional trends and developments. The Centre also organises private CEO briefings, where members of the Asia Society network and other visiting dignitaries are invited to address private gatherings of CEOs or their nominated representatives.

The Asia Society Australasia Centre also organises an Asia Foreign Policy Forum, which provides a platform for visiting and Australia based Government ministers, ambassadors and academics to discuss foreign, economic and strategic developments in the region. Past speakers at this forum have included former US Secretary of State Madeline Albright, former Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, and Secretary General of the Beijing Olympics Organising Committee Wang Wei. The Centre also organises an Annual Dinner which has hosted speakers of equally high standing, including former Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, and former President of the Philippines Fidel Ramos. In addition to these
activities, the Centre organises a number of other ‘special events’ including exhibitions, meet the author programs, cultural evenings and Asian art lectures.

The activities and operation of The Asia Society Australasia Centre are entirely self-funded. The Chair of the Centre is Hugh Morgan, who until recently was the Chairman of the Business Council of Australia. The Founding Director of the Centre is Richard Woolcott, a former Head of Australia’s Foreign Affairs Department. An advisory panel comprising some 40 prominent individuals offers guidance on the Centre’s programs and activities. This panel includes figures such as former Secretary of DFAT Dr Ashton Calvert, Australia’s first Ambassador to China Professor Stephen Fitzgerald, Australian businessman Baillieu Myer, former Australian Ambassador to the United States and former Leader of the Opposition Andrew Peacock, and the Australian Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs Kevin Rudd.

**Australian Bilateral Bodies**

Over the past 25 years, nine bilateral bodies have been created by the Australian Federal Government to support Foreign Affairs and Trade objectives in a number of key bilateral relationships. These bilateral bodies are: the Australia-China Council (ACC); the Australia-India Council (AIC); the Australia-Indonesia Institute (AII); the Australia-Japan Foundation (AJF); the Australia-Korea Foundation (AKF); the Australia-Thailand Institute (ATI); the Council on Australia-Latin America Relations (COALAR); the Council for Australian-Arab Relations (CAAR); and the Australia-Malaysia Institute (AMI).

The primary focus of these mechanisms is to further people-to-people linkages in the bilateral relationship in question. Toward this end, they each engage in a wide range of Track 2-type activities. The AII (in cooperation with the Australian National University), for instance, has facilitated an innovative and useful dialogue process between Islamic clerics in Indonesia and Malaysia and Australian religious leaders. It also runs a highly successful Youth Exchange Program, as well as exchange programs between journalists, artists
and teachers. Likewise, approximately half of the ACC’s budget is spent on youth exchanges and the promotion of Australian studies in China. The ACC also supports a range of commercial, educational and promotional activities. Most of these bodies have annual budgets in the vicinity of A$700,000. Although the bilateral bodies listed above are government funded, they operate rather autonomously, with each receiving guidance from an independent Board or Directors.

**Australian Strategic Policy Institute**

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) is a Canberra-based think tank. It was established in 2000 by the Australian Federal Government to provide an independent source of information and ideas on defence and security issues in Australia. As part of its mission, ASPI organises a number of bilateral Track 2 dialogues involving civilian and military officials (both former and current), diplomats, academics and journalists from throughout the Asian region. ASPI’s stated objective in developing and managing these dialogues with key regional countries is to strengthen ‘bilateral security and defence relations to achieve a level of closeness befitting their common interests’. Toward this end, dialogues have thus far been held with defence and security experts from Japan (July 2005, April 2004, and September 2002), India (April 2005, October 2003, May 2002, and July 2001), China (July 2003), and Indonesia (July 2002. A report summarising the proceedings of the dialogue is typically produced, primarily with a view to informing and influencing the Track 1 level.

ASPI has cooperated with, and received assistance from, a number of government agencies and other institutions in organising these events, including the Australian Department of Defence, the Australia-India Council, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the China Institute for International Strategic Studies, the Australia-Japan Research Centre and the Japan Institute of International Affairs.
Business Councils and Trade Associations

A number of Australia-based business councils and trade associations with an Asia focus engage in Track 2-type activities. These include organisations such as the Australia-China Business Council, the Australia-Malaysia Business Council, the Australia-Philippines Business Council, the Australia-Korea Business Council, the Australia-India Business Council, the ASEAN-Australia Business Council, the Australia-Indonesia Business Council, the Australia-Japan Business Cooperation Committee, the Australian-Taiwan Business Council, and the Australia-Singapore Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

Similar organisations exist in New Zealand, including the Korea-New Zealand Business Council, the ASEAN-New Zealand Combined Business Council, the NZ-China Trade Association, the Hong Kong-New Zealand Business Association, the New Zealand-Taiwan Business Council, the New Zealand-Singapore Business Council, the Japan-New Zealand Business Council, and the New Zealand-APEC Business Coalition. The Auckland Chamber of Commerce runs the secretariats for the majority of these organisations.

Each of the above business councils and trade associations strive to perform a range of economic and trade functions for their memberships, which typically comprise a mixture of companies, organisations and government agencies. These functions include promoting trade, expanding investment, strengthening business ties, influencing policy, and providing links between business and government. The business councils and trade associations usually undertake a range of activities, including the provision of information and research to members, organising trade missions and bilateral joint discussions, liaison with the government, as well as the hosting of visiting government and business leaders from abroad.

Due to New Zealand’s small size, in particular, one of the problems they continue to face is the maintenance of adequate membership levels for individual business councils and trade associations, while
developing and then sustaining any form of collective arrangement among them has also proven difficult. The establishment of the ABAC has further diminished their impact in recent years.

On a more positive note, however, business councils and trade associations have previously shown their potential at the second track level. A clear case in point is the period prior to the establishment of Closer Economic Relations (CER) between Australia and New Zealand, when the Australia-New Zealand Business Council played an instrumental role in reducing protectionist opposition to CER, particularly within the New Zealand business community.

Institutes of International Affairs

Established in 1933, the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) is a nationwide, independent and non-profit organisation whose stated objective is to ‘promote interest in and understanding of international affairs in Australia’. It has eight branches, located in Perth, Adelaide, Hobart, Melbourne, Canberra, Sydney, Brisbane, and Townsville. This nationwide structure is regarded as one of the unique strengths of the AIIA. It runs regular lectures, seminars and conferences. It also sponsors research and publications. Although each individual branch is responsible for its own activities, a national AIIA office is located in Canberra.

The AIIA has approximately 1,200 members nationwide. Most members have served and lived overseas in various capacities or have an academic interest in international affairs. AIIA funding is derived primarily from membership fees and from commercial rents at its headquarters in Canberra. Although this income has proven adequate to meet the operational costs of the institute, funds for the undertaking of any additional research or major initiatives have remained extremely limited.

The AIIA does receive an annual grant from DFAT, which is principally directed to the publication of its journal entitled The Australian Journal of International Affairs (AJIA). Under the editorship
of Professor William Tow, the AJIA is one of its real strengths and is currently ranked just outside the top 20 scholarly journals in the world in terms of academic citations. The AIIA also produces the *Australia in World Affairs* series, a general reference which remains the definitive commentary on Australian foreign policy.

In addition to this strong publications program, the AIIA maintains close contacts with a number of like-minded institutions; the most active of these probably being its relationship with the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs (NZIIA). The AIIA also has close links with parts of the Australian National University, Asialink, the Australian Defence Force Academy, the Japanese Institute of International Affairs, and the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs.

Notwithstanding these linkages and the long tradition of scholarship which the AIIA has built up, its influence and importance has diminished in recent years. Funding difficulties have clearly played a part here.

The cross-Tasman counterpart of the AIIA—the NZIIA—serves as a mechanism for promoting informed public discussion and understanding of international affairs, particularly as they affect New Zealand. It has 45 Corporate Members and 42 Institutional Members, each of which provides financial support. This membership includes government departments, embassies and universities. The two major partners of the NZIIA are the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) and Victoria University of Wellington. The NZIIA’s national office is located at Victoria University.

The NZIIA organises seminars and talks at its nine branches, which are scattered throughout the country in Auckland, the Waikato, Napier-Hastings, Palmerston North, Wairarapa, Wellington, Christchurch, Timaru and Dunedin. The Wellington branch is generally acknowledged as being one of the strongest among the nine and tends to be reasonably well attended by civilian and military officials. In recent years, the NZIIA has hosted a number of high-
profile speakers, including Prime Minister Helen Clark, former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali and former British Secretary of Defence Sir Michael Quinlan. Although the NZIIA does not appear to have any real impact at the Track 1 level—and neither does it purport to—it does provide a useful forum which various government agencies, such as MFAT, have been able to utilise as an independent platform for visiting dignitaries and other speakers. In addition to organising such seminars, the NZIIA also publishes books on international politics and a relatively well-known bi-monthly periodical, the *New Zealand International Review*.

**Lowy Institute for International Policy**

The Lowy Institute for International Policy is a relatively new player on Australia’s second track diplomatic scene. It is a Sydney-based think tank established in April 2003 as a result of a gift from one of Australia’s leading businessmen, Frank Lowy. The Lowy Institute aims to inform and deepen public debate about international policy within Australia. It also aspires to shape broader international discussion on these issues. It is staffed by a dynamic team of former officials, senior academics and a number of younger, emerging scholars. The Lowy Institute also runs a research program focused specifically on the Asia-Pacific region. Through its active programme of publications, seminars and lectures, the Lowy Institute has made an immediate impact on the Australian scene. At the Track 2 level, it has already hosted a number of major conferences, including an annual ‘New Voices’ Forum which brings together early-career people from a wide range of backgrounds, including international law, investment banking, civil society, the media, academia and key government agencies.

Along similar lines, the Lowy Institute also co-hosts an annual APEC Future Economic Leaders Think Tank, which senior officials from government financial institutions who have been identified as future leaders are invited to attend. In conjunction with the International Peace Academy, the Lowy Institute in September 2004
also ran a three day conference addressing Asian approaches to peace and security and the role of the United Nations. Close to 50 government officials, politicians, diplomats, academics and civil society representatives from throughout the region participated in this event.

**New Zealand Asia Institute**

The New Zealand Asia Institute (NZAI) was established by the University of Auckland in 1995 and officially opened in 1996. It was established in response to ‘the growing importance of Asia to New Zealand and to the university’s own changing socio-cultural context’. The NZAI runs an active program of conferences, lectures and seminars. In July 2005, for instance, it co-hosted the Korean Studies Association of Australasia Conference.

The NZAI also runs an active publications program, which includes an informative twice-yearly newsletter entitled *Asia Info*. It recently completed an Asia:NZ research contract, which involved a stocktake and assessment of the existing literature on New Zealand-Asia engagement. It also seeks to establish linkages with external constituencies in New Zealand and the broader Asian region, including government, business, media, universities, other research institutes, and non-governmental organisations.

Toward this end, in December 2003 the NZAI organised a successful Track 2 dialogue in collaboration with the Shanghai Institute for International Studies. This forum brought together scholars from several of China’s leading foreign policy think tanks, with a team comprised largely of New Zealand academics from the University of Auckland and the Auckland University of Technology.

**Regional Ethics in Leadership Conferences**

The Regional Ethics in Leadership Conferences are an initiative of the St James Ethics Centre in Sydney, Australia. They aim to bring together young leaders from Southeast Asia and Australia, together
with more experienced senior leaders from around the region, to discuss issues of common concern. The first Regional Ethics in Leadership Conference ran in January 1996 and a total of 10 conferences have thus far been held. Seven of these have taken place in Malaysia, two in Hanoi, Vietnam, and one in Bangkok, Thailand. They have addressed a number of topics, including ‘Responses to Great Power’, ‘Responding to Terror’, ‘Identity’, ‘Is there a New World Order?’, ‘Intergenerational Equity’ and ‘Ethics and Globalisation.’

The St James Ethics Centre was established in 1988 and is based in Sydney. It is an independent, not-for-profit organisation whose stated aim is to provide ‘an open forum for the promotion and exploration of ethical questions arising in contemporary society’. The Regional Ethics in Leadership Conferences were initially conceived as part of the Vincent Fairfax Fellowship, which is a leadership program run by the Centre. Since their inception, the Regional Ethics in Leadership Conferences have involved the participation of a number of prominent individuals, including the late Tan Sri Dr Noordin Sopiee (a key figure in a number of other regional Track 2 processes, such as ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP), Dr Pranee Thiparat (the Director of the Institute of Security and International Studies at Thailand’s Chulalongkorn University), Mr Tran Dac Loi (Director General of the International Youth Cooperation Development Center, CYDECO Vietnam), and a number of serving ambassadors.

The Institute of Strategic and International Studies Malaysia has been the joint convenor of a number of the Regional Ethics in Leadership Conferences and remains an important partner in this evolving process. Personal relationships appear to have played an important role in developing this partnership. The introduction of the Executive Director of the St James Ethics Centre, Dr Simon Longstaff, to Dr Sopiee, for instance, was initially arranged through Dr Anil Seal of Cambridge University and facilitated by the late Dato’ Alexander Yu Lung Lee of Malaysia.
CHAPTER 5

REFLECTIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Track 2 institutions and activities have clearly become established as a permanent feature of the region’s economic, political and security architecture. Moreover, all the available indicators suggest that Track 2 processes in this part of the world continue to burgeon. By way of example, the data provided by the DRM reveals that, from almost a standing start at the beginning of the 1990s, the volume of second track processes presently dedicated to the discussion of Asia-Pacific security issues alone numbers close to 150. The findings of the current study also suggest, however, that Australia and New Zealand are already either a member or a participant in most of the region’s leading Track 2 processes, such as the ABAC, PECC and CSCAP. Australians and New Zealanders also take part in a number of major second track conferences in the region, such as the Shangri-La Dialogue, PAFTAD and the Asia-Pacific Roundtable. Where Australia and New Zealand are excluded from regional Track 2 institutions and activities, such as NEAT and CEAC, it is usually for reasons of perceived geography.

This level of involvement notwithstanding, Australian and New Zealand second track engagement with Asia still faces a number of
potential challenges. First, although some Track 2 personnel enjoy extremely good linkages with the Track 1 level, there is still much scope to enhance the relationships between the first and second tracks in both Australia and New Zealand. Further strengthening this relationship will not be a straightforward exercise. Part of this difficulty stems from the fact that Track 1-level policy practitioners in both countries are already overstretched. They are necessarily driven by the demands of responding to the most immediate and pressing issues of the day, meaning that the urgent must often take precedence over the important. Because second track processes tend, by their very nature, to be more incremental and future oriented, this represents a potential obstacle to developing greater interaction and synergies between the Track 1 and Track 2 levels in both Australia and New Zealand. Added to this, there are currently few formal structures in place to facilitate a greater degree of interaction between the Track 1 and Track 2 levels in either country.

Second, Track 2 processes suffer from a ‘public relations’ problem of sorts in that there is sometimes a tendency for them to be perceived, particularly at the Track 1 level, as nothing more than a ‘talkfest’. This phenomenon is certainly not unique to Australia or New Zealand and is one which Track 2 institutions and activities continue to encounter worldwide. It is largely a product of the fact that participants in second track activities will often consider dialogue, networking activities and the generating of new ideas to be valuable undertakings in and of themselves, whereas those at the Track 1 level responsible and accountable for allocating government funding to these processes will typically exhibit a preference for more tangible and measurable progress and may not see how Track 2 activities can help achieve their ends. Bridging this perceptual divide is particularly important at the present time, when such a high priority continues to be placed on dialogue and the development of common understandings as a means of advancing the cause of Asian regionalism.
Each of these potential obstacles will require careful negotiation if Australia and New Zealand are to sustain and perhaps even strengthen their Track 2 engagement with Asia. The good news, however, is that a clear recognition regarding the potential utility of Track 2 institutions and activities appears to exist at the highest levels of government in both countries. In a June 2004 address to the NZIIA, for instance, New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark made the observation that the ‘process of capability-building would be enhanced by more, or at least more co-ordinated, input into the policy process from the so-called ‘Track II’ institutions in New Zealand’. Likewise, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer has been a strong and active supporter of a number of Aus-CSCAP initiatives, including its major project on Islam in Southeast Asia and the CSCAP General Conference.

Against that backdrop, the final part of this chapter summarises the key conclusions and recommendations to emerge from the study. In doing so, it offers suggestions as to how Australia and New Zealand might best go about sustaining and further strengthening their Track 2 engagement with Asia.

1. **Track 2 engagement with Asia requires a long-term commitment**

The findings of this study suggest that second track processes are necessarily strategic and medium-to-longer term in their outlook. Indeed, they are often at their most effective and influential when they operate in such a manner. In addition, the benefits which Track 2 institutions and activities provide may not always be easily measured. There needs to be an understanding and acceptance therefore, particularly at the Track 1 level, that these processes will often take time to demonstrate their true value. Toward this end, a consistent level of governmental commitment is required over the longer-term.
2. A clear correlation exists between the level of resources devoted to second track processes and their effective operation

The findings of this study suggest that funding is one of the most critical variables conditioning the operation and effectiveness of second track processes. The South China Sea Workshops, which have struggled to make an impact since the withdrawal of CIDA funding in 2001, serve as cases in point. The PBEC experience is also instructive, with this institution essentially becoming moribund of late, in part due to an inability to attract and maintain corporate sponsorship.

The contrasting examples of the Lowy Institute for International Policy and the Asialink ‘Conversations’ provide recent examples of the impact that relatively well resourced second track processes can have. They also demonstrate that the funding for effective second track mechanisms need not come exclusively from government. The experience of the Australia-New Zealand Leadership Forum illustrates that the potential is there, notwithstanding the considerable efforts which were initially required to attract corporate funding for this initiative from the Bank of New Zealand and Qantas. Without compromising their own basic missions and objectives, part of the challenge is for Australia’s and New Zealand’s Track 2 institutions to ensure that they remain relevant to corporate (and government) sponsors.

Whether the funding for these processes ultimately comes from government or the private sector, what remains clear is that Track 2 institutions and activities are simply unable to function effectively in the absence of adequate resources.
3. **Should Australia or New Zealand opt to undertake any further broadening of their Track 2 involvement in the region, this would most productively be focused upon sponsored workshops with a specifically Australian or New Zealand-influenced agenda**

Although the effectiveness of second track processes is difficult to measure with any real degree of precision, sponsored workshops do appear to be making quite an impact. As noted in chapter 4, the Asialink ‘Conversations’ are one recent Australian-led initiative which serves as a case in point here. As an Australian initiative with Australian funding support (private in this case), such events provide the opportunity to discuss issues from Australian (as well as other) perspectives. It can be an advantage, for instance, to consider Australia-Asian issues outside the immediate context of US-Asian dynamics. Another advantage of initiating Australian or New Zealand sponsored workshops is that they may assist in strengthening relationships and formulating issues in ways that can assist Australia and New Zealand in the broader, well-established regional Track 2 processes.

This study has identified a number of other regional institutions which would be worth contemplating as partners in organising such initiatives. These include the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), the Shanghai Institute of International Studies (SIIS), the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia, and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta.

4. **Scope exists for further joint Australia-New Zealand Track 2 initiatives to be undertaken**

While the interests, objectives and strategic circumstances of Australia and New Zealand are by no means identical, it is worth bearing in mind that the two countries have historically worked together on a number of aspects of Asia-Pacific regional security. Moreover, the fact that few (if any) Track 2 processes have infinite
resources at their disposal, logically creates an incentive for further trans-Tasman collaboration on Asia-Pacific issues of common interest or concern. By way of example, both countries clearly have a stake in better understanding and addressing the growth of Chinese criminal syndicates in the South Pacific region. At the Track 2 level, the Australian and New Zealand Member Committees of CSCAP are already extremely well positioned to provide expert analysis and sound, yet innovative advice on this very issue. Among the eight study groups that CSCAP currently runs, for instance, are those addressing security in Oceania; maritime cooperation among member states (including piracy, smuggling, poaching and container security); and globalism and the law: opportunities for criminality, transnational crime and terrorism. This is clearly one area, therefore, where scope exists for a joint Australia-New Zealand Track 2 initiative.

5. Efforts to nurture the ‘next generation’ of Track 2 participants are desirable and necessary

Perhaps because Track 2 activities rely so heavily on personal linkages and the intellectual contribution which individual participants are willing and able to make, there is now a growing recognition of the need to expand that social capital by bringing younger scholars—the ‘next generation’ of the Track 2 community—into the fold. Consistent with this, a number of the institutions referred to in this study—namely ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP—are actively seeking to expand their networks by involving younger scholars. Through its ‘New Voices’ Initiative, the Lowy Institute for International Policy has also taken steps to help build the skills and networks of those who will likely become the future leaders of Australia’s Track 2 community. Such mechanisms could usefully be developed further. The Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security (CANCAPS)—a Canadian-based initiative which has proven to be an extremely effective mechanism for training younger scholars and practitioners and providing them with an entrée into Canada’s Track 2 community—may provide a useful example for Australia and New Zealand to draw upon.
Further work could also be undertaken on the question of how best to identify the likely Track 2 personnel of the future and on how to provide them with an entrée into the second track community. The aforementioned initiatives notwithstanding, there is little evidence to suggest that the manner in which this ‘next generation’ issue is being approached has been particularly systematic. Likewise, a study documenting and evaluating the range of ‘next generation’ fora which already exist in the region, such as the ‘Young Leaders fellowship program’—an initiative of the Pacific Forum CSIS designed to provide young professionals from the United States and Asia with training and networking opportunities—would also seem to be a worthwhile exercise.\(^7\)

6. ‘Strategic alliances’ between Track 2 institutions and local media outlets should be encouraged

Strengthening public awareness and appreciation regarding the importance of second track processes is clearly central to strengthening Australian and New Zealand Track 2 engagement with the region. Media outlets have a key role to play in facilitating this process. The inaugural Australia-New Zealand Leadership Forum serves as a case in point. Aside from a useful public report written by one of the journalists who was present at the meeting,\(^6\) this important Track 2 initiative received scant media coverage in either country. By building closer ties and possibly even some form of ‘strategic alliance’ with relevant media outlets in Australia and New Zealand, Track 2 institutions can safeguard against the possibility that some of their most promising initiatives will escape public attention.
7. The progress of emerging Track 2 institutions and activities focused on crystallising the notion of ‘East Asian Community’ building still needs to be carefully monitored

One of the most interesting features of the continuing burgeoning in regional Track 2 activity has been the emergence of a number of processes—such as NEAT and the CEAC—focused on crystallising the notion of East Asian community building. This trend is being mirrored at the Track 1 level, as evidenced over recent years in the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) process and the establishment of an East Asia Summit. Consistent with its apparent desire to play a more active role in the region, Beijing has been one of the main drivers of this trend. Similarly, at the Track 2 level, China took the responsibility for establishing the NEAT once approval for this process was given at the APT Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in May 2003. Kenichi Ito, the President and CEO of the Japan Forum on International Relations, was present at the inaugural September 2003 meeting of the NEAT in Beijing. He has since observed that he ‘was impressed by the strong determination shared by all participants to create a momentum for regional integration that would not fall behind that of other regions’.

For countries such as Australia and New Zealand—which are sometimes described as being geographically peripheral—the progress of second track processes whose primary aim is to further the notion of an East Asian Community needs to be watched carefully. The jury still remains out on how far these emergent processes will go in advancing this potentially powerful idea. One line of thinking, however, maintains that these new initiatives could potentially begin to pose a serious (Chinese-led) threat to more established processes, such as CSCAP. While Australia and New Zealand should avoid any sudden or dramatic moves away from more established processes in the short-to-medium term, it would still be prudent to monitor carefully the upward trend in these new institutions and activities in the months and years ahead.
8. The relationship between second and third track activities in the region requires further consideration

As discussed in chapter 2 of this paper, second track processes can perform a valuable ‘brokerage’ role by acting as a conduit between government, on the one hand, and a broad range of potentially useful Track 3 processes, NGOs, specialist organisations and academic institutions, on the other. This study identifies at least two successful examples of this ‘bridge’ ideal at work. Aus-CSCAP, for instance, is in a sense acting as a bridge between Track 3 Islamic processes and Track 1 through its project on Islamic perspectives; as is ASEAN-ISIS as the host of the ASEAN People’s Assemblies. Further research could usefully be undertaken on examples such as these. One of the primary obstacles to realising this bridge ideal, of course, remains the need to allay the concerns of Track 3 networks that this could result in their ‘co-option’. In the final analysis, the undeniable increase in the importance of regional Track 3 processes suggests that some innovative thinking is urgently required to surmount this potential impediment; for, as Job concludes, ‘encompassing the voices and interests of civil society must become a priority for Track 2 if it is to sustain its role in shaping the future of the Asia Pacific security order’.

A Final Word

In closing, it is hoped that the above conclusions and recommendations will be relevant to government, diplomats, business, media, academics, the Track 2 community and the public more generally in both Australia and New Zealand. To reiterate the premise outlined at the beginning of this paper—that engagement with Asia remains a multilayered, multi-dimensional process that extends beyond those official relations which occur at the government-to-government level, to encompass a wide spectrum of people-to-people contacts and personal linkages—it appears that the success of Australian and New Zealand engagement with Asia ultimately remains contingent upon the contribution that such parties are willing and able to make.
Notes

Chapter 1: Introduction


7 See, for example, Ross Garnaut, Peter Drysdale and Stuart Harris, ‘Local Preening Clouds the Big Picture’, The Australian, 7 November 2001, p. 15.


Chapter 2: Track 2 Diplomacy—A Critique


17 Helen E.S. Nesadurai and Diane Stone, ‘Southeast Asian Think Tanks in Regional and Global Networking’, *Panorama*, vol. 1, 2000, pp. 19–35.


29 Stuart Harris, 'The Regional Role of ‘Track Two’ Diplomacy’ in Hadi Soesastro and Anthony Bergin, eds., *The Role of Security and Economic Cooperation Structures in the Asia Pacific Region*, Centre for Strategic and International
Track 2 Diplomacy in Asia: Australian and New Zealand Engagement

Studies, Jakarta, in cooperation with Australian Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1996, p. 147.

30 Townsend-Gault, ‘Can International Law Contribute to Preventive Diplomacy in Southeast Asia?’, p. 34.


Chapter 3: Leading Track 2 Processes in the Asian Region


For further reading, see Mely Caballero-Anthony, 'Non-State regional governance mechanism for economic security: the case of the ASEAN People’s Assembly', *The Pacific Review*, vol. 17, no. 4, 2004, pp. 567–85.

For further reading, see Hernandez, ‘The ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP Experience’, pp. 280–84.


Tamora Vidailet and Joyce Li, ‘China forum rolls ahead, but still not a Davos’, *Reuters*, 22 April 2005.


For further reading, see Simon, ‘The ASEAN Regional Forum Views the Councils for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific: How Track II Assists Track I’, pp. 5–23.


For a thorough recounting of the origins and objectives of the SCS Workshops, see Djalal and Townsend-Gault, ‘Preventive Diplomacy: Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea’, pp. 107–33.


Chapter 4: Australian and New Zealand-based Track 2 Institutions and Organisations


Chapter 5: Reflections and Future Directions

The first meeting of this forum was held in May 2004 at Government House, Wellington. It was sponsored by the Bank of New Zealand and Qantas and brought together 76 participants from both sides of the Tasman, including government ministers and politicians, senior public servants, business leaders, academics, journalists, regulators, union representatives and sporting figures to discuss the nature and future of the relationship between Australia and New Zealand. A clear objective, however, was to canvass ways to broaden, strengthen and deepen the already close economic ties between the two countries. The idea to convene such a forum was initially recommended by the New Zealand Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. The second meeting of this forum was held in late April/ early May 2005 in Melbourne.


Garnaut, Ross, Peter Drysdale and Stuart Harris, ‘Local Preening Clouds the Big Picture’, *The Australian*, 7 November 2001, p. 15.


Hammer, Chris, ‘China is on the rise—economically and diplomatically: how should Australia take advantage of this?’, *The Diplomat*, vol. 3, no. 6, February/March 2005, pp. 10–12.


Ito, Kenichi, ‘Japan’s move to community’, *Japan Times*, 16 April 2004.


Nesadurai, Helen E.S., and Diane Stone, ‘Southeast Asian Think Tanks in Regional and Global Networking’, *Panorama*, vol. 1, 2000, pp. 19–35.


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