Police Building in the Southwest Pacific – New Directions in Australian Regional Policing

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INTRODUCTION

AFTER GAINING INDEPENDENCE in the 1970s, the countries of the Southwest Pacific were left to direct their own political and external affairs. As the dominant metropolitan power – seigneurial state – in the region, Australia sought to avoid any appearance of interfering with the sovereignty of its smaller neighbours. Australian influence was wielded primarily through the medium of bilateral development assistance, with the bulk of this going to its former colony and the largest of the newly independent countries, Papua New Guinea. While respecting traditional notions of sovereignty, Canberra\(^1\) has provided substantial levels of development assistance to regional governments, including support aimed at enhancing the capabilities of their defence and justice institutions. The limited and, in some cases, diminishing, capacity of domestic law enforcement agencies has occurred against a background of serious internal conflicts in some countries, including a nine-year long civil war in Bougainville, and mounting concerns about political instability, law and order, and economic dysfunction in others. Combined with the turbulence in post-Suharto Indonesia, increasing volatility in the Southwest Pacific, including coups in Fiji and Solomon Islands in 2000, prompted some Australian commentators to speak of ‘an arc of instability’ beyond the continent’s Northern and Eastern shores.

Although prepared to assist in facilitating peace negotiations and peace monitoring activities in Bougainville and Solomon Islands, Canberra

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\(^1\) Canberra is the national capital of Australia and hence home to the country’s primary decision-making organs, including the national parliament and the Australian Federal Police headquarters.
maintained its reluctance to intervene directly to restore security in the case of conflicts in the Pacific Island countries. As well as the constraints of sovereignty, it was acknowledged that the internal diversity and related complexities in these countries posed further obstacles to successful external interventions. As stated in a 2003 Australian Foreign Affairs White Paper,

Australia cannot presume to fix the problems of the South Pacific. Australia is not a neo-colonial power. The island countries are independent sovereign states. When problems are so tightly bound to complex cultural traditions and ethnic loyalties, only local communities can find workable solutions. (Commonwealth of Australia, 2003)

A major turning point in Australian policy took place in mid-2003 after Canberra agreed to lead a Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). This decision to intervene in the troubled archipelago, albeit at the invitation of Solomon Islands government, has been viewed by many as marking a paradigm shift in Australian policy in the Southwest Pacific (Kampmark, 2003). A distinctly more robust and proactive style of regional engagement has emerged against the backdrop of a dramatically changed international strategic environment following the ‘terrorist’ attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 and bombings in Bali in 2002 and in Jakarta in 2003. These changes in strategic thinking have also coincided with a growing domestic critique of the effectiveness of Australian aid programmes in the region. Some have criticised these as consisting primarily of ‘boomerang aid’, whereby the principal beneficiaries are the Australian managing contractors and consultants responsible for implementing such programmes (AidWatch, 2005). Others have argued that Australian aid has not only failed to deliver on its promises but that it is directly implicated in the reproduction of political and economic dysfunction by fuelling corruption and inducing high levels of aid dependency among recipient states (Hughes, 2003). The effect of these criticisms has been the reformulation of aid practices with a view to ensuring that desired outcomes are achieved and that Australian taxpayers receive ‘value for money’. In light of the changing security environment and re-evaluation of aid policy, Australia’s approach to regional engagement has become progressively more securitised in orientation and intrusive in character.

Australian confidence in undertaking international peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction has also been bolstered by its relative success in earlier peacekeeping missions in Bougainville and, in particular, in East Timor from 1999 under the auspices of the United Nations. In addition to the Solomon Islands mission, the new post-2003 approach has been demonstrated in the short-lived Enhanced Cooperation Program (ECP) in Papua New Guinea, as well as in engagements with a number of smaller Pacific Islands states, such as Nauru, that are viewed as beset by varying
degrees of security, political and financial crises. A common feature of these engagements has been the strong emphasis placed on strengthening policing structures and related law and justice agencies, as well as the increasingly prominent role of serving Australian police personnel in the delivery of these services.

Over the past couple of years, peacekeeping and building the capacities of police organisations in post-conflict or otherwise ‘vulnerable’ states have been gradually redefined as core business for Australian police and, in particular, for the Australian Federal Police (AFP, 2004). The growing importance of these roles has been accompanied by a significant shift in modes of delivery, with Australian-supported capacity building initiatives assuming a markedly ‘hands on’ character. This includes, for example, the insertion of Australian personnel, including police, into ‘in-line’ positions in institutions being ‘strengthened’, as opposed to the former practice of adviser facilitated programmes. Moreover, while the provision of police capacity building expertise was previously managed by the Australian government’s Agency for International Development (AusAID), the Australian Federal Police have steadily assumed direct responsibility for overseas policing initiatives, necessitating new levels of cooperation between these two agencies.2 Complicating matters further, and in keeping with general trends in the delivery of aid, is the move to embed police capacity building programmes within both sector-wide and whole-of-government approaches.

This chapter – comprising six distinct sections – explores the changing face of Australia’s contribution to police capacity building and peacekeeping in the Southwest Pacific with a particular focus on Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea. First, it provides an introduction to the Melanesian social context, so as to familiarise the reader with the nuances of social order in the region. Second, it provides a brief history of Australia’s longstanding contribution to police capacity building in the Southwest Pacific and an overview of its more recent involvement in peacekeeping activities. Third, it examines the changing global and regional security environment and the establishment of the International Deployment Group (IDG) of the Australian Federal Police. The chapter then looks at two case studies, namely RAMSI and the Enhanced Cooperation Programme (ECP) in Papua New Guinea. Although not well known beyond Australia and the immediate region, these two cases provide important insights into the significant new directions in Australia’s approach to transnational policing.

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2 In recent times, an AusAID liaison officer has been working at the AFP’s Majura facility, while a senior AFP officer is working within AusAID’s fragile states unit.
In conclusion, the sixth section reflects upon lessons learned and examines the ongoing challenges to Australian involvement in regional police building.

THE MELANESIAN SOCIAL CONTEXT

The contemporary manifestations of social disorder in Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea that prompted Australian intervention are deeply rooted in local cultural and historical circumstances. Consequently, the success or otherwise of capacity building and peacekeeping missions in these countries is highly contingent upon a deep understanding of local exigencies. Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, like the neighbouring Melanesian states of Fiji and Vanuatu, are young states with recent histories of both colonisation and decolonisation. In Papua New Guinea, after almost a century of colonial occupation by Germany, Britain and later Australia, independence was gained in 1975, while Solomon Islands gained independence from Britain in 1978. The historical and social contexts of state building in Melanesia are very different to those that pertained, for example, in the European proto-states several hundreds of years ago, and challenge the universal and unilinear view of political development underlying the concepts of ‘failed’ and ‘failing’ states that have been applied to the Melanesian region.

Map of Melanesia

Throughout Melanesia, the colonial experience was uneven, with many Melanesians experiencing only fleeting contact with district agents, whose role it was to extend colonial influence from established centres. Consequently, while colonial agents imposed foreign notions of social order upon those with whom they had contact, local ideas about right and wrong were in many areas left untouched, and even in areas of frequent contact, proved extremely resilient. The influence of Christian missionaries, who similarly introduced new notions of social order, was of greater significance to the majority of Melanesians, whose relationships with the churches continue to be more consistent than their relationships with the state.

Like the colonial dependencies, the contemporary states of Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea have limited penetration and legitimacy, failing to provide state services to the majority of citizens, approximately 85 per cent of whom live rural subsistence lifestyles. Despite rapid social change, both Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea share durable forms of local social organisation, in which social groups are constituted upon the basis of factors such as shared language, shared putative ancestry and
shared ownership of demarcated territory. Emanating from these ongoing forms of social organisation, allegiance is to one's kin and close allies, rather than to an abstract notion of 'nation state', posing challenges to the legitimacy of the state and its proclaimed monopoly over the use of force.

The ongoing resilience of local forms of social control, alongside the significant influence of the church and lesser influence of the state, has resulted in an environment marked by acute social and legal pluralism. In rural areas, local forms of social control, greatly informed by Christian values, prevail over the inherited state system of police, courts and prisons, with which people engage largely only when and if they choose to do so. Consequently, dispute resolution is characterised by forum shopping, as the limited deterrent capacity of the state permits citizens the liberty to pick and choose from various state and non-state options. Significantly, disjunctions between state and local notions of right and wrong continue to pose a major challenge to the maintenance of social order in contemporary Melanesia, with clear implications for external attempts at capacity building within law and justice institutions, such as the police.

AUSTRALIAN-LED CAPACITY BUILDING AND PEACEKEEPING

Capacity building

The provision of police capacity building assistance to Pacific Islands countries has traditionally been managed by AusAID, whose programme designs were implemented by consultants (drawn largely from state police forces) recruited by Australian managing contractors. However, the Australian-led regional assistance mission to Solomon Islands and the ECP in Papua New Guinea have entailed growing reliance on the AFP as the principal agency for the delivery of large-scale police capacity building initiatives. The AFP is now the key stakeholder (in collaboration with AusAID and other government agencies such as the Department of Attorney General) in all overseas police initiatives, be they peacekeeping, conflict prevention or capacity building exercises.

Australia has a lengthy history of supporting regional law enforcement agencies, most notably in Papua New Guinea. Predating the current predilection for ‘capacity building’, Australia began providing assistance to the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) prior to PNG’s independence in 1975. During the 1970s and 1980s, members of Australia’s state forces were seconded to the RPNGC with the aim of transferring

3 The AFP has also provided some capacity building assistance via the Law Enforcement Cooperation Programme (LECP).
specialist skills and training in communications, technical services, prosecutions, investigations, traffic, general duties and instructional techniques. Since then, many members of the RPNGC have also undertaken training and police postings in Australia (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1974).

In 1989, the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau (forerunner to AusAID) launched the first phase of the RPNGC Development Project, commencing what was to become 15 years of sustained bilateral assistance to the PNG constabulary. Comprising three separate phases (1989–1992, 1993–1998 and 2000–2005), the project was a substantial, if conventional, capacity building and institutional strengthening exercise facilitated by advisers who focused upon key areas such as fraud and anti-corruption, prosecutions, community policing (since 1993), corporate planning, information management, human resources, logistics and infrastructure, leadership and management, training, finance, discipline, general duties and gender. Despite 15 years of Australian assistance, the RPNGC continues to be riddled with problems of poor management and poor performance of basic policing duties. Given the previous focus of Australian development assistance upon the measurement of outputs rather than impacts, it is difficult to quantify the success or otherwise of the RPNGC Development Project. As outlined at section five, however, the perceived failure of the RPNGC Development Project in part provoked the move away from adviser delivered programmes to inline policing, which was briefly employed during the Australian-supported Enhanced Cooperation Programme in late 2004 and the first half of 2005.

Since cessation of the RPNGC development project in February 2005, the constabulary has been receiving advisory support through the PNG Law and Justice Sector Programme (LJSP), which provides the principal facility for the delivery of Australian assistance to strengthen the capacity of all law and justice sector agencies while simultaneously fostering sector-wide collaboration. This reflects broader donor trends away from agency specific support projects towards sector wide approaches, such as that offered to the Solomon Islands law and justice sector prior to the deployment of RAMSI in mid-2003 and that prevailing in Fiji under their law and justice sector programme. Like its PNG counterpart, the Fiji law and justice sector programme, which began in 2003, aims to facilitate agency specific planning and budgeting consistent with agreed sector wide outcomes, and involves advisers recruited by Australian managing contractors working with the courts, prisons, police and the Ministry of Justice (AusAID, 2005a).

Despite this trend towards sector-wide approaches, Australia maintains an agency specific approach in its capacity building support with the Vanuatu police. The Vanuatu Police Force Capacity Building Project commenced in 2003 in the shape of an interim phase, designed to provide
immediate support to the VPF while facilitating the process of a longer-term project design. In recent months, there has been considerable debate about the form of future Australian policing assistance to Vanuatu. This has included arguments against the conventional bilateral adviser-based capacity building model and the advocacy of an AFP directed initiative comprising both serving AFP agents and externally recruited personnel.4

In addition to various country specific programmes, AusAID, in partnership with New Zealand’s aid agency, launched a five year Pacific Regional Policing Initiative in 2004. This initiative aims to contribute to a safer, more secure environment among member states of the Pacific Islands Forum, the premier instrument of regional governance in the Southwest Pacific.5 It comprises eight programme components, namely: support to the South Pacific Chiefs of Police Conference (SPCPC); an executive development programme to strengthen leadership; a police technical skills programme to enhance basic operational capacity; training and capacity development; forensic technical skills; the establishment of an incentives-based Pacific policing technical assistance facility; training institution infrastructure; and programme management (Pacific Regional Policing Initiative, 2004).

As outlined at sections four and five, RAMSI and the FCP, both of which are AFP-led missions, provide detailed insights into Australia’s new and more interventionist approach to police capacity building initiatives in the region. In addition to these major missions, the AFP continues to offer capacity building support under the Law Enforcement Cooperation Programme (LECP).

The LECP, based largely upon the Australian Federal Police’s extensive international liaison officer network, was established in 1998 to enhance collaboration between the AFP and international law enforcement agencies, particularly in relation to combating the international trade in illicit drugs (Palmer, 2000). Funded initially under the national illicit drug strategy and focused on the Asia Pacific region, the programme has subsequently expanded globally and has supported a range of activities including course delivery in countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Vanuatu and Solomon Islands, conferences in Bangkok, London and United Arab Emirates, AFP officer attachments in Solomon Islands, California, Indonesia and Hong Kong, and scholarships for members of the People’s Republic of China Police Force. In the process of

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4 Potentially, support to Vanuatu will resemble the Timor Leste Police Development Programme, which is a unique model comprising staff recruited by a private contractor (mainly from state police forces) and serving AFP personnel.

5 Pacific Forum Island countries include Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Australia and New Zealand.
enhancing international cooperation against illicit drug trafficking, LECP activities seek to contribute to the strengthening of law enforcement capacity and infrastructure within specified countries. In 2004, the LECP undertook extensive strategic planning with a view to facilitating larger and more sustainable capacity-building projects (Jevtovic, 2005).

Peacekeeping and Peace monitoring

For many decades, Australia has participated in the provision of personnel to overseas peacekeeping missions, with members of the former ACT Police and Commonwealth Police (forerunners to the AFP) and state forces participating in United Nations missions as early as 1964.6 Since then, members have undertaken missions in Namibia, Thailand, Cambodia, South Africa, Mozambique, Haiti, Somalia, Bougainville, East Timor, Solomon Islands, Jordan, Nauru and PNG (AFP, 2005a). Peacekeeping and regional assistance missions, such as RAMSI, are now considered core business fundamental to the strengthening and maintenance of international law enforcement cooperation (AFP, 2004).

While previously Australian peacekeeping exercises involved the provision of Australian police personnel to large UN led missions, Australian soldiers and police are now being deployed for both regional and bilateral law and order initiatives, such as RAMSI and the ECP (Keety, 2004a), all of which are managed by the IDG.7 Prior to RAMSI, Australian police had participated in two peacemaking missions in the Pacific Islands. The first of these was on the island of Bougainville as it emerged from a devastating nine-year long civil conflict. Following peace talks and the signing of a truce in Burnham, New Zealand, in October 1997, four AFP members were deployed to Bougainville as part of the Truce Monitoring Group (TMG). The TMG, which was led by the New Zealand Defence Force, comprised military personnel from Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, and Vanuatu, as well as civilian monitors from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Department of Defence, AusAID, and the AFP. The role of monitors was to observe; investigate any breaches; liaise with local stakeholders; facilitate the peace process; discourage any potential breach; and report any breach of the truce. After the Lincoln agreement and signing of a permanent ceasefire agreement between the parties to the conflict, the Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) replaced the TMG in May 1998. AFP monitors also served with the PMG, which was led by the Australian Defence Force. The role of the PMG was similar to

6 Since 1964, 1414 AFP members have participated in missions to Cyprus. See AFP (2005a).
7 Peacekeeping missions were previously under the auspices of Peace Operations.
that of the TMG and included: observing and monitoring the peace process; investigating breaches of the ceasefire agreement; liaising between all groups and organisations; facilitating the peace process; discouraging potential breaches; and reporting any breaches of the ceasefire agreement (McDevitt, 1998; White, 1998). At its peak the PMG comprised around 300 predominantly military personnel. A total of over 5,000 unarmed military and civilian personnel from Australia, New Zealand, Fiji and Vanuatu served on the PMG, including 3,500 Australian Defence Force personnel and over 300 Australian citizens. Australia also led the civilian Bougainville Transition Team (BTT) that replaced the PMG on 30 June 2003 and remained on Bougainville until 31 December 2003. The BTT continued the peace-related activities of the PMG, although on a reduced scale.

The second peacekeeping mission was the International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT) that served in Solomon Islands between 2000–2002 prior to the deployment of the regional assistance mission. Established under the Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) in October 2000, the IPMT was to work in support of the Peace Monitoring Council (PMC). Also created under the TPA, the PMC consisted of eminent Solomon Islanders and its principal role was to monitor and enforce the terms of the peace agreement. The IPMT was led by an experienced DFAT official and consisted of personnel drawn from the AFP and police from New Zealand, Vanuatu, Cook Islands and Tonga, as well as from a number of Australian and New Zealand government departments, including defence. The 49-strong IPMT was an unarmed and neutral organisation tasked with collecting and storing weapons and building confidence among the parties to the TPA and amongst the community more widely (Hegarty, 2001). It completed its 20-month deployment in June 2002.

In practice, the lines between peacekeeping and capacity building have become progressively blurred in larger missions such as those in East Timor and Solomon Islands where both activities have been undertaken by the same body of international police. Once the primary peacekeeping objectives have been achieved, the focus switches to capacity building. The transition from peacekeeping to capacity building brings many new challenges to the assisting police, entailing, as it does, the pursuit of different objectives and deployment of different skills.

THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEPLOYMENT GROUP

While the attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, elevated international security concerns to an unprecedented level, bombings in Bali
in 2002 and Jakarta in 2003 accentuated Australian anxieties about security in its immediate neighbourhood. Having aligned itself closely with the Bush administration in Washington, the government of Prime Minister John Howard has adopted the ‘war on terror’ as an important strategic lens for viewing issues of regional security. Accordingly, the countries of the South-west Pacific have been recast in terms of the potential threats their varying levels of internal instability and insecurity present to Australia’s own national interests. The concepts of ‘failed’ and ‘failing’ states have, in turn, become central to the identification of perceived security threats and the justification of preventive and remedial actions on the part of Australia and other seigneurial states.

A state is deemed to be at risk of ‘failing’ when it is no longer capable of delivering what Rothenberg (2004) refers to the essential ‘political goods’ that provide the basis for the existence and perpetuation of the modern state. The most fundamental of these, in his view, is the provision of security against internal (for example, law and order) and external threats. Protection against internal threats is conventionally provided by the state’s law enforcement and judicial apparatus, while military and defence forces protect against external aggression. Other ‘political goods’ include the rights of citizens to participate freely and openly in the political process, the provision of certain basic services, management of the national economy, and an environment conducive to economic opportunities. Modern states are viewed as existing along a continuum of state capabilities. At one end, ‘strong’ states are those considered to perform well in the delivery of essential ‘political goods’. At the other, ‘weak’ states are those viewed as experiencing difficulty in delivering one or more of these ‘political goods’.

‘Failed’ states provide an extreme variant of ‘weak’ states and are perceived to be no longer capable of fulfilling any of the basic attributes of modern statehood. The nightmare scenario of state ‘failure’, depicted so vividly by writers like Robert Kaplan (2000), is one characterised by endemic lawlessness, violence, internal conflict, corruption, poverty and disease. Whereas in the past, such catastrophic situations were viewed principally in terms of their humanitarian consequences for the populations concerned, the prism of the ‘war on terror’ has recast them primarily in security terms. That is, in light of the security threats they ostensibly pose, not only to their own unfortunate citizens, but, more significantly, to neighbouring states and the wider international community. From this

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perspective, ‘failed’ and ‘failing’ states are increasingly viewed as incubators of regional (and international) instability, conflict and insecurity (see also Sheptycki, this volume).

The official case for Australian intervention in Solomon Islands in mid-2003 was set squarely within this strategic framework. Unveiling his proposal to the Australian parliament, Prime Minister John Howard spoke of ‘a significant change in Australia’s regional policy’ and one that reflected concerns that Solomon Islands could be exploited by ‘drug dealers, money-launderers and international terrorism’. ‘We will pay very dearly for indifference if we adopt that course now’ (Australian, 2003). Phil Goff, the New Zealand Foreign Minister, warned that Solomon Islands was in danger of becoming a failed state. As well as the catastrophic consequences for Solomon Islanders, there was ‘also a significant threat of instability to the Pacific’ with Solomon Islands at risk of becoming ‘a haven of drug traffickers, people smugglers, terrorists and people trading in small arms’ (Radio New Zealand National News 2003). According to the Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, Australia:

...will not sit back and watch while a country slips inexorably into decay and disorder... The last thing we can afford is an already susceptible region being overwhelmed by more insidious and direct threats to Australia. (Downer, 2003a)

The clearest exposition of this position was found in the report on Solomon Islands by a government-funded think-tank, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI, 2003). Published several weeks before the deployment took place, the report identified Solomon Islands as a ‘failing state’ and warned of it becoming ‘a petri dish in which transnational and non-state security threats can develop and breed’ and a ‘post-modern badlands, ruled by criminals and governed by violence’ (ASPI, 2003: 13). This, according to the report, would render Australia vulnerable to transnational crime operating out of Solomon Islands and possibly even terrorism. Moreover, such a situation could become contagious, with problems spreading to other countries in the region. It was also made clear that a decision to intervene in Solomon Islands would precipitate a shift in Australia’s broader regional policy (ASPI 2003: 7). Anticipating the regional mission, the report proposed the establishment of a ‘sustained and comprehensive multinational effort’ to undertake rehabilitation work with the consent of the Solomon Islands. The first stage would be directed at restoring law and order, while the second stage would assist Solomon Islands to ‘build new political structures and security institutions and address underlying social and economic problems’ (ASPI, 2003: 39).

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9 The Institute is a government-funded independent think-tank. See also Wainwright (2003).
More recently, ASPI (2004) has turned its attention to Papua New Guinea, which is identified as arguably the most difficult of Australia’s three top-priority foreign policy challenges. While downplaying the significance of the ‘war on terror’ as the main driving force of Australia’s new activism in the region, the focus of the report remains squarely upon the diminishing capacity of the PNG state and the potentially catastrophic consequences for PNG and its neighbours if this problem is not addressed:

Australian policy towards PNG needs to recognize the possibility that unless today’s negative trends can be reversed, Australia may find within ten to fifteen years that our closest neighbour is a state in acute crisis, whose people live a Hobbesian nightmare of lawless misery, and whose problems threaten to spread to our other neighbours. (ASPI, 2004: 18)

Although not yet a ‘failed state’ (ASPI, 2004: 8), the signs of potential ‘failure’ are clear:

A vicious cycle links failing service delivery, falling revenues and national fragmentation with increasing fragility of government institutions, poor economic performance and lack of legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the people. The risk is also growing that the institutions of governance in PNG have weakened to the point that they might collapse under the effects of the kinds of crises that have occurred several times already in PNG’s short history – a major secession movement, attempted coup or acute economic crunch. (ASPI, 2004: 9)

This has resulted in a significant change in Australia’s strategic thinking and in its mode of engagement with the Southwest Pacific. A more robust and interventionist stance has replaced the formerly hands-off approach adopted in relation to the Pacific Islands countries.

Australia’s renewed engagement with the countries of the Southwest Pacific has been broadly welcomed in the region. After years of relative neglect, Canberra’s apparent interest in assisting its smaller neighbours and willingness to deploy substantial resources towards this end has been viewed as a significant step forward. At the same time, the intrusive nature of this new approach and the prominence of the external security agenda on which it is premised have inevitably given rise to reservations, resentment, and, in some cases, outright opposition, on the part of some regional leaders. For members of the political elites in these countries, Canberra’s new assertiveness is perceived as a direct threat to national sovereignty. Viewing the region through the prism of the ‘war on terror’ obscures the

10 The other two top-priority foreign policy challenges are identified as China-US relations and Indonesia.
11 The reference here is presumably to General Singirok’s rebellion in 1997 against the Chau government’s decisions to deploy mercenaries to Bougainville. According to one veteran observer of PNG politics, Singirok ‘did not attempt a military coup’ (May, 2003: 6).
historical and social foundations of the many challenges facing these countries including their tenuous positions in the global economy. Questions also arise concerning the long-term sustainability of these Australian-led initiatives. Are they facilitating a genuine process of reform in the countries concerned that will be sustained under local leadership and direction long after the external personnel have departed, or are they simply enhancing debilitating levels of dependency on external resources and expertise (also see Goldsmith et al., this volume)?

Countering terrorism has now become a dominant concern for regional law enforcement agencies, alongside the need to address instability in the Southwest Pacific and the growing threat of transnational crime, identity crime and e-crime (Keely, 2004b). In a media release on 2 February 2004, the Australian Minister for Justice and Customs, Chris Ellison, outlined the establishment of the International Deployment Group (IDG) under the auspices of the Australian Federal Police, stating that:

"The IDG will enable the strategic deployment of personnel undertaking peacekeeping operations, restoration of law and order missions and the delivery of capacity-building initiatives in the region. (Ellison 2004)"

The landmark Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, popularly known as the Brahimi report, states that:

"Member States are encouraged to each establish a national pool of civilian police officers that would be ready for deployment to United Nations peace operations on short notice, within the context of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System. (Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 2000)"\(^\text{12}\)

In keeping with this recommendation, the International Deployment Group was created by the Australian government in 2004 in order to provide a ready reserve of Australian police to deploy overseas in multilateral law enforcement capacity building missions (for example, RAMSI), bilateral law enforcement capacity building programmes under the auspices of the LECP, international monitoring missions and international peacekeeping missions.

The IDG operates from a training facility at Majura on the outskirts of Canberra, in the Australian Capital Territory, where the AFP is based. All staff permanently attached to the IDG are housed at the Majura complex, which also boasts a mock village in which pre-deployees undertake scenario based training. The IDG comprises members drawn from within the AFP itself, in addition to members of Australian state police forces who are appointed as special members of the AFP for the duration of their IDG service. In order to qualify for lateral recruitment (from the state services) applicants must have four or more years of policing experience and must

\(^{12}\) See Recommendation 10(a).
not have been out of the policing sector for more than three years (AFP, 2005b). Standard IDG service is based around service blocks of 40, 60, 80 or 100 weeks, during which members are deployed for four month periods, with one month of leave (AFP, 2005c). Most IDG deployments are unaccompanied missions and the IDG currently has personnel deployed to Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, Cyprus, Jordan, Timor-Leste and Nauru. In Timor Leste (in the Timor Leste Police Development Project) and more recently Vanuatu, postings range from six months to two years, some of which are accompanied postings.

To prepare them for mission life and work, IDG members are required to undergo a series of short courses prior to and during mobilisation. The first of these, the International Deployment Pre-Deployment Training (IDPT) programme, is a two-week generic programme to provide all members deploying overseas with a basic understanding of peace operations. The primary aim of this programme is to force members beyond their comfort zone and there is a significant focus upon scenario-based learning including a mock siege, four wheel driving, trekking, navigation and orientation, as well as a host of physical and team building exercises. Following the IDPT, members undertake mission specific training immediately prior to deploying, during which they are given seminars by a variety of speakers on issues such as medical conditions, culture, civil society, tax, customs and quarantine etc, in addition to a one day capacity building workshop. Once members have deployed they are given an in-country briefing, the length and content of which varies from mission to mission.

While the IDG has enhanced Australia’s capacity to provide personnel to support regional and global law enforcement, as a new institution it faces a number of challenges. As a relatively small police service, it is a constant challenge to meet staffing requirements (even when state jurisdictions are contributing) and it is difficult to balance the welfare needs of Australian police with the needs of recipient countries. For example, while unaccompanied staff welfare concerns have led to the development of a deployment model in which staff members are deployed for four months on, one month off, AFP missions in the region are primarily capacity building missions. Interviews with returned IDG deployees suggest that capacity building missions require longer term deployments in order to foster people-to-people relationships and to enable Australian police to gain a reasonable level of familiarity with the culture in which they are expected to operate. Most significantly, however, questions have been raised about the disjunction between the aims and means of capacity building and day-to-day police operations, with several returnees highlighting the tension between

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13 According to the AFP Annual Report 2005–2006, the AFP has 5,567 employees comprising 2,396 sworn officers, 1,257 protective service officers, 1,782 unsworn staff and 132 seconded state police (AFP, 2006: xii).
the expectations of capacity building (where one must take a back seat and facilitate learning and action by others) and policing more generally (where police are action oriented and rewarded on the basis of task completion). IDG management is engaged in a constant process of review and reformulation of policy and practice in light of these and other challenges arising from international deployments.

THE REGIONAL ASSISTANCE MISSION TO SOLOMON ISLANDS (RAMSI)

RAMSI was a response to a progressively debilitating internal crisis in Solomon Islands. 'Ethnic tensions' between indigenous Guadalcanal people and 'settlers' from other island provinces, particularly Malaita, that had been simmering away for many years finally boiled over in the late 1990s. Groups of young Guadalcanal militants embarked on a violent campaign of intimidation directed primarily against Malaitans. Approximately 30,000 'settlers' were displaced from their homes in rural Guadalcanal. In response, a Malaitan militia was formed in Honiara with the active participation of elements of the Malaitan-dominated Police Field Force (PFF). On 5 June 2000, the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) and collaborators in the police staged an armed takeover of the national capital, Honiara. Prime Minister Bart Ulufa’alu was subsequently forced to resign. Canberra refused requests to intervene in what it viewed as an internal matter, but facilitated peace talks between the rival militias culminating in the Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) in October 2000.

While the focus of most observers has been on the traumatic events that unfolded between the late 1990s and the regional intervention in mid-2003, the genesis of the crisis has much deeper roots in Solomon Islands' modern history. Beneath the rubric of 'ethnic tensions' lies a series of profound challenges of governance and development, many of which are equally evident in neighbouring Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu. These include aspects of Solomon Islands' colonial legacies, the diverse and dislocative impacts of integration into the global economy, demographic factors, land tenure issues, internal migration, and the increasingly dysfunctional and corrupt character of the post-colonial state (Bennett, 2002).

Following the Townsville Peace Agreement, it was clear that the deeply compromised Solomon Islands government lacked the capacity and will to halt the rapidly deteriorating security and economic situation. The initial spectre of inter-ethnic warfare was displaced by the effective capture and plundering of the Solomon Islands state by a small group of corrupt leaders, armed ex-militants and renegade police officers. With growing lawlessness in Honiara and parts of rural Guadalcanal and Malaita, the collapse of essential government services and effective bankruptcy and
corruption of the Solomon Islands state, Canberra belatedly reversed its longstanding policy of non-intervention and on 24 July 2003 the Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, launched the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). The initial aim was to restore law and order in light of Solomon Islands' 'barely functional' criminal justice system and the wholesale collapse in relation to other elements of governance (Howard, 2003).

RAMSI was initiated and mobilised by Australia as a regional mission under the auspices of the Pacific Islands Forum and, specifically, the Forum’s Biketawa Declaration on Mutual Assistance of 2000, which allowed Forum leaders to consider collective action in response to a security crisis in a member state. Unusually, the mission was led by a police contingent of approximately 330 police officers (the Participating Police Force – PPF) drawn mainly from the AFP but including smaller numbers from state and territory forces, New Zealand and from other Forum member states. The latter include contingents from Tonga, Samoa, Vanuatu, Fiji, Cook Islands, Tuvalu, Kiribati, and Papua New Guinea. Around 1,800 regional military personnel mainly from Australia and New Zealand provided initial logistical support and security for the police although this number was significantly reduced as the security situation improved.

The Commencement Phase, covering the first six months, was essentially a peacekeeping exercise and went remarkably well. Security was quickly restored in Honiara and the police presence was extended to other parts of the country. Most of the PPF are based in Honiara and reside at a large self-contained camp on the outskirts of town – the former Guadalcanal Beach Resort (GBR). Other members are stationed at the 16 police posts established throughout the provinces. Large numbers of illegally held weapons have been taken out of circulation since RAMSI was deployed. For example, by the end of a month-long amnesty in August 2003, approximately 3,730 firearms had been surrendered or collected. These included a substantial number of military and commercial weapons, as well as homemade guns, and, according to the UN Small Arms Survey, amounted to an estimated 90 per cent to 95 per cent of the country’s stockpile (Nelson, 2004). By January 2004, RAMSI and Solomon Islands’ National Peace Council had collected approximately 3,800 weapons. In the first 200 days of the mission, around 860 arrests were made and over 1,400 charges were laid. By the end of the first year, approximately 3,500

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14 By the end of 2002, the Solomon Islands economy had contracted for the fourth year in a row, having shrunk by around 24 per cent since 1998. See Downer (2004).
15 In a speech to a security conference in Sydney in March 2004, Special Coordinator Nick Warner stated that approximately 700 military weapons had been collected (see Warner 2004).
arrests had occurred. By the beginning of 2005, more than 5,000 arrests had been made and more than 7,300 charges laid (Keely, 2005). Key militia leaders were arrested and prosecutions initiated for a range of serious criminal offences.

During the second phase – Consolidation Phase – the PPF concentrated on cleansing the ranks of the Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP) of its criminal and corrupt elements. By February 2004, over 50 police officers had been arrested and charged with 285 offences. These included two Deputy Commissioners. Over 400 officers – approximately 25 per cent of the total workforce – have been removed from the Royal Solomon Islands Police. Support is also being provided to the government legal offices, courts and prison service with approximately 90 AusAID funded personnel working in the law and justice sector (AusAID, 2005b). The third phase – Sustainability and Self-Reliance – commenced in January 2005.

Having dealt with the immediate security problems arising from the conflict, RAMSI has now shifted into a longer-term and significantly more difficult capacity building phase with key government institutions. As well as the focus on rebuilding the police and strengthening other law and justice agencies, there is an ambitious programme aimed at stabilising government finances and strengthening the essential machinery of government. The latter includes an emphasis on accountability mechanisms and reform of the public service. Australia has provided 17 advisers and in-line personnel to assist in key areas of budget, audit, treasury, internal revenue, customs, payroll and debt management. Work has also commenced on an economic reform programme to improve investor confidence, achieve economic recovery and support sustainable social and economic development (AusAID, 2005b). RAMSI has been estimated to cost approximately AUS$200 million per annum (Tomar, 2004). Australian development assistance is also being provided in the areas of health, education, and environmental and natural resource management. The principal vehicle for Australian support to the non-state sector is the Community Peace and Restoration Fund – recently replaced by the Community Sector Programme. This programme aims to support small-scale community-based projects in order to promote the reintegration, resettlement and rehabilitation needs of conflict-affected groups.

RAMSI’s initial success in restoring security and disarming former militants has been widely praised by local, regional, and international observers (see, for example, Callick, 2003). In addition to the credit due to RAMSI personnel and leadership, this success is, in no small part, a result of the overwhelming support provided to the mission by the vast majority

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16 This was the figure stated by the commander of the Participating Police Force, Ben McDevitt, at the One Year Anniversary Press Conference held at the Office of the Special Coordinator in Honiara, 22 July 2004.
of Solomon Islanders who had suffered from the insecurity and deprivations of the previous five years. Over three years since the deployment commenced, support for RAMSI remains high among ordinary Solomon Islanders. Criticisms of the intervention have nevertheless been made and major problems emerged in mid-2006. The latter involved serious post-election disturbances in Honiara in April 2006 and the subsequent dramatic deterioration in bilateral relations between Australia and Solomon Islands following Manasseh Sogavare’s appointment as prime minister. A long-time critic of RAMSI, Mr Sogavare has openly challenged aspects of the mission and, in turn, has been consistently rebuffed by Australian authorities. At the time of writing, there is an open stand-off between Canberra and Honiara, and there is uncertainty about the future of the regional mission.

The initial focus on apprehending former militia members and leaders prompted criticism that RAMSI was not devoting enough time to pursuing the so-called ‘big fish’ who had allegedly manipulated the militia groups and benefited most from the preceding crisis (see, for example, Brown, 2005a). For their part, RAMSI officials emphasised the slow pace of complex investigations and the need for greater public cooperation in the provision of relevant evidence. A series of high-profile arrests and prosecutions, including five former Cabinet ministers, has gone some way towards alleviating this complaint. In early 2005, Terry Brown, the Anglican Bishop of Malaita, levelled a number of criticisms against the policing and security dimensions of the mission. These included: the ostensible failure of RAMSI to address minor crime in the provinces; a narrow focus on Honiara; constant turnover of RAMSI personnel; understaffing of provincial police stations; remoteness from local people; lack of communication with crime victims; and persistent shortage of magistrates and consequent delays in court hearings. The outspoken Bishop stated that if it didn’t improve its relations with ordinary Solomon Islanders, RAMSI risked becoming viewed as an ‘occupying army’ (Brown, 2005a).

Another criticism relates to questions of Solomon Islands’ ownership and the limited scope for local initiative in the face of RAMSI’s dominant

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17 These have included the conviction and imprisonment of a former Minister of Communication for, among other things, demanding money with menace in February 2004; the arrest of the former Foreign Minister in September 2004 on a charge of demanding money with menace; the arrest of the Minister for Provincial Government and Constituency Development on corruption related charges in January 2005; the arrest for theft of the Minister for Police, National Security and Justice in February 2005; the arrest of two prominent lawyers, including the former MEF spokesperson, in February 2005 in relation to the misappropriation of compensation funds; the arrest on corruption charges of the former Finance Minister in April 2005. Frustrations are still expressed about the failure to initiate proceedings against Prime Minister Sir Allan Kemakeza and several other senior Ministers believed by many local observers to have profited during the period of insecurity preceding the intervention.
presence. Without the active participation of ordinary Solomon Islanders in the processes of recovery and reform, there is a risk that the RAMSI exercise will serve to further disempower local actors and reinforce a dependence on external assistance. In this vein, prominent Solomon Islands academic Tarcisius Kabutaulaka (2004) has warned that RAMSI's dominance could lead to either a debilitating dependency or a perception of foreign occupation. The Solomon Islands Christian Association (SICA), the key umbrella organisation for the churches, has raised similar concerns. SICA has urged RAMSI to respect the need for indigenous leadership and initiative, and to resist the temptation to provide all the answers (Solomon Star, 2005). There is also a widespread perception that RAMSI is primarily an Australian initiative and that, by implication, its regional character is largely tokenistic. The demand here is to enhance the regional complexion of the mission by, for example, placing more Pacific Islanders in leadership positions.18

A tragic reminder of the existence of more sinister forces aligned against RAMSI occurred in December 2004 when an Australian member of the PPF was shot and killed while on patrol in Honiara. Two former MEF militants were subsequently arrested and charged. The security clampdown initiated by RAMSI in the aftermath of this incident gave rise to complaints of heavy-handed policing tactics, and resulted in the first court action challenging the constitutionality of the immunity provisions provided foreign police personnel under the Facilitation of International Assistance Act (SIBC 2005).19 Andrew Nori, former MEF spokesman and himself the subject of criminal proceedings for alleged misappropriation of compensation funds, subsequently launched another constitutional challenge (Igara, 2005).

There have been several reviews of the mission undertaken at the instigation of the Solomon Islands government. A glowing assessment of the mission's considerable achievements was provided in the report of the Intervention Taskforce. The report nevertheless raised some concerns about the lack of clarity over the duration of the mission, the need for the government to take greater ownership of the recovery work, as well as reservations about the extension of the immunity provisions to RAMSI's civilian advisers (RNZI, 2004). A Cabinet sub-committee proposed that the mission's mandates in respect of the stabilisation of government finances, promotion of economic recovery, and the building the machinery

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18 The report of the Pacific Islands Forum Eminent Persons Group that was tasked with reviewing RAMSI recommended the strengthening of Pacific representation in both the policing and civilian components of the mission. See Pacific Islands Forum Eminent Persons Group (2005).

19 RAMSI officials have recently announced that they will not be claiming immunity in respect of the first case arising from the alleged mistreatment of a Solomon Islands citizen  (RNZI 2005).
of government, be pursued under normal bilateral arrangements after June 2005 (SIBC News 2005). An Eminent Persons Group (EPG) appointed by the Pacific Islands Forum to review RAMSI reported in 2005 (Pacific Islands Forum Eminent Persons Group, 2005). While praising RAMSI’s successes and calling for its continuation, the EPG Review made a number of important recommendations. These included the need for RAMSI to adopt a more development-oriented approach with Solomon Islands as an equal partner; increasing Pacific Islands representation in RAMSI’s policing and civilian components; more involvement of Solomon Islands counterparts; the need to address the underlying causes of the conflict; greater efforts addressed at reconciliation and rehabilitation; consideration of the role of local chiefs in conflict resolution; improved consultation between central and provincial governments, as well as with NGOs; and, in general, better donor coordination.

Although RAMSI was initiated at the express invitation of the Solomon Islands government, sovereignty remains a sensitive issue among some leaders and members of the bureaucracy, particularly among members of the urban elite who are most exposed to the RAMSI presence. The Prime Minister sacked two of the Ministers involved in preparing the previously mentioned Cabinet sub-committee report after they made critical remarks about the dominant role of RAMSI including the claim that it could become a ‘liability’ to Solomon Islands (The Age, 2005). Some observers have talked about the existence of two governments in Solomon Islands—one Solomon Islands and the other Australian. Sovereignty issues have also been raised more recently by a shadowy group of self-proclaimed Malaitan separatists who have also accused the mission of being anti-Malaitan (PacNews, 2005). While relatively little is known of this group it is believed to include disgruntled former MEF members who retain their illegally acquired high-powered weapons. The charge of anti-Malaitan bias has been strongly rejected by the current RAMSI Special Coordinator (ABC Radio, 2005).

Violent disturbances occurred in Honiara following the public announcement of a new prime minister-elect on 18 April 2006. Over the course of two days of rioting and opportunistic looting, around 50 police personnel and an unknown number of civilians were injured, and extensive property damage occurred including the razing of most of Chinatown, Honiara’s commercial centre. A new government was formed under the leadership of Menassah Sogavare. Former Prime Minister, Sir Allen Kemakeza, had gone out of his way to accommodate the regional mission and its principal (Australian) sponsors, appreciating, no doubt, that RAMSI provided his administration with a level of legitimacy that was unmatched by its poor standing among many Solomon Islanders. Sogavare, on the other hand, adopted an openly confrontational approach in his dealings with the Australian government and sought to cloak himself in the
mantle of defender of Solomon Islands' sovereignty. His actions, in turn, provoked outrage and bellicose language on the part of Australian leaders, notably Foreign Minister Alexander Downer. While the subsequent and ongoing tussle between the two governments has undergone various, often bizarre twists, it is ultimately a struggle over the control, direction and future of the regional mission. The police building component has been caught up in the middle with accusations of politicised policing being levelled by Solomon Islands critics - charges which have been vehemently denied by the regional police. Ultimately the future of the policing component depends on whether or not the dispute between Australia and Solomon Islands over the future of the mission as a whole can be resolved.

PAPUA NEW GUINEA AND THE ENHANCED COOPERATION PROGRAMME (ECP)

The Australian-funded Enhanced Cooperation Programme in Papua New Guinea was informed by many of the same considerations underlying RAMSI. Indeed, once the decision to intervene in Solomon Islands had been announced, it was clear that attention would soon turn to PNG. As an Australian journalist remarked at the time, 'the renewed regional involvement cannot stop at the Solomons. The much bigger challenge of helping steer PNG from disaster looms' (Australian Financial Review, 2003). Another stated that 'the Australian-led intervention [in Solomon Islands] is a new strategic principle with potential to apply to other nations across the Melanesia trouble zone where PNG is the pivotal player' (Kelly, 2003). RAMSI's early success in restoring law and order also had a significant impact on Australian thinking about how best to proceed in PNG.

The symptoms of PNG's mounting difficulties are relatively well-known. They include the failure of economic growth commensurate to a rapidly increasing population, the decline in infrastructure and government services, political instability and corruption, escalating lawlessness and social disorder; and, more recently, the alarming growth of a major HIV/AIDS pandemic. Throughout the post-independence period, Australia has sought to assist its former colony by providing substantial levels of development assistance. Much of this has consisted of large capacity-building projects aimed at strengthening key state institutions. Recent years have seen more emphasis on programme aid aimed at key government sectors. Since 1975, Australia has provided aid totalling more than A$14 billion in real terms as official development assistance to PNG (AusAID, 2003). This has included assistance directed towards strengthening the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) dating back to 1984, and, more recently, support for other components of the law and justice sector. In total, more than
AUS$240 million in assistance has been provided to this sector alone, 68 per cent of which has been directed at the police.

While there are common threads running through official Australian perceptions about the difficulties facing Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea and how these should be addressed, there are important differences in the circumstance of both countries with implications for the justification and form of the ECP and its very different reception in PNG. For a start, there was no armed takeover of Port Moresby by an ethnic militia or the forcible ousting of a democratically appointed Prime Minister as occurred in Honiara in June 2000. Attempts to place PNG in the same category as Solomon Islands and, in particular, to describe it as a ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ state have been vigorously rejected by sections of the PNG elite. While the many deficiencies of the PNG state can hardly be denied, it does not yet satisfy the broadly defined criteria of a failed or collapsed state. Likewise, its notorious ‘law and order’ problems are complex in character and uneven in distribution. They do not arise from a single internal conflict. Critics of the ‘failed state’ thesis in PNG have also pointed to the significant efforts by recent governments to address some of the outstanding governance and economic challenges.20

The possibility of deploying Australian police and public servants in PNG was first officially broached in September 2003.21 At the time, relations between Port Moresby and Canberra were strained as a result of Australian government suggestions that its regional aid programme be linked to the adoption of anti-corruption measures by recipient countries.22 Canberra’s changing stance on development assistance aroused deep resentment among some members of the PNG political elite, including, notably, veteran Prime Minister Sir Michael Somare. Detailed proposals for a new bilateral assistance package were agreed to at the Australia-Papua New Guinea Ministerial Forum in Adelaide in December 2003. Australian Foreign Minister Downer’s (2003b) media release announced ‘a new era of cooperation with PNG’. Despite this agreement, relations between the two...

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20 These have included several home-grown initiatives, including the introduction of a limited preferential voting system and provisions to discourage MPs from changing political parties, aimed at stabilising PNG’s parliament and reforming the electoral process. See also Nix (2003).
21 Mike Manning, director of a Port Moresby-based private sector think tank (the Institute of National Affairs), claims that PNG ministers first started lobbying for increased Australian assistance in the law and justice sector soon after the Somare government took office in 2002. See Manning (2000).
22 Sir Michael Somare and some other leaders took great offence at the assertive stance adopted by Australia on a number of issues at the Pacific Islands Forum meeting in Auckland in August 2003. See, for example, ‘Howard stalls on united Pacific’, Australian, 15 August 2003.
governments continued to show signs of strain. The package included substantially increased Australian inputs to policing, other law and justice agencies, border management (for example, immigration, customs, transport security), as well as economic and public sector management. What became known as the Enhanced Cooperation Programme was to be delivered through the direct placement of Australian personnel into positions in the PNG police and other key government agencies. The policing component of the ECP was estimated at AUD$800 million over a five year period and was to be additional to the existing AUD$350 million a year Australian aid programme to PNG. Australian officials, including police officers, were to remain attached to their 'home' institutions but in PNG would operate within the organisational structures of their host departments and be answerable to PNG agency heads. The principal components of the ECP – as agreed to in Adelaide – included:

- **Police:** Up to 230 Australian police officers (Australian Assisting Police – AAP) to be deployed initially in Port Moresby and subsequently in Lae, Mt Hagen and along the Highlands Highway. In addition, up to 20 officers to be deployed in Bougainville. 400 new PNG officers were also to be recruited under the programme.

- **Law and justice:** Up to 18 Australians working in non-policing roles in various law and justice agencies. Positions were to include that of Solicitor-General, three litigation lawyers in the Solicitor-General's Office, five prosecutors in the Public Prosecutor's Office, two Correctional Service Managers, four expatriate judges, as well as further specialists in other key law and justice agencies.

- **Finance:** Up to 36 Australian officials were to be placed in key economic, finance, planning and spending agencies. These personnel were to be drawn largely from the Australian Commonwealth Departments of Treasury and Finance and Administration.

- **Border Control:** Ten Australian officials were to work in PNG’s immigration services, border and transport security and management, and aviation security.

The first batch of civilian officials under the ECP was sent to Port Moresby in mid-February 2004. However, disagreement between the two governments over conditions of deployment of Australian personnel caused lengthy delays in the implementation of the programme. Canberra insisted that their police and officials be provided with immunity from prosecution.

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23 For example, shortly after the agreement was signed in Adelaide, Prime Minister Somare and Foreign Minister Namaliu complained of 'serious misrepresentations' in The Australian asserting that PNG would plunge into anarchy and corruption without the ECP. Sir Rabbie Namaliu took out a full-page advertisement in the PNG Post-Courier to refute the Australian media claims (National, 2003).
under PNG law in accordance with the protection afforded under UN missions, while Port Moresby steadfastly refused to grant blanket immunity. Canberra's position stemmed from concern about protecting operational personnel, particularly the police, from vexatious litigation. PNG opposition to immunity arose, in part, from the implication that its legal system was incapable of providing adequate protection against vexatious actions. The most prominent and consistent PNG critic of the ECP was the Governor of Morobe Provincial and former judge, Luther Wenge. Wenge asserted that the ECP infringed PNG's sovereignty and, in particular, that the immunity provisions breached PNG's Constitution. To this end, he initiated a major constitutional challenge in the Supreme Court (Post-Courier, 2004a). A compromise between Canberra and Port Moresby on the immunity issue was finally reached in early July 2004.24 Later the same month, the PNG Parliament passed enabling legislation allowing for the deployment of Australian police.

Australian police began arriving in September 2004. Approximately 20 officers were sent to Bougainville, while others were deployed in staged phases to Port Moresby. Popular expectations of the Australian police were high and the first AAP officers to go on joint patrols with their RPNGC counterparts in Port Moresby were given a rapturous reception by ordinary Papua New Guineans. Despite public support and that of a number of key government ministers, other leaders were more guarded. Former Prime Minister Sir Mekere Morauta (2005) welcomed Australia's re-engagement but also expressed reservations about aspects of the ECP. He pointed out that the programme remained widely seen as Australian-imposed and driven. Disagreement over the immunity provisions reinforced this perception. Lack of ownership on the PNG side constituted a potentially fatal weakness. In his view:

Australia can chauffeur the journey the vehicle and indeed help fill the petrol tank. But the purpose of the journey, the destination and the direction, have to be set by Papua New Guinea. (Morauta, 2005: 160)

Sir Mekere questioned whether the ECP was the best use of such a large amount of Australian funding and whether other initiatives addressing underlying causes might not achieve greater development outcomes.25 He

24 Under this agreement Australia was to have complete jurisdiction, when one of its officials was alleged to have engaged in behaviour that constituted an offence under Australian law but not under PNG law. Where concurrent jurisdiction applied, the choice of jurisdiction was to be decided by a Joint Steering Committee comprising Australian and PNG officials (Post-Courier, 2004a).

25 A similar argument had been made by Australian economist Craig Sugden who questioned whether the ECP offered a sustainable solution to PNG's underlying development problems. See Sugden (2004). In Sugden's view, the ECP 'may instead be limited to offering temporary relief to their symptoms' (2004: 55). Moreover, many of its direct benefits were susceptible to capture by those already relatively well-off (Sugden, 2004: 61).
also warned of growing resistance to the programme as its law enforce-
ment strategies took effect, 'If effective, it will bite. Once it does bite, it is
to encounter resistance' (Morauta, 2005: 160).

From its inception, the ECP remained overshadowed by the uncertainties
surrounding Governor Wenge's constitutional challenge and, more broadly,
the fragility of the bilateral relationship. Concerns about the disparity in
terms and conditions of service of Australian personnel compared to those
of their PNG counterparts accentuated tensions and led to familiar charges
of 'boomerang aid'. The so-called 'shoe incident' involving Sir Michael
Somare and security officials at Brisbane airport in March 2005 generated
a storm of protest in Port Moresby and other parts of PNG about
Australia's alleged lack of respect towards PNG and its leaders.

This incident and the uncompromising stances of both governments in its
immediate aftermath reflected a bilateral relationship in serious trouble.
PNG suspended a high level meeting on the ECP between senior officials
on both sides and this had the effect of suspending further deployments of
AAP. Tensions between elements of the RPNGC and the AAP also became
public in May 2005. A Police Association meeting in Port Moresby
resulted in the presentation of an ultimatum to the RPNGC Commissioner
demanding the removal of all AAP from PNG within 48 hours (Post-
Courier, 2005a). Complaints by RPNGC members included allegations of
the poor working relationship with the Australian police, the clash between
different police cultures, and the alleged failure of ECP capacity
building efforts. In addition to these public complaints, RPNGC officers
who participated in focus groups during May and June 2005 claimed that
while many of them developed good working relationships with AAP
personnel, differences in modes of reporting and access to material
resources hampered the formation of meaningful working relationships.
Moreover, even where cooperation was apparent, RPNGC members
appeared to be motivated primarily by the promise of material reward,
rather than the transfer of skills and capacity building.

After months of anticipation, the Supreme Court finally handed down its
decision on Governor Wenge's challenge on 13 May 2003. A unanimous

26 The Australian NGO AidWatch published a report that indicated that of the A$806
million dedicated to the ECP, A$339.8 million goes towards salaries and accommodation of
Australian personnel in PNG, while A$394.89 million goes to logistics and operations,
leaving a total of A$55.7 million for technical assistance to the RPNGC. The report
reinforced the view that the principal beneficiaries of the substantial programme were

27 Security officials at Brisbane airport insisted that Somare remove his shoes as part of a
routine security check despite the objections of his staff and their claims that this amounted to
a breach of protocol and, more significantly, an act of disrespect to the PNG Prime Minister.
Reporting of this incident in the PNG press led to public demonstrations in several PNG
towns and demands that Australia officially apologise to Sir Michael.

28 See, for example, 'Visiting force faces PNG's old-style policing' (Forbes, 2004).
panel of five senior judges declared that a number of provisions in the PNG Parliaments Enhanced Cooperation Act, including some of those dealing with immunity, were unconstitutional (Post-Courier, 2005b). AAP officers were immediately withdrawn from Bougainville and stood down in Port Moresby prior to being repatriated to Australia. The future of the ECP now rests on efforts between the two governments to renegotiate aspects of the programme in order to satisfy constitutional requirements. On recent performance, there appears to be little sign of willingness to compromise on either side. However, current negotiations for the return of Australian police to Papua New Guinea are underway and it has been suggested by AFP personnel involved in the decision making that a small contingent of police personnel will shortly deploy to Papua New Guinea as advisers.

LESSONS LEARNED AND CONCLUSIONS

Critical analysis of lessons learned and the incorporation of those lessons into ongoing mission planning are integral to the success of Australian policing missions in the region. Moreover, it is important that such lessons are gleaned not only from an Australian perspective, but also from the perspective of recipient services. Given the relatively recent prominence of police-led missions in the region (for example, RAMSI, 2003; ECP, 2004), it is difficult to ascertain the efficacy of such missions, which are ideally long-term commitments with long-term objectives. Consequently, the following observations must be seen as interim, rather than final, comments.

In our view, the current security environment clearly justifies the existence of an organisational unit such as the International Deployment Group. However, ongoing attention is needed to a variety of issues such as recruitment, the linguistic and cultural competencies of deployees, pre-deployment training, performance measures and the development of mechanisms that will capture the growing body of corporate knowledge about overseas policing missions. Furthermore, it is imperative that at this early stage the IDG does not fall into the trap of formulating a generic policing response to problems of law and order in countries that have only superficially similar dynamics. This is most obvious in the case of PNG and the ECP, which was widely depicted in the Australian press as being the ‘next in line’ of a series of RAMSI-inspired interventions in the region.29 As highlighted earlier, while Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands share many common ‘Melanesian’ characteristics, the historical and cultural circumstances of each country differ significantly.

29 For example, a report by Kelly (2003) stated that, ‘the Australians-led intervention [in Solomone Islands] is a new strategic principle with potential to apply to other nations across the Melanesia trouble zone where PNG is the pivotal player’.
It is critical to acknowledge that the success of Australian policing missions in the region is highly contingent upon the development of strong people-to-people relationships – a major objective of Australian foreign relations (Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, 2003). Given the differences between recipient country and external personnel's cultural backgrounds and attitudes to professional service, it is necessary for significant attention to be paid to the attitudes of IDG recruits. Due to the current shortage of Australian police personnel who are willing and able to be deployed on unaccompanied overseas missions, there is presently significant pressure upon the IDG to accept the majority of willing applicants. While applicants do undergo significant psychological and professional screening prior to selection, there is a need for the development of further tools to assess the cultural adaptability and suitability for capacity building of all applicants. Clearly, while cultural awareness training may enhance the ability of deploying to adapt to and perform well in host country environments, individual attitudes and assumptions impact significantly upon their ability to benefit from such training.

As recipient countries become increasingly exposed to capacity building exercises, local police officers' expectations simultaneously increase and their evaluations of incoming personnel become more critical. Interviews with local police officers in both Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands suggest that they expect incoming Australian police officers to be of mature age (a significant factor in local notions of respect and social hierarchy) as well as highly skilled in operational policing – the mainstay of all Pacific Islands police forces. While it is accepted that Australian mission planners also possess a clear idea of the desirable profile of applicants, due attention to discrepancies between local and Australian notions of 'suitable applicants' ought to be given because ultimately, capacity building is contingent upon the political will and commitment to cooperation of local police services. In other capacity building exercises, such as the Law and Justice Sector Programme in Papua New Guinea, this issue has been partially addressed via the involvement of Papua New Guinean development partners in the selection of Australian consultants, an initiative which is aimed at engendering local ownership and improved relationships. Increased attention to the matching of deployee skills to mission tasks would also facilitate their acceptance by Pacific police personnel (many of whom have lengthy police experience in a variety of operational areas), as would an intensification of language training.

While many lessons have been learned from Australia's lengthy engagement in international peacekeeping missions, police capacity building is a comparatively recent endeavour. It is therefore pertinent that policing organisations such as the AFP systematically debrief returned deployees in order to capture knowledge developed whilst in the field and enhance organisational memory of lessons learned. The quality and nature of an
emergent constabulary ethic is considerably dependent on the ability to reflexively incorporate past lessons into future operations. It is well recognised that there is a need for a deeper understanding of what makes capacity building initiatives work, be they police or non-police exercises. In the case of police capacity building exercises, particularly those involving in-line or quasi in-line personnel, it is also necessary to seriously examine the tensions between the expectations and career demands of Australian police personnel and the nature of capacity building.

Given the recent intensification of Australia’s involvement in police capacity building initiatives in the Southwest Pacific, it is little surprise that there is significant room for further learning and improved engagement. Ongoing evaluations of performance and the reformulation of approaches to capacity building in keeping with changing local circumstances are clearly central to the success of such missions. Ultimately, it is necessary to accept that capacity building exercises in the Pacific will not develop quasi-Australian police organisations, but rather, they should aim to assist local police organisations to develop locally sustainable law enforcement agencies in keeping with international human rights standards. The partnerships developed between the AFP, AusAID and academic institutions will certainly enhance understanding of the challenges to police capacity building in the region. However, the alignment of foreign objectives with local security needs, culture and development aspirations remains a considerable challenge.

The fate of the policing component of the ECP in PNG and current uncertainty over the future of the regional assistance mission in Solomon Islands also attests to the intrinsic vulnerability of external police building missions to the vagaries of local politics. As emphasised by other contributors to this volume, police building is an inherently political undertaking insofar as it deliberately sets out to engage with existing power relations and structures with a view to changing them. It can generate resistance and opposition among members of the host police institution, as well as among other local actors – such as members of the local political elite – who feel personally or otherwise threatened by the prospect of an efficient police force. Resentment and resistance can also be provoked by other aspects of the larger state-building exercise of which police building is increasingly a part. In such a case, the policing component can become the inadvertent victim of power struggles over the direction and control of the external intervention – matters over which the police have little, if any, sway.

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Crafting Transnational Policing
Police Capacity-Building and Global Policing Reform

EDITED BY
Andrew Goldsmith and James Sheptycki

Oñati International Series in Law and Society
THE BOOK examines the phenomenon of crafting transnational policing. By this term is meant the different forms of engagement in policing reform by international donors, national governments, foreign police and law enforcement agencies in the domestic policing agencies and programs of recipient countries. It includes, inter alia, peace-keeping in post-conflict situations, reconstruction and capacity-building as part of nation- or state-building exercises, and the provision of technical assistance in relation to certain aspects of law enforcement. In each instance, there is a cross-border provision of knowledge and resources with a view to shaping the kind of policing provided in recipient nations. Why do some countries engage in these activities? Why has policing become a preferred form of foreign policy engagement in some countries? What forms of policing development are provided? How are they delivered? And how are they received? How should these kinds of assistance and/or interventions be conducted in future? In this regard, is there a non-negotiable ‘core’ of good policing that needs to be developed and nurtured as an integral part of all defensible transnational policing engagements?

These are some of the questions raised by the contributions to this book. The book arises primarily from papers presented at a workshop held in Óñati, Spain in July 2004 on the emergence of a global constabulary ethic. The book has also been supplemented by two solicited chapters.

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