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東亞論語學研究叢書Ⅰ

東亞論語學：中國篇

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序

黃俊傑

這部二卷本《東亞論語學》，是台大人文社會高等研究院「東亞經典與文化研究計畫」在 2007 與 2008 年舉辦的同名研討會，所發表的論文經送審後編輯而成的論文集。在這套書即將付梓前夕，我樂於說明這套書的特色，以就教於讀者。


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3 John Makeham, Transmitters and Creators: Chinese Commentators and Commentaries on the Analects (Cambridge: Harvard University
年唐明貴、廖雲仙分確探討漢魏六朝、元代、日本《論語》學的新書出版。2006年我討論日本《論語》學以及相關學者吳英寧研究日本《論語》學論史的新書出版。上述論述《論語》學的新著，除了2006年出版討論日本《論語》學的二本之外，其餘均以中國《論語》學為中心。

在以上《論語》學研究的學術現況之中，《東亞論語學：中國篇》與《東亞論語學：韓日篇》這兩套書的出版，就顯得特別意義，而可以補足有研究成果的不足，尤其是本書《韓日篇》所收七篇論述朝鮮《論語》學的論文及一篇附錄，都是過去研究學術界較少研究的課題。

這兩套書如果與最近六年來的新書相比較，最明顯的特色在於這兩卷研究中日韓《論語》學的新書，有心於開拓東亞《論語》學的視野，使《論語》這部經典作為東亞儒學的公共性的架構位置為之彰顯無遺。

其次，這兩套《東亞論語學》探討過去研究論著較少涉及的《論語》學研究課題，例如在中國《論語》學領域中，本書所論述的新問題包括《論語》中的詮釋與當代東亞學者研究的課題，西藏文化中的孔子形象、漢代儒家文獻中的孔子形象與思想等，都是過去學者較少或尚未觸及的問題。另外，本書《韓日篇》各篇論文所探討的固然多以為琉球儒者為主，但也有論文研究香山、片山兼等過去漢語學術界學者未曾觸及的思想人物。

總之，《東亞《論語》學》這個研究領域，將《論語》學放在東亞文明的廣袤視野中考察，可以開拓許多新的問題意識與研究課題，值得我們繼續努力以赴。我期待這兩套《東亞論語學》的出版，標誌著《論語》學研究的新起點。

黃俊傑
2008年11月23日

Asia Center, 2003).
4 唐明貴：《論語學的形成、發展與中華—譚魏六朝隋唐論語學研究》（北京：中國社會科學出版社，2005）。
5 廖雲仙：《元代論語學考述》（臺北：新文豐出版社，2006）。
6 黃俊傑：《德川日本《論語》詮釋史論》（東亞文明研究叢書59，臺北：台灣大學出版中心，2006）。
7 吳美寧：《日本論語訓讀史研究》（上）（下）（首爾，2006）。
導論

黃俊傑∗

孔子與《論語》是兩千年來東亞思想與文化的資產，日本德川儒者伊藤仁斎(1627-1705)稱《論語》為「最上至極宇宙第一書」，兩千年來東亞儒者詮釋《論語》者為數至夥，形成特殊的具有東亞文化特色的詮釋傳統。《東亞論語學》《中國篇》與《韓日篇》這套書是臺灣大學人文社會高等研究院「東亞經典與文化」研究計畫，分別在2007年6月29日、30日及2008年3月8日、9日舉辦兩場有關「東亞論語學」的國際學術研討會後，累積國內外多位學者的成果，經審查及作者修訂後收入本書。在本書付梓之際，謹簡略說明舉辦「東亞論語學」會議的用意。

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「東亞論語學」研究會舉辦之初衷，有心於以《論語》經典為研究核心，以文化為研究脈絡，文史哲學的研究進路兼採，深入挖掘東亞《論語》學發展或解釋的多元現象，展開東亞《論語》學的交流與對話。」東亞論語學」研究會聚焦於五項主題：(1)比較《論語》的重要篇章或價值理念在東亞各國儒者解釋的同調與異趣。如本書收入《仁與樂：《論語》中的樂論與當代東亞學者的詮釋》及《明清自然氣本論者的《論語》詮釋》二文。此。③將「東亞論語學」作為東亞思想發展的過程，而不是僅作為思想發展的結果，即所謂「作為思想發展過程的東亞《論語》學」的研究應當以下二義：其一是分析《論語》學的發展過程中，所呈現的東亞各區域與時代之思想特質與思想傾向；其二是運用新資料，探討重要儒者如朱子(1130-1200)、李退溪(1502-1571)、荻生徂徠(1666-1728)等的《論語》學在東亞擴散發展之過程。這類作品多收入在另一《東亞論語學：韓日篇》之書中。(3)挖掘東亞各國儒者未被廣泛刊行或出版的孔子(551-479B.C.)或《論語》之解釋作品，加以分析並解釋其特色。本書收錄《西藏文化中的孔子形象》一文。此。(4)孔子的形象、思想、神話在東亞各國歷代的轉變與涵義。如收入本書的《論語體文本中的孔子形象與思想》及《論語中的曲禮及其影響》二文即屬此類。(5)注意將《論語》視為宗教的解釋特色，如《晚明佛學與儒學解經——以明學中的《四書箋注解》為中心》及《清末民國佛教文獻中的佛教解經》二文分別引用佛教及一貫道的宗教觀點來詮釋《論語》。透過這次的論壇會，經由東亞學者彼此的交流，探討「東亞論語學」的古今輪廓與現代意義。

本書共收入臺灣、大陸、澳洲、英國、美國、加拿大等學者，共計十七篇有關中國《論語》的研究論文，其中包括「論語與孔子的歷史形象」、「《中國論語詮釋學》」及「論語宗教學」等三項重要主題，論文內容涉及《論語》的歷史、哲學與宗教等課題。首先，在「論語與孔子的歷史形象」之主題上，分別探討藝術境界上的孔子、命理學的孔子、佛王的孔子及現代化的孔子等形象。其次，在「中國論語詮釋學」之主題上，從《論語》的「曲禮」論述、政治概念及特色之分析外，還涉及《論語義疏》、《解編》、《新編程伊川》(1033-1107)、明清氣本論者及劉寶楠(1791-1855)等人的論語詮釋。此外，本書《論語與宗教》之主題，則涉及《論語》與佛教、一貫道等宗教的解釋關係。總之，本书作為臺灣學者界對「東亞論語學」的最新系列研究之一，在探索孔子與《論語》的古今輪廓與現代意義上，希冀能拓展孔子與《論語》的研究視野及其意義。

二

現在我們將收入本書「論語與孔子的歷史形象」、「中國論語詮釋學」及「論語宗教學」三項主題的十七篇論文，依順序編目，略述其大要，以供讀者參考。

首先，本書在「論語與孔子的歷史形象」主題中，共收入
仁與樂是一種創造性的和諧關係，認為「仁與禮」、「仁與樂」是需要分別思考的問題。「禮與樂」的關係也是值得重視的問題。因此，陳昭瑛從兩方面探討「仁與樂」的關係，一是從「空間」及「時間」的意義出發，探討孔子從「空間感」建構起來的「仁與樂」的關係如何在荀子 (298-238 B.C.) 的禮樂思想中表現出「空間感」所論證的關係。其次，陳昭瑛試從「美學」的觀點探討「仁與樂」的關係，指出在先秦儒家的樂論中，「表現」與「模倣」（或「再現」）是「仁與樂」之最主要美學關係。在這裡陳昭瑛反駁了日本美學家今道友信(1922-)認為東方以中國為主的美學是「表現」的美學，而非「模倣」的美學，但陳昭瑛認為中國美學從最早的樂論開始，就是既重視「表現」也重視「模倣」的。陳昭瑛這篇文章特別探討出儒家「仁與樂」的關係所透露的藝術性超越「仁與禮」所涉及的藝術性。若能深入對此一課題的探討將有助於我們對儒家美學的建構及理解東方美學的特質。

有關孔子的歷史形象也在當代引起激辯。如所周知，孔子曾經在風雲錯變的近代中國遭受過唾棄與重建的過程，台灣與香港學者對孔子的詮釋也截然不一，被現代學者視為「新儒家」的學者自然對傳統文化也各有見解。本書第三章是潘朝陽所著《當代新儒家的孔子詮釋》一文，即是扣緊《論語》詮釋，依據詮釋系統的對照來觀察當代新儒家對孔子之詮釋學意義，進一步分析，比較臺灣及大陸當代新儒家對孔子詮釋之不同面貌，潘朝陽首先檢視並批判馮友蘭(1895-1990)、任繼愈(1916-)等人的孔子詮釋觀點，並以此反駁世人將馮友
蘭也列人當代新儒家，是荒謬的。接著蘇徐復觀對於孔子在中國文化史上的地位之詮釋，綜合性地證成了當代新儒家如勞思光(1927-）、牟宗三(1909-1995)、唐君毅(1908-1978)、徐復觀(1902-1982)與國史學者的周穆(1895-1990)等對於儒家大經典以及經典貫通的聖人精神，確能返歸經典的(1)思想結構(2)歷史脈絡，以及(3)以敬意和溫情而合於經典詮釋的三個面向，也就是自我道德人格的建立、政道與治道的理論之宣示以及儒家常道常會的繫持，提出了他們在風雲時代中的回應和創造。

孔子的形象在異時異地及異邦，皆有其不同的形象，但鮮少有人關注到西藏文獻中的孔子形象，本書第四章收入曾德明、林純瑜二者共著的《西藏文化中的孔子形象》一文，則為我們分析了孔子在西藏文獻中所具有的權力形象，本書第四章收人曾德明、林純瑜兩者共著的《西藏文化中的孔子形象》一文，則為我們分析了孔子在西藏文獻中所具備的權力形象，本書第四章收人曾德明、林純瑜兩者共著的《西藏文化中的孔子形象》一文，則為我們分析了孔子在西藏文獻中所具備的權力形象，本書第四章收人曾德明、林純瑜兩者共著的《西藏文化中的孔子形象》一文，則為我們分析了孔子在西藏文獻中所具備的權力形象，本書第四章收人曾德明、林純瑜兩者共著的《西藏文化中的孔子形象》一文，則為我們分析了孔子在西藏文獻中所具備的權力形象，本書第四章收人曾德明、林純瑜兩者共著的《西藏文化中的孔子形象》一文，則為我們分析了孔子在西藏文獻中所具備的權力形象，本書第四章收人曾德明、林純瑜兩者共著的《西藏文化中的孔子形象》一文，則為我們分析了孔子在西藏文獻中所具備的權力形象，本書第四章收人曾德明、林純瑜兩者共著的《西藏文化中的孔子形象》一文，則為我們分析了孔子在西藏文獻中所具備的權力形象，本書第四章收人曾德明、林純瑜兩者共著的《西藏文化中的孔子形象》一文，則為我們分析了孔子在西藏文獻中所具備的權力形象，本書第四章收人曾德明、林純瑜兩者共著的《西藏文化中的孔子形象》一文，則為我們分析了孔子在西藏文獻中所具備的權力形象。
乏有武勇之輩如子路、軍事才能者如冉求。本書所收第六章
陳立勝的《論語》中的勇-歷史變遷與現代啟示》一文中，
即透過孔子論勇，進一步縱圖此後以降的孟、荀、宋明理學
家到近代梁啟超對勇德的階段性解釋之特色。陳立勝將《論
語》中的「勇」，區分為義勇、智勇、仁勇，特別是「仁勇」，
被後繼的孟、荀發展為儒家之「大勇」、「上勇」論。此外，
陳立勝特別指出孟子論勇當包括「內聖之勇」與「外王之勇」，
此二種勇皆被包涵在「聖人之勇」中。再者，此文最特別之
處是凸顯宋代理學家所推崇的顏子之勇。在宋以前，顏子並
無勇的形象，但經由理學家將之提升為「體道之勇」之形象。
實言之，「勇」不再著意強調臨危不懼、處驚不亂的能力，
而是個人生命成長過程之中的某種自我突破的能力，是個體
生命拋棄舊的行為模式與積習而向新的生命超越過程中所展
示出的毅力、决心與志氣，其所展現的「勇」均扣緊個體人
格的成全，表現出強烈的「為己」特質。陳立勝最後指出，
儒家所推崇的「勇」煥發著自足、為己的古典精神與氣質。
與此比照，近人如梁啟超(1873-1929)、胡適(1891-1962)所塑
造的「勇」更多地指向「國家」、「民族」之「大義」、「為己」
的儒學精神已經不再是關注的焦點，這多少反映了近代民族
主義、國家主義興起這一時代背景，「勇」成為一種「政治德
性」、「戰爭德性」（戰爭不過是政治的延續）而更多地與「愛
國主義」結合在一起。陳立勝此文從「勇」的道德觀念，分
析各時代儒者皆有不同的詮釋進路，顯示詮釋的多元創造及
其在時代的意義，相當具有啟發性。

三

本書第二部分主題是有關「中國論語詮釋學」，計有八篇
文章，從《論語》的「曲禮」論述、政治概念及特色之分析
外，還涉及皇侃的《論語義疏》、韓愈的《論語筆解》、宋儒
程伊川、明清實本論者及清儒劉 фут等人的論語詮釋。

本書第七章是葉國良的《論語》中的「曲禮」論述及其
影響》，作者首先指出孔子在禮儀方面的教化，對「經禮」、「曲
禮」、「禮意」三者並重，因而在後世形成禮學傳統，而要完
整了解禮學的淵源和流行，要先從《論語》談起。葉國良此
文論述的重點，只限在「曲禮」，但也附帶論及禮意部分，特
別提出：前人或圍繞對四部曲分類的成規，或當時尚無戰國
楚簡及敦煌遺書的發現，在論述上往往不夠完整，故此文打
破圖書分類的限制而予以著書宗旨為探討主軸，也適當補述相
關的出土文獻。因此，葉國良檢討日本曲禮研究者如武內義
雄(1886-1966)、吉本道雅的曲禮研究之不足，因為武內與吉
本兩位先生論「曲禮」是以《禮記．曲禮》為中心，但葉國
良認為《論語．鄉黨》是可負的最早的「曲禮」專篇，其餘
各篇也間有名「曲禮」論述，若未能以《論語》為出發點，則
無法完整地掌握「曲禮」的原委。這是葉國良這篇文章論
述宗旨上與前人重要的研究方法很大的不同，認為論述「曲
禮」，不應執著名義而從《禮記》的《曲禮》開始。葉國良以
為，吳澄(1249-1333)(兩年)、湛若水(1466-1560)、武內義雄、
吉本道雅從《曲禮》出發，去思考它和《儀禮》的關係，才
會看不清「曲禮」整體的發展脈絡，而有「曲禮」為經、《儀禮》為傳的說法，因而此文的作法是，從《論語》談起，與眾家有鮮明的研究取徑之不同。

中國詮釋迥異於西方詮釋學，而最能表現中國文化特色者，則是《論語》所發展而出的經典解釋，堪稱最具中國特色的詮釋傳統。而這本書《論語》詮釋學中，毫無疑問是以孔子的道德政治概念為核心，本書第八章江宣樑所著《《論語》的政治概念及其特色》一文，即在中西政治概念的比較之下，闡明《論語》道德政治的特色。江宣樑認為要對「政治」進行中西文化的理解，須先求其政治的「通義」、「通義」，而撇開彼有無或無相應的翻譯詞的不對等前提下作比較。因此，江宣樑所謂「政治的通義」是指「透過政治權力的行使，管理廣大人口的公共事務」，站在這樣的「通義」之認知基礎上，選擇性地以「理想政治秩序」、「政治正當性」、「從政者德行」等三個項目為分析之主要對象，逐一說明《論語》對這些問題的說法。

首先，就「理想政治秩序」而言，根據江宣樑的分析，大致得出瞭解《論語》所追求的治理理想是一種「公天下、讓天下、正名分、重德行」的政治秩序。其次，對於「統治正當性」與「從政者德行」的分析，江宣樑認為雖然我們得不到任何類似「民主正當性」的說法，但並不表示孔子不在意人民對統治者的看法。綜上所述，江宣樑認為「修身」、「尊賢」、「惠民」、「守信」是孔子期望統治者應有的作為，也是統治權威能夠獲得人民支持的條件。這些要項構成《德治」的重要基礎，是儒家統治正當性的具體表現。江宣樑並特別發現「敬事而信」这一對從政者的人格要求，似乎是在中國政治傳統對從政者最核心的要求。在這個意義上，《論語》所推崇的「敬事而信、節用愛民」，顯然具有極深刻的意義。綜而言之，江宣樑就政治學專業角度來審視古典孔子《論語》的政治概念，論述之餘必先釐清一些政治學上的用語，如「政治」、「正當性」、「合法性」之西方理論，以作為對照或分析《論語》之概念及特色，概能呈顯《論語》政治概念的特色。

本書接下來的第九、十、十一章的英文論文，分別探討皇侃的《論語義疏》、韓愈、李輔(772-836)的《論語筆解》及用維根斯坦(Ludwig Wittgenstein，1889-1951)的語義學比較朱熹與何晏對《論語》的解釋方法論的問題。B ernhard Pührer（傅熊）的“Exegetical Strategies and Commentatorial Features of Huang Kan’s Lunyu jijie yishu. A Preliminary Overview”，旨在探討皇侃《論語義疏》（以下簡稱《義疏》）的解釋策略與詮釋特色。如所知者，北宋邢昺(932-1010)所彙編的《論語正義》，是根據許多何晏(1957-249)彙編的《論語集解》所提供的文獻。傅熊指出皇侃雖舉於具有獨特特色的何晏，但從其所著有關《禮記講疏》（今亡佚）、《孝經義疏》、《論語義疏》的註解書，便可清楚瞭解他與何晏的分別。

傅熊指出，從皇侃義疏的註解書中如《三禮》、《詩經》、《書經》、《春秋》還有《易經》等，可看出皇侃有明確的注經偏愛。皇侃在這些義疏中，計有180,000字，被描述為是在《論語集解》下所作的第二層次的事實集解，即皇侃用一有
趣的形式, 与《論語集解》或王弼(226-249)的《論語釋疑》有相当的不同。就形式而言, 《義疏》明显地受到漢魏時期學者的傳統思想啟示。它所顯現註解的策略即是為人所熟知的章句注釋, 且由於它專注在「義」或「義疏」的註釋上, 對於這種註解風格, 傅熊特別指出顯而易見已當時只有「玄」的解經轉變到更基於文獻與詮釋, 這種詮釋方式是儒學的老傳統。「義」或「義疏」的詮釋方式, 傾向專注在文本的本質, 故哲學上的細微解釋不是其主要關心。值得注意的是, 《義疏》的詮釋中有相當詳盡有關「禮」的詮釋, 這顯然是皇侃的專業領域。這意味著皇侃對典制有諸多詳盡的評論, 可視為《義疏》的特徵之一, 同時也會讓一些原先經典上的口語性質, 有些段落會變的有點冗長。此外，《義疏》也有一些的問答格式, 且其主體部分是以簡要風格表示, 較少注意哲學上的細微及偏離主體到訓詁考證。傅熊認為以上都可算是《義疏》的注經策略, 影響日後的章句形式。另外, 傅熊特別提到《義疏》有漢代陰陽五行思想、孝治天下的概念, 也不乏用佛教用語來詮釋《論語》, 並反對用《孟子》作為儒學的詮釋典範等的詮釋特色。傅熊這篇文章在最後提醒研究《論語義疏》的學者, 不要忽略《論語義疏》的歷史和哲學的脈絡, 否則將降低《論語》在中國思想史上的多元性。

皇侃的《論語義疏》並未明顯對何晏所編《論語集解》做一番批判性的整編工作, 且尚帶有漢代餘風。本書第十章所收錄 John Makeham 的“Han Yu and Li Ao's Lunyu Biji Interpretation of the Analects” 一文, 即分析唐代中晚期被認為是韓愈、李翱的作品《論語筆解》（以下簡稱《筆解》），對《論語集解》做出相當嚴厲的批評, 其中的許多詮釋觀點, 都深深影響宋代儒者的詮釋。John Makeham 首先認定韓、李是《筆解》的作者, 其論文則有兩個目的, 其一是簡述韓、李解釋《論語》文本的主要策略, 這方面多著墨在《筆解》對《論語集解》的批評; 其二是分析韓、李所認為的孔子之核心教義。就第一個關於《筆解》的詮釋策略而言, 韓、李二者往往透過一些篇章的詮釋作為主要之篇章, 這些篇章往往都是既重要且精微, 足以讓讀者急於洞見儒家教義的重要性; 其次, 他們運用文本內部的詮釋, 認為孔子本身在編輯《論語》文本時, 也扮演過重要的角色, 故章與章之間, 常有連貫的關係, 並不是沒有關係。John Makeham 為了說明上述的詮釋策略, 多舉韓、李對《論語集解》的批評, 以加強他們所認為的經典本意, 舉出《論語集解》在歷史上、內部文本關係上及人性思想論等, 批評孔安國舊注的不當詮釋, 藉此來削弱《論語集解》詮釋的權威, 企圖重塑另一風格的詮釋。另外, John Makeham 這篇文章的第二個重點是分析韓、李所認為的孔子之核心教義, 分析韓、李以轉換孔安國等舊注對人性教義的學習等級的詮釋, 如在人性論上, 韓愈有知名的人性三品論（上品、中品、下品）；又如在孔子門人學習的等級上，各分生知、學知、困知三等級，以及分別「聖人」與「善人」，善人不可消於聖人，並認為顏回賢於子貢，肯定其聖賢之地位。此外, 李翱引用《易經》以解孔子的「天命」，加強了《論語》的宇宙形上論色彩, 同時也引用《中庸》以建立孔、曾、
思、孟的道統，確立了基於心性修養的「聖」比「學」更重要，因為「學」有可能因其慾望而成為反效果。以上 John Makeham 對韓、李的《筆解》分析之論點，都足以顯示他們影響後世宋儒對《論語》的解釋傾向。

本書第十一章收錄 James Peterman 的 “Just the Details: A Wittgensteinian Defense of Lunyu Early Commentarial Practice” 一文，透過對《論語·顏淵》首章的「克己復禮為仁」之解釋，利用奧地利哲學家維根斯坦的語義學作品 Philosophical Investigations (《哲學探討》)，分析與比較何晏與朱熹對此章「克己」與「禮」的實踐解釋之基本衝突點，指出朱子對此章的形上學解釋概念陷入一種三難問題 (trilemma)，從而對何晏這類早期的《論語》詮釋書，進行維根斯坦式的防衛。James Peterman 指出依照維根斯坦的語義學概念，語詞的意義是根據其語言上的習慣用法。而語詞的用法之所以能夠被表達，是為了應用語詞。基於這樣的語詞原則，我們可說真正的概念是因其適用到特別的場合而與準則產生關聯。James Peterman 利用維根斯坦這種語義學的觀念，清楚地指出朱熹詮釋《論語》所遭遇的形上學概念之邏輯三難問題。他指出「克己」概念的解釋，說明這三難問題：(1)如果朱子運用這個哲學形上概念是不同於一般的概念，那麼朱子所用的形上語言只會誤導對「克己」的一般概念之表達，所以並沒有進一步的意義，因此，我們對於這種沒有增加何晏的解釋，可以置之不理。(2)人們可能在一般的感覺上是滿足克己的標準，但不會满足嚴格的、形上概念的標準，所以朱子的克己理論會導致對話者的概念混淆，從而往往會讓他們成為道德懷疑主義者。(3)朱子的形上語詞缺乏清楚的實踐準則，如此會變成沒有意義，畢竟缺乏應用準則的理論概念，是缺乏意義的。

James Peterman 以上所指出的朱子形上學的三難問題，都可適用在朱子所有的形上學概念的討論。而若根據何晏或早期的詮釋書，實則反而可以用一般的名詞掌握孔子的特性，從而避免三難的哲學問題。最後，James Peterman 認為正因這些早期的《論語》詮釋書具有明顯的「表面性」，提供我們掌握《論語》這種精深重要的、一般的倫理的特性。

本書第十二章是林維杰所著《程伊川論《論語》的理論原則》，旨在從詮釋學的角度處理程朱程頤 (伊川) 提出之《論語》的理解原則。林維杰首先爬梳程伊川《解經原則》時的歷史背景，特標明伊川、朱熹是屬於具有一「意義自足」的「自主詮釋學」（詮釋學的自律系統）之性格，有別於陸象山 (1139-1192) 依本心學論說的經典詮釋之意義依他 (heteronomy of meaning) 所呈現的「依他詮釋學」（詮釋學的他律系統）性格。對於這樣的詮釋分類之分析，已可詳見於林維杰的專文（朱陸異同的詮釋學轉向）(2007)。在林維杰這樣的詮釋分類下，接著通過伊川對《論語》的解析，循著注釋編纂在《論語章句集注》前並標明為《論語論孟子法》的簡短文獻，大致提出了五條理解或解經原則：(1)以經解經，(2)切己，(3)解文義，(4)重修養，(5)聖人氣象。限於篇幅，這裡僅介紹比較特殊的第四、第五項的解經原則。

關於林維杰提到的第四項「由修養求作者之意」原則而言，讓我們注意到學問或真理的追求，同時也意味著學習的
過程中也要注重品行的發展與德性的養成，所以「解經原則」其實是一種「解經態度」，而此態度同時又是「修養態度」，用一種相即的表現方式來說，便是「即解經即工夫」或「即詮釋即修養」。如此一來，便會有一個重要的曠高後果：方法學不僅可以提供倫理學在追求目標時的助益，而且方法學本身亦可能具有其倫理意涵，林維杰用伊川的名言「涵養須用敬，進學則在致知」正是反應這個極具中國特色的詮釋觀點。伊川的這種解經連著修養工夫的觀點，確實是儒門解經的一項重大原則，他告訴我們原本工夫論的「修養」也可能是經典詮釋的「方法」，而提出一個「方法即修養」的解經原則。

最後一項的「觀聖人氣象」原則，林維傑分析指出，理學中如二程將聖人氣象乃是以經文的生動手段，「觀聖人之所以於聖人」之所為可以論解此原則，亦是此事。語義者觀聖賢氣象，反過來說，聖賢氣象也須由經書中獲得，因為聖人之氣象是可以透過學習、學習而得。林維傑在此引用卡西勒（E. Cassirer, 1874-1945）的經典著作《符號形式的哲學》中的理論分析儒門的德性氣象與聖賢境界的氣象論意學、符號學之意義，指出由價值判斷與符號學的媒介意義看來，氣象之於聖人、賢人，乃具有一種「氣化美學」之意義，即此氣象之氣化性格可援引、承聖賢之智慧性格的心境與人格，同時在其有效之援引、承聖賢之氣象中，得以未來之氣化光彩。

綜而言之，林維傑此文透過朱子《論語集注》這篇短文，區分伊川與《論語》的五項解經原則，由詮釋學的角度，屢屢抽絲剝繭，賦予這篇短文具有深刻的解經創造性意義，從而得到朱子的繼承，展開他們「詮釋學的自律系統」之獨特性。本書第十三、十四章分別收入明清有關《論語》的詮釋學課題，內容也都涉及迥異於宋明理學的清儒詮釋特色。

第十三章張麗珠所著《宋、清對『內聖／外王』各有側重的解經進路——以朱熹〈論語集注〉和劉蕡〈論語正義〉為觀察線索〉一文，通過觀察宋明朱熹的〈論語集注〉和清儒劉蕡的〈論語正義〉的經注經史，實地考察其在各自不同的主題關懷下，所各自呈現的不同詮釋面目，而可以具體體察宋、清儒者通過經注經解所傳達出來的時代意識，以及以後此一「詮釋學」而展開的思想史脈絡，扣緊朱注、劉注之釋「學」、釋「禮」、釋「仁」、釋「義利之辨」等，對於儒家重要核心概念或核心要義之不同注釋，加以落實其比較。透過張麗珠的比較宋、清的解經進路，指出其彼此間隱然呈現了「本體界／現象界」、「理想主義／現實主義」之各有偏重取向。故理學和清代新義理學，遂成為以「道德倫理／社會範疇」的「應然／實然」相埒的兩種儒學義理模式。此外，張麗珠在這篇文章中，曾為清代新義理學發聲，認為「在經典詮釋上，他們並未違背詮釋者的『主體性』與經典的『主體性』交融」之主客一體、「心得」原則；他們利用考據學，是通過對此「詞意」的發掘，以說明儒學存在理學以外的其他義理詮釋模式、思想進路；是為了要在語詞的意義中找到一種可以作為清人價值觀後盾的解釋方式，以示思想有本。其目的本在鋪陳、推開清代的新義理觀，在於對傳統經典賦予「現代」（指詮釋者所處時代）意義。總之，張麗珠在此文章中一再強調欲探究儒學的義理演進，應從當代理人所思、所行、所追求與嚮往的生活軌跡中去把握時代的脈動；唯有正
視儒學價值世界中存在著各種殊異的價值型態，並且承認不同的時空範疇與歷史階段中有其各自不同的意識型態，才能從一元的道德標準中掙脫而出。

接著，劉又銘所著《明清自然氣本論者的《論語》詮釋》一文，劉又銘一開始即指出在明代中葉以後，儒學中另有「自然氣本論」一系，自成典範，跟朱子學、陽明學相抗；因此，劉又銘從明初「自然氣本論」的研究為基礎，討論明清自然氣本論者如羅欽順（1465-1574）、王廷相（1472-1544）、呂廷翰（1491-1559）、顧炎武（1613-1682）、戴震（1724-1777）等人的《論語》詮釋。劉又銘特別指出，上述這些自然氣本論發展史上具有開創性的學者，雖然並沒有關於《論語》的專著，但整體來看，他們緩慢地、分頭地共同建構了一個「後朱子、陽明」的《論語》（以及其他經書）詮釋典範，而這大約就是清代焦循〈論語通義〉、〈論語補疏〉以及劉寶楠〈論語疏義〉詮釋典範的前身。這重大，也就是或許可以看作焦循〈論語通義〉、〈論語補疏〉以及劉寶楠〈論語疏義〉的一段「前史」。

於是，劉又銘首先介紹明清自然氣本論的要旨，這方面作者已有相當的研究成果，分別在其《理在氣中——羅欽順、王廷相、顧炎武、戴震氣本論研究》（2000）、《呂廷翰的自然氣本論》（2005）、《〈宋明氣本論研究的若干問題〉》（2005）及《明清儒家自然氣本論的哲學典範》等專著或論文中詳已得之。值得學者注意的是，劉又銘關注的這些明清自然氣本論之學者，並非孟學一路，它在許多方面不符孟學一路的標準，這就是它之所以一直被理學主流觀點（包括當代新儒家）排斥、贬抑的主要原因。事實上它是荀學一路，必須從荀學的標準來看待它。劉又銘由此明清自然氣本論者的《論語》詮釋，鮮明地呈現明清自然氣本論者的理路一貫，彼此呼應，進而從中看出，相對於朱子的《論語集注》，明清自然氣本論者的《論語》詮釋有意識地、自覺地在每個關鍵問題上拉出距離，形成自己獨特的解釋，建構起自己獨立的典範了。也就是說，焦循、劉寶楠的《論語》詮釋典範其實是近代中葉以來長久積澱所成，並非只是在乾嘉學術的土壤上才酥醒出來的。劉又銘在文中，同時也頗為明清氣本論者叫屈，認為自清代以來，明清自然氣本論的哲學一直處在被邊緣的、模糊的、被輕忽被擱置的狀態。但他認為明清自然氣本論的哲學典範正是清代經學（尤其是乾嘉經學）一個恰當的、相應相契的前理解和詮釋典範；從明清自然氣本論的角度切入，將為當前清代經學研究帶來一個新的契機。這個契機也可以劉又銘在文章最後，提出大規模到「東亞儒學」的視野中窺出，特別是與德川儒學的《論語》詮釋也在某些精神上相互呼應。劉又銘從自然氣本論找到日本德川儒者相類似的解釋思維，堪稱日後可發揮的學術研究方向。

本書的第三部分是有關「論語與宗教」之主題，涉及《論語》與佛教、一貫道等宗教的解釋關係。所周知，晚明佛教界出現了明顯的三教融合趨勢，本文第十五章作者高雄所撰（晚明佛學與儒典解經——以智旭的《四書薈解》為中心，旨在以源流之智旭（1599-1655）的《四書》解為中心，重新討論晚明佛學思想是在怎樣的思
想條件下透過注疏儒典來貫通兩教。龍彥特別指出蘊益直接
援佛意以疏《四書》的解經學方式來貫通儒佛，這一創制在
中國佛教思想史上可謂前無古人，而又開晚近儒佛會通的新
形式。另外，龍彥指出蘊益學的流行對明代佛教來說並不是
福音，對於明代佛教學人來說，作為正統意識形態的朱子《四
書》學中有鮮明的排佛論傾向，明確把佛教作為「異端之說」。
龍彥指出蘊益對儒佛關係的論述，無論從思想立場和方法上
面都與蓮池以來的傳統有很大不同。可以說，晚明佛教學界
對朱子《四書》學的反佛論進行最有策略和系統還擊的，則
無疑要算蘊益智旭了。這樣的反擊使得蘊益對儒學的貫通，
是以心學為宗，他會通儒佛就是有意識地接引到儒佛心學的
傳統中，去抵抗朱子學的影響。蘊益的解經《四書》顯然有
策略性地要顛覆朱子學的傳統，龍彥舉出一些論證：如蘊益
以人論定，更強調《論語》在《四書》系統中所具有的優先
地位，他並不遵循朱子《四書》學的排序，而代以自己的判
釋標準。即把《論語》列第一，次《中庸》、《大學》，最後才
是《孟子》。此外，蘊益對於《大學》章句，蘊益亦有意不崇
朱注章句，而明確尊奉陽明的意見，承襲荀本。

根據龍彥的分析，指出蘊益注解《四書》所持的佛教學
觀念也主要來自於《起信論》和天台教觀，這樣的例子在
他的《四書》解中隨處都可以找到。龍彥更指出在蘊益的《四
書》解解中，他為研心的陽明後學，非李卓吾（1527-1602）
本屬。蘊益對卓吾的公開推崇，主要表現在他的《四書》
解的寫作當中。也許他重解《四書》很大意義上就是受到了
卓吾的啟發，特別是他的《論語點睛》，幾乎無處不在地廣引
卓吾之說來加以佐證。龍彥最後指出，明代儒學內部的朱王
之爭，也曲折地再現於明末佛學的思想論述當中，不瞭解這
一點，就會忽略明末佛學思想有關儒佛關係論的複雜性和豐富性。

《論語》除了在上述與佛教人物的解釋關係外，其在民
間的影響力亦不容小覷。換言之，孔子或《論語》不會只是
儒教的專有物。收入本書第十六章鍾雲鶴所著〈民間教派人
士對《論語．學而》首章的解讀——以王守廷．江希張．孟
頴為例〉一文，即以一貫道的信奉者，用宗教性的態度解讀
《論語》，來窺探儒家經典被宗教詮釋的轉化過程及其意義。
鍾雲鶴此文旨在處理以清末先天道信徒王守廷(1856-?)之〈論
語秘竅〉、清末民初萬國道德會江希張(1907-2000)之〈新註論
語白話解說〉，以及當今一貫道信徒孟頴（本名侯洪芳，1952-）
三人對《論語．學而》首章的宗教式解讀，探討儒家經典注
疏在民間教派之解釋中，所呈現的另一面向。鍾雲鶴首先分
析王守廷雖宣揚三教匯通的教義思想，但在經典注疏的選擇
上，卻是「以儒為宗」，並以道術煉身養氣，藉以修養本性之
源，了脫生死輪迴，這樣的修道理念，成了王守廷詮釋儒家
經典的主體。王氏更將〈學而〉首章全然神聖化了，改變以
往學者對這一章的解释重心，乃放在「學」上，但對王氏而言，
〈學而〉章不只是〈學〉，還包含民間教派所重視的「天師」的問題。

其次，鍾雲鶴另分析有神童之稱的萬國道德會之江希
張，他曾用白話注解《論語》，其主要目的是希望透過白話解
釋，以宗教傳教的方式，將儒家思想普及化、平民化，以民
間宗教團體的力量，宣導儒教救國、治國的理念，希望能在
當時的反儒家思潮中，力挽狂瀾，回復「以儒為尊」的傳統。
至於江氏對《學而章》的解話特色，則在朱子解經典範中，
雜取三教思想，藉以表彰《學而章》的宗教意義，以「學而
時習」的學習經驗，提昇孔子在世界史上的地位；至於孟頴
對《學而章》的解話，經顧雲鶯分析，認為是在本「本」與「非
本」的思考模式中進行，所謂「本」乃指對宇宙本體、性命
之源的尋求；「非本」則是指非性命本體的現象界。顧雲鶯分
析這樣的「本」與「非本」的解經模式，是以宗教修行的角
度「強勢解讀」經典，重點在宣導宗教信仰者對經典的「衍
義」（significance），而非發揚經典的意義（meaning），故而其
目的乃在告誡世人修道的真義，切莫被假象所迷惑，並且說
明選擇修行法門的重要性。顧雲鶯進一步指出，上述民間教
派對《學而章》的解話，實開創了儒家經典詮釋「以教解
經」的宗教層面，對於我們研究中國社會所調的三教合一的
現象，擴展了儒家經典注疏的另一視野，有其不同於學術界
的價值與意義。

本書最後一章收入張崑誌的〈正統與異端——李炳南與
南懷瑾的《論語》詮釋比較〉一文，選擇兩位在臺灣頗有影
響力的宗教家及民間學者李炳南（1890-1986）與南懷瑾
（1920-），以二氏的《論語》著說為核心——即李炳南的《論語
講義》與南懷瑾的《論語別裁》，比較其解經方法及對三教與
宋儒解經的態度。張崑誌指出二氏雖皆取儒學，但因李氏
皈依淨土，稱其對儒學的態度為「攝儒歸佛」；南懷瑾自言喜
歡研究佛教與禪學，卻道道地地是個亦儒亦佛亦道者，故南
氏對儒學的態度，可稱之為「三教折衷」者。透過張崑誌的
分析，指出《論語講義》比較屬於傳統的正式注經模式，圍繞
在古人注解世界中，再加以自言今解：《論語別裁》則只是「解
經」或「說經」，利用體悟的「方便通經」，使經典常範化，
故較能吸引大眾的興趣。即便如此，二書所呈現的講說風格，
李炳南猶如古代儒者，講經亦步亦趨，中規中矩，多以儒說
儒，雖間雜有一些佛教論點並企圖「接佛入儒」，但比較不涉
三教紛擾問題，表現極為傳統而嚴謹。南懷瑾則彷彿如書人，
經常古今對話，不時以釋、道之義理說儒，又常插科打諢，
表現出極為活潑的樣貌，亦具十足的禪味。最後，張崑誌並
檢討南氏的《論語別裁》造成兩岸民間及文化界的流行，使
我們見識到經典通俗化在民間所引起的莫大魅力，但同時也
不免帶來經典解釋的「無政府主義」之問題。

五

以上集多國學者，共十七篇有關中國《論語》的研究論
文，內容涉及《論語》的歷史、哲學與宗教等諸多課題，可
謂相當多元。最後，我們再針對研究方法論及未來可發展的
研究方向，以作為「東亞論語學」進一步的研究展望。

所謂「東亞論語學」是「東亞儒學」的重要組成部分，
是指東亞各國儒者透過解話《論語》而形成的思想傳統。「東
亞論語學」一詞中所謂的「東亞」並不是存在於東亞各國關係
之上具有狹隘性的抽象概念。相反地，所謂「東亞」這個
概念，存在於東亞各國之間，在東亞各國具體而特殊的關係
脈絡與情況的互動之中。因此，所謂「東亞」並不是僵硬而
一成不變的固定概念。「東亞」是在變動的東亞各國互動的脈
絡中，與時俱進的概念。所以，所謂「東亞論語學」並不預
設一個一元論的、僵硬的，相對於「邊陲」而言的「中心」，並不是以中國《論語》學作為絕對至高的單一標準檢核日、韓、越、台各地《論語》學的正確與否，而是在東亞的比較視野之中，著重各地的人文特質與思想風土，如何型塑具有地域文化特色的《論語》解釋傳統。

上述關於「東亞論語學」的內涵的說明，已經預設某種研究方法的轉向，這就是前面曾經提到：將「東亞論語學」作為東亞思想發展的過程，而不是作為思想發展的結果。所謂「作為思想發展過程的東亞《論語》學」，既重視《論語》學的發展過程中，所呈現的東亞各地域與時代之思想特色，又聚焦於東亞個別儒者苦心孤詣重建《論語》思想世界的過程。

除了在方法論上注重《論語》學的發展過程以外，《東亞論語學》也在未來展開新視野的方向，誠如陳昭瑛在二〇〇七年六月「東亞論語學國際學術研討會」的發言內容，她以日據時代的啟蒙運動與左翼運動的領袖王敏川(1889-1942)為例，指出儒家思想和馬克思主義、女性主義結合的可能性。她也指出：在第二軸心時代的「東亞論語學」可以聚焦五個面向：（一）「仁」的反殖民論述，（二）「仁」作為全球倫理，（三）廿一世紀的孔子，（四）「他者」意識的其他涵意，尤其是生態意識與性別意識，（五）全球化中的反全球化思維。這些意見對廿一世紀全球化時代的「東亞論語學」研究極具啟示，可以作為我們進一步研究工作的參考。
human nature (xing 性) which are quite incompatible with the views of Mencius. Perhaps with the exception of Zhao Qi, the Mengzi was only perceived as an analytical tool for reading the Lunyu and used as such on a wider basis long after Huang Kan's times. Some modern scholars even go as far as to accepting the readings suggested by Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200) as representative for their notion of "pure Confucianism" and criticise Huang Kan for smuggling external (i.e. non-"Confucianist") concepts and views into the interpretation of a "Confucian classic". Needless to say that this rather short historical angle creates a sort of conventional scholarship from which we learn more about the status, the perception and the politics of so-called Confucianism during recent times than about Huang Kan's sub-commentary. More importantly, this approach completely neglects the historical and philosophical context of the Lunyu yishu and reduces the richness and diversity of Chinese intellectual history — as recorded and transmitted in Huang Kan's sub-commentary — to the most unfortunate and persistent myth of a fairly monolithic tradition dominated by one reading tradition of the Lunyu.

Han Yu and Li Ao's *Lunyu Biji*
Interpretation of the Analects

John Makeham*

*Lunyu bijie* 論語筆解 is attributed to Han Yu 韓愈 (768-824) and Li Ao 李翱 (772-841). Although there has long been speculation as to whether Han and Li actually wrote *Lunyu bijie*, today scholarly consensus accepts the traditional attribution. I also follow this consensus view and will not be rehearsing the scholarly debates about the authorship question. My aim in this essay is twofold. First, to identify and to describe briefly the main tactics deployed by Han Yu and Li Ao in developing their interpretation of the Analects text, paying particular attention to their criticisms of the *Lunyu jijie* 論語集解: (Collected Explanations of the Analects) commentaries. Second, to reconstruct the central teaching that Han Yu and Li Ao believed

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to lie at the heart of the *Analects*.

I. Hermeneutic Tactics

Three decades ago, Fu Weixun 傅偉勤 distinguished between five different hermeneutic steps or approaches.¹

a. “What exactly did the original thinker or text say?”

b. “What did the original thinker intend or mean to say?”

c. What *could* the original thinker have said?

d. What *should* the original thinker have said? or “What should the creative hermeneutician say on behalf of the original thinker?”

e. “What must the original thinker say now?” or “What must the creative hermeneutician do now, in order to carry out the unfinished task of the original thinker?”

One of the distinguishing features of the *Lunyu bijie* commentary is that the authors’ interpretative approach is overwhelmingly in accord with the second of these steps, as they attempt to convince the reader that the interpretation they provide represents what Confucius (and occasionally his disciples and other interlocutors) intended to mean to say. Han and Li deployed a range of tactics in their pursuit of this hermeneutical strategy. First, they portray a number of passages as master passages (for example, 2.4, 5.9, 5.13, 11.3, 11.19, 11.20, 17.2/3, 17.19)² by characterizing those passages as having profound and subtle import that enable the alert reader to gain insight into the significance of Confucius’ teachings. These master passages are also portrayed as tools to gain insight into the *Analects* as a whole, including being able to discern the relative achievements of Confucius’s disciples.

Second, Han and Li frequently use intratextual interpretation (examples from the first ten books include: 1.14, 2.2, 5.10, 6.24, 7.15, 8.2, 9.1, 9.4, 9.12). The use of passages from other parts of the *Analects* to interpret a given passage serves to reinforce the idea of overall textual coherence and the belief that Confucius himself had played a role in editing the text.

Third, they frequently (and gratuitously) amend passages. Despite the fact that Han and Li evidently believed that Confucius had played a role in editing the *Analects*, on 16

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occasions they altered the wording of the text; on 2 occasions they rearranged the order of the text, and on 1 occasion they proposed the removal of 1 portion of text. They were able to justify doing so by appeal to several alleged circumstances. These included the jumbling of strips in the transmission of the Analects text (12.15, 15.4); miscopying by scribes (13.20); and omissions made by redactors (14.37).

**Criticizing Lunyu jijie**

The fourth and most regularly employed tactic was to challenge the interpretation of the Lunyu jijie 论语集注 (Collected Explanations of the Analects) commentaries. Lunyu jijie is important because it is the representative writing of the so-called “old commentary” tradition of the Analects, preserving a selection of some of the earliest commentaries ever written for the Analects, including substantial selections attributed to two of the earliest commentators, Kong Anguo 孔安国 (d. c. 100 B.C.) and Bao Xian 包咸 (d. 68). Although Zheng Xuan was arguably the single most influential commentator between the Han and the Tang, until the appearance of Zhu Xi's Lunyu jizhu 論語集注 (Collected Annotations of the Analects), Lunyu jijie was the single most influential Analects commentary.

The frequency with which this critical tactic is deployed warrants our regarding Lunyu bijie as a selective subcommentary on Lunyu jijie. Significantly, however, Han Yu and Li Ao consistently sought to criticise and undermine the Lunyu jijie interpretations. By bypassing the authority of the Han commentaries, Han Yu and Li Ao hoped to be able to persuade their readers that they (Han and Li) were able to recover the original meaning of Confucius' teachings. In doing so, they anticipated a number of developments that came to full fruition in the Song. For example, Steven Van Zoeren has described the Song as marking a turning point in the tradition of classical

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3 The eight commentaries from which the editors made their selections are as follows: Kong Anguo's xunjie 訳解 (glosses and explanations) commentary, Bao Xian's zhangu 句句 (section and sentence) commentary, Mr Zhou's 周氏 (first century) zhangu commentary, Ma Hong's 马 Kı (79-166) xunshuo 訳説 (glosses and interpretations) commentary, Zheng Xuan's 鄭玄 (127-200) zhu 注 (annotation) commentary, Chen Quan's 陳群 (d. 236) yishuo 義說 (interpretation of the meaning) commentary, Wang Su's 王肅 (195-256) yishuo commentary, and Zhou Sheng Lie's 周生烈 (195-256) yishuo commentary.

4 Given that Zheng Xuan “borrowed” significantly from earlier commentators, especially Kong and Bao, even though he never acknowledged these sources, then this claim may seem unfounded. If, however, it is accepted that the commentaries which Zheng Xuan modified and appropriated as his own were traditionally attributed to Zheng Xuan, then the claim is still defensible.

5 Only a selection of zhangu from any one pian are selected for inclusion in Lunyu bijie.
studies, characterized “on the one hand by the criticizing and
loosening of traditional and institutional authority over
interpretation and on the other hand by a renewed and deepened
engagement with the classics.”6 Susan Cherniack argues that
sustained attacks on the integrity and credibility of the central
government’s official texts led to a situation in which textual
authority was transferred from a tradition-based model to one in
which individual readers were now able to “assert their own
rights to determine authorial intent in the classics, independent of
tradition.”

The following examples are typical of Han’s and Li’s
criticisms of the Lunyu ji jie commentaries.

3.12

子曰：吾不與祭，如不祭。包曰：不自親祭，使攝者
為之，不盡敬，與不祭同。

韓曰：義違上文。禰自既灌而往，吾不欲觀之矣。蓋
魯僖公亂昭穆。祭神如神在，不可踰而亂也。故下文

6 Steven Van Zoonen, Poetry and Personality: Reading, Exegesis and
Hermeneutics in Traditional China, Stanford: Stanford University

7 Susan Cherniack, “Book Culture and Textual Transmission in Sung
also her discussion of the problem of textual authority created by the
repeated need to revise mistakes in the Directorate editions of the
classics, 57 ff.

Han Yu and Li Ao’s Lunyu Biji Interpretation of the Analects 303

云：吾不與祭。蓋嘆不在其位不得以正此禮矣。故云：
如不祭。言魯僖祀異不祀同為也。

Han Yu: The meaning here is connected with the
previous passage (3.10), “From the moment of the
opening libation onwards I have no desire to observe the
di sacrifice.” This is because Duke Xi of Lu had thrown
the generational order (zhao mu) system into disarray.
“Sacrifice as if the spirits are present.” (3.10) [The mu
generation] cannot take precedence [over the zhao
generation] and thereby throw [the zhao mu system] into
disarray. Hence this passage says “I do not participate in
the sacrifice.” Confucius is explaining that the situation
whereby the one whose [spirit tablet] was not placed in
its proper position was unable to be rectified. Hence in
saying that “it is just as if the sacrifice had not taken
place,” he is saying that Lu had contravened the [proper
conduct of the] sacrifice. It was the same as if no
sacrifice had taken place at all.

In order to be able to show what the original thinker had intended,
Han Yu has first to show that the interpretation advanced by the
Lunyu ji jie interpreters (in this instance attributed to Bao Xian) is
mistaken. The Lunyu ji jie commentary interprets Confucius to be
saying that unless he personally participates in a particular sacrifice, instead of sending someone to take his place, it will lack the necessary reverence and so fail to be a genuine sacrifice. By drawing a tenuous intratextual connection with 3.10, however, Han Yu maintains that it is not Confucius’ participation that is at issue but the continued misconduct of the di sacrifice in the state of Lu ever since the time of Duke Xi, when the proper sequence of the zhaow and mu generations had been reversed in the ancestral temple. Han Yu is referring to an incident recorded in Zuozhuan, Duke Wen, year 2, according to which Duke Xi, the younger brother of the illegitimate Duke Min 閔, not only acceded to the throne ahead of his elder brother but whose spirit tablet was also placed before that of his elder brother.

Curiously, even though Han Yu was attempting to undermine the authority of the Lunyu jijie commentary by proving Bao Xian’s interpretation to be historically incorrect, it is evident that Han’s own commentary is most immediately based on the Lunyu jijie commentary to Analects 3.10 (attributed to Kong Anguo). This, of course, is not acknowledged in the Lunyu bijie commentary.

4.26

子遊曰：事君數，斯辱矣；朋友數，斯疏矣。包曰：

du shuo shu sheng shuo zhi du.

Han Yu and Li Ao’s Lunyu Biji interpretation of the Analects

韓曰：君命召不俟駕。速也。豈以速為辱乎。吾謂數

當謂數數之數。

李曰：數数字三速必辱矣。朋友數數則益疏矣。包云

速數非其數只。

Han Yu: “When summoned by one’s lord one should not wait for the horses to be harnessed.”

This is to act promptly. How could acting promptly mean humiliation? I maintain that here “shuo 数” means frequently.”

Li Ao: Being frequently and repeatedly disrespectful will certainly lead to humiliation. If friends are frequently disrespectful [of one another] then they will grow increasingly distant. In saying that shu 数 means “promptly” Bao Xian misunderstood the meaning.

Han Yu and Li Ao challenge the Lunyu jijie interpretation by appealing to a different reading of the term 数. By reading the term to mean “frequently,” the import of the Analects text is then understood to be that being over solicitous or importunate to one’s lord will lead to humiliation. Presumably Bao understood the passage to mean that if one was hasty in serving one’s lord this would lead to humiliation. Either reading is possible, thus underscoring that Han Yu’s (and Li Ao’s) real purpose was to

8 Mencius, 2B.2.
undermine the authority of the Lunyu jijie commentary.

5.6

子使漆雕開仕。對曰：吾斯之未能信。子說。（孔曰：開，弟子，漆調姓，開名。仕進之道未能信者，未能究習也。鄭曰：善其志道深也。）

韓曰：未能見信於時。未可以仕也。子說者，善其能付己，知時變。

李曰：孔言未能究習。是開未足以任。非經義也。鄭言志遠深。是開以不任為得也。非仲尼循循善誘之意。云善其能付己知時變。斯得矣。

Han Yu: He was as yet unable to secure the trust of the people of the day and so was not yet able to serve in office. The text says Confucius was pleased because he thought it was good that Qidiao Kai was able to take his own measure and know when the times had changed.

Li Ao: Kong Anguo said that he was still unable to apply himself fully and this was why he was not up to the task of serving in office. This is not the meaning of the text. Zheng Xuan said that Qidiao Kai’s mind was profoundly fixed on the way and this was why he did not take up office. Zheng maintained that that was the meaning of the passage. Yes this is contrary to the notion that “the Master is good a guiding others step by step.”

What the passage actually says is that Confucius was pleased because he thought it was good that Qidiao Kai was able to take his own measure and know when the times had changed. This grasps the meaning.

In this passage, the Lunyu jijie commentary provides two different interpretations, without recommending one over the other, leaving it for the individual reader to choose between the two. Li Ao, following Han Yu, rejects both interpretations. Although there is nothing to recommend Han Yu’s and Li Ao’s interpretation over the other two interpretations, once again it will be noted that Han Yu’s and Li Ao’s real purpose lies less in championing a particular interpretation than in challenging the authority of the Lunyu jijie commentary.

2.12/13

子曰：君子不器。子貢問君子。子曰：先行其言，而後從之。孔曰，疾小人多言而行之不順。

韓曰：上文「君子不器」與下文「子貢問君子」是一段義。孔失其旨。反謂疾小人。有戾於義。

9 Lunyu, bijie does not reproduce the comments by Kong and Zheng.

10 Analects, 9.11.
the interpretation attributed to Kong Anguo). The tactic relies on being able to bring in the figure of Zigong, represented in the four divisions (si ke) described in Analects 11.3.

5.10

宰予畫壁。子曰：朽木不可雕也，糞土之牆不可圬也。於予與何誅？子曰：始吾於人也，聽其言而信其行；今吾於人也，聽其言而觀其行。於予與何誅？

This passage in brackets is not reproduced in Lunyu bijie.
rested this would not warrant a sharp rebuke. Furthermore, the phrase *yu Yu* 於予 (as for Yu) is clearly referring to Zai Yu. Where the latter half of the text says “*shi wu* 始吾” (in the beginning I) and “*jin wu* 今吾” (now I), this is Confucius referring to himself.

Li Ao: The former *wu* also misunderstood the meaning of “as for Yu” and “what is there to rebuke?” as well as the phrase in the second half of the text, “it was on account of Yu that I have changed in this respect.” Even if Confucius believed that Zai Yu had been taking his leisure in bed during the daytime, what would this matter, given Zai Yu’s talents? The second half of the text talks about Zai Yu’s words and deeds. Even if he had been in bed this would not amount to any great fault. It would also be acceptable to change the text so that it read “not in the daytime.”

The commentaries in *Lunyu jijie* (not cited by Han and Li) portray Zai Yu as lazy and also imply that he is hypocritical. Because Zai Yu was the leading disciple in the “speech” category (11.3), Han Yu and Li Ao develop an unashamedly apologist interpretation so to avoid Zai Yu’s being seen to be criticised. The suggestion that *zhou* 畫 is a mistake for *hua* 漢 already had a considerable history and was not initiated by Han and Li. Indeed, both Han and Li are somewhat equivocal as to whether the amendment needs to be adopted at all, and they each appear willing to accept either reading as long as Zai Yu’s integrity is not brought into question.

1.14

子曰: ⋯⋯敏於事而慎於言。就有道而正焉。可謂好學也矣。孔曰: 敏，疾也，有道，有道德者。正，謂問事是非。

韓曰: 正謂問道。非問事也。上句言事，下句言道。孔不分釋之，則是與道混而無別矣。

李曰: 凡人事正事皆謂之事跡。非所謂聖賢德行。非記誦文辭之學而已。孔子曰: 有蕩回者，好學，不違怒。不貳過。此稱為好學。孔云: 問事是非。蓋得其近者，小者，失其大端。

Han Yu: “To rectify himself” refers to asking about the way, not to asking about affairs. The first sentence refers to affairs; the second sentence refers to the way. Kong Anguo did not distinguish between them and so mixed the comment about affairs together with the comment about the way, drawing no distinction.

Li Ao: All human and political affairs are referred to as
“marked events.” As for the way, this concerns the moral behaviour of the sages and worthies. The way is not some learning concerned merely with recording and reciting words and phrases. Confucius said: “There was Yan Hui; he was fond of learning. He did not transfer his anger nor did he make the same mistake twice.” (6.3) This is called being fond of learning. Kong Anguo said, “[To rectify himself refers] to asking about the appropriateness or otherwise of particular affairs.” Although grasping the facile and inconsequential, he lost sight of that which is of great import.

In this example, Kong Anguo is taken to task for failing to identity the true import of the passage and for dwelling on matters of peripheral concern. The interpretation proposed by Han Yu and Li Ao has no more prima facie claim to being correct than does Kong Anguo’s interpretation. Rather, the force of argument relies on appeal to what Confucius really meant and that this meaning had somehow been unambiguously disclosed to Han and Li. The relevance of Li Ao’s intratextual reference to Yan Hui, as featured in Analects 6.3, is not immediately evident. As we will see in the following section, however, Yan Hui is central to the principal interpretative theme developed in the Lunyu bijie commentary. Thus the reference here to Yan Hui is really appealing to the image of Yan that Han and Li construct in a piecemeal fashion over several other key commentaries.

II. Confucius’ Central Teaching

Three grades theory of human nature

Han Yu and Li Ao’s views on human nature constitute a key theme in many of the Lunyu bijie commentaries. The significance of this topic needs to be understood against the backdrop of a long history of discussions of the topic of human nature. Of particular relevance is the notion, developed since at least as early as Han times, that there are three grades of human nature. Jia Yi 賈誼 (201-169), for example, had used the tripartite grading of “upper,” “middle,” and “lower” (shang, zhong, xia) to distinguish three different grades of ruler:

Rulers of the upper grade can be led such that they ascend (shang) but they cannot be led such that they descend (xia). Rulers of the lower grade can be led such that they descend but they cannot be led such that they ascend. Rulers of the middle grade can be led such that they can ascend or descend.

Jia explained that this is a function of “raw nature” (caixing 材性).\(^{12}\)

\(^{12}\) See his Xinshu 新書 (New Writings), 5.7a, Sibu congkan 四部叢刊
Wang Chong 王充 (27-c.100) echoes the "neutrality" view of human nature in respect of the "middle grade person" (zhongren 中人). Commenting on Confucius' dictum at Analects 17.2, that "By virtue of their natures people are close to one another but through habituation they diverge," he writes:

The type of nature that people in the middle grade have will depend on what they habitually apply it to. If they habitually apply it to what is good then they will do good. If they habitually apply it to what is bad then they will do bad. When it comes to matters of extreme goodness and extreme badness, however, these no longer depend on habitual application.13

Wang had also developed a theory that at the moment of conception, the quality of vital energy (qi 氣) that the embryo receives from its parents (and which, in turn, could be affected by the mother's state of mind at the moment of conception) determined such qualities as whether one would be a person of moral worth (xian 賢), a reprobate (buxiao 不肖), or benighted (yu愚), as well as physical appearance and life expectancy.14 The quality of this qi also determined the quality of the five constant virtues (wuchang 五常, wuxing 五性) with which one was endowed.15 These views on the role of qi highlight the view that certain conditions of human nature were given; they do not develop spontaneously throughout the course of an individual's life.16

14 For example, Lunheng, 1:50-51, 75, 2:781. Commonly used terms such as xian and yu refer both to an intellectual capacity and a moral capacity. An implicit premise in much Confucian thought, as well as writings influenced by that thought, is that unless a person has the intellectual capacity to know how to distinguish between moral acts and immoral acts then it would be ludicrous to make him morally responsible for his actions. (It will be noted that such notions as choice and responsibility were not generated in the conceptual clusters which informed the ethical formulations of traditional Chinese thought.) The predominant view was that it was not enough simply to be instructed in the central Confucian virtues because unless one was already in possession of some of these virtues, then even learning would be in vain. In short, their solution was the idea that certain virtues or, at the very least, certain incipient virtuous tendencies were innate. The classic formulation of this thinking is, course, to be found in Mencius.

15 For example, Lunheng, 1:75, 135.

16 Possibly the earliest extant examples of the notion of a qi-constituted nature are in the so-called "Guodian bamboo strips" (date of composition pre-300 B.C.) and the "Chu Warring States bamboo strips" (now in the possession of the Shanghai Museum, and dated to the third-century B.C.) Of the Guodian materials, I am referring to the text that has been named Xing zi ming chu 性自命出 (The Nature Comes from the Command), and of the Shanghai Museum materials, I am referring to the closely related text that has been named Xing qing lun
Several centuries later, Huang Kan’s 皇侃 (488-545) views on the subject of human nature, set out in his Lunyu yishu 论语义疏 commentary to 17.2, not only echo Wang’s in respect of the role of qi, but also in respect of the tripartite grading of human nature:

Descending from the grade of “the sage” down to that of “the worthy” and “the benighted,” there are myriad gradations. Expressed in general terms, these can be divided into three grades. The upper division is that of the sage whereas the lower division is that of the benighted. Although there are different levels between these two grades, they can be collectively treated as a unity….There are both clear and turbid qualities of qi. If one is endowed with the clearest quality of qi then one will be a sage; if one is endowed with the most turbid quality of qi then one will be a benighted person. Because the qi of a benighted person is of the most turbid quality, then even if this qi were allowed to settle it would not become clear. Because the sage has the clearest quality of qi, then even if it were stirred it would not become turbid.

Later in the same commentary, again echoing Wang Chong, Huang emphasized the unique capacity for those in the middle grade to be affected by their environment:

Between the most wise and the most benighted, there is a range of grades which includes those who are below Yan Yuan and Min Ziqian, and those who are above those with only a bare modicum of goodness. Within this range there are those whose clear qi exceeds their turbid qi, those whose turbid qi exceeds their clear qi, and those who have equal measures of clear and turbid qi. In the case of such people, if their qi is allowed to settle, it will become clear, whereas if it is stirred, it will become turbid.

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17 Such as solids suspended in a liquid.
18 Wang Fu, Qianfu lun 潛夫論 (Essays of a Recluse), Qianfu lun jian jiaozheng 潛夫論箋校正 (Critical Edition of Essays of a Recluse with Corrections), Wang Jipei 汪繼培 (b. 1775), Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985, 378, also emphasizes the malleability of those he terms zhongyong zhimin 中庸之民 (middle grade people). Echoing Mencius, Wang identifies the ruler as having the most influence on the environmental conditions which affect people of the middle grade.
turbid. These people change as the world around them changes. If they encounter good then they become clear and rise; if they encounter bad then they become sullied and sink.

Thus, for people in the middle grade, regardless of what proportion of clear or turbid qi they are endowed with at birth, it is the post-natal environment which determines the path of individual moral action.

The three/nine grades theory of human nature had wide currency during the Tang. For example, the imperially sponsored Zhengyi (Correct Meaning) subcommentary to Liji (Book of Rites), compiled by Kong Yingda et al., adhers unequivocally to this theory:

Those who receive a full endowment of pure qi are the sages. Those who receive a full complement of turbid qi are the benighted people. Those below the sages and above the benighted people have varying quantities of pure and turbid qi and cannot be spoken of as being uniform. For this reason, all people, from sages to the benighted, are divided into nine grades. Confucius said, “Only the most wise and the most benighted do not change” [Analects, 17.2]. People in the remaining categories move in pursuit of things. Accordingly, the Analects says, “By virtue of their natures (xing) men are close to one another but through habituation they diverge.” [17.2]. This comment is also based on the situation of people in the middle seven grades.

Let us now turn to examine how comments in Lunyu bijie were informed by this tradition of discourse, yet also departed from it.

5.13

子貢曰：夫子之文章，可得而聞也。夫子之言性與天道，不可得而聞也。孔曰：性者，人所受以生也。天道者，元亨日新之道。深微，故不可得而聞也。

韓曰：孔説粗矣。非其精蘊。吾謂性與天道一義也。若解二義則人受以生何者不可得而聞乎哉？

李曰：天命之謂性。是天人相與也。天亦有性。春仁、夏禮、秋義、冬智是也。人之率性，五常之道是也。蓋門人只知仲尼文章而少知仲尼之性與天道合也。非子貢之深蘊，其知天人之性乎？

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19 For additional references, see McMullen, State and Scholars in T'ang China, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, 311, n. 212.

20 Liji (Book of Rites), Shisan jing zhusu 十三經注疏 (The Thirteen Classics with Annotations and Subcommentaries), Ruan Yuan 阮元 (1764-1849), Taipei: Yiwen yinshuguan, 1985, 52.2b (“Zhongyong”).
Han Yu: Kong Anguo's interpretation is crude and misses the excellent profundity of the passage. The nature and the way of heaven are one and the same in meaning. If they are interpreted as two different meanings, then why should it be that humans are unable to hear about [the way of heaven] given that [by virtue of their nature] they are bestowed with life [by heaven]?

Li Ao: That which heaven decrees is called the nature. It is indeed that heaven and humans are united. Heaven also has a nature. In spring it is humaneness, in summer it is ritual propriety, in autumn it is righteousness, and in winter it is wisdom. In following their nature, it is the way of the five constant virtues [that people follow.] The disciples could only understand Confucius' accomplishments and were incapable of understanding Confucius' [teaching] that the nature and the way of heaven are united. If it were not for his profundity would Zigong have been able to understand the nature of heaven and humans?

Whereas Wang Chong maintained that the quality of one's innate endowment of *qi* determined the quality of one's five constant virtues (*wu chang*), Li Ao and Han Yu depart from the views of Wang Chong, Huang Kan, Kong Yingda and many others by not referring to *qi* when discussing human nature. In the above passages, however, Li Ao does invoke the concept of the five constant virtues, and in doing so implicitly alludes to Han Yu's essay "Tracing the Nature its Source" (*Yuan xing* 原性) in which Han espouses a three grades theory of human nature:

性之品有三，而其所以為性者五……。性之品有上中下三。上馬者，善馬而已矣；中馬者，可導而上下也；下馬者，惡馬而已矣。其所以為性者五：曰仁、曰禮、曰信、曰義、曰智。上馬者之於五也，主於一而行於四；中馬者之於五也，一 不少有焉，則少反焉，其於四也混；下馬者之於五也，反於一而悖於四。性之於情親其品。21

There are three grades of human nature and the nature is constituted by five [constant virtues]...The nature is divided into three grades: upper, middle, and lower. Those of the upper grade are imbued with goodness and nothing else. Those of the middle grade can be led higher or lower. Those of the lower grade are imbued with badness and nothing else. The nature is constituted by the five constant virtues: humaneness, ritual propriety,

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21 "Yuan xing," 11.5b-6a, *Han Changli quanjji* 韓昌黎全集 (Complete Works of Han Yu), *Si bu beiyao* 四部備要 (The Essential Collection of the Four Divisions), Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1936.
living up to one’s word, good faith, righteousness, and wisdom. With those of the upper grade, the five constant virtues are ruled by one virtue [humaneness] which is carried out through the other four. With those of the middle grade, one virtue [humaneness] is possessed in no small measure and so it is rarely opposed. In regard to the other four virtues, however, they remain confused. With those of the lower grade, they oppose one virtue [humaneness] and rebel against the other four.

When refracted through the lens of Han Yu's essay “Tracing the Nature its Source,” the _Lunyu bijie_ commentary to 5.13 not only explains why different disciples have differing potentials for understanding the import of Confucius’ teachings, it also suggests that the superior constitution of the five constant virtues in Zigong’s nature accounted for his insight into Confucius’ teachings. Now, given that Han Yu’s views on the five constant virtues are part and parcel of his three grades theory, what does he see to be the difference between the upper grade and middle grade?

**Grades of nature and learning**

17.2/3

子曰：性相近也，習相遠也。子曰：唯上知與下愚不移。孔曰：上知不可為易，下愚不可為賢。

韓曰：上文云性相近。是人以可習而上下也。此文云

上下不移。是人不可習而遷也。二義相反。先儒莫究其義。吾謂上篇云：「生而知之者上，學而知之次也。」

因而學之又其次也。因而不學，斯為下矣。」與此篇二義兼明焉。

李曰：窮理盡性以至於命。此性命之說極矣。學者罕明其歸。今二義相戾。當以易理明之。乾道變化，各正性命，又。利貞者性情也。又。一陰一陽之為道，繼之者善也。成之者性也。謂人性本相近於靜，及其動感外物，有正有邪。動而正則為上智，動而邪則為下愚。寂然不動情性而忘矣。雖聖人，有所難知。故仲尼稱顏回不言若愚。遊省其私，亦足以發。回也不愚。箋坐發憤，不習如愚。在卦為復。天地之心遂矣。餘聖而下，性習近遠。智愚萬殊。仲尼所以云因而不學，下愚不移者，皆欲勉學者之歸也。若窮理盡性，則易庶能窮焉。

韓曰：如子之說，文雖相反義不相戾。誠知乾道變化，各正性命，坤道順乎承天。不習無不利，至哉！果天地之心其遂矣乎？

Han Yu: ‘The first passage says, ‘The nature of humans is close.’ This means that through habitual practice
people can become wise or benighted. The next passage says that the most wise and the most benighted do not alter. This means that people cannot change through habitual practice. The two meanings contradict one another and former ru did not got to the bottom of the matter. I maintain that the meaning of both passages can be elucidated when read in the light of the passage in the previous chapter (16.9) which states: "To be born knowing things is the highest. Next is to know things through learning. And after this is to learn things through encountering them as obstacles. The common people, insofar as they make no effort to learn things even when encountering them as obstacles, are the lowest."

Li Ao: "To fathom principles and thoroughly penetrate one’s nature and so attain what has been decreed." This is the ultimate statement of the nature and the decree yet scholars rarely understand its import. The meanings of the two passages in the text are contradictory and so should be elucidated in the light of the principles contained within the Book of Changes. "The way of the creative power is to transform and to change; each thing attains its proper nature and decree." And "fitness and constancy constitute the emotional responses and the nature." And "The alteration of yin and yang is the way. That which continues this process is goodness. That which completes this to completion is the nature." This says that it is in [a state of] stillness that the nature of humans has always been close to one another. When that nature is activated in response to external things, it can be either correct or perverse. When the nature’s activation is correct then it is in accord with the most wise; when its activation is perverse then it is in accord with the most benighted. "Being still and not activated, both the nature and the emotional responses are forgotten." Even if one were a sage, there would be some difficulties in knowing [if someone had achieved such a state]. Thus Confucius declared that when Yan Hui did not speak it was "as if he was stupid. Yet when he withdraws to reflect in private, he is quite enough to


24 Changes, 1.6a.
25 Changes, 1.17b.
inspire one. Hui is by no means stupid!” This is because he “sits in forgetfulness” and forgets about practicing instructions that have been handed down, such that it appears as if he is stupid. Of the hexagrams, this matches Fu (return), “the mind of heaven and earth.” Profound! The natures and emotional responses of those below the sub-sage [Yan Hui], however, are at variation from one another, and there are myriad gradations between the wise and the stupid. This is why Confucius said “[The common people.] insofar as they make no effort to learn things even when encountering them as obstacles, are the lowest” and “the most benighted do not alter.” These were words to motivate and encourage students. As for fathoming principles and thoroughly penetrating one’s nature, the Book of Changes is the only way to do this thoroughly.

Han Yu: With your interpretation, although the two passages are opposite, the meaning is not contradictory and one can truly realize that “The way of the creative power is to transform and to change; each thing attains its proper nature and decree” and that “the way of the procreative power is passively to receive heaven.” “By not practicing, everything is furthered.” Supreme! Indeed, is it not that “the mind of heaven and earth is profound”? The contradiction Han Yu refers to concerns two claims: through habitual practice humans can become either wise or benighted; the most wise and the most benighted cannot change through habitual practice. Li Ao’s solution is to the appeal to Confucius’ other claim that people who are neither the most wise nor the most benighted can change by learning. More importantly, however, Li Ao further maintains that it is in a state of stillness that the nature of humans is most similar. Activation of this nature can lead to correct or perverse emotional responses. Correct emotional responses enable one to achieve wisdom and for those whose natures are in the upper grade—such as the sub-sage Yan Hui—they are also able to “sit in forgetfulness” and so not lose the state of stillness.

It would appear, however, that the task of fathoming principles and thoroughly penetrating one’s nature was exclusive to sages and sub-sages. According to Li Ao’s commentary to 17.2/3, for those in the middle grade, not only do their emotional responses vary, so do their individual natures. Presumably, again this must be because of the variation in the constitution of the five constant virtues in individual natures. As for those in the lowest grade, it is not because of their natures that they are
condemned to ignorance, but rather because they “make no effort to learn things even when encountering them as obstacles.” Similarly, in his essay “The Teacher” (Shishuo 師說), Han Yu writes: “Today, even though the great mass of people are a long way below sages, they find it shameful to learn from a teacher. This is why the sages become wiser and the benighted more stupid. Herein lies the reason sages are sages and the foolish are foolish.”

Grades of learning

For people in the middle grade, Li Ao and Han Yu proposed that learning was sequential (a view that Zhu Xi also made central to his own views on learning).

11.2

孔子曰：從我於陳、蔡者，皆不及門也。鄭曰：皆不及仕進之門，而失其所。
韓曰：門謂聖人之門。言弟子學道由門以及堂；由堂以及室。分等降之差。非謂言進士而已。
李曰：如由也，升堂未入於室。此等降差別。不及門猶在下列者也。
Han Yu: Door (men 門) refers to the sage’s door. This is saying that the disciples learn about the way by moving

through the sage’s door and on into his hall (tang 堂). From the hall they move on into his inner chamber (shi 室). They are graded in descending hierarchical order. The passage is not talking about their advancement on the path to office.

Li Ao: A disciple such as You (Zilu) ascended to the hall but did not enter the inner chamber. This is an example of graduated differences in a descending hierarchy. Those who had not reached the door were ranked further below.

The curriculum of learning that Confucius prescribed for his disciples followed a defined sequence; moreover, different disciples progressed to different levels in this curriculum. Only when they had completed this curriculum could they abandon learning altogether and enter the realm of Confucius’s inner chamber. According to Han Yu and Li Ao, the core of Confucius’s curriculum consists of four hierarchically arranged grades (pin 品) or categories (ke 科) of learning.

11.3

德行：顏淵、閔子路，冉伯牛，仲弓。言語：宰我，子貢。政事：冉有，季路。文學：子游，子夏。
李曰：仲尼設四品，以明學者，不問科，使自下升高，
understanding depends on virtuous conduct.” 28 This is because it does not rely on words.

The speech category follows next. This is what *Changes* refers to when it says “Plan before speaking; deliberate before acting. Through planning and deliberation, change and transformation are achieved, but these cannot be fixed to a constant norm.” 29 These are not matters that can be constrained by government and law.

The category of affairs of government follows next. This is what is meant when it is said, “Although there are no venerable and perfected men, there are the statutes and laws.” 30 This says that the affairs of government are not concerned only with words.

The category of “textual learning” is at the bottom. This is what *Rites* refers to when it says, “They would identify the sentences in the texts and determine the meaning. They discussed what they learned and selected their friends.” 31 Small achievements lead to great achievements. This is to ascend from the lower to the higher.

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29 *Changes*, “Xīzhuan,” 7.17a.
30 *Odes*, 18.1.6b, Shisan jing zhushu edition.
31 *Li ji*, “Xue ji 学记,” 36.3a, Shisan jing zhushu edition.
Li Ao: All matters associated with learning the way of the sages begin with texts. Only after texts are mastered can human affairs be rectified. Only after human affairs are understood can one be confident in speech. Only after words have been forgotten, can one silently understand one’s actions. This is called virtuous conduct. It is to enter the innermost part of the sage’s domain. The four categories are ordered thus, yet the commentaries do no elucidate why they are so ordered.

Learning is thus sequential, and must proceed in a hierarchical progression through four stages, represented as four categories of learning. The lowest or most elementary category is textual learning, next is affairs of government, next is speech, and the uppermost category is virtuous conduct, exemplified by silent understanding. The goal of learning is to become a sage, and as these comments make clear, advancement towards that goal is possible. The crucial stage in that advancement is the category of “virtuous conduct” which is characterized by silent understanding, a state achieved by Yen Yuan.

Yan Yuan and Zigong

5.9

子謂子貢曰：女與回也，孰愈？對曰：賜也，何敢望伯？回也，聞一以知十；賜也，聞一知二。子曰：弗如也；吾與女，弗如也。包曰：既然子貢不如，復云吾與女俱不如者，蓋欲以慰子貢也。

Han Yu: Yan Hui was a sub-sage. In asking only Zigong who was superior, this surely [affirmed] that Zigong was not the equal of Yan Hui. Since Zigong had made it clear that Yan Hui possessed the actuality of a sage, why should Confucius need to console him? Bao Xian misunderstood the meaning.

Li Ao: The meaning of this passage is most profound and former ru failed to fathom it fully. I maintain that Mencius said that Yan Hui had entered deeply into the
realm of the sage. He said that he “partook of the sage’s actuality but on a reduced scale.” He used the differing limitations [of the disciples] to grade them. Zigong’s [accomplishments] in speech were more profound that those of Yan Hui, such that the [overall] gap between them was not so distant that it could not be breached. Zigong modestly claimed that he only measured up to two tenths of Yan Hui’s actuality and so Confucius praised him for also having glimpsed the inner part of the sage’s domain. Concerned that his followers would mistakenly believe that Yan Hui was very learned and Zigong not so, he furthermore stated that he and Zigong were both unable to match Yan Hui so as to dispel any doubt among his followers. He was not consoling Zigong.

Han Yu: I regard the meaning behind Zigong’s words to be profound and subtle. [Zigong’s attainments were] consistent with possessing eight tenths of Yan Hui’s actuality. It was by only two tenths that he did not measure up to Yan Hui. Otherwise, why should Confucius state that [he and Zigong both] were unable to

match Yan Hui. Profound indeed!

Han and Li are unequivocal that Zigong was no match for Yan Yuan’s perspicacity (although Li is notably more sympathetic to Zigong’s achievements). This view is advanced even at the price of allowing Confucius to concede that he too was not the equal of Yan in perspicacity. Given that Confucius’ status as a sage in never in question, then this is perhaps a relatively minor concession to make. To reinforce Yan’s achievements, Han Yu even modifies a passage from *Mencius* to claim that Yan Hui possessed the actuality of a sage. Nevertheless, he still insists that Yan Hui was a sub-sage.

11.19

子曰：回也，其庶乎！聶空。賜不受命，而尊者焉，

億則屢中。

韓曰：…吾謂回則坐忘遣照是其空也。賜未若回每

空而能中其空也。賜當為覽：種當為優之謬也。子

貢貿於優變，未受性命之理。此蓋明賜之所以亙也。

李曰：仲尼品第賜皆大賢。豈語及賜者之富耶？集

解失之甚矣。吾謂言語考定賜優變能居中乎。即亙

之亙匹亙矣。

Han Yu: I say that sitting in forgetfulness and dispelling all images from his mind was Yan Yuan’s “being

empty.” Zigong was not yet able to match Yan Yuan in achieving a state of emptiness each time he attempted to do so. *Huo* 貧 (goods) should be *zi* 資 (to assist in), and *zhì* 殖 (to multiply) is surely a mistake for the character *quan* 權 (to adjust priorities). Zigong [had devoted himself to] assisting in ways to adjust to change, and had yet to receive [understanding of] the principles of the nature and the decree. This [passage] was probably to show why Zigong was below Yan Yuan.

Li Ao: Confucius ranked both Yan Yuan and Zigong as great worthies. How could he possibly have even begun to discuss such matters as storing up wealth? The *Ji jié* commentary is wide of the mark. I maintain that the speech category was actually of assistance in making correct conjectures about how to adjust to change. Thus it is clear that Zigong was next down from Yan Yuan.

Again, Han and Li confirm Yan Yuan’s superiority over Zigong, with Zigong not yet having advanced to the “virtuous conduct” category. This difference is further reinforced by Han Yu in the following commentary:

17.19

子曰：予欲無言。子貢曰：子如不言，則小子何述焉？
Li Ao: How profound are the words of the sage! Other than Zigong, who would be capable of talking about them? Who would be capable of silently understanding them? I note that in a previous chapter it states: “Zigong said, ‘The master’s views on the nature and the way of heaven cannot be heard.’” Furthermore in a later chapter it states that when Chen Ziqin said that Zigong was superior to Confucius, Zigong said: “The gentleman may be judged ignorant on the basis of uttering a single word. One must be careful with words. The Master is just like heaven which cannot be scaled.” This clearly affirms that Zigong already understood the significance of Confucius’ remark “What does heaven say?” He stated “What would there be for us younger ones to transmit?” in order to see if he could entice the sage to extrapolate on his remarks. Truly profound!

Once again, Li Ao appears committed to emphasizing that the gap between Yan Yuan and Zigong is really one of degree rather than of kind, suggesting that Zigong had even attained “silent understanding” of the sage’s teachings (whereas Han Yu had specifically denied this—a rare instance of inconsistency). Yet even the attainment of “silent understanding” would, in itself, seem still not to have been enough to enable even the most accomplished disciple to “enter the sage’s inner chamber.”

Sagehood beyond learning
11.20

子張問善人之道。子曰：不踐跡，亦不入於室。
韓曰：⋯⋯吾謂善人即聖人異名爾。豈不循舊跡而又不入聖人之室哉？蓋仲尼誨子張，言善人不可循跡而至於心室也。聖人心室惟寂，惟微；無形可觀，無跡可踐。非子張所能至爾。
李曰：仲尼言由也升堂，未入於室。室是心地也。聖人有心，有跡，有造形，有無形，堂堂乎，子張誠未至此。

Han Yu: … I maintain that shanren 善人 (good man) is a different name for shengren 聖人 (sage). Is it likely that in not following old traces one will not enter the sage’s inner chamber? Here Confucius is instructing Zizhang, saying that following [other people’s] traces will not enable them to enter the inner chamber of the sage’s mind. The inner chamber of the sage’s mind is profound and subtle; it has no visible form, nor are there traces one can follow that lead to it. It is beyond the reach of Zizhang.

Li Ao: Confucius said, “You (Zilu) has entered my hall
but has not yet entered my inner chamber." 34 The inner chamber refers to the "mind-ground." 35 The sage has a mind, and also has traces; he has a created form, and is also without form. "Grand indeed though Zizhang was," 36 he had not yet reached this.

Although neither Yan Yuan nor Zigong is mentioned in the two passages of commentary, there is little doubt that their accomplishments were held to be superior to these other disciples. Yet even if Li Ao's comment at 5.9 that, as with Yan Yuan, Zigong had also "glimpsed the inner part of the sage's domain (窺見聖幾)" might be interpreted to mean that they had both glimpsed Confucius' inner chamber (室), actually entering this metaphorical chamber would seem to be different matter. Attainment of this level of understanding required the disciple to abandon traces—the record of those who had journeyed there before one—and to rely on his own mind alone.

Despite this injunction to rely on oneself, one book can still serve as a guide in how to exhaust the mind. According to Li

Ao's commentary to 17.2/3, "as to fathoming principles and thoroughly penetrating one's nature, the Book of Changes is the only way to do this thoroughly." The crucial role of the Book of Changes in assisting one to fathom principles and to penetrate thoroughly one's nature is explained in the following comments:

2.4

孔曰：吾五十而知天命。孔曰：知天命之終始。

韓曰：天命深微至摯，非「原始要終」一端而已。仲尼五十學易，「窮理盡性以至於命」，故曰知天命。

李曰：天命之謂性，易者，理性之書也。先儒失其傳。惟孟軒得仲尼之髓。故盡性章云：盡其心所以知性，修性所以知天。此天命極至之說。諸子罕述其微。

Han Yu: Heaven's decree is profound, subtle and abstruse—it is not merely that aspect concerned with "tracing the origins [of things] and seeking where they finish." 37 When he was fifty Confucius studied Changes. "He realized patterns fully and exhausted the nature to its full extent so as to arrive at the decree." 38

Hence it is said to know heaven's decree.

34 Analects, 11.15.
35 According to Charles Müller's entry in the Digital Dictionary of Buddhism, this Chinese Buddhist concept refers to "the true mind that all sentient beings are originally endowed with. It is the agent and locus for the production of the myriad phenomena."
http://www.him.tyu.jp/-acmul/dictb/db/func/b5fc3-5730.html
36 Analects, 19.16
37 Changes, "Xici zhuan," 8.20a.
Li Ao: “That which heaven decrees is the nature.”

Changes is a book for ordering the nature. Former ru lost its [true line of] transmission. Only Mencius received the profound truths of Confucius. Hence the “Jinxing” chapter of Mencius says: “Exhaust the mind fully in order to understand the nature. Cultivate the nature in order to understand heaven.” This is the doctrine of the ultimate realization of the decree of heaven. Rare indeed was it for the various masters to attain [understanding] of its subtleties.

Three points are worth noting. First, in citing Zhongyong (traditionally attributed to Zisi) and Mencius, Li Ao may well have been alluding to the notion of a Zengzi-Zisi-Mencius lineage, as first articulated by Han Yu when he claimed that Mencius was a student of Zisi and that Zisi’s learning was probably derived from Zengzi. The significance of this “original dao tong” is that it lends authority to Han Yu and

29 Zhongyong 1.

40 Han Yu, “Song Wang Xun Xiucai xu 迤王績秀才序” (Preface Presented to ‘Flourishing Talent’ Wang Xun), Han Changli quanji, 20.9a. Later, the Cheng brothers further developed this idea by declaring that Zengzi alone had transmitted Confucius’ way (dao), which he transmitted to Zisi, who in turn transmitted it to Mencius. See Er Chengji, 二程集 (The Collected Writings of the Cheng Brothers), Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981/2004, vol. 1, 327.

Han Yu and Li Ao’s Lunyu Biji Interpretation of the Analects

Li Ao as commentators. By consistently criticizing the Lunyu jijie commentaries, claiming to be able to discern what Confucius really intended or meant to say, the implication is first that they alone had discerned which historical ru had insight into “Confucius’ profound truths” and second, that they were the modern inheritors in the long ruptured transmission of Confucius’ way.

Second, given their sustained attacks on the Lunyu jijie commentaries, there is some irony in the fact that by also providing a privileged role for Changes in this original dao tong, Li Ao and Han Yu were continuing a development in Analects exegesis initiated by the Lunyu jijie editors. For just as the Lunyu jijie editors had read selected passages from the Analects in the intertextual light of passages from Changes—enabling the Analects to acquire a cosmological grounding it had hitherto lacked—similarly Li Ao and Han Yu employed Changes to provide the metaphysical underpinning for the program of learning they found evidence of in the Analects.

Third, Han Yu and Li Ao clearly anticipate Zhu Xi’s Lunyu jizhu in maintaining that there is a point at which learning and effort become counterproductive. In one passage Zhu proposes that if Yan had lived a few more years he would have become a sage if he stopped making an effort and relied instead on “cultivating” (yang) himself. He uses the analogy of the
alchemical practice of transmuting cinnabar (*tian dan* 煉丹),
describing how when the requisite temperature has been reached
then, rather than increasing the heat, it is simply a matter of
keeping the concoction warm and letting the process effect its
own maturation. In order for transformation to be effected,
ultimately one must draw from oneself, one cannot rely further
on method. Despite his best efforts, his natural gifts, and his
special relationship with Confucius, Yan Yuan did not achieve
sagehood. This is not simply because he died prematurely; rather,
it is because even learning can become an obstacle if it is
motivated by desire. Learning can take one so far; beyond that
one must “get it from oneself” and not from learning. Yet in the
end, Zhu cites not a single example of any ordinary person or
even a single gifted disciple who had achieved sagehood. Neither
did Han Yu and Li Ao.

41 *Zhu zí yuè luì* 朱子語類 (Topically Arranged Conversations of Master
Zhu), compiled by Li Jingde 李鶚德 (*fl. 1263*), Beijing: Zhonghua

Just the Details:
A Wittgensteinian Defense of
*Lunyu* Early Commentarial Practice

James Peterman

顏淵問「仁」。子曰：「克己復禮，為仁。一日克己
復禮，天下歸仁焉。為仁由己，而由仁乎哉？」顏淵
曰：「請問其目？」(*Lunyu* 12.1)

But first we must learn to understand what it is that opposes such
an examination of details in philosophy. (Wittgenstein,
*Philosophical Investigations*, section 52)

Introduction

In recent work in English on early commentaries on

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