POLITICS AND THE MEDIA IN TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY INDONESIA

Decade of democracy

Edited by Krishna Sen and David T. Hill

ROUTLEDGE

Politics and the Media in Twenty-First Century Indonesia

Every political aspirant and activist knows the media are important. But there is little agreement on how an increasingly diversified media operate in post-authoritarian transitions and how they might promote, or impede, the pathways to a sustainable liberal democracy in the twenty-first century. This book examines the role of the media during Indonesia's longest experiment with democratisation. It addresses two important and related questions: how is the media being transformed, in terms of both its structure and content, by the changing political economy of Indonesia after the fall of Suharto? And what is the potential impact of this media in enabling or hampering the development of democracy in Indonesia?

The book explores the workings of democratisation, by examining the role of ethnic identity and nationalism; increasingly cheaper and diversified means of media production, challenging state monopolies of the media; the reality of personalised and globalised media; and the challenging of the connection between a free media and democracy by global capitalism and corporate control of the media. Further, it argues that the dominant forces transforming Indonesia today did not arise from the singular point of Suharto's resignation, but from a set of factors which are independent from, but linked to, Indonesia's internal politics and which shape its cultural industries.

Krishna Sen is Executive Dean, Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of Western Australia, Perth and Fellow of The Australian Academy of the Humanities. Her most recent publications include (as co-editor) *Political Regimes and the Media in Asia* and (co-authored with David T. Hill) *The Internet in Indonesia's New Democracy* (both published by Routledge).

David T. Hill is Professor of Southeast Asian Studies and Fellow of the Asia Research Centre on Social, Political and Economic Change at Murdoch University, Western Australia. His publications include *The Press in New Order Indonesia, Journalism and Politics in Indonesia: A Critical Biography of Mochtar Lubis (1922–2004) as Editor and Author* and (co-authored with Krishna Sen) *Media, Culture and Politics in Indonesia*.

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Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

LONDON AND NEW YORK

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Contributors

Mario Antonius Birowo completed his PhD in the School of Media and Information at Curtin University of Technology, Perth, sponsored by an Endeavour International Postgraduate Research Scholarship (EIPRS), writing a thesis on 'Community Radio and Grass-Roots Democracy: A Case Study of Three Villages in Yogyakarta Special Region, Indonesia'. He completed a Masters degree in Communication Science from Ateneo de Manila University in 1998 with thesis title 'Re-examining Participatory Communication: A Study of Four NGOs in Indonesia'. He has been a lecturer at Atma Jaya Yogyakarta University, Indonesia, since 1993, with research interests which include participatory communication, public health communication and intercultural communication.

Birgit Bräuchler teaches at the Institute for Social Anthropology, Goethe University, Frankfurt, Germany, and was formerly a postdoctoral fellow at the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore. Dr Bräuchler has done extensive research on the expansion of the Moluccan conflict into cyberspace and is editor of *Reconciling Indonesia: Grassroots Agency for Peace* (Routledge, 2009) and author of *Cyberidentities at War* (Bielefeld, 2005: transcript) as well as several articles and book chapters on the globalisation of local conflicts, identity politics, religion and the Internet. Her general research interests are conflict and peace studies, media and cyber anthropology, religion, ethnicity, revival of tradition and culture change. Her regional focus is insular Southeast Asia, in particular Indonesia.

Ignatius Haryanto is a media researcher at the Institute for Press and Development Studies (*Lembaga Studi Pers dan Pembangunan*) based in Jakarta. He graduated from the Mass Communication Department of the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Indonesia, and is currently completing his Masters thesis in Driyarkara School of Philosophy in Jakarta on Intellectual Property. He has published more than 15 books in Indonesian, and contributed to international publications such as *Asia Media Directory*, *Slovenian Media Watch* and *Boletin Digital de Politicas de Comunicacion.* Recently he contributed a chapter, 'Indonesia: Alternative Media Enjoying a Fresh Breeze', (with Shita Laksmi), in Kalinga Seneviratne (ed.) *Media Pluralism in Asia:*

The Role and Impact of Alternative Media (Singapore: AMIC, 2007). In 2005, he took a summer course on 'Intellectual Property: A Comparative Perspective' at Central European University at Budapest.

David T. Hill is Professor of Southeast Asian Studies at Murdoch University, Perth where he is Fellow of the Asia Research Centre on Social, Political and Economic Change. He is the founder and Director of the Australian Consortium for 'In-Country' Indonesian Studies (ACICIS), an international consortium of 20 universities that places foreign students into Indonesian universities for semester-length study programmes. His publications include *Journalism and Politics in Indonesia: A Critical Biography of Mochtar Lubis (1922–2004) as Editor and Author* (Routledge, 2010), *The Press in New Order Indonesia* (Equinox Publishing, 2007), and with co-author Krishna Sen, both *The Internet in Indonesia's New Democracy* (Routledge, 2005) and *Media, Culture and Politics in Indonesia* (Equinox Publishing, 2007).

Rachmah Ida is Senior Lecturer at the Department of Communications, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Airlangga University in Surabaya, Indonesia. She completed her PhD in Media Studies at Curtin University of Technology in 2006, with a dissertation examining the Indonesian television soap opera industry and its consumption by female viewers in Surabaya. She has contributed chapters to several edited books, and is the author of *Image of Contemporary Islam: Representations of Muslim Women in Indonesian Religious Soap Opera* (forthcoming) to be published by the Asian Muslim Association Network and the Asian Research Foundation, Bangkok, Thailand.

Budi Irawanto is Lecturer at the Department of Communication Studies, Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia, where he teaches film studies and mass communication theory and is coordinator of media and information in the Centre for Southeast Asian Social Studies. His areas of interest are visual mass media (film and television), popular culture and cultural identity. Awarded an Australian Development Scholarship (ADS), in 2004 he completed his Masters thesis at Curtin University of Technology, Perth, Western Australia, on the construction of ethnic identity in Indonesian television serials. He is currently undertaking a PhD at the National University of Singapore.

Edwin Jurriëns is Lecturer in Indonesian Language and Culture at The University of New South Wales College in Canberra, Australia. He is author of *From Monologue to Dialogue: Radio and Reform in Indonesia* (KITLV, 2009) and *Cultural Travel and Migrancy: The Artistic Representation of Globalization in the Electronic Media of West Java* (KITLV, 2004), and co-editor (with Jeroen de Kloet) of *Cosmopatriots: On Distant Belongings and Close Encounters* (Rodopi, 2007).

Jennifer Lindsay is Visiting Fellow at The Southeast Asia Centre, Australian National University prior to which she was Senior Research Fellow at the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, after teaching at

the Department of Performance Studies at the University of Sydney. She studied in New Zealand, the United States, and Australia, and has spent 20 years in Indonesia, as student, researcher, diplomat and foundation program officer. She writes on cultural policy, performance, media, translation and language in Southeast Asia and Indonesia, and is a regular translator from Indonesian into English for Indonesia's major magazine, *Tempo*.

Krishna Sen is Dean, Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of Western Australia, Perth, and Fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities. She was formerly Executive Director, Humanities and Creative Arts, in the Australian Research Council, Professor of Asian Media and Director of Media Asia Research Group, Curtin University of Technology, and Fellow of the Asia Research Centre at Murdoch University. She has published extensively on the Indonesian media. Her recent publications include (as co-editor with Terence Lee) *Political Regimes and the Media in Asia* (Routledge, 2008) and (as co-author with David T. Hill) *The Internet in Indonesia's New Democracy* (Routledge, 2005).

Janet Steele is Associate Professor of Media and Public Affairs at The George Washington University, USA. She received her PhD in History from The Johns Hopkins University, and is especially interested in how culture is communicated through the mass media. Her most recent book, *Wars Within: The Story of* Tempo*, an Independent Magazine in Soeharto's Indonesia* (Equinox Publishing and ISEAS, 2005) focuses on *Tempo* magazine and its relationship to the politics and culture of New Order Indonesia. She has published articles on media history and criticism in *Asian Studies Review*, *Indonesia*, *Foreign Policy*, *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, *Political Communication*, *Columbia Journalism Review* and *The American Journalism Review*.

Hapsari Dwiningtyas Sulistyani is Lecturer in the Department of Communication of Diponegoro University, Semarang, Indonesia. She teaches communication theory, research methods, and communication and gender. She is also a researcher in the Centre for Mass Media Studies. Her main area of research interest is media representations of Indonesian women. She received her masters degree in Communication and Cultural Studies from Curtin University, Western Australia with a thesis on the construction of women in post-New Order cinema.

Acknowledgements

The volume had its genesis in a two-day workshop on Indonesian media convened by the editors in October 2006 at the Asia Research Centre on Social, Political and Economic Change at Murdoch University, Perth, Western Australia. With one exception, all of the chapters in this book were initially presented as papers at this workshop. In addition to thanking all the participants at that original workshop, we would like to thank the Centre's Administrative Officer, Tamara Dent and the then Director, Professor Garry Rodan, for their ongoing support both in organising the workshop and during the process of producing this volume.

Additional sponsorship for the workshop was provided by the Australian Research Council's Asia Pacific Futures Research Network, and the Asia Research Institute at the National University of Singapore, where David was a Visiting Senior Research Fellow in 2006. We would like to thank staff from these institutions who provided valuable support for the project. We particularly appreciated the assistance of the Australian Research Council which has supported our research over many years, including that which frames this volume. Wendy Sahanaya provided welcome editorial and research assistance in the preparation of the final manuscript, lightening our load enormously, for which we thank her greatly.

Our greatest expression of thanks goes to the contributors of this volume for their willingness to respond so graciously to our various suggestions for revisions, and importantly for their patience and forbearance through the very long process of bringing this volume to fruition.

Krishna Sen and David T. Hill
Fremantle
14 March 2010

Introduction

Re-forming media in Indonesia's transition to democracy

Krishna Sen

Through much of the twentieth century, the relationship between the media and any form of government – democratic or not – has been seen as more or less axiomatic. In Indonesia, the media has been the site of every momentous transition in living memory. In the early hours of 1 October 1965, General Suharto took over the then only legal radio and television stations in Indonesia to announce his army's ascendency over the so-called communist coup attempt. Thirty-two years later, he announced his resignation and nominated his successor, Habibie, simultaneously on Indonesia's many television channels, beamed across the world to millions of viewers. Since then, every presidential campaign and ballot (four counting the indirect elections of Wahid and Megawati) has taken place in the full glare of television cameras, in itself symbolising the distance that Indonesia has travelled towards democratisation. Put simply, every political aspirant and activist knows the media are important. But beyond the symbolic and the obvious, there is little agreement on how the increasingly diversified media operate in Indonesia and post-authoritarian transitions more generally and how they might promote or impede the pathways to a sustainable liberal democracy in the early twenty-first century.

This book is a collection of essays that tease out ways of understanding the role of the media in Indonesia's longest experiment with democracy. Individually, the papers range over quite different topics – from pornography legislation (Lindsay) to communal strife in Maluku (Bräuchler) to women film-makers (Sulistyani). They are focused however on a particular point in Indonesia's history and engaged with widely held aspirations for democratisation in Indonesia. Together, they answer a common set of questions about the state of the media in post-Suharto Indonesia, and in doing so they provide Indonesia-centred insights into a key question in both media studies and politics: how do we understand the relation between media and democratisation?

Through the 1980s and 1990s, the overthrow of authoritarian governments in Europe and Asia, including Indonesia in 1998, coincided with the dramatic spread of the Internet and international satellite television and produced a flurry of academic and popular analysis of the relation between new media and the collapse of authoritarian rule. The use of the Internet by pro-democracy activists everywhere is relatively easy to demonstrate.[1] And while precise causalities are always hard to

establish in relation to political transformation, it is easy to be swayed by the heroic assumptions about the Internet's capacity to weaken state censorship, spread democratic ideas and eventually bring down the dictator. Observing Indonesia in the last days of Suharto, the editors of this book have argued elsewhere that a diverse range of media practices contributed explicitly and implicitly to the erosion of the New Order.[2] Writing with substantial input from media-savvy activists, we documented 'the crumbling of censorship and the expansion of the media markets'. But we concluded too that 'there can be no simple connection between the erosion of government censorship, the opening up of the media and the establishment of a pluralist democracy as understood in the West.'

Written over a decade after the collapse of President Suharto's 32-year rule, the essays in this book grapple with some of the persistent questions implied in that conclusion. How will the media operate in a post-authoritarian context while the rules and practices of democracy are being constructed? Who controls the content of media texts when the state ceases to censor? As the communal conflicts in Indonesia in the aftermath of the fall of Suharto demonstrate, one group's majority rule may well imply the silencing of another. And so we need to ask: how will journalists and other media practitioners relate to popular but not necessarily unified aspirations for democracy? And what in the end is the value of an open (that is, not state-censored or state-owned) media to the establishment of democratic governance in Indonesia?

The answers to such questions anywhere in the world are empirically complex and theoretically debatable. Extending Mihai Coman's commentary on the studies on post-communist Europe, it could be argued that while the so-called 'third wave' of democratisation (which included Indonesia at the end of its swell)

> have generated an interesting corpus of works and a passionate field for theoretical debates . . . we have to recognise that nothing essentially has happened in media theory: no new theory, no new concepts, no new patterns emerged from the media's evolution in these countries.[3]

There are nonetheless some common grounds within most of this corpus, which are shared by the essays in this volume, and therefore, worth mentioning briefly here.

First, while popular discourse has remained hung up on the 'impact' of the media, academic writing increasingly eschewed any unified notion of 'THE media' including any attempt to understand its 'impact' on politics in any generalised way. Media, even defined narrowly as print and electronic media, are now omnipresent and integrated into every level of political activity. Peter Gross (2002) sensibly talks about the 'media-politics entanglement' rather than as any simple, singular notion of 'media effect'. The articles in this book are a series of attempts to disentangle various points of the intertwining of media and politics in Indonesia after Suharto.

Second, the absence of a coherent theoretical explanation of how the media operates in the process of transition from authoritarianism to democracy and

debates about the diverse pace and process of democratisation through the 1990s[4] underscores the importance of micro-level, careful, empirical studies of media structures, regulations and practices. This is precisely what the essays in this volume provide in relation to the current phase in Indonesia's transition from authoritarian rule.

Third, the euphoria surrounding the democratic potentials of the Internet and satellite television have now been substantially reassessed in the light of the capacity of many states (China and Singapore, for instance) to continue to stop digital content and satellite broadcast from crossing national borders. Further, digital and satellite technologies are now so ingrained into the operations of every other medium that the Internet is implicated in one way or another in all discussions of the media. In that sense, while with one exception (Bräuchler) the papers in this collection do not explicitly discuss the Internet, all media are now in effect 'internetted' – news media draws information from the net, audience surveys are conducted online, television discussions go off camera and on to the station's webpage, and whether I am in Perth or London or Jakarta, I can choose to watch an Indonesian television news broadcast or an Australian one.

At the end of the twentieth century, the Indonesian media emerged out of the state-enforced limits while at the same time new technologies created new spaces and new ways for using the media everywhere. The papers here are about identifying what remains of old practices, and what new practices are emerging. What are the new limits to the capacities of citizens in producing and consuming media in Indonesia? Who sets these limits and why?

These questions and the answers provided are embedded in certain assumptions about the state of Indonesia's democracy, notions of how the media might best serve the progress of democratisation, and indeed what constitutes democracy in twenty-first century Indonesia. All of the Indonesian contributors to the volume are also in different ways participants in the Indonesian media scene and would see themselves as activists for democratisation. The non-Indonesians are also not entirely non-partisan – all have deep connections with the idealist '*Reformasi*' movement – understood as the broad-based critical intellectual and student movement that brought down the Suharto government.[5] With that in mind, this chapter now turns to briefly outlining some of the assessments of the state of Indonesia's democracy which the remaining chapters in this book take for granted.

Democratisation in Indonesia

While most observers agree that Indonesia has moved towards some form of democratic governance[6] since the resignation of Suharto on 21 May 1998, there is substantial disagreement about the progress and nature of Indonesia's democratisation. In 2000, just two years after the fall of the three-decade-old dictatorship, a special issue of the journal *Democratization* on the 'third wave', included Indonesia amongst the 'slowly democratising countries', alongside Bangladesh, Kenya, Mexico and South Korea. 'In these protracted transitions,' said the editorial, 'it appears that democratization is a "war of attrition" of the authoritarian

incumbents and opposition parties over the microinstitutional foundations of the transition.'[7] In a more recent optimistic review of the state of Indonesian democracy in the same journal, Webber[8] suggests that Indonesia's democratisation is progressing relatively quickly and argues that 'contemporary Indonesia has most of the attributes of a consolidated democracy.'

Indonesia's second ever democratically elected President – albeit through indirect election – was installed just 18 months after the resignation of Suharto. Since then, major constitutional reforms have been passed through an elected parliament. For the first time in Indonesian history, after amendments to the Constitution in 2002 the President and Vice President are now elected through direct popular ballot. Substantial decision-making power and fiscal authority have devolved to the district level of government. Special autonomy has been granted to the culturally and physically distant provinces in Aceh and Papua. Elections have been held at all levels and the national parliamentary ones at least have been internationally regarded as largely free and fair. The military's representation in the legislature and the bureaucracy has been curtailed and the doctrine of 'dual function', the ideological mainstay of the military's right to intervene in all aspects of civilian life, has been repudiated. Finally, 'a broad consensus exists between the major countrywide political forces regarding the rules governing ownership of and access to the mass media, the formation and behaviour of associations'.[9]

On the other hand, corruption remains endemic. Suharto died without ever being held accountable for either genocide or corruption. His relatives and his cronies, within and outside the military, have never been brought to justice except in some minor, somewhat symbolic ways.[10]

> Indeed, institutional reform has been erratic. Most of the parties and leaders in place even after the 2004 elections have their roots in the New Order administration and armed forces – not least former general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, chosen as Indonesia's first directly elected president.[11]

While the President has long been seen by voters as relatively 'clean' and reformminded, he was not only a successful career army officer under Suharto but is also the son-in-law of General Sarwo Edhie, the founder of the army's notorious 'special forces'. General Yudhoyono is said to have been one of the officers who planned the attack on the Democratic Party of Indonesia (PDI) headquarters in July 1996 – a move to displace the increasingly popular Megawati from heading an increasingly restless political party.[12] In the early years of *Reformasi*, Yudhoyono's reformist credentials were at best questionable. More generally, as many observers have pointed out, efforts to return the army to the barracks in the post-Suharto period have had limited success. The army retains its vast business network and its territorial structure which means parallel presence of the military alongside every level of civilian authority.

While Suharto is gone, much remains of the New Order's system and personalities which are now being integrated into the emergent institutions of Indonesian democracy. O'Rourke's detailed study of the first four years of *Reformasi*

documents the Byzantine manoeuvres the Suharto era elites went through to defend their position in the face of massive popular demand for change. In their more fine-tuned and highly theorised study of roughly the same period, Robison and Hadiz argue:

> Suharto's New Order was embedded in a complex coalition of interests, embracing the state bureaucracy, politico-business families, corporate conglomerates and commercial propertied interests descending from Jakarta to the regions and small towns of Indonesia. . . . [T]hose essential relations of power and interest, and to some degree even those forces hegemonic under Suharto, . . . have largely survived the collapse of the Suharto regime.[13]

Looking at the details of the workings of the media, the papers in this volume contribute to the assessments of the direction and progress of Indonesia's democratisation. They identify the 'residual'[14] elements of the New Order in structures (Haryanto, Ida), texts (Sulistyani), and practices (Steele, Haryanto). They describe also the 'emergent' structures (Birowo, Haryanto, Hill, Ida), texts (Irawanto, Jurriëns, Sulistyani) and practices (Bräuchler, Jurriëns, Lindsay, Steele).

Like all twentieth-century dictators, Suharto had severely curbed the capacity of the media to operate outside of state control. For activists and partisan observers alike, the removal of censorship, bureaucratic interference and intimidation, crony ownership and complex structures of licensing which scared private media owners into submission were themselves significant areas in the anti-Suharto battle. The media institutions of the New Order are extensively documented and need not be repeated here.[15] While freedom of information and expression may now be part of Indonesia's democratic consensus, as many of the authors in this volume discover, not all emergent structures and practices are necessarily democratic or even less odious than the practices of the Suharto era. More significantly, the sociocultural space occupied by the media is now larger and infinitely more multifaceted than in the heydays of the New Order. To understand, critique and re-form the media to serve democratisation in post-Suharto Indonesia, activists and researchers alike therefore need different questions and analytical tools from those that served them well in bringing down the New Order.

Understanding media in Indonesia at the turn of the century

There is no attempt here or elsewhere in this book to produce a survey of the media in Indonesia. Together, the chapters reveal the main directions and fissures in the media-politics entanglement. This section is a summary of the common understanding about the media from which the individual chapters proceed.

As indicated earlier, the media produced and consumed by Indonesia's citizens are vast and highly diversified technologically, structurally and textually. Just in terms of volume, there are thousands of publishers, hundreds of radio stations and dozens of television stations publishing and broadcasting in almost every language spoken. By some estimates, there may be up to 2,000 illegal radio and television

stations which broadcast regularly but without permit. Media owners range from tiny community radio stations to some of the biggest corporations in the country. On the island of Java, just a few hours of driving might take you from the plush studios of RCTI (Indonesia's oldest privately owned TV station) to a tiny semi-legal station run by a department of local government in East Java. The differences between media outlets in Indonesia are simply mindboggling.

The three chapters which follow each focus on a different region of Indonesia to illustrate the vastly differentiated financial and human resources, and audience reach of media outlets. We have started in the regions deliberately to home in on difference, as diversity itself is to some extent a characteristic that separates contemporary Indonesian media from that of the New Order's *Ancien Régime*. In Suharto's Indonesia, almost every discussion of the media (including most previous work by most of the contributors to this volume) started in Jakarta, the epicentre of media production, its language and, of course, state control. While the developments at the provinces were beginning to challenge Jakarta's monopoly over the messages and images in the 1990s, some of which are documented elsewhere by the editors of this volume,[16] these developments were still relatively peripheral to the 'national' media scene which emanated by mandate, as it were, from Jakarta. By contrast 'provincial' meant relatively localised, relatively small, unsophisticated and so on. In Chapter 1, Ida outlines the trajectory of the two fastest growing media conglomerates in Indonesia. She focuses particularly on the *Jawa Pos Group* which emerged, in the last decade of the New Order, out of the regional capital Surabaya and now has national presence via diversified media holdings publishing and broadcasting 'locally' in dozens of provincial capitals. By contrast, Chapter 2 (Hill) is a review of a very different kind of 'provincial' media – the weak, small, struggling, somewhat ephemeral news media in Papua. Both papers raise questions about the categories of national and regional, habitually deployed in studies of culture and politics in Indonesia under Suharto.

Later in the book, Chapter 4 (Irawanto) describes the working of the mostly small, mainly didactic Islamic magazines, which are national in their aspirations but much less professionalised and poorly funded in comparison to the provincial flagship paper, *Jawa Pos* discussed in Chapter 1. Inspired by, and to some extent drawing its material from, global Islamic texts, some of these magazines are similar in their amateurish production to the community radio in the Yogyakarta Special Region of Central Java, discussed in Chapter 3 (Birowo). In another sense, the Islamic publications and the Minomartani community radio are in stark contrast: the Islamic media are explicitly didactic and seek to bring their readers in line with the global faith while the Minomartani radio station seeks to give a voice to members of the small urban village where it is located.

Together, the first four chapters alert us to the shortcomings of simple dichotomies which have characterised studies of media in Indonesia: national vs regional, commercial vs community and professional vs amateur. It turns out that the media which emerges from the capital with the intent of reaching a national audience (e.g. the Islamic press) can be small, poorly funded and struggling, while media moguls emerge from regional settings (e.g. *Jawa Pos* Group discussed in Chapter

1 and referred to in Chapters 2 and 7) and use the diversity of language and culture to reach mass national audiences and build highly profitable national media organisations, which in turn may be deployed for the financial and political benefit of owners. These Java and Bali-based media groups are national in a fundamentally different way from the national media of the Suharto era, which were monolingual (in the national language of Bahasa Indonesia), Jakarta-based and Jakarta-centric and whose papers usually arrived days later in many provincial areas. The *Jawa Pos* and *Bali Pos* groups publish and broadcast in a range of regional languages, print papers in small towns and are not only attuned, but as Chapter 7 (Bräuchler) shows, engaged and involved in local political and cultural contradictions.

When state censorship is removed, who ultimately controls the content in the media is a moot question in media and communication studies. Who actually shapes the news that we read or hear? In the final analysis, without day-to-day state control over what appears in the media, it is the journalists and the editors who literally 'make' the news and interpret them for the citizen/consumer. But the practice of journalism is itself always determined by operations of a multiplicity of institutions and ideals. Chapters 5 (Steele) and 6 (Haryanto) analyse the key new factors shaping journalism and newscasting in post-Suharto Indonesia.

In a global comparative framework, Indonesia has remained roughly in about the same position since Freedom House started ranking nations on press freedom in 2003. In its most recent survey of press freedom around the world Indonesia is still at 113th (out of 195 countries)[17] alongside Nigeria, well below Philippines and a little above Thailand. Such rankings are, of course, always problematic. But if one assumes that the methodology of the rankings is roughly the same from year to year (and that does indeed appear to be the case), then it would be fair to say that from an international comparative perspective the progress of press freedom as a measure of Indonesian democracy has been unspectacular over the period with which the essays in this book are concerned.

Freedom House's special report on *Countries at Crossroads 2005* starts from the assumption that an 'independent media and independent judiciary are fundamental components of any effort at reform'.[18] The odious licensing regime for the Indonesian press was overturned by President Habibie. The Ministry of Information which implemented the majority of the New Order's legal and extra-legal restrictions on media was scrapped by the next president, Abdurrahman Wahid. The much debated 1999 press laws guaranteed freedom of the press. But under Megawati's Presidency (23 July 2001–20 October 2004), a new Ministry of Communication was back, and the national broadcasting commission, chosen by the parliament and answering to the President, was given the power to shut down media outlets. Despite the controversy around these new institutions, they have been on the whole somewhat ineffectual in either curbing or protecting freedom of expression in the media, either in relation to political news or in terms of cultural and artistic expression. What has constrained and shaped news reporting is not the relatively weak press laws and their lax implementation, but the capacity of powerful business and political interests to use the corrupt legal system and defamation laws that favour the rich and the powerful – what O'Rourke has dubbed the 'ruler's

law' rather than the rule of law. As the latest Freedom House country report on Indonesia puts it, journalists across the country continue to be frustrated 'by legal harassment from powerful politicians and businesses as well as continued attacks against journalists'.[19] While the actual number of court cases is relatively few, high-profile defeats for journalists and media outlets shape the behaviour of both media organisations and individual journalists. Steele takes up particular cases in point in Chapter 5.

While the media in Indonesia are, as indicated earlier, highly diversified and independent, and diversely allied, news outlets provide outstanding coverage of all levels of Indonesian business and government to news aficionados around the world, the majority of urban Indonesians get most of their news from a small number of networked outlets owned by about half a dozen companies. Even in the context of the USA, where the freedom of the press is politically and culturally ingrained, concentration of ownership has been shown to severely curtail the democratic rights and responsibilities of the media – an argument famously encapsulated in the title of McChesney's most cited book, *Rich Media, Poor Democracy*.[20] Empirical evidence of how and how much owners (mostly powerful businessmen who are at some distance from the day-to-day workings of their particular media outlets) control news and analysis is hard to come by in Indonesia and in most other contexts. In Chapter 6, based on interviews with employees in four mainstream, Jakarta-based, national media organisations, Haryanto provides rare evidence of the direct impact of Indonesia's media moguls on the production of news. While Haryanto's argument that owners intervene directly to protect and promote their own financial and political interests is based on a small number of interviews, the very fact that some journalists 'feel' that they are being instructed in particular ways constitutes a constraint on their capacity to report freely not just in the instances where the instructions are given, but in all cases where investigative work is called for. In the context of the 'ruler's law', where job protections are non-existent, salaries are low,[21] the threat of sacking and court cases operate as powerful forces to restrict journalists collectively, and indeed as Steele argues, to shape the very definitions of the profession and its ethics.

Nothing has dominated politics in the first decade of the twenty-first century so much as the issue of communal conflict in the aftermath of the so-called '9/11'. In his foreword to *The Global Public Relations Handbook*, Koichiro Matsuura, then Director General of United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization UNESCO, wrote

> In an age . . . when ill-judged remarks can ignite the tinder box of popular opinion, when stereotyping and stigmatization of 'the other' can suddenly destroy community relations built up over decades, there is a premium on intercultural dialogue within and between societies. There is a corresponding need for sensitivity to these matters by organizations and individuals operating in multicultural, multi-faith, and multi-ethnic environments.[22]

Jennings Bryant in his annual Presidential address to the International Communication Association (the flagship professional body of communication

scholars) identified the development of 'a science of diplomatic communication' as one of three key challenges for twenty-first century communication and media scholars. While the contributors to this volume would not want to delve into the 'east-west' communication models that Bryant posits, the way the media operate in a context of ethno-religious conflict has particular significance in Indonesia's democratic aspirations. The New Order severely circumscribed all reference to communal conflict both in news and entertainment media. As in many other parts of the world, this decade has witnessed a rise in ethnic tensions in Indonesia, some escalating into armed conflicts. Indonesian reformers and media theorists find themselves in a quandary: bans on reporting on ethnic clashes are reminiscent of the Suharto dictatorship; no-holds-barred reporting of news and views may in some cases endanger lives and threaten the very survival of the nation. In Chapter 7, Bräuchler navigates this delicate problem of balancing media freedoms and ethno-religious tolerance in the Moluccas, in the context of one of Indonesia's worst communal conflicts. No generalised answers emerge from her analysis about how the media might behave in conflict, to simultaneously promote peace and free speech. She shows however that while some kinds of media practices can inflame conflict, other practices can help the cause of peace. In this chapter most emphatically, but also in this book more generally, what matters is not the specificities of a medium as such but the agency of those who use it. As Bräuchler shows, the different media technologies run into each other in her particular ethnographic space and the practices surrounding media production and consumption are of central importance in the politics of conflict and their resolution.

The last three chapters are primarily about texts. Chapters 8 and 9 identify new kinds of media texts that have emerged in the post-New Order. Jurriëns (Chapter 8) uses the term 'meta-journalism' to describe the critical discussion about media that takes place in talk-back radio and the plethora of media-watch type programmes. The integration of media criticism into media programming suggests a rise in popular interest in what the media does, and what it should do. Internationally there is now substantial evidence that, in moments of turmoil and political transition, 'citizens are more likely to turn to media as a source of reassurance and information'.[23] The much censored New Order news media evoked widespread mistrust among readers, who as one senior journalist pointed out, learnt to 'read between the lies'.[24] While there is no systematic work in Indonesia on the extent to which the citizens' collective dependence on the media has (or has not) changed, Jurriëns' work suggests that the media is now widely seen as part of a system that needs to be held accountable to the citizens and to democratic principles.

Sulistyani (Chapter 9) looks at the emergence of new representations of women in cinema. This is the only chapter looking exclusively at what might conventionally be regarded as entertainment media. However, the conventional media theory divide between politics and persuasion on the one hand and entertainment and leisure on the other has never held particular sway in Indonesian studies. Television, radio and even popular music, all prescribed and proscribed by earlier regimes, had politicised entertainment in ways that are not obvious in western democratic contexts. I have argued elsewhere that the New Order's stated gender ideology

was overtly and repeatedly inscribed into texts of Indonesian cinema through a variety of institutional mechanisms.[25] Sulistyani documents the transformation of some of those institutional conditions, leading to the emergence of new and more diversely gendered discourses.

In the final chapter of the book, Lindsay pries open the very definition of media by questioning where a representation ends and a social act begins. Analysing the debates over pornography, she finds that both at the level of popular understanding and in Indonesian law, the lines between citizens' behaviour and their representation are repeatedly erased. Baudrillard's argument that in the postmodern period the distinction between representation and reality breaks down has been highly influential in cultural studies in the last two decades. Lindsay documents empirically the precise movements through which the enmeshment of reality and representation are enshrined in Indonesian law.

Pornography is a particularly sensitive issue in the largest Muslim majority country in the world. As Lindsay documents, the new legislation affecting all media and all public action takes place in a context of the most liberal period of sexual discourse in Indonesian art and literature but ironically also during a period of a rising tide of Islamic influence on the state. The last chapter of the book homes in on the critical issue of global politics in the first decade of the twenty-first century: the negotiation between political Islam and liberal democracy, which is not just the rule of the majority through ballot but a fundamental tolerance of difference and diversity in all forms of public behaviour. Together the last two chapters remind us that sex and gender, always at the centre of entertainment media, are never far from the questions about freedom and tolerance which undergird democracy.

Taken together the essays show that the practitioners within the media, as much as the critics and observers, need to learn the new modes of speaking and silencing in Indonesia. Sources of restriction are now more amorphous and criticism harder to target. The essays which follow offer directions along which critical media research might progress in Indonesia.

Notes

1   See S. Gan, J. Gomez and U. Johannen (eds), *Asian Cyberactivism: Freedom of Expression and Media Censorship*, Bangkok: Friedrich Naumann Foundation, 2004; D. Hill and K. Sen, *The Internet in Indonesia's New Democracy*, London: Routledge, 2005, Chapters 5 and 6.
2   K. Sen and D. Hill, *Media, Culture and Politics in Indonesia*, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 218.
3   M. Coman, 'Developments in Journalism Theory About Media, "Transitions" in Central and Eastern Europe', *Journalism Studies*, 1: 1, 2000, p. 35.
4   See Eisenstadt, T., *Democratization*, 2000, 7: 3, special issue.
5   Since the fall of Suharto, *Reformasi* is understood also as the period following the end of Suharto's New Order. Through this book, the term is used in both senses, as a movement and as the post-New Order phase of Indonesian history.
6   Freedom House 2009 report, for instance, ranks Indonesia alongside India as 'free' and scoring 2 in political and civil liberties with the best possible score being 1.
7   T. Eisenstadt, 'Eddies in the Third Wave: Protracted Transitions and Theories of Democratization', *Democratization*, 7: 3, Autumn 2000, p. 4.

8   D. Webber, 'A Consolidated Patrimonial Democracy? Democratization in post-Suharto Indonesia', *Democratization*, 13: 3, 2006, p. 398.

9   Webber, 'A Consolidated Patrimonial Democracy?', p. 399.

10   The only member of the Suharto family to be jailed was son 'Tommy' (Hutomo Mandala Putra) who was sentenced to 15 years jail in 2002 for arranging the murder of the Supreme Court judge who had convicted him of graft. He spent only four years in prison. Of Suharto's cronies, Mohamad ('Bob') Hasan was convicted of fraud in February 2001, and jailed until his parole in February 2004.

11   M.L. Weiss, 'What a Little Democracy Can Do: Comparing Trajectories of Reform in Malaysia and Indonesia', *Democratization*, 14: 1, 2007, p. 36.

12   K. O'Rourke, *The Struggle for Power in post-Suharto Indonesia*, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2002, pp. 12–13.

13   R. Robison, and V.R. Hadiz, *Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets*, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004. p. 12.

14   The terms 'residual' and 'emergent' are borrowed from Raymond Williams' classic work, *Marxism and Literature*. Sulistyani's chapter applies Williams' terms more systematically, though necessarily removed from Williams' epochal deployment of 'emergent' capitalist culture.

15   See D. Dhakidae, *The State, the Rise of Capital and the Fall of Political Journalism: Political Economy of the Indonesian News Industry*, unpublished PhD thesis, Cornell University, Ithaca, 1991; D.T. Hill, *The Press in New Order Indonesia*, Perth: UWA Press/ARCOSPEC, 1994.

16   See Sen and Hill, *Media, Culture and Politics in Indonesia* and Hill and Sen, *The Internet in Indonesia's New Democracy*.

17   All independent nations were listed with some ranked equally, in between 1 and 195.

18   S. Repucci and C. Walker, *Countries at the Crossroads 2005*, accessed 5 October 2006, www.freedomhouse.org/template.cf.?page = 140&edition = 2

19   Freedom House, 'Freedom of the Press' 2009, accessed January 2010 at www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fop/2009/freedomofthepress2009_tables.pdf

20   R.W. McChesney, *Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Policy in Dubious Times*, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1999.

21   A Freedom House survey in 2007 reported that over 60 per cent of Indonesian journalists earned less than US$ 600 a month, which was not enough to cover basic living costs (Freedom HouseMap of Press Freedom, 2008 accessed January 2010 at www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page = 251&country = 7412&year = 2008).

22   K. Matsuura, 'Foreword' in K. Sriramesh and D. Vercic (eds), *The Global Public Relations Handbook: Theory, Research And Practice*, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004, p. xxii

23   M. Loveless, 'Media Dependency: Mass Media as Sources of Information in the Democratizing Countries of Central and Eastern Europe', *Democratization*, 15: 1, 2008, p. 162.

24   Aristides Katoppo, quoted in D.T. Hill, *The Press in New Order Indonesia*, 1994, p. 46.

25   K. Sen, *Indonesian Cinema: Framing the New Order*, London: Zed Books, 1994, especially Chapter 6.

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1 Reorganisation of media power in post-authoritarian Indonesia

Ownership, power and influence of local media entrepreneurs

Rachmah Ida

Since the fall of Suharto, the media in Indonesia have undergone significant changes and become more enmeshed in business. Media companies are more significant economically, with some diversifying into a wide range of non-media businesses.[1] The convergence between information technology, entertainment and education has been creating new businesses that power media growth. On the other hand, as the media become more substantial commercial entities and the power of the media owners grows, the industry may resent the government's regulatory mechanisms, arguing such constraints inhibit the independence of the media and restrict its economic growth. In post-Suharto Indonesia, the interests of business entrepreneurs, including those national media barons nurtured during the Suharto regime, have been accommodated within new alliances and political coalitions.[2] In regional Indonesia, schemes to bolster regional autonomy have enhanced the bargaining position of local business owners.

In the context of increasing regionalism in post-Suharto Indonesia, this chapter looks at the constitution of regional media power and investigates the emergence of new oligarchic alliances, involving particular media owners, at the regional level. Using the instances of regional media in East Java and Bali, I argue that the growing economic power of local media enterprises has changed the nature of its relations with government and society. The chapter is organised into three sections. The first outlines the patterns of media ownership at the national level as a background. The second discusses the pattern of regional media corporations using the cases of the Jawa Pos Group in East Java and the Media Bali Post Group in Bali. The final section focuses on the reconstitution of power and influence of these regional media owners at the regional level.

National media empires: An initial remark

Business and politics are two terms that cannot be separated in my analysis of the media and especially the television industry in Indonesia. Large corporations, particularly those privileged by the New Order regime, continue to control private national TV broadcasting services and to expand their media business at the

national and regional levels. Here I examine in particular the initiatives of two large national media corporations, Media Nusantara Citra (hereinafter MNC) and Surya Citra Media (SCM), in establishing and acquiring local media, particularly in Java.

As discussed elsewhere in this book, the ownership of media in Indonesia remains largely in the hands of the family and cronies of the Suharto regime. Bambang Hary Iswanto Tanoesoedibyo, better known as Hary Tanoe, the chairman of the investment company PT Bhakti Investama, is an important figure in this. Since 2002, Hary Tanoe has held a major share of Bimantara Citra Ltd and been its CEO. Bimantara Citra Ltd holds 100 per cent of PT Media Nusantara Citra (MNC), a holding company for three nationwide private television stations (RCTI, TPI and Global TV), and major print media and radio stations. It is also the principal licensee of three national cable television networks, Indovision, Oke TV and Top TV, and MNC Entertainment, the main supplier of recycled *sinetron* (television soap operas) and music shows for cable TV providers and regional private television stations. Since July 2008, Media Nusantara Citra has created PT Global Mediacom, a holding company that manages all the media and entertainment businesses of PT Bimantara.

After Suharto's resignation, there has been little significant change among the players in the television business. On the face of things, people like Suharto's second son Bambang Trihatmojo and Sudono Salim (also known as Liem Sioe Liong, a close Suharto crony) are no longer major media owners in Indonesia, but they appear to have maintained effective control. It is widely rumoured, for instance, that Hary Tanoe is just 'the extended hand' of Bambang Trihatmojo.

Another case worth scrutinising is Surya Citra Media (SCM) Ltd, which controls the nationwide private TV station, SCTV. Since 2004, the two Sariaatmadja brothers, Fofo and Eddy, the owners of PT Abhimata Mediatama (a company that was jointly owned with Bambang Trihatmojo of Bimantara), have taken over PT Bhakti Investama's shares in SCM and in PT Datakom Asia, a giant media and publishing group set up by Peter Gontha, Bambang Trihatmojo and Anthony Salim (a son of Sudono Salim) from the Bimantara Group. In addition, PT Citrabumi Sacna, owned by Henry Pribadi, sold its 25 per cent share to PT Abhimata Mediatama. PT Indika Multimedia, owned by Sudwikatmono's (Suharto's foster brother) son, also sold its 14.42 per cent share to PT Abhimata, making PT Abhimata the main shareholder of Surya Citra Media, the holding company of SCTV.[3] However, Suharto's second daughter, Titiek Suharto (through her joint share with Sariaatmadjaja's brothers) and Suharto's grandson, Dandy Rukmana, remain members of the SCTV shareholder board.

These two major media networks have initiated the establishment of a network of television and radio stations in regional Indonesia. MNC, in collaboration with Satria Naradha's Media Bali Post Group, has established a local network Cakra TV (PT Mataram Cakrawala Televisi Indonesia) in Semarang, Central Java. Tanoe, through his MNC, has collaborated with local entrepreneurs in Surabaya and Malang to establish several new local TV and radio stations. In April 2008, I discovered, in documents submitted to the Regional Broadcasting Commission of

East Java (*KPID Jatim*) by PT Kalimahakam Citra Radio and PT Kalimahakam Media TV, that these two media companies were linked to the MNC Group of Global Mediacom Ltd.[4] PT Kalimahakam Citra has acquired PT Cakra Awigra, owner of the radio station SCFM (formerly controlled by the SCTV Group) and renamed it Trijaya FM Surabaya.

In its submitted documents, PT Kalimahakam Citra proposes to change the name of Trijaya FM to Citra FM and introduce a new programme format. In addition, PT Kalimahakam Rajawali also proposes to launch its local private TV station KMTV in Surabaya. In order to pre-empt government regulation of network TV (as stipulated under the 2002 Broadcasting Bill No. 32/2002), PT Kalimahakam Media TV is being positioned by MNC to be a local Surabaya station of RCTI. In Malang, a three-hour drive from East Java's provincial capital Surabaya, the MNC Group has bought shares in several local Malang TV stations such as *Malang Pendidikan TV* (in which MNC holds 40 per cent of the shares), Malang Global TV (20 per cent), and Malang Rajawali TV (30 per cent) (PT Kalimahakam Media's KPID Jatim Proposal, April 2008). Another private Surabaya TV station, SBO TV established in 2007, is one of the Jawa Pos Group's TV stations, and also affiliated with MNC Group. These tangled webs of media ownership which began to emerge in the last decade of the New Order[5] have come to dominate and shape the entertainment industry in the post-Suharto era.

Another new fast-growing media corporation in post-Suharto Indonesia is Trans Media Corporation Ltd controlled by Chairul Tanjung. Tanjung is the CEO of Para Group, whose major business is in the banking sector. Trans Media Corporation manages two nationwide TV stations, Trans TV and Trans7.[6] Para Group's businesses are varied, ranging from media to retail banking, franchise coffee shops (*The Coffee Bean & Tea Leaf*) and ice cream (*Baskin Robbins*), and distribution of global brands (*Guess*, *Mango*, *Zara*, *GAP*, etc). It was rumoured that Tanjung is also a front man for Salim's businesses. However, he clarified that he simply had some joint businesses with the Salim family, including several companies in Singapore.[7] Tanjung is also close to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's inner circle. In 2007, Tanjung coordinated several entrepreneurs, including the well-known Indonesian business moguls Anthony Salim and James Riady, and senior government officials to launch the '*Visi Indonesia 2030*' (Indonesian Vision 2030) project which mapped out how Indonesia could achieve 'developed' status by the year 2030. Tanjung chaired the project and since then he and his team have become unofficial Presidential advisors.

The pattern of media ownership in Indonesia remains unchanged in the sense that particular Chinese-Indonesian capitalists[8] (e. g. Hary Tanoe, Fofo Sariaatmadja and Sudono Salim) are essentially funding the industry while their capital is secured by *pribumi* (indigenous) patrons within the bureaucracy. In 1986 Robison pointed out that the Chinese investors had become central to the general economic process in Indonesia and for the larger indigenous capitalists, by offering both 'revenue and corporate and commercial infrastructure'.[9] The economic and political alliance between Chinese capitalists and the larger indigenous owners in the television business remains a vital component in determining the pattern of ownership.

Bakrie Brothers, another media business player, is owned by Aburizal Bakrie, the Social Welfare Minister under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Bakrie is chairperson of *Golkar*, the political party which held power throughout the New Order and which has survived as a key player in the post-Suharto political landscape.[10] His son, Anindya Bakrie continues to dominate shares in two national private TV stations: ANTV and TV One.[11] PT Cakrawala Andalas Televisi, the holding company of ANTV, repositioned its station after being required by its creditors to roll over its US$ 157 million debt. ANTV was relaunched in April 2003 with a refocussing from youth to family television. Since September 2005, Star TV Asia, owned by Rupert Murdoch, has taken a 20 per cent share of Cakrawala Andalas Televisi. ANTV and TV One broadcast programmes supplied by *Star World Asia*, *Discovery* and *National Geographic* channels.

As these cases illustrate, when government interference in the private television sector lessened and regulations eased, major business players have utilised the opportunity to create a market environment that advantages existing players. The Broadcasting Bill No. 32/2002, article 18 does regulate the system of ownership and limit the concentration of media ownership. Yet, both the government and the Indonesian broadcasting commission (KPI) which is charged with regulating broadcasting, seems to turn a blind eye. With members of the public more preoccupied with the powerful effects of media content (like sex, pornography and violence), the risks from media concentration and its political consequences are generally overlooked, remaining a concern of a handful of specialists who are aware of the extent to which such an oligopoly exists in Indonesia.

Studies on the political economy of media in the west have offered some analysis of how the large media corporations increasingly control the media, and are seen to weaken the role and rights of the society.[12] Many studies in the west have also demonstrated the significant influences of the large media corporations in setting the political agenda of a nation. McChesney shows that the increasing media concentration in the hands of a few large corporations in America has become a crucial problem for the western capitalist 'free' media's role in production and reproduction of democratic processes in the country.[13]

Looking at the pattern and activities of a few powerful Indonesian media magnates, some of whom are also influential supporters of, even the main actors in, a major political party I believe that a similar argument can be made in Indonesia. The most prominent of such indigenous media owners, as loyal supporters of the *Golkar* party, continue to play a role not only as owners of capital, but also, to borrow Robison's term, as 'dealers in political concessions'.[14] Thus media ownership remains in the hands of the dominant political and economic players, and their ideology of media marketisation acts as a barrier to the development of alternative broadcasting services and democratisation of the media. The space for democratising media practices is reduced when the channels for public discourse necessary to media reform are controlled by those for whom such practices would be a threat. As such, the relationship between the ownership of media and their political opportunism in the country is pervasive. A similar pattern of concentration is replicated at the local level. It is to the rise of the so-called 'little kings'

(*raja-raja kecil*) of regional media in East Java and Bali in post-Suharto Indonesia that I now turn my attention.

Regional media ownership

The transition from authoritarian rule towards a new democratic system in Indonesia has been accompanied by a process of decentralisation, strengthening regional autonomy. Although the benefits of this shift from centralised to decentralised government remain debatable, the legislated devolution of authority increasingly to regional-level government has enabled these regional governments to set wide-ranging rules and policies. Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry Van Klinken explain, 'The weakening of the central states does not automatically result in more local democracy. On the contrary, decentralisation can under certain conditions be accompanied by new forms of authoritarian rule'.[15] The reorganisation of power relationships at the regional level, thus, involves a complex process of renegotiation of boundaries between various levels of power and sociopolitical and cultural arrangements. The following section discusses the regional-level media industry, mainly after Suharto's fall, and how the major regional media owners are defining and contesting power in the context of these regional autonomy provisions.

The expansion of regional autonomy has opened up the possibility for development of more local commercial media. Local and community newspapers, radio stations and television channels competing for local audiences with local content have been established by both local governments and local media business groups. The initiative to establish local media institutions is supported by major private (mostly oil) companies located in provincial areas, and by individuals, especially those with prior interest in local media and other business.

Local entrepreneurs have acted as regional 'little kings' and started to expand their power by building local television stations in several regional provinces as is the case with Satria Naradha, CEO of *Bali Post* daily and the private local TV station, Bali TV. Bali Post is the largest daily in regional Bali and Lombok and was set up by Ketut Naradha, Satria Naradha's father. The success of Bali TV inspired Satria Naradha, with his holding company Media Bali Post Group (*Kelompok Media Bali Post*, KMB), to expand and invest in other regional private television stations in Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Sumatra. Adopting the business collaboration pattern of Hary Tanoe, Satria Naradha has collaborated with local media entrepreneurs in these provinces to establish his own media network, while always placing his representatives (Balinese males) alongside the local TV executives. These stations include Yogya TV in Central Java, Cakra TV in Semarang, Central Java (with MNC of Hary Tanoe), Bandung TV in West Java, Balikpapan TV in East Kalimantan, Makassar TV in South Sulawesi, Sriwijaya TV in Palembang, South Sumatra, Surabaya TV in Surabaya and Aceh TV in Aceh. In 2007, when I visited three of these local stations (namely Aceh TV, Makassar TV and Yogya TV) they were relaying afternoon and evening news programmes from Bali TV.

In addition to TV stations, Naradha's Media Bali Post Group controls several other media businesses, including commercial radio and print. In Bali, the group

controls three newspapers, namely *Bali Post*, *Denpost* and *Bisnis Bali*, and manages the two commercial radio stations Global FM and Radio Genta. The Media Bali Post Group was considering the launch of another local station, Bali Music Channel TV (BMC TV), but this initiative was cancelled when Naradha fell out with prospective investment partners in the venture. Now, Bali Music Channel TV is controlled by the SUN TV network, part of Hary Tanoe's Media Nusantara Citra (MNC).

Much larger than the Media Bali Post Group is the Jawa Pos Group of Dahlan Iskan, which has expanded into almost every major regional city in Indonesia. The Jawa Post Group, based in East Java's capital Surabaya, is the second largest press empire in Indonesia.[16] *Jawa Pos* daily paper was established as a family concern in 1949, but when it was about to collapse in the early 1980s,[17] Dahlan Iskan, then a journalist with the leading news magazine *Tempo*, was brought in to manage it. Within a decade, Iskan had changed the company into one of the country's top twenty enterprises.

Iskan now controls more than 140 companies spanning the archipelago under his *Jawa Pos News Network* (JPNN). JPNN is Indonesia's largest newspaper network with more than 80 regional dailies in major towns and sub-districts across the country from Aceh to Papua. The Jawa Pos Group also manages 40 printing networks, dozens of weekly tabloids, paper factories and non-media businesses in fields as diverse as hotels, travel agencies, real estate, transportation and power plants in East Java and East Kalimantan provinces.

Since 2002, the Jawa Pos Group has also established local private television stations in several provinces. Jawa Pos TV (JTV, also dubbed Jawa Timur TV or East Java TV) in Surabaya was its initial entry into local television. JTV's reception area includes greater Surabaya and almost all of East Java, but it can also be accessed in other parts of Indonesia using a parabola dish and via the cable television service *Indovision*. In mid-2008, to expand the Jawa Pos Group, Iskan launched Jawa Pos Media Corporation (JPMC), a holding company for all his local TV stations. By 2009 there were 15 local private TV stations in JPMC, spanning the country.[18]

In addition, Iskan has initiated local media corporations in several provinces. For instance, Media Riau Pos Group (MRP) is a holding company for two local TV stations, Batam TV and Riau TV, and local dailies such as *Batam Pos*, *Pos Metro Batam* and *Riau Pos*. Since 2005, Iskan has also established Fajar Media Corporation (FMC) in Makassar, South Sulawesi, which controls the province's *Fajar Pos* daily and Fajar TV. The executive director of Fajar Media Corporation, Alwi Hammu is a close contact of former Vice President Jusuf Kalla. To support the operation of these publication networks, Iskan has also built branch offices in each province, housed in a building known as Graha Pena (the 'Pen House'), with Graha Pena buildings now in Surabaya, Jakarta, Makassar, Kendari, Palu and in other major provincial cities that are home to his regional newspapers.

The foregoing accounts of the Jawa Pos and Bali Post business empires suggest that one of the consequences of regional autonomy in post-New Order Indonesia has been the growth of new regional media business groups and networks. These

flourishing businesses have privileged both Naradha's and Iskan's positions within the provincial economy and politics. Robison and Hadiz[19] suggest that as central state power fragments after the New Order, the regional elites and institutions are rising as 'important players'. The fruitful businesses of both the Jawa Pos Group and the Media Bali Post Group are instances of the emergence of what Robison and Hadiz call 'new oligarchic alliances'. The following section explores the new interaction between these regional media proprietors and regional government.

Power and influence of local media entrepreneurs

The involvement of two local *pribumi* media owners and their enterprises in the activities of regional government are symptomatic of a new form of coalition between political entrepreneurs and business interests in the regional context. Robison and Hadiz examine two 'broad scenarios' with regard to the survival power of oligarchy in post-New Order Indonesia. First, they suggest that the oligarchic power nurtured under Suharto's regime might continue as the basis of new forms of alliances and money politics and reorganise within 'a new, more open, and decentralised political format'.[20] Second, they suggest the possibility that former forces will be 'swept aside by new coalitions of political entrepreneurs and business interests', who are mainly regional and local. Taking a cue from these scenarios, this section explores how the so-called 'local oligarchic' organisations might emerge in the contexts of the Jawa Pos Group and Dahlan Iskan in East Java, and the Media Bali Post Group and Satria Naradha in Bali.

Iskan is one of three most influential business owners in East Java province alongside Alim Markus, owner of PT Maspion Group (electronic production and retail) and Halim Gunawan, owner of PT Gudang Garam (cigarette production). McMichael[21] writes that Chinese business interests still largely control private sector enterprises in East Java province.[22] Alim Markus and Halim Gunawan are among those Chinese families, which include Ciputra's (Citra Raya Group), Gondokusumo's (Dharmala Group), Alexander Tedja's (Pakuwon Group) and Harry Susilo's (Sekar Group), as predominant business players in the East Java economy. The only 'non-Chinese' business player with similar economic power is Dahlan Iskan. Iskan and the Jawa Pos Group draw advantage from their close relationship with the East Java government which is keen to see *pribumi* businesses succeed in the province.[23]

The attitude of the East Java government towards Iskan has privileged him in his personal relationships with the regional elites. The Governor of East Java (2004–8), Imam Oetomo, was keen to see *pribumi* businesses prosper in his province. Earlier, in 1999, Iskan was appointed CEO of the East Java province corporation, PT Panca Wira Usaha Jatim (known as Wira Group), a holding company controlling more than 55 East Java government businesses.[24] Iskan accepted the position of CEO offered by the Governor, but insisted on not being paid for the job. In 2004, Iskan asked to resign as the CEO of Wira Group as a result of a controversy. PT Percetakan Puri (Puri printing company), one of the branch companies of PT Panca Wira Usaha Jatim, failed to fulfil satisfactorily a

provincial government order to print the admission test papers for the civil service entry exam in November 2004. Despite that formal request to resign, he remained Wira's CEO. Iskan was also involved in a business venture of the East Kalimantan provincial government when he encouraged that government to collaborate with one of his companies to build a power plant there to alleviate the province's electricity shortage. In 2005, the governor agreed to the initiative on the condition that Iskan be appointed CEO of the regional government-owned company, as he has been in East Java.

Apart from these provincial government businesses, Iskan has also been involved in several activities of the municipal government of Surabaya. First in 2001, through his company PT Kya Kya Kembang Jepun, Iskan initiated, and was appointed as the project convenor responsible for, the redevelopment of Kembang Jepun Street, where the former *Jawa Pos* office is located. The plan was to develop the area into a lively Chinatown and an evening hawkers' food market. PT Kya Kya then became the managing company and the sole contractor for the Kya Kya Chinatown project. However, after Iskan had left his position in PT Kya Kya, the project was not managed well. The Surabaya city administration took over the management of the project, relocating it in May 2008 to Kapasan market in the eastern part of Surabaya.

Second, Iskan was also an influential actor in the political process of the Surabaya government, when he supported one candidate in the June 2005 Surabaya mayoral election (known as PILKADA). In coalition with Megawati Sukarnoputri's Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) Iskan sponsored Arif Afandi, former chief editor of his *Jawa Pos* newspaper.[25] Iskan's financial support for Afandi included buying air time on talk shows and other forms of advertisement on JTV for the campaign by Afandi and his running mate, the incumbent Surabaya mayor, Bambang Dwi Haryono. Iskan's efforts succeeded and Afandi was elected deputy mayor of Surabaya. Iskan confesses in his book,

> I cast my vote on the election day for the Mayor of Surabaya. My subordinate, Jawa Pos's editor in chief Arif Afandi, was running for deputy mayor partnering the mayoral candidate, Bambang D.H. I had to vote for him as an expression of my support to my subordinate.[26]

As Robison and Hadiz[27] suggest, since the electoral system in Indonesia has been reformed, the local parliament (DPRD) has become a crucial site for the proliferation of 'money politics' during elections for *bupati* (district head) and mayor. The case of Dahlan Iskan and the Jawa Pos Group described earlier provides an instance of a media baron's involvement in the electoral money politics.

Dahlan Iskan is not the only local media owner who takes an active part in the social, economic and political dynamics of their region. The CEO of Media Bali Post Group, Satria Naradha has also become one of the most influential community figures in Bali. He has promoted the establishment of local television throughout Indonesia. In Denpasar in July 2002, Naradha founded and was the first chairperson of the Local Television Association (*Asosiasi Televisi Lokal*

Indonesia, ATVLI). His determination to challenge the domination of nation-wide private television broadcasters and his work to strengthen local media to serve local audiences, have made him popular in many sections of the community.

Since Naradha has argued repeatedly for the need to embrace the modern world without losing one's traditional cultural identity, he is depicted in the Indonesian media as a Balinese-nationalist. His idealism in promoting the importance of local identity, especially for the Balinese, and their culture has been remarkable.[28] For Naradha, the success of local TV stations like Bali TV (and his other local TV stations outside Bali) depends on their capacity to bring the richness of local cultural sites and practices to the screen and to mobilise local cultural products to challenge the dominance of centralised (Jakarta-based) 'national' television stations. Naradha was the main proponent of the notion of *Ajeg* Bali[29] (roughly translated as 'Bali standing strong'), a cultural and economic movement aimed at creating a Balinese cultural renaissance which he popularised through his media. His critics regarded his popularisation of *Ajeg* Bali as merely a sales pitch of Media Bali Post Group.[30] Naradha's pride in being Balinese was fully compatible with his commitment to the unity of the Republic of Indonesia. For example, in March 2006, on behalf of Balinese media and press communities, in his restatement of opposition to the Jakarta government's pornography bill, Naradha declared 'Bali will never betray Indonesia, we will never secede. Instead, we shall fight to the end any group that is trying to subvert the nation into a monolithic society based on the teaching of one single religious belief'.[31]

As an influential local entrepreneur, Naradha has established the regional Krama Bali Cooperative *(Koperasi Krama Bali*, KKB) for small and middle Balinese enterprises.[32] This initiative has been supported both by the Governor and district heads (*bupati*) in Bali, all of whom joined KKB. In March 2006, KKB, which is under control of Media Bali Post Group holding company, opened a huge electronics and mobile phone market in Kuta, Bali.[33] In addition, together with the National Education University of Bali (Undiknas), Media Bali Post Group has established a programme to reconstruct the Balinese economy through a series of training and educational courses for those small and middle enterprises.

Thus, both Iskan and Naradha provide examples of the alliances at the provincial level that lay the foundation for the post-New Order power structure. Decentralisation has made possible the emergence of these so-called local 'little kings' who are increasingly able to exploit the discourse of regionalism to acquire major national political and economic advantages.

Conclusion

It is notable that the pattern of local media corporations and their local political and economic roles in post-authoritarian Indonesia have mirrored those at the national level. While the Suharto-era media moguls, their children and close friends still control the media corporations at the national level, strong local media entrepreneurs have started to stretch their tentacles to establish their media and non-media businesses in provinces beyond their own. Indeed, as liberalisation

and the growing market-orientation of media have become part of the euphoria of democracy in Indonesia, the concentration of media ownership in the hands of a few people seems not to have attracted the attention of either the government or the media regulatory bodies. Therefore, media corporations have become a crucial site for the proliferation of money politics at the national, regional and local levels.

Large media players in Jakarta have utilised their institutions to shape the course of political events for their own interests. Surya Paloh and Aburizal Bakrie, for example, used their media during their 2004 and 2009 national presidential campaigns. By comparison, the big local media owners appear to be less direct with their political intentions at the regional level. However, the foregoing discussion bears further witness to Robison and Hadiz's argument that 'There now appear to be great opportunities for the emergence of local oligarchies fusing local business, bureaucratic and business interests in diffuse, predatory networks of patronage'.[34]

Notes

1   K. Sen and D. Hill, *Media, Culture and Politics in Indonesia*, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2000.

2   R. Robison and V.R. Hadiz, *Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets*, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004.

3   P. Iswara and M. Wijaya, 'STW Communications lepas SCTV*'*, *Koran Tempo* 25 October: 2004, p. 12; Sudibyo, A., *Ekonomi Politik Media Penyiaran*, Jakarta: LKIS, 2004; Widiyanto, 'Siapa Pemilik Televisi Indonesia?', *Bisnis Indonesia*, 8 March 2006.

4   I became aware of these documents when I was a member of the public hearing forum set up by the Regional Broadcasting Commission of East Java (*KPID Jatim*).

5   Sen and Hill, *Media, Culture and Politics in Indonesia*.

6   Trans 7 was previously TV 7 managed solely by PT Duta Visual Nusantara. PT Duta Visual Nusantara is a subsidiary company of the Kompas Gramedia Group (controlled by media mogul Jakob Oetama), whose interests include printed media, book publishing, and book stores, and whose reputable daily paper, *Kompas* has been the market leader for decades (see Hill, 1994).

7   *The Business Times*, Singapore, ('Man With The Midas Touch', 26 January 2008) reported that Chairul Tanjung held '18th spot in the 2007 rankings of Indonesia's richest by Forbes Asia magazine, and 15th in Globe Asia's rankings'. See http://sophiesworld-sophiesworld.blogspot.com/2008/01/indonesian-with-midas-touch.html, Last accessed 30 September 2009.

8   Chinese capitalists have long played a significant role and have been essential to the general process of capital accumulation and economic growth in Indonesia. See Robison, *Indonesia: The Rise of Capital*, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986 and Robison, R. and V. R. Hadiz, *Reorganising Power in Indonesia*.

9   R. Robison, *Indonesia: The Rise of Capital*, p. 317.

10   The classic study of Golkar is David Reeve, *Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System*, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985.

11   The Bakrie Group has joined with Eric Tohir of Mugi Rekso Abadi (MRA), the newly emerging owner of *Republika* daily and franchisee of several glossy international magazines, to take over Lativi station, which was owned by Abdul Latief, the former Minister of Labour under Suharto.

12 H.I. Schiller, *Culture Inc.: The Corporate Takeover of Public Expression*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

13 R. McChesney, *Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Policy in Dubious Times*, Urbana: University of Illinois, 1999, p. 3.

14 R. Robison, *Indonesia: The Rise of Capital*, p. 363. In addition to Aburizal Bakrie and Eric Tohir, these influential indigenous media owners include Surya Paloh, CEO of Media Indonesia Group.

15 H.S. Nordholt and G. van Klinken, 'Introduction' in H.S. Nordholt and G. van Klinken, (eds) *Renegotiating Boundaries Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia*, Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007, p. 1.

16 Sen and Hill, *Media, Culture and Politics in Indonesia*, p. 58.

17 D.T. Hill, *The Press in New Order Indonesia*, Perth: University of Western Australia Press/Murdoch Asia Research Centre. 1994, p. 90.

18 They are JTV (Surabaya) with its 11 relay stations across the country, Jak TV (greater Jakarta), Fajar TV (Makassar, South Sulawesi), Riau TV (Pekanbaru, East Sumatra), Batam TV (Batam, Sumatra), Pal TV (Palembang, South Sumatra), Pajajaran TV or PJTV (Bandung, West Java), Jambi TV (Jambi, Sumatra), SBO TV (Surabaya), CB Channel Depok (Jabodetabek, West Java), Padang TV (Padang, West Sumatra), Malioboro TV (Yogyakarta, Central Java), MK TV (Jakarta) and Pon TV (in Dahlan Iskan's home town of Pontianak, East Kalimantan). Interview with Ali Murtadlo, director of JTV Surabaya, September 2007.

19 Robison and Hadiz, *Reorganising Power in Indonesia*, p. 224.

20 ibid., *Reorganising Power in Indonesia*, p. 225.

21 H. McMichael, *Economic Change in East Java: Balance Development or Skewed Growth?* Working Paper No. 85: 1–19, Perth: Asia Research Centre Murdoch University, 1998, p. 6.

22 In a media interview, Iskan once described himself as a marginalised person who always lives on the borderline between Muslim and Christian, between Chinese and *pribumi*, between politics and business, and between social and sporting activities. ('Dahlan Iskan: "Saya Sosok di Perbatasan"' *Republika*, November 11, 2001, p. 7.)

23 McMichael, *Economic Change in East Java*, 1998.

24 See 'Dahlan Iskan, "Saya Sosok di Perbatasan".' *Republika*, November 11 2001, p. 7.

25 The links between local media and local politics in the 2005 round of elections (including in Surabaya) are explored in David T. Hill (2009) 'Assessing Media Impact on Local Elections in Indonesia' (pp. 229–55) in M. Erb and P. Sulistiyanto (eds), *Deepening Democracy in Indonesia? Direct Elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada)*, ISEAS: Singapore, 2009.

26 D. Iskan, *The Joy of Agony: Surviving of and Gaining from Life Hardship and Liver Transplant*, Surabaya: JP Books, 2007, p. 104.

27 Robison and Hadiz, *Reorganising Power in Indonesia*, p. 246.

28 M. Hitchcock and N.D. Putra, *Tourism, Development and Terrorism in Bali*, England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2007.

29 The *Ajeg* Bali ('Bali standing strong') campaign was initiated by Naradha's media corporation, the Balinese government, politicians and *adat* (traditional customary) communities in Bali, who wanted to preserve Balinese cultural heritage. However, *Ajeg* Bali has been criticised by some Balinese academics and intellectuals as being fundamentalist and politically biased. I. Ngurah Suryawan discusses *Ajeg* Bali in '*From cultural tourism to Ajeg Bali: A genealogy of Balinese cultural and political change*,' an unpublished paper presented at the University of Tasmania, Launceston, 16–18 December 2005. See also Rhoads (2007) on the discourse of *Ajeg* Bali as a Hindu-Balinese identity.

30 Hitchcock and Putra, *Tourism, Development and Terrorism in Bali*, pp. 173–74.

31 As quoted in I. Wayan Juniartha 'Balinese Reiterate Opposition to Pornography Bill', *The Jakarta Post*, 16 March 2006, p. 6. On the pornography bill, see Lindsay's contribution to this volume.

32 'KKB Diharapkan Jawab Tantangan UKM' *Bisnis Bali*, 21 June 2005. Available http://
    www.bisnisbali.com/2005/06/21/news/perbankan/kkb.html (accessed 10 September
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33 'Saatnya Bali Garap Sektor Perdagangan.' *Denpost*, 15 March 2006. Available http://
    www.denpost.net/2006/03/15/nusa.htm (accessed 10 September 2006).
34 Robison and Hadiz, *Reorganising Power in Indonesia*, p. 247.

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2   On the border

Local media in the land of Papua

David T. Hill

Introduction[1]

That the dramatic fall of Indonesian president Suharto in May 1998 was accompanied by equally wide-ranging changes in the Indonesian media industry has been much discussed. Less evident is the fact that the complex transformations experienced by the media nationally have not necessarily been uniform across the archipelago, nor uniformly positive where they have been felt. While ending the New Order requirement for strictly controlled 'publication permits' and the opening up of local media markets to new players might have stimulated greater competition and a diversity of voices in some regions (such as Manado), it remains to be seen whether the economic, political, cultural and security conditions are such as to convert media reforms and liberalisation into a successful democratising force throughout the archipelago.[2]

Clearly, the forces prevailing vary enormously from region to region. This chapter contributes a case study of how these changes have operated in one of the most politically sensitive areas of the Indonesian nation, a region questioning the core terms of what it might mean to be part of a post-Suharto Indonesia. With the exception of Aceh in the archipelago's other extreme, and West Timor in the nation's centre, the 'land of Papua' (*tanah Papua*) represents Indonesia's most politically sensitive border area, where the post-New Order state maintains many of the practices of its more authoritarian predecessor.[3] Implementation of post-Suharto regional autonomy provisions enhancing the capacity of local officials to exercise greater authority, hand-in-hand with the continuing substantial military presence attempting to eradicate an independence movement, and the particular extreme formulations of the local economy (where multinationals extract enormous wealth alongside an essentially subsistence economy within an impoverished communications infrastructure) combine to create a unique context for the development of local media.

A September 2006 report by the respected International Crisis Group (ICG) opened with the warning that 'No part of Indonesia generates as much distorted reporting as Papua'.[4] It addressed a string of widely-held assumptions about political conditions in Papua, testing the extent to which they were, or were not, well-founded. While the ICG report makes no specific comment as to whether local

media are free to report politically controversial events, its heavy reliance on local press articles (to document, for example, the rise of Papuan nationalism/separatism, the mobilisation and internal configuration of Papuan politics, the demonstrations and violent clashes between civilians and security forces, the trials and sentencing of those brought to justice) provides one indicator – albeit impressionistic – of just how much has changed since 1998. Such topics would have been taboo in Papuan media during the reign of President Suharto.

Despite – or perhaps because of – the political sensitivity of research concerning Papua, studies about the media there are few.[5] To supplement such evaluations, this chapter will sketch the political history of Papua before attempting an overview of the emergence of local media in the territory (with an emphasis on the provincial capital Jayapura), highlighting those aspects of media development which may differ from the more common experience elsewhere in Indonesia. The latter part of the chapter examines the politics and policing of Papuan media since Suharto in the light of the specific problems faced by the industry in this challenging, politically-charged border region. Papua's very fluid politics and highly contested relationship with the rest of Indonesia create a constantly changing media. The following details primarily describe changes till 2005, but what emerges is a media in flux. That some of the individual media described later no longer exist simply underscores the very instability which is a hallmark of media on the border.

Political background to Papua

A simple sketch of the inhospitable terrain, low (and declining) educational levels, and limited public infrastructure of Papua insinuates predictable challenges to be faced by its media. The land mass of Papua covers some 42,198 square kilometres, divided along a backbone of towering mountain ranges and deep jungle valleys, inhabited by less than 2.35 million people.[6] Eryanto and Stanley point to the extremely low educational levels in the territory; the statistics for 2003 indicate that, of the population in the age group of 15 years and above, nearly 39 per cent had either never been to school or had not completed primary education, a noticeable increase on the 35.6 per cent in 2001. The territory had less than 20,000 kilometres of road (that is, about one linear kilometre per two square kilometres), of which only about 25 per cent were asphalted by 2002.[7]

It is impossible to separate developments in contemporary Papua from the peculiarities of its colonial history. While the Dutch colonial state claimed the entire western half of the island of New Guinea from 1848, in practice Dutch presence was rare and its involvement minimal. Yet when Indonesia declared independence in 1945, the Dutch refused to concede West New Guinea, retaining authority over the territory until Indonesian nationalist claims and rising international pressure made Dutch retention untenable. After American intervention, the Dutch surrendered control to Indonesia in 1963 pending an 'Act of Free Choice' in 1969 administered by the United Nations but widely disputed as a sham. After the initial incorporation of Dutch New Guinea into Indonesia, the western half of

the island of New Guinea was referred to in Indonesian initially as 'Irian Barat' (West Irian) and after 1973 as 'Irian Jaya' (Victorious Irian). It was administered as a single province, with its capital on the north coast called initially Hollandia, then Sukarnopura and most recently Jayapura.[8]

A low-level independence movement, spearheaded by the Free Papua Organisation (*Organisasi Papua Merdeka*, OPM) has maintained a dogged opposition to Indonesian incorporation. As the ICG noted,

> Pro-independence sentiment is widespread, thanks to poor governance, a sense of historical injustice, a feeling of cultural and racial difference from the rest of Indonesia and chronic low-level abuse, extortion and indignities on the part of security forces. [. . .] But organised political activity in support of independence is fractious, prone to ethnic divisions and lacking in strong leadership.[9]

After the fall of Suharto, as part of a broader reconfiguration of Indonesia's provinces, in 1999 a law (No. 45) was passed by parliament to divide the territory into three new provinces (to be known as Irian Jaya, Central Irian Jaya and West Irian Jaya). It was met with strident opposition from Papuan nationalists who believed the subdivision would fragment Papuan identity and undermine the push for special provincial autonomy, or indeed independence. As a concession to the assertion of Papuan identity, the planned subdivision was cancelled and, in 2001, President Abdurrahman Wahid officially changed the name of the province from Irian to the preferred local name, Papua. A measure of the enduring schisms and tensions, both within the broad coalition of Papuan nationalists and between those often-fluid alliances and the Jakarta central government, can be gleaned from the fact that in January 2003 President Megawati Sukarnoputri revived the plan to subdivide Papua and established the new province of West Irian Jaya (though the planned third province of Central Irian Jaya was not created). Pending direct elections for a new governor planned for 2004, President Megawati installed an acting governor in the capital Manokwari in November 2003.[10] Finally, after Megawati's fait accompli, in March 2006 two separate polls were held to elect new governors in each of what are now regarded as two separate provinces.[11]

'Historical injustice and chronic low-level abuse on the part of security forces' have been Papua's lot since its incorporation into Indonesia.[12] The ICG believes 'Post-Soeharto governments have made efforts to acknowledge and redress Papuan grievances, and the human rights situation has certainly improved with democratisation, but serious abuses still occur, and officers responsible are seldom held accountable.'[13] Significantly, the ICG argues 'No extrajudicial tactics have been employed by the Yudhoyono administration'.[14] It is noteworthy that in Papua, as had been happening since 2005 throughout the rest of the archipelago, in 2006 for the first time direct elections took place for both provincial governors and district heads, with the result that both governors (of Papua and West Irian Jaya provinces) and all 29 districts heads are indigenous Papuans.[15]

Local media

Media, whether local, national or transnational, still remained a luxury in Papua almost a decade after the fall of Suharto. For those who did have access to communications media, it was axiomatically the 'old' media of print, radio or television. Satellite dishes to receive television broadcasts were evident, dotted across the rooftops of lower middle-class neighbourhoods and across the business districts of Jayapura during a visit in 2005. By contrast, the 'world wide web' remained largely illusive. The first public Internet café in Jayapura only opened in 1998, prior to which barely a handful of citizens or organisations wealthy enough to have their own computers and modems were able to connect to the Internet.[16] In January 2005, there were only three Internet venues in the Jayapura environs, each with less than a dozen computers. Even for those middle-class locals who were gaining access to Internet and email, lack of English-language fluency presented a hidden barrier for many to participate actively in such global communication.[17]

While there were a raft of Internet sites dedicated to news about Papua – such as the 'Diary of Online Papua Mouthpiece' (Do-OPM) which was 'run by The Collective Editorial Board (CEB) Based [sic] all over the world, and coordinated from the Jungles of West Papua New Guinea Island',[18] 'Papua Press Agency' at http://www.westpapua.net/,[19] the Melanesia News[20] and 'Papua Web'[21] – these seemed predominantly managed from locations abroad. There were also mailing lists and discussion group sites (like 'www.kabar-irian.com' and the Yahoo group 'free-papua'),[22] though, given the paucity of Internet access points locally, it would be reasonable to assume too that these were primarily used by people outside of Papua itself.[23]

Print media

Papua's geography of deep valleys separated by high mountain ranges presents an intimidating barrier to the easy distribution of print media. Even in the capital of Jayapura, it was rare to find a newspaper seller hawking their wares along the streets as might be common in many other parts of Indonesia, particularly in provincial capitals. To find a reasonably complete selection of local publications in Jayapura in 2005, purchasers had to visit one of a handful of rudimentary news agencies. Beyond the city, distribution of newspapers was poor, and largely dependent on air cargo, which was expensive and often infrequent.[24] Added to this impediment were extremely low educational levels – and consequent literacy levels – in the territory. But statistics suggested the community was polarising with both increasing lack of education at one end side by side with growing numbers of tertiary students on the other. The number of students attending the only state university in the territory, Cenderawasih University in Jayapura, nearly tripled over a decade from 3,730 in 1993 to 11,063 in 2003.[25]

Despite hurdles, there was a buoyant and diverse locally-produced print media in Papua, largely centred in the capital Jayapura. Publications could be categorised broadly into those published daily (which tended to be broadsheets), and

those published either weekly (usually tabloids) or less frequently (including in A4 magazine format). To illustrate these developments and the diversity of commercial publications, let us examine five papers in some detail before mentioning briefly some of the prominent or less frequent periodicals.

Tifa Papua

The modest Rp 4,000 tabloid *Tifa Papua* did not stand out from the half-dozen other similar weeklies on the news-stands of Jayapura, but this publication produced by the Catholic Press Foundation was the direct descendent of Papua's first printed periodical. The Dutch-language *de Tifa* (named after the Papuan drum, 'tifa') was started by a Franciscan friar, Monsignor Oskar Cremers, on 22 April 1956 to promote missionary activities to the general public. Initially printed in The Netherlands until the Jayapura diocese obtained its own printery, in 1962 the publication went bilingual, introducing Malay sections. The following year it changed its name to *Tifa Irian*, switching content entirely to Indonesian. It emerged in its current format with a further name change to *Tifa Papua* in 1999.[26] Although still published by the Catholic Press Foundation, it was housed in the Journalists' Centre of the Papua Branch of the Indonesian Journalists Association (*Balai Wartawan PWI Cabang Papua*) and its content was secular. Despite being the first issue of the publication's fiftieth year, the initial edition for 2005, for example, featured a soccer story on the front page, together with three photo boxes highlighting stories concerning national identity and integration, the need for a 'pro-active' press, and a local libel case.[27]

A cursory examination of the paper's 16 pages indicated one of the primary dynamics operating within the Papua media: virtually all of the space devoted to recognisable 'advertising' (that is, in which the appearance, typeface or layout flags it being other than editorial or featured content of the paper) appeared to be sponsored by institutions or individuals associated with government. The first issue for 2005 illustrated the extent of this. One entire page, headlined 'Papua Develops', was an acknowledged advertorial for the Papua Regional Communication and Information Board (BIKDA). Another page was filled entirely by an advertorial 'Developing Sarmi District' and a quarter-page ad sending Christmas greetings from the Sarmi District government. Elsewhere, there were quarter-page 'Christmas greetings' ads from the City of Jayapura government, the Papua Provincial Assembly, a half page from the Jayapura District government, and a similar half-page ad from the management and staff of *Tifa Papua* itself. All the government-related advertisements noted the names of the chief administrative officers of those entities. In total, three of the 16 pages were government-related advertorial or explicit advertising, with another half page advertising the newspaper itself, compared with only one quarter-page ad for an external business: a local general store. More than 90 per cent of the externally-funded advertising (including advertorial) space in the paper came from government sources, of one level or another.

This is not to imply that government advertorials do not have a valuable function. 'Papua Develops' (mentioned earlier) outlined the provincial government's

report to the President on the damage wrought by a major earthquake off the territory on 26 November 2004. It described what had been done, and continued to be needed, in order to rehabilitate the population and the infrastructure adversely effected.[28] 'Developing Sarmi District' provided a summary of a report by the district head (*bupati)* to the local government evaluating the performance of that level of government over the previous year.[29] But the paper's heavy reliance on government advertising revenue and sponsorship placed it potentially in a dependent relationship.

While the amount of government-related advertising space in *Tifa Papua* may be greater than in some other papers, media reliance upon government patronage through this form of advertising revenue is common in the territory. That this was so evident in *Tifa Papua* was partly due to the fact that this publication was explicit in indicating which articles were associated with particular government sources, by clearly 'badging' those sections of the paper. Nonetheless, whether such government-related advertising space was badged or unacknowledged (as was more commonly the case), very few of the local publications had a sufficiently broad advertising base to be immune from potential government financial pressure.

Cenderawasih Pos

The most financially secure newspaper in the territory was the *Cenderawasih Pos* (known locally as *Cepos*), which first appeared in March 1993, making it Papua's first daily newspaper. Its heritage reaches back to the 1950s when a weekly, *Cenderawasih*, began publishing with Indonesian support as part of the propaganda war being waged between the Indonesian Republic and the Dutch colonial state of West New Guinea. The weekly appeared sporadically until the arrival of the Surabaya-based Jawa Pos Group (JPG) in 1993, which injected capital, equipment and staff, converting the erratic weekly into a regular daily broadsheet.[30] When the Jawa Pos Group moved into *Cepos* in March 1993 Abdul Munib, from the central Javanese town of Brebes, was appointed managing editor. One of only three staff with previous media experience, Abdul Munib had previously established his reputation as a journalist with the national magazine, *Prospek.*[31] He quickly became regarded as one of Papua's most experienced journalist professionals and went on to make an indelible imprint upon the development of the region's print media.

In all, the JPG despatched about 15 staff from the Group's East Java base to Papua to provide the driving force behind the fledgling *Cepos*. Bringing in colour printing and Internet facilities dramatically changed the appearance of the local press, and proved a major turning point in the development of the media in Papua. While previous publications concentrated mainly on church or local news, *Cepos* was able to tap national and international sources for both news and sport, providing a wider range of contents. Its resemblance to the 'national' newspapers originating from Jakarta, which up till then had to be flown in several days after publication, marked it out as a 'new', 'modern' style of publication, yet additionally infused with local stories and perspectives.

Initially without any local competitor dailies, *Cepos* established itself quickly in the marketplace, despite the fact that a variety of factors, including lack of staff experience, technical and printing difficulties, meant that the paper often appeared late. As the paper's first managing editor, Abdul Munib, joked, 'We were dubbed the morning paper that published in the afternoons'.[32] With the passage of time and greater experience, the enterprise became more reliable. Of the original imported staff, virtually all have since departed, replaced by those newly recruited in Papua.[33] In January 2005 *Cepos* Director, Nurul Hidayah, claimed a very respectable circulation of about 10,000 copies, with a cover price of Rp 4,000 and distribution throughout most of the major towns of Papua, including Merauke and Biak.[34] The paper employed about 25 journalists in a total staff of about 40 and, with its links to the JPG, was able to attract some – albeit only a relatively small amount of – advertising nationally through a staffer based in Jakarta. Progressive increases in the numbers of pages (from 12 to 16 in August 2003, and to 24 in July 2004), while maintaining about 30 per cent of the space for advertising, suggests the venture was able to expand the advertising base gradually.

On the paper's masthead, *Cepos* proudly asserted its claim to be 'the first and largest daily paper in Papua', and increasingly covered not simply Jayapura news but the breadth of Papua. *Cepos* management dedicated individual pages of the paper to key regional centres, adopting a practice used throughout the *Jawa Pos* Network by dubbing these pages regional '*Radar*' (as in '*Radar Sentani*' or '*Radar Biak*'). As the market strengthened in particular provincial towns, these '*Radar*' were inaugurated as separate subsidiary newspapers within the 'Cenderawasih Pos News Network' (CPNN) modelled on the highly successful progenitor, the *Jawa Pos* News Network (JPNN). Thus, just as Cepos was one of 81 papers in the JPG, by the middle of 2006 it too had its own network of subsidiary papers, with *Radar Timika*, *Radar Sorong*, *Fakfak Express* and *Manokwari Pos* in four of the major provincial towns. All publications were linked to the *Cepos*' Internet site – the only Internet site maintained by a Papua-based paper – which appeared (in September 2009) to be regularly maintained and up-to-date, with a downloadable pdf version of each page of the day's print edition.[35]

After the post-Suharto reformist government removed the stringent publication permit requirements that had presented often insurmountable barriers to the opening of new and politically independent newspapers, Papua experienced a substantial growth in local media. Many of the newly emerging publications were staffed by former journalists from either *Cepos* or *Tifa*.[36]

Papua Pos

The first post-Suharto paper in Papua was established on 5 April 1999 by Abdul Munib who left *Cepos* with several colleagues to start the weekly *Irja Pos*. It went daily that September, subsequently changing its name to the *Papua Pos*. Thus for the first time in the history of the territory, there were two daily papers in Jayapura competing for local readers.

At Rp 4,000, the 12-page black-and-white *Papua Pos* was a mid-range broadsheet, with a better newsprint quality than later cheaper competitors. Describing itself as a 'general daily' (*harian umum*), with a motto 'Because of our unity we are strong' (*Karena Persatuan Kita Kuat*), it featured strongly local items on its front page (with both of the lead items on the day selected featuring the province's governor, J.P. Solossa, illustrated by photographs of him) with a scattering of national news. The prominence given to the governor may have been related to what appeared to be the newspaper's financial collaboration with the regional government, which sponsored one full page of the publication. Page 11 featured a large headline banner 'Information from the Provincial Government of Papua, in collaboration with the Papuan Province Regional Communication and Information Board'.[37] Included were articles on the governor distributing financial support to various religious organisations in the province, and another on how the Regional Communication and Information Board was disseminating information about Papua's 'special autonomy' within the Indonesian state. In addition to such acknowledged government-sponsored 'advertorial' space, more than one and a half of the paper's 12 pages were devoted to advertising. Such advertisements included illustrated government health service information on AIDS and illicit drugs, hotels, airlines, computer, motorcycle, car dealerships, medical services, shoes, florists and boutiques, and mini-classifieds. Apart from the sports and celebrity/gossip pages, there was no international news. The paper encouraged readers to send criticisms or suggestions to the editors by SMS and gave the mobile phone numbers of the editorial staff.

Bisnis Papua

A split within the *Papua Pos* led to the exodus of its indefatigable editor Abdul Munib, who in July 2004 established *Bisnis Papua*, a daily broadsheet with the motto 'This is the time for economic thinking' (*Saatnya berpikir ekonomi*).[38] With a cover price of Rp 3,000 (making it amongst the cheapest daily papers in Jayapura), it was published by PT Media Bisnis Papua, a company headed by businessman Yusuf A. Kamaluddin and associated with the local chamber of commerce (KADIN Papua) in whose building the newspaper's office was located. *Bisnis Papua*'s orientation was towards commercial and business news, focussing on local news and events. It included a diverse range of advertising, almost exclusively from local businesses such as photographic or motorbike dealerships, restaurants, hotels, pharmacies and air charter firms. There was also a small section of about a dozen 'pay-by-the-line' classified ads. Total advertising coverage remained less than one of the paper's eight pages. The newsprint and print quality of the black-and-white publication was poor and much of the reporting appeared to rely heavily on official government announcements, policies or events. Yet the existence of a specialised business and commercial daily in a market such as Papua's was a significant publishing achievement and suggested a growing segmentation (and confidence) in the media sector.

Pasific Pos

With its motto 'Independent, well-mannered and responsible' (*Independen, Santun dan Bertanggungjawab*), the eight-page *Pasific Pos* was another of the Rp 3,000 daily broadsheets published in Jayapura for a very small readership.[39] It was established at the end of 2004 when a split occurred within the *Papua Pos*. The paper, published by PT Mediana Papuana under company director Suroso, brightened its otherwise rather bland black-and-white appearance with a pink tinge highlighting particular features. It managed to snare a reasonable share of local advertising, featuring (in the selected edition) advertisements by hotels, banks, airline companies, house rentals, local radio stations, furniture, photography, mobile phone, electrical and computer shops, and tyre dealerships. Articles covered a broad range of topics, with a mixture of local and national news on the first two pages, followed by separate pages for south Papua, Jayapura, Economy and Business, other regions of Papua, Arts and Entertainment (including international celebrity gossip from Hollywood and Bollywood), with Sports taking the back cover.

In addition to the publications discussed previously, there were also a string of tabloids which appeared less frequently. These included the weekly *Mimbar Rakyat* [People's Forum] (of which the motto was 'Thinking critically and objectively', *Berpikir Kritis dan Obyektif*, Rp 5,000); the fortnightly *Kamasan* ('giving facts without sensationalism', *Mengungkap Fakta Tanpa Sensasi*, Rp 4,500), both of which appeared to have been established in 2004; and the 'news tabloid' *Detikpos Papua* ('articulating undercurrents', *penyambung arus bawah*, Rp 3,500), published every ten days from 2003. One of the most innovative of these was *Suara Perempuan Papua* (*Voice of Papuan Women*, a fortnightly which began in mid 2004 with the motto 'Women and Change', *Perempuan dan Perubahan*).[40] *Jubi* (*Jujur Bicara*, Speaking Honestly) was established in August 1999 by a forum of local non-government organisations (*Foker LSM Papua*), under the editorship of Mohammad Kholifan. This 16-page weekly tabloid combined critical journalism and social activism, but conflicts within the collective that backed the paper led to its disappearance in 2004, only to re-emerge under a re-organised editorial collective in August 2007.[41] While the rapid rise and fall of newspapers typified much of Indonesia's post-Suharto press, with stiff competition and slender profits if any, in Papua such turnover has become the norm.

Radio

If the rugged geography of Papua presents a virtually impenetrable barrier to the widespread distribution of print media, such terrain may appear more hospitable to successful electronic media, which is less reliant on land or air transportation. Although building and maintaining a broadcasting station is no easy challenge when all equipment must be flown in, radio involves relatively straightforward transmission technologies not dependent upon daily transportation infrastructure. In contrast to the Jawa Pos Group's incursion into the Papuan press, it appeared that no national conglomerates had begun to invest in Papua's radio. However, as it did with print, the Church played a major formative role in pioneering radio. Unlike

with print, the Indonesian government (through the Department of Information and the military) played a more overt role.

In 2003 there were eight radio stations (apart from the state broadcaster, RRI) in Jayapura. The oldest, Suara Kasih Agung (SKA), associated with the Christian 'Paulus Foundation', began broadcasting in 1973 initially using the transmitter of the Jayawijaya Military Regional Command (*Kodam*) but equipped with its own facilities since 2000. During the 1990s the Department of Information set up Tabora Broadcasting System (TBS) radio, but this was closed in 1998 as part of the post-Suharto reforms. After 1997 there was something of a boom in local radio in Jayapura with seven of the eight non-RRI stations appearing since then, with five of those starting up after the post-Suharto media reforms.[42]

Eryanto and Stanley had grave concerns regarding the state of radio in Papua for, while Jayapura was well served by these eight stations, most districts lacked any local station (although exceptions in 2002 included Biak, Merauke, Nabire, Fakfak, Serui and Timika).[43] Beyond this, only the national network of Republic of Indonesia Radio (RRI) was audible. More recently, the Media Development Loan Fund (MDLF) and the Jakarta-based Radio News Agency 68H helped build several modest local stations in isolated districts previously not serviced by radio.[44] The first, Radio Matoa in Manokwari, commenced broadcasting in December 2003. It was established by a limited liability company, PT Gunung Meja Media, which brought together NGO activists, local investors and media workers, with initial establishment and operating costs supported by the external institutions.[45] The station broadcast local talk shows on issues of particular interest (such as the formation of the Papua People's Assembly, or the strategy of the Jakarta government to subdivide Papua into three separate provinces) and played an important role in voter education prior to the first direct elections for provincial governor. In the view of 68H head, Santoso, the radio station demonstrated its value to the local community by regularly updating them on the elections, which were postponed on several occasions while conflict raged over those for and against the proposed subdivision.

Similarly, in March 2005 Radio Merbau commenced broadcasting in the tiny settlement of Bintuni, served by only five kilometres of roadway, yet it was the site of a massive (US$ 3.4 billion) international gas-drilling operation. Santoso noted that '*Radio Merbau* is the only media, the only information bridge between the multi-million dollar natural gas project in Tangguh and the local communities living around it.'[46] The station immediately demonstrated its value by broadcasting voter education programmes and discussions with the various candidates in the elections for district head (*bupati*). Radio Pikonane in Anyelma in Papua's Central Highlands, followed suit in December 2007, powered by a micro hydropower generator located in a nearby river to overcome the absence of any existing electricity source.[47] Such stations provided instantaneous broadcast throughout reasonably dispersed reception areas. The independent Radio News Agency 68H provides them (and more than a dozen others throughout the territory) with a regular supply of quality news and current affairs programming, including material produced by local reporters. Faced with onerous challenges such as maintaining equipment

and catering for a widely scattered audience with low per capita buying power and thus little appeal for commercial advertisers, the stations have been innovative in generating income by, for example, charging for song requests, government announcements, bereavement notices and sponsored programmes.[48]

After the fall of Suharto and the liberalisation of the media nationally, the government abandoned the legal requirement for all radio stations – whether government or private – to relay news bulletins from RRI. In Papua, however, the practice lingered on for several years as both local government officials and radio broadcasters were unsure about breaking with the past. Agitating for stations to grasp the opportunities to start their own news services was AJI, but it took till about 2001 for stations to launch their own regular news programming. Radio journalists then began to adopt the practices of their print colleagues, such as regularly attending press conferences and reporting on diverse news stories. AJI Papua also encouraged the establishment of the Alliance of Papua Radio as a sectoral lobby group to provide a forum for such interests. By 2005 the Alliance included as members the majority of local stations, (including Voice of Papua, Move, Art FM, Gita Radio), although not all chose to participate (with Radio Cyclops, and two Protestant stations, Radio Suara Nusa Bahagia and Radio Swara Kasiogo, remaining unaffiliated).[49]

Television

While a variety of national (Java-based) stations are received across Papua via satellite, in 2005 the only television organisation which actually had a physical presence and produced programmes locally was the national network *Televisi Republik Indonesia* (TVRI), which had a station in a hillside suburb of Jayapura.[50] Initially, after its establishment in 1976, Jayapura facilities merely relayed programmes produced elsewhere. Such relay facilities were gradually extended until there were 23 relay stations across Papua with a broadcast reach over approximately 40 per cent of the population.[51] More significantly in 1993, Jayapura was equipped with production facilities and began producing limited programming for both local broadcast and (occasional) contribution to the national TVRI network, via Jakarta.[52] TVRI's national content was determined centrally, with Jakarta providing virtually all programmes, either from those produced in Jakarta or contributed by other regional stations to the national pool.[53] Most staff were locally employed, but in 2005 senior positions were still held by non-Papuans (mainly from Manado or Makassar).

The fall of Suharto and consequent change of policy within TVRI meant that from 25 December 2000, TVRI Jayapura no longer had its programming determined by Jakarta. It could broadcast whatever it wished, but was given no additional budget. The station did develop a daily local hour, featuring Papuan cultural items along with local news. 'Papua Lens' (*Lensa Papua)* was first broadcast in December 2002 with substantial sponsorship from the provincial government. In 2005 TVRI Jayapura regarded 'Papua Lens', broadcast daily at 5.30 p.m., as its most popular programme, watched by an estimated 70 per cent of Jayapura TV sets.

The programme broadcast on 6 January 2005 provides an example of content. The first half hour contained about 20 minutes of local songs by four musical groups, with a ten-minute biblical commentary by a local Christian minister.[54] At 6 p.m. there was ten minutes of local information and news (with items including a protest against results in the public service entrance tests, labourers at the Jayapura port protesting about wage rates, Chinese business people and community groups raising money for tsunami victims and the military installation at Sentani celebrating New Year with social events). A ten-minute interlude with a song by a local theological college choir and a public health service announcement about dengue fever followed. The final ten minutes may be loosely categorised as 'ceremonial' news including reports about the Papua provincial branch of the All Indonesia Workers Union (SBSI); a meeting of an insurance company; the Jayapura mayor's presentation to a seminar on social problems and his visits to various local schools; a meeting of the government women's organisation (*Dharma Wanita*); and the governor's participation in preparations for the 150th anniversary of the arrival of the Christian gospel in Papua.[55]

Such content seemed innocuous enough but the station was free to run items on any news it regarded as newsworthy and in doing so, occasionally raised the ire of the military. One confidential media industry professional claimed that phone calls from the security authorities – usually detectives from the intelligence services (*reserse intel*) – objecting to particular television news items continued at much the same rate as during the Suharto period: about once every couple of months. But this source noted that, on the positive side, the national political reform movement of 1998 had the effect of making government figures and local parliamentarians more accessible and more subject to scrutiny.

Television played a prominent role during local direct elections across Indonesia.[56] Debates between candidates for the gubernatorial elections were also televised in Papua and exposed the strains of the campaign. Mietzner observed that Golkar candidate, John Ibo (who was the Chair of the provincial Parliament), exposed his fraying temper, denouncing the moderator of that televised campaign debate as biased.[57] Yet in Papua television appears to have been less pivotal than might have been the case for other provinces in candidates' image-creation since, as Mietzner notes, a deputy *bupati* from the central highlands district of Puncak Jaya, Lukas Enembe, came within a whisker of victory 'despite poor performances in the televised debates with his rivals', ultimately losing to Barnabas Suebu, who having served as Irian Jaya governor (1988–93) under Suharto, was far better known.[58]

Politics and policing of media in Papua

The media in Papua face a variety of challenges, some common across the archipelago, others more unique and acute. Such problems may be divided into those which are politically-related and those which are derived from economic and infrastructural constraints.

In 2001 Papuan journalist Neles Tebay, a correspondent for the national English-language daily *Jakarta Post*, compared styles of writing about Papua with the

musical forms of Javanese gamelan orchestra and Papuan *tifa* drum (which is held in the hand of a single dancing musician). He observed that '*gamelan* news reporting is orchestrated, while *tifa* reporting cleverly skirts around central government control'.[59] It was no coincidence that he cited the weekly *Tifa Papua* as an example of this Papuan *tifa* style of journalism.

Tifa had honed its skills during the New Order but the transition to a more liberal regime was not automatic. In July 1999, as Human Rights Watch recounts, the publication was prevented from publishing for two weeks because of its forthright coverage of a controversial 'National Dialogue' on special autonomy.

> The article which particularly upset the authorities . . . was one which had appeared in June, which reported that military officials had provided a busload of Indonesian prostitutes to troops from neighboring Papua New Guinea (PNG) after the latter had secured the release of Indonesian hostages who had been abducted by OPM guerrillas and taken into Papua New Guinea in May.

Tifa reported that 30 prostitutes had been provided to the PNG troops by an Indonesian intelligence officer, Colonel Saragih.[60] Incensed, Saragih pressured officials in the territory's 13 districts (*kabupaten*) to cancel advertising and subscriptions to *Tifa*, which he claimed was pro-OPM. He then contacted *Tifa*'s printer, Tinta Mas, and two other presses in Jayapura, directing them not to print the tabloid. It took a fortnight for *Tifa* to find another printer prepared to do the job, ironically the regional office of the Department of Information (which suggests something of the fraying of New Order discipline).[61] Human Rights Watch observed 'No other newspaper in Irian Jaya, however, commented on the two-week disappearance of the region's oldest newspaper, a clear indication that the press in Irian Jaya still felt itself to be operating under the shadow of military control.'

In their 2002 study of the semantics of Indonesian media reports regarding Papua, Kirksey and Roemajauw noted the extent to which the mainstream media during the New Order had to refer to the loci of Papuan identity (such as the *Organisasi Papua Merdeka*, OPM, 'Free Papua Organisation') not with their self-referential nomenclature but with 'symbolically charged acronyms that were imposed by the Ministry of Information' (such a *Gerombolan Pengacau Liar*, GPL, 'Wild Terrorist Gang'; or *Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan*, GPK, 'Security Disturbance Movement') intended to 'paint Papuan aspirations as illegitimate'.[62] Such terms were commonly used by publications in Papua, such as *Cenderawasih Pos* and *Tifa Irian* during the New Order, although adoption of denigrating terms did not necessary imply that such media were not conveying contrary subaltern messages.[63] While the fall of the New Order enabled an opening up of the accepted terminology for such loci in the media (both within Papua and globally) – to the extent that Kirksey and Roemajauw observe that the self-referential term OPM was more than twice as prominent as denigrating alternatives in the mainstream Indonesian media – they believe 'the legitimacy of these [self-referential] names continues to be challenged'.[64]

Far from the likelihood of external and international scrutiny, in Papua intimidation of journalists, and political interference from local authorities and political parties constituted an ever-present threat to the operations of an open and independent media. In one example, on 24 November 2001, rocks were thrown through all the windows of the Jayapura office of the Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI) in the middle of the night in what AJI Papua chief, Fritz Ramandey, interpreted as retaliation for reports written by AJI members.[65] AJI, the most significant politically-independent organisation of Indonesian journalists, had been established in Java in 1994. The Papua branch formed in 1999 with about 18 members, growing by 2005 to more than 40, mostly in print media but several in local radio stations.[66] The organisation lobbied for better working conditions and higher wages. In 2002, for example, there was a brief strike at *Cepos* which gained a basic wage increase. But AJI office bearers risked being the target of attack.

More commonly, however, intimidation was targeted directly at journalists. In one particular example, reported by AJI, actions by the major shareholder of the local *Timika Pos* triggered a nasty confrontation in April 2006, when staff went on strike in protest against the appointment of a new politically-aligned editor-in-chief. Owner Silvana Kristina, who held 65 per cent of the paper's shares, had appointed Baharudin to the key editorial position despite staff opposition to what they regarded as a political appointment. Baharudin was the district chairperson of the Golkar Party, and staff were concerned that he would leverage his editorial position to support party candidates in the forthcoming 2006 local district elections. Staff concerns were exacerbated by the fact that Baharuddin's younger sister was married to the incumbent district head (*bupati*), Klemen Tinal, and that, Baharudin, who was also the manager of a local bar and discothèque, had a poor record in the media, having been sacked as editor-in-chief of the Jawa Pos Group's daily *Radar Timika* in 2004. Striking staff occupying the newspaper's offices were subsequently attacked by a mob of about 50 hoodlums, reportedly led by a local Golkar cadre, while the police chose not to intervene.[67]

On occasions the police are instigators of attacks on journalists rather than merely neutral or inactive bystanders. The Indonesian Television Journalists Association (*Ikatan Jurnalis Televisi Indonesia*, IJTI) and AJI extracted a public apology from the Deputy Head of the Public Relations Division of the national police after condemning the local mobile police (*Brimob*) for physically beating four television and print journalists in Papua in March 2006. Police spokesperson Anton Bahrul Alam apologised, stating that 'the victims have been met by a team from the Papua regional police [*Polda Papua*]. Their treatment and the cost of their damaged equipment has [sic] been reimbursed by the Head of the Papua Regional Police.' He indicated an internal investigation was being undertaken into the incident and stressed that the police leadership did not order the beating and greatly regretted it.[68]

Some attacks on journalists have ended up in local courts. Metro TV journalist, Muhammad Imron was punched at the Sentani airport in December 2005 while interviewing Papua's Governor Solossa, about starvation in Yahukimo district. His assailant, Elly Auri, the provincial government's head of protocol, felt the

journalist was treating the governor disrespectfully. The attacker apologised through the media, but was nonetheless found guilty of assault and sentenced to one month's jail on a two- month good behaviour bond.[69] Such outcomes were not common. The danger of physical attack upon journalists is not unique to Papua, with AJI convinced mob violence and thuggery represent the greatest threat facing Indonesian journalists.[70] As a possible measure of the growing confidence of anti-Jakarta forces in the territory since Suharto's fall, some violence against media was from pro-independence groups venting their disfavour against media reports deemed sympathetic to the status quo. For example, Eriyanto and Stanley report the facilities of the Fakfak station of RRI were damaged on 28 January 2000, and put off the air for four days by an attack from a pro-independence militia (*satgas*). A month later, the Merauke RRI station was similarly damaged by 400 people objecting to what they regarded as pro-government propaganda broadcasts.[71] In the relatively rare cases when influential government or business figures sue rather than use violence or intimidation over adverse media coverage, the legal system has been sorely tested. In the first such case of the Reform era, when the head of the Papuan Transmigration Office sued the *Papua Pos* over its reports of his financial malfeasance, then editor Abdul Munib had to mount his own legal defence – ultimately successful – because he could not find any local lawyer with prior experience in such media law.[72]

As in other parts of Indonesia, some leading media figures in Papua have been co-opted by political parties. Frans Siriwa, who held the original publication permit for *Cenderawasih* weekly and who, after the involvement of the JPG, was the official General Director (*Pemimpin Umum*) of the new publishing company, was courted by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) in the lead-up to the 2004 general elections. The editor-in-chief, Joko Suhendro, emphasised that Siriwa played no role in the editorial line of the paper and that the publication did not skew any reporting of Siriwa or support his electoral campaign.[73] He stressed the paper had a strict policy that journalists and their reporting had to be free of political bias, and choose between political partisanship or journalism. That *Cepos* managed to maintain independence from government agencies and to stand above party politics was confirmed by a leading member of AJI in Papua.[74] But the danger remains in Papua, as in other parts of Indonesia, that parties will seek to enlist media figures to enhance their public profiles.[75]

Identity is at the heart of much of Papua's politics – and permeates the media. While no specific statistics were available, it is commonly observed that even within the local newspapers, most journalists tended to be non-Papuans. An office bearer in AJI Papua estimated that across Papua only about ten per cent of journalists were indigenous, with that figure rising to about one quarter of the AJI branch membership.[76] One respected Papuan journalist observed that ethnic Papuans faced greater scrutiny when covering sensitive political issues, and in particular anything related to Papuan nationalism or the movement for independence.[77] Papuan journalists have to show even greater caution than non-Papuans in reporting anything associated with what is dubbed 'M' (for *Merdeka*, Independence) in the local parlance, because the authorities tended to regard neutral coverage as

ipso facto pro-'M'. One informant, for example, recounted how, in response to a Papuan journalist's questions, a (Javanese) military spokesperson had barked back, 'Are you a journalist or a spy?' A prominent Papuan activist believed the editor of *Tifa Papua* was still phoned by government authorities wanting to influence the paper's editorial direction.[78] Editors had to walk a fine line between covering stories of interest to readers (notably those relating to Papuan identity and political autonomy) while maintaining sober working relations with government agencies and other antithetical political forces.

A similar dilemma faced candidates in the 2006 gubernatorial elections. Mietzner has noted that, as their media strategy reflected, on the one hand candidates had to reach out to the local electorate while on the other allaying the concerns of Jakarta authorities that they might foment dissent or secession.

> John Ibo, for example, posted one-page advertisements in several local newspapers that underlined his commitment to the unitary state of Indonesia. Declaring that Indonesian unitarianism was the final political format for Papua, these advertisements did not address the Papuan electorate, but were designed to ease political concerns among Jakarta-based government officials. Ibo asserted that Papuan voters needed no further explanation of his political agenda, which he assumed was well-known, but he deemed it necessary to convince Jakarta that he could cooperate well with the central government if elected.[79]

Economic and structural problems for the media

In their insightful study of Papuan media, Eryanto and Stanley highlight a range of key problems facing the local industry, which have diminished little in the years since their 2002 survey.[80] Production and circulation figures for individual newspapers were insufficient to achieve 'economies of scale', with the vast bulk of sales coming not from subscription but from impulse buying on the streets, which provided the least stability and security for a newspaper. By their estimate (in 2002), only *Cepos* was selling more than 6,000 with some papers like the *Papua Pos* selling only about 1,000. For most papers, subscribers, who tended to be middle-class, intellectuals or government bureaucrats, consisted of only about 30–40 per cent of sales (although *Cepos* claimed about 60 per cent). Since impulse sales are heavily reliant on catchy headlines and sensationalist cover stories, a high dependence on such sales militates against more sober, thoughtful styles of journalism. Coverage of issues of significant public concern, such as special autonomy provisions or pro-independence groups, may cause a spike in sales. Mohammad Kholifan, one of the region's most respected journalists and a former editor of the independent-minded *Jubi* tabloid, argued that since impulse buyers tended to be indigenous Papuans, they were more likely to want to follow such issues. This dynamic may drive newspapers – even the more politically conservative ones like *Cepos* – to cover such controversial issues as part of their sales strategy.

Economic difficulties and poor infrastructure were chronic. Eryanto and Stanley observed even basic computers were a scarcity in some publications (with one

having only two computers shared by all staff!). In addition, of the five news-papers they identify, only *Cepos* has its own printery, with the others dependent either on *Cepos*, the state printery, or a single private firm. Distribution presented immense hurdles, given the cost of air-freight around the territory. Even if the papers were successfully distributed, extracting payments from distributors and agents appeared to be an equally difficult task. Before its temporary closure, *Jubi* was owed around Rp 120 million by recalcitrant agents![81] That journalists routinely accepted payments ('*amplop*') from government, business and other sources is not surprising given that their wages – generally between Rp 300,000 – Rp 800,000 per month – were well below the one million rupiah which Eriyanto and Stanley regarded as a living wage for Jayapura. This fate was shared with journalists throughout Indonesia as a 2005 AJI Survey of 17 cities revealed that 'more than 50 per cent of journalists are unable to cover their basic needs with their salary and are forced to take on other jobs to support themselves.'[82] Many publications had an unhealthy reliance upon sponsorship from government (from provincial to local level). Some district (*kabupaten*) administrations effectively buy up stock of a paper for free distribution as a cost-effective strategy to inform their constituencies about their policies and programmes.[83]

Conclusion

One of the complications in any discussion of regional media and local identity is precisely who – or what – is 'local'? Some journalists in Jayapura did not regard *Cepos* as a 'local' newspaper, despite it being edited, produced and published in Papua by Papua-based staff. It was thought 'different' from the other 'local' papers because it was owned by the Jawa Pos Group which was based in Surabaya, and its connections outside Papua – what might be described as cultural, social, economic and political 'capital' – meant it was able to publish more critically about local poli-tics. But in the politics of Papua, even 'local' identity can be further disaggregated. There are rivalries between 'coastal' and 'highland' groups over access to political power, with particular political leaders regarded as surrounding themselves with their own community, to the disadvantage of others from even relatively proximate districts.[84] People from communities or language groups from other parts of Papua may be regarded, in some contexts, as consequently less 'local'.

In Jayapura, we were very conscious of the absence of a whole variety of cul-tural products taken for granted in other parts of Indonesia. The Land of Papua Arts Board (*Dewan Kesenian Tanah Papua*) in the centre of Jayapura had been, for periods, under close scrutiny by the security authorities. Bookshops had few, if any, volumes of Papuan literature. There were few books of any kind published by Papuans, or about Papuan life, culture, politics, society or art, either contemporary or historical. There was little evidence of Papuan incorporation into school texts or other public representations of 'Indonesian-ness'. In the context of this absence, the physical presence of the local media, with its images of Papuans whether in print or on TVRI's *Lensa Papua*, provides one validation, one valued assertion, of being Papuan.

Notes

1 This chapter is part of a larger joint project with Krishna Sen on 'Media in a Post-Authoritarian State: Crisis and Democratisation in Indonesia', funded by the Australian Research Council. Fieldwork for this paper was undertaken together in December 2004–January 2005, but I take sole responsibility for the limitations of this paper. It was drafted while I was a Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Asia Research Institute of the National University of Singapore, to whose staff I express my appreciation. As noted in the following pages since 2003, the former province of Papua (previously called Irian Jaya) has been divided into two: Papua and West Irian Jaya. However, unless specified otherwise, in this paper the term 'Papua' is used to refer to the combined territory of these two provinces (generally referred to in Indonesian as *tanah Papua*, the 'Land of Papua').

2 For an analysis of media in Manado, see D. T. Hill, 'Media and Politics in Regional Indonesia: The Case of Manado', in K. Sen and T. Lee (eds) *Political Regimes And The Media In Asia*, London and New York: Routledge, 2008, pp. 188–207.

3 Several detailed studies have appeared on post-Suharto Papua politics, including: J. Wing and P. King, *Genocide in West Papua? The Role of the Indonesian State Apparatus and a Current Needs Assessment of the Papuan People*, West Papua Project at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney, 2005 downloadable from http://www.arts.usyd.edu.au/centres/cpacs/WestPapuaGenocideRpt.05.pdf (accessed 6 September 2006); P. King, *West Papua and Indonesia Since Suharto: Independence, Autonomy or Chaos?*, Sydney: UNSW Press, 2004. The Indonesian government has been at pains to put its perspective in such publications as *Questioning the Unquestionable: An Overview of the Restoration of Papua into the Republic of Indonesia*, New York: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations, 2004.

4 International Crisis Group, *Papua: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions*, Jakarta/Brussels: ICG, 2006 quotation from p. 1, located at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/indonesia/b53_papua_answers_to_frequently_asked_questions.pdf (accessed 6 September 2006).

5 The only substantial analyses, upon which I shall draw heavily later, are: Eryanto and Stanley (eds), *'Potret Media di Papua 2002'*, unpublished manuscript, 49 pp, produced under the auspices of the Institut Studi Arus Informasi, Jakarta, 2002 and J.W. Mirino (ed.) *Sekelumit Wajah Pers di Papua*, Jakarta: AJI-Papua and Lembaga Studi Pers dan Pembangunan, 2003. Andrew Dodd produced a valuable radio documentary on the situation in 2007–8, broadcast on the ABC Radio National Media Report on 7 February 2008 as 'The Voice of Papua'. http://www.abc.net.au/rn/mediareport/stories/2009/2436720.htm (accessed 9 September 2009).

6 *Papua Dalam Angka 2003: Papua in Figures*, Badan Perencanaan dan Pengendalian Pembangunan Daerah Provinsi Papua & Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Papua, [Jayapura], 2004, Table 1.1.3; and para. 3.1 provides data from the 2000 National Census.

7 *Papua Dalam Angka 2003*, para. 8.1.

8 For an aerial map of Jayapura, see http://wikimapia.org/#lat = -2.5415998&lon = 140.7046402&z = 18&l = 0&m = a&v = 2 (accessed 1 August 2008).

9 ICG, *Papua*, p. 4.

10 For a detailed, if highly critical, account of the political history of Papua, see King, *West Papua and Indonesia*, pp. 19–94.

11 For a detailed study of these elections, see M. Mietzner, 'Autonomy, Democracy and Internal Conflict: The 2006 Gubernatorial Elections in Papua' in M. Erb and P. Sulistiyanto (eds) *Deepening Democracy in Indonesia? Direct Elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada)*, Singapore: ISEAS Press, 2009, pp. 259–282.

12 ICG, *Papua*, p. 1.

13 ICG, *Papua*, p. 9.

14 ICG, *Papua*, p. 11.

15 ICG, *Papua*, p. 1.
16 S. E. Kirksey and J. A. D. Roemajauw, 'The Wild Terrorist Gang: The Semantics of Violence and Self-determination in West Papua', *Oxford Development Studies*, 30: 2, 2002, pp. 189–203 notes the opening of the first Internet café at the main post office in 1998 (p. 199).
17 Kirksey and Roemajauw, 'The Wild Terrorist Gang', pp. 199–200.
18 http://www.melanesianews.org/DoOPM/ (accessed 8 September 2006).
19 ibid. accessed 8 September 2006.
20 http://www.melanesianews.org/ (accessed 8 September 2006).
21 http://papuaweb.anu.edu.au/ (accessed 11 September 2006). The site http://papua. startpagina.nl/ (accessed 8 September 2006), in Dutch, provides an excellent link to dozens of Papua-related internet resources.
22 See http://www.kabar-irian.com/mailman/listinfo (accessed 8 September 2006), which contains links to lists in English and Indonesian. The 'free-papua' group was founded in January 2000 for 'members-only' and had 59 participants in September 2006. Its considerable traffic peaked at 256 postings in April 2006. See http://groups.yahoo.com/ group/free-papua/ (accessed 8 September 2006).
23 For more detail, see M. Cookson, 'Papua webs: Web-based resources related to Indonesian Papua and West Papua', *Inside Indonesia*, 94, October–December 2008, http://insideindonesia.org/content/view/1129/29/ (accessed 9 September 2009).
24 Eryanto and Stanley 'Potret Media di Papua 2002', fn 2 note the importance of air transport for print media distribution and the limited infrastructure (including landing strips and planes) available to the public.
25 *Papua Dalam Angka 2003*, Table 4.1.15. There are eleven private colleges in the territory where another 7,073 students studied in 2003 (see Table 4.1.21).
26 Eryanto and Stanley 'Potret Media di Papua 2002' p. 3, cite Mohammad Kholifan 'Pers Papua, Dulu dan Sekarang', *Independen*, No. 9, Yr 7, September 2001, p. 28, as the source for historical background on *Tifa Papua*.
27 Information based on *Tifa Papua*, edition No. 1, Year 50, first week of January 2005.
28 F. Ohoiwutun, 'Kerugian Bencana Gempa Nabire Ditaksir Mencapai Rp. 600 Milyar', in 'Papua Membangun', *Tifa Papua*, Week 1, Year 50, January 2005, p. 11.
29 Arifin, 'Bupati Beberkan Tugas Pokok Kepala Distrik', in 'Membangun Kabupaten Sarmi', *Tifa Papua*, Week 1, Year 50, January 2005, p. 13.
30 M. Kholifan, 'Kepakan Cenderawasih', *Pantau*, II, No. 018, October 2001, pp. 24– 27. www.pantau.or.id.txt/18/10.html (accessed 27 December 2004). On the Jawa Pos Group, see http://www.jawapos.com/cv/index.html (accessed 13 September 2006).
31 On Abdul Munib's period at *Cepos*, see M. Kholifan, 'Kepakan Cenderawasih'.
32 Abdul Munib is quoted in M. Kholifan, 'Kepakan Cenderawasih'.
33 Interview with Joko Suhendro, *Cenderawasih Pos* Editor-in-chief, *Cepos* offices, Jayapura, 4 January 2005.
34 Interview by Krishna Sen and David T. Hill with Nurul Hidayah, Jayapura, 3 January 2005.
35 http://www.cenderawasihpos.com provided details of the company and personnel (accessed 10 September 2009).
36 Eryanto and Stanley 'Potret Media di Papua 2002', p. 4.
37 Information on *Papua Pos*, based on 3 January 2005 edition, with Papua Provincial Government Information page on p. 11.
38 Observations regarding *Bisnis Papua* based on the situation in January 2005, with specific data drawn from the paper's 8 January 2005 edition.
39 Information on *Pasific Pos* based on 5 January 2005 edition.
40 By 2008, this latter publication had migrated to the Internet as *Tabloid Suara Perempuan Papua* http://suaraperempuanpapua.wordpress.com/2008/ (accessed 9 September 2009), although updating ceased in November that year.
41 Email correspondence with Editor-in-chief Victor Mambor, 10 September 2009. By

September 2009, it was appearing both in print (selling 1,000 copies and distributing another 1,000 gratis) and on the Internet, http://www.tabloidjubi.com/ (accessed 10 September 2009).

42 Eryanto and Stanley 'Potret Media di Papua 2002', pp. 27–33.

43 Eryanto and Stanley 'Potret Media di Papua 2002', p. 3.

44 On the MDLF, see http://www.mdlf.org/, and on Radio 68H, see http://www.kbr68h.com/Utama_All.htm, both accessed 10 September 2009. For a list of radio stations in Papua (and West Irian) which are part of the 68H network, see Santoso, *Waves of Freedom: Radio News Agency KBR68H*, (translated from the Indonesian by Ruth MacKenzie) Jakarta: KBR68H, 2006 p. 33.

45 Information on Radio Matoa from Santoso *Waves of Freedom*, pp. 107–110.

46 Information on Radio Merbau from Santoso *Waves of Freedom*, pp. 103–107. Quotation from p. 106.

47 On Radio Pikonane, see T. Piper 'Radio Pikonane: Connecting Papua's Central Highlands', *Inside Indonesia*, 91, January–March 2008. http://insideindonesia.org/content/view/1056/29 (accessed 10 September 2009); http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/documentaries/2007/12/071219_press_for_freedom_three.shtml (active 1 August 2008), and a YouTube video of the opening at http://www.mdlf.org/en/main/multimedia/43/, both accessed 10 September 2009.

48 T. Piper, emailed personal communication, 18 November 2006.

49 Interview with Fritz Ramandey, Jayapura, 4 January 2005.

50 Since our fieldwork, two other TV stations have been established. The local commercial station, Metro Papua TV (a collaboration between the national Metro TV network and the local government) began broadcasting in May 2007. It was still only producing one local broadcast per day of a half-hour news programme, when it changed its name to Televisi Mandiri Papua (TVMP) in 2008. (See http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Televisi_Mandiri_Papua (accessed 10 September 2009); and A. Flassy, 'Televisi Mandiri Papua', *Tabloid Jubi*, 21 February 2008, Available http://tabloidjubi.wordpress.com/2008/02/21/televisi-mandiri-papua/ (accessed 10 September 2009). The pay channel Top TV also commenced broadcasting in Jayapura environs in May 2007 (though its website www.toptvpapua.tv seemed inactive when visited on 10 September 2009), differentiating itself by using the colloquial form of Indonesian spoken in Papua in its news presentations. See also A. Dodd, 'The Voice of Papua', *Media Report*, ABC Radio National, 7 August 2008.

51 Information provided by Henoch Puraro, Head of TVRI Jayapura, in an interview on 7 January 2005.

52 According to TVRI Jayapura's Head, in 1994, Jayapura sent about 150 items to Jakarta, of which about 73 were broadcast (Henoch Puraro Interview, 7 January 2005).

53 On the practices of TVRI under the New Order, see K. Sen and D.T. Hill, *Media, Culture and Politics in Indonesia*, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 109–132 and P. Kitley, *Television, Nation, and Culture in Indonesia*, Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 2000.

54 According to Henoch Puraro, the languages of the songs broadcast on this day included one from Serui and another from Wamena. (Interview, 7 January 2005).

55 On the importance of 'ceremonial' news under the New Order, see P. Kitley, *Television, Nation, and Culture in Indonesia*, pp. 178–212.

56 For an assessment of the impact of media upon local elections, see D. T. Hill, 'Assessing Media Impact on Local Elections in Indonesia' in M. Erb and P. Sulistiyanto (eds) *Deepening Democracy in Indonesia? Direct Elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada)*, Singapore: ISEAS Press, 2009, pp. 229–255.

57 Mietzner, 'Autonomy, Democracy and Internal Conflict', p. 272.

58 Mietzner, 'Autonomy, Democracy and Internal Conflict', pp. 267–272.

59 S.E. Kirksey and J.A.D. Roemajauw, 'The Wild Terrorist Gang', pp. 189–203; quotation from p. 195. *Gamelan* refers to the Javanese bronze gong and xylophone orchestra.

60 Human Rights Watch, *Indonesia: Human Rights And Pro-Independence Actions In Papua, 1999–2000*, Section V. 'Crackdown Following The Opening Of The National Dialogue', 2000, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/papua/Pap004–04.htm#P305_68820 (accessed 13 September 2006).

61 'Tifa Yang Sulit Dibungkam', *Tempo*, 18 July 1999, cited in Human Rights Watch, *Indonesia: Human Rights*, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/papua/Pap004–04.htm#P305_68820 (accessed 13 September 2006).

62 Kirksey and Roemajauw, 'The Wild Terrorist Gang', pp. 192–193.

63 Kirksey and Roemajauw, 'The Wild Terrorist Gang:', p. 194.

64 Kirksey and Roemajauw, 'The Wild Terrorist Gang:', pp. 193–194.

65 Front Line and IMPARSIAL (The Indonesian Human Rights Watch), *Front Line Indonesia: Murders Death Threat [sic] And Other Forms of Intimidation of Human Rights Defenders, 1998–2002*, p. 104, located at http://www.frontlinedefenders.org/pdfs/56_Front%20Line%20Indonesia.pdf (accessed 13 September 2006).

66 On the history of AJI, see Sen and Hill, *Media, Culture and Politics in Indonesia*, pp. 55–56 and A. Utami *et al. Banning 1994*, Jakarta, Alliance of Independent Journalists, 1994.

67 E. Maryadi, 'Hentikan Kekerasan dan Kriminalisasi terhadap Wartawan di Papua', 30 April 2006, located at http://ajiindonesia.org/id/alerts_details.php?cid = 1&id = 102 (accessed 23 August 2006).

68 V. K. Wijayanti, 'IJTI dan AJI Tuntut Kapolri Minta Maaf', detik.com, 20 March 2006, located at http://ajiindonesia.org/id/news_details.php?cid = 1&id = 98 (accessed Wednesday, 23 August 2006).

69 'Kabag Protokol Divonis 1 Bulan', *Cenderawasih Pos*, 15 September 2006, located at www.cenderawasihpos.com/Metro/metro.2.html (accessed 15 September 2006).

70 AJI recorded 23 such cases during the year to August 2006, when one journalist was murdered, one abducted, one imprisoned and 34 assaulted. It claimed government officials were behind 14 attacks on journalists, with police causing eight. Papua was not a particularly high-risk zone, with Jakarta the most dangerous place in the country for journalists (13 cases) followed by East Java and Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (eight cases each). See IFEX, 'Mobs, Thugs Pose Biggest Threats To Press Freedom', located at http://www.ifex.org/en/content/view/full/76367/ (accessed 13 September 2006).

71 Eryanto and Stanley, 'Potret Media di Papua 2002', p. 8.

72 Eryanto and Stanley, 'Potret Media di Papua 2002', pp. 8–9.

73 Interview with Joko Suhendro, Jayapura, 4 January 2005.

74 Confidential interview, Jayapura, 4 January 2005.

75 For a discussion of journalists and media owners who have played important party political roles in Indonesian regional elections, see Hill 'Assessing Media Impact' and Rachmah Ida's contribution to this volume.

76 Interview with Fritz Ramandey, Jayapura, 4 January 2005.

77 Confidential interview, Jayapura, 6 January 2005.

78 Confidential interview, Jayapura, 10 January 2005.

79 Mietzner, 'Autonomy, Democracy and Internal Conflict', p. 278 cites an interview he conducted with John Ibo, Jayapura, 6 January 2006.

80 Eryanto and Stanley, 'Potret Media di Papua 2002', pp. 4–11.

81 Eryanto and Stanley, 'Potret Media di Papua 2002', p. 6.

82 The survey found that more than 60 per cent of Indonesian journalists are paid under US$ 190 a month. IFEX, 'Majority of Journalists Vastly Underpaid: AJI Survey', located at http://www.ifex.org/20fr/layout/set/print/content/view/full/76841/ (accessed 13 September 2006).

83 Interview with Fritz Ramandey, Jayapura, 4 January 2005.

84 Mietzner, 'Autonomy, Democracy and Internal Conflict' discusses the broader political tensions between 'coastal' and 'highlands' groups in Papua.

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3 Community radio and the empowerment of local culture in Indonesia

Mario Antonius Birowo

Freedom of information has become an important issue in the transition to democracy in Indonesia. Denied during the New Order from 1965 to 1998, the problems around the establishment of an open media have not been entirely overcome. This chapter examines one facet of the Indonesian community's attempts to establish a democratic information, media and communication system. It pursues a case study of community radio in Yogyakarta Special Region, to analyse how ordinary people use community radio to preserve local culture as a strategy to empower themselves in the public sphere.

Participatory communication

Communication studies scholars have been discussing the participatory communication approach in the development process since the 1970s. It has been argued that communication from the bottom up, or participatory communication, enables participants to communicate their views on their particular circumstances in order to build common interests and understanding. Community participation is regarded as a crucial aspect of empowerment, by developing self-confidence, awareness and local organizational ability.[1]

This calls for a shift from a communicator-oriented approach to an audience-oriented approach to communication, recognizing that people are the agents of development.[2] This approach cannot be applied in a non-democratic society which puts government at the centre of the communication flow, a phenomenon often found in the developing countries. In most developing countries, communication technologies are controlled by social and economic elites, particularly those in power and in large cities, with mass media content reflecting their perspective on issues such as politics, economics and entertainment. With this imbalance in the flow of communication, mass media are regarded as responsible for widening the gap between advantaged and disadvantaged audiences, with mainstream media providing little space for ordinary people.[3] As Rodriguez[4] points out, mainstream media operates hierarchically, with audiences in the passive role of receiving media messages.

It has been argued that centralized communication, from the centre to the periphery, while designed to accelerate development, does not allow for active involvement of the participants in the process of communication. Some Latin

American scholars such as Jesus Martin Barbero, Luis Ramiro Beltran, Juan Diaz Bordenave, Fernando Reyes Matta and Rafal Roncagliolo rejected centralized communication in the development process, and proposed an alternative model emphasizing participatory communication (known as the participatory communication model).[5] Paulo Freire's *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* published in 1970 (translated into English in 1983) was the major source of inspiration for this model or normative theory of participatory communication.[6]

Freire's notions of dialogical education, conscientization and the 'culture of silence' became widely accepted by development communication scholars. In this process, men and women, not as recipients but as knowing subjects, achieve a deeper awareness both of the sociocultural reality which shapes their lives and of their capacity to transform that reality. Their consciousness about their environment is the foundation for participating in the process of decision-making where they can voice their interests and propose solutions which are relevant to their lives.[7] Freire's liberation notions encourage critical thinking which helps people to understand 'the causes of social injustices and to organize effective action to influence the sociocultural reality that shapes their lives'.[8] Freire's 'conscientization' has contributed to the movement of independent community media, which 'went hand in hand with critique of oppressive mainstream media and the culture of silence they induced'.[9] His emphasis on people-centred development is central to the participatory communication model, in which people are the subject of the communication process.[10] This participatory communication model has influenced the development of community radio throughout the world, especially through United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) programmes facilitating community radio in developing countries.[11]

By making space for people's participation, community radio creates horizontal communication, based on the principles of community access to media production and decision-making. Along with the notion of participation, Servaes[12] takes into account the importance of cultural identity in the communication process, with cultural identity a key to the development of community solidarity. Through cyclical and horizontal communication processes, participants engage in dialogues about their daily experience, which result in commonness of views.

Community radio provides the circumstances in which people can create new ideas to solve problems based on local conditions. In this way, community radio aims not only to participate in the life of community but also to allow local people to participate in the life of the station. Aimed at empowering ordinary people, community radio is an effective medium for participatory communication, more focused on facilitating expression rather than professionalization, since if ordinary people have the opportunity to express their interests, they can exercise the political power to change their lives.[13]

Community radio in Indonesia: struggle for freedom on the air

The movement for democratization that ousted Suharto in 1998 also called for press freedom, freedom of information and freedom of expression. Siregar, the

General Secretary of the Indonesian Newspaper Publishers Association, argues that there have been two significant changes related to the post-Suharto flow of information: decentralization and democratization, which have replaced the system of centralization and authoritarianism under Suharto.[14]

In the reform era, measures to reduce the government's previous control on the flow of information have been brought about through legislative changes. New regulations were enacted during Habibie's administration (1998–1999) and later, the Wahid administration (1999–2001) demolished the institutions for controlling the mass media. During Megawati's administration (2001–2003), the People's Representative Council (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*, DPR) enacted the Broadcasting Act No. 32/2002 enshrining new media freedoms. This Act changed fundamentally the relations between the state and citizens regarding the function of mass media as media of expression. It introduced two new institutions in the broadcasting system in Indonesia: the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (*Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia*, KPI) as an independent regulatory body to manage the broadcasting system in Indonesia and community broadcasting.

Attempts to gain legal acknowledgement for community radio in Indonesia have always been controversial. According to Ali Pangestu,[15] the Head of Presidium of the Community Radio Network of Indonesia (*Jaringan Radio Komunitas Indonesia*, JRKI) (2002–4), prior to the enactment of the 2002 Broadcasting Act, community radio was regarded by government as 'wild radio, illegal radio'.

A variety of strategies were employed in the push for legal recognition for this form of radio. For example, on 22–24 March 2002, community radio activists of West Java participated in a workshop in Bandung.[16] Participants from various types of *radio gelap* (illegal/unregulated radio) such as citizens' forum radio, campus radio and hobby radio all agreed to transform their operations into community radio. Since the community radio movement was only just beginning, not all participants were familiar with the term so the meeting discussed the definition and characteristics of community radio. The main agenda was to create common understanding about the movement and strategies in promoting community radio in Indonesia, especially to gain legal acknowledgement under the new Broadcasting Act. They regarded the new Act as entitling them to obtain a legitimate broadcasting licence. Activists at this workshop started to build collaborative networks, making history by establishing the first community radio association in post-colonial Indonesia, the Community Radio Network of West Java (*Jaringan Radio Komunitas Jawa Barat*, JRK Jabar).[17]

The Bandung workshop was a trigger for the establishment of Yogyakarta Community Radio Network (*Jaringan Radio Komunitas Yogyakarta*, JRKY) on 6 May 2002. In fact, the community radio movement in Yogyakarta had its roots in a UNESCO-sponsored Community Radio Seminar which was held there on 4 September 2001. That was the first time the prospects for community radio were discussed in an academic environment and received attention from a wider public. Participants included academics, NGO activists, journalists, radio practitioners and politicians. Subsequently many other seminars, discussions and conferences have been organized to promote community radio in Indonesia. Civil society groups

supporting the community radio movement organized a forum, the Community Radio Supporters Network (*Jaringan Pendukung Radio Komunitas*, JPRK), to lobby for the establishment of an independent regulatory body for broadcasting and to encourage the House of Representatives to acknowledge community broadcasting by including it in the Broadcasting Act.[18]

Soon after the UNESCO seminar, 30 community radio stations and 23 NGOs founded JRKY to support community radio. It was inaugurated on 6 May 2002 in the Yogyakarta Provincial House of Representatives building, to underscore community radio's role in the democratic movement. Likewise at the national level, the Indonesian Community Radio Network (*Jaringan Radio Komunitas Indonesia*, JRKI) was inaugurated on 15 May 2002 in the national House of Representatives building in Jakarta, when the Broadcasting Act No. 32/2002 was still being drafted.

In 2002 community radio activists, NGOs and universities established a team called Advocates for a Draft Broadcasting Act (*Advokasi Rencana Undang Undang Penyiaran*) to lobby for the inclusion of a clause on community broadcasting in the Act. Activists understood obtaining community acknowledgement would be a long process, so they formed a coalition with NGOs and academics, lobbied members of the Council and networked with international organizations such as AMARC (*Association Mondiale Des Radiodiffuseurs Communautaires*, World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters), Internews and UNESCO.[19] Kitley has noted the importance of this civil society movement in gaining freedom of information, not evident in the Suharto era.[20]

The draft Broadcasting Bill was dominated by ideas about democratization of the broadcasting system in Indonesia. According to Zainal Suryokusumo,[21] a former member of the Press Council, the Broadcasting Act adopted by the People's Representatives Council was proposed by civil society organizations, initiated by the Indonesian Press and Broadcasting Society (*Masyarakat Pers dan Penyiaran Indonesia*, MPPI) and the Indonesian National Private Broadcast Radio Association (*Persatuan Radio Siaran Swasta Nasional Indonesia*, PRSSNI).[22] Responding to the growing dominance of media corporations, communication academics and media activists began looking at alternative media to counterbalance the unequal distribution of communication resources.[23] The earlier Broadcasting Act No. 24/1997 contained no reference to community broadcasting. Effendy Choirie, a Vice Chair of Commission I of the House of Representatives,[24] contends the DPR introduced community radio into the new Act because it wanted to emphasize participation of people in the public sphere and reduce government intervention in broadcast media.[25]

The much-debated Broadcasting Act was enacted on 28 December 2002, inaugurating a new era for Indonesia's media. The Act established a new regulatory body, the KPI, and acknowledged four types of broadcasting institutions: (1) public broadcasting, (2) private broadcasting, (3) subscriber broadcasting, and (4) community broadcasting.

In article 21 clause (1) of the Broadcasting Act No. 32/2002, community radio is defined as 'a broadcasting institution in the form of an Indonesian corporate body,

which is established by a certain community, independent and non-commercial in nature, with low transmission power and limited broadcasting coverage to serve the interests of its (surrounding) community'. Thus community radio's limited reach, over a small geographical area, is clear, with 'community' defined as a group of people living within a small area.

Despite enacting the Bill, the government seems unwilling to implement some of its clauses. First, in practice, it does not support the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPI) granting broadcasting licences, wanting this authority retained by government. Second, the government initially rejected community radio on the grounds of state security, claiming this media would create 'inter-group' conflict (meaning, tensions across class, religion or ethnic divisions).[26] At the Community Radio Meeting in Bandung in March 2002, one senior officer of the Department of Communication and Information Technology asserted this media could ignite conflict between religious and racial groups.[27] In addition, there is suspicion in some quarters, perhaps stimulated by international support for the community radio movement in Indonesia, that community radio is an overseas concept and institution.[28]

The Government sought to regulate community broadcasting. AMARC notes the government seems ambiguous in implementing Broadcasting Act No. 32/2002.[29] Activists assert the government is not supporting the development of community broadcasting, and Government Regulation No. 51/2005 limits the coverage area of community radio to a 2.5 square kilometre area. Many critics of this limitation of coverage area pointed out first that, while on the densely populated island of Java a 2.5 square kilometre area might provide a reasonable participating audience, it would be insufficient for low population density areas like Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Papua. Second, even on Java the coverage area is too small to accommodate people's information needs because social interaction for most of the population takes place over much greater areas. For example, this limitation does not accommodate the interactions between people who have similar interests or features, such as ethnicity, profession and religion.[30]

Nonetheless, the 2002 Broadcasting Act has benefited the development of community radio in Indonesia. While previously community radio was illegal, operating underground and constantly risking closure, today there are thousands of such stations across Indonesia, so many in fact that accurate data is unobtainable, with many joining together to form networks.[31] Further, the conflict between the Indonesian Government's Department of Information and Communication, and the KPI has meant that the precise process for gaining a community radio broadcasting permit is still uncertain. Community radio stations have been following the process set down by the KPI but, after more than three years, still no licences have actually been issued.

Empowering people with local cultures

In Indonesia, the history of community radio epitomizes a transformation from media of elites into media of ordinary people. In the 1930s, broadcast radio was

established by aristocrats as media for cultural expression, and during the Dutch era culture and entertainment were predominant in radio programming.[32] A community of Javanese aristocrats collectively funded their radio stations. For example, in the early 1930s, in Surakarta, 600 kilometres from Batavia/Jakarta, a group of Javanese aristocrats, 'Javanese Kunstkring Mardi Raras Mangkunagaran,' established a radio station to promote Javanese culture.[33] Nowadays community radio belongs to ordinary people, as a mode of cultural expression, especially for local culture marginalized in mainstream radio dominated by city-based pop culture.

Syamsul Muarif, Minister of Information and Communication, observed in 2002 that 41,000 villages still could not receive broadcast radio.[34] Most private radio stations are located in big cities, limiting access to information for those beyond these reception areas. In addition, private radio programmes, particularly those primarily targeting teenagers, are frequently oriented to Jakarta's capital city lifestyle. For example, their radio presenters adopt the Jakartanese language style or 'MTV style', which combines Indonesian and English – what Indonesians call *bahasa gado-gado*. English is often used for private radio station programme titles. If Sen and Hill[35] concluded that radio is an exception by not marginalizing local cultures, that situation has now changed. In many cases, local cultures are the minority in commercial radio, a situation which reflects Lucas's critique that the mainstream media, in its present form and structure, has become an effective tool for globalization.[36] In this vein, MTV style can be seen as a representation of globalization, especially Americanization. As Rodriguez notes, cultural invasion from abroad has worried developing countries since foreign values and cultural forms endanger local cultures and identities, in turn affecting national identity.[37]

Community radio, in this context, can be interpreted as an attempt to provide a diversity of content from people who have little opportunity to participate in message production in mainstream media. It is a resistance to the growing uniformity of social life produced by mainstream media. Thus, community radio, following the principle of democracy, challenges 'the homogenisation of way of life'.[38]

Learning from the field

The following case study describes how community radio plays its role in providing public space for people, especially through its focus on local culture. In Yogyakarta Special Region, one of the pioneers of community radio is Balai Budaya Minomartani Community Radio (*Radio Komunitas Balai Budaya Minomartani FM*, Radio BBM). Radio BBM is located in Minomartani village, Sleman Regency, in the north of Yogyakarta. The name 'Minomartani' consists of two words: 'mino' meaning fish, and 'martani' meaning field. So Minomartani refers to the many fish farms and rice fields that used to exist in the village. Since Minomartani is only nine kilometres to the north-east of central Yogyakarta and close to various universities, the location has become an attractive residential area for newcomers. Rapid housing development has changed Minomartani, transforming it from rural to urban.

Today, the village has become primarily a suburban housing estate. Most residents no longer farm, but are instead civil servants, lecturers, entrepreneurs and employees of private companies. Kisno, a volunteer at Radio BBM as well as a local artist, explains that the population of Minomartani is ethnically complex, with residents not only from Java, but also from Sumatra, Sulawesi, Jakarta and elsewhere. Radio BBM encourages all these inhabitants to communicate with each other using arts and culture which are developing in Minomartani Cultural Hall. In this way, inhabitants can bond as a community.[39]

The Minomartani Cultural Hall (*Balai Budaya Minomartani*, BBM) was founded in 1990 by the Audio Visual Production Training Centre (*Studio Audio Visual Puskat*), better known as SAV Puskat.[40] BBM is actually a compound, consisting of staff housing of SAV Puskat and a cultural hall.[41] This cultural hall is a public space, open to Minomartani residents who want to stage traditional performances, such as *wayang kulit* (shadow puppetry), *wayang orang* (dance drama based on traditional forms known as *wayang*), *ketoprak* (traditional drama), traditional dance and *karawitan* (traditional music). Although BBM focuses on traditional arts, it also allows young people to perform in pop bands, and frequently pop mixed with traditional music.

The idea of creating a community radio was developed by SAV Puskat as early as the 1980s through its concept of a 'media village', where a sense of community could be strengthened by enabling all residents to participate in village-based media, such as a one-page newspaper, posters, puppet performances and community radio. Such village media was a way of empowering people as they assess their local situation and consider ways of bettering their life. Iswara Hadi, the chairperson of SAV Puskat, acknowledges that Latin America's experiences inspired their community media programmes, such as folk theatre, community radio and video programmes (personal communication 23 April 2007). The aim of such a media village was similar to Freire's notion of conscientization, by recognizing people's identity as an important factor in participatory action.[42]

In 1993, to promote community radio and ideas about the potency of radio, Ruedi Hofmann, a Jesuit priest and Head of SAV Puskat, convened a discussion regarding the potential of community radio in Balai Budaya Minomartani. Participants included community members and three Yogyakarta commercial radio broadcasters. To stimulate discussion, they watched a video about *Latacunga* Community Radio in Latin America, brought back by Hofmann after his visit there. According to Kusuma,[43] a radio practitioner who participated in that discussion, the concept emerged of a *gubug rekaman* (literally, 'recording hut') where village residents could produce and broadcast their own radio programmes. Since the political situation of Indonesia in the early 1990s did not allow people to establish a community radio, this idea was finally realized in 1995 when the community of Minomartani cooperated with Radio Retjo Buntung, a private radio station, to broadcast cultural performances, especially *wayang* and *karawitan* (traditional Javanese orchestral music). The programmes were produced in Minomartani village, and broadcast by Radio Retjo Buntung, as a way of circumventing prevailing broadcasting regulations. The broadcasts cost 150,000 rupiah (AUD$ 21), but even at these rates the

community had difficulty obtaining sufficient funds, with the programme ceasing after two years due to the 1997 economic crisis in Indonesia.

In 1998 the idea of village radio was continued with the establishment of a low power radio, Radio Suket Teki (Grass Nut Radio), founded by SAV Puskat and, importantly, by some students of Gadjah Mada University who were living in Minomartani. Using the frequency 93.5 FM, Radio Suket Teki had no broadcasting permit, so it was effectively 'illegal', closing down in 2000 after a warning from the Monitoring Bureau of the Department of Transportation.[44]

Giovani,[45] a resident of Minomartani and a social communication expert from SAV Puskat, explains that *suket teki*, a kind of grass used as food and natural medicine, was adopted as the name of the radio station because it symbolized that, with its simplicity, Radio Suket Teki could provide benefits to the community. The experience of Unai, a mother of four, illustrates the function of that radio station. She says that being an announcer on the radio helped her to learn to speak in public and improved her self-confidence. She got involved in the radio to socialize more with others, but could not imagine having that opportunity in mainstream radio. Her experience demonstrates community radio's contribution to people's empowerment by developing individuals 'who are confident enough to speak up with their own points of view'.[46]

Although Radio Suket Teki closed in 2000 because it did not have a broadcasting licence, after a two-year hiatus the Minomartani community revived the village radio station in 2002 to support local culture. The initiative came from a group of residents who were active in cultural events in Minomartani Cultural Hall and wanted to use radio to publicize their performances.[47] The result was BBM Community Radio (*Radio Komunitas Balai Budaya Minomartani*), named after its location in the Minomartani Cultural Hall (Balai Budaya Minomartani/BBM), with SAV Puskat providing the building for a radio studio and some equipment.

The BBM Community Radio studio consists of two climate-controlled spaces and one common room. One space, with a sofa, is used for talkback programmes, the other for the technical operator. The studio, although simple, is semi-sound-proof. There are two personal computers, an audio mixer, audio player and an amplifier. Although it initiated the radio's establishment and provided its facilities, SAV Puskat does not own Radio BBM. Instead, the radio is managed independently by the Minomartani community. Residents participate as volunteers with the station open to all, including volunteers from outside Minomartani village who live in the station's reception area. Volunteers work as members of the Community Broadcasting Board (*Dewan Penyiaran Komunitas*), the Founders Board, the Advisors Board and as announcers and technical operators.

BBM Community Radio provides opportunities for people to celebrate their cultural identity. One initial example of this was the project to produce a Javanese-language historical drama 'Rona Cakrawala Tanah Perdikan (RCTP)' telling the history of Minomartani village in the context of the history of Mataram Sultanate (now Yogyakarta Special Region).[48] In this drama, Minomartani village is depicted as a free territory within the Sultanate, suggesting that through this retelling of their history, the villagers are asserting that they too are free citizens like their

ancestors. The drama enables them both to entertain and to promote values such as integrity, tolerance and emancipation to their audience. The programme interprets the community's identity through members' own signs, codes and narration, reinforcing their cultural values in a highly local and specific way.

As BBM Community Radio became popular among Minomartani residents, it began to attract the attention of the local government. The village government started using the radio to seek input from residents or to disseminate information about government policies. The station broadcasts the latest information not only through its news programmes, but also in talkback programmes. The village chief, for example, announces government activities on talkback and gets immediate feedback from residents telephoning the programme. This enables people to hold the village government to account for its actions. The radio station encourages dialogue in a democratic spirit, by providing public space for discussion about matters of importance to the community. Through their radio, people have the opportunity both to hear and to be heard.[49] Because of its popularity, BBM Community Radio belongs not only to Minomartani residents but also to surrounding villages in its five square kilometre reception area.[50]

Inclusiveness

BBM Community Radio is a representation of the various ethnic groups making up the population of Minomartani, where their cultural activities were seen as opportunities to share their daily experiences and reflect upon the interaction between local and outside culture. The openness of Radio BBM to non-Javanese cultures was demonstrated by its creation – and broadcast in the 'Around the Archipelago' *(Jajah Nusantara)* programme – of *gamelan gaul*, a mix of Javanese music with music from other Indonesian ethnic groups, including those from Papua and West Java, for example. In this way, BBM hoped to attract both youth and non-Javanese listeners (interview with Surowo 22 February 2009). Every Wednesday night, Radio BBM broadcasts traditional music from other regions of Indonesia to foster better understanding of other cultures. As a result, Radio BBM was invited by Tabanan village in Bali to exchange broadcasts of Javanese and Balinese versions of *mocopatan* (a kind of traditional music).[51]

Intercultural communication can be seen in Radio BBM's off-air activities. The radio station has often hosted groups from other regions, even from other countries. In October 2008, a Malaysian group performed in Minomartani Cultural Hall, with Radio BBM broadcasting the event. Since residents often lack time to gather together, such broadcasts of cultural activities provide access to community events, and help the community stay in touch.

Solidarity building

Alfaro views community radio as part of the public sphere in which people can engage in dialogue and make collective commitments.[52] Some of the programmes on BBM are directed at building solidarity, that is, a form of citizenship where

people commit with others. BBM Community Radio's purpose is to be 'the radio that encounters, the radio which develops, and the radio which increases the quality of people's life'.[53] This aim is evident in the station's popular flagship programme of Javanese music, *Mbah Tro Mulur*. The name is an abbreviation of *Nambah Mitro Ketemu Sedulur* (to add friends and to meet relations), a Javanese expression which means communication strengthens cohesion among community members. *Mbah* means grandfather or grandmother, and by extension, an attribute given to elders, usually as a term of respect. *Tro Mulur* is a Javanese nickname. The words in the programme's name are very familiar to the Javanese ear. Here, the name symbolizes the programme's effort to draw the station into a closer relationship with its community. The programme itself is a combination of song requests and artistic performances, with people having the opportunity to perform their creations, especially of Javanese music, while also sending greetings to audience members.

The programme functions like a village hall get-together. The virtual interactions are followed up with *jumpa darat* (face-to-face meetings) held every evening in the Radio BBM studio from 6 p.m. to midnight. These gatherings build closer relationships among the community and support friends who are working as announcers and technical operators in the studio. Often people bring food to the studio for the announcers, operators and their visitors. Sometimes food vendors close to the studio offer the volunteers snacks, in turn getting free promotion with their names mentioned on the radio. To accommodate visitors to the studio, there are benches in front surrounding a table made from planks and covered with a simple large umbrella where people can chat until the radio shuts down for the day.

The radio has an institutionalized audience group, the *Paguyuban Monitor* (literally the 'monitoring group'). Members are between 30–60 years of age, from various backgrounds and professions, including teachers, entrepreneurs, lecturers, employees of private institutions, civil servants, housewives and retirees. The group's focus is the preservation of local culture. Not surprisingly, many members are traditional artistes who have also been involved in cultural activities in the Minomartani Cultural Hall, which have been incorporated into Radio BBM with performances recorded and broadcast so more residents can listen. Many young shadow puppet (*wayang kulit*) performers have developed their skills at the station, with one publishing a book of *geguritan* (Javanese poems), most of which had been broadcast by the station.

Paguyuban Monitor is at the core of Radio BBM's activities, both on- and off-air, with these two forms of activities supporting each other. Supporters interact not only in the community radio programmes on-air, but follow this up in their interactions in daily life, and consequent concern for each other. Off-air activities are extensions of the broadcast programmes, in activities such as visits to hospital patients, collection of donations for natural disaster victims, sporting activities and art performances, which then provide input back into the broadcasts. If a member has a problem, the group would help solve it. If they had a major celebration, such as a birthday, members would join in. *Paguyuban Monitor* also sustains the radio financially, with money raised from members' contributions.

BBM Community Radio did not acquire a broadcasting licence until 2009, because of the complex process involved. Although community radio was recognized by Broadcasting Act No. 32/2002, obtaining a broadcasting licence remains problematic because of the ongoing difference of opinion between the government and KPI about who has authority to grant broadcasting licences.[54] So, to avoid being closed by the Local Broadcasting Monitoring Institution (*Balai Monitor*), community radio must have acknowledgement and support from the local government. Thus, BBM Community Radio activists adopted a 'cultural strategy'. As the former capital city of the Mataram Sultanate, Yogyakarta is the centre of Javanese culture.[55] The local population still see the Sultan of Yogyakarta, Hamengku Buwono X, who is also the Governor of Yogyakarta Special Region, as a cultural icon as well as a political leader. As a cultural leader, he has interest in preserving Javanese culture. For this reason, in 2002 activists of Radio BBM invited him to visit the studio to observe the role of the station in cultural preservation in Minomartani. During his visit, the Sultan was invited to participate in a talk show with his people in Minomartani. The visit had a positive impact on BBM Community Radio, and on other community radio stations in Yogyakarta. Resulting publicity about this visit illustrated the Sultan and Governor acknowledging the benefit of community radio for the community. His autographed photograph was framed and hung on the studio wall of BBM Community Radio as evidence of his support.

Conclusion

BBM Community Radio continues to play an important role in the community radio movement in Indonesia. It demonstrates that the establishment of a community radio station should not be seen as the starting point for organizing people, but rather should be viewed as an extension of an existing desire to communicate.[56] It plays a valuable cultural role by facilitating dialogue between diverse elements in a community, optimizing radio's potential to provide a community with relevant local content.

During its development, BBM Community Radio went through three stages: first, creating a sense of community through cultural activities; second, establishing a radio station as a forum for people to get together; and third, developing radio as a medium for community development. In the first stage, most activities in the Minomartani Cultural Hall were aimed at encouraging residents to come together and interact during cultural activities and meetings. Minomartani residents were encouraged to practise their traditions and other cultural activities. They used the cultural hall as a place to present their art performances and social activities. At that stage, the cultural hall encouraged a focus on cultural expression, especially of traditional culture, to strengthen community and communality. In the second stage, BBM Community Radio functioned as a broadcasting forum where residents could get together. Its programmes developed a media habit among the residents. The programme, *Mbah Tro Mulur* illustrates how the broadcasts could strengthen audience solidarity with residents encouraged to communicate through

radio. Residents learnt from their own experiences how to use the media. Finally, in the third stage BBM Community Radio developed the capacity of residents by giving them the opportunity to express themselves through radio and to develop self-reliance, participation and organization.

Given the difficulties ordinary people have in expressing their local culture through mainstream media, community radio functioned as an alternative means of cultural preservation. As a medium for cultural identity, it became a public arena, an on-air community hall, where people exchange their experiences. Participants in community radio's on-air programmes also join in community radio's off-air activities, promoting local culture and strengthening solidarity. Community radio gives people more options for distributing and receiving information of benefit to them. But this is only possible if the media operates within a system that is democratic. Such radio provides a public sphere in a simple format, with flexible rules, no hierarchy and a participatory environment, enabling village people access and creating a sense of democratic communication. In Indonesia's transition to democracy after the fall of the New Order, community radio has played its role in civil society's movement for social change, to democratize the political system, in what Antlov sees as a mechanism of democracy that allows people to be heard.[57]

Notes

1 P.M. Lewis, 'Community media: giving "a voice to the voiceless",' in P.M. Lewis and J. Susan (eds), From the Margins to the Cutting Edge: Community Media and Empowerment, Cresskil: Hampton Press, 2006, pp. 13–39.

2 J. Servaes, 'Linking theoretical perspectives to policy,' in J. Servaes, T.L. Jacobson and S.A. White, Participatory Communication for Social Change, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1996, p. 32. See also P. Thomas, 'Participatory development communication: philosophical premises,' in A.G. Dagron and T. Tufte (eds), Communication for Social Change Anthology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, New Jersey: Communication for Social Change Consortium, 2006, p. 475.

3 P.M. Shingi and B. Mody, 'The effects gap hypothesis,' in A.G. Dagron and T. Tufte (eds), Communication for Social Change Anthology, p. 126.

4 C. Rodriguez, 'Civil society and citizens' media: peace architects for the new millennium,' in K.G. Wilkins (ed.), Redeveloping Communication for Social Change: Theory, Practice, and Power, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, pp. 147–60.

5 These Latin American scholars (whose work can be found in A.G. Dagron and T. Tufte (eds), *Communication for Social Change Anthology*) were concerned about the use of development communication in the context of local culture, to enable people to participate. They promoted a new model which should develop from the local situation. For example, J.D. Bordenave ('Communication theory and rural development: a brief review,' in A.G. Dagron and T. Tufte (eds), *Communication for Social Change Anthology*, pp. 133–41) suggests a need for new models in agricultural development. L.R. Beltran ('Rural development and social communication relationships and strategies,' in A.G. Dagron and T. Tufte (eds), *Communication for Social Change Anthology*, 2006, pp. 76–87) argues about the need for a new model to answer problems of rural development and social communication in Latin America. J.M. Barbero ('Communication from the perspective of culture,' in A.G. Dagron and T. Tufte (eds), *Communication for Social Change Anthology*, 2006, pp. 333–42) argues for the importance of culture in the construction of communication theories.

6 Servaes, Linking theoretical perspectives, p. 17. See also S.A. White, 'The concept of participation: transforming rhetoric to reality,' in A.G. Dagron and T. Tufte (eds), Communication for Social Change Anthology, p. 482.
7 P. Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983.
8 J. Downing, Radical Media: Rebellious Communication And Social Movements, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2001, p. 45.
9 Lewis, Community media, p. 20. See also Thomas, Participatory Development, pp. 476–77.
10 Downing, Radical Media, p. 46.
11 UNESCO began its community radio campaign programmes in 1980, with the first community radio in Africa being built in Kenya in 1982. In Asia, UNESCO and Danish International Development Assistance (DANIDA) facilitated the first community radio in Sri Lanka. C. Fraser and S.R. Estrada, Community Radio Handbook, UNESCO, 2001, pp. 8–12.
12 Servaes, 'Linking theoretical perspectives', pp. 15–17.
13 See M. Kaufman, 'Community power, grassroots democracy, and the transformation of social life,' in M. Kaufman and H.D. Alfonso, Community Power & Grassroots Democracy, Zed Books, London, 1997, pp. 1–24.
14 A.E. Siregar, Indonesia: Democracy, Economic Development and the Media, 2002. Available http://www.magazine.org.tw/events/fippseoul/presentation/S-I%20amir.pdf (Accessed 22 April 2005).
15 Interview with Ali Pangestu, 6 April 2007.
16 Kompas 27 May 2002.
17 Akhmad Nasir, a founder of Angkringan Community Radio, argued that to promote community radio in Indonesia, the stations had to raise their profile to gain greater attention from policy makers involved in the process of drafting the Broadcasting Act. In 2002, this led community radio stations to consolidate their power, building an association and networking (Interview 25 July 2006).
18 The NGOs included Yogyakarta NGO Forum (Forum LSM), the Legal Aid Institute (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum), the Environmental NGOs Forum (Wahana Lingkungan Hidup), KAPALA, USC Satu Nama, Combined Resource Institution and LAPERA. (Interview with Mart Widie, the secretary of the JRKY, 11 May 2006.)
19 This process of building social coalitions was part of the community radio movement strategy everywhere. Experiences in various countries, such as in Latin America, showed that community radio was given legal recognition as a result of a long process of struggle. They were often opposed by the government and corporate media (see C. Rodriguez, Fissures in the Mediascape. An International Study of Citizens' Media, Cresskill: Hampton Press, 2001, p. 10). AMARC is Association Mondiale Des Radiodiffuseurs Communautaires or World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters.
20 P. Kitley, 'Civil society in charge? television and the public sphere in Indonesia after Reformasi', in P. Kitley (ed.), Television, Regulation and Civil Society in Asia, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, pp. 97–114.
21 Interview with Zainal Suryokusumo, 18 December 2006.
22 Masduki, Regulasi Penyiaran: dari Otoriter ke Liberal, Yogyakarta: LKIS, 2007, p. 130.
23 C. Rodriguez, 'From alternative media to citizens' media,' in A.G. Dagron and T. Tufte (eds), Communication for Social Change Anthology, p. 764.
24 Commission I of the House of Representative oversees Acts concerning information, including the Broadcasting Act No. 32/2002.
25 Interview with Effendy Choirie, 16 March 2007.
26 One community radio activist involved in the drafting process felt the security issue emanated from the Department of Defence.
27 R. Henschke, 'Power to the people,' in Inside Indonesia, October–December 2002. Available http://www.insideindonesia.org/edit72/Theme%20Henschke (Accessed 6 February 2007).

28 In the debates about the KPI and community radio, commercial broadcasting institutions tend to support the government's position (Tempointeraktif, 'KPI dikritik soal kasus MNC,' 9 May 2008. http://www.tempointeraktif.com/read.php?NyJ = cmVhZA = = &MnYj = MTIyNzYO. (Accessed 9 May 2008). The support of commercial broadcasters for the government can be seen in two cases: first, the judicial review of the position of KPI under the Broadcasting Act No. 32/2002; and second, the head of PRSSNI arguing that the idea of community radio derived from foreign organizations, and that it would erode nationalism and create grass-roots conflicts (Dirgantara Online vol. 12, no. 3–4 May-August 2002. 'Apa Kabar Radio Kampus?', http://dirgantara.idxc.org/dirga12/1203b.shtml (Accessed 3 January 2007).

29 AMARC, 'Country Assessment Indonesia.' http://documents.amarc.org/files/2005–09–08/Indonesia.pdf (Accessed 13 June 2008).

30 AMARC, 'Country Assessment Indonesia.

31 Networks include Indonesian Community Radio Network (*Jaringan Radio Komunitas Indonesia*), Community Radio Network for Democracy (*Jaringan Radio Komunitas untuk Demokrasi*), Indonesian Farmers' Solidarity Radio Network (*Jaringan Radio Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia*), Farmers' Voice Radio Network (*Jaringan Radio Suara Petani*), Fishermen's Voice Radio Network (*Jaringan Radio Suara Nelayan*), Indonesian Campus Radio Forum (*Forum Radio Kampus Indonesia*) and Urban Poor Consortium (UPC) Community Radio.

32 Lindsay, J., 'Making waves: private radio and local identities in Indonesia', Indonesia, no. 64, October 1997, pp. 106–7. Available http://e-publishing.library.cornell.edu/Dienst/Repository/ (Accessed 25 May 2005). C. Wild, 'Indonesia: a nation and its broadcasters,' Indonesia Circle, no. 43, 1987, p. 19.

33 Kementerian Penerangan-Djawatan Radio Republik Indonesia 1953, p. 12; Wild, 'Indonesia: a nation and its broadcasters,' p. 19.

34 This was stated in the forum on Advocacy Strategies for Community Broadcast Institutions ('Strategi Advokasi Lembaga Penyiaran Komunitas'), 14 May 2002, Jakarta. See Laporan Lokakarya Nasional Strategi Advokasi Lembaga Penyiaran Komunitas, Jakarta 12–15 Mei 2002, p. 32.

35 K. Sen and D.T. Hill, Media, Culture and Politics in Indonesia, Melbourne: Oxford University Press.2000, p. 16

36 F. Lucas, Primer on Community Based Radio, Manila: Asian Social Institute and World Association for Christian Communication, 1995, p. 5.

37 Rodriguez, 'From alternative media to citizens' media,' p. 766.

38 Rodriguez, 'From alternative media to citizens' media,' p. 774.

39 Interview with Kisno, 13 September 2006

40 Puskat means Pusat Kateketik or Catechetical Centre. It is an Indonesian Jesuit Institution. Audio Visual Studio is a part of that institution, hence the studio is better known as the Studio Audio Visual Puskat (SAV Puskat). Well-known as the centre of media production based on people centred development, the SAV Puskat was established in 1969 as a laboratory to support educational activities at Pradnyawidya Catechetical School (see http://www.savpuskat.or.id/profil.php?ver = eng, Accessed 2 November 2009).

41 Although the BBM compound was established by a Catholic institution, there is no church there and BBM is not used by SAV Puskat for religious activities.

42 S.A.White, 'The concept of participation: transforming rhetoric to reality,' in A.G. Dagron and T. Tufte (eds), Communication for Social Change Anthology, p. 482.

43 Interview with Kusuma, 13 May 2006.

44 A. Tanesia, 'Seni dan budaya Desa Minomartani,' in A. Nasir, A. Tanesia, I. Prakoso and M. Amri, Media Rakyat: Mengorganisasi Diri Melalui Informasi, Yogyakarta: Combine Resource Institution, 2007, pp. 102–05.

45 Interview with Giovanni, 14 March 2006.

46 White, The concept of participation, p. 484.

47 'Since it began, Radio BBM has supported cultural preservation,' said Margio, a member of Community Broadcasting Board of Radio BBM (Interview 8 March 2006).

48 RCTP consisted of three series: the first 'Mendung di Kartasura', had seven episodes; the second, 'Bumi Sesigar Semangka', had 14 episodes; and the third, 'Tahta Semusim', had ten episodes. Other programmes include Traditional Jokes (Dagelan Mataram), Ethnic Music (Jajah Nusantara), Mbah Tro Mulur (Nambah Mitro Ketemu Sedulur [To add friends and to find family]), Educational items and Children's Fairy Tales (Dongeng Anak).

49 C. Fraser and S.R. Estrada, 'Community radio for change and development,' Society for International Development, vol. 45, no. 4, 2002, p. 70. Available http://proquest. umi.com.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/ (Accessed 17 January 2005).

50 Data of Bureau of Statistics (BPS) of Yogyakarta Special Region shows that in Sleman Regency in 2006, where Minomartani is located, the population density per square kilometre was 1,754.05 (Susenas, BPS Provinsi D.I. Yogyakarta, available http://www. bps.go.id [Accessed 30 May 2008]).

51 Tanesia, 'Seni dan budaya Desa Minomartani', p. 105.

52 R.M. Alfaro, 'Popular cultures and participatory communication on the route to redefinitions,' in A.G. Dagron and T. Tufte (eds), Communication for Social Change Anthology, pp. 745–46.

53 Interview with Surowo, 3 March 2006.

54 On 28 July 2004, the Constitutional Court approved a judicial review of the Broadcasting Act No. 32/2002 that stripped the KPI of the authority to issue broadcasting licences, returning that authority to the government, as had been the case during the New Order. Amelia, a member of the KPI, asserts that government broadcasting regulations are not oriented to ordinary people (personal communication 26 March 2007). Pointing to Government Regulation No. 51/2005, she argues that it is more complicated to establish a community broadcasting institution than a commercial one, reflecting a policy bias against community radio.

55 Sen and Hill (Media, Culture and Politics in Indonesia, p. 16) argue that Yogyakarta has an important position in Indonesian politics since it is seen as the cultural capital of the Javanese, the ethnic majority in Indonesia. It is well known as a student city and home to hundreds of higher-degree institutions.

56 J.L. Hochheimer, 'Organising Community Radio: Issues in Planning', Communications, vol. 24, no. 4, 1999, p. 451.

57 H. Antlov, 'Not enough politics! Power, participation and the new democratic polity in Indonesia,' in E. Aspinall and G. Fealy, Local Power and Politics in Indonesia, Decentralisation & Democratisation, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003, p. 73.

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4   Riding waves of change

Islamic press in post-authoritarian Indonesia[1]

Budi Irawanto

> *The position of the Islamic press is very strategic in waging the wars of thought (gazwul-fikr). They [enemies of Islam] wage war through shaping opinion, therefore we must anticipate this with an Islamic press.*[2]
>
> — Shiddiq Amien, leader of *Persatuan Islam* (PERSIS)[3]

'Start with foreplay. For instance, kissing, hugging, and touching. Do not go directly to your main intention.'[4] If you speculate that this steamy passage comes from an Indonesian men's or adult magazine, you are completely wrong. Instead, it comes from an article in the December 2005 edition of the Islamic bridal magazine, *Anggun* that expounds how the Prophet Muhammad enjoined husbands and wives to beautify their union with kisses and romantic words. It would have been unthinkable to find such a sexually explicit passage in the Islamic press in Indonesia ten years ago. The change is probably due to the impact of the 1998 *Reformasi* movement, which created more space for press freedom and ended many cultural taboos. Not surprisingly, according to the Indonesian Press Publishers Association (SPS), in 1999 (one year after *Reformasi*) the number of publications in Indonesia has rocketed from 289 to 1,398,[5] though the readership is still very limited.[6]

In the context of this tremendous proliferation of print media in Indonesia, the case of the Islamic press[7] warrants particular scrutiny for two reasons. First, statistically 88 per cent of the total Indonesian population, or 215 million, is Muslim, which constitutes the largest potential readership for Indonesian print media. Consequently, studying the Islamic press enables us to capture the aspirations of a large majority of Indonesian readers. Second, since *Reformasi* there has been a proliferation of Islamic media, both in number and diversity of content. Throughout the New Order, there were little more than a dozen. In 1994, there were only 13 Islamic publications from a total of 275 publications in Indonesia.[8] It was somewhat surprising for many foreign observers that, while the majority of the Indonesian population was Muslim, two of the largest daily newspapers were associated with Christian interests.[9] There were also very few studies on Islamic media in Indonesia especially during the New Order era. Exceptions include Liddle's study on the scriptural tradition of *Media Dakwah*,[10] Hefner's

study on the rivalry between *Republika* daily and *Media Dakwah*,[11] and Siegel's study on 'Kiblat and the Mediatic Jew'.[12] The scope of these three studies was limited to only two publications, the leading daily *Republika* and the magazine *Media Dakwah*.

In contrast to the previous studies, this chapter focuses on the proliferation of Islamic press since the fall of Suharto. This Islamic press has a diverse readership with a wide demographic in terms of age, gender, social group and ideology.[13] The chapter examines the process of negotiation between Islamic values, popular culture, mystic traditions and Indonesian contemporary politics as reflected in the pages of Islamic publications. This process of negotiation has become important following the bankruptcy of many Islamic media organisations caused by poor management and, on the larger plane, broader sociocultural changes in the aspirations of Indonesian Muslims. I argue that the economic and political sustainability of the Islamic press depends on its ability to appropriate popular culture and 'Islamise' it, and to articulate the politics of Islam in the context of contemporary Indonesia.

To substantiate my argument, this chapter is divided into three sections. The first section provides a brief history of the Islamic press in Indonesia from the Dutch colonial period to the New Order. The second section discusses the complexity of the negotiation process in the Islamic press in post-authoritarian Indonesia. The third section discusses the business future of this Islamic press in Indonesia.

A brief history of the Islamic press in Indonesia

According to research reported by the leading Indonesian Islamic daily *Republika* the term Islamic media, more commonly dubbed the 'Islamic press', refers to 'press in which journalism practices serve Muslim interests, both material and ethical'.[14] Using George J. Aditjondro's classification,[15] Islamic media, which constitutes 'the majority of religious media', aims to spread the faith and uphold Islamic religious values. Such religious values refer to the Holy Qur'an, *Hadits* (prophetic sayings and customs) and the thoughts from authoritative *ulama* (religious teachers). David T. Hill[16] includes 'Islamic media' (along with student press, regional press, English-language publications and Chinese-language publications) amongst 'the marginal presses' in Indonesia due to their limited circulation and readership. Laksmi and Haryanto[17] put 'Islamic media' along with Leftist-oriented book publishing, community-based radio and gender-oriented journals in the category of 'alternative media', since these could be seen as tools used by social activists in their struggles on issues such as community development, gender equality and the empowerment of civil society.

The dawn of the twentieth century marked the emergence of the Islamic press in Indonesia in tandem with the spread of the reformation of Islamic thought originating from Egypt.[18] This reformist movement was initiated and mediated by two leading Egyptian magazines, *Urwatul Wustho* and *Al Manar*. In Java, the Egyptian reformist initiatives inspired the *Jami'at Khair* movement whose members established many Islamic organisations in Indonesia, such as *Muhammadiyah*,

Syarikat Dagang Islam (Association of Muslim Traders), *Persatuan Islam* (Islamic Union) and *Jong Islamieten Bond* (Young Muslims Association).[19] Subsequently, the Islamic press was established to facilitate greater discussion of contemporary Islamic thought.

As an 'indigenous press' (*pers pribumi*), the Islamic press was also part of the radical resistance or political struggle against the Dutch colonial rule, and thus overtly partisan. The prototype of the Islamic press was *Al-Munir* published in Padang, West Sumatra, in 1911 by two renowned Islamic scholars (*ulama*), Haji Abdullah Ahmad (1878–1933) and Haji Abdul Karim Amrullah (1879–1945). These reformist scholars had a significant influence on Indonesian Muslims.[20] Although *Al-Munir* lasted only five years, it became the model for the Islamic press in Java.

Many Islamic publications were banned during the Japanese occupation. Of those that survived into the early years of Independence, some, such as *Kiblat*, *Adil*, *Almuslimun* and *Suara Muhammadiyah*, discussed issues related to Islamic law (*sharia*). The well-known Muslim writer Buya Hamka, together with other Islamic leaders, established the independent Islamic magazine, *Panji Masyarakat* (The Banner of Society), known as *Panjimas*. After Hamka passed away in 1981, his son M. Rusydi Hamka took over the magazine which has fostered some leading Muslim writers such as Azyumardi Azra, Komarudin Hidayat and Bactiar Effendy. *Panjimas* was probably the most prominent Islamic magazine in post-independence Indonesia until it finally collapsed in 2003 after a series of management crises.[21]

In the New Order era, the Islamic press was increasingly subject to market forces. Modernisation, in concert with 'developmentalism', became a major issue in the Islamic press and triggered much critical discussion among Muslim intellectuals in Islamic journals. Further, Suharto's New Order regime took some punitive action against the Islamic opposition (including banning *Abadi* daily). In 1985, some large media groups, such as the Kartini Group, expanded into the Islamic press. When Suharto initiated a *rapprochement* with Muslim political leaders during the early 1990s,[22] a marriage between the Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI), *Republika* daily and *Mizan* publishing house produced *Ummat* magazine, which died shortly after Suharto's fall.[23]

The current state of the Islamic press in Indonesia

After the fall of Suharto, new Islamic publications emerged and existing ones were revitalised and re-designed.[24] For instance, at the beginning of the *Reformasi* period, *Adil* tabloid, an organ of the modernist organisation *Muhammadiyah*, was initially incorporated into *Republika* daily, but later separated to become an independent and fairly objective publication. Meanwhile, *Tekad* tabloid, another publication created by *Republika* daily at times both criticises and defends the *Golkar* party and the military, but generally takes a critical standpoint on the Indonesian Party for Democratic Struggle (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan*, PDIP).[25]

Table 4.1 classifies the Islamic press, based on format, content and target readership.[26]

Table 4.1 Islamic press in contemporary Indonesia

No	Name of media	Format	Content	Target reader	Publisher
1.	*Al-Furqon*	Magazine	Islamic proselytising	General	Lajnah Dakwah Ma'had al-Furqon (Gresik)
2.	*Al-Hawari*	Magazine (half quarto size)[1]	Islamic proselytising	General	Yayasan Studi Islam Al-Bayan (Yogyakarta)
3.	*Alia*	Magazine	Popular culture	Adult women	Not mentioned[2] (Jakarta)
4.	*Alkisah*	Magazine (half quarto)	Mysticism	Family	Not mentioned (Jakarta)
5.	*Almuslimun*	Magazine (half quarto)	Islamic proselytising	General	Yayasan Almuslimun (Bangil)
6.	*Amanah*	Magazine	Popular culture	Family	Yayasan Damandiri dan Ikatan Persaudaran Haji Indonesia (Jakarta)
7.	*Anggun*	Magazine (half quarto)	Popular culture	Muslim brides	PT Variapop Group (Jakarta)
8.	*Annida*	Magazine (half quarto)	Islamic popular (youth) culture	Teenagers (especially girls)	PT Insan Media Pratama (Jakarta)
9.	*As Silmi*	Magazine (half quarto)	Islamic proselytising	General	PT Marwah Indo Media Group (Bogor)
10.	*Asy Syariah*	Magazine (half quarto)	Islamic proselytising	General	Oase Media/ Yayasan Asy Syariah (Yogyakarta)
11.	*Azikrra*	Magazine (half quarto)	Popular culture	General	Not mentioned (Jakarta)
12.	*Cahaya Sufi*	Magazine (half quarto)	Sufism	General	PT Cahaya Sufi Indonesia
13.	*Da'watuna*	Magazine (half quarto)	Islamic proselytising	General	Not mentioned (Jakarta)
14.	*Dunia Islami*	Magazine (half quarto)	Political Islam	General	PT Marwah Indo Media Group (Bogor)
15.	*Elfata*	Magazine (half quarto)	Islamic proselytising	Teenagers	Not mentioned (Semarang)
16.	*Fatawa*	Magazine	Political Islam	General	Yayasan Majelis at-Turots al-Islamy (Yogyakarta)

17. *Gerimis*	Magazine (half quarto)	Islamic proselytising	General	PT Marwah Indo Media Group (Bogor)
18. *Ghoib*	Magazine (half quarto)	Mysticism	General	Not mentioned (Jakarta)
19. *Hidayah*	Magazine (half quarto)	Mysticism	General	PT Variapop Group (Jakarta)
20. (*Suara*) *Hidayatullah*	Magazine	Political Islam	General	Yayasan Penerbitan Pers Hidayatullah (Surabaya)
21. *Hikayah*	Magazine (half quarto)	Mysticism	General	PT Baragas Jaya Utama (Jakarta)
22. *Hikmah*	Tabloid	Islamic rituals	General	Not mentioned (Jakarta)
23. *Kasyaf*	Magazine (half quarto)	Sufism	General	Yayasan Akmaliyah –Pesantren Akmaliyah (Jakarta)
24. *Khalifah*	Tabloid	Islamic rituals	Family	PT Khalifah Indomedia Pratama (Jakarta)
25. *Kisah Hikmah*	Tabloid	Mysticism	General	PT Nurani Media Teduh (Surabaya)
26. *Media Dakwah*	Magazine	Radical political Islam	General	Dewan Da'wah Islamiyah (Jakarta)
27. *Mu'minah*	Magazine (half quarto)	Islamic proselytising	General	PT Marwah Indo Media Group (Bogor)
28. *Muslimah*	Magazine (half quarto)	Islamic popular (youth) culture	Teenage girls	PT Variapop Group (Jakarta)
29. *Nabila*	Magazine (half quarto)	Popular culture	Adult women	CV Nabila Elita Media (Bandung)
30. *Nikah*	Magazine (half quarto)	Popular culture	Family	Not mentioned (Sukoharjo)
31. *Noor*	Magazine	Urban (popular) culture	Urbanites (adult women)	PT Nur Cahaya Teduh (Jakarta)
32. *Nurani*	Tabloid	Popular culture	Family	PT Nurani Media Teduh (Surabaya)
33. *Paras*	Magazine	Urban (popular) culture	Urbanites (especially adult women)	PT Variasi Malindo (Jakarta)
34. *Qiblati*	Magazine (half quarto)	Islamic rituals	General	CV Media Citra Qiblati (Yogyakarta)
35. *Republika*	Newspaper	Islamic issues	General	Yayasan Abdi Bangsa (Jakarta)

Table 4.1 Continued

No	Name of media	Format	Content	Target reader	Publisher
36.	*Sabili*	Magazine (half quarto)	Political Islam	General	PT Bina Media Sabili (Jakarta)
37.	*Salafy*	Magazine	Islamic rituals	Students	Pondok Pesantren Ihya' As-Sunnah (Yogyakarta)
38.	*Suaraquran*	Magazine (half quarto)	Sufism	General	Pesantren Taruna Al-Quran (Yogyakarta)
39.	*Syir'ah*	Magazine (half quarto)	Moderate political Islam	General	Yayasan Desantara (Jakarta)
40.	*Tarbawi*	Magazine (half quarto)	Islamic rituals	'Educated people' (students and white-collar workers)	Not mentioned (Jakarta)
41.	*Tashfia*	Magazine (half quarto)	Islamic rituals	General	Tashfia Indonesia (Yogyakarta)
42.	*Taubat*	Tabloid	Islamic proselytising	General	PT Barokah Media Unggul, Jawa Pos Group (Surabaya)
43.	*Ummi*	Magazine (half quarto)	Popular culture	Adult women	PT Insan Media Pratama (Jakarta)
44.	*Variasari*	Magazine (half quarto)	Popular culture	Family	PT Variasari (Jakarta)

While media production was largely centralised in Jakarta during the Suharto period, with political decentralisation, local media (including Islamic press) have grown rapidly, with new media being produced in places such as Bandung, Yogyakarta, Semarang, Sukoharjo, Surabaya, Gresik and Bangil.

Magazines in a half quarto (or 'booklet') size seem the most popular format for Islamic publications perhaps because it is practical, easy-to-handle and cheap to produce. Prices of Islamic publications range from Rp 4,500 (for tabloid or newspaper format) to Rp 23,300 (for colour, glossy magazines), to which readers living outside Java normally have to add postage or delivery. There is little financial attraction to invest in Islamic newspaper and tabloid publishing. Even the most successful, the Islamic daily *Republika*, has only a relatively small readership of about 320,000, making it the eleventh or twelfth-ranked newspaper nationally.[27]

The contemporary Islamic press offers readers material on women's issues, fashion spreads, home design and cooking tips, marriage and the family. The popularity of Islamic women's magazines, such as *Noor* and *Paras*, indicates the

seriousness with which women seek to educate themselves and the expansion of women's religious discussion groups (*kelompok pengajian*) over the last twenty years. In general, the mystical dimensions of religion appear in two forms in the current Islamic press: sufism and mystic stories. While in magazines like *Ghoib*, *Alkisah*, *Hikayah*, *Hidayah* and *Kisah Hikmah*, readers find numerous mystical stories along with religious lessons, in other magazines such as *Suaraquran*, *Kasyaf* and *Cahaya Sufi* readers can learn more of the spiritual and esoteric aspects of Islam. The sufi-oriented magazines are mostly published by Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*) which have begun to enter the media business. Generally, no pictures or photographs of humans appear in sufi-oriented magazines because their publishers want to avoid any hint of not conforming to the strict Islamic teaching which bans images of people or animals. *Salafy* magazine, which originated from Ihya-al-Sunah boarding school, is committed to political activism led by the militant leader, Ja'far Umar Thalib.[28]

Politically-oriented Islamic publications, such as *Sabili*, *Suara Hidayatullah* and *Media Dakwah*, are very critical of modern democracy, American hegemony and America's support (real and alleged) of Israel, since the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US.[29] These magazines are also critical of the Islamic State Universities (formerly known as *Institut Agama Islam Negeri* and later as *Universitas Islam Negeri*) which they see as agents of secularisation and even Orientalist thought because many of the lecturers and professors are graduates from western rather than Middle Eastern universities.

It is noteworthy that there is a linkage between the print media which are highly dependent on online sources – such as *Republika*, *Sabili*, *Suara Hidayatullah* and *Media Dakwah* – and fundamentalist online sources. Narratives positing a US–Israel conspiracy spread quickly though those media: the daily *Republika* published the email headlined '4,000 Jews absent on the WTC attack' in its 21 September 2001 edition. *Sabili* also published the story. *Republika* and other Islamic media have cited mailing-list conspiracy theories found in online sources such as Afghan Islamic Press and Islamic Online. Barkin[30] observed that 'One such survey (about the causes of 11 September) performed by *Republika* described the origin of the attacks as "speculative", with results indicating 34.4 per cent of respondents believed radical Jews were the perpetrators'.

Syir'ah (literally, 'path to God') expresses moderate political Islam by disseminating views on tolerance, promoting multiculturalism and critical discourse on *syariah*.[31] Unlike most Indonesian Islamic publications, which represent Islam as an exclusivist religion, *Syir'ah* shows an open and progressive Islamic view and a tolerance for difference. For instance, in June 2005, *Syir'ah* published an article about Yusman Roy, an *ulama* from Malang, East Java, who was detained by police for praying in Indonesian rather than Arabic.[32] *Syir'ah* felt there was no harm in interpreting the Muslim prayer (*sholat*) as Yusman did. *Syir'ah* also provided background information about long-standing deliberations over whether it was permissible to say *sholat* in languages other than Arabic, a topic debated for more than a thousand years.[33]

In order to give a more detailed picture of the Islamic press in contemporary

Indonesia, I will discuss *Sabili*, *Annida* and *Hidayah* as prominent examples of the diversity of content and readership.

Sabili: voicing radical political Islam

Sabili is popularly considered 'the largest Islamic publication in Indonesia'.[34] Established in 1988 by a group of *dakwah* (proselytisation) activists using pen names, the magazine did not obtain the publication permit legally required under the New Order regulations, and displayed the journalists' sympathy for the Afghan and Palestinian causes. Translated articles from Middle Eastern publications such as *Al-Mujtama* in Kuwait dominated *Sabili* before it ceased publication and was replaced by other short-lived publications, *Intilaq* and *Ishlah*. Since its inception *Sabili* covered global issues related to Muslim interests, such as the Afghan, Palestinian and Bosnian causes, rather than limiting its coverage to Indonesian Muslim concerns. According to *Sabili*'s editor Hery Nurdi, articles on global Islamic society were the safest way of criticising the New Order regime (interview, 22 July 2005).[35] *Sabili* was revived in 1998 with funding from several Muslim businessmen. It played to the euphoria of *Reformasi*, reporting on and highlighting controversial topics which quickly resulted in it being banned. These included reports about what the magazine believed to be aggressive Christian proselytising and the Tanjung Priok massacre in 1984.[36]

Given how short-lived many Islamic media have been, the survival of *Sabili* magazine is impressive. It has been argued that Islamic media is in a 'slow dance to the death'[37] caused by various factors such as poor management, the failure to capture the aspirations of the main readers and the practice of old-fashioned adversarial journalism. Many moderate Islamic media quickly went bankrupt when press freedom flourished under *Reformasi*. As media researcher Agus Muhammad[38] writes, 'While the market is dominated by the Islamic media voicing fanaticism and exclusivism, the moderate Islamic media are disappearing from the market'. According to Muhammad, poor management of financial and editorial policy is the main factor causing the decline of the moderate Islamic media.

Social and political conditions during the New Order affected *Sabili*. According to one of the magazine's founders, Zainal Muttaqin, *Sabili* was conscious of its position representing Indonesian Muslims who were suppressed and marginalised when it was established.[39] During the New Order, those critical Muslims aligned with *Sabili* were stigmatised as extreme right (*ekstrim kanan*) for their critical standpoint against the repressive military. This identification with the sense of marginalisation felt in the Muslim readership gave *Sabili* a unique position among Islamic media in Indonesia. As an editor of *Darul Islam*, Al Chaidar, describes the situation:

> Of course, there was *Panji Masyarakat* magazine, but it still published [articles on] fashion and *tabarruj* [cosmetics and make-up]. So it gave the impression that Islam is just about make-up rather than more substantial issues. Another publication was *Adzan*, but its journalistic language was not popular. In this

context *Sabili* was able to fill the gaps with up-dated political information and strong advocacy for Muslims. These won the sympathy of Muslims at that time.[40]

In a similar vein, A. Mabruri M. Akbari, the chief executive of *Ummi*, *Saksi* and *Annida* magazines, remarks,

> The advocacy style of *Sabili* provided a chance for Muslims, who previously had no media, to feel they were represented. This was a fortuitous coincidence: the suppressed Muslims in the New Order regime met the emergence of the media giving them voice.[41]

However, the development of *Sabili* was not without problems. Observers say that *Sabili* has had difficulty securing advertisements, the major financial support for any media. They argue that advertisers neglect *Sabili* because of its image as a radical publication, with a much segmented readership. Moreover, they question the quality of *Sabili*'s journalism. For instance, on 9 November 2002 in response to objections raised by the Concerned Brotherhood Youth Forum (*Forum Pemuda Peduli Ukuwah*, FPPU), the Indonesian Press Council (*Dewan Pers Indonesia*) released an evaluation of the quality of *Sabili*'s reporting in which it concluded that *Sabili* had practised sensationalist journalism and published opinionated and judgemental news articles.

In terms of economic sustainability, *Sabili* faces serious problems because its readership is declining significantly. From its peak in 2002–3, when *Sabili* sold more than 140,000 copies per edition equating to a readership exceeding a million, sales have since fallen to around 40,000 per edition, with a total estimated readership in 2007 of 324,000.[42]

Annida: Articulating Islamic youth culture

The name *Annida* is taken from the Qur'an and means 'a gentle call' (*menyeru dengan lemah-lembut*). This is because the mission of *Annida* is to call for 'right practice' (*haq*) based on the Qur'an and *Hadits*. Established in May 1991 by Dwi Septiawati (later the general manager of PT Insan Media Pratama, a company which produces many Islamic publications), the magazine focused on issues relevant to women.

In September 1993, *Annida* joined the Ummi Group (owned by PT Insan Media Pratama) and changed its target readership from women to teenage girls, adopting the new motto of a 'teen's best friend for sharing stories' (*sahabat terbaik berbagi cerita*). After considerable market uptake, selling around 90,000 copies per month, in 1999 *Annida* changed from monthly to fortnightly. The editors included more fiction, particularly short stories, than serious articles on Islamic proselytising. *Annida* became a vehicle for many young Muslim writers to publish their works, with encouragement from a Writers' Circle group (*Forum Lingkar Pena*, FLP).[43] According to the former editor of *Annida* and founder of FLP, Helvy Tiana Rosa,

Annida has published about 1,600 short stories over the past decade, and has also helped develop young writers through activities such as seminars, writing workshops, working together with schools, university students and grass-roots communities.[44] Short stories are chosen as the main content of *Annida* because the form is already familiar to teenage readers and can convey an Islamic message effectively. Helvy Tiana Rosa said that the short stories published by the magazine should reflect three characteristics: First, they should resist exploiting a woman's body and sexuality. Second, they should depict good Muslim women with devout spiritual intentions, Islamic intellect and doing good deeds. Finally, they should portray women who hold firm to their ideology.[45]

To attract more teenage readers, in 2003 *Annida* replaced its old motto with 'Smart, Hip, *Sharia*-Minded' (*Cerdas*, *Gaul*, *Syar'i*) and in 2009 changed it again to 'Unlimited Inspirations' (*Inspirasi Tak Bertepi*). This spirit is clearly reflected in many of *Annida* regular features, such as personal advice columns, articles on Islamic fashion[46] and popular or practical knowledge of Islamic law. Although it draws heavily on popular culture, *Annida* also includes information on contemporary politics in Indonesia such as the general elections (*Pemilu*) and public debate over the drafting of an Anti Pornography and Porno-action Bill (*RUU Anti-Pornografi dan Porno-aksi*).[47]

Hidayah: Reinventing mystical tradition

Established in 2001 three years after the fall of Suharto, *Hidayah* achieved instant popularity, becoming Indonesia's top-ranked magazine, chosen by 4.9 per cent of 40 million readers above ten years old from nine Indonesian major cities (according to 2006 Media Nielsen Research). As the chief editor, Ridwan recalls, 'All copies of the first twelve editions were sold out; even now some people are still looking for those editions'.[48] The main content of *Hidayah* is mystery stories, purportedly based on actual occurrences, that contain religious lessons, as emphasised by an introductory note from the editor entitled 'reading *Hidayah*, finding lessons' (*membaca Hidayah menuai Iktibar*). Many of the mystery stories are about the death of sinners (such as criminals, gamblers or loan sharks), while demonstrating how God's law has worked more effectively than Indonesia's secular law.

According to Ridwan, in 2005 *Hidayah*'s readership was declining slightly for many reasons, including the petrol price rises which left people with less disposable income, the popularity of religious television drama (*sinetron religius*) and the public's shifting attraction from reading print materials to televisual entertainment. At first, the popularity of the so-called *sinetron religius* (religious television drama)[49] helped to boost the sales of *Hidayah*, but over time people chose to watch these *sinetron religius* rather than read the magazine. Since mystic stories are its core content, *Hidayah* has been accused of luring Muslims away from rational ways of thinking and practising cheap exploitative journalism. However, the editor of *Hidayah* claims that the magazine also publishes articles in a variety of styles featuring good inspiring stories (*khusnul khotimah*) with religious lessons, such as Stories of the Book (*Kisah Kitab*), Qur'anic Stories

(*Kisah Qur'an*), profiles of Islamic preachers and prominent Muslims and stories of missionary work (*Syiar*).

The variety of Islamic publications, as noted previously, is inseparable from the profile of publishers. Politically-oriented Islamic magazines such as *Suara Hidayatullah*, *Media Dakwah* and *Sabili* are commonly established by Muslim activists, whereas popular culture and mystical magazines such as *Anggun*, *Muslimah*, *Hidayah* and *Taubat*, are set up by media groups such as PT Varia Pop and the Jawa Pos Group. It is noteworthy that some Islamic publications such as *Ummi*, *Saksi* and *Tarbawi* have strong affiliation with the Prosperous Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, PKS). Although *Sabili* did not have direct relationship with the PKS, it openly supported the party in the 2004 election.

Keeping their heads above water

There have been many obstacles to the growth of the Islamic press and readership has declined in recent years. They do not attract sufficient advertising revenue, refraining from advertising cigarettes, alcohol or other products that are not *halal* (allowed by Islamic law). One of the founders of *Sabili*, Zainal Muttaqin, stated that the magazine would only advertise 'things that are clearly *halal* and clearly good' (*sesuatu yang jelas-jelas halal, jelas-jelas baik*).[50] Advertisers are reluctant to pay to advertise in media that have a limited readership and content. Media planner of Metro Advertising, Bambang Dwi Cahyono, remarked,

> *Sabili* is really hardline, very radical. As far as I'm concerned, that's fine. We should have courageous media that dares to speak frankly. But, they have to accept the market consequences. In the end, advertisers say: What kind of readers will we reach if we place advertisements there? Is our product compatible with *Sabili*?[51]

While *Hidayah*, for example, had quite a large readership, its advertising revenue was limited because its readership was not an attractive target market for advertisers. As Ahmad Zairofi, editor of *Tarbawi* magazine, says, 'Most Islamic magazines are based on donations'.[52] Commonly, the Muslim media attract only small or classified ads (*iklan mini*). Many such publications were not set up as businesses, but to promote spiritual ideals. Magazines like *Al-Furqon*, *Al-Hawari*, *Almuslimun*, *Kasyaf*, *Salafy* and *Suaraquran*, published by *pesantren*, resemble 'in-house bulletins' rather than commercial media. Such publications may commonly be managed unprofessionally and appear only irregularly. Magazines such as *Panji Masyarakat* (*Panjimas*), *Kiblat*, *Suara Azan* and *Ummat* went bankrupt due to poor financial management.

With a very limited range of content and without professional distributors, Islamic publications struggle to find more than a small readership. Most are only displayed in small kiosks that specialise in the sale of Islamic books and other religious items. The few that are displayed in newspaper kiosks throughout urban neighbourhoods lack appeal when placed next to other popular publications. As

Watson observes, 'Muslim newspapers and journals with covers of pretty, demure women wearing head scarves and long robes rub shoulders with tabloids and men's magazines with pictures of attractive buxom women in swimming costumes and revealing dresses'.[53] As the media analysts Sudibyo[54] and Muhammad[55] observe, the quality of journalism is low, particularly in the radical Islamic media. Although some publications claim to have a staff of reporters, the content is repetitive, limited and poorly edited. Generally, articles are highly opinionated rather than investigative. Common are heavily didactive articles filled with Qur'anic quotations. Akbar Muzakki, an editor of *Suara Hidayatullah*, admits, 'If we really tried investigative reporting in religious media we would face hurdles because not everyone would be prepared to give us concrete data or facts'.[56]

Conclusion

The fall of Suharto's authoritarian New Order has contributed to the proliferation of Islamic press in Indonesia. As a result, the Islamic press is more pluralistic and polyphonic rather than merely being the medium for Islamic proselytising (*dakwah*). Some Islamic media have appropriated popular culture, while adapting it to Islamic values. The Islamic press has continuously negotiated the massive spread of supposedly secular-westernised popular culture facilitated by globalisation. There is a new phenomenon in religious proselytising that employs mystical, supernatural beliefs to call Muslims back to their basic faith exemplified in *Hidayah*, *Hikayah*, *Ghoib*, *Kisah Hikmah* and *Alkisah*. In the uncertain and perplexing conditions brought about by political transition and globalisation, such mystical stories provide hope and ease people's anxiety. In the same vein, most articles in politically-oriented Islamic press reflect a deep suspicion of the westernised secular, cultural and political system seen as increasingly hegemonic in Indonesia. Articles in *Sabili*, *Suara Hidayatullah and Media Dakwah* on the hegemony of the US and its Jewish allies framed by a 'theory of conspiracy' are instances of such anxiety.

This study to some extent affirms Watson's[57] argument that Islam is indeed a major point of reference, not for its immediate impact on national politics, but because it presents an ideal of a better way to live and provides mechanisms for coping with the stresses of life in contemporary Indonesia. It also reaffirms one of the conclusions of Fealy's[58] study on consuming Islam, that 'the greatest impact of commodified Islam is in the cultural and spiritual sphere'. Yet the lack of commercial success suggests that the Islamic press still faces many challenges, particularly on how to sustain journalistic integrity, expand its readership, and create efficient marketing and distribution. Clearly Islamic content is not per se a cultural drawcard for consumers. These publications must compete with television as this popular media produces many Islamic programmes for Muslim audiences. This is inseparable from recent developments in Indonesia, which show the deeper intrusion of religious-based content into supposedly secular popular culture, exemplified by the large number of TV programmes with religious material.

Notes

1 The author is grateful to the participants of the workshop on Mediating Transition to Post-Authoritarian Indonesia, organised by Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, Perth, 9–10 October 2006, for their helpful (often humorous) comments and suggestions on drafts of this chapter, some portions of which have appeared in *Jurnal Sosial Politik*, Vol. 9, No. 3, March 2006.

2 Kedudukan pers Islam amat strategis untuk menangkal perang pemikiran (gazwul fikr). Mereka [musuh-musuh Islam] melancarkan perang melalui pembentukan opini, sehingga kita pun harus mengantisipasinya dengan pers Islam. (quoted in 'Nasib Pers Keagamaan Kita', *Pikiran Rakyat*, 13 February 2006. Available: www.pikiran-rakyat.com/cetak/2006/022006/13/teropong/index.html [accessed June 2006]).

3 *Persatuan Islam* (Islamic Union, *Persis*) was established formally on 12 September 1923 in Bandung by a group of Muslims interested in religious study and activity. The organisation grew out of their informal religious discussions. The two leading figures in these discussions were Haji Zamzam and Haji Muhammad Junus. Now, the *Persatuan Islam* is a small educational and religious community across Indonesia and Malaysia, but its relatively few followers are mostly intense believers in Islamic piety and righteous behaviour. H. M. Federspiel, *Islam and Ideology in the Emerging Indonesian State: The Persatuan Islam (PERSIS), 1923 to 1957*, Leiden: Brill, 2001, provides an excellent study of the history and development of the *Persatuan Islam*.

4 Mulailah dengan pemanasan. Misalnya, dengan saling bercumbu rayu, saling meraba dan peluk-pelukan, tidak langsung pada tujuan (M. Anshari, 'Etika Berjimak dalam Islam', Anggun, December, 2005, p. 94.)

5 Tim Peneliti Dewan Pers, 'Media Performance: Sebuah Kerangka Analisa', in Rahayu (ed.), *Menyingkap Profesionalisme Surat Kabar di Indonesia*, Jakarta: Dewan Pers, Depkominfo and PKMBP, 2006, pp. 1–20.

6 J. Oetama, 'Powering the Media Dynamics', Kompas, 17 March, 2005.

7 I use the term 'Islamic press' to refer to the print media, although the Indonesian term 'pers' is sometimes used for both the print and electronic media (K. Sen and D. T. Hill, *Media, Culture and Politics in Indonesia*, Melbourne: Oxford University Press. 2000, p. 71).

8 D. D. Malik, 'Media Islam: Media Pinggiran', in I. S. Ibrahim and D. D. Malik (eds), *Hegemoni Budaya*, Yogyakarta: Bentang, 1997, pp. 42–48.

9 D. T. Hill, *The Press in the New Order Indonesia*, Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1995.

10 R. W. Liddle, 'Media Dakwah Scriptualism: One Form of Islamic Political Thought and Action in New Order Indonesia', in M. R. Woodward (ed.), *Toward A New Paradigm: Recent Development in Indonesian Islamic Thought,* Tempe, Arizona: Arizona State University Program for Southeast Asia Studies, 1996, pp. 323–56.

11 R. W. Hefner, 'Print Islam: Mass Media and Ideological Rivalries Among Indonesian Muslims', *Indonesia*, 64, 1997 pp. 76–103.

12 J. T. Siegel, 'Kiblat and the Mediatic Jew', *Indonesia*, 69:, 2000 pp. 9–40.

13 In this chapter I only analyse Islamic publications which are circulated in Yogyakarta, Java. Therefore, Islamic publications from beyond central Java might be overlooked. However, since most mass media is produced on Java, this analysis would capture the most prominent Islamic press in Indonesia. It would be extremely difficult to calculate the precise number of Islamic publications in Indonesia. With the media deregulation and political liberalisation that followed the fall of Suharto, anyone with sufficient capital may produce a publication, distributing it privately and hoping to make a profit, without the New Order requirement for a publishing permit (Surat Izin Usaha Penerbitan Pers, SIUPP).

14 [P]ers yang dalam kegiatan jurnalistiknya melayani kepentingan umat Islam, baik yang berupa materi (misalnya politik) atau nilai-nilai. (as cited in A. Swastika, 'Anak Muda

Islam Indonesia, Lagunya Enak, Penampilannya Sopan', *Kunci* 13, December, 2003a. Available: www.kunci.or.id/teks/13media.html [accessed 13 January 2005])

15 G. J. Aditjondro, 'Bulletin versus Bullets: The Politics of the Alternative Media in Indonesia', paper presented at *The 'ASIA 95' Lunchtime Seminar*, Perth: Centre for Asian Studies of the University of Western Australia, April, 1995.

16 Hill, *The Press in the New Order Indonesia*.

17 S. Laksmi and I. Haryanto, 'Indonesia: Alternative Media Enjoying A Fresh Breeze', in K. Seneviratne (ed.), *Media Pluralism in Asia: The Role and Impact of Alternative Media*, Singapore: AMIC and Nanyang Technology University, 2007, pp. 53–85.

18 In the early twentieth century Muslim education in Indonesia (then known as the Dutch East Indies) underwent significant changes, as the influential ideas of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad 'Abduh, who advocated Pan-Islamism and Islamic Modernism, were brought back to Indonesia by returning pilgrims and students. Al-Afghani and 'Abduh argued that a 'return to teachings of Qur'an and Hadith' would revitalise Islam, uniting Muslims across the world into a single religio-political community. For a brief description about the development of Islam in Indonesia in the first quarter of the twentieth century, see Federspiel's (2001) introduction of his book.

19 Joenaedi as cited by 'Media Massa Islam Indonesia', *Kunci* 13, December 2003b. Available: www.kunci.or.id/teks/13media.htm (accessed 13 January 2005).

20 For an interesting discussion of the development of Islam in Southeast Asia, see H. J. Benda, 'Islam di Asia Tenggara dalam Abad ke-20', in A. Azra (ed.), *Perspektif Islam di Asia Tenggara*, Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia. 1989, pp. 68–97.

21 S. W. E. Soekanto, 'Islamic Media and the Slow Dance to Death', *The Jakarta Post*, 2 October 2004.

22 As Suharto's support within the military wavered, he started to reconcile with Islamic groups (R.W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.). Some gestures from Suharto were quite clear such as the removal of the prohibition against the veil for Muslim girls in schools in 1991 (Smith-Hefner 2007), his pilgrimage to Mecca with his family, and his close relationship with particular Muslim reformists, especially some activists of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (ICMI). For a discussion of ICMI, see Hefner, R. W.,'Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle Class', *Indonesia*, 56, 1993, pp. 1–35.

23 Soekanto, 'Islamic Media'.

24 This phenomenon contrasts to Islamic book publishing which has been booming since the 1980s. While it was affected slightly by the 1997 economic crisis, it quickly recovered. For a more detailed discussion of contemporary Islamic book publishing, see Watson, C.W., 'Islamic Books and Their Publishers: Notes on the Contemporary Indonesian Scene', *Journal of Islamic Studies*, 16: 2, 2005, pp. 177–210.

25 J. Olle, 'Sex, Money, Power', *Inside Indonesia*, 6), January–March, 2000. Available: www.insideindonesia.org/edit60/jolle1.htm (accessed 4 October 2005).

26 Some Islamic media for children are excluded because they are merely a small business unit of a larger media group. For instance, *Aku Anak Saleh* (I am a Pious Muslim Kid) is managed by PT Anak Saleh Pratama under the same media group as *Gatra* and *Sportif* magazines. Other Islamic media for children include *Wildan*, *Ya Bunayya*, *Didik* and *Hanif*. Excluded also are media produced for internal distribution within Islamic organisations, such as *Suara Muhammadiyah* (Muhammadiyah's internal bulletin), *Risalah* and *Al Kahbar* (circulated within the Persatuan Islam organisation).

27 G. Fealy, 'Consuming Islam: Commodified Religion and Aspirational Pietism in Contemporary Indonesia', in G. Fealy and S. White (eds) *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia*, Singapore: ISEAS, 2008, p. 22.

28 Hefner, *Civil Islam*.

29 S. Soekanto ('The Western Media and Prosperous Justice Party', *The Jakarta Post*, 24 June 2005) notes that, despite having been previously involved in demonstrations

outside the US Embassy in Jakarta, some journalists with Islamic media wrote very positively about American society after visiting the US at the invitation of the Foreign Press Centre of the US State Department.

30 G. Barkin, 'Indonesian Media Reaction to Terrorist Attacks in the United States', 2001. Available: http://web.mit.edu/cms/reconstructions/communications/indonesia.html (accessed 7 June 2006).

31 Laksmi, and Haryanto, 'Indonesia: Alternative Media', p. 66.

32 Laksmi and Haryanto, 'Indonesia: Alternative Media', p. 62.

33 Laksmi and Haryanto, 'Indonesia: Alternative Media', p. 67.

34 Soekanto, 'Islamic Media'.

35 It was a common practice during the New Order regime for media to avoid direct criticism of government policies since the government Department of Information had the power to revoke the obligatory publishing permit (SIUPP). This led to journalists and publications 'self-censoring', and writing up news euphemistically to incorporate veiled or indirect criticism. For a concise overview of Indonesian media during the New Order, see Sen and Hill, *Media, Culture and Politics in Indonesia*.

36 On 12 September 1984, a group of Muslims, who had gathered to demand the release of detained colleague, stormed a police station in Tanjung Priok, a harbour district of Jakarta. The military fired into the crowd, killing at least nine people and wounding more than fifty. For an interesting discussion on the conflicting discourses about Tanjung Priok affair, see K. C. Kolstad, 'Enemy Others and Violence in Jakarta: An Islamic Rhetoric of Discontent', in M. R. Woodward (ed.), *Toward New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought*, Tempe, Arizona: Arizona: Program for Southeast Asian Studies, Arizona State University, 1996. pp. 357–80.

37 Soekanto, 'Islamic Media'.

38 A. Muhammad 'Quo Vadis Media Islam Moderat?', *Jaringan Islam Liberal*, 20 March, 2005. Available: http://islamlib.com/id/artikel/quo-vadis-media-islam-moderat/ (accessed 14 October 2009).

39 A. Muhammad, 'Jihad Lewat Tulisan: Kisah Sukses Majalah Sabili dengan Beragam Ironi', *Pantau*, II: 0, 15 July, 2001. Available: www.pantau.or.id/text/15/06d.html (accessed May 2006).

40 Muhammad 'Jihad Lewat Tulisan'.

41 *Gaya pembelaan Sabili sangat memungkinkan umat Islam yang selama ini tidak punya media, kemudian merasa terwakili. Jadi klop. Antara umat Islam yang tertindas selama Orde Baru, dengan munculnya media yang menyuarakan mereka.* (Muhammad 'Jihad Lewat Tulisan').

42 Fealy, 'Consuming Islam', p. 22.

43 Forum Lingkar Pena (FLP) was founded by some Muslim campus activists (Helvi Tiana Rosa, Asma Nadia and Muthmainnah) in 1997 at the University of Indonesia, Jakarta. Its main purpose is to prepare young writers to propagate Islam using popular culture such as short stories, comics and novels. Beginning with only 30 activists, by 2003 FLP claimed 5,000 (predominantly women) members, both within and outside Indonesia. To disseminate their works, FLP cooperates with Islamic publishing houses such as Syaamil, Mizan, Pustaka Ummat, Pustaka Annida, Gema Insani Press, Zikrul Bayan and even the major publisher, Gramedia. In 2003, FLP established its own publishing house, Lingkar Pena Publishers. See Kailani (2009) for a detailed discussion of FLP.

44 Latifah and A. Budiyanto, 'Annida and the Contemporary Islamic Society in Indonesia', paper presented at the 15th AMIC Conference, Penang, 17–20 July, 2006.

45 Latifah and Budiyanto, 'Annida and the Contemporary'.

46 For a rich description of the development of Islamic fashion, particularly the jilbab (headscarf worn by Muslim women), see Juliastuti, N., 'Politik Pakaian Muslim', *Kunci*, 2000. Available: www.kunci.or.id/teks/13media.html (accessed 13 January 2005) and Swastika, 'Anak Muda Islam Indonesia', and for a thoughtful analysis of the veil and Javanese women after Suharto's fall, see N. J. Smith-Hefner, 'Javanese Women

and the Veil in Post-Soeharto Indonesia', *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 66, 2, 2007, pp. 389–420.
47 On this Bill, see Lindsay's contribution to this volume.
48 'Membuat Mutu Lebih Baik', *Cakram*, July 2006.
49 The term sinetron religius was popularised by Indonesian media to refer to a particular format of television programme with clear Islamic messages using dramatic narratives of tragic events or mystical stories. The stories of sinetron religius depict God's punishment of those breaking Islamic law (*sharia*). The sinetron religius usually achieve highest ratings during the Muslim fasting month (*Ramadhan*).
50 Muhammad, 'Jihad Lewat Tulisan'.
51 Sabili sifatnya sangat keras. Radikal sekali. Buat saya bagus. Harus ada yang punya keberanian untuk ngomong lebih lugas. Hanya konsekuensi pasar harus diterima. Akhirnya, advertiser juga mengatakan, wah kalau saya memasang iklan di sini reader-nya kayak apa nih. Apa produknya cocok dengan Sabili? (Muhammad 'Jihad Lewat Tulisan').
52 Zairofi in K. Seneviratne (ed.) *Media Pluralism in Asia: The Role and Impact of Alternative Media*, Singapore: AMIC and Nanyang Technology University, 2007, p. 70.
53 Watson, 'Islamic Books and Their Publishers', p. 178.
54 'Agus Sudibyo: Mutu Jurnalistik Media Islam Radikal Sangat Lemah', *Jaringan Islam Liberal*, 20 March 2005. Available: http://islamlib.com/id/artikel/mutu-jurnalistik-media-islam-radikal-sangat-lemah/ (accessed 14 October 2009).
55 Muhammad, 'Quo Vadis Media Islam Moderat?'.
56 Di dalam sebuah media agama, kalau kita melakukan investigative reporting yang bener-bener [sic], kadang juga ada kendala, karena tidak semua orang mau memberikan data dan fakta secara konkret. (Muhammad 'Jihad Lewat Tulisan').
57 Watson, 'Islamic Books and Their Publishers', p. 210.
58 Fealy, 'Consuming Islam', p. 37.

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5 Indonesian journalism post-Suharto

Changing ideals and professional practices

Janet Steele

A dozen or so writers sat around a conference table at *Tempo* magazine, wait-ing for Amarzan Loebis' class to begin.[1] Amarzan is one of *Tempo*'s senior edi-tors and a noted writer, as well as a former political detainee and left-wing poet. Every Tuesday morning, *Tempo* writers and editors meet for an hour or so to hear Amarzan's critique of the most recent edition of the magazine. As the writers straggled in, the conversation turned to Tomy Winata, and the infamous *Tempo* story that nearly landed chief editor Bambang Harymurti in jail.[2] The story com-pared the tycoon to a 'scavenger', and insinuated that there might have been a connection between Tomy's business interests and the fire that ravaged the Tanah Abang textile market. Bambang and two other editors were charged with criminal defamation.

'The real question', said Amarzan, 'is how urgent was the story compared with the cost? Was the story professional? Was it a little bit professional? Was it less than professional? Or wasn't it professional at all?'

Amarzan Loebis's question points to two key issues in Indonesian journal-ism today: the tension between professionalism and the public's 'right to know', and the gap between the zeal to expose and prudence as the better part of valour. Although the Supreme Court ultimately overturned the lower court's decision sen-tencing Bambang Harymurti to a year in jail, the Tomy Winata incident contin-ues to hang over the heads of Indonesian journalists like the sword of Damocles. The case – which dragged on for months, and involved seven different lawsuits – seemed to show the dangers of publishing hard-hitting stories that touched on prominent individuals with high-level government and military connections.

For observers of the Indonesian press, the Tomy Winata case has served as a useful focal point for what has changed – and what has not – since the days of the New Order.[3] The case suggests that a number of obstacles continue to obstruct the practice of independent journalism in Indonesia today, including a weak legal system that doesn't always guarantee the rights of journalists, fear of lawsuits by wealthy and powerful individuals, and the ongoing threat of *premanisme* or thuggery. The Tomy Winata case also illustrates several aspects of the changing professional practices of journalism that may not be immediately apparent, such as source selection, how stories get framed and the fundamental question of what becomes news in the first place. Despite huge advances in freedom of the press in

Indonesia, there are still limits to what can and what cannot safely be published.

As tempting as it is to interpret the changes in Indonesian journalism post-Suharto as a kind of morality play in which courageous journalists are fighting the forces of darkness, it would be a mistake to do so. The picture is much more complicated. A 'New Order mindset' still pervades the professional practices of journalists, and is reflected in a style of reporting that includes a lack of context, too much privileging of official sources and an inclination towards reporting on events rather than underlying causes. Using a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, I will examine the new boundaries of freedom of the press in Indonesia post-Suharto, focusing on how changes in the professional practices of journalists, including framing, source selection and what becomes news – are related to broader changes in Indonesian politics and culture.

Who's in the news? Victims and public officials

In 2000, when I did a content analysis of 1,300 stories from the national section of *Tempo* magazine, one of the most striking differences I found between the 23-year period that started with the magazine's founding and ended with its ban in 1994, and the two-and-a-half year period after *Tempo*'s return to publication in 1998, had to do with the number of stories that focused on victims or *korban* as the main actors.[4] Between 1971 and 1994, victims were the largest category of 'unknowns' who appeared in the pages of *Tempo*, making up 27 per cent of the total (N = 228).[5] (See Table 5.1) Many of these individuals were victims of economic development or government confiscation of their land. Other types of victims included political prisoners, victims of hate crimes, riots, state-sponsored violence or natural disasters. I argued that this focus on victims was the result of several factors, the most important of which was a desire to use the suffering of ordinary people as an indirect means of criticizing the regime. By telling the victims' stories, *Tempo* was able to offer a subtle critique of Suharto-era government policies at a time when direct criticism was far too risky to include. As several of my coders noticed, when *Tempo* reporters asked government officials to comment on the news, their responses often seemed uncaring or foolish.

After *Tempo* returned to publication in 1998, there were fewer victims as main characters, and only 9.5 per cent of the total number of stories were about ordinary people (N = 21). (See Table 5.2) After discussing this development with *Tempo* writers and editors, I concluded that the change had occurred because it was no longer necessary to obfuscate who was responsible for incidents that victimized ordinary citizens, and that in a new era of openness and press freedom, there was no longer any reason to present politics as a kind of 'moral drama'.

But have stories about victims really disappeared? As the example of print coverage of the 'mud volcano' in East Java will demonstrate, these types of stories still dominate Indonesian news.

On 29 May 2006, hot toxic mud began to gush out of an exploratory oil well in Porong, Sidoarjo, East Java. Dubbed a 'mud volcano' by some geologists, the sludge is a mixture of hot mud and ash. Both the company that owns the oil well

Table 5.1 Summary of 'Who' in *Tempo* magazine's National Section prior to the banning, 27 March 1971–4 June 1994

Who	Main actor	% Total	% Category	Most-quoted Source	% Total
President	68	5.72%	7.46%	31	2.77%
DPR-MPR	33	2.78%	3.62%	32	2.86%
Government officials (national)	228	19.19%	25.03%	258	23.04%
Government officials (local)	80	6.73%	8.78%	86	7.68%
Military officials	107	9.01%	11.75%	111	9.91%
Leaders of political parties	83	6.99%	9.11%	69	6.16%
Leaders of NGOs	5	0.42%	0.55%	10	0.89%
Press leaders (in Indonesia and overseas)	12	1.01%	1.32%	17	1.52%
Labour leaders	7	0.59%	0.77%	8	0.71%
Leaders of non-government organizations	38	3.20%	4.17%	36	3.21%
Leaders of regional independence/autonomy movements	11	0.93%	1.21%	2	0.18%
Well-known religious figures	53	4.46%	5.82%	63	5.63%
Well-known businessmen/women	25	2.10%	2.74%	20	1.79%
International political figures	63	5.30%	6.92%	54	4.82%
Other 'Knowns'	98	8.25%	10.76%	93	8.30%
Demonstrators, rioters	33	2.78%	14.47%	19	1.70%
Victims	62	5.22%	27.19%	29	2.59%
Suspects/criminals	61	5.13%	26.75%	20	1.79%
Other 'Unknowns'	72	6.06%	31.58%	94	8.39%
Anonymous	2	0.17%	—	53	4.73%
No 'who'	47	3.96%	—	15	1.26%
'Knowns'—total	911	76.68%	—	890	79.46%
'Unknowns'—total	228	19.19%	—	162	14.46%
Total Who	1188	100.00%	92.02%	1120	100.00%

Table 5.2 Summary of 'Who' in *Tempo* magazine's National Section after the return to publication, 19 October 1998–19 March 2000

Who	Main Actor	% Total	% Category	Most-quoted Source	% Total
President	6	6.52%	9.38%	1	1.28%
DPR-MPR	4	4.35%	6.25%	4	5.13%
Government officials (national)	8	8.70%	12.50%	5	6.41%
Government officials (local)	0	0.00%	0.00%	2	2.56%
Military officials	9	9.78%	14.06%	11	14.10%
Leaders of political parties	13	14.13%	20.31%	9	11.54%
Leaders of NGOs	1	1.09%	1.56%	0	0.00%
Press leaders (in Indonesia and overseas)	0	0.00%	0.00%	1	1.28%
Labour leaders	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%
Leaders of non-government organizations	6	6.52%	9.38%	11	14.10%
Leaders of regional independence/autonomy movements	3	3.26%	4.69%	2	2.56%
Well-known religious figures	3	3.26%	4.69%	3	3.85%
Well-known businessmen/women	2	2.17%	3.13%	0	0.00%
International political figures	4	4.35%	6.25%	1	1.28%
Other 'Knowns'	5	5.43%	7.81%	9	11.54%
Demonstrators, rioters	3	3.26%	14.29%	1	1.28%
Victims	2	2.17%	9.52%	1	1.28%
Suspects/criminals	5	5.43%	23.81%	2	2.56%
Other 'Unknowns'	11	11.96%	52.38%	7	8.97%
Anonymous	2	2.17%	—	8	10.26%
No 'who'	5	5.43%	—	0	0.00%
'Knowns' – total	64	69.57%	—	59	75.64%
'Unknowns' – total	21	22.83%	—	11	14.10%
Total Who	92	100.00%	7.13%	78	100.00%

and the firm which was doing the drilling (PT Lapindo Brantas) are partly owned by the family firm of one of Indonesia's most powerful individuals, the former Coordinating Minister for the People's Welfare Aburizal Bakrie. With millions of tons of mud already flooding the regency at the rate of 150,000 cubic metres a day, more than 15,000 residents displaced from their homes, farms and factories ruined, key transportation arteries affected and no realistic plans in place to stop the flow, the scale of the disaster is immense.[6] While police initially charged nine relatively low-level Lapindo employees with negligence, legal responsibility for the disaster is not yet clear.

Who *is* responsible for the disaster? This question is interesting not only from a legal and political perspective, but from a journalistic one as well. American media scholar Shanto Iyengar has suggested that television news coverage is dominated by two types of frames, 'episodic' frames, which focus on specific individuals or occurrences and 'thematic' ones, which contextualize events by examining the broader social and political forces behind the news.[7] This distinction, Iyengar argues, has huge implications for how television viewers think about accountability. An episodic report on poverty, for example, leaves viewers with the impression that the poor themselves are responsible for their situation, whereas a story that is more thematic, exploring structural and societal factors, can lead viewers to demand social change. Put simply, stories that frame events in terms of 'victims' and 'perpetrators' make it easy to see these events as discrete episodes, rather than as part of a recurring pattern that requires action.

Based on Iyengar's distinction, it is obvious from even a cursory view of the toxic mud story that nearly all of the coverage in Indonesia has been episodic. Close reading of the Jakarta dailies *The Jakarta Post*, *Kompas* and *Tempo*, as well as *Surya* from Surabaya suggests that the focus of the reporting has been on the suffering of the victims, the (unsuccessful) efforts of Lapindo Brantas to stem the flow of the mud, and, during the initial months, daily announcements of new plans to contain or dispose of the mud in the event that the flow cannot be stopped.[8] Sources include villagers (the victims), local government officials from the Sidoarjo *Kabupaten* (regency), representatives of Lapindo Brantas, environmentalists, geologists and other 'experts'. Of these types of stories, the vast majority focus on the victims.

One of the more interesting aspects of newspaper reporting on the toxic mud incident is that it clearly assigns responsibility to PT Lapindo Brantas. *The Jakarta Post* is typical in that nearly all of its stories point out that Lapindo is 'a company controlled by the Bakrie family'. Although at the time of writing it was unclear as to whether the Bakrie family would be held criminally liable, then Welfare Minister Aburizal Bakrie had nevertheless 'promised to pay for the disaster'.[9] The openness with which the issue of ownership and responsibility is discussed today in Indonesian news media is remarkable, especially given Lapindo's ties to a politically powerful family.

In another striking sign of change in the Indonesian press system, it is clear that Lapindo Brantas is carrying out a sophisticated public relations campaign. In the months immediately following the disaster, Lapindo's team in Surabaya included

a former managing editor from the *Surabaya Post* as well as a 'crisis centre' at the five-star Shangri-la Hotel. The company also established a 'media centre' at the office of the *Bupati* (regent) in Sidoarjo, where journalists were invited to enjoy free coffee, Internet access and photocopying. Although the right of a company to get out its version of the facts may not surprise those who live in western democracies, such company-sponsored damage control raised more than a few eyebrows in a country where public relations is a relatively new business.[10]

Of far more concern than the new-style press releases and 'media centre' were the persistent rumours that Lapindo Brantas was employing more old-fashioned means of controlling the press – the use of 'envelopes' to journalists and 'support' money to local officials. *Surya*'s energetic chief editor Dhimam Abror said that whereas his paper had a clear policy that any reporter who accepted a bribe would be fired, he was still concerned about Lapindo's ability to manipulate news coverage.[11] In fact, Dhimam was so uneasy about even the appearance of impropriety that when a Lapindo representative wanted to meet with him to talk about placing a half-page ad in the paper, the editor insisted that they meet in *Surya*'s office.[12] Interestingly, Lapindo's efforts to influence the media have been widely reported in the press, which is itself a sign of the changes that have occurred since the Suharto years.[13]

Despite these positive developments, there are also some clear weaknesses in the coverage of the toxic mud story. Perhaps the most obvious is the lack of a broader context. An orientation towards discrete events – whether they are statements from Lapindo, a traffic jam on the toll road or a leak in one of the retaining ponds – makes it difficult to see the story from a larger perspective. The frames for the story include the suffering of the dislocated victims, the damage to the area economy and the question of who is responsible for fixing the problem. Left unasked are broader questions of accountability: how did the company get permission to drill in this area in the first place? How are political and military interests involved in the process of drilling exploratory wells? How many other wells have been built under similar circumstances? None of these questions are likely to be answered – or even raised – by episodic coverage of the news. As former *Kompas* journalist and UNESCO–Indonesia unit director Arya Gunawan wrote, newspaper readers are not interested only in the 'what' of an event, but also the 'why'. 'Take the example of P.T. Lapindo Brantas' mud disaster in Sidoardjo, East Java', he wrote.

> In order to evaluate the context of the event, a newspaper would have to report not only on the incident itself, but to go much further in tracking down the cause of the event, the impact, and even an explanation of why until now the government has done nothing to hold accountable those who are responsible for the disaster.[14]

The limitations to news coverage of the mud volcano stem not only from outside pressure, but also from the limits of journalistic practices in Indonesia. There are many aspects of the Lapindo story that have simply not been covered. For

example, *Surya*'s then chief editor Dhimam Abror commented that of all the players who were involved in the disaster – the journalists, the villagers, the local government officials, the NGOs – it was actually the military that had benefited the most. 'It is just like *ABRI masuk desa*[15] (the Armed Forces enter the villages) during the New Order', he said. 'The NGOs don't understand what's going on, the political parties are doing nothing, and the media are confused. But the military are sophisticated and they are ready.'

And the military are also being paid by Lapindo. Visitors to the site in 2006 could see their presence everywhere – shoring up the retaining walls, smoking and chatting in village *warungs* (stalls), patrolling the refugee camp and – most amazingly – running the public kitchen that feeds 7,000 people a day. Yet none of this has become news, a lacuna for which there is no ready explanation. The *Surya* journalists didn't think that the role of military in Sidoarjo was a 'sensitive' topic, but it had also never occurred to any of them to write about it.

When I asked a group of veteran *Surya* reporters and editors if they thought that the toxic mud story would have been covered differently during the New Order, they all agreed that under Suharto the version provided by Lapindo's media centre would have prevailed. Tutug Pamorkaton, the senior journalist supervising *Surya*'s team of reporters in the field, added that one aspect of the story that is being reported very cautiously is the 'exploration data', which the company has refused to release. But when I later asked Dhimam Abror about this, he dismissed it as a concern, saying that if Lapindo is refusing to talk, the journalists aren't looking hard enough for sources elsewhere.

'Sources Make the News'

In Leon Sigel's memorable phrase, 'news is not what happens, but what someone said has happened or will happen'.[16] One of the most striking elements of journalism in New Order Indonesia was journalists' reliance on official sources and statements. Angela Romano found that the views of cabinet ministers dominated news coverage during the New Order, and that they – like other Indonesian public officials – generally preferred to speak with groups of journalists rather than allowing private interviews.[17] As Thomas Hanitzsch has concluded, the de-politicization of journalism under Suharto 'led to a kind of "A said X and B said Y" journalism that passively relied on official sources and statements'.[18]

My analysis of national news stories in *Tempo* magazine supports the notion that during the Suharto years the statements of public officials dominated news coverage. Moreover, I found a further distinction between the main actor – or who the story was *about* – and the most frequently quoted source or sources.[19] During the Suharto years, the most-quoted source in nearly 30 per cent of the stories published in *Tempo*'s national section was a 'government official' (*pejabat negara*). (See Table 5.1) 23 per cent of the total were national officials and 7.68 per cent were regional or local officials. High-ranking military officials were the most-frequently quoted sources an additional 10 per cent of the time.[20] By comparison, members of Indonesia's legislative assembly were the most-quoted sources only

2.86 per cent of the time, and the President was the most-quoted source only 2.77 per cent of the time.

This picture changed somewhat after 1998, and the types of individual who were most frequently quoted in *Tempo* became more diverse. (See Table 5.2) The percentage of government officials quoted dropped from nearly 30 per cent to 9 per cent, whereas the percentage of military sources shot up to 14 per cent. Leaders of political parties became more significant as most-quoted sources, rising from to 6 per cent to 11.54 per cent, as did well-known leaders of non-government organizations, rising from to 3 per cent to 14 per cent. In general, this picture reflects the more democratic orientation of politics in post-Suharto Indonesia.

Yet despite these changes, official sources still dominate news coverage in Indonesia, something that was especially obvious after the 2004 tsunami. By coincidence, I was in Jakarta on 26 December 2004. Within a few days, Yayasan Pena Indonesia (a writers' foundation established by journalist Farid Gaban) called for volunteers to assist in the translation of news stories from Aceh that would then be disseminated via the Internet. Over the course of the next two weeks, I translated a total of 25 news stories. There were a great many to choose from, so I established the following two criteria: the article had to have an Aceh dateline, and it had to be written by an independent journalist in the field.

In translating the stories, I discovered to my surprise that many of them were not very interesting. In fact, the stories that I translated or otherwise read on the Pena Indonesia website were far less gripping than the ones that I was simultaneously reading in foreign newspapers. I wondered how this could be, given that the stories I was translating were written by native speakers who were in many cases Acehnese. And what could possibly explain the comparative richness of stories by international reporters who were dependent upon local 'fixers' and translators?

Then suddenly it became clear – it was the choice of sources. The stories written by the Indonesian reporters tended to rely on quotations from officials: *Bupati* (regents), village heads, military officials, hospital heads and leaders of NGOs. Although the stories did indeed include quotations from victims – the second largest group of sources – most of the sources were government officials. A week or so later, I asked a group of 15 Indonesian journalists who were participating in a course on narrative journalism why they thought that reporters preferred to write articles based on official statements. After a few sheepish laughs, the truth came out: their bosses demanded it. It wasn't 'news' unless a public official said it.

This reliance on official sources can also be seen in stories about the mud volcano in Sidoarjo. It was not by accident that Lapindo initially set up its media centre in the *Bupati*'s office. There is a symbiotic relationship between journalists and public officials in reporting on disasters, and the fact that so many stories flow through the office of the *Bupati* has the effect of enhancing what media critic Paul Weaver once described as the 'fabrication [of] crisis and emergency response'. The stories that result not only leave readers with the impression that the nation is in a constant state of crisis, but also that public officials are doing something about it. As Weaver wrote,

the lie is the story's implication that the events are un-self-conscious and in that sense authentic, and that the journalist and reader are uninvolved observers whose presence and interest don't affect the news makers' behaviour. Both of these implications are untrue.[21]

In this case, as in so many others, it appears that in Indonesia journalists are grafting some of the worst characteristics of western journalism onto a New Order mindset. Even the Department of Information under Suharto couldn't have come up with a plan as devious as that of having journalists willingly participate in the fiction that P T Lapindo Brantas and Indonesian government officials have any idea at all as to how to stem the flow of mud.

Story selection – what becomes news?

One of the most remarkable developments in Indonesian journalism since the fall of Suharto has been the rise of investigative reporting.[22] With many circumstances similar to those that gave rise to muckraking journalism in the United States of America at the turn of the twentieth century – including an explosion of mass-marketed magazines and a growing middle class – Indonesian journalists have turned their attention to some of the same kinds of issues that absorbed investigative reporters like Ida Tarbell and Lincoln Steffens: the social costs of industrialization, the role and responsibilities of government, and the spread of business influence over politics.[23] Since the fall of Suharto, for example, *Tempo* has published investigative pieces on topics ranging from 'Buloggate' – the illegal diversion of funds from the State Logistics Agency (*Bulog*) to finance Golkar's 1999 election campaign – to the number of shares of press publications owned by the former Minister of Information, Harmoko.[24] The rubric *Investigasi* – unthinkable under Suharto – utilizes high standards of written evidence to prove what were in many cases already known as 'open secrets'. Young journalists clamour to attend workshops in investigative reporting and there is high demand for training.

Despite these developments, there are nevertheless limits to exactly what can be investigated. At a UNESCO-sponsored seminar on investigative reporting in December 2005, *Tempo* chief editor Bambang Harymurti likened the state of investigative reporting in Indonesia to a rice field that is not yet ready for planting. Before the farmer can plant the field, Bambang said, he must first prepare the soil. Moreover, there is no point in planting the seeds if there is insufficient water and fertilizer. As Bambang pointed out, the parallels with the challenges facing journalists were obvious: in a legal situation in which criminal defamation laws remain on the books and truth is not a defence in libel trials, journalists are not yet properly able to do their jobs. Although in 2005 Indonesia's legislative assembly was considering revisions to the Criminal Code, the draft code contained provisions that were even more restrictive than the original. The number of these articles was increased from 35 to 49, and nine of them carried clauses that could ban a journalist from working for life.[25]

Regardless of what Indonesian journalists think of *Tempo*'s story on Tomy Winata – and many are rightfully critical of its use of anonymous sources[26] – most agree that the story has had an enormous chilling effect on investigative reporting. Journalists have to be extremely careful in writing about the relationship between business and the military. For example, months after a cache of 145 weapons was found at the home of the army chief of staff's deputy assistant for logistics Brigadier General Koesmayadi after his death on 25 June 2006, there were still many unanswered questions. What had the general been doing with all of those weapons? In the immediate aftermath of the discovery, rumours abounded – including that 'the weapons were to be used . . . for taking up arms against the government'.[27] Another much reported suspicion was that the weapons were part of the black-market arms trade, perhaps, as *Tempo* put it, they were being 'sold to conflict areas or to organizations providing security services to business magnates'.[28]

Why was *Tempo*'s language so indirect? Which 'business magnates' might be getting security services from the military? Two weeks later, a sentence in *Tempo*'s 8 August edition suggested a possible explanation:

> The Military Police also questioned Koesmayadi's relatives and colleagues, including the owner of the Artha Graha business group, Tomy Winata. . . . According to the commander of the Army's Central Military Police, Maj. Gen. Hendardji Supandji, Tomy was questioned because he was 'a close friend of Koesmayadi'.[29]

When I asked a number of *Tempo* journalists about this sentence, they all said the same thing, that although 'everyone knew' Tomy Winata was involved, that fact couldn't yet be included in the story. As managing editor Taufiqurohman said, there was as of yet no 'written evidence' linking the businessman with the general, and military sources were unwilling to go on the record.[30] Although this reluctance to write about Tomy Winata's connection with the illegal arms trade could perhaps be viewed as a commendable use of higher standards of professionalism, it is hard not to interpret it also as resulting from very real fear of repercussions from a business tycoon who has already demonstrated his willingness to sue for criminal defamation.

Business pressures

When I was doing research on the history of *Tempo* magazine, founding editor Goenawan Mohamad frequently told me that property developer Ciputra – who controlled 43.5 per cent of the shares in the company which owned *Tempo*, Grafiti Press through the Jaya Raya Foundation – never tried to interfere with the contents of the magazine. In Goenawan's words, he probably would have liked to, but he was afraid. His reasons for being reluctant to interfere were complex, but certainly involved his ethnicity as Chinese-Indonesian. Under Suharto's New Order regime, Indonesians of Chinese descent had considerable economic clout, but little political power, and as Ciputra himself said, he preferred to stay in the background.[31]

Ironically, the New Order's press system created monopolistic conditions for magazines like *Tempo*, which became hugely profitable.[32] Today, things are different. An end to legal restrictions on starting a press business has meant that competition has intensified. There are many more players in the market, and business concerns have become paramount over political ones. As a result, *Tempo* has had to face concerns about ownership and control. According to *Tempo* newspaper's chief editor Malela Mahagasarie, Ciputra has asked on more than one occasion why *Tempo* newspaper can't be 'profitable' and 'more like the *Jawa Pos*' – the Surabaya daily paper, resuscitated by former *Tempo* journalist Dahlan Iskan in 1982, that became the centre of one of Indonesia's most extensive media empires.[33] There have even been rumours that Ciputra would like to sell the shares he controls through the Jaya Raya Foundation. Regardless of the truth of these rumours, it is clear that the lifting of artificial controls on the market for press publications has given Ciputra far more reason to interfere in the business aspects of *Tempo* than he ever did during the New Order.

As Malela points out, Ciputra has never tried to get involved with the content of either *Tempo* magazine or *Tempo* newspaper.[34] But what exactly did Ciputra mean by his statement that *Tempo* should be more like the *Jawa Pos* – a paper that is known for its sensationalism and putting money-making above the values of good journalism? Although the *Jawa Pos* is partly owned by Grafiti Press, which is also an owner of *Tempo*, *Jawa Pos* boss Dahlan Iskan runs a very different kind of news organization.[35] Dhimam Abror, former chief editor of the *Jawa Pos*, describes Dahlan as a businessman above all else, and says that the owner of the *Jawa Pos* is more interested in profit than idealism.[36] Asked for examples, he and other senior editors from *Surya* said that the *Jawa Pos* seldom writes critically of property development, especially when it is connected either with Ciputra or his business interests. Comparing the *Jawa Pos* with *Surya*, which is one of the rival Kompas-Gramedia Group's regional papers, coordinator of reporters Alfred Lande said that from the 1990s *Surya* was known as being a *koran berani* (courageous paper). 'The *Jawa Pos* was very cautious', he said.

> Ciputra owned the *Jawa Pos*, and he also owned a lot of property. In order to do so, he had connections with many government officials, so the *Jawa Pos* was very careful. *Surya* didn't own anything other than the paper.[37]

As the experience of many western countries has proven, the goals of running a media company are quite different from those of running a quality news organization, and research suggests that media mergers and consolidation have deleterious effects on news content.[38] Perhaps this was what Ciputra meant when he lamented that the problem with *Tempo* people who had been with the magazine before the ban was that none of them really cared about making money.

Pressure from 'Groups in Society'

In addition to the difficulty of writing about the shady business dealings of wealthy and powerful individuals like Tomy Winata, another obstacle for

Indonesian journalists is the problem of writing stories that touch on what were referred to as issues of 'SARA' during the New Order.[39] According to the 1982 Press Law, 'Press publications have to be kept safe from matters that will hurt the public . . . for example stories that would generate ethnic, religious, racial, or inter-group conflict'.[40] This was widely interpreted to mean that the press couldn't report openly on religious clashes, church burnings, race riots, labour unrest or separatist movements.[41]

Although the current Press Law contains no such prohibitions, many Indonesian journalists still believe that it is inappropriate to report on what are often called 'communal clashes'. Reporters and editors frequently say that reporting on inter-religious or ethnic violence 'just makes the situation worse'. There is a strong feeling that it is better simply not to report on this kind of news.[42] Although this view may seem somewhat naive – after all, there is still news in the form of gossip and text messages – there is nevertheless a great reluctance among journalists to report openly and honestly on inter-group conflict without the use of euphemisms and subterfuge. The view that it is 'provocative' to be specific about the causes of inter-religious violence is apparent even in the work of Indonesian media scholar Eriyanto, who wrote with great insight of the cynical role played in the 1999 violence in Ambon by the *Jawa Pos* newspaper group, which owned two papers in the conflict zone, one supporting each of the combatant parties.[43]

> Based on my observations, news coverage in *Suara Maluku* at the very beginning of the conflict was actually not provocative. Use of the words Islam or Christian was avoided. *Suara Maluku* frequently used the name of the village, or something like 'the quarrelling groups', or 'villagers'. But Ambon is a small city. By mentioning the name of the village or the name of an individual, it was obvious whether the village was Muslim or Christian.[44]

A new manifestation of the old SARA regulations may be apparent in one of the most interesting developments in Indonesian journalism since the end of the New Order: the rise of *jurnalisme damai* or peace journalism. Becoming something of a fad in Indonesia after 2000, peace journalism workshops have been sponsored by the British Council and the NGO Internews, and have been greeted with enthusiasm by local journalists' organizations such as Institute for the Study of Press and Development (*Lembaga Studi Pers dan Pembangunan*, LSPP) and the Media Watch group in Surabaya. Based on the work of Norwegian peace researcher Johan Galtung, who coined the term in the 1970s, peace journalism has been picked up by British television war correspondents Annabel McGoldrick and Jake Lynch, who brought the concept to Indonesia.

In general, peace journalism distinguishes between two modes of reporting: 'war or violence journalism' and 'peace or conflict journalism'. According to the advocates of peace journalism, war or violence journalism reports on conflict as a zero-sum-game. It is victory-oriented, and inclined to take sides. Peace or conflict journalism does the opposite, exploring the background of conflicts, giving voice to all sides and focusing on 'the creativity of conflict resolution as well as peace

making and peace keeping efforts'.[45] McGoldrick and Lynch write that the ethos of peace journalism 'is to set out, with the choices made in editing and reporting, to "create opportunities for society at large to consider and to value non-violent responses to conflict"'[46]

Although McGoldrick and Lynch are quick to point out that the only way real solutions to conflict can be found is through honest and accurate reporting,[47] this does not seem to be the way that peace journalism is interpreted in Indonesia. When McGoldrick and Lynch suggest that 'a particular combination of political and cultural factors predisposed the Indonesian journalists to be receptive to our message',[48] they seem to be unaware that these factors might include a predisposition to avoid reporting on SARA matters that might 'hurt the public'.

The problem with peace journalism as it is understood in Indonesia is that it is both vague enough to be almost meaningless (e.g. journalism that will result in peace), and very similar to the New Order understanding of good journalism as something that is not likely to promote horizontal conflict.[49] It is hardly surprising that when *Kompas* editor Jakob Oetama was awarded an honorary doctoral degree from the University of Gadjah Mada in 2003, he was credited with having been a pioneer of peace journalism. *Kompas* is not known for its honest and hard-hitting reporting of communal clashes, and in fact is more properly recognized for steering clear of reports that are likely to stir up inter-group conflict.[50]

It would be wrong, however, to suggest that such reports are absent from all media. For example *Tempo*'s 2006 Independence Day edition focused directly on these topics, with a remarkable series of articles on religious, racial and inter-group conflicts. Yet one of the striking aspects about these stories is that nearly all of them focus on individual victims. Whether it is the story of the teacher from the Ahmadiyah Muslim sect who saw his campus in West Java attacked and burned by a group of Muslim fundamentalists, the followers of traditional religious beliefs who face discrimination because they do not have a religion written on their identity cards, or the young girl of Chinese descent whose mother tried to marry her to a Taiwanese man for 5 million rupiah (about US$ 550) because she did not have proof of Indonesian citizenship, they all share a common structure. In each case, the article uses the story of an unfortunate individual to highlight a larger issue of discrimination and even violence.[51]

As remarkable as these stories are, they are each classic examples of what Iyengar calls episodic news coverage. As Iyengar's work suggests, although a focus on the individual or anecdotal case can serve to highlight the issue as one of importance, it also reduces the sense of government or social accountability, and can distract the reader from thinking about fundamental social and economic causes. Moreover, in each of the cases listed earlier, the magazine refrains from focusing on who is perpetuating the violence and discrimination against the victims, and why. The absence of perpetrators raises very important questions.

Nearly every journalist in Indonesia with whom I have spoken agrees that today there is very little government interference with the press. Instead, journalists, editors and owners have to fear violent attacks by the public. The gang of thugs that attacked the *Tempo* office in the name of Tomy Winata is just the best-known

example. Other examples include the May 2000 occupation of the *Jawa Pos* office by the paramilitary wing of the moderate Muslim organization Nahdlatul Ulama, physical attacks on *Playboy* magazine by the Islamic Defenders' Front (*Front Pembela Islam*, FPI), and intimidation of *Tempo* newspaper journalists by members of the Betawi Brotherhood Forum (*Forum Betawi Rempug*, FBR), a Jakarta paramilitary organization that often engages in violent activities in the name of religion.[52]

When *Tempo* newspaper published an editorial on 20 May 2006 defending the right of former First Lady Shinta Nuriyah Wahid (wife of Abdurrahman Wahid) to sue the head of the FBR after he called her a depraved and immoral woman (*perempuan bejat dan tidak bermoral*) because of her participation in a parade opposing the draft Pornography and Porno-Action law, lawyers for the FBR presented the newspaper with a summons (*somasi*), the first step in a libel suit.[53] The document called the paper's editorial 'tendentious, prejudiced, [and] provocative'. *Tempo* newspaper refused to apologize or to back down from its views – after all, as chief editor Malela Mahagasarie pointed out, the article in question was an editorial. Although the case never went to trial, given this climate of harassment it is little wonder that journalists for *Surya* daily told me that when a story like the FPI's attack on *Playboy* magazine occurred in Jakarta, it was better just to report on the facts of the story, and not do anything to 'blow it up out of proportion'. ('*Jangan besar-besarkan*'.) Why defend *Playboy* if it meant risking attack?

Journalists in Indonesia today continue to face threats of intimidation and physical violence. For example in June 2005 the management of *Radar Sulteng*, the largest newspaper in Central Sulawesi, voluntarily halted publication for three days following protests over a guest editorial entitled 'Islam, A Failed Religion'.[54] Although the article was actually focused on a well-publicized theft of funds from the Department of Religion by a former cabinet minister – and was therefore about corruption and hypocrisy rather than religion per se – such subtleties were lost not only on the mob that attacked the office, but also on the police. The writer, a lecturer at the Muhamadiyah University of Palu, was charged with 'insulting Islam'.

Veteran journalist and former Press Council member, Atmakusumah Astraatmadja has pointed out that even in the Press Council it is extremely difficult to reach consensus on the topic of 'insulting Islam'. When the Press Council discussed which of the defamation provisions of the draft Criminal Code should be eliminated, and was able to reach agreement on offenses such as insulting the president, the vice-president, the government of Indonesia and the heads of friendly nations, there was no discussion at all of Articles 336, 339 or 340, those that criminalize insults to religion.[55]

Conclusion: Prudent professionalism

When Amarzan Loebis and the young writers at *Tempo* talk about upholding standards of professionalism, it is not always easy to determine exactly what they mean by this. The work of German media researcher Thomas Hanitzsch may offer some insights. When Hanitzsch interviewed 385 Indonesian journalists in 2002,

he found that 53.5 per cent said that getting information to the public neutrally and precisely was 'extremely important' to them. Other important goals were to 'depict reality as it is' (40 per cent), 'support disadvantaged people' (40 per cent) and 'criticize bad states of affairs' (37.5 per cent).[56]

Hanitzsch's findings are in keeping with my own observations. Journalists at *Tempo*, for example, are proud not only of their new tradition of investigative reporting, but also of 'defending the weak',[57] and like reporters elsewhere they have internalized what Hanitzsch has defined as the news culture of professional journalism.[58] Yet despite this, many old habits remain. Indonesian news continues to be episodic in character and focused on particular events rather than underlying processes and causes. There is still a tendency to rely too heavily on statements from public officials and to report their words without comment – even if the reporter suspects that a source is lying. Journalists are especially cautious in reporting on stories that deal with the intersection of powerful business, military and political interests, and stories that are likely to offend religious hardliners often are not reported at all.

Of course, none of the attributes of the journalism described previously is unique to Indonesia. As business pressures become more acute and the Indonesian news industry continues to undergo consolidation and change, the question Ciputra asked of *Tempo*'s directors – 'why can't you be profitable?' – will be heard more and more often. In some ways, it is easier for journalists to oppose a dictator than it is to fight the forces of the market. If the idealism and professional goals of Indonesian news organizations become increasingly subordinate to the market-driven aims of media owners and conglomerates, then unfortunately the future of Indonesian journalism does not look bright.

Notes

1 The edition under consideration was the Independence Day special issue of 14 August 2006. The class took place on 15 August.
2 'Ada Tomy di "Tenabang"?' *Tempo*, 3 March 2004. Tomy Winata is a millionaire businessman with close ties to the police as well as to Indonesia's political and military elite. For an overview of the story and its implications, see J. Steele, *Wars Within: The Story of Tempo, an Independent Magazine in Soeharto's Indonesia*, Jakarta and Singapore: Equinox Publishing and ISEAS, 2005, pp. 271–82.
3 See E. Nakashima, 'Press Freedom Boosted in Indonesia', *Washington Post*, 11 February 2006.
4 For details of the ban, see Steele, *Wars Within*. For the content analysis, see pp. 143–64.
5 One edition was randomly selected from each month that *Tempo* was published between April 1971 and March 2000. A team of eight students from the University of Indonesia coded each story for 'who', 'what' and 'where', along with the names of the two most frequently quoted sources. I used the method as well as the terminology of Herbert Gans who divided news sources into the categories of 'knowns' and 'unknowns'. H. Gans, *Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek and Time*, New York: Pantheon, 1979.
6 See P. Ritter, 'A Wound in the Earth', *Time Magazine* (Asia edition), 10 March 2008.

7 S. Iyengar, *Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.

8 The following generalizations are based on examination of *The Jakarta Post*, *Koran Tempo*, *Kompas* and *Surya* for the month of August 2006.

9 See for example 'Hot Mud Gushes, Runs Rings around Sidoarjo', *The Jakarta Post*, 24 August 2006. In August, 2009, the East Java police officially terminated all charges against Lapindo executives, citing 'problems in providing evidence' as the explanation. 'Sidoarjo Mud Reaching Critical Stage as Lapindo Fails to Pump Sludge Away', *The Jakarta Globe*, 2 September, 2009. Aburizal Bakrie was the Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare in the United Indonesia Cabinet from 2005 till 2009.

10 Interestingly, the origin of the public relations industry in the US can also be traced to a disaster, and to Ivy Lee's masterful handling of a deadly Pennsylvania Railroad accident in 1906 near Gap, Pennsylvania. Lee broke with established precedent and invited reporters to the scene of the accident at the railroad's expense. See M. Schudson, *Discovering the News: A Social History of American Newspapers*, New York: Basic Books, 1978, pp. 134–36.

11 Dhimam Abror left *Surya* in 2008. He is now the chief editor of the *Surabaya Post*.

12 Interview with Dhimam Abror, 23 August 2006.

13 See, for example, 'Lapindo Hires Pros to Clean up its Image', *The Jakarta Post*, 24 August 2006.

14 A. Gunawan, 'Jurnalisme Baru: Kembalilah ke Akar', paper presented at a University of Indonesia symposium on recent developments in journalism, 30 August 2006.

15 'ABRI masuk desa' was a Suharto-era programme in which soldiers were sent out to rural areas to help build infrastructure.

16 L. Sigel, 'Sources Make the News', in R. Manoff and M. Schudson, (eds), *Reading the News*, New York: Pantheon, 1986, p. 15.

17 A. Romano, *Politics and the Press in Indonesia: Understanding an Evolving Political Culture*, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, pp. 117–33.

18 T. Hanitzsch, 'Journalists in Indonesia: Educated but Timid Watchdogs', *Journalism Studies*, 6: 4, 2005, 493–508.

19 This distinction may reflect certain aspects of Javanese culture, as well as the values of journalism. For a discussion of this point, see Steele, *Wars Within*, pp. 149–50.

20 Although in many instances members of the military also held government office, the coders were instructed to determine which of these two identities was primary in the story. The codebook stated:

> When a person can be categorized in two subcategories, force that person into one subcategory that is the most fitting with the role of that person in the article. If, for example, the story is about President Suharto and his activities as President, he should be classified as the President – despite the fact that he is also a general.

21 P.H. Weaver, *News and the Culture of Lying: How Journalism Really Works*, New York: Free Press, 1994, p. 79.

22 In this regard, Indonesia's experience has differed from that of new democracies in Latin America. Journalists at *Tempo*, for example, do not simply report on leaks from government sources, but conduct real investigations. See S. Waisbord, *Watchdog Journalism in South America: News, Accountability, and Democracy*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2000, especially chapter 4, 'The Politics of Sources'.

23 E. Fitzpatrick, *Muckraking, Three Landmark Articles*, Boston: Bedford Books of St. Martin's Press, 1994.

24 For *Tempo*'s prize-winning investigation on Buloggate II, see 'Kuitansi yang Makin Menyulitkan Akbar', *Tempo*, 19 November 2001; for the investigation of Harmoko's shares, see 'Harmoko', *Tempo*, 13 January 2003.

25 See Indonesia entry in K. Karkelar (ed.), *Freedom of the Press 2006: A Global Survey*

of Media Independence, New York and Washington D.C: Freedom House, 2006. A paragraph-by-paragraph list of the 47 articles that dealt with freedom of the press and freedom of expression in the 2005 draft version of the Criminal Code can be found in Lukas Luwarso, Sugeng Suprayanto and Samsuri, (eds), *Potret Pers Indonesia 2005*, Jakarta: Dewan Pers, 2005, pp. 240–48. In August 2008, the Constitutional Court rejected a request for judicial review of the articles on defamation that remain in the Criminal Code. See 'Court upholds defamation protection for some', *The Jakarta Post*, 16 August 2008.

26 For a critical view of *Tempo*'s use of anonymous sources in the Tanah Abang case as well as one that appeared one month earlier in *Koran Tempo*, and connected Tomy Winata with plans to bring the gambling business to Central Sulawesi, see A. Harsono, 'Koran Tempo + Sumber Anonim = US $1 Juta', *Pantau*, 2 February 2004.

27 'Why the Guns?', *Tempo*, 4 July 2006, English edition.

28 'Generals Out of Line', *Tempo*, 11 July 2006, English edition.

29 'Tripped at Satan's Warehouse', *Tempo*, 8 August 2006, English edition.

30 Interview with Taufiqurohman, 30 August 2006.

31 Steele, *Wars Within*, pp. 91–93.

32 See especially D. Dhakidae, 'The State, The Rise of Capital, and the Fall of Political Journalism', Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, May 1991.

33 Interview with Malela Mahagasarie, 16 August 2006.

34 *Koran Tempo*, or *Tempo* newspaper, was first published on 2 April, 2001 as an offshoot of *Tempo* magazine.

35 M. Wangkar, 'Jawa Pos Adalah Dahlan Iskan', *Pantau*, 7 May 2001.

36 Interview with Dhimam Abror, 23 August 2006.

37 Interview with Alfred Lande, 23 August 2006.

38 See for example M. Lee and N. Soloman, *Unreliable Sources: A Guide to Detecting Bias in the News Media*, New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1990.

39 During the New Order, the acronym SARA was coined to refer to conflicts involving *Suku*, *Agama*, *Ras* and *Antar-golongan*, meaning Ethnicity, Religion, Race or Inter-group (Class).

40 See *Penjelasan atas Undang-undang Republik Indonesia No. 21 Tahun 1982 Tentang Perubahan atas Undang-undang Nomor 11 Tahun 1966 tentang Ketentuan-ketentuan Pokok Pers*, Indonesia Media Law and Policy Center.

41 See D. Hill, *The Press in New Order Indonesia*, Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1994, pp. 44–47.

42 I base this observation on journalism workshops that I have taught in Jakarta, Surabaya, Ambon, Makassar, Pontianak, Kendari and Manado. Interestingly I found the same kind of sentiment among journalists in both Bangladesh and Malaysia.

43 On media coverage of the Ambon conflict, see the contribution by Birgit Bräuchler in this volume.

44 Eriyanto, 'Koran, Bisnis dan Perang', *Jurnalisme Sastrawi*, Jakarta: Yayasan Pantau, 2005, p. 241.

45 T. Hanitzsch, 'The Peace Journalism Problem', *Agents of Peace: Public Communication and Conflict Resolution in an Asian Setting*, Jakarta: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2004, p. 195.

46 J. Lynch and A. McGoldrick, 'Reporting Conflict: An Introduction to Peace Journalism', *Agents of Peace*, p. 107.

47 They write 'what would be the point of reporting peace work to heal rifts between followers of different faiths if the rifts themselves were suppressed?', *Agents of Peace*, p. 123.

48 *Agents of Peace*, p. 141.

49 M. Ali, 'Jurnalisme Damai, Suatu Keniscayaan', *Suara Merdeka*, 14 February 2005.

50 For a review essay that touches on some of these issues, see I. Haryanto, 'Jurnalisme Kepiting', *Pantau*, 3 June 2002.

51 'Ahmadiyah Angst', 'The Plight of Sanghyang Kersa', 'Under Seige', and 'Heni's Take', *Tempo*, 15 August 2006, English edition.

52 On the FBR, FPI and other paramilitary groups, see I. D. Wilson, 'Continuity and Change: The Changing Contours of Organized Violence in Post-New Order Indonesia', *Critical Asian Studies*, 2006, 38: 2, 265–97.

53 'Somasi Shinta Nuriyah', *Koran Tempo*, 20 May 2006. I am grateful to Malela Mahagasari for giving me a copy of the *somasi*, H. Harry Ibrahim, SH, Direktor Lembaga Bantuan Hukum 'Forum Betawi Rempug to Pempiman Redaksi Koran Tempo', 24 May 2006. On the Pornography and Porno-Action law, see the contribution by Jennifer Lindsay to this volume.

54 'Islam, Agama Yang Gagal', *Radar Sulteng*, 23 June 2005.

55 Interview with Atmakusumah, 6 August 2006.

56 Hanitzsch, 'Journalists in Indonesia: Educated but Timid Watchdogs', p. 499.

57 Steele, *Wars Within*, especially chapter 8.

58 T. Hanitzsch, 'Mapping Journalism Culture; A Theoretical Taxonomy and Case Studies from Indonesia', *Asian Journal of Communication*, 16 (June): 2006, 169–86.

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6 Media ownership and its implications for journalists and journalism in Indonesia

Ignatius Haryanto

Recent studies of the global concentration of media ownership note its negative consequences for democratic freedoms.[1] In the US context McChesney has argued this concentration – now in the hands of five major global enterprises – has been the result of 'radical improvements in communications technology that make global media empires feasible and lucrative in a manner unthinkable in the past', together with a strengthening neo-liberal endorsement of the commercial exploitation of the media and the concentration of ownership.[2] Similarly, in May 2004 the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), while describing merger and acquisition processes as having 'reached an alarming level', warned that deregulation 'has boosted both the commercial power of global [media] corporations, but it also gives them political power. They are currently demanding even greater relaxation of rules on media ownership, spending enormous sums on political donations while lobbying key politicians'.[3] The IFJ was further concerned that big media companies produced poor journalism, allocating less funding for training and for investigative journalism.

Against this global trend, this chapter will examine the extent to which increasing concentration of media ownership may present concerns in post-Suharto Indonesia, where nine business groups now control half the print media and two-thirds of the television stations. It will discuss the insights of journalists in Indonesian newsrooms, scrutinizing the impact of such media ownership upon journalistic practices.

Dhakidae described the slow evolution of the Indonesian news industry under the New Order state which was 'economically generous and politically patronizing, with the result that Indonesian journalism is economically prosperous, and politically decapacitated'.[4] He argued that newspaper market concentration began in Indonesia from 1975, as only a few newspaper companies proved able to survive the hard economic times triggered by the global oil crisis. By the close of the New Order, several major players were emerging, most notably the print-based empires around the *Kompas* daily paper (known as the Kompas-Gramedia Group), and the *Tempo* newsweekly with its offshoot, the *Jawa Pos* daily (regarded collectively as the Tempo-Jawa Pos Group).[5] In addition, moving into media were some New Order business figures, such as Surya Paloh (through his Media Indonesia Group), and, with the opening up of private television stations, other state-favoured capitalists

like Aburizal Bakrie (ANTV), Liem Soe Liong (Indosiar) and Suharto family members, son Bambang Triatmodjo (RCTI), daughter Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (TPI) and brother-in-law Sudwikatmono (SCTV).[6] Sen and Hill have argued that by the end of the New Order, media organizations had become primarily economic entities, driven by the need to get readers and viewers. They argued,

> When we documented the crumbling of censorship and the expansion of the media market in ways that government everywhere find hard to control, we seem to have confirmed a certain liberal capitalist faith in the connection between a free, privately owned media and liberal democratic politics. [However] optimistic projections about cultural freedoms and democracy clearly needed to be tempered [as] there can be no simple connections between the erosion of government censorship, the opening up of the media and the establishment of a pluralist democracy as understood in the West.[7]

The post-Suharto transition

Many scholars have discussed Suharto's tight control over the media.[8] Yet the liberalization of the media after his fall brought its own problems and contradictions. In 2004, after four years of reform, Indonesia's 'press freedom index', as determined by the Reporters Without Borders (*Reporters sans frontiers*, RSF) a media advocacy organization, had risen from amongst the world's worst to a middle ranking (of 117 out of 167 countries), but remained weighed down by occasional physical attacks and killings of journalists.[9]

Initially, the number of periodicals surged from about 300 when Suharto fell to a peak of over 1,500, although by 2007 data from the Indonesian Press Council indicates only about 516 publications had survived.[10] Entrepreneurs were eager to start their own publications but lacked sufficient capital or capable staff to sustain the enterprise. While the media were able to report news without government constraints, they faced new challenges, including assaults from offended mobs, and the complexities of providing balanced coverage of highly sensitive polarizing regional issues (such as the pro-independence Free Aceh Movement, GAM or *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*).[11] The restrictive 1982 Press Law was replaced by a more liberal 1999 Press Law, which required no publishing licence to open a media business, and established an independent Press Council to arbitrate over public complaints against the media. Similarly, the 2002 Broadcasting Law initiated a new era for the broadcast media annulling the heavy-handed 1997 law. The post-Suharto media landscape included those press conglomerates that had grown since the mid 1970s, the residual political and economic interests of the surviving Suharto clan and cronies, new media entrepreneurs who thrived in the changed economic conditions after the New Order, along with strengthened local media players boosted by regional autonomy provisions (most notably the Jawa Pos Group and Bali Pos Group, discussed by Rachmah Ida in this volume).

In tabular form, the nine major Indonesian media players ten years after the fall of Suharto may be summarized as shown in Table 6.1**.**

Table 6.1 Major Indonesian media groups, ten years after Suharto

Media group	Group leader	Newspaper	Magazine/Tabloid	Radio station	Television station	Cyber media	Other businesses
Kompas Gramedia Group	Jakob Oetama, Agung Adiprasetyo	*Kompas, Jakarta Post, Warta Kota* and other 11 local papers	37 magazines and tabloids. 5 book publishers	Sonora Radio and Otomotion Radio	—	Kompas.com, Kompas Cyber Media	Hotels, Printery, Public Relations Agencies, University
MNC (Media Nusantara Citra)	Hary Tanoesoedibjo	*Seputar Indonesia* (Sindo)	*Genie, Mom & Kiddie, Realita* and *Trust Magazine*	Trijaya FM, Radio Dangdut TPI, ARH Global, Women Radio	RCTI, Global TV, TPI, Indovision (cable television)	Okezone	—
Jawa Pos Group	Dahlan Iskan	*Jawa Pos, Fajar, Riau Pos, Rakyat Merdeka* and other 90 newspapers in regional areas	23 weeklies	Fajar FM in Makassar	JTV (Jawa Pos TV) in Surabaya and other 3 local stations (Pekan Baru, Batam, Makassar)	—	Travel bureau, power plant
Mugi Reka Aditama (MRA)	Dian Muljani Soedarjo	—	*Cosmopolitan, Harper's Bazaar, Esquire, FHM, Good House Keeping* and other 10 magazines (has the most franchised magazines)	Hard Rock FM (in Bandung, Jakarta, Bali and Surabaya), MTV Sky (in Jakarta and Bandung)	O'Channel (has been taken over by SCTV)	—	—
Bali Post Group	Satria Narada	*Bali Post, Suluh Indonesia* and 2 other newspapers	*Tokoh* tabloid	—	Bali TV and 8 local television stations	Bali Post, Bisnis Bali	—
Mahaka Media Group	Eric Tohir	*Republika, Harian Indonesia* (in Mandarin language)	*Golf Digest Magazine, Arena, Parents Indonesia* and *A+* magazine	Radio JakFM	Jak TV, TV One (jointly with Bakrie Group)	—	Entertainment, outdoor advertisement

Group	Owner	Newspaper	Magazine	Radio	TV	Online	Other business
Femina Group, Alisjahbana	Pia Alisjahbana, Mirta Kartohadiprodjo	—	*Femina, Gadis,* and 10 other magazines / *Ayahbunda, Dewi*	Radio U-FM	—	—	Production house
Bakrie Group	Anindya Bakrie	—	—	—	ANTV, TV One	Viva News	Property, Mining, Crude Palm Oil
Lippo Group	James Riady	*Jakarta Globe, Investor Daily, Suara Pembaruan*	*Investor* magazine, *Globe Asia* and *Campus Asia*	—	—	—	Property, Hospital, Schools and university
Insurance							

Note: From various sources

While several studies of New Order media discussed media groups like the Kompas-Gramedia Group,[12] Sinar Kasih Group,[13] Tempo/Jawa Pos Group[14] and Media Indonesia/Surya Presindo Group,[15] these ownership patterns have since changed dramatically. Some have grown (like the Kompas Gramedia Group and Jawa Pos); others have been shrinking (such as the Sinar Kasih Group and Tempo). The Jawa Pos Group, which was initially a part of the Tempo Group, has emerged as its own entity, now larger than its founder. While about half of the owners of major media companies come from backgrounds in journalism (such as those controlling the Kompas Gramedia Group and the Jawa Pos Group), other recent investors had no prior media experience (such as Hary Tanoesoedibjo, Dian Muljani Soedarjo, Anindya Bakrie and Eric Tohir). However, the interviews conducted for this chapter with journalists working in different media groups suggest that there is no significant difference between the attitude of and levels of editorial intervention by the media owners, regardless of whether their backgrounds were in media or non-media enterprises. Evidence from these particular sources indicates the media owners regard news as a commodity with which to secure their economic and political interests.

The impact of concentrated media ownership upon journalism practice: Stories from the field

While acknowledging the 'liberalizing' effect of new reformist media laws after Suharto, the remainder of this chapter attempts what might be described as an elementary 'newsroom ethnography', based on interviews between March and July 2008 with four working journalists from different media groups. It questions whether media concentration hampers journalists, restricts the public dissemination of information or encourages self-censorship by journalists. To maintain their anonymity, a condition of their frankness, the interviewees will be referred to only as Informants A, B, C and D, but the company that employs them will be stated to enable conclusions regarding the impact of emerging media enterprises upon journalism practice in these media groups. The purpose is to illustrate the perceptions of the media professionals operating within working newsrooms in their interactions with media owners rather than to present statistical evidence or an objectified analysis at arm's length.

Mass media or newsletter?

Informant A worked with a monthly magazine published by the Lippo Group,[16] which is owned by tycoon James Riady, who ventured into the media business early in the post-Suharto 'Reform' period. Lippo, whose businesses include property, insurance, supermarkets, banks, hospitals, schools and a university has become a major player in the media. The group bought the evening daily *Suara Pembaruan* in 2005, and then established *Globe Asia*, *Campus Asia*, *Investor Magazine* and *Investor Daily*. In November 2008, Lippo launched a new English daily, *The Jakarta Globe*. *Globe Asia*, where Informant A worked, is a monthly business magazine that conducts

regular surveys on the country's richest and most influential men and women. Initially, the group wanted to publish an Indonesian version of *Forbes* magazine, but when negotiations with *Forbes* faltered Lippo decided instead to establish its own magazine independently. Lippo's media were highly integrated editorially. Informant A said that the regular newsroom meetings were attended by all chief editors in the group, with decisions there being applied to all Lippo's media. This encouraged the reporting of stories to be synchronized across the various media. According to Informant A, the media owner had ultimate authority; newsroom staff did not criticize or even comment on the owner's wishes.

Informant A believed Lippo publications had a political 'hidden agenda'. For instance, in its November 2007 edition, *Globe Asia* highly praised Sutiyoso, the controversial former Jakarta governor and aspirant for the 2009 presidential election, despite widespread public criticism of his two periods as governor. Some newsroom staff suspected that the favourable cover story was in return for Sutiyoso's protection of Lippo's business interests, particularly in property. According to the Informant, Lippo's owner does not hesitate to interfere in media content, even without consulting the chief editor or senior staff. He has surprised both writers and editors of articles by simply removing articles he deems unsuitable.

Informant A described the content of Lippo publications as akin to company newsletters, filled with promotional stories about the group's business, rather than a genuine newspaper or a magazine. She cited one survey of influential women they were preparing for publication in which James Riady's wife was to be featured despite no indication to staff as to who had proposed her inclusion. No one in the newsroom was brave enough to question this until James Riady himself decided it was inappropriate to list his wife.

The group's cross-promotion in its media was evident in the way it writes about the various sections of the conglomerate. In February 2008, for example the group's Pelita Harapan University placed an advertisement in several major media outlets like *Kompas* and *Suara Pembaruan*, as well as *Globe Asia* magazine. The advertisement in *Globe Asia*'s February 2008 edition included an in-house survey that ranked Pelita Harapan as Indonesia's second best university, below only the University of Indonesia, complete with rather dubious criteria and statistics purporting to support that claim. *Suara Pembaruan* had also previously published these survey results in its 29 January edition in an article titled 'Private universities breaking through public universities domination'. In response, Surabaya Institute of Technology rector, Priyo Suprobo, published an op-ed article in *Kompas* titled '"Bubble Information" from Conglomerate University',[17] in which he criticized the Pelita Harapan University advertisement as false and misleading. As a member of the Education Ministry's auditing team that accredits Indonesian universities, Priyo argued the criteria and statistics included in the *Globe Asia* advertisement and *Suara Pembaruan* article were flawed and designed to mislead. Priyo did not explicitly state that Pelita Harapan University, *Globe Asia* and *Suara Pembaruan* belong to the same business conglomerate, but his analysis illustrated how dubious information was used by the publications to promote the business interests of the group. The Lippo Group did not respond.

Informant B is a senior editor at *Suara Pembaruan* daily, an evening newspaper that is traditionally associated with the country's Protestant Christian community.[18] The Informant has been working at the newspaper for about 15 years, but noticed a significant change after Lippo acquired the paper in 2005, when, for example, prominent advertisements for Lippo companies started appearing regularly. Less obvious to outsiders was the fact that Lippo changed chief editors twice before finally installing one of its trusted staffers in the position; Wim Tangkilisan was appointed chief editor of all Lippo's publications despite having no background in journalism.[19] Both Informant A and Informant B concurred that editorial meetings in Lippo publications consisted only of senior editors from the various Lippo media companies, and that these meetings tended to orchestrate which issues were to be featured and which were to be downplayed, with one major factor in such decisions being the company's economic interests.

Informant B was uncomfortable that *Suara Pembaruan* avoided publishing stories about investigation being undertaken by the Attorney General's office into private banks that had enjoyed government subsidies during the economic crisis in 1997–98. The Informant believed that the Lippo Group, which owned such a bank, was 'censoring' these sensitive stories to maintain good relations with other banks. Informant B was also uncomfortable that editorial decisions in the newsroom have less authority than those made in the advertising department. For example, if the media owner demanded an advertisement for Pelita Harapan University be placed on page one – regarded almost universally by editors as reserved for significant news, and virtually never for advertising – the newsroom staff could not refuse. The paper also allocates substantial space for events or activities held by the Lippo Group, such as a health seminar in their hospital, or a seminar with foreign speakers at Pelita Harapan University.[20] Despite such Lippo venues being in Karawaci, Banten, 30 kilometres away from central Jakarta, the newspaper nonetheless sends reporters and publishes such stories, regarded by the Informant as barely newsworthy. Informant B also points out that James Riady is a devout Christian and requires *Suara Pembaruan* to cover any religious event conducted by his church. While prior to its purchase by Lippo, *Suara Pembaruan* was regarded as part of the broad Protestant community, it was the Informant's impression that since James Riady took over, news of his particular church dominates the paper.

In summary, Informant B concluded that the Lippo Group's main interest is mobilizing their media for the benefit of their other businesses, and the disadvantage of their business rivals. Such a claim requires further study, but it conforms to Bagdikian's notion of 'monopoly control over the news'[21] and the argument that many business people invest in the media industry to promote their broader economic and political interests, rather than because of any altruistic desire to provide the public with independent, objective information and pluralistic points of view.[22]

Political interests in media

Informant C is a reporter with the Media Indonesia/Metro TV Group, which is owned by Aceh-born businessman Surya Paloh. Paloh is a flamboyant and controversial

figure who, while close to the Suharto family, nonetheless spoke out publicly for press freedom during the New Order. His first newspaper, *Prioritas*, was banned in 1986 for deviating from its official licence to cover business and economics and veering too explicitly into political coverage. Following the ban on *Prioritas*, Paloh formed the Media Indonesia Group, branching out with several newspapers in the regions including Aceh and North Sumatra.[23] While later divesting itself of most of these regional interests, the Media Indonesia Group maintains its shares in *Lampung Post*, and Metro TV has also helped establish a local television station in Papua called Metro Papua (see Hill's chapter in this volume). The Media Indonesia Group is smaller than several other media conglomerates (such as the Kompas-Gramedia, Jawa Pos, Femina or Bakrie groups), but Surya Paloh does not shy away from using his media to advance his political and economic interests.

A long-standing member of the Golkar Party (which was established in the 1960s and became the ruling party of President Suharto), Surya Paloh headed its board of commissioners from 2004 to 2009. He is currently head of Golkar's Advisory Board, while the party's chairman is businessman turned Vice President (2004–9), Jusuf Kalla. Surya Paloh sought – but failed to gain – Golkar's candidacy prior to the 2004 presidential elections, during which time he demonstrably mobilized his media for self-promotion. According to Informant C, Paloh ordered Media Indonesia and Metro TV to cover his activities every day. Readers consequently found his bearded face all over the paper, welcoming guests or meeting national political figures. Metro TV projected Surya Paloh as a competent leader, able to comment on any subject, from financial issues to national politics and the environment. It is therefore not surprising that Paloh had opposed government legislation designed to limit cross-media ownership – although the restrictions which were passed in 2002 are ambiguous and their impact still unclear.[24] He openly stated that he used Metro TV and Media Indonesia as his political vehicle, declaring 'If I can't use them, what else can I use? If there are any journalists who disagree with this situation, they are free to leave Metro or Media Indonesia. I don't want to be hypocritical.'[25]

Informant C manages the running text on Metro TV. During his eight-hour shift, he has to insert at least 12 news items, both foreign and local. Foreign news presented no ethical issues for the journalist, unlike local news, whose 260 character-text is the real target of strict control and censorship by the media owner and top editorial team.[26] Informant C noted that amongst the taboo topics was any negative coverage of Bank Mandiri, because it had provided loans to the media group. Metro TV is also not allowed to cover anything to do with the scheme known as Bank Indonesia Liquidity Assistance (BLBI), under which the national reserve bank provided financial support worth trillions of rupiah to bail out banks crumbling during the 1998 financial crisis.[27] Subsequent audits found a substantial proportion of these funds were obtained and used corruptly. One of Informant C's editors said it was not appropriate to cover this as 'it concerns us', leading the Informant to assume that Media Indonesia Group may have gained financial advantages from the BLBI policy in the closing phase of Suharto's rule.

However, there are also issues that Metro TV owners might be reluctant to cover, but which it does report simply because they are being covered by all other stations; in such cases it may respond by providing only superficial coverage. For example, Metro TV was highly reluctant to cover the May 2006 mudflow in Sidoarjo, East Java, in which the mining firm, PT Lapindo Brantas owned by the Bakrie Group, caused an extremely severe environmental disaster when a faulty drilling operation tapped an unstoppable geyser of hot mud which submerged at least 12 villages in three districts.[28] Aburizal Bakrie, one of the owners, is also a Golkar party executive. Despite serious questions about Lapindo Brantas' operations and extensive environmental damage, the Informant felt Metro TV gave the mudflow disaster only passing mention in its news reports, without any effort to go deeper either through an in-depth report or a talk show.

It was also revealing how Metro TV covered the dying days of former president Suharto at the end of January 2008. Just prior to Suharto being admitted to the hospital's intensive care unit during the last weeks of his life, the Attorney General's Office tried to revive its investigation of him over the allegedly corrupt operations of his Supersemar Foundation. However, according to Informant C, Metro TV reported only on Suharto's declining health, and never mentioned the investigation into his wealth. One of the senior editors, Sugeng Suparwoto, who used to be a close confidante of Suharto's eldest daughter Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, reportedly ordered newsroom staff in mid January not to cover the investigation. Informant C described how staff were also specifically asked to refer to the former strongman as 'Pak [Mister/Father] Harto' or 'former president Suharto' and not simply 'Suharto' in the news narration. This particular demand was unusual broadcasting practice since Indonesian presidents after Suharto were usually referred to without the honorific 'pak' (in the case of Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid or Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono) or 'bu' (for Megawati Sukarnoputri).

The Informant confirmed that senior staff of the conglomerate (sometimes referred to as Surya Paloh's 'success team') make it clear that they expect Metro TV's coverage of politics to reflect the aspirations of its owner. Given Surya Paloh's position as the head of Golkar Party Advisory Board, Metro TV must support Golkar. This was particularly evident during several elections for regional heads, such as those in South Sulawesi, North Maluku and West Java, when Golkar Party candidates were expected by party insiders to win the elections. Whenever there was any public dispute about the result of the elections, the Informant felt Metro TV's coverage was slanted towards Golkar by, for example, interviewing commentators who were sympathetic to Golkar. According to Informant C, newsroom staff were extremely obedient to Surya Paloh's wishes and instructions from the senior managers, and there was no discussion or debate about this pro-Golkar policy. The Informant believed 'the newsroom policy at Metro TV is highly subject to interference from Surya Paloh as owner, and top editors like Elman Saragih. It is safe to say that journalistic independence does not exist in Metro TV'.

Informant D is a television journalist who has been working in the TV industry since the late 1990s, and has established a reputation as a critical journalist, daring

enough to oppose any inappropriate newsroom policy. In 2006, Informant D joined RCTI, the first private television station in Indonesia, which had been acquired in 2003 by businessman Harry Tanoesoedibjo, whose other business ventures include telecommunications and stock markets. In August 2003, Tanoesoedibjo appointed himself as chief of the RCTI editorial board, with the authority to control news content. RCTI gave highly favourable coverage on issues related to the Suharto family's interests. As with Metro TV, for example, Informant D recalls RCTI newsroom staff were also ordered to refer to Suharto as 'Pak Harto' instead of 'Suharto' or 'former president Suharto' (as was used by other stations such as SCTV and TransTV) while reporting on his final days in January 2008. By using the affectionate nickname 'Pak' (Father), RCTI was positioning Suharto as the father who has contributed so much for Indonesia, and displaying the station leaders' respect for the former strongman.

Tanoesoedibjo also manages to keep at bay television coverage that is unfavourable to his businesses. The case of his purchase of local airline Adam Air in 2007 illustrates this point.[29] Several months prior to his purchase of the airline, on 1 January 2007 the media widely reported that that air traffic control had lost contact with an Adam Air plane flying from Surabaya to Manado. Around this time, Adam Air's owners, Adam Suherman and Agung Laksono (Chair of the Indonesian parliament), approached Tanoesoedibjo to buy the airline, with the deal being finalized in April when Tanoesoedibjo (through his company, Global Air Transport) acquired Adam Suherman's 50 per cent share.[30] Unaware of these negotiations, Informant D and his news crew continued reporting the Adam Air crash which had killed at least 120 passengers. But in April 2007, he received a short text message from a colleague informing him that Tanoesoedibjo had just bought Adam Air, and intimating that as a consequence RCTI's coverage of the Adam Air crash would no doubt stop. Uncertain about the message, Informant D questioned RCTI chief editor Arief Suditomo, who confirmed the policy, surprised that reporters had become aware of it so soon. The newsroom staff demanded to meet with Tanoesoedibjo himself to hear the policy directly from him. In a subsequent meeting which Tanoesoedibjo called for all the newsroom staff he confirmed his takeover of Adam Air, and asked the newsroom not to jeopardize the airline's image. Staff showed some resistance until Tanoesoedibjo delivered what was interpreted as a thinly veiled ultimatum, stating 'It is not everyday that I ask you for a favour'. His opposition to negative reports about the airline was clear.

Informant D also detailed how Tanoesoedibjo asked newsroom staff not to cover the investigation into former Minister for Law and Human Rights, Yusril Ihza Mahendra. Yusril was allegedly involved in accepting bribes from a Web-based enterprise established to facilitate the process of company registration with the Ministry, which was said to have lost the state Rp 400 billion in revenue. Business partners in the website were Harry Tanoesoedibjo's brothers, Budiman R. Tanoesoedibjo and Hartono Tanoesoedibjo.[31] Informant D said it was awkward that, while every other media outlet was covering this case, RCTI did not, redirecting coverage instead onto another corruption case. Tanoesoedibjo applied the same editorial restrictions to other media in his MNC Group, which

also includes the daily paper *Seputar Indonesia* (also known as *Sindo*) and *Trust* economic weekly magazine. In the midst of the criminal examination of Yusril, *Trust* magazine was about to print a cover story on the investigation but, according to Informant D, 'an order from top management' cancelled it. *Seputar Indonesia* initially published several headline articles on the case, but the story quickly disappeared. The Informant described how tensions slowly emerged in RCTI over the issue, with disobedient reporters and editors attempting a 'guerrilla struggle' rather than an outright fight against Tanoesoedibjo.

Meanwhile in September 2008, when the current global economic crisis crushed one of the Bakrie Group's companies, Bumi Resources – owned by the family of Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare, Aburizal Bakrie – Informant D said that RCTI was also asked not to cover the issue. Tanoesoedibjo admitted to the newsroom staff that he owned a large number of shares in Bumi, so unfavourable coverage of the company's problems would reduce its economic value, and consequently the value of Tanoesoedibjo's holdings.

Downgrading journalism quality

Doyle[32] argues that media concentration in the hands of few has two important consequences: the decline of media pluralism and the abuse of political power by media owners. Hrvatin and Petkovic,[33] in a survey of concentrated media ownership and its impact on media independence in Central and Southern Europe, argued that:

> Media owners are in a position to influence media content, and the mere possibility that they would choose to exert such influence justifies restrictions. Their motives may be political, ideological, personal or commercial, but the outcome is the same. Media owners are those who dictate media content.

They added that,

> Media concentration has an impact not only on media content but on the manner of reporting as well. The media are overwhelmed with 'servile' and market-driven journalism where the interests of owners and advertisers take priority over the interests of readers. Certain kinds of media content are used only as a guise to promote sponsored texts or advertising.

In this case, 'censorship is much more effective, because the interests of the owner are miraculously the same as those of "information"'.

As this chapter has illustrated, in post-Suharto Indonesia, the concentration of media ownership effectively into the hands of a relatively small number of major media groups has created a situation where media collude with business and political interests. It has resulted in a diminution of the quality of journalism, surpassed by media bias towards the economic and political interests. Ultimately, such publications tend to be more like newsletters for their particular groups rather than independent, impartial media, reporting critically upon those with economic and political power. Moreover, some media groups even provide false information

accepting covert payments to present what is essentially paid content as news items, making the independence of the newsroom subservient to the advertising or marketing departments. As these Informants have illuminated, commercialism and profit-seeking outweigh any pursuit of scoops or investigative journalism. Under such pressures, journalists self-censor, avoiding news items that may antagonize owners or breach taboos set in particular newsrooms. Although Suharto has long gone, those struggling for press freedom in Indonesia still face a battle, but while past struggles were against government censorship or threats from the military institution, today's enemies are often closer to home and require a very different strategy.

Notes

1 See for example: E. S. Herman and R. W. McChesney, *The Global Media: The New Missionaries of Corporate Capitalism*, London and New York: Cassell, 1997; R. W. McChesney, *Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Politics in Dubious Times*, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1999; P. N. Thomas and Z. Nain, (eds) *Who Owns the Media? Global Trends and Local Resistances*, London: Zed Books, 2004; B. H. Bagdikian, *The Media Monopoly*, Sixth Edition, Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2000; V. MacLeod, *Media Ownership and Control in the Age of Convergence*, London: International Institute of Communication, 1996; J. Tunstall, and M. Palmer, *Media Moguls,* London: Routledge, 1991; G. Roberts, *Leaving Readers Behind: The Age of Corporate Newspapering*, Fayetteville: The University of Arkansas Press, 2001; G. Doyle, , *Media Ownership: The Economics and Politics of Convergence and Concentration in the UK and European Media*, London: Sage, 2002 and S. B. Hrvatin and B. Petkovic, *Media Ownership and Its Impact onMedia Independence and Pluralism*, Ljubljana, Slovenia: Peace Institute, 2004.
2 R.W. McChesney 'The Political Economy of International Communication' in P. N. Thomas and Z. Nain (eds) *Who Owns the Media? Global Trends and Local Resistances*, London: Zed Books, 2004, pp. 10–11
3 http://europe.ifj.org/en/pages/media-concentration
4 D. Dhakidae, 'The State, the Rise of Capital, and the Fall of Political Journalism', Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1991: p. ii.
5 Dhakidae, 'The State, the Rise of Capital'; D. T. Hill, *The Press in New Order Indonesia*, Perth: University of Western Australia Press, 1994; K. Sen and D. T. Hill, *Media, Culture and Politics in Indonesia*, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2000.
6 On the emergence of private television stations in Indonesia, see P. Kitley, *Television, Nation and Culture in Indonesia*, Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2000 and Sen and Hill, *Media, Culture and Politics*, pp. 111–32.
7 Sen and Hill, *Media, Culture and Politics*, p. 218.
8 D. N. Hidayat (ed.) *Pers Setelah Revolusi Mei: Runtuhnya Sebuah Hegemoni,* Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2000; Sen and Hill, *Media, Culture and Politics*; A. Heryanto, and S. Y. Adi, 'The Industrialization of the Media in Democratizing Indonesia', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 2001, vol. 23, 327–55; D. McCargo, *Media and Politics in Pacific Asia*, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003; J. M. Tesoro, *The Invisible Palace: The True Story of a Journalist's Murder in Java*, Jakarta: Equinox, 2004; A. Romano, *Politics and the Press in Indonesia: Understanding an Evolving Political Culture*, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.
9 Reporters Without Frontiers, *Third Annual Worldwide Press Freedom Index*, 2004, http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/Asia_index_Eng_2004.pdf (accessed 7 October 2009).
10 Dewan Pers, *Data Penerbitan Pers Nasional Tahun 2007*, Jakarta, 2007: p. xiii.

11 B. Bräuchler, 'Cyberidentities at War: Religion, Identity, and the Internet in the Moluccan Conflict', *Indonesia*, 2003, vol. 75, April; P. Spyer, 'Fire without Smoke and Other Phantom's of Ambon's Violence: Media Effects, Agency, and the Work of Imagination', *Indonesia*, 2002, vol. 74, October; L. Arragon, 'Mass Media Fragmentation and Narratives of Violent Action in Sulawesi "Poso" Conflict', *Indonesia*, 2005, vol. 79, April; R. W. Hefner, 'Civic Pluralism Denied? The New Media and Jihadi Violence in Indonesia' in D. F. Eickelman and J. W. Anderson (eds) *New Media in the Muslim World*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003.

12 See for example: Dhakidae, 'The State, the Rise of Capital', pp. 230–54, 334–50, 404–13; Hill, *The Press in New Order*: pp. 83–86; Sen and Hill *Media, Culture and Politics*, pp. 57–58.

13 See for example: Dhakidae, 'The State, the Rise of Capital', pp. 218–29, 325–33; Hill, *The Press in New Order*: pp. 86–88.

14 See for example: Dhakidae, 'The State, the Rise of Capital', pp. 255–68, 351–62; Hill, *The Press in New Order*, pp. 88–91; Sen and, Hill, *Media, Culture and Politics*, pp. 58–59.

15 Hill, *The Press in New Order*, pp. 91–97.

16 The interview with Informant A was held in Jakarta, 5 March 2008.

17 P. Suprobo, '"Bubble Information" from Conglomerate University', *Kompas*, 15 February 2008.

18 The interview with Informant B was held in Jakarta, 17 March 2008. For a brief overview of the history of *Suara Pembaruan*, see http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suara_Pembaruan (accessed 9 October 2009).

19 Respected observer of the Indonesian media Andreas Harsono, for example, described Tangkilisan as 'not a journalist. He is a media executive'. (See 'Okezone Mohon Maaf dan Mencabut Berita Tentang Putera Presiden SBY', dated 9 April 2009, Available: http://bintangtenggara.multiply.com/journal/item/268/lanjutan_berita_Okezone_ Mohon_Maaf_dan_Mencabut_Berita_Tentang_Putera_Presiden_SBY, (accessed 16 January 2010).

20 To substantiate this general observation, I examined in detail Monday editions of *Suara Pembaruan* in May 2009. In the edition of 4 May, for example, of its 28 pages, two pages consisted of advertisements for Lippo's sister companies (e. g. St Moritz condominium, Kemang Village apartment complex, *Investor* daily, First Media cable TV and Internet provider, and a Pelita Harapan University architectural seminar). In the 18 May edition, approximately two and a half of the 28 pages were similar Lippo Group advertisements (including St Moritz condominium, Pluit Village Lippomall, Kemang Village, First Media, Pelita Harapan University and a *Suara Pembaruan* business gathering).

21 R. W. McChesney, *Communication Revolution: Critical Junctures and the Future of Media*, New York and London: Free Press, 2007.

22 G. Roberts, *Leaving Readers Behind: The Age of Corporate Newspapering*, Fayetteville, AR: The University of Arkansas Press, 2001.

23 Hill, *The Press in New Order*, pp. 91–97.

24 U. Hisyam, *Editorial Kehidupan Surya Paloh: Perjalanan 50 tahun 1951–2001*, Jakarta: Yayasan Dharmapena Nusantara, 2001, pp. 62–64.

25 Quoted in Andreas Harsono, 'Wartawan atau Politikus', *Pikiran Rakyat*, 7 June 2004.

26 Informant C was interviewed in Jakarta on 20 March 2008.

27 On the BLBI (Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indonesia) corruption cases, see Sukowaluyo Mintorahardjo, *BLBI Simalakama*, Riset Ekonomi Sosial Indonesia, Jakarta, 2001; J. Soedradjad Djiwandono, *Bank Indonesia and the Crisis: An Insider View*, ISEAS, Singapore, 2001; and the summary provided at http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bantuan_ Likuiditas_Bank_Indonesia (accessed 17 January 2010).

28 For an overview of the Lapindo Brantas mudflow disaster, see Pohl 2007 and http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sidoarjo_mud_flow (accessed 17 January 2010). The victims of

the environmental disaster have established a portal at http://www.korbanlumpur.info/ (accessed 17 January 2010).

29 'Kinerja Jelek Terancam, Adam Air Buka Kesempatan Kerjasama Strategis', *Kompas*, 21 March 2007.

30 'PT Bhakti Investama Tbk. Resmi Akuisisi Adam Air: Bhakti Resmi Akuisisi 50% persen saham Adam Air', dated 15 April 2007, at http://adamairjambi.multiply.com/ journal/item/3 (accessed 10 December 2009).

31 *Kompas,* 29 November 2008 and *Kompas*, 26 December 2008.

32 Doyle, *Media Ownership*, p. 6.

33 Hrvatin and Petkovic, *Media Ownership*, p. 12.

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7 The transformation of the media scene

From war to peace in the Moluccas, Eastern Indonesia[1]

Birgit Bräuchler

Johan Galtung and others have argued that reconciliation and peace have attracted much less attention from the media than war and conflict.[2] Taking the Moluccan society's transition from conflict to peace, this chapter discusses how media in Indonesia can contribute both to the fragmentation and the unification of society. It illustrates how the society and the media are interdependent and provides a comprehensive analysis of these processes based on a context-oriented, integrative and agency-oriented approach to media studies.

Indonesia's transforming media scene

In an archipelagic nation like Indonesia, the media are a key element in creating and sustaining a national identity. As Benedict Anderson has prominently argued, the rise of print media played a primary role in the formation of nations as 'imagined community'.[3] In the Suharto-era, news media in Indonesia were subjected to strict control and censorship. They served to promote the government's and the military's idea of a 'national culture' and their interpretation of news, history and the state.[4] After the country was freed from Suharto's authoritarian grip, the Department of Information was closed and the freedom of the press enacted as an essential part of the democratization of the country.[5] The loosening of authoritarian constraints upon the media and its subsequent liberalization resulted in an explosion in the number of dailies, journals, radio and TV stations throughout the country. In addition, Internet access rapidly increased. As Woodier argues, this new media environment and the increasing accessibility of the media to ordinary citizens will have 'dramatic consequences for the political and social fabric of Indonesia and Southeast Asia as a whole',[6] and will challenge established power structures and authorities. But the new developments not only fostered democratization, but also competition and social fragmentation. Media – the former cornerstone of national unity – became increasingly used by different interest groups and as weapons in the many regional conflicts in the post-Suharto era. 'Media is a double-edged sword.'[7]

Media, conflict and peace

The marriage of conflict and media has been a quite happy and successful one for many decades now. Media can be used in various ways and for various objectives.

The coverage in local, national and international media decisively influences local conflicts and the way outside observers perceive and react to them.[8] Media can be used to deceive the public about a conflict's 'real' causes and to construct a unified narrative.[9] The rise of the new media has even transformed conflicts into global spectacles: images of conflicts from all over the world are brought right into homes, be it on TV or the Internet, in the newspaper or on the radio.[10] But media are not only used to report about conflicts; they are increasingly employed as weapons by warring parties.[11] Simon Cottle's term 'mediatized conflicts' tries to express the multiplicity of these media processes in which 'conflicts are variously defined, framed and visualized, elaborated, narrativized and evaluated; moralized, deliberated and contested; amplified and promoted or dampened and reconciled; conducted and symbolized, enacted and performed.'[12] As I will show, the Internet and 'small media' such as leaflets, graffiti and locally-produced video CDs play as much a role in those 'mediatized conflicts' as the more conventional mainstream media. Nevertheless, media studies still focus on a media world structured and dominated by certain elites, whereas the common people are mainly depicted as a passive audience.

The news media pay much less attention to reconciliation and peace than to conflict.[13] Images of conflict seem to be much easier to convey than images of reconciliation and peace. Similarly very few scholars have analysed how media may be used to foster peace. Nevertheless, media can demonstrably be an important means in peace and reconciliation processes. As Howard *et al.* argue, media are an 'extremely versatile *tool*' that can not only be used 'to deconstruct and break down and indeed demolish existing structures', but also 'to construct and repair and rebuild'.[14] 'Peace journalism' was a term introduced by Johan Galtung in the 1960s and then further developed in the following decades. Galtung criticized the prevailing style of journalism that focused on violence and the negative side of conflict, thus more one-sided propaganda than a neutral means to convey 'the truth' about a conflict. Peace journalism, on the contrary, is supposed not to differentiate between 'us' and 'them' but to re-humanize people and emphasize that all had suffered in the conflict and that it was now time to consider how to solve the conflict and the problems that triggered it. Peace journalism tries to explore the conflict's dynamics, uncover the truth on both sides, highlight integrative initiatives that secure common ground between the parties and thus, foster dialogue and peace.[15] Most of the literature on peace journalism and related topics is highly policy-oriented and application-oriented. In academic literature, there is still a big gap to be filled.

A major shortcoming in the studies on peace journalism is that they typically focus on one type of media and institutionalized media structures, and rarely include grass-roots agencies into their analyses. What I want to argue for in this chapter, using the Moluccan case, is a more integrative perspective on local media that emphasizes the linkage between the various media and the active appropriation of the media by a broad variety of actors including members of the ordinary community.

Integration, agency and communication

A study which only focused on one type of media would run the risk of not appreciating the complex media environment in situations of conflict and peace-making; it might also fail to capture the impact of those people who have access to some media but not to the specific form of media under analysis. Many studies researching conflict and media focus on the national press, radio or TV stations, to which most local people might have no access. Although these national media do exert their influence on local conflicts, in an archipelagic state like Indonesia, local media play a much bigger role in conflicts carried out far away from the centre. Gatekeepers of local media such as local newspapers and radio stations are often embedded in the local population and thus much more empathetic to their aspirations. Other local media such as leaflets, graffiti, posters and video CDs are practically available to anybody.

We need not only to consider the mainstream media and the so-called new media, but 'the potential of alternative "old" media'.[16] The differentiation of media producers, media activists and (passive) recipients of media messages, which is still maintained in most media studies, is rather counterproductive in a contemporary context of conflict. As the 'practice turn' in social theory and its growing influence on media anthropology suggest,[17] common people are not locked up in pre-determined and fixed media structures and hierarchies, but can creatively appropriate media and shape the media space. Moreover, media-oriented practices are inseparably linked with other social practices, in our case in conflict and peace processes. As Nick Couldry argues, a main objective of a practice-oriented media anthropology is 'mapping the complexity of media-saturated cultures where the discreteness of audience practices can no longer be assumed.'[18] This is not to say that power and hierarchy no longer have a role to play when it comes to media access. But we have to investigate also how 'the resource-poor and institutionally powerless . . . are apt to resort to creative tactics and/or turn to new media and modes of communication in their bid to gain media space and symbolically counter ingrained imbalances of power.'[19]

Media are part of a much larger communicative repertoire (*kommunikativer Haushalt*)[20] that is heavily determined by local collective memories, the local sociocultural context and its interplay with the broader national and international environment. To achieve peace, conflicts have to be transformed through the mobilization of other registers of the communicative repertoire. The most important aspect is how one group identifies itself and then refers to their opponent in a conflict. To overcome a conflict, the practices of how to address and characterize 'the other' have to be altered and a sense of shared interest and commonality created.[21] Peace journalism builds on this transformative potential. However, not only journalism, but the whole media scene has to undergo this transformation.

For the rest of this chapter we turn to the Moluccas to understand the role media and various media actors played in the conflict and peace process, how they interacted and how the transformations within society and the media are interlinked.

The Moluccan conflict

Following a quarrel between a Christian bus driver and a Muslim passenger in Ambon town on 19 January 1999, a violent conflict was fought in the Moluccas from 1999 until 2003. While the exact number of deaths (estimated between 8,000 and 15,000) may never be known, around 700,000 people – almost a third of the Moluccan population – had to flee temporarily, and hundreds of churches and mosques were destroyed. Although scholars like G. J. Aditjondro and Tamrin Tomagola suspect that members of the former Suharto regime and the military whose political influence was curbed after Suharto fell were the driving force behind the Moluccan conflict,[22] the clashes were generally depicted as framed with religious symbolism from the beginning. The incident described previously took place on Idul Fitri, the end of the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan, and shortly after that rumours spread that the biggest mosque and largest church on Ambon Island had been set on fire. In 2000, the radical Muslim Communication Forum of the Followers of the Sunnah and the Community of the Prophet (*Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama'ah*, FKAWJ) sent its military wing, the *Laskar Jihad* (Holy Warriors), to the Moluccas in order to help their co-religionists, preserve them from their alleged extinction, and fight Moluccan separatism that the FKAWJ equates with the Moluccan Church and Christianity.[23] This further contributed to the oversimplified depiction of the Moluccan conflict as a religious war, and reinforced a widespread image of fundamentalist Islam, resurgent worldwide. Moluccan society became divided along religious lines between Muslims and Christians. Neutrality was interpreted as betrayal and thus, often fatal.[24]

Media in the Moluccan conflict[25]

The media became a crucial factor in enforcing the religious dichotomization of Moluccan society. Newspapers, radio and TV stations were either classified as Muslim or Christian. With few exceptions,[26] in the Moluccan context, scholars have paid very little attention to the role of the media as an important means to enforce conflict lines and trigger new clashes – be it through the expansion of the conflict into the Internet, the local press, TV or radio stations, books or tabloids, pamphlets or graffiti, pictures or videos. Through media, people involved in the conflict could express their emotions and fight each other; media became tools to manipulate people and thus influence the conflict dynamics.[27]

The general explosion of media in the post-Suharto era coincided with the outbreak of the Moluccan conflict. Immediately before the start of the conflict there was only one daily newspaper in the Moluccas, *Suara Maluku* (SM). SM had been published with intermissions since 1953. It was incorporated into the Jawa Pos Group in 1993, leaving the consortium in 2003.[28] In the first year of the conflict, two new dailies emerged: *Ambon Ekspres* (AE) in July 1999 and *Siwalima* (SL) in October 1999. SM was located in a Christian area, which made it difficult, if not impossible, for its Muslim staff to come to the office during the conflict. At the same time, the remaining Christian journalists could not get access to events that

took place in the Muslim area or to Muslim informants. This necessarily resulted in a one-sided, Christian-focused reporting. That was when Dahlan Iskan, chief of Jawa Pos Group, decided to start a new daily in Ambon, *Ambon Ekspres*, to give Muslim journalists the chance to work and write about the situation in the Moluccas.[29] The reporting in SM and AE became increasingly divergent. *Siwalima* was set up later that year in the Christian area but with the intention of providing a unifying peace press and to unite Christian and Muslim journalists. However, this proved to be rather unfeasible and SL turned into the most polarized of these three dailies, clearly siding with the Christians.[30] SM and SL became the mouthpiece for the Christians, AE for the Muslims. As some of these dailies' journalists later put it, these media not only heated up the conflict, but also turned it into a war between journalists. Despite their often good intentions, the journalists could not manage to bridge the religious divide. In part this may have been because the process of training quality journalists could not keep up with the post-Suharto media boom. Most journalists in these newspapers had little media experience and underwent no professional training prior to joining the papers. They were trained briefly by the more senior staff and then left to learn on the job. In a conflict situation where it was a challenge for even trained journalists to provide neutral reporting, this lack of experience proved destructive.

Muslims reproached the national television station TVRI (TV of the Republic of Indonesia) and the national radio station RRI (Radio of the Republic of Indonesia) for being pro-Christian; yet, although both stations had their main offices in Christian areas, they tried hard to cover the Muslim perspective. RRI tried to keep in touch with Muslim colleagues by telephone; TVRI continued to have a Muslim and a Christian crew. But the conflict conditions and the strict boundary lines between communities made it very difficult to cover both sides comprehensively.[31] The government even made efforts to use television as a peace medium by sponsoring the so-called *Obet-and-Acang* spot, which was broadcast on national TV and several commercial channels in 1999 a short while after the conflict had broken out.[32] The narrative of this *Obet-and-Acang* reconciliation 'advertisement' focused on the violent disruption of a friendship between two Ambonese children whose names – and nicknames – reflect their different religious affiliations – Robert ('Obet') and Hasan ('Acang'). They search for each other in the smoke and eventually, find and embrace each other. But the spot did not have the desired effect: 'Instead, "Obet" and "Acang" have become Maluku's favourite slang for "Christian" and "Moslem", a hostile shorthand to delineate us and them', which are used next to the slang 'whites' (Muslim) and 'reds' (Christian), after the headdresses the fighters wear, or the sarcastic local jibes 'Israeli' (Christian) and 'Palestinian' (Muslim).[33]

During the conflict new radio stations emerged, the most prominent being the extremely provocative and radical station run by the FKAWJ in Ambon on 105.5 FM: Suara Perjuangan Muslimin Maluku (SPMM, The Moluccan Muslims' Voice of Struggle). SPMM was on air daily from 10 p.m. until 7 a.m., broadcast news every half hour and otherwise recitations of the Koran (mostly verses that legitimize the Laskar Jihad's mission in the Moluccas) and lectures on reli-

gious issues very much coloured by the FKAWJ's ideology. The predecessor of SPMM was *Gema Suara Maluku* (GSM, Reverberation of the Muslim Voice), the first radio station of the Muslim community in Ambon town that was initi-ated in August 2000 by the Chief of the Information Department of the FKAWJ, Abdul Hadi, together with local Muslims in order to counter what they regarded as the mischievous information offered by existing Christian private radio stations, TVRI, RRI, *Siwalima*, *Suara Maluku* and even, *Ambon Ekspres*. According to the FKAWJ, GSM provided Muslims with another effective weapon in their struggle against the Christians. GSM was not only used to provide information for the Muslims, but also to broadcast Friday speeches from the famous Al-Fatah mosque in Ambon town and speeches given by the FKAWJ's leader, Ja'far Umar Thalib. When SPMM took over from GSM, the programme was even more radicalized. The station called upon the whole Muslim community to refrain from any interac-tions whatsoever with Christians and to join the jihad against a worldwide Judeo-Christian conspiracy and the (Christian) South Moluccan Republic (RMS) militia allegedly destroying the Indonesian state.[34]

The Christian side got extremely worried about the highly provocative charac-ter of SPMM and asked the local government to shut it down, but in vain. Some of SPMM's equipment was destroyed in a military raid, but shortly after, the station was back on air. The radio was most popular among uneducated Muslims, who often gathered in the streets and cafes to listen to SPMM's news. The FKAWJ considered media most important for their missionary, social and educational endeavours, their information politics in the Moluccan conflict, and as a weapon against the Christians. In order to cover all levels of society and to reach as many people as possible, the FKAWJ not only spread their messages via radio, but also on the Internet,[35] via a tabloid called *Laskar Jihad Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah*,[36] bulletins and leaflets,[37] booklets and books.[38] These books were sold at newspaper stalls in Muslim areas together with the publications of Rustam Kastor – a former general who is the main local ideologue behind the Muslims' accusation against the Christians and the Church, regarded by him as seeking a separate Moluccan state. Leaflets were also used by other people or groups to spread their views, and, along with rumours, often triggered new waves of violence.[39] The most prominent example is a leaflet, distributed in Tidore in the Northern Moluccas in November 1999, allegedly written by a pastor who 'revealed' in it the plan to Christianize the Northern Moluccas. Although both the church and the pastor repeatedly rejected these accusations, the deceptive leaflet triggered massive acts of violence against the local Christian population in the North.[40]

The FKAWJ's deployment of the media reflects the Moluccan conflict's mul-tifaceted media scene, in which 'small media' and the Internet play as much a role as the daily newspapers. Ambon town and conflict-affected villages were plastered with graffiti, scrawled on the walls of destroyed buildings. 'Making the stones speak'[41] became a very effective and visible means of expressing one's feelings, to discredit and insult the other side and to provide symbols with which one can identify or that depict the artist as part of a wider community that could protect him/her in the conflict. There were, for example, slogans

Figure 7.1 Advertisement for Radio SPMM in the FKAWJ's tabloid

insulting Jesus or Mohammed, such as 'Jesus pemabuk' (Jesus is a drunkard) or 'Mohammed berzina' (Muhammed commits adultery), which would not only offend Moluccan Christians or Muslims, but Christian and Muslim communities worldwide. The same applies to inscriptions that attack the religions, such as 'Islam Muka Lonte' (Islam has the face of a whore), or depict the Moluccan

Christians as 'kafir' (infidels). Muslim murals regarding 'satu ummat' (one community) imply Moluccan Muslims are part of an Islamic world community to which they can turn for support. The Star of David in Christian areas compares their situation with the Jews in Israel.

In a much more direct though not as accessible way, the parties to the conflict visualized their experiences, their sufferings and the other side's cruelty and viciousness through locally-produced and distributed videos.[42] Pictures used in these videos and on the Internet often depicted the physical destruction of the conflict and pictures of victims: bloody images with often badly mutilated bodies. These pictures are much more effective in arousing emotions than words and would have never been accepted for publication in the mainstream Indonesian press. As Cottle argues, 'showing images of body horror' does not automatically 'produce anti-war sentiments':[43] on the contrary. Pictures of a massacre of hundreds of Muslims who had sought refuge in a mosque in the Northern Moluccas when circulated on Java massively angered the Muslim community there and prompted the FKAWJ to send the Laskar Jihad to the Moluccas. More generally, as Spyer suggests, 'too little heed is given to the work of the imagination and the construction of knowledge in all of this and, specifically, to how these compel and propel particular actions and shape those who carry them out.'[44] The various media do not only refer to what happened, but also appeal to people's fantasy and imagination regarding what might, or is about to, happen, thus increasing tension and a dangerous alertness that can easily turn into another cycle of violence.

Conflict videos were not only produced as propaganda material to split society further and legitimize more violence, but also as part of campaigns to seek outside help to stop the conflict. Masariku Network was set up by a group of (Protestant) Moluccans in Jakarta and Ambon in order to document the violence, exchange information among their members in the Moluccas and abroad, deliver proof of who is involved in the violence (such as the Laskar Jihad and the military), raise international awareness of what is happening in the Moluccas, and thus build an advocacy and fund-raising network that could help end the conflict and reconcile the parties. Masariku set up an online mailing list, collected eyewitness reports, went to many hot spots, took thousands of pictures, put them online, circulated them on CD and also produced documentary campaign videos under often very dangerous conditions. Although these videos try to take an objective stance by emphasizing the suffering of the whole Moluccan population, the role of the military and the role of outsiders in triggering the conflict and setting Christians and Muslims against each other, they inevitably represented a Christian perspective.

The Catholics also actively used the media to circulate information about the violence locally as well as internationally, and to seek support, particularly after the arrival of the Laskar Jihad. The Crisis Centre of the Diocese of Ambon (CCDA) first used fax and then the Internet to spread their almost daily (English) reports on the conflict to an international (mostly Christian) audience. Like the Laskar Jihad and the Crisis Centre of the Protestant Church, the CCDA was confronted with an increasing number of daily requests and enquiries, and the only way to deal with this in an effective way was the Internet. It is fast, has a global reach, is

cost-effective and interactive, and thus an ideal means for the people involved in the conflict to provide a voice for their respective communities. In order to make this information available as well to the local population that had no Internet access, the Catholic Church also included summaries of these reports in their monthly Pastoral Newsletter (*Warkat Pastoral – Warta Keuskupan Amboina*) that was distributed to all Catholic churches in the Diocese of Ambon.

These various media and their depictions do not, of course, exist in isolation from each other. They rather refer to each other, react to each other's reporting, emerge because of each other, and are thus part of a vicious cycle that is hard to break. *Ambon Ekspres*, for instance, emerged to balance *Suara Maluku*'s reporting. *Siwalima* was established to reconcile the media split. The FKAWJ claims that their radio station and their website were set up in reaction to Christian-biased local press and radio stations and the prominent Christian *Ambon Berdarah On-Line* Website (ABO, http://www.geocities.com/ambon67) that was strongly promoting the Christian case. Graffiti 'communicated' or more accurately battled with each other as well as the varied Internet projects in a series of actions and reactions – to give just some examples.

Cross-media references were common on all sides of the conflict. The media of the Laskar Jihad, Radio SPMM, is promoted on their website and in their tabloid (see Figure 1). Speeches broadcast via SPMM are also put online. The website advertises books published by the Jihad Press and new editions of the tabloid. In the tabloid, one can find information about the websites and the radio station. The leaflets provide email and web addresses and reproduce graphics used on the webpage. The bulletins reproduce excerpts from the tabloid, the websites and the financial reports of the Laskar Jihad. Photos of graffiti are put online by Masariku as well as the FKAWJ; reports from *Siwalima* are forwarded to and circulated via the Masariku-Mailing-List and ABO; Masariku contributions are integrated into ABO; *Siwalima*, Suara Maluku, RRI and TVRI are used as sources for the reports of the Crisis Centre of the Diocese of Ambon, and so forth. Media on all levels are thus involved in the conflict. All try to advance their group's cause (some more and some less consciously) and pick up common themes of the warring parties' identity schemes, thus reinforcing them.

The Moluccan media thus became a constituent part of the conflict's dynamics and the establishment of 'divided memories'.[45] The strategic use and the 'power of images' were decisive.[46] Religious symbols played an important role and provided the media players with the chance to connect to a wider religious community, its values, its prayers and also its funds.

Although the influential role of the multifaceted media is more than obvious, it was neglected for a long time by local authorities, and no preventive measures were taken, at the local or the national level. It was possibly the simultaneous explosion of the conflict in the Moluccas and the media in Indonesia in general that made the situation so difficult and unpredictable. Only from the beginning of 2001 did the then Moluccan governor, Saleh Latuconsina, begin repeatedly warning the population not to be provoked by the reporting in the local and national newspapers, TV and radio stations.[47] At the same time, he urged the media to provide neutral cover-

age of events, and also took concrete measures to control media representatives. His first plan to shut down SPMM was never realized. He put more effort into his second plan: to ban any reporting on FKM activities from August 2001 onwards. Associations such as the Indonesian Alliance of Independent Journalists (*Aliansi Jurnalis Independen*, AJI) and Reporters without Borders (*Reporter Sans Frontières*, RSF) were extremely worried about press freedom during civil emergency rule. As if to confirm these worries, the military took Latuconsina's reporting ban as reason to beat up two journalists (from SL and SM) simply because they were on their way to the same meeting as the FKM's leader in Waisarissa on Seram, which was meant to promote reconciliation.[48] While increasing attention was paid to the print media, small media and the role of the Internet were never considered.[49]

Transforming the media scene, transforming society

The rising awareness of the influential role of the media resulted in the establishment of the Maluku Media Centre (MMC). The MMC was one of the many conflict solution, peace and reconciliation efforts initiated after the outbreak of the conflict. It became an important factor in the peace dynamics in the Moluccas. The MMC was established after AJI had organized a meeting of journalists and leaders of Moluccan and Northern Moluccan media (mainly newspapers) in Bogor, West Java. To lend more weight to this initiative the governor of the Moluccas was also invited, after which he finally started to raise community awareness about the role of the media in the conflict.[50] Being located right at the border between a Christian and a Muslim area in Ambon town, the MMC initially functioned foremost as a place where journalists from both sides could meet in the midst of the conflict situation, hold discussions, try to produce more balanced news and thus contribute to solving the conflict.

Over time the MMC developed from being a neutral meeting point into a centre that organized skills training for journalists, workshops, discussions, research, monitoring and advocacy for press freedom and the rights of journalists, who are still severely underpaid and who are often physically threatened if covering sensitive topics like corruption.[51] These were also the objectives of a webpage the MMC maintained (until 2005) and its monthly magazine *Tabaos*. From the MMC's perspective, it was critical to replace 'war journalism' (*jurnalisme perang*) with the introduction and teaching of peace journalism (*jurnalisme damai*).[52] The MMC's main goal was capacity-building and increasing media professionalism in the Moluccas to equip journalists better for their tasks in any future conflict, as a preventive force. With the support of AJI and the international Media Development Loan Fund (MDLF)[53] in 2005 the MMC extended its training activities beyond the island of Ambon, organizing a big meeting in Namlea town on Buru Island, which had the largest number of journalists after Ambon. In 2007, it held training programmes in the Southeastern Moluccas. It also extended its training activities to TV and radio journalists.

The MMC was one of the decisive factors triggering a transformation of the conflict-oriented media scene in the Moluccas into a peace-oriented one. The

reporting style in the dailies changed radically as reports and editorials tried to avoid simplified dichotomizations of society and started using unifying symbols. Importantly, they focused on reporting peace efforts instead of war events. Moreover, the organized media tried to re-balance the religious composition of their staffing. The MMC managed to create immense solidarity and cooperation among the journalists, thus setting a good example for the Moluccan population at large and triggering other media initiatives for peace.

In February 2001, even before the official launch of the MMC, *Radio Suara Pelangi* (103.5 FM) was set up in the border area, using the call-sign *The Reconciliation Station*, with the aim of countering one-sided reporting of the conflict. Through its news and partly interactive programming, it aimed to foster dialogue and integration, thereby contributing to the reconciliation process. The initiative was supported by the government as an effort to 'counter' the Laskar Jihad's *SPMM* station and to 'neutralize' the community tensions. As an indication of the connections between local media, the director of *Radio Pelangi* was also head of *Siwalima*. *Radio Pelangi* employees also underwent training organized by BBC and *Internews*,[54] among others, for media staff in conflict areas throughout Indonesia.

Other reconciliation media projects evolving in the transition from conflict to peace in the Moluccas included the travelling library (*perpustakaan keliling*) of the National Library in Ambon town, which delivered books to remote areas and villages on Ambon and neighbouring islands by truck and boat. This was interrupted by the conflict and revived in 2002. Other reconciliation activities initiated by the National Library, which is ideally located in a Christian–Muslim border area, were exhibitions, readings, recitation and story-telling competitions, and a letter-writing competition for International Peace Day in 2003. Christian and Muslim teenagers from all levels of society were asked to express their feelings about the conflicts in letters to the government. These were then published as a book.[55]

Since the revival of tradition is an important means for the Moluccan people to build inter-religious bridges and create sustainable peace, video CDs of the conflict were replaced by videos of installation ceremonies of traditional village heads, celebrations of the renewal of inter-religious village alliances ('*bikin panas pela*'), the performance of rituals that had been postponed during the years of conflict, or regionally important celebrations, such as the anniversary of the Pattimura revolt against the Dutch on Saparua island (Central Moluccas) in 1817. Many of these ceremonies and rituals brought Christians and Muslims together and were thus a means for reconciliation. Their recording on CD provided abiding symbols of historical moments of unity.

By 2008, although much graffiti remained from the heights of the conflict, the street scene, at least on Ambon, seemed to be increasingly marked by posters and banners promoting peace (*spanduk damai*), reconciliation and the unification of Moluccan society through cultural activities and values. During the campaigns for local and regional elections (specifically the elections of mayor in 2006 and of *Bupati* in 2007), election posters dominated public space in Ambon town and

the villages. Great care was taken that each pair put up for election (consisting of the candidate plus their deputy) included one Muslim and one Christian, which was assumed to guarantee balanced policies. Candidates depicted individually on election posters included integrative election slogans. For example, Muhammad Umarella, a candidate for *Bupati* adopted the slogan 'Agama boleh beda–Kita Satu *dalam* Budaya & Adat Istiadat' (Our religions may differ, but we are united through culture and tradition). In early 2007 the governor of the Moluccas, together with his wife, appeared on oversized posters next to images of the Protestant Silo Church, the Al-Fatah Mosque and the Catholic Cathedral, the three most important

Figure 7.2 Election poster for *Pilkada* 2007, Central Moluccas © Birgit Bräuchler

Figure 7.3 The governor and his wife wish 'Happy Maulid' and 'Happy Easter', Ambon town, 2007 © Birgit Bräuchler

buildings in the Central Moluccas representing the three major denominations. On their posters, they wished the community 'Happy Maulid' (for the Prophet Muhammad's birthday) and 'Happy Easter', while also including the unifying slogan 'Bersama Membangun Maluku' (Developing the Moluccas Together).

In line with the rapid growth of media throughout Indonesia, the number of dailies and weeklies in the Moluccas also increased. Some survived; others closed after a short time. But all tried to balance the numbers of Christians and Muslims on their staff. By May 2007, there were 20 radio stations in Ambon compared to only a handful before the conflict.[56] Two local TV stations emerged in Ambon: *Ambon TV* and *Maluku TV*. The former was founded one week before the 2006 local elections (*Pilkada*) and was owned by then deputy governor Muhammad Abdullah Mehmed Latuconsina; the latter was established in 2007 by the governor of the Moluccas, Karel Albert Ralahalu and several businessmen.

While this chapter celebrates the role of the media in the transition to peace in the Moluccas, the increasing link between politics, politicians and the media requires a more cautionary note. Politicians routinely used television to promote their causes. Regional and local politicians were involved in the executive committees of some local newspapers and some members of the parliament were professional journalists. Media can thus easily become a political instrument. During

the 2006 mayoral elections in Ambon town, many journalists were involved in candidates' campaign teams. As a consequence, their reporting was biased and gave the impression that each newspaper had its favourite candidate. Reporting in several newspapers became quite tendentious, due to political not religious affiliations.[57]

Conclusion

I have attempted to reflect on new directions for media anthropological research, to promote a more practice-oriented approach to media research and dismiss the producer–audience divide that has long been perpetuated in media studies. Only when we develop an integrative perspective, that is, when we analyse the media scene as an integral part of its sociocultural context and also analyse the relationship between different media, can we appreciate its dynamics and its influential role in peace *and* in conflict. Such analysis requires long-term studies of an area and its evolving local media scape.

   During the Moluccan conflict different kinds of media were used at all levels of society, on both sides of the divide: the press, radio, TV, photos, videos, leaflets, books, letters, the Internet, graffiti, bulletins, etc. After the conflict, a lot of effort has been put into the creation of a 'unifying' media. Each type of media works differently; they are used by different kinds of people, they cater to different people and have a different reach, they require different agencies, but they all refer to each other, communicate with each other, react to each other and make use of a symbolism that is understood across diverse media and on both sides of the conflict. Although class, power and hierarchy influence who has access to which media, all levels of society can still contribute to shaping the Moluccan media scape; they can ignore certain media messages, they can creatively appropriate media space, invent new media and thus produce their own messages. As Warde notes, 'no matter where a practice fits in a hierarchy of prestige, there are internal goods to be derived from it for individual practitioners.'[58] All the various media practices contribute to the conflict and peace dynamics and are integral parts of the societal transformation process. Media discourses decisively shape communication processes, social memories, individual agencies and collective identities in a society, and conversely, cultural communication patterns, social memories (of conflict, of a shared past, of a common culture, etc.), individual agencies and collective identities shape the way media are appropriated and used. It is the perspective of practice that helps us to 'address how media are embedded in the interlocking fabric of social and cultural life.'[59]

Notes

1   I would like to thank the Asia Research Institute (ARI), National University of Singapore, for giving me the opportunity to write this chapter during my ARI fellowship, and the editors of this book, Krishna and David, for inviting me to the workshop underlying this edited volume, which I unfortunately could not attend.

2   Johan Galtung is one of the founding fathers of modern peace and conflict research

and a strong promoter of the concept of '"positive peace" . . . built around such ideas as "harmony", "cooperation" and "integration"', opposed to "negative peace", the mere absence of violence.' (J. Galtung, 'Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some Responses', *Journal of Peace Research*, 1985, 22 (2), p. 145). For an earlier example of this kind of thinking, see J. Galtung, 'An Editorial', *Journal of Peace Research*, 1964, 1 (1), 1–4. As will be outlined later, Galtung has also developed the concept of 'peace journalism'.

3 B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Verso: London, 1983.

4 K. Sen and D. T. Hill, *Media, Culture and Politics in Indonesia*, Oxford University Press: Oxford/New York, 2000.

5 Press Law No. 40, 1999 (Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia, Nomor 40 Tahun 1999, Tentang Pers).

6 J. Woodier, 'Perning in the Gyre: Indonesia, the globalized media and the "war on terror"', in B. Cole (ed.) *Conflict, Terrorism and the Media in Asia*, Routledge: New York, 2006, p. 42.

7 R. Howard, 'Media and Peacebuilding: An Operational Framework', in R. Howard, F. Rolt, H. v. d. Veen and J. Verhoeven (eds) *The Power of the Media: A Handbook for Peacebuilders*, European Centre for Conflict Prevention: Utrecht, 2005, p. 21.

8 See for example, T. Allen and J. Seaton (eds) *The Media of Conflict: War Reporting and Representations of Ethnic Violence*, Zed Books: London/New York, 1999; M. Hudson and J. Stanier, *War and the Media*, New York University Press: New York, 1998; and P. Knightley, *The First Casualty. The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist, and Myth Maker from the Crimea to Vietnam*, André Deutsch: London, 1975.

9 J. Pottier, 'Modern Information Warfare versus Empirical Knowledge: Framing "The Crisis" in Eastern Zaire, 1996', in J. Pottier, A. Bicker and P. Sillitoe (eds) *Negotiating Local Knowledge: Power and Identity in Development*, Pluto Press: London/Sterling, Virginia, 2003, pp. 215–40.

10 Since the Internet has demonstrably played a decisive role in planning the September 11 attacks on the Twin Towers in New York, increasing attention is now paid to a rising fusion of media, conflict and terror, which also resulted in a boom of scholarly publications on the topic. See for example B. Cole (ed.) *Conflict, Terrorism and the Media in Asia*, Routledge: New York, 2006. S. Cottle, *Mediatized Conflict: Developments in Media and Conflict Studies* Issues in cultural and media studies, Open University Press: Maidenhead, Berkshire/New York, 2006; A. P. Kavoori and T. Fraley (eds) *Media, Terrorism, and Theory: A Reader*, Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham, MD, 2006; K. Knorr Cetina, 'Complex Global Microstructures: The New Terrorist Societies', *Theory, Culture & Society*, 2005, 22 (5), 213–34; R. Latham (ed.) *Bombs and Bandwith: The Emerging Relationship Between Information Technology and Security*, The New Press: New York, 2003; and A. T. Thrall, *War in the Media Age*, Hampton Press: Cresskill/ New Jersey, 2000.

11 For example, the so-called 'hate media' in Rwanda, fax wars in Saudi Arabia and the expansion of the Moluccan conflict onto the Internet. See J. Marks, 'Preface', in R. Howard, F. Rolt, H. v. d. Veen and J. Verhoeven (eds) *The Power of the Media: A Handbook for Peacebuilders*, European Centre for Conflict Prevention: Utrecht, 2005, pp. 13–17; D. F. Eickelman and J. W. Anderson, 'Redefining Muslim Publics', in D. F. Eickelman and J. W. Anderson (eds) *New Media in the Muslim World. The Emerging Public Sphere*, Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 1999, pp. 1–18; B. Bräuchler, 'Cyberidentities at War: Religion, Identity, and the Internet in the Moluccan Conflict', *Indonesia*, 2003, 75 (April), 123–51; and B. Bräuchler, *Cyberidentities at War: Der Molukkenkonflikt im Internet*, transcript: Bielefeld, 2005.

12 Cottle, *Mediatized Conflict*, p. 185.

13 Cottle, *Mediatized Conflict*, p. 100.

14 R. Howard, F. Rolt, H. v. d. Veen and J. Verhoeven (eds) *The Power of the Media: A*

Handbook for Peacebuilders, European Centre for Conflict Prevention: Utrecht, 2005, p. 81.

15 See for example J. Galtung, 'High Road, Low Road', *Track Two*, 1998, 7 http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/two/7_4/p07_highroad_lowroad.html (15 January 2002) and http://www.transcend.org.

16 B. Cole, 'Conclusion', in B. Cole (ed.) *Conflict, Terrorism and the Media in Asia*, Routledge: New York, 2006, p. 118.

17 For the former, see S. B. Ortner, *Anthropology and Social Theory: Culture, Power, and the Acting Subject*, Duke University Press: Durham/London, 2006; and T. R. Schatzki, K. Knorr Cetina and E. v. Savigny, *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory*, Routledge: London/New York, 2001. For the latter, see for example, recent discussions on the Media Anthropology Mailing List of the European Association of Social Anthropologists, http://www.media-anthropology.net and the volume edited by B. Bräuchler and J. Postill (eds) *Theorising Media and Practice*, Berghahn: Oxford/New York, 2010.

18 N. Couldry, 'Theorising Media as Practice', *Social Semiotics*, 2003, 14 (2), 115–32.

19 Cottle, *Mediatized Conflict*, p. 2.

20 T. Luckmann, 'Kommunikative Gattungen im kommunikativen Haushalt einer Gesellschaft', in G. Smolka-Kordt, P. Spangenberg and D. Tillmann-Bartylla (eds) *Der Ursprung der Literatur*, München, 1988, pp. 279–88.

21 For a comprehensive study on the complexity of communication and how it determines the emergence, the perpetuation, the understanding and the solving of conflicts, see D. G. Ellis, *Transforming Conflict: Communication and Ethnopolitical Conflict*, Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham, MD, 2006.

22 See for example G. J. Aditjondro, 'Guns, Pamphlets and Handie-Talkies: How the military exploited local ethno-religious tensions in Maluku to preserve their political and economic privileges', in I. Wessel and G. Wimhöfer (eds) *Violence in Indonesia*, Abera-Verlag: Hamburg, 2001, pp. 100–128; and Tamrin Tomagola's contributions in Z. Salampessy and T. Husain (eds) *Ketika Semerbak Cengkih Tergusur Asap Mesiu: Tragedi Kemanusiaan Maluku di Balik Konspirasi Militer, Kapitalis Birokrat, dan Kepentingan Elit Politik*, TAPAK Ambon: Jakarta, 2001.

23 This accusation became essential part of the Moluccan Muslims' interpretation and explanation of the conflict. Turning into a self-fulfilling prophecy an Ambonese doctor, Alex Manuputty, in December 2000 founded the Moluccan Sovereignty Front (*Front Kedaulatan Maluku, FKM*), in order to re-establish independence proclaimed in 1950 by the South Moluccan Republic (*RMS*). According to Manuputty, since the Indonesian government was not able to put an end to the conflict, this was the only way to stop the fighting and the abuse of human rights in the Moluccas. However, contrary to what the Laskar Jihad and Manuputty himself claimed, the FKM only had a handful of followers in the Moluccas and in the Netherlands. Some observers even claimed that the FKM was a provocation by the military to give them an excuse to intervene in the Moluccas.

24 To understand fully why religion could become such a driving force in the Moluccas, it is necessary to consider regional and national developments over previous decades, such as the Suharto government's Islamization policy in the 1990s and its transmigration policy. Through these programmes more and more (Muslim) migrants came to the Moluccas, and increasingly Muslims were given positions in the local bureaucracy formerly dominated by Christians. This was accompanied by a growing importance of religion and the decreasing influence of *adat* (tradition and customary law) in the Moluccas.

25 If not stated otherwise, the following account is based on participant observation and interviews with journalists and other people actively or passively involved in the multi-layered media scene conducted in the Moluccas from 2002 until 2007 and on my intensive online research in Moluccan cyberspace from 1999 until 2003.

26 See for example Bräuchler, 'Cyberidentities at War'; Bräuchler, *Cyberidentities*

at War; V. Joseph, 'De media en de Molukken: geruchten, feiten en evenwichtige berichtgeving', in V. Joseph, W. Manuhutu and H. Smeets (eds) *De Molukken in crisis*, Actuele Onderwerpen: Lelystad, 2000, pp. 13–17; and P. Spyer, 'One Slip of the Pen: Some Notes on Writing Violence in Maluku', Workshop 'Indonesia in Transition', Padang, 2002. For a policy-oriented analysis, see The Institute for the Studies on Free Flow of Information/Institut Studi Arus Informasi (ISAI), *The Role of Media in Peace-Building and Reconciliation: Central Sulawesi, Maluku and North Maluku*, ISAI: Jakarta, 2004. For an overview of the press in the Moluccas from 1908 until 1969 see M. A. Ely, *Pers nasional di Maluku*, Pustaka Baca: Jakarta, 1987. On the role of the Internet, see the various publications by B. Bräuchler, and D. T. Hill and K. Sen, 'Netizens in Combat: Conflict on the Internet in Indonesia', *Asian Studies Review*, 2002, 26 (2), June, 165–87. The Institute for the Studies on Free Flow of Information in Indonesia (Institut Studi Arus Informasi, ISAI) dedicated one issue of *Pantau* magazine to the Moluccan tragedy, analysing coverage in the national daily newspapers *Kompas*, *Suara Pembaruan* and *Republika* ('Petaka Maluku', *Pantau*, 2000, 9.) None of the dailies had made any effort to foster investigative journalism in the Moluccan case or tried to contribute to its solution; they either sharpened the conflict, ignored or hid it (O. Eriyanto and M. Qodari, 'Mempertimbangkan Jurnalisme Damai', *Pantau*, 2000, 9, p. 41). For further analysis of newspapers' reporting of the Moluccan case, see R. Rahabeat, *Politik Persaudaraan: Membedah Peran Pers*, Buku Baik: Yogyakarta, 2004.

27 Although I will restrict my analysis here to local or localized media, the media split went far beyond that to the national and international level.

28 I. Passal, 'Harian Suara Maluku: Si Tua Yang Tak Renta', *Tabaos (Journal of the Maluku Media Centre)*, 2007, Edisi April, p. 23.

29 AE was the only Ambon newspaper with colour printing and a large print run (approximately 5,000) during the conflict (M. A. Tunny, 'Dari Bilik Kamar Kos, Menjadi Koran Terbesar di Maluku', *Tabaos (Journal of the Maluku Media Centre)*, 2007, Edisi Agustus, pp. 22–24).

30 For a detailed analysis of SM, AE and SL, see O. Eriyanto, *Media dan Konflik Ambon*, Kantor Berita Radio 68H, Majalah Pantau dan Media Development Loan Fund: Jakarta, 2003. In the following years, some other dailies emerged. *Metro Maluku* was founded by *Suara Maluku* journalist Max Apono in 2000, *Koran Info* and *Info Baru* in 2002 and 2003 by (Muslim) businessmen, *Dewa* and *Marinyo* in 2004 and 2005/2006 by former (Christian) *Siwalima* partners. Several other newspapers appeared irregularly such as *Seram Pos* or *Tragedi Maluku*. Some, such as *Suisma* (Suara Umat Islam Maluku, The Voice of the Islamic Community in the Moluccas; 2000–2002), did not survive long.

31 For the media landscape (especially the press) during the conflict, see Eriyanto, *Media dan Konflik Ambon*; Joseph, 'De media en de Molukken'. Southeast Asian Press Alliance; 'Fiery Reporters: Ambon & Aceh Special', *ALERT magazine*, 2002, 3 (1).

32 P. Spyer, 'Fire without Smoke and other Phantoms of Ambon's Violence: Media Effects, Agency, and the Work of Imagination', *Indonesia*, 2002, 74 (October), p. 29.

33 International Crisis Group, 'Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku' *Asia Report No. 10*, 2000, p. 4.

34 On RMS, see Endnote 23 .

35 They maintained a well-visited website and a mailing list: http://www.laskarjihad.co.id/ and http://groups.yahoo.com/group/laskarjihad/. On the Laskar Jihad's online presence see B. Bräuchler, 'Islamic Radicalism Online: The Moluccan Mission of the Laskar Jihad in Cyberspace', *The Australian Journal of Anthropology*, 2004, 15 (3), 267–85.

36 The tabloid was produced on Java, appeared biweekly and had a print run of 70,000–100,000, about 5,000 of which were sent to Ambon for distribution during the crisis.

37 *Nusroh*, for instance, was a Laskar Jihad bulletin covering *dakwah* (proselytizing), social, educational and health issues in the Moluccas as well as the Muslims' struggle. *Bel@* (Berita Laskar, Laskar News) was one example of a Laskar Jihad leaflet that

covered news from Ambon and Poso. These pamphlets had a print run of several thousands and were not only distributed in busy areas in Ambon town (such as the harbour and in front of the mosque) or in villages, and on the neighbouring islands, but were also posted on walls.

38 See, for example, A. Syafruddin and E. Prasetyo, *Tragedi Kebun Cengkeh: Fakta Pembantaian Paramedis, Pasien & Warga Sipil Ambon*, Jihad Press (LJ Media): Jakarta, 2001; J. U. Thalib, *Buku Petunjuk dan Latar Belakang Pengirim Laskar Jihad ke Maluku*, Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama'ah: Malang, 2000; and J. U. Thalib, *Laskar Jihad Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah Mempelopori Perlawanan Terhadap Kedurjanaan Hegemoni Salibis-Zionis Internasional di Indonesia*, Jihad Press (LJ Media): Jakarta, 2001. Syafruddin and Prasetyo are on the executive committee of the FKAWJ (Public Relations and Information Department). Information on the FKAWJ's media is based on interviews with the FKAWJ's media people and its public relations and information department, with Moluccans reached by these media, and own observations. When the FKAWJ was dissolved in October 2002, all their media disappeared. The mailing list's activities were halted before that, in late 2001, because too many advertisements were attached to the mails by Yahoo showing bikini-clad women. The list's archives are still available online.

39 Spyer in 'Fire without Smoke' reflects, among others, on the role of rumours in the Moluccan conflict.

40 For a detailed description and analysis of the leaflet see J. Nanere, *Kerusuhan Maluku: Halmahera Berdarah*, BIMASPELA (Yayasan Bina Masyarakat Sejahtera dan Pelestarian Alam), Ambon, 2000, pp. 63–80.

41 J. Peteet, 'The Writing on the Walls: The Graffiti of the Intifada', *Cultural Anthropology*, 1996, 11 (2), p. 144.

42 As Patricia Spyer argues, while VCD traffic was relatively small-scale and closely controlled among Christians in Ambon, Muslim VCDs, by contrast, were 'not only mass-produced, sold in the markets and streets of much of Indonesia, but transnationally popular and quite homogeneous: Ambon's VCDs look much like Kashmir's, Bosnia's, and video representations of Palestine shown in Malaysia and elsewhere' ('Fire without Smoke', p. 34).

43 Cottle, *Mediatized Conflict*, p. 95.

44 Spyer, 'Fire without Smoke', p. 24.

45 B. Giesen, 'Noncontemporaneity, Asynchronicity and Divided Memories', *Time & Society*, 2004, 13, 27–40.

46 S. Frey, *Die Macht des Bildes. Der Einfluß der nonverbalen Kommunikation auf Kultur und Politik*, Hans Huber Verlag: Bern/Göttingen/Toronto/Seattle, 1999.

47 See for example *The Jakarta Post* 28 February 2001 and satunet.com 27 March 2001. The authority of the governor had been strengthened to deal with the crisis by the allocation of extensive civil emergency powers from the central government in June 2000.

48 *Press Freedom Alert, Journalists receive death threats in the Moluccas*. Online. Available at http://www.rsf.fr (accessed 30 June 2000) and Maluku Media Centre. Suing and beating up journalists or blocking the media's access to conflict areas is still common in Indonesia and, as Woodier argues, is a means by which politicians, local strongmen, religious groups and sections within the police and armed forces try to reassert control of the media and the flow of news and information. See Woodier, 'Perning in the Gyre'. For cases in the Moluccas, see Maluku Media Centre, *Tabaos: Eksekutif Represif, Pers Beraksi*, 2007, Edisi Mei.

49 My own in-depth studies, however, show that the Internet played an important role. It was used by local actors (the Protestant Masariku Network, the Catholic Crisis Centre and the Laskar Jihad) as a strategic part of their information politics. These actors expanded the Moluccan conflict into cyberspace, where the fighting continued with other means and where influence on an international audience was exerted (Bräuchler, 'Cyberidentities at War', and *Cyberidentities at War*).

50 AJI was formed in 1994 by a group of Indonesian journalists who were no longer willing to submit to 'the state-engineered obstruction of information' and rejected the concept of a single press organization controlled by the state, the Union of Indonesian Journalists (PWI). See L. Luwarso, 'The Liberation of the Indonesian Press', *Development Dialogue 2*, 1998: The Southeast Asian Media in a Time of Crisis, p. 85. In setting up the MMC, AJI had received funding from The Asia Foundation (TAF). In 2004, after a meeting in Makassar supported by AJI, Media Development Loan and Fund (MDLF) and Tifa, MMC became an independent forum, which meant that from 2005 onwards it had to seek its own funding. This resulted in the closure of MMC's webpage. From 2007 onwards, the MMC was supported by FreeVoice, Dutch Support for Media in Development. For a good insight into MMC's direction and activities, see the centre's journal *Tabaos* that was launched in 2007. For a short history of the MMC, see M. A. Tunny and I. Passal, 'Maluku Media Centre: Rumahnya Jurnalis Maluku', *Tabaos (Journal of the Maluku Media Centre)*, 2007, Edisi Maret, 11–12. I would like to thank the director of the MMC (in 2007), Rudy Fofid and other MMC staff and journalists for helping me with their insights into Moluccan media policies and transformations.

51 See for example Maluku Media Centre, *Tabaos: Ironi Tanpa Koma – Potret Sosial Ekonomi Jurnalis Maluku*, 2007, Edisi April.

52 See the various contributions in Maluku Media Centre, *Tabaos: Pers di Zona Perang*, 2007, Edisi Agustus.

53 On the MDLF, see http://www.mdlf.org/.

54 Internews is an international media development organization whose mission is to empower local media worldwide (see http://www.internews.org/).

55 I. Saya (ed.) *Bunga Rampai: Surat Perdamaian*, Pemerintah Ambon, Perpustakaan Nasional Provinsi Maluku, UNICEF: Ambon, 2003.

56 Maluku Media Centre, *Tabaos: Lintasan Siaran Radio Di Angkasa Maluku*, 2007, Edisi Juli.

57 I thank Rudy Fofid, Dien and Yayat from the MMC and *Ambon Ekspres* journalist Yani for sharing their analyses with me.

58 A. Warde, 'Consumption and Theories of Practice', *Journal of Consumer Culture*, 2005, 5 (2), p. 148.

59 Couldry, 'Theorising Media as Practice'.

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8 'Radio Active'

The creation of media-literate audiences in post-Suharto Indonesia

Edwin Jurriëns

> Press freedom is the materialisation of the sovereignty of the people, which is based on the principles of democracy, justice and the supremacy of the law, and has to be upheld in society with respect to the provision of information, education and entertainment, and to facilitate social control.[1]
>
> The impact of media watch movements can already be felt. The people are aware of their rights and responsibilities as media consumers. Those who have been disadvantaged are no longer hiding with their anger repressed. They use the right of reply or the right to correction.[2]

Meta-journalism, dialogue and ideological becoming

The two quotes represent, respectively, a legalistic interpretation and a rather idealised observation of the role of the press and its audiences in Indonesia's self-proclaimed ambition of *Reformasi* (Reformation), or the sociopolitical reform from New Order authoritarianism to fully-fledged democracy.[3] The first quote is from a radio programme making audiences aware of the value of press freedom and giving journalists guidelines on how to live up to the standards of a democratic press that serves the interests of the public ('the sovereignty of the people'). The second quote is from a newspaper article implying that the press itself, as a tool for monitoring sociopolitical processes and safeguarding democracy, had to be monitored by the public with or without the intermediary assistance of media-watch institutes. Both the radio programme and the newspaper article also reminded audiences of their responsibility not to remain silent or become angry when they were dissatisfied with the press, but to use their right of reply (*hak jawab*) in a democratic, non-violent manner.

The two quotes succinctly summarise two key principles addressed by Indonesian pro-democracy movements attempting to promote press freedom as an integral part of *Reformasi*: first, the principle of the press as an independent 'Fourth Estate' representing the public interest and monitoring the other three, that is, government, parliament and the judicial system;[4] second, the principle of journalists and audiences observing or critically evaluating the ethics of the press. Since the fall of Suharto in 1998, Indonesia has witnessed an explosive growth in journalist associations, media-training institutes, media-watch organisations, and

print and broadcasting media promoting these and other principles related to press freedom.[5]

During the New Order, the only professional journalist organisation officially acknowledged was the government-controlled *Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia* (Indonesian Journalists Association, PWI), which had mandatory membership for every Indonesian journalist.[6] The journalistic genre propagated by the government through the PWI, the state broadcasters *Radio Republik Indonesia* (Radio of the Republic of Indonesia, RRI) and *Televisi Republik Indonesia* (Television of the Republic of Indonesia, TVRI) – which had official monopolies on the production of news broadcasts – and several other institutions, was its own version of development journalism, which was meant to stimulate the development of the country and promote and implement New Order's five-year development plans.[7] Commercial radio and television were obliged to relay the news programmes of the state broadcasters, although they also developed creative ways of including current affairs and even sociopolitical criticism in 'soft news' broadcasts, infotainment, talk shows and artistic programmes. However, the space for media organisations to develop alternative journalistic concepts and discuss media-related issues with their audiences was restricted due to the threats of censorship and ban.

Especially after the abolition of the Department of Information in 1999, which was one of the New Order's main instruments for curbing the press, opportunities increased for the establishment of new media institutions and experimentation with alternative modes of journalism. Publishing companies no longer needed *Surat Izin Usaha Penerbitan Pers* (Press Publishing Company Permits, SIUPP) for the publication of newspapers and magazines. Commercial radio stations no longer depended on recommendations from the *Persatuan Radio Siaran Swasta Nasional Indonesia* (Indonesian National Association for Commercial Broadcast Radio, PRSSNI) for obtaining broadcasting licences.[8] International and local NGOs and media organisations also started to promote and experiment with alternatives to the New Order's development journalism, including peace journalism and journalism addressing issues such as gender and cultural diversity.[9] Another journalistic genre that has come to the fore since *Reformasi* is what I call meta-journalism or 'journalism about journalism'. This genre concerns the press freedom principles referred to earlier, as it is constructed to provide journalists and audiences with insight into the working mechanisms of the media and make both groups media-literate and less susceptible or vulnerable to media abuse. In this chapter, I will specifically focus on the way in which meta-journalism has addressed the Indonesian public through the medium of radio.

Radio has played an influential role in the process of *Reformasi* due to the exploitation of certain cultural–technological features of the medium, such as the relative cheapness and portable size of radio receivers, the high speed of broadcast transmission, the highly accessible orality and aurality of programmes and the possibility of on-air interaction between hosts and listeners.[10] With these features, the medium has been able to reach groups of illiterate people in the cities and the countryside who do not have any access to the print media.[11]

I consider meta-journalistic attempts to serve press freedom and enhance the media literacy of media producers and consumers to be part of a larger journalistic development during *Reformasi* that is focused on engaging the Indonesian public in media matters. Since the late New Order and early *Reformasi*, public engagement has been triggered and enabled by media institutions involving audiences in media discourse (such as interactive radio talk shows),[12] but also media production, ownership and management (as in the case of community radio).[13] Meta-journalism goes beyond mere audience engagement, however, as it also contributes to the 'ideological becoming' of the public in a Bakhtinian sense, central to which is dialogue. According to Bakhtin,[14] dialogue is not merely conversation between two or more people, but the condition of every word or 'living utterance'. This means that words or utterances never stand on their own, but are always shaped by their previous, present and forthcoming interactions with other words, in always different socio-ideological contexts.[15] People's ability to play with words and their contexts contributes to their ideological development, as it gives them insight into the idea of the unstable, context-bound character of the meaning of words.

I consider meta-journalism dialogical, as it includes reflections on journalism, exposes the ideological mechanisms behind information provision and breaks with the 'monologism' of New Order's official culture. This monologism included the regime's version of development journalism, which was constructed to disengage audiences and discourage them from asking critical questions about general socio-political issues as well as specifically media-related ones, such as press freedom and journalistic independence. Bakhtin argues that such 'authoritative discourse' hampers people's ideological development by demanding unconditional obedience and not permitting any play with words and their contexts.[16] He contrasts authoritative discourse with 'internally persuasive discourse', which is also directed at shaping people's 'ideological interrelations with the world'.[17] However, unlike the structure of authoritative discourse, 'the semantic structure of an internally persuasive discourse is *not finite*, it is *open*; in each of the new contexts that dialogise it, this discourse is able to reveal ever newer *ways to mean*'.[18] The meta-journalistic discursive practices in this chapter are 'persuasive' rather than 'authoritative', as they are neither free from ideological and commercial motivations nor deny any opportunity for further play, negotiation or contestation.

In this chapter, I focus on three case studies of dialogical, meta-journalistic radio programmes: a series called *Mengawal kebebasan pers* (*Pioneering/Monitoring press freedom*) produced by the Indonesia Media Law and Policy Centre, Suara Surabaya's talk show *Lembaga konsumen media* (*Institute of media consumers*) and episodes of the Trijaya talk show, *Jakarta first channel*. In their own ways, the different programmes seek to uphold and further develop the *Reformasi* ideal of press freedom by enhancing the media literacy of audiences. The Indonesia Media Law and Policy Centre programmes are presented by a media lawyer and focus on legislation that guides and protects the public in dealing with the media. The programmes are in the form of features, which contain the pre-recorded narrative of the lawyer-host as well as inserts with the comments from media experts and practitioners, but do not facilitate live interaction with the audience. The Suara

Surabaya *Lembaga konsumen media* series comprises talk shows in which the host, representatives of the Institute of Media Consumers (the co-producer of the programme), other invited guests and the listeners comment on media consumer affairs from an experiential perspective, and discuss how media institutions in real life use and abuse the public sphere. Trijaya's *Jakarta first channel* is a talk show about topical sociopolitical issues, which sometimes also includes meta-journalistic discussions on media-related topics.

Indonesia media law and policy centre: Mengawal kebebasan pers

In 2001, the media law division of Internews Indonesia became an independent institution called the Indonesia Media Law and Policy Centre (IMLPC).[19] IMLPC's mission is to enhance the professionalism of the Indonesian press, particularly non-governmental radio and television, which have only been officially allowed to produce their own news programmes since the fall of Suharto in 1998.[20] The Centre also informs the public about media legislation and negotiates with parliament and other relevant parties about the drafting of new media laws. Its activities include the organisation of workshops, the publication of books and brochures, and the production of radio and television programmes on issues related to media law and policy.[21]

IMLPC's radio programmes are sent as broadcast material on CD to local radio stations nationwide. I will focus on IMLPC's 2001 CD series *Mengawal kebebasan pers* (*To pioneer/monitor press freedom*),[22] which was produced in collaboration with the *Dewan Pers* (the Indonesian Press Council) and the Jakarta commercial radio station MsTri. The series comprised features on the rights and obligations of both journalists and audiences in the context of Indonesia's renewed press freedom. Themes included 'Violence against the mass media by the masses' (*Kekerasan terhadap media massa oleh massa*, June 2001), 'How to correctly recognise a journalist' (*Bagaimana mengenali wartawan dengan benar*, August 2001) and 'Who holds responsibility in a talk show' (*Siapa yang bertanggung jawab dalam sebuah talk show*, June 2001).

Each feature took approximately 25 minutes and consisted of the host's narrative, inserts with comments from media experts, background music and special sound effects. The host was Hinca I.P. Pandjaitan, media lawyer and head of IMLPC. From 2001 until 2006, Pandjaitan was also host of the weekly TVRI talk show *Dewan Pers menjawab* (*The Press Council responds*), in which issues are addressed similar to those in the IMLPC features. In each radio feature, Pandjaitan's narrative was accompanied by western classical music, probably to enhance the status of the programme and create a serious but pleasant atmosphere. Comments from experts and special sound effects were used to illustrate certain key issues or provide dramatic emphasis. For instance, when Pandjaitan talked about violence against the media, the sounds of broken glass and people screaming could be heard.

In the programmes, Pandjaitan tirelessly reminded journalists and the general public that their right to obtain and provide information was protected by 'the

supremacy of the law'. While different parties with or without any legal knowledge have used and abused this phrase in the context of *Reformasi*, Pandjaitan always referred to specific legislation such as the Second Amendment to the 1945 Constitution, the 1999 Press Law and, particularly, the 1999 Human Rights Law. Pandjaitan often quoted article 14 of the Human Rights Law, which states that 'every person has the right to seek, obtain, own, store, process and convey information by any type of medium available'. At the same time, Pandjaitan used different case studies to argue that journalists and the general public had to develop the right ethics and skills to avoid or counter media abuse, and give real meaning to the information freedom of the *Reformasi* era.

For instance, in the programme on the theme 'Who holds responsibility in a talk show', Pandjaitan discussed the publication of President Abdurrahman Wahid's health reports by the commercial television station Metro TV. He posed the question whether Metro TV and its informants had acted ethically in accordance with their right to convey information or whether they were in breach of other legislation that prohibits people from offending the President (*penghinaan terhadap Presiden*). The programme did not solve the problem in a direct manner, but presented the details of the case as well as references to relevant legislation to encourage the listeners to search for answers themselves.

The programme on the theme 'How to recognise a real journalist' was also about the ethics of the journalism profession. It talked about *wartawan gadungan* ('fake journalists'), sometimes also called *wartawan bodrek* ('Bodrex journalists')[23] or *wartawan amplop* ('envelope journalists')[24] in Indonesia. These so-called journalists use fake press cards and force people to pay money for being interviewed for a story that will never be published. In the programme, Pandjaitan provided the public with practical and legal information about how to recognise and deal with bogus journalists. Indirectly, he also criticised 'real' journalists who, in order to supplement their official salary – which is often very meagre indeed – ask interviewees for envelopes of money in exchange for publicity.

The programme on the theme 'Violence against the mass media by the masses' was about audience behaviour. It analysed why Indonesia during *Reformasi* has experienced groups in society expressing their anger at the media by threatening journalists or destroying their offices. The programme discussed and defended the rights and functions of the press and warned the public about sentences for violent behaviour against journalists. Pandjaitan also informed the listeners about alternative, non-violent ways of expressing their dissatisfaction with media reports, including their right of reply and their right to demand rectification (*hak koreksi*).

The IMLPC programme series addressed themes that were considered of immediate relevance to the Indonesian public struggling with the challenges of *Reformasi*, such as law reform, regional autonomy and human rights. At the same time, the themes and ways of discussion transcended the Indonesian situation and the borders of the Indonesian nation state, as they were also derived from and applicable to situations and nation states elsewhere. Similar to Internews Indonesia, IMLPC receives inspiration from the civil society and public sphere idiom used by the extensive network of international NGOs of which it is part.

This means that the institutional structures and programmes of IMLPC and also Internews Indonesia contradict Habermas's implicit claim that the boundaries of the public sphere follow the boundaries of the nation state,[25] and call for the study of civil society and the public sphere in an international perspective.

IMLPC's programmes also provide counter-evidence against Habermas's claim that mass culture and media segmentation would lead to passive consumerism. The programmes live up to the expectations of the bourgeois public sphere to the extent that they are institutionalised, reach large parts of society through IMLPC's extensive network of client stations, and voice consensus among media scholars and practitioners involved in rational debates on state-related issues.[26] Rather than contributing to the 'refeudalisation of society'[27] and the 'externalisation of inner life',[28] IMLPC and other post-New Order media organisations have shown awareness of these Habermasian fears – which can manifest themselves in concrete instances of media abuse indeed – in their attempts to make audiences media-literate and media-savvy.

However, similar to the criticism on Habermas's notion of the bourgeois public sphere, IMLPC programme content has been criticised for being elitist and exclusive, as it is based on the professional input of media insiders rather than the shared experiences of the common public. In this respect, radio stations broadcasting programmes such as the pre-recorded episodes of *Mengawal kebebasan pers* confront their audiences with finalised products and the consensuses reached by others. Local stations broadcasting IMLPC programmes have also received comments from their listeners that the programme content is Jakarta-centred and often not relevant to local circumstances.[29] In short, the programmes are dialogical in their attempts to enhance the media literacy and ideological awareness of the public, but not in the narrower, more literal sense of directly involving audiences in debates on the media and other sociopolitical issues, due to IMLPC pre-recording its programmes and representing – rather than presenting – the public.

Suara Surabaya: Lembaga konsumen media[30]

A programme in which media-related issues are always discussed in lively interaction with the listeners is *Lembaga konsumen media*, produced by Suara Surabaya[31] in cooperation with *Lembaga Konsumen Media* (Institute of Media Consumers, LKM). LKM, initially called *Lembaga Konsumen Pers* (Institute of Press Consumers, LKP), was one of the first Indonesian media watch organisations, founded by the journalist and university lecturer Sirikit Syah in Surabaya in 1999.[32] In the weekly radio programme, LKM representatives together with the Suara Surabaya host and the listeners discuss the content and impact of different types of media – including magazines, billboards, television soaps and radio bulletins – and the rights and responsibilities of the listeners as information consumers.[33] In addition to co-producing the radio programme, LKM also publishes a newsletter, keeps records of offences by the press, provides feedback to press organisations considered to have harmed the public interest, and organises workshops and seminars on the role of the media in the public sphere.[34]

In their work on television talk shows, Livingstone and Lunt[35] argue that many audience participation programmes are manifestations of the 'oppositional public sphere' – rather than Habermas's bourgeois public sphere – where a diversity of views is expressed, accounts of lived experience in the life-world are validated, and sometimes compromise is reached. The dialogue in audience participation programmes 'may also afford opportunities for accountability, the identification of contradictions between policy/expertise and everyday life, space for ordinary people to generate and validate common experiences, and so forth'.[36]

According to Habermas,[37] this alternative type of public sphere is subject to corruption and refeudalisation because it allows political authorities and business leaders to engage in direct dialogue with citizens, thereby transforming publicness into public relations. Livingstone and Lunt,[38] on the other hand, rightly argue that the programmes do not represent a public unified by the successful outcome of communication between different parties – as would be the case in the bourgeois public sphere – but rather diverse publics exploring the very possibilities and restrictions of communication. The same exploration and negotiation of the rules of discursive interchange in the public sphere takes place in Suara Surabaya's *Lembaga konsumen media*, in which listeners talk about their own experiences with the media.

In order to demonstrate how the programme attempts to guide listeners through this literally dialogical process of 'ideological becoming', I will focus on a 23 July 2002 broadcast about advertisements promoting the use of condoms in the fight against HIV/Aids. The Suara Surabaya host, Meinara Iman, talked about these advertisements with Tjuk Suwarsono from LKM, the sexologist Dr Andi Wijaya and the listeners. The advertisements were controversial as they touched on a taboo subject in Indonesian society, the issue of pre-marital sex.

The one-hour episode started with Wijaya arguing that the risk of the advertisements was that people, especially youth, could derive a false sense of safety from using condoms. Wijaya referred to data from the US, which showed that in 13 per cent of the cases condoms failed to offer sufficient protection. According to Wijaya, abstinence was a far more reliable method. He also thought the condom campaign should have been targeted specifically at groups with a high-risk lifestyle and not the general public. After this introduction, the listeners, addressed as 'media consumers' (*konsumen media*), were invited to give their own opinion on the issue.

Some of the listener-participants agreed with Wijaya. They were not necessarily against condom use, but thought the campaign should have been targeted at adults only:

> Actually, it should not be the case that because we, adult people, can't control ourselves, the government has to recommend condom use, which causes these kids to misuse them, etc. I also want to suggest that maybe the mass media, when socialising and helping the government with social health services, shouldn't print [the information] directly in the newspaper. Maybe they could print a special brochure or something and distribute it to adults only.[39]

Others argued, however, that the main issue was not the publicness and accessibility of the advertisements, but the personal attitude of the media consumers:

> I reckon it's 'up to the person itself'. [sic] Whether they want to or don't want to, it's their responsibility. So in my view, making ads about condoms, it's up to them. So, it's up to whoever reads them. That's what I reckon.[40]

In the final part of the programme, Wijaya summarised some of the points made by the listeners and provided advice for media producers and consumers. Similar to Panjaitan's argument about the 'right of reply' in the IMLPC programmes, Wijaya emphasised the right of media consumers to protest if they did not agree with certain messages in the media. He also urged parents to spend as much time as possible with their children in order to protect them and teach them proper values. The host ended the programme by expressing the hope that the information provided by Wijaya and the listeners would contribute to the improvement of future media campaigns about HIV/Aids.

In *Lembaga konsumen media*, Suara Surabaya uses this type of case study on media programmes or media campaigns to address the rights and responsibilities of media producers and audiences. In general, the different discussants do not argue for a return to a New Order-type control of the media, but try to explore and negotiate the boundaries of the press's Fourth Estate function in the context of *Reformasi*. In *Lembaga konsumen media* and other talk shows, Suara Surabaya promotes media literacy not only by addressing the media content audiences are confronted with in their daily lives, but also by giving audiences the opportunity to talk about their own or the hosts' performances as participants in radio talk shows. This Suara Surabaya model of meta-journalism has become a source of inspiration for other Indonesian radio stations in their attempts to raise media literacy, particularly *Global FM* in Tabanan, Bali, which I have discussed in detail elsewhere.[41]

Trijaya: 'Multi-sided journalism'[42]

Similar to Suara Surabaya, the Jakarta-based commercial radio station Trijaya has a long and respected reputation as the organiser of debates on the Indonesian airwaves. Even during the New Order, Trijaya had interactive talk shows on topical matters, including sensitive political issues. Ironically, the radio station had more opportunities to address such issues than many other media because of its protected status as part of the Bimantara business group owned by Suharto's second son, Bambang Trihatmojo.[43]

Trijaya Jakarta profiles itself as a news station, using the slogan 'More Than Just Music'. In 2001, Trijaya Jakarta's news programmes included *Lintas informasi* (*News flash*, a news bulletin broadcast once an hour daily), *Trijaya market report* (information from the Jakarta Stock Market, broadcast from Monday until Friday at 10 a.m., and 1.45 and 4.45 p.m.), *Trijaya economic business* (national and international business reports, broadcast from Monday until Friday at 12 noon), *Seputar Indonesia di Trijaya FM* (relays of RCTI's news bulletin *Seputar*

Indonesia [*Around Indonesia*], broadcast from Monday until Saturday at 6.30 p.m.), and *Trijaya news round-up* (an overview and analysis of the news of the day or the previous day, from Monday until Friday at 6 p.m. and 6 a.m.).

Trijaya Jakarta's talk shows on current affairs include *Indonesia first channel*, *Jakarta first channel* and *Thank God it's Friday*. In 2001, *Indonesia first channel* contained discussions about topical issues and was broadcast on Monday from 7.30 until 9.30 a.m. *Thank God it's Friday* dealt with social problems and public services and was broadcast on Friday from 7 until 9 a.m. *Jakarta first channel* invited journalists and experts to analyse the main news items in the morning newspapers and was broadcast on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday from 6 until 9 a.m.

According to Trijaya Jakarta's former news programme director, Ido Seno,[44] Trijaya has tried to implement the idea of 'multi-sided journalism' in its talk shows by giving different parties equal opportunity to express their own viewpoints. This multi-sided journalism has functioned as a provocative and productive answer to the monologism of the New Order's cultural politics with its one-sided, non-negotiable representation of social and political reality. The Trijaya producers do not present themselves as the providers of 'independent' news, as this would hide the fact that news necessarily carries a particular point of view. They rather use multi-sided journalism to make listeners media-savvy by providing them with different insights into an event and thus, training them to put the 'factuality' of news and information into perspective.

Trijaya's *Jakarta first channel*, an instance of its multi-sided journalism, is a morning show on current affairs presented by a host and one or more interviewers. The first part of *Jakarta first channel* consists of the host reading the headlines and leading articles of influential national newspapers, such as *Kompas*, *Koran Tempo* and *Media Indonesia*. It also includes Trijaya's own news bulletin *Trijaya news round-up*, music and commercials. The second part of the programme consists of a talk show in which the interviewers talk with invited informants or experts (*nara sumber*) on a topical issue.

In accordance with the principle of multi-sided journalism, the invited guests in the talk show are usually representatives of different professions or interest groups, who provide the listeners with different interpretations of the 'same' topic. The listeners do not always have the opportunity to phone in and express their opinion as in Suara Surabaya's *Lembaga konsumen media*, as Trijaya prefers rather to have an organised debate in which spokespersons or representatives of different sections of society are each given equal opportunity to speak.[45] In this sense, *Jakarta first channel* follows the rule of the classical debate in which rational discussion takes place in an orderly manner under the guidance of a chair.[46] This type of debate suits Habermas's idea of the bourgeois public sphere as an institutionalised and accessible forum that is used by the public to hold rational discussions and possibly, reach consensus. Livingstone and Lunt[47] rightly put the publicness of these debates into perspective by addressing the controlling power of the host, the prominence of experts over lay participants and the restricted opportunity for listeners to express themselves. In this sense, the literal dialogism of *Jakarta first*

channel is rather restricted, similar to the IMLPC programmes discussed earlier. However, unlike the IMLPC programmes, Trijaya's talk show is not pre-recorded and does represent a certain dynamic atmosphere with the unpredictable directions and outcomes of live interaction.

An example of a *Jakarta first channel* edition with a meta-journalistic character was broadcast on 16 October 2001. The broadcast discussed the role of the Indonesian media in covering a demonstration against the US invasion in Afghanistan held on Israk Mikraj (the Ascension of the Prophet), 15 October 2001.[48] The demonstration was organised by the Indonesian fundamentalist Islamic organisation *Front Pembela Islam* (Islamic Defenders Front, FPI) outside the Indonesian parliament building in Jakarta. The police had attempted to disperse the demonstrators, as demonstrations on public holidays were prohibited according to Article 9 of the 1998 Law Number 9 on the Expression of Opinion in Public (*Undang–Undang Menyampaikan Pendapat di Muka Umum*), a law meant to accommodate *Reformasi* ideals such as the right to organise demonstrations.

When the FPI members refused to stop the demonstration and leave the location, a violent confrontation broke out between the police and the demonstrators. Several people were hurt, including reporters from commercial television stations (Metro TV, Indosiar) and the print media. The police also confiscated reporters' film and video cassettes containing images of the confrontation. Media institutions were outraged that some of their reporters were wounded and their material confiscated, and generated more media coverage, including reports and discussions in radio news programmes such as Trijaya's *Jakarta first channel*. In the 16 October *Jakarta first channel* broadcast, two male interviewers talked with a representative from each of the major parties involved in the conflict: the FPI, the police and the media. The interviews were conducted by phone and took about 15 minutes each.

The first interview was with Habib Risieq Shihab, Chairman of the FPI. Shihab declared that FPI would take three steps in the aftermath of the incidents. First, they would not let themselves be 'provoked' and would 'restrain themselves' from taking violent revenge on the police or other groups in society. Second, they would continue searching for FPI members who were missing, and third, they would hire lawyers and take legal action against the police, so that 'the supremacy of the law would be upheld'. According to Shihab, the FPI had sent a letter to the police to announce their plan to hold a demonstration on the 15th, but received no reply indicating demonstrations on public holidays were forbidden. Shihab suspected that the police wanted to portray the FPI negatively, in order to distract attention from the US invasion in Afghanistan and to prevent other groups from organising demonstrations. The FPI itself wanted Indonesia to cut diplomatic relations with the US.

The second interview was with Superintendent Anton Bachrul Alam from the Jakarta (Metro Jaya) regional police. Alam explained that the video cassettes and films from the television and newspaper reporters were found and would be returned. He apologised for the police conduct, emphasised the importance of the work of journalists and undertook to investigate the police officers involved

in the incident. The police would also help search for the missing FPI members. According to Alam, the police had replied to the FPI's letter, asking for more details on the planned demonstration, but never received any further information. The police expected violence at the demonstration, as they had confiscated weapons from FPI supporters from Surakarta, who had arrived in Jakarta by train the previous day. In order to resolve any remaining issues, the police would meet with FPI representatives at the Department of Religion. Alam denied Shihab's allegations that the action of the police was to scapegoat the FPI and prevent people from organising other anti-US demonstrations.

The third and final interview was with Andi F. Noya from Metro TV. Noya explained that a Metro TV cameraman had filmed the police attempting to disperse the demonstrators and damaging one of the demonstrator's cars. When the cameraman refused to hand over his video cassette and tried to flee, he was chased by the police, hit on his head and hand, and eventually forced to surrender the cassette. According to Noya, Metro TV would only broadcast the content of the confiscated cassette if the station considered the information still to be relevant, and that decision would not be influenced by any pressure from, or negotiation with, the police. Noya could understand journalists sometimes had injuries from working in risky circumstances, but could not accept the police taking or destroying their materials and breaching the freedom of the press.

The specific ways in which the different parties answered questions and responded to the situation represented the sometimes paradoxical and confusing character of *Reformasi*-style discourse and behaviour. The FPI, with its fundamentalist ideology and militant attitude, can be considered an example of 'un-civil society', which with the lessening of central state control seized the opportunity to manifest itself in public. Ironically, during the interview Shihab used 'good' civil society discourse – similar to the discourse used by IMLPC and LKM, for instance – attempting to convince the audience that the FPI would not seek recourse to violent revenge, but rather contribute to 'upholding the supremacy of the law'. He also positioned the FPI as victim, just like the press, thereby encouraging the audience to attribute some of the press' democratic values and functions to his own organisation.

The fact that a senior police representative publicly apologised for bad police behaviour in the media would have been very rare during the New Order. Alam used exactly the same phrase as Shihab about 'upholding the law', but also said that the police conduct was aimed at safeguarding the values of *masyarakat madani* ('civil society', with Islamic connotations).[49] He may have used this late 1990s activist-scholarly term to imply that the FPI did not act in accordance with what was envisioned as *Reformasi*-style social behaviour. Several times during the interview, he also underlined the importance of press freedom and the role of journalists in society. Not surprisingly, this last point was confirmed by the representative from the media, Metro TV's Noya.

The interviewers confronted their guests with questions of equally critical intensity ('Why did FPI decide to demonstrate on a public holiday?', 'Why did the police confiscate media materials?', 'Why was Metro TV not willing to take

the police to court?''), although they approached each interviewee with a slightly different attitude. While not impatient with Shihab, the interviewers certainly attempted to prevent him from using his quite impressive oratory skills to exploit the programme completely for FPI's own ideological ends. The interviewers applauded the Superintendent's self-criticism, but also interspersed ironic comments about police conduct. They treated their fellow journalist, Noya, with an interesting combination of solidarity and professional rivalry.

During the talk show, the people interviewed did not have the opportunity to talk with each other, nor were there any phone-in opportunities for the listeners. In line with the idea of multi-sided journalism, the Trijaya hosts tried to give the interviewees equal time to present their own version of the story – without having to face the risk of endless interruptions – and provide the audience with the clearest possible overview of the different aspects of the case. Although this restricted dialogism in a narrow, literal sense, the talk show was certainly dialogical in a broader Bakhtinian sense of 'ideological becoming', as it contributed to the audience's knowledge about the work of journalists, the mechanisms of media representation and the function of a free press.

Conclusion

Mengawal kebebasan pers, *Lembaga konsumen media* and *Jakarta first channel* are three examples of meta-journalism, a journalistic genre that has come to the fore in Indonesia since the late New Order. In each programme, meta-journalism has manifested itself in a different form. *Mengawal kebebasan pers* has the format of a feature in which a host discusses relevant media legislation and case studies about media abuse. *Lembaga konsumen media* is a talk show in which a host, invited media experts and the listeners talk about the role and impact of the media in daily life. *Jakarta first channel* has the format of a rational debate, in which hosts, interviewees, and regularly also listeners, discuss sociopolitical topics including the media in an orderly manner.

These different formats have consequences for the way in which the public or the public interest is represented. In *Mengawal kebebasan pers* a specialist discourse is used on behalf of the public; in *Lembaga konsumen media* listeners have the opportunity to talk about their own ideas and experiences in a direct manner; and in *Jakarta first channel* representatives of different interest groups interact with each other in accordance with the concept of multi-sided journalism.

In general, *Mengawal kebebasan pers* and *Jakarta first channel* are closer to the ideals of Habermas's bourgeois public sphere, in which consensus as a result of rational debate is presented or aimed at, while *Lembaga konsumen media* is closer to the ideals of the so-called oppositional public sphere, in which the process rather than the outcome of discursive interaction is the main objective. While this implies that not all programmes involve their audiences literally in dialogue to the same extent, the programmes all belong and contribute to what could be called a dialogical public sphere in the Bakhtinian sense, as they represent the attempts of

Indonesian programme producers to develop (radio) journalism and safeguard the value of press freedom by making journalists and audiences media-literate.

Notes

1 Kebebasan pers adalah perwujudan kedaulatan rakyat yang berasaskan prinsip–prinsip demokrasi, keadilan dan supremasi hukum yang harus ditegakkan di tengah-tengah masyarakat dalam upaya memberikan informasi, pendidikan, hiburan dan sebagai kontrol social. (Indonesia Media Law and Policy Center, Ms Tri 104.4 FM, Dewan Pers, *Mengawal kebebasan pers bersama Hinca IP Pandjaitan*: *kekerasan terhadap media massa oleh massa*, produced June 2001, Jakarta, 2001a).

2 Dampak gerakan media watch sudah dapat dirasakan. Masyarakat sadar akan hak–hak dan tanggung jawabnya sebagai konsumen media. Mereka yang dirugikan, tak lagi bersembunyi dengan kemarahan terpendam. Mereka menggunakan hak jawab atau hak koreksi. (S. Syah, 'Tokoh pers 1999: media watch', *Kompas*, 6 January 2000, http://www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0001/06/opini/toko04.htm [accessed 21 September 2006]).

3 *Reformasi* can also been seen as a process, which, by vehemently unleashing the anger and creative energy that had been stored in society for so long, has reversed and undermined social hierarchies in a manner relatively similar to Bakhtin's 'carnival' (M.M. Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984, p. 10).

4 J. Schultz, *Reviving the Fourth Estate: Democracy, Accountability and the Media*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

5 Syah, 'Tokoh pers 1999: media watch'.

6 K. Sen and D.T. Hill, *Media, Culture and Politics in Indonesia*, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 53, 55; D.T. Hill, *The Press in New Order Indonesia*, Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1995 (1994), pp. 67–73. In 1994, journalists founded *Aliansi Jurnalis Independen* (the Alliance of Independent Journalists or AJI) as an alternative to the official PWI and in protest against the bans of the news magazines *Tempo*, *Editor* and *DeTik* earlier that year (Hill, *The Press in New Order Indonesia*, p. 55). AJI received official status in 1998, after the fall of the Suharto regime.

7 Development journalism is an international concept developed by Third World countries in the 1960s as a tool to fight media imperialism, pursue cultural and informational autonomy, and establish solidarity ties with other developing countries (P. Kitley, *Television, Nation, and Culture in Indonesia*, Research in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series no. 104, Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 2000, pp. 178–79; S. Tobing, *Development Journalism in Indonesia: Content Analysis of Government Television News*, Dissertation Ohio University, 1991, p. 4; D.O. McDaniel, *Broadcasting in the Malay World: Radio, Television, and Video in Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore*, New Jersey: Ablex, 1994, pp. 224, 298–99). According to the original concept, development journalism did not solely rely on government sources nor merely reported the positive aspects of government activities, but shared many characteristics with investigative journalism (Tobing, *Development Journalism in Indonesia: Content Analysis of Government Television News*, p. 47). In practice, however, many national governments of Third World countries, including Indonesia, have used the developmental and anti-imperialistic aspect of development journalism as an excuse to control the media and silence the opposition (Tobing, *Development Journalism in Indonesia: Content Analysis of Government Television News*, pp. 35, 47).

8 PRSSNI was the only official, government-controlled private radio organisation in Indonesia from 1977 until 1998 (J. Lindsay, 'Making waves: private radios and local identities in Indonesia', *Indonesia*, 64, 1997, 105–23, specifically pp. 113–14; Sen and Hill, *Media, Culture and Politics in Indonesia*, pp. 87–88).

9   An example is the Indonesian NGO Lembaga Studi Pers dan Pembangunan (Institute for Press and Development Studies, or LSPP), which has organised training courses and published a series of journalism handbooks in cooperation with The Asia Foundation and USAID Jakarta (Darpan A. Winangun, LSPP Publishing Manager, personal communication, 10 October 2001). The book series includes titles such as *Jurnalisme Damai: Bagaimana Melakukannya?* (*Peace Journalism: How to Conduct It?* 2001), *Konflik Multikultur: Panduan bagi Journalis* (*Multicultural Conflicts: A Guide for Journalists*, 2000) and *Konvensi tentang Penghapusan Segala Bentuk Diskriminasi terhadap Perempuan: Panduan Meliput bagi Jurnalis* (*The Convention for the Abolition of Every Form of Discrimination against Women: A Reporting Guide for Journalists*, 1999).

10 Masduki, *Jurnalistik Radio: Menata Profesionalisme Reporter dan Penyiar*, Yogyakarta: LKIS, 2001, pp. 1–8.

11 Quantitative data suggest that radio was the most popular medium in Indonesia towards the end of the Suharto regime. According to figures of the Indonesian *Badan Pusat Statistik* (Central Agency for Statistics), in 1995 69.4 per cent of the 45,653,084 Indonesian households owned a radio set. The justifiable assumption of an average of five users per set implied an audience of more than 158 million radio listeners (H.I.P. Pandjaitan, C.C. Chan, L.S. Schramm and L.N. Tabing, *Radio: Pagar Hidup Otonomi Daerah*, Jakarta: Internews Indonesia Media Law Department, 2000, p. 14). The same agency calculated that 43.4 per cent of the households owned a television set, which, on the same assumption of five users per set, implied an audience of more than 98 million television viewers. The total readership of newspapers and magazines was estimated to be around 72 million (H.I.P. Pandjaitan, C.C. Chan, L.S. Schramm and L.N. Tabing, *Radio: Pagar Hidup Otonomi Daerah*, p. 14).

12 E. Jurriëns, 'Radio awards and the dialogic contestation of Indonesian journalism', *Indonesia and the Malay World*, 34 (99), 2006, 119–49, and 'Indonesian radio culture: modes of address, fields of action', *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs*, 41 (1), 2007, 33–71.

13 E. Jurriëns, 'Radio komunitas di Indonesia: "new Brechtian theatre" di era Reformasi?', *Jurnal Antropologi Indonesia*, 72, 2003, 116–30.

14 M.M. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M.M. Bakhtin*, ed. M. Holquist, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981, pp. 276–77.

15 Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M.M. Bakhtin*, pp. 279–80.

16 Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M.M. Bakhtin*, p. 343.

17 Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M.M. Bakhtin*, p. 342.

18 Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M.M. Bakhtin*, p. 346; emphasis in the original.

19 Jakarta-based Internews Indonesia was founded as part of the United States non-profit organisation Internews Network in 1998. The Network has 20 offices worldwide and is also active in the states of the former Soviet Union and other (former) conflict areas such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Israel, Palestine, Timor Loro Sae and Iran. It is funded by organisations such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Dutch Government, the United States Information Agency (USIA), the Ford Foundation and Rockefeller Financial Services. According to its website, Internews Network supports 'independent media in emerging democracies', particularly 'innovative television and radio programming and internet content', and promotes the media as a tool 'to reduce conflict within and between countries' (Internews, http://www.internews.org/about/about.htm, 2001 [accessed 19 October 2001]). In 2001, Internews Indonesia cooperated with more than 50 radio partners nationwide.

20 J. Samuel, 'Radios Indonésiennes: comment survivre à l'Ordre Nouveau?', *Archipel*, 64, 2002, 289–321, specifically p. 318; K. Sen, 'Radio days: media-politics in Indonesia', *The Pacific Review*, 16 (4), 2003, 573–89, specifically p. 585.

21 Louis C. Schramm, personal communication, 18 September 2001.
22 *Mengawal* can either mean 'to pioneer' or 'to monitor', depending on whether it is
    derived from the noun *awal* (beginning) or from the noun *kawal* (guard, watch). Thus,
    mengawal enables a play with two concepts (pioneering and monitoring) that are both
    considered relevant in the early stage of Indonesia's renewed journalistic freedom
    during *Reformasi*.
23 *Bodrek* is derived from the Bodrex brand painkiller, which in one of its commercials
    depicts a mass of people hunting for the medicine. Fake journalists usually also operate
    in groups, hunting for money (Veven Wardhana, personal communication, 18 October
    2001).
24 These are fake or 'real' journalists demanding envelopes with money from
    interviewees.
25 C. Calhoun, 'Introduction: Habermas and the public sphere', in C. Calhoun (ed.)
    Habermas and the Public Sphere, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: The MIT
    Press, 1992, pp. 1–48, specifically p. 37.
26 In Habermas's view (J. Habermas, *On Society and Politics: A Reader*, ed. S. Seidman,
    Boston: Beacon Press, 1989a, pp. 231–32), the bourgeois public sphere is an institu-
    tionalised and accessible forum that offers citizens the opportunity to conduct rational
    debate and reach consensus about topics related to the state and other authorities.
    Habermas identifies public discourse or communicative action as a crucial factor in
    coordinating the public sphere and achieving a mutually agreed consensus among citi-
    zens (Calhoun, 'Introduction: Habermas and the public sphere', pp. 6, 16).
27 According to Habermas (*On Society and Politics: A Reader*, pp. 235–36; Calhoun,
    'Introduction: Habermas and the public sphere', pp. 21, 26), refeudalisation means that
    state and civil society are no longer distinct, but have become interlocked, with the state
    penetrating the private realm on the one hand and private organisations assuming public
    power on the other. As a consequence, the public sphere has come to resemble an arena
    where legislators stage displays for their constituents and special interest groups seek
    to increase the prestige of their own positions. The different parties in this arena prefer
    to negotiate with each other in order to reach a mutually beneficial compromise rather
    than to organise a truly critical discussion for the benefit of society as a whole.
28 Habermas's notion of the externalisation of the inner life implies that citizens have
    reduced the private sphere merely to family affairs, while withdrawing from 'their
    socially controlled roles as property owners into the purely "personal" ones of their
    noncommittal use of leisure time' (J. Habermas, *The Structural Transformation
    of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, Cambridge,
    Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1989b, p. 159; cited in Calhoun, 'Introduction: Habermas
    and the public sphere', p. 22). As a consequence, rational debate has been replaced by
    passive culture consumption and apolitical sociability. As Craig Calhoun ('Introduction:
    Habermas and the public sphere', pp. 22–23) rightly observes, Habermas here follows
    the same critique of mass culture in which earlier members of the Frankfurt School
    played a prominent role.
29 This view was expressed by Yusirwan Yusuf, head of Suara Padang, Padang (personal
    communication, 19 August 2002) and Kecuk Sahana, production manager of Unisi,
    Yogyakarta (personal communication, 30 August 2001), amongst others.
30 This paragraph is partly based on Jurriëns, 'Indonesian radio culture: modes of address,
    fields of action'.
31 Suara Surabaya, founded by Soetojo Soekomihardjo on 11 June 1983, was the first
    Indonesian commercial radio station with a news format. In order to circumvent New
    Order legislation that forbade news production by commercial stations, Suara Surabaya
    proclaimed that it did not produce news but information. This 'information' was inserted
    in talk shows in which listeners functioned as journalists and discussed all kinds of
    topical problems. Listeners remained Suara Surabaya's first-hand information sources
    after the fall of the New Order (T. Nurdiana and A. Berthoni, 'Trik Soetojo menyiasati

berita jadi informasi', *Kontan* 21, 25 February 2002; Samuel, 'Radios Indonésiennes: comment survivre à l'Ordre Nouveau?', 308–9).

32 Syah, 'Tokoh pers 1999: media watch'.

33 Based on personal communication with Meinara Iman D., news director of Suara Surabaya, 24 July 2002, and recordings of 2002 broadcasts.

34 Syah, 'Tokoh pers 1999: media watch'.

35 S. Livingstone and P. Lunt, *Talk on Television: Audience Participation and Public Debate*, London and New York: Routledge, 1994, pp. 26, 160–61.

36 Livingstone and Lunt, *Talk on Television: Audience Participation and Public Debate*, p. 174.

37 Habermas, *On Society and Politics: A Reader*, p. 236; see also Livingstone and Lunt, *Talk on Television: Audience Participation and Public Debate*, p. 174.

38 Livingstone and Lunt, *Talk on Television: Audience Participation and Public Debate*, p. 32.

39 Sebetulnya kan ulah kita-kita orang dewasa yang tidak bisa mengontrol diri, sehingga pemerintah perlu memberikan anjuran untuk memakai kondom tersebut ya sehingga yang mana mengakibatkan anak-anak ini menyalahgunakan dan lain sebagainya ya. Saya juga ingin mengusulkan, mungkin media massa dalam rangka menyosialisasikan dan membantu pemerintah dalam layanan kesehatan masyarakat tersebut mungkin jangan langsung dicetak di koran. Mungkin bisa dicetak brosur tersendiri atau bagaimana, disebarkan hanya kepada orang dewasa saja.

40 Kalau menurut saya, 'up to the person itself', Pak. Apakah dia mau apakah dia tidak, dia harus bertanggunjawab. Jadi menurut pendapat saya itu, pemasangan iklan tentang kondom itu, ya terserah aja. Jadi, jadi orang yang membacanya. Gitu aja, Pak.

41 Jurriëns, 'Radio awards and the dialogic contestation of Indonesian journalism'.

42 This paragraph is partly based on Jurriëns, 'Indonesian radio culture: modes of address, fields of action'.

43 Samuel, 'Radios Indonésiennes: comment survivre à l'Ordre Nouveau?', p. 310; Sen, 'Radio days: media-politics in Indonesia', pp. 580–82. Trijaya is part of a national network of radio stations that also includes SCFM (Surabaya), Prapanca (Medan), Trijaya Yogyakarta (Yogyakarta), Trijaya Semarang (Semarang), Mercurius Top (Makassar) and Voice of Papua (Jayapura). The programmes of Trijaya Jakarta are also broadcast via World Space, a radio satellite service that can be received in Indonesia, other parts of Asia and the north of Australia. The network aims at an audience of middle- and high-income urban business people. The Bimantara business group also owns the commercial television station RCTI, which is located at the same media complex as Trijaya Jakarta (personal communication with Ido Seno, 12 October 2001).

44 Personal communication, 12 October 2001.

45 Ido Seno, personal communication, 12 October 2001.

46 According to Livingstone and Lunt (*Talk on Television: Audience Participation and Public Debate*, pp. 57–59), in the classical debate audience members and experts discuss social problems with each other under the guidance of a host. Each party receives equal opportunity to present their opinion in a rational and orderly manner. The discussion partners aim at reaching a conclusion by the end of the programme.

47 Livingstone and Lunt, *Talk on Television: Audience Participation and Public Debate*, p. 58.

48 Israk Mikraj, which is always on the 27th of Rajab (the seventh month of the Islamic calendar), commemorates the Prophet Mohammad's flight on a winged horse known as a Buraq from Mecca to Jerusalem. During the flight the Prophet went through the seven levels of heaven, where he met several earlier prophets of Islam. Mohammad's trip instigated the Islamic rule of the five daily prayers.

49 *Madani* is derived from *madina* ('city'), an Arabic equivalent of the Latin 'civil'. However, for Muslims, *madani* also bears connotations of 'Madina', the city where the Prophet Muhammad established the first Islamic state and constitution (W. Wolters,

'The making of civil society in historical perspective', in H. Schulte Nordholt and I. Abdullah (eds), *Indonesia in Search of Transition*, Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, pp. 131–48, 2002, specifically p. 140; R.W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002, p. 189).

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9 The construction of women in contemporary Indonesian women's cinema

Hapsari Dwiningtyas Sulistyani

As a cultural practice, cinema produces, reproduces and represents myths about women and femininity.[1] This chapter explores the ways in which women are represented in Indonesian 'women's' films. According to Krishna Sen, under the New Order '*film wanita*' (women's films), while sold as films made for and by women and about women's problems, were in fact predominantly filmed through the male gaze and spoken by male voices.[2] The dominant male perspective of the depiction of women in New Order films was partly due to the fact that both the film-makers and their films were constrained by boundaries created by New Order gender politics.

An important factor that influenced the way in which women were constructed in these films was the working environment under which women directors were obliged to operate. As Sen argues, women directors in that era were 'extreme[ly] marginalised institutionally' so they had to adopt mainstream (male) constructions of women 'to gain acceptance and survive'.[3] The substantial rise in the number of female film-makers (directors, producers and scriptwriters) in the post-New Order period reflects and contributes to a better working environment for Indonesian women in the film industry. This more encouraging working environment could arguably affect the way in which female film-makers construct female characters in their films.

Starting from Sen's work, I argue that the limits set by the New Order continue to affect contemporary Indonesian films about women, even though many of them are now directed, written and produced by women.

The chapter focuses on the way in which female characters are presented in the post-New Order 'women's films' *Pasir Berbisik* (*Whispering Sand*)[4] and *Berbagi Suami* (*Sharing a Husband*).[5] Both fit the definition of 'women's films' as commonly understood in Indonesia. By comparing representations of motherhood, violence and female fantasy in these two films, this chapter undertakes a textual analysis, and an examination of the political positions of women directors with respect to Indonesian women's issues and experiences.

While New Order women's films were predominantly produced from the masculinist viewpoint, since *Pasir Berbisik* and *Berbagi Suami* were made after the fall of the New Order, their creators had the advantage of working under conditions more favourable for women film-makers. Analysing the representation of women in these films not only allows the exploration of residual New Order values, beliefs

and practices in the films, but also of the shift in the way female characters are constructed in Indonesian women's films since the fall of the New Order.[6]

The post-New Order Indonesian film industry and women film-makers

Since 1991 the number of Indonesian films produced has declined significantly, falling from around 115 films in 1990 to approximately 57 films in 1991, and 31 films in 1992.[7] However, 'particular important changes have emerged in the post-New Order film industry, including pluralistic themes and changes in genre, narrative and mode of film production',[8] which also signify that a 'new' generation of Indonesian film-makers has emerged to dominate the contemporary Indonesian film industry. Another new, positive phenomenon is the increase in the number of women actively making films.

Women film-makers are playing a significant role in the redevelopment of the Indonesian film industry. Nan T. Achnas and Mira Lesmana, for example, are directors involved in *Kuldesak*,[9] the first independent cinema released after the New Order. Mira Lesmana is the producer of the successful box-office films *Petualangan Sherina*[10] and *Ada Apa Dengan Cinta*,[11] which attracted 1.3 million and 2.5 million viewers respectively. The increased number of women film-makers now operating professionally in Indonesia, particularly as directors, is an important development in the industry.[12] I argue that this increase, along with other factors, potentially influences the way female characters are constructed in contemporary Indonesian film texts. However, because discourses surrounding 'women' were a major concern to the New Order, I also argue that the way women are represented in contemporary Indonesian cinema still incorporates New Order gender politics to some degree.

The increased number of women film producers is an important factor contributing to the supportive working environment for women directors. Mira Lesmana, Lola Amalia, Shanty Harmayn, Christine Hakim and Afi Shamara are examples of some women producers. Nia Dinata has stated that Shamara, who produced Dinata's first and second films (*Ca Bau Kan*[13] and *Arisan*[14]), was very dedicated, particularly in solving funding problems and in her determination to make the best possible film.[15] Together, Dinata and Shamara established Kalyana Shira Films, a production house that specialises in films directed by women.

In investigating female directors' feminist politics, Smelik argues that the historical context of feminism creates the possibility for female film-makers' political positions 'to become enacted and empowered as conscious and self-reflective subject positions'.[16] As Judith M. Redding and Victoria A. Brownworth suggest, the nature of film-making is very much political because it is a tool whereby the director imposes a vision on particular issues through dynamic visual images in which the audience is immersed.[17] In that sense, film-making is a potent medium for female film-makers to use while asserting distinct subject positions on women's issues.

Jane Gaines has pointed out that in analysing female images in film texts, we must be able to 'imagine women's oppression in terms other than gender'.[18]

Gaines disagrees with the branch of feminist film theory that only focuses on the ideological aspects of film, and does not consider the complexity of social life.[19] This chapter takes up Gaines' theory in its consideration of the sociological and historical contexts of the films. However, my analysis is concerned, for the most part, with the film texts themselves; therefore I use strands of several feminist theories to analyse the diversity of women's issues represented in selected films texts. For example, I look at the representation of polygamy in *Berbagi Suami* by using feminist theory on marriage and family. In the representation of a mother–daughter relationship in *Pasir Berbisik*, on the other hand, I consider the feminist perspective on motherhood.

This chapter is also concerned with the way in which female directors use traditional (dominant) cinematic codes and conventions to signify their political positions on women's issues. It examines how cinematic styles are used to construct the female characters as subjects in each film at the level of connotation or myth (in Barthesian terms), in order to investigate the film director's political position on women's issues.[20] Furthermore, the chapter explores residual elements of New Order gender ideology evident in the construction of the female characters in order to understand more fully how women characters are positioned. While the films resist New Order ideologies in other ways, they continue to reproduce New Order discourse on gender.

Borrowing Raymond Williams' terminology, we might be able to read in these films a struggle between 'residual' gender ideologies of the New Order and the 'emergent' ones of the Reform period.[21] According to Williams, 'residual' elements demonstrate that certain values, meanings and practices from previous dominant constructions are still active in current dominant cultural practices. If residual elements stem from major areas of discourse from the past, in most cases the characteristic will be incorporated into dominant culture.[22] Besides these residual effects, dominant cultural texts are also influenced by the emergence of new meanings and values that are continually being created.[23] Williams suggests that we can find the emergence of new values and new meanings incorporated in current dominant texts.[24] While Williams develops his argument in the context of cultural systems, I will use his concepts of 'residual', 'emergent' and 'dominant' in a more limited sense, namely, in the context of the changing discourses about women in Indonesian film texts. Thus, based on William's argument about the continuity of change,[25] and the fact that the notion of Indonesian 'woman' was a major discourse in the New Order era, it is likely that the current dominant constructions of women in film texts incorporate residual influences of the New Order era while at the same time, changing values concerning women, even though not yet fully articulated, have begun to challenge dominant discourses relating to women.

Indonesian women's films: *Pasir Berbisik* (*Whispering Sand*) and *Berbagi Suami* (*Sharing a Husband*)

Pasir Berbisik is a surrealist art film about a mother–daughter relationship directed by the young female director, Nan T. Achnas, who also wrote the screenplay with

Rayya Makarim. Berlian is a single mother who is excessively overprotective of her daughter, Daya. She works as a *jamu* (traditional medicine) seller and midwife, helping the village women deliver their babies or secretly performing abortions. Daya's father abandoned them long ago. Daya is a beautiful teenage girl who rebels against her mother's possessiveness. Her rebellious behaviour is mainly reflected in her attempt to fulfil her fantasies. Daya cannot talk to her mother about her fantasies about her father, or her dream of becoming a dancer, like Berlian's sister whom she idolises. She longs to dance and wear ornate costumes like her aunt, but because she has no one to talk to about her dream she often lies on the ground, whispering to the sand.

The film-maker has deliberately omitted any clear description of where or when the film is set. Thus, when it depicts an unexplained mass killing and arson attack, it is impossible to locate the incident in Indonesian history. This unexplained act of violence forces Berlian and Daya to abandon their house. They cross a desert of constantly shifting sands seeking a new place to live. Then Daya's father, Agus, finally returns to his family. While Daya is happy because his return fulfils her dream of meeting him, he destroys her fantasy of her 'perfect' father by 'selling' her to Suwito, the richest merchant in the very poor village. Suwito forces Daya to masturbate in front of him. Berlian, furious when she discovers what Agus has done, poisons him. The film ends with Berlian setting her daughter 'free' by sending her away in the hope of finding a better life.

Mira Lesmana, one of Indonesia's leading female directors and producers, notes the film's creation of an extraordinary visual ambience, suggesting that many visual images in *Pasir Berbisik* contain profound connotative meanings.[26] Nan T. Achnas marks her authorial statements in the film by using visual images that have symbolic meanings.

Nia Dinata, director and scriptwriter of *Berbagi Suami*, on the other hand, marks her authorial statements by exploring the controversial issue of polygamy from various women's points of view. *Berbagi Suami* is composed of three stories about polygamy in modern Indonesia featuring three female characters (Salma, Siti and Ming) from different social classes and ethnic backgrounds. Salma is a gynaecologist and a devout Muslim who is trying hard to convince herself that it is her fate to have a polygamous husband. Her husband uses the Koran, Islam's holy book, to justify polygamy. In the second story Siti, a naive Javanese girl who is tricked into a polygamous marriage to her own uncle, then starts a romantic relationship with one of the other wives. The last story is about Ming, an Indonesian-Chinese who has ambitions of stardom while working as a waitress in a popular roast duck stall in Jakarta. She dreams of an easy life by taking her already-married boss as her husband and having a career as an actress. The film self-consciously explores multiple views of polygamy, and this is made evident in the way in which it constructs its female characters.

Thus, *Pasir Berbisik* and *Berbagi Suami* are inspired by women's personal experiences. As Carolyn Heilburn suggests, women must share their own personal experiences with other women in order to be able to create 'new' narratives on female subjectivities that challenge the dominant patriarchal narratives.[27]

The representations of mother and wife

Pasir Berbisik begins with a depiction of a *wayang suket* (shadow puppet). The puppet moves to the sound of *gamelan* (Javanese orchestra). Then a desert landscape under a blue sky comes into view. A girl appears from the horizon and walks towards the camera. Her skin is suntanned. She lies down, pressing one of her ears to the sands as if listening, then whispers softly to the earth. The camera zooms to her feet: her upper body is out of the frame. Then from the central horizon, a middle-aged woman appears and walks towards the girl. The woman sits beside her and caresses her hair. The camera zooms to the girl's hand as it slowly moves across the sand. The camera follows the movement of the hand until it disappears from the frame. Then the title of the film, '*Pasir Berbisik*,' comes onscreen with the shadow of the Javanese puppet on the sands as the backdrop.

These opening images signify the film's theme of 'motherhood', and it becomes clear later that female fantasy and violence are also central to the plot. The notion of a woman's role as a mother is represented to some degree in both films. According to Simons, in Foucault's interpretation of the subject, 'women attain particular forms of empowered subjectivity within motherhood'.[28] He also suggests that as mothers and caretakers women 'are located in subject positions that authorize a significant range of actions to subjectify others [their children]'.[29] This notion of power and motherhood is at work in the mother–daughter relationship between Berlian and Daya in *Pasir Berbisik*.

The early scene of *Pasir Berbisik* highlights the contrast between the romantic fantasy Daya has about her relationship with her father, and her uncomfortable relationship with her mother. It is also made apparent later in the film that Berlian's constant surveillance of Daya's behaviour, together with the lack of communication between them, undermines Daya's self-confidence, making her feel helpless and useless in her relationship with her mother. In order to explain why Daya feels powerless in this relationship, the film makes obvious the ways in which Berlian controls her daughter. For example, Berlian always calls Daya *anak* ('child') rather than using her name. This way of making Daya 'anonymous' can be seen as a strategy to keep her a child within her mother's control.

At one point in the story, Daya gets angry with Berlian because her mother burns her favourite red *kebaya* (Javanese blouse), a present from her aunt. In her anger, she asserts, 'My name is Daya, not *anak*'. Berlian answers by telling Daya to go inside, still calling her *anak*. Then, in tears, Daya says, 'Do not call me *anak*, Mother, my name is Daya. Why don't you ever call me by my own name?' It is clear that Daya wants her mother to realise that she does not like her powerless position in their relationship.

If we read the discourse of motherhood in *Pasir Berbisik* further by using Barthes' referential code, Berlian's appearance reflects 'the classical Hollywood iconography for "Mother" – plain dress, apron, [simple] hair'.[30] This construction closely relates to the way in which patriarchy has positioned the mother outside the discourse of sexuality.[31] In the context of women's social construction in New Order Indonesia, women must be non-desiring and non-sexual as mothers or

wives, but the opposite as lovers. Berlian sees it as her responsibility to make her daughter a 'good' woman, a prospective mother. In relation to the mother–lover dichotomy, Berlian's discourse valorises motherhood, while the film itself continuously shows its flaws. Furthermore, her attitude makes plain that, if Daya publicly expresses her desire to dance and to wear 'sexually provocative' clothes, the daughter will be perceived as a loose woman and will not have the opportunity to become a 'good' Indonesian woman who accepts her traditional roles as mother and wife.

Berbagi Suami, on the other hand, represents the way in which the female characters challenge women's traditional roles of wife. The last scene of Ming's story, for example, signifies that Ming is through with marriage. The film implies that Ming could only take a man as a lover not as a husband. In that sense, *Berbagi Suami* represents a challenge to the New Order's construction of the 'good' Indonesian woman. The New Order's gender politics reinforced the domestic responsibilities of women by attempting to restrict them to the traditional roles of wife and mother. The way Ming prefers to become a lover than a wife indicates that it is not impossible for women to rebel against the social values that constrain their freedom and choices in life.

Pasir Berbisik also represents how the role of a wife forces women to change their character. When Daya's father comes home, Berlian acts in a way which contradicts her character as portrayed in the film so far. At first, when Daya's father, Agus, comes to the house, Berlian does not allow him to enter, leaving him kneeling at the front door. When night comes, Daya begs to her mother to open the door and let him in, saying 'It is freezing outside . . . Mother!' Her mother remains silent and simply looks at Daya, who interprets this as a sign for her to open the door. She walks quickly to the door and opens it. Slowly, Agus enters the house. Later in the film Berlian is seen serving her husband food and drink. Berlian also never complains to her husband, even though Agus never helps her either by earning money or doing domestic work. Berlian is trying to fulfil her socially expected role as a 'good wife', and yet she fails her daughter by dropping her protective guard, which results in her worst fear being fulfilled: her daughter suffers sexual abuse.

The way in which a woman is subordinated by social and religious constructions of a 'good' wife is also represented in Salma's story in *Berbagi Suami*. The film shows how Salma's husband, Pak Haji, persuades her to tolerate his polygamy by quoting the Koran. Pak Haji says 'throw away all your hatred and jealousy towards her . . . otherwise you're the one who is sinning!' Salma, then, tries to accept her polygamous household by convincing herself that one cannot fight fate. However, her son, Nadim, opposes her decision to tolerate his father's polygamy, causing conflict between mother and son.

Thus, both *Berbagi Suami* and *Pasir Berbisik* depict a contradiction between women's roles as mothers and wives. These films challenge the New Order's vision of the 'ideal' woman as both mother *and* wife, and a social order where these roles are inseparable from one another.

The representations of female fantasy, desire and love

Both *Berbagi Suami* and *Pasir Berbisik* are about exploring women's selves. In *Pasir Berbisik*, female fantasy is represented in Daya's daydreams about her father and her dream of becoming a dancer. Daya's fascination with dancing is encouraged by her aunt with whom she shares a close relationship. In one scene Daya and her aunt dance on the beach and become so involved they appear to forget their surroundings. Citing Damster, Summers-Bremner suggests that, particularly for women, dancing is a mode of speech.[32] Women's expressions of desire within patriarchal societies are constrained by social rules of 'appropriate' behaviours and language. Through dancing, women are able to get in touch with their desire, which male-oriented linguistic formations are inadequate to express. Thus, Daya's fantasy of becoming a dancer can be understood as an expression of feminine desire in the film.

Daya's practice of talking and listening to the sand is another indication of her desire to express her fantasies. Her aunt is the only person who can understand why Daya does this. As her aunt prepares to leave the village to continue her dancing tour, Daya is heartbroken. As she lies on the sand, pressing her ear to the ground, her aunt approaches and says, 'What does the sand say to you?' Daya looks up. Her aunt turns and walks away. Daya follows, but when her aunt turns back to look at her, she stops, tries to hold back her tears, and watches as the aunt walks away. Clearly, Daya longs for her aunt's freedom to express her desire through dancing and her freedom to look beautiful.

Several other elements in the film, including clothes and hairstyles, have symbolic significance for women. When her aunt gives Daya a showy red *kebaya*, the young girl is delighted. She smiles when her aunt dresses her in the *kebaya* and compliments her on how beautiful she looks. After receiving the *kebaya*, Daya is frequently depicted dancing in front of a mirror wearing the blouse. She also tries to imitate her aunt's hairstyle, suggesting she is attempting to make herself beautiful like her aunt.

Daya's aunt is constructed as erotic, not only through her physical appearance (clothes, make up, hairstyle), but also through her profession as a dancer, while Berlian is represented as non-sexual. Daya's aunt dances to please the men who attend her performances: her dance movements are seductive and erotic. The film shows how a man who chooses her as his dance partner during the show gives her a tip by slipping money inside her bra. According to Ann E. Kaplan, a female character depicted as erotic in a film text is usually positioned as 'loose'.[33] However, such a character is able to gain a certain degree of subjectivity by manipulating the very position of erotic object. In this film, for example, Daya's aunt represents freedom. She uses her positioning as a 'loose' woman to earn money as a dancer, while, at the same time, doing something that she loves. In the film's diegetic world, the aunt would not have had the freedom to dance and travel had she been constructed as a 'good' woman or a 'good' mother.

Berlian disapproves of her daughter's behaviour when Daya is indulging in her desire for beauty. Even though Berlian does not express her opinion verbally, the way she looks at Daya when her daughter is dancing or wearing the red *kebaya*

suggests that she does not like Daya's actions. Berlian disapproves of her daughter's desire to dance and to look beautiful because Berlian sees it as potentially preventing Daya from fulfilling her traditional roles as mother and wife. Berlian's rejection of beauty and dance are easily read as the repression of female sexuality. Through Berlian and Daya's aunt, *Pasir Berbisik* represents two sides of female subjectivity in Indonesian society. The film not only signifies the expression of feminine desire of beauty and sexuality (represented by the aunt), but it also indicates that Indonesian women (represented by the mother) are restrained by social constructions that dictate that women repress their sexuality.

According to Catherine Belsey, desire is a place of resistances to the social norms, particularly 'female' desire, which is seen to challenge the normative social construction of women as 'passive'.[34] A challenge to the normative boundaries of female sexual desire is signified in *Berbagi Suami*, particularly in Siti's story. Siti is the third wife of her own uncle. The depiction of female desire is more openly articulated in this strand of story than it is in the other two. Sri (the first wife) is constructed as a woman who does not keep her sexual desire secret. Siti says that Sri is 'always ready [to have sex] and seems to love it'. The film also shows a homosexual encounter between Siti and Dwi, the second wife. Siti's voiceover describes how they use every chance they get to sneak into the bathroom, their place of salvation. Her voiceover says 'Here [in the bathroom], we released all of the emotions that have been repressed'. As well as presenting a vivid expression of women's desire, this particular scene demonstrates a further resistance to constructed social boundaries of female sexuality by depicting the main female characters as having a homosexual relation far more satisfying than their sexual relations with their shared husband.

The homosexual desire between Siti and Dwi is represented within the notion of love. In her voiceover, Siti states that her life is bliss because of love. Siti also says 'love teaches me to stop making compromises. Love makes me want to keep her for myself. Love gives me more courage'. In this sense, the film insinuates that their liberation from a polygamous marriage comes not through refusing their subordinate position but through their love of each other. Some feminist theorists argue that love is rooted in 'a socialization that is far deeper than articulated thoughts, ideas and opinions'.[35] As Mantila further says, because love runs deeper than a political conviction, even a committed feminist can find herself bound in an imbalanced love-relationship.

Berbagi Suami also represents the attempt of a young woman, Ming, to refuse to fall in love. The film signifies that Ming does not want to be blinded by love and that she agrees to become her boss's second wife for his money. However, the film then indicates that Ming eventually falls in love with her husband and prefers not to share him. Thus, the film is still using love as a root cause for the expressions of female desire that are against the accepted social boundaries of female behaviour.

The father and the presence of violence

The first half of *Pasir Berbisik* portrays the difficulties that a woman with no husband and a fatherless child endure. An unexplained mass murder followed by

chaos in their village force Berlian and Daya to move to another village. However, because *Pasir Berbisik* is a film deliberately created without a clear sense of setting and time, the significance of many events, including the chaos in their village, is lost. While director Nan T. Achnas suggests that she tried to set *Pasir Berbisik* in a 'never-never' land that had no connection to reality, this resulted in a lack of contextualisation for the events rather than creating a world of fantasy.

When Agus, Daya's father, returns home, Berlian's family becomes a 'complete' or a 'normal' family. At first, the film depicts how happy Daya is when her family finally becomes complete. Daya follows her father everywhere and enthusiastically listens to his stories. She has faith in her father's promises that one day he will take her to the big city so she can experience 'real' life, and that he will buy everything she and her mother want. Although these promises are proven to be empty as the film progresses, at least for a while the presence of her father does provide Daya with the happiness she hoped for and expected. Later in the story, Daya is broken-hearted when her father betrays her trust by 'selling' her to the village's rich old man, Suwito. Daya does not understand how her father could do this if he really loved her. Agus asks her to go inside Suwito's house, while he waits in Suwito's car outside. Even though the door to the house is open, Agus cannot see Daya and Suwito clearly. Suwito tells Daya that if she wants to help her father, she must obey Suwito's orders. Suwito commands her to put her hand inside her blouse. Daya's expression indicates that she obeys the order reluctantly, and her terror shows on her face. Aware that Daya is reluctant to obey his order, Suwito intimidates her by saying that, being a good girl who loves her father, she must help her father by pleasing Suwito. Then he asks her to rub her nipple and put her finger into her vagina. While Daya complies, it is obvious from her face that she is terrified and humiliated by these acts. Finally, she breaks down and cries.

Daya's sexual abuse is important in *Pasir Berbisik* because it critiques the role of fathers and the notion of the normal family in Indonesia. When Berlian finds out what Agus has done to Daya, she is literally angry enough to kill him. Berlian's facial expression while poisoning her husband is cold and silent. In her case, getting rid of the father is the only way she can make the family 'normal' by her own standards.

In *Berbagi Suami* the issue of violence against women is represented in a different way. The discourse of violence is less apparent in *Berbagi Suami* than it is in *Pasir Berbisik*. The theme of violence particularly appears in Siti's story. Siti is forced to take her married uncle as her husband. Her deep sadness is signified in the scene of her wedding ceremony, at which she cries throughout. Sexual violence is represented more explicitly in the scene of her first night with her uncle. Her voiceover expresses the trauma: Siti says 'tonight is the scariest night of my life. All frightening thoughts are mixed together. I feel shame, guilt, and disgust just by looking at his expression'.

Both *Pasir Berbisik* and *Berbagi Suami* signify how violence against women is caused by men (father/uncle) who are supposedly protecting women and children. In this way, both films question the social construction that suggests the presence of men or a father is a compulsory requirement for a 'normal' family.

Female subject positions and the director's political position

The richly symbolic and occasionally poetic visual language used in *Pasir Berbisik* suggests that this film holds much deeper meaning than the narrative itself yields. Even some of the characters' names contain a symbolic message. For example, Berlian, means diamond, a very hard rock, and Berlian is indeed constructed as a woman who is 'hard,' emotionless, though nonetheless deeply incorruptible. As the film unfolds, we learn that Berlian has had a difficult life, which may have toughened her resolve to 'look out' for her daughter so that Daya might be spared the same fate. The use of this particular 'artistic' mode of language is one of Nan T. Achnas's authorial trademarks as a film-maker. Similar language is also present in her other film, *Kuldesak*. Thus, Achnas marks her authorship not by use of the avant-garde cinematic style but rather by utilising symbolic language and beautiful images.

On the other hand, *Berbagi Suami* director Nia Dinata relies on the film's unique theme to mark her authorial statement. *Berbagi Suami*'s main theme, polygamy, is an issue that was very marginalised in New Order cinema. In her previous film, *Arisan* which won Best Film in the 2004 Indonesian Film Festival, Nia Dinata challenges the dominant notion of gender in Indonesia by explicitly representing a homosexual couple.

In *Berbagi Suami*, Dinata use voiceovers to express what the lead female characters feel about their experiences of polygamy. The voiceovers also indicate that female characters' points of view dominate the scenes. In Gennette's terms, lead female characters in *Berbagi Suami* are categorised as homodiegetic characters who tell their own stories 'from within the frame of the fictional world'.[36] The film-maker adopts this homodiegetic strategy because it places the main character of the film in a position of authority for establishing and verifying the 'facts' in the fictional world.[37] In the context of *Berbagi Suami*, this kind of strategy is suitable because it enables the film-maker to explore the complexity of women's experiences of polygamy through the lead female characters' voiceovers.

In *Pasir Berbisik* Berlian's 'unfeminine' (hard, cold and unyielding) character has been the cause of her uncomfortable relationship with her daughter. However, the film ends with a depiction of a softer, more 'feminised' Berlian, with her asking Daya to move to another village to avoid the riot. When her daughter begs to be allowed to stay in Pasir Putih with her mother, Berlian breaks down and cries. Daya says, 'I will never leave you, Mother. Please let me stay in this village with you'. Berlian insists on sending Daya away because she feels that everything that is good in this village has already gone. The following scene depicts Daya on a hill outside the village. Berlian and Daya are watching each other. Then, in tears, Berlian turns around and walks away. Daya starts counting, hoping that on the count of three her mother will turn around to look at her. But Berlian does not turn. Her unselfish love for her daughter is demonstrated through her expression of emotion, together with the sacrifice she makes in giving Daya up so the daughter can go to a safer, better place.

Both *Pasir Berbisik* and *Berbagi Suami* imply that women cannot completely escape the influence of patriarchal ideology when they fall back into the expected

subject position for women. However, both films refuse to naturalise patriarchal values; rather, they depict those values for what they are – a set of rules that serve the interest of men and entrap women in hopelessness.

Conclusion

Both *Pasir Berbisik* and *Berbagi Suami* critique many dominant ideas about the construction of female subjectivity in Indonesia, such as the notion of 'normal' family that considers the presence of the father essential, and the way in which women's sexual desire and fantasies are culturally and socially controlled. The films also imply a contradiction between motherhood and wifehood, something the New Order posits as inseparable. In *Pasir Berbisik*, for example, the contradiction in Berlian's position as a mother and as a wife is demonstrated when she is driven to kill her husband precisely to carry out the maternal duty of protecting her daughter. This depiction fractures the image the New Order presents of the neatly-packaged identity of woman as 'wife-and-mother'.

While *Pasir Berbisik* and *Berbagi Suami* frequently challenge many elements of film-making and culture imposed by the New Order, there are traces of the regime's gender policies. For example, while Berlian is constructed as a powerful (unfeminine) mother, which openly opposes the New Order's construction of the ideal mother, she nevertheless falls back into a feminine subject at the end of the film. The film thus ends with a depiction of a softer, more 'feminised' Berlian. On the other hand, in *Berbagi Suami* Ming completely rejects the notion of love, yet is eventually broken-hearted (read as 'punished' for her non-feminine behaviour) when her husband leaves her to return to his first wife.

It would appear, that even though there are residual influences of New Order gender ideology in contemporary Indonesian women's films, some progress has been made in the way female directors are able to express their political opinions with regard to women's issues, thus subverting the domination of male gaze in the construction of women in Indonesian cinema.

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10   Media and morality

Pornography post Suharto

Jennifer Lindsay

In 2006, public debate on pornography erupted in Indonesia. The debate centred on the drafting by a parliamentary committee of anti-pornography legislation that proposed to extend control of pornography beyond the media into the realm of public behaviour. The draft then passed from view, and when the public thought it had been shelved, in September 2008 a revised version re-emerged with stronger support from political parties in parliament, and despite renewed protest was endorsed by the House of Representatives on 30 October 2008.

While discussion about what constitutes pornography and what mechanisms there should be for its regulation have existed since the founding of the Indonesian republic (and before), in the post-Suharto era, the issue of pornography re-emerged with a vengeance, foregrounding conflicting views about the role of national legislation affecting media, behaviour and the arts.

My discussion of this issue focuses on the manifestation of the debate in 2006 and 2008, and in particular the shift of pornography from a media issue to a question primarily of public morality and behaviour. I propose that this shift can be seen as a reaction to changes from New Order authoritarianism, with the relaxing of systems of media control at a national level juxtaposed with a new public authoritarianism of moral policing at a community level, spearheaded by right-wing political Islam and facilitated by post-New Order political structures of regional autonomy.

To present these developments, I retrace some history of Indonesia's anti-pornography legislation, paying attention to the ideology driving it, the mechanisms for implementing it, and particularly to the conceptualization of pornography itself. I note changes over time, with regulations designed for the media becoming progressively more specific in determining what constitutes pornography (as proscriptive regulation) compared to the broader criminal code that describes pornography in terms of its effect on people, thus allowing for changing community standards.

In the post-Suharto period, I will argue, the perception of pornography increasingly slips between media and behaviour. In the 2006 debate and its re-emergence in 2008, pornography was treated not as a media issue, but as a wider issue of public morality with the impulse to regulate this proscriptively *as though* it were media. I argue that this marks the end of an earlier clearer separation of the worlds

of media and behaviour, and movement towards a more blurred Baudrillardian mediatized reality, a blurring which in this case is particularly promoted by the Islamic religious right.

Laws on pornography and regulatory frameworks

The Criminal Code

Pornography and its control are nothing new in Indonesia. Since colonial times, pornography has been prosecuted under the criminal code which dates from the late nineteenth century.[1] Known in Indonesian as *Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana*, or more usually by the acronym KUHP, the Dutch criminal code was taken over by the Republic of Indonesia. In 1963, the lengthy process of its revision was begun. A draft text was completed in 1993 but this has since undergone continual revisions and is still under revision (2008). The following discussion refers to the wording of the official KUHP in force as it stood in 2006.

The criminal laws on pornography, as the criminal code itself, were adopted by the new Republic and remained unchanged. While the language has changed (from Dutch to Indonesian) and the sentences for infringements have altered, the actual wording for what constitutes pornography has remained the same, namely material that '*melanggar kesusilaan*', '*melanggar rasa susila*' or '*melanggar kesopanan*'. The Dutch phrase that this translates is '*aanstotelijk voor de eerbaarheid*' (article 282) and '*openbare schennis der eerbaarheid*' (article 281) which dates from the original Dutch text of 1886[2] and in English approximates 'offence to modesty', or 'blatant offence to modesty'. Interpretations and decisions about what offends are left to the courts to decide. The criminal law thus defines pornography in terms of its *effect* on the perceiver/s, not in terms of objective or absolute identifiable acts, things or works. The same wording is used for the law on indecency, article 281 of the Criminal Law, namely that it is a criminal act for anyone to '*melanggar kesusilaan*' in public.[3]

The criminal laws that cover pornography are found in articles 282 and 283, immediately following the aforementioned article 281 on indecency. While the article on indecency applies to people themselves as agents of offence, the articles on pornography stipulate that media – namely writing, pictures or objects (*benda*) – are the source of offence. People make pornography, sell it, distribute it and buy it. Pornography (although, notably, this word itself never appears) is clearly a media issue.

Article 282 states that it is a criminal offence to broadcast, show or display in public; to produce, to import, to distribute, to export, to store, to proffer or assist others to obtain; writing, pictures or things that '*melanggar kesusilaan*'. It distinguishes between those who do the aforementioned with intent and full knowledge of contents (a heavier sentence) and those who merely suspect the contents, and gives the heaviest sentence of all to those who do the aforementioned consistently and/or as a source of income.[4]

Article 283 is concerned with underage access to pornography, but this is listed together with access to birth control devices and devices for abortion. It states that it is a criminal offence to offer, give permanently or temporarily, to hand over or show or read aloud, writing, pictures or things that '*melanggar kesusilaan*', as well as devices for birth control or to procure abortion, to underage persons (under 17 years of age). Again, a distinction is made between those doing the afore-mentioned with full knowledge of the contents, and those who merely 'suspect' (*menduga*) that the material is offensive.

Other articles in the criminal code that might refer to pornography include articles 532 and 533. Article 532 says that it is an offence to sing songs or give speeches in public, or to create writing or pictures, that '*melanggar kesusilaan*' in any place visible from the public thoroughfare. Unlike articles 282 and 283, the wording here names people as *creators* of pornographic material – the singers of the songs, the speakers of the speeches, the writers of the books and the drawers of the pictures. The offence, though, is the public, visible (and presumably live) doing of this.

Article 533 concerns access to youth. The offence is to blatantly show or dis-play in public, writing with titles or covers or contents clearly legible, or pictures or things, which can arouse the lust of youth (*membangkitkan nafsu remaja*); or to read aloud the contents of writing that can arouse the lust of youth, or to give (temporarily or permanently), proffer or assist youth to obtain such material, or to proffer for sale such material in front of underage persons (below 17 years of age). Unlike the previous article, this one concerns dealers and distributors. However, unlike all other articles, this one stipulates the effect of the offensive material in specifically sexual terms. It does not merely offend a sense of morality; it arouses youthful lust.

In summary, a few points can be made about the Criminal Code. Significantly the term 'pornography' is not used. Second, material is described in terms of its effect, not its contents. Apart from one article referring to youth, this effect is described in general terms of offending a sense of morality, which is the same term used for the law on indecency. Only one article, which refers specifically to youth, links pornographic material and sexual behaviour, namely the article that groups pornography with devices for birth control and abortion. Overall, the laws prioritize for prosecution those people who distribute and produce pornography, and pornography is clearly a media concern. One article refers to performance (singing of songs, speaking of speeches and drawing of pictures) in public spaces. The wording of this article seems to apply particularly to medicine sellers and hawkers of sex aids.[5]

Media laws

Other than the Criminal Code, pornography in Indonesia is also covered in laws, regulations and guidelines relating to the press, broadcasting and film.[6] However, unlike the Criminal Code, these media laws and regulations were not inherited from colonial times, but have been drawn up since independence, and undergone

changes. These changes, from the 1950s through to the present, can be categorized as follows: changes to cover developments in media technology; changes in methods of prosecution and control; increased specificity in defining pornography; more explicit linking of morality with religion; and changes in the anti-pornography discourse driving the regulation.

Technology

Regulations, laws and guidelines to control pornography are reactive, as the distribution and creation of pornography change with developments in media technology and run ahead of attempts to control them. It is not surprising then that, during the Sukarno period, regulations and prosecutions centred on printed material and film, and during the New Order, videos and DVDs became a new focus. Since the fall of the New Order, broadcasting, mobile phones and the Internet have become prime areas of concern. Rapid developments in media technology, with the constant appearance of new forms and systems that defy existing media controls, fuel the anxiety for regulation.

Pornography control and prosecution mechanisms

The method of prosecution of the media for pornography offences has also changed. During the pre-New Order period, pornography cases were prosecuted according to the criminal law and punished with fines, with prosecutions made against the media owners and editors.[7] In the early New Order period, pornography cases involving the press were still taken to court and prosecuted under the criminal code. However, the sentence for offences was no longer a fine, but the withdrawal of publishing licences.[8] Very soon, though, there was no need for the courts at all. From 1972, the powerful Department of Information acted independently of the legal process by either threatening to withdraw, or withdrawing publishing licences as punishment for pornography offences, as it did for the publication of politically critical material.[9] This strategy also targeted media owners and editors. Since the fall of the New Order and the dismantling of the Department of Information, the licence-withdrawal control mechanism has disappeared, and press cases (for pornography, defamation, etc) now again fall under the criminal law. The fact that Indonesia's legal system is inefficient and riddled with corruption is one of many factors motivating the recent anti-pornography drive.

Film has had a slightly different trajectory regarding pornography in Indonesia because films are controlled through censorship procedure before their distribution, unlike print material which is censured after transgression. Concerns for pornography in film have focused on the establishment of mechanisms and clear guidelines for censorship, which, like the criminal code, has a long history in Indonesia. The first film censor body was set up in the Indies in 1916 in four cities; Batavia, Surabaya, Semarang and Medan. In 1925, this localized censorship was replaced with a single centralized Film Censorship Commission in Batavia, which in 1940 became an autonomous body answerable to the Department of Internal

Affairs. During the Japanese occupation, the censorship commission came under the control of the Department of Propaganda which controlled everything related with media. Early in the Indonesian republic's history, a national body for film censorship was established. This was followed by a Censor Committee formed in 1953 under the auspices of the Department of Education, Training and Culture (*Pendidikan, Pengajaran dan Kebudayaan* or PP&K) comprising 33 people, 24 of whom were government representatives and nine of whom represented political parties.[10]

In 1964, the Censor Committee was moved to the Department of Information, and in 1965 was renamed the Board of Film Censorship.[11] Early in the Suharto regime, the Censor Board was reshaped and brought under tight government control.[12] Selection of board members based on political party representation was abolished and board membership steadily increased over the years, always with heavy representation from security agencies.[13] By 1990, Board membership stood at 45, of which the six leadership positions were held *ex officio* by the Department of Information and the Department of Education and Culture. Ten positions were held by 'independent' figures (including intellectuals and artists), 19 by other government representatives (with a heavy loading from security) and the remaining ten *ex officio* by representatives of social organizations, including religious groups. The Indonesian Council of Ulama (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia*, MUI) was one of the religious groups represented in this figure of ten, which also included the Committee of Church Representatives.[14]

After the 1992 Film Bill was passed, the Censor Board (named the *Lembaga Sensor Filem*) became semi-autonomous. The composition of the Board remained basically the same, however, both then and following the fall of Suharto in 1998 and the dismantling of the Department of Information in 1999. The Censor Board Membership has stayed at 45 until the present, with the current (2005–8) Board of 45 consisting of 16 *ex officio* government positions and representatives of government organizations, nine representatives of community organizations and religious groups, and 20 non-government individuals, of whom seven are retired staff of the former Department of Information.[15] Proposed changes are now in store with the passing of a new Film Bill in September 2009. The Bill (which is being challenged by the film community who see it as threatening restriction and government control over the thriving post-*reformasi* independent film industry)[16] stipulates that the membership of the Censor Board will now be set at 17, consisting of 12 'community elements' and five 'government elements'.[17] The clause that particularly alarms the film industry is the provision for the Censor Board to form 'branches' at the provincial level, which is seen as a dangerous move towards the implementation of censorship similar to the anti-pornography regulations issued as bylaws (*peraturan daerah* or *perda*), discussed in detail later.[18]

Broadcasting sits between film and the press for regulation relating to pornography. During the Sukarno period and through much of the New Order, the state had a monopoly on national radio and television. Private radio, which developed in the 1970s, was limited in frequency and controlled through a licence procedure, and private television began only in the early 1990s.[19] As the Department

of Information had direct control over the state broadcasters (*Radio Republik Indonesia* and *Televisi Republik Indonesia*), regulations for pornography in broadcasting were not so urgent. Since 1998, however, broadcasting has been at the forefront of the debate about pornography. This is because there has been a boom in private television, and because much of the material considered offensive by the supporters of the pornography bill (so-called 'erotic' dancing for instance) is broadcast on television, which is far more pervasive as a medium reaching into people's homes across the archipelago than either film or print.

Legally, prosecution for the criminal pornography infringements in broadcasting can also be made through the criminal code (targeting media owners). The 2002 Broadcasting Bill (UU 32/2002), which was finalized in the early post-Suharto period, has only a brief mention of pornography grouped with other criminal activities such as drug-taking and gambling. The Bill merely prohibits the broadcasting of material that 'manifests elements of violence, pornography (the term used is *cabul*), gambling, misuse of narcotics and prohibited drugs'.[20]

Defining pornography

Media regulations relating to pornography in Indonesia have become increasingly specific in their definition of the term. It is as though as media becomes increasingly impossible to control because of the speed of developments in technology, the urge to keep things in control turns to the actual definition of pornography itself.

Pornography in the media emerged as a matter for regulation early in Suharto's New Order.[21] In June 1968, a meeting about pornography in the press – the Indonesian title was '*Pornografi dalam Pers*' (note that pornography is now named as such) – was organized by the journalism department at Moestopo University in Jakarta, and attended, among others, by officials from the Journalists' Association, the Department of Information and the Attorney General's office.[22] A working definition of pornography was produced which described pornography as media – 'writing, pictures, photos and sculpture' – which can 'arouse sexuality beyond social norms'.[23] Notably, this early New Order definition explicitly linked morality and religion, saying these things 'offend morality and religious moral sensibilities'.[24]

In 1973, the newly-formed *Direktorat Bina Pers* (Directorate for the Development of the Press) in the Department of Information issued guidelines for the press on pornography. These guidelines were the most specific description to date of what was considered to constitute offensive material, and listed: nudity, display of female breasts, sex, masturbation, homosexuality, sodomy, intercourse, any attitude or discussion promoting free love, any contact with genitals whether naked or not, the touching of buttocks, breasts, sexual arousal, showing female or male genital arousal and other things that arouse lust; sadism, masochism and horror 'tending towards the pornographic'; any writing or pictures that might cause someone to be embarrassed or disgusted or which offend moral sensibilities according to prevalent community standards.[25]

The Directorate for Film appears to have drawn on these press guidelines when, following the passing of the Film Bill in 1992, it issued revised guidelines for the Censor Board. These guidelines stipulated that films would be cut for nudity, close-up shots of genitals, thighs, breasts or buttocks, whether clothed or unclothed; same-sex or between-sex erotic kissing; scenes, movements or sounds of sexual intercourse or that give the impression of intercourse; masturbation and homosexual or heterosexual oral sex; and finally, scenes that could 'create an unethical impression'.[26]

In the post-Suharto era, broadcasting guidelines on pornography have become more like those for film. As mentioned previously, the Broadcasting Bill of 2002 gave little attention to pornography. In 2004, however, the newly-formed nine-member Broadcasting Commission (*Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia*, *KPI*) issued explicit guidelines on what constitutes pornography, which were more detailed than anything ever produced for film censorship, and the most detailed anywhere for any media to date. Section 3 has an entire section on '*Kesopanan, Kepantasan dan Kesusilaan*' (decency, propriety and morality) on what is prohibited for broadcast, and what is permissible for broadcast under special circumstances. Prohibitions include: nudity, 'still or moving'; pictures of any body parts that usually arouse lust, such as thighs, buttocks, breasts and genitals; kissing; intercourse real or simulated; sounds of or conversation or activity leading towards sex; sex between animals; sex between people and animals; programmes endorsing sex outside of marriage; rape; forced sex; programmes endorsing rape; songs and videos with explicit sexual lyrics; or dances that according to common sense could be categorized as sensual, manifesting sex, arousing sexual desire or conveying the impression of sexual intercourse; programmes that can be interpreted as degrading women as sex objects; broadcasts with children or teenagers as sex objects, including scenes with children and youth scantily dressed, or whose movement can be associated with sexual allure; and masturbation, real or implied. Special circumstances, namely within restricted broadcast hours between 10 p.m. and 4 a.m., allow the broadcast of talk shows about sex, if they are presented in a scientific and polite manner, and with no explicit public phone-ins; programmes that discuss sexual deviancy (paedophilia; sex between children or underage youths; incest; bestiality; sex with violence; group sex; sex aids), provided that such behaviour is not condoned; programmes about sex workers, provided that this behaviour is not condoned and the face and identity of the sex workers is obscured; programmes about homosexuality and lesbianism provided this is not condoned or promoted as something normal to be accepted by society. Finally, again within the restricted broadcasting hours, works of art such as sculptures or paintings revealing nudity can be shown as long as they do not exploit the sexual allure of that nudity.[27]

Anti-pornography discourse.

Along with changes in media technology and increased specificity in definition of what constitutes pornography, there have also been changes in the discourse of anti-pornography itself. In the Sukarno period, anti-pornography discourse was

couched as the protection of revolutionary spirit and national identity against foreign influence and depravity; during the New Order it was maintenance of national identity and public order; and post Suharto, the discourse has shifted squarely to morality and religion.

Concern about controls for pornography, then called '*cabul*', emerged early in the Indonesian republic. The 1951 national Cultural Congress already debated issues of film import and censorship.[28] The two issues were linked, for in the 1950s and early 1960s, '*cabul*', was seen as a threat imported from outside, namely 'the West'. The offending female bodies in posters and pictures, and those doing the kissing onscreen were western.[29] Lewd pictures, erotic films and sexually-explicit texts, along with youth fashion, rock music and dance were seen to be part of western degeneracy popularized by western (American) films.

Indonesia was not alone in this concern about encroaching western depravity. In Singapore, for instance, a large public meeting in mid 1956 demanded a government clampdown on pornography.[30] However, whereas in Singapore the call was driven by religious authorities, in Indonesia the most vocal critics of western degeneracy and obscenity ('*cabul*') at this time were those on the far left of the political spectrum, namely the Communist Party and those associated with it. While Muslim organizations in Indonesia also called for tighter control of moral standards, it was the Left that drove the campaign against depravity as part of its attack on western imperialism and anti-revolutionary subversion, employing this rhetoric in the campaign to stop the import of all American films. For instance, the Secretary General of the Indonesian Communist Party, D.N. Aidit in 1964 attacked American films as 'decadent, pornographic ('*cabul*'), spreading bestial instincts, anti-democratic attitudes, racial discrimination, delinquency, gangsterism, unkempt hair and Beatle(s) hair styles, and all kinds of other efforts to separate the People from revolutionary traditions and the revolutionary struggle.'[31]

The point of conceptual commonality between the Left, with its revolutionary, anti-imperialist campaign against western decadence, and the non-Left – particularly Muslim groups – was concern for the dignity of national identity, referred to as '*kepribadian nasional*' or '*kepribadian bangsa*'. The discourse of 'national identity' also allowed anti-pornography campaigns to cross periodically into other areas of life, such as dress, popular culture and prostitution. Sukarno railed against western-style dancing ('*dansa-dansi*') and rock music (which he dubbed '*musik ngik ngak ngok*'), and in the early 1960s police hounded young men with long hair or wearing crotch-hugging trousers. This did not radically alter with the change of regime in 1966. The New Order, alarmed at the uninhibited public behaviour and sexual permissiveness of the young generation, translated the earlier discourse of revolutionary values into '1945 values', with the army held up as the paragon of discipline and '*kepribadian bangsa*' for the youth to emulate.[32] During the New Order, there were periodic campaigns against prostitution (for instance in 1971, 1984 and 1994),[33] and sporadic police intervention to maintain decorum in public entertainment, particularly when that entertainment was linked to nationally-significant celebrations or venues. In 1987, for instance, at Brebes, in Central Java, police gave *dangdut* singers from the group KK Demak performing at the

17 August fair a warning for wearing hot pants and tank tops considered to be 'inappropriate to the culture of our nation'.[34]

When the Suharto regime assumed power in 1966, the relaxed media climate led to an initial flourishing of what was considered to be pornography both in the distribution of foreign imports (particularly videos), and in local production (particularly films).[35] Following a rash of Indonesian films in the 1970s and 1980s with erotic themes and semi nudity, often thinly disguised as retellings of local legend, the Censorship Board tightened its controls, and in 1977 drew up guidelines for censorship which were further refined in 1981.[36] Significantly, the threat to moral standards was now no longer seen to be coming only from outside but it was recognized that pornography was being produced at home. Significantly too, censorship concerns were not merely a matter of control of sex and violence, but were primarily a matter of public order and national security. The Film Censor Board's duty statement drawn up following the passing of the 1992 Film Bill directly linked the protection of morality to the protection of 'public order' in true New Order discourse.[37]

During the New Order, the Muslim religious community became increasingly vocal in demanding more stringent measures against pornography. In 1988, it was the Indonesian Council of Ulama (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia* or MUI) that led the protest against the film *Pembalasan Ratu Laut Selatan* (Revenge of the Queen of the South Seas), starring a scantily-clad Yurike Prastica, and succeeded in having the film recalled by the Censor Board.[38] In 1994, the MUI again made representations about the proliferation of film pornography. The Minister of Information, Harmoko, instructed the Censor Board to clean things up and threatened to close national film production, if sex and pornography continued to be exploited in film. The Minister of Religion, Armizi Taher, also requested the Censor Board to be more rigorous in its policing and asked the ulama to be less 'emotional' about pornography in film.[39]

However, while during the New Order religion and morality became increasingly linked in anti-pornography discourse, the New and pre-New Order regimes actually shared more similarity in their ideological stance against pornography than either of them does with the post-Suharto period, where religion, in the name of Islam, has come to the fore to monopolize the moral high ground and has emerged as the political force driving the call for changes in legislation. It is to the post-Suharto period and the anti-pornography bill that we now turn.

Post Suharto: new freedoms, new controls and the anti-pornography drive

When Suharto resigned in May 1998, journalists with activist experience were those most prepared to rally colleagues and make demands for structural change. The new Press Bill was passed during the Habibie presidency, and the entrenched Department of Information was dismantled in October 1999 when Abdurrahman Wahid, just installed as President replacing Habibie, announced his new Cabinet. Mechanisms for issuing the hated Publishing Licences (SIUPP) suddenly

vanished, the Censor Board had no home, and there was a boom in new private television and radio stations, and magazines. From mid 1998, even though many New Order media regulations were not officially rescinded, people quickly acted as though they had, aware that the monitoring mechanisms were no longer functioning. With the end of media control by the Department of Information, the Criminal Code was again used to prosecute pornography.

Inevitably, the press pushed limits in its competition for readership. In reaction to the boom in smutty tabloids, the Minister of Women's Affairs during the Habibie Presidency, Tutty Allawiyah, in 1999 waved a bunch of tabloids in Parliament and demanded action, calling for anti-pornography legislation.[40] In the same year, the police summoned editors of four Jakarta tabloids and one daily, *Popular*, *Liberty*, *Matra*, *POP* and *Objektif* accusing them of offending KUHP 282 clause 3. The infringement that caught most public attention at the time was *Popular*'s semi-nude photo of the celebrity Sophia Latjuba. In response to this summons, and taking the initiative to promote responsible journalism, the Journalists' Association (*Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia* or PWI) together with the Bandung newspaper *Pikiran Rakyat* hosted a two-day seminar in July 1999 to discuss pornography, media ethics and a proposed system of guidelines to be managed by the media itself. It was at this stage that the Indonesian Council of Ulama **(**MUI) entered the negotiations, for the MUI participated at this conference, and a recommendation was made that the MUI conduct follow-up research on the effects of pornography on society.[41]

While the press was the initial focus of anti-pornography discussion in 1999, broadcasting, VCDs and live performance soon became the real battleground. After a few months of uncertainty as to whether the New Order controls had really gone, broadcasting also tested the waters, and Indonesian television serials, *sinetron*, became more daring in depicting risqué scenes.[42] Around the same time, local VCD production came to light, with six locally-produced explicit pornographic films made public between 2000 and June 2003.[43] Meanwhile, raunchy dancing, epitomized by the popular female *dangdut* artist Inul with her skin-tight pants and pelvic 'drilling', and now frequently broadcast on television, attracted the ire (and envy) of her older male rival, Rhoma Irama, the former unchallenged 'king of *dangdut*', now gone pious, who in the name of Islam led the call for a ban to both media broadcast *and* live performance of Inul and her ilk.

The period immediately after May 1998 was characterized by a combination of vague media controls, a weak legal system and technological developments – particularly the explosion of VCD – which together were conducive to the propagation of pornography. From 1999 to 2005, the anti-pornography lobby proceeded in two directions. On the one hand, the process begun in 1999 by the Minister of Women's Affairs to draft anti-pornography legislation continued, and by 2002, during Megawati's presidency, a first draft had been completed which focused on mechanisms for control of pornography in the media. The Press Council also drafted guidelines for a division of responsibility between the Council and the police to control pornography in the print media; with the Press Council to handle

affairs when pornography was clearly a breach of journalistic standards and ethics, and other cases to be reported directly to the police.[44]

Meanwhile, however, the voice from the MUI and Islam was gaining strength, campaigning not only against media pornography, but also 'indecent' dress, lewdness and 'erotic behaviour' in general. In 2001, the MUI issued a fatwa (number 287) outlawing all things that 'arouse lust', including paintings, pictures, writings, sound, advertisements and speech, whether mediated or unmediated, as *haram*.[45] Anti-pornography discourse was no longer in terms of national identity, national security or development – but had become explicitly religious.

The MUI campaign attracted political allies. On 6 March 2002, the then Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare, Jusuf Kalla, met with the MUI and 70 mass organizations and called for a 'war against pornography'.[46] The MUI began to draft its own text of an anti-pornography bill.[47] The 2002 draft text that had been prepared by a special committee in DPR since 1999 was quietly shelved, and in 2003 a new parliamentary committee was formed.

Decentralized authoritarianism

The introduction of regional autonomy in Indonesia in 2001 brought a new element into the 'war' against pornography. Local authorities at a municipal and district (*kabupaten*) level began to introduce *sharia*-related bylaws (*peraturan daerah* or *perda*), including anti-vice regulations (*perda maksiat*) to regulate prostitution, gambling, the sale of alcohol and pornography. Almost half the regional regulations in force in Indonesia in 2007 fell into this category of 'morality' regulations.[48]

Since 1998, media controls also have become steadily more subject to community demand and intervention. Calls for film censorship are more community-driven, and the Censor Board, rather than being the undisputed central authority issuing edicts as it was during earlier eras, is now increasingly in the defensive position as a target of protest with its decisions challenged or ignored at the local level.[49] These protests and challenges are made in the name of morality. In 2007, community groups in Makassar (including *Warga Peduli Moral Sulsel* or Citizens Concerned for South Sulawesi Morality) achieved a local ban on the film *Maaf, Saya Menghamili Istri Anda* (Sorry, I got your wife pregnant). The MUI became more vocal in calling for censorship of particular films, and in 2004 succeeded in getting the film *Buruan Cium Gue* (Kiss me Quick), which had already been passed by the Censor Board, recalled from national distribution.[50]

Anti-pornography drive

The fall of the Suharto regime ushered in a period of creative and artistic freedom, much as the early New Order period had done in the early 1970s. With relaxed or inoperative controls over media and the arts, explorations led to new anxieties and clashes.

In the field of literature, young women writers published sensational novels

that were sexually explicit and were criticized as being at worst disgusting and at best deliberately provocative. In 2003, a long-brewing clash between *dangdut* stars Inul and Rhoma Irama became more heated, with Rhoma Irama calling for a boycott of Inul's performances and television appearances, thus giving moral support to thugs acting in the name of Islam who started sabotaging her public performances and succeeded in intimidating sponsors who cancelled their bookings. Inul sought support from other artists and even former president Abdurrahman Wahid. Visual arts were also a target for intimidation. In 2005, an artwork by Agus Suwage and Davy Linggar titled 'Pinkswing Park' featuring nudes of soap opera actress Anjasmara and the model Isabel Yahya was exhibited in Jakarta at the Mandiri Bank Museum. The Islamic Defenders' Front (FPI), by now confident of political backing through the anti-pornography campaign, publicly raided the exhibit, forced its closure and demanded (and got) an apology from the organizers.[51] Meanwhile, in late 2005, plans for publication of an Indonesian edition of *Playboy* magazine were also meeting with violent opposition.[52]

In this heated climate, in late 2005 the new draft of the anti-pornography bill, drawn up by the MUI but submitted in parliament by the Islamic-based Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS), became public when 'experts' were called in to comment on it before the Parliamentary committee. The new draft was titled the Anti Pornography and Pornoaction Bill (*Undang-Undang Anti Pornografi dan Pornoaksi*, soon known by the acronym UU APP). When the text of this draft became public in early 2006, debate erupted as people realized the drafting process had been hijacked by Islamic parties and groups, and that the proposed bill was no longer a matter of media regulation of pornography (for which there was wide community support), but an attempt to use the pornography issue to implement *sharia*-influenced law to control public morality, dress and behaviour.

The 2002 Anti Pornography Bill Draft: Defining media

A comparison of the 2002, 2006 and 2008 drafts of the Bill is revealing in tracing the conceptualization of pornography. The changes in wording, the addition of sections dealing with live performance and behaviour, and confusion between pornography as a media matter or a wider matter of general morality, indicate a grappling with the interrelationship of mediated and non-mediated worlds in the desire to control both.

The 2002 draft was called the Anti Pornography Bill, and contained a total of 36 articles, of which only one clause of one article defined pornography, and did so specifically referring to media:

'Pornografi adalah substansi dalam media atau alat komunikasi yang dibuat untuk menyampaikan gagasan-gagasan tentang seks dengan cara mengeksploitasi seks, kecabulan, dan/atau erotica.' (Pornography is substance in the media or in communication devices which is made to convey ideas about sex by exploiting sex, obscenity, and/or erotica.)

The focus of this draft was the updating of what is defined as media rather than what is defined as pornography. Article 1, which includes the aforementioned

definition of pornography as clause 1, has six clauses defining what is included as media (including print, audio and visual electronic, mobile telephone, Internet, intranet, advertisements, public service announcements, videos, VCDs, computers and personal computer disks).

However, one significant change in the 2002 draft in comparison with all existing legislation was that prosecution for pornography was extended beyond producers and distributors to those who use pornography and to those knowingly depicted in it. This was the first clear step towards extending prosecution to the likes of *dangdut* star Inul for televised or live performances deemed pornographic. Further, one clause of the draft referred to works of art; prohibiting the production, distribution or modelling in works of art that 'contain pornographic elements' shown in public places that are not arts venues. This clause could be used against art exhibitions in any venue not exclusively and specifically approved as an art gallery, or live performances for weddings, in public squares for 17 August celebrations, or for election campaigns. The bulk of the Bill, however, namely 14 of the draft's 36 articles, covered the establishment of an independent national body, the National Pornography Board (*Badan Pornografi Nasional*), to investigate infringements that would still be prosecuted under existing regulations. This was dropped in later revisions. Overall, this draft was relatively moderate, focusing on developments in media technology and still referring to the Criminal Code as final arbiter.

The 2006 Anti Pornography and Pornoaction Bill draft: Defining porn

The 2006 draft, the frame of which had been drawn up by the MUI, was a very different document, however. First, the bill was now named the Anti Pornography and Pornoaction Bill (UU APP). The addition of the new oddly named 'pornoaction' category indicates two things: the conceptual wrestling with pornography as a media issue or as a wider moral one of public behaviour; and the aim to ensure that live performance was also liable for prosecution as pornography. While 'pornografi' is conceived in the draft as the creation, circulation and consumption of recorded or transmitted material, 'pornoaksi' is conceived as the live enactment of pornography, in definitions that cross between behaviour and staged performance.

The February 2006 draft of the Anti Pornography and Pornoaction Bill contained 93 articles, of which 20 dealt with pornography and six with pornoaction. The initial definition of pornography repeated the definition of the aforementioned 2002 draft, but now added a definition of pornoaction as follows: **'**Pornoaksi adalah perbuatan mengeksploitasi seksual, kecabulan, dan/atau erotika di muka umum'. (Pornoaction is action that exploits sexual[ity], obscenity and/or erotica in public.) The draft listed for prosecution the creation, dissemination, purchase, financing and facilitating of, and appearance as actor or model in pornography, as did the 2002 draft, but went further to specify what pornography is, namely material

that exploits the attraction of certain sensual parts of the adult body; nudity; the attraction of bodies or parts of the body of people performing erotic dance or moving erotically; kissing; masturbation; heterosexual acts; homosexual acts; necrophilia; bestiality; orgies; sex shows; children masturbating; children having sex and children having sex with adults.

Prohibitions of 'pornoaction' were listed as: revealing 'certain sensual parts of the body'; nudity in public; kissing in public; erotic dancing or erotic movement in public; masturbation or simulating masturbation in public (including ordering children to do the same); having sex or performing sex-simulated movements in public (and ordering children to do the same); holding sex shows and sex parties, including those with children; watching sex shows and sex parties; and the funding, sponsoring, or provision of space or equipment for 'pornoaction', sex orgies or sex shows.

The May 2006 revision of the February draft eliminated some of the more blatant interventions into public behaviour in the name of controlling pornography (such as prosecution of kissing in public) to which there had been widespread reaction.[53] The new draft continued the impulse to give a specific definition to pornography and pornoaction, but added the language of the Criminal Code, in terms of pornography's effect: **'**Pornography consists of human works that deliberately exploit sexual objects by displaying them in public and offending the community's sense of morality.'[54] However, 'Pornoaction is action that deliberately exploits sexual objects carried out in public and which offends the community's sense of morality and diminishes human dignity and values.'[55] Notably, the May 2006 revision eliminated the word 'media' entirely from its definitions. Pornography has clearly become a matter of public behaviour and morality.

From media to virtual media

The text of the February 2006 draft UU APP reflects a combination of the 2002 KPI media guidelines on pornography and the 1992 guidelines for the Film Censor Board discussed earlier. However, these have been adopted and applied to both pornography *and* 'pornoaction'. In other words, restrictions drawn up for media censorship are now applied to behaviour. Performance – both staged and unstaged – is treated *as though* it is media. Non-mediatized behaviour and performance is interpreted in terms of media, as enacted pornography. And proceeding from this perception, behaviour, like media, is seen as something that can be specified, regulated and controlled.

Much of the Indonesian writing around the pornography issue at the time illustrates this tendency to define 'reality' or 'liveness' in media terms, as a Baudrillardian loop,[56] enveloping the virtual and actual. Pornography of the live event or behaviour is defined in terms of what it is *not* (not media). For instance, Djubaedah takes the example of striptease arguing that 'in my view, striptease that is performed live, or without communication media, can be called pornoaction. However if that striptease is presented via communication media, then it can be categorized as pornography.'[57]

Another of the many books that emerged in Indonesia at the time of the debate also reveals the grappling with terminology to capture everything as pornography, and then define it in media terms. Burhan Bungin, in his book titled *Pornomedia*, has a whole chapter on suggested terminology for different categories, including '*pornografi*', '*pornoteks*' (textual porn), '*pornosuara*'(audio porn) '*pornoaksi*'(pornoaction) and '*pornomedia*' (pornomedia), and distinguishes '*pornoaksi*' from the others by its liveness.[58]

We are certainly a long way here from the criminal code with its reluctance to define pornography itself, or from specifications of pornography during New Order times that were designed as proscriptive regulations for the media. What we see in the 2006 drafts of the Anti Pornography and Pornoaction Bill as well as much of the discussion around them, is that pornography is no longer seen as merely a restricted matter of *graphos*, but *all* activity is reinterpreted as enacted graphos. 'Pornoaction' is the realization of action known from the media, perceived in media terms, and defined in terms of media.

2008

After the heated debate of early 2006, things went quiet on the anti-pornography front, and most people thought the bill had been abandoned. Then in September 2008, during the Muslim fasting month and six months before the 2009 national elections as major political parties began serious jostling for minor party support, the issue suddenly re-emerged with the announcement that the revised draft was now complete and would be submitted for parliamentary approval as a 'Ramadan gift' to the people of Indonesia. The special parliamentary committee in charge of drafting the bill claimed now to have the political support of all the major political parties to vote in the bill, with only the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) and the Prosperous Peace Party (PDS) rejecting it. The same committee claimed to have taken all the 2006 criticisms of the bill into account and produced a bill acceptable to Indonesian society at large.

Reaction showed otherwise. Demonstrations followed in Bali, Papua, Manado, Bandung, Yogyakarta, Solo, Semarang and Surabaya. Critics pointed out that the bill was motivated by political concerns of pre-2009 election inter-party trading of influence; that the drafting procedure was legally flawed, and moreover that little of substance had changed in the bill itself.[59]

Indeed, the definition of pornography in this revision, now titled the Bill on Pornography (*Undang-undang Tentang Pornografi*) showed little change. Far from teasing apart pornography as a media issue from intervention into public behaviour, as earlier protests had demanded, the new definition collapsed both in a single definition:

'Pornography consists of drawings, sketches, illustrations, photos, writing, sounds, moving pictures, animations, cartoons, conversations, body movement or other forms of messages via communication media and/or public performance, which contain indecency or sexual exploitation which offend moral norms in society.'[60]

The detailed listing of what constituted pornography in earlier drafts is summarized in the final text as: 'sexual intercourse, including deviant sexual intercourse: sexual violence; masturbation; nudity or appearance resembling nudity; genitalia.'

The final text of the bill contains 45 clauses in eight sections. As before, it targets producers, providers, distributors and users, as well as those who appear as actors in pornography and live performers. A new emphasis in the 2008 draft is the policing of pornography in the private realm, extending criminal behaviour to those who own or store any pornographic material in their homes. It also extends a provision that first appeared in May 2006, giving the community a policing role in reporting cases of production, distribution, ownership or use of pornography. One further new emphasis, which attracted no comment in Indonesian media coverage, is the inclusion of a new definition, namely that of government with national government and regional government defined in two separate clauses. Regional government (governors, regents, mayors and local government apparatus) appears in clauses binding the government to implement the law. This in effect legislates against regional governments (at provincial or district levels) implementing their own local counter regulations that might contradict or weaken the impact and reach of the bill.

After its endorsement by the House of Representatives on October 30, the pornography bill was passed to the President for his signature in order for it to become law. There still remained the opportunity to then challenge the bill under a process of judicial review, and indeed this process began in early 2009 with the Constitutional Court hearing objections to the bill.[61] Some are not waiting for such legalities, however. Just three days after the bill's endorsement, police in Jakarta were reported to have arrested 'erotic dancers' performing in public, with the arrest made 'in accordance with the new pornography laws'.[62]

Conclusion

Drafting of the anti-pornography bill took almost a decade. Its definition of pornography owes much to the media laws and guidelines from both the New Order and post-New Order, but its conceptualization of pornography from the beginning through to the final wording of the bill endorsed by the House of Representatives on 30 October 2008 continually widened to include media, performance and behaviour, and regulate all in the name of morality. This became more explicit in each successive draft. The basic premise of the bill is that all activity related to eroticism and sex is pornography unless proven as an exception. Pornography is not seen as an exception to sexuality, but rather the conceptualization is the other way around. All the world is porn, and all men and women its players. Life is permeated with sex that needs to be regulated and controlled. Just like media.

The driving force moving pornography from a media issue to a broad issue of public and private morality is the post-New Order power of political Islam. The implementation of *syaria*-influenced regulations on morality at regional and local levels is one example of this, as is the political influence of groups like

the Indonesian Council of Ulama, the MUI. The clout of Islamic-based parties in parliament in their power to strike deals with other political parties is another. Tellingly, the House of Representatives endorsed the text of the Pornography Bill, with only two of the ten factions rejecting it, just one day after another bill was passed, the Presidential Election Bill, which set the minimum support a party or coalition of parties must win to nominate a presidential candidate at 20 per cent of House seats or 25 per cent of popular votes. With their eyes firmly on the 2009 general and presidential elections, the major political parties and their minor coalition partners needed the support of the Islamic-based parties.

The political power of Islam in Indonesia, which has steadily increased since the fall of Suharto, has allowed for the intrusion of religion into the conceptualization of pornography and regulation, and it is no coincidence that this intrusion has occurred with regulation that was initially concerned with media. With the anti-pornography bill, the proscriptive role of religion in determining clear rules of behaviour, of determining guidelines of right and wrong, found a match in the proscriptive role of media regulation, which establishes clear guidelines about what can and cannot be shown, to whom, where, when and under what conditions.

It must be said that of course the media itself is part of the process of turning behaviour, performance, ritual or culture into matters of 'public morality'. Media turns the live interactive face-to-face world into mediatized reality by bringing Inul and her sexy dancing, for instance, into people's living rooms across the archipelago. The local social negotiations of acceptance of dress, movement or images of the live situation are altered, and borders of private and public become blurred or redefined. The concept of 'pornoaction' can also be seen as an expression of the permeability of the live and mediatized worlds, of seeing action as realized media.

Notes

1 Alex Rachim dates the original Criminal Code in Holland as 1886, and its application to the Indies in 1912 (A. A. Rachim (ed.) *Pornografi Dalam Pers Indonesia. Sebuah Orientasi*, Jakarta: Dewan Pers, 1977, p. 43). Razak says the Criminal Code dates from 1870, and it was applied to the Indies in 1915 with virtually no revision or addition (A. Razak and G. Subagio (eds), *Debat Besar Pornografi*, Bandung: Harian Umum Pikiran Rakyat Bandung and Dewan Kehormatan Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia, 2000, p. 129).

2 Rachim, *Pornografi Dalam Pers Indonesia*, pp. 39, 42, 44.

3 L. Muntaqo, *Porno. Definisi & Kontroversi*, Yogyakarta: Jagad Pustaka, 2006, p. 69.

4 See the full text of articles 281, 282, 283, 532 and 533 in Muntaqo, *Porno, Definisi & Kontroversi*, pp. 70–76.

5 See T. Lesmana, *Pornografi dalam media massa*, Jakarta: PT Penebar Swadaya, 1995, p. 16 for examples of how it has been used for such prosecution. For examples of concern in the 1950s about advertisements for 'obat-obatan', presumably aphrodisiacs, see the communist newspaper *Harian Rakyat*, 26 August 1954, p. II, ('Awas iklan cabul'), also 2 September 1954 p. III and 4 September p. II.

6 Apart from the Criminal Law, other than the press and broadcasting bills discussed here, another more recent bill that can also apply to pornography is the 2002 Child Protection Act (*Undang-undang Nomor 23 Tahun 2002 tentang Perlindungan Anak*).

7 Lesmana, *Pornografi dalam media massa*, pp. 13–16 discusses 16 cases brought to court between 1954 and 1963. Of these, 12 were for texts in newspapers or magazines, one for a picture in a magazine, one for a picture in a book, one for a picture in a newspaper and one case was against a person selling sex tonics in a public area. In all cases (except the sex-tonic seller), the prosecutions were made against the owners and editors of the media.

8 For instance, in 1967 nine magazines and newspapers in Jakarta and Bandung were prosecuted and had their publishing licences withdrawn (Lesmana, *Pornografi dalam media massa*, p. 12 and Rachim, *Pornografi Dalam Pers Indonesia*, p. 89).

9 See Lesmana, *Pornografi dalam media massa*, p. 12.

10 A list of names of Censor Committee members is given in *Abadi*, 2 February 1953. See further V. Kusuma and I. Haryanto, 'Sensor Film di Indonesia' in I. Haryanto (ed.) *Ketika Sensor Tak Mati-Mati*, Jakarta: Yayasan Kalam, 2007, pp. 104–36, specifically p. 111. This article gives a survey of film censorship in Indonesia and I have drawn on it for more recent information. Riyanto cites 1951 as the official date of the formation of the Censor Committee, based on PP Number 23, 1951, when the committee was moved from the administrative umbrella of the Department of Internal Affairs to the Department of Education, Teaching, and Culture (G. N. Riyanto, *Peranan Badan Sensor Film Dalam Penegakan Hukum. Suatu Tinjauan Sosiologi Hukum*, Skripsi Sarjana Hukum, Faklutas Hukum, Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta, 1991, p. 45). On the history of the film censor board, see further Lembaga Sensor Film, *Paradigma Baru Lembaga Sensor Film Sebagai Garda Budaya Bangsa*, Jakarta: Lembaga Sensor Film, 2005, Chapter 2.

11 The instruction was PP no. 1, 1964. The change of name to *Badan Sensor Film* (BSF) occurred in 1965, SK MENPEN No. 64/SK/M/1965 (Riyanto, *Peranan Badan Sensor Film*, p. 45).

12 In 1968, based on SK MENPEN No 44/SK/M/68 (Riyanto, *Peranan Badan Sensor Film*, p. 45).

13 See further K. Sen, *Indonesian Cinema: Framing the New Order*, London: Zed Books, 1994, pp. 67–69.

14 See Riyanto, *Peranan Badan Sensor Film*, pp. 71–74. The BSF's total 45 members were as follows: the six leaders were all government appointees, *ex officio*, namely; Ketua – Direktor Jendral, Directorat Radio, Film dan Televisi; Wakil Ketua I – Directorat Jendral Kebudayaan; Wakil Ketua II – Departemen Penerangan; Ketua Pelaksana Harian – Departemen Penerangan; Wakil Pelaksana Harian – Direktorat Jendral Kebudayaan; Sekretariat – Departemen Penerangan. The remaining 39 members included ten non government experts (described as intellectuals, cultural figures, experts and prominent social figures), and the remaining 29 included 19 representatives from government organizations, plus ten representatives from community organizations including MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia), PPGI, KWI (Komite Wali Gereja), KNPI (Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia), KOWANI (Kongres Wanita Indonesia), PGRI (Persatuan Guru Republik Indonesia), Pramuka, Angkatan 45, PWI (Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia) and KNPI (Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia).

15 The 2009–12 Board (the second board appointed by President Susilo Bambang Yudoyono) has a membership of 45 as follows: Government *ex officio* and government organizations 17, made up of Departemen Pendidikan Nasional 1; Departemen Agama 1; Departemen Dalam Negeri 1; Departemen Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia 1; Kantor Menteri Negara Pemberdayaan Perempuan 1; Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia, 1; Markas Besar Kepolisian Republik Indonesia, 1; Badan Reserse Kriminal Markas Besar Kepolisian Republik Indonesia 1; Badan Intelejen Strategis 1; Kejaksaan Agung 1; Badan Intelejen Negara 1; Departemen Komunikasi dan Informatika 1; Departemen Luar Negeri 1; Kantor Menteri Koordinator Kesejahteraan Rakyat 1; kantor Menteri Negara Pemuda & Olahraga 1; Departemen Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata 1;Departemen Pertahanan 1: Community organizations and religious groups 10, made up of Majelis Ulama Indonesia 1; Nahdlatul Ulama 1; PP Muhammadiyah 1; Konferensi Wali Gereja

Indonesia 1; Persekutuan Gereja-gereja di Indonesia 1; Parisadha Hinda Dharma 1; Umat Budha Indonesia 1; Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia 1; Tenaga Ahli Jurnalis 1; Kongres Wanita Indonesia 1: and 18 individuals (intellectuals, cultural figures and non government experts). I thank Drs Narto Erawan, former Director of the Directorate of Film at the Department of Information, and member of the 2005–8 Censor Board, for assistance with this data. See further Sekretariat Lembaga Sensor Film *Profil Anggota LSF 2009–2012* Jakarta: Sekretariat Lembaga Sensor Film, 2009 and Lembaga Sensor Film *Paradigma Baru Lembaga Sensor Film Sebagai Garda Budaya Bangsa.* Jakarta: Lembaga Sensor Film, 2005.

16 See, for instance, Wina Armada Sukardi "UU Perfilman Baru, Siapa Peduli?" *Kompas* Sunday 13 September p. 20, Amin Shabana "Gagalnya Reformasi Perfilman" and Totot Indrato "Kami Tidak Percaya Negara", both in *Kompas* Saturday 12 September 2009, p. 7.

17 Clause 64 article 1. ("Anggota lembaga sensor film berjumlah 17 (tujuh belas) orang terdiri atas 12 (dua belas) orang unsur masyarakat dan 5 (lima) orang unsur Pemerintah.").

18 Clause 58 article 1 ('Lembaga sensor film dapat membentuk perwakilan di ibukota provinsi.').

19 See J. Lindsay, 'Making Waves: Private Radio and Local Identities in Indonesia' *Indonesia*, No. 64, October, 1997, pp. 105–23 and K. Sen and D. T. Hill, *Media, Culture and Politics in Indonesia*, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 109–19.

20 'Isi siaran dilarang menonjolkan unsur kekerasan, cabul, perjudian, penyalahgunaan narkotika dan obat terlarang'. See Muntaqo, *Porno, Definisi & Kontroversi*, pp. 79, 134.

21 I have not found any press laws on pornography before the 1999 press law.

22 The meeting was held from 30 May–2 June. See Razak and Subagio (eds), *Debat Besar Pornografi*, pp. 42, 91.

23 Lesmana, *Pornografi dalam media massa*, p. 10.

24 . . . karya-karya manusia berupa tulisan-tulisan, gambar-bambar, foto-foto, benda-benda pahatan yang melanggar susila dan kesopanan agama, yang merangsang kehidupan seks pada waktu tertentu daripada norma-norma kondisi setempat yang dapat merusak norma-norma masyarakat dari akibat negative yang disebarluaskan oleh pers, televisi dan film
     (Lesmana, *Pornografi dalam media massa*, p. 10 quoting Albert J. Lantang, 'Beginilah Konsensus Pornografi Sebenarnya', *Harian Operasi*, 29 July 1971).

Note the ambiguous wording of 'melanggar susila dan kesopanan agama' which can be either 'offends morality and religious sensibilities' or 'offends religious morality and sensibilities'.

25 Razak and Subagio, *Debat Besar Pornografi*, pp. 205–7 reproduce these guidelines, dated 7 May 1973.

26 Article 19, clause 3 of the Pedoman Sensor BSF No. 7 1994. See Lesmana *Pornografi dalam media massa*, pp. 90, 213. The last phrase in Indonesian is '*menimbulkan kesan tidak etis*'.

27 Translations are my own. Muntaqo gives the full original Indonesian text in *Porno, Definisi & Kontroversi*, pp. 79–85.

28 Minutes and transcripts of the discussions at the 1951 Cultural Congress are reproduced in *Indonesia. Madjalah Kebudajaan*, January–February–March No 1–2–3, Yr. III 1952, pp. 1–486.

29 The rhetoric of the need to keep out images from the depraved west is remarkably similar to contemporary anti-pornography rhetoric in the name of morality and Islam. Rachim (*Pornografi Dalam Pers Indonesia*, pp. 12–13) quotes a newspaper on 3 June 1953:

> Buku-buku dan bacaan cabul berisikan gambar-gambar perempuan Barat yang telanjang serta gambar-gambar cium-ciuman dengan bebas dibolehkan masuk ke tanah air kita dan di Surabaya banyak dijual di Pasar Turi, Pasar Blauran dan took-toko buku lain yang terbuka untuk umum – parlemen diminta perhatiannya.

30 See T. Harper, *The End of the Empire and the Making of Malaya*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 95.

31 '. . . decanden [*sic*], cabul, penyebar naluri kebinatangan, sifat-sifat anti demokrasi, diskriminasi rasial, cross-boy-isme, gangsterisme, rambut sasak dan rambut gondrol (beatle) serta usaha lain-lain untuk memisahkan Rakyat dari tradisi revolusioner dan perjuangan revolusioner.' (D. N. Aidit, *Seni dan Sastra* , first published in 1964, quoted from the 2002 reprint, np. Radja Minjak (sic) p. 38).

32 See K. E. McGregor, *History in Uniform: Military Ideology and the Construction of Indonesia's Past*,Singapore: NUS Press, 2007, pp. 123–26 on the army's efforts to define 1945 values in response to a perceived generational gap in ideals. See also B. R. O'G. Anderson, *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990, pp. 186–87 describing two episodes in 1972. The first, a contest involving nudity and sexual stimulation for the king and queen of freaks at a New Year's Eve event held in Surabaya at a stadium devoted to memory of independence fighters. The second, an outdoor rock performance in May 1972 in Yogyakarta, which ended with an audience protest attacking the bands, and involved public sexual display. Anderson comments: 'What was scandalous here, of course, was the public display of sexuality by upper- or middle-class people, not their private sexual behaviour (about which traditional Java has generally been tolerant).'

33 Lesmana, *Pornografi dalam media massa*, p. 3.

34 '*tidak sesuai dengan budaya bangsa kita*' (Lesmana, *Pornografi dalam media massa*, p. 95).

35 Lesmana, *Pornografi dalam media massa*, p. 11 calls 1970–72 the 'golden age' of porn in Indonesia. Of course, he was writing in 1995, before the post-Suharto explosion.

36 Sen, *Indonesian Cinema*, p. 69.

37 'terpeliharanya ketertiban umum dan rasa kesusilaan' (Muntaqo, *Porno. Definisi & Kontroversi*, pp. 135–36).

38 Lesmana, *Pornografi dalam media massa*, p. 5.

39 See *Republika* 15 and 16 July 1994, and *Surabaya Post* 3 July 1994.

40 Drafting was begun by Komisi VIII DPR (see *Gatra*, 4 February 2006). See also 'Pornografi Lampuai Batas Moral: Sejumlah Majalah dan Tabloid Disidik', *Republika*, 1 July 1999, and Syarifah, *Kebertubuhan Perempuan Dalam Pornografi*. Jakarta: Yayasan Kota Kita, 2006, p. 2).

41 See further Razak and Subagio, *Debat Besar Pornografi*, pp. 36, 50, 105. Salim (p. 122) claims that a draft of the anti-pornography bill had been prepared by the Ministry of Religious Affairs 'in the last years of the New Order' (A. Salim, 'Muslim Politics in Indonesia's Democratisation: The Religious Majority and the Right of Minorities in the Post-New Order Era' in R. H. McLeod and A. MacIntyre (eds), *Indonesia: Democracy and the Promise of Good Governance*, ISEAS, Singapore, 2007, pp. 115–37.) but I have found no other reference to any draft or any text earlier than the 2002 one I discuss later.

42 Razak mentions that from 1998 to 1999, 'bukan saja telenovela dari luar negeri, tetapi sinetron karya dalam negeri yang menampilkan artis-artis Indonesia melakukan adegan-adegan . . . seks, hubungan intim sebelum menikah, perslingkuhan, busana seksi yang mengundang birahi penontonnya. . . .' (Razak and Subagio, *Debat Besar Pornografi*, p. 41). See also 'Jalan-jalan ke Pelosok Jakarta Melihat-lihat VCD Porno: Anak Ingusan, Tujuh Ribu, Sabun Mandi, Sepuluh Ribu', *Rakyat Merdeka*, 11 June 2002 and 'VCD Empek-empek Palembang Goyang Jakarta-Bandung', *Rakyat Merdeka*, 9 June 2001.

43 See Barker, T., 'VCD Pornography of Indonesia' in A. Vickers and M. Hanlon (eds) *Asia Reconstructed: Proceedings of the 16th Biennial Conference of the ASAA, 2006, Wollongong, Australia*, Canberra: Asian Studies Association of Australia (ASAA) Inc. and Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies (RSPAS), The Australian National University, 2006. Available at: coombs.anu.edu.au/SpecialProj/ASAA/biennial-conference/2006/proceedings.html

44 See L. Luwarso, S. Suprayanto and Samsuri (eds) *Portret Pers Indonesia 2005. Sebuah Laporan*, Jakarta: Dewan Pers and EIDHR European Commission, 2005, p. 12.
The Press Council held to this position later when making representations about the drafting of the RUU APP.

45 Fatwa MUI Nomor 287, 2001. 'Menggambarkan secara langsung atau tidak langsung tingkah laku secara erotis, baik dengan lukisan, gambar, tulisan, suara, reklame, maupun ucapan, baik melalui media cetak maupun eletronik yang dapat membangkitkan nafsu berahi adalah haram'.

46 'Disarankan Perangi Pornografi Lewat Jalur Hukum', *Media Indonesia*, 7 March 2002.

47 Muntaqo, *Porno. Definisi & Kontroversi*, p. 43.

48 Robin Bush notes that there were at least 78 regional regulations in force in 2007, of which 35 were morality regulations, see 'Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia', p. 176. (R. Bush, 'Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?' in G. Fealy and S. White (eds), *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia*, Singapore: ISEAS, 2008, pp. 174–91.)

49 In fact, even before regional autonomy was implemented, there were incidents of regional rejection of national decisions on censorship. During the New Order, there were also regional censor bodies (Badan Pembinaan Perfilman Daerah or BAFFIDA) which could impose their own extra film restrictions, for reasons of regional security and sensibilities (Riyanto, *Peranan Badan Sensor Film*, p. 55). The membership of these bodies was appointed by the Governor, and included military and security personnel. These regional bodies could not cut films, but they could stop distribution of a film in the province. See Haryanto, *Ketika Sensor*, pp. 90–91.

50 Kusuma and Haryanto, 'Sensor Film di Indonesia', pp. 105–6, 124–29.

51 The apology was not enough. In February 2006, the FPI laid charges laid against them, invoking paragraph 282 clauses 1 and 2 of the KUHP.

52 P. Kitley, *'Playboy Indonesia* and the media: commerce and the Islamic public sphere on trial in Indonesia' *South East Asia Research*, vol. 16: 1, March, 2008, 85–116.

53 Both Allen (P. Allen, 'Challenging Diversity? Indonesia's Anti-Pornography Bill', *Asian Studies Review*, 31: 2, 2007, 101–15.) and Salim, ('Muslim Politics in Indonesia's Democratisation') use the infamous February draft as basis for their writing on the bill, but by the time their articles were published there was (at least) the May 2006 revised text which eliminated some of the prohibitions they discuss.

54 'Pornografi adalah karya manusia yang sengaja mengeksploitasi obyek seksual dengan menampilkannya di muka umum dan melanggar rasa kesusilaan masyarakat.'

55 'Pornoaksi adalah perbuatan yang sengaja mengespoitasi obyek seksual yang dilakukan di muka umum yang melanggar rasa kesusilaan masyarakat dan merendahkan harkat dan martabat manusia.'

56 A self-perpetuating feedback loop of hyper-reality.

57 'Menurut penulis, strip-tease yang dilakukan secara langsung, atau tanpa melalui media komunikasi, saat ini dapat disebut pornoaksi. Apabila strip-tease itu ditampilkan di media komunikasi, maka strip-tease dapat dikategorikan sebagai pornografi.' (Djubaedah, N., *Pornografi Pornoaksi ditinjau dari Hukum Islam*, Jakarta: Prenada Media, 2003, p. 140).

58 B. H. M. Bungin, *Pornomedia: Sosiologi Media, Konstruksi Sosial Teknologi Telematika & Perayaan Seks di Media Massa*, Jakarta: Kencana, 2005, pp. 124–25. Pornoaksi

adalah suatu penggambaran aksi gerakan, lenggokan liukukan tubuh, penonjolah bagian-bagian tubuh yang dominant memberi rangsangan seksual sampai dengan aksi mempertontonkan payudara dan alat vital yang tidak sengaja atau disengaja untuk memancing bangkitnya nafsu seksual bagi yang melihatnya. Pornoaksi pada awalnya adalah aksi-aksi subjek-objek seksual yang dipertontonkan secara langsung dari seseorang kepada orang lain, sehingga menimbulkan rangsangan seksual bagi seseorang termasuk menimbulkan hysteria seksual di masyarakat.

59 See *inter alia*: Ida Indawati Khouw, 'Porn bill, a complete waste of much-needed energy', *The Jakarta Post*, 22 September 2008, p. 2: Maria Hartaningsih, 'RUU Pornografi Dinilai Cacat oleh Banyak Pihak', *Kompas*, 29 September 2008, p. 35: 'Moeslim: Sebaiknya Tolak Saja RUU Ini', *Kompas*, 22 September 2008, p. 35: Bramantyo Prijosusilo, 'Think twice before passing the pornography bill', *Jakarta Post*, 22 September 2008, p. 6.

60   Pornografi adalah gambar, sketsa, ilustrasi, foto, tulisan, suara, bunyi, gambar bergerak, animasi, kartun, percakapan, gerak tubuh, atau bentuk pesan lainnya melalui berbagai bentuk media komunikasi dan/atau pertunjukan di muka umum, yang memuat kecabulan atau eksploitasi seksual yang melanggar norma kesusilaan dalam masyarakat.

This is the final text of the bill endorsed by the House of Representatives on October 30. An earlier draft circulating in September had another definition of pornography, mix-and-matching bits of earlier texts and defining pornography as 'sexual material that inspires lust'.

61 See 'Pornography Law 'Limits Women's Basic Rights''', *The Jakarta Post*, 6 August 2009, p. 4.

62 *Kompas*, 3 November 2008. http://cetak. kompas.com/read/xml/2008/11/03/01093024/ kilas.metro

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