

**Nation Building,
State Building, and
Economic Development**

**Case Studies
and Comparisons**

S. C. M. Paine, Editor

Contents

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The Incomplete State and the Alternate State in Papua New Guinea

HANK NELSON

Abstract: This case study shows the difficulties of forging a national identity and creating effective state institutions in an archipelago state of enormous ethnic and linguistic diversity. Papua New Guinea faces no major international security threats. The former colonial power, Australia, bowed out peacefully, but left behind a population inadequately educated to staff modern state institutions. Although the country has an extensive endowment of natural resources, these have not produced general prosperity. Rather, they have raised the exchange rate, making it more difficult for other sectors of the economy to develop. State services, elementary schooling, the road system, hospitals, and policing do not extend to all parts of the country. Most political parties and political leaders have a very narrow regional following. Although regular and highly contested elections have been held since independence, and despite a free and active press, corruption has increased and violent crime is endemic.

Lines on the map are one of the most significant and lethal legacies of colonialism. The map inherited by Papua New Guinea has not provided the boundaries to foster an easy growth of a sense of nationhood and the institutions of a state. It is made up of the eastern half of the island of New Guinea and other islands farther to the east. The largest of the Pacific island states, Papua New Guinea has a total land area of 178,213 square miles (461,691 square kilometers) and a population of over 6,000,000. Some of the eastern islands, particularly New Britain, New Ireland, and Bougainville, are significant in terms of both population and area.

Colonial Rule Under a Succession of Powers

The arbitrary border on the west was established early. The Dutch claim to the west of New Guinea was an extension of their possessions in the East Indies, and Dutch sovereignty to the 141st meridian was accepted in 1884 by the British, who laid claim to the southeast, and the Germans, who planted their flag in the northeast. After the Australian colonies federated in 1901, the new Australian nation took over British New Guinea in 1906, and renamed it the Australian Territory of Papua. At

lity, which rests on three pillars of family, and extended family connections and the indigenous makeup of his elite in order to share the wealth, while the elite remains in power and French support in potentially

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

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

the start of World War I in 1914, Australian troops went north, faced brief opposition, and occupied German New Guinea, which as part of the postwar settlement became an Australian mandate under the League of Nations in 1921. Thereafter, Australia administered all of east New Guinea, but retained separate administrations for Papua and New Guinea. In 1949 the two Australian Territories in the east, combined since 1942, continued under the one administration as the Territory of

Papua and New Guinea—New Nations. In 1971 the combined retained at independence in 1975 the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority in 1963, confirmed by an act of free choice. The province of New Guinea was divided into two provinces. For a nation that came into being in 1975, Papua New Guinea has been much more successful. For Australians, the importance of Papua New Guinea in two metaphors: they were both stepping stones to Australian lands.

When the Japanese landed at Milne Bay, a small Australian force, Australia's survival in Europe, could provide a triumph over a disaster, and a triumphant enemy. Australia shifted its pleas for aid to the Americans and Australians from the Pacific; but where over 100,000 Japanese surrendered in August 1945.

Previously one of the inhabited islands in four years of war, Papua New Guinea through their lands, bringing with them a new era. Papua New Guineans had never before; they had fought along with the world. At the same time, perhaps the most decorated. It was not the generation who emerged from the war with some of the world. With few exceptions, none of the grades of primary school. They had never before. It was not the generation who emerged from the war with some of the world. With few exceptions, none of the grades of primary school. They had never before. It was not the generation who emerged from the war with some of the world. With few exceptions, none of the grades of primary school. They had never before.

In the immediate postwar period of New Guinea to their defense had reduced this assessment. For the defense seemed appropriate.¹ Whether (the Dutch) and the east (the British) halfway round the globe, but after they shared a border in the Torres Strait



Papua and New Guinea—New Guinea was then a Trust Territory of the United Nations. In 1971 the combined territories became Papua New Guinea, the name retained at independence in 1975. Meanwhile, in 1962 Dutch New Guinea passed to the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority and then to Indonesian control in 1963, confirmed by an act of free choice in 1969. Indonesian New Guinea has been successively the province of West Irian, Irian Jaya, and then Papua. In 2007 the province was divided into two, Papua and West Papua.

For a nation that came into being without violence or even a political prisoner, Papua New Guinea has been much concerned with internal and external security. For Australians, the importance of the New Guinea islands was often expressed in two metaphors: they were both island ramparts essential for the defense of Australia and stepping stones ready to be exploited by an enemy eager to grasp Australian lands.

When the Japanese landed at Rabaul on 23 January 1942 and swept aside the small Australian force, Australia's fears were realized. The British, struggling for survival in Europe, could provide no aid, Singapore offered not protection but disaster, and a triumphant enemy was in the New Guinea islands. Pragmatically, Australia shifted its pleas for aid and close military alliance from Britain to America. The Americans and Australians fought the key battles of 1942 in the Coral Sea, at Midway, Guadalcanal, Milne Bay, Kokoda, and Buna, and cemented a long-term shift in alliances in the Pacific; but the war remained in Papua and New Guinea, where over 100,000 Japanese surrendered when the Emperor Hirohito conceded defeat in August 1945.

Previously one of the inhabited areas in the world most lightly tied to the outside, in four years of war, Papua New Guineans had seen over 1,500,000 foreigners pass through their lands, bringing with them the most advanced and destructive engines then known. Papua New Guineans had traveled farther and earned more cash than ever before; they had fought alongside foreigners, and some had excelled and been decorated. At the same time, perhaps a quarter of them had not known that a war was on, and, for those caught up in it, there was no media directed to Papua New Guineans to turn particular events into common experiences. Papua New Guinea emerged from the war with some of its people having a vision of a new and better world. With few exceptions, none of them had a Western education beyond a few grades of primary school. They had no exploitable political or social infrastructure. It was not the generation who experienced the disruption of war, but the next, who founded the first political parties and began talking of a nation.

In the immediate postwar period, Australians thought the critical significance of New Guinea to their defense had been confirmed, but by the late 1960s they had reduced this assessment. For Australia, a continental, rather than a forward, defense seemed appropriate.¹ When the neighboring colonial powers on the west (the Dutch) and the east (the British in the Solomon Islands) withdrew, they went halfway round the globe, but after the Australians ceased being administrators, they shared a border in the Torres Strait and retained a defense interest. That concern

ps went north, faced brief opposition as part of the postwar settlement of Nations in 1921. Thereafter, but retained separate administration Australian Territories in the east, administration as the Territory of

with defense was self-interested and practical, with a continuing engagement with the Papua New Guinea Defense Force (PNGDF). As Papua New Guinea declined on international indices measuring corruption and speculation increased about its becoming a failed state, Australia had to consider whether its neighbor could maintain the integrity of its borders and prevent transnational criminals, subversive groups, drug traffickers, and terrorists from finding a haven.² By 2003, when the two countries announced their Enhanced Cooperation Program, security was again a motive for Australia's increased engagement with the region.

Security Environment

For an independent Papua New Guinea, security has been dominated by legacies of the map. The long land border in the west—dividing related peoples and cutting through swamps, tropical rain forest, and precipitous mountains—will always be difficult to police. It is more than an international border. Given the number of Indonesians from elsewhere in the archipelago who have settled in west New Guinea, the 141st meridian is now where Southeast Asia meets Australasia and Melanesia, where the lingua franca changes from Bahasa Indonesian to English or New Guinea Pidgin (*Tok Pisin*), and where Islam meets Christianity. A line that is at once a national, regional, and cultural marker and crosses difficult terrain is going to cause problems.

While both sides have generally cooperated, nearly every year there are incidents ranging from minor cases of people avoiding customs or migration regulations, to shots being fired at alleged adherents of the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM)—the persistent guerrilla movement in the western part of the main island—and refugees crossing into Papua New Guinea to escape Indonesian forces harassing OPM and its supporters. The highest number of refugees came in 1984, when over 10,000 crossed; some are still in camps in Papua New Guinea.³ As the efficiency and resources of the PNGDF have declined or been diverted elsewhere, the country's capacity to monitor the border has diminished. In parliament in 2007, a member for an electorate on the border complained, "Money laundering, sales of illegal firearms, drug trafficking, human smuggling and other illicit activities were becoming common practices and seemed acceptable."⁴

On the east, the colonial border meant that Bougainville, the most northern of the Solomon Islands, was attached to independent Papua New Guinea.⁵ Their homeland geographically separate and conscious of their distinctive blackness, Bougainvilleans had already asserted their desire for special consideration from the Australian administration. As Conzinc Rio Tinto developed a major mine at Panguna, prospecting, the acquisition of land, and the arrival of workers from outside the island stimulated separatist sentiment on Bougainville. In 1972, on the eve of self-government, the copper mine at Panguna began production. The Bougainville secession movement increased in strength as independence approached, and in 1975 many Bougainvilleans accepted reluctantly their place in the nation of Papua New

Guinea. The mine was financial half of all export earnings) and c Solomons Province. But dispute about the distribution of landow sive responses from the police a mine, intermittent violence, and

The Bougainville Revolution: guilty of violence against other) atavistic to educated Bougainvil the government attempted to int national, the army revolted and i coup, the prime minister was fo later faced charges.

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More people have died elsewhere decade of civil war on Bougainvi that in parts of the Highlands—m Eastern Highlands, Chimbu (or S Highlands—traditional warfare, : and those involved were defying g weapons gradually changed from shotguns and automatic weapons. . clans engaged in their own wars reports of "3000 guns in the Baiye and more reliable claims of up to in Enga Province,⁹ and of Highlar tion.¹⁰ The total numbers being ki the Eastern Highlands, 500 are sa have recorded over 3,000 deaths in

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Guinea. The mine was financially significant for the nation (generating just under half of all export earnings) and dispersed funds to local landowners and the North Solomons Province. But disputes over compensation for pollution and arguments about the distribution of landowner payments led to sabotage of the mine, aggressive responses from the police and the PNGDF, the closing and destruction of the mine, intermittent violence, and brutality.

The Bougainville Revolutionary Army could not unify Bougainvilleans—it was guilty of violence against other Bougainvilleans, and some of its policies seemed atavistic to educated Bougainvilleans. The PNGDF performed poorly, and, when the government attempted to introduce mercenaries recruited by Sandline International, the army revolted and expelled the mercenaries. Although there was no coup, the prime minister was forced to stand down and members of the military later faced charges.

After ten years of low-level warfare, the most implacable of the Bougainvilleans were isolated, and in 1997 the majority came together with the government to negotiate a cease-fire. While few had died in battle, many Bougainvilleans had been forced from their homes, nearly all education and health service had ceased, and much infrastructure was destroyed. Under the conditions of the peace agreement of 2001, Bougainville neither remained a province nor seceded. The difficult process of writing and operating a constitution for an island that is both “autonomous” and within the nation of Papua New Guinea continues, and, as the peace settlement includes the right to a referendum, the Bougainville Autonomous Government may be temporary. Where civil wars in other parts of the world with rich resources have often been contests for the control of mineral revenue, on Bougainville the mine was opposed, destroyed, and not reopened—although in future the Panguna mine (or some other mine) may well be exploited.⁶

More people have died elsewhere in resurgent tribal or clan fighting than in the decade of civil war on Bougainville. Even before the Australians left, they found that in parts of the Highlands—meaning the five adjoining Highland provinces of Eastern Highlands, Chimbu (or Simbu), Western Highlands, Enga, and Southern Highlands—traditional warfare, suppressed for a generation, was breaking out and those involved were defying government officers and their armed police.⁷ The weapons gradually changed from traditional bows and arrows, clubs, and axes to shotguns and automatic weapons. Just how many weapons are in the hands of rural clans engaged in their own wars is uncertain, but there are alarming newspaper reports of “3000 guns in the Baiyer and Lumusa areas in the Western Highlands”;⁸ and more reliable claims of up to thirty automatic weapons owned by one clan in Enga Province,⁹ and of Highlanders making their own weapons and ammunition.¹⁰ The total numbers being killed is uncertain, but in one prolonged clash in the Eastern Highlands, 500 are said to have died and in Enga the village courts have recorded over 3,000 deaths in ten years.¹¹

While sometimes characterized as “ethnic” violence, much of the fighting is between clans and alliances of clans from the same cultural groups. Many of the

uses of the disputes (land, murder, but population increases (especially money (and high compensation), guns have transformed traditional leaders, and hired gunmen are not subject to the restraints on

economic activities, but it has not the clans have not fought for issues, such as protecting rainforests or, and the fighting has often gone on of the clan wars has been as great

ry of potential riches. The contrast idlocked sub-Saharan states, which y. With its extraordinary mountains, e cultures, it could have a significant ss income than it does in the smaller s restrained by problems of law and frastructure, and malaria.

find, the alluvial gold dredged from : 1930s. Mineral production did not until the development of several sig- k Tedi, Porgera, Misima, and Lihir. major projects are underway—the t mine, the largest investment by the area. Important oil and gas reserves curing safe production and passage plans to pipe gas to Australia have e is a chance of Exxon Mobil mak- duction, evident in most years since d prices. But inevitably Papua New ld commodity prices for oil, metals,

ual value, made up 75 percent of the ; exports) accounted for the rest of the fisheries. Within agriculture, the old while oil palm has grown and coffee or reasons of history and proximity, s: in 2006 Australia supplied over 50

percent of imports, and Singapore, the second most important source, provided 12.6 percent.¹⁴

Recent macroeconomic indicators have been favorable, partly as a result of high commodity prices. External debt has decreased, the current account has been in surplus, and the GDP growth estimates for 2007 were over 5 percent. The problem is governance. The state has slight capacity to collect and distribute the benefits of improving national accounts. Firstly, according to Transparency International, over a third of the six billion *kina* government budget is “stolen each year by corrupt politicians and bureaucrats.”¹⁵ That may be an exaggeration, but the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index for 2007 ranked Papua New Guinea at 130 among 163 listed countries and the press reports alarmingly high totals for misappropriated monies.¹⁶ Secondly, the institutions of government are weak. The state is unable to regulate or provide the infrastructure and security necessary for a growing economy. Thirdly, the advantages that come with the exploitation of minerals and high commodity prices may enable the government to postpone basic reforms; high wages in the mining industry will inflate wages elsewhere; and the currency will be maintained at a high level, making it difficult for other exporters to compete on world markets. In other words, Papua New Guinea will show the symptoms of “Dutch disease,” meaning that flourishing natural resource export revenues have raised the exchange rate to the detriment of the development of manufacturing.

A significant characteristic of the Papua New Guinea cash economy is that around 8 percent of the population, dependent on subsistence gardening, is not in it, and about 70 percent has food gardens and a variable income from tree crops (coffee, oil palms, coconuts, betel nuts,¹⁷ and cocoa) and vegetables. As a result, many people are lightly connected to the cash economy. They make enough to meet essential needs and imposts such as school fees, respond to high market prices, and in tough times are able to provide their own food, fuel, and shelter. Except for oil palms, most cash crop production comes from small holders rather than plantations.

Papua New Guinea did not inherit rich social capital at independence, and it has not been able to invest effectively in the health and skills of the population. In 1975 life expectancy was estimated at forty-one, half the children of primary school age were in school, and only one-third of adults were literate. By 2005, life expectancy had increased to fifty-seven, 75 percent of children were in primary school, and over half of all adults were literate. The independent government can therefore point to considerable advances, but Papua New Guinea is still low on international measures of education, health, and income. The United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Index (2007/2008) places Papua New Guinea at 145th place out of 177.¹⁸

Political Environment

The traditional polities and colonial history did little to foster the institutions or consciousness of a nation-state. Much of island and coastal New Guinea was ruled

successively by Germany, Australian military and civil administrations, Japan, and again by Australian military and civilian administrations. The longest continuous administration of the northeast has been that of independent Papua New Guinea, beginning in 1975. In the Highlands, home of half the population, the Australian administration only began its exploratory patrols in the 1930s. By the early 1950s, there was still a quarter of the total population completely or partially outside Australian rule. As the Australians left within a generation, many people who had grown to maturity in the traditional society were still active in their communities when the Australians left. At independence, some coastal communities had known a century of colonialism and some had endured what might be called a disruption rather than a period of colonialism.

The ethnic diversity of Papua New Guinea is often illustrated by pointing out that it is a nation of 800 languages. While languages are important markers of ethnicity, they understate the political diversity because the larger language groups are divided. Most traditional leaders held sway over a few hundred people and, through alliances with other leaders, could extend their influence. None had power over an area as large as any of the current eighty-five rural administrative districts. In a few areas, leaders held hereditary positions and were called "chiefs," but most were self-made "big-men." While many of the Melanesian communities have been described as egalitarian and competitive, individuals, families, and clans could often be placed in rank order. It was much more likely that big-men would come from some families rather than others. Even so, big-men had to work constantly to maintain their position against rivals inside and beyond their extended families.

Extensive trade routes across seas and land linked many peoples, but did not result in the formation of political units. The colonial experience gave people a sense of belonging to larger units, such as Sepik, Manus, Milne Bay, or Chimbu, and to Papua as opposed to New Guinea; and some people—such as Bougainvillians—may be more conscious of their provincial identity than their national. If the people of the five Highland provinces developed a stronger identity and expressed it politically, they could assert influence within the state and perhaps provoke a disruptive reaction from the coast and islands, but as yet no movement has come close to commanding the loyalty of anything like a third or half the nation. Fragmentation has impeded building a nation, but the very extent of the fragmentation has prevented the development of fissures likely to break the nation into two or three incompatible regions.

The Australian administration did not establish a national political institution with a majority of Papua New Guineans—an elected parliament—until 1964, and, at that time, nine years before internal self-government, there were no political parties. The first House of Assembly was a place where individuals made requests, asked questions, and debated, but they did not then aspire to govern. It was not until 1967 that Papua New Guineans formed a political party (Pangu Pati), which operated in the House and aimed for home rule. By 1972, Pangu, in a coalition led by Michael (later "Sir") Somare, had a majority in the House. By then Australia was ready to

hand over power. Had a referendum would probably have voted against becoming self-governing in 1975, it was greeted with enthusiasm by many—and outright opposition by not want to join the new nation.

It was not until the eve of independence that Melanesians and Australians began to create symbols of a nation: a flag, a national anthem, a compromise, with the omission of the designation of "The Territory" in the state were equally late in being adopted. The 3,436 members of the PNC, two-thirds of the commission, in the public service only one and nearly 4,000 overseas offices and divisions of the public service.

Papua New Guinea came peacefully to independence with no violence to leave scars, no bloodshed. There was some criticism of the new government but not enough to prevent a functioning elected government and media, few Papua New Guineans make them continue to work effectively.

Having come into existence peacefully, it has retained its democracy. Elections have been contested by many parties. Prime ministers and ministers do not return to office. Somare, prime minister, and began his third period in office. Morauta, is an ex-prime minister, media, the ombudsman, the judiciary, independence and sometimes offshoots, officers, procedures, and policies.

In spite of obvious evidence of corruption there are signs of a system under development. Exposed in the media and in official records servants being charged and some rolls manipulated, double voting in some cases voters intimidated, organized within electorates, not a major or insignificant violation of faith impedes good governance. In the

civil administrations, Japan, and strations. The longest continuous independent Papua New Guinea. If the population, the Australian in the 1930s. By the early 1950s, completely or partially outside generation, many people who had still active in their communities coastal communities had known what might be called a disruption

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hand over power. Had a referendum been held then, most Papua New Guineans would probably have voted against ending the colonial ties. Papua New Guinea became self-governing in 1973 and independent in 1975. Generally, nationhood was greeted with enthusiasm by a minority and unease, indifference, or ignorance by many—and outright opposition by those Papuans and Bougainvilleans who did not want to join the new nation.

It was not until the eve of self-government that progressive Papua New Guineans and Australians began to press for the adoption of the most fundamental symbols of a nation: a flag, an anthem, and a name. In the end, the name was a compromise, with the omission of "The Territory of" and the "and" of the old designation of "The Territory of Papua and New Guinea." The institutions of a state were equally late in being possessed by Papua New Guineans. In 1972, of the 3,436 members of the PNGDF, 617 were still Australians; in the police force two-thirds of the commissioned officers were from overseas (mainly Australia). In the public service only one head of a department was a Papua New Guinean and nearly 4,000 overseas officers were serving in the first, second, and third divisions of the public service.¹⁹

Papua New Guinea came peacefully but suddenly to independence. There was no violence to leave scars, no dominant army, and no heroes of the struggle for independence. There was some emotion to give enthusiasm to those at the center of the new government but not enough to unite a diverse people; and while there was a functioning elected government and public service, and an independent judiciary and media, few Papua New Guineans had the technical skills and experience to make them continue to work efficiently.

Having come into existence with a freely elected government, Papua New Guinea has retained its democracy. Elections to the single-house parliament have been held on time, contested by many parties and individuals, and changed governments. Prime ministers and ministers defeated at one election have won later elections and returned to office. Somare, prime minister at independence, was reelected in 2007 and began his third period in office. The leader of the opposition in 2007, Mekere Morauta, is an ex-prime minister. The institutional monitors of democracy—the media, the ombudsman, the judiciary, and the auditor-general—have retained their independence and sometimes offer frank, even aggressive, criticism of government officers, procedures, and policies.

In spite of obvious evidence of democracy working and being valued by people, there are signs of a system under stress. Corruption has grown in spite of its being exposed in the media and in official inquiries, and despite politicians and civil servants being charged and some jailed. There is much corruption of elections with rolls manipulated, double voting, ballots filled out in batches, votes bought, and in some cases voters intimidated and ballot boxes stolen. But most corruption is organized within electorates, not nationally and there are electorates where there is no or insignificant violation of fair process.²⁰ The fragmentation of the electorates impedes good governance. In the 2007 general elections, an average of twenty-

presented over thirty parties and

loyalties to secure votes, making most successful national political elections outside their home postelection from a combination committed to policies, members elected them, not to an electorate. Now that they have a short time their voters. They need to be in opposition. In these aggressively holds a seat.

here: candidates do not owe their movements are formed by individuals competitive system, but it has not in the 2007 election than in 2002, used. Attempts to stabilize parties from first-past-the-post to limited preferred preferential system, voters they mark in order of preference. votes or "preferences" outside their states outside local affiliations. The local-level governments, hold powers they lack funds and competence. So particularly in the New Guinea Islands) services, most people are dependent ment.

ics alien to the Western experience es not provide any basic services a medical service within a day's ic power line or a water main, or a areas warfare has forced the state e provides just two or three such empts to reach all adult citizens is then voting is not compulsory and result, people live in what observs an incomplete or optional state. have to leave home.²¹ And many ig companies build roads, schools, hes have long contributed to health hope and some material services; id donors take over many govern- mavailable or coming from another

source, many citizens do not have a basic contract with the state—they do not pay taxes in return for services.

Prospects

Papua New Guinea appears to face neither immediate success nor disaster. No external force threatens the nation or even wishes it ill. Within Papua New Guinea no group commands the sympathy of 20 percent or more of the population, a constituency sufficient to sustain a long campaign and fracture the nation. The possible, but remote, exception is a complete breakdown of the government in Port Moresby which then provokes the New Guinea Islands to break away. The other areas of sufficient size—the north coast, the Highlands, and Papua (the south coast)—have geography against them. The Highlands are landlocked and need outlets to the coast, Papua surrounds Port Moresby, and the north coast is ill-defined and currently people from there hold a strong stake in the Port Moresby government.

The PNGDF has defied the government when its self-interest has been involved (and for that reason it is unlikely that its numbers will be reduced to a recommended total of just over 2,000). At the end of 2007, there were rumors of an army plot to arrest the prime minister, but the PNGDF does not possess the tanks, troop carriers, and aircraft to move quickly with intimidating power to critical points. An army coup in Port Moresby would have difficulty imposing its rule in Madang, Goroka, Kokopo, Kavieng, and Alotau. A coup carried out by a combined PNGDF and Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary would be a greater threat to the democratic state as the police are more numerous (over 5,000) and more dispersed and can call on reserve and auxiliary personnel. But the police and the army have a history of conflict rather than cooperation, and there are divisions within the leadership of both the PNGDF and the police. A force able to carry out a successful coup—such as the combined armed services with the support or sympathy of students or a politician and his followers—currently seems unlikely.

Particular problems of law and order will continue. In lists of the world's most dangerous cities, Port Moresby ranks alongside, and sometimes above, Algiers, Bogota, Lagos, Baghdad, and Johannesburg.²² Most people who can afford to do so live within razor-wired and patrolled houses or compounds and rarely venture out after dark. Other towns, such as Mt. Hagen and Kainantu, are equally dangerous. Given the protracted traditional fighting in some rural areas, there is an urgent need for the state to assert its monopoly of violence, but little progress has been made in attempts to get guns out of the hands of citizens engaged in crime and warfare. There have already been some unholy associations of politicians and town *raskol* gangs²³ and armed clans, and there is the potential for a part of Port Moresby or another town to decline into a level of chaos that will require a substantial force to reassert control. These are likely to be locally dangerous and destructive, and damaging (but not fatal) to the state.

Political uncertainty also comes with the inevitable change in leaders that will

happen simply because of the age of several of the most prominent of them—Somare is over seventy, and Julius Chan, Mekere Morauta, Paias Wingti, Bart Philemon, and Rabbie Namaliu are approaching the end of their political lives. Just who the new leaders will be is unclear, but it can be assumed they will be different because they will have been educated and grown to political consciousness in an independent Papua New Guinea, not with memories of Australian institutions, personnel, and values.

Religion is important in the political and daily life of Papua New Guineans. The preamble to the constitution refers to the “Christian principles that are ours now” and to the “guiding hand of God.” But the churches in this predominantly Christian country have been undergoing change. The churches that grew out of the old Catholic and Protestant missions have been influenced by charismatic and born-again movements. New fundamentalist groups have formed. Some administrative and technical expertise has been lost, but the churches retain influence and are increasing their involvement in tertiary education.

The prevalence of HIV/AIDS is close to 2 percent and could reach 10 percent by 2025.²⁴ Transmission is by heterosexual sex. If HIV/AIDS cannot be contained, then it has the potential to reduce the workforce, absorb much of the health and aid budgets, and dislocate some communities. In rural communities where people believe that disease is a result of malign sorcery, accusations, counteraccusations, and severe punishments multiply the impact of an insidious disease.

Australia has provided some fifteen billion dollars in aid to Papua New Guinea since 1975. While Australia, the major aid donor, has maintained and may increase its annual aid, its assistance has declined as a percentage of Papua New Guinea’s revenue. Through the last thirty years, the manner of delivery and intent of Australian aid has changed, often following international trends in what is thought to be most effective. It has shifted from direct aid to the budget to project aid, with emphases on institutional strengthening, governance, and law and order. Interventions in East Timor and the Solomon Islands marked an increased Australian engagement in the region. In 2003 Australia and Papua New Guinea agreed on an Enhanced Cooperation Program, committing Australia to placing civil servants in Papua New Guinea positions and providing an additional billion dollars over five years.

The context in which Australia provides aid has changed. Where in the past Australians were by far the most numerous foreigners in Papua New Guinea, they are now outnumbered by Asians.²⁵ There are probably more Chinese alone than Australians, Chinese investment in resource extraction is growing, and China will increase in importance as a trade partner. At the same time, Japan, the European Union, the United States, and New Zealand are increasingly seen as alternative sources of aid, and the health of Papua New Guinea’s economy gives its government options.

For Papua New Guineans, the map inherited from the colonial powers made the development of a sense of nationhood difficult. Their precolonial communities were among the most fragmented on the globe, and the Australian administration

was benign but late and incomplete and a commitment to a national war, endemic problems of law and order afflicted Papua New Guineans, must cooperate. No group can expect the peoples of Papua New Guinea must cultivate alliances.²⁶ Geographically it sits at the junction between Asia and the dominant economies of the Pacific area rich in minerals. It will prolong chronic poor governance and bridge the gap that now separates literacy, children of average weight,

Notes

1. H. Nelson, *Fighting for Her Country* (Melanesia, Discussion Paper, Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute Lowy Institute, 2005), 7.
2. Hugh White and Elsinia White, *Warfare in Papua New Guinea* (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute Lowy Institute, 2005), 7.
3. R. May, “East of the Border,” *Geographical Magazine* (London), 124.
4. *National* (Papua New Guinea), 7.
5. A. Regan and H. Griffin, eds., *Warfare in Papua New Guinea* (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute Lowy Institute, 2005).
6. Anthony Regan, “The Bougainese: The Political Economy of Armed Conflict,” *Journal of Pacific Studies* (Canberra: ANU Press, 2003), 133–66.
7. *Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Moresby Bombing* (Moresby: Government Printer, 1973), 2; W. Clifford, *Warfare in Papua New Guinea*, 2 vols. (Port Moresby: Economic Research, 1984); Sinclair, *Warfare in Papua New Guinea* (Australia: Crawford House, 2001).
8. *Post-Courier* (Papua New Guinea), 9 January 2008.
9. Polly Wiessner et al., “Warfare in Papua New Guinea,” an excellent unpublished paper (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute Lowy Institute, 2007).
10. *Post-Courier*, 9 January 2008; *Small Arms Violence in Papua New Guinea* (Canberra, Discussion Paper, August 2007).
11. Wiessner, “Warfare in Papua New Guinea.”
12. “Cops Deployed to Protect Oil Fields,” *Herald*, 30 January 2008.
13. Copra is the dried coconut meat. Palm oil comes from the oil palms.
14. <http://www.dfat.gov.au/geoffs/>
15. Scoop New Zealand News (www.scoop.co.nz), 30 January 2008.

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was benign but late and incomplete in its attempt to create the institutions of a state and a commitment to a nation. Those plagues of the “bottom billion”—civil war, endemic problems of law and order, corruption, and poor governance—have afflicted Papua New Guineans, but their very fragmentation has meant that they must cooperate. No group can come close to dominance, and the history of the peoples of Papua New Guinea has constantly confirmed that families and clans must cultivate alliances.²⁶ Geography has given Papua New Guinea advantages. It sits at the junction between Australia and Southeast Asia and between Australia and the dominant economies of East Asia, and it has an extensive and diverse land area rich in minerals. It will probably continue to avoid catastrophe while suffering chronic poor governance and occasional crises, but it has a chance to begin to bridge the gap that now separates it from the countries able to offer their citizens literacy, children of average weight, and a life span of over sixty-five years.

Notes

1. H. Nelson, *Fighting for Her Gates and Waterways*, State Society and Governance in Melanesia, Discussion Paper, Canberra, March 2005.
2. Hugh White and Elsinia Wainwright, *Strengthening Our Neighbour* (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2004), 14; Ben Scott, *Re-Imagining PNG* (Sydney: Lowy Institute, 2005), 7.
3. R. May, “East of the Border,” in *Between Two Nations*, R. May, ed. (Bathurst, Australia: Robert Brown, 1986), 124.
4. *National* (Papua New Guinea daily newspaper), 8 October 2007.
5. A. Regan and H. Griffin, eds., *Bougainville Before the Conflict* (Canberra: Pandanus Books, 2005).
6. Anthony Regan, “The Bougainville Conflict: Political and Economic Agendas,” in *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict*, Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, eds. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 133–66.
7. *Report of the Committee Investigating Tribal Fighting in the Highlands* (Port Moresby: Government Printer, 1973), 2–3; Mervyn Meggitt, *Blood Is Their Argument* (Palo Alto, CA: Mayfield, 1977); W. Clifford, L. Morauta, and B. Stuart, *Law and Order in Papua New Guinea*, 2 vols. (Port Moresby: Papua New Guinea Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research, 1984); Sinclair Dinnen, *Law and Order in a Weak State* (Hindmarsh, Australia: Crawford House, 2001).
8. *Post-Courier* (Papua New Guinea daily newspaper), 9 January 2008.
9. Polly Wiessner et al., “Warfare in Enga Province: From Prehistory to Modern Times,” 2007, an excellent unpublished paper.
10. *Post-Courier*, 9 January 2008; Sinclair Dinnen and Edwina Thompson, *Gender and Small Arms Violence in Papua New Guinea*, State Society and Governance in Melanesia, Canberra, Discussion Paper, August 2004.
11. Wiessner, “Warfare in Enga Province,” 51.
12. “Cops Deployed to Protect Oilfields,” *National*, 22 January 2008; *Sydney Morning Herald*, 30 January 2008.
13. Copra is the dried coconut meat from the coconut palm used to produce coconut oil. Palm oil comes from the oil palms.
14. <http://www.dfat.gov.au/geofs/png.pdf>.
15. Scoop New Zealand News (www.scoop.co.nz), 6 December 2007.

16. *National*, 28 September 2007, and *Post-Courier*; 6 September 2007.
17. Betel nuts, a mildly euphoric stimulant, are chewed throughout much of Asia.
18. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/>.
19. *Papua New Guinea Report for 1971–72* (Canberra: Government Printer, 1974), 13, 15, 34, 41.
20. "Papua New Guinea National Election, June–August 2007: Report of the Commonwealth-Pacific Islands Forum Election Assessment Team," http://www.forumsec.org/fj/_resources/article/files/png%20FINAL%20REPORT.pdf.
21. H. Nelson, "Governments, States and Labels," State Society and Governance in Melanesia, Discussion Paper, Canberra, January 2006.
22. *Global Report on Human Settlements 2007*, www.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/5204_47267_BK_percent208.pdf; "Economist Intelligence Unit," *Guardian*, 22 September 2004.
23. *Raskol*, derived from the English word *rascal*, is a Papua New Guinea Pidgin term for a person, usually a member of a gang, engaged in crime and violence.
24. www.ato.gov.au/budget/2006-07/ministerial/html/ausaid-05.htm.
25. H. Nelson, "The Chinese in Papua New Guinea," State Society and Governance in Melanesia, Discussion Paper, Canberra, March 2007.
26. Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

18

National Identity Indonesia

ROBERT CRIBB

Abstract: This case study focuses that is at the center of Southeast developed during the colonial er. Indonesian national identity part. grant heritage, such as the Chinese leader, Sukarno, tried to deepen t precepts: belief in God, nationali. racy. Although at independence In products and minerals, including ownership damaged the country's, starvation in the countryside, a ra and a growing Communist mover. harto, who slaughtered the Comm. wealth under himself, and transfe traders. Since the fall of Suharto, Indonesia's tradition of exclusion

Modern Indonesia is a paradox. A known outside ethnographic circle Greek *Indos* (India) and *nesioi* (is and Melanesia (black island)).¹ It distance greater than that from Du ethnic groups it encompasses, but figure of around 400. No local sta ritory, and even the Dutch East In of state succession, only took its fi the twentieth century. Small wonc thoroughly implausible state and

From a longer historical perspe At its core lies the island of Java