author is content to note that “determination, ambition, and fortuitous circumstances proved to be more important than strategies” (209).

After its triumph, “Vietnam was bloated with hatred for imperialism and with pride in its revolutionary vanguardism in Southeast Asia” (232), and in the years that followed, the party “turned Vietnam into a giant laboratory for half-baked utopian ideas” (295). Pol Pot might plausibly be judged more odious than anyone in Hanoi, but Tuong Vu does not mention his name and instead declares that “Le Duan’s condescending view of the Cambodian revolution had long infuriated Cambodian ‘Khmer Rouge’ leaders who launched border raids on Vietnam as soon as they took power in Phnom Penh in April 1975” (221). As for Beijing’s truculence, culminating in the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979, the text asserts that “it was China rather than the United States that felt threatened by the Vietnamese after 1975” (235). By the end of the decade, Vietnam had become an “international pariah” (212). In 1986 Le Duan passed away, but Hanoi leaders were still calling on everyone to “remain loyal to Marxism-Leninism and the socialist path that Uncle Ho, the Party, and the people had wisely opted for” (262). It all came to an ignominious end with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Tuong Vu’s “primary objects of analysis are not particular events and policies, but the evolving thoughts of revolutionaries about Vietnam’s relations with the world” (3). The result is a presentation that marginalizes “events and policies” and makes quick work of the scholars who have chosen to dwell on them. The First Indochina War ended with the defeat of French colonialism in Vietnam, an achievement that is elided when Tuong Vu represents the Communist Party’s “anti-imperialism” simply as a code word for fealty to the Soviet bloc. The text seldom mentions the United States, and then largely to reference Hanoi’s “dogmatic and negative” view of U.S. behavior (20). Mark Bradley is faulted for claiming that an opportunity for peace was lost at the end of World War II, but Bradley was not wrong to detail how in 1946 Ho repeatedly appealed to Washington for help and squandered a lot of political capital trying to get the French to agree to a settlement that would have averted an all-out war. Tuong Vu seems not to notice Bradley’s accompanying demonstration that Washington policymakers viewed the Vietnamese people through a “prism of racialized cultural hierarchies,” which led them to conclude that Vietnam was not ready for self-government and would be better served by a restoration of French sovereignty in Indochina (Bradley, *Imagining Vietnam and America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919–1950* [2000], 77).

Further along, Tuong Vu states, “it was Hanoi’s escalation during 1964–1965 that provoked a hesitant [President Lyndon] Johnson into authorizing American troops to be sent to Vietnam” (292). Fredrik Logevall demonstrates that from early in Johnson’s presidency he secretly prepared for escalation while presenting himself as the “peace candidate” in the 1964 presidential election. Le Duan may have “underestimated American commitment to defending South Vietnam” (Vu, 178)—but, then, so

did the American people, who overwhelmingly returned him to office, in part because he promised not to send American boys to die in Southeast Asia. Johnson needed no “provocation.” He raged against critics who called for a negotiated settlement, and told subordinates to knock down “the idea of neutralization wherever it rears its ugly head” (Logevall, *Choosing War: The Last Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam* [1999], 130). Both sides were gearing up to escalate in 1964, as Le Duan and company faced adversaries in Washington who also could be characterized as intransigent war makers. Gone are the days, and good riddance, when scholars could get away with U.S.-centered accounts of the Vietnam War. But no balanced treatment is possible if Washington policymakers are left on the sidelines.

Drawing on prodigious archival digging and argued with a sustained and ferocious passion, *Vietnam’s Communist Revolution* is an indictment of an ideology that, in the author’s opinion, brought violence and suffering to people in Vietnam and played a deplorable role in the world. Some readers will relish its denunciation of a political movement that ended in “paranoia and self-delusion” (221), while others may wince on reading passages that summarily dismiss more nuanced interpretations. But I predict that no one will be bored by this ambitious and combative book.

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JAMES R. RUSH. *Hamka’s Great Story: A Master Writer’s Vision of Islam for Modern Indonesia*. (New Perspectives in Southeast Asian Studies.) Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2016. Pp. xix, 286. \$79.95.

From the outset of this biography of Haji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah (or Hamka, as he was famously known), James Rush declares deep admiration for his subject. Rush states in the preface that from his days as a graduate student learning Indonesian, Hamka’s writings “drew me in” and “could bring Indonesia to life for me” (xi). Rush found Hamka “a wholly authentic Indonesian voice through which I might see Indonesia from the inside” (xii). In the following six chapters, the author presents the most detailed English-language account of Hamka’s life and writings to date.

Studying Hamka’s work is no light undertaking. He wrote prolifically across all forms of publication, from newspaper columns to novels to handy popular guides to Islam to prodigious multivolume texts on Islamic history and exegesis. There is probably no other Islamic intellectual in Indonesian history who has written as much as Hamka, and there are probably few others who could rival his influence. He not only wrote incessantly but was also famed for his preaching and public service. Hamka was a board member of Indonesia’s second-largest Islamic organization, Muhammadiyah, represented the Masyumi political party in the Constituent Assembly in the late 1950s, and, at the end of his life, was the founding chair of the national ‘Ulama’ Council (MUI).

In many of these roles, Hamka was controversial. He was an uncompromising advocate of Islamic modernism, and thus critical of traditional Islam and its attitudes toward mysticism and the dead. Hamka worked closely with Japanese occupiers in his native West Sumatra during the Second World War, which earned him, for a time, obloquy as a collaborator. He endorsed, then opposed, and finally supported the state ideology of *Pancasila* (Five Principles). Hamka was repeatedly accused of plagiarism in some of his best-known writings. He was jailed for several years by President Sukarno on trumped-up sedition charges in the mid-1960s before being politically rehabilitated by Suharto's New Order regime. As MUI chair, Hamka earned the ire of Christians and traditional Javanist faith groups (*kepercayaan*) for his rejection of Christmas greetings and opposition to state recognition of "heterodox" beliefs.

Rush brings great depth of scholarship and sensibility to his examination of Hamka. He deftly places his subject into a vivid historical setting, drawing on Hamka's own writings for primary source material. Rush explores the key issues in which Hamka was embroiled, whether they were religious, social, or political, offering judicious accounts of often complex subjects. The author's discussion of Hamka's writings on Islam, especially his monumental *Tafsir al-Azhar*, regarding Qur'anic interpretations and the Indonesianizing of Islamic law, is especially meticulous. Rush quotes liberally and tellingly from Hamka's speeches, letters, and publications to illustrate particular points. By so doing, he allows his subject's own distinctive voice to ring through the text.

Rush's own writing is elegant and pellucid. He maintains admirable narrative thrust and rarely belabors points. Therefore, the book is a pleasure to read and memorable. The author succeeds in providing deep insight into Hamka's personal development and his thinking. Biographical writing of this quality is rare in Indonesian studies.

But Rush's approach is not without its problems. Chief among these is his seeming reluctance to elaborate upon Hamka's shortcomings. Often Rush in passing implies criticisms of his subject, but rarely does he dwell upon them. For example, we are told that "one might say that Hamka," rather than having been a highly original thinker, "was merely adopting a popular trend" (27), but this is not taken further. We learn that he was more a "reader with a brilliant capacity for synthesis and popular narrative writing" (115) than a scholar, and that many of his historical treatises showed a patchy understanding of Western events (116–117).

The only substantive criticisms of Hamka to be found in this book are from other people, not Rush. We are informed in the closing section that Abdurrahman Wahid wrote that Hamka was "unsystematic" and "lacking analytical depth" and that there was "nothing special about Hamka as a man of learning and culture" (194). Rush declines to enter into debate on this matter. Similar conclusions have been ventured by Anthony H. Johns and Suha Taji-Farouqi in their assessment of Hamka's exegetical works. They describe him as an "amateur" exegete who

"lacks the discipline" and "intellectual acuity" of other leading Indonesian Qur'anic scholars, such as Quraish Shihab or Habsi Ash-Shiddieqy ("A Public-Figure *Mufasssir* from the Malay-Indonesian World: Hamka [d. 1981] and his *Tafsir al-Azhar*," in Suha Taji-Farouki, ed., *The Qur'an and Its Readers Worldwide: Contemporary Commentaries and Translations* [2015]: 217–274, here 262). Moreover, Rush does not express an opinion on whether Hamka was guilty of plagiarizing the Egyptian author al-Manfaluti, despite devoting many pages to the discourse that raged about this topic in the early 1960s.

Overall, Rush has written with considerable empathy and imagination about Hamka. But this biography is less powerful than it might have been because Rush avoids categorical judgment, particularly of a negative type. Perhaps he likes Hamka too much to searchingly scrutinize him. As a result, Rush has produced a very readable and illuminating biography, but not a highly rigorous one.

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JENNIFER L. GAYNOR. *Intertidal History in Island Southeast Asia: Submerged Genealogy and the Legacy of Coastal Capture*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Southeast Asia Program Publications, an imprint of Cornell University Press, 2016. Pp. ix, 227. Cloth \$69.95, paper \$23.95.

Although Southeast Asia contains the largest archipelago in the world, the history of the peoples who live upon its seas has been the subject of very little historical research, at least compared to the amount of work with the usual focus on empires and states and their dependence on trade and agriculture. *Intertidal History in Island Southeast Asia: Submerged Genealogy and the Legacy of Coastal Capture* by Jennifer L. Gaynor is an attempt to address this shortfall. The author, an ethnohistorian, directs our attention to Tiworo, an area off the southeast peninsula of the orchid-shaped island of Sulawesi in modern Indonesia. The maritime peoples of this area, often known as Sama, utilized their knowledge of the straits, shoals, reefs, and seas to become valuable allies of early modern polities, which echoes into modern-day social relations and understandings of the region. By focusing on peoples who move easily between the coasts and the open ocean, Gaynor has provided an insightful consideration of the dynamics of power, trade, and social relations that points historians to new understandings of societies and ecosystems that usually fall beyond the shore of the academic gaze.

Gaynor begins with a tale of capture, which is also reflected in the subtitle of the book. In the 1950s, a young woman named Lawi was taken against her will from a Sama community and forced to marry the commander of a regiment from a nearby Bugis polity participating in a rebellion against the central Indonesian state. This was a cultural practice that reiterated long-standing relations in the region. Tiworo was located along the northern branches of a vast trade network linking Java and the spice islands of Maluku, and Sama knowledge of boat building, navigation, and exploitation of littoral resources