


ASEAN, Australia and the Management of the *Jemaah Islamiyah* Threat



Bilveer Singh

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OF THE *JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH* THREAT**

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Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence are a series of monograph publications that arise out of the work of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at The Australian National University. Previous Canberra Papers have covered topics such as arms control at both the global and Southeast Asian level, regional strategic relationships and major aspects of Australian defence policy. For a list of New Series Canberra Papers please refer to the last pages of this volume.

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ABSTRACT

The Southeast Asian region was riddled with the threat of terrorism long before the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States. Due to various historical developments, nature of geography, ethnic-religious make-up and the nature of regimes in the region, terrorism of different kinds, particularly associated with religious extremism, has been in vogue in Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar and the Philippines for more than four decades. What defined the terrorist challenge was that it was national in character, attempting either to secede from the Central Government to form a new state or to force the Central Government to adopt policies that would support the *raison d'être* of these extremist groups, basically that called for the establishment of a political system that was more Islamic in character, either nationally or within a specified territory within a national state.

However, what has made the challenge of 'new terrorism' distinct, especially with regard to *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI), is that while it aims to establish an Islamic state, its goals and organisational structures are far more wide-ranging. Unlike the terrorism and challenges of past religious extremist groups in the region, JI is a regional terrorist organisation. It wants to establish a regional Islamic state (*Daulah Islamiyah*) covering most of southern Southeast Asia, forming a new Islamic epicentre in the Asia-Pacific region. Additionally, JI has been able to synergise with various existing extremist groups in the region and beyond, succeeding in the process in posing the most serious security threat to the region since the end of the Cold War. What JI is, the challenge it poses, the measures that have been adopted to manage it and the long-term consequences of the JI phenomenon are analysed in this study.

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
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADJACT	<i>ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter-Terrorism</i>
AMMTC	Annual Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime, ASEAN
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asia Nations
ASIO	Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
ASNLF	Aceh/Sumatra National Liberation Front
BAKIN	<i>Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara</i> or State Intelligence Coordinating Agency
BMIAF	<i>Bangsa Moro Islamic Armed Forces</i>
BNPP	<i>Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Pattani</i>
BRN	<i>Barisan Revolusi Nasional</i>
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency, U.S.
DDII	<i>Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia</i>
DI	<i>Darul Islam</i>
DOM	<i>Daerah Operasi Militer</i> or Military Operations Region
GAM	Free Aceh Movement
GAMPAR	<i>Gabungan Melayu Pattani Raya</i>
ISD	Internal Security Department, Singapore
JI	<i>Jemaah Islamiyah</i>
KMM	<i>Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia</i>
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MIM	Mindanao Independence Movement
MMI	<i>Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia</i>
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
MP-GAM	<i>Majelis Pemerintahan—Gerakan Aceh Merdeka</i>
NAD	<i>Nanggroë Aceh Darusalam</i>
NII	<i>Negara Islam Indonesia</i>
PARNAS	<i>Partai Revolusi Nasional</i>
PPP	Unity Development Party
PSII	Indonesian Syarikat Islam Party
PULA	Pattani United Liberation Army
PULO	Pattani United Liberation Organisation
RO(s)	Restriction Order(s)
SAS	Special Air Service Regiment, Australia
SJIW	Singapore <i>JI Wakalah</i>
SOMTC	Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime, ASEAN
STA	Singapore Technologies Aerospace
TII	<i>Tentara Islam Indonesia</i>
UIFO	Union of Islamic Forces and Organisations
UN	United Nations
U.S.	United States of America

JI and other Terrorist Organisations



CHRONOLOGY OF TERROR

1940s

- 1940s Origins of JI in *Darul Islam* (DI), an organisation that fought for Indonesian independence and the creation of an Islamic state
- 1949 Embryo of JI (DI *Tentara Islam Indonesia*, TII) was formed along with the proclamation of the *Islamic Nation of Indonesia* (NII)

1960s

- 1963 Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir met in Solo (Java, Indonesia)
- Sept. 1965 *Gestapu* coup and the subsequent displacement of Sukarno; Rise of Suharto and the repression of militant Islamic groups under the New Order regime
- 1967 Sungkar and Bashir set up a radio station called *Radio Dakwah Islamiyah Surakarta*, the Islamic Proselytisation Radio of Surakarta (Solo)

1970s

- 1971 Sungkar and Bashir founded *Pesantren Al-Mu'min*, which moved to the village of Ngruki, outside Solo, in 1973 and became known as *Pondok Ngruki*
- 1976 Alleged induction of Sungkar and Bashir into DI
- 1978 Arrest of Sungkar and Bashir;
Trial in 1982 sentenced the pair to nine years in prison for involvement in *Komando Jihad*; Sentences were reduced on appeal to three years and ten months
- 1979 Series of crimes tied to people from *Pondok Ngruki* and referred to as *Terror Warman*

1980s

- 1980s Movement in disarray following arrest of leading members for involvement in *Terror Warman* movement;
JI regrouped into a network called *Usroh*
- 1982 Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) began to recruit radical Muslims from around the world to fight with the *Mujahidin* in the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989)
- 1985 Indonesian Supreme Court summoned Sungkar and Bashir and the pair fled to Malaysia;
Usroh movement collapsed; JI's name resurfaced in *Usroh* trials; JI began to take its current form

1990s

- Mid-1990s Movement was already becoming international; Most members in Indonesia had gone underground, fled to Malaysia, joined the international network in Afghanistan, or were arrested
- 1996 JI movement extended to Perth, Melbourne and Sydney, Australia as *Mantiqi* (District) 4 and led by Abdul Rahim Ayub
- May 1998 Suharto's resignation ended 32 years of rule; Subsequent return of Sungkar, Bashir and other exiles to Indonesia
- April 1999 Bombing of Istiqlal Mosque, Jakarta
- Nov. 1999 Death of Sungkar; Bashir took over the leadership (*amir*) after Sungkar's death; Bahir as head of JI called a meeting at the International Islamic University (*Universiti Islam Antarabangsa*) in Malaysia to set up the International Mujahidin Association (*Rabitatul Mujahidin* or RM)

2000

- August Bashir formed *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI); Bombing of the residence of the Philippines Ambassador, Jakarta
- December Christmas Eve Bombings in 11 cities in Indonesia

2001

- June Arrest of Abu Jibril in Malaysia
- July Bombings of Gereja HKBP and Gereja Santa Ana, Jakarta
- August Arrest of Nik Adli Nik Aziz in Malaysia; Atrium Mall bombing, Jakarta
- September *Al-Qaeda* terrorists hijacked four US airlines, which they used to crash into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon in Washington and an unintended target in Pennsylvania
- November 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism; JI's bombing of Gereja Petra, North Jakarta
- December Singapore's Internal Security Department (ISD) arrested Ibrahim Maidin, Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana and 13 others connected to the JI branch in Singapore; Another 21 were arrested in August 2002 in Singapore

2002

- January Arrest of Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi (@ "Mike") in Philippines; Joint US-Filipino military exercise known as "Operation Balikatan" in southern Philippines

- March Arrest of Agus Dwikarna in Philippines
- May *Joint Communiqué of the Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism, Kuala Lumpur;*
Work Programme to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime, Kuala Lumpur;
 Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines' trilateral Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication Procedures sealed in Putrajaya, Malaysia to combat the spread of terrorism and transnational crime
- August *ASEAN-United States of America Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism, Bandar Seri Begawan;*
- September Grenade explosion near US Embassy Warehouse, Jakarta
- October Bombings of Sari Club and Paddy's Café, Bali;
 Bombing of the US consulate in Denpasar, Bali and the Philippine consulate in Manado, North Sulawesi;
 Series of bombings in Zamboanga and the southern city of Kidapawan, the Philippines;
 Inclusion of JI into United Nations (UN) List of Terrorists;
 Arrest of Bashir in Indonesia
- November Arrests of Amrozi and Imam Samudra in Indonesia;
 Suicide bomber in Bali bombings identified as Iqbal;
 Malaysia's JI / *Kumpulan Militant Malaysia* (KMM) murdered a Christian Member of Parliament (MP), Dr Joe Fernandez in Malaysia; Subsequent arrest of Zulkifi Abdul Hir;
Declaration on Terrorism by the 8th ASEAN Summit, Phnom Penh
- December Arrest of Mukhlas in Indonesia
- 2003**
- January Arrest of Ali Imron in Indonesia;
Joint Declaration on Co-operation to Combat Terrorism, 14th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting, Brussels
- February Arrest of Mas Selamat Kastari in Indonesia;
 Car bomb attack at the Cotabato airport, the Philippines
- March Bombing of Davao airport, the Philippines
- April Arrests of Abu Rusdan and Nasir Abbas in Indonesia;
 Bashir's trial for treason;
 Bombing in Medan, North Sumatra, allegedly by Free Aceh Movement (GAM);
 Bombing of United Nations building, Jakarta;
 Bombing of Soeharto-Hatta International Airport, Jakarta;
 Bombing of Sasa wharf terminal, Davao City, the Philippines
- May Arrest of Arifin Ali in Thailand;
 Amrozi's trial for terrorism;

- June Bashir's trial for treason and terrorism;
Grenade explosion in Cubao, Quezon City, the Philippines
Arrest of Idris in Indonesia;
Arrests of Maisuri Haji Abdulloh, Muyahi Haji Boloh and Waemahadi Wae-dao in Southern Thailand;
Imam Samumdra's trial for terrorism;
Mas Selamat Kastari testified at Bashir's trial;
Video-Conferencing testimonies of Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana, Jaafar Mistooki and Hashim Aba at Bashir's trial
- July Mas Selamat Kastari sentenced to 18 months jail in Indonesia for immigration violations;
Video-Conferencing testimonies of Ahmad Sajuli, Agung Diyadi, Ferial Muchlis and Fariq Hafid at Bashir's trial;
Arrests of Ichwanudin, Pranata Yuda (@ "Mustofa"), Suyono and 6 others in Indonesia; Ichwanudin committed suicide in police custody;
Bombing of Indonesia's Parliament compound, Jakarta;
Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi and two Filipino Abu Sayyaf members, Abdul Mukim Edris and Merang Abante, escaped from jail in Camp Crame, Manila
- August Bombing of JW Marriott Hotel, Jakarta;
Suicide bomber of JW Marriott Hotel bombing identified as Asmar Latin Sani;
Amrozi sentenced to death after being found guilty for involvement in the Bali bombings by the Denpasar District Court, Bali;
Bomb explosion outside Thai courthouse, Thailand
Arrest of Hambali in Thailand
Five suspected terrorists, including three from Pakistan and two from Myanmar, were arrested for violations of immigration laws in Chiang Mai, Thailand. A sixth man - a Thai national who was also arrested - was reported to have given shelter to the five suspected terrorists
- September Bashir sentenced to four years imprisonment for subversion with the aim of overthrowing the government by a Jakarta court. He was, however, found not guilty on terrorism charges due to a lack of evidence to prove that he was the leader of JI;
Imam Samudra sentenced to death after being found guilty for involvement in the Bali bombings by the Denpasar District Court, Bali;

Ali Imron sentenced to life imprisonment after being found guilty for involvement in the Bali bombings by the Denpasar District Court, Bali;

Arifin Ali and four others charged in Bangkok for planning to bomb foreign embassies and tourist spots in Thailand;

15 linked to Abu Rusdan, including a Malaysian national Syamsul Bahri alias Farhan and a Universitas Semarang Professor Bambang Tutuko alias Abu Umar, were captured in separate arrests in Jakarta, Central Java and Lampung that began in the middle of August 2003. They had plotted to blow up the Indonesian Police headquarters.

October

Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi killed in a joint police-military operation in the southern Philippines.

ASEAN AUSTRALIA AND THE MANAGEMENT OF THE JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH THREAT

Bilveer Singh

Introduction

Religious extremism and terrorism are not new phenomena in Southeast Asia. Due to various enduring factors, including political, economic and social-cultural diversity in the region, extremism and terrorism of various types have always been associated with various protest movements and challenges against established authorities in the region. This was true during the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods of Southeast Asian history and politics; hence, the description of Southeast Asia as a 'region of revolt', 'a region of rebellions' and 'a region of neither war nor peace'.

In this connection, while each Southeast Asian country had confronted challenges from religious extremists and terrorists over different periods of time, these tended to be largely national in character. Hence, the *Darul Islam* (DI) and Free Aceh Movement (GAM) challenges were essentially Indonesian in character. The challenge posed by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) was, in the past, largely confined to the Philippines. Similarly, the Pattani United Liberation Organisation's (PULO) challenge was confined to Thailand.

The nature of terrorism, particularly Islamic terrorism, underwent a fundamental change with the emergence of *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI). For the first time, there was a religious terrorist network (that was not only region-wide in organisation, but also cooperated closely with various national-based terrorist organisations as well as coordinated with *Al Qaeda*) that was bent on undertaking global-oriented terrorism in the name of *Jihad* against the West, particularly the United States.

It is against this backdrop that this study aims to analyse the emergence of JI as a new source of regional threat to Southeast Asia. This will be examined against the background of the rise of religious extremism in the region as a whole. What are the origins of JI? What is the structure and organisation of JI? What is the character of its regional network? What are its links with *Al Qaeda*? What are the various terrorist activities of JI in the region, including Australia? How can this menace be best managed? What are the implications of the rise of JI for regional security and what are the

future prospects of organisations of this nature? An understanding of these issues will shed light on the rise of the new low intensity conflict in the region and the future that holds for the region as a whole.

CHAPTER 1

THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Introduction

Religious extremism is on the rise and no religion has been able to escape from this phenomenon.¹ While the Western media has focused on Islamic extremism as the most dangerous threat to Western civilisation following the end of the Cold War, in actuality, religious extremism is not the sole monopoly of Islam. As religious extremism is caused by a plethora of political, economic and social-cultural factors, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Sikhism and other religions have experienced revitalisation, revivalism and greater extremism. The resurgence of religious extremism world-wide has enhanced inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts, especially in the post-Cold War era. This phenomenon was most vividly highlighted by Professor Samuel Huntington in his article 'The Clash of Civilizations' in *Foreign Affairs* in 1993, a thesis that was subsequently elaborated on in his 1996 book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. Among other issues, Samuel Huntington argued:

In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political or economic. They are cultural. Peoples and nations are attempting to answer the most basic question humans can face: who are we? And they are answering that question in the traditional way human beings have answered it, by reference to the things that mean most to them. People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs, and institutions. They identify with cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations, and at the broadest level, civilizations.

... In this new world the most pervasive, important and dangerous conflicts will not be between social classes, rich and poor, or other economically defined groups, but between peoples belonging to different cultural entities. Tribal wars and ethnic conflicts will occur within civilizations. Violence between states and groups from different civilizations, however, carries with it the potential for escalation as other states and groups from these civilizations rally to the support of their 'kin countries'.

...The revitalization of religion throughout much of the world is reinforcing these cultural differences. Culture can change and the nature of their impact on politics and economics can vary from one period to another. Yet the major differences in political and economic development among civilizations are clearly rooted in their different cultures.²

Even though all religions are experiencing some form of revivalism and extremism, it is Islamic extremism that has focused the world's attention. This is mainly due to the violence that has been perpetrated by various Islamic groups in the United States, the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia in the last 20 to 30 years. Why then is there a rise of Islamic extremism in the world? No one single cause can be attributed to the rise of Islamic extremism. Scholars have been trying to grapple with this issue for some time. However, what must first and foremost be recognised is that stereotyped images of Islam as a monolith religion that is predisposed to violence fails to capture the multi-faceted and complex nature of Islamic extremism. Here, the mistakes made with regard to 'monolith communism' must not be repeated. Despite this, a number of causes can be identified even though it is dangerous to generalise this across different countries, let alone regions.

Against this backdrop, the rise of Islamic militancy has been attributed to a whole array of factors and developments (mainly political, economic, social and international) as follows:

Political

- Disillusionment with national politics and the political process
- Political repression by regimes, especially those of the so-called secular persuasion

Economic

- Disillusionment with the economic programmes of various states and the exploitation of the poor by the rich
- Unfair distribution of economic goods even though the country might be well-endowed
- Sense of injustice that the country is being exploited by 'global capitalism' and the 'capitalists', often through collusion with local élites

Social-Cultural

- Disillusionment with the spread of 'global values', mainly Western, through mass media that is often controlled by various (allegedly) Jewish groups

International

- Disillusionment with the international system, mainly dominated by the West, and the US in particular, which is often portrayed as practising double standards. Though viewed as a democracy and champion of human rights, its pro-Israel policies and sanction of Israeli repression of the Palestinians and Arabs, as well as the US's largely anti-Islamic policies, evident in its almost non-action when Muslims were being butchered in Bosnia, have riled many into launching a *Jihad* against the US, Israel and their supporters
- International (read, Western) support for repression of Muslims by various secular governments is also a source of anger and motivation. The lack of objection by the West to the repressive policies of Egypt and Algeria (and in Indonesia in the Suharto era) against their respective Islamic militants has led to the burgeoning of Islamic militancy in these countries.

In short, the failure of 'nationalist projects' to deliver political, economic and social goods has led to counter-actions, namely the adoption of the 'Islamic mode' of political, economic and social development, including the use of terrorism and violence, to remedy what are perceived as national, regional and global injustices.

In this context, three important sources of Islamic extremism are worthy of note. One major cause is the failure of secular governments to promote good governance and economic development in most Islamic countries. Many governments in the Muslim world have failed to address the challenges of development arising from rapid political, economic, social and demographic changes over the last century and particularly in the last 25 years. Governmental failures have led to the emergence of poor masses in large and medium-sized towns, as well as in rural areas, and this has made them particularly susceptible to extremist appeals. As governments failed to deliver the 'goods' or simply ignored a large section of the populace, the extremist religious groups gained dominance and tried to answer various material and psychological shortcomings by resorting to religious revivalism and extremism. This is because national and international injustices are usually blamed for the populace's backwardness, and violence (*Jihad*) is often recommended as the only alternative to overcome national, as well as the *ummat's* (Islamic community), problems worldwide.

Additionally, external forces have also played a major role in the rise of many extremist Islamic groups in the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia. Here, of particular importance was the funding provided by the United States and the conservative regimes in the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia, to prop up or create extremist groups, would could counter the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Israel's occupation of Palestine and its inhuman policies towards Palestinians and Arabs in general. The rise of extremist groups was also a function of the fact that the West, especially the US, was supporting various conservative, feudal and oppressive regimes in the Middle East, mainly for geo-political and geo-economic reasons, leading many to blame Washington and its allies for the rise of extremism in the region.

A related factor is the crisis within Islam. It is clear that there has been a decline of the established tradition of *ithihad*, an interpretation of the *Koran* by Muslim clerics to apply *Koranic* laws to changing circumstances and dynamic developments that are confronting all societies, not only Islamic ones. One consequence of this has been the rise of rigid and narrow interpretations of various religious precepts, especially as governments have failed to deliver political and economic goods as well as failed to build institutions, or even usher in democracy.

While these factors are largely behind the rise of religious extremism worldwide, they also hold true of Southeast Asia, a region that has a long history of religious-oriented extremism and violence. In this context, a number of religiously-oriented conflicts, mostly originating in the Cold War period, are worthy of mention.

Religious Extremism in Southeast Asia

Most of the religious extremism, particularly that in Southeast Asia which is Islamic in nature, tended to be nationally based and the most important ones in this regard included the separatist challenge posed by the Independence Movement for Aceh and *Darul Islam* in Indonesia, the separatist challenge by the Pattani United Liberation Organisation in southern Thailand and the Moro National Liberation Front in southern Philippines. A number of splinter groups have also emerged in the three countries.

The Darul Islam Challenge

The predecessor of what was to emerge as *Darul Islam* (DI) was the *Hizbullah*, the Army of Allah, which was initially created by the Japanese during the occupation of the country from February 1942 to August 1945.

Following the Japanese surrender in August 1945, the *Hizbullah*, though not directly under the Indonesian Army, fought a guerrilla war against the Dutch with a view to gaining national independence. The *Darul Islam* challenge was a direct function of the Linggajati Agreement signed between the Dutch and the Indonesian Government on 15 November 1946.³ Under this agreement, The Hague recognised the Republic's *de facto* authority in Java, Sumatra and Madura and where the Indonesian leaders agreed to work towards the United States of Indonesia. The agreement was only ratified by Holland in March 1947. Due to the Linggajati Agreement, both parties agreed to withdraw their troops to the established demarcation lines. A direct consequence of this was the need for the *Siliwangi* Division in West Java to withdraw to Central Java. This was, however, opposed by the Deputy Defence Minister, Kartosuwiryo,⁴ a former leader of the *Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia* (PSII) or Indonesian Syarikat Islam Party. He saw the Linggajati Agreement as a deal between the Socialist Prime Minister, Sutan Sjahrir and the Dutch that disadvantaged the Republic and, accordingly, opposed Jogjakarta's policies.

Kartosuwiryo opposed Sjahrir and Jogjakarta's position on the grounds that, since the Republican Army was in control of territories in Java and elsewhere, they should not succumb to Dutch diplomatic and military pressure, something that the Socialists and the Jogjakarta leadership under Sukarno-Hatta was prepared to do. This was a consequence of the debate between those who proposed *diplomasi* (diplomacy) and those who proposed *perjuangan* (struggle) as the best way to gain independence from the Dutch. The Republican Army was made up of mixed elements, including various *laskars* or militia groups. There were many Islamic-oriented *laskars* in West Java, a group that Kartosuwiryo appealed to. Thus, when the Republican Army withdrew to Central Java, the Islamic-oriented *laskars* stayed on and continued fighting the Dutch. In many ways, these *laskars* were in control of vast territories in West Java, partly as a consequence of the vacuum left by the evacuation of the *Siliwangi* Division.

Following the signing of the Renville Agreement in January 1948, a ceasefire was declared between the Dutch and Republican Army. This permitted the *Siliwangi* Division to return to West Java. This move was, however, opposed by Kartosuwiryo and the Islamic *laskars* in West Java, leading to the outbreak of conflict between the *Siliwangi* and *laskars*. The latter felt that, since the *Siliwangi* had 'shamelessly' abandoned the territory and that it was now in the *laskars'* control, the former had no right to return control of the territory to West Java. The battle for control between the two forces led to the outbreak of a military conflict that was to result in the birth of *Darul Islam* and the *Negara Islam Indonesia* in July 1949.

Sections of the *Hizbullah* established DI (or House of Islam) and established its armed faction called *Tentara Islam Indonesia* (TII) or Indonesian Islamic Army. On 7 August 1949, DI, under the leadership of Kartosuwiryo, based essentially in West Java, refused to place his military units under the command of the regular army and proclaimed an Islamic state. Kartosuwiryo accused the moderate and largely secular nationalist leaders such as Sukarno and Hatta of committing 'crimes against Islam' because they had rejected "Islam as the sole foundation of the state".⁵ As DI was created to set up an Indonesian Islamic state (*Negara Islam Indonesia*, NII), it eventually established nine political and military commands, namely, in Aceh, Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, East Java, Central Java, Jakarta, West Priangan and East Priangan, the last two in West Java being the strongholds of DI.⁶

What started as Kartosuwiryo's challenge in West Java eventually spread to different parts of the country with a number of DI rebellions breaking out throughout the country. In central Java, Amir Fatah and his associates launched a DI rebellion against the Republican Government. More ominous was the DI rebellion in South Sulawesi. During the Revolutionary War, the Military Governor for South Sulawesi was Kahar Muzakkar. Following the Linggajati Agreement, all Republican troops could not withdraw as had been stipulated in the agreement, and the fighting continued. Once the ceasefire was declared in 1949, just like the Dutch Government, the Republican Government also refused to recognise Kahar's forces as part of the Republican Army. Kahar felt betrayed by the Republican Army, particularly Sukarno, Hatta, Sudirman and Nasution. He then raised arms and fought against the Republic and the Republican Army. Later, he joined forces with Kartosuwiryo and, hence, the expansion of DI to South Sulawesi. Just as Kartosuwiryo, Amir Fatah and Kahar Muzakkar fought against the Dutch during the 'war of revolution', in South Kalimantan, Ibnu Hadjar led the guerrillas. In West and Central Java, as well as in South Sulawesi, following the Renville Agreement, clashes broke out between the Republican Army and forces of Ibnu Hadjar, leading to the latter joining forces with Kartosuwiryo's DI and the rebellion spreading to Kalimantan. The last major region to support the DI rebellion was Aceh, in September 1953.⁷

Although the DI was militarily suppressed and its leader, Kartosuwiryo, captured by the *Siliwangi* Division on 4 June 1962 in Gunung Rakutak and later (in September), sentenced to death, in every other sense, the concept, roots, aspirations, etc of the DI, TII and NII remained in Indonesia's body politics. It was simply never allowed to surface and pose a challenge to the political order, especially under Suharto. DI's insurgency in Indonesia, mainly in Java, Sumatra and Sulawesi lasted until 1962 when Kartosuwiryo

was executed. In South Sulawesi, Kahar led the insurgency and this lasted much longer. Even though DI's military threat was contained and neutralised, as an organisation, it remained intact, especially with regard to its various commands in Java, Sumatra and Sulawesi. Under Suharto, the activities of DI were closely monitored and its leaders pursued.

The Conflict in Aceh

Aceh, located on the westernmost tip of Indonesia, is renowned for its prominent role during the Indonesian struggle for independence against Dutch colonial rule. A province of more than 4 million people, located at the head of the Malacca Strait, it lies astride one of the most strategic waterways in the world, linking the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Having violently resisted Dutch colonial rule for decades, the Acehnese were finally forced in the early 1900s to submit to an uneasy peace with their colonial masters. The Dutch stationed their troops in Aceh until the Japanese invasion of 1942. In 1948, with the help of the Netherlands, the province was annexed by the newly-created Indonesian state.

Since becoming part of the Republic of Indonesia, Aceh has revolted on two occasions against the state, namely in 1953 and 1976. In 1953, Aceh declared itself a part of *Darul Islam's* revolt. The rebellion was Islam-inspired and led by Teungku Chik di Tiro of Pidie. It was led by the Acehnese *ulamas* (religious leaders) demanding greater autonomy for Aceh regarding religion, *adat* (customary law) and education. Indonesian troops quelled the unrest. When the *Darul Islam* rebellion erupted in parts of Java and in Aceh, a movement that wanted Indonesia to become an Islamic state, it never advocated independence for Aceh and this accounted, in part, for its weakness in Aceh. The *Darul Islam* movement disintegrated in Aceh when its leaders were co-opted into government and Aceh was given special provincial status. A shaky truce was negotiated with Jakarta in 1959 and Aceh was granted the status of 'Special Region' or *Daerah Istimewa* with autonomy in matters of religion, education and social customs.

In reality, however, the Acehnese felt that they had been cheated of the right to exercise their autonomy while the majority of the Acehnese felt that there was no benefit to be gained by integrating into the Republic of Indonesia. Despite its great wealth, Aceh has remained one of the poorest and underdeveloped provinces in Indonesia. What Aceh contributes to the central government in terms of oil, natural gas and other resources and what the Acehnese people receive in return is perceived to be profoundly unequal, representing a clear case of 'internal colonialism'. For instance, in 1997/98, the central government collected more than 32 trillion Rupiah and gave Aceh only 290 billion Rupiah.

Among other factors, this economic exploitation made some Acehnese decide to fight for the independence of Aceh by joining the guerrilla movement, the Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front, Free Aceh Movement, *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*. In 1976, Aceh revolted, declaring independence, marking the beginning of an era of oppression by the Indonesian regime.⁸ Instead of working to ameliorate socio-political and economic conflict through dialogue, Jakarta mobilised the military to institutionalise state violence and counter-insurgency against suspected members of the independence movement, leading to military brutality, abuse of power and massive casualties on both sides. Jakarta's oppression of Acehnese separatism is understandable, as it wants to preserve the territorial integrity of the state, profit from the vast resources found in the province, use the territory for resettlement of Javanese from the over-populated Java, as well as prevent and pre-empt similar rebellions in other parts of the country.

Throughout the 1960s, Aceh enjoyed relative peace until the Suharto government was perceived to be anti-Islamic, anti-Acehnese, highly exploitative and violent. In October 1976, Hasan di Tiro and his supporters proclaimed Aceh's independence, and a brutal conflict has been ongoing since then until the recent attempts since 1999 to negotiate a peace deal between Jakarta and the GAM. Di Tiro, a former Indonesian diplomat who has spent most of his life in exile in Sweden, is a descendant of a famous family of Muslim clerics and is the grandson of Teungku Chik di Tiro. Hasan di Tiro's family has asserted its claim to Aceh's sultanate and Hasan di Tiro founded the Aceh/Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF), which was later dubbed *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (GAM) or the Free Aceh Movement. Under pressure from the Indonesian military, many GAM leaders fled abroad to Malaysia and many found their way to Libya in the 1980s. In 1989, many of the GAM commanders returned to Aceh, forcing the Indonesian Government in 1990 to declare Aceh as a *Daerah Operasi Militer* (DOM) or a Military Operations Region. This lasted until August 1998.

While Hasan di Tiro's GAM has been the key separatist group in Aceh, now renamed *Nangroë Aceh Darusalam* (NAD), due to internal differences, a splinter faction led by Dr Hussani, a former cabinet minister in GAM, has emerged calling itself the *Majelis Pemerintahan — Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (MP-GAM). The conflict between GAM and the Indonesian Government has continued despite a number of efforts at peacemaking. On 12 May 2000, representatives of the Stockholm-based GAM and the Indonesian government signed a formal accord in Geneva, Switzerland. Referred to as a 'truce' or 'humanitarian pause' by the then Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid, this agreement was the culmination of secret

negotiations begun in February 1999. On 13 June 2000, a six-point agreement, "The Permanent Procedure of the Joint Committee on Security Modalities," was signed in Banda Aceh, the capital of the province. Despite the designation of certain areas in Aceh as 'peace zones', the deal collapsed and armed conflict continued unabated.

Separatism in Southern Thailand

The four southern Thailand provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala and Satun that border northern Malaysia, have a population that is essentially Islamic in character. What divides the four provinces from the rest of Thailand is religion; hence, the clash of the 'Buddhist and Islamic worlds'. Even though Pattani has been part of Thailand and may have originated from the ancient Langkasuka Kingdom, according to Chidchanok Rahimmula, "it was not so much the founding of the dynasty (in Pattani) as that of Islamisation that was to have a profound impact on the course of Pattani's later history" as it was Islam that brought "its continuing membership in the Malay world".⁹ The separatist movements in south Thailand are, to a large extent, linked to Thailand's evolving relations with Pattani, especially following Pattani's military defeat at the hands of Bangkok in 1776. Since then, there has been a systematic attempt by Bangkok to politically, economically and most importantly, administratively, subdue the region. One consequence of this has been the outbreak of insurgency, with the insurgents attempting to mobilise themselves internally and externally through the common bonds of Islam.¹⁰

While not seeking independence, there have been a number of separatist movements that have sought union with Malaysia. Among the first 'Malay-Islamic' group to emerge in the post-Second World War period was the *Gabungan Melayu Pattani Raya* (GAMPAR) or the Association of Malays of Greater Pattani. GAMPAR was launched in close collaboration with the left-wing oriented Malay Nationalist Party in Kota Baru, Kelantan on 5 March 1948. Even though it was ostensibly to uplift the social-cultural conditions of Thai Muslims in the south, its members were involved in an armed uprising and, following the Border Agreement on the Suppression of Communism in December 1948, the British colonial authorities in Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok arrested most of GAMPAR's leaders and the organisation was suppressed.

Since GAMPAR's demise, three main separatist movements have dominated the struggle in the south, namely the *Barisan Revolusi Nasional* (BRN), the *Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani* (BNPP) and the Pattani United Liberation Organisation (PULO). The National Revolution Front (BRN) was founded in 1960, essentially as a left-wing organisation working closely

with the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), with sanctuaries in southern Thailand. Having pan-Malay ideals, it adopted armed struggle as a means to first unite the four Muslim-dominated provinces in the south and later to seek a union with Malaya (later, Malaysia). The BRN was however greatly weakened by internal divisions and two splinter groups emerged from it. The first was the *Partai Revolusi Nasional* (PARNAS) or the National Revolutionary Party in 1965. A more effective splinter from the BRN was the BNPP or Pattani National Liberation Movement that was formed in 1971 in Kelantan under the leadership of Tengku Abdul Jalil.¹¹ The BNPP is believed to have some support from Kelantan and various Middle East countries, including the Islamic Secretariat and Arab League.

The PULO was established in 1967 in India and has been by far the most important separatist group in southern Thailand. Believing in secession from Thailand and sanctioning the use of force, it established the Pattani United Liberation Army, PULA. As most of PULO leaders were foreign educated, they established a fairly extensive international network, especially with the Middle East countries. It has achieved some degree of international recognition, being an observer at the World Muslim League Conference.¹²

Separatism in Southern Philippines

The Moro rebellion has dominated Philippines politics for the longest period, having its roots in the Spanish and American colonialism of the country. Since the Spanish halted the Islamisation of the Philippines in 1565 and drove the Moros southward, the war between the essentially Islamic Moros and the largely Christian north, be it under Spain, the US or Philippines, has continued almost unabated.¹³ The Moros¹⁴ fought the Spanish for nearly 350 years. Following the US colonisation of the Philippines, the Moros contested Washington's control of the Muslim territories and, again, the war continued. The same pattern continued under Philippines rule, only that the situation was worsened by an influx of Catholic settlers in the south, the occupation of Muslim lands by the northern settlers, the growth in landlessness of the Muslims and the growth in economic deprivation. This was worsened by the brutal military repression of the essentially Catholic-dominated Armed Forces of the Philippines.

Due to the accumulation of grievances, in May 1968, under the leadership of Datu Udtog Matalam, the former Governor of Cotabato, the Muslim Independence Movement, later renamed as the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) was established with the avowed aim of establishing an independent Islamic state constituting Mindanao, as well as the Sulu and

Palawan Islands.¹⁵ The other Islamic militant organisations, Union of Islamic Forces and Organisations (UIFO), and the *Ansar El Islam*, were also established during this period, mainly with support from the Middle East. An important catalyst for the establishment of the MIM, UIFO as well as other militant groups was the Filipino Muslims' reaction to what has come to be known as the 'Jabidah Massacre' or the Corregidor Incident. In March 1968, the Philippines Armed Forces massacred 28 Muslim military trainees who refused to be sent to Sabah and Sarawak to agitate the people there to demand annexation by the Philippines. Once this became public, Kuala Lumpur broke off diplomatic relations with Manila and began supporting the Moro struggle by permitting the establishment of military training camps in country.¹⁶ In many ways, Kuala Lumpur's support for the Moros was critical in the growth and development of the separatist movement.

In reaction to the formation of the MIM, Manila sponsored the establishment of various 'Christian defenders groups', the most notorious being the Illaga Movement. This intensified Muslim-Christian violence in the south, thereby worsening the security situation. An important consequence of this emerging conflict was the emergence of a new group of new and younger Muslim leaders and this gravely altered the tempo and direction of the conflict. A key leader in this regard was Nur Misuari, who founded the Moro National Liberation Front, MNLF in 1972. Following this, the MIM was dissolved with the Organisation of Islamic Conference, Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers and Libya supporting the MNLF. The *Bangsa Moro Army*, the military arm of the MNLF, conducted a bitter guerrilla war with the Philippines Army, forcing President Marcos to declare martial law in 1972. Due to the intensity of the fighting, the Philippines Government sued for peace, resulting in the 1976 Tripoli Agreement that was brokered by the OIC. Rather than independence, Nur Misuari accepted autonomy for 13 of Mindanao's 21 provinces. The agreement however broke down and warfare continued. A new deal was signed in 1996 that brought a modicum of peace to southern Philippines as far as the MNLF was concerned.

However, a split in the MNLF saw the establishment of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the MNLF Reformist Group. Particularly important is the former that was formally established on 26 December 1977. Unlike the essentially leftist credentials of the MNLF, the MILF has emphasised its Islamic identity with the goal of establishing an independent Islamic Moro state.¹⁷ Its leader, Hashim Salamat, the former Vice-Chairman of the MNLF, is strongly supported by many Muslim religious leaders as

well as a powerful military wing, the *Bangsa Moro* Islamic Armed Forces (BMIAF) that is believed to greatly outnumber the MNLF. While the MNLF draws its support from the Tausug ethnic group and is based essentially in Sulu, the MILF has the support of the two largest ethnic groups in Mindanao, namely the Maguindanaos and Maranaos. The BMIAF is highly proficient militarily as many of its members have combat experience in Afghanistan, fighting alongside anti-Soviet *Mujahideen* fighters.

In view of the growing insurgency in southern Philippines, with the support of the OIC and particularly Indonesia, Nur Misuari negotiated a peace deal with Manila. However, in addition to the challenge posed by the MILF, the establishment of an extremist Islamic movement, *Abu Sayyaf*, in 1991 by Amilhussin Jumaani and Abdurajak Abubakar, complicated the state of Islamic separatism in the Philippines. The founders of the *Abu Sayyaf* were religious scholars (or *Ullamas*) who had been trained in the Middle East. Even though the *Abu Sayyaf* is a much smaller outfit when compared to the MNLF and MILF, it is however extremely ruthless, with most of its members being veterans of the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan. Being extremely anti-Christian and not prepared to negotiate, it has been involved in some of the most brutal attacks in the south. It has also been able to increase its membership, mainly drawing support from ex-MNLF members who have become disillusioned with Nur Misuari. Despite the Government's claim that the *Abu Sayyaf* has been annihilated, the extremist group has been able to survive and poses a serious security threat to the Philippines, all the more so given that it has successfully linked up with various international terrorist groups.

Conclusion

Even though other states in Southeast Asia such as Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore and Brunei have experienced challenges from their Muslim populace, the Islamic separatist challenges faced by Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines have by far been the most serious. These threats have been further intensified with the discovery of the *Jemaah Islamiyah* network in the region. This network is viewed as probably the greatest Islamic danger in the region, not simply because of its objectives, but more importantly, because of the great lengths with which it has nurtured itself clandestinely in the region, and more importantly region-wide, as well as its perceived extra-regional linkages. The JI threat takes on special importance given JI's ability to network with existing separatist groups in Southeast Asia and to synergise with global Islamic extremist movements such as *Al Qaeda*.

CHAPTER 2

THE EMERGENCE OF *JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH* AS A SOUTHEAST ASIAN TERRORIST ORGANISATION

Introduction

There is much controversy about the origins and establishment of *Jemaah Islamiyah*. This has been worsened by the fact that many even deny its existence, as at times it has been argued to be nothing more than a creation by the United States and its allies that are bent on undermining Islam and Indonesia. Yet, at the same time, it is often argued that there are two different *JI* organisations. The first and older one, established probably in the 1970s, is believed to be largely religious in character, despite being characterised by its hard line espousations. This is believed to be led presently by Abu Bakar Bashir. However, it is the second *JI*, believed to be operating clandestinely and under cover, even under the auspices of the original *JI*, that is believed to be the terrorist organisation and one that has been difficult to detect. However, the fact that the United Nations and a number of countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and even the EU have identified and listed *JI* as a terrorist organisation justifies analysing the origins of this largely elusive organisation that is believed to be behind many of the terrorist activities in the Southeast Asian region, especially since the late 1990s.

JI's Origins

Very little is known of *JI*. Like *Al Qaeda*, it is essentially a secretive organisation. This is mainly due to the fact that *JI* is clandestine in character.¹⁸ The organisation is also one of the few that is regional in character. The origins of *JI* can be traced to one of the following 'theories':

- (a) An outshoot of the *Darul Islam*, created to continue its struggle through a new organisation following its suppression by the Sukarno regime.
- (b) An outshoot of the *Darul Islam* that emerged as a consequence of power struggle in the Islamic militant organisation, especially under the Suharto regime.
- (c) A 'black operation' by the Indonesian military under the Suharto regime that went out of control.
- (d) A front for *Al Qaeda* in the region, formed by various returning *Jihadists* following the completion of their operations in Afghanistan.

As an outshoot of DI, JI is believed to have been created to continue the struggle to create an Islamic State in Indonesia. Even though Kartosuwiryo and other leaders of DI were arrested, including Kahar Muzakkar in Sulawesi, once the Sukarno regime was toppled and the New Order under Suharto in place, the Islamists felt that they had as much right to be politically active given that they played a critical role in containing and neutralising the communist threat. However, as the Suharto regime pursued anti-Islamic policies and was bent on nipping in the bud any aspiration that would eventuate in an Islamic state, the establishment of JI was a clear sign of resisting Suharto and his apparently anti-Islam policies. Even though JI was believed to be established for missionary work, eventually it took on a bigger political role of resisting the New Order and its supporters, especially the West, and it is within this context that JI's origins can be understood.¹⁹ Thus, even though JI was originally created for *Tablig* (educational) and *Dakwah* (missionary) activities, it became increasingly political, especially once its key leaders fled to Malaysia and linked up with other like-minded leaders, groups and organisations, facilitated mainly by their support for the *mujahideen* struggle in Afghanistan in the 1980s.

Somewhat related to the above, JI's origins can also be understood from the manner in which the DI leadership in Central Java evolved. Following the arrest and execution of Kartosuwiryo, the nine commands of DI were believed to have become autonomous with almost no central authority directing the movement. In this context, the Central Java command was headed by Djalaeni and later Adnan Maszudi. The latter, a Sundanese, was found unacceptable to many, including Sungkar and Bashir. As both Sungkar and Bashir had differences with Maszudi, and did not accept his leadership, following their *hidjrah* to Malaysia, rather than faced expulsion, they are believed to have established a new organisation, JI. In this context, JI can be seen as the successor to DI, which was based in Central Java and emerged out of an internal power struggle in the organisation.

A somewhat different view argues that JI was nothing more than a 'black operation' by the Suharto Government that went wrong. According to the International Crisis Group (ICG), as part of its attempt to manage the challenge posed by political Islam, especially during the 1977 general election, mainly through the Islamic party organised under the PPP, the national intelligence agency, BAKIN, through Ali Moertopo, decided to reactivate the former DI members, many of whom had been inducted into the military. According to the ICG, "the argument provided by BAKIN was that, with the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, Indonesia was in danger of Communist infiltration across the Indonesian-Malaysian border in Borneo,

and that only the reactivation of the *Darul Islam* could protect Indonesia".²⁰ Following this, through to mid-1977, the Indonesian Government arrested many who were accused of being members of the *Komando Jihad*, "committed to following the ideals of Kartosuwiryo and establishing the Islamic state of Indonesia (NII)".²¹ Those arrested in 1978 included Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir and, following their migration (*hidjrah*) to Malaysia, they continued to maintain links with JI even though it was operating in Indonesia under the constraints of the New Order regime. However, once President Suharto's regime collapsed in May 1998, the greater democracy and liberties allowed the members of JI, including Sungkar and Bashir, to return home and, with the Indonesian military greatly weakened by the democratisation of the country, JI has been able to operate independently of any control and has emerged as a radical Islamic movement bent on transforming Indonesia into an Islamic state, including through the use of terrorism.

A final version argues that the origins of JI can be found in the common experience of many Indonesians and their like-minded compatriots who were involved in the *Jihad* struggle against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Many of them were also involved in DI, past and present, and as such, it was almost natural for them to respond to the call for *Jihad* in Afghanistan. While the United States was involved in the Cold War against the 'evil empire', Washington supported Osama Bin Laden and his *Jihad* activities against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.²² In this endeavour, the US condoned the mobilisation of *Jihadists* all over the world, including in Southeast Asia. JI was believed to have been created in this context and, not surprisingly, many JI operatives in Southeast Asia have spent time either fighting the Soviets or training in military camps in Afghanistan. To that extent, JI is believed to have been established with either the connivance or even the tacit support of the US, as it was regarded as a useful regional organisation that would support Washington's global causes, especially in containing the 'Evil Empire' in Afghanistan. As all these operatives were involved in the *Jihad* against the USSR, once this war ended, many of them returned and continued their struggle in their home countries, partly due to the various injustices that they saw, as well as the belief that the West, particularly the US, was dominating these countries. As Osama Bin Laden, the leader of the global *Jihad* movement in Afghanistan turned against his former patron, the United States, especially the Central Intelligence Agency, a similar turnaround could be detected from the *Jihadists* that returned to their home countries. This largely explains the anti-West character of JI even though it is believed to have originated in the context of the *Jihad* operations against the Soviets and, more importantly, with the support of the US.

Whichever 'theory' one subscribes to, it is clear that the roots of present day JI can be traced to the *Darul Islam* (DI), especially its branch in Central Java. It is believed that JI grew out of *Darul Islam*, an Indonesian militant organisation that was committed to the creation of an Islamic state in Indonesia. Largely due to the repressive, particularly anti-Islamic policies of Suharto's New Order, the centralised structure of DI was destroyed. This, however, led to the emergence of essentially autonomous branches of DI, led by various local leaders. Particularly important in this regard was the DI branch in Central Java, then led by Sheik Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir. Inspired by DI's militant ideology, in 1969, Bashir and Sungkar founded the Radio *Dakwah Islamiyyah* Surakarta, a pirate radio station, broadcasting calls for *Jihad* in Central Java. This was shut down in 1975. Concurrently, in 1971, the pair is believed to have founded the puritanical *al-Mukmin* Koranic Studies boarding school, which in 1973 moved to Ngruki village, east of Surakarta (Solo). The roots of JI are allegedly found in this school, known popularly as Pondok Ngruki.

From evidence available thus far, sometime in February 1977, Sungkar, a former *Masjumi* political activist, together with Bashir, who tended to be more of a religious preacher, founded a group called the *Jemaah Mujahidin Anshorullah*. It was essentially a DI organisation, founded and supported by DI members in Central Java. This group is believed to have somehow metamorphosed into JI. In 1978, the Indonesian security apparatus jailed Sungkar and Bashir for nine years for participating in the activities of a clandestine Islamic militia, the *Komando Jihad*. However, in 1982, both Sungkar and Bashir were released before they could complete their prison sentences. On their release, they continued their militant activities. In this regard, 1984 was a watershed year, especially following the Tanjung Priok incident where more than one hundred Muslims were allegedly massacred by the Indonesian security forces. This led to retaliations, with many bombings taking place from 1984 to the middle of 1985. Against this security situation, the Indonesian Government charged Sungkar and Bashir with subversion, in particular for denigrating the state ideology of *Pancasila*. Before they could be convicted, like many DI leaders from Central Java, both fled and sought refuge in Malaysia.

Malaysia proved to be a safe haven and many Islamic political dissidents congregated there. In addition to Sungkar and Bashir, the other key players included Hambali alias Riduan Isamuddin alias Nurjaman, originating from Cianjur, West Java, Abu Jibril alias Fikruddin Muqti alias Mohamed Iqbal Rahman, Ali Ghufron alias Muklas, Fathur Rahman al-Gozi, originating from Madiun, East Java, and Agus Dwikarna. It is the coming

together of these anti-Suharto Islamic radicals and the like in Malaysia that is often viewed as the germinating ground for what was eventually to emerge as the militant JI. Even though JI and its leadership are believed to have originated from this source, Bashir has argued that JI is “only a Koran reading group”.²³ Regardless of Bashir’s denials and claims, what cannot be denied is that JI has emerged as a major terrorist organisation, had more than a decade to grow and extend its tentacles region-wide, and tends to be led essentially by Indonesian militants.

Sometime between 1985 and 1987, being out of Indonesia and outside the DI, TII and NII framework, Sungkar and Bashir broke away from DI and established JI. Around 1993, the decision seems to have been made to establish a region-wide JI network, with Hambali and Abu Jibril tasked by Sungkar to set up the militant cells in the Southeast Asia region. Between 1996 and 1997, JI is believed to have been established as a regional organisation. Many of its members had fought the Soviets in Afghanistan and received military training. Following Suharto’s fall, both Bashir and Sungkar returned to Indonesia, their home and main base of their struggle, to continue their activities. When Sungkar died in 1999, the leadership of JI fell into the hands of Abu Bakar Bashir, with Hambali controlling the field operations in the region.²⁴ Due to the increasing political space provided by *Reformasi*, the activities of Abu Bakar Bashir widened, as evidenced in the establishment of *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI) or the Indonesian Mujahidin Council established on 7 August 2000 to push for the adoption of strict Islamic *sharia* law in Indonesia. It is widely believed that the MMI and JI interact closely, just as JI is believed to be working closely with *Al Qaeda*. In fact, JI is believed to be the front of *Al Qaeda* in Southeast Asia.

While Bashir is the *Amir* in every sense of the word, he is more the spiritual leader. However, for a long period, the field commander and operations chief of JI in Southeast Asia was Hambali. As Hambali was appointed by Sungkar, a person whom Hambali looked up to and from whom he took his orders, following Sungkar’s death, there appears to have been a schism between Bashir and Hambali, with the former being unable to control the latter. This partly explains Bashir’s confidence in operating the way he does in Indonesia, as, until recently, it was difficult to charge him with anything other than the fact that he was tried and charged in 1984, escaping justice by absconding from the country.

Structure and Organisation of Jemaah Islamiyah

Due to the secretive nature of JI, there is very little published material on its structure and organisation.²⁵ Most of the information on JI’s structure

has been published by governments that have captured JI operatives. One important source in this regard has been the information that was published by the Singapore Government following the detention of a number of JI operatives in the country in 2002. However, what is interesting is the very close resemblance between the structure of *Al Qaeda* and JI (see Figures 1 and 2).²⁶

Figure 1: Organisation Structure of Al-Qaeda²⁷






Figure 2 : The JI Structure in Southeast Asia



Organisationally, JI is believed to be operating in a number of countries in Southeast Asia, namely in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, southern Philippines and southern Thailand.²⁸ At the top of the JI hierarchy is the *Markas* (Headquarters) and below it is the *Regional Shura* (Consultative) Council. Below this, JI is believed to be divided into a number of regional and territorial divisions or *mantiqis*, with the main ones being in Indonesia, Malaysia, southern Philippines and Australia.²⁹ The *mantiqis* are further

divided into *wakalabs* or branches. **JI** branches are believed, for instance, to be found in Singapore, Johor, Kelantan, Selangor and Negri Sembilan (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: A *JI Mantiqi* and its Sub-Units



Each *wakalah* in turn has various functional groups dealing with economic matters, *dakwah* activities, communications and operations. The Singapore *wakalah* was headed by Ibrahim Maidin (now in detention) in 1999 and later, he was succeeded by Mas Selamat, who was arrested in February 2003 by the Indonesian police while on a bus in Tanjung Pinang in Bintan.

It would appear that the aim of **JI**, just like **DI**, is to develop and establish an Islamic nation through the use of force and revolution. Both Sungkar and Bashir are believed to view Kartosuwiryo as their role model. However, unlike **DI**, the goals of **JI** are far wider. It is not simply to create an Islamic state in Indonesia, Malaysia and southern Philippines, but eventually a *Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara*, encompassing the whole of southern Southeast Asian, including Singapore and Brunei.³⁰ While the indigenous goal is either a national or supra-national Islamic state, **JI** also works closely with *Al Qaeda* to support global *jihād* activities, as was evident in the 'Singapore Plan' where Western political, military and commercial targets were identified for attack.

***Jemaah Islamiyah* as a Regional Terrorist Organisation**

According to various sources, even though **JI** was essentially born in Indonesia and largely Indonesian-led, over time, it has developed extensive collaboration with various radical groups in Southeast Asia. There are essentially two aspects of **JI**'s regionalism. First is its region-wide network as evident in its structure and organisation. Even though **JI**'s top leadership

is allegedly in the hands of individuals such as Abu Bakar Bashir, Hambali and Mukhlas, what makes it a force to be reckoned with is its region-wide expanse covering the whole of Southeast Asia. Intelligence officials believe that JI has a Southeast Asian-wide network, including a cell being established in Australia. JI is believed to have four main territorial divisions (see Figure 4).

Figure 4: JI's Regional Structure

<i>Mantiqi One:</i>	Malaysia, Singapore, Southern Thailand and possibly Myanmar
<i>Mantiqi Two:</i>	Indonesia (Java, Sumatra, Eastern Indonesia)
<i>Mantiqi Three:</i>	Indonesia (Sulawesi, Kalimantan), East Malaysia (Sabah, Sarawak), Brunei and Southern Philippines (Mindanao)
<i>Mantiqi Four:</i>	Australia, Indonesia (Papua) and possibly Papua New Guinea and East Timor

The first covers Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Myanmar. The second covers Sumatra and Java in Indonesia. The third covers Indonesia's islands of Sulawesi as well as various islands in eastern Indonesia, including Maluku, Kalimantan, Sarawak, Sabah, Brunei and southern Philippines. The fourth cell covers Australia, the Indonesia's province of Papua and possibly Papua New Guinea and East Timor. Indonesian intelligence officials have described the JI regional network as follows: *Mantiqi Ula* covering Sumatra, Singapore, Malaysia and southern Thailand; *Mantiqi Sani* covering Java, Bali and eastern Indonesia; *Mantiqi Salitz* covering Philippines, Kalimantan and Sulawesi; and *Mantiqi Robi* covering Australia and Papua.³¹

The second aspect of JI's regionalism is its close collaboration with various extremist and terrorist groups in the region. JI is closely affiliated with *Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia* (KMM), sharing its founders and top leaders, namely, Abu Bakar Bashir and Riduan Isamuddin (Hambali). In addition to the MMI headed by Bashir, JI is also linked to *Laskar Jihad*, which was one of Indonesia's top militant groups until its militia wing was recently disbanded. *Laskar Jihad* is headed by Jafar Umar Thalib, presently on trial accused of inciting religious violence. Jafar, a veteran of the Afghan war, is believed to be behind much of the violence in Ambon and the Malukus. Similarly, JI has close ties with *Laskar Jundulla*. JI is also believed to be cooperating closely with the *Abu Sayyaf* Group, one of the most violent radical groups in the Philippines. Additionally, JI is also linked to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), an Islamic radical group in the Philippines that surpasses *Abu Sayyaf* in numbers and possibly threat. Due to JI's close

connections with various radical groups in Southeast Asia, FBI Chief, Robert Mueller singled JI out as *Al Qaeda's* foremost Southeast Asian collaborator. There are also reports that Islamic militants from Myanmar, in particular the Arakan Rohingya National Organisation, may also have linked up with *Al Qaeda* and become part of the 'regional network' of terrorists. Similarly, JI is believed to be working closely with a relatively new terrorist group in Pattani, southern Thailand, namely *Gerakan Mujahideen Pattani*. There are also reports that JI has established ties with some groups in Cambodia (see Figure 5).

Figure 5: JI's Regional Partners and Linkages

Malaysia (*Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia*)
 Indonesia (*Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, Laskar Jihad, Laskar Jundulla, GAM*)
 Philippines (*Abu Sayyaf Group, MILF*)
 Thailand (*Gerakan Mujahidin Pattani Islam*)
 Myanmar (Arakan Rohingya National Organisation)
Al Qaeda network

Following the arrest of the second batch of JI operatives in Singapore in 2002, it was revealed that, by 1999, a regional network of Islamic militant groups bent on using terrorism, among others methods, to pursue their political objectives, had already been established. JI is said to have initiated an alliance called *Rabitatul Mujahidin* involving among other groups, the MILF, *Abu Sayyaf*, and *Gerakan Mujahidin Islamic Pattani*. It is highly possible that *Majelis Permusyawaratan Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (MP-GAM) led by Dr Hussani, which has been fighting for an Islamic state in northern Sumatra and where the *Al Qaeda* leadership paid a visit to facilitate cooperation, might also be involved in this alliance.³²

Jemaah Islamiyah* and *Al Qaeda

One feature which makes JI extremely dangerous and a source of national, regional and global concern is its linkage with *Al Qaeda*, especially organisationally. Many JI leaders are believed to be close to Osama Bin Laden and his terrorist network. In addition to being Muslims, what binds JI with *Al Qaeda* is the single-minded belief in *Jihad* and, initially, it was this ideological affinity that brought individuals from the Southeast Asian region into contact with Osama Bin Laden and his network, especially when they were involved in the 'global Jihad' against the Soviets in Afghanistan, mainly with the backing of the United States. Once the war in Afghanistan tapered off and the *Mujahideen* fighters returned home, they continued their struggle, with Osama Bin Laden and his *Al Qaeda* organisation coordinating, funding

and giving direction to the various 'local Jihads' around the world, including in Southeast Asia.

In this connection, key JI leaders such as Abu Bakar Bashir and Hambali, for instance, are staunch supporters of Osama Bin Laden and his global causes, especially against the United States. Abu Bakar Bashir has described Osama as a "true Islamic warrior" and publicly stated, "I support Osama Bin Laden's struggle because his is the true struggle to uphold Islam, not terror — the terrorists are America and Israel"³³, whilst Hambali spent time fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. Even more importantly, *Al Qaeda* succeeded in establishing close ties with various radical Islamic groups in the region, including the *Abu Sayyaf* Group and the MILF in the Philippines, *Laskar Jihad* and *Laskar Jundullah* in Indonesia as well as various other Islamic groups such as GAM in Aceh, the *Gerakan Mujahideen Pattani* and possibly the Rohingya in Myanmar. In addition to sharing common causes on *Jihad* in Afghanistan, another source of *Al Qaeda's* infiltration into the Southeast Asian region was through the *Madrasahs* in Pakistan that were largely controlled by the *Taliban*. However, the single most important conduit of *Al Qaeda's* penetration into Southeast Asia was through JI, leading many to conclude that JI was *Al Qaeda's* point in Southeast Asia. JI can also be viewed as the *Al Qaeda* of Southeast Asia, as it coordinated many terrorist activities through its regional network, *Rabitatul Mujahideen*, that grouped all key Islamic radical movements in the region and that was established in 1999 under the leadership of JI.

The potency of JI's linkage with *Al Qaeda* is best evident from the various cooperative endeavours and operations believed to have been undertaken and planned in the region or against targets outside Southeast Asia as follows:

- Indonesia's *Darul Islam* leader, Al Chaidar, admitted supporting *Jihad* activities in Afghanistan and receiving financial assistance from Osama.³⁴
- KMM's hosting of Zacarias Moussaoui, a Frenchman, who is believed to be part of the group that planned and was to be involved in the 11 September 2001 attack in New York and Washington.
- *Laskar Jundullah*, through Agus Dwikarna, is supposed to have organised a terrorist training camp in Poso, Sulawesi in Indonesia in cooperation with *Al Qaeda*.
- Emergence of Hambali as one of the top six leaders of *Al Qaeda*.
- Claims by Omar Al-Faruq, the *Al Qaeda* operative in Southeast Asia under American detention that he was given orders by two senior *Al Qaeda* leaders, Abu Zubaydah and Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, to undertake

large-scale attacks of American targets in Southeast Asia and that Abu Bakar Bashir was his key collaborator in the region.

What is unique about the regionalisation of the JI threat in Southeast Asia has been its ability to link up with various radical groups, many of them well-established and in a position to threaten the security of various states. In this way, JI has played a catalytic role in synergising regional terrorism, especially in close collaboration with *Al Qaeda*. According to Singapore Minister of Home Affairs, Mr Wong Kan Seng, the ability of *Al Qaeda* to “franchise and indigenise its violent expertise and agenda” was something unique in the annals of terrorism in the region.³⁵ The extent of *Al Qaeda*'s penetration into the Southeast Asia region was evident from the way in which JI operatives reported and sought ‘clearance’ from Osama and his key lieutenants for various operations in the region. For instance, a videotape, showing various American targets in Singapore, was recovered from the house of Abu Hafs alias Mohd. Atef, a key military leader of Osama, who was apparently killed during the American bombing of Afghanistan in December 2001. The videotape was shown to him by members of the Singapore branch of JI who travelled to Afghanistan for military training.³⁶

Conclusion

Comprehension of the origins and structure of JI is not a mere academic exercise. What makes JI particularly important and unique in the history of terrorism in Southeast Asia in general, and religious terrorism in particular, is its regional character. Never has such regional terrorism confronted the Southeast Asian region. This makes the understanding of its character and network that much more important if it is to be effectively managed, contained and neutralised.

CHAPTER 3

THE TERRORISM OF *JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH*

Introduction

Even with the arrests of key leaders of *Jemaah Islamiyah* and the perpetrators of the October 2002 Bali bombings, the persistence of the terrorist group continues to pose a serious threat to the security of the Southeast Asian region. Despite the detention of several key *Ji* leaders such as Mukhlas, Imam Samudra, Agus Dwikarna, Abu Jibril and the apparent successor to Abu Bakar Bashir, Abu Rusdan and later, Hambali, the 5 August 2003 car bomb blast that tore apart the J W Marriott Hotel in Jakarta was a compelling message that *Ji* is not toothless. What the J W Marriott Hotel bombing has demonstrated is that terrorists can strike anywhere and anytime.

Ji Operations in Southeast Asia

What has made *Ji* such a force to be reckoned with is not merely the fact that it is religiously motivated and organised and has a region-wide network, but probably even more importantly, its willingness and ability to destabilise the region by undertaking violent terrorist activities. This was revealed in a 40-page manifesto captured in Solo, Central Java in December 2002. The manifesto titled *Pedoman Perjuangan Jemaah Islamiyah* (PUPJI) or *General Guide to the Struggle of the Jemaah Islamiyah* was allegedly written by its founder, the late Abdullah Sungkar.³⁷ So far, analysts have attributed the following attacks (planned, aborted and implemented) in the region to *Ji*:

- Bomb explosion in a Philippines Airline passenger plane in 1994
- *Oplan Bojinka* (plan to assassinate the Pope and President Clinton in Manila as well as explode 11 American airliners in the Pacific region in 1995)
- Bombing of *Istiqal* Mosque in Jakarta in 1999
- Attempted assassination of the then Vice-President Megawati Sukarnoputri of Indonesia in 1999
- Grenade attack on the residence of the Philippines Ambassador to Indonesia (in Jakarta)
- Bombing of 17 churches that killed 22 and wounded nearly 100 in

Jakarta, West Java, North Sumatra, Riau, Bandung, East Java and Nusatenggara on Christmas Eve 2000

- Bombing of five targets in Manila on 30 December 2000
- Involvement in the Maluku fighting that killed more than 5,000 people
- Hosting by the Malaysian JI cell of *Al Qaeda* operatives that were involved in the bombing of the USS Cole and the 11 September 2001 attack on New York and the Pentagon
- Arrest of nearly 100 JI operatives in Malaysia and Singapore in 2001 and 2002 that were planning to attack Western and national targets in the two countries
- The October 2002 Bali bombing that killed more than 200 people
- The August 2003 bombing of the J W Marriott Hotel in Jakarta that killed 11 people.

In this respect, the Bali bombing can be regarded as the single most critical event that has highlighted the threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia and, in particular, the danger posed by JI and its various national, regional and international collaborators. This terrorist act was probably the most serious since the 11 September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington. The Bali attack on 12 October 2002 took the lives of 202 holidaymakers, mostly from Australia.³⁸ A number of arrests have been made, including Imam Samudra and Amrozi. Both are believed to be part of the JI network and close associates of Hambali and Mukhlas, the regional leaders of JI. In fact, Amrozi and another two of his brothers wanted in the Bali bombing, namely Ali Imron and Ali Fauzi, are younger brothers of Mukhlas who had, prior to his arrest in December 2002, reportedly taken over responsibility for JI operations in Southeast Asia from Hambali.³⁹ Following new legislation to try and convict terrorists, Amrozi has been found guilty and sentenced to death for his involvement in the Bali bombings by the Denpasar District Court in Bali.

JI at Work in Singapore: A Case Study

Even though Singapore is essentially a Chinese-majority state, historically the Republic has been confronted with threats and challenges from various Islamic groups. These challenges have included:


- The Maria Hertogh riots in 1950

- The agitation by the Malay National Party and PMIP for *Melayu Raya* in 1950
- The threat posed by *Angkatan Revolusi Tentara Islam* in 1961
- The bloody communal riots in 1964 and 1969
- The threat posed by the Singapore People's Liberation Organisation in 1981
- Attempts by *Hizbollah* to recruit Muslim Singaporeans in 1990 and, later in 1998, through Ustaz Bandej, an Indonesian extremist, to bomb American interests in the Republic.

The activities of Islamic militants in Singapore are a function of three main variables. First, it is due to the sizeable presence of Muslims in Singapore, constituting about 16 per cent of the Republic's population. The fact that many Singapore Muslims believe they have been systematically marginalised and discriminated against by the Chinese-dominated Government has provided various internal and external elements a ready-made disgruntled group to be exploited for various religiously-oriented causes. Second, being located in the heart of the Malay World where Singapore's immediate neighbours are dominated by Islamic majorities, especially in Malaysia and Indonesia, means that the Republic cannot escape from any development that involves the Malay-Muslim population. Finally, as Singapore is geo-strategically located and closely intertwined with the region and the world, this means that any development involving the regional and global Islamic population would have an immediate and direct impact on the Republic, particularly its Muslim population.

In this connection, even though JI was not home-grown in Singapore, despite the Republic being alleged to be a 'tightly-organised state', the activities of the JI cell in Singapore remained undetected for nearly a decade. Singaporeans are believed to have been involved in JI activities, mainly in Malaysia, as early as 1990. A Singapore JI cell was believed to have been established in 1993 following the return of its leader, Ibrahim Maidin, from military training in Afghanistan.⁴⁰ The Singapore JI cell, known as the Singapore JI *Wakalah* (SJIW) reported to JI leaders in Malaysia (*Mantiqi 1*), especially Abu Jibril, Hambali and Mukhlas. Although it long maintained a low profile, the SJIW began enhancing their activities in 1997, working closely with the *wakalah* in Johor, the southernmost state in Malaysia that borders Singapore (Figure 6).

Figure 6: The Singapore Structure



SIJW was organised into a number of functional groups, including the Operations Group involved in intelligence and military activities; the Security Group (*Tajnid*) tasked with ensuring that the SIJW is secured from infiltration and detection; the Economic/Finance Group, overseeing financial affairs; the Communications Group that managed electronic and non-electronic linkages, including security; the *Dakwah*/Missionary Group that imbued its members with hard line teachings; and the Educational (*Tarbiyah Rasmiyah*) Group that focused on generational educations matters.⁴¹

As a terrorist group, the members of the SIJW started military training as early as 1990. The bulk of their military training took place in Malaysia even though some members were also trained in Afghanistan and in camps run by the MILF in the southern Philippines. In the main, there were four main phases of military training involving the SIJW. From 1990 to 1994, the

emphasis was essentially on physical fitness training where the trainees had no real inkling that they were being prepared for sinister military operations in Singapore. The actual basic military training started in 1995. From 1997 onwards, the members were given advanced military training involving ambushes, infiltration, etc. From 2000 onwards, members were taught the tactics of urban warfare, preparing them essentially for military operations in Singapore.

Arrests and Discovery of JI's Operational Cells (*fiahs*) in Singapore

On 6 January 2002, the Singapore Internal Security Department served thirteen of the fifteen persons arrested in December 2001 for terrorism-related activities with Orders of Detention for two years under Section 8(1)(a) of the Internal Security Act.⁴² They were: Haji Ibrahim bin Haji Maidin, 51, condominium manager; Mohamad Anuar bin Margono, 31, driver; Mohamed Khalim bin Jaffar, 39, printer; Ja'afar bin Mistooki, 40, despatch driver; Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana, 39, businessman; Fathi Abu Bakar Bafana, 36, businessman; Mohamed Ellias s/o Mohamed Khan, 29, manager; Mohamed Nazir bin Mohammed Uthman, 27, ship traffic assistant; Adnan bin Musa, 36, technician; Halim bin Hussain, 41, supervisor; Hashim bin Abas, 40, service engineer; Andrew Gerard Ali Ridhaa bin Abdullah, 34, technician; and Othman bin Mohamed, 42, supervisor. The other two persons arrested were released on Restriction Orders.

Of the thirteen, eight had gone to Afghanistan for training in *Al Qaeda* training camps. As part of their preparations for training in Afghanistan, all of them underwent military and religious training in Negri Sembilan, Malaysia, and all are believed to have entered Afghanistan illegally. These covert arrangements for their entry into Afghanistan from Pakistan were made by their leader in Malaysia, Hambali, a Malaysian permanent resident of Indonesian nationality. Training in the *Al Qaeda* camps included the use of AK47s and mortars, and the study of military tactics. One of the Singaporeans went to Afghanistan for training on three separate occasions between 1991 and 2000. Among the documents recovered from IT forensic investigation of Khalim Jaffar's encrypted diskette was a letter nominating Mohd Ellias and Mohd Nazir for special training in one of three areas, viz. ambush/assassination, sniper or "field engineering" (ie, bomb construction).

On 16 August 2002, the Singapore Government announced the arrest of another 21 Singaporeans: Ab Wahab bin Ahmad, 42, delivery man; Syed Ibrahim, 30, despatch clerk; Simon bin Sabtu, 38, canteen operator assistant/proprietor; Mohamed Noor bin Sulaimi, 32, project co-ordinator; Munain

bin Turru, 41, driver; Naharudin bin Sabtu, 33, part-time trainer; Sanin bin Riffin, 40, driver; Nordin bin Parman, 39, taxi-driver; Mohd Jauhari bin Abdullah, 37, assistant engineer; Salim bin Marwan, 31, butcher; Mahfuh bin Haji Halimi, 40, manager; Azman bin Jalani, 39, unemployed; Abdul Majid s/o Niaz Mohamed, 40, driver; Said bin Ismail, 45, fitter; Faiz Abdullah Ashiblee, 37, unemployed; Zulkifli bin Mohamed Jaffar, 42, used car salesman; Habibullah s/o Hameed, 45, part-time foot reflexologist and religious teacher; Husin bin Ab. Aziz, 52, businessman; Fauzi bin Abu Bakar Bafana, 37, technical officer; Mohammad Hisham bin Hairi, 34, transport worker; and Sajahan bin Abdul Rahman, 54, businessman.

Nearly all of the 21 men detained are believed to be members of JI.⁴³ The Singaporean JI is part of a larger JI network with cells in Malaysia, Indonesia and others parts of Southeast Asia. The Singapore network reports to a Malaysia-based leadership structure called a regional '*shura*' (or consultative council). Following the arrest and detention of Mohammad Iqbal Abdul Rahman alias Abu Jibril by Malaysian authorities in June 2001, this was essentially headed by Hambali before his arrest in Thailand in August 2003.

The JI organisation in Singapore is headed by a leader (with the title *Qoid wakalah*) and is organised into various functional cells or *fiahs*.⁴⁴ These include cells for fund raising, religious work, security and operations. Ibrahim Maidin was the leader of JI in Singapore and Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana was a leading figure in JI's regional *shura*. The rest of those detained were mostly members of the security unit or of the various operations cells. The operations *fiahs* are the cells assigned for terrorist support or terrorism-related activities. JI's terrorism-linked activities began long before the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US. The leader of JI, Ibrahim Maidin, had gone to Afghanistan for military training in 1993. The surveillance activities of the first JI cell in support of terrorist targeting began as early as 1997.

The oldest operations cell called itself *Fiah Ayub*. This cell, led by Khalim bin Jaffar, is believed to have started exploring terrorist targeting in Singapore as early as 1997. It conducted target surveillance of those locations frequented by Americans in Singapore. This cell is believed to have drafted up two well-developed plans. The first was to target a regular shuttle bus service conveying what was expected to be US personnel between Sembawang Wharf and the Yishun MRT Station. Khalim made a detailed reconnaissance of the Yishun MRT Station. He prepared a videotape of the reconnaissance, with commentary in English by one of those detained, Hashim bin Abas. The videotape and some handwritten debriefing notes

in Arabic were later found in the rubble of an *Al Qaeda* leader's house in Afghanistan.

The plan was apparently developed and ready for activation. Khalim briefed *Al Qaeda* leaders on this plan when he went to Afghanistan for training between August 1999 and April 2000. The *Al Qaeda* leaders showed interest in the plan but, for unknown reasons, did not subsequently pursue it. The second developed plan appeared to be a bomb attack against US naval vessels along the northeast waters of Singapore between Changi and Pulau Tekong. Found among Khalim's possessions was a MINDEF map with markings indicating observation posts both in Singapore and Johor and a "kill zone" in the channel between Changi and Pulau Tekong.

Also found among Khalim's possessions was a list of over 200 US companies in Singapore. Three of them were highlighted as potential targets, apparently because the office-bearers were regarded as fairly prominent members of the American community in Singapore. Other items included two tampered Singapore passports, 15 forged Malaysian and Philippines immigration stamps, night vision binoculars, and literature on bomb-making and survival techniques.

The second operations cell called itself *Fiah Musa*. Members of the cell include Fathi Abu Bakar Bafana, Mohd Ellias, Mohd Nazir and Adnan bin Musa. In April 2001 they used Andrew Gerard, another JI member who was a technician in Singapore Technologies Aerospace (STA), to photograph Paya Lebar Airbase and the American aircraft there as a potential target for terrorist attack. Gerard was also directed to collect information on STA and Paya Lebar airbase facilities and on the movement of personnel. He took more than 50 digital photos of the airbase and aircraft as instructed and handed them over to cell members. These photographs were recovered from the possessions of one of those detained, Khalim bin Jaffar.

In September/October 2001, the cell was approached by a mixed group of foreign elements to assist in a plan for the terrorist bombing of specific targets in Singapore. These foreigners were known to the local cell members only by code-names. The link-up between cell members and these foreigners was made by the ex-Singaporean detainee, Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana. (Faiz is the brother of Fathi Abu Bakar Bafana and a member of the JI regional '*shura*'.)

Two of the foreigners (one of Arab extraction calling himself 'Sammy' and believed to be linked to the *Al Qaeda* organisation; the other of Indonesian extraction calling himself 'Mike', and described as a trainer and bomb-maker with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front) came to Singapore in October

2001. Assisted by cell members, they conducted surveillance of several establishments, including the US Embassy, the Australian High Commission, the British High Commission, the Israeli Embassy, commercial buildings where there are American companies and also the MINDEF Complex at Bukit Gombak. They video-recorded what they surveyed for use in their planning. A copy of the video-recording was found in the office of Fathi Abu Bakar Bafana. Both 'Mike' (identified as Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi) and 'Sammy' (identified as Jabarah Mohamed Mansur) were subsequently detained in the Philippines and Oman respectively.⁴⁵ Together with two Filipino *Abu Sayyaf* members, Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi escaped from jail at Camp Crame, Manila. He was, however, killed in a joint police-military operation in the southern Philippines in October 2003.

'Sammy' and 'Mike', who were the directing figures, also informed the cell that they needed 21 tonnes of ammonium nitrate for construction of several truck bombs. As they already had 4 tonnes in Malaysia with Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana, they instructed the cell members to help procure 17 tonnes of ammonium nitrate. They also directed them to try and locate suitable warehouses for a secure site to construct truck bombs. Mohd Ellias subsequently attempted to purchase 17 tonnes of ammonium nitrate through a contact from a local vendor. Mohd Ellias was arrested by ISD before he could follow up and complete the transaction.

The third operations cell called itself 'Fiah Ismail'. It was formed after the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks in the US. Members of the cell included Halim bin Hussain. They conducted some preliminary surveillance and observations of a few targets including US companies. Following the arrest of the second batch of detainees in August 2002, the Singapore authorities discovered that there were additional 'fiahs' in the Singapore JI set-up. Four operational 'fiahs', namely, 'fiah Yakub', 'fiah Syuib', 'fiah Daud' and 'fiah Nuh' were uncovered, although their specific targets and tasks are unknown.

Ji's Strategy in Singapore

Around 1999/2000, JI stepped up its militant orientation. This was reflected in an increased number of reconnaissance and surveys of potential targets. It also engaged in greater efforts to recruit more JI members into the operations cells and prepare them for military training abroad. This change in orientation was initiated by regional JI leader Hambali who reportedly wanted JI to convert all its cells (ie, *dakwah* or missionary work, etc.) into operation cells. JI planned to send as many men as possible for training abroad in Afghanistan or Mindanao. Other programmes, which were not focused on these immediate objectives, were dropped.

Hambali's strategy was to prepare JI in Malaysia and Singapore operationally to mount a series of terrorist incidents at the right time. Targets in Singapore would include the water pipelines and MINDEF. The aim was to create a situation in Malaysia and Singapore conducive to overthrowing the Malaysian Government and making Malaysia an Islamic State. The attacks on key Singapore installations would be portrayed as acts of aggression by the Malaysian Government, thereby generating animosity and distrust between Malaysia and Singapore. Hambali aimed to stir up ethnic strife by playing up a 'Chinese Singapore' threatening Malays/Muslims in Malaysia; he hoped that this would create a situation which would make Muslims respond to calls for *jihād* (militant *jihād*), and turn Malaysia and Singapore into another 'Ambon', where religious clashes have broken out between Christians and Muslims since January 1999, resulting in many deaths and injuries. In this plan, Hambali was assisted by a small group of Malaysian JI members based in Johor. This group met with Singapore JI leaders including Ibrahim Maidin (Ibrahim was detained in Jan 2002) on at least 5 occasions between Dec 2000 and Jul 2001. The leadership core working directly with Hambali resided in the Malaysian JI.

In 1999, JI initiated an alliance with other *jihād*/militant groups in the region, called the *Rabitatul Mujahideen*. The alliance facilitated co-operation and the sharing of resources among the groups, in terms of training, procurement of arms, financial assistance and terrorist operations. The objective was to unify the Islamic militant groups in the region, with the ultimate goal of realising the *Daulah Islamiyah*, ie, an Islamic State comprising Malaysia, Indonesia and Mindanao, following which Singapore and Brunei would eventually be absorbed.

The Singapore JI is important to the regional JI organisation as a source of funds. In the early 1990s, many Singapore JI members had to contribute about 2 per cent of their monthly salaries, while in the latter half of the 1990s, the amount was raised to 5 per cent of their monthly salaries. There were others who gave a fixed sum monthly. Apparently, 25 per cent of the funds raised would be given to the Malaysian JI and another 25 per cent to the Indonesian JI. This sum of money would be personally handed over to the Malaysian JI, and the amounts meant for the Indonesian JI would then be forwarded by a Malaysian representative. The funds for the Singapore JI were used for various purposes to fund the expenses of the *fiahs* (cells) and to assist local JI family members who were in need. JI funds were also used to send local JI members for military training abroad, and to purchase equipment that included walkie-talkies and binoculars.

Jl's Threat to Singapore

Almost all JI operatives arrested in Singapore had undergone some kind of military training in Afghanistan, Malaysia or in MILF camps in the Philippines. One member, Mahfuh bin Haji Halimi (Mahfuh), had trained in Afghanistan at *Al Qaeda* facilities from September 1990 to January 1991. Another JI member, Habibullah s/o Hameed (Habibullah), attended a short training stint in 1995 with the MILF. He attended further training in 1996 and 1997. A staunch supporter of the MILF, he also organised visits by several JI and non-JI persons to the MILF's Camp Abu Bakar. JI had also been conducting training camps in Malaysia since 1990. Until 1994, the training was focused mainly on maintaining physical fitness with activities like jogging and trekking. From 1995, however, the training camps held in Gunung Pulai and Kulai began to also teach 'military' skills (without firearms training). For instance, JI members were taught to make Molotov cocktails, learn knife-throwing skills, topography and jungle survival skills. In 1997, additional modules like guerrilla warfare, infiltration and ambush were included. Around 2000, reconnaissance and observation courses were conducted in Kota Tinggi; these classes were dubbed 'urban warfare'. The JI even conducted 'Recall and Operation exercises' to ensure that members were operationally ready. Fourteen of the 21 arrestees (including the 3 who went to Afghanistan) participated in such training camps in Malaysia.

In addition to military training, the severity of the JI threat to Singapore was best evident from the reconnaissance of military and non-military targets in Singapore. JI leaders assigned at least 8 of these operations cell members to conduct 'casing' (which involves surveillance and reconnaissance) of a range of potential targets in Singapore. These targets include the following: water pipelines, Changi Airport and Biggin Hill Radar Station, Jurong Island, MINDEF and American targets in Singapore.

JI at Work in Indonesia: A Case Study

Following the '911' terrorist attack in the United States, authorities in Southeast Asia began to take notice of the terror network operating in the region. When Singapore's Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew commented that regional terrorist leaders were roaming freely in Indonesia, he was not misinformed. In fact, prior to the October 2002 Bali bombings, there were denials over the existence of the *Jemaah Islamiyah* terror network in Indonesia, if not accusations that JI is a mere construct and a tool of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), of the US and their 'Zionist conspirators', used

to gain control of Indonesia. With the arrests and court trials of key JI leaders and the perpetrators of terrorist activities, the Bali bomb attack is an important watershed to the recognition and, more importantly, to the understanding of *Jemaah Islamiyah* and, in particular, its terrorist network in Indonesia.

Despite the origins of JI in *Darul Islam* (DI), an organisation that emerged in Indonesia back in the 1940s, a mere cursory glance of the chronology of JI's evolution in Indonesia reveals the relative currency of its terror operations. With the fall of Suharto's New Order regime in 1998 and the subsequent return of Abdullah Sungkar, Abu Bakar Bashir and other members of JI to Indonesia, the terrorist organisation began to hit headlines with a series of bomb attacks in the country. Terrorist operations attributed to JI include:

- The bombing of Istiqlal Mosque in Jakarta, April 1999
- The bombing of the residence of the Philippines Ambassador in Jakarta, August 2000
- The Christmas Eve Bombings in 11 cities in Indonesia, December 2000
- The bombings of Gereja HKBP and Gereja Santa Ana in Jakarta, July 2001
- The Atrium Mall bombing in Jakarta, August 2001
- The bombing of Gereja Petra in North Jakarta, November 2001
- A grenade explosion near the US Embassy Warehouse in Jakarta, September 2002
- The bombings of the Sari Club and Paddy's Café, Bali, October 2002
- The bombing of the US consulate in Denpasar, Bali and the Philippine consulate in Menado, North Sulawesi, October 2002
- The bombing of the United Nations building in Jakarta, April 2003
- The bombing of Soekarno-Hatta International Airport in Jakarta, April 2003
- The bombing of the Indonesian Parliament compound in Jakarta, July 2003
- The bombing of the J W Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, August 2003

It is ironic that the fall of the authoritarian New Order regime, and the increased optimism for democracy in Indonesia, has in fact led to the greater militancy of Islamic groups. However, it is of no mere coincidence that democratisation has led to the emergence of among other terrorist organisations, JI in Indonesia. Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has argued that "the armed forces are the strongest institution [in Indonesia], which can safeguard the unity of the country. But the armed forces are wary of being accused of human rights violations, if they act against the militants as they have done in the past".⁴⁶ Indeed, democratisation in Indonesia has meant that the Islamic constituency has become all-powerful politically and thus rivals traditional political agents such as the armed forces, thereby weakening the government's ability to deal with hard-line Muslims and their organisations in the country, lest it be accused of undertaking Suharto-type anti-Islamic programs that in the past were endorsed by the Western world, especially the United States.

The democratisation process in the post-Suharto Indonesia has also provided opportunities in the political space for Abu Bakar Bashir and other Muslim activists. Bashir, who has assumed the role of the *Emir* or leader of JI following the death of Sungkar, founded the *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI) together with Irfan Awwas Suryahardy and Mursalin Dahlan. According to an ICG report, Bashir apparently believed that it was not an opportune time for further armed struggle as the US and the Indonesian authorities were clamping down on Islamic activists.⁴⁷ Instead, Bashir argued in MMI-JI held meetings that the increased political openness in the post-Suharto environment offered opportunities for the establishment of the Islamic state (*Daulah Islamiyah*) through the conventional political system. Bashir's advice did not go down well with the younger and more belligerent group, including Hambali. The ICG is not wrong to suggest that JI is starting to fracture. The younger militant faction in JI believes that the MMI is contrary to the teachings of Sungkar and the latter's intention for JI to remain underground until the time is ripe. This younger militant group is adamant about furthering their causes through terrorist activities.

While the focus of court trials has been placed on Bashir as the *Emir* of JI, he is more likely the spiritual leader. This is not to say that Bashir is not tainted by the crimes of JI. However, notwithstanding the possibility that he gave his blessings to the terrorist operations, Bashir is unlikely to be the mastermind behind the deadly Bali bomb attacks, among other operations. According to a Malaysian security official, if Bashir, following Sungkar's death was JI's 'godfather', then Hambali was the 'consigliere'. That is to say, while JI members recognise Bashir as the *Emir* of JI, it would be more

accurate to suggest that Bashir is the *de jure* leader of JI, and Hambali is the operations chief.

The 'Ngruki Alumni'

Notwithstanding the apparent split in the leadership of JI, one key element that continues to tie Bashir, Hambali and other members of militant organisations in Indonesia is the 'Ngruki alumni' network. In 1971, Bashir and Sungkar founded the Islamic school, *Pesantren al-Mu'min*, which moved to the village of Ngruki in 1973 and became known as *Pondok Ngruki*. This religious boarding school near Solo, Central Java adopted an ideological outlook of Middle Eastern Islamic radicalism and viewed the *Darul Islam* rebellions as important inspirations. More disturbingly, the teachings of Sungkar had an anti-Christianity tinge, which was attributed to his association with the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (*Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia* or DDII).⁴⁸ Both Sungkar and Bashir were arrested and discredited in 1978 for alleged involvement in *Komando Jihad*, the shadowy Indonesian Intelligence-created Islamic militia responsible for arson and bombings of churches, cinemas and nightclubs. The pair were accused of preaching and circulating a book called *Jihad and Hijrah* which urges *jihad* against Islam's enemies. They were charged for not flying the Indonesian flag at the *pesantren* and for being anti-*Pancasila*.

After their release in 1982, Sungkar and Bashir fled to Malaysia in 1985. A core group of the 'Ngruki network' followed the two founders of the *pesantren* to Malaysia. Sungkar continued his teachings and founded *Pondok Pesantren Luqmanul Hakiem* in Johor, Malaysia. This 'Ngruki network' thus expanded and became the foundation and breeding ground for JI. Association with the 'Ngruki network' does not equate to membership of the JI terror network. Yet, what this 'Ngruki network' meant to the bonding of JI members in terms of its loyalty to the teachings of Sungkar and Bashir, its commitment to the cause of *jihad*, its shared experience radicalised by repression during Suharto's Indonesia, and its sheer membership, cannot be understated.

The JI Operations Chief - Hambali

While the media's attention has been placed on the court trials of Abu Bakar Bashir and the perpetrators of the Bali bombings, it is the capture of Hambali on 11 August 2003 in Ayutthaya, Thailand that is a significant triumph in the region's battle against terrorism. Thai police sources have said that Hambali had travelled from the Chiang Khong border district in Chiang Rai to hide among the Muslim community in Ayutthaya. Hambali

has confessed during interrogation that he was plotting to bomb the backpacker area of Khao San Road and the US, Israeli and Japanese embassies. He was also planning to attack planes at Bangkok International Airport with missiles. Also, his capture has prevented a possibly deadly terrorist attack during the forthcoming APEC meeting, which brings together prime ministers, presidents, and chief executives from 21 Asia-Pacific economies. More importantly, as one of the few top leaders aware of the complete operations picture, Hambali's arrest is a major blow to the JI organisation.

Just as JI is a clandestine organisation, little is known about Hambali the terrorist mastermind. What is clear is that Hambali operates with different pseudonyms, including Riduan Isamuddin. Born Encep Nurjaman in Kampung Pabuaran, sub-district Karang Tengah, Cianjur, West Java in 1964, Hambali attended a *madrrasah* and graduated from the *Al-Ianah* Islamic High School in 1984. In 1985, at the age of 20, Hambali left Indonesia for Malaysia. It was not a surprising path, given that many Indonesian migrants had left for neighbouring Malaysia to find work. However, Hambali's search for greener pastures took a major detour and he left for Afghanistan subsequently to fight with the *Mujahideen*.

The Soviet-Afghan war (1979-1989) provided the formative experience for radicals from Southeast Asian countries who fought alongside *Al Qaeda* members. Zachary Abuza noted that Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) has been recruiting radical Muslims from around the world to fight with the *Mujahideen* since 1982.⁴⁹ The US CIA had monitored about 1,500 Indonesian students travelling to the Middle East. However, about 30-40% never arrived at their stated destination. It is strongly believed that many of these students joined the *Taliban* in Afghanistan. Along with other Muslim radicals of his generations, his three-year stay as a *Mujahideen* in Afghanistan essentially transformed Hambali in terms of his world outlook and strengthened his firm commitment to the cause of *jihād*. On Hambali's unyielding faith in the way of *jihād* on his return to Malaysia in the late 1980s, Abu Bakar Bashir commented that "Hambali, just like me, encouraged people to carry out *jihād*, which at that time was not known in Malaysia".⁵⁰ Following a forgettable time as a *satay* and *jamu* hawker after his return from Afghanistan, Hambali the preacher began to captivate his Malaysian audiences with his Afghan experiences. Anecdotes of his time spent fighting the Soviets and his encounters with Osama Bin Laden served as inspirations to other radical Muslims in his congregations.

By about 1993, Sungkar's protégé, Hambali, was tasked with establishing the militant cells in the Southeast Asia region. Modelling JI along Osama's

Al Qaeda, Hambali divided JI's structure into independent operation cells. He did so to ensure the survival of the organisation even if some cells were busted. Also, with the decision made to establish a region-wide JI network, Hambali took on a bigger role to establish links with the KMM, MILF, *Abu Sayyaf* and other Islamic militant organisations. In 1994, Hambali set up a business company called Konsojaya Sdn. Bhd., seemingly to trade palm oil with Afghanistan. The firm was in fact a cover for acquiring funds and logistical support, including buying bomb materials for terrorism.

Not only was he a key leader in the JI organisation, Hambali was also the *Al Qaeda's* link man for Southeast Asia. He had served in the *Al Qaeda's* media and military committee in his second stint in Afghanistan. Hambali took part in the foiled attempt to bomb American airliners over the Asia-Pacific. He also hosted a meeting of *Al Qaeda* members, including two of the September 11 hijackers, in Kuala Lumpur in January 2000. Hambali arranged the meeting to plan the attack on the US destroyer USS Cole in Yemen in October 2000. He also provided assistance to Zacarias Moussaoui, the twentieth would-be hijacker of September 11 when the latter visited Malaysia in September and October 2000.

Hambali is believed to be the mastermind behind the operations in Southeast Asia, including the 'Singapore Plan' in 1999, the Christmas Eve bombings in Indonesia in 2000, the attack on the residence of the Philippine ambassador in Jakarta in 2000, the Bali bomb blasts in October 2002 and the J.W. Marriott Hotel car bomb explosion in Jakarta in August 2003. While the arrest of Hambali, the operations chief, is a tremendous blow to the terrorist network, the question is whether the separation of JI into many independent operation cells by Hambali has successfully ensured the survival of the terrorist organisation. Chances are that this amoeba-like terrorist organisation will, before too long, produce another 'Hambali'.

Suicide Bombings – Unit Khos in the Bali and Jakarta Attacks

For his disciples willing to die for the cause of *jihād*, Hambali's magnetism lies in his comprehension of the sufferings of Muslims in Palestine, Bosnia and Chechnya. In an interview with *Time* magazine, Sobri, a former disciple of Hambali revealed the sense of reverence members had for the preacher: "Whatever happens, I can never forget him. For me, he opened a window into the world of Muslim sufferings".⁵¹ It is this appeal that draws Muslim radicals into Hambali's *jihād* project both at home and abroad. More disturbingly, Hambali taught these Islamic terrorists that violence is seen as a sacrosanct act. For Hambali and his *jihādists*, death in the name of *jihād* means martyrdom and life everlasting.

Bali Bomb Blasts, 12 October 2002

It is in Bali in October 2002 that these suicide bombers first struck. Following the foiled Singapore Plan and the subsequent arrests of JI members in Singapore and in Malaysia, Hambali made the critical decision (in a meeting held in southern Thailand) to move away from attacking well-guarded 'hard' targets such as embassies to 'soft' ones such as bars and nightclubs frequented by foreigners. Mukhlas emerged as the terrorist network's *Mantiqi 1* commander at another meeting in Bangkok. He was also the eldest of the three Nurhasyim brothers behind the Bali bombings (the other two being Amrozi, who was sentenced to death by the Denpasar District Court for his role in the blasts and Ali Imron). Final plans were drawn up by Mukhlas in Central Java in August 2002 and he identified Kota Beach in Bali as the prime target.

According to a statement by the detained JI treasurer, Wan Min Wan Mat during the trial of Imam Samudra, Hambali had directed that about US\$35,500 be sent to Mukhlas. It was also decided that Imam Samudra be named field commander for the Bali attack. By September 2002, Imam Samudra had targeted Paddy's Irish Bar and the larger Sari Club for the deadly attack. Mukhlas appointed Idris, the Bali cell's deputy commander, to help with the logistics. Amrozi subsequently bought a L300 Mitsubishi van and transported the bomb materials and the vehicle to Bali. Indonesian electronics expert, Dulmatin, and former Malaysian university lecturer Dr Azahari were entrusted the job of making the bomb. Ali Imron has disclosed that the bomb-makers used 900kg of potassium chlorate, 150kg of sulphur and 75kg of aluminium to create the van bomb which tore apart the Sari Club. The two other bombs used in Bali were smaller. He also told the Denpasar District Court that the detonating cord used in the Kuta attacks had been 'made in the USA' and obtained in the Philippines, and that the TNT came from Ambon in Indonesia's Maluku islands.

Imam Samudra had shortlisted and settled on three suicide bombers from among six names, all aged between 19 and 22. Iqbal was to drive in the vehicle used as a bomb while Feri was to wear the bomb in a vest and Rohmadi was to drive into the Sari Club on a motorcycle, wearing the bomb in a vest. However, Rohmadi was later found to be too incompetent in his driving ability and was subsequently dropped as a Bali suicide bomber. Following a trial run on 11 October, the suicide bombers struck the next day, 12 October 2002. Idris and Ali Imron detonated a cell-phone bomb at the US Consulate in Denpasar (the phone is designed to emit a current from the battery to the detonator in a cell-phone bombing. When it receives a call or

an SMS, the bomb triggers off). Moments later, Feri blew himself up at Paddy's and Iqbal was also torn apart as his bomb went off at the Sari Club.

A crucial oversight had led to the investigations and the subsequent capture of the perpetrators of the Bali bombings. While Amrozi had erased the chassis number and other features of the van used in the Sari bombing, he failed to realise that the vehicle had been used as public transport and overlooked a government stamp. This oversight provided a crucial lead for forensic experts, which eventually led investigators to the 'Smiling Bomber', Amrozi. A month after the Bali bombings, Amrozi and Imam Samudra were captured by Indonesian authorities in November 2002. In December, Mukhlas was nabbed and his brother Ali Imron arrested a month later in January 2003. Idris was also taken into police custody in June 2003. Subsequently, Amrozi was found guilty and sentenced to death by the Denpasar District Court for involvement in the terrorist attack. Whether justice will be carried out, remains unclear. What is certain is that 202 people died as a result of the Bali bomb blasts, many of them holidaymakers from Australia. For those who survived the deadly terrorist attack, the wounds suffered and the indelible physical and psychological scars have changed their lives forever.

J W Marriott Hotel, Jakarta Bomb Blast, 5 August 2003


Despite the arrests of the alleged leader of JI, Abu Bakar Bashir, and the perpetrators of the Bali bomb blasts, the J W Marriott Hotel car-bomb explosion in Jakarta on 5 August 2003 demonstrates that the terrorist network is all but crippled. Indonesian authorities have affirmed that JI was likely responsible for the Marriott bomb, which was similar to those set off in Bali and the one that injured the Philippines ambassador in 2001. The bomb used in the Jakarta hotel attack consisted of mobile phone detonators and a 150kg cocktail of potassium chlorate and TNT packed in three containers, along with four jerry cans filled with a mixture of petrol and kerosene to create a fiery blast. The hotel bombing killed 11 people and injured 150.

Forensic results from Indonesia's investigations have certified that the DNA of a severed head found in the blast scene of the Marriott Hotel explosion belonged to suicide bomber Asmar. On 5 August, Asmar had driven a Toyota Kijang van into the Marriott Hotel driveway. As security guards of the hotel approached the vehicle, Asmar triggered the bomb explosion that ripped through the hotel. However, Indonesian investigators believed that the suicide bomber had blundered in the operations by activating the bomb too early and too far away from the hotel lobby front.

Security sources have disclosed that a kamikaze act at the hotel lobby front could have killed at least 200 people, given the lunchtime crowd in the adjoining coffee house. Instead, the bomb explosion was thrust downwards, creating a 2m wide and 1m deep crater. Nevertheless, 11 were killed in the bomb explosion, mostly Indonesian hotel security guards and taxi drivers awaiting passengers at the hotel front.

Disturbingly, Asmar is believed to be one of the ten or fifteen suicide bombers recruited by Mustofa, a senior JI leader (Mustofa was arrested in Semarang in July 2003). Asmar belonged to *Unit Khos*, a special squad within the JI network made up of suicide bombers believed to be gearing up for more attacks. Sidney Jones, the project director of the ICG in Jakarta has likened *Unit Khos* to the Indonesian military's Kopassus Special Forces unit.⁵² This *Unit Khos* special operations outfit specialises in bombings and assassinations. Based on the accounts of an unnamed former JI leader, Indonesia's *TEMPO* Magazine revealed that there are three kinds of fighters in JI: the regular fighters who have undergone four to six months of military training; the special unit *khos* fighters who have undergone military training for at least three years; and the militant *istimata* fighters who are prepared to carry out acts of *amaliyah istishadiyah* (suicide bombings). This suicide-bomber network is believed to be headed by Zulkarnaen (alias Arif Sunarso), reportedly the most senior JI leader after Hambali. Zulkarnaen commands JI's military wing, *Aksari*, which reports directly to the leadership of JI, be it Abu Bakar Bashir, Hambali or any of their successors (see Figure 7).

Figure 7: The *Aksari* Military Wing and JI Structure



Jl's Threat to Indonesia

The enactment of a new anti-terrorism law in Indonesia, which allows police to arrest a person and detain him for seven days on suspicion of terrorism based on intelligence reports, signals an important change in the perception of Indonesia in the fight against terrorism. Indonesia's resolve to stamp out the Jl network is clearly demonstrated with the death sentences passed on Bali bombers, Amrozi and Imam Samudra, and the life sentence on Ali Imron, for his involvement in executing the October 2002 bombings in Bali. Yet, despite convictions in the Bali cases, Indonesia's fight against terrorism appears still to be an arduous task. While Indonesia's security agencies are pushing for the introduction of tougher, if not draconian anti-terrorism laws and measures, politicians are out to score political points by opposing such moves or by denying that Jl even existed in Indonesia. On 17 September 2003, former President Abdurrahman Wahid has asserted that "none of the news that terrorists are here is convincing to me".⁵³ Such denials underscore that the politics of terrorism, especially the politicians' fear of a political backlash from the predominantly Muslim electorate as a consequence of heavy-handed measures against terrorism, affects how decisive and effective Indonesia will be in combating the Jl network.

Unlike the decisiveness demonstrated in the convictions of the Bali bombers Amrozi, Imam Samudra and Ali Imron, the four-years jail sentence of Bashir is a far cry from the 15 years that prosecutors had pressed for. Bashir was found guilty by the Jakarta court of subversion with the aim of overthrowing the government. However, he escaped terrorism charges due to a lack of evidence proving that he was the leader of Jl. Bashir's light jail term is sending mixed signals that Jakarta is 'taking one step forward, and two steps back' in its fight against terrorism. Doubts linger about Jakarta's credibility and commitment to fighting the Jl terror. The political ramification of an absence of a decisive stance against terrorism is stark: it offers hope for the terrorists to carry out acts of terrorism in the name of Islam.

Conclusion

The emergence of a region-wide terrorist network (with global linkages) that has been operating in a clandestine fashion for more than a decade is a new type of challenge confronting the Southeast Asia region. Unlike the Cold War challenge posed by communism, the JI challenge is all the more dangerous and difficult to manage because of its ability to camouflage its activities behind the cloak of Islamic practices, *albeit* of a radical nature. In fact, many of its adherents have been seduced into the JI brand of terrorism through this route. As such, other than detecting the menace, managing the JI threat is going to pose a significant dilemma for governments in the region, as they must be seen as suppressing the threat posed by terrorism, and not Islam.

The Bali bombings and the Marriott Hotel explosion revealed that the JI terror network is very much alive and possibly more potent than before. The 'Group of 272' formed from the number of Indonesians who fought in Afghanistan means that the terror network has the ability to reproduce itself very quickly. Moreover, the group of suicide bombers committed enough to the cause of *jihad* has significantly increased the potency of terrorist attacks in Indonesia and the region as a whole. On the whole, the latent pool of militants in Indonesia means that another 'Hambali' and another cast of kamikaze bombers could appear in the headlines before long.

CHAPTER 4

JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH AND ITS AUSTRALIAN CONNECTIONS

Introduction

On 11 September 2001, 19 *Al Qaeda* terrorists hijacked four US airlines, which were used to crash into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon in Washington DC and what was an unintended target, a field in Pennsylvania. The deadly terrorist attack on the United States killed an estimated 3,000 people. The September 11 tragedy has dramatically changed the global security environment and forced countries to rethink their established and conventional security policies. If any Australian had previously chosen to ignore this changing security context and embrace isolation, the Bali bombings brought the threat of terrorism into sharp focus for Australia. 202 people were killed and many others injured by the bomb blasts at the Sari Club and the Paddy's Irish Bar in Kota Beach, Bali. Among the deceased were 88 Australians. The majority of those injured were also Australians. As Foreign Minister Alexander Downer puts it, "the Bali bombings underscore that terrorism is in Australia's region — it is on our doorstep".⁵⁴ The Bali attack is a critical reminder that every country is threatened by the menace of terrorism and that no one is immune, including Australia.

Dangerous Times

With Osama Bin Laden's *Al Qaeda* and its call for international *jihād*, the threat of terrorism to Australians is global. Yet, the impact of terrorism on Australia is most acute in its immediate region. The presence of the JI terror network has fundamentally challenged the security of the region, most potently demonstrated by the Bali bombings. However, the Bali attack is not an isolated event. Warnings of terrorist threats against Australians include:

- Fears of a terrorist attack during the Sydney Olympics after three Afghans were caught with maps outlining the nuclear reactor at Lucas Heights in Sydney's south, August 2000.
- Terrorist attacks in September 2001 on the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon in Washington DC and what was an unintended target, a field in Pennsylvania.

- Attorney-General Daryl Williams received information that terrorists were planning attacks on US and UK interests in Australia over Christmas, December 2001.
- The Office of National Security issued warnings to Foreign Minister Downer that Australians could be intended targets in Bali, Riau and Singapore, June 2002.
- US agencies issued warnings to the Australian federal government of possible attacks against 'energy production and transmission infrastructure' in various Western countries, October 2002.
- Bali bomb blasts at the Sari Club and Paddy's Irish Bar, killing 88 Australians, October 2002.
- Department of Foreign Affairs issued warnings of a possible attack against Westerners in Surabaya, Indonesia, March 2003.
- Various security breaches at Australian airports in 2003, including the delay of a Qantas flight to Singapore in Perth after a retractable knife was found in a seat pocket, June 2003.
- J W Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta, killing 12 and injuring an Australian, August 2003.

JI at Work in Australia – A Case Study

In the midst of gold medal-winning performances by top-class athletes at the Sydney Olympic Games in 2000, plans for a most frightening terrorist plot to attack the nuclear reactor at Lucas Heights in Sydney's south were underway. Intelligence reports at that time suggested that *Al Qaeda* was planning to attack the Olympics. The plan was eventually called off, perhaps due to the lack of personnel to carry out the devastating attack. Subsequently, three Afghans were captured with maps outlining the nuclear reactor at Lucas Heights.

Three years on, the threat to Australia has remained, if not escalated. When an Australian, David Hicks, was suspected and arrested by the US for terrorism charges, the initial general consensus was one of disbelief. Hicks had apparently received advanced terrorist training with *Al Qaeda* for six months. Hicks learnt to use various weapons and carried out surveillance and ambushes during the six months training in an *Al Qaeda* programme. Since his capture in Afghanistan, Hicks has been detained by the US military at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba.

More worrying, it was revealed that JI had established its branches in Australia during the 1990s. According to a report by *Four Corners*, the leaders of JI, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir, turned their attention to Australia while in exile in Malaysia. It was in 1990 that the pair first arrived in Sydney. Sungkar and Bashir appointed their disciples to lead the new Australian branch, thereby displacing the authority of local religious leaders such as Zainal Arifin in the law-abiding Muslim community in suburban Dee Why. Zainal and his followers had to swear allegiance and accept the leadership of Sungkar and Bashir over the Australian community.⁵⁵ Bashir, in a speech given in 1993 in Sydney, demonstrated their intention to establish the JI network and an Islamic state in Australia,

The Islamic faithful in Australia must endeavour to bring about an Islamic state in Australia, even if it is 100 years from now... and may God bless the struggle of our brethren in Australia who have demonstrated such loyalty, despite being surrounded by non-believers.⁵⁶

While their leaders had aspirations for the JI branch in Australia known as *Mantiqi* (District) 4 to become operational in terms of launching terrorist attacks, affluent Australia was essentially an important source of funds for the cause of *jihad* in the region. The JI leaders' clamour for terrorist funds was concealed in the disguise of raising money for the needy in Malaysia and elsewhere in the region. According to Zainal Arifin, about A\$18,000 was raised each month in Perth and Melbourne.⁵⁷ Also, JI's message for 'charity projects' won support among some non-Indonesian Muslims, including a group known as the Islamic Youth Movement in Sydney's west. From its office in Lakemba, the movement raised funds for relief projects in Islamic countries. Whether these funds eventually went to the needy remains highly doubtful. What is clear however is that the JI branch in Australia has generated much of the terrorist funds, including the US\$1 million sent in 2000 to the MILF in the Philippines to buy vehicles.

It is believed that the JI movement extended to Perth, Melbourne and Sydney, Australia in 1996 and is known as *Mantiqi* 4. This Australian network is led by Abdul Rahim Ayub, a follower of Sungkar in Jakarta. Abdul Rahim Ayub moved to Australia in the 1980s, first to Melbourne and subsequently settled into an apartment in Dee Why. In 1998, with the construction of a new mosque for the local Muslim community in Dee Why, Abdul Rahim and his extremists planned to take over the place of worship. It was Abdul Rahim's intention to use the new mosque as a base for the

expansion of JI's influence and support in Australia. The arrival of Abdul Rahim's twin brother, Abdul Rahman Ayub, in Australia fuelled the extremists' violent attempt to capture the mosque. Abdul Rahman is an Afghan war veteran, who fought alongside the *Mujahideen* and *Al Qaeda* for five years. When Zainal Arifin opposed the presence of the extremists in the mosque, he was attacked by the Abdul Rahim group. Subsequently, Zainal went to court and obtained an apprehended violence order against the Ayub brothers. The pair then left Dee Why to seek out another base in Australia.

Abdul Rahim settled in Perth and subsequently became a paid teacher and a board-member of the *Al-Hidayah* Islamic school. His twin brother, Abdul Rahman also helped out in the school. Unknown to the school or the local community, the Ayub brothers were in fact top leaders of the JI branch in Australia. Abdul Rahim told his employers at the Islamic school in Perth that he needed to return to Indonesia in order to visit his sick mother and left Australia at the start of the school holidays on 27 September 2002. He has been on the run ever since. According to revelations gained from the interrogations of detained *Mantiqi 3* leader, Nasir Abbas, Abdul Rahim is still the head of JI's *Mantiqi 4*, covering Australia, Indonesia (Papua) and possibly Papua New Guinea and East Timor.

Australia's Response to the JI Threat

While the presence of a JI branch in Australia fundamentally challenges the capability of Canberra to deal with the threat of terrorism, it is clear that the war against terrorism is a multi-faceted, multi-front battle. Hence, Australia's battle against the JI terror network can be analysed in terms of its counter-terrorism endeavour in the domestic, regional and international arenas.

Domestic Counter-Terrorism Measures

The Australian government has responded robustly to the threat of terrorism. It has introduced a wide range of strong domestic measures to combat the presence of the JI branch in Australia. The Government is strengthening military, police and intelligence counter-terrorism capabilities at a cost of \$1.3 billion over five years.⁵⁸ It has tightened financial, aviation and border controls. It has established an inter-governmental agreement on counter-terrorism cooperation that focuses on, among other issues, the coordination of critical infrastructure and communications protection.

The new measures implemented by the Government and national security agencies include⁵⁹:

- Increased intelligence capability such as the creation of a 24-hour Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) monitoring and alert facility.
- Strengthened defence forces with the establishment of (i) a new Special Operations Command under the command of Major General Duncan Lewis; (ii) a counter-terrorist Tactical Assault Group; and (iii) a 300-strong Incident Response Regiment with specialised skills and equipment to counter chemical, biological, radiological and explosive threats.
- Improved Federal police capability with joint Federal, State and Territory Police counter-terrorist investigation teams and a new counter-terrorist coordination centre.
- Enhanced security whilst flying due to increased baggage and passenger screening and tighter airport security.
- Tightened customs controls with advanced facial imaging identification equipment and new facilities including giant X-ray machines that can examine three shipping containers at once.
- New anti-terrorism laws that can indict individuals who plan, support or engage in a terrorist act, or who train with (or are members of) a terrorist organisation. Penalties of up to life imprisonment may apply. Assets of terrorist organisations and their supporters can now be frozen.
- Upgraded emergency services to counter chemical, biological, radiological and explosive threats. In a national emergency, the Prime Minister will take strategic control.

Regional Cooperation against Terrorism

In recognising that a regional counter-terrorism endeavour is probably the best means to deal with the regional threat of JI, Australia is committed to the Southeast Asian region's fight against terrorism. Australia also has taken the lead in having the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) focus on the promotion of regional counter-terrorism cooperation. Also, Canberra has strengthened its cooperation links with other key Southeast Asian nations. The Government has signed counter-terrorism agreements with Indonesia,

Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. These agreements provide the basis for closer intelligence exchanges and strengthened cooperation between law enforcement agencies. These agreements will also complement the regional counter-terrorism 'pact' between Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Cambodia and Thailand. Boosted by shared interests to defeat the JI terror network in the region, Australia is providing assistance to regional countries in their bid to strengthen their capacities in key security areas.

Australia's program of assistance include, among others⁶⁰:

- A A\$10 million, four-year programme to assist Indonesia in the strengthening of its police force's counter-terrorism capacity. The programme also aims to restrict the flow of funds to terrorists and to improve travel security through stronger customs control.
- Training regional security and intelligence agencies to enhance their counter-terrorism capacity.
- Counter-terrorism exercises between the Australian Defence Force and Special Forces units of the armed forces of Thailand and the Philippines.
- Counter-terrorism investigation training in Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji. It aims to improve management and analytical skills and intelligence support for the Pacific countries during terrorist attacks.
- Anti-money laundering training and workshops in Papua New Guinea and other Pacific island countries to control the flow of funds to terrorists.
- Assisting Pacific island countries draft their counter-terrorism legislation. These countries are required to implement counter-terrorism laws under the Nasonini Declaration.

Having identified Indonesia as a critical player in the fight against the JI terror network, attempts were made to strengthen ties between Canberra and Jakarta even before the Bali bombings. The Australian government concluded a counter-terrorism agreement with its Indonesian counterpart in February 2002. This agreement paved the way for joint investigations into the Bali attacks. The success of this cooperation is evident with the capture of key JI leaders and the perpetrators of the Bali bomb blasts, including among others, the Nurhasyim brothers (Mukhlas, Amrozi and Ali Imron) and the Bali bombings field commander, Imam Samudra, and his deputy, Idris.

More importantly, Canberra clearly indicated the significance of the Australian-Indonesian relations with its plans to resume ties with the Indonesian Special Forces, Kopassus, in the area of counter-terrorism. Prime Minister John Howard has publicly stated that Kopassus could best protect Australians and Australian interests in Indonesia in the face of the terrorist threats faced by both countries. In a message directed to Australians living in Jakarta, the Prime Minister said: "Don't lose faith in the relationship and the friendship between our two countries. It is very important to our futures".⁶¹ The statement is an astonishing turnaround for ties between Canberra and Jakarta, which had been strained by the Indonesian military-backed bloodbath in the former East Timor in 1999. Under the leadership of John Howard, Australia has already undergone two periods of extreme tension — over East Timor in 1999 and over the Tampa Affair and Howard's victorious 'asylum seeker' election in 2001. Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda has also admitted that Indonesians are still affronted by Howard's comment about the role of Australia as a 'deputy sheriff' of the US and his suggestion of pre-emptive strikes against neighbouring countries in countering terrorism.⁶² John Howard argued that, "it stands to reason that if you believe that somebody was going to launch an attack on your country, either of a conventional kind or a terrorist kind, and you had a capacity to stop it and there was no alternative other than to use that capacity, then, of course, you would have to use it". On taking pre-emptive action against terrorists in neighbouring countries, Howard said, "Oh yes. I think any Australian prime minister would".⁶³ In view of his harsh statements against Indonesia, Howard's latest endorsement of Australian-Indonesian ties is unexpected, if not out of character.

Despite the fact that Kopassus members were probably the main culprits in human rights abuses in Aceh and Papua, Howard's new affirmed importance of the Indonesian government and Kopassus is understandable. The move towards new engagement is only realistic given that Kopassus, and not the Indonesian police, is primarily responsible for, and has the capability to deal with, the threat of *Ji* in Indonesia. The bolstering of relations between Canberra and Jakarta has also been facilitated by the strong personal ties between Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer and his Indonesian counterpart, Dr Hassan Wirajuda. However, the issue of human rights violations has remained a sticky one. While Dr Hassan has welcomed the new era of synergy between the two countries, Downer has maintained that Australian troops would only engage Kopassus members untainted by human rights abuses.⁶⁴ Also, any new engagement is likely to be discreet. The Bali investigators from Australia have set a precedent of astutely taking a back seat while allowing the Indonesian police to claim credit for the

arrests of key Bali suspects. In contrast to Howard's 'megaphone diplomacy' during the Tampa Affair, Canberra's new low-key approach is likely to be appreciated in Jakarta. Notwithstanding the issue of human rights violations, the new cosiness between Australia and Indonesia is a major decisive moment for the cooperation between Canberra and Jakarta in countering the *Ji* threat.

International Action Against Terrorism

The linkages of *Ji* with other regional and global terrorist groups means that the terrorist threat to Australians has amplified both domestically and overseas. The problem cannot be dealt with by a single country alone. Instead, the international threat of terrorism demands a global counter-terrorism endeavour. It is for this reason that Australia has sustained and cultivated its links with countries whose capabilities are crucial for the international war against terrorism.

In this respect, the United States is of enormous importance because of its law enforcement, military and intelligence resources that are critical in the war against terrorism. The clandestine nature of terrorists necessitates the employment of state-of-the-art intelligence. Cooperation with the US and other intelligence partners, such as the United Kingdom, is thus vital to Australia's pursuit of justice against the perpetrators of terrorist acts. In a national address on 20 March 2003, Prime Minister Howard affirmed that, in the arduous fight against terrorism, there is nothing more critical than timely and accurate intelligence reports.⁶⁵ It is clear that the close friendship and the intimate sharing of intelligence between Canberra and Washington have been strengthened in the face of the terrorism threat.

Australia is an important global actor in the coalition against terrorism, which includes over 60 countries. Australia's contribution in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan has demonstrated clearly the effectiveness of coordinated international action. Members of Australia's Special Air Service Regiment (SAS) assisted in the defeat of the *Taliban* in Afghanistan. More importantly, the downfall of the *Taliban* regime has decisively disrupted *Al Qaeda* operations. Also, the deployment of air force and navy personnel in regions surrounding Afghanistan provided vital support to the SAS.

While the military force has demonstrated its importance in countering terrorism, the Australian Foreign Ministry led by Downer has also utilised diplomacy to alleviate the fears within Muslim communities that the war against terrorism is not a war against Islam. Downer has emphasised that the war against terrorism "does not represent a clash between Islamic and

Western norms, cultures and civilisations. The war against terrorism is a clash, instead, between tolerance and moderation, on the one hand, and, on the other, zealotry and extremism".⁶⁶ Indeed, it is important to note that the majority of Muslims are moderates and have nothing to do with terrorism.

Conclusion

As an important global player, world events have a direct impact on Australia. It is thus not surprising that the September 11 and Bali bomb blasts have had acute repercussions on Australian interests. The threat of terrorism has dramatically changed the security outlook and environment of Australia. Perceived as part of the Western world and its 'Zionist conspirators', Australians are now targets of the menace of the JI terror network. Terrorism is, as Foreign Minister Downer puts it, 'on the doorstep' of Australia. The strengthening of close cooperation between Canberra and various governments in the region is an important step in the fight against terrorism. However, Australia must realise that success in the region's counter-terrorism endeavour cannot be expected overnight, particularly in a region laden with a lackadaisical political will to deal with hard-line Muslims, lest it jeopardises the support of a politically-sensitive, predominantly Islamic electorate and ruins the chances of re-election for incumbent governments. Hence, Canberra must continue to assure moderate Muslim communities that its fight against terrorism is not a war against Islam or a 'clash of civilisations'.

CHAPTER 5

MANAGING THE *JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH* THREAT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Introduction

Unlike the management of other terrorist organisations or even past terrorist organisations in the region, due to the nature, character and expanse of JI, the only way the threat posed by it can be managed is through the adoption of comprehensive, wide-ranging measures. As it is a 'national' organisation, specific local and national measures would be needed to contain, neutralise and eventually weed out the menace. As JI is also a regional terrorist organisation, region-wide measures would also be needed, either on a bilateral or ASEAN-wide multilateral basis. Finally, as JI is connected with the *Al Qaeda* network and has an international agenda, either regionally or internationally to support the 'global jihad struggle', especially against the United States, international measures would also be needed to manage the threat. What measures have been taken thus far and how effective they have been are analysed in this chapter.

International

Prior to the September 11 attack, the ASEAN countries viewed the United States as a champion of democracy and human rights in the region, best evident in the manner in which Al Gore, the former American Vice-President, championed for the release of the detained Anwar Ibrahim, the former deputy of Dr Mahathir Mohammad. September 11 changed everything with the Republicans under George Bush, already converts of *realpolitik*, re-orienting American foreign and defence policies against international terrorism. In a way, there appears to be a new 'cold war', only this time the enemy is not 'international communism' but 'international terrorism', often confined to Islam and not other religions.

Internationally, almost all countries in Southeast Asia supported the various counter-terrorism measures that were being undertaken, especially by the US and its allies. Most countries condemned the '911' attack as an attack on the 'civilised world'. This was best evident in the stance adopted by the Singapore Government. The Republic strongly supported retaliations against the perpetrators, as it believed that there was no safety in silence.

Singapore's leaders defended their support for the US as follows:

We have to stand up for our principles. It's not an attack just on the US. Its 7,000-odd casualties and more than 2,000 were from 80 different countries. So it's an attack on all civilised, open countries in the world. Singapore is also vulnerable. We are a financial centre, we are an economic hub, we are an open city. It happened in the US. We can take precautions but we can never say it will not happen in Singapore. And indeed, such things have happened in Singapore.⁶⁷

In the same vein, Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong argued that "we have to participate in the international effort against terrorism because it is our responsibility as an international citizen. This is something all countries have to do together".⁶⁸ Singapore made its clearest stance yet on the issue when its foreign minister, Professor S. Jayakumar argued in a speech during the Ministerial Meeting on Counter-Terrorism at the United Nations Security Council that:

Countering the threat of terrorism is clearly and rightly now a central global priority. The perpetrators of these horrendous crimes must not go unpunished. They must be brought to justice to deter others from contemplating similar horrific crimes. Singapore stands with the international community in this campaign against terrorism. This is not a fight against any religion. It is not a fight against the people of Afghanistan. It is a fight against the forces of violence, intolerance and fanaticism. It is a fight for civilisation and a fight that we must win. We must gird ourselves for a long effort. The threats will come in many different forms. Some will be more virulent than others, some wax while others wane. And, like disease, even as one source of terrorism is eradicated, others will spring up or mutate. Only a determined, united, comprehensive and sustained global strategy will enable the international community to contain these malignant forces.⁶⁹

Singapore and its ASEAN members also endorsed the various measures, especially those financial in nature, adopted by the United Nations Security Council in countering terrorism. One of the most telling signs of growing international cooperation in stamping out terrorism was the 3 August 2002 signing in Brunei of the wide-ranging anti-terrorist pact between the US and ASEAN countries. The pact committed the parties to mutual assistance

in the crackdown on the movement of terrorists, detection of fake passports and movement of terrorist funds. It also called for improved intelligence sharing and stronger counter-terrorism measures as part of the wide-ranging goal to prevent, disrupt and combat international terrorism.⁷⁰

Regional

What transpired in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 was a testament to the global reach of terrorism and its far-reaching spillover ramifications, especially in Southeast Asia. The region could not escape the consequences of whatever 'order' dominated the world, as it was plugged into the world strategically, politically and economically. With Washington blaming Osama Bin Laden and the *Al Qaeda* network for the terrorist attack, and declaring war on all those who supported and harboured such terrorists, particularly the *Taliban* regime in Afghanistan, the US's anti-terrorist war eventually reached Southeast Asia, mainly due to links that were alleged to have existed between various terrorist groups in Southeast Asia and those targeted by the US. For example, GAM, MILF, *Abu Sayyaf* and JI were believed to have close ties with Osama and *Al Qaeda*.⁷¹

In this regard, particular attention was paid to Islamic terrorists alleged to be operating in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, and eventually as part of a network discovered in Singapore in December 2001. Though motivated by differing considerations, ASEAN was jolted into action and this saw a number of policies being adopted by the regional body. The first important step was broached when all Heads of Governments, at the Seventh ASEAN Summit in Brunei, adopted the *ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter-Terrorism* (ADJACT) on 5 November 2001. Among other outcomes, the Heads of ASEAN Governments:

- condemned the 11 September terrorist attacks and extended deepest sympathy and condolences to the people and Government of the US and the relatives of the victims;
- committed themselves to counter, prevent, and suppress all forms of terrorist acts;
- approved the initiatives of the Third ASEAN Ministers Meeting on Transnational Crime held in October 2001 to focus on terrorism and deal effectively with the issue at all levels and endorse the convening of an Ad Hoc Experts Meeting and Special sessions of the Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) and an Annual Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) that will focus on terrorism.

The pressing question is: how can ASEAN, in the light of its commitments to counter-terrorism, implement what has been agreed upon? The ADJACT did provide a framework as far as possible courses of action were concerned, including reviewing and strengthening national mechanisms to combat terrorism; signing, ratification and accession to all relevant anti-terrorist conventions; deepening cooperation among front-line law enforcement agencies in combating terrorism and sharing 'best practices'; integrating relevant international conventions on terrorism with those of ASEAN; enhancing information and intelligence exchange on terrorists and terrorist organisations, their movement and funding; strengthening cooperation and coordination between AMMTC and other relevant bodies in ASEAN in countering, preventing and suppressing all forms of terrorist acts; and enhancing regional counter-terrorism capacities.⁷²

A number of initiatives have been undertaken in the 'region's war against terrorism', including:

- The undertaking of closer intelligence cooperation between ASEAN partners, best evident in the 'informal' meeting of the military intelligence chiefs held in Kuala Lumpur in late January 2002.
- Provision of intelligence and information to neighbours, which led to the arrest of the alleged Indonesian bomb maker in the Philippines, Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi, and *Al Qaeda* operative, Mohamad Mansour Jabarah.
- The formation of a troika (Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia) to discuss joint policy. This anti-terror pact was gradually expanded to include Thailand, Cambodia and Brunei. Singapore, however, indicated its preference for a bilateral approach arguing that "we feel that the provisions in there [the expanded troika] are already covered by existing understandings by Singapore and the respective ASEAN countries".⁷³
- An increase in border cooperation between Indonesia and Malaysia.
- An ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC), followed by a Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism, held in Kuala Lumpur in May 2002.

National

It is, however, at the national level that most counter-terrorist measures have been taken by various countries, and it is here that Singapore's policy towards international terrorism and especially the threat posed by various

Islamic militant groups was more obvious. Motivated by differing, and at times even conflicting, domestic concerns, countries in the ASEAN region have adopted a whole array of measures to combat the menace. Even though there is a lack of uniformity in the national counter-measures, it is clear that countries that have the will and are least constrained domestically, such as Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines, have adopted wide-ranging measures to deal with the threat compared to some others, such as Indonesia that, for different reasons, had to be more circumscribed and restrained in managing the threat. The policies adopted by the Singapore Government are an excellent manifestation of the lengths to which some governments are prepared to go in managing terrorism in Southeast Asia.

In December 2001, the Government announced the arrest of a clandestine group of 13 Singaporeans with links to regional and international terrorists, who were planning to bomb Western, especially American, commercial and military targets in Singapore. An additional two were arrested but released with Restriction Orders (ROs) forbidding them from leaving Singapore without official consent. That the terrorists' threat to Singapore was real was further reinforced when the Singapore Prime Minister revealed on 5 April 2002 that five other members of JI planned, a month following the arrest of 13 suspected terrorists, to hijack a plane and crash it into Singapore's Changi International Airport.⁷⁴ In August 2002, an additional 18 members were arrested. All those arrested were believed to be members of *Jemaah Islamiyah*. An additional three members were also arrested but subsequently released after being issued with ROs. Of the 31, eleven had received military training in *Al Qaeda* camps in Afghanistan. An additional three had trained with the MILF in the Philippines. Those arrested were described as 'foot/ground soldiers', with the masterminds operating from abroad.⁷⁵ Many more JI operatives and cells are believed to be in the country and apprehending them has been given a top priority.⁷⁶ The Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs also stated on 21 September 2002 that it believed that "about a dozen [JI] members are dispersed and in hiding in the region".⁷⁷ In this regard, the policy goals as far as managing Islamic militant groups, especially JI, are as follows:

- (a) Investigate, unearth and disrupt the JI network in the country.
- (b) Prevent violence and harm to life and property in the country.
- (c) Undertake preventive detention of all JI operatives in the country that are deemed dangerous.
- (d) Engage various government agencies to socialise the nature of threat to ensure that it does not undermine ethnic and social cohesion in the country and where the threat is not Islam but terrorism.

- (e) Support various diplomatic and political efforts to designate JI as an international terrorist organisation.

It is against this backdrop that the anti-terrorism policies of Singapore can be appreciated, which include:

- Using the Internal Security Act to arrest 31 (by October 2002) suspected terrorists belonging to the *Jemaah Islamiyah*.⁷⁸
- Outlining a new homeland security framework to enhance cooperation between the Defence and Home Affairs ministries, under the purview of the Security Policy Review Committee. A 'special joint exercise' between the two ministries was organised in late January 2002 involving, among others, the evacuation of casualties in a chemical plant that had been sabotaged and decontaminating fire-fighters who had come into contact with chemicals as well as disposal of bombs. All these activities are coordinated by the National Security Task Force that is under the charge of Deputy Prime Minister and Coordinating Minister for Security and Defence, Dr Tony Tan.
- Establishing a National Security Secretariat to strengthen coordination between all security agencies.⁷⁹
- Strengthening the Counter-Terrorism Division in the Ministry of Home Affairs, set up in 1988, as well as establishing the Joint Counter Terrorism Centre in January 2002 to coordinate intelligence efforts to combat terrorism.
- Passing the UN Act forbidding Singaporeans and foreigners in the Republic from assisting terrorists financially or otherwise, thereby criminalising such acts.
- Signing the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.
- Expanding the budget for intelligence and counter-terrorism activities.
- Strengthening the Suspicious Transactions Reporting Office in order to stop money-laundering activities that might involve with international terrorism.
- Supporting various diplomatic and political efforts to designate JI as an international terrorist organisation.
- Emphasising inter-ethnic harmony and peace through various mechanisms, including the establishment of Inter-Racial Harmony Circles throughout the country.

In the main, as each Southeast Asian country is confronted with its own home-grown terrorist problem, counter-terrorism measures at the national level are particularly critical, given governments and their policies must be accountable to the due electoral process. Despite this constraint, countries faced with the terrorist threat, especially Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines, have undertaken various measures, including the arrest of suspects alleged to be involved in national, regional and international terrorism. In the case of Singapore and Malaysia, this has been greatly facilitated by resorting to laws enacted by the British colonial authorities that provided for detention without trial. At the same time, all governments have committed themselves to anti-terrorism policies, even though the type of commitment implemented has varied from country to country. Despite the public espousal to wipe out terrorism and undertake cooperative measures, thus far, only the Philippines has invited the United States to undertake 'joint exercises', a euphemism, for military support in its war against the *Abu Sayyaf* terrorists in southern Philippines.⁸⁰

Conclusion

Although the challenge posed by religious-oriented terrorism is not new, the nature and character of the *Ji* threat has forced the various governments in the region to become more pro-active nationally, regionally and internationally in order to overcome the menace. Not only does *Ji* pose a threat to the various regimes in the region, at the same time, it has the potential to wreak havoc on the delicate ethnic and racial balance in various Southeast Asian countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as giving these countries a negative image to investors, and tourists as well as the West. As such, the stakes are indeed high and managing *Ji* has indeed become a high priority security issue, best evident in the various laws, regulations as well as investments propping up the security and intelligence services.

CHAPTER 6

THE LIMITS TO MANAGING THE *JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH* THREAT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Introduction

Although governments in the region are in concert that JI is a serious political, economic and security menace, the fact that the terrorist organisation has been able to germinate almost undetected for so long and reach various critical sectors of society would tend to indicate that serious problems exist in the management of the threat. Uppermost in this regard, over and above the availability of resources, is the fact that JI, as an 'Islamic' organisation, has been able to 'melt away' and take cover in various legitimate religious activities, thereby making its detection and its threat-oriented activities that much more difficult to detect. At the same time, in Islamic-dominant societies such as Malaysia and Indonesia, there is the political cost of antagonising the 'Islamic vote bank', and governments are generally wary of appearing anti-Islamic and of being perceived as persecuting radical Islamic groups at the behest of what appears to be the 'anti-Islamic West'.

Limits to Managing JI in Southeast Asia

Due to its strategic location, political and economic importance to the world and the presence of a large Islamic populace, Southeast Asia figures greatly in the international fight against terrorism. However, the first priority should be for governments in the region, possibly with the assistance of the US, to address the various domestic sources of tensions. According to Mohamed Jawhar Hassan, "the Muslim majority countries of ASEAN, noted for their essentially moderate and pacifist ways, can play a key role in mobilising the Islamic world in this endeavour".⁸¹ He identified a number of steps that states in the region can take in the fight against terrorism. Southeast Asian states can contribute in the campaign against terrorism. This can be done by cleaning up their own backyard and making the environment non-conducive to international terrorists and their overtures to local militants. There is also the need to intensify efforts to address both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism. The root causes include socio-economic development in southern Philippines, economic recovery in Indonesia, greater determination in restoring law and order and apprehending militants in Maluku and Sulawesi to end the sectarian violence, as well as finding a peaceful solution to the problem in Aceh and

Papua. Social cohesion and satisfaction, together with a just and able political administration, are increasingly seen as natural barriers to both the recruitment and sustenance of terrorist elements. The object should be to make the ground infertile to terrorist appeals and, once the region is relatively free from strife, terrorism would be unable to take root, almost in the same manner as communism was rooted out of the region in the past.

As long as the US is perceived to be selectively promoting certain countries and policies rather than fairly assisting the suppression of terrorism in the region, its counter-terrorist policies are unlikely to succeed in the region. It is thus important for the US to be ready and willing to invest time, effort and resources into Southeast Asia to assist in the maintenance of peace and stability. The approach should be to allow the US to take a back seat and let ASEAN take care of itself in its own way — whilst still consistently providing assistance and expertise when required to combat the terrorist menace in the region. It is also crucial that regional forums such as the ASEAN Human Rights Working Group and the Asia-Pacific Dialogues be treated not as a vehicle for them to champion American interests and policies, but rather for them to show interest in the problems of the region, and indeed the region itself. These include issues of good governance, human rights and economic stability. In this regard, there is a serious need to overhaul America's hegemonic image in the region. The US should make efforts to be seen as a supporter of peace and stability rather than one that is merely interested in advancing its own selfish, national interests in Southeast Asia.

Closely related to Washington's adoption of policies that are in principle sound, Walter Laqueur also observed that "the current resurgence of religious terrorism is largely identified with trends in the Muslim and the Arab World, much to the chagrin of the defenders of Islam and Islamists in the West and East".⁸² This has the potential to complicate and undermine Washington's counter-terrorism posture in general, and Southeast Asia in particular. This concern was clearly articulated by Mr Goh Chok Tong, Singapore's Prime Minister, when he argued that the fight against terrorism is "not a fight against Islam. It is a fight against terrorists who misuse religion to rally support for their cause and to justify their violence".⁸³

Southeast Asia is a region where moderate Muslims form the majority of the populace, and where, due to the increasing tendency towards 'a clash of civilisations', the maintenance of racial-religious harmony is a great concern not only to the region but also to the world at large. How the governments in the region manage the delicate ethnic balance in their respective societies, especially in states such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines, where there are sizeable Muslim populations, and

whether Washington relates fairly and prudently with these governments, will go a long way in determining the success of counter-terrorism policies in the region. Any government that appears or behaves as nothing more than a proxy of Washington in its counter-terrorism policy in the region is likely to gain the wrath of its citizens and be regionally isolated.

Closely related to a sense of fair play by governments in the region and the US is the manner in which the politics in the Middle East has evolved. US policy in the Middle East and, more particularly, Washington's response to the Israeli-Palestinian crisis during the tenure of the hawkish Ariel Sharon, will have a major determining role in promoting or limiting the success of American anti-terrorism policies in the region. If the US adopts a one-sided policy of backing Israel at all cost, as is widely perceived in Southeast Asia, it will only succeed in heightening the general sense of injustice towards Muslims in general, and Palestinians in particular. If the US fails to distinguish between Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism, with the former largely fuelled by the sense of injustice and helplessness in the face of state-sponsored violence by Israel, the net result is likely to be a paradigm shift in favour of greater religious fervour and fundamentalism, with extremist rather than moderate leaders gaining the cudgels of power in the region.

What cannot be denied is that US policy in the Middle East has created an anti-US sentiment in the Arab-Muslim world and provided the motif force to oppose the US and its policies. To some, the 11 September 2001 attacks were largely driven by this consideration. The Israel-Palestine saga during the leadership of Ariel Sharon, where the US fully backed the hard-line policies of Israel, has only succeeded in creating more dissension in the region. In the face of the seemingly pro-Israeli policies of the US and Israel's excessive violence against Palestinians, many Islamic groups in ASEAN have volunteered to physically aid in the fight against Israel, just as they did during the Afghanistan bombings. As long as the Israel-Palestinian problem remains unresolved, it will only succeed in fanning the flame of anti-US sentiments in the region, driven by what is perceived as double standards in US policy as regards the Middle East. The empathy that is increasingly shared between the Muslim majority nations means that one cannot ignore their concerns, and anti-US sentiments and elements will continue to fester as long as Washington continues its hypocritical policies of supporting Israel's violence while objecting to similar measures by Islamic groups.

Washington's policies toward Indonesia, the most populous Islamic country in the world, have also weakened its global anti-terrorism war. In its euphoria to undertake 'democratic enlargement' at all costs, the Clinton

Administration supported the overthrow of Suharto and the subsequent democratisation of Indonesia. This saw, among other events, Indonesia's decision to abandon East Timor, the former Portuguese colony that it annexed in 1975. However, the mayhem that followed the United Nations mismanaged referendum in August 1999 led the United States to cut all ties with the Indonesian military, the most important political force in the country and the most important pillar capable of countering Islamic extremism and terrorism in the country. As long as the US Congress maintains its ban on military sales and training assistance, and continues to insist on 'reforming the Indonesian military',⁸⁴ there will be great limits to the ability of the latter to effectively manage and deal with the terrorist threat in the country.

Ironically, for Washington, democratisation in Indonesia has meant that the Islamic constituency has become all-powerful politically, thereby weakening the government's ability to deal with hard line Muslims and their organisations in the country, lest it be accused of undertaking Suharto-type anti-Islamic programs that in the past were endorsed by the Western world, especially the United States.⁸⁵ This was best evident in the decision of the Indonesian Government to pardon Abu Bakar Bashir on charges of subversion and its intervention in seeking the release of Tasmsil Linrung and Abdul Jamal Balfas from detention in the Philippines.⁸⁶ That Washington's counter-terrorism policies are facing problems in Indonesia was clearly evident in the allegations of Lieutenant-General Zen Maulani, the former Head of National Intelligence, when he argued that the 'sole Superpower' was using 'anti-terrorism' to gain control of Indonesia:

...since Indonesia had many islands, a population of 220 million and some Muslim extremists, the US analysts concluded that the *Al Qaeda* network must exist here...The US was trying to create the image that there is an *Al Qaeda* network in this country to force the Indonesian Government to act more firmly, more proactively in taking part in the fight against what the Americans label 'terrorism'. [However] Washington's main aim was to weaken the forces of Islam in Indonesia and to control its abundant natural resources. To maintain its sole superpower position, its war and economic industries [must] survive, and they need oil. The world's largest oil producers are in the Islamic world and that is why there is a need for US hegemony over the Islamic world. [In this endeavour] the US was bent on dividing Indonesia into smaller states so that none would have the power to stand up to it. They are applying a preventive strategy to prevent

Islamic countries, including Indonesia, from becoming advanced countries.⁸⁷

Additionally, the nature of ASEAN, inter-state differences, as well as the strategic nature of the Islamic community in each country will also place brakes on the effectiveness of the American counter-terrorist posture and policies in the region. While ASEAN has come of age, it remains, relatively speaking, a weak organisation. Regional politics has traditionally centred on non-interference and consensus between states as the basis for any discussion and policy in the region organisation. It is this understanding that has successfully managed inter-state tensions. It is precisely this approach that has also prevented the region from binding together in a collective effort against terrorism. ASEAN countries have been loath to see interference in their domestic affairs by another neighbour and this has greatly militated inter-ASEAN cooperation in counter-terrorism. Ironically, some countries in the region, such as the Philippines, have found it easier to request military assistance from the US rather than from a fellow ASEAN counterpart. Indeed, most states in Southeast Asia find it easier to cooperate at an international level; however, most of them are faced with domestic tensions and conflicts at home because different groups have differing opinions on this issue leading to inter-state relations being cohesive while intra-state ties tend to be more divisive.

Added to this, even though ASEAN has committed itself to combating the scourge of terrorism, its ability to do so has been greatly hampered by growing differences among its member-states over various issues. While disagreements over defining what terrorism covers is rather universal, following 11 September 2001, what has come to the fore has been the different approaches adopted by member states to tackle the menace and the preparedness of Singapore, a strategic ally of the US and essentially a Chinese majority state with a sizeable Muslim minority, to openly criticise Indonesia for not doing enough to tackle terrorism in that country. Both of these developments have affected ASEAN's effectiveness to tackle terrorism in the region, thereby weakening the US's ability to manage the problem there. What these problems highlight is the lack of a united front in Southeast Asia in the creation of a terrorist-free region. Additionally, due to the increasing political clout of political Islam in Indonesia, Jakarta finds it increasingly difficult to crack down on the various hard-line Islamic groups and is not prepared to tolerate actions being taken against suspected Indonesian terrorists in the region. This was evident in the Indonesian Government intervention that led to the release of a number of terrorist suspects when they were arrested in the Philippines in 2002.

Finally, what has appeared to be the most serious obstacle in stamping out the terrorist threat in the region has been the presence of a large Islamic community that is not always supportive of the government's policies as far as counter-terrorism is concerned. In countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, there has always been a certain degree of unease and suspicion that counter-terrorism is just another cloak to undertake anti-Islamic policies, and this has militated government action against the *bona fide* terrorist groups. How to undertake counter-terrorism policies against Islamic-oriented terrorist groups without appearing to be anti-Islamic is one of the most difficult challenges facing governments in the region, particularly in Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei, where the Islamic political constituency is also the largest, and in Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines, where it is somewhat sizeable. Together, these developments have placed limits on the ability of the US to undertake counter-terrorist actions and ensure that strategically important Southeast Asia is free from the threat posed by terrorism, especially to American interests.

Conclusion

Terrorism in Southeast Asia is very much a problem that needs to be addressed on various levels. There is a need for the Southeast Asian region to demonstrate to the international community that it is able to handle the threat of terrorism in a concerted manner. The creation of a region-wide consensus to coordinate efforts would go a long way towards centralising the effort against terrorism, as well as sounding out to the world that ASEAN is united in eradicating terrorism in the region. Due to various developments, mainly domestic in nature, despite platitudes to eradicate terrorism, Southeast Asian governments have been unable to agree on a common approach in tackling the problem. At the same time, it is crucial for ASEAN and the US to recognise that the root causes of terrorism often lie in the domestic sphere. Issues of political misrepresentation, socio-economic concerns and religious diversity should be dealt with fairly and expediently so that there is little or no ground for terrorist elements to latch on to. It is equally important that the more moderate Muslim community in the region assert itself onto the international Islamic consciousness and call for a more moderate stand. It is undoubtedly beneficial for the religion that the common misconception that Islamic extremism is the cause of terrorism be curtailed. The US should also take an active interest in assisting in the creation of a security network, as well as providing aid and expertise to resolve the domestic problems plaguing the region. Washington should also re-examine its Middle Eastern policy, especially in light of the unfolding Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Already being criticised for its inaction and bias of its

response to the Middle East, the US should reconsider its options in the Southeast Asian region, as the region remains central in the fight against international terrorism.

At the same time, it is also clear that as the JI terror network cuts across national borders, there is an urgent need to disrupt the regional network, including the movement of JI operatives, finance and weapons. While nationally all governments in the region are said to be doing so, what appears lacking is regional political will. All the original ASEAN founding members, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines are seriously threatened by JI and have a long history of security cooperation. Yet, when it comes to managing the JI threat, despite increased intelligence exchange and sharing, there does not appear to be a strong signal that ASEAN, as a regional organisation, is prepared to stem the JI menace. There is no ASEAN Anti-Terrorism Task Force or the like. As Admiral Dennis Blair, the former Commander-in-Chief of the US Pacific Command has stated, the challenge of terrorism "is beyond the resources and authority of any single country and its armed forces". As such, until and unless the ASEAN Governments, particularly the founding members, get their act together, the JI threat will take a long time to manage. Is ASEAN waiting for another Bali attack or another J W Marriott Hotel bombing to occur before it will act militarily as a regional grouping? Is it not time for ASEAN to become a security organisation in the management of terrorism? In the last twenty years or so, ASEAN has done well in managing conventional threats from outside. However, when it comes to non-conventional threats, be it attacks from financial speculators, haze or JI, it is always found wanting. If this lesson is not learnt, then it can expect more low intensity attacks in the future.

CONCLUSION

THE FUTURE OF JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY

Introduction

Historically, whenever the challenge of terrorism, religious in character or otherwise, had emerged in the Southeast Asian region, it was essentially viewed as a national concern, and national authorities took a long time to overcome the threat. Hence, the protracted nature of the security threat as evident in the GAM challenge in Indonesia, the MILF and *Abu Sayyaf* challenges in the Philippines and the threat posed by PULO in Thailand. In this regard, the JI challenge is something new, as it is not only a national threat to a number of countries in Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines, but also, given JI's linkages, its concern has become regional and global in character. The security implications of the JI threat stems mainly from the character of its composition, organisation and linkages.

JI as an Islamic Terrorist Organisation

Due to the Islamic majority of Southeast Asia, political authorities in the region (especially in countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei, and even in those countries such as Thailand and the Philippines with a sizeable Muslim presence) often face a dilemma in addressing challenges posed by Islamic organisations, for fear of being called 'anti-Islamic' and facing a resultant backlash from the Islamic political constituency. It is because of this that authorities in the region, especially following the emergence of the JI threat, are quick to announce that the problem does not arise from Islam *per se* as much as it does from terrorism. There is a concerted effort to distinguish the two even though, in reality, this is more easily said than done. There have also been concerted efforts to promote the rise and dominance of moderate Islam while ensuring that Islamic radicalism is stalled and stemmed in the Southeast Asian region. Even though the region, by and large, is dominated by *Sunni* Islam of the moderate variant, there are strong but influential pockets of radical Muslims in the region that have been the main source of inspiration, support and recruits for JI and its causes

Yet, at the same time, it cannot be denied that political Islam is an important factor, all the more so in societies where there is a perception that the majority community discriminates against the Islamic minority or, in

Islamic majority societies where, following the Asian Financial Crisis, there is a belief that secular politics and state management has failed to solve the problems of the majority of people. This was clearly highlighted by Mr Kobsak Chutikul, a Member of Parliament from the Chart Thai Party. According to him:

There is no cause to be alarmist [about Islamic dominance in Southeast Asia]. The traditional, syncretic Islam of Southeast Asia, suffused with Indigenous Malay and other traditions, co-existing for centuries with many races and beliefs, is not the most fertile soil for Islamic fundamentalism. But then again, Islam itself has never been the problem. The vulnerabilities of the region stem not from the presence of a large Islamic population, but from the unique mix of relatively open, modernising societies with a high degree of visible Western influence and presence coping with the after-effects of economic crisis and continued uncertainties in the midst of hard-core squalor and poverty in many areas — some of which correspond to ethnic and religious divides, creating disenfranchised groups who in a globalised setting are now able to reach out for support from outside for their own domestic agendas and who, in turn, are susceptible to influence and manipulation for the wider external agendas of others.⁸⁸

JI as a Regional Terrorist Organisation

What makes the management of the JI threat all the more difficult and challenging is the fact that it operates like an amoeba. In fact, a senior Indonesian intelligence officer likened JI to a hydra-headed monster. Thus, even if one country in Southeast Asia succeeds in containing and neutralising the 'national' JI threat, this is not a sufficient condition in the management of the JI danger. For the JI threat to be managed definitely, all the countries in the region (at least where the four JI *Mantiqis* are operational, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Myanmar, the Philippines and Australia) must cooperate and undertake joint actions to manage the scourge. Otherwise, the threat posed by JI as a regional terrorist organisation will remain unmanageable, as it will be able to find safe havens and sanctuaries in one country or another. Here, of particular importance will be the policies of Indonesia and Malaysia, the two countries that have become the primary 'hosts' of JI and its leaders. What this also implies is that, as long as there are no regional mechanisms to manage JI, the threat of terrorism from it will remain for a long time to come.

JI as Part of a Global Terrorist Network

Until the 11 September 2001 attack, Southeast Asia did not figure prominently on the international 'terrorism map' despite it being a victim of terrorism for such a long period. Only *Abu Sayyaf* had figured prominently in the 'who's who' list of terrorist organisations compiled by the United States Government. Since then, the United States has added six new groups to the list of terrorist organisations. Two of these are non-Muslim organisations, namely the New People's Army and the Alex Boncayao Brigade, both of which are from the Philippines. All the rest are Islamic organisations, including the MILF from the Philippines, GAM from Indonesia, *Al-Ma'unah* from Malaysia and the region-wide based JI. This shows that Southeast Asia has emerged as an important area for the West (especially in the United States' 'war on terrorism'), and this is best evident in the deployment of American troops in the Philippines to contain the threat posed by *Abu Sayyaf* and the MILF. This also implies that there are international resources that can be tapped to manage JI as it is regarded as part of a global threat, especially to the West. It is thus imperative that countries in the region dovetail their national and regional policies in such a way that a three-pronged approach (namely, national, regional and international) is adopted to overcome the danger posed by JI to peace and security in the region.

Moving Ahead but Treading Cautiously in Overcoming the JI Menace

From the manner in which all Southeast Asian countries have supported the United Nations' move to label JI an international terrorist organisation, it is clear that all are united in recognising JI as a serious threat and want it curtailed. Yet, at the same time, it must be realised that not all countries in the region can adopt robust counter-terrorist measures as have been adopted by the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Singapore or even the Philippines. This is primarily due to the influence, power and sensitivities of political Islam and the way in which the majority of its adherents in the largely Islamic dominant countries, especially in Indonesia and Malaysia, view the problem. Partly due to past experience of the United States' anti-Islamic stance, its present policy of condoning the 'state terrorism' of Israel against the Palestinians, as well as the Islamic populace's experience with their own government's persecutions, particularly in Indonesia, most Muslims in general tend to be both cautious and wary of measures that appear tantamount to be anti-Islamic in character.

This has serious short to medium term implications for the Southeast Asian region in particular. As such, whatever is undertaken nationally,

regionally and internationally in the name of counter-terrorism, governments must ensure that the Southeast Asian region does not destabilise and, more importantly, they must make it difficult for moderate, secular-oriented Islamic leaders to rise and rule in Islamic majority countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and even Brunei. This is because it is obvious that one of the long-term goals of JI is to discredit and de-legitimise the ruling élites in the region and replace them through 'internal jihad'. If caution is not heeded, then the national, regional and international community would, wittingly or unwittingly, be playing into the hands of JI and assisting it to achieve its long-term strategic goal in the region. In this regard, Western governments, particularly the United States, Britain and Australia, have not helped by their adoption of what could be interpreted as anti-Islam rather than anti-terrorist measures. One example of this is the US State Department's November 2001 decision to place more stringent visa application procedures on Muslim men from 25 Islamic countries, including Malaysia and Indonesia. This gave the impression that the US was waging war against Islam, and not against terrorism. Similarly, the heavy-handed manner in which the Australian security apparatus went around Australia searching for JI operatives after the Bali bombing did not go down well in the region, leading Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to comment that if Southeast Asia was not safe for travel for Westerners, then similarly, countries such as Australia are not safe for Muslims.⁸⁹

At the same time, both Indonesia and Malaysia, due to its increasingly democratic set-up and culture, something the West played a role in promoting, cannot be expected to be heavy-handed against its citizens who subscribe to Islamic radicalism (not terrorism), as the ruling élite might suffer a backlash from its electorate. Hence, the need for caution in managing the JI threat cannot be understated. It is in this regard that, while the 'war against terrorism' has been launched, it cannot be fought with the same vigour and lack of sensitivity as it is being fought in certain parts of the world. If this is done, then it might unleash all kinds of complications, especially if outsiders are seen to be interfering in the internal affairs of a particular state and ignoring the due process that is in place, especially in countries that are becoming increasingly democratic. For this, one need not go far to observe its consequence as even neighbours are capable of causing irritations to one another. For instance, when Singapore Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew described Indonesia as a 'nest for terrorists' in January 2002, this immediately brought a negative reaction from Indonesian leaders and, more importantly, its people, who accused Lee Kuan Yew of being an 'American puppet and mouthpiece' and being the insensitive leader from a neighbouring country. Dewi Fortuna, a foreign policy adviser to former

President BJ Habibie commented on Lee's comments in the following terms: "SM Lee's words do reverberate. What he says damages the image of Indonesia even further, especially when we are trying to refurbish our image".⁹⁰ One of the latest leaders to weaken the 'united front' against terrorism in the region was Australia's Prime Minister John Howard when he commented on 1 December 2002 that his country was prepared to undertake a 'pre-emptive strike' against terrorists in neighbouring Asian countries.⁹¹ This immediately brought about negative reactions from the region, almost in the same manner as when the Australian Prime Minister had earlier remarked in late 1999 that he was prepared to act as the 'Deputy Sheriff' to the United States in the region.⁹²

Thus, while the war against terrorism is being fought on a world-wide basis and in Southeast Asia, *Ji* is being increasingly identified as the key terrorist group that has to be neutralised. In the management of the *Ji* threat, various sensitivities will have to be taken into consideration, with each country containing *Ji* within the limits of its political, economic, social-cultural and security parameters.

Whither *Jemaah Islamiyah*?

With the capture of *Ji*'s top leaders including the *Emir* Abu Bakar Bashir, his successor Abu Rusdan, the operations chief Hambali, and the perpetrators of the Bali and Marriott Hotel bombings, the operations of the terrorist network have been severely damaged. This is more so as *Ji*'s plan to extend its tentacles to other parts of the region has been successfully foiled with the arrests of Arifin Ali, Maisuri Haji Abdulloh, Muyahi Haji Boloh and Waemahadi Wae-dao in Southern Thailand and an Egyptian, Esam Mohamid Khid Ali, and two Thais, Hajichiming Abdul Azi and Muhammadiyahuddin Mading in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Another 15 linked to Abu Rusdan, including a Malaysian national Syamsul Bahri alias Farhan and a Universitas Semarang Professor Bambang Tutuko alias Abu Umar, were captured in separate arrests in Jakarta, Central Java and Lampung that began in the middle of August 2003. Their arrests averted the terrorist plot to blow up the Indonesian Police headquarters. With such effective counter-terrorism in the Southeast Asian region, it is worthwhile to ponder over the potential of the *Ji* threat in executing terrorist attacks. Essentially, is *Ji* 'dead'?

The answer is probably 'unlikely'. Despite years of persecution, the survival ability of the *Darul Islam* (*DI*) organisation from which *Ji* originates, indicates the possibility that *Ji* will follow the same path. Notwithstanding the political repression by the Suharto's New Order regime, the concept, roots, aspirations, etc of the *DI*, *Tentara Islam Indonesia* (*TII*) and *Negara Islam*

Indonesia (NII) remained in Indonesia's body politics, albeit that it was never allowed to surface and pose a challenge to the political order. Likewise, JI and its unyielding commitment to the cause of *jihād* and the establishment of a *Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara*, has left its mark in the region.

This paper has argued and shown that the decentralised organisational structure of JI has led to its ability to reproduce itself very quickly despite the capture of members of various operation cells. JI operates like an amoeba or a hydra-headed monster. It will not be long before another 'Hambali' or another cast of suicide bombers make the headlines.

Also, the pool of previously dormant militants or 'sleepers' provides a ready supply of reserves for terrorist operations. Among other supporters of JI, the potent force of the 'Group of 272' in Indonesia are experienced war veterans who fought in the Soviet-Afghan war. Furthermore, indoctrinated with fundamentalism, militant youths from the 'Ngruki alumni' and other radical Islamic schools' alumni networks are ready to die for the cause of *jihād*.

Lastly and more importantly, as long as the root causes of terrorism remain, the durability of the JI organisation or other terror network is assured. The failure of 'nationalist projects' to deliver the political, economic and social goods has led to counter-actions, namely the adoption of the 'Islamic mode' of political, economic and social development, including the use of terrorism and violence, to remedy what is perceived as national, regional and global injustices. This is because national and international injustices are usually blamed for the populace's backwardness, and violence (*jihād*) is often recommended as the only alternative to overcome the national, as well as the *ummat's* (Islamic community), problems worldwide.

The region of Southeast Asia may have foiled various terrorist plans with the arrest of key JI members. Yet, this is not to assume that the region is safe. The Bali and the Marriott Hotel bombings are stark reminders that the JI terror network is only crippled. The capacity of JI to regenerate and reorganise itself continues to challenge the security of the region. The key to fighting terrorism is to prevent it from happening in the first place. This necessitates a regional, if not global, counter-terrorism endeavour to fight not only the JI organisation, but also to remedy the root causes of terrorism. While Australian Prime Minister John Howard's call for unilateral pre-emptive strikes against other neighbouring countries is unfitting in a global community governed by international laws, cooperative actions (military strikes or otherwise) between countries in the region to prevent terrorist attacks are effective measures to combat terrorism. The key to successful counter-terrorism in the region is thus cooperation.

Notes

Chapter One — The Rise of Religious Extremism and Terrorism in Southeast Asia

- ¹ See report by United Nations' Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance. Cited in 'Religious Extremism on the Rise, says U.N.', http://www.ips.org/rights/news/nup051299_11.htm
- ² See Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 21-29.
- ³ Al Chaidar, however, has argued, "the origins of Darul Islam emerged firstly in the year 1905 with the appearance of the *Sarikat Dagang Islam*, the United Islamic Merchants, which was pioneered by H Samahudi. Following this organisation, came the birth of *Sarikat Islam*, United Islam, in the year 1912, which was pioneered by H O S Cokrominoto and, during the development of this organisation, there arose the PSII, the United Islamic Party of Indonesia. The movement was oriented towards the various aspects of life — political, economic and social. By means of a long exhaustive process, in the year 1949, the Islamic State of Indonesia or *Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia* was formed under the leadership of Imam Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwiryo until he was arrested by the Soekarno regime of the Indonesian Republic". See Al Chaidar, "Terrorism and Islamic Fundamentalism: The Darul Islam's Responses Towards Indonesian Democracy, 1949-1982". Paper presented at a Regional Workshop on Contemporary Islamic Movements in Southeast Asia: Militancy, Separatism, Terrorism and Democratisation Process, Bogor, 28-31 October 2002, organised by The RIDEP Institute and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Indonesia.
- ⁴ For a biographic reference, see Irfan S Awwas, *Menelusuri Perjalanan Jihad S M Kartosoewirjo*, (Jogjakarta: Wihdah Press, 999) and Al Chaidar, *Pemikiran Politik Proklamator Negara Islam Indonesia S M Kartosoewirjo*, (Jakarta: Darul Falah, 1999).
- ⁵ Cited in Adam Schwarz, *A Nation In Waiting: Indonesia's Search For Stability*, (St.Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1999), p. 169.
- ⁶ For details, see C. Van Dijk, *Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia*, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981).
- ⁷ For further details, see C. Van Dijk, *Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia*, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981).
- ⁸ See Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, 'Issues and Politics of Regionalism in Indonesia: Evaluating the Achenese Experience', in Lim Joo-Jock and Vani S., (eds.), *Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia*, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984), pp. 111-128.
- ⁹ See Chidchanok Rahimmula, 'Peace Resolution: A Case Study of Separatist and Terrorist Movements in Southern Border Provinces of Thailand'. Paper presented at a Conference on Contemporary Islamic Movements in Southeast Asia: Militancy, Separatism, Terrorism and Democratisation Process, Bogor, 28-31 October 2002, organised by The RIDEP Institute and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Indonesia.

- ¹⁰ For an excellent background study, see Omar Farouk, 'The Historical and Transnational Dimensions of Malay-Muslim Separatism in Southern Thailand', in Lim Joo-Jock and Vani S (eds.), *Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia*, pp. 234-257.
- ¹¹ See Omar Farouk, 'The Historical and Transnational Dimensions of Malay-Muslim Separatism in Southern Thailand', in Lim Joo-Jock and Vani S (eds.), *Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia*, p.240.
- ¹² See Andrew Tan, *Armed Rebellions in the ASEAN States: Persistence and Implications*, (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 2000), Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, No. 135, pp. 46-49.
- ¹³ For a history of this conflict, see Omi Eliseo R Mercado, 'Culture, Economics and Revolt in Mindanao: The Origins of the MNLF and the Politics of Moro Separatism', in Lim Joo-Jock and Vani S (eds.), *Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia*, pp. 151-175.
- ¹⁴ Moro is a generic term referring to thirteen ethno-linguistic groups of people residing in the southern Philippines who share a common bond of Islam and a history of struggle against the largely Christian 'colonisers', be they the Spanish, Americans or Catholic Filipinos. These groups include Maranaos, Maguindanos, Tausugs, Samals, Yakans, Iranus, Jama-Mapuns, Badjaos, Kalibugans, Kalangans, Molbogs, Palawanis and Sanglis. Of these, the most important are the Maguindanaos, Maranaos and Tausugs. See Omi Eliseo R Mercado, 'Culture, Economics and Revolt in Mindanao: The Origins of the MNLF and the Politics of Moro Separatism', in Lim Joo-Jock and Vani S (eds.), *Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia*, p. 152.
- ¹⁵ According to the independence declaration, "the Muslim inhabitants of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan ... desire(d) to secede from the Republic of the Philippines, in order to establish an Islamic state". See Omi Eliseo R Mercado, 'Culture, Economics and Revolt in Mindanao: The Origins of the MNLF and the Politics of Moro Separatism', in Lim Joo-Jock and Vani S (eds.), *Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia*, p. 156.
- ¹⁶ See Omi Eliseo R Mercado, 'Culture, Economics and Revolt in Mindanao: The Origins of the MNLF and the Politics of Moro Separatism', in Lim Joo-Jock and Vani S (eds.), *Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia*, pp. 155-56.
- ¹⁷ Hashim Salamat, a Cairo-trained scholar accused Nur Misuari and the MNLF leadership of "being manipulated away from Islamic basis, methodologies and objectives and fast evolving towards Marxist-Maoist orientations". See Taha M Basman, 'MILF and Abu Sayyaf Group: Roots, Prospects and Linkages'. Paper presented at a Conference on Contemporary Islamic Movements in Southeast Asia: Militancy, Separatism, Terrorism and Democratisation Process, Bogor, 28-31 October 2002, organised by The RIDEP Institute and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Indonesia.

Chapter Two — The Emergence of *Jemaah Islamiyah* as a Southeast Asian Terrorist Organisation

- ¹⁸ Singapore security officials have indeed described it as a 'deep clandestine terrorist organisation'.
- ¹⁹ In this connection, the admission by Al Chaidar, one of the more prominent leaders of DI today is interesting. He argued that, against the backdrop of Suharto's persecution of Islamic forces, those grouped under the DI umbrella reacted in various ways: "... the real Islamic forces grouped in DI who tends to a fundamentalistic reaction than a radical one are those which consistently oppose militarism with militarism. The Islamic groups in Aceh, Lampung, Tanjung Priok and other places have held lots of demonstrations to protest the massacre of their community by the military ... But the remnants of the DI who tend to and had been influenced by the fundamentalistic tendencies planned a retaliation in the form of terror attacks, crimes against law and order, and other violent way. *Jama'ah Islamiyyah* which has the purpose of establishing *Dawlah Islamiyyah* by applying the strategies of *iman* (belief), *hidjrah* (migrating) and *jihad* (war). [This is to] realise an Islamic Community (*Jama'ah Islamiyyah*) by the mobilization of the three strengths: *quwwatul aqidah* (faith), *quwwatul ukhuwwah* (brotherhood) and *quwwatul musallahah* (military)". Al Chaidar argued that "the three elements of strengths are essential in order to establish *Dawlah Islamiyyah*, especially by means of *Jihad*". See Al Chaidar, 'Terrorism and Islamic Fundamentalism: The Darul Islam's Response Towards Indonesian Democracy, 1949-1982'. Paper presented at a Regional Workshop on Contemporary Islamic Movements in Southeast Asia: Militancy, Separatism, Terrorism and Democratisation Process, 28-31 October 2002, Bogor, Indonesia, organised by The RIDEP Institute and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Indonesia.
- ²⁰ See *Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the 'Ngruki Network' in Indonesia*, (Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group), 8 August 2002, p.5.
- ²¹ See *Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the 'Ngruki Network' in Indonesia*, (Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group), 8 August 2002, p.5.
- ²² Professor Eqbal Ahmad's account of this is most instructive: "In 1985, President Ronald Reagan received a group of bearded men. These bearded men I was writing about in those days in *The New Yorker*, actually did. They were very ferocious-looking bearded men with turbans looking like they came from another century. President Reagan received them in the White House. After receiving them, he spoke to the press. He pointed towards them, I'm sure some of you will recall that moment, and said, "These are the moral equivalent of America's founding fathers". These were the Afghan Mujahidin. These were at the time, guns in hand, battling the Evil Empire. They were the moral equivalent of our founding fathers! In August 1998, another American President ordered missile strikes ... to kill Osama Bin Laden and his men in the camps in Afghanistan. I do not wish to embarrass you with the reminder that Mr Bin Laden ... was only a few years ago the moral equivalent of George Washington and Thomas Jefferson! He got angry over the fact that he has been demoted from 'Moral Equivalent' of your

'Founding Fathers'. So he is taking out his anger in different ways". See Eqbal Ahmad, 'Terrorism: Theirs and Ours', in <http://www.sangam.org/ANALYSIS/Ahmad.htm>

²³ For additional details, see Marc Erikson, 'Southeast Asia: The Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda of Southeast Asia', in *Asia Times Online* in <http://www.atimes.com/se-asia/DB06Ae01.html>

²⁴ Prior to his arrest in August 2003, the principal JI operative in Southeast Asia was the 37 year old Hambali. Like Bashir and Sungkar, in the mid-1980s, he fled to Malaysia to escape a Suharto-ordered crackdown on Islamic militancy. In 1987, he went to Afghanistan to fight the Soviet-occupation forces. He returned to Malaysia in 1990 and began preaching a radical brand of Islam. He was also involved in organising the Afghan veterans in Malaysia. Meeting like-minded people such as Bashir and Sungkar, he established close ties and Hambali is believed to have become the Chief of Operations of JI and its key contact and point man for *Al Qaeda*. According to a Malaysian security official, if Bashir, following Sungkar's death was JI's 'godfather', then Hambali was the 'consigliere'. Since then, Hambali has been accused of masterminding various bombing operations in Indonesia, the Philippines as well as organising the 'Singapore Plan', which targeted truck bombings of American, Australian, British and Israeli interests in Singapore, as well as various Singapore targets. For details, see *Ibid*. Also refer to a five part report titled 'Asia's Own Osama', in http://www.time.com/time/asia/features/malay_terror/hambali.html

²⁵ Information about the structure of JI has been emanating from various sources including the capture of a secret JI manual titled *The General Guide to the JI Struggle* which also contained diagrams of the JI organisation. During the trials over the Bali bombing, one key suspect, Muhammad Nasir Abbas, revealed that Abdullah Sungkar and later Abu Bakar Bashir were the Amirs of JI, an organisation established sometime in 1991-1992 following a split with DI. Below the Amir was the 'Majelis Markazi', assisting the Amir. Some of its members included Abu Rusdan, Sultan Arif, Mustofa and Secretary of Majelis Markazi, Abu Dujana. Below the Majelis Markazi were the four Mantiqis (number one led by Hambali and later Mukhlas, number 2 by Abdu Khatib and later Abu Insan, number three by Nasir himself, while the leader of number four remained unnamed). See 'Sidang Bom Bali Bongkar Rahasia Organisasi JI', <http://www.google.com.sg/search?q=cache.ZG5B2TZdhtwJ:cybernews.cbn.net.id/detilhit.asp%3Fkategori>

²⁶ According to a *Newsweek* report, the head of the *Al Qaeda* organisation is Osama Bin Laden. He is supported by a Consultative Council. In turn, there are four main committees responsible for various aspects of the terrorist network. This includes the Finance Committee that controls the financial aspects of *Al Qaeda* that sustains the network. Next is the Religious/Legal Committee. This functions to justify the terrorist attacks based on extremist interpretations of Islam. The Media Committee disseminates information in support of the organisation's activities. Finally, the Military Committee recruits and trains Islamic fighters, allocates weapons to assist in terror campaigns and coordinates attacks. Below these main committees are support cells, groups of four to five people who lay

- the groundwork for various terrorist operations. See 'The Nuts and Bolts of Terror', *Newsweek*, 15 October 2001, p. 36.
- ²⁷ American officials have argued that the Consultative Council is an extremely important body that approves all terrorist operations of Al Qaeda, including the 1998 bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Nairo and the October 2000 attack on the US warship Cole in Yemen. See 'Terrorist Threat Worsens as Al Qaeda links grow', *Sunday Ontario Edition*, 16 June 2002. See http://document?_m=b85a3c4b6bd434f6578a00b15460888c&_DOCNUM=4&WCHP=DglsZv-ISIZ'6/19/02
- ²⁸ Following the arrest of the second batch of JI operatives in Singapore, it was announced that, by 1999, a regional network of Islamic militant groups bent on using terrorism, among other methods, to pursue their political objectives, had already been established. JI is said to have initiated an alliance called *Rabitatul Mujahideen*, involving groups such as the MILF, *Abu Sayyaf*, *Gerakan Mujahidin Islamic Pattani* and, possibly, *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*, which has been fighting for an Islamic state in northern Sumatra and where the *Al Qaeda* leadership paid a visit to facilitate cooperation. See 'JI spreading to southern Thailand', *The Straits Times*, 18 September 2002. According to a media report, the *Rabitatul Mujajideen* unites at least nine home-grown Muslim militant groups in the region. See *Foreign Broadcast Monitor*, (Singapore), No.218/02, 20 September 2002, p.3.
- ²⁹ According to Internet sources, Asian intelligence officers believe that JI has branched out of Southeast Asia with a cell being established in Australia. According to intelligence sources, JI now has four main cells, with the first covering Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand; the second covering Sumatra and Java in Indonesia; the third covering Indonesia's Sulawesi island, Kalimantan, Brunei and the southern Philippines; and the fourth covering Australia and Indonesia's province of Papua. See *The Straits Times*, 23 October 2002.
- ³⁰ According to Sidney Jones, the Director of the International Crisis Group in Jakarta, "The JI, which shared the same philosophy as the DI), however, dreamt bigger and wanted to establish an Islamic Republic unifying Malaysia, Indonesia, Mindanao in the Philippines, Singapore, southern Thailand and Brunei". See 'JI: From a village school to a regional network of terror'.
- ³¹ See 'Terror in Asia: The region is still on the danger list', *TIME Magazine*, 2 December 2002, p.48.
- ³² According to the ISD (Singapore), following the arrest of JI operatives in August 2002, "a significant finding is that the regional JI did not operate alone, but formed the *Rabitatul Mujahideen* regional alliance of "jihadist"/militant groups. The *Rabitatul Mujahideen* comprised a central committee made up of leaders from the regional militant groups, including the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and a south Thailand "jihadist" group (based in Narathiwat). JI's role was to set up and co-ordinate meetings of the alliance partners. Secrecy was very strictly maintained and only invited senior members of these groups were allowed to participate in *Rabitatul Mujahidin* meetings." Apparently, 3 meetings were held between late 1999 and mid-2000.

- ³³ See 'Profile: Abu Bakar Ba'asyir', <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2339693.stm>
- ³⁴ See 'Bin Laden Funded Christian Haters', <http://www.mailarchive.com/eskol@mitra.net.id/msg00006.html>
- ³⁵ See 'Terrorism's New Front: Minds of Singaporeans', *The Straits Times*, 22 May 2002.
- ³⁶ See 'Government News Release on the ISA Arrests — The Link of the Yishun Video', <http://www2.mha.gov.sg/mha/detailed.jsp?artid=41&type=4&root=0&parent=0&cat=0>

Chapter Three — The Terrorism of *Jemaah Islamiyah*

- ³⁷ See 'Pacific plot in book of terror', *The Courier Mail*, 1 September 2003; 'JI planned Pacific bombing campaign', *The New Paper*, 1 September 2003.
- ³⁸ The Bali bombing was particularly important as it signalled JI's threat to Australia rather than simply to Southeast Asia. That *Mantiqi* 4 covers Australia is not surprising given that Abu Bakar Bashir and other senior JI leaders are believed to have made a number of visits to Australia to establish the JI network there. See 'Australia Probes Jemaah Islamiyah Money Trail', <http://asia.news.yahoo.com/.021103/reuters/asia-1321447.html>
- ³⁹ For details, see 'The Family Behind The Bombings', *TIME Magazine*, 25 November 2002, pp. 16-22; 'Where will they strike next?', *Ibid*, pp. 44-53.
- ⁴⁰ For details, see Rohan Gunaratna, 'The Singapore Connection', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 14, No. 3, March 2002, pp. 8-11.
- ⁴¹ In a number of organisational charts, the *Dakwah* and Educational Groups are often combined as one unit even though the religious and propagandistic wings tend to undertake clearly differentiated functions. For instance, Rohan Gunaratna combines the two units under 'Mission Unit' with the educational one totally ignored. See Rohan Gunaratna, 'The Singapore Connection', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 14, No. 3, March 2002, p. 8.
- ⁴² See Rohan Gunaratna, 'The Singapore Connection', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 14, No. 3, March 2002, p. 9.
- ⁴³ From the arrests made by the Singapore Government under the Internal Security Act, five of those arrested have been served with Restriction Orders and not detained. Two persons, Faizal Khan bin Gulam Sarwar, 34, and Mohd Agus bin Ahmad Selani, 34, were among the 15 arrested in December 2001. They were released on 6 January 2002 and served with Restriction Orders under Section 8(1)(b) of the ISA with conditions prohibiting them to have contact with any terrorist organisation, to prevent them from deeper and further involvement with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The Restriction Order, which is for a period of two years, will be reviewed annually. Although not members of JI, they did however support the MILF. From the second batch of arrests of 21 persons in August 2002, three of those arrested, namely Fauzi bin Abu Bakar Bafana (Fauzi), Mohamad Hisham bin Hairi (Hisham) and Sajahan bin Abdul Rahman

(Sajahan) were served with ROs on 14 September 2002. Fauzi and Hisham are JI members while Sajahan had visited the MILF training camp in 1999. However, like the earlier two, they were released, as they did not participate in terrorism-related activities.

- ⁴⁴ 'Fiah' refers to a cell within the local JI structure. A 'fiah' usually receives directives from the JI 'shura' (consultative council) via the 'fiah' leader. A local JI group will typically have several 'fiahs', each with a specified function, eg 'dakwah' (missionary work), fund-raising and operations. Each 'fiah' usually comprises an average of 4 JI members, including the leader. The composition of the 'fiah' is often fluid and members may be switched between 'fiahs' or undertake jobs in more than one 'fiah' at the same time. Around 1999/2000, there appeared to have been a reorganisation of resources at the direction of the Indonesian JI leadership so that more JI members were directed to join the operations 'fiahs'. In the investigations, which led to the first arrests of JI members in December 2001, ISD uncovered the existence of 3 operations 'fiahs' (*fiah ayub*, *fiah musa* and *fiah ismail*). Following the second batch of arrests in August 2002, an additional 4 operations 'fiahs' were uncovered (*fiah yakub*, *fiah syuib*, *fiah daud* and *fiah nuh*). Most of the details about the organisation and tasks of the JI *fiahs* in Singapore have come from the ISD.
- ⁴⁵ See 'Singapore bomb plot mastermind 'held in Oman'', *The Straits Times*, 13 July 2002.
- ⁴⁶ See Lee Hsien Loong's speech in Munich, Germany on 2 February 2002.
- ⁴⁷ See 'Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates', *ICG Asia Report* No.43, (11 December 2002), pp. 3-4.
- ⁴⁸ See Martin van Bruinessen, 'Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia', ISIM and Utrecht University, 2002, p. 3.
- ⁴⁹ Zachary Abuza, 'Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda's Southeast Asian Network', excerpt from unpublished book, (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, March 2003), p.1.
- ⁵⁰ Refer to a five parts report titled 'Asia's Own Osama', in http://www.time.com/time/asia/features/malay_terror/hambali.html
- ⁵¹ Refer to a five parts report titled 'Asia's Own Osama', in http://www.time.com/time/asia/features/malay_terror/hambali.html
- ⁵² See 'JI suicide squad on the loose', *The Straits Times*, 13 August 2003.
- ⁵³ See 'Bali bomber Ali Imron gets life term', *The Straits Times*, 19 September 2003.

Chapter Four — Jemaah Islamiyah and Its Australian Connections

- ⁵⁴ See speech to the Australian Chamber of Commerce, Shanghai, 11 November 2002, http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2002/021111_fa_auspersp.html
- ⁵⁵ See 'The Australian Connections', *Four Corners*, <http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2003/transcripts/s878332.htm>
- ⁵⁶ See 'The Australian Connections', *Four Corners*, <http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2003/transcripts/s878332.htm>

- ⁵⁷ See 'The Australian Connections', *Four Corners*, <http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2003/transcripts/s878332.htm>
- ⁵⁸ See White Paper on Foreign Affairs & Trade: *Advancing the National Interest*, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, http://www.dfat.gov.au/ani/chapter_3.html
- ⁵⁹ Refer to *Protecting Australia*, National Security Australia, <http://www.ema.gov.au/www/nationalsecurityHome.nsf/HeadingPagesDisplay/Protecting+National+Security?OpenDocument>
- ⁶⁰ See White Paper on Foreign Affairs & Trade: *Advancing the National Interest*, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, http://www.dfat.gov.au/ani/chapter_3.html
- ⁶¹ 'Binding Tie Is Common Interests', *Australian Financial Review*, 7 August 2003.
- ⁶² 'Indonesia Seeks Fresh Kopassus Ties', *Australian Financial Review*, 14 August 2003.
- ⁶³ See 'Aussie 'act against terror' remark riles neighbours', *The Straits Times*, 2 December 2002.
- ⁶⁴ See 'Aussie 'act against terror' remark riles neighbours', *The Straits Times*, 2 December 2002.
- ⁶⁵ See <http://www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/speech79.html>
- ⁶⁶ See speech to the Australian Chamber of Commerce, Shanghai, 11 November 2002, http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2002/021111_fa_auspersp.html

Chapter Five — Managing the *Jemaah Islamiyah* Threat in Southeast Asia

- ⁶⁷ See Transcript of interview with DPM BG Lee Hsien Loong by Hwee Goh, Channel News Asia on 28 September 2001, (Singapore Government Press Release, Media Division, Ministry of Information and the Arts).
- ⁶⁸ Cited in *The Straits Times*, 23 September 2001.
- ⁶⁹ See Statement by Prof. S Jayakumar, Minister for Foreign Affairs at the United Nations Security Council Ministerial Meeting on 12 November 2001, (Singapore Government Press Release, Media Division, Ministry of Information and the Arts).
- ⁷⁰ See 'US-ASEAN Anti-Terrorism Pact May Threaten Human Rights: Watchdog', <http://www.islamonline.net/english/news/2002-08/03/article19.shtml>
- ⁷¹ According to one report, Osama's second in command, Ayman Al Zawahiri, together with the then military chief of *Al Qaeda*, Mohammed Atef, visited Aceh in 2000 and were "impressed by the lack of security, the support and extent of Muslim population". See 'Osama's Men Visited Aceh: Report', *Today*, 11 July 2002.
- ⁷² See *The Straits Times*, 6 November 2001 and <http://www.aseansec.org>
- ⁷³ See 'Thailand is latest to sign on to anti-terror pact', *The Straits Times*, 6 November 2002.

- ⁷⁴ The alleged hijacking was supposed to be led by Mas Selamat Kastari. However, before they could be arrested, they are believed to have fled to Malaysia, following which they are believed to have travelled into Thailand and, from there, to Medan in Indonesia via Langkawi (Malaysia). Their whereabouts have since remained a mystery. However, Mas Selamat was arrested in February 2003 in Tanjung Pinang. For details, see 'PM reveals plans to crash jet into Changi', *The Straits Times*, 6 April 2002 and 'Militants fled to Medan via Malaysia', *The Straits Times*, 7 April 2002.
- ⁷⁵ According to investigations, "a group of 20 people, organised in 4 cells, were planning to set off 7 simultaneous explosions in Singapore. The Singapore group had already obtained access to 4 tonnes of ammonia nitrate that were stored in Muar, Johor in Malaysia and had been given money to buy an additional 17 tonnes of chemical and 7 trucks. The trucks were each to contain 3 tonnes of nitrate and to be used as bombs, creating 7 simultaneous explosions". See *The Straits Times*, 10 February 2002.
- ⁷⁶ The seriousness with which this effort is being made is mainly to ensure that JI operatives do not succeed in their endeavours, as this could have very serious repercussions for national and regional security. According to the Singapore Government, the second batch of detainees, unlike the first, were bent on undertaking activities that could have severely harmed Singapore's interests. The Singapore Government believed that, this time, JI operatives "planned to generate animosity between Singapore and Malaysia and make Malaysia an Islamic state. By turning 'Chinese Singapore' against Malay/Muslim Malaysia, they hoped to turn the two countries into another Ambon, racked by ethnic strife and religious clashes". See *The Straits Times*, 20 September 2002.
- ⁷⁷ See '12 JI members dispersed and hiding in the region', *The Sunday Times*, 22 September 2002.
- ⁷⁸ To date, more than 100 suspected terrorists have been detained in various ASEAN countries, most notably in Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines.
- ⁷⁹ According to Dr Tony Tan, the Coordinating Minister for Security and Defence, this was needed as "Singapore was facing a new type of international terrorism, which was strategic in outlook, and much more dangerous and sustained than the one-off terrorist attacks carried out in the past by disparate groups. It is not possible for us to deal with these new threats with the same type of structure and capabilities we had in the past". Cited in *The Straits Times*, 7 January 2002.
- ⁸⁰ Following the collapse of the *Taliban* regime in Afghanistan, the next focus for the United States in its war of terrorism was the Philippines. It dispatched nearly 1,200 military advisors to Mindanao (Southern Philippines) to assist the Philippines Armed Forces in its war against *Abu Sayyaf*. Under the cover of 'Exercise Balikatan 02-1', American troops were deployed in the southern Philippines, principally on Basilan Island. Following the end of this 'exercise', another one was underway, with more American troops being deployed in the country. It was mainly due to this that US Secretary of State Colin Powell praised the Philippines as being "in the forefront of leadership in Southeast Asia in respect to the global war against terrorism". See 'US-ASEAN Anti-Terrorism Pact May Threaten Human Rights: Watchdog'. Cited in <http://>

www.islamonline.net/English/2002-08/03/article19.shtml; also see 'MSLA not on agenda in Gloria-Powell Meeting', http://www.inq7.net/nat/2002/aug/03/text/nat_1-1p.htm

Chapter Six — The Limits to Managing the *Jemaah Islamiyah* Threat in Southeast Asia

- ⁸¹ See CSIS Pacnet Newsletter, Issue 1, 4 January 2002.
- ⁸² Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction*, Oxford University Press, 1999.
- ⁸³ 'It is a national problem affecting everyone', *The Straits Times*, 21 September 2002.
- ⁸⁴ Admiral Dennis Blair, the former Commander-in-Chief of US forces in the Pacific, for instance, stated on 5 February 2002 that, despite the Congressional ban, some cooperation was being undertaken with the Indonesian military. However, he made it clear that "the US could not resume a full military relationship with Indonesia until its armed forces completed reforms that bring the standards of conduct and accountability to what we expect of advanced armed forces". Cited in *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 6 February 2002.
- ⁸⁵ As was argued by Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, Indonesia has thus far acted circumspectly in dealing with extremist religious groups and their leaders due to four main reasons: "First, it has had to watch its flanks, to avoid being attacked by political opponents for acting too harshly against fellow Muslims. Second, elections are due in 2004, and potential contenders are wary of souring the Muslim ground, which form 90 % of the population. Third, the slackening of law and order in Indonesia post-Suharto has made it harder for any government to enforce its will in this country of 13,000 islands. Finally, the armed forces are the strongest institution, which can safeguard the unity of the country. But the armed forces are wary of being accused of human rights violations, if they act against the militants as they had done in the past". See Lee Hsien Loong's speech in Munich, Germany on 2 February 2002.
- ⁸⁶ Even though Malaysian and Singaporean authorities believed that Bashir was the 'Emir' behind *Jemaah Islamiyah* and its terrorism in the region, due to various legal loopholes and fears of a backlash from Muslim hardliners, the Justice Minister, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, recommended a presidential pardon on grounds that the country's subversion laws had already been repealed in 1999. Similarly, due to political pressures and the close association of Tamsil and Abdul Jamal with Amien Rais, the Speaker of the People's Consultative Assembly, the Indonesian Government pressured the Philippines to release the two even though the third accused, Agus, remains in Philippines' detention. See *The Straits Times*, 27 April 2002.
- ⁸⁷ See 'US 'using terror claims to control Indonesia'', *The Straits Times*, 27 May 2002.

Conclusion — The Future of Jemaah Islamiyah and Implications for Southeast Asian Security

- ⁸⁸ See 'ASEAN must set itself a terrorism free-zone', http://scoop.bangkokpost.co.th/bkpost/2001/october2001/bp20011030/news/30Oct2001_opin...4/14/02
- ⁸⁹ See 'Aussie raids may hamper anti-terror fight: Jakarta', *The Straits Times*, 1 November 2002.
- ⁹⁰ See 'Outcry and the SM Factor', *Today* (Singapore), 22 February 2002.
- ⁹¹ John Howard argued that "it stands to reason that if you believe that somebody was going to launch an attack on your country, either of a conventional kind or a terrorist kind, and you had a capacity to stop it and there was no alternative other than to use that capacity, then, of course, you would have to use it". On taking pre-emptive action against terrorists in neighbouring countries, Howard said, "Oh yes. I think any Australian prime minister would". See 'Aussie 'act against terror' remark riles neighbours', *The Straits Times*, 2 December 2002.
- ⁹² Reacting to this, an Indonesian Government's spokesperson commented that "Australia cannot 'willy-nilly' flout international law" and the Malaysian Defence Minister warned that his country "will not allow any foreign military action in the country". See 'Aussie 'act against terror' remark riles neighbours', *The Straits Times*, 2 December 2002.

APPENDIX 1



Sources: Southeast Asia (Reference Map), 2002
Perra-Castaneda Library Map Collection
The General Libraries
The University of Texas at Austin
<http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/asia.html>

APPENDIX 2

2001 ASEAN DECLARATION ON JOINT ACTION TO COUNTER TERRORISM

We, the Heads of State/Government of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) gathered in Bandar Seri Begawan for the Seventh ASEAN Summit,

Recalling the agreement among Heads of State/Government during the Second Informal Summit in December 1997 in Kuala Lumpur to take firm and stern measures to combat transnational crime,

Reaffirming our primary responsibility in ensuring the peaceful and progressive development of our respective countries and our region,

Deeply concerned over the formidable challenge posed by terrorism to regional and international peace and stability as well as to economic development,

Underlining the importance of strengthening regional and international cooperation in meeting the challenges confronting us,

Do hereby,

Unequivocally condemn in the strongest terms the horrifying terrorist attacks in New York City, Washington DC and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001 and consider such acts as an attack against humanity and an assault on all of us;

Extend our deepest sympathy and condolences to the people and Government of the United States of America and the families of the victims from nations all around the world, including those of our nationals;

View acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed wherever, whenever and by whomsoever, as a profound threat to international peace and security, which require concerted action to protect and defend all peoples and the peace and security of the world;

Reject any attempt to link terrorism with any religion or race;

Believe terrorism to be a direct challenge to the attainment of peace, progress and prosperity of ASEAN and the realisation of ASEAN Vision 2020;

Commit to counter, prevent and suppress all forms of terrorist acts in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and other international law, especially taking into account the importance of all relevant UN resolutions;

Ensure that, in observing the above, all cooperative efforts to combat terrorism at the regional level shall consider joint practical counter-terrorism measures in line with specific circumstances in the region and in each member country;

Recommit ourselves to pursue effective policies and strategies aimed at enhancing the well-being of our people, which will be our national contribution in the fight against terrorism;

Note that, towards this end, ASEAN had established a regional framework for fighting transnational crime and adopted an ASEAN Plan of Action that outlines a cohesive regional strategy to prevent, control and neutralise transnational crime;

Approve fully the initiatives of the Third ASEAN Ministers Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) held in October 2001 to focus on terrorism and deal effectively with the issue at all levels and endorse the convening of an Ad Hoc Experts Group Meeting and special sessions of the SOMTC and AMMTC that will focus on terrorism;

Warmly welcome Malaysia's offer to host the Special AMMTC on issues of terrorism in April 2002. This meeting would represent a significant step by ASEAN to the United Nations' call to enhance coordination of national, sub-regional and international efforts to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security;

In strengthening further ASEAN's counter-terrorism efforts, we task our Ministers concerned to follow-up on the implementation of this declaration to advance ASEAN's efforts to fight terrorism by undertaking the following additional practical measures.

1. Review and strengthen our national mechanisms to combat terrorism;
2. Call for the early signing/ratification of or accession to all relevant anti-terrorist conventions including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism;
3. Deepen cooperation among our front-line law enforcement agencies in combating terrorism and sharing "best practices";

4. Study relevant international conventions on terrorism with the view to integrating them with ASEAN mechanisms on combating international terrorism;
5. Enhance information/intelligence exchange to facilitate the flow of information, in particular, on terrorists and terrorist organisations, their movement and funding, and any other information needed to protect lives, property and the security of all modes of travel;
6. Strengthen existing cooperation and coordination between the AMMTC and other relevant ASEAN bodies in countering, preventing and suppressing all forms of terrorist acts. Particular attention would be paid to finding ways to combat terrorist organisations, support infrastructure and funding and bringing the perpetrators to justice;
7. Develop regional capacity building programmes to enhance existing capabilities of ASEAN member countries to investigate, detect, monitor and report on terrorist acts;
8. Discuss and explore practical ideas and initiatives to increase ASEAN's role in and involvement with the international community including extra-regional partners within existing frameworks such as the ASEAN + 3, the ASEAN Dialogue Partners and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), to make the fight against terrorism a truly regional and global endeavour;
9. Strengthen cooperation at bilateral, regional and international levels in combating terrorism in a comprehensive manner and affirm that at the international level the United Nations should play a major role in this regard.

We, the Leaders of ASEAN, pledge to remain seized with the matter, and call on other regions and countries to work with ASEAN in the global struggle against terrorism.

Adopted this Fifth Day of November 2001 in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam.

Source: ASEAN Secretariat homepage (<http://www.aseansec.org/>)

APPENDIX 3

JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE SPECIAL ASEAN MINISTERIAL MEETING ON TERRORISM

Kuala Lumpur, 20-21 May 2002

1. We, the ASEAN Ministers responsible for transnational crime issues, gathered in Kuala Lumpur from 20th to 21st May 2002 for the Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism under the Chairmanship of the Honourable Dato' Seri Abdullah bin Hj Ahmad Badawi, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs of Malaysia;
2. We recall the initiative taken by ASEAN to combat transnational crime in the 1997 ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime adopted at the Inaugural ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) in the Republic of the Philippines and the 1999 ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime adopted at the 2nd AMMTC in Myanmar;
3. We recall the 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism adopted at the 7th ASEAN Summit in Brunei Darussalam to advance ASEAN's efforts in the global struggle against terrorism;
4. We unequivocally condemn acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and underscore the urgency for a cohesive and united approach to effectively combat terrorism;
5. We strongly emphasize that terrorism must not be identified with any religion, race, culture or nationality;
6. We reaffirm our commitment and support to undertake the fight against acts of terrorism committed wherever, whenever and by whomsoever without discrimination and with due respect to religion, race, culture and nationality;
7. We note with concern the close links between transactional crime and terrorism, and that this lends greater urgency to our efforts to combat transnational crime;
8. We dedicate our efforts and resources towards implementing practical measures underlined in the 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism;

9. We recognize that the sovereignty, territorial integrity and domestic laws of each ASEAN Member Country shall be respected and upheld in undertaking the fight against terrorism;
10. We recognize the right of individual ASEAN Member Countries to continue pursuing practical preventive measures to address the root causes of terrorism;
11. We commit to counter, prevent and suppress all forms of terrorist acts in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and other international law, especially taking into account the importance of all relevant UN resolutions;
12. We commit to follow-up on this Communiqué by entrusting the Senior Officials to execute the Work Programme on Terrorism to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime approved on 17th May 2002 in Kuala Lumpur which is deemed to be an integral part of this Communiqué and to review its progress at subsequent meetings of the ASEAN Ministers responsible for transnational crime issues. The Work Programme includes, among others, programmes on:
 - exchange of information,
 - compilation and dissemination of relevant laws and regulations of ASEAN Member Countries,
 - compilation and dissemination of bilateral and multilateral agreements and information on relevant international treaties where feasible,
 - development of multilateral or bilateral legal arrangements to facilitate apprehension, investigation, prosecution, extradition, inquiry and seizure in order to enhance mutual legal and administrative assistance among ASEAN Member Countries where feasible,
 - enhancement of cooperation and coordination in law enforcement and intelligence sharing, and
 - development of regional training programmes;
13. We note with appreciation the projects and initiatives to be undertaken as follows:
 - training by Malaysia on intelligence procurement in relation to terrorism,
 - workshop by Malaysia on psyops and psywar in relation to terrorism,
 - workshop by Indonesia on combating international terrorism,

- logistical support by Singapore for training on bomb/explosives detection, post-blast investigation, airport security and passport/document security and inspection in relation to terrorism,
 - offer by Singapore to facilitate a dialogue session at the upcoming ASEANAPOL meeting to discuss practical measures and explore avenues of cooperation against terrorism,
 - designation of principal contact points in all ASEAN Member Countries on counter-terrorism matters;
14. We task the Chairman of the Annual SOMTC to continue to liaise with all ASEAN Member Countries, with the assistance of the ASEAN Secretariat, on the successful implementation of the Work Programme;
15. We laud the signing of the Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication Procedures between the Republic of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Republic of the Philippines in Kuala Lumpur on 7th May 2002 under which the Parties to that Agreement will cooperate among themselves to combat transnational crime, including terrorism;
16. We express our deepest appreciation to the Government of Malaysia for the warm and generous hospitality accorded to us and our respective delegations.

Adopted this 21st day of May 2002 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Source: ASEAN Secretariat homepage (<http://www.aseansec.org/>)

APPENDIX 4

WORK PROGRAMME TO IMPLEMENT THE ASEAN PLAN OF ACTION TO COMBAT TRANSNATIONAL CRIME

Kuala Lumpur, 17 May 2002

6. Terrorism

6.1 Information Exchange

- a. Establish a compilation of national laws and regulations of ASEAN Member Countries, including international treaties and agreements, pertaining to terrorism leading towards establishing a regional repository of such laws within a certain timeframe on-site and on the ASEANWEB.

Action Line: ASEAN Member Countries to submit their respective national laws, regulations, bilateral agreements, if feasible, and information on international treaties that have been ratified and/or signed, where applicable, within 6 months after the endorsement of the Work Programme by the 2nd Annual SOMTC to the ASEAN Secretariat for compilation and distribution to Member Countries.

- b. Explore ways for ASEAN to cooperate with ASEANAPOL and relevant international organizations concerned with terrorism matters to further facilitate sharing of information and analysis of critical intelligence information such as “modus operandi” and offences involving terrorist activities.

Action Line: ASEAN Secretariat to explore linkages with ASEANAPOL and relevant international organizations within 6 months after the endorsement of the Work Programme by the 2nd Annual SOMTC.

- c. Enhance cooperation in the exchange of information among Member Countries as well as with international agencies to combat terrorism.

Action Line: ASEAN Member Countries to submit to the ASEAN Secretariat, within 6 months after the endorsement of the Work Programme by the 2nd Annual SOMTC, their respective focal points on terrorism. The ASEAN Secretariat will then publish a directory for dissemination to all ASEAN Member Countries.

- d. Exchange of information on technologies to detect and deter the use of materials of mass destruction, including biological agents or toxins, in terrorist attacks and develop means to deter terrorist attacks on electronic and computer infrastructure.

Action Line: ASEAN Member Countries shall enhance the exchange of the above-mentioned information on technologies.

- e. Exchange of information on security practices for international special events, strengthen and expand international cooperation and consultation in anti-terrorist activities.

Action Line: ASEAN Member Countries shall enhance the exchange of the above-mentioned information on security practices.

- f. A comprehensive database of international treaties and agreements pertaining to terrorism/transnational crime be established.

Action Line: ASEAN Secretariat to approach dialogue partners and other donor countries and funding agencies on assistance to set up the database.

- g. Enhance information/intelligence exchange to facilitate the flow of information, in particular, on terrorists and terrorist organizations, their movement and funding, and any other information needed to protect lives, property and the security of all modes of travel.

Action Line: ASEAN Member Countries to begin exchange of information on the above initiative.

6.2 Legal Matters

- a. Work towards the criminalisation of terrorism in ASEAN Member Countries.

Action Line: ASEAN Member Countries should provide information among each other and to the ASEAN Secretariat on the progress of their efforts to enact domestic legal instruments, within 6 months after the endorsement of the Work Programme by the 2nd Annual SOMTC.

- b. Consider the feasibility of developing multilateral or bilateral legal arrangements to facilitate apprehension, investigation, prosecution, extradition, exchange of witnesses, sharing of evidence, inquiry and seizure in order to enhance mutual legal and administrative assistance among ASEAN Member Countries.

Action Line: Interested ASEAN Member Countries to explore the modalities through exchange visits, seminars and other means.

- c. Work towards the early signing/ratification of or accession to all relevant anti-terrorist conventions including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

Action Line: ASEAN Member Countries to work towards the early signing/ratification by first reviewing the current anti-terrorist conventions.

- d. Study relevant international conventions on terrorism with the view to integrating them with ASEAN mechanisms on combating international terrorism.

Action Line: ASEAN Secretariat shall finalise, within 6 months after the endorsement of the Work Programme by the 2nd Annual SOMTC, the compilation of the relevant international conventions and further conduct, within six months after this finalisation, a study on the feasibility of integrating them with ASEAN mechanisms on combating international terrorism.

- e. Working on a regional operational convention or agreement to combat terrorism.

Action Line: ASEAN Secretariat shall conduct a study within 6 months after the endorsement of the Work Programme by the 2nd Annual SOMTC to consider the formulation of a regional operational convention or agreement to combat terrorism.

- f. Work towards a bilateral or multilateral mutual legal assistance agreement or arrangement to enhance cooperation in combating terrorist acts and deliberating on various aspects of the issue in a comprehensive manner including its definition and root causes.

Action Line: ASEAN Secretariat to consult with Member Countries on the feasibility of holding an ASEAN Meeting to formulate an ASEAN agreement or arrangement in Mutual Legal Assistance among ASEAN Member Countries on combating terrorism as soon as possible.

6.3 Law Enforcement Matters

- a. Enhance cooperation and coordination in law enforcement and intelligence sharing on terrorism issues affecting ASEAN Member Countries.

Action Line: ASEAN Secretariat to publish a directory of focal points and contact persons in charge of terrorism for dissemination to all ASEAN Member Countries within 6 months after the endorsement of the Work Programme by the 2nd Annual SOMTC.

- b. Deepen cooperation among front-line law enforcement agencies in combating terrorism and sharing best practices.

Action Line: ASEAN Secretariat to explore the possibility of conducting a seminar on terrorism.

6.4 Training

- a. Develop regional training programmes and conduct regular conferences to enhance existing capabilities in investigation, intelligence, surveillance, counter-terrorism, detection and monitoring and reporting of terrorist activities.

Action Line: Interested ASEAN Member countries are urged to submit their project proposals on training programmes/conferences to the ASEAN Secretariat within 6 months after the endorsement of the Work Programme by the 2nd Annual SOMTC. The ASEAN Secretariat to seek funding from dialogue partners/international organizations for the projects. ASEAN Member Countries conducting national training programmes may extend invitations to other ASEAN Member Countries to join their existing programs.

- b. Hold a multilateral seminar on emergency response to terrorist threats.

Action Line: Interested ASEAN Member countries are urged to submit their project proposals on convening such a seminar to the ASEAN Secretariat within 6 months after the endorsement of the Work Programme by the 2nd Annual SOMTC. The ASEAN Secretariat to seek funding from dialogue partners/international organizations to convene the seminar.

6.5 Institutional Capacity Building

- a. Review and strengthen national mechanisms of ASEAN Member Countries to combat terrorism.

Action Line: ASEAN Secretariat shall assist Member Countries in strengthening their national mechanisms of Member Countries to combat terrorism. Assistance from ASEAN Member Countries in providing necessary documentation and information would be welcome.

- b. Strengthen existing cooperation and coordination between the AMMTC and other relevant ASEAN bodies in countering, preventing and suppressing all forms of terrorist acts. Particular attention would be paid to finding ways to combat terrorist organizations, support infrastructure and funding and bringing the perpetrators to justice.

Action Line: ASEAN Secretariat to explore the possibility of inviting the chair the of task forces or heads of other ASEAN bodies that are directly involved in the fight against terrorism, for example DGICM, ASEANAPOL, to attend SOMTC meetings

- c. Develop regional capacity building programs to enhance existing capabilities of ASEAN Member Countries to investigate, detect, monitor and report on terrorist acts.

Action Line: Interested ASEAN Member countries are urged to submit their project proposals on capacity building programmes to the ASEAN Secretariat within 6 months after the endorsement of the Work Programme by the 2nd Annual SOMTC. The ASEAN Secretariat to seek funding from dialogue partners/international organizations for the programmes.

- d. Convene specialized workshops, seminars and training courses for ASEAN law enforcement officials on new forms of terrorism such as bio-terrorism and cyber-terrorism. The areas for discussion could include the review of laws and legislation in these new areas with a view towards harmonization where feasible.

Action Line: ASEAN Member Countries will provide the ASEAN Secretariat a list of research institutions in each country with the capabilities of carrying out chemical analysis of biological agents and toxins, which would be useful in combating bio-terrorism. The list would be circulated to all Member Countries.

6.6 Extra-regional cooperation

- a. Discuss and explore practical ideas and initiatives to increase ASEAN's role in and involvement with the international community including extra-regional partners within existing frameworks such as the ASEAN + 3, the ASEAN Dialogue Partners and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), to make the fight against terrorism a truly regional and global endeavour.

Action Line: AMMTC Chair and the ASEAN Secretariat may look into the possibility of inviting the Plus Three Countries — China,

Japan and the Republic of Korea — and other dialogue partners to the SOMTC and AMMTC meetings.

- b. Strengthen cooperation at bilateral, regional and international levels in combating terrorism in a comprehensive manner and affirm that at the international level the United Nations should play a major role in this regard.

Action Line: ASEAN Secretariat to conduct a study on how ASEAN programmes/projects could complement/support UN resolutions.

Source: ASEAN Secretariat homepage <http://www.aseansec.org/>)

APPENDIX 5

ASEAN-UNITED STATES OF AMERICA JOINT DECLARATION FOR COOPERATION TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

The Governments of Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Republic of Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Union of Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the United States of America (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the participants");

Mindful of the 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, which, inter alia, undertakes to strengthen cooperation at bilateral, regional and international levels in combating terrorism in a comprehensive manner and affirms that at the international level the United Nations should play a major role in this regard;

Reaffirming their commitment to counter, prevent and suppress all forms of terrorist acts in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, international law and all the relevant United Nations resolutions or declarations on international terrorism, in particular the principles outlined in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373, 1267 and 1390;

Viewing acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed wherever, whenever and by whomsoever, as a profound threat to international peace and security, which require concerted action to protect and defend all peoples and the peace and security of the world;

Recognising the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity and non- intervention in the domestic affairs of other States;

Acknowledging the value of existing cooperation on security, intelligence and law enforcement matters, and desiring to strengthen and expand this cooperation to combat international terrorism through the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime, as a leading ASEAN body for combating terrorism, and other mechanisms;

Recognising the transnational nature of terrorist activities and the need to strengthen international cooperation at all levels in combating terrorism in a comprehensive manner;

Desiring to enhance counter-terrorism cooperation between the relevant agencies of the participants' governments;

Solemnly declare as follows:

Objectives

1. The participants reaffirm the importance of having a framework for cooperation to prevent, disrupt and combat international terrorism through the exchange and flow of information, intelligence and capacity-building.
2. The participants emphasize that the purpose of this cooperation is to enhance the efficacy of those efforts to combat terrorism.

Scope and Areas of Cooperation

3. The participants stress their commitment to seek to implement the principles laid out in this Declaration, in accordance with their respective domestic laws and their specific circumstances, in any or all of the following activities:
 - I. Continue and improve intelligence and terrorist financing information sharing on counter-terrorism measures, including the development of more effective counter-terrorism policies and legal, regulatory and administrative counter-terrorism regimes.
 - II. Enhance liaison relationships amongst their law enforcement agencies to engender practical counter-terrorism regimes.
 - III. Strengthen capacity-building efforts through training and education; consultations between officials, analysts and field operators; and seminars, conferences and joint operations as appropriate.
 - IV. Provide assistance on transportation, border and immigration control challenges, including document and identity fraud to stem effectively the flow of terrorist-related material, money and people.
 - V. Comply with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373, 1267, 1390 and other United Nations resolutions or declarations on international terrorism.
 - VI. Explore on a mutual basis additional areas of cooperation.

Participation

4. Participants are called upon to become parties to all 12 of the United Nations conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.
5. The participants are each called upon to designate an agency to coordinate with law enforcement agencies, authorities dealing with countering terrorism financing and other concerned government agencies, and to act as the central point of contact for the purposes of implementing this Declaration.

Disclosure of Information

6. The participants expect that no participant would disclose or distribute any confidential information, documents or data received in connection with this Declaration to any third party, at any time, except to the extent agreed in writing by the participant that provided the information.
7. All the participants are urged to promote and implement in good faith and effectively the provisions of the present Declaration in all its aspects.

Signed at Bandar Seri Begawan this first day of August, Two Thousand and Two.

For ASEAN

Mohamed Bolkiah
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Brunei Darussalam

For the United States of America

Colin L. Powell
Secretary of State

Source: ASEAN Secretariat homepage (<http://www.aseansec.org/>)

APPENDIX 6

DECLARATION ON TERRORISM BY THE 8TH ASEAN SUMMIT

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, condemn the heinous terrorist attacks in Bali, Indonesia, and in the Philippine cities of Zamboanga and Quezon. We extend our deepest sympathies to the families of those who died and to those who were injured. We express the solidarity of our countries with Indonesia and the Philippines and ASEAN's full support for their determined pursuit of the terrorist elements responsible for the attacks. We commend Indonesia and the Philippines for their efforts to curtail terrorism within their borders and for their determination to step up those efforts.
2. We denounce once again the use of terror, with its toll on human life and society, in many places around the world for whatever cause and in the name of whatever religious or ethnic aspiration. We deplore the tendency in some quarters to identify terrorism with particular religions or ethnic groups.
3. We are determined to carry out and build on the specific measures outlined in the ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, which we adopted in Brunei Darussalam in November 2001. We resolve to intensify our efforts, collectively and individually, to prevent, counter and suppress the activities of terrorist groups in the region. The ASEAN countries shall continue with practical cooperative measures among ourselves and with the international community.
4. We welcome Thailand's accession to the Agreement on Information Exchange and Exchange of Communication Procedures. We commend our law-enforcement authorities for the cooperative work that has resulted in the arrest of persons plotting to commit acts of terrorism and in otherwise preventing such acts. We direct them to continue to intensify their cooperation in combating terrorism and, in particular, in expeditiously carrying out the Work Plan adopted by the Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism in Kuala Lumpur in May 2002, raising the level of cooperation, coordination and the sharing of information in the fight against terrorism.

5. We look forward to the following activities:
 - the International Conference on Anti-Terrorism and Tourism Recovery in Manila next week;
 - the Regional Conference on Combating Money-Laundering and Terrorist Financing in Bali in December 2002;
 - the Intersessional Meeting on Terrorism of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia, in March 2003;
 - the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime with ministerial counterparts from China, Japan and the Republic of Korea in Bangkok in October 2003; and
 - the establishment of the Regional Counter-terrorism Center in November 2002 in Kuala Lumpur.
6. We call on the international community to avoid indiscriminately advising their citizens to refrain from visiting or otherwise dealing with our countries, in the absence of established evidence to substantiate rumours of possible terrorist attacks, as such measures could help achieve the objectives of the terrorists.
7. We urge the international community to support ASEAN's efforts to combat terrorism and restore business confidence in the region. We are determined to cooperate actively in mitigating the adverse impact of terrorist attacks on ASEAN countries and urge the international community to assist us in these efforts.
8. We resolve to ensure the security and harmony of our societies and the safety of our peoples and also of others who are in our countries and in the region.

(ASEAN Leaders adopted the Declaration at their working dinner in Phnom Penh on 3 November 2002.)

Source: ASEAN Secretariat homepage (<http://www.aseansec.org/>)

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Bilveer Singh

