COUNTERING TERROR
New Directions Post ‘911’

Editors: Clive Williams and Brendan Taylor

Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 147
CANBERRA PAPERS ON STRATEGY & DEFENCE NO. 147
COUNTERING TERROR:
NEW DIRECTIONS POST '911'

Editors:
Clive Williams
Brendan Taylor

Published by
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
Australian National University
Canberra
2003
Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence are a series of monograph publications that arise out of the work of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University. Previous Canberra Papers have covered topics such as arms control at both the global and Southeast Asian level, regional strategic relationships and major aspects of Australian defence policy. For a list of New Series Canberra Papers please refer to the last pages of this volume.

Unless otherwise stated, publications of the Centre are presented without endorsement as contributions to the public record and debate. Authors are responsible for their own analyses and conclusions.

Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
Publications Program: Editorial Board

Professor Paul Dibb
Professor Desmond Ball
Professor David Horner
Dr Alan Dupont
Dr Coral Bell
Professor Anthony Milner
Professor Virginia Hooker
Professor Ross Babbage
ABSTRACT

The essays in this book were originally presented as speeches to the SDSC conference “Post 11 September - New Directions”, held on 11 September 2002. They assess where counter-terrorism efforts are, and should be, headed as a consequence of the attacks on the US homeland and the initiation of the “war on terror”. Several interesting themes emerge, including the prospects for the American-led campaign against global terrorism, security threats in Southeast Asia, and the strategic implications for Australia.

Contributors include the Secretary of the Commonwealth Attorney General’s Department, Robert Cornall; Executive Director of the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence, Dr Grant Wardlaw; three of this country’s most eminent strategic thinkers, Professor Paul Dibb AM, Professor Desmond Ball, and Dr Coral Bell; a former senior Defence public servant, Dr Ron Huisken; and two of the world’s leading authorities on Southeast Asia, Dr Greg Fealy and Dr John Funston. The book is edited by Australia’s foremost terrorism expert, Clive Williams MG, and Dr Brendan Taylor.
CONTENTS

Acronyms and Abbreviations         ix
Contributors                       x
Acknowledgements                   xiii

1. INTRODUCTION
   Desmond Ball and Brendan Taylor  1

PART ONE: THE GLOBAL CONTEXT

2. SEPTEMBER 11 REVISITED, ONE YEAR ON
   Clive Williams                   11

3. HAS THE WORLD CHANGED SINCE SEPTEMBER 11?
   Grant Wardlaw                   15

4. DIPLOMATIC REALIGNMENTS SINCE ‘911’
   Coral Bell                      19

5. OBSERVATIONS ON AMERICA
   Ron Huisken                     24

PART TWO: REGIONAL AND NATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

6. TERRORISM IN INDONESIA
   Greg Fealy                      33

7. MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE: MANAGING
   INTERNAL THREAT
   John Funston                    40

8. HOMELAND DEFENCE: NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES
   Robert Cornall                  49

9. A NEW DEFENCE POLICY FOR A NEW STRATEGIC ERA?
   Paul Dibb                       59

Bibliography                       69
## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Australian Crime Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Australian Federal Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIO</td>
<td>Australian Security Intelligence Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASPI</td>
<td>Australian Strategic Policy Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DI</td>
<td>Darul Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISA</td>
<td>Internal Security Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JI</td>
<td>Jemaah Islamiah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMM</td>
<td>Kumpulan Militan/Mujahidin Malaysia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>Nuclear, biological and chemical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAS</td>
<td>Party Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMNO</td>
<td>United Malays National Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONTRIBUTORS

Desmond Ball is a Professor in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University. (He was Head of the Centre from 1984 to 1991). Professor Ball is the author or editor of some 40 books or monographs on nuclear strategy, defence decision-making, Australian defence, and security in the Asia-Pacific region. His recent publications include books entitled Presumptive Engagement: Australia's Asia-Pacific Security Policy in the 1990s; The Transformation of Security in the Asia-Pacific Region; Burma's Military Secrets: Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) from the Second World War to Civil War and Cyber Warfare; Breaking the Codes: The KGB's Network in Australia, 1944-1950; Death in Balibo, Lies in Canberra; and articles on issues such as strategic culture in the Asia-Pacific and defence acquisition programmes in the region. Professor Ball has been a member of the Council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and was a founding member of the Steering Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP).

Coral Bell is a Visiting Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University. She was previously Professor of International Relations at the University of Sussex, and earlier a member of the Australian Diplomatic Service. Dr Bell’s research interests are mainly in crisis management and the interaction of strategic, economic and diplomatic factors in international politics, especially as they affect US and Australian foreign policies. She has recently published studies of the Kosovo and East Timor crises and a Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Working Paper entitled The First War of the 21st Century: Asymmetric Hostilities and the Norms of Combat. Her forthcoming book is entitled The Road Past Baghdad.

Robert Cornell is the Secretary of the Commonwealth Attorney General’s Department. Before joining the Department, Mr Cornell held various key roles in public legal administration, including as Managing Director of Victoria Legal Aid, and as Executive Director of the Law Institute of Victoria. Mr Cornell also has extensive experience in private legal practice, having been a partner in a large Melbourne law firm for fifteen years.

Paul Dibb is Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University. Prior to joining the Centre, Professor Dibb held Senior positions as Deputy Secretary of Defence (1988-91); Director, Joint Intelligence Organisation (1986-88); Ministerial Consultant to the Minister for Defence (1984-86); and Head of the National Assessments Staff, National
Intelligence Committee (1974-78). His publications include *The Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower; Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, Report to the Minister for Defence; Towards a New Balance of Power in Asia; The Revolution in Military Affairs and Asian Security;* and *America’s Asian Alliances.* His articles have appeared in many of the leading international relations and strategic studies journals, including *Survival,* *The Washington Quarterly,* and *Orbis.*

**Greg Fealy** holds a joint appointment as a Research Fellow in Indonesian politics in the Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, and lecturer in Indonesian History and Politics in the Faculty of Asian Studies, Australian National University. Dr Fealy specialises in Islamic culture and politics in Indonesia and post-independence political history. He has closely studied the political behaviour of Indonesia’s largest Islamic organisation, *Nahdlatul Ullama,* and has written numerous articles on this topic, including the only English language text on the organisation. His research interests have included campus *dakwah* (proselytisation) movements, militant Islamic groups and the functioning of Indonesia’s legislatures.

**John Funston** is a Visiting Fellow at the Faculty of Asian Studies, Australian National University. Dr Funston’s research interests include the domestic politics of Malaysia and Thailand, and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) political developments. Dr Funston’s publications include an edited volume on *Government and Politics in Southeast Asia* (authored chapters on Malaysia and Thailand), *Malay Politics in Malaysia: A Study of UMNO and PAS,* and numerous articles on Malaysian and Thai politics, and Southeast Asian regional issues. He has also published pieces in the *Asian Wall Street Journal,* *The Australian Financial Review,* and *The Sydney Morning Herald.*

**Ron Huisken** is a Senior Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University. Before joining the Centre, Dr Huisken held positions at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, UN Department of Disarmament Affairs, and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. From 1995-2001, he was Director-General of Alliance Policy at the Department of Defence. His research interests are mainly in East Asian security, alliance politics, arms control, nuclear weapons, and missile defence. He has published several books and articles on these subjects, including the recent “Civilising the Anarchical Society: Multilateral Security
Processes in the Asia Pacific”, which appeared in the August 2002 edition of the journal Contemporary Southeast Asia.

**Brendan Taylor** is a post-doctoral fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University. He was recently awarded a PhD from the ANU for his thesis entitled *Economic Statecraft and the Sole Superpower: More State than Craft?*, which is currently being reviewed for publication. His areas of research interest are American foreign policy and Northeast Asian security. Consistent with these, Dr Taylor is also writing a book examining US alliance relationships in the Asia-Pacific Region.

**Grant Wardlaw** is currently Executive Director of the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence, Australia’s national criminal intelligence service. Prior to taking up this post in February 2001, Dr Wardlaw held senior executive positions in intelligence, research and policy organisations, including being the inaugural Director of the Commonwealth Government’s Office of Strategic Crime Assessments. He has published widely in the fields of terrorism and law enforcement intelligence and is the author of *Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Countermeasures*. In 1988 and 1991 Dr Wardlaw worked in Washington, D.C., as a Distinguished Visiting Professor, Defense Intelligence College, Defense Intelligence Agency, specialising in terrorism, low intensity conflict and international drug trafficking.

**Clive Williams** is director of terrorism studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University. He has a career background as an officer in Australian Military Intelligence, which included a number of overseas intelligence appointments. After leaving the Army in 1981, he pursued a civilian career in Defence Intelligence, working mainly on transnational issues. He was a Chevening scholar at the War Studies Department of London University in 1987. He has worked and lectured internationally on terrorism related issues for more than 20 years. His recent publications include “Australian Security Policy, post-11 September”, which appeared in the April 2002 edition of the *Australian Journal of International Affairs*; “Australia’s Evolving Maritime Border Threat Environment” in Martin Tsamenyi and Chris Rahman, ed., *Protecting Australia’s Maritime Borders: the MV Tampa and Beyond*, and *The Sydney Olympics: the Trouble Free Games*, an SDSC Working Paper.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The conference from which the essays in this book resulted would not have been possible without the input of a number of people. Ms Anne Dowling, Centre Administrator at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, provided critical administrative and organizational support. She was ably assisted by the then Administrator of the Graduate Studies in Strategy and Defence (GSSD) program, Ms Phuong Nguyen. Thanks also are due to the John Curtin School of Medical Research ‘Tea Club’, who provided light refreshments for the large group of conference attendees.

The editors would like to thank Professor Desmond Ball for the advice and support he has given during the course of this project. Finally, we would like to acknowledge Miss Meredith Thatcher, who was responsible for some editorial matters and processed the manuscript for publication.

Clive Williams and Brendan Taylor, Canberra
January 2003
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Desmond Ball and Brendan Taylor

More than a year after the terrorist attacks on the US homeland and the initiation of the 'war on terror', beginning with Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, many critically important aspects of this phenomenon remain difficult to fully comprehend - including the motivations and intentions of Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network; the nature of the failure of the US intelligence establishment, which perhaps succumbed to 'warning fatigue' and even sophisticated signals deception; the future direction of the US, after the war against Iraq; the extent of Al Qaeda associates and sympathizers in Southeast Asia; the impact of future US policy on our region; and the implications of all this for Australian strategic and defence policies, which remain subject to these uncertainties.

The impact of September 11 and the war on terror on regional security and the strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific region will undoubtedly be profound. It will lead to changes in the strategic influence and relative military capabilities of important regional powers. It has raised a new agenda for strategic, defence and security policies, including the alliance relationships between regional countries and the US, and has induced changes in strategic priorities. It has caused new thinking about the use of force, operational concepts, and capability requirements.

But although the impact is undoubtedly deep, it runs in divergent currents and confusing eddies; and there will be unexpected consequences. This will be a long war, with asymmetric responses; current assessments will almost certainly have to be radically revised as the war progresses. There will be victors and vanquished in this war, but the winners in the long-term will not necessarily be those who enjoyed military success on the battlefields of Afghanistan (or, in the near future, Iraq).

September 11 and the war on terror must also be viewed in perspective. They may presage a new era in international relations, but they will not lead to wholesale re-orientations in strategic policies or defence postures,
and they will not change the more fundamental dynamics of strategic developments in the Asia-Pacific region. Rather, the recent events have formed an additional dimension to the geo-strategic issues and national security concerns of the post-Cold War period, which by and large have retained their currency and potency - the evolving balance of power in the region, the rise of China, and the future character of the US-China relationship; the multiplicity of conflicts both inter-state and intra-state; the salience of maritime issues; the requirements of defence self-reliance, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and the possibility of an arms race in the region; and the challenges of the so-called 'new security agenda', such as environmental security issues, unregulated population movements, transnational crime, drug trafficking and money laundering. Generally, the impact of September 11 will be to reinforce trends which had already become manifest in the region - for example, to provide an additional rationale for increasing defence expenditures (in which the war on terror is really only a minor factor), acquiring new defence capabilities, and exploiting new technologies, especially some elements of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), Information Warfare (IW), and network-centric warfare.

In the essays that follow, eight senior academics and public officials look ahead across this broad front of issues. As the title of this volume implies, their primary focus is not so much on the events of '91' and the subsequent war on terror; although some of this ground will necessarily be covered for background purposes. Rather, each contributor offers a unique perspective both on where counter-terrorism efforts are and should be headed as a consequence of September 11. To be sure, despite the fact that over a year has now passed since the attacks on New York and Washington, this remains new and uncertain territory, where no one has lien on all the answers. That said, the authors selected for this volume are all leaders in their respective fields. For that reason, they are considered those best qualified to foreshadow the key strategic and political developments which will most likely affect global, regional and Australian security well into this uncertain era.

The first part of this volume covers global issues. Chapter 2, by Clive Williams, provides a review of terrorism - trends and patterns. Williams begins by identifying those who have suffered and benefited most as a result of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. He then seeks to discern the main reasons for Al Qaeda's actions on that fateful day, before outlining the key developments that have flowed from these during the months since. Williams goes on to identify a number of enduring concerns, many of which pertain to the US-led response to '911', as opposed to the
threat of terrorism itself. Following this, he undertakes an assessment of the terrorism-related outlook. A number of important conclusions emerge. First, while the threat to Australia has undoubtedly increased in the wake of September 11, Williams argues that US and Israeli nationals remain the most likely targets for future attacks. Indeed, he goes on to conclude that the most pressing threat to Australian interests may actually be the extent to which Canberra's absolute commitment to its superpower ally has undermined our policy independence, as perceived by others in the region. According to Williams, such an outcome raises important questions as to what economic, political and defence roles Australia sees itself playing internationally in the future.

In chapter 3, Dr Grant Wardlaw offers a response to Clive Williams. While concurring with him on a number of points - namely with reference to the fact that '911' should be seen as only part of the Al Qaeda campaign rather than its beginning or end - Wardlaw does beg to differ with a number of his key conclusions. First, where Williams seeks to identify the 'winners' and 'losers' of '911', Wardlaw contends that such assessments are likely to change over time. Similarly, while Williams implies that broad international and domestic support for the US-led campaign against terror is gradually waning, Wardlaw argues that political cleavages over appropriate response strategies are appearing at varying rates for different initiatives. Consistent with this theme, Wardlaw points to the dangers of continuing to treat terrorism as a unitary threat when, in reality, it is a complex, multi-faceted phenomenon that is not always consistent with the typically single-minded approach the US has adopted toward it. Wardlaw concludes by addressing the question posed at the beginning of his chapter - 'Has the world really changed since September 11?' Like the phenomenon of terrorism he so succinctly describes, the answer Wardlaw provides is a multi-faceted 'Yes', 'No' and 'Maybe.'

In chapter 4, Dr Coral Bell discusses the diplomatic realignments that have taken place in the period since September 11. In doing so, she demonstrates that the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon did not 'change everything', as asserted by so many commentators at that time. Rather, Dr Bell argues that the United States has not only remained the paramount power in a unipolar society of states, but that its diplomatic hand may actually have been strengthened as a result of '911'. Bell observes that even those nations with grievances against the US see the benefits of maintaining good relations with the sole superpower, while simultaneously recognising the tremendous costs that future catastrophic terror attacks could potentially inflict upon every established government
in the world. Interestingly, however, the single exception to this rule, Dr Bell concludes, could be Saudi Arabia's 60 year old alliance with the United States.

Dr Ron Huisken, in chapter 5, concurs with Bell that the major powers in the contemporary international system ultimately accept the importance of a committed and engaged United States. And yet somewhat ironically, Huisken goes on to observe, the events of September 11 appear to have aroused deep-seated unilateralist instincts in Washington that have rendered the sole superpower more immune to international criticism, more reluctant to compromise, and less inclined toward any but the most limited forms of coalition arrangements. These unilateralist tendencies, Huisken maintains, are attributable to a fear that the phenomenon of global terrorism could potentially rob America of a historic opportunity to shape an enduring world order in its favour. While Washington's desire to 'go it alone' will likely soften with time, Huisken believes that the interim consequences of President Bush's current policy approach could well be severe. As such, he concludes by encouraging all US allies and friends, including Australia, to assist in hastening its reversal.

The second part of this volume addresses regional and Australian issues. In the weeks immediately following September 11, many were sceptical as to whether the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington signalled a heightened degree of threat to the broader Asia-Pacific, or to Southeast Asia in particular. The December 2001 arrest of 13 members of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network in Singapore led some to reconsider this view; particularly when subsequent intelligence assessments indicated that the accused planned to acquire 21 tons of ammonium nitrate and explode it on the island via seven truck bombs. However, it was essentially not until the Bali bombing of 12 October 2002 that what many still thought to be the relatively unlikely prospect of a major terrorist attack occurring within the region became a reality.

Due in large part to the events in Bali, Indonesia is now widely perceived as a hub of terrorist activity in Southeast Asia. In chapter 6, Dr Greg Fealy describes the key features of this nation's main terrorist group, JI, before discussing the changing dynamics of Indonesian extremism and various strategies for combating terrorism there. While observing that terrorist activity is not a particularly new phenomenon to anyone familiar with Indonesian history, Fealy points to the internationalisation of radical Islam and the increased capacity of militant groups to wreak havoc and cause destruction as relatively new, but critical developments. However, the answer to Indonesia's terrorist problems, he suggests, lies within the Islamic
community itself, including generating a greater willingness to report suspicious activity and the whereabouts of 'wanted' terrorist suspects. In the meantime, Fealy argues that Western governments ought to be wary of employing high-cost, short-term strategies to a problem that will likely require a medium to long-term focus.

In chapter 7, Dr John Funston considers the extent to which a serious Islamic terrorist threat can also be said to exist in Malaysia and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. The evidence he presents indicates the existence of Islamic extremism and terrorism in both countries, which are essentially part of a broader regional scene of Islamic activities. According to Funston, however, it is not clear that these are Al Qaeda directed, or that they include a coherent and organized regional plan to establish a new Islamic state. Indeed, from his perspective, the likelihood that Southeast Asian states would disintegrate in the face of any such pressure is highly remote. Funston concludes his analysis with an interesting and highly relevant postscript to the Bali bombing; the investigations into which appear to suggest that the extent of Malaysia-based terrorist activities are, in actual fact, considerably more extensive than was previously thought.

The confirmed existence of terrorist activities in Australia's immediate neighbourhood, in turn, harbours significant implications for our own national security perceptions and institutional arrangements. As a recent study produced by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) articulates:

Terrorism is now a major security problem for Australia, and our most obvious strategic policy challenge is to find effective and proportionate responses to it. The Bali bombing on 12 October 2002 confirmed and amplified a judgement made after 11 September 2001: the risk to Australia from terrorism has increased sharply, and is likely to remain relatively high at least in the medium term.3

In chapter 8, Secretary of the Commonwealth Attorney General's Department, Robert Cornall, outlines the steps Canberra has taken to meet the challenges '911' has posed for Australia's homeland defence. After providing a comprehensive and extremely useful overview of changes introduced to enhance Australia's national security arrangements in the wake of the terrorist attacks, Cornall addresses the proposition that we, like our superpower ally, should establish a Department of Homeland Security. He concludes, however, that there is nothing significant to be gained from proceeding down such a route. Instead, Cornall maintains, Australia should
finalise its new national security arrangements and allow them some time to settle in before any further changes are contemplated.

In the final chapter of this volume, Professor Paul Dibb also cautions against undertaking wholesale change, particularly where Australia's defence policy is concerned. While acknowledging that the events of '911' have introduced a new discontinuity in Australia's strategic circumstances, Dibb observes that much remains familiar with the pre-September 11 security agenda, particularly in Asia. That being the case, he argues that it is simply not appropriate at this juncture to fundamentally alter Australia's force structure and military preparedness to fight the so-called 'war on terror.' Instead, Dibb calls for a balance between the requirements for operations within Australia's area of immediate strategic concern and the demands associated with being a coalition member in expeditionary operations further afield. Consistent with this, while conceding that some adjustments to Australia's force structure are necessary, he argues that any such changes should not alter the conceptual framework laid down in the 2000 Defence White Paper. If, indeed, Canberra is serious about waging the war on terror, Dibb suggests that this is going to require a significant increase in defence expenditure. However, while the advent of such would ultimately have the effect of improving Australia's capacity to meet conventional military challenges closer to home, Dibb concludes that the attainment of this latter objective should continue to remain foremost in the minds of Australia's strategic planners.

Taken together, the chapters contained in this volume address a broad variety of issues. This reflects the complexity of the terrorist phenomenon and the multi-faceted nature of the responses it calls for. It is interesting to note, however, that in those instances where they do cover similar analytical terrain, the contributors to this volume often find themselves in agreement over the directions counter-terrorism efforts are, and should be, taking in the post-September 11 environment. And yet, just as frequently, their respective prognoses and prescriptions diverge quite sharply. In the final analysis, this is perhaps simply a product of the fact that there are no 'quick fix' solutions to many of the issues raised here, just as there are no easy answers to the policy, academic, and public debates that ought to be conducted in the course of addressing them. At the very least, it is hoped that this volume will go some way toward helping to facilitate this latter process.
Notes

1 A terrorist group that is reportedly active in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.


PART ONE

THE GLOBAL CONTEXT
PART ONE

THE GLOBAL CONTEXT
CHAPTER 2

SEPTEMBER 11 REVISITED, ONE YEAR ON

Clive Williams

The attacks on September 11 should be seen as one, albeit catastrophically successful, action in an ongoing Al Qaeda campaign. The start date for this campaign was 22 February 1998, when Osama Bin Laden announced the creation of the International Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders, and the fatwa against the Americans and their allies, which included civilians as legitimate targets. Al Qaeda attacks since then have included the US embassies in East Africa on 7 August 1998 and the USS Cole bombing on 12 October 2000. Nine other planned attacks, three around the millennium, did not materialise.

The main reasons for Al Qaeda’s action on September 11 in my judgement were: to create a US response that would unify all Muslims, both against the US and against autocratic Muslim rulers; to show solidarity with the Palestinians; to protest the US military presence in Saudi Arabia; to protest the US-led sanctions against Iraq; to show the Muslim ‘man-in-the-street’ that the US is not invincible; and last but not least, to express frustration at the lack of opportunities for achieving political change in a Muslim world often dominated by US-backed leaders.

Apart from those killed or injured, those who suffered most in the immediate aftermath of ‘911’ were: the families of the estimated 3,066 victims, including those of undocumented illegal aliens working at the World Trade Center; the families of the New York police and emergency services; the US intelligence community and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for the worst US intelligence failure since Pearl Harbor; US airlines who suffered major economic losses; the tourism industry; the insurers of the hijacked aircraft and the World Trade Center; and finally, the Northern Alliance, whose charismatic military leader Ahmad Shah Massoud was assassinated by Al Qaeda operatives two days before.
Those who benefited (at least in the short term) were: Al Qaeda, and its supporters; Israel - which, within hours, had used the event to move its forces into the West Bank, raising suspicions about prior intelligence knowledge; the Bush administration and the Howard Government - both of whom were quick to capitalise on the opportunity to show leadership; New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, who seized the moment to bolster his image; welfare agencies in the US; the security industry; and, of course, lawyers.

In the past 12 months, there have been some remarkable developments and outcomes from the terrorism of September 11: the war in Afghanistan has been won at minimal allied casualty cost, with the Taliban ousted; Al Qaeda has been displaced from Afghanistan, and some of its leaders eliminated; the Northern Alliance has been triumphant; warlords in Afghanistan are back in business; organised crime in Central Asia is thriving, with the Golden Crescent on course to regain its place as the top producer of heroin; the global insurance industry has restored its interests through increased premiums; and the US is now in a strong position to control Central Asian oil reserves.

While there is no doubt about the hero status of emergency services in the US, there is now some questioning about the “management” of the response on September 11. Meanwhile, the US (and allied) intelligence community has attracted considerably more funding, as has the FBI. Defence areas have also received a significant increase in funding to both transform their structure and priorities to deal with asymmetric threats, and to conduct the war on terror.

Internationally, Israel is increasingly isolated as a result of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s heavy-handed actions against the Palestinians and its continued occupation of the West Bank. However, Sharon remains popular at home. Conversely, the Bush administration has lost some domestic support over the mixed success of its prosecution of the war on terror and the failure to capture Bin Laden. It also lost much international credibility as a result of the President’s January 2002 State of the Union address, in which he described Iran, Iraq and North Korea as constituting an “axis of evil.”

Those who continue to pay the price for September 11 include: the public, through inconvenient security measures, loss of civil liberties, and additional taxation; Muslim populations in the West, who are generally regarded with heightened suspicion; all terrorist organisations, because of new restrictive security measures - particularly those affecting their fund-raising activities in the West; Pakistan and Russia, who have lost important spheres of
influence; Saudi Arabia, whose support of militant Wahhabism and payment of protection money to Al Qaeda have been exposed; and China, which has lost influence in Central Asia whilst remaining unable to generate much external support for its crackdown on Uighur separatists in Xinjiang.

Some Ongoing Concerns

While over a year has now passed since the September 11 attacks, a number of ongoing concerns remain.

First, terrorism within the US has become the ‘new communism’ and is being used to justify a range of sometimes questionable government actions, particularly in relation to human rights.

Second, no action has yet been taken to address the root causes of Islamic extremist terrorism, or the reasons why Al Qaeda still attracts significant Muslim support.

Third, there is increased instability in South Asia involving two nuclear-capable states, India and Pakistan.

Fourth, the Bush administration will come under increased international scrutiny over its detention policies (both domestic and at Guantanamo Bay), other infringements of civil liberties, discrimination against minority elements, and the possible association of Special Forces personnel with Northern Alliance war crimes in Afghanistan.

Fifth, a Bush-led war against Iraq is now being seen more in the context of guaranteeing US oil imports and retaining the President’s domestic political popularity, than in terms of any real concerns about terrorism or the Iraqi development of WMD.

Conclusions

As far as the future is concerned, the terrorism-related outlook is that: Al Qaeda is down but definitely not out, retaining much of its original operational capability and having received increased popular support; the threat to Australians has increased since ‘911’, as evidenced all too clearly by the October 2002 tragic events in Bali. Nevertheless, US and Israeli nationals overseas remain the most likely target of future attacks; Muslim support for Al Qaeda - and opposition to Bush policies - has increased, including in Australia; regional Muslim insurgencies in Southeast Asia do not directly threaten US or Australian national interests, but they do create a significant support base for future Al Qaeda operations, particularly in Indonesia; and the financing of Islamic extremism has probably not been
significantly affected since ‘911’.

For Australia, one important ramification is that our perceived policy of absolute commitment to the US has the potential to cause problems in terms of other countries’ perceptions of our lack of independence. Consequently, there seems to be an assumption, particularly within Southeast Asia, that we are more interested in being a global player than a regional one. Notwithstanding the November 2002 announcement that Australia and the United States have finally agreed to commence negotiations to conclude a Free Trade Agreement, it also remains far from clear that the our close “ally” status will positively influence US trade policies towards Australia. As such, Canberra needs to balance carefully its interests in an extension of the war on terror to include Iraq, particularly the potential trade loss with the Middle East.

A major defence issue for Australia is whether to design its future defence force to accommodate America’s transformation strategy for dealing with asymmetric threats, and what defence role it sees itself playing internationally in the future. An equally important regional consideration is where Australia stands on separatist insurgencies - principally Islamic - that have legitimate claims to separatism or greater autonomy. After all, regional governments invariably label their own separatists as ‘terrorists’. Do we really want to see regional governments attempt to crush these elements with US aid, or should we take a more statesmanlike position and look towards trying to broker equitable longer-term solutions?

In the final analysis, it is important to bear in mind that both the ‘crush’ and ‘do nothing’ approaches are potentially dangerous options in terms of encouraging future operational support for Al Qaeda, Islamic extremism, and terrorist regional networking.

Notes
1 Meaning a ‘religious ruling’.
2 Exact figures of those killed may never been known with any certainty. However, it is important to note that illegal aliens killed have not been included in official figures. See ‘Dead and Missing’, New York Times, 24 April 2002, A13.
3 For example, the financial services firm Morgan Stanley estimates that commercial insurance premiums in the United States will rise by up to 50 percent between 2002 and 2004 to cover the potential cost to businesses of future terrorism. See Stephen Roach, ‘Sands in the Gears of Globalization’, Newsweek International, 4 February 2002.
5 Wahhabism is an extreme form of Islam to which Osama bin Laden and his followers reportedly adhere.
The purpose of this chapter is to offer comment upon Clive Williams' very comprehensive and worthwhile contribution from chapter 2. He raises a wide range of important issues for debate and I would like to pick up on just a few of them.

First, I agree totally that September 11 should be viewed as only part of the Al Qaeda campaign - it was neither the beginning nor the end. Despite the routing of the organisation in Afghanistan, this is a problem that will confront us for some time to come. Not only is the operational clout of Al Qaeda almost certainly still considerable, but we are also left with the model it so effectively utilised and the legacy of the large number of people it has trained. We will continue to hear from Al Qaeda.

It is important also that September 11 be seen as part of the evolution of terrorism. There is not as big a break between this act and others as many would have us believe. To be sure, there were winners and losers, but the judgement as to who falls into which category is likely to change over time. Many initial judgements were too hasty and it may still be too soon to make the final assessment.

Implicit in Mr Williams' comments is the fact that the initial effusive support for the full range of counter-terrorism initiatives led by the US immediately after the attacks has begun to subside. But the differences of opinion over appropriate response strategies are emerging at different rates for different initiatives depending on such factors as: the nature of the response, its cost and degree of threat to existing bureaucratic and political interests, the degree of international cooperation required, and more sober assessments of the practical difficulties of ensuring that a number of the alternatives would actually have a substantial impact on terrorism or would be worth the damage to, for example, civil liberties.
As September 2001 recedes, we can expect increasing division of opinion (both internationally and domestically) unless, of course, there is another attack on a similar scale or a credible threat emerges involving nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) agents. With regard to the latter, it is not necessarily that the realisation of the threat is new, but rather that the scene set by the September 11 attacks and the unrelated but adjacent anthrax incidents brought it into sharp public focus.

Williams also raises a number of ongoing concerns about the new terrorist environment. In my view, the major concerns revolve around the manner in which US thinking is driving the response, and the policy options that this thinking both includes and excludes. Excluded is any genuine assessment as to the causes of terrorism - a seemingly hopeless exercise in some ways - but one that must nevertheless be given due weight.

Another is the drive to see all classes and types of political violence, from the actions of legitimate protesters to the aggression of the "wrong sort" of nation state, as instances of terrorism. Terrorism is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon and I fail to see how a "one size fits all" counter-terrorism strategy - no matter how many components it may have - can possibly be expected to succeed. The difficulty with the international counter-terrorism agenda being so dominated by the US is that their single-mindedness, while effective against some targets, some of the time and in some places, will not succeed overall because it simply fails to take account of the cultural and political nuances that must be acknowledged for the panoply of terrorist situations faced by the world.

We all could benefit from a more dispassionate and comparative examination of counter-terrorist campaigns in a number of countries to see what works for particular times, places and contexts. This suggestion is partly a plea for standing back and looking at the bigger picture, partly for more research into what has worked and partly a hope that we can see that the terrorist threat is not unitary, but rather of a more complex nature, with varying threat levels and strategic implications.

A number of commentators have raised the spectre of the fear of terrorism being exploited as a bogey used to justify otherwise unacceptable strategic options. I share this concern to the extent that the nature of some of the post September 11 debate about terrorism - certainly in the US, but to an extent in Australia and elsewhere as well - has not been very balanced. The debate has seemingly excluded any viewpoint resembling the 'soft option' and vilified as unpatriotic anyone who would raise issues such as the impact on civil liberties by some of the proposed remedies. To my mind, this runs
Has The World Really Changed Since September 11?

the risk of promoting hysteria, encouraging threat inflation and leading to a narrowness of thought that, translated into narrow policy and strategy, will inevitably end in failure.

Let me clarify by stating that I do not think harsh measures or decisive action should be dismissed outright. The scale and level of some terrorist threats clearly warrant action that we might not have previously contemplated. But that action should be rationally and fully debated. We need, as a society, to know what we are giving up, yet remain confident that the sacrifice has a reasonable chance of being effective, before we rush to take steps that might ultimately be difficult to reverse.

Many are asking if the world has really changed since September 11. The answer is yes, no and maybe. Yes it has changed fundamentally, at least for the foreseeable future, because the mindset and the worldview of the US have undergone a sea change. Given the unprecedented extent of the current unipolar situation, that US determination affects us all.

But, no, I don't believe that terrorism has really changed. Terrorism embraces many styles and types. While much focus remains on Al Qaeda, there are many groups and tactics whose survival have not been affected by recent events (except to the extent that some groups' activities may temporarily have been made more difficult). Groups such as Al Qaeda are somewhat unique in tactics and structure, but these too form part of, rather than represent a clear departure from, the evolutionary path of terrorism. I would even see NBC terrorism as part of this evolutionary process. In this case, it would not be so much that the nature of terrorism had fundamentally changed, but rather that the consequences would be of a fundamentally different order.

That said, perhaps some of the changes are fundamental in the sense that there may be no going back. However, that would be truer of the response to terrorism rather than terrorism itself.

As far as Australia is concerned, September 11 has raised a number of political, social and policy issues that will require careful handling. It has thrown the spotlight on our own preparedness for terrorism and caused debate about the threat level, appropriate response and potential associated social costs. I hope that the nation can debate these issues rationally to find the best way forward.
Notes

CHAPTER 4

DIPLOMATIC REALIGNMENTS SINCE '911'

Coral Bell

The attacks of September 11 did not “change everything”, as a lot of people said at the time. The US remained the paramount power in a unipolar society of states, and the significance of that status was illustrated by a great number of diplomatic realignments in the following year.

The most vital of those realignments have been between the US, China, Russia and the governments of South and Southeast Asia. All of those changes have been important to Australia, although its own relationship with the US remained constant, except for some questioning on the part of the Opposition, as the American focus moved from Afghanistan to Iraq.

During the first stage of US reaction to the attacks, Washington found unexpected ‘allies of necessity’ in Pakistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. They were the crucial players in US military collaboration with an equally unexpected co-belligerent, the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Victory was secured in approximately one month by a combination of US air-power and the tribal forces who had earlier been resisting the Taliban. But if the Taliban disappeared, so did Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar. The warlords remained a problem. The victory was therefore clouded. Nevertheless, the success of American diplomacy in converting (almost overnight) the government of President Musharaf in Pakistan from support of the Taliban to cooperation with US forces was notable, especially as it was managed without alienating India, a nation perceived as diplomatically vital.

President Putin’s decision to identify the Russian national interest with that of the West in the conflict was less unexpected, and seems to have been instant. He was the first world leader to telephone Bush, while the US President remained airborne in the first few hours after the attack, to assure him that he understood the reason for the raised alert status of US forces, and that he was standing down Russian forces.\(^1\) Putin’s cooperation with regard to the establishment of US forces and bases in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan was also essential.
China’s attitude initially appeared likely to be more ambivalent. During the first eight months of the Bush administration, relations with Washington had been decidedly tense: the Hainan Island spy-plane, the sale of advanced weaponry to Taiwan, and the removal of the last shreds of ambiguity about the degree of Washington’s political and military commitment to the Taiwanese government had all produced a diplomatic chill. Moreover, the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the original draft of which reached Donald Rumsfeld’s desk on September 11, clearly identified China as the likeliest prospective ‘peer-competitor’ for the US and thus the inevitable focus of its strategic preoccupations after the disappearance of the Soviet Union. That version was hastily modified after ‘911’, but can still be dimly seen in the document. The Pentagon’s focus now (and for, in all probability, the whole of this decade or possibly much longer) is the world-wide network of the Jihadists. Geographically, that must mean mostly the Gulf, and South or Southeast Asia, which makes the likelihood of any early confrontation between Washington and Beijing much more remote. This is partly because Washington’s policymakers will not want to be distracted from the combat with this new adversary, but also because the strategic context within which China must act now makes any sort of challenge to the US less diplomatically feasible than it seemed in the mid-nineties. At that time, the political future of Russia was quite uncertain, and Chinese leaders received polite smiles of acquiescence when they raised the subject of ‘strategic partnership’ in Moscow. Moreover, Pakistan then saw China as its most important great-power ally. Washington remained reluctant to involve itself again in Southeast Asia, and was hardly present at all in Central Asia.

All that has now changed. Russia is close to being a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the US has established a sort of protectorate over Afghanistan, and is strongly present with forces and bases in Central Asia. It has mended its fences with India, established an alliance with Pakistan and returned to Southeast Asia, which begins to look like the ‘second front’ in its combat with the Jihadists. Though China has its own anxieties about Islamic militants, the new American presence so close to its borders must look like ‘encirclement’ in Beijing. However, China remains substantially dependent on its ability to sell into the US market in order to obtain the foreign exchange which finances its economic development. So it has economic as well as diplomatic and military reasons for its decision-makers to decide that it is not yet time for any challenge to US predominance in East Asia.
Since very painful choices for Australian decision-makers would arise from any hostile confrontation between the US and China over Taiwan, that is good news for Canberra. On the other hand, if the US goes into Iraq, and Australia goes along (at least in a token way), which seems likely, Canberra’s relations with Malaysia and Indonesia seem certain to take a dive.

The most complex and ambiguous area of diplomatic uncertainty is, however, the Gulf region, especially Saudi Arabia. In the first three months after ‘911’, it was almost compulsory in the US and elsewhere to take a charitable view of the Saudi connection with the Jihadists. But by early 2002, that stance was beginning to crack under the weight of the evidence. It was not merely that fifteen of the nineteen hijackers were Saudis, or that Saudis constituted a high proportion of those detained in Guantanamo Bay, or even that the doctrine which inspired the Jihadi leadership, especially bin Laden, has its origin in the Saudi religious hierarchy. It is primarily because the funds which created and sustain the Jihadi network, and also the radical mosques and madrassah schools that teach young Muslims (in the West as well as Pakistan and the Middle East) about the glory of dying in Jihad against the West appear to be largely funded by Saudi charities and Saudi individuals, including some of the princes. Indeed, a group of Americans and Australians whose relatives died in the twin towers are already suing the Saudi ‘establishment’, in effect because of those connections, and the US Treasury is investigating modes of cutting off that flow of funds.

In July 2001, the Defence Policy Board, a highly influential offshoot of the Pentagon, heard a research paper describing Saudi Arabia as ‘the kernel of evil’, active on every level of terrorism. In effect, the Saudi establishment is charged with ‘buying off’ its potential domestic terrorists by funding them to operate abroad. And the Saudi intelligence community (which was headed by one of the princes) is charged with being less than cooperative in helping to interpret the flurry of ‘chatter’ from suspect sources which was noticed by US intelligence bodies in the months before ‘911’, indicating that ‘something big’ was on the way, and that bin Laden’s fingerprints were all over it.

If those charges are proved, it might be difficult for the 60 year old alliance to survive. The Saudis at one stage indicated that the elaborate bases the US has built on their territory might not be available in the event of an attack on Iraq. The Pentagon has built potential alternatives in Qatar and Kuwait, but still a military adventure in the Gulf, with the Saudis so ambivalent, would be rather dicey, and that is no doubt a factor in the preference of many US policymakers for a UN solution.
To sum up, if I had to nominate one of America’s alliances as a possible delayed casualty of ‘911’, it would have to be the Saudi alliance rather than NATO. Though some fence-mending efforts are under way on both sides, bin Laden’s objectives must have included just such an outcome. There has been a great deal of media speculation, as US attention has shifted to Iraq, that some of America’s NATO allies, especially France and Germany, might be so alienated that NATO itself might be affected. But that 53 year old connection has survived many such crises in its time, and it serves the interests of both sides of the Atlantic so well that I am certain it will survive this one, even if there is a major battle in Iraq. Washington’s policies were even more unpopular during the Vietnam War period, but the alliance was not really weakened.

The Muslim world (especially the Arab world) is rather a different proposition. Its diverse societies already have many grievances against the US, especially over Palestine, and a major military engagement in Iraq might be the last straw for some of them. On the other hand, none of the governments of that world love Saddam Hussein much, and all of them can see possible benefits (including financial ones) in good relations with Washington. The cases of Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and even Djibouti illustrate the advantages of Washington’s unique combination of military and economic power in getting unlikely governments to see things its way. Beyond that, however, there is the fact that the Jihadists are indeed a danger to every established government in the society of states, and that the Muslim governments are vulnerable in a way that others are not. So, on the whole I would argue that, despite current arguments, Washington’s diplomatic hand has been strengthened by the events of the past year, in that its ability to secure ‘bandwagoning’ is greater. Other governments know that they have an unforeseen adversary ‘out there’, a non-state actor challenging them in the name of alternative norms. Even if they do not always like America’s strategies, they know that its strengths are vital to winning the battle, just as they were during the Cold War.

Notes


President Bush is not naturally eloquent. His speeches are short and disciplined, but he does have a weakness for the arresting one-liner. At this stage of his Presidency, the competition for the most arresting one-liner has already become pretty fierce. The one that has always stuck in my mind as revealing a great deal came very early. On 13 February 2001, Bush had this to say to a military audience in Norfolk Virginia: “The best way to keep the peace is to redefine war on our terms.”

That sentence spoke volumes about the scale of accomplishment that the US considered to be within its reach, and hinted at just how different the world looked to a lone superpower. In my view, the sentence also pointed to another important characteristic of the Bush administration. Notwithstanding the end of the Cold War, this administration was focused on grand strategy.

The economy, the environment, health care, welfare and so on were all important and would be addressed. But none of these ‘defined’ the administration. None of these were intended or expected to shape the administration’s legacy. What did define the administration was the view that the US had both the interest and the capacity to provide order and direction in the more free-wheeling, disaggregated international arena that characterised the post-Cold War world.

This was an administration that knew what to do with unipolarity. And it was an administration that regarded unassailable military pre-eminence as the foundation stone for translating the condition of unipolarity into policies that could perpetuate this condition.

The key players in the administration all served in, or were close to, the administration of Bush Snr (1989-93). They came to the view at that time that unipolarity was an instrument that the US could and should wield decisively to protect and advance its interests. This work was done in
1990-91. According to press reports, the thrust of this strategy was that it was within the capacity of the US not simply to deter any and all future challengers, but to in fact dissuade them from aspiring to challenge at all.

President Bush Snr reportedly endorsed this aspiration. On the very day that the President introduced this theme - in a discreet and understated manner in a speech in Aspen, Colorado on 2 August 1990 - Iraq invaded Kuwait. Nobody noticed the speech, and conceptual development of the strategy petered out.2

The intervening Clinton administration, although its theme of 'democratic enlargement' arguably echoed this Republican thinking, was presumably deeply frustrating to this group of grand strategists. Importantly, however, the Clinton era did not see any dissipation of the fundamentals. To the contrary, America defied the widely forecast trend toward multipolarity, and did so effortlessly. Most particularly, the US military effort remained massive in absolute and relative terms. The US took a great leap forward in the application of information technologies to the business of war, acquiring and demonstrating a capacity for 'immaculate coercion' and, indeed, setting out on the road to redefine war.

Another crucial phenomenon unfolded during the Clinton years, although it was in fact generic to the circumstances the US found itself in. Disproportionate power and prominence came together with a growing sense of disproportionate exposure and vulnerability. Threats at the margin - untidy, irregular threats from essentially undeserving actors - assumed unusual prominence because they looked to be the only developments in the foreseeable future that could mar the exploitation of unipolarity. This, in turn, fuelled an instinct to further extend US power to also control (ie, defeat or deter) these potential irregular threats.

When the grand strategists re-assembled under Bush Jnr they were in a hurry, and it showed. The US impatiently shed all external constraints on the development of its military capacities - as seen most conspicuously in the missile defence arena. The determination to shape and control strategic developments more closely and across a wider geographic front was clearly visible in the Quadrennial Defense Review of September 20013 and only slightly less so in the Nuclear Posture Review of December 2001.4

The impression of the US detaching itself from the company of mere major powers was palpable and attracted a great deal of criticism and diagnosis. Whether the world lost touch with Washington or vice versa is a moot point. It would appear, however, that Washington absorbed being misunderstood and under-appreciated as part of the burden of leadership,
the singular responsibility to take the hard positions and make the tough decisions. Needless to say, this did not ease the communication problem.

Seen from this perspective, the tragedy of September 11 reinforced instincts that were already deeply entrenched. Specifically, ‘911’ boosted unilateral instincts in Washington, and did so very sharply, but they were very much in place long before this event.

This perspective also helps to explain - if indeed help is needed - why Washington so thoroughly subordinated its entire foreign policy agenda to the campaign against terrorism. The Bush administration believed that it had perhaps the greatest opportunity in history to shape the world to the benefit of the US and all other nations prepared to accommodate to this broad international order. A valuable decade had been lost but the fundamentals remained in place. The administration had conceptualised the challenge to this vision from so-called asymmetric threats, but this in no way diminished the shock of the real thing.

September 11 was a starker exhibition of asymmetry than anyone had been capable of seriously imagining, let alone articulating. The event was utterly devastating, yet devastatingly simple. The US response was driven not only by the sheer audacity and depravity of the attack, and the feelings of rage and humiliation that ensued, but also by the concern that this phenomenon could rob the US of its historic opportunity to directly shape a favourable and enduring world order.

The US did not achieve its present status through conquest or any other dishonourable means. If the emergence of a hyperpower was, to an important extent, an accident of history, I subscribe to the view that the US is the safest incumbent that one could wish for. Moreover, I suspect that this view is more widely held than might appear at first glance. The well-nigh universal reaction to ‘911’ was driven by straightforward sympathy, and a recognition, at least in principle, that the target could have been, or become, the Kremlin, Big Ben, or the Forbidden City. But it was also driven by an appreciation, particularly among the major powers, that their aspirations were founded in a predictable world order, an order that was, and is, hugely dependent on a committed and engaged United States of America. This is the case even for those states whose aspirations explicitly include diminishing US pre-eminence.

The US commands unprecedented power, above all military power. It is a power that genuinely has unilateral military options in essentially all contingencies. This is widely seen as the pivotal dimension of US power. Two thoughtful recent investigations into the diverging world views of the
US and Europe - one American, the other European - both conclude that a significant boost in Europe’s ‘military’ capacity is indispensable to getting back on the same ‘political’ wavelength as Washington. Neither author seemed optimistic that this would happen.

The United States is a power that takes very seriously the view that it is the last line of defence and that the mixture of opportunities, responsibilities, burdens and risks that accompany this role cannot, in the final analysis, be transferred or shared. It is also a power that believes very deeply that US values and interests are essentially universal. These are the well-springs of the contention that the United States is the ‘exceptional’ state, one that can be ominously powerful without being an ominous power.

A decade ago, President Bush Snr put this thought in the following way: “They (the rest of the world) trust us to do what is right” and that the US had to lead because “there is no one else.” In 2002, it had become: “America’s security role in the world is unique...When US interests are protected, America and its friends prosper from peace and freedom.”

Under these various impulses, all sharply intensified by ‘911’, the US has embraced the loneliness of leadership and become a harder nation, more detached, more impervious to criticism, more impatient with compromise and more disdainful of coalitions.

In the article already cited, Robert Kagan observed that “As is so often the case in human affairs, the real question is one of intangibles - of fears, passions and beliefs.” US hegemony has been with us for some considerable time. In the past, US conduct had certain intangible qualities that disguised and softened this condition. The aura of reluctance and humility, of a generosity of spirit, that once accompanied America’s power and influence, has now worn rather thin.

Just a few years ago, Josef Joffe could write persuasively that the US would defy the fate of past hegemons because ‘soft power’ figured so prominently in how it exercised power and influence. This contention would not have the same resonance today. One of the great skills of the statesman is the ability to present a potentially divisive reality in ways that promote understanding and acceptance. This skill is not necessarily absent in Washington today. Very few skills are in my experience. It would appear however that, in recent times, it has not been seen as a skill of great value or importance. There is no foreseeable challenge to unipolarity, and staying close to the US will remain very important to most states, Australia among them. But it has become a much more demanding business than it used to be.
Many are of the view that ‘911’ and the war on terror only suppressed the issues that constituted the strategic agenda before that day. This is a view that I share. At the same time, what might almost be labelled ‘the fallout’ from the war on terror has at least changed the context in which these earlier issues will be addressed in significant ways. The war on terror has, for example:

- certainly accelerated and arguably deepened the strategic accommodation between the US and Russia;
- increased the isolation of China;
- made the US an integral player in Central Asia;
- further invigorated Japan’s transition to normalcy; and
- opened the way to substantive and positive relations between the US and India.

All of these would be regarded, certainly in Washington, as falling on the positive side of the ledger. There has also been some negative fallout. Europe’s resentment at being marginalised is one example. Another is that while Washington had eyes only for Al Qaeda, the Israel-Palestine situation spiralled out of control. Just how costly in broader strategic terms this could prove remains to be seen.

Finally, for some of the more ambitious players in Washington, regime change in Iraq should be seen in terms of the war on terror becoming an instrument of grand strategy. Specifically, regime change in Iraq is seen as the catalyst for a process that will bring democracy and development to the entire Islamic world, an outcome that should be seen as the real objective of the war, and the criteria for victory.9

A deeply ingrained capacity to self-correct and to (eventually) align itself with basic norms and principles ranks amongst the United States’ greatest political strengths. It goes a long way toward explaining why the world is so comfortable with a country that is more powerful than any imaginable coalition of other states. The rest of the world holds the US to high standards. Criticism is often trenchant. But this criticism is often directed at alerting the US to the indirect or unintentional consequences of a proposed action or policy. Very few states fear it as a potential aggressor.

Still, America’s allies and friends should never hesitate to assist the process of self-correction. Should the US get it wrong, the consequences are likely to be very severe, especially for the rest of us who are generally more vulnerable to such ‘consequences’ than the US. As the US surveys the
global chessboard and considers options and strategies alone, now might be a particularly good time to assist in this process.

The thrust of such advice and counsel might be to encourage the administration, literally, to 'lighten up', to remind them that virtually everyone is on their side, that they have more allies and friends than any hegemon in history, to encourage them to continue to embrace the discipline of engagement with the rest of the world, and to urge them to lead rather than slip deeper into the lonely belief that they have no choice but to impose.

In the final analysis, it might be said that the more conscious the world is of unipolarity, the more the US has departed from the attitudes and practices that have served it so well in the past. And the world now appears to be very conscious indeed of unipolarity.

Notes


8 Josef Joffe, 'How America Does It', *Foreign Affairs* 76, no.5 (September/October 1997), pp.13-27. For an intriguing development of Joffe's thesis see Clark S. Judge, 'Hegemony of the Heart', *Policy Review* 110, (December 2001/January 2002), pp.3-13. Judge contends that, across the less developed world, under-privileged people are creating an immense informal economic sector, chasing the American dream in what look like American ways. This phenomenon is bypassing and undermining entrenched social structures and, vaguely or otherwise, the affected elites blame the US.
PART TWO

REGIONAL AND NATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
PART TWO

REGIONAL AND NATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
CHAPTER 6

TERRORISM IN INDONESIA

Greg Fealy

Introduction

Prior to 1998, Indonesia’s Islamic community had a reputation for being one of the most moderate and pluralist in the Muslim world. A large majority of Indonesian Muslims opposed the creation of an Islamic state and supported the religiously neutral state ideology of Pancasila. Conflict between Muslims and religious minorities was rare, and liberal Muslim thinkers and leaders were at the forefront of the nation’s intellectual life and reform movement. Extremist Islam, in so far as it existed, was held firmly in check by the vast security and intelligence apparatus of Soeharto’s New Order regime.

With Soeharto’s downfall in May 1998, a different image of the nation’s Islam began to emerge. Vigilante and paramilitary Islamic groups were formed and quickly gained a high public profile through their brazen, often violent, actions and their fundamentalist ideologies. Various paramilitary groups raised and trained thousands of fighters and sent them into regions where Muslim-Christian conflict had broken out, often with the effect of intensifying the bloodshed and intra-communal animosities. One group, the Laskar Jihad, marched on the presidential palace and parliament in Jakarta dressed in white gowns and turbans and brandishing swords, thereby providing dramatic pictures that found their way into the international media. Anti-vice vigilantes attacked nightclubs, brothels or gambling dens with seeming impunity and pro-shariah groups rowdily demonstrated in front of parliament demanding that the constitution include an obligation for Muslims to uphold Islamic law. None of these actions would have been tolerated during the Soeharto era.

In the past year, perceptions of Indonesian Islam have changed more dramatically as evidence emerged of serious terrorist activity. In December 2001, the Singaporean government exposed a terrorist cell connected to the
JIl network. Shortly afterwards, the Malaysian government made similar announcements. Cell members told interrogators that the three leading figures in JIl were all Indonesian. Later in the year, Indonesians were arrested and convicted in the Philippines on terrorism-related charges. On 12 October 2002, terrorists bombed two nightclubs on the resort island of Bali, killing 190 people, the majority of whom were westerners. Investigations by Indonesian and international police have adduced strong evidence that Indonesian JIl members carried out the bombing and also had a pivotal role in its planning. As a result, Indonesia is now seen as a country which has a significant problem with Islamic extremism, and particularly groups disposed to violence.

It is not the intention of this chapter to analyse Indonesian terrorist groups in any detail. There are several reasons for this. First, there has been a flood of new information regarding Indonesia-based terrorism in recent months, particularly arising from the investigations into the Bali bombings, and it is reasonable to expect more revelations in the coming months. A more thorough scholarly examination of these groups may need to wait until those investigations are largely concluded. Second, the focus of this book is the future direction of counter-terrorism efforts, rather than dissecting what has already taken place. Thus, I will confine myself to a brief description of JIl, the main terrorist group, and concentrate instead on broader issues relating to the changing dynamics of Indonesian extremism and strategies for combating terrorism.

**Jemaah Islamiah**

JIl was established in Malaysia in the mid-1990s by Abubakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar, both of whom had fled Indonesia after being charged with subversion in the mid-1980s. It soon spread to other countries in the region, including Singapore, Malaysia and Australia, and also developed training and operational links with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the southern Philippines. JIl appears to be a diverse movement, a common element of which is identification with the so-called Ngruki network and the teachings of its founders, Ba’asyir and Sungkar. At the core of JIl is a relatively small group, perhaps numbering several hundred, who are prepared to use violence to achieve their objectives. Ba’asyir is commonly described as JIl’s spiritual head but, at least until recently, control of operational matters lay with Riduan Isamuddin, alias Hambali, who is currently a fugitive. A central aim of JIl is to create a pan-Southeast Asian Islamic state wherein the caliphate can be re-established.
Terrorism in Indonesia

JI clearly has links to Al Qaeda. There is some evidence to suggest that senior JI figures, including Sungkar and Hambali, had direct contact with Al Qaeda leaders, and it is also likely that funding, training and technical expertise may have been gained through bin Laden's network. A number of writers have asserted that JI is in fact the Southeast Asian arm of Al Qaeda, although publicly available information suggests that the Al Qaeda-JI relationship may be of a more ad hoc rather than command nature.

The weight of evidence pointing to JI's terrorist activities is now substantial. The Singaporean government has released a good deal of credible documentary and video evidence attesting to JI activities on the island. Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, an Indonesian who acted as one of JI's chief bomb experts, has confessed to his involvement in a string of terrorist acts, including the bombing of the Metro Manila in December 2000. His confession is supported by considerable circumstantial evidence. The most persuasive evidence of all is the police findings into the Bali bombing. At the time of writing, 15 Indonesians are in custody over suspected involvement in the bombing and another six are being sought by police. A quite detailed picture has now emerged of JI's leadership, ideology and organisational methods, as well as how its members planned and executed the bombing. Ba'asyir himself is now under arrest, although on suspected involvement in the Christmas Eve 2000 church bombings and alleged assassination attempts on Megawati rather than the Bali bombing. On 25 October 2002, JI was placed on the UN register of terrorist organisations, although its operations will be difficult to curtail.

Is Terrorism a new phenomenon in Indonesia?

While some characteristics of recent terrorist activity are new, others are familiar to anyone with knowledge of Indonesian history. Virtually since the nation gained independence in 1945, Indonesia has had militant groups perpetrating violence in the name of Islam. Such groups were numerically small and never succeeded in attracting a following amongst mainstream Muslim organisations, although they did enjoy localised support in a number of regions.

The most obvious example of this was the Darul Islam (DI) movement led by Kartosuwrjo, which rose up in rebellion against the Republic in 1948 and established an Islamic state in the highlands of West Java. By the early 1950s, Muslim regionalists in five other provinces, including Aceh, South Sulawesi and South Kalimantan, had joined the DI cause. At its height in the mid-1950s, DI claimed to have more than 20,000 fighters and was by far the most serious security problem facing the Indonesian military.
The back of the rebellion was not broken until the early 1960s. Kartosuwirjo was eventually captured and executed in 1962 and DI leaders in Kalimantan and Sulawesi had been killed by 1965, leaving the movement with only a few scattered insurgents thereafter. The human and economic toll of the DI rebellion was immense. An estimated 40,000 people lost their lives and over 500,000 were displaced. There was also widespread destruction of property and disruption to commercial activity. Although its activities would arguably not fall within accepted current definitions of terrorism, DI was clearly prepared to engage in extreme methods to advance its cause. During the 1970s and 1980s, a number of small radical groups, many with links to former DI members, engaged in occasional acts of violence but posed no significant threat.

In the past 15 years, two important changes have taken place within radical Islam in Indonesia: first, ‘the struggle’ has become internationalised; and second, there has been a marked increase in the capacity of militant groups to wreak havoc and destruction. The internationalisation is evident in the flow of money, material, organisational concepts and technical expertise from other parts of the Islamic world to Indonesia. By comparison, DI was entirely a local phenomenon which gained no support from outside Indonesia. The enhanced destructive capacity of radical groups is clear from the scale of the Bali bombs and the high-level planning and coordination needed to carry out the attack. This was far in excess of any other bomb attack in the country’s history.

A key factor bringing about these changes was the experience of Indonesian Muslims who fought as mujahidin in Afghanistan in the 1980s and early 1990s. Indonesian mujahidin gained skills as soldiers in arduous battlefield conditions, learned terrorist-related skills such as bomb making and running clandestine operations, were indoctrinated with pan-Islamic and virulently anti-Western ideologies, and established relations with Muslim radicals across the Islamic world, from whom they could later gain financial assistance, access to technical know-how and connections into global militant networks. The exact number of Indonesian mujahidin is not known, but estimates range from several hundred to many thousands (a figure of 500-1,000 seems the most plausible).

Not all former mujahidin have become involved in militant activity in Indonesia, but most of the major radical groups have Afghanistan veterans within their leadership ranks. In addition to the mujahidin factor, there are also increasing numbers of Indonesian Muslims who receive their education in the Middle East, where they gain exposure to more puritanical and radical expressions of the faith, such as Salafi-Wahhabism from Saudi Arabia and
Yemen. Cyber-technology has also greatly increased the speed and volume of information flows between Islamist groups in Indonesia and their counterparts elsewhere in the Islamic world. A final factor was the radicalising effect of state repression of Islam during the Soeharto period. In general, many Muslims believed that they were actively discriminated against and that religious minorities held a disproportionate share of political and economic power. More specifically, many militant Muslims suffered persecution and brutality under the regime, with hundreds being jailed on fabricated charges. Sungkar, Ba’asyir and Hambali were all incarcerated during the New Order period.

**Responses to Terrorism**

British police have a maxim about fighting terrorism: ‘Communities defeat terrorists’. Underlying this is a belief that even sophisticated state security operations will fail unless they gain the support and cooperation of society. This would seem just as true of Indonesia as it is for other countries. It has porous borders and security services of relatively low professional capacity. Corruption is rife in the police and military and the level of training, equipment and morale is generally poor. The intelligence services, and particularly the main civilian agency, Badan Intelijens Negara, have long histories of manipulating extremist groups and fabricating information for their own purposes. In this environment, the role of the Islamic community is critical. It is the readiness of Muslims to report suspicious activity or inform police of the whereabouts of ‘wanted’ suspected terrorists which will govern how successful Indonesia’s anti-terrorism campaign will be.

A key priority of both Indonesian and Western governments should be to maintain community trust in state efforts to combat terrorism. For Indonesian Muslims to cooperate with counter-terrorism measures, they must first be convinced that the threat is real and that the state is not continuing Soeharto-era strategies of using the spectre of disorder to justify repression. Unfortunately, the actions of some Indonesian intelligence officials in late 2001 and early 2002 heightened public scepticism about terrorist groups. Inconsistent and seemingly inaccurate statements were made about Al Qaeda bases in Central Sulawesi and there is some evidence that Indonesian and Filipino security officials conspired to ‘plant’ explosives in the luggage of three Indonesians travelling through Manila as a pretext for their apprehension. Measured and accurate public information campaigns should be a central part of the fight against terrorism.
Indonesian Muslim leaders also need to play a greater role in persuading their community of the risks of not acting against terrorism. Initially following the Bali bombing, many Muslims sought to deny that the perpetrators were Indonesians, preferring instead to blame outside groups and even Western intelligence agencies. Since November 2002, however, the police disclosures of JI involvement have forced all but the most intransigent of Muslim leaders to admit to the home-grown nature of the problem. In the closing weeks of 2002, we began to see prominent Muslims speak out strongly against the provocative rhetoric and violent methods of extremists. In the past, such leaders have taken a Voltarean view, arguing that the inflammatory statements of radicals like Ba'asyir fell within the bounds of acceptable discourse. Ultimately, the most effective brake on the spread of terrorism will be a change of attitude within the Islamic community itself. This will also be important in shoring up Indonesia's international reputation as having a moderate and pluralist Muslim majority.

What of the response of Western governments? The success of the police investigation into the Bali bombing is vindication of the policy pursued by the US and several other Western governments to concentrate their counter-terrorism aid on the police rather than the Indonesian military - Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) - whose dismal human rights record and reluctance to undertake internal reform have made the West wary of supporting any military role in law enforcement. Hopefully, assistance aimed at further upgrading police training and equipment will be increased and aid to the military will continue to be limited to strictly defence and national security functions. The Indonesian government should also be encouraged to make the rule of law its cornerstone in fighting Islamic extremism. Too often in recent years, militant groups have been able to break the law with impunity because the security forces were either worried about being portrayed as anti-Islamic or tacitly supported their actions.

One final point: Western governments should be careful in pursuing high-cost, short-term programmes when trying to change Muslim community attitudes to terrorism. The recent advertising campaign on Indonesian television depicting happy and patriotic American Muslims seems to have been greeted with deep scepticism and dismissed as simply more US propaganda. There are also risks inherent in proposals to pump large sums of money into the state education system and moderate Islamic schools as a means of attracting students away from the more radical institutions. While improving the general quality of state and Islamic education is welcome, throwing money at the school sector without adequate research and monitoring of how it will be spent is unlikely to be effective. The causes of
Terrorism are complex and hasty responses may well worsen rather than ameliorate the problem. The most effective policy responses to Indonesian radicalism probably need to have a medium to long-term focus. By way of example, Western aid organisations already fund a number of innovative programmes to support liberal Islam and Islam-based civil society activities. Given the prominence which many radical Muslim leaders enjoy in the Indonesian media, these programmes have helped to ensure that more tolerant and pluralist versions of the faith have a presence in the 'market place'. Hopefully, such programmes will receive longer-term funding.

Notes

1 Although the Bali bombing investigations have been the main source of new information on terrorist groups, a number of other sources have contributed greatly to our understanding of extremist Islam in Indonesia. See, for example, Sidney Jones, ‘Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates’, International Crisis Group Asia Report no. 43, 11 December 2002. Rohan Gunaratna’s Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (London: Hurst and Company, 2002) also contains some interesting information.

2 Jones gives 1995 as the year of JI’s founding, whereas Zachary Abuza says it was formed in 1993-4. See “Leadership and Terrorist Management in Jemaah Islamiyah”, unpublished paper dated 5 December 2002.

3 Ngruki is the name of the village where Ba’asyir’s al-Mukmin Islamic school is located.

4 Both Rohan Gunaratna and Zachary Abuza claim to have evidence of JI being an organisational wing of Al Qaeda.


6 Two of the detainees were later released without charge, but the third, Agus Dwikarna, was found guilty of immigration offences and is now serving a 10 year jail term in the Philippines. It subsequently emerged that intelligence agencies had strong covert reporting suggesting that Dwikarna was involved in terrorism and that they had used the explosive smuggling and immigration charges as a way of keeping him in detention. There is still no compelling evidence that Al Qaeda had training bases in Central Sulawesi, although it is entirely possible that Southeast Asian terrorist groups such as JI and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front did. For more on the Al Qaeda camps and Manila arrests, see Greg Fealy, ‘Is Indonesia a terrorist base?’, Inside Indonesia, no. 71, July-September 2002, pp.24-25; and ‘Why Indonesian Muslims are Sceptical about Terrorists in Their Midst’, AUS-CSCAP Newsletter, no. 13, May 2002, pp.17-18.
CHAPTER 7

MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE: MANAGING INTERNAL THREAT

John Funston

Early last year, Newsweek, citing FBI sources, described Malaysia as a bin Laden stronghold, and the "primary operational launchpad for September 11." Several other US media reports, including by the Washington Post, Christian Science Monitor and Time, described Malaysia as a hotbed of Muslim militants, organised as Jemaah Islamiah (JI), an Al Qaeda branch.

Malaysian leaders quickly rejected this analysis. Local Islamic extremists were, they claimed, a serious local and regional threat, aspiring to unite Muslims throughout Southeast Asia. Up to 50 might have received Taliban or Al Qaeda training, and Osama bin Laden may have inspired them to overthrow the Malaysian government, but no Al Qaeda cells existed in Malaysia.

While there is disagreement over the nature of the 'threat' in Malaysia, there are few differences over how the government, and especially Prime Minister Dr Mahathir, has handled this and other aspects of the September 11 phenomenon. The Australian journalist Greg Sheridan, for example, wrote on several occasions that Mahathir managed these issues better than any other leader in the region. Indeed, with just a few exceptions, Mahathir has been rehabilitated in the eyes of the international media. Following his retirement announcement in June 2002, he has been hailed as the person who single-handedly built modern Malaysia from a backwater, and protected it against racial communalists and Muslim extremists - a model Islamic moderate.

Looking at the evidence, however, neither Washington nor Kuala Lumpur has made a convincing case that there is a serious Islamic terrorist threat in Malaysia. The government response, based mainly on police actions (including use of the notorious Internal Security Act or ISA) and attempts to appear more Islamic than the opposition, has arguably reduced opportunities for legitimate dissent, while simultaneously advancing the cause of conservative Islam.
US evidence on the Al Qaeda connection

The key evidence mentioned in US sources is a reported videotape (taped by the Malaysian Special Branch at US request) of a meeting between two Al Qaeda operatives involved in September 11 and a Malaysian, Yazid Sufaat. Yazid is also said to have met with Zacarias Moussaouei - now under detention in the US for involvement in September 11 - and to have made accommodation in Malaysia available to these three. I presume that this video exists and it reveals what it is purported to - although the video has never to my knowledge been publicly shown, and Yazid has vigorously defended himself against all charges in an affidavit prepared by lawyers.

But if Yazid is guilty as charged, his role appears to have been a minor one. Malaysian leaders have consistently affirmed this, and claimed he became inadvertently involved. The names of one or two other Malaysians with alleged JI or Al Qaeda connections have occasionally appeared in accounts of regional terrorists, but the numbers are miniscule. That said, it would be surprising if there were no Malaysians among Al Qaeda members or supporters, as supporters have been uncovered in numerous countries.

US accounts are perhaps on firmer ground in pointing to indirect connections between Malaysia and terrorism. Malaysia has, for several years, provided residence to key Indonesian figures identified with JI, including three freelance Islamic preachers alleged to be top JI leaders. Indeed, Malaysia refused to hand over one of these (Hambali) when Indonesia sought his extradition following the December 2000 bombings in Indonesia. Nonetheless, JI (which translates simply as Islamic Community) remains a shadowy group, and the extent of its penetration in Malaysia has not been documented. Malaysian authorities have never publicly acknowledged Malaysian membership of it - claiming all local terrorists belong to the Kumpulan Militan/Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) - though several of those detained under the ISA have been charged with JI membership.³

Malaysia may also have provided some succour to international terrorists, including visa-free entry, easy transit and even hospitality. It has, over the years, provided such support to rebels in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and even Chechnya. However, with US concerns about Al Qaeda, it is not likely to have welcomed this group, or any of its affiliates, in the same way. The reported videotaping of Al Qaeda activities would appear to illustrate this.
Malaysia’s case for local terrorists

Between June 2001 and April 2002, in five or more separate operations, Malaysia arrested 63 ‘Islamic extremists’ that were allegedly planning to overthrow the government by use of force. Charges laid accuse them of affiliation with KMM or JI. A Human Rights Commission investigation of ISA conditions in June 2002 provided a rare public insight into these detainees. Most identified as KMM denied such an organisation existed. Some acknowledged membership of JI, but claimed this was a social welfare organisation recognised by Malaysian authorities and working in cooperation with them.

Arrests were carried out under the ISA, and evidence was provided that some had fought with the Afghan Mujahidin in the 1980s. However, since the ruling United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) had supported such actions at the time (along with the US and other Western countries), this was not strong evidence of a terrorist plot. Moreover, the police simply asserted that they had evidence of planned terrorism, and asked the public to accept this. The foreign media quickly accepted that the arrests were ‘proof’ of terrorism.

Without access to confidential records, it is impossible to comment on police claims with absolute certainty, although there are at least three reasons why they might be questioned.

First, all evidence has been obtained through interrogation under the ISA, which involves intense psychological, if not physical, coercion. Moreover, the ISA has frequently been used for political rather than security purposes, particularly since 1998 when it was employed against former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar and his supporters. In April 2001, a further 10 Anwar supporters were held under the ISA. A High Court case in September 2002 declared the arrests illegal as there was no evidence that those detained represented a militant threat to the state.

Second, Malaysian authorities have strong reasons to play up allegations of a terrorist threat. Internationally, it helped Dr Mahathir gain a coveted invitation to Washington and a new-found respectability. Domestically, it helped reinforce non-Malay/Muslim fears about Islam, turning them back to the government side and away from the opposition headed by Party Islam (PAS). With non-Muslims comprising approximately 45 percent of the population, that gave an enormous boost to Mahathir’s sagging fortunes, which had been on a steady slide since his 1998 sacking of Anwar. Malays were less sympathetic to anti-terrorist rhetoric, although the government
did put PAS on the back foot with claims that it had links to KMM and the Taliban.

Third, Malaysian officials have handled the issue as a psychological warfare operation, and have been less than frank in providing credible information. They never explained the shift from Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia to Kumpulan Militant Malaysia, which appears to follow psy-war speak that changed 'communists' into 'communist terrorists' (or 'CTs'). And as noted, authorities have never publicly acknowledged that JI exists in Malaysia, although several individuals have been charged under the ISA with JI membership. KMM leadership was initially said to be headed by a son of PAS Kelantan leader Nik Aziz, but later attributed to three Indonesian leaders of JI.

**Malaysian Islam**

Islam in Malaysia has generally been a force for moderation. Since independence in 1957, there have only been three clear incidents of violence linked to Islam. In October 1980, eight assailants were killed when they attacked a police station in Johor. In November 1985, fourteen villagers and four police were killed during a conflict in Memali (Kedah). In July 2000, a group known as Al-Ma'unah seized arms from military depots in Grik (Perak) and, in a subsequent shootout, three were killed (two from the security forces). In both the Memali and Grik cases, the circumstances remained clouded in controversy, many Malays believing that security forces mishandled these incidents, or were implicated in them.

Although Malaysian Muslims are adherents of the orthodox Sunni school, they also have a history of attraction to somewhat strange sects. At times, this has involved association with invincibility cults (a factor in the violent incidents above). Other examples include a wide range of 'deviant' beliefs, such as the hugely popular Darul Arqam. This combined a large commercial operation (selling approved Islamic products) with a simple lifestyle aimed at emulating Islam at the time of its origins. In 1994, the government arrested its leaders under the ISA and banned it.

Muslims have become much more devout in recent years under the influence of the dakwah movement, a process of Islamic resurgence that began in the late 1960s. This has had many manifestations, including greater attention to Islamic rituals, codes of dress, together with commercial practices such as Islamic banking and insurance and, in some cases, increased attention to Islamic law (shariah).
Islam in Malaysia has also been profoundly influenced by the manner in which Mahathir sacked Deputy Prime Minister Anwar in 1998. Hundreds of thousands of Malays left the ruling UMNO and joined the opposition, including PAS. While PAS is not an extremist or terrorist organisation as some have claimed - it has played by democratic rules for over 50 years - it does support a conservative form of Islam, with an emphasis on shariah law. Ironically, Mahathir, the defender of moderate Islam, drove thousands of Malays into the arms of PAS, before then seeking to win them back by means that included outbidding PAS on Islamic issues.

**Managing the ‘Islamic threat’**

The Malaysian government’s approach to Islamic matters since 1998 has relied heavily on the use of state power to restrict the activities of PAS and the party led by Anwar’s wife, keADILan (National Justice Party); use of the government and mainstream media (all controlled by UMNO and its coalition partners) to denigrate the opposition; and attempts to appear more Islamic than its rivals.

At least 73 Malaysians have been arrested under the ISA since April 2001, with 63 being linked to Muslim terrorism, and nearly all remain under detention. Numerous other political restrictions have been imposed, leading to an almost complete ban on free speech and assembly. In an unprecedented act, the police broke up a meeting on PAS premises in early 2002, and court cases against opposition members have moved forward on numerous charges relating to sedition, the Official Secrets Act, illegal assembly and rioting.

The media has always been used by the government to advance its own interests, but this has reached new heights. Government-owned television stations responded immediately to the events of September 11 by showing pictures of the devastation at the World Trade Center juxtaposed with the activities of Malaysia’s opposition parties. In the weeks leading to a January 2002 by-election, they carried daily a one minute presentation showing a Taliban member executing a female prisoner, again juxtaposed with scenes relating to Malaysian opposition parties. The mainstream newspapers have followed suit.

However, arguably the most important element in the government’s approach to these issues, particularly since September 11, has been UMNO’s attempt to demonstrate it is more Islamic than PAS. On 29 September, Mahathir declared that Malaysia was an Islamic state, leaving considerable ambiguity about the constitution’s hitherto accepted secular form. Mahathir and others had occasionally made such claims before, but to emphasise
that this was serious, he took the issue back to the ruling coalition and gained formal endorsement. In parliament, and at UMNO's general assembly in June 2002, Mahathir declared that not only was Malaysia an Islamic state, but it was a "fundamentalist, Islamic state."

There is, of course, a quite deliberate playing on words in these pronouncements. Mahathir has not changed from an Islamic moderate to an extremist overnight. But others might not perceive that to be the case, particularly since Mahathir has increasingly sought to present himself as an Islamic leader. A leading Islamic figure at the UMNO assembly declared Mahathir the most pious man in the country. In July 2002, a choir welcomed his return from an overseas visit with a song representing him as a 'caliph' - a traditional Islamic ruler combining religious and temporal powers. He has also supported public flogging for those found guilty of incest, and projected himself as a leading international spokesman for 'moderate' Islam. (Balancing international and domestic interests has, however, often proved difficult. To give just one example, at an Organisation of the Islamic Conference meeting in April 2002, Mahathir gained Western applause for describing Palestinian suicide bombers as "terrorists", but in the face of local concern qualified this four days later by saying they were "legitimate terrorists").

Supporters have also been quick to try and give substance to Mahathir's Islamic state declaration. An Information Department book entitled *Malaysia is an Islamic State* proposed reduced rights for non-Muslims. It was eventually withdrawn, but similar views were expressed in other articles that remain on government web sites. UMNO leaders even came out to support hudud (a controversial aspect of Islamic criminal law), although they objected to the form approved in PAS ruled states. Indeed, UMNO goaded PAS into introducing hudud laws in Terengganu sooner than it otherwise would have. UMNO did not vote against the legislation, it abstained (unlike in Kelantan a decade earlier when it voted in support). Mahathir justified abstention on the grounds that the hudud legislation did not apply to non-Muslims.

Have such initiatives enabled UMNO to win back Malay support? July 2002 by-elections in Kedah after the death of former PAS leader Fadzil Nor were a critical test, and UMNO invested a massive effort in the campaign. In what had been an UMNO stronghold until the 1999 election, the party wrestled back the federal constituency by a narrow margin, while PAS retained the state seat. Non-Malay voters helped UMNO over the line in the former case, but UMNO made no inroads into the Malay electorate.
There have been two main consequences of UMNO policies on Islamic matters in recent years. Fallout from the Anwar incident, and UMNO attempts to outbid PAS, have enhanced the cause of conservative Islam in Malaysia. And the closing of democratic space has made it more likely that Muslims will resort to extremist options. The broad consensus from research on a range of Islamic countries has been that democracy acts as an important hedge against extremism and terrorism.

Singapore - the Al Qaeda connection

Between December 2001 and January 2002, Singapore authorities arrested 15 alleged JI terrorists, and claimed to have foiled a plot that included, inter alia, the bombing of US and Australian targets in Singapore. A tape showing surveillance of US targets was discovered by the US in Afghanistan, at a former Al Qaeda residence, and was subsequently shown on Singapore television. Singapore also passed on information to the Philippines, resulting in the arrest of another operative there.

That there was some sort of plot, linked at least loosely with Al Qaeda, seems impossible to deny. But how well organised the plotters were, and how much of a threat they represented, is difficult to judge. In the details provided by Singapore, there are certainly many examples where conspirators acted in a manner that could only be described as grossly incompetent.

Singapore prides itself, justifiably, on the quality and accuracy of information it makes publicly available. Nonetheless, the fact that - like Malaysia - its information has largely come from ISA detainees, and Singapore benefits internationally and domestically by highlighting Islamic threats, provides reason for caution. There is no independent evidence for other claims by Singapore, including plans to crash a plane into Changi airport, and to sink US ships in the harbour. Its representation of JI as a co-ordinated Al Qaeda-linked organisation aimed at uniting all Islamic countries and regions in Southeast Asia under theocratic rule also lacks independent confirmation, and is at odds with later claims that Al Qaeda was “franchising” out terrorism in the region and JI was “operationally independent.” Moreover, if there is a grand plan for a regional Islamic super-state, it would be more logical to see this as a reflection of naïveté on the part of the conspirators; not, as represented, a cause for heightened alarm. Southeast Asian states will not disintegrate in the face of such a threat.6
With only 15 percent of the population Muslim, Singapore does not face the same sort of management problems as Malaysia. ISA detentions serve as a warning that the government will oppose extremism strongly, and the media (all government-linked) has been mobilised to emphasise the importance of Muslims fitting into multi-cultural Singapore - even to the extent of forbidding school girls from wearing head scarves, a very firm stand in the current environment.

The Regional picture after the Bali Bombing

One year after September 11, there is some evidence of Islamic extremism and terrorism in both Malaysia and Singapore. It is part of a broader regional scene of Islamic activities. Islamic preachers have for years roamed the region, governments have supported Islamic insurgent groups in neighbouring countries, and groups such as Darul Arqam have established footholds throughout Southeast Asia. What is not at all clear - and on the evidence seems most unlikely - is that these activities are Al Qaeda directed, and/or include a coherent and organised regional plan to establish a new Islamic state.

The tragic Bali bombing and information emerging out of investigations into this have, however, lent increased credibility to some of the details on terrorism provided by Singapore and Malaysia. In particular, we now know that Malaysia-based terrorism activities associated with JI were much more extensive than evidence had suggested hitherto. Nearly all arrested in relation to Bali had spent years in Malaysia, acquired permanent residence status there, and were based either at the small coastal village Sungai Manggis, which is approximately one hour’s drive south of Kuala Lumpur, or the religious school Pondok Pesantren Lukman al-Hakim in Johor. Even when JI leaders returned to Indonesia after the fall of Soeharto in 1999, several remained, and Malaysia continued to be a centre for JI meetings.

Much about JI organisational arrangements remains obscure, but it is clear that the Malaysian chapter is dominated by Indonesians, almost all associated with the former extremist Darul Islam movement and/or the Nrugki Islamic school near Solo. A few Malaysians have been named in supportive roles - one or two financiers, but most “foot soldiers”. Nor is there yet much evidence of a Malaysia-specific agenda. Virtually all Malaysian JI activities so far identified have related to terrorist activities in Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines.

Recent actions by government leaders have not helped to clarify the nature of Malaysia’s terrorist problem. Further arrests have brought the total to around 74, all (with the exception of two arrested December 2002 in
Sabah) described as KMM rather than JI. In October, Deputy Home Minister Chor Chee Heung advised parliament that KMM members had now been cleared of involvement in any robberies - though the government had hitherto claimed that investigation of a failed bank robbery in May 2001 alerted police to KMM’s existence. In November, police chief Tan Sri Norian Mai announced the arrest of four KMM “suicide bombers”, allegedly trained to attack the US embassy and cut water supplies to neighbouring Singapore. However, he did not explain why earlier reports had claimed such bombers would be brought from outside the region, or why suicide bombers might be necessary for actions against water supplies. Despite talk of suicide bombers, new evidence of JI activities in Malaysia, and even a statement by Mahathir that the Bali bombing could just as easily have occurred in Malaysia, political leaders complained bitterly when foreign governments or the international media alleged that terrorism remained a serious threat.

Notes

2 See, for example, ‘Mahathir’s Legacy Will Endure’, The Australian, 6 July 2002, p.12.
3 An unnamed official told Barry Wain of the Far Eastern Economic Review that those arrested after December 2001 belonged to JI, but this had not been acknowledged so as not to “alarm the public.” See Barry Wain, ‘Wrong Target’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 April 2002.
4 Six of the ten remain under detention on a technicality, and the government has foreshadowed amendments to prevent legal appeals against ISA detention.
5 Anwar was dramatically bashed at the hands of the chief of police, underwent a controversial trial and police subsequently employed harsh measures to put down opposition from his supporters.
6 A further 21 arrests announced on 19 September added little to this picture. New information focused on plans to disrupt Singapore water supplies (half sourced from Malaysia) in an attempt to promote Singapore-Malaysian conflict and bring down the Kuala Lumpur government - an outcome that even Singapore analysts dismissed as inconceivable.
CHAPTER 8

HOMELAND DEFENCE: NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES

Robert Cornall

Sometimes a single event is so dramatic that it changes the course of history. It precipitates severe reactions and hostile retaliation. It justifies responses which most likely would not otherwise have taken place. It disrupts established relationships between countries and creates new alliances that have far-reaching military, economic and social consequences.

The terrorist attack on the United States on September 11 was such an event. The full impact of events on this scale can only be gauged and measured years later. A little more than a year after that fateful day, we are still a long way from that point of clarity and understanding. Commentators have offered a wide range of theories and opinions about the reasons for the terrorist attack and its outcomes, to date and into the future. The divergence of their views on the causes and effects of September 11 is reminiscent of the reply made some years ago by the Chinese leader Zhou En-Lai when he was asked his assessment of the importance of the French Revolution. He replied: "It's too early to say."

A number of press articles have, however, focused on more practical and immediate issues. For example, in his article in the *Australian Financial Review* of 7 September 2002, Clive Williams writes about instability in our region and its implications for Australia, including "increased terrorist regional networking."1 These sorts of concerns lead directly into a down-to-earth consideration of our national security arrangements which have, understandably, received much attention in the months since '911'. Against that backdrop, the purpose of this chapter is to comment on the steps the Australian Government has taken to enhance our national security arrangements to meet the new challenges to our homeland defence.

**Initial response on September 11**

The starting point for this assessment is Australia's initial response to the attack on the early morning of September 11 and over the next few days. The attack tested counter-terrorist plans and procedures that had been
written down, reviewed and exercised over years but never put into operation in such a serious, real life situation. It is widely accepted that the plans and procedures worked, and that our departments and agencies responded very well. However, those plans and procedures were prepared in less dangerous times. Now that our threat level had increased to the highest level short of a direct security threat in Australia - and was likely to remain at that level for some time - we needed to review our counter-terrorism arrangements.

Review of Australia’s Counter-terrorism Arrangements

The review made four recommendations to Cabinet:

First, it suggested that some immediate increase in resources was required to meet the new threat level for agencies such as the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), the Protective Security Coordination Centre and the Australian Federal Police (AFP), which had to meet much greater operational demands than before.

Second, there were recommendations to consolidate some activities to achieve a better coordinated governmental response. As a result, the Australian Protective Service was merged with the AFP on 1 July 2002 and Emergency Management Australia was transferred from Defence to the Attorney-General’s Department in the Administrative Arrangements Order of November 2001.

Third, a number of practical longer term measures for more effective screening of people and goods to better protect our borders were put forward.

And finally, there were recommendations to strengthen Australia’s terrorism laws. With the exception of a bill to increase ASIO’s powers, this legislation has now been passed by Parliament.

The package of anti-terrorism legislation is made up of several Acts. They are:

Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002

The Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 amends the Criminal Code Act 1995 to:

- create a new offence of terrorism and a range of related offences;
- modernise Australia’s treason offence; and
- create offences relating to membership and other specified links with a terrorist organisation.
The penalties for these offences range from 10 years to life imprisonment. The legislation also creates a regime whereby an organisation can be listed in Regulations as a terrorist organisation if a Court is satisfied that it is a terrorist organisation or if it has been identified as one by a decision of the United Nations Security Council.

Suppressing the Financing of Terrorism Act 2002


The Act inserts a new offence into the Criminal Code Act 1995 directed at persons who provide or collect funds and are reckless as to whether those funds will be used to facilitate a terrorist act. The maximum penalty for the offence is life imprisonment. It also amends the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 to introduce new higher penalty offences for using or dealing with the assets of specified persons and entities involved in terrorist activities and making assets available to those persons or entities.

Criminal Code Amendment (Suppressing Terrorist Bombings) Act 2002

The Criminal Code Amendment (Suppressing Terrorist Bombings) Act 2002 amends the Criminal Code Act 1995 to make it an offence to place bombs or other lethal devices in prescribed places with the intention of causing death, serious harm or extensive destruction which would result in major economic loss. The maximum penalty for each of these offences is life imprisonment.

Telecommunications Interception Legislation Amendment Act 2002

The Telecommunications Interception Legislation Amendment Act 2002 amends the Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 to recognise offences involving terrorism as falling within the most serious class of offences for which interception warrants are available.

Border Security Legislation Amendment Act 2002

The Border Security Legislation Amendment Act 2002 deals with border surveillance, the movement of people, the movement of goods and the controls Customs has in place to monitor this activity.
Criminal Code Amendment (Anti-Hoax and Other Measures) Act 2002

The Criminal Code Amendment (Anti-Hoax and Other Measures) Act 2002 amends the Criminal Code Act 1995 to insert new offences directed at the use of postal and similar services to perpetrate hoaxes, make threats and send dangerous articles. The new anti-hoax offence carries a maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment. Using a postal or similar service to make threats is punishable by a maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment in the case of a threat to kill, and a maximum penalty of seven years’ imprisonment for a threat to cause serious harm. A maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment applies to the sending of dangerous articles.

Part III AAA, Defence Act

The above legislative changes followed earlier amendments to Part III AAA of the Defence Act, which were designed to clarify and facilitate the use of the Australian Defence Force in a terrorist situation. These were passed immediately prior to the Sydney Olympic Games.

Air Security Officers

In addition to these responses, the Government in late 2001 announced that it would introduce air security officers as an extra protection for civil aviation. These commenced operating on domestic flights as of 1 January 2002 and will start on international flights as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made.

Leader’s Summit

As part of our response to the new security challenges since September 11, the Prime Minister convened a summit of State and Territory leaders in Canberra on 5 April 2002. The leaders reached agreement on a number of important proposals to improve Australia’s national capacity to deal with terrorism and multi-jurisdictional crime.

National Terrorist Situations

One key agreement was that the Commonwealth would, after consulting with and seeking the agreement of affected States and Territories, assume lead responsibility for “national terrorist situations.” For this purpose, a national terrorist situation was defined to include attacks on Commonwealth targets, multi-jurisdictional attacks, threats against civil aviation and attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials.
These new arrangements are to be included in an inter-governmental agreement which is currently being drafted. The practical outcome of this process will be that the Prime Minister, the National Security Committee of Cabinet and the Secretaries Committee on National Security will have central roles to play in managing a national security incident.

Other agencies will be subject to their overall direction. Depending on the nature and demands of the incident, those agencies will include the Attorney-General’s Department, the Protective Security Coordination Centre, ASIO, AFP, Customs, the Australian Protective Service, the Australian Defence Force, and the Department of Health.

The management of the day-to-day response will be handled by the Commonwealth’s Counter-Terrorism Committee (formerly the Standing Inter-Departmental Committee on Protection Against Violence). This Committee comprises the 13 Commonwealth departments and agencies which are most relevant to counter-terrorism.

National Counter-Terrorism Committee

Another important outcome of the Leader’s summit was that the Standing Advisory Committee on Commonwealth/State Cooperation for Protection against Violence will be reconstituted as the National Counter-Terrorism Committee and given a broader mandate to cover prevention and consequence management issues with Ministerial oversight.

Australian Crime Commission

A further outcome was an agreement to replace the National Crime Authority with an Australian Crime Commission (ACC) from 1 January 2002. This decision has significance in regard to Australia’s anti-terrorism strategies for two main reasons. First, the ACC will place a strong emphasis on its much enhanced role of developing national strategic criminal intelligence, which could have benefits in relation to terrorist as well as criminal activity.

Secondly, the Board of the ACC will include all nine Australian police commissioners and the heads of four important Commonwealth agencies: ASIO, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, the Australian Customs Service and the Attorney-General’s Department. Their membership on the ACC Board should result in these key officials developing much closer working relationships that will benefit both Australian law enforcement and Australia’s response to any threat of terrorism within its borders.
Increasing Regional Security

Since the events of September 11, Australia has also taken steps to improve counter-terrorism capacity and preparedness within the Asia-Pacific region.

In February 2002, the Prime Minister signed a memorandum of understanding with Indonesia. Under that memorandum, both nations agreed to help ensure that the region is more fully engaged in the regional campaign against terrorism. The memorandum also supports and enhances bilateral, agency-to-agency level law enforcement, security, intelligence and defence cooperation relevant to combating international terrorism. In August 2002, the Minister for Foreign Affairs signed a similar memorandum of understanding with Malaysia.

Critical Infrastructure Protection

One final measure should also be mentioned.

The Government recognises how much Australia - like other developed countries - relies on its critical infrastructure. That infrastructure includes important buildings and physical resources as well as the interconnected computer systems that drive Australia’s economy.

In March last year, the Commonwealth convened a conference of leaders from business, utilities, industry associations and State and Territory Governments to review what needs to be done in this area. The task force came up with six recommendations to develop an improved, co-ordinated national approach to the protection of Australia’s critical infrastructure. While those recommendations are currently being implemented, it needs to be emphasised just how massive a task it is to contemplate and protect ourselves against all possible areas of risk.

The Nature of Terrorism

The enormity of the task at hand is in part attributable to the fact that threats to Australia’s security can take so many different forms. The term “security” itself encompasses a huge range of issues, including terrorist attacks, criminal activities, espionage, vandalism, accidents and computer hacking. It involves buildings and physical infrastructure, such as dams, offshore oil platforms, electricity supply, transport, telecommunications and other essential services. It also covers computer networks of all descriptions.
This breadth of risk means that the task of protecting ourselves demands not just specific responses to obvious threats. It also requires the establishment of a security culture at all levels of Australia's national activities in both the public and private sectors.

**Have we done enough?**

In my view, I think a lot has been done and that we should finalise these new arrangements and give them time to settle in before any further changes are made. Not everyone agrees with that view, however, as reflected in this comment from a study published by ASPI:

> Counter-terrorism is a bureaucrat's paradise. It cuts across many boundaries between and within state and federal governments, allowing endless scope for 'coordination.' The Government has already beefed up the national coordination machinery, but no one is in charge. So the one issue that needs to be considered is whether the threat of terrorism is serious enough to need a single authority to take responsibility.  

This remark gives rise to the question of whether Australia should follow the United States' lead and establish a Department of Homeland Security.

**A Department of Homeland Security?**

At the outset, it ought to be noted that this option was considered, but not pursued, after the last election on the basis that the present counter-terrorism structure is appropriate for Australia. Nonetheless, it is an interesting proposition.

At a theoretical level, there is a need to closely analyse the reasons for doing so. If the objective is simply to address the perceived fault that "no one is in charge" and that there is too much scope for bureaucratic coordination, then it is my view that nothing significant would be gained from proceeding down this route.

The following five arguments each point toward that conclusion:

First, under the new arrangements within the Commonwealth, there is a clear line of direction from the National Security Committee of Cabinet, the Prime Minister and the Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet to the Commonwealth's operating departments and agencies and, through them, to their State and Territory counterparts.
Second, the nature of possible threats to our security is so diverse that a sizeable portion of the Australian Public Service could be caught up in the new department. The co-ordination problems would remain, but they would be included under the umbrella of one portfolio.

Third, even with one Commonwealth department, the need for co-ordination between Commonwealth and State and Territory agencies - particularly police and emergency services - will remain.

Fourth, the size of our institutions and the ready accessibility of their senior officers in Canberra break down many barriers to immediate and direct communication that are likely to exist elsewhere.

And finally, the US restructure was undertaken in a different environment and for reasons which may have no direct application in Australia.

The American situation

The US is not only significantly larger than Australia, but also operates on an entirely different scale that brings problems not faced in Australia. A series of organisational charts included by President George W. Bush in his June 2002 publication *The Department of Homeland Security* serve to illustrate this point. The charts show “Major Cabinet Departments and Agencies Involved in Homeland Security before Reorg.” and “Committees with Homeland Security Jurisdiction.”

While the new American Homeland Security structure (refer Appendix) looks significantly better, a considerable level of “bureaucratic co-ordination” will remain inherent in these arrangements, given the size of the agencies involved. Moving them into a Department of Homeland Security will not alter this. Moreover, even if the need for co-ordination is reduced - or at least better controlled - at a national level, there is still a massive need for co-ordination at other levels within the US. By way of example, the FBI deals with some 18,000 law enforcement agencies - from the Chicago, Los Angeles and New York Police Departments to the one and two person Sheriff’s Office - comprising a total of 625,000 law enforcement officers. How does this contrast with Australia’s eight neatly organised police forces?

The FBI has now established an Office of Law Enforcement Coordination to ensure better coordination between the FBI and its 13,000 agents and State, municipal and local law enforcement agencies. Moreover, this continuing need for co-ordination is recognised in the Executive Summary of the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* published by the Office of

American democracy is rooted in the precepts of federalism - a system of government in which our state governments share power with federal institutions. Our structure of overlapping federal, state and local governance - our country has more than 87,000 different jurisdictions - provides unique opportunity and challenges for our homeland security efforts... The challenge is to develop interconnected and complementary systems that are reinforcing rather than duplicative and that ensure essential requirements are met.4

Clearly, therefore, co-ordination of activities and shared responsibilities are an integral part of the new American homeland security framework.

Conclusion

This chapter has summarised the responses of the Australian Government to September 11 and the nation’s new directions in homeland security. The view taken here is that, collectively, these have comprehensively strengthened Australia’s national security arrangements. While no counter-terrorism arrangements come with an ironclad guarantee, it is hoped that they are enhancements that will ensure Australia remains as safe a country in the future as it has been in the past, even though we are now living in more dangerous times.

Notes

Appendix
CHAPTER 9

A NEW DEFENCE POLICY FOR A NEW STRATEGIC ERA?

Paul Dibb

The central question facing Australian defence policy is whether the world is entering a radically new strategic era. It has become commonplace to assert that the events of September 11 have transformed international affairs. While there is some truth in this assertion - particularly for the United States - it does not mean that the war on terror should become the sole organising principle for Australia’s defence policy. This is particularly the case given the uncertainties in our own area of primary strategic interest. Of course, there will need to be some adjustments to Australia’s force structure and preparedness to fight terrorism, but we also need to make much quicker progress in transforming the ADF’s legacy force structure to more adequately meet conventional military challenges closer to home.

This chapter examines Australia’s changed strategic circumstances since the December 2000 Defence White Paper. It analyses the events of September 11 and what they mean for Australia’s defence policy.

The Post-Cold War World

The Cold War, which ended over a decade ago, was a highly dangerous bipolar confrontation over what constituted the best political and economic system. The West won decisively without a blow being struck. However, the Cold War was also a predictable period with clearly defined spheres of influence and rules of the game, including intrusive arms-control agreements. While tensions were often high, the risk of outright war between the US and the USSR was low - particularly in the last 20 years of Cold War détente.

The decade of the 1990s, after the end of the Soviet Union, was in retrospect an artificial and rather complacent period. World affairs stumbled along with no clear ideological focus other than the victory of the democratic free enterprise system and the spread of globalisation and the information revolution. The risk of a major war - especially in Europe - was seen as an
obsolete idea. The idea of a ‘new world order’ of peace and prosperity, however, was rapidly shattered with the 1991 Gulf War, the crises in Somalia and Rwanda, and events in the former Yugoslavia, yet none of these brushfires fundamentally challenged the pre-eminent power and authority of the US. However, this period did give rise to a popular view that what mattered in international affairs were economics and the new information technologies. Military power and the role of the nation state were seen mistakenly - as of declining relevance.

The events of September 11 have reversed this trend. Military power and the authority of the state are now back in command. And we have a new ideological principle: the war on terror and the ‘axis of evil.’ The Western world, in particular, now feels much more vulnerable to large scale and co-ordinated attacks from terrorists. The fear of attacks by terrorists using weapons of mass destruction effectively ends the post-Cold War era. It is difficult to see how this era will unfold and, indeed, how victory will be defined. But one thing is certain: we have now entered a much less ordered and more anarchical world.

**A World Without Order?**

This less predictable world lacks the recognised order and norms of international behaviour characteristic of the Cold War period. In the Cold War, there were distinct spheres of influence - for example, in Europe - where the other side would not directly intervene. This is not the case with terrorism, which has a global reach and does not recognise any ‘no-go’ areas. There are no clear-cut geopolitical divides in the war on terror.

As already mentioned, there are no international rules of the game in this respect. The terrorists obviously are not subject to the norms of international law or civilised behaviour. Equally important, rogue states - which may harbour terrorists - have not agreed to arms control agreements or to limit their programmes to develop WMD. Compared with the Cold War, there are no counting rules and no intrusive inspections in countries such as Iran.

We now have a more anarchical world, yet it is important to understand - as crucial as the war on terror is - that this is not the sole organising principle for world security. While it is certainly the current preoccupation of the US and its close allies, this does not apply to the rest of the world to the same degree at all. As we enter the early years of the 21st century, the world is characterised by at least three geopolitical groupings. There is a post-modern world consisting of North America, Europe and Japan (as well as Australia and New Zealand) which is democratic, favours free enterprise
and has led the globalisation revolution - particularly in the key areas of innovation: information and communication technologies. This world dominates the global dimensions of economic, technological, and military power, and cultural influence. War between countries in this grouping is not credible any longer.

There is a more traditional group of countries that reflect the pre-globalisation characteristics of world order. This is seen most clearly in Asia. Here, the risk of major war is not an outmoded concept: India and Pakistan, China and the US over Taiwan, and North and South Korea continue to be high-risk areas. As discussed further below, in Asia the war on terror is not the unifying strategic preoccupation that it is in the US. And yet, this is a rapidly growing and strategically important part of the world that is witnessing the rise of two new powers - China and India - and the relative decline of America’s major ally, Japan.

The third group of countries can best be described as pre-modern. They are characterised by regimes - most of which are in the Middle East - that reject the dominance of Western culture and which see the spread of globalisation as a threat to their way of life and religion. Their pre-modern attitudes are most clearly reflected in harsh domestic laws and their attitudes to women, and the rejection of democracy. It is in this arc of countries, extending from North Africa through the Middle East to Central Asia, that there exists the greatest risk of a clash of civilisations with the West. In much of orthodox Islam there is bitter resentment over the loss of their ancient cultural values and leadership in such areas as architecture, literature and mathematics. In particular, the greatest risk of the US and its allies going to war now lies in the Middle East. It is also in this part of the world where the most extreme fundamentalist terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, have their origins. It is important that the war on terror does not slide into a war on Islam; however the risks of this occurring are now considerable. This will be particularly the case if Iraq becomes the next theatre of American military operations at a time when the Israeli-Palestine conflict is seen in much of the Arab world as a failure of US diplomacy.

The War on Terror

It is difficult to envisage how the so-called war on terror will be resolved. There are over 300 terrorist groups in the world, but not all of them are a threat to the US. The focus is shifting now from the Taliban and Al Qaeda to Iraq. Still, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington seem more reluctant than their political leaders to engage in a major war to overthrow Saddam Hussein. It remains to be seen whether in fact the US will use military force
to replace the Iraqi regime. And what of Iran and North Korea: are they the next candidates for US war plans? It is much more likely that US policy, including the recent declaratory policy of preventive strike, is aimed about bringing voluntary change in these rogue regimes with regard to WMD and their harbouring of terrorist groups.

It is important to understand what the war on terror is and what it is not. There can be little doubt about US determination to stamp out those responsible for the '911' attacks. However, it is proving difficult to decapitate the leadership of Al Qaeda while many of the covert WMD programmes in the 'axis of evil' countries are in deep and dispersed underground bunkers, making them difficult to identify and to attack successfully. So, what we are seeing is a determination by the US to retaliate for the humiliation it suffered on September 11 and recognition that this will be a long, drawn out conflict requiring considerable patience. There will be no quick victories and, indeed, it will be difficult to assess when and if victory has arrived.

It remains to be seen whether the impressive coalition that the US assembled in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks can be sustained over the long haul. The coalition is beginning to have divergent views over whether to support a military attack on Iraq. Germany and Russia would be highly unlikely to be involved in such an operation; and Japan would be reluctant to supply even rear area logistics support. When the coalition was first put together in late 2001, most countries in the world supported the United States: yet very few, in fact, have made combat contributions to the war on terror. While France, Germany, Italy and Turkey have contributed, the important military operations have been undertaken by the US, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. This is the Anglo-Saxon alliance.

The US has made it clear that it can pursue the military aspects of the war on terror alone, if it has to. And, if it is attacked by WMD, it will undoubtedly retaliate in kind. But the paradox of American power is that the sole superpower cannot afford to go it alone. That would only lead eventually to the rise of coalitions of interests arrayed against it. The unilateral use of US power will not allow it to solve global problems like terrorism and the proliferation of WMD without involving other nations. The US must adopt cooperative engagement with the rest of the world, as was demonstrated by President Bush's address to the United Nations on 12 September 2002. For many key issues in the 21st century - from terrorism and drug smuggling to international crime - military and economic power alone cannot ensure success and, at times, may undermine rather than enhance US objectives.
A critique of US policy would recognise that it is doing little to address the fundamental and underlying problems that spawn terrorism. This is undoubtedly a complex and long-term challenge. Given US attitudes to the current conflict between Israel and Palestine, its apparent lack of interest in nation building in war-torn Afghanistan, and its inability to bring about democratic reform in such allies as Saudi Arabia, this does not augur well. The great sympathy felt for America immediately after September 11 has quickly evaporated and been replaced by suspicion - and even hostility - in some parts of the world. America bashing is in fashion not only in the Middle East, but also in Europe. In our own part of the world, China is maintaining a sullen silence. This is because successful US diplomacy is outflanking China in its sphere of influence in Central Asia and Pakistan, and has encouraged a Japan that is undertaking its most significant military deployments since the Second World War.

As Owen Harries has pointed out, the understandable reaction of the US to the outrage of September 11 has forced America decisively along a course of action that - by emphasising its military dominance, by requiring it to use its vast power conspicuously, by making restraint and moderation virtually impossible, and by making unilateralism an increasing feature of American behaviour - is bound to generate widespread and increasing criticism, and perhaps hostility, towards it. Harries (who for 20 years was editor of the conservative US journal The National Interest) concludes that this may turn out to be the real tragedy of September 11.

It is not in Australia’s interests to see a gathering political hostility that leaves America both dominant and increasingly disliked and isolated. This would be an extremely unhealthy state of affairs, not just for the US. America’s allies, especially the United Kingdom and Australia, need to offer sober advice where appropriate on this issue. But the US does not seem to be in listening mode: it is feeling very vulnerable, for the first time since the War of Independence, to attacks on its own soil. Another major terrorist attack, particularly if it involves WMD, will only serve to foster US unilateralism.

The Old Security Agenda in Asia

Australia’s area of primary strategic interest, the Asia-Pacific region, is still characterised by a quite different strategic agenda. As already noted, unlike in Europe or North America, major war is not incredible here. The recent tensions between India and Pakistan, and the danger that nuclear weapons might be used, illustrate that fact. And while the risk of war between China and the US over Taiwan has receded, largely because of the
events of September 11, it remains a major strategic risk. The most heavily armed part of the world is the Korean peninsula: the confined geography and short warning times involved in this theatre continue to be a hazard for world peace (as the naval clashes on 29 June 2002 demonstrated).

In addition to these major confrontations, there are some two dozen unresolved territorial disputes in the region that periodically generate tension. The South China Sea, which involves contending claims by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, is the most obvious of these. There are also outstanding territorial disputes between Russia and Japan, Japan and South Korea, and China and Japan.

The situation is made more hazardous by the steady modernisation of most of the armed forces in the region. While the Asian economic crisis of 1997-98 was a setback for defence budgets, most countries have now resumed reasonably strong economic growth. As a result, there have been substantial increases in defence expenditure in such countries as China, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and India. By and large, the same has not been true for the ASEAN countries - with the notable exception of Singapore. While defence expenditure in NATO Europe has contracted by about 30 percent since the mid-1980s, defence budgets in the Asia-Pacific region have increased by almost 30 percent to a total of $US160 billion. Japan and China are now the third and fourth largest defence spenders in the world. It is Asia, not the Middle East, which has the largest concentration of proliferators of WMD. More than half of potential proliferators of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and chemical and biological weapons are in the Asia-Pacific region.

In Australia's immediate neighbourhood, the situation in Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and the islands of the South Pacific has deteriorated. The outlook for stability in Indonesia is very uncertain and could pose Australia with major security risks over the next few years. Papua New Guinea goes from bad to worse and no solution is in sight to what could become a failed state. In the South Pacific islands, military coups and economic collapse have become common features.

As a result of these tensions and uncertainties, as well as the impact of the 1997-98 economic crisis, there has been practically no progress in recent years in developing the security architecture of the region. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) seems to have stalled. After eight years, it has become little more than a diplomatic talk shop. Very little progress has been made with concrete military confidence building measures: there are no counting rules for major items of military equipment; no military incidents at sea agreements; no open skies agreements; and no regional military arms-control
understandings. Instead, there seems to be a growing proliferation of sub-regional organisations: for example, ASEAN Plus 3, the Shanghai Cooperation Group, and the South West Pacific Forum.

The first ever meeting of regional defence ministers occurred in June 2002 in Singapore and was organised outside the auspices of any of these regional groupings. There has also been some useful cooperation regionally against terrorism with bilateral agreements between Australia and Indonesia and Australia and Malaysia, as well as some loose trilateral understandings between the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia.

There needs to be a greater sense of urgency in the region about security cooperation. The weakness of the ARF, and indeed of ASEAN itself, was demonstrated by their helplessness when the crisis arose in East Timor in late 1999. The ARF would be incapable of doing anything about a war between India and Pakistan, or one between China and the United States over Taiwan, let alone conflict on the Korean peninsula. It is time that the major players in the ARF took hold of its agenda and made some concrete progress with military confidence building. In the longer term, this may mean encouraging the major powers to take over the leadership role of the ARF from the ASEAN countries.

Policy Implications for Australia

The analysis in this chapter highlights the fact that there are important areas of policy continuity in Australia’s strategic circumstances. However, the events of September 11 have introduced a new discontinuity - not least for our US ally. The war on terror has yet to be played out and it is too early to assert, as some do, that a paradigm shift has occurred in international affairs. There is much that remains familiar with the old security agenda in the world, particularly in Asia. It would not be appropriate at this juncture to fundamentally alter Australia’s force structure and military preparedness to fight the so-called war on terror.

It remains to be seen whether the war on terror continues on at a high tempo of military operations. Since January 2002, when the Taliban was defeated in Afghanistan, we have entered a much quieter period. Despite the victory in Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden and his key deputies in Al Qaeda remain at large. At time of writing, there is much talk in Washington about whether a full-scale military attack on Iraq will occur early this year. If this occurs, it will mark a new phase of the war to include rogue regimes suspected of developing WMD. Australian participation in such a war
would raise wider implications for Australia’s foreign policy in the Middle East and its relations with Southeast Asian Muslim countries.

Even though Australia is among America’s closest allies, great care needs to be taken in responding to the war on terror. There are three reasons for this. First, it remains to be seen whether the attacks on the US in 2001 were isolated events. Second, future challenges to Australia’s security (and, indeed, to that of the United States) may be quite different from the war on terror. Third, any dramatic changes to Australia’s force structure towards an expeditionary force risk leaving us without the high-technology capabilities that would be essential to meet more conventional military challenges to our own security. This is not to argue against some adjustments to Australia’s force structure, but rather that any such changes should not fundamentally alter the conceptual framework of the December 2000 Defence White Paper with its emphasis on:

- the defence of Australia as “the bedrock of our security, and the most fundamental responsibility of government”; and
- having defence forces “able to make a major contribution to the security of our immediate neighbourhood.”

Judgments about the need for a higher level of defence preparedness are a different issue. In recent years, Australia has been committed to a more intense level of military operations than at any time since the Vietnam War. In the last five years, for example, the Australian defence force has been involved in some 28 separate peacekeeping operations overseas. Our analysis of Australia’s immediate strategic environment suggests that we should continue to prepare for the possibility of deploying substantial ADF forces (for example, a brigade and a battalion) to two separate regional contingencies simultaneously. We also need to factor into our military contingency planning how best to respond to a US request for a military contribution to any outbreak of conflict on the Korean peninsula or across the Taiwan Straits.

All of this points to the need for a careful balance between the requirements for operations in our area of immediate strategic concern, where Australia could expect to lead such operations, and the demands on our force structure and preparedness of being a coalition member in expeditionary operations further afield. A central planning issue is the clear recognition that there are limits to Australia’s defence capacity and influence. The changes to Australia’s strategic circumstances identified in this chapter do not require a jettisoning of the key defence planning principles identified in the December
2000 Defence White Paper. However, there may well need to be a continuing emphasis on higher levels of readiness, both for operations closer to home - where we would expect the ADF to make a difference - and further afield in support of coalition operations. This will require a hard-edged assessment of what the ADF can do, and what it cannot do, within currently planned Defence financial guidance.

It is indeed true that the White Paper did not foresee the scale and destructive effects of acts of international terrorism. The question now is what does the Government intend to do with the ADF in this regard? It has announced improved intelligence capabilities, a doubling of the Special Forces tactical assault group and a permanent Incident Response Regiment to respond to attacks with WMD. Should it now restructure the ADF away from the defence of Australia and its ability to operate in our own region and, instead, develop an expeditionary force for coalition operations at great distance from Australia? This would be highly expensive. It is important to consider that even the United Kingdom, which spends more than five times as much as Australia on defence, has only a limited power projection capability.

Of course, Australia must have the capacity to protect its interests much further than in its own region. However, too many commentators confuse the crucial difference between how to structure a defence force and how it can be used. Structuring a defence force demands a clear definition of priorities because defence is expensive and the budget is finite. We have structured the force primarily for the defence of Australia and to be able to operate decisively in our own region. This has given successive governments the option of using the ADF to support Australian interests in distant places such as Somalia, Angola and the Persian Gulf. However, even operations closer to home, such as those in East Timor, have revealed important deficiencies in the ADF.

So where does all this leave us? It suggests that the fundamentals of the White Paper were appropriate and that structuring the ADF for expeditionary operations is unrealistic and unaffordable. But clearly the Government has in mind doing more about the war on terror and other unconventional threats. The sustainability of some elements of the army should be improved. We have deficiencies in strategic airlift, troop-lift helicopters and amphibious transport. We need to build up significantly our holdings of precision-guided munitions. And we should invest more in emerging technologies such as networked communications that can deliver information in real-time. The ADF has no coherent joint planning in this regard.
All this suggests a significant increase in the defence budget if Australia is going to take the war on terror seriously. The good news is that if the Government decides to go down the path recommended in this chapter, the new capabilities proposed are all relevant to the defence of Australia and conventional military operations in our region. This will be important if the war on terror proves to be a strategic dead-end.

Notes


3 Owen Harries, Understanding America (Sydney: The Centre for Independent Studies, 2002), pp.29-30.


6 Derived from David Horner, Chronicling the Peacekeepers, (Canberra: unpublished report, 2002), Annex A.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

In addition to the specific references below, articles have been cited from the following newspapers and periodicals: AUS-CSCAP Newsletter; Australian Financial Review; Far Eastern Economic Review; Newsweek; New York Times; Sydney Morning Herald; The Australian; The New Yorker; Washington Post.

Books, Articles and Reports


Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Beyond Bali: ASPI’s Strategic Assessment 2002, (Canberra: ASPI, 2002).


Harries, Owen, Understanding America (Sydney: The Centre for Independent Studies, 2002).


**Other Material**


Bibliography


SDSC Publications

Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence
CP43  Australia's Secret Space Programs by Desmond Ball  15.00
CP44  High Personnel Turnover: The ADF Is Not a Limited Liability Company by Cathy Downes  15.00
CP45  Should Australia Plan to Defend Christmas and Cocos Islands? by Ross Babbage  15.00
CP46  US Bases in the Philippines: Issues and Implications by Desmond Ball (ed)  15.00
CP47  Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) by Desmond Ball  20.00
CP48  The Vietnam People's Army: Regularization of Command 1975-1988 by D.M. FitzGerald  15.00
CP49  Australia and the Global Strategic Balance by Desmond Ball  15.00
CP50  Organising an Army: the Australian Experience 1957-1965 by J.C. Blaxland  20.00
CP51  The Evolving World Economy: Some Alternative Security Questions for Australia by Richard A. Higgott  15.00
CP52  Defending the Northern Gateway by Peter Donova  15.00
CP53  Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT): Intercepting Satellite Communications by Desmond Ball  20.00
CP54  Breaking the American Alliance: An Independent National Security Policy for Australia by Gary Brown  20.00
CP55  Senior Officer Professional Development in the Australian Defence Force: Constant Study to Prepare by Cathy Downes  20.00
CP56  Code 777: Australia and the US Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) by Desmond Ball  22.50
CP57  China's Crisis: The International Implications by Gary Klintworth (ed)  17.00
CP58  Index to Parliamentary Questions on Defence by Gary Brown  20.00
CP59  Controlling Civil Maritime Activities in a Defence Contingency by W.A.G. Dovers  17.00
CP60  The Security of Oceania in the 1990s. Vol.I. Views from the Region by David Hegarty and Peter Polomka (eds)  15.00
CP61  The Strategic Significance of Torres Strait by Ross Babbage  30.00
CP62  The Leading Edge: Air Power in Australia's Unique Environment by P.J. Criss and D.J. Schubert  22.50
CP63  The Northern Territory in the Defence of Australia: Geography, History, Economy, Infrastructure, and Defence Presence by Desmond Ball and J.O. Langtry (eds)  24.50
CP64  Vietnam's Withdrawal from Cambodia: Regional Issues and Realignments by Gary Klintworth (ed)  17.00
CP65  Prospects for Crisis Prediction: A South Pacific Case Study by Ken Ross  20.00
CP66  Bougainville: Perspectives on a Crisis by Peter Polomka (ed)  20.00
CP67  The Amateur Managers: A Study of the Management of Weapons System Projects by F.N. Bennett  22.50
CP68  The Security of Oceania in the 1990s. Vol.2, Managing Change by Peter Polomka (ed)  15.00
| CP69 | Australia and the World: Prologue and Prospects by Desmond Ball (ed) | 25.00 |
| CP70 | Singapore’s Defence Industries by Bilveer Singh | 14.00 |
| CP71 | RAAF Air Power Doctrine: A Collection of Contemporary Essays by Gary Waters (ed) | 15.00 |
| CP72 | South Pacific Security: Issues and Perspectives by Stephen Henningham and Desmond Ball (eds) | 20.00 |
| CP73 | The Northern Territory in the Defence of Australia: Strategic and Operational Considerations by J.O. Langtry and Desmond Ball (eds) | 24.50 |
| CP74 | The Architect of Victory: Air Campaigns for Australia by Gary Waters | 23.00 |
| CP75 | Modern Taiwan in the 1990s by Gary Klintworth (ed) | 23.00 |
| CP76 | New Technology: Implications for Regional and Australian Security by Desmond Ball and Helen Wilson (eds) | 23.00 |
| CP77 | Reshaping the Australian Army: Challenges for the 1990s by David Horner (ed.) | 24.00 |
| CP78 | The Intelligence War in the Gulf by Desmond Ball | 17.50 |
| CP79 | Provocative Plans: A Critique of US Strategy for Maritime Conflict in the North Pacific by Desmond Ball | 20.00 |
| CP80 | Soviet SIGINT: Hawaii Operation by Desmond Ball | 17.50 |
| CP81 | Chasing Gravity’s Rainbow: Kwajalein and US Ballistic Missile Testing by Owen Wilkes, Megan van Frank and Peter Hayes | 22.50 |
| CP82 | Australia’s Threat Perceptions: A Search for Security by Alan Dupont | 17.00 |
| CP83 | Building Blocks for Regional Security: An Australian Perspective on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) in the Asia/Pacific Region by Desmond Ball | 17.00 |
| CP84 | Australia’s Security Interests in Northeast Asia by Alan Dupont | 18.50 |
| CP85 | Finance and Financial Policy in Defence Contingencies by Paul Lee | 17.00 |
| CP86 | Mine Warfare in Australia’s First Line of Defence by Alan Hinge | 23.00 |
| CP87 | Hong Kong’s Future as a Regional Transport Hub by Peter J. Rimmer | 20.00 |
| CP88 | The Conceptual Basis of Australia’s Defence Planning and Force Structure Development by Paul Dibb | 17.50 |
| CP89 | Strategic Studies in a Changing World: Global, Regional and Australian Perspectives by Desmond Ball and David Horner (eds) | 28.00 |
| CP90 | The Gulf War: Australia’s Role and Asian-Pacific Responses by J. Mohan Malik | 21.00 |
| CP91 | Defence Aspects of Australia’s Space Activities by Desmond Ball | 20.00 |
| CP93 | Infrastructure and Security: Problems of Development in the West Sepik Province of Papua New Guinea by T.M. Boyce | 23.00 |
| CP94 | Australia and Space by Desmond Ball and Helen Wilson (eds) | 26.00 |
| CP95 | LANDFORCE: 2010: Some Implications of Technology for ADF Future Land Force Doctrine, Leadership and Structures by David W. Beveridge | 15.50 |
CP96 *The Origins of Australian Diplomatic Intelligence in Asia, 1933-1941* by Wayne Gobert  
17.50

CP97 *Japan as Peacekeeper: Samurai State, or New Civilian Power?* by Peter Polomka  
16.00

CP98 *The Post-Soviet World: Geopolitics and Crises* by Coral Bell  
15.00

CP99 *Indonesian Defence Policy and the Indonesian Armed Forces* by Bob Lowry  
20.00

CP100 *Regional Security in the South Pacific: The Quarter-Century 1970-95* by Ken Ross  
23.00

CP101 *The Changing Role of the Military in Papua New Guinea* by R.J. May  
15.00

CP102 *Strategic Change and Naval Forces: Issues for a Medium Level Naval Power* by Sam Bateman and Dick Sherwood (eds)  
23.00

CP103 *ASEAN Defence Reorientation 1975-1992: The Dynamics of Modernisation and Structural Change* by J.N. Mak  
24.00

CP104 *The United Nations and Crisis Management: Six Studies* by Coral Bell (ed)  
17.50

CP105 *Operational and Technological Developments in Maritime Warfare: Implications for the Western Pacific* by Dick Sherwood (ed)  
20.00

CP106 *More Than Little Heroes: Australian Army Air Liaison Officers in the Second World War* by Nicola Baker  
23.00

CP107 *Vanuatu’s 1980 Santo Rebellion: International Responses to a Micrastate Security Crisis* by Matthew Gubb  
14.00

CP108 *The Development of Australian Army Doctrine 1945-1964* by M.C.J. Welburn  
15.00

CP109 *The Navy and National Security: The Peacetime Dimension* by Dick Sherwood  
16.00

CP110 *Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) in South Korea* by Desmond Ball  
15.00

CP111 *India Looks East: An Emerging Power and Its Asia-Pacific Neighbours* by Sandy Gordon and Stephen Henningham (eds)  
24.00

CP112 *Nation, Region and Context: Studies in Peace and War in Honour of Professor T.B. Millar* by Coral Bell (ed.)  
24.00

CP113 *Transforming the Tatmadaw: The Burmese Armed Forces since 1988* by Andrew Selth  
23.00

CP114 *Calming the Waters: Initiatives for Asia Pacific Maritime Cooperation* by Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates (eds)  
23.00

CP115 *Strategic Guidelines for Enabling Research and Development to Support Australian Defence* by Ken Anderson and Paul Dibb  
17.00

CP116 *Security and Security Building in the Indian Ocean Region* by Sandy Gordon  
24.00

CP117 *Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) in South Asia: India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka (Ceylon)* by Desmond Ball  
17.50

CP118 *The Seas Unite: Maritime Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region* by Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates (eds)  
25.00

CP119 *In Search of a Maritime Strategy: The Maritime Element in Australian Defence Planning since 1901* by David Stevens (ed)  
24.00

CP120 *Australian Defence Planning: Five Views from Policy Makers* by Helen Hookey and Denny Roy (eds)  
15.00

CP121 *A Brief Madness: Australia and the Resumption of French Nuclear Testing* by Kim Richard Nossal and Carolynn Vivian  
15.00
CP122 Missle Diplomacy and Taiwan’s Future: Innovations in Politics and Military Power by Greg Austin (ed) 25.00
CP123 Grey-Area Phenomena in Southeast Asia: Piracy, Drug Trafficking and Political Terrorism by Peter Chalk 17.50
CP124 Regional Maritime Management and Security by Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates (eds) 24.00
CP125 The Environment and Security: What are the Linkages? by Alan Dupont (ed.) 17.00
CP126 ‘Educating an Army’: Australian Army Doctrinal Development and the Operational Experience in South Vietnam, 1965-72 by R.N. Bushby 17.50
CP127 South Africa and Security Building in the Indian Ocean Rim by Greg Mills 20.00
CP128 The Shape of Things to Come: The US-Japan Security Relationship in the New Era by Maree Reid 17.50
CP129 Shipping and Regional Security by Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates (eds) 20.00
CP131 The Next Stage: Preventive Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region by Desmond Ball and Amitav Acharya (eds) 25.00
CP132 Maritime Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: Current Situation and Prospects by Sam Bateman (ed) 23.00
CP133 Maintaining the Strategic Edge: The Defence of Australia in 2015 by Desmond Ball (ed) 30.00
CP134 An Independent Command: Command and Control of the 1st Australian Task Force in Vietnam by R.W. Cable 17.50
CP135 Armed Rebellion in the ASEAN States: Persistence and Implications by Andrew Tan 23.00
CP136 Burma’s Secret Military Partners by Andrew Selth 18.50
CP137 Where Are They When You Need Them? Support Arrangements for Deployed Air Power by Peter McLennan 26.00
CP138 ASEAN, the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and the Challenge of Denuclearisation in Southeast Asia: Problems and Prospects by Bilveer Singh 18.50
CP139 The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP): Its Record and Its Prospects by Desmond Ball 18.50
CP140 Wars of Conscience: Human Rights, National Security and Australia’s Defence Policy by John Hutcheson 26.00
CP141 Civil-military Relations in Democratising Indonesia: The Potentials and Limits to Change by Bilveer Singh 26.00
CP143 The Real C-Cubed: Culture, Careers & Climate, and how they affect capability by Nick Jans with David Schmidtchen 26.00
CP144 The Human Face of Security edited by David Dickens 22.50
CP145 Masters of Terror: Indonesia’s Military & Violence in East Timor in 1999 by Hamish McDonald and others 30.00
CP146 Small Arms Production and Transfers in Southeast Asia by David Capie 22.50
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WP225</td>
<td>India's Strategic Posture: 'Look East' or 'Look West'?</td>
<td>Sandy Gordon</td>
<td>$6.00 (excl. GST)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP226</td>
<td>Index to Parliamentary Questions on Defence for the Period 1989 to 1990</td>
<td>Gary Brown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP227</td>
<td>Australia and Papua New Guinea: Foreign and Defence Relations Since 1975</td>
<td>Katherine Bullock</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP228</td>
<td>The Wrigley Report: An Exercise in Mobilisation Planning</td>
<td>J.O. Langtry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP229</td>
<td>Air Power, the Defence of Australia and Regional Security</td>
<td>Desmond Ball</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP230</td>
<td>Current Strategic Developments and Implications for the Aerospace Industry</td>
<td>Desmond Ball</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP231</td>
<td>Arms Control and Great Power Interests in the Korean Peninsula</td>
<td>Gary Klintworth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP232</td>
<td>Power, the Gun and Foreign Policy in China since the Tiananmen Incident</td>
<td>Ian Wilson</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP233</td>
<td>The Gulf Crisis: Testing a New World Order?</td>
<td>Amin Saikal and Ralph King</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP234</td>
<td>An Australian Perspective on Maritime CSBMs in the Asia-Pacific Region</td>
<td>Desmond Ball and Commodore Sam Bateman RAN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP235</td>
<td>Insurgency and the Transnational Flow of Information: A Case Study</td>
<td>Andrew Selth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP236</td>
<td>India's Security Policy: Desire and Necessity in a Changing World</td>
<td>Sandy Gordon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP237</td>
<td>The Introduction of the Civilian National Service Scheme for Youth in Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel T.M. Boyce</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP238</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence in the Gulf War</td>
<td>Shaun Gregory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP239</td>
<td>Reflections on Cambodian Political History: Backgrounder to Recent Developments</td>
<td>Stephen R. Heder</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP241</td>
<td>A History of Australia’s Space Involvement</td>
<td>Matthew L. James</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP242</td>
<td>Antarctic Resources: A Dichotomy of Interest</td>
<td>John Wells</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP243</td>
<td>The Right to intervene in the Domestic Affairs of States</td>
<td>Gary Klintworth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP244</td>
<td>An Isolated Debating Society: Australia in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific</td>
<td>Greg Johannes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP245</td>
<td>Recent Developments in China’s Domestic and Foreign Affairs: The Political and Strategic Implications for Northeast Asia</td>
<td>Di Hua</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP247</td>
<td>Index to Parliamentary Questions on Defence, 1991</td>
<td>Gary Brown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP248</td>
<td>Call Out the Troops: An Examination of the Legal Basis for Australian Defence Force Involvement in 'Non-Defence' Matters</td>
<td>Elizabeth Ward</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP249</td>
<td>The Australian Defence Force and the Total Force Policy</td>
<td>Charles E. Heller</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP250</td>
<td>Mobilisation: The Gulf War in Retrospect</td>
<td>James Wood</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP251</td>
<td>Mobilisation: The Benefits of Experience</td>
<td>James Wood</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP252</td>
<td>Strategic Studies and Extended Deterrence in Europe: A Retrospective</td>
<td>Andrew Butfoy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP253</td>
<td>Geographic Information and Remote Sensing Technologies in the Defence of Australia</td>
<td>Ken Granger</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP254</td>
<td>The Military Dimension of Common Security</td>
<td>Andrew Butfoy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP255</td>
<td>Taiwan's New Role in the Asia-Pacific Region</td>
<td>Gary Klintworth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
WP256 Focusing the CSBM Agenda in the Asia/Pacific Region: Some Aspects of Defence Confidence Building by Paul Dibb
WP257 Defence and Industry: A Strategic Perspective by Stewart Woodman
WP258 Russia and the Asia-Pacific Region by Leszek Buszynski
WP259 National Security and Defence Policy Formation and Decision-Making in India by Bruce Vaughn
WP260 A Question of Priorities: Australian and New Zealand Security Planning in the 1990s by Stewart Woodman
WP261 Papua New Guinea-Australia Defence and Security Relations by Peter I. Peipul
WP262 The Regional Security Outlook: An Australian Viewpoint by Paul Dibb
WP263 Pakistan's Security Concerns: A Chinese Perspective by Liu Jinkun
WP264 The Military Build-up in the Asia-Pacific Region: Scope, Causes and Implications for Security by Andrew Mack and Desmond Ball
WP266 Sino-Russian Detente and the Regional Implications by Gary Klintworth
WP267 Australia and Asia-Pacific Regional Security by Peter Jennings
WP268 Cambodia's Past, Present and Future by Gary Klintworth
WP269 Australia's Aerial Surveillance Programme in the South Pacific: Review and New Options by Wing Commander R.W. Grey
WP270 Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region (With Some Implications for Regional Security Cooperation) by Desmond Ball
WP271 Australian Security Planning at the Crossroads: The Challenge of the Nineties by Stewart Woodman
WP272 Index to Parliamentary Questions on Defence, 1992 by Gary Brown
WP273 Trends in Military Acquisitions in the Asia/Pacific Region: Implications for Security and Prospects for Constraints and Controls by Desmond Ball
WP274 A Proposal for Cooperation in Maritime Security in Southeast Asia by Wing Commander R.W. Grey
WP275 The Preparation and Management of Australian Contingents in UN Peacekeeping Operations by Captain Russ Swinnerton RAN
WP276 The Future of Australia's Defence Relationship with the United States by Paul Dibb
WP277 Russia's Military and the Northern Territories Issue by Geoffrey Jukes
WP278A Regional Regime for Maritime Surveillance, Safety and Information Exchanges by Captain Russ Swinnerton RAN and Desmond Ball
WP279 The Political Role of the Singapore Armed Forces' Officer Corps: Towards a Military-Administrative State? by Tim Huxley
WP280 The East Coast Armaments Complex (ECAC) Location Project: Strategic and Defence Aspects by Desmond Ball
WP281 Rules of Engagement in Maritime Operations by Captain Russ Swinnerton RAN
WP282 The Political and Strategic Outlook, 1994-2003: Global, Regional and Australian Perspectives by Paul Dibb
WP283 Index to Parliamentary Questions on Defence, 1993 by Gary Brown
WP284 New Dimensions to the Japan-Australia Relationship: From Economic Preference to Political Cooperation by Nobuyuki Takaki
WP285 Winners and Losers: South Asia After the Cold War by Sandy Gordon
WP286 Australia and New Zealand: Towards a More Effective Defence Relationship by Jim Rolfe
WP287 China's Policy Towards the Spratly Islands in the 1990s by Sheng Lijun
WP288 How to Begin Implementing Specific Trust-Building Measures in the Asia-Pacific Region by Paul Dibb
WP289 Burma's Arms Procurement Programme by Andrew Selth
WP290 Developments in Signals Intelligence and Electronic Warfare in Southeast Asia by Desmond Ball
WP291 India's Naval Strategy and the Role of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands by D.N. Christie
WP292 Japan and Australia: A New Security Partnership? by Naoko Sajima
WP293 Chinese Strategy and the Spratly Islands Dispute by Brigadier Chris Roberts
WP295 Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) in North Korea by Desmond Ball
WP296 The Emerging Geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific Region by Paul Dibb
WP297 Maritime Strategy into the Twenty-First Century: Issues for Regional Navies by Jack McCaffrie
WP298 The Cold War in Retrospect: Diplomacy, Strategy and Regional Impact by Coral Bell
WP299 Australia-Indonesia Security Cooperation: For Better or Worse? by Bob Lowry
WP300 Reflections on American Foreign Policy Strategy by John Chipman
WP301 New Requirements for Multilateral Conflict Management by UN and Other Forces: Nordic Responses by Jaana Karhilo
WP302 Developing Army Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era by Bill Houston
WP303 The Joint Patrol Vessel (JPV): A Regional Concept for Regional Cooperation by Desmond Ball
WP304 Australian-American Relations after the Collapse of Communism by Harry G. Gelber
WP305 Policy Coordination for Asia-Pacific Security and Stability by Yukio Satoh
WP306 Force Modernisation in Asia: Towards 2000 and Beyond by Paul Dibb
WP308 Burma's Intelligence Apparatus by Andrew Selth
WP309 Burma's Defence Expenditure and Arms Industries by Andrew Selth
WP310 Australia’s Vulnerability to Information Attack: Towards a National Information Policy by Adam Cobb
WP311 Australia, the US Alliance and Multilateralism in Southeast Asia by Desmond Ball
WP312 From Distant Countries to Partners: the Japan-Australia Relationship by Yukio Satoh
WP313 The Burma Navy by Andrew Selth
WP314 Problems and Issues in Malaysia-Singapore Relations by Andrew Tan
WP315 The Burma Air Force by Andrew Selth
WP316 Australia’s National Security into the Twenty-First Century by Brigadier Mike Smith
WP317 Alliances, Alignments and the Global Order: The Outlook for the Asia-Pacific Region in the Next Quarter-Century by Paul Dibb
WP319 The Evolution of China’s Perception of Taiwan by Sheng Lijun
WP320 UN Peacekeeping, UNIFIL and the Fijian Experience by Jim Sanday
WP321 The Future of the ASEAN Regional Forum: An Australian View by Alan Dupont
WP322 Singapore’s Defence Policy in the New Millennium by Andrew Tan
WP323 Responses to NATO’s Eastward Expansion by the Russian Federation by Alexei Mouraviev
WP324 The Remaking of Asia’s Geopolitics by Paul Dibb
WP325 The Nuclear Crisis in Asia: The Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Programmes by Desmond Ball and Mohan Malik
WP326 Researching Security in East Asia: From ‘Strategic Culture’ to ‘Security Culture’ by Pauline Kerr
WP327 Building the Tatmadaw: The Organisational Development of the Armed Forces in Myanmar, 1948-98 by Maung Aung Myoe

WP328 Drugs, Transnational Crime and Security in East Asia by Alan Dupont

WP329 The Relevance of the Knowledge Edge by Paul Dibb

WP330 The US-Australian Alliance: History and Prospects by Desmond Ball

WP331 Implications of the East Asian Economic Recession for Regional Security Cooperation by Desmond Ball

WP332 Strategic Information Warfare: A Concept by Daniel T. Kuehl

WP333 Security Developments and Prospects for Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region, with Particular Reference to the Mekong River Basin by Desmond Ball

WP334 Burma and Weapons of Mass Destruction by Andrew Selth

WP335 Transnational Crime and Illegal Immigration in the Asia-Pacific Region: Background, Prospects and Countermeasures by John McFarlane

WP336 Burma and Drugs: The Regime’s Complicity in the Global Drug Trade by Desmond Ball

WP337 Defence Strategy in the Contemporary Era by Paul Dibb

WP338 The Burmese Armed Forces Next Century: Continuity or Change? by Andrew Selth

WP339 Military Doctrine and Strategy in Myanmar: A Historical Perspective by Maung Aung Myoe

WP340 The Evolving Security Architecture in the Asia-Pacific Region by Desmond Ball

WP341 The Asian Financial Crisis: Corruption, Cronyism and Organised Crime by John McFarlane

WP342 The Tatmadaw in Myanmar since 1988: An Interim Assessment by Maung Aung Myoe

WP343 Cambodia and Southeast Asia by Tony Kevin

WP344 The Principle of Non-Intervention and ASEAN: Evolution and Emerging Challenges by Herman Kraft

WP345 Will America’s Alliances in the Asia-Pacific Region Endure? by Paul Dibb

WP346 Officer Education and Leadership Training in the Tatmadaw: A Survey by Maung Aung Myoe

WP347 The Prospects for Southeast Asia’s Security by Paul Dibb

WP348 The Army’s Capacity to Defend Australia Offshore: The Need for a Joint Approach by John Caligari

WP349 Interpreting China-Indonesia Relations: ‘Good-Neighbourliness’, ‘Mutual Trust’ and ‘All-round Cooperation’ by He Kai

WP350 Strategic Trends in the Asia-Pacific Region by Paul Dibb

WP351 Burma’s Order of Battle: An Interim Assessment by Andrew Selth

WP352 Landmines in Burma: The Military Dimension by Andrew Selth

WP353 Japanese Airborne SIGINT Capabilities by Desmond Ball and Euan Graham

WP 354 The Indonesian Military Business Complex: Origins, Course & Future by Bilveer Singh

WP 355 Professor A.D. Trendall and His Band of Classical Cryptographers by R.S. Merrillees

WP 356 Factionalism and the Ethnic Insurgent Organisations by Des Ball & Hazel Lang

WP 357 ABM vs BMD: The Issue of Ballistic Missile Defence by Ron Huisken

WP 358 South Africa’s Defence Industry: A Template for Middle Powers? by Greg Mills & Martin Edmonds

WP 359 The New Submarine Combat Information System and Australia’s Emerging Information Warfare Architecture by Desmond Ball

WP 360 Missile Defence: Trends, Conflicts and Remedies by Desmond Ball

WP 361 Indonesian Security Responses to resurgent Papuan Separatism: An Open Source Intelligence Case Study by Matthew N. Davies*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WP 362</td>
<td>ANZUS: Life after 50: Alliance Management in the 21st Century</td>
<td>$8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by Ron Huisken</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP 363</td>
<td>A Strategic Framework for Missile Defence by Ron Huisken</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP 364</td>
<td>'The First War of the 21st Century': Asymmetric Hostilities and the Norms of Conduct by Coral Bell</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP 365</td>
<td>The Utility and Limits of The International Coalition against Terrorism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by Paul Dibb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP 366</td>
<td>QDR 2001: America's New Military Roadmap by Ron Huisken</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP 367</td>
<td>Malaysia's Security Perspectives by Andrew Tan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP 368</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Security: Taking Charge Collectively by Ron Huisken</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP 369</td>
<td>The War on Terror and Air Combat Power: A Word of Warning for Defence Planners by Paul Dibb</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP 370</td>
<td>Organised Crime and Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific Region: The Reality and the Response by John McFarlane</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP 371</td>
<td>The Sydney Games — The Trouble-free Games by Clive Williams</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP 372</td>
<td>Iraq (November 2001-November 2002) America's Checks and Balances Prevail Over Unilateralism by Ron Huisken</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP 373</td>
<td>The Kopassus Dilemma: Should Australia Re-Engage? by Alan Dupont</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP 374</td>
<td>Transformation or Stagnation?: Rethinking Australia's Defence by Alan Dupont</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The price of this publication is $12 (excl. GST)

**Ordering Information**

- We will accept either one-off or standing orders.
- Cost of packaging and postage by surface mail is included in all book prices. A 15% discount is allowed for books collected personally from the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre.
- Method of payment: Cheque or money order, payable to Australian National University, OR Bankcard/Mastercard/Visa/American Express.
- **GST is payable on books supplied within Australia.**
- Method of payment for overseas customers: Bank draft in Australian dollars, payable to Australian National University OR Bankcard/Mastercard/Visa/American Express.
- Please include payment or credit card details with your order and forward it to:
  - Publications Sales
  - Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
  - Building 6, Fellows Road
  - Australian National University
  - Canberra ACT 0200 Australia
  - Fax: 61 (0)2 6248 0816, e-mail:sdsc@anu.edu.au.

Abstracts of recent SDSC publications and a list of publications in print are available through the centre's home page: <http://sdsc.anu.edu.au>. A full list of publications will be sent out on request.
‘Sometimes a single event is so dramatic that it changes the course of history ... It disrupts established relationships between countries and creates new alliances that have far-reaching military, economic and social consequences. The terrorist attack on the United States on September 11 was such as event.’

ROBERT CORNALL

‘... the US has embraced the loneliness of leadership and become a harder nation, more detached, more impervious to criticism, more impatient with compromise and more disdainful of coalitions.’

RON HUISKEN

‘As far as the future is concerned, the terrorism-related outlook is that Al Qaeda is down but definitely not out. ... The threat to Australians has increased since ‘911’, as evidenced all too clearly by the October 2002 tragic events in Bali.’

CLIVE WILLIAMS

‘It is difficult to see how this era will unfold and, indeed, how victory will be defined. But one thing is certain: we have now entered a much less ordered and more anarchical world.’

PAUL DIBB