THE COUNCIL FOR SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE ASIA PACIFIC

Its Record and Its Prospects

CSCAP

DESMOND BALL

Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 139
The **Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific** (CSCAP) is the premier second-track organisation in the Asia-Pacific region. It was set up in 1992–93 to provide 'a more structured regional process of a non-governmental nature ... to contribute to the efforts towards regional confidence building and enhancing regional security through dialogues, consultation and cooperation' in the region. It was described at the time as 'the most ambitious proposal to date for a regularised, focused and inclusive non-governmental process on Pacific security matters', and as 'one of the most important developments in regional security since the end of the Cold War'. It was an important, ambitious and exciting initiative, in a region which heretofore had been opposed to multilateralism.

This monograph provides a critical review of CSCAP's achievements since 1992–93. It describes the activities of the CSCAP Working Groups, and the relationship between CSCAP and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). It addresses several issues which are of crucial importance to the future of CSCAP, including the future of its Working Groups, the role of the Steering Committee, the relations with officialdom in the member countries, and tensions within the basic charter and objectives of the organisation. It also discusses CSCAP's research agenda, and identifies new subjects for study, including arms control, defence cooperation, the environment and security, and the concept of human security. Finally, it provides an assessment of CSCAP's prospects.
THE COUNCIL FOR SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE ASIA PACIFIC (CSCAP)

ITS RECORD AND ITS PROSPECTS

Desmond Ball

Published by
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies
The Australian National University
Canberra
October 2000
ABSTRACT

The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) is the premier second-track organisation in the Asia-Pacific region. It was set up in 1992-93 to provide 'a more structured regional process of a non-governmental nature ... to contribute to the efforts towards regional confidence building and enhancing regional security through dialogues, consultation and cooperation' in the region. It was described at the time as 'the most ambitious proposal to date for a regularised, focused and inclusive non-governmental process on Pacific security matters', and as 'one of the most important developments in regional security since the end of the Cold War'. It was an important, ambitious and exciting initiative, in a region which heretofore had been opposed to multilateralism.

This monograph provides a critical review of CSCAP's achievements since 1992-93. It describes the activities of the CSCAP Working Groups, and the relationship between CSCAP and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). It addresses several issues which are of crucial importance to the future of CSCAP, including the future of its Working Groups, the role of the Steering Committee, the relations with officialdom in the member countries, and tensions within the basic charter and objectives of the organisation. It also discusses CSCAP's research agenda, and identifies new subjects for study, including arms control, defence cooperation, the environment and security, and the concept of human security. Finally, it provides an assessment of CSCAP's prospects.
THE AUTHOR

Desmond Ball is a professor in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, Canberra. Professor Ball is the author or editor of over 40 books or monographs on defence and security in the Asia-Pacific region. His recent publications include monographs and books entitled The Transformation of Security in the Asia-Pacific Region (Frank Cass & Co.Ltd., London, 1996); Presumptive Engagement: Australia's Asia-Pacific Security Policy in the 1990s (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1996); Breaking the Codes: Australia's KGB Network, 1944-1950 (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1998); Burma's Military Secrets: Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) from the Second World War to Civil War and Cyber Warfare (White Lotus Press, Bangkok, 1998); The Next Stage: Preventive Diplomacy and Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.131 (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1999); and Maintaining the Strategic Edge: The Defence of Australia in 2015, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.133 (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1999). Professor Ball is a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences of Australia (FASSA), a member of the Council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), and co-chair of the Steering Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP).
Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence are a series of monograph publications that arise out of the work of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University. Previous Canberra Papers have covered topics such as the relationship of the superpowers, arms control at both the superpower and Southeast Asian regional level, regional strategic relationships and major aspects of Australian defence policy. For a list of New Series Canberra Papers please refer to the last pages of this volume.

Unless otherwise stated, publications of the Centre are presented without endorsement as contributions to the public record and debate. Authors are responsible for their own analysis and conclusions.
CONTENTS

Tables and Figures
Acronyms and Abbreviations

1 Introduction 1
2 CSCAP'S Foundation and Achievements 5
3 Towards a Critique 33
4 CSCAP and the ARF 47
5 Some Other Issues 55
6 An Agenda for Progress 63
7 CSCAP'S Prospects 87
Annex 1: The Kuala Lumpur Statement, 8 June 1993 93
Annex 2: The CSCAP Charter 96

Bibliography 105

Strategic and Defence Studies Centre 115
TABLES

2.1 CSCAP Member Committees 10
2.2 CSCAP Co-Chairs 12
2.3 CSCAP Memoranda 12
2.4 Steering Committee Meetings 13
2.5 Working Group Meetings 24
2.6 Working Group Publications 30
3.1 The ARF Agenda 36
6.1 Security in the South Pacific 76
6.2 Economics and Security 77
6.3 The Environment and Security 81

FIGURE

2.1 CSCAP Structure 9
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>anti-ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Australian Federal Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN ISIS</td>
<td>ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASO</td>
<td>Annual Security Outlook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BW</td>
<td>biological warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3I</td>
<td>command, control, communications and intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCIS</td>
<td>China Center for International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CICP</td>
<td>Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSBM</td>
<td>confidence and security building measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCAP</td>
<td>The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Centre for Strategic and International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>Centre for Strategic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CW</td>
<td>chemical weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMP</td>
<td>electromagnetic pulse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPDA</td>
<td>Five Power Defence Arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRSC</td>
<td>Forum Regional Security Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>intercontinental ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDSA</td>
<td>Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIR</td>
<td>Institute for International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRBM</td>
<td>intermediate-range missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISDS</td>
<td>Institute for Strategic and Development Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISG</td>
<td>Intersessional Support Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Institute for Strategic and International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IW</td>
<td>information warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIIA</td>
<td>Japan Institute of International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCSBM</td>
<td>maritime confidence and security building measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRBM</td>
<td>medium-range ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCAs</td>
<td>national command authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRI</td>
<td>National Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>overseas development assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACATOM</td>
<td>Pacific Atomic Energy Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAFTAD</td>
<td>Pacific Asia Free Trade and Development Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PECC</td>
<td>Pacific Economic Co-operation Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMC</td>
<td>Post-Ministerial Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIPS</td>
<td>Research Institute for Peace and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAP</td>
<td>Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEANWFZ</td>
<td>Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFIA</td>
<td>Seoul Forum for International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIIA</td>
<td>Singapore Institute of International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td>submarine-launched ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLOCs</td>
<td>sea lines of communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMIS</td>
<td>Strategic Maritime Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOM</td>
<td>Senior Officials' Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAC</td>
<td>Treaty of Amity and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>unmanned aerial vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCLOS</td>
<td>UN Convention on the Law of the Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>UN General Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WG</td>
<td>Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZOPFAN</td>
<td>Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) is an experiment in liberal institution building being undertaken by realists. It confronts immense difficulties in promoting multilateral security cooperation in a world in which national interests count for more than the common good and power politics ultimately prevail. But it is an organisation with enormous potential, comprised of representatives from the leading academic centres and other research institutes specialising in Asia-Pacific security matters, as well as government officials (retired and current) with great practical experience in international affairs involving the Asia-Pacific region.

CSCAP was set up in 1992-93 to provide 'a more structured regional process of a non-governmental nature ... to contribute to the efforts towards regional confidence building and enhancing regional security through dialogues, consultation and cooperation'. It was described at the time as 'the most ambitious proposal to date for a regularised, focused and inclusive non-governmental process on Pacific security matters', and as 'one of the most important developments in regional security since the end of the Cold War'. It was an important, ambitious and exciting initiative, in a region which heretofore had been opposed to multilateralism, but it also contained inherent sources of tension - such as the liberal institutionalism/realism relationship, somewhat different academic and policy-oriented perspectives, and different views about the scale of the activities to be undertaken by the organisation. The tensions have been both creative and debilitating.

CSCAP is now a generally recognised feature of the security architecture of the Asia-Pacific region. Its achievements since 1992-93

---

3 Ian McPhedran, 'Asia-Pacific Body Created to Formalise Regional Cooperation', Canberra Times, 17 July 1993, p.3.
have been extraordinary. These are described in chapter 2. Chapter 3 discusses the main factors involved in forming a critical appreciation of CSCAP and its achievements. How should CSCAP be assessed? How can its achievements be evaluated? Against which expectations, strategic contingencies or other criteria should the progress with the institutionalisation of regional security cooperation be measured? How does the progress compare to the more disturbing developments in the regional security environment? Chapter 4 discusses the relationship between CSCAP and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Among the different views about CSCAP's purposes, its ability to provide policy-relevant studies and analyses for the ARF has generally been accorded highest priority. The contribution which CSCAP has made to the ARF process is also an important measure of its success. Chapter 5 addresses several other issues which are of crucial importance to the future of CSCAP - the future of its Working Groups, the role of the Steering Committee, the relations with officialdom in the member countries, and tensions within the basic charter and objectives of the organisation. These are issues which require continuous reflection and frequent review.

Chapter 6 discusses CSCAP's research agenda. It identifies ten subjects which are interesting and important in terms of regional security, and concerning which CSCAP has the requisite expertise, but which are not currently being adequately studied by the organisation - such as the regional security outlook, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), arms control, defence cooperation, the environment and security, and the concept of human security. It is argued that CSCAP should explore ways and means of covering these subjects. Finally, chapter 7 provides a brief assessment of CSCAP's prospects. It argues that much will depend on its demonstrable ability to simultaneously both initiate and sponsor new conceptual approaches to regional security issues and also support official enterprises such as the ARF. But most determinate will be the dynamics of regional security developments. No matter how successfully CSCAP functions in organisational and intellectual terms, it will count for little if these developments engender an environment characterised by tension, conflict, arms races and a propensity to use force to resolve disputes. CSCAP's prospects depend ultimately upon its capacity to influence and shape these developments, and to
contribute to the construction of a regional security architecture in which cooperative modalities prevail over power politics.
CSCAP'S FOUNDATION AND ACHIEVEMENTS

At the beginning of the 1990s, as the Cold War ended, there was a burgeoning of non-governmental activities and institutional linkages concerning security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, in which government officials were greatly involved but in their private or non-official capacities, and which was soon generally referred to as the 'second-track' process.¹ By 1993-94, these second-track meetings exceeded one per week.² Some of these were small workshops, sometimes involving less than two dozen participants, and designed to address specific issues (such as security of the sealanes through the region, or territorial disputes in the South China Sea). The largest and most inclusive was (and still is) the annual Asia-Pacific Roundtable, organised by the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN ISIS), which involves about 300 participants from more than two dozen countries.

In 1991, four institutions in the region, namely the ASEAN ISIS, the Pacific Forum in Honolulu, the Seoul Forum for International Affairs, and the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) in Tokyo, together with representatives of other research institutes from the region, began a two-year project on Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (SCAP). The discussions at a series of SCAP meetings in 1991-92, involving participants from 17 countries, and including scholars as well as officials acting in their private capacities, clearly showed the need for more structured processes for regional confidence building and security cooperation.

---

The Foundation of CSCAP

CSCAP was formally established at a meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 8 June 1993, following agreement reached by representatives from strategic studies institutes in 10 countries in Seoul on 1-3 November 1992. Three essential themes permeated the discussions that attended its establishment. The first was that the Council should be a non-governmental institution but that it should involve government officials, albeit in their private capacities. Although it was considered essential that the institution be independent from official control in order to take full advantage of the extraordinary vitality and fecundity of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) engaged in the second-track process, as well as to allow relatively free discussion of diplomatically sensitive issues that could not be brought up in official forums, it was also recognised that official involvement was necessary in order to attract government resources and to ensure that the value and practicability of the NGO efforts secured official appreciation. In other words, the prospects for implementation should count for as much as the intrinsic worth of any ideas generated in the second-track process. It was considered important that the official involvement include senior military personnel as well as defence civilians and foreign affairs officers.

The second theme derived from the experience of NGOs such as the Pacific Asia Free Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD) and the Pacific Economic Co-operation Conference (PECC) in the promotion of Asia-Pacific economic cooperation throughout the 1970s and 1980s. These NGOs have contributed to the regional economic cooperation process in several important ways. They have, to begin with, developed and disseminated the ideas and stimulated the discussion that engendered the process. They have conducted the technical economic studies and analyses which showed the benefits of liberalisation of trade in the region, either through formal free trade arrangements or, more recently, the concept of 'open regionalism'. They have demonstrated to government officials that meaningful and productive dialogue on complex and important policy matters is

---

CSCAP's Foundation and Achievements

possible notwithstanding the extraordinary disparity in the sizes and interests of the numerous parties involved. Indeed, some of them, and most especially the PECC, have explicitly been structured to involve officials themselves in this dialogue - albeit in their 'unofficial' capacities. PECC has even engaged in negotiation with respect to the resolution of differences between states, which have arisen during the dialogue process. By providing forums for official but 'unofficial' dialogue, the NGOs have contributed to greater official inter-action and enhanced mutual confidence, as well as providing a sound 'building block' for supporting cooperative arrangements at the governmental level itself.

Many of the participants in the foundation of CSCAP were also actively involved in the PAFTAD and PECC processes. Indeed, several of the institutions represented in Seoul were also the co-ordinators of their national PECC committees. In a sense, CSCAP was loosely modelled on the PECC experience and practice. It was intended that CSCAP should support official forums concerned with regional security dialogue and cooperation, such as the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences (PMCs) and the Senior Officials' Meetings (SOMs), in much the same way that PECC supports the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process. More particularly, the establishment of CSCAP national committees and working groups closely reflected those established in the PECC programme in terms of their general rationales and operational activities.

The third theme in the foundation of CSCAP was the acceptance of the need to build on extant arrangements in the region wherever possible rather than construct new structures and processes. In practice, this meant building upon the arrangements and processes developed by the ASEAN ISIS association, and particularly ISIS Malaysia, which were the most advanced in the region in terms of both their infrastructure and their cooperative arrangements and practices.

The Achievements

CSCAP's progress over the period from 1992-93 to about 1996, which constitutes its formative phase, is primarily measured in terms of its own institutionalisation. It moved fairly quickly to draw up a charter and set of by-laws, to expand its membership, to achieve a sound financial basis, to organise regular meetings, and to publish the products of its Working Groups.
Procedures were developed for the selection of CSCAP Co-chairs, one coming from an ASEAN country and the other from a non-ASEAN country. The founding co-chairs, Jusuf Wanandi from Indonesia and Amos Jordan from the United States, were appointed pro tem in 1993 and confirmed at the first Steering Committee meeting in Kuala Lumpur in June 1994. Wanandi's term of office was set at three years, and Jordan's at two, in order to provide some continuity through subsequent (two-yearly) appointments. It was agreed at the fourth meeting of the Steering Committee in Honolulu in December 1995 that 'the non-ASEAN chair will normally be selected on the basis of rotation among the geographical areas, namely (a) North America; (b) Northeast Asia; and (c) Australasia/South Pacific'.

A CSCAP Secretariat was established, courtesy of ISIS Malaysia. The first CSCAP newsletter was produced in May 1994 and the second in October 1994. CSCAP Memorandum No.1 on The Security of the Asia Pacific Region was submitted to the first ARF Senior Officials' Meeting (SOM) in April 1994 for consideration prior to the first ARF meeting in July 1994.

Several sub-committees have been established to support the Steering Committee. Two of these meet twice a year, coincidental with the Steering Committee meetings: the Finance Committee, which considers budgetary and financial matters; and the Working Group Committee, which consists of the co-chairs of the five Working Groups and involves discussion of their current and prospective activities, and areas of duplication and potential cooperation. A Planning Committee of the Steering Committee was established in December 1995; it 'was tasked to prepare a vision for the future direction of the region, and help CSCAP accordingly'. In June 1996, the Steering Committee agreed that 'the Planning Group be institutionalised as a Select Committee of the CSCAP Steering Committee, to be responsible for the further development of plans and proposals for consideration by the Steering Committee'.

The CSCAP Charter provides, in Article IX(1), that 'CSCAP shall convene a General Meeting on a regular basis', with 'the agenda, time and venue [to] be decided by the Steering Committee'. Two General Meetings have been convened. The first was held in Singapore on 4 June 1997, and was attended by about 200 members. The second was
CSCAP’s Foundation and Achievements

Figure 2.1: CSCAP Structure

CSCAP Steering Committee

-----------------------------
Co-chairs

Sub-Committees

• Finance
• By-laws
• Membership
• Working Groups
• Planning

Secretariat

Member Committees

• Australia
• Canada
• Indonesia
• Japan
• South Korea
• Malaysia
• Philippines
• Singapore
• Thailand
• USA
• New Zealand
• Russia
• North Korea
• Mongolia
• China
• Vietnam
• Europe
• India
• Cambodia
• Papua New Guinea

Working Groups

• CSBMs
• Maritime Cooperation
• Cooperative and Comprehensive Security
• North Pacific Dialogue
• Transnational Crime
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member Committee and Institutional Sponsor</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No. of members</th>
<th>Activities/Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Australia. Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC)</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Co-chair of WG/MC. Co-chair of WG/TNC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Canada. Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Co-chair of WG/NP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Philippines. Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS)</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Co-chair of WG/TNC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 US. Pacific Forum CSIS</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>Co-chair of WG/CSBMIs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 New Zealand. Centre for Strategic Studies (CSS)</td>
<td>June 1994</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Co-chair of WG/CCCS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Russia.</td>
<td>Dec. 1994</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Mongolia.</td>
<td>June 1996</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Europe.</td>
<td>Dec. 1998</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Joined as Associate Member in June 1994.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>India. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA)</td>
<td>June 2000</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Joined as Associate Member in December 1994.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Cambodia. Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP)</td>
<td>June 2000</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2.2: CSCAP Co-Chairs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASEAN Co-Chair</th>
<th>Non-ASEAN Co-Chair</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Sponsor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jusuf Wanandi,</td>
<td>Amos Jordan,</td>
<td>1994-97</td>
<td>CSCAP-USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCAP-Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noordin Soopiee,</td>
<td>Nobuo Matsunaga,</td>
<td>1997-99</td>
<td>CSCAP-Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCAP-Malaysia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carolina Hernandez,</td>
<td>Han Sung-Joo,</td>
<td>1999-2001</td>
<td>CSCAP-Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCAP-Philippines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desmond Ball,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUS-CSCAP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.3: CSCAP Memoranda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Date Issued</th>
<th>Sponsor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>The Security of the Asia-Pacific Region</td>
<td>April 1994</td>
<td>SC Pro-Tem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures</td>
<td>June 1995</td>
<td>WG/CSBM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation</td>
<td>December 1997</td>
<td>WG/MC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Table 2.4: Steering Committee Meetings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>5 June 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>3-5 June 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Canberra</td>
<td>9-10 December 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Singapore</td>
<td>3 June 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Tokyo</td>
<td>18 December 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>29 May 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Seoul</td>
<td>3 December 1999</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
held in Seoul on 4 December 1999, and discussed the role of CSCAP in Asia-Pacific security in the new millennium. The third General Meeting is scheduled to be held in 2001.

Membership

CSCAP now includes nearly every country in the region. The original ten (Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and the US) were joined by three others in 1993-94 (New Zealand, Russia and North Korea). The most critical accession was that of China in December 1996. It was accepted from the outset that China’s membership was essential - a pan-regional security architecture of any substance or credibility was inconceivable without China - but it was also recognised that its inclusion would bring difficulties, especially concerning the involvement of Taiwan. The conditions for Taiwanese participation were agreed in Canberra in December 1996, but it took another two years before the Taiwanese attended their first Working Group meeting. The European committee became a full member in December 1998. Most recently, in June 2000, India, Cambodia and Papua New Guinea joined the Council.

The individual memberships of CSCAP’s member committees have also grown substantially - by nearly 60 per cent, from a total of 452 members (in 13 countries) in 1995, when the first CSCAP Directory was compiled, to some 750 in 2000. The largest of the member committees is US-CSCAP, with 185 members; the average for the other member committees is about 30 members.

Several member committees produce their own newsletters. The Australian newsletter comes out twice a year, the most recent being No.9 in February 2000. The Philippines' committee publishes an annual newsletter, most recently No. 4 in June 2000. South Korea has also published four issues of its newsletter. These comprise the best set of publicly available materials concerning cooperative security activities in the region.

Working Groups

The Working Groups are the primary mechanism for CSCAP activity. According to the Charter, they are supposed 'to undertake policy-oriented studies on specific regional and sub-regional political-security problems'. It had been agreed at the Seoul meeting in November 1992 that 'the first two of these Working Groups will
CSCAP's Foundation and Achievements

examine maritime surveillance in Southeast Asia and the enhancement of security cooperation in the North Pacific.¹

Four Working Groups were established at the first official meeting of the Steering Committee in Kuala Lumpur in June 1994:

(i) Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs);
(ii) Concepts of Cooperative and Comprehensive Security;
(iii) Maritime Cooperation; and
(iv) the North Pacific.

A fifth, on Transnational Crime was set up in December 1996 (initially as a Study Group, until its viability was accepted by the Steering Group in December 1997). These Working Groups have now had more than forty meetings and produced a dozen volumes of edited papers.

The Working Group on CSBMs

The Working Group on CSBMs has been the most energetic. It was the first to have a meeting (in Washington DC in October 1994). It has now had 13 meetings, double that of some of the other groups. It produced CSCAP Memorandum No.2 on Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures for approval by the Steering Committee in June 1995, and it has now published one edited volume and four occasional papers. It has made more use of electronic dissemination of its reports than have the other groups.

Through its first five meetings, the group was primarily concerned with transparency-type CSBMs, which the ARF had articulated as its principal interest in 1995 - such as Defence White Papers and conventional arms registers, as well as nuclear non-proliferation. In April 1996, at its fourth meeting, the group produced 'a generic model for developing a defence white paper, which could be considered as a general format [for use] by interested parties'. However, work on arms registers stagnated, as most countries in the region acceded to the UN Conventional Arms Register, while being unwilling to accept a more detailed and more meaningful, but also more intrusive, Regional Arms Register.

Since 1996-97, the Working Group on CSBMs has concentrated on two main subjects: nuclear energy and non-proliferation, and

---

The work on nuclear energy, commonly called the PACATOM project, is intended to address the safety and non-proliferation concerns about the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is premised on the belief that multilateral confidence-building measures aimed at increasing transparency and enhancing safeguards and individual assurances, if introduced at an early stage in the process, could help ensure that the anticipated expanded regional use of nuclear energy does not contribute to misunderstandings about the nuclear intentions of individual nations, while also promoting nuclear safety and non-proliferation goals. The objectives of the project are:

- to identify and articulate, and then help to address or alleviate, nuclear energy-related regional concerns;
- to identify and help institute both information collection and dissemination and a series of confidence building measures aimed at reducing current nuclear energy-related concerns while setting the stage for more formalized multilateral cooperation;
- to assess the feasibility and define the likely parameters of an institutionalized regional regime aimed at promoting greater safety, security, and transparency in nuclear energy production and research operations [i.e., an Asian or Pacific Atomic Energy Community (PACATOM)].

The work on preventive diplomacy began at the fifth meeting of the group, in Singapore in October 1996. Both this and the sixth meeting, in Washington DC in May 1997, were designed to directly assist the ARF's preliminary consideration of preventive diplomacy. Since then, as discussed further in chapter 4 below, the group has worked closely with the ARF on this subject. It is probably the CSCAP work which has been most appreciated by the ARF.

Over the next couple of years, the Working Group on CSBMs plans to continue development and refinement of the CSCAP Asia-Pacific Nuclear Energy Transparency Web Site. The site is to be made

---

6 ibid., p.vi.
even more comprehensive through the addition of information on nuclear energy research and reprocessing facilities, nuclear weapons free zones, and the plans and attitudes of current non-nuclear energy producing states.

The Working Group also intends to widen its discussions to address other regional security concerns, including non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), offensive and defensive missile developments, military alliances, and some non-traditional security concerns. It intends to closely monitor ARF activities to determine how best to assist the ARF’s examination of confidence building and preventive diplomacy. It also intends to work on regional security outlook assessments.

The Working Group on Maritime Cooperation

The Working Group on Maritime Cooperation is one of the most important second-track activities concerning maritime security matters in the region. It has had nine meetings, and produced five volumes of edited papers and a CSCAP Memorandum on Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation. It has remained very conscious of its objectives, and has adhered to a perspective plan designed to meet those objectives. Its edited volumes comprise an essential set of reference material for any informed discussion of maritime cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region; they are widely cited in both the academic literature on Asia-Pacific security and official forums.

The objectives of the Working Group were defined in November 1994 (in preparation for the second meeting of the CSCAP Steering Committee in Kuala Lumpur in December 1994) as being:

---

7 See Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates, 'Introduction' in Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates (eds), Calming the Waters: Initiatives for Asia Pacific Maritime Cooperation, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.114 (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1996), pp.1-7; and Desmond Ball, 'Maritime Cooperation, CSCAP and the ARF' in Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates (eds), The Seas Unite: Maritime Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.118 (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1996), pp.1-22.

8 See, for example, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia and ASEAN: Managing Change (Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, March 1998), p.198.
to foster maritime cooperation and dialogue among the states of the Asia Pacific region and enhance their ability to manage and use the maritime environment without prejudicing the interests of each other;

• to develop an understanding of regional maritime issues and the scope they provide for cooperation and dialogue;

• to contribute to a stable maritime regime in the Asia Pacific region which will reduce the risk of regional conflict;

• to undertake policy-oriented studies on specific regional maritime security problems;

• to promote particular maritime confidence and security building measures (MCSBMs); and

• to promote adherence to the principles of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).9

Its initial meetings focused on maritime CSBMs, maritime surveillance and information sharing, marine scientific and technological research, marine resources, marine environmental conservation, and law and order at sea (especially piracy). Its work on CSBMs resulted in publication of CSCAP Memorandum No.4 on Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation in December 1997.

In June 1997, at its third meeting in Bangkok, the group began work on regional oceans management and security, central themes from which have been pursued in accordance with an 'action plan' for work on the 'objectives and principles of good oceans management' drawn up at the fifth meeting in Kuala Lumpur in November 1998. The work on 'good oceans management' is 'directed towards the building of law and order at sea', and covers safe movement of shipping and resource exploitation at sea, maritime crime, maritime pollution, and instruments for dispute settlement. The sixth meeting of the group, in Hanoi in August 1999, was devoted to 'good oceans governance', and the papers prepared for the meeting were published by CSCAP Vietnam in September 1999.

The seventh meeting, in Wollongong in November 1999, was organised jointly with the Working Group on Transnational Crime, and addressed issues involving maritime crime and law and order at sea.

The eighth meeting, in Manila in July 2000, finalised the draft of a CSCAP Memorandum on Cooperation for Law and Order at Sea, for consideration by the Steering Committee in December 2000.

With regard to future activities, the Working Group on Maritime Cooperation plans to focus on issues in the marginal seas of East Asia. Jurisdictional problems in these seas are a source of tension and potential conflict in the region, the resolution of which requires a range of maritime confidence-building and preventive-diplomacy measures. Following completion of the CSCAP Memorandum on Cooperation for Law and Order at Sea, the group intends to develop a prospective CSCAP Memorandum on The Law of the Sea in the Asia Pacific Region.

The Working Group on Concepts of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security

The Working Group on Concepts of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security was set up following the suggestion of the then Malaysian Foreign Minister, Datuk Abdullah Ahmad Badawi at the Seventh Roundtable in Kuala Lumpur in June 1993, that a study group be formed to examine the concept of comprehensive security and how it might be adopted as the basis of security policy-making by all countries in the Asia-Pacific region. This group has now had eight meetings, and produced five edited volumes and a CSCAP Memorandum on The Concepts of Comprehensive Security and Cooperative Security.

The work of this group is different from that of the other groups in being more conceptual and theoretical. It is also perhaps more difficult, due to both the gulf between the conceptual literature and 'the real world of policy-making', and to the elusiveness of the subject itself. As one of the co-chairs of the Working Group noted at the third meeting of the Steering Committee in Kuala Lumpur in June 1995: 'The subject is still a concept in search of a settled identity'.

As befits the breadth of comprehensive approaches to security, as well as reflecting the elusiveness of the subject, the work of the WG/CCCS has been wide-ranging - perhaps at the expense of

---

analytical depth and policy utility. The first two meetings of the group explored the concept of comprehensive security and prepared the memorandum on *The Concepts of Comprehensive Security and Cooperative Security* for approval by the CSCAP Steering Committee in December 1995 and submission to the ARF SOM-3 in April 1996. The third meeting, in Wellington in December 1996, discussed the theme of interdependence and security, and particularly the linkages between economic development, high levels of economic inter-dependence, and peace and security.\(^{11}\) The fourth meeting, in Kuala Lumpur in September 1997, focussed on the challenges to regional security posed by environmental degradation, food shortages and energy requirements; it also examined the political, legal and military dimensions of disputes concerning marine resources in East Asia. The fifth and sixth meetings involved an in-depth examination of the Asian economic crisis of 1997-98 and its implications for the structure of regional security. (The papers prepared for these two meetings were published in a single volume in 1999).\(^{12}\) The seventh meeting, in Seoul in December 1999, discussed the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of other sovereign states, some recent challenges to the principle, and its applicability in the Asia-Pacific context.\(^{13}\)

**The Working Group on the North Pacific**

The objective of the Working Group on the North Pacific, as defined in a paper prepared by its founding co-chairs on 2 November 1994, is 'to contribute toward dialogue and security cooperation in the North Pacific with specific reference to security issues in Northeast Asia'. It is different from the other groups in several important respects: it has distinct geographical boundaries in focussing on a sub-region of Asia-Pacific; whereas the most vital regional security issues lie in Northeast Asia, the mechanisms for dialogue are less developed there than elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region; the intention has been

---


13 See David Dickens and Guy Wilson-Roberts (eds), *Non-Intervention and State Sovereignty in the Asia-Pacific* (Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University, Wellington, 2000).
to focus on a few key issues, mainly concerning the Korean Peninsula, rather than pursuing several fronts; and it has been from the outset less confident about its capacity to produce policy recommendations. Rather, it is tasked with promoting the institutionalised dialogue necessary for the development of cooperative policies. The group had its first meeting (on 'Frameworks for Stability on the Korean Peninsula') in Tokyo in April 1995, but it was hamstrung for a couple of years by the absence of participants from North Korea (which joined CSCAP in December 1994 but did not attend the group's April 1995 meeting) and China (which did not join CSCAP until December 1996). It has now had six meetings.

The Working Group on Transnational Crime

The Working Group on Transnational Crime is designed to address the increasing importance of transnational crime as a threat to regional security. The official objectives of the group, as decided at the Steering Committee meeting in Canberra in December 1996, are:

- to gain a better understanding of and reach agreement on the major transnational crime trends affecting the region as a whole;
- to consider practical measures which might be adopted to combat transnational crime in the region;
- to encourage and assist those countries which have recently become engaged in regional security cooperation, and which are concerned about the problem of transnational crime in the region, to endorse the United Nations and other protocols dealing with transnational crime, particularly in the narcotics area, and to develop laws to assist in regional and international cooperation to counter drug trafficking, money laundering, mutual assistance, extradition and the like.

It is a test case of the ability of security analysts in the region to seriously consider the new security agenda as involving real threats to security. The Working Group has now held eight meetings, or as many of most of the other groups set up three years before it began.

The first two meetings were exploratory. The first, in Singapore in March 1997, developed a checklist of 19 types of transnational crime affecting the region, and allocated research projects to member
countries from this list. The second meeting, in Bangkok in October 1997, winnowed this to leave those crime types most likely to affect the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region: arms trafficking, drug production and trafficking, international corporate/white collar crime, smuggling of nuclear materials, counterfeiting, illegal immigration, money laundering, and technology crimes. The third meeting, in Manila in May 1998, discussed drug trafficking, money laundering, arms smuggling, terrorism, illegal immigration, and technology crimes, as well as the conceptual and policy relationships between transnational crime and regional security. The papers prepared for the second and third meetings were published in 1999.14

Subsequent meetings have been more focused on particular issues. The fourth and fifth meetings, in Sydney in October 1998 and Bangkok in May 1999, discussed three topics: illicit arms trafficking, production and trafficking of synthetic drugs, and the impact of the economic crisis of 1997-98 on crime in the region. The group found that transnational crime had increased as a result of the crisis. The increased unemployment led people to resort to illegal activities to survive. Illicit capital flight and money laundering increased. Smuggling of people also increased. On the other hand, the law enforcement resources available to meet these challenges were reduced by the crisis.15

The group had its seventh meeting in Manila on 31 May - 1 June 2000, the two themes of which were identity fraud, especially in relation to international travel documents, and law enforcement cooperation in the region. With regard to further work on identity fraud, the meeting decided to establish two sub-groups: one on technology and crime, particularly e-crime, and the other to consider best practice in the issuance and handling of travel documents. In the case of law enforcement cooperation, the meeting also decided to survey the current status of cooperation in relation to 'mutual assistance and extradition' in the region.

The work of the Working Group on Transnational Crime has been applauded by several law enforcement agencies and has been

reported in the regional media. For example, in 1997 the Deputy Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police (AFP), Adrien Whiddett, described the establishment of the Working Group as 'a heartening development' and a 'clarion-call to arms'.\textsuperscript{16} The Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade of the Australian Parliament also commended the setting up of the group.\textsuperscript{17} The \textit{Far Eastern Economic Review} reported in April 2000 in a special report on cyber crime that as early as May 1998 the Working Group on Transnational Crime had warned that 'crime in cyberspace is clearly a significant threat to national and regional security and stability'.\textsuperscript{18}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, \textit{Australia and ASEAN}, p.205.
\end{itemize}
### Table 2.5: Working Group Meetings

(i) **Working Group on CSBMs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Subject/Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 1994</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>Discussed a wide range of CSBMs and their acceptability or applicability in the Asia-Pacific region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-17 May 1995</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Produced draft of CSCAP Memorandum No.2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1995</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>Discussed various CSBMs, especially with respect to proliferation, weapons modernisation and transparency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1996</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>Discussed three main subjects: Defence White Papers; the UN Arms Register; and nuclear safety and non-proliferation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1996</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Discussed three main subjects: the UN Arms Register; nuclear safety and non-proliferation; and preventive diplomacy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-23 May 1997</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>Two primary topics: nuclear energy; and preventive diplomacy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-31 Oct 1997</td>
<td>Fukushima, Japan</td>
<td>Nuclear energy/PACATOM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-9 May 1998</td>
<td>Washington, DC, and Albuquerque, New Mexico</td>
<td>Nuclear energy/PACATOM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-13 Dec 1998</td>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>Nuclear energy/PACATOM.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## CSCAP's Foundation and Achievements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Subject/Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>28 Feb - 2 March 1999</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>Preventive diplomacy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>25-27 May 1999</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>Nuclear energy/PACATOM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>3-5 April 2000</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Preventive diplomacy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>22-24 May 2000</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>Nuclear energy/PACATOM.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ii) **Working Group on Maritime Cooperation**

Co-chaired by Australia and Indonesia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Subject/Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>24-25 August 1999</td>
<td>Hanoi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>6-9 November 1999</td>
<td>Wollongong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>25-26 July 2000</td>
<td>Manila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>19-21 November 2000</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### CSCAP's Foundation and Achievements

#### Working Group on Concepts of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security

Co-chaired by Malaysia, New Zealand and China.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Subject/Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Place</td>
<td>Subject/Comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 31 Jan - 2 Feb 1997</td>
<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>Discussed four main topics: current dialogue mechanisms in Northeast Asia; the relevance of institution-building in Southeast Asia for Northeast Asia; the connection between economic and security cooperation; and possible CSBMs suitable for Northeast Asia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 15-16 Dec 1997</td>
<td>Makuhari, Japan</td>
<td>Discussed four main issues: recent developments in Northeast Asia (and particularly the bilateral summit meetings); border CSBMs in Northeast Asia; institutional arrangements for economic security cooperation in Northeast Asia (and particularly KEDO); and the role of the ARF in Northeast Asia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 8-10 Nov 1998</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>Four topics were discussed: the security implications of the regional economic crisis, particularly for North Pacific states; the significance of recent increased bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral relations among the major powers of Northeast Asia; the evolving circumstances on the Korean Peninsula; and the proliferation of weapons and the effectiveness of non-proliferation regimes regarding Northeast Asia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 27-28 Sept 1999</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>Discussed four topics: the implications of the changes in major power relations in Northeast Asia; the Korean Peninsula; proliferation and counter-proliferation in the North Pacific; and economic cooperation and regional governance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 14-16 June 2000</td>
<td>Ulaan-battor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Working Group on Transnational Crime

Co-chaired by the Philippines, Thailand and Australia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Subject/Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 25-26 March 1997</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Developed a list of 19 types of transnational crimes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 11-13 October 1998</td>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>The major topics discussed were the illicit trafficking in firearms throughout the Asia-Pacific region; the production and trafficking of synthetic drugs in the region; and the impact of the Asian financial crisis on the development of transnational crime in the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 6-9 Nov 1999</td>
<td>Wollongong</td>
<td>Joint meeting with WG/MC. Two themes: trafficking in humans; and maritime crime and law and order at sea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. 31 May - 1 June 2000</td>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>Identity fraud (including cyber crime), and law enforcement cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. 16-18 October 2000</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>Discussed law enforcement cooperation in the region; cyber crime; identity document fraud; and synthetic drug production and trafficking in the region.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2.6: Working Group Publications

(i) Working Group on CSBMs


(ii) Working Group on Maritime Cooperation


(iii) Working Group on Concepts of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security


(iv) *Working Group on the North Pacific*

(v) *Working Group on Transnational Crime*

Assessment of CSCAP's achievements is extremely difficult. To begin with, many of the conceptual variables are quite intangible, such as 'confidence', 'trust', 'transparency', and even some of the more elastic concepts of 'security' itself. Then, the standards of measurement are problematic: they are conceptually undeveloped, inconstant, and, indeed, are at least in part a function of the variable being measured (i.e., the cooperative achievements).

The simplest yardstick of CSCAP's achievements is the Working Group activity as measured in terms of numbers of meetings and publications. According to the quantitative measurements, some groups have been more active than others. The Working Group on CSBMs has had many more meetings than any of the others, but the Working Group on Maritime Cooperation and the Working Group on Concepts of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security have published the most books. However, there are important differences in the analytical qualities of the published works, while the disparate conceptual and practical approaches defy comparative evaluation.

A much more demanding standard would be the structure and systemic tendencies of the regional security architecture: i.e., to what extent are the cooperative ventures keeping abreast of the changing components and configurations of security relations and of the systemic propensities for conflict or peace in the region?

The difficulty is greatly compounded by the lack of any conceptual framework for addressing the interaction of institutionalised cooperation and geostrategic developments based upon power politics and national self-interest. The theoretical literature is essentially bifocussed on liberal institutionalism and extreme realism, whereas most international political activity, and certainly some of the most critical activity in the security field in the Asia-Pacific region since the end of the Cold War, involves the confluence of cooperative modalities and power relationships.

In general, the cooperative security measures which have been officially accepted and institutionalised over the past decade satisfy one
or more of the following: First, they address the real concerns which regional security policy-makers and analysts have about certain aspects of the emerging regional security environment - i.e., the uncertainty pervading the region, the high levels of economic inter-dependence and concomitant levels of vulnerability to potentially destabilising economic forces and economically-inspired political conflict, the challenge of the major Asian powers, the vigorous arms acquisition programmes underway in the region, the prospect of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), a variety of important maritime issues, the existence of numerous territorial and sovereignty disputes, and the possibility that one or more of these could erupt into war.

Second, they do not impinge on core national interests - i.e., territorial claims and other sovereignty issues, defence capabilities and operations, or internal political processes (which might be affected by more transparent policy-making). Third, their design and development has been in accord with 'the Asian way' - i.e., they have involved evolutionary developments from extant regional structures rather than the importation of Western modalities or the creation of new structures; decisions are made 'by consensus after careful and extensive consultations' rather than by voting; and the implementation of particular measures eschews legalisms and is left to voluntary compliance.1 According to the ARF's Concept Paper:

The ARF should ... progress at a pace comfortable to all participants.
The ARF should not move 'too fast for those who want to go slow and not too slow for those who want to go fast'.2

Clearly, there are strong tensions between aspects of these criteria. Measures which address important security issues are likely to affect national interests to some degree. And measures which are relatively easy to implement because they reflect 'the Asian way' are less likely to substantively address important issues. In practice, the scope for significant manoeuvre is fairly limited.

The institutionalisation of dialogue, as exemplified in both the ARF and CSCAP, was a necessary building block for enhanced security cooperation, but it was also easier to emplace than other 'blocks' (such as preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution, and arms control); there is no guarantee that laying the foundation will lead to any further (and harder) construction.

The Record of the ARF

CSCAP is a doubly dependent subject in the overall calculus of regional security. Its success depends on both its contribution to the first-track processes of regional security cooperation, and especially the ARF, and also on the extent to which the cooperative modalities are affecting the regional security architecture.

The ARF is the centrepiece of the institutionalisation of multilateral security dialogue and confidence building in the region. It held its first meeting in July 1994, and its progress, especially since its adoption of the Concept Paper and appended agenda at its second meeting in Brunei in August 1995, has been quite remarkable.

The Concept Paper outlined 'a gradual evolutionary approach to security cooperation', which is supposed to take place in three stages:

Stage 1: Promotion of Confidence-Building Measures;
Stage 2: Development of Preventive Diplomacy Mechanisms; and
Stage 3: Development of Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms.

The Concept Paper covers some three dozen proposals for CSBMs, preventive diplomacy, maritime cooperation and other cooperative measures. These are divided into two lists: the first (Annex A) containing 'measures which can be explored and implemented by ARF participants in the immediate future'; and the second (Annex B) being 'an indicative list of other proposals which can be explored over the medium and long-term by ARF participants and also considered in the immediate future by the Track Two process'.3

---

3 ibid., pp. 116-19.
Table 3.1: The ARF Agenda

ANNEX A: IMMEDIATE (1995-96)

1. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

Principles

1. The development of a set of basic principles to ensure a common understanding and approach to interstate relations in the region; and
2. Adoption of comprehensive approaches to security.

Transparency

3. Dialogue on security perceptions, including voluntary statements of defence policy positions;
4. Defence Publications such as Defence White Papers or equivalent documents as considered necessary by respective governments;
5. Participation in UN Conventional Arms Register;
6. Enhanced contacts, including high level visits and recreational activities;
7. Exchanges between military academies, staff colleges and training;
8. Observers at military exercises, on a voluntary basis; and
9. Annual seminar for defence officials and military officers on selected international security issues.

II PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

1. Develop a set of guidelines for the peaceful settlement of disputes, taking into account the principles in the UN Charter and the TAC;
2. Promote the recognition and acceptance of the purposes and principles of the TAC and its provisions for the pacific settlement of disputes, as endorsed by
Towards a Critique

the UNGA in Resolution 47/53 (B) on 9 December 1992; and

3. Seek the endorsement of other countries for the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea in order to strengthen its political and moral effect (as endorsed by the Programme of Action for ZOPFAN).

III NON-PROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL

Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (SEANWFZ).

IV PEACEKEEPING

1. Seminars/Workshops on peacekeeping issues; and
2. Exchange of information and experience relating to UN Peacekeeping Operations.

V MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION

Disaster Prevention

ANNEX B: MEDIUM AND LONG TERM

I CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

1. Further exploration of a Regional Arms Register;
2. Regional security studies centre/coordination of existing security studies activities;
3. Maritime information data bases;
4. Cooperative approaches to sea lines of communication, beginning with exchanges of information and training in such areas as search and rescue, piracy and drug control;
5. Mechanism to mobilise relief assistance in the event of natural disasters;
6. Establishment of zones of cooperation in areas such as the South China Sea;
7. Systems of prior notification of major military deployments that have region-wide application; and
8. Encourage arms manufacturers and suppliers to disclose the destination of their arms exports.

II PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

1. Explore and devise ways and means to prevent conflict;
2. Explore the idea of appointing Special Representatives, in consultation with ARF members, to undertake fact-finding missions, at the request of the parties involved to an issue, and to offer their good offices, as necessary; and
3. Explore the idea of establishing a Regional Risk Reduction Centre as suggested by the UN Secretary-General in his Agenda For Peace and as commended by UNGA Resolution 47/120 (see section IV, operative para 4). Such a centre could serve as a data base for the exchange of information.

III NON-PROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL

A regional or sub-regional arrangement agreeing not to acquire or deploy ballistic missiles.

IV PEACEKEEPING

Explore the possibility of establishing a peacekeeping centre.

V MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION

1. A multilateral agreement on the avoidance of naval incidents that apply to both local and external navies;
Towards a Critique

2. Sea Level/Climate Monitoring System;
3. Establishment of an ASEAN Relief and Assistance Force and a Maritime Safety (or Surveillance) Unit to look after the safety of the waters in the region;
4. Conventions on the Marine Environment
   • Dumping of Toxic Wastes
   • Land-based Sources of Marine Pollution;
5. Maritime surveillance; and
6. Explore the idea of joint marine scientific research.

The terms 'immediate future' and 'medium and long-term' are not defined, but it was generally reckoned by the ARF Senior Officials in 1995 that Annex A should be achieved within 1-2 years, while some of the measures in Annex B could take 3-5 years and others perhaps a decade or so. In terms of the progression from confidence building to preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution, dialogue and consultations about the latter were to begin immediately, with the expectation that some preventive-diplomacy mechanisms would be devised and emplaced within about five years and some conflict-resolution mechanisms in about 10 years.

According to this schedule, Annex A should have been substantially implemented by now. In fact, there has been considerable progress with most of the 16 measures contained in it. Many of them were fairly simple, such as the organisation of 'seminars/workshops on peacekeeping issues', 'exchanges between military academies [and] staff college', and 'enhanced contacts, including high level visits and recreational activities'. Some required novel activity on the part of many of the members, such as the preparation and publication of Defence White Papers or 'equivalent documents', although some of the products have involved little real transparency. An important achievement has been the South East Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) treaty, which entered into force on 27 March 1997. Some of the measures in Annex A are still some years away, however, such as the development of 'a set of guidelines for the peaceful settlement of disputes', or the adoption by all ARF members of the principle of 'comprehensive approaches to security'.
It is fair to say that a good start has already been made with some of the 19 measures in Annex B. This is especially the case with regard to maritime CSBMs, where there has been considerable progress with the development of maritime information databases, such as the Australian-developed Strategic Maritime Information System (SMIS); 'a multilateral agreement on the avoidance of naval incidents', produced by the CSCAP Working Group on Maritime Cooperation as Guidelines for Maritime Cooperation, and submitted to the ARF in early 1998; and exploration of 'the idea of joint marine scientific research' and other aspects of oceans management, which are currently also being explored by the CSCAP Working Group on Maritime Cooperation. It is quite likely that other measures will be implemented over the next few years, such as the development of a 'mechanism to mobilise relief assistance in the event of natural disasters', and exploration of 'the possibility of establishing a [regional] peacekeeping centre', as well as more maritime cooperation measures.

On the other hand, it is clear that some proposals have already stagnated, such as the notion of a Regional Arms Register. Others are unlikely to be implemented during the next decade, such as the 'establishment of zones of cooperation in areas such as the South China Sea'. More generally, there is unlikely to be much progress with the institutionalisation of conflict resolution or arms control during the next decade, and likely to be only modest progress with preventive diplomacy.

The Concept Paper described preventive diplomacy (Stage II of the ARF agenda) as 'a natural follow-up to confidence-building measures', and Annex B contains three specific proposals: to 'explore and devise ways and means to prevent conflict'; to explore the idea of appointing Special Representatives to undertake 'fact-finding missions' and to 'offer their good services'; and to explore the idea of establishing a Regional Risk Reduction Centre.

Progress with preventive diplomacy has been very slow. The ARF sponsored three seminars in 1995-97 (the third of which, in Singapore in September 1997, was organised by CSCAP), but these neither reached any consensus about the conceptual basis of preventive diplomacy nor identified any concrete measures. The first moves

---

4 Desmond Ball, 'Introduction: Towards Better Understanding of Preventive Diplomacy' in Desmond Ball and Amitav Acharya (eds), The Next Stage: Preventive
forward began with the meeting of the ARF Intersessional Support Group (ISG) on Confidence-building in Bangkok in March 1999, which was arranged to immediately follow a meeting on preventive diplomacy organised by the CSCAP Working Group on CSBMs and which most participants in the ISG meeting had attended. It considered four proposals, which were deemed to lie in 'the overlap between CBMs and preventive diplomacy': an enhanced role for the ARF Chairman, particularly a 'good offices' role; the development of a register of experts and eminent persons among ARF participants; production of an Annual Security Outlook; and voluntary background briefings by ARF participants on regional security issues. The ISG participants agreed that 'the main focus of the work programme for the ISG on CBMs in the 1999-2000 intersessional year [would] be the development of the concept and principles of preventive diplomacy', and that the roles of the ARF Chairman and ARF SOM Chairman should be enhanced 'in liaising with external parties, including other regional organizations', and agreed 'in principle on the proposal to develop a register of experts/eminent persons to serve as a pool of resources in CBMs and preventive diplomacy'. These were endorsed by the ARF SOM-6 in Singapore in May 1999, and 'noted' as 'a positive step forward' by the ARF-6 meeting in Singapore in July 1999.

Over the ensuing twelve months, the progress included the preparation by Singapore of a draft paper on Concepts and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy, the production by Thailand of the first Annual Security Outlook, enhancement of the role of the ARF Chairman in liaising with external parties, including the United Nations and the

---

* Diplomacy and Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.131 (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1999), pp.2-4.
5 Co-Chairman's Summary Report of the Meetings of the ARF Intersessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures held in Honolulu, USA, 4-6 November 1998, and in Bangkok, Thailand, 3-5 March 1999, p. 15.
6 ibid., pp.15-18.
7 Report of the Chairman of the Sixth ASEAN Regional Forum Senior Officials' Meeting, Singapore, 20-21 May 1999, para.11.
8 Chairman's Statement, The Sixth Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Singapore, 26 July 1999, para.5.
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the beginning of a compilation of a register of experts/eminent persons. With regard to Stage III of the ARF agenda (i.e., conflict resolution), the Concept Paper stated that:

It is not envisaged that the ARF would establish mechanisms for conflict resolution in the immediate future. The establishment of such mechanisms is an eventual goal that ARF participants should pursue.

In the case of non-proliferation and arms control, the ARF agenda promises little. Even transparency measures concerning arms acquisitions are unacceptable to most ARF members, let alone constraints on the acquisition and employment of weapons systems.

The Dynamics of the Regional Security Environment

The burgeoning activity in the 1990s concerning security dialogue and cooperation in the region was a response to concerns which regional security policy-makers and analysts had about certain aspects of the emerging regional security environment. The principal concerns have been as follows:

- the uncertainty pervading the region;
- the stability of the balance of power;
- the rise of China, and its inevitable impact on regional and international relations;
- territorial and sovereignty disputes;
- arms acquisition (or 'defence modernisation') programmes;
- proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
- maritime issues; and

---


• the new security agenda, including both economic and environmental security issues as well as transnational crime.

As noted above, the most important but also most demanding standard for measuring the recent cooperative achievements is comparison with these concerns. Has cooperation kept abreast of the more disturbing developments in the regional security environment? Two of the important concerns amenable to this sort of comparison are the propensity for conflict and the danger of an arms race in the region.

First, the propensity for conflict can be compared to the developments in preventive diplomacy and other conflict prevention and conflict resolution mechanisms. As discussed above, the ARF has been sponsoring substantial dialogue about preventive diplomacy, but no conflict prevention mechanisms are likely to be established in the foreseeable future, and the establishment of mechanisms for conflict resolution remains 'an eventual goal'.

On the other hand, there is much fertile ground for conflict in East Asia, and a finite and perhaps increasing likelihood of significant war in the region over the next decade or so. The geostrategic shifts, involving immense changes in the economic strength and military capabilities of countries in the region, will be extremely difficult to accommodate peacefully.

More specifically, there are more than three dozen issues of simmering and potential conflict involving competing sovereignty claims, challenges to government legitimacy, and territorial disputes in East Asia. Most of the issues are unlikely to lead to inter-state conflict. Some could well be resolved through negotiation, possibly involving the institution of joint development zones encompassing the areas of disputation; others are quiescent; and others will remain essentially internal matters. Nevertheless, the high proportion of inter-state issues suggests that inter-state conflict is more likely in the Asia-Pacific region than elsewhere.

I believe that, over the next decade or so, the likelihood that at least one or more of these or some other issues will erupt into a major war is higher than that substantial conflict-prevention mechanisms will be established in the region.

The second area of concern is the regional arms build-up and the relatively poor development of arms control arrangements. Since the
end of the economic crisis in 1999, most countries in the region have returned to increasing defence expenditures (with the only important exception being Indonesia). It is clear, however, that, at least over the next decade or so, there is very little possibility of countries in East Asia engaging in arms control or even in multilateral security dialogues which will constrain their force development plans and programmes. Most countries in the region are committed to robust acquisition programmes and can provide the strategic justifications for them.

The common characterisation of the arms acquisition programmes in East Asia in the late 1980s and early 1990s as an 'arms race' was very wrong. In most countries in the Asia-Pacific region, the proportions of GNP committed to defence spending were much lower in the mid-1990s than they had been in the early 1980s - typically 30 or 40 per cent lower. China and Singapore, where the proportions have remained fairly constant, are the only exception to this. In both East Asia and Asia as a whole, the total value of arms imports (in constant prices) was much lower in the mid-1990s than it was in the late 1980s. Further, there was little evidence of the action-reaction dynamics that are an essential feature of arms races. Rather, the regional acquisition programmes of the past decade or so can best be explained in terms of the requirements for enhanced self-reliance in the context of a rapidly changing and increasingly uncertain regional security environment.

On the other hand, the possibility of some regional arms race developing within the next decade or so must remain a serious concern. Since the requirements for defence self-reliance cannot be defined without some consideration of the capabilities possessed by neighbours and potential adversaries further afield, there must come a point where further acquisitions begin to stimulate reciprocal or interactive dynamics. In the next decade, most countries in the region will face the demands not only of continued force modernisation but also of replacement of the weapons systems acquired in such large volumes in the late 1980s. Defence budgets and acquisition programmes may enter another cycle of substantial increase - but this time from a base of higher numbers and more sophisticated capabilities than obtained during the round of the late 1980s and early 1990s.

The 'offensive' character of some of the new weapons systems being acquired is also cause for concern. Many of the new acquisitions (such as the maritime attack aircraft, modern surface combatants, and submarines, all equipped with anti-ship missiles) involve strike
capabilities with offensive connotations. These capabilities are the most likely to generate counter-acquisitions. Other acquisitions, such as submarines and long-range anti-ship missiles, are more disturbing in terms of their implications for crisis stability.

I now believe that, over the next decade and a half, it is more likely that there will be serious manifestations of these disturbing possibilities - more reciprocal acquisitions and action-reaction dynamics, and more likelihood of inadvertent escalation in crisis - than that arms control mechanisms will be instituted with any capacity to assuage them.

The 1997-98 Economic Crisis and Multilateral Security Cooperation

Multilateral security processes and activities were severely damaged by the Asian economic calamity in 1997-99. They lost the attentions of policy-makers. They suffered because of the cuts in regional defence budgets, within which training and exercise activities - the basis of most defence cooperation - were hit particularly hard. And multilateralism suffered because of the perceived impotency of the major regional institutions during the crisis.

Defence cooperation programmes, of which joint training and exercise activities became the centrepieces in the 1990s, were appreciably affected. For example, the Thai Air Force cut its joint exercises with Malaysia and Singapore by more than half in 1998. The cancellations included the annual Thamal joint exercise, the most important one conducted by the Thai and Malaysian defence forces.11

During the last quarter of 1998, Malaysia suspended its participation in exercises conducted under the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), the most important multilateral defence cooperation arrangement in the Asia-Pacific region, because of economic considerations.12 These FPDA exercises are generally the largest, most realistic, and most sophisticated joint exercises held in the region. They were resumed a year later, but with little Malaysian enthusiasm.

Another aspect of defence cooperation which was severely hit by the cuts in regional defence budgets was the attendance of military officers at Staff Colleges in other countries. This had become a significant and relatively inexpensive means of sharing perspectives about regional security matters, making personal friendships among these officers, contributing to transparency, and building mutual trust.

While the processes of regional confidence building and security cooperation were undoubtedly damaged, the impact on CSCAP itself is difficult to assess. As with other regional multilateral forums, such as ASEAN and the ARF, CSCAP contributed little to the comprehension of the strategic and security implications of the economic crisis, or the development of any policies for alleviation of these. On the other hand, the calamity may have provided CSCAP with a great opportunity. With some official relationships impaired, second-track organisations can play very constructive roles in the rebuilding of cooperative activities.
CSCAP AND THE ARF

The most straightforward measure of CSCAP's achievements is its utility to the ARF - although it is not easy to measure, and it is not CSCAP's only objective. As Jusuf Wanandi argued in June 1994: 'The main challenge for CSCAP is whether its work will be relevant to the ARF'. And as the Planning Group of the CSCAP Steering Committee reported in June 1996, 'CSCAP's utility ... will largely hinge on the relationship between CSCAP and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)'.

As soon as the moves to set up the ARF began, CSCAP's pro-tem members were considering ways and means of forging a special working relationship with it. The members of the ASEAN ISIS group were important players at this juncture. The ASEAN ISIS was registered with ASEAN, the core of the incipient ARF process, and since 1991 had provided support to the ASEAN Ministerial Meetings, the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences (PMCs), and the ASEAN Senior Officials Meetings (SOMs) in terms of both the generation of ideas and the provision of research and studies on regional security issues. Jusuf Wanandi, who was foundation co-chair of CSCAP and who was one of the principal proponents of both the establishment of the ASEAN PMC SOMs and the notion of using the PMC as a regional security forum, was one of the most articulate advocates of close linkages with the ARF process.

CSCAP Memorandum No.1 on *The Security of the Asia-Pacific Region* was prepared by the CSCAP Pro-Tern Steering Committee and submitted to the first ARF SOMs in April 1994 for consideration prior to the first ARF meeting in Bangkok in July 1994. These officials' and Ministerial meetings in 1994 were of historical importance, but they were mainly taken up by protocol and organisational matters, with little discussion of substantive security issues. CSCAP's memorandum as well as other specially prepared material on security and confidence

---


2 See, for example, ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies, *A Time for Initiative: Proposals for the Consideration of the Fourth Asean Summit*, 4 June 1991.
building in the region, including an Australian paper on practical proposals for security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, were given only perfunctory consideration.

The ARF’s agenda was essentially set by the Concept Paper endorsed at the second ARF meeting in Brunei in August 1995, which articulated the three-stage programme (confidence building, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution) and the catalogue of CSBMs for possible implementation in the short and longer-term time frames. It stated that:

Given the delicate nature of many of the subjects being considered by the ARF, there is merit in moving the ARF process along two tracks. Track One activities will be carried out by ARF governments. Track Two activities will be carried out by strategic institutes and non-government organisations in the region, such as ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP. ... The synergy between the two tracks would contribute greatly to confidence-building measures in the region. Over time, the Track Two activities should result in the creation of a sense of community among participants of those activities.

The CSCAP Steering Committee discussed the Concept Paper at their third meeting in Kuala Lumpur in June 1995, and noted that 'all CSCAP work should be tailored' to providing 'input and expertise' to the ARF.

In July 1996, at their 29th annual meeting (in Jakarta), the ASEAN Foreign Ministers reviewed the development of the ARF over the previous couple of years, and their joint communique stated:

The Ministers expressed satisfaction with the progress made thus far through Track One as well as Track Two activities, in promoting confidence-building measures among its [i.e., the ARF's] participants.

---


The Foreign Ministers noted with satisfaction the closer cooperative relations between ASEAN and non-governmental bodies such as the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). They also noted that these bodies had continued to provide ASEAN with useful ideas and proposals with regard to political and security cooperation in the region.\(^5\)

CSCAP's desire to forge a close working relationship with the ARF affected most aspects of its development during its formative phase. By 1995, the outstanding problem constraining the ARF relationship was the inconformity of their memberships, and particularly China's absence from CSCAP. As the Steering Committee meeting in Honolulu in December 1995 was informed: 'China's membership in CSCAP is vital given the fact that the PRC has insisted that all second track activities recognised by the ARF should have the participation of all ARF members'.

Since 1997, most of the direct support to the ARF has come from the Working Group on CBMs and the Working Group on Maritime Cooperation. The former's project on Preventive Diplomacy has been the model in this respect. When the project was initiated in 1996-97, it was carefully designed to explore possible ways for the ARF to move into the subject. Officials from the ARF's ISG on Confidence-building were invited to the Working Group's meeting in May 1997.

In September 1997, CSCAP organised the third ARF Track Two Conference on Preventive Diplomacy, the purpose of which was 'to identify possible concrete measures which could be adopted to move the ARF process to Stage Two'. Its most important proposal was that 'the ARF SOM be asked to consider a preventive diplomacy role for the ARF Chair to provide good offices in certain circumstances'.

The exemplary initiative was the organisation of the tenth meeting of the group in Bangkok, on 28 February-2 March 1999, immediately prior to the meeting of the ARF ISG on Confidence-building on 3-5 March 1999, most of the members of which also attended the CSCAP meeting. This provided the officials with a superb opportunity to participate in a lively and informal discussion of a

dozen possible preventive diplomacy measures - including enhancing the 'good offices' role of the ARF Chair, establishing a register of experts or eminent persons, producing an annual Regional Security Outlook, etc. The most memorable achievement of this Working Group meeting, however, was the agreement which was reached on a working definition of preventive diplomacy, and an accompanying list of 'key principles', which were then forwarded to the ensuing ISG meeting.6 A report by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade noted in June 1999 that:

The CSCAP meeting on preventive diplomacy held immediately before the ISG was successful in developing a set of draft principles. This is a useful and helpful document, which will no doubt form the basis of the ARF's work in this area in the next year.7

In July 2000, at the ARF - 7 meeting in Bangkok, Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan (the ARF Chair) reported on 'the implementation of the enhanced role of the ARF Chair as an excellent example of progress in the interaction between the ARF and CSCAP'.8

The Working Group on Maritime Cooperation has also contributed substantially to the ARF process. About a third of the measures in the Concept Paper's Annexes A and B involve maritime matters, providing the group with a rich pasture to explore. Several of these subjects were addressed in the first meetings of the group, such as maritime safety, marine pollution, search and rescue, and joint marine scientific research. CSCAP Memorandum No. 4 on Guidelines for Maritime Cooperation, produced by the group in 1997, incorporated the proposal in Annex B for 'a multilateral agreement on the avoidance of naval incidents' in the region. The Working Group on Maritime Cooperation was given some tasks by the ARF Track Two Conference on Preventive Diplomacy in Singapore in September 1997. According to the Co-chairman's Report:

7 'ARF Makes Progress on Confidence Building Measures', Peace and Disarmament News (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra), June 1999, p.15.
8 Letter from Nitya Pibulsonggram, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, to CSCAP Co-chairs, 11 July 2000.
The meeting was briefed on the nature of Map Exercises. They were defined as simulation exercises designed to enhance multilateral understanding and co-operative measures to foster comprehensive security ...

The meeting discussed the terms 'Freedom of Navigation' and 'Navigational Right', and the possibility of an ARF declaration on the latter as a CBM. Given the diversity of views, it was recommended that the issues raised be discussed in the CSCAP Working Group on Maritime Security ...

The Co-chairs agreed to forward the following proposals to the current Co-chairs of CSCAP (Malaysia and Japan) with the suggestion that CSCAP explore further:

a. The utility and feasibility of Map (Simulation) Exercises.
b. The issues raised in the paper on Freedom of Navigation.

The Meeting endorsed the view that close co-operation be enhanced between CSCAP and ARF.9

The ARF ISG on CBMs has also found the work of the Working Group on Maritime Cooperation to be quite useful. For example, 'CSCAP's maritime cooperation guidelines' were commended by the ISG at its meeting in Bangkok in March 1999.10

The Bangkok ISG meeting also considered the relationship between the ARF process and second-track organisations such as CSCAP. A proposal for a formal link was not accepted, but the meeting agreed to the promotion of informal links.11

Although they remain informal, linkages are now being established which are quite structured, regularised and even institutionalised. Much of the initiative for this current process has come from the Thai Foreign Minister, Surin Pitsuwan, who was Chairman of the ARF from July 1999 to July 2000. In January 2000, the then Permanent Secretary of the Thai Foreign Ministry, Saroj

9 See the Co-chairman's Statement on the Singapore meeting, in Ball and Acharya (eds), The Next Stage, pp.289-91.
11 ibid.
Chavanaviraj, wrote to the Co-chairs of CSCAP to explore 'ways and means to enhance interaction between the ARF and CSCAP':

Following the Meeting of the ARF Inter-sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures (ISG on CBMs), which Thailand co-chaired with the United States in March 1999, there has been general agreement among ARF participants concerning the value of enhancing interaction between Track I and Track II. Specifically, the 6th ARF Ministerial Meeting in Singapore on 26 July 1999 endorsed the proposal on an enhanced role for the ARF Chairman in interaction between Track I and Track II ...

As CSCAP is one of the most active Track II fora with extensive activities related to regional security matters of interest to the ARF, we feel that it would be beneficial to forge greater interaction between the ARF and CSCAP, although any such link would have to remain informal and inclusive so as not to compromise the integrity and independence of CSCAP nor exclude the ARF from working with other Track II fora ...

Indeed, CSCAP's work has gained increased appreciation from the ARF. Several ARF countries ... dispatch officials to participate, in their private capacity, in the various CSCAP meetings. In particular, we value CSCAP's contribution regarding preventive diplomacy with the convening by the CSCAP Working Group on Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) of the CSCAP Workshop on Preventive Diplomacy on 28 February - 2 March 1999 in Bangkok ... CSCAP is planning another Workshop on Preventive Diplomacy in conjunction with the next ISG on CBMs in April 2000 in Singapore. These are certainly good examples of how to further promote interface between Track I and Track II.

To further promote the interaction ... it would be a useful first step for CSCAP to transmit to the ARF Chair through you as Co-Chairs of the CSCAP Steering Committee the results and recommendations of its various meetings.12

---
12 Letter from Saroj Chavanaviraj, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, to CSCAP Co-chairs, 28 January 2000.
In June 2000, following discussion of the matter at the 13th Steering Committee meeting in Kuala Lumpur, the Co-chairs informed the Permanent Secretary of the Thai Foreign Ministry, now Nitya Pibulsonggram, that:

The CSCAP Steering Committee wishes to seize this opportunity by:

(i) encouraging its Working Groups to submit the outcome of their deliberations on key issues affecting regional security to the ARF Chairs;

(ii) generating policy studies and recommendations on security issues relevant to areas of primary concern to the ARF as well as those which CSCAP believes the ARF should take into serious consideration;

(iii) developing policy memoranda on these issues for transmittal to the ARF Chair; and

(iv) exploring ways by which these policy inputs may be more effectively fed into the ARF processes.13

In subsequent correspondence and 'informal meetings', several possible measures have been discussed, including periodic briefings of designated ARF senior officials by CSCAP officers and attendance of ARF senior officials at CSCAP meetings; periodic briefings of CSCAP officers by ARF senior officials; attendance of CSCAP Working Group Co-chairs at relevant ARF inter-sessional meetings; the coordination of CSCAP Working Group and ARF ISG meetings; and the tasking of CSCAP Working Groups by the ARF to research particular cooperative measures, such as Preventive Diplomacy and measures to combat transnational crime.

A CSCAP Initiative: Reviewing the ARF Concept Paper

CSCAP should not wait to be invited by the ARF before it undertakes work which might be beneficial to the ARF process. A useful initiative would be to review the Concept Paper and its role in the ARF’s agenda, and to develop a draft new concept paper which might guide the ARF process over the next decade.

---

13 Letter from CSCAP Co-chairs to Nitya Pibulsonggram, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, 12 June 2000.
Since its endorsement by the ARF Foreign Ministers at the ARF-2 meeting in Brunei in August 1995, the Concept Paper has become a principal yardstick for measuring and assessing the progress of the ARF - and hence of the multilateral security process in the Asia-Pacific region more generally. It should be regenerated.

The Concept Paper was put together by the ASEAN Senior Officials in early 1995, and reflected the sorts of strategic concerns, types of confidence-building measures and levels of expectations that had emerged around 1993-94. Since it was formally adopted by the ARF in August 1995, the measures contained in its Annex A should by now have been 'explored and implemented'. It is a reasonable time for an interim stocktake. Such review should include the development of a new Annex for the 'immediate future' (i.e., up to about 2003), the addition of measures reflecting imminent concerns (e.g., the proliferation of long-range, land-attack cruise missiles), and the explication of the ARF's expectations in terms of key milestones. Many countries will resist more specific schedules. Many reckon that the process is more important than particular products. However, without an ability to measure progress, to take stock and to develop new initiatives, the process will succumb to inefficiency and irrelevance.
SOME OTHER ISSUES

Promoting the relationship with the ARF must be the focal point of concerns about the role of CSCAP in the evolving security architecture of the Asia-Pacific region. But CSCAP also has other interests and objectives, the tensions between which must be carefully monitored and managed. CSCAP's organisational basis - the Working Groups, the Steering Committee and its sub-committees, and the core principle of second-track activity itself - must also be regularly reviewed to ensure that it remains tuned to the fundamental objective of promoting regional security dialogue, confidence building and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Future of the Working Groups

The Working Groups are CSCAP's flagships. It is necessary to ensure that their activities are focused on issues which are important in security terms, which are not being adequately addressed elsewhere, and to which CSCAP's expertise is directly applicable. The subjects must be both relevant to the interests and concerns of the ARF but also attuned to developments in the regional security environment.

The Working Groups are supposed to be regularly reviewed. As the Steering Committee agreed at its first meeting on 5 June 1994:

Working Groups should not exist indefinitely, and the Steering Committee will decide when a particular Working Group should be terminated.

The development of the Working Groups has involved practical and mechanical matters, concerns about analytic objectivity and quality, and questions about policy relevance. My own view regarding some of these issues, presented at the Eighth Roundtable in Kuala Lumpur in June 1994, and which had widespread support among the founding members of CSCAP, was as follows:

There are innumerable regional security issues which warrant vigorous study and analysis, but the availability of resources (including funds, expertise and the Council's own management/co-ordination/secretarial capabilities) places a
limit of some six to eight Groups which could function effectively over the next few years. This means that the next couple of Groups will have to be constructed very carefully in term of their subjects/terms of reference, Member Committee sponsorship and memberships. Given that the ideal number of members of any particular Working Group would be about eight - anything less would make it difficult to achieve geographic balance and to incorporate the full range of necessary expertise; too many more would make management and co-ordination difficult - it will be impossible to satisfy all Member Committees. Membership of a particular Working Group would have to normally be limited to no more that one person per country, and even then some countries would have to forego membership of some Groups. It is likely that there will be some competition for berths.¹

However, successive Steering Committee meetings have been reluctant to either consider termination of any of the original groups or create new groups. The principal argument raised against the idea of increasing the number of groups is that some countries wish to be represented on all groups but lack the resources to participate in more than four or five.

The only review of the Working Groups to date was undertaken by the CSCAP Steering Committee's Planning Group, which reported in June 1996 that there were four subjects which were 'appropriate for either new Working Groups or incorporation into the extant Groups':

(i) the relationship between economics and security;
(ii) environment and security;
(iii) weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and non-proliferation; and
(iv) transnational crime.

In the case of transnational crime, a Study Group was set up in December 1996, which became the fifth Working Group in December 1997. Although there has been considerable interest in CSCAP in the relationship between economics and security, Steering Committee

meetings have rejected suggestions for a separate working group to be established on the subject. A 'substantive session on Economics and Security' was held at the meeting of the Steering Committee in Canberra in December 1996. Two meeting of the Working Group on Concepts of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security in 1998-99 were devoted to it, the papers from which were published in late 1999.\textsuperscript{2} The quality of the papers notwithstanding, a single volume could never authoritatively address the myriad of complex issues concerning economics and security. The subject of environmental security was discussed (along with food security and energy) at the fourth meeting of the Working Group on Concepts of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security, in Kuala Lumpur in September 1997, but the papers prepared for this meeting were never published. The proposal for a Working Group to deal with the subject of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and non-proliferation was never taken any further.

Another issue on which there are differing views concerns the memberships of the Working Groups. Two or three of them are composed of experts, typically being the best person in the specific field (such as the law of the sea, drug smuggling or preventive diplomacy mechanisms) in each of the member countries. Other groups remain primarily made up of members of the Steering Committee. The enormous talent residing in the Steering Committee notwithstanding, it is questionable whether its members are always the most expert in the relevant subjects. It can also be argued that Working Groups should probably not be chaired by members of the Steering Committee, who generally have other demanding executive functions anyway (including directing their respective strategic studies institutes). On the other hand, the Co-chairs of the Working Groups need to participate fully in Steering Committee meetings both to have the best possible understanding of the Steering Committee's purposes and to ensure that the Steering Committee is kept informed about activities being undertaken in the name of the Council.

Finally, the policy-oriented requirement of Working Group activities should not mean that all participants in these activities are politically acceptable to all the Member Committees. Over the longer term, CSCAP will be judged by the objectivity and quality of its product, which demands that membership of a Working Group be

\textsuperscript{2} Wilson-Roberts (ed.), \textit{An Asia-Pacific Security Crisis?}.\textsuperscript{,}
based on relevant experience and expertise and that analysis and study be as unfettered as possible by political considerations.

**Steering Committee Meetings**

The CSCAP Steering Committee meetings bring together some 50-60 security specialists, twice a year, to discuss a waning number of obligatory administrative matters. CSCAP's formative phase is now complete. Most membership issues have been resolved as the Council has expanded to embrace almost all countries in the region, although the question of Burma (Myanmar) would probably be contentious. It should be possible to address all administrative matters in less than half a day.

The Steering Committee has a responsibility to ensure that CSCAP realises its full potential in achieving its fundamental purposes and functions, including the development of policy recommendations. This can only be done effectively with a sound and agreed understanding of the regional security environment and the security outlook, according to which its policy-oriented activities can be attuned.

Steering Committee meetings should primarily be devoted to a detailed discussion of the reports and activities of the Working Groups, and to discussion of recent and prospective regional security developments with a specific intent of re-organising and refining the Working Group activities to ensure their continued policy relevance.

The most reliable and effective way for the Steering Committee to adequately stay abreast of regional security concerns is to produce a regular *Regional Security Outlook*. One possibility is for the Steering Committee to establish an *Outlook* group, the membership of which would be elected once a year, which would prepare an annotated list of security issues for discussion at the annual June meeting, and then a draft *Outlook* paper for consideration at the December meeting. It would then make final revisions, with publication scheduled for the next March in time for submission to the ensuing ARF SOMs meeting each April.

**Objective Tensions**

The various strategic studies institutes which comprise the foundation and working core of CSCAP have different backgrounds, interests, purposes and functions, and relations with government. The
CSCAP process itself inherently contains tensions with respect to motivations, functions and operating principles. These tensions are unavoidable, and require the institution of informal arrangements and practices to satisfactorily manage them. The good will and 'give and take' that have characterised CSCAP developments to date augur well for the future.

The most significant tension concerns the implicit diversity of functions. CSCAP is intended to play several roles, both activist and facilitative, and academic and policy-oriented - to encourage and itself undertake conceptual studies and analyses (for example, the concepts of cooperative and comprehensive security), and to explore new ideas, as well as to 'provide policy recommendations' and to support official mechanisms such as the ARF.

Not all conceptual study is conducive to policy recommendations, and much policy development has little conceptual interest. Compromises are needed in some areas, if only because of resource constraints (and, most particularly, the relatively small number of Working Groups that CSCAP can support).

On the other hand, neither theoretical work nor good scholarship is incompatible with policy relevance. Indeed, within the structured context provided by CSCAP, they could well have a symbiotic relationship. To begin with, the academic analysts and the policy-maker share many of the same concerns - the increasing fluidity and uncertainty of the emergent regional security environment, the arms acquisition programmes, the nature and import of territorial conflicts, the maritime issues, and the general objective of enhanced regional security - although they might have different explanations for and solutions to the matters of concern. The policy-related activity of CSCAP should identify the most troublesome concerns, as well as articulate the practical and operational possibilities and constraints that should inform conceptual study. On the other hand, the conceptual activity should broaden the discourse, expose fundamental linkages (such as between economic and environmental matters, political stability, and regional security), and explore possible approaches to the resolution of fundamental security issues rather than current and more particular or transient concerns. They will, of course, be judged by different criteria - excellence of analysis and policy utility - but not ones that defy optimisation.
Relations with Officialdom

The appropriate relationship between non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and government agencies is always a complex, delicate and difficult matter. As Lawrence Woods has noted, in order to contribute to the processes of regional dialogue and cooperation, NGOs 'need to attract and maintain state interest, state support and state involvement', but they must also preserve their independence and avoid state control if they wish to further advance these processes. On the one hand, the contribution which NGOs can make to the processes of regional cooperation depends on their ability to secure official appreciation of the value and practicability of their efforts. On the other hand, there is a real concern that connections with government might be inversely related to intellectual independence, and that too close an involvement with official processes and activities risks the loss or at least severe impairment of some of the most important attributes of NGO activity - objectivity, pan-regional perspectives, unfettered thinking, and more stimulating and imaginative research agendas.

The problem is somewhat exacerbated in the case of CSCAP because it is interested not just in developing and disseminating ideas and stimulating discussion, but also in directly supporting official arrangements and processes. Some disturbing possibilities were noted in 1994:

In some countries, governments have unabashedly linked the extent of their financial support and participation to their degree of control over their respective Committees. Although very short-sighted, their position is quite understandable - why provide official support (including funds) to a process which is of problematic 'reliability' in terms of bureaucratic or national interests? The corollary is also a major concern: it is likely that the strongest Member Committees will be those that toe their official government lines most closely. Unless great care is taken, the Member Committee structure might tend to entrench particular national political positions rather than provide a

mechanism for frank and open dialogue, including dissentient views, about regional issues.\(^4\)

---

There is a multitude of interesting and important subjects concerning security in the Asia-Pacific region which CSCAP has the talent (in terms of intellectual ability and policy experience) - but not the resources - to address. The subjects of the original four Working Groups - confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), concepts of cooperative and comprehensive security, maritime cooperation, and security dialogue in the North Pacific - remain very germane, although they would probably be accorded different priorities and incorporate different elements if their rankings and terms of reference were determined today.

This chapter discusses ten other subjects which require expert study and analysis, and which would be appropriate for CSCAP to manage. Many of them have already been considered by the CSCAP Steering Committee. For example, the need for a regular review of the regional security situation has been discussed at several Steering Committee meetings. Some of them involve long-standing issues which had worried regional security analysts well before the security dialogue process became institutionalised in the early 1990s - such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated missile systems, and the robust conventional weapons acquisition programmes which accelerated in the late 1980s and which caused fears of a regional arms race. Some involve subjects which have been addressed in some respects, such as aspects of the relationship between economics and security, or the environment and security, but which require both further, more focussed analytic work and the development of policy recommendations. In some cases, the urgency of more extensive research and analysis has increased because of more recent disturbing developments in the regional security environment. Some are intended to directly support the progressive activities of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), especially with respect to formative work on preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution in the region, and the need for more gainful involvement of defence officials in ARF and other cooperative security activities.
Furthermore, in order to both maintain intellectual vibrancy and inform policy-making which might shape the evolving regional security environment, CSCAP's work must not only react to disturbing security developments and respond to the ARF's directions; it must also be path-breaking and practicable. In addition to work on traditional areas of security, such as weapons acquisitions and defence operations, it is especially important to pursue an agenda which incorporates a comprehensive definition of security, including with respect to the referent object - the state or the individual? The topic of human security requires much more conceptual exploration and development; its findings could be extremely useful for policy-making.

This is not to suggest that CSCAP should have another ten Working Groups. Some of the subjects are quite finite in terms of scope and duration. Others, such as a regular review of the regional security outlook, are very specific but of indefinite duration. Most of them could be addressed by the current Working Groups, although some of the Groups would have to be refashioned to accommodate them and renamed to better reflect their new objectives and tasks. On the other hand, CSCAP should not resile from the creation of new Working Groups if that is the best means of dealing authoritatively with particular subjects.

(i) The Regional Security Outlook

The need for a regular review of the regional security situation was articulated at both official and second-track levels at the outset of the process of institutionalised multilateral security cooperation in the region in the early 1990s. Within the ARF process, the need has been most emphatically identified in the discussions about preventive diplomacy. At the first ARF-sponsored seminar on preventive diplomacy, in Paris in November 1996, one of the three measures recommended to the ARF 'for consideration' was production of a regular 'regional strategic outlook'.

In 1998-99, the ARF Intersessional Support Group (ISG) on confidence-building measures extensively discussed the idea of an Annual Security Outlook. It reported that:

---

1 Ball, 'Introduction' in Ball and Acharya (eds), The Next Stage, p.2.
Participants shared the view that an annual security outlook (ASO) would be a useful basis for discussions in the ARF SOM and ARF Ministerial Meetings. In this regard, during the discussions, there emerged three alternative options for implementation of this proposal, namely:

i. Production of the ASO by individual participants on a voluntary basis at the Track I level for compilation without any editing by the ARF Chairman;

ii. Production of the ASO by individual participants on a voluntary basis at the Track I level for compilation without any editing by the AFF Chairman who would undertake to produce an overview of the regional security outlook based on individual contributions;

iii. Continuation with the ASO by Track II institutions.2

The ARF SOM-6 meeting, in Singapore on 20-21 May 1999, agreed to adopt the first option,3 and this was endorsed by the ARF-6 meeting in Singapore on 26 July 1999.4 At the meeting of the ISG in Tokyo in November 1999, Thailand (as the current ARF Chair) undertook to compile the first Annual Security Outlook, consisting of papers submitted by individual countries by 31 March 2000.5

The compilation was presented to the seventh ARF meeting, in Bangkok on 27 July 2000, the Chairman's Statement from which states that:

The Ministers welcomed the first volume of the ARF Annual Security Outlook (ASO), produced by individual participants on a voluntary basis at the Track 1 level and compiled without editing by the ARF Chair. They shared the view that the ASO could help promote confidence, understanding and transparency as well as facilitating the exchange of views among

---

2 Co-Chairmen's Summary Report of the Meetings of the ARF Intersessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures Held in Honolulu, USA, 4-6 November 1998, and in Bangkok, Thailand, 3-5 March 1999, pp.17, 22.
4 Chairman's Statement: The Sixth Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Singapore, 26 July 1999, para. 17.
ARF participants. While noting the voluntary nature of the ASO, it was hoped that the production of ASOs should be an annual exercise and that the ARF participants try to further enhance the value of ASOs to the ARF process.6

At the second-track level, a consortium of institutions – the East-West Center in Honolulu, the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) in Tokyo, and the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN ISIS) – began a project in 1994 to produce an annual Asia Pacific Security Outlook which would consist of both commissioned country studies and an introductory regional security overview. The first edition was published in 1997, and successive editions were published in 1998, 1999 and 2000.7 According to the consorting institutions:

The Outlook does not seek to develop a consensus view of regional security trends and issues. Rather, it presents the distinctive national perspectives of most member countries of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), in a form that facilitates comparison and the identification of areas where perceptions or interests differ. The objective is both to increase mutual understanding within the community of security analysts in the region and to help elucidate the key issues that will affect future regional security and stability.8

Launching the Asia Pacific Security Outlook project involved many of the CSCAP member committees, and an informal relationship was soon emplaced with the Steering Committee. Beginning at the fifth meeting of the Steering Committee in Kuala Lumpur in June 1996, regular briefings on the findings of the Outlook have been given by the project organisers to the Steering Committee.

6 Chairman's Statement: The Seventh Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Bangkok, 27 July 2000, para. 8.
The need for CSCAP to have its own institutionalised Outlook process was discussed in the previous chapter, where it was argued that the Steering Committee should itself become immersed in discussion about current regional security developments in order to inform and direct the Working Group activities; indeed, it was suggested that the Steering Committee should establish a sub-committee to produce regular Outlooks. Briefings about other projects, including the annual Outlooks of the East-West Center and its partners, are not sufficient. Real understanding and consensus about issues can be reached only through direct involvement in a process of discussing strategic issues, clarifying misperceptions, and developing consensual positions on substantive matters.

However, to maintain three separate Outlook processes – the ARF’s ASO, the Asia Pacific Security Outlook, and a CSCAP project – would be profligate and would preclude benefits from coordinated or collaborative efforts.

(ii) Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Long-range Delivery Systems

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and long-range missile systems, which is now proceeding much more rapidly and extensively in Asia than in any other part of the world, poses very difficult challenges for security policy-makers and analysts in the region.

China is the largest nuclear power in Asia, with a stockpile of more than 400 nuclear weapons (including more than 250 strategic and some 150 tactical weapons), and an active development programme.\(^9\) Nuclear proliferation has become overt in South Asia, with India possessing perhaps a hundred weapons and Pakistan a couple of dozen.\(^10\) North Korea may have produced one or two nuclear weapons in the early 1990s.

Many countries in the Asia-Pacific region also maintain biological warfare (BW) capabilities. About half of the countries thought to maintain chemical weapons (CW) are also in this region

---

10 Desmond Ball, 'The Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Programmes' in Desmond Ball and Mohan Malik, The Nuclear Crisis in Asia: The Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Programmes, Working Paper No. 325 (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, August 1998), pp. 1-7.
The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific

(i.e., China, North Korea, South Korea, Vietnam, Laos, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Burma, India and Pakistan).  

There is also considerable proliferation of ballistic missile technology in the region, or at least in the Northeast and South Asia sub-regions. China has produced a full suite of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and short-range, tactical ballistic missiles.  

Two new road-mobile ICBMs are being developed - the Dong Feng -31 (DF-31), which is likely to enter service in 2001 or 2002, which 'will be targeted primarily against Russia and Asia'; and the DF-41, which is likely to be operational around 2005, and which 'will be targeted primarily against the United States'.  

China has also exported some short-range ballistic missiles elsewhere in the region (e.g., M-11 missiles, with a range of some 300 km, to Pakistan). North Korea has some 30 Scud B/C missiles in service, and is developing the longer-range Nodong-1 (500-1000 km) and Taepodong (1,500 km) ballistic missiles. South Korea has some 12 NHK (250 km) ballistic missiles. Taiwan is developing the 950 km-range Tien Ma ballistic missile. India has a comprehensive development programme which includes the short-range (150-250 km) Prithvi, the Agni IRBM, and several possible ICBM launchers. Pakistan has flight-tested the short-range Shaheen I and the medium-range Ghauri (1,300 km) ballistic missiles.

There are several issues of particular concern. The first relates to the stability of the India-Pakistan nuclear relationship, given that both parties lack assured second-strike capabilities - which require both invulnerable weapons and invulnerable but responsive command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) systems. Weapons can be made invulnerable by hiding them, or putting them in hardened underground silos, or in submarines at sea. This is very expensive -

12 For a comprehensive recent assessment of ballistic missile proliferation, see National Intelligence Council (NIC), Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015 (National Intelligence Council, Washington DC, September 1999).
13 ibid., p.11. See also Robert Sae-Liu, 'Beijing Parade to Show Off Latest Missile Hardware', Jane's Defence Weekly, 11 August 1999, p.11.
much more expensive than simply producing the warheads. A survival C\textsuperscript{3}I system is also very expensive.

From the point of view of crisis stability, the most dangerous situation involves nuclear-armed parties with vulnerable C\textsuperscript{3}I systems. The pressure for pre-emptive or 'decapitation' strikes can become compelling, as the destruction or incapacitation of the adversary's command and control system offers the possibility of victory, or at least minimal damage to one's homeland.

In both New Delhi and Islamabad, the constituent elements of the respective national command authorities (NCAs) and the military high commands are located in soft, above-ground premises - the worst possible situation. Retaliation, the essential ingredient of deterrence, can only be assured by delegating employment authority to field commanders, which provides little reassurance.

Second, the future of the India-China nuclear relationship warrants further consideration. In the overall dimensions of the Indian nuclear programme, China is a far more important factor than Pakistan. India's nuclear planners have calculated that only about 15 nuclear weapons would ever be required for use against Pakistan. Most of India's current and projected stockpile is aimed at China.

Similarly, India's ballistic missile programme is primarily directed against China. The \textit{Agni} IRBM, which is the leading edge of the Indian ballistic missile programme, has little relevance to Pakistan. India has already developed the \textit{Prithvi}, which has sufficient range to cover most of Pakistan, and the Indian air force has a variety of fighter and ground attack aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons and penetrating Pakistani air defences (including \textit{Jaguars}, MiG-27s and MiG-29s).

Moreover, Indian satellite reconnaissance systems and other technical intelligence systems have been developed and are operated much more with China than with Pakistan in mind.

A nuclear arms race between India and China in the next decade is a real possibility. India may soon have more nuclear weapons than the United Kingdom, and China will soon have more than France. It is likely that the Indian arsenal will more than double over the next decade, and that China will produce a couple of hundred further weapons. In addition to fuelling each other's programmes, expansions of this scale could also cause other countries in Northeast Asia to exercise their own nuclear options.
Third, the proliferation of ballistic missile technology has generated pressures for the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) capabilities, which could be quite destabilising. Washington is now seriously considering the development of both a national ABM system for the defence of the United States itself and theatre defences for the protection of US forces abroad against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. The North Korean Taepodong programme has increased Japanese interest in ballistic missile defence, but Japan, as well as South Korea and Taiwan, were already concerned about the growing Chinese ballistic missile capabilities. It is time for another debate about ballistic missile defences, but the arguments (both positive and negative) will be very different from those which obtained in the mutual nuclear deterrence situation of the Cold War.

(iii) Arms Control

Over the next decade or so, there is very little prospect of countries in East Asia engaging in arms control or even in multilateral security dialogues which will constrain their force development plans and programmes. Most countries in the region are committed to enhance self-reliance, and will resume robust modernisation programmes as soon as their economic circumstances permit.

It is nevertheless useful to consider the various sorts of arms control measures which might form an arms control agenda for the next decade. This should include measures which arms control analysts had previously considered worthwhile, but which failed to attract sufficient endorsement for implementation to proceed, such as the proposal for a Regional Arms Register; measures for addressing the more disquieting aspects of some of the arms acquisitions in the region, such as the potential for arms race and crisis instabilities discussed in chapter 3; and measures concerning new technologies and modes of conflict, such as cruise missiles and Information Warfare (IW).

The danger of cruise missile proliferation is very serious in this region. They are technically easier to produce and cheaper to acquire than ballistic missiles. Enabling technologies such as anti-ship cruise missiles (e.g., Exocets and Harpoons), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), GPS satellite navigation systems and small turbojet engines are now
widely available. However, the development and deployment of cruise missiles are also more difficult to monitor.\textsuperscript{14}

Several countries in East Asia have either begun to indigenously design and develop long-range, land-attack cruise missiles (e.g., China), or to seriously consider the acquisition of such missiles (e.g., Australia). China's \textit{Hong Niao} family of cruise missiles is armed with both nuclear and conventional warheads, with ranges up to 1,500-2,000 km (in the case of the HN-2, which entered service in 1996) and 4,000 km (in the case of the HN-2000, a supersonic version which is currently in development).\textsuperscript{15} The US Navy, of course, maintains about 4,000 \textit{Tomahawk} land-attack cruise missiles, which it has used against six countries since 1991. In August 2000, the US Air Force confirmed that it had moved 'an unspecified number' of conventional air-launched cruise missiles to Guam, which USAF officials said 'will allow the USA to respond more quickly to crises, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region'.\textsuperscript{16}

Efforts should now be organised to explore measures for preventing the proliferation of long-range, land-attack cruise missiles. In Southeast Asia, there should be an agreement that no country will produce or acquire cruise missiles with ranges greater than 150-200 km.

Defence planning and operations in the Information Age have increasingly involved the development of strategies and capabilities for Information Warfare (IW). This has included electromagnetic pulse (EMP) generators for disruption of electronic and computer infrastructure; graphite strips which cause failures in electrical distribution systems; using the Internet to ferment civil unrest; and using the Internet to damage or render inoperable critical elements of vital national infrastructure, such as air traffic control systems, financial markets and electronic communications networks.

IW should be addressed from an arms control perspective. Civilians are generally affected more than military forces (some of


which are acquiring protective capabilities). Unfettered popular communications are important for peace-making and peace-keeping. The development and proliferation of techniques and capabilities for network-based attacks on electronic infrastructure will asymmetrically threaten societies with greater dependence on information technology; IW is an attractive strategy for terrorists. It is worthwhile considering the parameters of some Information Operations Agreement designed to constrain attacks on information systems.17

(iv) Refocussed Defence Cooperation

The Asian economic crisis severely damaged regional defence cooperation. Joint training and exercise activities suffered disproportionately from the cuts in defence expenditures.

As defence programmes have been reconstituted in the aftermath of the crisis, training and exercise activities have been recovering. However, there has been a virtually complete absence of informed dialogue concerning the identification of the most appropriate and productive sorts of cooperative activities to be accorded priority in the reconstruction process.

More consideration should be given to a consolidation of joint activities and a reorientation away from relatively expensive exercises to more carefully tailored training programmes.

At the same time, consideration should also be given to more effective participation of defence personnel (both civilian and uniformed) at ARF meetings. The desirability of increasing defence participation was recognised by the ARF at the outset, and by 1998 concrete steps were being taken. For example, most of the delegations at the meetings of the ISG on Confidence-building in Honolulu in November 1998 and in Bangkok in March 1999 included defence officials. They 'exchanged views and information on their respective defense policies, including defense conversion, and reviewed their political-military and defense dialogues, high-level defense contacts, joint training and personnel exchanges with fellow ARF participants'.18

---

It was also agreed that 'participation in [the] Leaders Retreat at [the] ARF SOMs should continue to include [the] SOM leader plus one in order to accommodate participation by defense officials'. Meetings of the ISG now include a Defense Officials' Lunch for informal discussions 'on issues of common interest'. These gatherings can be used to explore and promote practical cooperative measures. One possibility is to conduct a half-day Map Exercise involving an accident by or hijacking of a vessel in some part of the region (such as the Malacca Straits) to demonstrate the cooperative aspects of the search and rescue practices involved.

(v) Security in the South Pacific

CSCAP's geographic purview includes the South Pacific, but the security challenges confronting the small island states in this sub-region have mostly been ignored by the Council. This is doubly unfortunate: not only does this sub-region have numerous security problems, which in some fashion have already affected and will inevitably continue to affect many other places in the Asia-Pacific region, but also the small island states of the South Pacific have a different definition of security itself, exposure to which would be beneficial to CSCAP.

Security in the South Pacific primarily involves its economic, environmental and criminal dimensions, rather than more traditional defence and military matters. The most important security issues involve the following categories:

- unresolved historic inter-ethnic and post-colonial disputes, especially over issues of land, fishing and other resource rights;
- issues of governance, especially as a result of political instability, serious crime and public order problems, endemic corruption and nepotism, and the decay of infrastructure;

19 ibid., p.20.
environmental degradation as a result of global warming, deforestation and pollution;
health issues, including HIV/AIDS;
economic viability and aid-dependency;
susceptibility to foreign criminal influences, including the exploitation of their offshore banking facilities for money laundering or capital flight, narcotics trafficking (both as recipient and transit countries), frauds (including advanced fee frauds, pyramid schemes, and the like);
uncertainty over the capacity and reliability of local military and police forces.

Many of the South Pacific countries are constantly beset with social and political instability and crises, and are vulnerable to economic collapse, breakdowns of law and order, criminal exploitation and, in some cases, tremendous unrest and even coups. Unfortunately, however, there is little sense of regional cohesion or identity, and the existing South Pacific institutions are not really equipped to deal with serious security threats or to contribute significantly to confidence building, preventive diplomacy or conflict resolution. The South Pacific Forum established a Forum Regional Security Committee (FRSC) in the 1980s, but it meets only once a year, and the participants are mainly police commissioners and customs officials, usually with little experience in regional security matters. The Forum Foreign Affairs Ministers held their first meeting in Samoa in August 2000; this is intended to be an annual event, but no supporting infrastructure has been developed at either the official or non-official levels. There are no second-track organisations concerned with security in the South Pacific.

CSCAP should have some capacity for monitoring security developments in the South Pacific. It might not be necessary to devote a Working Group to the subject, but developments in this sub-region should be included in the Regional Security Outlook, and the Steering Committee's discussions about substantive regional security issues should encompass this sub-region. (Some possible subjects for a research project are listed in Table 6.1.) CSCAP should also work with

---
22 ibid., pp.18-19.
the Forum Secretariat and other interested parties to promote multilateral security dialogue and cooperation in the South Pacific, and to construct linkages with appropriate multilateral organisations in the sub-region. There is already considerable interest in CSCAP in the South Pacific. For example, H.E. Mr Noel Levi, Secretary General of the Forum Secretariat, wrote in October 2000 that: 'CSCAP is an interesting organisation which I intend to look closely at in the context of developing some kind of linkage at [an] organisational level'. The Steering Committee might consider the admission of the Forum Secretariat to Associate Membership of the Council, in which case it 'may participate in CSCAP Working Group activities' and 'may participate in the CSCAP General Meeting as observers' (Article IV, 2). This would allow the Forum and the Forum Regional Security Committee to tap into the experience gained by CSCAP in institution-building, and it would provide a means by which the Steering Committee and the Working Groups could be regularly apprised of security developments in an important sector of CSCAP's own region.

23 Email message from H.E. Mr Noel Levi, Secretary General, Forum Secretariat, Suva, Fiji, to Executive Director, AUS-CSCAP, Canberra, 3 October 2000. See also Crocombe, Enhancing Pacific Security, p.18.
Table 6.1: Security in the South Pacific

Subjects for research
• security perceptions and security concepts in the South Pacific;
• means of assistance to existing multilateral institutions, such as the Forum, in the development of confidence-building, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution measures relevant to the South Pacific;
• concepts of nationalism, sovereignty and regionalism;
• the resolution of historic inter-ethnic and inter-regional disputes;
• means for dealing with external criminal threats, including drug-trafficking, paedophile activities, money laundering and other crimes involving financial activities;
• dealing with issues of economic viability and aid dependence;
• dealing with environmental degradation as a result of global warming, deforestation, pollution, and non-sustainable exploitation of natural resources;
• the capabilities, deficiencies and reliability of local military and police forces.

(vi) Economics and Security

The relationship between economics and security is pervasive, profound and extremely complex. Economic factors have the determinate role in shaping the structure of security in the Asia-Pacific region over the longer term (i.e., the structural dimension of the relationship); the prevailing patterns of economic development significantly affect the systemic tendencies toward conflict or peace (the behavioural or functionalist dimension); the mechanisms and processes established to promote regional economic cooperation can be utilised for the discussion, negotiation and resolution of some common security issues (the utilitarian dimension); and lessons learned in the establishment of the cooperative economic institutions could be distilled to inform the multilateral security process.24

24 See Desmond Ball, 'The Benefits of APEC for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region' in Susan L. Shirk and Christopher P. Twomey (eds), Power and
Consideration might be given to the organisation of a joint project on economics and security by CSCAP and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC). (Some issues which could be addressed are listed in Table 6.2.)

Table 6.2: Economics and Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjects for research</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• the relationship between economic growth and political stability;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• the implications of economic inter-dependence for regional security;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• issues such as trade diversion, dumping, subsidies, tariffs and other forms of protection, and violations of international trade agreements which could lead to disputation and conflict;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• the relationship between economic growth and defence expenditure;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• the relationship between defence expenditure and economic growth and technological development;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• the dependence of Asia-Pacific economies on overseas trade and the vulnerability of sea lines of communication (SLOCs);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• the possibilities for joint development zones in areas of disputation and potential conflict (e.g., the South China Sea);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• the use of overseas development assistance (ODA) and foreign investment for promoting regional stability;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• environmental issues which could become causes of disputation and conflict;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• the problems of piracy, smuggling and other illegal activities in Asian waters.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(vii) Environment and Security

In the early 1990s, when CSCAP was conceived, there was a vigorous but largely inconclusive debate about the environment and security. It encompassed the implications of environmental degradation and resource scarcity for conflict causation, the redefinition of the concept of security itself to include protection against environmental hazards, the deliberate and incidental wreaking of environmental havoc in war, and the use of defence forces in conservation, reforestation and environmental repair campaigns. The question of CSCAP undertaking work on the subject has been discussed on several occasions. For example, the Steering Committee's Planning Group identified the environment and security in 1996 as one of four subjects which were 'appropriate for either new Working Groups or incorporation into the extant Groups'. As noted earlier, the fourth meeting of the Working Group on Concepts of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security, in Kuala Lumpur in September 1997, was devoted to environmental security, food security and energy, but the papers prepared for the meeting were not published.

The increasing urgency of environmental problems demands that CSCAP procrastinate no longer. There are important conceptual, empirical and policy-oriented issues which must be addressed, a combination which CSCAP is well-placed to manage. At the conceptual level, there are hotly contested issues concerning the meaning of the term 'environmental security', the core values being threatened, and the 'common security' implications, which must be appreciated before effective and acceptable policy approaches can be

---

developed. Some new conceptual arguments, such as that concerning 'latent regional environmental security complexes', are directly relevant to the construction of cooperative policies for the common environmental defence.26

As with economics, environmental issues affect all dimensions of security. Disputes over polluted water, diminishing fish stocks, and other food and energy issues can lead to war. More commonly, they lead to diplomatic ruptures, reciprocally hostile public opinions, and a general political relationship not conducive to the institutionalisation of confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy. Environmental degradation and unsustainable resource exploitation can also lead to economic collapse and loss of the beneficial security aspects of economic inter-dependence.

The connections between environmental degradation, food and resource scarcity, economic development and security, would be greatly illuminated by case studies. Deforestation in eastern Malaysia and Kalimantan began producing adverse effects elsewhere in Southeast Asia in the late 1980s.27 The haze from forest fires in Sumatra and Kalimantan in 1997-98 caused widespread health problems and strained relations between Indonesia and some of its ASEAN neighbours.28 Deforestation in the Philippines and Thailand as well as Malaysia (Sarawak) and Indonesia has contributed to sporadic violence within local communities.29 Acid rain coming from China has become a serious concern in Japan and Korea, with increasingly strident demands for governmental measures to induce Chinese cooperation in solving the problem.30 It is possible that environmental damage could become so great (with the decline in cultivable land and potable water, and extensive noxious air pollution) as to constrain

26 Guen Lee, 'Environmental Security in East Asia: Regional Security Complexes in East Asia', (Paper prepared for a conference on Transnational Security Threats in Asia, organised by the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, 8-10 August 2000).


30 Guen Lee, 'Environmental Security in East Asia: Regional Environmental Security Complexes in East Asia', pp.4-6.
future Chinese economic growth, let alone degrade the quality of life.\textsuperscript{31} The construction of massive dams on the upper Mekong River and its tributaries, as well as other large-scale projects proposed for various places along the river, could cause conflict among the riparian states; they are certain to dramatically affect the millions of people in the basin area – farmers, fishermen and traders – who depend upon the Mekong for their livelihood.\textsuperscript{32} Global warming threatens the physical survival of several South Pacific island states. The involvement of transnational criminal organisations in environmental damage (such as in illegal production and sale of chlorofluorocarbons, and in dumping of toxic wastes) would be interesting to explore.

Some aspects of the environment and security relate directly to the interest which CSCAP and the ARF have in preventive diplomacy. As Gareth Evans has argued, the most promising approaches to preventive diplomacy are those which emphasise early rather than late prevention, so that time can be used to explore a variety of preventive measures before positions become hardened and conflict becomes virtually inevitable.\textsuperscript{33} Insofar as environmental issues are reckoned to be an increasing cause of inter-state as well as intra-state conflict, environmental monitoring provides a means of early warning of possible war and/or civil violence. Further, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are very useful in providing such early warning. NGOs of various sorts are frequently present in areas of high tension and environmental disaster, and they frequently detect the first indications of impending violent conflict. Some of the NGOs also perform a preventive function through their grass-roots infrastructure projects, which serve to alleviate conditions which might otherwise lead to the outbreak of violence.

There is no better place than CSCAP to bring together security specialists and environmentalists, including NGOs as well as official agencies, to organise a long-term project on the environment and


\textsuperscript{33} Gareth Evans, 'Preventive Diplomacy: Concepts and Practice' in Ball and Acharya (eds), \textit{The Next Stage}, chapter 3.
security. The distinctive feature of such a project would have to be the identification of meaningful and practicable policy measures.

Table 6.3: The Environment and Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjects for research</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• conceptual aspects of the relationship between the environment and security;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• the environment and food security;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• the environment and energy security;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• environmental degradation and conflict;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• water and conflict;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• deforestation and community conflict;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• the use of defence forces in environmental security missions (e.g., monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>environmental change and assisting in protecting or rejuvenating the environment);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• peace-support operations for environmentally-failed states;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• environmental warfare;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• transnational crime and environmental damage;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• marine pollution and maritime cooperation;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• multilateral approaches to environmental issues.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(viii) Preventive Diplomacy

CSCAP is already doing very substantial work on the concept of preventive diplomacy, one of the two priority subjects of study by the Working Group on CSBMs since 1996, but even more is required. The lack of any effective mechanisms for the resolution or prevention of conflict is one of the most worrisome features of the contemporary regional security environment, in which conflict issues (both inter-state and intra-state) are rife. The construction of such mechanisms, whether by the development of a system of a 'concert of powers', or the institutionalisation of cooperative security structures and processes, is one of the most imperative regional security requirements. Moreover, having agreed to preventive diplomacy being the second stage of its agenda, the ARF has effectively made progress with preventive diplomacy a measure of its own vitality and credibility. However, there was no progress from 1995 through 1998,
and although there has been some movement in the last couple of years it is still very limited. Any contribution which CSCAP might make to the development of preventive diplomacy mechanisms and their political acceptance throughout the region would be of great service to the ARF process.

There are several ways in which CSCAP could directly assist the ARF with respect to preventive diplomacy over the next few years. The ARF is committed to intensified discussions on 'the concept and principles' of preventive diplomacy, pursuant to a paper prepared by Singapore's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in July 2000.34 CSCAP could undertake activities designed to appreciably inform this discussion, such as preparing and distributing papers which explore the conceptual side of the subject, organising workshops for ISG participants, and promoting broader public discussion to engage non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which should be much more involved in this process.35 It should produce a CSCAP Memorandum to complement the Singapore paper. There is further work to be done on the particular measures to which the ARF has already agreed, including proposals to enhance the role of the ARF Chair, and to compile a register of regional experts/eminent persons (on which the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been working on behalf of the ARF). The involvement of CSCAP in the production of a Regional Security Outlook also warrants further consideration. Over the longer term, there is great scope for CSCAP to explore new ideas about preventive diplomacy and to develop new measures tailored to suit the Asia-Pacific security environment. For example, a meeting might be organised to address the idea of preventive multilateral cooperation with respect to transnational issues such as drug trafficking, disposal of nuclear waste, major movements of population, environmental matters, deadly epidemics, etc. The salience and importance of non-military security issues are continuing to increase in this region; and the new security issues are generally less sensitive politically than traditional military security issues, and hence it should prove easier to

34 Chairman's Statement: Seventh Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Bangkok, 27 July 2000, para.35.
reach consensus on cooperative measures designed to mitigate the harmful effects.\textsuperscript{36}

\textbf{(ix) Conflict Resolution}

Stage III of the ARF agenda concerns conflict resolution, but it is described in the \textit{Concept Paper} as 'an eventual goal that ARF participants should pursue', and has received no attention to date. This is probably wise, for any official consideration is likely to generate suspicion and apprehension by some members, and impact negatively on the current Preventive Diplomacy endeavour.

On the other hand, thinking about conflict resolution by second-track organisations should not be inhibited. This thinking should extend to consideration of possible institutional mechanisms for conflict resolution.

An essential precursory project would involve a study of the most likely characteristics of possible conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region - in terms of their scale, intensity, naval and air dimensions, level of technology, and sorts of casualties. There are some three dozen issues of potential conflict in East Asia involving competing sovereignty claims, challenges to government legitimacy and territorial disputes.\textsuperscript{37} The spectrum of the conflict issues is much more extensive and the character of possible conflict much more variegated than in any other region. About two-thirds of the issues involve interstate disputes. Most of these are about maritime boundaries and offshore territorial claims, such as the competing claims to the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. But many are about land borders, mostly involving disputes over colonial impositions but some having much longer roots. Analysis of these conflict issues, including the types of forces likely to be employed, should inform thinking about conflict resolution.

\textsuperscript{36} See Alan Dupont, 'Preventive Diplomacy and Transnational Security Issues' in Ball and Acharya (eds), \textit{The Next Stage}, chapter 7.

(x) Human Security

Since the end of the Cold War, there has not only been a broadening of the concept of security to encompass the 'new agenda' issues such as economic and environmental security; there has also been a questioning of the referent object of security, and, in particular, a reassertion of primacy of the individual as compared to the state (wherever these are inconsonant).38 'Human security', which focusses on the individual as the referent object, has been described by Ramesh Thakur as follows:

Negatively, it refers to freedom from: from want, hunger, attack, torture, imprisonment without a free and fair trial, discrimination on spurious grounds, and so on. Positively, it means freedom to: the capacity and opportunity that allows each human being to enjoy life to the fullest without imposing constraints upon others engaged in the same pursuit. Putting the two together, human security refers to the quality of life of the people of a society or polity. Anything which degrades their quality of life - demographic pressures, diminished access to or stock of resources, and so on - is a security threat. Conversely, anything which can upgrade their quality of life - economic growth, improved access to resources, social and political empowerment, and so on - is an enhancement of human security.39

In April 2000, in his Millennium Report to the General Assembly of the United Nations, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan argued that globalisation was redefining state sovereignty and that human security - allowing everyone 'to make their lives better' - should be the central endeavour. He said:

The benefits of globalisation are obvious: faster growth, higher living standards, new opportunities. Yet a backlash has begun,


because these benefits are so unequally distributed, and because the global market is not yet underpinned by rules based on shared social objectives ... In this new world, groups and individuals more and more often interact directly across frontiers, without involving the State. This has its dangers. Crime, narcotics, terrorism, pollution, disease, weapons, refugees and migrants: all move back and forth faster and in greater numbers than in the past.

No shift in the way we think can be more critical than this: we must put people at the centre of everything we do. No calling is more noble, and no responsibility greater, than that of enabling men, women and children, in cities and villages around the world, to make their lives better. Only when that begins to happen will we know that globalisation is indeed becoming inclusive, allowing everyone to share its opportunities.40

The new thinking must be supported by new conceptual frameworks, constructed to suit particular regional environments. In the Asia-Pacific region there are claims to distinctive Asian values, more acceptance of the primacy of societal over individual rights, and stronger commitments to essentially unqualified concepts of state sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. In many countries in East Asia, standards of living (as measured inadequately by Gross Domestic Product per capita) have doubled or tripled over the last few decades. But in many places there are gross violations of human rights, state-sponsored killings, torture, extreme cruelty, injustice, exploitation of fellow human beings (including women and children), grinding poverty, and little hope for the future. CSCAP cannot truly claim to be promoting real security in the region unless and until the human dimension becomes a central feature of its activities.

---

CSCAP'S PROSPECTS

CSCAP is a very exciting endeavour. It is one of the most important attempts to construct a pan-regional security dialogue and consultation institution in the Asia-Pacific region since such efforts were obstructed by the ideological divide of the Cold War. Its establishment augured 'a new era in confidence-building', based on the novel concept of a 'second track' process. It is a case study in institution-building, designed to promote security in an international system in which national interests and power politics remain dominant, and constructed in a fashion which accords with the prevailing realities. With member committees in 20 countries, and some 750 individual members, including most of the leading international scholars of Asia-Pacific security affairs and officials with great practical experience, it has enormous potential to shape the regional security architecture.

But CSCAP also faces serious problems. There are tensions within the organisation with respect to motivations, objectives and operating principles. The issue of the conceptual/policy balance remains undetermined. When the Steering Committee's Planning Group considered the issue in 1996, it found that: 'It has become clear that CSCAP's utility is greatest in the area of "policy relevant" research'. However, it provided no guidance to the Steering Committee about whether the balance within CSCAP's extant activities was correct or whether adjustments should be made. The Planning Group noted that the key measure of CSCAP's effectiveness was its utility to the ARF, but notwithstanding significant progress in the relationship between CSCAP and the ARF over the past couple of years, it is still not sufficiently close for CSCAP's potential to be realised. In many Foreign Ministries, CSCAP's capacities are unappreciated. More generally, CSCAP lacks the public profile which its capabilities and activities warrant.

CSCAP's prospects depend on many factors, some of which are beyond its own ability to affect (including some of the most important features of the evolving regional security environment). But there are many things which CSCAP can do. It can begin by scrutinising its own domestic affairs, resolving debilitating tensions and reforming its own organisation and working practices. It can develop procedures and agendas intended to promote vigorous and intellectually stimulating discourse. It can improve the quality of its research and analyses. It can make greater effort to extend its deliberations to ensure that the policy implications are clear and policy recommendations are formulated. It can consider measures to improve its public profile. And it can enhance its ability to anticipate regional security developments, both to demonstrate its extraordinary capacities and, more substantively, to influence the direction and character of some of the more disturbing security developments.

CSCAP's domestic affairs involve the whole organisation of member committees, Steering Committee meetings, and Working Group structures and activities which has been established over the past seven or eight years. It undoubtedly contains inefficiencies, outmoded working practices, and unnecessary impediments to its own progress. It should be possible to be more efficient and more productive while not discomforting those who prefer to move slowly.

With regard to the member committees, CSCAP's foundation stones, the Charter requires (Article V, 1) that these 'shall be broad-based' and include non-governmental institutions and/or individuals. The second-track process is supposed to provide a more detached and independent means of research and discussion, but in some cases it is difficult to distinguish between official governmental and second-track positions. Being too beholden to national interests has undoubtedly impeded work in both the confidence-building and preventive diplomacy fields - e.g., the resistance to some proposed transparency measures, such as a register of regional arms acquisitions.

With regard to the Steering Committee, now that CSCAP's formative phase is complete, the meetings can be concerned less with administrative and organisational matters, and more with substantive regional security issues. In particular, the Steering Committee meetings should be primarily devoted to, first, discussion of the
reports and activities of the Working Groups, and, second, discussion of recent and prospective regional security developments, i.e., the Regional Security Outlook.

The Steering Committee should initiate a thorough review of its Working Groups. Four of the groups were established, and their objectives and terms of reference defined, back in 1994, and the fifth (on transnational crime) in 1996. Some of the groups have been more active and more productive than others, at least according to quantitative measures such as the numbers of meetings held and publications produced. Some have developed more effective ways of supporting the ARF process than others. The Steering Committee agreed at its first meeting in Kuala Lumpur in June 1994 that:

Working Groups should not exist indefinitely, and the Steering Committee will decide when a particular Working Group should be terminated.

New issues have arisen as the regional security environment has evolved over the past six years, while others have acquired greater urgency. Ten subjects which CSCAP might hopefully accommodate in some fashion were outlined in the previous chapter. Some of these might require the creation of a new dedicated Working Group, but mostly they could be dealt with by the current but reformed groups. The CSCAP Steering Committee might establish a Working Group Review Committee (which should include at least one of the co-chairs of each of the five current groups) to report to the 15th Steering Committee meeting in Kuala Lumpur in June 2001 on possible new Working Group arrangements, with proposed new objectives and terms of reference for all groups.

CSCAP itself should be subject to regular review. Otherwise, it risks ossification. Its activities will be reviewed by others anyway, at least implicitly, as when funds are being sought or studies of regional institution-building are undertaken. But CSCAP needs to institutionalise its own review process. This is an appropriate function for the General Meetings. The second CSCAP General Meeting, in Seoul on 4 December 1999, addressed the role of CSCAP in Asia-Pacific security in a new millennium. The meeting reviewed CSCAP's achievements since 1993-94, with various participants arguing that CSCAP had 'played a very significant part in bringing about the
establishment of the ARF', that the ASEAN countries 'should remain the driving force' in both the ARF and CSCAP, but that the organisation faced major problems which needed to be resolved if it was to progress. Some participants noted that 'policy results are required, but the consensus principle makes this a slow process', that the refusal to grant Taiwan associate membership had previously compromised the principle of inclusivity, that discussion of the South China Sea should be permitted (as in the ARF), and that some relationship with PECC and/or APEC might be useful. These are all important points, which should have been better received by the Steering Committee. Reviews of CSCAP's activities should be a principal function of the General Meetings, which should be held every three years. They should become an instrument of rejuvenation.

CSCAP's prospects depend in large part on its ability to produce policy-relevant reports and, in particular, to support the ARF process. There has been substantial progress in this connection, even though the ARF has been resistant to formal linkages. Most of the Working Groups have now produced papers or help meetings designed to address matters of direct interest to the ARF -- such as the CSCAP Memorandum No.2 on Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures produced by the Working Group on CSBMs in June 1995, Memorandum No.3 on The Concepts of Comprehensive Security and Cooperative Security produced by the Working Group on Concepts of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security in December 1995, and Memorandum No.4 on Guidelines for Regional Maritime Corporation produced by the Working Group on Maritime Cooperation in December 1997, each of which the ARF found useful. But the most beneficial work has been that of the Working Group on CSBMs on preventive diplomacy, undertaken in support of the ARF Intersessional Support Group (ISG) on Confidence-building. This work has been widely praised within the ARF process, and has helped to promote further and more structured linkages between CSCAP and the ARF.

It is necessary to stress that support for the ARF process does not mean simply working to address the ARF's current (and now five years old) agenda. As the Steering Committee's Planning Group reported in June 1996: 'It is important that CSCAP activities move out in front of the topics summarised in the Concept Paper'. Indeed, CSCAP
should be at the forefront of the discourse about regional security cooperation more generally. It should not wait to be invited by the ARF, but should initiate projects which it believes the ARF will appreciate. A useful initiative would be to develop a new draft concept paper for the ARF which would guide its activities over the next decade. In order to be at the forefront, CSCAP will have to accord more attention to the policy implications of so-called non-traditional or 'new security agenda' subjects - such as economics and security, the environment and security, and the concept of human security.

Over the long term, CSCAP's prospects will be determined by the dynamics of regional security developments. No matter how successfully CSCAP functions in organisational and intellectual terms, it will count for little if these developments engender an environment characterised by tension, conflict, arms races and a propensity to use force to resolve disputes. In order to influence and shape these developments to the extent that this is possible for any multilateral security organisation, CSCAP must develop and institutionalise some capacity to anticipate regional security developments. CSCAP must also work together with the ARF and other institutions concerned with the enhancement of regional security to construct a regional security architecture in which cooperative modalities prevail over power politics.
Annex 1

The Kuala Lumpur Statement

June 8, 1993

Establishment of the Council for Security Co-operation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)

The ending of the Cold War and the fundamental transformation ensuing from the elimination of superpower rivalry have provoked a far-reaching re-evaluation of security arrangements in the Asia Pacific region.

Four institutions in the region, namely the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN ISIS), the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), Pacific Forum/CSIS (Honolulu), and the Seoul Forum for International Affairs, together with representatives of other research institutes from the region, have undertaken an in-depth examination of the security issues and challenges facing Asia Pacific today and in the future.

A series of conferences on Security Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific (SCAP) have been held: first in Honolulu (Oct 29-30, 1991), second in Bali (Apr 17-19, 1992), and third in Seoul (Nov 1-3, 1992). Participants from seventeen countries, including scholars as well as officials acting in their private capacities, have taken part in these meetings.

The discussions at these meetings have clearly shown the need for more structured processes for regional confidence building and security co-operation. The meetings welcomed the initiatives at the official level to develop a formal or informal inter-governmental regional forum for dialogue on political-security issues.

In particular, the meetings noted the concrete steps that have been taken by the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) at which the six ASEAN foreign ministers (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) meet annually with foreign
ministers of other Asia Pacific countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand and the United States) and a representative of the European Community. The participants in the SCAP process believe that the PMC makes a significant contribution to the development of a multilateral political-security dialogue for the Asia Pacific region. The participants support the multilateralisation of the ASEAN PMC process and the establishment of a Senior Officials Meeting (SOM). The participants in the SCAP process believe that the ASEAN PMC process should be inclusive and welcome the early inclusion of other countries in the region.

The participants also welcomed initiatives for the establishment of other regional processes, such as the North Pacific Co-operative Security Dialogue proposal. These initiatives can only strengthen the broader regional processes.

As representatives of non-governmental institutions concerned with the security, stability and peace of the region, we also feel that we have the responsibility to contribute to the efforts towards regional confidence building and enhancing regional security through dialogues, consultations and co-operation.

It is with this objective in mind that we are establishing a Council for Security Co-operation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP). It will be open to all countries and territories in the region. The Council's activities will be guided by a Steering Committee consisting of representatives of non-governmental institutions in the region who are committed to the ideals of regional security co-operation.

Steering Committee members will seek to establish broadbased committees in each of their respective countries or territories. These committees should include government officials in their private capacities. We also propose that CSCAP establish Working Groups that will be given the tasks of undertaking policy-oriented studies on specific regional political-security problems.

Initially the CSCAP Steering Committee will be co-chaired by Amos Jordan (Pacific Forum/CSIS) and Jusuf Wanandi (CSIS Jakarta). The
Steering Committee will be served by a Secretariat. ISIS Malaysia has accepted this responsibility for the first two years.

The founding members of CSCAP are:

Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Australia;
University of Toronto-York University Joint Center for Asia-Pacific Studies, Canada;
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia;
Japan Institute of International Affairs, Japan;
The Seoul Forum for International Affairs, Republic of Korea;
Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Malaysia;
Institute of Strategic and Development Studies, Philippines;
Singapore Institute of International Affairs, Singapore;
Institute for Security and International Studies, Thailand;
Pacific Forum/CSIS, United States of America.

Kuala Lumpur, June 8, 1993
Article I: The Name of the Organization

The name of the organization shall be the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, henceforth to be referred to as CSCAP.

Article II: The Purpose and Functions of CSCAP

CSCAP is organized for the purpose of providing a structured process for regional confidence building and security cooperation in the Asia Pacific region.

The functions of CSCAP are as follows:

a. to provide an informal mechanism by which political and security issues can be discussed by scholars, officials, and others in their private capacities.

b. To encourage the participation of such individuals from countries and territories in the Asia Pacific on the basis of the principle of inclusiveness;

c. To organize various working groups to address security issues and challenges facing the region;

d. To provide policy recommendations to various inter-governmental bodies on political-security issues;

e. To convene regional and international meetings and other cooperative activities for the purpose of discussion political security issues;

f. To establish linkages with institutions and organizations in other parts of the world to exchange information, insights and
experiences in the area of regional political-security cooperation; and

g. To produce and disseminate publications relevant to the other purposes of the organization.

Article III: Membership

1. Membership in CSCAP is on an institutional basis and consists of Member Committees. Admission of new members into CSCAP shall require the unanimous agreement of the Steering Committee.

2. When evaluating an application for membership, consideration shall be given to whether or not the applicant:


   b. Has co-operated with other CSCAP members on various projects related to regional security; and

   c. Has established a broad-based Member Committee, with the capacity to participate actively in CSCAP.

3. a. Applicants not fully meeting all the requirements for full membership may be accepted as Candidate Members pending fulfilment of the requirements.

   b. Candidate Members are eligible to participate in all CSCAP activities except for membership in the Steering Committee.

Article IV: Associate Membership

1. Associate Membership may be granted to institutions in a country or territory not represented in the Steering Committee and which have demonstrated interest and involvement in the stated objectives and activities of CSCAP.
2. a. Associate members may participate in CSCAP Working Group activities.

     b. Associate members may participate in the CSCAP General Meeting as observers.

Article V: Member Committees

1. A Member Committee shall be formed for each country or territory representative in CSCAP.

2. The Member Committee shall be broad-based, composed of non-governmental and government affiliated institutions in political-security studies and/or individuals (including officials) in their private capacities.

Article VI: The Steering Committee

1. The Steering Committee shall be the highest decision-making body of CSCAP.

2. The Steering Committee shall be comprised of one formally designated representative from each Member Committee.

3. a. The Steering Committee normally shall be co-chaired by a member from an ASEAN Member committee and a member from a non-ASEAN Member Committee.

     b. The term of the Co-Chairs shall be two years.

4. The Steering Committee may establish Sub-committees on membership, finance, and working groups, and other Sub-committee as deemed necessary.

5. The Steering Committee shall meet at least twice a year.

6. a. The quorum for the Steering Committee shall be at least three quarters (3/4) of the total members.
Annex 99

b. Except for questions of membership, decisions of the Steering Committee shall be made by at least eighty percent (80%) of the quorum.

Article VII: The Secretariat

1. The Steering Committee shall be served by a Secretariat.

2. The Secretariat shall be provided by the Member Committee which will host the General Meeting for the coming year.

3. The Secretariat shall perform the following duties:

   a. serve as the communication/liaison center between the Member Committees;

   b. assist in the organisation of the Steering Committee and General Meetings;

   c. publish materials as directed by the Steering Committee; and

   d. undertake all other responsibilities given by the Steering Committee.

4. The Secretariat shall be funded by the CSCAP Fund for the following purposes:

   a. administrative expenses;

   b. publication of the CSCAP Newsletters; and

   c. other necessary expenses approved by the Steering Committee.
Article VIII: Working Groups

1. The Steering Committee shall establish Working Groups to undertake policy-oriented studies on specific regional and sub-regional political-security problems.

2. The proposal to establish a Working Group shall come from a Member Committee or Committees that will also be responsible for the funding of the project.

3. Participation in the Working Group shall be broad-based.

Article IX: General Meetings

1. CSCAP shall convene a General Meeting on a regular basis. The agenda, time and venue of the General Meeting shall be decided by the Steering Committee.

2. Each Member Committee shall bear the international travel and accommodation expenses of its participants while the host Member Committee shall bear all other local expenses.

Article X: Non-Member Participants in Working Groups

1. Organizations or individuals from member countries or territories with an interest in CSCAP activities may be invited through the Member Committee to participate in CSCAP Working Group activities.

2. Organizations and individuals from non-member countries or territories and international bodies may be invited to participate in working group activities by the Chair of the Working Group with the consent of the Co-Chair of the Steering Committee.
Article XI: Observers and Guests at General Meetings

1. Associate Members shall be invited to participate at the General Meeting as observers.

2. a. Individuals and organizations from non-member countries or territories may be invited to attend General Meetings as guests.
   
   b. Invitation to such individuals and organizations will be issued by the Co-Chairs of the Steering Committee and the Chairperson of the host Member Committee.

3. Individuals and organizations attending CSCAP General Meetings as guests may speak at the meetings only upon invitation by the Steering Committee Co-Chairs.

Article XII: Funding

1. A CSCAP Fund shall be established with annual contributions from the Member Committees, Candidate Members and Associate Members. Contributions shall be determined by a formula which will be agreed upon by the Steering Committee.

2. CSCAP shall seek other sources of funding.

3. A Sub-committee on Finance shall be established to propose and review the formula for annual contributions. The Sub-committee shall also manage the Fund.

4. The Steering Committee shall suspend a Member Committee from all CSCAP activities including membership in the Steering Committee if the Member Committee defaults on its annual contribution for two consecutive years.
Article XIII: The Amendment Process

Except for Article III (1) requiring unanimity of the Steering Committee, the CSCAP Charter may be amended by eighty percent (80%) of the quorum of the Steering Committee provided that an intention to propose such amendment or amendments has been circulated by the Secretariat to all members of the Steering Committee sixty (60) days in advance of consideration.

Article XIV: Transitional Provisions

1. The Founding Institutions of CSCAP are:
   a. Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia
   b. Institute of Security and International Studies, Thailand
   c. Institute of Strategic and Development Studies, Philippines
   d. Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Malaysia
   e. Japan Institute of International Affairs, Japan
   f. Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, Canada
   g. Pacific Forum/CSIS, United States
   h. Seoul Forum for International Affairs, South Korea
   i. Singapore Institute of International Affairs, Singapore
   j. Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australia

2. a. In the formative phase, the designed representatives of the founding institutions shall form the pro tem Steering Committee of CSCAP.
b. The CSCAP Steering committee, composed of the designated representatives from each of the ten (10) Founding Member Committees, shall be established in June, 1994.

c. The Steering Committee shall be co-chaired initially by Amos A. Jordan (Pacific Forum/CSIS, United States) and Yusuf Wanandi (CSIS, Indonesia) for terms of two and three years, respectively.

3. ISIS Malaysia will provide the Secretariat of CSCAP for the first two years.

4. The Asia Pacific region consists of the countries and territories of Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, South Pacific, Oceania, and North America.

Adopted in Lombok, Indonesia, 16 December, 1993.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Official ARF Statements


Chairman's Statement: The Sixth Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Singapore, 26 July 1999.

Chairman's Statement: The Seventh Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Bangkok, 27 July 2000.


CSCAP Publications

Bateman, Sam (ed.), *Maritime Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: Current Situation and Prospects*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.132 (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1999).

Bateman, Sam and Stephen Bates (eds), *Calming the Waters: Initiatives for Asia Pacific Maritime Cooperation*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.114 (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1996).

Bateman, Sam and Stephen Bates (eds), *The Seas Unite: Maritime Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.118 (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1996).


Bateman, Sam and Stephen Bates (eds), *Shipping and Regional Security*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.129 (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1998).


Dickens, David and Guy Wilson-Roberts (eds), Non-Intervention and State Sovereignty in the Asia-Pacific (Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University, Wellington, 2000).


Rolfe, Jim (ed.), Unresolved Futures: Comprehensive Security in the Asia-Pacific (Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University, Wellington, 1995).


Books, Monographs and Reports


ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies, A Time for Initiative: Proposals for the Consideration of the Fourth ASEAN Summit, 4 June 1991.

Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Paper on Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region, paper commissioned by the 1993 ASEAN PMC SOM and submitted to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) SOM, Bangkok, April 1994.


Evans, Gareth and Paul Dibb, *Australian Paper on Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region* (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, January 1995).


Book Chapters and Journal Articles


Ball, Desmond, 'Maritime Cooperation, CSCAP and the ARF' in Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates (eds), The Seas Unite: Maritime Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.118 (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1996).

Bibliography

Ball, Desmond, 'The Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Programmes' in Desmond Ball and Mohan Malik, *The Nuclear Crisis in Asia: The Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Programmes*, Working Paper No. 325 (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, August 1998).

Ball, Desmond, 'Introduction: Towards Better Understanding of Preventive Diplomacy' in Desmond Ball and Amitav Acharya (eds), *The Next Stage: Preventive Diplomacy and Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region* (Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.131 (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1999).


Dauvergne, Peter, 'Environmental Insecurity, Forest Management and State Responses in Southeast Asia' in Alan Dupont (ed.), *The Environment and Security: What are the Linkages?*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.125 (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1988).


**Newspaper and Magazine Articles**

'ARF Makes Progress on Confidence Building Measures', *Peace and Disarmament News* (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra), June 1999.


Bibliography


McPhedran, Ian, 'Asia-Pacific Body Created to Formalise Regional Cooperation', *Canberra Times*, 17 July 1993.


Correspondence

Email message from H.E. Mr Noel Levi, Secretary General, Forum Secretariat, Suva, Fiji, to Executive Director, AUS-CSCAP, Canberra, 3 October 2000.
114  The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific

Letter from Saroj Chavanaviraj, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, to CSCAP Co-chairs, 28 January 2000.

Letter from CSCAP Co-chairs to Nitya Pibulsonggram, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, 12 June 2000.

Letter from Nitya Pibulsonggram, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, to CSCAP Co-chairs, 11 July 2000.
STRATEGIC AND DEFENCE STUDIES CENTRE

The aim of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, which is located in the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies in the Australian National University, is to advance the study of strategic problems, especially those relating to the general region of Asia and the Pacific. The centre gives particular attention to Australia's strategic neighbourhood of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. Participation in the centre's activities is not limited to members of the university, but includes other interested professional, diplomatic and parliamentary groups. Research includes military, political, economic, scientific and technological aspects of strategic developments. Strategy, for the purpose of the centre, is defined in the broadest sense of embracing not only the control and application of military force, but also the peaceful settlement of disputes that could cause violence.

This is the leading academic body in Australia specialising in these studies. Centre members give frequent lectures and seminars for other departments within the ANU and other universities and Australian service training institutions are heavily dependent upon SDSC assistance with the strategic studies sections of their courses. Members of the centre provide advice and training courses in strategic affairs to the Australian Department of Defence and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Regular seminars and conferences on topics of current importance to the centre's research are held.

Since its inception in 1966, the centre has supported a number of visiting and research fellows, who have undertaken a wide variety of investigations. Recently the emphasis of the centre's work has been on problems of security and confidence building in Australia's neighbourhood; the defence of Australia; arms proliferation and arms control; policy advice to the higher levels of the Australian Defence Department; and the strategic implications of developments in Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Southwest Pacific.

The centre maintains a comprehensive collection of reference materials on strategic issues. Its publications programme, which includes the Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence and SDSC Working Papers, produces up to two dozen publications a year on strategic and defence issues.
# The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific

## CANBERRA PAPERS ON STRATEGY AND DEFENCE

### NEW SERIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO.</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>AUTHOR(S)</th>
<th>PRICE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CP43</td>
<td>Australia's Secret Space Programs</td>
<td>Desmond Ball</td>
<td>15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP44</td>
<td>High Personnel Turnover: The ADF Is Not a Limited Liability Company</td>
<td>Cathy Downes</td>
<td>15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP45</td>
<td>Should Australia Plan to Defend Christmas and Cocos Islands?</td>
<td>Ross Babbage</td>
<td>15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP46</td>
<td>US Bases in the Philippines: Issues and Implications</td>
<td>Desmond Ball (ed.)</td>
<td>15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP47</td>
<td>Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)</td>
<td>Desmond Ball</td>
<td>20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP48</td>
<td>The Vietnam People's Army: Regularization of Command 1975-1988</td>
<td>D.M. FitzGerald</td>
<td>15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP49</td>
<td>Australia and the Global Strategic Balance</td>
<td>Desmond Ball</td>
<td>15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP50</td>
<td>Organising an Army: the Australian Experience 1957-1965</td>
<td>J.C. Blaxland</td>
<td>20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP51</td>
<td>The Evolving World Economy: Some Alternative Security Questions for Australia</td>
<td>Richard A. Higgott</td>
<td>15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP52</td>
<td>Defending the Northern Gateway</td>
<td>Peter Donovan</td>
<td>20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP53</td>
<td>Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT): Intercepting Satellite Communications</td>
<td>Desmond Ball</td>
<td>20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP54</td>
<td>Breaking the American Alliance: An Independent National Security Policy for Australia</td>
<td>Gary Brown</td>
<td>20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP55</td>
<td>Senior Officer Professional Development in the Australian Defence Force: Constant Study to Prepare</td>
<td>Cathy Downes</td>
<td>20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP56</td>
<td>Code 777: Australia and the US Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS)</td>
<td>Desmond Ball</td>
<td>22.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP57</td>
<td>China's Crisis: The International Implications</td>
<td>Gary Klintworth (ed.)</td>
<td>17.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP58</td>
<td>Index to Parliamentary Questions on Defence</td>
<td>Gary Brown</td>
<td>20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP59</td>
<td>Controlling Civil Maritime Activities in a Defence Contingency</td>
<td>W.A.G. Dovers</td>
<td>17.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP60</td>
<td>The Security of Oceania in the 1990s. Vol.I, Views from the Region</td>
<td>David Hegarty and Peter Polomka (eds)</td>
<td>15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP61</td>
<td>The Strategic Significance of Torres Strait</td>
<td>Ross Babbage</td>
<td>30.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP62</td>
<td>The Leading Edge: Air Power in Australia's Unique Environment</td>
<td>P.J. Criss and D.J. Schubert</td>
<td>22.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CP63 The Northern Territory in the Defence of Australia: Geography, History, Economy, Infrastructure, and Defence Presence by Desmond Ball and J.O. Langtry (eds) 24.50
CP64 Vietnam's Withdrawal from Cambodia: Regional Issues and Realignments by Gary Klintworth (ed.) 17.00
CP65 Prospects for Crisis Prediction: A South Pacific Case Study by Ken Ross 20.00
CP66 Bougainville: Perspectives on a Crisis by Peter Polomka (ed.) 20.00
CP67 The Amateur Managers: A Study of the Management of Weapons System Projects by F.N. Bennett 22.50
CP68 The Security of Oceania in the 1990s. Vol.2, Managing Change by Peter Polomka (ed.) 15.00
CP69 Australia and the World: Prologue and Prospects by Desmond Ball (ed.) 25.00
CP70 Singapore's Defence Industries by Bilveer Singh 14.00
CP71 RAAF Air Power Doctrine: A Collection of Contemporary Essays by Gary Waters (ed.) 15.00
CP72 South Pacific Security: Issues and Perspectives by Stephen Henningham and Desmond Ball (eds) 20.00
CP73 The Northern Territory in the Defence of Australia: Strategic and Operational Considerations by J.O. Langtry and Desmond Ball (eds) 24.50
CP74 The Architect of Victory: Air Campaigns for Australia by Gary Waters 23.00
CP75 Modern Taiwan in the 1990s by Gary Klintworth (ed.) 23.00
CP76 New Technology: Implications for Regional and Australian Security by Desmond Ball and Helen Wilson (eds) 23.00
CP77 Reshaping the Australian Army: Challenges for the 1990s by David Horner (ed.) 24.00
CP78 The Intelligence War in the Gulf by Desmond Ball 17.50
CP79 Provocative Plans: A Critique of US Strategy for Maritime Conflict in the North Pacific by Desmond Ball 20.00
CP80 Soviet SIGINT: Hawaii Operation by Desmond Ball 17.50
CP81 Chasing Gravity's Rainbow: Kwajalein and US Ballistic Missile Testing by Owen Wilkes, Megan van Frank and Peter Hayes 22.50
CP82 Australia's Threat Perceptions: A Search for Security by Alan Dupont 17.00
CP83 Building Blocks for Regional Security: An Australian Perspective on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) in the Asia/Pacific Region by Desmond Ball 17.00
CP84 Australia's Security Interests in Northeast Asia by Alan Dupont 18.50
<p>| CP85 | Finance and Financial Policy in Defence Contingencies by Paul Lee | 17.00 |
| CP86 | Mine Warfare in Australia's First Line of Defence by Alan Hinge | 23.00 |
| CP87 | Hong Kong's Future as a Regional Transport Hub by Peter J. Rimmer | 20.00 |
| CP88 | The Conceptual Basis of Australia's Defence Planning and Force Structure Development by Paul Dibb | 17.50 |
| CP89 | Strategic Studies in a Changing World: Global, Regional and Australian Perspectives by Desmond Ball and David Horner (eds) | 28.00 |
| CP90 | The Gulf War: Australia's Role and Asian-Pacific Responses by J. Mohan Malik | 21.00 |
| CP91 | Defence Aspects of Australia's Space Activities by Desmond Ball | 20.00 |
| CP93 | Infrastructure and Security: Problems of Development in the West Sepik Province of Papua New Guinea by T.M. Boyce | 23.00 |
| CP94 | Australia and Space by Desmond Ball and Helen Wilson (eds) | 26.00 |
| CP95 | LANDFORCE: 2010: Some Implications of Technology for ADF Future Land Force Doctrine, Leadership and Structures by David W. Beveridge | 15.50 |
| CP96 | The Origins of Australian Diplomatic Intelligence in Asia, 1933-1941 by Wayne Gobert | 17.50 |
| CP97 | Japan as Peacekeeper: Samurai State, or New Civilian Power? by Peter Polomka | 16.00 |
| CP98 | The Post-Soviet World: Geopolitics and Crises by Coral Bell | 15.00 |
| CP99 | Indonesian Defence Policy and the Indonesian Armed Forces by Bob Lowry | 20.00 |
| CP100 | Regional Security in the South Pacific: The Quarter-Century 1970-95 by Ken Ross | 23.00 |
| CP101 | The Changing Role of the Military in Papua New Guinea by R.J. May | 15.00 |
| CP102 | Strategic Change and Naval Forces: Issues for a Medium Level Naval Power by Sam Bateman and Dick Sherwood (eds) | 23.00 |
| CP103 | ASEAN Defence Reorientation 1975-1992: The Dynamics of Modernisation and Structural Change by J.N. Mak | 24.00 |
| CP104 | The United Nations and Crisis Management: Six Studies by Coral Bell (ed.) | 17.50 |
| CP105 | Operational and Technological Developments in Maritime Warfare: Implications for the Western Pacific by Dick Sherwood (ed.) | 20.00 |
| CP106 | More Than Little Heroes: Australian Army Air Liaison Officers in the Second World War by Nicola Baker | 23.00 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CP108</td>
<td>The Development of Australian Army Doctrine 1945-1964</td>
<td>M.C.J. Welburn</td>
<td>15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP109</td>
<td>The Navy and National Security: The Peacetime Dimension</td>
<td>Dick Sherwood</td>
<td>16.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP110</td>
<td>Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) in South Korea</td>
<td>Desmond Ball</td>
<td>15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP111</td>
<td>India Looks East: An Emerging Power and Its Asia-Pacific Neighbours</td>
<td>Sandy Gordon and Stephen Henningham (eds)</td>
<td>24.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP112</td>
<td>Nation, Region and Context: Studies in Peace and War in Honour of Professor T.B. Millar</td>
<td>Coral Bell (ed.)</td>
<td>24.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP113</td>
<td>Transforming the Tatmadaw: The Burmese Armed Forces since 1988</td>
<td>Andrew Selth</td>
<td>23.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP114</td>
<td>Calming the Waters: Initiatives for Asia Pacific Maritime Cooperation</td>
<td>Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates (eds)</td>
<td>23.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP115</td>
<td>Strategic Guidelines for Enabling Research and Development to Support Australian Defence</td>
<td>Ken Anderson and Paul Dibb</td>
<td>17.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP116</td>
<td>Security and Security Building in the Indian Ocean Region</td>
<td>Sandy Gordon</td>
<td>24.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP117</td>
<td>Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) in South Asia: India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka (Ceylon)</td>
<td>Desmond Ball</td>
<td>17.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP118</td>
<td>The Seas Unite: Maritime Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region</td>
<td>Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates (eds)</td>
<td>25.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP119</td>
<td>In Search of a Maritime Strategy: The Maritime Element in Australian Defence Planning since 1901</td>
<td>David Stevens (ed.)</td>
<td>24.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP120</td>
<td>Australian Defence Planning: Five Views from Policy Makers</td>
<td>Helen Hookey and Denny Roy (eds)</td>
<td>15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP121</td>
<td>A Brief Madness: Australia and the Resumption of French Nuclear Testing</td>
<td>Kim Richard Nossal and Carolynn Vivian</td>
<td>15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP122</td>
<td>Missile Diplomacy and Taiwan's Future: Innovations in Politics and Military Power</td>
<td>Greg Austin (ed.)</td>
<td>25.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP123</td>
<td>Grey-Area Phenomena in Southeast Asia: Piracy, Drug Trafficking and Political Terrorism</td>
<td>Peter Chalk</td>
<td>17.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP124</td>
<td>Regional Maritime Management and Security</td>
<td>Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates (eds)</td>
<td>24.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP125</td>
<td>The Environment and Security: What are the Linkages?</td>
<td>Alan Dupont (ed.)</td>
<td>17.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP126</td>
<td>'Educating an Army': Australian Army Doctrinal Development and the Operational Experience in South Vietnam, 1965-72</td>
<td>R.N. Bushby</td>
<td>17.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Price</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP127</td>
<td>South Africa and Security Building in the Indian Ocean Rim</td>
<td>Greg Mills</td>
<td>20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP128</td>
<td>The Shape of Things to Come: The US-Japan Security Relationship in the New Era</td>
<td>Maree Reid</td>
<td>17.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP129</td>
<td>Shipping and Regional Security</td>
<td>Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates</td>
<td>20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP131</td>
<td>The Next Stage: Preventive Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region</td>
<td>Desmond Ball and Amitav Acharya</td>
<td>25.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP132</td>
<td>Maritime Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: Current Situation and Prospects</td>
<td>Sam Bateman (eds)</td>
<td>23.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP133</td>
<td>Maintaining the Strategic Edge: The Defence of Australia in 2015</td>
<td>Desmond Ball (ed.)</td>
<td>30.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP134</td>
<td>An Independent Command: Command and Control of the 1st Australian Task Force in Vietnam</td>
<td>R.W. Cable</td>
<td>17.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP135</td>
<td>Armed Rebellion in the ASEAN States: Persistence and Implications</td>
<td>Andrew Tan</td>
<td>23.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP136</td>
<td>Burma’s Secret Military Partners</td>
<td>Andrew Selth</td>
<td>18.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP137</td>
<td>Where Are They When You Need Them? Support Arrangements for Deployed Air Power Forces</td>
<td>Peter McLennan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>forthcoming</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP138</td>
<td>ASEAN, the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone and the Challenge of Denuclearisation in Southeast Asia: Problems and Prospects</td>
<td>Bilveer Singh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>forthcoming</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP139</td>
<td>The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP): Its Record and Its Prospects</td>
<td>Desmond Ball</td>
<td>18.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>