NATION, REGION AND CONTEXT

STUDIES IN PEACE AND WAR
IN HONOUR OF
PROFESSOR T.B. MILLAR

Edited by Coral Bell

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NOTES ON ESSAYISTS

Desmond Ball is a Special Professor in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University. He was Head of the Centre from 1984 to 1991. His recent work has mostly been in the field of security developments in the Asia-Pacific area, but he has worked also on many aspects of Australian defence policy. In addition, he is Australia's best-known contributor to the analysis of nuclear strategy. His books and monographs include *Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration* (1980) and *A Suitable Piece of Real Estate: American Installations in Australia* (1980).

Coral Bell is a Visiting Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University. She was previously Professor of International Relations at the University of Sussex, and earlier a member of the Australian Diplomatic Service. Her research interests are principally in the field of crisis management and the evolution of the central balance of power. Her next book (forthcoming) is to be called *The Plural World: Diplomacy and Politics at Century's End*.

Alan Burnett was a long-time colleague of Tom Millar in the academic and administrative work of the Australian National University. His research work has been principally in the environmental and diplomatic problems of the South Pacific, and in New Zealand affairs. He is the author of *The A-NZ-US Triangle* (1988), and editor of *The Anzus Documents* (1991).

Paul Dibb is a Professor in the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University and Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. His career has been balanced between academic work and service to the Australian government. He was Head of the National Assessments Staff and later Director of the Joint Intelligence Organisation and Deputy Secretary of Defence. His earlier research work is published as *The Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower* (1986). His 1986 official study, *Review of Australian Defence Capabilities*, marked a major milestone in the evolution of Australian security policies.
Phillip Greville graduated from Duntroon in the same class as Tom Millar in 1944, and served with the 2/7th Field Company at Wewak. He graduated from Sydney University in 1950 as BE (Civil), served with the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment in Korea, and was captured on 23 August 1952 while repairing a minefield fence. He later served in many staff, service and instructor appointments, including Commander 1st Australian Logistics Group and Acting Commander 1st Australian Task Force Vietnam, and he retired from the army in 1980 with the rank of brigadier. He was awarded the CBE in 1972. Since retiring he has written on defence subjects for the Advertiser, the Pacific Defence Reporter and the Australian.

A.J.R. Groom is Professor of International Relations at the University of Kent at Canterbury in the United Kingdom. A past Chairman of the British International Studies Association, he is the founder and Chairman of the European Standing Group for International Relations of the European Consortium for Political Research. He is the Director of the Centre for Conflict Analysis and a Board member of the Academic Council for the UN System. His academic interests include international organisation, integration theory, conflict studies and European international relations, as well as international relations theory. He has published some 16 volumes in these fields and over one hundred papers, including Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory, edited with Margot Light (1994).

Carsten Holbraad was for several years Senior Research Fellow in International Relations at the Australian National University and is now Visiting Fellow in the European Institute at the London School of Economics. He is the author of a number of books, including Middle Powers in International Politics (1984) and Danish Neutrality (1991), and is currently completing a study of internationalism and nationalism in European politics.

Michael Leifer is Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science and was Chairman of its Centre for International Studies when Tom Millar was a Visiting Fellow there. His research interests have been in regional security

**Robert O'Neill** is the Chichele Professor of the History of War and a Fellow of All Souls College, University of Oxford. Formerly an Australian Army officer, he served in the Vietnam War (1966-67) and was mentioned in dispatches. He was a Professorial Fellow in International Relations and the second Head (following Tom Millar) of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University (1971-82). He was Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London from 1982 until 1987, when he moved to Oxford. His books include *The German Army and the Nazi Party, 1933-1939* (1966); *Vietnam Task: The 5th Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment, 1966-67* (1968); *General Giap: Politician and Strategist* (1969); and the two-volume history, *Australia in the Korean War 1950-53* (1981, 1985).

**James L. Richardson** is a Professor in the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University and at present Acting Head of the Department of International Relations. He has written on German and European security, arms control and crisis diplomacy, and Australian foreign policy. His books include *Charting the Post-Cold War Order*, edited with Richard Leaver (1993) and *Crisis Diplomacy: The Great Powers Since the Mid-Nineteenth Century* (1994).

**John J. Weltman** is a Professor at the University of Colorado. His latest book, *World Politics and the Evolution of War*, was published in 1995 by the Johns Hopkins University Press. His previous works have dealt with nuclear proliferation, the obsolescence of war, international relations theory, international security and other topics. He has served on the faculty of the Australian National University and leading academic institutions in the United States, and has held a variety of positions in the American foreign policy and national security communities.
PREFACE

The essays in this volume have been written by people who worked with Tom Millar in various academic environments, who shared his interests and valued the tenacity, care and candour which he brought to scholarly enquiry. The central preoccupations of his work were with Australia's defence, and the diplomatic complexities of the region in which it must live, and that is reflected in the first group of essays, Nation and Region. But he was never given to provincialism: he was very much a citizen of the larger Western world, deeply fascinated by the problems of the East-West balance during the Cold War years. That is reflected in the second group of essays, The International and Intellectual Context of Enquiry. This group indicates also the tradition of the thought of which he was a part: liberal-conservative internationalism in its British and American incarnations. He was a man of strong moral feeling, and had been a professional soldier for some years, so the ethical problems of combat, from the treatment of prisoners of war to the justifications (if any) of nuclear strike were central concerns of his whole adult life. His writings were always straightforward, lucid, easy, and down to earth: not theoretically oriented, but subtle-minded as well as shrewd. His reviewers often called him a 'realist', but that word now has overtones which did not match his mind-set. He was actually a traditionalist, and his tradition was not a simplistic realpolitik, even on strategic issues.

Thomas Bruce Millar AO, 1925-94, was born and initially educated in Western Australia. He entered the Royal Military College, Duntroon, as a 17-year-old cadet in 1942, and remained in the Australian Army until 1950, rising to the rank of major and serving in Japan. When he left the army he returned to university life, completing his MA at the University of Melbourne and his PhD at the University of London (on the Commonwealth in the United Nations). After a year at Columbia, he took up an appointment in international relations at the Australian National University.

His work there is recounted in chapter 3 of this volume. But Tom Millar had always a strong sense of moral obligation to serve the community with all his considerable abilities, and that showed in his willingness to take on many extra tasks. (He well deserved his Order
of Australia.) He served as Director of the Australian Institute of International Affairs for seven years, and undertook also the Chairmanship of the Citizen Military Forces enquiry in 1973. The report he prepared resulted in a substantial reconstruction of the Australian reserve system, and perhaps represented his major impact on Australian defence policy, an influence continuing to the present day.

In his later years, as a Professor in the University of London, he was instrumental in preserving the cause of Australian studies in London from death by financial anaemia, negotiating private funding when a change of government in Canberra threatened its previous support. He was a member of Council of both the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the International Institute for Strategic Studies and remained active in research, with first the London School of Economics and then Kings College, London to the time of his death in June 1994. I think he would like best to be remembered as one who, in the analysis of strategy and foreign policy, assessed the relevant facts as objectively and validly as he could, and wrote as lucidly as he could.

In putting together this book of essays I have been immensely helped by the patient efforts of Elza Sullivan in word processing, and by Helen Hookey as subeditor. My thanks, and those of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, go also to the eminent scholars who have contributed essays for this memorial volume.

Coral Bell
Canberra
July 1995
I

REGION AND NATION
CHAPTER 1

AUSTRALIA'S STRATEGY FOR SECURITY ENGAGEMENT IN ASIA

Desmond Ball

In most ways Australia is peripheral to Asia, and in many ways Asia is of only marginal relevance to Australia. But strategically, Australia is in the Asian area, and has been since Japan began casting around for raw materials for its growing industries and open spaces for its growing population nearly forty years ago.

T.B. Millar (1968)\(^1\)

Australia has finally made up its mind about the Asia-Pacific region. We are now desperate to be engaged. As the Prime Minister stated on 15 February 1995:

... engagement with Asia is not a take-it-or-leave-it affair for Australia. Asia is not a target of convenience for us. It is not a fashion or a flavour-of-the-month, or a political gimmick.\(^2\)

Rather, 'the simple truth for Australia is that unless we succeed in Asia, we succeed nowhere'.\(^3\) The very future of this country as we enter the twenty-first century is dependent upon the success of our policy of Asian engagement.

For most of the two centuries of European settlement of Australia, it has been otherwise. Over most of the past 200 years, Australia could fairly be characterised, as the American novelist John Updike once described it, as the 'young white continent abandoned at

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4 Nation, Region and Context

the foot of Asia'. For the first three-quarters of a century following the arrival of the First Fleet in 1788, the settlers were almost entirely from Britain and the various constituent governmental units were colonies. Self-government for domestic internal matters was established in each of the colonies as a result of the Australian Colonies Government Act of 1850. The establishment of the Commonwealth of Australia on 1 January 1901 brought certain defence responsibilities - defence by land was the responsibility of the home government, but in the nearby seas it was jointly managed with the British Admiralty and, farther away, it was wholly a British responsibility. With respect to foreign relations, only in 1923 did Australia gain the right to appoint its own diplomatic representatives and negotiate treaties with foreign powers. Effective detachment from the imperial connection followed the fall of Singapore to the Japanese in February 1942, but it had been signalled by Prime Minister John Curtin just three weeks after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, when he said that:

The Australian Government ... regards the Pacific struggle as primarily one in which the United States and Australia must have the fullest say in the direction of the Democracies' fighting plan.

Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.

For most of the past two centuries, Australians have been afraid of Asians. We were afraid of having them living amongst us, and fearful of them in terms of external threats to Australia's security. Internally, the white immigrant settlers from imperial Britain were ignorant and contemptuous of Asian customs and culture, and resentful of the Asian (and especially Chinese) capacity for hard work. Restrictive and discriminatory legislation against Asian immigrants was enacted in all the colonies in the 1850s and 1860s, which became

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6 John Curtin, 'The Task Ahead', Herald (Melbourne), 27 December 1941, p.10.
the basis of the 'White Australia Policy'. As T.B. Millar noted in 1978:

Whatever the reasons or the rationalisations given, most Australians have for a century acted mainly from an unreasoned fear and hostility to support their governments in excluding all but a small number of permanent coloured settlers.7

Although some liberalisation in immigration policy took place through the 1960s, the White Australia Policy was officially abandoned (by the Whitlam Labor government) only in 1973.

For much of its history, Australia has evinced a high level of insecurity - a remote and vulnerable white enclave in a region which it did not understand.8 In the 1880s, there was widespread anxiety about the strategic threat posed by China. As the Premier of New South Wales, Sir Henry Parkes, stated in a speech in 1888:

There is a Power, hitherto chiefly known as the barbarous power, which is so rapidly creating armies and a formidable navy, that it is sufficient at all events to awaken the intelligent attention of reflecting man. I mean the empire of China.9

In the 1890s, Japan became 'the yellow peril'. Japan's defeat of Russia in 1905 came as a shock to Australia and renewed fears that it would extend its power southward and threaten Australia's security, and when Japan claimed Germany's colonial possessions in the Pacific following the First World War, the Australian Prime Minister, William Hughes, was moved to inform the British Prime Minister that 'Australia profoundly distrusts Japan, [and] that its national welfare and its trade alike are seriously menaced by Japan'.10 The fear, hostility and suspicion that characterised Australian attitudes toward Japan in the 1920s were based on racial prejudice and ignorance rather than objective strategic analysis or any prescience of the events which

7 Millar, Australia in Peace and War, p.13.
8 See Alan Dupont, Australia's Threat Perceptions: A Search for Security, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.82 (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1991).
10 Cited in Dupont, Australia's Threat Perceptions, p.21.
were to unfold into the war in the Pacific in 1941.

In the 1950s and 1960s, Australia became obsessed with the threat of Asian communism. A policy of 'forward defence' was adopted, based on the presumption that Australia's security was best served by the defeat or at least containment of nationalist and communist movements in East Asia. For more than two decades, from 1950 to 1972, Australia was involved in conflicts in Asia - the Korean War, the Malayan Emergency, Konfrontasi in Borneo, and the Vietnam War. Australia, by itself, could do little to affect matters. However, its willingness to contribute forces was complemented by diplomatic activity designed to encourage the military commitment of both the United Kingdom and, increasingly from the late 1950s, the United States to the region - a commitment which was also intended to guarantee the direct defence of Australia should that become necessary. (The hosting of important US facilities by Australia in the 1960s, at Northwest Cape, Pine Gap and Nurrugar, was also meant to reinforce this guarantee.)

The policies of forward defence and dependence upon 'great and powerful friends' were abandoned in the early 1970s, and replaced by policies of greater self-reliance and focus on the defence of Australia and its immediate approaches (the 'sea-air gap'). In July 1967, the British government had announced the timetable for Britain's final withdrawal from Asia - the forces in Malaysia and Singapore, the last to leave, would be withdrawn by the mid-1970s. And on 25 July 1969, President Nixon had announced at Guam that US ground forces were unlikely to be committed to the Asian mainland again, a position codified in the 'Nixon Doctrine' enunciated to Congress in February 1970. The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1971, approved by the Defence Committee in March 1971, stated for the first time that any threat of overt military aggression by China into Southeast Asia or by Vietnam beyond Indochina was unlikely; that 'the likelihood of Australian combat involvement outside Australia' was 'not great' and receding; and that 'Australia must pursue her own security interests by her own efforts more than was necessary before'. 11 The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1973, approved by the Defence Committee on 1 June 1973 and endorsed by the Whitlam Labor government, stated

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that Australia 'must now assume the primary responsibility for its own
defence against any neighbourhood or regional threats'.

But if defence of Australia and greater self-reliance necessarily
became the basic parameters which underlie Australian defence policy,
it was to take another decade and a half before these could be
amplified and clarified to the point where they could usefully inform
Australia's defence force development. Since 1971, successive
assessments of the strategic basis of Australian defence policy have
reiterated that there are no imminent or foreseeable threats to
Australia, but that certain low-level contingencies could emerge with
little or no warning and that there are always gross uncertainties at the
outer bounds of the 10- or 15-year projections. New planning concepts
and methodologies had to be developed; new policy-making
structures, command and control arrangements, and joint service
machinery instituted; credible contingencies postulated and areas of
operation in northern Australia and the 'sea-air gap' explored; and
criteria for the development of Australia's defence force capabilities
explicated. Key milestones in the accomplishment of these tasks were
the Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, produced by Paul Dibb in
March 1986, and The Defence of Australia 1987, a policy information
paper published by the Minister for Defence, Kim Beazley, in March
1987.

The effective implementation of the strategic policy of greater
self-reliance in the defence of Australia, the greater maturity of
Australian policy makers and the population at large that it reflected,
and the national self-confidence that it generated, had effects that went
well beyond the defence establishment. As Gareth Evans noted in
December 1988:

I see the White Paper [of March 1987] as a watershed not only
in defence policy, but in foreign policy. In a very real sense,
the Hawke Government's defence policy has once and for all
liberated Australian foreign policy... It is no longer necessary
for Australian foreign policy to begin with the assumption that

12 Department of Defence, Defence Committee, Strategic Basis of Australian Defence
Policy 1973 (Canberra, 1 June 1973), p.84.
13 Paul Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, Report to the Minister for
14 The Hon. Kim C. Beazley, Minister for Defence, The Defence of Australia 1987
its first task is to ensure the defence of Australia by attracting the protective attention of great and powerful friends.

As a result, an Australian Foreign Minister is now freer to think about his responsibilities a little more systematically, and, may I say, a little more intricately, than has ever previously been the case.\textsuperscript{15}

An immediate product of the Minister's new thinking was the appreciation of 'the reality that Australia's interests are multidimensional, and that to promote these interests we need policies that are equally multidimensional'.\textsuperscript{16} In December 1989, the Minister issued a major statement on \textit{Australia's Regional Security}, which officially articulated a multidimensional approach to Australian security policy and planning:

The policy responses or instruments available to protect Australia's security are \textit{multidimensional}. They go well beyond strictly military capabilities, essential though these are. They also embrace traditional diplomacy, politico-military capabilities (in the border-zone between defence and diplomacy), economic and trade relations, and development assistance. And they extend to immigration, education and training, cultural relations, information activities, and a number of other less obvious areas of government activity.\textsuperscript{17}

\textbf{Imperatives for Regional Security Cooperation}

It is now generally accepted throughout the Asia-Pacific region that increased security cooperation is imperative for many important reasons. To begin with, the establishment of some mechanism or variety of mechanisms for managing the increasing regional \textit{uncertainty}, which is attendant upon the extraordinary rate

\textsuperscript{15} Senator the Hon. Gareth Evans, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'Australia's Place in the World: The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decision-Making' in Desmond Ball (ed.), \textit{Australia and the World: Prologue and Prospects}, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.69 (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1990), pp.323-4.

\textsuperscript{16} ibid., p.324.

\textsuperscript{17} Senator the Hon. Gareth Evans, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, \textit{Australia's Regional Security} (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, December 1989), p.2. The particular elements of the multidimensional posture are discussed in Section III of the statement, pp.15-38.
and extent of change which now permeates the region, is a critical requirement for regional security planners. Much of the change derives from the economic dynamism of East and, to a lesser extent, Southeast Asia, which offers the prospect of longer term stability but which is also somewhat fragile, being dependent upon long and vulnerable sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) for vital energy resources and raw materials from outside the region, and which generates considerable domestic instabilities as traditional modes of production and social relationships are disturbed and transformed. This uncertainty is compounded by the decline of the presence and influence of the former superpowers and the transition from bipolarity to some as yet undefined form of multipolarity. In particular, there is a general apprehension throughout the region concerning the pace, scope and extent of the US drawdown and the future of the US economic and strategic commitment to the region.

Second, it is necessary to counter the centrifugal possibilities within the region. The reduction of the US presence in the region is generating compensatory moves which, in the absence of mechanisms for regional consultation, could well lead to increased regional tension and competition. A more diffusive regional security environment is emerging, with the potential for regional states each to pull in a different direction. New conflict issues are arising, particularly in the South China Sea. Competition for markets in Indochina is likely to increase.

A third reason concerns the various major advanced weapons acquisition programmes currently underway in the region. There are many and various reasons for these acquisition programmes - insofar as these programmes are a reflection only of the increased economic strength of Asian countries, or a means of acquiring new technology, they provide little cause for concern. Indeed, the contrary can be argued - that the national self-confidence which is generated by the acquisition of these advanced capabilities is itself a source of confidence building in the region. It is critical, however, that these acquisition programmes do not lead to a regional arms race.

A fourth reason pertains to the character of the new weapons systems being acquired. The most significant acquisitions involve maritime attack aircraft, anti-ship missiles, and submarines. These strike capabilities tend, in general, to be more inflammatory than other more purely 'defensive' capabilities. It is therefore particularly necessary that their acquisition be accompanied by dialogue and transparency as well as other confidence-building arrangements.

Fifth, increased regional cooperation is necessary to provide a combined counterweight to the intrusions of other powers into the region. A failure to develop common perspectives and policies for addressing the increasing capabilities of the major Asian powers (China, Japan and India), for example, can only lead to dissension and fuel for a regional arms race. Some countries in Southeast Asia are more concerned than others about India's power-projection capabilities, some are more concerned about the increasing Chinese capabilities, and some are more worried about the plans and intentions of their nearer neighbours. Justifications for particular acquisitions, no matter how well articulated, might simply not ring true in these circumstances - leading to misunderstandings and unanticipated and unfortunate reactions.

Sixth, there is the concern that all countries in the region have with the law of the sea. All have signed the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which has defined the legal regime of the seas and is a major confidence-building measure in its own right. The convention has also been ratified by Indonesia and the Philippines. Thus, all regional countries share a common responsibility to respect the principles of UNCLOS and to work towards the principle of its Article 88, which states that the High Seas (which include Exclusive Economic Zones for the purposes of this article) 'shall be reserved for peaceful purposes'.

Seventh, many of the current and prospective regional security developments can only be addressed on a cooperative basis. Environmental issues, in particular, are amenable only to international effort. In practice, any comprehensive regional maritime surveillance regime would also have to involve a cooperative multinational effort.

Eighth, the increasing rapidity of change and the relatively novel nature of emerging security problems demand an unfettered flow of ideas and dialogue on policy initiatives and means of
addressing common problems. Time is being compressed to the point where uncoordinated trial and error efforts cannot be afforded.

Ninth, and more positively, regional cooperation is necessary for the achievement of 'regional resilience'. Regional resilience is a two-legged beast: it requires not only that each country achieve 'national resilience' or self-reliance, but also that there are more or less institutionalised mechanisms and processes for regional dialogue, consultation and cooperation. Without muscle in each leg, and a good sense of balance, the beast cannot work.

Finally, with respect to Australia's own long-term strategic interests, the promotion of multilateral security- and confidence-building arrangements provides Australia with a significant role in the region. Although most of the initiatives for regional security cooperation quite properly come from the ASEAN and South Pacific capitals, there is an unabashed recognition within the region that Australia is the principal repository of the experience and skills necessary to convert the various notions into viable operational regimes. Australia has not been diffident about capitalising on this important opportunity for regional involvement.

Institutionalisation of Regional Security Dialogue

At the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) in Jakarta in July 1990, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Gareth Evans, suggested that consideration might be given to the establishment of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA), similar to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The essence of the proposal was summed up by Evans in an article he published later that month:

We should now be looking ahead to the kind of wholly new institutional processes that might be capable of evolving, in Asia just as in Europe, as a framework for addressing and resolving security problems. In Europe, wildly implausible as this would have seemed even just a year ago, the central institutional framework for pursuing common security has

19 Senator the Hon. Gareth Evans, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'Address to the Opening "6+6" Session of the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference', Jakarta, 27 July 1990, pp.4-5.
become the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The CSCE is made up of all countries in NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Why should there not be developed a similar institutional framework, a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia, for addressing the apparently intractable security issues, which exist in the region?20

The regional reaction to the CSCA proposal was generally negative. It was argued that the conditions that had facilitated the concept of the CSCE 'have not been obtained in Asia';21 and there was a general disinclination to consider the establishment of 'wholly new institutional processes'. Rather, the institutionalisation of dialogue should proceed cautiously, at a rate determined by regional interests and perceptions, and involving the evolutionary adaptation and employment of extant regional structures - most particularly, the ASEAN PMC itself. This approach led, in 1993-94, to the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as the first Asia-Pacific-wide forum for regional security discussions.

Australia is one of the most active participants in the ARF process, though it has become more sensitive to the modalities of its ASEAN neighbours in this process. At the first meeting of the ARF in Bangkok on 25 July 1994, Foreign Minister Evans was insistent that there be issued a communiqué that not only solemnised this 'historic event' but also articulated an agreed agenda for progress with particular confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) for the region, including nuclear non-proliferation, peacekeeping cooperation, exchanges of non-classified military information, maritime issues, and preventive diplomacy.22 Australia has also been active in invigorating the Senior Officials Meetings (SOMs), which are responsible for preparation of the ARF agendas, and in undertaking or sponsoring studies for consideration by the ARF. In particular, it has been active in the initiation of the process of 'inter-sessional SOMs', which seems likely to become the most important mechanism for the development and implementation of regional CSBMs.

Defence of Australia and Regional Contingencies

For a quarter of a century now, Australian defence planning has been focused essentially on the defence of the Australian continent, Australia's offshore territories, and the maritime approaches (the 'sea-air gap'), although it was not until the mid-1980s that the full range of principles and criteria were satisfactorily articulated in the basic strategic documentation. The depth of the commitment to the defence of Australia as opposed to forward operations is unassailable. Contingency plans are maintained only for contingent areas of operation in northern Australia and the sea-air gap. Since the very early 1970s, there has been no planning for Australian Defence Force (ADF) operations in Southeast Asia. The ADF command structure has been carefully tailored to independent but joint-service operations in defence of Australia - as evinced, for example, in the responsibilities and workings of the ADF Headquarters at Russell Hill in Canberra; the establishment of joint-service functional or environmental commands (Air Command, Maritime Command and Land Command); and the establishment of the in-theatre Northern Command (NORCOM) in Darwin. The major ADF exercises and training activities are concerned with operations in northern Australia and/or the sea-air gap. The ADF's force structure, from its major combatant elements to its communications and logistic support systems, has been designed for defence of Australia. Within Russell Hill, the only criterion that can be advanced in justification of equipment acquisitions and force structure changes is their cost-effectiveness for defence of Australia; whatever their utility in forward operations, it is inadmissible. Moreover, the ADF has had to accept that the defence of Australia is a national responsibility, which is beyond its own capabilities to satisfy unaided but which opens up a range of important civil resources for utilisation - such as domestic communications systems, medical services, transportation capabilities, repair and maintenance capabilities, and vital asset protection capabilities. The increasing dependence of the ADF on the civil infrastructure and the incorporation of civil support into ADF contingency plans and operational concepts effectively ties the ADF to the defence of Australia.

However, while it is possible to envisage a variety of low-level contingencies which could involve hostilities in northern Australia and
the immediate approaches, which could arise at quite short notice and which could be extremely challenging,\textsuperscript{23} they are generally fairly improbable. Employment of the ADF is less likely in defence of Australia contingencies than in forward operations.

The government has adumbrated three particular contingent situations in which ADF operations in the region might be authorised:

(i) the provision of support for a legitimate government in maintaining internal security;

(ii) counter-terrorist operations;

(iii) the protection or rescue of Australian citizens abroad, in both opposed and unopposed circumstances.\textsuperscript{24}

Elements of the Australian Defence Force have been placed on high readiness four times since the mid-1980s, in each case in response to a domestic contingency in a South Pacific state. The occasions were the Fiji coups in May and September 1987, the riot in Vanuatu in May 1988, and disturbances in Port Moresby in early 1989. In addition, at the beginning of 1990, preparations were made for the evacuation of Australian nationals from Bougainville.\textsuperscript{25}

It has been generally presumed that the sorts of capabilities that would be required for these regional operations would mostly have been acquired for the defence of Australia anyway. As the 1994 Defence White Paper stated:

Activities in support of our regional interests will not in themselves determine the force structure of the Australian Defence Force, but our existing capabilities will continue to provide us with the scope to undertake the full range of

\textsuperscript{23} See, for example, Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, pp.52-5; Ross Babbage, A Coast Too Long: Defending Australia Beyond the 1990s (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1990), especially pp.32-44; and J.O. Langtry and Desmond Ball (eds), The Northern Territory in the Defence of Australia: Strategic and Operational Considerations, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.73 (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1991).

\textsuperscript{24} Evans, Australia’s Regional Security, p.21.

\textsuperscript{25} Matthew Gubb, Vanuatu’s 1980 Santo Rebellion: International Responses to a Microstate Security Crisis, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.107 (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1994), p.40.
activities and projects necessary to support our regional objectives.26

Australia's surveillance and early warning networks, such as the Jindalee over-the-horizon radar system, the P-3C Orion long-range maritime patrol (LRMP) aircraft, and sophisticated signals intelligence capabilities, already provide regional coverage out to several thousand kilometres. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN)'s assets for operations in the sea-air gap (the FFG-7 frigates, the ANZAC frigates, and the Collins-class submarines) are well suited to regional operations; and the strategic and tactical mobility required for operations across the Australian continental mass provides the ADF with inherent mobility. Arguments have occurred over the requirements for a helicopter support ship and amphibious landing capabilities, which would be of clear utility in regional operations but which could also be justified in terms of contingencies in northern Australia (where internal lines of communication are sparse and could well be obstructed).

Nevertheless, there is increasing concern among some Australian defence analysts that the demands of regional engagement will inevitably impact on force structure development, at the expense of the capabilities required for the defence of Australia.27 Australia's substantial contributions to international peacekeeping operations (such as Cambodia in 1991-93, Somalia in 1993-94, and Rwanda in 1994) undoubtedly degraded the ADF's capability to effectively respond to some short-warning contingencies in northern Australia, but these were judged to be most improbable at the time. In 1993, strategic guidance admitted the possibility that peacekeeping operations and 'other activities in support of regional security ... can influence training and the acquisition of material for specific missions', though it reiterated that these 'do not determine the ADF's overall force structure'.28 Regional engagement, particularly with joint exercises a prominent feature, requires some inter-operability of equipment, to facilitate communications and mutual logistic support. Further, as regional activities command more of the attention of policy

27 See, for example, Alan Thompson, Australia's Strategic Defence Policy: A Drift Towards Neo-Forward Defence, Working Paper No.29 (Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, November 1994).
28 Robert Ray, Minister for Defence, Strategic Review 1993 (Defence Publications,
makers than defence of Australia planning, there is a concern that there will be strong and irresistible pressures from the Services to equip to meet the ADF's actual commitments rather than hypothetical "credible contingencies".29

Defence Cooperation

Defence cooperation between Australia and its Southeast Asian neighbours has burgeoned since the late 1980s. In 1993-94, Australia spent some $A229 million on cooperative defence activities with Asia-Pacific countries.

The United States remains Australia's most important ally, although the nature of the alliance has changed quite dramatically over the past couple of decades. The United States is no longer thought of in terms of the guarantor of Australia's defence, as was the case in the 1950s and 1960s. Rather, the important aspects of the relationship from Australia's point of view are the preferential access to US defence technology, which is important to maintain the high-technology focus of Australian defence strategy; the intelligence cooperation and exchange arrangements; and the access to the most senior strategic councils in Washington that derives from Australia's hosting of the important satellite early warning and signals intelligence ground stations at Nurrungar and Pine Gap. The ADF continues to be more involved with US rather than ASEAN defence forces in terms of joint exercises (with 42 per cent of its joint exercises being with US forces and 33 per cent with ASEAN forces in 1993-94), and the largest exercises in which the ADF is involved are the Australian-sponsored Kangaroo and US-sponsored Rimpac exercises. The ADF regards exercises with the United States as professionally the most rewarding of its joint exercise activities. More generally, the maintenance of close cooperation with US forces strengthens the framework of continued US presence and interest in the Western Pacific and hence works to alleviate some of the regional concern about the possibility of US withdrawal from the region.

However, the weight of the ADF's joint activities has moved decidedly towards the ASEAN countries with respect to most aspects

of Australia's defence cooperation. Even in the case of exercises, those with the ASEAN countries plus New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and South Pacific countries exceed those with the United States (53 per cent to 42 per cent in 1993-94).

Constraints on Further Enhancement of Australia's Defence Cooperation Activities

There are some very real constraints which are inevitably impacting on the further enhancement of defence cooperation between Australia and regional defence forces.

Resources are limited, and major cooperative programmes are not cheap. A quarter of a billion dollars out of a defence budget of $A10 billion is small in percentage terms (2.5 per cent) but it represents a major opportunity cost. In two years, it would amount to more than sufficient to cover the acquisition of an airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) capability, which remains one of the ADF's highest priority projects.

It was already evident in 1991 that the ADF (and, in particular, the RAN) was finding that its regional exercise commitments were impinging on the effective satisfaction of nationally oriented tasks and roles, and that further regional involvement could not be undertaken without increased allocation of resources to the ADF for the purpose of 'regional engagement'.

However, the resource demands of enhanced defence cooperation are not limited to financial allocations: perhaps of greater importance is the demand on management and planning resources. Much of the current range of exercise and other cooperative activity between Australia and the ASEAN defence forces remains almost ad hoc, lacking clear and coherent frameworks and modalities, and hence is very demanding in terms of planning and coordination effort. It is said that the management resources involved in the organisation of some PASSEXs can be as much as those required of the RAN for much larger but more routinised allied exercises such as RIMPAC; and, more

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30 See Desmond Ball, Building Blocks for Regional Security: An Australian Perspective on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) in the Asia/Pacific Region, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.83 (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1991), p.50.
generally, that the 'edges of the envelope' have been reached in terms of available staff resources, in both ASEAN defence forces and the ADF, to support much further expansion in joint exercise activities.

It is unlikely that the extraordinary pace of cooperative activity over the past several years can continue to increase over the foreseeable future. Rather, it is more likely that there will be a period of consolidation. Some of the particular activities initiated in the late 1980s and early 1990s will be further expanded, and some new areas of cooperation will undoubtedly be opened up, but the rate of growth of new activity will lessen. Rather, there should be greater emphasis on the institutionalisation (albeit informally) of the cooperative activities established over the past half decade; a more considered refinement of the activities to ensure that they serve the more general processes of regional cooperation rather than simply reflecting the ease of implementation; and more attention to the economic and political dimensions of the relationship to provide a sounder base for cooperation over the longer term.

There are other potential costs and dangers. Close interaction inevitably exposes vulnerabilities, whether they be weaknesses in doctrine and operational concepts or deficiencies in capabilities that might become apparent in joint exercises, or vulnerabilities in lines of communication, infrastructure and vital installations that could be appraised by regional defence forces exercising and training in Australia.

The Solidity of Australia's Regional Commitment

Prime Minister Keating has declared that 'nothing less than the future of this country as we enter the twenty first century' will be determined by the success of Australia's policies for Asian engagement, but there are significant elements of the Australian polity which remain to be persuaded about both the overall philosophy and logic of engagement and some important themes of the government's policies for engagement. The legacy of two centuries of ignorance, suspicion and fear concerning Asia remains potent. For most Australians, the kinship ties are with Europe rather than Asia.

There remains considerable opposition to high levels of Asian immigration and aspects of multiculturalism. Australia's economic relations with Europe and North America are robust and in important sectors are stronger than those with Asia. Nevertheless, people of Asian ethnicity now comprise some eight per cent (or 1.4 million out of 17 million) of the Australian population, and the figure is growing rapidly. Moreover, Australia has been at the forefront of the promotion and institutionalisation of economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region since the late sixties. The Opposition is supportive of the general thrust of the Government's policies of closer economic and security cooperation with our Asian neighbours, though a change of government might see a change in emphases, priorities and some aspects of policy (particularly where these are closely identified with particular personalities such as Prime Minister Keating and Foreign Minister Evans).

Public opinion is at sharp odds with government policy concerning important aspects of regional engagement, especially where relations with Indonesia are involved. According to a survey conducted in March-May 1993, for example, 57 per cent of voters believed that Indonesia would pose a security threat to Australia within 10-15 years; and only 28 per cent of voters thought that trade agreements with Indonesia were more important than differences over East Timor. These particular views are not shared by federal members of parliament (who polled 38 per cent and 55 per cent on these issues) or by policy makers in Canberra, and have had no evident impact on government policy; but when major themes of policy are not supported within public opinion, their future must remain at least somewhat problematic.

Australia's Policy Objectives

Australia's interests in Asia are broad and the objectives of Australia's regional engagement policies are manifold. There are domestic constituencies and foreign policy interests. The Prime Minister has said that:

32 Figures supplied by Charles Price.
34 ibid.
... our economic links with Asia are vital ... But it is a profound error to see that as the whole story ... our interest in Asia has a much broader focus and a much wider purpose. Success in the efforts we make in Asia will affect not just Australia's prosperity but our security ... And, more than that, closer engagement with Asia is already helping to transform Australian society ... Asian culture and Asian values will, in a very short time I believe, begin to work their impact on mainstream Australian culture ...35

Some dimensions of this 'wider purpose' have been fairly well articulated. The case for economic liberalism, including domestic deregulation and structural adjustment and free trade abroad, as well as for closer regional economic cooperation, has been argued at the highest national levels. The basis of Australia's regional security policies has also been publicly explained.36

On the other hand, other aspects of the 'wider purpose' remain unclear, and the key interrelationships between the various dimensions remain unarticulated. For example, the connection between the Asianisation of Australia's immigration flow and the increasing Asian ethnicity, and Australia's economic success in Asia has not been clearly explained. The Prime Minister has declared that 'Australia's Asian community will be a key' to the success of economic engagement,37 and has observed, more particularly, that Australians of Asian ethnicity can be used to 'get into' Asia,38 but there is little analytic base for this view.

The relevance of Australia's policy of multiculturalism to regional engagement is problematic. The kinship ties of Australia's Asian community are undoubtedly strong. But enthusiasm for cultural diversity is not a characteristic of most of our Asian neighbours.

36 See, in particular, Ray, Strategic Review 1993; and Ray, Defending Australia.
38 ibid., p.3.
Machinery for National and Regional Security Policy Making

Australian officials have proclaimed a multidimensional approach to Australian security policy and planning in which a comprehensive range of policy instruments - diplomacy, military capabilities, economic and trade relations, overseas development assistance, immigration policy, cultural relations, etc. - are composed to enhance Australia's security. However, Australia is yet to establish the necessary policy-making machinery for coordinating and providing coherence to these various dimensions of national security.

A major purpose of such national-level machinery would be to address the nexus between economic matters, defence activities and regional security developments, especially where hard choices have to be made between competing dimensions of Australia's regional engagement policy. Over the longer term (the next one or two decades), the success of Australia's engagement will be determined more by the ability of the economy to sustain high levels of real growth, to generate and capitalise on advanced technological products and processes, and to engage competitively and energetically in the international marketplace, than by the associations constructed through defence cooperation. This is not to gainsay the critical importance of cooperative defence activities. However, there are inevitable economic ramifications of a defence vote of $A10 billion - in terms of balance of payments on the external account, government deficits, and technological innovation, for example - but there is no mechanism for assessing the impact of defence spending on Australia's overall economic performance or the trade-offs that might be made between reduced defence activity and more vigorous economic activity.

An essential element of Australia's defence policy is the maintenance of a 'technological edge'. Given Australia's relatively small population and large area of defence responsibility, the defence of Australia is predicated on advanced technology - for command and

39 Evans, Australia's Regional Security, p.2.
40 For a discussion of the machinery required for coordinating the various military and non-military dimensions of Australian national security policy, see Desmond Ball, 'The Machinery for Making Australian National Security Policy in the 1980s' in Robert O'Neill and D.M. Horner (eds), Australian Defence Policy for the 1980s (University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 1982), chapter 10.
control, wide-area surveillance, air defence, combat information and electronic warfare. The rapid economic growth in the region, featuring advanced technological processes and products, will inevitably make it more difficult for Australia to maintain its technological edge. The promotion of Australian defence industrial exports, justified in part to sustain an indigenous high-technology base for the defence of Australia, could lead to the diffusion of those very technologies most required for the ADF’s technological superiority. The complexities of these critical issues, at the junction of economic, technological, defence and regional security domains, demand consideration in the broadest national terms at the highest policy-making levels.

Similarly, there is no satisfactory mechanism for addressing the optimum allocations of resources and responsibilities for the foreign policy and defence instruments of regional cooperation. How is it known that a vote of $A10 billion for defence against remote contingencies as compared to vote of $A2.365 billion for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (including just $A400 million for all international relations, trade and business liaison, and $A1.36 billion for development cooperation)⁴¹ is the most appropriate balance of resources and activity?

The legs of self-reliance and regional cooperation need to be carefully balanced. The pursuit of self-reliance can easily go too far - emphasising independent military strength to the effective exclusion of other dimensions of security, which is expensive in terms of resources, stimulates regional tension and arms competition, and leads to a degraded regional security environment and hence to a diminution of national security broadly defined. On the other hand, placing national security hostage to the vagaries of cooperative relationships is simply unrealistic. Determining the right balance between self-reliance and regional cooperation is a very difficult exercise.

Balancing the two legs of defence of Australia and cooperative engagement is complicated by the inherent tensions between them. This is manifested in the superficial contradictions that the ADF prepares for hypothetical contingencies in northern Australia when it is much more likely to be ordered to service in regional situations; and that the ADF is enjoined from using regional operations as a

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determinant of force structure planning or a criteria for major capability acquisitions when the activities in which it is most actively engaged are in the region - whether peacekeeping operations or cooperative training and exercise activities.

But the tensions are more fundamental than this, and, in the absence of clear policy guidance and careful management, risk crippling each of the respective legs. As Pauline Kerr and Andrew Mack have argued, there is 'a certain tension' involved in the defence policy of arming against 'potential threat from the same Southeast Asian nations with which it is seeking to cooperate more intensively'.

On the one hand, if there is any real possibility of Australia's neighbours becoming military threats, Australia will have exposed its deficiencies and vulnerabilities to its potential enemies. But if there is no such possibility, a $A10 billion defence vote is not only economically wasteful but could raise regional anxieties, cause offsetting regional acquisitions and force structure developments, and undercut the prospects for regional cooperation.

And with respect to the 'defence of Australia' leg, Alan Thompson has argued that 'the two elements of self reliant defence and regional engagement, although theoretically compatible, are in practical terms contradictory'. Resources are finite and capabilities for some defence of Australia contingencies remain 'deficient in many and fundamental respects'; but the requirements for regional operations (including peacekeeping) are substantially different than those for these contingencies, and the dynamics of regional activities will inevitably divert resources and capabilities away from an adequately self-reliant defence of Australia posture.

The reality is more complex but less contradictory, and more manageable, than the direness of these arguments suggests. There is no inherent contradiction between self-reliance and cooperation. Regional strategic circumstances are currently quite benign, but uncertainty abounds, and politico stratégic changes of great moment.

43 Thompson, *Australia's Strategic Defence Policy*, p.11.
44 ibid., pp.11-13.
can occur much faster than the responses that might be required in terms of capability development. The ADF has been structured in part to possess capabilities for dealing with short-warning contingencies that would be low level almost by definition; and in part to provide a base for expansion should regional circumstances substantially deteriorate and major war become conceivable (a base that is methodologically structured on the basis of assessments of likely warning times and that would expand and adapt as informed by intelligence indicators) - but in neither case are capabilities maintained which any of Australia's neighbours have found or could find to be threatening. And, the concern that a 'neo-forward defence' agenda is now driving Australian defence policy at the expense of critical defence of Australia requirements is unsubstantiated. The depth of the ADF's commitment to the defence of Australia - in terms of its command and control structure, contingency planning, training and exercising, officer development, force structure development, doctrine and operational concepts, and reliance upon the civil infrastructure - is unassailable. Nevertheless, the tensions are real, and laxity in strategic guidance or carelessness in management could lead quickly to crippling imbalance and quite disturbing consequences.

**Defence Cooperation: Objectives, Presumptions, Costs and Priorities**

Defence cooperation is fundamental to Australia's policy of regional engagement. Cooperative defence activities have burgeoned since around 1989, and the results have undoubtedly been quite positive in terms of increasing trust, reducing the likelihood of misperceptions and misunderstandings, promoting constructive security discourses and modalities, and improving the regional security environment. But the activity is expensive and may be reaching satiation. The essentially ad hoc growth of the past decade or so cannot continue, and several fundamental issues can no longer be avoided.

To begin with, a quarter of a billion dollars, or 2.5 per cent of the defence vote, is now being spent on 'Defence's wider engagement with the Asia-Pacific'. However, much of this is associated with

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activities which would be undertaken, at least in large measure, even in the absence of cooperative arrangements - such as the Operation Gateway P-3C Orion LRMP maritime surveillance patrols in the eastern Indian Ocean and the South China Sea ($A11.073 million in 1993-94) and much of the exercise activity ($A123.95 million in 1993-94). The incremental cost of the cooperative activities, which is the essential primary element of any cost-benefit assessment of defence engagement, does not seem to have been calculated. In any event, whether it be a quarter of a billion dollars or some incremental factor, its strategic basis has never been determined. Why not spend $A150 million instead of $A228.963 million; why spend 2.5 per cent of the vote rather than, say, five per cent? It is impossible to precisely quantity the benefits being achieved, but some judgement has to be made as to whether a quarter of a billion dollars is the optimum figure, given ADF budgetary limitations and the shape of the marginal returns curve around that figure. It could well be that diminishing returns are now attending the sorts of cooperative activities that have featured in the recent burgeoning.

Much of the current cooperative activity is founded on bilateral arrangements established before concepts and policies of cooperative security were proclaimed; but it has evolved rapidly, and without due consideration to the particular objectives being sought. The purposes and requirements of closer military contacts, of transparency in exercise activities and weapons acquisitions, of preventive diplomacy and preventive deployments, or of constructing a regional security architecture based on 'common security' are quite different and in some important respects inconsistent. (The entrenchment of military interests and perspectives in the essence of cooperative regional endeavours is unlikely to promote the prospects for a 'common security' system.)

But even if the objectives and purposes of these cooperative activities were unambiguously clear, the means and processes by which they might be achieved are not. As Pauline Kerr and Andrew Mack have pointed out:

[There is] an area which has received insufficient attention on the regional security research agenda. It is now almost axiomatic in the Australian security community, official as

46 ibid.
As academic, that confidence building measures, limited transparency and increased defense cooperation are security enhancing. We agree, yet there have been no arguments made, nor research undertaken, to demonstrate how CSBMs and defense cooperation are supposed to build confidence and enhance security. This is not a trivial issue since some military planners believe that some CSBMs can undermine security.\footnote{Kerr and Mack, 'The Future of Asia-Pacific Security Studies in Australia', p.51.}

The logical basis of the security enhancement rationales of some of the most prominent cooperative activities is very presumptive. As Pauline Kerr and Andrew Mack have noted: 'Neither the Defence Department nor the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade have explained publicly why they believe that building linkages with Southeast Asia will necessarily make Australia more secure'.\footnote{ibid., p.36.} Personal contacts are supposed to build friendships and trust, but familiarity can also breed contempt. Personalities are not always able to manage major historical events; focus on personal relations can inspire false confidence and distract from more substantive endeavours. Transparency is supposed to build trust, but it can also expose vulnerabilities (in both intelligence collection and force structure capabilities), and it can remove the uncertainty about the capabilities of potential adversaries that sometimes serves to enhance deterrence (or induce caution). The friendships, trust and common practices promoted by joint exercises can be flimsy constructs in stormy political weather. When a Filipina maid was hanged in Singapore in March 1995, the public outrage in the Philippines caused a major diplomatic rupture between Singapore and Manila; a joint exercise underway between elements of the Singaporean and Filipino defence forces was wound up early and the Singaporeans flown home.\footnote{Lindsay Murdoch, 'Outrage as Maid's Body Returned Home', \textit{Sydney Morning Herald}, 20 March 1995, p.12.}

Whatever the benefits being gained from defence cooperation, they are heavily qualified and should be assessed against the costs - and not just the financial outlay, but also the staff resources, the vulnerabilities exposed, and the impact on training requirements and capabilities for the defence of Australia.
And within the range of cooperative activities, there is a need for informed guidance with respect to priorities - in terms of countries to be favoured, types of activities undertaken, and values being sought. Are joint exercises more productive than training programmes? How much effort should be expanded on engagement with defence forces in Northeast as opposed to Southeast Asia? How are the relative merits of an air defence exercise with Malaysia, a counter-terrorist training programme with Indonesian Special Forces (Kopassus), and a multinational 'fleet concentration period' in Australian waters to be imputed?

Fiscal and capability constraints, together with diminishing returns in some areas, will require a new agenda for defence cooperation. The ADF cannot sustain a rate of more than two dozen major joint exercises a year (or one a fortnight!). Less progress can be made with networking the important bilateral arrangements in the future because most of the connections have now been made. Further moves to multilateralism in exercises and training programmes are unlikely to produce returns that might be anticipated, particularly in sophisticated activities such as pilot training, where the best skills have already been extracted through bilateral programmes.50

Australian defence planners must now begin discussions with their regional counterparts about their future common directions. Decisions need to be made and policies formulated - with respect to the purposes to be achieved, the most promising means of achieving them, and the level of resources and effort to be devoted to them - to guide the defence cooperation processes over the next half decade and ensure their constructive contribution to regional security is maximised.

Conclusions

The changes that have occurred in Australia's approach to the Asia-Pacific region over the past quarter of a century, and especially the past decade, have amounted to a profound transformation. As the

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Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Gareth Evans, stated in October 1991:

The great turn-around in contemporary Australian history is that the region from which we sought in the past to protect ourselves - whether by esoteric dictation tests for would-be immigrants, or tariffs, or alliances with the distant great and powerful - is now the region which offers Australia the most. It has come to be accepted now almost as a commonplace that our future lies in the Asia Pacific region. This is where we live, must survive strategically, and find a place and role if we are to develop our full potential as a nation.\(^{51}\)

There is no doubt about the commitment of the Australian government to constructive and cooperative engagement with Asia. However, Australia does not have a strategy for Asia-Pacific security - that is, a clear and coherent set of policies, balanced objectives, and means of implementation which are carefully tailored to the political and resource constraints. Rather, Australia has a high level of professed commitment to a set of policies which have been articulated to greater and lesser extents, but the connections between which have been sketched only in outline. They contain conceptual tensions and potential policy dilemmas. Compromises in policy development, sub-optimisation in policy implementation, and distortions introduced by political and historical circumstances are inevitable. However, some issues will have to be addressed soon if the engagement process is to be effectively and efficiently managed.

The general thrusts of Australia's policies of regional engagement are not in question. By and large they accord with the changes in international relations in the post-Cold World, and more particularly with the economic and strategic developments in the Asia-Pacific region, including a shared appreciation of the imperatives for regional cooperation to address emergent regional security concerns. However, there are critical conceptual issues which remain in question, such as the link between high levels of economic interdependence and the promotion of regional stability. And there are important themes of the government's policies, such as the 'special

\(^{51}\) Cited in Senator Gareth Evans, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'Australia in East Asia and the Asia Pacific: Beyond the Looking Glass' (Lecture to the Asia-Australia Institute, Sydney, 20 March 1995), p.1.
relationship' with Indonesia in foreign policy and some aspects of multiculturalism in domestic policy, which remain contested.

Australia has proclaimed a multidimensional approach to regional security, involving the careful development and composition of foreign policy and diplomacy, defence capabilities and activities, trade and investment, development assistance, immigration policy, and educational and cultural activities. It reflects a realistic appraisal of the broadening but increasingly complex nature of national and regional security. However, Australia lacks the national policy-making machinery to coordinate and oversee such multidimensional activities. Critical issues such as the relationship between defence expenditure and economic performance, and their respective contributions to regional engagement, or the relationship between ethnic pluralism and regional engagement, remain inadequately addressed.

Australia's core security policies are defence self-reliance and regional cooperation. Although containing inherent tensions, their composition is a rational response to regional uncertainty. As Sun Tzu proclaimed around 400 BC: 'To rely on rustics and not prepare is the greatest of crimes; to be prepared beforehand for any contingency is the greatest of virtues'.52 Prudence requires a careful admixture of policies of greater self-reliance and enhanced regional dialogue and cooperation - or, more generally, in Indonesian terms, 'each country's Ketahanan Nasional (National Resilience) is the precondition of achieving Ketahanan Regional (Regional Resilience)'.53

However, the legs of self-reliance and regional cooperation need to be carefully balanced. The pursuit of self-reliance can become nugatory; but the experiment with cooperation contains risks, has costs, and is founded on many important presumptions. Determining the right balance is a very difficult task. It requires a cost-effective analysis of the quarter of a billion dollars currently being spent by the Defence Department on regional engagement of a kind -

comprehensive, systematic, and informed by clear guidance as to objectives and resources - that is yet to be undertaken.

It is time for a stocktake of Australia's regional security policies and activities. The extraordinary pace of cooperative activity over the past half decade cannot be reproduced over the next. Such progress has been made with the strengthening and networking of pre-existing bilateral arrangements, in important areas such as exchanges of intelligence assessments and dialogue on confidence-building measures, that consolidation rather than further expansion now occupies attention; diminishing returns are obtaining with some activities (for example, some joint exercises and training programmes, although not with information exchanges); and the pressures on the ADF are becoming unbearable (for example, with respect to staff resources, core defence of Australia exercises, and capabilities for regional operations). Although important elements of this stocktake are quite properly matters for Australian debate and decision, such as the capability requirements for defence of Australia and the amount of resources to be devoted to defence engagement, other elements should be addressed in close consultation with our neighbours (for example, our defence cooperation programmes and our initiatives for trust building). It will be an exciting exercise: the conceptual issues are fascinating and the policy issues are among the most consequential facing Australia today.
CHAPTER 2

THE EVOLUTION AND FUTURE OF AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE POLICY

Paul Dibb

Overview

Over the last thirty years, Australian defence policy has changed dramatically from being heavily dependent on allies and planning against (communist) threats from Asia to having a self-reliant defence posture, which gives priority to the defence of Australia and to strategic partnership with our immediate region, as well as to the US alliance. This move by Australia from forward defence to seeing its security being inextricably bound together with - rather than against - Asia is all the more remarkable when it is considered that for the first 150 years of settlement it was Europe, not Asia, that was the predominant focus of Australia's foreign and defence policies. Moreover, Australia's dependence on a great and powerful protector - the United States - continued for almost three decades after the end of the Second World War with our forward military commitments in Korea and Vietnam. It was not until the early 1970s that a more independent defence policy began to emerge.

Tom Millar was at the forefront of this radical change in strategic thinking and it underpinned his push to have the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre created in 1966. His book *Australia's Defence*¹ was a pioneering work and he continued to have a burning interest in Australia's defence policy for the next thirty years. Writing in 1977, he felt that Australia had a continuing sense of strategic dependence that was buttressed 'by solemn talk and largely token gestures'. He was sceptical about the concept of defence warning time (and frequently berated this writer about it) and he worried about Australia's 'immense natural wealth, its open spaces, and the indolent spirit of much of the populace'.²

Millar did not believe that Australia should reconcile itself to becoming 'a Eurasian society' and he doubted our ability to attain a real measure of defence self-reliance. He was also a fervent anti-communist (believing right until the late 1980s that communist ideology was important in the USSR) and a strong supporter of the US alliance.

Tom Millar thought that Australia could not contemplate the future without the American alliance and that Australia had to be amenable to American influence and responsive to US interests: this was the penalty for a privileged position. Although he argued over many years for a strong Australian defence he felt that the defence of Australia concepts that became official policy in the late 1980s were too narrow and risked isolation. Dependence on the US alliance was seen in Tom Millar's philosophy as the price of security, if not of survival.

It is not, however, the purpose of this paper to analyse Tom's prolific writings on Australian defence policy - which speak for themselves. Instead, the aim is to:

* trace the evolution of Australia's defence policy since the early 1970s; and
* analyse the future strategic outlook and assess its implications for both defence policy and force structure, as well as the alliance relationship with the United States.

**Evolution: From Dependence to Independence in Australia's Defence Policy**

Ideas for a more independent Australian defence policy were being developed in classified thinking in the late 1960s, but it was the *Australian Defence Review* of 1972 that registered in the public mind the concept that the fundamental objective of Australian defence policy was the independence and security of Australia, rather than forward defence as a subordinate ally. The 1972 Defence Review recognised, for the first time publicly, that Australia required an 'increasingly self-reliant military strength'. But it stated that the best defence of Australia's interests was seen 'to go beyond the defence of Australian

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The region comprising Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific was seen as a major determinant of the security of 'our territory and interests'. Geography was identified as having 'a compelling influence' on Australian security: in particular, the size and nature of the continent and its ocean surrounds 'would create major difficulties for an enemy attempting to occupy any part of the country'.

The 1972 Review also clearly recognised that the United States expected its friends and allies to share more of the burdens of defence and that the 'first call for their own defence must be upon their own combat resources'. The Review implicitly judged that it would be prudent for Australia not to rest its security as directly or as heavily as its previous peacetime history on the military power of the United States. Self-reliance was seen as laying claim to being 'a central feature in the future development of Australia's defence policy'. Thus, short of overwhelming military challenges, Australia had the primary responsibility for its own (conventional) defence. It was foreshadowed in the 1972 Review that Australia would move progressively in the 1970s and 1980s towards 'a more independent and improving national defence capability'. Specific mention was made (albeit without prejudice to the foreseeable requirements for ground forces) of the need to improve Australia's independent naval and air strength into the 'ocean and archipelago environs' of the continent. The need for joint force operations rather than single-service approaches to defence planning was also highlighted.

In many ways then, the 1972 Defence Review was a path-breaking document. It clearly foreshadowed much of Australia's current defence policy.

A great deal of the credit for this revolution in Australian defence policy must go to Sir Arthur Tange, the then Secretary of the Department of Defence, who gathered around him some of the best
strategic thinkers in the country (W. Pritchett, R. Hamilton, R. Furlonger, G. Jockel, for instance). But Tange did not only concentrate on the need for changed strategic thinking: he brought about in one bold administrative action the most important reorganisation to Australia's higher defence machinery since federation. Sir Arthur's report to the government in November 1973, *Australian Defence: Report on the Reorganisation of the Defence Group of Departments*,\(^\text{11}\) recommended a single Department of Defence which would combine the whole of the activities previously comprehended by the Departments of Navy, Army, Air, Defence and specific areas of the Department of Supply. The Service Boards were to be abolished and a Chief of Defence Force Staff (as distinct from the previous position of Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee) was to be created. Most importantly, a departmental organisation concerned with strategic policy and force development was created, as well as an organisation for the management of the new Five Year Defence Program. Tange's report, which was accepted by government, was intended to break down the separation of single-service authority from the Department of Defence and to ensure, through the diarchy of the Secretary and the Chief of Defence Force Staff, the appropriate checks and balances of military and civilian advice to government. The recommendations of this far-reaching report remain at the essence of today's organisation of the Department of Defence.

In 1976 the government issued a White Paper (*Australian Defence*), which addressed in more detail the fundamental strategic issues raised in the 1972 Review. Again, key concepts canvassed in this document - such as self-reliance, warning time and the role of intelligence advice, levels of conflict, the need for defence bases in the north of Australia, the identification of Australia's area of primary strategic interest, the need to retain a margin of technological advantage - are all expressed in ways that are perfectly familiar to today's reader. Furthermore, the 1976 White Paper, whilst stressing the 'many important practical advantages'\(^\text{12}\) flowing to Australia from

\(^{11}\) (Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, November 1973) [Tange Report].

its defence relations with the United States, emphasised that Australia would:

... no longer base our policy on the expectation that Australia's Navy or Army or Air Force will be sent abroad to fight as part of some other nation's force, supported by it ... we believe that any operations are much more likely to be in our own neighbourhood than in some distant or forward theatre, and that our Armed Services would be conducting joint operations together as the Australian Defence Force.¹³

I have spent some time here retracing the evolution of Australian defence policy twenty years ago because it is important to recall how the fundamental basis of current Australian strategic thinking and defence planning evolved. Some commentators seem to believe that this writer's report in 1986 (Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities)¹⁴ to the then Minister for Defence, K.C. Beazley, began from a clean sheet of paper. Evidently it did not. Moreover, although my terms of reference instructed me to examine the content, priorities and rationale of defence forward planning and to advise on which capabilities were appropriate for Australia's future defence requirements, this task was to be undertaken in the light of the strategic (and financial) planning guidance endorsed by the government.

Why then was my Review required? Despite the undoubted progress made in previous years, especially in the area of strategic analysis, the higher defence machinery had simply not been able to agree on a basis and rationale for the structure of the Australian Defence Force, let alone particular force structure priorities. For the whole of the previous year before Beazley commissioned the Dibb Review, the Secretary and Chief of Defence Force Staff, and their senior advisors, had exchanged over a hundred pages of memoranda registering their disagreement with each other on every conceivable aspect of priorities for structuring the defence force. My task was to deliver a compromise and, in the discussion of the Dibb Review in the public domain, to act as a stalking-horse (some would say fall-guy) for the government's next White Paper. In the event, and armed with the

¹³ ibid., p.10.
authority of the Minister, a compromise was agreed which set out a detailed programme for force structure priorities for the next decade. The Review aimed to satisfy (or at least straddle) the theological debate on warning time and levels of threat by introducing the concept of escalated low-level conflict. It sought to give priority to intelligence, surveillance, and command and control. It proposed a new type of surface combatant for the navy (later to grow somewhat and become the ANZAC frigate) and the urgent acquisition of a mine countermeasures force. It proposed transferring the air force's operational control of helicopters to the army, and it envisaged an army that was lighter, more mobile and more focused on the north of Australia. It proposed a combat role for the reserves in the north of the continent. Contrary to some expectations, the Review supported retention of the F-111 strike force.

The reaction to these proposals by government was favourable and the Secretary and the Chief of Defence Force Staff jointly signed an historic minute to the Minister recording their general agreement - subject, of course, to disagreements with each other on some matters of detail and to some of the language in the Review. The US administration, however, initially reacted adversely to the Review, seeing it as overly preoccupied with the defence of Australia and as not giving sufficient attention, including in matters of force structure, to the containment of the Soviet Union. After a fairly vigorous exchange between Beazley and the US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinburger, it was decided to draft a White Paper that retained most of the essential force structure proposals in the Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities whilst conceding to American demands by coming up with the idea of defence self-reliance 'within a framework of alliances and agreements'. Considerable space was given in the government's 1987 White Paper, The Defence of Australia 1987, to the importance of the alliance with the United States and to Australia's support of the ability of the United States 'to retain an effective strategic balance with the Soviet Union'. Fears were expressed that a redistribution of power in favour of the Soviet Union in the central balance, or an extension of Soviet influence in our region at the expense of the United States, would be a matter of fundamental

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concern to Australia ...'. The then Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, and his senior intelligence advisers had views on the Soviet Union's strengths as a challenger to the United States that were not shared by this author.

The 1987 White Paper set a blue-print for force structure priorities which - with modifications to reflect budgetary constraints - remains as a fundamental guide to Australia's defence force planning almost a decade later. In many ways, the 1987 White Paper was before its time because, despite the window-dressing about the global superpower confrontation, it proposed both a defence policy and a detailed force structure which for the first time in Australian history were driven by national interests rather than those of allies. Of course, the alliance remained important - and was identified in the 1989 document Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s, as being 'central' to our defence policy - but clearly a more balanced and equal relationship was emerging.

In the 1990s, Australian defence policy has shifted in two areas. Our changing strategic environment with the end of the Cold War has focused Australia's defence interests on the need for a form of strategic partnership with Southeast Asia, and Australia's economic circumstances and reduced defence budget have forced the Department of Defence to examine areas of cost saving and efficiency measures. Alan Wrigley's 1990 report on The Defence Force and the Community was a catalyst for far-reaching change of the approach by defence to commercialisation and contracting out. Wrigley made wide-ranging recommendations which - if accepted - would also have had profound implications for the force structure. His idea of sovereignty-defence tasks and constabulary tasks was not accepted by government; neither were his proposals to cut the regular ADF force components (especially the army) deeply and replace them with a part-time citizens' militia. Wrigley's attempts to reinterpret strategic guidance freely were not endorsed by government but his advice about transferring some important defence activities to the private

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16 ibid.
18 Published subsequently (Department of Defence, Canberra, 1992).
19 The Defence Force and the Community: A Partnership in Australia's Defence, Report to the Minister for Defence by Alan K. Wrigley (Australian Government Publishing
sector was accepted. The Commercial Support Program is currently yielding to defence net recurring savings of some $A100 million annually.

About the time of the Wrigley Report, the Minister for Defence, Senator Robert Ray, commissioned the Force Structure Review, which argued for a smaller, leaner defence force that would place greater emphasis on the reserve elements of the ADF. The Force Structure Review took very much into account the likely constrained resource environment facing defence. It proposed a long-term restructuring programme that would maintain the momentum of the 1987 White Paper by converting some combat capabilities - principally in the army - to the reserves, by greater efficiency in support and maintenance functions for all three services, and by some adjustments to the major capital investment programme. The central idea was to free up resources within a heavily committed forward programme to allow new investment proposals to be developed in the second half of the 1990s. This was seen as important because from the first decade of the next century there will be heavy demands to replace obsolete equipment. Consequently, the scope of new initiatives lies mainly in this decade. Within a limited resource framework, the Force Structure Review supported continuing substantial investment in intelligence and surveillance capabilities. (In 1989 the Secretary of Defence, Tony Ayers, deemed the defence intelligence function to be sufficiently important to change the title and responsibilities of the old 'Dep Sec B' position to Deputy Secretary [Strategy and Intelligence].)

The drive for greater efficiency in defence activities, especially in the use of personnel, encouraged the Force Structure Review to recommend personnel reductions (service and civilian) of some 14,000 out of a total military and civilian force of 93,000: a reduction of 15.3 per cent. These reductions in personnel, which were to be partly offset by the introduction of some 4,000 Ready Reserves and the exchange of about 5,000 positions for commercial contractor support, were made because of declining financial guidance from government and a desire to complete the central elements of the force structure programme for the defence of Australia identified in the 1987 White Paper.

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20 Service, Canberra, June 1990) [Wrigley Report].
The other aspect of the government's review of defence policy was to re-examine the strategic environment after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Strategic Review 1993 began this process as a precursor to a new White Paper which was to consider the long-term strategic outlook in the next century. Strategic Review 1993, however, had a shorter time-frame of three to five years: it was most noteworthy for highlighting the extent to which Australia's security is now linked to that of our region and the importance accordingly attached to Australia's security as being 'in and with the region'. In particular, Strategic Review 1993 introduced the concept of the need for a strategic partnership with Southeast Asia:

Our growing national links with South-East Asia have important implications for Defence. Increasingly, our defence relationships with South-East Asia will be characterised by the concept of partnership ... Australia has the opportunity to develop new patterns of defence relationships with South-East Asia that will strengthen the future security of the region ... we should aim to develop defence relationships based on the concept of partnership that increasingly reflect the growing sophistication of regional capabilities, regional perceptions of a more complex strategic environment, and the evolution of a sense of a regional security community.21

This concept of strategic partnership mirrored the government's economic emphasis on Australia being part of Asia. As a result, the treatment of Australia's strategic circumstances in Strategic Review 1993 placed regional security before its description of the defence relationship with the United States and also before its analysis of Australia's defence posture, even though the Minister for Defence, Senator Robert Ray, described the defence of Australia as remaining 'at the heart of Australia's defence policy'. In some ways, Strategic Review 1993 reads rather more like a foreign policy document than a defence planners' view of the world. This was natural given the rapidly changing global and regional strategic outlook - as well as the escalating demands for UN peacekeeping operations - but it did not provide a sufficiently detailed or rigorous intellectual framework for Australia's force structure planning needs into the twenty-first century. Some of the early drafting apparently tried to conflate credible levels

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of threat with the idea of major conflict - but without the analytical framework or intelligence advice to support such views. As the re-drafting process proceeded to more senior levels of responsibility and drafts had to survive the professional opinion of senior defence committees and the interdepartmental review process, those assumptions did not survive.

Many of the themes of Strategic Review 1993 were carried over into the new 1994 Defence White Paper, Defending Australia:

- the uncertain and fluid nature of the post-Cold War strategic outlook;
- the view that superpower rivalry will be replaced with a more complex and changing balance of regional powers;
- the fact that the United States will have difficulty coping with the multiple challenges of the post-Cold War era and at the same time remaking its own economic and social system;
- the judgement that Australia's growing interdependence with Asia requires an active role in emerging security dialogue, including the promotion of sound and publicly visible strategic assessment and force structure processes; and
- the constrained resource outlook, but with continued funding for investment being necessary to manage block obsolescence in the first decade of the next century.

Strategic Review 1993 ended with an appeal for 'adequate sustained defence funding'. This issue was addressed by Government in the 1994 Defence White Paper by a rather vague commitment to sustain defence expenditure 'at approximately 2 per cent of Gross Domestic Product', although there is a recognition that some modest real growth in defence spending will be needed later this decade and in the following decade. This crucial issue of the appropriate level of defence spending will be examined later. It is sufficient to note here that many of the newspaper editorials commenting on the 1994 Defence White Paper remarked upon the apparent gap between the careful and tough-minded strategic analysis in the document and its

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23 ibid., p.146.
rather vague financial commitment. The problem, of course, is that the analysis of a more uncertain and complex strategic outlook in the Asia-Pacific region has not led to the identification of any specific military threat - either now or foreseeably. At a time of serious fiscal problems to do with the budget deficit, this has naturally caused ministers to be convinced that a modest commitment to forward defence expenditure is sufficient. (Some of the government's economic advisers in Treasury and Finance have a much less positive attitude to the future security of the nation than their political masters.)

In fact, the most striking part of the 1994 Defence White Paper is its hard-edged treatment of the long-range strategic outlook at a time when many so-called strategic experts are talking about 'the Pacific century' and how growing economic interdependence and democratisation in the region will lead to a prolonged period of peace. Clearly, this is one possible scenario. But the 1994 Defence White Paper is not nearly so sanguine. The Minister for Defence, Robert Ray, in his preface to the White Paper, talks about new trends 'which will transform Australia's strategic environment over coming years'. The White Paper looks ahead fifteen years to describe the key international trends that will shape Australia's strategic environment. These trends are not seen as threatening but they are described as being 'more demanding'. At the same time, it is recognised that Australia's technological edge will be eroded. The Defence Department no longer talks about Australia's margin of technological advantage (or, as it is was described in the late 1970s, our margin of technological superiority), but instead the White Paper focuses policy on exploiting Australia's defence science and technology and industry capabilities to sustain a technological edge in areas of excellence. These areas are identified as:

- intelligence collection, evaluation and distribution;
- surveillance and reconnaissance;
- command and control;
- key weapons and sensors; and
- electronic warfare.

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24 ibid., p.iii.
Increasingly, these areas of excellence will inform Australia's force structure planning and the priority requirements from defence industry. It will, however, be increasingly difficult for us to sustain a technological edge as more capable weapons are introduced into the region and as Asia's technological and educational prowess improves under the impetus of rapid economic growth.

This decline in our relative military standing and capacity will come at a time of great strategic uncertainty. In many ways Australia will be more alone strategically than it has been for 50 years: in the post-Cold War world alliances are becoming less certain and dependable as the over-arching vision of a Western strategic community aligned against the common threat - the USSR - disappears and is replaced by competing national interests and an overwhelming focus on regional strategic demands. As the White Paper notes, Australia's security (and the likelihood or not of armed attack on Australia) will now depend on strategic developments in Asia. The US alliance is seen as 'a key element of our defence policy' (no longer, it will be noted, the central element). The White Paper foresees (perhaps too optimistically) that the United States will remain strategically engaged in Asia 'for as far ahead as we can see'. But although the United States will remain the strongest global power, the White Paper acknowledges that the relative military strength of other powers in Asia will grow over time and that the nature and perception of American interests and the capabilities of US forces will change. The White Paper observes dryly that Australia's defence relationship with the US will require 'careful management' and that Australian and US perspectives on regional issues 'will differ sometimes'. It also makes explicit (as every defence White Paper since 1976 has done) that Australia does not rely for its defence on combat assistance from the United States, although it is acknowledged that the undertakings in the ANZUS Treaty, and the US record of standing by its allies, mean that we could expect 'substantial and invaluable help in a crisis'.

Thus the US alliance remains an important factor of continuity in Australian strategic analysis. What is new, however, is how two major trends will change Australia's strategic environment over the next fifteen years: one is the changing strategic postures and relationships of the major powers in Asia; the other is economic...
change throughout Asia, which is increasing the military and strategic potential of countries in the region.

As a result of these trends and of political change which can be expected in a number of countries (such as China, Japan, Vietnam, and Indonesia), the strategic outlook in the region will become more fluid and uncertain, and military capabilities throughout our region will grow. By the year 2000, Asia will spend more on defence than NATO Europe; it already outspends the Middle East by a ratio of three to one. In strategically significant parts of the region there is a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological) and their means of delivery by ballistic missiles. Throughout the region - with very few exceptions - advanced conventional weapons (such as F-16 and F-18 fighter aircraft; warships with Harpoon or Exocet surface-to-surface missiles, capable air defence systems, and embarked helicopters; diesel electric submarines; modern electronic warfare and communications fits) are increasingly affordable and are being introduced rapidly into service - generally with foreign assistance. All this means that Australia's strategic environment will become more demanding. It also means that the scale and intensity of possible low-level conflict, (or short-warning conflict, to use the White Paper's terminology) will increase and the potential demands of such conflict on the ADF will also rise.

In sum, the 1994 Defence White Paper marks an historic watershed in analysing Australia's strategic environment free from the ideological challenge of the Cold War and the global dimensions of the alliance with the United States. It is a much more regionally focused document but - unlike Strategic Review 1993 - it gives central attention to the capability demands of the defence of Australia whilst stressing the importance of strategic partnership with Southeast Asia and the continuing importance and relevance of the alliance with the United States. In many ways, the 1994 Defence White Paper marks the maturing of Australia as a nation. The views expressed in it are uniquely national and they were formulated without the pressure of conforming to external, great-power expectations.

**Future Directions for Australian Defence Policy**

What then of the future? How do we see Australian defence policy changing over the next fifteen years? Are radical changes in
prospect, either due to external circumstances or domestic economic or political factors?

On the domestic front, and no matter what the politicians claim, there is now a basic bipartisan approach to Australian defence policy. The Soviet Union no longer exists as an ideological bogey man to be exploited in Australian domestic politics. Both sides (Labor and Liberal-National Coalition) agree on the continuing importance of the US alliance and of the imperative of closer defence relations with our immediate region. Differences of view seem to centre more these days around the funding base (although the Coalition has not committed itself to spending any more on defence), the operational capabilities of the ADF (the Coalition states that it would have more combat-ready troops, spend more on training and operational readiness, and would not have such a hollow force structure), and the acquisition of capabilities for operations beyond the defence of Australia. But the Coalition has not yet devised a credible alternative strategic blueprint that would allow it to ascribe priorities to force structure funding in a logical and intellectually rigorous way.

Defence spending seems likely to stay at about present levels - irrespective of which party is in power - barring dramatic and unforeseen change to our strategic circumstances. But there is a serious problem here. On current growth rates in the economy and given the extrapolation of current financial guidance for the defence budget, defence spending will soon fall below 2 per cent of GDP. There is nothing magic about this particular figure, except it will put us well below most spending ratios in our region and so will undermine Australia's desire to show military leadership in the region. It risks Australia becoming rather like New Zealand: not being seen to have the minimum force structure required for our own defence.

The external strategic outlook is more variable. We can say, on the positive side, that Australia faces no foreseeable military threat and that global conflict between the major powers is now a remote prospect. From a less certain perspective, however, the shifting balance of power in Asia could conceivably face Australia in the longer term with an unfavourable correlation of forces - especially if the United States chooses not to hold the balance of power. Against this longer term prospect, and our declining technological edge, some major force structure decisions will have to be taken. They include
whether to go ahead, for example, with the local construction of more submarines. Closer to home, the stability of Indonesia and Papua New Guinea will require careful monitoring because of the direct consequences developments there can have on our own security.

The 1994 White Paper does not support any major force structure changes from the 1987 White Paper. But it does foreshadow that 'clear priority' will be given to naval and air capabilities. There are implications here for the army: the army's force structure still does not reflect Australia's unique strategic circumstances and the fact that we are an island continent. It is likely that the army will have to move away from its preoccupation with a divisional structure and restructure around independent brigades, with more emphasis on mobility and with perhaps a smaller regular force and greater reliance on reserves. If the defence budget suffers further real reductions, it is the army that will probably have to take the brunt of the cuts because of its lower priority in the strategic circumstances that will face Australia over the next ten to fifteen years.

There are also serious longer term issues concerning the air force. When the F-111 strike force and the F/A-18 fighters reach the end of their life-of-type, it is difficult to see how Australia will be able to afford replacements for either of them in anything like useful numbers. This is particularly the case for the F-111s. Even for the fighter force, the rapidly escalating real cost of modern combat aircraft will make their eventual replacement a difficult and expensive force structure decision. For the navy too, there are questions surrounding not only the appropriate size of the submarine force but also whether - if equipped with a long-range strike missile such as Tomahawk - it might assume the premier strike role. Submarines do not have the same timeliness as aircraft but they will continue to have strong attributes of stealth. The question of how the growing vulnerability of surface ships to stand-off missile attack is resolved will determine the size and shape of the surface fleet beyond 2010.

Some innovative possible approaches to the long-term force structure needs of the ADF are raised tentatively in the 1994 Defence White Paper for the first time. They include:

- military satellites for surveillance;
- seabed acoustic arrays;
unmanned aerial vehicles;

- ground sensors/surveillance radars; and

- the combat soldier 2010.

To this list might be added emerging technologies such as surface-wave and synthetic-aperture radars, as well as developments in explosives (thermobaric weapons), terminal guidance, imaging, and information-based warfare. In all these areas the ADF will have to become a smarter force that depends on such capabilities for the survival of its small number of platforms. There will have to be more attention to the constant upgrade of platforms rather than the acquisition of greater numbers.

It is also likely that command and control arrangements will change. The ADF has already shifted remarkably in the last decade to a more centralised control of combat forces by the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF). The autonomous power of the single-service chiefs of the Navy, Army, and Air Force is likely to reduce further: indeed, it is possible that the single-service chiefs may eventually be abolished and that single-service operational control will be invested in the so-called environmental commanders at two-star level (Maritime Commander, Air Commander, and Land Force Commander). The single services will, however, retain their separate identities: there will be no move to the ill-fated Canadian model of a homogeneous force.

Other areas of reform are likely. In recent years, the strengthening of decision making in HQ ADF, particularly in the Development Division, has considerably lessened traditional single-service/civilian tensions in the area of force structure decision making. It may be a logical step to move eventually towards integrated force structure decision making staffs. However, the need for the checks and balances of the civilian Secretary and the military CDF diarchy, and their subordinate staffs, will remain.

There are other areas which require attention. For example, defence industry policy in Australia has made considerable progress in recent years, particularly with the Price Report on defence industry in 1992.26 The 1994 Defence White Paper states that industry's
contribution to our defence effort 'will become more important' as Australia's strategic environment becomes more demanding. But it does not explain how defence industry is going to become more important or what specific strategic priorities are envisaged for Australia's defence industry. If our strategic circumstances are going to become more demanding then we need some concept of what size and capabilities will be needed in our defence industry base. If market forces are to be the sole determinant of our industry capacity this raises some crucial questions about our ability (or otherwise) to sustain and modify the defence force in combat. At present, industry does not even have any guidelines about what surge capability is required from it for credible short-warning conflict.

There are conceptual areas which also require attention. Australia produces high-grade intelligence to guide strategic policy but there is insufficient analysis of long-range trends and too much of a tendency to rely on current intelligence. We are at one of those rare turning points in international affairs where a major discontinuity has occurred with the collapse of a major world power (the USSR) and new challenges are emerging (such as the future power of China). More imaginative (and contestable) assessments are needed that set out a range of future scenarios. In the military area we need to know about the nature of future conflict and how this might be applied to Australia's unique strategic circumstances. There also needs to be much closer interweaving of military and technological trends in our policy analysis, so that we can ascertain optimum and affordable technologies for the ADF.

Finally, and most importantly, Australia should pay more attention to the training and development of strategic analysts. We only just have a critical mass in this key area (where traditionally we have done rather well for our size). The understandable trend in the Australian Public Service in recent years towards micro-economic reform and greater emphasis on generalist management expertise threatens to underrate the need for first-class strategic analytical capabilities (in both the policy and intelligence areas). As Australia's strategic circumstances become more fluid and complex there will be a requirement to train and develop more - not fewer - analysts in this

Conclusions

Australian defence policy has undergone a remarkable change. From the time when Tom Millar first started writing about the need for a distinctly Australian defence policy in the early 1960s we have evolved from an essentially dependent and derivative strategic culture to a self-reliant defence philosophy that bears a uniquely Australian stamp. Other middle powers in the region, including some of the ASEAN countries, are looking to Australia's approach to defence analysis and force structuring principles as a model.

Tom would not have agreed with everything that is happening in Australia's defence policy. He would probably have suggested that there are areas of possible tension, if not contradiction (such as self-reliance within the framework of an alliance; and planning for credible contingencies whilst developing strategic partnership with the region). I do not support such views, but I recognise that they need to be debated. Tom Millar was also a realist and he would have applauded the effort to have a distinctly Australian intellectual framework.

As to the future, this essay has shown that many challenges lie ahead in the areas of strategic analysis, force structure, new technologies, and command arrangements to ensure that the debate over Australia's defence policy will continue well into the next century. As Tom Millar once remarked, Australia faces an uncertain future but it is surely not 'beyond the wit and will of (its) people ... to defend and retain' so vast a land.27

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CHAPTER 3
AUSTRALIANS AND STRATEGIC INQUIRY

Coral Bell

So much of Tom Millar's life and work was directed towards the forwarding of strategic enquiry in Australia that it is appropriate that one of the essays in this book should sketch the context in which that effort was made. He was interested not only in Australia's own defences, and its regional security, but in the global balance of power as well as Australia's old imperial connections and its place in US strategic assessments. In all that, I shall argue, he was preserving an old Australian tradition, as well as furthering it.

Denis Healey, the principal political force behind the foundation of the Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS), remarked in his autobiography that the 'climate of the Antipodes seems conducive to producing good defence intellectuals and air marshals, as well as great sopranos', and that 'from the middle fifties Australia has contributed far more to international understanding of defence problems than any country of similar size'.

Whether those kind words are deserved or not is a matter that Australians must allow others to judge, but it does seem at least evident that strategic debate (on a variety of issues) has been lively in Australia in the period since 1945: more lively than the country's rather modest military capacity could have been expected to inspire. Australia of course has a military tradition going back to the nineteenth century and has had good generals in the past, like Sir John Monash in the First World War. But their skills have been in the deployment of troops, not in the elaboration of strategic theory. In the period since 1945 (with which this essay will be concerned), it is not primarily among career officers of the armed services that the debates will be considered (though some of the 'top brass' have been genuinely interested), but among a rather amorphous group drawn from several

sources: academics, a few journalists, members of the 'intelligence community', high civil servants from the departments concerned with defence and foreign affairs, or from the small bureaucracy round the prime minister, and a tiny handful of politicians. Only the academics and the journalists have been able to publish freely, so their names are the ones that have become known. But they could be regarded as just the tip of a smallish iceberg: the more formidable part, for good or ill as far as the actual making of policy has been concerned, has been down below, in the dark waters of anonymity.

The late Alastair Buchan, the first Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS - it was always intended to be international, but the word was modestly left off the title until the membership matched it), once asked the author why Australians had taken more enthusiastically than Canadians to strategic enquirey. (He felt some chagrin about that, regarding Canada as his second homeland, from the days when his father had been Governor-General there.) The answer seems to lie in the difference of strategic context. Australia, like Canada, has been an intent follower of both the American and the British strategic and political debates, suspended as both countries have been between those two intellectual cultures. And, like Canada, it has had privileged 'insider' status, through the UKUSA agreement of 1947, as regards the 'intelligence product' of both countries. But for Canada, risks and options in the nuclear age have been inescapably determined by the simple geographic fact of its contiguity to the United States. Washington cannot abandon it, and equally Canada cannot move away. Its risks and options are therefore subject to a steely geographical fatalism. So for Canadians there has been less need for strategic debate: fewer possibilities of choice, hence less point, less incentive to debate.

Australia, on the other hand, is half a world away from each of its 'great and powerful friends' as Menzies (its longest-serving Prime Minister), used to call America and Britain. In the Second World War it had the traumatic experience of having to contemplate, for the first time in its short and previously sheltered history, the immediate possibility of invasion. (Asian invasion as a distant possibility had haunted Australian consciousness ever since there has been an Australian consciousness, that is since the early nineteenth century.) Moreover, it suffered heavy air raids on its northernmost city: the Japanese sent as many planes against Darwin as against Pearl Harbor,
and a few of the citizens of Sydney (the author included) heard a Japanese shell or two whistle overhead during the submarine raid of 1942. So one might say that Australian experience of what might happen once the traditional protector (then Britain) was no longer able to provide protection was quite painful. The policy makers in Canberra lived through six months of profound anxiety from December 1941 to May 1942 (Battle of the Coral Sea), when the US Navy put paid to any prospect of the Japanese further expanding their area of conquest. But after that there was a long, hard, painful three-year grind until atomic weapons blew Japan out of the war in 1945.

Consciously or unconsciously, that patch of history has to my mind haunted Australian strategic enquiry ever since. All the issues that have preoccupied Australian analysts in the fifty-plus years since then were originally encapsulated in that wartime experience. How a small society (as Australians will continue to be) defends so large an area of real estate as has fallen to us. (It is even larger now than it was during the Second World War, because of the 200-mile zone under the changed Law of the Sea.) How to ensure that our allies will be ready with help when we really need them. How to organise and equip forces for the necessary level and period of 'self-reliance'. What 'premiums' we must pay, diplomatically and militarily, for our alliances. How best to stay on good terms with Asian neighbours who are very important to us in a variety of ways, but who may not see eye-to-eye with us on matters like human rights or the political and economic structures that make for human happiness and welfare. Asian neighbours who now include one formidable nuclear power, China, and who could conceivably include at least three more nuclear powers in the not-too-distant future. Asian neighbours, moreover, whose rates of economic growth are now so much faster than Australia's, and whose populations are in some cases so much larger, that several of them could conceivably, at an indefinite future date, be as much militarily superior to Australia as Japan was in early 1942.

To my mind, that 1942 level of perceived vulnerability has remained in the minds of policy makers, as well as the speculations of Australian strategic analysts, in undeclared and possibly even unconscious ways for most of the period with which this essay will be concerned. And sometimes in ways so deniable that the connection must remain speculative.
For instance, when plans were made in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War by the then Labor Prime Minister, Ben Chifley, and his advisers for the setting up of the Australian National University (specifically designed as a research institution), nuclear physics was from the first scheduled to be one of its specialisms. Natural enough: one of Australia's best-known scholars, Professor Mark Oliphant, had been a member of the Manhattan Project, which achieved the first atomic weapons. It was not surprising either that his new department should attract two colleagues from the same project, Philip Baxter and Ernest Titterton, Englishmen who adopted Australian citizenship. But the upshot was that from very early in the atomic age Australia had a school capable of turning out physicists and engineers competent in the nuclear field (including weapons design) if Australia should ever need to go down that road. (No such decision was ever taken, or even likely, though the idea was kept alive in some quarters until the early seventies.)

Similarly, when Menzies agreed in the early fifties to the testing of British atomic weapons in Australia, and to flight tests for British rockets, the arrière-pensée of having some useful knowledge of the technology 'brush off' on to the Australian participants was present, though it was never officially proclaimed, and possibly never came to anything much. So the indications are that at the very beginning of the nuclear age, its strategic implications were not lost on Australian policy makers.

Many people have assumed that Australia's strategic dependence on the United States since 1951 (formalised in the ANZUS Treaty of that year) stemmed naturally and without any hitch from the wartime alliance after 1941. Not so, however. Between about 1944 and 1951 there were sharp differences of strategic assessment between Canberra and Washington. Even though the two Labor Prime Ministers (Curtin, then Chifley) never quarrelled openly with General McArthor's strategies, a great many mutinous murmurs became audible, especially in the ranks of the Australian High Command. Diplomatically, moreover, Chifley had begun to turn back towards Britain for future support well before the end of the war. Politically, the Labor government, which stayed in office until December 1949, looked dangerously left-wing in several respects when viewed from Washington. The Minister for External Affairs, Dr H.V. Evatt, who had been rather a thorn in Washington's flesh even during the wartime
alliance, became considerably more so as the war wound down. He elected himself, for instance, 'leader of the small powers' at the San Francisco Conference of April 1945 (which was intended to rubber-stamp the great-power proposals for the United Nations) and managed to secure some amendments that Washington did not much like, especially in view of the strategic plans of the US Navy for the small Pacific islands that America had taken over from Japanese occupation. He also managed to browbeat the British into agreeing that Australia should represent the British Commonwealth as a whole in the bodies dealing with the occupation of Japan, and sent his unfortunate envoy there (Professor W. Macmahon Ball) instructions that embroiled him in a permanent running battle with General McArthur. Worst of all, when Evatt made it to the presidency of the UN General Assembly in 1948-49 (a temporary post he rather liked to describe as 'President of the World') he took positions vis-à-vis the Soviet Union that some people in Washington (especially the then Secretary of Defense) regarded as little short of treasonous vis-à-vis the West, and the more suspect in that some of his closest advisers were regarded in the US intelligence community as fellow-travellers or worse. So by the late forties one could say that strategic/diplomatic assessments in Canberra and Washington were very substantially at odds, especially in the two vital matters of the future of Japan and the nature and dynamics of the Cold War. On Japan, Australian attitudes remained far more restrictive and punitive than American attitudes had by then become: on the Cold War, quite a powerful 'insider' current of opinion remained unconvinced of the merits of Western diplomatic strategy, though this was at a point when the siege of Berlin was under way, and Australian air crew took part in the air lift.2

What changed this picture, and ensured that the strategic alliance with the United States was locked into place, was a change of government and the Korean War. By the time the North Koreans launched their invasion of the South in June 1950, there was a new set of policy makers in Canberra, with Robert Menzies as Prime Minister and Percy Spender as Minister for External Affairs. Their opinions on Cold War issues differed radically from Evatt's, though distrust of

2 For a fuller account of Australian relations with Washington, see Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1988; 2nd edn. Allen & Unwin in assoc. with Department of International Relations, Australian National University, Canberra, 1993).
Japan was still almost as intense on their side of politics as on the Labor side. Thus when it became clear, in the wake of the Korean War, that the United States was determined on a non-punitive peace treaty for Japan, which would see its economic and potentially its military power restored, and its status as America’s most important future ally in the Pacific made certain, Australian policy makers could only bargain for the most effective strategic guarantee they could get, which turned out to be the ANZUS Treaty. It could never be regarded as even approximating to the NATO commitment, though Spender, as chief negotiator and later as Australian Ambassador in Washington, worked very hard to make it as nearly so as possible. The Labor opposition did not like the treaty at all at the time, but became reconciled later.

It is only slightly unjust to say that strategic enquiry in Australia, at the top political level, became comatose after Spender’s efforts for ANZUS. Such open official reassessments as there were, during the following eighteen years, were rather marginal. The same coalition of political parties remained in power, in fact, for twenty-three years, and none of its successive ministers for defence and for foreign affairs felt much inclination to question the existing arrangements, until the Vietnam trauma of the sixties. The economy was in long boom for more than two decades, with what now seem only slight and occasional downturns. As late as 1972, an unemployment rate of two per cent was regarded as dangerously high. Australians fought in the Korean War, but the casualties were low (about 350), and the war remained uncontroversial, not prompting resentment against the American alliance. Moreover, the Asia-Pacific strategic landscape looked alarming enough during most of those years to inspire a determination to cling to the American protectorate. China went into the convulsions successively of the 'Great Leap Forward' and the 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution', and embarked on war with India in 1962. Indonesia, in the early sixties, embarked on the Konfrontasi campaign against Malaysia, and some Australians (mostly on the right) were inclined to speculate that it might move on to expansionist ambitions vis-à-vis Papua New Guinea. So altogether, until Vietnam and its aftermath forced reassessment of earlier assumptions, the successive political decision makers felt safer following the established precedents.

3 Both of which inspired some sympathy and apologetics on the Australian left.
Nevertheless, perhaps because of its built-in long-standing sense of strategic vulnerability, Australia had produced one behind-the-scenes policy maker who could have been classed as a defence intellectual before that term was even invented. He was Sir Frederick Shedden, who was Secretary of Defence for the truly momentous twenty years from 1937 to 1956, and most importantly, Secretary of the War Cabinet throughout the Second World War. His most vital work was done before the years covered by this essay, and has been ably recounted elsewhere, but it was in his time that a process of regular bureaucratic reassessment of Australia's external circumstances was established, by the putting together at irregular but quite frequent intervals of an official document called The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy. It was never published in the sense of actually being made public (though earlier editions are now available under the thirty-year rule) but it had a reasonably wide circulation within the bureaucratic establishment, so segments of various editions did often come the way of academics and journalists, and the mere year of publication told one something about the subjects causing anxiety in high establishment circles, given a reasonable level of acquaintance among the officials writing it.

In the academic world, before the setting up of specialist research institutes like the IISS (1958) and the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC, 1966), and the founding of specialist journals, civilian research and publication on strategic issues had to be sustained mostly in university departments of international relations (though there were very few of them) and by bodies engaged in publication and research on international politics in general, like the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House or RIIA) in London, and its Australian counterpart, the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA). The earliest Australian ventures into strategic enquiry about the nuclear future were mostly in the form of pamphlets and journal articles published under the auspices of such bodies. To the best of my knowledge, the first 'hard cover' publication by an Australian in the field was my own 'Atoms and Strategy' in the

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4 See David Horner, Inside the War Cabinet (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1995).
5 The United States had lavishly-funded 'think tanks' like RAND and the Hudson Institute, but the resources to sustain them were not available elsewhere.
Survey of International Affairs for 1954. That annual volume was for many decades, after its founding by Arnold Toynbee in 1923, the most authoritative text-book in international politics. By 1954, Toynbee was on the verge of retirement, and totally absorbed in his A Study of History. I was earning a crust as a research officer at the RIIA while a graduate student at the London School of Economics (LSE). He gave me an entirely free hand in the design and writing of the book, and both the 'lead stories' of the year, as I saw them, were strategic. (That raised a few eyebrows round Chatham House.) The volume is thus mostly concerned with Western nuclear doctrine, and the repercussions of the French defeat at the great battle of Dien Bien Phu, in Vietnam. At more than forty years remove in time, those accounts still seem predictive of Australian strategic preoccupations over the next four decades.

During my time at Chatham House, I became well acquainted with the moving spirits behind the creation of the Institute for Strategic Studies, which has been so important in the work of Australians in the field that some account is warranted here. By the mid-fifties, the Cold War had settled in, and seemed at the time likely to persist indefinitely. Nuclear strike capabilities were deemed almost certain to remain the central strategic fact in the 'standoff' between the two great adversary coalitions, the communist world at the time appearing almost monolithic, from the Elbe to the Pacific coast of China. The founders of the ISS were primarily men who had been young officers at the sharp end of the fighting during the Second World War, and who had good personal reasons for knowing that war (especially in the nuclear age) was too dangerous to be left to the generals. Denis Healey had been beach-master at the Anzio landing, Michael Howard had been with the Guards in Germany, Alastair Buchan had been at Arnhem. It is less well known that several of the other founders in Britain were men of serious religious convictions, who had difficulty in reconciling 'just war' doctrine (especially the principle of proportionality) with the known results of nuclear strike: the Bishop of Chichester, for example, and the Secretary of the Methodist Conference, as well as Rear-Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard (ex Naval Intelligence). I even saw the then Archbishop of Canterbury (Michael Ramsey) at one of the early ISS meetings, in its old premises in the

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6 (Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1954.)
Adelphi. I mention this factor in the motivation for independent strategic enquiry because in more recent years religious convictions have often been equated with right-wing extremism in political and strategic doctrine. These were men of an older and better tradition: that even in wars and dealings with an adversary, moral rules did apply, and that the most crucial value in strategic matters was consideration of the consequences of action.

However, the bright particular Australian star of those early days in London, Hedley Bull, came to strategic enquiry by a somewhat different route. He was a product of the Philosophy Department at the University of Sydney in John Anderson’s days as Professor, and very much bore that imprint to the end of his life. He went on to a BPhil at Oxford, and was then recruited to the Department of International Relations at LSE. The presiding spirit there at the time was Martin Wight, an immensely charismatic scholar and teacher, who was not at all oriented to strategic enquiry. (He had been a conscientious objector in the Second World War.) Martin was undoubtedly the most important influence on Hedley’s general understanding and mode of analysis of international politics (as also on Tom Millar’s and my own). But strictly for financial reasons (the salaries of assistant lecturers were not lavish) Hedley also took on the chore of helping an old Labour stalwart of the disarmament movement of the 1930s, Philip Noel-Baker, put together a book. Though this intellectual collaboration proved inharmonious, the experience interested Hedley so much in the contemporary problems of the field that he went on to do more work in it for ISS and write a brilliant work of his own, The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age.7 When Harold Wilson came to power as Labour Prime Minister in Britain in 1964, he decided to make the arms-control issue a particular area of his foreign policy concerns, mostly (to my mind) because the left of his party was by that time somewhat in revolt against the closeness of Britain to Washington, especially as the United States’ Vietnam involvement was already getting steadily under way. So Hedley was appointed to supply (as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit) the intellectual drive and understanding needed to get the project off the ground. His years at the Foreign Office, working on the problems involved, generated real intellectual

7 (Weidenfeld & Nicolson for ISS, London, 1961.)
excitement, and a large input into the still more important debate on the same issues in Washington, where the process which eventually produced the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks was beginning to get underway. Eventually that produced also the SALT and START treaties, and thus the beginnings of limitation and dismantling of nuclear stockpiles. The methods of recruitment and consultation he used were sometimes innovative enough to startle the Foreign Office: the author was a member of the Arms Control Advisory Panel which he set up to gather understanding from seismologists and nuclear physicists as well as strategists and historians. Hedley Bull must be undoubtedly accorded a place among the handful of scholars who dominated and shaped that important and productive branch of strategic theory. Indeed, it was the group of scholars who made arms control a branch of strategic theory, whereas the older disarmament movement had remained just a branch of moral protest, and therefore basically ineffective.

When he returned to Australia as Professor of International Relations at the Australian National University, Bull brought some of those he had worked with in London with him. That legacy seems to have been among the factors which account for Australia's unusual degree of activism (by comparison with other middle powers) in the field of arms control, which will be looked at presently.

To return to the early sixties, the first organised Australian contribution to the international strategic debate was participation in the ISS Conference at RAND in California in 1963 on *The Security of Southern Asia*. The Institute was only about five years old at this time, and conferences were very small by later standards. Of the twenty-nine members, five were Australians. (The author was one.) That high proportion was undoubtedly due to Alastair Buchan's perception, as Director, that Australians would be preoccupied for the foreseeable future with strategic relationships in Southeast Asia. The intensity of the debate in Washington over policy in the area was just beginning to be appreciated. President Kennedy was still alive (the conference was in September) and a good deal of the discussion revolved round his just-leaked refusal of US military intervention in Laos. Both official opinion in Canberra, and mainstream intellectual opinion among the small groups of Australians given to discussing strategic matters, was at the time decidedly 'hawkish', eager for US intervention in Vietnam,
and in some cases prepared to contemplate the building or acquisition of nuclear weapons by Australia.

The primary origin of this frame of mind was that the four years or so from the launching of the Indonesian policy of 'confrontation' against Malaysia (which then included Singapore) by President Sukarno in 1961-62, until his violent overthrow by the Indonesian Army in September 1965, was a period of exceptional alarm in policy-making and intelligence circles in Canberra. The concept of the 'Peking-Djakarta' axis (China and Indonesia in revolutionary alliance) had gained considerable currency. President Sukarno appeared to be dependent for support (against the army) almost solely on the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) which had proclaimed its brotherhood-in-arms with Mao Tse-tung's China, already then lurching towards the great convulsion of the Cultural Revolution, and also towards nuclear status (its first test was in 1964). The forces which looked to Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam were deemed certain to be victorious within a year or so, unless the Americans intervened, and triumphant policy makers in Hanoi were assumed likely thereafter to extend their sway over both Cambodia and Laos in short order, and move on to destabilising both Thailand and Malaysia. The Kennedy policy makers looked much less firmly committed to the defence of Southeast Asia than their predecessors in Eisenhower's time, mostly because of their alleged 'appeasement' of Indonesia over Irian Jaya. So a member of the very small intelligence community in Canberra could quite plausibly in those years make a 'worst case' analysis in which the PKI secured ascendancy in Indonesia, and stepped up the confrontation campaign against Malaysia, while Ho Chi Minh's forces took over South Vietnam, with the backing of both China and the Soviet Union, and began to turn their attention to the rest of Southeast Asia. Thus from early in the 1960s, Australia's long-term strategic prospects appeared quite menacing to many analysts, in the academic world as well as the defence establishment.

The late sixties were the one period in recent Australian history\(^8\) when strategic questions have moved from \textit{sotto voce} debate among the tiny handful of those professionally or academically concerned to a shouting match among the general public. Vietnam was of course the cause. But disquiet over Australian involvement

\[\text{\footnotesize 8 There is an earlier parallel: the conscription debate of 1917.}\]
there was slow in developing. As late as 1966, Harold Holt (Menzies’ successor as Prime Minister) could campaign on the slogan which has historically damned him - 'all the way with LBJ' - and win the election with a landslide. Probably the first understanding in Canberra of how little the behind-the-scenes strategic assessments in Washington resembled the public ones came with Robert McNamara’s departure to the World Bank in 1967. He was widely seen in Australia and elsewhere as the strategic architect of the war, and some 'insiders' in Canberra correctly interpreted that decision, though McNamara himself did not give a full account of it until 1995.9 The more fatal blow to any remaining Australian official optimism was Johnson’s announcement in March 1968 that he would not again seek the presidency. At the time it seemed to mean that one of the Democrats opposed to the war would get the nomination (probably Robert Kennedy) and win the election on a platform of quitting the fight. Richard Nixon had had a 'bad press' in Australia ever since his days as Vice-President in the mid-fifties, and few analysts would have believed at this time that he could win the election, much less that his foreign policy would move in the direction that it did. His 'Guam doctrine' of July 1969 was a final indication to policy makers in Canberra that the strategic alliance to which they had pinned Australia's fortunes might not always answer in future.

The British had already indicated, more than three years earlier, during the 'East of Suez' debate, that their presence in Australia’s area of strategic concern had an early termination date. Denis Healey, as Defence Secretary in the Wilson Labour government, visited Canberra in January 1966, just after Holt came to office, with a tentative suggestion of a British base in Australia after the pull-out from Singapore, but the idea was coldly received by Holt and his colleagues, who feared the expense and still hoped for the retention of Singapore; as did Lee Kwan Yew, who managed to secure postponement until the next British government, Heath's, had to confirm it in 1971. So the idea came to nothing.10

In the academic field in Canberra, the most internationally known Australian strategic theorist in the early sixties was

Professor Arthur Lee Burns, a lively and somewhat 'maverick' thinker who had published an influential monograph, *From Balance to Deterrence: A Theoretical Analysis,* and who held a chair in political science at the Australian National University (ANU). He established a Defence Studies Project in that department in 1964, but it proved an uncongenial context. Thus it fell to Dr Tom Millar, in the Department of International Relations, to push the idea through to establishment of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre.

Tom was far more suited by education, experience and temperament to pilot the project through what was in those days quite a dangerous minefield of academic, official and popular attitudes to strategic enquiry. He was a graduate of the Royal Military College at Dunroon, and had been in the Australian Army for eight years, rising to the rank of major. He had served with the Australian occupation troops in Japan, in military intelligence, and once told me of his wanderings through the eerie ruins of Hiroshima, in the days when the residual dangers of radioactivity were not well understood. When he left the army he returned to university life, and worked for his PhD at the London School of Economics. (I first met him at one of Martin Wight's seminars there.) Then he went on to a Research Fellowship at Columbia, and back to an appointment in the Department of International Relations at ANU. He began to make his intellectual mark in writing about Australian defence from 1962, when hardly anyone else in the universities was contemplating that field, and his 1965 book, *Australia's Defence,* was a truly pioneer effort.

However, his main contribution to the furthering of strategic enquiry in Australia, and by Australians elsewhere, derived from his considerable qualities as an academic entrepreneur. Without his intellectual resourcefulness and tenacity of purpose, the SDSC might not have come into being.

By 1965-66, the intellectual battle over Australia's participation in the Vietnam War (though not yet the political battle) was in full swing, and it was raging particularly in the universities. Canberra's policy makers had decided, disastrously, that there should be conscription-by-lottery (called 'national service') somewhat on the American pattern, and that those called up could be sent to Vietnam.

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11 (Australian National University, Canberra, 1956.)
12 (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1965.)
Resentment among students was inevitably passionate, and though Australia never had an incident as ugly as the Kent State shootings in the United States, the strength of moral feeling against the war rose to almost equal level.

In that sort of atmosphere a mere interest in strategic enquiry could be misrepresented (especially by left-wing academic colleagues) as proof of an insensate militarism. I mentioned earlier that moral disquiet about the implications of nuclear strategy was the motivating force of quite a few of the founders of the IISS in London. Perhaps not coincidentally, both the two original proponents of strategic enquiry in Australia were, like them, men of strong religious convictions. Arthur Burns had originally intended to be a Presbyterian minister, Tom Millar was a devout Christian Scientist. The intellectual difficulties of reconciling 'just war' doctrine with the consequences of nuclear strike was a powerful stimulus to intellectual enquiry, especially for those well-enough acquainted with the traditional doctrine to be aware of the requirement of 'proportionality'. To what cause could nuclear strike be proportional?

Tom Millar remained the head of the SDSC for its first four years. His most influential book was probably *Australia in Peace and War: External Relations, 1788-1977*. Very few of those who have written about Australian policies have had an equal understanding of how those two phases of the national experience mesh together to produce political and social change. But he also wrote about the Commonwealth, South Africa, the United Nations and the East-West balance of power. His later years were spent mostly in London, where he applied his talents as an academic entrepreneur to rescuing the cause of Australian studies from what seemed at one stage a fatal case of financial anaemia. The present Sir Robert Menzies Centre for Australian Studies is as much a monument to his efforts as the SDSC. After his formal retirement he remained active in research at the London School of Economics or King's College, London, and at the time of his death was still working on a study of UN peacekeeping.

The second major figure in this early period of strategic enquiry, Hedley Bull, though he did not entirely desert strategic studies, moved firmly back into the field of general international

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13 (Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1978.)
theory, and published in 1977 what is undoubtedly the most important Australian contribution to that field, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics.\textsuperscript{14} He also published a splendidly provocative defence of strategic enquiry, 'Strategic Studies and its Critics', in World Politics for July 1968. His final years were spent as Professor of International Relations at Oxford, and he was working at the time of his death on the evolution and widening of the society of states.

The third major figure of this time in Australian strategic enquiry, Arthur Burns, took more readily than his fellow-countrymen to the American mode of rather abstract and theoretical analysis. He published in 1968 a book, Of Powers and Their Politics: A Critique of Theoretical Approaches\textsuperscript{15} which had a considerable influence in America, but was too remote from the practicalities of middle-power defence to have much of an impact in Australia.

By the time Tom Millar handed over the SDSC to his successor, Robert O'Neill, in 1970, a 'generation change' was setting in among strategic analysts. The Second World War, and the crises and tensions of the early Cold War, had been the formative influences on the strategic outlook of the first generation (including the author). Vietnam was already beginning to shape the outlook of the second generation. It was also, by the end of the sixties, inducing convulsive change among some at least of the political decision makers in Canberra.

John Gorton, the Prime Minister of the time, seems in retrospect 'quicker off the mark' than some of his colleagues. He had already, though not yet installed as Prime Minister at the time of President Johnson's visit to Canberra for Holt's funeral,\textsuperscript{16} told the President bluntly that there would be no increase in Australian troop numbers in Vietnam. He also, prudently, 'kicked upstairs' to the neutralised eminence of the Governor-Generalship, the most fervent supporter of Australian involvement, Paul Hasluck, who had been Minister for External Affairs and also one of Gorton's rivals for the prime ministership. Moreover, Gorton visited the United States in

\textsuperscript{14} (Macmillan, London, 1977.)
\textsuperscript{15} (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs NJ, 1968.)
\textsuperscript{16} Actually more a memorial service. Holt was drowned or taken by a shark in December 1967 while swimming in rough seas, and his body was never found, a circumstance which generated many fantastic conspiracy theories, including one that has him taken off by a Chinese submarine, and still living in Beijing.
May 1968 (by which time LBJ was very much a 'lame duck' President) and tried to see his potential successors, though he only managed a telephone call with Nixon. On his return to Canberra, he instructed the relevant policy departments and the services to prepare a full-scale review of Australia's defence.

One might almost say that in spirit Australia's commitment to the cause of preserving the South Vietnamese government died with Harold Holt, though the troops were not all out until the end of 1971, and for political reasons Australia's change of course was not fully made plain until 1972. The political reasons revolved round the existence of the Democratic Labor Party (DLP): its preferences were still required for a Coalition victory in the election of 1969, and though the DLP had by this time become bitterly disillusioned with the American alliance, they were not prepared to desert the South Vietnamese: quite the contrary.

The DLP, being from its inception based on a Catholic social movement, had always been more strongly sympathetic than any other Australian grouping to the South Vietnamese Catholics, who were expected to fare very badly in the event of a communist victory. Their disillusionment with the Americans probably began with the coup of 1963 against the Catholic nationalist leader, Ngo Dinh Diem, and his murder, along with that of his brother. Though American complicity (indeed sponsorship) of the coup was not officially confirmed until McNamara's memoirs were published in 1995, it was widely rumoured at the time, and most well-informed observers (who certainly included the intellectual leadership of the DLP) would have assumed it was probable. As it became clearer, in the late Johnson period, that Washington was steadily moving away from the original commitment to Saigon, the DLP's denunciations of the American alliance became steadily more strident: the American political élite

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17 An anti-communist splinter of the Labor Party, first formed in 1955. Its influence on the distribution of electoral preferences was a major factor in keeping Labor out of power until 1972.

18 Malcolm Fraser, who became Prime Minister in 1975, wrote in a comment on McNamara's memoirs in 1995, that if he had known of this complicity at the time he would have reconsidered his support for the Australian commitment to US policy. It is hard to believe that the circumstances of the coup were not well known to the Australian intelligence officers in Saigon and Washington, but Fraser was merely a backbencher at the time, and Menzies as Prime Minister would not have been inclined to share intelligence material with his backbenchers.
were depicted in the DLP literature as going through a sort of national 'nervous breakdown', and likely to desert Australia in its turn. The DLP was certainly the only Australian political grouping at this time which was prepared to contemplate Australia allying itself with the Asian powers, independent of any commitment by the United States or Britain.

However, as Lee Kwan Yew once perceptively put it, though Australia was willing to take on the role of deputy sheriff while either the United States or the United Kingdom was acting as sheriff, it was never willing to take on the more demanding role for itself. In Gorton's time that observation was particularly true: he was a bit wary, at least initially, even about Britain's parting strategic gift to the area, the Five Power Defence Arrangements which came into force in 1971, and have endured and developed surprisingly well ever since. Denis Healey, who came back to Australia for the conference which set up these arrangements, referred to Gorton as 'a crazy mixed-up kid', but he was really more a somewhat erratic but very fervent Australian nationalist, rather given to suspicion of both Australia's 'great and powerful friends'.

That perhaps accounts also for the fact that he was the one Australian Prime Minister willing to look seriously at preparing the groundwork that would make possible an Australian nuclear option at some distant future date. He set in motion the machinery for Australia's building a 500-megawatt nuclear power station at Jervis Bay, originally proposed to be ready by 1975. If it had actually 'come on stream' then, using Australian uranium enriched in a gas centrifuge, it could have produced enough weapons-grade fissile material to have given Australia a 'minimal independent nuclear deterrent' by about the early eighties. And some of the aircraft being bought round this period could have been adapted to carry nuclear weapons. But there was not really enough political or intellectual support for any such project, beyond a few members of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission, one or two of the 'top brass', and some 'grassroots' elements in the Country Party and the Returned Services League. When Gorton was deposed by his party colleagues in March 1971, his successor, William McMahon, shelved the whole idea, partly because of doubts over its economic viability and partly because Australia had by then signed (though not yet ratified) the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. When Labor came to office at the end of
1972, the new Prime Minister ratified the treaty and more firmly rejected the nuclear power project. The Labor Party at that time was averse even to the mining of uranium, though Australia has large and potentially lucrative deposits. Thus one might say that the very brief flicker of interest in Australia as a possible nuclear power was extinguished by 1972.

Some of the other strategic changes of assumptions in the Gorton period had a longer influence, however. This was really the moment when question-marks first appeared over what had been the basic concept of Australian policy ever since its first inception: that of 'forward defence'. Australians had fought in the Sudan or South Africa or the Middle East or Korea or Vietnam on the general assumption 'better there than here'. That is, sustaining (originally) the imperial 'security community', and later the American-led security alliance, was seen as the best mode of serving the national interest, in that it kept potential adversaries well away from Australia's own shores. And of course the system could be seen as having served its purpose, in that only during the first six months of 1942 could an adversary (Japan) be said to have approached our shores. But such a system requires not only allies and bases abroad, it implies at least one truly powerful ally. Essentially that has to be one of the central balance powers, if the assumed political adversary is also one of the central balance powers, and only such powers would have serious capacity to attack. In 1969 it was clear that Britain's time in the area had ended, and America's future commitment also at that date looked relatively dubious. So the assumption of 'forward defence' began to look unpromising, and notions of either 'continental defence' or 'neighbourhood defence' began to replace it. The difference between the two rested on the definition of the area of Australia's direct strategic concern. The countries of Southeast Asia appeared at this point to be 'consumers' rather than 'producers' of security: that is, more likely to need military aid than to provide it. (That assessment changed later, of course.)

That strategic context has been the background for the later work of the SDSC. Tom Millar's first successor was Dr Robert O'Neill, who had been a young officer in Vietnam during the Australian involvement there and went on to become the official historian of Australia's role in the Korean War. It was Bob O'Neill who developed the SDSC into an alternate, independent source of strategic analysis
and comment for the Australian policy debate. A major influence on his mode of strategic analysis had been Sir Basil Liddell Hart, with whom he had worked as a graduate student at Oxford. As a historian, he was able to use the past as an illumination of the present, and had no difficulty in combining historical and contemporary studies, moving easily from work on the Korean and Vietnam wars to studies of superpower policies and regional security in the Asian, Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. He had a notable level of success in expanding the international links of the SDSC, and strengthening its financial infrastructure, by securing Ford Foundation support for a visiting fellows programme which recruited scholars and officials from South and Southeast Asia.

His consolidation of the enterprise in Canberra was undoubtedly a factor in O'Neill's appointment in 1982 as Director of the IISS in London. Most of the members of the Institute are American or West European, and they include many of the important policy makers of the countries concerned. So the advent of an Australian to the Director's role marks the achievement of an 'insider's' position in the world strategic debate that no other peripheral or middle-power national has enjoyed. O'Neill's years there coincided with a period of vital controversy over the defence and arms control policies of the central balance powers: such matters as Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI or 'Star Wars'), cruise missile deployment in Western Europe, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks between Washington and Moscow. This dangerous and exciting patch of history (the winding down of the Cold War) engendered many passionate arguments, not least within the conferences and the study groups of the IISS, and it was to the major credit of the Director that the Institute's reputation for calm and balanced expert analysis, illuminated by his own brand of liberal realism, was never diminished. He also managed to broaden the Institute's area of preoccupation from its original concerns (mostly with the central nuclear debate and the European theatre of potential military operations) to encompass also regional conflicts round the Pacific Rim, and in Asia, Africa and Latin America. He reinforced its independence by strengthening its financial base, through gathering in impressive capital funds, and bringing its publications and other activities into the computer age. In 1987 Bob O'Neill moved to the Chichele Chair of the History of War at Oxford, and he remains a major figure in the central strategic debate as
Vice-Chairman of the IISS, and Chairman of its Executive Committee. He also influences generations of graduate students (many of whom will go on to be policy makers) from all over the world at Oxford. His current research interests are focused on the relation between thinkers and practitioners in the field of security over the past two centuries.

The next major Australian voice in the world's strategic debate was that of Dr Desmond Ball. His road to influence might be regarded as unorthodox, since he had been a leading activist of the Vietnam protest movement while a student at the Australian National University, but his doctoral thesis, on the alleged 'missile gap' of the Kennedy period, established him at once as a leading analyst in the realm of nuclear theory. Des Ball evidenced from his graduate student days an exceptional cogency of analysis concerning nuclear-strategic relationships, as well as an exceptional talent for securing information which the governments concerned were not entirely willing to see in the hands of outsiders. His Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration19 dispelled a good deal of earlier 'disinformation' about the strategic nuclear balance between the United States and the USSR, and his A Suitable Piece of Real Estate: American Installations in Australia20 greatly broadened the basis of understanding on which the 'joint facilities' at Pine Gap, Nurrungar and elsewhere have been debated in Australia.

Ball's most influential work on nuclear strategy was done in the late 1970s and early 1980s, much of it undertaken at or published by the IISS. His Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?,21 seen by expert opinion as a brilliant analysis, was a direct and effective attack on the US strategy of controlled nuclear war-fighting. His work on strategic nuclear targeting exposed the strategic bankruptcy of nuclear employment policies. In the mid-1980s, his work on command and control, intelligence, and crisis stability introduced a new dimension to the study of crises as a precursor to nuclear war.

During the period when Professor Ball was head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, the Centre was at the forefront of the ongoing transformation of Australian defence policy from 'forward defence' and dependence on 'great powerful friends' to a self-

19 (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1980.)
20 (Hale and Iremonger, Sydney, 1980.)
21 (IISS, London, 1981.)
reliant policy of defence of Australia. Its work on low-level contingencies, Northern defence, mobilisation planning, and force structure development was an important input into establishing the conceptual framework of Australian strategic and defence planning for the next decade. At this time also, SDSC moved to develop a postgraduate course in strategic studies, (the first in the southern hemisphere) and greatly expanded its publications programme of monographs and working papers. The latter have underpinned a much more comprehensive and up-to-date debate on Asia-Pacific, as well as Australian, security issues. Since the end of the Cold War, Ball’s attention has been mostly focused on the strategic issues affecting Southeast Asia and the Pacific Rim, especially the establishment of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), in which he has been the primary intellectual driving force.

The present head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Professor Paul Dibb, has undoubtedly had more direct influence on strategic policy making in Australia than any of his predecessors. His original work in geography (at the University of Nottingham) developed into a long-term interest in the Soviet Union, and he was among the earliest and most convincing sceptics, while the Cold War was still on, of its survival as a superpower. His knowledge of that vast area of strategic preoccupations helped bring him headship of the National Assessments Staff, and later appointments as Director of the Joint Intelligence Organisation and Deputy Secretary of Defence. His work on the Soviet system is published as The Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower.  However, his direct influence on the formulation of Australian defence policy stems primarily from an official study (Review of Australian Defence Capabilities) usually known as the Dibb Report, of 1986, which largely determined the shape of subsequent defence White Papers. The essential strategic problem for Australia, in his view, since the declining years of the Cold War, has been to devise an intellectual framework which will be useful in guiding policy makers through a prospectively fast-changing world balance. The fixed guidelines or sign-posts of the Cold War years have already largely become irrelevant, and should, he argues, yield to unchanging certainties such as the nature of Australia’s northern

22 (Macmillan in assoc. with IISS, Basingstoke, 1986 and 1988.)
23 (Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1986.)
geography, the geopolitics of the area, and the need to be able to discern, in the light of a detailed knowledge of regional military capabilities, which threats are credible, and what means are necessary to meet them.

Since Tom Millar's work in the forwarding of strategic enquiry in Australia has mostly borne its visible fruit in the academic field, this memoir has been devoted chiefly to that. Tom himself was given to saying that he knew of no academic study that had influenced actual policy making, but that to my mind was just his characteristic use of irony to engender argument. It is of course always difficult to show direct causal connection between the choices of decision makers and the analyses published by outsiders. But such analyses do help create the climate of opinion within which both the policy makers and the decision makers live, work, and have their being. As a listener to the strategic dialogues in London and Canberra, and occasionally in Washington, since the very earliest postwar period (my first task after recruitment to the Australian diplomatic service in 1945 was an assessment of the Baruch Plan), I have enjoyed first-hand observation of how radically the climate of strategic opinion has changed over those fifty years, and how much that change of intellectual climate has been owed to the work of bodies like the IISS and the SDSC, and the American foundations. I used particularly to see the process in action at first hand in the early days of the ISS in London. The civil service mandarins (who would be writing the policies for the Minister) would walk up from Whitehall to its old premises in the Adelphi, for lunchtime meetings, the academics would walk down from LSE and King's College, the journalists would come over from Fleet Street, and members of the Australian 'intelligence community' from Australia House. A consensus of sorts would begin to emerge: the climate of informed opinion would change by a degree or two. I especially remember that process in discussion of the proliferation and potential use of nuclear weapons. When the arguments began in the fifties, it was almost accepted as inevitable that there would be thirty or forty nuclear powers by the seventies, and that those powers would use their weapons in case of serious hostilities. One might hopefully say that the society of states has been 'argued out of' that set of assumptions, and that the strategic analysts have been largely instrumental in that change in the climate of opinion.
But I am of course conscious that the 'behind closed doors' debates of the intelligence community, the defence establishment, the Department of Foreign Affairs and the entourage of advisers round the Prime Minister have been just as prolonged, and at times as passionate, as the public debate among outsiders. The limit of space and the limits of the author's level of knowledge do not allow it to be adequately recounted here. No doubt that story will find an appropriate narrator in due course, probably at the SDSC.

Something more must be said here, however, of one field of special Australian effort, that of arms control. Australian governments have been more 'activist' than those of most middle powers in this area for some years now. It was particularly notable in the early years of the Hawke Labor government, from 1983. Perhaps taking a leaf from Harold Wilson's 1964 book (the domestic political need to reconcile the left of the party was quite similar in the two cases) the new government in Canberra instituted an Ambassador for Disarmament (Richard Butler was the first appointee) and provided extra resources to the relevant sector of the department, creating what eventually came to be called the Peace, Arms Control and Disarmament Division. Its efforts have borne considerable fruit at the international level. The text of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which appears likely to come into force world-wide, was largely devised by Australian officials, and Australia was also a major force in the progress of Comprehensive Test Ban negotiations and the Non-Proliferation Treaty negotiations, as well as the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty. Paul Keating as Prime Minister also found it politically and internationally advantageous to forward this tradition: in November 1995 he set up what was ambitiously called the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, bringing together some international Eminent Persons to prepare a report towards that objective. Because of its location in the southern hemisphere and the existence of the monitoring facilities at Pine Gap and Nurrungar, and seismological facilities elsewhere, Australia is and will continue to be exceptionally well placed to play a role in the global monitoring of arms control. In recent years the scholars associated with the Peace Research Centre and the International Relations Division at ANU, especially Professor Andrew Mack, have contributed substantially to the progress of arms control systems (especially via confidence-building measures) in the Pacific Rim area.
An apologetic consciousness that this memoir is already too long is the only factor which restrains me from more detailed consideration of the work of other participants in strategic enquiry in Australia: Geoffrey Jukes on Soviet power, Ian Bellany and John Weltman on nuclear issues, Stewart Woodman, Ross Babbage and J.O. Langtry on Australian defence, Peter Hastings on New Guinea, David Horner in military history. The teaching and research training instituted in Canberra has expanded the pool of expertise and contributed analysts to posts of influence elsewhere: Martin Indyk, for instance, who became a Middle Eastern policy maker as an official of the National Security Council staff in Washington, and later US Ambassador in Israel. There are likewise now, in the mainstream of Australian strategic enquiry, new institutions like the National Defence College and the Australian Defence Force Academy. A small but vigorous counter-current of dissentient opinion has from the beginning flowed against the mainstream, arguing, for instance, for armed neutrality or 'defensive defence'. So altogether, the strategic debate in Australia seems to me to have been lively, productive, open and influential, and in all that to have owed a great debt to Tom Millar. It is now taking new directions, widening the concept of security to include economic and environmental issues. That also he would have approved.
A recurrent feature of foreign policy is the way in which states seek to adjust to disturbing changes in their strategic environment through making alternative provision for security. One contemporary example of such adjustment on a collective basis has been the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which began its first working session in Bangkok in July 1994. The late Tom Millar entertained a long-standing scholarly interest in the junction between foreign policy and regional security, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. This chapter will seek to examine the nature and the merits of the recent and embryonic exercise in adjustment of foreign policies in that region with specific reference to the provenance of the security model employed.

The ASEAN Regional Forum constitutes an unprecedented initiative in common security as opposed to common defence. It has taken the form of extending a structure of multilateral dialogue long institutionalised by six states within geographic Southeast Asia to a wider Asia-Pacific involving the participation of eighteen states, including the European Union. The Forum comprises the six members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) as well as their seven industrialised dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and the United States) whose governments engage in regular bilateral meetings with ASEAN as a collective entity, as well as participating in a Post Ministerial Conference which follows on immediately after annual meetings of the Association's foreign ministers. Membership in the Forum has been accorded also to Vietnam, Laos and Papua New Guinea which have all adhered to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia concluded in February 1976. These states had been granted observer status at the annual meetings of ASEAN's foreign ministers as a consequence. Vietnam, however,
became a full member of ASEAN in July 1995. It is anticipated that Cambodia will join the Forum on its adherence to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and attendant acquisition of observer status. China and Russia are included in the Forum's current membership although their links with ASEAN have been limited to invited representation at the opening sessions of annual meetings of its foreign ministers.

It is important to stress that although the compass of the multilateral initiative in common security is Asian-Pacific in scope (so subsuming Southeast Asia), it has been called the ASEAN Regional Forum and not the Asian Regional Forum. The choice of nomenclature has been deliberate so as to accord the credit to ASEAN, which has been a successful pioneer of the model of regional security now employed experimentally beyond its walls. Indeed, the institutional source of ARF may be traced to the first-ever meeting of senior officials of the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference, which was convened in Singapore, in May 1993 and which took its mandate from the fourth meeting of ASEAN's heads of government, also in Singapore, in January 1992. That meeting had sanctioned the intensification of 'external dialogues in political and security matters' through the vehicle of the Post Ministerial Conference.

In the discussions in May 1993, the thirteen senior officials addressed the political and security landscape of the Asia-Pacific after the end of the Cold War. The attendant uncertainty was looked at positively as providing an opportunity to set the stage for peaceful cooperation within the wider region, giving rise to the conclusion that 'multilateral processes of cooperative security would help Asia-Pacific nations to achieve this'. In reviewing security cooperation, the senior officials limited their discussions to 'preventive diplomacy and conflict management, non-proliferation questions (nuclear and non-nuclear), and confidence-building measures'. It was evident from those discussions that a close interrelationship had been identified between economic development and security as well as to the corresponding political and security conditions for economic growth and development. The final sentence of the Chairman's Statement asserted:
It is therefore important for ASEAN and its Dialogue partners to work with other regional states to evolve a predictable and constructive pattern of relationships in the Asia-Pacific.\(^1\)

That formative occasion was significant for the extent to which regional security was addressed in terms which were an integral part of ASEAN’s corporate culture and not that of conventional Cold War security arrangements. Collective security with an intramural referent and collective defence with an extramural one were not deemed appropriate for the agenda. Such military-related mechanisms, and especially the latter, had been rejected by ASEAN from the very outset. Indeed, from the outset, and arising from its origins, ASEAN had sought to approach the problem of regional security in an alternative manner to that which had been characteristic of Cold War arrangements. That Cold War manner is best described as a balance of power approach to security, whereby states agree to combine their military resources in alliance and common defence against a likely external predator. In the case of the Cold War, in both Southeast Asia and East Asia, common defence meant in practice the guarantee of a major external power, with the United States playing the dominant role except in respect of Malaya and then Malaysia/Singapore, which was primarily a British responsibility.

ASEAN, which was established in August 1967 during the Cold War, constituted a deliberate attempt to pioneer an alternative model of regional security heralded earlier in 1961 in the smaller and abortive Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), which it superseded. That model of common or cooperative security has been pursued with a considerable measure of success over nearly three decades.\(^2\) It has pivoted on the interrelated goals of conflict avoidance and conflict management but without directly addressing the problem of power, which remains an abiding factor in a world of states without a common government. At issue in this analysis is the question of the fitness for purpose and utility of ASEAN’s model of regional security.

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security for application on a much wider geographic canvas in the Asia-Pacific in the post-Cold War era. An ASEAN model of regional security has never been articulated formally but one has been inferred here from the institutional experience of the Association.

The ASEAN Model

ASEAN was inaugurated in August 1967 as an expression of regional reconciliation within Southeast Asia in the wake of Indonesia's 'Confrontation' of Malaysia, which had also drawn the Philippines into hostile alignment against the new federation. The Association represented itself in its founding declaration as committed to the promotion of economic, social and cultural cooperation even though security was uppermost in mind. The five founding states (Brunei was not admitted to membership until 1984) saw little point in 1967 in attracting hostile reaction from ideological adversaries within and beyond Southeast Asia by declaring a common security interest which they could not hope to underpin with their own resources. However, the preamble to the founding Bangkok Declaration did register the aspiration that the countries of the region shared a primary responsibility for strengthening its economic and social stability, and for ensuring their peaceful progressive national development, and also that they were determined to ensure their stability from external interference in any form and manifestation. Ostensibly in support of those ambitious ends, ASEAN's foreign ministers came together in November 1971 to affirm a commitment to making Southeast Asia a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). That meeting was not convened under ASEAN's formal aegis, however, and the member governments acknowledged privately that any early operational realisation of the grandiose proposal was well beyond the Association's means. Indeed, those member governments which had reservations about its implications for their own national security were content to endorse ZOPFAN in the clear knowledge that it would be unworkable in practice.

It was only in February 1976, shortly after the successes of revolutionary communism in Indochina, that the member governments were moved to articulate openly an interest in promoting political stability on a corporate basis, but notably without a commitment to common defence. ASEAN was then still an embryonic
security community and not a defence community in the conventional sense. From the outset, its governments had been divided in their approach to regional security over the identification of external threat, which meant that any collective enterprise could only be based on an acceptable lowest common denominator. Four out of the five founding members were involved in formal balance-of-power arrangements of mixed kinds pivoting on extra-regional support. The Philippines was a party to a mutual security pact with the United States (1951) as well as a signatory with Thailand to the multilateral Manila Pact (1954) with organisational expression in the ill-fated Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which was disbanded in 1977. Malaya, which became independent in 1957, had resisted adherence to the Manila Pact because it was content with the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (1957), which did not complicate the management of domestic communal politics by attracting the hostile response of the government in Beijing. By the time that Singapore had become independent from Malaysia in August 1965, the Manila Pact had become discredited, so that the government of the island-state could only contemplate external protection through the remit of the revised Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement, which took initial effect from September 1963.

Indonesia, however, whose change of political order in March 1966 had been fundamental to the formation and regional significance of ASEAN, espoused a non-aligned tradition of foreign policy which repudiated balance-of-power arrangements. Its government registered its commitment to reconciliation with Malaysia through its founding role in ASEAN. It was responsible also, however, for including in the preamble to ASEAN's Bangkok Declaration the affirmation that all foreign bases in Southeast Asia were only temporary. Reasons of differing strategic perspective as well as limitations of capability were responsible in part for ASEAN taking an alternative path to security from the outset. The security architecture of the Cold War was not deemed appropriate for the new enterprise. Although ASEAN was formed at the height of American intervention in Vietnam, non-communist governments in the region were already turning their minds to the prospect of an American military withdrawal and its consequences. Moreover, less than a month before ASEAN's inaugural meeting in Bangkok, the British government had given notice of its intention to withdraw its military presences from east of Suez.
ASEAN’s initial outlook towards the problem of regional security had been governed in part by a lack of consensus over its external dimension. The Association’s alternative approach to that of the Cold War alliance model was driven, however, by a sense of common predicament. Regional cooperation was directed to address that predicament. In engaging in regional cooperation, there was a shared assumption of a reinforcing interrelationship between coping with regional tensions, internal political stability and economic development. The ability to manage regional tensions, if only on an intramural basis, was joined to the linked goals of political order and economic development. Indeed, the reduction of regional tensions would permit a greater allocation of national resources to economic development in the interest of political stability, and attendant progress in economic development would contribute in turn to reinforcing political stability.

This approach, which was undeclared but implicit in 1967, reflected a consensus about domestic political order among governments only too conscious of the fragile fabrics of their post-colonial societies. They had all experienced internal political challenges which had attracted popular support partly because of economic deprivation. It was therefore possible to define common threat among the member states of ASEAN with reference to subversion and insurgency. The relevance of economic development as an antidote to those expressions of political pathology, and therefore as a buttress for regional security, was based on the half-truth that poverty is the prime source of political discontent because it provides a fertile soil in which revolutionary forces flourish. The shared appreciation of linkage within ASEAN has been summarised elsewhere by this author as follows:

A process of reconciliation institutionalized through regional co-operation was intended to counter any revival of serious contention between member governments. An attendant ability to address problems of domestic political stability through the mechanisms of economic development was expected to produce corporate as well as individual benefits. External adventurism would be discouraged. The contagion of internal political disorder would be prevented from spreading from an infected state to contaminate the body politic of regional partners, and from providing a point of entry to
South-East Asia for competing external powers. This inferred theory of political prophylaxis expressed the idea of the indivisibility of security integral to the original concept of collective security. Over-rationalized in this exposition, the common approach to regional security on the part of ASEAN governments reflected a genuine consensus. That consensus was over the most appropriate way that a regional association, deficient in military capability and in no position to engage in collective defence, might make a contribution to regional security.3

The founding assumption about the positive relationship between economic development and the different dimensions of security had not been born with ASEAN. It had informed the joint outlook of those three governments (Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand) which had inspired the formation in 1961 of the short-lived ASA. It was also part of the political doctrine of General Suharto's 'New Order' in Indonesia that had been articulated in the concept of national resilience. That concept was intended to indicate those qualities of self-sufficiency and resourcefulness which would strengthen the economic, social and political fabric of the state in the interest of an interrelated development and stability. It was conceived also as enjoying the potential for wider expression as regional resilience, so denying the damaging interventionist role of external powers. In the event, ASEAN's founding assumption bore fruit, as a corporate ability to cope with intramural tensions, and to act at times as a diplomatic community, took place concurrently with rising economic performances in most states. To that end, the alternative model of common security pioneered by ASEAN served a practical purpose in the regional circumstances of the time. It could be argued that an informal zone of peace was created within intramural bounds which encouraged continuing inward investment, critical for economic achievement and political order.

In its role as a diplomatic community, ASEAN employed its regional credentials to play a critical part in challenging Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Cambodia from the end of the 1970s. It did so, however, not on an autonomous basis but as part of an informal

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3 This exposition is taken from the author's study, *ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia* (Routledge, London and New York, 1989), p.3.
balance-of-power arrangement, which reflected a revised pattern of Cold War alignments attendant on Sino-Soviet antagonism and Sino-American rapprochement. It was the change in that pattern of alignments which permitted ASEAN to act so effectively as a diplomatic community during the Cambodian conflict. But that role was insufficient in itself to resolve the conflict as an international and regional problem. It was overcome because of the manner in which the Cold War was brought to a close, with Vietnam losing the countervailing support of the Soviet Union and, therefore, being obliged to appease its coalition of adversaries. In the event, the decisive diplomatic influence was exercised in the case of Cambodia by the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and not ASEAN, which was left with only a marginal role. The prosecution and nature of resolution of the Cambodian conflict had pointed up the limitations of the ASEAN model of regional security in the extramural domain. The conflict had been precipitated by an act of military force which the Association was not capable of reversing in its own right; nor was it willing even to engage in joint peacekeeping in Cambodia under UN auspices.

The end of the Cold War, which had been critical to conflict resolution, had the effect of undermining the pattern of global and regional alignments which had served ASEAN's diplomatic purpose during the 1980s. Above all, the United States and China had ceased to share a common interest in exploiting the diplomatic services of ASEAN for challenging the regional position of Vietnam, which had been viewed as the political surrogate of the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War meant that the strategic priorities of the United States in the Asia-Pacific had changed fundamentally, exemplified by the alacrity with which its government withdrew its military presence from the Philippines in November 1992. That change, together with the breakup of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, also had the effect of providing China with a regional strategic latitude unique in its experience since the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949. That latitude, which was reinforced by military modernisation, was not seen to be redressed by the limited military access arrangements which the United States then entered into with some ASEAN states. Perceived examples of China's new latitude have been its employment of force in the late 1980s in support of its claims in the Spratly Islands, as well as the promulgation in February 1992 of a new law on its
territorial waters which reiterated its extensive claims to maritime jurisdiction, and most recently the revelation in February 1995 of the seizure of Mischief Reef, also in the Spratly group, to the west of the Philippines island of Palawan.\(^4\)

**A New Strategic Environment**

It was this set of regional changes which gave rise to the need for ASEAN in particular to take stock of existing security arrangements. The Association had not changed its guiding assumptions; nor had its governments reconciled their differing strategic perspectives, so as to begin to address the problem of power which had eluded ASEAN from the outset. Nonetheless, when the senior officials of the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference met in Singapore in May 1993, they could not have been more pointed in their view that '[t]he continuing presence of the United States, as well as stable relationships among the United States, Japan and China, and other states of the region would contribute to regional security'. To the extent that the ASEAN governments were a party to this consensus, it indicated that although formally rejecting balance of power as a corporate mechanism for regional security, the members of the Association sought to sustain its practical benefits. To that extent, they had acknowledged the lack of strategic utility of their ZOPFAN proposal for Southeast Asia. Indeed, Southeast Asia as a strategic concept had been called into question by the post-Cold War changes in strategic environment, which was why alternative provision for security on a wider Asia-Pacific basis had become imperative.

In taking a new initiative over regional security arrangements, the governments of ASEAN had responded to prompting from Japan, which had attracted American encouragement shortly before the advent of the Clinton administration in January 1993. The United States had not been well disposed to multilateral security arrangements in the Asia-Pacific because of a concern that any such developments might prejudice well-tested bilateral linkages, especially between Washington and Tokyo. However, in his confirmation statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Winston Lord, incoming Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, had

registered the positive change of attitude to multilateral security arrangements of the new administration. For its part, Japan's foreign ministry had been conscious for some time that its government might have to confront the problem of engaging in a conventional security role, if steps were not taken to address the post-Cold War condition of the Asia-Pacific, especially by compensating for a regional loss of confidence in the resolve of the United States. In the light of the controversy which such a role would arouse both within Japan and also regionally, an initiative was taken by Japan's Foreign Minister, Taro Nakayama, as early as July 1991 at the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference in Kuala Lumpur.

In advance of the ASEAN summit in Singapore in January 1992, Mr Nakayama pointed to the significance of the Post Ministerial Conference as 'the most important forum for dialogue regarding the stability and development of the Asia-Pacific Region'. He went out of his way to register his endorsement of a prior statement by ASEAN's foreign ministers which had identified that gathering as one of the appropriate bases for addressing regional peace and security issues. He then advocated adding to existing mechanisms and frameworks for cooperation in economics, diplomacy and security by establishing 'a forum for political dialogue', intended to strengthen the political foundations of mutual cooperative relations, which would go beyond mere confidence-building measures aimed at easing military tensions. To that end, Mr Nakayama urged that 'it would be meaningful and timely to use the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference as a process of political dialogue for mutual reassurance among us'. He then suggested that a senior officials meeting be organised to report its deliberations to an ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference, in a virtual writing of the script for the diplomatic process which led to the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum, initially at a dinner during the annual meeting of the Association's foreign ministers in Singapore in July 1993.

Mr Nakayama's speech had been modified in advance so as to allow the preceding joint communiqué of ASEAN's foreign ministers to claim credit for identifying the appropriateness of the Post

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Ministerial Conference for addressing regional security issues. Although the trend towards adjustments in security arrangements was continued with the next ASEAN summit in Singapore in January 1992, and the Post Ministerial Conference in Manila in the following July, a further Japanese initiative was undertaken in order to sustain its momentum. In January 1993, Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa addressed the Foreign Correspondents' Club in Bangkok in the course of a tour of four ASEAN countries. He provided assurances about Japan's peaceful intentions, in the context of continuing security arrangements with the United States, but stressed the significance of the political and security dialogue which had been actively under way 'in the ASEAN post-ministerial conference since last year'. He went on to point out that '[i]n this period of transition for the international community, the countries of the Asia-Pacific region need to develop a long-term vision regarding the future order of peace and security for their region', and that Japan would actively take part in discussions to that end. The outspoken Japanese initiative was quite unprecedented, and represented not only the rising global standing of Tokyo but also a sense of predicament attendant on the changes in the regional security environment.

Within a matter of months, attempts were under way to see whether the notion of a long-term vision for regional security could be translated into practical expression, first at the meeting of senior officials of the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference in Singapore in May 1993 and then at a dinner for eighteen foreign ministers also in Singapore in July, at which the ASEAN Regional Forum was inaugurated. The ASEAN Regional Forum did not begin its operational existence until July 1994, when a short meeting was convened in Bangkok, again during the course of the Association's annual meeting of foreign ministers. The period allotted for discussion was only three hours, which meant there was time only for a brief statement by each of the eighteen representatives, shortened by the need in some cases for translation. It was hardly an opportunity for dialogue, although informal meetings between participants undoubtedly took place outside of the formal occasion. Great emphasis was placed, however, on its uniqueness, with the participation by all the major powers in the Asia-Pacific, some of

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6 For the full text of this speech on 16 January 1993, see BBC, *Summary of World Broadcasts* FE/1589 A2/1.
whom had been adversaries during the differing phases of the Cold War. To that end, the apparent role assumed by ASEAN in promoting the Forum seemed acceptable to countries such as China, which might not have been as forthcoming if the initiative had come openly from Japan. That said, the object of the first working session was to ensure that the participants were comfortable with the expanded structure of dialogue, underpinned by the tacit understanding that good regional citizenship would be a precondition to sustained economic cooperation and advantages.

The short conference concluded on a positive note with the decision taken to convene on an annual basis. Its Thai chairman pointed out that '[b]eing the first time ever that high-ranking representatives from the majority of states in the Asia-Pacific region came to specifically discuss political and security cooperation issues, the Meeting was considered a historic event for the region'. He added that, '[m]ore importantly, the Meeting signified the opening of a new chapter of peace, stability and cooperation for Southeast Asia [sic]'. Nothing of substance was achieved by way of addressing regional problems, however, with the only concrete proposal to promote the eventual participation of all ARF countries in the UN Conventional Arms Register. On the complex and contentious issue of jurisdiction over islands in the South China Sea, the Beijing government made it clear that it was only prepared to deal with the matter on a bilateral basis. Its interpretation of that position was made explicit with the subsequent seizure of Mischief Reef.

As of the time of writing, the ASEAN Regional Forum had had only one full working session at foreign minister level, of a limited duration. It would be premature, therefore, to pass judgement on its limited performance, when the declared prime object of the exercise was 'to foster the habit of constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern'. It would seem more relevant to consider the merits and applicability to a wider Asian-Pacific compass of those security ideas which have inspired the relatively successful workings of the much smaller scale ASEAN.

7 Chairman’s Statement: The First Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 25 July 1994, Bangkok.
Common and Uncommon Security

ASEAN has functioned as a vehicle for common security through the development of informal mechanisms of conflict avoidance and management, facilitated by the small and intimate scale of the collective enterprise. ASEAN's practical origins lay in the need, above all, to ensure that reconciliation between Malaysia and Indonesia would become well founded in mutual trust and confidence. To that end, it has been revealed by one of its architects that a tacit rule was enshrined from the outset: 'that inter-state problems should not be aired openly no matter how small'. That self-denying ordinance tended to be more honoured in the breach in ASEAN's early years, especially in the turbulent relations between Malaysia and the Philippines over the latter's claim to the territory of Sabah. However, the Association overcame its early teething troubles and began to develop a working culture of consultation, which was registered progressively from the mid-1970s. A more explicit rule was articulated at the first meeting of ASEAN's heads of government in February 1976, to the effect that security cooperation in the conventional sense would be permitted only on a 'non-ASEAN basis'. ASEAN has adhered strictly to that latter rule, in part because of the impossibility of defining a shared basis for common defence as indicated above. The alternative of common security has depended greatly on the observance of the self-denying ordinance over avoiding open contention and the generation of an intramural culture of consultation and cooperation.

Limitations to the ASEAN model have been indicated above in respect of its failure to confront the problem of power. An additional limitation may be identified in the outcome of an early breach in principle of the fundamental self-denying ordinance over avoiding open contention. At the first meeting of its heads of government in February 1976, the Association concluded a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia. Its primary purpose was to set out a code of conduct for regional relations which might serve as a basis for a modus vivendi with the revolutionary states of Indochina which had come to power during the course of 1975. In addition, the Treaty incorporated dispute settlement provisions drawn from Chapter Six of

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the Charter of the United Nations. Those dispute settlement provisions have remained dormant ever since, however, without once ever having been invoked by member states, reflecting both the spirit of the initial self-denying ordinance and also the difficulty of proceeding beyond the form of provision for dispute settlement. Ironically, that provision has been subsequently endorsed by both the ASEAN states and the members of the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference. Positive reference was made to the Treaty in a Declaration on the South China Sea promulgated by ASEAN's foreign ministers in Manila in July 1992, and also in the Chairman's Statement issued at the end of the meeting of senior officials of the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference in Singapore in May 1993, which led on to the inauguration of the ASEAN Regional Forum.

Despite such recent endorsement, ASEAN has not deviated in its pursuit of common security through a minimalist strategy of avoiding and managing contentious intramural issues, which has depended on mutual forbearance and restraint. Indeed, it was recognised in the terms of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation that the dispute settlement provisions could only apply if all parties to a dispute would agree to their application. The problem with the minimalist strategy, however, is that the viability of common security depends on a continuing ability to avoid rather than confront contentious issues, even through the kind of pacific settlement of disputes machinery contained in Chapter Six of the United Nations Charter. It also places the security of adherents to the ASEAN model at the mercy of the good will of regional partners, which is why those regional states which have been able to afford it have embarked on policies of rearmament.

What the ASEAN model does is to provide an overarching framework of constraint within which member states have the option of pursuing contentious issues on a bilateral basis, if and when the circumstances are right. Two contrasting examples during 1994 of the validity of such an approach have involved Malaysia, which has been in dispute with both Singapore and Indonesia over offshore islands. Malaysia and Singapore have been able to agree to go to third-party mediation, most probably the International Court of Justice, over the issue of jurisdiction over the island of Pedra Branca (in Malaysia, Pulau Batu Puteh) which is situated to the eastern side of the Singapore Strait. Significantly, neither party has thought it
appropriate to place this dispute within the compass of the dispute settlement provisions of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, knowing full well that such recourse would probably damage the fabric of regional cooperation in the process.

Malaysia has also been in dispute with Indonesia over jurisdiction over the islands of Sipadan and Ligitan, which are situated off the coast of eastern Borneo. Malaysia has made a corresponding offer to go to third-party arbitration, which Indonesia rejected in favour of employing ASEAN's dispute settlement machinery, almost certainly in the knowledge that other governments within the Association would be most reluctant to be drawn into an intramural quarrel. At issue as far as the ASEAN model is concerned is that its viability would seem to depend on member governments being able to avoid contentious issues with one another. Employment of dispute settlement machinery contains the high risk of institutionalising contention, so placing undue strain on the Association. It was not invoked also in the acrimonious case of a Filipina maid whose hanging in Singapore (after being found guilty of murder) brought diplomatic relations between ASEAN partners close to the point of rupture.

The introduction and employment of formal dispute settlement machinery would seem to be an academic issue as far as the ASEAN Regional Forum is concerned. The limitations which have been indicated in the case of ASEAN would be writ much larger in the case of the Forum. Moreover, none of its members have expressed a practical interest in taking up the recommendation made at the formative Senior Officials Meeting in Singapore in May 1993, that the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation be employed 'to provide measures for preventive diplomacy and dispute resolution'. The purposes and principles of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation were endorsed at the first working session of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Bangkok in July 1994 'as a code of conduct governing relations between states and a unique diplomatic instrument for regional confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and political and security cooperation', but without any specific reference to its use for dispute resolution.

The limitations to the ASEAN model in terms of the Association's role as a diplomatic community over the Cambodian conflict have been discussed above. The essence of the ASEAN model, which is devoid of common power, is that it only operates as a
regional complement to balance of power arrangements when any such arrangements coincide with the corporate interests of the Association. Such a coincidence obtained for a time in the case of Cambodia, but has not been registered since the end of the Cold War. Its absence was pointed up in respect of the Declaration on the South China Sea issued by ASEAN's foreign ministers at their annual meeting in July 1992, which called on claimant states to settle their disputes in a peaceful manner. By that time, however, the pattern of alignments which had permitted the confrontation of Vietnam had changed and its disparate elements were not of one mind over the South China Sea. The net effect was to point to ASEAN's effective security role being essentially intramural, especially in the wake of the Cold War. Indeed, given the differences of strategic perspective which it is obliged to accommodate, the Association could not contemplate moving beyond its well-established minimalist security role to a balance of power practice, without setting up internal tensions which would pose a serious risk to its corporate cohesion. That prospect is not on the formal agenda of the ASEAN Regional Forum whose Asia-Pacific compass encapsulates such considerable political diversity and complexity that it would not make sense to address regional security on other than the basis of the minimalist ASEAN model. Balance of power is only implicit in the overall arrangement to the extent that it provides for the continuing regional engagement of the United States, in respect of which recurrent assurances have been forthcoming.9

The Prospect for ARF

The ASEAN Regional Forum began its formal existence as a dinner party for eighteen foreign ministers seated around an oblong table, which is not the best medium for communication in multilateral dialogue. It began its working life with a single three-hour meeting in a hotel suite which provided opportunity only for a series of short statements by each of the eighteen foreign ministers present. For the time being, it functions through machinery set up by ASEAN, including annual meetings of foreign ministers and periodic meetings of senior officials. Should an attempt be made to establish machinery

9 See, for example, the assurance by Admiral Richard C. Macke, Commander in Chief US Pacific Command, 'Rest Assured, America's Asia-Pacific Commitment Is Here to Stay', International Herald Tribune, 12 January 1995.
The Extension of ASEAN's Model of Regional Security

separate from ASEAN with a different cycle of meetings, the obvious risk would arise of alienating those six governments which assumed the formal responsibility for ARF's inauguration.

Potential tensions aside, the ASEAN Regional Forum enjoys the constructive advantage of the participation of the most important Asia-Pacific states at a far more favourable juncture than that faced by ASEAN at its formation. Apart from the end of the Cold War, the most important difference in context between Bangkok in 1967 and Bangkok in 1994 is the remarkable economic progress of East Asia (including much of Southeast Asia), to which China has become an enthusiastic party. Underlying the initiative for the ASEAN Regional Forum has been the prospect of employing the nexus of economic advantage as a basis for imposing constraint on a declared territorial revisionism by China, which poses a threat to regional stability. A prime object of the collective enterprise would seem to be to try to educate China in the canons of good regional citizenship, with a tangible price in economic disadvantage to be paid for their violation. There is a conspicuous absence of political will among the ASEAN states and Japan, in particular, for containing China in any coercive way.

The ASEAN Regional Forum is an attempt to promote the habit and culture of consultation pioneered by ASEAN among a more diverse group of countries whose differences of interest and strategic perspective are far more pronounced than those of ASEAN itself. By its very nature, and even more so than ASEAN, the ARF cannot directly confront the problem of power in the new strategic environment which has emerged in the Asia-Pacific. It is obliged to rely on the fragile premises of common security which have always been at risk in a world of states without a common government. Moreover, its member governments are not joined in common enterprise by those same domestic concerns which enabled the governments of ASEAN to identity shared threats, to be addressed through the approach of common security. ARF is dependent nonetheless on the minimalist approach to security which has distinguished the institutional experience of ASEAN. At issue, therefore, is to what extent a model of regional security, which has worked up to a point within a limited constituency by conspicuously avoiding the problem of power, can be made effective on a much wider basis in a post-Cold War Asia-Pacific.
For the members of the ASEAN Regional Forum, there is no practical alternative to the extension of ASEAN's model of regional security. Despite its evident fallibility, it is, faute de mieux, the only possible post-Cold War framework capable of drawing in all the major powers of the Asia-Pacific. Collective security within that framework is out of the question, however. Problematic, nonetheless, is whether the ASEAN Regional Forum is capable of moving beyond the form of common security to addressing its substance with any effect.
CHAPTER 5

ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY: WHAT ARE THE REAL DANGERS?

J.L. Richardson

The ending of the Cold War has provided a setting which has not only led governments to rethink the requirements of national security, but has also given new impetus to a more fundamental kind of rethinking of the meaning of security itself, reinforcing a tendency already evident in many quarters in the 1980s. Among the leading ideas which have been canvassed in these discussions are first, the concept of common security, which shifts the focus from security against others to security through communication and cooperation with others; second, a broadening of the concept to include, for example, economic and environmental as well as military security; and third, the view that security should be thought of not just in terms of states, or nations, but of people - the individuals whose personal security, it is maintained, is the final goal of the security of states.

These proposals, especially the latter two, are not unproblematic. Whereas common security and the related theories can be seen as an extension of concepts and theories normally included in the discussion of national security,\(^1\) the inclusion of other dimensions of security or the shift of focus from the state to the person risks broadening the concept to the point that it can touch on almost any aspect of policy. Respect for human rights, for example, is central for the security of the person, but does this mean that the promotion of human rights should be regarded as part of national security policy?

Despite problems such as these, which will be discussed further below, the case for taking a broader view of security is a powerful one. In the present setting, characterised by unprecedentedly

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\(^1\) The idea that adversaries could enhance their security through 'collaboration', for example through negotiating agreements on arms control, is a central theme of contemporary strategic studies. 'Common security' can be seen as an extension of this idea. The frequent use of the term, 'international security studies' indicates how pervasive the idea has become.
rapid changes of many kinds, certain questions present themselves which seem to require such a concept. For example, as we look towards the twenty-first century, where are the greatest threats to the security and well-being of the Australian people to be discerned: in the military sphere (the traditional sphere of 'national security'), or in the economic, the environmental or perhaps the societal sphere? (Threats to the cohesion and identity of the community may well be the supreme concern of not a few states at the present time.) In some societies the security of the person may be endangered by policies deemed necessary for the security of the state, and vice versa. In some cases there may be a clear hierarchy of threats: for Kuwait, presumably, the supreme threat would be military, whereas for certain Pacific island states the threat posed by global warming to the continued existence of the state's territory would be uppermost. For Australia, the hierarchy is not self-evident, and in the case of any region, especially one so heterogeneous as the Asia-Pacific, it is likely to differ among the various states of the region.

Regional security in the Asia-Pacific has for the most part been discussed in traditional military terms. This discussion - in regional forums, in the media and in scholarly journals - can be conceptualised as a debate between realists and liberals. For the realists, the threats to security are quite high, and the primary response must be essentially military - for example, the construction of a balance of power. For the liberals, favourable economic and political trends reduce threats to (military) security very substantially, and the most important policies are political and economic - continued support for those trends, in particular economic interdependence, democratisation and the promotion of international institutions. Not all viewpoints fall within these two approaches, but they form the parameters of the mainstream debate and, it would appear, of the thinking of the region's policy communities.

Even within these parameters, the issues raised are momentous, and in contemplating a broader approach to regional security it is appropriate to begin by reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of the realist and liberal approaches to security in the traditional sense. This will be attempted in the next section of the chapter; the following section will canvass a broader range of threats - in particular the economic and the environmental; and the concluding section will review the problems that need to be surmounted if
Australia is adequately to confront the broad security agenda.

The Realist Approach

Realist theory has never been unchallenged in international relations, but from 1945 until the recent past it provided the dominant paradigm for the discipline, and it remains without serious challenge in the sub-discipline of strategic studies. For realism there is a clear hierarchy of issues: the primary concerns of international relations are those relating to national security ('high politics'), even though this may be temporarily obscured by the prominence of other issue areas, such as the economic at the present time.

For realism, the fundamentals of international relations do not change, because the underlying structure of the international system, anarchy, remains the same. That is to say, so long as the world consists of independent sovereign states, the central imperative for governments is to protect the security and independence of their societies. Contemporary neo-realist theory seeks to derive the essential characteristics of international politics from a highly parsimonious analysis of the consequences of an anarchic system structure. In their pursuit of security, states must be prepared to defend themselves and to form alliances with other independent states. The logic of the system thus leads to the formation of a balance of power in order to prevent any of the stronger states from dominating the rest. Neo-realism highlights power balancing: states which do not act in accordance with its logic, like firms which fail to compete in the market, are unlikely to survive. A balance of power, however, may be unstable: in their search for security states prefer to have a margin for error, but this enhances their capacity to threaten others, and vice versa. There is no easy answer to this security dilemma.

The classical realism of earlier authors was based on certain further premises. These were less rigorously formulated, but there were certain characteristic assumptions. First, there was an assumption that states seek power, not only security: that is to say, they seek power for its own sake, not only as a means to security. Powerful states seek to dominate others - they seek hegemony. Typically, this premise was associated with pessimistic assumptions concerning human nature. Second, there was an assumption that conflict is more salient in international politics than cooperation, not only because the
powerful seek ever greater power but because when states differ over values, rights and claims - as they do constantly - in the absence of any authoritative means of adjudicating these differences, and force remaining the final arbiter, disputes of this kind become a focal point for international tensions and alignments. Arguably, classical realism provides a more satisfactory, if less parsimonious, theory than neo-realism, but that issue is tangential to the present discussion. The essential point is that realist approaches to Asia-Pacific security appear to be much more influenced by classical realism than by the refinements of neo-realist theory.²

Realist analyses of Asia-Pacific security tend to take a pessimistic view of regional conflicts, noting a legacy of 'political fragmentation and hostility' from the past, expecting regional rivalries to become more acute as the Cold War overlay recedes, perceiving 'flashpoints' such as the Spratly Islands as catalysts for serious conflict between China and its neighbours, and highlighting tensions between Japan and other states in the region, where historic memories exacerbate current economic frictions. Above all, however, assuming that present projections of the rapid growth of China's economy and its military potential prove correct, realists expect that such a China will pose major security threats in the region. China's historic self-image as the 'middle kingdom', surrounded by tributary states, points to the kind of position that it can be expected to seek. China has never been just one great power among several: it must be expected that it will seek regional hegemony, the normal aspiration of any dominant power, and one peculiarly attractive to a state with China's traditions, on the one hand, and its more recent experience of subordination to

² Neo-realist theory has not responded convincingly to the question why, if the overriding goal of states is security - the systemic imperative - cooperation is so difficult to achieve, and power seeking so recurrent a phenomenon. The principal response is that on security issues states seek relative gains, not absolute gains (in which case cooperation would present fewer problems). Adversaries seek security by pursuing relative gains, and the power to protect them, at one another's expense. While this is plausible so far as it goes, it does not explain why some states' conceptions of security are so limitless as is sometimes the case, and it is woefully inadequate as an explanation of the Napoleons and Hitlers. Classical realism's additional premises offer explanations of some of these phenomena, but present many problems in themselves, some of which have been identified by the neo-realists. The classic statements of the two approaches are Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations (Knopf, New York, 4th edn 1967); and Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Addison-Wesley, Reading MA, 1979).

For realist thinking, this defines the central security issue for the coming period: to construct a balance of power against China. Little attention has been paid to the potential role of Russia in such a balance, a surprising omission in the perspective of the past century. It is generally noted that all governments in the region are urging the United States to remain actively involved in security issues, but also that domestic pressures could lead the United States to abandon its military presence, and that a balancing role has little appeal to American public opinion. The US-Japanese relationship is central to America's future role, and while it might be sound realist logic to maintain it in the face of the expected regional ascendancy of China, it is by no means certain that this logic will be politically effective in the United States, especially if economic tensions in relation to Japan become more serious.

In this context, one line of thinking is to look to the nuclear arming of Japan to provide the necessary balance against China.\footnote{Aaron L. Friedberg, 'Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia', \textit{International Security}, Vol.18, No.3, Winter 1993/94.} The underlying neo-realist logic is the same as that which led to the better known proposal of John Mearsheimer that Germany should become a nuclear power in order to provide the necessary regional balance in post-Cold War Europe.\footnote{John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', \textit{International Security}, Vol.15, No.1, Summer 1990, pp.5-56.} Similar reservations are in order. First, far from promoting stability, such a development would threaten existing levels of confidence and existing positive relationships, creating new tensions and instabilities. Second, it amounts to grasping the most hazardous option at the outset, neglecting the range of measures - diplomatic and political as well as economic and military - by which countervailing power may be built up in the contemporary international environment, should the potential hegemonial threat actually begin to emerge.

This points to a major shortcoming of realist thinking, in that it tends to apply concepts such as balance of power or hegemony in too
mechanical a way, whereas in practice they are problematic when applied in the context of the contemporary Asia-Pacific region. 'Hegemony' has been applied in other contexts in varying senses. In the case of the United States in relation to Latin America, it refers to the influence which flows from the economic preponderance of the United States in the region. Historically, in Europe it has referred to the kind of hegemony which great powers have sometimes sought and occasionally, like Napoleon's France or Hitler's Germany, have briefly enjoyed. In the case of East Asia at the present time it is Japan, not China, which has the economic and financial resources to be the potential economic hegemon, and most states in the region are ahead of China in the process of economic modernisation; thus there is no economic basis from which Chinese hegemony might be derived, and this situation will not readily change, given China's immense internal needs. And no reasons have been advanced for expecting a strong China - which by definition would enjoy a widening range of options globally as well as regionally - to follow the example of those atypical European leaders, Napoleon and Hitler, in a bid to subjugate a very different continent in a very different setting.

This does not, of course, rule out the possibility that force might be used to resolve a specific international issue - over the Spratly Islands, for example, if the parties are unable to agree on the allocation of rights over oil exploration and exploitation (they are less likely to agree over sovereignty claims). But even in this case, the use of force would not provide assurance of the security of exploitation.

A persuasive historical critique of realism's emphasis on military power balancing has been advanced by Paul Schroeder. According to Schroeder's well-supported analysis, the experience of the modern state system suggests that constructing a military balance of power was typically the last recourse of foreign policy, not its constant preoccupation. Typically, states confronted by demands or threats from one of the 'great powers' sought first to address the problem by means less costly and dangerous than the formation of a military balance against the threat. They might seek to accommodate the demand, associating themselves with the threatening power rather than balancing against it ('bandwagoning', in the current jargon); or

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they might seek to avoid involvement ('hiding'), or to defuse the issue through placing it in a broader context or through some other initiative ('transcendence'). Such indirect diplomatic approaches did not always, as they did in the 1930s, lead to disaster: indeed, they normally did not. Historically, and not only in the 1930s, states went to considerable lengths to avoid the last resort, which often did not eventuate. Such a pattern could be seen as eminently rational - to prefer low-cost, low-risk strategies over high-cost, high-risk strategies, adopting the latter only when other options had been exhausted.

Such an approach does not imply blindness to the potential threat from a strong power with great ambitions, but it does imply an awareness that international dangers are multiple, not clear-cut, and that there are dangers in prematurely identifying an enemy or in rigid alliances, just as there are dangers in underestimating threats. The inclusion of a potential adversary in a variety of associations may be more effective than the construction of an opposing coalition. More generally, this approach assumes an awareness of the richness of the resources potentially available to diplomacy - 'statecraft' - an awareness which has largely atrophied in current Western thinking on international relations, dominated as it has been by the starkness and clarity (in retrospect) of the choices in the 1930s and the relative simplicity, once initial uncertainties had been resolved, of diplomacy in the Cold War. There is a greater awareness of complexity with respect to economic issues and multilateral institutions, but here much of the complexity consists in the technical detail or in responding to pressures from internal and external constituencies. Little attention is paid to discerning the opportunities which potential linkages among different issue areas may provide.

Such opportunities are likely to be presented by the multiple uncertainties of the Asia-Pacific future. In so open-ended a situation, the main danger from the mechanical application of realist thinking is the self-fulfilling prophecy: that the premature identification of a long-term threat - from China - may lead to a hardening of political alignments in a fixed pattern, the dangers of which were traditionally well recognised.

If Western theory and practice are deficient with respect to the discerning of larger diplomatic opportunities, the practice of some Asian states may be more attuned to these potentialities. The members
of ASEAN have demonstrated skill in enhancing their influence through acting collectively, and more recently in positioning ASEAN at the centre of the emerging regional security dialogue. But if diplomacy has been uppermost, their defence modernisation programmes show that they have not neglected the military underpinnings of security. 'Realism' is not denied, but nor is it uppermost in foreign policy thinking.

Realist thinking is not without its residual strengths. It is possible that an overemphasis on diplomacy or on institutions can lead to a neglect of military preparedness, but this lesson has been so thoroughly learned in Western realist thought over six decades that it is in little danger of being forgotten. It is internalised in national security establishments which enjoy a strong position in most governmental structures, and are well placed to mobilise opinion and to secure adequate resources. By comparison, diplomacy enjoys no such popular esteem or wider constituency.

Moreover, it is possible that, all indications to the contrary notwithstanding, realist prognoses concerning the Asia-Pacific future could be proved correct. That is to say, despite globalisation, and despite the increasing awareness that the costs of major war for any modern - or modernising - state manifestly outweigh its benefits, the regional future could become one in which, as in the Cold War, military considerations come to dominate foreign policy. Even if, among the major states, the costs of war might appear prohibitive, the aggressive pursuit of certain interests to the point of risking war might serve the interests of particular groups or élites. The old 'high politics' could return.

It is classical realism, rather than neo-realist theory, which alerts one to these potentialities. Neo-realist theory, whose level of abstraction would move international relations theory closer to economics, sees little scope for diplomacy, or for exploring the complex array of potentialities which it may open up, or foreclose. But, as noted earlier, classical realism has resisted systematic theoretical formulation. There is much to be said for the recent contention of Owen Harries that realism is a disposition rather than a theory. Central to the realist disposition, according to Harries, are:

its awareness of danger as a natural part of life; its stress on self-reliance and its guiltless acknowledgment of the need to
put self-interest first; its willingness to use force prudentially; 
the overriding priority given to survival; and the recognition 
that humanitarian impulses ... cannot be overriding.7

He also refers to realism's 'natural, controlled pessimism'; he might 
also have referred to its healthy scepticism towards the claims of 
governments which invoke universal norms in support of their 
particular claims. I shall suggest below that the realist disposition still 
has something to offer as a residual or as a corrective.

The Liberal Approach

The ending of the Cold War has seen a revival of liberal theory 
in international relations. Together with other, more gradual, 
developments in the international environment it has prompted a 
widespread view that the international system is undergoing a process 
of fundamental change. It is not claimed that the Wilsonian vision of a 
liberal world order is on the point of realisation, but that the changes 
are sufficiently far-reaching that the structural constraints invoked by 
the realists are no longer compelling. In particular, it is claimed that 
major war is becoming so unacceptable or even unthinkable an option 
that the survival of a system of independent states no longer depends 
on a balance of power - that is to say, on the willingness of the major 
powers to go to war in order to maintain it.8 This is, of course, a 
momentous claim. In essence, the liberal contention is that the present 
transformation of the international system is so fundamental that the 
continued existence of a system of independent states no longer 
depends, as the realists claim it has for several centuries, on a balance 
of power maintained, in the last resort, through major war.

The most prominent strand in liberal international relations 
theory at the present time - the 'neo-liberal institutionalism' associated

8 For arguments that this claim should be taken seriously, see Robert Jervis, 'The 
Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?', International Security, Vol.16, 
No.3, Winter 1991/92, pp.39-73; James L. Richardson, 'The End of Geopolitics?' in 
Richard Leaver and James L. Richardson (eds), The Post-Cold War Order: Diagnoses 
and Prognoses, Studies in World Affairs II (Allen & Unwin in assoc. with 
Department of International Relations, Australian National University, Sydney, 
1993). For a statement of liberal claims, see Charles W. Kegley, Jr, 'The Neoidealistic 
Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and New International Realities', 
with Robert Keohane - highlights the role of international institutions in facilitating cooperation and in enhancing the interests of member-states in continued cooperation. In the Asia-Pacific region, where institutionalisation is at an early stage, this aspect of liberalism appears to be less significant than three other developments which liberals also highlight: globalisation, democratisation and tendencies making for 'the obsolescence of major war'.

Interdependence among states - the intensification of links through trade and foreign investment - has long been regarded as a factor making for peace, but the experience of 1914 showed that interdependence alone could not prevent major war. Today's 'globalisation', however, goes far beyond traditional interdependence. In addition to trade and investment links it includes the increasing tendency on the part of major firms to organise production on an international basis, and also the increasing role of international financial institutions and networks. And it is not limited to the economic and financial sphere, but includes the pervasive effects of global media and communications, the sharing of images, the dramatic expansion of the Internet, and the changing of consciousness which is the end-product of these developments. While providing no final guarantee against major war, globalisation amounts to a transformation of the setting within which states interact.

Like the benefits of interdependence, the idea that major war has become intolerably costly is a commonplace of twentieth-century thought, twice revealed as premature. Yet here, too, the setting has changed in important ways, further tilting the scales against war. Whereas territorial gains once ensured a gain in wealth and power, the securing of any gains from the control of a hostile population is now very doubtful, and the cost of making such gains, even in non-nuclear war, is likely to be out of all proportion to the gains themselves - which could be far more predictably secured by a few years of economic growth. Moreover, war among major powers cannot exclude the

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10 At the time of the Second World War massive territorial gains still appeared advantageous to the rulers of Germany and Japan, despite the heavy anticipated costs of war. Such a prospect appears much less plausible at the present time. Territory remains important to ethnic groups within certain states, and in some cases to states where ethnic communities overlap existing frontiers.
ultimate irrationality of escalation to nuclear war. It is true that in the event of intense political hostilities, war through miscalculation cannot be entirely ruled out; but the Cold War suggests that the awareness of this possibility makes for extreme caution if such tensions reach the crisis point.

The likelihood of major war is reduced not only by changes at the level of the international system, but also by changes within societies. Recent American studies have emphasised the effects of democratisation, and in particular it is claimed that there are no instances when stable liberal democracies have fought one another.\(^\text{11}\) Explanations for this phenomenon remain rather unconvincing, however, and there can be little confidence that, where very serious conflicts are present, the adoption of democratic government would ensure the avoidance of war. In particular, it is quite possible that the absence of war among democracies may be explained by other factors than their form of government - for example, by the absence of conflicts of this magnitude among them, as in western Europe, or by geographical separation, or by changing attitudes towards war in modern industrial societies. It is this last factor which is emphasised by John Mueller.\(^\text{12}\) Recent indications of Russian attitudes provide support for this view of industrial society: aversion to war has been very evident in public reactions to the campaign in Chechenya, for example. The phenomenon is not peculiar to the Western democracies.

The strength of the liberal approach is that it is open to the potential significance of the changes underway and to the idea that there may be a need to jettison the realist assumptions which have dominated thinking about international relations for several centuries. Its weaknesses are, first, that it may underestimate the importance of structural continuities: even if they no longer dominate the international system, they may still exert a powerful residual influence. Second, liberalism offers too many ready-made answers, too many optimistic prognoses, too complacent a view of the virtues of the new tendencies, too great a readiness to neglect their problematic side. For example, interdependence and globalisation are tending to widen inequalities, both within societies and between states and

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\(^\text{11}\) See, for example, Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993), which supports the claim but discusses some of the criticisms which it has provoked.

\(^\text{12}\) See Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday.
regions: the losers in industrial societies fear long-term unemployment and a loss of opportunities, social standing and self-esteem, while those in 'third-world' societies face absolute deprivation in addition to all these. And market-driven economic growth is accelerating environmental degradation and a process of unpredictable import, global warming, while governmental responses remain little more than symbolic.

Liberalism shares one of the weaknesses of realism; namely, its blindness to the potential for constructive diplomacy, on the one hand, and to the costs of diplomatic obtuseness, on the other. But whereas realism creates a risk of self-fulfilling prophecies, liberalism relies too heavily on the presumed beneficence of impersonal forces, such as trade or democratisation. In doing so, it neglects the social dislocation which these may entail, especially if introduced hastily in response to external pressures. It also neglects the tensions which may be generated by the aggressive promotion of liberal causes, and the need for sensitive diplomacy to keep relationships in balance, in the short term, and to build long-term relationships of confidence, especially across cultures. With regard to the Asia-Pacific, these weaknesses are fairly evident.

More generally, the Asia-Pacific is a region in which the impact of the transforming processes emphasised in contemporary liberalism - globalisation, democratisation and the declining acceptability of war - is uneven. In particular, although foreign trade and investment are crucial for China's economic modernisation, it is not yet fully involved in those multiple networks - related to finance, production, media and communications - entailed in globalisation. Moreover, the Chinese government has resisted political reform and on present indications an authoritarian form of government is likely to remain for some time ahead. Indeed, in the face of certain analyses which see rapid economic growth posing a risk of political fragmentation, and diffuse fears of the consequences of political 'chaos', the preservation of political unity and order is likely to remain a priority of China's government.13 Similar concerns are present in much of Southeast Asia, and movement towards political democracy is

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13 For the potential for fragmentation, contested by many analysts, see Gerald Segal, *China Changes Shape: Regionalism and Foreign Policy*, Adelphi Paper No.287 (Brassey's for IISS, London, 1994).
correspondingly inhibited, justification being advanced in the 'neo-Confucian' doctrine expounded especially by Singaporean intellectuals.

In this setting the considerations making for the unacceptability of war among most of the major powers and among mature industrial societies are only weakly present in East Asia. Societies undergoing rapid industrialisation are not necessarily averse to war, especially when ruled by authoritarian governments, and the 'strong' states in the region may not be decisively constrained by their societies' uneven involvement in global networks. In such a setting the avoidance of major war may rest mainly on cost-benefit calculations. So long as there is a prospect of sustained, relatively rapid economic growth in the region, these are likely to represent a powerful constraint against major war. It is not only that the gains from the continued expansion of trade and investment links are likely to exceed those from any military success, and that the disruption of these links would incur major economic costs. There is also the increase in global influence and standing which follows from the region's economic advance, relative to any other region. In a highly competitive international economic order, the East Asians are proving to be the most effective competitors. It is this competitive strength in the economic arena which provides the strongest incentive to governments and élites in the region to avoid lapsing into military hostilities.14 While there can be no final assurance that all élites or ethnic groups will share this perspective, it provides a reasonable basis for projection - a plausible framework for the medium-term future.

The Broad Concept of Security

Neither realism nor liberalism provides an adequate framework for assessing the full range of threats to security in the region - security being understood in the broad sense discussed earlier, of assuring the well-being of the peoples concerned against economic and environmental dangers as well as military threats, and against violence within societies as well as violence from without. It was noted that there are dangers of conceptual confusion in broadening the

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14 For an amplification of these points, see James L. Richardson, 'Asia-Pacific: The Case for Geopolitical Optimism', The National Interest, No.38, Winter 1994/95, pp.28-39.
definition of security in this way, but as Arnold Wolfers pointed out many years ago, 'national security' has always been an ambiguous symbol, and one which is used, like 'national interest', to confer an aura of unquestioned legitimacy on policies and practices which might otherwise be seen to be highly questionable. Moreover, given the priority so long accorded to military security during the Cold War, to restrict the term 'security' to the military sphere in present circumstances tends to create a presumption that military concerns should rightly continue to have primacy in governmental priorities at all times.

The discussion of a broader concept of security since the mid-1980s has focused attention on fundamental issues. The question, security for whom?, points to the fact that in many societies the security of the state does not at all equate with the security of its people, but rather with the security of particular élites or hierarchies, which may entail a high level of insecurity on the part of minorities, or even the majority of the people. Moreover, a country may be relatively secure against military attack yet extremely vulnerable in the face of international economic pressures or adverse environmental changes. The important question for public policy is: in which of these broad areas - military, economic, environmental and societal - are the greatest threats to the security and well-being of the people concerned, and how might they best be countered? To limit this sort of inquiry to the military domain has no plausible justification.

The present inquiry will not address the whole of this agenda. It will leave aside questions relating to the security of persons and minorities against arbitrary violence - the human rights agenda as understood in the West - because these questions require careful analysis of the specific conditions in societies where personal security is under threat. The discussion will be limited to military, economic and environmental dangers, because although each state confronts distinctive problems in each of these areas, its security is also endangered by broader developments which affect the region as a

whole, or major parts of it.

In general, the term 'danger' is used in preference to 'threat', because of its broader connotations. A threat is associated with a particular state - the former Soviet threat, or the concern over a future threat from China, for example. It is the aggressive actions of the other state which create the problem; its action is autonomous, one's own options are perceived on a scale ranging from appeasement to deterrence. A danger, on the other hand, is a problem which calls for responses from all those concerned. Failure to cope adequately with a danger may be as much a consequence of one's own faulty policies as of the shortcomings of others. In a setting so strongly characterised by uncertainty as the Asia-Pacific, the terminology of threats is premature. The terminology of dangers is appropriate, not least because it draws attention to the possibility that dangers may be worsened by one's own policies, especially if these are based on stereotypes formed in an earlier period and in a different setting.

The general thesis of the following pages is that in Western, including Australian, discussions of the region disproportionate attention is paid to military, as against economic and environmental dangers. The former tend to be overstated, and defined too presumptively as threats; the latter tend to be understated, or relegated to the margins of discussion. It is not possible to present a thoroughgoing analysis of each of these areas, some of them insufficiently examined in the existing literature. But nor is it necessary to do so in order to establish that the thesis is plausible. For this, given the speculative nature of the enterprise, a broad canvassing of the issues is sufficient.

**Military Dangers**

Dangers come in many forms, and it must be assumed that new dangers, unexpected today, will emerge to replace those of today's which recede. Presently perceived dangers may be divided into three categories: specific potential flashpoints; dangers to the overall regional balance and sense of confidence; and - possibly as a consequence of the latter but possibly as an independent development - the proliferation of destabilising weapons systems, above all nuclear proliferation.
Prior to the US-North Korean agreement of October 1994, whereby North Korea renounced the production of plutonium in exchange for massive assistance for its civil nuclear programme, developments in Korea were at the top of the list of potential flashpoints. The United States appeared willing to go to extreme lengths to block the perceived North Korean nuclear weapons programme, and there were fears that the insecure North Korean regime might embark on a new war on the peninsula. The agreement has for the time being defused these concerns, but its implementation will require persistence and patience. A divided Korea could still be the source of a major international crisis. In recent diplomacy on Korea, however, the areas of agreement among the major powers have been much more substantial than the issues dividing them. So long as this remains the case, the probability is that such a crisis would not escalate into a confrontation among those powers.

Actual military incidents, albeit at a low level, have taken place in the Spratly Islands in 1995, and there have been sharp diplomatic exchanges. Further friction over China’s claim to sovereignty over the whole of the island group, and the conflicting claims of Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan, as well as the Philippines, appears likely. The disincentives against outright war, however, are very substantial: they include not only the economic and political costs to China of a perceived war of aggression, but also the difficulty of achieving decisive military success, assuming intimidation alone were insufficient to bring about a renunciation of the competing sovereignty claims. And to the extent that the exploitation of the seabed oil resources was the goal, this would be difficult to secure against sabotage or covert attack if the legitimacy of their unilateral exploitation was denied by the neighbouring states. This suggests that the use of force is likely to remain limited to bargaining and attempted intimidation.

The future status of Taiwan is a more serious issue: China’s readiness to go to extreme lengths to prevent Taiwan’s becoming a formally independent sovereign state is highly credible, and would be viewed differently from the use of force elsewhere in the region. It is generally assumed that a declaration of formal sovereignty by the

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government of Taiwan would provoke a major crisis. Whether China would have the military capability to overwhelm Taiwan, given the latter's relatively advanced weaponry, is another question. The potential role of outside powers in such a crisis has not been very thoroughly explored. In particular, Richard K. Betts draws attention to a 'worst case' scenario in which the United States, having stood aside as a crisis unfolds, decides to intervene in support of a democratically elected government in Taiwan after the event.\(^{18}\)

The possibility of such misjudgment cannot be excluded, especially in a political climate where foreign policy is driven mainly by domestic concerns, but it would represent a sad commentary on the extensive intellectual resources now devoted to the discussion of security issues in the region. While such scenarios pose the issues most starkly, others may be more likely: those which stop short at a confrontation, Cuba-style, or in which full crisis is averted through diplomatic pressures. More generally, and allowing for the possibility of unforeseen contingencies, there is no reason to qualify an earlier conclusion that the dangers now familiar to security analysts are not the kind of issues which tend to generate great wars.\(^{19}\)

But what if there is a change in the regional configuration of power? The present 'balance' is in reality a preponderance, a very marked one, on the part of the United States and its allies and supporters. Even if the US-Japanese security relationship should break down, the basic resources of power in the Asia-Pacific will be diffused. Japan will remain an economic superpower in the region, the United States will remain a major economic presence with unrivalled military capabilities, Russia will remain a nuclear power. China may achieve formidable economic and military power, but has still to do so, and for the foreseeable future, it is argued below, the notion of Chinese hegemony appears misplaced. Even if there were an automatic link between superior resources and a will to hegemony, China will not have this kind of superiority of resources.

Security, however, does not follow automatically from a diffusion of basic power resources. A sense of security - \textit{confidence} in


\(^{19}\) Richardson, 'The Case for Geopolitical Optimism', p.35.
security - normally requires something more. This was the basic impetus for the formation of NATO, for example. Its founders did not, as many later came to do, perceive a Soviet military threat, but they perceived a Soviet political threat and a need for a security system in order to restore a sense of confidence in western Europe. It is this search for something more which has preoccupied security analysts in the region since the end of the Cold War. There has been little sense of political urgency behind this, however, and no impetus to create a new formal security structure. Governments have for the most part urged the United States to retain its presence in the region, and have responded to concerns over its possible future disengagement by enhancing their military capabilities (though well short of an arms race) and by instituting a region-wide security dialogue, at both governmental and sub-governmental levels, through the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific.

Should the US-Japanese conflicts over trade seriously damage the US-Japanese military relationship, Japan could be expected to strengthen its own capabilities. While some might perceive this as a welcome counterweight to China, others would be likely to perceive it as threatening, especially if the emphasis were on offensive (power projection) capabilities and above all if it were to include nuclear weapons. Unless China was perceived as very threatening, a major Japanese build-up would be likely to promote a sense of insecurity in the region, not greater security. However, unless there is a drastic change in its internal political climate, Japan would be likely to opt for no more than is perceived as absolutely essential in changed circumstances, not for a radical shift in its security profile.

As the foregoing suggests, the open acquiring and deployment of a nuclear capability by any state would be among the developments most likely to increase the sense of insecurity in the region. Japan's potential to transform itself into a significant nuclear power within a relatively short period can enhance its diplomatic weight, while internal political forces will continue to provide a major disincentive to its actually doing so. A united Korea might be less reluctant to 'go nuclear', but would have to weigh the risk that by alarming its powerful neighbours through acquiring a modest, and presumably untested, nuclear capability it might become less, not more, secure.
What this brief outline suggests is not that major military dangers in the region may be disregarded, but that they appear to be quite a long way from materialising, and that this provides scope for diplomacy backed by measured military responses to threats that actually emerge. While this is compatible with a prudent realism, there is a danger that a mechanical style of realist analysis, together with a certain institutional interest in magnifying the sense of threat in order to promote high military spending, can lead to the kind of stereotyped thinking which makes for alarmist prognoses, a premature recourse to military options and alignments, and a disdain for the kind of diplomatic options which the region may well continue to offer. In this sense realist thinking could become part of the problem, tending, ironically, to enhance regional insecurity.

**Economic Dangers**

In contrast to the military sphere, with its abundant literature on threats to security, the discussion of dangers in the economic sphere is underdeveloped. There is a case for drawing on realist modes of thought in the economic domain, where the prevailing stereotypes lead to an incomplete and selective awareness of dangers. Indeed, only two, closely related, dangers are widely acknowledged: a general move to protectionism or the emergence of exclusive regional blocs, both of which are seen as capable of introducing major geopolitical instability. While this might indeed follow from a radical shift to regional blocs or a general embracing of protectionism, the likelihood of either of these appears to be greatly overstated in the rhetoric of the advocates of free trade. The economic and political strength of internationally or globally oriented business and financial interests in the major economies amounts to a major barrier to all-out protectionism, and the worldwide diffusion of the trade patterns of each of the prospective regional blocs counts heavily against moves towards autarkic regions. The rhetorical invocation of these threats is best seen as part of the process of de-legitimising these options, not as identifying plausible dangers.

We may, as in the military sphere, distinguish between specific and systemic dangers. In view of the paucity of systematic discussion, the following can be no more than a preliminary sketch, drawing attention to a range of potential dangers. The most visible, at the time
of writing, are the repercussions of trade disputes among the major regional actors, in particular between the United States and Japan, or the United States and China. While the effects of such disputes on the global economic order may be less than catastrophic, their effects on regional politics could be very substantial. In the first place, they could undermine institutions for regional cooperation, such as APEC; and second, as noted above, they could lead to the likely instabilities associated with Japan's seeking a new defence posture or with China's adopting an anti-US, and possibly anti-Western, political stance.

A second, quite different kind of visible danger would be a financial and economic crisis along the lines experienced by Mexico at the beginning of 1995, a crisis of confidence to which states with high overseas debts and balance of payments deficits may be liable in the present global economic system. Most states in the region may have more solidly based economies than Mexico, but this can change, and in addition to the immediate costs incurred by the affected society, the region-wide repercussions for confidence can be serious. In the case of economies such as the Australian, dominated by short-term electoral and financial concerns, dangers of this kind are likely to be underestimated.

A third concern, also not unfamiliar, is that China's remarkable economic advance might falter, for a variety of economic or political reasons. While this might produce short-term relief for competing economies, a serious and prolonged setback to China's hopes for economic modernisation and the consequent social improvement could be expected to have major adverse repercussions for the region, whether in the form of massive refugee pressures or a desperate recourse to military measures. But whereas the consequences of rapid Chinese growth can be regarded as a challenge to constructive diplomacy, the consequences of the failure of the reform experiment would be far less amenable to external influence.

Certain systemic dangers may also be discerned. In the absence of sustained attention to these in the policy communities or in academia it is impossible to make an informed judgment on their likelihood, or on how they might best be addressed. First, there is a danger that single-minded pressure for trade liberalisation - in
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particular for a more rapid opening of markets than the governments of regional states deem safe, especially when what is demanded is not merely the removal of tariff barriers but changes in the ways in which production and markets are organised - could lead to social dislocation of a serious kind. It could result in large-scale unemployment, and the surfacing of social and political tensions which remain latent in times of rapid economic advance. In such a setting the Asia-Pacific is unlikely to be immune to the political volatility characteristic of most other regions. The phase of economic expansiveness since the 1970s might prove as transient as the 'golden age' of the Western societies in the preceding generation. In other words, trade liberalisation, as defined in Western capitals, should not be seen as an unconditional good, but should be conditioned by respect for social institutions and political circumstances.

Second, and more broadly, there are the consequences of the one-sided market priorities of governments and international financial institutions during the past two decades: a decline in social equity and cohesion in Western societies, and an increase in absolute deprivation in much of the Third World. These are at their most extreme, in the West, where ideology reinforces technological trends making for increasing inequality and unemployment; in the Third World, in societies lacking the infrastructure and educational levels to compete in global markets. These trends are less obtrusive in East Asia, thanks to its unprecedented economic growth, but the social upheavals accompanying growth may nonetheless present formidable problems. It is difficult to suppose that increasing polarisation within and between societies will not eventually lead to serious conflict. While on present indications this problem may be less acute in East Asia than elsewhere, any major setback in the region, in the context of rising expectations and ambitions, could have major repercussions.

Systemic dangers, then, could arise in the form of political consequences of present economic trends and priorities. They could also arise from problems inherent in the present global economic system. In particular, the workings of the international financial system are little understood. The international 'anarchy' in this sphere is far more decentralised, far less clearly structured than the system of states. Whereas the governments of the major powers, in their more important relationships, have long-term horizons and for the most part compelling motives for prudence, actors in the international financial
arena are driven by short-term, profit-maximising imperatives and have strong incentives to engage in speculation. Major misjudgments of risk are quite frequent, and governments have opted out of any attempt to control the system. Thus far, major crises have been contained, though at high cost to societies whose governments had engaged in imprudent borrowing. Individual banks and other institutions have collapsed; others have been rescued by governments. The systemic consequences of the collapse of a major institution where governments were unable or unwilling to mount a rescue have yet to be experienced. There appears to be little ground for confidence in the long-term stability of an international financial system constructed on present lines.

Despite the prominence of economists in contemporary governments as well as in economic institutions, there is far less systematic study of dangers to economic security than of threats to security in the military sphere. Strategic analysts, like military bureaucracies, may tend to overstate military threats, but this has the positive consequence that the threats receive sustained analytical attention. The bias in economics in favour of markets leads to a corresponding neglect of analysis of their adverse consequences, or of the potentiality for major crisis. This is due not only to excessive faith in abstract models, but also to the one-dimensional development of the economics discipline. Its timeless models are applied to the practical problems of managing the present, the world as it is. History is deemed irrelevant: change, as in realist thinking, does not affect the essentials. Equally absent is the perspective of critical theory, with its normative concerns and its focus on changing structural conditions which have brought about the particular circumstances of the present and which, interacting with normative ideologies, can be assumed to be transforming present circumstances in ways as yet unclear. Further discussion of economic dangers to security, then, requires a major input from outside the economics discipline.

Environmental Dangers

The discussion of environmental dangers is characterised by a bifurcation between two levels: on the one hand, a multidisciplinary research community, keenly aware of a wide spectrum of dangers and potential responses; on the other hand, governments reluctant to
address the issues, rather perpetuating the emotive but misleading stereotypes of public debate. The geographers, demographers, anthropologists, meteorologists, climatologists, agricultural and forestry scientists, ecologists, marine scientists and others who pool their expertise in identifying environmental dangers avoid, by the nature of their interaction, the narrowing of perspective induced by the standard paradigms of the strategists and the economists. Their recommendations on policy and institutional changes are correspondingly broad-based and practical, although they are well aware of the political and financial constraints which militate against their being adopted by governments. Perhaps even more formidable is the underlying ideological and even cultural constraint: an acknowledgment of ecological limits calls in question not only assumptions of perpetual economic growth but more basic assumptions on the nature of modernisation - or 'modernity'.

This is not, of course, to suggest that the research community endorses the popular stereotypes whereby green, conservationist values are presented as obstacles to development, and vice versa. In grappling with the problems of sustainability, the researchers are assuming that development - in the sense of technological innovation and the capacity of economies to satisfy a wider range of needs and in particular to improve the living standards of those now excluded from the basic amenities of 'modern' society - will and must continue, but that it cannot simply continue in the same way. A continuation of the unholy alliance between governments and markets in the undiscriminating promotion of 'growth', in other words, will not only end disastrously but will run into increasing obstacles.

Environmental dangers may be divided into three broad categories: first, those of limited scale, which present problems mainly of cost; second, larger dangers to ecosystems, where the problems are clear but the availability of satisfactory solutions is not; and third,

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21 For an excellent example of such scholarly collaboration, see Harold Brookfield and Yvonne Byron (eds), *South-East Asia’s Environmental Future: The Search for Sustainability* (United Nations University Press and Oxford University Press, Tokyo and Kuala Lumpur, 1993).

22 The level of public debate in Australia, with its crude juxtaposition of conservation versus development, is exceptionally low, compared for example with that in western Europe, where environmental dangers are more present, and much effort is devoted to the development of environmentally friendly technologies, whose economic benefits are widely acknowledged.
problems on a global scale, characterised by great uncertainties and the possibility of momentous consequences for human society. Typical of the first category is local pollution of the atmosphere or of rivers, which can be controlled by restrictions on emissions, waste disposal and the like. The cost of doing so may be very high, however. What has proved possible for London or for Singapore may be out of reach for many cities, and the example of London shows that gains are not permanent but are easily eroded unless there is governmental will to respond to new sources of pollution.23

There is no complete separation between the first and second categories. River pollution, for example, may be relatively local and manageable, as in the case of the Thames, but major rivers, some of which flow through several countries, tend to carry vast amounts of waste material and noxious residues; not all of these may be subject to practicable control, even if the resources were available. The second category includes a variety of processes, often interacting, which contribute to the gradual degradation of ecosystems:

... wind and water erosion, decline of nutrient content and organic matter in agricultural soils, salinisation and alkalisation of irrigated farmland, overdrawing of groundwater, deforestation and desertification.24

Concerning these processes, Vaclav Smil writes that there are:

... no satisfactory technical solutions capable of restoring the damaged ecosystems. There is no shortage of remedial management methods, most of them requiring major socioeconomic adjustments of affected populations, but these measures can bring notable improvements only after decades of sustained application. The importance of arresting the degradative processes during their earlier, reversible stages is thus critical.25

23 The cleaning up of London's air and of the Thames is well known; the more recent decline is less well publicised. For Singapore, see Brookfield and Byron (eds), South-East Asia's Environmental Future, pp.274, 345-52.
25 ibid.
The burden of Smil's argument, in his authoritative study of China's environmental problems, is that the chance of checking these processes in the early stages has been lost. 'Continuing degradation is, to an uncomfortably high degree, inevitable'. China, clearly, is experiencing in a more acute form the same kinds of environmental problems that are becoming evident in Southeast Asia, as in rapidly developing economies, and even in many that are not rapidly developing, elsewhere. In Smil's judgement, which rests *inter alia* on Chinese assessments during the 1980s when scholars were encouraged to undertake serious studies of the factors involved in the deterioration of China's environment, 'their magnitude is now clearly a critical determinant of the nation's development aspirations'.

If this is correct, it follows that China faces a choice between suffering further, cumulative degradation or else devoting very substantial resources to the task of slowing down, arresting and eventually reversing the present trends. The former, unsustainable course of action foreshadows a major crisis for China's development in the foreseeable future; the latter would require a complete refocusing of the development strategy. In either case, the image of China as a rapidly emerging economic and military superpower, free to turn its energies to external aggression, loses its plausibility when the environmental problems are taken into account. Indeed, it is the scenario of an environmentally caused developmental crisis, and the ensuing political disorder, which offers the more credible setting for a Chinese military threat - not the scenario of sustained rapid growth on present lines, which can now be seen to be implausible. On the other hand, there is no reason to expect a government committed to sustainable development priorities on the scale that would be demanded, to have recourse to military adventures.

It is the third category of environmental danger - global processes whose effects are still uncertain, in particular global warming - which attracts the greatest attention in the West. At present expert opinion appears to be firming up in support of the view that global warming is probably occurring, and will have far-reaching consequences, although its timing and its significance for different

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26 *ibid.*, p.159.
27 *ibid.* For a candid assessment by a Chinese environmentalist, see Hu Angang, 'China's Environmental Issues' in Stuart Harris and Gary Klintworth (eds), *China as a Great Power in the Asia-Pacific Region* (Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1995).
regions still remain unclear. Fears for very low-lying coastal areas and for the long-term survival of certain of the Pacific atolls remain in order. The time-scale could be more protracted than in earlier projections, but then again, such is the degree of uncertainty, it might not be. Governmental responses to these uncertainties are remarkably lacking in the prudential realism which the magnitude of the potential dangers would lead one to expect. Whereas in the case of uncertain military threats, the conventional realist wisdom stresses the danger of unpreparedness even to the point of urging the need to prepare against the worst case, governments respond to the global environmental uncertainties by disputing whether or not the initial costs of controls on 'greenhouse' gas emissions should be borne wholly by the Western developed countries; and in the case of the latter, the response is mainly tokenism, special pleading and the fudging of figures. While all this is readily explicable in terms of the short-term economic interests involved, the upshot is that governments are not yet seriously addressing the issue: an infusion of prudential realism would be in order.

It is not surprising, but is nonetheless alarming, that governmental responses tend to be in inverse relationship to the magnitude of the problems. In the case of local pollution, there are some notable local achievements, given a certain level of wealth as a prerequisite, but there are many instances of neglect or half-measures. In the case of ecological degradation there is extensive research, but governmental responses are very patchy. Specific problems are occasionally addressed energetically; but in general, with the partial exception of the advanced industrial countries, the problems are addressed only selectively, and the relevant institutions and programmes are grossly underfunded. In the case of global climate change, policies to date have been little more than symbolic.

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28 For example, in 1986 Indonesia, recognising that excessive use of chemical pesticides was proving counterproductive, banned most of them, replacing them by ecologically favourable biological and cultural controls. See James J. Fox, 'Ecological Policies for Sustaining High Production in Rice: Observations on Rice Intensification in Indonesia' in Brookfield and Byron, South-East Asia's Environmental Future, pp.219-20.
Australia and the Broad Security Agenda

The broad security agenda outlined here is not addressed in Australian discussions of the region. Policy-making institutions are not structured to bring the issues into a common focus, and they find little resonance in the wider public discussion. The discussion of security is mainly in traditional military terms, driven by the concerns of the Department of Defence. The specialisation within the government is reinforced by the specialisation of defence analysts outside officialdom, in the media and in the universities. The main innovation since the Cold War is the promotion of defence cooperation with neighbouring states, and of the region-wide security dialogue, defined essentially in military terms.

The broadest concept to have received high-level political endorsement is 'cooperative security', Gareth Evans’s formulation, building on the idea of common security, in the context of his attempt to redefine the appropriate roles for the United Nations in the complex cross-currents of post-Cold War conflicts. The focus is broadened to the global setting, but remains diplomatic and military. Social and economic conditions are seen as the sources of many of the politico-military conflicts, but the focus is on the management of those conflicts. In the academic discussion there are occasional attempts to interrelate economic and military aspects of security, but for the most part the two remain under their separate headings.

Thus, neither governmental nor public discussion provides a framework within which the different kinds of dangers that arise within each of the three areas might be assessed. The institutional setting and the assumptions which limit the public debate give rise to a tendency to overstate the military dangers, and to understate or neglect entirely the economic and environmental.

Clearly, very formidable problems stand in the way of any attempt to redress this imbalance. We may approach this question by noting that not all the problems are equally intractable. They are most readily addressed with respect to the military dangers, and with greater difficulty with respect to the environmental; it is in the

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30 See, for example, Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill (eds), Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1994).
economic area that the problems are the most deep-seated of all.

Military dangers receive a large measure of expert governmental attention. The extent to which there are pressures to conform with prevailing orthodoxies is impossible to assess from outside, but it would be rare good fortune if Australian institutions were free from the cognitive and organisational conditions making for distorted assessments, which have been extensively documented in other contexts. The best corrective for this would be the presence of vigorous debate in academia and in the universities, and a degree of official interaction with such debate, but this is manifestly not the case in contemporary Australia. It is true that greater interaction between government and outside specialists - many of them university-based - has developed in recent years, but in the absence of wider public debate, shared specialisation and assumptions among insiders and outsiders limits the extent to which orthodoxies will be challenged. Among the assumptions unlikely to be shaken are the perception of dangers as threats, and the perception of the military as the ultimately determining reality in international politics and the corresponding downgrading of the diplomatic. This later perception is reinforced by the propensity of the media to highlight military action of any kind, while the significance of unobtrusive diplomacy passes unreported.

Nonetheless, this is an area of policy in which unorthodox views find expression, and thus provide a point of reference, a potential for broader debate. They are not dismissed by the scholarly community, but are accorded a degree of legitimacy. Moreover, it seems fair to say that the specialist discussion is relatively sophisticated and places value on close attention to the specific. The biases are subtle, no longer of the same order as the stereotypes which constrained policy thinking in the Cold War. The principal cost evident at the present time is the devaluing of the diplomatic - the absence of a sense of statecraft.

With respect to environmental dangers, the problem is different. Here, as noted earlier, the scholarly community is broad-based, multidisciplinary but as a consequence somewhat diffuse. Its research, in collaboration with its counterparts in the region, is

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enhancing specialist knowledge of the scope of the damaging environmental processes which are under way, as well as the probabilities associated with future dangers. Its problem is to gain the attention of officialdom or the wider public.

This problem has several dimensions. First, the dangers are relatively long-term, the remedies not only costly but likely to disturb vested interests and established practices. The expert networks are not politically organised at the national level, nor is there a regional network of non-governmental and semi-governmental institutions such as have underpinned the development of APEC and the newly instituted governmental security dialogue through the ASEAN Regional Forum. The more prominent of the Green lobbies focus attention on issues with popular appeal - saving trees, whales or, more broadly, endangered species - but not on the complexities of the degradation of ecosystems or the rethinking which looks to reconcile the imperatives of development with those of sustainability. This is not to say that the task of upgrading the priority accorded to environmental dangers is impossible, but it is to underline its arduous character.

It is in relation to economic dangers that the impediments to addressing the broad agenda are most intractable. Whereas environmental dangers are well defined, the problem being to attract attention to them, economic dangers remain undefined, and there is no process for defining them. The economics discipline lacks even the maverick scholars who extend the boundaries of the debate in military studies. Contemporary economics has, to a very marked degree, the characteristics of 'normal science' identified by Thomas Kuhn32 - a scholarly community so thoroughly committed to a ruling paradigm that propositions which fall outside it are simply not entertained. In this, Australian economics is an extreme case: elsewhere maverick scholars have a voice, rather as in strategic studies in Australia. Outside the closed profession, diffuse concerns may be expressed in the wider community, but these are easily brushed aside.

This closure does not exclude all attention to specific economic dangers, such as the effects of trade disputes or of a major check to growth in any of the larger economies. Here, remedies consistent with

disciplinary orthodoxy are readily discerned. It is with respect to
dangers where remedies would challenge those orthodoxies - above all
the systemic dangers - that the economics discipline and profession are
silent. Denial of such dangers is comfortable: what would be
profoundly disturbing would be the entertaining of heretical ideas.
Foremost among the heresies which must be banished is the notion
that the political and social costs of the free working of market forces
might be a prime concern of policy, and that remedies might require
concerted action by governments, restricting market forces for social
and political ends. Heresies such as these gained credence within the
discipline for a time - the time of Keynes and his generation, led astray
in their response to the disaster of the Great Depression - but the
present generation has restored the paradigm and can confidently
assume that the benefits of free trade and deregulated financial
markets will overwhelm residual concerns such as the foregoing.

For those who do not share this faith, the economic dangers
are the most alarming of all. There is every prospect that regional élites
will respond adequately to concrete military dangers as they emerge,
and a reasonable chance that realist overreactions will be contained.
And it is not out of the question that environmental dangers will move
up the policy agenda as expert findings become more widely
disseminated, and irrelevant stereotypes lose credibility. Economic
dangers can be placed on the policy agenda, however, only by
initiatives from outside a discipline which not only de-legitimises
unorthodox views in academia and the media, but enjoys a
hegemonial position in the governmental bureaucracy. If there are
serious dangers in the economic domain, those in control of the
discipline and of policy making will ensure that no preparations are
undertaken against them.
CHAPTER 6

THE ANZAC CONNECTION

Alan Burnett

The importance of alliances to Australia's security was a central implication of Tom Millar's interpretation of present and prospective world politics. Thus Australia's long-standing alliances with Britain, with New Zealand and with the United States (after 1951) occupied much of his attention. He did not relish the diminution of the historic defence arrangements with Britain, but he understood the reasons for that decline after British forces were substantially withdrawn from Malaysia in the early 1970s. He was deeply involved with Australia's relationship with the United States, seeing it as one of the building blocks of long-term stability in the Pacific and of fundamental significance in Australia's foreign policy. In the case of New Zealand, he worked hard and long in an attempt to ensure that that aspect of the old imperial relationship was nurtured and strengthened as circumstances changed. In exploring and actively seeking to improve the relationship, he encountered problems on both sides of the Tasman. He was deeply concerned when the NZ Labour government under David Lange began to depart from what he regarded as fundamental principles in 1985.

Almost twenty years earlier, in 1968, he had put his views trenchantly:

Between Australia and New Zealand, there is a substantial community of defence interest, and substantial reasons for a defence community ... They have lived and worked alongside each other in defence activities since World War II, and of course the co-operation goes back a long way before that. They have been brought up on similar military philosophies, traditions, and training manuals. They differ in size, in economic potential, perhaps in national philosophy and dynamic, and especially in geography. New Zealand has no cause to be interested in the Indian Ocean, and has much greater involvement in the island territories of the South-west...
Pacific. Australia is more concerned about Asia ... The security of New Zealand is extremely important to Australia; the security of Australia is vital to New Zealand. This catalogue indicates that while all that Australia does is not of interest to New Zealand, almost all that New Zealand does interests Australia...

Does not ANZUS already provide the context for such cooperation? Unfortunately, perhaps, it does not, or does not provide much more than a skeleton ... At present, it would seem that Australia is so fascinated by its special relationship with the United States, and New Zealand is so determined not to be dominated or patronised by Australia, that both are ignoring useful opportunities of mutual benefit...

The time to start a community is now, while Britain is still in the area. Other countries, notably Papua-New Guinea, the B.S.I.P., and Fiji, would be extended facilities in the form of training places ... etc. They could become full members in their own time if they wished. Australia can afford to be generous ... both in terms of helping to provide the means for economic and social change, protecting investment against the anger which even now is building up, and in helping to prevent the seizure of power in the name of an alien and uncongenial ideology or a blind nationalism.

Perhaps this is a pipe dream, from a pipe lit with a rather old-fashioned mixture; perhaps it expresses a 'zeal not according to knowledge', or an enthusiasm not to be matched by performance. Seddon was angered when Britain denied him his ideal of Pacific Federation, just as it denied Sir Samuel Griffith the right to annex New Guinea. In both cases, London was probably right, but today our sights are lower, our capacities are greater. Will we be circumscribed by our own myopia and parochialism, or might we perhaps draw a bow at this not impossible venture?

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1 British Solomon Islands Protectorate, now the sovereign state of Solomon Islands.
By that period, however, marked differences in national trading interests had begun to develop, especially *vis-à-vis* Europe; as he noted later:

There are important national differences, and they are two separate nations, but they are more kin than foreign to one another, and each has closer links to the other than to any third country. Australia's identity as a nation has developed largely as a process of separation from Britain; New Zealand's has similarly, at a slower pace, but has also developed as a process of distinguishing itself from Australia ...

[There is continuous contact and easy contact between officials. But ministers also have national interests, electorates, their own status and personal ambitions to satisfy. To Australian political leaders, New Zealand rarely matters very much: it can be taken for granted; it is small and can be pushed around a little. New Zealand political leaders understandably resent such attitudes.]

From the late seventies or early eighties, those differences had begun to widen towards potential strategic rift. In 1994, the New Zealand Labour Party with David Lange as Prime Minister arrived in power, carrying heavy commitments to seek change in one of the fundamental operating conditions of the ANZUS alliance, the US deployment of nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered warships. By that date, a considerable proportion of the US Navy was either nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed or both. It had become the established strategic convention of US policy to 'neither confirm nor deny' the existence of nuclear weapons on those ships, though almost anyone prepared to spend a little time with the standard reference books could fairly readily work out which probably were or were not so armed. Several of America's allies had nominal policies of refusing to have nuclear weapons in their territories. But with such governments (notably Japan's) the issue had been 'finessed' by a convention that the

4 For a fuller account, see Alan Burnett, *The A-NZ-US Triangle* (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1988); also Alan Burnett (ed.) with Thomas-Durell Young and Christine Wilson, *The ANZUS Documents* (Department of International Relations, Australian National University, Canberra, 1991).
question would not be raised.

Perhaps Washington was misled by an assumption that relations with a New Zealand Labour government would prove as easy and comfortable as relations with an Australian Labor government had proved since 1983. But the two governments differed in more than the spelling of the party name. The personalities in charge of the two nations were very different, and so were the strategic outlooks and the political movements they represented. There had been earlier strategic partings of the ways, indicating possible future cleavages. Even the sense of a common self-definition, stemming from the disasters of Anzac Cove in 1915, was not as complete as it sometimes looked to outsiders. The two countries certainly shared a sense of being victims of muddled and incompetent British strategies, but that national myth developed much more strongly in Australia than in New Zealand. Anzac Day has become for many the true national day of Australia, a kind of sacred national icon. (When arrangements for the 80th anniversary commemoration in Turkey went slightly wrong in 1995, it was a frontpage story for days.) In New Zealand that sort of feeling is attached more to Waitangi Day.

After the early disasters of the Pacific war, the strategic divergencies became open. Australia argued vigorously for the return of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF) from North Africa to the Pacific. Allied Command, although providing transport for the Australian 9th Division to return, could not, or would not, provide shipping for 2NZEF and its equipment, because of a British decision, based on allied advice, that shipping could not be released from the North Atlantic. Furthermore, the British view was that the loss of that battle-hardened element would seriously weaken the 8th Army. On 4 December 1942, after the matter was discussed in secret by the House of Representatives in Wellington, the Australian government was advised that New Zealand had accepted Churchill's argument. The decisive cable to Winston Churchill (copied with a message of regret to Curtin) said, among other things:

We have been greatly impressed by the facts set out in your telegram under reply and by the dangers involved in attempting in present circumstances to move the Second New Zealand Division and we have come to the conclusion ... that
we cannot take the responsibility ... of pressing at this juncture for the return of New Zealand troops.5

This decision was not fully understood nor forgiven nor forgotten in Canberra. Although the United States had fulfilled its obligations and sent Marines to New Zealand in the first half of 1942, there was a perception in Australia that New Zealand had let it down and was not willing to assist properly with the recovery of Papua New Guinea and other Pacific islands from the Japanese. Subsequently there was insufficient appreciation in Australia of the extent of New Zealand's almost complete economic dependence on Britain and the way that it, until the 1970s at least, needed to attach greater weight to British views as it tried to maintain a precarious economic viability.

That was the background to the Australian-New Zealand defence relationship that Tom Millar interested himself in during the 1960s. To again quote his words:6

The defence of Australia is achieved by very much more than its defence forces. It is achieved first of all by the fact that Australia is a single state relatively heterogeneous in its population, and confined within and occupying the whole of an island. Had the land bridge between Terra Australis and Asia not subsided all those years ago, or had the wind pattern been different, this continent would now be populated predominantly by Asians speaking one or more languages of the Malay, Indian or Chinese type. That situation may yet come to pass in the centuries ahead even if it is not an immediate or even a foreseeable prospect. On the other hand, had Australia been colonised by several European powers, it might have inherited their animosities ...

In the case of Australia, there is no obvious enemy at the gates, no nation visibly threatening Australia or its vital interests: Australia is not now or predictably under threat, and to say


6 In a collection of essays put together in 1985, just before the ANZUS crisis became fully developed. See Desmond Ball (ed.), The ANZAC Connection (George Allen & Unwin, Sydney, London and Boston, 1985). The inspiration for the book came from Tom Millar.
that it cannot defend itself because of its large size or meagre resources is so gross an oversimplification as to be nonsensical. It all depends on the nature and size of the attacker. On the other hand to say that Australia does not need to defend itself because there is no threat and therefore does not need to be able to defend itself is equally nonsensical and much more dangerous ...

If New Zealand under a Labour government were to decide to leave ANZUS - which in the light of NZLP conference decisions is possible even if unlikely - Australia would do everything it could to retain the treaty with the United States, around which has been woven a web of intelligence, procurement, technological, training, planning and other relationships affecting security.7

Tom Millar's assumption that, if it came to a parting of the ways between the United States and New Zealand, Australia's path would and must lie with the United States (despite any remaining sentiment about the Anzac connection) proved of course correct. The Australian Prime Minister of the time, Bob Hawke, was not only much more in charge of his own party and government than David Lange in New Zealand, he was a firm-minded pragmatist in strategic matters, and probably the most pro-American of all Australian Labor leaders ever to acquire high office. He had been a friend of the US Secretary of State of the time, George Schultz, for some years.

According to the interpretation current in Canberra at the time, David Lange himself had not been particularly keen on the nuclear ships ban before his advent to the prime ministership. It had been a more passionate preoccupation of his predecessor, Bill Rowling, and of a powerful colleague, Helen Clarke (now leader of the party). In an optimistic moment, reportedly, Lange had assured the US Ambassador in New Zealand that the issue could be 'finessed', as was done in Japan and Denmark. So the Americans proposed a visit by the USS Buchanan, which was certainly not nuclear-powered, and in view of its age probably not nuclear-armed either. But the Prime Minister proved unable to deliver his party: the ship was refused entry, and the Americans were left feeling resentfully that they had been led up the

garden path, and had the welcome mat rudely pulled out from under their feet. Only since the advent of the Clinton administration in Washington has New Zealand begun to slightly 'come in from the cold' of US disfavour.

In retrospect, it all seems rather a storm in a diplomatic teacup, at least from Canberra's point of view. Australia's strategic relations with Washington were not damaged: in fact they were probably rather enhanced by the fact that Australia had become America's sole interlocutor in the South Pacific. Australia's diplomatic and strategic leverage with New Zealand was also enhanced, in that Canberra had become the only remaining strategic ally for Wellington, a position of which, one could argue, Canberra took excessive advantage. On the other hand, David Lange, and New Zealand as a whole, did rather well out of the incident internationally, in the sense of becoming symbols of brave opposition to a strategic Goliath in places of intellectual debate like Oxford and Yale. The United States had the consolation of being able to demonstrate to far more important allies, in Japan and Europe, that the 'neither confirm nor deny' principle would be maintained, and that the bonds of alliance could not with impunity be strained beyond a certain point, or penalties would be incurred. Those penalties did not in reality amount to much (except perhaps for the New Zealand armed forces). At one stage many New Zealanders feared some kind of economic sanctions, and a few US Congressmen spoke up in favour of proceeding along that path, but the State Department was able to divert them.

Perhaps the most long-lasting of the consequences of this little diplomatic drama, however, was to convert almost the whole spectrum of New Zealand political opinion to a rather fervent anti-nuclear stance, generating waves of feeling which, at the time of writing, are directed more against France than against the United States, though that could change if the United States should resume nuclear testing. Certainly neither of the two parties which alternate in government could at present reverse the 1985 decisions.

Denis McLean (who was New Zealand's Ambassador in Washington during the roughest part of the phase of ill-feeling between the two countries) has conveyed admirably the mood in his

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8 On, for instance, the matter of what were called the Anzac frigates: naval ships built in Australia, and somewhat reluctantly purchased by New Zealand.
own country which produced those 1985 decisions, and which has prevailed since:

... foreign and defence policies in the New Zealand setting have tended to take on the character of a shadow-play. The imagery could be enlarged or diminished according to domestic fancies: only rarely would the consequences of particular policies emerge from the shadows as hard-edged and unpalatable reality. A sincere wish to be different, for New Zealand to lead the way, has long been present but has sprouted especially strongly from the soil of anti-nuclear protest. In an isolated place, sheltered from the harsh winds of international realpolitik, such tendencies can produce exotic blooms. Anti-nuclearism seems to have taken firm root. It is plain that the imperatives of cooperation and compromise in the interest of collective security now touch raw nerves. An intellectual yearning - or perhaps more accurately a yearning among intellectuals - has manifested itself in a search for some sort of middle ground in non-alignment or neutralism. The geostrategic facts rarely intrude on such fancies. Many have clearly come to believe that a positive defence role is superfluous. The issues are complex. In the end the essential difficulty has to do with the establishment of consensus in a remote country which has never been subject to direct pressure or external attack.9

By the mid-sixties, New Zealand had a considerable list of grievances against France in the area of nuclear policy. The French secret service had in 1985 sunk the Greenpeace nuclear protest ship Rainbow Warrior, while it was at anchor in Auckland harbour, an outrageous act of state-sponsored terrorism, and a clear breach of New Zealand sovereignty. (The ship had been preparing to sail into the French nuclear testing zone.) When New Zealand put two of the French agents concerned on trial, and convicted and jailed them, the French government exerted economic pressure to get the agents returned to its own custody, then reneged on its undertaking that they should serve out their sentences. Even before those events, New Zealand policy makers, especially on the Labour side, had been bolder

9 Denis McLean, New Zealand: Isolation and Foreign Policy (Pacific Security Research Institute, Sydney, 1990), pp.2-3.
and more active in contesting the French right to use Pacific territories for nuclear tests. Norman Kirk, an earlier Labour Prime Minister, sent a New Zealand frigate to stand off the Moruroa Atoll in 1973 when the French were testing there, and though that frigate was in fact supported by an Australian supply ship, the then Australian Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, kept a relatively low profile on the matter.

Possibly the difference between the two governments on this issue (which was evident still in the first reactions of the two governments to the French resumption of testing in 1995) is an indication of the nature of the possible strategic cleavage in the Anzac connection. New Zealand identifies more and more with the small sovereignties of the Pacific islands. That is perhaps inevitable, since it has a large and growing population of Islanders as well of course as its own Maori population, who are ethnically Polynesian. Australia, on the other hand, has been assertively identifying itself, in recent years, as part of Asia. Its major markets and its economic future are there, and any security threat to Australia (though none is expected for the foreseeable future) must come from or through Asia. So the central focus of diplomatic, political and military preoccupations in Canberra, as well as economic ones, must be there. The resumption of the French testing in the Pacific in 1995, and the detention of Rainbow Warrior II on the tenth anniversary of the French sinking of the original Rainbow Warrior, have seen the most vigorous assertion for many years of the Anzac connection. It seems probable that it will in future be used mainly to defend the interests of the small Pacific territories. As an omen of that, one might cite the position reached by the time of the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting at Auckland in 1995, when Australia, along with the other members of the Commonwealth except Britain, had come round to the New Zealand position on French nuclear testing.
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II

THE INTERNATIONAL AND INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT OF ENQUIRY
CHAPTER 7
A WORLD WITHOUT SUPERPOWERS?
Robert O'Neill

The world which Tom Millar studied with such insight was dominated by a roughly balancing duopoly. For over forty years the United States and the Soviet Union, together with their respective alliance systems, set the international agenda. Their rivalry dominated political, military and public attention around the world. The end of the Cold War has relieved the world of many of the tensions and fears emanating from the rivalry of the two superpowers, and in the early 1990s many extolled the coming era as one of peace and prosperity. But far from it being in effect 'the end of history', the post-Cold War age has been one of bloodshed and horror, as civil wars and social distress have become more acute, and international organisations such as the United Nations and the main regional groupings, from NATO through to the Gulf Cooperation Council, have had little effect in controlling this strife.

The End of Russia as a Superpower

One of the chief causes of this decline in international order has been the collapse of the Soviet Union. Its fall has released all the long-pent-up forces of nationalism, ethnicity, ideology, and criminality held not only in Russia and the other states of the Soviet Union, but also throughout central and eastern Europe. The Soviet collapse has particularly undermined the bases of strength of Russia itself, politically, economically and even militarily. While Russia remains a superpower in the nuclear dimension, it has lost that status in terms of its political influence and standing in the eyes of the rest of the world. Its economic weakness is so glaring that potential donors and investors are deterred for fear of pouring their money down a rat hole. The Russian political system is so ineffective that foreign investors see little by way of legal protection for their investments against arbitrary acts of government, criminals or civil strife.

Russia's conventional military power, while substantial, is but a fraction of what it was a decade ago, and the Russian Army no
longer has a well-developed jumping-off point in the heart of Europe. The laws governing compulsory military service are treated with contempt by most of those to whom they apply. The performance of the Russian Army in Chechenya inspires no awe among other military professionals. The departure of the Soviet Army from central Europe to eke out a precarious existence in hastily constructed camps in Russia itself has transformed the balance of power in Europe as a whole. Much of the navy is rusting at anchor in ports that cannot support it properly. The air force cannot afford the flying time necessary to keep it at first-class level, despite its fine stock of aircraft.

Even Russia's remaining qualification for superpower status, its nuclear arsenal, no longer is sufficient to maintain much leverage for it in the international arena. Nuclear arms control is widely seen as having been effective, and rational agreements between sensible governments are relied upon confidently to solve the problem of gradual reduction in nuclear stockpiles while preserving a stable balance between the two nuclear giants. And as the world moves further away from the era of the rivalry of the twin superpowers, the remaining influence of Russia's nuclear weapons is also dwindling. They are of little use for compelling good behaviour in the bordering states, the 'near abroad', and any attempt to use them to exert pressure on former Warsaw Pact allies would probably bring forth defiance from those they were meant to impress and condemnation from the international community at large.

The world therefore has effectively lost one of its two superpowers. Recovery is not impossible, but political turmoil in Moscow and the regional centres of Russia tell us that it will not regain strength in the near future. If anything Russia will weaken, raising more problems of secession and goading nationalist extremists to seize power and use Russia's military power while it exists. Although the reformers under Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin have some successes to their credit, the current weakness of their political base warns that this process will be halting and effective only in small areas for many years. The slowness of the reforms to deliver results seems likely to undermine public faith in capitalism and the free market system, creating openings for those who wish to turn back the clock, economically and politically. Yeltsin's lack of public support may lead to his loss of office in 1996, unless he seeks to cling to power by decree. Another period of internal conflict or disarray might perhaps follow
the presidential election, further undermining Russia's capacity to exert influence beyond its own borders and in the world at large.

Yet even in these circumstances, where most Russians see decay and disorder more clearly than the promised peace and prosperity, the military could take control only with great difficulty. They are far from popular and opinion within their ranks on the preferred political future for Russia is deeply divided. The country would have to slide a long step closer to the abyss of ungovernability for another autocracy to become viable.

In this context Russia will be able to exert influence only in its neighbouring states, and by bargaining with other permanent members of the Security Council over the terms on which it might not seek to veto resolutions which the others wish to adopt. Russia will have some commercial leverage through its oil and gas exports, but in a world where neither commodity is in short supply, Russia will probably be more anxious to sell than others are to buy. Russia can continue to seek to bar the entry into NATO of its former allies, but if the Western powers strongly believe the admission of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia to be in their interests, they will find some way of adequately sweetening the taste of humiliation for Russia.

The one way in which Russia could still assert great influence would be to threaten to use its nuclear weapons against the United States, Japan or a major NATO power in Europe. There is no doubt that Russia could traumatishe any or all of Western Europe, the United States, Japan or China by use of its nuclear weapons, but what this would usefully achieve for Russia in the longer term is far from clear. Such action can only credibly be thought of as an act of desperation by some splinter group which has seized power and wishes to wreak vengeance on a world which has disregarded and disadvantaged it. And surely it would result in the continued weakening and delegitimising of Russia and Russians in the international community. While Russian nuclear weapons fired in a salvo could do enormous damage to the target state or states, it would be the initiation of a conflict which Russia in its present condition would lose. Were the nuclear attack simply the firing of one or two weapons by someone acting without the full authorisation of whatever government happened to be in power in Moscow, the consequences for Russia
would still be dire, including forcible denuclearisation. In sum, Russia has lost the purchase on international politics once held by the Soviet Union. It exists as a massive problem state, but not one whose every diplomatic and military move attracts the attention and countermoves of the United States. Washington no longer has to be apprehensive lest the Russians should gain an advantage which could tip the balance of international power seriously against the West. Russia still has a little leverage through its permanent membership of the Security Council, but it is no longer a heavy weight in the balance of international security. It seems fair to say that in effect Russia is no longer a superpower.

Has the United States Ceased to be a Superpower?

What of the United States? It has retained most of the military power it had while the Cold War was still being contested, and it has the financial, industrial and demographic capacities to expand its military establishment should the need to do so be compelling. Moreover the United States keeps its military forces up to date in terms of equipment, intelligence availability, training, command and control systems, and mobility. American conventional weapons have enormous destructive capabilities, combined with accuracy over long ranges. No centre of government (or of terrorism, once located) is safe from them. The United States has close relations with sufficient other states to enable force deployment for operations in almost any part of the globe. It is unquestionably the strongest military power in the world, and its leadership of the United Nations coalition in checking Saddam Hussein seemed to put a seal on a new era of international order where the policing would be rigorous, and led by the United States.

In economic terms the United States has recently been in difficulties, but the same can be said for all advanced industrial states. And there are clear signs that recovery in the United States is now well under way: unemployment is falling, investment is up, productivity has increased, output is rising. The quality of products, particularly cars, has improved under the stimulus of foreign competition. The relative cheapness of the US dollar further enhances the attractiveness of American goods in international markets. There remain problems to be faced in making the North American Free Trade Area work as it
should to the advantage of all three members, but again there are many reasons to be more optimistic than pessimistic on that score.

Even more importantly, the United States is the world's leading free market in terms of ideas. There are more research institutes of high quality in the United States than anywhere else. The tradition of public philanthropy is well established and governments at federal and state levels have enacted legislation which on the whole is more encouraging to such activity than is the case in other countries. The high-quality publication industry is flourishing and the United States produces overwhelmingly more books and journals commanding an international expert audience than does any other state. The United States has had to pay a penalty for establishing this role of leadership as other less scrupulous states have permitted the piracy of intellectual property. But the outcome of recent negotiations on this problem with one of the principal offenders, China, shows that the United States has effective leverage to use against offenders and is determined to wield it, even at the risk of other substantial interests such as trade. While some analysts such as Paul Kennedy point to the probability of the United States declining, that prognosis does not take fully enough into account the growing importance of ideas of all kinds as ways of building influence.

Military force, for most states, is a declining currency, but ideas - leading to better products and services, better systems of government, better leisure activities and healthier people - are becoming increasingly important. Those with the best ideas will be sought out eagerly throughout the world. Those whose ideas are not so attractive will scarcely be noticed. The advent of the information superhighway will accelerate this process and strengthen its positive effects for those who have what is wanted, and reinforce its negative consequences for those whose intellectual output is not seen to be of the greatest utility. American investments, financial, political and societal, in the fostering of intellectual creativity and a wide, rigorously administered free market in ideas have positioned that country well to continue leading the way in most fields of human activity.

This kind of leadership does not necessarily equate with state power, however. Once a permissive framework for intellectual interaction has been established (and state authority is necessary for this to happen) it can autonomously develop through the contributions
of individuals who serve the needs of other individuals. Indeed a free market in ideas can be subversive of state power as citizens see their fortunes determined more by what they pick up or sell through the Internet than through the authorised channels of the state.

States will remain important as sources of protection and justice, and collectors of taxes, but they will be seen increasingly by many as simply part of the background of administration which permits their own more interesting and rewarding activities to continue. As long as political parties keep within the middle ground they will be potentially electable but the previous passions of support for this party or that seem likely to decline and citizens may well become more detached from the political process, leading to lower turn-out rates in elections and less respect for the holders of political office. Much of the magic of politics, inspired by its supposed power and glamour, reinforced by remoteness, will disappear. The functions of politicians will be seen more to be those of administrative routine, as their daily lives are brought ever closer by the more inquisitive, less respectful media, reaching us in ever-increasing and more revealing ways. Americans are likely to become more enthusiastic about this kind of direct, free interaction with other people of interest in the world than about that offered by the apparatus of government, supported by expensive foreign military and economic commitments.

At least the political system of the United States is not under fundamental challenge, whatever Speaker Gingrich may claim to the contrary. There is strength and essential stability in the federal structure. Americans prefer their present system of direct election of their head of state and the separation of powers to any other. It undoubtedly creates nightmares for those charged with executive governmental responsibilities, not least the Secretary of State. But it also seems well designed to meet the overriding concern of most Americans with the need to uphold individual rights and freedoms, and to check the arbitrary or excessive use of political power. America's advanced competitors in Europe and East Asia seem more likely to face the need for major political reforms than does the United States itself. The struggles between integrationists and nationalists have yet to be worked out in Europe, and those between the old guards and the reformers in Japan, China, Korea, Taiwan and the ASEAN states will continue to be waged with ferocity for many years.
Despite all these formidable strengths, the United States is in many ways more notable in the mid-1990s by its absence from international crises than by its leadership and participation in resolving them. In Bosnia the United States is involved through NATO but this participation is limited to the use of air power, which thus far has had a small role to play alongside that of the ground forces supplied by Britain, France and others. The US contingent in Macedonia is important as an indicator of interest, but it is a tiny force and may one day be dismissed by a Balkan strongman such as Milosevic as Clinton's bluff. Operation Restore Hope in Somalia proved to be a source of constant humiliation to the United States and it was poignant that the intervening force finally had to be evacuated under US protection. The Haitian intervention, although skilfully made and costing few US casualties, shows signs of protraction as the issues it was intended to resolve prove stubborn and the capacities of the Aristide government to solve them come increasingly into question.

The 1994 mid-term election campaigns were marked for their lack of attention to foreign policy issues. Speakers from the President downwards gave perfunctory attention to this field and it registered low in the priorities of voters, who were much more interested in economic policies and social problems. While this trend has perhaps reached a new high-water mark, it has been in evidence for several years. Probably the apogee of US activism in the world was the Gulf War of 1990-91. Despite Bush's success in pushing Saddam back behind his own borders at low cost in US casualties, he failed to reap any benefit at the hands of the voters when confronted by an opponent who placed his priorities in the economic and social fields and had no aspirations to play a leading international role. Since Clinton's inauguration the United States has generally played a careful and discreet role on the world stage, not abdicating from all responsibility, but leaving leadership and force commitments much more to others.

Where the United States has played an important role it has been more as a mediator or broker, as in the moving forward of the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians, than as a leader or a source of discipline. In entering into closer security relationships with India and Pakistan during Defense Secretary Perry's visits there in early 1995 the Clinton administration was signalling that it did not want a return to confrontation on the question of the two countries'
nuclear programmes. The nuclear agreement with North Korea was obtained only by bribing Kim Jong Il with a large nuclear power generation capacity and a free supply of fuel oil until the generators are on line. While this agreement has its advantages in avoiding a build-up of tension on the Korean peninsula, it sets a precedent which may incline other states to practise nuclear leverage for what they can get.

While NATO continues to agonise about its future, the Clinton administration does not seem able to give the necessary clear, convincing lead which will resolve the issues of its role and the extent of its membership. As a result, America's allies have apprehensions that are all the stronger as to whether the Atlantic alliance will retain much meaning for long, and as to the extent to which they should be willing to make commitments to it, as opposed to the Western European Union and other bodies, for the sake of a stronger international order.

Despite Republican criticism of the Clinton administration for lack of leadership in foreign policy, their spokespeople barely touched on the subject in the mid-term campaign. The wave of new Senators and Congressmen who have given the Republicans control was not elected to inspire the United States to take up an increasing international burden. Rather they are in Washington because they promised to cut back government expenditures and keep as free a hand as possible for the United States. They are in Washington to take even further the Clinton slogan 'It's the economy, stupid!'. The new Republicans tend to be people who think poorly of foreigners, and see them as a bunch of ungrateful mendicants, perversely unwilling to accept US guidance yet parasitically feeding on American generosity to further their own interests. The Republicans will try to reduce American aid payments, just as they have voted to cut peacekeeping payments to the United Nations.

Towards a More Narrowly Defined American Leadership Role

Why has this transformation in American attitudes come about? Why, after fifty years of taking an active lead in world affairs, is the United States in all its estates, President, Senate, House of Representatives, the media and public opinion, so little inclined to continue in that role, just when it can have it without challenge? There
are several obvious factors such as weariness, a desire to give free riders a lesson, and the seriousness of the internal problems of the United States. Poverty, the state of the cities, race relations, unemployment, drugs, the environment, crime, teenage pregnancies, AIDS, the gun laws, corruption, public education and the future of the family are major challenges for all levels of government in the United States, and it is principally the federal government which has the resources to respond. However none of these problems is new, and the economic outlook is much better than when President Clinton was elected. Previous administrations carried these burdens yet devoted top priority to the ensuring of international stability.

The new factor is the removal of the powerful stimulus of the Cold War rivalry. The United States is no longer under challenge for leadership in most parts of the globe. It no longer has to balance off an extremely powerful ideological adversary, who can field bigger conventional forces in the very sensitive area of central Europe, and play a spoiling role in Third World affairs, threatening to turn the West's flank if the latter devoted its full attention only to the central front in Europe. The United States no longer has to manage an alliance in constant tension both within itself and, as a group of states, with the rival Warsaw Pact. American leadership is no longer the subject of keen appraisal in the media, legislatures and cabinets of the West generally. Arms control agreements have done much to reduce the direct military threat to the United States itself, and the decline of Russia has reinforced America's military superiority yet further. In essence, the United States has more authority in the world than it wants to exert.

Given this state of pre-eminence the United States does not need allies in the sense that it did during the Cold War. And what is more, many Americans see some of these allies, particularly Japan and Germany, as having done much better for themselves than the United States through being free of the latter's military burdens. It is high time, Americans believe, that those allies carried an equivalent weight of commitments to the United States, and until they show that they can do that the United States will stay in the background. It is not about to be taken for granted in a situation where its own direct security interests are no longer under serious threat.
Because America does not have to lead an ideological struggle any more, it can relax in the confidence that its own constitution, ideology and political system are superior, and let the world come to it, rather than having to play the activist role, going forth to convince the world by persuasion, example and demonstration of its strength and superiority by making them readily available to all who are threatened by communism or communist powers.

Many of the people who led the United States through that period, both in the political arena and in the principal departments of government, are no longer in office. Others have come in, elected or chosen in different times by a different generation for different purposes. They know about different things to their predecessors and have different concerns and motivations. Many of them do not know much about world affairs and how to exert leadership in a form that will be readily accepted and effective. Their constituencies or power bases are not those which care deeply about the state of international affairs, so the newcomers in office have to respond to different stimuli to their predecessors of the Cold War era. The old activist messages are not picked up or passed through to the highest levels of government or to the most powerful legislators. The external situation has been transformed and the direction of view of the government and people has swung away from the international horizon. Until that external context changes appreciably for the worse, attention will be focused primarily on America's internal problems.

This is not isolationism. Americans have not forgotten entirely the lessons of the interwar period. More importantly, they know that the world is far more integrated than it was then and that the United States gains more than it loses from the new forms of linkage. If there is conflict in the Gulf, or involving Israel, or in central Europe or in East Asia, US interests may well be threatened. Military intervention on a substantial scale may be necessary. But any decisions for such intervention will be taken in Washington after due deliberation, not in foreign capitals.

The forces sent by the United States will be drawn from its ready reaction formations, in accordance with what is available, not from a carefully designed counterbalance to any one individual power. These forces probably will be not have been held forward against any one commitment, trained in the operational environment and familiar
with its demands, but will be sent either from the United States itself, or from conveniently held US bases somewhere in the middle distance. These forces will operate under US command. The intervention will be specifically limited in nature to the removal of the principal object of offence to the United States. Washington will not be assuming thereby a continuing security mandate for the area in question, any more than it will have been drawn into the conflict in some automatic kind of way as under the treaty provisions of Cold War guarantees. Coalition partners will be welcome, but the reality of the current and likely future situations is that allied forces will be much smaller and less powerful than those of the United States, and they will lack the full modern command and control apparatus necessary for fighting strictly limited conflicts with success. As soon as victory can be claimed the forces will be withdrawn and brought back home.

Americans know the considerable extent to which they are exposed to risk by virtue of their military capability and their tradition of leadership during the Cold War. Many of them do not feel comfortable about taking that same prominent stance now that the Cold War is over. They do not want to shrug off their military power, although they are reducing it selectively to accord with the new context. The Gulf War demonstrated the possible (although not actual) extent to which American personnel are at risk in this form of interventionist warfare where the United States provides the overwhelming part of the military force, and others provide political and financial support. Thus, many Americans now argue, intervention should be undertaken only for causes in whose name voters will readily support the casualty costs likely to be incurred. In the current context such causes will be very few in number.

The leaders of the new Republican majorities in both houses of the Congress, Senator Robert Dole and Speaker Newt Gingrich, have taken pains to define their stances on the future role of the United States in international security affairs. Both reject the label of isolationism, but each espouses a policy designed to meet economically and effectively threats to US interests only. Any sense of commitment to wider goals, such as the rule of law in the world, is difficult to detect from their public statements. They mention the United Nations only in criticism. In speeches given on 1 March 1995 at a conference on Defining an American Role in an Uncertain World, both acknowledged a continuing burden of leadership which the
United States must carry, but the terms under which that leadership will be exerted were drawn more narrowly than under the Reagan or Bush administrations. Gingrich asserted that there was no alternative to US leadership. 'I don't believe anybody else is going to replace us ... and I believe the alternative is a dark and bloody planet ...'.

Gingrich developed his position more fully:

One, the United States must lead. Period. I mean, the objective lesson of the last five years is simple. There's no replacement. It's not a question of, well, we'll back out and somebody else will emerge. If we don't lead the planet, there is no leader on the planet. We are in the classic sense a hegemon. We're the only military power that matters - if we decide to be decisive. Now, that doesn't mean we can bully everybody. I said lead. I didn't say dictate. I didn't say dominate. I said lead. That means we have an active duty to routinely be the leader.

Implied in this acknowledgement of the responsibility to lead is a spirit of firmness and direction. Gingrich's denials of any desire to bully or dominate others are interesting, not least because he thought it necessary, in context of his speech, to make some qualifications to the extent to which America would use its power. However sincere these denials may be, they point to an inherent problem in the future international system: the temptations before the United States to use power unwisely will be very real. However difficult it may be for others to attract the attention and commitments of the United States, once made these may prove a mixed blessing.

The Consequences for Other States

Two principal consequences for the rest of the world flow from these changes in the capabilities and dispositions to act of Russia and the United States.

First, there is a stronger need for the international community to define what is expected of the United Nations. By implication of the statements of the two Republican leaders, and by the votes of their

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followers in the Congress, the United Nations is heading back to the state of relegation in which it languished for most of the Cold War. If the United States, as the biggest contributor to UN funds, cuts back its contributions substantially, that in itself is a guarantee of relegation. No other power can fill that gap in necessary income for the world body. But even if the financial cuts are not heavy, the withdrawal of much active US support and approval for the United Nations, and increased reluctance to give it military muscle, will have a very marked limiting effect on its authority in the world.

In this new context both the General Assembly and the Security Council need to define their priorities more closely if the United Nations is to retain any substantial effectiveness and authority. It seems reasonable to expect that such a re-ordered United Nations would focus on the political settlement of disputes, where this is possible, and on the provision of observer and small peacekeeping forces. Larger interventions may simply be beyond its capabilities to organise, direct and even to legitimise. Its administrative structure, committees, agencies and mass conference activities, such as the March 1995 convention on social justice and the alleviation of poverty held in Copenhagen, all face serious reduction.

Second, security and order will have to be maintained more by regional and single-state action than the architects of the hoped-for 'New World Order' of a few years ago had in mind. In the present era of national self-assertion, the cause of regionalism does not seem likely to flourish. The European Union as it approaches the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference faces monumental difficulties. It is an open question, in the light of the post-Maastricht debates, as to whether any real progress will be made on ways of conceiving and implementing a common foreign and security policy. There are too many different visions in the minds of leading members as to what such a policy might aspire to or how it should be implemented. In the light of signs from the United States that its role will be more circumscribed than before, there is agreement that the European security identity needs to be more clearly defined. But Britain regards security as being something which lies well outside the competence of the governing bodies of the European Union (the Commission and the European Parliament), while France and Germany see virtue in close association between the European Union and the Western European Union. France continues to play an individual role in security matters,
although showing signs of becoming more of a team member than in the past. Germany is caught between its central partnership with France as keystone of the European Union and its sense of wider common interest with the United States, and even with Britain.

While a consensus is emerging among EU members that the Union must be expanded to the east, there are divergences regarding both extent and speed. The current fifteen members (1995) may become twenty-four around the turn of the century (adding Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia). This will happen only if there is agreement among existing members that the applicants can comply with essential EU standards, not only regarding their economies and their degree of openness, but also in their social and environmental policies. These are high hurdles for the potential newcomers to jump, and continued differences among the fifteen seem likely to lead to their being raised rather than lowered.

In the meantime discussion proceeds on expanding NATO eastwards. While there is readiness on the part of members to debate the issue, the question of the worth of guarantees given to states which extend NATO's responsibilities and liabilities very considerably has to be examined. These guarantees will only be worth their face value in a crisis if a common interest is perceived by the guarantors collectively in maintaining the freedom and independence of new member states. That in turn will depend upon the extent of integration of the eastern states into the wider European system, particularly the European Union. Hence the future security of new NATO members depends very much on how existing members of the European Union feel about admitting them, and then on how well the newcomers perform as EU members. In the meantime these states will be rather exposed, particularly to whatever storms may blow in their direction out of Russia, Ukraine and the Balkans.

As far as Russia and its former Soviet neighbours are concerned, there is so little love lost between them that, the formalities of the Commonwealth of Independent States notwithstanding, it is difficult to see any security system operating which is not a form of Russian hegemony. Just as it is not clear, in the light of the struggle to subdue rebel Chechenya, that Russian protection would be other than heavy-handed and inept, nor is it apparent that the non-Russian CIS
states need that kind of relationship. The former Soviet Union will remain a consumer rather than a supplier of security to anyone for a long time to come.

In Southeast Asia ASEAN continues to set an example for other regions to adapt to their own needs. Cohesive, effective, well established and highly valued by its members, ASEAN has admitted Vietnam and is now poised to include Laos, followed in due course by Cambodia. With them, ASEAN will inevitably assume a wider role in preserving security in the South China Sea. Given the recent increase in China's naval power, this will not be a light undertaking. But with strong diplomatic support from its friends in the West, and some continuing display of interest by a United States which can in the worst case project naval power into the South China Sea, ASEAN should be up to the challenge. Its region looks to be one of the more prosperous and secure parts of the world in the decade ahead.

Elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region we see the beginnings of integration, but in security terms this area is too vast and fragmented to be able to take care of its own problems. The United States will have to remain committed to it, especially through its security treaties with Japan, Korea and Australia. Both sides of the Congress know this, although they are unlikely to trumpet it from the rooftops. The main powers of East Asia, Japan, Korea, Russia, China and ASEAN form a complex group of actors who can collide and collude in a great variety of ways, not all to the advantage of regional peace and harmony. The direct nature of American interests in the Pacific seems likely to suffice to keep Washington engaged and committed to the role of basic guarantor of security there.

In other parts of the world where conflict can easily erupt, such as South Asia, the Gulf, the eastern Mediterranean, the Maghreb, and West Africa, the existing regional organisations are weak and regularly ignored by disputants. With careful effort and encouragement from outside, these defects can be remedied in many cases. Look at the internal weaknesses of the Southeast Asian region in the 1950s and 1960s, and compare them with the present situation. No region is beyond working out a more secure future for itself. The resources required to form an effective regional linkage are more matters of political will, diplomacy, planning and common sense than of money and armed forces. The real question is how long it will take
regional leaders to realise this to the extent that they are prepared to put old enmities and suspicions to one side for the sake of a much more important mutual interest.

From this perspective, a world without superpowers, or one in which the remaining superpower is not trying to keep the peace everywhere, may be a helpful stage for international society to enter. Once leaders at all levels, from sub-national groups to regions, realise that self-reliance has to be their watchword, and take some steps to implement it, the world as a whole will be in a better condition. But experience teaches us that this trend will be difficult to launch, and that its development to a significant level will be slow and uneven. These are not reasons for not attempting to bring it about, but they point to the fact that a world in which the United States confines itself to a more narrowly defined security role will be a more painful and dangerous place for many. And the level of pain in it will effectively prevent the United States from remaining as uncommitted as some of its leaders would prefer.

In other words, in this more mature phase of the post-Cold War world there will undoubtedly be a sharp increase in the security burdens that most states have to bear, but the United States will still, in its own interests, be saddled with the basic role of global guarantor against total disorder and mayhem. The same adrenalin may not drive the United States as in the Cold War, but the web of its interests will be sufficiently strong to prevent a full lapse back into isolationism.

Intelligent leaders in other parts of the world would be well advised to increase their efforts to create healthy state structures and then shape strong secure regions for themselves. Human nature retains its age-old propensity to use violence when frightened or frustrated, but fewer incidents of conflict will arouse the intervention of the United States. The nationalists, holdouts and die-hards who oppose regional integration are setting their own and their nations' feet on an increasingly dangerous path. Tom Millar, of course, understood this very well. Although his death has deprived us of his counsel, his writings, particularly those on regional cooperation, will repay reading for a long time to come.
CHAPTER 8

PEACE AND WAR IN CONSERVATIVE INTERNATIONALIST THOUGHT

Carsten Holbraad

Internationalism, as the term is used here, relates to international society. It is distinct from traditional cosmopolitanism, of the type that projects a society of all mankind, as well as from the modern form of universalism that embraces the physical as much as the social cosmos. In their ultimate goals and more ambitious programmes, some kinds of internationalism transcend the confines of international society, but their point of departure is still the existing society of states.

Internationalism, however, is more than an awareness of the existence of an international society, with institutions and values, and a willingness to pursue common or shared interests within that society. Rather as nationalism consists not merely of a recognition of national identity and an inclination to pursue national interests but has an emotional element as well, so internationalism has also a quality of emotional, and even intellectual commitment. Though both may be described as ideologies, the mixtures of rational and irrational elements in nationalism and internationalism are not necessarily the same. In our times, nationalism is often marked largely by strong passion, while internationalism usually has a more substantial intellectual content.

Three broad kinds of internationalism may be distinguished. Two of them, namely the liberal and the socialist, are well known and theoretically quite highly developed. The third is less developed, and barely has a name by which it is recognised. One reason for its relative obscurity is its conservative nature. In contrast with liberal and socialist internationalism, the visionary goals and progressive programmes of which make them highly explicit ideologies, conservative internationalism is largely implicit, at least in its more common form. Indeed, like conservatism in national politics, it is an ideology which is sometimes held more or less unconsciously.
The European Background of Conservative Internationalism

Despite its low profile, conservative internationalism is much older than the other two. Dating from the first centuries of the five-hundred-year-old European states system, it derives from a way of thinking about international politics which is conservative in the sense of focusing on what exists or has existed, rather than on what might be or ought to be. But there are two broad varieties of conservative internationalism. One, which may be traced to the operation of the balance of power in the seventeenth century, has its roots in the political realism of early European statecraft. The other, which made an early appearance in the Wars of Religion between the mid-sixteenth and mid-seventeenth centuries and reappeared after the French Revolution, springs from religious or ideological conflict in European society. It is in the former variety that the level of ideological consciousness is usually lower.

With the emergence of sovereign states in Europe and the development of political interaction and diplomatic relations among them came the balance of power. At first merely a pattern of shifting alignments, in the course of time it took on the character of a rule of political interaction among several independent powers. Continual participation in the operation of the balance of power increased the understanding of the mechanics and the awareness of the requirements of the system. It operated through diplomacy, alliances and war, or threat of war, and called for vigilance and prudence on behalf of its participants. It demanded a willingness to weigh the short-term against the long-term interests of the state. Above all, it presupposed an ability to recognise that several states could share an interest in opposing a preponderant power, and that all states had an interest in common in securing the continued existence of the whole states system and each of its units.

In this awareness of a shared interest in security and a common interest in survival may be seen the germs of one tradition of conservative internationalism. Having sprouted in the mid-seventeenth century, when the balance of power had reached maturity with the Peace of Westphalia, having developed in the eighteenth century, which had been the classic age of the European system of counterbalances, and having triumphed in the Napoleonic Wars, when
a great power had attempted to overturn the balance and secure domination, this tradition became the major formative influence on the European Concert in the nineteenth century. Having survived the various ideological challenges of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the tradition reasserted itself in the mid-twentieth century and, in a modern and more developed form, became a major force in both global and regional international politics.

The other type of conservative internationalism, which springs not from the need to deal with recurrent bids for domination in the states system but from a determination to respond to intermittent doctrinal challenges in international society, is typically manifested not so much in alliances of a number of powers as in solidarity of rulers or governments. Such solidarity usually appears in the periods of transnational tension and conflict which follow cataclysmal events of the kind described as international revolutions. The first such event was the reformation, which was followed by generations of conflict between the conservative forces of Counter-Reformation Catholicism, championed by Spain and Austria and inspired by the papacy, and the reforming powers, led by the successive enemies of the House of Habsburg and inspired by the idea of a Protestant League. The second major event to bring doctrinal passion into European politics was the French Revolution, which introduced and exported ideas which were unacceptable to the other powers. After defeating Napoleon they formed, on Russian initiative, a counter-revolutionary Holy Alliance. Directed against Jacobinist ideas, it was an association of Christian monarchs for protection of the existing social order of Europe. A hundred years later the Russian Revolution brought a new ideological conflict into international politics. Challenged by communist doctrines about state and society, the Western powers fought an inconclusive war of intervention against the Soviet Union and all it stood for. The pattern of ideological conflict, however, was now becoming more complex.

In the battle with Bolshevik policies and communist ideology after the First World War the Western powers were motivated not only by conservative but also by liberal internationalism. The next few

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1 The term is Martin Wight's. For a distinction between periods of balance of power politics and periods of doctrinal conflict in European history, see Martin Wight, *Power Politics*, ed. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1978 and Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1979), chapter 7 and appendix II.
decades saw, on one side, a gradual emergence of a democratic form of socialist internationalism and, on the other side, a rapid rise of a fascist movement which might be seen as expressing not only a particularly virulent type of nationalism but, particularly in its hostility to both revolutionary and democratic forms of Marxism and its programme for reorganising Europe along racial and hierarchical lines, also a novel and radical form of conservative quasi-internationalism of a solidarist kind. The outcome was a triangular ideological conflict between the Soviet Union and its supporters, the liberal democracies and the fascist powers. After the defeat of Germany, Italy and Japan and their allies, at the hands of an alliance which more than anything else was a manifestation of conservative internationalism of the balance of power tradition, the central ideological conflict was again dualistic, between the Soviet Union with its allies and supporters and the Western powers. But the ideology of the West was a mixture of conservative, liberal and democratic socialist elements. Conservative internationalism of the solidarist kind, though an important influence in the setting up of the European Economic Community in the 1950s, never became the major element in Western ideology.

In more recent years, however, it has appeared in a new form in several non-Western parts of the world. After the decline of the ideological challenge directed by Moscow and the collapse of the Soviet Union, fundamentalist movements in regions of Asia, the Middle East and Africa have emerged as actual or potential ideological opponents of the West. Based on religion and culture and transcending national boundaries, some such movements, in particular Islamic fundamentalism, seem to resemble in several respects the major manifestations of solidarist conservatism in earlier centuries of European history. If they gain influence in their regions and maintain their passionate hostility to Western influence, a new pattern of ideological conflict may develop in the world, between the now predominantly liberal internationalism of the West and a variety of non-Western types of solidarist conservative internationalism. The current Western drive to enlarge the area where liberal values and institutions are accepted might contribute to such a development.

Since the nineteenth century, however, the solidarist kind of conservatism has most of the time been the least influential form of internationalism, whether in Europe or in the world. Outrivalled by liberal internationalism already in the mid-nineteenth century and
challenged by socialist internationalism in the earlier part of the twentieth century, it has in most of the latter half of this century been largely eclipsed by competing ideologies. The less ideological variety of conservative internationalism, however, has been a decisive influence in long periods of the history of international politics in Europe and the world, both in peace and in war. Though sometimes overshadowed by nationalism or other kinds of internationalism, it has as a rule always reasserted itself. The focus in this essay will be on the internationalism that is associated with the balance of power and rooted in the realist tradition of international thought.

The Assumptions and Concerns of Conservative Internationalism

Resting on pessimistic assumptions about human nature, politics and history, the old realist school of thought presents an austere picture of international society. The states system is conceived as a multiplicity of sovereign states engaged in continual interaction. Each state, in its relations with other members of the system, is seen as pursuing its own interests with the means at its disposal. Given that the interests of states often are irreconcilable, conflict is endemic and war recurrent in the system. In such conditions, security must be the overriding concern of each state. It follows that power is always at a premium, and that states constantly seek to secure their position by augmenting their own forces or forging alliances, defensive or offensive, with other powers. From Machiavelli and Hobbes to the prominent realists of the twentieth century, the principal themes of the writers of this tradition have usually been conflict and power.

As a derivative of this tradition of thought, modern conservative internationalism retains some important realist characteristics. In the first place, it is pluralist in the conception of the structure and processes of international society. Though in regional politics it may project the goal of a community, as in the case of the European Economic Community, this is conceived as an association of states, not as a federation or a unitary state. Second, the primary concern is with the security of states. Though the concept of security may have broadened to include not only the military but also other dimensions, the basic preoccupation is with the survival of sovereign states. Third, foreign policy is separate from and prior to domestic politics. Though foreign policy and diplomatic efforts may be directed
towards international organisation and regional integration, the emphasis is still on high politics.

Yet, despite the realist assumptions and concerns behind this set of ideas, contemporary conservative internationalism is constructive and ameliorative, in the sense of going beyond the existing state of affairs in pursuit of a more developed international society. First, its concept of security is more complex than in most older realist writings. In a world of nuclear arms, it gives higher priority to international peace as a goal of diplomacy than the traditional literature did. Also, while acknowledging the priority of strategic and military security, it recognises the importance of the economic dimension as well. Second, conservative internationalism is aimed at a degree of international organisation. While accepting the natural conflict of interests among states, it focuses on interests which are shared and seeks accommodation through diplomacy. The ultimate goal of such diplomacy is typically some form of standing international organisation, perhaps even a confederation of states seeking joint security. Third, conservative internationalism may even countenance a measure of supranational decision making in special fields. Given the interdependence of the modern world at both the global and the regional level, it may be convenient to delegate certain powers to a standing committee of representatives of the collaborating states. Since such a body would operate under the authority of the participating governments, the arrangement would not seriously compromise the basic and indispensable principle of national sovereignty. Any functional integration would take place within a framework of international cooperation.

The programme of conservative internationalism may vary as regards the geographical scope defined, the diplomatic means employed and the political structure projected. The scope may be universal, or quasi-universal, as in the conservative strand of the ideology expressed in the establishment and activities of the United Nations. It may be regional, as in the internationalism behind intergovernmental cooperation in the North Atlantic region or in western Europe. Or it may be local, perhaps comprising just a few countries. The typical scope is regional. In such cases a regional internationalism may go hand in hand with a global realism which has few internationalist qualities. This seems to have been the case in some west European thinking about international integration. Thus,
part of the motivation behind the conservative internationalist drive towards a confederated western Europe has been a desire to restore the power of Europe in global politics by making it less dependent on the United States and more capable of holding its own in the rivalry between the superpowers.

The sort of ways and means employed in conservative internationalist pursuits depends on the nature of the challenge. To deal with limited or transient difficulties the normal channels of diplomacy may be preferable, while a more substantive issue with some bearing on security may call for an international conference, in the tradition of the old Concert of Europe. An actual or potential threat from a hostile power may demand an alliance of the countries affected. To meet the needs arising from the interdependence of the modern world, it may be necessary to set up permanent international bodies to deal with economic or other aspects of international relations directly or indirectly related to security. In particularly exposed regions, such as western Europe after the outbreak of the Cold War, the most suitable course of action may be the formation of some kind of confederation, which is usually the most advanced form of collaboration among states advocated by conservative internationalists.

The most significant diversity, however, relates to the type of political structure projected for the more institutional forms of international cooperation. The design may be for a hegemonic order, as in some British and French conservative internationalist thought about the organisation of western Europe in the first decades of the European communities. It may point towards a more oligarchic order, as in some argumentation for closer bonds between two or more major powers in the European Community (EC) of later decades. Or it may pay tribute to the principle of the equality of all participating states, as exemplified by the formal arrangement for European Political Cooperation. Such diversity of conception reflects the hierarchy of power in the international community.

The solidarist variety of conservative internationalism, too, springs from a concern with security. But the perceived threat is not so much to the equilibrium of the states system as to the order of the international society, and takes the form of an attempt to revolutionaryise the structural and ideological foundations of that
society. Since the means employed by the revolutionary forces may include not only war but also subversion, the defence is likely to be directed against both external and internal enemies. Thus the nature of the challenge as well as the form of the response help to merge foreign and domestic policies. And since the revolutionary forces threaten, directly or indirectly, both a number of particular countries and international society in general, the counter-revolutionary defence tends to be mounted collectively and fought jointly, in the solidarist spirit of conservative internationalism.

The record of conservative internationalism in relation to the issue of war or peace is ambivalent. The pluralist version, as the ideology of the balance of power, has been associated sometimes with resort to war and sometimes with prevention of war. While the rules of the balance of power may call for war, its operation can also avert war. Its ultimate function has not been to maintain peace but to provide security. Yet, in the age of the Cold War, the central balance succeeded in protecting the security of its parties as well as in avoiding war between the superpowers.

The role of the solidarist version of conservative internationalism in relation to war and peace also has two aspects. While the organic solidarity of the counter-revolutionary partners often stifles actual and potential conflicts of interest among them, their ideological and psychological commitment to conservative ideas and values tends to intensify the battle with the revolutionary camp. By stressing the ideological dimension of the issue, such internationalism adds passion to the conduct of the conflict. Indeed, with an ideological clash which perhaps not only splits the society of nations but also threatens to divide each partner in the conservative alliance internally, the result for the international society may be something resembling civil war. In terms of peace or war, pluralist conservatism may be, on balance, rather safer than solidarist conservatism. But, in principle, both varieties of internationalism accept war as a legitimate means of conducting foreign policy. In conservative philosophy, war is a recurrent phenomenon of international politics.
The Development of Conservative Internationalism in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries

Most statesmen and writers of the realist tradition of thought about international politics have recognised the existence of some kind of society of nations. Usually they have seen it as a society of sovereign states, based on shared interests in maintaining order and security and held together by diplomacy and alliances or more developed forms of international organisation. Even those most impressed with the salience of conflict of interests and struggle for power have sometimes gone out of their way to acknowledge elements of society. When Treitschke listed the bonds that held together his *Staatengesellschaft*, he even included war as a unifying element, because it taught nations to know and respect each other's qualities. But of course not all of those who recognised international society were internationalists.

Yet, it is not difficult to point to prominent examples in European history of people who, to a significant degree, were inspired by a conservative internationalism of the pluralist kind. For more than half a century after the Napoleonic Wars, British thought about European politics was dominated by balance-of-power ideas. They were developed by statesmen and endorsed by international lawyers. Foremost among the former was Castlereagh. As a principal architect of the Vienna settlement, he was inclined to equate the European balance of power with the territorial distribution of 1815. The repose and peace of Europe, he thought, depended on the maintenance of existing boundaries. This could be achieved through the continued solidarity of the great powers, the basis of which had been prepared by the Treaty of Chaumont in 1814, largely his own work, and consolidated by the Quadruple Alliance in 1815. Such solidarity, he asserted, required a lasting British commitment. Castlereagh's idea of great-power solidarity and Continental involvement to maintain the territorial order and uphold the existing balance, which found expression in his advocacy of the congress system in the postwar period, was in the nature of pluralist internationalism.

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Later statesmen gradually liberated the balance of power from the territorial settlement of 1815, at the same time reducing British commitment to Europe. Both Palmerston and Russell saw that the idea of the balance of power transcended the reality of the established distribution of territory, and that there might be a case for sometimes letting the political principle override the legal fact. For maintaining a more flexible balance of power, they relied mainly on what became known as the Concert of Europe, which was less formal than the congress system of the postwar years. Operating on an ad hoc basis, the Concert required occasional rather than regular involvement in European affairs and was thus less demanding for Britain. Though both were willing to concert their policies with other great powers when a crisis arose and the balance was at stake, Russell was more European in outlook than Palmerston. While Palmerston's commitment to Europe was qualified by his nationalist spirit, Russell was convinced that Britain 'has duties to Europe as she has duties to her own people'.

Neither, however, was so dedicated to European cooperation and continental involvement as Castlereagh had been. Moreover, their internationalism was less conservative than Castlereagh's. Both of them were moved by Whig sympathies for oppressed people; Palmerston and, even more so, Russell allowed attachment to the balance of power to be qualified by some enthusiasm for the idea of national liberty.

The dual process of releasing the balance of power from the Vienna settlement and imbuing the conservative tradition of European involvement with liberal influences was completed by Gladstone. While he upheld the principle of balance of power and the idea of a concert of powers, his preoccupation with international society took him beyond the concern with security. Ultimately intent on the advance of Christian civilisation, he allowed the declining tradition of conservative internationalism to be eclipsed by the ascent of liberal internationalism.

The broad development in British thinking about balance of power and European involvement was reflected in the writings of some international lawyers in the second half of the century. While

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Travers Twiss, writing in the early 1860s, still tended to assume that maintaining the balance of power meant upholding the equilibrium consolidated in the Vienna treaties, Robert Phillimore, writing half a dozen years earlier, asserted that the former function transcended the latter. And T.E. Holland, in a book published in 1885, took Gladstone's position when he argued that the role of the Concert of Europe in the Eastern question was not only to maintain a balance of power but also to bring civilisation to Turkey.4

Surveying the history of nineteenth-century British ideas about the balance of power, one sees a tradition of thought which in its earlier stages rested on the basis of territorial conservatism and in its later phase supported a superstructure of liberal internationalism. German thought on the subject during the same period was of a different nature and took another course. Developed mainly by North German historians, it presented the balance of power as a tendency governing the interaction of states rather than as a principle guiding foreign policy. The point of departure was again the conservative internationalism of the post-Napoleonic years, but in its dynastic as well as its territorial aspect.

In central Europe, the dynastic component of that internationalism had both religious and secular elements. The Habsburg emperors and the Prussian kings, and some of their advisers, were inclined to accept the assumption that sovereigns were servants of God who had been charged with maintaining law, government, order and peace in the Christian society of Europe, on the basis of which Tsar Alexander in 1815 had introduced the treaty of the Holy Alliance and secured the signatures of the other sovereigns. Most of the conservative statesmen and publicists of the period, however, paid only lip-service to the mystical insights and religious doctrines behind that treaty, or else ignored it. When they had to make a case for dynastic legitimacy, they usually based it on positive law, namely the treaties of the Vienna settlement, instead of on divine right.

The foremost exponent of the secular argument for dynastic internationalism and governmental solidarity was Metternich, who served the Habsburgs for more than fifty years. The two greatest dangers, be believed throughout the restoration period, were

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European war and social anarchy. Since recent history had demonstrated that either of those calamities could lead to the other, to prevent territorial aggression and to quell revolutionary activity initially seemed equally important to him. In the course of time, however, after France had joined the diplomatic concert of the great powers and a series of revolutions had broken out in other parts of Europe, he focused more on the social enemy than on the potential political adversary. Like his adviser Gentz, he saw the society of Europe as an organism and revolution as a disease. All revolutionary outbreaks, he believed, could be traced to a network of secret societies and should be dealt with by force. The remedy he proposed was a general union of European governments led by the principal powers. Such a body could counterbalance the forces of revolution and, through judicious intervention and suppression, prop up the existing order and stave off anarchy. Thus Metternich’s concern with the dualistic and unstable balance of forces in the society of Europe came to overshadow his commitment to the multiple and consolidated balance of power in the external relations of the states.5

In German thought about European politics, there was no clear division between dynastic and territorial conservatism. Tied up with each other, they formed a complex of conservative internationalism of the solidarist kind, with the dynastic strand generally the stronger of the two. Till well into the second half of the century this form of internationalism prevailed in both Austria and Prussia. For the first generation of writers interested in the balance of power, it was difficult to resist the solidarist influences of restoration thought.

Friedrich Gentz, secretary to the postwar European congresses, repudiated the old balance of power which he in 1806, in his Fragments upon the Balance of Power in Europe, had held up as the model to be emulated, and praised the new system of a general union directed by the principal powers. After 1818 his political thought was motivated by fear of revolution. Like Metternich, he saw a new balance of power in the society of Europe between the union of sovereigns and the forces of revolution, and advocated armed intervention and suppression of revolutionary outbreaks. Friedrich Ancillon, cousin to Gentz and tutor to the young Frederick William IV, had also been inspired in his earlier writings by the classical balance of

5 ibid., pp.15-34.
power. In the postwar decade, however, he identified with the new organisation of politics, which, though apparently a deviation from the older system of counter-forces, was in reality, he argued, its perfection. The Göttingen historian Arnold Herrmann Ludwig Heere, too, managed to reconcile the pre-revolutionary balance of power with the postwar system. Like Gentz and Ancillon, he embraced the doctrines of dynastic and territorial conservatism, instead of developing a theory of the balance of power for the nineteenth century.

Leopold von Ranke, writing in the middle decades of the century, dissociated himself from Metternichian policies and, as he put it, tried to steer a middle course between reaction and revolution. That allowed him to rise above the ideological debate of the restoration period and address himself to the great issues of the relations of states which had dominated European history before the French Revolution. What he saw was a system with two constitutive characteristics, namely the individuality of the states and the unity of Europe. Although each nation-state was unique and independent, together they formed a society with a distinct history, common religion and shared values. In Die grossen Mächte, the most famous of his essays, Ranke surveyed the history of the states system. It was a story of incessant struggle, of new powers rising against old ones expanding, of fresh alliances springing up to defend weaker states against stronger neighbours, of Europe always maintaining its freedom and diversity in the face of successive bids for universal domination. The most recent attempt to secure dominion, that of revolutionary and Napoleonic France, had revived the dormant nationalities of the European peoples and invigorated the states. It was the idea of nationality which enabled Ranke to uphold the principle of state individuality against the solidarist tendencies of restoration thought, and to regenerate the balance-of-power theory. The principal powers of Europe, he observed in 1854, were like the branches of a tree, or celestial bodies 'incessantly moving together and side by side, sometimes in a certain conjunction and sometimes in a certain divergence from each other'.

The heart of this system was the balance of power. By regulating the

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struggle among states, it sustained the duality of individuality and unity.

Ranke's system of thought gained considerable following among his contemporaries in Prussia and successors in the *Reich*, who applied it first to European and then to world politics, making it the basis of German thinking about international politics in the half-century before the First World War. In the process, however, it was exposed to the influence of other ideas and attitudes, in particular those of Prussian national liberals and Hegelians. From the former came a passionate German nationalism, as expressed in the writings of Treitschke, and from the latter a set of anti-European doctrines about the state and the pursuit of self-interest, as evinced in the speeches and policies of Bismarck in the period before the foundation of the *Reich*. The result was a radical change in the character of German balance-of-power thought. The European outlook and pluralist internationalism reflected in Ranke's notions of cultural unity and systemic order gave way to German nationalism and political egoism. The idea and policies of imperialist *Weltpolitik* after 1900 marked the final confluence of Rankean balance-of-power thought, German nationalism and Hegelian doctrines.7

The interwar period in European history was not a good time for conservative internationalism. Though there were elements of solidarist conservatism in the counter-revolutionary response of the allied powers to the establishment of the Soviet Union and elements of a different kind of solidarist conservatism in the ideas and programmes of the fascist movements and governments, the former was mixed with liberal internationalism and the latter overshadowed by rightist nationalism. Nor was pluralist conservatism a conspicuous part of interwar thinking about international politics. In the negotiations leading to the establishment of the League of Nations, Lloyd George and his colleagues proposed a kind of international organisation much more along conservative internationalist lines than the one that was actually set up. They wanted a great-power council with both power and responsibility, which on a permanent basis could continue the European tradition of conference diplomacy, maintaining

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7 ibid., pp.90-107.
the balance of power and engaging in functional cooperation. But the liberal internationalism of President Wilson and his colleagues prevailed. The balance of power was replaced by a system of collective security, conceived as a standing arrangement for joint defence against any potential aggressor. Though some argued that this constituted a development of the balance of power rather than marking its abolition, the new system did not enjoy the support of an effective school of conservative internationalism, and ended in miserable failure in the international crises of the 1930s. Thus, the interwar decades became a period of liberal and socialist internationalism, and of nationalism.

The Modern Revival of Conservative Internationalism

After the Second World War there was a revival of conservative internationalism in European political thought. Although solidarist conservatism was an element in the anti-communism of the west European nations after the outbreak of the Cold War as well as in the federalist thought of the founders of European communities in the 1950s, the new conservatism was mainly of the pluralist kind. It appeared in both global and regional politics and, as regards the type of political structure projected for institutional cooperation, took several forms.

At the global level, conservative internationalism of the pluralist sort was evident well before the end of the war. As soon as the allied powers had gained the upper hand in hostilities, their leaders began to make plans for the international organisation of the postwar world. Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill were determined that the special position their countries had secured in the prosecution of the war should be recognised in the structuring of the peacetime order. On the grounds that the main burden of maintaining the peace would fall on the victorious great powers, the statesmen decided to secure decisive influence for the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China in the organisation that became known as the United Nations. Together with the representative of China, they drew up a proposal according to which threats to international peace and security

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would be the responsibility of what became known as the Security Council. This body would have the power to take decisions which would bind other members of the United Nations. By arranging permanent membership of the Security Council for their countries, the 'Big Five' in effect set themselves up as the oligarchs of the postwar international system. Since China, then preoccupied with its civil war, was in no position to take on global responsibilities, the oligarchy consisted in practice of the Big Four. In 1945 the two superpowers, as the United States and the Soviet Union soon would be known, and the two European great powers, Britain and France, assumed rights and duties in global international politics akin to those which the powers of the Concert of Europe had exercised much more informally and spasmodically in European politics in the nineteenth century.

The basis of the new system of peace and security was the idea of collective security. It assumed a degree of diplomatic solidarity among the principal powers, in particular between the superpowers. When the relative harmony of the wartime alliance gave way to rising tension between the Soviet Union and the Western powers, and the postwar multiple concert was succeeded by the dualistic Cold War, the system of collective security broke down. Within a few years it was replaced by a system of opposed alliances, which meant a return to the balance of power. One result of this development was that the scope for conservative internationalism, as expressed in intergovernmental cooperation for security purposes, was relegated from the global to the regional level.

In western Europe, the most prominent expressions of such internationalism took the form of projects for the reorganisation of Europe which rested, explicitly or implicitly, on the idea of a hegemonic order. In 1946, in a speech in Zurich, Winston Churchill called for the formation of 'a kind of United States of Europe' as a solution to the enormous political and economic problems facing the European countries after the war. But, in contrast with many others who used the same term in those years, he did not advocate a European federation, at least not one which would compromise British sovereignty. What he seems to have had in mind was more a loose association in which Britain, then still the strongest European power
after the Soviet Union, would play the leading part.9

But the foremost example of a European statesman advocating a confederal structure built round his own state was Charles de Gaulle. In reaction to the federal drive of the Eurocrats in the 1950s and 1960s, he championed the idea of a 'Europe of the States'. 'What are the realities in Europe? What are the pillars on which it can be built? In truth they are the States ... the only entities that have the right to command and the authority to act ....', he proclaimed in 1960.10 'I repeat', he said about the Europe of the Community at a press conference in May 1962, 'that at present there is and can be no Europe other than a Europe of the States', adding with obvious reference to the schemes of the European federalists, 'except, of course, for myths, fictions and pageants ...'.11 What de Gaulle had in mind for Europe was a 'political union', by which he meant a community of states cooperating with each other in the fields of defence and foreign policy while retaining their sovereignty. Governed by a personal, almost mystical, attachment to the nation-state, he rested his vision squarely on the principle of state sovereignty.

This pluralist union, obviously led by France in the west, would eventually stretch from the Atlantic to the Urals. De Gaulle, as Willy Brandt observed in his autography, came closer in his perceptions to a whole Europe than any of those who wanted to adapt too fast and too permanently to the postwar political landscape.12 But his ambitions for France and Europe went beyond the continent. From an early stage, he cast a united Europe in a central role in global politics. 'Who can restore the balance between the two New Worlds, if not the Old World?' he asked in July 1946. 'Ancient Europe, which for so many centuries has guided the universe, is in a position to provide the necessary element of moderation and understanding in the heart of a world that is tending to split in half.'13 Primarily concerned with stability, order and security, he always focused on the diplomatic and military aspects of international relations. More than most politicians
of his time, he upheld the distinction between the high politics of strategy and foreign policy and the low politics of institutional, economic and social relations among states. He was a conservative internationalist in the realist tradition.

A different kind of internationalism worth considering here is the one developed in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe in the later forties, the fifties and the sixties. As a theory about inter-socialist relations which was derived from proletarian internationalism, it naturally became known as socialist internationalism. Yet notwithstanding its socialist essence, it had several qualities in common with pluralist conservative internationalism. In the first place, whatever else it was, it was also a theory of inter-state relations. An authoritative Soviet dictionary defined socialist internationalism as 'the application and the development of the principles of proletarian internationalism both in the relations between nations and nationalities who have started on the path of socialism and between sovereign socialist states'.

While proletarian internationalism was to do only with relations among working classes and their political parties, socialist internationalism was both about such relationships and about relations between socialist states. Though the former part of socialist internationalism always was regarded as ideologically the more important, after 1948, when the people's democracies were launched on the path towards socialism, a good deal of thought was given to the latter.

Already in Stalin's last years Soviet theorists, while continuously stressing the special quality of relations between countries with similar political and socio-economic structures, paid tribute to the principle of state sovereignty and the norms of international law in their analysis of the interaction of socialist countries. After Stalin's death in 1953, and especially after the several crises between the Soviet Union and people's democracies in the Khrushchev years, there were further theoretical developments, with an accentuation of the tendency to pay tribute to the principles of equality and national independence. But the suppression of the 'Prague spring' in 1968 led to a temporary reversal of such tendencies. The proclamation that in the West became known as the Brezhnev

doctrines of limited sovereignty left little doubt that the international interests of the socialist commonwealth took precedence over the individual national interests of the constituent states. At the same time, however, there was a growing willingness to admit the possibility of conflict between socialist countries, and to explore this phenomenon theoretically. Under Gorbachev, Soviet theorists were actually encouraged to address their efforts to the inter-state relations of socialist countries and in particular to tackle the problems of defining national interests and dealing with conflicts of interest between members of the socialist commonwealth.\(^\text{15}\)

In the second place, socialist internationalism signified an advanced degree of cooperation among socialist states. Soviet theorists, most of the time unwilling or unable to accept the existence of serious conflicts of interest between the fraternal states, continuously projected the concept of solidarity in defence of the achievements of socialism and in the struggle against imperialism. Under Brezhnev, they even paid particular attention to the coordination of the foreign policies of the socialist states.\(^\text{16}\) The form of solidarity they were advocating, however, was quite different from the confederation of states typical of some conservative internationalist thought. Rather than a pluralist association of states set up essentially for purposes of security, the socialist commonwealth was a union of countries based on shared ideology and common political, economic and social structure. But, as we shall see, the practical outcome of the drive for solidarity had a good deal in common with the manifestations of conservative internationalism in western Europe in the postwar decades. Both the military and the economic international organisations of the socialist countries were more than anything else agencies of intergovernmental cooperation.

Whatever the ultimate ideological nature of the socialist internationalism developed by the theorists and pursued by the decision makers of the Soviet Union, it had one more thing in common with the confederal ideas championed by some British and French leaders in the postwar decades. As a blueprint for international organisation, it was clearly of the hegemonic kind. From the establishment of the people's democracies to Stalin's death, the Soviet

\(^\text{15}\) ibid., p.305.
\(^\text{16}\) ibid., p.197.
Union presented itself as not merely the only model for the economic and political development of the east European countries but also the undisputed hegemon of the bloc. Despite the formal emphasis in theoretical writings on sovereignty, full equality and mutual advantage, the programme of cooperation and friendship with the Soviet Union in the name of proletarian internationalism always meant putting Soviet state interests first. With the de-Stalinisation campaign under Khrushchev came an attempt to move from coerced union towards voluntary solidarity. In the name of socialist internationalism, the theorists began to give added prominence to the themes of higher respect for national divergencies and greater equality in relations with the Soviet Union. But when Tito's Yugoslavia insisted on staying independent of the east European bloc and Hungary turned into a case requiring 'fraternal aid', a new concern with the undermining effects of doctrinal 'revisionism' led to a revived emphasis on socialist unity under Soviet leadership. Until the later 1980s, when under Gorbachev's leadership the Soviet specialists in international relations began to work seriously on the difficult concept of a 'socialist partnership', the structure of the east European international system was in both theory and practice dominated by one great power.\(^\text{17}\)

The notion of an oligarchic form of institutional cooperation has been rather less prominent in conservative thought about European politics than the idea of a hegemonic structure. When it has turned up, it has sometimes been as a source of anxiety rather than inspiration. the spectre of a concert of Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany directing the EC occasionally haunted some of the lesser powers in the region, but never materialised. However, the idea of a special relationship between the governments of France and the Federal Republic, forming a kind of central axis in European politics, was advanced repeatedly and, since the days of Adenauer, at various stages pursued by the leaders of the two countries. Originally reflecting the complementary interests of the French in bolstering the security of their country and of the Germans in gaining diplomatic status and political influence, it culminated when Adenauer and de Gaulle in January 1963 signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation. Later it found fresh expression in the personal friendship and close contact between Helmut Schmidt and Giscard d’Estaing. A more

\(^{17}\) ibid., pp.305-8.
recent manifestation of the idea was the plan for the formation of a joint Franco-German armed force. Since the focus of the projected relationship usually was on inter-governmental cooperation for purposes of security, in the broader sense of the term, such ideas may be seen as expressions of conservative internationalist thought.

The ideas that projected a hegemonic order as well as those which pointed towards an oligarchic structure of the regional association of states usually had their advocates and supporters in the countries which were cast for the principal roles in the projected system. The arguments for a more egalitarian structure were more likely to come from states that were destined for lesser parts in the system. In the Netherlands and Italy there were occasionally negative reactions to tendencies towards the formation of a special relationship between France and the Federal Republic. Supporting an expanding cooperation of all the partners and an advancing integration of the entire region, the governments of the two countries on the whole preferred a less oligarchic structure for the EC. the conflict between the pursuit of a hegemonic or an oligarchic structure and the preference for a more egalitarian system survival the decline of conservative internationalism in the later years of the Cold War and became a theme of the debate in the 1990s about the political organisation and economic arrangements of the European Union (EU).

The solidarist kind of conservative internationalism, too, was a feature of European thought already in the later stages of the Second World War. It was conspicuous in some of the programmes for the postwar organisation of Europe drawn up by writers and politicians of Catholic convictions. An example from Italian political debate is the platform prepared for the Christian Democratic party and entitled 'Idee ricostruttive della Democrazia Cristiana', the final draft of which was written by Alcide De Gasperi in 1943. In the concluding sections the document set out some principles for postwar international order. While all peoples should adopt the principle of national self-determination, nations should also accept limitations on their sovereignty in the interest of a wider solidarity; organs of confederation, with continental as well as intercontinental ties, should be promoted; and institutions should be set up for resolving international disputes, bringing about disarmament and discharging
various other functions.\textsuperscript{18}

At that stage of his life De Gasperi had less faith in the kind of Christian corporatism which had inspired him in his youth. Under fascism, the corporatist movement had departed from its original doctrinal basis, according to which corporations were natural societies performing social and economic functions subject to rules of justice and charity, and had identified with the fascist movement and totalitarian politics. After the reign of Mussolini it seemed important to De Gasperi to limit the role of his party to the political sector of society and leave the religious sphere to the church. There could be no return, he saw clearly, to the promotion of a medieval kind of homogeneous society, whether in Italy or in Europe. Yet, his political thought was still inspired by his religious beliefs and Christian heritage. The European internationalism that he pursued during his years in office after the war, which pointed towards a functional integration with other Catholic countries in the first place, evinced a commitment to Christian solidarity and a faith in the transnational force of Catholicism.

In German postwar politics, the foremost conservative internationalist of solidarist inclinations was Konrad Adenauer. In the tradition of earlier times in German and European history, he saw himself as a Christian statesman. Using his God-given reason and conscience, he told an authorised biographer, he made his contribution towards 'the establishment of the order willed by God even here, in this world'.\textsuperscript{19} The ideology that guided him in German and European politics was that of a Roman Catholic Rhinelander. While his Catholicism rested on the principles of the more liberal papal encyclicals, his attitude to Protestantism reflected a lifelong involvement in the affairs of the Rhineland. Detesting Protestant Prussia and Berlin, he had no deep commitment to the idea of the \textit{Reich} and no great enthusiasm for the goal of German unification. Hating Bolshevik Russia and godless communism, he identified with the West and engaged in the ideologicial crusade against the Soviet Union.

In west European politics Adenauer was an integrationist. As early as 1946, the year when he founded the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), he pledged himself to a united Christian Europe, declaring that he now regarded himself 'primarily as a European, and only in the second place as a German'. Throughout his years as leader of the CDU and Chancellor of the Federal Republic he was inclined to put European integration before German unification. But the Europe he had in mind was 'little Europe', consisting essentially of the Federal Republic, France, Italy and the three Benelux countries. It was also a Catholic Europe, initiated by Robert Schuman, himself and De Gasperi and backed by the Vatican. Membership for Britain and the Scandinavian countries, all largely Protestant, was not high on his list of priorities. It was a Europe which liberals and socialists in many countries rejected as conceived in the Carolingian tradition, promoted by a 'black front' of Catholic statesmen and supported by the conservative forces of European society.

Mainly because of the strong emphasis on integration through supranational authorities, this conception of European unity was also unacceptable to conservative internationalists of a pluralist bent. Soon after de Gaulle returned to office in Paris the issue between solidarist and pluralist approaches to European integration came to the fore. Some years later when Adenauer attempted to crown his work by signing a treaty of friendship and cooperation with France, for the purpose of consolidating the Franco-German reconciliation and establishing an Adenauer-de Gaulle axis in the emerging Europe, the pluralist approach had clearly outrivalled the solidarist way. When solidarist ideas and policies reappeared in later debates about the structure and development of the EC and the EU, it was usually in the ideological context of liberal or socialist internationalism rather than as expressions of a revived form of conservative internationalism.

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20 ibid., p.197.
21 'Don't forget', Adenauer told the French High Commissioner in 1954, 'that I am the only German Chancellor who has preferred the unity of Europe to the unity of his own country'. (Rudolf Augstein, Konrad Adenauer, trans. Walter Wallich (Secker & Warburg, London, 1964), p.77.)
Resultant International Organisations

In the 1950s the solidarist kind of conservative internationalism was a considerable force in the international politics of western Europe. Derived mainly from the traditional political universalism of Roman Catholicism and the revived anti-communism of the first decade of the Cold War, upheld by prominent statesmen in France, West Germany, Italy and a few smaller countries and supported by Christian Democrats and members of other integrationist political parties in the region, it manifested itself primarily in the supranational programmes of the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community. From the outset, however, it was rivalled, and eventually eclipsed, by the other kind of conservative internationalism. During most of the Cold War conservative internationalism in Europe, as in other parts of the Western world, was largely of the pluralist type.

At the global level, the principal manifestation of such internationalism in 1945 was the Security Council of the United Nations. When the immediate postwar state of relative diplomatic solidarity among its five permanent members gave way to strategic tension, political rivalry and ideological conflict, and large parts of the world divided into opposite blocks, conservative internationalism found fresh expressions at the regional level. Both in the East, where the Soviet Union consolidated its control of eastern and much of central Europe and received communist China into the socialist camp, and in the West, where major powers as well as many smaller states looked to the United States for leadership, new organisations for international cooperation were set up.

Though each of the organisations that were established in western Europe in the earlier years of the Cold War had more than one ideological source, most of the major organisations were manifestations of conservative more than of any other kind of internationalism. Largely limited to intergovernmental cooperation, they were oriented, directly or indirectly, towards security. The motivation for the creation of one of the largest institutions, namely the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), came from the United States.

Originally intended as an instrument for implementing the American scheme for providing massive aid to Europe first announced
by General Marshall in June 1947, the OEEC was in the first place designed to provide information about the various national economies and help the US government to coordinate the allocation of funds. But the American goals for Europe went beyond economic recovery. Some of the statesmen behind the Marshall Plan wanted the countries of western Europe to integrate not only economically but also politically, and eventually form a kind of United States of Europe. The process of integration, they thought, would strengthen the free and democratic part of Europe and make it more self-reliant in the confrontation with the communist forces on the other side of the east-west division of the continent. While they concentrated on economic means and political goals, their ultimate concern was with military security, of western Europe and the United States.

From the beginning those Americans, in their desire for a united Europe, tried to introduce elements of supranationality in the structure of the organisation. The Europeans, however - the British and the French in particular but also the representatives of some smaller states - successfully opposed such integrationist pressures from across the Atlantic, and moved in different directions. As a result, the OEEC turned out to be much more modest than intended by some of its founders. Set up in April 1948, it developed into an agency essentially for intergovernmental communication and cooperation in various matters of economics. Only at the level of its technical committees did it in certain areas of activity show some functionalist tendencies. In neither the economic nor the political sphere did the organisation develop significant supranational characteristics. Yet through cooperation with the governments of the United States and Canada it became a useful bond in the unity of the West against the communist world, as did its successor, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) set up in 1961.

Together with the European Payments Union, set up in 1950, the OEEC and OECD represented an institutionalisation of the economic and financial relations of the Western nations. That process reflected a growing recognition of the social dimension of security and a novel acceptance of the complex interdependence of modern states. Both qualities became characteristic of conservative internationalism in the second half of the twentieth century.
The most important organisation created in the postwar period was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Though set up on North American initiative and led by the United States, with ten west European nations as founding members, joined by Greece and Turkey in 1952 and the Federal Republic in 1955, it was the foremost peacetime manifestation of conservative internationalism in modern European history. Based on the North Atlantic Treaty signed in April 1949, it was also the principal security organisation of the Western part of the world. Historically a response to the foreign policies and revolutionary ideology of the Soviet Union and its supporters in the first years of the Cold War, which were perceived as both aggressive and subversive, the treaty and the organisation were from the outset essentially defensive. In the words of the preamble of the treaty, the purpose of the signatories was 'to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law'. NATO was conceived as an instrument of collective defence of North American and west European states whose security interests were seen as mutually dependent. It provided intergovernmental machinery for coordination of defence policies and collaboration of armed forces.

However, the alliance treaty also foreshadowed cooperation of a nature other than political and military. Concerned about the risk of communist subversion of Western societies, the parties declared their intentions to strengthen their free institutions, bring about a better understanding of the principles underlying those institutions, promote conditions of stability and well-being and, not least, to facilitate harmony and encourage cooperation in economic matters (article 2). Mainly in the 1950s, there was a good deal of debate about developing the economic, social and cultural potentials of the alliance, in the course of which some Canadians, Norwegians and others championed the idea of an Atlantic community. But nothing very substantial resulted from the debate.

In later decades, several significant developments took place in the conceptions of the nature and role of NATO. While at the height of the Cold War the emphasis had been very much on the military side of the activities of the alliance, after the East-West détente in the 1960s came a new willingness to focus on diplomatic relations with opponents. Subsequently, in particular after the decline of the Cold War in the 1980s, came a drive to make the alliance rather more
European. While NATO in the earlier decades had rested largely on the US strategic nuclear deterrent and had involved the stationing of heavy components of US forces on European soil, now some of the European allies indicated an interest in assuming a less dependent role within the framework of the alliance. In the same period, there was also a tendency to evolve other frameworks for west European political and military cooperation. The long-standing European Political Cooperation (EPC) was consolidated and developed by the EC partners, the Western European Union (WEU) was revived, and some form of Franco-German military cooperation was initiated, all of which might be seen largely as expressions of conservative internationalism at regional and local levels.

Most recently - after the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the disappearance of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the outbreak of civil war in Yugoslavia and the eruption of nationalist rebellions in parts of former Soviet territory - there has been a good deal of debate about the current role and responsibilities and the future composition and programme of NATO. Whatever the outcome of that debate, the continued existence of a peacetime alliance of many nations engaged in intergovernmental cooperation for purposes of general security is organic evidence of the survival of pluralist conservative internationalism in the post-Cold War world.

Of the more exclusively European international organisations set up in the postwar decade, the most obvious manifestation of conservative internationalism was the Western European Union. It rested on the Brussels Treaty of 17 March 1948, a 50-years alliance between Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. While formally directed against a revival of German militarism, it was signed after the coup in Prague, at a time when west Europeans were more concerned with the communist threat. In 1954 the treaty was amended to include the Federal Republic and Italy in a union of states for 'mutual defence and other purposes'.

The principal objectives of the founding treaty were to reduce the risk of successful subversion by providing for various forms of economic, social and cultural cooperation and to guard against armed aggression by preparing for collective military action. Article 5 was a definite commitment to collective defence, rather stronger than the
corresponding article of the North Atlantic Treaty. While the OEEC gradually took over the coordination of economic policies, NATO soon assumed responsibility for the planning of collective defence. Thus, in the following years the activities of the organisation were mainly in the areas of social and cultural cooperation.

But after the amendment of the treaty and the entry of the two ex-enemies the WEU took on additional functions in the field of defence. In its new form, the organisation provided a solution to the problems connected with German rearmament and membership of NATO, which the aborted European Defence Community of 1952-54 (EDC) had failed to solve. With the integration of West German armed forces in the NATO structure in the following years the WEU declined in importance and, at least as an instrument of security, eventually became dormant. In the later 1980s, however, it was revived as a convenient forum for those EC members which were seeking closer European cooperation in defence and security within the NATO alliance. In 1994 NATO decided that the WEU should be the European arm of the organisation. By then the WEU had been expanded to include all members of the EU except Denmark and Ireland, which in defence cooperation wanted only the status of observers.

Though periodically preoccupied with social and cultural cooperation, the WEU was always basically an organisation for security, which during the Cold War meant internal as well as external security. While formally devoted to promoting the unity and encouraging the integration of Europe, it was never more than an agency of intergovernmental cooperation. Though certain attempts were made in the earlier years to turn its Council into an executive agency which would be politically accountable to its Assembly, the former did not develop supranational elements and the latter remained purely advisory. Thus the WEU, too, was in the pluralist mould.

The other west European organisation to be considered here, the Council of Europe, eventually turned out much the same way. But in inception, as well as in its earlier activities in particular, it was a compromise between different traditions of thought about European integration. An outcome of the postwar efforts of various groups advocating what was loosely called European union, the Council of Europe reflected the influence both of those who wanted to move
towards federation and of those who were reluctant to go beyond intergovernmental cooperation. According to its statute, signed by ten west European governments on 5 May 1949, the aim of the Council would be 'to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realizing the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress'. The means of pursuing this goal should be discussions of questions of common concern, followed by agreements and common action in economic, social, cultural, scientific, legal, administrative and other matters.

From the outset an issue arose within the institution between the federalists, who came mainly from France, Italy and the Benelux countries, and the pluralists or functionalists, mostly British or Scandinavian. The former, inspired by the 'European idea' and working through the Consultative Assembly, endeavoured to promote their goal of union by trying to turn the Assembly into a European parliament which would control the activities of the Committee of Ministers. But the Committee eventually rejected such proposals and maintained the intergovernmental structure of the institution. While the Assembly could make recommendations to the Committee and the latter make recommendations to the governments of member countries, the Council of Europe rested in the last resort on the principle of unanimity. The Council never developed supranational elements, but became a framework for functional activities of various kinds. However, since matters of defence from the outset were left to NATO, it did not become a security organisation in the military sense of the term.

Despite the diplomatic efforts of the government of the United States and the public campaigns of diverse movements on the continent to push European integration beyond the limits of intergovernmental cooperation, the major agreements signed and organisations set up in the first years of the Cold War were essentially pluralist. The main reason was the unwillingness of the British to compromise their national sovereignty by accepting an element of supranationality in the new organisations. Thus, though the communist challenge to the external and internal security of the West in those years led to institutionalised intergovernmental cooperation, it did not bring about a unification of western Europe.
The international organisations that were set up in eastern Europe during the second decade after 1945 were largely expressions of socialist internationalism. Resting on treaties which had been negotiated by communist governments, they were imbued with socialist ideology. Yet over the years they developed characteristics which in certain respects made them not very different from some of the Western manifestations of conservative internationalism. The two most important were the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, also known as COMECON).

The WTO rested on the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, usually called the Warsaw Pact, which the Soviet Union and seven east European countries signed in the Polish capital in 1955. Set up after the amendment of the Brussels Treaty, which prepared the way for German rearmament and membership of NATO, it was obviously a security organisation. While article 3 of the treaty called for joint consultation if one or more of the parties considered that a threat of armed attack had arisen, article 4 prescribed immediate assistance in the event of an armed attack on any of the parties.

Despite the ideological, political, economic and social bonds of the socialist commonwealth, the WTO was ultimately an intergovernmental agency rather than anything else. Neither legally nor politically did it develop into a supranational body. While article 5 of the Warsaw Pact called for the establishment of a unified command and article 6 for the setting up of a political consultative committee, the treaty paid respect to the principles of the independence and sovereignty of states and of non-intervention in their domestic affairs. In practice, of course, the Soviet Union dominated the alliance. But it never succeeded in making its allies accept complete integration. Operating through the bureaucratic channels, they exercised varying kinds and degrees of pressure on the hegemonic power, gradually compelling it to come to terms with their national feelings and divergent policies. Yet, though the east European security organisation remained an agency for intergovernmental cooperation, it was never a pluralist association of states like the ones already established in western Europe. In both theory and practice, the nature and activities of the WTO were conditioned by the ideological and structural bonds of the socialist commonwealth.
The CMEA was of an equally mixed character. Formed in Moscow early in 1949 in response to the challenge presented by the Marshall Plan, it comprised initially the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, and from 1950 also East Germany and Albania. In the last years of Stalin, who generally preferred to exercise Soviet influence by political rather than economic means, the Council was neglected, but it was revived under Khrushchev and subsequently expanded to include non-European communist states as well. The declared purpose of the organisation was to promote the economic growth of the members by uniting and coordinating their efforts, and the basic principle once again the sovereign equality of all members. The Council should organise economic, scientific and technical cooperation, and 'foster the improvement of the international socialist division of labour by coordinating national economic development plans'.

Eventually the call for a socialist international division of labour within the bloc grew so strong that it came into conflict with the principle of sovereignty and equal rights. In 1960 and 1961 theorists could still stress the voluntary basis of the CMEA and describe it as 'by no means ... a supra-state agency with authority to intervene in the affairs of sovereign states'.²² But the following year Khrushchev proposed the establishment of a supranational planning authority and the drawing up of a general investment plan. The east European opposition to the proposal soon became public. While the economically developed states saw it as a threat to their national sovereignty, some of the less developed countries were concerned about the danger of being reduced to suppliers of raw materials. In 1963 the Rumanian leadership, especially alarmed by the implications of the proposal, denounced the idea of an international socialist division of labour and invoked the old principles of national sovereignty and equal rights.²³

Though the Rumanian veto led to a shelving of the scheme, the debate continued. Soviet writers and officials, convinced that economic integration was essential for the efficiency of the WTO, pursued their goal of an ideologically correct and politically expedient

²² Light, The Soviet Theory of International Relations, p.190; the writer quoted was Kuusinen.
²³ ibid., p.191.
division of labour among the members of the bloc. But faced with continued opposition, in particular from the Rumanians, they gradually adopted a less coercive version of the idea and settled for something short of complete integration of the economies. Like the WTO, the CMEA did not become a supranational agency but remained more in the nature of an intergovernmental organisation. Yet like the security organisation, of which it was the economic counterpart, the CMEA was in theory and practice conditioned by the ideology and structure of the union of socialist states.

Despite the ideological pressure from each of the superpowers - inspired, in the case of the United States, at first mainly by liberal internationalism and soon also by conservative internationalism of the anti-communist solidarist type and, in the case of the Soviet Union, by solidarist socialist internationalism - and despite the federalist campaigns and unitarian efforts within Europe itself, the pluralist kind of conservative internationalism prevailed in the shaping of the four west European organisations surveyed here and also left its mark on the two principal east European institutions.

In the decades of the Cold War, a period of neither war nor peace in which considerations of security usually enjoyed high priority, that type of internationalism maintained its influence in the region. But in the later 1980s, when East-West tension declined and attention began to shift from the regional security organisations to the United Nations and the European Community, other kinds of internationalism gained ground. And in the 1990s, after the Cold War had come to an end and before a new pattern of great-power conflict could emerge, liberal internationalism came to the fore, and soon outdistanced both conservative and socialist internationalism.

Yet, not only the survival of NATO and the revival of the WEU but also the keenness of old and new countries in central and eastern Europe to join, or at least secure the protection of, the developing Western security structure indicate that conservative internationalism is still an ideological force in the international politics of the region. As long as conflict of interests, ideas and values is a feature of relations among states; war is a recurrent phenomenon of international politics; and prudence, foresight and breadth of vision are elements of statesmanship - may the oldest and most basic form of internationalism continue to exist and play its part.
CHAPTER 9

PROGRESSIVISM AND SCIENTISM IN AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL THOUGHT

John J. Weltman*

In international politics, as in the study of politics generally, Americans characteristically maintain the view that their analyses are scientific, or aspire to be so: that they derive in some fashion, growing progressively more objective, from an external reality. Behind the facade of scientism an identifiable set of basic assumptions about politics - a tradition of political thought - underlies the supposedly empirical American study of politics. We can call this tradition liberal. The liberal tradition holds that political conflict is rooted in unnecessary social disharmony. The individual is essentially plastic in his potential. A well-conceived environment could eliminate conflict between the individual and society. Reason could provide that well-conceived environment. Reason could also operate upon social institutions themselves. Reason could be made to provide a set of criteria, on the basis of which those institutions could be reshaped, so as to ensure social harmony.

When Americans came to seriously address themselves to the task of understanding their political life, they did so in a manner which most often presumed the omnicompetence of reason, and the plasticity of individuals and institutions. To this must be added a conception of explanatory activity in political affairs which held that the goal of that activity, and thus the criteria on the basis of which its success must be judged, lay in the practical consequences which the activity might produce. The goal of the academic analysis of politics, as it came to

* Much of the material in this essay is drawn from the author's 'The American Tradition in International Thought: Science as Therapy', Colorado College Studies No.20 (Colorado College, Colorado Springs, 1984), pp.124-45. The author gratefully acknowledges the permission of the publisher to use this material here.
develop in the United States, was the reform of institutions, of the policy process, and thus of the policy outcome. The programme for such reforms was to be developed through a process of objective analysis - through a 'policy science'.

In recent years methodological assumptions and aspirations common in political science generally have spread to the American study of international relations. Should we accept these aspirations to greater objectivity in the study of international relations at face value? Or should our experience of the relationship between method and implicit presumptions about politics, in the study of political science generally, incline us to the view that some such relationship applies also to the contemporary study of international politics? If it does apply, what manner of intellectual premise finds voice in this study today?

The American experience of international relations prior to this century has been fragmentary and episodic. Relations with other political units were occasional and exceptional intrusions upon an all-absorbing domestic normality. Since external relations were an occasional irrelevance rather than a continuing problem, the imperative for sustained speculation about them did not arise. But American thought - in spite of its episodic character - has been predominantly governed by a distinct perspective, largely to the exclusion of others. This perspective, while momentarily displaced from primacy in the early years of the Cold War, has regained its importance in the contemporary American academic understanding of international relations.

Order and Conflict in International Relations Theory

Much as the problem of justice has formed the central question of domestic political philosophy, the problem of order has formed the central question for international theory. Speculation about justice has not, of course, been absent from international thought. But it must inevitably occupy a subsidiary place here, unlike its place in domestic political philosophy, where consideration of justice implies that the problem of order has been surmounted.

No one who attempted to investigate the international realm could ignore the prevalence and potential of organised violence.
Thought about international relations has accordingly been dominated by consideration of the causes and consequences of war; and by consideration of the possibilities for mitigating or eliminating war. There are a variety of schemes for organising and categorising that thought, of which the most powerful divides international thought in two, by the level at which dominant causes are assumed to operate.

In 'systemic' accounts, the explanation of events lies primarily at the level of the peculiar, 'anarchic' condition within which the political units coexist. Without an overarching authority, the units are left incapable of imposing harmony of action or resolving disputes among themselves. They must instead look to their own resources to avoid undesirable events, or to gain their objectives. They are constrained by their situation to acquire such means, and to engage in such behaviour, as will tend to reduce their vulnerabilities to the possible actions of others. The possibility that these measures may not be successful, and indeed may result - when the others respond in kind - in an increase in the general vulnerability of everyone, cannot be excluded; but since failure to take them presents dangers of an immediate character, these measures may be forsworn only at great risk.

While international conditions may thus be described as anarchical, in contrast with the hierarchical model of domestic political units with central authority structures, this anarchy may take many different forms, with correspondingly differing implications for the situation and behaviour of the units coexisting within it. Such matters as the number of units, the distribution of capabilities among those units, and the character of the means by which the units interact with one another, are crucial in explaining whether the inevitable violence threatens catastrophe or can be tolerably managed at the margins of everyday life.

The forms of anarchy, and the implications of those forms for the nature and character of the order of which international regimes are capable, are questions which have given rise to an extensive and complex literature. An emphasis on the situation which conditions the behaviour of political units can be seen in some of the earliest attempts

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1 The distinction between systemic and reductionist approaches of course follows that developed by Kenneth N. Waltz, in his classic Theory of International Politics (Addison-Wesley, Reading MA, 1979).
in Western thought to understand the problem of war. The balance-of-power literature which arose in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries built upon this base in order to construct an account of the patterns of interaction which resulted from otherwise uncoordinated activity in an anarchical order. Much of the balance-of-power approach suggested that these patterns might tend to limit the effects of conflict, a result which no specific unit need actually intend.

'Reductionist' attempts at explaining the problem of war emphasise the character of the units which coexist, rather than the situation within which they find themselves. Such explanations embrace a wide variety of notions. Many of these notions arose as a reaction against the systemic outlooks just discussed. Acceptance of the inevitability of war was opposed by the attempt to find the means of eliminating it. War was traced to the failure of the political units to conform to some proper norm - whether of external behaviour or of internal organisation. Bad states or irrational men make war. Eliminate the evil, allow reason to prevail in social life, and war will disappear. The character of the evil, the nature and capabilities of reason, the manner in which its sway has been constrained, and the means by which reason might be set free: an immense variety of differing views were to be found, touching upon these topics. Such a range of views dominated Enlightenment thought on war.

The Enlightenment in Europe was a complex intellectual phenomenon, embracing a variety of emphases. Furthermore, war and foreign policy were minor concerns to the philosophes, whose thought was dominated by problems of domestic reform. When they did turn their attention to war, they differed radically in the extent to which they believed it a condition which could be mitigated in any practical or immediate sense by the application of reason.

The Voltairean attitude toward war, however, was the Enlightenment's most characteristic response. War was an anachronistic irrationality. It was butchery practised by kings and aristocrats for their amusement, in the name of glory and honour. It brought no advantage to anyone else, and often nothing but horror. The solution was implicit: the barbarous ideas of an earlier age, which justified and glorified mass violence, must be eliminated by reason. Perhaps this must mean that those social classes peculiarly addicted to these ideas must be displaced from positions of political power. The
Enlightenment derided the general and the conquering hero as figures of cultural approbation and substituted the merchant and the scientist. Give these latter figures - and the ideas they represented - free play over policy, and wars would be a thing of the past.

This attitude was to be refined and developed in the next century. The rise of nationalism, and the domestic changes in the states of Europe catalysed by the French Revolution, did not eliminate war. Indeed they threatened to make it even more horrendous. The simplicities of the characteristic Enlightenment attitude would not suffice in the new age. But this attitude clearly formed the basis of the more complex formulations of liberalism in the next century.

Liberal thought about war developed along three main lines in the nineteenth century; these lines continue to dominate the contemporary understanding of war and of international relations. All of these lines of development are reductionist, in the sense earlier employed in this essay.

Liberal thought in the nineteenth century continued to be dominated by the Enlightenment's belief in the role of reason as the solvent of international disputes. Introduce rationality into international disputes and the means of settling them without war would be found. This approach formed the basis of the 'peace movements', which grew up throughout Europe, but found their greatest appeal in England and in the United States. It found form also as one of the justifications in support of liberal economic doctrines. Freedom of trade and freedom of information were cornerstones of this approach. Conflict was pathological. It flowed from the failure to recognise and conform to the natural order of things. Eliminate this failure through understanding, and international disputes which might otherwise lead to war would be defused. Thus, a proper understanding of economics would lead to the realisation that the free and untramelled operation of commerce would lead to maximum benefits for all. Therefore, governments should no longer seek to constrain commerce, internally or externally. To the maximum extent possible, politics should be removed from international interchange. Left to itself, the operation of economic forces would produce harmonious relations.

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More generally, international disputes were held to be the product of emotions, or misunderstandings resulting from misinformation. Misinformation was endemic when small cliques of officials carried on foreign policy in secret. The cure lay in the creation of an informed international public opinion through the wide dissemination of information about international questions. This would guard against misunderstanding as well as against the retention of parochial perspectives in the policy process.

A second line of development saw greater obstacles to be overcome before reason could be made to prevail in international intercourse. Certain governmental forms were inherently incapable of responding to the dictates of reason. These forms must first be eliminated - perhaps by revolution - and replaced by others more responsive to reason. Monarchical and aristocratic forms of government were inherently warlike. Reason could only do its work among governments subject to popular control. Only republics were peaceful.

The rise of Marxist socialism added a further variation to this approach. The mere establishment of formal republican institutions would not be sufficient. Behind the forms, there still lay domination by a small group, a group defined now in terms of economic class. The control of the bourgeoisie must be broken and domination by the working class substituted for it, before the underlying natural harmony of interests could become effective.

Yet another variant on liberal thought saw deeper obstacles to peace than the retention of outmoded governmental structures or the domination of those structures by exploitative economic interests. This outlook concentrated on the nation. Human beings were naturally grouped into national units, defined variously by linguistic, historic, cultural or ethnic criteria. War was due to the failure to recognise this natural order. As long as human beings were forced into political structures that did not conform to their national identities, conflict would result. The solution was obvious, albeit painful. The map of Europe must be redrawn to conform to the underlying structure of national identities. To achieve this might take

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war and revolution in the short term. But once governments in each state reflected this underlying structure, there would be no further cause for conflict.

Thus liberal thought and its variants in Europe was characterised by a reductionist concentration on the character of the domestic political unit, as the key to the explanation of the problem of war and to the elimination of that problem. But liberal thought in Europe did not dominate the field to the exclusion of other streams of thought on war. Indeed, the vehemence with which liberal thinkers denounced what they felt to be the chimera of the balance of power, suggested the degree to which systemic approaches retained their influence, at least on the thinking of policy makers. In America, however, the domination of the liberal approach became far more complete.

**Traditional Emphases in American Political Thought**

In the United States in the nineteenth century, the experience of geographic isolation coalesced with the development of political thought to produce a situation in which thought about war, foreign policy, and international relations flowed squarely within this liberal and reductionist tradition. Until relatively recently, the alternative systemic balance-of-power outlook was largely ignored. This is not to suggest that there was, in fact, a great deal of concern in the United States with these questions. Indeed the American historical experience in the last century was predominantly one in which relations with foreign states were largely confined to the commercial level, with only the occasional intermittent and short-lived exception. Thus foreign policy did not often present those occasions for choice which might have created a body of political speculation on these issues. Certainly there arose few situations which occasioned any questioning, or even detailed defence, of prevailing assumptions.

The long American experience of isolation in the nineteenth century is the great cliché in the history of American foreign policy. We have come to understand that this isolation was by no means complete and total. Its duration was more the result of a fortuitous and unrealised congruence of policy between Britain and the United States during this period than it was of any purely geographical determinism. But whatever the tenuous basis of the experience, it did
allow Americans the luxury of avoiding the difficulties which beset liberal doctrines of international relations in Europe.

To an age in which ideological fissures often seemed to render empathic communication impossible, the difficulties of communication experienced by European governments in the nineteenth century must seem relatively minor. The ordered rituals of diplomatic language, and the cosmopolitan character of the transnational élite responsible for foreign policy in European capitals, minimised misunderstandings. While foreign policy was largely carried on in secret, the character of the élites and their common mode of expression minimised the intrusion of emotional elements into politics. Secrecy and élitism proved not at all incompatible with rationality in foreign policy.

Far from calming diplomatic intercourse with its supposedly pacific sentiments, the development of popular interest in foreign policy questions added an often bellicose influence to foreign policy decisions. The management of the great international crises which punctuated the decades before the First World War was complicated by the intrusion of jingoistic public opinion pressures, which created domestic prestige dangers for governments appearing to pursue moderate policies. Furthermore, it would be difficult to show that the parliamentary democracies pursued more peaceful policies than the monarchies. Indeed, until 1904, the Anglo-French conflict remained one of the most persistent and intense in Europe.

Nor did nationalism play the beneficent role which liberals had anticipated for it. To be sure, many of the conflicts that threatened European peace in the period leading up to the First World War had their roots in the frustrated ambitions of various groups under the political domination of multinational empires in eastern Europe. Yet the emergence of Germany and Italy as unified nation-states could not be accomplished without precipitating international wars. At Versailles in 1918, a conscious attempt was made to follow the liberal prescription for national self-determination by redrawing the map of eastern and central Europe. It soon became apparent that the prescription had little, if any, demonstrable pacific effect.
The socialist view, that states governed by the workers would be peaceful, was also to run into complications as a result of the First World War. The extent to which the workers in each of the European states willingly supported their own capitalists' war effort in 1914 was a profound blow to believers in a transnational and pacific working class.

None of these considerations conclusively disproved liberal or related reductionist assumptions in Europe. They did, however, complicate the problem of explanation, as seen by the proponents of these assumptions. In America, by contrast, liberal assumptions about international relations remained uncomplicated by the difficulties that had arisen in the nineteenth century in Europe. Until the First World War, America remained a museum of pristine liberal assumptions about international relations.

While socialist outlooks did not gain much foothold in America, mainline liberal assumptions about the role of reason, of popular control of governments, and of national self-determination dominated American thought. What little external conflict formed part of the American experience in the nineteenth century was with entities simplistically characterised as primitive, irrational, elitist, or resistant to popular demands for self-determination. There was thus little reason to look beyond obvious manifestations of internal structure, in seeking explanations for international conflict. American nationalism, in the form of the ideology of 'manifest destiny', conveniently was not faced with any opponents who need be considered the moral equals of the United States. Thus whatever conflict resulted could conveniently be put down to the pathological character of the opponents' polities.

The little debate that there was about foreign policy occurred within this tradition of thought. To what extent should, or could, America actively intervene in the historical process to achieve a more pacific world by promoting change in institutional structures in other territories? American policy oscillated between involvement and non-involvement throughout the nineteenth century, with the choice turning largely on the basis of opportunity.

Woodrow Wilson's outlook in the new century combined the classic emphasis on reason and popular control with the prescription for national self-determination. An additional increment was the view
that the application of reason to the settlement of international disputes could be facilitated by the introduction of new international institutions. The character of these institutions was to be judicial. The League of Nations was thus not essentially different from institutional proposals which had been central to the peace movement in Britain and the United States in the decades around the turn of the century. As with its intellectual progenitors, the League was understood to provide the third-party arbiter that could apply the norms of international behaviour in situations where self-interest and emotion might make these norms ambiguous to the parties in conflict. In most cases it was presumed that full disclosure of the facts to world public opinion would provide a just and peaceful solution to disputes, once time had been allowed for emotions to cool. Only rarely would further sanctions prove necessary, and even then economic sanctions would suffice.

The study of international relations in the United States in the period between the world wars concentrated on these legal and institutional mechanisms. The experience of the First World War had vastly expanded the level of interest in the country in foreign policy and related events. The experience had also been responsible for the birth and development of formal academic study in the area, as it had been in Britain. The intellectual principles underlying this study in the United States, however, remained firmly rooted in liberalism.

*The Cold War Period*

The collapse of the League system and the outbreak of the Second World War put the academic study of international relations into crisis, and produced a radical shift in perspective. Realism, which came to dominate the study of international relations in the United States in the years following the Second World War, drew many of its ideas from the earlier systemic tradition, with its emphasis on the notion of a balance of power.

Realism was more a mood than a formal intellectual school. What coherence realism had was as a reaction to the failures of the approaches that had preceded it. Certain emphases were common to realist writers. There was an acceptance of the notion that states existed in an environment that exhibited no political or moral unity. In this anarchic environment, conflict and the possibility of war could
never be eliminated. It could potentially be managed, so as to minimise the likelihood of the eruption of the most catastrophic violence. This management, however, was a never-ending process, with no final solutions envisionable. Any arrangement not firmly rooted in the felt and immediate self-interest of the parties to it must collapse. The appeal to a common interest shared by all parties only masked the private ambitions of some of them.

Beyond this point it is difficult to find unity in the realist approach. For many, realism remained merely a cautionary bias against optimism. In some cases, however, the attempt was made to construct a science of foreign policy. The failure of this attempt to provide convincing conclusions became the basis on which the next generation of academic analysts were to criticise the entire realist outlook. Furthermore, the static and unprogressive moral implications implicit in the realist outlook repelled many in the United States, who refused to give up the long-standing American view that solutions to the problem of war, not merely the management of war, should be the mission of academic study.

The unifying focus that was supplied briefly to the academic study of international relations by the realist approach was not replaced by a single alternative. It was replaced by a host of outlooks. These outlooks, however, had in common a number of characteristics. They shared a reductionist view, in which the solution to international political conflict was to be found in some other sphere, such as domestic politics, economics, or psychology. They reflected a reversion to classic liberal notions of war and its cure. They retained faith in the efficacy of reason, an aspiration to employ reason to create a policy science, and a belief that such a science was possible. It may be said, then, that the modern academic study of international relations in the United States represents a return to traditional American outlooks, after the somewhat alien interlude of realism.

The Return to Tradition in Modern American Thought

One result of the strictures levelled at the realist approach was the development of approaches that attempted to consider in detail the many domestic influences in the foreign policy process, and their role. The 'bureaucratic politics' approach was thus the 'group theory' of domestic politics, so important in the development of the pluralist
tradition in domestic political science, carried over into the realm of foreign policy. Institutional position powerfully constrained behaviour. Institutions operated in terms of routine habitual patterns. Persons holding posts within institutions tended to adopt perspectives congruent with those routines. A given policy result was the outcome of the interplay of these domestic institutions, plus the idiosyncratic and unpredictable outcome of the manoeuvres of the courtiers close to the president seeking to gain his ear.

The focus of attention in such studies inevitably shifted away from the external setting in which policy was imbedded, and toward the internal process by which that policy was formulated. If policy was found wanting, the solution must lie in institutional reform. Procedural change, designed to introduce flexibility and reduce the role of ingrained habit, and change in communication patterns designed to enhance the capacity of the president to make subordinate institutions responsive to his designs: such was the character of the reforms prescribed.

Related approaches shifted the focus of attention further in the direction of the individual. Various approaches suggested that psychological pathology might account in some fashion for international conflict, with the 'frustration-aggression hypothesis' having considerable prominence. More recently, the focus of attention has shifted from the role of pathology in the creation of international tensions and violence to the role of perceptual difficulties experienced by all persons, including those deemed 'normal'. The individual exists in a world which presents him with an immense and diffuse array of stimuli. In order to operate in such a world, he must impose some sort of pattern upon these stimuli. He normally attempts to assimilate events to past experiences and beliefs, discarding or ignoring contrary data. Some measure of psychological closure is thus a normal and necessary part of the process of perception. When we come to deal with the perceptions of the outside world held by statesmen, however, the difficulty arises that this process may inadvertently lead to incorrect perceptions. If policy is based upon incorrect perceptions, it may produce unintended, and possibly disastrous, results. Thus, for example, a policy of vigorous opposition to a putative opponent, incorrectly perceived to be aggressive or expansionist, may create such an opponent.
The remedy for these difficulties is both psychological and bureaucratic. Statesmen must attempt to cultivate an awareness of common misperceptions. They should institutionalise within the bureaucratic structure 'devil's advocates', whose role is to question established wisdom. The policy analysis function should be removed from the hands of those with an interest in particular policies.

Notions of rationality are crucial to this approach. Reason provides the standard on the basis of which correct perceptions may be distinguished from incorrect. Rational closure produces correct perceptions. Irrational closure produces incorrect perceptions. Whether or not such a standard can be reliably discerned except by the historian after the event, however, is open to considerable doubt.

Two schools of thought in the academic study of international relations shifted the focus of attention from political to economic processes. Interdependence analysis followed in the classical liberal tradition of the nineteenth century, with its perception of commerce untrammelled by politics as providing common interests among peoples that would mitigate or eliminate conflict. Dependency theory fell in that radical and Marxist tradition, which also emphasises the primacy of economic processes, but sees them as producing rather than ameliorating conflict.

Interdependence notions have grown more subtle and complex as they have been elaborated in this century. In early forms, one found a sense of automaticity about the process. The autonomous growth of economic and social ties transcending the state would gradually reduce the role of political institutions and the incidence of those conflicts to which such institutions gave rise. This was the thesis of functionalism. Later writers grew more impressed with the role of political institutions. The state would not automatically wither away. Neo-functionalists grew to appreciate its resiliency. National political institutions could only be reduced in importance by an active process involving the creation of supranational bureaucracies and interest groups oriented to achieving their ends by dealing with those bureaucracies. Most of this literature concentrated on western Europe, attempting to explain the successes and failures of the process of integration there.

Some interdependence analysts postulate a process with considerably broader geographic scope than this. The contention here
is that the process of modernisation has changed the character of foreign policy, the means by which it is carried on, and the questions which form the foreign policy agenda. While this process was seen as having made its greatest advance in those countries popularly known as the 'first' and 'second' worlds, it is progressively spreading throughout the Third World. The effect of the process is to raise in importance 'low politics' issues, at the expense of 'high politics', with low politics referring to social and economic questions, and high politics to political and strategic matters. The societal changes that modernisation represents mean that governments increasingly are unable to autonomously manage social and economic matters of concern to their populaces. These questions can only be dealt with successfully by cooperative behaviour with other states. They are, in any case, not questions that are susceptible to resolution by measures involving the threat or use of force. Indeed, such measures will usually prove distinctly counter-productive. There is no assumption that these matters will be resolved harmoniously, in any automatic sense. There is, however, the sense that economic and social processes are progressively reducing the role of force and war in international relations.

This outlook may be criticised on the grounds that the conclusions postulated are dependent upon two rather narrow premises. Interdependence analysts generalise too freely from the west European experience during the Cold War. Certainly that decline in the role of force which seemed then to be apparent in the European context was not reflected in other regions. The Third World increasingly became the locus for violent conflicts of a variety of sorts. Furthermore, even the pacific nature of the European situation since the Second World War may have been due to the strategic condominium exercised in that region by the superpowers during the Cold War. Whether that pacific character will survive the demise of the security structures erected by the superpowers during the Cold War remains to be seen. The revival of ancient national and ethnic conflicts in the post-Cold War world does not augur well.

Dependency theory was developed as a consequence of a number of criticisms that had been levelled at earlier theories in the Marxist tradition. Historians found it difficult to document the Marxists' postulated causal connection between pressure by capitalists and imperial expansion in the nineteenth century. Indeed the opposite
most often seemed to be the case. Governments often dragooned economic interests into supporting expansionist ventures that had been undertaken for political or strategic reasons. It also proved difficult to establish a causal relationship between imperial rivalry and war. The most virulent such rivalries, for example those between Britain and France, and between Britain and Russia at the end of the century, did not prevent the development of ententes when common danger loomed on the continent.

Dependency theory met these criticisms by broadening the object of its analysis. No longer was the notion of imperialism confined to certain economic activities supported by the military power of the state. Any economic activity that produced a 'relational inequality', that 'distorted' the development pattern of the recipient society, was now the object of analysis. Furthermore, dependency theory no longer postulated any coherent relationship between economic activity and war, concentrating instead on the domestic social and economic patterns of the participants in the economic relationship. The ambitious breadth of dependency theory's concepts was not without its cost in vagueness, however. Unless some norm could be found against which the hypothesised distortion of development occurred, the risk followed that any economic relationship between advanced and underdeveloped states would be classified by definition as one of dependency, regardless of its specific character.

Proponents of this approach have recently sought to avoid this critique by 'deconstructing' that complex of ideas based upon the state, which was so privileged in thought about international relations. The residual that remained after the process of deconstruction had occurred bore a remarkable similarity, however, to those transnational economic and cultural relationships that had been emphasised in earlier notions of interdependence and dependency.

What I have suggested as forming a set of common characteristics of the American approach to the study of international relations, is to be found even in the one area which one would expect to escape its influence: strategic thought in the United States. The reductionism apparent elsewhere in American thought had its parallel in strategic thought. The American military tradition assumes that war is an exceptional aberration from the normal, an aberration to be
surmounted and eliminated. Strategic thought in America since the Second World War reflected an extensive confidence in the capability of reason to eliminate war, as well as an attempt to reduce strategic questions to technological, bureaucratic or psychological ones.

American strategic thinking revolved around the concept of deterrence. This notion involved the attempt to dissuade in advance a putative opponent from engaging in a given action by the threat to inflict punishment upon him. The successful deterrent thus avoids the actual use of force. While the notion of deterrence was itself not novel, its centrality within American thought was so. When deterrence was made the central element in strategy, it represented an attempt to remove war from the realm of politics. The perfect deterrent eliminates war through technological means. Other states conform to prescribed codes of behaviour, as a function alone of the passive, organisational posture of the deterrer. General war, at least, is thus eliminated as an element in international politics.

Quite obviously, reliance on deterrence presumes a certain technological determinism, asserting an historically unique character for contemporary weaponry. Deterrence is conceived to turn upon the creation, in the mind of a putative opponent, of a psychological disposition to expect that transgression would inevitably be followed by great punishment. Analysts therefore concentrated upon the technological and organisational requirements of successful deterrence, as well as the range of events that could be deterred. They maintained also that these requirements and this range could be reliably determined by some species of formal, often quantitative, reasoning.

Contemporary Approaches

The bureaucratic politics outlook emphasises the domestic political process, with the external environment playing a residual role. The goal is the improvement of policy outcome. The means is the application of reason to procedures and institutions, so as to reduce incoherence and cross-purposes. The Enlightenment faith in reason as the incremental solvent for social ills is fully evident here.

That complex of ideas which has been referred to here as interdependence follows in the classical liberal tradition, proclaiming
the primacy of commerce in the resolution of international conflict. Economic issues are accepted as being of prime importance by partisans of dependency theory, but the operation of economic forces is seen as producing conflict, rather than as being the means to its resolution. In either guise, the contemporary emphasis on the study of 'international political economy' represents the latest version of nineteenth-century liberal and radical views on war. The deconstructionist project - far from representing a break with the American tradition - only masks an ambition to retain these liberal and radical views in a residually privileged position.

Contemporary American thought in international relations, then, remains dominantly reductionist. The character of that reductionism, furthermore, lies with one or another branch of that liberal tradition which has dominated American thought from the early days of the republic until today.

The most powerful argument against reductionism in international relations is that these approaches largely ignore the unintended consequences that international anarchy produces for the actors within it, whatever their attributes and organisation. Only by assuming that historical progress has, in some sense, transcended this anarchy can one assume that the consequences too have been transcended. To assume that one's own epoch is historically unique, that the 'end of history' has been reached, has often been a great temptation, especially now when faced with the end of that Manichaean conflict that has so dominated international relations for two generations and more. But the very enormity of the assumption must make one shrink from easily accepting it.

In any case, the character of contemporary American international thought is no argument for the view that historical progress has occurred. It is, rather, more of a demonstration of continuity in the history of ideas. Whether or not the world has changed, the underlying premises of American thought have not.
CHAPTER 10

THE COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS
IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM

A.J.R. Groom*

The survival of the Commonwealth of Nations and its influence in international politics were among Tom Millar's primary interests, and the subject of his first serious research work.\(^1\) He rejoiced in the Commonwealth's beneficient role in the evolution of events in South Africa, and hoped that it might flourish beyond the turn of the century, and that Australia's potential republican status might enhance rather than diminish Australia's interest in that connection.

We cannot determine the probable role for the Commonwealth in the late 1990s and beyond unless we examine the likely environment for Commonwealth activity, as well as the potentialities of the Commonwealth itself. Moreover, this environment needs to be conceived at two levels: at the level of background themes and in terms of more specific agenda items. Background themes are less likely to appear on the world leaders' agenda of the moment but, nevertheless, they indicate trends which, unless managed successfully now, will provoke the crises of tomorrow. They can be ignored momentarily but they will not go away. They are 'chickens waiting to come home to roost' for the hapless decision makers of tomorrow.

The first of these themes is that of the arms race. Despite the current amelioration of global political relations, it is unlikely that the military-industrial complexes in the great powers and regional powers will be easily tamed. This is because much military procurement is due not to the action-reaction model of the arms race, but to racing with oneself.

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1 His PhD thesis topic concerned the Commonwealth at the United Nations.
There is not much that the Commonwealth can do about this except generally to facilitate discussion among Commonwealth members in particular about the rules of the game and their awareness of issues. For example, the willingness of South Africa to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty is something which the Commonwealth can welcome and there may be a Commonwealth role in the nuclear relationship between India and Pakistan. However, for the most part, the Commonwealth is best fitted to promote and indeed to initiate supportive techniques for parties in conflict. In the past the Commonwealth countries played a leading part in initiatives such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and that of the Six Presidents and Prime Ministers. But the NAM has lost its way and the Six have terminated their efforts. Despite the recent reactivation of the Security Council, the need for informal intervention is self-evident, and on occasion the Commonwealth cloak may be the one that fits the best, particularly in regional conflicts.

The conventional arms burden of the Third World is very great and, unlike in the developed world, there appears to be no immediate prospect of a 'peace dividend', since many of the arms purchases of Third World countries have been concerned more with regional and domestic conflicts than with the Cold War. Perhaps the only area where there is likely to be a significant peace dividend is in southern Africa, and the Commonwealth may have a role in ensuring that the peace dividend comes about. Clearly, the Commonwealth is not a major forum for arms control and disarmament negotiations, but the Commonwealth as an organisation, or indeed some members of it acting in concert, can be an agent to facilitate arms control and disarmament. Indeed, a proactive political role in regard to regional conflicts is one way in which the Commonwealth can play its part, but it also has begun to develop a peacekeeping and peace observation facility. As such it is part of the global repertoire which encompasses the United Nations (UN) and regional bodies.

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The Commonwealth has several useful attributes in this regard, particularly that it is a non-threatening body. Yet, at the same time, it is also an organisation which has, among its members, a number of sophisticated military powers; such as India, Britain, Pakistan, Australia, Canada, Nigeria, Bangladesh and, indeed, smaller countries which have found a niche in a peacekeeping role, such as Fiji, which is now moving back towards the Commonwealth. Thus, there is a military capacity for peacekeeping and peace observation among Commonwealth members, but there is a further asset, and that is the capacity of the militaries of Commonwealth countries normally to work together in ways that facilitate peacekeeping operations. For example, the use of English as a lingua franca lessens the probabilities of misunderstanding, and the sharing of military culture from the common British past often facilitates coordination, whether through training, standard operating procedures or, indeed, weapons systems. However, there are dangers. The financial burden which accrues to the United Nations through peacekeeping is a very onerous one, and the budget of the Commonwealth Secretariat could easily be overwhelmed even by a single peacekeeping operation of any significance. The Commonwealth will not find a vocation as peacekeeper to the world, but it may find an occasional role in particular circumstances. It therefore needs to think about the possibilities. The military dimension is one that, understandably, the Commonwealth has long eschewed, but this aspect of military cooperation in the Commonwealth might be a useful part of the global repertoire. This is particularly the case where disputes may arise in small countries; for example, there is a range of such disputes in the South Pacific, many of which involve Commonwealth countries. Thus, the Commonwealth might be a most appropriate body, not only to facilitate resolution of such conflicts politically, but also to provide a peacekeeping and a peace observation framework.

Although nuclear weapons grab the headlines and conventional arms are part of the fabric of world trade, one of the most disturbing background changes over recent decades has been the access to effective means of coercion by relatively small groups, which are often not states and whose members feel that they have nothing to lose. Complex, interdependent societies are particularly vulnerable to those who feel they do not belong and who, having little to lose, are prepared therefore to risk all; coercion by such groups is very effective
and difficult either to defeat or to deter. Thus, if we are not to turn Western societies into neo-fascistic armed camps, or garrison states, we must develop strategies of accommodation - mutual accommodation, and not one-sided accommodation. It is here that the Commonwealth may have a real role, since it is organised, it has connections (not only with governments but with many non-governmental organisations) and it is non-threatening. In short, it can try its arm by risking its hand!

Structural violence is something about which we have become more aware in recent years. It is a situation in which groups or individuals are denied the full development of their talents, not by some overtly coercive means, but by the insidious effect of structures. One particular element of this lies in the North-South economic relationship in which the North, willy-nilly, 'exploits' the South, not through overt coercion but through terms of trade and the like. The Commonwealth as a trans-regional body is an appropriate framework in which the fact and incidence of structural violence can be analysed and the problem of its reduction broached, hopefully, in a non-confrontational manner.

Attitudes towards authority are changing. Ascribed authority, or bureaucratic authority, is now no longer enough. Authority comes increasingly from the ability to serve a constituency in a manner acceptable to the person or group in authority and others in that constituency. In short, authority has to be earned. Only then can it be exercised successfully in an efficient manner. Other forms of authority will be and are being challenged. The Commonwealth is not an organisation based on ascribed or hierarchical authority. It is therefore in a good position to act as an examplar, in which legitimised authority is exercised in its own affairs, and as an agent for the promotion of such a process in other forums.

On the other side of the coin from authority lies participation. This is again a ubiquitous factor. Indeed, it could be argued that the end of empire was brought about by the need of many groups to participate fully in global affairs, even if this meant taking a chance on economic development or 'good government'. Many individuals and groups are knocking on the door and they may be inclined to kick it in if it is not opened for them. This can be seen in the demands for more equitable decision-making structures at the global level, particularly in
economic matters, in the demands for recognition by identity groups within states and by those which are transnationally organised. It reflects the next stage in decolonisation. The Commonwealth is a uniquely participatory organisation in the sense that it associates governments and peoples in an ensemble or network of relationships. This is an extremely important asset on which to build and one which has been neglected to date. Indeed, it is probably the reason why the Commonwealth has survived.

There has been a great and understandable reluctance of governments to come to terms with identity politics whether in terms of nation, community, ethnicity, gender or religion. The reasons for this are clear, since such conflicts may well threaten the viability of a state. Yet identity politics, and ethnic politics in particular, will not go away and governments will have to face up to their existence. The Commonwealth does not have a spectacular record in this direction, whether it is concerned with India, Uganda, South Africa, Cyprus or the United Kingdom, not to mention Canada, Fiji and elsewhere. But it is a framework within which these very delicate and important issues can be broached, not perhaps well, but possibly more appropriately than in other forums. For example, how can we engender some serious thought by scholars and practitioners about the issues raised in situations where there is an immigrant majority, not just in Fiji, but also in Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Northern Ireland? And how can we make inherited state boundaries sufficiently permeable to allow the free expression of ethnic identity, whether those boundaries be in Africa (originating in the Congress of Berlin in 1885) or in eastern Europe, with those imposed after the two world wars?

The problem of identity groups is a fundamental one which will throw up many items on the agenda. The reason is clear; to deny an individual or group an expression of some dimension of their identity - whether race, ethnicity, religious community, gender, or whatever - is to deny their full existence as a human being. It is not only a question of *cogito, ergo sum*, but also 'I relate, therefore I am'. A denial of identity is a denial of self, yet a response to that denial may be, in the eyes of the majority, subversion. The Commonwealth is not, but ought to be, leading on such issues. It is one of the most important items on its political agenda in the long run.
The question of identity raises the issue of institutional structures. Too many institutions exist to satisfy institutional needs, rather than the human needs which were at the origin of their creation. The Commonwealth record on keeping together institutional and human needs is relatively good. In some ways it can become the 'Salvation Army' of the international organisational system, in a way that is analogous to that in which the Salvation Army complements the welfare state in many countries. The Commonwealth is also an exemplar in that it bridges the divide between governmental and non-governmental organisations, and it is doing so to increasing effect. We have a major problem, globally, in that many important actors are disenfranchised from formal decision-making processes, although they are important, and the issues cannot properly be broached without their participation. Since the Commonwealth crosses this divide and also the regional divide, it has many assets on which to build. It needs, in the future, to realise them.

The North-South economic divide is one of the fault lines of humanity. It is a fundamental cause of insecurity for the globe, because the rich will not be able to sleep easily in their beds so long as the poor have envy in their hearts and access, as we have seen above, to effective means of coercion. Moreover, the gradual consolidation of two fault lines, those of economic well-being and the white global minority supported by what South Africans used to call 'honorary whites' (that is, the Japanese), creates the conditions for a global political, economic and security earthquake. The Commonwealth record on North-South is quite good. The Commonwealth's role here is to be concerned with the small, the one-off and the exemplar, in the context of the many items that such a theme will throw onto the agenda of the late 1990s.

1960 or thereabouts saw the emergence in its fullness of global society. Whereas a 'world society' was one in which particular events, such as the Second World War, might affect many parts of the world to varying degrees, 'global society' is one in which no part of the world can escape from the phenomenon and, as a consequence, we all hang together - or hang separately. The phenomenon of globalism is therefore likely to throw many items onto the agenda, often in the form of some notion of global 'riot control', but this is merely a palliative. Someone has to start thinking about the implications of these issues in a way that is non-confrontational and non-adversarial,
if we are not to hang separately. The Commonwealth has attributes where a beginning might be made to achieve the analysis of, and then prescription for, a new global society.

One observation that is chilling in regard to these themes is the growing gap between an exponential rate of change in many dimensions and our social, political and economic concepts. In the past, when the rate of change was modest, social, political and economic thought, as well as institutions, had the time to adjust to a changing environment. Now, the rate of change is so fast that adjustment of political, social and economic ideas and their institutional framework has lagged far behind. This makes the juxtaposition of the themes enumerated above all the more worrying. There is a growing proliferation of the means of effective coercion from the nuclear level to that of the terrorist. There are demands for more appropriate authority structures, for more participation, for less structural violence, for more appropriate institutional frameworks, the response to which has been paltry. The world has an intransigent élite, it also has a multidimensional dysfunction and it has emancipated 'victims' who can do something about it. Decision makers are being faced with the consequences of living in exciting times.

The Relevance of the Commonwealth

The themes which have just been set out will give rise to a large number of agenda items for the end of the next decade and beyond. Clearly, it is not the function of the Commonwealth to deal with all of these, or even with many of them. But it does have the capacity, suitably managed, to influence some of them in an ameliorative and imaginatively effective manner. We need, therefore, to take note of the Commonwealth's significant assets.

The Commonwealth has given some evidence that it is an appropriate forum for full and frank discussion between political leaders. Moreover, it seems to be reasonably businesslike in its attitude, without a great deal of posturing, and this is due to its low profile and low-key approach. Discussions are, in the main, in private. This seminar-style problem solving needs to be cherished, nurtured and expanded. It is an invaluable asset.
A second asset that is not perhaps as valued as it ought to be is the flexibility of the Commonwealth. Most bureaucracies, whether they be international organisations or universities, are not very flexible. The Commonwealth has given some indication that it has a degree of flexibility. The quick response to the small and unusual request is something that the Secretariat has managed to achieve in a relatively large number of instances and certainly in contrast to many other international organisations. But it needs, perhaps more self-consciously, to 'set out its stall', to make it clear that it will consider anything, particularly those things that other bodies cannot do well or quickly.

A major asset of the Commonwealth, as mentioned before, is that it is non-threatening. This means that the Commonwealth, as a body overall, is not a forum for adversarial confrontation. It can therefore treat problems on their merits rather than from the perception of the interests of particular parties. In most international organisations discussion starts from the interests of the parties, rather than from the nature of the problem. One of the ways in which the Commonwealth can secure an important niche for itself is if it concentrates on the nature of the problem rather than the position of the parties. Since the Commonwealth is a non-threatening organisation, it might well be able to do this in a manner not open to other bodies and thereby feed into the international debate an important perspective that is otherwise neglected.

The Commonwealth is also a trans-regional organisation. There are very few such organisations (the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organisation of Islamic Countries are two other examples). The Commonwealth 'slices the cake' differently; not universally, not regionally, but trans-regionally. Moreover, this particular asset is not threatened by any sense of exclusivity. Britain can be a member of the Commonwealth and the European Union (EU): Ghana of the Commonwealth and of the Organization of African Unity. There is thus a sufficient degree of representivity for any discussions that take place in Commonwealth forums to be of general interest and relevance. Again, this is an asset which must be cherished.

The Commonwealth is an association of governments and peoples and over 200 international organisations. Reference has been made previously to the importance of the linking of governmental and
non-governmental organisations and actors. It would be a significant step towards the enfranchisement of relevant actors. Where the Commonwealth has not perhaps been able to do this as effectively as it might be in the area of economic relations. There should be a concerted effort to incorporate multinational corporations within the work of the Commonwealth. However, there is an uneven development, as in so many things, in the nature of the pluralistic society of many Commonwealth countries. National and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) may be acceptable to members such as Britain, Canada or Australia, but they are not so well viewed in other member-states of the Commonwealth. But even such members have to deal with international NGOs such as Oxfam, Amnesty International, Greenpeace and the multinational corporations. Commonwealth forums may serve as appropriate meeting places where they can examine the nature of the problems with which they are all concerned.

One further asset of the Commonwealth that needs to be stated is that it can afford to fail. Indeed, the Commonwealth ought to live dangerously. While a quiet life would serve a number of purposes, the items on the agenda which follow are such that it would be irresponsible to live a cosy, but declining existence. In some ways, in recent years, the Commonwealth has been 'playing too close' to established power and governments. This was presumably thought to increase the likely degree of influence. However, 'back-stopping' the major powers of the system on the great issues of the day only gives a semblance of influence. The Commonwealth has the vital asset that it does not matter if it fails: it does not really matter if the Commonwealth no longer exists. This gives the Commonwealth a licence to live dangerously, particularly in the sense of being different. If this role is pursued with prudence, diligence, a sense of responsibility and efficiency, the Commonwealth may find a new relevance.

The Commonwealth Response

How have the Commonwealth's assets been brought to bear upon the range of issues emanating from fundamental trends which characterise contemporary world society? In particular, has the Commonwealth been able to adapt itself to the new political
environment created by the end of the Cold War, the dismantling of 
apartheid in South Africa, and the subsequent end of the struggle for a 
new international economic order? The response of governments, and 
of the Secretariat led by the new Secretary-General Emeka Anyaoku, is 
to be found in the Harare Declaration, which was issued at the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in 
Zimbabwe in 1991, and subsequent attempts to implement it.

The Commonwealth does not have a constitution but it does 
have a shared set of beliefs, customs and practices which from time to 
time are set out in declarations. One such declaration was that of 
Singapore in 1971, which was a defining statement of the then 
Commonwealth. The Harare Declaration likewise sets the 
Commonwealth on course as a value-based organisation. The 
declaration alludes to the Commonwealth's:

... unique strengths and character. These are rooted in its 
shared ideals, common traditions and language, in its 
membership of 1.4 billion people on every continent and major 
ocean, and its ability to fashion a sense of common purpose 
out of diversity.

The declaration refers to the combination of diversity in 
juxtaposition to the shared inheritance in language, culture and the 
rule of law. It asserts that the Commonwealth's way:

... is to seek consensus through consultation and the sharing of 
experience. It is uniquely placed to serve as a model and as a 
catalyst for new forms of friendship and co-operation to all in 
the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations.

The Commonwealth members state their belief '... that 
international peace and order, global economic development and the 
rule of international law are essential to the security and prosperity of 
mankind'. They reaffirm their attachment to the liberty of the 
individual under law, to equal rights and to '... the individual's 
inalienable right to participate by means of free and democratic 
political processes in framing the society in which he or she lives'. 
They state their firm opposition to all forms of racial oppression and 
prejudice and recognise the urgency of economic and social 
development.
The Commonwealth members then set out an action programme which concentrates in a number of areas. First, '... the protection and promotion of the fundamental political values of the Commonwealth': The key to this is:

... democracy, democratic processes and institutions which reflect national circumstances, the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary, just and honest government; fundamental human rights, including equal rights and opportunities for all citizens regardless of race, colour, creed or political belief.

They stress equality for women, universal access to education and the promotion of sustainable development and the alleviation of poverty in the countries of the Commonwealth. Within a framework of respect for human rights, they reiterate their commitment to the protection of the environment, through respect for the principles of sustainable development; their concern to combat drug trafficking and abuse; and more generally their commitment to help small Commonwealth countries in tackling their particular economic and security problems while at the same time supporting the United Nations. In short, the Commonwealth sees its particular niche, and perhaps its comparative advantage, in the promotion of democracy and human rights and in the protection of small states. In addition, they pledge themselves to continue their often innovative and exemplary, if small-scale, programmes in the field of sustainable economic and social development.

While the Secretary-General has recognised that 'one-day democracy' is not good enough in and of itself, nevertheless the Commonwealth has garnered substantial experience in the monitoring of elections, an experience which in both quantitative and qualitative terms, is probably not exceeded in any other international organisation. Missions are sent on the invitation of a government if all political parties in that country agree. Commonwealth observers have no executive or supervisory role, they report to the Secretary-General who circulates their reports to the government concerned, the political parties in that country and other Commonwealth-member governments. The observers are independent and represent only themselves and not governments or the Secretariat. Their purpose is to determine whether the conditions exist for a free expression of will,
and then to assess whether the results broadly reflect the wishes of the people. Observer missions are funded by voluntary contributions and serviced by the Secretariat.

After some unhappy experiences, notably in Uganda, Commonwealth observer missions for elections are now beginning to have the air of a well-oiled machine, to the extent that the Commonwealth has now produced a technical manual on running multi-party elections, including advice on the role of courts, on electoral administration, on the compilation of a voter’s record and, where appropriate, on the role of autonomous electoral commissions. The purpose of this manual is not only to give advice of a technical nature, but also to establish minimum standards. Stephen Chan has sounded a note of caution in that election observers may have a lack of detailed local knowledge causing observers to miss or misunderstand the nuances of intimidation, bribery and vote-related patronage. He also warns against making a fetish of elections, and stresses that a healthy civil society is the real aim. He also points out that observers do not provide security, but require security for their persons if they are to act effectively. A distressing number of electoral observers lost their lives in Cambodia. Chan also raises the issue about whether it is better to have one observer mission or several from other institutions, such as the UN or EU, or ad hoc missions organised by personalities such as the former President Carter. The disadvantage of a single mission is that if it gets it wrong, then this can have significant political repercussions. The disadvantage of several missions is that if they do not share a consensus, then an errant government may be able to play off one finding against another. Nevertheless there can be little doubt that the Commonwealth has pioneered and developed and is a leading organisation for the monitoring of elections. As a non-threatening organisation, it is perhaps particularly acceptable in this role, but it is likewise essential that it maintains minimum standards without fear or favour and that it continues to recognise that elections are but one manifestation of a healthy civil society.

Such a civil society is one in which the exercise of human rights is an uncontroversial daily occurrence and forms an organic part of the political culture. An interesting development in this regard is

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3 Stephen Chan, Towards a Commonwealth Humanitarian Order (University of Kent, paper prepared at the request of the Commonwealth Secretariat, n.d.).
the growth of watch-dog activities on Commonwealth governments by NGOs and their feeding into the political process at CHOGMs through the new mechanism of accrediting NGOs to such meetings. Stephen Chan would like to develop this notion further, and has proposed a Commonwealth human rights commission of independent persons to monitor, warn and advise upon the fulfilment of human rights in Commonwealth countries. He suggests that this commission could meet every two years to consider evidence and to hear governments and to prepare a report which would be available to the next CHOGM as a public document, rather in the manner that Amnesty International publishes a similar report. Since the Commonwealth is now insisting that any new member should fulfil a requirement of basic human rights for its citizens, Chan suggests that the commission could be asked to report upon this. Some would argue that if a government which was found wanting has not mended its ways after an appropriate period, then there might be a case for the suspension and later expulsion of that country from some of the activities of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth took that notable step, over Nigeria, at its 1995 meeting.

Monitoring of the electoral process and promotion of basic human rights have moved the Commonwealth forward into intra-state politics in a manner which in the past would have been unthinkable. But the Commonwealth not only has a role to play in intra-state politics, it also has a role to play in inter-state relations among its members. Here the Secretary-General has a formal entrée in the form of his right of access to heads of government of all Commonwealth members. Unfortunately this does not always extend to effective access to other political leaders in a particular member-state. Nevertheless all the secretaries-general of the Commonwealth have been active in the sphere of conflict management. They are in a position to give early warning of rising disputes and to engage in preventive diplomacy. More recently they have played a major mediatory role in southern Africa in various manners, ranging from the 'Eminent Persons' group to playing a major facilitating role in the emergence of democracy in South Africa. There is perhaps room for the Commonwealth to develop a capacity to undertake training programmes in mediation and facilitation. And while the Commonwealth does not have the financial resources for a large-scale peacekeeping role, nevertheless there is a welcome degree of
compatibility between the armed forces of Commonwealth countries, which has been a godsend for the management of UN peacekeeping activities. The Commonwealth Secretariat could develop a capacity to enhance this degree of compatibility through training programmes and the like. In this manner the Commonwealth may be able to fulfil its vocation as a venue for experiment and as a look-out organisation. The Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC) has for long maintained a roster of experts who are available on short notice to aid Commonwealth governments through their Economic and Legal Advisory Service, formerly known as the Technical Assistance Group. Stephen Chan has suggested that this might serve as a model for a mediation and facilitation service with particular concerns for early-warning and preventive diplomacy, whereby the Secretary-General could call upon not only his colleagues in the Secretariat but a group of outside experts in the field, in order to undertake quiet diplomacy in both intra-state and inter-state conflicts.

Mention of the CFTC is a timely reminder of some of the Commonwealth's past and continuing successes in the field of economic development and technical assistance. Such successes have, of course, been on a small scale, but they have often served as an exemplar for other organisations. Moreover, for small countries the activities of the Commonwealth have often been in the economic and social sphere a life-line for survival. At the international level the Commonwealth has often, through its ministerial meetings played a major role in the dissemination of information and in the movement towards consensus. As former Secretary-General Ramphal has so aptly put it: 'the Commonwealth cannot negotiate for the world but it can help the world to negotiate'. Evidence for this can be found in the Limassol Statement on the Uruguay Round, and in the detailed help that the Commonwealth Secretariat was able to give Commonwealth members in the negotiations of the various Lomé agreements with the EU on the Common Agricultural Policy. The Commonwealth Secretariat has also been able to give advice at the macro level on the restructuring of economies and at the technical level it has played a major role in providing assistance in debt management, where some forty countries now use the Commonwealth Secretariat's computerised system, on the development of capital markets, on exchange rate management, on privatisation and on trade policy. It has also helped
to set up stock markets and given advice on the performance of public enterprises.

Nevertheless the CFTC and other Secretariat bodies in this field require more funds. The 1991 Report of the Secretary-General to the CHOGM pointed out that the four developed countries of the Commonwealth only channel 2.1 per cent of their aid through the CFTC, and an argument was made that this proportion should be doubled in real terms. Nevertheless the CFTC does on an annual basis place 350 experts in the field and provides training for over 4,000 officials. These Commonwealth experts are drawn in a balanced manner from all over the Commonwealth, 25 per cent coming from Africa, 31 per cent from Asia, 36 per cent from the four developed countries and 8 per cent from the Caribbean. This distribution is in stark and happy contrast with the North/South structure of the UN and its specialised agencies, where almost a third of the experts on short-term contracts are drawn from the United Kingdom.

Commonwealth ties have long been buttressed by linkages between universities in the form of cross-fertilisation and mobility among both staff and students, particularly at the postgraduate level. While such ties remain strong, they are diminishing and, particularly at the student level, they are being hampered by the limited degree of concessional rates on student fees offered by the four developed countries of the Commonwealth - Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Indeed, in 1991 only 45 per cent of the foreign students studying in those countries came from the Commonwealth, which was a considerable diminution in comparison with historic figures. The Commonwealth Secretariat itself gives priority to basic education and to higher education and, when faced with declining student numbers at the Limassol CHOGM, heads of state in government accepted that further fee concessions were unlikely, and therefore that they should concentrate on programmes which would emphasise split-site degree programmes, linkage schemes and joint degrees and offshore campuses, as well as the strengthening of facilities in the universities of the developing countries of the Commonwealth. It is also a matter of considerable regret that the Commonwealth of Learning, which has concentrated on distant-learning programmes of vital interest to the small countries of the Commonwealth, has been grossly underfinanced; indeed, it has attracted less than half the funding needed for a fully-fledged programme, the budget for which was set at
some ten million Canadian dollars. In 1994 the funding was provided by only four countries (namely Brunei, Canada, India and Nigeria) to the tune of 94 per cent of the budget. Thus this important and innovative initiative, which has received a considerable amount of praise in the reviews that it has undergone, is floundering financially. Commonwealth countries are therefore missing a golden opportunity to obtain at modest expense a very considerable investment in the future.

In science, another traditional area of Commonwealth activity, the Secretariat has mounted three flagship programmes - in energy, bio-diversity and genetic resources. There is also general support for scientific and technological aspects of environmental planning and for the sustainable management of natural resources, agriculture and technological aids, but once again proved and highly worthwhile programmes are underfinanced.

Nevertheless the Commonwealth Secretariat has been able to undertake, with the blessing of CHOGMs, new programmes in the area of combating drug abuse and drug trafficking, and giving support to countries faced with the phenomenon of money laundering. The small states of the Commonwealth, and indeed some dependent territories, are vulnerable to drug barons and other nefarious characters who use the offshore banking facilities, which are vital to the well-being of the islands, for quasi-illicit practices. Such countries often do not have the technical resources to fight against these illicit practices and the Commonwealth Secretariat is able to provide technical assistance which may enable them to ensure that they are not exploited, and that their banking and other financial facilities follow good practice. All of this suggests that for a very limited increase in the budget of Commonwealth programmes a major increase in value added would be obtained. It seems to be a classic case of 'spoiling the ship for a ha'p'orth of tar'.

One of the unusual features of the Commonwealth as an institution is that it consists of an ensemble of governmental and non-governmental organisations, which act in a mutually supportive manner. Thus when the Commonwealth is in stormy political waters, the continuing smooth operation of functional ties - whether between magistrates, nurses, universities, chambers of commerce, journalists or parliamentarians - serves to provide a safety net for long-term
continuation of ties which are valued by all. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth Secretariat has not had an easy relationship with NGOs, in part because some governments of member-states look somewhat askance at the NGO sector in their own country, which may be very primitive, and also at the transnational and trans-regional activities of NGOs, which are often based in the developed countries of the Commonwealth. It was therefore only in 1993 that an NGO desk was set up in the Secretariat. However, the Commonwealth Foundation has done a great deal of work in this area. It is funded by governments for the purpose of working with NGOs, especially in the social sector, although the commercial and infrastructure activities of the Commonwealth are largely eschewed. The Foundation has been particularly helpful in setting up Commonwealth professional associations whereby centres for such associations in particular countries are funded, in whole or in part, so that the engineers, the journalists, the teachers and other groups can establish professional associations using common facilities, such as meeting rooms, communications systems and secretarial back-up. The success of such professional centres encouraged the Foundation to set up Commonwealth liaison units in over forty member-countries of the Commonwealth whose purpose is to help NGOs of the particular countries. The Commonwealth Foundation spends approximately a third of its funds for such purposes.

However, Commonwealth NGOs are now having a more organic role in the business of the Commonwealth. For example, at the Limassol CHOGM, NGOs were accredited for the first time, and the successful Harare forum of NGOs, which met a few months before the CHOGM in Harare, has now been followed by a second such forum in Wellington, preceding the 1995 CHOGM in Auckland. In Harare, the NGOs were represented by approximately 150 individuals who broached three themes: environmentally sustainable development; collaboration in the Commonwealth; and the role of NGOs in post-apartheid South Africa. The NGOs in Harare also act as a watch-dog on human rights issues.

The second NGO forum was held in Wellington in June 1995. The theme of the forum, which had approximately 150 participants, was 'Out of Poverty'. The participants shared experiences at the grassroots level and sought to develop strategies to alleviate poverty. The forum also tried to develop a code of good policy and practice for
NGOs in Commonwealth contexts. The participants in the forum were chosen from those who had experience at the grass-roots level of socio-economic development and had an ability to be involved not only in the forum but also in the pre-forum and post-forum activities. They were also required to have communications skills, and it was intended that there would be equal representation of males and females, with a preference being given to participants under the age of forty-five, and an acknowledgement of the need to represent disabled and indigenous groups. Initial reaction to the forum has been somewhat disappointing, since many participants were not functioning at full speed after a long journey, and in any case felt an urgent need to 'tell their stories', as one participant put it. Moreover, indigenous groups, led by the Maoris, made something of a take-over bid, which caused unease among other groups. Thus the drafting group found it difficult to work on a consensus basis, which was necessary if the report of their deliberations was to have clout with the political leaders meeting in the CHOGM. The difficulty in arriving at consensus was hardly surprising, since such difficulty is also present in NGO meetings associated with other major conferences, whether on the environment, women, disarmament or other issues. People who participate in NGOs often are strongly motivated for a particular cause, which they do not wish to see under-played, and they therefore find it difficult to act in concert with each other. Nevertheless NGOs are now an organic part of the Commonwealth framework and a great potential source of strength for the Commonwealth, once they have worked out a satisfactory modus operandi.

The Commonwealth continues to be attractive to new members or to returning members, such as Pakistan. A major addition to membership was the readmission of South Africa on 1 June 1994 as the fifty-fourth member of the Commonwealth. Not only has South Africa been a considerable scene of Commonwealth activity, but it has also much to contribute to the future of the Commonwealth - not least on the financial side, where its initial assessment is £350,000. Consideration has been given to the application of Cameroon to join the Commonwealth at CHOGMs in 1991 and 1993. The issue was considered again in 1995 at Auckland, and membership is assured provided that it is able to give the necessary guarantees regarding human rights and a democratic political culture. The case of Mozambique is rather more difficult, since it does not share the British
heritage of all other Commonwealth members, particularly in questions of language and administrative practice, although the Commonwealth has played a major role in helping Mozambique to establish a democratic political process and culture. It is likely, therefore, that Mozambique will not become a full member but rather a 'cousin' of the Commonwealth. The newly-independent state of Eritrea has also expressed an interest in Commonwealth membership. Eritrea was under British control from 1941-52 and English is widely spoken among the élite. It is also possible, in the context of the peace process in Northern Ireland, that the Republic of Ireland might consider rejoining the Commonwealth, which is now a very different institution from that which it left almost fifty years ago.

Conclusion

In a world in which economic and political blocs are being reformed, the existence of a trans-regional, trans-bloc institution and forum is of considerable importance. The Commonwealth cannot tie the world together, but it can create ties across the world, and particularly across the great fault lines of politico-economic blocs. Moreover, it can act as an exemplar, as a catalyst, and as a look-out. In so doing, it is in an advantageous position, because the Commonwealth is situated at the margin of several major groupings, and these margins overlap. It has been observed by the historians of the evolution of civilisation that new ideas, new formulations, new institutions, new spurts in civilisation often come at the margins of great empires. Merely being situated there does not make the Commonwealth a likely engine for such change, but nevertheless its position at the intersecting margins does give it the opportunity to fulfil a useful function in the evolution of contemporary global society. Even if its most likely future is a genteel and gentle decline, it still exhibits an element of vitality and it has the capacity to surprise us yet again. The existence of such an organisation is already an anomaly - may it continue to surprise us in the future!

In a recent intervention in a conference, the Canadian social scientist, Robert Cox, remarked that the characteristics of the world of the 1990s are three-fold. We are in a world that is post-hegemonic; that is, the dominance of the United States is no longer evident, but there remains common ground among different co-existing civilisations.
Secondly, we are in a post-Westphalian society, in which the sovereign state system that emerged in Europe in the seventeenth century has now been supplemented by many other actors, who are able to command resources and the loyalties of millions of people. And finally, we are in a period of post-globalisation in which politics, social questions and economics are now global in the sense discussed above. These three developments have given rise to new sources of conflict and new opportunities. What we need, therefore, is both global mechanisms and decentralisation, a creative schizophrenia, or perhaps to 'have our cake and eat it', so that we can learn adequately to cope with the emerging social forces. Nearly a decade ago the Commonwealth was said to be 'small beer, but a good local brew'. It has the capacity so to remain if it has a mind to do so.
CHAPTER 11
PRISONERS OF WAR AND 'RE-EDUCATION'

Phillip Greville

Historically, the fate of the prisoner of war (POW) has been a function of his or her value in a financial, political or military sense. In classical antiquity, civilisations valued the prisoner as a source of labour, and thus the POW became a slave. With the emergence of feudal societies, the prisoner became valued for the ransom that could be raised. With the rise of the modern state, and the use of professional armies, the value of the prisoner lay not so much in labour or in the money that could be raised but in the POW's value in exchange for one's own soldiers captured and held by the enemy. Typical exchanges took place by numbers and by ranks to ensure reciprocity. In the aftermath of the French Revolution, and the mobilisation of citizen armies, the POW was looked upon as a representative of the people, with common citizens identifying with the POW's fate. At the same time, the introduction of conscripted armies of comparatively unlimited size led to wars being fought to the bitter end, with little or no exchange of POWs until hostilities ended. These two factors led to international agreements which established the ways in which prisoners of war should be treated.

General Henry Wager Halleck, General-in-Chief of the Union Armies, who issued US Army General Order No.100 on 24 April 1863, established the first instance in Western history in which a government of a sovereign nation instituted formal guidelines for its army's conduct towards its enemies. The code had been developed by Professor Lieber of Colombia University and included rules governing the care of captives. These rules were adopted by the governments of Prussia, France and Britain.

The Hague Convention of 1907 summed up the customary law developments of previous centuries. This convention is still in force. It embraces the laws governing belligerency, POWs, the conduct of combat, pacific relations between belligerents, armistices and the occupation of enemy territory.
As a result of experiences in the 1914-18 war, the Geneva Conventions were extended. Three articles are particularly relevant for this essay. The first part of Article 13 states:

Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated ... Likewise, prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.

Article 17 states:

No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.

Article 38 states:

While respecting the individual preferences of every prisoner, the Detaining Power shall encourage the practice of intellectual, educational, and recreational pursuits, sports and games, amongst prisoners, and shall take the measures necessary to ensure the exercise thereof by providing them with adequate premises and necessary equipment.

As the noted English expert on the laws of armed conflict, Professor G.I.A.D. Draper,1 declared, the success of the Geneva Conventions for the protection of prisoners of war is dependent upon the successful working of the consensus system and the effective adherence of the protecting power. He concluded that since 1949 there had been little success. Certainly Marxist societies had their own interpretation of how the laws of armed conflict should be administered. To quote an essay by the Deputy Director of the Henry Dunant Institute in Geneva, Jiri Toman, on 'The Socialist Countries and the Law of Conflict',2 condensing the philosophy of Soviet writers A.I. Poltorak and L.I. Savinskii:

As is known, the laws of armed conflict are governed by two fundamental principles: that of humanity and that of military necessity. According to Marxist philosophy, there are fundamental differences between the 'principle of humanity' in bourgeois society and that in socialist society. Marxism - in the minds of these two authors - places the humanitarian concept on a higher level, having as its objective 'the creation of conditions for the free and harmonious development of mankind' in order to assure 'the promotion of economic, political and moral structures' and 'the construction of a stable peace between peoples, the progressive development of humanity as a whole'. According to the socialist system, as far as the belligerent parties are concerned there is no possible contradiction between the superior principle of humanity and the 'reasons of state' known as 'military necessity'. For the military necessity of a socialist state inevitably serves the higher interest of humanity. Thus, this equality of interests excludes all possibility of contradiction.3

Toman concluded his essay with a statement that clarifies Soviet/Chinese attitudes towards POWs and international humanitarian law generally:

It should be stressed that the application of humanitarian law by socialist countries depends - more so than for other countries - on the evaluation of political interests. If the application of humanitarian law (both with regard to its effects and its propagandist character) is seen as serving the interests of its 'final cause', the Soviet Union would not hesitate to develop, affirm and apply the law. But it would willingly abandon the application of the law if it represents an obstacle to the realization of its fundamental objectives.

Regimes that abuse their own people are not likely to concern themselves with the welfare of their prisoners of war. Stalin repeatedly refused German offers mutually to respect the provisions of the 1907 Hague and the 1929 Geneva conventions, observing:

There are no Russian prisoners of war. The Russian soldier fights on till death. If he chooses to become a prisoner he is automatically excluded from the Russian community.4 This is close to the attitude which the Japanese expressed about their own servicemen becoming prisoners of war, and explains in part the official Japanese attitude to Allied prisoners in the 1939-45 war.

It is worthwhile comparing the fate of Russian POWs in Germany during the first and second world wars. In the 1914-18 war the Russians were incapable of meeting the international standard of maintenance for the Germans they held prisoner. However Germany honoured its international obligations. Of the 2,417,000 Russians captured by the Germans in the 1914-18 war, 70,000 died. In the 1939-45 war, 5,754,000 Soviet citizens were captured by Germany, of whom about 3,500,000 died.5 The disparity speaks for itself.

The Concept of 'Re-education'

Because so many of the wars of the twentieth century have been wars of ideology, the prisoner of war has assumed a new function. The prisoner can be made to appear a visible symbol of, and testimony to, the superiority of the captor's way of life, and system of values. That has implied efforts at 're-education' of POWs, a process which in some hands has been responsible for many conspicuous barbarities. Even when that has not been the case, its justification remains doubtful. This essay will look at the process in two contrasting cases: the experience of Western prisoners of war in Chinese and Korean hands during the Korean War, and the experience of German prisoners of war in some Western hands during Second World War. The first is chosen because the author's personal experience as a prisoner of war was during the Korean War, the second as reflecting the assumptions and practices of some Western governments.6

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5 ibid. p.2
6 The writer was captured in August 1952 and released in September 1953. For the first three months he was held in solitary confinement and under intense interrogation. Eventually lodged in Branch 3 Camp 2, he was asked by a senior US officer to run courses for fellow POWs once 're-education' by Chinese had ceased.
Mao's China: 'Brainwashing'

During the civil war in China, some 'reactionaries' who were captured by Maoist forces were 'eliminated', the remainder were 're-educated', usually in special camps where group study was combined with tension, detention and terrorism to win the enemy soldier to the communist side. This 're-education' or brainwashing process had five major elements: thought reform (hsı-nao); the small group (hsiao-tsu); struggling and struggling against (to-ts'un); the accusation process (tou-cheng); and self-confession (t'an-pai). In 1942, Mao explained the object of thought reform as being to 'punish the past, to warn the future', to 'save men by curing their ills'.

To enable brainwashing to occur, the victim is required to bare his or her life story and to abandon all privacy. The main thrust of subsequent study is to assimilate prescribed ideas, and to demand 'progress in one's attitude'. The techniques include criticism, self-criticism, and mutual criticism of one's present and past thoughts, ideological attitudes and work habits. All this culminates in an admission of guilt - a confession. As meticulous records are maintained, any deviation in answers can be easily detected and summarily punished.

The incessant interplay between harsh conditions, simulated relief, uncertainty, lack of medical assistance, poor food, inadequate clothing, poor hygiene, sleep deprivation and isolation nurtured feelings of guilt in an atmosphere of uncertainty and anxiety, and resulted in serious personal stress. Those who had suffered incarceration in Chinese 'reform' prisons reported how they were relentlessly badgered, cursed, tortured, pleaded with, coached, reviled, and informed on by their cell-mates, to get them to think 'correctly'; they spoke of how much more fanatical and brutal their fellow prisoners had been than their jailers.

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8 Albert D. Biderman, March to Calumny: The Story of American POW's in the Korean War (Macmillan, New York, 1963), pp.142-6, under the sub-heading, 'Were POWs Subjected to "Brainwashing"?'.
Such stress often leads to neurosis, the effects depending on the strength of the individual's psyche and the nature and power of the imposed stress. Pavlovian theory recognises that each person has a tolerance to stress, but once this threshold is passed, uncontrolled excitement intervenes, which is followed by cerebral inhibition. William Sargant believes there are three stages of cerebral inhibition: the equivalence phase, in which humans 'display no more pleasure on receipt of a five pound note that on that of a sixpence'; the paradoxical phase, in which 'the sixpence may give greater pleasure than a thousand pounds' and the ultra-paradoxical phase, in which 'positive conditional patterns suddenly become negative and vice versa'.

Uncontrolled excitement describes the state of mind of a US officer overheard by the author during intense 're-education' in October/November 1952. The last phase explains why so many communists, in the Soviet Union, in its European satellites and in China, went to their execution confessing their phoney guilt.

Much of the methodology used was based upon a simple reading of Pavlov's theories of conditioned and unconditioned reflexes, those relating strictly to survival. However, Pierre Ryckmans (the noted Sinologist, who also writes under the name of Simon Leys) has recently suggested that Mao's 're-education' programmes also owed much to Confucianism:

The Maoist concept of 'Re-education' that was to generate such dreadful excesses at the time of the 'Cultural Revolution' was in fact one of the many unconscious resurgencies of the Confucian mentality which paradoxically permeated the psychological substructure of Maoism.

When the North Koreans invaded South Korea in June 1950, and the United Nations decided to intervene, both the UN Command and the North Koreans declared their intention to apply the Geneva

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10 At the main interrogation centre east of Pyongyang.

Conventions concerning prisoners of war. When the Chinese entered the war late that year, they too made much of their intention to abide by the provisions of the conventions. At the same time they declared that the UN military personnel were all war criminals, and therefore not entitled to be treated in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention applying to prisoners of war. However, should the UN prisoners confess to having been duped by the capitalist states, they would be treated in accordance with the Chinese 'lenient policy'.

The Chaplain of the First Battalion of the Gloucestershire Regiment, S.J. Davies provides us with the thoughts of the Commandant of No.2 Camp about the lenient policy:

So we remind you again of the Lenient Policy of the Chinese People's Volunteers.

We give you warm clothes for the Korean winter; we feed you; we give medical attention and regular inoculations; we look after you; we have even been known to return sick prisoners to your lines; we give you full religious freedom.

... there are a few of you who are real enemies of the peace-loving people, and who wish to organise subversive activities against the camp authorities, and disrupt the study programme ... Our Lenient Policy is not limitless. It cannot be extended for ever to those who are deliberate reactionaries with a hostile attitude towards us.\(^\text{12}\)

This was reinforced by one camp officer, D.P. Wong, who stated to prisoners refusing to take part in political study:

No one knows you are prisoners, no one knows you are here. If you resist us, we shall put you in a deep hole where you will remain for forty years - and your bones will rot. The world will forget you.\(^\text{13}\)

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\(^\text{12}\) S.J. Davies, *In Spite of Dungeons: The Experiences as a Prisoner-of-War in North Korea of the Chaplain to the First Battalion, the Gloucestershire Regiment* (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1954), pp.71-9. The Chinese refused all requests to furnish Bibles or hymn books, would not permit Davies to visit Camp 1, the other-ranks camp in the same valley. After a period of harassment over religious services, Davies was jailed on charges of 'illegal religious activities, and a hostile attitude'.

The first UN prisoners in Korea were captured by the North Koreans and their treatment was uneven, and to no obvious pattern. When the Chinese entered North Korea, they took over the accommodation occupied by UN prisoners and the POWs were forced to march to other locations during a very severe winter. During this period many POWs died from malnutrition, dysentery, pneumonia, frostbite and neglected battle wounds.\(^\text{14}\) When talk of an armistice began in January 1951, the communists set in train some means of coping with the prisoners in their custody. Permanent camps were constructed, and those who showed some sympathy for the communists were sent to Camp 12. The Koreans set up a United States-British War Prisoners Peace Organisation. Prisoners in death camps, such as 'The Caves' or 'The Bean Camp', were offered succour should they join. Once in Camp 12, they were threatened with return to the death camps if they failed to comply with the Koreans' wishes.

Once truce talks began, there was a marked improvement in the treatment of UN POWs, especially in food and accommodation, although neither was lavish. The North Koreans were forced by the Chinese to yield the custody of all POWs. It was during this period (July 1951 to May 1952) that the Chinese introduced compulsory indoctrination, in a drive to 're-educate' the prisoners and to enlist them in the 'peace campaign'.

The Chinese made every effort to identify those who were sympathetic to them, and also those who were strongly anti-communist. The former they labelled 'progressives' and the latter 'reactionaries'. In October 1951, officers were put into a camp of their own, Camp 2, and NCOs labelled as 'reactionaries' were separated from private soldiers and installed in penal camps (such as Branch 2 to Camp 2) where discipline was severe, rations sparse and punishment frequent. All prisoners not in solitary confinement were forced to participate in lectures and protracted discussions. Farrar-Hockley described the lecture programme as follows:

In April 1951 there were nine and a half hours of compulsory study each day, a year later only four hours. It began with 'comrades' like D.P. Wong threatening our student body with severe punishment - a threat that was executed - for those who did not perceive the 'truth'; and ended with 'comrades' like

Sun calling on us to 'keep silent' when we booed an unusually crass statement ... 15

Apart from the tedious lectures and the filling in of long questionnaires, the prisoners had to debate such illuminating issues as:

- Give the reasons for the ever-deepening crisis of world capitalism.
- Is peaceful co-existence between the different social systems possible?
- Why does the Soviet Union head the world peace camp?
- Who is the unjust aggressor in Korea?
- Give Lenin's five contradictions within capitalism.
- Say why the triumph of world socialism is inevitable.
- The strength of the democratic camp, led by the Soviet Union, is incomparably greater than the imperialistic camp, led by the American imperialists.

The texts for these 'lessons' were the standard communist classics such as Lenin's *Left Wing Socialism - An Infantile Disorder*; *One Step Forward - Two Steps Back*; *Right of Nations to Self Determination*; and *Two Tactics of Social Democracy*; together with Stalin's monographs *Anarchism or Socialism*; *The Foundation of Leninism*; and *Political Report to the Fourteenth Congress*; and the anonymous party texts *Outline Political History of the CPSU (B) (Shorter)*; *The Great October Socialist Revolution*; and *The CP of USSR - Guiding Force of Soviet Society*.

Camp libraries 16 were slowly established and, apart from the above texts, the works of American and British fellow-travellers and communists were represented, including *Conspiracy against Peace* by Ralph Parker, *Plot against Peace* by Ivor Montague, and *Further Light on Korea* by D.N. Pritt, QC. American communists were well represented, particularly the works of George Z. Foster, head of the Communist Party in the United States: *Twilight of World Capitalism; Outline Political

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16 Among the propaganda material, there were some treasures. The author, who made a list of the books in his camp library, recalls volumes by Dickens, Hardy, Stevenson, de Maupassant, Lermontov, Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy and Chekhov and others, perhaps from confiscated libraries.
History of the Americas; and History of the Communist Party in the USA. Australasia too was represented, with books such as Yo Banfa by Rewi Alli; Signed with Their Honour by James Aldrich; and Wilfred Burchett's China's Feet Unbound and The Peoples Democracies.

An important part of the library was the newspapers section. The 'progressives' were given a major role to play as mouthpieces for the Chinese peace movement. There were peace committees formed in other-ranks camps (5, 7 and 12) with a Central Committee of the United States-British War Prisoners Peace Organization based in Camp 12. While they lasted the 'peace committees' played a major role in the communist indoctrination campaign, mainly by acting as channels through which propaganda was fed to the prisoners.

The Central Committee published a weekly paper called the Peace Fighters' Chronicle, and 'pamphlets, the preparation of surrender appeals, atrocity stories, and broadcasts for Peking or Pyongyang Radio'. They were also responsible for the production of 'spontaneous' and 'unanimous' appeals and declarations addressed to the Communist-front World Peace Council, the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council. Despite the efforts put into the peace committees by the Chinese they faded out of existence in the course of a year. After that the Chinese relied on the 'progressives' and a system of intimidation to obtain signatures on petitions and appeals. Apart from camp newspapers (such as Peace Dove, Torch, Times, Standard, Globe, Outpost, Daily News, Weekly Courier), Camp 5 published at roughly fortnightly intervals a newspaper called Towards Truth and Peace, which was circulated in most camps. It relied on the communist press of non-communist countries and the press of communist countries, and Chinese radio stations.

The most important paper, however, was the Daily News Release, which was issued to all camps, even Branch 3 in Camp 2. An English-language edition of Hsinhua Newsagency, it contained more up-to-date news than any of the outside papers. It was, of course, ideologically biased and contained many articles from people like

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18 ibid., p.13.
19 Branch 3 Camp 2, described by the UK Ministry of Defence as a penal camp for 'special criminals'. It was remote and transport into the camp very restricted.
Winnington, Burchett and Gaster. There were quite a few 'glossies' from behind the Iron Curtain, such as Hungary, Czech Life, China Pictorial, Soviet Life, but the papers read most avidly were those from Britain and the United States - London Daily Worker, New York Daily, Peoples World (California) and National Guardian (Mid-West USA). The London Daily Worker had some good theatre and film reviews, but above all it contained the cricket and rugby scores.

By some standards (for example, the Japanese in the Second World War), the Chinese regime was reasonable. However the punishments inflicted on prisoners, usually for failing to confess to 'crimes' of political deviation or for failing to disclose information the Chinese wanted about fellow prisoners, were horrifying. One example will suffice: Farrar-Hockley escaped and after his recapture he was taken to an underground cavern and made to strip to the waist. He was then beaten unconscious and revived by lighted cigarettes being applied to his back. His face was covered with a towel, to which ice water was applied. The water eventually seeped through into his nostrils and mouth, which filled with water with every breath. He fainted once more, to be revived by cigarette burns. After three such episodes he was returned to his cell, still bound, and was refused permission to go to the toilet. After seven days, befouled, he was quite relieved to be told, 'You are very lucky, tomorrow you will be shot'. Recalling the incident, Farrar-Hockley wrote, 'Such was my condition that I was glad - grateful that I was going to die a clean death'.

In the United Kingdom there was a concerted effort by communists and communist supporters to exploit the fears, worries, hopes and doubts of the families of POWs in Korea. It was not until December 1951 that the Chinese agreed to exchange lists of prisoners. Before and after that date, information about prisoners provided an opportunity to influence their relatives. In the United Kingdom, relatives were asked 'not only to study Communist articles and reports in search of the information they longed for, but to enrol themselves in the "peace" campaign and assist the various activities under its cover'. Dr Monica Felton and the National Assembly of Women figured prominently in these activities. Dr Felton visited the POW camps in Korea and on her return told audiences that the men wanted

20 Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp.185-7.
21 Treatment of British Prisoners of War in Korea, pp.28-31.
to know what was being done to speed up the end of the war: 'Again and again they asked me to urge their families and friends to take an active part in the movement for peace in their own localities ...'.

Political indoctrination was the prime objective of the Chinese, with two points in mind. First, in order for the POWs to participate in various propaganda activities they had to learn the communist line and the proper jargon. The second point was to facilitate compliance with orders. The number of troops involved in maintaining security of the camps was large: greater than the number of prisoners. However, numbers did not concern the Chinese, because they had plenty of 'volunteers' available. To achieve political indoctrination, on the other hand, required numerous English speakers, and here they were more limited. Only a few captives were ever given the complete treatment; among them were those who 'confessed' to germ warfare. Of the eighty pilots targeted, forty made confessions. Perhaps the Chinese also hoped for permanent conversions to communism.

Although the 'progressives' were active, they never created the force for intimidation or persuasion hoped for by the communists. To remedy this, the Chinese used noted visitors from England, and the left-wing journalist Wilfred Burchett from Australia. The British Ministry of Defence Report details the activities of these collaborators in the POW camps in North Korea. Burchett claimed he gave lectures to prisoners on the Armistice Talks. A fellow journalist, Tibor Méray from Hungary, who worked alongside Burchett, asserts that:

As propagandists they [Burchett and Winnington] were indispensable to the Chinese. It would have been an almost impossible task to find two other English speaking communists of the same calibre.

According to Méray, Burchett worked for Shen Chen-tu, the liaison officer to the Press Corps, whom he briefed, and who told Burchett what he could say or write. Burchett was not very effective when addressing Camp 1, where the Australian and British prisoners told him what they thought of him. He was more effective in person-to-person contact with US fliers in the process of 'confessing'.

22 ibid., p.30.
23 Tibor Méray, My Memories of Wilfred Burchett, translated by Matyas Sarkosi (unpublished manuscript, copy in possession of author).
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How successful was the 're-education' programme? The fact that the Chinese in time gave it up is evidence of its relative failure. However, about 10 per cent of UN POWs may have been affected. Of those affected, some had been communist or socialist prior to capture. The majority of POWs (about 80 per cent) were unaffected by the programme, although they did not violently oppose it. The remaining 10 per cent did strenuously oppose it. The 80 per cent majority used their personal reserves of humour and ridicule to resist indoctrination. Nevertheless, the Korean efforts did find 'treasure trove' in at least one case: George Blake, who went from his brainwashing in one of the camps to a career in espionage for the Soviet cause in Britain.

German Prisoners in Western Hands

Since the Second World War was fought on both sides for ideological reasons, it is not surprising that some kind of 're-education' effort was carried out in most countries with a considerable POW population, notably in Russia, America, Canada, France and Britain. It was not only in communist countries that the intention was to replace one ideology with another. In the West, however, there was no universally agreed definition of democracy that could have been inculcated into the POWs as political dogma. For the Allies, the ideological element in the war had been negative. The fight had been against something felt to be a human and political danger. It was assumed that the German soldier was a carrier of that ideology. The object of most 're-education' was 'denazification', the elimination of a dangerous creed.

National socialism as a totalitarian system had two relevant characteristics. It claimed identity with the people, and it claimed moral justification for violence. It dictated not only behaviour, but thinking. The group ethos had political enforcement: it was

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24 Biderman, March to Calumny, pp.38-68. Biderman also quotes W.O. Reiners, Soviet Indoctrination of German Prisoners of War, 1941-1958 (unpublished), in which he claims 35-45 per cent of German officers and 75 per cent of enlisted men were affected by Soviet 're-education'.

25 See Nigel West, Seven Spies Who Changed the World (Mandarin, London, 1992). Blake, who worked in SIS, was eventually detected and sentenced to 42 years' imprisonment, but was 'sprung' by an Irish fellow-prisoner, and was at the time of writing still living in Russia.
dangerous not to conform. The result was an initially flawless group solidarity, maintained as long as control was effective. For German POWs up to the collapse of the Nazi leadership, patriotism and national socialism were synonymous. At the beginning of 're-education', any kind of discussion thus appeared a frightening novelty to a German POW: conformity was general and willing; non-conformity was rare. Even within POW camps, committed Nazis maintained control through terror and violence.

The British War Office departments concerned with prisoners of war were apolitical, fully absorbed in a heavy administrative task, unconvinced of the value of 're-education', and sensitive about any activity that might prejudice future British prisoners. The drive for 're-education', therefore, came instead from the wartime POW Division (POWD) of the Foreign Office.

POWD classified all German POWs into 'A' or 'White', 'B' or 'Grey' and 'C' or 'Black', the categories being designed to indicate the degree of identification with Nazism. Both British and American authorities considered age was a factor in conformity. The division of POWs into the three groups was largely based on the age of the POW at the time of the National Socialist Party seizure of power in 1933. Group I contained young men up to the age of twenty-six, who had known no other social system. Group II contained men aged between twenty-six and thirty-five. They had put the Nazis into power and were steeped in Nazi doctrines. In their ranks were found the most uncompromising fanatics. They were the carriers of the ideology. Group III were the older men, who still had roots in a social ethic that antedated national socialism. They provided most of the anti-Nazis.

There was also a sub-group of the very youngest prisoners, those between fifteen and eighteen. They only remembered Germany at war, and saw Hitler as the embodiment of the nation. Regardless of age group, about three per cent of the total prisoners were said to be characterised by lack of human empathy, and possessed of no moral convictions.

Gradually the War Office conceded that PPOD could help with problems in the camps, particularly during the postwar period, and moved to administrative cooperation, though never a common aim. Indeed during the revision of the Geneva Convention on the treatment of POWs (1949), the War Office made proposals designed to
'prevent future incursions into its domain' (that is, from the Foreign Office).

Commandants of camps played a decisive role in the psychological life of POWs. To the POW the commandant was the representative of the British character, the British political viewpoint, and the 're-education' programme. Commandants were consciously vetted by War Office in an effort to ensure that no one with anti-German prejudices was selected. They were meant to be apolitical, and tended to have a deep distrust of anything that smacked of ideology. As officers, the commandants understood the relationship of the POW to the discipline they wished to promote, but that restricted their understanding of POWs as people. They generally imputed to the POW their own belief in the inherent virtues of military life.

Only about 10 per cent of commandants accepted the point of 're-education' so completely that they required only material help to get on with it. Ten per cent apparently hindered all attempts at 're-education'. The broad mass of commandants had no great interest in 're-education', but afforded POWD representatives facilities to do their work. What a commandant knew about the social aspects of his charges depended in large measure upon the interpreters. Of these, the non-British ones were mostly Jewish refugees, who impressed many German POWs by their surprising fairmindedness, contrary to the expectations fostered by Nazi doctrine.

Having separated the POWs into 'whites', 'greys' and 'blacks', POWD concentrated upon the 'whites'. They ran courses at Wilton Park, known to some as the 'Institute for Opportunists', 'Dream Palace' or 'Democrat Factory'. A group of German psychiatrists conducted an independent survey of Wilton Park, and concluded that:

It was welcomed by those who were really interested ... The teaching of political, economic, social and juridical subjects was considered most positive and of world-wide scope. It was also considered excellent that the lectures were not only by the staff but by well-known Britishers representing different political opinions. That encouraged reflection and the formation of individual judgement.
According to Henry Faulk:

It was most successful in giving new hope to the depressed activists. Freed from direct military control, administrative cares, the fears of arbitrary transfer, the depressing atmosphere of men weary in body and spirit, the negative pressure of the National Socialists' outlook and the general distrust of the camps, the 'white' activists bloomed in the company of kindred spirits. They felt that they had really 'experienced a bit of democracy' and were part of the world again. They felt 'human' again.26

Australia had only a handful of German POWs: 1637, including merchant seamen. Its 're-education' efforts had little serious political content, and were organised by a 35-year-old German corporal, Dr Erich Stolleis, who had been a lawyer. They concentrated on languages and crafts, along with pre-university courses.27

In the American case during this period, press controversy about Nazi behaviour in POW camps led to public agitation to 'do something' about 're-educating Nazis'. The reaction of the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, reflected Pentagon thinking, where the general belief was that any such programme would be met with suspicion, hostility, and resistance. Instead of being persuaded by the unwelcome teaching, the prisoners were assumed to be likely to turn against it and their captors. However, increasing public demand (including pressure from Mrs Roosevelt) led to officials being told to examine the situation and produce a plan which called for screening the prisoners, separating the recalcitrant from the amenable ones, ignoring the former and starting education courses for the latter, with emphasis on democratic theory and practice.

There were two major obstacles. The first concerned the limitation imposed by the Geneva Convention, and the second the availability of qualified people to implement any programme. The problem of the Geneva Convention was especially complicated, since to force propaganda upon the prisoners was patently illegal and could invite serious retaliation against American POWs in enemy hands.

27 Nevertheless, the system has attracted recent criticisms. See Barbara Winter, Stalag Australia (Angus & Robertson, London and Sydney, 1986), pp.32-5.
Article 17, on the other hand, stated: 'So far as possible, belligerents shall encourage intellectual diversions and sports organised by prisoners of war'. On that rationale, a 're-education' programme was begun on 22 May 1944 under the control of the Provost Marshal General, who created the Prisoner of War Special Projects Division headed by Lt Col Edward Davison (a British-born, nationally known poet, teacher and author). Davison collected a group of leaders and educators of university calibre.

The goal of the programme, as stated by Davison, was that if a large variety of facts could be presented convincingly, perhaps the German prisoners of war might understand and believe historical and ethical truth as conceived by Western civilisation. Thus, the POWs should be provided with films to belie the Nazi charge that America was decadent, inefficient and corrupt; books in the German language stressing the Christian ethic, and revealing the true history of Germany and America; a national German-language prisoner-of-war newspaper, plus individual camp newspapers, to give the anti-Nazi prisoners an opportunity to express their convictions and lead the others away from the Nazi faith; and opportunities for self-education in democracy, history, civics and the English language. Former professors, linguists and writers among the prisoners were invited to renounce their Wehrmacht ranks and assist in the creation of the programme. One task was the establishment of Der Ruf (The Call), a bi-monthly newspaper-magazine, under the editorship of Dr Gustav Rene Hocke, a prize-winning German novelist and Curt Vinz, a former German publisher. Works by German authors banned by the Nazis (Thomas Mann, Carl Zuckmayer, Franz Werfel, Heinrich Heine) were published, followed by German translations of Joseph Conrad, Ernest Hemingway and William Saroyan, and Wendel Wilkie's One World.

POW reaction to the films made of the liberation of the concentration camps varied from disbelief to indifference. However some prisoners were visibly shocked, with a thousand prisoners in one camp burning their German uniforms. At one stage the idea of enlisting German POWs to fight against Japan was considered, but the US Army rejected the idea. However, a Police School and an Administration School (to train selected German POWs for use by the American Military Government in Germany) were established and their graduates used by the American Military Government in due course. Perhaps the most prominent of them was Dr Walter Hallstein,
who was to become Rector of the University of Frankfurt and the President of the European Economic Community in the 1960s.

Conclusions

The aims of the 're-educators' in the East and the West were similar, in that they involved breaking down the existing patterns of thought and imposing new ones in their place. The communists, however, were trying to convert prisoners to a specific set of beliefs, whereas in the West the aim was to break down the stultifying behavioural patterns of national socialism, with a view to developing critical capability in the individuals. The same tools were used by each nation involved: formal courses and discussions, films, books, and camp newspapers. Resources in quantity and quality available to the Americans and the British far exceeded that available to the Chinese and Koreans.

Both East and West classified POWs with the aim of removing the influence of the 'reactionaries' over their fellow countrymen, and using the 'progressives' to influence the uncommitted majority. When the communists failed to obtain sufficient effective 'progressives', they imported into the POW camps foreign visitors to undermine the will of their fellow countrymen and to add impact to some of their propaganda programmes.

The basic difference in spirit was that associated with the physical treatment of POWs. The communists were prepared to use torture, punishment and the deprivation of food, medicine, mail and toilet facilities on those not prepared to 'learn'. The West did not use such methods. The distinction is very important.

Were they nevertheless successful? Official US statistics claimed that, of German POWs, 74 per cent left the United States with an appreciation of the value of democracy, about 33 per cent were definitely anti-Nazi; about 10 per cent were still militantly Nazi, and about 15 per cent, while not strictly Nazi, were not favourably disposed towards the United States. Much of these favourable effects were, however, lessened when the POWs were transferred to France and the United Kingdom, for labour tasks prior to repatriation to
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Germany. The legality of such transfers was doubtful, but the victorious Allies justified them on the basis that the unconditional surrender had annulled both the prisoners' status as POWs and their general rights.

Whatever the level of success of the Western programmes, and despite the good liberal intentions of most of those who ran them, the justifications presented for the inescapable political element in all this ('re-education' as against actual education) still seems questionable. On my personal experience as an ex-prisoner of war and a professional soldier, the precedents set could operate dangerously against future prisoners of war. On the evidence from Bosnia, levels of humanity in the treatment of such captives have not improved much, despite the legal efforts.

28 In France they were employed in the clearance of mines, and many were reported to have been killed in that task.
WORKS WRITTEN OR EDITED BY T.B. MILLAR

Written by T.B. Millar


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Reports


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Gary Klintworth, *China’s Modernisation and the Strategic Implications for the Western Pacific* (Department of Defence [Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Defence Fellowship Report], Canberra, 1987).


Gareth Evans and Paul Dibb, *Australian Paper on Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region* (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1994).
This volume of essays is focused round the subjects on which the late Tom Millar, the founder of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, promoted Australian research.

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Thomas Bruce Millar AO, 1925–1994