JAPAN AS PEACEKEEPER:
Samurai State, or
New Civilian Power?

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ABSTRACT

Japan has joined UN peacekeeping operations at a time of fundamental change and considerable uncertainty in international society. The United States, and other Western allies, had insisted during the Gulf crisis that Japan should contribute personnel, as well as money, to collective efforts to maintain world peace and security, and that its contributions should be 'commensurate' with its economic and financial standing. But far from striding boldly into the ranks of peacekeepers, Japan has hesitantly taken only a half-step forward. Tokyo hopes that it can juggle conflicting demands, on the one hand, for sustaining its security alliance with the United States, absent a Soviet threat, and, on the other, for managing the domestic turmoil and regional anxiety caused by needing to reinterpret its Peace Constitution to send its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) overseas for the first time since World War II. The end of the Cold War removed a buffer between Japan and its history and geography - the reality of living cheek by jowl with China, Korea and Russia; it also exposed Japan more nakedly to the key contemporary challenge - the global contest for economic strength and technological prowess - and, especially, to the import of American perceptions that Japan's success in these fields, rather than any hostile military power, most threatened America's future.

Pressure on Japan during the Gulf crisis had the salutary effect of an overdue 'wake up' call. Japan needed to move more robustly in contributing to international security than it was at that time. But it was insensitive and mistaken to have pushed for the overseas dispatch of the SDF. Instead, Washington, and other allies, should have actively helped Japan find non-military ways to fulfil its international responsibilities which the great majority of Japanese people could fully support, and which would have helped reassure Japan's neighbours of its commitment not to become a military power which threatens other countries.
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>Air Self-Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South-East Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSP</td>
<td>Democratic Socialist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAEG</td>
<td>East Asian Economic Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPC</td>
<td>Foreign Press Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td>Ground Self-Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communication Technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IISS</td>
<td>International Institute for Strategic Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDA</td>
<td>Japan Defense Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDRT</td>
<td>Japan Disaster Relief Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIT</td>
<td>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MITI</td>
<td>Ministry of International Trade and Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSA</td>
<td>Maritime Safety Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>Maritime Self-Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peace-Keeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Self-Defense Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDPJ</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLOC</td>
<td>Sea Line of Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SII</td>
<td>Structural Impediments Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS</td>
<td>United States Ship</td>
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INTRODUCTION:
BEYOND 'CHEQUE-BOOK' DIPLOMACY

Stand up, Japan, the world needs you. By hiding behind a doubtful interpretation of its war-renouncing constitution, say Japan's critics, it is forfeiting any say in shaping the new world order its western partners want to construct. After Japan's role in the Gulf war - a role so retiring as to be embarrassing - they want to see a more assertive political leadership, matching the country's diplomatic weight to its economic muscle. It would be a Japan that stopped saying no.

'Time to Wake Up',

It is hereby reaffirmed that Japan will continue to strictly abide by its basic policy not to become a military power which threatens other countries, by maintaining a strictly defensive posture under the Peace Constitution, and taking account of the past lessons, in discharging its responsibilities more than ever before for the peace and stability of the world.

Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa,
Statement on the Enactment of the International Peace Cooperation Law,

Before joining United Nations' peacekeeping missions, Japan revisited some of the darker recesses of its national psyche to reinterpret its Constitution. Hitherto successive governments and the National Diet had held that the 1947 Constitution, which renounces Japan's sovereign right to belligerency, barred Self-Defense Forces (SDF) from service abroad. The International Peace Cooperation Law,1 passed by the Diet in June 1992, now allows the SDF to join specified peacekeeping activities under the aegis of the United Nations. Thus

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1 The International Peace Cooperation Law is the short title given to the Law concerning Cooperation for UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and Related Activities and the Law to Amend part of the Law related to the Dispatch of Japan
2 Japan as Peacekeeper
the first dispatch of Japanese 'blue berets' to Cambodia late in 1992 conveyed an import extending well beyond the modest nature of the event itself. An era of 'cheque-book' diplomacy had ended for Japan, the postwar merchant state; what had begun, and where it could lead, remained less clear.

Historically, a Japan that stopped saying no had shown the potential to shift course quite sharply. As Susumu Takahashi, professor of political science at the Faculty of Law, the University of Tokyo, cautioned, it would be disastrous if Japan were simply to yield to the impulse of the moment, and 'go in one fell swoop from its old isolationist "peace in one country" to a new interventionist "one-country peace in the world"'. The debate about peacekeeping, he argued, had become one in which certain people were contending that 'the Constitution is out of touch with the times' while citing the need for a change of government and for Japan to play a greater international role. Yet no one explained what they intended to do should they take the reins of power, nor what kind of international role they had in mind. Instead, they were disdainful of 'fuddy-duddies' who dared suggest that there might be more important considerations.2

In contrast to the view of 'Japan's critics', quoted above, many Japanese did not consider the ban on SDF forces serving abroad a 'doubtful' interpretation of the Constitution. Rather, they saw it a key safeguard to ensuring Japan would never again repeat the disastrous military adventures of the 1930s and early 1940s. A Jiji Press poll taken in mid-August 1992, two months after the controversial passage of the peacekeeping bill through the Diet, showed some 60 per cent of respondents considered the bill should be revised or scrapped. Of those opposed to, or dissatisfied with, the law, 39 per cent called for establishing a peacekeeping body that was separate from the SDF; another 18 per cent wanted the law scrapped altogether.3 In Cambodia as the main body of Japanese troops arrived in October

2 Disaster Relief Team (IDRT).
1992, they were met largely by several hundred Japanese journalists, including 40 television crews, many of whom openly expressed their scepticism, if not outright opposition, to the mission.4

Nor did Japan's neighbours, especially China and the Koreas, see themselves as part of 'the world' which the London Economist discovered to be 'needing' a more robust, politically assertive Japan. Key members of a Western alliance, physically and emotionally drained by four decades of constraining an ambitious Soviet Union, no doubt had their reasons for 'welcoming' a Japan which matched its diplomatic weight to its economic muscle, as Washington and London made clear during the Gulf crisis. But in Asia, Japan already stood as an economic and technological giant among dwarfs. Few, if any, felt disconcerted by Japan's 'retiring role' in the Gulf war, nor did they necessarily warm to the prospect of Tokyo filling bigger political and security shoes, especially in the absence of effective countervailing forces in the region.

Nor was the pressure from Washington on Tokyo to provide SDF personnel for the Gulf war without a singular irony. Here was an American President, well supported by the US Congress and the media, professing the hope that the Gulf war would become the 'crucible of a new world order' in which force would be eschewed as a means of settling disputes between nations, while pressing Germany and Japan again to take up arms, even against the wishes of the majority of their peoples. As MIT Professor, John W. Downer, commented in the wake of the Gulf war:

Until the Gulf War, Japan seemed to offer not merely a striking contrast to its previous self but also a major hope, directly and by example, for a more stable, less militarized world order. Now, instead, it is the most ridiculed and reviled of all the nations on the anti-Iraqi side. The civilian-oriented economy, the peace constitution, and the pacifist political constituency are the butt of made-in-America Gulf War jokes, the target of anger and abuse. The Japanese have been told that they will never qualify as a great power in the new world order without awesome firepower, military

4 'Tokyo's troops tiptoe into Cambodia', Sunday Age (Melbourne), 18 October 1992.
forces that can be dispatched abroad, and a snappier responsiveness to U.S. demands.\footnote{1}

Moreover, Western efforts to nudge Japan back into the mainstream of power politics recalled their important role at the turn of the century in helping lay the foundations of modern Japanese military power which, a few decades on, created such carnage and havoc in the Asia-Pacific.

\section*{Slippery Slope to Warrior State}

During the protracted and often bitter debate over the peacekeeping legislation, the phrase 'overseas dispatch of military forces' tended to assume a life of its own. The fiercest supporters of the Constitution not only considered the dispatch of forces abroad as illegal, but also saw any resort to the use of arms, even in self-defence, as opening the flood-gates to unrestrained use of force, and rampant aggression in Asia. Even so, the more significant tension lay with the great majority of Japanese who did not hold extreme views. They supported the Peace Constitution, and the policy of not becoming a military power which threatens other countries, but also recognised the need for Japan to pull its weight in world affairs. Among these, the older generation generally held the stronger views against compromise on the status of the SDF, arguing instead to look for other ways of meeting Japan's obligations. For example, a senior member of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and a former Chief Cabinet Secretary, Masaharu Gotoda, in opposing change, warned that 'a small leak will sink a great ship', and dismissed contrary views as those of 'people ignorant of the flow of history'.\footnote{6} Japan, he and others argued, must never forget how the Japanese army turned a single incident at the Marco Polo Bridge in 1937 into an excuse for a full-scale invasion of China. In contrast, the former LDP Secretary General, Ichiro Ozawa, contended that a greater danger than the spectre of militarism lay in going 'our own righteous way'. By refusing to join peacekeeping, Japan risked becoming isolated from the rest of the world, he argued, as it had in the 1930s leading up to the ruinous Pacific war.\footnote{7}

\footnote{1}{Japan and the U.S. Samurai Spirit', \textit{Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists}, June 1991,p.29.}
\footnote{6}{Issei Hirofumi, 'Clearing the Mist from the Peace-keeping Debate', \textit{Japan Echo}, Vol.XIX, No.3, p.45, quoting \textit{Asahi Shimbun} interview 16 November 1991.}
\footnote{7}{Ibid., quoting \textit{Asahi Shimbun} interview 15 November 1991. See also 'Gulf Crisis and Japan: Generations; Their Attitudes Divided by Whether They Have War}
A suspicion among many Japanese that peacekeeping could become a slippery slope to Japan eventually rejoining the ranks of warrior nations was reinforced by pressures coming especially from Ozawa and his supporters for an even more 'flexible' reinterpretation of the Peace Constitution, allowing Japanese participation in 'collective security'; the 'flip-flop' performance of both the Kaifu and Miyazawa governments in framing and seeking to win passage for legislation in the Diet; and the prominent role of gai-atsu (foreign pressure) in the proceedings. Many were critical that draft bills on peacekeeping were pushed forward, not in the context of a debate about broad principles and careful analysis of Japan's long-term interests, but simply because 'it is expected of us'. Initially, Japan's allies expected Tokyo to provide personnel in the Gulf. Those putting forward the aborted peacekeeping proposal late in 1990 knew that the dispatch of SDF personnel, in whatever capacity, to an American-led collective military operation, endorsed by the UN but not under UN control, could not win approval even within the LDP, let alone in the Diet. Nonetheless, they pressed on to sustain some credibility in Washington and to use the draft as a bargaining chip in the domestic power play.

Tactically, those committed to the passage of some form of peacekeeping legislation needed to encourage: (i) the notion that the Constitution was 'out of touch with the times'; (ii) adequate public support for the use of SDF forces; and (iii) support among non-LDP parties in the Upper House, where the LDP lacked a majority. All three goals were pursued in the vague context of Japan playing an international role 'more commensurate' with its economic standing. Moreover, as the debate brought forward a new coalition between the LDP, the Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party to gain the necessary support for the passage of the bill, it focussed renewed attention on political realignment and reform. Thus the debate agitated four large issues with wide-ranging ramifications for Japanese politics and society: (i) the interpretation of the Peace Constitution; (ii) the status and role of the SDF; (iii) how Japan could best contribute to

international stability and security; and, (iv) the future of Japan's post-Cold War political party structure.

A New Civilian Power?

By early in 1992, the magnitude of what was happening in Japan began to make an impact, if not on the Bush administration, then at least on sections of the American media which earlier during the Gulf crisis had generally accepted the simplistic, short-sighted Economist-type analysis. As coalition forces gathered in the Saudi desert, the New York Times, for example, had joined the general media chorus at that time: peacekeeping required 'nations with worldwide interests, money and manpower, and there aren't many', the paper argued. Americans would tire of their 'lonely and costly role - and ask with rising impatience, when will Bonn and Tokyo start carrying their share?9 Yet by April 1992, as the debate dragged on in Tokyo, the Times had changed its view:

Why is the Bush Administration so wrongheadedly determined to see that Japan send troops overseas for the first time since World War II? Legislation to permit Japanese participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations - like Cambodia and Yugoslavia - has thrown Tokyo politics into needless turmoil and spread anxiety through Asia.

Japan was demonstrating better, non-military ways to fulfil its international responsibilities, the Times added. The alternative, sometimes called 'the new civilian powers' or 'global civilian powers',10 and involving initiatives in foreign aid, the environment and UN projects, pointed toward a humane internationalism to replace the militarised politics of the Cold War. America would do better to

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exploit 'a natural partnership between existing American military power and growing Japanese civilian power'.

The importance of the idea that the interests of both Japan as well as the Asia-Pacific region would be better served were Japan to evolve as a different kind of post-Cold War power came to be obscured partly by a focus on Japan's alleged neurotic pacifism; partly also because Washington, and perhaps especially the Pentagon, did not appear much interested in a 'different kind of ally'. As Professor Downer and others observed, both American and Japanese conservative opinion leaders who support a greater military role for Japan commonly used phases such as *Heiwa-boke* ('peace senility') to imply that Japan had become soft and irresponsible since 1945, out of touch with the real world. These kinds of slurs on the Japanese national character tended to deflect attention from the real underlying concern of many Japanese, namely the fragility of their democratic institutions, and their lack of confidence in the ability of civilians to sustain control over a revitalised and newly assertive military. While many of the old taboos in discussing security affairs came down during the peacekeeping debate, the issue of civilian-military relations remains highly sensitive and generally neglected. Yet behind-scenes civilian-military clashes during the Gulf crisis, and the call in October 1992 by a senior Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) officer for a coup as 'the only way' to purge Japan of corrupt politicians, no matter how extreme and unrepresentative of the army, highlighted the pertinence of the issue.

Needlessly exacerbating divisive domestic issues and placing Japanese democracy under stress at a time of considerable global uncertainty and major readjustment in US-Japan relations seems especially ill-advised. The region, including Japan itself, has looked to the US-Japan alliance as the ultimate means of reassurance that Japan will not again become a major military power which threatens other countries. However, the alliance itself is at risk because the demands of

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12 'Japan and the U.S. Samurai Spirit', p.30
13 See Isori Hirofumi, 'Clearing the Mist ...', pp.44-5.
14 See, for example, 'Gulf Crisis and Japan: Foreign Ministry vs. JDA; Verbal Exchanges on Military Coloring of Co-operation Unit; Drawing up of Law Bill ... "We Have Won!", JDA Says', *Asahi Shimbun*, 29 November 1990, p.2 (US Embassy translation, Tokyo).
sustaining it in a post-Cold War world could prove beyond the capacities of either nation and people. Theirs is no longer an alliance between an hegemonic superpower and a fragile economy, but between two of the world's three great economic powers. Absent the Soviet threat, the basis of US-Japan relations has turned on its head: economic concerns tend now to overshadow shared political and strategic interests. A new dynamic unleashed by the Information Age technological revolution and the rising importance of economic power relative to military capability is pressing heavily on their strategic relations. Efforts to bring security relations into kilter with their greatly changed, and still evolving, economic relationship have largely failed to satisfy important constituencies in both countries at a time when the level of alienation between governments and their general publics seems higher than at any other time in the postwar period.

A Place of Honour

Even so, the real issue is not the spectre of Japanese militarism but whether Japan can find a 'third way' between the kind of merchant, or trading state it has been during the Cold War, and the so-called 'normal' political-military power of contemporary times. Japan seeks acceptance as a 'normal' member of the international community which eschews a sovereign right to belligerency. It seeks a role which sustains domestic cohesion and safeguards its security, including its core societal values; reassures its neighbours of its peaceful intentions; and makes an honourable contribution to the international common good, while earning Japan authority and prestige commensurate with its economic and financial power.

In arguing the case for peacekeeping to a generally dubious public, Japanese officials claimed that since 1948 some 80 nations had provided about 500,000 troops for peacekeeping forces in various parts of the world. 'What is stopping Japan from participating too? ... Can Japan find a place of honour among the nations of the world without cooperating?' That is a question which Japan alone cannot answer, except perhaps in the sense a senior Foreign Ministry official, Kazuo Ogura, posed the issue in the aftermath of the Gulf crisis. Japan had vowed, he noted, 'never to manufacture, maintain, or introduce nuclear weapons, and it has a virtual ban on arms exports'. The Constitution renounced the use of force to solve international disputes.
'Are these principles or ideals that Japan alone should adhere to, regardless of what other countries do? Or are they international goals toward which the countries of the world should strive, even if their achievement is far in the future?' he asked. If the former, Japan should sustain its resolve to pursue them 'even when they cause the Japanese to be shunned by the international community'; if the latter, 'we should formulate them in a way suited to broadcasting them overseas, and we should make aggressive diplomatic efforts to achieve their realization'. What remains to be seen is whether such an aspiring civilian power can find international acceptance, security, and a place of honour in a post-Cold War world.

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CHAPTER 1
THE END OF AN ERA

We are plunging into an era in which the esteem of the international community cannot be won by holding aloft our war-renouncing Constitution, accommodating international demands, and internationalizing the economy. Efforts in such areas served to give us our present peace and prosperity, but now they are inadequate.

Kazuo Ogura,
Director-General,
Cultural Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Tokyo, June 1991.

The Persian Gulf war left the Japanese as a people and nation grappling with issues of war and peace and, ultimately, the kind of power the nation might become in a post-Cold War world. Japan had opposed Iraq's seizure of Kuwait but could neither project a distinctive voice on the issue, as might be expected of a rich, advanced state, nor act purposefully with men and materiel in support of the American-led coalition opposing Iraq, despite its security alliance with the United States. It did eventually emerge as one of the largest contributors to the war's treasury, but many still judged it harshly for acting too slowly. Japan's anguish and inaction had complex roots in a militaristic past and the trauma of World War II, widespread support for its anti-war Constitution enforced in 1947, and lack of broad agreement among those who wield power and shape national strategy as to what role Japan might play in keeping international order and peace in a post-Cold War world. During the crisis, robust American pressure on Japan to provide logistic support and personnel was likened to the role of Commodore Matthew Perry's 'Black Ships'\(^1\) in the 1850s. Then the task was to open Japan to international commerce; now, the knock on the door called upon Japan to take its place among responsible world powers in international security affairs.

The call had sounded for Germany as well as Japan, growing more insistent as coalition forces gathered in the Saudi desert. In the Gulf, President George Bush said, he had caught a 'glimmer of a better future - a new world community brought together by a growing consensus that force cannot be used to settle disputes and that when that consensus is broken, the world will respond'. The United Nations and the world's leading nations were joined in 'orchestrating and sanctioning' collective action against Iraqi aggression. He hoped that history would record the crisis as the 'crucible of the new world order'. In the cause of 'collective security' and 'peacekeeping', others argued, Japan and Germany should amend their Constitutions to be able to send troops abroad again. Peacekeeping required 'nations with worldwide interests, money and manpower, and there aren't many', argued the New York Times. Americans would tire of their 'lonely and costly role - and ask with rising impatience, when will Bonn and Tokyo start carrying their share? Despite its no-war Constitution, Japan spent US$25-30 billion a year on nearly 250,000 men under arms in its Self-Defense Forces, the London Economist commented: 'Better for everyone, including the Japanese, to recognise that they wield military power, and then wield it responsibly'.

Among Japanese, the call to arms clearly proved traumatic and a potentially powerful catalyst for fundamental change. As Yasusuke Murakami of the editorial advisory board of the Japan Echo commented, the Gulf crisis posed a dilemma for all Japanese. While committed under the Constitution to the 'lofty ideal of pacifism', Japan had relied on the United States for protection as it 'devoted itself to the pursuit of economic growth'. This 'convenient two-facedness' had become 'unacceptable internationally, and the Japanese themselves are now finding it awkward to live with in their own minds'. He faulted the Constitution's drafters for lacking 'serious concern about Japan's ability to function as an autonomous nation-state in the usual sense of the term - a country ... able to maintain its own independence and territorial integrity'. Kazuo Ogura, Director General, Cultural Affairs, the Foreign Ministry, counselled 'returning to our starting point after

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12 Japan as Peacekeeper

the Second World War to find the values and ideals in foreign policy that we see as appropriate for the world and that the Japanese people will willingly defend.6

More than any other crisis, the Gulf war aroused a new level of anxiety over the impact of relations with the United States on Japanese society, and in shaping the country's perspective on, and behaviour towards, the outside world. Concern had grown in the context of trade negotiations, especially the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) and the use of Article 301 (Super 301) of the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act.7 Further, as the Soviet threat, the main glue binding the US-Japan alliance, declined, and the search for a new 'glue' in shared ideals and values on the model of the Atlantic alliance intensified, many Japanese felt vulnerable rather than reassured. A stress on 'what we [Americans] as a people [believe]', 'for our values are the link between our past and our future, between our domestic life and our foreign policy, between our power and our purpose'8 resonates strongly in the US heartland and even among allies with a similar cultural heritage, but can leave Japanese feeling culturally harassed by evoking a sense of disorientation. Ogura argued that few countries were more committed to 'democracy, freedom, or market mechanisms' than Japan, but Japanese and Americans 'do not see eye to eye' on where shared values should take Japan-US relations. For many Japanese these values lacked a 'home-grown feeling' and even imparted a 'vaguely unsettling sensation, as if we were wearing a new suit of Western clothes'. So many found difficulty with the idea that 'fighting to the death for these concepts is their natural duty as Japanese'.9

The San Francisco System

The San Francisco System, set in place in September 1951, had sought to keep Japan in the Western camp and the Soviet Union out of East Asia, while reassuring nervous Asia-Pacific neighbours against a revival of Japanese militarism. Facing Hobson's choice, Tokyo

6 Ogura, 'The Rupture between Japan and the United States ...', p.49.
7 Asian Security 1990-91, an annual publication of the Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo, linked the talks with Japanese security; see 'The SII Talks and Japan-US Relations', pp.23-32.
8 'A New World Order', p.v.
9 Ogura, 'The Rupture between Japan and the United States ...', p.49.
capitalised on the Cold War, accepting a continued American military presence in Japan, with its implications for Japanese foreign policy, in return for US security guarantees. The anti-war Constitution helped Tokyo parry American pressures to spend more on its own defence and integrate its forces into American alliance strategy in East Asia, allowing Japan to focus single-mindedly on rebuilding its national economic strength and social cohesion. Four decades later, the impact of global change, including Japan's surging economic and technological strength and the end of the Cold War, found Tokyo under chronic American diplomatic pressures but with much more leverage of its own. The Gulf crisis proffered a singular opportunity for prodding Japan to become a more complete power again. Autonomy of military action was not an offer: 'that right seemed to go beyond what their own publics (Japan and Germany) and anxious neighbors would accept', argued the *New York Times*. Of two options open to Japan, either limiting itself to sending forces abroad only if specifically authorised by the United Nations, or acting only as part of multilateral forces engaged in collective security and peacekeeping operations, the *Times* judged the former 'too restrictive,' the latter 'perhaps the least troublesome approach'.

Thus, calls for Tokyo to fight for as well as finance the cause of collective security were correctly perceived in Japan as a further extension of American postwar policy of co-option and containment rather than a departure. Among Japan's ruling élite, some such as former Chief Cabinet Secretary Masaharu Gotoda, worried that even the dispatch of noncombat personnel abroad could become a slippery slope to 'the path which we took in the past'. Herein lay a concern that Professor Akio Watanabe, University of Tokyo, believed 'any serious Japanese' must address. Compared with a 'reformed and repentant Germany,' integrated into regional institutions such as the European Community and NATO, Japan still posed a fundamental question: 'What is today's Japan like; is it like the old imperial Japan after all postwar re-orientations in political, social and intellectual life?' It is a question for history to determine, Watanabe adds, not for hasty judgements.

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10 'Bonn and Tokyo as Global Police', p.18A.
11 'Gulf Crisis and Japan: Generations; Their Attitudes Divided by Whether They Have War Experience or Not ...', *Asahi Shimbun*, 14 December 1990, p.2.
12 Akio Watanabe, 'Japan's Role in the Changing Northeast Asian Order', *Korean*
addressing this question in policy terms was by continuing with co-option. By 'separating itself off from the general trend of the world, centering on the United States and Britain', and going its own 'righteous' way in the past, Japan ended up in World War II, LDP Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa argued during the Gulf crisis. This was the view that Japan's best years as a secure modern, democratic state have been those during the periods of its alliances, first with Britain and, since 1951, with the United States. Others, however, sharing the kinds of concerns reflected in the comments of Murakami and Ogura quoted above, believe that continuing on the present policy course risks serious domestic division, endangers Japan's core societal values, and hence threatens national security.

What Kind of Japan?

In terms of forcing Japanese to re-examine their traditional concepts of world order, and their place and role in the world, the coming years could prove as wrenching as earlier watershed periods, such as Japan's encounters with Western expansionism in the 16th and 19th centuries. Historically, Japan has tried either to avoid all potentially dangerous international entanglements through adopting isolationist policies, or sought security by 'moving with the powerful' (nagai mono ni makareyo). It entered its first alliance in its modern history in 1902 with the United Kingdom, another island nation on the edge of a disunited, war-torn continent, and, at the time, trying to shore up its declining influence through balance of power politics. Japan's relations with the United States can be divided into three periods. First, from 1853, when Commodore Matthew Perry opened Japan to the world, until late in the 19th century, during which, as a senior Japanese diplomat Hiroshi Kitamura has argued, 'The United States was an unselfish, good-willed teacher of modernization, Japan a hard-working, progressive, and very capable student'. Second, from about 1900, when both teacher and student began to grow increasingly

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suspicious of each other's intentions and longer term goals. While, at first, they contained their rivalry through 'sphere of influence' agreements, by the late 1920s rivalry turned increasingly into confrontation, culminating in the first great Pacific war. Third, the postwar period until the present, during which time the student not only caught up with, but surpassed the teacher in exploiting new technologies for wealth creation in certain key sectors of manufacturing industry. During the first two periods of relations with the United States, pursuing a strategy encapsulated in the slogan 'a wealthy country and a powerful army' (fukoku kyohei), Japan aspired to be a 'normal' great power of those times. In contrast, under the security umbrella of the San Francisco system, Japan has pursued the strategy of a trading, or merchant nation (tsusho kokka or chonin kokka) and, because of its anti-war Constitution, seen itself as a 'special state' (tokushi kokka). However, the Gulf war signalled the unwillingness of the West to accept the continuation of that status, at least in its Cold War form. Another era of Japan's external relations had begun.

A Japan Contributing to the World

As might be expected of a country with a history of isolation, Japan has traditionally shown a Janus face to the world: on the one hand, energetically developing friendly ties; on the other, holding itself relatively aloof and avoiding intimate relations with mentors and allies. One explanation of these traits rests partly on Japan being an isolated archipelago, with rugged topography, which divides the country into several distinct regions. Japanese society, despite its important continuities, tended to be 'fissiparous and turbulent, rent by regional, class and factional conflicts'. Rival fractions looked to the outside world to acquire wealth, military technology, ideas on statecraft, ideology and prestige largely to gain advantage over their domestic opponents, some in recent times looking to the West, others to Asia. Another explanation turns more on a sense of insecurity instilled by Japan's encounters with Western military power, first in the 16th and early 17th centuries, and more especially with Commodore Perry in 1853. Whatever the reason, to buttress their power and promote domestic cohesion, leaders have stressed Japanese uniqueness, racial superiority and social homogeneity and harmony,

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16 Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, pp.1-20.
while projecting the image of a vulnerable, often victimised country, surrounded by aggressive powers, all too ready to subjugate Japan. A defensive 'outsider's' mentality has helped galvanise the population in Japan's seemingly single-minded efforts to catch up with the industrial and technological might of advanced Western powers. But it has also hindered building international goodwill and enhancing Japan's standing and authority in the world. It has tended to leave an impression of an insular people with a 'small-country mentality', and a consuming interest in economic advantage.

Japan had begun exploring its future choices as a world power well before the Gulf crisis. A major thrust of thinking stressed the role of the current technological revolution in moving the world towards an information society (\textit{jojo shakai}). Through the prism of its burgeoning economic and technological prowess, Japan saw itself as a key actor shaping such a world and emerging in the process as a leading culturally oriented industrial state - a creative society nurturing a spirit of voluntarism, altruism and enlightened self-interest.\footnote{See, for example, Masataka Kosaka (ed.), \textit{Japan's Choices: New Globalism and Cultural Orientation in an Industrial State} (Pinter Publishers, London and New York, 1989), being the report of a committee of experts chaired by Professor Kosaka and reporting to the Ministry for International Trade and Industry.} However, the dramatic collapse of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 refocussed thinking more towards the greater pace of political rather than societal change. Recognising not only that the 1990s promised a major shift from Cold War bipolarity towards a new world order but also that its own surging economic power manifestly figured among the causes of global change, Japan began pondering its contribution to the creation of a new world order. By 1988, world GNP had reached about US$20 trillion, with the United States and the European Community (EC) each generating about $5 trillion and Japan about $3 trillion, or, jointly, almost two-thirds of the total. Having become the '3' in this '5:5:3' edifice of like-minded democratic, market states, Japan recognised that it could no longer pursue a 'minor power' foreign policy, claiming 'special circumstances' and 'exemptions' for itself. By continuing to cling to its former ways, Japan's posture would lack the universality required of a major power. And it would fuel 'revisionist thinking' among others that 'Japan is different' and lead...
Japan along the path of xenophobic nationalism and self-imposed isolation from the international community.  

Viewed from Tokyo, a new world order underpinned by trilateral cooperation between the United States, West Europe and Japan would retain a key link with the Cold War era - its 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with the United States. The Treaty would continue to serve primarily to deter Soviet naval and air power in the Pacific as well as conflict in Korea. It would also reinforce Japan's position in resolving its territorial dispute with Moscow and in concluding a peace treaty, while remaining the cornerstone of regional stability and security. The Treaty lent credibility to Japan's stance of not again becoming a major military power, thus facilitating its larger political and economic role among watchful neighbours, and helped sustain the US presence in East Asia - political and economic as well as military. The US-Japan alliance, secured by the Treaty, and reinforced by shared interests and concerns as Pacific powers, gave relations with the United States a special status for Japan compared with West Europe in trilateral affairs. The Treaty committed both powers to cooperate in political and economic matters as well as the military, providing the basis for a global partnership, as underscored during summit talks in Washington DC in September 1989 and in Palm Springs in March 1990.

From Washington's perspective, a 'global partnership', moving beyond 'burden-sharing' to 'responsibility' and 'power-sharing', hinged on Japan's economic and security cooperation. In Palm Springs, President Bush stressed the 'ugliness' that friction in trade, investment, finance and technology, had brought to relations, fuelling frustration and mistrust, with a rising risk of protectionism and economic nationalism. Only concrete results in the Structural Impediments Initiative talks could keep Congress from retaliatory action. As Japan's

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18 Takakazu Kuriyama (Vice-Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time of writing, and subsequently Ambassador to the United States), 'New Directions for Japanese Foreign Policy in the Changing World of the 1990s: Making Active Contributions to the Creation of a New International Order', an English translation from Gaiko Forum, May 1990; for an abridged version of the same article, see Takakazu Kuriyama, 'Assuming Global Responsibilities in a Transition Period', Economic Eye, Vol.11, No.3, Autumn 1990, Tokyo.

largest export market, the United States had borne the brunt of Japan's economic growth in the 1980s, creating a $50 billion trade imbalance. For growing numbers of Americans, Japan's economic muscle loomed as a greater threat than Soviet military power. Yet Japan clung to an underdog mentality, conceding 'too little, too late' on 'fair' trade. With the Gulf crisis, Washington turned to the even more touchy issue of greater equality in security relations. 'We want to see a Japanese flag in the Gulf', a senior Washington official confirmed in August 1990, indicating that meant cargo aircraft and ships, including minesweepers, manned by the Self-Defense Forces. In Tokyo, Ambassador Armacost said many Americans were watching Japan's role in the Gulf closely 'to see if it's in conformity with Japan's status with the rest of the world'. On another occasion, he said the crisis 'tests in a dramatic way the efficacy and effectiveness of our partnership in defending basic interests'.

Washington's requests for support in the Gulf threw Tokyo into turmoil. Under Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita, Japan had begun expounding on the theme of 'a Japan that contributes to the world' in terms senior officials considered appropriate for a country sworn not to use force in resolving international disputes. His proposals focussed on a role in the United Nations' peacekeeping efforts, the promotion of cultural exchange, and the expansion of official development assistance. Outlined before the UN disarmament session in New York in 1988, the peacekeeping role envisaged involvement in providing non-military assistance in areas such as monitoring elections, transport, communications, and medical care. Foreign Ministry officials had joined UN monitoring teams in Afghanistan and Iran-Iraq, and the Ministry had begun work on the kind of organisation Japan would need in order to respond promptly and flexibly with people, money and other non-military resources for

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peacekeeping operations. Now Tokyo found itself facing demands which not only went well beyond anything hitherto contemplated under an American-sponsored Constitution but which were also at odds with numerous Diet resolutions on the dispatch of SDF forces overseas.

True, during the Iran-Iraq war in August 1987, as his term as Prime Minister was ending, Yasuhiro Nakasone had flirted with the idea of sending minesweepers to the Gulf. He argued before the Diet that minesweeping could not be equated with the use of force forbidden by the Constitution. Others disagreed, including Nakasone's chief cabinet secretary, Masaharu Gotoda, who held the view that the SDF constituted the 'minimum number of armed personnel necessary for the defense of the nation' and their mission did not include 'brazenly venturing halfway across the world to remove mines that were laid in the course of a war'. In the event, no minesweepers were sent. Nakasone explained that a Ministry of Foreign Affairs study group had agreed that dispatching ships would not violate the Constitution. However, if a Japanese tanker under escort by a minesweeper should be attacked, the constitutionality of the minesweeper being able to counterattack was in doubt, since Japan itself was not under attack. Under some pressure for a timely contribution, Nakasone also explored the possibility of dispatching patrol boats from the Maritime Safety Agency (MSA), but eventually settled for untied loans to Oman and Jordan, a contribution to the UN peacemaking effort and the cost of upgrading the Gulf's navigation system. As Japan considered its response to the new Gulf war in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Nakasone was among those cautioning against sending minesweepers.

In the months following the Iraqi invasion, Tokyo became embroiled in its most intense and critical moments in security relations with Washington since the 1960 crisis over the revision of the original San Francisco agreement. Then, Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi and US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had jointly pursued changes

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in the 1951 Treaty to eliminate its most humiliating inequalities and, many believed, both ultimately wanted the Constitution changed to allow Japanese forces to fight overseas. Now, in very different circumstances, Washington in effect challenged Tokyo to begin behaving more like a major power than the all-too-familiar 'minor power' pleading 'special circumstances'. It was for Tokyo to decide what support it would give in the Gulf, but Washington left no doubt that the strength of their 'global partnership' could hinge on the kinds of burdens it chose to share. Specifically, security alliances were bonded on battlefields; allies shared risks as well as rewards, fighting together, shedding blood together. It was for Tokyo to find the will and the way of meeting Washington's expectations through a more flexible interpretation of existing constraints or by making necessary legal changes. It also seems likely that Washington wanted to underline for many in Tokyo that they should not over-value any shift that might be taking place in the relative weight of economic compared to military power in world affairs. Military power would remain the ultimate guarantor of peace and security.

Allies Who Fail Us

In the event, the familiar face of Japan largely prevailed. Repeated efforts of key political leaders and officials to get a sizeable Japanese presence into the Gulf in some guise or other to conjure up a new image of a Japan 'contributing to the world' led to embarrassment, even humiliation. Tokyo could only partly temper its failures by writing ever larger cheques, eventually providing more than US$13 billion. It gained little kudos but much scorn, despite providing the largest per capita financial contribution after Saudi Arabia. On the theme of 'allies who fail us', both Japan and Germany (but especially Japan) became the target of anger and abuse in the US Congress, media commentary, and elsewhere. Japan may only have avoided major damage to relations with Washington fortuitously, as a result of the euphoria surrounding the outcome of the war, with its unexpectedly low casualties among American and other coalition forces. Tokyo also helped salvage some face in US defence circles by dispatching, two months after the war ended, six naval vessels, including four minesweepers, crewed by 500 members of Japan's

25 For details of these events, see Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, pp.137-163.
Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), to clear Iraqi mines still blocking Gulf sea-lanes, despite continuing domestic political opposition. While acknowledging the break with precedent, Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu claimed the deployment did not constitute an actual projection of military forces, nor change Japan's ban on sending forces abroad for combat purposes.\(^2\) Tokyo also provided two officials, including an GSDF officer, to take part in a UN Chemical Weapons Inspection Team sent to Iraq.\(^2\)

In seeking to establish a presence in the Gulf, Tokyo tried several approaches, all of which were frustrated. Initially, it focussed on sending a sizeable medical team under a law passed in 1987 for contributing to international disaster relief. No one, it was felt, could find fault with medical support. In its first package of measures, announced on 29 August 1990, the government said it would send 'urgently' a 'medical team of about 100 persons'.\(^2\) However, problems arose over whether medical support could be extended to those injured in fighting or only to refugees; to care for the former, some argued, 'would be supplying the shaft of the spear' and be 'essentially the same as bearing arms'. Volunteer medical 'samurai' also proved hard to find. War zones carried far greater risks than areas hit by natural disasters. By the time an advance team of 17 members, including five doctors, was assembled in mid-September, Washington had some 170,000 personnel in the Gulf. Moreover, arriving in Saudi Arabia on 19 September 1990, the team found itself 'an arrow without a target' (or timely funding from Tokyo). Saudi authorities wanted mobile hospital cars, ambulances and communications equipment rather than medical personnel. While the team prepared a report on the options for the main unit which was never sent, and a few stayed

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on to work among refugees, the initiative 'no one could fault' collapsed in disarray.29

A similar fate befell efforts to draft a new law enabling the dispatch of personnel to the Gulf, and such action in other similar crises. Two points apparently were readily agreed within the Foreign Ministry. First, Japan could not send troops, no matter what 'some circles in the United States expected' or 'what the United States says'. Second, any 'peace cooperation law' should be tied to the United Nations, lest, without a 'UN brake', the dispatch of personnel risked spreading 'without limit'.30 The options were (i) use the SDF by revising the Self-Defense Forces Law; (ii) use the SDF 'on secondment' as the nucleus of a new UN Peace Cooperation Corps, with its own flag, uniforms, command and administration, separate from the Japan Defense Agency (JDA); or (iii), option (ii) with volunteers, excluding the SDF. Prime Minister Kaifu ruled out option (i) as politically untenable in view of the strength of the opposition in the Upper House and the concerns of neighboring Asian nations. His preferred option, (iii), faced serious obstacles, especially with the time constraints on recruiting, training and funding volunteers for the Gulf. That left officials trying to reconcile the dispatch of SDF personnel with past interpretations of the Constitution which had rejected their overseas deployment. Two approaches came to the fore: one sought to minimise the SDFs profile in the UN Peace Cooperation Corps to make it acceptable to the Japanese public and the Diet; the other sought to distinguish between the 'collective self-defence' (shudanteki jieiken) traditionally ruled out by the Constitution, and the deployment of the SDF as part of a UN force which, it was argued, would not violate the Constitution. The former approach, initially advanced by the Foreign Ministry and skillfully parried by the JDA, became mired in confusion; the latter, pressed especially by the then LDP Secretary General Ichiro


Ozawa, also failed in the context of the Gulf, partly because the coalition forces were not a UN force.31

**Peacekeeping and the Constitution**

Not surprisingly, the Japan Defense Agency fought against the establishment of a new organisation which either excluded the SDF or threatened to undercut their role. Initially the JDA reacted negatively towards an SDF role in the Gulf, fearing the danger of becoming a political pawn in events. By September, more aware of its bargaining strengths, its attitude had changed. Even a non-combat role in the Gulf would involve confusion and danger. It was clearly not the place for untrained civilian volunteers. Nor could a volunteer organisation built from scratch quickly acquire, let alone gain the skills to use effectively, the ships and planes the SDF had at its disposal. During the drafting of the bill, led by the Foreign Ministry, the JDA put stiff terms on its cooperation, while repeatedly suggesting that it would be better for the Prime Minister to pursue the 'volunteer formula'. Its demands included the retention of active duty status for SDF personnel attached to the proposed UN Peace Cooperation Corps (the 'concurrent' or 'double duty' formula) and operational control over its ships and planes. Moreover, it wanted constitutional aspects of deploying SDF personnel with the armed forces of other nations, and the arms they might carry and conditions of their use, fully clarified to avoid any confusion in the field, as well as revisions to the SDF Law to cover the position and status of SDF personnel. The confidence with which the JDA pressed its position, underpinned by some singularly robust gai-atsu (foreign pressure), took its toll on civilian officials working on approaches to minimise the SDF profile, sharpening civilian-military sensitivities. Some officials grew worried that 'uniformed groups' were exploiting the crisis for a 'breakthrough' for 'advancing abroad' and that their success in shaping the draft bill that went before the Diet did not reflect well on civilian control over the military.32

31 ibid.
32 'Gulf Crisis and Japan: Foreign Ministry vs. JDA; Verbal Exchanges on Military Coloring of Cooperation Unit; Drawing up of Law Bill..."We Have Won!", JDA Says', Asahi Shimbun, 29 November 1990,p.2 (US Embassy translation, Tokyo).
Growing public opposition to an SDF role in the Gulf and attacks on the draft bill before the Diet, including from among ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) members, forced its abandonment early in November. At the time, the LDP agreed to cooperate with the Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), whose support the government needed to get a bill through the Upper House, to set up an organisation for peacekeeping operations which would exclude the SDF. However, with the end of the Gulf war, the pendulum shifted again. In August 1991, prior to getting Komeito and DSP agreement, the LDP outlined revised plans for a 'UN Peacekeeping Operations Cooperation Corps', with the SDF again at centre stage and a new interpretation of the Constitution to legitimise their role. In the past, a key constitution watchdog, the Cabinet Legislative Bureau, had ruled that the Constitution barred the SDF from participation in UN operations involving 'use of force'. During the debate on the earlier bill in November, the Bureau's Director General, Atsuo Kudo, had advised the Diet that it would be difficult for the SDF to join UN forces, although they could join UN ceasefire observation teams. Now, he said that the SDF, working 'with' but not 'incorporated in' UN peacekeeping forces would not be unconstitutional provided they withdrew in the event of the collapse of a ceasefire agreement.

Shifting attitudes encouraged the LDP to press forward along similar lines to earlier failed efforts. First, the debate had helped establish wider public appreciation that the SDF could best provide the necessary numbers of suitably trained and equipped personnel for international peacekeeping operations. Second, the dispatch of MSDF minesweepers to the Gulf without any serious domestic or regional repercussions strengthened public acceptance of an overseas noncombat role for SDF. Third, foreign pressure had contributed towards greater support for a peacekeeping role. As LDP Diet Affairs Committee Chairman, Seiroku Kajiyama commented: 'Among Japan's international contributions, there has to be a place for peacekeeping operations.'

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operations.\textsuperscript{35} Polls taken during the Gulf crisis in 1990 had indicated a clear majority against sending SDF forces; by July and August 1991, polls suggested a majority, especially among those in their 20s and 30s, now favoured their use in peacekeeping as well as overseas disaster relief missions. A significant opposition remained, favouring a separate peacekeeping force in which SDF retirees, or SDF personnel on special leave, could serve with other volunteers. It held that the participation of SDF personnel carrying light arms in UN peacekeeping operations would signify a first step towards an overseas military role in violation of the Constitution. Nor were the polls without a warning to US interests which might favour an overseas military role for the SDF. In a marked reversal of a similar 1988 survey, polls suggested that the United States had displaced the Soviet Union as the country Japan had most to fear (mirroring an earlier shift in US attitudes towards Japan), with the change most marked among Japanese in their 20s (33 per cent) and 30s (27 per cent), who are generally more influenced by, and favourably disposed towards, American social mores and life styles than their elders.\textsuperscript{36}

The San Francisco System and the Gulf Crisis

Finding a way of coping with the disparate forces in Japanese domestic politics, as well as differing interests in Washington, has been a central challenge for US-Japan security relations. Many Japanese, who welcomed President Truman's directive on disarming and democratising Japan and the Occupation's early crackdown on antidemocratic, militaristic leaders, progressively felt betrayed and alienated by Washington's policy shifts in the late 1940s as US-Soviet conflict sharpened and China fell under communist rule. The view that Japan's disarmament and the anti-war Constitution was a mistake had taken hold in parts of the administration long before Vice-President Richard Nixon bluntly said so in Tokyo in 1953.\textsuperscript{37} In contrast to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur, an architect of the Constitution, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff


had believed so all along, as had small influential political and military factions in Japan. Washington remained ambivalent, especially within the Department of State. In Japan, where a majority of the population had zealously espoused the Constitution, those who sought to tamper with it, as Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi learned in 1960, risked decisive retribution.\footnote{\textit{Politics} (Crane Russak, New York, 1991), p.121. For valuable and contrasting discussions of these events see Kataoka, \textit{The Price of a Constitution}, and Welfield, \textit{An Empire in Eclipse}.}

Thus, the San Francisco System has always been a case of 'same bed, different dreams', with diverse interests making their own cost-benefit calculations in changing circumstances. In Japan, the Pentagon sought a complete ally, able eventually to defend itself, integrated into US global strategy and sharing the burden of East Asian security. For the Pentagon, the US-Japan Security Treaty, signed in September 1951, began laying the groundwork for Japan's return to the ranks of 'normal' allied states; the revised 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was to have taken the process a step further, with the revision of the Constitution the intended next move. The 1951 Treaty deferred to 'disarmament' and 'irresponsible militarism', but stressed Japan's 'inherent right' of 'self-defense' and 'collective defense' as a sovereign nation and future member of the United Nations. As a 'provisional arrangement', the United States agreed to maintain armed forces 'in and about Japan' in the 'expectation' that Japan would itself 'increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense'. The 1960 Treaty deleted references to a 'disarmed' Japan and the danger of 'militarism', stressing instead the two parties' common desire to uphold 'the principle of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law', encourage closer economic cooperation, and promote conditions of economic stability and well-being in their countries. It also affirmed a 'common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East'.\footnote{For texts of both treaties, see Kataoka, \textit{The Price of a Constitution}, pp.225-9.}

Ruling LDP conservatives, who have held power for most of the postwar period, were divided in the 1950s over how best to manage security relations with the United States. Most favoured passive alignment, the position Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida adopted in negotiating the 1951 Security Treaty; a minority supported a closer, though ambivalent, active alliance, such as Kishi had in mind
in the revised 1960 Treaty. In essence, these were rival strategies for rebuilding postwar Japan and restoring its prestige and status as an independent sovereign nation. They differed in the priority they gave to rearmament, in their domestic political constituencies, and in their attitudes towards involvement in US regional political and military strategy. Yoshida did not want Japanese fighting in Korea. He was determined to give priority to rebuilding Japan as an economic and industrial power, believing real equality unattainable as long as an American military presence remained in Japan. Kishi and other like-minded leaders (such as Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama and Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu in the mid-1950s), all Japanese Gaullists at heart, favoured the restoration of Japan as a military power. Their common cause centred on restoring Japan's status as an independent sovereign state. They differed among themselves on the issue of closer integration into US Cold War strategy, but were anti-communist, and some, such as Kishi, were prepared to accept a more active alliance with the US as the price of military power. Ultimately, however, both groups remained captives of the Constitution, the one willingly, the other sought its revision. Most other political interests, including those alienated by US policy shifts towards Japan as the Cold War gained momentum, supported by a majority of the public, through the Constitution, have held a veto on the options of the ruling élite. In the 1960 Treaty crisis, they denounced closer involvement in US military strategy, *de facto* constitutional revision, large-scale rearmament, the introduction of nuclear weapons and overseas service for the SDF, which they feared, not without justification, could emerge among the Treaty's hidden agenda.

Thus a key struggle among ruling conservatives for Japan's soul took place in the politically charged 1950s. An unsettled regional security environment towards the late 1950s, including the Quemoy crisis, helped bring the Kishi Gaullists to the fore. The 1960 Treaty crisis effectively left them stymied, giving the upper hand to exponents of the Yoshida strategy. A Yoshida protege, Hayato Ikeda, took over as Prime Minister. He immediately shifted the focus to economics, stressing a realistic goal of doubling average incomes in 10 years (Japan had exceeded 10 per cent growth rates since the mid-1950s), adopted a policy of passive alignment with the United States, and pursued the 'politics of low posture'. By August 1960, his cabinet had the highest public approval (51 per cent) of any since 1945. First under
Ikeda, who remained Prime Minister until October 1964, and then under Eisaku Sato, another Yoshida disciple (and Kishi's younger brother), until July 1972, the Japanese 'economic miracle' gained pace and Japan's behaviour as a merchant nation or trading state in a cold war, 'samurai' world took shape.

Notwithstanding the problems its extraordinary success brought, especially in commercial relations, the merchant-state strategy flourished with relatively modest adjustment until the Gulf crisis. Partly in response to Washington, but increasingly due to concern over the longterm reliability of US security guarantees after its departure from Vietnam in 1975 and the decline in the relative strength and global competitiveness of the US economy, Tokyo significantly raised its defence spending and developed closer military cooperation with the Pentagon. Thus the merchant-state strategy led Japan to give priority to sustaining the alliance by seeking to appease Washington rather than pursue, as a Kishi Gaullist strategy may well have done, the kind of autonomy needed for exercising a leadership role. Among the first tentative signs that Tokyo had begun searching for a more assertive posture, compatible with maintaining the centrality of US-Japan relations and upholding the Constitution, came with the low-key peacekeeping moves under Takeshita, and the concerns expressed by Vice Foreign Minister Kuriyama, outlined above. Even so, Tokyo's merchant-state reflexes dominated its reaction to the Gulf crisis, as Washington left no doubt that its contribution would be assessed against Japan's economic standing and the 'efficacy and effectiveness' of its partnership in 'defending basic interests'.

Washington should accept some blame for Tokyo's performance, including the initial response late in August, described in the US Congress as 'contemptible tokenism' and 'almost an insult'.\footnote{R.W.Apple Jr, 'Germany and Japan Draw Harsh Attacks On Gulf Crisis Costs', \textit{New York Times}, 13 September 1990, p.1.} Communications between the two administrations seemed remarkably Byzantine for a relationship which is often touted as the 'most important in the world'. Washington dispatched a wish list, including items that \textit{prima facie} would breach the US-imposed Constitution, as if on a 'fishing' expedition. Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force Headquarters claimed that in mid-August it received a direct call requesting support, including an escort for the USS \textit{Midway}, from US
Naval Headquarters in Yokosuka, bypassing official channels. Top-level communications largely bypassed Prime Minister Kaifu, focusing instead on senior LDP leaders, to an extent which would have caused a diplomatic uproar if perpetrated against a major European ally. Pentagon officials stressed the importance of a Japanese flag in the Gulf, including minesweepers, while former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, more sensitive to the political ramifications of Japanese military involvement, suggested Tokyo might assume responsibility for refugees. Washington also played up Japan's greater dependence on Middle East oil imports, largely ignoring the more critical issue of the US economy's greater vulnerability to oil price rises (as the subsequent US recession underscored, while the Japanese economy continued a record five-year period of expansion). The House of Representatives also reacted with more heat than light by adopting a resolution, by 370 to 53, which would begin withdrawing US forces from bases in Japan if Tokyo failed to pay the full cost of stationing them there (encouraging Japanese wits to quip about 'our American mercenaries'). In short, the tactics used to put Tokyo under pressure seemed at odds with the level of understanding and kind of professionalism that might be expected of such an important bilateral relationship.

If Washington deliberately set out to send Tokyo a memorable sharp shock at the high end of the Richter scale, it succeeded. Many raw nerves were exposed during the bureaucratic and political upheaval provoked by the crisis. Civilian-military frictions sharpened, and divisions emerged between and among bureaucrats and politicians, not infrequently on generational lines. Bureaucrats in critical positions, such as the Cabinet Legislative Bureau, came under intense political pressure. If the Legislative Bureau Director General opposes it (a constitutional interpretation permitting the dispatch of SDF personnel) to the end, just dismiss him, one senior LDP leader suggested during discussion in October. (In August 1991, the Director General in question amended his earlier interpretation, p.24

41 'Gulf Crisis and Japan: USFJ Requests MSDF Directly "to Dispatch Mine-Sweepers"; Also Sounds Out on Escort of Midway', Asahi Shimbun, 1 December 1990, p.2 (US Embassy translation, Tokyo).
42 'Gulf Crisis and Japan: Cabinet Legislative Bureau; Even "Arguments" for Dismissing Director General, Heard from within LDP; Strong Wind, Seeking Change in Interpretation of Constitution', Asahi Shimbun, 12 December 1990, p.2 (US Embassy translation, Tokyo).
above.) Tokyo voters also sent Ozawa, who led the charge to get the SDF into the Gulf, a decisive rebuff when his candidate for the Governorship (selected to help cement a much needed LDP/Komeito/DSP alliance to get a majority in the Upper House of the Diet) was resoundingly defeated by the 80-year-old incumbent. Kaifu was another casualty, left dangling in the breeze by President Bush in the aftermath of the crisis (in contrast to Chancellor Kohl, who spoke of revising the German Constitution to permit the use of forces outside NATO).

A 'Normal' State or New Kind of Power?

For Japan, the Gulf crisis clearly signalled the end of an era. Japan as the merchant-state which flourished under American protection during the Cold War, had effectively been targeted by Washington and other key allies as surely as the Imperial Navy's prized battleship, the Yamato, in the final days of World War II. Whether the Gulf-scarred merchant state can limp to port and undergo the kind of 'refit' which might enable it to survive, with its anti-war Constitution largely in tact, in a post-Cold War world, or whether, ultimately, it will meet the Yamato's fate, remains to be seen. The opportunity to pursue a merchant-state strategy was partly a fluke of history. World War II had left the United States with an extraordinary predominance of military and economic power, and the Cold War transformed Japan into a prized strategic asset. Japan exploited the situation brilliantly.

Even so, Japan's success depended on much more than a fluke of history. Global change, triggered especially by the new technologies of the Information Age revolution, has boosted the role of economic power relative to military power, at least in relations between advanced industrial states. A capacity to exploit technological innovation for wealth creation, and take advantage of the internationalisation of production and finance, has grown in importance relative to the role of armed forces, the key component of territorial power. The transnational corporations and financial institutions of the inner core of advanced industrialised states are major global actors, often blunting the effectiveness of governmental control over national economies. All with their own unique vulnerabilities, these great economies need to coordinate their
economic policies to some degree, and military force no longer seems to be an option in their relations with each other. Contradicting realist theory, self-interest would now seem to dictate that they should be 'associates' rather than 'rivals'. In short, geopolitics is giving ground to what is being called 'geo-economics', a game in which Japan has shown a capacity to excel.

CHAPTER 2
GEO-ECONOMICS AND THE SAN FRANCISCO SYSTEM

The end of history will be a very sad time. The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one's life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands.... Perhaps this very prospect of centuries of boredom at the end of history will serve to get history started once again.

Francis Fukuyama,
'The End of History?'¹

Meeting in Tokyo early in 1992, soon after the 50th anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, President Bush and Prime Minister Miyazawa announced one of the most wide-ranging frameworks for cooperation ever put forward by two great powers. The initiative, called the Tokyo Declaration, sought to reinforce and reinvigorate the US-Japan alliance in a rapidly changing, post-Cold War world. 'As the two largest market oriented economies and democracies in the world, Japan and the United States accept a special responsibility for shaping the new era', the declaration asserted, proposing cooperative action in four broad fields: cooperation to promote world peace and prosperity; political and security relations; cooperation on environment, quality of life, and science and technology; and enhancement of mutual understanding and exchanges.² Yet far from instilling fresh confidence in the potential of

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¹ National Interest, Summer 1990, p.21.
their partnership, the occasion did more to reveal its frayed moorings and uncertain future. After beginning badly, with Tokyo feeling slighted first by delays, and then by a sudden, unilateral decision in Washington to shift the focus from the future of their global partnership to bilateral trade issues, the visit turned into a diplomatic disaster. The trade focus served to highlight differences rather than shared interests, and led both parties to complain openly through the media of perceived insults as they bickered unseemingly over commercial matters. Then President Bush's sudden illness at an official banquet provided the vivid and dramatic image of the leader of the world's most powerful nation struggling in the arms of the leader of its main economic competitor. 'It's so symbolic', a former Deputy Minister of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), Naohiro Amaya, commented to TV audiences. 'The superpower America is tired and everyone around it has to take care of it'. A New York Times correspondent concluded, as the visit ended 'on a note of confusion and discord' that, perhaps without realising it, the participants 'had given birth to the first summit meeting between rival superpowers in the post-Cold-War era'.

When set in place four decades earlier, US-Japan security relations rested upon two key pillars: World War II had left the United States with an extraordinary preponderance of economic and military power; and, the Cold War had transformed Japan into a prized strategic asset. One pillar of the relationship began to crumble in the 1970s under the impetus of Japan's remarkable economic and technological achievements; the other collapsed in 1991 with the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union. Now, an occasion intended to get relations back on track after the crisis caused by the Gulf war, instead suggested that the bewildering complexity of change underway in both the international system and their respective societies could even render their relations more vulnerable than most. Notwithstanding the evolution of the San Francisco System since the 1950s, its enduring inequalities are ill-suited to an emerging polycentric, or multipolar world.

It was generally been grounded in disbelief that US-Japan strategic interests could diverge, in growing economic interdependence, and in the continued strong support the alliance enjoys among policy and decision-makers in both Washington and Tokyo. Inertia also played a role: 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it'. In essence this view held that co-option was working, or could be made to work through external and internal pressures, or a combination of the two, such as during SII negotiations and the Gulf crisis. The difficulties were seen as those of a close, complex and basically successful relationship; in fact, one so intertwined that 'divorce is virtually unthinkable'. The glitches tend to be explained in terms of weaknesses or shortcomings in the political system, such as the weak position of former Prime Minister Kaifu, which makes Japan slow to respond in bringing about necessary change. Those holding this view were reassured by developments such as expanding defence and geopolitical cooperation, especially during the 1980s; close cooperation in managing exchange rates since 1985; and agreement under the SII on structural reform. Both Washington and Tokyo tend to blame the media for focussing too much on differences in relations, overlooking the wide-ranging collaboration and tangible mutual benefit.

In recent years, a harsher reading of Japan has led some analysts to be less confident about both the outlook for US-Japan relations as well as Japan's ability to play a constructive role in world affairs. This view, focussing on political, social and institutional arrangements, deems the 'Japan Problem' to be systemic. Domestic arrangements which helped create the 'economic miracle' are viewed as protectionist and, now that Japan is an economic superpower, incompatible with stable US-Japan relations and the functioning of the global market-place. Despite the continuing strength of the more benign view outlined above, this so-called revisionist view gained supporters in Washington as Japan's current account exploded from a deficit of US$11 billion in 1980 to a US$87 billion surplus in 1987 and

5 For example, Ellen L. Frost, For Richer, for Poorer: The New U.S.-Japan Relationship (Council of Foreign Relations, New York, 1987).
7 For example, Edward J. Lincoln, Japan's Unequal Trade (The Brookings Institution,
the US merchandise trade deficit with Japan deteriorated from US$10 billion to US$60 billion in the same period, while the US trade deficit with Japan in high-tech products grew from US$5.6 billion in 1981 to US$22.3 billion in 1988. The imbroglio over the FS-X, Japan's plans to build its own fighter plane, symbolised the growing division within policy and decision-making circles in Washington, with the past Cold War dominance of political and security interests in the process being challenged by trade and technology interests in the administration, Congress and the private sector. The character of the SII talks reflected the rising influence of the latter. Japan's inability to respond to the Gulf crisis with the timely dispatch of personnel further strengthened their position. Moreover, East Asian trade trends could help keep a strong focus on commercial relations. Not only is Washington concerned to 'level playing fields' in Japan, ROK and Taiwan, but trade trends in general are worrying. For example, on current projections, the US is expected to take 34 per cent of ASEAN's exports by 1995, rising from 29 per cent in 1990, whereas Japan's share of ASEAN's exports could fall from 31.5 per cent to 23.7 per cent. At the same time, Japan's exports to ASEAN states will rise while America's share could fall by a quarter. Much of the rising Asian share of the American market stems from Japanese regional investment, which quintupled in Asia in the 1980s while the rate of American investment was almost halved.10

In these circumstances, United States' and Japanese strategic interests could already be diverging, and economic interdependence increasing, rather than containing, the potential for fundamental conflict. In focussing on America's changing strategic interests in a post-Cold War world, some US analyses are giving priority to 'countering the Japanese economic challenge' in order to maintain the United States as the 'premier global power'. In the 1950s and 1960s, Americans were concerned about 'bomber gaps' and 'missile gaps' with the Soviet Union. Now, 'with much greater justification', it is 'concerned with economic performance gaps with Japan'; hence, the

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9 ibid., p.2.
developing 'economic cold war'. Analyses draw attention to the growing concerns of US defence planners in seeking to maintain superiority and autonomy with the globalisation of high-tech industry. Among technology leaders, the United States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Japan, patent applications suggest that only Japan is resisting the general trend towards growing dependence on imported technology. As Japan reduces both areas of technological backwardness and foreign dependence, what use might it make of its technological autonomy? Some analyses leave the question open, arguing that Japan 'can be expected to continue its restrained but increasingly flexible approach towards defence planning and military programs' unless 'rejected by the United States'. Others, believing that Japan will become 'as strong as it wishes, no matter what the U.S. says or does', argue that 'the longer the U.S. defense subsidy for Japan continues, the worse America's chances will be in the economic and technological competition that has already begun'. Washington should end the alliance and 'let Japan be Japan'.

Except for the radical 'let Japan be Japan', the range of US positions on relations with Japan, outlined above, remains within the postwar paradigm of co-opting Japan to the ways of the Western international community and of containing any tendency towards a militarily autonomous Japan. But the balance has shifted significantly in emphasis from co-option to containment, with an increasing concern over 'countering' Japanese economic power. Should relations continue to move in emphasis from cooperation towards confrontation, and that danger remains very real, anti-American sentiment in Japan, already on the rise, cannot help but grow. As Ogura has noted, opinion polls point to two paradoxes. On the one hand, Americans tend to view Japan as an important ally, but their feelings of trust and friendship toward it are weakening; on the other, younger people, the most Americanised in Japan, are feeling more anti-American: something, he argued, which could not be brushed aside simply as a 'backlash at the

14 Ronald A. Morse and Alan Tonelson, 'Let Japan Be Japan', *New York Times*, 4
Geo-economics and the San Francisco System 37

seemingly strong-armed diplomatic pressure from the United States'. Ogura sees the two paradoxes stemming largely from deep-seated frustration in both societies. On the one hand, Americans were not yet psychologically ready for a world in which, for them more than any other people, interdependence meant the beginning of dependence, and they were especially ill-prepared to accept dependence on Japan; on the other, as an economic superpower, Japanese wanted an 'honourable status' in the world community but not through embracing Western, or American, values and ideals at cost to their own values and identity. 'America's way of life is not the world's.'

The importance of culture as a determinant of the way people think and behave tended to be obscured during the Cold War, with its stress on ideological and military confrontation between two superpowers and use of terms like 'the West' and 'the East'. But a nation-state is a culture in the sense that its citizens share a communal identity through a consciousness of common tradition; common values and beliefs embedded in art, literature and religion, and in legal, political and economic systems; and informal mechanisms such as customs, ways of life and symbols that impart special meaning to those belonging to a particular national entity. A nation is a power by virtue of the various political, economic and military resources at its disposal, and its disposition and ability to employ those resources, including military force, to achieve its purposes and goals, especially in getting others to do what they otherwise would not do. Clearly, culture and power intermingle and interact. Culture also has strategic import in the sense that it plays a key role in underpinning the moral resources of a people and nation and in creating national purpose in times of both peace and war. Within states, culture can empower the whole to be greater than the sum of the parts; between states, it can be a dynamic aid or serious impediment to enhancing understanding, close relations and coalition and solidarity building. Culture is bound to play a larger role at all levels of society, sub-national, national and international, in a post-Cold War, Information Age world, in the throes of great social and political change. 'Culture helps shape peoples'...

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hopes, fears, preferences, prejudices, priorities and expectations. It influences judgements about what is worth doing and what can be done. It can be a powerful motivational and inspirational force as well as the source of debilitating conflict and division.

Capitalism versus Capitalism

Even so, the more powerful forces shaping US-Japan relations are economic. With the end of the Cold War, two broad, related issues could be most crucial: (i) the Information Age technological revolution; and (ii) the pivotal role of economic forces in global affairs, focussing on three dominant hemispheric economic powers, the United States, the EC and Japan. The technological dynamic, which is still working itself out, is probably the key. Arguably, it was the real nemesis of communism and the Cold War. It is also the harbinger of the new world order. Whoever best masters the new technologies, commercially (and militarily), should best advance both their power and security. What would seem to matter most for US-Japan relations is whether the two powers can arrive at a new post-Cold War modus vivendi. Initial efforts to find a new balance through burden sharing and a proposed 'global partnership' have generally found both countries, as indicated above, reluctant to address the full range of new issues bearing on their relations.

Three factors seem most likely to impair prospects for stability in US-Japan relations. First, the collapse of the Soviet threat, which provided the main 'glue' binding US-Japan security ties, especially following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1978. The combination of the US defeat in Vietnam in 1975, and the modernisation of Soviet forces in the Pacific in the 1980s, was primarily responsible for closer US-Japan defence and security cooperation in the post-1978 period. Second, the continuing uneven rate of economic growth in the United States and Japan, with, if current trends continue, the latter becoming the larger economy early in the 21st century. Third, the apparent inability of key sectors of the American industry to remain competitive with Japanese industry, either in third countries or in the US home market. These issues must raise serious questions about the durability of close ties, despite economic interdependence and common political and security interests.
Nor is it surprising that recent years have seen a sharper focus on differences between the two economies. With the Cold War over, and geo-economics edging geopolitics off centre stage, the concern has turned towards analyses about how and why American (or Anglo-American) capitalism differs from Japanese (and German, or Continental). Just as the communist 'church' suffered its schisms - so also now capitalism in its turn. Moreover, the debate goes to the heart of the technological challenge. Professor Chalmers Johnson asserts that 'Japan has invented and put together the institutions of capitalism in new ways, ways that neither Adam Smith nor Karl Marx would recognize and understand'. Others, arguing from a neo-Schumpeterian perspective, note that the 'institutions of capitalism historically have been formed and reformed in response to successive changes in technoeconomic paradigm ...' Contemporary Japan, 'like 19th century Great Britain and the US in the post-World War II period (building on the mass production model of Henry Ford), has developed a new "national innovation system" or, more broadly, "regime of accumulation" [based on information and communication technologies (ICT)] that is competitively superior to the forms of capitalism still prevalent elsewhere'.

Many Japanese, not surprisingly, agree with this latter judgement. It is the nature of a techno-economic paradigm that raises difficulties for any incumbent leader to respond to the challenge of a new, superior model. The paradigm involves a combination of interrelated product and process, technical, organisational and managerial innovations, which results in a quantum jump in potential productivity for all or most of the economy, and opens up an


unusually wide range of investment and profit opportunities. Moreover, these innovations require adaptations in the social, political and institutional fabric of society. Since the social and political institutions built around, say, the 'Fordist' paradigm, are 'prone to inertia and capture by vested interests, such adaptations usually lag behind the pace of technological change, often engendering tensions and perhaps socio-political crisis'. Moreover, societies do not respond uniformly to paradigm shifts.19

Differences between American and Japanese capitalism certainly seem quite deeply rooted in their respective national values and cultures (and in the political and institutional structures which embody those values). MIT economist, Lester Thurow, contrasts Japan's 'producer' capitalism, as characterised by 'belonging, building, conquering, power and esteem', with the American 'consumer' kind, in which 'every individual's goal is to maximize the net present value of his/her lifetime consumption'. He adds that the goals Japanese firms seemingly pursue are 'all human goals as important as maximising consumption'.20 Princeton economist, Alan Blinder, paraphrasing Abraham Lincoln, comments that 'a well-run Japanese corporation is of, by, and for its people'.21 A former US Treasury official, Stephen Cohen, uses 'cowboys' and 'samurai' as metaphors in contrasting the individualistic, self-interested and socially divisive character of the US economic performance between 1969 and 1989 with Japan's 'minimization of divisiveness and interest group politics', which, he comments was 'an ideal strategy for rebuilding the strong industrial base after the Second World War'. Cohen noted the 'fierce loyalty to group institutions and self-identity derived through participation in group activities'.22 Other samurai qualities which seem pertinent include a conviction that success is based on 'singleminded seriousness', failure on 'whimsicality'. What really matters is the depth of devotion and concentration brought to bear on action - traits that help make everyone a 'specialist' in the modern work-place with such

19 ibid., p.3.
20 Thurow, Head to Head, p.118.
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concepts as 'total quality control' (TQC) and 'zero-defects management'.

Viewed from this perspective, the paradox Japan posed as
merchant state has a vital inner logic. Its odd combination of strength
and weakness, resilience and fragility, superiority and subjection,
purpose and apparent aimlessness, makes sense in a people seeking to
blot out a painful past period of history while retaining their roots,
determined to be modern yet still Japanese, and striving for prosperity
and security while rebuilding their self-assurance and pride as a
people and nation. The strategy has been much more than a path to
prosperity. It has also engaged the task of inspiring a people in the
aftermath of traumatic defeat, and lacking the full range of normal
paraphernalia of the nation state. It has drawn on values and ideals
from Japan's rich legacy of Shinto, Buddhist, Confucian and Taoist
thought, which exerted great influence on the Japanese mind over
centuries under samurai rule. Former MITI Vice-Minister, Naohiro
Amaya, likened Japan's position in the world to that of the merchant
class in the Tokugawa period (1603-1868), manoeuvring adroitly in a
samurai-dominated society to emerge as the real power behind the
sword. Nor should the merchant state's martial character be
surprising: 'The strong military presence marking internal Japanese
history has imprinted certain elements of the warrior ethos onto
important areas of Japanese thought and society ...' Millions of
Japanese were more than willing to sacrifice for their company.
Foreigners may view Japan's behaviour as 'docile' and 'reactive, not
proactive'; its diplomacy as 'value free', even 'immoral'. But, as
Tetsuya Kataoka argues, Japan 'pursues success according to its own
definition: in commerce, manufacturing, finance, and high tech'. Far
from being 'reactive or destitute of ambition', Japan inspired 'awe in
America' and compelled Europe 'to integrate itself as a way of

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23 For example, 'Questing for the Best', Business Week, 25 October 1991, pp.1-24,
discussing the 'close-to-perfection standard set by Japan after 40 years of dogged
effort'; also, Peter F. Drucker, 'Japan: New Strategies for a New Reality', Wall Street

24 Thomas Cleary, The Japanese Art of War: Understanding the Culture of Strategy
(Shambhala, Boston, 1991).

25 Kenneth B. Pyle, 'Japan and the Twenty-first Century', in Takashi Inoguchi and
Daniel I. Okimoto (eds), The Political Economy of Japan, Volume 2, The Changing

26 Cleary, The Japanese Art of War..., p.5.
competing'. Japan's 'industrial machine had trounced Pittsburgh, Detroit, Silicon Valley', and 'is still on the march'.

Although the United States had ample warning that Japan was 'on the march' economically, its response since the early 1970s has largely evaded the heart of the matter. The idea that Japan might have a superior industry process has been hard to accept. The NIH (not invented here) syndrome remained deeply embedded among many sectors of American industry until more recent years. The fact that Japan, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, pursued protective industry policies has also helped deflect attention by providing legitimate targets for American complaint. Partly for political and strategic trade-offs, Washington indulged some of these practices, and they have left their legacy in severely constraining foreign trade and enterprise. But along with the legitimate targets, the SI1 negotiations would appear to be striking at a crown jewel in Japan's 'economic miracle' by targeting the so-called production keiretsu, which, for example, Toyota Motor Corporation has refined in its effective assault on Detroit. Only now are US economists cautiously beginning to concede that 'a production keiretsu might be a better coordinating mechanism than either vertical integration or open markets - at least in some US industries'. However, even should Japanese-style capitalism, emphasising flexible corporate networking based on long-term inter-company relationships rather than relying entirely on market forces, be superior for improving production efficiency in key technologically oriented industries, a major problem in adapting such a system worldwide remains.

Economics and National Security

The merchant-state strategy played an important role in ensuring that the 'centre' of postwar Japan held together. It put the Constitution, the most divisive and debilitating domestic issue, to one side, and reinforced political stability by delivering solid and continuing increases in living standards. It gave priority to creating the skills, organisation and industry that have positioned Japan in the

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27 Kataoka, The Price of a Constitution, p.3.
forefront of the current technological revolution, thereby underpinning its formidable economic power and competitiveness in the global economy. What seems important to acknowledge in US-Japan relations, especially in pursuing negotiations such as the SII, is that the merchant-state strategy shared the same central concerns as Alexander Hamilton's approach to building American power two centuries ago - both believed in using economic policy as an instrument of national unification and national power.

Japan's economic strength and technological capabilities give it the option of becoming a major autonomous military power with a nuclear capability. An estimate published in 1989 concluded Japan had the necessary economic and human resources, as well as the ability to direct and control those resources to emerge as a military superpower within ten to 25 years, depending upon its approach. Doubling its current levels of defence spending (1 per cent GNP) would probably have little negative impact on GNP growth, underlining that current limitations are political and not due to economic constraints. Japan can either

- keep its rearmament within the spirit of the constraints of its anti-war Constitution, or
- undermine the spirit of the Constitution by gradually extending the outer limit of what might constitute self-defence by adopting greater 'flexibility' in its interpretation, while acquiring an increasing capacity to threaten the use of force against others, or
- revise the Constitution, as some Japanese already advocate, in order to remove the constraints.

Any decision to move from existing policy would most likely hinge initially on external factors tending to undermine domestic political support for the anti-war Constitution. Arguably, external pressures during the Gulf crisis, strongly encouraged by interest groups within Japan, have begun a process of domestic political change which, especially in the climate of uncertainty marking post-Cold War US-Japan relations, could shift the balance of power

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significantly against supporters of the Constitution, opening the way to, and even encouraging, the pursuit of the second option above. That is partly why the Constitution's strongest defenders, the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDP), pressed for the Nordic model (an organisation separate from the SDF but including SDF personnel as volunteers, or secondees) for Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping. That this option, favoured by Prime Minister Kaifu at the time of the Gulf crisis, generally got short shrift in LDP and bureaucratic circles reflected not only the strength of the LDP's defence 'tribe' (zoku), or lobby, and the influence of the SDF itself, but also the preferences of the Pentagon. The pace of any future shift could, in turn, depend on other issues, such as the extent to which Washington's efforts to counter or cope with Japan's economic challenge might promote anti-American, nationalistic forces in Japan, or adverse changes in the regional security environment, and in Washington's perceived commitment to Asia-Pacific security.

Japanese advocates of constitutional revision, while still a small minority, now feel less constrained in expressing their views than in the past. They are capitalising on criticism of Japan's perceived failure to play a role in world affairs 'commensurate with its economic power' by laying the blame on the consequences of the anti-war Constitution. Nor do they lack the support of 'realists' outside Japan, including some in American military circles. Now that Japan is the second largest world economy (and on current tends, could be in the process of overtaking the United States) the view is widespread that the issue is more a matter of when, rather than whether, Japan again becomes a 'normal' power, exercising its 'sovereign' right to use military force in the pursuit of its national interests.

31 For example, Kataoka, *The Price of a Constitution* ...
CHAPTER 3
EAST ASIAN SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD

... communications, mass media and information exchange make it no longer possible to speak of any clear line of demarcation between Occident and Orient. Europe is no longer the Europe of the past; nor is Asia the Asia of the past. Both are searching for new identities.

Yasuhiro Nakasone,
The 1984 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture,
IISS London.¹

October 1992 witnessed two historic events in East Asia's post-Cold War era: first, the main body of Japan's first dispatch of troops overseas since World War II, largely at the prodding of its Western partners, joined peacekeeping forces in Cambodia; and second, Emperor Akihito, in response to an invitation initially issued by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, became the first Japanese monarch ever to visit China. The two events highlighted a central dilemma confronting Japan, a people whose history as a nation state dates at least from AD 239, when Himiko, Queen of Yamatai, concluded an alliance with the powerful Chinese kingdom of Wei, presenting tribute and receiving, in return, a golden seal of office and a purple ribbon of state.² Now, in the uncertain climate of an economically interdependent, changing world, Japan must seek its future in both the 'Orient' and the 'Occident'. For the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Soviet power removed a buffer between Japan and its history and geography - the reality of living cheek by jowl with China, Korea and Russia - and the demands that can entail. It also exposed Japan more nakedly to the key challenge of the post-Cold War world - the global contest for economic strength and technological prowess - and, especially, the

² Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p.2.
Japan as Peacekeeper

import of American perceptions that Japan's success in these fields, rather than any hostile military power, most threatens America's future.3

During the Cold War, under the San Francisco System, Japan subordinated its foreign policy to the United States, although for much of the period Tokyo sought to play down the centrality of the Washington connection in its perspective on the world, claiming to pursue an 'omni-directional' policy. However, from the late 1970s, and especially in the early 1980s under Prime Minister Nakasone, Japan clearly identified itself with the Western alliance, inevitably creating tensions with Japan's identity as an Asian nation, both domestically and within the region. Domestically the strong tilt towards the West would not have been politically possible without a prominent focus on Japan's territorial dispute with Moscow and the perception of a growing Soviet threat; regionally, it was aided by the American rapprochement with China and the Sino-Soviet conflict. Now, with the end of the Cold War, pressures upon Japan from Washington and other Western allies, notably during the Gulf war, to 'stand up and be counted', the collapse of the Soviet Union, the deterioration of Sino-American relations since the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, and the rising prosperity and national self-confidence of Asian states, new forces are ascendant both within Japan and the region.

Although differing interests within Japan had their own reasons for supporting participation in peacekeeping, the importance of paying the 'dues' demanded by Washington to sustain its 'global partnership' and security alliance encouraged the ruling LDP to attach high priority to playing a significant role in Cambodia. Nonetheless, the 'overseas dispatch of military forces', even under the aegis of the United Nations, not only caused a wrenching domestic political battle; it also inevitably provided a disconcerting reminder among fellow Asian states of the 'unfortunate period' during which Japan 'inflicted great sufferings on the people of China' (and other Asian states). As Emperor Akihito told his Chinese hosts, with 'a sense of deep reproach', the Japanese people 'believe such a war must never be repeated and resolve to tread the path of a peaceful nation'. The timeliness of the Emperor's visit should have helped reassure China

that Japan would indeed, as Beijing had counselled, handle the
dispatch of the SDF abroad with caution. By visiting Xian, capital of
the Tang dynasty (618-907), the Emperor also pointedly drew attention
to a past era of close Sino-Japanese cooperation, during which Japan
remodelled its institutions and society on Chinese lines.4

These events mark an important stage in post-Cold War
strategic relationships in East Asia, with major implications for US
regional influence. In Cambodia, Tokyo has reaffirmed the importance
it attaches to its alliance and 'partnership' with the United States while
demonstrating its aspirations to a greater political role in the region. At
the same time, in China, it has taken a discreet but decisive step away
from its traditional dutiful merchant-state attitude towards the United
States where it has stayed 'a half-pace to the rear', or cast itself as 'vice-
president', reaffirming instead its intention to pursue a more
autonomous foreign policy while underlining the centrality of Sino-
Japanese relations to the long-term stability and prosperity of the Asia-
Pacific region. The importance of Sino-Japanese relations is shifting
irreversibly from its secondary status during the Cold War to centre
stage in regional inter-state relations. While it remains to be seen how
quickly their relationship might progress, both countries have ample
economic and political reason to cooperate. Yet they will remain rivals,
watchful of each other, and the historical legacies will not be easily
overcome. Moreover, American policies towards both Tokyo and
Beijing are likely to be a key determinant of the pace at which the
strategic character of Sino-Japanese relations develops, and the extent
to which the interaction of relations between the three powers could
increasingly be the main factor shaping other regional relationships -
including those involving Moscow, already a much diminished actor
in the region and, eventually, a united Korea.

Although foreign comment tended to focus on the significance
of the Emperor's visit for Sino-Japanese commercial relations, the more
important issues were political and cultural. In contrast to significant
public scepticism over the Cambodian peacekeeping mission, the
Emperor's visit to China had strong public support, with a solid
majority approving an apology for the wartime period. While the
more extreme elements of the political left and right, for differing

4 Lincoln Kaye, 'Saving faces', Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 November 1992, pp.13-
4; and Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p.2.
reasons, were among those opposing the visit, those among the moderate left and middle-ground who were alienated by the peacekeeping bill, welcomed it. Indeed, the Social Democratic Party of Japan, for whom the peacekeeping legislation was a major defeat, has been both an advocate of closer ties with China and a critic of the San Francisco System for obstructing that goal. Significantly, the visit suggested a sense in which Japan was 'returning to our starting point after the Second World War to find the values and ideals in foreign policy that we see as appropriate for the world and that the Japanese people will willingly defend'. Prime Minister Yoshida had wanted to recognise Beijing following the American Occupation, both to lay the political and economic basis for a more independent foreign policy towards Washington, as well as to encourage Beijing to rely less on Moscow. However, out-manoeuvred by John Foster Dulles on the issue, Tokyo had to recognise Taipei.

The challenge these developments poses for American policy in East Asia needs to be seen against the general political and economic trend in the region during the past decade. Even though East Asia did not feel the rush of history in the same way as Europe, the effects of the end of the Cold War, and, in particular, the collapse of Soviet power, will prove to be profound. The region's 'Berlin walls', a divided Korea and a dispute between Moscow and Tokyo over the southernmost Kuril Islands, Japan's 'northern territories', have not shown the same tendency to crumble. Unlike East Germany, North Korea did not rely on Moscow's patronage for its survival; moreover, South Korean leaders prefer the journey towards reunification more than the prospect of arriving. For its part, Tokyo did not want to give Washington cause for unease by a precipitate rapprochement with a historically troublesome Moscow, believing time to be on its side. Nor did the US Navy, a key influence on American decision-making in the Pacific, favour change.

Yet, at another level, East Asia was moving beyond the Cold War well before the collapse of the Berlin wall, with the importance within the region of Japan and China rising relative to that of the

5 For example, Motofumi Asai, Japanese Foreign Policy - Reconsideration and Turnabout (Nihon Gaiko - Hansai to Tenkan) (Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1989).
6 See Chapter 1 above, pp.11-12, for the comments of Kazuo Ogura, Director General, Cultural Affairs, the Foreign Ministry.
7 Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, pp.52-54.
United States and the Soviet Union. By 1982, Beijing concluded that the superpower struggle had stalemated and that the superpowers' grip on international events was weakening. It cut back on defence spending to shift more resources into economic reform, and reopened negotiations with Moscow, which led to full restoration of relations just as the leadership plunged into domestic upheaval in 1989. Even so, Sino-Soviet rapprochement, Moscow's withdrawal of its support for Vietnam in Cambodia, and the withdrawal of its forces from Cam Ranh Bay, left Beijing as the key broker and ultimate security guarantor in the political settlement in Cambodia, agreed to under UN auspices in October 1991. Meanwhile, a surge of Japanese investment in ASEAN states during the 1980s, especially in Thailand, as well as greater access to its own market for ASEAN products, further entrenched Japanese economic influence in the region. Highlighting Japan's pre-eminence, a Malaysian proposal for an Asian 'free-trade' bloc, the East Asian Economic Group (EAEG), as an Asian response to European and American moves to establish expanded 'free-trade' areas, effectively proffered Tokyo the leadership crown.

The East Asian economic dynamic has now gained a momentum and resilience of its own, largely unaffected by the lingering legacies of the Cold War. While still heavily reliant on American and other external markets, the region has reached a stage of development in financial power and commercial activity which should continue to propel it forward, even if Europe and North America turn more inward. Regional growth rates, although slowing, are likely to remain higher than those in Europe and the United States. East Asia, including Japan, produces about US$4 trillion a year in GDP, and by the year 2000 should exceed US$5 trillion, rivalling that of the EC and similar to that of the United States. East Asia is the only region likely to be a net supplier of funds to global financial markets in the coming period. A series of growth centres, and rapidly rising numbers of 'middle class' consumers in many economies, should help sustain the region's momentum. One growth centre between Taiwan, Hong Kong and southern Guangdong and Fujian provinces, on current trends, could have a combined GNP in the order of France's by 2000; another involving the two Koreas, north China and the Soviet Far East has great potential. Planned spending on infrastructure among regional countries, excluding Japan, during the 1990s totals more than US$500
billion, including US$300 billion in Taiwan over the next six years, and could rise to US$1 trillion by 2000 on current indications.8

Uncertainty as 'Enemy'

As East Asia emerges from the shadows of an Atlantic-centred Cold War world, a rising force in global economic affairs, attracting growing interest as an Asian model for would-be modernisers wanting to avoid the social and cultural hazards of Westernisation, it could not only seriously complicate the management of US-Japan bilateral relations but also provide Washington with a far more taxing challenge than it faces in Europe to retain its political influence and expand its economic presence. The United States does not enjoy the same bonds of understanding, friendship and common values in Asia as in Europe, as reaction to US policy during the Gulf crisis demonstrated, not only in Japan but in the region. Yet, as in Europe, the inclination has so far been to cling to arrangements and institutions which have best served US interests during the Cold War, even though these were established in a different time and for other purposes. In Europe, NATO is seen as Washington's best, if not only, hope; in the Pacific, the US still relies on the bilateral security network anchored by the San Francisco System.

As a region of great diversity, sustained by historical differences and unique cultural traditions, East Asia might seem a safe prospect for the US continuing to wield influence through military power. Most if not all countries in the region welcome a continued American military presence, fearing the possible consequences of its withdrawal, especially if precipitate, on the stability of the region. Tokyo, in particular, considers the maintenance of the US-Japan security relationship essential on four main counts: (i) for the US nuclear umbrella, since both China and Russia are independent nuclear powers; (ii) as a foundation from which to intensify dialogue with Moscow and establish a new relationship; (iii) as a component of regional stability, especially through the role US forces play in maintaining peace in Korea and in safeguarding the sea lines of communication (SLOCs), as well as for reassuring the region concerning Japan's commitment to not becoming a military power

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threatening its neighbours; and (iv) as the basis of Japan's overall relations with the United States. Thus, as the Cold War wound down, Washington re- emphasised a regional military role in East Asia. However, such an approach promises to leave the United States still paying a disproportionate share of the costs of regional security while continuing to lose ground in terms of political influence and market share.

Part of the problem is not that East Asia will lack tension and conflict in the period ahead. Rather, with the exception of the Korean peninsula, where security possibly remains 'threat driven', the new enemy is 'uncertainty'. Moreover, uncertainty arises not only from the region's potential for revisiting old animosities in the manner of Yugoslavia. A far more significant cause of uncertainty, which often passes largely unremarked, arises from the need for two kinds of geopolitical adjustment: (i) to give adequate voice to the rising importance of East Asia in world councils and institutions; and (ii) to cope with the rising weight of Japan and China in the region, and, in time, a reunited Korea. Moreover, few contingencies, apart from Korea, are likely directly to engage American interests. The most likely areas of conflict involve Chinese territorial claims, including Taiwan and the Spratlys in the South China Sea. Should Beijing resort to force in pursuing these claims in the foreseeable future, it would choose options which minimised confrontation with the United States, confident that Washington would be anxious to avoid any military engagement in Asia. And although the nuclear issue in North Korea has gained much prominence, it needs to be kept in perspective. Even should Pyongyang be within a few years of developing a limited nuclear weapons capability, which now seems unlikely, it would remain only of limited bargaining potential. By threatening to use nuclear weapons, North Korea would only risk hastening its destruction rather than ensuring its survival. Korean reunification is no longer a question of whether; only of when and how. A far more critical issue for the region is to ensure that a reunified Korea not become a nuclear weapons state.

Thus, East Asia could emerge as the world's most complex security environment. The future of the US-Japan alliance, the nature of American post-Cold War engagement with the region, and the kind of defence and security policies Japan and China might pursue, are among the most central issues of concern. All will be shaped by
global, regional, and domestic forces, both new and old. The United States and Japan are part of the inner core of advanced industrialised states for which continued economic success requires a high level of involvement in the global economy. China, on the other hand, is a sufficiently powerful state to aspire to join the major economic league and, if kept on the periphery, could be disruptive, reviving conflict in the region.

Moreover, post-Cold War US-Japan relations, arguably crucial not only to the kind of Asia-Pacific likely to emerge in the period ahead, but also to the kind of Japan, have begun badly. Tensions arising from the Gulf war, President Bush's ill-fated 'jobs, jobs, jobs' diplomacy, and the disclosure early in 1992 of US Defense Department papers suggesting that the Pentagon wanted to keep both Germany and Japan on a 'short leash', while they paid for the privilege, have at the very least poisoned the climate of the would-be US-Japan 'global partnership'. Even moderate, pro-American Japanese seem persuaded that the United States presents a 'covert barrier' to Japan's assumption of a greater role in world affairs.9

Doubts will also persist among Asia-Pacific countries, and perhaps especially in Japan, over the United States' staying power in the region, despite its declaratory policy and the still modest and measured reductions in its Pacific forces, until it confronts its domestic economic and social disorders more convincingly, and sends less ambiguous signals that it wants to engage with East Asia as a genuine partner, sharing power with other states rather than as a unilateralist 'globocop'. Ironically, at a time in history when its role could prove crucial to the emergence of a dynamic, stable Asia-Pacific, America's traditional confidence in the region as the future has seemingly faltered, shaken by self-doubt centred on Japan. For despite its rhetoric about a 'new Pacific partnership', the Bush administration allowed its Asia policy to drift, especially by comparison with its attention to Europe. Further, isolationist, 'America first' sentiment, and a seeming reluctance among key elements of American society to confront the cultural challenge to their 'European-ness' of engaging

9 For example, Takashi Inoguchi, 'Japan's role in international affairs', *Survival*, Summer 1992, p.76.
fully with East Asia could continue to constrain American attention to the region.10

US Goals and Strategies in Asia

American interests in East Asia have remained basically unchanged since Washington first began expanding its influence into the Pacific in the mid-19th century. It has sought commercial access to the region; freedom of navigation; and the prevention of the rise of any hegemonic power or coalition. However, the ideological foundations of American foreign policy, with its interest in strengthening and enlarging the community of nations sharing a commitment to democracy and individual rights, as well as to the principles of international cooperation, have provided the inspirational and motivating force for sustaining the pursuit of these pragmatic goals. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, as former colonies in East Asia sought their independence, US ideological influence in the region probably reached its peak. In more recent years, growing confidence in traditional Asian values and culture and rising national assertiveness within the region are feeding on perceptions of a decline in US economic and military power, leading to harsher, more outspoken judgements on American society and international behaviour. American values and lifestyles which once may have attracted are now more likely to be censured; far from being seen as universal and desirable, they are often viewed as socially and culturally threatening.

The American mission in the Pacific has also traditionally needed a compelling focus. In turn, Imperial Russia until the early 1900s, Japan in the 1920s and 1930s, and most recently the Soviet Union were seen as the essential challenge. Now, reminiscent of the US naval historian and strategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan, who played a proselytising role in the US expansion into the Pacific in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, China appears to be emerging as the new 'enemy-designate'. In 1901, writing on 'The Problem of Asia,' Mahan foresaw China as the long-term danger. For Mahan, the answer was for the West to bring the Asian peoples 'within the compass of the family of Christian states', not so much by military force as by peaceful

commercial penetration.\textsuperscript{11} Today, Mahan's sentiments find an echo in the US Congress as members, speaking from the pulpit of Western humanism rather than militant Christianity, berate Beijing for its human rights record and threaten punitive sanctions. Obligingly, Chinese authorities respond by expanding their domestic security apparatus, clamping down on foreign contact, and warning against 'foreign cultural subversion'.

Should China become the new American 'enemy' in Asia, as the mood in Congress and elsewhere sometimes suggests is happening, that could lead to a further divergence in US-Japan strategic interests. Tokyo had cause to be bitter when the Nixon administration reversed US China policy without warning, let alone consultation. Since 1989, Tokyo has pursued a difficult path, trying to hold ranks with the West in disapproving events in Tiananmen Square while, as its largest aid donor, trying to avoid damage to China's economic reforms and prevent its isolation. Tokyo has a strategic interest in helping avert domestic instability in China, and in fostering economic reform and the growth of democratic forces, just as Germany and other West European countries consider they have in East Europe and the Soviet Union. Likewise, the difficulty that the US human rights policy towards China can cause for Tokyo from time to time finds a parallel in differences between the United States and some ASEAN states over the issue of human rights and democratic causes in Myanmar (Burma). Nor does that mean an absence of concern in Tokyo about China, or among ASEAN states about events in Rangoon. Disputes are often less over goals than over priorities and ways and means, and especially over perceived double standards in Western behaviour towards Asia.

American military power has underpinned stability in East Asia since World War II, while its technology, domestic markets and military intervention in Korea in the 1950s, and Indochina in the 1960s and 1970s, have played a major part in fuelling the region's rising prosperity. All helped make the United States a 'Big Daddy' in the region. Now, as 'America first' sentiment gains momentum in the US heartland, Washington needs a more persuasive argument for spending US$40 billion or more a year on East Asian security, while

\textsuperscript{11} Philip A. CROWL, 'Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian', in Peter PARET (ed.), \textit{Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age} (Princeton University
running a US$75 billion trade deficit with the region, than that of 'cooperative vigilance' against 'unpredictability, uncertainty, and instability', especially when Japan and other Asian economic rivals could be the main beneficiaries. Scope for trying to shift much more of the costs to Japan and other East Asian allies through 'burden-sharing' also seems fairly limited. Just as Vietnam in the 1970s was the 'wrong war, at the wrong time, in the wrong place', relying on military power for influence in East Asia in the 1990s is the 'wrong strategy, in the wrong era, in the wrong region of the world'.

Towards a Common Security Regime

During the Cold War, members of the Atlantic alliance saw Asian security primarily in terms of the Soviet threat. Asia generally remained aloof from this view until the build-up and modernisation of Soviet Far East and Pacific forces gathered pace in the 1970s, and Moscow invaded Afghanistan in 1978. Then China, until 1982, and Japan, in particular, became concerned. However, Korea was entangled in the Cold War from the outset, and Indochina in both the Cold War and the Sino-Soviet conflict. But most countries tried to avoid close involvement with East-West ideological issues. Their main security concerns were with historical racial, ethnic and other regional issues and sustaining the integrity of their economically and socially fragile young states, many being creations of the post-World War II period. Socialist regimes in China, North Korea and Vietnam were also home-grown compared with the Soviet-sponsored European kind. Compared with Europe, the United States also faced a different strategic situation in East Asia in confronting the Soviet threat. The military balance was more complex than in the central European theatre, and more heavily reliant on American naval and air power, except in the Korean peninsula where land forces confronted each other.

With the collapse of Soviet power, East Asia has a singular opportunity for building a security structure directed primarily at the region's own real needs. The political settlement in Cambodia under

UN auspices, and the restoration of Sino-Vietnamese relations, leave the Korean conflict and the 'northern territories' dispute between Tokyo and Moscow as the only remaining major issues impeding the full normalisation of relations between all the countries of East Asia and the Pacific. Commercial relations are already moving forward, irrespective of diplomatic ties in many instances. While both Korea and the 'northern territories' could remain difficult to resolve, their resolution seems more a question of how and when, than whether. They should not unduly delay dealing with the post-Cold War security demands of the region, of which military forces, no matter how important, are only one aspect. The region requires a comprehensive approach to security directed at economic and socio-cultural issues as well as military. And meeting the latter should be possible at much lower force levels than during the Cold War superpower confrontation in the region, without risk of a security 'vacuum'.

In particular, as is increasingly acknowledged,\(^\text{13}\) Northeast Asia needs to complement its bilateral security arrangements with a regional forum, including Japan, China, Korea, Russia, and the United States (in which Washington would not feel compelled to take sides) in order to identify and address issues of common security concern. Japan has edged forward cautiously with its proposal for dialogue on security issues in a post-ministerial ASEAN setting. Its primary purpose is to reassure its neighbours of its peaceful intentions as it moves to assume a greater role in world affairs. However, the ASEAN security dialogue will essentially focus on Southeast Asia. Arguably, the far more important security dialogue must take place in Northeast Asia. But Tokyo seems uncomfortable with the idea of a Northeast Asian forum. It would like a more broadly based colloquium, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group, to place political (and security) issues on its agenda, a preference key ASEAN states will resist, largely from fears that it could undermine ASEAN's own importance as a regional organisation.

The region needs to build an interlocking network of bilateral and multilateral mechanisms, dealing with economic, socio-cultural and military threats. It also needs to move from an adversarial

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approach to that of a common, or cooperative security framework. As ASEAN has demonstrated, some of the diverse threats within the region can best be contained by cooperative engagement aimed at jointly building stronger, more closely integrated contiguous states. Any security structure which implicitly or explicitly designated a regional or external 'enemy' would risk polarising the region, as during the Cold War, and encouraging a debilitating arms race. The region already has a number of valuable building blocks which can help form the foundation stones of a comprehensive structure, including regional bodies such as ASEAN, the South Pacific Forum, and APEC, and more specific arrangements which address particular kinds of regional conflict and could be more widely applied, such as the Timor Sea Zone of Cooperation, dealing with an Australian-Indonesian territorial dispute, and the regional airspace surveillance and control regime between Malaysia, Singapore and Australia.¹⁴

CHAPTER 4
A NEW KIND OF POWER AND PARTNERSHIP

But there is neither East nor West/Border, nor Breed,
nor Birth/When two strong men stand face to face/Tho' they come from the ends of the Earth.

Rudyard Kipling,
The Ballad of East and West

Four decades ago, the United States dominated a war-ravaged world, both as a complete political, economic and military power and as a much admired, open society and culture. Today, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, it again stands alone as a military power, but its economic supremacy is under strong challenge, especially from Japan, and its traditional political role as a beacon of free institutions and markets is coming under threat as a consequence, while domestic violence and social disorder seem to be rising, especially among the poor and ethnic minorities, and a debate rages among élites over American cultural identity. Further, an apparent reluctance to confront these challenges robustly has generally seemed oddly out-of-character with the United States' past as a dynamic, purposeful people and nation, more often creating the flow in the tide of history than seemingly left caught in its ebb.

Americans themselves are divided in their search for explanations. Some stress a complacency evident in a commitment to short-term action and inaction, restricted investment as a basic policy, government seen only as a burden, corporate sclerosis, and the dark side of financial speculation, while the poor have been denied the crucial support needed to change their situation.1 Others focus on the alleged 'cult of ethnicity' and 'rights' pressed too far, threatening 'the fragmentation, resegregation, and tribalization of American life'.2

Whatever the reasons, the search for solutions has major implications for US-Japan relations, and the kind of Japan which could emerge in a post-Cold War world. The 'American obsession' with Japan, a former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Richard Holbrooke argues, reflected 'America's fear that it may have lost its own way. Japan seems to be better at the very things on which Americans once prided themselves; quality products, hard work, sacrifice, strong family structure, a sense of national pride and patriotism'. He also noted 'an underlying racism, not always conscious, in the attitudes of some Americans towards Japanese' and 'resentment that Japan is not sufficiently grateful to the United States for its generosity and protection since World War II'. A member of the faculty of Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, Robert Reich, contends that the real issue is more 'an America that no longer coheres'. The deep message of the wave of 'Japan-as-enemy' books, coinciding with the end of the Cold War, was that a Japanese challenge, absent the Soviet Union, gave Americans a reason to join together. The central question for America in the post-Soviet world, he says, is whether Americans can rediscover their identity and mutual responsibility in a 'diverse America, whose economy and culture are rapidly fusing with the economies and cultures of the rest of the globe' without creating a new enemy.

The fact that the end of the Cold War should find the Pacific's two leading powers confused and uncertain in their understanding of each other, and seemingly ill-prepared for a shared future has deep historical and cultural roots, which were reinforced by their Cold War relations. Since the merchant ship Empress of China sailed for Canton from New York in 1784, beginning the American adventure in the Pacific, the United States has been many things there: belligerent, benefactor, coloniser, protector and democratiser, but never partner. From their outset in the mid-1850s, the dominant aspect of US-Japan relations has been one of inequality; the recurring theme that of teacher-pupil, patron-client, demander-demandee. From an American perspective such a leitmotif has seemed entirely appropriate and

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consistent with its national self-image and sense of 'manifest destiny'\textsuperscript{5} From a Japanese perspective, the central issue has been that of meeting the threat of Western imperial power to Japanese national integrity and identity; the recurring theme, the desire to be modern and powerful and to win respect and acceptance by learning from Europe and America while reinforcing the 'Japanese spirit' in order to retain their Japanese identity (\textit{Wakon Yosai}; Japanese spirit, Western techniques).\textsuperscript{6} Japanese spirit, or identity, equates with aesthetic sensibility, which some Japanese\textsuperscript{7} believe has been debased since the Meiji era by being split into two parts: \textit{Yamato-damashii}, or the Yamato or warrior spirit, which became the rallying cry for ultranationalism in the 1930s; and \textit{jocho}, or sentimentality, which is soft, and allegedly manifest in Japan's postwar pacifism.

Initially, US-Japan Cold War arrangements had let both parties reinforce congenial self-images from an earlier, more pleasant period in their relations: the one as benefactor, the other as beneficiary. A \textit{de facto} separation of economic and political strategic issues (\textit{seikai bunri}) helped Japan cope with the danger to its national identity in an unequal military alliance. Washington subordinated economic interests to political and strategic concerns, and Tokyo the reverse, allowing both parties to pursue their main concerns without serious conflict. As the burden of hegemony began to tell, however, Washington gradually curbed its economic and technological largesse, and pressed Tokyo to meet more of the costs of Japan's defence. In 1971, the United States recorded its first merchandise trade deficit since 1893, and in 1985, became a net debtor nation for the first time since World War I. Both milestones heralded American economic policy initiatives directly largely against Japan, as well as strategic

\textsuperscript{5} John L. O'Sullivan used the phrase in 1845 writing about 'the fulfilment of our manifest destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence ...'. Quoted in Simon Winchester, \textit{The Pacific} (Hutchinson, London, 1991), p.17; when in 1898 the Spanish-American war established the Philippine Islands as part of the United States, some Washington commentators saw this as fulfilling 'our Manifest Destiny'. See John K. Emmerson and Harrison M. Holland, \textit{The Eagle and The Rising Sun: America and Japan in the Twentieth Century} (Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1988), p.46.


\textsuperscript{7} For example, Tsutsumi Seiji, 'Post-Cold War Japan in Historical Perspective', \textit{Japan Echo}, Vol.XVII, No.4, 1990,p.80 (translated from 'Sozoryoku to sozoryoku', in \textit{Sekai}, October 1990, pp.164-77).
shifts in relations, first in the early 1970s with China, then in the mid-1980s with the Soviet Union. By the end of the Cold War, the United States' dollar had declined to about one-third of what it was relative to the Japanese yen in the 1950s. Thus Japan's economic success transformed a key strength of postwar US-Japan relations, seikei bunri, into an Achilles' heel.

By the late 1980s, Japan found itself subjected to increasingly critical scrutiny from an American perspective. Yet while some found 'revisionism' a 'fresh and unvarnished look at the structure and exercise of Japanese economic and political power', \(^8\) others were struck by the similarity of many of its themes with past Western perceptions of Japan. Or as Endymion Wilkinson argues, 'in the collective European and American mind there has formed a limited stock of images, both positive and negative, about Japan and the Japanese from which, depending on the mood of the day, the relevant image can be recalled any number of times'. Similarly, in the case of Japanese perceptions of the West. 'The key difference', according to Wilkinson, 'is that Japanese images of Europe and the USA have tended to be more positive and closer to reality than European and US images of modern Japan'. \(^9\)

Historically, the 'Japan is different' theme, emphasising negative images and often coloured by fears of 'Orientals', has found receptive audiences in the West each time the latter has badly underestimated Japan's military and economic capabilities. Japan's defeat of China in 1895, its victories over Russia in 1904 and 1905, its attack on Pearl Harbor and military successes in Southeast Asia in 1941 and 1942, and, most recently, its emergence as an economic superpower, all caught the West by surprise. Blinded by a sense of innate superiority and failure to take Japan seriously, Western misjudgement resulted partly from subjective out-of-date images of Japan. Rather than look to the possibility that the Japanese might simply be doing a better job, the West has tended to see itself as the ultimate model, or standard, and explain its periodic embarrassment by emphasising differences between itself and Japan, focussing on alleged trickery and deceit. Japan's Ministry for International Trade

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and Industry, for example, becomes the 'notorious' MITI; Japan an 'enigma'. Qualities attributed to Japan take on their negative aspects: efficient becomes ruthless; pragmatic, unprincipled; group behaviour, conformism; disciplined, regimented or docile; willingness to learn, slavish imitation; paradox, contradiction; and so on.\textsuperscript{10} Japanese themselves encourage the West to look for differences rather than similarities by often emphasising their 'uniqueness', Kuriyama's concern, quoted above,\textsuperscript{11} being an exception.

More than any other Asian nation, Japan can take credit for beating back the Western barbarian at the gate. In part, its success came about because Japan came out of its world into the world of the West, and learned from the West. Now that the West in its turn must learn from Japan, it is far from clear that Western nations, and perhaps especially the United States, are ready emotionally and intellectually to do so. For example, in its Structural Impediments Initiative with Japan, the United States has generally assumed that Japan is the party that must make the changes, although many Americans concede that perhaps more than 80 per cent of structural problems between the two economies derive from US domestic problems.

Moreover, the burgeoning American revisionist analysis is now finding that the Japanese, 'for all their hi-tech and their talk of "globalization" are still in the thrall of a resolutely defensive insularity, neither the depth nor the rationale of which we [Americans] fully understand'.\textsuperscript{12} More than a century ago, the West was told that Japan would never be a serious commercial rival because 'the love of indolence and pleasure of the people themselves, forbid it'.\textsuperscript{13} Now the West is assured that Japan lacks a capacity for 'an enlightened leadership role' because of its 'overblown particularism'. Unlike America, Britain, ancient Rome, or even the old Soviet bloc, as well as major 'cultural players' like China and France, Japanese allegedly lack a capacity to think in terms of "horizontal" relationships among equals - a greater sensitivity to universal traits and needs and interests, in order to override the rigid verticalities of superior-inferior power.

\textsuperscript{10} ibid., p.149.
\textsuperscript{11} See pp.16-17.
\textsuperscript{12} Hall, 'Samurai Legacies ...', p.14.
\textsuperscript{13} Quoted by Wilkinson, Japan versus the West, p.121, from the Japan Herald of 9 April 1881, the leading English language newspaper of the day, summing up the dominant Treaty Port view.
relationships, and of the precipitous intercultural chasms that still dominate the Japanese view of the outside world'. Japanese also allegedly fear the adoption of their own culture by others because 'fuller participation by foreign people would destroy Japanese identity itself, the way a clam dies once it has been pried open'. For its part, Japan is arguing that Americans were not yet psychologically ready for a world in which, for them more than any other people, interdependence meant the beginning of dependence, and they were especially ill-prepared to accept dependence on Japan.

In times of economic and social upheaval, such as those through which the world is now passing, nations turn more readily to the 'moral imperatives' of national vulnerability and external threats to ensure that their peoples cohere and 'the centre holds'. Their leaders exploit a deep-felt human need for roots and manifest purpose, especially in coping with uncertainty and stress. Professor of History at Harvard University, Akira Iriye, argues persuasively that Japan went to war against the United States in December 1941 because its military leaders and their civilian supporters wanted to bring unity to their national experience. They wanted decisively to end the uncertainty and confusion created by a strategy for rapid industrial development that sought to integrate the country into the world economy and manage external problems through multilateral agreements and international cooperation. They played upon the theme of a simplistic world divided on its East-West cultural axis: the contrast between an idealised Asia, renowned for its cooperation, harmony, mutual respect, integration and communal unity, and a demonised West, noted for its egoism, constant rivalry, friction, and imperialism. Japan, they argued, need to 'totally put an end to the long period of dependence on and copying after the West'. Intellectually and culturally, Japan should return to its 'innate intelligence'. This sacred mission of ending Western-dominated patterns and restoring Asia to its past greatness placed great stress on rebuilding, regenerating, reawakening, and rebirth.15

Japan's merchant-state strategy came to play a similar, although in marked contrast, constructive, role in ensuring that the 'centre' of an economically and psychologically devastated postwar

14 Hall, 'Samurai Legacies ...', pp.22-3.
15 Iriye, Power and Culture, pp.1-35.
Japan held together. The strategy, as discussed above,\(^\text{16}\) emerged from the struggle among ruling conservatives for Japan's soul in the 1950s, culminating in the crisis over the 1960 revision of the US-Japan security treaty. By putting the question of constitutional revision firmly to one side, Japan avoided its most divisive and debilitating domestic issue. Instead, priority went to creating the skills, organisation and industry that have positioned Japan in the forefront of the Information Age technological revolution, thereby underpinning its formidable economic power and competitiveness in the global economy. Now the peacekeeping debate has not only reopened the constitutional issue, but also the broader question of whether Japan can find an 'honourable', respected place in the world, commensurate with its economic standing, without bending the interpretation of its Peace Constitution to an extent that would lead to its eventual abandonment.

**Geo-economics and the Role of Force**

The idea that a world ruled by law might be a realistic vision and a preferred choice of governments began to emerge in the latter part of the last century, closely associated with the expectation that liberal democracy, with its stress on law as the arbiter of relations among citizens with equal rights, would become a near-universal form of government.\(^\text{17}\) A century later, as democracy gains wider currency, international leaders seem slow to seize opportunities to strengthen the effectiveness of machinery both for facilitating pacific settlement of disputes between parties, as well as for deterring non-compliance with members' obligations under the UN Charter. This failure of great-power leadership seems all the more indefensible, given that, under the impact of new information technologies and the globalisation of the international economy, the world appears to be undergoing a fundamental structural transformation which should encourage the stepping up of efforts to ensure that world politics be increasingly shaped more by the pursuit of economic welfare and mutual accommodation than by the use of military force and aggressive nationalism.

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\(^\text{16}\) See pp.26-8.

In contrast to the 1930s, at the core of the emerging international system, the advanced industrial states are no longer unitary and their governments are constrained by the strength of transnational non-government actors, and by their relative loss of control in an Information Age over their economies and societies. These states share a commitment to democracy, markets, and respect for territorial borders. Their stability and prosperity are so entwined they cannot credibly threaten, let alone afford to use, military force to settle disputes with each other. They must behave as 'associates' rather than 'self-help' military 'rivals', as in the past. Thus, notwithstanding comparisons being drawn between the 1930s and present times, and even the view of some that the United States and Japan could again be on a collision course leading to war,18 the character of both US-Japan relations and the global environment of the 1990s is greatly changed from the 1930s, and even more so compared with the 1890s.

Fears that the world could be tumbling into warring trade blocs, although not without some basis, generally fail to take adequate account of the consequences of the changing structure of the international system. Whereas prior to World War II, autonomous military capability and control over resources basically determined fundamental calculations of national security, today these alone will not guarantee security and survival. The economic basis of national power calls for active engagement in the global economy. Thus, a well-educated, skilled workforce and advanced industry, capable of competing in the international market-place, has become as indispensable for a nation-state as its armed forces. Moreover, as a consequence of global interdependence and the diffusion of power, even the most powerful states will find that their ability to enforce their will is waning. Power is becoming less fungible, coercive and tangible.19 However, the possibility of a regression to a new form of acute great-power rivalry will remain, though not without huge cost to all. Further, the extent to which the use of force is evident among disputing states and non-state actors, not subject to the same interests and constraints as the advanced economies, will partly be determined

18 For example, George Friedman and Meredith Lebard, The Coming War With Japan (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1991).
by the behaviour of the core states themselves. All of these issues are relevant to Japan's security concerns in a post-Cold War world.

The unique aspect of Japan's Peace Constitution lies in its articulation of an intention not to maintain 'land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential'. Since the SDF are 'land, sea and air forces' in all but name, a minority of Japanese continue to regard them as a violation of this aspect of the Constitution. However, most accept that, under the Constitution, Japan retains the inherent right as a sovereign state to self-defence. Thus, the size and structure of the SDF are guided by judgements about the minimum force levels required for self-defence, and the kinds of weapon systems considered to be defensive rather than offensive. With modern weaponry, that can be a difficult judgement, but Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and weapons systems such as long-range bombers and aircraft carriers which can project power well beyond Japanese territory are clearly ruled out. Japan does not restrict deployment of the SDF to its own territorial land, sea, and air, and currently operates within a 1000 nautical mile limit. However, it interprets the Constitution as barring both the dispatch of the SDF overseas with a view to exercising force, as well as their involvement in collective security, except to the minimum extent that that might be required for the defence of Japan.

The basic principles on which Japan's defence policy rests were set out by a Cabinet decision in 1957. Stating that the objective was to prevent 'direct and indirect aggression, but once invaded, to repel such aggression, thereby preserving the independence and peace of Japan founded upon democratic principles', the decision set out the following principles:

(i) to support the activities of the United Nations, and promote international cooperation, thereby contributing to the realisation of world peace;

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20 Article 9 of the Constitution states: 'Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerence of the state will not be recognised'.

(ii) to promote the public welfare and enhance the people's love for the country, thereby establishing the sound basis essential to Japan's security;

(iii) to develop progressively the effective defence capabilities necessary for self-defence, with due regard to the nation's resources and the prevailing domestic situation;

(iv) to deal with external aggression on the basis of the Japan-US security arrangements, pending more effective functioning of the United Nations in the future in deterring and repelling such aggression.

Since 1976, Japan has pursued what it calls 'a moderate defense buildup' in accordance 'with the fundamental principles of maintaining, under the peace Constitution, an exclusively defensive posture and of not becoming a military power which might pose a threat to other countries, while adhering to the principles of civilian control and observing the three non-nuclear principles,' together with maintaining firmly the Japan-US security arrangement. Japan's defence spending doubled from US$5 billion in 1976/7 to US$10 billion in 1979/80, and has since risen by an average annual rate of five to six per cent. By 1992, it totalled US$34 billion, compared with the United Kingdom's US$41 billion, France's US$35 billion, and Germany's US$31 billion. However, if calculated according to the NATO definition (including retirement pensions and other auxiliary costs), Japan's defence budget reached US$40 billion in 1988 (or more than US$10 billion above Japan's own figures), compared with the UK's US$35.7 billion, France's US$32.4 billion and West Germany's US$31.7 billion. Thus, for the past five years, despite restricting its defence budgets to roughly 1 per cent GNP, Japan has established itself at the forefront of spending among second-tier military powers.

Japan now finds that a national defence strategy based on an alliance with the United States, pending a more effective United

22 First enunciated in December 1967, the principles state that Japan will neither possess, nor manufacture, nor permit entry of nuclear weapons in the country.
24 Rounded figures from various issues of The Military Balance (IISS, London).
Nations, has left it in an uneasy position in a post-Cold War East Asian security environment. It faces rising anxiety among its neighbours over the size of its defence spending; yet despite these expenditures, it remains heavily dependent on the United States for its defence. Moreover, since the alliance grew out of a threat which no longer challenges basic American interests, the long-term outlook for American support has become more clouded. Renewed questioning of the need for the alliance has also arisen within Japan. In view of an increasingly robust nationalism and a generational change within Japan, more and more Japanese could grow impatient with political leaders who seem subservient to a foreign power, accepting the presence of foreign military forces which are partly intended to keep Japan itself contained. During the 1990s, most of the remaining American forces in Japan could be withdrawn, either in response to cuts in US defence spending or to ease political tension in Japan. But the United Nations is unlikely to have a much greater capacity to deter and repel aggressive military powers.

**Peacekeeping and Peacemaking**

As during the 1970s and 1980s, when relations with Washington had come under strain over trade access and the growing trade imbalance, Japan has sought to address its post-Cold War security concerns foremost by looking for new ways, both direct and indirect, of keeping the Japan-US security treaty in good repair. That aim predominated in efforts to get peacekeeping legislation enacted, encouraging a radical new look at the Constitution to accommodate the use of force in third countries for peacemaking as well as peacekeeping in collective security operations endorsed by the 'international community'. A special LDP study group meeting under the chairmanship of the then Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa published a draft report in February 1992 to stimulate debate and test public reaction. The report's central argument was that the Constitution's language showed that its 'spirit is hardly that of a passive, unilateral pacifism; it is instead an active and dynamic philosophy':

Peaceful means alone will not always be sufficient for achieving the eternal human goal of 'the banishment
of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance'.

In the course of the endeavor to preserve 'an international peace based on justice and order,' there may be times when the international community must band together to fight tyranny. If Japan were then to refuse to participate, in effect condoning tyranny, it would in fact be bringing dishonour upon itself; the Japanese would be violating the preamble's spirit by concentrating solely upon themselves and ignoring what goes on in other countries.

Interpreting the Constitution in the light of the 'ideal of an active and dynamic pacifism expressed in the preamble', the report argued, should not rule out the use of force where the international community was cooperating to maintain or restore (emphasis added) peace. Japan, for instance, could join a UN army, were one to be formed under Article 43 of the UN Charter, without contravening its constitutional renunciation of war and of the use of force to settle disputes. Interpretations to the contrary so far adopted by Japan were 'the product of a time when there was no adequate international consensus on what must be done to protect or restore global peace and no demand for Japan to take part in such endeavor, and when Japan itself lacked the power to cooperate'. But that was no longer appropriate.

The Ozawa report fell on stony soil. Many Japanese were having enough difficulty accepting the dispatch of the SDF forces abroad even for peacekeeping, let alone peacemaking. As former diplomat Yukio Okamoto argued, participation by the Japanese military in an international army would 'be an overly abrupt shift'. He agreed that the report was wise in not bringing up the 'controversial issue' of amending the Constitution since there was 'no possibility of an amendment [gaining public approval], and to push for one now

26 The Constitution's preamble includes the following: 'We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth ... We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, but that laws of political morality are universal; and that obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all nations who would sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship with other nations'.

an amendment [gaining public approval], and to push for one now would be counterproductive'. He said the report should have explained why keeping the US-Japan security treaty in force was 'vital', and given attention to matters that Japan's wartime government had 'paid scant attention to, such as the drafting of non-Japanese "comfort women" to serve the troops in the field'. Japan needed to make clear its view 'on the rights and wrongs of its past conduct'; otherwise such issues could 'stir up needless fears of Japan in neighboring countries'.

The government found itself labouring to explain how peacekeeping did not involve 'the use of force', and getting the legislation through the Diet left a trail of ambiguities. First, it had to establish a set of guidelines. For Japan to participate all parties to the conflict would need to have agreed to a cease-fire and to the deployment of peacekeeping forces, and to Japan's participation in them. Peacekeeping forces would also need to be strictly impartial, not favouring any party to the conflict. If any of these conditions were not met, Japan would withdraw its contingent. Finally, the use of weapons by Japanese peacekeepers would be limited to the minimum needed to protect their own lives. Second, the Diet further watered down the legislation by refusing to allow Japanese peacekeepers to get too close to the 'sharp end' of peacekeeping. Although the bill provided for Japanese participation in activities such as the monitoring of ceasefire agreements, stationing of peacekeeping forces in the buffer zone and providing surveillance, assisting in the exchange of POWs, the transportation of arms and ammunition for peacekeeping forces, and so forth, these kinds of activities were not to be undertaken until the Diet has passed further legislation to allow them at some indeterminate time in the future. However, the decision on where precisely to 'draw the line' on what was permissible and what was not seemed to be left partly to the government itself. Third, even when the Diet eventually approved participation in 'sharp end' peacekeeping activities, the government would still need advance approval from the Diet, but again the decision as to where the line should be drawn for

30 For details, see Annex B, pp.89-90.
activities that would not need Diet approval apparently lay largely with the government. Finally, the question of whether Japanese peacekeepers would be under UN or Japanese command seemed deliberately vague. The director of the United Nations Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, Minoru Tamba, reportedly claimed that UN command and the Prime Minister's command were 'one and the same'. As many Japanese saw it, UN guidelines on the use of arms in peacekeeping were too liberal to be consistent with Japan's constitutional ban on the use of force.

From the point of view of sustaining a consensus among Japanese on their international role in a post-Cold War world, the least satisfactory aspect of the quest for peacekeeping legislation was the nature of the debate and the handling of the bills in the Diet. Both bills were pushed forward for specific purposes, the first to make a show of trying to get personnel to the Gulf, the second to participate in Cambodian peacekeeping. The latter bill finally passed in the absence of any members of the SDPJ, the largest opposition party. One of Japan's most influential papers, the Asahi Shimbun, shared the view of many in arguing that debate should have focussed on 'carefully formulated views for the future and full reconsideration of Japan's past history' instead of how to get the SDF involved in peacekeeping. Polls showed the public remained sceptical of Tokyo's ability to exercise effective civilian control. Thus, the government was forced to accept a series of amendments testifying to this scepticism, and leading to flawed legislation. While Japanese expressed strong support for promoting Japan's contribution to the international community, they were strongly divided on the issue of sending SDF forces overseas.

Thus, far from striding boldly into the ranks of peacekeepers, Japan stumbled forward, hoping that in the interest of sustaining the US-Japan security treaty, everything would somehow work out given time. Just as some of the public had warmed to the idea of dispatching the SDF abroad after the successful deployment of MSDF minesweepers to the Persian Gulf following the Gulf war, the government hoped that public support for peacekeeping would grow

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once Japan had completed a successful mission. However, many officials were clearly nervous that the Cambodian conflict, fraught with its physical and political minefields, should have been the first cab off the rank. Before the contingent began to leave, opponents were already on the offensive arguing that the government had failed to meet its own guidelines by going ahead without the specific approval of the Khmer Rouge for Japan's participation, and while it refused to comply with the disarmament phase of the ceasefire agreement. Nonetheless, early in September, Cabinet approved the dispatch of 1811 SDF personnel and civilian police during a 12-month period, comprising an eight-member unit of SDF officers in September 1992 to act as ceasefire monitors, and 600 GSDF engineers in October (both groups to be replaced after six months). A total of 75 civilian police were also sent in October for a nine-month assignment, while 520 personnel were drawn from MSDF and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) units to transport peacekeeping personnel to Cambodia. The Japanese press were told that ceasefire monitors would be unarmed while the other units would be allowed to take 133 handguns and 1044 rifles for self-defence purposes, although these weapons would normally be held in storage.33

The Status and Role of the SDF

The Japanese public has kept its military in the proverbial 'doghouse' since the end of World War II, reluctant to rehabilitate them from the ignominy of having led the nation into the disastrous Pacific war. During the 1930s, Japan's military were virtually free of any form of effective civilian control, while they frequently intervened in domestic political affairs by defining almost any domestic and international development as a national security matter. That experience and the impact of the war caused a pendulum swing to an opposite extreme with its own important defects. First, the genesis of the SDF in 1954, and the legal and social twilight zone they have inhabited ever since, have created a poor environment for developing healthy civilian-military relations. Second, postwar means of civilian control (Bunmin Tosei or Shibirian Kontororu) and national party politics

have not proved conducive to nourishing the concept of civilian supremacy over the military in government.

Some of the weaknesses of postwar arrangements were sharply exposed in the course of putting peacekeeping legislation in place. For example, early efforts of officials to find ways of sending SDF forces to the Gulf while avoiding a military 'colouring' in order to meet constitutional requirements led to serious tension between some civilian officials and the SDF. A former vice-minister of the Defense Agency, Seiki Nishihiro, commented that the SDF had felt 'greatly insulted' by the way they were treated. 'Most everybody agreed', he argued, 'that SDF personnel were the only ones who could be asked to face the difficulties and the dangers in the gulf; people's biggest concern was with finding a way to dissociate them from the SDF organization before they were dispatched'. Arguably, a military which was confident of its role and standing in Japanese society would not have reacted so negatively. Instead, it would have accepted that its job was to deal with the difficult and dangerous. Should the national interest require a clear distinction between its role of defending Japan, and the task of peacekeeping in order to sustain confidence in Japan's commitment not to become a military power which could threaten other countries, then the SDF should have accepted that situation and responded to civilian control.

Moreover, the crisis exposed the pitiable position in which the Japanese party system can leave the Commander-in-Chief, SDF, and counter-productive aspects of civilian control over the military. Under the 1954 SDF and Defense Agency laws, the Prime Minister (who must be a civilian and an elected member of the Lower House of the Diet) is Commander-in-Chief of the SDF; and since the Director-General of the Defense Agency is a state minister, he also must be a civilian to comply with the constitutional requirement that all state ministers be civilians. Finally, in what might be called 'bureaucratic control' (Bunkan Tosei), senior civilian officials head various bureaux within the Defense Agency. Since these powerful officials have generally been seconded from other ministries, with the Home Ministry and police dominating key bureaux, their presence exposes the military to control by other

34 Japan Echo, Vol.XIX, No.2, Summer 1992, p.64.
ministries. Their influence on military matters on which they might not be well qualified to advise has been a ready source of friction with senior SDF officers. During the Gulf crisis, a weak Prime Minister could not even lead the LDP, which he nominally heads, let alone direct the SDF to provide the nucleus of a new Nordic-type unit for a Japanese peacekeeping role, even though that was his preferred second option, and it would have found majority public support. Moreover, during the drafting of peacekeeping legislation, no SDF officers were directly involved. Under postwar arrangements, their advice is filtered through civilian Defense Agency officials. Thus, many among the public, seeing that civilian authority over the military was greatly qualified by the weaknesses of the political party system, and the uneasy state of civilian-military relations, were understandably sceptical about the overseas dispatch of the SDF, having in the past seen the prohibition on their dispatch as one of the key assurances of effective control of the military.

A further major complication arises from the way in which interests within Japan, both civilian and military, exploit US-Japan security relations to advance their own agenda to return Japan to the status of a 'normal' military power, a goal that is shared by certain interests within the United States itself. With the SDF increasingly recruited to the task of sustaining the alliance as tension over trade issues got worse in the 1980s, Tokyo found itself under enormous pressure during the Gulf crisis to comply with Washington's request for SDF personnel. In fact, Japan's lack of a more autonomous defence strategy leads many Japanese to accept a weak political system, and the lack of effective mechanisms for responding to crises such as the Gulf, out of fear that otherwise the government could be overwhelmed by gai-atsu, or 'foreign pressure', at serious risk to the long-term national interest.

Although the US-Japan alliance is certainly not in any imminent danger of breaking down, these kinds of 'structural weaknesses' will need to be addressed to keep the security relationship in good repair over the longer term. Ensuring the effective development of civilian supremacy over the military branch of government, while giving the SDF a respected role and status in Japanese society, free from any legal ambiguities, should be a priority objective for Tokyo, if it is really serious about reassuring its neighbours and allies that it will not again become a military power
threatening others. It is also a priority which should have Washington's full support and cooperation. The concept of civilian control is less well grounded in Japan than among Western democracies, and even by comparison with traditional practice in Asian countries such as China and Korea. For centuries, the samurai not only determined the political fate of the Japanese nation but were also considered the leaders of the popular conscience; the morale and spirit of the warrior were as important as their material powers. However, that is not to argue that Japanese are now, or ever were, more prone to bellicosity than other peoples. It simply underlines the point that the onus is squarely on Japan itself, rather than others, to provide the reassurance that the 1930s and early 1940s were a not-to-be-repeated aberration.

Compared to Germany, Japan continues to labour under several disadvantages in its efforts to reassure neighbours that it has irrevocably changed. Its public expressions of regret over past behaviour usually seem too grudging to be convincing; Japanese who openly try to examine the 'rights and wrongs' of past behaviour domestically are all too often subject to hostility and attack; and some prominent officials have even tried to minimise and justify past wrongs. Moreover, far from being part of established regional arrangements, which could provide a measure of reassurance to neighbours through dialogue and the pursuit of common interests, Japan wields enormous unilateral economic clout within the region, and has an increasingly difficult alliance relationship with a global power whose interests are oriented more towards Europe than East Asia. Thus a large measure of misgiving characterised Asian reaction to the passage of the peacekeeping bill.36

The enormous impact of the Vietnam experience on the American psyche pales in significance compared with the lingering trauma of the Pacific war for many Japanese. Despite the lapse of time, Americans should be more understanding of the predicament of these Japanese than many showed themselves to be during the Gulf war. Policy-makers in Washington should also be more sensitive to the domestic political consequences of their pressure on Japan to 'stand

up and be counted', and wary of Japanese who praise Americans for possessing the 'samurai spirit' which these voices allege is now lacking in Japan. Otherwise, Washington risks helping weaken the very political forces of liberalism and internationalism in Japan which will be crucial to the future of the alliance, while promoting the nativistic and racial sentiments which could bring about its destruction. An example of the Bush administration's lack of perception in this regard was the way it rolled out the 'red carpet' in Washington for a visit by LDP 'kingmaker', Shin Kanemaru, in mid-1992, despite the fact that his links with a major influence-peddling scandal were widely known privately in Tokyo at the time, and had every prospect of becoming public knowledge, as happened soon after.

A New Kind of Alliance

The system of alliances and alignments fashioned and led by the United States during the Cold War to oppose successfully an expansionist Soviet Union can rightly be included among America's greatest contributions to the protection and fostering of free, democratic and prosperous societies throughout the world. Since these arrangements now encompass more than two-thirds of the global economy, their preservation and expansion should be a central objective of global efforts to maintain peace and prosperity. However, in the absence of the Soviet threat to act as an all-purpose 'glue' binding members together, post-Cold War alliance arrangements will need a new sense of common purpose based on an agreed set of shared principles and interests. Moreover, in view of the diffusion of power and its changing nature in an Information Age world, an effective post-Cold War alliance system will entail greater acceptance by the United States of a cooperative approach in the pursuit of international goals, involving power-sharing as well as burden-sharing ('representation' as well as 'taxation'); a more comprehensive view of international security, so that economic and environmental issues are given greater weight relative to the military; and a greater willingness on the part of militarily powerful nations to help develop and enforce supra-national mechanisms for a world increasingly ruled by law, and shaped more by the pursuit of global prosperity than by aggressive nationalisms.
On these criteria, the Gulf war should be viewed more as the 'last hurrah' of a passing era than the harbinger of a new world order. Notwithstanding its merits, one of the more striking aspects of the crisis was the extent to which the outcome was shaped and concluded by the leaders of the same key nations which shaped the architecture of the post-World War II 'new world order': the United States, Britain and France, with important, although secondary, roles for the Soviet Union and China. Neither of the two main defeated powers, Germany or Japan, had an effective voice in coalition policy, although a post-Cold War world order cannot be put in place without their active representation. Or, for that matter, without a voice other than China's for the Third World. It was also ironic that the 'crucible of a new world order' in which force was to be eschewed as a means of settling disputes between nations should begin by demanding that Germany and Japan again take up arms. The dismal record of history shows that it is far easier to find leaders who make their name by taking their people to war in the cause of peace than leaders who would seek their place in history by working for peace through pursuing prosperity and social justice by non-military means. A world in the throes of major structural change does not need more great powers based on the traditional military-political and territorial model, but powers of a new and different kind.

Moreover, no relationship is likely to be more instrumental in determining whether a sustainable alliance system can be put in place in a post-Cold War world than the US-Japan alliance. Notwithstanding its evolution since the 1950s, the San Francisco System remains a relic of a past bipolar era, ill-suited to an emerging polycentric world, and the rising importance of East Asia. Its inequalities and the tension between the treaty system and the Constitution lie at the core of the problem. The original 1951 security treaty and the 1960 revised version represented differing compromises between, on the one hand, Washington's 'second thoughts' on the kind of Japan it wanted as an ally when faced by the Soviet threat and, on the other, the interplay of Japanese domestic politics. In essence, the anti-war Constitution and the San Francisco System are warring with each other and, especially after the needless domestic political upheaval and regional anxieties created by Japan's entry into the ranks of peacekeepers, it is the San Francisco System that should be reshaped. A robust partnership between the United States, as a great
traditional military power, and Japan, as an Information Age civilian power, based on equality and mutual respect, and a renewed Japanese commitment to its Peace Constitution, should properly qualify as a 'crucible' of a new order.

Fear of a return to Japanese militarism is not the issue as much as whether the United States and the international community will support Japan's search for a 'third way' between the kind of merchant state it has been, and the 'normal' political-military power of contemporary times. Japan seeks acceptance as a 'normal' member of the international community which eschews a sovereign right to belligerency. It seeks a role, acceptable to its people, which sustains Japan's domestic cohesion and safeguards its security, including its core societal values; reassures its neighbours of its peaceful intentions; and makes an honourable contribution to the international common good while earning Japan authority and prestige commensurate with its economic and financial power.

As a different kind of power, Japan would continue a peacekeeping role under the aegis of the United Nations, but not pursue the constitutional reinterpretation of the Ozawa report. Rather, it could revisit the option of creating a Nordic-type peacekeeping force separate from the SDF in order to strengthen domestic and regional support for its peacekeeping role, and to create, over time, the domestic climate for enhancing public confidence in civilian control of the military, as well as the standing of the SDF in Japanese society, while removing any doubts about their legal position. Japan would also increasingly assume full responsibility for its own self-defence, within established parameters, remaining under the American nuclear umbrella. However, it would clarify and reaffirm its commitment to policies such as the 'three non-nuclear principles', the ban on weapons exports, and constraints on military spending.

Few, if any, countries are better positioned than Japan to evolve as a prototype of a civilian power. As an economic superpower at the cutting edge of technological innovation, Japan has the capacity to play a leading role in strengthening international security through non-military means. It would build upon its efforts already underway in the area of arms control, assisting in providing both the technology and funding for surveillance and verification systems. It would also actively promote regional security dialogue and demilitarisation.
However, it would make its main contribution to the international community by advancing social and economic order through development programs addressing poverty, debt, health care, underdevelopment, population control, and environmental protection.
CONCLUSION

Far from striding boldly into the ranks of peacekeepers, Japan has stumbled forward haltingly, hoping that, in the interest of sustaining its security alliance with the United States, the domestic turmoil and regional anxiety left in the wake of reinterpreting its Peace Constitution in order to send its Self-Defense Forces overseas could be managed successfully over time. Japan has joined UN peacekeeping operations at a time of fundamental change and considerable uncertainty in international society. The United States, and other Western nations had insisted during the Gulf crisis that Japan should contribute personnel, as well as money, to collective efforts to maintain international peace and security, and that its contributions should be 'commensurate' with its economic and financial standing.

Japan finds that its national defence strategy, based since 1952 on an unequal security treaty with the United States, nominally pending a more effective United Nations, has left it in an uneasy position in a post-Cold War East Asian security environment. It faces anxiety among its neighbours, especially the Koreas and China, over the size of its defence spending, and now the dispatch of its forces overseas for the first time since World War II for peacekeeping operations; yet, it remains heavily dependent on the United States for its defence. Moreover, since the alliance grew out of the Soviet threat, the longer term outlook for American support has become more clouded. Renewed questioning of the need for the alliance has also arisen within Japan. In view of an increasingly self-assertive nationalism and generational change, more and more Japanese could become impatient with leaders who accept the presence of foreign military forces which are partly intended to keep Japan itself contained. During the 1990s, most American forces in Japan could be withdrawn, either in response to cuts in US defence spending, or to ease political tension in Japan.

A central dilemma for Japan is that it must now seek its future in both the 'Orient' and the 'Occident'. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of Soviet power removed a buffer between Japan and its history and geography - the reality of living cheek by jowl with China, Korea and Russia - and the demands that can entail. It also exposed Japan more nakedly to the key challenge of the post-Cold War world -
the global contest for economic strength and technological prowess - and, especially, the import of American perceptions that Japan's success in these fields, rather than any hostile military power, most threatens their future. Thus, as Japanese peacekeepers arrived in Cambodia, largely at American behest, Emperor Akihito, responding fortuitously to a 14-year old invitation, became the first Japanese monarch ever to visit China, pointedly reminding everyone of a past era of close Sino-Japanese cooperation.

Although foreign comment tended to focus on the significance of the Emperor's visit for Sino-Japanese commercial relations, the more important issues were cultural and political. In contrast to the significant public scepticism over the Cambodian peacekeeping mission, the Emperor's visit to China had strong public support, with a solid majority approving an apology for the wartime period. While the more extreme elements of Japan's political left and right, for differing reasons, were among those opposing the visit, those among the moderate left and middle-ground, who were alienated by the peacekeeping bill, welcomed it. Indeed, the Social Democratic Party of Japan, the largest opposition party, for whom the peacekeeping legislation was a major defeat, has been both an advocate of closer ties with China and a critic of the US-Japan security treaty for obstructing that goal. Thus, the Emperor's visit signalled a Japan which has taken a discreet but decisive step away from its deferential merchant-state attitude towards the United States, with a suggestion that Japan could be returning to its post-World War II 'starting point' to find the values and ideals in foreign policy which Japanese people saw as appropriate for them, and, hence, would willingly defend.

Samurai Nation or Civilian Power?

A central fear of many Japanese during the protracted debate on peacekeeping, and political manoeuvring to get legislation in place, was that peacekeeping could become a slippery slope to Japan eventually rejoining the ranks of warrior states. Moves to bend the interpretation of the Peace Constitution to the limit, and beyond, especially by powerful ruling party interests, have set the stage for a future push to involve Japan in collective Gulf-type security operations. The Japanese public has kept its military in the proverbial 'doghouse' since the end of the World War II, reluctant to rehabilitate
them from the ignominy of having led the nation into the disastrous Pacific war. Both Japanese and American conservative opinion leaders, who support a greater military role for Japan in international security, use phrases such as *Heiwa-boke* ('peace senility') to imply that Japan has become soft and irresponsible since 1945, out of touch with the real world. These kinds of slurs have deflected attention from an underlying concern of many Japanese about the fragility of their democratic institutions, and their lack of confidence in the ability of civilians to sustain control over a revitalised and newly assertive military. While many of the old taboos in discussing security affairs dissipated during the peacekeeping debate, the issue of civilian-military relations remained highly sensitive and generally neglected.

Behind-the-scenes civilian-military clashes during the Gulf crisis, and the call in October 1992 by a senior GSDF officer for a coup as 'the only way' to purge Japan of corrupt politicians, no matter how extreme and unrepresentative of the army, highlighted the pertinence of the issue of civilian-military relations. The refusal of the SDF to support civilian proposals for a Nordic-type peacekeeping force, separate from the SDF, highlighted a certain lack of responsiveness to civilian control. Many Japanese, seeing that civilian authority over the military was also qualified by the weaknesses of the political party system, were understandably sceptical about the overseas dispatch of the SDF, having in the past seen the ban on their dispatch as one of the key assurances of effective control of the military.

Although the US-Japan alliance is not in any danger of breaking down, these kinds of 'structural weaknesses' will need to be addressed to keep the security relationship in good repair over the longer term. Ensuring the effective development of civilian supremacy over the military branch of government, while giving the SDF a respected, less ambiguous, role and status in Japanese society, should be a priority objective of Tokyo, if it is really serious about reassuring its neighbours and allies that it will not again become a military power threatening others. The concept of civilian control over the military is less well grounded in Japan than among Western democracies, and even by comparison with traditional practice in China and Korea. For centuries, the samurai not only determined the political fate of the Japanese nation but were also considered the leaders of the popular conscience; the morale and spirit of the warrior were as important as their material powers. That is not, however, to argue that Japanese
might be more prone to bellicosity than other peoples, or ever were, but simply to underline the point that only Japan itself, and not Washington, or anyone else, can provide the ultimate reassurance that the 1930s and early 1940s were a not-to-be-repeated aberration. Compared to Germany, Japan continues to labour under several disadvantages in its efforts to reassure the region that it has irrevocably changed; and that was why a large measure of misgiving marked Asian reaction to the use of the SDF in its peacekeeping role.

The enormous impact of the Vietnam experience on the American psyche pales in significance compared with the lingering trauma of the Pacific war for many Japanese. Despite the lapse of time, American and other Western critics of Japan should be more understanding of the Japanese predicament than many showed themselves to be during the Gulf war. Policy-makers in Washington should also be more sensitive to the domestic political consequences of their pressure on Japan to 'stand up and be counted', and wary of Japanese who praise Americans for possessing the 'samurai spirit' which these voices allege is now lacking in Japan. Otherwise, Washington risks helping weaken the very political forces of liberalism and internationalism in Japan which will be critical to the future of the alliance, while promoting the nativistic and racial sentiments which could bring about its destruction. The fact that interests within Japan, both civilian and military, exploit US-Japan security relations to advance their own agenda to return Japan to the status of a 'normal' military power, a goal that is shared by certain interests within the United States itself, leads many Japanese to accept a weak political system, and the lack of effective mechanisms for responding to crises such as the Gulf war, out of fear that otherwise the government could be overwhelmed by gai-atsu ('foreign pressure') at serious risk to the long-term national interest.

From the point of view of sustaining a consensus among Japanese on their international role in a post-Cold War world, the least satisfactory aspect of the quest for peacekeeping legislation was the nature of the debate and the handling of the bills in the Diet. Both bills were pushed forward for specific purposes, the first to make a show of trying to get personnel to the Gulf, the second to participate in Cambodian peacekeeping. The latter bill finally passed in the absence of the main opposition party. One of Japan's most influential papers, the Asahi Shim bun, put the view of many in arguing that debate should
have focussed on 'carefully formulated views for the future and full reconsideration of Japan's past history' instead of how to get the SDF involved in peacekeeping. Polls showed strong public support for promoting Japan's contribution to the international community, but that Japanese were deeply divided on the issue of sending SDF forces overseas.

Japan as Peacekeeper

American and other allied pressure on Japan at the time of the Gulf crisis had the salutary effect of a long overdue 'wake up' call. Japan needed to move much more robustly in contributing to international security than it was at that time. But it was insensitive and mistaken to have pushed for the overseas dispatch of the SDF, first for the Gulf and then for Cambodian peacekeeping, partly by mocking and shaming Tokyo into action. Instead, Washington and other Western governments should have actively helped Japan find roles that the great majority of Japanese people would fully support. The domestic turmoil and regional anxiety created by the enactment of the peacekeeping legislation could prove unsettling for regional stability, and costly for Western interests in East Asia.

Japan and the Asia-Pacific region would be better served were Japan to evolve as a different kind of post-Cold War power, contributing to global security mainly by non-military means. A world in the throes of major structural changes does not need more great powers based on the traditional military-political and territorial model. A partnership between the United States, as a great traditional military power, and Japan, as an Information Age 'civilian power', based on equality and mutual respect, and a renewed Japanese commitment to its Peace Constitution, would make a far more positive contribution to East Asian and world peace than a Japan offering its military services in various parts of the world. Nor is fear of Japanese militarism as much the issue as whether the United States and the international community will support Japan's search for a 'third way' between the kind of merchant state it has been, and the 'normal' political-military power of contemporary times.

Few, if any, countries could be better placed than Japan to evolve as a prototype of a civilian power. Japan has the capacity to play a leading role in strengthening international security through
non-military means. It would build upon its efforts in the area of arms control, assisting in providing both the technology and finance for surveillance and verification systems. It would also actively promote regional security dialogue, confidence-building measures and demilitarisation. As a different kind of power, Japan might reconsider the option of a Nordic-type peacekeeping force separate from the SDF in order to strengthen domestic and regional support for its peacekeeping role, and to create a better domestic climate for enhancing public confidence in civilian control of the military, and the standing of the SDF in Japanese society. Japan would also increasingly assume full responsibility for its own self-defence, within established parameters, remaining under the American nuclear umbrella. However, it would clarify and reaffirm its commitment to policies such as the 'three non-nuclear principles', the ban on weapons exports, and constraints on military budgets. And it would make its main contribution to the international community by advancing social and economic order through development programs addressing poverty, debt, health care, underdevelopment, population control and environmental protection.
ANNEX A

CHRONOLOGY OF THE PEACEKEEPING LAW

1990
2 Aug.: Iraqi forces invade Kuwait.
7 Aug.: The US decides to send troops to Saudi Arabia.
25 Aug.: The UN Security Council adopts a resolution allowing limited use of military force against Iraq.
29 Aug.: Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu announces an initial package of financial aid for the multinational force deployed in the Gulf region. He discloses an idea for a legal measure that would allow Japan to cooperate with UN peacekeeping efforts but rules out overseas dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces.
16 Oct.: The Government submits to the Diet the UN Peace Cooperation Bill to enable participation by the SDF in support activities for the multinational force.
8 Nov.: The Liberal Democratic Party, Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party agree to scrap the bill.
9 Nov.: The LDP, Komeito and the DSP agree on an organisation, separate from the SDF, to join UN peacekeeping operations.
29 Nov.: The UN Security Council adopts a resolution authorising military action against Iraq if Baghdad fails to meet a Jan. 15 deadline for pulling out of Kuwait.

1991
17 Jan.: Operation Desert Storm begins with air attacks against Iraq.
24 Jan.: The government decides (i) to extend US$9 billion to the multinational force; (ii) to use SDF planes to airlift displaced people from the Gulf region, and (iii) to charter commercial airliners to transport Asians from the region. However, the use of SDF planes was not executed.
24 Febr.: Ground war against Iraq begins.
27 Febr.: Iraq announces its acceptance of all UN resolutions related to the Gulf crisis. The war ends at midnight.
24 April: The government officially decides to send Maritime Self-Defense Force minesweepers to the Persian Gulf.
26 April: Flotilla of MSDF minesweepers leaves for the Gulf.
19 Sept.: Government submits to the Diet a new bill to allow SDF personnel to take part in UN peacekeeping operations, including operations by armed peacekeeping forces.
4 Oct.: The bill is carried over to the next session of the Diet.

5 Nov.: Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa forms a new Cabinet.
18 Nov.: The Diet resumes deliberations on peacekeeping bill.
27 Nov.: The LDP, Komeito railroad the bill through the Lower House Ad Hoc Committee on International Peace Cooperation.
3 Dec.: The Lower House passes the bill.
20 Dec.: The bill is carried over to the next session of the Diet.

1992
24 Jan.: Ordinary session of Diet is convened.
31 Jan.: Miyazawa pledges at a UN Security Council summit that Japan will pass the bill during the current session.
11 Mar.: Yasushi Akashi, head of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia urges Japan to provide more assistance for UNTAC.
15 Mar.: UNTAC begins full operations.
23 Mar.: Cambodian Premier Hun Sen urges Miyazawa to send SDF personnel to UNTAC.
28 Apr.: The Upper House Select Committee on International Peace and Cooperation resumes deliberations on the bill.
29 May: The LDP, Komeito, DSP agree to revise the bill.
1 June: The LDP, Komeito and the DSP submit a revision to the bill to the Upper House committee. It freezes for the time being Japan's participation in operations by armed peacekeeping forces and calls for prior Diet approval each time SDF personnel are dispatched overseas for types of peacekeeping operations that cannot be carried out by civilian organisations. It provides for a review three years later.
5 June: The LDP, Komeito and the DSP ram the bill through the Upper House select committee.
9 June: The Upper House passes the bill in a plenary session after more than three full days of delays caused by the 'ox walk' tactic adopted by the Social Democratic Party of Japan, Rengo Sangin and the Japanese Community Party.
11 June: The Lower House Select Committee on International Peace and Cooperation passes the bill.
15 June: The Lower House enacts the bill in a plenary session.
ANNEX B

SUMMARY OF TERMS AND SCOPE OF THE PEACEKEEPING LAW

The Prime Minister must receive Diet approval each time Self-Defense Forces personnel are sent on any of the following peacekeeping operations:

- monitoring compliance of ceasefire arrangements;
- supervising the disarming, withdrawal or redeployment of troops;
- patrolling in a buffer zone;
- checking the movement of weapons;
- collecting, maintaining or disposing of discarded weapons;
- assisting in ceasefire line demarcation;
- assisting in exchange of prisoners of war;
- engaging in other tasks similar to these activities specified by a government ordinance.

However, a ban will remain in force on the above peacekeeping activities pending further legislation.

When the Diet is adjourned or the Lower House has been dissolved, the Prime Minister must seek Diet approval without delay as soon as the next legislative session convenes.

When the government extends participation in peacekeeping operations beyond two years, it must receive Diet approval again.

Diet approval is unnecessary for participation by Japanese personnel in other peacekeeping operations such as:

- monitoring elections;
- assisting and monitoring local police;
- providing aid in civil administration areas;
provision of medical care;
- searching for, and rescuing refugees;
- providing refugees with food, clothing and medical care, etc.;
- setting up of shelters for refugees;
- reparation/construction of basic life-supporting facilities;
- assisting removal of contamination and other damage to the natural environment;
- provision of transport and communications facilities, storage of materials, construction of all sorts and provision of machines and equipments.

The total number of personnel to take part in peacekeeping operations or in international humanitarian relief activities will not exceed 2000.

Without Diet approval, the government can provide necessary goods free of charge, or at prices lower than market price, to the UN and other parties or organisations that are engaging in peacekeeping operations or international humanitarian relief activities.

Without Diet approval, the government can use ships or aircraft of the SDF or the Maritime Safety Agency to transport displaced people and goods for humanitarian relief activities and for some peacekeeping operations.

In unavoidable situations, individual members on a peacekeeping mission can use small arms to protect themselves or other members. Use of the weapons must be within a rational limit dictated by the circumstances.

The government must review the law three years after it has gone into effect.
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Japan has joined UN peacekeeping operations at a time of fundamental change and considerable uncertainty in international society. The United States, and other Western allies, had insisted during the Gulf crisis that Japan should contribute personnel, as well as money, to collective efforts to maintain world peace and security, and that its contributions should be 'commensurate' with its economic and financial standing. But far from striding boldly into the ranks of peacekeepers, Japan has hesitantly taken only a half-step forward. Tokyo hopes that it can juggle conflicting demands; on the one hand, for sustaining its security alliance with the United States, absent a Soviet threat, and, on the other, for managing the domestic turmoil and regional anxiety caused by needing to reinterpret its Peace Constitution to send its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) overseas for the first time since World War II. The end of the Cold War removed a buffer between Japan and its history and geography - the reality of living cheek by jowl with China, Korea and Russia; it also exposed Japan more nakedly to the key contemporary challenge - the global contest for economic strength and technological prowess - and, especially, to the import of American perceptions that Japan's success in these fields, rather than any hostile military power, most threatened America's future.

Pressure on Japan during the Gulf crisis had the salutary effect of an overdue 'wake up' call. Japan needed to move more robustly in contributing to international security than it was at that time. But it was insensitive and mistaken to have pushed for the overseas dispatch of the SDF. Instead, Washington, and other allies, should have actively helped Japan find non-military ways to fulfil its international responsibilities which the great majority of Japanese people could fully support, and which would have helped reassure Japan's neighbours of its commitment not to become a military power which threatens other countries.