Problems in Australian Defence Planning
The author reviews the rationale behind defence forward planning and suggests that planners are giving insufficient attention to the indirect threat posed by the Soviet Union. To counter this indirect threat he suggests that strategic priority should be given to regional defence and in place of the 'core force' concept the implementation of a prospective planning system based on the analysis of relevant contingencies.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

During this work I have been encouraged by the successive Heads of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Dr Robert O'Neill, Dr Tom Millar and Dr Desmond Ball. I also give special thanks to Colonel J.O. Langtry (Retired) of the Centre for his help and encouragement throughout. Finally, I am indebted to the many military and civilian officers of the Department of Defence who have contributed either directly or indirectly to this work.

Ray Sunderland
Canberra 1985
Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence are a series of monograph publications which arise out of the work of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University. Previous Canberra Papers have covered topics such as the relationship of the superpowers, arms control at both the superpower and South-east Asian regional level, regional strategic relationships and major aspects of Australian defence policy. For a complete list refer to the last pages of this volume.

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PREFACE

In February 1985 Australia's Minister for Defence, Mr Kim Beazley, announced that the Government would undertake a major review of Australia's defence capabilities. Mr Paul Dibb, a Senior Research Fellow at the Australian National University's Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, was appointed to conduct the review.

Mr Dibb is to report within 12 months and his terms of reference require him:

a to undertake a review of the content, priorities and rationale of defence forward planning in the light of strategic and financial planning guidance endorsed by the Government;

b to advise on present and future capabilities and on the present and future balance between resource elements such as manpower, activities, operating stocks, facilities and equipment - where appropriate that advice should indicate priorities for changes to particular defence force elements within various time-frames;

c to advise on whether strategic guidance to Government can be made more explicit for future defence forward planning.

In this monograph I examine some of the matters which are the subject of the current Government review, particularly the rationale behind defence forward planning. To help the reader through the pages ahead, a few observations may be helpful. The monograph is the result of efforts made over the past decade to come to grips with the problems of defence planning under conditions of considerable uncertainty. I had, and still have, many difficulties with the 'core-force' concept of defence planning. First, because it is a very poor substitute for a military strategy, second because its success depends on making timely responses to perceptions of developing threats, and third, because it provides little rationale for making force structure decisions.

I put my thoughts together in a series of Working Papers which were published by the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre over the period 1981 to 1985. In the first
of these, *Australia's Next War?*, I examined the strategic concepts evolved since World War II which have been conditioned by a fear that disputes between nations might escalate to nuclear war. I suggested that Australia was vulnerable to 'strategies of persuasion' and that defence planners should study the strategies of low-level conflict, the influence of third parties and policy constraints on the use of force.

In the next working paper, *Australia's Changing Threat Perceptions*, I pointed to the increase in Soviet activity in Australia's area of strategic interest and the need for a defence strategy which would minimise opportunities for Soviet expansion, either directly or through the use of surrogates. This led to a third working paper entitled *Australia's Emerging Regional Defence Strategy*, in which I noted that the defence and foreign policy initiatives of successive Australian governments showed clearly an emerging strategy based on a doctrine of regional participation. I then suggested that the Australian Defence Force should be optimised to contribute to stability in the region and, as a last resort, to the defence of continental Australia.

The final two working papers, *Australia's Defence Forces - Ready or Not?* and *Selecting Long-Term Force Structure Objectives*, dealt with the concept of readiness and the need for a planning system which takes account of strategy, perceived threats and readiness. A prospective planning system was suggested to cope with the uncertainty that presently prevails.

These Working Papers provide the foundation for the concepts developed in the following pages. I believe that considerable improvements in the capabilities of the Australian Defence Force can be achieved without substantial increases in defence spending. These improvements can be made by changing the intangible components of military power, such as improved strategic doctrine, more realistic threat assessments and improved planning systems. The 'core-force' concept should be replaced by activity aimed at setting long-term force structure objectives. A Prospective Planning System provides a solution to the problem of planning under conditions of great uncertainty.
CHAPTER 1
THE STRATEGIC PROBLEM

The problem that has plagued Australian defence planning over the past decade is uncertainty about the nature of future threats. This uncertainty engendered a strategic concept which goes by the name of 'core-force'; a concept which provides no rationale for the selection of force structure objectives. It is not the first time that Australia has been afflicted with this problem, it is one of the enduring features of our strategic environment. When Australia's defence force was founded, a little over one hundred years ago, defence planners were faced with similar uncertainty. Indeed there is some similarity between the threat perceptions of today and those of our colonial forebears, who imagined Russian ships raiding our shores.1

Australia's isolated geographic location provides much of its security; it also creates much uncertainty about the nature of possible threats. A potential enemy would need to possess considerable resources to invade Australia and given the difficulties of hiding preparations for attack we should have considerable warning time. Given time, a small defence force could possibly expand to meet any threats which might eventuate. This is the logic behind the 'core-force' concept. But history tells us that we cannot view defence issues in such simplistic terms. Political expediency may again dictate that we dispatch an expeditionary force; raids on the mainland and on our territories may indeed become a possibility. Is it prudent to eschew even the remote possibility of invasion? Coherent defence planning demands that we examine all such contingencies.

In 1984 the defence planning document entitled 'The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy' was leaked to the press.2 While the leak of such a highly classified document may be judged as reprehensible, it nevertheless provides us with a unique opportunity to analyse the starting point of the defence planning process. The document is startling, not for the classified information revealed but for what it tells us about the defence planning process.
If we are searching for information on which to base force structure decisions, then there are only slim pickings. A few examples illustrate the point.

After a nuclear conflict, it seems likely that the principal requirement for the Defence Force, as for the nation as a whole, would be to adapt quickly to the changed situation, and to help government, as required, to preserve stability and security to facilitate that adaptation.

It is not necessary, because of the unlikelihood of the situation occurring, to direct defence effort toward dealing with post-nuclear conflict circumstances at the expense of other present and prospective requirements; nor would it be practicable to attempt this, in view of the indefinable and highly speculative nature of the contingency. This follows a statement that

It would be prudent to assume that the facilities (the joint US/Australian defence related facilities in Australia) would be seen by the USSR to be directly assisting the US and might be attacked in a super-power nuclear exchange. If this assumption is valid, surely it would also be prudent for the Australian Defence Force to possess some capability to monitor the effects of nuclear weapons and also possess some decontamination capability.

The document provides a little more help to the defence planner on the subject of chemical and biological warfare. Independent of Australia's treaty commitments, we see no security advantage to Australia now in the acquisition of chemical or biological weapons. We recognise, however, that such weapons could be acquired relatively easily by unfriendly nations should they see advantage.

The Defence Force, and particularly ground forces prepared for ready deployment, should continue to provide basic training in chemical warfare defence and in the broad characteristics of biological warfare. The potential force structure implications of this guidance include the provision of protective and decontamination equipment, filtration systems in combat vehicles, aircraft
and perhaps ships, and the whole range of training and logistic support that would be required to maintain such a capability.

When discussing the potential for conflict between the superpowers the document concludes that 'Australia could not be assured of necessary military supplies, except for items in which we were self-reliant or had been able to stockpile before the conflict'. There is no discussion of the need for a stocking policy for this or any other contingency. The Defence Force presently has no stocking policy.

The possibility of involvement in conflict beyond Australia's area of primary interest is dismissed, despite the substantial historical precedent for involvement in such conflicts.

Proposals for Australian defence involvement beyond our area of primary interest are too unlikely, the circumstances too uncertain and our probable military role too minor to require special provision in our force structure.

This brings us to considerations of the defence of Australia and here the force structure guidance becomes even fuzzier.

Indonesia could now, with some little preparation and using its full air and sea transport capabilities, deploy an attacking force of some seven lightly equipped battalions onto nearby Australian mainland territory. However, such a force would be vulnerable to a counter-attack from air and sea and could not count upon secure logistic support. An enterprise of this sort, so lacking in military or political rationale, is not a realistic prospect against which to plan our defence development and activity now.

While this contingency is regarded as an unrealistic prospect at present, it at least provides a measure of guidance on the size and type of force the Australian Defence Force might be required to deter. Such guidance is vital when making decisions on the deterrent forces required, range and capabilities of weapon systems, armour protection, characteristics required of our electronic
warfare systems and communications. The development of logistic and infrastructure support also requires that some guidance be given on the most likely area of operations.

In the end the document seems to favour raids and harassment as being the type of contingency, albeit improbable and remote, having the most impact on Australia's basic defence posture. (Shades of our colonial heritage.)

However, Indonesia might use military force to harass remote settlements, coastal shipping and other targets around Australia's north ... The national interests and military capabilities of both countries suggest that, sooner or later, the outcome of such a campaign would be a negotiated settlement ... In a campaign of harassment of Australia, Australian territories at Christmas and Cocos Islands could be favoured targets.9

Having gone through all this analysis we are left no better off than we were at the beginning.

Requirements for a basic defence posture - force infrastructure and activities - relevant to neighbourhood contingencies are always likely substantially to exceed resources allocated ... In sum, the basic strategic features of our own neighbourhood have potential to absorb our total defence effort. Neighbourhood contingencies might now be seen as remote. Should they develop, however, we would face defence problems of grave dimensions.10

This summary gives point to my argument - we must examine these contingencies to establish our force structure objectives. If we fail to do so we will surely face defence problems of even graver dimensions.

The ANZUS alliance, once the cornerstone of Australian defence policy, is in disarray and it is difficult to conceive how we can ever return to the comfortable relationships of the past. New Zealand continues with the incredible argument that it can continue to be allied with the US but not under the US nuclear umbrella. It is like saying that it would like to be defended by US conventional forces but it would refuse to be defended by nuclear forces. If for no other reason than this, it is time to rethink Australia's defence strategy.
To solve the strategic problems we must devise a planning system for the management of ambiguity and paradox. The source of ambiguity is an inadequately defined threat environment; the paradox is how to defend so much with so little.

Notes

2  The National Times, March 30 to April 5, 1984.
3  Ibid, p. 23.
4  Ibid.
5  Ibid., p. 24.
6  Ibid.
7  Ibid., p. 28.
8  Ibid., p. 30.
9  Ibid.
10  Ibid.
Early in 1980 the Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence directed its Sub-Committee on Defence Matters to monitor the implementation of the Government's defence programmes. In the course of its hearings, the Sub-Committee found that there were widespread misunderstandings of what constitutes a threat to Australia's security. The Sub-Committee asserted that 'no analysis of a defence programme can proceed without a thorough understanding of the types of threats and contingencies which may be faced by the Australian Defence Force'. The Sub-Committee discussed threat in terms of both the capabilities and intentions of a potential enemy and pointed out that, while theoretical capabilities are to a degree measurable in terms of a country's resources and military order of battle, the assessment of intentions is a much more complex matter.

For the purposes of their report, the Sub-Committee classified threats to Australia under four main headings: potential for global conflict and its implications for Australia, invasion of Australia, intermediate levels of threats to Australian interests, and low-level contingencies. In the course of preparing the Report, the Sub-Committee took more than 1,800 pages of public evidence over a period of 12 months and a further amount of evidence 'in camera'. As such, the Report could make a substantial contribution to the defence-planning process.

In reviewing the potential for global conflict and its implications for Australia and its region, the Sub-Committee identified the following trends:

- a continuing high level of strategic nuclear competition and military expenditure between the superpowers, but within the framework of restraints;
- continuing and perhaps increased superpower tensions and competition in regions of instability and confrontation, with the recurrent risk of escalation;
continued tensions between the Soviet Union and the Western Alliance, China and, to a lesser degree, the larger part of the non-aligned group;

- less emphasis on a bi-polar structure internationally, giving third powers, or groups of powers, more room to manoeuvre;

- further nuclear proliferation;

- an international agenda largely devoted to the political and economic concerns of Third World countries, and to international issues with important consequences for stability on a global and regional level; of utmost importance in this regard is the continued security of oil supplies.5

A good deal of space (42 out of 54 pages) is given in the Report to the potential for global conflict and the possibility of invasion of Australia. Little space (9 pages) is given to what is described as intermediate levels of threat and low-level contingencies. This treatment is surprising in the light of the conclusion on page 54: Australia is more likely to suffer low-level contingencies than the intermediate levels of threat, mentioned in this report, or invasion. These low-level threats could arise at short notice and could give rise to challenging problems. There is uncertainty regarding the extent and timing of allied support for several contingencies in the regional environment that may confront Australia. This calls for continuing emphasis on self-reliance by Australia and possession of well-balanced defence forces.6

In acknowledging that Australia would suffer damage either directly or indirectly as a result of a nuclear exchange between the superpowers, the Report concludes that 'deterrence to nuclear attack on Australia is inseparable from deterrence to global or nuclear war in general'.7 In considering the strategic environment in global terms the Sub-Committee asserts that 'overall, there is a clear comprehension by both superpowers of the awesome consequences of escalation to nuclear conflict ... The threat of general devastation that a nuclear war would entail not only deters nuclear aggression, but it also serves as a very powerful deterrent against some acts of conventional aggression'.8
The Sub-Committee's study of the nature and probability of threats to Australia's security leads it to conclude that large-scale attack on Australia is 'remote and improbable in the foreseeable future'. It later goes on to hedge its bet by stating that 'there is the danger that the emergence of such a threat may take less time than is likely to be required to obtain long-lead items of important equipment and increased trained manpower. This places a heavy responsibility on our intelligence agencies and those responsible for planning a smooth expansion of Australia's Defence Force'.

Overall the Report presents a cautiously reassuring appraisal of Australia's strategic prospects. The Sub-Committee points out 'that the relative absence of short and medium range threats arises not only from Australia's fortunate geographical isolation, but also from the success thus far of the war prevention strategy of the Western Alliance'.

On 14 December 1982 the then Minister for Defence, Mr Ian Sinclair, responded to the Report of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence discussed above. He said that the Government did not disagree 'with the broad thrust of the Committee's conclusions' with respect to the possibilities and implications of global conflict.

In spite of heightened international tensions, the Government's assessment of the likelihood of global nuclear warfare is that it continues to be low. The Government considers that the penalties attaching to nuclear warfare are a formidable constraint on both powers. It supports the efforts of these powers to find a basis for strategic arms control through agreed and verifiable measures to limit and reduce nuclear forces. The Government also supports United States' efforts to reinforce the credibility of its nuclear deterrent force through measures designed to enable an adequate response to the Soviet Union's continuing improvement of its nuclear capabilities. The Government points out, however, that continued avoidance of nuclear war does not mean stability in the global order or in the various parts of the world. Nations that value their independence and that wish to protect their
interests must be prepared to be active interna-
tionally and to command military strength to support
their efforts.\textsuperscript{14}

In discussing Australia's region, Mr Sinclair went on to
state that the Government supported 'efforts to promote a
sense of regional interest and cooperation resistant to
external interference'.\textsuperscript{15} He also noted that world economic
difficulties could lead to political instability, particularly in
Third World countries, with the possibility of radical
political change with regimes 'resorting to military threat as
a way out of their economic and political difficulties'.\textsuperscript{16}

When commenting on the nature and type of threats that
could be mounted against Australia, Mr Sinclair said that
while 'such contingencies appear fanciful and remote -
clearly we cannot afford to ignore the possibility of any
level of threat to Australia'.\textsuperscript{17}

If there is any consistent lesson in the
history of military conflict it is this: undue
reliance on the theory of perceptible threat is
dangerous: time and again forecasting has proved
defective, with serious consequences.\textsuperscript{18}

Mr Sinclair referred to some of the contingencies which
could be relevant to Australian defence planning:
The Government does not believe that it is
absolved from the need to consider the contingency
of a major threat in its defence planning. Lead
times for major equipment acquisition alone dictate
this. But, however important it is to address the
contingency of a major threat, it would be quite
unrealistic to give it undue emphasis. In parti-
cular, the range of circumstances in which limited
military operations might occur against Australia,
perhaps motivated more by political than military
considerations, deserves careful attention.\textsuperscript{19}

He went on to note the range of low-level contingencies
which were included in the Sub-Committee Report:
Instances of these include sporadic attacks against
key installations; harassment of shipping; intrusions
into Australia's air space; military support for
illegal exploitation of off-shore resources; support
for dissident elements in a regional country, the
security of which is important to Australia, or even
in Australia itself; or providing assistance to overseas-based terrorist groups using violence in Australia.\textsuperscript{20}

Threat perceptions have changed significantly over the past seven years. In November 1978 the Department of Defence 'saw no identifiable threat of substance'.\textsuperscript{21} Since then there has been growing concern about the degree of threat posed by the Soviet Union. There is little doubt that this concern stems from shifts in the strategic balance of power and increasing Soviet presence in our region.

A United States' analyst, Stephen Kaplan, writing for the Brookings Institution, lists nearly 200 incidents since World War II where the Soviet Union has used, or threatened to use, their armed forces in expanding or preserving their authority outside their borders.\textsuperscript{22} Soviet conventional forces dominate the European scene. Of the 191 regular divisions which are maintained by the Soviets, 30 are in Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{23} Soviet military forces continue to exercise firm control over the Warsaw Pact allies. Political movements towards greater autonomy were crushed in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and in Poland in 1981; albeit by the Polish Army in the latter case. The West has been powerless to intervene beyond imposing sporadic economic sanctions. The US determination to reach a position of military superiority has resulted in yet another arms race, with the USSR equally determined that the US will not succeed. Despite the SALT talks, there has been no serious attempt to contain nuclear proliferation.\textsuperscript{24} The NATO alliance is in disarray. There is mounting pressure to remove nuclear weapons from Europe for fear that it will become a nuclear battleground and there have been divisions within the Western Alliance over the transfer of US technology to the Soviets, particularly over the natural gas pipeline project. These divisions serve to advance Moscow's long-term political goal of separating Western Europe from the United States.

On the southern flank of NATO, Soviet influence is widespread. The Soviet Union has contributed to Libya's massive arms build-up and Libya in turn finances, aids and trains terrorist movements which operate throughout the Western World. There is also evidence of continuing covert Soviet support for insurgent movements targeted against South Africa, Zaire, Somalia, Sudan and Chad.\textsuperscript{25}
In the south of the African continent Soviet influence is spreading. The Soviets have financed and armed Angola and the Marxist regime is currently supported by 20,000 to 25,000 Cuban troops. Angola therefore provides a potential base on the Atlantic coast which could threaten the lines of communication around the Cape of Good Hope. Much of Europe's oil is carried by this route. Cuban forces in Angola also supply arms and guidance to SWAPO guerrillas seeking power in Namibia. South Africa has reacted by making preemptive raids into Angola. The Soviets, through their Cuban surrogates, are therefore actively thwarting attempts by the United Nations to achieve independence for Namibia.

Soviet influence has also spread to the north-east of the African continent where their forces now have bases in Ethiopia and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). Ethiopia, with Cuban and Soviet support, is now engaged in a sporadic war against dissidents, while in the PDRY Soviet reconnaissance aircraft have regular use of the base at Aden. Western reliance on African mineral resources and on the sea and air communications around and across Africa is a source of vulnerability to the Soviets and their surrogates.

Soviet interest in the Middle East dates from the 1950s when the British withdrawal from Israel created a power vacuum the Soviets hoped to fill. The instability of the region remains a continuing source of tension between the Soviets and Western nations as each attempts to extend its influence. The war between Iran and Iraq continues and fighting between religious groups in Lebanon is endemic. Although the Soviets have been unable to achieve the penetration they desired, they will keep trying. They regard the area as strategically important to their interests - as does the West.

The invasion of Afghanistan is yet another example of Soviet efforts to improve its geo-strategic position in the area, albeit indirectly. While not yet in need of Middle East oil, the Soviets have sought, with partial success, to influence the oil-producing countries. This may be assumed to be a strategic goal to increase its power vis-a-vis the West.
Soviet interest in south-west Asia derives from its strategic location with respect to the trade routes across the Indian Ocean. Soviet attempts to achieve encirclement of China also influence its approach to relationships with India and Pakistan. India and Pakistan have fought each other three times; these were short bloody wars resolved in India's favour. Tensions remain; but the possibility of further conflict in the immediate future is remote. China has been the principal threat to India since the invasion of 1962, but a recurrence of this threat in the near future is unlikely. On the other hand, Soviet policy has been consistent. In competition for India's favours the Soviets have been more successful than the United States. They are now a major source of arms and there has been a considerable expansion of trade. India, thanks to Soviet aid, has enhanced its military position vis-a-vis China. However, it would be mistake to consider India as putty in Soviet hands; for example, India rejected Moscow's proposals for a collective security system as part of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship.

South-East Asia is strategically important because it sits astride the Straits of Malacca - the principal trade route between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The area is abundant in resources and vital to the security of Australia and Japan. The Soviets have prepared their groundwork for expansion of influence in the region through their support for and close association with Vietnam. Their foothold apparently is firm and they are now preparing to capitalise on their investment. Japan, an old Soviet adversary, is the dominating economic power. The Soviets will therefore offer an alternative to those regional governments who are wary of over-dependence on Japan and apprehensive about China.

Vietnam remains a threat to several countries in the region and the Vietnamese occupation of Laos and Kampuchea creates a continuous source of tension between Vietnam and China on one hand, and Vietnam and Thailand on the other.

Soviet interest and policy in east Asia seem to be directed in part towards containment of China. The Sino-Soviet conflict has compelled each nation to strengthen its position militarily and both have competed for political influence in the region; hence China's rapprochement with
the West in order to obtain technological assistance for modernisation. Soviet apparent intentions for further expansion of influence in the region are evident in the building of a naval base complex on the Pacific in Sakhalin and Kamchatka.²⁹

Japan regards the Soviet Union as a traditional enemy and this situation persists through Soviet occupation of four islands at the southern end of the Kuril chain over which the Japanese claim sovereignty. Possession of all the islands of the chain is important to the Soviets for strategic reasons as a defensive barrier and to provide passage for the Soviet Pacific Fleet. The Soviets in turn are suspicious of Japan, particularly in relation to the improvement of Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations since 1972.

North Korea was a Soviet satellite from 1948 to the time North Korea invaded South Korea. Chinese intervention in the war allowed the North Koreans to achieve a measure of independence from the Soviets. However, the Soviets continue to exert a considerable influence over North Korea and through economic ties and the provision of military assistance tie up substantial US forces. The situation on the Korean peninsula remains volatile, but seems to be contained by the presence of US forces.

Prior to the 1960s, Central and South America were of only marginal interest to the Soviets. However, the Cuban revolution provided an unexpected opportunity to intervene in the region and thus reduce US dominance. During the Cuban missile crisis the Soviets discovered that while the US was reluctant to use overt military force it was also determined to exclude Soviet nuclear weapons from the region. Despite this setback, Soviet interest in Central and South America has continued on the basis of two strategic perceptions. The first is that it can exploit national liberation movements and thus extend its influence. Second is the importance of the area to the US as a factor influencing the East-West balance of power. Cuba will continue to serve as a surrogate for the Soviets to finance and train subversive organisations in many parts of the world. It is also well placed strategically to collect intelligence on US forces and has potential to interfere with trade from the Gulf of Mexico to Europe.
The extension of Soviet influence over the past three decades may be summed up as a strategy of expansion based on unlimited opportunism. In some areas the Soviets have been successful, but in others they have failed to achieve their strategic goals. An example of this strategy is to be found in Soviet relations with Middle East countries. First they attempted economic penetration, and if this was successful they then tried to influence political events in their favour. The Arabs gradually began to perceive them as another imperialist power. Soviet involvement was at its height in the October 1973 war and their interference in this war made Sadat determined to remove them from Egypt. Having failed here, the Soviets were quick to seize an opportunity to obtain access to ports and airfields in Ethiopia and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

The expansion of the Soviet navy also parallels the extension of Soviet influence throughout the world. These naval forces have been configured to neutralise Allied maritime forces which could threaten the success of Soviet military operations. Soviet warships continually patrol the world's major oceans - the Atlantic, Mediterranean, Indian and Pacific Oceans. Land bases in surrogate countries have been sought and these have a potential to threaten Western lines of communication. The USSR has influence near many of the strategic nodal points vital to the West. Algeria and Morocco near the Strait of Gibraltar; Ethiopia and South Yemen near the Gulf of Aden; Angola and potentially Namibia near the sea route around the Cape of Good Hope; from Afghanistan the Soviets could threaten the Gulf of Oman; Cuba has the potential to interdict the Florida Strait. Soviet influence in Central America is a potential threat to the Panama Canal and Soviet influence in North Korea is a potential threat to the Sea of Japan. It is also likely that part of the Soviet strategy of expansion based on unlimited opportunism is an interest in the sea route around Cape Horn which will become important if the Panama Canal is closed. This would partially explain their offers of assistance to Argentina during the war over the Falkland Islands.

Ten years ago there was little public concern about Soviet influence in Australia's area of strategic interest to the north, beyond Soviet aid being provided to North Vietnam. Now the Soviets base their ships and aircraft at
Cam Ranh Bay and Danang; which are as close to Darwin as Darwin is to Sydney. These events, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, brought home to Australia the pervasiveness of the Soviet threat and led to a reappraisal of Australia's strategic circumstances. Dr T.B. Millar has reviewed the interests of the major powers in the Asia-Pacific region. He found that Soviet policies were directed at projecting Soviet power and influence throughout the region and concluded that only the Soviet Union 'gave evidence of being generally unsatisfied and probing for targets of opportunity'. He also concluded that 'it does not appear yet to have reached the summit of its ambitions in terms of global deployment of power and influence, but there are no indications that it is prepared to use force to obtain bases of its own'.

There is evidence that the previous Australian Government reacted to the changed strategic environment by trying to come to terms with a new defence strategy. In an address to the Australian Defence Association on 19 November 1982, Mr Sinclair said that

Forward defence and the maintenance of close defence associations, through [the] Defence Cooperation Program and alliance arrangements [was seen] as strategically essential.

This was the first time that the Government had publicly announced a 'forward defence' posture since the Vietnam war.

Mr Sinclair then went on to examine 'the possible motivation of any potential adversaries'; and concluded that:

An attack against Australia by the Soviet in a global context would seem only likely in association with a wider involvement than Australia alone. For all that, the increasing capability and strength of the Soviet commitment in South-East Asia and the Indian Ocean concerns us. It is the effect of that presence on our region and the countries in it, rather than directly on Australia, which is of greater concern. The Australian Defence Force could have a role in a global conflict but this would be concentrated in the waters and air space of our
immediate region, acting both in our national defence and supplementing the efforts of our allies.\textsuperscript{36}

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Fraser Government announced a number of new defence initiatives. These included the deployment of Australian maritime forces to the Indian Ocean; provision of facilities for B52 aircraft at Darwin; the construction of patrol boat bases at Darwin and Cairns; decisions to construct a forward airfield at Derby and a railway from Alice Springs to Darwin; the improved readiness of the Army's Operational Deployment Force based at Townsville; the expansion of the Army Reserve from 22,000 to 30,000; and a decision to replace the tactical fighter force. There has been more emphasis placed on the once almost dormant Five Power Arrangements with Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand and the United Kingdom and increased defence aid under Defence Cooperation Programmes with ASEAN and South-West Pacific nations. The Government also announced increased use of the naval base at HMAS Sterling near Fremantle, the future development of a patrol boat base at Port Hedland, the expansion of the Army's northern surveillance force called NORFORCE and the conduct of two major exercises in the north during 1983.\textsuperscript{37}

The Hawke Government appears to have adopted a more pragmatic approach to its relations with the Soviets, while at the same time it has followed, with minor variations, the same general policy on foreign affairs and defence as that of the Fraser Government. The attempt by Foreign Minister Hayden to draw Vietnam into a wider association beyond the Soviet bloc failed because there seems little prospect of Vietnam withdrawing from Kampuchea.

The Labor Government shares the concern of the previous Government about the increased capability and strength of the Soviet commitment in South-East Asia and the Indian and Pacific Oceans. In response to a question - 'How seriously do you view the Soviet Union's growing military strength in the Pacific and Indian Ocean region?' - the Prime Minister, Mr Hawke, said:

The relationship of the Soviet Union with Vietnam, the buildup of the facilities they have at Cam Ranh Bay, should be a matter of continued surveillance and understanding. It provides the Soviets with a
unique opportunity to extend surveillance activities into ocean areas adjacent to Australia's trade routes and in our area of security concern. That's not to say we read it as posing, in any immediate sense, a threat of aggression. Nevertheless, it's a situation that must be of some concern. Then there is the Northwest Indian Ocean, and particularly the Persian Gulf area, most dramatically illustrated, of course, in their subjugation of Afghanistan. If you look at the expansion of Soviet interest in the Horn of Africa, in Yemen, and see the influence they have through their Cuban surrogates in parts of Africa, it would be a pretty unintelligent democracy which didn't have a concern about these developments. 38

The defence initiatives which have been announced since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan are a clear indication of increasing perceptions of threat. But the question we must now ask is - what is our strategy to deal with this threat? The 'core force' concept of providing a basis for expansion is not a strategy for the defence of Australia. We must decide what is to be defended and what we are to defend against. It is not good enough to say that there is no identifiable threat of substance when there is a growing concern about the degree of threat that the Soviet Union poses.

The Soviets now sit astride our trade routes to Japan through the South China Sea from their base at Cam Ranh Bay and their ally, Vietnam, is a state possessing military power second to none in its region. The Vietnamese people and their leaders have been honed by war and adversity. Their size, energy and aims give them a demonstrable capacity to extend their influence in the region; a region vital to Australia's security. Their new connection with the Soviets reinforces their capacity and the Soviets will be quick to take advantage of opportunities. 39 Australia's strategy should be directed towards minimising these opportunities. The situation could now change rapidly making once unexpected events much more likely.

No discussion of threat perceptions would be complete without some words about warning times. The Sub-Committee on Defence Matters, which was referred to earlier, points out that there are two elements to warning
time. The first is capability and the second is intent. The capabilities of other nations to wage war are relatively easy to assess. Much of the information needed is available to the public and the remainder is almost certainly available to the Foreign Affairs, Intelligence and Defence community. It is not possible to draw any meaningful conclusions from the study of the defence capabilities of other nations unless the study is done against the background of a defence strategy. For example, is our defence strategy to be based solely on the defence of Australia, its territories and maritime approaches, or on some form of projection of power to assist in the defence of our regional neighbours? A coherent defence strategy is fundamental to the assessment of warning time, because warning times to assist our regional neighbours will differ markedly from warning times associated with the defence of the Australian continent.

The second element of warning time is intent. There is a whole host of resources available to government to assist in identifying an emerging threat, but history shows that we may have a misplaced confidence in our abilities to identify threats. One much-quoted study attempted to quantify warning times for conflicts by studying data on past conflicts. One of the conclusions was that there is a fifty per cent probability that a conflict could occur in less than four months. There are, however, some problems in logic with this approach, not the least of which is the proposition that future events are in some way determined by the past. Since warning time is inherently unpredictable, we should decide in advance what we wish to deter - this is the essential element of a deterrent strategy.

While it is fashionable in Australia to scoff at the possibility of war, it would be a brave politician who would now repeat the often-misquoted statement made by Lance Barnard of no threat for fifteen years. The Soviet Pacific Fleet of 209 major naval vessels (28 SSBN, 92 other submarines and 89 major surface combatants), 225 minor combatants and 100 amphibious and major auxiliary support ships is based at Vladivostok. At Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam the Soviets have established a facility with improved communications and intelligence-collection capabilities to support operations in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean. Soviet naval aviation BEAR D and F aircraft
maintain a regular deployment to Cam Ranh from which they conduct intelligence collection and anti-submarine warfare missions. Over 100 of these aircraft have deployed to Vietnam since 1979. In the same year the Soviets established a permanent naval presence of approximately 15 warships and auxiliaries in the South China Sea. Soviet activity indicates a commitment to not only showing the flag, but to demonstrating that they intend to remain an Asian and Pacific power. Moscow has pursued this goal through its now close association and support for Vietnam.

This chapter on threat perceptions is concluded by quoting the words of an eminent US analyst of Soviet foreign policy:

From the vantage point of Soviet foreign policy, the Vietnam connection represents a long-sought and very important beachhead; it is the successful extension of Soviet prestige, power and physical presence - over thousands of intervening miles - to a region of East Asia where before it was a lonely pariah.

This leads us to the question - where will the Soviet strategy of expansion, based on unlimited opportunism, lead to next in our region? For it is only by considering this question, and the strategies and tactics that might be involved, that we will be able to formulate a counter-strategy.

Notes

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., p.vii.
5 Ibid., p.9.
6 Ibid., p.54.
7 Ibid., p.23.
8 Ibid., p.3.
On 16 March 1982 Brezhnev announced some Soviet arms control initiatives while at the same time warning the United States that it would take retaliatory steps if the US proceeded with its missile deployment to Western Europe. The US position is that NATO would only abandon plans to deploy 572 new US missiles to Western Europe if the Soviets dismantled their SS 20, SS 4, and SS 5 missiles; particularly the mobile intermediate range SS 20 missile of which the Soviets are estimated to have about 350 deployed. This was countered in May 1982, when Reagan renounced the SALT II Agreement and stated that his administration wished to pursue START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) talks. There was little progress during 1983 and 1984 due to the deaths of Brezhnev and his successor Andropov. The new Soviet leader Gorbachev has proposed a 50 per cent reduction of nuclear weapons on both sides. Reagan and Gorbachev are to have discussions on these and other matters at the time of writing.
26 Some idea of the Soviet and Cuban involvement in the Horn of Africa may be found in the following data: In 1977-78 Cuban and later Soviet military personnel were sent to Ethiopia to help government armed forces fighting against Somali forces. Eventually, the number of Soviet advisers rose to about 1,000 and in the early Spring of 1978 between 16,000 and 17,000 Cuban soldiers were reported. See Stephen S. Kaplan, *Diplomacy of Power*, pp.199-200.

27 Although alternative sources exist the most troubling possibility is that military or civil conflict in South Africa could halt nearly all mineral exports from southern Africa for an extended period. The West depends heavily on South Africa not only for chrome, manganese and platinum, but also for important minerals such as asbestos, industrial diamonds, vermiculite, phosphates, coal and uranium.

28 There were 17,000 Soviets in Egypt before they were expelled. Stephen S. Kaplan, *Diplomacy of Power*, p.330.


31 Canberra Times, 9 December 1982. (Edited text of a paper by Dr T.B. Millar at a symposium of the Indonesian Centre of Strategic and International Studies on 5 December 1982.)

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 Ian Sinclair, Minister for Defence, Address to the Australian Defence Force Association, 19 November 1982.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.


39 Moscow has invested considerable resources in Vietnam. Since 1979, over $US 2 billion in military aid, supported by approximately 2,500 military advisers. Since 1976 approximately $US 5 billion in economic aid and 3,750

Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Threats to Australia's Security, p. vi.

It can be assumed that some of the evidence given 'in camera' to the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters concerned the identification of potential enemies.


Paul Dibb concludes that 'The Soviet military lodgement in Indochina is likely to continue, at least through the 1980s, and removing that presence, which is potentially threatening to regional security, should be a central policy concern'. See Paul Dibb, World Political and Strategic Trends Over the Next Twenty Years - Their Relevance to Australia, (Working Paper No. 65, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, January 1983), p. 14.

Until 1972, Australia's strategy was directed towards the provision of support to our more powerful allies in return for their protection. Australia had forces committed to the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty to counter a perceived threat from China. The nation was also committed to counter communist insurgency with British forces in Malaya and Borneo and later with US forces in Vietnam. This strategy was given the catchword 'Forward Defence' and there was some consensus amongst Australian defence planners, a consensus shared by the nation as a whole, that the 'threat' was communist insurgency. The Nixon doctrine of 1970, followed by the withdrawal of US land forces from South-East Asia, caused Australia to abandon its concept of 'Forward Defence' and attempt to reorient its strategic concepts towards the defence of Australia and the achievement of greater self-reliance. These concepts were first labelled 'Continental Defence', nicknamed by some as 'Fortress Australia', and later 'Defence of Australia', the latter being a broader concept embracing both the defence of continental Australia and the approaches thereto.

Robert O'Neill points out that, while the concept of 'Defence of Australia has become an accepted basis for force structure development, it does not adequately address the possible future needs to provide forces for service abroad with allies'. O'Neill goes on to suggest that while 'defence of Australia and its interests must remain the prime objective of the defence force ... Soviet activism in the Third World ... point[s] to a need for the Western allies to maintain forces for rapid deployment to contain limited outbreaks of conflict, or to demonstrate a reactive capacity to deter hostile action'.

Australia has a positive interest to be served by the development of such a capacity and, further, must wish to avoid the negative consequences of perceived unwillingness or incapacity to make some contribution to this wider effort ... Bearing in mind the limited size of the Australian Defence Force and its established expertise in terms of operations in its own region, it seems
reasonable to say that Australia should not think of undertaking commitments outside the area of South-East Asia, the eastern part of the Indian Ocean and the south-west Pacific, unless it were for extremely important diplomatic or peace-keeping purposes.\(^3\)

O'Neill was well aware of the disquiet that such a concept would arouse,\(^4\) particularly among those concerned with husbanding scarce defence resources, but their argument essentially boils down to one of risk assessment. The problem for military planners is not that they are neglecting to think about the defence of Australia, but that they may fail to give proper weight to the important relationships Australia has with its northern neighbours. Concentration on the problems associated with the defence of continental Australia and the approaches thereto carries with it an element of isolationism and a loss of perception of more distant threats.

Interestingly, this military focus is at odds with the public statements made by the present Government. The Government has, in its first five months in office, repeatedly demonstrated its strong belief in the abiding importance to Australia of strategic developments in South-East Asia. Our concerns there are not with direct threats against this country but with understanding better and where possible helping to reduce the tensions there that promote uncertainty and increased involvement in the region by external powers. We recognize that some of these tensions arise from deep-seated and long-held mistrust that will not pass away easily but we recognize also potential there for deterioration which could have an impact on our immediate neighbourhood, and ultimately on Australia itself.\(^5\)

South-East Asia thus remains strategically vital to any consideration of the defence of Australia and it is important that defence planners recognise this fact in formulating a defence strategy.

Despite the present preoccupation with the defence of Australia, there are a number of bilateral and multi-lateral defence and non-defence arrangements with Australia's neighbours and other Western allies, some of which pre-
sently involve Australian forces and others which could involve the commitment of forces in the future. Two of the partners of the ailing ANZUS alliance are party to the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FDA). Two FDA nations are partners in the ASEAN agreement which, while it has no specific defence provisions, is concerned with matters of mutual interest. The three members of the ANZUS alliance and two of the ASEAN partners are involved in the moribund but nevertheless extant South East Asian Collective Defence Treaty, sometimes called the Manila Pact. Finally Australia has defence ties through Defence Cooperation Programmes (DCP) with the ASEAN nations, Papua-New Guinea and some South-West Pacific countries. The scope of these defence linkages is illustrated in Figure 1.

**FIGURE 1**
These linkages are clearly complex enough in themselves, but they must also be viewed in the context of the dynamics of the region in which interests are constantly changing. To be credible they must advance or protect the interests of those involved. Failure to do so may be taken to indicate the absence or erosion of the linkage and an invitation for a third party to intervene. Australia chose to reaffirm the Five Power Defence Arrangements in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan but has not attempted to breathe any life into the Manila Treaty, wishing to avoid being involved in a conflict between Thailand and Vietnam. However, despite the strong defence linkages Australia has with some of its neighbours it may have little capacity to influence events. The authoritarian nature of some of the anti-communist states is at the same time a source of strength and weakness to Australia's defence: strength in presenting a staunchly anti-communist front, weakness because authoritarian rule rests insecurely when social forces seek to improve quality of life.

The Report of the Committee on Australia's relations with the Third World concluded that Australia had only a very limited capacity to provide unilateral assistance to ASEAN members and suggested that Australia should seek to overcome this weakness by encouraging US and, to some extent, Japanese involvement in South-East Asia. The Report concluded:

While our defence will depend basically on the global power balance, we need to take more account of the instabilities in our own neighbourhood and of the possibility that we might on occasion be alone in meeting threats originating in, or transmitted via, that neighbourhood.

This conclusion is in line with a similar finding by the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence: Australia is more likely to suffer low-level contingencies than the intermediate levels of threat or invasion. These low-level threats could arise at short notice and could give rise to challenging problems. There is uncertainty regarding the timing of allied support for several contingencies in the regional environment that
may confront Australia. This calls for continuing emphasis on self-reliance by Australia and possession of well-balanced defence forces.\textsuperscript{9}

Taken together, these findings should have an important bearing on the formulation of a defence strategy. First, Australia should accept that it has only a very limited capacity to provide unilateral defence assistance to its neighbours and, second, that it might be alone in meeting threats originating in or transmitted via that neighbourhood. Since there is still some uncertainty about the nature of these threats, there is a need to reorient strategic thinking and approach a strategy for the defence of Australia from the perspective of strategies which may be employed against Australia and her neighbours.

Strategic concepts which have evolved since World War II have been conditioned by a fear that disputes between nations might escalate to nuclear war. Those nations possessing nuclear weapons have developed strategic postures around the theory of deterrence. Some nations shelter under the nuclear umbrella of the Super Powers and some have acquired an independent nuclear deterrent. But this has not prevented war; it has only deterred war between nations when both sides possess nuclear weapons. These wars have come to be called 'limited wars'.

Kissinger defines limited war as war fought for a limited political purpose.\textsuperscript{10} In limited war the upper end of the conflict spectrum has been defined as the non-use of tactical nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{11} This definition is claimed to be 'simple, unambiguous, easily understood and observed'.\textsuperscript{12} But, while it may be easily observed, the definition is not as simple and unambiguous as it first appears. This is because strategies, tactics and force structures will be influenced by the existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of one or both protagonists, even if they are not used. Similarly the strategies, tactics and force structures of other countries will be influenced by perceptions that their forces might be involved as a result of Super Power conflict. There is even more difficulty defining the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Terrorism is a phenomenon of the times - are isolated acts of terrorism to be included in a definition of limited war? There is, therefore, a need for
a broader term to assist our conceptualism of the use of force in an environment influenced by the existence of nuclear weapons.

Sarkesian and Scully have provided a working definition of 'low-intensity' conflict. The writer prefers to use the term 'low-level' rather than 'low-intensity' because it is possible to conceive of various rates of intensity at each level of the conflict spectrum. The working definition thus becomes:

Low [level] conflict as used here, refers to a range of activities and operations at the lower end of the conflict spectrum involving the use of military or a variety of semi-military forces (both combat and non-combat) on the part of the intervening power to influence and compel an adversary to accept a particular, political military condition.

It is no accident that low-level conflict prevails in an age of nuclear weapons. Given the need for constraint in these circumstances, some components of power are rendered irrelevant. Great Britain could not employ nuclear weapons to win back the Falklands any more than the United States could have used them in Vietnam. The Soviets seem to have a better understanding of this constraint and have shaped their strategies accordingly. Moscow continues to seek an advantageous military balance, which exceeds the US conception of parity, and persists in exploiting opportunities to extend Soviet influence and create client states in the turbulent Third World. Their foremost strategy is the use of surrogate forces to assist Third World nations in defeating external or internal opponents. They achieve two direct benefits from such intervention. First, the use of surrogate forces avoids the possibility of direct Super Power confrontation and, second, the assistance provided, usually in the form of arms supplies and equipment, increases Soviet influence with both surrogate and Third World forces.

Another low-level strategy exploited by the Soviets is the training, supply and support of terrorist groups. Many of their client states such as East Germany, North Korea and Cuba have become training bases for terrorist groups who direct attacks at Western and pro-Western nations. The strategy is to create political turbulence
which in turn acts to weaken central control, thus opening the way for Soviet espionage, subversion or the threat to use military force to stabilise the situation. These terrorist activities run very little risk of starting a major conflict and are relatively inexpensive. They also afford many opportunities for the Soviets to put political pressure on Western nations.

In recent years we have seen attempts by Western nations to counter the spread of Soviet influence in Third World countries, the foremost examples being the intervention by the US in Central America and the occupation of Grenada. But each of these operations has shown that such intervention presents many policy difficulties to Western democratic nations. Defence planners must therefore study the strategies of low-level conflict, the influence of third parties and the policy constraints on the use of force.

In his classic work, Strategy for Tomorrow, General Beaufre discusses the characteristics of low-level conflict in a nuclear age, the effects of the mass media and the increasing cost of high technology weapon systems on the strategic environment. After examining the factors that affect low-level conflict, Beaufre concludes that the contemporary strategic environment orders the limitation of conflict and that strategy is now required to obey new rules. He claims that, because of the reaction to what he calls 'world opinion' against war, it is essential that the strategy for military operations be designed to achieve political objectives in a very short time. He describes this as the strategy of the fait accompli and goes on to point out that to be successful at a national level, the fait accompli must break the will of the people to resist. If the people outside the area of operations continue to resist, or successfully appeal through the mass media for foreign support, then the military operations will not be decisive.

In the years since World War II there have been a number of examples of low-level conflict which may be categorised as attempts, more or less, to use the strategy of the fait accompli. The examples include the first and second Arab-Israeli wars; even the third, the so-called Yom Kippur War, may qualify. The Chinese invasion of India in 1962 with the subsequent annexation of Eastern Kashmir and the United States invasion of Grenada in 1983 are other
examples which come to mind. In all these wars the operations were intense and confined to small areas. On the other hand, the Argentine fait accompli occupation of the Falkland Islands was unsuccessful at a national level (the islands being a territory of the United Kingdom) because the invasion did not break the will of the people outside the area of operations to resist.

Beaufre identified another strategy which may be employed in circumstances where the fait accompli is revealed as unattainable for the present. He calls this a persuasive strategy. In this strategy all the resources of the adversary are harnessed to achieve the desired objectives but military operations play only an auxiliary role. The strategy employs political and economic pressure and a psychological campaign which might include military operations which are psychological in character.

It is not the military operations per se which are important but their effect on the population. The Vietnam campaign is perhaps the most striking example of the successful use of a strategy of persuasion. The French loss at Dien Bien Phu, while a tactical defeat, was not militarily devastating for the French. However, in strategic terms, the political and psychological repercussions were such that the French gave up the struggle. The North Vietnamese employed a similarly successful strategy against the United States and her allies.\(^\text{18}\)

According to Beaufre, the pursuit of a negotiated settlement is the essential element of a strategy of persuasion and the result of the strategy is the opening of negotiations:

\[\ldots\text{interminable negotiations which can only reach their conclusion through exhaustion of the belligerents. It is therefore necessary that the conflict last, that it be heavy enough to wear away the morale of populations, that it be long enough to permit the evolution of ideas in support of a compromise judged unacceptable at first.}\]^\text{19}\]

The strategy of persuasion is therefore a strategy of psychological attrition. The campaign must be prolonged - possibly many years. Initially the target population may be unaware that it is under attack because the first manifestations of the strategy might be a progressive increase
in political, economic and psychological pressure. During
the early stages, an adversary might attempt to reduce the
target country's political influence in world and regional
affairs while at the same time enhancing its own position.
The mass media might be used to attack, for example, the
target country's foreign, internal or economic policy. The
key elements of a politico-economic plan might be to
engineer the progressive isolation of the target country
through subversion, propaganda, strikes, trade embargoes
and boycotts. All these activities could be initiated
externally, or through internal 'front' nationals who are
sympathetic to the ideals of the aggressor nation.

The next stage in a strategy of persuasion might be
an increase in psychological pressure through the conduct
of covert activities, the aim being to sap the will of the
people and show that the government of the target country
is incapable of maintaining law and order. The covert
activities might include sovereignty infringements of terri-
torial waters and airspace, hijacking, bombing, kidnapping,
extortion or terrorist operations against the target country's
nationals both at home and overseas. The activities might
also include the seizure of overseas property or embassies.
The aggressor nation might disclaim all responsibility for
these acts through the use of surrogate forces claiming that
the people have invited 'freedom fighters' to assist them,
and in countering these 'freedom fighters' the target
country is the aggressor and performing all manner of
atrocities against its own people. There is much evidence
of all these activities - none can be discarded as a possi-
bility, nor can the possibility of covertly inspired coup
d'etat be ignored.

The final act of a strategy of persuasion might be the
conduct of military operations which are part of a psycho-
logical plan. When considering these operations it is as
well to remember that an adversary may well be employing
the indirect approach. He may not aim to achieve success
in military operations - his objective being the pursuit of a
negotiated settlement. An adversary could measure success
in military terms by causing damage, casualties and
undermining morale - not necessarily victory on the battle-
field. Above all, an aggressor would aim at achieving a
disproportionate response - the social, political, psycho-
logical, economic and military cost of this response gradu-
ally sapping the will of the people to resist. The pressure would continue 'long enough to permit the evolution of ideas in support of a compromise judged as unacceptable at first'.

Quite apart from the fear of escalation to nuclear war, the mass media can act to limit conflict through influence on 'world opinion' just as in previous wars the media was used for propaganda and to gather popular support. The influence of the media is pervasive and the Vietnam campaign is perhaps the best example of its power to influence the conduct of military operations.

In recent conflicts we have witnessed attempts by Western nations to curb this influence. The British acted to restrict the media during the Falklands campaign and imposed a measure of censorship. Even so, it was claimed by some that the conduct of operations was prejudiced. The US excluded the media from the early stages of the invasion of Grenada and claimed that this was necessary to achieve surprise. Whether or not similar restrictions will apply in future conflicts remains to be seen, but if recent events are any indication, there will be some restrictions imposed. In open societies it is certain that decisions to place restrictions on the media must be taken at the highest political level, and even then some measure of cooperation from the media is required. In an open society the media is vulnerable to manipulation by an aggressor whereas in closed societies the media may be used for propaganda purposes. In any event, it would be prudent for Australian defence planners to prepare contingent plans for media access to future operations involving Australian forces.

Another effect of the mass media and 'world opinion' is evident in legal terms. An adversary may wish to avoid legal responsibility for operations by employing third parties. The forces may be from another country, mercenaries or local dissidents. The activities of the Cubans, East Germans and mercenaries in Africa provide examples. The US support of local dissidents against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua shows that the tactic is not confined to the Eastern bloc.

The Korean war and the Arab-Israeli wars provide many examples of how the United Nations and the Super Powers have acted to contain conflicts. In recent years the
United Nations has become less effective because peace-keeping initiatives have been vetoed as a result of differences between the Super Powers. Nevertheless, the United Nations still remains a force in international affairs by bringing the disputing parties together in open debate. United Nations peace-keeping forces have had mixed success to date but their utility as a intervening force is diminishing. It is becoming increasingly difficult for the United Nations to harness the necessary support for the creation of peace-keeping forces and their place has been taken by multi-national forces which have not been raised under United Nations' auspices. The Commonwealth force in Zimbabwe and the multi-national forces in the Sinai and Beirut are examples.

Despite the existence of the nuclear deterrent, the Soviet Union has been able to influence events throughout the world by a variety of strategies and methods. The United States' preoccupation with the Iranian crisis in 1979 and 1980, when coupled with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, seems to have wakened Western policy-makers to the Soviet success in exploiting low-level conflict. The United States also seems to have discovered belatedly that deterrence is not exclusively founded on nuclear capability. There have been nearly 200 incidents since World War II where the Soviet Union has used, or threatened to use, its armed forces in expanding or preserving its authority outside its borders.22

The United States has moved to counter the Soviet success by grouping existing forces into an organisation called the 'Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force' and creating a new command, Central Command, to focus on south-west Asia. The forces are heavy and structured for European operations; as such they lack credibility for rapid strategic deployment. The US is currently reorganising some infantry divisions to improve their strategic deployment capability. Some questions still remain about the ability of the United States to provide logistic support for distant deployment and the combat effectiveness of these 'lighter' forces.

The influence of third parties on Third World politics recently took a new turn. For the first time since the Vietnam War the United States intervened militarily to curb the expansion of communist (Soviet) influence. The action
was hailed as a rescue mission but it soon became apparent that the real purpose was to remove the Marxist government and supporting Cuban forces. The 'Soviet connection' with this government was later revealed. The invasion also demonstrated United States' resolve to counter Soviet influence in areas where vital interests are at stake (in this case the Caribbean). There remain, however, powerful policy constraints which militate against military intervention where United States' vital interests are not at stake.

No nation can use force or the threat of force without suffering the social and political consequences. The Vietnam experience is still fresh in the minds of many people and serves as a powerful restraint on nations who might be considering the use of force to achieve policy objectives. The media also acts as an influence on 'world opinion' to contain the use of force. But memories of unpleasant events are notoriously short and past experience will not necessarily guide future practice. Military intervention is once again becoming an instrument of policy by Western governments. In the past two years, quite apart from the various peace-keeping operations, we have witnessed the British operations in the Falklands, the French intervention in Chad, the United States' invasion of Grenada and counter-insurgency operations in Central America.

The Soviet Union and its client states have not shrunk from the use of force as is evident by the continuing Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. Indeed, the failure of the Soviet leadership to show any signs of remorse following the Soviet destruction of the South Korean airliner shows that it regards failure to use force as a sign of weakness.

Another manifestation of the constraints which apply to the overt use of force is the growth of low-level conflict, particularly at the lower end of the conflict spectrum where the distinctions between war and peace become blurred. Psychological warfare, guerrilla warfare and 'conventional' operations can occur simultaneously. Systematic, state-orchestrated terrorism is a new dimension of warfare. Terrorism has become an integral part of the strategy of some states seeking to achieve well-defined political and
military objectives. Some states are known to hire international terrorists as agents because the association can easily be denied.

Legitimacy for military intervention is often claimed when so-called 'vital interests' are at stake. For example, the United States has said it will intervene in south-west Asia if the oil supply is threatened. The United States also claims that instability proximate to its borders threatens its 'vital interests' and legitimises intervention in the Caribbean and Central America. Attempts are sometimes made to legitimise military intervention by claims that other governments are violating 'human rights' or do not have 'public support'.

Nations sometimes seek to legitimise their cause by taking a dispute to the United Nations. Legitimacy is claimed if the United Nations condemns the other party. Violations of the United Nations' Charter, the Geneva Agreement or some other 'international law' are sometimes cited in support of claims of legitimacy. Legitimacy is enhanced by securing the direct or indirect support of other nations. Smaller nations may be economically or politically coerced into rendering support. Similarly smaller nations may be required to act as the clients or surrogates of larger nations.

Western powers risk disaffection at home if they intervene in support of a group which does not have a measure of local popularity. In revolutionary situations the track record of right-wing elites is as poor as those of the left. The Vietnam experience also taught Western democracies that military intervention without popular support is likely to fail. Military intervention also carries with it an obligation to succeed. Long drawn-out wars with substantial casualties will eventually test the mettle of the home population - popular support will wane, calls for withdrawal will grow and international credibility will suffer.

The report of the Committee on Australia's relations with the Third World concluded that Australia had only a very limited capacity to provide unilateral assistance to its neighbours. For this reason it seems unlikely that Australia alone would be able to meet any substantial requests for military assistance. In the event of such a request Australia would need to ensure that her 'vital interests' were at stake, that political and military objec-
tives were clear and the proposed assistance had popular support. Above all, military intervention should be a strategy of last resort, the weapons of diplomacy having failed. This makes a strategy for the defence of Australia a precondition for making these policy decisions.

Dr T.B. Millar, in his review of the interests of the major powers in the Asia-Pacific region, observed that Soviet policies were directed at projecting Soviet power and influence throughout the region and specifically:

1 to ensure the Soviet eastern flank is secure in the event of war in Europe;
2 to contain US military power in the area, especially in Japan, the Philippines and at sea;
3 to protect Siberia against, and to contain the ambitions of, the Chinese People's Republic;
4 to support the communist regimes in North Korea and Vietnam;
5 to ensure unconstrained passage for Soviet naval and mercantile shipping through the straits giving entry to the Pacific and the East China Sea and those of the Malaysia-Indonesia Archipelago.

We may now examine how the Soviets are going about achieving these objectives and the policy implications for Australia.

The first three of these objectives, and support for the communist regime in North Korea, are being pursued by military deployments to the Far East. At present Soviet military forces in this region are second only to those in Europe. During the fifteen years from 1965 to 1980, the number of Soviet divisions arrayed against China has doubled and the number of tactical aircraft has tripled.

The Soviet Union now bases close to 40 per cent of its SSBNs in the Pacific. The Pacific Fleet is the largest of the Soviet Union's four fleets - a total of 209 major naval vessels, 225 minor combatants and 100 amphibious and major auxiliary support ships. The Soviet build-up of power in the islands to the north of Japan is equally impressive. Four islands which were Japanese prior to World War II have been turned into Soviet fortresses. Currently there are 10,000 troops on the islands, including a coastal defence division.
The pursuit of the fifth objective, and Soviet support for the communist regime in Vietnam, should be the principal concern of Australian defence planners. Since 1979 the Soviets have invested approximately $US2 billion in military aid and provided 2,500 military advisers to Vietnam.30 Five billion (US) dollars have been invested in economic aid along with 3,750 economic advisers.31 As a result, Vietnam has become a client state of the Soviets and in return for this support the Soviets have gained access to base facilities. Improved communications and intelligence facilities have been established at Cam Ranh Bay; Soviet aircraft maintain nearly continuous deployments to Vietnam for intelligence gathering and anti-submarine missions; over 100 aircraft have been deployed since 1979.32 A permanent naval presence of approximately 15 ships and auxiliaries has also been established in the South China Sea.33

The ASEAN nations clearly recognise the threat possibilities even through the Association is not a military alliance. All have greatly increased their defence spending. Last year ASEAN spent more than $US8 billion34 on defence; but defence cooperation has been slow because each nation has a different perception of the threat. Thailand, with Vietnamese troops on its border, has the sharpest perception of threat and sees any move to increase Vietnam's influence as serving only to reinforce the Soviet position. This is seen as eventually allowing the Soviets to have a hegemonic role over the non-communist nations of South-East Asia.

Singapore and the Philippines believe that the danger comes directly from the Soviet fleet which has extended its naval patrols from Cam Ranh Bay and continuously uses the South China Sea and the straits through the Malaysia-Indonesia archipelago for passage to and from the Indian and Pacific Oceans. On the other hand Indonesia and, to a lesser extent, Malaysia both see China as a problem. This is because there are remnants of communist insurgency movements in these countries that still look to China for support. Communist insurgents also operate in Thailand but, in this case, the Thais have an ambivalent attitude to Chinese support of insurgents because they also see the Chinese as an ally against the Vietnamese.
Differences in threat perceptions militate against ASEAN defence cooperation in the near term; however, all of the ASEAN nations have established bilateral, and in some cases multilateral, defence arrangements which are important expressions of concern about regional security. The Thais rely mainly on the United States to provide equipment necessary for defence. Malaysia and Indonesia work closely together and conduct combined exercises on each other's territory. Singapore and Thailand provide training facilities for each other. Thailand conducts air exercises with Indonesia and combines with Malaysia in anti-terrorist operations along the common border.

The Philippines has long historical connections with the United States and provides base facilities for ships and aircraft. Since World War II it has been involved in counter-insurgency operations at various degrees of intensity; these operations show no signs of abating. Recently there have been signs of political instability and growing opposition to the Marcos regime.

Australia's defence links with its neighbours were reviewed earlier in this chapter. The ANZUS Treaty is now under question and the Manila Pact is moribund; but Australia retains close defence relations with Papua-New Guinea and is linked to Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand and Britain through the Five Power Defence Arrangements. Other important expressions of interest in regional security are to be found in the Defence Cooperation Programmes with Papua-New Guinea, the ASEAN nations and many countries of the South-West Pacific (Solomon Islands, Fiji, Tonga, Vanuatu, Tuvalu, Kiribati and Western Samoa). These defence links define the area of Australia's strategic interest. They also define an area into which the Soviets have already achieved some penetration.

The Australian Government has clearly recognised the penetration but has done little to change the strategic posture of the Australian Defence Force. A part of the statement made by the Minister for Defence in connection with the 1983-84 Defence Budget gave some details of 'The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy'. The Government observed that '... imbalance between the military capacities of the two superpowers creates pressures for strategic concession, heightens tension and risks of
crisis', but this observation was not translated into any changes in the readiness or sustainability of the Defence Force.

The Minister referred to the 'abiding importance to Australia of strategic developments in South East Asia and the need to help 'to reduce tensions there that promote uncertainty and increased involvement in the region by external powers'. Here he is clearly referring to the possibility of further Soviet penetration. He then went on to say that the Government recognised also 'the potential there for deterioration which could have an impact on our immediate neighbourhood, and ultimately on Australia itself.

More recently the Government approved a number of defence and foreign policy guidelines concerning Indian Ocean issues which were aimed at giving greater attention to the development of relations with littoral states. On 17 January 1984 the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Hayden, said that Australia had important national interests in the Indian Ocean region. Together with the Pacific Ocean and the region to Australia's north, the Indian Ocean was an area of strategic significance to Australia. In particular, there was a need to protect Australia's western coastline, off-shore resource interests and the territories of Christmas Island and the Cocos Islands.

All these defence and foreign policy initiatives seem to be at odds with the Government's 'judgement that the nation presently faces no prospect of military threat'. Paul Dibb asserts that it is highly irresponsible to plan forward on this basis, even if no specific contingency is identifiable upon which we should concentrate our force development. He goes on to suggest that Australia needs to plan for three major eventualities:

- First, there is a range of intermediate and low-level contingencies which could involve direct threat to Australia, or its vital interests ...
- Second, there is a prospect that the military power of some of Australia's neighbours could change dramatically ... Australia could face, for the first time, a potential regional threat from a force in being.
Third... the notion that Australia's... higher technology levels [over] regional states provides us with a sufficiently advantageous margin for our numerical deficiencies... will increasingly need sceptical examination.\textsuperscript{41}

The extension of Soviet influence over the past three decades has been characterised as a strategy of expansion based on unlimited opportunism;\textsuperscript{42} nibbling away at small countries, winning some, losing some, two steps forward, one step back, avoiding a decisive encounter, using proxies and spreading revolution by whatever means possible. The goals of the Soviet Union have not changed; its strategy is the classic indirect approach:

The true aim [of strategy] is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that, if it does not of itself produce a decision, its continuation by battle is sure to achieve this.\textsuperscript{43}

The 'Soviet connection' should be the major focus of the Australian defence planner throughout the potential conflict spectrum.

The containment of China is central to Soviet policies in the east Asia region and the massive build-up of Soviet forces along their common border is a manifestation of these policies. The Soviet presence in Vietnam also contributes to the containment of China and facilitates the transition of Soviet naval forces between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

There now seems to be little prospect of rapprochement between China and the Soviet Union. The 1978 peace treaty between China and Japan and the growing ties between China and the United States\textsuperscript{44} will raise the prospect of long-term 'strategic encirclement'\textsuperscript{45} by China and the West. Herein lies the danger for South-East Asia, because the Soviets might try to relieve some of the pressure of strategic encirclement, by attempting further penetration into the region south of China.

At present there are few opportunities for the Soviets to increase their influence in this region. The ASEAN nations face favourable prospects for internal stability and cooperative development. It must be recognised, however, that should domestic instabilities occur, there could be risks of external intervention. The Philippines, for example, has shown some signs of political instability during
the past year and this could be a cause for concern in the future, particularly if internal insurrection grows. The Prime Minister of Vanuatu occasionally acts like the 'mouse that roared' and threatens to welcome Soviet naval and air forces. This might not be a hollow threat because the Cubans have recently opened a mission in the capital, Vila.

The area with the greatest potential for conflict is along the Sino-Vietnamese border. The Chinese border attacks in May 1984 were much more sustained and achieved deeper penetration than similar attacks in 1979 when the Chinese sought to teach Vietnam 'a lesson' for invading Kampuchea. While such hostilities have no immediate impact on Australian security, the long-term implications could be grave; particularly if the Soviets found it necessary to build up their forces in Vietnam. This would have a destabilising effect on the region, causing unrest and tension and possibly calling for some countervailing action by Western powers.

Less likely, but far more dangerous, is the possibility of an accidental clash on the Thai-Kampuchean border which could escalate into a local conflict. Given the necessary preconditions, the Soviets might well provoke such a clash. The United States would then feel compelled to provide some assistance, but would probably try to avoid committing troops. In the circumstances, the United States and Thailand might call on Australia and other regional states for military assistance. The Thais might even attempt to invoke the Manila Pact.

An Australian strategy must take account of all these complexities. Military measures are not enough. A strategy must integrate all political, economic and military action in the region in order to deter further Soviet penetration, remove the sources of conflict and strengthen cooperation. A strategy should recognise the rights and views of the regional states who will wish to remain independent and responsible for their own defence.

Australia has already gone a long way in providing economic and military assistance. The ASEAN-Australian economic programme promotes agricultural development in Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Brunei. In the past five years Australia has contributed $57 million to the programme which is expanding at a rate of about 25 per cent per year. Economic assistance is
not confined to the ASEAN nations. For example, the Government recently announced that it was increasing its aid programme to Burma by $46 million during the next three years. Military assistance to regional countries under the defence cooperation programme presently accounts for about $45 million per annum. In the past 12 months more than 1,000 members of the armed forces of regional countries have attended training courses in Australia. There have also been numerous joint exercises and exchanges between Australian Defence Force personnel and the servicemen of regional states.

But these measures do not go far enough. There is a need to reinforce the defence links between Australia and the regional states both to enhance Australia's security and the security of the region as a whole. While much is being done by way of providing economic and military assistance, Australia's defence planning is presently too introspective. Planners are rightly concerned about the defence of Australia, but insufficient planning is being done about the more immediate problem of regional defence. The Soviets pose an indirect threat to the region and, given their modus operandi, planners should be concerned with the strategies and tactics of low-level conflict, psychological warfare, espionage, subversion, terrorism, the use of surrogate forces, the supply of arms and equipment, training local forces, the influence of third parties and the constraints on the use of force.

Because Australia has limited resources, strategic priority should be given to regional defence; and because Australia has only a very limited capacity to provide unilateral economic assistance, it should encourage the US, and to some extent Japanese, economic involvement. It is not necessary to believe in the 'domino theory' to conclude that Australia will be acting too late if it is engaged in conflict on its own shores.

Forces structured for low-level conflict in the region would be, to a large extent, the same as those required for low-level operations in defence of Australia. It will be necessary for the forces to be equipped to deal with the range of weapons provided to surrogate forces and client states by the Eastern bloc. This is a serious deficiency in the present force structure, because there are no agreed
threat criteria. Similarly, forces should be equipped and trained to operate in the climate and terrain conditions which apply in the region.

In fostering stability in the region, it is not necessary to deploy forces overseas, although in some circumstances the Government may be asked to provide military assistance. There is no doubt that an overseas deployment increases the security of the host country and raises the level of confidence; it also boosts the local economy. But the important contribution to regional defence is the declaration that Australia is capable of deploying and sustaining a highly effective force.

Forward deployment is an option for all three Services. The forward deployment of an Australian fighter squadron at Butterworth, Malaysia, is evidence of Australia's determination to assist in regional defence. Its withdrawal would send the wrong signals to the Soviets and the Government has rightly agreed to maintain a presence in Malaysia for the foreseeable future by rotating the new F-18 fighters through Butterworth after the existing Mirage squadron is phased out. The ASEAN nations also lack a long-range surveillance capability. The deployment of Australia's P3-Orion maritime patrol aircraft to Butterworth also assists in regional defence.

National strategy grows out of determining factors such as the character and psychology of people, tradition, political, social and economic institutions, geography, infrastructure and population distribution. Diplomacy, strategy, politics and military power are as one. National strategy should be designed to ensure peace - but not peace at any price.

In judging that the prospect of military threat to Australia is slight, planners have given insufficient attention to the indirect threat posed by the Soviet Union. The 'expansion base' has become the 'design case' for force structure and, given resource constraints and the need for modernisation, the Defence Force is becoming progressively less ready to meet even the lowest-level contingency. There is a pressing need to balance the requirement for readiness and sustainability against the cost of the modernisation programme. Strategic priority should be given to
regional defence and forces structured for low-level conflict in the region - this includes Australia. Robert O'Neill has concluded that:

The major issue now is not so much one of finance or organisation but of strategic judgement in recognising a growing need to contribute to the security of Australia's regional environment. The security of the home base is still a sine qua non of sound posture, but Australia would be ill advised to pursue that strategic policy alone, with dedicated perfectionism. To do so would be to misunderstand how the balance of international power normally works. Diplomacy and strategy must go hand in hand: to refuse greater defence cooperation to our allies and regional partners in the 1980s might not only lead them to regard Australia as irrelevant but also require Australia to maintain ultimately much greater forces for its own protection in a hostile environment.46

Force structure will always remain largely determined by budget allocations, but readiness and sustainability can be improved by giving priority to forces required for low-level conflict and regional defence. There will still be a requirement for forces structured for the defence of Australia and these will include those required for regional defence. Should there be a shift in international events which would indicate the possibility of an attack on Australia, then there would be a call for Defence Force deployments to provide some form of protection, particularly in the more remote northern areas. Judgements about what part of the Defence Force should be earmarked for regional defence and what part will be required for the defence of Australia will be assisted by the study of relevant contingencies. Without an agreed strategy there is no rationale for making such judgements. The defence and foreign policy initiatives which have been taken by the Government over the past three years show clearly an emerging strategy for the defence of Australia based on a doctrine of regional participation; in other words a regional defence strategy.
Notes


2 Ibid., p.167.

3 Ibid., pp.167-168.

4 'If I may pre-empt one line of criticism of this argument - that I am thereby opening the door to the development of major intervention forces which will consume huge quantities of resources and thereby detract from current capabilities to defend Australia against direct threat - let me reiterate that the scale of force contribution likely to be required from Australia for regional deployment is modest. The defence strengths of regional partners are appreciable against local threats. What they are looking for in time of crisis is supplementation, not supersession. Let me also point out that failure to help maintain a favourable regional environment could require the maintenance of much greater forces to defend Australia. In other words, there is an economic argument to be faced by the strict constructionists of the "defence of Australia" posture.' Ibid., pp.170-71.


7 Ibid., pp.111-112.

8 Committee on Australia's Relations with the Third World, Australia and the Third World, p.181.

9 Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Threats to Australia's Security, p.54.


12 Ibid.
14 Ibid., p.3.
16 Beaufre prefers to use the term 'conventional warfare' as wars fought with conventional weapons as opposed to those fought with nuclear weapons.
17 It is interesting to compare the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon with the wars of 1967 and 1973. In the earlier wars Israel was the clear winner of every propaganda battle. The Arab nations that practised censorship in peacetime did not want to acknowledge their defeat, let alone have it recorded on the nightly television news. However in 1982 the PLO was able to turn the propaganda battle against the Israelis. The Israeli Army was required to fight through populated areas and root out guerrillas. The swath of destruction was fully documented by cameramen and brought to the world-viewing audience each night in 'living' colour.
18 The negotiations in Paris during 1971-72 were notable for their propaganda value to the North Vietnamese.
19 Andre Beaufre, Strategy for Tomorrow, p.36.
20 Ibid.
21 For example, it was claimed that media reports of bombs not exploding in ships caused Argentine forces to adjust fuse settings with subsequent loss of British ships.
22 Stephen S. Kaplan, Diplomacy of Power.
23 Committee on Australia’s Relations with the Third World, Australia and the Third World, pp.111-112.
26 Ibid.
27 Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine.
30 Ibid., p.91.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
49

36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., p.6.
39 Ibid., p.7.
40 Paul Dibb, World Political and Strategic Trends over the Next 20 Years.
41 Ibid., pp.16-17.
42 Ibid.
44 The Chinese Prime Minister visited the United States in January 1984 and signed two Agreements; one on the exchange of scientific and technological information and the other to promote trade and provide for joint development of oil and coal resources and other sectors of the Chinese economy. This was followed in April 1984 by a visit to China by the President of the United States.
45 Paul Dibb, World Political and Strategic Trends Over the Next 20 Years, p.11 and Soviet Capabilities, Interests and Strategies in East Asia in the 1980s, (Working Paper No.45, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, Canberra, February 1982).
CHAPTER 4
READINESS

Australia's overall military strategy has been described as deterrence, but it has never been made clear what threats the Defence Force is required to deter or how the forces are to perform this act of deterrence. The absence of perceived threats has given rise to the concept of 'core force' or 'expansion base'; that is, a force capable of dealing with threats should they emerge at some time in the future. But little attention is given to the degree of readiness required to meet these threats. Indeed, the Department of Defence may be accused of neglecting readiness in favour of the current modernisation programme.

The modernisation programme, in fact, has the effect of eroding the operational effectiveness of the Defence Force because the percentage of GDP allocated to defence has remained fairly constant. Each new generation of equipment, albeit more capable, proves to be much more costly than the past. Thus, the cost of modernising must be met by cuts in force structure or readiness. This effect is illustrated in Figure 2, where for a given force structure and a given percentage of GDP, the costs of modernisation are offset by reductions in the costs of maintaining readiness.

FIGURE 2
Without increases in defence allocations, attempts to modernise the forces will inevitably lead to reductions in force structure or sacrifices in readiness. The defence Five Year Development Plan is presently facing an enormous 'bow wave' of projected costs of modernisation which can only be met by further reductions in force structure, readiness or both. All three Services have faced these pressures; the most significant example to date being the decision not to proceed with the purchase of a replacement aircraft carrier.

At the heart of these problems lie the planning processes of the Department of Defence which fail to take account of the force levels and readiness status required of the various components of the Defence Force. These processes were found to be deficient by two recent enquiries.

In 1982 the Defence Review Committee found that decisions taken in a programming context would be improved if they were preceded by an appreciation of Defence Force capability requirements on an overall and longer term basis. The present deficiency is in our view the absence of any real attempt to achieve a longer term military perspective of total Defence Force structure needs. We recognise, of course, that the difficulties are caused by the absence of a definitive base line which is a result of the current absence of a direct threat to Australian security.3

More recently the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence found that the military strategy was essentially reactive, that is, designed to expand to meet threats once they arose. The Committee considered that an alternative approach was needed which:

- takes account of the fact that national security should not be responsive to factors which could not be perceived until a threat had developed but should be dynamic and positive so as to delay further or deny the emergence of a threat;
- adopts specific strategies and force structures for deterring aggression and countering those threats that are not deterred; and
gives priority to deterring intermediate and high-level threats and defending ourselves against the likely low-level threats. This Committee also considered 'that Australia's present defence strategy - sometimes referred to as the core force strategy - is inadequate in terms of its short term deployment capacity and combat sustainability, its expansion potential and its operational command structure'. In other words - readiness.

Readiness is a complex concept, subsuming as it does a number of separate interacting variables. In military terms readiness is usually specified as a degree of notice and measured by the number of days before deployment is to occur. Any Reserve elements must be eligible for 'call-out' within the provisions of existing legislation and Constitutional process. This degree of notice implies that for a given force all preparations for war will be completed within the specified time. This in turn means that servicemen must be ready for operational service; that is, they are trained, medically fit, within certain age limits and have sufficient residual time in service. The force must be suitably equipped and have adequate maintenance and reserve stocks for operations. There must also be sufficient reserves of manpower, stores, equipment and ammunition to sustain the force in combat. Readiness includes requirements to prepare and promulgate doctrine, train and evaluate individuals and units. Finally, readiness implies that servicemen have the leadership, morale and esprit de corps necessary to be an effective fighting force.

The Navy maintains some ships at a high level of readiness. Once a ship is 'worked up' and has completed its operational readiness evaluation, it is ready in all respects for its mission. Once at this readiness state a ship's combat effectiveness is limited only by the Fleet's capacity to provide maintenance and resupply. However, apart from strategic reserves of fuel, Australia maintains only minimal stocks against a contingency that the Fleet might be required to undertake a specific combat mission.

The Army has selected units at an advanced state of readiness for deployment at short notice. Ready reaction groups of the Special Air Service Regiment are held at very short notice for counter-terrorist operations. Response forces to provide aid to the civil power, for example,
bush-fire fighting, are maintained at short notice. The Army also has a small force which is earmarked to provide a United Nations peace-keeping contingent in Namibia at relatively short notice. Finally, the Army has an Operational Deployment Force (ODF) which is maintained on light scales of equipment for unspecified low-level conflict situations, but there are only minimal stocks held against a contingency that the ODF might be required to undertake prolonged combat operations.

The Air Force designates certain aircraft which are held at a very high level of readiness for search and rescue missions, while other aircraft are held ready for missions such as surveillance. But once again, there are only minimal aircraft or stocks held against an operational contingency.

Uncertainty about the nature of threats to Australia's security, and thus the degree of readiness required, engendered the concept of 'core force' in the mid-1970s. The Department of Defence defined the term 'core force' in 1981 in reply to a question posed by the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters:

Whereas some countries are able to identify both the nature and source of threats facing them, the same cannot be said for Australia. Our defence force should not be tailored to meet a specific situation but must be versatile and contain a range of generalised capabilities.

The force-in-being must be capable of performing current and foreseeable tasks (such as surveillance) and of dealing with credible short-term contingencies. It should also contain the basic professional skills, equipment and reserve forces to enable timely expansion to counter a developing threat. In this sense the force-in-being is an expansion base; it is also referred to as a 'core-force'. The core force is not a static entity maintained against the day when warning of a particular threat is declared to have been received. Rather, the expansion base provided by the force-in-being is continually being developed in response to changing circumstances including both strategic and technological. The expansion capacity of the Defence Force will
depend on many factors such as the extent of the developing threat, the civil resources that are mobilised and directed to its development and the extent of support in the community. Numerous study treatments have demonstrated the futility of relying on simplistic analysis techniques drawn from peace-time derived data for assessment of expansion capacity.

There has been much criticism of the 'core force' concept, but apart from a few notable exceptions very little has been offered by way of alternatives. This is surprising because there is a substantial literature about the treatment of strategic uncertainty and a wide range of methodologies is available to those preparing assessments. All of these techniques are aimed at improving the quality of decision-making. Put simply, we are trying to answer two questions: 'What will happen, if ...?' and 'What may happen, unless ...?'

To answer these questions it is necessary to identify alternative prospects and explore the consequences of each alternative. Studies in the 'futures' field have been rapidly expanding; spurred on by the pace of technological change and with it socio-economic change. Nearly all developed Western nations have organisations designed to advise governments on future opportunities and problems that may need to be met. Typical organisations are the Office of Technology Assessment for the Congress of the United States and the New Zealand Commission for the Future. This is not meant to imply that future studies are not conducted in Australia; indeed there has been some very skilful and effective work done. TELECOM 2000 is just one such study of sophisticated long range planning. The need to expand long-range planning activities was recently recognised by the Australian Government when a Commission for the Future was established.

Taylor lists a number of ways in which forecasts can be helpful in assisting the decision-making process:
- providing a useful framework for planning and decision-making. Decisions or long-range plans, policies and programs cannot be made rationally without basic assumptions. Forecasts provide planners and decision-makers with reasonable sets of basic assumptions;
suggesting a variety of possible approaches to solving problems. In addition to providing a framework of planning assumptions, forecasting can provide alternative approaches to issues by identifying a range of otherwise unanticipated problem areas;
- increasing the degree of choice; and
- helping to assess alternative processes and actions.\(^9\)

O'Connor has provided a very useful summary of the techniques of technological forecasting.\(^{10}\) Many of these techniques may be adapted to strategic forecasting. He points out that there are two basic approaches to forecasting - exploratory and normative: exploratory forecasting being concerned with forward projections from the present knowledge base and normative forecasting which starts with a set of goals and then works back to the present to determine how best to achieve these goals.

The 'core force' concept of defence planning may, therefore, be categorised as exploratory forecasting, although there is no rigorous attempt at making forward projections beyond the identification of a range of equipment which might be required in the context of a Five Year Development Programme. This has lead to the well-founded criticism that the planning process is reactive and lacking a longer term perspective of total Defence Force structure needs.

Langtry and Ball\(^{11}\) summarised the deficiencies of the 'core force' approach to defence planning as follows:

Unfortunately, the 'core force' suffers from a number of quite debilitating inadequacies. Theoretically, the development of force expansion models cannot proceed very far because it is not possible to define the elements of a 'core force' unless it is known what it is to be the core of. A choice has to be made, whether consciously or not, in the selection of core capabilities, yet the lack of consideration of terminal capabilities required allows no rational criteria for this choice.\(^{12}\)
They go on to suggest an alternative approach based on the concept of disproportionate response which would assist Australia to control the threat environment rather than react to it.

... it is possible to develop a relatively 'threat insensitive' defence posture - a posture designed around 'contingencies to be deterred'. This approach would abjure specifications of any particular threat. Rather, it would identify a range of contingencies which Australia could possibly face, from minor harassments to nuclear attack, and describe the policy and posture necessary to deter these contingencies.\(^{13}\)

This approach to defence planning was taken up by the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence which concluded:

The Committee considers that the basic planning and selection criterion for Australia's deterrent strategy should be the notion of disproportionate response, whereas the capabilities required for defence against low level threats should be derived from detailed studies of likely contingencies.\(^{14}\)

The Swedish Defence Forces use normative planning techniques somewhat similar to those suggested by Langtry and Ball and endorsed by the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee. The intention of the Swedes to exploit uncertainty resolution over time was outlined in a 1969 report on 'Planning and Program Budgeting in Defence'.\(^{15}\) An important component of the new system was activity aimed at setting long-term goals as well as identifying alternative ways of reaching these goals.\(^{16}\) It is now a feature of the Swedish system that planning is coordinated with the political decision making process.

At an early stage, the Government issues guidelines for the prospective plans in the form of crisis scenarios. Parliament is informed and can react against the scenarios if it wants to. This guidance is not connected to any budgetary commitments for the Government. This procedure is aimed at reconciling the need for systematic
long range planning in defence and the wish of politicians to avoid early commitments and to preserve freedom of action. In developing these crisis scenarios the Swedes considered the major delimitations on their overall defence objective which could affect their plans and found the following spectrum of situations:

- normal peaceful conditions;
- crises outside Europe causing shortages of raw materials and agricultural or industrial products necessary for the economy;
- war in Europe, with Sweden remaining neutral. In such a situation, Sweden being required to prevent violation of its territorial integrity, to manage interruption to its foreign trade, and to limit access of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons employed in neighbouring countries;
- military or economic threats in support of demands directed against Sweden;
- surprise attack aimed at reaching a decisive success before Sweden had been able to carry out full mobilisation;
- an attack with conventional weapons against the mobilised Swedish defence, with the aim of gaining control over the whole or parts of Sweden; and
- a war into which Sweden was drawn and in which nuclear, biological and/or chemical weapons are employed.

Proceeding from these hypothetical situations, various crisis scenarios were composed. By obtaining the agreement of Government to these scenarios, the Government assumed responsibility for the types of situations towards which planning was directed without entering into financial commitments. In this way the Swedish Government became involved in setting long term defence objectives, while at the same time preserving their freedom of action on budgetary matters.

The prospective planning then proceeded as follows:

- during the first phase (15 to 20 years ahead) various defence structures were formulated which were based on different assumptions
about future defence expenditure. The efficiency of these structures was then tested by war gaming;
in the next phase the decision points were defined. The aim was to keep all options open to implement future structures. A 10 year lead time from decision to implementation was considered necessary for all the consequences of decision to remain fully visible; and
the final phase was a five-year programme plan.\textsuperscript{19}

The first serious difficulty with this methodology is that the possibility of foreseeing all future developments is remote and the risk of neglecting some important future event can never be removed. Another difficulty is in making the defence scenarios sufficiently credible to obtain government agreement. Individual attitudes towards uncertainty will influence the collective perception and thus the organisational goals ultimately selected. There are other more general considerations which will influence the planning process and these include ideological and socio-economic interests of the armed services in order to justify their existence. One possible way of overcoming these difficulties is to establish a 'think tank' outside the defence organisation to develop alternative future scenarios.

It is now relevant to examine the planning methodology involved in making force structure decisions in the Australian Department of Defence.

The Tange re-organisation of the Defence Group of Departments institutionalised a systematic approach to defence planning.\textsuperscript{20} This process starts with the development of Australia's Security Outlook and Defence Policy Objective documents through the Services and Defence Force Capabilities papers to the Five Year Development Programme (FYDP).

The Services and Defence Force Capabilities papers are not satisfactory in their present form because they are not directed towards the achievement of a long term defence strategy or force structure objective. Indeed, the papers tend to concentrate on justifying the existing force structure as well as the equipment sought in the FYDP. This deficiency was recognised by the Defence Review Committee
when they recommended an increase in the joint Service staff supporting the Chief of the Defence Force Staff (CDFS) and an expansion of the role of the Defence Operational Requirements Committee.

While it is accepted that the individual Services would still initiate most of their own requirements, the task of the Defence Operational Requirements Committee would be to encourage the development of a military perspective of Defence Force structure objectives taking account of operational needs in a total force sense. These longer term objectives would, of course, be formulated in the light of strategic policy and capabilities guidance developed in accordance with the joint process. Once a total military perspective of Defence Force requirements (for example, the Defence Force Capabilities Paper) has been developed, there would still be a need to consider and argue proposals in the programming context — we recognise, of course, that the difficulties are caused by the absence of a definite base line which is the result of the current absence of a direct threat to Australian security.

Normative planning techniques which exploit uncertainty resolution over time are designed to deal with high levels of strategic uncertainty. Babbage has suggested how these techniques may be adapted to an Australian situation. He has argued that the most appropriate criteria for Australia's future security planning are four-fold: contingencies, doctrinal objectives, constraining influences and the additional requirements of national policy.

In a very real sense, the major underlying cause of Australia's current security planning problem is the high level of strategic uncertainty with which the country is confronted. Thus the nature of possible future pressures and threats is a logical starting point for the processes of coherent security planning.

He then went on to describe the general character of a planning system which involved the evaluation of alternative concepts and structures.
The formulation of security policy is ultimately the responsibility of government. Decisions taken at this level are influenced by a complex set of factors, including the results of detailed analysis conducted by the Department of Defence resulting in the Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy document. The purpose of this document is 'to produce strategic and policy objectives based on the situations, trends and contingencies of importance to Australia's defence security'. However, because there are no immediately discernible threats, the account in its present form, does not provide sufficient guidance. There is a requirement to obtain government agreement to a defence strategy and a set of aggression cases which could be used as a general basis for prospective planning.

The general idea of prospective planning is to formulate a long term view of defence force structures reaching beyond confident predictions of strategic circumstances. This is because significant changes to force structure cannot be achieved within the life-span of existing equipment. A time frame of 15 to 20 years is usually chosen, because by that time much of today's inventory will be obsolete. The aim of prospective planning is not so much to produce a plan as to produce a generalised set of force structures considered suitable to meet several types of aggression cases within the context of an overall defence strategy.

It now remains to suggest a way of integrating prospective planning into the existing defence planning process. The system could incorporate the following activities:

- analysis of the strategic environment generally along the lines of the present guidance documents - Australia's Security Outlook (ASO) and the Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy;
- identification of a set of aggression cases considered relevant for long term defence planning. The purpose is not to try and predict the future but to describe a set of conceivable alternatives;
- description of scenarios. This would involve an elaboration of the aggression cases selected as relevant to defence planning;
- selection of generalised force structures for each scenario. For the purposes of subsequent analysis these force structures would be described in terms of major formations and units, equipment and the support of infrastructure;
- the conduct of analytical studies on the selected force structures. This might involve a range of studies from computer assisted war-gaming to field tests with troops;
- the description of Defence Force Structure objectives in the Defence Force Capabilities Paper;
- the formulation of joint and single Service structure plans to achieve required capabilities; and
- the development of alternative contingent plans to meet changes in the strategic environment or variations to budget priorities.\(^{28}\)

The proposal is to replace the existing incremental planning system with activity aimed at setting long-term force structure goals as well as identifying alternative ways of reaching these goals. The intention would be to exploit the additional information which would be gained over time. The process would involve multi-stage decisions in each five years of a 15 year planning period; the final five years being incorporated in a Five Year Development Programme (FYDP). Each stage would be a complete cycle of forecasting, planning and decision, and the whole process would roll forward year by year. The process is illustrated in Figure 3.

**FIGURE 3**

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<th>Stage 1</th>
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The first step in the process is forecasting. This involves writing a scenario leading to one or more of the aggression cases which have been selected for study. Olaf Hemler describes scenario writing as follows:

Scenario writing involves the constructive use of imagination ... It aims at describing some aspect of the future; but instead of building up a picture of unrestrained fiction or even constructing a utopian invention that the author considers highly desirable, [the] scenario starts with the present state of the world and shows how, step by step, a future state might evolve in a plausible fashion out of the present one. Thus, though the purpose of a scenario is not to predict the future, it nevertheless sets out to demonstrate the possibility of a certain future state of affairs by exhibiting a reasonable chain of events that might lead to it.\(^9\)

Having developed the scenario, the planner or analyst is now able to generate contingencies by asking the question 'what if ...?' The study of these contingencies will then lead to the development of proposals for new capabilities, techniques or systems. The scenario is the communication device by which the planner stretches the imagination and forcibly illustrates the consequences and pitfalls of various alternative proposals. Inevitably the choice between the alternatives will rest on the judgement of the decision-makers. Since the analysis is restricted to the context of the scenario, care must be taken not to bias the result and thus influence these judgements.

In the early stages of the analysis the scenario may be described to groups of military experts who are required to define the force structures needed to meet such a situation. Care must be taken to ensure that the responses are not narrowly confined to the tactical operations involved, but rather a more general overview of the capabilities considered most important. It is then possible to test the sensitivity of the advice given by changing the important geographic, military and political factors involved in the scenario. The recommended force structures may only be the first iteration in a process of successive refinements of
force structure. Various analytical tools can be used to test force structures ranging from computer assisted war-gaming to tactical exercises with troops.

An important aspect of the analysis will be an assessment of lead times for the development of particular capabilities. This is no easy task because it is necessary to make a whole host of assumptions; for example, the assessment of lead times calls for the identification of the numerous elements that contribute to the achievement of a particular defence capability. These elements range from the infrastructure necessary to manufacture and support various items of equipment to the trained manpower necessary for its operation. Each element has a lead time which is different from the sum of the various parts. There are other complications such as risk-taking. For example, lead times may be reduced if reliance is placed on defence supplies from overseas sources. It is therefore necessary to make a judgement as to whether these supplies would be available in a defence emergency. If it is decided not to take the risk, then it will be necessary to pay the cost of manufacture in Australia. With many high technology weapon systems, where Australian industry has no capacity, this may not even be a viable option.

Another difficulty associated with the measurement of lead time is the time necessary to integrate all the elements of a new weapon system into the force structure. As technological complexity of weapon systems increases, so too do the lead times necessary for the introduction of a new capability or the upgrading of an existing one. We have seen, all too frequently in recent years, the impact of new technology on the battlefield - the handheld anti-armour missiles of the Yom Kippur War and the Exocet air-to-surface missiles in the Falklands War. Development of counters to these new weapons also takes time. Indeed, the visible subcategories of new weaponry, on-the-shelf and imminent, exceed our ability to keep variables in focus; for example:

- remotely-piloted vehicles (drones for reconnaissance, bombing, fighter-interceptor roles);
- fuel air (aerosol)-explosives;
- ceramic-metal armour (such as Chogham armour);
- rocket-assisted artillery projectiles;
- air-cushion vehicles (ground effect machines);
vertical and short take-off and landing close-air-support aircraft;
cannon-launched precision-guided munitions;
'smart bombs' (precision-guided missiles);
cheap 'fire-and-forget' portable anti-tank weapons;
advances in electronic warfare (EW) and command, control, communications and intelligence (C³I)
technology;
high volume-of-fire radar-controlled anti-aircraft weapons;
laser and particle-beam weapons;
scatterable mine systems;
artificial intelligence; and
space weapons.

It is only through the study of contingencies involving the employment of new weapon systems that informed judgements can be made about force structure requirements. And because of the increasing complexity of warfare it is all the more imperative to decide what we are going to defend and what we are going to defend against. To paraphrase Robert O'Neill - the notion that we should have small quantities of everything on which we can expand is a luxury we can ill afford.

Notes

2 The average over the past five years is 2.8 per cent of GDP. See Department of Defence, Defence Report 1983-84, (Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1984), p.103.
4 Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, The Australian Defence Force, p.xvii.
5 Ibid., p.xvi.
This is a two-battalion brigade group with elements having designated reaction times ranging from 14-28 days notice to move.

The concept is attributed to Mr G.D. Cawsey, the then First Assistant Secretary, Force Development and Analysis Division, and was first publicly described by him in a submission to the Parliamentary Sub-Committee on Defence Matters. See Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Hansard Transcript of Evidence, 1978-79, vol.1, p.1044.

Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Hansard Transcript of Evidence, Apr.80-Mar.81, vol.2, p.1642.


Desmond O'Connor, Technological Forecasting in the Australian Military Environment, (Working Paper No.52, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, Canberra, June 1982).

J.O. Langtry and Desmond Ball, Controlling Australia's Threat Environment, (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1979).

Ibid., p.4.

Ibid., p.60.

Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, The Australian Defence Force, p.xvi.


Ibid.


B. Schwartz, 'Programme Budgeting and/or Long-Range Planning', p.46.
Sir Arthur Tange introduced a Five Year Rolling Programme in 1969. The first programme was to cover the five year period from June 1982 and the Services were required to have their 'shopping lists' ready by January 1970. This process was based on the PPBS (program planning budgeting system) introduced by Robert McNamara when he was US Secretary of Defense in 1964. Sir Arthur Tange, Report on the Reorganisation of the Defence Group of Departments, (called the Tange Report), (Department of Defence, Canberra, 1973).


Ibid., p.xxiv, (Recommendation 92).

Ibid., p.117.

R.E. Babbage, Rethinking Australia's Defence, (University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1980).

Ibid., p.152.

Ibid., pp.275-292.


System designs considered suitable for Australian Defence Planning are described in R.E. Babbage, Rethinking Australia's Defence, in particular Appendices C and D, pp.260-294.

CHAPTER 5
PROSPECTIVE PLANNING

We have previously examined a range of circumstances where military operations might be mounted against Australia. It was noted that the contemporary strategic environment orders the limitation of conflict out of fear of escalation to nuclear war. It was also observed that Australia might be required to deal with certain low-level threats without the direct support of allies. Given the necessary preconditions for conflict, it was postulated that these low-level threats might develop in the context of a persuasive strategy characterised by an aggressor mounting a prolonged political, economic and psychological attack - military operations having only an auxiliary role. With this as background it was suggested that we need a strategy to counter the persuasive strategy - a strategy that went well beyond Australia's shores and was directed towards cooperation with allies and contributions to regional stability. This was labelled as a strategy of assertion which was manifest by a demonstrated ability to escalate the level of deterrence ahead of what was perceived to be an emerging threat. Langtry and Ball described a similar strategy based on the notion of controlling Australia's threat environment rather than reacting to it.

The fundamental weakness of the 'core force' concept is that it is a reactive strategy based on an assumption that developing threats will be perceived and the 'core force' will have sufficient time to expand to meet these threats. We have substantial historical evidence to question this assumption; indeed threat perceptions have changed significantly over the past few years; but very little effort has been made towards improving the readiness and sustainability of the Defence Force. This is because the present 'core-force' planning processes are equipment orientated and fail to take account of the different warning times for various contingencies, or the force levels and readiness states required of the various components of the Defence Force.

There are two elements to warning time - the first is capability and the second is intent. The capabilities of other nations to wage war are relatively easy to assess, but our ability to identify emerging threats is a much more
difficult matter. We must therefore adopt specific strategies for deterring aggression and escalate the level of deterrence ahead of perceived emerging threats.

To do this we must first identify the threats we wish to deter: that is, a set of aggression cases considered relevant to long-term defence planning. We are assisted in making this selection by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence which examined threats to Australia's security. The Committee acknowledged that Australia would suffer damage either directly or indirectly as a result of a nuclear exchange between the superpowers and concluded that deterrence to nuclear attack on Australia was inseparable from deterrence to nuclear war in general. While nuclear war could occur with little warning the Committee believed that there was a clear comprehension by both superpowers of the awesome consequences of nuclear conflict.

The Committee also concluded that large scale attack or invasion of Australia was remote and improbable in the foreseeable future, but later went on to hedge its bet by stating that the emergence of such a threat might take less time than is likely to be required to obtain some long-lead-time items of equipment and increased trained manpower.

Overall the Committee presented a cautiously reassuring appraisal of Australia's strategic prospects, but pointed out that low level threats could arise at short notice and give rise to challenging problems. There was uncertainty about the extent and timing of allied support for contingencies which could occur in the region. This led the Committee to conclude that Australia should place continuing emphasis on self-reliance and the possession of well-balanced forces.

We may now postulate a spectrum of hypothetical threat situations which will influence Australia's defence strategy and force structure:

- **Situation 1.** Normal peace-time conditions rising to activities and operations at the lower end of the conflict spectrum which involve the use of military or a variety of semi-military forces (both combat and non-combat) on the part of an aggressor to influence or compel Australia to accept a particular political or military condition.
- **Situation 2.** A major attack or invasion with conventional weapons, the aim of the aggressor being to gain control of the whole or parts of Australia.

- **Situation 3.** War between the superpowers with Australia suffering damage, either directly or indirectly as a result of a nuclear exchange or the use of chemical and/or biological weapons.

The basic technique of prospective planning is to identify the force structures considered necessary to deter or mitigate the hypothetical threat situations selected for study. Since fundamental changes in defence force structure take some time to implement, a long-term perspective is necessary to keep all force structure options open. A 10-15 year lead-time is usually necessary to accommodate the various decision points. And since defence decisions are largely influenced by threat perceptions and risk-taking, subjective judgements will always be required when these decision points are reached. The advantage conferred by prospective planning is that the cost of each decision, whether made or deferred, will always be explicit.

We are now ready to commence prospective planning and the first step is to write a scenario leading to one or more of the threat situations we have selected for study. Our time frame must accommodate decision points for long-lead-time items - 15 years; this takes us to the year 2000.

When considering what the world will be like in the year 2000 it is a reasonable bet that it will be very much like what it is today. Looking back over the past 15 years we find that little has changed. We can expect these long-lived trends to persist through to the year 2000 although there will undoubtedly be some surprises like the Falklands and Grenada. East-West confrontation will continue; the arms race will go on, punctuated from time to time by arms limitation talks. The rich will get richer and the poor will get poorer. The West will suffer periodic economic recessions, but should be able to maintain political stability. Far more dangerous is continuing economic stagnation in Eastern bloc nations. These internal pressures may lead the Soviets to seek external enemies rather than social reform. The ideological challenge between East and West will continue to be played out in peripheral areas.
One of these peripheral areas lies to the north of Australia where 15 years ago there were no Soviet bases. The bases at Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay will continue to be developed until the Soviet quest for influence in the region has run its course. The stability of the region to the north is vital to the security of Australia and a sudden switch of ideology in any of the countries in the region would be cause for great concern. However, some countries are more important for Australia’s defence than others - a communist Vanuatu could possibly be tolerated, but a dispute with Indonesia or a dispute between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea would be much more dangerous. A Vietnamese attack on Thailand might be less cause for alarm than a revolution in the Philippines which caused the United States to lose their bases.

It therefore seems likely that East-West confrontation in Australia’s area of strategic interest will continue over the next 15 years. The Soviets will try to extend this sphere of influence, as they have in the past, through the use of surrogate forces and by adopting the strategies and tactics of low-level conflict - terrorism and unconventional warfare. It is the potential for a major shift in the strategic posture of the region which should be the source of greatest concern for Australia’s defence over the next 15 years.

**Scenario**

1985-1990. The ANZUS Alliance is weakened as anti-nuclear factions gain increasing influence in Australia and New Zealand. The Soviets seek to extend their influence in the islands of the South-West Pacific by offers of economic assistance. Sporadic violence continues in New Caledonia. Incidents occur along the common border between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. East Timor remains an irritant in relations between Australia and Indonesia. Leftist guerillas gain strength in the Philippines. Vietnam continues to occupy Kampuchea in an attempt to dislodge Khmer Rouge guerillas; border incursions into Thailand increase. The Soviets increase the
strength of their naval and air forces based in Vietnam. China engages in harassment activities along the China-Vietnam border.

1990-1995. Cooperation under the ANZUS Treaty continues to decline. Anti-nuclear and anti-American factions become more active in Australia and there are isolated terrorist attacks against US representatives. The Soviets extend their influence in the South-West Pacific by establishing some permanent missions and fishing rights. A rebellion in New Caledonia against French rule is put down with violence but independence is granted; a leftist government assumes power. Australian relations with Indonesia deteriorate because of Australia's support for Papua New Guinea over problems which persist along the border. The Indonesian economy deteriorates and there is widespread civil unrest. The death of Marcos brings civil war to the Philippines and a leftist government seizes power. With memories of Vietnam the United States is loath to intervene and is eventually forced to withdraw from its bases. The Philippines withdraws from ASEAN. The Soviets are quick to seize the opportunity to build up their bases in Vietnam. Vietnam in turn is encouraged to increase pressure on Thailand. China retaliates to 'teach Vietnam another lesson'. Thailand invokes the Manila Pact, but the US, Australia and other treaty partners claim that the Pact is no longer relevant.

1995-2000. Australia strengthens military ties with Malaysia and Singapore under the Five Power Defence Arrangements, and with Papua New Guinea under bi-lateral arrangements. Civil disturbance in Indonesia increases and the authoritarian government once again comes under attack from left-wing forces. The difficult and complex border dispute between Australia and Indonesia over the Timor Sea remains unresolved. With the loss of the Philippine bases the United States seeks to strengthen its strategic position
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in east Asia. China is offered increased economic aid, transfer of defence technology and military assistance. The Soviets fearing strategic encirclement encourage Vietnamese probes against China and Thailand. Vietnam becomes a major Soviet base and acts as a Soviet surrogate in the region much as Cuba does in Central America and elsewhere.

The 20th Century ends with a marked decline of United States influence in the region. The probability of global conflict remains remote but, as a contingency, has importance for long range force structure planning. A major military assault on Australia is also judged as being remote as this would require an adversary to possess major maritime capabilities. Only the Soviet Union possesses such capabilities and their use against Australia would involve risk of conflict with the United States. Nevertheless the possibility cannot be completely ruled out and requires the forces to maintain a deterrent against such a contingency. Other nations in the region have improved their strategic deployment capabilities and are capable of making limited air and naval attacks on Australia. They are also capable of deploying and maintaining regimental (brigade) size ground forces with some light armour, artillery and air support.

The purpose of the scenario which has been described is not to predict the future. It nevertheless shows how a certain future state could exist by describing a reasonable chain of events that might lead to the three hypothetical threat situations which have been selected for study. To meet these threat situations three force structure objectives are identified.

- **Objective 1.** To provide the forces necessary for normal peace-time tasks and to deal with short-term low-level threats (situation 1).
- **Objective 2.** To provide deterrent forces against the possibility of a major attack on Australia (situation 2).
Objective 3. To provide the forces with capabilities that will mitigate the effects of global war (situation 3).

The description of force structures to meet these objectives is a complex task calling on judgement and military experience in the first instance. The efficiency and sensitivity of these force structures to various contingencies, including changes in technology, must be tested in war game studies and the experience gained in these studies used to modify the structures. Normally one or two contingencies tend to have a dominating effect; for example, a contingent deployment overseas to assist a friend or ally.

To illustrate the process we will concentrate on Army force structures. The same process will need to be repeated for Navy and Air Force force structures. In general terms the Army is divided into two components—the Field Force, and the support area. The Field Force comprises those combat, combat support and logistic units which are capable of being deployed in the field for operations. It also includes those logistic units required to interface with the support area. The support area includes those headquarters and units necessary to provide command and control, training and administrative support for the Field Force. It follows that it is first necessary to define the structure of the Field Force before the structure of the remaining elements can be decided.

Objective 1 - Peacetime Tasks and Low-Level Threats

Beyond the fundamental need to train and maintain military skills, there are certain peace-time tasks of a continuing nature that are required at short notice and influence force structure. These tasks include provision of forces to aid the civil power and civil community; for example, counter terrorist operations and bush-fire fighting, and contributions to the national mapping programme. The Army is also required to provide special communications for the Defence Force and specialised transport to carry out a wide variety of transport support tasks.

There are other peace-time activities that contribute positively to the defence effort as well as to national and diplomatic goals. These activities include exercising with
friends and allies and cooperation with neighbours in defence matters. While these activities are not force structure determinants, they create a requirement for certain elements of the Defence Force; for example a headquarters for command and control, and a comprehensive logistic system capable of deployment in the field to support other Services and allies.

The low-level threat situations to be analysed are examples of limited military measures for the exercise of political pressure that would escalate over time. They have their primary impact on the use of the Defence Force in defence of likely targets in northern Australia. The capabilities of civilian and other defence, intelligence and surveillance organisations already in existence should be used, as far as possible, to complement the capabilities of the Army. This total information-gathering organisation would include police, State emergency services, customs, health, aborigines, coast watchers, flying doctor services, local mining and industrial organisations. Other capabilities necessary for surveillance are signal electronic support measures, intelligence elements, and ground and air reconnaissance units.

Should international events indicate a likelihood of raids or attacks on Australian territory there would be a requirement for ground forces deployed in the north to provide a measure of protection and deterrence. The form and extent of this protection depends on judgements on what might be an acceptable level of risk; given that even greatly expanded forces would not guarantee total protection. The physical security of key points would place heavy demands on manpower. However, in practice protection would be confined to important points and be complemented by forces deployed to provide general area protection of the population centres. Given the postulated threat, it is judged that, in the initial stages, a satisfactory level of general area protection and deterrence could be achieved by forces ranging from infantry in company and platoon groups garrisoned in towns and operating with dedicated elements providing air and ground mobility, to larger units more specifically tailored to the task, such as light reconnaissance units using tracked, wheeled or other vehicles as the terrain dictates.
The extent to which armour and artillery support might be deployed depends on the level of conflict judged most likely at the time. It is difficult to define with certainty an upper limit to the intensity of attacks if such a situation of hostility ever arose, and it is assessed that even very low-level situations would require substantial forces and elements of firepower, as insurance, in the key areas of the north and west of Australia.

The vastness of the distances involved highlights the importance of air support for ground operations. Air mobility would be achieved by the use of RAAF assets, and all infantry units and their supporting elements need to be trained for air mobile operations, with a proportion trained for airborne operations.

These operations would require the ground forces to traverse large distances, over a variety of terrain. The ground reconnaissance elements would need to be equipped with a variety of vehicles and water-craft. Light fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft may also be included. The distances involved, monsoonal conditions and the traffic-ability of terrain dictate that air would be the primary means of mobility and maintenance would need to be supplemented, where possible, by road and sea.

The maximum use must be made of the existing governmental and commercial infrastructures to provide administrative support for ground force operations. There is doubt about the capacity of the infrastructure to contribute significantly to this support, as its size and diversity reflects the existing civilian dependency. It is therefore essential for timely warning to be given to enable the infrastructure of the north to cope with additional demands for food, fuel and other high usage consumables.

The elements of force structure that might be required during the intelligence gathering, surveillance, protective and reactive phases of these postulated low-level operations are shown at Annex A.

Annex A shows that if the Army is required to deploy forces to meet low-level threats in remote parts of Australia then the minimum force required for the task would be a brigade group of three infantry battalions with appropriate supporting Arms and Services. Depending on the development of the civilian infrastructure in the area of operations, a much larger logistic force may be necessary than that
shown in Annex A. It is not envisaged that all these forces would be deployed immediately, but would be built up as the strategic situation deteriorated.

Low-level threats are likely to be unattributable and may be prolonged. In this event it would be necessary to provide reinforcements for the deployed force and respite in the event of prolonged operations. Current policy is to provide respite after 12 months in a combat area. Trained soldiers must be available from the balance of the force-in-being. This suggests that similar forces, albeit at a lower state of readiness, must be available for this purpose. On the basis of one brigade undertaking operations, one resting and one preparing for operations, at least three brigades could be required.

Objective 2 - Deterrent Forces

The scenario postulates a threat of regimental (brigade) size with appropriate light armour, artillery and air support. This threat may be in addition to the low-level threats analysed previously which might demand protective and surveillance forces to be deployed. The requirement would be for the army to have the capabilities to attack and destroy a lodgement.

Point protection of military installations and, in particular, airfields assumes a greater importance in these threat situations. Infantry and armoured fighting vehicles (AFV), with field artillery support disposed to provide defence in depth, is seen as a fundamental requirement for this task. Forces necessary to provide the intelligence, surveillance and protective capabilities remain similar to those required for a lower level threat and would have been built up progressively in accordance with the level of threat, the degree of acceptable risk and the level of deterrence required.

Further levels of direct and indirect fire support such as is offered by main battle tanks and medium artillery provide an extra margin of capability and flexibility, though their particular characteristics are more appropriate in reactive operations against more substantial lodgements. Tanks, if deployed strategically in small groups at key centres, might be regarded primarily as a deterrent to
lightly equipped attacks, and their pre-emptive deployment in this way could partially offset their relative lack of mobility in reactive operations.

Though lightly equipped, well trained enemy troops would be able to prepare substantial fortifications within a relatively short period after landing. Once dug-in and fortified, the displacement of such a force of regimental size would call for a large response on our part (up to three brigade groups) and could cause heavy casualties if we attempted an assault with a similarly light force. Protection of assault forces in armoured personnel carriers (APC) to reduce casualties would be important.

The need to secure a mounting area and to contain and report on the lodgement is a task for special forces, air mobile infantry or AFV or combinations of these forces. Medium and field artillery would be required in most circumstances as well as capabilities for gun and mortar locating. Air defence weapons are necessary to prevent reinforcement of the lodgement, regardless of the enemy air threat. Field engineers are required to assist in the mobility of the force, both in concentrating for the attack and in the attack itself. Tanks are required for the destruction of fortifications and in clearing a built-up area, but there would be time constraints involved in concentrating them and an additional logistic penalty incurred.

The insertion of the assault force using all the means of movement requires air and sea capabilities. There is therefore a need for air transport and terminal support, with possibly logistics-over-the-shore operations as well. The development of an airhead and beach facilities together with the possible need for road construction identifies a requirement for construction engineers. There is also a need for general and specialised transport and a fuel quality control element. Because of the need for increased stock levels and the diversity of support, an administrative organisation is needed to provide an interface between the support area and the administrative elements of the force.

The concept of operations would entail a quick reaction by light mobile forces to contain the lodgement and secure a mounting area for a subsequent attack. The attack would utilise maximum combat power to destroy the lodgement in an attempt to demonstrate the futility of repeating similar lodgements. Forces for this type of contingency should
include joint and subordinate headquarters, assault forces and logistic support forces. The assault forces would comprise infantry supported by APC, AFV, field artillery, gun and mortar locating equipment, field engineers, Army aviation and possibly medium artillery. Depending on factors such as the season/weather, the pre-positioning of mechanised units and the availability of heavy transport, it could be possible to utilise a smaller, more mechanised force including tanks, mechanised infantry and medium artillery. The greater logistic demands of such a mechanised force, however, would need careful balancing against the advantages of increased firepower and protection for the assaulting forces.

Possibly lesser forces and/or capabilities could defeat the lodgements, but only with attendant increase in casualties and delays in achieving success. The prospect of failure could not be tolerated. The location of the lodgement, the weather/season, the need for quick deployment and reaction, and the available logistic support are all interacting factors that influence the size and composition of the force structure.

The elements of force structure that might be required to destroy a regimental (brigade) size attack are shown at Annex B.

If the Army is to have a deterrent against the possibility of a major attack on Australia, such as the one described above, then at least one division, with appropriate supporting troops, would be required (see Annex B). Since the forces are likely to be required to deal with low-level threats simultaneously, this division would be in addition to the forces required to meet Objective 1. And since the postulated lodgement could be reinforced, or similar lodgements could occur in other areas in the north, it may be necessary to reinforce our forces deployed against an initial lodgement or to undertake similar operations against lodgements in other areas. It is difficult to define with certainty the upper level of such attacks and, given that we might have already positioned substantial forces in key areas in the north, it would be prudent to have an equivalent reserve force and the basis of a third similar force. The expansion base should be designed to provide these forces within the warning time. This suggests an expansion base for the Army (both Regular and
Army Reserve) of a Corps of three divisions with appropriate support in Corps Troops and Communication Zone units.

Objective 3 - Effects of Global War

Australia would suffer either directly or indirectly as a result of a war between the superpowers. These types of contingencies are seen as being remote and improbable but might require the full mobilisation of the nation's resources. They identify, however, a further group of capabilities which might be required in the event of such situations developing. The capabilities that are judged to fall into this category are defensive aspects of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) warfare. The expansion base should include units capable of monitoring the effects of NBC weapons and maintaining the necessary skills in decontamination. The rest of the Army should be trained in appropriate protective measures.

Having identified the force structure elements which are required to meet the force structure objectives, we are now ready to proceed with the final stage of prospective planning. Starting with the inherited force structure and some assumptions concerning defence budgets in the years ahead, the next stage is to identify decision points and develop strategies to keep all options open to implement the future structures.

During this stage it is necessary to keep in mind that there are other practical factors that affect the structure of the force-in-being. These include the historical, political, cultural, social and economic factors associated with existing organisations. The surrounding civilian infrastructure will have a degree of dependency on most military organisations; it is also necessary to make the best use of existing facilities and training areas. There is a need for balanced force structures in order to develop collective skills, and there are certain functions which are more appropriate to the Regular Army than the Army Reserve; for example, counter-terrorist operations. Some of these factors exert a stronger influence on force structure than others; for example, geographic location and State political requirements. It is also necessary to remember that we have only
identified the force structure required of the Field Force; there is need for a substantial organisation in the support area to back up the Field Force, and provide command and control, training and administrative support.

Having identified the elements of each force structure objective, planners may now proceed with more detailed studies. Examples of such studies include:

- calculations of rates of expansion based on manpower requirements;
- calculations of lead-time necessary to develop or acquire equipment; and
- identification of facilities required and calculation of lead-times for construction or acquisition.

It is now necessary to establish the links between the force structure objectives, the analysis of the strategic environment and the defence budget as set out in the Five Year Defence Programme (FYDP). As previously discussed, the basic technique is to arrange the objectives allowing sufficient lead-time to accommodate the various decision points. To illustrate the process assume that we wish to achieve the force structure objectives over the time span shown in Figure 4.

FIGURE 4

A, B and C represent decision points to acquire certain capabilities a, b, or c. When we arrive at time A, we will have a greater insight into the future that we had at time O. Objectives may then be adjusted to take account of the additional information gained between times O and A. The process is repeated for each capability objective.\(^{13}\)
The advantage of prospective planning is that the future outcomes, as set out in the Force Structure Objectives, provide the necessary goals for coherent planning; but because these goals remain hypothetical and 'neutral', the final decision remains with the decision-maker and the quality of the decision is 'informed' by the analysis. Prospective planning connects the range of hypothetical threat situations with the available resources through the Planning Programming Budgeting System (PPBS) and the Five Year Development Plan (FYDP).

Prospective planning is a technique which permits the identification of long-term force structure objectives reaching beyond confident predictions of strategic circumstances. To illustrate the process I have chosen a scenario which shows how, step by step, some future state could evolve out of the present one. In presenting this scenario it is not my intention to be a prophet of doom, nor do I pretend to be able to foretell the future. However, I have attempted to look at the world the way it is, not the way we would like it to be, because failure to prepare ahead of time may well contribute to the seriousness of conflict - particularly if conflict eventually arises in a form not previously considered. It is here that scenarios and contingency studies have an important part to play in defence studies by advanced conceptualisation of problems and conflicts. The recognition of a problem is always the first step towards finding a solution.

Notes

1 J.O. Langtry and Desmond Ball, *Controlling Australia's Threat Environment*.
2 Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, *Threats to Australia's Security*.
6 *Ibid*.
8 *Ibid*.
Lead-time is necessary for the development and manufacture of equipment and the enlistment and training of manpower.

Another of the problems associated with the 'core-force' concept is that the potential enemy is not identified; therefore there is no rationale for making judgements about the capabilities required for the defence of Australia. For example, what is the air threat; what is the armour threat; and what is the electronic warfare threat? Some judgements have to be made about threat, even if they are made on the basis of capabilities possessed by our neighbours. For the purpose of the analysis which follows, I have assumed that a regional power has become a Soviet surrogate and is equipped with a mixture of Western and Eastern bloc weapons.

Basically because I have more experience in this environment. I am also indebted to the many officers I consulted during the conduct of the Army Manpower Review in 1980, in particular members of the Army Manpower Review Working Group. In the analysis I drew heavily on the Working Group Report.

It is not proposed to conduct a detailed analysis of this contingency although rational force structure development requires the identification of an 'Objective Force'. See Ray Sunderland, 'A Methodology for Mobilisation Planning' in Desmond Ball and J.O. Langtry (eds), Problems of Mobilisation in Defence of Australia, (Phoenix Defence Publications, Manuka ACT, 1980), pp.125-137.

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS

The Australian people are not isolationist by nature; they have the character and tradition of supporting their friends. While they may criticise some of the actions of their allies, they remain ideologically committed to the West and opposed to the philosophies of the Eastern bloc. The time is probably past when the nation would be prepared to send forces to fight in distant parts, but the people are unlikely to stand idly by while their close neighbours are slowly drawn into the web of Soviet expansionism.

There is a growing concern about the degree of threat posed by the Soviet Union. Soviet forces are permanently based in Australia's area of strategic interest; Soviet aircraft, ships and submarines patrol the oceans adjacent to Australian shores; the Soviets vie for political favours in the island nations of the Pacific by offering economic incentives; they demonstrate their reach through strategic weapons testing in the Indian and Pacific Oceans; and they showed their callous disregard for human life when they destroyed an airliner which had intruded into their airspace.

Despite these events, little has been done to change Australia's defence posture, although there are now signs of an emerging strategy based on a doctrine of regional participation. After Vietnam Australia's forces were reduced and now only a skeleton remains. Australia clings to an illusion that rapid mobilisation and rearmament is possible when all evidence points to the fact that conflict can occur with little or no warning. This is a deep-seated problem, affecting not only defence and foreign policy, but also giving the nation a false sense of security which may ultimately create a situation where Australians are ill-prepared to defend themselves.

The Defence Department's preoccupation with the provision of a so-called 'core-force' or 'expansion base' has eroded the operational effectiveness of the defence force. The percentage of GNP allocated to defence has remained fairly constant while the increasing cost of purchasing high technology equipment is weakening rather than strengthening the force structure. All three Services have faced these pressures, the most significant examples to date being
the decisions not to proceed with the purchase of a replacement aircraft carrier and reduction of Army manpower allocations by about 700. Without increases in defence allocations, attempts to modernise the forces will inevitably lead to reductions in force structure or sacrifices in readiness and sustainability. The defence five year development plan is already facing an enormous 'bow wave' of projected costs of modernisation while reserves have been reduced drastically. The highest priority units in the force-in-being could not be sustained in combat for more than a few days. Given present allocation of funds it is inevitable that further reductions in force structure will be required if projections for expenditure are to be achieved or the sustainability of the forces improved.

A comprehensive review of the roles and missions of the Services such as is now being conducted by the Government is long overdue, and there will be a need to exercise some tough judgements. The questions we must ask are -under what circumstances are we prepared to use force and what risks are we prepared to take? The defence budget is under-funded for what the Defence Department wants it to do now, let alone make adequate provision for the future. The present planning process rarely takes out a major capability, rather it seeks to reduce costs by taking a little bit here and a little bit there. These cost reductions are usually at the expense of readiness and sustainability, maintenance, reserve stocks, operating costs, manpower, pay, conditions of service and, finally, arbitrary reductions are made to the quality and quantity of equipment provided. Unless something is done now, the so-called 'core-force' will be spread even thinner and the forces will be less ready to meet even the lowest level contingency. There is a pressing need to balance the requirement for readiness and sustainability against the cost of the modernisation programme. To do this we must first have a defence strategy - a strategy which reinforces the defence links between Australia and the regional states, both to enhance Australia's security and the security of the region as a whole.

There has been a shift in the US-Soviet military balance from US supremacy to one of ambiguous equilibrium. There is a growing sense of insecurity in the Western world and decreasing public confidence in the concept of nuclear
deterrence. While the Soviets continue to expand their influence throughout the world, the United States is apparently faced with a shortage of military resources to deal with concurrent problems in Europe, the Middle East and Central America. This shift in the balance of power has serious implications for Australia because it increases the number of circumstances where, for a variety of reasons, Australia could be expected to act alone in its own defence. Perceptions that such circumstances exist have given rise to calls for increasing self-reliance and possession of well-balanced forces. Australia's Minister for Foreign Affairs has said:

... we cannot assume military support from our Treaty partners in every contingency ... we should therefore develop a self-defence capability in case in a particular contingency we need to rely on our own resources. By definition, therefore, it would not be prudent to base the development of our Defence Force structure on the assumption that our forces will necessarily be part of a superpower deployment in the event of any form of hostilities in which we are involved.¹

In recent years there has been a number of seemingly disconnected defence initiatives which indicate increasing emphasis on regional defence, albeit not expressed in these terms or identified with a particular threat. Nevertheless the initiatives are clearly in response to shifts in the strategic balance between the superpowers and the increasing Soviet presence in Australia's area of strategic interest. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the Fraser Government announced the deployment of Australian maritime forces to the Indian Ocean, provision of facilities for United States B52 aircraft at Darwin and the expansion of the Army Reserve. There has been more emphasis placed on the once almost dormant Five Power Defence Arrangements with Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand and the United Kingdom and increased defence aid under Defence Cooperation Programmes with ASEAN and South-West Pacific nations. There has also been more emphasis placed on the defence of the north and west of Australia. This includes the construction of patrol boat bases at Darwin and Cairns and commencement of forward airfields at Derby and Tindal. The Government has announced increa-
sed use of the naval base at HMAS Sterling, the future development of a patrol boat base at Port Hedland and the expansion of the Army's northern surveillance force. More recently the Government approved guidelines for a comprehensive and integrated policy approach to Indian Ocean issues which seek to give greater attention to the development of relations with Indian Ocean littoral states.

All these defence and foreign policy initiatives are clearly a reaction to increasing perceptions of threat, yet defence planners continue to be uncertain about how these threats will materialise. This uncertainty has led to the emergency of a curious dichotomy in defence planning. On one hand we are advised that defence planners have concentrated on developing a 'core-force' or 'expansion base' because future defence crises are inherently unpredictable. On the other hand we are informed that planners give priority to providing forces to meet a range of low-level contingencies which could arise at short notice. The 'core-force' has thus become the 'design case' for force structure, and the force structures required for low-level contingencies have become the 'off design case' which, although being hedged against, are ones which defence planners appear to avoid over-emphasising.

There are potentially dangerous deficiencies in this 'core-force' approach to defence planning if the more likely lesser contingencies, which are obviously the most pressing, are not adequately addressed.

I am led to the conclusion that the thrust and direction of Australian defence planning must change away from the 'core-force' concept to a strategy based on deciding first what is to be defended and what we are going to defend against. We are faced with an increasingly complex, dynamic and evolving strategic environment. The processes by which policy advice is formulated must be re-designed to cope with rapid change, complexity and multiplying uncertainties. We must develop a positive attitude towards the treatment of uncertainty and avoid creeping incrementalism which is disastrous for incisive administration and will leave us unprepared should a defence emergency arise. What has been suggested is an ongoing system for the management of complexity and uncertainty based on the analysis of relevant contingencies. A prospective planning system will allow us to identify alternative force structures and exploit
the additional information we will gain with the passage of time. Above all, decisions taken in the programming context are likely to be improved if they have been preceded by an appreciation of Defence Force capability requirements on an overall and longer-term basis.

It is difficult to get any group of people, let alone governments, to agree to defence goals well into the future. But defence goals are not just a measure of military desire, they involve choices within a framework of finite resources - an ability to distinguish between what is desirable and what is possible, what is essential and what may be discarded. The process of choice also involves threat perceptions, risks, budget restrictions, politics and other social and economic factors. Within a Prospective Planning system the process of choice is illuminated by scenarios and the analysis of contingencies. Above all, Prospective Planning will generate improvements in the capabilities of the Australian Defence Force through changes in the intangible components of military power such as improved strategic doctrine, more realistic threat assessments and improved planning systems.

Note

ANNEX A
FORCE STRUCTURE OBJECTIVE 1

Headquarters. In the early stages an organisation is required to coordinate all operational and administrative aspects of intelligence gathering. As these activities are likely to involve all three Services, as well as providing an interface with civilian organisations, a Joint Force Headquarters will be required. A Brigade Headquarters may also be required to command the land component of the force.

Infantry. In the protective phase the number of battalions deployed depends on the degree of acceptable risk and whether Army Reserve units are called out. A reactive force is also required. Each battalion, operating possibly in company and platoon groups, would need to be air mobile with an element trained for airborne operations. Given the distances involved, the assessed requirement is a minimum of three infantry battalions, with one of these battalions providing the reserve/reactive force.

Special Air Service (SAS). These forces are relevant to the intelligence gathering, surveillance and reactive phases. However, given an adequate Army Reserve surveillance force, they may not be deployed until the reactive phase. The assessed requirement is one SAS squadron.

Armour Reconnaissance. These elements are required in the surveillance, protective and reactive phases. They should be equipped with electronic surveillance devices and be provided with a variety of vehicles including tracked or wheeled vehicles, motor cycles and water-craft. In the reactive phase they would provide additional mobility and firepower. Taking account of possible deployment patterns the assessed requirement is one reconnaissance regiment.

Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) Elements. Conventional means of cross-country mobility clearly have a place when distances are relatively short and the terrain is trafficable. Subject to the weather conditions some APC elements could be required in the protective and reactive phases. The
assessed requirement is one APC squadron to lift one infantry battalion which may be operating in company or platoon groups.

**Field Artillery.** Reactive forces would need to be lightly equipped and may operate without the support of artillery against small isolated raiding parties. However, it is difficult to be unequivocal about artillery support with the exception of surveillance equipment, given that the enemy could be equipped with light artillery and mortars. The assessed requirement is one field regiment and a detachment of the divisional locating battery.

**Engineers.** In the protective phase both field and construction engineers would be employed with engineer reconnaissance parties deployed at an early stage. Engineers are necessary to complement the civil infrastructure, to assist and maintain surface mobility, and to counter possible mining and demolition activity in the reactive phase. However as most of the force would be deployed near existing areas of population, many normal engineer tasks may be unnecessary or could be provided by civil organisations. The assessed requirement is one field squadron and one construction squadron.

**Survey.** In addition to the requirement to complete the mapping of the area for tactical operations there would be a need for continuing survey support to all elements of a deployed force. The assessed requirement is one topographical survey troop.

**Brigade Signal Elements.** The command and control requirements from the brigade headquarters to units of the deployed force would require signal elements. The assessed requirement is one brigade signal squadron with supplementary HF radio facilities because of the wide dispersion of forces.

**Force Signal Elements.** There is a requirement for communications between the brigade headquarters and the joint force headquarters and from both of these to the next superior headquarters. Whilst maximum use would be made of the civilian infrastructure and the existing defence
communications network, a rear link back-up HF system is required. The assessed requirement is elements of both a divisional signal regiment and a communications zone signal regiment and one cypher troop.

**Air Support Signals.** There is a requirement for communications from the deployed force to the supporting RAAF elements. Because the forces may be widely dispersed and separated from possible operating air fields the assessed requirement is one tactical air support signal squadron.

**Signal Intelligence.** In the information gathering phase a requirement exists for some electronic warfare elements, in particular electronic support measures for intercept purposes. The assessed requirement is one electronic warfare troop.

**Army Aviation.** A requirement exists in all phases for elements of army aviation involving both fixed wing (FW) and rotary wing (RW) aircraft to supplement and cover gaps between other surveillance forces, and RW aircraft to operate in conjunction with the ground reconnaissance elements and to provide a command and liaison function. The assessed requirement is two reconnaissance RW squadrons, one general support FW squadron and one command and liaison squadron.

**Intelligence.** In all phases of the low-level threat a need exists for language and photographic interpretation, interrogation and counter-intelligence capabilities operating as part of a coordinated intelligence gathering organisation. The assessed requirement for these tasks is an element of a divisional intelligence unit.

**Logistic Headquarters.** It is assessed that one headquarters logistic support group (HQ LSG) is required to provide command and control of logistic units deployed.

**Transport Squadron.** There may be a requirement for an element of ground transport to move those forces not mobile by air or APC and to assist in the administrative support of forces deployed away from their established base areas. The assessed requirement is one transport squadron.
Terminal, Air Dispatch and Movement Control. There may be a requirement to establish some airhead, port and base facilities, additional to the capacity of the infrastructure, to cater for the increased operational and administrative movement of men and materiel. The assessed requirement is one composite terminal/water-craft squadron, a ship's army detachment, one air dispatch squadron and elements of a movement control group and a ground liaison group. These elements are seen as being dispersed between the operational and support areas. The air dispatch squadron would require an associated air equipment section and be supported by elements of an air maintenance platoon.

Medical. Protective forces need medical facilities to supplement the local infrastructure in the case of minor sick and for casualty evacuation. The assessed requirement is one field ambulance. Local hospitals may also need to be augmented by elements from a field hospital. Prior to and during initial deployment, there is a need for the collation of information on the environmental health climate. One preventive medicine company is required for this purpose.

Supplies. Because the deployed force would be a significant addition to the normal civilian dependency in the area, and because operations may be mobile and dispersed, there would be a need to hold some stocks of fresh rations and petroleum products plus specific military items such as combat rations, ammunition and general supplies. The assessed requirement is one combat supplies platoon and one field supply company.

Repairs. There would be a need for a repair capacity to supplement the capacity of the local infrastructure. This would provide the necessary base from which to deploy forward repair teams or groups with the range of spare parts and major unit assemblies. The assessed requirement is one field workshop deployed between the operational and support areas.

Military Police. Any deployment of a military force involving the establishment of base areas necessitates the provision of military police detachments, including the Special Investigation Service (SIS), to perform specific military
duties and assist the local police. The assessed requirement is one military police platoon and a detachment from a military police platoon (SIS).

**Ancillary.** The overall welfare of the deployed force is enhanced by attached ancillary elements. The assessed requirement to be attached to the brigade headquarters is one cash office section, chaplains, welfare staff and a section to administer canteens and other amenities.
ANNEX B
FORCE STRUCTURE OBJECTIVE 2

**Force Headquarters.** The operation would possibly be conducted by a joint force with Air Force and Navy making appropriate contributions. The postulated level of attack indicates that additional land forces, over and above those needed to deal with low-level operations, would need to be deployed with associated combat and logistic support. The joint force headquarters deployed for low-level operations could provide the necessary level of command and control with some supplementation.

**Formation Headquarters.** The command and control of subordinate formations requires the deployment of division and brigade headquarters. These may be required to command infantry or mechanised formations (see below). The assessed requirement is one division and three brigade headquarters.

**Infantry.** The removal of a lodgement of even a lightly equipped enemy force of about brigade size calls for a large response - up to three brigades. Fire support and protection of infantry in APC would be important. In some circumstances mechanised infantry as part of a mechanised force would be valuable, particularly if such a force was pre-positioned in the north. In other circumstances there could be a requirement for an airborne force to secure a mounting area. The assessed requirement is nine infantry battalions with one being capable of mechanised operations and another of airborne operations.

**Commando.** Because of the political implications of a lodgement a quick reaction would be required to contain the lodgement. A commando raid on enemy command and control elements or to prevent reinforcement would contribute to this end. The assessed requirement is one commando regiment.
Special Air Service. In addition to the continuing requirement for surveillance and intelligence gathering in the north the SAS could possibly be required to obtain information for the subsequent attack on the lodgement. The assessed requirement is one SAS squadron.

Armour. As indicated in the discussion of the employment of infantry, in some circumstances a mechanised force including armour would be valuable. Tanks could also be required in the destruction of fortifications and in clearing a built-up area. The assessed requirement is one armoured regiment for these tasks.

Reconnaissance. Additional light reconnaissance forces may be required to provide protection for key military installations in the period of deteriorating relationships leading up to the lodgement. Additionally, AFV are needed in the reactive forces to provide reconnaissance, security and to engage in offensive and delaying actions. The assessed requirement is one reconnaissance regiment.

APC. In the reactive phase protection and mobility for our assault force in APC is important to reduce casualties. The assessed requirement is one APC regiment to provide mobility for the combat elements of one brigade.

Field Artillery. Field artillery is identified as necessary both in the protective and reactive phases. In the protective phase field artillery provides defence in depth to key military installations and likely lodgement areas. In the reactive phase it is required to provide close indirect fire support for the assault forces. The assessed requirement is three field regiments, one in support of each of the three brigades.

Medium Artillery. Medium artillery provides an extra margin of capability and flexibility in both the protective and reactive phases. In particular, medium artillery can engage targets at a longer range than field artillery and is essential for counter-battery fire and for operations with mechanised or APC-borne assault forces. If mechanised forces are employed an element should be self-propelled. The assessed requirement is one medium regiment.
Gun and Mortar Locating. The lodgement could contain light artillery and mortars. This indicates a requirement for locating artillery to find and fix enemy equipments, and to provide meteorological and survey data to our own guns prior to and during the reactive phase. The assessed requirement is one divisional locating battery.

Air Defence. The lodgement area is likely to be within the range of enemy aircraft. There is therefore a need to protect key assembly and concentration areas, including airfields, from air attack and also to prevent enemy build-up by air of his lodgement force. The assessed requirement is one air defence regiment. Additional air defence regiments may need to be deployed for the protection of towns and industrial areas within range of enemy aircraft.

Field Engineers. Field engineers are required to provide normal combat engineer support, advice and services to the deployed forces in the protective and reactive phases. The assessed requirement for these tasks is one field engineer regiment and one divisional engineer support squadron.

Construction and other Engineers. It is difficult to assess the level of engineer commitment in this type of contingency as it depends largely on the capability of the infrastructure, the disposition of our forces and the length and level of deployment of protective forces. Engineers may be required to assist in the mobility of the force during all weather conditions, construct roads and tracks and provide certain supporting facilities in base areas. They could also be given airfield construction and maintenance tasks. The assessed requirement is a construction regiment, including a well-drilling troop.

Survey. No additional survey capability is seen as necessary in this setting above that required in the low-level setting. The assessed requirement is one topographical survey troop to provide the necessary day-to-day survey support.
Signals. There is a requirement for communications for command and control within and between formations and from all elements to their next superior headquarters and supporting forces. These are required at an increased level in these circumstances because of the increased force levels. The assessed requirement is three brigade signal squadrons, one divisional signal regiment, one tactical air support signal squadron, one air defence signal squadron and one communications zone signal regiment.

Army Aviation. Army aviation support for surveillance, reconnaissance and command and liaison is necessary in all phases of the contingency and the level of support will be greater than required for the low-level situation, commensurate with the increased force levels. The assessed requirement is one divisional aviation regiment and one general support squadron.

Intelligence. Combat intelligence capabilities are required by the deployed force. The assessed requirement is one divisional intelligence unit. There is also a need in all phases for an electronic warfare capability to gain information on enemy intentions and locations and engage in electronic counter-measures. The assessed requirement is one electronic warfare squadron.

Transport. Ground transport is required to move those protective and reactive forces not transportable by air or APC and for the administration associated with the movement and maintenance of men and materiel. Some of the long-haul tasks require heavy and specialist task vehicles. The assessed requirement is three transport squadrons and one general transport regiment.

Terminal, Air Transport and Movement Control. The support of the deployed protective forces and insertion of forces and equipment for the reactive phase will require the use of all means of transport, involving sea, air, road and possibly logistics-over-the-shore operations. The assessed requirement is one terminal regiment, ship's army detachments, one air transport support regiment, one movement control group and one ground liaison group.
Medical. Prior to the reactive phase there would only be a requirement for the care of minor sick and a limited number of casualties. In the reactive phase, however, there will be a large increase in the number and severity of casualties, requiring the deployment of additional medical facilities. The assessed requirement is three field ambulances and one field hospital.

Supply. The level of supply capability required for this contingency will depend on the duration of the surveillance and protective phases and level of forces deployed, as well as the capacity of the civilian and military infrastructure in the area of operations. The assessed requirement for divisional units in support of the operation is three combat supply platoons, three field supply companies and one supply company (divisional troops). The air transport support regiment also requires the support of an air maintenance platoon and an air equipment platoon.

Petroleum. Operations involving mechanised units and army aviation, together with Army obligations to the RAAF and Navy, create a need for petroleum units. The assessed requirement is two petroleum platoons and their associated petroleum laboratories.

Repair. Each of the deployed force units would require its dedicated or integral repair element and there would be a requirement for additional repair capacity. As the reaction phase may be a task of limited duration, most of the repair associated with this phase could be undertaken in a base area after the operation. The assessed requirement is three field workshops and one heavy recovery company.

Military Police. In the protective phase a large body of troops and vehicles will be deployed in the area of operations, requiring the provision of military police including the SIS. The assessed requirement is one military police company plus one military police platoon (SIS).
Postal. The assessed requirement is one divisional postal unit operating both in the support area and the operational area to liaise with and assist the civilian infrastructure in providing postal facilities to the deployed surveillance and protective forces.

Ancillary. During the protracted surveillance and protective phases depicted in the contingencies, there is a requirement for facilities and detachments to administer the welfare of deployed troops. The assessed requirement is a normal proportion of chaplains, legal and welfare staff attached to the formation headquarters, one divisional cash office, one amenities unit and canteen facilities.

Logistic Headquarters. Because of the need for an interface with the support area and the levels and diversity of support required, there is a need for a separate logistic organisation and headquarters. A headquarters logistic support force (HQ LSF) is the assessed requirement.
The aim of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, which was set up in the Research School of Pacific Studies in The Australian National University, is to advance the study of strategic problems, particularly those relating to the general region of the Indian and Pacific Oceans and South-east Asia. Participation in the Centre's activities is not limited to members of the University, but includes other interested professional and Parliamentary groups. Research includes not only military, but political, economic, scientific and technological aspects. Strategy, for the purpose of the Centre, is defined in the broadest sense of embracing not only the control and application of military force, but also the peaceful settlement of disputes which could cause violence.

This is the only academic body in Australia which specialises in these studies. Centre members give frequent lectures and seminars for other departments within the ANU and other universities. Regular seminars and conferences on topics of current importance to the Centre's research are held, and the major defence training institutions, the Joint Services Staff College, and the Navy, Army and RAAF Staff Colleges, are heavily dependent upon SDSC assistance with the strategic studies sections of their courses.

Since its inception in 1966, the Centre has supported a number of Visiting and Research Fellows, who have undertaken a wide variety of investigations. Recently the emphasis of the Centre's work has been on problems posed for the peace and stability of Australia's neighbourhood; the defence of Australia; arms proliferation and arms control; decision making processes of the higher levels of the Australian Defence Department; management studies and the role of the Minister in Australia's defence policy making; and the strategic implications of developments in South-east Asia, the Indian Ocean and the South West Pacific Area.

The Centre contributes to the work of the Department of International Relations through its graduate studies programme; and the Department reciprocates by assisting the Centre in its research. A comprehensive collection of reference materials on strategic issues, particularly from the press, learned journals and government publications, is maintained by the Centre.

The Centre also conducts seminars and conferences which have led to several volumes of published proceedings.
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