Conflict and Cooperation in the Indian Ocean:
Pakistan's Interests and Choices
The Indian Ocean is studded with many potentially explosive areas. One such area is Pakistan’s neighbourhood which includes India, Iran, Afghanistan, China and the Soviet Union. Because of the strategic and commercial importance of the area, the United States is also deeply involved there. Recent developments in this region such as the Khomeini revolution in Iran, the takeover by the Soviet-backed group in Afghanistan and subsequent deployment of Soviet forces in order to quash the tribal resistance movement, and the rapid changes in the Indian political scene, have invoked fears for the future security of Pakistan.

Professor Cheema makes a detailed examination of Pakistan’s region, identifying the major trends that have evolved there during the last decade regarding conflict and co-operation and then analyses the alternatives available to Pakistani foreign policy formulators. Before focusing on Pakistan’s region, he scans the whole of the Indian Ocean region. As an experienced writer, Professor Cheema offers some penetrating insights into the regional sets of relationships and suggests useful and practical options open to the Pakistanis within the given geopolitical situation in the region.

ROBERT O’NEILL
Editor, Canberra Papers
and Head, SDSC
Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema is a Project Director (Strategic Studies), Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan, and was a Visiting Fellow in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University, during the period in which this volume was written. After taking his Masters Degrees (in History and Political Science) from the Punjab University, Pakistan, and M.Litt (Strategic Studies) from Aberdeen University, U.K., Mr Cheema's appointments included the following: Lecturer in History and Political Science, Government College, Lahore, 1962-66; Director/Course Co-ordinator, Foreign Office Training Courses, Pakistan Administrative Staff College, 1975-76; Chairman, Department of International Relations, Quaid-I-Azam University, 1976-78. He is the author of three books and has written many articles.
Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence are a series of monograph publications which arise out of the work of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University. Previous Canberra Papers have covered topics such as the relationships of the superpowers, arms control at both the superpower and South-east Asian regional level, regional strategic relationships and major aspects of Australian defence policy. For a complete list refer to the last pages of this volume.
## CONTENTS

### Introduction

1

### Patterns of Conflict and Co-operation in the Indian Ocean

- Southern Africa 5
- Red Sea Region 9
- Persian Gulf 14
- South Asia 18
- South-east Asia 21
- Australia 24

### Pakistan’s Regional Environment

#### Pakistan-India

- (a) Political Factors 27
- (b) Military Factors 31
- (c) Economic Factors 33
- (d) Cultural Factors 34
- (e) Superpower Involvement 36

#### Pakistan-Afghanistan

- (a) Political Factors 39
- (b) Military Factors 44
- (c) Economic Factors 45
- (d) Cultural Factors 47
- (e) Superpower Involvement 47

#### Pakistan-Iran

- (a) Political Factors 48
- (b) Military Factors 51
- (c) Economic Factors 52
- (d) Cultural Factors 53
- (e) Superpower Involvement 53

### Pakistan’s Interests and Choices

56

### Bibliography

67

### The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre

73

### Other Publications

74
Introduction

Until the advent of the 1970s the overriding external force in the Indian Ocean had been British, and to a considerably lesser extent Portugese, Dutch and French. In 1968 the British Government announced the phased withdrawal of its military presence east of Suez. The British decision to withdraw and the concomitant appearance of a few Soviet naval vessels in the area shot the once neglected Indian Ocean into prominence. Since then a vast body of literature has appeared relating to the political, economic and strategic importance of the ocean. It has focused much more on the political, economic and military competition between the great powers rather than on the aspirations of the littoral states, particularly their co-operative endeavours. The vacuum created by the British withdrawal was regarded by the superpowers as too significant and too dangerous to be left to the littorals, since the naval powers of the nations bordering the Indian Ocean were regarded as too weak to dominate the ocean. (Cottrell and Burrell 1971: 35-7). Besides, most of the littorals were absorbed in local disputes and regional conflicts, so their inability to ensure the trade routes and the sea lines of communication provided temptation to the great powers to move in. Justifying their naval presence as the continuation of traditional policies of securing their vital interests, both the United States and the Soviet Union began to increase and continued to increase their naval strength in the Indian Ocean. Thus the decade of the 1970s witnessed the emergence of the Indian Ocean as another theatre of big power rivalry.

Despite it being the smallest of the world’s oceans, the commercial and economic importance of the Indian Ocean has never been in question. For centuries it was navigated by the Egyptians, the Dravidians, the Phoenicians, the Greeks, the Chinese, the Persians, the Arabs, the Portugese, the Dutch, the Danes, the French and the English, in search of spices, raw materials and trading partners. (Toussaint 1966). Trading links among the littoral states were relatively unimportant and the main markets for their goods were located outside the Indian Ocean region. European entry to the area increased the volume of trade, which in turn led to intense rivalry for the supremacy of trade routes. The littorals did not participate in this grim struggle. (Singh 1977: 8).

It was not until the mid-19th Century that Britain acquired complete control over the ocean; a feat which had never been attained by any of the littorals throughout the history of the region (Cotterill and Burrell 1972: xvii). For almost 129 years the Indian Ocean was virtually a British lake. Britain was able to enjoy complete
domination of the ocean not merely because of the fact that most of the littorals were its colonies but also because of its constant efforts to contain its European rivals which required the creation of a strong navy. (Singh 1977: 11-12). The absence of a serious naval challenge helped Britain to control all the entry points and regulate trade within the Indian Ocean region until the outbreak of the Second World War. The postwar era brought a series of radical changes in the British position and witnessed the emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as great powers. (Martin 1972: 407).

The war-crippled economy forced Britain to withdraw gradually from east of the Suez Canal and within a short span of 20 years almost all the former British colonies had acquired the status of independent nation states. Having lost the major incentive to maintain its military presence in east of Suez, the British finally decided in 1968 to quit the region altogether and to link its future defence with that of Western Europe.

The British decision to withdraw from the area alarmed the Americans and the Chinese alike, both believing that the resulting power vacuum would be exploited by the Soviet Union. (New York Times, 12 January, 1968). The appearance of a few Soviet vessels in the ocean was immediately interpreted as Soviet efforts to step up its naval activities in order to fill the vacuum. Not much weight was accorded, at the time, to the argument that the Soviet naval entry into the Indian Ocean could have been a reaction to America’s introduction into the region of the Polaris-Poseidon nuclear submarine fleet. Neither was it considered that the appearance of the Soviet vessels merely coincided with Britain’s decision to withdraw. Available evidence makes it quite clear that the Soviet entry was strongly influenced by its determination to achieve seaborne nuclear parity with the United States on the one hand, and the ongoing competition between the superpowers for political influence and economic gains on the other. (Smolansky 1972: 337-55 and The Muslim Condition 1979). While vociferously denying these allegations, the Soviets continue to step up their activities and by now have become a major factor in this part of the world. (Misra 1975: 144-49). Where once there were no Soviet vessels, now a number of their naval ships spend several months cruising in different areas of the ocean. This is not surprising in view of long-standing Soviet involvement in Asia. (Jukes 1973). While highlighting the dangerous implications of the British withdrawal for Western economic and political interests, the Americans have devoted increasing attention to the Indian Ocean theatre. In fact too much has been made of the British withdrawal: since early in the postwar period Britain was in no position to guarantee the uninterrupted supply of raw materials to Western markets or even to protect Western investments in the area. Perhaps that is why the American, British and French naval forces have regularly been deployed in the Indian Ocean from that time.
Reaction among the littoral states to the growing naval activities of the superpowers has been somewhat mixed. Most of them have viewed their increasing presence disapprovingly and suggested that the Indian Ocean be declared a nuclear free peace zone. The idea originated in the Second Non-Aligned Conference held in Cairo in 1964, and was eventually presented to the UN General Assembly in the early seventies. Although the General Assembly passed various resolutions regarding the Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace in 1974 and in 1975, progress towards the establishment of a peace zone was not impressive mainly because of the lack of interest shown by the superpowers. (Misra 1977, Singh 1977: 204-54). There were some regional powers who, while professing to dislike this presence, qualified their position by pointing out that the Americans could not be asked to quit as long as the USSR remained in the area. (Singh 1977: 206). A few states in the region, each for its own reasons, wanted to see the superpowers doing their balancing tricks in this ocean. Realising the growth of hostile feelings among the littorals, the superpowers have attempted to come to some kind of understanding between themselves with regard to their naval presence in the area. To attain some degree of mutual military restraint or a complete demilitarisation of the ocean, a joint American-Soviet working group was set up in March 1977, (Hass 1978) and since then it has held many meetings to seek an acceptable formula.

As stated above, the available literature tends to concentrate upon the big powers' interactions in the area and shows scepticism on the part of outside observers regarding the possibilities of cooperation among the nations bordering the Indian Ocean. This scepticism primarily stems from the diversity of resources, historical backgrounds, cultural differences of the states, and the perpetual conflicts between some of them. Besides, some of the countries have strong links with powers that lie outside the region. This, of course, does not necessarily imply that cooperative efforts have never been made by the littorals, or that the chances of cooperative ventures are remote because some of the locals are involved in regional conflicts or neighbourhood rivalries. Regional cooperation has been attempted from time to time, with varying degrees of success. ASEAN, RCD, and OAU are all products of regional efforts.

But how does one define a region? 'Like beauty, the region tends to be in the mind of the beholder, or perhaps of the participant'. (Millar 1980: 1). For some purposes the Indian Ocean, stretching about 4,000 miles from the west coast of Australia to Africa and covering an area roughly about 28 million square miles, might be considered a region; for other purposes it could be divided into many geographic regions or geopolitical units. Generally accepted geographical names of various
regions have often proved to be fortuitous and essentially are the products of traditions rather than rational choice. (Vali 1976: 25a). Geographically the Indian Ocean region can be divided into six distinct areas of study: Southern Africa, the Red Sea region, the Persian Gulf, South Asia, South-east Asia, and Australia. ‘These divisions of the region around the periphery of the Indian Ocean should not be viewed as watertight compartments; on the contrary trends, policies and interests between neighbouring sub-regions frequently overlap’. (Vali 1976: 28). While geography continues to remain the most important single factor in the formulation of a country’s foreign policy (Bhutto 1969: 28) and the geographic vicinity continues to generate strong impulses between nations, the inherent complexities of international relations compel us not ‘to be confined to certain predetermined areas without allowing for their impact on neighbouring or even more distant nations’. (Vali 1976: 28). The use of term region in international relations is somewhat arbitrary and is often employed only because the interested party or parties find within a given territorial area a number of interrelated problems that are of primary importance to them.

Since this paper is written from a Pakistani point of view, it is necessary to define Pakistan’s region at the outset. While the Pakistan of 1947 would ordinarily be included in the region known as South Asia, the truncated Pakistan of 1972 could just as easily be included in the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Sea region or even Western Asia. Alternatively one could envisage a new region for Pakistan based on geographic, geopolitical and geostrategic considerations. In addition, while carving out a region for Pakistan, one has to keep in mind that differences among members of Pakistan’s region are relatively smaller than the difference between Pakistan’s region and other regional groupings. For the purposes of this paper Pakistan’s regions includes India, Afghanistan and Iran. Since this region comprises important countries in which the superpowers are deeply involved, superpower interaction in the past and their likely future policies which may affect the Indian Ocean region as a whole cannot be ignored.

This paper is divided into three sections, the most important of which are the second and third. The thrust of the article is towards the identification of trends that have evolved during the last decade with regard to conflict and cooperation in Pakistan’s region and towards the describing of the choices available to Pakistan in the near future. To gauge the intensity of conflict and cooperation in the past and to identify trends for the future, four sets of indigenous factors (political, military, economic and cultural) will be applied to all the actors in Pakistan’s region. The involvement of the superpowers will also be discussed. The first section of the paper
briefly reviews the patterns of conflict and cooperation in various distinct areas of the Indian Ocean in order to give an overview of the whole region.

Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation in the Indian Ocean

The Indian Ocean region encompasses a variety of people with different religions, cultures, histories, political and economic structures. With an area of 45 million square kilometers (28 million square miles), the Ocean washes the shores of 37 littoral and island countries.* The USA, USSR, UK, China, Japan, France and New Zealand can be termed ‘user countries’, and there are also about 16 hinterland countries in the area.** The region contains over a billion people — over one-quarter of the world’s total population. (Caldwell 1979). Its seabed contains millions of tonnes of polymetallic nodules (containing iron, manganese, nickel, cobalt, copper, vanadium and molybdenum); its littoral states, produce roughly 90 per cent of the world’s rubber, tea and jute, 60 per cent of tin and oil, and it has large deposits of gold, diamond, manganese, iron and copper; its continental shelf has good fishing grounds. (Reddy 1979). To try to treat such a vast region as one whole would be not only difficult but unwise.

Southern Africa

Perhaps one of the most explosive areas along the shores of the Indian Ocean is Southern Africa where the potential for conflict has already acquired dangerous proportions. South Africa, Mozambique, Madagascar and Tanzania are the littoral states, and Zambia, Namibia, and Zimbabwe are the hinterland countries. All of the abovementioned states have already attained independence, except for Namibia.

---

* The Littoral and Island Countries. Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Burma, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, North Yemen, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Reunion, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, South Yemen, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, United Arab Emirates.

and its continuing decolonisation is well advanced. This means that by early in the 1980s South Africa will be the only country in the area with white minority rule.*

The current situation in South Africa is that the black majority is deprived by law of its basic rights and is subjected to extreme forms of racial discrimination. The key to the political system in the country is the doctrine of white supremacy known as apartheid, which is defined as a system of separate development. (SIPRI 1976). The system has generated antagonism between the white government of South Africa and the black independent states of the whole of the African continent. The apartheid system is regarded as anathema by the native black population and neighbouring countries, and South Africa itself is viewed as the last great bastion of the white colonialism.

Condemned by the UN and ostracised by most of the nations of the world, the white South African regime depends upon its military might and prospers through the vested interests of certain Western states. While most nations of the world vociferously criticise and highlight the inhumane policies of apartheid, the leaders and writers of few Western states work hard to turn the attention of the world to such matters as the security of the Cape sea route and the need for southern african stability in the Western defence chain. (Bowman 1972). Frequent references have been made to South Africa as a 'Southern Gibraltar' and a 'gatekeeper' to the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and it has been urged that Western powers extend full military cooperation to the South African Government.

For the West the economic and strategic importance of South Africa stems from the country's natural resources and its strategically important location. During the time of the closure of the Suez Canal, its important role in guarding the sea lanes was increasingly apparent. South Africa produces key minerals such as gold, diamonds, platinum, antimony, chrome, uranium, coal and high-grade ore etc. Some of these minerals, such as chrome, used in the manufacture of jet engines, are regarded as vital to military industries. (Roy 1979). ‘Today, South Africa supplies nearly 90 per cent of the free world’s supply of platinum-group metals, over three-quarters of its gold, and nearly half its chromite and vanadium’. (Adelman 1978: 34). South Africa is also a good trading partner of the West. In 1977 55.2 per cent of South Africa’s imports came from Europe, 21.2 per cent from America, 16.4 per cent from Asia and 5.6 per cent from Africa. (South Africa 1978: 519-46). Similarly, foreign investments in South Africa are also fairly high. (Asiaweek 1978: 547-56). Around 350

* The current ratio between whites and non-whites is one to four.
American companies have an aggregate direct investment of some $1.7 billion in South Africa, with the outstanding loans and credits of US banks totalling close to $2.2 billion. The Republic is also the recipient of one-fifth of the United Kingdom’s foreign investments. (Adelman 1978: 34).

While stressing the blessings of individual liberty enjoyed in the West and highlighting the significance of human rights in the free world, one often comes across the argument that these values are preserved in the West through its military strength, which in turn is based on economic strength. Since South Africa is in a position to disrupt the flow of minerals essential to Western and Japanese economies, they feel that it would be unwise to put too much pressure upon the South African regime to liberalise its policies vis-a-vis its black population, or to exclude South Africa totally from Western defence strategies. (Graham 1977). Such arguments imply that while the West should continue supporting human rights in general, it should not be too assertive in areas which are economically extremely important: a compromise should be worked out which does not disrupt the flow of key raw materials. Encouraged by such thinking in the West, the South African regime has consistently capitalised on the underlying fears of the West and emphasised how great the damage would be to Western economies if South Africa fell into hostile hands. Constant reference is being made to the dangers that the growing Russian presence in the area poses for Western shipping using the Cape route. Few would accept such an argument. What political objective would be gained by deliberate interference with Western shipping? Such an action can provoke the West and may cause a major confrontation, the dimensions of which would not be confined to Southern oceans only. (Spence 1975: 137-8).

While regularly employing the anti-Communist theme in order to ensure support from the major Western powers and presenting the African Nationalists’ demands in South Africa as Marxist Leninist-inspired, it frequently warned the West not to make ‘the mistake of seeing the Communist onslaught on South Africa as a drive aimed at eliminating apartheid. (Du Plessis 1977). Mr Botha even went so far as to suggest that ‘the failure of South Africa to remain a bastion of the free world would lead eventually to the encirclement of Europe and a direct threat to the Atlantic Ocean’. (Spence 1975: 137-8).

The allegations that the African Nationalists demands are Communist-inspired and applauded by the Soviets lack any basis in reality. Their real purpose seems to be to present the issue in terms of a Communist threat in order to gain moral and military support from the so called free world to perpetuate the existing system. (SIPRI 1976: 197).
Few would deny that the existing political system is anathema and that the white regime in South Africa is regarded as the last bastion of white colonialism by native blacks as well as by the neighbouring independent black states. During the last decade the regional environment of South Africa has undergone radical transformation. Independent black states have emerged on the borders of South Africa, and the twin forces of anti-apartheid and anti-colonialism are having some success. Several liberation movements have come into existence, many of which are openly encouraged and supported by regional organisations like the Organization of African Unity and 'even the United Nations have passed resolutions giving public support to these movements, and recommended that they should be rendered material help, including arms aid, to enable them to continue their struggle'. (Singh 1976: 154). Recent literature on South African problems reflects a visible change in attitude even in those countries which have hitherto overtly or covertly supported the South African white regime for one reason or another. (Ferguson and Cotter 1978). Until radical reforms are introduced which will restore the legitimate rights of the blacks, the liberation forces, inspired by the knowledge that the Mozambicans, the Zimbabweans and the Namibians have advanced towards their political goals by armed struggle, are likely to increase the intensity of border raids and inflict heavy damage to men and material. 'Concessions made by Pretoria, unless they eventuate early in the decade, are likely to be spurned by the nationalist movements supported by African frontline countries'. (Ayoob 1980b).

Given the existing regional environment, the pattern of conflict in southern Africa will continue to be somewhat similar to that of the last decade. Cooperation among the black states will continue to increase as long as the South African problem is unresolved. A concerted effort of the black states to liberate South Africa would be supported by most nations of the world, and international pressure on South Africa's white regime is likely to increase. Given the intransigence of South African whites and their government's reluctant inching towards a negotiated settlement leading to a multi-racial society, the danger of a violent race war in the not too distant future seems very real. No amount of military preparedness, economic strength and politico-diplomatic leverage is likely to alter the probability of insurgency from within and guerilla activities from outside. The South African government has to recognise that their greatest threat stems from the apartheid system, and that their best safeguard lies in the introduction of reforms designed to give the blacks their legitimate status in the society.
The Red Sea Region

The Red Sea Region comprises Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia on the African side and Jordan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, North Yemen and South Yemen on the Asian side. The region’s importance stems from its location around the main trade route which connects the Indian Ocean region to the Mediterranean region. Besides its importance as a maritime route, the deep involvement of the superpowers as a consequence of the ‘Cold War’ initially, and later with the Arab-Israeli conflict, has further enhanced the strategic importance of this main artery linking Europe with the world of the Indian Ocean. Ideologically the area runs the gamut from traditional conservative regimes to revolutionary leftist governments, military dictatorships and progressive administrations. The deep involvement of the superpowers has influenced the foreign policy orientations of the regional countries, as well as the existence of local and regional conflicts such as Arab-Israeli, Somali-Ethiopian, North Yemen-South Yemen, and the continuing liberation struggle for Eritrea. All these have affected their outlook as has the complex net of inter-state relationships.

By far the most dangerous regional conflict is the Arab-Israeli conflict. The shock waves of this conflict have always affected the powerful actors of the region. While President Sadat’s peace initiative has improved Egyptian-Israeli relations, it has not proved to be a panacea for the overall Arab-Israeli conflict. On the contrary it has loosely divided the Arab world into three groups; a pro-Sadat group, an anti-Sadat group led by Syria, and a somewhat neutral group led by Saudi Arabia. The Palestine issue still remains central, and thus far ‘Sadat has demonstrated that he has neither the will nor the ability to negotiate on behalf of the Arab parties, particularly in view of Israeli inflexibility on this point’. (Male 1979). In the absence of a solution to the Palestine problem, anything can still happen in this volatile region. Even the Saudis, who have hitherto maintained a somewhat neutral posture in a difficult situation created by Sadat’s peace initiative, and have constantly emphasised the ultimate usefulness of a unified Arab position, may be forced to choose between the strategies of the two major front-line states, Syria and Egypt. As long as the Arabs continue to squabble among themselves and deny all hopes of a concerted Arab peace strategy the superpowers continue to back their chosen partners; and as long as Israel refuses to negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organisation as the sole representative of the Palestinians, the chances of a comprehensive peace settlement in the area are rather dim.
While resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict would be a great accomplishment, it may not necessarily lead to overall peace and stability in the Red Sea region, as the existence of local disputes between Ethiopia and Somalia, North Yemen and South Yemen, and the enormous reserves of oil in Saudi Arabia and vast deposits of precious metal in the Red Sea* continue to attract the attention of superpowers and influence the interstate relationships.

Acute antagonism with political, ethnic and religious dimensions exists between Ethiopia and Somalia. Their conflict 'has sometimes manifested itself in the local Somali resistance in the Ogaden to Amharic overlordship, and at other times in the clash of nationalist Somali irredentism within Ethiopian imperial ambitions'. (Ayoob 1980a: 136). In essence the dispute revolves around a few million Somalis living in south eastern Ethiopian territories. The Ethiopia-based Somalis want to join their Muslim brethren across the border in Somalia, and the government in Somalia wants to unify all the territories inhabited by the Somali people. The Ethiopians, of course, oppose the unification of the Somalis which would involve the disintegration of the south eastern territories of Ethiopia. The roots of the problem can be traced back to the nineteenth century when the Shoan Emperor Menlik acquired control of Somali-inhabited territories and persuaded his major European competitors to accept Ethiopia's historical claims to the region in return for his recognition of Italian, British and French rule in the Somali lands. (Ayoob 1978: 3). With the expulsion of the Italians from the Horn of Africa after the Second World War, the British occupied all the Somali areas with the exception of French-ruled Djibouti and also took over administrative control of Ethiopia. (Ayoob 1978: 15). This temporary administrative unity under the British accelerated the growth of Somali nationalism, culminating in an independent Somali Republic on 1 July 1960.** However, the Somali-inhabited areas of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti were not included in the new Republic, so the struggle towards the unification of all Somali areas continued on into the post-independence period. Since the establishment of the Republic there have been two major clashes over the troublesome boundary question between Ethiopia and Somalia, and the west Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), mainly operating in the Ogaden area, has increased its activities and

---

* During the years 1963-67, international research vessels discovered three 'deeps', close to the mid-point of the Red Sea, containing important sedimentary deposits of copper, zinc, silver, gold and other metals. (Campbell 1972).

** In 1950 Italian Somaliland became a UN Trust Territory under Italian administration on the condition that it should become independent in ten years. (Ayoob 1978: 5-7).
at times was able to wrest substantial portions of the Ogaden from Ethiopian control. (Ayoob 1978: 18-19). The fall of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 and the subsequent weakening of central authority in Ethiopia provided further opportunities to WSLF to realise its aspirations. Aided and openly supported by the Somali authorities, the WSLF intensified its activities in the Ogaden, resulting in a full-fledged war between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977-78.

The Ethiopia-Somali conflict originated as a result of the European scramble for African territories in the nineteenth century, and has continued to breed ill-will between the two countries throughout the twentieth century. The conflict potential of this border was further enhanced by superpower involvements. The Americans, in pursuit of friends during the Cold War era, and having raised the need for proximity to the Arab-Israeli conflict theatre, were the first to arrive on the scene. They acquired base facilities near Asmara 'as part of a deal with Ethiopia under which Washington extended support at the UN to the Ethiopian annexation of Eritrea and also provided military aid to Addis Ababa'.(Ayoob 1978: 10). The Soviets were not deeply involved in the region until the military takeover in Somalia in 1969. From then until 1977 Somali-Soviet relations grew stronger, at which time the Somalis decided to cut all ties with Moscow. This dramatic step was primarily caused by increasing Soviet involvement with the Ethiopian regime of Colonel Mengistu, who emerged as the strongman in early 1977. As Ethiopia under Mengistu began to move rather rapidly towards the Soviets the American support for Ethiopia was reduced. The growing American links with Saudi Arabia and the reduced significance of bases further contributed towards the American decision to reduce its support to a minimum. Thus Mengistu decided to switch sides and to cut off all links with the Americans and turn to the Soviets for support and military aid. The Soviets not only immediately rushed military equipment worth $1 billion to Ethiopia but also airlifted between 10,000 and 12,000 Cuban troops, in order to prevent the disintegration of the Ethiopian empire and reverse the trend in the Ogaden war. (Ayoob 1979b: 200). The joint participation of the Soviets, the Cubans and Ethiopians in the Ogaden war finally managed to check the Somali offensive and eventually pushed the Somalis out of Ethiopian territories.

Another source of trouble in the area is the continuing civil war in Eritrea where Muslim guerrillas have been attempting to liberate Eritrea from Ethiopia. The problem of Eritrea dates back to 1889 when the Italians established it as a colony on the Red Sea. The area was inhabited by Christians and the Muslims, who regarded it as distinctly separate from Ethiopia. After the Second World War, the British
temporarily took over its administration until the fate of this Italian colony was finally decided by the UN. Just as the big powers were divided over the eventual status of Eritrea, the Eritreans were divided among themselves. The Unionist Party drew its strength from the Tigrinya-speaking Christians in the highlands and favoured annexation to Ethiopia, while the Muslim League supported by the lowland inhabitants advocated independence, along with the Independent Bloc consisting of Christians, Muslims and the Italians. (Ottaway and Ottaway 1978: 153). 'The solution finally adopted by the United Nations in 1952 was to join Eritrea and Ethiopia in a federation. Ethiopia was given control over defense, foreign policy, finance, transport and communications, while Eritrea was allowed to have its own government, with an elected legislature and executive'. (Ottaway and Ottaway 1978: 153). In 1962 the Federation was dissolved and Eritrea was annexed by the Ethiopian government. Since then the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) has been fighting for total independence of Eritrea from Ethiopia, gaining in strength despite the Ethiopian government's attempts to crush the movement. (Clapham 1972:a). Initially the ELF was totally dependent upon the support of Eritrea's Muslim population but later a Christian influx broadened the movement, and it is supported and aided by most of the surrounding Arab States.

The Asian side of the Red Sea is involved in the struggle for supremacy between Saudi Arabia, North Yemen and South Yemen. The roots of Yemen's problem can be traced back to September 1962 when an army coup d'etat overthrew the rule of the Iman of Yemen, who then established a government in exile. He was supported by the Saudi Arabians and opposed by the Republican regime in North Yemen, along with its Egyptian supporters. After the 1967 Arab-Israeli war Egyptian policy changed and President Nasser, in an attempt to woo Saudi Arabia, agreed to withdraw his troops from Yemen by the end of 1967. Almost at the same time North Yemen's President Sallal, who was pro-Nasser, was deposed and replaced by a more radical regime headed by Abdul Rahman al Iryani. The situation in South Yemen was no different from that in the North. The Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (FLOSY), which enjoyed the blessings of President Nasser, also suffered a setback because of changes in Egyptian policy, and as a result a left wing radical group, the National Liberation Front (NLF) became more powerful than FLOSY. Towards the end of 1967 the British withdrew from South Yemen and transferred their power to the NLF. At the time of independence the NLF leadership was relatively moderate, but by the end of 1970 the left had taken over and on 30 November 1970 South Yemen became the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). (Bell 1973: 4).
The withdrawal of Egyptian troops from North Yemen created a serious imbalance, and the new regime, facing the onslaught of various radical groups who were supported by South Yemen, found it difficult to maintain its hold over the country. Consequently North Yemen and the Saudis, who were also equally apprehensive of Southern Yemen's radical regime, came to an understanding under which the republicans of the North agreed to include some of the Saudi-backed royalists in the cabinet. Since then Saudi influence over North Yemen has gradually increased. The Saudis, on their part, have given extensive economic aid enabling the Yemenis to balance their budget, finance their balance of payments deficit, and maintain their armed forces. This has reduced their reliance on the USSR, which had increased in the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and subsequent Egyptian withdrawal. Not only is the aid given to the government of North Yemen, but the Saudis also provide considerable financial assistance to a number of powerful Yemeni tribes (Dawisha 1979: 140) which in turn make it possible for the Saudis to apply indirect pressure on the central authority in North Yemen whenever the need arises.

Since 1975 the Saudis have also endeavoured to increase their influence over the PDRY government by initiating an aid programme. 'The Saudi objective is presumably to minimise the PDRY's disruptive influence in the Peninsula, and ultimately to modify its communist orientation', (Stookey 1978: 45) but it seems that the Saudis have not met much success. On the contrary, the South Yemenis have increased their disruptive activities. (Dawisha 1979: 141).

It is clear then, that there are threats of various kinds in the Red Sea region. Another Arab-Israeli clash is likely to result in a blockade of the Bab-el-Mandeb Straits, with disruption to major shipping routes. A war between Soviet-backed Ethiopia and Saudi-supported Somalia could seriously affect the stability of the area and thus the trade route. The situation in southern Arabia also appears to be unstable because of the nature of both North and South Yemeni regimes and the perpetual faction-fighting within both countries, as well as the intensification of disruptive activities of the PDRY. In addition, the Soviets see Aden as their most important naval base in the area since their eviction from Berbera in Somalia, so they are unlikely to withdraw support for the current sympathetic regime, and would resist the rise of unsympathetic elements in the PDRY in the foreseeable future. Finally the explosive situation in Eritrea is capable of engulfing all the regional powers as well as involving the superpowers.
The Persian Gulf

If the Red Sea region possesses potential for regional instability and threatens to upset the strategic balance in the 1980s, the recent revolution in Iran removing the Shah, the West's 'policeman' of the Gulf, has already done so in the Gulf. It has posed the difficult question for the United States, Western Europe, Japan and the Gulf States of who would be able to maintain the security of the Persian Gulf. Prior to the advent of the Khomeini regime, Iran was successfully encouraged by the USA to play the role of Gulf strongman and protector. The British withdrawal from east of the Suez Canal coupled with increased Soviet naval activities in the late 60s enhanced the strategic importance of Iran. The Nixon Doctrine and the oil boom after 1973 further persuaded Western planners that Iran was the one country able and willing to ensure Western strategic and economic interests in the Gulf. Consequently it was decided to build up Iran as their surrogate in the area, with the result that a massive supply of sophisticated weapons was sold to Iran.

The oil-producing Gulf is regarded as the area most vital to the West. It includes Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar and Oman. These countries produce one-third of the world's oil but consume only three per cent. Around 58 per cent of the world's known oil deposits are located around the Gulf. (Agwani 1978: 32). Most of the oil flowing out of the Gulf is consumed by the West in general and Western Europe and Japan in particular.

Aside from oil, the West has increasingly substantial trade with the Gulf States. The area is, in fact, a major market for the West as well as an important source of oil, and most of the surplus Gulf petrodollars are handled and invested by Western financial institutions. Since the oil boom in 1973 the economic interaction between the West and the Gulf States has been growing rapidly. While the constantly rising prices of oil have increased the oil import bills of the consumers and brought unprecedentend revenues to the producers, there has been a corresponding growth in the Gulf market for foreign goods and services. It is speculated that by 1980 the Gulf imports will exceed the 50 billion dollar mark. (Agwani 1978: 124) The sale of arms alone amounts to nearly half of that.

Until recently all the Gulf States except Iraq have enjoyed a remarkable continuity of dynastic rule. The departure of the Shah after a thirty-seven year rule in January 1979 marks the end of another dynastic rule in the Gulf. Whatever the nature of the policy that emerges out of the unsettled situation in Iran at the time of writing, the reestablishment of the Pahlavi dynasty is highly unlikely. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Oman, Qatar and Bahrain are all ruled by different dynasties. One
interesting characteristic of these states is that despite rapid economic progress and the constant inflow of modern technology, the process of political modernisation is painfully slow, especially in Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar and UAE. Although the environment has changed and the oil wealth has brought a degree of social revolution to the traditional societies of the Gulf States, medieval political institutions still persist. The nature of succession in the Gulf States is usually unpredictable. Latent rivalries exist among the principal ruling families, and in some cases between rival branches of the same family. For example in Kuwait rivalry between al-Salim and al-Jabir, two branches of the ruling al-Sabah family, continues and in Qatar the struggle for power among the three branches of ruling al-Thani family has its effect on Qatar society. The ruling family in Saudi Arabia is also divided. The seven sheikhdoms of UAE* are no different.

All the Gulf States are predominantly Muslim so in addition to family feuds, dormant tension exists between the Shi’ite and Sunni sects of Islam. Iran is the only Shi’ite country where the rule is in the hands of Shia leadership. Iraq, Bahrain and Dubai have Shia majorities but all three are ruled by Sunni minorities. (Wilson 1979: 10) In Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE there is a sizable Shia minority. For the last 1100 years of Islamic history, Shia-Sunni doctrinal squabbles over theological orthodoxy have never really manifested themselves in an explosive and dangerous form until 24 September 1979, when a leading Iranian theologian, Ayatollah Sadek Rouhani, called on the Shias of Bahrain to rebel against its Sunni rulers. (The Economist, 29 Sept. 1979: 62) Not only were Shia theologians sent into many Gulf States to impress upon the Shia population ‘to try to change their countries into Islamic republics on the Iranian model by using Iranian methods of mass protest’, but when these preachers were arrested or expelled, as happened in Kuwait, Bahrain and Dubai, Tehran radio threatened reprisals. (The Economist 29 Sept. 1979: 62).

Linked with the export of Shia revolution was the claim that Bahrain is part of Iran based on Iran’s occupation of Bahrain in the 18th century. (Balderstone 1979). This issue was settled through the good offices of the UN Secretary-General in 1970 and the Iranian Parliament (Majlis) accepted the outcome of the UN mission and gracefully relinquished Iran’s claim in 1971. (Agwani 1978: 57-59). Although the Iranian government later described this renewed claim as Ayatollah Rouhani’s personal view and not that of Iran’s government, the damage had been done and tension increased. The Saudis also made it clear that ‘they would be prepared to

---

supply troops to the Gulf States whose territorial integrity was threatened'. (Balderstone 1979). To export the Shia revolution or to attempt to capitalise on the doctrinal squabbles of the Shias and the Sunnis is likely to unleash a host of problems and destabilise the whole of the Gulf region. In Iran itself the turbulent Sunni minorities such as the Kurds in the northwest, the Baluchis in the southeast, and the Arabs in Khuzistan, could be provoked by Sunni theologians to cause considerable upheaval. In present circumstances and with the overenthusiasm shown by Qom theologians it would not be unrealistic to imagine of a situation in which the dynastic rulers of the Gulf States would be unable to prevent a social upheaval caused primarily by the influx of petro-dollars and ultra-modern technology and accelerated by the forces unleashed by the Iranian revolution. In an attempt to preserve the old political order these rulers might be tempted to invoke the explosive Shia-Sunni question.

However, current developments suggest that most Sunni states are scrupulously avoiding the delicate issue of a Shia-Sunni schism. Either pan-Shiaism or pan-Sunnism could cause bitter divisions among the Gulf States thus destabilising the region and creating a favourable situation for the leftists in almost all the Gulf states.

Among the other local irritants and disputes which have in the past generated tensions and apprehensions are the age-old rivalry between the Arabs and the Iranians, the dispute between Iran and Iraq over the Shatt-Al-Arab, the take-over of Abu Musa and the Tunb Islands by Iran, the Kuwait-Iraqi dispute, the Buraimi issue between Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi and Oman, and the decades-old rebellion in the Dhofar province of Oman. However developments of the 1970s have demonstrated the ability of the Gulf States to resolve peacefully and quickly numerous multi-faceted, overlapping and interlocking disputes. These include the Bahrain settlement in 1970, the Buraimi issue in 1974 and the Shatt-Al-Arab dispute in 1975.

Perhaps the most important question posed by the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty is the maintenance of regional stability and security of the Gulf, where vital American, Western European and Japanese interests are at stake. The Shah's willingness to assume regional responsibilities and the Saudi's willingness to play second fiddle to Iran — despite resentment in some Saudi quarters — made Iran an ideal candidate for the Nixon Doctrine. Iran was prepared to fill the security gap caused by Britain's military withdrawal from the Gulf. Consequently there was an enormous increase in arms supplied to Iran during the 1970s. The quantity of American arms sales to Iran during the last decade is quite startling: 'over $100 million in 1970, $524 million in 1973, $3.91 billion in 1974, $2.6 billion in 1975, $1.3 billion in 1976, and there were $12.1 billion of weapons in the pipeline when the Shah fell'. (Falk 1979: 46).
These arms, coupled with the Shah’s vision of Iran’s future role inspired by the glories of ancient Persia, caused uneasiness among Iran’s Arab neighbours and even aggravated the debate over whether to call it the Arabian or the Persian Gulf. The Shah’s remark that ‘Iran’s supremacy over the Persian Gulf is a natural thing, we already have this and we shall enhance it in the future’ (Price 1976: 9) did not engender much enthusiasm in the Gulf States. Much of the Arab anxiety stems from Iran’s strategic ambitions. The sensitivities and anxieties of Arab states regarding the Iranian military build-up were expressed in a 1976 conference in Muscat when the Foreign Ministers of Persian Gulf littoral states assembled to discuss ways for multilateral cooperation for the security of the region. It was ‘suggested that before proposing a multilateral military pact, Tehran should have first expanded its economic, cultural and commercial links with these states and gradually moved into the political and military arena’. (Amirie 1978: 463). In terms of population and armed forces, Iran is by far the most dominant country in the region, and since in most of the local disputes Iran is directly or indirectly involved the apprehensions of the Arab States are natural. This of course does not mean that Iran’s efforts for collective security arrangements within the Gulf region had diminished or that they had faded. On the contrary after the developments in the Horn of Africa and the April 1978 coup in Afghanistan, many Arab states began not only to share the Iranian perception of external threats, but a security consensus began to emerge. (Ramazani 1979: 832). However, the advent of the Khomeini regime and the subsequent decline of Iran’s power and contraction of her regional security responsibilities have raised serious doubts about the effectiveness of collaborative regional security arrangements.

The stability and the security of the Gulf region will, to a considerable extent, depend upon the outcome of the Iranian revolution and its subsequent foreign policy orientation. Assuming Khomeini’s Islamic republic with an overt anti-communist bias consolidates its hold over Iran and follows an independent non-aligned foreign policy as it has proclaimed its intention to do, the chances of regional stability are likely to be good. Given the Islamic character of the regime and its support for the PLO, Iranian-American relations will deteriorate, and in the event of another round in the Arab-Israeli war Iran might be tempted or influenced to use her oil as a weapon. Relations with the Soviet Union will not register any major change unless the Soviets decide to interfere directly or indirectly in the internal affairs of Iran. Alternatively if Khomeini’s regime tries to project itself as the protector of the Shi’ites, its most natural targets would be Iraq and Bahrain. Such an eventuality would almost certainly sour Iran’s relations not only with Iraq or Bahrain but almost...
would almost certainly sour Iran's relations not only with Iraq or Bahrain but almost with every state in the Gulf region.

Whatever emerges out of the Iranian situation after 1980, Iran's importance for the security of the Gulf cannot be minimised. Iran's military and economic importance in the region continues, despite its current inward orientations. Regional cooperation through aid and trade, which was actively pursued by the Shah, may now be encouraged by Saudi Arabia, which in fact 'has followed the course with mixed success in Oman, the YAR and the PDRY'. (Chubin 1979: 105-6). The Iranian revolution has not only thrust upon the Saudis greater regional responsibilities, but it has also caused the Saudis to take a much more cautious approach towards the Camp David Accords and the US Defence Secretary's recent proposals for expanded US-Saudi military relations. (Ahmad 1979: 9-10). Saudi-Arabia has become more vulnerable, and many Saudis question the real value of their American connection. The pro-Soviet coup in Iraq, Soviet successes in the Horn of Africa and the Iranian revolution have alerted most of the Gulf States. Most of the Arab states will proceed slowly and cautiously on the path of modernisation and would be much more attentive to possible insurgent elements within their societies. Cooperation among the dynastic states is likely to become more essential.

South Asia

The region includes India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bhutan; 'India may be described as the dominant major power, Pakistan as a significant and reasonably cohesive middle power, Bangladesh as a weak and dependent middle power, Sri Lanka and Nepal as weak small powers and Bhutan as a mini-state' (Palmer 1975: 889). India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka account for nearly two-thirds of the population of the Indian Ocean countries. Despite its large reservoir of manpower, the region is regarded as one of the poorest areas of the world.*

Vast changes have occurred in South Asia's geopolitical situation during the last decade. Momentous developments in 1971 — the dismemberment of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent country — created a new South Asian environment much more conducive to cooperation than conflicts. Since 1947 the South Asian scene had been bedevilled by the ongoing conflict between India and Pakistan, which reached its climax in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war. Although the war truncated Pakistan, the residual state of Pakistan emerged as more viable and

* In late 1973 and early 1974, the four principal South Asian states (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka) were listed among the twelve states of the world unable to meet their external liabilities and facing international bankruptcy (Morrison 1975 5).
geographically compact. Since the Simla Agreement of 1972, Pakistan's attitude also underwent a radical change. The existing ceasefire line was transformed into a line of control and both governments pledged to resolve their differences by peaceful means and through bilateral negotiations. (India-Pakistan Simla Agreement 1972: 272). Since 1972 Indo-Pakistani relations have registered marked improvement. A concrete manifestation of these improved relations was the Salal Dam Agreement, signed in April 1978, regarding the design and construction of a dam on the upper reaches of the river Chenab, whose source is in Indian Kashmir, close to the Pakistan border. (Pacific Defence Reporter Yearbook 1979: 159).

For India the 1971 war with Pakistan demonstrated its military superiority, and Indian perception of the Pakistani threat became more realistic. For the first time since the partition of the subcontinent in 1947, Indian decision-makers realised that their fears of Pakistan had been somewhat exaggerated, and in reality any threat from Pakistan was perfectly manageable. (Ayoob 1976: 156-7). Another significant psychological result of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war was that many Indians felt satisfied that the secession of East Pakistan had discredited the two-nation theory of the Muslim League, which had formed the basis for the creation of Pakistan and that the stand of the Indian National Congress had been vindicated. (Ayoob 1976: 156). Thus began an era in which it became possible for Indians and Pakistanis each to become free of their obsession, and a process of normalisation was initiated. Unless something radical takes place to halt or reverse the process, it would be quite safe to assume that Indo-Pakistani relations will continue to improve during the 1980s.

As long as Indo-Pakistani tension is kept down in the region, there is little likelihood of a major upheaval in the area. While India's dominant position is recognised by its smaller neighbour, it also generates fears and apprehensions among them. India regards Nepal and Sri Lanka as outposts of Hindu culture and, in addition, India's defence is closely linked with them. In many ways Indian defence policy can be regarded as a replica of British defence doctrine relating to the Indian territories, based on three cardinal objectives: (a) to secure the safety of the North West Frontier and Baluchistan, an area through which successive invading armies entered the Indian subcontinent; (b) to encourage the establishment of buffer states along the periphery of the subcontinent and prevent them from falling under the control of a foreign power; (c) 'command of the Indian Ocean and its environs'. (Kodikara 1979: 13 and Palmer 1966: 902-3). Admittedly India's difficult relationships with Pakistan and China compelled her to reassess her defence doctrine, but scrutiny of Indian defence policies indicates that with regard to smaller neighbours they did not register any major change. Nepal continues to remain a
buffer state with a tilt in India’s favour, buttressing India’s periphery. Similarly, on its southern flank Sri Lanka which ‘had long been considered by naval strategists to be an essential link in India’s security’ (Kodikara 1979: 17), is still being accorded the same important place by Indian defence planners. Since both Nepal and Sri Lanka are regarded as being of primary strategic importance, it was not surprising when India conveyed to foreign powers that she would not allow or tolerate interference in their affairs. (Kodikara 1979: 17). However such a protective and patronising attitude has put constraints upon the independent manoeuvrability of both Nepal and Sri Lanka. Nepal’s attempt to declare itself a Zone of Peace was accepted by many countries, but the Indians cold-shouldered the Nepalese initiative because it entailed ‘a change in mutual obligations and understandings based on the existing treaty’. (Shaha 1976). However the foreign policies of both Nepal and Sri Lanka follow India’s general line and avoid clashing with Indian interests. Sri Lanka has shown more streaks of independence in its foreign affairs than has Nepal. While maintaining good relations with India, Sri Lanka has been able to develop good relations with China as well. Whatever Sri Lanka’s reasons for strengthening relations with China, its ability, living under the shadow of a domineering India, to do so without adversely affecting relations with the latter is a credit to Sri Lanka’s diplomacy. However this does not necessarily mean that Sri Lanka will assert its independence in foreign affairs further and ignore the compulsions of its geographic and geostrategic position in South Asia.

Bangladesh’s relations with India have ebbed and flowed with the changes of government in Bangladesh. During Mujib’s regime relations with India were markedly friendly, but the post-Mujib period registered some tension between the two countries, primarily caused by the Farakha dispute over Ganges waters and to a considerably lesser extent by the influx of refugees from Bangladesh. However the signing of the Farakha Accord in November 1977, after hurried negotiations between India and Bangladesh signified the beginning of a new period of improved relations between both nations. India yielded to most of the Bangla demands with regard to the Farakha dispute despite vociferous criticism by many Indian parliamentarians who labelled it as a ‘sell-out’ to Bangladesh. It also adopted a liberal attitude towards the incoming refugees from Bangladesh.

Like Nepal and Sri Lanka the problem of Bangladesh is to assert its independence in foreign affairs under the shadow of a domineering India and still maintain friendly relations. This delicate balance depends heavily upon the limits of tolerance India is willing to accord. The dictates of geography make it imperative for Bangladesh to recognise India’s minimum security needs on its eastern flank.
As far as the superpowers are concerned, the Communist powers have displayed more consistency in their relationships with the states in South Asia than has the United States. The Americans have changed their policies vis-a-vis South Asia in accordance with the shifts in their global strategies partly because they had never regarded the area as important as had the Soviets. The developments of the 1970s provided unparalleled opportunities for the Soviets to enhance their influence in the area which they fully utilised. By the end of the decade the Soviet Union emerged as the most influential outside power in the area. However the Sino-Soviet rift still continues to influence various sets of relationships among the local states as well as their relations with one superpower or the other.

**South-east Asia**

South-east Asia has attracted world attention almost continuously since the end of the Second World War. Characterised by great ethnic and linguistic diversity, religious pluralism, ideological fissures, different colonial experiences and varying degrees of great-power involvements, the area continues to remain a source of tension and a focus of attention. It includes Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea (Cambodia). The region has large resources of tin, iron, rubber, tea, sugar cane and some petroleum.

The decade of the 1970s has witnessed momentous developments in the area. Not only did the Vietnam war end and the American forces withdraw from the area, but the two Vietnams were united under the Communist regime of Hanoi. In addition Kampuchea fell to the Communists and Laos was taken over peacefully by the Pathet Lao. Towards the end of the 1970s there emerged two distinct groups of South-east Asian states: the ASEAN states (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Indonesia) and the Indo-Chinese states (Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea) while inwardly-oriented Burma remained secluded at the periphery. However the situation was complicated by the extraordinary events of 1978 and 1979 when the Vietnamese-backed group forceably took over Kampuchea and drove the Chinese-supported Pol Pot government out of the capital. This of course angered the Chinese, and subsequently a major clash between the Chinese and the Vietnamese took place in which Chinese attempts to pressure the Vietnamese to withdraw from Kampuchea had far-reaching consequences. For one thing, it could push the Vietnamese deep into the lap of the Soviets. Admittedly the Soviet-Vietnam 'treaty of friendship and cooperation' (signed in November 1978) was not militarily tested during China's attack on Vietnam in February-March 1979, but in the event of a future Sino-Vietnam clash, pressure on the Soviets to demonstrate that they can be
relied upon would obviously increase. (Girling unpublished: 4). Such an eventuality would not only globalise the regional conflict but would also intensify Sino-Soviet rivalry, sabotaging the Chinese initiative towards the normalisation of relations with the Soviets.

The stability of South-east Asia is now closely linked with the Sino-Soviet rivalry. Although both powers have been struggling for increased influence in various parts of the world, South-east Asia did not experience the full impact of this rivalry until recently. This is partly because both the Soviets and the Chinese were involved in supporting the Vietnamese in their struggle against the Americans. Unlike the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent and the Horn of Africa, South-east Asia was never regarded by the Russians as an area of vital importance. While Peking attached considerably more importance to South-east Asia than did the Soviets, the existence of 13 to 14 million Overseas Chinese within these countries caused varying degrees of suspicion towards China and constrained Chinese initiatives, compelling China to move cautiously. With the Sino-American rapprochement and the Soviet foothold in Vietnam, the situation changed. The Chinese then established diplomatic relations with almost all of the ASEAN states, and joined with the Japanese in trying to impress upon the Americans the necessity of maintaining a military presence in South-east Asia. (Girling 1978: 202). In addition China openly pledged support to Thailand in the event of conflict with Vietnam. (Girling: 4). Such a pledge has made the Thai position somewhat awkward especially after the mopping-up operation against the remnants of Khmer Rouge forces was well underway and the danger of the conflict spilling over into Thailand became very real.

One significant outcome of the Vietnamese attack on Kampuchea and the overthrow of the Pol Pot government has been the strengthening of ties between the ASEAN states. Until late 1978 ASEAN was regarded as a weak union that ‘has done little to fulfil its original purpose of bringing together the non-Communist states of South-east Asia threatened by the instability of continuing war in Indo-China’. (Housego 1979). They have collectively condemned the armed intervention by Vietnam in Kampuchea and continue to accord recognition to the Khmer Rouge regime. They have also been able to get the refugee problem accepted as one for which the international community was responsible and not just the ASEAN states.* Such collective efforts are likely to encourage those who see ASEAN as a strong bulwark against Soviet-backed Vietnamese expansion.

* These refugees were Chinese living in Vietnam who were expelled by the Vietnamese authorities. Many of the ASEAN states refused to provide refuge to these expelled Chinese and were condemned by the world in general for their refusal to accept them. The internationalisation of refugee problems through the collective efforts of the ASEAN states provided great satisfaction to those who view still closer unity of ASEAN with favour. (Housego 1979).
Since a clear polarisation exists in South-east Asia between the ASEAN and Indo-Chinese states, it is highly unlikely that South-east Asia will become a community of nations speaking with one voice in world affairs in the near future. The existing conflict can be contained if all parties involved, local as well as external, are determined to keep it localised. If the Kampuchea problem is allowed to spread, then a major war between the two groups of South-east Asia, backed by their respective superpower supporters, cannot be ruled out. The Soviets are likely to provide maximum support to their ally, Vietnam, as they cannot afford to lose the only foothold they have in South-east Asia. This foothold is regarded as necessary to counter increasing Chinese influence, especially in the light of the Sino-American rapprochement, and improved relations between China and the ASEAN states and Japan. The Chinese, of course, cannot allow their allies in the area to be bullied or kicked around by the Soviets' friends in the area. Under the existing groupings, in the event of a future clash the Americans are likely to side with the Chinese-backed group.

As far as the local states are concerned, a major war would destabilise the whole area. For the Vietnamese, confronted with enormous economic problems and facing a protracted war in Kampuchea, a major war would not only force Hanoi somewhat reluctantly deeper into the Soviet embrace, but would also put severe strains on economic development and on the process of internal consolidation and integration which began after the unification of north and south. It would also jeopardise Vietnamese efforts to expand their economic links with Japan and the United States. Similarly the Thais along with other ASEAN members would be dragged into such a war, which of course, would not be confined to Indo-China this time. Given the diverse nature of their societies and the inequalities between the states and within them a war would threaten the delicate balance existing within the ASEAN states and may even cause the 'Balkanization' of the region.

Perhaps the best alternative to such gloomy prognostications is to encourage a reconciliation between the ASEAN states and the Vietnamese-dominated Indochina states, which in turn might promote regional cooperation. This would seem to offer a way to reconcile the desire for diversified political and economic relationships that promises greater freedom of action and would maintain national security without incurring the enormous costs of competition for arms, for allies, and for aid. (Gwin 1977:9-10). Instead of antagonising Vietnam to the point of no return, the ASEAN States will have to enlist its support in order to reduce dependence upon extra-regional powers and to establish South-east Asia as a 'Zone of Peace, Friendship and Neutrality'. However the success of such a venture would also depend upon the
Vietnamese. They will have to decide how far they are willing to go in pursuing their hegemonic designs in the area, but should Vietnam demonstrate restraint, the chances for regional cooperation would certainly increase. However, given the existing atmosphere created by the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and the subsequent Sino-Vietnamese war, coupled with the current chaotic situation in Kampuchea and the ASEAN response, prospects for regional cooperative ventures seem dim. It is most urgent that the regional powers evolve a mechanism resolving such disputes peacefully, and prevent the transformation of the local conflict into a global one. The extra-regional powers will have to avoid making South-east Asia an area of intense competition. An 'adversary partnership' between the Communist and non-Communist states of the region seems feasible at least as far as the issues relating to the usage of the ocean is concerned. (Polomka 1978: 54-6). Clearly much will depend on the common perception of South-east Asian states that might evolve regarding 'their shared interest in safeguarding the seas of the region to ensure that they are primarily of benefit to the peoples of South-east Asia'. (Polomka 1978: 56).

**Australia**

Sparsely populated, the island-continent of Australia is located on the rims of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Among the Indian Ocean littoral states it is the largest in terms of territory, and roughly one-third of its coastline is on the Indian Ocean. The population is largely European in origin and is concentrated in the south-east corner. Isolated from the traditional centres of its own cultural mainstream it is situated on the edge of Asia. Although the percentage of its trade with the Indian Ocean littoral is not very high, well over 50 per cent of its total trade passes through the region. (Australia 1976: 171). However trade with the littoral states has recently increased, particularly oil, which is imported in large quantities from the Middle Eastern and Persian Gulf countries.

Until recently Australian foreign policy was oriented towards its Pacific connections. Not only are its industrial, commercial and financial centres located on the Pacific side, but the 'strategic orientation of the country was overwhelmingly upon the Pacific; the concrete expression of this concern was, of course, to be found in the terms of the ANZUS Pact and its emphasis upon the Pacific dimensions of Australian security' (Beasley and Clark 1979: 127) and until the 1970s the principal external custodian of sea lanes in the Indian Ocean was the United Kingdom; Australia's traditional friend and an ally. It was only after the United Kingdom officially announced its phased withdrawal that Australia began to realise that it is
itself "an Indian Ocean power". (Vali 1976: 69). It was not until Britain announced its withdrawal from east of the Suez Canal that the resource potential of Western Australia, which covers almost the entire Australian Indian Ocean coastline, began to be realised, and consequently the Indian Ocean began to be accorded due security considerations. (Beasley and Clark 1979: 127). By the 1970s almost all the littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean had acquired independence, and most of them had joined the non-aligned movement and begun to assert their African and Asian cultural identities. The use of oil as a weapon in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 forced Australia to realise the increased importance of its relations with the Indian Ocean countries. Finally, the Labor Party's victory in the 1972 Australian election and the subsequent establishment of diplomatic relations with China contributed to Australia's increased interest in the Indian Ocean region.

Despite the Labor Government's efforts to give a new look to Australian foreign policy, no radical change took place. Neither Whitlam's government nor the succeeding government of Malcolm Fraser could afford to ignore the dictates of geography. Far removed from its traditional friend Britain, and situated in between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, no Australian government could contemplate the reduction of its military ties with the USA. Although the withdrawal of British forces from east of the Suez and of American forces from the Asian mainland 'confronted Australia with the reality that a dependence on great and powerful friends is no longer sufficient to guarantee an effective defence of Australia (Australia 1976: 191), it also highlighted the importance of maintaining the existing security arrangements with the United States. The dilemma the Australian Government has faced since the early 1970s is how to improve relations with the Indian Ocean littoral states, amongst which there is a general agreement that the superpowers should not have any base facilities in the Indian Ocean, and at the same time support American efforts to upgrade the Diego Garcia base. (O'Neill 1977: 185). Since Australia has 'a formal alliance with the United States', it has not only allowed the Americans to build the North-west Cape Communications Station but has also 'offered the US Navy base facilities at Cockburn Sound'. (O'Neill 1977: 185). While recognising the desire to improve relations with Indian Ocean littoral states and to increase self-reliance as far as the security of Australia is concerned, no Australian government could afford to reduce its military ties with the United States under the existing conditions. Perhaps the best way out of this dilemma is to take a low posture on sensitive issues like the Zone of Peace concept, the Freedom and Neutrality Proposal and the extension of the Diego Garcia facilities. (O'Neill 1977: 185). To establish its credentials as an Indian Ocean state, Australia needs to increase its participation in regional affairs, and
nothing could be more useful than to support those general proposals on which
consensus has already emerged. Australia could further increase its contributions
towards economic cooperation and development through trade and investment in
the Indian Ocean region.

Security considerations and the increased awareness of being an important
Indian Ocean littoral state compel Australia to continue its commitment with the
Americans while increasing economic cooperation with the Indian Ocean littorals.
It has also been able to use its membership in the Commonwealth as well as UN ad
hoc committees on the Indian Ocean for regional identification. Having actively
participated in the workings of the ad hoc committees and by accepting the Peace
Zone concept, Australia has already demonstrated its emerging Indian Ocean
orientation. Being a Pacific as well as an Indian Ocean power, Australia has no real
option but to continue to walk the tightrope. Supporting the Americans over Diego
Garcia and accepting the regional Peace Zone concepts are mutually contradictory,
yet the Australians have so far successfully pursued this policy and apparently will
continue it into the 1980s. To cut off security links with the Americans completely
would dangerously expose Australia's defence, and no Australian government is
prepared to do so. Alternatively to ignore altogether the developments in the Indian
Ocean and withdraw itself from the affairs of the region would seriously jeopardise
its economic interests and also endanger its security. Geography — physical
location, the vast land mass and the resource potential — seems to have allocated to
Australia the role of a great power within its region; the governments have, of
course, opted for the role of a medium power, a somewhat dependent medium
power. While Australia will continue to depend upon the American support as far
as its security is concerned during the 80s, it is likely to increase its participation in
the affairs of the Indian Ocean region and increase its defence capability based on
the doctrine of self-reliance.
Pakistan's Regional Environment

The successive coups in Pakistan (July 1977) and Afghanistan (April 1978), a revolution in Iran (January 1979) and a series of relatively rapid changes of government in India are just a few of the recent developments that have invoked fears of an uncertain future in the northwestern sector of the Indian Ocean. They have also caused alarm in the West concerning the age-old Soviet southward drive and the emerging pattern of power balances in the area. The current situation tends to make a Western observer somewhat sceptical regarding the possibilities of cooperation within Pakistan's region. Yet if one scrutinises the developments of the last decade and analyses the emerging trends, optimism regarding future cooperation may not seem totally unfounded. To gauge the chances of future conflict and cooperation, it is essential to look at the factors and major issues that have hindered cooperation in the past and have generated tension within Pakistan's region. In order to present a general picture of Pakistan's relations with its regional neighbours, it would be worthwhile to arrange our discussion around the factors causing conflict and cooperation and the great power involvement in each set of relationships.

Pakistan-India

(a) Political Factors

Since partition Indo-Pakistani relations have been characterised by continuing tension and mutual suspicion, lack of normal neighbourly contacts, four major armed clashes, and several border clashes and crisis situations in which either the threat of force was employed or actual limited military operations were conducted. Trouble really began with the hasty departure of the British from the subcontinent. Mountbatten's desperate surgery left many grave issues unsettled. Among the issues that exacerbated mutual distrust were the division of financial and military assets, refugees and evacuee property problems, the question of the Indus waters, minority problems and the question of integration of princely states like Junagadh Hyderabad and Kashmir, etc. The bellicose speeches of leaders also contributed their share.

In the complex of unresolved issues that were the legacy of the partition, the fate of Jammu and Kashmir survived as the main cause, as well as the symbol of their mutual animosity and intransigence. But by the beginning of the 1960s all the above mentioned issues except Kashmir were resolved. It defied settlement, and in three out of the four Indo-Pakistani wars, it figured prominently. It was not until the signing
of the Simla Accord in 1972 that the Kashmir issue began to decline as a significant factor in Pakistan’s India policy. Mutual accommodation was shown at Simla when both sides discarded the ceasefire line in Kashmir and a mutually acceptable ‘line of control’ was worked out. (Ayoob 1976). For India it meant that she could disassociate the new line from the old UN line and also keep fewer strategic posts in the Kargil area; for Pakistan the new line symbolised its successful resistance to Indian efforts to solve the Kashmir issue on the basis of a status quo favouring India, and was a way of keeping the issue alive. (Ayoob 1976: 165-66).

Following the Simla Agreement, three events further eroded to a considerable extent the conflictual potential of the Kashmir issue, and strengthened the accommodative approaches of India and Pakistan over Kashmir.

While touring Pakistani Azad Kashmir (AK) in November 1973, Bhutto suggested that pending the settlement of the Kashmir dispute with India the existing anomalous situation of Azad Kashmir must end, and urged the AK leaders to evolve a consensus regarding the future constitutional and political links of AK with Pakistan. (Ayoob 1976: 165-66). Because of protests in AK as well as in Pakistan, the proposal was ‘shelved only to be revived next year in a different form’. In June 1974 the Government of Pakistan announced the establishment of a Kashmir Council consisting of fourteen members; seven to be elected by the AK Assembly and five were to be nominees of the Prime Minister from the Federal Assembly. The Prime Minister of Pakistan was to head the Council with the President of AK as its Vice-Chairman. (Asian Recorder 1974: 12108). The Council was provided with legislative and executive powers. The formation of the Kashmir Council was viewed as ‘a veiled form of constitutional integration with Pakistan’ as the chief executive of Pakistan was to head this important body. (Ayoob 1976: 167). In addition, Bhutto encouraged Pakistan’s Peoples Party (PPP) to participate actively in AK politics, which was reminiscent of Nehru’s policies in Indian-held Kashmir during the 1950s.

A second major development regarding Kashmir took place in India, when Sheikh Abdullah, the Chief Minister of Kashmir, and the government of India successfully concluded negotiations over ‘the quantum of autonomy to be enjoyed by the State of Jammu and Kashmir within the Indian Union’, and as a result of the Indira-Abdullah accord the Sheikh once again was installed as the Chief Minister of the State on February 1975. With the emergence of a new power balance after the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, the Sheikh began to be aware of Pakistan’s weakness with regard to future dealings with New Delhi. India, on the other hand could afford, in the light of new circumstances, to be much more magnanimous to the Sheikh without being charged with having succumbed to dissident Kashmiri or even Pakistani
pressures. (Ayoob 1976: 167-68). The resultant accord recognised the permanence of Article 370* and provided the Sheikh with a much needed face-saving device, which, could be interpreted as having secured the autonomy of Kashmir in substance. Having settled the nature of the autonomy Kashmir was to enjoy within the Indian Union, the Sheikh began to express his ideas regarding the unity of all the territories of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, which in fact meant the return of AK territories to Pakistani’s Kashmir. The demonstrations which took place in Srinagar after the hanging of Bhutto further strengthened the Sheikh’s stand. Crowds of Muslim Kashmiris, while demonstrating against the government of Pakistan in the streets of Srinagar, demanded the liberation of Azad Kashmir from Islamabad rule and a few hundred Kashmiris even tried to cross the border. (Far Eastern Economic Review 20 April 1979). It seems pertinent to mention here that the same Muslim Kashmiris, while protesting against the Kashmiri government in Srinagar over the theft of a Holy relic in 1963-64, demanded that Kashmir should be liberated from Indian rule.

Another significant development is the signing of the Salal Agreement on April 14, 1978. The agreement was the result of lengthy correspondence and negotiations which started in 1970. The Salal Hydro-electric Project included the building of a dam across the river Chenab near Riasi (in Indian-occupied Kashmir), a diversion canal and a power station. The Pakistanis felt that the proposed dam would enable India to interrupt the flow of water and to flood the Punjab province of Pakistan. The Indians argued that the idea of flooding the Pakistani Punjab would be impossible without causing much greater damage to its own territories. (Keesing’s 1978: 29019). The Agreement was the result of a compromise over the design of the Salal project providing that ‘in order not to prevent the free flow of waters to Pakistan the height of the dam would be a little less than ten metres, instead of twelve metres as originally proposed’. (Keesing’s 9 June 1978: 29019).

The Simla Agreement ushered in an era of reduced tension and lessened suspicion. Not only have matters relating to important Kashmir questions been discussed bilaterally and resolved peacefully, but hostile propaganda against each other has ceased altogether. Being locked in a conflict relationship, both India and Pakistan in the past exploited each other’s internal turmoils and tensions through propaganda and any other available means. India’s overt support for East Pakistani separatists and unconcealed sympathies for the advocates of a separate Pakhtoonistan, and Pakistan’s covert sympathetic gestures for the Kashmiris, the Nagas and

the Mizos are just a few of the too well known examples that need not be elaborated here. (Muni 1980: 143). The process of normalisation initiated by the Simla Agreement has not yet received any serious setbacks despite the fact that the governments in both countries have been replaced. Diplomatic relations have been resumed, communication links have been reestablished, the visits of high level dignatories have taken place, and even arrangements for trade in the private sectors have been discussed. The leaders in both countries are pursuing positive policies towards each other, and there seems to be a remarkable degree of congruity in their views regarding both the concept of a Peace Zone in the Indian Ocean and the non-aligned movement. Despite initial differences in their approaches towards the establishment of a Zone of Peace in the Indian Ocean, both have worked hard towards this end. Both are now members of the non-aligned movement, and display understanding of each other’s positions over various international issues. Mr Desai’s statement on the Afghan situation in which he urged the Tarakai Government to acquire credibility with the Afghan people instead of blaming Pakistan for its troubles, was much appreciated in Islamabad. (Dawn (Karachi) 23 June 1979).

Undoubtedly a major contribution towards Indo-Pakistani antagonism is generated by the continuing dispute over Kashmir. However, the developments since the Simla Agreement of 1972 indicate quite convincingly that despite the Kashmir dispute efforts can be directed towards the general improvement of Indo-Pakistani relations, and indeed the attempts have proved fruitful. Besides, the developments in both Indian and Azad Kashmir and the Salal Agreement reinforce the belief that the Kashmir issue is slowly losing its potential for conflict with the result that the chances of cooperation between the neighbours are certainly brighter as we enter the decade of the 1980s. It does not necessarily follow that all Indo-Pakistani problems will be automatically resolved once Kashmir is out of the way. Given the nature of the relationship during the last 32 years the emergence of conflict of interests cannot be altogether ruled out. However, what seems to be clear from the developments of the 1970s is that, in future, both countries are likely to apply deliberate restraints in order to contain the conflict and prevent any blow to the slowly emerging detente between them. A recent manifestation of this cautious and realistic approach can be found in India’s attitude towards Pakistan’s nuclear programme. Despite the vicious campaign carried out in the Western media against Pakistan’s quest for nuclear technology, *India’s response was cool and cautious. ‘India should not get flustered

if Pakistan conducts its first nuclear explosion. The best response would be to ignore it' declared Dr. H.N. Sethna, Chairman, Indian Atomic Energy Commission. (Indian & Foreign Review 1978: 8). Prime Minister Desai wrote a letter to President Zia ul Haq expressing India's concern over Pakistan's efforts to acquire nuclear capability, and after receiving assurances from the Pakistani President was quite satisfied. (Indian & Foreign Review 1979). This kind of bilateral contact was lacking in the 1950s and the 1960s.

(b) Military Factors

Throughout the years of independence, Pakistan's main security concern has been India. The Pakistanis were convinced that many Indians were never reconciled to the division of the sub-continent and favoured unity, if necessary by force.

The belief was further strengthened when threatening statements were issued by important Congress leaders such as Acharya Kripalani (President, Indian National Congress) who said that 'neither Congress nor the nation has given up its claims of a united India', and the emphasis of Sardar V.B. Patel (Home Minister) that 'sooner than later, we shall again be united in common allegiance to our country'. (Khan 1967:115-16). In addition India's violent takeover of Junagadh and Hyderabad, coupled with its delaying tactics with regard to the division of financial and military assets, further confirmed the apprehensions of the Pakistanis. It was this sense of insecurity which compelled Pakistan to align herself with the West. India interpreted Pakistan's membership of Western-sponsored defence alliances, SEATO and CENTO, as attempts to attain parity with India and to challenge the natural power hierarchy in the sub-continent. India envisaged a central place for itself in the sub-continent and was not only keen to assert its position but also expected its primacy to be acknowledged as such by its regional neighbours. Pakistan's drive towards security was regarded as a dangerous pursuit aimed at distorting the existing regional power balance. (Muni 1980: 73-77). This difference in perceptions of each others intrinsic aims explains the intensity of the arms race in the area and the mutually antagonistic policies.

It was not until the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 in which India was able to demonstrate its military superiority that its attitude towards Pakistan became more relaxed. Indian decision makers began to be more realistic in their appraisal of the threat that Pakistan's quest for security posed for India's security, and the average Indian began to shed his obsession with Pakistan. (Ayoob 1976: 156-7). Similarly, with the dismemberment of Pakistan and disillusion with the West, the Pakistanis began to acknowledge the relatively improved position of India in the region. (Hussain 1977: 36).
While the East Pakistan crisis demonstrated the military superiority of India, the separation of East Pakistan has in fact improved Pakistan's security situation. As a result of the 1971 crisis Pakistan has been reduced in size and population but not significantly in military strength. A simple comparison of figures given below of the Pakistan Army's strength in 1971 and 1979 reinforces the above mentioned proposition, particularly if viewed in the context of the fact that the Pakistan Army has to defend a much more limited area now than was the case prior to 1972. (*Military Balance* 1970 and 1979).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1970-71</th>
<th>1979-80</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total strength</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Divisions</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armoured Divisions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Armoured Brigades</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Infantry Brigades</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defence Brigades</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Aviation Squadrons</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To defend East Pakistan with the strength of 1970-71 was regarded as a logistic nightmare. With a thousand miles of hostile Indian territory lying in between East and West Pakistan, it was almost impossible to provide credible defence to East Pakistan. With increased Army strength and the improved geographic logistics, the new Pakistan is much less vulnerable. A comparison with Indian army figures indicates that both countries have 16 infantry divisions and two armoured divisions, but India has an edge over Pakistan in independent armoured and infantry brigades. (*Military Balance* 1979). In addition India also has 11 mountain divisions, but these divisions are primarily intended to defend the northern frontiers of India. As long as Sino-Indian relations remain cold, these divisions are likely to be tied down in the Himalayan area, and therefore are not a threat to Pakistan.

Despite its relatively improved strategic position *vis-a-vis* India, Pakistan's security dilemma is still acute. Not only is India vastly superior in numbers, it has a well developed arms industry. Pakistan does not really have any arms industry worth mentioning and so it is heavily dependent on outsiders for military hardware. Ever since its withdrawal from SEATO and CENTO and the subsequent U.S. arms embargo, procurement of arms has become rather difficult. Modern sophisticated arms are extremely costly and have to be replaced frequently. Pakistan's economy is not yet strong enough to sustain a regular inflow of modern arms, so their purchase
has been drastically cut down. With such a limited supply of arms, Pakistan’s military strength is far less today than India’s, which not only makes its own arms but also has a dependable external provider.

(b) Economic Factors

Despite the fact that both India and Pakistan are facing the difficulties inherent in a rapidly increasing population and in limited resources and are struggling to overcome their economic problems, mutual trade and economic cooperation which could generate enormous benefits have never been accorded high priority. This is primarily because economic relations have remained subservient to the political relationship. With the improvement in the political atmosphere, economic cooperation and trade relations are now attracting increasing attention in both countries. Trade relations on a government-to-government basis were resumed at the beginning of 1975 and in the private sector trade was allowed in 1976. (Keesing’s 1976: 27843). As long as the trade was conducted on a government-to-government basis, Pakistan recorded a surplus, but when the private sector entered the field the position was reversed. (Keesing’s 1979: 2970). In 1975-76 Pakistan exported to India goods worth 149.5 million rupees and imported from India goods worth 12.7 million rupees, whereas in 1976-77 Pakistani imports were worth 235.7 million rupees and exports only amounted to 1.2 million. (Pakistan Economic Survey 1979: 119). To prevent further imbalance trade talks were held in Islamabad on 7-9 October 1978 and the communique issued at the end of the talks stated ‘that pending conclusion of a new agreement Pakistan’s trade would be conducted through public sector agencies and India’s through both the public and private sectors’. (Keesing’s 1979: 119). The years 1978-79 witnessed a gradual decrease in the trade imbalance. (Pakistan Economic Survey 1979: 119). The current pattern of trade is still somewhat lopsided in India’s favour, but this can be rectified provided India agrees to buy natural gas from Pakistan. However, India would perhaps not commit itself to any such deal unless Pakistan, in turn, agrees to buy coal and iron ore for its emergent steel production. In the long run such trade would certainly generate benefits for both countries especially when the lower cost of transport is taken into account. Alternatively India could lower tariffs on select commodities like medical instruments, sporting goods, textiles etc. in order to encourage trade between them, but at the moment it does not seem ‘to be prepared to lower its barrier, for admitting competitive Pakistani goods’. (Braun 1979).

It seems somewhat difficult at this stage to push the idea of economic cooperation between these two neighbours. Although both have pursued similar economic
strategies in the past and have opted for mixed economies with a centralised planning system and are steering a more pragmatic course between full socialisation and a free market economy, Pakistan fears that India would inevitably be the dominant partner in any scheme of regional economic cooperation since the Indian economy has grown faster than Pakistan's. This fear, though it may seem somewhat inflated to an Indian or an outsider, was one of the major causes which frustrated the Shah of Iran's efforts to enlarge the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) movement in the recent past. However, this does not necessarily imply that efforts leading to closer economic links based on the mutuality of interests should be discouraged. Differences in viewpoints can be reconciled in the interests of the higher goal of cooperation, and reciprocal preferences on designated products could be explored. Joint industrial ventures could be undertaken and through these ventures the transfer of technology would certainly have a favourable impact on cementing the relationship between India and Pakistan. The Pakistanis would particularly welcome the transfer of inexpensive intermediate technology which India has developed over the years. Any magnanimous gesture on India's part would not only alleviate Pakistani apprehensions but would also make useful contributions toward Indo-Pakistani economic cooperation. Cooperation does not have to be geared toward a sophisticated integration at this stage, but a spirit of accommodation has to be employed by an industrially advanced country towards partners who are less industrialised and are much smaller in size, population and resources.

Congruity of views regarding international economics and North-South relations already exists between India and Pakistan and the need for increased coordination and harmonisation of their respective positions on the international economic front has been well recognised. (Muni 1978: 492).

(d) Cultural Factors

Ever since the arrival of the Aryans, the north western part of the sub-continent which now forms Pakistan has played a significant role in its defence. Almost all the foreign invaders with the exception of the British and the Arabs used this route to establish their empires in Delhi, and had to fight their way to the centre of India. Until the British united the whole of the sub-continent, the areas included in Pakistan as well as north and north-eastern India remained parts of various empires. Despite a long history of living together, feelings of belonging together between the Hindu and Muslim communities of India were never fully developed. Perhaps the inherent incompatibilities of the two religions impeded and prevented such a development.
Although the broad bases of both religions sharply differ from one another, there are not many examples in history of interference in each other's respective religious spheres. Irrespective of the religious inclinations of the rulers, both communities learned to live with the situation with remarkable ease. The result was that religious antagonism remained dormant until the arrival of the British, who utilised this underlying religious cleavage to its advantage. The British strategy of 'divide and rule' effectively promoted Hindu-Muslim antagonism. Communal riots rarely occurred under the Mughals or their predecessors, but the British Raj witnessed innumerable clashes between Hindu and Muslim communities. The establishment of the British Raj widened the gulf between the Hindus and Muslims of India, but their departure further raised the existing antagonism to the point of hatred of each other. The hasty departure of the British left many unresolved problems which not only generated tension and hatred but also led to a series of conflicts and hampered cooperative ventures.

One of the legacies of the partition was the problem of religious minorities in both India and Pakistan. While the creation of Pakistan satisfied the exponents of the two-nation theory, it also made a large number of Muslims who remained in India an unreliable minority. For almost 25 years after partition they were not only regularly blamed for the division of the sub-continent but were also 'regarded as representatives of an anti-Indian, hostile, divisive, and subversive influence which had shattered the aspirations for national unity'. (Ahmad 1979:14). In addition prompt protest notes from Pakistan over the communal riots further confirmed the extremist Hindus in their negatively oriented beliefs. What is surprising is that even the attitudes of secular-minded Hindus became somewhat ambivalent regarding the promotion of measures to safeguard the cultural distinctiveness of the Muslim minority. Even Nehru was unable 'to persuade States with sizeable Muslim populations to implement the safeguards and recommendations of the Language Statement of 1958'. (Ahmad 1979:14). It was not until the break-up of Pakistan in 1971 that the situation began to improve considerably for the Muslims in India, and the prejudices shaped by the events of the past began to be abandoned. The Muslim community in India no longer looked to Pakistan as the guardian of its interests and welfare, and even President Zia ul Haq is said to have communicated to New Delhi that Pakistan has little interest in the Indian Muslims or their welfare. (Talib 1979). Increasing identification of the Indian Muslims with India has not only removed extremist Hindu fears but the delinking of Pakistan from the Indian Muslims has also improved the atmosphere in the area. The dismemberment of Pakistan provided great satisfaction to opponents of the two-nation theory and eased considerably 'the
fears and apprehensions which were responsible for the negative attitude of important sections of the Hindus towards the Muslim minority'. ('The Muslim Condition' 1979: 10-11). These changes in attitudes have enabled the government of India to adopt policies in order to cater more for the Indian Muslim's demands and remove their grievances which have completely transformed the outlook for the Indian Muslims.

Although a variety of languages is spoken in India and Pakistan, three of them continue to play a significant role as a cultural bridge — Urdu, Hindi and English. Urdu is the national language of Pakistan and also enjoys considerable status in a number of northern Indian states. Hindi, in spoken form, is very close to Urdu and it is India's official language. English, the language of the British Raj, is virtually India's second official language, and is still very much used in Pakistan. Most government business in Pakistan is still conducted in English. English is still employed as the medium of instruction in Pakistani universities as well as in most universities in India. Films made in all the three languages are equally enjoyed in both India and Pakistan. In addition to communication facilities, similarities in dress and food are remarkably visible.

(e) Superpower Involvement

The quest for peace in the regions of the Third World has often been adversely affected by external powers, and the conflict between India and Pakistan is no exception. The legacies of British colonial rule have continued to haunt both India and Pakistan and the early involvement of Russia and the USA in sub-continental affairs have further complicated the situation. This does not imply that the local powers are not to blame to some extent. The Pakistanis' sense of insecurity brought the Americans to South Asia, and the quick Indian reaction to this introduced the Soviets into the area. Thus came the Cold War to South Asia. In 1954 and 1955 Pakistan joined the Western SEATO alliance and the Baghdad Pact (later renamed as CENTO). Pakistan perceived a threat from India and joined the above-mentioned alliances in order to procure the much needed weapons and to equip its forces for what seemed to be certain conflict. The Indians, of course, interpreted Pakistan's bid to enhance its security as an attempt to upset the existing power equilibrium and to challenge its overriding authority in sub-continental affairs. India had assigned for itself a central role not only in South Asian affairs but also in Asian affairs in general. Consequently, enraged over Pakistan's membership in SEATO and CENTO, India invited the Soviet leaders in 1955 to visit the area. The Soviets, who were also
annoyed over Pakistan's participation in Western defence alliances directed against them, were in a punitive mood, in utter disregard of Pakistan's stance on the Kashmir dispute and Pakhtoonistan, and immediately committed themselves to support both India on Kashmir and Afghanistan on Pakhtoonistan. While it may be true that the initial Soviet thrust into South Asia was a reaction to Pakistan's involvement in the Western-sponsored defence alliance system, recent researches indicate that Moscow had anticipated the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in the mid-1950s and 'was already looking for an alternative Asian power to play one of the roles that had been projected for China in the Stalinist foreign policy — that is, to serve as a channel to the non-aligned or reluctantly aligned nations of Asia and Africa'. (Rose 1978: 401 and Jukes 1973: 99-112). At the time, India seemed to be the most attractive replacement. Perhaps this explains why the Soviets, who hitherto were extremely critical of Indian leadership and treated them with disdain, (Jukes 1973: 99-112) responded to the Indian overtures so quickly and so enthusiastically. To woo India, Moscow not only 'abandoned several fundamental features of the Stalinist policy towards non-Communist Afro-Asian states' and influenced the Communist party of India to tone down its attack on the Indian ruling group, but also expanded economic and military aid to India considerably within a short span of time. (Rose 1978: 401-2 and Jukes 1973: 99bb). The Indian reaction to Pakistan's membership in SEATO and CENTO merely provided further opportunities to the Soviets to enhance their influence in India, and was not the sole cause of Soviet entry into South Asian affairs.

This state of affairs continued until the early 1960s when the thaw in the Cold War, the introduction of intercontinental missiles and the Sino-Indian war of 1962 caused dramatic changes. Despite the warnings and protests of the Pakistani leaders, the West rushed arms aid in response to an Indian request following the Sino-Indian border war. Pakistan, disenchanted with the West, began to drift away, started searching for new friends in order to maintain the balance vis-a-vis India, and China readily lent its support. By the mid-1960s India had become the mistress of the West, still claiming the spurious chastity of a temple Devi — that is today, the purity of true non-alignment — while Pakistan, the legally-wedded wife of the West, began flirting with China and threatened divorce. Eventually Pakistan became content with a legal separation. The Soviet Union, realising that the Pakistanis' sense of insecurity might push them too deeply into the Chinese lap, began to seek ways to impede Pakistan's growing friendship with China and at the same time to weaken its pro-Western policy. (Chaudhury 1975: 33). The Soviets began to smile at Pakistan. The smile vanished in 1969 when President Yahya firmly rejected Brezhnev's
proposal of an Asian collective security system and Kosygin's idea of a regional economic grouping. (Chaudhury 1975: 63-66). In the meantime Pakistan's relations with China continued to strengthen while those with America continued to deteriorate, especially because of the American arms embargo after the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War.

After the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, the Pakistani leaders, realising the crucial role the Soviets could play in future South Asian affairs, carefully avoided criticising the Soviet role in the separation of East Pakistan and began to mend fences with the Soviets. Initially the Soviets were somewhat cool towards Pakistani overtures, but gradually through the efforts of Bhutto, the Soviets began to relent. Disenchanted with the West and in order to please the Soviets, Pakistan withdrew first from SEATO and later from CENTO. By the late 1970s relations with the Soviets had vastly improved.

The American policy towards the area has changed as the region itself has changed. The one-dimensional strategic view of the 1950s has been replaced by a more diverse outlook. (Newsom 1978: 52). Relations with India have registered a marked improvement and after suffering a slight setback during the Bhutto regime, relations with Pakistan have become steady.

American policy in South Asia has been less consistent than the policies of the Soviet Union and China. It fluctuated from decade to decade. During the 1950s the emphasis was upon the containment of perceived Communist expansionism in the area. Pakistan, with its two wings, was regarded as a useful instrument to serve American strategic interests in the area. The west wing could play an important role in the containment of Soviet expansionism and the eastern wing could prove to be useful in its strategy vis-a-vis China. Although the Americans would have preferred India to Pakistan, Nehru's strong opposition to the Cold War alliance system and Dulles's contempt for non-alignment more or less forced Indian policy makers to opt for second best. However the Kennedy administration not only de-emphasised the Soviet threat but also recognised non-alignment as a valid approach to international relations. The Sino-Indian war of 1962 provided the long-awaited opportunity to win back Indian friendship and consequently India emerged as a useful instrument in America's containment of China policy of the 1960s. Improvement in Sino-American relations again caused a fundamental change in the American policy towards the area. The earlier part of the decade witnessed improved relations with Pakistan and a slight deterioration of Indo-American relations. However the latter half of the 1970s registered a marked improvement in Indo-American relations, especially during the Desai regime.
Chinese relations with Pakistan were further strengthened especially after the Sino-American normalisation. As long as Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet relations continue to be cool, China can ill afford not to help Pakistan and counterbalance Soviet influence in the area. However the decade of the 1970s has witnessed efforts, though painfully slow, towards the normalisation of Sino-Indian relations. In 1976 ambassadors were exchanged, and in 1979 the Indian Foreign Minister Vajpayee visited China. The major outcome of the visit was that the Chinese acknowledged the need to resolve the long-standing border dispute as a precondition for complete normalisation of relations. (Far Eastern Economic Review 5 October 1979).

The difference in Indian and Pakistani perceptions of each others' threats coupled with the superpowers' active involvement in pursuit of their regional and global objectives continued to exacerbate the tensions and conflicts in South Asia until the beginning of the 1970s. Realistic appraisals of each others' perception along with far-reaching changes in the global environment has improved the atmosphere rather dramatically in the area.

Pakistan-Afghanistan

(a) Political Factors

The violent overthrow of Afghanistan President Dauod's regime on April 27-28, 1978 not only ended Afghanistan's age-old buffer status and brought to power a pro-Soviet Marxist-Leninist party but also inflicted a serious blow to the emerging detente between Kabul and Islamabad. Although immediately after the ousting of King Zahir Shah in July 1973 Dauod had revived the Pakhtoonistan issue, yet by 1976 he was convinced that perpetuating the issue was to no advantage for Afghanistan. It was also causing annoyance among some countries which had provided aid, like Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and which had expressly disapproved of his Pakistan policy. (Eliot 1979). In addition, raids across the border from Pakistan in retaliation for border incursions and Afghan intervention in Pakistan's internal affairs helped convince Dauod during 1975 that the dangers were mutual, and that Pakistan's military capabilities compared to Afghanistan were much more substantial. (Eliot 1979 and Far Eastern Economic Review 28 February 1975). Thus the years 1976-78 witnessed a gradual change in Afghanistan's Pakhtoonistan policy. Dauod visited Pakistan twice and Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto and his successor General Zia ul haq each made a trip to Kabul; these visits vastly improved the atmosphere between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Hostile propaganda ceased and
the Afghans dropped their insistence on Pakhtoon self-determination, and an active search to resolve the issue was well under way at the time of the April takeover by Taraki. *(Far Eastern Economic Review 28 February 1975)*.

The main political problem which has hitherto prevented normal neighbourly relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan is the Pakhtoonistan issue. At various times since 1947, the Afghan governments have revived the issue in one form or another to espouse its claims for Pakhtoonistan. The crux of the claim is that Afghanistan does not recognise the Durand Line, fixed in 1893, as an international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the Pakhtoons living on the other side of the Durand Line (within Pakistani territories) should be allowed to exercise the right of self-determination. It asserts that Pakhtoons have never been and are not happy in Pakistan, and should be allowed to form their own independent state. *(Khan 1965: 12-13)*. Pakistan argues that self-determination was exercised in 1947 and the Pakhtoons opted for Pakistan. ‘Out of a total electorate of 572,798 just over 50 per cent took part. Pakistan received 289,244 votes and India 2,874’. *(Burke 1973: 70)*. Pakhtoons opting for Pakistan secured an absolute majority of the total number of votes cast. Afghanistan, of course, does not recognise the validity of the referendum held in 1947 and refuses to accept the outcome on the grounds that a third choice of opting for independence was not given in the referendum so a large number of voters refrained from exercising their right in response to Ghaffar Khan’s appeal. Assuming that all the eligible voters had participated in the referendum, Pakistan argues that it would not have made any difference, as the figures quite clearly indicate that more than half of the electorate opted for Pakistan. *(Burke 1973: 70)*.

As far as Afghanistan’s reluctance to accept the Durand Line as an international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan is concerned, it needs to be mentioned here that not only the ‘Line was defined in principal in the Anglo-Afghan Agreement of November 1893 signed by Sir Mortimer Durand and Amir Abdurrahman’ but the Agreement was confirmed and the validity of the Durand Line was reaffirmed successively by ‘Amir Habibullah in 1905, Amir Amanuulah in 1921 and King Muhammed Nadir Shah in 1930’. *(Lamb 1968 and Razvi 1971)*. As a matter of fact ‘the Durand Line merely gave a more precise shape to the mutual understanding already existing in principal’ between Amir Abdumahman and the British Government in India in 1893. *(Burke 1973: 85)*.

The Pakhtoonistan issue strikes most observers as nothing more than a comic opera because of the absurdities and contradictions in the Afghan case. While promoting the cause of self-determination for the Pakhtoons living within Pakistan, it
conveniently ignores the wishes of the Pakhtoons living on Afghanistan side of the Durand Line. It is only logical that if the Pakhtoons were to have their own independent state, they would most certainly like to include Pakhtoons living on both sides of the Durand Line. After all 'two-thirds of Pakhtoons live in Pakistan and only one third live in Afghanistan and it would appear more rational for the minority to join the majority. (Burke 1973: 88). The Afghans strongly resent the implication. 'During an amiable, lengthy and courteous interview with me', recounts Griffiths, 'the Prime Minister (of Afghanistan) for just one brief instant sparked a flash of anger, it was when I asked him whether he thought any part of Afghanistan should become part of Pushtunistan. His sharp 'never' and subsequent rebuke of my "irrelevant" question betrayed not only strength of feeling but perhaps also an awareness of the ambiguity and weakness of the arguments for an independent Pushtunistan'. (Griffiths 1967: 62).

Three times since 1947 the Pakhtoonistan issue has reached such a crescendo that Pakistani-Afghan relations deteriorated to the point where the borders were closed. The effects of the border closure with Pakistan were disastrous for Afghanistan, as it meant the closing of the transit route to and from India and the denial of port facilities at Karachi. On the other hand the closure has made Afghanistan more dependent on the Soviet Union which provided an alternative outlet for Afghan goods. In the process the Soviets began to take an increasing share of Afghan exports. 'Tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan also enhanced the Afghan need for Soviet military aid'. (Eliot 1979: 59). Without Soviet military assistance, training, and encouragement the Afghans were in no position to press the claim so effectively that it would be taken seriously by any Pakistani Government.

The Pakhtoonistan issue since 1947 'has appeared perpetually poised on the brink of disaster yet which has never actually toppled from its precarious ledge into open conflict'. (Griffiths 1967: 64). There are many reasons for this delicate balance. The absurdities and contradictions in the Afghan case for Pakhtoonistan indicate that the issue is meant to serve varied purposes at different times. Initially it was an attempt on the part of Afghan rulers to gain a chunk of territory from the departing British. On June 21, 1947, the Afghan Prime Minister said: 'If an independent Pakhtoonistan cannot be set up, the Frontier Province should join Afghanistan'. (Razvi 1971: 145). During the early days of Pakistan the Afghans were much more vociferous for Pakhtoonistan than they are today. Perhaps they thought that partition had left Pakistan a weak state and they would be able to realise their ambition. Later, the Afghan rulers used the issue in order to extract maximum
concessions from Pakistan with regard to transit trade. In fact they even demanded an ‘Afghan Zone’ in Karachi. (Burke 1973: 73-74).

The Pakhtoonistan issue was also meant to serve as a focal point to unify the heterogeneous nature of the Afghan society. (Mustafa 1978: 25). Afghanistan’s population is around 16 to 17 million, of whom the largest group is that of 7-8 million Pakhtoons, and the rest of the population consists of Persian-speaking Tajiks and Hazaras, Turic-speaking Uzbeks, Turkomans and Qizilbash. (Holliday 1978: 7-8). The Pakhtoons are further sub-divided into two groups of Pushto speakers and Dari speakers. Although the Pushto speakers are in the majority the rulers have always come from Dari-speaking stock, and Pushto has only recently been accorded the status of one of the national languages of Afghanistan. By supporting the cause of Pakhtoons, the Afghan rulers have sought to identify themselves with a Pan-Pakhtoon national consciousness, which in fact they have tried to create. (Mustafa 1978: 25). It needs to be mentioned here that almost all Pakhtoons on the Pakistani side are Pushto speaking. In many ways the campaign for Pakhtoonistan seems to be preemptive lest the Pakhtoons on the Pakistani side begin to demand the unification of all the Pakhtoons within Pakistan; the Pakhtoons on the Pakistani side are more prosperous than those on the Afghan side and have no wish to become Afghan subjects. (Lamb 1968: 92).

The Afghan Government has also used the Pakhtoonistan issue as a diversion whenever its position is threatened by internal instability. Often the Afghan rulers, unable to solve pressing internal economic and social problems, have sought to divert public opinion with an external issue. However this tactic has cost the Afghans dearly, and has ultimately increased their dependence on the Soviet Union. Dauod’s forceful insistence on the issue in the early 1960s led to his early downfall in 1963, as it became obvious to Kabul that the loss of transit trade through Pakistan would result in total dependence on Russia. This is precisely what the Soviets wanted all along. Dauod did not repeat this mistake, (Stockwin 1978: 247) and while highlighting the issue once again in 1973, he was careful not to overplay it. Apart from a few angry outbursts, the present regime in Kabul is also careful in its use of the issue, at least for the moment, and is not likely to embark upon an irredentist course until its own position is consolidated and the situation in Afghanistan stabilises. For one thing, Pakistan is in a position to complicate further the already difficult situation for the Afghan ruling group. Ironically a vast majority of the Pakhtoons living in the south and east of Afghanistan and for whom Afghanistan in the past opted for hostile relations with Pakistan, are also deeply involved in the struggle against the present Afghan Government (Far Eastern Economic Review 5 October 1979). However, if
Pakistan does not play its cards properly, relations between these two Muslim neighbours could again deteriorate.

Reports from Kabul in early 1980 depicted a confused picture of the situation. While the Muslim insurgents increased their strength in terms of numbers, they were neither able to unite themselves and coordinate their efforts nor were they able to make any tangible gains. But this did not necessarily imply that the intensity of insurgency had decreased or the Government had managed to consolidate its hold over the country. The ability of Afghan tribesmen to carry on a war of attrition with minimum equipment for a long time is a well-recognised fact. Ironically, this lack of central leadership is turning out to be their real strength. It is not unlike the methods used by the rebels during the Algerian war against the French. *(International Herald Tribune* 6-7 October 1979).

On 28th December 1980 the third coup since the April takeover in 1978 and the fourth since the fall of the monarchy in Afghanistan took place, bringing Babrak Karmal, the leader of the Parcham wing of the People's Democratic Party (the ruling party since April 1978), to power in Kabul. *(Sydney Morning Herald* 29 December 1979). Former President Amin who replaced President Taraki in September 1979 was executed after a short trial for 'Crimes against the State' *(Sydney Morning Herald* 29 December 1979). The latest changeover in Kabul has not only sharply divided the ruling party but has also caused large-scale violent clashes between the supporters of Amin and those of his successor. Perhaps the most significant aspect of that coup was the active participation of the Soviet troops in ousting Amin and installing Karmal as the new ruler of Afghanistan. Recent reports indicate that the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan has risen to over 80,000. Whatever emerges out of the chaotic situation in Afghanistan, it is certain that the Soviets are there to stay. The increased number of troops merely reflects both their determination to continue to have a sympathetic regime in Kabul and the importance they attach to Afghanistan. The pretext employed by the Soviets to introduce their combat troops into Afghanistan is the alleged request for military help by the new regime in Kabul. The real reasons for their actions are 1) the inability of previous Soviet-backed Communist regimes to crush the Islamic revolutionary movement of the local tribesmen since April 1978; 2) the danger of Islamic revivalism spilling over into the Muslim-populated areas of the Soviet Union if Afghanistan were to fall to Muslim guerillas; 3) the current wave of anti-Americanism in the area (i.e. Iran and Pakistan) coupled with the Americans' logistic problems in reaching Afghanistan; 4) the importance of Afghanistan to the Soviets in terms of a lever that could be used against Iran and Pakistan (if the need arises); and finally 5) a firm foothold in Afghanistan.
brings the Soviets closer to the Indian Ocean. Given the situation in Afghanistan, the dangers of spillover of the Afghan turmoil into Pakistan as well as Iran are very real.

(b) Military Factors

A simple comparison of current Afghani and Pakistani forces indicate that without military aid Afghanistan is not really much of a threat to Pakistan’s security. The Pakistani Army is over four times the size of the Afghan Army, whereas the difference between their air forces is considerably less. \textit{(Military Balance 1979)}.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total strength</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserves</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airforce</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total strength</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat aircraft</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In qualitative terms the Pakistani forces are regarded as much better trained, equipped and experienced than those of Afghanistan. Perhaps one of the major reasons for Afghanistan’s decision not to push the Pakhtoonistan issue so far that it would lead to armed conflict with Pakistan was the Afghan’s recognition of Pakistan’s military strength. In almost all the border clashes the Afghan losses were much greater than those of Pakistan. During 1980 the Afghan Army disintegrated.

For Pakistan, Afghanistan’s close links with the Soviet Union and to a lesser degree with India are a source of much greater concern. After the Coup in April 1978 the Afghan government moved even closer to the Soviets. On 5th December 1978 the Afghan and Soviet governments signed a treaty of ‘Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation’. Article 4 of the treaty calls for the development of cooperation in the military field on the basis of appropriate agreement concluded between them. \textit{(Survival 1979)}. As a result of the treaty the number of Soviet advisers as well as the flow of military hardware began to increase, and hundreds of Afghan civilians and military officers were sent to the Soviet Union for training. Later when the insurgency gathered momentum and the government forces suffered reverses, military aid was stepped up and the number of advisers increased rapidly. By October 1979 it was reported that the number of Soviet advisers had increased to 5,000, including 3,000 military advisers, and a great deal of modern weaponry was
pumped into the country to support the regime, including MIG 21 fighters, T.34 tanks, and M1-24 helicopter gunships. (Far Eastern Economic Review 5 October 1979). However, not only has the number of advisers dramatically increased since October but the coup in December 1980 introduced over 80,000 Soviet troops.

The Afghan-Soviet treaty has not only militarily strengthened Afghanistan vis-a-vis Pakistan, but it has also completely transformed Afghanistan’s traditional role of being a buffer state and has brought her firmly within the Soviet orbit. Pakistani worries are based not only on the fact that the new situation in Afghanistan has brought Soviet influence to within 350 miles of the Arabian Sea, but also on the increased probability of Afghan-Soviet support to discontented elements in the minority provinces of Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier. The April takeover increased the Soviet’s ability to supply weapons to the dissidents in Baluchistan or to put pressures on Pakistan. While the Afghans with the Soviets firmly behind them could provide substantive assistance to dissidents in Baluchistan, the outcome, under existing circumstances and the incumbent disunity among the Baluchi and Pakhtooni groups is likely to favour Pakistan. But what happens if the dissident groups in Baluchistan and North-West Frontier unite and acquire the requisite Soviet weapons and money via Afghanistan? Assuming that a considerable number of Pakistani forces are tied down by the Pakhtoon-Baluchi dissidents, then in such an eventuality the ability of Afghan forces to press hard would certainly be increased.

(c) Economic Factors

The traditional trade routes available to land-locked Afghanistan have been either through Pakistan or the Soviet Union. A third route was made available through Iran after the signing of the Iran-Afghan Economic Cooperation Agreement in July 1974. In addition to joint ventures like a sugar complex, a meat complex, textile plants, and an irrigation project on the Helmand River, Iran agreed to finance the Trans-Afghan Railway project in order to connect Afghanistan with the outside world via Iran. (Mustafa 1978: 20). However this plan turned out to be short-lived and after the April coup the construction of the railway between Kabul and Bandar Abbas in Iran was cancelled. Instead the Afghan government announced its ‘plans to build a bridge across the Amu Desya, the river separating the Soviet Union from Afghanistan and to increase economic interdependence with the USSR’. (Negaran 1979: 104). The Soviet Union continues to be not only the main donor to but also the main trading partner with Afghanistan. ‘During the last 25 years Soviet assistance to Afghanistan totalled $1.5 billion. (Sinha 1979: 120). Afghan exports to and imports
from the Soviet Union continue to increase, exporting natural gas, raw and processed agricultural products, and importing mainly petroleum products, capital goods and sugar. (Far Eastern Economic Review 5 October 1979). For a short time during the earlier half of the 1970s the trade pattern began to change. Throughout the current decade Afghanistan exported much more to Pakistan than it imported. (Pakistan Economic Survey 1979: 118-19). Despite the adverse balance for Pakistan, the volume of trade had been constantly increasing.

Since 1947, Pakistan has provided transit facilities for Afghanistan's goods. Even during difficult times transit facilities were never withdrawn bar one or two occasions when diplomatic relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan had been broken off. Even after the April coup the Afghan government recognised the importance of these transit facilities and appreciated Pakistan's cooperation in this regard. (Asia Week 17 November 1978). It seems that both Pakistan and Afghanistan recognised that the withdrawal of transit facilities would not only adversely effect Pakistani-Afghan relations but would also make Afghanistan completely dependent upon Soviet transit facilities, and neither State relished such an eventuality. As it is, 'an estimated 75 per cent of Afghan trade now passes through Russia'. (Stockwin 1978: 247).

Another factor which has had to be considered in the context of changes in Pakistani-Afghan relations is the seasonal migrations of the Pawandas. The Pawandas are Afghani nomadic groups who migrate to Pakistan during the winter and go back to Afghanistan in the summer months. The Pawandas not only provide cheap labour to Pakistani businessmen and industrialists but also trade in dry fruits, rugus, karakal skin and smuggled goods. Being illiterate and unfamiliar with the intricacies of the modern state system they do not carry passports but cross the borders at will. Neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan has ever tried to stop their seasonal movements, which have been accepted either explicitly or implicitly by both sides.

Industrially Afghanistan is regarded as one of the most backward countries in the region, and nearly all industry is owned by the state with the exception of a few small industrial plants. Mineral extraction is still in an early stage. However the recent discovery of substantial deposits of gas and iron ore could draw the increasing attention of interested parties. Pakistan needs iron ore and Afghan ore could be imported relatively cheaply because of low transport costs provided political relations between the neighbours improves.
(d) Cultural Factors

Ethnically and culturally the Pakhtoons who inhabit the area on both sides of the Durand Line are of the same stock. Except for a brief period when Ahmad Shah Durrani was the Amir of Afghanistan, the Pakhtoon areas remained part of the Indian empires until the British decided to instal Amir Abdurrahman as the Amir of Afghanistan, and signed a boundary agreement with the Afghan rulers clearly delimiting their respective areas. The majority of the Pakhtoon tribes became subjects of the British Indian empire. While it is true that the Pakhtoons have always enjoyed a considerable amount of autonomy even under the British, it is not correct to say that the Pushto speaking tribes collectively form a nation. Throughout history there was never a time when Pakhtoons constituted a cohesive unit of any sort by themselves. Their loyalties to the Amir of Afghanistan or to the Viceroy of India were always regarded as dubious. Neither the British nor the Amirs ever trusted them because the ‘first loyalty of every tribesman has been to his own tribe’, and that ‘they are notorious for perpetual inter-tribal feuds’. (Burke 1973: 88). After tribal loyalties comes the Islamic religion and then the state.

Islam is and has been for a long time the dominant religion in the areas constituting Pakistan and Afghanistan. The great majority of the population in both countries are Sunni Muslims, and Shia Muslims form minority groups. The existence of a common religion has played a major role in restraining both the Afghans and the Pakistanis from going to war with each other. The Mullahs in both societies command considerable respect.

The languages spoken in both countries are under the predominant influence of the Persian language. Dari, the national language of Afghanistan, is a crude mixture of Persian and Pushto with Persian being the dominant element. Similarly, Urdu, the national language of Pakistan, is overwhelmingly influenced by classical Persian. Pushto is spoken by most of the Pakhtoons living on either side of the Durand Line. The Afghan Tajiks speak Persian. In addition to these languages, Arabic enjoys a respectable status and many people in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, especially the religiously orientated classes, can read, write and even speak Arabic.

(e) Superpower Involvement

The Russian involvement in the affairs of Afghanistan dates back to the first half of the nineteenth century when the great game of power politics began. It ended with the April 1978 takeover by a Marxist-Leninist regime. Afghanistan is more Russian now than at any time in its history. Just as the Russians were worried that the British in India would use their influence over Afghanistan to try to stir up troubles along its
southern border, Pakistan is worried that the Soviets will use the Afghani base to stir up troubles in Baluchistan and the North West Frontier. During the last 32 years of Pakistani-Afghan relations, Pakistan has painfully learned that tension between these two Muslim neighbours has increased whenever Pakistani-Soviet relations took a downward turn. With the Soviets deeply entrenched in Afghanistan, Pakistan has no choice except to tread carefully. Despite the massive influx of Afghan refugees, Pakistan has so far been very careful not to implicate the Soviets. Fears grow in Islamabad that if the situation in Afghanistan does not stabilise soon Pakistan may be dragged willy-nilly into the Afghani cauldron. Equally apprehensive are the Chinese who view the firm Soviet hold over the Afghans as upsetting the power balance in the area.

American interest in Afghanistan has always remained peripheral. Apart from economic assistance, the United States has not supplied arms to Afghanistan nor has it ever attempted to influence the Afghans to join CENTO. The United States has not only recognised the Durand Line as an international border but has also tried through diplomatic channels to persuade Afghanistan to resolve the Pakhtoonistan dispute with Pakistan peacefully. After the April Coup, the Americans have not cut off their economic assistance to Afghanistan as they believe that it would further drive the Afghan Government into the Soviet embrace. (Eliot 1979: 61). Even the latest coup and the subsequent introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan is not likely to cause a major shift in American policy vis-a-vis Afghanistan. However, the Americans will probably use the Afghan situation to their advantage at the diplomatic level especially in the Muslim world and may even further strengthen their naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

**Pakistan-Iran**

(a) Political Factors

The regional environment of both Pakistan and Iran underwent substantial change during the 1970s. Pakistan was dismembered and weakened after the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war and India emerged as the dominant power in South Asia; Iran emerged as the pre-eminent power in the Persian Gulf as a result of the British withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971 and the rising importance of oil as a crucial factor in international relations after the 1973 Middle East war. From 1947 to 1971, of the two states ‘Pakistan had been the more dynamic partner with a larger population, an impressive military establishment, a growing industrial base, and tripolar relations
with the United States, the Soviet Union and China'. (Tahir-Kheli 1976: 754). During the 1970s Iran emerged as the dominant partner. Increased oil revenues enabled Iran not only to buy the most sophisticated weapons from the West and ‘thereby launch a massive drive for the modernisation of its armed forces’, but also ‘to build for Iran a more resilient economy and an industrial base, including a major civilian nuclear programme’. (Ayoob 1977: 5). Iran and India then emerged as regional powers on either side of Pakistan, and in addition relations between the two improved. After the Shah’s visit to India in October 1974 Indo-Iranian ties grew steadily. It was within this changed context that Pakistan had to adjust its foreign policy.

For Pakistan, Iran had been a stable friend and a trusted ally for 32 years. With the solitary exception of a minor boundary dispute in the 1950s which was resolved amicably in 1960 with Pakistan transferring a small tract of 300 square miles, (Lamb 1968: 84) Pakistani-Iran relations had been notably free from friction. Iran’s support to Pakistan — moral or otherwise — during difficult times, and its economic assistance has always been well appreciated by Pakistani governments — and has led to a kind of special relationship between these two Muslim neighbours. Until recently both were members of CENTO, and still are members of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) movement.

Despite changes in the power balance of the region relations between them continue to be cordial and friendly. In fact, Iran’s interest in Pakistan’s security and territorial integrity increased considerably after the separation of East Pakistan. This increased Iranian interest stems from the troubles in the Baluchistan province of Pakistan which is a potential threat to Iran’s territorial integrity. In Tehran’s view, the separation of Baluchistan would not only expose Iran’s eastern flank but would also have ‘serious repercussions on the Baluchi population on the Iranian side of the border’. (Ayoob 1977: 8). To prevent such an eventuality the Shah offered diplomatic, economic and military support to Bhutto in 1973 and also conveyed his firm resolve to underwrite Pakistan’s territorial integrity vis-a-vis India. (Ayoob 1977: 8). While explaining Iran’s security interests to an Egyptian journalist, the Shah remarked, ‘as for the eastern border, our policy is clear. We are unequivocally against any separatist movement in Pakistan, and will firmly block it’. (Amirie 1978: 465).

In an effort to relieve Pakistan of another external worry and to help Pakistan to consolidate internally, especially in Baluchistan, Iranian diplomacy played an effective role in reducing the pressures applied by Afghanistan for an autonomous state of Pakhtoonistan. The major outcome of active Iranian efforts to defuse the potentially
explosive disputes between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and between Pakistan and India was a marked improvement in atmosphere. President Daoud of Afghanistan moderated his stand on Pakhtoonistan; in addition the Indo-Pakistani rapprochement began to emerge. However, the April Coup in Afghanistan not only caused a serious setback to Iran-Afghan relations and Pakistani-Afghan relations, but also intensified the security concerns of Iran and Pakistan. Afghanistan is in a particularly good position to help insurgents in Baluchistan and to exploit unrest in Iran. With the advent of the Khomeini regime the situation has further deteriorated, as the current regime in Iran is extremely hostile to Afghanistan. Iran's main fear is that the separatist movement in Baluchistan might prove contagious and that the movement for greater Baluchistan is almost certain to gain momentum with Soviet aid. Iranian officials argue that 'Soviet involvement in Baluchistan would be accompanied by unrest among other Iranian minorities, such as the Kurds, the Azerbaijanis, and the Khuzistan Arabs and by a revival of the Communist-led rebellion in the Dhofar area of Oman'. (Harrison 1978: 156-7). Thus there could be potentially hostile powers on both sides of the entrance to the Persian Gulf. Undoubtedly this is the most pessimistic possibility. Such an eventuality, though far-fetched, would almost certainly destabilise and Balkanise the whole area, and would not serve the interests of any of the regional powers. Realising the significance of such an eventuality both Iran and India have gone out of their way to reassure Pakistan and to emphasise their desire for regional stability. After consulting the Shah in May 1978 the Indian Foreign Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee 'made a significant departure from India's long-standing policy of studied ambivalence with regard to the Durand Line between Pakistan and Afghanistan by asserting that 'existing boundaries should be respected, with any differences being settled peacefully'. (Harrison 1978: 156-7).

Just as Pakistan needs Iran, Iran needs Pakistan to improve its relations with the Arab world. Under the Shah Iran was somewhat unhappy over Pakistan's growing ties with the Arabs in general and with radical Arab states in particular; and although the Shah publicly expressed his resentment by refusing to attend the Islamic summit at Lahore in 1974, he never allowed his irritation to cause any setback to Pakistani-Iran relations. The new regime can hardly afford to ignore the useful role Pakistan can play, especially in view of Pakistan's cordial relations with most of the Arab states. Hostility between the Persians and the Arabs is long-standing, and the clandestine preaching of the Shia revolution by some of Khomeini's lieutenants is causing further tensions between Iran and some of the neighbouring Arab states. (The Economist 8 September 1979 and The Age 10 October 1979). Such a policy could bring the dormant antagonisms between the Sunnites and the Shi'ites to the
surface and may even plague the whole region. Since Pakistan, India and Afghanistan have sizable Shia populations, they cannot afford to ignore the dangerous implications of such a policy.

(b) Military Factors

Until 1971, Pakistan's military establishment was much more impressive than that of Iran. After the emergence of Iran as the strongest regional power and the dismemberment of Pakistan during the 1970s, the balance began to tilt in Iran's favour. Iran has purchased highly sophisticated weapons from the West during the last six years. It was speculated that 'Iran's total weapons acquisition programme over the next decade will eventually reach 33 billion dollars', which, in fact, meant that 'for a period stretching from 1973 to 1985, Iran will have averaged an expenditure of 2.5 billion dollars annually in weapons procurement'. (Marwah 1976: 155). This, of course, is a staggering defence build-up for a state of Iran's size and a source of concern by all the neighbouring states, friendly or hostile. Yet when one scrutinises Iran's strategic location and the emerging patterns of geo-politics in the region, the Iranian military build-up may not seem so threatening. Iran is an occupant of a strategically important location on the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf; it has a powerful neighbour in the North (the Soviet Union); it confronts hostile communist-backed regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan; and it faces potentially destabilising separatists movements in the North (Kurds), South (Irani Baluchis) and Southeast (Pakistani Baluchis). In these circumstances 'Iran could ill afford not to have a strong military power capable of defending its wealth and long, exposed borders'. (Amirie 1978: 465). In addition, the ambivalent and sceptical attitudes of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf heightens Iranian uneasiness. Besides, Iran under the Shah was determined to maintain security in the Gulf, even if it had to do it unilaterally.

Relations between Iran and Pakistan have been friendly and stable, and there is no reason, other than through speculation and improbable hypothetical scenarios, to assume that the present state of friendship will be transformed into a hostile relationship — especially in the light of improving Indo-Pakistani relations and increasing Indo-Iranian ties. Among the factors that might influence the existing state of relationships is the possibility of an open split between the Arabs and Khomeini's regime, such as the Iran-Iraq war which began in late 1980. Confronted with serious domestic problems and Soviet-backed hostile Afghanistan, coupled with deteriorating Iranian-American relations, Iran is in a poor position to withstand the anger of the Arabs as well.
Until recently Pakistan and Iran had also remained alliance partners in CENTO, another of the factors cementing Pakistani-Iran relations. They have jointly conducted many military exercises, and Iran has helped Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. After East Pakistan’s separation in 1971 and the subsequent weakening of Pakistan, Iranian interest in the security of Pakistan further increased. ‘Iranians’ commitment to the security and preservation of Pakistan’s territorial integrity was strengthened dramatically when Pakistani police seized an estimated 300 machine guns and 60,000 rounds of ammunition smuggled into the Iraqi Embassy in February 1973 for Baluchistan, the area straddling the Iranian-Pakistani border’. (Ramazani 1975: 1061). However this does not necessarily imply that in any future troubles in Pakistani Baluchistan Iran would be automatically pledged to support Pakistan militarily. The current Iranian regime, however sympathetic it may be to Pakistan, will have to consider its own domestic problems, the nature and degree of foreign involvement in Baluchistan, the seriousness of repercussions for Irani Baluchis, and the nature of the separatist movement in Pakistani Baluchistan. Whether the Baluchi secessionists seek an autonomous Baluchistan within Pakistan or opt for complete independence will make considerable difference to Iran’s response.

(c) Economic Factors

Iran and Pakistan are not only bound together by bilateral economic links but are also members of regional multilateral economic institutions like the Regional Cooperation for Development association. Although the pace of economic collaboration is not as impressive as was envisaged by the founding fathers of RCD, the economic interdependence of Iran and Pakistan continues to increase and to strengthen the special relationship that has existed between these two countries.

Iran’s economic assistance to Pakistan has been considerable and has been on the increase since the oil revenue quadrupled in 1973. The assistance has been both in the form of balance-of-payment support and of project financing. In most of the projects, the foreign exchange component is entirely met and in future projects it was envisaged that it would be met by Iran. (Pakistan Economic Survey 1979: 159-60). Most of the Iranian-financed projects are located in Baluchistan.

Trade during the 1970s, though generally favouring Pakistan, has not been very impressive. In fact, the volume of trade has decreased since the mid-1970s. (Pakistan Economic Survey 1979: 112-13). This decline is primarily because of the diversification of Iranian trade and Pakistan’s concentration in Middle Eastern markets. After 1974 the two-way trade with the Arab Middle East grew nearly 90
per cent, although it generally favoured the Arabs. (Weinbaum and Sen 1978: 604). However, the number of Pakistani workers in Iran and the Middle East increased rapidly in the last ten years and their remittances rose sharply, exceeding the one billion dollar mark by the end of 1978. (Weinbaum and Sen 1978: 602-4).

(d) Cultural Factors

During the days of Darius the Great the areas constituting Pakistan and Afghanistan were part of the Great Achaemenian Empire. By the middle of the fourth century B.C. the territories south of Hindu Kush had broken away. In 327 B.C. when Alexander entered India, he encountered no Persian officials on his eastward march. After Alexander’s death, the tide of conquest began to flow from the south towards its natural borders in the Western Hindu Kush. When Alexander’s successor, Seleucus, the founder of the Macedonian dynasty in the Middle East, tried to conquer areas beyond the Hindu Kush, he found the local ruler, Chandragupta Maurya, too strong for him. Since then the areas forming Pakistan have never remained under the Persian kingdoms, although Persian culture has ruled the area for centuries. Under the Muslim rulers of India it enjoyed a privileged status. The court language, until the establishment of British rule in India, was Persian.

Just as Dari, the national language of Afghanistan, is a mix of Persian and Pashto with Persian being the dominant element, Urdu, the national language of Pakistan, is a mix of Persian, Arabic and Turkish languages with Persian again dominating. Perhaps the easiest foreign language to learn for an Urdu speaker is Persian.

Islam is another cultural bond between the Iranians and the Pakistanis. However, most Iranians belong to the Shia sect whereas a vast majority of Pakistani Muslims are Sunnis. While there is fundamental congruity on the basic tenets of Islam, there is a difference in interpretations. The Islam practiced in Pakistan is much closer in its operational form to that practised in most Arab countries than is Iranian Islam. However, Islam has played a strong role in cementing Pakistani-Iran relations.

(e) Superpower Involvement

Until the early 1960s Pakistan’s relations with Iran were strongly influenced by both countries’ dependence on the United States and their common distrust of the Soviet Union. The motivating force behind this early dependence was the need for security by both countries. Iran abandoned the neutralist course in world affairs after Mossadegh’s fall, when the Shah became convinced that the main threat to Iran’s
security came from a 'lethal kind of imperialism' (Ramazani 1975b: 256-60) pursued by the Soviets. To protect Iran the Shah opted for alignment with the West. Initially Pakistan perceived a threat from India rather than from the Soviet Union; and this seemed real enough to cause Pakistan to seek external assistance. At that time the United States in pursuance of its containment policy was signing up players for its own side, and found both Iran and Pakistan only too willing to play Western-oriented roles against potential Soviet expansion. Alignment with the West provided the necessary sense of security to both countries: to Iran against the Soviet threat and to Pakistan against the Indian threat.

Enraged over Iranian and Pakistani participation in the Western-sponsored defence alliance system, Moscow responded by supporting India and Afghanistan against Pakistan, and Iraq against Iran. These negative and somewhat punitive reactions further pushed both countries into the Western lap. It was not until the early 1960s that disenchantment with the West stepped in and relations vis-à-vis the Soviet Union began to take a new turn. With the thaw in the Cold War, the Sino-Soviet split, and the obsolescence of conventional military bases in the early 1960s, Soviet-Asian policy registered a marked change and became much more pragmatic and realistic in its approach to Iran and Pakistan. Russia began to make friendly overtures to both countries. Both suspected Moscow, but at the same time felt the need to test Soviet declarations of good neighbourliness and peaceful co-existence. On 15 September 1962 Iran ‘assured the Soviet Government that it will not grant any foreign nation the right of possessing any kind of rocket bases on Iranian soil’. This pledge was accompanied by an official statement promising that Iran would not become a party to any aggression against the Soviet Union. (Ramazani 1975b: 315-16). Moscow, satisfied with the pledge, praised the Iranian land reform measures. Despite the suppressive measures of the Shah and the arrest of many members of the Tudeh party (the pro-Moscow communist party of Iran) during the riots following land reform, the Soviet press vehemently ‘condemned the anti-government riots, blamed the Mullah for them and charged that they were in league with reactionary feudal lords’. (Ramazani 1975b: 327-28). Thus began the process of normalisation of Iran’s relations with the Soviet Union.

In Pakistan the situation was much more complicated than in Iran. By deep commitment to India, especially on Kashmir, the Soviets had left themselves no room for manoeuvre but the Chinese moved faster than they did. Pakistan joined the Western pacts not because it felt threatened by Communist expansionism but to secure itself militarily against India and to enlist Western support for Pakistan’s stand on the Kashmir issue. In contrast to the Chinese, the Soviet leaders in their first
visit to the sub-continent committed themselves to the Indian stance on Kashmir and to the Afghan stand on Pakhtoonistan. The Chinese remained extremely friendly to the Indians during the 1950s, and realising the significance of the Kashmir dispute, refrained from firm commitments. Although China moved closer to Pakistan in the early 1960s, the tension between the Soviets and the Pakistanis had reduced considerably. Following the war of 1965 the Soviets played the role of honest broker at Tashkent in 1966.

The fluid situation of the 1960s was replaced by an even more complex set of relationships in the 1970s. Not only did the Soviets sign a friendship treaty with India, but they also openly helped the Indians to dismember Pakistan. In addition, the discovery of arms in the Iraqi Embassy indicated Soviet designs with regard to Pakhtoonistan. The Baluchi situation is also closely linked with Iranian security. The British withdrawal and increased Soviet activity in the Persian Gulf area had influenced the Iranians to assume a major share of responsibility for the security of the Persian Gulf. Iran’s assertive new policy suited the Americans admirably. They regarded Iran as ‘a Nixon doctrine ideal’, a small stable state which is willing and apparently able to defend both itself and parallel American interests in a vitally strategic area. (Takis-Kheli 1976: 755-56). Consequently the United States became the greatest single source of weapons for Iran.

The Khomeini regime has not only revoked the Bilateral Defence Pact with the United States of 1959 and the 1921 Treaty with the Soviet Union (Ayoob 1979a) but has also withdrawn Iran from CENTO. While publicly denouncing US imperialism, Khomeini has not been able to undo all ties with the West. Iran is still heavily dependent on the Western markets for the sale of the oil which is the backbone of the economy, and on the regular supply of US weapons for its armed forces. (Saikal 1979). Since the Iranian armed forces are equipped with American weapons, it would be dangerous to cut off the supply line, especially in the light of not only internal strife and troubles but also the external threat and the role Iran assigned itself with regard to the security of the Gulf region.

The Soviets, of course, are playing a ‘watch and wait’ game with regard to both Iran and Pakistan. Their relations with Pakistan improved during the Bhutto regime, which recognised the dictates of geography and conveyed that awareness to the Soviets. However, the Soviet-backed Afghan coup in April 1978 and the increased Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan after December 1979, coupled with its increased ability to put pressure on Pakistan either by supporting Pakhtoonistan or by providing arms to Baluchi dissidents, has caused apprehension and fears among the Pakistanis.
Pakistan’s Interests and Choices

Detente heralded an era for the superpowers of mutual recognition of each other’s legitimate interests and mutual accommodation, at least in areas of vital interest. Competition continued in the grey areas, but with caution, so as not to upset the whole arrangement. Since detente was never meant to be comprehensive and no code of conduct was agreed upon, general probing and testing of the will and nerves of each other continued, especially in the Third World. Compared to the Americans, the Soviets have been much more active and responsive to situations that provided opportunity to encourage sympathetic parties to bid for power. Within the span of a few years, seven pro-Soviet regimes have come into power in Africa and Asia; Vietnam, Laos, Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, South Yemen and Cambodia. (Zagoria 1979: 733-36). In addition, by the late 1970s the Soviet web of ‘friendship and cooperation’ treaties included seven more African and Asian countries: India, Iraq, Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia, Vietnam and Afghanistan. (Legvold 1979: 769). This does not necessarily imply that the Soviets did not respect the detente process at all, or that they extended support to communist or sympathetic socialist parties and encouraged subdivisions indiscriminately, violating the spirit of detente. Equally absurd would be the interpretation that some of these developments are the product of a preconceived Soviet ‘master plan’. Complex indigenous forces were at work which produced many favourable situations, and the deliberate restraint on the part of the Soviets in some situations deserves mention. ‘Far from justifying Kissinger’s allegation that in Iran “the margin between unrest and revolution came at least in part from the outside”, the Soviet Union apparently did little to stir a boiling pot’. (Legvold 1979: 769). Similarly, the Soviets also avoided being dragged into the conflicts in Chad, Nicaragua and Spanish Sahara. (Legvold 1979: 771). No doubt restraint in some cases pays more dividends than active involvement. Local instability and separatists movements coupled with vacillating US policy and lack of timely American response created situations ripe for Soviet moves. The Soviets, being more vigilant and active in peripheral areas, cautiously moved in and tilted the momentum in their favour.

While analysing choices for Islamabad one has to bear in mind that the superpowers are competing in more than one theatre in the world and have to set their own priorities. An intense struggle is going on in Africa between the United States and the Soviet Union with China playing only a minor role; in South-east Asia and the Far East the Soviet Union is set against the Chinese with the West being
represented by Japan. The stalemate in the Middle East seems to be reminiscent of the one that prevailed in Europe for almost three decades, with hostile camps opposing each other. It prevents war but doesn’t mean peace. The instability in Iran and the unpredictability of the outcome has alarmed both sides. However, it seems that the Americans will, in all probability, accept any regime which ensures their investments and oil supplies. Despite the fact that active superpower cooperation in the Third World is a rarity, the policies of the superpowers in South Asia have reflected a tacit understanding since 1962. Even the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 did not radically alter the situation. Since the dismemberment of Pakistan, the Americans particularly have maintained a low-keyed posture in South Asia, with the result that India has emerged as the dominant regional power and the Soviets have gained a firm foothold in Afghanistan.

Given the existing pattern of global and regional interactions, Pakistan, lying at the crossroads of regional strategic and political interests, surrounded by powerful neighbours, being economically weak and politically a difficult country to govern, is increasingly viewed not only by the superpowers but also by the regional powers as a buffer state. A tacit understanding seems to exist between the regional powers as well as the superpowers that further disintegration of Pakistan would suit no one. Everybody wants to keep it alive, but beyond that not many states seem to be much interested except China, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. These countries hope to contain the Soviet Union at Pakistan’s borders, but they also realise that unless actively supported by them she would be unable to withstand a Soviet downward thrust.

In blocking the Soviet Union’s access to ‘warm waters’, Iran and Pakistan occupy a strategically important location. With Iran in serious turmoil, a weakened Pakistan, and the recent takeover of a pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan, Pakistanis as well as outsiders are justifiably afraid that the Soviets and the Afghans are united in seeking to gain, and share, access to warm water ports on the Arabian Sea. What is often underplayed is the fact that ‘such a warm water port would only be useful to Moscow if it could be absolutely sure that its long lines of communication with such a port (or base) were very secure’. (Stockwin 1978: 246). Afghanistan’s deep involvement over the Pakhtoonistan issue adversely affected its relations with Pakistan and its transit trade through the port of Karachi. It increased Afghan dependence upon the Soviets in terms of military and political support, and forced them to seek an alternative trade route through the Soviet Union. Good relations with Iran and Pakistan would provide Afghan access to Iranian and Pakistani ports, a relatively shorter trade route, and would allow more room for manoeuvre with the
Soviets. Further, if the Soviets and the Afghans are determined to gain access to the Arabian Sea, it is likely to be attained at the cost of the total break-up of Pakistan, which is not in the interests of Iran, Afghanistan, India, China or the United States. As all of them are likely to resist such a move, the Afghan regime can only attain such an objective at the cost of its total dependence on the Soviets which, in turn, would provoke strong internal as well as external reactions.

A major preoccupation of Pakistan's foreign policy has always been territorial integrity and regional security. Threats from India led Pakistan to join the Western defence alliances and later to develop closer relations with China. While the threat from India is gradually diminishing, threats from Afghanistan and the Soviets' increased ability to stir trouble in Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Province are acquiring dangerous proportions. Recognising the dictates of geography and the recent developments on its western borders, Pakistan has left CENTO and has joined the non-aligned movement. However, the search for friends to help preserve its territorial integrity continues. After the separation of East Pakistan, this search brought Pakistan closer to the other Islamic countries. Attempts to establish special relationships with the Islamic world in fact began immediately after partition, but the divergent policies and ideologies pursued by leaders in Pakistan and the Middle Eastern States made close relations impossible. 'Whereas the unifying theme and the rationale for an independent Muslim State of Pakistan has been religion, the nationalism of most postwar Middle Eastern States and the attitude of their leaders were essentially secular'. (Weinbaum and Sen 1978: 596). While the basis of Pakistani nationalism was religious, the nationalism of most Arabs was essentially secular in character. Pakistan's association with the West, regarded by radical Arab states as imperialist powers, further strained relations between them. Despite Pakistan's close relations with the West and the almost regular rebuffs of the Arab leaders, almost all Pakistani governments have consistently supported Arab causes. A vast majority of Pakistanis cherish the goal of Islamic solidarity and have demonstrated their resentment against any move by the West perceived to be detrimental to their goal of a Muslim State. Considerations of security and economic development and the uncompromising attitude of some of the radical Arab states such as Libya, Syria, and Iraq influenced Pakistani decision makers to maintain good relations with the West while continuing to explore all avenues to improve and strengthen relations with the Muslim world. It was not until the dismemberment of Pakistan and the consequent disenchantment with the West, and the ascent to power of Bhutto, who was essentially secular in outlook, that relations with leading Arab states began to improve rapidly. The Islamic summit at Lahore in February 1974
was attended by 38 delegations, mostly led by their heads of state; it was a clear testimony of vastly improved relations with the Muslim world. By sheer 'dint of impressive diplomatic skill' Bhutto 'was not only able to cement friendly ties with conservative as well as radical states of the Middle East', but also emerged as a 'leading champion of non-Arab solidarity with the Arabs'. (Weinbaum and Sen 1958: 599-605). In addition, the strengthening of ties with the Arab world opened up a new source of financial assistance. The advent of the military regime in 1977 and its subsequent enthusiastic pursuit of Islamic fundamentalism has put strains on the rapidly improving relations with the radical Arab states, but relations with conservative Arab states continue to be steady and friendly.

Given the emotional attachment with the Muslim world, Pakistan's economic and security interests, and the realities of power in Pakistan's regional environment coupled with the superpower pursuits, limited options are open to Islamabad. Theoretically the following options can be considered:

a. Pakistan can try to align itself with one of the powerful neighbours or superpowers;

b. it can try to promote a regional alliance;

c. it can accept its new status as a buffer state and by being open to everybody without preference and pursuing a policy of strategic passivity;

d. it could completely close itself to the outside, developing military and economic self-reliance;

e. it could pursue an even-handed policy of bilateralism — a balancing policy between America, China and Russia; or

f. it could follow a policy of non-alignment.

As far as the alignment policy is concerned, Pakistan's past experience with the West has been a frustrating one. The Pakistanis feel that they have paid too high a price for the alliance with the West, with minimal dividends. Pakistan's dependence upon American economic and military aid increased, which in turn provided the Americans with a lever often employed to the detriment of Pakistan's interests. The alliance also invited the wrath of the Soviet Union as well as that of the Third World and caused tensions with leading members of the Muslim world. A great deal of Pakistan's frustration stems from the fact that the Americans, while fully cognizant of Pakistan's perception of threats from India, encouraged them to join the alliance, then in their hour of need left them in the lurch. Despite Pakistan's warnings that the weapons supplied to India after the Sino-Indian border war in 1962 would be used against Pakistan, the Americans ignored Pakistan's apprehensions and rushed
military aid to India. Again, in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war the Americans imposed an arms embargo, knowing full well that India had another source of arms supply whereas Pakistan was fully dependent upon US arms. In the 1971 war, the American role was disappointing compared with Soviet support and encouragement to India. In general Pakistan’s association with the West has prevented the realisation of its major foreign policy objectives. This is primarily because the Americans viewed South Asia with a sense of equanimity, despite the fact that Pakistan was an ally and India was a friend of the Soviets. Under existing conditions neither the Pakistanis nor the Americans are likely to aim for a renewed alliance. For Pakistan even to consider such an alliance now would not only be hazardous to the normalisation process with India, which is well advanced, but would also antagonise the Afghans and the Soviets.

Although the Soviet Union has emerged as the most influential superpower in the region recently, Pakistan is unlikely to seek an alliance with the Soviets. Any attempt to forge an alliance with the Soviet Union would not only greatly upset Pakistan’s friendly relations with China, but would seriously affect its relations with the conservative Arab States on one hand and the West on the other. In addition, neither India or Iran would relish such an alliance. Iran especially would be put in a very difficult situation should such an alliance come into existence. On the other hand, the Soviets are not anxious to go for such an eventuality at this juncture. Having established a foothold in Afghanistan, they have already increased their ability to pressure or even coerce Pakistan whenever the need arises. Besides, Pakistan has also left CENTO, thereby removing another source of irritation. Admittedly an alliance with Pakistan would provide the Soviets an access to warm waters, but the cost would include serious damage to detente, endanger renewed efforts to improve the Sino-Soviet climate, and cause apprehension from the regional powers. Just as the Soviet manoeuvres in and beyond Afghanistan are in part seen as a reaction to the massive American arms shipments to Iran, (Stockwin 1978: 252) any Soviet attempt to extend its network of treaties to Pakistan might invoke some strong reaction in the West as well as in the region.

The third major power with which Pakistan could seek an alliance is the People’s Republic of China. While China does not feel itself in a position to underwrite the security of Pakistan alone, it may be willing to share the responsibility with the West or the powerful Muslim States. But such an eventuality would make Pakistan a frontline state against the Soviet Union and would also antagonise India and Afghanistan. For the Chinese an alliance with Pakistan is likely adversely to affect both its own normalisation process with India and the initiative it had taken towards ‘genuine
An independent regional alliance is only thinkable either with Iran or with the Arab States. An alliance which includes both Iran and the Arab states is desirable from Pakistan’s viewpoint but not feasible under existing conditions. Both Iran and Pakistan have to calculate whether their respective fears of increased Soviet participation in regional politics need to be escalated as a result of the April 1978 takeover in Afghanistan. Admittedly the Soviets’ hold in Afghanistan has increased their ability to put pressures on Iran and Pakistan, especially in the troubled Baluchi areas. Still, it is not certain that Soviet encouragement and support of the Baluchi insurgency would serve their interests nor that the Soviets are likely to undertake such an adventure. Firstly, because Baluchistan’s population is extremely heterogenous, the insurgency during 1973-77 was confined to a limited area, and neither spread all over the provinces of Baluchistan nor involved the Baluchis living across the border in Iran. In order to organise a major insurgency, the dissidents would have not only to overcome the problems posed by ethnic and tribal diversity and their accompanying mutual suspicions (Negaran 1979: 107) but also to establish regular channels with the Baluchis living across the border in Iran. This might require increased Soviet input in terms of money and arms. Among the factors the Soviets will have to take into consideration is the existence of a powerful Iranian Air Force with four airfields near the Pakistan-Iran border. Under the chaotic conditions in Afghanistan, such a venture seems highly unlikely. Secondly, there is hardly any tangible evidence of the much-publicised Soviet training camps for Pakistani insurgents in Afghanistan, and some Western intelligence sources have even denied the existence of such camps. (Legvold 1979: 771). Thirdly, it would not be in Soviet interests even to contemplate the disintegration of Pakistan as it would set a precedent for destabilisation elsewhere, and even damage detente. (Rose 1978: 410). In the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war both Moscow and Washington warned India not to undertake extensive military operations against West Pakistan because they feared that the total disintegration of West Pakistan might result in three or four non-viable states within a highly strategic area. (Rose 1978: 410). In addition, recently even the Indian Government has shown greater sympathy for Pakistan’s security concerns, and instead of supporting Afghanistan, India’s Foreign Minister, A.B. Vajpayee, remarked that the existing borders between Pakistan and Afghanistan should be respected. (Negaran 1979: 112).

An alliance with Iran would very much depend upon who emerges successfully out of the Iranian turmoil. The regime in Iran led by Khomeini is hostile to the...
Afghan regime and in general dislikes the Communists, but it has not yet been able to consolidate its hold in Iran. If a pro-Soviet leftist government emerges out of the chaos in Iran, however unlikely, then the importance of Baluchistan for Soviet access to a warm water port will decrease dramatically. (Negaran 1978: 109). If Khomeini’s forces manage to establish themselves firmly in Iran, it seems highly unlikely that they would revive the Shah’s plan of a loose security pact either with Pakistan or with the Gulf states. Such an alliance would cause tension with the Soviets, who hitherto have refrained from participation in the Iranian situation and may even be considering activating the Baluchi insurgency. It would also cause a serious setback to the emerging detente between India and Pakistan. Besides, an Iran-Pakistan alliance may put the improving Pakistani-Arab relations to a severe test.

Alternatively a regional alliance with the conservative Arab states would also be viewed with suspicion, not only by the Soviets, the Indians, the Iranians, the Afghans and the Turks, but also by the radical Arab states who might label it as a reactionary alliance against modernisation. Such an alliance might not even be endorsed by the West because it would be interpreted as a practical manifestation of Islamic revivalism, thus generating danger signals far beyond the Middle East. Pakistan can ill afford to annoy either the radical Arab states or Iran at the moment.

The oil boom after 1973 provided unprecedented economic opportunities for Pakistani workers in the oil-producing Muslim states. The volume of trade with the Middle East increased dramatically, and by 1977 the number of skilled and semi-skilled Pakistani workers in the Middle East (mostly in the Gulf states) exceeded 300,000. (Weinbaum and Sen 1978: 604). The number of Pakistanis in Iran is far less than those in the Arab states. Nevertheless, Pakistani manpower in the Middle East, Britain and Iran has become a major source of foreign exchange earnings. What Pakistan needs to do is to keep the Arabs, the radicals as well as the conservatives and the Iranians, in good humour. An alliance either with the Arabs or Iran is likely to upset the delicate balance for which Pakistan has worked so hard and it has so carefully maintained. Besides, Iran’s security interests are inextricably linked with those of Pakistan so far as its eastern flank is concerned, and if the need were to arise, Iran would be likely to come to the aid of Pakistan. So why establish an alliance and earn the wrath of so many interested parties unnecessarily?

The third option open to Pakistan is to recognise the existing power realities in the region and to accept the buffer-state status, which is the logical outcome of the changing regional environment and adopt a policy of strategic passivity. With strong powers on the east and west, two great powers on the northern borders, and a Soviet-
backed regime in Afghanistan, a policy could be envisaged that would make Pakistan a bridge between the East and the West instead of a stumbling block. Involving all the neighbouring countries in the development of its transit routes including ports and railways, establishing service centres, trade markets, investment zones and developing tourism, could transform the country into a viable buffer state. It is essential to a buffer state that its own government and people accept such a status and maintain a strict neutrality in international and regional relations; equally essential is the fact that all the neighbours should accept and guarantee such a status. Under the existing situation, the surrounding neighbours are unlikely to agree upon such a status for Pakistan, and the Pakistanis themselves would reject such an option. It is not just their historic pride. The weak economy, the sensitive cultural balance, the emotional attachment with the Islamic world, and their internal political strife would all combine to prevent their acceptance of such a status. Although to accept the buffer state status and open the country to everybody would probably not invite foreign interference immediately, such openness cannot be regulated easily. At some future time interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs would become very easy.

The fourth option is to draw an iron curtain around the country and pursue a policy of military and economic self-reliance. This implies pulling out of international as well as regional power politics and concentrating entirely on internal developments. Such a policy would not only require a social and political revolution but also, in order to resist outside pressures and to defend itself against external attack, it would need well-equipped and trained armed forces. Pakistan does not have a well-developed arms industry and has had to depend heavily on the outside world for equipment. In addition, modern sophisticated arms make it necessary for the purchaser to seek assistance in training his soldiers to use properly what is bought. Pakistan’s geographical location prevents it from withdrawing from regional politics, and its aid-orientated economy and consequent increasing reliance on external aid and technical assistance rules out this option altogether.

The fifth option for Pakistan is the one which originated in the 1960s and was vigorously pursued by Bhutto in the mid-1970s. This is the policy of bilateralism.* An even-handed policy of bilateralism implies that “the relations are confined to the limits of the common national interests of the two powers concerned and do not exceed those limits inimically to the interest of a third country”. (Bhutto 1976:22).

* An authoritative exposition of bilateralism is given in Khan (1967:114-21). His successor President Yahya Khan further elaborated the principles of bilateralism in an address to the Iranian Parliament on 30 October 1969. (Burke 1973: 359-60). A comprehensive analysis of bilateralism was provided by former Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto who adopted it as Pakistan’s foreign policy during his tenure. (Bhutto 1976).
Where the limits are exceeded and begin to affect adversely the legitimate interests of third parties, the point of conflict should be insulated from the rest of the relationship and the separate points of conflict should be dealt with individually. Such a policy requires a high degree of reciprocity, which is hard to come by in a world consisting of unequal states. The chances of an equal degree of reciprocity are higher for a great power pursuing a policy of bilateralism than in the case of a small power. However, if the absolute minimum of reciprocity, which is defined as the 'mutual respect for each others' territorial integrity and sovereignty and non-interference in each others' internal affairs' (Bhutto 1976: 21) is maintained within existing power realities, then the policy of bilateralism can be pursued with some success.

A foreign policy based on bilateralism has to avoid a one-sided approach in its international dealings, either in strong ideological leanings, or one-sided economic dependence. The degree of friendliness or the intensity of relations will naturally vary with different countries but they should not present a definitely biased pattern. A country whose territorial integrity is at stake has to pursue a low-profile foreign policy, cultivating good relations with all its neighbours irrespective of differences in ideology or political and economic systems. Bilateralism is perhaps the most appropriate policy to serve Pakistan's principal foreign policy aim which is to establish a bilateral equation with the three great powers and the two regional powers without antagonising any one of them in the process. Bhutto's shrewd bilateral moves did manage to improve Pakistan's relations with her estranged neighbours India and Afghanistan while mending fences with the Soviet Union. Bhutto, the enthusiastic supporter of bilateralism, did not maintain a low foreign policy profile. He attempted to carve out a wider geographic role for Pakistan, while meticulously working to enhance his own stature as a regional and international figure. (Weinbaum and Sen 1978: 605). His efforts to seek a closer unity with the Third World countries, his proposal to hold a Third World economic conference, presumably in Pakistan, won the endorsement of Libya, Iran and a number of Muslim and African states of the Third World and earned him much sought-after international recognition. But, in many capitals of the world, Bhutto's determination to propel himself to the forefront of the Third World was greatly resented, (Weinbaum and Sen 1978: 606) causing the alienation of many nations in the 1970s, which Pakistan could ill afford. However, this does not necessarily mean that the policy of bilateralism is not suitable for Pakistan. A low-profile policy of evenhanded bilateralism can be used to serve the interests of Pakistan.
Bilateralism is very close in substance to non-alignment, which is the sixth option open to foreign policy makers in Pakistan. Theoretically the main difference between bilateralism and non-alignment is that bilateralist foreign policy leaves room for and accommodates a defence alliance between a great power and a developing nation (Bhutto 1976: 22) whereas the non-aligned movement grew out of an aversion to the defence alliance system of the cold war era. It needs to be mentioned here that in practice many nations professing non-aligned policies have signed 'friendship and cooperation' treaties with the Soviet Union, which in turn are regarded as sugar-coated versions of defence alliances by those nations who themselves were in such relationships with America. Another difference is that almost all nations pursuing non-aligned policies are members of a group called the non-aligned movement, which is itself a kind of loose alignment, whereas a country opting for bilateralism can maintain its independent stance and stay out of groups with such labels. Belonging to the non-aligned movement implies that a country will have not only to quit the defence alliance but also to bring its policies into line with those broadly pursued by the group as a whole.

The present government of Pakistan opted for non-alignment and in September 1979 it officially joined the non-aligned group. (Dawn 15 September 1979). Theoretically membership in the non-aligned movement should find favour with Afghanistan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, the Soviet Union and Iran. Choosing non-alignment does not necessarily imply that Pakistan will have to change its policies with regard to the Zone of Peace and Nuclear Free Zone in the Indian Ocean. While supporting the Peace Zone concept in general, Pakistan has been pushing hard towards the inclusion of its own proposal of de-nuclearisation of the Indian Ocean into the broader framework of the Peace Zone concept. The proposal was incorporated in the Peace Zone concept at the meeting of the littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean held at New York in July 1979, with a brief footnote reflecting the objections of the Indian government. (UN 1979 and Dawn 16 July 1979).

Congruity of views on anti-colonialism, anti-racism, peaceful coexistence, the new international economic order and disarmament already exists between Pakistan and its partners in the non-aligned movement. While the membership of the non-aligned movement has provided another forum for Pakistan to continue its dialogue with India and Afghanistan over outstanding disputes, membership might put some strains on its special relationships with China on one hand and its over-enthusiastic approach towards the Islamic world on the other. The Islamic world is divided into many groups. They all profess the aim of Muslim unity, but in practice the nation
state has so far always taken precedence when major decisions had to be made. Pakistan has already been rebuffed once in the early years of its existence while trying to foster Muslim unity, because many of the Muslim countries opted for secular policies. In some ways the same is true, even today. The rift between radical and conservative Muslim States appears to be wider than it was in the late 1940s.

Given the pattern of conflict and cooperation in the Indian Ocean as well as in Pakistan's region and the choices available to Islamabad, bilateralism and non-alignment are the most feasible and best suited to serve Pakistan’s interests. Pakistan needs to improve its relations with its neighbours and to reconcile itself with the changed power patterns in the area. To offset the economic benefits accruing from special relationships with the United States, emphasis should be placed on the cultivation of good relations with Western Europe, ASEAN, and Australia in addition to its neighbours and the Islamic World.

Although this study, after having scanned the patterns of conflict and cooperation in the Indian Ocean and focused upon Pakistan’s regional environment, suggests that policies of either bilateralism or non-alignment are perhaps the most expedient options for the foreign policy formulators in Pakistan, the choice, in fact, is dependent upon who is in power. In addition, the domestic variables will continue to influence foreign policy making. Given the existing regional constraints and the emerging pattern of conflict and cooperation in the Indian Ocean, a major deviation from the abovementioned options seems highly unlikely. However marginal differences in interpretation will certainly be frequently employed in order to give a distinctive appearance to the ruling group.


______ (1979a) ‘The charade comes to an end’, *The Canberra Times*, 8 November.


Braun, Dieter, (1979) 'New patterns of India's relations with Indian Ocean littoral states', presented at the International Conference on Indian Ocean Studies, Perth.


Chubin, Shahram, (1979) 'Repercussions of the crisis in Iran', *Survival*, v.21, May-June.


Cottrell, Alvin J. and Burrell, R.M., (1971) 'No power can hope to dominate the Indian Ocean', *New Middle East*, n.36, September.


——— 'Southeast Asia — ASEAN and the Indochina conflict', (unpublished paper).


Harrison, Selig S., (1978) 'Nightmare in Baluchistan', Foreign Policy, n.32, Fall.


Housego, David, (1979) 'Asia's prosperous five forge an unexpected unity', The Canberra Times, 29 November.


'The India-Pakistan Simla Agreement' (1972), Survival, v.14 (5), September-October.


——— (1979) v.16 (13) 15 April: 7-8.


Khan, M. Ayub, (1965) 'Foreign relations', Pakistan Horizons, first quarter.


——— (1975b) Iran’s foreign policy 1941-73, University of Virginia Press, Charlottesville.


The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre,
Research School of Pacific Studies,
The Australian National University

The aim of the Strategic and Defence Studies, which was set up in the Research School of Pacific Studies in the Australian National University, is to advance the study of strategic problems, particularly those relating to the general region of the Indian and Pacific Oceans and South-east Asia. Participation in the Centre's activities is not limited to members of the University, but includes other interested professional and Parliamentary groups. Research includes not only military, but political, economic, scientific and technological aspects. Strategy, for the purpose of the Centre, is defined in the broadest sense of embracing not only the control and application of military force, but also the peaceful settlement of disputes which could cause violence.

This is the only academic body in Australia which specialises in these studies. Centre members give frequent lectures and seminars for other departments within the ANU and other universities. Regular seminars and conferences on topics of current importance to the Centre's research activities are held, and the major defence training institutions, the Joint services Staff College, and the Army and RAAF Staff Colleges, are heavily dependent upon SDSC assistance with the strategic studies sections of their courses.

Since its inception in 1966, the Centre has supported a number of Visiting and Research Fellows, who have undertaken a wide variety of investigations. Recently the emphasis of the Centre's work has been on problems posed for the peace and stability of Australia's neighbourhood; the defence of Australia; arms proliferation and arms control; decision making processes of the higher levels of the Australian Defence Department; management studies and the role of the Minister in Australia's defence policy making; and the strategic implications of developments in South-east Asia, the Indian Ocean and the South West Pacific Area.

The Centre contributes to the work of the Department of International Relations through its graduate studies program; and the Department reciprocates by assisting the Centre in its research. A comprehensive collection of reference materials on strategic issues, particularly from the press, learned journals and government publications, is maintained by the Centre.

The Centre also conducts seminars and conferences which have led to several volumes of published proceedings.
Other Publications

The following series of studies by the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre is distributed by: The ANU Press, P.O. Box 4, Canberra, ACT, Australia, 2600:—

Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence

NO.

☆ 1. Oil Supply in Australia’s Defence Strategy,
    by Alex Hunter.

☆ 2. The Strategic Situation in the 1980s,
    by Geoffrey Jukes.

☆ 3. Australia and the Non-proliferation Treaty,
    by J.L. Richardson.

☆ 4. An Australian Nuclear Force,
    by Ian Bellany.

☆ 5. Educating for the Profession of Arms,
    by P.H. Partridge.

☆ 6. The Strategy of General Giap Since 1964,
    by Robert J. O’Neill.

☆ 7. Soviet Policies in the Indian Ocean Area,
    by T.B. Millar.

☆ 8. Australian Defence Procurement,
    by Ian Bellany and J.L. Richardson.

☆ 9. Japan and Nuclear China,
    by John Welfield.

☆ 10. The Army in Papua New Guinea,
    by Robert J. O’Neill.

☆ 11. Conscription and Australian Military Capability,
    by Darcy McGaurr.

☆ 12. The Strategy of Total Withholding,
    by Peter King.

☆ 13. Chinese Military Thinking under Mao Tse-tung,
    by W.A.C. Adie.

☆ Out of print.
☆ 14. The Development of Soviet Strategic Thinking Since 1945,
   by Geoffrey Jukes.
☆ 15. The Moscow Agreements and Strategic Arms Limitation,
   by Hedley Bull.
16. Arms Limitation in South-east Asia: A Proposal,
    by Ron Huiskes.
17. The Development of Australian Army Officers for the 1980s,
    by Ross Babbage, Desmond Ball, J.O. Langtry and Robert O'Neill.
18. The Horn of Africa: Regional Conflict and Super Power Involvement,
    by Mohammed Ayoob.
19. Strategic Factors in Interstate Relations in South Asia,
    by Shelton Kodikara.
20. The Cruise Missile and Arms Control,
    by Ron Huiskes.
21. The Persian Gulf: Arms and Arms Control,
    by K.R. Singh.
22. Arms Build-Up and Development: Linkages in the Third World,
    by S.D. Muni.
23. Conflict and Cooperation in the Indian Ocean,
    by Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema.
24. Nuclear Weapons Spread and Australian Policy,
    by John J. Weltman.

☆ Out of print.
Proceedings of Conferences organised by
The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre

☆ 1. The Defence of Australia: Fundamental New Aspects,
   Ed. Robert O'Neill.
2. The Future of Tactical Airpower in the Defence of Australia,
   Ed. Desmond Ball.
3. The Strategic Nuclear Balance: an Australian Perspective,
   Ed. Robert O'Neill.
4. The Strategic Nuclear Balance, 1975,
   Ed. H.G. Gelber.
5. Insecurity! The Spread of Weapons in the Indian and Pacific Oceans,
   Ed. Robert O'Neill.

Also:

☆ 6. Australia's Defence Resources: A Compendium of Data,
    by Jolika Tie, J.O. Langtry and Robert O'Neill.
7. A Select Bibliography of Australian Military History, 1891-1939,
    by Jean Fielding and Robert O'Neill,
    published by the Australian Dictionary of Biography,
    The Australian National University.
8. Naval Power in the Indian Ocean: Threats, Bluffs and Fantasies,
    by Philip Towle.
9. Arms for the Poor: President Carter's Policies on
    Arms Transfers to the Third World,
    by Graham Kearns.
10. Defence Resources of South East Asia and the South West Pacific:
    A Compendium of Data,
    by Ron Huiskens

☆ Out of print.
Published and distributed by
The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre

Working Papers

NO.

☆ 1. The Defence of Continental Australia,
   by Robert O'Neill.

† 2. Manpower Alternatives for the Defence Forces,
   by J.O. Langtry.

3. Structural Changes for a More Self-reliant National Defence,
   by Robert O'Neill.

4. Australia and Nuclear Non-proliferation,
   by Desmond J. Ball.

5. American Bases: Some Implications for Australian Security,
   by Desmond J. Ball.

6. The Political Military Relationship in Australia,
   by T.B. Millar.

7. The Two Faces of Political Islam: Pakistan and Iran Compared,
   by Mohammed Ayoob.

8. Cost-effectiveness and the B-1 Strategic Bomber,
   by Ron Huisken.

9. Limiting the Use of Conventional Weapons: Prospects for the 1979 UN
   Conference (Future of incendiaries, cluster bombs, high velocity rifles,
   fuel-air explosives and land mines.)
   by Philip Towle.

☆ 10. The Structure of Australia’s Defence Force,
      by Robert O'Neill.

11. Australia as a Regional Seapower: An External View,
    by Michael MccGwire.

12. The Indian Ocean Littoral: Projections for the 1980s,
    by Mohammed Ayoob.

13. The Australian Tactical Fighter Force: Prologue and Prospects,
    by Desmond J. Ball.

14. Non-aligned Criticisms of Western Security Policies,
    by Philip Towle.

☆ Superseded by No.24
† Superseded by No.22.
16. Blueprint for a Catastrophe: Conducting Oil Diplomacy by ‘Other Means’ in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, by Mohammed Ayoob.
17. Developments in US Strategic Nuclear Policy under the Carter Administration, by Desmond Ball.
18. Australian Policy in the Committee on Disarmament, by Philip Towle.
19. Pakistan’s Quest for Nuclear Technology, by Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema.
23. Arms Control and Detente, by Philip Towle.
27. Global and Regional Changes and Their Implications for Australia to the Year 2000, by T.B. Millar.
30. Australia’s Strategic Options for the 1980s, by Robert O’Neill.
Other monographs

Controlling Australia’s Threat Environment:
A methodology for planning Australian defence force development,
by J.O. Langtry and Desmond J. Ball.

Published and distributed by
Phoenix Defence Publications
PO Box 574, Manuka, ACT 2603.

Problems of Mobilisation in Defence of Australia,
by Desmond J. Ball and J.O. Langtry.
The Department of International Relations
Research School of Pacific Studies
The Australian National University

The Department of International Relations also publishes and distributes a series of monographs titled Canberra Studies in World Affairs.

NO.

1. President Carter and Foreign Policy: The Costs of Virtue,
   by Coral Bell.

2. Contemporary Alliances,
   by T.B. Millar.

3. Refugees: Four Case-Studies,
   by Milton Osborne.