The Post-Soviet World: Geopolitics & Crises

Coral Bell



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ABSTRACT

The world has changed more rapidly and more radically in the three years since 1989 than it did in the forty years before that date. This book offers an interim analysis of these changes, from the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, up to and including the election of President Clinton in 1992. A special chapter is devoted to their impact on Australia's foreign policy prospects. The changes in Western and Central Europe and the Central Asian Republics, along with their probable impacts on China, Japan and India, are also charted.

Dr Coral Bell (BA Sydney, MSc (Econ.), PhD London), Visiting Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, began her research work in international politics as a member of the Australian Diplomatic Service. She was one of the first women ever appointed in that field, in Dr Evatt's time. Subsequently she undertook academic research, as a graduate student in the University of London, and as a research officer for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, before a series of university posts, at the Universities of Manchester, Sydney and the London School of Economics. She was Professor of International Relations at the University of Sussex for several years before her return to Australia as Senior Research Fellow at the Australian National University.

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CONTENTS

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand and the United States
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
CENTO	Central Treaty Organisation
C^3I	Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC	European Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
	European Conference on Security and Cooperation
EDC	European Defence Community
EEP	Export Enhancement Policy
ERM	Exchange-Rate Mechanism
G7	Group of Seven
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GNP	Gross National Product
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
MFN	Most Favoured Nation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OAS	Organisation of American States
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
SEATO	South-East Asian Treaty Organisation
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks/Treaty
UN	United Nations
US	United States

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This monograph is specifically about the post-Soviet world order, rather than 'the new world order' or 'the post-Cold War world order'. Though those three phrases are often used as synonymous, they are in fact subtly different. Paradoxical though it may seem, the post-Soviet world order is in fact being constructed on the ruins of two separate versions of 'a new world order', each of which seemed hopeful to many people in its day. Just after the First World War, Lenin and Woodrow Wilson raised the rival banners respectively of a new world order based on revolution (but headquartered for the time being in Moscow) or a new world order based on self-determination and the League of Nations. Both failed. The end of the Soviet Union in December 1991 was a belated acknowledgement of the failure of the expectations of November 1917, national as well as international. The end of Yugoslavia and (more peacefully) of Czechoslovakia, long after the League itself had been wound up, has been in its way another reminder of the high fail-rate of new world orders, and the intransigence of some historic forces like nationalism. A lot of names which had vanished for decades from the lexicon of international politics are back again, bringing their echoes of 'old unhappy far-off things, and battles long ago'. St Petersburg, Slovakia, Slovenia, Slavonia, Moldavia, Bosnia-Herzegovena, Macedonia, Croatia, Kosovo: even perhaps Bohemia and Transylvania, those prime inspirations of traditional and literary fantasy.

But that is not the only reason why there is a haunting 'forward to the past' quality in recent developments. Ethno-linguistic identity seems to have replaced ideology as a source of crisis in many parts of the world. The explosive potential in that tendency should not be under-rated. The world is full of multinational or multi-ethnic empires, lightly disguised as federal or even unitary states. The dissolutions of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have shown that a central sovereignty can be broken up, even with unexpected speed. The example of the European Community has shown that there can be alternate arrangements to the sovereign state as a framework for economic and defence cooperation. The example of the tiny sovereignties of the Pacific Islands (some of them with so few people

they would hardly fill a small football-stadium) has shown that political communities far smaller than was previously thought viable can in fact survive. (Reflecting on the city-states of ancient Greece or Renaissance Italy, one could even hope that creativity might be fostered by small political communities.) But in any case, the society of states seems to have entered a new phase of fragmentation and integration like that of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when it saw the integration of Germany and Italy, and the fragmentation of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires.

Those are not the only contemporary reminders of past diplomatic history. The central argument of this monograph is that the emerging (or re-emerging) pattern of great power relationships is that of a concert of powers, somewhat akin to that after 1815, though of course global rather than merely European, and based on six great powers instead of five. Since so much has already been published about Russia and the other republics of the former Soviet Union, I have concentrated instead on the world outside that central enigma, especially on the way other regional balances have been affected by the changes which have taken place in the ex-Soviet area.

Some of those changes have reversed more than the assumptions of 1917, or the strategic calculations of the Cold War. They have reversed three hundred years of Czarist accumulation of territory in Central Asia, and perhaps eventually in the Far East.

It may seem mere quibbling to deny this enormous transformation the name of a new world order. But what most people mean by that phrase is not merely changes in the rank-order of power in the society of states. Those have certainly taken place, and so have changes in territorial dispositions, and in claims to sovereignty. But what most people mean by (and want from) a new world order is a change in the moral quality of relationships in the society of states. The image they associate with the phrase is of a world actually more orderly, more harmonious than that of the past: an international system governed by the rule of law, in which external or even internal boundaries are not changed by force, defenceless cities are not shelled, governments do not adopt military or economic policies which will create floods of refugees, minorities and dissidents are allowed full human rights.

A glance at any morning's headlines will convince most people that we do not as yet have a new world order in that ambitious and optimistic sense. We do however have a world of changed power-relationships, not only in the central balance but in many regional balances. My purpose in this study is to attempt a first tentative sketch-map of the geopolitical and strategic contours of that global landscape, after the avalanche of change in the former Soviet sphere of power and influence. Not the prospective economic landscape: that is for another study.

The post-Soviet world order is about two years younger than the post-Cold War world, assuming that the end of the Cold War came with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, and that the Soviet Union died, almost certainly beyond hope of resuscitation, in December 1991. One of the puzzles for future historians to explore will be whether the Soviet Union would have expired of its own internal contradictions even without the extra stresses created by the Cold War. Perhaps no certain answer will ever be possible, but the fact that Yugoslavia has also passed into history (with hardly any such external pressure after Stalin's death) seems evidence that the difficulties were intrinsic to the two systems, producing a sort of economic-cum-ideological 'metal fatigue', which was fatal in both cases. If that interpretation is accepted, it has large implications for the remaining Communist governments, in China, Vietnam, North Korea and Cuba. But that is a question for later analysis. What presents itself insistently for study in the early nineties is the transformed (and still self-transforming) landscape of the post-Soviet world, which (I shall argue) presents some contours very like those of an earlier society of states.

CHAPTER 2

A CONCERT OF POWERS?

The imminence or likelihood of Armageddon, in the form of a nuclear battle for the world between the central balance powers, was widely taken as an article of faith, especially on the left, during the forty-three years of the Cold War (1946-89). More optimistic folk hoped wistfully that the tensions between the West and the Communist world would in time dwindle down (without major direct hostilities) to a wary tolerance, a guarded coexistence, as the somewhat parallel struggle between Islam and the West had done centuries before. Those given to traditional power political analysis also expected a slow-motion transition from the bilateral balance of power characteristic of the Cold War to a multilateral balance, probably of five or six powers, with tensions diffused between them.

Not even the most optimistic expected a rapid transition to a concert of powers. Yet that mode of central balance symbiosis appears, for the moment at least, to be the dominant influence on current world politics. Of course, it could prove quite temporary, but this essay will put the case for believing that, given some prudent decision making in the capitals of the central balance powers, it could not only be made long-lasting, but prove of value to the whole society of states.

The concept itself may not be fully familiar except to those brought up on European nineteenth-century diplomatic history, since that was the last phase of international politics in which it exerted a long-sustained dominance: most of a century in fact. Briefly, one might say that the difference between a workable concert of powers and an ordinary multilateral balance of power is that a concert system requires consciousness on the part of central balance decision-makers that (at least for the time being) the common interests of their respective countries *vis-à-vis* the rest of the society of states are more important than their competitive interests *vis-à-vis* each other. That consciousness can only emerge when adversarial tensions between the central balance powers are at an unusually low ebb: that is, when the element of plausible challenge to the *status quo* of power distribution is either almost absent, as is the case at the moment, or comes from

outside the central balance. In effect, once the Soviet Union fell apart, and the old familiar diplomatic entity of Russia emerged as its successor-state, the strategic and ideological tension between Washington and Moscow (which had dominated the entire period of the Cold War) vanished into thin air. 'The enemy has evaporated', as the US Chief of Staff said. Russia is, of course, a formidable nuclear power, but only a revolutionary displacement of its current policy-making élite could reinstate the old Communist or new Russian nationalist challenge as the central tension in world politics. And none of the other members of the central balance—Europe, Japan, China, India—have for the time being the necessary capacity and will to assume the former Soviet role of presenting a radical alternative to the *status quo*, ideologically and strategically speaking. Even less so economically speaking, since all espouse market economics of sorts.

'For the time being' is, however, the operative phrase. Differential rates of economic growth, which worked so irresistibly during the Cold War decades, to the eventual undoing of Soviet power, are still at work, and will in time further modify the existing hierarchies of power. I use the plural because there seem at present to be two quite different rank orders in the central balance, one strategic and the other economic. The strategic rank order is clear enough: the US, then Russia (with still probably 20,000 nuclear warheads in its armoury, and very large conventional forces, even if they are at present in some disarray), then Europe (two nuclear powers, large conventional forces with state of the art weaponry), then China (nuclear capacity, large conventional forces), then India (large conventional forces, nuclear threshold), and finally Japan (well-equipped conventional forces, but severe inhibitions on their use and on nuclear development).

The economic rank order is more controversial. But looking to the future, Europe is bidding to overtake the US at the top.[1] Despite the difficulties of the present transition period, the great changes in Eastern Europe and the erstwhile Soviet area have brought into sight a truly immense prospect: a European Economic Area stretching from Portugal to Vladivostok (from the Atlantic to the Pacific, from the Arctic to the Mediterranean), with eight hundred million people, more

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1 See on this point Lester Thurow, 'The Twenty-First Century Belongs to Europe', *International Herald Tribune*, 20 April 1992.

than fifty nations, mostly skilled workforces, and almost every kind of resource. Some European policy-makers (the most influential being Jacques Attali, the head of the European Bank, EBRD), are already pointing out that vision to their colleagues. No doubt the Eastern half will remain in economic difficulties for the rest of this decade, but even the Western half, the present nineteen-nation European Economic Area, has already a GNP greater than that of the US. The North American Free Trade Area must come next in the economic rank order, then Japan, then China and India, with Russia for the time being bringing up the rear.

That disparity between strategic rank order and economic rank order has, to my mind, been a source of some confusion in considering the shape of things to come, internationally speaking. There is a well-known piece of heavy-handed American irony, 'The Cold War is over, and Japan won'. Neat but inaccurate: Japan has, it will be argued later, lost substantially in terms of diplomatic leverage, and indirectly perhaps even in economic terms, with the end of the Cold War. Those who have resented that country as prospectively displacing the US in overall world influence were unduly impressed by its ability to maintain an export surplus: a two-edged asset at best.

The sources of tension between the central balance powers, including that between the US and Japan over trade, will be considered later. Meantime, the evidence for arguing that a concert of powers does at present exist derives chiefly from the renewed activism and effectiveness of the UN Security Council. For when the UN was being put together, back in 1944-45, the Security Council was consciously designed as a piece of diplomatic machinery that would run only on one specific fuel: a concert of powers. That was made certain by the veto accorded each of the five permanent members: the US, the Soviet Union (now Russia), China, Britain and France. Except when they were unanimous, very little could be done. So the Security Council in fact did very little throughout the Cold War years.[2] But since 1990 it has been determinedly active, from the Gulf and Yugoslavia to Somalia. Since nothing has changed in the actual UN

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2 Except for two rather accidental occasions, Korea 1950 and Suez 1956. In the Korea case, the Soviet Union happened to be boycotting the Security Council, and Taiwan still held the China seat. In the Suez case, there was a very temporary coincidence of interest between the US and the Soviet Union against Britain, France and Israel.

machinery, the renewed activism offers testimony that the fuel that makes the machinery run - the concert of powers - is in renewed supply, even though the present permanent membership of the Security Council represents the power-distribution of 1945, not that of 1992. That point will be developed later.

The evidence of a concert of powers emerging between the six members of the central balance became visible during the Gulf War, most significantly in the attitude of Russia (then still known as the Soviet Union) but also in the attitudes of China and India. Gorbachev's chief diplomatic aide at the time, Evgeny Primakov, when making one of his visits to Moscow's former ally, Iraq, said that he was 'engaged in an experiment in cooperation with the US'. The post-Cold War *détente* between Washington and Moscow was still new and tentative at that time. The fall of the Berlin Wall, which marked the true end of the Cold War, had occurred only ten months earlier, and right-wing opinion in the US was largely (even predominantly) inclined, in the opening stages of the Gulf crisis, to believe that Moscow would, in due course, reveal itself as still an adversary, by surreptitiously backing Iraq. Only in late 1990, shortly before the launching of the Western air force campaign in January 1991, did that sector in Washington feel fully assured that Moscow had, in effect, diplomatically and strategically abandoned its erstwhile ally. By then Russian interests *vis-à-vis* the US and the developed world in general were clearly being given precedence in Moscow over the one-time ambitions of Soviet policy makers *vis-à-vis* the Arab world. Recalling the amount of Soviet effort that had been put, for thirty-five years (1955-1990), into building Soviet influence in the Arab world, that appears truly a momentous symbolic change of course by Moscow.

The Chinese and Indian modifications of stance were less remarkable, but hardly less important as indications of the prospective basis of a concert of powers. Given the rapid decay of Soviet influence in the Third World after 1989, and the extreme improbability that Russia (as successor state) could cultivate any equivalent degree of influence, the obvious candidate for the role of 'leader of the opposition' in the transformed society of states is China. It flies alternative banners, at least politically and ideologically, if not economically, to those of the other five: banners which have exerted, and will probably continue to exert, considerable appeal for Third World intellectuals. It is a nuclear power, is making rapid economic

progress, and is the bearer of a great and ancient civilisation, though one never given to much preoccupation with individual rights as defined in the West. Altogether, a potentially powerful disrupter of the established international order, if and when it chooses that path. But in fact its stance towards the Western action against Iraq was quite as acquiescent, though not as supportive, as Moscow's. If Beijing had wanted to throw a spanner into the works, the veto mechanism at the Security Council meetings was there to its hand. That it refrained from any such effort was an indication that, as in the case of Moscow, the assumed national interest *vis-à-vis* the other central balance powers, especially the US, was being given priority, at least for the time being, over interests *vis-à-vis* the rest of the society of states. The maintenance of MFN status in trade with the US, for instance, may well be of more significance for China's economic development at the moment than most other considerations. Even that may be placed in jeopardy (as, for instance, by the repression of the Tiananmen protesters) if and when the regime begins to feel that its own vital interests are becoming endangered. But certainly not for the interests of Iraq.

Given its general suspicion of US purposes during the Cold War decades, and its long self-definition as leader of the non-aligned world, India might perhaps have appeared likelier than China to initiate any international resistance to American policy in the Gulf. Popular opinion was indeed vividly averse to, or alarmed by, some of the Western operations.[3] Nevertheless, the Indian government temporarily allowed refuelling rights to US air transports making for the Gulf, and a year on from the hostilities (having meantime reassessed many of its foreign and defence policies) Delhi was considering joint exercises with the US Navy in the Indian Ocean.

Those acquiescent attitudes on the parts of three powers which would previously have been regarded as likely to denounce, or even try diplomatically to block, US-led military action against a Third World power, illustrate the point made in my earlier definition of the necessary basis of a concert of powers: that the decision-makers of the central balance should see their common interests as taking precedence over competitive interests. And, ironically, it was Saddam Hussein

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3 See J. Mohan Malik, *The Gulf War: Australia's Role and Asian-Pacific Responses*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.90 (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1992).

who more or less forced that perception upon them during the crisis. For it was, and is, to the interest of all the central balance powers (and indeed practically all the other members of the society of states) that the supply and pricing of oil be kept out of hands which seem likely to prove extortionate, a possibility which not many governments were inclined to dismiss in the case of the Iraqi dictator. Oil in unhindered supply at reasonable prices is even more vital to a relatively poor developing country like India than to the US, Russia and Britain, which have supplies of their own, and therefore are to some extent cushioned against price rises. A year after the end of the Gulf War the price of oil in real terms was lower than it had been twenty years earlier.

The underlying point again is that the interests of the dominant powers of the central balance can also in many instances correspond to the interests of most of the society of states. (Seldom all of them.) The question came into even sharper focus during the course of the Gulf War, and still more during its immediate aftermath, on a strategically crucial matter: nuclear proliferation beyond the circle of the central balance powers.

At the time of the Israeli strike against Iraqi nuclear installations in 1981, American and other intelligence sources believed that Iraqi efforts had been a good ten years away from weapons capacity, and that the Israeli strike would set those efforts back substantially, or even end them. In subsequent years the reports of the IAEA had seemed to confirm that that had indeed been the case.[4] However, about October 1991 an Iraqi defector, a nuclear scientist, reported that the efforts had not only surreptitiously persisted, but had presumably been intensified, and that the Iraqis were by then within a year or so of a deliverable warhead, along with means to deliver it on, for instance, Tel Aviv or Teheran or the Western bases in Saudi Arabia. Washington's objectives in the conflict with Iraq were therefore redefined to include its forced nuclear disarmament. Which in turn meant embracing the military option, since there was no way that merely persisting with sanctions would have induced Saddam Hussein (or probably any other foreseeable Iraqi decision-maker) to agree to such a measure of disarmament. The difficulties that the

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4 For more details on US intelligence assessments of the Iraqi programme, see *International Herald Tribune*, 21 April 1992.

Western inspection teams have been having, even in conditions of semi-occupation after military victory, are ample evidence of that.

However, the main point to note is that the nuclear weapons aspect of the Gulf crisis reinforced a consciousness, already existing since at least 1974 among the decision makers of the major nuclear powers and their close allies,[5] that it was in their common interest that membership of the nuclear club should remain as restricted as possible, and that 'breakouts' might potentially be at hand. Logically (though before 1991 it would have seemed quite preposterous), that gave the US, Britain and France a common interest with Russia against Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, which until a few months earlier would have been regarded in Moscow as being as much entitled as Russia itself to be defended by the last Russian missile and soldier. From the moment when the Soviet Union shattered into fragments, the major strategic interest of the Western alliance became to ensure that only one nuclear power should emerge from the debris: Russia. Otherwise the process of nuclear proliferation would not only take a sharp *nominal*[6] bump upwards with the addition of Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus but (more seriously) the likelihood of still further proliferation would be much increased. For in the desperate economic circumstances not only of the advanced science sector of the ex-Soviet world, but of individual scientists, technologists and relevant armed forces personnel, scattered across the newly independent republics, any nuclear-ambitious Third World country could suddenly hope to recruit to its weapons programme some of the most knowledgeable people in the world in the relevant fields. (There are said to be about 100,000 ex-Soviet personnel with a fair expertise, about 15,000 with a high expertise, and about 3,000 peak-level.)

The problems of that particular issue have produced some situations which would have seemed the stuff of satiric fantasy until December 1991, like Ukraine demanding that Western monitors should oversee the destruction of ex-Soviet weapons because the decision-makers in Kiev did not trust the Russians; the Russians themselves eagerly selling plutonium, uranium 238 and their most

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5 Who were already members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group or London Club, set up after the Indian nuclear test explosion of 1974.

6 Nominal because though the weapons are on the soil of those three countries, they are still controlled by the electronic lock or 'two keys' system, and the 'keys' are held by the President and Defence Minister in Moscow.

advanced space technologies to the Americans; the US and Germany setting up an institute in Russia for ex-Soviet scientists to work (at bargain rates) for the West so that they would not be tempted to take alternative employment; and NATO kindly proffering the services of its officers to help in dismantling nuclear warheads on ex-Soviet soil.

It remains for the foreseeable future to the interest of the members of the 'nuclear club' (all but one of whom are also members of the central balance) that it should, as nearly as feasible, be restricted to its present membership. Of such perceptions is a concert of powers made. It may not be possible to prevent the addition of several other very large powers in due course (since prevention might in their cases involve more dangers than acquiescence) but in cases like Iraq, that is clearly not the assessed probability. Does North Korea also come into the Iraq category? Logically, that should depend on the attitudes of China, Japan and Russia. Does any of them want a small erratic nuclear power in their common proximity?

Reverting for a moment to the role of the Gulf War as the catalyst added to the previously existing 'mix', which crystallised-out the concert of powers, I would argue that it in effect provided both an urgent and universally relevant economic factor (the supply and pricing of oil) and an enormously important and permanently operating strategic factor (the control of nuclear proliferation). So all in all, historians will perhaps be able to elevate Saddam Hussein (posthumously) to the role of Wicked Godfather at the advent of the global concert. Or at least spare him a footnote in their analyses.

The standard argument against the possibility of a concert of powers used to be the alleged incompatibility of the economic assumptions, political value systems and general ideologies of the decision-makers of the central balance powers, especially those in Washington, as against those in Moscow, Beijing and Delhi. Possibly that was true during the Cold War decades, but with the collapse of European Communist societies, and the dwindling influence of other forms of radicalism, it is obviously no longer true for five of the six members of the central balance. The mainstream political/economic spectrum hardly now runs beyond conservatism on the right and social democracy on the left. The fringe parties beyond either edge of that range are not as yet of much influence. China, obviously, is the one exception, in that it still espouses Communist party autocracy as a

political system, even though its economic practice seems to be a sort of authoritarian capitalism, which is doing rather well. If one looks at the changes in some other East Asian societies which also began with authoritarian or interventionist capitalism (Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, even Japan) one is entitled, to my mind, to feel a certain optimism about the long-term outcome in the case of China. But even if Beijing should prove a 'holdout' in terms of domestic politics, that would not, to my mind, vitiate the notion of a concert, or even differentiate the prospective system from its predecessor.

The old Concert of Europe was certainly run by a like-minded group of people (the European internationalist aristocracy of that day) who shared common assumptions, objectives and lifestyles. But the political systems of the five members varied fully as much as, or possibly even rather more than, those of the six central balance powers do today. Britain and France in the early nineteenth century were relatively liberal societies, but Austria, Russia and Prussia were as autocratic by the standards of that time as China is by the standards of the present day. And there were outbursts of indignation by the citizenry of the more liberal societies against abuses of human rights in the more autocratic, precisely as today. Nineteenth-century liberal causes, like the freeing of Italy from the clutches of the Austrian empire and of Greece from the clutches of the Ottoman empire, were as passionately espoused by outsiders in their time as the freeing of Eastern Europe or the Baltic states has been recently. Perhaps even more so: Byron, after all, died in the morass of the Greek liberation campaign, whereas more recent poets have usually confined themselves to writing folk-songs. Mazzini and Garibaldi were as much the heroes of London drawing rooms as Walesa and Havel have been of their Washington counterparts more recently. What is rather more surprising, given the restricted literacy of the time, is that indignation at foreign tyrants could spread beyond the middle class, as for instance to the workmen at Barclay's Brewery in 1850 who threw a visiting Austrian dignitary, General Haynau, into a horse trough because he was held responsible for atrocities in Italy.[7]

On the essential basis of a power concert, communication between policy-making élites, the advantage is in reality

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7 An account of these dissident movements of the nineteenth century may be found in A.J.P. Taylor, *The Trouble-Makers* (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1957).

overwhelmingly with the contemporary system as against its predecessor. It took a week's hard travelling by coach over bad roads for Castlereagh to be in direct touch with Metternich, whereas President Clinton can be in touch by phone and fax with just about every other decision-maker in the world in the course of one working day, and his predecessor often seemed bent on doing so.

The present-day concert is also vastly better placed than any previous incarnation of the idea in respect of diplomatic structures. In fact, present-day diplomatic structures are so abundant (not to say excessive) that they have constituted a sort of scaffolding within which the concert of powers has been put together with quite surprising speed. There are three 'generations' of structures involved: those designed before the Cold War, like the UN and its specialised agencies; those created during the Cold War, for Western purposes, like NATO on the strategic side and the Group of Seven (G7) on the economic side; and those created as the Cold War began to fade, like the ECSC. The UN instrumentalities, especially the Security Council, were indeed designed at a time when policy-makers still hoped (though they no longer really expected) that the war-time alliance which defeated Hitler could and should persist as a concert of powers after the war: hence the provision of the veto for the permanent members. Thus during the Gulf crisis the Security Council was belatedly able to slip into the role which had been envisaged for it (by the Russians most insistently) in 1944-45.

The Cold War generation of Western diplomatic structures, by contrast, was at one stage expected by many people to fade away (like their counterparts on the other side of the Iron Curtain) with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. But that has not happened: rather, the tendency has been for Russia and the rest of Eastern Europe to become 'candidate members' of structures which were originally and resolutely dedicated to their containment. Yeltsin himself has said that he hopes Russia will, in due course, join NATO. The Western decision-makers concerned are chary as yet: rather bowled over by the speed of events, and anxious about what sort of commitments or complications would ensue if push should come to shove in relations between Russia and Ukraine, for instance. The most they are able to concede at the moment is the setting up of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council as a sort of Eastern 'annex' to the alliance itself, plus the 'redefinition' of Russia as no longer an adversary, and

assorted offers of joint exercises, confidence-building measures and so on. Before 1990 such gestures would have seemed the stuff of fantasy: by 1992 they seemed more like part of a transition process already well under way.

That process has been made the easier by the way in which NATO had previously developed beyond its original function as a military alliance into a 'security community' for its members. That is, it had provided not only reassurance but constraints on the strategic and in part the diplomatic policies of member governments. (The French made a good deal of that point at the time of their departure from the coalition mechanisms, though not from the alliance itself, in 1966.) Reassurance is no doubt necessary for all the members, otherwise they would hardly accept the burdens of membership. Constraint, on the other hand, is of importance primarily where there are reasons on the part of some members for apprehensions about others, as for instance between Greece and Turkey. The long antagonism between those two neighbours would hardly be 'containable' in an alliance less well endowed than NATO, from which each receives benefits it is anxious not to lose. More important still, each is conscious that the other might receive greater benefits from the alliance, if it should itself quit or be thrown out. Membership thus operates as a constraint on both, and might so operate *vis-à-vis* other 'adversary pairs', like Russia and Poland, for instance, or these days even Russia and Ukraine.

The German analogy is, however, perhaps more pertinent in Russia's case. A cynical old NATO joke long defined the purpose of the alliance as 'to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down'. Keeping the Russians out (militarily, from Western Europe, was meant) no longer looks as if it requires massive strategic precautions, and thus no longer provides an adequate rationale for so powerful and elaborate a structure as NATO. Keeping the Americans in offers potential new difficulties which will be explored presently. Keeping the Germans down, or (more politely) balancing the continuous rise of German power, especially economic power, within the transformed Europe, has become obviously a much more difficult and more complex task than it was during the Cold War decades. Especially given the present prospects of German economic dominance in the whole of the ex-Warsaw Pact area, where it is already doing more than the rest of NATO put together. The French

were once confident that their political and diplomatic skills, plus their nuclear status, could always balance German economic predominance, but that is no longer seen to be so.

This analysis has been carefully sprinkled with phrases like 'for the time being', because of the author's consciousness that the present central balance relationship may prove merely the latest in the series of *détentes* which punctuated the Cold War decades from 1955 ('the Spirit of Geneva') on.[8] But there is a very large difference between those episodes and the contemporary situation. They all occurred within the stable, solid bilateral balance of the Cold War years, in which the Russian camp at least looked more or less strategically and diplomatically (if not economically) on a par with the Western camp. That situation is gone for the foreseeable future: Russia is still a formidable nuclear power but its economic catastrophe has destroyed its diplomatic and ideological clout, at least for the time being.

There is one large obvious diplomatic objection to the notion of a concert of powers, an objection whose essential point is already beginning to be made audible, even though the phrase itself is not current as yet. The objection is that such a system would operate as a sort of 'collective colonialism' against the Third World. That suspicion can be heard, for instance, in the protests of radical Arab opinion against the alleged 'scapegoating' of Iraq and Libya, with respect to the Gulf War and the Lockerbie trial.

The original European concert may undoubtedly be interpreted as having allowed some of its members to help themselves to much of the Third World; Britain and France in Africa, and Russia in Central Asia. But that does not necessarily mean that a new global concert would be followed by another round of imperialism. *Neither the political nor the economic conditions which permitted and encouraged the nineteenth-century expansion of Europe are likely to recur.* The political condition of the contemporary world is one in which nationalist feeling is so widespread that the sort of subjugation of peoples which seemed so easy then has now become, in effect, too difficult to be worth the effort. One can see the psychological effects of that change

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8 The most important of those *détentes* was that devised after 1969, which contained within itself the seeds of the potential concert, especially in the 1975 Helsinki process, so much distrusted in the US at the time.

most dramatically illustrated in the sudden resigned shrug with which the Russians gave up their enormous contiguous empire in 1991, though throughout the Soviet period it had been regarded as both economically and strategically vital. In a slow-motion way, the same impulse can be seen working in the dismantling of all the overseas empires of the European powers: Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal. Within the thirty years from the end of the Second World War, the decision-making élites in all those countries came to the conclusion that, in effect, the game was no longer worth the candle. They may not have used the term 'cost-benefit analysis' in the Cabinet papers and such which embodied the vital decisions, but nevertheless, what happened was that costs (military and psychological) rose steadily, while benefits (economic and strategic) shrank steadily, until the total 'payoff' became clearly negative. Sometimes, as in France and Portugal, it took long wars and political convulsions before the decision-making élite changed, or took the point. In other cases, as in Britain, one can see the process occurring within a single strand of a conservative élite; contrasting, for instance, Churchill's reluctance in 1947 to see Britain abdicate in India, with Macmillan's eagerness to see it do so in Africa only thirteen years later, in 1960. The contrast between Gorbachev and Yeltsin on the Soviet Union was, of course, more astonishing, but otherwise analogous. Nineteenth-century decision-makers (except Bismarck) tended to believe that overseas territories were a large national asset. Twentieth-century ones have had ample demonstration that very small societies with practically no territory or resources (for instance, Hong Kong and Singapore) can prosper, whereas those with vast territories and resources (for instance, the erstwhile Soviet Union) can reduce their citizens to misery and mutiny.

The other main count against the concert system is, of course, that it failed in 1914. But the policy-makers of 1815 could hardly be expected to solve the problems of their great-great-great grandchildren, any more than those of the present day can be expected to foresee the problems of the late twenty-first century: their effort must be to help the world get to that distant date without irreparable ruin.

That brings us to the positive case for a concert of powers, which rests on the proposition that only a cooperative (even collusive) relationship between the societies which do most to determine the

future of humanity is likely to be able to cope with the problems of the next few decades.

It is already clear that the post-Cold War period is not going to look much like the millenium. That is largely because the society of states seems to be moving into a double-edged process of fragmentation and integration.[9] Fragmentation, as in the former Soviet area and in Yugoslavia; integration, as in the partial transfers of sovereignty from the ancient nation-states of Western Europe to the European Community.

At first sight it may seem paradoxical that there should be simultaneously movements towards larger entities like Europe and smaller entities like Bosnia, but it is not really surprising. The nation-state, as defined earlier this century, seemed to many of its peoples too large for some purposes and too small for others. Too large to allow an adequate political and cultural identity to Scots or Welsh, Basques or Catalans or any other of the myriad ethno-linguistic communities into which humankind is divided. Too small to provide economic and defensive efficiency. That double-edged complaint suggested a remedy: looser confederations (for defensive and economic purposes) of politically and culturally autonomous sovereign communities. The 'models' on the one hand of the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia falling apart, and on the other of the European Community pulling itself together, will undoubtedly create aspirations for the one pathway or the other in many communities which regard themselves as either captive in an alien sovereignty, or divided from their ethnic brothers. There are many such entities: the world, as was noted earlier, is full of multinational or multi-ethnic empires lightly disguised as federal or even unitary states. Especially the developing world, where many of the boundaries are accidental legacies of the colonial period, with little relevance to tribal communities. So far the successor states have prudently opted to maintain those arbitrary frontiers. But can that agreement hold once the peoples concerned have become fully conscious that it has proved possible, in contemporary conditions, to dissolve a central sovereignty, as in the erstwhile Soviet Union, the erstwhile Yugoslavia, the erstwhile Czechoslovakia, the erstwhile Ethiopia? If Ukraine, which had been wedded to Russia for three

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9 See John Lewis Gaddis, 'Towards the Post Cold War World' in *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1991.

centuries, could break away from what had, up to 1991, looked like a chilled steel structure of control, why should Tibetans despair? Or Biafrans? Or East Timorese? Or even, perhaps, the Kurds? The end result of a process of that sort may eventually be beneficial to human welfare and happiness, but the process itself must be crisis-ridden. Only a viable concert of powers, legitimised as the Security Council, is likely to be able to provide the necessary diplomatic clout (and economic resources) to keep the almost inevitable hostilities (as in Yugoslavia) within limits.

The revival of the United Nations since 1990 has sometimes seemed the most remarkable thing of its kind since Lazarus. But the reality behind it is that the Security Council (as against the General Assembly) has always, since 1945, been potentially quite a powerful diplomatic artefact.[10] All that has been needed to put the breath of life into it has been a concert of powers, along the lines of that for which it was originally designed.

(Some Third World governments, brooding about the pressures on Iraq and Libya as auguries for their own futures, will undoubtedly be liable to think of it as a Frankenstein's monster. That probability could be reduced if its membership were expanded to reflect the power-distribution of the 1990s rather than that of 1945: perhaps eight or ten permanent members, including Japan, Germany and India, and twenty elected members, which would allow reasonably frequent 'turns' on the Council for the rest of the society of states. The G7, which is the real economic face of the concert of powers, will presumably expand automatically as new economic potencies are acknowledged. NATO, which is the essential strategic 'backup' for Security Council edicts, seems also to be moving, however slowly, towards expansion of its role. The basic principle is surely that the facades of power-relations should reflect the realities behind them, and not be mere 'Potemkin villages'.)

Beyond the present crises of fragmentation and reintegration, there are others that will also be difficult to cope with unless a concert of powers is maintained. For instance, the rising potential for environmental disaster. If China and India take the high-energy-consumption, high-pollution roads towards industrialisation, so

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10 See Appendix for details of its legal powers.

disastrously followed in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, much of the world may come to look like the Aral Sea and the Kola Peninsula. But if China and India see themselves as members of a useful club, which includes the Western powers, with resources and capacity to offer less damaging technologies, and also economic inducements, those dangers may be reduced. Less powerful countries would then find it difficult to defy so massive a concentration of authority. The arms trade is another area in which only joint effort by the central balance powers (still the main suppliers) can prove effective. That in turn is the most hopeful mode of discouraging regional arms races, and reducing local hostilities to less lethal levels.

Hope for the durability of any such system clearly depends on persistence of the present relatively equable relationships (despite the frictions) between the six central balance powers. There are ambiguities between (and particularly within) each of them that may make that seem unlikely. Yet, on the whole, the advantages for each from the prospective system seem to provide incentives enough for the relevant decision-makers to work hard at keeping it in being. Moreover, the diplomatic structures which I called a sort of 'scaffolding' for the concert of powers, tend to the same effect. They impose meetings, and meetings usually impose an effort at consensus, or apparent consensus, if only for the sake of the domestic 'images' of the political leaders involved. None of the present permanent members of the Security Council is likely to boycott its sessions as the Soviet regime did in 1950, because it is so potent a status symbol in present circumstances, as well as being conceivably useful to their respective national interests at some future date. The same is true of the other major international groupings: NATO and G7, the Bank and the Fund, the ECSC and the OECD, EC, APEC, OAS and the rest. They may impose, jointly, quite a burden on the time of decision-makers and policy-makers, but they have also functioned to create a sort of 'group-think' among the international élite whose members are always meeting each other in various rather desirable locales. Those are the workers in the scaffolding of the concert of powers, so to speak.

As a final factor making for the system's viability one might note that its maintenance luckily requires no formal treaty or agreement or even joint declaration. Only a set of tacit understandings to refrain from particular types of policy. Diplomats and foreign policy strategists are normally quite adept at tacit understandings.

Against those factors making for persistence of the system, one must weigh those making for its potential disruption. They are real enough, but none of them seems likely to reach 'critical mass' for the next decade or two, which seems to imply at least some time for further consolidation. Lawrence Eagleburger (Acting Secretary of State at the time of writing) said perceptively, at the end of the Cold War, that America had won, but both sides had finished out of breath. The same need for a breathing-space seems to apply to the other four members of the central balance: they are all rather in need of a decade or two for adjustments and reconstructions, mostly on internal economic and political matters.

Russia is the most obvious case, of course: the wounds inflicted by seventy years of the command economy will in fact probably need a couple of generations, rather than merely a couple of decades, to heal. But Russia has a particularly clear historical orientation to a concert system, more so even than Britain. Not only were the Czars and their policy-makers architects of, and missionaries for, the nineteenth-century version, the tradition clearly persisted in the Soviet period, along with a good deal else of the old Russian diplomacy. One can see it at various points, from the primarily Russian-determined structure of the Security Council in 1945 to Mr Gorbachev's technique of *rapprochement* with the powers after 1984.

No such tradition can be seen in the Chinese case, unfortunately. In fact, even its main experience of alliance, the Sino-Soviet agreement of 1950, was rather bleak. But the central ambiguity of its diplomatic future seems to arise from the present uneasy coexistence between a party autocracy, a theoretically revolutionary ideology, and a flourishing, though authoritarian, market economy. If that particular blend should prove to persist, China, as it grows stronger economically and militarily, will look more than somewhat formidable to the other powers. One might thus foresee a reversion to the bilateral adversarial balance, though with a very different line-up from the last one. Perhaps even reversion to a Cold War, with a new work-out for the concepts of containment and deterrence. On the other hand, even the aged leaders in Beijing have, presumably, not acquired the secret of immortality, and remembering how rapid the changes were in Moscow once the new generation, represented by Gorbachev and Yeltsin, came to power, one is bound to suspend judgment on the middle- and long-term prospects for China. And at

least for a decade or two, good relations with the other central balance powers will remain vital to its progress.

India is even less likely than China to be able to present a serious challenge to other central balance powers for the next decade or two. Like China, it is the bearer of a great and ancient civilisation that once made it a world state on a par with the Roman Empire. But also, like China, it is only at the beginning of recovery after some centuries of eclipse. The disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the re-emergence of Russia as its successor state, were considerably more disconcerting to the Indian political élite than to its Chinese counterpart. After all, the Chinese had been saying since 1959 that the Russians were 'taking the capitalist road', whereas the Indians had seen the Soviet government as the necessary ideological balancing pole, opposite to the Americans, between which they were pursuing their own policy of non-alignment. Thus their mental map of the world has needed to be recast to a degree not really necessary for the Chinese. On the other hand, their political institutions and assumptions are far more like those of the other four, which may well prove a source of diplomatic strength. American policy-makers in particular have usually felt that India ought to be a natural ally: the world's most populous democracy alongside its most powerful one. There is even a sort of similarity in the moral disapproval which the intellectual élites of both countries have felt for power-politics in the traditional European style. The attitudes which lie behind the theory of non-alignment have a good deal in common with those behind the current American tendency to neo-isolationism. So Delhi's attitude to the next phase of world politics might prove closer to Washington's than it has been since 1947.

In the Japanese case, contrariwise, the issue is not the loss of a one-time superpower ally, but its continuing presence. The over-dependent, over-exclusive, relationship with the United States has been visibly fraying since the winding down of the Cold War began in the mid-eighties. That has been logical enough, since the original 'compact' on which the US-Japan Treaty was based was a byproduct of the tension between Washington on the one hand, and 'the Moscow-Peking axis' (as it was called at the time) on the other. That is, the 1950 outbreak of the Korean War, along with the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet agreement in the same year, made Japan so vital strategically to the United States that its economic viability was, for two or three

decades, as important to Washington as to Tokyo. That situation could hardly be expected to survive the waning of tensions with Beijing and Moscow, especially given the uncomfortable level of Japanese success: the current feeling among many Americans of having warmed an economic viper in their collective bosom is not surprising.

There is, unfortunately, no multilateral alliance in the Asia-Pacific region to provide the sort of 'containment' of Japanese military potential that NATO provides in Europe for Germany and Russia. So the decline of the US-Japan relationship creates a sense of vulnerability right through the area, in view of Japan's last military expansion, only fifty years ago. But a concert of powers would offer an egalitarian, multilateral framework for Japan's future, appropriate to its current international status, yet providing constraints as well as reassurance. It would even provide for Japan a framework of security in future relations with Russia, and the expanding power of China, as well as *vis-à-vis* regional potential threats, like a reunified and perhaps nuclear-armed Korea.

Europe pioneered the national state: why should it not also pioneer a form of political organisation to succeed the national state? On the evidence of the European Community to date, there is no doubt it can be very effective economically, and on the basis of either the Western European Union or NATO it could also be effective militarily. Small political units within it constitute no great problem: after all, Luxembourg was among the original founder-members. Only diplomatically does there seem to be a question-mark over its effectiveness. In that respect the capitals that will matter seem likely to remain London, Paris and Berlin. Those were also, of course, the dominant capitals (along with Vienna and St Petersburg) of the nineteenth-century concert of powers.

Finally, the United States. Even before the Los Angeles riots of May 1992, the ambiguities of the American diplomatic future had become audible in the election-year rhetoric. The candidacy of Pat Buchanan might be regarded abroad as just a straw in the wind, but it clearly took quite a strong wind to lift so substantial a straw. George Bush's success in international politics became almost an embarrassment rather than an asset to his campaign. Neo-isolationism at the American political grassroots may be regarded as, among other things, part of the process of redefinition of the nature of the post-

Soviet world order. The US Chief of Staff implied as much when he remarked rather plaintively that his people were 'running out of demons'; down to minor-league demons, in fact, like Saddam Hussein and Kim Il-sung. Maintenance of the Cold War build-up, or the budgets that went with it, could hardly be justified on such a level of threat. The notion of a concert of powers has tended on the whole to be regarded with disfavour in American ideologies of international politics. Historically, its nineteenth-century embodiment was an object of suspicion and distrust. Yet when James Baker as Secretary of State talked of 'collective engagement', he seemed basically to be presenting the same idea under a more tactful euphemism. He even pointed out its virtues in avoiding 'the dangerous extremes of either fallacious omnipotence or misplaced multilateralism', and the fact that it could allow continued American leadership with reduced American burdens, as in the highly advantageous cost-sharing arrangements for the Gulf War.[11] Whether Republican or Democratic presidents inhabit the White House for the next decade or two they may find it necessary to channel most of their energy and capacity for leadership into the inner cities rather than the external world. So a concert of powers may be almost as useful to President Clinton's successors as to President Yeltsin's.

Thus for all six members of the central balance, the present pattern of the relationship may be seen to provide real advantages. That is a solid enough reason for expecting it to persist. Not precisely a new world order, but certainly a transformed one, as transformed as that of the early nineteenth century, after the 'triple earthquake' of the American and French revolutions, and the industrial revolution. The historical parallel remains clear.

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11 See his speech of 21 April 1992 to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

CHAPTER 3

NEW REGIONAL BALANCES

Whether or not history endorses that forecast of a concert of powers as the probable pattern of the central balance for the foreseeable future, it remains clear that practically every regional balance in the society of states has undergone some mutation as a consequence of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The post-Soviet world order thus undoubtedly means a changed set of power-relations right through the society of states, and in many quarters the changes have made the world look more like its pre-1917 (or much earlier) self than like anything radically new. The political convulsion of late 1991 in Moscow not only undid the ideological assumptions of October 1917, it undid much of the centuries-long Czarist accumulation of territory, and brought into doubt the future of some areas even of the Russian Federation itself, as well as destroying the extended regions of hegemony and influence built up by Stalin and some of his successors after the Second World War. Thus, among other effects, the change recreated both Central Europe (Mitteleuropa) and Central Asia ('the realms of Tartary', as that area used to be called when it represented a sort of fantasy world of poetic barbarism to Western Europe).

Logically enough, the level of change in power-balances outside the former Soviet territories and Eastern Europe depended on the proximity of the area concerned to the epicentre of the diplomatic earthquake, Moscow. So it was relatively low in distant regional balances, like Southeast Asia, the Pacific, and Latin America, though even in them a ripple effect can be discerned: much more in closer areas.

The previous historical transformatory sequence of the American Revolution, the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries seems the nearest analogy. In that case, the two political revolutions (1776 and 1789) took at least forty years (to 1815) to even begin to work themselves out, and the economic changes much longer, of course. So obviously it would be absurd as yet to attempt a final 'bottom line' for the events of 1989-91. What follows must therefore be read as a first

approximation, or interim sketch, of the post-Soviet diplomatic and strategic landscape of the society of states, while it was still defining itself in 1992.

Europe

For most of the Cold War decades, the term 'Europe' was often loosely used to mean, in fact, the rather small, mostly prosperous West European enclave which was engaged in integrating itself into an economic (and prospectively a political, or at least diplomatic) community. 'Europe' in that definition had a sort of collective membership in the central balance of power, even though the limits of its capacity to take military decisions as a single entity were well understood. For a time, until the post-Maastricht period, only a small additional increment of political will seemed needed to create a sort of federal or at least confederal sovereignty. That ambition was cherished, however, primarily by the more zealous members of the European movement, though also pressed on Europeans by many Americans, reasoning from their own constitutional history that a United States of Europe was both possible and desirable.

More lukewarm Europeans refused to share that vision: a good French nationalist, for instance, like Charles de Gaulle with his insistence on a 'Europe des patries', and more recently a good English nationalist like Margaret Thatcher in her denunciations of the idea of a 'megastate' ruled from Brussels by a non-elected bureaucracy, the 'Eurocrats'. Even before the end of the Cold War, the tension between the two points of view had provided the central argument in European affairs, that between the proponents of 'widening' (i.e. admitting more members) and 'deepening' (i.e. delegating more power to Brussels). Only a few people believed that the two could and should proceed in tandem.

The end of the Cold War, and then the dissolutions of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia, obviously transformed the feasible definitions of 'Europe', both in potential size and prospective nature. Many Europeans had always regretted and been embarrassed by the division of their continent between the prosperous and democratic West and the poverty-stricken party autocracies of the East. The

cleavage seemed incompatible with any serious notion of Europe as historically one civilisation, with preferably one destiny.

Moreover, the end of the Cold War reminded European policy-makers of a point that had been rather overlooked among the economic benefits since 1957: that the initial pressure for economic integration in the West (i.e. without the East) had come from *strategic* preoccupations inseparable from the Cold War. The Marshall Plan of 1948, which first imposed joint economic planning, was an element in the initial Washington strategy for the containment of Soviet military power and political influence. The diplomatic strategist who originally formulated the concept was able to assure the US president of the time, Harry Truman, that Stalin would refuse participation for the East European world he then controlled. (The policy-maker concerned, George Kennan, was stationed at the US Embassy in Moscow in the initial phase of the Cold War, and first presented the idea of containment in a long telegram to Washington in March 1946.)[1]

There was almost a straight line of cause and effect from the anxieties and strategies of those early Cold War years to the creation of the initial European economic institutions. For instance, Western strategic preoccupations imposed a need for revival of German industrial capacity, especially in steel-making. French policy-makers, concerned that such a revival would also mean in time the revival of German military capacity, found a solution for their own specific anxieties in the Schumann Plan, which in due course created the European Coal and Steel Community. Thus the French-German 'balance', within the context of Western apprehensions concerning possible Stalinist expansion, was the 'starter-motor' of the great engine driving West European 'togetherness'. By the time the process got to the larger agreement of the Treaty of Rome (1957) the realisation of its potential economic benefits had rather allowed its original strategic rationale to be overlooked, especially as the one serious failure of the movement, the European Defence Community (EDC), had been hastily buried in 1954.

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1 Kennan's telegram, and Winston Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' speech of the same month in Fulton, Missouri, may be regarded as the initial strategy and the first salvo of the Cold War, but they were arrived at quite independently, without Anglo-American consultation. Churchill was in opposition at the time.

The end of the Soviet Union thus removed the almost-forgotten first impetus behind the creation of a specifically *Western* institution called the European Community, and permitted a reconsideration of the area it should operate in, and therefore of the nature of its most useful functions. Even de Gaulle's much-derided notion of 'Europe to the Urals' would no longer seem so absurd if the tensions in non-European Russia continued to build as they appeared to be doing in 1992.

In other words, the argument about the 'widening' as against the 'deepening' of Europe was moved on to quite a different basis by the Soviet collapse. East European societies which had once looked merely like object-lessons in how not to do it began to look like a set of 'walking wounded' in urgent need of help, but also like a set of opportunities. And while those opportunities might be mostly economic for Germany, they could be diplomatic and strategic for France. The East Europeans, including the Russians, had again become participants in the politics of 'Europe' in a way that had not been the case since the 1930s.

In those days (and earlier) the chosen French modes of balancing the potential ascendancy of Germany had included alliance with Russia and other East European societies, as in the 'Little Entente'. Up until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, nothing of that sort had any longer been feasible or necessary. With France's political and diplomatic skills, and its nuclear status, and given the 'standoffishness' of Britain, the hand on the European helm was usually that of France. But outmatching a reunited Germany, with its economic and financial dominance within the 'Europe of the Twelve', would be difficult even for the skills of French policy-makers. The prospect of a 'German Europe', as against a 'European Germany', became abruptly more visible.

At the time of the signing of the Maastricht Agreement at the end of 1991, the 'integrationist' side of the European argument still seemed to be in the ascendant. By the time it came up for ratification, towards the end of 1992, the notions of a single currency and a single Reserve Bank (the 'Eurofed') enforcing its economic edicts were being more vigorously challenged. If the interim outcome proves to be not a federal Europe, but a new sort of political entity, about half-way between confederation and alliance, that will allow continued

'widening' to include the ex-fiefdoms of the former Soviet Union, as well as the other candidates for membership.

Strategically speaking, the disintegration of the Soviet Union into its somewhat quarrelsome republics has transformed the European situation even more than it has affected the United States. What Washington had to fear, as far as its own territories were concerned, was nuclear strike, and the Russian store of long-range delivery systems for nuclear warheads is only marginally less than that of the Soviet Union, though the possibility of their actual use is vastly less. What Western Europe feared, however, was the Red Army sweeping westward towards the Channel Coast. There is a really enormous military difference between Soviet armed forces based in Eastern Germany, twenty minutes by tank to Denmark, and Russian forces, in some disarray, sitting a whole world further east, behind Ukraine as well as the ex-Warsaw Pact societies, several of which are eager to join NATO and would probably seek to throw in their fortunes with the West if anything in the way of a new threat, either nationalist or communist, emerged in Russia. So obviously Western Europe is no longer in need of American protection in the way it was during the Cold War years. The transatlantic relationship is therefore much more equal than it used to be, strategically as well as economically. That does not mean the likely disbanding of NATO: merely that it will function, like so much else, on different terms.

East Asia

The two great powers of East Asia, Japan and China, contrary to earlier predictions, both seem to have seen a reduction of their respective diplomatic leverages in the transformed society of states. In the case of Japan that may be offset, especially in the early nineties, by continued economic clout in a world hungry for capital and for high-technology goods. But its long-protected (and even indulged) situation in the sphere of American power was originally primarily a fringe-effect of the Cold War rivalry between Washington and Moscow. After all, from 1941 to 1945 Japan was much the more hated of America's two enemies: the one which had forced the US into the war, in American eyes, by the treacherous sneak attack at Pearl Harbor in December 1941, while its diplomatic emissaries were still officially

discussing peace in Washington. Yet nevertheless, not quite five years after the end of hostilities, American policy-makers were beginning work on a Japan peace treaty that many of the Pacific regional powers at the time thought far too lenient. And in the following decades of the Cold War, right up to the mid-eighties, unhindered access to the American market was the bedrock of the astonishing Japanese economic success. It was only after the winding down of the Cold War got under way (that is, after about 1986) that the cries for protection against Japanese industries, and against Japanese acquisition of American assets, rose to their peak level in Washington. And it was only after the Soviet Union shrank and then dissolved as an adversary (that is after late 1989), that Japan rose to an unwanted eminence as (despite Saddam Hussein), the major enduring menace on the American horizon, because of its trade policies, or at least because of its discomforting success at maintaining enormous trade surpluses: still about US$40 billion in the early nineties, though down from its 1987 peak.

The American resentments directed towards Japan awakened reciprocal Japanese resentments, audible in books like *The Japan that Can Say No* by Akio Morita and Shintaro Ishihara.[2] So one has to say that the psychological basis of the alliance, as well as the economic basis, was considerably eroded even before the post-Cold War landscape of the society of states began to take shape. In terms of classic balance of power theory, the indicated course for Japan would originally have been 'reinsurance' with the other militarily once dominant power of the initially envisaged multilateral balance, the Soviet Union. But that option was until too late blocked by the dispute over the 'Northern Territories': the four islands that the Soviet government had seized from Japan at the end of the Second World War. As long as they remain in Russian hands, Japan will really have more serious cause of quarrel with the new Russia than the United States now has, in these days of very cordial Washington-Moscow *détente*. Moreover, historically the Japan-Russia relationship has been much more consistently hostile than the US-Russia relationship. After all, the twentieth century really began with the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905; Japan was involved with the interventions after 1917; it fought the Russians in Siberia in the mid-thirties; it was an ardent

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2 The book was first published in Japanese. The English translation was published by Kaffa-Holmes, Kobunsha, undated.

member of the Anti-Comintern pact, along with Nazi Germany, and Mussolini's Italy, and the whole *raison d'être* of that pact was the defeat of Soviet purposes. After 1950 Soviet policy remained at odds with the US-made Japan peace treaty and, of course, all that has since stemmed from it. Mr Gorbachev, that dedicated and assiduous international traveller, began his campaigns in the outside world as early as 1984, with the visit to Margaret Thatcher, but for almost seven years he did not venture to Japan. Why that noticeable delay, given the fact that Japan was an obvious potential source of the capital and consumer goods that the Soviet Union so desperately needed?

The most plausible answer is that he knew he could not go to Japan, or cultivate useful diplomatic friends there, without facing the question of the 'Northern Territories', and he was never in a good position to do so. To the time of writing, that had also proved the case for Mr Yeltsin: his proposed visit in 1992 was abruptly cancelled by the Russians because of the resentments it generated among Russian nationalists and some rather undiplomatic statements in Japan. In brief, neither leader appeared to be able to make the major concession the Japanese were going to want (the return of the islands), despite hopes that they might be prepared to pay quite handsomely for them. The reasons were of course strategic and nationalistic, not economic, and are, if anything, reinforced by the existing phase of reductions in the global balance of forces. In effect, as Russia has lost its edge of strategic ascendancy in conventional forces in Europe (a process now probably irreversible), and as the START negotiations have begun to reduce the total count of nuclear warheads (within Russia as well as outside it), the Russian 'last ditch' deterrent, like its American equivalent, has become reliant on the least vulnerable delivery system, submarine-launched ballistic missiles. In the Russian case the most useful redoubt or bastion for these forces may remain the Sea of Okhotsk, close to the polar ice-cap. And the Japanese 'Northern Territories', by all accounts, had long been integrated into the radar and sonar defences of that redoubt.

Economic desperation may, of course, in time prove stronger than Russian nationalism and strategic calculation *vis-à-vis* the islands. In that case a deal could yet be struck. But so far the Japanese seem determined not to provide funds until then.

Can Japan's great economic assets, its ability to export capital and its high-tech edge, offset its various kinds of vulnerability, political and strategic, in the world of the transformed balance? Though it is unfashionable to say so, over the long term I would be somewhat doubtful, especially as the indications seem to be that its world financial ascendancy may have peaked in 1988-9, and it may in time find a powerful rival in the new Europe, and others in Asia. As a great power in a multilateral balance, or concert, of six powers, Japan might be accounted to have fewer basic strengths than the other five. It is much the smallest in both population and territory, and much the least well endowed with resources other than capital and technical skills. The US, Europe, Russia, India and China all have vast hinterlands and unused capacities of various sorts, including the capacity to absorb other peoples. One does not see the same long-term assets in the Japanese case, though no one could deny that its present assets are for the time being very impressive, and it will no doubt remain the dominant economic power in the Asia-Pacific region for quite some time.

China's time of power is obviously not yet, whereas a new time of troubles may not be far off. The old relations between China and Russia, or more precisely between the old Chinese empire and the old Russian empire, were historically highly predatory on the part of the Russians, and as recently as the 1950s the government in Beijing was still producing maps showing the enormous swathes of territory lost to the Russians in the 'unequal treaties' of the nineteenth century. Now that Russia is again where China's one-time ally, the Soviet Union, used to be, the memories of those old polemics might well revive. The new Russia seems unlikely to offer any military challenge to China's security, but it clearly offers an enormous ideological challenge to the old men who still run the party and the regime in China. Not just in terms of doctrine, though that may still be important in Beijing. One would say that the threat most keenly felt is that posed by the emergence of the independent republics, those in Central Asia especially. If Tajikistan can become an independent state, why not Tibet or Xiangkiang? Once the central power-élite in Moscow lost their ideological self-confidence, even 'heartland' territories of the old Russian empire, like Ukraine, were allowed to slip away into independent sovereignty, with only Gorbachev, among the ruling élite, seeming to care much about holding the Union together. (Something

very similar happened to the political élite in London during the process of dismantling the remnants of empire.) For the old men in Beijing it must have been a formidable warning: *'après nous le déluge'*?

The minor powers of East Asia—Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines—may have better prospects in the new order. They must undoubtedly, and at reasonable speed, come to terms with the implications of some greater future withdrawal of US forces from the area. As of 1992, all that had been firmly projected was a drawdown of about 10 or 12 per cent in US land forces, but that is likely to prove just a first instalment, especially in South Korea. It is difficult, despite Iraq, to envisage the US again putting its combat forces into a war on the Asian mainland, as it did in Korea in 1950 and Vietnam in 1965. Those decisions were taken on Cold War assumptions which no longer are valid. Both China and Russia these days find South Korea a more useful economic partner than North Korea. If North and South ever came to blows again, their respective decision-makers would, let us hope, probably come under diplomatic pressure from all the outside powers—the concert of powers—to end it quickly, and if they failed to do so, they might be left to their own devices. So the moral for South Korea would seem to be the desirability of cultivating strategic self-reliance with all possible speed, and the moral for the United States would seem to be that the way to induce South Korea to move in that direction would be to cease resisting pressures for the withdrawal at least of more US land forces, perhaps retaining air and naval forces while the process of gradual inching towards reunification gets under way, as it appears to be doing.

Taiwan seems likely to increase its ability to cultivate economic though not diplomatic friends, and influence people in the new global balance. Since China is less important to both Moscow and Washington as their adversarial conflict vanishes, they have the less need to propitiate Beijing by throwing Taiwan to the wolves. President Bush's sale of F-16 planes to Taiwan during the 1992 election campaign was one signal of that. The island is rich enough, and has population and resources enough, to be able to defend itself quite adequately against any attack that China would be likely to mount in the foreseeable future. It no longer seems entirely preposterous to imagine China's future, in time, looking more like Taiwan's present system than like Mao's past aspirations. But that is probably a very distant vision.

Vietnam is an interesting ambiguity. The affiliation of its Communist élite was always much more towards Moscow than towards Beijing: Ho Chi Minh was already a Comintern agent in Lenin's time, long before the Chinese party amounted to anything much. And nationalistically the Vietnamese have a thousand-year history of fear and resentment towards China. Moreover, China launched a military attack on Vietnam only thirteen years ago, in 1979, and more recently has asserted sovereignty over the Spratly Islands, to which Vietnam had a claim, and which may lie in the middle of an oilfield.

China's general policies in the South China Sea are regarded in Hanoi as expansionist. So all the auguries would seem to indicate that Vietnam, despite its present ideological resistance, may in time find attractions in the Moscow example. Moreover, the Vietnamese still have a recent entrepreneurial tradition, at least in the South, and plenty of skilled peasant farmers. In theory, they ought to be able to move away from the command economy towards a market economy with some ease and speed, though perhaps not while the original revolutionary power-élite is still in control. When that group has been gathered to its ancestors, their successors should be able to attract even more capital from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, maybe even the ASEAN countries and Hong Kong. So Vietnam's prospects may be better than those of many Third World countries.

For the Philippines, the most important aspect of the winding up of the Cold War was that it reduced American need for Clark Field and Subic Bay, even though the Russians may not be quitting Cam Ranh Bay. Loss of the money the bases pumped into the Philippines economy will probably increase distress and social unrest in the areas concerned: on the other hand, nationalist resentment did focus on the issue, and any decision-maker in Manila, whether Cory Aquino or her successor, had to take account of that. Besides, though the US Navy will probably survive the US defence cuts better than the other services, it knows it will have less money to spend and fewer ships to deploy. So its resistance to giving up Subic Bay was much less prolonged than it might otherwise have been. The frictions of the negotiation helped along the loosening of alliance ties which was already quite apparent, and inevitable with the change to the transformed balance. One might even see a new set of tacit understandings in the South China Sea area, in which some continued

Russian presence will help offset some US withdrawal against the assertive Chinese presence in a new triangular balance.

South Asia

As the dwindling of the Soviet Union into Russia-and-its-not-at-all-cooperative-Commonwealth has recreated Central Europe as an area of uncertain scope and possibility, those attributes are even more clearly seen in the much larger, also recreated, Central Asia. There were suddenly six new Islamic sovereignties in the world—Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, independent republics, mostly poor but no longer having to hide their Islamic lights under a Soviet bushel. They had been the Soviet Union's 'Third World' in effect, and highly dependent on Moscow. But their political élites seem to have developed some independence of spirit rather fast, and in Kazakhstan there were still at the time of writing more than 1,000 Soviet nuclear warheads, mostly on SS-18s.

So that general region could hardly fail to be an area of new strategic interest and scrutiny, especially to India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, but also to China (which has borders with Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan) and Iran (which has borders with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan). The control and dismantling of the SS-18s or their nuclear warheads in Kazakhstan must remain, until the process is completed, a matter of concern to the whole world, since if the local scientists and technologists, not to mention weapons-design blueprints and even fissile material, should slip across various borders to Pakistan or Iran, the likelihood of proliferation will be much increased in various delicate local balances.

For Pakistan therefore the transformed world balance produced some potentialities that were of concern to the rest of the world, and in particular to India. There were, however, offsetting factors. The US, which was formerly given to looking the other way as far as Pakistan's nuclear ambitions were concerned, became much more inclined to seek to block them. And as the once-strong American strategic interest in Afghanistan diminished almost to nothing, Pakistan itself became strategically much less necessary to Washington. In fact, one could argue for a rather Machiavellian

reversal of alliances for the US as far as Afghanistan and the Indian subcontinent are concerned. The *mujahadin*, who once looked like worthy freedom fighters fending off a Soviet 'forward policy' directed towards the Indian Ocean, now look more like potential Islamic fundamentalists or fractious warlords likely to keep their country in a permanent state of civil war. It is a neat historical irony that the lavish US resources which went into contesting apparent Soviet expansionism there may have resulted in the birth of another Islamic fundamentalist regime, or an endemic state of 'warlordism'.

That is by no means in Pakistan's interest: only if Afghanistan is reasonably peaceful can the millions of Afghan refugees on Pakistani territory be expected to go home. And a stable, reconstructed Afghanistan would potentially mean a large additional benefit for Pakistan. The Islamic Republics of Central Asia might well find that their most convenient seaport was Karachi, if the roads through Afghanistan could be improved or the area made safe for the transit (possibly even by pipelines) of oil and gas, in which they are rich. Pakistan would thus have a new and enormous hinterland, in need of practically everything, of the same religious affiliation as itself, and of similar sociological mores.

If the outcome of the ongoing transformation should be in that direction, it will offer a particularly neat study in reversals of fortune. As recently as 1979, when Soviet troops moved into Afghanistan, many Western analysts believed that this further expansion of the Soviet sphere of power was a final triumphant Russian win in the old Anglo-Russian 'great game'. That is to say, Russian power would finally reach the Indian Ocean, by driving on through Baluchistan, incidentally dismembering Pakistan. Instead, Russia now seems in thankful retreat from Central Asia: the heirs of the British Raj might therefore be held to have finally won the old 'great game', though a new version is being played between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.

That is no consolation for India, however. It already has so many difficulties with Islamic forces and Islamic societies that it could hardly be expected to cheer the arrival of new independent Islamic sovereignties, possible allies at least in spirit for Pakistan, along its northern approaches. More than that, however, one might argue that the end of the Cold War, and of the Soviet Union as a sovereign entity

and a force in the central balance, 'disoriented' Indian foreign policy more than that of any other major power, even China.

The newly sovereign India and the Cold War were, so to speak, born in the same period, 1946-47, and Indian foreign policy from its earliest days assumed the context of the Cold War as its basic background. That is to say, the concept of non-alignment, which Nehru devised as the central foreign policy strand when India emerged from the British Raj, derived its cohesive force from the contrast between the repudiated world of the superpowers and their allies (the 'aligned' world, organised into two tight alliances, NATO and the Soviet camp) and those who sought peace under the banner of non-alignment, spurning involvement in the world's central quarrel. As history proved, however, the two alliances in Europe managed to avoid direct hostilities with each other almost completely, whereas many of the non-aligned countries were rather frequently involved in wars. Including India, which therefore found itself in need of advanced weaponry, and diplomatic backing in various international forums.

From 1955, when Khrushchev paid a first official visit to India, those needs were largely met by the Soviet government, and successive Indian decison-makers developed a considerable dependence on Moscow in those fields, though still preserving the formal status of non-alignment, which precluded an actual alliance. The relationship grew particularly close after 1960, because by that date both Moscow and Delhi had come to see China as a source of danger. The Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950 had abruptly ceased to function, amid considerable acrimony, about then, and India fought a brief and inconclusive, but very costly, border war with China in 1962: a war which left, and still leaves, China in occupation of a considerable area of what Indians still regard as Indian territory.

So up to about 1985, when Gorbachev began his revisions of Soviet policy *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world, including China, both Moscow and Delhi had solid strategic and geopolitical reasons for a close relationship. Some economic reasons too: the Indian armed forces were equipped with Soviet weapon systems acquired at a much lower cost than their Western equivalents; even a nuclear powered submarine was lent to the Indian navy for a time, though that did not

work out very well. For a time also there was a brisk barter trade between the two countries.

Ideologically, moreover, one could say there was a certain sympathy between the political élites in office in both. Not that the Communist Party of India was all that powerful in the federal structure (as against some of the states), but the Indian political and bureaucratic class, including the academics, did seem to preserve for rather a long time the Fabian socialist attitudes its members (including Nehru himself) had acquired in the British universities they attended as young men. They did not really take to the unabashed capitalism of the US, being more oriented to the idea of planning than of market forces. So altogether one might say that the demonstrated economic failure of the Soviet system, as well as the political disintegration of the Soviet Union itself, left a very large hole in the Indian *Weltanschauung*.

As in other cases, though, there are offsetting factors, especially the chance of better relations with the US. During the second decade of the Cold War (the years of SEATO and CENTO)[3] Washington had found Pakistan the only available potential ally in the Indian subcontinent, and a general alienation thus set in between Washington and Delhi. Its worst phase was about the time of the secession of Bangladesh, 1971, but actually there were very few periods, in the whole 43 years of the Cold War, when one could say that India and the US were reaching real cordiality with each other: perhaps the Galbraith ambassadorship in the Kennedy years would be the nearest. With the end of the Cold War, Washington has little need of the alliance-building which the Indians formerly regarded with so much disapproval. Indeed, there are strong forces in the American political system which would like to see the US dispense with many of the existing alliances. Though it is unlikely these neo-isolationists will ever call their policy 'non-alignment', its emotional roots are not much different to those of that Indian concept.

Could Russia ever be, for the Indian government, the diplomatic 'best friend' that the Soviet Union once was? It seems unlikely, though there are reasons why Delhi must seek good relations

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3 South-East Asian Treaty Organisation and Central Treaty Organisation respectively. Both were Western diplomatic devices of the mid-fifties (the Dulles period of US foreign policy making) constructed to maintain the 'containment' of Soviet or Chinese expansion by local alliances. Neither was effective.

with Moscow. The Indian armed forces will go on needing ammunition and spare parts for their ex-Soviet equipment. Reportedly the defence procurement people were for a time having great difficulty in securing reliable supplies, but Russia has urgent need for foreign exchange, advanced weapon systems are among its best exports, and the domestic demand has dried up as arms cuts come into operation. The Indian Navy is to conduct joint exercises with US Navy units, however, and perhaps in time Indian equipment may be instead sought in the West.

The Middle East

The boundary between Central Asia and the Middle East is an uncertain one. Turkey, for instance, could if it wished aspire to be a player in both balances, especially since the new Islamic sovereignties in Central Asia mostly speak languages of the Turkic group. And Turkey is a member of NATO in good and influential standing, especially since the strategic value of the NATO bases there was demonstrated in the Gulf War. What is more, now that Russia and Ukraine sit quarrelling on the Black Sea, where once was the formidable power of the Soviet Union, Turkey's one-time strategic vulnerability has been vastly reduced. In the anxious days of the early Cold War, 1946-47, the assumed danger to Greece and Turkey from Soviet pressure (in Turkey's case especially over control of the Black Sea straits) was one of the major preoccupations of Western policy-makers, inspiring for instance the Truman doctrine of 1947, and the whole long development of the Eastern Mediterranean strategy. Turkey is certainly therefore one of the major beneficiaries of the transformed central balance; militarily, diplomatically and perhaps even economically.

For Iran the prospects seem more ambiguous. There are about 6 million Azeris in the newly-sovereign republic of Azerbaijan, and about 10 million across the border in Iran. The very first crisis of the Cold War, in 1946, was over apparent Soviet machinations to detach the Iranian segment of the Azeri homelands from Teheran, presumably with a view to eventually amalgamating it with Soviet Azerbaijan. That apparent project was successfully resisted by a sort of diplomatic double-act between Washington and Teheran. But Iran

is no longer a Western protégé, as it was then, and the 16 million Azeris on the two sides of the border might together quite rapidly discover that they have a common destiny. Reunited Azerbaijan could be quite a substantial power, and a rich one, since a large part of the area is oil-bearing. It will be ironic if the project that was resisted in 1946 comes eventually to some sort of fruition.

Whatever the outcome there, both Turkey and Iran seem vigorously bent on making what they can of the new situation in Central Asia. Ironic echoes of that old Cold War arrangement, CENTO (originally intended by the West to stretch from Turkey to Pakistan, around the southern periphery of Russia) seem to be audible in the newly invigorated Economic Cooperation Organisation which now seeks to add the six ex-Soviet republics to Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. They were long ago intended by Western policy-makers to be the 'anchors' for a barrier of containment, in case of any future push southward of Russian power. That was the initial Western concept (with Eden and Dulles as policy-makers) of what was successively called 'the Northern Tier', the 'Baghdad Pact' and 'CENTO'. Given history's proclivity for repeating itself, one has to wonder whether the newly strengthened Central Asia Organisation could someday see the need for the same capability against the new Russia. However, Turkey and Iran are at opposite ends of what might be called the Islamic ideological spectrum: Turkey quite secularist still, and Iran fundamentalist, with Pakistan seeming at present to be veering in the direction of Iran. So there will be scope for considerable rivalry *vis-à-vis* the ex-Soviet republics.

For the time being, however, the Middle Eastern issue highest on the world's agenda is still the conflict between Israel and the Arabs. And it does not seem over-optimistic to argue that the effect of the transformed world balance has been to increase the pressure towards accommodation on all the local parties.

I say accommodation rather than settlement because a true settlement (in the sense of a genuine, agreed, permanent relinquishing of competing claims to that over-promised and over-cherished patch of real estate, Palestine) may not be possible. What is not merely possible, but has already happened, however, is a reduction in the level of danger that the conflict represents to the rest of the world. In the three decades (1955-85) when the Middle East appeared one of the

most crucial areas of contest between American and Soviet power, the Arab-Israeli conflict often looked like a tinder-box that might spark the nuclear conflagration between the superpowers. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, that is obviously no longer the case. Russia, as the primary Soviet successor-state, might conceivably try to revive some of the traditional Russian Orthodox interests in Christian communities or Christian holy places within the Muslim world. But that is certainly not likely to attract radical Arabs and Iranians, as Soviet ideology once did. Several of the Communist parties of the area were once popular and influential; whether they can even survive the current intellectual upheaval in left-wing doctrine seems uncertain. Moreover, the flow of Russian Jews to Israel is unlikely to diminish: they have fully as much to fear from the revived nationalisms of the new republics as they ever did from the Soviet Communist hierarchy. After all, the pogrom was a Russian invention long before 1917. And, unfortunately, some Russians now seem to believe that various kinds of 'outsiders' (such as Jewish Communist intellectuals like Marx and Trotsky) were the source of all their troubles. Troubles which are going to seem almost unbearable at times for at least the rest of this decade. So despite Israel's own troubles, Jewish communities from Russia and Ukraine and the other republics may well continue to need a refuge there.

Israel's success in securing diplomatic recognition from both Russia and China was a compensation of sorts for at least a temporary diminution of its leverage in Washington. A presidential election primary in which a populist Republican candidate, Pat Buchanan, could talk of Congress as 'Israeli-occupied territory' was a disconcerting signal of resentment in some American quarters of what had come by many 'insiders' to be classed as a too-blatant Israeli manipulation of the American policy-making machine. That feeling probably began with the quite visible role of Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency, in the 'Iran-Contra' fiasco, the Pollard spy-case, and other intelligence blunders. But the developments that really undermined Israeli strategic leverage in Washington were the end of the Cold War, and the way the Gulf War was fought.

To put it bluntly, US strategic need for Israel as a bastion or a foothold in the Middle East depended primarily on the Cold War image of the Soviet Union as the alleged 'puppet master' of the radical Arabs, and as an ever-encroaching superpower rival for the US, perpetually seeking to oust it from the area. The more elaborate

versions of the relevant scenario went on to assume that the long-term Soviet 'game-plan' was to so extend its influence that the oil-exporting states became totally vulnerable to Moscow's diplomatic pressures, thus making Western Europe and Japan dependent on Soviet goodwill for their oil supplies, and so in due course securing a Soviet victory in the struggle for the world.

That hypothesis may not seem to have been particularly plausible even as a concept for the high Cold War years, but it did undoubtedly get an 'inside track' for Israeli influence in the corridors of Washington, as late as the Reagan terms of office. In Bush's time, the Washington enthusiasm for Israelis became rather thin. The Gulf War inevitably sharpened the perception of Israel as a potential strategic embarrassment for American policy-makers, striving to hold together a military and diplomatic operation dependent on Arab bases and Arab acquiescence in the use of high-tech Western weaponry against an Arab state, even so distrusted a one as Iraq. In fact, at the time the SCUD missiles were flying, a very senior State Department policy-maker, Lawrence Eagleburger (later Acting Secretary of State), had to be deployed for a time in Israel to keep the Israelis persuaded of the virtues of a 'low profile' until the war was over.

The intransigence with which Israeli policy-makers resisted American pressures of the 'land-for-peace' variety during the Shamir period certainly did not endear them to Bush or Baker, and that showed very clearly in questions like the loan guarantees for Russian Jewish resettlement. Israelis, however, could console themselves that if they temporarily lost diplomatic clout in Washington, some of those they used to class as their most dangerous Arab enemies lost even more. Particularly, of course, Iraq, which they had long regarded as the most ferocious and irreconcilable of the Arab states, even though its military operations against Israel up to 1991 had not been particularly effective. With the revelations of the intensity of the Iraqi effort to construct nuclear weapons, and the SCUD attacks on Tel Aviv during the Gulf War, Israeli strategists felt themselves confirmed in the prescience of their own pre-emptive strike against the Iraqi nuclear installations in 1981. Without the delay thus imposed, they tended to argue, the warhead assembly line might have been fully operational before the decision to invade Kuwait, and the war would therefore have been fought on very different terms.

The regime in Saudi Arabia also seemed less diplomatically (and even perhaps economically) sure of itself than before. The sight of half a million Western troops (including American female soldiers in shorts) mounting a military operation against an Arab state, with the acquiescence of those who are the guardians of Islam's sacred places, cannot be regarded as anything but humiliating: a very bitter pill to swallow. The Saudi forces are re-equipping with advanced US weaponry, but they can hardly expect to be allowed to use it against Israel.

The US has thus inherited an expanded version of Britain's old role in the Gulf. It even took on a ten-year defence agreement with Kuwait, on the old British model. There was no prospect for the foreseeable future of revived Russian rivalry in that area: only the regional powers, particularly Iran, could plausibly raise a challenge. And for the Arab regimes at present, one would say, the US was a preferable hegemon to Iran, certainly far less likely to threaten the Saudi royal house, or the minor royal houses of the Gulf, with fundamentalist Islamic doctrines.

To sum up, one might argue that US ascendancy in the Arab world from the Gulf to the Mediterranean was by 1992, after the Gulf War and the end of the Cold War, considerably greater than combined British and French ascendancy had been just after the First World War. Thus, more confidently than before 1991, one could assume that the chances of its imposing at least a resigned accommodation to stalemate between the local parties, if not an actual settlement, must be accounted better than they had been since 1967.

Retrospect and Prospect

When it becomes possible to see the astonishing events of 1989-91 in Eastern Europe in some perspective (perhaps historians will by then be calling it the period of the Great Anti-Communist Revolution) it will probably appear that the most important impact of those events on the world outside Europe was in the realm of economic theory and political ideology. The *Economist* delivered a memorably harsh obituary of the previous system's influence:

> ... for most of the past century, the body of ideas called Marxism-Leninism has succeeded in poisoning half the world's political life. It not only misruled, at its peak, most of the Eurasian pair of continents. It misled many of the young governments of the newly independent post-1945 third world.[4]

No doubt debate on the impact of Marxist-Leninist concepts (as against the manoeuvrings of Soviet policy-makers, from Lenin on) will in time produce whole libraries of learned works, from both left and right. But as an interim reflection, what seems most doubtful is how deep the ideology ever penetrated. That very perceptive Indian analyst, M.N. Roy, writing as early as 1951 and attributing the phrase to Lenin himself,[5] called it 'nationalism painted red'. He predicted that it would sweep the entire Third World, and would prove in time to have all the defects of the European nationalisms of the 1930s. That analysis has clearly proved prophetic; as was obvious, for instance, in cases like Mengistu's in Ethiopia. A political attitude chosen as a sort of 'ideological cosmetic' can, of course, be discarded with equal ease. When Mengistu announced the scrapping of fifteen years of allegedly Marxist-Leninist policies, he said blandly:

> Today's world is no longer what it was when we charted the direction of progress fifteen years ago ... we must make sure our path is in harmony with the present global outlook.[6]

That application of the principles of the Vicar of Bray was not enough to serve him. Without the Cuban soldiers, Soviet military advisers and East German intelligence officers who had been helping him repress the insurgencies in Eritrea and Tigré, and run or ruin Ethiopia, his regime rapidly secured its well-earned place in the dustbin of history,

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4 *Economist*, 21 December 1991-3 January 1992, p.9.

5 Roy was with Lenin in the earliest days of the Comintern, and was the founder not only of the Indian but of the Mexican Communist Party. By the late 1940s he had broken with communism, and was writing trenchant analyses of its influence in the Third World. See his 'The Communist Problem in East Asia: An Asian View' in *Pacific Affairs*, Vol.XXIV, No.3, September 1951.

6 See Samuel M. Makinda, *Security in the Horn of Africa*, Adelphi Paper No.269 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Summer 1992) for an account of events in Ethiopia and Somalia during the period of Soviet influence and its subsequent decline.

and the old Ethiopian empire fell into disrepair as fast as the old Russian empire.

Inevitably, for much of the rest of Africa, from Angola to Zimbabwe, the more flexible of the local leaders have been reassessing their political, ideological and diplomatic assumptions, in the light of better understanding of what had actually happened to the Soviet and East European economies in the years from 1917 or 1946. During the seven decades from 1917 to 1989, it was almost incumbent on any young revolutionary would-be leader to adopt some variant of alleged Marxist analysis as his mode of interpreting the nature of economics and politics, and expounding 'the way forward' for his people. Now that option looks so much less promising, what alternative *Weltanschauung* will those aspirants to power adopt? For the Muslims among them, the answer may look relatively easy: some variant of Islamic fundamentalism. So should we expect more Algerias as well as more Ayatollahs? Perhaps so, but there might also be a new wave of relatively secular reforming military autocrats like Kemal Ataturk or Gamal Nasser. Nationalism (especially ethno-linguistic nationalism) does still appear at least as strong a force as religious fervour.

CHAPTER 4

AUSTRALIA AND ITS NEIGHBOURHOOD

For Australia the primary diplomatic and security impact of the transformed central balance will probably not be direct but indirect, the result of changes in moods and balances in other regions. Foreseeably, over the middle term, in balances in South Asia and Northeast Asia, and at a more distant time that in Southeast Asia. Most immediately, however, from the visible and ongoing (though in 1992 exaggerated by electoral fervour) changes in diplomatic and political mood in the United States. Whatever the outcome of the 1992 election had been, and indeed whether Republicans or Democrats occupy the White House for the rest of this decade, it was clear by 1992 that American policy-makers would have to devote more of their energy and capacity for leadership to the problems of the economy and the inner cities, and less to those of the outside world. Likewise, the funds collected from American taxpayers must be oriented in the same direction, and away from defence. That will inevitably mean a changed set of prospects for some of America's allies and protectorates in the Pacific and round the Asian rim, as well as those in Europe. Even if Bush had been re-elected, the order of American priorities was going to be distinctly different in his second term to what it was right through the four Cold War decades, and into Bush's first term.

For most of those four decades Australia was a more-than-necessarily dependent ally of the United States, making serious efforts to develop a measure of strategic self-reliance only at the end of the period, in the mid-eighties. Dependence did *not*, however, imply real identity of national perceptions. In fact, Australian and American interpretations of the nature of the dangers to be apprehended in the Pacific, and the meaning and utility of the ANZUS treaty, differed quite markedly from the very first, despite the tactful rhetoric of the assorted political leaders on both sides of the Pacific who have expatiated on ceremonial occasions over ANZUS 'unity of purpose'. The reality was otherwise. The two sides of the Pacific have consistently had quite diverse anxieties and priorities.

For Washington, the true justification of the ANZUS treaty lay in the urgent need, in 1950-51, to secure the consent of the Pacific war allies to the recruitment of Japan as a strategic bastion against possible future encroachment of Soviet and Chinese power. For Canberra, its justification was as a mode of securing such reassurance as could be negotiated at the time, given that Australia was not really able to resist the new (post Korean crisis) American definition of its strategic perimeter.

Australia's strategic dependence on the US had, of course, originated almost ten years before the treaty, in 1941-42, when Japan's onslaught on the Western-controlled territories in the Pacific brought enemy action, for the first time, to continental Australia, in the form of the Japanese air raids on Darwin and elsewhere. The memory of those anxious six months was always present in the minds of the Australian formulators of ANZUS (Percy Spender and Alan Watt) as they put their arguments to the Americans in 1950-51.[1] What came out of the negotiating process was in its small way just as much a demonstration of the uses of diplomatic ambiguity as the Shanghai communiqué twenty years later. It enabled the US treaty-makers to regard the result of their efforts as a straightforward buttress of their Cold War alliance system, whose primary objective right up to 1989 was always the containment of *Soviet* power. The Australian interpreters of the treaty, to the contrary, during those same years could always present it as a general security blanket against whatever dangers might in future arise in the Pacific; the Soviet threat looking about the least likely of them, except for a brief period after 1979.

Since the treaty was still being put together at the time of Chinese intervention in the war in Korea, late in 1950, the possibility of Chinese expansionism some day in the Asian-Pacific area in general could not be disregarded. But within policy-making circles in Defence and External Affairs, the estimates were that it would be many decades before China was an effective naval and air power, that being the decisive criterion for the prospect of serious attack on the Australian mainland. Whereas Japan's notable Second World War

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1 Spender was Minister for External Affairs and Watt the head of the foreign policy bureaucracy in Canberra at the time. The Prime Minister, R.G. Menzies, was initially quite sceptical about the alliance. For a fuller account see the author's *Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy* (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1988).

capacities in those areas were well remembered and widely regarded as likely to be recreated once opportunity offered itself. That view was prevalent on both sides of the Australian political spectrum. The depth and long-lasting effect of Japanese revulsion against military power was underestimated, both in official circles and at the grass-roots level, then and later. Labor spokesmen, including Dr Evatt, made more capital at the time of the prospect of revived Japanese militarism, because Labor was in opposition and therefore free of any inhibitions about denouncing the Japan peace treaty devised by the US, but Japan was almost equally distrusted on the other side of the Australian political spectrum.

Behind the scenes in Canberra, informed opinion estimated ANZUS as about ninety per cent precaution against Japanese military revival, and ten per cent precaution against future Chinese ambitions, not expected until some distant date when China had acquired an adequate air force and navy. The speechwriters for the Prime Minister and the Minister for External Affairs were encouraged, however, to dwell on the alleged impending dangers of 'international communism' for reasons of diplomatic and political tact, and that formulation or rationale was ideologically quite congenial to the political leaders then in office, who were also engaged in a domestic struggle with the local communist party. Russia as a national power (even though submerged for the time being in the Soviet Union) was of course never regarded as a relevant concept in the diplomacy of those early years. However, a decade or so later, as the reality of the split between the Soviet Union and China began to be better understood, some policy-makers in Canberra did begin to toy with the notion of Moscow as a sort of 'co-belligerent' of the West against China, which for Australia (as against the US) tended to be the main focus of anxiety in the Communist world.

The divergence of attitudes between the two capitals in the assessment of threat in the Asia-Pacific area was probably at its sharpest in the period 1960-65, because of a complication presented by Indonesia. As Australia's only really powerful close neighbour, that country had been regarded with a degree of inevitable speculative apprehension even during the period of active Australian help to the Indonesians in their struggle against the Dutch (1946-48). That apprehension was greatly magnified during the Indonesian campaign to take over Dutch New Guinea (now Irian Jaya) and the 'konfrontasi'

campaign against Malaysia in the early sixties. Right-wing Australian opinion, which had earlier been enthusiastically pro-American, became agitated by a consciousness of the possibility that in some future situation of crisis and potential hostilities (arising perhaps from a border clash in Papua New Guinea), Washington might find that its strategic interests lay with Indonesia rather than Australia. Indonesia was indubitably a major power, likely perhaps within fifty years or so to become one of the great powers of the central balance. And it controlled the straits by which US naval ships made their way from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean—straits whose use might be crucial during, for instance, a Persian Gulf crisis.

Anxiety on those points first became acute in Canberra during the early Kennedy period, 1961-62, because of policy changes by the new administration on the issue of Dutch New Guinea. It grew steadily stronger until September 1965, when it was partly alleviated, and completely changed in ideological complexion, by the failed coup and successful counter-coup of that month in Indonesia. But despite the stability of the Indonesian regime in the quarter-century since then, those Djakarta-centred anxieties have never entirely vanished. If, in the prospective multilateral balance of future decades, an alliance should ever develop between Indonesia and either Japan or China, the alarms of the early sixties would readily be revived. The old nightmare of the alleged 'Peking-Djakarta' axis (much discussed behind the scenes in Canberra at that time) could very easily be reformulated as either a 'Djakarta-Tokyo' or 'Djakarta-Beijing' community of interest.

Coincidentally or not, it was at this period that Australia acquired a sort of offset to potential Indonesian strategic leverage in Washington in the form of the US installations, first at North West Cape, then at Pine Gap and Nurrungar. All three are, or were, essentially part of the American command, control, communications and intelligence (C^3I) network. That is, they were primarily elements of the US strategic apparatus for the containment of Soviet power, and thus part of the central nuclear balance, rather than of any regional balance.

That being the case, they were logically on Soviet nuclear targeting lists, perhaps with a high priority. Thus the chief direct strategic benefit to Australia from the end of the Cold War was the vanishing of whatever element of risk the US installations had

previously carried. In my view, that was always a very small risk, since the possibility of direct nuclear exchange between the superpowers was quite low after the early sixties, the period when the installations began to be created. Less, probably, than the risk for the average Australian of being struck by lightning or taken by a shark. Nevertheless, the removal of even that measure of risk must be accounted a benefit.

The end of Cold War apprehensions did not, however, as some protesters had imagined, render the US installations in Australia useless. Instead, it suggested alternate and possibly wider uses. In the Gulf War, for instance, Nurrungar and Pine Gap were of considerable value to the US command in the monitoring of Iraqi rocket launches and military communications. Presumably, they could serve the same purpose, *vis-à-vis* both sides, in future conflicts. If the UN continues to acquire responsibility for crisis management in regional conflicts at the rate it has been doing in the early nineties, the information collected in that manner from satellites might in due course go to the Military Staff Committee or the Security Council.

Pine Gap and Nurrungar are in effect elaborate relay stations. Information collected by US satellites in appropriate orbits is relayed to their computers, and then, for the present, to Norad or Washington. A technique of 'cross-linking' satellites, which would enable such information to go direct to its US recipients (prospectively taking Australia 'out of the loop' as regards Nurrungar) is reported to have been devised. Thus there may not be a very long future for that installation in its contemporary function. But that should make it the more readily disposable to alternative functions, Australian or international. The monitoring of potential nuclear explosions in a prospectively stronger anti-proliferation or test-ban regime (monitored perhaps by the Security Council rather than IAEA) would be obviously useful. If the tentative proposals for a joint early warning system now being explored between Moscow and Washington come to fruition, Nurrungar also seems logically likely to be a part of the network required. Such a system could in time conceivably be available to all the central balance powers, or indeed the society of states as a whole via the UN. In short, two of the main US Cold War facilities on Australian real estate, Pine Gap and Nurrungar, seem likely to become even more valuable if the current transformation of global politics maintains its present logic. The third, North West Cape, has already

been handed over to Australian management and seems likely to remain appropriate for Australia's own strategic purposes.

That potential redirection of the US facilities to perform new roles in the transformed world order seems rather an appropriate symbol of the kind of general mutation that the Australian stance as a whole seems likely to undergo. As in the case of the central balance, there is a clear 'forward to the past' aspect to it. A much less distant past, however: the late 1940s rather than 1815.

Two factors present in that immediate post-war context are replicating themselves in the early 1990s. The first has been the assumption of a larger role for the United Nations. The second is a substantial injection of ambiguity into American policy. Both factors were at low ebb during the Cold War years: the UN role dwindled almost to negligible proportions in many crises, and the US commitment was only marginally ambiguous after 1950. From then until 1990, it would have appeared Utopian to expect the UN to now be operating globally in its present manner, or to have secured its present concert of powers basis for so operating. The change will have implications requiring scrutiny for middle powers like Australia: implications for Defence as well as Foreign Affairs policy-makers.

The second factor of similarity between the initial post-war period and the contemporary period is the increased ambiguity about the future American role in global politics, both in Europe and in Asia. Just after the Second World War the American urge to disinvolve the US from the troubles of the rest of the world was almost as powerful as it had been just after the First World War. That urge was successfully resisted by some very adroit policy-makers, mostly in the State Department, in the period 1946-49, but it was a close-run thing even as regards Europe, where American interests were most involved and appeared most threatened, right up to the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949.

As regards Asia, the urge for disinvolvement was even more acute, and the level of interest and commitment there was then very much less than it has been during the past few decades. The US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, was voicing the consensus of opinion among the Joint Chiefs of Defense Staff, among others, when

in January 1950[2] he defined the US perimeter in Asia as running from Japan to the Philippines, excluding South Korea and Taiwan as well as the Asian mainland in general. Washington's sense of having burned its fingers in the Chinese civil war was quite acute at the time.

The shock of the Korean crisis six months later of course reversed the assessments that lay behind the Acheson speech. But it should be borne in mind that subsequently, over the Cold War decades, 'holding the perimeter' in Asia proved far more costly and painful in human terms for Americans than the equivalent effort in Europe. After all, there were no European parallels to the Korean War and the Vietnam War, which together cost about 100,000 American lives. Moreover, the Vietnam War damaged the American political consensus far more than any other conflict since the American Civil War of the 1860s: the wounds are still visible.

Furthermore, one has to note that there is a kind of historical and cultural inevitability to the American connection with Europe which does not apply to its connection with Asia. The new sovereignty which asserted itself in 1776 was created by transplanted Europeans, full heirs to the Western tradition. The input of Asian peoples to the US in the last few years can only marginally modify (if at all) the ties of language and law and custom and culture. It is true that the economic connections across the Pacific have recently been growing much faster than those across the Atlantic, but that has often seemed as much a source of friction and resentment as of fellow-feeling for the US. A great many Americans see Japan as the most dangerous adversary or competitor of their own society, now that the Soviet Union has vanished into history.

All that makes logical the assumption that by the end of the century, if present trends are maintained, the lines of American deployment in the Pacific may run from Alaska to Hawaii and probably Guam, with American forces out of Japanese and Korean bases as they are already out of those in the Philippines. American policy-makers invariably and officially argue that the current degree of US economic involvement with Asia, and the prospective further

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2 In a speech which Republican party spokesmen have long alleged to have given a 'green light' for North Korean aggression against the South. Unless and until North Korean Politburo documents become available for scrutiny, there is no way of determining whether the decision to invade was encouraged by the speech.

economic growth of the Pacific Rim economies will rule out any American efforts at disinvolvement, along the lines of those which were getting under way in 1949-50. The economic involvement is, of course, real and may remain at its present level, but how congenial is it to the average American? In neo-isolationist arguments such as those put by Patrick Buchanan during the 1992 presidential primaries, the loudest note was resentment that the Japanese were allegedly 'freeloading' on American defence efforts while at the same time stealing American markets and buying up cherished American national assets with their ill-gotten export surplus. As for China, the right wing of the American spectrum distrusts its political system and military intentions, while the liberals are outraged by its suppression of protest. Even the 'smaller dragons', the newly industrialising economies of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and many of the ASEAN countries, are the objects of faint resentment for the speed of their penetration into American markets, and the allegedly unfair low-wage basis of their competitive edge. Thus whatever the continuing economic logic of the US ties to Asia, their political, diplomatic and military logic is more questionable. Until the outcome of the Uruguay Round of GATT is known, it remains difficult to forecast the future shape of the world's trading patterns. But it is not impossible that the American hemisphere (North and South) may constitute one economic zone, and the East Asian rim of the Pacific a rival rather than a complementary one. The cross-Pacific economic ties of the last few decades should thus not be regarded as a law of history or nature: they were the outcome of a phase of very rapid economic growth which may in a decade or two be centred elsewhere: Eastern Europe perhaps, or Latin America.

The two tendencies sketched in the last few paragraphs (the increased role allocated to the UN, and the increased ambiguity of US commitment to the Asia-Pacific area) may, as was implied earlier, impart rather a 'back to square one, as of 1945' feeling to Australian policy making. In terms of domestic politics, that actually may ease some problems. Such dissent as has been audible in recent years from the established lines of policy (for instance, over Australian participation in the Gulf War) has had its origins almost entirely in distrust or suspicion in intellectual and Labor Left circles of the intentions behind Washington's policies, and resistance to Canberra's assuming the role of lieutenant in US enterprises. Sponsorship by the

UN provides a sort of moral and diplomatic legitimacy to operations which may be in substance not much different to those explicitly of the US. Of course, even participation in UN enterprises may not be without its difficulties: the commitment in Cambodia, for instance, may prove more expensive and open-ended than it originally seemed. If the UN continues collecting crisis-management tasks at its recent rate, in fact, the financial and military burdens to be shared out between middle powers (Australia among others) might actually be greater than in old-fashioned management by the great powers.

However, that being said, there does not seem much case for Australian apprehensions about the workings of the prospective system. We have no present or immediately impending quarrel with any of the six powers of the concert. With two of them (the US and Europe) we have long-standing close ties of security, tradition and kinship. With two others, Japan and China, we have very useful economic ties. With India we can cultivate closer ties via the Commonwealth, and with Russia via sympathetic trading relationships and perhaps even technological assistance in areas like dry-land farming or food and fibre processing. So Australian influence, in comparison with that of other middle powers, seems likely to stand up reasonably well, except for our relatively marginal position *vis-à-vis* the possible 'tripartite' trading zones, if the present open economic order breaks down.

Over the longer term, however, the auspices for Australia look less favourable. The outcome of the post-Cold War reshuffle of power relationships has been quite different in the Asian region to what it was in the European region, and the reactions among local powers have therefore been quite different. In Europe what essentially happened was that the potential hegemonic power on the Continent, the Soviet Union (against which the balance of power coalition, NATO, had been devised and maintained) fell apart and was replaced by its successor, Russia, an old familiar diplomatic entity, at present in great economic distress and almost devoid of ideological 'clout'. Russia does of course still have immense nuclear strike power, and in time its reorganised armed forces will probably again be the strongest in Europe. But it no longer looks like a potential hegemonic power: it has vastly fewer strategic assets *vis-à-vis* the rest of Europe than the Soviet Union once had, and diplomatically is in a weak position because of its economic troubles.

For Asia, on the contrary, the potential hegemonic power, China, is still much as it was politically, or at least is seeming to retain a strong coherent central authority. Moreover, it is doing remarkably well economically and will therefore be able to buy or construct advanced weapon-systems to make itself strategically more formidable. Since the Soviet forces which used to be concentrated on its borders (about 50 divisions) have been reduced and will probably be replaced by much weaker Russian forces (and maybe some forces from the other ex-Soviet republics) its overall strategic position is indeed already much improved. That is, the main military threat it faced from about 1969 to about 1984 (the possibility of Soviet strike) has vanished, so China has a much freer hand to redeploy its own forces. After 1997 it will be in possession of the excellent harbour and naval station of Hong Kong, and it seems to be already making plans to build up its naval forces, possibly even acquiring a carrier (the *Varyag*, from Ukraine) as well as assorted frigates and other ships. On such matters as sovereignty over the Paracels and Spratlys, and general control of the South China Sea, the signals seem to be of quite an assertive policy in Beijing.

As if one potential hegemonic power were not enough, the minor powers of Southeast Asia and South Asia have to also reckon on two other potential candidates for that role, in other parts of the enormous region under contemplation. India and Japan, clearly, have the basic resources and skills to build formidable naval and air power. Both have national interests to pursue.

It is therefore not surprising that the reactions of the local powers have been different in the two areas, tending in Europe towards arms reduction and in Southeast Asia towards arms acquisition, though not really an arms race. There are some other reasons too: the Southeast Asian countries are newly prosperous, and thus newly able to afford advanced weaponry. Also they have become newly conscious, especially after the failure of the negotiations over the Philippines bases, that the Americans are, after all, prepared to take their ships and aircraft away at a pinch. Until that outcome, there was a general tendency to believe that Washington would always concede another point or two to save an established position.

Finally, over a longer conspectus still, it must be borne in mind that the redistribution of power between members of the society of

states will continue, as it always has done, and will probably tend to be driven mostly by differential rates of economic growth. That factor is particularly visible among Australia's neighbours. It is also visible that Australia itself does not do well by comparison. Increasing prosperity means among other things increased ability to buy expensive but unproductive strategic assets like advanced weapon-systems. In the past Australia's defensive 'edge' has resulted largely from our ability to buy more of that sort of hardware than anyone else in the vicinity. That is changing.

In the next few decades new powers will qualify as potential members of the central balance or (if it persists) of the concert of powers: maybe Indonesia, maybe Pakistan, maybe even Vietnam or a reunified Korea. It is easier to recognise than to define the factors which qualify a country as a candidate for that status: demographic basis, rate of economic growth, technological capacity, military potential, political coherence, strategic assets. But a good many of the present 'possibles' seem to be in the Asia-Pacific region. So our vicinity is going to be more 'crowded' than it has ever been in the past by great powers requiring a good deal of elbow room. That may not always be comfortable for minor powers, or middle powers like Australia. Thus the maintenance of a coherent central security system is in our interests. In the last analysis, great powers can usually only be constrained by other great powers, though a cohesive regional security community (such as ASEAN might become, especially if Vietnam and Cambodia can be integrated into it) is a possible extra bastion. The central security system will almost certainly continue to be formalised and legitimised under the rubric of the UN. But on the evidence of the Cold War decades, the only basis on which the system can be kept viable is that of a concert of powers. Its maintenance is therefore in the interests of most middle powers, including Australia. If and when it ceases to be viable, our position will be much more exposed and vulnerable.

CHAPTER 5

TRANSITIONS AND CRISES

Three years on from the end of the Cold War, the post-Soviet society of states showed little resemblance to the fondly hoped for 'new world order' once alleged by optimistic spirits to be just around the corner. In the immediate euphoria of the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the subsequent demise of the Soviet Union, liberal democracy had seemed to be universally victorious, and to carry with it, some held, the promise of universal peace. So proclaimed the theories of 'the end of history' and 'the obsolescence of war'.[1]

Unfortunately, however, the still fast-evolving society of states appeared rather more inclined to revive old quarrels than to move on to millenial tranquillity. So at three years retrospect, the Cold War, and indeed the whole phase of primarily ideological conflict since 1917, had begun to appear as a vast glacier blanketing (but also preserving beneath itself) the conflicts of previous centuries. With the end of the Cold War, the glacier had disappeared, and the old quarrels had re-emerged into the international landscape of the late twentieth century, their ferocity apparently enhanced by the long-enforced hibernation.

That is to say, what are usually called ethnic or religious quarrels, endemic to particular areas, have by and large replaced the single central Cold War quarrel (over ideology and world power) as the main source of crisis in international politics. And there is not much likelihood that this tendency will disappear any time soon. For, as was mentioned earlier, the world is full of multinational and multi-ethnic sovereignties lightly disguised as unitary or federal states, and their prospects of internal tranquillity appear in many cases to be less now than they were during the Cold War decades.

This distinction between the multinational state and the multi-ethnic society is an important one for this analysis. Britain, for instance, is a multinational state in the sense of being made up of three

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1 The classical and most influential statements of these two points of view were Francis Fukayama, 'The End of History?' in *The National Interest*, No.16, Summer 1989; and John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (Basic Books, New York, 1989).

nations, the English, the Scots, and the Welsh, with quite distinctive cultures and histories, inhabiting historically recognised and defined territories; though, of course, members of all three groups may live anywhere within the polity, and there are various other ethnic minorities. Australia and the US are multi-ethnic societies, in the sense of being peopled by citizens of many ethnic origins. But they are not multinational states, since those ethnic groups do not inhabit or claim distinctive territories.

Bosnia, to its sorrow, has been an example of a society in contention between the two population patterns. Though what are usually called the three ethnic groups (Serbs, Croats and Muslims) are in reality of the same ethnic origin (Slavonic), they have been created by history into three separate 'tribes', whose totems are religious (Orthodox, Catholic and Islamic). Since the more accurate terms, tribalism or sectarianism, are generally resented by all three groups, the less accurate term 'ethnicity' is used as a euphemism to describe the basis of their quarrels over 'turf' in Bosnia. (In some other instances, as between Armenians and Azeris, there is a more genuine ethnolinguistic difference.) If separate territories are established by and for the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia, as is the objective of their military operations and the expulsions in the name of 'ethnic cleansing', Bosnia might turn into a multinational state of sorts, with the three groups separated into 'cantons'. But unless some system of international guarantees is secured, it might not long survive even as such. Thus, for the UN, the Bosnian crisis has been a sort of 'test case' for a kind of problem that may become all too frequent in the next few decades.

The sovereign state in fact shows signs of moving into a prolonged identity crisis, caught between tendencies, in many cases, towards local fragmentation on the one hand and global integration on the other. Sovereignty, as understood since the Treaty of Westphalia, is being ground away, or at least thinned out, between those upper and nether millstones. Global integration undermines it economically, since with the rise of the transnationals there comes a reduction in economic autonomy for both national and multinational states. So local pressures for separatism take on a certain logic, even when there is no true ethnic difference. In Italy, for instance, the nineteenth century saw heroic effort being put into the unification of north and south. But the contemporary tendency, in the prosperous north of the

'Lombard League', is to question the usefulness of unification with a south seen still as poor and crime-ridden. The south, for its part, could make a case for the possible benefits of more local decision making, in much the same way as the less prosperous Slovakia has seen advantages in divorce from the more prosperous Czech Republic.

The two tendencies - fragmentation and integration - are by no means impossible to reconcile with each other. They could become complementary, in fact, if we assume sovereignty is mutating into the form of loose confederations (for regional economic or defensive purposes) of politically and culturally autonomous communities, either ethnic or multi-ethnic. That would eventually mean a society of states larger in numbers, but smaller in median size. From the three effective sovereignties of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, twenty-one smaller sovereignties seem at the moment to have evolved. That seven-fold increase may be quite exceptional, but the tendency it represents may not be so. The membership of the society of states might certainly rise to two hundred sovereignties: possibly a great many more.

That would not necessarily be a matter of regret. The two most creative societies in diplomatic history, the city-states of ancient Greece and those of Renaissance Italy, were made up of very small sovereignties, by contemporary standards. Even modern city-states, like Hong Kong and Singapore, have proved creative, at least in economic terms. So small may prove beautiful, for sovereign states as for other organisations. But the road of any such evolution will be crisis-ridden and disaster-prone.

It has probably been inevitable that the sovereignties most affected by revulsion against multinational and multi-ethnic compositions have been those formerly under Communist governance to some degree: not only the erstwhile Soviet Union, the erstwhile Yugoslavia and the erstwhile Czechoslovakia, but also Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Somalia, whose political élites also, for a time, promulgated at least a cosmetic Marxism. Nothing fails like failure: long-pent-up resentment of an oppressive central authority has carried with it rejection of all its ideological tenets, including internationalism and even multiculturalism. So an East German youth, indoctrinated since childhood in the proposition that the foreign workers in his society were 'socialist brothers', may react (when the restraints of the

old system of enforced conformities are lifted) by burning down their hostels. In still more extreme cases, like Somalia and perhaps Afghanistan, loss of authority on the part of central government has meant reversion to traditional local groupings and leaderships: clans and sub-clans in Somalia, ethno-linguistic tribes and rival warlords in Afghanistan.

The potential for trouble of such developments rests in part on what may be called the 'example' factor. The would-be leaders of many communities trapped in alien sovereignties now have an entirely new set of stars to steer by. Once the principle of self-determination has been accepted as the standard of justice in international politics, the way lies open for smaller and smaller units to claim it as their right. Certainly Papua New Guinea must be self-determining but how about Bougainville? Its area is clearly defined, its population relatively (by Pacific standards) substantial, its economy potentially viable, even promising. If societies as tiny as those of Nauru, or the Cook Islands, or Vanuatu or Tuvalu can be endowed with sovereignty, by what criterion is it denied to Bougainville? On the other hand, there are about 700 linguistic groups in Papua New Guinea: clearly it would be absurd to assert sovereignty for them all. Many of the frontiers in what used to be called the Third World are arbitrary legacies of colonial times, with no relevance to tribal boundaries. Until now the successor governments in the post-colonial period have prudently resolved to let those frontiers remain as they were. But will they be able to maintain that resolution when the potential leaders of the societies concerned have been shown that it is possible to dissolve a central sovereignty? The 'example' factor is already visible, for instance, in Chief Buthelezi in South Africa talking of 'the Yugoslav option' for his Zulu followers.

The other chief source of prospective crises is what might be called the 'orphans of empire' factor. The many multinational and multi-ethnic societies round the world are mostly the products of long-ago imperial expansions: a more numerous or more militarily efficient society expanding to take over a neighbouring one. In the imperial phase, settlers from the dominant society have moved into the territory so annexed. When the imperial phase is over, the descendants of those settlers are likely to find themselves resented and disadvantaged, even expelled or threatened with massacre. In the Soviet case, for instance, there are about 25 million Russians in the other republics of what used

to be the Soviet Union (essentially the old Czarist empire). In the light of the past history of, for instance, the *Volksdeutsche,* whose communities had spread into Europe from medieval times until the end of the Second World War, one would say that is a very potent source of future trouble and human misery.

It is not only the multinational state and the multi-ethnic community that has found its assumptions questioned since the end of the Soviet Union. It is also that prime example of either internationalism or supra-nationalism (again the distinction is important), the European Community. Until the ambiguities of the Maastricht Treaty, people had tended in recent decades rather to forget that the Community in fact owed its origins, back in 1948-50, very largely to the Western sense of common danger from the Soviet Union. It was the Marshall Plan of 1948 that first required the coordination of the West European economies, and the Marshall Plan was essentially part of the diplomatic strategy of containment, initially devised in 1946[2] while the Continental economies were still prostrate after the war, and Germany, of course, also occupied and dismembered. Even the first of the 'functional' initiatives, the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) of 1951, was primarily strategic in its motivation. German coal and steel were needed for Western rearmament: French policy-makers had to devise a plan which would make that possible without German capacities again endangering France. So was begun the Franco-German integrative tendency which, still in 1992, is the central engine of Europe. It was only after 1957 that economic motivations began to replace strategic ones.

Russia is, of course, a great military power in Europe, and in the global balance, even in these days of economic catastrophe there, but strategically and ideologically it is almost impossible that it should ever present the level of threat to Western or even Central Europe that the Soviet Union once seemed to present. So the strategic case for continued integration, specifically of the West (excluding the Central and East) of that continent, in effect vanished with the Soviet Union. The ambivalences about the Maastricht Treaty are still unresolved at the time of writing. But in effect the struggle for the rest of this decade

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2 The most recent analysis of this period of US policy is A *Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War* by Melvyn P. Leffler (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1992).

seems likely to be between a wider-but-looser confederation in Europe (which might, in time, include much of the East and might even become 'Europe to the Urals', as de Gaulle once wanted it to be), or a smaller-but-tighter federation, approximating a 'United States of Western Europe', clearly likely to be dominated by Germany, not only economically, but diplomatically, and even politically.

So that part of the world also is in an uncertain transition, tending to be racked by crises, though more probably economic and monetary ones, as over the ERM in 1992, than those involving control of territory. The looser or 'confederation' identity for Europe (long espoused by Britain, especially in Margaret Thatcher's time as Prime Minister), may be regarded as a form of close internationalism. The 'federation' or 'United States of Europe' definition would have to be regarded as supra-nationalism, most of the substance of sovereignty, especially in economic and monetary matters, having passed to the central authority. The 'looser-but-wider' definition seemed, at the end of 1992, to be graining ground, and to be more in line with other tendencies in the society of states.

Even very prosperous Western democracies, like Canada and the United States, could find themselves further affected by another form of separatism, that based on a renewed demand for identity on the part of 'First Nations'; i.e., the indigenous peoples of the Americas and elsewhere, the peoples whose ancestors were already there when the 'new worlds' were 'discovered' by European explorers from 1492 on. This process has gone furthest in the case of Canada, where the Inuit (Eskimo) people have already been endowed with a vast stretch of the Northeast (almost a fifth of the Canadian landmass) which is now a sort of autonomous territory called Nunavut. The French-speaking inhabitants of Quebec, and assorted Indian tribes, are also demanding some degree of cultural and political autonomy. If the 'example' factor proves valid in the rest of the Americas, there are more than five hundred Indian tribes in the US, and almost six hundred, with a much larger total population, in Latin America, who would also be entitled to press claims. Nearer home, the Maori peoples in New Zealand are already well embarked on the reassertion of their separate identity, and of their territorial claims under the Treaty of Waitangi. Australia's Aboriginal peoples have no such treaty to appeal to, but certainly an equal moral claim, and one they are now likely to press more effectively.

So altogether it does not seem an exaggeration to regard this post-Cold War phase of diplomatic history as one involving no less than a redefinition of the nature and functions of sovereignty. That is a potential transition in which strong crisis-management mechanisms are going to be necessary, since the old concept of sovereignty is the very basis of the present society of states. Only a diplomatic mechanism with some legal claim to universal authority is likely to be able to cope with the stresses inherent in so fundamental a change. Thus, if the Security Council did not already exist, it would be necessary to invent something very like it. The environmental and economic problems which were earlier expected to provide the main agenda for international politics (global warming, the ozone layer, world debt) will also need a strong central authority if they are to be remedied, or even contained. As was pointed out previously, a concert of powers is the only fuel which will make diplomatic mechanisms like the Security Council work, so there is a strong case for conserving it.

Late in 1992, the difficulties of doing so seemed, encouragingly, rather less than they had appeared a year earlier. That was because some of the ambivalences had been removed, at least for the time being, from the foreign policy future of the United States.

In the initial phase of the presidential election campaign, the challenge to George Bush had come clearly from neo-isolationalists and protectionists. His excessively articulate rival for the Republican nomination, Patrick Buchanan, may never have been a serious threat, but he did get about 30 per cent of the vote in some primaries by voicing a sort of unofficial but popular reaction to the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union. That reaction, at least as articulated by Buchanan, was to the effect that the US could now simply declare its victory, pull its troops out from their deployments abroad, wind up the Cold War alliances, leave NATO to the Europeans, and 'go back to the farm'; in effect, opt out of world politics and return to the isolationism of the 1930s. Though Buchanan was the most visible 'front man' for that movement of opinion, it did have some more serious proponents, mainly on the far right.[3]

Protectionism also had quite a noticeable phase of popularity. The belief that the Japanese had long been 'freeloading' on the

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3 See, for instance, several of the essays in Owen Harries (ed.), *America's Purpose: New Visions of U.S. Foreign Policy* (I.C.S. Press, San Francisco, 1991).

American defence effort, and using the advantages so derived to steal American markets, was even more influential among Congressmen, and Senators fighting for re-election, than among the Democratic and Republican candidates for the presidential nominations. Resentment against both Europeans and Japanese, for their alleged or real failures to 'play fair' in economic competition, was powerful enough to induce the Bush Administration to resort to the Export Enhancement Policy (EEP), that is to competitive subsidies to match those of the European Community on export commodities like wheat. The motivation was to induce American farmers to believe the administration in Washington was effectively fighting their battles against Europe, but inevitably non-subsidising exporters of farm products like Australia were caught in the cross-fire. The issue became somewhat damaging to the political relationship between Canberra and Washington, and even seemed at times to threaten the strategic relationship, with farm lobbyists' demand to 'close the bases'.

During the last two decades of the Cold War, roughly the mid-sixties to the mid-eighties, such a threat to the US facilities in Australia might just possibly have been successful in securing some extra diplomatic leverage in a crisis for Canberra. But by the early nineties, Pine Gap and Nurrungar (while still very valuable in many ways) were by no means as strategically vital to America's own security as they once had been, so that form of possible Australian diplomatic leverage dwindled with the Soviet threat. And even without the end of the Cold War, technological change was in any case undermining its long-term basis.

Luckily, by the time Clinton was established as Bush's impending replacement, both those spectres (isolationism and protectionism) were looking far less convincing. The incoming president was clearly no isolationist, neo- or otherwise, and appeared personally less wedded to protectionism than many of his party, though electoral pressures may yet push him in that direction.

His defence budget forecasts did propose further cuts above those contemplated by Bush, but the differences between what the Democrats proposed and what the Republicans might actually have enacted if they had been returned to power do not seem very great. The Bush projection was US$1.42 trillion over five years: the Clinton projection US$1.36 trillion for the same period. That would probably

mean ten carrier-groups instead of twelve, 100,000 or 75,000 men in Europe instead of 150,000, a faster drawdown, possibly, in Korea and Japan. But Republicans might well have moved to those positions anyway, so the long-term difference still appears marginal. Clinton even proposed to continue with SDI, though with the emphasis on ground-based rather than space-based systems, which would be easier for the Russians to agree to, if the technology ever came to anything much.

On relations with Russia, and with Eastern and Western Europe, and on arms control (which had been a particular interest of Vice-President Albert Gore) policies seemed likely to differ only in degree, or in declaratory warmth. The President-elect appeared quite close in his general views in that area to Cold War Democratic stalwarts like Sam Nunn and Les Aspin, well trusted in defence and allied circles, especially at NATO.

Whether Clinton might prove more reluctant than Bush or Reagan (or for that matter Kennedy and Truman) to involve US forces in action abroad was a question implicit in some of the rhetoric of the election. He could be (and was) represented as a 'draft-dodging baby-boomer', even (by implication) a 'peacenik' unfitted, by reason of his active participation in the Vietnam protest movement, to be Commander-in-Chief of the US armed forces, one of the essential roles of any president. Aspersions of a vague sort were cast on his patriotism or loyalty on the basis of a tourist visit to Moscow when he was a student, in 1969.

While to those accustomed to the hyperbole of election campaigns that kind of insinuation could be dismissed as merely a rather rough verbal passage in an inevitably bitter political battle, it would be possible to argue that adversary eyes in, for instance, Baghdad might see them as signalling a possible future opportunity. Clinton's main foreign policy speech of the campaign (to the World Affairs Council in Los Angeles on 14 August 1992) was thus at pains to dispel any assumption of an unduly dovelike stance on his own part:

> The world remains a dangerous place. Moreover, the dangers are now different and less apparent ... U.S. military force will remain a force for stability - and, yes, justice - as the old global order continues to collapse and a new one emerges. We can never forget

> this essential fact: power is the basis for successful diplomacy, and military power has always been fundamental to international relationships ... there are those - some in my party - who see defense cuts largely as a piggy bank to fund their domestic wish lists ... [but] a president must identify the new threats to our security, define military missions to meet those threats, adapt our forces to carry out the missions, and back up those forces with the training, technology and intelligence they need to win ... The Pentagon stands as America's best youth training program, our most potent research center, and the most fully integrated institution in American life.[4]

Clinton had been initially somewhat ambivalent about the Gulf War, but so were many Democrats, though Gore was for it. Either might, as members of the Vietnam-protest generation, be specially wary about any involvement of US land forces in Southeast Asia, or even East Asia in general, and that would have implications for the situation in Korea. Some of Clinton's possible advisors, especially those inherited from the Carter period, were on record as anxious to see an early end to the US troop deployments in Japan as well as those in South Korea. On the other hand, Clinton has seemed more willing than Bush to accept the possible involvement of US forces in Yugoslavia. And his chief political heroes among recent Democratic predecessors as president were Roosevelt and Truman, who, after all, involved the US in the Second World War and the Cold War respectively. Eisenhower was the last US president professionally qualified to be Commander-in-Chief, but Clinton seemed likely to be firmly in the mainstream of US presidential tradition in willingness to use armed forces.

On trade issues, the GATT talks were at the point of open hostilities between the US and the EC (or more specifically France) during the period of transition between the two administrations. The incoming presidential team will of course include new negotiators who may develop fresh tactics for the ongoing battles, which will not

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4 The full text of this speech is available in United States Information Agency Special File, 13 November 1992.

really end even if there is a successful outcome of the Uruguay Round. So a continuation or revival of EEP subsidies cannot be ruled out.

A success or two in foreign policy may come relatively early in Clinton's first term: perhaps on GATT, or the Middle East, where James Baker's hard work seemed tantalisingly close to a 'payoff' when he had to quit as Secretary of State. Despite those prospects, and despite the right and necessary re-orientating of American priorities towards economic and social reconstruction at home, the outside world is likely to trouble Bill Clinton's presidency a good deal more than he would wish.

The most obvious area of crisis, as his administration begins to make its choices and order its priorities, is in the Balkans and Eastern Europe: shoring up the fragments of the former Yugoslavia as they begin their lives as sovereign states. A spillover of the fighting into Kosovo is possible, involving Albania and perhaps other Islamic countries, at least as providers of funds and volunteers. It could prove the first test of Clinton's willingness to put US forces into harm's way, as elements in an UN-sponsored collective action to restrain or limit the area of hostilities.

The most formidable problems, however, (as is normal in international politics) are more likely to stem from potential developments within the great powers, or between them and the lesser powers round their frontiers. Both Russia and China may provide ample scope for that, even during a Clinton first term.

In Russia a truly pluralist society, in the sense of a very contentious one, has emerged in place of the old monolithic conformism; but democracy, in Yeltsin's time as in Gorbachev's, survives only on a knife-edge, among the competing factions and forces. Some of the most doom-laden Western scenarios have not yet proved prescient. A market economy, of however bent and fragile a sort, does seem to be emerging, a year on from the end of the old order, despite the rampant inflation, the shortage of consumer goods, and the threat of massive unemployment. If some coalition of hard-line nationalists and unrepentant Communists should come to power in Moscow, it would not, of course, restore the bipolar balance as it was before 1989. For that to happen, Russia would have to reconquer the other ex-Soviet republics, and then Eastern Europe. If any new set of decision-makers in Moscow appeared even tentatively oriented in

that direction, the old Cold War strategies of containment and deterrence would come back into operation, and the prospect of Western economic aid would vanish. So would the concert of powers. A multilateral balance of power would appear in its stead, probably heavily stacked against Russia. The Security Council would obviously again be stymied, but the alternative diplomatic mechanisms of NATO and other alliance systems would suddenly revive. War could not be ruled out, but Russia would be in so disadvantageous a strategic position that only a very irrational set of decision-makers in Moscow could be regarded as likely to risk it. Even discounting that possibility, it is clear that a great deal of the future of the global system depends on what happens politically and economically in Russia in this period of, hopefully, transition to a secure pluralist democracy based in a rapidly developing market economy. It may be years before the die is firmly cast either in that direction, or its disastrous alternatives.

China offers the other great political uncertainty among the world powers. The policy-makers in Beijing, in Deng Xiaoping's final days, still appeared confident that they could pass on to their inevitable successors (men mostly themselves in their sixties, but representing 'the young generation' by the standards of Chinese politics) the secret of how to maintain indefinitely their successful course of authoritarian capitalism, without weakening the grip of the party. If that should prove true, the China of, perhaps, 2020 will be a formidable force indeed in the world's affairs: relatively rich, overwhelmingly numerous, equipped with advanced weapon-systems, including nuclear ones, with a totalitarian government and an assertive stance in Asia and the South China Sea. Its neighbours, even including Japan, would not be likely to find that very comfortable.

On Western theories, by contrast, the old men in Beijing have got it wrong: successful capitalism will generate forces incompatible with autocratic party control. In any case, there must be a succession crisis when Deng is finally gathered to his ancestors. The uncertainties of political transition thereafter may be parallel to those at present being endured in Russia, though the economic context should be far more favourable.

Only time will tell which theory will prove valid, but this may be an issue where the change from Bush to Clinton may prove influential, for good or ill. Of all Washington's 'opposite numbers' in

policy making, those in Beijing had probably most to be anxious about in that transition. For Bush devoted a special personal care to the Washington-Beijing relationship, undoubtedly stemming from his stint as America's representative there in the early days of the Nixon 'opening to China', and his understanding, as a hangover from the days of Cold War power-calculations, of the possible importance of 'the China card' in some future diplomatic manoeuvre. In the initial post-Cold War euphoria, those calculations seemed to refer to a time long ago, and far from relevant. But the post-Cold War euphoria has proved a lot more temporary than the Cold War itself, and power-calculations about a multilateral central balance may in due course be necessary again. In them, China must almost inevitably be of more real importance than it was during the original calculations of the early seventies. For it must inevitably be far stronger, strategically as well as economically, than it was then. In fact far stronger than it has ever been since Westerners impinged on the Chinese world-state in the eighteenth century. That may be quite an anxious time for those who live in the Pacific, a time when they are likely to feel the need of outside allies.

One can see all these considerations behind Bush's careful personal tending of the Washington-Beijing link, and also behind the policies of many of the smaller states of the Asia-Pacific region. No such factors, however, have yet appeared to influence Clinton's projected policies. He inherited from his last Democratic predecessor, Jimmy Carter, a strong commitment to human rights and the active sponsoring of democratic values in places abroad where they seem to be lacking. Among the techniques chosen to promote that worthy end is the setting up of a 'Radio Free Asia' broadcasting service, along the lines of the 'Radio Free Europe' which was undoubtedly useful to, and influential among, those who led the dissident movements against communism in Eastern Europe. That will irk the policy-makers in Beijing a good deal: possibly also those in Djakarta, when it touches on East Timor or Irian Jaya, as well of course as minor Asian autocracies like that in Myanmar. In the Chinese case, moreover, there is the fear of loss of MFN status, which would affect not only China's economic progress, but the stability of Hong Kong and perhaps even Taiwan.

The initial Chinese reaction to Clinton's election has been cautious and muted. The decision-makers will probably swallow a good deal (as with the Bush sale of F-16s to Taiwan) rather than react

in ways that would jeopardise the MFN status which is so important to this phase of their economic transformation. But that will not always be the case, as their overall strength increases.

The end of the twentieth century offers a rather neat historical illustration of the dangers of getting what you want. For a good forty years, many people on the left of the political spectrum saw the root of all international evil in the Cold War. Those on the right of the political spectrum used to retort that, on the contrary, it all stemmed from 'the evil empire' itself, the Soviet Union. Now both sides have got what they wanted: the Cold War has passed into history, and so has the Soviet Union. More lapse of time is needed, of course, before either can be adequately assessed, but neither warrants nostalgia. Yet the post-Cold War, post-Soviet Union world has not proved to be an instant Utopia, and the new millenium does not seem likely to produce the Millenium.

APPENDIX

THE POWERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
(CHAPTERS V TO IX OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS)

CHAPTER V
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

COMPOSITION

Article 23

1. The Security Council shall consist of eleven Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect six other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.

2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members, however, three shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.

3. Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative.

FUNCTIONS AND POWERS

Article 24

1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary

responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.

3. The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration.

Article 25

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.

Article 26

In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

VOTING

Article 27

1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in

decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

PROCEDURE

Article 28

1. The Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. Each member of the Security Council shall for this purpose be represented at all times at the seat of the Organization.

2. The Security Council shall hold periodic meetings at which each of its members may, if it so desires, be represented by a member of the government or by some other specially designated representative.

3. The Security Council may hold meetings at such places other than the seat of the Organization as in its judgment will best facilitate its work.

Article 29

The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

Article 30

The Security Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

Article 31

Any member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected.

Article 32

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security

Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. The Security Council shall lay down such conditions as it deems just for the participation of a state which is not a Member of the United Nations.

CHAPTER VI
PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Article 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Article 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 35

1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.

2. A state which is not a member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.

3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.

Article 36

1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.

3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council shall also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

Article 37

1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.

2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

Article 38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

CHAPTER VII
ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action

may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Article 44

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

Article 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.

3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.

4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional subcommittees.

Article 48

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.

2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

Article 49

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

Article 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

CHAPTER VIII
REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Article 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.

Article 53

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Government concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

2. The term 'enemy state' as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

Article 54

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

CHAPTER IX
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COOPERATION

Article 55

With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:

a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development;

b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and

c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

Article 56

All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.

Article 57

1. The various specialized agencies, established by intergovernmental agreement and having wide international responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments, in economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related fields, shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 63.

2. Such agencies thus brought into relationship with the United Nations are hereinafter referred to as specialized agencies.

Article 58

The Organization shall make recommendations for the coordination of the policies and activities of the specialized agencies.

Article 59

The Organization shall, where appropriate, initiate negotiations among the states concerned for the creation of any new specialized agencies required for the accomplishment of the purposes set forth in Article 55.

Article 60

Responsibility for the discharge of the functions of the Organization set forth in this Chapter shall be vested in the General Assembly and, under the authority of the General Assembly, in the Economic and Social Council, which shall have for this purpose the powers set forth in Chapter X.

STRATEGIC AND DEFENCE STUDIES CENTRE

The aim of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, which is located in the Research School of Pacific Studies in the Australian National University, is to advance the study of strategic problems, especially those relating to the general region of Asia and the Pacific. The Centre gives particular attention to Australia's strategic neighbourhood of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. Participation in the Centre's activities is not limited to members of the University, but includes other interested professional, diplomatic and parliamentary groups. Research includes military, political, economic, scientific and technological aspects of strategic developments. Strategy, for the purpose of the Centre, is defined in the broadest sense of embracing not only the control and application of military force, but also the peaceful settlement of disputes which could cause violence.

This is the leading academic body in Australia specialising in these studies. Centre members give frequent lectures and seminars for other departments within the ANU and other universities, as well as to various government departments. Regular seminars and conferences on topics of current importance to the Centre's research are held, and the major defence training institutions, the Joint Services Staff College and the Navy, Army and RAAF Staff Colleges, are heavily dependent upon SDSC assistance with the strategic studies sections of their courses. Members of the Centre provide advice and training courses in strategic affairs to the Department of Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

Since its inception in 1966, the Centre has supported a number of Visiting and Research Fellows, who have undertaken a wide variety of investigations. Recently the emphasis of the Centre's work has been on problems of security and confidence building in Australia's neighbourhood; the defence of Australia; arms proliferation and arms control; policy advice to the higher levels of the Australian Defence Department; and the strategic implications of developments in Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Southwest Pacific.

The Centre runs a Graduate Programme in Strategic Studies, which includes both Graduate Diploma and Masters programmes. It maintains a comprehensive collection of reference materials on strategic issues, particularly from the press, learned journals and government publications. Its Publications Programme, which includes the Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence and SDSC Working Papers, produces more than two dozen publications a year on strategic and defence issues.

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