CULTURE AND NATIONALISM IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY EASTERN EUROPE

edited by

Roland Sussex and J. C. Eade

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ISBN: 0-89357-146-6.

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INTRODUCTION

by Roland Sussex

National revivals reveal the nineteenth century in one of its most characteristic perspectives. At the beginning of the century the heavyweight autocracies—including Britain, France, Prussia, Russia, Austro-Hungary and Turkey—were in fairly firm control of their respective dominions. The national and ethnic groups under their domination did not threaten the imperial authority to any serious degree, and like the smaller states and principalities, had only a restricted and fairly local awareness of their own identity. By the end of the century, however, the big autocracies were in a much weaker position, and the geographical and political map presents an altogether more fragmented picture. The essential difference between the map of 1800 and that of 1900 lies in the host of smaller nations and sub-nations, which during the nineteenth century had discovered—or redis-covered—, and affirmed—or reaffirmed—their own internal identity, and their claims to existence as autonomous entities.

These national revivals are commonly interpreted in terms of political entities in defined geographical locations. Certainly, the unification of Italy, or the re-emergence of Bulgaria and Serbia at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, shows how disparate groups can become nationally united across (as in the case of Italy) and within (for example, Bulgaria or Serbia) existing national boundaries. And it is also true that political and geographical autonomy was the explicit goal of all the nationalist revival movements of the century. Nonetheless, a purely political and geographical solution to nationhood imposes strict limitations on the very concept of national revival, and the way in which we can achieve a proper understanding of this complex, unstable, but erratically dynamic phenomenon. Some of the large-scale strands of nationalist revivals are fairly clear, in particular the notion of *patria*—the geographical homeland—and *natio*—the ethnic group which lays claim to *patria*. In the context of the nineteenth-century national revivals, both these concepts took on a historical perspective, by reference back to periods when a given people had controlled a given area of territory. This historical strand is important, because it reveals other aspects of the claim by ethnic groups to independent existence and territorial claims. Here we find the themes of ethnic consciousness, and linguistic and cultural continuity, sometimes

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intertwined with ethnic and atavistic myths which were held to prove or support claims to the physical homeland, and to establish rights of ethnic succession. The nineteenth century itself encouraged such arguments, particularly in the heyday of Romantic nationalism and the concept of ethnic self-determination. And it is arguments and sentiments like these, preserved and revived in various forms throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries, which have been invoked by ethnic groups as they struggle for self-identification and self-determination against ruling autocracies, as well as among themselves.

In one sense, then, the question of national revivals in the nineteenth century focuses and intensifies some of the century's most powerful underlying forces. But our conception of nineteenth-century nationalistic movements, as projected by a very wide range of published documents and analyses in the contemporary literature, shows a consistent and limiting bias towards what the linguist Benjamin Lee Whorf (albeit in another context) called 'Standard Average European'—the cultural viewpoint, standards, and preconceptions of the most powerful Western European cultures. Of itself, such an approach need not necessarily be a bad thing. After all, the mere cultural weight, scope and impetus of Western European culture mean that it tends to concentrate and reflect the greatest range of an age's sensitivities. The problem is that the big European cultures were often aligned with the autocracies, which prevented them from perceiving the true extent and nature of the national revivals *from within*. Even a man like Herder, with his wide sensibilities and his sympathy for subordinated ethnic minorities, does not sound like a subordinated minority, but rather like a benevolent German, when he exhorts—say—the Slavs not to lose hope in their aspirations for a free and independent existence. The problem is one of perspective. The sheer bulk and richness of the Western European cultural tradition tends to impede our understanding of nationalist movements beyond its immediate sphere. We know of these external national movements, and refer to them freely; but we see them not from within, but from the point of view of, and with the cultural preconceptions of, the dominating culture of the day.

A healthy antidote to this cultural ethnocentrism is the study of national movements in nineteenth-century Eastern Europe. Unlike national movements in the Americas, Africa or Asia, the East Europeans were stimulated in their desire for freedom precisely by their relation to the cultural and political structures of the major ruling autocracies. Many of them received cultural stimulus and encouragement from within this tradition; most found a sense of identity in their opposition to this tradition. And they found, from within their own ethnic and cultural traditions and heritage, the bases for the struggle for existence, self-determination and autonomy.

The term 'Eastern Europe', of course, is itself something of a misnomer. Modern Eastern Europe covers an irregular and ill-defined area between the modern German Democratic Republic in the west and the USSR in the east, and from the former Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the

north, to Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria in the south. This definition is mainly a political artefact, based on the delimiting line between the Communist and the non-Communist worlds. And yet in the nineteenth century this area did have a certain coherence, if only in negative terms, by being the most concentrated area of unrealised national aspirations in all of Europe. The realisation of these aspirations in the twentieth century has been a fundamental cause of the re-shaping of the geo-political map of Europe. And the revival of their cultures has contributed enormously to the richness of the modern European tradition.

Considerations like these persuaded the Humanities Research Centre of the Australian National University to choose as its theme for 1980 the topic of European national revivals in the nineteenth century. Two conferences were held, one devoted to Western Europe, and one to Eastern Europe. The papers published in this volume represent a selection of the papers offered at the second of these two conferences. The conference on the nineteenth century national revivals in Eastern Europe, which was held in Canberra from 9 to 13 July 1980, explored the common factors among the otherwise very diverse national movements of Eastern Europe, in the context of an overall European perspective. It examined the different paths by which ethnic groups had asserted and eventually achieved a sense of common origin, common fate, and unity of purpose; and it surveyed some of the paths which had led to the eventual establishment of political and geographical autonomy among the peoples of Eastern Europe, and some of the individuals—writers, patriots, politicians and philosophers—who had promoted that cause for independence.

This volume is not intended to be representative of the whole field of nineteenth-century national and cultural revivals in Eastern Europe. The papers published here were chosen rather because they address not only individual aspects of the revival question, but also a common core of broader issues: the questions of *natio* and *patria*, ethnic re-awakening and cultural renaissance, the pursuit of a sense of national identity, historical revival, and the affirmation of national rights in the present. Furthermore, rather than treating the revival issue within the context of a single discipline like history, politics, geography, language studies, and so on, these papers are biased more towards inter-disciplinary perspectives, and towards the principles underlying the emergence, development and success—or failure—of attempts at national and cultural revival.

Especially characteristic of the nineteenth-century revivals in Eastern Europe is the close link between nationalism and culture. In the twentieth century we have seen many nationalist movements; they have often been successful, particularly in the dismemberment of the old European colonial empires. But these revivals have been more ethnic-political in nature. The nineteenth-century revivals were distinctly more cultural—and, in a fundamental sense, more cultured. In the nineteenth century the patriot is also the poet, the maker, in the person of a Korais, or a Mapu, a Shevchenko, or a Mickiewicz. His vision is sometimes practical, local and pragmatic; sometimes it is messianic, combining

immediate goals for national self-management with an almost cosmic feeling of destiny. These patriot-messiahs stand in a direct line of descent from a dis-tinguished former culture and country, and lay claim to the modern *land* by right of *cultural* inheritance.

The cultural aspect of the revivals has two main strands: the historical element, and the stimulation of contemporary writing and general cultural activity. The historical connection is most clearly visible in the case of the Greeks: in order to draw on the prestige and charisma of this most distinguished of cultural traditions, it was enough for patriots like Korais to establish the right of succession, and thereby to imply the *droit d'état* (Jeffreys, Clogg). In the case of the Jews the cultural inheritance had a more strongly ecclesiastical character, but was none the less potent for that; the difficulty was rather with the lack of continuity in geography and land which separated the nineteenth-century Jews from their ancestral homeland and cultural milieu (Patterson). For Ukrainians (Pritsak) there was an additional problem of discontinuity with Old Kievan culture, and the presence of an antagonistic counter-culture in the form of Russian. Sometimes, however, the historical element took on a supra-cultural aspect, especially when the destiny of historic races was at issue—as happened with the Poles (Walicki). And the Hungarians supported their own claim to ethnic uniqueness by invoking the Turanian theory—the notion that the Hungarians were descended from the Turanians, or Turkic races—long after the theory itself was discredited on linguistic grounds (Winternitz).

Parallel to the historical revival is the rebirth of contemporary culture—the formation, stimulation and exercising of a sense of cultural self-awareness. Its most visible outward sign is in writing of many kinds, from pamphlets and journalism to literature, and in the support of the language through grammars, dictionaries, and the founding of language-regulatory bodies. The Slavonic *matice*, institutions which functioned as semi-official national cultural centres, played a typically key role in fostering folklore, and in publishing the new writing. Significantly, many of the *matice* were closed down by the occupying powers during the latter part of the century, since their cultural activities had broadened to provide a base for political as well as ethnic-cultural nationalism. Publishing houses and educational structures were also instrumental in forming the language and ethos of the new cultures. In some cases—as with the Bulgarians or the Jews—there had been a long interval between the antecedent historical culture and the language and style of the nineteenth century. There was con-sequently a problem of how to forge a workable union of the old and the new, and how to get it accepted by the nation at large. Pritsak describes the conflict between opposed cultural models for Ukrainian language-culture, and the mechanisms by which the victor finally triumphed.

Together with cultural identity comes the highly emotive question of identity with the land, the *patria*. The nineteenth century began with a strong expression of patriotism in the Napoleonic Wars. Following on the American War of

Independence, the Napoleonic Wars showed a clearly political slant to the nationalism issue: to fight for King (or Emperor) and country. For the smaller European nations and sub-national groups of the day, however, the *patria* could not properly be called their own; in fighting for or on it, they fought ostensibly for whoever happened to have political control over it at that moment. The Greek War of Independence represents a strong outbreak against just such a subjugation. But for most of the sub-national groups such action was not possible, either militarily or politically. Instead, they took the a-militarist approach of elevating the Land into an almost mystical entity. For the Jews this dream was indeed a distant one; they did not even live on their own land, let alone have control over it (Patterson). For the other emerging ethnic groups, *patria* became a kind of grail. Such a concept turned out to be a potent catalyst in focussing national sentiment in the eventual political and military activity which was needed to assert their territorial rights. For the time being, however, it gave the cultural tradition a physical home, and the mystical sense of identification with the culture was paralleled by a comparable, though subtly different, sense of identification with the earth.

This perspective is very much a matter of an internal view. Seen from a greater thematic distance, the issues of nationalism can be studied more from the point of view of their underlying processes, and the factors which motivated and perpetuated them. This area embraces a number of different themes. What was the motive behind the autocracies' insistence on geo-political authority? Imperial Russia, cast so often in the role of the evil oppressor during the nineteenth century, in fact conducted an expansionist policy much more moderate than its twentieth-century successor, and in fact achieved very little in return for very substantial expenditure in men and money (Jelavich). Nor was it always clear who was the oppressed: Marx and Engels certainly did not have a constant or wholly sympathetic view of the fate of the Poles (Cummins). And it is not even so certain just what nationalism was all about: Jensen departs from the position of most of the papers in this volume, and of nationalist revival studies in general, in arguing that nationalism is not a nineteenth-century product arising from the union of *natio* and *patria*, but rather the result of a working relationship between people and a state, which implements the wish of the people for organized national activity.

This point is worth pursuing. Because even within the European model of nationalist revivals, there are significant differences, and changing relationships between the intangibles (*natio, patria,* cultural ethos), and their concrete expression as part of a nation-state. Is a nationalist revival possible without culture? Without *patria*? And what are the temporal factors governing each alternative? The twentieth-century nationalist revivals have been much less cultural than those of the nineteenth century, as we have noted. Other models of a-cultural nationalism include the Tartar Hordes, which were certainly not cultureless—they must have had a considerable tradition of oral culture, like most nomadic peoples—and the

emergence of other pre-literate nationalist movements. In the twentieth century we have seen some nationalist revivals which are highly politicized, especially along Marxist ideological lines; the modern conflicts in South-East Asia and Central America have all the signs of nationalism being used as a means to achieve political-ideological ends, rather than as a catalyst to self-determination *per se*.

Nationalist revivals, then, are not always the same. They change their ideological, cultural and political basis in different times and in different places. The nationalist-cultural revival of Eastern Europe in the nineteenth century presents one particularly clear case of the association of culture with nation and with homeland. To succeed, the nationalist movements had to exhibit a number of characteristics like vitality, 'abstand' and historicity, as Sussex argues from his application of a sociolinguistic model to the structure of nationalist revivals. The success of nationalist movements can certainly not be predicted by any simple algorithm. But as the papers in this volume show, we can now achieve a clearer and finer understanding of how nationalism and culture combine in revival movements, and how they interact with other factors in what Cummins calls 'the springtime of peoples'.

Sense of the Past in Pre-Independence Greece

by Richard Clogg

> We have said many times, friends, that the worst misfortune of a once re-nowned Race is the forgetting of its ancestral virtues, the unawareness of its own wretchedness, the neglect of, and contempt for, education. Which things, it seems, prevailed after the lamentable downfall of Greece into enslavement. But already, by Divine Providence, the Greeks of their own accord have begun to awake from the deepest lethargy of ignorance, to care for enlightenment and for their re-birth, and to take gigantic steps on the road to the acquisition of their ancestral virtue and religion.
>
> Grigorios Paliouritis (1814)[1]

It is, of course, a commonplace that national movements the world over have sought, and continue to seek, to legitimise themselves by reference to the glories, real or imagined, of a past before they had fallen under alien domination. E.J. Hobsbawm has observed that just as the bourgeois parvenu seeks a pedigree, so do 'new nations or movements annex examples of past greatness and achievement to their history in proportion as they feel their actual past to have been lacking in these things'.[2] English radicals of the seventeenth century looked back to the supposed freedom of Anglo-Saxon England before the imposition of the 'Norman Yoke', while Mustafa Kemal Atatürk sought to authenticate the Turkish right to Anatolia by claiming the Hittites and Sumerians as the ancestors of the Ottoman Turks. In the Balkans, Romanian nationalists harked back to the Dacian conquests of the Emperor Trajan, Bulgarians to the glories of the First and Second Bulgarian Empires, Serbs to the medieval empire of Stephan Dushan, Albanians to Skanderbeg and beyond him to the ancient Illyrians.

The nascent Greek intelligentsia of the eighteenth century, of course, drew its inspiration from the glories of ancient Greece. The fact that this heritage was revered throughout the civilized world was one of the most important factors in determining the precocity of the Greek national movement in relation to that of the other Balkan peoples. Virtually nothing was known outside the Balkans of the historical antecedents of the other peoples of the peninsula. Yet the language

and civilization of ancient Greece had for centuries been the object of intensive study in Western Christendom. Infinitely more was known about the ancient Greeks outside the Greek lands than within. The Greeks' rediscovery, during the decades before independence, of a sense of Hellenic ancestry was indeed in considerable part mediated through Western interest in, and knowledge of, their heritage. Daniil Philippidis and Grigorios Konstantas in their *New Geography* of 1791, one of the most remarkable works of the 'Neo-Hellenic Enlightenment', bemoaned the fact that as descendants of Hecateus, Ptolemy, Pausanias, 'and so many others', they were obliged to go to the offspring of the Scythians, Celts and Gauls to learn something of their own ancestors.[3]

That the Greeks should have become so obsessed with their past is not to be wondered at, given the extraordinary hold which the ancient world exercised over the imagination of educated people throughout the civilized world during the period of the Greek national revival. European and American statesmen shared a common classical tradition in education, so much so that John Adams during the first Continental Congress in 1774 felt obliged to ask himself whether Demosthenes, had he been a deputy to the Congress, would have been satisfied with the non-importation and non-exportation agreements. Ancient Greek failed to become the official language of the new United States by only the narrowest of majorities. The influence of classical Greece and Rome over many of the protagonists of the French Revolution was profound. The donning of the 'Phrygian' cap and the adoption of classical names became common: one earnest citizen named his son Régénéré Anatole Pierre Lycurgue Combert.[4] When Adamantios Korais, who more than any other Greek of his epoch sought to re-awaken his compatriots to the glories of their ancient heritage, sought, shortly after the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence in 1821, to enlist the support of Jean-Pierre Boyer, the President of Haiti, he received a characteristic reply. The President assured Citizen Korais that the Haitians had the greatest sympathy for the righteous struggle of 'les descendans de Leonidas' and would gladly have contributed, if not troops or ammunition, then money with which to buy arms, had it not been for the supervention of a local rebellion. Unable to offer practical help, President Boyer nonetheless assured Korais and his compatriots of the

> 'voeux ardens que le peuple haïtien forme pour leur délivrance, déjà les Grecs modernes comptent ... des trophées dignes de Salamine ... Puissent-ils, semblables aux Grecs de l'antiquité, leurs ancêtres et sous les ordres de Miltiade qui les dirige, faire triompher, dans les champs d'une nouvelle Marathon, la cause sainte qu'ils ont entreprise pour la défense de leurs droits, de la religion et de la Patrie!'[5]

Here I want to analyze the process by which the Greeks regained in the decades before 1821 a 'sense of the past', an awareness that they were the heirs to an intellectual and cultural heritage that was universally admired throughout the

civilized world. In short, I want to examine the genesis of the 'progonoplexia', or ancestor obsession, that has so bedevilled the cultural and linguistic develop- ment of modern Greece. At the outset I should make it clear that I shall not be seeking to add to the somewhat sterile debate that has raged since the 1830s, when the German Hellenist Fallmerayer claimed that not a drop of pure Hellenic blood flowed in the veins of the modern Greeks, as to the racial and cultural continuity of the Greek people.[6] The only point I should like to make in this particular connection is to stress that there had, of course, been earlier periods in their history when the Greeks had developed a particular awareness of their past. During the late first, second and third centuries A.D., the period termed by Philostratus the 'second sophistic', there was a notable revival of interest in the past which was reflected, *inter alia*, in linguistic Atticism and the adoption of Homeric names.[7] During the period of the Byzantine Empire there were periodic revivals of interest in the classical past, none more poignant than that associated with Georgios Gemistos Plethon and the Despotate of the Morea during the last, desperate years of an Empire that appeared doomed to extinction. Plethon stressed the physical continuity of the Byzantine inhabitants of the Peloponnese with their Greek ancestors, going so far as to change his name so that it would more closely resemble the Plato he so admired. Much to the scandal of the Church hierarchy he adumbrated a 'Hellenic' religion, heavily influenced by Platonic ideas, to take the place of Orthodox Christianity.[8]

How far the kind of explicit consciousness of the past that is reflected in Plethon's writings survived the Ottoman conquest is a matter for debate. But there does seem to have been some kind of collective memory of a glorious past. At a popular level this was reflected in legends and traditions and in the enormous popularity of tales of the exploits of Alexander the Great.[9] Some kind of residual link with the past, too, was reflected in a number of superstitious practices and in the awe in which the physical remains of antiquity were held. Mikhail Photein- opoulos, for instance, in his compendium of laws known as the *Nomikon Prok- heiron* of 1765, found it necessary to admonish the Greeks not to place food on gravestones, in the belief that the dead would rise up and eat it, 'for this was Hellenic, akin to the mead that the Hellenes poured over the tombs of their dead'.[10]

Numerous instances are recorded by travellers of the attribution of miraculous qualities to the surviving memorials of Greece's past greatness. When C.R. Cockerell sought to remove antiquities from the Temple of Aphaea on Aigina, the primates of the island begged him not to, not out of any sense of the despoliation of their own heritage, but for fear that they would suffer some kind of misfortune. Cockerell believed this 'rubbishy pretence of superstitious fear' to have been a mere pretext to extort money.[11] Richard Chandler observed that the peasants of Eleusis looked on the famous statue of Demeter as ensuring the fertility of their crops. The local Ottoman *ağa*, Ahmet, was 'fully possessed with this superstition', and refused to allow Chandler to dig or measure near the statue

until his scruples had been overcome by a present of 'a handsome snuff-box containing several zechins or pieces of gold'.[12] Other travellers found that the famous Sigean inscription at Yenishehir in the Troad was regarded as having miraculous powers in the cure of the 'ague' and in the exorcism of 'daemonical possession'.[13] There are, too, occasional indications of the existence in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of a more explicit consciousness of the past. In 1577, for instance, Stephan Gerlach asked Ioannis Zygomalas why he preferred to deliver his sermons in ancient Greek. To which Zygomalas replied that he preferred to deliver a hundred sermons in ancient Greek rather than to give so much as one in the vulgar. It was sufficient that a sermon was understood by just one or two of his listeners.[14] In the seventeenth century the so-called 'Protestant' Patriarch, Kyrillos Loukaris, plaintively remarked that 'in olden times, when wisdom ruled in Greece, the Hellenes took the Latins for barbarians. And now is it not strange that we have become barbarian and they have become wise?'[15]

It seems, then, that during the early centuries after the Ottoman conquest some awareness of their ancient heritage existed not only among learned Greeks but at the popular level, even if for the great mass of the Greek people this almost sub-conscious awareness was suffused with superstition. What I want to do here, however, is to try to trace the emergence in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries of an explicit, conscious and clearly articulated 'Sense of the Past', of that obsession with Greece's former greatness that was to be such an important constituent of the Greek national movement. In short, I want to examine the process whereby on the eve of the outbreak of the War of Independence in 1821 many members of the Greek intelligentsia came to make, and to believe in, the most extravagant claims as to the imminent regeneration of their homeland. One such, Nikolaos Skouphas, in the preface to a translated *Short History of Greek Literature* published in 1816, averred that a new epoch had begun for the Greeks: before long the whole of enlightened Europe would witness 'the rebirth of new Platos and new Demosthenes upon the ruins of the old classical world',[16] while in 1820 Benjamin of Lesvos declared in the preface to a study of metaphysics that 'nature had set limits to the desires of other men, but not to those of the Greeks. The Greeks were not subject in the past and are not now subject to the laws of nature'.[17]

This rediscovery of the past manifested itself in a number of ways in the seventy years or so before independence: in a massive upsurge of interest in the written memorials of ancient Greek civilization; in an increasing emphasis on the teaching of the classics in the schools and colleges of the Greek world; in the revival of names associated with the glories of the Greek past; in a growing interest in the physical remains of antiquity and an increasing resentment at the despoliation of this heritage by travelling foreigners and more particularly Englishmen; and, last but not least, in the bitter polemics that raged over the language question, the extent to which the modern language of the Greeks should be 'purified' to render it more akin to the idea of Attic purity. This almost

obsessive interest in past glories had, of course, clear political implications. If the Greeks were truly the heirs to an historical, linguistic and cultural tradition that was universally admired throughout the civilized world, was it not then particularly reprehensible that they continued to labour under the Hagaren yoke? If indeed, as the Metropolitan Ignatios of Oungrovalachia maintained in 1811, the Muses had never forgotten their ancestral abode on Olympos and Parnassos and now wished to return there after such a long sojourn in Europe,[18] then had not the civilized nations of Europe incurred a massive debt of obligation to the enslaved Greeks? Could they not now be expected to repay this debt by helping the Greeks to overthrow an insufferable tyranny?

How, then, did this rediscovery of the past manifest itself? While Iosipos Moisiodax was certainly justified in complaining in 1766 of a scarcity of the writings of their classical forebears which had stripped the Greeks 'of all the most basic knowledge of the ancients',[19] it is less easy to understand the reasons that prompted Grigorios Paliouritis to write in 1815 that the descendants of Miltiades, Leonidas and Epameinondas were ignorant 'not only of the works but of the very names of their ancestors'.[20] For during the intervening fifty years the Greeks had been subjected to a veritable flood of editions of the classics, histories of the ancient Greeks and of classical literature, accounts of the archaeology, lore and mythology of the ancient world, and a whole host of books whose purpose was to extol the virtues of that Hellas which was 'the marvel of the world, the amazement of every living being and the mentor of almost every human generation'.[21]

A leading role in this effort to re-awaken interest in the classical was played by that 'new Hippocrates',[22] Adamantios Korais, the dominant figure in the pre-independence cultural revival. Born in Smyrna in 1748, Korais had been a miserable failure as a merchant in the flourishing Greek community of Amsterdam. He subsequently studied medicine at Montpellier, but his heart lay in the study of classical philology. Shortly after he had graduated from Montpellier, one of his French patrons, the hellenist D'Ansse de Villoison, tried to secure him a job in Oxford.[23] Had this effort succeeded, it is tempting to speculate that Korais might have led the cloistered life of an Oxford don. Instead between 1788 and 1833 he lived in Paris and laboured ceaselessly to raise the educational level of his fellow countrymen and to instil in them a sense of Hellenic consciousness. He poured forth an unending stream of nationalist polemic, while all the time consolidating his reputation as one of the foremost hellenists of the Europe of his day. The great Richard Porson, who took a low view of the work of most of his contemporaries, thought highly of Korais' scholarship.[24]

Korais' most ambitious educational project was the *Elliniki Vivliothiki* or Hellenic Library, which was launched in 1805. The project evolved in response to a question put to him by the Zosimas brothers, wealthy merchants from Jannina, as to how best the incipient resurrection of Greece might be accelerated. In answer Korais conceived the ambitious scheme of publishing, in editions

specifically geared to a Greek readership, the greater part of the Greek classics, beginning with Homer and ending with 'those writing at the time of the Ptolemies, or a little later'. Orphaned and indigent students, thanks to the generosity of the Zosimades, were to receive free copies of the texts—but only if, on the basis of six monthly examinations, they were judged by their teachers to be worthy recipients of such largesse. Similarly, teachers who provided sufficient evidence of their own zeal would receive further free copies. Korais was sure that parents who could afford to do so, and who were conscious that the greatest gift they could bestow on the Motherland was to bring up their children to be enlightened and good-mannered, would purchase copies for their own children. Moreover, such parents could further demonstrate their patriotic feelings by purchasing additional copies to distribute to the indigent. At Greek booksellers in four cities, Vienna, Trieste, Venice and Livorno (all, it should be noted, outside the Greek lands), such parents could obtain a twenty per cent discount on the price that was to be charged to Europeans. Korais concluded by asserting that 'our common mother has need of the succour of all its children, so as to assume its ancient virtue and glory, so as to be numbered among the enlightened nations, and so as to oblige her enemies to shout out, despite themselves: 'Cry out with joy at the appearance of ancient Athens'.[25]

Thanks to Korais' extraordinary erudition and industry, the project reached fruition with the publication over the next twenty years of a whole series of editions of the classical texts. These were prefaced by a fascinating series of introductions, entitled 'impromptu reflections', in which Korais expounded his views as to ills that beset the Greek nation, and more particularly attacked the monkish ignorance and obscurantism of the Orthodox clergy. His basic message was that through the rediscovery of their own ancestral virtues and through the dissemination of education, then somehow, in a manner which was never specifically spelled out, the Greeks would regain the freedom and independence that was rightfully theirs.

Korais was by no means alone in his efforts to rekindle a sense of Hellenic consciousness in his compatriots. Other authors brought out editions of the classics or translations of them into modern Greek. One of the most curious of these offerings was an edition of Aristotle's *Physiognomonika* published at the Patriarchal Press in Constantinople in 1819 in *karamanlidika*, that is to say in Turkish printed in Greek characters, for the use of the very substantial populations of Turkish-speaking Greeks in Asia Minor. Translated from ancient Greek into modern Greek and thence into Turkish, it was intended by its Greek translator, Anastasios Karakioulaphis of Kayseri, as a small gift to the 'heteroglot sons' of his 'most beloved Motherland, Greece'.[26] Numerous grammars of ancient Greek were printed, many of them closely based on Western originals. Some of these, such as Stephanos Kommitas' *Paidagogos, i praktiki Grammatiki* (Vienna, 1800), were written in the conviction that ancient Greek was the only language worthy of the true sons of Greece, while the compilers of others, such as

Stephanos Oikonomos in his *Grammatiki tis Ellinikis Glossis* (Vienna, 1812)[27] argued that it was no more possible to restore the ancient language than to resurrect the dead. Vasileios Efthymiou in his *Pheravgis Grammatiki praktiki tis palaias Ellinikis glossis* (Vienna, 1811) was of the same opinion. 'How else', he asked,

> is it possible to transform the study of grammar from bitterness and disgust to pleasure and sweetness, if I did not introduce the present work written in the language that the young Greeks of my Motherland learn to understand from their swaddling clothes?[28]

Some grammarians, such as Athanasios Christopoulos, went so far as to argue that the modern language of the Greeks was in fact but a dialect of ancient Greek. Christopoulos complained in his 'Aiolodoric Grammar' of 1805 that 'many arrogant persons uncritically traduce the present day [Greek language] as barbaric, and this because it does not resemble the language of Thucydides and Plato'. But, he argued, Attic Greek had been spoken only in Athens and Attica. The Spartans, Macedonians, Peloponnesians, Epirots, etc., had spoken Doric or the Aiolian of Ionia: 'hence our language is Aiolodoric'.[29] Even that arch demoticist and champion of a reformed orthography, Ioannis Vilaras, included translated extracts of Plato's *Crito* and Thucydides' *History* in his *I Romeiki glosa* (Corfu, 1814).

Numerous histories of ancient Greece were published including a sixteen-volume translation of Charles Rollin's *Histoire ancienne des Egyptiens, des Carthaginois, des Assyriens, des Babyloniens, des Mèdes, et des Perses, des Macédoniens, des Grecs* (Paris, 1730-38).[30] The translator, Alexandros Kangkellarios, said that he had included the history of other civilizations such as those of the Egyptians, Assyrians, Babylonians, Medes and Persians so that the qualities of the Macedonians and Greeks would be all the more apparent. This was not a view that commended itself to Grigorios Paliouritis, who felt that it could only serve to confuse young Greeks.[31] Another translation was that of Goldsmith's *History of Greece*.[32] Grigorios Paliouritis justified his *Short History of Greece* of 1815 on the ground that the study of grammar without history was nothing but 'empty words',[33] while Vasileios Efthymiou in his *Short History* of 1807 stressed the importance of approaching ancient Greek culture through the medium of the modern language so as not to put off the young.[34]

In addition to general histories there were also biographies of individual worthies of the ancient world, such as Athanasios Stageiritis' lives of Themistocles (1816) and Miltiades (1818).[35] One very important category of historical writing was the local histories of the kind called for by Daniil Philippidis and Grigorios Konstantas in their *Geographia Neoteriki* of 1791 to complement their detailed study of the province of Magnesia,[36] and by Konstantinos Koumas in his *Outline of Ancient Geography* of 1819.[37] Koumas' remarks were particularly addressed to the clergy, whom he called upon to describe the geography of their parishes. One such work was the account of the Metropolitan Kyrillos of the region of Konya (Iconium) in Cappadocia and published at the Patriarchal Press in Constantinople

in 1815, during Kyrillos' tenure of the Ecumenical Patriarchate,[38] another the study of the *eparkhy* of Philippoupolis (Plovdiv) written by the priest Konstantinos Oikonomos and published at the expense of the Metropolitan Paisios of Philippoupolis in 1819.[39] Another popular genre was the history of ancient Greek literature: sometimes, as in the case of Anthimos Gazis' *Greek Library*, a compilation from a number of sources,[40] sometimes a straight translation, as in the case of M.S.F. Schoell's *Histoire abrégée de la littérature grecque, depuis son origine jusqu'à la prise de Constantinople par les Turcs* (Paris, 1813), the first volume of which covered the Greek writers from Homer to Zeno.[41] There were also accounts of ancient Greek religion, customs, lore and mythology.[42]

One book that proved irresistible to Greek translators, since it encapsulated the essence of Western romantic philhellenism, was the Abbé J.J. Barthélemy's *Voyage du jeune Anacharsis en Grèce, dans le milieu du quatrième siècle avant l'ère vulgaire*. This was a longwinded account, complete with verbatim conversations, of the imaginary journey of Anacharsis the Younger between 363 and 338 B.C., during the course of which he met with various *worthies* of the ancient world. First published in 1788, it was translated into a variety of languages, and enjoyed an enormous popularity. The first (partial) translation was undertaken by Georgios Sakellarios, who wrote in his preface that the Greek reader who was able to read it in a foreign language 'moistened the book with tears, seeing the exposition of the acts and the image of our brilliant ancestors'. Sakellarios' labours were continued by Rigas Velestinlis (Pheraios), the protomartyr of Greek independence. The first volume (translated by Sakellarios) and the fourth volume (translated by Rigas Velestinlis and Georgios Vendotis) were published in Vienna in 1797,[43] but the enterprise was abruptly terminated by the arrest and subsequent execution of Rigas by the Ottoman authorities in Belgrade in 1798 after the failure of his mission to revolutionise the Balkans. The project was resumed some twenty years later by Khrysovergis Kouropalatis of Anchialos (now Pomorie in Bulgaria) who brought out a seven-volume edition in Vienna in 1819. 'What other race', he asked in the preface, 'over a span of so many centuries, encompassed by so many fearful tempests, could guard such an heritage, and withstand such tribulations, without losing its brave sentiments'?[44] Kouropalatis in his preface gives a good insight into the way in which Greek intellectuals in the years before 1821 had become intoxicated with nationalist sentiment:

> there is nothing in the world more honourable, more desirable, more sacred than the Motherland ... in short, patriots of all nations think of nothing else, breathe nothing else, have no other wish, than the advantage, the increase and the glory of the Motherland.[45]

Almost without exception these works, although published in Greek for a Greek audience, were actually printed outside the Greek lands—in Venice, Vienna, Paris, Leipzig, Pest and elsewhere. As with other categories of Greek books published at this time, the bulk of the readership was to be found in the

prosperous communities of the Greek mercantile *diaspora*, or in the great cities of the Ottoman Empire such as Constantinople or Smyrna, rather than in the lands that formed the nucleus of the independent Greek state. A study of the subscription lists that were appended to a significant number of books published during the period of the 'Neo-Hellenic Enlightenment' has shown that a mere seven per cent of subscribers came from these regions.[46] Yet these subscription lists do also list readers, or at least purchasers, in somewhat unlikely places. Among the subscribers to the 1819 *karamanlidika* edition of Artistotle's *Physiognomonika*, for instance, were 22 subscribers from Niğde in Cappadocia (who together subscribed for a total of 36 copies). Subscribers are also recorded from Kayseri, Çorlu, Fertek, Bafra, Dilmosun, Incesu and Isparta, described as 'the Asiatic Sparta'.

John Cam Hobhouse, who travelled in Greece with Byron, conceded that 'the generality of the Greeks can read and write, and have a smattering of Hellenic' but was scathing about the paucity of books to be found in the Greek lands. Only Athanasios Psalidas of Ioannina had 'what might be called a library, and that a very small one'. Amongst his books were a copy of Thucydides with a 'Romaic' translation, and a copy of Goldsmith's 'Grecian history in Romaic'.[47] Elsewhere he found a copy of Rollin's 'Ancient History'.[48] Similarly, in the 1790s, J.B.S. Morritt of Rokeby came across a copy of Rollin in the house of an old man in the Mani who

> talked to us a vast deal about ancient Greece, of which he knew the whole history as well or better than us; he was particularly well acquainted with the different colonisation of the country, and his eyes sparkled with pleasure when he talked of the ancient Spartans.[49]

Although the actual diffusion, as opposed to the mere publication, of books, is notoriously difficult to quantify, there are indications of the circulation on a reasonably large scale of these books in the Greek lands. On the very eve of the War of Independence, for instance, an English missionary, William Jowett, found a complete set of the Greek classics in the library of the academy of Ayvalik (Kydonies) that 'new Miletus',[50] on the coast of Asia Minor, near Pergamon.[51]

Moreover there is also evidence of the circulation of works of western classical scholarship in the Greek lands. Adamantios Korais was introduced to the study of Latin and to the riches of western classical scholarship by Bernhard Keun, pastor to the Dutch protestant community in Smyrna.[52] Korais' own voluminous correspondence provides further evidence of his assiduity in trying to keep his fellow countrymen abreast of western classical scholarship, not only through his own writings, but by shipping editions of the classics to the schools of Greece and principally to the academies of Chios and Ayvalik. In the 1770s the Swedish traveller J.J. Björnståhl met an elderly Greek in the Phanar, Nikolaos Karatzas, who had an excellent knowledge of the classical authors. He possessed copies of Prideaux's *Marmora Oxoniensia*[53] and of Fabricius' *Bibliotheca Graeca*.[54] He also

possessed many other books in Latin, which he could not read, a rare failing in Björnståhl's experience of Greek scholars. Joachim, the Bishop of Anchialos, for instance, had translated the first nine books of Ovid's *Metamorphoses* into ancient Greek. Moreover, as he discovered, a knowledge of Western classical scholarship was by no means restricted to the metropolis. In Ambelakia in Thessaly, for instance, the local teacher, Georgios Triandaphyllos, who had studied with Evgenios Voulgaris at the *Athoniada Skholi* on Mount Athos, possessed a number of good European editions of the classics and lent Björnståhl the folio edition of Casaubon's commentary on Strabo published in Amsterdam in 1707. One of Triandaphyllos' pupils was reading Aristophanes in the original.[55] When the libraries of the Phanariot princely families were being dispersed after the outbreak of the Greek revolt in 1821, the oldest work which the British Embassy chaplain, Robert Walsh, was able to find was a copy of Joshua Barnes' edition of Homer published in Cambridge in 1711. In happier times Walsh had been entranced by Helena, the daughter of Princess Smaragda Morouzi, whom he considered to be the very realisation of an ancient Greek statue: 'her figure, dress, and mind seemed formed on such a model'. Her favourite reading was the poets and historians of ancient Greece. She often read Homer in the original to Walsh but he found that 'the modern pronunciation was very different indeed from that which we teach in our seminaries'.[56]

A very important part in the inculcation of this revived 'sense of the past' was played by the schools and colleges whose resurgence was such a marked feature of the decades before independence. An increasingly heavy emphasis was placed on the study of ancient Greek and on the classics of Greek history and literature. This emphasis was particularly pronounced in the various colleges where a more advanced education was essayed in the years immediately before 1821. These included the *Philologikon Gymnasion* of Smyrna (founded in 1808), the Academy of Chios, the *Lykeion* of Bucharest, the *Ionios Akadimia* founded by the eccentric philhellene Lord Guilford in Corfu, the *egali tou Genous Skholi (Great School of the Nation)* at Kuruçesme on the Bosphorus, and the *Ellinomouseion* of Ayvalik. If Rigas Velestinlis had grounds for complaining in the early 1790s that 'every sagacious patriot sorrows on seeing the unfortunate descendants of the most renowned Aristotle and Plato wholly empty of the idea of philosophy',[57] then the schoolteachers, who were to form the hard core of the nationalist intelligentsia, were to make up for lost time during the next three decades, in the process inflicting on Greek education that excessive preoccupation with the ancient world that has proved such a burden up until the present day.

Recording his impressions of a visit in 1820 to the famous Academy of Chios, headed at this time by Neophytos Vamvas, an American missionary, the Rev. Levi Parsons, noted that:

The lessons of the *second* class are in ethics and history, selected from the works of Chrysostom, Isocrates, Plutarch, Dionysius and Lucian. The *third* class, in

distinction from the first and second, are instructed in *poetry*—lessons taken from the Iliad—also in the different dialects and measures. The *fourth* class study Demosthenes, Plato, Herodotus, Homer, Sophocles, Euripides, and Pindar, and are required to translate frequently from the ancient Greek.[58]

At the *Philologiko Gymnasio* in Smyrna, founded as a counter to the traditionally oriented *Evangeliki Skholi* in the same city, Konstantinos Koumas taught the *Iliad*, Demosthenes, a part of Xenophon and some of the tragedies of Euripides and Sophocles,[59] while at the *Lykeion* of Bucharest, in addition to ancient Greek, students were obliged to study rhetoric, poetics, history, mythology and archaeo-logy.[60] The Quaker philanthropist William Allen was grieved to find during the course of a visit to Athens in 1819 that at a 'sort of grammar school for the classics' they taught 'Socrates, Eusebius, Plato and Xenophon, but *not* Jesus Christ'.[61] During the course of the annual examinations at the School of Zakynthos the literary class of 1817 was required to produce, in addition to essays on friendship, happiness and virtue, encomia of Aristeides, Themistocles, Homer and Solon. One of the students, Count Ioannis Lountzis, produced a poem to Homer cast in the form of a Sapphic ode.[62]

A by-product of this heavy bias towards the classical past in education was a revival of interest in the theatrical performance of the classics of the ancient world. Often these performances were restricted to the school environment, as when the students of *Ellinomouseion* of Ayvalik spent their leisure time declaiming plays such as Euripides' *Hecuba*,[63] while members of the Princely Academy in Bucharest staged a performance of *Phocion* in 1820. In 1815 young Greeks were in the habit of presenting plays based on classical themes by Iakovaki Rizos Neroulos, such as *Aspasia* and *Polyxenes*, at the house of the Russian consul in the Princes' Islands.[64] Petros Ippitos records having attended a performance of Sophocles' *Philoctetes* at the Greek theatre in Odessa in 1818.[65] Another direct outcome of this heavy emphasis in the schools and colleges on the culture of the ancient world was the practice among young Greeks of substituting the names of the worthies of ancient Greece for their Christian baptismal names, and that of their elders of giving their children such names at birth. These practices seem to have begun in the first decade of the nineteenth century. The classic instance of this sometimes slightly ridiculous practice occurred at the *Ellinomousion* of Ayvalik—at the instigation, it should be noted, of the French philhellene Ambroise Firmin Didot during his visit in 1817. 'Pour faire revivre dans l'enceinte du collège la langue de Demosthène et de Platon', Firmin Didot prevailed upon the students to covenant to abandon their coarse and vulgar vernacular for their 'mother tongue', as befitted the descendants of the Hellenes. If any of the students failed to keep to the agreement he was to be subject to the penalty of the public recitation of a page of Homer. In appending their names to the covenant the various signatories adopted classical names in the place of their Christian names. Thus Dimitrios became Themistocles, Charalambos became Pausanias and Didot himself, appropriately enough, signed himself as Anacharsis.[66]

In his biography Dionysios Pyrros described a ceremony which he had organised in 1813 in a school at which he taught in Athens which was attended both by pupils and by the *archontes*, or notables, of the city. As each pupil was called out, Pyrros presented him with a branch of laurel and of olive, saying that 'now your name is no longer Yannis or Pavlos or what have you but Pericles, Themistocles or Xenophon. Fear God, help your Motherland and love philosophy', while the assembled *archontes* shouted out 'Long live Pericles' or 'Long live Themistocles!'[67] It is worth noting that among the subscribers to Pyrros' *Geographia methodiki apasis tis Oikoumenis* (Venice, 1818) were three students Xenophon and Patrocles Gerondas and Miltiades Kharkhandilis. As they would have been too old by 1818 actually to have been baptized with these names, it is attractive to speculate that these were three of Pyrros' students who had participated in the 1813 ceremony and who had continued to use their new names.[68] William Jowett, an English missionary, visiting Chios on the eve of the Greek revolt, observed the 'great fashion, at present, of giving their children classical names' such as Calliope and Euterpe. He discovered one Chiot who intended to baptize his daughter Anthepe 'having discovered that that was the name, in very ancient times, of a Queen in Scio'.[69] Sometimes these students, in their enthusiasm, assumed names which were in fact calques of names of which there is no record in classical times. An instance of this is the adoption by Panayiotis Theodoridis and Giorgios Ioannidis of the names Panayiotis Phoivapollon and Phoivapollon o ek Smyrnis.[70]

One of the most significant manifestations of this new Hellenic consciousness was the development of a serious and scientific interest in, rather than a mere superstitious reverence for, the physical remains of Greek antiquity, and of a desire to preserve intact this marvellous heritage from the depredations of foreigners. Generations of foreign travellers in the Greek lands had purchased antiquities of all kinds for shipment home, even if few were to match the scale of Lord Elgin's operations on the Acropolis in Athens. A thriving antique market, dominated by Greeks, appears to have existed in Constantinople. Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, for instance, records that these Greek antiquaries had correspondents in Aleppo, Cairo, Arabia and Palestine 'who send them all they can find, and very often in great heaps, that are only fit to melt into pans and kettles'. They appeared totally ignorant of what they were selling and incapable of distinguishing between what was valuable and what was not: 'those that pretend to skill, generally find out the image of some saint in the medals of the Greek cities'. One of them showed her a figure of Pallas 'with a victory in her hand' and assured her that it was the Virgin holding a crucifix. She was also offered the head of Socrates on a sardonyx and, as though that would inflate its value, was told that it was a representation of St Augustine.[71] The zeal with which these foreign visitors sought to add to their collections of antiquities is well exemplified by J.B.S. Morritt of Rokeby. During a visit to Athens in 1795 he noted that above almost every door was 'an antique statue or basso-rilievo': 'some we steal, some

we buy'. He had already amassed some two hundred coins and medals and hoped soon to have two thousand. On a visit to Pella he employed the town crier to tout for medals, a move that resulted in the acquisition of several of Philip and Alexander.[72]

Not surprisingly these depredations aroused the Greek intelligentsia to fury. In the preface to his edition of Isocrates, Korais complained bitterly of Europeans having fleeced Greece of 'all the memorials and remains of her ancient glory'— but at least, he added, although shameful to the Greeks, this had ensured their preservation and saved them from total destruction at the hand of ignorant Greeks. He reserved the full force of this fury not for Greece's foreign despoilers but for those of his fellow countrymen who, either through ignorance or greed, were prepared to mortgage the country's ancestral heritage to aliens. He had particularly in mind the famous sale to E.D. Clarke of the codex containing Plato's Dialogues by the monks of the monastery of St John the Divine on Patmos. 'The savage peoples of Africa', he fulminated, 'who know neither good nor bad letters, could not have acted worse'. To remedy this deplorable state of affairs, which he attributed particularly to the ignorance and indifference of the clergy, he proposed that the Ecumenical Patriarch and the Holy Synod forbid forthwith the sale, to Greeks or foreigners, by the clergy of any manuscripts written in Greek. Instead a library, known as the *Ellinikon Mouseion*, should be set up where these priceless manuscripts could be properly cared for, protected and catalogued.[73]

One of the objects of the *Philomousos Etairia*, or Society of Friends of the Muses, that was established in Athens in 1813 was 'the uncovery of antiquities, the collection of marble inscriptions, of statues, of vessels and of any other worthwhile object'. The objects so collected were to be gathered together in a museum.[74] Not much was done to put these ambitious schemes into practice before 1821, and the rhetoric of the nationalist intelligentsia continued to resound with impassioned pleas to the Greeks to show a proper respect for the heritage of their ancestors. As an anonymous polemicist (? Stephanos Karatheodoris) put it in the *Stokhasmoi tou Kritonos*, a radical tract that was burned in the courtyard of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople in 1819:

> Do not suffer henceforth the enlightened nations to call you by the name of one of the tribes of the Caucasus ... erasing the Greeks from the catalogue of nations. Do not allow to continue any longer the woeful absurdity of their descendants, whereby they daily betray the ancestral treasures. They sell, I say, Plato to a Clarke, the ruins of Athens to an Elgin, and perhaps construct walls with the tomb of Themistocles.[75]

From the point of view of Greece's longer-term cultural development, the most important manifestation of the Greeks' rediscovery of the past was the increasingly bitter dispute that raged over the form of the language that was appropriate to a regenerated Greece, the Greek language being, as Grigorios Zalikoglou put it, 'that sacred flame ... the only natural bond that unites us'.[76] I

shall not dwell on the language question here, as I do not want to duplicate what Michael Jeffreys says. Suffice it to remark that Greek *literati* were roughly divided into three camps over the question of language. On the one hand there were the extreme archaizers, such as Platon Petridis, who subscribed to the view that the Greek language had been debased in proportion as the nation had been enslaved.[77] Petridis, and those of like kind, who included Stephanos Kommitas,[78] Panayiotis Kodrikas,[79] the Vlach Nikolaos Darvaris,[80] and Neophytos Doukas,[81] argued that if the Greeks were once again to become worthy of their ancestral greatness then they should revive the supposed purity of Attic Greek. At the other end of the spectrum were those such as Athanasios Khristopoulos[82] and Ioannis Vilaras[83] who sought to systematise the spoken language by compiling grammars, or those, such as Iosipos Moisiodax, Dimitrios Katartzis, Daniil Philippidis and Grigorios Konstantas who, by employing the popular language for the composition of books of serious content, sought to give it intellectual respectability.

A third main group, of which Korais was the acknowledged leader, advocated a middle way—adopting the spoken language but 'purifying' it of foreign words and constructions. Korais succinctly stated his linguistic philosophy in his introduction to Heliodorus' *Ethiopica*:

> So to distance oneself from customary usage as to be unclear in meaning, and completely unnatural to the ear, is tyrannical. So to vulgarize, on the other hand, as to appear disgusting to those who have received an education appears to me demagogic. When I say that the whole nation shares in the language with democratic equality, I do not mean that we should leave its shaping and creation to the vulgar imagination of the mob.[84]

Another subscriber to this middle way called upon his compatriots to write their books in the 'kathomiloumeni glossa': 'avoiding on the one hand outlandish and foreign speech, on the other the complex and abstruse syntax and periods of ancient Greek, and thus little by little to systematise and correct the common language of the race'.[85]

Inevitably the existence of such radically conflicting views made for a great deal of linguistic confusion. The kind of complications that could ensue for the ordinary, not very well educated Greek are graphically illustrated in the advice given to the readers of a fairly common genre of Greek book of the period, namely a guide to writing letters of various kinds, and in particular to Ottoman officials, bishops and other *episimoi*. The anonymous author of one such compilation, the *Neon Epistolarion* published in Venice in 1779, advised his readers that when writing to someone more important than themselves they should not try to hellenize and write words of which they did not know the meaning 'as it seems to me that it is not fitting that a number of important people over-hellenize and hyper-atticize'.[86]

Moreover, the increasingly violent polemics over the language led to a sometimes ludicrous contempt for earlier and supposedly debased stages in the deve-

lopment of the language. One can sympathise with Korais' complaint that the reading of so much as three or four pages of the 'Makaronist' chronicler Phrantzes was enough to aggravate his gout. 'C'est une horreur', he wrote,

And we wonder why the Greco-Roman Empire fell. After the nation declined from the Thucydides's, the Herodotus's and the Xenophons to the Phrantzes's how was it able any longer to resist the Scythians?[87]

Yet what is one to make of his further complaint that it was not an appetizing task to read the masterpiece of seventeenth-century Cretan Renaissance literature, the *Erotokritos* and 'such other monstrosities of wretched Greece'? But, he added, 'the lover of a very comely girl should not neglect to flatter her plain maidservant if access to the girl is thereby made easier'.[88] Dionysios Photeinos, a Greek from Patras settled in Bucharest, was so offended by the 'disgusting idioms and words barbaric and scarcely intelligible' in the *Erotokritos* that he was moved to publish a paraphrase in the 'now flourishing and most sweet speech of educated Greeks of our race'. In this *New Erotokritos* Phrontistas was renamed Sophocles.[89]

It is tempting to ridicule the sometimes absurd pretensions of the Atticizers, yet it has to be confessed that right was not always on the side of the demoticists. Such passions did the language question arouse that one leading archaizer, Neophytos Doukas, was set upon and beaten up by a gang of pupils of the demoticist Benjamin of Lesvos, at that time director of the Princely Academy in Bucharest. As a result Prince Brâncoveanu ordered that the 'malicious and boorish' Benjamin be banished from the territories of Wallachia.[90]

Needless to say this almost obsessional interest in the past did not go without challenge in the Greek world itself. Dr Mikhail Perdikaris, for instance, satirised the pretensions of those members of the new intelligentsia who delighted in dressing in Western clothes, *alafranga*, and in flaunting their doctorates from Western universities. In particular he ridiculed their practice of changing their names:

some take no pleasure in the surnames of their own family, and take the name of some ancient, or philosopher, or hero, thinking that, though without the virtue and learning of those of blessed memory, with only their bare name they are those themselves. So that one calls himself Empedocles, another Thrasyboulos, one calls himself Ass, another Blockhead.[91]

It was the hierarchy of the Orthodox Church that was most outspoken in its attacks on this resurgence of interest in the classical past. Equating as it did the ancient world with idolatry, the hierarchy was fearful that this obsession with antiquity, combined with a growing interest in the natural sciences, might fatally undermine the attachment of the Greek people to the Orthodox faith. Konstantinos Koumas records that the Ecumenical Patriarch, Grigorios V, in conformity with the ideas that he had formed on Mount Athos, was indifferent to scientific knowledge. He counselled the Orthodox *pliroma*, or flock, not to occupy them-

selves with Hellenic studies and the 'foolish wisdom' of the Europeans. Instead they should concern themselves with the study of grammar and the exegesis of the Fathers of the Church: 'the Platos and Aristotles, the Newtons and the Descartes, triangles and logarithms lead to indifference in matters divine'.[92] Grigorios' predecessor, the Patriarch Kyrillos VI, complained to Koumas, when the latter was director of the Patriarchal Academy at Kuruçesme, about grammatical innovations. He averred that he was at a loss to understand the current preference for Thucydides and Demosthenes over 'the most elegant' Synesius and Gregory Nazianzen; and he declared the verses of the twelfth-century Phtokhoprodromos to be much more harmonious than those of Euripides.[93]

One doughty champion of Orthodox tradition, Athanasios Parios, averred that a number of *literati*, as a result of an excessive reading of ancient Greek books and above all of Lucian, the model of Voltaire, could not now bring themselves to touch a religious book.[94] Elsewhere Athanasios attacked the philosophers of the ancient world as men who paid mere lip service to virtue and learning and, for good measure, denounced Plato as being 'woman obsessed, a pederast and a parasite'.[95] In 1784 the Orthodox clergy of Bucharest could only with difficulty be prevailed upon to grant a Christian burial to the Athonite monk and learned grammarian, Neophytos Kafsokalyvitis, after he had cried out in the delirious fever that preceded his death that he was about to join the souls of Plato and Demosthenes.[96] In a famous encyclical of 1819, Grigorios V and the Holy Synod condemned, *inter alia*, the recent innovation 'of giving ancient Greek names to the baptised infants of the faithful'. The clergy were enjoined to admonish their flocks

to abandon forthwith this abuse ... parents and godparents are in future to name at the time of the holy and secret rebirth [baptism] with the traditional Christian names, to which pious parents are accustomed, the [names] known in Church, and of the glorious saints that are celebrated by it.[97]

In general, then, the attitude of the Church hierarchy was more or less uniformly hostile to this growing obsession with Greece's classical past. In vain did some members of the intelligentsia seek to demonstrate that the study of the literary remains of the ancient world was not inherently inconsistent with the practice of the Orthodox religion. Konstantinos Oikonomos, for instance, in a speech delivered at the commencement of the third year of the *Philologikon Gymnasion* in Smyrna in 1811, valiantly sought to argue that the Fathers of the Church had immersed themselves in the Greek classics and had made an exact study of ancient Greek. St Basil the Great had read Thucydides and Xenophon; St Gregory, Plato and Aristotle. St John Chrysostom had always the most elegant works of the rhetoricians to hand and had enriched his homilies with them: hence his appellation as 'The Demosthenes of the Christians'. One of the greatest benefactions of the Church had been its contribution, through the Bible, to the preservation of 'our ancestral tongue ... pure and intact'.[98]

Although the Orthodox hierarchy's primary concern was that the recovery of Greece's classical heritage might bring in its wake irreligion and atheism, it was fearful also of the increasingly explicit political connotations of all this frenetic activity. For an institution that preached an absolute and unquestioning obedience to the Ottoman power, and indeed went so far as to argue that the Ottoman Empire had been specifically raised up to protect Orthodoxy from contamination by Latin Christianity, revival of pride in the achievements of a Hellenic past when Greece had been free of alien domination could not but have serious implications. Moreover Greek intellectuals were not slow in making an open connection between their past glories and political freedoms and their present debasement and subjugation to the Ottoman yoke. Implicit in the whole revival of interest in antiquity was that it portended the imminent regeneration and liberation of Greece. Ioannis Pringos, for instance, that epitome of the prosperous and 'progressive' pillar of the Greek mercantile *diaspora*, in an entry in his diary for 1768 called on the Almighty to raise up another Alexander, to evict the Turks from Greece, as once he had evicted the Persians.[99] Among his manifold efforts to raise the level of national consciousness of his compatriots, Rigas Velestinlis published a large printed 'icon' of Alexander the Great, flanked by four of his generals, and with cameos of his victories over the Persians.

Greeks living within the bounds of the Ottoman Empire necessarily had to be more circumspect in their equation of the ancient glories of Greece with her imminent regeneration. Yet there is plenty of evidence that this equation was continually being made. The Comte de Marcellus, a former French minister to the Ottoman Porte, has given in his memoirs a dramatic insight into the way in which the Greeks on the very eve of the 1821 revolt made the connection between erstwhile greatness and future liberation. During the winter of 1820 de Marcellus was invited by the family of a Greek notable, a former *postelnic* of the Danubian principalities, to participate in a literary evening at a mansion in Büyük Dere on the Bosphorus, 'loin du tumulte de Constantinople'. He was sworn to secrecy, the servants were dismissed, and he was led to a room well sheltered from the public eye. Among those present were Costaki and Nikolaki, the sons of Alexandros Mourouzis, a former *hospodar* of Moldavia, and Dionysios Kalliarkhis, the Archbishop of Ephesus. Ottoman courtesies such as coffee and the *tsibouki*, or pipe, were eschewed in favour of such supposedly Hellenic delights as sherbet and rose water. After Konstantinos Oikonomos had made a speech of introduction, a student of the *Ellinomouseion* of Ayvalik declaimed, in a 'voix animée, ardente et harmonieuse' the *Persians* of Aeschylus. An added note of poignancy was added by the fact that the young Greek was shortly afterwards to die on the field of battle in Greece. Once he had reached the victory of Salamis, the young Ayvaliot could not refrain from declaiming Rigas' *Thourios* or war hymn. When he had finished, Costaki Mourouzis pointed to the parallels between the *Persians* and the present situation of the Greeks. Was not Metrogates, the commander in Lydia, the vizir of Bursa? Arsames, who came from Egypt,

was clearly none other than the envoy of Mehmet Ali, who had recently brought a shipment of convicts to re-inforce the fleet. A King of Macedonia had avenged Greece of the first invasion by these barbarian hordes. Who would deliver her from the second?[100] In the late eighteenth century Edward Gibbon opined that:

> the olive-tree, the gift of Minerva, flourishes in Attica; nor has the honey of Mount Hymettus lost any part of its exquisite flavour ... By some, who delight in the contrast, the modern language of Athens is represented as the most corrupt and barbarous of the seventy dialects of the vulgar Greek; this picture is too darkly coloured; but it would not be easy, in the country of Plato and Demosthenes, to find a reader, or a copy, of their works. The Athenians walk with a supine indifference among the glorious ruins of antiquity; and such is the debasement of their character that they are incapable of admiring the genius of their predecessors.[101]

As we have seen, by the last quarter of the eighteenth century and during the first two decades of the nineteenth the true picture was quite the reverse of that painted by Gibbon. The Greeks' rediscovery of the past had manifested itself in a wide variety of ways, in the study of the classics, of the history, society, institutions, religion and mythology of the ancient Greeks, in an increasing emphasis on ancient Greek in the schools and colleges, in a tendency to adopt the names of illustrious heroes of the past, in bitter disputes over the language question and in a variety of other ways. True, it could be argued that this renewed 'sense of the past' was largely confined to the small nationalist intelligentsia, which in any case was more active and more concentrated outside than inside the Greek lands. All this ferment seems largely to have passed the generality of the Greeks by. The reaction of the klephtic leader Nikotsaras on being compared to Achilles —'What Achilles and such like fairy tales are you talking about? Did the musket of Achilles kill many?' [10]— was far more characteristic of the attitudes of the mass of Greeks than the somewhat self-conscious antics of the students of Ayvalik. Yet as is the way with nationalist movements, it was precisely this small and unrepresentative intelligentsia that was able to impose its own ideology on the national movement.

There is no question but that this revived Hellenic consciousness left a powerful imprint on the development of the ideological framework of Greek nationalism. Moreover, it was to have a profound and, in many respects a disastrous, influence on the cultural development of the newly independent state. It was, moreover, to play a part in creating the psychology of dependence that has been such a significant factor in the subsequent political evolution of the country. The feeling of the Greeks has often been that because ancient Greek civilization had such a profound effect on the evolution of Western civilization as a whole, then necessarily the West owed Greece a great debt of obligation—that in some respects the rest of the world owed Greece a living. Moreover, the obsession with the past raised excessive and unnatural expectations on the part of foreigners

as to the achievements and potential of the modern Greeks. We may trace such attitudes in the comments of the once ardent philhellene, Alexander Pushkin. On the outbreak of the War of Independence in 1821, Pushkin was firmly of the opinion that 'twenty-five million Turks will leave the flourishing country of Hellas to the legal heirs of Homer and Themistocles'; and he dashed off a poem dedicated to 'Eleftheria'. But within two years he was writing to a friend that

> we have seen these new Leonidas's in the streets of Kishinev and Odessa. Many of them we know personally and we can vouch for their complete worth-lessness—they have no idea of art, no concept of honour, no enthusiasm ...' [103]

Yet for all the ills subsequently inflicted on Greece by the phenomenon of *progonoplexia*, whose genesis I have essentially been tracing in this paper, it is undeniably true that this obsession with the past helped mightily in fostering a sense of identity that overrode the particularism and local patriotism so character-istic of the Greek world. The sense of Hellenic ancestry felt by many of the leading figures in the Greek national movement, the feeling that they were capable of matching the feats of their illustrious ancestors, contributed power-fully to the launching in 1821 of an insurrection which to any rational observer must have seemed doomed to failure. Yet, as we know, the long struggle of the Greeks was eventually crowned with success. 'Sense of the Past' played no small part in the ultimate securing, against very heavy odds, of independence from the Ottoman Turks.

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1. Grigorios Paliouritis, *Arkhaiologia Elliniki itoi philologiki istoria, periekhousa tous nomous, tin politeian, ta ethima tis thriskeias, ton eorton, ton gamon, kai epikideion, ta dimosia kai ta kata meros paignidia ton palaion Ellinon, exairetos de ton Athinaion* (Venice, 1815), i, 6.

2. E.J. Hobsbawm, 'The Social Functions of the Past: Some Questions', *Past and Present*, no. 55 (1972), 14. Cf. A.D. Smith, 'The Formation of Nationalist Movements' in A.D. Smith (ed.), *Nationalist Movements* (London, 1976), p. 16.

3. Daniil Philippidis and Grigorios Konstandas, *Geographia Neoteriki* (Vienna, 1791), cited in W.M. Leake, *Researches in Greece* (London, 1814), p. 173. The *Geographia Neoteriki* has been reprinted with an introduction by Aikaterina Koumarianou (Athens, 1970).

4. H.T. Parker, *The Cult of Antiquity and the French Revolutionaries: a Study in the Development of the Revolutionary Spirit* (Chicago, 1937), vii, 143.

5. Jean-Pierre Boyer, Port au Prince, to Coray, C. Polychronides, Togaredy and Clonares, 19 January 1822, 'an 19 de l'indépendance', Korais Library, Chios, MS 535.

6. This controversy has been revived in recent years. See, for instance, Romilly Jenkins, *Byzantium and Byzantinism: Lectures in Memory of Louise Taft Semple* (Cincinnati, 1963); Cyril Mango, 'Byzantinism and Romantic Hellenism', *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, xxxviii (1965), 29-43, and the review article by Speros Vryonis, 'Recent Scholarship on Continuity and Discontinuity of Culture: Classical Greeks, Byzantines, Modern Greeks' in Speros Vryonis (ed.), *The 'Past' in Medieval and Modern Greek Culture* (Malibu, 1978), pp. 236-56.

7. E.L. Bowie, 'Greeks and their Past in the Second Sophistic', *Past and Present*, no. 46 (1970), 3-41.

8. For an up-to-date account of Plethon, see Steven Runciman, *Mistra: Byzantine Capital of the Peloponnese* (London, 1980), pp. 110 ff. Alkis Angelou discusses the preponderance of Aristotelian over Platonic ideas in the learned culture of the Tourkokratia in his *Platonos tykhai. I logia paradosi stin Tourkokratia* (Athens, 1963).

9. See, for instance, I.Th. Kakridis, *Oi arkhaioi Ellines sti neoelliniki laiki paradosi* (Athens, 1978); originally published in German as *Die alten Hellenen im neugriechischen Volksglauben* (Munich, 1966); Margaret Alexiou, *The Ritual Lament in Greek Tradition* (Cambridge, 1974); G. Veloudis, *Der neugriechische Alexander. Tradition in Bewahrung und Wandel* (Munich, 1968) and the same author's *I phyllada tou Megalexandrou. Diigisis Alexandrou tou Makedonos* (Athens, 1977). See also David Holton, *Diigisis tou Alexandrou. The Tale of Alexander: the Rhymed Version* (Thessaloniki, 1974).

10. P. Zepos (ed.), *Mikhail Photeinopoulou Nomikon Prokheiron* (1765) (Athens, 1959), pp. 43 f.; quoted in Kakridis, *Oi arkhaioi Ellines*, p. 14.

11. S.P. Cockerell (ed.), *Travels in Southern Europe and the Levant, 1810-1817: the Journal of C.R. Cockerell, R.A.* (London, 1903), pp. 53-4.

12. Richard Chandler, *Travels in Greece* (London, 1776), p. 191.

13. G.E. Marindin (ed.), *The Letters of John B.S. Morritt of Rokeby, Descriptive of Journeys in Europe and Asia Minor in the Years 1794-1796* (London, 1914), p. 146; Robert Walpole, *Memoirs relating to European and Asiatic Turkey* (London, 1817) p. 98.

14. E. Legrand, 'Notice biographique sur Jean et Théodose Zygomalas', *Recueil de textes de l'Ecole des langues orientales* (Paris, 1889), ii, 104.

15. A. Papadopoulos-Keramefs, Ierosolymitiki Vivliothiki (St Petersburg, 1894), ii, 514; quoted in C.Th. Dimaras, *O Ellinikos Diaphotismos* (Athens, 1964), p. 14.

16. [Nikolaos] Skouphas, *Synoptiki istoria tis Ellinikis Philologias ap'arkhis taftis mekhris aloseos tis Konstantinoupoleos para ton Othomanon* (Vienna, 1816), i, 13-14. This was a translation of M.S.F. Schoell, *Histoire abrégée de la littérature grecque* (Paris, 1813).

17. Benjamin Lesvios, *Stoikheia tis Metaphysikis* (Vienna) 1820, p. 4; quoted in K.Th. Dimaras, *Psykhologikai paragontes tou Eikosiena* (Athens, 1957), p. 5.

18. *Ermis o Logios*, February 1811, p. 47.

19. Iosipos Moisiodax, *Ithiki Philosophia* (Venice, 1761), p. 15; quoted by K.Th. Dimaras, 'To skhima tou Diaphotismou' in *Neoellinikos Diaphotismos* (Athens, 1977), p. 15.

20. Grigorios Paliouritis, *Epitomi istorias tis Ellados* (Venice, 1815), pp. 17-18.

21. Dionysios Pyrros, *Geographia Methodiki apasis tis Oikoumenis . . .* (Venice, 1818), p. 154.

22. Anonymou tou Ellinos, *Elliniki Nomarkhia, itoi logos peri Eleftherias* ('Italy', 1806), ed. G. Valetas (Athens, 1957), p. 182. Konstantinos Koumas wrote that, even if he had the power of a Demosthenes, he could not sufficiently praise Korais, *Synopsis Physikis* (Vienna, 1812), p. 23.

23. I have discussed this phase of Korais' life in 'The Correspondence of Adhamantios Korais with Thomas Burgess 1789-1792', *Anzeiger der phil.-hist. Klasse der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 106 (Jahrgang 1969, So.3), 40-72*. Korais' first philological work, his *Emendationes in Hippocratem*, was published in Oxford in 1792 in Thomas Burgess' *Musei Oxoniensis Litterarii Conspectus*.

24. William Maltby, *Recollections of the Table-Talk of Samuel Rogers to which is added Porsoniana* (London, 1856), p. 322. Heinrich Eichstadt dedicated his edition of Diodorus Siculus (Halle, 1800-1802) to 'quatuor viris in re critica summis': Korais, Porson, F.A. Wolf and Daniel Wyttenbach.

25. Adamantios Korais, *Prokiryxis neas ekdoseos Ellinikon Poiiton kai Syngrapheon, itis ginetai dia dapanis ton adelphon Zosimadon, dia tous spoudazontas tin Ellinikin glossan Ellinas* (Paris, 1805) in G. Valetas (ed.), *Korais: Apanta ta prototypa erga* (Athens, n.d.), i (pt. 2), 831.

26. *Aristotelesin insan saraflamasi Yunaniden haliyaki Yunaniye ve dahi lisani Türkiye tercüme olup* (Constantinople, 1819). One of the two copies of this work in the Dawkins Collection in the Taylorian Library in Oxford once belonged to one 'Demosthenese Haci P. Kemaloğlu Alasehirli'. A total of 319 subscribers subscribed for 851 copies of this book.

27. Oikonomos' grammar was a re-working of Philipp Carl Buttman's very widely used *Griechische Grammatik*.

28. Efthymiou's grammar was based on that of Christian Gottlob Broeder.

29. *Grammatiki tis Aiolodorikis, itoi tis omiloumenis torinis ton Ellinon glossas* (Vienna, 1805), p. 4.

30. *Palaia istoria ton Aigyption, Karkhidonion, Assyrion, Babylonion, Midon, Person, Makedonon kai Ellinon* (Venice, 1749).

31. *Epitomi istorias*, p. 21.

32. Goldsmith *Istoria tis Ellados apo tis protis katavolis ton Ellinikon pragmaton akhri tis aloseos tis Konstantinoupoleos ypo ton Othomanon*, tr. Dimitrios Alexandridis (Venice, 1806-7).

33. *Epitomi istorias*, p. 20.

34. *Istoria synoptiki tis Ellados* (Vienna, 1807), p. xvii. Efthymiou's history was based on an anonymous English school textbook.

35. *Vios Themistokleous tou Athinaiou* (Vienna, 1816) and *Vios Miltiadou Athinaiou* (Vienna, 1818).

36. *Geographia Neoteriki*, ed. Koumarianou, pp. 102-3.

37. *Synopsis tis Palaias Geographias* (Vienna, 1819), p. 6.

38. *Istoriki Perigraphi tou en Vienni proekdothentos khorographikou pinakos tis megalis Arkhisatrapias Ikoniou nun proton typois ekdotheisa.*

39. *Enkheiridion peri tis eparkhias Philippoupoleos* (Vienna, 1819). Another example of the genre of local or regional history is Athanasios Stageiritis, *Epeirotika, itoi istoria kai geographia tis Epeirou palaia te kai nea* (Vienna, 1819).

40. *Vivliothikis ellinikis vivlia dyo periekhousa kata khronikin proodon tas peri ton exokhon Ellinon syngrapheon vevaioteras eidiseis* (2 vols, Venice, 1807).

41. [Nikolaos] Skouphas, *Synoptiki istoria tis Ellinikis Philologias.*

42. E.g. Grigorios Paliouritis, *Arkhaiologia Elliniki*; Athanasios Stageiritis, *Ogygia i arkhaiologia, periekhousa ton arkhaiotaton ethnon, i ton dyo proton aionon tou adilou kai iroikou, tin istorian, tas kosmogonias, theogonias, tin arkhin kai proodon tis eidololatreias, kai pasis ktistolatreias, tas ieropraxias, ieroskopias, mythologian plirestatin ton theon kai iroon kata genealogian, saphinizomenin dia tis istorias kai alligorias, tas teletas, tous agonas, ta manteia, kai panta ta symvevikota kai ethima, pros gnosin tis arkhaiologias kai katalipsin ton poiiton kai syngrapheon* (5 vols, Vienna, 1815); Kharisios Megdanis, *Ellinikon Pantheon: i syllogi tis mythikis istorias ton para tois arkhaiois Ellisi mythologoumenon theon, kai tis kat' aftin alligorias . . . pros kharin kai opheleian ton philomathon neon tou genous* (Pest, 1812).

43. *Periigisis tou neou Anacharsidos eis tin Ellada* (Vienna, 1797) and *Neos Anacharsis tomos tetartos* (Vienna, 1797).

44. *Periigisis tou Neou Anacharsidos eis tin Ellada* (Vienna, 1819), i, 7.

45. Ibid., p. 6.

46. See Philippos Iliou, 'Pour une étude quantitative du public des lecteurs grecs à l'epoque des lumières et de la révolution (1749-1842)', *Actes du premier congrès international des études balkaniques et du*

sud-est européennes, iv (Sofia, 1969), 480, and the same author's 'Vivlia me syndromites. I. Ta khronia tou Diaphotismou (1749-1821)', *O Eranistis*, xiii (1975), 101-79.

47. See note 32 above.

48. See note 30 above. J.C. Hobhouse, *Travels in Albania and other Provinces of Turkey in 1809 and 1810* (London, 1855), ii, 508. Cf. also J. Bartholdy, *Bruchstücke zur nähern Kenntniss des heutigen Griechenlands* (Berlin, 1805), i, 335.

49. *The Letters of John B.S. Morritt*, p. 203.

50. *Ermis o Logios* (1820), p. 481.

51. Richard Clogg, 'Two Accounts of the Academy of Ayvalik (Kydonies) in 1818-1819', *Revue des études sud-est européennes*, x (1972), 641.

52. See D.C. Hesseling, 'Korais et ses amis hollandais' in *Eis mnimin Spyridonos Lambrou* (Athens, 1935), pp. 1-6. J.F. Usko, chaplain to the Levant Company's Factory in Smyrna, in re-stocking the Factory library after its destruction in the great janissary riot of March 1797, known as the 'Smyrna rebellion', asked for a substantial collection of Greek and Latin authors to be sent out from London, Richard Clogg, 'The Library of the Levant Company's Factory in Smyrna (1805)', *O Eranistis*, xi (1974), 112-24.

53. *Marmora Oxoniensia, ex Arundellianis, Seldenianis, aliisque conflata: recensuit . . . H. Prideaux* (Oxford, 1676).

54. Hamburg, 1708-54.

55. *Jacob Jonas Björnståhls Briefe auf seinen ausländischen Reisen an . . . C.C. Gjörwell* (Leipzig, 1783), pp. 86, 94-5, 204, 207.

56. Robert Walsh, *A Residence at Constantinople during a Period including the Commencement, Progress, and Termination of the Greek and Turkish Revolutions* (London, 1836), ii, 472, 391.

57. *Physikis apanthisma dia tous agkhinous kai philomatheis Ellinas* (Vienna, 1790), Preface.

58. Daniel O. Morton, *Memoir of Rev. Levi Parsons* (Burlington Vt., 1830), pp. 283-4.

59. *Ermis o Logios*, November 1811, p. 391.

60. *Ermis o Logios*, March 1811, p. 66.

61. *Life of William Allen, with Selections from his Correspondence* (London, 1846), p. 114.

62. Platon Petridis, *Diatrivi ekphonitheisa eis tas dimosias exetaseis tis en Zakyntho Skholis* (Corfu, 1817), p. 27.

63. Ambroise Firmin Didot, *Notes d'un voyage fait dans le Levant en 1816 et 1817* (Paris, 1826), pp. 385-6.

64. Ariane Camariano, 'Le théâtre grec à Bucarest au début du xixe siècle', *Balcania*, vi (1943), 385, 391-3.

65. *Ermis o Logios* (1818), p. 587. Cf. Dimitris Spathis, 'O "Philoktitis" tou Sophokli diaskevasmenos apo ton Nikolao Pikkolo. I proti parousiasi arkhaias tragodias sto neoelliniko theatro', *O Eranistis*, xv (1978-9), 265-320.

66. *Notes*, pp. 385-6.

67. Dionysios Pyrros, *Periigisis istoriki kai viographia* (Athens, 1848), pp. 70-1.

68. *Geographia methodiki*, p. 324.

69. William Jowett, *Christian Researches in the Mediterranean from 1815 to 1820* (London, 1822),p. 75. Cf. S.S. Wilson, *A Narrative of the Greek Mission; or, Sixteen Years in Malta and Greece* (London, 1839), p. 265.

70. R. Argyropoulou, 'Panagiotis Phoivapollon kai Phoivapollon o ek Smyrnis', *O Eranistis*, vi (1968), 52. Korais noted that whereas Greek seamen had hitherto named their ships after saints, they were now beginning to bear 'the names of the great men of antiquity'. He knew of ships bearing the name

of Themistocles and Xenophon, *Mémoire sur l'état actuel de la civilisation dans la Grèce, lu à la Société des Observateurs de l'Homme le 16 Nivose, an xi (16 Janvier 1803)*, p. 44.

71. *Letters of the Right Honourable Lady M—y W—y M——e: written during her Travels in Europe, Asia, and Africa, to Persons of Distinction . . . which contain, among other Curious Relations, Accounts of the Policy and Manners of the Turks*, (London, 1777), p. 136.

72. G.E. Marindin, pp. 179, 159. Elsewhere Morritt records one of the more unusual hazards to which the memorials of Greek antiquity were subject. When Admiral Orloff failed in his attempt to carry off the doorway of the temple of Bacchus on Naxos during the course of the Russo-Turkish war of 1768-1774 he peppered the marbles with cannon balls (p. 218).

73. Adamantios Korais, *Isokratous logoi kai epistolai meta skholion palaion, ois prosetethisan simeioseis, kai ton aftoskhedion stokhasmon peri tis ellinikis paideias kai glossis akolouthia* (Paris, 1807), pp. 34 ff. This was the first volume of the *Elliniki Vivliothiki*.

74. *Ermis o Logios* (1814), pp. 98-9. I am grateful for this reference to Mrs Evita Arapoglou. For an account of rudimentary archaeological excavations in Greece, necessitating the bribery of local Turkish officials, at this time (1813/14), see the MS diary of Thomas Burgon in the Burrows Library, King's College, University of London.

75. *Stokhasmoi tou Kritonos* (1819), reprinted *Melissa i Ephimeris Elliniki* (1821), p. 310.

76. Grigorios Zalikoglou, *Lexikon tis Gallikis Glossis* (Paris, 1809), p. 30.

77. Platon Petridis, *Eidopoiisis kai protasis pros tous neous tous Ionas dia na anorthososi tin glossan tis Palaias Ellados* (Corfu, 1817), p. 1.

78. *Paidagogos.*

79. *Meleti tis koinis ellinikis dialektou* (Paris, 1818).

80. *Eisagogi eis tin ellinikin glossan* (Venice, 1805).

81. *I kat'epitomin grammatiki Terpsithea* (Vienna, 1812).

82. *Grammatiki tis Aiolodorikis.*

83. *I Romeiki glosa.*

84. *Iliodorou Aithiopikon vivlia deka* (Paris, 1804), pp. 68-9.

85. Grigorios Paliouritis, *Arkhaiologia Elliniki*, pp. 18-9.

86. *Neon Epistolarion, periekhon diaphorous kharaktiras kai ypodeigmata epistolon pros opoiondipote prosopon* (Venice, 1779), p. 14.

87. Iakovos Rotas, *Apanthisma epistolon Adamantiou Korai* (Athens, 1839), i, 133, cited in part in Cyril Mango, 'Byzantinism and Romantic Hellenism', p. 133.

88. Rotas, *Apanthisma*, i, 187.

89. *Neos Erotokritos para Dionysiou Photeinou* (Vienna, 1818), Vol. II, preface. Works such as the *Erotokritos* were also attacked on grounds of their supposed immorality. The Athonite monk Nikodimos Agioreitis, in his massive *Pidalion* or Rudder of the Orthodox faith, published in Leipzig in 1800, urged that the *Erotokritos*, the *Erophili* and the *Voskopoula* be shunned along with heretical books. 'Those who write, or print, or buy, or read, or listen to such works sin grievously and should be corrected' . . . *Pidalion tis noitis nios, tis mias agias, katholikis, kai aplostolikis ton Orthodoxon Ekklisias, itoi apantes oi ieroi, kai theioi kanones, ton te agion kai paneuphimon apostolon, ton agion oikoumenikon synodon, ton topikon kai ton kata meros theion pateron* (Leipzig, 1800), cited in Philippos Iliou, 'Simeioseis gia ta "travigmata" ton Ellinikon vivlion tou 16o aiona', *Ellinika* xxviii (1975), 117-8.

90. N. Banescu, 'Momente din vieața "Academiei Grecesti" ', *Omagiu lui I. Bianu* (Bucharest, 1927), pp. 39-40. Among the charges levelled against him was that 'instead of using systematic, useful and clearly written books, he introduced his own badly written and barbarous sounding writings'.

91. *Prodoiikisis eis ton Ermilon i Dimokrithirakleiton Mikhailou tou Perdikari Iatrou: periekhousa tin apologian tou poiitou, tin alligorian tou poiimatos kai tin eidisin dia tin atakton ekdosin tou Ermilou* (Vienna, 1817), p. 64.

92. Konstantinos Koumas, *Istoriai anthropinon praxeon* (Vienna, 1832), xii, 514.

93. Ibid., p. 512.

94. *Khristianiki Apologia* (Constantinople, 1798), p. 94; cited in C.Th. Dimaras, 'Notes sur l'évolution des idées du xvie au xix siècle dans le domaine culturel grec et sur les doctrines qui l'ont enregistrée', *Zeitschrift für Balkanologie*, v (1967), 14.

95. Nathanail Neokaisareos (pseud.), *Antiphonisis pros ton paralogon zilon ton apo tis Evropis erkhomenon philosophon deiknousa oti mataios kai anoitos einai o talanismos opou kanousi tou genous mas kai didaskousa poia einai i ontos kai alithini philosophia* (Trieste, 1802), p. 15.

96. C.Th. Dimaras, *La Grèce au temps des lumières* (Geneva, 1969) 39 and *Magasin encyclopédique*, viii (1803), 488-9.

97. This encyclical was reprinted, with a somewhat bemused commentary, in *Melissa i Ephimeris Elliniki* (1820), pp. 218-19.

98. *Ermis o Logios* (1811), pp. 417, 412. Georgios Ainian in the preface to his archaising grammar, *Nea Ariadne*, published at the press of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 1816, argued that the Church, in preserving the language amidst a multitude of tribulations, had contributed significantly to the survival of many Hellenic writings.

99. N. Andriotis, 'To khroniko tou Amsterdam', *Nea Estia*, x (1931), 852.

100. *Les Grecs anciens et les Grecs modernes* (Paris, 1861), pp. 226 ff.

101. *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ed. J.B. Bury (London, 1907), vi, 485-6. Gibbon's strictures are perhaps predictable. It is more surprising to find such an acute and informed observer of the Greeks as George Finlay declaring that 'before the commencement of the present century, no modern Greek would have boasted of any ancestral connection with the pagan Hellenes, any more than he would yet think of pretending to a Pelasgic, Dorian, Ionian or Achaian pedigree', *A History of Greece from its Conquest by the Romans to the Present Time B.C. 164-A.D. 1864*, ed. H.F. Tozer (Oxford, 1877), v, 122.

102. Koumas, *Istoriai*, xii, 544. Evidence, however, of a certain degree of knowledge of the ancient world at a semi-popular level is contained in 'The Complaint of Roumeli', first recorded by the brothers Dimo and Nicolo Stephanopoli during a visit to the Mani at the behest of Bonaparte in the late 1790s:

Where is my Athens,
Where is that Athens,
That the world once held in awe
And still reveres?
There for the very first time
freedom came into the world;
There did Solon proclaim
his laws to the Athenians;
Thither did the nations of Europe
hasten for enlightenment;

cited and translated in Roderick Beaton, *Folk Poetry of Modern Greece* (Cambridge, 1980), p. 173.

103. Demetrios J. Farsolas, 'Alexander Pushkin: his Attitude towards the Greek Revolution 1821-1829', *Balkan Studies*, xxxii (1971), 74-5. Cf. M.A.B. Mangourit, *Défense d'Ancône, et des départements romains, le Musone et le Metauro … aux années vii et viii* (Paris, 1802), pp. 46-7.

Marx, Engels and the Springtime of Peoples

by Ian Cummins

Just as Marx and Engels declared that 'the workingmen have no country'[1] Europe witnessed a remarkable springtime of peoples. While continuing to interpret history in terms of class struggles, therefore, the authors of the *Communist Manifesto* were compelled to turn their attention to the national struggles then taking place virtually throughout continental Europe. Although their writings during this period showed that their most immediate concerns lay in Western Europe, and particularly in their own still disunited homeland, events in the Tsarist and Austrian empires also came under their scrutiny. Yet where the levels of social, economic and cultural development of the more advanced societies of the West made it possible for Marx and Engels to speculate upon the possibilities of proletarian revolution occurring there, the situation in Eastern Europe in these respects was by no means so clearly defined.

If the awakening of national consciousness in Eastern Europe was thus to create both problems and opportunities for the ruling groups of the day, it was also to do so for some of their most dedicated opponents. In these circumstances, as far as Marx and Engels were concerned, the struggles of such groups as the Poles and the Magyars were seen as having their part to play in furthering the proletarian revolution in the West, while those of some other peoples were condemned as likely to impede it. Marx and Engels indicated their response to these renewed manifestations of Eastern European national self-awareness in their articles in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, the daily newspaper they produced at the time, which it is the principal task of this paper to examine.

At the outset it should be stated that since, in the internal organization of the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, it was Engels who was responsible for its coverage of international and military affairs, it was from him that most of the commentaries on national movements came. If later readers might have questioned the 'scientific' character of some of these, there is no evidence that Marx, the senior 'founder of Scientific Socialism', dissociated himself from them.

Marx's and Engels' interest in Eastern Europe antedates the appearance of the springtime of peoples. In particular, the cause of Poland had evoked their sympathy prior to 1848, although they tended at that time to see its success, like that

of Ireland's, as at least partially dependent on the successful outcome of class struggles in the West. In a speech at an international meeting held in London on 29 November 1847, Marx argued that since class contradictions between bourgeoisie and proletariat were most highly developed in England, the triumph of the English proletarians over their local bourgeoisie was the precondition of 'the victory of all the oppressed over their oppressors', and that 'Poland must be liberated not in Poland but in England'.[2]

While Marx, at least at this stage of his career, thus predicated the achievement of Poland's liberation on the triumph of the English proletariat, Engels was to postulate a more direct link between Poland's fate and that of his own country:

> The first condition for the deliverance both of Germany and of Poland is the overturning of the present political state in Germany, the downfall of Prussia and Austria, the driving back of Russia beyond the Dniester and the Dvina.[3]

But the country which Marx and Engels hoped to see reconstituted was, they urged, not to resemble the old aristocratic Poland, whose disappearance was 'no loss for those who have nothing to lose in the old society'.[4] On the contrary, Marx declared, the replacement of the Russian autocrat by Polish aristocrats would simply give despotism naturalisation papers.[5] As for a middle class, the Germans in Poland had 'prevented the formation of Polish towns with a Polish bourgeoisie' and indeed their role in that country's partition had helped to impede 'centralisation, that most potent of political means by which a country achieves rapid development'.[6]

Engels' predilection for centralisation was fully shared by Marx who, in calling two months earlier for the unification of his own country, had declared that 'the conflict between centralisation and federalism in Germany is a conflict between modern culture and feudalism'.[7] Already described in the *Communist Manifesto* in a decidedly positive light, national unification and centralisation were seen as contributing to the development of a modern economy, which, in the Marxian scheme of things, was considered an essential prerequisite to the emergence of a class-conscious proletariat, the class whose mission it was to bring about the socialist revolution. If Germany still had some way to go before attaining this latter goal, Poland had even further to travel. While striving for national independence, therefore, her task was to undertake 'at the same time a struggle of *agrarian democracy*—the only form of democracy possible in Eastern Europe—against *patriarchal feudal absolutism*'. Yet such an agrarian revolution could not possibly be achieved, Engels declared, unless Poland were restored on a viable foundation:

> Poland must have at least the dimensions of 1772, she must comprise not only the territories but also the estuaries of her big rivers and at least a large seaboard on the Baltic.[8]

While Engels was later to revise at least some of these evaluations of Poland's past and future, there could be no denying that, during the upheavals of 1848 and 1849, he saw the partition of Poland as holding the Holy Alliance together.

Aware that other Slavic nationalities were not quite so strategically placed, and believing that they might have somewhat different aspirations and allegiances, Engels commended the Poles for 'their great political understanding' and 'true revolutionary spirit' in uniting with 'their old enemies, the Germans and Magyars, against the pan-Slav counter-revolution'. He added that 'a Slav people for whom freedom is dearer than Slavism proves its vitality by this fact alone, and thereby assures a future for itself'.[9]

It is in the course of this same article that some of Engels' most striking, though by no means unrepresentative, pronouncements are made. Surveying the events of 1848, he declared:

> Among all the large and small nations of Austria, only three standard-bearers of progress took an active part in history and still retain their vitality—the Germans, the Poles and the Magyars. Hence they are now revolutionary.
>
> All the other large and small nationalities and peoples are destined to perish before long in the revolutionary world storm. For that reason they are now counter-revolutionary.[10]

It is significant that these remarks are couched not in terms of class but of nationality, seemingly extending to all members of the community concerned. The best that such nationalities could hope for, it would seem, would be the loss of their present identity and subsequent absorption into a more 'advanced' people.

A month after this article on Hungary appeared, the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* carried another piece by Engels attacking pan-Slavism, in the course of which he repeated his conviction that

> apart from the Poles, the Russians, and at most the Turkish Slavs, no Slav people has a future, for the simple reason that all the other Slavs lack the primary historical, geographical and industrial conditions for independence and viability.
>
> Peoples which have never had a history of their own, which from the time when they achieved the first, most elementary stage of civilization already came under foreign sway or which were *forced* to attain the first stage of civilisation only by means of a foreign yoke, are not viable and will never be able to achieve any kind of independence.[11]

Engels then went on to argue that

> if the Austrian Slavs formed a compact mass like the Poles, Magyars or Italians, if they were in a position to gather from twelve to twenty million people in a state, their claims would have a serious character despite everything. But the actual situation is the precise opposite of this.[12]

He then proceeded to examine the geographical factors which he considered would impede the creation of a viable and unified Slavic state.

It would seem, however, that Engels' hostility towards the Slavs (other than the Poles) was not based solely on their failure to concentrate a sufficiently large number of their population in a suitably compact area of territory and to develop a modern economy in it. The underlying grounds for his attitude would seem to lie at least as much in his notion of 'historyless peoples', a group which, in Engels' taxonomy of nationalities, appears to parallel the lumpenproletariat in Marx's conception of the class structure. Much in evidence in Engels' writings during the upheavals of 1848–49 and their aftermath, this notion, originally derived from Hegel, was to reappear in one form or another, virtually throughout his career.[13] These historyless peoples were to be found in several areas of Europe, Engels maintained, though in the climate of the 1848 revolutions it was obviously the Slavs who were the principal targets of his wrath:

> There is no country in Europe which does not have in some corner or other one or several ruined fragments of peoples, the remnant of a former population that was suppressed and held in bondage by the nation which later became the main vehicle of historical development. These relics of a nation mercilessly trampled under foot in the course of history, as Hegel says, these *residual fragments of peoples* always became fanatical standard-bearers of counter-revolution and remain so until their complete extirpation or loss of their national character, just as their whole existence in general is itself a protest against a great historical revolution.
>
> Such, in Scotland, are the Gaels, the supporters of the Stuarts from 1640 to 1745.
>
> Such, in France, are the Bretons, the supporters of the Bourbons from 1792 to 1800.
>
> Such, in Spain, are the Basques, the supporters of Don Carlos.
>
> Such, in Austria, are the pan-Slavist *Southern Slavs*, who are nothing but the *residual fragment of peoples*, resulting from an extremely confused *thousand years of development*. That this residual fragment, which is likewise extremely confused, sees its salvation only in a reversal of the whole European movement, which in its view ought to go not from west to east, but from east to west, and that for it the instrument of liberation and the bond of unity is the *Russian knout*—that is the most natural thing in the world.[14]

The Czechs, together with the Moravians and Slovaks, were also declared never to have had a history of their own.[15] But the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*'s attitude towards the Czechs had not always been quite as hostile as this. In his account of the abortive Prague uprising of June 1848, Engels asked whether, after '400 years of German oppression', the Czechs could seriously have been expected to associate themselves wholeheartedly with the German revolutions and agree to send delegates to the 'wretched, faint-hearted' Frankfurt Parliament. On the contrary, he felt, Germany's record (or, more precisely, Austria's) in Bohemia would drive 'the gallant Czechs … into the arms of the Russians, … the side of

despotism opposed to the revolution'.[16] In the light of this not particularly well-founded belief, and in view of the divergence of their interests from those of neighbours considered to be more revolutionary, the Czechs, in Marx's and Engels' strategy as in twentieth-century diplomacy, were to be sacrificed on the altar of a higher *Realpolitik*.

Six months earlier, Engels had sought to suggest possible reasons for the durability of Habsburg rule, which, he maintained, would nonetheless soon be approaching its end. In part, these were geographical. In the course of Western European development, he contended, bourgeois civilisation followed the sea coasts and the course of big rivers, but had difficulty in penetrating the barren and impassable mountain regions inland, 'which remained the seat of barbarism and of feudalism', forces which remained especially concentrated in the land-locked South German and Southern Slavic areas:

> Protected by the Alps from Italian civilisation and by the mountains of Bohemia and Moravia from that of North Germany, these inland countries had the additional good fortune of being the basin of the only reactionary river in Europe. The Danube, far from linking them with civilisation, brought them into contact with a much more vigorous barbarism.[17]

It was to be by means of essentially technological forces that these foundations of Habsburg rule would be undermined. The introduction of machinery—to be used for silk spinning in Lombardy, in Bohemia's cotton industry, and elsewhere—would, in time, destroy the system of domestic industry under which hitherto isolated village communities had provided for their needs. Similarly the introduction of railways would break down 'the granite walls behind which each province had maintained a separate nationality and a limited local existence'. Where the Austrian empire had survived the French Revolution, Napoleonic invasion and the effects of further upheavals in France, it would not be able to withstand steam, which he saw as forcing its way through the Alps and the Bohemian forests, robbing the Danube of its role, tearing Austrian barbarism to shreds and thereby pulling the ground from under the feet of the House of Habsburg.[18]

With forces such as these at work in the Austrian empire, Engels' subsequent designation of the Czechs as a historyless people seems to have been based on a somewhat insecure foundation. It is not surprising, therefore, that later Marxist thinkers, such as Otto Bauer, responded to his contentions by arguing that even a nation without a history could still be capable of having a future, thanks, in no small measure, to the effects of capitalism which Engels himself had described.

In the exceptionally fervid atmosphere of 1848-49, with only the Poles considered a reliable ally against the supremely counter-revolutionary force represented by Russia, Engels, having dismissed the Czechs and Southern Slavs as 'historyless', directed his support towards the struggling Magyars. The likelihood of a Hungarian defeat did not greatly trouble him, however, since deliverance

would follow with 'the first victorious uprising of the French proletariat', after which

> the Austrian Germans and Magyars will be set free and wreak a bloody revenge on the Slav barbarians. The general war which will then break out will smash this Slav Sonderbund and wipe out these petty hidebound nations, down to their very names.[19]

Engels' conclusion smacks more of racism than of 'scientific socialism':

> The next world war will result in the disappearance from the face of the earth not only of reactionary classes and dynasties, but also of entire reactionary peoples. And that, too, is a step forward.[20]

While this last remark might be difficult to justify in terms of the more characteristically 'Marxian' elements of Marxian theory (not to mention in other respects), this might not necessarily be true of all of Engels' strictures on the suggested causes of the allegedly backward and reactionary nature of most Slavic communities. After all, economic underdevelopment, political dependence, and ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity *were* characteristic of many of the regions inhabited by Slavs in 1848. It is doubtful whether these handicaps would have been overcome, however, had the Slavs allied themselves with the nationalist causes with which Marx and Engels tended to sympathise. The Hungarians under Kossuth had distinguished themselves by their intolerance of the claims of national minorities in their region, a fact of which Marx and Engels might not have been fully aware, given that most of their information on current developments in the Habsburg empire was provided by the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*'s Vienna correspondent, a man who was not inclined to worry himself unduly about the rights of ethnic minorities in Hungary. Only later, in his London exile, was Marx to dismiss Kossuth as the representative of 'an obscure and semi-barbarous people still stuck in the semi-civilization of the sixteenth century',[21] a judgement in striking contrast to Engels' description of him in January 1849 as 'a truly revolutionary figure, a man who in the name of his people dares to accept the challenge of a desperate struggle, who for his nation is Danton and Carnot in one person'.[22] If, in 1848 and 1849, the Hungarians were inclined to disregard the rights or aspirations of their Slavic neighbours and fellow citizens, so too were many of the 'German' liberals in Austria, who, while seeking to introduce some liberal constitutional principles into the Empire, tended to look to Germany for inspiration.

It was thus not because they were reactionary 'by nature' that the Austrian Slavs tended to remain aloof from the revolutionary movements of 1848: rather did this tendency stem from a belief that neither the Hungarians nor the liberal 'Germans' offered a more attractive alternative. This did not mean, however, that the restored Empire would reward them with any lasting benefits, either.

Accordingly, when the Slavic Congress, with its clear majority of Austrian

Slavs, opened in Prague on 2 June, most of those present tended to favour the notion of Austro-Slavism within the framework of a federally restructured Habsburg empire, in the hope that this would protect the small Slavic nationalities from German and Magyar domination. In this sense there would appear to be some foundation for Engels' claim that Pan-Slavism, the doctrine he associated with the Prague Congress, was designed to give a basis of support to the fragmented Austrian Slavs. There was less justification, however, for his contention that Pan-Slavism sought to break the power of the German, Polish and Magyar revolutions 'by thrusting between them Russian outposts at the Elbe, the Carpathians and the Danube'.[23] While comparatively few delegates would have gone so far as to endorse the view of the sole Russian representative, Bakunin, that the liberation of the Slavs could not be achieved without the complete destruction of both the Habsburg and Tsarist empires, more were inclined to share the misgivings over possible Russian expansionism which were felt by Palacký, the Czech President of the Congress. Palacký had no wish to see the disappearance of the Austrian empire, since he feared that its replacement by a number of republics and dwarf republics could pave the way for the establishment of 'a universal Russian monarchy'.[24]

Palacký's forebodings about possible Russian intentions were, however, not enough to shield him from the scorn of Engels, who described him as 'nothing but a learned German run mad, who even now cannot speak the Tschechian language correctly and without foreign accent'.[25] Three years earlier, Engels had identified 'Herren Palacký, Gaj and Co.' as 'ideologists ... [of] the abstract quality of Slavism and the so-called Slav language, which is at any rate common to the majority of the inhabitants'. This notion of an alleged Slavic community of interests and culture, on which the doctrine of Pan-Slavism rested, was, however, dismissed by Engels who maintained, on the contrary, that

> in reality, all these peoples are at the most diverse stages of civilisation, ranging from the fairly highly developed (thanks to the *Germans*) modern industry and culture of Bohemia down to the almost nomadic barbarism of the Croats and Bulgarians; in reality, therefore, all these nations have most antagonistic interests.[26]

It is apparent, therefore, that Marx's and Engels' views of the nationalism of the Austrian Slavs were based to a large extent upon their perception of the overall requirements of the socialist revolution. In their eyes the fact of national oppression alone did not automatically entitle the oppressed nationality to support. The working class movement was expected to give support to such a nationality only when its political actions were deemed to have a revolutionary character. National movements which failed to meet these criteria were not entitled to such protection.

In the circumstances of 1848, the overall interests of the revolution, as Marx and Engels saw them, required a posture of firm opposition to the major reaction-

ary powers of the day, and above all, to Russia. Marx's and Engels' attitudes to Poland were to fluctuate in accordance with the changing fortunes of the European revolutionary movement. In 1848, however, their attitude was unequivocal: 'The creation of a democratic Poland is a primary condition for the creation of a democratic Germany'.[27]

Three years later, as the revolutionary tide receded, a dejected Engels was to write to Marx in quite a different vein:

> ... the Poles are a doomed nation, to be used as a means until Russia itself is swept by the agrarian revolution. From that moment on, Poland has no *raison d'être* any more. The Poles have never done anything in history except play heroic quarrelsome acts of stupidity. No moment could be pointed out in which Poland represented progress even *vis-à-vis* Russia or did anything of historical significance. Russian rule, with all its nastiness, with all its Slavonic filth, is civilizing for the Black and Caspian Seas, for Central Asia, for Bashkirs and Tartars, and Russia has absorbed far more civilization-bearing and industrial elements than Poland with its chivalrous and bearskin nature.[28]

While such exceptionally despondent sentiments as these could safely be expressed in the confines of private correspondence, Engels' public references to Poland continued to be favourable virtually till his death.[29] Indeed, having attracted the sympathy of substantial sections of the European labour movement, Poland's cause was, in the following decade, to become one of the major concerns of the International Working Men's Association, with Marx and Engels prominent among its champions.[30]

When seen in the light of his strong sympathy for Poland in 1848, one of Engels' letters to Weydemeyer in 1853 is revealing. It suggests that Engels was not fully aware of all the implications of Polish demands in 1848 and previous years:

> As for the former Polish provinces this side of the Dvina and the Dnieper, I have not wanted to hear anything about them ever since I learned that all the peasants there are Ukrainians while only the nobles and the townsmen are Poles, and that for the peasant there the restoration of Poland would mean merely the restoration of the old rule of the nobility in full force, as was the case in Ukrainian Galicia in 1846. In all these areas, i.e. outside the Kingdom of Poland proper, there are hardly 500,000 Poles![31]

A letter such as this provides one piece of evidence to help us understand how Engels' judgment of the situation in 1848 might not have been always accurate. He saw events through a variety of lenses whose combined effect was to distort his vision. These included deficiencies in his own knowledge (as the admission to Weydemeyer recognises), excessive trust in biased sources of information (such as the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*'s correspondent in Vienna), and his practice (shared by many of his contemporaries, and not only those of his own persuasion) of

conceiving of nationalism as a political rather than a sociological phenomenon, a practice which led him to judge it in terms of liberalism or conservatism, to be supported or fought to the extent to which it corresponded with the requirements of the political movement with which he was associated. A further factor which coloured his judgment was his vision of Germany as having a civilizing mission to fulfil, in relation to her Eastern neighbours at least, as is suggested by the following remarks about the 'historyless' Slavs:

... these dying nationalities, the Bohemians, Carinthians, Dalmatians, etc., had tried to profit by the universal confusion of 1848, in order to restore their political *status quo* of A.D. 800. The history of a thousand years ought to have shown them that such a retrogression was impossible; that if all the territory east of the Elbe and Saale had at one time been occupied by kindred Slavonians, this fact merely proved the historical tendency, and at the same time physical and intellectual power of the German nation to subdue, absorb and assimilate its ancient eastern neighbours; that this tendency of absorption on the part of the Germans had always been, and still was, one of the mightiest means by which the civilization of Western Europe had been spread in the east of that Continent; that it could only cease whenever the process of Germanisation had reached the frontier of large, compact, unbroken nations, capable of an independent national life, such as the Hungarians, and in some degree the Poles, and that, therefore, the natural and inevitable fate of these dying nations was to allow this process of dissolution and absorption by their stronger neighbours to complete itself.[32]

Lest the impression be gained that Engels' strictures against historically unviable peoples were, in the conditions prevailing in 1848, directed exclusively against the non-Polish Slavs, his remarks on the Danes, and on Scandinavian traditions in general, should not be overlooked. Voicing his support for Germany in its 'first revolutionary war' against Denmark over control of Schleswig-Holstein, he declared that Germany for once represented the forces of social progress as against Scandinavianism, which he excoriated as

enthusiasm for the brutal, sordid, piratical, Old Norse national traits, for that deep-rooted inner life which is unable to express its exuberant ideas and sentiments in words, but can express them only in deeds, namely in rudeness towards women, perpetual drunkenness and wild berserk frenzy alternating with tearful sentimentality.

Against such forces, the position of forward-looking societies was perfectly clear:

By the same right under which France took Flanders, Lorraine and Alsace, and will sooner or later take Belgium—by that same right Germany takes over Schleswig; it is the right of civilisation as against barbarism, of progress as against stability ... This ... is the right of historical evolution.[33]

While Engels did not bestow uncritical support on all manifestations of German nationalism, the idea that Germany was entitled to act as the bearer of progress to her 'less advanced' neighbours was obviously not repugnant to him. This attitude, which was to find its counterpart in his and Marx's ideas on the relations between Europe and the non-European world, was to prove a legacy of dubious value to some of his successors in the Second International. His practice of evaluating national movements according to their possible value to what were deemed the wider interests of the revolution none the less remained to be followed by the first Soviet Commissar of Nationalities, J.V. Stalin, who, basing his statements directly on Engels' writings of 1848-49, declared in his distinctive style:

> The question of the rights of nations is not an isolated, self-sufficient question; it is part of the general problem of the proletarian revolution, subordinate to the whole, and must be considered from the point of view of the whole.[34]

That particular translation of theory into practice, however, lies beyond the scope of this discussion.

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1. K. Marx and F. Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (1848) in K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works* (2 vols, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950-51), I.49. Henceforth *MESW*.

2. Marx's speech at the International Meeting held in London on 29 November 1847 to mark the 17th anniversary of the Polish uprising of 1830; K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works* (Moscow/London: Progress Press/Lawrence and Wishart, 1975-) (to be cited henceforth as *MECW*), vol. 6, p. 389.

3. F. Engels, Speech in Brussels on 22 February 1848 on the occasion of the second anniversary of the Cracow insurrection; *MECW*, vol. 6, p. 552.

4. Marx, Speech on the seventeenth anniversary of the Polish uprising of 1830; *MECW*, vol. 6, p. 388.

5. Marx, Speech on the second anniversary of the Cracow insurrection (1848), *MECW*, vol. 6, p. 549.

6. F. Engels, 'The Frankfurt Assembly debates the Polish question', *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* (to be referred to henceforth as *NRZ*), No. 70, August 9, 1848; *MECW*, vol. 7, p. 339.

7. K. Marx, The Programmes of the Radical-Democratic Party and of the Left at Frankfurt', *NRZ*, No. 7, 7 June 1848; *MECW*, vol. 7, p. 51.

8. Ibid., pp. 351, 352.

9. F. Engels, 'The Magyar Struggle', *NRZ*, No. 194, January 13, 1849; *MECW*, Vol. 8, p. 231.

10. Ibid., p. 230.

11. F. Engels, 'Democratic Panslavism, I', *NRZ*, 15 February 1849; trans. in *Ibid.*, p. 367.

12. Ibid., p. 367.

13. See, for example, Engels' remarks on the 'disgusting' Bulgarians and other Southern Slavs in his letter to Bernstein of 22/25 February 1882; Marx-Engels *Werke*, vol. XXXV, pp. 279-81.

14. F. Engels, 'The Magyar Struggle', *MECW*, vol. 8, pp. 234-235.

15. F. Engels, 'Democratic Panslavism, I', *ibid.*, p. 367.

16. F. Engels, 'The Prague Uprising', *NRZ*, No. 18, June 18, 1848; *MECW*, vol. 7, pp. 93, 92, 93.

17. F. Engels, 'The Beginning of the End in Austria', *Deutsche-Brusseler-Zeitung*, No. 8, January 27, 1848; *MECW*, vol. 6, p. 531.

18. Ibid., p. 534.

19. F. Engels, 'The Magyar Struggle', *loc.cit.*, p. 238.

20. Ibid., p. 238.

21. Marx to Engels, 1 December 1851; K. Marx and F. Engels, *Werke* (Berlin, Dietz, 1961), Vol. XXVII, p. 377.

22. F. Engels, 'The Magyar Struggle', *loc.cit.*, p. 227.

23. Ibid., II, p. 244.

24. See Palacký's letter to the Committee of Fifty of the Frankfurt Parliament, 11 April 1848, trans. W. Beardmore, *Slavonic and East European Review* (1947–48), Vol. XXVII, pp. 303-308.

25. F. Engels, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany*, (February 1852); *MECW*, vol. 11, p. 46.

26. F. Engels, 'The Magyar Struggle', *NRZ*, 13 January 1849; *MECW*, vol. 8, p. 233.

27. F. Engels, 'The Frankfurt Assembly debates the Polish Question', *NRZ*, No. 81, August 20, 1848; *MECW*, vol. 7, p. 351.

28. Engels to Marx, 23 May 1851; in S. Avineri (ed.) *Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization* (New York, Anchor Books, 1969), p. 447. Avineri's translation, which I have reproduced here, is perhaps a little coy in that it uses the phrase 'a doomed nation' to render Engels' original, though less polite, words 'une nation foutue' (*MEGA*, Part III, Vol. I, p. 206).

29. See, for example, the *Inaugural Address of the Workingmen's International Association* (1864), *MESW*, Vol. I, p. 349; Preface to the Polish edition of the *Communist Manifesto* (1892), in D. Struik (ed.), *Birth of the Communist Manifesto* (New York: International Publishers, 1971), pp. 141-143.

30. I have examined the First International's treatment of the Polish question in my *Marx, Engels and National Movements* (London: Croom Helm, 1980), Ch. IV.

31. Engels to J. Weydemeyer, 12 April 1853; K. Marx and F. Engels, *Select Correspondence* (Moscow: F.L.P.H., n.d.), p. 91.

32. F. Engels, *Germany—Revolution and Counter-Revolution*, *MECW*, Vol. 11, p. 71. The fact that these remarks were written for the predominantly American readership of the *New York Daily Tribune* suggests that Engels' previous references in *NRZ* to Germany's mission to the so-called 'historyless peoples' were not mere propagandistic devices designed to appeal to German opinion.

33. F. Engels, 'The Danish-Prussian Armistice', *NRZ*, No. 99, 9 September, 1848; *MECW*, vol. 7, pp. 421, 422, 423.

34. J. Stalin, *The Foundations of Leninism*, Ch. VI, in J. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism* (Moscow, F.L.P.H., 1953), p. 74.

Adamantios Korais:
Language and Revolution

by Michael Jeffreys

Korais needs to be discussed before two different audiences: first as a significant figure in the European Enlightenment, unusual in showing the reaction of a Greek to Neoclassicism's rediscovery of Greece. But he is also a difficult and ambiguous figure within a purely Greek context. To some Greek-educated students for example, he is simultaneously a *democratic* patriot in the struggle for Greek freedom, and the father of a *conservative* linguistic stratum of Greek, *katharevousa*, to which we attribute many of the present ills of Greek education and society. This combination causes puzzlement and suspicion, which needs explanation. I don't think I have been able to keep this Greek audience separate from the international concerns of the Conference. I hope that both groups will pardon me if what I have to say does not seem to be aimed exclusively at them.

Korais was born in 1748, in Smyrna, a largely Greek city on the Aegean coast of Asia Minor, under Ottoman rule. His was a mercantile family, but with connections to learning on both his mother's and his father's side. He was educated at the newly-founded school of Smyrna. In his own words, 'The teacher and the school resembled all the teachers and schools elsewhere in Greece at the time, in other words they gave a poor education accompanied by abundant beatings'. His brother gave up the struggle, but Adamantios Korais continued, partly under the stimulus of his maternal grandfather's will, which promised his considerable library to the first of his grandsons successfully to complete school. Korais won the prize, but found that the books merely demonstrated his ignorance and the inadequacy of his education.

In the cosmopolitan mercantile city of Smyrna he found tutors in French and Italian, who at least did not beat him. In learning Arabic, however, he was prevented from the obvious course of selecting a Turkish tutor by his passionate lifelong hatred of Turks, as individuals and as a race, for keeping the Greeks in political subjection, apathy and ignorance. Arabic was thus approached slowly via Hebrew, with a poor Jewish tutor. Latin too seemed closed off to him, because it was in the hands of the Jesuits. No good son of the Orthodox faith could submit

himself to such teachers, especially one who had inherited the library of Korais' grandfather, a man who had written a refutation of the Latin faith, in thirty-six chapters of iambic verse, which was printed and distributed among the educated orthodox as potent medicine againt the disease of Catholicism. Fortunately Korais found a Dutch Protestant pastor, Bernard Keun, who was willing to exchange lessons in Modern Greek for instruction in Latin. He found, in his new teacher's modest library, books which solved many of his problems with Hebrew and even with Ancient Greek, the one subject on which he felt that his education had taught him something. It was a practical demonstration of the benefits which enlightened Europe had to offer Greece.

In 1772 at the age of 24 he persuaded his father to send him to Amsterdam as the representative of his silk-exporting business. There, in an exciting atmosphere far from Turkish domination, his passion for learning could be indulged among the friends of his Smyrna Latin teacher. His activity during the six or seven years in Amsterdam may be summed up by the words of a letter written about him back to Smyrna:

> He has four teachers and is learning Dutch, Hebrew, Spanish and French. He is also learning geometry and the lyre ... every Saturday evening, instead of going to church, he attends the opera ... now he has hired a man to teach him fencing.

His father's Amsterdam trade collapsed through neglect and in 1778 Adamantios was forced to go home.

He tells that after the freedom of Amsterdam the next four years in Smyrna were intolerable. Restraints and limitations which had previously been a challenge now served only to depress him, and only Keun kept him sane. In order to escape, he revived an earlier project to study medicine, the most respected profession for a Greek in the Ottoman Empire. His parents, wishing to keep him in Smyrna, then played the traditional trump card of the Greek family by arranging a marriage. 'This hook,' he tells us in his autobiography,

> would certainly have caught me, both because of my youth and through the beauty, even the wealth, of the bride, who was the orphan of a very rich father, if my desire for freedom had not forced me to feel contempt for all desires of other kinds.

His parents were resigned to losing him, and in 1782, aged 34, he entered the medical faculty at Montpellier.

Within two years of his departure both parents were dead. For the rest of his life Korais had to provide his own financial support. He was constantly poor—a lower-middle class sort of poverty, admittedly, but one which became extremely acute in times of crisis. Six years of study qualified him as a doctor, though he was never to practise. He wrote two theses, one on fevers, the other a marriage of medical and philological interests in a discussion of Hippocrates.

His state of mind is shown by his voluminous surviving correspondence, especially the letters to Dimitrios Lotos, the *protopsaltis* of his church in Smyrna. He mixes complaints about his ill-health and poverty with homesickness for Smyrna, while recognizing the political and educational reasons which would always prevent his return. He corrects his correspondent's Greek. He shows admiration for Western Europe, particularly France and England. But increasingly the strongest current is that of Greek nationalism. He retells pro-Greek and particularly anti-Turkish tit-bits from the European press. He tells us that the most moving moment when he defended one of his theses was the comment of a young French doctor that, 'he had learned from it that the Greeks of today, though subjugated, are still the Greeks of ancient times, that the spirit of their progenitors has not died out'. More opportunities for his nationalism are provided by the Russo-Turkish war which broke out in 1787, and the exploits of Lambros Katsonis, a Greek admiral fighting at the side of the Russians.

When Korais went to Paris in 1788, he described it as 'the Athens of Modern Europe'. After describing its wonders to the *protopsaltis*, he concludes:

> Such, my friends, is Paris. Anyone is bound to be amazed at these things, but for a Greek who knows that his ancestors 2,000 years ago in Athens had reached the same—perhaps even a higher—level of wisdom, his surprise is mixed with melancholy. But when he realises that all these blessings not only have died out in Greece today, but have been replaced by countless evils, that in the place which was ruled by the wise laws of Solon (whose name, my friend, I have often heard pronounced by learned men here with a kind of reverence) there now hold sway ignorance, malice, violence, brutality, insolence and shamelessness; that instead of Miltiades, Themistokles and the like, whom Europe still admires, we are governed—alas—by whom? By riff-raff and camel drivers, or by monkish barbarians even worse than our foreign tyrants. When the unhappy Greek sees all this, his melancholy becomes indignation and despair.

His move to Paris in 1788 is announced by a brief letter in which he mentions the need to work for a few months in the Royal Library. He was 40 years of age. In fact he was to spend in Paris the remaining 45 of his 85 years, leaving the city only for the French countryside at two moments of famine and sickness.

He had hardly been in Paris a year when the Revolution began. There survives a corpus of 14 letters to the *protopsaltis* and a few others dating between 1789 and 1797, when the series breaks off. There are gaps for lost letters whose existence can be documented, and doubtless others lost without trace. But the whole is a useful historical source for historians of the Revolution, the narrative and comments of a careful and şensitive observer. His letters are curiously naive, giving clear testimony to the amazement and excitement which the events inspired in him. He approves the rhetoric of democratic idealism, though it can go too far for him. The successes of the revolutionaries are at first triumphantly

acclaimed, though a note of horror soon creeps in at some of their manifestations. He enthuses, for example, about the storming of the Bastille, but is outraged by meeting an excited crowd carrying heads on pikes.

His strongest personal reaction is to project the events from Paris to the Ottoman Empire. The confiscation of church property, for example, gives him an opportunity for the vicarious satisfaction of his own anticlericalism against the Orthodox Church, an attitude he seems to have combined with unquestioned religious faith. He rejoices, in abstract, at the destruction of tyrants and the establishment of egalitarian institutions. In practice, however, he feels sympathy for the French King and horror at the amount of bloodshed. The Terror he calls the 'tyranny of Robespierre', speaking of the 'crimes of this monster'. One can hardly blame him for thinking that liberty, equality and fraternity could have been established with less destruction of human life, and for hoping that a Greek revolution would be less bloody—even if, with the benefit of hindsight, this seems a forlorn hope. As we shall see, Korais' attitude to Napoleon followed the same path as that of many other liberal observers, his initial enthusiasm falling slowly to complete disillusion.

Korais' democratic feelings must have been derived from his classical reading, if only because there were few practical examples available from more recent periods. As he moved around the streets of Paris on all but the most violent days of revolutionary activity, reading avidly all the revolutionary pronouncements he could find and putting his friends in danger by sending compromising pack-ages to Smyrna, his vague ideas became more settled. He rejected the indiscrim-inate violence of Jacobinism, which he had learned to fear at close quarters, and favoured a more ideological approach to political and social change, with *education* as its main revolutionary weapon. He honoured the half-century of philosophical speculation which had prepared European minds for the possibility of revolution, and was particularly moved by the splendid ceremony of the transference of the bones of Voltaire to the Pantheon. It reminded him that the ancient Athenians had given Sophocles high rank as payment for a tragedy he had written. In the revolutionary wars, however, there was more need for Spartan than for Athenian values. Many mothers, he declares, willingly offered their only sons for enlist-ment in the army. 'Now I believe all that the ancient Greek writers say about the women of Sparta. These days you hear of nothing but Marathon, Salamis, Artemision, Leuctra, Plataea, etc.' He was equally moved by a strange plan of the revolutionary leaders, which he reports in November 1792, if the establishment of democracy in France should prove impossible, that they should commandeer ships at Toulon and sail off to Crete and Cyprus to found a Greco-Gallic state. Korais believed that such a project would have wide support among the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire.

In fact no philologist of Greek birth, living through the French Revolution in Paris, could fail to be impressed by the fact that the revolutionaries' sources on democracy were not very different from his own. Greek and Roman civiliza-

tion appeared to have enormous revolutionary power. Ancient examples and parallels are constantly quoted in the records of all the legislatures of the revolutionary period. They are drawn from the regular Latin curriculum of the *collèges* at which most of the revolutionary leaders had studied, together with avid reading of Plutarch in translation. At first one has the impression that they had a largely decorative function—a heavy admixture, as it were, of the Latin tags used more recently in Anglo-Saxon legislatures. But when the references are collected and analyzed, as in Harold Parker's book, *The Cult of Antiquity and the French Revolutionaries*, it seems clear that they have a more significant role. The revolutionaries had a definite sense that they were stepping out of the framework of Modern European history. After the eclipse of the Girondins, even the American example was not of much use. The only model to follow, the only term of comparison left, one which had been used frequently by the great *philosophes* of the last half-century, was the ancient world, where revolutionary problems had been faced and some solutions offered. Ancient republican constitutions, for example, played a large part in the debates over the constitution of democratic France.

When the Hall of the Convention in the Tuileries was redecorated in 1793, statues of Solon and Lycurgus (together with Camillus and Cincinnatus) were included—democratic saints with laurel crowns for haloes. The two Greek statues represented the tension of opposites in ancient Greek influence, as was fully acknowledged in the debates of the time. Desmoulins and other moderates favoured Solon and Athens, the more civilised ideal, while extremists like Robespierre and Saint-Just preferred the puritan virtues of Sparta—though both of these two, when condemned, spoke of drinking the hemlock like Socrates. Saint-Just, indeed, had he not been guillotined, would in a few days have proposed to the Convention an educational programme directly modelled on the Spartan system described in Plutarch's *Life of Lycurgus*. He also had plans for public festivals of a Spartan type, some of which actually took place. Persons and towns renamed themselves after classical heroes or places, or the martyrs of the Revolution. The town of St Maximin neatly had it both ways, by rechristening itself Marat-hon. Even Napoleon, in his letter of surrender, wrote, 'I throw myself, like Themistokles, upon the mercy of the British people'.

Korais' autobiography is a brief document, and his discussion of this turning-point in his career is disappointingly scrappy. This is what he says:

> The doubts I had felt up to this time about return to my homeland, which had been lessened by the death of my parents, were completely removed by the political change in France, and I came to an irrevocable decision to live no more with tyrants. This increased the desire which I had long felt to contribute all in my power to the education of my fellow- countrymen, particularly when I discovered that the increase and spread of education in the French nation had given birth to the love of freedom. The only means I found to make this

contribution was by editions of ancient Greek writers with long introductions in Modern Greek, so that they may be read not only by students of the ancient language, but by those of limited education.

Up to the year 1798 Korais' publications are largely translations of medical works to provide him with an income. After that year most of his production falls into four groups. First the *Elliniki Vivliothiki*, the 'Greek Library', with 16 volumes in its major series and nine in its minor series of supplements. Then two pamphlets of a directly revolutionary nature, real calls to arms, both published anonymously but securely attributed to Korais. Thirdly a varied group of controversial works, again mostly anonymous and in many cases in dialogue form. Finally there are volumes of miscellaneous notes, the *Atakta*, published in the last years of his life. The first two of these groups will concern us here.

The two brief revolutionary works which form the second group are the *Asma Polemistirion*, the Battle Hymn of the Greeks fighting for freedom in Egypt, published in 1800, and the *Salpisma Polemistirion*, the Trumpet Call to Battle, published in 1801. The former publication was inspired by the news that a small Greek detachment was fighting alongside the forces of Napoleon in Egypt— probably Greek mercenaries of the Mamelukes who had changed allegiance. In 1800 it had seemed for some years that the liberation of Greece by Napoleonic forces, probably from their base in the Ionian Islands, was only a matter of time. Korais thus now saw in the presence of the small Greek force in Egypt the beginning of a general co-operation of the French and Greek peoples, even a union, as he had speculated in 1792. The song calls for vengeance on the Turkish rulers of Greece, calls up memories of past Greek greatness, and has as its refrain *Zito i eleftheria!*, 'Long live freedom!'. Here is the climax of the last verse:

French and Greek bound together, united in friendship, are not Greek or French but one nation, Grecofrench, crying 'Let cursed slavery be abolished and wiped from the surface of the earth'. *Zito i eleftheria*

The *Salpisma Polemistirion* refers to the same situation and presents Greece herself, pictured as a wounded, bedraggled mother in an engraving in the pamphlet, telling the history of the troubles of the Greek nation since antiquity and demanding revenge. Those who are in Egypt are to emulate the exploits of their French brothers, and those elsewhere are to flock to Egypt or to hold themselves ready for other services. The amount of Turkish blood to be shed will be small, for the Turks themselves are hostile to their tyrants and some provincial governors are already in revolt.

This is authentic revolutionary propaganda, with conscious echoes of the first martyr of the Greek Revolution, Rigas Velestinlis, who had died in a Turkish prison two years before in 1798. Korais' pamphlets seem intended as a kind of continuation of Rigas' war-song, the *Thourios*. All these works regard the revolution as something likely to happen at once, in the intoxication of the explosion

of the power of democratic France. But it was not to be. The French retreated from Egypt in 1801, as Korais was publishing the *Salpisma Polemistirion*. After the pause of the Peace of Amiens, Napoleon was crowned Emperor in 1804, and it became plain, as Korais puts it, that 'Instead of freeing the distressed peoples of Europe from their rulers, he preferred to be the ruler of those rulers'. Rigas' reputation was safe, uncompromised and uncompromising, in his martyr's tomb, having never had to face the disappointment of his hopes in France. Korais lived on 35 years beyond Rigas, and had to come to terms not only with the Emperor Napoleon but with the return of the Bourbons.

In the years between 1801 and the first announcement of the *Elliniki Vivliothiki* in 1805 there are signs of tension heralding a new direction in Korais' thinking. Already in the introduction to a translation of Beccaria in 1802 there is less concentration on the immediate situation and more on a long-term programme of education—largely, of course, a result of the different frame of publication. In 1803, in his famous memoir on the current state of civilisation in Greece, presented to the Société des observateurs de l'homme, he is anxious to assure his audience of the advances of the Greek people in the direction of Enlightenment. In a letter to Alexandros Vasiliou written seven days after his lecture, he stresses a passage in which he says that if a French army were to liberate Greece, they would find Greeks educated to accept freedom. This same message is found two years later in an anonymous *Dialogue of two Greeks*, securely attributed to Korais, which calls for a Franco-Greek alliance on unexpectedly equal terms, on the grounds that the French acknowledge the increasing capacity of the Greeks to seize freedom for themselves. These works show a new wariness towards the French and their Emperor, and a renewed stress on the Greeks' ability and responsibility to play their part in winning independence.

When the *Elliniki Vivliothiki* begins in 1806, the first two volumes are an edition of Isocrates, perhaps an obvious choice for his admiration of Athenian cultural achievements and his stress on the unity of the Greeks against a common enemy. Volumes 3-8 are six volumes of Plutarch. Here one senses that Korais is thinking of the influence that the *Parallel Lives* had exercised over the imagination of the revolutionary leaders. If a wide range of the revolutionary spectrum had found in them potent lessons and models, perhaps if they were used in Greek schools, Greek revolutionaries would arise more just but no less effective than Robespierre, to free their people from their Ottoman masters. The books, with their long introductions in Modern Greek discussing national problems, particularly that of education, were distributed far and wide by the generosity of Korais' merchant collaborators. They were to be for years among the most common educational tools in Greek schools.

It is obvious that the *Elliniki Vivliothiki* envisages a much extended time-span before the achievement of Greek freedom, in comparison with the revolutionary works of 1800-1. In fact, when the revolutionary struggle did break out in 1821,

Korais expressed the view that it was too early. This attitude was defended in his autobiography:

> I was deceived only in this, that the revolt against the tyrant which my calculation placed around the middle of the present century, in fact occurred 30 years earlier. That it happened at the wrong moment was plain from the audacity of the leaders of the Revolution ... and from the utter foolishness of the conduct of many politicians in Greece up to this day [words written in 1829]. This conduct has been the cause of the shedding of so much innocent blood that the Greek name would all but have disappeared from the face of the earth if the forces raised against the tyrant, both on land and sea, had not performed deeds truly worthy of Marathon and Salamis.

With thirty years more education, he claims, the foundation of the Greek state would have been more auspicious. This is a speculation which it would be unwise to take further.

In spite of his disappointment with the timing of the Revolution, Korais at the age of 73 threw himself wholeheartedly into the struggle to ensure its success. Letters and publications with advice of every kind were showered upon the revolutionary leaders. Other letters were sent around the world, appealing for practical help to governments and the influential philhellenes. It is impossible to estimate the influence of this work—how many volunteers arrived in Greece, how many bankers and philanthropists were persuaded to contribute, how far the governments and naval commanders of Western Europe were deflected in the direction of Greek independence as a direct or indirect result of Korais' writing. Nevertheless the energy shown was amazing. In the internal politics of the new Greek state Korais had a considerable share in the responsibility for the overthrow of Kapodistrias, an act whose wisdom may be questioned, but which at least serves to establish Korais' credentials as a fierce democrat to the end of his life.

It is time to sum up Korais' career, with special emphasis on the pressures which formed his views on the nature of political change, and the development of those views as a response to changing political circumstances. He hated the Turks, and was attracted and impressed by the Western European Enlightenment. He was inspired with the democratic principles of the French Revolution, and dreamed of putting them into practice in Greek lands. At the same time he had seen at close quarters the brutality and chaos which the Revolution caused, and the difficulty of creating a stable democratic state out of a revolutionary situation. He had been impressed by the dynamic revolutionary power of a classical education within the thought world of a neoclassical age. Later he wrote to inspire the Greeks to join Napoleon in achieving their freedom. But the shattering of these hopes threw him back on the belief that Greece should rely on its own strength, should exploit its privileged access to classical education, and should build a strong, educated, truly enlightened nation whose bid for independence (around

1850) would be successful without bloodshed on a large scale, and would lead directly to a democratic state. When the Revolution broke out in 1821, he felt it was too early, but still supported independent Greece with every ounce of his failing strength till his death in 1833.

With this background we must turn to the remaining subject of this paper, Korais' linguistic work—that part of his policy which, to most people's regret, has been the most influential and long-lasting.

When dealing with Greek language and literature of this period, the unwary may fall into two misapprehensions, against which the common works of reference will not warn them. Let me issue warnings here. First, about the pre-existence of literature, particularly prose writing, in a language approximating to spoken Modern Greek. In the new *History of Modern Greek Literature* of Linos Politis, for example, Korais is dealt with between pages 98-100 of a 370 page book. The first 97 pages may give you an impression of a sparse but persistent verse literature in spoken Demotic Greek, with a certain amount of prose. But a large proportion of both kinds of writing survived in manuscript form, much of it in Western European libraries, from which it has been published in the last 150 years. The main access to previous demotic literature at the time we are considering was through a series of Venetian editions of rather low quality and small tirage, and from oral sources. The oral poetic sources were rich, carrying both purely traditional material and some works, like the Cretan *Erotokritos*, which had originally been written compositions. But they had not yet been exploited to form a secure written vernacular. This immense task was performed for verse by Solomos and his school, and was not really complete till the 1880s. In prose, the decisive step was taken by Psycharis in 1888.

The second of these warnings has reference to writing on the language question itself. Modern histories, very properly, give more space to early advocates of the introduction of modern demotic than to those who were supporting the status quo—the written language of learned, particularly ecclesiastical, writing generally used in the period of Turkish rule. Even less space is given to those supporting the reintroduction of Ancient Greek. But the space given in a history book must not be allowed to conceal from us the realities of the situation as it would present itself to a contemporary. Many of the demoticists of the period did not publish their work in their lifetime—for example, the whole output of Katartzis and the *Dialogue* of Solomos. Only one of the demoticists, Rigas Velestinlis, had an instinct for publicity, and he was executed after a very short period of publishing activity. The enormous productivity and wide distribution of one writer, Neophytos Doukas, the main prophet of extreme archaism, would outweigh the whole efforts of the demoticists. The strident popular voices of the time were ranged against the spoken language.

After this long introduction, let us look at Korais' linguistic theories. The most explicit statement of his position is to be found in the introduction to his edition of Heliodorus, published in 1804, the year of Napoleon's imperial coronation.

But linguistic reformers do not need explicit statements. We can see the language of Korais in action in his letters, in his translations, and especially when he corrects the writing of his friend the *protopsaltis*. On the whole, he is quite· consistent throughout his life. If there is a change, it seems to me to be in the direction of a slightly stiffer and more archaic language.

One issue may be disposed of first because it was a belief common to all eighteenth-century and most nineteenth-century Greek writers on the language, however unsound it may seem to us now. In Korais' words: 'Just as it is true for each individual that "a man's character is known by his speech", so, in the same way, the character of an entire nation is known by its language'. But this common approach was not used in a uniform way, reflecting widely different assumptions about the duty of those who study language. One view regarded the spoken language as a kind of national assembly, in which every speaker had a vote, a democratic right as important as any other. These, in Greek terms, were the demoticists. Others saw in the link between language and nation an opportunity for wide-ranging intervention in the national character by a kind of linguistic engineering. By raising, in some way, the level of the language, the level of the nation could be raised too. This was a primary justification for all forms of Greek archaism: there seemed to have been a fairly steady decline in the fortunes of the Greeks as a people from Alexander at the end of the classical age down to the end of the period of Turkish domination, accompanied obviously enough by a change in the Greek language, easily interpreted as a decline. It seemed obvious that archaism would restore some of the lost moral and political fibre.

Korais used both of these theories. His basic position, I feel, is the first of the two I have given here, the demotic and democratic approach. Since Korais' reputation is such that many people may find this hard to believe, here is a small anthology of quotations to establish the point:

> Just as one person differs from another in personal character, so he naturally must differ as well in linguistic character. But this character cannot show itself as it truly is, except when a person writes in his natural language—that is, in the language which he suckled with his mother's milk and which he speaks every day ... If we wish to bring order to the conceptions of our mind and to render the language able to express those conceptions, we have a great obligation to write in the language in which we think ... No-one has the right to say to a nation, 'I want you to speak like this, to write like this' ... Only time has the power to alter the dialects of nations, just as it alters nations themselves ... We write not for the ancestors who have been dead for centuries, but for our fellow Greeks of today ... It would be a fine thing, naturally, if we lived in those times when the dead were raised up, and the gift of tongues spread around without effort. But miracles do not happen every day.

In these quotations Korais writes as a demoticist, recognising that languages change, that the clock cannot be put back, that the arbiters of a people's language

are those who speak it. But this theoretical demoticism is heavily qualified by other considerations, all directly relevant to Korais' dream of Greek independence.

One comparatively unimportant factor arose from his position as one of the foremost Hellenists in Europe and a major propagandist of the philhellenic movement. Though most of his writing in Greek was aimed at his fellow-Greeks, it was inevitable that he should pay some attention to non-Greeks who could read the language. Ancient Greek was taught in most of the universities of Europe, Modern Greek hardly at all. Thus the more elements of the ancient language he used in his own writing, the wider his non-Greek audience would be.

A more significant reason for the 'purification' of the language was the existence in it of many more or less hellenized Turkish words. If the nation and its language have some essential link—a belief which, as I have said, was hardly challenged at the time—every time a Greek speaker uses a Turkish word, he shows his personal lack of independence and the subservient status of his people as a whole. Turkish words should thus be purged from the language and replaced by pedigree Hellenic forms. At the same time, one may as well remove French, Italian, even Latin words, all of which are the signs of previous subjections. This requirement, which may perhaps be pardoned in a lifelong hater of Turks at the moment of revolution from Turkish rule, nevertheless involved a good deal of change to some of the most common words in the Greek vocabulary.

But the most important factor directing Korais away from demotic is the emphasis given in his whole programme to education in Ancient Greek. This placed great weight in his mind on the barriers to comprehension between Ancient and Modern Greek, to the linguistic changes of every kind which prevented the school pupils of 1800—the revolutionary leaders designate of 1850—from drinking revolutionary milk direct from Plato or Plutarch. It was this pressure, to my mind, which made irresistible the temptation to tinker with the spoken language. Modern Greek dialects had preserved many archaic forms, and there was no clearly recognised standard demotic. If one were to use the education process to reinforce some of the archaic features of the dialects, together with a few logical extensions of those features which happened not to have survived in any dialect, one could go some way to bridge the chasm between the ancient and modern languages. Those trained in such a language could read the *Elliniki Vivliothiki* more easily than those trained in spoken demotic of a more natural kind. The new *katharevousa* which Korais used and recommended was much closer to that natural demotic than the Ancient Greek, and so Korais could still describe it as 'the language which he suckled with his mother's milk', in an age when the most pressing alternatives were the use of ecclesiastical, or even Ancient, Greek. But it is hard to see how Korais could defend himself against the charge of saying, 'I want you to speak like this, to write like this'.

His solution was the famous *mesi odos*, the 'middle way':

What other road is open to the nation's literary men but the middle one, leading away from vulgarity, for it is not likely that Plato, Isocrates and the rest wrote like the galley- slaves of Athens; far also from the difficulties of Ancient Greek, for it is likewise probable that Plato and Isocrates wrote in such a way that the galley-slaves could understand them . . . He who speaks and writes will be excused if he makes accustomed words regular and stylistically pleasing so that they become as seemly as possible, but not if he inserts other, ancient words in their place simply because these words are older.

Korais is here claiming for some linguistic arbiter the right to correct the language as he wills, within constraints which seem basically aesthetic. He himself exercised this function with sensitivity and fair restraint; but the principle once established, it was inevitable that his successors would be much less restrained.

Elsewhere we seem to hear reservations natural to one who had lived through the Revolution in Paris:

If, on one hand, it is tyrannical for a person to depart from common spoken usage to such a degree that he becomes unclear to the intellect and strange to the ear, on the other hand it is demagogic, I feel, for him to display a vulgarity so great that it becomes disgusting to those who have been well brought up. When I say that the whole nation partakes of its language with democratic equality, I do not mean that we must entrust the cultivation and creation of that language to the ochlocratic imagination of the vulgar. The mob is everywhere a mob.

Interestingly enough, Korais will have found support of a kind for his language policy among the revolutionary leaders, even those closest to the mob which he despises. The speeches of the revolutionary legislatures are full of the rhetoric of the mother-tongue, in vindicating the French of Paris against the tyranny of Latin, which had been overthrown. Yet as in the case of Korais, there is another side of their policy which seems to be in flagrant contradiction of that rhetoric. There were millions of French men and women in the revolutionary period who spoke little French and wrote none—either because they came from the periphery of the French state and spoke a distinct language like Flemish, German, Italian, Spanish, Basque or Breton, or because their language was one of the patois current in huge areas of the centre and south of the country.

In an era of wars, this linguistic fragmentation was seen as a severe threat to national unity. At a time of rapid change and Enlightenment, the need to translate every document into so many languages was seen as a terrible barrier to progress, a powerful force in the determination of the *ancien régime* to keep the people of France in ignorance of their rights. The situation demanded change. Information and statistics were collected, teachers of French were appointed, official discrimination was practised in favour of French and against all the alternatives. In the period of the Terror, these rules were pushed ahead ruthlessly, to be relaxed later.

Even so, this period marked a crucial step in the linguistic unification of France.

There are, I think, crucial parallels here with the policy of Korais. Both sides of the comparison chose a national language in the interests of the rapid spread of Enlightenment; both defended it against an archaic alternative by using the rhetoric of the mother-tongue; both defended it against the ignorance and vulgarity of 'inferior' forms of expression. In both cases there are unresolved contradictions between the two defences. One may add that there are some indications that Korais was a close acquaintance of the Abbé Grégoire, the revolutionary priest who collected statistics on French language fragmentation and was a major force in deciding and implementing language policy. This seems to me an interesting line of approach worth taking further, in the hope of finding more clues to Korais' thinking.

Thanks largely to the personal prestige of its greatest philologist, the new Greek kingdom adopted the *mesi odos*, katharevousa, as its official written language. In the event it was rivalled not so much by demotic spoken Greek as by Ancient Greek, which had the support of the romantic German ideas of the new court in Athens. Ancient Greek took its revenge for this defeat by driving katharevousa, through competitive pressure, into greater and greater archaism. Those who continued Korais' policy after his death allowed their writing to become generally incomprehensible to an extent which he would hardly have accepted. Other supporters became open partisans of the use of Ancient Greek.

The subsequent history of the language question is too complex to examine here. It is worth mentioning that katharevousa dominated Greek linguistic expression in the nineteenth century, and has been slow to recede in the twentieth. Only literature has been generally free of its influence since the first years of the century. It was in 1975 that it was abolished officially from education and the apparatus of government, and it will be many years before it finally disappears in practice—for example, from the law-courts and the church. I am confident that the ghost of Korais would have wished to curb its worst excesses, that his democratic spirit would have ceased to defend it by about 1850.

This has been a plea for a sympathetic consideration of Korais and his linguistic policy. I would sum it up by recommending that those who think about the history of the Greek language during the Enlightenment and particularly in the period of the French Revolution need to beware of drawing without thought the equations between linguistic stance and political purpose, which can be assumed for most other periods of Modern Greek history. At this time archaic does not always equal reactionary, nor is demotic always democratic. Neoclassicism in Western Europe gave Ancient Greek the aura of a revolutionary weapon, and some Greek intellectuals tried to seize that weapon and use it. They were mistaken. Korais' use of katharevousa and his *Elliniki Vivliothiki* can have added only marginally to the preparedness of Greeks for revolution, even if the moment of revolt had been delayed to 1850. But his mistake was not reactionary, nor stupid. He had chosen from the ideological panoply of the French Revolu-

tionaries a weapon which he thought specially appropriate to Greeks, and had done all in his power to make that weapon accessible through the Greek education system.

I am unable to suggest a twentieth-century parallel. If I wanted one, I should look for an ideological myth of Marxism-Leninism which would have been specially impressive to a non-Russian resident of Leningrad in 1917. To be a complete parallel it would need to be a myth within a particular national framework, which might promise a special path to revolution to an observer from that national group.

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The best book on Korais in English is S.G. Chaconas, *Adamantios Korais: A Study in Greek Nationalism*, New York, 1942; repr. 1968. Though it suffers from a general naiveté of approach and particularly a belief in *katharevousa* as a spoken language of the respectable classes, it remains useful nonetheless, as is clear from the influence of its translations of Greek texts on those I have presented here.

See also:

R. Clogg (ed. and tr.), *The Movement for Greek Independence, 1770-1821*, London, 1976, esp. 118-131.

C. Th. Dimaras, *La Grèce au temps des lumières*, Geneva, 1969.

Queux de Saint-Hilaire (ed. and tr.), *Lettres de Coray au Protopsalte de Smyrne*, Paris, 1880.

V. Rotolo, *A. Korais e la questione della lingua in Grecia*, Palermo, 1965.

Tsarist Russia and Balkan National Liberation Movements: a Study in Great-Power Mythology

by Barbara Jelavich

For all of the national movements of the nineteenth century, those of Italy and Germany as well as of the East European people—the attitudes and reactions of the great powers—Britain, France, Russia, the Ottoman Empire and the Hapsburg Empire, and after unification Germany, Italy—were usually of decisive importance. Although much attention has been given in historical studies to the national programmes, less interest has been shown in the subject of great-power mythology—that is, how the leaders of the large states viewed the role of their nation in world affairs and how they related that attitude to the national liberation movements. Great powers, like small nationalities, were also governed by romantic concepts concerning their place in history and often quite irrational conceptions of the significance of their contributions to human development.

This paper will concentrate on one great power, Russia, and will examine its relationship to the Balkan national movements from the late eighteenth century to the 1880s, the period in which the foundations for the modern Romanian, Bulgarian, Greek and Serbian states were laid. The aim will be to explain why tsarist Russia was so vulnerable to appeals from Balkan national leaders, and why at times tsarist officials were willing to sacrifice the interests of their own state to meet Balkan requests for aid and protection. An explanation will also be attempted of why the Balkan governments, once established, did not share a similar feeling of responsibility or attachment to Russia and why their own perceptions of their place in history led to friction with the great power patron. This study will deal exclusively with the reaction of those responsible for the direction of Russian foreign policy and not with the ideas of writers, poets, journalists, artists, historians and publicists, even when they dealt with similar themes in their works.

In the nineteenth century Russian foreign affairs were conducted by a narrow group consisting of the tsar and those ministers and advisers whom he chose to consult. The foreign ministers, the generals and the ambassadors assigned to the

major European capitals usually exerted the principal influence. During this period a relatively few men made the major decisions; the most important were the four tsars—Alexander I, Nicholas I, Alexander II and Alexander III—and their most influential foreign ministers—Prince A. Czartoryski, I. Capodistrias, K.R. Nesselrode, A.M. Gorchakov and N.K. Giers. All of these men, tsars and officials alike, were European and western-oriented. They considered their state as a part of the European system, and they held firmly to the principle of the balance of power in international relations, that is, that the European states should remain in a state of rough equilibrium. When one gained a territorial extension, then the others should receive an equivalent compensation. Like their counter-parts elsewhere, the Russian statesmen tended to make decisions on a day-to-day basis; they met international crises as they occurred. They did not have great imperial plans nor clearly defined broad national goals.

In the century under discussion the major Russian attention was directed toward Europe and relations with the other great powers. Two major issues arose: the national movements and the overseas imperial drives of the rival states, Britain and France in particular. As far as the national revolutions were concerned, conservative, autocratic Russia, holding Polish lands, usually opposed them in principle. Nevertheless, different attitudes, depending on Russian state interests at the time, were adopted. Thus violent opposition was shown to Polish and Hungarian activities, but, at least after 1856, diplomatic support was given to Italian, German, and sometimes Romanian efforts. Reasons of state, not ideology, thus determined the Russian official reaction to the national movements outside of the Balkan peninsula.

Similar practical considerations dictated the Russian response to European imperialism, a movement in which Russia, of course, took part. Here too the Russian government had initially no great plans for conquest; it is difficult to find, for instance, any determined 'drive' to the Indian Ocean. Russian actions were often taken in answer to the more ambitious British initiatives in China, India, Afghanistan, and Persia. The so-called 'great game in Asia' was little more than that for most Russian statesmen in this century. They had few dreams of vast eastern empires and only occasionally held the idea that Russia had a civilizing mission in Asia.

In contrast to the episodic and eminently rational view of relations with Europe and the rest of the world, the Russian government from the eighteenth century to the outbreak of the First World War remained continuously involved in the affairs of the Balkan peninsula and it was willing to make sacrifices often disproportionate to the issues at stake. This region, controlled by the Ottoman Empire, was, of course, of enormous strategic significance for all of the great powers. The tsarist government too had to be concerned with its fate. In dealing with the Ottoman territories, the Russian diplomats had three possible alternative policies. First, they could come to an agreement with the other governments principally concerned—France, Britain and the Habsburg Empire—and arrange

for the partition of the lands into spheres of influence or areas of direct conquest and annexation. Second, they could seek to dominate the Ottoman government and thus control the destiny of the entire empire; or, third, they could encourage the national movements and support the division of the peninsula into autonomous or independent states. Throughout most of the century the first two courses of action were followed. Certainly, at no time did the Russian government openly and officially stand sponsor for, or attempt to organize, subversive movements against Ottoman rule. Individual agents, it is true, did take part in such activities, but, when they were discovered, these actions were usually denounced.

Nevertheless, despite this basically conservative approach, Russia was drawn into four wars in the nineteenth century over controversies related to the status of the Balkan Christians and through the resultant peace treaties in fact carried through the third alternative. This paradoxical situation was largely the result of the enormous influence which Balkan issues could exert on individual Russians and the parallel direction of Balkan and Russian views of their historical destiny. In times of stress and crisis irrational concepts, based more on imagination and sentiment than on practical considerations of national interest, did come into play. Most important was the fact that certain aspects of Balkan national mythology were not only accepted by influential Russian statesmen, but these concepts also fitted well into Russian perceptions of their country's role in world diplomacy. To understand the compatibility of Balkan national doctrines with tsarist conceptions, a short review of those aspects of Balkan nationalism which could appeal most deeply to Russian sympathies is necessary.

Balkan national liberation movements, as is well known, were all preceded or accompanied by a period of cultural revival during which a standard literary language was developed and an intense interest was shown in the past. Writers revived the memories of previous rulers and heroes and the periods of national glory before the humiliating Ottoman conquest. The Greeks looked back to classical Greece and the Byzantine Empire; the Romans turned to the Romans and Dacians; the Serbs and Bulgarians took pride in their medieval empires. All perceived the nation as a living, dynamic conception and the natural political organization for mankind. It was assumed that the modern Balkan people were the direct descendants of these great ancestors. Closely connected to these doctrines was the concept of historic lands, that is, that certain people had the eternal right to the possession of definite territories, determined by God and history. Ottoman Turks, no matter how long they had been in residence in any Balkan region, were universally regarded as intruders in the land and destined for eventual expulsion.

In addition to the emphasis on the historic origins of each people, the Balkan national movements contained a strong religious element. During the long period of Ottoman rule, the Orthodox church under the millet system had provided political leadership. Some church authorities were deeply involved in the national

revivals. Religious doctrine also gave strength to the conception of historic lands. The Ottoman conquest was explained as the punishment of God for Christian sins; it was expected that at some time the Balkan people would again come into full possession of their rightful property.

As long as Balkan revolutionary ideology emphasized the concept of the restoration of historic rights and Orthodox Christianity, the national liberation movements were bound to win sympathetic attention in Russia. Russian tsars, in particular Alexander I and Nicholas I, were hostile to European revolutionary movements because of the associated liberal ideology and the attacks on legitimate authority. The Orthodox aspect was particularly attractive to conservative Russians. In the past the Russian people, under the leadership of their church and princes, had also fought against foreign domination. As the strongest Orthodox power, in fact until 1830 the only independent Orthodox state, Russia was bound to be drawn into the struggle of other Orthodox communities against Islam. The Balkan emphasis on the revival of past empires was similarly appealing to Russian sentiments. Russian statesmen too had a classical education; Greece, Rome and Byzantium were part of their cultural heritage. The Panslavs, influential after 1856, emphasized the common Slavic background of the Russians and the majority of the Balkan inhabitants. As regards the Ottoman conquest, Russian statesmen shared the general Balkan opinion that it was one of the great disasters of history, but that, at some time, Ottoman rule would be broken and the historic nations reborn. As the great Orthodox power, Russia should be expected to show sympathy and understanding and, where possible, lend material assistance.

Although such sentiments were of major importance in the nineteenth century, they played a relatively minor role in initiating the first direct Russian involvement in Balkan affairs, which occurred during the reign of Peter the Great. Subsequently, during the eighteenth century Russian possessions were extended to the Black Sea. The limit to Russian expansion to the southwest was set by the Treaty of Bucharest of 1812 when the frontier became the Pruth and Danube rivers. During the wars of the eighteenth century, usually waged in alliance with the Habsburg Monarchy, the Russian court was the recipient of constant appeals from Balkan Christians for assistance. In turn, the Russian government repeatedly called upon the Balkan people to aid in its military ventures. In general, in the eighteenth century the Russian officials were able to exploit the Orthodox relationship to win support for their policies. Little, if anything, was sacrificed for the Balkan population. Nevertheless, by the end of the century a close political as well as a religious association had been established, and, most important for the future, Russian treaties with the Ottoman Empire contained clauses referring to the Balkan people. Although this aspect was not understood at the time, these arrangements marked the assumption by tsarist Russia of important obligations towards the Ottoman Christian population. In the nineteenth century these treaty stipulations were to become the instruments which compelled repeated Russian intervention, both willing and unwilling, in

Balkan affairs. The national leaderships were able to exploit this situation to obtain their own objectives.

The chief diplomatic means used by the Russian government to support the Balkan Christians and to insert its influence between the Ottoman government and its subject population were the political and religious protectorates established through a series of treaties concluded in both the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The first agreement which gave Russia specific rights in this regard was the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji of 1774. Here the Ottoman government promised to 'protect the Christian religion' and the Russian court was allowed specific privileges in regard to Wallachia, Moldavia and the islands of the Archipelago. In further treaties concluded in 1792 and 1802 Russia was able to gain a major voice in the administration of the Romanian Principalities. Once these agreements were made, the Russian government felt compelled to insist on their implementation. The Russo-Turkish War of 1806-1812 commenced with a quarrel over the application of these rights. In 1812, in the Treaty of Bucharest, guarantees were given for Serbia as well as for the Principalities. In 1821, despite Alexander's disapproval of the Greek revolt, diplomatic relations with the Porte were broken because the previous treaties were violated. In 1826 the Russian government forced the Sultan to accept its protectorship of both Serbia and the Danubian Principalities. The Russo-Turkish War of 1828 broke out over the implementation of the terms. In the Treaty of Adrianople of 1829 the Russian protectorship of Serbia and the Principalities was confirmed; Greek autonomy was recognized. In 1830 Russia became one of the three protectors of independent Greece. In 1853 Russia became involved in a major war, first, with the Ottoman Empire, and in 1854 with Britain, France and Sardinia, over the exact nature of the relationship with the Orthodox Christians. In 1877 the Russian government again, and after great hesitation, went to war over issues involving Balkan Christians, this time the Bulgarians, Montenegrins and Serbs. As a result of these military ventures, by the 1880s Ottoman power in Europe had been severely curtailed; an independent Romania, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro had been established and an autonomous Bulgarian government had been organized. Not only had Russian arms been the major contributors to the national victories, but Russian diplomats had played a leading role in determining the political structure of the autonomous and independent regimes.

All of these wars, whose origins lay in the Russian relationship with the Balkan Christians, brought Russia few practical returns. As far as territorial possessions were concerned, Bessarabia was acquired in 1812; in 1878 the Treaty of Berlin provided for an extension of the Russian frontier in Asia Minor and the return of three districts of southern Bessarabia which had been lost in 1856. The other transfers of Ottoman Balkan lands were for the benefit of the Christian population or the Habsburg Monarchy. For these meager rewards the Russian state paid an enormous price. The losses on the battlefields alone were impressive; con-

sidering only mortality figures, 40,000 perished in 1828-1829, 450,000 in the Crimean War, and 120,000 on Balkan battlefields in 1877-1878.

The economic costs were also disastrous and affected Russian development throughout the century. As a backward country Russia could not really afford such foreign policy adventures which absorbed so much of her limited resources in unproductive enterprises. Moreover, Balkan connections could not provide economic advantages. Russia and the Balkan states had parallel agrarian economies; they had little to buy or sell each other. The peninsula could not be a major market for Russian goods nor a source of raw materials. Economic imperialism was thus not a justification for Russian intervention.

Why then did Russia in the nineteenth century allow herself to be drawn into this series of difficult and costly wars, particularly in view of the fact that no vital national interests were at stake and no territorial goals were set? The question becomes even more complicated when it is remembered that the tsars and diplomats during most of the century preferred the alternatives of seeking exclusive domination in Constantinople or of cooperating with the other great powers to agree upon spheres of influence, policies which, when they were implemented, did maintain the peace. Certainly, the best explanation lies in the ideological aspects discussed previously and the unique relationship which was established between Russia and the national movements beginning in the eighteenth century. The compatibility of Balkan national ideology, at least in its early phases, with conservative Russian views has been mentioned. The religious implications were particularly important; even level-headed and western-oriented leaders found it difficult not to respond to Balkan appeals based on these arguments. Long before the eighteenth century begging missions had regularly taken the road from the Balkan lands to Moscow and other Russian cities. Their participants called in the most servile and humble tones for financial and military assistance from the mighty tsar against their dreadful oppressor. Although such appeals were usually not answered, neither the tsars nor their ministers rejected the idea that Russia was the natural patron of Balkan Orthodoxy and that their state had real responsibilities toward oppressed Balkan Christians. They thus in time accepted the role offered them by the Balkan national leaders and developed what was in fact a romantic national myth of their own to justify their relationship with the revolutionary movements. With attitudes ranging from lofty crusading fervour to woolly-headed sentimentality, tsars and their officials came to agree that Russia had a special responsibility toward the Balkan Orthodox population and that in some manner Russian national honour was involved.

Of course, once the treaties with the Ottoman Empire gave Russia the right to intervene in Balkan affairs, Russian representatives had to ensure that the stipulations were not violated; honour was an issue here too. Having accepted the role of benevolent counsellors and protectors, they had to act in accordance with their position. Moreover, from the Russian *right* to intervene, Russian leaders gradually gained the conviction that they were in some sense *obligated* to act to

protect endangered Balkan Christians. This attitude was well expressed in an instruction written by Nesselrode to the Russian ambassadors at the commencement of the Greek revolution. Although Alexander I strongly denounced the revolt itself, he felt compelled to intervene when the Ottoman authorities took strong measures against Christian Greeks and Romanians. Nesselrode wrote:

> In addition to these general considerations, Russia has special considerations which result from its position, from the faith that it professes, and from its treaties with the Ottoman Empire.
>
> The Emperor *is absolutely right* in demanding that the Turkish government *protect* the exercise of the Christian religion, the persons of its ministers, the inviolability of its temples, that it does not bring destruction and death into the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia and that, for the inhabitants of these countries, as for those of the islands of the archipelago and the rest of Greece, it observes a just and constant distinction between innocence and crime.[1]

Closely connected with these sentiments of obligation toward the Balkan Christians, a sort of crushing paternalism was also to develop. Individual Russian diplomats often felt it their duty not only to liberate Balkan people from Ottoman rule, but to instruct and guide them along the proper paths in the future. This 'little brother' attitude was to be particularly galling to the proud new Balkan governments.

The strongest link, it can thus be seen, between Russia and the national liberation movements was the common Orthodox faith, a similar attitude toward past history, and the treaties which the Russian diplomats felt in honour bound to uphold. Although during the century Russian policy was conducted usually on a traditional and pragmatic basis, questions of religious conviction and national honour remained extremely important. The strong Orthodox imprint is well shown in the manifesto issued by Nicholas I at the time of the beginning of hostilities with Britain and France in April, 1854. Even with allowance given for the rhetoric of all such documents, the words are an expression of the tsar's convictions.

> From the very beginning of our dispute with the Turkish government, we solemnly announced to our faithful subjects that a feeling of justice alone induced us to reestablish the injured rights of Orthodox Christians, subjects of the Ottoman Porte.
>
> We have not sought, nor do we seek, to make conquests, or to exercise in Turkey any supremacy whatever which was of such a nature as to exceed the influence belonging to Russia by virtue of existing treaties ...
>
> Ready to confound the audacity of the enemy, shall she deviate from the sacred aim assigned to her by Divine Providence? No! Russia has not forgotten God! It is not for worldly interests that she has taken up arms; she fights for

the Christian faith, for the defense of her co-religionists oppressed by implacable enemies.[2]

After the Crimean War, and to the theme of Russia as the protector of Orthodox Christianity, the Panslavs attempted to add the additional responsibility of the sponsorship of Slavs. Although Panslav propaganda prepared part of the emotional background to the Russian declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire in April, 1877, the Russian actions in this crisis were motivated primarily by the relationships and ideas discussed previously. Russian national honour remained deeply engaged in all questions involving the Porte and its Christian subjects. In February, 1877, Alexander II, although recognizing that war was not in the national interest, nevertheless declared that: 'In the life of states as in that of private individuals, there are moments when one must forget all else and defend one's honour'.[3]

Having thus cast themeselves in the roles of saviours and protectors of Balkan Christianity and having contributed with money and arms to the foundation of the modern Balkan states, the Russian government naturally expected suitable responses from their protégés. Here they were to suffer profound disappointment. Once the national governments were established, Balkan attitudes changed abruptly. Thereafter, when Russian officials and advisers stepped on sensitive national toes, or when the Russian government failed to give the expected assistance to further national advancement, all of the Balkan nations were capable of turning quite sharply against their former protector and patron. They showed themselves, in fact, willing to cooperate with any court which would offer them assistance, even when such policies were damaging to St Petersburg. Within the Balkan states rival political parties tended to look to different powers for support and encouragement. Russian officials were often shocked to see that no great fund of gratitude and trust had been built up in any of the Balkan capitals and that no government felt any particular obligations for the future.

Indeed, it was soon apparent that the Balkan national leaders were eager and willing to accept Russia as their liberator and protector only as long as Ottoman control remained intact; then Balkan and Russian national myths went hand in hand. Balkan revolutionaries appealed to Russia in the name of Christian and humane principles; they accepted Russian sacrifices willingly, but with no feeling of indebtedness. Once national goals had been achieved, the differences between the tsarist autocracy and the new nations became apparent. The Balkan leaderships were willing to accept Russian military support, but not Russian political predominance, no matter how benevolent or paternal its intent. Thus Russian and Balkan perceptions of their relationship came to differ sharply. The basic dilemma has been aptly summed up by one authority:

There was consequently a time gap or cultural lag between the value systems of the Russian Pan-Slavists and the Russian government and the ideologies of the Balkan elites. The ideologies of the new Balkan elites were nationalism,

secularism, modernism, liberalism, radicalism and socialism, all suspect to the Russian government.[4]

Moreover, except for the undoubtedly crucial military and diplomatic support, it was indeed true that tsarist Russia had little more to offer. The economic factor has already been discussed. Cultural and intellectual relationships were affected by the fact that the Balkan leadership, like the Russian, was western-oriented. When possible, Balkan students went to Paris, Vienna, London, Munich or Berlin to study, not to Moscow and St Petersburg. Wealthy individuals who could travel went first to Paris. As one Russian diplomat commented: 'As far as material culture is concerned, Russia stands in as little need of Slavdom as Slavdom does of Russia'[5]—a remark which could be applied even more aptly to the non-Slavic Balkan people. Tsarist autocracy, of course, offered few attractions as a political system, even to the most conservative political factions.

However, perhaps the greatest problem for the future lay in the romantic national outlook of the Balkan nations themselves. A study of their past history gave the people the conviction that they were blessed with an equal, or, in fact, a more elegant ancestry than the Russians. Classical Greece, Byzantium, Rome and the Serbian and Bulgarian medieval empires took pride in cultural achievements superior to anything offered by early Russian history. Greeks, for instance, could stake a good historical claim to Constantinople and to primacy in the Orthodox world. Moreover, romantic nationalist ideology looked upon all nations as equals. Russian size and power were thus not seen as a justification for the assertion of even moral preeminence.

The question also had a practical political aspect. The new Balkan leaders, often themselves in a shaky position, could not share the credit for national liberation with others. In February, 1878 the Romanian foreign minister Mihail Kogălniceanu declared: 'We owe our independence to our sacrifices, to the bravery of our soldiers led by our prince'[6]—thus refuting Russian claims to Romanian gratitude. Moreover, Balkan politicians often found that they could rally much public support by attacking Russian influence. Once the Ottoman danger had subsided, the former patron and protector could easily be portrayed as a national enemy. The entire vocabulary of Balkan romantic nationalism, formerly used against the Ottoman Empire, was now often directed against the Russian government.

Throughout the century the repeated rebuffs caused much resentment among the Russian diplomats. The tone of injured pride and disillusionment reechoes throughout their despatches and pronouncements. The two words—'blood' and 'treasure'—recur constantly in their protests over what they regarded as the ungrateful Balkan attitude. Each new nation in turn was a source of disappointment. In none was tsarist Russia able to maintain a position of moral authority or to obtain a clear recognition of its contributions as a national liberator. Independent Greece soon passed under the influence of the predominent Medi-

terranean seapower, Britain. By the 1880s both Serbia and Romania had moved into the diplomatic camp of Germany and Austria-Hungary.

The deepest Russian disillusionment, however, came in connection with Bulgaria, whose autonomous government owed its existence to Russian military victories, but which after 1885 rejected all attempts at interference. In conversations held with the British ambassador Sir Robert Morier, the Russian foreign minister N.K. Giers gave repeated expression to the Russian disappointment in words which well illustrate the nature of the Russian reaction. In November, 1885 he declared that Russia had received a

lesson we can never forget and which is most wholesome for us—Never again to go forth making moral conquests with our blood and money but to think of ourselves and our own interests only.[7]

In July, 1886 he complained:

Why ... should I not call things by their names, and point to the situation as it really exists. We have submitted, and we are submitting, to the deepest humiliation. Can no one feel or understand what a Russian understands and feels, when he reflects that, having spent his best blood and half his treasure in rescuing the Christian populations of the Balkans from the Turkish yoke, and with that blood and treasure having furnished the conditions for Bulgarian autonomy and well-being, all the fruit of his toil is being taken from him.[8]

Three months later Giers saw the solution of the problem in

a total abandonment by Russia of Bulgaria, and all her concerns, as a country deep dyed in ingratitude, against which the Slav mother should shake off the dust of her feet.[9]

In July, 1887 he continued in the same spirit:

The dominant feeling ... is one of disgust at the ingratitude of the Bulgarian people, and at the folly which made Russia shed so much blood and waste so much treasure on such people.[10]

This paper has, of course, presented only one aspect of Russian policy in regard to the Balkan national movements in the nineteenth century, but one which certainly deserves careful consideration. Russian tsars and diplomats were deeply affected by ideological concerns; they did feel that Russia as an Orthodox power had a responsibility toward Orthodox Balkan Christians. They did respond to Christian appeals; the wars against the Ottoman Empire gave them few material returns, certainly none commensurate with the costs. Since the Balkan leaders appealed to them as protectors and benefactors, the Russian statesmen were naturally aggrieved when, after national liberation, the Balkan governments not only rejected their influence, but often denounced them as dangerous oppressors. This reaction was far from the role of grateful children gathered around the feet

of a benevolent father which the Russian leaders would have liked to have assigned to their former protégés.

Since the topic of this volume is romantic nationalism, it might be well to end with a fairy tale—one with a sad ending for the tsarist Russian liberators. Many Russian statesmen imagined their nation in the role of a valiant knight entrusted with the sacred mission of freeing the captive Balkan princesses from the fearful Ottoman dragon. Having succeeded in this noble task, instead of receiving the love and gratitude of the princesses, the knight not only saw the rescued maidens turn to other lovers, but he found himself accused of the lowest of motives—of seeking little more than an increase in his personal supply of dragon meat, meaning territory and power, and of desiring to reduce the princesses to the position of subservient household drudges.

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1. Nesselrode to General Pozzo di Borgo, Count Golobkin, Count Alopeus and Baron Nikolai, St Petersburg, June 22/July 4, 1821; Barbara Jelavich, *Russia and Greece during the Regency of King Othon, 1832-1835: Russian Documents on the First Years of Greek Independence* (Thessaloniki, 1962), pp. 126, 127.

2. Russian Manifesto relative to the War with Great Britain, France and Turkey, St Petersburg, April 11/23, 1854; Edward Hertslet, *The Map of Europe by Treaty* (London, 1875), II, 1205-1206.

3. W. Graf Reutern-Baron Nolcken, *Die Finanzielle Sanierung Russlands nach der Katastrophe des Krimkrieges 1862 bis 1878 durch den Finanzminister Michael von Reutern* (Berlin, 1914), pp. 140, 141.

4. Traian Stoianovich, 'Russian Domination in the Balkans', in Taras Hunczak (ed.), *Russian Imperialism from Ivan the Great to the Revolution* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1974), p. 234.

5. Baron Rosen, *Forty Years of Diplomacy* (London, 1922), II, 93.

6. Kogălniceanu to Ghika, Bucharest, January 27/February 8, 1878. Vasile M. Kogălniceanu (ed.), *Acte şi documente din Corespondenţa diplomatică a lui Mihail Kogălniceanu (Bucharest, 1893), p. 23.

7. Morier to Rosebery, no. 384c (secret and confidential). St Petersburg, November 11, 1885. Great Britain. Foreign Office, Political Despatches 65/1219. Cited in Charles Jelavich, *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism* (Berkeley, 1958), p. 236. In September the Tsar wrote to his chief of staff expressing similar views: 'Everything else that takes place in the Balkan Peninsula is secondary for us. There has been enough propaganda to the detriment of the true interests of Russia. The Slavs must now serve us and not we them' (ibid, p. 236).

8. Morier to Rosebery, FO 65/1260, no. 253 (most secret). St Petersburg, July 21, 1886. See also Barbara Jelavich, 'Bulgaria and Batum', *Southeastern Europe*, I:1 (1974), 76.

9. Morier to Iddesleigh, FO 65/1262, no. 366 (most confidential). St Petersburg, October 13, 1886. See also Barbara Jelavich, 'Russia, Britain and the Bulgarian Question 1885-1888', *Südost-Forschungen*, XXXII (1973) 175.

10. Morier to Salisbury, FO 65/1297, no. 260 (confidential). St Petersburg, July 26, 1887 (see ibid, p. 181).

Nationalism and Cultural Revivals: the Romanian and Serbian Experiences (1780s-1870s)

by John H. Jensen

1. Introduction

In this paper I challenge a few of our long-cherished ideas about culture and nationalism. To put it bluntly, I do not believe that the connection between culture and nationalism is direct or causal, nor do I believe that nationalism is created by culture, as that term is usually employed—to denote history, religion, art, language or even cookery. I do not believe that nationalism is a movement or an idea apart from more concrete aspects of human experience; and I certainly do not believe with Elie Kedourie that 'Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the Nineteenth Century',[1] even though this would have been a very convenient time for such a doctrine to have emerged.

No, I think that nationalism is something else, as I shall explain, and that its links to culture are both stronger and weaker—and certainly different in kind—than those which have been suggested by some students of the subject. I have not the time to trace the history of older views of nationalism; I refer to Hayes and Kohn and Shafer for that.[2] Instead, I will proceed directly to comment on certain aspects of eighteenth-century cultural revivals, and then follow this up with some thoughts about the meaning of nationalism. Having made my foundations clear, I will briefly explore the complex eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century experiences of certain Romanians and Serbs to suggest some ways in which those experiences can be shown to fit on the foundations so laid.

2. Cultural Revivals

Right across Europe we find a growing interest in ethnically defined cultural forms, language, and history in the course of the eighteenth century. Whether we call these phenomena 'revivals' or 're-discoveries' or 'creations' (and the last term is probably more accurate than any other) the reality is a stronger awareness of cultural history, or cultural uniqueness and significance. These new ethnic self-consciousnesses included a range of broader changes, from the beginnings of

historical sociology in the work of Montesquieu (and perhaps I may be allowed to add Vico), to the discovery (or invention) of the *Volksgeist* by Herder—and even to the demands for attention from peasant communities in, say, the western mountains of Transylvania.[3] If we think of Horia's revolt, we also must think about the reforms of Joseph II and of all the other rulers and governments with an interest in equalizing men so that they might be more easily governed—and of the moves towards popular and free education at the primary level, which required textbooks of one ethnic content or another and which inspired demands for the satisfaction of other ethnic groups in the school-served community.[4]

I am suggesting here also that there is an interaction at work, a 'challenge-and-response' relationship, whereby the liveliness of one ethnic culture complex in its own creation inspired the envy, emulation and then the demands of another. But this, too, is not necessarily nationalism.

Cultural revivals or arousals of ethnic self-consciousness in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries had a number of sources, a variety of motivations. They grew in uniqueness, yet in profusion, all across Europe, in the East as in the West. If one unifying factor can be identified amongst them, it is probably the set of attitudes which we have come to name 'Romanticism'. Vico and Montesquieu found human institutions growing through social creativity; and so their Romantic followers looked for the springs, the sources, of purest popular nationhood.[5] A people's historical experience and religion and language could be traced from beginnings; in these beginnings a form of democracy in action made the *ethnie* unique and entitled to a self-conscious existence. It simply was; it existed, like God.

Why and how did these studies of ethnic beginnings, identities and institutions begin? Who took part, aside from the singleminded antiquary? There are almost as many answers to this question as there were ethnic groupings gaining self-awareness in that century from Montesquieu to Elias Lönnrot. I suspect that the professional and social strivings of Protestant clergymen had something to do with it—I would look closely at Franke's Halle institutions.[6]

There are other spontaneous growths in eighteenth-century society that find a place here. Groups of professional men in Roman Catholic countries, forming reading circles or Masonic lodges, contributed to such activities.[7] Informal groupings of merchants, wholesalers, and shippers in regions of ethnic complexity, like the Baltic provinces or the lower Danube and Black Sea port communities, could finance their own school teachers and priests and could print and buy their writings, and so support efforts to dignify their nations with a history and a purer language.[8]

They could also compete, as did Greek, Romanian (Vlach), and Slavic Orthodox believers, for control of local churches and schools.[9]

There was surely another element in these apparently spontaneous developments. Imitation is a powerful motivator, as well as the sincerest form of flattery. The eighteenth century wanted to be up to date with the latest ideas, too. The

German historical school of romantic studies in history, folklore, language and law inspired followers all along the eastern marches of Europe, from Finland to Latvia, to Transylvania and the Banat.[10] So there was a complex and growing network of knowledge about popular experience which related the entity, the *ethnie*, to its moral justification. By this I mean its right to be taken seriously, and so experienced in the emotional commitment dear to Romantic intellectuals. And such commitment could lead to deeds.

3. The Ancient Forms of Thought and Behaviour

I think there are important ways in which these Romantic cultural revivals have merged comfortably with popular passions. They have led to action: they have fed some very old urges which lie close to the surface in most men and most societies; and most students of nationalism have taken comfort from these links, have found them plausible and useful. I need to explain these relationships, in order to distinguish them from what I think is modern nationalism.

What I have in mind here takes four forms, with a good many common points between them: ethnocentrism, xenophobia, patriotism, and human aggression. Let us begin, then, with ethnocentrism. It suggests the in-group identification that leads to the inclusive *ethnie*. It is easy to see how the work of historically-minded linguists and folk-lorists would strengthen in-group feeling among those who paid attention to it: feelings of solidarity and self-satisfaction resulted. Loyalty is focussed on the self-defined group into which we come, by birth or by choice, and to which we belong.[11]

This feeling was strengthened by collectors of peasant dialects and minstrels' songs in the South Slav lands. But it existed long before the eighteenth century, long before what we call 'nationalism'. Its presence in ancient Israel and in the Greek city states confused Hans Kohn, and many others. We ought to be able to see it for what it is, and to realize that there was something quite new going on in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, something which cannot be explained by this age-old human characteristic of solidarity with the ways and the people of one's own group.

What I have said about ethnocentrism can be applied also to xenophobia, patriotism and aggression. The mild cosmopolitan optimism of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment was challenged by the concomitant of the in-group philosophy. Love of one's ethnic brethren often meant rejection of the stranger, and those who articulated it had good reason to register an answering phobia. Klopstock springs readily to mind in this connection, but there were many others.[12]

In southeastern Europe the relations between rulers and ruled, favoured and exploited, were exacerbated by the mutually excluding strength of the several ethnic traditions. They could, and did, manage to live in uneasy propinquity—and there was a certain amount of grudging contact and even of cultural borrowings

across ethnic lines—but the rivalries and hatreds ran very deep.[13] This is familiar enough, but the point is that these attitudes can be traced back to the initial contact between these communities. Cultural revivals could strengthen such attitudes, but they did not create them. The new thing we call nationalism gained venom from both, but was more than either.

Attachment to a fatherland, real or imagined, and to its laws and history, is what we call 'patriotism'. Again we are dealing with something as old as human history, with the added qualification that the 'historic rights' of ethnic communities with territorial stakes of one sort or another in this south-eastern European region were greatly strengthened by the legal studies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[14] Such historic rights were reinforced by patriotism proper in the cultural revivals of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to provide even greater strength for these old sets of values. And as people tried to define and understand the new thing that was shaping their lives—nationalism—it was easy for the more literate among them to confuse it with the familiar attitudes of patriotism. Patriotism, after all, had a respectable pedigree in the classical literature which was basic to the education of many of these same observers. But, again, this only confused the issue, for nationalism was a good deal more than patriotism.

What of the interaction between cultural revivals and my fourth form of human behaviour—aggression? Perhaps a mild suggestion is in order. If one sought moral justification for arrogant and aggressive behaviour towards neighbours who did not share in one's own 'cultural revival', the need for room to make that revived culture flourish might provide just that moral justification. And what do I mean by 'room'? Teaching posts, jobs in the bureaucracy, or access to the corridors of power, for the proponents of the revived culture? From these possibilities we can think on to more ways in which the brilliance of new ideas might blind one to the rights of others. In any case, the important thing is the way such self-absorption can release destructive, aggressive conduct.[15] But aggression, too, is not the same thing as nationalism. In the popular mind it has become identified with nationalism, and I am sure it contributes in subtle ways to most of our moral judgments about nationalism; but if nationalism is a modern phenomenon (and I believe it is), it cannot be explained by reference to what has always been.

The ferment of cultural re-discovery in the period under consideration here touched the lands of the middle Danube, and agitated both Serbs and Romanians. This re-creation was open to the modernising influences coming from the north and the west. It is easy to see how it intensified the old rivalries and promoted the sources of self-identification among these peoples. It made relations among them more difficult, but I do not believe that we have yet explained the growth of nationalism.

4. What is Nationalism?

So, what is nationalism? Something new was happening in Europe in the period

from the middle of the eighteenth century to the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century. This was a new dimension in European experience, adding new meaning to life, and putting a new edge on loyalties.[16] It was a combination of many small and large changes in social, economic and political patterns. It happened alongside experiences of conflict and loyalty, and it was contemporary with a deepening of group self-consciousness and a great deal of rhetoric about identities and exclusivism. Of course, there was interaction, interpenetration, between these more familiar aspects of European experience, and this thing that was strikingly new. But we need to isolate the new element and make its meaning clear, if we are to understand it.

For me, nationalism is the growing relationship between state and people which emerges in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of European history, reaching its first maturity in the generations around the turn of the nineteenth century—the time of Horia and Gheorghe Sincai, of Karageorge Petrović and Dositej Obradović, and of the metropolitan Stevan Stratimirović. This new relationship reflected the growing penetration of the state into ever deeper layers of European experience, the breaking down of the privilege which had hitherto limited the state's action, the growing competence of the state to act effectively, and the development of more efficient systems of political involvement which allowed people to feel that they had a stake, a share, in their state, that they could have some influence over its policies, and that its actions were of the highest importance for their unity and well-being.[17]

This new relationship began to gain power, urgency, and a degree of popular appeal in the second half of the eighteenth century. But this was possible in part because of changes in the state-people relationship that had begun more than a century earlier. Let us look briefly at this sequence, the background of growing state influence, and the new urgency in the relationship in the later eighteenth century that imprinted nationalism upon the European consciousness.

First, let us consider the preliminary expansion of the state into areas which had previously been reserved for local and/or privileged management. This was to some extent the product of religious conflict and of the weakening of older religious institutions. But the stronger Post-Reformation state had to take up other responsibilities too. There was the constant warfare of the seventeenth century which almost wrecked European society. Theodore Rabb documents the reaction of dismay which inspired that 'Struggle for Stability' which he chronicles in his important essay of that name.[18] There was the long-term economic downturn (and demographic stagnation) which was caused partly by war and partly by structural changes in the European economy. Only the state could guide the recovery process, and cameralism or mercantilism were the state's tools. War and economic pressure led to the state gaining a greater share in economic resources and this exigency was expressed in heavier expenditures, heavier taxation, and more efficient borrowing techniques. By the beginning of the eighteenth century the state and its credit were dominant features in Europe's economic landscape.[19]

As the state became more central to all aspects of life, it was re-enforced by auxiliary social organisations—not necessarily new ones, but given new roles by their identification with the changing state. These social entities improved the efficiency of the state's contact with society and provided it with manpower resources, as well as propagators of its *mythos*, its mission to guide the society.

The business community found opportunities flowed from working with and for governments; so did the churches and their priests and ministers. Armies and navies flourished as social institutions, as did the economic arms of the state, involved in administration and gaining access to the top levels of decision-making. The internal efficiencies of military and naval establishments were influential in changing habits and attitudes elsewhere in society—and in government, too. Serbs and Croats of the military frontier, for example, were deeply influenced by their association with the military arm of the Habsburg state.[20]

Education became more important in this more complex state-people relationship, and governments were deeply involved in touching their societies through schooling by the end of the eighteenth century. The schoolmaster, like the priest, the magistrate, and the member of the local chamber of commerce—or the military contractor—provided buffers between state and people—buffers or transmission belts.[21] And everywhere we look in eighteenth-century Europe we see bureaucrats, a new estate, employed by the state or in relation to it, but inevitably engaged in the life of society. But the role of the bureaucrat in the building of modern nationalism calls for a paper of its own.[22] Perhaps I should end this section by noting that the cultural revivals of that period may be as much the product of the social changes I have just noted as autonomous growths reflecting the strivings of the artist, the 'patriot', and the scholar.

The later decades of the eighteenth century tested this new relationship, tested the state's capacity to guide its society through new pressures and dangers. This is the second part of the sequence. In the process, the relationship gained in strength and meaning. What I call nationalism was being born.

We have not time here to examine the exciting later decades of the eighteenth century, the decades in which the pressures and dangers I have just mentioned were at work in South-eastern Europe. Joseph II was no fool, and he did not reform and rule in a vacuum; nor were the Uniate hierarchy in Transylvania, or the Orthodox metropolitan at Sremski Karlovci, immune to the new social environment. And few of us need to be reminded of the swirling tide of disorder sweeping over Ottoman Europe in that *Kirjali* era.[23]

Europe was experiencing sudden rapid economic growth, and the beginnings of the great demographic explosion that has transformed the contemporary world.[24] Governments were finding war too expensive, yet they could not avoid war. Political reforms were demanded, and not only because of the American example. There were new ideas in the air, new ideas about equality, the rights of man, and the responsibility of governments to the governed; others were trying to implement reforms that pushed towards efficiency, and not necessarily towards

satisfying egalitarian or liberal principles. And resistance to change was growing, regardless of the threat this created of bitter civil disorder.

It was under these conditions that European states faced the great challenges of war along the Danube (the Ottoman Empire was at war with Austria or Russia or both, intermittently, from 1788 to 1812), the French Revolution, and the imperialism of Bonaparte. By 1815, there were three versions of the new state— and of the new, more integrated, relationship between state and people which I call nationalism. These had been hammered out in the furnaces of war and revolution between the 1780s and 1815. There was the conservative bureaucratic state of the Habsburgs and the Tsar; there was the liberal and popular revolution- ary model of the French Jacobins; and there was the imperial centralised effici- ency of Bonapartism. Each had demonstrated its capacity to manage society and to meet the heavy demands of war, and each had shown that it could claim and focus the loyalties of its people and draw upon their energies. In 1814 and 1815, one recalls, it was the peasant armies of the eastern aristocratic and bureaucratic monarchies that put down the centralised despotism of Europe's richest and most populous land.

Whichever model you consider, you find certain common features. There was a demand for loyalty and discipline, enforced when necessary by secret police and dragoons. There was reform in matters bureaucratic, fiscal, and legal, in order to gain greater efficiency. And there was a strong appeal to those old basic passions of patriotism, xenophobia, ethnocentrism, and aggression. This was the modern reality in which Europeans participated and which would be eyed with a view to acquisition and use by peoples outside the charmed circle of European culture, at least in the early nineteenth century.[25] Other varieties in this relationship would emerge later, but in this period these three held the field.

5. Some Romanian and Serbian Experiments

When we examine the experiences of Romanians and Serbs at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century, we find the reactions varying greatly in terms of the model of nationalism (the form of this relationship) indicated. The choice is dictated by location, by experience, and by internal competition for the power to shape the future forms of statehood.

Which groups of these peoples were within Europe, and therefore partici- pating in one of the European models of nationalism? I think that we should include the Transylvanian Romanians and the Habsburg Serbs. And for those outside Europe, possible importers of nationalism? Here we could include the Romanians of Wallachia and Moldavia, and the Vlachs scattered across the southern Balkans, and the Serbians of the Pashalik of Belgrade, and the areas of Bosnia contiguous to it. The limits of time and space force me to mention only (and briefly) the Romanians of Transylvania and the Serbs of the Voivodina (all the Precani Serbs), and of the Pashalik of Belgrade. Let me summarize what can be said about them in terms of my frame of reference.

Keith Hitchins has documented the situation of the Romanians in Transylvania.[26] To me the most interesting thing about them is that the leading proponents of Romanian nationality in the eighteenth century were Uniate clergymen, from Innocenţiu Micu to Petru Major and Gheorghi Şincai. What was the main direction of their cultural drive, the objective of their political striving? It seems to me that this can be brought under two headings: cultural respectability, and elite political recognition. Their emphasis was on the rehabilitation of Romanian culture, Romanian ethnicity, as native, old, established and respectable. The Romanians were descended from the Roman legionaries, had been Christians from the beginning; they were loyal and responsible Catholic subjects of the Habsburg crown, and as such they were entitled to equality of treatment alongside the Magyars, Szeklers and Saxons of Transylvania.[27] The Uniate version of Romanian ethnic identity was born, therefore, out of political struggle. The struggle had been engaged from the early years of the eighteenth century, under the old bishop Innocenţiu Micu, in the generation before cultural re-discovery and ethnic self-consciousness in the Romantic mode became popular.

In fact the whole thrust of Romanian propaganda was towards its acceptance as one of the 'received' nations of Transylvania, so that Uniate Romanians (and specifically the elite among them) could share in the privileges enjoyed by other good subjects of the conservative bureaucratic Habsburg state.

By 1791, and the *Supplex Libellus Valachorum*, the meaning of this Romanian culture revival in Transylvania was clear. In the midst of Habsburg problems (the failed war against the Turks, the rejection of Josephine reforms, especially in Hungary, and the gathering storms in Poland, in France and Western Europe), the Romanian Uniate clergy and their allies among the tiny elite minority of educated and prosperous laymen sought to make political gains. Their opportunity came with the settling-down process that Leopold II attempted in his short reign.[28]

Stephen Fischer-Galaţi, speaking of Clain (sic!), Maior, and Şincai, has said:

> The thrill of tracing the spoken language of the Romanians of Transylvania [back] to the inhabitants of ancient Rome arrested whatever thoughts of social and political justice they might have entertained.[29]

They sought no relief for the peasants and no union with other areas inhabited by Romanian-speaking folk. The concrete demands presented to the Emperor Leopold in the *Supplex libellus* were for the same rights as those enjoyed by the privileged nations of the province. Fischer-Galaţi sums them up as follows: 'gradual incorporation of Romanians into the Magyar-dominated oligarchy, representation in Transylvania's political institutions and cessation of discriminatory practices'. And these

were to be be extended to the Romanian *natio* in the most restrictive medieval sense—higher clergy, town patriciate, and 'bourgeois intellectuals'. The peasantry did not belong to the nation, nor did the inhabitants of other Romanian provinces within or without the confines of the Habsburg empire.

He concludes: 'A smaller Romania would be difficult to conceive'.[30]

But what does Fischer-Galati expect Samuel Clain or Gheorghe Sincai to conceive? For them the Habsburg system was undergoing dynamic changes. It offered a great deal to themselves and to their people, if they could come to terms with its power structure in this new dispensation. Real co-operation between the leaders of the people and those Romanians who could function efficiently in these modernizing institutions could lead to resolution of political problems and to a gradual improvement for the masses. If you look for nationalism as an expansive and intolerant 'movement', demanding popular government which deals with social ills in mid-nineteenth or even twentieth-century fashion, as Fischer-Galati seems to do, and if you look for this in the late eighteenth century, you are certain to be disappointed. But let us now turn to the Serbs, to the Serbs of Voivodina, and the military frontier first, and then to the Serbs of the Pashalik of Belgrade and of the Principality that emerges after 1817.

In Voivodina we see the Romanian dream come true. What the Transylvanian Daco-Romanian school hoped to achieve with the *Supplex libellus*, the Voivodina Serbs had enjoyed for a hundred years. Yet few observers of nationalism would be impressed by the results.[31] Certainly Adler does not approve. He observes:

> Rather than a celebration of resurgent Slavdom riding the wings of a progressive and benevolent *Weltgeist*, the public affairs of the Serbs in Hungary were characterized by defensiveness and trepidation for what the future might bring ... Considering the relative advantages they enjoyed over most of their ethnic neighbours—fairly extensive literacy, a sophisticated commercial bourgeoisie, a "national" leadership in the persons of the Orthodox hierarchs with a legal and traditional claim to wide autonomy—the Serbs were distinct laggards.[32]

What was wrong with Serbian nationalism north of the Danube and the Save, when only a few kilometres to the South other Serbs were fighting for national independence and building a new national state? Adler suggests three major explanations. First there was the self-interest of Serbian Orthodox churchmen, and particularly of the metropolitan, Stevan Stratimirović, who ruled—and he really did rule—from 1790 to 1836. The privileges which Serbs in Southern Hungary had gained from Leopold I back in 1690, when Habsburg and Serb together were resisting the unspeakable Turk—those privileges were essentially for a Serbian ethnic community like an Ottoman *millet*, defined by confession and led by its religious authorities. Stratimirović could work with the Habsburgs, and he saw any significant cultural change or nationalist agitation as a threat to the *status quo*.

The second reason is closely allied to the first, but is rather more interesting. We might expect the educated and well-to-do laymen (described by Traian Stoianovich as 'conquering Balkan Orthodox merchants')[33] to challenge those immobile Churchmen. But not so.

> The insuperable difficulty for ... secularist liberals [among the Hungarian Serbs] was the fact that the [Serbian nation] to which the 1690 privileges were extended was ... not the Serbian ethnic group but an agglomeration bound together only by the confessional tie of Orthodoxy [... and led by the clergy].

Adler goes on:

> The basis of nationhood delineated by the Privileges, i.e. a ... confessional community in which the sacral and civil authorities were united and mutually re-enforcing, was carried over among the educated classes almost intact into the fifth decade of the nineteenth century ... the power of this anachronistic union of the spiritual and worldly authorities can be best measured by the obstructions put in the path of Vuk Karadžić's language reforms ....[34]

The third reason is more mundane. The confessional community which enjoyed these privileges included Romanian Orthodox believers as well as Serbs; but the Serbs were politically dominant within the community, even in the Banat and up to Caransebeş, where Serbs were very few and far between. In the Banat, in Stratomirović's day at least, sixty per cent of the population was Romanian, though most parishes were occupied by Serbian priests. So the Serbian community clung to its privileges as it fought a bitter rearguard action against Romanian demands.[35]

Historic rights are often cited as integral parts of the nationalism of a cultural community. For the Serbs of the Voivodina, patriotism—historic rights—stood in the way of a more dynamic relationship between state and people. It was only in the late-sixties—after Kossuth and 1848, and after the *Ausgleich*—that South Hungarian Serbs began to see that a dynamic state could be a distinct disadvantage to their community, if they could not relate to that State as Serbs.

And so we turn, at last, to the wild pig merchants and *haiducs* of the Šumadija. Where was their cultural revival? Did Vuk Karadžić find a warmer welcome among those front-line fighters in the Serbian national cause? Were they in fact fighting for a 'Serbian national cause'? Karadžić's complaints are well known, and Roger Viers Paxton has shown how local and immediate was the cause for which Karageorge and his fellow chieftains fought.[36] Gale Stokes, too, has insisted that there was no nationalism in Serbian politics before the 1840s, and he must be right.[37] But it all depends on what you mean by 'nationalism'.

I have attempted to show elsewhere that Miloš Obrenović was the real founder of Serbian nationalism and that he was performing this task when he constructed a rudimentary state, began to build schools, and offered some economic opportunities and stability for the new farmers who came flooding into a now pacified

Serbia in the 1820s and 1830s.[38] That is what I mean by nationalism. Miloš was greedy, cruel and illiterate, but we qualify this by adding that he was cautious, a shrewd judge of Serbian realities, and determined to build a Serbian society of independent peasant proprietors. He encouraged immigration to fill up the country by reserving land and freeing new arrivals from tax obligations for a period. He feared the potential power of his rivals, and so resisted the agglomeration of property into large holdings in other hands than his own; thereby he ensured that the vacant lands, and the lands left behind by the fleeing Turkish *Spahi*, were shared out among small landholders. In 1820 he issued a decree 'making district leaders personally responsible for finding new settlers land, even if they had to "take it away from those who have too much and are not able to till it"'.

Miloš also protected peasant property rights in a period of rapid economic development which saw the introduction of Western individualistic commercial law. He protected the peasants from the merchant and the money lender: in 1836, for instance, he made it legally impossible to deprive the peasant of his house, his inherited homestead, two oxen and a horse, in payment of a debt; and in 1837 he forbade interest beyond twelve per cent on loans. He tried to restrict the number of taverns in a village.[39] At the same time, he tried to build a unified administration and bureaucracy to act on his, and his people's, behalf. He and most of his people were illiterate; they were deeply suspicious of educated men who could build personal power through their monopoly of pen, paper, and knowledge of procedures and law. Miloš despised men of the pen, and treated his officials as lackeys, beating the highest or the lowest with his cane when their behaviour angered him. Even so, a modern state—a state that collected taxes, built roads, maintained schools and markets, and negotiated with foreign powers—had to have an educated administration, and Miloš built one. In the same way, modern codes of law and an educated judiciary, an army on the central European model, and the beginnings of primary and secondary education all had to be built up from scratch. Though Miloš' own inclination undoubtedly was to rule his land like a pasha—to demand labour and women from his subjects for his personal use, to monopolize trade and the issuing of licenses to trade, to deal arbitrary justice to those who displeased him—the process of modernization went on under his direction.[40] This may be his most lasting monument; it is certainly his greatest claim to the title of builder of Serbian nationalism.

6. Conclusion

I have here examined a number of issues related to the connections between cultural revivals and nationalism and have adduced some specific examples of Romanian and Serbian experience which illustrate these connections. The points which I would wish to summarise are these:

1. The revivals or creations of ethnic culture in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are not necessarily part of nationalism, though they may be related to it in certain ways;

2. In the midst of difficult social and economic changes certain very old human experiences gained new meaning and were actively employed by uncertain or unhappy people—ethnocentrism, xenophobia, aggression, and patriotism. Patriotism, especially, with its connotations of historical rights and local roots, and privileges, were important in the Habsburg lands of south-eastern Europe. Historians have mistaken for nationalism the marriage of these ancient patterns with cultural revivals.

3. Nationalism is a thing in itself, a consciousness, a relationship, the bonding between people and state that became progressively more strong and important in the later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The movement becomes possible as the state penetrates and becomes at one with society; it takes different forms dictated by the experience and traditions of different parts of Europe. By the beginning of the nineteenth century it was available as (1) conservative eastern European monarchy; (2) French revolutionary popular government; and (3) the efficient centralized despotism of Bonaparte. As any of these it is modernity, and it has its attractions for folk outside Europe. Serbs and Greeks will import it as they build new states in the early nineteenth century.

4. And so we come fourthly to the Romanian and Serbian experience. We looked first at the Romanians of Transylvania, where the Uniate clergy carried on a century-long struggle to be accepted among the 'received' nations of the principality, and so to gain equality of status for a Romanian elite alongside the Magyars, Szeklers, and Saxons. This political struggle encouraged the cultural creation. In the modernizing Habsburg state of Maria-Theresa, Joseph II, and Leopold II, the Romanians were seeking their place in an emerging nationalism —the nationalism of a European state, albeit conservative, bureaucratic, and dominated socially by aristocracy and church. Historic rights had to be confirmed before the nation could participate in this political order, and so historic rights were invented.

We next moved on to the Voivodina and the Serbian community there which enjoyed historic rights. The determination to hold these rights vis-à-vis both Magyar and Romanian challengers brought unity to clerical leaders and urban educated lay people. It meant resistance to cultural change, cultural re-creation, which could lead to a popular movement which historians might like to label 'nationalism'. But the Serbs of southern Hungary saw their 'nationalism' in the *status quo* guaranteed by the two Leopolds, in the same European conservative political order which Translyvanian Daco-Romanians wished to join.

In the Belgrade Pashalik we are outside Europe. All is to be created, if a Serbian state is to absorb the energies and loyalties of the Serbian people and is to provide for them the security and services which lead to that bonding of people and state which I call nationalism. We should not be surprised to see the Prince initiating change along lines characteristic of neighbours like Pasvanoglu of Vidin, or Ali Pasha of Janina. But Miloš learned quickly. He accepted enough of European

social and political technology,[41] and showed enough interest in the lot of his people, to set the process in motion. Serbia had a long way to go in 1839, but the framework for a special brand of Serbian nationalism had been constructed by that time.

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1. E. Kedourie, *Nationalism* (1960), p. 9. My essay is designed to bring together familiar materials for the purposes of an unfamiliar argument. I limit myself to citation of material readily available in English or other Western European languages.

2. The basic works which appear in virtually all bibliographies of nationalism are: (1) C.J.H. Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism* (1926); (2) *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (1931); (3) *Nationalism: a Religion* (1960); (4)H. Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: a Study in its Origins and Background* (1944); (5) *Prophets and Peoples: Studies in Nineteenth Century Nationalism* (1961); (6) *Nationalism: its Meaning and History* (rev. edn, 1965); (7) B. Shafer, *Nationalism: Myth and Reality* (1955) (8) *Faces of Nationalism: New Realities and Old Myths* (1972). A recent book which covers most of the old ground (and repeats most of the old mistakes) is L.L. Snyder, *Varieties of Nationalism: a Comparative Study* (1976).

3. K. Hitchins, *The Rumanian National Movement in Transylvania, 1780-1849* (1969), pp. 33-41; R.W. Seton-Watson, *History of the Roumanians* (1934), pp. 184-8.

4. P.F. Sugar, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804* (1977), pp. 231-2, and 'The Nature of the Non-Germanic Societies under Habsburg Rule', *Slavic Review*, 22 (1963), 1-30, esp. pp. 4-5, 23-4; T. Stoianovich, 'The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant', *Journal of Economic History*, 20 (1961), 234-313.

5. See esp. R.R. Ergang, *Herder and the Foundations of German Nationalism* (1931).

6. Two old, but still useful, studies are F. Paulsen, *German Education, Past and Present*, tr. T. Lorenz (1908), pp. 136-50, and J.W. Adamson, *Pioneers of Modern Education in the Seventeenth Century* (1905), pp. 237-57. Another useful starting point is H.C. Bernard, *Education and the French Revolution* (1969), especially its first three chapters on the period before the Revolution (pp. 1-53). See also the more recent collection of papers from the 1973 meeting of the History of Education Society, *The History of Education in Europe* (ed. T.G. Cook, 1974), esp. articles by J. Lynch, 'Myth and Reality in the History of French Education', pp. 21-35; and L. Boucher, 'Tradition and Change in Swedish Education', pp. 67-84, including the valuable chronological table on pp. 80-4. The best recent text in this field is C.J. Lucas, *Our Western Educational Heritage* (1972), pp. 309, 359-73.

7. There is a valuable article on Italy and on the discussion groups and agricultural societies patronised by the nobility, the upper strata of the bourgeoisie, and the clergy, by J.M. Roberts. See his 'Lombardy', in A. Goodwin (ed.), *The European Nobility in the Eighteenth Century* (1967), vi, 60-82. On Freemasons and Freemasonry, see J.M. Roberts, *The Mythology of the Secret Societies* (1972), pp. 43-57; G.H. Luquet, *La Franc-maçonnerie et l'état en France au xviiime Siècle* (1963); and J. Katz, *Jews and Freemasons in Europe, 1723-1939* (1970). F. Venturi adds important details in his *Italy and the Enlightenment: Studies in a Cosmopolitan Century* (1972), pp. 198-264.

8. T. Stoianovich, n.4 above. See also (1) N. Todorov, *La ville balkanique sous les Ottomans (xv-xixe s.)* (1977), esp. essays v, vi, vii, ix and xv; (2) W.S. Vucinich, 'The Nature of Balkan Society under Ottoman rule', *Slavic Review*, 21 (1962), 597-616, (3) comments by S.J. Shaw (pp. 617-22) and T. Stoianovich (pp. 623-32); (4) Sugar, *Southeastern Europe* (1977), pp. 252-4.

9. On this topic, see (1) K. Hitchins, *The Rumanian National Movement . . .*(1969); (2) T. Stoianovich, 'The Social Foundations of Balkan Politics, 1750-1941', in C. and B. Jelavich (eds), *The Balkans in Transitión: Essays on the Development of Balkan Life and Politics since the Eighteenth Century* (1963) pp. 297-345; (3) C. Jelavich, 'Some Aspects of Serbian Religious Development in the Eighteenth Century', *Church History*, 23 (1954), 144-52; (4) his article 'The Croatian Problem in the Habsburg Empire in the Nineteenth Century', *Austrian History Yearbook*, III, part 2 (1967), 83-115; (5) P.F. Sugar, in *Southeastern Europe . . .* (1977), pp. 255-70, 282-8; (6) his essay 'The Nature of Non-German Societies . . .' (cited above, n.4); (7) E. Turczynski, 'The National Movement in the Greek Orthodox Church in the Habsburg Monarchy', *Austrian History Yearbook*, III, part 3 (1967), 83-128; (8) the valuable 'Comments' of M.B. Petrovich, ibid, pp. 129-35; (9) Turczynski's, 'Originäre und imperiale Impulse der National-

bewegung in Südosteuropa', in *Actes du Premier Congrès International des Etudes Balkaniques et Sud-Est Européennes*, IV: *Histoire: XVIIIe-XIXe ss.* (1969), 365-89.

10. See (1) J.H. Wuorinen, *A History of Finland* (1965), pp. 95-103; (2) his *Nationalism in Modern Finland* (1931); (3) H. Schreiber, *Teuton and Slav: the Struggle for Central Europe* (1965), pp. 249-54; (4) H. Rothfels, 'The Baltic Provinces: some Historical Aspects and Perspectives', *Journal of Central European Affairs*, IV (1944), 117-46; (5) G. von Rauch, *The Baltic States* (1974); (6) K. Hitchins, *Rumanian National Movement* ... (1969); (7) D. Wilson, *The Life and Times of Vuk Stefanović Karadžić, 1784-1864: Literacy, Literature and National Independence in Serbia* (1970).

11. See the article on 'Cultural Relativism' in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (ed. D.L. Sills), III (1968), 546.

12. F.G. Klopstock, 'Die Deutsche Gelehrtenrepublik ... Geschichte des letzten Landtags' in *Ausgewählte Werke* (ed. K.A. Schleiden, 1962), pp. 875-929; esp. pp. 888-9 and 909-14.

13. W.S. Vucinich, 'Nature of Balkan Society ...' (1962), pp. 613, and 615-6.

14. J.H. Elliott, 'Revolution and Continuity in Early Modern Europe', *Past and Present*, (1969), 35-6, and pp. 47-52, with additional useful references on p. 50, n.44. See also J.H. Franklin, *Jean Bodin and the Sixteenth Century Revolution in the Methodology of Law and History* (1963), esp. Ch. III.

15. J. Dollard et al., *Frustration and Aggression* (1939); L. Berkowitz, *Roots of Aggression* (1969); R.A. Baron, *Human Aggression* (1977); and A. Bandura, *Aggression: a Social Learning Analysis* (1973).

16. It is difficult to argue from the late appearance of the word 'nationalism' (starting with its use by Herder in the 1770s, by Barruel in 1798, and its not reaching English in its permanent meaning till the late-1840s) to the newness of the experience. See A.D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* (1971), p. 167; A. Kemilainen, *Nationalism, Problems Concerning the Word; the Concept and Classification* (1964), pp. 50 ff; and B. Hyslop, *French Nationalism in 1789 according to the General Cahiers* (1934), p. 22. My forthcoming *Building Modern Nationalism* will try to put the case for this new sense of urgency in the relationship between state and people in the late-eighteenth century.

17. M. Raeff, 'The Well-Ordered Police State and the Development of Modernity in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Europe: An Attempt at a Comparative Approach', *The American Historical Review*, 80 (1975), 1221-43.

18. T.K. Rabb, *The Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe* (1975); but cf. P. Roberts, *The Quest for Security, 1715-1740* (1947).

19. H. van der Wee, 'Monetary, Credit and Banking Systems', in *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, V: *The Economic Organisation of Early Modern Europe* (ed. E.E. Rich and C.H. Wilson, 1977), pp. 290-392; B. Behrens, 'Government and Society', ibid., pp. 549-620; P.G.M. Dickson, *The Financial Revolution in England: a Study in the Development of Public Credit, 1688-1756* (1967); J. De Vries, *The Economy of Europe in an Age of Crisis, 1600-1750* (1978), pp. 219-32; C.H. Wilson, *England's Apprenticeship, 1603-1763* (1965), esp. chaps 10 and 15; E.L. Hargreaves, *The National Debt* (1930); A. Vührer, *Histoire de la dette publique en France* (2 vols, 1886); J. Sperling, 'The International Payments Mechanism in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries', *Economic History Review*, 14 (1962), 446-68 and E.J. Hamilton, 'Pubic Debt: History, Origin and Growth of the Public Debt in Western Europe', *American Economic Review*, 37 (1947), 118-30.

20. G. Rothenburg, *The Military Border in Croatia, 1740-1881: a study of an imperial institution* (1966).

21. See note 6, above; to the works listed there we can add: E.H. Reisner, *The Evolution of the Common School* (1930) and M.G. Jones, *The Charity School Movement* (1938). On the place of the priest and pastor in eighteenth-century society, see G.R. Cragg, *The Church in the Age of Reason, 1648-1789* (1964). M. Van Creveld, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton* (1977) is useful on the role of the military contractor. But a comprehensive study of business communities and their organisations in the eighteenth century is still to be written.

22. J.A. Armstrong, *The European Bureaucratic Elite* (1973) is the best place to start on this topic.

23. Sugar, *Southeastern Europe . . .* (1977), Ch. xi; S.J. Shaw, *A History of the Ottoman Empire*, Vol. I: *Empire of the Ghazis . . . 1280-1808* (1976) is a sympathetic account which probes deeply for the causes of the Ottoman dilemma. On its meaning, see L. von Ranke, *A History of Serbia and the Serbian Revolution*, in the excellent translation of Mrs A. Kerr (1853).

24. De Vries, esp. pp. 243-54; also *The Cambridge Economic History*, Vol. V, esp. the chapter by B.H. Slicher van Bath.

25. See, for example, R. Clogg (ed.) *The Movement for Greek Independence, 1770-1821* (1976); C. and B. Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States 1804-1920* (1977); J.C.B. Richmond, *Egypt 1798-1952: Her Advance towards a Modern Identity* (1977); R.A. Humphreys and John Lynch (eds), *The Origins of the Latin American Revolutions* (1965); J.J. Johnson, *Simon Bolivar and Spanish American Independence, 1783-1820* (1968).

26. See his work cited in n. 3, above; little is added by Sugar, *Southeastern Europe . . .* (1977), pp. 142-67; R.W. Seton-Watson, *A History of the Roumanians* (1934) remains valuable and interesting.

27. The Romanian objectives in the later-eighteenth century in Transylvania were summarised in the *Supplex Libellus Valachorum* (1791) and carefully analysed in D. Prodan, *Supplex Libellus Valachorum, or the Political Struggle of the Romanians during the Eighteenth Century* (1948); English tr. 1969).

28. On Leopold II and the 'settling down process', see C.A. Macartney, (1) *The Habsburg Empire, 1790-1918* (1968), ch. 2; (2) Macartney (ed.), *The Habsburg and Hohenzollern Dynasties in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*,pp. 11-12, 140-5 and 204-6; (3) Hitchins, pp. 112-34; (4) Rothenberg, p. 81; (5) the articles in *Austrian History Yearbook*, III, part 2 (1967)

29. *Nationalism in Eastern Europe* (1965), p. 374.

30. Ibid., p. 375.

31. On this topic, see Philip Adler, 'Nation and Nationalism among the Serbs of Hungary, 1790-1870', *East European Quarterly*, 13 (1979), 271-85.

32. Ibid., pp. 271, 276; and see Sugar, 'The Non-German Societies', (1963) pp. 23-4. These comments are re-inforced by W.S. Vucinich, 'The Serbs', pp. 4-7 and I.J. Lederer, 'Comments', ibid., p. 191.

33. Stoianovich, n. 4 above.

34. Adler, p. 277; the author here refers to E. Turczynski, *Konfession und Nation. Zur Frühgeschichte der serbischen und rumänischen Nationsbildung* (1976). Duncan Wilson goes into detail about Vuk Karadžić's problems with the Habsburg Serbs.

35. Hitchins' work is particularly useful on this question, and especially his study of the life of Bishop Şaguna, *Orthodoxy and Nationalism: Andreiu Şaguna and the Rumanians of Transylvania* (1977). Adler touches only very lightly on these relations, on pp. 278-80.

36. 'Nationalism and Revolution: a Re-examination of the Origins of the First Serbian Insurrection, 1804-1807', *East European Quarterly*, 6 (1971), 337-62; cf. L.P. Meriage, 'The First Serbian Uprising (1804-1813): National Revival or Search for Regional Security', *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism, 4, 2 (1977), 187-205 in which the author says bluntly: 'Throughout the revolt the Serbian rebels never considered the possibility of seeking recognition of the Belgrade pashalik* as a sovereign, independent state, or of expanding the insurrection into a national liberation movement encompassing all Serbians under Ottoman domination' (p. 198).

37. 'The Absence of Nationalism in Serbian Politics before 1840', *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, 4, 1 (1976), 77-90.

38. At the Ernst Kohn Bramsted Memorial Conference of the Australasian Association of European

Historians (May 1979). The paper was entitled 'The Paradox of Balkan Nationalism'.

39. M.B. Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia*, I (1976), 186.

40. Ibid., pp. 140-5; cf. C. and B. Jelavich (n. 25 above), pp. 58-61. And see T. Stoianovich, 'The Pattern of Serbian Intellectual Evolution, 1830-1880', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 1 (1959), 242-72.

41. The word 'technology' is used here in the sense created by the translator (John Wilkinson) of Jacques Ellul's *La Technique* (*The Technological Society*, 1964); that is, for the techniques employed in managing and controlling human beings—social and psychological 'technology'.

The Influence of Hebrew Literature on the Growth of Jewish Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century

by David Patterson

Before we examine the influence exerted by the revival of Hebrew literature and Hebrew Language on the growth of Jewish nationalism in the century following the French Revolution, two matters are worthy of brief consideration. In the first place, the partitions of Poland towards the end of the eighteenth century resulted in the incorporation into the Russian empire of a substantial Jewish community. Henceforward, the tzarist government was confronted by a foreign, self-contained and numerous population just inside the country's western borders. As Yiddish was the Jewish vernacular and Hebrew the written language, communication between Jews and Russians remained at least for some decades tortuous and halting. Moreover, the new subjects clung tenaciously to their religion, rituals, dietary laws, modes of dress, social conventions and educational system. To their neighbours the Jews appeared a closely-knit, inbred and unintelligible community of suspect loyalty.

The hostility harboured against an alien people living so close to a strategically sensitive border was sharpened by the wave of nationalism which swept across Russia in the wake of the Napoleonic wars. A deliberate policy of 'russification' was directed at the Tzar's Jewish subjects, and repeated attempts were made to undermine their separateness, sometimes by blandishment but more frequently by naked oppression, throughout the nineteenth century. Governmental persecution was further aggravated by an unusually steep rise in Jewish fertility leading to an explosion of population.

The concomitant deterioration of an already desperate economic situation gave rise to a number of attempts by sections of the Jewish communities to alleviate their plight. The ranks of the growing revolutionary movements in Russia were swelled by substantial numbers of young Jews who had given up all hope of achieving social and political equality as long as the tzarist regime remained in power. Indeed, political agitation of this kind, no less than the great waves of emigration to western Europe and America and the rise of Jewish nationalism

culminating in the Zionist movement in the last decades of the century, may be regarded as by-products of Russian nationalism. Certainly, the growth of modern Hebrew literature, as well as the no less remarkable development of Yiddish literature in Russia in the second half of the last century, reflect a vivid sharpening of Jewish self-consciousness.

Secondly, it is important to recall that a century ago there could hardly have been a single person in the entire world whose sole language was Hebrew. Although Hebrew had maintained a continuous literary tradition spanning some three millennia, it had ceased to be a spoken language for more than fifteen hundred years, apart from sporadic use among small groups, and even then only in situations of diglossia. In the course of one hundred years Hebrew has become the sole language of perhaps a million people. For a further million or so it is the first language, and it has become the principal second language of about another million. Hence, there are now some three million people for whom Hebrew represents a normal and natural mode of expression catering for every facet of private and public activity. Such a complete linguistic renaissance is most unusual and may well be unique.

In order to introduce an element of cohesion into a wide-ranging and complex theme, an article first published in 1879 in a Hebrew monthly, *Ha-Shahar*, which appeared in Vienna under the editorship of Peretz Smolenskin, has been chosen as the starting point for this paper. This article[1] was the first venture into print by Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, the pseudonym adopted by Eliezer Isaac Perlmann. Entitled *She'elah Nikhbadah* (A Weighty Question), Ben-Yehudah's article represents a heartfelt plea for a resurgence of Jewish nationalism and a return to Zion. The sections of the article devoted to literature and language are, in fact, quite small. Although, in his later writings, the revival of spoken Hebrew became one of the main planks in Ben-Yehuda's platform—and he is, indeed, rightly regarded as a central figure in that extraordinary process—in this first article the revival of literature and the revival of language play a somewhat minor role. Only a few passages have any real bearing in this regard but they are worth quoting in full.

Towards the end of his article, Ben-Yehuda writes as follows about the growth of modern Hebrew literature:

What shall our literature do and in what shall it delight? Our periodical literature has put on and discarded many forms since its inception to the present day; it has changed its fashion and altered its appearance ten times. There was a period when literature occupied only the heights of Parnassus, the mountain favoured by the gods, adorning itself in the festive garb of rhetoric and poetry, and wafting its sweet fragrance into the nostrils of every reader. But it quickly realised that all of us mortals who sit at the foot of the mountain do not dare ascend the heights, and that little by little we were becoming remote from it. So our literature humbled itself and came down the mountain. Again it stretched out its magic wand, its raiment changed once more, and it appeared

to its readers clad in the mantle of scholarship and science. But neither were these robes pleasing to the readers. So it cast them off, grasped a sword and proceeded to wage war on the Kabbalah and Hasidism, against its frivolous customs, its over-lengthy garments and sidelocks, etc. etc. Our literature passed through all these phases, without leaving behind any great impression on the life of our people. It is an idle boast that literature changed the face of Judaism, that by virtue of its strength and power the Jewish people ascended a number of rungs on the latter of Enlightenment. Literature made no impact on the life of the people either in Russia or in the countries of the west.

In Ben-Yehuda's view the real task of Hebrew literature should be the propagation throughout the Jewish people of the idea of a return to Zion—an enterprise beyond the powers of the few societies and philanthropists then concerned with the problem, in spite of their good intentions:

A number of societies already exist whose aim is the settlement of the land of Israel. Indeed, the admirable society, *Alliance Israélite Universelle*, has founded an agricultural school and settlement called Mikveh Yisrael in the vicinity of Jaffa. Sir Moses Montefiore, whose name commands respect and veneration from all our people—our own Sir Moses too, has made great efforts, and he is still actively engaged in spite of his great age. Yet all these activities have proved ineffective, and the results of all their efforts are of little worth, and have no power to heal our people's affliction or effect a cure.

But why? Have our great men not acted in good faith? Do they begrudge either the money or the effort required? Of course not. It is not their fault if a few individuals are unable to undertake so great a task which concerns the people as a whole. If the latter remain complacent and if they do not lend support to the efforts of the men who have taken it upon themselves to work on our behalf, a few individuals cannot succeed no matter how great their wealth. They need intermediaries between the people and themselves, intermediaries who will explain their aims and objects, arouse the people's enthusiasm and make them want to help.

This surely is the task of our literature and of our writers.

So much for Ben-Yehuda's opinion of Hebrew literature from the French Revolution until his own day! About the Hebrew language he adds an additional passage:

The land of Israel will become the centre for the entire people, and even those who live in the diaspora will know that "their people" dwells in its land, that its language and its literature are there. The language too will flourish, and literature will spawn writers in plenty, because their literature will be able to reward its devotees, and it will become an art in their hands, as is the case with other literatures. Only then will our literature renew its vigour, because writers will serve it not for love alone, but also for reward; and they will not be forced

to write at unearthly hours as they do now—for our writers have to make a living, since at present they receive no reward for their labours.

Jewish scholarship, too, will thrive and blossom and bear fruit, like a healthy plant in its native soil, and it will bring benefit to all the people.

Herein lies our people's salvation and our nation's happiness!

These passages contain almost all that Ben-Yehuda has to say in *She'elah Nikhbadah* about literature and language—and it is clearly limited. There is one further sentence which is worth quoting because of its apparently prophetic quality:

We Hebrews, indeed, have an advantage in that we possess a language in which we can even now write anything we care to, and which it is also in our power to speak if only we wish.

The main thrust of his ideas about the revival of Hebrew as a living language, however, comes in his subsequent writings, some of them published not long after the appearance of his first article. The original concept of national revival was followed by the growth of the idea of a comparable and, indeed, inseparable revival of language and literature only as a second stage in his thinking, even though it soon became central to it.

It is, however, worth reviewing, if only in short compass, the early development of modern Hebrew literature and the concomitant development of language which Ben-Yehuda dismisses in somewhat cavalier fashion, to determine whether its impact was quite as negligible as might appear from his article. Although the roots of modern Hebrew literature may be traced back to the Renaissance, Ben-Yehuda seems to accept the commonly held view in his day that the modern period begins in the last decades of the eighteenth century in Germany, and that modern Hebrew literature is a consequence, if not a cause, of the movement of Enlightenment known in Hebrew as *Haskalah*. The movement of Enlightenment reflects the attempts by sections of the Jewish people in western and central and—later—in eastern Europe to come to terms with European culture in the 'age of reason'.

It is common knowledge that the Jewish people—held back by the institution of the ghetto and the consequent separation of ghetto dwellers from the populace outside—were late comers to the modern world. Suffice it to recall that following the Napoleonic conquests the ghetto gates were broken down, and many Jews set off hot-foot towards the elusive goal of emancipation. The impact of the outside world upon the Jews as they emerged from the ghetto and tried to find their way into the glittering realm of western European civilisation is responsible, directly or indirectly, for many of the subsequent movements in Jewish history. Thrown off balance, many Jews pinned their faith upon the movement of Enlightenment, a dominating force in the eighteenth century. At the time it seemed to many exponents of *Haskalah* that here was the dawn of a new era for

the Jewish people too, where all would be sweetness and light, and that all the old hatreds and animosities between Jews and their Gentile neighbours had been some kind of ghastly mistake, merely a wrong way of looking at things. With a change in the angle of vision in the wake of the new Englightenment the problems would dissolve and Jews would at last be able to integrate into western European culture. With one proviso, namely, that to achieve this desirable end, the Jews would have to change their image so as to merge more smoothly into the patterns of the outside world.

The attempt to bring about this change of image followed two distinct lines. The first entailed a religious reform, with a marked shift of stress from the practical aspects—the positive and negative injunctions—which were regarded as a barrier between Jewish and Gentile society, to the ethical aspects of Judaism. At the same time a deliberate attempt was made to diminish the nationalist elements in the Jewish religion, which seemed to hinder progress towards the goal of emancipation. The charge of dual loyalties was levelled against the Jews by the opponents of emancipation. How can Jews aspire to German citizenship, it was argued, when every day they pray for the restoration of Zion and for the return to their ancient homeland? To obviate any such charge, the Jewish national future was sacrificed in favour of the Jewish past. History took the place of nationalism, just as a concern with the ethics of religion replaced traditional observance.

From the early nineteenth century Reform Judaism regarded itself as a bridge between Jews and Gentiles, as an important signpost on the road to emancipation. The remarkable growth of the Reform Movement in Judaism is a fascinating topic in itself, but one which lies beyond the confines of this paper. More germane is the second method employed to bring about a change of image and present what was regarded as a more acceptable face to the outside world.

The proponents of such a change advocated a reform of the Jewish educational system. Instead of an education based on an intensive and, indeed, exclusive study of the traditional Jewish sources, new elements were grafted on to the syllabus, designed to enable the child to come to grips more successfully with the outside world. Hence, the introduction of secular studies, side by side with more traditional learning, was reinforced by teaching at least the elements of the language of the country in which the child lived! A growing proportion of Jewish children in Germany acquired some familiarity with German, Jewish children in France started to learn French, those in Holland began to acquire Dutch—in addition to their native Yiddish. Meanwhile, however, the first language most children acquired for the purposes of reading and writing remained Hebrew, which was taught from a very tender age. The provision of textbooks in Hebrew over a range of secular subjects, both original or translated, to cater for the new kinds of syllabus, reinforced by an adult thirst for elevating and instructive works of literature reflecting the currents of enlightenment, provides the driving force behind the growth of modern Hebrew literature.

There was a second formative factor of importance. The new literature was deliberately composed in a particular kind of language. The adherents of enlightenment rejected the rabbinical Hebrew modes of composition, which were regarded as unsatisfactory both stylistically and grammatically, and unsuitable for the expression of the cultural and aesthetic values which they wished to inculcate as part of their educational aims. Reviewing the strata of literary Hebrew in search of the one most likely to help unleash emotional and aesthetic springs of creativity which, it was believed, had suffered atrophy in the ghetto period, and hence bring out 'the man in the Jew' and stimulate an interest in culture and ethics, the *Maskilim* opted for the language of the Bible. Apart from the sharp contrast with rabbinical Hebrew, the language of the Bible was favoured partly because it reflected the halcyon period when the Jewish people lived in its own land, and partly because it was considered that Biblical Hebrew represented the pure and pristine form of the language. It is noteworthy in this respect that Biblical Hebrew was treated as a single stratum of language regardless of the fact that it spans not less than a millennium.

Modern Hebrew literature, therefore, in the century following the French Revolution comprises an attempt to describe and embrace many facets of the contemporary European world in a neo-Biblical Hebrew. In great measure it proved to be a contradiction in terms. The Hebrew Bible contains less than six thousand different words, and although for certain kinds of expression (namely, historical narrative, religious poetry, wisdom literature and prophecy in particular), Biblical Hebrew is highly effective—perhaps unrivalled—any attempt to formulate the concepts and phenomena of modern society in that idiom must soon encounter formidable problems. In the absence of the necessary vocabulary, Hebrew writers were frequently compelled to foster conventions in their readers' minds that when they wrote particular words or phrases what they actually meant was something different. At the same time resort was frequently made to complex, euphuistic and rhetorical modes of expression, known as *melizah*.

It was a brave attempt, still worthy of respect, but its limitations were of such severity that the flowering of modern Hebrew literature in German-speaking Europe towards the end of the eighteenth century scarcely lasted thirty years. German quickly superseded Hebrew as the mode of literary expression, as an inferior instrument is abandoned in favour of a better. After a short exhilarating flight to the heights of Parnassus, the heady enthusiasm for Hebrew rhetoric rapidly declined. Had it been confined to central Europe, modern Hebrew literature would certainly have been short-lived.

Prior to tracing the shift of modern Hebrew literature to the more fertile soil of eastern Europe, one further aspect of modern Jewish history is worthy of consideration. As stated above, the exponents of Enlightenment were convinced that the solution to the Jewish problem was firmly rooted in the 'age of reason', and that the best hope for emancipation lay in propagating the concepts of

Enlightenment both among the Jewish people and the population at large. But whereas in the latter half of the eighteenth century the ideas of Enlightenment were, indeed, a real force within certain intellectual circles, the nineteenth century was increasingly dominated by two quite different influences, which have largely shaped the modern world.

The immense impact of the movements of nationalism on the one hand and materialist philosophies on the other on the course of nineteenth- and twentieth-century history requires little elaboration. But in pinning their hopes on the movement of Enlightenment the Jews hitched their fortunes to a waning star. It is as though they came charging into the nineteenth century on an eighteenth-century wagon. The curious feeling of unreality which characterises Jewish aspirations in the nineteenth century stems largely from this factor. It is a striking feature of much of the Hebrew literature of the period, certainly until almost the last quarter of the nineteenth century. A lack of contact with reality and a strong flavour of self-delusion permeate most Hebrew writing of that time. In hindsight, it is quite clear that Jewish longings for acceptance into German society by means of a change of image were never really reciprocated by the German population, and the true nature of the Jewish situation has been illustrated only too tragically in this century. But the particular delusions which characterize modern Hebrew literature in Germany and Austria from the last decades of the eighteenth and the early part of the nineteenth centuries were carried over into the very different conditions of Jewish life in eastern Europe just when modern Hebrew literature was sinking into oblivion in Germany itself.

In eastern Europe and particularly in the so-called Pale of Settlement in Russia, Hebrew literature quickly struck deep roots. The Jewish population was numerous and closely-knit. Large numbers of Jews lived in small towns and villages, while many larger towns contained sizeable Jewish communities. Moreover, there was no centre of cultural imitation comparable to that in Germany. Whereas for the Jews in Germany the adoption of German at the expense of Hebrew had yielded obvious benefits, both cultural and economic, for Russian Jewry there was little point in abandoning Hebrew literature and learning for the inferior peasant culture of the surrounding environment. In consequence, Hebrew literature began to flourish, although it was still dominated by the ideas of the *Haskalah* movement in Germany, which were quite unsuited to the conditions of eastern Europe.

In a well-known passage in a novel by Peretz Smolenskin, the author asks, 'What has *Haskalah* got to do with Roumania?'[2] The question is pertinent, because it embodies the artificial attempt to apply a set of ideas, which might have had some relevance in the cultural milieu of Berlin, to the completely different conditions of Jewish life in eastern Europe. Gradually, however, Hebrew literature came to grips with the more immediate and obvious reality, and the two vibrant forces of the nineteenth century, namely nationalism and then materialism—the latter at first in the guise of social realism—play an increasingly notice-

able role. These new trends in modern Hebrew literature both spring from the novels of Abraham Mapu (1808-67), who attempted at first to propagate the concepts of *Haskalah* by projecting them into an idealised past. It is as though he wished to say: life should be better than the wretched conditions of Jewish existence in Lithuania warrant. It is difficult to know quite what the future may yield, but we may conjure up a picture of what life may have been like in Biblical times, when the Jewish nation lived on its own soil and when its occupations and relationships were of a more normal kind.

Accordingly, he wrote two historical romances set in the ancient land of Israel in the period of Isaiah. The first, entitled *Ahavat Ziyyon* (The Love of Zion) appeared in Vilna in 1853 and has become a classic by any standards, with some twenty editions in Hebrew, and translations in perhaps a dozen languages—although like so many classics it has long been relegated to the schoolroom, to be read, and then reluctantly, only by children. But in its day *The Love of Zion* was widely acclaimed, and its vivid portrayal of everyday life in the ancient homeland greatly stimulated the rise of Jewish national consciousness. A second romance *Ashmat Shomron* (The Guilt of Sumaria) published in Vilna in 1865-66, dovetails chronologically with the first novel and again transfers the ideals of Enlightenment into the distant past. The fact that both novels were composed in Biblical, or rather neo-Biblical, Hebrew, with form and content blending by and large harmoniously, strengthened their impact on the Hebrew-reading public.

A third novel, *Ayit Zavua*[3] (The Hypocrite) composed in the interval between the two already mentioned, is set in Mapu's native Lithuania and is concerned with the contemporary scene. Within the framework of this long and rambling romance, Mapu again attempts to propagate the ideals of *Haskalah*, by portraying his young hero (by profession an agricultural expert) and his gifted and charming young heroine meeting young Russian aristocrats on terms of social and cultural equality while remaining loyal to their Jewish background. The concept is so artificial—the product of wishful thinking—and the situation so unreal that the characters fall flat on their faces. The neo-Biblical Hebrew, which suited the historical romances so well, seems only to heighten the sense of incongruity which permeates *The Hypocrite*. Yet Mapu's novel of contemporary Jewish life also contains much social criticism, and the depiction of the darker sides of Lithuanian Jewish society in the middle of the nineteenth century introduced an element of social realism into modern Hebrew literature, which was destined to play an increasingly important role in Hebrew fiction throughout the remainder of the century and well beyond—such was the power of Mapu's influence.

Even within *The Hypocrite*, however, there is a series of letters written by Azriel, who journeys to the Holy Land and describes his adventures in epistolary form for the benefit of his friends in Lithuania. Two passages in particular are worthy of note, and both occur in Part III of the novel in a letter which purports to have been written in Jerusalem on the eve of Passover in the year 1853—the year in which *The Love of Zion* was published. Azriel writes as follows:

On the fourteenth day of the first month, the season of joy and gladness for our fathers in ancient times, the season of praise and thanksgiving to the Lord, who brought them forth from Egypt to settle upon this lovely land, the inheritance of their father Jacob—on this pleasant festival I sit upon Mount Zion, pencil in hand, to set down my inmost thoughts upon the page. And the mourning and desolate city of God looks down upon me from the north, through the veil of widowhood. Just as I had pictured her, so do I see her in all her holiness, as though mourning for her sacred desolation. My spirit aches to see her mounds forsaken, the forlornness of ancient times, and the desolation of each generation. Can this be Zion, so celebrated by the prophets who sprang from her? Enemies have destroyed her foundations, and fools have dispersed the words of her holy sons. But Mount Zion shall never crumble, nor shall the holy words be lost to Zion's sons. For these are the words of the living God, fixed in the heavens, lighting up the darkness like the stars. And even when heavy clouds conceal the stars, the spirit of wisdom shall shine forth, and pierce the blackness. The night shall vanish, and the light of God shine even as of old. Yea, a new light shall shine on Zion, which now lies desolate and mourning. The sons, which she bore in bewilderment, shall flock to her sacred ruins. They shall come streaming in from all the lands of the dispersion, for they are all her children, who bear her name upon their lips with every outpouring of prayer. They shall come to her and say that through all their sorrows and afflictions they have remembered her, and the love of Zion shall never be erased from their hearts. It is the love that springs from the delightful hope that hovers over her ruins, and whispers in our ears the consolation of Isaiah: "For the Lord shall comfort Zion: he will comfort all her waste places; and he will make her wilderness like Eden, and her desert like the garden of the Lord; joy and gladness shall be found therein, thanksgiving and the voice of melody".

Then a little later the letter continues:

This is the heavenly vision which my imagination conjured up concerning Mount Zion and her assemblies. All the delights of ancient times welled up and lived before my eyes. Hurrah! I thought—wake up, my soul, and awaken the love of the eternal people. Remember the days of old, that they may bring comfort at the present time. And you too, O sacred Hebrew tongue, don your holy garb and your spirit of noble grace, and sing to your lover, the youth of Israel, borne on the arms of God since the days of Egypt. Make your voice resound, that your words be heard to the very ends of the earth, wherever the sound shall reach. But sing your song only for him that loves you, for the people that has chosen you, for they are all your delight. Hurrah! my spirit marches proudly, walking the eternal paths of old. And with the power of imagination I hear a rustling from the grave, a cry from out the rock, the voice

of the world's dead that sleep in the dust of the ground, rising rejuvenated from the ashes of death, and living before me in my sight. This is the great cry, which breaks forth from the Hebrew tongue to her people, resounding as in the days of her youth.[4]

Now these two passages are quite remarkable. They are virtually prophetic. The ability to envisage in the early sixties of the last century the great ingathering of the exiles on the one hand and the revival of the Hebrew language on the other was an extraordinary achievement. Mapu's impact not only on the Hebrew reading public but on at least one complete generation of Hebrew writers was considerable. The growth of nationalist feeling which he engendered may be traced, although in different forms, through the writings of Peretz Smolenskin, Moshe Leib Lilienblum and Eliezer Ben-Yehuda into the great period of literary revival known in Hebrew as *Teḥiyyah*, which burgeoned in the twenty-five years prior to the First World War. The direct line of national sentiment clearly reflects one of the dominant forces of nineteenth-century Europe, with the result that modern Hebrew literature at last makes contact with the mental climate of the nineteenth century, and in so doing fulfills the condition so fervently advocated by Ben-Yehuda in *She'elah Nikhbadah*.

At the same time the main element of Mapu's novel of contemporary life, namely the aspect of social realism, albeit within the framework of a romance, exerted an impact of no less consequence for Hebrew literature. Time and again *The Hypocrite* emphasizes the need to change the social conditions of Jewish life in eastern Europe. It attempts to inculcate a more positive attitude to manual work and advocates changes of occupation, especially by the acquisition of professional skills. In particular, it argues the case for a 'back to the land' campaign as a means of creating a healthier and more solid basis for Jewish life, which was characterised by an increasingly precarious economy and instability of occupation.

The social realism of Mapu's story, reinforced by the impact of Russian 'positivism', became the model for a series of powerful novels by his successors. The problems and dilemmas of contemporary Jewish life were singled out for treatment in the works of Peretz Smolenskin and Reuben Asher Braudes, and then particularly in the stories of Mendele Mokher Sefarim, the pseudonym adopted by Shalom Jacob Abramowitz. The emphasis on social realism continues to dominate Hebrew fiction throughout the above-mentioned period of literary revival, reaching its climax in the searing tales of Joseph Hayyim Brenner. From the late sixties of the nineteenth century Hebrew literature is increasingly concerned with the portrait of the Jewish plight, and the attempt to heighten Jewish self-awareness. By gradually undermining the illusions fostered by the 'Berlin Haskalah' and concentrating on the stark reality of everyday existence, Hebrew literature finally comes to grips with life, and falls in line with the powerful emphasis on materialism and social reform which play so central a role in nineteenth century thought.

Hence Mapu's work prefigures a bifurcation in Hebrew literature, with both prongs making contact with the real forces of the prevailing ideologies namely, nationalism and materialism. In consequence it exerted an increasingly powerful impact on the circle of Hebrew readers.

Moreover, no matter whether Hebrew fiction was concerned primarily with nationalism or social realism, the writers were faced with the basic problems, first of description, and second—and what was to prove even more difficult—of dialogue. They were compelled to fashion conversation within the confines of a neo-Biblical Hebrew, and portray characters who would in real life have spoken Yiddish, conversing in Biblical idiom. Somehow it worked, although the ingenuity, the labour, the sheer devotion to the task which the creation of such dialogue demanded was immense, and even today, however quaint, it must command respect. Its contribution to the concept of the revival of Hebrew as a spoken language was considerable. Eliezer Ben-Yehuda himself testifies to the influence that Mapu's novels exerted upon him, and he describes how, while walking in the countryside with a friend, they began to converse in Hebrew using as their model the conversations from *The Love of Zion*.[5]

Hence the role of Hebrew literature, through the inspiration it afforded Ben-Yehuda and others like him, to revive the spoken language in *Ereẓ Yisrael* (the Land of Israel), led in turn to a revival of Hebrew literature as it was gradually transferred from Europe to *Ereẓ Yisrael* from the early years of the twentieth century—thereby fulfilling the prediction which Ben-Yehuda had made in his very first article that only by concentrating the Jewish nation in its homeland could Hebrew literature really flourish.

As Hebrew literature at last made contact with the dominant forces of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, namely nationalism and social realism, it acquired an impressive power and maturity. By fostering an awareness of the real nature of the Jewish situation and the decisive forces of the modern world, it stimulated the growth of national consciousness, and played a vital role in the process of harnessing and concentrating Jewish creativity. Due to the increasing flexibility of Hebrew, both in its literary and spoken forms, and the immense devotion and loyalty of its adherents, a veritable renaissance of language has taken place which can have few if any parallels in history. Within the space of a hundred years, a halting literature, and at best a sporadic and stringently limited vernacular have blossomed into a fully fledged and all-embracing medium of expression in writing and in speech. It is a striking and indeed dramatic development, of which the true dynamics have scarcely begun to be explored in any depth. But the mutual impact of literature and language would appear to be decisive. The growth of modern Hebrew literature laid the groundwork for the revival of the spoken language, which was in turn destined to stimulate the creation of a literature of surprising range and quality. Both Hebrew literature and Hebrew language influenced Jewish nationalism, and both in turn were nourished by it.

Although the appearance of the article *She'elah Nikhbadah* in 1879 reflects only an initial and tentative groping towards a definition of the role of the revival of Hebrew literature and Hebrew language in the Jewish national renaissance, the subsequent development of his ideas and the remarkable tenacity bordering on fanaticism with which he pursued his goals throughout his life bear witness to the centrality of Eliezer Ben-Yehuda's achievement as a missionary and catalyst. In reviewing the publication of his first article from the perspective of a hundred years, it is only fitting that his achievements should be remembered with a certain admiration and respect.[6]

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1. For my English translation of the article, see 'A Weighty Question', in *Eliezer Ben-Yehuda: A Symposium in Oxford*, ed. E. Silberschlag (Oxford, 1981), pp. 1-12.

2. *Ha-Yerushah* (1878-1884), St Petersburg, 1898, pt.2, p. 55; cf. D. Patterson, *The Hebrew Novel in Czarist Russia* (Edinburgh 1964), chs. 5, 6.

3. Part 1 was published in Vilna in 1858, part II in 1861, and part III in 1864. A second edition containing all five parts was published posthumously in Warsaw in 1869.

4. See D. Patterson, *Abraham Mapu* (London, 1964), pp. 160ff.

5. Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, *Ha-Halom ve-Shivro*, ed. R. Sivan (Jerusalem, 1978), p. 72.

6. This article has also appeared in *Hebrew Studies* (formerly *Hebrew Abstracts*), University of Wisconsin-Madison, XX11, 1981.

Prolegomena to the National Awakening of the Ukrainians during the Nineteenth Century

by Omeljan Pritsak

I

In discussing the intellectual origins of the modern Ukraine, Rudnytsky wrote:

> The political, and then cultural, Russification of the former class of Cossack *starshyna* toward the end of the eighteenth century formed a turning point in the development of Ukrainian national consciousness. In an epoch when the people were still represented by their aristocracy, it meant an interruption in the national existence of the Ukraine. With it came an alienation between the popular masses and the ruling class, who had ceased to serve the interest of their native land. This alienation of the elite from the masses condemned the former to civic impotence, while depriving the latter of much needed cultural services.[1]

Rudnytsky does not explain why the Russification took place and what type of assimilation occurred. Elsewhere he stated that the nationalist movement of the nineteenth century

> started in those areas of the Ukraine where the Cossack traditions were the strongest, and originally most of the leaders came from the descendants of the former Cossack officers (*starshyny*) class.[2]

The two statements seem to me logically incompatible. Yet they commonly appear in studies dealing with the Ukraine of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Clearly the entire set of problems deserves reexamination. This paper presents an attempt at a new solution, this time from the point of view of universal history.

II

It is well known that the ultimate chasm between Western and Eastern Christianity was marked by the events of the year 1054. While from that time Western

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Christianity began a period of unique development which finally resulted in a secular civilization, Eastern or Orthodox Christianity stagnated and remained—and even still remains—basically pre-secular. The concept of a nation and national awakening was a typical product of Western civilization and remained completely alien to the Orthodox mind almost until the beginning of the nineteenth century.

The notion of separation between Church and State (also unknown in Islam), that is, the division between the religious (*sacerdotium*) and the secular (*regnum*) powers or realms, was derived in the West from the Gospel: 'Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's' (Mark, 12.17). The idea was strengthened by the attractiveness of the highly-developed Roman law, and it stimulated the creation of a parallel (but different) Christian Canon law.

The later medieval history of the Catholic Christian world was basically a struggle between secular and religious powers, which on the one hand stimulated learning (in the twelfth-century Renaissance), and on the other, encouraged intellectual commitment. The great currents followed each other consecutively —Humanism, the Italian Renaissance, the Reformation, the Scientific Revolution, the French and English Enlightenment. The result was a clearly-defined separation of church and state, and the birth of a secular culture based on the vernacular. The obligatory translation of the Holy Writ into these vernaculars gave them a *dignitas* embracing the entire nation.

By the eleventh century, the political institutions of Western Europe abandoned universalism (the concept of one emperor for all of Christianity) and started to develop as societies of states, that is, as political bodies. The roots of this development go back to West European feudalism, the semi-barbaric Germanic substitute for the decayed Western Roman imperial system.

The term 'feudalism' has often been misused, especially by Marxist historians. The term was originally a legal concept, limited to the idea of the contractual relation between the lord (*seigneur*) and the *vassal,* with the result that state authority was delegated to private hands. The idea of mutual contract with its reciprocal rights and duties must be stressed, however, since it was the first step toward the emergence of the societal estates and of the parliamentary institutions that resulted in West European democracy based on personal freedom.

The economic upsurge during the Age of Expansion in Western Europe (ca. 1000-1400) gave rise to a class of rural magnates with spiritual and secular authority, and a class of prosperous townsmen, forerunners of the later bourgeoisie. Consequently, and in the spirit of 'mutual contract', at the beginning of the thirteenth century the prelates and secular barons—and later also the townsmen —received political immunities, such as freedom from taxes, and a royal judiciary. Thus a political elite emerged that was conscious of both its political rights and privileges and of its duties, with estate solidarity rooted in the territorial principle (*patria*).

There was no Feudalism or, for that matter, Humanism or Reformation within the Orthodox world. The concept of a universal Christian orthodox empire was

never replaced by the idea of societies of states, just as the *dignitas* of the sacred language was never passed on to the 'secular' vernaculars. In the Petrine Russian Empire, for instance, the use of a single religious sacred language was paralleled —because of the needs of the state—by a single quasi 'sacred' official imperial language. Even during the Ukrainian cultural renaissance of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries not one single secular book was printed by any of the numerous presses in the country.

The political system that developed and still prevails in contemporary Eastern Europe is that of a patrimonial rule of the Hellenistic type, where 'the rights of sovereignty and those of ownership blend to the point of becoming indistingui- shable, and political power is exercised in the same manner as economic power'.[3] The despotic ruler (*knjaz', tsar, imperator*) was the country's only political authority, as well as its principal merchant and industrialist. There was no place for a society or for a political elite in such a system. All activities—political, cultural, economic —were, and still are, the sole monopoly of the ruler, whether *tsar* or a Party Politbureau.

What was the position of the Ukraine, which bordered on the west and south with Catholic states—from the year 1000 with the Kingdom of Hungary and with several Polish principalities (mainly Little Poland and Mazovia), and from 1320 with the Kingdom of Poland? During pre-Mongolian times, the Rus'- Ukrainian branches of the Rurikide dynasty did not take the religious split of 1054 very seriously. They continued to intermarry with Catholic partners, and Jaroslav the Wise (d. 1054) was rightly called 'the father-in-law of Europe'.

Some rulers even nominated the metropolitan of Kiev (the first prelate of Rus') as their spiritual overlords, without asking the approval of the Patriarch of Constantinople (Jaroslav nominated Ilarion in 1051, Iziaslav II named Klym Smoliatych in 1147, Michael of Chernihiv named Peter Akerovych in 1239). Others went so far as to accept their crown from the Pope (Iziaslav I's son Peter- Jaropolk around 1070, Daniel in 1253, and his grandson George I around 1307).

Some prelates, indeed, officially professed support for union with Rome. The first such was Peter Akerovych during the First Council of Lyons in 1245. The Union of Brest in 1596 created the final split between the Rus' Ukrainians: one part became known as the Uniates (or Greek Catholics), the other remained Orthodox.

The upper strata, like the ruling dynasty, were indifferent to the feuds between the Eastern and Western Churches. They were attracted by the political immuni- ties obtained by their Hungarian and later their Polish peers. However, they were not able to create a Rus'-Ukrainian province on an estate system in the western mode, because they lacked both the experience of its working, and Catholic Latin learning. They ended simply as an integral part of the Polish gentry.

The Orthodox culture, the basis of Rus' learning, was chrestomatical, the low-brow stepchild (intended for use by the 'Barbarians') of the high-brow Byzantine culture. The Church Slavonic language was no match for Latin, that

excellent instrument for intellectual activity, with its enormous corpus of writings and excellent grammars and dictionaries. The Rus'-Ukrainian educated clergy were not influenced by the twelfth-century Renaissance or, later, by Humanism and the Reformation.

Although the kings of Galicia succeeded in their efforts to erect a separate metropolitanate of Little Rus' in Halych (1303-1347), that new metropolitan See soon lost the protection of the now Western-oriented political establishment, and it failed to attract the backing of intellectuals. Many talented Orthodox prelates left Rus'-Ukraine and emigrated to the north: the newly consecrated Galician metropolitan Peter of Rata, near L'viv, did not return to Halych, but went to Vladimir-on-the-Kliazma and thence to Moscow, where he became known as the St Peter of Moscow.

From 1300-1550 there was no one to protect and to vivify the 300-year-old Orthodox cultural legacy in Galicia (and in Kiev, after 1470). The old Orthodox values lost attractiveness for the ruling classes, and they ceased to patronize Orthodox cultural activities on a large scale. After the educated clergy deserted, the masses were left with semi-literate priests. The *Galician-Lodomerian Chronicle*, the highest achievement of the so-called Monumental Style in Old Rus' literature, was abruptly cut short at 1307 and never resumed.

During the rebirth of the Rus' faith (ca. 1570-ca. 1640), which started in Volhynia (Ostroh) and Galicia (L'viv), the newly-founded (1634) Kievan Mohyla College, for a long time the only institution of higher learning in Orthodox Christianity, adopted Latin as its language of instruction; but significantly enough it also assumed the anti-humanistic spirit of the Jesuit Counter-Reformation, rather than that of the progressive Western Renaissance or Enlightenment. The tragedy here was that the Old Rus'-Ukrainians, in their simplicity, tried to achieve something impossible: they strove to create a truly united and universal church, a task in which even the two universal Christian centres, Rome and Constantinople, had failed.

This tedious undertaking proved to be like attempting to square the circle, and unnecessarily delayed Ukrainian intellectual development for some three centuries. In practice, instead of forging unity, one and the same person would change the religious rite according to his needs: at one time he would be Uniate, only to convert soon to Orthodoxy, and then perhaps back again. This happened to several prelates later active in Imperial Russia. A flagrant case was the famous theoretician of Peter's absolute power, Feofan Prokopovych.

III

The Ukrainian Cossack estate developed as a kind of mirror-reflection of the Polish *szlachta* (one may call them anti-*szlachta*) and had a similar class ideology: the demand for rights and privileges in exchange for military service. After 1648 the Cossack Hetman State became a copy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. As in the Polish system, the Ukrainian clergy and burghers were pre-

vented from forming truly independent estates. But following the Lithuanian practice, and in contrast to Poland with its large and legally uniform large ruling *szlachta* estate, a new nobility developed in the Hetman state: the Comrades of the Standard, the Emblem Comrades, and the Distinguished Military Comrades.

There emerged, then, three clearly-defined estates and two social groups which can be considered underdeveloped. The three estates were: (1) the nobility, (2) the Cossacks, and (3) the peasants (*pospolyti*); the latter were never officially serfs during the Hetmanate. The two social groups, the clergy and the townsmen, never developed into special estates, and this was to have very tragic consequences for the Ukrainians.

In the heyday of the Cossack movement, during the first half of the seventeenth century, close cooperation existed between the Cossacks and the Orthodox clergy. In fact, the clergy's help was decisive in Khmel'nyts'kyi's revolution in 1648-1649. But Khmel'nyts'kyi was too strongly rooted in the Polish *szlachta* ideological tradition to agree to share power in the new state with the Kievan metropolitan, Syl'vester Kosov. In the year 1651 a chasm opened between the two which was never really bridged. The Ukrainian clergy soon found a protector in the person of the Muscovite *tsar* (later the Russian emperor) thus depriving the Hetman state of the services of the highly educated stratum of society, while fostering the transplantation to the Ukraine of the Muscovite centralist and imperial ideology. Once the Hetmanate was abolished, the two underdeveloped social groups, the burghers and the clergy, were the first to assimilate. The burghers became a part of the empire's closed class of merchants and artisans, and the common denominator in that stratum now became the vernacular of the Russian merchants. This was extremely important because in Western Europe the nineteenth century was the century of the bourgeoisie.

After the secularization of church estates on the territory of the former Hetmanate, executed by imperial decree in 1786-1788, the Ukrainian clergy became completely dependent on the state for finance. This resulted in their assimilation into the closed class of Russian clergymen, and their status soon became very much like that of civil servants. Thus, the interruption of the Ukraine's national existence at the end of the eighteenth century resulted not from the alleged Russification of the former Cossack officer class, but from the failure of the seventeenth-century Cossack system to include the clergy and townsmen as separate estates.

IV

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the territory of the present-day Ukraine was not only divided between two major European empires—the Habsburg and the Russian—but consisted of six different cultural zones. The first zone within the Russian Empire formed the core Ukraine land (also called the Sloboda Ukraine; we will see later that the Rus' vernacular received its name 'Ukrainian' precisely there, at Kharkiv University). This was old Ukrainian colonial territory

which the Cossacks began to cultivate in the 1630s. Although its inhabitants retained the Cossack military system, they were never part of the Hetman state, but subjects of the Muscovite tsar from the very beginning.

The second zone was Malorussia, the territory of the former Hetman state (the Left-Bank Ukraine), with its administrative and cultural center in Nizhyn. It was here that the Cossack historical and political traditions were firmly rooted.

The third zone, Novorossiia, was a new colonial region formed after the destruction of both the republic of the Zaporogian Host (Sich in 1775) and the Crimean Khanate (in 1783). Its centre, the free-port Odessa (built in 1794), soon became a part of the Mediterranean international commercial world. During the second half of the nineteenth century Odessa became the largest city in the Ukraine; by the 1850s its population had reached 100,000.

After the Cossack system was destroyed there and replaced by Polish gentry rule (by 1714), the lands of the Right-Bank Ukraine, inclusive of Volhynia, became culturally Polish territory. In Polish, these lands, which comprised the fourth zone, were called 'Podole, Wolyn' i Ukraina', and in Russian, 'Iugo-Zapadnyi Krai' (the South-Western land); its cultural centre was the Polish university of Vilnius (the former capital of Lithuania) and its technical branch lay in Volhynian Kremianets'.

In the Habsburg Empire there were two distinct Ukrainian lands: Galicia (with Bukovyna), which Austria received in 1772/1774, and Transcarpathia, which belonged to the former kingdom of Hungary.

As a result of reforms introduced by Joseph II, Galicia (our fifth zone) soon entered a period of searching for its national identity, a process enhanced in 1808 when a Uniate metropolitanate was established in L'viv. For the first time a Uniate prelate was treated with full dignity, on the same level as the Roman Catholic church princes. This fact would help decisively in the regaining of historical consciousness by Ukrainians in Galicia, so that in the second part of the century the small and basically poor land soon became the Ukrainian Piedmont.

The last zone, Transcarpathia, is geographically the most western of all the Ukrainian lands. Due to the liberal regime of eighteenth-century Hungary, an appreciation of the value of education also spread to Transcarpathia, and by 1800 there were many Transcarpathians who studied at the Austrian, Hungarian and German universities. I will speak later about their unique role in the Ukraine and in the Russian Empire as bearers of Western scholarship.

This outline of the six Ukrainian cultural zones shows that Ukrainian intellectual life had two distinct points of gravity: the Ukraine and Malorosiia in the East, and Galicia in the West. The two were not interconnected; between them lay the expanding Polish sphere, with its great Jewish *shtetl* population; so that until the 1860s the two provinces developed almost completely independently; the Right Bank Ukraine, being outside this Ukrainian intellectual development, remained a *tabula rasa*. This would have very grave consequences: the alienation between the merging Ukrainian intelligentsia rooted in the Left Bank Ukraine

(outside the Pale of Settlement) and the Jewish enlightenment (*haskalah*), rooted —as mentioned above—in the Right Bank Ukraine (inside the Pale of Settlement).

As I stated earlier, the ideas of nation and national awakening were western imports in Eastern Orthodox Europe. The importation was not direct—it came via the mediation of the imperial capitals of St Petersburg and Moscow, on the one hand, and Vienna (along with Budapest and Prague), on the other.

V

The Enlightenment was a strong ideological current in Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Its basic precepts were that the ordering principle of existence was the intelligent human mind; that all men were equal; and that therefore any type of human slavery was illegal. Rational men must act critically, reforming and revolutionizing society. Typical of the Enlightenment were its secret societies, among them the English 'Freemason Grand Lodge', and the German patriotic 'Tugendbund'.

The Enlightenment was the first western secular current to be confronted directly by the Russian imperial elite, at that time military in character. These noblemen-soldiers were sent to Germany and France to fight during the Napoleonic wars. Since all of them knew French, and many could also read German, their contact with western ideas was direct. It was generally believed in Russia that the ascent of Alexander I to the Russian throne in St Petersburg (1801) would bring about liberal reforms (e.g., a constitution, abolition of serfdom). Because such hopes remained unfulfilled, the noblemen attempted, upon Alexander I's death in December 1825, to take over the government, but this Decembrist revolt failed.

The Decembrists were also active in the third zone of the Ukraine (Iugo-Zapadnyi Krai) where most of the Russian garrisons were stationed. They had some sympathy from the secret societies of the local Polish noblemen. The constitution of the Northern Society based in St Petersburg envisioned a federation of thirteen states. The Ukrainian territory was to have two states: a Black Sea State, with the capital Kiev, and a Ukrainian state, with the capital Kharkiv (each state was to have about three and a half million inhabitants). The ideas of the Northern Society left their imprint on the constitution of the later Kievan Cyril and Methodius Society, and also on the political thought of Mykhailo Drahomanov. From the time of the Enlightenment, led in Eastern Europe by the gentry intellectuals of the Decembrist type, comes a remarkable political pamphlet (compiled ca. 1820), which was disguised as a chronicle under the title *Istoria Rusov*. It was published in 1846 in Moscow. The unknown author (or authors) agreed with the idea of reestablishing patriotic secret societies, and was familiar with the political ideas of both the American and French Revolutions. For the first time the new Western European terms *patriot, citizen, politics, revolution, neutrality, balance of power*, etc., were introduced to Ukrainians. Granting the many

historical errors and intended fabrications, *Istoria Rusov* presents a Malorossiian perspective on the Ukrainian past, and desires a political weight for Malorossiia among contemporary European powers. The author was very critical of the Muscovites' mistreatment of the true Rus'ians, i.e. Ukrainians, and he hoped for the restitution of the Rus' political rights in an independent Malorossiian state headed by an elected *Hetman*. Incidentally, the author vehemently opposed 'the new name Ukraine' (the Kharkiv product), regarding it as unhistorical, and defended the use of the historical name Malorossiia.

VI

The next European ideological current, Romanticism, reached the Ukraine and Russia via the newly-established imperial universities of the western type. The small provincial town of Kharkiv (ca. 10,000 inhabitants) was destined to house the first university in the Ukraine. The university came into being there because of two imponderables. First, Alexander I, upon ascending to the throne of the Russian Empire, gathered a group of liberal noblemen-intellectuals—e.g., Prince Adam Czartoryski, Nikolai Novosil'tsov—around him and empowered them to reform the imperial educational system. Second, a gifted young self-taught noble-man inventor, Vasyl' Karazyn, who for a time also belonged to Alexander's liberal circle, became obsessed with the idea of founding a university in his native Kharkiv in the (Sloboda) Ukraine. He raised the necessary funds and finally got the approval of the emperor. But the emperor granted Karazyn's wish for another reason. The gentrymen from Malorossiia had repeatedly requested the establish-ment of a university, either in the old cultural capital of Kiev, or in one of Malorossiia's centres, such as Nizhyn and Baturyn; but the Imperial government opposed the creation of a university in those cities, so as not to irritate the Poles. Prince Adam Czartoryski, curator of the university at Vilnius and—as mentioned above—a personal friend of Alexander I, developed the idea of Polish cultural exclusiveness in the Ukraine within historical Poland, united in personal union with Russia. The emperor was captivated by that idea. Since Kharkiv was located far to the east and had never been under Polish rule, Czartoryski supported Karazyn's plan. Soon a galaxy of first-rate scholars was imported from Germany and France to Kharkiv, and they brought with them German Romanticism. Two German thinkers who had a special impact on the transplantation of Western ideas to Kharkiv were Herder and Schelling.

Johann Gottfried von Herder (1774-1803) was born in East Prussia, studied in Koenigsberg under Immanuel Kant, and later became professor in Jena, then a centre of poets and philosophers clustered around Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. It was he who emphasized feeling and imagination in arbitrary opposition to logic and reason. For Herder the true medium of thought was feeling, which he compared to the sense of touch and which—as an act of knowledge—he believed possible only through the medium of native language. In its ancient 'uncivilized' period, poetry of every nation appears in its greatest purity and power. The folk

poetry of a nation is original and peculiar to it. On that treasure of national experience and linguistic possibilities later poets should draw for their own creativity.

Herder's ideas were especially popular among the Ukrainians (and other Slavs) who had an underdeveloped vernacular literature, but rather highly developed folk poetry. For Ukrainian intellectual development it was significant that Herder visited the Ukraine in 1769 and thereafter wrote the following 'prophecy' in his *Diary of My Travels*:

> The Ukraine will one day become a new Greece; the beautiful climate of this country, the gay disposition of the people, their musical inclination and the fertile soil will all awaken. From so many small tribes which in the past were Greeks, there will rise a great and cultured nation and its boundaries will extend to the Black Sea, and thence into the far-flung world.

Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775-1854) was a student of Fichte in Tübingen, but whereas the latter made the knowing and willing subject the centre of all existence, the former emphasized the self-existence of the objective world. Schelling's major contribution was his idea of the unity of all natural forces and the unity of the humanistic and natural sciences. Such theories paved the way for the idea of evolution. Schelling, however, subordinated nature to mind. His popularity in the Russian Empire was enormous. 'I owe to Schelling', wrote I.F. Odoevskii, 'the habit I now have of generalizing the smallest events and the most significant phenomena I encounter'.

A true follower of Schelling was Mykhailo Maksymovych, the first to develop the analytical method for studying Ukrainian history. He also had a significant impact as the first rector of the University of Kiev, founded in 1834.

Some ten years after the founding of Kharkiv University, most of its professors of the humanities and social studies went to the villages to collect the only 'true' poetry (according to Herder), that is, folksongs; soon they started to write their own poetry. This professorial poetry, referred to as Kharkiv Romanticism, has a special place in the history of modern Ukrainian literature. It helped to create a new Ukrainian literary language based almost exclusively on modern Left-Bank dialects. This happened because the professors, both of Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian background, had no attachment to or knowledge of the Ukrainian traditional culture centred on Kiev and Malorossiia. A great breach was thus created between the Ukrainian literary language of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the new language of the second decade of the nineteenth century. This would doubtless have been avoided had the nineteenth-century renaissance occurred not in *tabula rasa* Kharkiv, but in historical Kiev.

The local geographic name Ukraine, an elliptic designation for 'Sloboda Ukraine', which was brought to the Kharkiv region in the 1630s from the Kievan Ukraine, now became the name for the new Slavic literary language. It would soon replace the historical names of Rus' and Malorossiia.

Specialists in the history of Ukrainian culture commonly hold that modern Ukrainian literature begins in 1798, when the first part of Ivan Kotliarevs'kyj's travesty *Eneida* was published in St Petersburg. In truth, Kotljarevs'kyj himself regarded his opus as a kind of practical joke rather than as a literary *chef-d'œuvre*, although the latter was actually the case. He never gave permission for its publication. The intentions of the publisher, the nobleman Parpura, were also far from literary: he simply wanted to make the jocular stanzas of Kotljarevs'kyj available to his friends. But the Kharkiv professors, trained in German Romanticism and themselves practising romantic songs in Ukrainian, recognized the true literary value of Kotliarevs'kyj's work. In 1842, three years after the poet's death, they published the first complete edition of *Eneida*. The work then assumed its deserved place in Ukrainian literature.

VII

For those peoples who failed to produce a vernacular version of the Holy Writ during the Reformation in the sixteenth century, and who thus failed to give their native language a chance to obtain the necessary dignity, Dante's *questione della lingua* was the first and basic problem during their nineteenth-century national awakening.

This was true for the Ukrainians. A prerequisite for an independent literary language in the nineteenth century was the creativity of a poet of genius who could shape raw linguistic material into an instrument capable of conveying the most sensitive feelings and abstract ideas. This poet of genius who assured the existence of an independent Ukrainian literary language was—in the spirit of dialectical development—not a member of the nobility with a university education, but the self-taught redeemed serf, Taras Shevchenko. Shevchenko's role, however, was not confined to literature. Relying upon the heritage of the preceding stages (as exemplified in *Istoria Rusov* and by Kotliarevskyj), and upon the popular tradition and interpretation of the Ukrainian Cossack revolution, Shevchenko created in fully developed form not only a poetic vision of an independent Ukraine, separate from Catholic Poland and Orthodox Russia, but also the idea of an armed struggle for the attainment of its independence.

In the first half of the nineteenth century the Ukraine produced two geniuses: an irrational novelist and a rational poet. Their native country was unprepared to nurture their talents. Both could develop only in the imperial capital of Rossija— St Petersburg.

First, Nikolaj Hohol'—Gogol, a scion of Malorossiia's gentry, embodied (as he himself stated) two souls in two systems. In his conscious system there was a harmonious union between his attachment to Russia and Malorossiia (Ukraine). In his unconscious system, however, the opposition, or disharmony, was clearly evident: a political consciousness was pitted against a critical and very political unconsciousness, and the conflict between Russia and the Ukraine emerged in force.

Gogol's mind was pre-secular (non-abstract); he who failed in his attempt to become a professor of history because he had no sense of historical perspective used his 'devil' as a *deus ex machina*. Gogol also had no concept of linear time (see, e.g., his *Vechera na Khutore*), his thinking was cyclical, mythical, global (non-individualized)—i.e., pre-Renaissance visualizing. He could not serve as a path-finder for his nation. Rather, he epitomized the epilogue of the pre-secular culture and ideas of Malorossiia's gentry society.

In contrast, Shevchenko was raised on the Right Bank as a serf among gentry. He developed a class consciousness early in life. A Ukrainian serf who had to survive in the imperial capital, he kept his eyes constantly open to society's rules and ways. In contacts with westerners (basically Poles and Germans in St Peters-burg), Shevchenko discovered and developed a historical and national conscious-ness (even if presented in mythical garb), as well as his own national identity.

If national consciousness is treated as a variant of Hegel's dialectic process, the following chain of reasoning emerges: mythical thinking—thesis, concrete (material) thinking—antithesis, and finally abstract thinking—synthesis.

Both national consciousness (secularization of the Ukraine as a political con-cept) and the dignity of the vernacular (secularization of the Ukrainian language) are products of abstract, secularized thinking, and therefore were unattainable through mythical thinking for even such a genius as Gogol. Shevchenko, on the other hand, was the *prologue* for a secular concept of the Ukraine.

VIII

What both the Poles and the Russians so feared became reality at the beginning of the 1840s. Kiev again became the centre of the Ukrainian movement, and all Ukrainian lands of the empire started to unify around it. Now, too, the Galicians would soon join in the activities of Ukrainians in the Russian Empire.

The reason for this unexpected turn of events was the Polish anti-Russian insurrection of 1830 (repeated in 1863), which consequently brought about a dramatic change in Russian policy. Now the hitherto culturally Polish Iugo-Zapadnyi Krai was declared genuine 'Russian' land, and drastic measures were taken to depolonize that territory. The Polish-centred university at Vilnius and the Kremianets' lycée were liquidated and replaced by the Orthodox Kiev Imperial University (1834) and a network of Russian state gymnasia. Young teachers and scholars from Malorossiia and the Ukraine were now invited to serve in the institutions of the Right Bank. They married, had children, and some twenty years later an indigenous and active Ukrainian intelligentsia began to appear in this land which had recently been culturally and intellectually Polish.

It was at this time that Mykhailo Maksymovych, whose debt to Schelling I noted before, introduced historicism as a theoretical concept; he also established —through a dialogue with his Moscow colleague Mikhail Pogodin—the basis for the treatment of Ukrainian history as a separate entity.

In 1845 three remarkable figures, representing three different Ukrainian zones, met in Kiev: the so-called Ukrainian Triad consisted of Mykola Kostomarov (1817-1885), Panteleimon Kulish (1819-1897), and Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861). Kostomarov represented the Sloboda Ukraine. Kulish was a scion of the Malorossiia's gentry. Shevchenko, as mentioned above, was from the Kievan land.

This is not the place to discuss at length the clandestine Cyril and Methodius Society, the first Ukrainian political and ideological organization which was created by the Ukrainian Triad. Nor can I dwell here on the interesting aristocratic figure of Kulish, the theoretician of a separate Ukrainian high national culture (apart from the folklore of the ethnographic people), who worked hard as Shevchenko's image-maker and preceptor. But I must say a few words about Kostomarov, the father of Ukrainian populism.

Kostomarov was a professional historian, trained in Kharkiv under the first Hegelian in the Empire—M. Lunin. In addition to numerous monographs on Ukrainian and Russian history, Kostomarov wrote the first scholarly treatment of the two 'Russian' nationalities, the Russian and Ukrainian (and also on the Jewish question, although as a native of the Eastern Ukraine he lacked the proper perspective).

In Kostomarov's view, the defining feature of the Ukrainian national character is democratism, as opposed to Polish aristocratism and Russian despotism. This true Ukrainian feature now resided only among the Ukrainian peasants because the Cossack upper classes had become denationalized. Thus the only subject of history should be that simple peasant, his wishes and desires. Due to the influence of Kostomarov, Ukrainian activists elevated this idealization of peasantry into the only national cause and became alienated from the traditional gentry and other classes. This happened during a century in which first the bourgeoisie and later— with the outbreak of the Industrial Revolution in the 1880s—the industrial workers took the lead in the societies of all advanced nations. The cause of this strange elevation of the peasantry was probably a guilt complex. Kostomarov was born the illegitimate son of a Russian *dvorianin* and a Ukrainian serf-girl. His father died tragically at the hands of rebellious serfs, and he was raised by his serf mother.

Strangely enough, a similar personal history obsessed the leader of Right-Bank populism, Volodymyr Antonovych (1834-1909). The illegitimate son of a Polish gentry-woman and of a Hungarian musician, he was adopted by his mother's husband—the impoverished Ukrainian gentryman Bonifatii Antonovych. Until 1860 Antonovych was active in Polish student organizations; he then left the Polish camp and decided to become Ukrainian to repay the debt of his ancestors who were nourished on Ukrainian soil.

As with Kostomarov's, Antonovych's Ukrainianism meant cutting his ties with the gentry class. His was an ideology of the renegades rather than a Ukrainization of his own class. A demand for the latter process came—unfortunately, only in the first decades of the twentieth century—from another Ukrainian-born Pole,

Wacław Lipiński, who acquired fame as a Ukrainian historian, sociologist and politician.

Antonovych did earn a firm place in the history of Ukrainian scholarship as the creator of the Kievan 'Documentary school of Ukrainian history'. His most august pupil was Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi. But as a political leader of the Ukrainian populist intelligentsia movement ('Hromada'), he was unable to define a non-Herderian, *political* role. This was so because he theorized that there exists a peculiar Ukrainian historical process, the characteristic feature of which is the inability to develop its own elite (because of an overdeveloped democratic instinct), a higher civilization, discipline, or a state. For these reasons Ukrainians should forever remain an apolitical nationality within the Russian state, but one having its own culture. Antonovych thus completely divorced his Ukrainophilism as a cultural activity from any political action. As a result, all socially active Ukrainian youth became attracted to Russian revolutionary political slogans and were lost to the Ukrainian nation.

One must correct a great disservice done by these ideologists of Ukrainian populism. The charge they made that the Ukrainian upper classes deserted the Ukrainian people, meaning the idealized peasantry, had grave consequences for the nation. Ukrainian populists of the Kostomarov-Antonovych brand are responsible for the alienation of the Ukrainian upper classes, as well as for that of the bourgeoisie, of the Jews, and the industrial workers because of the populists' fixation on the exclusive position of the peasants in the Ukrainian social structure. During the Ukrainian revolution of 1917-20 and thereafter, Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, the leading Ukrainian historian and politician, preached the pure traditional populism of Kostomarov-Antonovych, insisting that there was no need for central government in the Ukraine and that every village should be governed as a semi-independent political entity, economically self-sufficient.

IX

If prophets are not theologians, poets of genius are not political ideologists. Shevchenko's vision, which transcended the limited horizons of his contemporaries, could influence Ukrainian political thought only with the passage of time and the advent of appropriate conditions. It was a younger colleague and friend of Antonovych, a humanist and historian of ancient Greece and Rome, Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841-1895), who was the first to appreciate the true content and the political essence of Shevchenko's message. Drahomanov's contribution was to insist that the Ukrainian movement could not remain apolitical and purely cultural, that all political movements in the Ukraine had to have a Ukrainian national character, and that the Ukrainian nation had a right to complete equality.

Drahomanov's work was long barred from the Russian Ukraine. Following the example of Herzen, Drahomanov went to Geneva and with the financial support of the Kiev community began to publish *Hromada*. This first Ukrainian political journal, as well as the other brochures he published, was designed to

develop Ukrainian political thought, to inform Europeans of Ukrainian problems, and to call attention to the plight of Ukrainians under Russian rule. In 1861 serfdom was abolished in the Ukraine. This meant that seventy-five per cent of the population gained the status of free human beings. But the regime feared that if this tremendous mass of people became literate, it would become politically dangerous. The prohibition of the Ukrainian written word denied the Ukrainian language the right to be a medium of written communication and public instruction.

Drahomanov found followers among the Galician, now secularized, academic youth in Vienna and in L'viv, and as a result of his influence, the first Ukrainian political party, the Galician Radical Party, was formed in 1890.

Approximately one hundred Galician Orthodox families, mostly from the Sambir and Zhydachiv districts and from Kholm, managed (under circumstances still not entirely clear) to obtain entry into the Polish 'genealogical tribe' and to bear a heraldic symbol. Most possessed either the *Sas* or the *Korchak* coat of arms, both of which were held by old genealogical tradition to be of Hungarian origin. The emergence of this small but very tight-knit elite had tremendous importance for the survival of Rus' and Orthodox sentiments there. The Galician 'heraldic' gentry took possession of all important Orthodox (and later Uniate) ecclesiastic institutions, and continued to maintain them. In 1830 their sons were still active in Polish revolutionary organizations, but by 1848 they had already discovered their origins and demanded the partition of Galicia into two parts— Eastern (Ukrainian) and Western (Polish).

The Galician-Ruthenian (Ukrainian) *questione della lingua* , which entered a new stage with the creation of the chair of Ruthenian (Ukrainian) language and literature at the University of L'viv (1849), had dramatic episodes. Two schools of thought developed: the conservative camp which insisted on the use of the Galician version of Church Slavonic (one wing of the conservatives who persisted in a pre-secular manner of thinking ended as Russophiles); and the progressive camp, which in the 1860s was captivated by Shevchenko's genius.

The Galician gentry and a new intelligentsia of peasant origin (abolition from serfdom was proclaimed in Galicia in 1848) 'translated' secular Czech, Polish and German political ideas into their own code. During the period 1848-1914 a Ukrainian national and political consciousness came into being. After 1867 the Ukrainians in Galicia entered the stage of parliamentary activity and experienced the practice of democracy in the western manner. They were better implementors of the democratic process than the Transcarpathians who suddenly, during the first decades of the nineteenth century, appeared in leading positions of imperial Russian establishments (they were exceptional because they united Western secular scholarship with traditional Orthodoxy). Unfortunately, they—especially after the *Ausgleich* in 1867— never elevated their Ruthenian heritage and culture to the level of a secular civilization, and instead developed a kind of schizophrenia which is still to be seen in Transcarpathian émigrés.

1. *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy in the US*, VI:304 (1958), 1404–5.
2. *The Development of the USSR* (Seattle, 1964), p. 212.
3. Richard Pipes, *Russia under the Old Regime* (New York, 1974), pp. 22–3.

Lingua Nostra:
The Nineteenth-Century Slavonic
Language Revivals

by Roland Sussex

The Slavs held a special fascination for nineteenth-century European Romantics. Here was a major group of oppressed nationalities, comprising several former and potential nations, not in the Americas or the Caucasus, but right in the centre of Europe, struggling to preserve their languages and customs and to assert their territorial and political rights in the face of foreign authorities. Rousseau wrote a highly serious analysis of the problems of the government of Poland; and Herder, in his *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit*, addressed some impassioned and compassionate words to the Slavonic peoples:

> And when a law-abiding spirit, instead of a lust for war, promotes quiet industry and peaceful concourse between peoples, then will also you—now sunk so low—once a busy and happy people, be freed from the shackles of slavery and rule over your own fair lands, from the Adriatic to the Carpathians, from the Don to the Moldau, and you will there celebrate the ancient festivals of your peaceful labour and commerce.

The two famous champions of human self-determination may have been motivated by purely Romantic sentiments for the rights of oppressed nationalities. But there is an undertone of national political interest in many other writings of this period. Reaction against the big autocracies—the Prussian, Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires—is not wholly absent, either in this part of the late eighteenth century or into the earlier part of the nineteenth. Nor was there a clear realization of how many Slavonic nations there might be, and what was the standing of their claims to nationhood.

By the year 1800 there were over a dozen groups of Slavs with actual or potential claims to nationhood. In the East were the Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians; in the West were the Poles, Czechs, Slovaks and Sorbs (also known as the Wends or the Lusatian Sorbs); and in the South were the Bulgarians, Macedonians, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Bosnians, and various other

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smaller groups. In 1800 they did not have much chance of achieving their aspirations for autonomy. With the exception of the French Empire, there was little in Europe that worked in favour of local nationalism—Poland, for example, had just gone through its final dismemberment in the Third Partition of 1795, and had officially ceased to exist as a political entity. The French did bring a short-lived measure of freedom to the Illyrian provinces in North-West Yugoslavia from 1809 to 1814; but this experiment, which the French undertook for political expedience as much as for ideological reasons, was cruelly put down as the conservative forces of Europe re-asserted their influence. At the end of the Napoleonic Wars there was precisely one independent Slavonic state of any standing—Russia—and a collection of smaller political entities with restricted autonomy in what is now Yugoslavia. The Russians controlled the Ukrainians and the Byelorussians, together with a large part of Poland; the rest of the West Slavs were parcelled out between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Prussians; and the South Slavs were either still under Islam (Bulgarians, Macedonians, Serbs, Bosnians and Hercegovinians), or under the Hungarian (Croatia) or Austrian (Slovenia) branch of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. And yet in modern times there are ten Slavonic states with some kind of regional or supra-regional autonomy: Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Poland, Czechoslovakia (Bohemia-Moravia and Slovakia), Bulgaria, and the various republics of modern Yugoslavia (some with autonymous languages and some without).

The emergence of the Slavs to nationhood has been motivated by a number of factors: geography, political geography, religion, former political status, local and regional loyalty, and language. It is these last factors, indeed, which have probably contributed most to the shape of the modern Slavonic geo-political boundaries. Many historians have pointed out the Slavs' own strong association of *natio* with *patria*, of the connexion between the native soil and the political-ethnic entity which inhabits it. It is less generally acknowledged, however, to what extent the factor of language loyalty contributed to the perseverance of Slavonic ethnic sentiment, and to the eventual emergence of Slavonic nations as political entities.

Language loyalty is nothing new. Here in Australia we find it in émigré communities, just as in Europe these languages are strongly associated with the identity of groups of people. For the Slavs, however, language and language-customs have been a vital element of national survival. At some point in their history most of the Slavonic languages had enjoyed some measure of local autonomy and politico-cultural prestige, and language had *always* been vitally associated with such regional flowerings: Bulgarian in the tenth to the fourteenth centuries, Serbian in the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries, Slovene in the sixteenth, Czech in the fourteenth to the fifteenth, Polish in the sixteenth, not to mention smaller regional political entities like the Ragusan Republic round Dubrovnik, which enjoyed a remarkable period of cultural growth in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. All the language groups looked back on their

periods of former glory with a sense of nostalgia and identification, and for languages like Slovak—whose time was yet to come—the lack of a historical precedent was a significant barrier to the emergence of a national language-culture.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, most of this was no more than nostalgia. Only one Slavonic language, Russian, was in a position of political strength, supported by the government and by educational institutions. And even with Russian the situation was complicated by foreign influences, not so much by deliberate language imperialism on the part of foreign governments as by internal xenophilia by the Russians themselves: readers of *War and Peace* will remember how much French was spoken in Russian society in the early years of the century, and with what difficulty the Russians themselves learnt to speak their own language: Pushkin, Russia's greatest poet, spoke no Russian until he was eight, and then learnt it from his nanny; his native language until this period was French. Furthermore, Russian co-existed in official circles with Church Slavonic, the archaic language of the Russian Orthodox Church, based on South Slavonic models 800 years old, but with certain Russian admixtures; and Church Slavonic was only just being widely replaced by Russian in official documents in the latter half of the eighteenth century, and still exerted a large influence on the language of Russian literature and belles-lettres. No Slavonic language, in short, enjoyed the position of established model that we find with English, German, Italian, Spanish and particularly French in this period. All the Slavonic languages were subject to some degree of dilution, co-existence or pollution from other models, both Slavonic and non-Slavonic. In some cases the languages were widely used and written; in others, as with Sorbian and Slovak, they were rather at the level of local vernaculars. And the Slavs had to battle against anything from mild indifference—as in the Austro-Hungarian Empire during its earlier control of Poland—to active antagonism, like the forced Russification of the Ukraine, or the Kulturkampf of the Prussian Empire and the policies of Bismarck.

In the face of this repression, a vital part of the political consciousness of the Slavs was centred on, and nurtured through, language. And it is in language, its maintenance, attitudes to it, and achievements in it, that we find one of the most accurate barometers of the internal health and vitality of each of the emerging Slavonic nations.

My aim here is to consider language revival in its own right, and not primarily as a barometer of other aspects of the life of the nation. The means by which the languages revived are of great interest to the linguist as well as to the historians of ideas and the student of literatures and cultures. The linguist, and especially the sociolinguist, sees language revival in the perspective of language-cultures in context, and the deliberate self-differentiation of one language culture, whether by natural internally-generated momentum, or through the formalization and application of policies through institutions and administrative structures. These

developments, and the ways in which they were carried through, serve to characterize some of the essential differences among the modern Slavonic languages, and to explain how some of the mechanisms by which the languages have been revived, maintained, and perpetuated have interacted with other linguistic and non-linguistic structures in the evolution of the total language-cultures.

It is possible to approach this very broad topic on a number of fronts, and using a very wide range of criteria. I prefer to restrict my discussion to five very specific linguistic categories, which have both linguistic substance and extra-linguistic implications. In a widely influential paper in 1968 Stewart proposed a set of four criteria to characterize languages in terms of their sociolinguistic status, and in particular to provide a solid background for differentiating the functions of certain well-known types of sub-languages like pidgins and creoles. His frame of reference was purely synchronic—that is, in the terms of modern languages in their contemporary setting. But it turns out that these criteria (with the addition of one other factor discussed below) can be applied not only to the maintenance of language in emigré communities, but also to the question of how and why languages emerge from local vernaculars, and to define the factors which help and hinder their establishment in socio-cultural-political structures.

Stewart's criteria are:

Standardisation. A standardized language is formally unified and culturally unifying. One form of the language is established by some process—by agreement, the example of some major writer(s), or by political fiat and through government-supported instrumentalities—and is adopted over all the language's territory as the official norm. Regional variation in the form of dialects, and social variation in the form of sociolects, are not inconsistent with the standardized language, provided that the standardized language is the official variant, with usage in official instrumentalities, and as a lingua franca over the total language territory.

Autonomy or Abstand. If two neighbouring languages—or, for that matter, variants or dialects—are too similar, there is a risk that one of them will be absorbed or otherwise submerged by the other. 'Abstand' is naturally helped by political independence, though this is not a necessary factor for linguistic abstand. On the other hand, a certain degree of abstand is indispensable in order to separate the language forms and the language functions.

Historicity. No language-culture likes to appear as a recent arrival on the cultural scene, a cultural upstart among established giants. Historical antecedence is used in modern times as a basis for geo-political claims, as in the contemporary situation with the Jews and the Palestinians. It also supports a language's existence by powerfully demonstrating the continuing historical existence of a language culture, and its established place among other older and younger language-cultures. Authentic historicity is an obvious advantage. When a language lacks it, its supporters often try to manufacture it, or to appropriate the historicity of another adjacent language culture.

Vitality. A vital language has sufficient numbers of speakers, in sufficient concentration, to preserve the language against decimation or engulfment. Vitality, in this sense, includes 'Ausbau', a concept of sociolinguistics referring to the usage of the language in all social and cultural contexts, for all purposes of communication, and when a language is not competing with another language for use in certain roles—as English was kept out of the law-courts of England for four hundred years after the Norman Conquest, and so on.

Stewart's four criteria present a neat and potent method of classifying the elements which justify the status of a language as a language, rather than as a local variant; they also allow us to identify some of the most important factors in the emergence of the Slavonic languages as national languages.

Standardisation is well understood and institutionalized by all European and world languages except English. We have no national academies for the regularization and standardization of our language, and its standard forms are arrived at through practice and consensus, as in our major dictionaries and normative grammars. In the Slavonic countries the need for standardization was obvious from early on, especially with competing dialects, sometimes with only marginal abstand, trying to establish and formalize their difference from a neighbouring, and perhaps more vital, variant. For this reason the production of standard grammars and dictionaries is a vital step through which all the Slavonic languages have passed on the way to standardization; and it is precisely the languages which lack these resources which have not survived. By the nineteenth century all the modern Slavonic languages, with the exception of Slovak, Macedonian and to a lesser degree Serbo-Croatian and Bulgarian, had grammars and dictionaries of some standing, used by a wide variety of speakers in the regulation of their language. And all the languages had at least the beginnings of a literary tradition, usually based on Bible translations, which served as a focus and as a model for later writers. These achievements represent the consensus approach to language standardization, though in the case of the Bible translations the prestige of Biblical language often had something of the character of a decree. The other requirement was institutionalized and centralized control and regularization. Russia already had the Imperial Academy; but the other languages were in a more parlous state. One important key to their continued survival lay in the establishment of the 'Matice', institutions which acted as publishing houses, centres of language activity and normalization, language education, encouragement for writers in all kinds of areas, and generally provided the language with the regularized access to written expression, and the regularization of that written expression. The Matice appeared in a variety of countries in the middle of the nineteenth century; their significance to areas outside language is easy to judge by the fact that in countries like Slovakia the Matice were closed down by the occupying authorities because of their involvement, either actual or by example of ethnic autonomy, in the various movements for political independence of the latter part of the century. Sometimes it was not even a matter of closing the Matice; the

Russians simply banned the written use of Ukrainian in the latter part of the nineteenth century, and removed all the lines of access between the language and its standardizing institutions. This was not successful in the long run, because of the Ukrainians' rabid nationalism; but it might, if applied for very long periods, have reduced Ukrainian to the level of a local vernacular.

In due time some of the Matice became more like centres of popular language culture, concerned with education and such matters; in other cases, as with the Sorbian Domowina in Bautzen, the Matice foundation has continued to exercise a vital function in the continued standardization, and in propagating the standardized form, of the language. Elsewhere there is a tendency for the regulatory function to pass to the national language institute of the country's Academy of Science.

The choice of which form of the language to standardize caused some bitter controversies in the nineteenth century. In some cases the problem was solved on historical grounds, using previous and prestigious forms of the language as a basis of the language revival. Czech is the most obvious example of this approach, and the Kralice Bible of 1579-94 was one of the main models used in its formulation. In other cases a major variant emerged as dominant, usually by association with the geographical location of the capital—as with the role of Paris in the formation of modern French. Modern Polish is a mixture of western, Kraków and Warsaw elements, which evolved as the seat of the monarchy changed location; Sorbian is based on the dialect of Bautzen; Slovene on that of Ljubljana; Ukrainian on that of Kiev, and Byelorussian on that of Minsk; standard Bulgarian, which is based on Eastern variants, was adopted following a suggestion of the scholar and publicist Marin Drinov in 1869; and standard Macedonian, which emerged only much later—it was officially recognized only in 1943—is based on the variant of its capital, Skoplje. Russian is a more curious example, since the capital was St Petersburg in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but the dialect of Moscow was the model.

There are two examples of standardization by agreement and fiat which are worthy of special mention. Slovak was one of the languages notably lacking in historicity. Early documents of the area were all in Czech, and Slovak had scarcely risen above the level of a local vernacular in the Austro-Hungarian Empire—the Slovaks were under the control of the Hungarian branch, which was much less sympathetic to local language autonomy, both in Slovakia and Croatia, than the more benign Austrian branch. And the Slovaks, when they wrote in Slavonic at all, wrote in Czech, which with its strong historical tradition was a prestige model when compared to the lowly status of Slovak. In the latter part of the eighteenth century a Jesuit translation of the Bible into Slovak, and the grammatical studies of Anton Bernolák, had resulted in the emergence of bernoláčina, a kind of fusion of Czech morphology with West and Central Slovak phonology. This language was used by high class Catholic Slovaks, and did not achieve wide acceptance. It was later opposed by the more democratic approach of L'udovít Štúr, whose

philological and publicistic activity on behalf of Slovak eventually resulted in an agreement between the Bernolák and Štúr factions in 1851, and the emergence of a unified standard, soon codified in Hattala's Grammar of 1852, which has remained the basis of Standard Slovak ever since, even though the language did not receive official political recognition until 1918.

Another instance of standardization by agreement was reached after a much more acrimonious and long-running controversy between the Serbs and the Croats. Just as the Catholic-Protestant split in Slovak had threatened unity, so did the Catholic-Orthodox split in Croatian and Serbian. The two races had been at political, ethnic and linguistic odds for centuries, and it was something of a surprise when, in 1850, the leaders of the two language factions, Karadžić and Gaj, managed to solve their differences in the Vienna Literary Agreement. They agreed, partly as a matter of national unity in the face of opposition from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, to adopt a single standard language. It was based on a dialect—that of Hercegovina—and adjustments to the Cyrillic and Roman alphabets made the two writing systems match almost symbol for symbol. The adoption of Serbo-Croatian by the other language minorities of Yugoslavia, with the exception of the Slovenes and the Macedonians (who have separate languages) strengthened the agreement. On the other hand, the marriage of Serbian and Croatian has been an uneasy one. Not only have the Montenegrins claimed that their variant is a separate language, but the Croats—or at least a faction of the Croats—feel that their variant is separate from both Serbian and Serbo-Croatian.

Abstand (Autonomy). The Slavonic languages were originally one language—Common Slavonic—which progressively divided into three main daughter-languages—East, West and South Slavonic, and then successively into further daughter-languages which eventually formed the modern Slavonic languages. In the process of separation some dialects and varieties were absorbed by neighbouring varieties, and one of the main causes was lack of differentiation. In some cases, of course, the languages grew far enough apart for there to be no challenge to their distinct existence. For example, Bulgarian and Macedonian, as a result of their long exposure to Turkish while under the domination of Islam, have developed Turkish-like systems of re-narration tenses in the verb—special forms which are used for facts which are not attested by the speaker, but reported by him as being attested by someone else. Or we have the pleophony of East Slavonic, which gives vowel + liquid + vowel for liquid + vowel in the other languages:

Russian:	moloko
Polish:	mleko
Serbo-Croation:	mleko.

But in some cases the languages were close enough for there to be serious risk to their existence as separate entities. Languages react to such threats in a number of ways. Standardization is a powerful means of regularizing differences, and so

maintaining abstand; another important force is national or local ethnic sentiment, which can maintain and even increase or exaggerate differences which are otherwise less marked. Slovak, for example, has /r/ for Czech /ř/, and the Slovaks are proud to maintain this difference:

<div align="center">

Cz: /řeka   Sk: rieka

</div>

More recently Macedonian has been at pains to emphasize its abstand from Bulgarian, and the standard Macedonian language now differs from Bulgarian in matters of lexis and orthography—particularly in the use of the letter 'j'—in ways which serve to make Macedonian appear more different from Bulgarian than the linguistic data warrant, at least in some instances. The more a powerful neighbouring language makes inroads upon a smaller language with dubious abstand, the more the speakers of the smaller language tend to emphasize their differences. Slovak has emphasized its differences from Czech, and Ukrainian and particularly Belorussian are attempting to maintain their abstand from Russian. Belorussian is a particularly delicate case. The use of Russian in Belorussia is widespread, especially in administration, science and technology; and there is a real risk that Belorussian will decline as an autonomous entity, and become just another dialect of Russian, part of a long dialect chain to the West of the Greater Russian area. Language legislators have made Belorussian orthography look rather different from Russian, although the sounds of the language are much closer to Russian than the written forms would suggest. The influence of lexis in recent times has been particularly evident in the smaller languages with large and influential neighbours. Bulgarian lexis is full of Russian terms, borrowed both as a counterbalance to the Turkish elements in the nineteenth century, and more recently for scientific, political and technological purposes. Bulgarian, of course, is grammatically so distinct from Russian that it is in no danger of being swamped. But Belorussian in particular is close enough to Russian for the influence to be a serious threat to the abstand of the Belorussian national language.

Historicity. The arrival of literacy among the Slavs was linked with Christianization, in the ninth and tenth centuries, by Catholic monks in the West Slavonic area and in the West of the South Slavonic area, and by the Orthodox Church among the remainder of the Slavs. Historicity is, of course, not only a matter of literacy; but the existence of manuscripts from a given period is the main evidence for the existence, and historical antecedence, of a language-group and language-culture. The earliest extant Slavonic manuscripts are the Freising Leaves, a Slovene document of the eleventh century; and these have been important, together with later literary monuments like Bible translations of the sixteenth century, in ensuring the survival and revival of Slovene. Other languages have been less fortunate: the early history of Slovak is so intertwined with that of Czech that both languages have claims to early historical documents. The question of shared historical antecedents—which is inevitable, given the fact that it was only about 500 AD that the individual Slavonic languages began to separate out of East, West and South Proto-Slavonic—has led to some bitter controversies

about who has the stronger claim to the historicity and prestige of the early monuments. Two of these disputes are still running strong: the Bulgarian-Macedonian controversy over early Bulgarian/Macedonian literature; and the East Slavonic controversy over whether early East Slavonic literary culture is the property of the Russians, Ukrainians or Belorussians.

These disputes, which arose with renewed vigour in the nineteenth century, focused on the question of lines of succession in terms of language and culture: who was authentic inheritor of the tradition of the early monuments. At various periods, for example, the seat of early East Slavonic culture was in the Ukraine, Belorussia and only later in Greater Russia itself; and this fact gave enormous stimulus and encouragement to the nineteenth century linguistic nationalists of the Ukraine and Belorussia in their struggle to have their languages recognized, and made independent of, Russian itself. The elegant scholarly interpretation is to see this desire for historicity in terms of a renewed Romantic historical sense of identity with the past of the nation, as distinct from its standing in the Graeco-Roman cultural tradition; but in terms of basic reaction, it comes down to deep-seated ethnic competition and hatred. In modern times the domination of Russian in the cultural sphere of East Slavonic, and the riskiness for Ukrainian and Belorussian scholars in taking a contrary view, has left the field more to the Russians than is historically warranted. In Bulgaria and Macedonia, however, the battle is more even. In the nineteenth century both areas were subject to Islam until the 1870s, so the emergence of the national languages was very much a matter of creation after a long period of disuse. The Macedonians look back to the work of St Clement of Ohrid in the eleventh century, when a very substantial flowering of culture took place in Macedonia; the Bulgarians claim that at that time the political situation in the area made Macedonia part of Bulgaria. There is, of course, no 'correct' answer to this dispute. Both Bulgaria and Macedonia looked back, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, to the splendours which had gone so long before; and in creating their new literary languages they tried to create a synthesis of the older language with the living elements—often in folk legend and folk song—which were among the most lively vehicles of the native language during the 500 years of Islamic rule. It is likely that ethnic and political pressure would have allowed both these languages to revive even without the stimulus of their historical antecedence. But there is no doubt that the existence of this tradition was a powerful factor in the revival of the new languages, and the forms which they took. Language controversies, like wars, tend to unite the populace behind The Cause; and this is one of the most potent motivating factors in modern Macedonia, in its attempt to establish traditions which are separate from the cultural weight of neighbouring Bulgarian.

Vitality and Ausbau. Language revivals are severely weakened by the absence or limitation of ausbau. For a genuine and vital revival, it is necessary for a language to be used in all spheres of language activity. No Slavonic language had full ausbau at the start of the nineteenth century. Even Russian was limited by not being

used in many social functions or in the Church. And elsewhere the situation was much more serious, with all the West Slavs and the Slovenes under the influence (and administrative domination, not to mention cultural pressure) of German; the Croats under Hungarian influence; and the rest of the South Slavs under Islam. In modern times the influence of Russian is having a weakening effect on all the languages of the USSR, since Russian is not only the lingua franca, but also the language in which government and scholarship are predominantly carried on. Of the modern Slavonic languages, the most threatened are Sorbian—which is used mainly in local contexts, and where the written tradition is not extensive enough to maintain full vitality—and Byelorussian, for reasons of its contact with Russian.

Two crucial areas of ausbau which delayed the Slavonic nineteenth-century language revivals were education and printing. The policy of the Austro-Hungarian and Prussian Empires became increasingly anti-Slavonic as the nine-teenth century wore on, and towards the 1870s the Slavonic languages were increasingly submitted to all kinds of limitation in printing and education. The Germanisation of education, indeed, had gone to such lengths that it was difficult to maintain Slavonic language schools at all in some areas, and it was impossible for the Slavs to maintain a full range of language activities when German had to be learnt, and used, for a variety of important governmental and educational functions. This explains the vital importance of maintaining the Slavonic literary cultures abroad, especially in Paris and Switzerland; and why the association of national language with nationalist separatist sentiment, which is so typical of the Slavs, resulted in deliberate policies on the part of the Russian- and German-speaking powers to restrict ausbau in precisely those areas which would downgrade language sentiment to the local ethnic level.

The Slavs have spent centuries in contact with other language-cultures which they have felt to be superior; and the restriction of ausbau has meant, in some instances, that upgrading Slavonic language culture has been impossible. In modern times the restriction of full linguistic activity is tending to weaken a very large number of language cultures in the Soviet Union. Admittedly, there is a certain quantitative factor which is absolutely necessary to language revival: there is no point in trying to achieve full ausbau if there are insufficient speakers to maintain activity in all these areas. But with the exception of the Sorbs, there is no reason why any of the modern Slavonic languages should suffer from lack of ausbau for quantitative reasons; and there are only political-ethnic reasons, allied with questions like the spread of international technology, and the relation of technology to the international languages of science, which might tend to restrict ausbau (in the widest sense) to major national languages. It is worth noting, in this connexion, that the Slavs maintain an abnormally high rate of book production, and that this tendency has been evident in all the Slavonic countries as soon as the language has achieved national status. The exceptions are Ukrainian and Belorussian, which nowadays, on a population basis, come off very badly in the

publishing policies of the USSR, for political reasons rather than a lack of manuscripts.

These are the four factors which Stewart proposed for defining 'languages' as distinct from 'variants'; and as we can see, the four criteria do provide a very insightful means of investigating the current status, as well as the revival, of the modern Slavonic languages. There is one factor, however, which Stewart does not mention, and which is particularly evident among the Slavs. This is a matter —for want of a better word—of *Pride*. A language can have standardization, abstand, historicity, and ausbau, but it will not necessarily achieve continuing good health unless there is a body of individuals who identify with it, and who are ready to sacrifice time and effort to maintaining the language, even in the face of adverse pressures from invading or merely culturally adjacent languages. Conversely, a language can undergo revival even when some of Stewart's four factors are absent, provided that pride sustains them until such time as the four factors can be established or restored. I doubt whether a language can exist on pride minus some of the four major factors for a long period of time; but it does seem that revival requires some kind of emotional kinesis, and the four major factors themselves are not inherently kinetic.

The importance of pride becomes even clearer when we consider the fate of Slavonic languages outside their homeland. All the Slavs have gone through periods when foreign invaders have been living in close proximity on their soil; and all the Slavs have substantial migrant communities outside the homeland, some of them in other Slavonic or European countries, and some overseas in the Americas and Australia. I do not wish to suggest that language maintenance among migrants is in any sense a direct reflection of language revival in the homeland. But it seems that the same kinds of criteria apply. And if they are relevant to differing degrees, then these differences themselves tell us something about the qualitative distinction of the two kinds of language experience. In many emigré contexts, ausbau in the Slavonic languages is necessarily limited, since most work contexts are only weakly Slavonic. Standardization is often weakened, since the pre- and pro-scriptive authorities of the homeland are far away, the education experience is less constant, and in any case many of the native speakers will speak dialects without a full understanding of the relation of the dialect to the national standard. *Abstand* and historicity are not strong enough to maintain languages under such conditions, and it is surprising that the Slavs should have maintained their languages as well as they have in what has often been a very hostile environment for foreign language maintenance.

These five criteria can be applied not only to languages, whether in their homeland or in emigré communities. It is possible, within certain limits, to use them also as a measure of the general cultural revival and of the health of a language culture, and to characterize and compare the major elements of which it is composed. This type of extension not only justifies the method, but also

reveals some important and systematic connexions between language revivals per se, on the one hand, and cultural revivals in a broader sense on the other. It is certainly true of cultural traditions like folk-legends and customs, which are only partly language-bound, and which can be investigated in ethnographic terms using precisely these criteria; and it is also true—and probably in a much more direct sense—of literary revivals. Slavonic literary cultures, no less than the languages themselves, were acutely conscious in the nineteenth century of the presence of major language cultures, particularly French and German, which were simply more extensive than the native Slavonic literatures. In terms of literary activity it is possible to view nineteenth-century Slavonic literary work in terms of a *Drang nach Westen*: a desire to get on equal terms with the big Western cultures, to show not only that the Slavonic languages could do anything the Western languages could do, but also that their literatures were capable of the same range and depth of production as French, German—or later, English—literature. This explains, at least partially, the enormous volume of translation which has been characteristic of Slavonic literatures, not only of works of information and science, but also of literary prose, drama and poetry. The Slavs take translation very seriously, and in a more organized and institutional way, than we do; and they have translations of Schiller into Russian, Shakespeare into Polish, and Racine into Czech which should make us ashamed of the generally low quality and range of translations of foreign imaginative literature into English. The translation drive generally began with attempts to write native literature in a given genre, and continued parallel with it; it reveals an attempt to achieve the levels of the source text in the target text, and having learnt the techniques, to proceed to do something similar, but more native, in the native tongue. From the point of view of the five criteria, the motivating force is essentially pride; the criteria for standardization are initially provided by the source text and its literary culture, and are subsequently modified (and in some cases superseded) by the productions in the native language. Historicity is either there or it is not; if it is there, it is to be integrated into the reviving tradition. Ausbau is achieved by widening the range of genres and subjects which the native literature is capable of; and abstand is eventually achieved, as part of the drive to national differentiation, by creating something which is typically Czech or Polish or Slovene or Macedonian, but on an aesthetic standard of literary production which was originally taken from outside the native culture.

Having achieved this perspective on the emerging and reviving literary cultures of the nineteenth-century Slavs, we may proceed to contrast the achievements in language with those in literature, and in culture in general. I do not wish to pursue this line of argument at any length, since the validity of the method, and the issues of theory and methodology which it raises, go beyond my present aim. The central point I wish to make is that the general question of language revivals can be studied in its own right, on the basis of specifically linguistic criteria and methods; but that these methods are applicable to a wider range of

phenomena than mere language, and that by applying them to language, and to culture and literature revivals, we can find mutually illuminating comparisons in each area which go some way towards showing the organic unity of the total language-and-culture evolution. Furthermore, the five factors are not only applicable to the context of the nineteenth century. They have continued to play an active part in the development of the modern Slavonic languages, and we can use them to plot certain vital developments over the last century. A typical instance concerns Russification, the imposition of Russian forms and standards on non-Russian languages and language-cultures. The stamp of Russian is at once obvious in the socio-economic structures of all the Slavonic countries, as well as in East Germany, Rumania, Hungary and other areas within the Eastern Bloc. For all these language cultures the bad years of the thirties and forties were marked by a steady push towards forcible Russification, partly as a counter-balance to expressions of regional nationalism in areas like the Ukraine (it is ironic that this policy was inspired and directed by Stalin, who was himself not Russian, but Georgian). The thrust of this policy was directed precisely at the key areas of language use: to reduce the vitality of languages by ensuring that Russian was essential for communication in certain social functions, and so to reduce the ausbau and abstand of the language *vis-à-vis* Russian. The effects of this policy are brutally clear in modern Byelorussian. As Paul Wexler has recently shown, the hegemony of Russian, particularly in the administrative and scientific fields, has placed Byelorussian, and to some extent Ukrainian, in serious danger of dilution to the point of loss of identity. The same thing is currently happening to Sorbian, which is at the mercy of German—not, this time, as the result of any kind of Kulturkampf, but simply through dilution and lack of vitality and ausbau. And on the other hand, strenuous efforts are being made to increase the abstand of Macedonian from Bulgarian. There is good reason. Their historical traditions are indistinguishable until the present century in most relevant respects, and the Bulgarian Writers' Union has gone so far as to deny the existence of a Macedonian language—for them Macedonian is merely a western dialect of Bulgarian.

Such expressions of regional separatism are found not only at the level of nations or national republics. One of the results of World War II was to disperse many dialect speakers over areas where their dialect was no longer spoken: obvious examples include the movement of East Polish dialect speakers to Western Poland in 1945, to fill the areas of Silesia left vacant by the retreating ethnic German groups. This has had the effect of diluting some regional language varieties, and not only in Poland. On the other hand, there is now a growing tendency for regionalisms to revive in semi-official language use. Pride and abstand are being encouraged at the expense of national standard languages; and while the Slavs have not yet evolved regional literatures as rich as those of French or English, there are certain suggestive movements in this direction which promise to make language allegiance much more complex among the Slavs in the near future. Regionalism and regional nationalism are apparently a universal

phenomenon of the eighties, and pose a political, as well as cultural-language problem, in the Soviet Union no less than elsewhere. What we must see clearly is that regionalism in language is particularly critical for historical reasons which have now become a matter of habit for the Slavs.

I have been emphasising that language is far more central to the Slavs and their sense of nation-hood than it is to speakers of English. But there is more to it than this. Among the Slavs one finds an awareness of linguistic values, attitudes and historical perspective which are one of the central means of interpreting national identity. Native speakers of English have less sensitivity to their language than the Slavs have for their languages, apart from some incoherent though deep-seated feelings and a certain xenophobia. What the Slavonic language revivals have done is to centre cultural consciousness, and language-cultural conscious-ness, on the culture of language, the national language.

This explains why so much attention is devoted to the culture, maintenance, and regulation, of the national language among the Slavs; and why Stalin's policy of Russification paid such close attention to matters of language. For the politician, language is one of the cornerstones of opposition: destroy or weaken the language, and the coherency and unity of the opposition are weakened. So reasoned Bismarck and the nineteenth-century proponents of Kulturkampf; similar considerations prompted the policy of Germanisation of education in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In the past this sentiment has operated in various ways, both for and against Slavonic unity. But the Pan-Slav sentiment of the 1850s, which found expression in the emergence of Slovak and Serbo-Croatian, is now pretty well dead. What we have in its place is a kind of pan-Europeanism on the part of the West and South Slavs, and a certain assertion of a-Russianness on the part of the Ukrainians and the Byelorussians. This evolution is based on *abstand*. It is not consciously promoted at the governmental level, but by users of the language. And it is particularly evident in matters of lexis, and in the choice of English loanwords.

The finely tuned *Muttersprachgefühl* of the Slavs, if I may put it this way, finds expression, and parallel evolution, in broader areas of literary culture. The five language criteria have obvious relevance to the life and livelihood of literary cultures, and ethnographic cultures as well. This especially close connexion between literary activity and language consciousness among the Slavs means that we cannot only apply linguistic criteria to literature with more confidence than, say, with French or English; but in addition we can make certain inferences from language to literature, which are less justifiable in another context. To take a simple example, it is possible to quantify language data, like the numbers of words borrowed from individual languages, and to compare these figures to arrive at a comparative estimate of language contact and language interference between Slavonic languages and a given non-Slavonic language. This kind of calculation is often of marginal interest to literature; but it is there if we want it, and this kind of hard data can often illuminate more abstract questions like the matter of

literary influence. The history of Slavonic literary cultures, as I have tentatively suggested, depends very much on historicity, ausbau and abstand; and the language data provide a methodology and a model which can be used as one of many means to the end of a better understanding of cultural and literary values.

This is no more than a suggestion, and a procedural one at that, and I do not wish to take the issue further here. But the Slavonic intellectual traditions—particularly the formalist Schools of Moscow, Prague and Poland—have insisted on the mutual interdependence of language and culture. It is in this kind of perspective that much of their work has been couched, and it is with reference to such a perspective that their work must be understood. There is one further point to be made. The magnitude of the achievement of language revival has given the Slavs much to be proud of. Some historians of culture, however, take this kind of pride too far. They tend to play down the foreign element, and to emphasize national elements in both historical and ahistorical contexts. This is understandable, if not fully pardonable. But it does skew the truthfulness of their interpretations. It is all too easy for us, speaking from the security of *the* major world language-culture, to be condescending; but after all, English has had a long history of subservience to imported cultural and language standards. But that is another issue. Among the Slavs there is a strong inclination to deny foreign influence and to emphasize internal evolution in all spheres of human activity, whether it is a Russian who is supposed to have beaten Bell to the telephone, or Wright to flight, or whether it is merely a matter of how much Pushkin or Mickiewicz owed to their French cultural models, or Dvorak to the German musical tradition in which he was raised. Among the achievements of the Slavs, one of the most essentially Slavonic is the revival of the national languages. It was essentially the result of internal impetus, and was maintained with great courage and perseverance through a number of crises which did in fact result in the death of a number of languages in Europe (let alone Africa, Australia or the Americas). Slavonic historians of culture may be biased and misleading when assessing the contribution of foreign cultures to their literature; they may be biased, but not misleading, when they emphasize the Slavonic nature of Slavonic language revivals.

I have two principal conclusions to draw from this discussion: first, that the five-factor analysis of language revival, though naturally not the only possible analysis, does bring out a number of vital facts in a suggestive way. And second, that the Slavonic language revivals of the nineteenth century are continuing processes with direct relevance to concerns of the late twentieth century, both in the Slavonic homelands and overseas. At least two Slavonic languages are in danger of being submerged by two large and particularly vigorous neighbours; and at least two others have not established their abstand sufficiently to be confident of sustained revival. Furthermore, it is a mistake to talk of language revival in absolute terms. A language is revived to a certain degree of vitality, for a certain period of time, and that vitality is constantly challenged by interference

from other languages, both Slavonic and non-Slavonic, and from cultural, technical, ethnic and other pressures. The vital language responds, adapts, and gains vitality and revival in the process. The less vital language exhausts, or dilutes, itself in the process of trying to adapt to changing stimuli. The saddest case is language death; we have already had the casualty of Slovincian in this century, and it is worth struggling to avoid another. With luck, the Byelorussians and the Sorbs will be at least partially successful.

If there is one lesson to be learnt from the Slavonic language revivals of the nineteenth century, it is that language can form the focus of regional consciousness, and that the spirit and energy generated around language can ensure the survival, and bring about the revival, of the language, even under extremely adverse conditions. In this respect there are challenging parallels between the early nineteenth century and the latter part of the twentieth century. We are living through a period of rebirth of regionalism, nationalism, ethnic consciousness, separatism, and anti-supra-nationalism. This reaction against the centralizing tendencies of the last century is found in many areas of human social cultural and economic activity. Australia, for instance, is now more confidently assertive of its own individuality than for many years, and in a less strident voice. And the Slavs are now in a position of language strength, like Russian at the start of the nineteenth century. We now know so much more about the mechanisms of language survival and revival that the loss of a language now will be a poor commentary on the wisdom and motivation of our century. The revivalism of the latter part of the twentieth century is likely to be not so much a matter of language revival in lieu of political autonomy, but rather political revival using the established language abstand as a pillar. Though the majority of the languages themselves are not threatened, the power, energy, dynamism and obstinacy with which the Slavs can invest their feeling for the native language may come to play a significant role in the re-shaping of cultural, if not political, allegiances towards the year 2000. The trouble is that this time the political stakes are much higher; one Slavonic language could have the effect of a Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo. This is not fanciful. The language situation in modern Yugoslavia is delicate enough to be susceptible to very small perturbations in the language question. And the Russians will soon have to rethink their established policies of promoting Russian so single-mindedly for all the peoples of the Soviet Union: the population figures are swinging against them. The most encouraging development is among the West Slavs. Here a sense of political pragmatism is very strong. Recent language policy has tended to take the political fuse out of the language question. It does not—could not—lessen the depth of feeling of the Slavs for their languages; but it has attempted to separate language identity from political identity. This evolution marks an important departure from the spirit which has saved and sustained the Slavs through their long period of bondage. It remains to be seen whether it is possible to separate ethnic consciousness and language consciousness, on the

one hand, from the demon of political autonomy on the other. 'Solidarity', which was borrowed from French, is as much a Russian as a Polish word.

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National Messianism and the Historical Controversies in the Polish Thought of 1831-1848

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I: Introductory Remarks

'The Awakening of Eastern Europe' is a good term to describe the nation-building processes among the smaller Slavic nationalities of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires; I do not think, however, that it is equally useful in describing the nation-building processes in nineteenth-century Poland. Although the Poles had lost their independence at the end of the eighteenth century, they saw themselves—and were seen by the others—as an historical and political nation, and not merely as an ethic 'nationality' defined mainly by its language. According to the nineteenth-century terminology, used not only by Hegel, but by Marx and Engels as well, they were an 'historical nation' and, as such, did not belong to the category of dormant nationalities, which had to be 'awakened' to historical existence. This difference was felt very sharply even in the second half of the nineteenth century. In order to show this, it is enough to recall, for instance, Marx's and Engels' views on the national question in East-Central Europe.[1] As we know, they supported the idea of the restoration of Poland within the historical boundaries of 1772; but, at the same time, they strongly opposed the movement for the national 'awakening' of the small Slavic nations, considering it to be 'reactionary' and incompatible with the centralizing tendency of progress. An extremely interesting comment here is Engels's article 'What have the working classes to do with Poland?', written after the Polish uprising of 1863. The restoration of Poland, argued Engels, has nothing in common with the so called 'principle of nationalities', because 'nationality' and 'nation' are two different things. 'Nationality' is an ethnic group whose natural boundaries are that of language; 'nation' is a product of history, a politically organized territorial sub-division of mankind; its boundaries depend on its inner vitality and ability to be a vehicle of civilization. Every European nation has been composed of many ethnic nationalities and a great majority of nations are still inhabited by people of

different nationalities. To support separatist movements of the ethnic nationalities means to contribute to the disintegration of the multi-ethnic political nations; hence, the 'principle of nationalities' has nothing in common with 'the old democratic and working-class tenet as to the right of the great European *nations* to separate and independent existence'. Poland is not a 'nationality', but one of the great historic nations of Europe. Like many other nations in the present and in the past she is a multi-ethnic nation; therefore, the 'principle of nationalities' is, in fact, very dangerous from the point of view of the Polish interest. Engels did not hesitate to assert that this principle was 'a Russian invention concocted to destroy Poland'. He concluded:

> if people say that to demand the restoration of Poland is to appeal to the principle of nationalities, they merely prove that they do not know what they are talking about, for the restoration of Poland means re-establishment of a state composed of at least four different nationalities.[2]

Polish democratic nationalists of the Romantic epoch fully shared these views. They stood for the historical, political and territorial concept of the nation, as opposed to the ethnic, linguistic concept. For Joachim Lelewel—the greatest Polish historian of the epoch and one of the leaders of the Polish democrats in exile—the Polish nation consisted of Poles of Western Poland, Poles of Southern Poland, Mazovians, Lithuanians, Ruthenians and so forth.[3] Himself of Polish-German background, he considered even Polish Germans to be simply German-speaking Poles. The ancient Polish Commonwealth was for him one great multi-ethnic nation. He wanted to preserve the ancient Polish notion of being 'gente Ruthenus (vel Lithuanus), natione Polonus'. It is easy to recognise that what he meant by 'gens' corresponded to Engels' 'nationality', and what he meant by 'natio' was equivalent to Engels' 'nation'.

For the contemporary Westerners it may be difficult to understand how it was possible to conceive the inhabitants of the former Poland as members of 'political nation' when the Polish state had ceased to exist. At the beginning it was difficult also for the Poles. The last partition of Poland in 1795 was seen by many Polish patriots as the end of the Polish nation. Soon after, however, a different feeling prevailed and a distinction was made between a 'mere state' and a genuine 'political nation' whose spirit can live even if its earthly body—the state—has been destroyed. 'Mere state' is an artefact, a soulless machine, while a nation is a community held together voluntarily, by ties of common history and by the common political will to preserve, or to regain, its independent statehood. Membership in a state is compulsory, based on a purely territorial principle, while a political *nation* owes its existence to the will of its members. It was assumed, of course, that the overwhelming majority of politically conscious inhabitants of the former Commonwealth desired the restoration of the Polish state, quite irrespective of their language.

II: The Historical Controversy over the Democracy of the Gentry

The importance of the living tradition of the independent state, together with the depressing fact of the recent downfall of this state, gave birth to vivid historical controversies over the nature and value of the political heritage of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: over the so called 'democracy of the gentry'.

To be sure, nobody denied that the eighteenth-century Commonwealth—a republican state with an elected monarch as its first magistrate—was in a profoundly critical condition. This state, the biggest European state after Moscovy, was by then incomparably weaker than its absolutist neighbours: it had a ridiculously small army; its parliament was paralysed by the notorious 'liberum veto'; for a long time all efforts to strengthen the government and to introduce necessary reforms were frustrated by hysterical fears that stronger government would transform Poland into an 'absolutum dominium'. Many aspects of this situation were truly paradoxical. The 'golden freedom' of the Polish gentry was declared unalterable by Catherine the Great, although her own realm was an absolute monarchy. In contrast to the West, Polish conservatives were by then ardent republicans; most of them sympathized with the American revolution, some of them were deeply heartened by the downfall of monarchy in France. On the other hand, the ideology of the progressive party was, as a rule, more or less royalist. One of the greatest thinkers of the Polish Enlightenment, the chief spokesman of the Polish burghers, Stanisław Staszic, set forth a theory according to which absolute monarchy represented a higher stage of development than the 'feudal republicanism', whose retarded and degenerated form was, in his eyes, the 'democracy of the gentry'.

The final result of the short-lived victory of the modernizers was the Constitution of 3 May 1791. It abolished the much-abused forms of 'ancient freedom' (liberum veto, free elections, confederations, and so forth) and transformed the Commonwealth into a hereditary constitutional monarchy with modern government and biennial parliaments. Political rights were made dependent on the ownership of land: this meant that many burghers were raised to the status of 'active citizens' while the landless gentry—the clients of the magnates—were deprived of political influence. Thus not only the republican principles were replaced with monarchical ones, but even the most cherished idea of the gentry democracy—the equality of all the nobles—was abandoned.

In order to avoid oversimplification it is necessary to stress that republicanism in eighteenth-century Poland was not always bound up with conservatism. Some Polish republicans were fully conscious that the state had to be thoroughly—politically and socially—modernized, but tried to achieve this end without betraying basic republican ideas. In other words, they wanted to replace the feudal anarchy not with a hereditary monarchy, but with the modern 'orderly republic'. An interesting figure among them was Wojciech Turski—an admirer of revolutionary France who, in a dramatic speech in the French Convention, appealed to the Jacobins to help the Poles save their freedom. Even more significant was the

fact that Tadeusz Kościuszko, the leader of the great national uprising of 1794, was a progressively-minded republican who carefully avoided committing himself to the defence of the monarchical May Constitution.

After the defeat of the uprising of 1830-1831 the old issue of 'Republicanism versus Monarchism' became one of the main themes of ideological controversies among Polish exiles in France. The leader of constitutional monarchists was Prince Adam Czartoryski (1770-1861), former Russian statesman and head of the insurrectionary government in 1831. The main figure among the republicans was, at the beginning, the great historian Joachim Lelewel (1788-1861), chief representative of the Left in the insurrectionary government.

For the constitutional monarchists Czartoryski's family was an embodiment of the progressive tradition of eighteenth-century reformers, those who had paved the way for the Constitution of May 3rd. Lelewel's estimation of the historical role of Czartoryski's family was bitterly, one-sidedly critical; his view of the May Constitution was milder, but critical too. He was careful, however, to make a clear distinction between his republicanism and the republicanism of conservative eighteenth-century magnates. The crucial difference consisted in the violently anti-aristocratic spirit of his republican views. In his eyes both the conservative magnates and the progressive Czartoryskis belonged to the same aristocratic oligarchy whom he held responsible for the degeneration of the gentry democracy and for the downfall of the Commonwealth.

The May Constitution was criticized by Lelewel not only because of its monarchism but also because it had made 'active citizenship' dependent on the ownership of land. In his view the democratic principles of the ancient republic of the gentry should have been made a universal condition by means of which *all* the inhabitants of Poland were given equal political rights, quite irrespective of their status, ethnic background or property qualifications. He wrote a special treatise on the 'lost citizenship' of the Polish peasants and demanded that their lost rights should be fully restored. According to his historical theory the democratic-republican principles were inherent in the ancient Slavonic communalism and, as such, belonged to the common heritage of all Slavonic nations.[4] He put special emphasis on the existence of a republican tradition in Russia, exemplified by the flourishing city-republics of Novgorod and Pskov, and spoke with great sympathy of the Decembrists who had tried to restore the 'ancient Russian freedom'.[5] On the whole, however, Russia was for him a sad example of a Slavic country in which the democratic and republican traditions of ancient Slavdom had been most cruelly suppressed by absolutism, deeply alien and hostile to the Slavic nature of the Russian people. The case of Poland was entirely different: here the ancient Slavic principles had been weakened under the influence of Western feudalism and Catholicism, but later reemerged and reestablished themselves in the form of 'gentry democracy'. True, the ancient Slavic freedom was confined in it to one estate only. Nevertheless, Lelewel argued, the natural tendency of the 'gentry democracy' was to expand freedom, and not to restrict it. If this truly

Slavic tendency did not prevail and result in the full democratization of the Commonwealth, it was due to the kings who never got rid of monarchical leanings, and to the magnates who distorted the egalitarian principles of the gentry republic while paying lip service to it.

It is easy to see that such a conception combined a severe criticism of the Polish past with the extreme, romantic idealization of it. The objects of criticism were kings and magnates; the objects of idealization were the patriotic poor gentry with their dietines and other republican institutions. Contemporary Polish democrats, Lelewel claimed, should humbly bow down before their freedom-loving ancestors.[6] Rousseau—'the last defender of the Polish people'[7]—was completely right when he advised the Poles to cling to their traditions, to improve their republican institutions, but never to destroy them. Unfortunately, the eighteenth-century reformers did not listen to him, preferring rather to follow the advice of Mably, who saw the old Polish institutions as inherently bad and unimprovable. The May Constitution took a long step in the wrong direction. Lelewel did not hesitate even to put forward a risky hypothesis that Poland might have been saved by liquidating the royal power altogether instead of making it hereditary.[8]

Lelewel's final conclusions as to the legacy of the Polish past sounded very optimistic, even boastful. Poland had nothing to learn from the West. On the contrary, the contemporary West, decayed as it was, should learn from Poland, because what it needed for its political regeneration was precisely the same republican principles which had once been adopted, although in restricted confines, by the Polish 'democracy of the gentry'.

Constitutional monarchists also tried to deduce their political standpoint from the lessons of Polish history.[9] The historian who provided them with the best arguments was Karol Hoffman (1798-1875). In contrast to Lelewel, he was as far removed as possible from a romantic idealization of Polish history. He was a staunch Westerner, believing in the universal laws of historical development and rejecting Lelewel's thesis about the historical uniqueness and particular value of the communal institutions of ancient Slavdom. People, he maintained, are basically the same everywhere, the so-called 'national spirit' is a product of changing historical circumstances and by no means an independent, irreducible factor of historical development. Western feudalism, in the sense of a hierarchy within nobility, and absolutism were normal phases of historical evolution; while the Polish 'gentry democracy' was a historical anomaly, a deviation from the norm resulting from a retarded development. When the monarchy was weak in the West (i.e. in the feudal period), it was still too strong in Poland to allow the full development of a feudal hierarchy. Later, when the Western monarchy became absolute, the Polish nobility was too strong and not sufficiently differentiated within itself to allow a Western-type development. Thus Poland was able to skip both the phase of a full-fledged feudalism and the phase of royal absolutism. The final result of this was the beginning of the gradual dissolution

of the state. Royal power had no chance to become stronger; the overwhelming domination of the nobility over all other estates killed in embryo the growth of Polish cities, and the ideology of 'gentry democracy', preventing the establishment of a strong hierarchy within the ruling estate, vastly contributed to the growing anarchization of political life and to the final downfall of the state.

At the end of the 1830s the most militant monarchists became organized in the Monarchical and Insurrectional Party of May 3rd (whose membership reached the impressive number of 1500). The best theoretical and historical justification of their programme was a brochure of Janusz Woronicz entitled *On Monarchy and Dynasty in Poland* (Paris, 1839).[10] Its main arguments run as follows.

In comparison with a republic a monarchy is not only a much more efficient form of government, but also more conducive to social justice. All republics are based on exploitation and oppression because political equality for all creates conditions for an unbridled licence of the stronger. All republics are weak; the powerful ancient Rome was a republic only in the capital, its provinces were ruled by severe proconsuls. Poland's best times were the period of strong monarchy, while her republicanism resulted in general decline. The abuse of monarchical principle leads to despotism, but the abuse of republicanism leads to destruction. True monarchy, however, has nothing in common with 'sultanism' or the 'tsarism' characteristic of the political system defended by the Holy Alliance. A genuine monarchy is rooted in, and draws its strength from, a genuine social life, a genuine nation. Without a nation there is no mutual agreement between the ruler and the ruled, but only rule by sheer force. The three partitioning powers are not national states, their populations are composed of heterogeneous elements held together by force. Therefore, they cannot claim to represent the monarchical principle.

In this way Polish monarchists in exile combined their commitment to the idea of strong government with a belief that 'legitimism of nations' was older and more important than dynastic legitimism, defended by reactionary forces in Europe.

By way of digression, I should add that the controversy over the Polish 'democracy of the gentry' is still alive among historians of Eastern Europe, both in Poland and in the West. After the defeat of the great national uprising of 1863-1864, when the struggle for the restoration of Poland seemed to be entirely hopeless, the influential Cracow school of historiography condemned both the 'gentry democracy' of the Polish Commonwealth and the romantic democratism of gentry revolutionaries, seeing the latter as an extension of consequence of the former.[11] The negative view of the Polish libertarian tradition was strongly supported by nationalist historians of the three partitioning powers, whose obvious interest was to present the Polish Commonwealth as a state incurably ill and doomed to destruction. It seems that such, or similar, views, are still dominant among the Western historians. With some important exceptions, however. Let me quote, for example, the opinion of the distinguished American specialist in Polish history, Robert H. Lord:

The old Polish Commonwealth was an experiment of a highly original and interesting character ... It was the largest and the most ambitious experiment with a republican form of government that the world had seen since the day of the Romans. Moreover, it was the first experiment on a large scale with a federal republic down to the appearance of the United States. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries this republic was the freest state in Europe, the state in which the greatest degree of constitutional, civic and intellectual liberty prevailed.[12]

Similar opinions are voiced today by the eminent Belgian Slavist, Claude Backvis, the best foreign specialist in the Polish culture of the Renaissance period and one of the greatest admirers of the 'ancient Polish freedom'.[13]

Among the contemporary Polish historians—J. Tazbir, J. Maciszewski and others—the tendency to revise the schematic opinions and to rehabilitate the better periods of the 'democracy of the gentry' is, I think, very pronounced. An important argument for this tendency is the close connection between the republican institutions and the early emergence of national consciousness among the Polish gentry, i.e. among the ten per cent of the entire population of the Commonwealth. The existence of such a connection should not surprise us. If Hans Kohn is right that the 'Western' type of nationalism was bound up with the idea of the sovereignty of the people, government by consent, and a contractual, constitutional, conception of the state, that it was incompatible with an absolutist monarchy and inconceivable without the idea of political democracy,[14] it follows that all the conditions for such a type of national consciousness were more favourable in the old Poland (i.e. in the major part of East-Central Europe) than in the rest of Europe. The fact that the nation in Poland was represented only by the gentry does not contradict this thesis, because in England—the country chosen by Kohn as the best example of the positive qualities of 'Western' nationalism—the number of 'active citizens' was much smaller. If 'nationalism' means loyalty to the nation before loyalty to the king, or multiple loyalties to supra-national feudal authorities, the Polish gentry was 'nationalistic' from the beginnings of 'gentry democracy', and Andrzej Frycz-Modrzewski (the sixteenth-century Polish thinker who advocated, among other things, treating burghers and peasants as free citizens and establishing a Polish national Church) should be treated as one of the first great theorists of modern political nationalism. The traditions of this distinctively *political* nationalism were alive and very strong in the period of great national uprisings in nineteenth-century Poland; contrary to the opinion of Hans Kohn, who saw in the East of Europe only the purely ethnic, pre-political variety of nationalism, 'centering around the irrational, pre-civilized folk concept'.[15]

III: Political and Religious Messianism
Different conceptions of Nation (like 'political conception', 'linguistic conception' and others) are by no means the only criterion for distinguishing different

types of nationalism. Of equal importance is the general *Weltanschauung*—the style of thought and the hierarchy of values, with which a given type of nationalism is associated.

For the Polish democratic nationalists who strived to oppose 'The Holy Alliance of Peoples', of peculiar importance was the problem of the relationship between national and international tasks, national and universal values. The most widely-accepted solution of this problem can be classified as messianically-oriented romantic progressivism. This conception was developed in many countries, especially in Italy (Mazzini) and in France (Buchez, Michelet, Quinet), but nowhere was it as widespread as in Poland. The Polish thinkers even made a claim that it had originated in Poland.

The main features of this pattern of thought can be summarized as follows. Firstly, the idea of a universal historical progress, inextricably involved in the conception of nation as the individualization of mankind and the main vehicle of its progress; secondly, the idea of a national mission and a conviction that it is this mission, and not merely ethnicity or even inherited traditions, which constitutes the true essence of nationhood—hence the possibility of espousing the idea of revolution and a readiness to accept a radical break with the immediate past if seen as a deviation from the national calling; thirdly, the ethos of activism and moral perfectionism, the recognition of the 'spirit of sacrifice' as the highest national virtue; and, finally, a belief in the active brotherhood of nations, an indignant condemnation of the egoistic principle of non-interventionism, a firm conviction that helping all oppressed nations in their struggle for freedom is the only way to become a legitimate vanguard of mankind.

It is obvious that such a style of thought was incompatible not only with the rationalism, hedonism and utilitarianism of the Enlightenment, but also with the conservative romanticism which saw history as a slow, organic development and condemned the very spirit of conscious, purposeful activity. The crucial word for romantic conservatism was not 'national mission', but 'national uniqueness'. If the conservatives used the word 'mission', they meant not a conscious activity but a divinely assigned function which every nation fulfills without being aware of it, by means of its mere existence. 'It is the same of nations, as of individuals', wrote De Maistre. 'All have a character and a mission that they fulfill *without realizing it*'.[16] In contrast with this, the progressive romantics understood 'mission' as a consciously accepted and consciously realized task. General Ludwik Mierosławski (who during the Springtime of Peoples became a commander-in-chief of the Polish insurrection in Posnania, of the revolutionary forces in Sicily and, finally, of the insurrection in Baden and the Palatinate) put special emphasis on this role by making a distinction between the 'old' and 'new' patriotism. The 'old patriotism', he asserted, could be instinctive, traditionalist and unreflective, but the 'new patriotism' must be conscious, critical and future-oriented.[17]

In such a way 'nations'—in contrast to mere 'peoples'—were conceived as having a special role, a mission to fulfil in history. Added to this was a belief in

the peculiar importance of the national mission of the Poles. If we agree to see this as an expression of Polish 'messianism', we must concede, first, that this 'messianism' was the dominant ideology of the Polish national-liberation movement of the Romantic Epoch and, second, that it had by then numerous non-Polish sympathizers, especially among the European Left. It was suppported morally not only by democratic nationalists, like Mazzini or Michelet, but also by Marx for whom the Poles were, as he put it, 'the 20 million heroes' defending Europe from the Asiatic despotism of tsarist Russia.[18]

Here, however, the term 'messianism' is used in a more narrow sense. One should distinguish, I think, between the widespread messianic tendencies in the political thought of the Polish revolutionaries, and the genuine, religious messianism of the three great prophetic poets: Adam Mickiewicz, Juliusz Słowacki and Zygmunt Krasiński. Genuine messianism is a type of *religious* consciousness, an expectation of the second coming of the Messiah and the second salvation—this time a collective and terrestrial salvation of mankind. Therefore, from the point of view of traditional, post-Augustinian Catholicism, messianism is necessarily a form of heterodox religious consciousness; usually, although not necessarily, it is a more or less outspoken heresy, bound up with social revolution, since the belief in an earthly salvation is typical of the 'religions of the oppressed'. This was precisely the case with Mickiewicz's and Słowacki's ideas.

Krasiński, who tried to combine messianic dreams with political and social conservatism, represented a different type of messianic thinking (although he, too, did not succeed in reconciling his messianic ideas with the official doctrine of the Church). Since his interpretation of the Polish past was not particularly original and interesting, I shall not try to present his conceptions, concentrating instead on the revolutionary messianism of Mickiewicz and Słowacki. For the sake of brevity I shall limit myself to a discussion of the most mature, full-fledged forms of their messianism: Mickiewicz's Paris lectures on Slavonic literature (especially the last two courses, published under the titles *L'Eglise officielle et le Messianisme* and *L'Eglise et le Messie*, 1845) and the so-called mystic works of Słowacki, especially his gnostic essay *Genesis from the Spirit* (1847) and his great unfinished poem *King Spirit* (1847). In all these works *national* aims became subordinated to the universal *religious* aim; on the other hand, the mission of the Poles ceased to be merely political, assuming instead soteriological and eschatological dimensions. The most extreme exaltation of patriotic feelings became combined with a resolute condemnation of nationalism as an end in itself. Towiański, the Lithuanian prophet, who at the beginning of the 1840s exerted a considerable influence on Mickiewicz and Słowacki, repeatedly warned: 'thinking of a terrestrial fatherland incompatible with God's will is a crime, and we are scoundrels if we desire that'.[19] Mickiewicz was able to say: 'Poland must strive for a new, better world, otherwise it makes no sense to struggle for its restoration'.[20]

I have no time to give here a full presentation of Mickiewicz's and Słowacki's messianic ideas; I shall talk only about their idea of nation and their image of the

ancient Poland. However, I should add at least a few words about their general vision of the world. Philosophically speaking, it may be classified as a 'spiritualistic universal perfectionism', based on a belief in progressive reincarnation, combined with romantic anti-rationalism and hero-worship. From this point of view, historical progress was seen as a result of the efforts of individual spirits perfecting themselves through the long chain of incarnations; the ultimate goal of their efforts, to be achieved in the earthly life, was called the New Jerusalem or the Kingdom of God on earth. There exists a hierarchy of spirits formed as a result of their inner labour in their former and present incarnations. The more developed spirits have a natural duty to lead the less developed ones. The leaders of the general progress are the strongest spirits, the great, divinely inspired heroes—King-spirits, as Słowacki called them. Each of them represents a part of the progressively unfolding divine revelation.

Let us turn now to the idea of nation. The two Polish poets were very far from the sociological realism of conservative romantics, who claimed that nations were supra-individual entities whose existence was more real and more important than the existence of their individual members. Following Towiański, Mickiewicz and Słowacki defined nations as 'associations of kindred individual spirits' realising a common task in the universal progress. Such a conception prevented making nations absolute by subordinating them in the hierarchy of values, to the supreme cause of individual spiritual perfection and, no less importantly, to the ultimate goal of human history: the establishing of the divine order on earth. For Mickiewicz, a nation was nothing else than 'a set of aids given to man to help him to apply the truth' which had been revealed to him by God.[21] By force of this argument a nation was given a religious sanction but, on the other hand, came to be conceived as a means, and not as an end in itself.

Needless to say, this extreme spiritualization of the concept of nation minimized the importance of the ethnic and linguistic features of the empirically existing nationalities. Nation as a spiritual category was in principle independent of a 'nation's body'. Słowacki wrote:

> When the body of a nation has aged and the spiritual greatness no longer finds its abode therein, then the spirits commence their great migration in search of better, brighter houses, better endowed to serve them.[22]

In such a way, after the republican liberty had been suppressed in Pskov and Novgorod, the souls of the inhabitants of these cities 'stole away from their enslaved bodies to become Poles'.[23] In a similar way all the nations will become Poles in the future, because 'Polishness' is an inevitable stage of the universal progress leading to the 'new, sunny Jerusalem'.

Another consequence of these views was the emphasis on the crucial role of the great inspired men in the process of nation-building. According to Mickiewicz, 'each nationality is based upon a distinct revelation; each of them was founded by a single man, sprung from one thought and lived solely in order

to realize it'.[24] A people, in the ethnographic sense of this word, is only the raw material from which a nation can be shaped. The nation emerges only when the revealed truth transferred to the people by inspired heroes calls forth a response, infuses it with God's breath and focuses its activity on the realization of a great historical goal.

Using the terminology of Max Weber, it is justifiable to say that hero-worship in its application to political and social problems means the belief in charismatic leadership. This was precisely the position of the two Polish prophetic poets. They rejected not only the juridical rationalism characteristic of the Enlightenment, but also the conservative idealization of the pre-rational, traditional ties, of the organic *Gemeinschaft*, so much extolled by German romantics. The antithesis of 'reason' and 'tradition' was replaced by them with that of 'spirit' and 'routine', in which spirit—this 'eternal revolutionary', as Słowacki put it—was opposed both to rational doctrines and to ossified traditionalism. They felt that spiritual superiority— Charisma—was the only legitimate source of power; the only form of power which was compatible with freedom, which could demand absolute obedience without resorting to external compulsion and thus transform enthusiasm into strength. Charismatic leaders, 'great heroes whom the amazed masses immediately recognize as their legitimate rulers',[25] were described by Mickiewicz as an embodiment of antirationalism and, at the same time, as divinely inspired revolutionaries, breaking the chain of all 'established forms'. Słowacki went even further in his revolutionary zeal: his ideal was the 'holy anarchy'—the unlimited freedom of the most developed, i.e. the strongest and most holy spirits—breaking without scruple all existing laws, traditions and even ordinary moral rules. Both poets believed that the most urgent need of their epoch was a new Messiah—a messenger of God incarnating a 'new revelation'. Mickiewicz saw him as 'a Christ risen, Christ transfigured, armed with all the attributes of power, Christ the Avenger and Redresser'.[26] Since the victory of love must be preceded by a catastrophic period of revolutionary wars, this new Messiah, according to Mickiewicz, should combine 'the Christian spirit' with the spirit of Napoleon— the spirit of a man who was the greater genius of war, who possessed the compelling, magic power of command.

The idea of a personal Messiah was combined with that of a collective, national Messiah. Nations, like individuals, are not equal; they represent different stages of spiritual development; all of them, if they are genuine nations, have missions; but only some of them could play the role of the chosen instrument of universal salvation. The first chosen nation was the nation of Israel; now the Poles are the New Israel, since they have passed through the formidable sufferings which have hardened and elevated their spirit. In his Paris lectures Mickiewicz—in contradistinction to Słowacki—proclaimed also the messianic calling of France—the 'elder daughter of the Church' and, at the same time, the leader of revolutionary forces fighting against the decayed and corrupt Old World. He believed that a new religious climax was imminent, comparable to the revelation of Christ. The

meaning of the revelation of Christ consisted in the salvation of individual souls in Heaven; the meaning of the coming 'new revelation' will consist in collective salvation on earth. It will be, first of all, the salvation of the oppressed nations; Christian morality will extend its rule over the sphere of politics; nations will recognize in each other members of humanity and put an end to political crimes which have achieved their culmination in the partitions of Poland.

Let us return now to the controversies over the ancient Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. It is evident that the two messianic poets could not agree either with Lelewel and the democratic republicans or with the constitutional monarchists. They seemed to agree with the latter, because they shared their feeling that Poland needed, first of all, a strong, personal leadership. They disagreed with them, however, because the idea of charismatic power, of the personal charisma of the leader, was incompatible with the dynastic principle. It was equally incompatible with constitutionalism because the two Messianists saw the divinely constituted personal power as a 'living law' (to borrow the Saint-Simonian expression) and denied explicitly the need for any kind of a codified, written law. Their attitude towards the 'rule of law' sharply distinguished them from democratic republicanism as well. The followers of Lelewel's historical views presented the ancient Polish republic of the gentry as a prototype of modern democratic republicanism; they rejected the idea of a divinely constituted or divinely inspired personal power, emphasizing instead that the ancient Polish Commonwealth had been based upon the principles of representative government and the rule of law, that its very essence was expressed in the maxim: 'Non rex, sed lex regnat'.

In spite of this, Mickiewicz and Słowacki created an extremely idealized image of the 'ancient Polish freedom': an image much more extreme in its romantic idealization of the Polish past than the historical views of Lelewel. They idealized even the notorious *liberum veto*, seeing in it a magnificent expression of the respect for individual freedom. However, they managed to combine this with a nostalgia for a strong personal leadership, not limited by any laws and able to impose discipline upon freedom and to transform it into energy. How was this possible?

According to Mickiewicz, the essence of the ancient Commonwealth was its attempt to base society exclusively upon the inner impulses of good will in its members; upon their 'enthusiasm and exaltation'.[27] He idealized the *liberum veto* in the name of the moral, and not merely the 'mechanical', unity of society. For him the right of veto was perfectly compatible with charismatic leadership because freedom was perfectly compatible with divine inspiration. If the leader was truly charismatic, no one would, as a rule, oppose his decisions; and if anybody dared to use his right of veto, it would mean that his spirit was stronger than the spiritual power of the leader and, consequently, that he himself had the right to rule. In such a way the idea of charismatic authority enabled Mickiewicz to recognize the need for the strongest leadership without making any concessions to rationalist, Enlightenment-inspired criticism of the Polish 'anarchy'. Strong

leadership, he argued, does not consist in dynastic principle, enlightened absolutism or 'majority rule' in the Diet. The ancient Poles, like other Slavic nations (except Russia), lacked great divinely-inspired leaders; *this* was their misfortune, but they were *right* in rejecting the doctrine of the West. They were right in striving for a society based entirely and exclusively upon the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Juliusz Słowacki, who called himself 'a republican from the spirit', carried this messianic idealization of the Polish past still further. From his point of view *liberum veto* was a precious device, by means of which the true spiritual hierarchy was able to defend itself against the false, artificial, material hierarchy. In sharp contrast to Western bourgeois republicanism, in the ancient Poland the inferior spirits, although they constituted, of course, a majority, could not hold sway over the superior ones; but, quite on the contrary, the superior spirits were secured the right of opposing the will of the majority. Thus, in Słowacki's interpretation, the right of veto was a special privilege of the superior spirits to disagree with the mechanical majority, to rise above existing traditions and laws and to destroy them for the sake of spiritual progress. In opposition to Lelewel and other Polish democrats, who saw the ancient Polish republic as a prototype of modern democracy, Słowacki glorified the ancient Poland as a society most favourable for the spiritual elite, least resistant to legitimate rights of spiritual superiority.[28]

No wonder that both the monarchists and the democrats were very confused by the views of the two poets. Especially confusing, sometimes even horrifying, were for them the Paris lectures of Mickiewicz. The monarchists, horrified by Mickiewicz's condemnation of the works of eighteenth-century reformers, accused him of idealizing anarchy; the democrats, on the other hand, suspected him of a sympathy for a despotic power, similar to the power of the Russian tsars.

From the point of view of a comparative study of romantic nationalisms the ideas of Mickiewicz and Słowacki are, I think, of considerable interest. They represent an interesting, extreme case of a nationalism bound up with a prophetic, messianic consciousness. They are, perhaps, the best example of a special type of romanticism which I have called elsewhere 'the romanticism of charisma': romanticism which differed both from the conservative 'romanticism of tradition' and from romantic democratism. Finally, they are interesting because of the extreme spiritualization of the concept of the nation and, consequently, because of their emphatic disregard of the empirical, 'bodily' characteristics of the nation, such as its ethnic and linguistic features. It seems that such a conception could emerge only among the Polish exiles—members of an historical, political nation which had lost its empirical 'body' (i.e. its statehood), but wanted to preserve its soul, its national, and not merely ethnic, identity, its feeling of historical continuity and a common destiny. Messianism combined with a theory of progressive reincarnation was an antidote to national humiliation and a justification of the belief that after a great historic upheaval the soul of the nation would find for itself another, more perfect form of bodily existence. It was not a case of a slow

'awakening' of national consciousness, finding support in philological and ethnographic studies, but a product of the exaltation of patriotic feelings following the national catastrophe of 1831, after which the last remnants of the Polish statehood became liquidated. It was an explosion of an irrational hope born out of despair; a result of multiple deprivation; an expression of an exaggerated feeling of self-importance combined with a sense of enforced rootlessness and alienation, characteristic of the life of the romantic exiles.

1. Cf. my book *Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism. The Case of Poland*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1982, chapt. 'Marx, Engels, and the Polish Question' (pp. 358-91).

2. K. Marx, F. Engels, *The Russian Menace to Europe*, Glencoe, Ill. 1952, pp. 100-1.

3. Cf. P. Brock, *Nationalism and Populism in Partitioned Poland*, London 1973, p. 13.

4. For the genesis of this conception see F. Bronowski, *Idea gminowładztwa w polskiej historiografii* (The idea of Ancient Communalism in Polish Historiography),Łódź 1969.

5. See J. Lelewel, *Wybór pism politycznych* (Selected Political Writings), Warsaw 1954, pp. 218-20, 221-6, 246-50.

6. J. Lelewel, *Polska, rzeczy i dzieje jej* (Poland, Her History and Everything Concerning Her). Vol. XX, Poznań,1864, p. 390.

7. Ibid., p. 218.

8. Ibid., p. 623.

9. A good summary of Hoffman's views is contained in his aritcle 'On the Equality of the Gentry in the Old Poland' (1841). Reprinted in A. Walicki (Selected and introduced by) *Filozofia i myśl społeczna w latach 1831-64 (Philosophy and Social Thought of 1831-64*. Vol. V of the Series '700 Years of Polish Thought'), Warsaw 1977, pp. 977-88.

10. J. Woronicz, *Rzecz o monarchii i dynastii w Polsce*, Paris 1839.

11. See especially the works of J. Szujski and M. Bobrzyński.

12. C.H. Hastings and R.H. Lord, *Some Problems of Peace Conferences*, Cambridge, Mass. 1920, pp. 22-3.

13. See C. Backvis, 'Individu et la Société dans la Pologne de la Renaissance', in *Individu et Société à la Renaissance*, Bruxelles-Paris 1967.

14. Cf. H. Kohn, 'Nationalism', in: *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, ed. D.L. Sills, Vol. XI, 1968.

15. The systematization of Kohn's typology of nationalisms was made by L.L. Snyder in his *The Meaning of Nationalism*, New Brunswick, N.J. 1954, pp. 118-20.

16. J. de Maistre, *Works*, selected, translated and introduced by J. Lively, New York-London 1965, p. 129.

17. See his article 'Old and New Patriotism, in *Demokrata Polski*, v, 1842, pp. 225-43.

18. K. Marx, F. Engels, *The Russian Menace to Europe*, p. 108.

19. Współudział Adama Mickiewicza w sprawie Andrzeja Towiańskiego (The Participation of A. Mickiewicz in the 'Cause' of A. Towiański), Paris 1877, Vol. II, p. 30.

20. A. Mickiewicz, *Dzieła wszystkie* (Collected Works), Vol. 16, Warsaw 1932, p. 341.

21. A. Mickiewicz, *Dzieła* (Works), Warsaw 1955, Vol. 11, p. 186.

22. J. Słowacki, *Dzieła wszystkie* (Collected Works), Wrocław 1953-63, Vol. XII, pp. 287-8.

23. Ibid.

24. A. Mickiewicz, *Dzieła*, Vol. 11, p. 19.

25. Ibid., p. 36.

26. Ibid., p. 494.

27. Ibid., Vol 10, p. 44.

28. Thus, if 'democracy' means the rule of the masses—the 'rule of the inferior', as Edgar Jung put it—Słowacki's republicanism was the opposite of democracy. On the other hand, however, it had nothing in common with the defence of nobility—Słowacki's 'spiritual aristocratism' was a means of criticism of the 'material aristocracy', i.e. aristocracy as a social class. The poet was convinced that a true 'spiritual aristocracy' would emerge from the 'common people'.

The 'Turanian' Hypothesis and Magyar Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century

by Judith Winternitz

The root of the 'Turanian' linguistic hypothesis and of the associated 'Turanian' historical, cultural and political myth is—as in the case of other such myths—a set of undisputed historical facts. Set against the cloudy and turbulent background of the European Dark Ages, it seems clear that the original Magyar tribes arrived in Europe from the east by the beginning of the ninth century AD, and that the language they spoke was and is entirely unrelated to the vast majority network of Indo-European languages. The Magyars were perceived by their new neighbours, who were also often their victims, as marauding strangers akin to the Huns, Avars and other invaders of Asiatic origin of this period. Thus, incidentally, the name 'Hungarians' applied to them.[1] But this equation Magyar = Hun is not quite correct, at least on the linguistic level. Magyar is part of what is known as the Finno-Ugrian linguistic group, comprising, amongst others, the languages of various small Volga region groups (Mordvins, Cheremis) and Baltic groups (Finns, Estonians, Lapps) as well as Samoyed languages. The Huns and Avars spoke Turkic dialects.

It is as well at this point to state quite clearly that, to this day, there is no proof that the Finno-Ugrian language group, including Magyar, is fundamentally related to the Altaic language group, the main representatives of which are the Turkic and Mongol languages. The question of the nature and extent of the relationship between these two groups is even, perhaps, unanswerable, for it is highly probable that many Finno-Ugrian speaking groups lived at some point in close contact with Altaic language speakers, as indeed they possibly did with Indo-European speakers. It is possible that all three of these linguistic groups originally stem from the central Asiatic area, and that all three underwent internal splits into subgroups, with subsequent migrations, meetings and re-migrations. There are, therefore, certainly some general similarities between Ugrian and Altaic linguistic structure, and occasional correspondences in vocabulary. This is so in the Magyar case in particular because this group probably migrated into the north Caucasus area at quite an early period and lived in close proximity to Altaic

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speakers. By the time Magyar-speaking tribes reached Europe they may very well have seemed similar to other central-Asiatic invaders, for they had dropped the peaceful hunting and fishing tribal life of common Finno-Ugrian prehistory and had adopted a warlike, mounted nomadic life-style, similar to some of the Turkic-speaking groups. But this is not to say that the identification made by the Dark Ages chroniclers and many Magyars ever since is true: that there does exist a common Ural-Altaic proto-language and culture, of which the Magyars should be seen as the chief representatives in the European West.[2]

It is, however, precisely here, with this (understandable) early mis-identification, that the origins of the general European 'Turanian' linguistic hypothesis and the specifically Magyar 'Turanian' historico-political myth are to be found. For the warlike, horse-mounted tribes who settled in the Danube Valley, were converted to Christianity and founded a settled state in 1000 A.D., took over the mis-identification Magyar = Hun (Turkic) themselves and made it a fundamental part of their national heritage. When, in the nineteenth century, such historical traditions became the centre of a rather defensive Magyar national cultural and political re-awakening, the old mis-identification, with its implications of warlike superiority and distinctiveness from surrounding groups, was heavily stressed. These traditions found a parallel in an early nineteenth-century hypothesis of Ural-Altaic linguistic relationship, based on historical assumption and much speculation: the 'Turanian' theory. Though linguistics proper in the 1880s would do everything in its power to repudiate and demolish that old assumption of Ural-Altaic unity, the 'Turanian' idea simply refused to die in Hungary. For it had become indispensible in the fight to establish Magyar independence from Habsburg rule and to maintain and justify Magyar dominance over an area in which they were outnumbered by non-Magyars. That is, the 'Turanian' hypothesis was transformed into a politically-loaded Magyar ideology, which survived well into the twentieth century regardless of the shattering of its linguistic foundations.

We should first clarify the original nineteenth-century meaning of 'Turanian' and its general scholarly context. Linguistics was in its infancy in the early years of the century. It was a period of exploration and attempts at classification, but at the same time a period when science enjoyed great prestige and widespread public interest. The expectation of researchers and public alike was that important facts about ancient, if not primaeval, times would be revealed: facts about the origin of peoples and cultures, perhaps about the origin and nature of man himself. There was a fundamental confusion between the establishment of linguistic groupings—'Indo-European', 'Semitic' and so on—and the notion of ethnological groupings. Discussions of linguistic origins and relationships and typologies tended to imply, or sometimes overtly became, discussions of cultural or ethnological origins and typologies. And not just origins: the spoken and unspoken assumption of the popularizers of linguistics was that original linguistic-cultural characteristics somehow continued to function in the present. All this

theorizing, however, took place against the background of a considerable problem of lack of knowledge about many of the world's languages. Generalizations and classifications were often based on very shaky grounds of actual information, or on assumption or tradition. The languages central to the 'Turanian' hypothesis —Magyar, Finnic, Turkic (not to mention their more far-flung assumed relations)—were very little researched in purely linguistic terms.

The hypothesis of Ural-Altaic linguistic (and also cultural) relationship emerged around the middle years of the nineteenth century out of this background of expectation and linguistic problems, and itself exemplified many of them. The work of three men in particular must be mentioned: M.A. Castrén, C.C.J. Bunsen and F. Max Müller.[3] In their hands the Ural- Altaic or 'Turanian'[4] hypothesis was structured as a linguistic-cultural type. Apart from the emphasis on eastern origins, in which 'Turanians' were by no means unique according to contemporary linguistic theory, there were three central features:

(1) 'agglutinative' grammatical type
(as opposed to Indo-European 'inflection')

(2) warlike, nomadic tribal life-style
(as opposed to Indo-European settled, agricultural civilization)

(3) 'shamanistic' religion, concerned with numerous nature spirits
(as opposed to spiritual, supra-natural and eventually monotheistic Indo-European religion).

To sum up the essence of 'Turanian', Bunsen picked the figure of Attila the Hun, '... the hunting monarch, wild and valiant, the man of conquest, not of civilization'.[5]

The most successful, and therefore most important, 'Turanian' group for these linguists was the Magyar and, conversely, their picture of 'Turanian' was closely tailored to fit the old Magyar historical traditions and European traditions about them. However, because the hypothesis was the work of western European (predominantly German) linguists in the main, it was coloured by a basic assumption that the Indo-European ('Aryan') linguistic-cultural type was superior to the 'Turanian' in all ways. 'Turanian' and 'Aryan' were seen as contrasts: 'Turanian' as a half-developed 'Aryan'. From the other side of the fence, however, Magyar thinkers would scarcely see things in this negative light, particularly because the rise of linguistics and its classifications occurred virtually contemporaneously with a vast Magyar linguistic, cultural and political revival at the basis of which were the very assumptions which were 'scientifically' formalized in the 'Turanian' hypothesis.

To understand how 'Turanian' and Magyar nationalism became intertwined, we must consider the historical context of the Magyar revival. In the late eighteenth century the Magyars were a languishing, oppressed, backward and parochial minority, composed of peasants and small nobility, within the vast

absolutist Habsburg state. The glory of the past, independent Hungary, defined as the lands of the Crown of St Stephen, or geographically as the basin of the middle Danube, had been long lost. The last link with the past, Magyar, the language of those who had founded and mostly led the independent Hungary of old, was in decline. Latin and German were the languages of administration, with German in the ascendant. The great German Enlightenment philosopher Johann Gottfried von Herder seemed to prophesy virtually the end of Magyardom in his *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* (1784-91):

> Da sind sie [d.h. die Ungarn] jetzt unter Slawen, Deutschen, Wlachen und andern Völkern der geringere Teil der Landeseinwohner und nach Jahrhunderten wird man vielleicht ihre Sprache kaum finden.[6]

However, Marie Theresa's and Joseph II's centralizing reforms in the 1780s and especially the attempt to impose German as the sole language of administration and education proved to be a catalyst to revival. A concerted movement of conscious cultivation of the Magyar language was set off, involving purification from Slavic and German elements and self-conscious attempts to write of Magyar life and history. The mood was urgent, even desperate, the theme was the historical uniqueness of the Magyars and their achievements contrasted with their contemporary decline:

> To your homeland, Hungarian (Magyar), be unshakeably faithful; it is your cradle and then your grave, it nourishes you and then covers you . . .
> This is the land where so often the blood of your fathers flowed; to this land have a thousand years linked every holy name.
> Here the armies of the hero Árpád fought for a homeland; here the arm of Hunyadi smashed the yoke of slavery. Liberty! here were carried your blood-stained banners, and the best of us fell in the long struggle.
> And amid so many misfortunes, after so much strife, diminished but not broken, a nation dwells in this homeland.
> Homeland of all peoples, wide world! bravely it calls to you: 'The sufferings of a thousand years demand life or death!' . . .[7]

Already in the last decade of the eighteenth century the cultural revival was beginning to crystallize into a specific political movement to reassert supposed ancient Hungarian constitutional rights against Austrian domination. Often the participants in the Magyar political resistance from this time onward were also involved in the linguistic-cultural revival, and the Magyar-centred rhetoric employed was similar.[8] This rhetoric assumed, from history, the Magyar right to lead in the lands of the Crown of St Stephen. It is difficult to say at precisely which moment the Magyar right to lead became an asserted Magyar right to dominate non-Magyar groups in the historically-defined greater Hungarian area. Such a shift is not, after all, a major one, and was probably not at all clear to people at the time, for the Magyar revival was so far in advance of other 'national'

movements in the area that it could well serve as a rallying-point for general anti-Austrian resistance. However, the shift of emphasis was clearly in operation in the 1840s in the work of the leaders of what was to be the revolutionary movement of 1848-9. Perhaps the most obvious sign of it can be found in 1844, when, after much lobbying on the subject, the Magyar Diet managed to secure the replacement of Latin by Magyar as the official language of much of the mixed greater Hungarian area.

Since Magyar language and Magyar history were thus so deeply involved with Magyar survival and aspirations in the first half of the nineteenth century, the traditions and assumptions surrounding language and history had a very special place. Objective discussion of either was bound to be very difficult. Besides, the backwardness of the education system and the lack of institutions and professional studies—a general reflection of the poor state of Hungarian independent economic and political life over centuries—must be remembered. Equally it must be noted that the development of an academic infrastructure and an educated audience interested in such questions took place as a result of the revival period itself—for example, the establishment of the Magyar Academy of Sciences in 1827—and therefore these institutions and their audience would tend to share the assumptions of the revival in general. In terms of linguistics, therefore, a crude Turkic relationship theory (or, at best, the suspicion of a Ural-Altaic relationship with an emphasis on the Turkic element) held sway, as it were, automatically.[9]

All the more interesting it is, therefore, that Hungary produced at least two important linguists who doubted this Turkic relationship and went a considerable way toward disproving it: János Sajonvics and Sámuel Gyarmathi. Gyarmathi (1751-1830), who had, typically, been trained in Germany, is often considered today in an international context as one of the earliest practitioners of general comparative linguistics, as well as being one of the founders of Finno-Ugrian studies. His famous work *Affinitas linguae hungaricae cum linguis fennicae originis* (1799) asserted the Finno-Ugrian relationships of Magyar and denied the Turkic relationship. Although well received outside Hungary, Gyarmathi's work met with a cold if not hostile reception within the country, striking as it did at the heart of newly revived, proud historical traditions. The comment of a contemporary Hungarian journalist sums up the feeling with which Hungarian readers ignored Sajnovics' and Gyarmathi's conclusions:

Up to 1798 we knew only two sorts of potatoes: viz., the big white horse-potato and the long red potato. In that year Sámuel Gyarmathi, M.D., brought us from Göttingen two new sorts, hitherto unknown in our country ... Dr Gyarmathi rendered better service to his Nation and Country by having introduced these potatoes than by writing a Latin book of 387 pages in order to demonstrate ... the kinship of the Hungarian language with the language of the Finns.[10]

If such objective scholarship was uncomfortable in 1799, it would be even more so as Magyar nationalism moved toward the period of climax and crisis in the 1840s. The unfinished work of another Hungarian linguist, Anton Reguly(1819-1858) touched the same nerve as had that of Gyarmathi, although more gingerly. Reguly was not prepared to decide conclusively for the Finno-Ugrian relationships of Magyar (to which however he certainly inclined), and was conscious of the social forces and expectations pushing him in the Ural-Altaic direction, which he definitely did not want. In 1842, he identified the force dominating Magyar scholarship in linguistics and elsewhere:

> Wie lange suchen wir schon unseren Ursprung! und wie weit sind wir gelangt! Die einzige Ursache ist unser nationaler Stolz...[11]

Reguly referred to the inclination of Magyar nationalism to find Magyar origins and relations almost anywhere and through the use of the most questionable methods, so long as the old Magyar traditions (and thereby their contemporary political implications) were maintained. Thus, for example, the clear public preference for the romantic adventures of the traveller Csoma de Kőrös (1784-1842), with his theories about the high Tibetan origins of the Magyars.[12]

Clearly the Magyar political and cultural revival of the first half of the nineteenth century prepared the ground in Hungary for an all-too-easy acceptance of something like the 'Turanian' theory even before it had been 'scientifically' worked out by linguists in Western Europe. Already well established was the precedent of conveniently ignoring or downplaying solid linguistic work which seemed at variance with the traditions of the past and thus with the aspirations for the future. But although the 'Turanian' classification would be acceptable, the Western European colouring imposed on it, that of relative inferiority, would not. On the contrary, the Ural-Altaic heritage placed the Magyars apart, gave them the right of conquest and leadership. However there was still some considerable distance between the Magyar historical traditions of the 1840s and the 'Turanism' of the 1890s, the first, still to some extent plausible in its context, the second, an exploded linguistic hypothesis reasserted as a political solution to the problems of greater Hungary.

The 'Turanian' hypothesis in its mid-century Western European form filtered into Hungary with the development of an academic infrastructure and the expansion of higher education gradually from the 1850s onward. It was in this context that linguistics proper began to be pursued, though for some time it was still the province of gifted, interested amateurs. Typically, concerted efforts to establish the relationships of the Magyar language were the result of the work of a great liberal politician of 1848, a man who was also a teacher, lawyer and an intellectual with wide interests: Pál Hunfalvy (1810-1891). After being granted political amnesty in 1851 for his part in the 1848 revolution, Hunfalvy became the Librarian of the Magyar Academy of Sciences. His interest in linguistics stemmed partly from his educational background, but more specifically from the

patriotic reaction of this man of '48 against the defeat of the Magyar revolution and the military repression of his country and people. For him, as he stated to the Academy in 1851, the country's intellectuals had a national mission to investigate fully and scientifically the nation's history and language and their inter-relationship with other groups. Hunfalvy acted on this in a most striking and energetic way, taking charge of publishing and editing a good deal of the vast research materials on northern languages left behind by Anton Reguly, founding and writing a good part of the first Hungarian journal devoted to linguistics (*Magyar Nyelvészet*, 1856 ff.) and editing the linguistics section of the Proceedings of the Academy. True to the national traditions, Hunfalvy was initially convinced of the Altaic (Turkic) relationships of Magyar, though he would later change his view to define Magyar as having both Finno-Ugrian and Altaic elements but as forming an intermediary language between these two groups. After 1867 Hunfalvy became a member of the Upper House of the Hungarian Parliament and presided over it for the rest of his life as a much-respected elder statesman and patron of intellectual pursuits.[13]

Though his work was obviously patriotically motivated, Hunfalvy's con-clusions fitted into the general scholarly context of the 1850s and 1860s. In Western Europe well into the 1870s the 'Turanian' hypothesis of Ural-Altaic relationship remained quite academically viable—to the extent, for example, of having whole sections of European Oriental Congresses devoted to it. 'Turanian' even underwent expansion (and contraction) in extent as well as revised evalua-tions. In the standard starting-point, the Bunsen-Müller definition, 'Turanian' was based on the rather simply applied characteristic of grammatic 'agglutination'—an idea which was so vague that it could be 'found' in languages well beyond the Ural-Altaic core. Müller and Bunsen themselves classed large numbers of little-known languages world-wide into the 'Turanian' group because of their seem-ingly 'agglutinative' structure and certain of these—Japanese and the Dravidian languages of southern India—remained firmly accepted on this basis well into the twentieth century. At the same time, anthropological theory was slowly develop-ing a less dismissive view of the cultural level of 'nomads' and finding out that the Indo-Europeans themselves had had such a life-style, probably accompanied by 'shamanistic' elements in their religion. In the early 1870s too came the discovery of the important ancient Sumerian culture. Sumerian characteristics initially seemed to conform so well with the standard 'Turanian' definition that the culture was labelled until the end of the century as 'Turanian'. All this discussion, and especially the discovery of the Sumerian 'affiliation', added weight to the idea that 'Turanians' had contributed in a positive way to the growth of civilization generally and were or had been a force to be reckoned with.[14]

However it must be remembered that the ideal of scholarly objectivity had not yet penetrated into the study of Magyar language and history in Hungary, and, considering Hunfalvy's political commitment, it was unlikely to appear in his own work. Indeed, as regards the general historical context in which linguistic

studies took place in Hungary, the nationalistic pressures on them seem rather to have mounted in the second half of the century than subsided. The 1867 Compromise seemed to represent the fulfilment of the goals of 1848, yet the problem of Magyar versus non-Magyar had still not been solved. In fact it grew worse. 1848 disillusioned any naive hopes that the other 'nationalities' might voluntarily go along with Magyar leadership and cultural assimilation. In the period between 1850 and 1867 occasional overtures were made by the powerless ex-1848 Magyar leaders towards representatives of some of the 'nationalities' over the question of co-operation toward a possible modus vivendi in a future independent greater Hungary. The Compromise, however, precluded the need for continuing such dialogue. Certainly the goodwill of the 1868 Hungarian Nationality Law was genuine and its provisions 'liberal' enough to be seen as leaning toward cultural egalitarianism for all the groups living in the Hungarian half of the Monarchy. However the terms of the political Compromise itself and the continuing provision for Magyar linguistic and political leadership under the 1868 Law, plus the massive resistance of a new generation of nobles who had not learned the lessons of 1848 and would soon take over the leadership of the state, indicated the likely fate of such egalitarian tendencies. It did not need any particularly violent anti-Magyar activity on the part of other 'nationalities' for the hard line of Magyar political and cultural dominance to break through. From the 1870s the Nationality Law was declared unenforceable and was replaced by a public policy of aggressive cultural assimilation, and above all, linguistic assimilation to Magyar.[15]

Thus the results of investigation in the Magyar language were still decidedly more than simply a scientific question. Now, Magyar language and history were increasingly the justification of a precarious status quo and the assimilationist means of maintaining it. Thus we find Hunfalvy's attention widening in the 1870s toward historical and ethnographic studies with a linguistic component. In 1889 he founded the Magyar Ethnographic Society and already in 1875 had written a model work in this area: *Magyarország Ethnographiája*. Here he presented the typical message of the assimilationist era, in generally 'liberal', rather gentle form (less desperately assertive than others who would follow). Magyar was composed of mixed Finno-Ugrian and Altaic (Turkic) elements and was of crucial importance in creating a unified Hungarian state:

> A nation is created through language, religion and social organization. Of these three the most important is language . . .

For a thousand years Hungary had been called 'Magyarország', 'Land of the Magyars', and had spoken the Magyar language. This proved Magyar fitness to rule, justified their historical role of leadership in the past and naturally in the present.[16] The Ethnographic Society duly took up its founder's line.

On the basis of the atmosphere of interest and academic opportunity promoted by Hunfalvy the 'Turanian' idea was actively put forward in the work of the

internationally-known traveller and Turkologist Arminius Vámbéry (1832-1913). A man of poor Jewish origins, Vámbéry rose through his own talent for languages and the patronage of another famous 1848 liberal political and intellectual, Joseph Eötvös—both an important realist novelist and one of the authors of the Nationality Law of 1868. Thanks to this patronage Vámbéry became Professor of Oriental Languages at the University of Budapest from 1865. Vámbéry's early writings were devoted to recounting his years of daring wandering-in-disguise amongst Turkish tribes, in the tradition of Csoma de Körös. In them he built up a highly positive picture of Altaic nomad life and customs and by the 1870s began to make explicit a theory of the more Turkic than Finno-Ugrian origins of the Magyars, demonstrated on the face of it by linguistic evidence, but in fact peppered with physiological, anthropological and psychological references.[17] This specialist Turkologist and linguist was in practice as much interested in the Magyar past and present as Hunfalvy, and with similar assimilationist overtones:

> The (Magyar) invaders appeared with their small, sturdy, and hardy horses, quick as lightning and strong as iron. Their mode of warfare was strictly Asiatic, similar to that used to this day by the Turcomans, and they were animated precisely by the same spirit which led the Mongolians, under Jenghis Khan, over the whole of Asia and a large portion of Europe. With all this, they could not be called barbarians or savages, when their social and political institutions were compared with those of the inhabitants they subjugated in Hungary ... According to the fashion of the Scythian populations, they disturbed no one in his faith, nor did they interfere with any one's mode of worship. Nomads as they were, they knew how to appreciate what was still left of the ancient culture in their new country ...[18]

Again, this type of mixed historical, psychological and physiological use of essentially a linguistic relationship was not unique in the general European context. In 1870 Max Müller himself described 'Turanian' in terms of '... yellow skin and ... high cheek-bones ... black Chinese eyes ...'[19]: this from a man who insisted that linguistic classification had nothing to do with physiology. If, within the Magyar context the 'Turanian' hypothesis was used in a positive way, outside that context it was used negatively. Thus the Polish patriot-in-exile, Duchinski, in his work *Peuples Aryas et Tourans*, claimed that the Russian rulers of much of Poland were not Slavic Indo-Europeans but barbaric 'Turanians'. They were now displaying their characteristic despotic and uncivilized attitude in the Polish area and were ready to take over more and more of Europe masquerading as civilized Indo-Europeans. Thus the eminent French anthropologist Quatrefages wrote an impassioned article, 'La Race Prussienne', later reworked as a book, *The Prussian Race*, in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War. Here he announced to the world that the Prussian bombardment of that highpoint of Indo-European civilization, the Paris Natural History Museum, was the work not of Indo-

European Germans but of a mixed, mostly 'Turanian' (Finn) Prussian race. The bombardment was a typical expression of 'Turanian' barbarism, and Quatrefages warned the Indo-European southern Germans, who had so recently joined the Prussian-German state, that their new, brutish and dwarf-like rulers would wreak similar havoc on them.[20]

What was, however, unique in the Magyar use of 'Turanian' was that the linguistic basis of the concept collapsed entirely in the 1880s—yet the hypothesis continued to be upheld and used. It is even more ironic that the linguistic foundations of 'Turanian' were demolished openly within Hungary itself, that the attack on the hypothesis was very public and very decisive, and that it came from a dedicated Hungarian-based professional linguist who was the protégé of Hunfalvy himself.

The work of Jozséf Budenz (1836-1892) should have dealt a mortal blow to the 'Turanian' hypothesis. Born and trained in the most advanced techniques of Indo-European linguistics in the German homeland of that science, Budenz had, quite accidentally, become fascinated by the distinctiveness of the Magyar language from Indo-European patterns. Holidaying in Hungary in 1858 just after he had obtained his doctorate, he was invited by Hunfalvy to remain and ended up as his assistant for some years. Budenz threw himself into the task set out by his patron, that of elucidating the linguistic relationships of the Magyar language. Naturally, he adopted Hunfalvy's asssmptions about the Turkic/general Ural-Altaic relationships of Magyar, learning some of the Turkic dialects himself in order to demonstrate this view fully. He it was who came to the conclusion which Hunfalvy eventually took up as his own, that Magyar was probably an intermediary language between the Finno-Ugrian and Altaic groups. But since he was perhaps the only modern professionally-trained linguistic specialist in the country, Budenz was also aware of the vast distance that stood between suggesting such relationships and demonstrating them in the detailed and technical way that Indo-European linguistics was able to do with its own linguistic group. The turning point in his work came in 1868-9, after he had been helping Hunfalvy to edit some of Anton Reguly's materials on far northern Eurasian languages (essentially Finno-Ugrian). Investigating these, he decided that the Finno-Ugrian relationships of Magyar were far more important and more extensive than the Turkic elements. Exactly at this period, too, (significantly, just after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise had been reached) Budenz began lecturing on the Magyar language at the University of Budapest in an honorary capacity. In 1872 this was formalized into a Professorship in Ural-Altaic languages, from which position Budenz trained the first generation of Hungarian linguists. Immediately afterward the fruits of his investigations began to appear in the form of a *Magyar-Ugrian Comparative Etymological Dictionary (Magyar-Ugor Összehasonlító Szótár*, 1873-1881). Because of this work Budenz is without question a central figure in Finno-Ugrian linguistics; it was acclaimed outside Hungary and continued and expanded by his students within Hungary.[21] But—predictably—it also aroused a good deal of resistance, the spokesman of which was Vámbéry.

The decade of the 1880s saw an open 'Turkic-Ugrian War' carried on between Budenz and Vámbéry, taking up most of the energies of both. Vámbéry began as early as 1869, acknowledging the primacy of the Finno-Ugrian elements in the Magyar language but insisting on an important, even if secondary, Turkic connection. Increasingly as it appeared, Budenz's *Dictionary* denied anything but minor Turkish elements in Magyar to be explained historically, but not by any theory of fundamental relationship. The 'War' was on in earnest with Vámbéry's *A Magyarok Eredete* (1882) (*The Origins of the Magyars*), to which Budenz produced a 'Reply', Vámbéry countered with a 'Response' and Budenz came back with a 'Reply to the Response', Vámbéry meanwhile also adding a discussion of *A Török Faj* (1885) (*The Turkish Race*). All this took place not only in print but with increasing emotion, publicly, in the Academy's linguistic proceedings.[22] It did not help the level of debate that Budenz was—from the height of his professionalism and command of linguistic technique—perhaps understandably withering in his criticisms of his opponent. Indeed he had a point, since Vámbéry's rather loose discussions fluctuated at random between general linguistic statements, observations of historical parallels, and supposed anthropological and psychological similarities between Magyars and Turks. Budenz's position combined an attack on the inadequacy of Váambéry's purely linguistic manipulations (Budenz had studied Turkic dialects himself in the 1850's) with the commonsense argument that if Vámbéry wished to advance ethnological proof of Magyar-Turkic relationship he, Budenz, would accept it—but that this too was not yet demonstrated and besides had nothing to do with the linguistic nature of Magyar. The linguistic relationship was, at least, solidly demonstrable and might be worth something as an indication of Magyar origins in the absence of decisive evidence to the contrary.[23]

Against this Vámbéry continued to his death to insist on the Turkic relationships of Magyar, invoking linguistics where and how he wished, and dismissing it where it did not suit. For example in his last work, *A Magyarság Bölcsőjénél (The Birth of Magyardom*, appeared posthumously in 1914), Vámbéry seemed to agree that linguistic evidence was fundamental, that it was in fact the only currently available guide to Magyar prehistory, and that the Magyar language manifested indubitably ancient and basic Finno-Ugrian elements. But then he stated that these were far outweighed by Turkish linguistic features. He then proceeded to (linguistically) reconstruct a prehistoric scenario whereby a small and 'backward' Finno-Ugrian group was swallowed into a powerful and progressive Turkish tribe—which tribe were the Magyars. Incidentally this took place already in the geographic area of Pannonia (the Danube basin) where the Magyar tribe had already set up residence by the fourth century A.D., well ahead of any Slavic groups, and thus the land of greater Hungary well and truly belonged to the Magyars. Thus the Magyars were basically Turks who had assimilated from an early age various other groups. They could scarcely have been anything else, for their historical characteristics were classically Turkic. After all, 'The Ugrian

national groups ... have nowhere manifested themselves as conquerors and state builders ...'[24] Were not these Magyar qualities par excellence?

The Academy itself certainly inclined to Budenz's views, but he and his students had to carry on the fight for some time. For though they had decisively won the linguistic battle, they had not won the war. Hunfalvy's Ethnographic Society which spent much time on the question of Magyar origins took up an initially uncertain position poised between Finno-Ugrian and Altaic relationships, but after Hunfalvy's and Budenz's deaths (1891, 1892) the Society was dominated by Vámbéry's Turcological students and supporters like Géza Nagy and Gyula Németh.

Why did the 'Turanian' hypothesis persist against the linguists' attack? Firstly, it was hard to pin down, operating as it did on several levels at once, levels about which still no conclusive evidence seemed to have been found as a whole. Secondly, more importantly, the 'Turanian' hypothesis had become indispensable politically from the 1890s onward. Magyar intractability encouraged the deepening of non-Magyar resistance, which in turn created an even more heavy-handed attitude on the Magyar side amounting to a siege mentality. The Magyar state seemed faced with internal and external enemies, surrounded and undermined from within by hostile Germans and Slavs:

> It's terrible, living here in the middle of the continent, working, struggling for our livelihood, sometimes singing and revelling, and no nation in the whole wide world understands our language—not our language, or our feelings, or our life ... We are alone, without friends, without relations, unable to count on anyone; there are only enemies ...
> 'See here, we think this part of Asia must have been the ancestral home of the Hungarian people', he said, pointing with his finger to the southwestern part of Siberia and its frontiers: the Ural mountains of Altai to the east.
> 'Many tribes lived here: the Finns, the Ugors, the Ostyaks, the Hungarians, the Huns and Avars ...' ...
> They looked at the map without speaking. In his own loneliness Mishi felt the tragedy of the loneliness of his nation. Hungary was painted on the map in red, while around it were patches coloured green, yellow and violet—as many enemies as colours, appearing to form a mouth that was ready to swallow the morsel of red ...[25]

The solution to this tension offered by the 'Turanian' theory was gratifying. 'Turanian' directed foreign policy to look to 'relations' in the east, while confirming the Magyar right to dominate and assimilate in the west. With it the Magyars could free themselves from 'long centuries of Western (including Habsburg) subservience', could assure their national integrity and 'imperial future' and could 'resume their historic mission as the westernmost bastion of the ... Eastern world'.[26] 'Turanian' had the advantage of being familiar and of agreeing with Magyar historical traditions and their implications, not questioning them.

Responding to this need a separate Turanian Society was set up under the umbrella of the Ethnographic Society in 1910. The founding statement of the Turanian Society proclaimed:

The purpose of the Society is to study, propagate and develop the national cultures and economies of the (Ural-Altaic) peoples of Europe and Asia which are related to the Magyar people. The task is to be pursued in conformity with the Magyar national interest . . .[27]

The first President of the Turanian Society, Pál Teleki, was to become a most important political figure in interwar Hungary, serving as Prime Minister, drawing up the maps which put the case for Hungary during the Peace discussions in 1918-19 (in vain), and serving as the 'theoretician of Hungarian revisionism'. In his *The Evolution of Hungary and its Place in European History*, a course of lectures given in the United States in 1921, Teleki gave out in sophisticated form essentially the 'Turanian' theory of the foundation of the greater Hungarian state and the justification of its present claims to complete revision of the Treaty of Trianon.[28] With old aristocratic conservatives like Teleki and with Magyar Fascism between the wars the 'Turanian' theory continued in the service of Magyar nationalism.

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1. See C.A. Macartney, *Hungary, A Short History*, Edinburgh, 1962, p. 6 for the derivation of the word 'Hungarian'. It is a Slavicised form of the Turkish term 'On Ogor' meaning 'Ten Arrows', a descriptive term by which their new European neighbours knew them. For a detailed discussion of the earliest sources about the Magyars see also C.A. Macartney, *The Magyars in the Ninth Century*, Cambridge, 1930, which points out the misapprehensions and confusions of European and Byzantine scholars about them.

2. See Macartney, *Hungary*, Chapter I and Macartney, *The Magyars . . .*, passim, especially p. 121 ff and p. 156 ff. for the acceptance of the Magyars as a 'race of Turks' by their neighbours and the adoption of this idea in Magyar traditions themselves. For a recent discussion of the Finno-Ugrian linguistic group, its origins and relationships see Peter Hajdu, *Finno-Ugrian Languages and Peoples*, London, 1975. On Altaic Languages see Johannes Benzing, *Einführung in das Studium der altäischen Philologie und der Türkologie*, Wiesbaden, 1953 and Björn Collinder, *An Introduction to the Uralic Languages*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1965.

3. On the background of early linguistics and the 'Turanian' theory in Western Europe see J. Winternitz, 'The Development of the Linguistic Theory of Universal History with especial reference to C.C.J. Bunsen, 1830-1880's, PhD Dissertation, University of Sydney, 1979. On early Finno-Ugrian linguistic investigations specifically see Miklós Zsirai, *Finnugor Rokonságunk*, Budapest, 1937, p. 472 ff.

4. 'Turanian' was one of the current possible alternative terms to describe the Ural-Altaic relationship. Castrén himself did not use it, preferring 'Altaic' for this relationship as a whole. I use 'Turanian' because its linguistic meaning was clearly set by Bunsen and Müller, because it was in very common use throughout the nineteenth century, amid many other, fluctuating and confusing terms, and because the term crops up again in Hungarian history used in both linguistic and cultural-political senses in the twentieth century. The term 'Turanian' was the invention of Müller going on the work of other,

earlier Indo-European specialists and coming from terms used in ancient Indo-European texts. It originates from the geographic area 'Turan' and the 'Tuirya' people who were said to occupy it in the Old Persian *Avesta* text. 'Turan' was north-east of 'Iran', the land of the 'Aryas', that is to say, it was basically what Turkey is today (see *A Comparative Etymological Dictionary of the English Language*, Amsterdam, London and New York, 1967, vol. II, p. 1664). The distinction between the 'Tuirya' and the 'Arya' was always emphasized in the ancient texts: an opposition taken up by Müller also. In Müller's usage, 'Turanian clearly referred to Turkish linguistic characteristics, especially 'agglutination', and any other languages which could be said to manifest something similar to them.

5. C.C.J. Bunsen, *Outlines of the Philosophy of Universal History*, vol. II, (= *Christianity and Mankind*, vol. IV), London, 1854, p. 403.

6. Quoted in János Rathmann, *Zur Geschichtsphilosophie Johann Gottfried Herders*, Budapest, 1978, pp. 107-8; see also the whole section on 'Herder und Ungarn', pp. 105-25.

7. Translation of Vörösmarty's poem *Szózat* (1836) taken from D. Mervyn Jones, *Five Hungarian Writers*, Oxford, 1966, pp. 142-3. On the close connection of the literary revival and Magyar nationalism and the mood of both see further, T. Klaniczay, J. Szauder and M. Szabolcsi, *History of Hungarian Literature*, London, 1964; G.F. Cushing, 'The Birth of National Literature in Hungary', *Slavonic Review*, 38, 1960, pp. 459-75; Henri Marczali, 'Hongrie' in *Histoire et Historiens depuis cinquante ans*, Paris, vol.I, 1922, pp. 209-18; Ludwig Spohr, *Die geistigen Grundlagen des Nationalismus in Ungarn*, Berlin and Leipzig, 1936; Julius von Farkas, *Die ungarische Romantik*, Berlin and Leipzig, 1931.

8. On the Magyar revival in general see Macartney, *Hungary*; C.A. Macartney, *The Habsburg Empire, 1790-1918*, London, 1971; George Barany, 'The Awakening of Magyar Nationalism before 1848', *Austrian History Yearbook*, II, 1966, pp. 19-54 and his *Stephen Széchenyi and the Awakening of Hungarian Nationalism,1791-1841*, Princeton, 1968; F.S. Wagner, 'Széchenyi and the Nationality Problem in the Habsburg Empire', *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XX, 1960, pp. 289-311; Harold Steinacker, 'Das Wesen des madjarischen Nationalismus' in his *Austro-Hungarica, Ausgewählte Aufsätze und Vorträge*, München, 1963, pp. 267-97; George Barany, 'Hungary: From Aristocratic to Proletarian Nationalism' in Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer (eds), *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, Seattle and London, 1969; Erzsébet Andics (intro. and ed.), *A Magyar nacionalizmus kialakulása és története*, Budapest, 1964.

9. See Zsirai, op.cit., pp. 505-6 for some of the current fantasies about the nature of the Magyar language.

10. Quoted from Miklós Zsirai, 'Sámuel Gyarmathi, Hungarian Pioneer of Comparative Linguistics', the introduction to Gyarmathi's *Affinitas linguae Hungaricae cum linguis fennicae originis*, photolithographic reproduction of the original edition of Göttingen, 1799, Bloomington, 1968, pp. xvi-xvii. On Gyarmathi and Sajnovics see also Zsirai, *Finnugor Rokonságunk*, pp. 492-504; Istvan Szathmári, 'An Outline of the History of Hungarian Linguistics' in Lorand Benkő and Samu Imre (eds), *The Hungarian Language*, The Hague, Paris, 1972, p. 349 ff.; János Gulya, 'Some Eighteenth Century Antecedents of Nineteenth Century Linguistics: The Discovery of Finno-Ugrian' in Dell Hymes (ed. and intro.), *Studies in the History of Linguistics: Traditions and Paradigms*, Bloomington and London, 1974, pp. 258-76; Julius von Farkas, 'Sámuel Gyarmathi und die finnisch-ugrische Sprachvergleichung', *Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen*, Philologische-historische Klasse, 1948, pp. 109-36; see also A.J. Joki, *Uralier und Indogermanen* , Helsinki, 1973.

11. Quoted from Josef Papay, 'Anton Reguly's Gedächtnis' in T. Sebeok (ed.), *Portraits of Linguists*, Bloomington and London, 1966, vol. I, p. 279; on Reguly see also Zsirai, *Finnugor Rokonságunk*, pp. 515-21.

12. On Csoma de Kőrös see Joseph Somogyi, 'Les Grands Orientalistes Hongrois', *Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie*, 1933, vol. XLIX part 2, pp. 810-15.

13. On Hunfalvy see Zsirai, *Finnugor Rokonságunk*, pp. 521-6 and Auguste de Gérando, 'Obituary' in *Revue Historique*, vol. 49, 1892, pp. 232-35 and Szathmári, op.cit., pp. 354-5.

14. On the extensions of the 'Turanian' theory see Winternitz, op.cit., Chapters IV, V.

15. On this period in Magyar history see Macartney, *Hungary* and *The Habsburg Empire*; Steinacker, op.cit.; Barany, 'Hungary: From Aristocratic to Proletarian Nationalism'; Andics, op.cit.; also George Barany, 'Hungary: The Uncompromising Compromise', *Austrian History Yearbook*, III, part I, 1967, pp. 234-59; Z. Horváth, 'The Rise of Nationalism and the Nationality Problem in Hungary in the Last Decades of Dualism', *Acta Historica*, IX, nos 1-2, 1963, pp. 1-37; especially on the Nationality Law and its framing see Paul Bödy, 'Joseph Eötvös and the modernization of Hungary, 1840-1870', *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, n.s. vol. 62, part 2, 1972 and Johann Weber, *Eötvös und die ungarische Nationalitätenfrage*, München, 1966 and Eötvös' own *A Nemzetiségi Kérdés*, Pest, 1865.

16. Pál Hunfalvy, *Magyarország Ethnographiája*, Budapest, 1876 (*The Ethnography of Hungary*), p. 48, my translation. The original is: 'a nemzet lesz nyelve, hite és társadalmi szerkezete által. E három közt a nyelv az első ...'. See also a similar message given in his treatment of the history of Rumanians living in the greater Hungarian area, *Az Oláhok Története*, 2 vols, Budapest, 1894 (*The History of the Wallachians*).

17. On Vámbéry see the biographical sketch in the *Magyar Életrajzi Lexikon* (ed. A. Kenyeres), Budapest, 1967-9, vol. II, pp. 948-9 and Vámbéry's own autobiography, *Küzdelmeim*, Budapest, 1905, printed in several English editions as *The Story of My Struggles*, London, n.d. Vámbéry was a prolific writer and several of his works were published in English and German as well as Hungarian. See, for an early example, his *Travels in Central Asia*, London, 1864.

18. Arminius Vámbéry, *Hungary, in ancient, mediaeval and modern times*, 3rd edition, London, 1889, pp. 37-8.

19. F. Max Müller, *Lectures on the Science of Religion*, New York, 1870, p. 83.

20. See F.H. Duchinski, *Peuples Aryas et Tourans, Agriculteurs et Nomades*, Paris, 1864; J.L.A. de Quatrefages de Bréau, 'Histoire naturelle de l'homme—La Race Prussienne', *Revue des deux mondes*, vol. XCI, February 1871, pp. 647-69 and his *The Prussian Race, ethnologically considered*, (trans. I. Innes), London, 1872.

21. On Budenz see Zsirai, *Finnugor Rokonságunk*, pp. 527-39 and on his students, p. 547 ff.; also Szathmári, op.cit., p. 355 ff. and see Budenz's work, *Magyar-Ugor Összehasonlító Szótár*, reprinted from the Budapest, 1873-1881 edition as *A Comparative Dictionary of the Finno-Ugrian Elements in the Hungarian Vocabulary*, Bloomington, 1966. An example of the work of Budenz's students can be found in Josef Szinnyei, *Die Herkunft der Ungarn, ihre Sprache und Urkultur*, Berlin and Leipzig, 1920.

22. See Zsirai, *Finnugor Rokonságunk*, pp. 537-8 and Vámbéry's *A Magyarok Eredete: ethnologiai tanulmány*, Budapest, 1882 (*The origins of the Magyars: an ethnological discussion*) and his *A Török Faj*, Budapest, 1885 (*The Turkish Race*); see also Budenz's discussion of the whole 'War' in his *Egy kis viszhang Vámbéry Ármin Úr Válaszára*, Budapest, 1886.

23. See ibid., passim and especially pp. 15-16, from which I have paraphrased Budenz's attitude toward the question of the comparative importance of linguistic and ethnological information on the origins of the Magyars.

24. Ármin Vámbéry, *A Magyarság Bölcsőjénél*, Budapest, 1914 (*The Birth of Magyardom*), p. 45, my own translation. The original is 'Az ugor népcsoportok ... mint hódítók és államalkotók sehol sem tüntették ki magukat.' Similar sets of thoughts, with similar use of arguments and very similar political motivations are still to be found in expatriate Magyars' discussions of Magyar origins (on a rather non-specialist basis of information) to this day. See for example, Anthony Endrey, *Sons of Nimrod: The Origin of the Hungarians*, Melbourne, 1975 (coupled with the political views explained in his works *The Future of Hungary*, Melbourne, 1972 and *The Kingdom to Come*, Melbourne, 1976) or Dr D. Osetzky, *A Magyarság Török Ősei*, Sydney, 1977 (*The Turkic Ancestors of the Magyars*).

25. Zsigmond Móricz, *Be Faithful unto Death*, Budapest, 1962; see a whole long passage in this vein, pp. 159-67. Though this novel was first published in 1920, it was set in the late nineteenth century and

while Móricz himself was a liberal, critical of certain aspects of Magyar life, he nevertheless shared some of its myths. Quoted from pp. 159, 161, 165. For a concrete example of Magyar intractability on the national question in the early twentieth century see Keith Hitchins, 'The Nationality Problem in Hungary: István Tisza and the Rumanian National Party, 1910-1914', *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 53, no.4, December, 1981, pp. 619-51.

26. Joseph A. Kessler, 'Turanism and Pan-Turanism in Hungary, 1890-1945', PhD Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1967, pp. xii-xiii. See too the attempt to use a more specifically Turkic-oriented 'Turanian' theory for political purposes in Turkey itself, described in Bernard Lewis, 'History Writing and National Revival in Turkey', *Middle Eastern Affairs*, June-July 1953, pp. 218-227 and Gotthard Jäschke, 'Der Turanismus der Jungtürken . . .', *Die Welt des Islams*, vol. 23, 1941, pp. 1-54.

27. Quoted and translated in Kessler, op.cit., p. 359.

28. Count Pál Teleki, *The Evolution of Hungary and its Place in European History*, Academic International Press, 1975, see Chapters II, VI, VIII. This revisionism, on the basis of historical rights of the Magyars to lead in the Danube basin, became the still centre of Magyar foreign policy between the wars, as well as an overwhelmingly accepted political and cultural attitude within Magyar society. See Gyula Juhász, *Hungarian Foreign Policy 1919-1945*, Budapest, 1979 and Thomas L. Sakmyster, *Hungary, the Great Powers, and the Danubian Crisis 1936-1939*, Athens, Georgia, 1980 as well as discussions of Magyar nationalism and Fascism in the twentieth century like that of Barany, 'Hungary: From Aristocratic to Proletarian Nationalism' and István Deák's article on 'Hungary' in Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber (eds), *The European Right*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1974 and the section on 'Hungary' by G. Ránki and G. Barany in Peter F. Sugar (ed.), *Native Fascism in the Successor States 1918-45*, Santa Barbara, California, 1971. The argument about origins, rights and revisionism still goes on in strange forms amongst expatriates: see S. Székely, 'The Three Tablets of Tartaria', *Magyar Mult/Hungarian Past*, 1981.

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