POLAND IN THE EIGHTIES
Social Revolution Against 'Real Socialism'

Edited by
Robert F. Miller

Occasional Paper No. 18
Department of Political Science
Research School of Social Science
Australian National University
Canberra 1984
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PREFACE

Editing volumes of conference papers is reputedly an onerous task, rarely undertaken more than once or twice in a scholar's lifetime. My experience with this one, my second venture in the genre, was actually quite pleasant, thanks to the kind assistance of a number of people. The initiative for the original conference on 'Poland Since Martial Law: The Search for Normalisation', from which this book derives its title, belongs to Dr Seweryn Ozdowski. His organising committee, of which I was a member, was greatly assisted by the Centre for Continuing Education of The Australian National University, and particularly by Louise Mirlin, in the skilful orchestration of the conference proceedings.

Regarding the book itself, I should like to thank Professor Don Aitkin of the Department of Political Science, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, for agreeing to have the work published in the Department's Occasional Papers series, despite its unusual format and length. Our primary consideration was speed of publication, something that few commercial publishers are able to accomplish. For maintaining the reasonably tight schedules involved, I wish to express my appreciation to the contributors themselves, to the Department's word processing operators, Brigitte Coles, Christine Treadwell and Gail Hewitt, and to Departmental Secretaries Kath Bourke, Pam Lister and Hilary Richards, who at various stages helped to organise the production scheduling.

Special thanks are due to the readers of the manuscript, Professor Jerzy Zubrzycki, Dr Coral Bell and Dr Zbigniew Pelczynski for their thoughtful comments and for the admirable speed with which they accomplished their tasks. Russell McCaskie demonstrated his customary skill in assisting with the editing.

I am, of course, responsible for any and all errors of fact or judgement that may have escaped the attention of this formidable team. Several of the contributors have had long experience with editors and censors who had much more power over the ultimate shape of their manuscripts than I should ever wish to have. I hope that the experience of this volume was as pleasant to them as it has been to me. To all of the contributors I say, thank you for your cooperation, your suggestions, and your good humor.

Canberra
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Robert F. Miller
INTRODUCTION

POLAND SINCE MARTIAL LAW:

THE SEARCH FOR 'NORMALISATION'

BY

ROBERT F. MILLER

The sixteen months of Solidarity's existence as a mass public social movement were unique in the history of postwar East European history. For the first time in a country under Soviet domination the great majority of the working class itself had brushed aside the communist party, nominally ruling in its name, and sought to undertake the organisation and functioning of civil society on its own authority. Working-class Solidarity was quickly joined by other classes and strata of the population, namely, the intelligentsia and the peasantry, to become a truly nationwide social force. Its links with that other pillar of Polish national identity, the Roman Catholic Church, were close from the outset, and even significant elements within the Polish United Workers' Party (the communist party) saw fit to align themselves with the aims and policies of Solidarity.

The fact that some leading 'moderates' among the ruling party elite were willing to enter into a dialogue with Solidarity's leaders and to accept the need for some form of autonomous trade-union activity indicates the extent to which Solidarity's criticism of existing official social and economic practices was considered legitimate by all elements in Polish society. To be sure, most of the party negotiators were merely 'buying time' until a counterattack could be organised. Nevertheless, all but the most unreconstructed hard-liners recognised that some accommodations to social and political grievances were necessary and even justified. Unfortunately, the experience of the dialogue itself drove both sides to the conclusion that they were attempting to reconcile the irreconcilable. Even with its commitment to non-violence and 'self-limitation' of its aims and actions, Solidarity came to understand that it could hope for little real improvement from the existing corps of party leaders. The latter, even if their Soviet overlords had been willing to concede them substantial freedom of manoeuvre, came to realise that their claims to exercise a 'leading role' in society were incompatible with the demands of Solidarity for meaningful participation in social and economic decision-making.

Thus, the crackdown, or 'auto-occupation' as John Besemeres calls martial law in his introductory article, was inevitable, even if it was unexpected at the precise time it occurred. Martial law was perhaps preferable to the dreaded and strategically threatened, alternative of Soviet intervention. But, in a sense, 'auto-occupation' was even harder for Polish society to take, for it shattered the illusion that all of society was behind Solidarity's demand for reform. General Jaruzelski's pseudo-commitment to the continued protection of basic reforms, at least in the economy, and his initial promise to engage eventually in some sort of dialogue with a watered-down Solidarity
were undoubtedly designed to counter this widespread sense of betrayal. But this tactic and the associated strategy of allowing some freedom of legal and semi-legal publishing activity soon proved to be unproductive as far as the cherished goal of 'normalisation' was concerned.

For the aftermath of martial law has shown all too clearly that the basic flaws of the Polish version of 'really existing socialism' are still there. Moreover, in addition to the general contempt in society for the corruption, inefficiency and official dissimulation which gave rise to Solidarity in the first place, there is now deep popular resentment at the Government's actions to terminate the invigorating sixteen months' experiment with social self-organisation, democratic dialogue and the feeling of popular efficacy in helping to rebuild Polish life.

The papers in this volume were first presented at a conference on 'Poland After Martial Law: The Search for "Normalisation"', organised by the Centre for Continuing Education and the Departments of Political Science, RSSS and Slavonic Languages at The Australian National University. The aim of the Conference was to explore the social, economic and political factors in Poland leading to the rise of Solidarity and to chart their subsequent evolution under the conditions of martial law and beyond. For the purpose of this volume the papers selected have been organised under three headings: the Political Situation; Economy, Culture and Society in present-day Poland; and International Perspectives. Not surprisingly, the authors sometimes differ in their assessments of particular phenomena and in the emphasis they give to specific factors. What is more striking, however, is the degree of consensus on the main issues and problems of contemporary Polish social and political life. Where there are differences, they help to illuminate the complexities facing both the regime and the Polish people, upon whom it seeks to impose the rigidities of really existing socialism. No attempt is made to reconcile them here.

The general tone and background for the discussion are set forth in the companion papers by John Besemeres and Andrzej Walicki. Dr Besemeres begins by asserting that Solidarity was more than a trade union, but it was also more than a political party or a national liberation movement. Unfortunately, the rapidity with which it developed into a remarkably unified mass social movement soon engendered an unhealthy degree of overconfidence which led at least some of its leaders to look upon both Moscow and the Polish regime as 'paper tigers'. Although committed from the outset to a policy of non-violence and limited political aims, they were perhaps unwise in continually humiliating their negotiating partners in the ruling party-state elite. This provided hard-liners in the regime with a platform around which to rally more moderate forces for the eventual crackdown. Nevertheless, he concedes that it would be unjust to criticise the Solidarity leadership on this score, given the extent of popular rage against the regime. The people often demanded a more radical stance.

Regime 'moderates', like Kania and Rakowski, come in for special criticism for 'letting the side down', in a sense. Besemeres dismisses the extreme notion that genuine moderates were never more than a myth, but he charges them with major responsibility for the collapse of the reform impulse.
by their continual readiness to back down in the face of hard-line pressures. Furthermore, a number of them participated all too willingly in General Jaruzelski's 'auto-occupation', gaining little of substance for their efforts at mediation before martial law or credit for their personal reputations for their actions after it. Nevertheless, Besemeres contends that their involvement probably has had the effect of moderating the impact of martial law policies, something which evidently has earned them the undying resentment of Moscow and their hard-line Polish comrades.

Partly as a result of this moderation popular resistance to martial law has been remarkably cautious. Underground Solidarity has retained its commitment to non-violence. The people sense that the regime could be much more brutal, and the latter has reciprocated by pointedly advertising the 'velvet glove' with which it has concealed its essentially and legally very repressive actions, which in Besemeres' opinion are formally comparable to anything seen in Stalin's Russia.

As a technical measure of repression, martial law was clearly a brilliant success. But as a method of effective socio-economic normalisation, it has been anything but a success. The economy continues to stagnate, and living standards continue to sink. The workers continue to boycott the new official trade unions, and intellectuals still scorn the official cultural organisations. Politically, nothing has been done to restore popular confidence in the agencies of the party-state. Meanwhile, the regime continues its dual policy of promising reforms while threatening repression. The hand of Moscow may be behind the failure to carry out necessary reforms, but stagnation may actually suit Jaruzelski himself.

Addressing the related question of whether a Kadarist (Hungarian) or a Husakist (Czechoslovakian) solution is the more likely outcome of current Polish policies, Besemeres argues that, while rhetorically pursuing a Kadarist line - and perhaps ultimately desiring a 'Kadarised' Poland - Jaruzelski is actually implementing a Husakist policy of political repression. He doubts that such a policy can long keep a people like the Poles in thrall. But he is equally dubious that Poles will long remain satisfied with a Kadarist tradeoff. Popular consciousness in Poland has been too deeply affected by the democratic experience of the Solidarity period, and mass contempt for the corruption and incompetence of the ruling elite is too widespread for the Hungarian solution to be acceptable. The symbolic legacy of Solidarity has established a standard for future popular national and social action with which any Polish regime will have to contend.

Dr Andrzej Walicki's analysis of the 'Components of the Polish crisis' covers some of these issues from a different perspective and with different emphasis. He argues that the 13th of December crackdown was not only not surprising but inevitable. Solidarity had, indeed, gone too far in challenging the communist authorities; and the Polish government was simply 'not sovereign enough to surrender'. Walicki criticises the naivety of Jacek Kuron's conception of a 'self-governing republic' which Solidarity was to create under the very noses of the ruling communist elite; the latter were expected to content themselves with the retention of control over foreign policy, defence, and the organs of internal security. Moscow would never have
accepted 'finlandisation' of Poland; and the projected division of labour could seem reasonable only to young people with no personal experience of the Stalinist period, when the actual technology of communist power was more clearly evident. Walicki concludes his introduction by criticising the hypocrisy of Western objections to martial law. He expressly accuses the US in particular of failing to warn Solidarity of the impending coup in order to protect its own intelligence sources.

In the next section Walicki analyses the evolution of the system of communist party rule in Poland. The initial totalitarian stage drew to a close in the 'Polish October' of 1956, after which a three-fold process of decay began. The first process he characterises as 'de-ideologisation', where Polish communists under Gomulka began to substitute considerations of Realpolitik for Marxist internationalism as a legitimising rationale for party supremacy. Both ideological hardliners and younger revisionists opposed this turn toward ideological pragmatism. For the latter the official anti-Semitic, anti-liberal campaign of 1968 was the final death blow to their belief in Marxism. Thereafter, party rule was justified solely by emphasising that Moscow would accept only such a regime as a condition of Poland's survival as a quasi-independent state.

The second process - the 'irrational bureaucratisation of the "partocracy"' - was initially a reaction to arbitrary Stalinist personal rule. However, the ensuing regularisation and 'legalisation' of bureaucratic procedures was so heavily politicised in practise that regulation of the economy and society became a travesty of bureaucratic rationality. The resulting devastation and demoralisation of the economy spread beyond the party throughout Polish society, creating a universal web of conspiracies to defraud the system and obtain the personal advantage of position and privileged access to material benefits. By the late 1970s contempt and general frustration had become the prevailing public attitudes toward socialism in Poland.

The third process - the 'disalienation of the party' - involved an attempt by the Gierek leadership to overcome the ideological apostasy of the past by playing on the revival of Polish nationalism evoked by General Moczar's 1968 campaign against Jews and liberals. Dr Walicki contends that the return to nationalism was at least partly genuine and helps to explain the party's 'unprecedented concessions' in August 1980 and its reluctance to use force against Solidarity thereafter.

In the third section of the paper Walicki comments on popular conceptions of the origins of Polish 'national character'. He notes the alacrity with which Solidarity picked up the historical traditions of the old Polish 'gentry democracy'. But he concedes some validity to the arguments of 'pessimists' who emphasise the anarchistic behavioural patterns associated with that tradition. It was a tradition more attuned to great national patriotic movements against foreign oppression than to long-term, constructive social and economic development. Walicki cites contemporary sociological research which shows that these psycho-social characteristics persist to the present day: a 'schizophrenic' division between 'dirty egoism' and romantic nationalism, with few social bonds in between. Such a society, he argues, is particularly ill suited to Soviet-style socialism.
The next section on 'Attitudes of the Main Strata of the Population' begins with the assertion that the 1980 movement differed sharply from earlier outbursts in being mass-generated, rather than elite-inspired. The working class demonstrated its identification with the historical symbols of nationalism, acting as a truly 'national class' in a way curiously consistent with Marx's and Engels' predictions. Despite its lack of a consistent ideology, Solidarity also manifested a preference for egalitarian values and economic controls vaguely reminiscent of socialist doctrine. Walicki characterises it as 'socialist populism'. The negative side of this syndrome, however, was a failure to associate rewards with competence and productivity and a readiness to allow 'omnipotent authorities' to continue to make the basic economic decisions - albeit subject to popular oversight and accountability.

Turning to the peasantry, Walicki notes that although the private peasant economy dominates Polish agriculture and is more productive than the socialist sector, it is far from flourishing. The individual peasant economy is increasingly caught up in the morass of the national economic bureaucracy, and victimised by its arbitrariness and inefficiency. The peasants, too, strove to organise to redress their grievances and Rural Solidarity soon became part of the general mass movement of social self-organisation.

The third major stratum, the intelligentsia, played both a positive and a negative role in the course of the crisis. It was extremely effective in organising protest action and focussing dissent, but often behaved irresponsibly when called upon to join moderate elements of the regime in constructive reform programs. At the same time many intellectuals were not averse to collusion with party members in 'informal cliques and other forms of 'dirty togetherness'. In general, Walicki chides the intellectuals for their impractical extremism. Even moderates among them were too quick to surrender to the dominant popular frenzy. On the other hand, he praises them for their willingness to eschew corporate self-interests in favour of support for mass initiatives and for rebuffing official inducements to separate themselves off from the mass movement. Their most important achievement was to create a 'powerful alternative culture', unique in the annals of 'real socialism'.

The final essay in Part I, by Dr Jan Pakulski, is more narrowly focussed. It illustrates the parallels between the communist seizure of power in 1944/45 and the reassertion of that power as 'normalisation' by the martial law regime in December 1981. Pakulski argues that 'effective normalisation' entails not only the restoration of communist party political domination but also, more crucially, the reestablishment of social and economic equilibrium destroyed during the 'massive crisis of the 1970s'. Above all, it means economic reform and enhanced productivity.

He stresses the importance always attributed in postwar Poland to the military components of power. In 1945 the crucial factor was the merger of the military and party leadership. Since then the two groups always acted in unison as part of the same overarching nomenklatura system. General Jaruzelski is a typical product of that system. Western assessments which exaggerate his uniqueness as a military figure reflect a misunderstanding of the party-military relationship in Warsaw Pact states. All military leaders
are to a great extent political figures, albeit with, perhaps, a greater sense of discipline. Their assumption of direct power thus represents a revitalisation of the nomenklatura in key personnel appointments throughout the system. Pakulski argues that military rule was in a sense a victory for the party in its quest for reassertion of its centralised control. But at the same time, he says, it makes doubtful the undertaking of rational economic reforms necessary to achieve effective normalisation.

Dr Pakulski illustrates the similarities then and now in the uses of propaganda slogans and appeals to external threats as means of rallying the population and gaining a modicum of popular acceptance of communist party rule. This resort to nationalist symbols can easily backfire, however; the days when the people were willing to give official propaganda, nationalist or otherwise, a modicum of credence are probably over. More effective are the implicit threats of repression for dissident activity contained in such propaganda.

Legal regulations enacted to accompany the lifting of martial law are also implicitly extremely threatening and overtly restrictive, reminiscent of the early postwar legislation. None of these restrictions, Pakulski argues, are really compatible with either market rationality or reconciliation with the populace. The political situation has actually regressed to the 'square one' of 1945. As experience has shown, such a system is not at all consonant with the generally accepted requirement of 'effective normalisation'.

The essays in Part II deal with specific aspects of the internal situation in contemporary Poland. In Chapter Four Professor Jozef Wilczynski presents an overview of the economic issues which many regard as the principal cause of the present crisis. He shows that until recently Poland's rate of economic growth had compared more than favourably with that of Australia and most other developed capitalist economies, although agricultural growth had failed to keep pace with the rest of the Polish economy.

Next Wilczynski turns to the problem of inflation in Poland. As in the other Soviet-type economies, the Polish authorities deny the existence of inflation, arguing that central planning eliminates the possibility that supply and demand can be far out of balance. That assertion is, of course, strongly belied by the facts. Despite the official policy of maintaining long-term price stability for a range of staple consumer items, the frequent absence of the latter in state-controlled shops and the flourishing trade on free markets where prices are significantly higher, and steadily rising, is a true indicator of inflationary pressures. Professor Wilczynski offers additional evidence of inflation in the form of a comparison of official and black-market dollar exchange rates for the Polish zloty during the 1970s and 1980s. The present degree of currency inflation is over 600 per cent. The martial law regime itself has tacitly admitted the existence of inflation and commodity-money disequilibrium by ordering price rises for most consumer goods of up to 400 per cent. Nominally, as part of the putative economic reform package a significant portion of the price structure is to be de-controlled, including most industrial inputs. This commitment to reliance on market forces has not been consistently implemented, however, for fear of total loss of control over the economy. Thus, the combination of central determination
and illegal or semi-legal collusion to circumvent central directives has persisted.

Professor Wilczynski concedes that, according to official data, Polish per capita national income in the period before the present crisis was relatively high. In 1979, for example, Poland ranked just below Italy on this indicator, and ahead of Hungary, Spain and Israel. However, the author points out that in terms of actual disposable income per person and the social and political costs of that income the situation is far less favourable to Poles. Even officially it has been admitted that the standard of living has been declining since 1979: by 1983 it was as much as 25 per cent lower. The introduction of rationing in 1981 was a sign of official concern over the deterioration of the food supply.

In another section the author considers the question of Poland's international indebtedness. Compared to some Third World countries (e.g. Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and South Korea) the present debt of $27 billion is not extraordinary; however, Professor Wilczynski estimates that by the year 2000 it will have risen to $51 billion, largely because of the poor structure of the debt (short-term, concentration of repayments in the near future, utilisation for non-productive purposes) and the poor prospects for exports to hard-currency markets. Repayments will constitute a heavy burden on the Polish economy for some time.

Considering the problems of Poland's foreign trade, Professor Wilczynski notes a recent shift back to concentration on Socialist Bloc and Third World trade after the sharp turn to the West of the early 1970s. Imports from the West have had to be curtailed to conserve hard currency for essential purchases and debt repayments. This strategy has had a tangible depressant effect on popular living standards.

Finally, Professor Wilczynski considers the program of economic reform undertaken by the regime since martial law but actually planned during the Solidarity period. Among the objectives of the program were decentralisation of much of economic decision making, greater independence for enterprise management, greater price flexibility, greater emphasis on financial incentives and disincentives, and rationalisation of resource utilisation (labour, capital assets, raw materials and energy). Few of these objectives have been attained or even actively pursued under martial law and in its aftermath.

Thus, despite its wealth in material and human resources, the Polish economy has regressed badly in recent years. Wilczynski sees few prospects for a significant improvement in the near future without drastic changes in the structure and policies of the economic system - something the present regime shows no signs of willingness to undertake.

In Chapter Five Dr Krzysztof Zagorski examines the impact of 'class-type' relations on the sudden emergence of Solidarity as a mass movement for social and economic change. The author criticises recent 'new class' and other class-based theories by (mainly Western) sociologists for their lack of
explanatory power. Political tabus have made it impossible for East European social theorists to elaborate fully consistent and coherent class analyses of their own societies. At the same time, Zagorski defends some of the empirical sociological research on social differentiation being carried on, especially in Poland and Hungary, as providing at least a good starting point for more fundamental analysis of these societies.

The basic question he addresses, with oblique reference to these empirical findings, is how it was possible in so brief a time span for so broad a spectrum of social groups and strata to coalesce around a set of common objectives to transform the entire Polish social system. For Zagorski the scale of the Solidarity movement and the magnitude of its objectives qualify it as genuinely revolutionary. He rejects the arguments that the movement was either merely a temporary marriage of convenience between intellectuals and a 'workers' aristocracy or that the intellectuals, as a potent 'new class', were its main driving force and were motivated primarily by a desire to secure economic advantage. In point of fact, he argues, the main body of intellectuals in Poland have been no less the victims of the irrational bureaucratic 'redistribution' system common to 'really existing socialism' than are the working-class masses.

As regards the question of 'class ownership' Zagorski attributes primary importance to the dimension of control over 'work processes'. This dimension is especially crucial for intellectuals by virtue of the nature of their work. For them, work is less important as an instrument of material existence than as a source of self-realisation. Thus, they are more sensitive to bureaucratic control over their activity. This sensitivity applies, also, to control over the 'distribution' of their 'product'. Thus, their primary objective was to gain control over both their work processes and the distribution of the results. The author argues that this objective made the interests of the intellectuals and the workers remarkably congruent: both became conscious of the need to wrest control over these two processes from the ruling bureaucratic-political elite.

The spark which has periodically ignited political and social protest in postwar Poland has always been economic. Zagorski emphasises that the goal of working-class, and national protest in general, has never been the restoration of capitalist relations; Solidarity's prevailing ideology, such as it was, was extreme egalitarianism. Facile labelling of Solidarity as reflective of various 'isms' was never fully justified. From past experiences of protest the workers had learned two main lessons: that they were powerful when united; and the mere rescinding of particular, objectionable economic policies and the shuffling of top party and state office-holders produced no lasting benefits. Only the removal of the authoritarian bureaucratic system could provide a long-term solution.

Thus, by 1980 the workers understood the need for some form of effective social ownership of the means of production. And that meant limiting the power of the political bureaucracy. Zagorski illustrates the efforts of the latter to prove the relevance of its 'leading role', mainly by propagating the view that Polish society was not sufficiently mature to manage on its own. These efforts failed because of the patently dismal performance of the political elite in its own terms.
The common understanding of this fact was the basis for the 'class-type' alliance between the intellectuals, the workers, and other groups, particularly the private peasantry. Here Zagorski details the difficult experience of the peasants at the hands of the bureaucracy - which led them to the same conclusions. Heavy taxation, arbitrary restrictions in the allocation of farm inputs, and discriminatory social and political policies had destroyed what was potentially a very productive sector of the economy. Indeed, the only segment of the population which had not particularly suffered from the bureaucratic system and which, accordingly, did not join the protest movement en masse, were the marginal private, non-agricultural service personnel. All the rest were united by common objectives and a common perception of the economy of Polish social and economic revival.

Dr Maria Markus adds another perspective on the social reform activities of Solidarity in Chapter Six. She perceives those activities as an attempt to re-establish a functioning civil society which had been consciously destroyed by the regime in a standard Soviet-inspired program to abolish the self-organising and self-regulating social structures, which mediate between the individual and the state in modern societies.

After describing civil society in ideal-typical terms and showing how it operates to perform certain social functions in contemporary Western countries, Dr Markus discusses the awakening realisation in the 1970s that civil society, as such, no longer existed in Poland. Certain Polish sociologists had come to see its absence as a main cause of 'social schizophrenia'.

The main program of action from then on was concentrated on the organisation of social solidarity, participation and cooperation outside the framework of the state. The author distinguishes three points of contention in the process of emergence of Polish civil society in the Solidarity period: (1) the organisational principles of the new public sphere; (2) its main areas of concern and activity; (3) the forms and means of institutionalising the relationship between civil society and the state. Disputes on these questions promoted a consciousness of the need for organisation and consciousness among the various emergent groups and interests. The result was an impressive display of solidarity and mutual support, for example among manual workers, farmers, intellectuals, students and white-collar workers.

Among the factors contributing to this readiness for consensus two were especially prominent: (1) a sense of shared moral and cultural values; and (2) a focus on the state monopoly of control of the economy as the main obstacle to reform and progress. The principal difficulties encountered in acting on these shared perspectives were the unquestioned numerical dominance of Solidarity among the reformist groups, and the obvious need to assign to it, therefore, the role of 'interest aggregator' in formulating and presenting demands to the state. But there was also the realisation that possibilities were not unlimited. These conflicting pressures increased tensions within Solidarity and pushed it beyond its original motivations as a trade union.
Another problem was the absence of legally sanctioned mechanisms for negotiations between the emergent civil society and the state, giving the latter the initiative in deciding on the agenda for discussions and the choice of negotiating partners. This in turn added to tensions with Solidarity, among other things over the allowable degree of participation in the existing structures of power. For Dr Markus this question of participation is one of the most important theoretical and practical questions raised by the Solidarity challenge. Different political systems present different criteria for acceptable participation, ranging from a 'state-corporatist model' to a syndicalist one, where the state is largely ignored. Markus shows that there were adherents of both models - and others - among the actors in the 1980-81 drama, concluding with the observation that no real modus vivendi between Solidarity and the existing party-state was possible.

Nevertheless, the Solidarity experience will have a lasting heuristic value. It demonstrated the efficacy of organised social power based on consciousness of shared values. It also had an impact on the consciousness of the ruling elite - a recognition that pre-existing modes of rule are inadequate and without essential legitimacy. What the concrete results of these lessons will be are difficult to predict. Neither a Czech nor a Hungarian solution is likely, but some hybrid is possible - less 'comfortable economically' than the Hungarian model, but 'more flexible politically'.

In the final chapter of Part II, Chapter Seven, Dr Janina Frentzel-Zagorska discusses the role of culture in the sequence of upheavals and subsequent 'normalisations' in postwar Poland, as well as the efforts by the regime to normalise culture itself. The author presents a specific definition of the term culture - 'symbolic culture' - and identifies the various milieux which are its principal bearers. She shows the continuities of its role in society with the historical traditions of the Polish nation, particularly with the romantic tradition of the 19th century and the great uprisings against foreign rule.

Dr Zagorska also introduces a conceptual definition of three types of 'normalisations' employed by postwar Polish communist regimes following the repression of successive popular upheavals: 'short-term normalisation', 'long-term functional normalisation', and 'long-term dysfunctional normalisation'. She argues that symbolic culture developed strongly during the 1956 unrest and the ensuing 'normalisation' period. It regained its traditional role as a force for social integration and served in the ensuing crackdown as the only vehicle of genuine social communication. Nevertheless, official repression reduced the communication between the cultural intelligentsia and the broader society to woefully inadequate levels. Indeed, Dr Zagorska regards this inadequacy as an important cause of the failure of the workers and intellectuals to rally to each other's support in the upheavals of 1968 and 1970. For the intellectuals in particular the 1968 disorders were an important learning experience.

During the 1970s, as a result, symbolic culture became richer in content and more self-conscious in its objective as a promoter of unity and solidarity across classes, despite the efforts of the Gierek regime to fragment and suborn its leading institutional purveyors. The effects were clearly seen in
the solidaristic actions of social groups in 1980. Workers engaged in the strike activity in the Gdansk shipyards commonly recited poems by oppositional writers, from the 19th century to the present - from Mickiewicz to Milosz. Thus the Solidarity period witnessed a considerable strengthening of unity between workers, peasants, intellectuals and other strata of the society, a unity based to a major extent on consciousness of the importance of the national culture in the life of Polish society.

In the final section of her essay Zagorska examines the cultural component of the post-martial-law normalisation process. She concludes that the role of symbolic culture in preserving the unity of the nation will be stronger than in any previous period because of the consciousness-raising effects of the 16-month Solidarity experience. In order for the present normalisation to be at all 'functional' the regime must somehow produce a reconciliation with the enhanced requirements of society and its culture-bearing intelligentsia for a freer, more genuine expression of the authentic national culture. This is, perhaps, not its most important problem, but it is certainly a prerequisite for effective long-term normality.

Part III contains three essays on international reactions to the Polish crisis. Although the coverage is by no means comprehensive, the topics are representative of certain broader foreign policy issues impinging on the Polish leadership in its search for normalisation: namely, the reactions of its East European allies, the reverberations among Poland's Western trading partners and creditors, and Soviet perceptions of the danger to communist party rule and how to overcome them.

In Chapter Eight Dr Robert F. Miller analyses the reactions of the individual East European regimes to the successive stages in the evolution of the Solidarity-Government confrontation. He points out that although all of the socialist regimes in the region are similar in basic structures and follow a common set of political practices, the specific national political cultures - and the nature of the respective regimes' relations with Moscow - often produce important differences of nuance, or even substance, in policies on certain issues.

The Soviet leaders have set fairly narrow, if somewhat elastic, limits of permissible deviation from Soviet political and organisational orthodoxy; yet at the same time they expect the individual regimes to be able to keep their respective houses in order. The latter consideration exerts some pressure on the regimes to tailor their practices to the different conditions of their societies. They carefully follow the various experiments and modifications of the Soviet model undertaken by their neighbours - and watch anxiously for Moscow's reactions - in the hope of extending their own freedom of manoeuvre. Yet at the same time they all have a vested interest in preserving the basic structures and principles of communist party rule, the source of their own power and privilege. Some regimes are clearly more adventurous than others in the quest for acceptable compromises with national traditions and developmental requirements.
Miller observes that Poland has always represented a difficult problem for the maintenance of party rule. The pattern of accommodation with the Catholic Church, the peasantry and the intelligentsia there has always been looked upon with dismay by Moscow and its loyalist acolytes in the region. They have accordingly attempted to isolate her to avoid 'infection' of their own societies by the Polish 'disease' of rebelliousness and ideological apostasy, while tacitly granting her a dispensation from some of the more stringent requirements of 'real' socialism as long as the Polish leaders managed to 'keep the lid on'. However, the emergence of Solidarity, encompassing the vast majority of the working class itself, was considered unacceptably dangerous. The appeal for repression was almost unanimous throughout the region, although the Yugoslavs and Romanians were firmly against direct external intervention.

Martial law was thus greeted with a sigh of relief, as an ideal solution by all the ruling parties in Eastern Europe. But as 'normalisation' proceeded under its umbrella, the more hard-line regimes, such as the Czechoslovak and the East German, began to criticise Polish government policy for not going far enough in restoring the norms and structures of 'really existing socialism'. The author argues that General Jaruzelski, recognising the realities of Polish society, has tried to resist some of these demands while yielding on others. He evidently hopes for an eventual 'Kadarist' outcome of the normalisation process. In time Poland's Bloc allies have apparently come to accept these limitations, although occasional criticism continues to be directed at particular policies and practices. The result is that Poland has returned to its former status as the 'sick man' of Eastern Europe, suitably integrated into the Bloc's military and economic organisations, but still under partial quarantine in other areas of intra-Bloc and bilateral relations.

In his essay on West German responses to martial law in Poland in Chapter Nine Professor James L. Richardson shows that Bonn's policies reflected broader Western dilemmas on how to deal with the Soviet Bloc in the twilight of detente. Confronted with something short of direct Soviet intervention, the West was much less united in its response than it had been in 1956 and 1968. West German caution, exemplified by Chancellor Schmidt's mild reaction to General Jaruzelski's declaration of 13 December and his failure to implicate the Soviet Union, was roundly condemned by the media in other NATO countries. West Germany was alleged to be more concerned with commercial advantage than with principle and NATO solidarity. The West German media ultimately counterattacked with charges of their own, accusing the US of hypocrisy on economic boycotts when the Reagan Administration itself had so recently lifted its grain embargo, and the French for contracting in January to buy natural gas from the Soviet Union in the midst of disputes over the infamous pipeline embargo.

Professor Richardson argues that the different policies pursued by the various NATO partners vis-a-vis the USSR and, in this case, Poland, reflect profound differences of interest in detente and the perceived benefits of East-West trade. The Polish crisis merely brought these differences more visibly to the surface. For West Germany detente, however flawed, had brought obvious economic gains, but equally important were improvements in social contacts between the two Germanies. For the US the balance sheet was much
more unambiguously negative. On the vital question of high-technology exports to the East, Washington saw no compensatory gains in Western influence, while the West Europeans, deprecating the effect of embargoes in this area, sought to maximise benefits to themselves on a strictly commercial basis.

Thus, the author concludes, most of the debates over Poland were really concerned primarily with the larger problem of economic relations with the Soviet Union. The West Germans were often merely less hypocritical than some of their allies in seeking to avoid harsher East-West confrontations and pursuing their own interests. Washington's attempts to use the martial law crisis to rally the NATO alliance were largely a failure. If West Germany lost the early public relations skirmishes over the issue, NATO was ultimately the greater loser, since the crisis brought into bold relief the serious divisions and differences of interest among its members.

In Chapter Ten Dr Amin Saikal examines similarities and differences in the methods of Soviet intervention in Poland and Afghanistan. He notes that the geographic situation of both countries in regions traditionally considered strategically vital has always made Moscow extremely sensitive to their internal developments and orientations. Since World War II, the Soviet leaders, no longer content with maintaining spheres of influence in these regions, have sought to convert them into 'spheres of domination'. Because of opportunities provided by the Soviet Army's presence in Eastern Europe and favourable economic and social conditions Moscow was able to complete this process quickly in Poland and neighbouring countries, while in Afghanistan it had to settle for a policy of long-term penetration.

Dr Saikal argues that in the process of establishing control in Eastern Europe the Soviets elaborated a system of 'internal mechanisms' in each country to ensure stability and subservience to Soviet interests. Whenever internal unrest has arisen, the Soviet leaders have tried to deal with them, if at all possible, through these 'internal mechanisms', resorting to direct military intervention only when the latter have failed. He contends that this pattern has been successfully applied in the most recent crisis in Poland, as it was in 1956. The threat of military intervention was always kept visibly in reserve, but its actual use did not prove necessary.

In Afghanistan this technique was more difficult to apply after the 1978 coup, which brought the communists to power, because of the existence of two strong rival factions, the Khalq and the Parcham, nominally united in the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. It was soon clear that the PDPA had little popular support and could not rule without large-scale Soviet support. For twenty months the Soviets poured some 10,000 military and civilian 'advisers' and millions of dollars of aid money into the country to prop up the regime, but the factional conflict continued to hinder the development of strong 'internal mechanisms'. The failure of the latter to contain the growing popular resistance to PDPA rule and the opportunity presented by the weak American response to the 'hostage crisis' in neighbouring Iran prompted the Soviets to intervene militarily in a massive way to save the situation in December 1979.
By way of summary Dr Saikal observes that while the Soviets appear to give the 'internal mechanisms' in countries under their control a good deal of leeway in crisis situations before resorting to military intervention, the understanding of local conditions and opportunities by Soviet policy makers is often flawed and distorted by their accustomed ideological perspectives. He suggests that both Poland and Afghanistan illustrate this tendency to operate on the basis of erroneous perceptions. Finally, he notes that the Soviets tend to intervene directly only in regions which have been more or less explicitly abandoned by the West.

The Polish crisis is no longer regularly on the front pages of the world's major newspapers. This was undoubtedly an important objective of the Jaruzelski regime and represents an 'achievement' of sorts. However, the various perspectives presented by the contributors to this volume show unmistakably that the present relative invisibility of Polish events is by no means a sign that the crisis has been overcome. The domestic and foreign problems which led to it are still there. And the mixture of selected palliatives and general coercion offered by the regime has yet to prove its effectiveness beyond the achievement of a mutually hostile cease fire between rulers and ruled. Whether anything substantial and positive for the future can be built on such a basis remains to be seen.
PART I

THE POLITICAL SITUATION
CHAPTER ONE

THE POLITICS OF MARTIAL LAW

BY

JOHN BESEMERES

The pace of events in Poland has slowed somewhat of late, but in recent years and especially during the Solidarity period, more has been happening there in the course of a week than should occur in a well conducted Soviet province in the course of a decade. This being so, the overview that follows will be both selective and generalised. I shall try to keep close to fairly well accepted lines of analysis, whilst also on occasion proposing conclusions or summary judgements that may be controversial and, to that extent, may hopefully stimulate discussion.

Solidarity's Emergence and Development

The Solidarity revolution of August 1980 brought about an astonishing transformation of Polish society, all the more remarkable in that it scarcely affected the institutions of the party-state. A succession of local strikes over economic issues coalesced and within a few days in late August catalysed a nationwide non-violent insurrection based on an uncanny degree of popular consensus. That consensus was essentially a negative one. Some 80 to 90 per cent of the population, those for the most part without a stake in the system, suddenly discovered their mutual agreement that the existing dispensation was unbearable. They rejected, for example, price increases, censorship and the manipulation of news, oppression of the Church, privileges for party-state-security employees, incompetent and corrupt bosses, and official policies on health, housing, education, farming, consumer industries, etc., etc. They also rejected, though they chose not to do so explicitly, the leading role of the party and Soviet domination of Poland's affairs. The national movement that emerged under the protective umbrella provided by the industrial working class was patriotic, pluralist, egalitarian, democratic, implicitly anti-communist and Catholic (though not clerical as some superficial observers have claimed). There was initially at least a common strategic assumption that the movement must limit itself to avoid Soviet intervention and that the existing economic and political structures must be permitted to survive, if in modified form. Just exactly how those defective institutions should repair the ravaged economy or repair themselves was less clear. As time went on, as the economy collapsed further, and as the regime proved resistant to more than superficial changes, Solidarity's strategic unity began to splinter.

It was not surprising that this should have been so. For the Solidarity movement, despite its tactical disclaimers, was always more than just a trade union. It was even more than a political party or a national liberation movement. *It was in fact Polish society, as opposed to the Polish state, Polish society stripped of its Soviet integument. Like any other nation, and more so than most, Poles are given to political disputation. As the popular adage has it, wherever there are five Poles, there are six political parties and nine chairmen. Judged by Polish, or indeed by any standards, the unity*
that Solidarity achieved in the early months was uncanny, and the degree of
unity it maintained thereafter was still impressive.

To some degree it was a unity imposed by a sense of common danger. But
in 1980-81, as the regime successively resisted and then partially capitulated
to Solidarity pressures, Solidarity became more confident. Poles had been
belaboured by veiled threats of Soviet intervention since at least 1956, and
in the Solidarity period the threats were intensified. Western publicity for
Soviet troop movements on Poland's borders in December 1980 and thereafter
reinforced the propaganda endeavours of the regime and of Moscow and its
clients in Prague and East Berlin. But the Soviet Union did not invade. Thus
during 1980-81, while some Poles felt a growing, if unspecific, sense of
impending disaster, many more decided that the Polish regime and even Moscow
itself were paper tigers. This growing sense of impunity, coupled with the
spreading economic debacle and the apparent paralysis or hostility of the
Warsaw regime, caused many to abandon the strategy of 'self-limiting
revolution' and to seek solutions through structural changes to the system.
Hence the growing abandonment in the course of 1981 of the 'unionist' strategy
of 'them and us', in which Solidarity's role was not to govern or even to
formulate policy, but merely to veto the unacceptable and 'keep the bastards
honest'. In place of that limited strategy there emerged the Solidarity self-
management movement with its increasingly syndicalist ambitions and overt
moves towards political democracy, as for example in the calls made at the
Solidarity Congress for elections to local councils and the Sejm.

Did Solidarity Go Too Far?

None of this is either surprising or reprehensible. The Poles are
strongly democratic by temperament and tradition. If the word 'normalisation'
is freed of its post-1968 Czechoslovakian connotations, it can certainly be
argued that what happened in 1981 was that Solidarity, i.e. Polish society,
was undergoing 'normalisation' in the 'normal' sense i.e. assuming the sort of
diversity and differentiation that characterise any modern society, however
culturally unified or homogeneous.

Suggestions by either Soviet bloc ideologists or Western commentators
that Solidarity was too 'political' or that it 'went too far' tend to imply
that Dr Husak's sort of 'normalisation' is the only one rightly so called. We
should beware of accepting by default the argument that the highly artificial
status quo in Eastern Europe is in any sense 'normal'. Indeed, I wonder if
the title of this very book, for all that it employs quotation marks in
referring to 'normalisation', is not a further unconscious contribution to an
Orwellian disinformation campaign.

This, however, is more a moral than a political judgement. In political
terms - at least in the short run - it can plausibly be argued that Solidarity
may indeed have gone 'too far'. It is a matter for empirical debate (though
vital evidence may be lacking) as to whether Solidarity might have held the
regime to some kind of modus vivendi, had it not, for example, sent its
celebrated Message to the Workers of Eastern Europe.
I personally doubt that the Message was a decisive turning point (I also think that regardless of its timing, the Message will ultimately be seen as a vital historical document). But the case could be made that this was an instance of the right cause being proclaimed at a ruinous moment.

On the other hand, it could also be argued with some plausibility that Solidarity's gravest error was that in some respects it did not go far enough: that it should, for example, have sought more actively to 'infiltrate' the armed forces and the party and to influence their decisions directly rather than by indirect pressure through strikes and appeals to public opinion; or that it should have tried to exact more decisive concessions from the regime in the early months after August 1980, when popular support and enthusiasm were at their height, and when the general strike seemed (as during the Bydgoszcz Crisis of March 1981) to be a weapon that potentially could move mountains. If during these early months the Solidarity radicals had succeeded in seizing the moment to dictate terms, perhaps the regime would have capitulated and Moscow allowed some kind of 'power-sharing', at least for a time. The regime may not yet have been ready for a counterstrike, and Moscow may still have preferred to temporise.

Most independent observers share the moderate Solidarity position that any such manoeuvres were never worth the risk. In this view (which I also share incidentally) Solidarity was a non-violent movement by profound necessity and not by choice. Even the radicals had no serious operational plans for direct action. The regime itself had the force if it chose to use it, and Moscow might always decide to invade. Solidarity had to rely on the moral force of its overwhelming majority within Poland, precisely because it could not rely on physical force. Even if it were to adopt direct action and vanquish its domestic opponent, this would only hasten the final confrontation with the heavy-weight champion. It needed a domestic adversary that could hold its own; a KO victory in an early round would be the worst possible result.

Solidarity did not ever seriously prepare to vanquish its domestic opponent. But on many occasions it did sorely humiliate the regime and compromise it in the eyes of the Polish apparat, of Moscow, and of Moscow's clients in the 'normalised' states of Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Often little was achieved from these confrontations in terms of concrete results, but the regime was so mauled in the process that hardliners everywhere were bound to be galvanised into an enraged and concerted response.

Here, too, I wonder if it makes much sense to blame Solidarity either morally or politically for such outcomes. The Polish Primate has reproved both Solidarity and the authorities before and since martial law for failing to respect sufficiently their adversaries' humanity. But perhaps in relation to Solidarity at least he is applying standards of Christian humility that are too severe. After 35 years of humiliation, violence, deception, and deprivation of democratic opportunities, it was not surprising that Solidarity should be given to stridency and a little local indiscipline. In the face of the most spectacular economic collapse in post-war Europe, a degree of grassroots desperation was also fully understandable. Politically this intemperance may at times have been damaging to Solidarity's cause. Many
Solidarity leaders thought so. But restraining the rage of 1981 by democratic leadership and inspiration was like stemming a tidal wave with fishing nets.

The Fiasco of the 'Moderates'

If any side is to be blamed either politically or morally for the failure to reach a modus vivendi in 1980-81, it must surely be the regime and their Moscow principals. The Soviet bloc hawks in Moscow, Prague, East Berlin and the Polish beton are obviously mainly responsible for martial law. Let us, however, not waste time on them, as their attitudes and responses were transparently clear from the outset, though their timing and choice of weapon were a little less so. But what of the przyzwoici ludzie (decent people) the 'moderates', the closet patriots, the revisionists, the pragmatists, the liberals even within the Polish regime? What of Kania himself? Did these people not hope for a better outcome than martial law, and if so, what is their political and moral responsibility for the fiasco which finally ensued?

There are some observers (and since martial law, for understandable reasons, their numbers have increased) who maintain that the moderates are a myth and the establishment patriots a tiny silent and isolated minority; that the differences between regime factions are trivial and best disregarded; and that suggestions of divisions within the regime are usually false rumours deliberately spread by the authorities in a 'good-cop, bad-cop' convention to help break down popular resistance. Those whose views are of this type may find the rest of this chapter very tedious, or very irritating. For I take the view that gradations of attitude do exist within such regimes and that it is a blessing that they do, as within such regimes major reforms - however initiated - will only be effectively implemented when enough members of the Polish (or Soviet) establishment accept the necessity for them, be it with joy, equanimity, or reluctance. As the experience of Solidarity suggests, the weakest and most despised communist regime, while the Kremlin still stands, can certainly frustrate reforms from below, and can probably hold almost any opposition at bay.

It is for this reason that I believe that the Kania leadership with its vaguely moderate good intentions has much more to answer for in political terms than Walesa's Solidarity for the final collapse of the jousting 'dialogue' they half pursued in 1980-81. In a totalitarian or near-totalitarian state the apparatus of power has a complete monopoly of armed force, of legislative and administrative initiative and of the use and misuse of information. If these monopolies are not deployed on the side of reforms, however massive the public support for them, those reforms will fail.

By the time Kania emerged as party leader in the wake of the August 1980 strikes, there was little idealism left in Polish communism. The Polish party had always been weak, and following Gomulka's purge of 'revisionists' after 1956, and the moral carnage of 1968, virtually no ideologically committed visionaries remained. 'Negative selection', i.e. the preferential recruitment and advancement of anti-Catholic, pro-Soviet 'communists' in a country where 90% of the population detest all three categories, had produced a vast mass of incompetent, corrupt careerists in positions of power at all levels. There
was, however, an inevitable leavening of pragmatism, reformism, 'liberalism' and ability within the apparatus, as well as in the grass roots of the Party and in other milieux like the media and academia. The emergence of Solidarity gave this thin thread of reformism a chance within regime politics which, acting under their own steam, they might have found very difficult ever to make for themselves. There is evidence that people like Kania, Jagielski and Barcikowski, if with some nervous trepidation, sought to harness the groundswell of revolt to bring about improvements in the system. Some reformers, like Fiszbach, Dabrowa or Skrzypczak (party secretaries in Gdansk, Krakow and Poznan) were even prepared to go along with most of Solidarity's program. Kania and his main centrist backers, on the other hand, despite their reformist leanings, quickly became dismayed by the virulence of the movement and wished to rein Solidarity in. They seemed always more concerned about their own hardline backlash and Moscow's reactions than by any need to keep Solidarity on side. They showed little leadership capacity in respect of the general population and sought to rely exclusively on intimate bureaucratic tactics, compromise, deference to Moscow and toothless and insecure public fulminations in the direction of Solidarity. In the end they commanded the respect and loyalty of no one.

And yet it was the 'moderates' and assorted reformers within the regime who offered Poland and Solidarity their best hope of making life more bearable this side of a collapse of Soviet power or the extensive reconstruction of Soviet institutions and policies. And with or without a genuine compromise with a revived Solidarity, their role remains potentially just as crucial today.

Despite the radical democratisation of party life in the preceding months, the Extraordinary Party Congress of July 1981 produced no decisive improvements in the composition of the regime's leading organs. The Soviet letter of 5 June 1981 attacking the moderate Kania-Jaruzelski leadership mobilized the beton for an effective counterattack. Grabski, the leading twardoglowy (hardliner), attempted to oust Kania at an emergency Central Committee plenum. Soon afterwards Kania showed his gratitude for this assassination attempt by seeking to appease the hardliners. He supported their floundering candidatures for delegates' seats at the Party Congress; and during the rest of his administration he largely adopted their confrontationist policies in relation to Solidarity. While Kania's departure from the leadership before martial law suggests that he must at least have held to his stance against the use of force, some of his closest 'moderate' and 'liberal' supporters like Barcikowski and Rakowski seemingly went into the martial law manoeuvre as willing accomplices. Jaruzelski himself, of course, in the eyes of the Church, Solidarity and much of the Western press the leading regime moderate next to Kania, actually led the auto-occupation of December 13, 1981, if, as he said, 'with a heavy heart and great bitterness'. Somewhere in late 1981, perhaps between the first round of the Solidarity Congress in September and Kania's replacement by Jaruzelski as First Secretary in October, the 'moderate' coalition, or its leading lights, made common cause with the police-hardline coalition to wage a Blitzkrieg on the population. They may have felt that this would get Moscow off their backs and that they could later dispense with their hardline bedfellows and work to restore a degree of popular acceptance and respect. Their betrayal of popular trust
('our' army will never take 'their' side against us) they have since presented repeatedly as being a 'tragic necessity'. They seemed to expect relatively early absolution from the Polish people. So far, however, their choice to join the beton against the population seems to have made them just as detested by the public as any hardliners ever were. The 'moderates' failure to regain any degree of genuine legitimacy since martial law presumably tends to reduce their political worth in Moscow's eyes. If the 'moderates' are now hated every bit as cordially as the pro-Soviet hardliners, what exactly are their advantages? Do they bring any greater degree of stablity to the Polish scene from Moscow's point of view? Do they hold out any hope of an early stabilisation along Hungarian lines? And if not, why should they be suffered to continue in office?

The Martial Law Phase

The rage, bitterness and frustration of martial law have led many in Poland and outside to suggest that the 'moderates' are in no way to be preferred to the twardoglowi even if they can be distinguished from them. In what sense can the word 'moderate' be used about acts of war by a regime on its own population? I do not wish to propose General Jaruzelski or Deputy Premier Rakowski for the Nobel Peace Prize. But objectivity compels us to recognise that the reimposition of a totalitarian framework on Polish society since December 1981 has been by Soviet standards far from ruthless. The subjection of Polish society in the late 1940s and the repression of the Hungarian Revolution after 1956 both involved massive loss of life. The Czech re-Stalinisation after 1968 was much less violent, but the rot had not spread as far there, and in any case the Slovaks were not wholly displeased, whilst the Czechs were and are Czechs. It has to be said, I think, that for such a massive undertaking the Polish re-Stalinisation has seen a remarkable restraint observed on both sides. Despite the scale of the operations, there have been few fatalities. The regime estimates the number killed by martial law operations and repression of demonstrations since at 15. The true figure is certainly higher but probably less than in Poznan in 1956 (officially now 75) or the Baltic coast in 1970 (officially 45). Some 14,000 people have been jailed, detained or 'interned' since December 1981, but all but a few dozen have apparently since been released. The recent amnesty has essentially completed the process.

Partly as a consequence of its 'restraint' the regime has not overcome society's resistance, which now appears likely to become chronic and ingrained. After the initial shock, underground activities resumed. Illegal publications are again a mass phenomenon, and while underground Solidarity naturally has nothing of the power or coherence of the Solidarity of 1981, it is significant and surviving, as are a host of other, lesser conspiracies of similar spirit. It must excite the contempt and ridicule of the KGB that the Polish 'organs' have been unable to apprehend all their adversaries even after several years. The military commissar in Polish Radio Television suggested to a meeting of the party faithful in April 1982 that perhaps these Bujaks were hiding in Church establishments, and that catching them might be politically more costly than it was worth. Most Soviet bloc functionaries would feel very unhappy about such explanations. KGB professionals must also have felt keen indignation about the case of KOR member Litynski who was given
compassionate leave to attend his daughter's first communion and then did not return to custody.

There have been numerous more palpable signs of a 'rotten liberalism' at the policy level. The long period of flirtation with the idea of reviving a sanitised 'Solidarity'; the special privileges granted to Walesa and his continuing capacity even now to lead an active political life (compare the underground Solidarity Chairman Bujak's envious comment that Walesa has a quite different range of political possibilities open to him than the underground); the co-operation with the Catholic Church despite the pro-Solidarity militancy of some Bishops and many parish priests; the decision to permit a Papal visit; the refusal to apply administrative measures to the peasantry despite their failure to supply adequate amounts of produce for government purchase agencies; the inscribing of the right to private farming in the Polish Constitution; the retention in the leadership of some liberals and former (?) liberals like Kubiak and Rakowski despite criticism of the latter in a Soviet publication, etc.

Consequently, while it is true that the valorous war fought by Jaruzelski against his own population was an almost unique form of national betrayal, and while it is also true that the policy statements and legislative initiatives of the post martial-law regime have shown a consistent trend towards the neo-Stalinist totalitarian right, there has also been throughout, and still are, traces of a characteristic 'moderation' which is clearly not to the liking of influential circles in Moscow, Poland and elsewhere.

The moderation has, I said, been displayed on both sides. The Poles, despite their imposing track record as courageous rebels, have been distinctly cautious in their reactions to martial law. The industrial working class in the big militant centres have been subdued by the much less numerous (25,000) ZOMO and related units. The involvement of regular army troops has usually been marginal to the main encounters, and the morale of the armed forces in this distasteful repressive role has not really been tested. The resistance has been largely non-violent, and the great bulk of the violence that has occurred has been caused directly or indirectly by ZOMO. There are two obvious reasons for this uncharacteristic public caution: firstly, that Solidarity continues as before December 1981 to reject violence on principle; and secondly, that people still hold back from major confrontations, as before December 1981, because they realise that these would greatly increase the danger of Soviet invasion. But there is, I think, a third reason. It is not that Cardinal Glemp tells them to love their adversaries. It is that they sense that the Polish regime could be much more brutal with them than it has been, and they do not want to provoke them. Public respect for the repressive capacity of the Polish authorities has increased markedly since December 1981, but at the same time, people perceive something of a velvet glove. As a result calculated restraint tends to win out over contempt and desperate rage. The regime is hateful, but it could be worse, and in particular, it could be more brutal. There is thus on both sides, I feel, a small but important element of shadow boxing, an awareness that behind the struggles fought in the public arena, there are still common interests and that the enmity is not total. When deaths do occur, the regime is at pains to wave a small olive branch. Jaruzelski himself publicly expressed regret for the Wujek Murders
ffuta. Now, some policemen have stood trial for the murder of Gregorz Przemyk.

They were unlikely ever to be imprisoned, but the symbolism of the trial was emphatically not Stalinist, and again the 'organs' and their political henchmen must be enraged.

I am not suggesting that people are touched or reassured by gestures of this kind or any other of the regime's 'moderate' features, merely that their rage and hatred levels are thereby modestly, but significantly, reduced so that they continue to opt themselves for less violent responses, peaceful demonstrations, wreaths on graves, floral crosses, going to Church, to Czestochowa and to see the Pope, boycotting the press and the TV, reading bibula (illegal publications), helping their mates, hissing 'collaborators' off the stage, or depositing large heaps of their books outside their front doors. To quote an underground paper: 'Methods used are very mild. For example in ZWAR (a factory outside Warsaw) at the sight of a collaborator, people shout "Poof!"'. However one pronounces and understands this reproach (in Polish the implication is of an affront to the olfactory sense) it is less than deadly. Polish demonstrators confronted with ZOMO shout 'Gestapo', but they must know the parallel is not apt. They also now reportedly chant the near-traditional folk-air 'Jaruzelski bedziesz wisial!' (Jaruzelski you'll hang!). The fact that they do it at all is a telling comment on the nature of the present Warsaw regime when judged by the most rigorous Stalinist standards.

How, then, can we characterise the Jaruzelski regime, and how does it compare with the Budapest and Prague restorations headed by Kadar and Husak respectively? There is no time to be thorough, much less detailed: I will limit myself to some general propositions.

The martial law manoeuvre of December 1981 introduced rigours and restrictions surpassing anything that had yet been seen even in Stalin's Russia. It thereby disarmed 90% of the population which had been organising for 16 months in opposition to it. This operation was in the technical sense a brilliant success. As such it must have given great heart to Moscow and made communist satraps throughout the world feel their grip on power was in the last resort virtually unassailable. After all, seldom could any regime of any description have achieved such total failure and total public contempt as had the Polish regime by late 1981.

Despite the technical brilliance of the martial law manoeuvre, its longer-term achievements have been only modest. Public hostility has not diminished, and overt opposition has regathered strength. The neo-Stalinist institutions like PRON (Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth - the look-alike replacement for the Front of National Unity) and the new trade unions are being massively boycotted. Cultural and intellectual organisations like the Writers Union (ZLP), Filmmakers Union (ZFP), Stage Actors' Union (ZASP), and the Journalists' Association (SDP) refused to respond either to blandishments by Jaruzelski's liberal associates (Rakowski and Kubiak) or to threats and pressures by hardline apparatchiki, and virtually all have had to be banned, like Solidarity. There, too, the extent of the boycott has been remarkable.
In the economic sphere, there was a further 8% decline in production in 1982; despite quite good harvests, total agricultural output is declining; and the basic consumer market remains stricken. In 1982, it was acknowledged, average living standards fell by some 26%. Further price increases were foreshadowed for early 1984, and inflation was acknowledged to be running at about 30% per annum. The regime has by Draconian discipline and preferential treatment for miners increased output substantially in the extractive industries, but the processing industries are still working far below capacity. It was suggested that in 1983 for the first time in five years there would be a small increase in national product. This was, however, more a statistical than a substantive achievement. Certainly doubts remain. The economic reform, the one element in 'socialist renewal' to which the Jaruzelski regime seems at this stage to be still quite genuinely attached, has been introduced only partially, and there is evidently immense opposition to it from the 'teren' (i.e. the apparatus). It may kill the patient before it cures him. Or it may be set aside by reascendant centralism.

Soviet satisfaction with Jaruzelski remains muted. The 'moderation' of the regime in its treatment of its enemies, and its softness on the Church and private farming remain serious causes for dissatisfaction. There is also an apparent Soviet concern about the continuing military presence in civilian administration. Since the ostensible lifting of martial law, the 8,000 military commissars assigned as administrators to Polish factories and institutions have 'returned to their barracks'. But many senior officers remain in key positions of power in the civilian party state apparatus. The only position Jaruzelski has resigned from is Minister of Defence. And the party remains pitifully weak, numerically and otherwise: it has lost 28% of its members - mostly workers and young people - since July 1980. Just as the lifting of martial law seems to have been only cosmetic, the withdrawal of the military could also be reversible. 'Bonapartism' remains a possibility. On the other hand, Moscow's civilian leaders at least should be reassured by the fact that the Jaruzelski regime now strikes fewer pseudo-Pilsudskian accents than it did earlier. Subsequently, too, there were moves suggesting that yet another futile attempt to ideologise the population would be undertaken. The 13th Plenum of the party's Central Committee in October 1983 was devoted to ideology for the first time in twenty years, a youth gathering in Gdansk in early July held in the shadow of the Pope's visit was devoted to a similar theme, and there are suggestions that education should be given a stiff dose of Marxism-Leninism.

Since Soviet reservations about Jaruzelski remain, his own internal opponents are, not surprisingly, still active. In October 1982, Tadeusz Grabinski sent a letter to party Central Committee members from his exile as commercial attache in East Berlin. Grabinski, who had tried to unseat Kania 16 months earlier, was now apparently trying to do the same to Jaruzelski. As in late 1981, it seems that hard-line factional activity is permissible, whereas any other kind is not. It is hard to imagine the liberal former Gdansk party secretary Tadeusz Fiszbach doing the same from his exile in the Polish Embassy in Helsinki. Grabski's effort in October 1982 was not successful, but his turn may yet come. An enigmatic recent item in Polityka announcing the discovery of mineral water deposits near the township of Grabina asked whether this placename was not worth committing to memory as
having the potential for restoring Poland to health. Olszowski, another prominent hardline leader, has been seconded to a second term of upstairs exile as Minister for Foreign Affairs (Gierek did the same to him in the 1970s). And Kociolek, the ultra-hardline Warsaw Party Secretary has been sent as Ambassador to Moscow. Jaruzelski and his 'moderates' may feel happier that these adversaries are far away, but they should remind themselves periodically that Babrak Karmal was sent by his factional opponents as Ambassador to Prague. In any case, even if the Jaruzelski entourage has ensured its survival against coups from the Stalinist right, it has done so largely by adopting most features of the beton platform. The influence of the twardoglowi who remain is manifestly not diminishing.

Thus the Jaruzelski regime has thoroughly alienated the population (though a small awareness of worse alternatives has been instilled); it has done little for the economy; it has only partially placated Moscow; and it has pushed the leading domestic hardliners aside, but perhaps only temporarily, and at the cost anyway of adopting their platform. What if any are its more solid achievements?

We have already noted that it has imposed and maintained an unstable sort of calm, and at the cost of surprisingly few lives. It has docked the Solidarity plant above ground (though without threatening the roots). And it has kept itself in power. But perhaps its most unequivocal achievements have been in its relations with the Catholic Church and the West. From the first day of martial law, the Primate has consistently called upon the population to maintain calm and public order. The regime, for its part, has offered the Church concessions of various kinds, both humanitarian and sectional. It was recently reported, for example, that the Church is the main building investor in Chelm province. The Church's restraining influence has been an important factor in maintaining a public awareness that things could get markedly worse and that discretion is, therefore, still the better part of valour. The bargains that it has made for itself and for society, however, are temporary or at best of uncertain status. Walesa used to like to say that institutional Solidarity was the only guarantor that reforms would be adhered to. The Church is not a guarantor in that sense. The Pope's visit is over; the moves to create a Church-sponsored fund for agriculture are apparently stalled, the amnesty is nearly complete, but the released prisoners can be quickly reincarcerated; permits to construct Churches could be cancelled for lack of building materials; Catholic Intelligentsia Clubs (KIX) and diocesan weeklies can easily be closed down; and so on. The impression remains, as the regime now commences another anti-Church campaign, that it is not the Church that has had the best of the negotiations.

Poland's dealings with the West seemed for long to be proceeding very unfavourably. The general reaction to martial law was highly negative apart from one or two curious observations by Western bankers and political figures like Mr Trudeau and Mr Willy Brandt. Left and Right in the West seemed broadly agreed that martial law was a bad thing. But with time American policies in Western Europe and Central America are blurring some left-wing perceptions of the problem, whilst the establishment Right is gradually coming around to the view of the bankers that commerce must take precedence. The Polish authorities, for their part, have used the sanctions, such as they
were, to explain all their economic problems. Seemingly they have offered the West no political concessions for the resumption of trade credits, unless one is to regard the recent amnesty or the cosmetic 'lifting' of martial law as being such concessions. If you lend someone ten pounds he is in your grasp; if you lend him ten thousand, you are in his. With the international financial system in its present state, the West, it seems, can ill afford to maintain even such a mild sanction as refusing to throw good money after bad. President Reagan is now reported to be taking steps to ensure that Western governments follow Western banks, resuming credits for Poland in the hope that Poland in turn will start paying at least the interest on its debts. Begging creditors, it seems, can't be choosers. Poland is also continuing its efforts to become a member of the IMF. The IMF is very stern with non-communist governments in respect of domestic austerity policies. On that score at least, Jaruzelski should meet their requirements.

Poland's Future: Kadarisation or Husakisation, or What?

In Hungary in 1956, Kadar came to power under direct Soviet sponsorship, after Soviet armed forces had inflicted heavy casualties and thoroughly terrorised the population. (25,000 were killed and 100,000 fled). To the Soviet terror, Kadar initially added his own. Some years later, however, he embarked on a much more liberal course in all respects, and Hungary is now regarded as the best administered country (with the most contented population) in the Soviet bloc. In Czechoslovakia, where there was no effective military resistance, the Soviet occupation authorities decided to proceed by stages. There was no initial terror, but rather a slow slicing of the salami. The liberal reforms and their protagonists were peeled away in stages. A modified 'Stalinism with a human face' was progressively imposed. Despite some pressures from below and a growing economic malaise, the pattern of centralised authoritarianism has been repeatedly reinforced.

The Jaruzelski regime's stated intentions in their more cosmetic versions have been broadly Kadarist, if with a good deal of brusque military paternalism. But there has been no 'short, sharp shock' as in Hungary. The population is somewhat deflated, but is also angry and far from cowed. Unlike Kadar, an ex-political prisoner under Rakosi's communist regime, or even Husak, Jaruzelski is far removed from the type of idealistic prewar communist with a vision of a better future. And, unlike Kadar, Jaruzelski could not recall such people to serve in key positions in a new, reformed administration even if he wanted to. In Poland bureaucratisation and negative selection have had nearly thirty more years in which to kill the impulse to reform. Thus Jaruzelski does not have a population terrorized into obedience, nor a flexible apparatus, nor the economic conditions from which to fashion and implement a Kadarist strategy. Recent Draconian legislation make one wonder whether even the Kadarist intentions are still there. 'Lenient' approaches to the Polish population have been somewhat discredited in the Polish communist mind by recent experience. Gierek treated his opposition groups in the 1970s with much more delicacy than Husak or Brezhnev-Andropov-Chernenko treated theirs. In 1980, he reaped his reward, whilst Husak continues in office and Chernenko ascends (apparently) to ever higher things. Kania tried to reason with Solidarity and look what happened to him. Jaruzelski, for his part, came to the post of Premier and immediately
appointed liberals like Rakowski to high office. The experience of having special government responsibility for dealings with Solidarity has apparently turned Rakowski into a centrist or even a hardliner. What could it have done to Jaruzelski?

Symptomatic in this respect has been the fate of the report of the Commission set up by the Extraordinary Ninth Congress in July 1981 to investigate the causes of the repeated crises in Polish society since 1956. Headed by the markedly liberal sociologist and Politburo member, Professor Hieronim Kubiak, the Commission was a curious blending (like the party organs elected at the Congress) of liberals and hardliners. The Report it produced, however, despite certain references to 'anti-socialist groups' and 'revolutionary vigilance' was a remarkably liberal document, reading in places rather like one of the celebrated DiP (Experience and the Future) analyses of the Gierek years. It seems, however, that both the Report and its Chairman have been brushed aside. If, then, the programmatic declarations of the Jaruzelski regime have been broadly Kadarist, their actions to date have been Husakist. They have, like the Czechoslovak regime, avoided major bloodshed. But with 'loyalty' oaths, sackings, purges, bannings etc., they have imposed a similar pattern of pacificatory destruction in most spheres of life and in tens or hundreds of thousands of human lives. Like the Husak regime, Jaruzelski began by suggesting that some small part of what the people want might be granted them. Like the Husak regime the martial law authorities have reneged. But, unlike Husak, they cannot, within any realistic future timetable, offer Polish citizens the alternative of a retreat into relatively comfortable private consumerism.

Husak, like Kadar, was a former political prisoner under communism, an intellectual, a man with a reputation at the outset for some degree of liberalism and nationalism (albeit Slovakian). He was soon surrounded, however, by hardline watchdogs like Vasil Bilak, who managed to suffocate any impulses Husak may have had to pursue a liberal or independent path. Jaruzelski is beginning to look rather like a Polish Husak, though without the promise of sausages or Sunday driving.

My own view is that neither Husakisation nor a Grabski style coup would pacify Poland for long. Whatever circles must be squared to achieve it, some sort of (more liberal) Kadarisation is the only hope for a tolerably contented and therefore stable Poland under communist administration. Even that, however, may be too little for the Polish population. Solidarity's pluralist, democratic revolution has made a deep impact on Polish awareness. Like young soldiers fallen on the field of battle, Solidarity will not grow old. Its sins will be forgiven and its failures forgotten. Like many a martyr, it is in a sense more dangerous to the regime dead than alive. As Leszek Kolakowski has written, by banning Solidarity, the regime has assured that the name and symbols of Solidarity will 'remain for ever the historical property of the nation'. Any stirring of national or democratic sentiment has from now on a golden age and an ideology to inspire it, a ready-made set of objectives to aim towards, and a long series of precedents to justify, clarify and guide its actions.

See in this respect, the interesting and revealing interview with the former wojewoda of Gdansk, Jerzy Kolodziejski in Polityka 20 August 1983.

The figure of 14,000 is an estimate based on data provided in: Coordinating Office Abroad of NSZZ Solidarnosc The Situation of Trade Unions in Poland (Brussels 1983) pp.4-5.


The commissar's engagingly candid remarks were leaked on tape and published, to the rage of the regime, in Le Monde on April 15, 1982. An English translation recently appeared as 'Colonel Wislicki Speaks' in Survey vol.26 no.3, p.27.


Novoe Vremia, 6 May 1983.

Tygodnik Powszechny, 18 September 1983.


Only 3.1 million members had been dragooned into the new trade unions after nearly a year's efforts (cf. nearly 10 million in Solidarity within a matter of weeks despite much official obstruction). Polityka, 13 August 1983.

Economic statistics recently have become more slippery and elusive than usual. There are at times fleeting intimations of concealed disaster. For example Tygodnik Powszechny reported baldly on 21 August 1983 that 'production in Poland' in July was 11.6% lower than in June. An article discussing an internal bureaucratic working paper attacking the economic reforms quoted it as declaring that 'the economic situation has undergone a tragic deterioration' (Polityka, 2 July 1983). See also Roman Stefanowski 'Poland's Economy: Stagnation rather than Progress' RFE Research Poland SR/13, 26 August 1983.

See, e.g., J. Kleer 'Potyczka o reforme' Polityka, 2 July 1983 p.4. Kleer quotes (with disapproval) an allegation that at least two thirds of Poland's managers (kadra kierownicza) oppose the reforms, and that five sixths simply don't understand them.


15. Tygodnik Powszechny, 23 October 1983.


17. Polityka, 30 July 1983.


21. One of Trudeau's comments on the introduction of martial law was: 'We see unions in Canada asking for more. I don't suppose the union movement in Poland is very different'. Another was that 'the military regime will be able to keep the communist government from excessive repression'. See J.K. Fedorowicz 'Trudeau's Views on Domestic Developments in Poland' in A. Bromke et al. Canada's Response to the Polish Question (Toronto 1982), pp. 33 and ff.


23. See, for example, J.R. Nowak 'How Hungary emerged from Crisis' Polityka, 24 April 1982. Polityka was then edited by Mr Rakowski, Jaruzelski's appointee as Deputy Premier.

24. For a general discussion of the relevance of the Hungarian precedent, see the articles by W. Brus, P. Kende and J. Kis in Aneks no. 31 (1983), pp. 3-56.


26. On the Stalinist legislation that has been introduced to replace (and more than replace) martial law, see RFE Research Situation Report Poland/12 (4 August 1983), p. 2-14.

27. Kubiak shortly after presenting the Report lost his vital position as Central Committee Secretary for Culture. Since then the regime has resorted increasingly to standover tactics in the cultural world. Kubiak's liberal colleague in both the Politburo and the Kubiak Commission, Jan Labecki, was also dismissed from the Politburo and other Party positions. Excerpts from the Kubiak Report are reproduced in English in Survey vol. 26 no. 3, p. 37.
also *The Australian*, 21 September 1983. It is reported that a new, improved, hardline version of the Report has been produced placing the blame for the events of 1980-81 on 'oppositionists' and Western cold warriors. See *Newsweek*, 24 October, p.25.

28 It has been reported, for example, that 1,328 teachers including 1,034 university tutors, have been dismissed as a result of 'verification' procedures. *Wiadomosci Polskie* (Sydney), 15 October 1983.

29 Survey vol.26 no.3, p.4.
CHAPTER TWO
THE MAIN COMPONENTS OF THE SITUATION IN POLAND*
BY
ANDRZEJ WALICKI

On the Eve of Martial Law

Arriving in Australia from Poland three weeks before Martial Law, I had belonged to the pessimistic minority. The hope for a political miracle was not completely alien to me; however, on rational grounds martial law was precisely what I had expected. It was clear to me that martial law was the only alternative to a Soviet invasion. The possibility of a violent revolution was ruled out by everybody except small marginal groups; the non-violent revolution had already achieved a point of no return. No government in the world would be able to survive with such an overwhelmingly powerful extra-parliamentary opposition, as existed by then in Poland, and no society would be able to function in a more or less 'normal' way with the kind of nervous tension which had become a part of everyday life for the great majority of Poles. The release of this enormous tension could be achieved only through free elections, but it was absolutely clear that such a solution, tantamount to the total surrender of communism in Poland, would never be accepted by the Russians. To put it simply, the Polish communist government was not sovereign enough to surrender.

The situation was becoming utterly dangerous. During the first Solidarity congress in September the delegates, taking Walesa by surprise, passed a resolution which appealed to the workers of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to follow the Poles in 'the struggle for free and independent unions'. At the same time the union violently attacked the government's version of the 'worker self-management bill' and threatened to organise a national referendum to decide this question. Soon afterwards, in the second phase of the congress, the bill was reluctantly approved, but not as a working compromise with the party, or as a solution to Poland's economic problems. On the contrary: the delegates hoped, and loudly expressed their hopes, that self-management could be used as a powerful means of political struggle - a struggle to be waged against the party, with the aim of eliminating the trusted party members (the nomenklatura) from the leading positions in industry and in administration. This was in tune with the strange theory of Jacek Kuron; a theory which claimed that Poland could be organised from below as a 'self-governing republic', while leaving full control over the security forces, the army and foreign policy in the hands of the communist government.

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It was assumed, quite wrongly, of course, that such a solution would be acceptable from the point of view of the security interests of the Soviet Union. Politically it was seen as a step towards the 'finlandisation' or rather, semi-finlandisation of Poland. In contrast to Finland, it was argued, Poland would remain a member of the Warsaw Pact, and the communist party would retain the most important attributes of political power; on the other hand, however, in the sphere of purely internal socio-economic and cultural affairs Poland was to be given full autonomy from communist control. Its inner development was to be shaped by 'free social movements', and not by the blueprints of the communist party and the commands of the communist government.

If Poland were not part and parcel of the Soviet empire (and an extremely important part, be it added) these demands would be extremely moderate; one would ask only why a powerful, all-national movement demanded so little, and how it would be possible to combine a fully fledged participatory democracy on the local level with a communist-dominated government and, more important, with full communist control over the coercive powers of the state. In the existing situation, however, these demands were not moderate at all - they meant in practice that communist power in Poland should be reduced to safeguarding the interests of the Warsaw Pact. How could it be expected that the Soviet Union would accept such a curious arrangement? Many people, especially those who remembered the post-war period in Poland and the period of Stalinism which followed, saw it as absolutely impossible. But the younger generation, i.e. the majority of the Poles, did not want to listen to them: for them the argument about the impossibility of such a radical change - an impossibility stemming from the very nature of Soviet 'big brother' authority over Poland - was completely discredited, since for many years it had been used and abused by the government. 'Realistic' considerations became suspect, politically and morally. People started to ask questions: What is the function of 'political realism' in Poland? - Is it not a means of protecting one's privileges, or, at least, an excuse for one's passivity? How can we know what is really impossible without testing the limits of the possible?

In this way political realism had to give way before a powerful new wave of traditionally Polish 'political romanticism'. The events of 1980-81 were preceded by a long period of increasing popularity for the classics of Polish romantic literature. An outspokenly romantic variety of nationalism was propagated on the pages of the underground publications of the Young Poland Movement - a movement born among the young intelligentsia of the Gdansk region. Most of the younger Poles would have agreed with Mickiewicz, our great national poet, that 'reasonableness' is good in the daily life of an individual but not enough in times of national emergency: in such times one should be obedient to a higher reason whose spokesmen are those making heroic sacrifices for the sake of duty.

Let us return, however, to the last months of 1981. It became ever more clear that a confrontation was imminent. Walesa did not want it, but he was in the minority. Numerous underground publications were putting forward increasingly radical demands; they were distributed almost freely and in most cases did not conceal the names of their editors and authors, which created the atmosphere of an open challenge. The mood of the masses was shown on All
Saints' Day (November 1) when almost every inhabitant of Warsaw visited the historical cemetery of Powazki to pay homage to the heroes of the Warsaw uprising and to commemorate symbolically the martyrs of Katyn - seven thousand Polish prisoners-of-war, all officers, who had been murdered by the Russians in 1940. The Confederation For Independent Poland - a radically nationalist organisation presenting itself as the heir to Marshal Pilsudski's ideas - was more and more influential and more and more ostentatiously visible in the ranks of Solidarity. At the end of November fifteen prominent Solidarity members (including Andrzej Gwiazda) resigned from their positions to protest against Walesa's 'too conciliatory stand'. On December 6 the Warsaw regional branch of Solidarity set December 17 as a day of protest against the recent police raid on the firefighters' academy and, in addition, called for the establishment of a force of 'permanent worker guards to protect us in the future'. Next day Warsaw radio broadcast a tape-recording of a closed Solidarity leadership meeting in Radom: it was intended to show that Solidarity was advocating the overthrow of the government and that the secret police were well informed about everything. On December 11 Solidarity's national commission met in Gdansk and, the following day, voted for two radical resolutions.

First, that December 17 would be a day of a nation-wide political strike. (Karol Modzelewski, an important Solidarity adviser, said: 'This will be the day of their last struggle').

Second, that a nationwide referendum would be held in February in which the population of Poland would answer four questions:

1. Are you in favour of expressing a vote of no-confidence in the government of General Jaruzelski?
2. Would you favour a provisional government and free elections?
3. Are you in favour of Solidarity and the provisional government guaranteeing the Soviet Union's military interests?
4. Can the PUWP be the instrument of such guarantees in the name of the entire society?

A few hours later the delegates found that their means of communication were being cut off. It became clear that the government had acted too quickly for them. Walesa was reported to have said to his more radical colleagues: 'Now you've got the confrontation you've been looking for'.

Could such an outcome have been predicted and taken into account beforehand? Obviously, yes. A year before, in December 1980, everything had been prepared for a Soviet invasion: the troops were in a state of readiness, and even the hospitals in Belorussia and the Ukraine were prepared to receive wounded soldiers. Since the intervention had not materialised, it could and should have been suspected that the Soviets had received firm assurances that 'real socialism' would not be allowed to collapse in Poland. And indeed, nothing could be clearer in the Autumn of 1981. After the Solidarity congress
a soldier was shown on TV solemnly pledging that the Polish army was ready to defend 'socialism'. The party press repeatedly hinted that martial law was the only alternative to foreign invasion or even to a new partition of Poland. In October Stanislaw Kania, the man who had pledged not to shed Polish blood, resigned as First Secretary of the party. On November 29 Jaruzelski frankly told the Central Committee that a 'state of war' was being seriously considered. A few days earlier he had talked in Warsaw with Marshal Kulikov, commander of the Warsaw Pact forces: Marshal Kulikov was to be a frequent visitor to Warsaw during the days ahead. All these warnings, however, were felt by the people as provocations or as awkward attempts to intimidate them - in a word, as something which could only strengthen their resolve. People did not want to abandon their hopes and, therefore, easily credited the irresponsible gossip spread by a variety of so-called 'well-informed persons' - among them some Western journalists and tourists. It was believed that in fact the Soviet Union had already been compelled to make a deal with the US, which allegedly included a Soviet agreement to the 'auto-finlandisation' of Poland. Almost nobody believed that the Polish army would support the police against Solidarity. Almost nobody took into account the possibility that young soldiers, isolated in barracks, might respond positively to the arguments of their superiors and see martial law as the only way of saving Poland from foreign invasion; that these arguments, even if not entirely convincing, might prove strong enough at least to prevent an open breakdown of military discipline. In a word, the strength of the adversary and his determination to defend himself were grossly underestimated.

After December 12 - the day when Solidarity's national leadership voted for a general strike and a nationwide referendum - the authorities could wait no longer. Nobody could have any illusions as to the results of the referendum: it would be nothing less than the utter humiliation of the party. After such a crushing defeat the party would no longer be acceptable as a partner in a dialogue, let alone as a monarch allowed to reign, though not to govern. From the Soviet point of view to hesitate any longer would have amounted to a cowardly betrayal of socialism.

Many people cherished a romantic illusion that Jaruzelski, who was seen as a decent man and a patriot, would rather commit suicide than turn against his own nation. They disregarded the fact that in politics the traditional code of honour is, and should be, much less important than the Weberian 'ethic of responsibility'; they were not imaginative enough to realise that Jaruzelski's understanding of his responsibilities and duties might be different from theirs.

For me martial law came as a shock but not as a surprise; a tragedy, perhaps a fatal mistake, but not simply a crime. I felt that there was something false in the indignant moralism of US Secretary of State Haig and President Reagan. Professional politicians, having no illusions as to the nature of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe, should have been able to predict this outcome, to understand its reasons, and not to present it, indignantly, as an unexpected and unprovoked attack on a 'politically non-ambitious' trade-union movement. In fact, however, matters were even worse. An article in Newsweek (December 20, 1982) revealed that the American government had had a spy at Polish army headquarters, had known all details of
the plan for the military crackdown and had deliberately refrained from warning Solidarity leaders. The reason for this restraint was, allegedly, the personal security of the spy. All right, but the question arises: was there no other possible way of warning Solidarity than by showing them documents from the Polish General Staff?

The article in Newsweek ends thus:

One of the legends of World War II is that Winston Churchill decided not to defend the cathedral of Coventry against a Nazi air raid in order to protect the Ultra secret: that the Allies had broken the German code. In the cold war of the 1980s, Solidarity may have served as a Coventry. The parallel is not quite adequate, but I would rather not comment on it. I can easily understand why it was not in the interests of the US to warn Solidarity. I think, however, that cold 'Realpolitik' should not be combined with excessive moralism; otherwise it comes too close to moral cynicism.

What I have said is only a kind of introduction to my theme. My topic is extremely broad, multi-dimensional, and I do not feel competent to talk about everything in one essay. Therefore, I shall give you only a general view of the economic aspect of the Polish crisis, concentrating instead on its political, ideological and psychological aspects.

What I want to say can be divided into four parts:

1. The party and the system of 'partocracy'.
2. A few remarks on the historically formed national character of the Poles.
3. The attitudes of the main strata of the population: the workers, the intelligentsia and the peasants.
4. The effects of martial law and the prospects for the future.

The Party and the System of 'Partocracy'

In its classical totalitarian form communism is aggressively ideological. Communist 'partocracy' derives its legitimacy from a kind of secularised religion - a religion of earthly salvation in history through the messianic vanguard of the working class. This is why totalitarian communist rule is felt by non-communists as peculiarly oppressive. At the classical totalitarian stage communist rulers were not satisfied with external obedience, they tried to indoctrinate people, and to achieve this they resorted to most brutal pressures, combining physical threats with moral intimidation: 'If you are not with us, you are, objectively, an enemy of the people, a slave of your class-interests, and you will find yourself in the
garbage-can of history'. People who resisted this pressure perceived communist ideology as a lie, and the entire system as based upon a lie, trying to internalise this lie and thus to enslave us from within. And indeed, consistently totalitarian communism is an attempt to kill our innermost freedom - freedom of conscience, to save us from ourselves, to create in each individual an utterly repressive, politically controllable ideological super-ego, an 'inner policeman', who controls not only our actions but our thoughts and emotions as well.

This was the ideal which the communists were trying to realise in Poland in the period of so-called Stalinism. They were not particularly successful but at least succeeded in indoctrinating themselves. This gave them a feeling of self-confidence, stemming from faith in their historical mission, and this self-confidence endowed them with a certain authority in the eyes of the people. They were generally feared, often hated, but not held in contempt. Enthusiastic support for their rule was rare, but active ideological resistance on a mass scale was also weak, and public shows of faked enthusiasm were easily organised.

The 'Polish October' of 1956 did not destroy the system of 'partocracy' in Poland. Nevertheless, it set in motion certain processes which explain the peculiar features of de-Stalinisation in Poland. The PZPR under Gierek was very different from the Stalinist party of the early fifties.

Three processes, had, I think, brought about this change: (1) a process of de-ideologisation, (2) a process of the irrational bureaucratisation of the 'partocracy', and finally (3) a process of increasing, although superficial and ambiguous, disalienation of the party.

The first is probably the easiest to explain. The Polish thaw of 1955-56 shook the very foundations of communist ideology. It was greatly supported, of course, by Khrushchev's 'secret speech' but went much further and deeper than the thaw in the Soviet Union. The Polish party leader, Gomulka, genuinely believed in communism, but even he, in accordance with his 'nationalist deviation', contributed to the process of de-ideologisation by tending to emphasise purely Polish problems: he derived the legitimacy of communist rule in Poland not so much from Marxist doctrine but rather from his conviction that Polish communists had the merit of saving the political existence of Poland, which pre-war bourgeois parties had put in mortal danger and finally lost. The party as a whole quickly became more and more pragmatic, a process resisted both by dogmatic hard-liners and by the young revisionists who wanted to keep ideology alive by improving it. The hardliners, however, quickly became cynical rather than dogmatic and the revisionists more and more disappointed; the anti-Semitic campaign of 1968 added the proverbial last straw to their increasing disillusionment. One can safely say, therefore, that dogmatic Marxism was already dead in Poland in 1956, while the last hour of the prolonged agony of revisionism struck in 1968.

What was left after this almost complete ideological breakdown was a narrowly conceived political realism, based upon geo-political considerations.
We were told, quite unashamedly, that the party had to remain in power simply and solely because Poland could exist as a separate state within its existing boundaries only with the help of the Soviet Union, as a part of the Soviet empire, and the Soviet Union would only tolerate a communist-run Polish state. However, such a legitimisation of communism in Poland was not enough for the younger people who had not experienced the catastrophe of World War II; nor was it enough to protect the party against rapidly growing demoralisation. For the party, political realism was a poor substitute for a genuine faith in its mission; in fact the only thing which followed from realistic political considerations was not that the communist party was something good in itself, but only that it was the lesser evil, as far as Poland was concerned. No wonder, therefore, that such a self-image was not able to imbue party members with a healthy self-confidence, to enable them to cherish comfortable illusions about themselves. What was left to them was only the conviction that their ruling position was legitimised by Realpolitik and firmly backed by the existing agreements between the superpowers — nothing else. This explains, in my view, both their stubbornness in keeping power and their inner weakness and hesitations, their lack of self-respect and their inability to compel respect from the non-communist majority.

The second process — that of the irrational bureaucratisation of the 'partocracy' — was originally a reaction against the arbitrary use of personal power, characteristic of Stalinism. The rule of men, it was argued, should be replaced by the rule of law. Quite correct, but law was, on the one hand, crudely politicised, i.e. reduced to the role of an instrument of the current 'party line', and, on the other hand, identified with a constantly growing and changing multiplicity of bureaucratic-administrative rules, often completely impractical, contradicting each other or even grotesquely nonsensical. The results of this were manifold. First, it entailed the almost complete disappearance of economic rationality. It was inevitable in a situation where people were responsible not for the results of their activity but only for the observance of rules; where the director of a badly run factory could feel secure, while the director of an innovative, well-run factory could be fired if somebody, say, an envious colleague or a conservative apparatchik, accused him of ignoring absurd rules. Second, since life has its laws and without ignoring certain rules no economic activity would have been possible, people became accustomed to the rule of fiction: to breaking rules in fact while giving the impression of observing them. And it was possible: nobody was powerful enough to enforce the abolition of absurd rules since their existence, even as a fiction, was usually bound up with certain group interests; on the other hand, however, every smart manager or apparatchik would find ways of evading them. Third, the economy adjusted itself to absurdities: thus, for instance, the rules said that global production of machinery should be measured in tons, and industry adapted itself to this by making machines as heavy as possible and not producing light spare parts at all. The most fatal rule was, of course, the general rule in accordance with which productive output, in order to be treated as a fulfilment of the plan and a contribution to GNP, needed to be accepted not by the market but only by a bureaucratic body. This was, naturally, a powerful incentive to bad work, the production of things which were good for nothing except the boosting of statistical figures, fulfilling plans on paper only, bribing bureaucrats, and so forth.
This very demoralising state of affairs was not confined to the party; it was a deep and almost universal demoralisation of society as well. If certain things, like cement or spare parts, were necessary but not available on the market, they had either to be stolen or to be obtained as a special privilege. Party apparatchiks could influence decisions but non-party managers often knew better how to get things done. No wonder that the apparatchiks were closely integrated at different levels with non-party members in a 'community of dirty interests'. At the lowest level it involved, as a rule, direct bribery, but at higher levels it used to be more elegant. Politically influential persons had their clients whom they rewarded for their services by ensuring a measure of tolerance for their semi-legal economic activities, by allotting them special coupons for which they could buy certain things, like cars, without waiting many years and for prices much lower than the market prices, and so forth.

In this manner the omnipresence of aggressive ideological lies was replaced by the omnipresence of de-ideologised legal and statistical fiction, covering the dirty realities of life. True, not only the party but Polish society as a whole was gradually becoming a part of this system. It does not mean, however, that the system became acceptable: on the contrary, in the majority of cases even those people who were quite ready to draw personal profits from dirty practices hated these practices and dreamed of a truly honest life. The lies and fictions were universally hated. At the end of the seventies it was really infuriating to hear that, according to statistical data, the consumption of meat in Poland was almost on the same level as in the West. Even some Western journalists believed this and described the Poles as being 'aggressively carnivorous'. We know now that the alleged meat consumption per head included all inedible parts of the living animal, as well as cattle before slaughtering — an important addition because cattle waiting for slaughter were not being fed and losing much of their weight. This is a typical example of how statistics were used to embellish reality.

The final result was a complete economic mess, accompanied by widespread and increasingly aggressive frustration in society. Huge foreign loans aggravated the situation, because the inconvertible Polish zloties could not be used for repayments and Polish products were, as a rule, too bad to earn hard currency. And if they were good enough, they were destined for export only, which was, of course, extremely harmful to the domestic market. An example is the case of Polish tractors which Polish peasants could buy for dollars only.

The third of the above mentioned processes was closely bound up with de-ideologisation. A militantly ideological party had been felt by the overwhelming majority of Poles as a completely alien body, and it was the process of de-ideologisation which had removed some of the important psychological barriers dividing party members from non-party members. The party tried to take advantage of this, to manipulate non-party members by presenting itself as a truly national party, embracing national values, appealing to patriotism and national solidarity. This policy was only partially successful. The communists were wrong in believing that Polish patriotism, or nationalism, could be harnessed to serve the aims of a cautious Realpolitik, giving up the dream of true national self-determination. In 1968
the hardliners led by General Moczar appealed to Polish national feeling, trying to direct it against their rivals from the so-called 'Jewish faction' of the party. Unexpectedly for them, these demagogic appeals, followed by appropriate changes in cultural policy (more emphasis on national tradition, a tendency to look for positive values in traditional Polish patriotism, including its outspokenly anti-communist variety) greatly contributed to a genuine national revival in Poland which very soon became a powerful ally of the non-communist opposition. The year 1968 was the victory of Moczar but, at the same time, it was by then that the left-wing dissidents - the ex-revisionists, like Kuron, or spiritual children of the revisionists, like Michnik - decided to swear allegiance to national values and to become democratic nationalists. This was the key to their future success.

It would not be fair to say that the party's flirtation with nationalism was merely a tactical move, or that it served only the cause of the anti-Semitic hardliners. As a mass organisation (3 million members) the party was not immune to national feelings and sincerely wanted a kind of national legitimation of its rule. This was, I think, one of the reasons for its unprecedented concessions in August 1980 and for its quite prolonged reluctance to resort to the use of force. Of course, it was also the main reason why simple party members, i.e. non-apparatchiks, were so unreliable by then in supporting the party leadership: many of them supported 'Solidarity' and the majority preferred simply to disappear from public life.

The Extraordinary Congress of the party, held in July 1981, did not bring any satisfactory solutions for Polish problems. Nevertheless, the delegates were elected through a free and secret balloting process and themselves voted to use secret ballots in elections for party leadership. Thus, the PWP opened itself, as it were, to the will of its own rank and file and made its leadership dependent on pressure from below. This was another unprecedented event in the history of the Soviet bloc. Andrzej Szczypiorski, one of the leaders of intellectual opposition in Poland, wrote of it: 'For Poles of the 1970s the present party would have been the realisation of their most ardent aspirations'. But, he added, the Poles of 1981 were no longer a nation which wants to be ruled - they had become a nation that wants to rule itself.

A few remarks on the historically formed national character of the Poles

Thus, the party's flirtation with nationalism not only misfired but backfired. Why it had to be so can be explained, I think, by some peculiarities of Polish history and the historically formed national character of the Poles.

It has become very fashionable to take pride in the Polish past, especially in the libertarian traditions of the 'democracy of the gentry', and in opposing these traditions to the traditions of the Russian autocracy. Indeed, it seems relevant to remind readers that for three centuries the Polish gentry, that is, about 10 per cent of the entire population of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and more than 20 per cent of the Catholic population of this federal state, enjoyed full civil and political rights, including the right to elect their own king and to make him answerable for observing the limitations to his power.
All these facts are well remembered by those intellectuals, and not only intellectuals, who have joined the 'Solidarity' movement. Many of them saw this movement as the new embodiment of the 'republican spirit' of the old Polish gentry, insisting on the principle 'nothing about us without us'. On the other hand, characteristically enough, the supporters of authoritarian governments in Poland also drew arguments from Polish history, pointing out that too much freedom, having degenerated into anarchy, resulted in the inevitable downfall of the Polish state. Such arguments were used and abused both by the pre-war Polish Right and by the post-war communist rulers of Poland.

There is some truth, I think, in both the optimistic and the pessimistic views of the Polish historical heritage. However, in order to understand the genesis of some clearly visible features of the national character of the Poles it is not necessary to dwell upon the libertarian traditions of the ancient Polish Commonwealth. The virtues and faults of contemporary Poles can be explained in the light of nineteenth-century Polish history. Nineteenth-century Poles, especially in the first half of the century, were still a nation of the gentry, lacking the bourgeois capacity for well-organised hard work, but having instead an acute feeling of national humiliation, finding expression in outbursts of emotional patriotism. There was no well-organised civil society, no large-scale 'Gesellschaft', in early nineteenth-century Poland; there was instead a nation-wide, Gemeinschaft-like fraternity of the gentry, a federation of local neighbourhoods, a strong social cohesiveness based upon personalised, face-to-face relationships. In such conditions the great romantic national awakening, which was a reaction to the partitions of Poland, found an outlet not in patient civilising activity (as among the Czechs), but in heroic, spectacular deeds, such as national uprisings, fighting for the freedom of other nations, public demonstrations of national feeling, symbolic gestures, and so forth. The force of emotional patriotism was very great and by no means confined to the gentry - in the great uprisings of 1830-31 and 1863-64 the plebeian masses of Warsaw, Cracow, Poznan, Wilno, Lvov, and other towns with Polish populations, were indeed, along with the poor or landless gentry, most radical in their patriotic demands. The peculiar quality of this kind of patriotism was extolled by our great messianic poet, Mickiewicz, who insisted that Poles were capable of doing miracles, but only with the help of enthusiasm and exaltation. Another great poet, Cyprian Norwid, clearly saw the other side of the coin, namely the fact that Poles could be splendid only when inspired by a strong, idealistic motivation, and that without such motivation they were miserably inadequate. Under the influence of patriotic demonstrations in Warsaw on the eve of the uprising of 1863 his awareness of the sharp, grotesque contrast between 'Poland as a nation' and 'Poland as a society' had become most acute. According to Norwid, the Poles were supreme as a nation, because their heroism in crucial moments was superb; they were meanest as society because they were deficient in the virtues of will and character indispensable in normal, everyday life. Let me quote:

This is the Polish society! - this is the nation which is undeniably great as far as patriotism is concerned but which as a society represents nothing.
Everything which concerns patriotic and historical feelings is so great and so noble in this nation that I am ready to raise my hat before an urchin of Warsaw — but everything which one can expect not from the national but from the social feelings is merely budding here and so insignificant, almost mean, that I fear even to think about it.

We are no society at all.

We are a great national banner.

Perhaps some good people will hang me some time for these truths, but even if I have today a halter on my neck I would say, chokingly, that Poland is the first nation and the last society on earth.

It is fascinating to see how little the Poles have changed since the time these words were written. Norwid’s diagnosis has found spectacular confirmation in the works of contemporary Polish sociologists, who — using the methods of modern American sociology — have examined the attitudes and state of mind of the citizens of the People’s Republic of Poland. The main result of their works was well summarised recently by Professor Stefan Nowak. He has found that an overwhelming majority of Poles do not identify with the institutions in which they work, do not think in terms of public good on the institutional level. Their loyalties and their feelings of belonging are two-sided. First, they belong and are loyal to different primary face-to-face groups — from the family and groups of friends to informal cliques, mafias, and other personalised groups pursuing their interests in a half-legal, or illegal way. From this lowest level of integration we have a sudden leap to the highest, most abstract and most sublimated, symbolic level: the level of national solidarity. Thus, an average Pole does not belong to a large-scale institutionalised civil society; he belongs to different primary groups and, secondly, he belongs to his nation; not a nation as a system of political and economic institutions, but a nation as national tradition, national culture, the sphere of uniting symbols, of sublimated, lofty patriotic feelings.

Another Polish sociologist, Professor Podgorecki, now living in the West, has summarised his empirical investigations in a very similar way. He has found that Polish individualism is in fact an ‘extended individualism’, by which he means strong identification of the individual with different primary groups. In conditions of highly centralised bureaucratic socialism this attitude had degenerated into a ‘dirty togetherness’, that is, into loyalty in pursuing individual or group interests without regard for the nominally accepted rules of honest behaviour. On the other hand, the same people preserved the traditional Polish attitude of ‘spectacular principledness’. Podgorecki describes this attitude as follows:

By spectacular principledness we mean the attitude which not only approves a given norm or value for its own sake, but which also celebrates certain norms or values because they are considered sacred and symbolically significant. The clear tendency of the Poles is to accord particular respect to everything connected with the fatherland, political independence, the suffering of the nation throughout its
The words quoted were published in 1979, i.e. before the historic 'Polish August' of 1980. After this date we have seen many extreme expressions of what Podgorecki has called the 'spectacular principledness' of the Poles. National banners and singing the national anthem on the occasion of every strike, however minor, the tendency to make a matter of principle of everything, in spite of the verbal acceptance of the necessity for pragmatic compromises - all these phenomena are, I think, clear evidence that the Polish workers, united in 'Solidarity', have become a 'national class' not only in the sense of representing all national interests, but also in the sense of inheriting the traditional virtues and faults of the Polish national character.

We can say that both Nowak and Podgorecki have described contemporary Poles as schizohpenically divided between the egoism - very often 'dirty egoism' - of small primary groups and an idealistic, romantic devotion to patriotic values. There was, certainly, a moral conflict between the two attitudes. The seventies were the period of a spectacular blossoming of the 'dirty egoism' of different particular-interest groups, resulting in universal demoralisation, whereas in 1980 we witnessed a strong reaction against this - a reaction in which some features of 'spectacular principledness' can easily be found.

To sum up. The historically conditioned Polish national character was, I think, peculiarly uncongenial to Soviet-type socialism. 'Real socialism' could not but fail in Poland for at least two reasons (among other things, of course). In the first place, it did not appeal to national feelings, was felt as something imposed from without, depriving us of our inner independence (let alone independence in conducting our foreign affairs); it could not mobilise Polish patriotism, and Polish society clearly lacked the German ability to do honest, well-organised work under any government. Secondly, the centralised bureaucratic model of socialism made it impossible honestly to pursue private interests, to create conditions for positive selection in the process of getting rich. In this way what was bad became much worse and what was good had small chance to survive, let alone develop.

It is true that demoralisation of this kind is not something peculiar to Poland - it exists on a similar scale in the Soviet Union, and in Romania it is probably even worse. 'Real socialism' as such, as a system, is characterised by an increasing "criminalisation" of economic life which in most cases is now considered normal by the population itself (even in countries where earlier a strong work-ethic and a norm of honest business has predominated). What is peculiar to Poland, however, is the possibility of the peaceful co-existence of these attitudes with a strong public-spirited patriotism. Because of this the 'Solidarity' revolution, in spite of Walesa's exhortations, did not entail improvements in habits of work nor in the entire sphere of economic conduct. On the one hand, we had millions of public-spirited people, bravely demanding political and other changes, while, on the
other hand, the economy was rapidly sinking, dishonest practices were flourishing, and national energy was not channelled into overcoming the disastrous economic crisis.

Attitudes of the Main Strata of the Population

The most important difference between the 'Polish October' of 1956 and the 'Polish August' of 1980 is obvious. In 1956 the prime movers of change were certain elites: the liberally inclined elite within the party, acting with the support of a significant part of the military elite, plus the intellectuals. In 1980 the situation was quite different. While paying due respect to organisations created by the intellectuals, such as KOR (Committee For the Defence of the Workers) and others, there is no possible doubt that the 'Polish August' and the creation of Solidarity were the achievement of the workers, led by their own, natural, grass-roots leaders.

Many Western observers, especially on the left, had great difficulty in understanding why the Polish workers so eagerly committed themselves to all-national patriotic aims and why their patriotism turned out to be so strongly influenced by Catholicism, why, in a word, the aims of Solidarity became symbolised by the Polish eagle, the Polish Pope and the miraculous icon of the Black Madonna.

In fact, it can be easily explained, I think, even from a Marxist standpoint. According to Marx and Engels, a mature working class was destined to become a 'national class', i.e. that class in a nation whose interests at a given time coincide with the interests of society as a whole. And it was clear to them that for a country lacking national or political freedom the problem of liberty must be of primary importance, because, as Engels put it, 'in order to be able to fight one needs first a soil to stand on, air, light, and space. Otherwise all is idle chatter'. Thus, the ardent patriotism of the Polish workers and their commitment to the cause of political freedom for the whole nation should be seen by Marxists not as something strange but as evidence of their coming of age and readiness to assume the role of a 'national class'.

What about ideology? The vocabulary of Marxist socialism has been monopolised, as it were, by the party; it has for long been seen as a completely dead, ossified language, the language of official lies, and a strong reaction against it should be readily understood. The attraction of Catholicism is also understandable: the Polish Church, in contrast to the churches in other 'real socialist' countries, has entirely succeeded in defending its independence and has thereby become the most powerful defender of the Polish national identity. The fascination with free market mechanisms, characteristic of many Solidarity leaders, is explicable, in turn, as a reaction against the absurdities of a bureaucratic command economy.

At this juncture, however, it is necessary to stress that Solidarity had no consistent ideology and that on the subconscious level it was much more socialist than on the conscious. From my personal point of view its socialism was much too populist and not liberal enough; too collectivistic in its ethos,
too egalitarian, too much concerned with distribution and not enough with productivity, putting too much emphasis on material justice and not enough on formal justice, and so forth. It could applaud champions of the free market, but in practice it demanded more distributive justice, more social policy protection for the weak, and accepted unemployment only on condition that unemployed workers should receive their earlier average income. Its program demanded not only drastically progressive taxation but also the setting of a legal maximum limit on personal property, quite irrespective of its source, and, consequently, a partial expropriation of the well-to-do, that is, people who had more than one flat, more than one cottage in the country, and so forth. The very idea of 'Solidarity' was understood as a collective guarantee that no worker would be deprived of his essential standard of living and, further, that no worker, no group of workers, would reach relative affluence unless the rest of the working class did so, too. It is difficult to imagine free competition between self-managing factories in such conditions. In theory the union embraced the liberal idea of separating the economy from politics; in practice, however, this meant the replacement of bureaucratic control over the economy by its own control. It wanted not only freedom as autonomy but also freedom as participation and took for granted that all spheres of social life, including the economy, could be regulated by conscious decision-making. Thus, it set forth a program of maximal democratisation of control over the economy, but not a program limiting the scope of this control and subjecting workers to the anonymous and implacable rules of the free market.

This spontaneous and deeply rooted socialist populism of Solidarity members had two aspects. The first, manifesting itself in the attitudes of the workers' elite, was a striving for a genuine socialist ideal, as opposed to the existing reality; the other aspect, characteristic of the average mentality, can be described as a product of the existing system.

What I mean by this second aspect is a somewhat excessive emphasis on security and equality, combined with a grossly exaggerated belief in the power of political decisions. The existing system had compromised the very idea of meritocracy: people ceased to see any connection between a good income and good work, competence or talent, and became accustomed to treating a higher income not as the result of merit but solely as an unjust privilege, or as the result of skill in dishonest practices. No wonder, therefore, that the idea of a maximum equalisation of wages - an idea which is always very attractive to the mediocre - came to be identified with social justice. Secondly, the government and the party had for so many years presented themselves as virtually omnipotent, responsible for everything and 'giving' everything to the population, that at a time of economic crisis the first reaction of the man in the street was: if everything depends on the government and the party let us exert pressure on them and force them to improve the situation. The government reacted to this by stressing the limits of its real power, but such arguments, as well as its appeals for an increase in the productivity of labour, were often too easily dismissed. Thus, the ironic result of the extreme politicisation of the economy under 'real socialism' was a tendency to make unrealistic economic demands and a widespread belief in the importance of purely political means of fighting the economic crisis.
Of course, the maximum equalisation of wages obviously went against the interests of the workers' aristocracy, especially miners and shipyard workers. Nevertheless - and in this I see the influence of both socialist idealism and the feeling of patriotic responsibility - these relatively privileged groups of workers did not even try to fight for their particular interests; they rejected special offers made to them by the government and instead embraced the cause of the working-class as a whole and, indeed, the cause of a revival involving the whole nation. This was not a 'trade-union mentality' in Lenin's sense of the term, but much more. On the other hand, it was surprising how disciplined the masses were. Mass mobilisation during the Solidarity revolution was extremely widespread, feelings ran very high, but, in spite of this, no-one was physically injured and no property damaged. Finally, the evolution of the movement was most instructive: it developed quite spontaneously, towards acceptance of the idea of workers' councils, as envisaged by the young Lukacs or the young Gramsci. In fact Solidarity organisations were striving to transform themselves into organs of political and economic self-government, i.e. into workers' councils. Kuron's idea of a 'self-governing republic' was interpreted by the workers in just this way and no peculiarly Polish ideological complications should obscure this picture.

I am very sceptical of Council Communism and I personally regret that Solidarity did not develop as an ordinary trade union movement of the Western type. I think that such a course would, perhaps, have made its co-existence with the government and the party more secure and have endangered its great initial achievements less. Nevertheless, I can recognise, especially from a distance, something monumentally great and monumentally tragic in this unusual movement.

Let me pass now to another numerous sector of the Polish population, the peasants. A well-known peculiarity of People's Poland is the fact that its peasantry is not collectivised. The number of rural cooperatives (kolkhozes) is very small and their productivity is much less than the productivity of individual farmers; the same is true of the state farms, although they are better supplied with machinery by the state, receive more fertilizer per hectare and even pay less for many things, such as diesel fuel, than private farmers. This does not mean, however, that private agriculture was flourishing in Poland - quite the contrary. The peasants had become increasingly dependent on the nationalised sector of the economy and increasingly involved in the destructive mechanism of the bureaucratic command economy. It was easier for them to buy a private car than a tractor, because cars were available, although for astronomic prices, on the free market, whereas it was necessary to wait several years for a tractor or to buy it for dollars. They wanted to modernise their farms, but the necessary materials were unobtainable; even fertilizers were rationed; moreover, every transaction with the bureaucratised state agencies involved a tremendous waste of precious time. The peasants' reactions to such economic absurdities were quite rational but could not help to overcome the overall irrationality. Let me give a few examples of this. To the lack of tractors the peasants reacted by organising the illegal production of home-made tractors; this, however, was possible only through the organised, systematic stealing of certain parts from tractors produced by the state factory in Ursus. The government decided to give special pensions to those peasants who gave their farms to the state,
The majority of peasants reacted to this policy by producing a little of everything, so that if they happened to lose on the production of, say, wheat, they could make up for their loss in the production of potatoes, or vice versa. An additional risk of government-promoted specialisation of production consisted in the unreliability of the state as a partner to the contract. This lack of confidence in the state found spectacular confirmation at the time of crisis: those peasants who were courageous and confident enough to specialise in the production of meat suffered great losses when the state ceased to provide them with the contracted quantities of American fodder.

At the end of the '70s the peasants began to organise themselves in defence of their interests. A number of Farmers' Self-Defence Committees were founded, demanding calculability of law, greater investments to promote individual farming, the removal of the most glaring absurdities in rural policy, and so forth. Severe criticism of the official United Peasant Party, as a completely fictitious representative of the peasants, was followed by demands for freedom of association, greater freedom for the Church and, above all, the right to have a say in all decisions concerning agriculture. Particular attention was paid also to studying the traditions of peasant movements and the role of peasants in Polish history; some intellectuals and activists of the pre-war Peasant Party helped to organise such institutions as The People's University in Zbrosza Duza, The Peasant Centre for Knowledge in Warsaw, and others. This movement among the peasants eventually led to the creation of Rural Solidarity. It was promoted and actively helped by the workers' Solidarity. Both organisations had the same enemy, and this was much more important than potential antagonisms between worker and peasant interests.

The third important stratum - the intelligentsia - exhibited in its behaviour both the great virtues and the great faults of the Polish national character. As faults, I count, to use Podgorecki's words, a peculiarly Polish combination of 'spectacular principledness' with the lack of 'ordinary common-sense principledness' in everyday life and with an 'organic scepticism regarding everyday systematic work'. The intelligentsia showed a remarkable ability to organise a national campaign for political change, but previously they had not even tried to organise nation-wide, non-political protests against mismanagement, absurd rules and erroneous policies in the economy. This applies above all to the technical intelligentsia and managerial stratum, who were materially interested in supporting the irresponsible 'Westernism' of Gierek's economic policy. I dare to think, however, that the intelligentsia as a whole must honestly accept partial responsibility for the growing demoralisation in the economic sphere. They proved to be very efficient in organising public opinion and exercising moral pressure, but this pressure was always peculiarly one-sided. Supporting the unpopular decisions of the party was treated as collaboration and severely condemned; at the same time collaborating with party-members in informal cliques and other forms of 'dirty togetherness' were treated with surprising tolerance and indulgence.
Another cluster of peculiarly Polish traits in the mentality of the intelligentsia was their inability to avoid romantic emotionalism in politics, often combined with a lack of civil courage in resisting dominant moods; treating political activity not so much as the 'art of the possible' but rather as the public expression of moral attitudes; thinking too much about the future moral judgement of history, and not enough about the immediate practical results, etc. As a rule, politically active Polish intellectuals were also too inclined to apply to politics the inflexible standards of honour, to opt for the 'ethics of principles' and to reject, somewhat hastily, the Weberian 'ethics of responsibility', as too close, in their eyes, to opportunism and cynicism.

Of course I must not generalise too far. Different groups of people were involved at different stages of the movement. Nevertheless, it is characteristic, I think, that even those groups of intellectuals who defined themselves as programmatically moderate and saw their role as one of mediation between the authorities and the workers quickly surrendered to the dominant mood and contributed their share to the atmosphere of growing emotional frenzy.

It seems obvious that there are also many positive sides to this characterological pattern. What deserves to be stressed in this context is the remarkable readiness to give up particular corporate interests for the sake of alliance with the workers - an alliance proclaimed in 1977 by KOR and cemented by Solidarity. True, there were groups among the intelligentsia (such as the Nationalist Confederation of Independent Poland) which wanted to manipulate the workers, but the dominant trend was different. If the moderate intellectuals too easily gave up their mediating function it was from a fear of being seen as betraying the workers' cause. It should be remembered, too, that the party was willing to offer the intellectuals almost any inducement in return for their partial and qualified support of the party. The same intransigent spirit was preserved and even strengthened under martial law. The military rulers wanted to drive a wedge between the intellectuals and the workers by treating the interned intellectuals incomparably better than the interned workers; the intellectuals, however, refused to appreciate this privilege. The government made great efforts, indeed, to prove that even under martial law Poland could demonstrate a relative intellectual freedom, greater than that obtaining in other countries of the Soviet bloc (which was quite true); it was repeatedly hinted that by their stubborn persistence in opposition the intellectuals were depriving themselves of many material advantages which otherwise would be available to them. But the intellectuals remained unimpressed; they were impressed, instead, by Underground Solidarity's appeals, warning them that acceptance of government offers would be seen by the workers as acceptance once more of a privileged position at the cost of an unacceptable moral compromise.

True, not all intellectuals by any means chose such an attitude. However, those intellectuals who persisted in seeing their role as representing and embodying the collective conscience of the nation apparently decided to do everything to maintain their moral alliance with the workers. Even more: they apparently accepted in practice the Gramscian idea of voluntary subordination to the hegemony of the workers, although they did so without any direct Marxist influence.
The greatest achievement of the opposition intelligentsia is to be found, I think, not in the multiplicity of political programs which they worked out, but in their creation of a powerful alternative culture. The number of uncensored underground (though not as a rule anonymous) publications has been unprecedented in the history of 'real socialism'. These publications include not only occasional leaflets and political newspapers but also books by Polish and foreign writers (for instance, the novels of Gunther Grass) and serious cultural journals, like Zapis (Record), Glos (Voice), Krytyka (Criticism), Res publica, and others. In spite of much more difficult and dangerous conditions this underground publishing activity also flourished under martial law. It became more narrowly political but, on the other hand, more decentralised and thus more widespread. According to the emigre monthly Kultura the number of titles of illegal publications under martial law reached the impressive figure of seven hundred.

The Effects of Martial Law and the Prospects for the Future

In a very interesting article smuggled out of prison Adam Michnik, one of the leaders of KOR, conceded that at the end of 1981 General Jaruzelski had little choice but to impose martial law; otherwise he would have shared the fate of Dubcek, if not the fate of Nagy. Michnik conceded also that the liquidation of Solidarity was no part of the military rulers' original plan - they wanted to cut off the radical wing of Solidarity's leadership but to preserve the union as a symbol of the continuity of the 'Polish renewal'.

It was indeed so. It is idle to speculate what might have happened in the case of direct Soviet intervention in Poland, although it seems pretty certain that the consequences would have been disastrous. But if Jaruzelski's martial law had been accompanied by the shift of political power into the hands of a more hardline faction of the PUWP, it seems reasonable to suppose that even then the party would have been trying to carry out certain reforms. After all, every restoration assimilates something from the preceding revolution.

Jaruzelski's government committed itself to economic reform - a reform consciously modelled on Kadar's Hungary. Its declared aim was to make more room for market mechanisms, to introduce principles of self-management and self-financing, thereby removing bureaucratic absurdities and securing a healthy balance between supply and demand. Some people, otherwise very critical of the party, thought that the military dictatorship was in fact in a privileged position for carrying out such reform: market mechanisms, they argued, necessarily entail an increase of inequality and within Solidarity the pressure towards egalitarianism had been too strong to allow this. In practice it turned out to be much more difficult. The government proved to be hesitant, inconsistent and apparently without strong views on the issue of equality. Thus the effects of material incentives for better work, combined with a drastic increase in prices, were weakened, almost cancelled out, by egalitarian super-taxes on the one hand, and by generous financial compensation to low-income families, on the other. Most importantly, however; market mechanisms could not work properly in conditions of universal scarcity. Their most visible effect was the freedom of producers to increase prices with
no corresponding freedom for consumers to reject products as too expensive or too bad. Since there was almost nothing on the market everything had to be accepted at any price, and thus the dictatorship of producers over consumers (the so-called 'producers' market') became even stronger than before. The pathological traits of the reformed economy are revealed in the curious fact that very often the prices set by the producers were not high enough from the point of trade-managers and had to be increased once more to secure better profits for people working in the retail trade. An additional complication was the lack of hard currency and the inconvertibility of Polish zloties. Decentralising economic reform cannot prove its worth if the scarce resources of hard currency have to be centrally distributed; industrial enterprises cannot be made truly self-financing if spare parts for machinery, or materials necessary for production, are available only for hard currency, and their own products are not competitive enough on the world market.

In such conditions economic recovery cannot be expected in the near future. The standard of living in Poland has fallen catastrophically, much worse than official statistics are prepared to admit. In the opinion of some Polish journalists (Catholic publicist A. Micewski and others) Poland has become, economically, an enclave of the 'third world' in Europe.

On the eve of the lifting of martial law the Polish Diet (sejm) voted for an amendment to the constitution guaranteeing private farmers the right to own land. This move, unprecedented in a country of 'real socialism' and long awaited by Polish peasants, should be welcomed, but cannot automatically solve the problems of Polish agriculture. An independent commission of American experts, sent to Poland by the Rockefeller Foundation and headed by Norman E. Borlaug, came to very favourable conclusions concerning the abilities of Polish farmers and the potential productivity of Polish agriculture, but also made it clear that agricultural recovery in Poland depends on investments and on access to hard currency, a view shared by the Polish Church and by the Pope. It is well-known that the Vatican has agreed to set up a Catholic-run foundation to provide and channel Western money and machinery to private farmers in Poland.

Poland's problems, however, are not merely economic; they are political and moral as well. Poland cannot function without a minimum of political and moral consensus. This consensus had always been very weak, limited and conditional: 'real socialism' and 'limited sovereignty' were accepted only as a 'lesser evil', as a form of national existence which, in spite of all, enabled the Poles to remain a political nation and which would at some future time evolve into something better. This reasoning, however, was becoming more and more doubtful to the younger generation who remembered neither the war, nor the dark years of Stalinism. No wonder, therefore, that in the events which followed 'the Polish August' this frail consensus was so easily destroyed. It was part of the logic of revolutionary struggle. You cannot struggle resolutely enough if you are not confident enough, if you do not 'absolutise' your aims, if you perceive your adversary as a 'lesser evil' and try to do him justice; the mentality of a hesitant, sceptical Hamlet must give way to the mentality of an over-confident, romantic Don Quixote. This was why both the Solidarity leaders and the masses were more and more inclined to attribute the deepening of the economic crisis to the ill-will of party...
leaders and less and less inclined to concede that at least some of these might be patriots of a sort. The initial idea of seeking solutions in which there would be no victors and no losers was replaced by a rapidly growing hatred and a tendency to humiliate the party as a whole, both politically and morally. Martial law, in its turn, was a terrible humiliation for the overwhelming majority of the population. The police, whose privileges had been so violently attacked, took a brutal revenge. The official mass-media version of events provoked a powerful moral protest, the strength of which was shown in the total boycott of TV by the entire elite of Polish actors, who courageously resisted both material temptations and heavy political pressure. In such circumstances it was natural for hatred to be seen as a source of moral force, while self-criticism and efforts to understand both sides of the conflict, to see the imposing of martial law as a tragedy rather than a crime, were treated as cowardly opportunistisms and a sure way to capitulation.

The Pope's visit to Poland was, I think, of tremendous therapeutic importance. John Paul II found proper words to express his solidarity with the national desire for freedom and justice while, at the same time, condemning hatred and recalling the words of the Lord's Prayer: 'And forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us'. By raising the morale of the people he enabled them to draw strength from sources other than hatred; he compensated, as it were, for their physical defeat and thereby helped them to concentrate less on their wounds, to be more open-minded and more disposed to understand the external determinants of their situation. He did not publicly recommend any particular measures but it was significant that he did not limit his talks with General Jaruzelski to the official protocol: this clearly showed his continuing belief in the possibility of national reconciliation.

The next step was the government's - the lifting of martial law. But this alone is not enough. To restore the necessary minimum of consensus, stress must now be laid not merely on the 'lesser evil' but on the will 'to evolve into something better'. The experiment in participatory democracy and in dual power has failed, but the only acceptable alternative is the greatest possible liberalisation. I understand by this the creation of a situation in which the power of the ruling party is constitutionally limited in scope, although not divided, not shared with a rival political force; a situation in which different associations, including trade unions, would enjoy a legally guaranteed and well-defined autonomy in pursuing their statutory aims while acknowledging the leading role of the party and not trying to replace state machinery by a 'self-governing republic'. Needless to say, such a situation is not compatible with arbitrary rule: it demands respect for constitutional law, freedom of opinion and independence of the courts.

In fact it would be a return to the letter of the Gdansk Agreement of 31 August 1980 - an agreement intended to guarantee both full independence for the new, self-governing unions and the leading role of the PUWP in the state. It seems that Underground Solidarity is prepared to accept such a course, although it would mean the abandonment of its more ambitious ideas about the possible political role of the union. It formulates its main demand as 'union pluralism', which means that the postulate of a restoration of Solidarity in its former shape has been silently dropped. It is regrettable that General
Jaruzelski refused to discuss it with Walesa when the latter wrote him a conciliatory letter; it is even more regrettable that the lifting of martial law was not followed by acceptance of the pluralism of autonomous unions. This is a concession which would enable both sides to save face. It would lend conviction to the government's declarations that it never intended to violate its initial agreement with the workers, while for the workers it would be the necessary minimum enabling them to feel it worthwhile to concentrate on overcoming the tragic economic crisis. It is futile to think that they would reduce their role in this solely to the increase of productive effort - they must be given an active part in the fight for a proper functioning of economic reform, must feel that something depends on them, at least at the local level.

The new tough laws promulgated by the Diet in July 1983 have amply secured the leading role of the party. On the other hand, Jaruzelski's government emphasises not only 'socialist legality' but also 'socialist constitutionalism'; it intends to show that its laws, in spite of their restrictiveness, will protect citizens against arbitrariness; in other words, that certain spheres of life will be regulated by stable laws rather than changing bureaucratic rules and arbitrary political commands. This is the intended meaning of such moves as the establishment of the Administrative Tribunal and the Tribunal of the State, and of the project of introducing the Constitutional Tribunal to ensure the consistency of all laws with the Constitution. Theoretically speaking, the idea of such an authoritarian Rechtsstaat should be welcomed as a break with the totalitarian type of state, i.e. a state in which everything is politicised and political decision-makers take into account only practical, but not legal, considerations. It would put definite limits to 'partocracy' and, therefore, might also be seen as a step towards liberalisation. In practice, however, it has not worked in this way as yet. People in power seem either too afraid of the re-emergence of mass political resistance, or, sometimes, too confident in the purely coercive basis of their power; society, on the other hand, treats with profound suspicion all official organisations and all officially sanctioned channels of activity. The reasons for such a deep mutual distrust, resulting in the lack of even minimal consensus, are perfectly clear. But it is equally clear that without a minimum of consensus no constructive process can be set in motion. Since the revolutionary alternative cannot be seriously considered, the net result is stalemate: a minimal consensus is necessary but impossible or, rather, necessary although impossible.

Something must be done to break this stalemate. And it is obvious that it should be done by the government.
1And, indeed, we were witnessing 'an almost total collapse of the machinery of the State'. The words quoted are those of Jadwiga Staniszkis, a sociologist who had been active as one of the chief Solidarity advisers (see her article in Sisyphus. Sociological Studies, vol.III - 'Crises and Conflicts. The Case of Poland 1980-81', Warsaw 1982, p.114).

2Quoted from Radio Free Europe Research.


5Characteristically enough, the majority of the population perceived the apparatchiks (but not the party as a whole) as 'firmly opposed' or 'moderately opposed' to the government's agreements with workers. Only 4% believed that people from the party apparatus firmly approve these agreements. See 'Poles 80', in Sisyphus (as above), p.178.


7Norman Davies has pointed out 'a fascinating parallel' between the organisational structure of Solidarity and the ancient 'Republic of the Gentry' (See N. Davies, God's Playground. A History of Poland. Oxford 1981, vol.II, p.723-4). American historian, Martin Malia, who was in Poland in 1981 and observed the work of Solidarity's national congress, stated explicitly: 'Indeed, it is not too much to say that this young working class, in its mentality at least, resembles nothing more than a gigantic plebian szlachta [gentry], insisting on the principle of 'nothing about us without us' and aspiring to the 'golden freedom' of its ancestral lords'. (M. Malia, 'Poland's Eternal Return', The New York Review of Books, vol.XXX, No.14, Sept.29, 1983, p.26).


11F. Feher, A. Heller, G. Markus, Dictatorship over Needs, Oxford 1983, p.102. It is especially true of the more developed provinces of Poland, such as Poznania or Silesia. They still differ positively from the rest of Poland, but much less sharply than in the inter-war period.

A similar view was expressed by an anonymous activist from the underground opposition in Poland, in an interview for the Polish emigre quarterly Aneks. Among other things he said: 'First of all Solidarity should have secured a certain field for its activity. This had indeed been won. The field was broad enough for very sensible and useful activity. The second step should have been to draw a clear line of demarcation between Solidarity's sphere and that of the government. Such a line should have been respected not only by the government but also by Solidarity. In fact Solidarity behaved in a completely different way: being unable to manage with what it already possessed, it pressed further and further forward, which is always the easiest way.' See 'Wojny mogło nie być' (The War Could Have Been Avoided), Aneks, No.31/1983, p.138.

A sociological survey has shown that the peasants saw the purchase of machinery, spare parts and building materials as their most important problem (see 'Poles 80', Sisyphus, pp.194-5).


See, especially, the articles of B. Lagowski in Zdanie (Opinion) and in Polityka (Politics).

See B. Kramski, 'It Would not be a Problem, if Only ... American Experts on Polish Agriculture', Polityka, No.19, May 7, 1983, p.4.

See the interview with Dr A. Gwidz from the Warsaw Institute of Legal and Political Studies, in Polityka, No.38, Sept.17, 1983, p.3.

A former member of the KOR and Solidarity adviser, W. Kuczynski, has come to the conclusion that 'partocracy' no longer exists in Poland. The whole power rests firmly in the hands of the government, supported by the army, while PUWP serves merely as a facade. See W. Kuczynski, 'Solidarni i niepokonani' (Solidarity and Invincible), Aneks, No.29-30, 1983, p.19.

These words were written in October 1983.
Let me start with the proposition that effective normalisation requires not only the restoration of the basic elements of the political status quo (the rule of the communist party), but also, and principally, the restoration of social and economic equilibrium destroyed by the massive crisis of the 1970s. That involves economic reforms which would lead to improved productive capacity and satisfaction of basic economic needs, as well as political reforms which would introduce some elements of pluralism and decentralisation and create effective mechanisms of social control over the selection of leaders. The alternative to such normalisation is either prolonged instability, marked by cyclical eruptions of violence, or 'browbeating the population into submission' in a manner similar to the 'Hungarian solution' in 1956 and the Czechoslovak experience of 1968. A third possibility - the restoration of legitimacy through the rise of a popular (and acceptable to Moscow) charismatic leader from the party ranks - similar to the rise of Gomulka in 1956 - seems to be, under present conditions, too remote even to contemplate.

The prospects of effective normalisation must be discussed against the background of the dramatic crisis which led to the formation and subsequent suppression of Solidarity. One of the principal actors in these events, the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), emerged from the crisis internally divided, weakened by grass-roots 'horizontal structures' and decimated by mass desertion of its rank-and-file members, especially workers in large industrial centres. But the crisis did not affect the entire party apparatus. What often escapes the attention of political commentators is the fact that, first, the Solidarity-led revolt did not affect the police-military party apparatus, and second, that it was limited to the lower party ranks. Both these points deserve a separate comment.

Attempts to carry out the 'renewal' process in the apparatus of coercion, especially in the military and police forces, were nipped in the bud. When in 1981 the first independent union cells were spontaneously formed in the Peoples' Militia (MO), they were judged by the authorities as 'unconstitutional' and promptly banned. Attempts to form free trade unions in
the militarised school for firefighters in Warsaw met with a similar response. After the young cadets refused to submit and organised a sit-in strike, the school was stormed by paratroopers and thoroughly purged.

Similar protective measures were introduced in the army. Drafting of new recruits remained largely unaffected, but the 'old' cohorts, enlisted before the formation of Solidarity, were encouraged voluntarily to extend the duration of their service in return for various benefits and promises of free access to any tertiary school of their choice (Kontakt 1982:57). This enforced isolation of the armed forces from public opinion, associated with intense political indoctrination, control over promotions and appointments, and very stringent ideological-political discipline, resulted in the apparatus of coercion remaining largely unaffected by the 'renewal' process and ready to become the vanguard in the party's bid to regain power. In that sense the situation in Poland after August 1980 was not unlike the post-war configuration: Solidarity commanded the souls of the majority of the people; the party effectively commanded the guns and police truncheons.

This unaffected part of the party establishment carried what was mistakenly seen by many commentators as a military coup in December 1981. In fact, it was a reassertion of party rule, or, as it was put by Kostecki and Mrela (1982:26), 'the restoration of the monopoly of control by the party-state elite over social and political developments'. In that sense, it was neither a coup nor a military takeover. It was a forcible suspension of a peaceful popular revolt. It was conducted by party officials in uniform in defence of the most vital interests of the party leadership. This point deserves a brief historical digression about the origins of the Polish army.

In Stalin's plans, and in the calculations of Polish communists, the army was to become the power basis and the pool of political and social transformations in post-World War II Poland. After the initial failure to gain control over the first Polish army, the task of forming a second - this time politically reliable - military force was entrusted to the group of Polish communists in the Soviet Union, who formed in February 1943 the Union of Polish Patriots (ZPP) and, later, the Central Bureau of Polish Communists (CBKP). Under the aegis of these organisations, and under close Soviet supervision, the nucleus of the Polish Army was formed in Selce on the Oka River.

Because of the delicate political tasks facing the army, communist supervision over recruitment and training was very strict. The first channel of control was through the Soviet military command, which determined all movements and important appointments, as well as the supply of food, arms and ammunition. The Soviets controlled also the key commanding posts which were held, with Stalin's approval, by the most reliable Polish communists. The officer corps of the newly formed army was heavily populated by Soviet 'POPy' - the mocking abbreviation for 'fulfilling the duties of Poles'. They constituted at the end of 1944 about 45 percent of the entire officer corps - altogether over 19,000 men, including 36 generals, who commanded the major army units. Later they were gradually replaced by Polish officers trained at special schools and courses in the Soviet Union (Zbiniewicz 1961).
The second level of control was through the 'political apparatus' in the army, which consisted of party (i.e. Polish Workers' Party - PPR) 'plenipotentiaries' and 'political officers'. The former were directly appointed by and subordinated to the PPR's Central Committee; the latter, usually holding positions of deputy commanders, were subordinated to the Army's Main Political Directorate (GZP-W), which was the equivalent of the PPR's Central Committee Military Department.

As if this extensive system of control had not sufficed, in October 1944 PPR leaders decided to establish a special five-man Army Department in the Central Committee with the aim of 'further strengthening the partisan [i.e. the PPR-J.P.] elements in the army' by direct appointments of party officials to the commanding and officer posts. This was followed by tightening the party's grip on the recruitment agencies. In autumn 1944 instructions were issued to all recruiting commissions to screen out 'unreliable and hostile elements'. In order to fill the gaps created by such political selection, it was decided in November 1944 to delegate 10,000 'patriots' and party activists to the army and schools for officers (Kostecki 1982iii:81; Polonsky and Drukier 1980:56-58).

This is by no means a complete list of controlling measures. Strict secrecy surrounds the activities of the two perhaps most important controlling agencies: the army's Counter-Intelligence and the Soviet NKGB. The former was created out of graduates of the Soviet Political School located near Kuybishev; over 200 graduates of this school were directed to the Polish army as advisors, political officers and military court judges (Gora 1967:118). The latter intervened directly in the 'more sensitive' political operations, such as the arrest and kidnapping of Polish underground and political leaders, mass arrests and deportations of the Home Army (AK) soldiers, and the elimination of the underground radio stations (Zenczykowski 1982:60-103; Socha 1980a).8

It is worth emphasising that complete political control over the armed forces had been acquired even before the massive purges and political trials in the so-called 'Stalinist period'.9 In the next ten years this control was further strengthened; all people who, because of their Home Army (AK) backgrounds, foreign contacts or voiced opinions, were regarded as politically unreliable, were suspended, arrested or imprisoned (Szerer 1981). It must also be pointed out that this system of control and political supervision over the army has undergone very few changes, and that the whole generation of present military officials are the product of this selection and grooming system.

This historical digression highlights two important points: first, that the Polish army (especially its professional cadres and officer corps) has never been a politically neutral and autonomous force vis-à-vis the party and the Soviet commanders; and second, that it is very hard to distinguish between the top echelons of military and party officials. Since 1945 these two categories have formed a single group; they enjoy the same privileges, they are subject to the same nomenklatura system of appointments, and their careers interlock and overlap. As was observed by Szafar (1983), a party official can one day serve as regional secretary or head of a youth organisation and be
promoted next day to the rank of general in the Main Political Directorate (GZP). General Jaruzelski, like most of his colleagues, represents a typical political-military path of ascent. He has been in the Politburo since 1968 and, before being promoted Chief of Staff and Minister of National Defence, he had served as head of the Main Political Directorate (GZP). He was, in fact, the first head of the Directorate with a regular military background. Therefore his characterisation (by the FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, among others) as 'a Polish patriot first, a soldier second, and a communist third' is based on a rather serious misunderstanding.

One should also treat with scepticism the claims of the 'internal nature' of the December 1981 'solution'. Being an essential part of the Warsaw Treaty forces, the Polish army is strictly controlled by the Soviet military command and logistically dependent on the Soviet forces. Although the officer corps is no longer populated by Soviet 'POPy', the training of the top military officials still includes a characteristic 'international' component. It is enough to mention that at least eight of the twenty members of the Military Council of National Salvation (WRON), which officially held power between 13 December 1981 and 22 June 1983, graduated from the Soviet political-military academies. It is unlikely that their presence and prominence among the leaders of the December 'coup' was accidental.

The dominant role of military-party officials in the present leadership cannot be seen as evidence of a change in the power structure or the political priorities of the Polish elite. But it does lead to an important change in the style of rule which, in turn, affects the prospects of effective normalisation. The mentality of military-party officials, their habit of issuing orders and relying on discipline, seems to be incompatible with the program of decentralisation, the principles of market rationality and even the mildest versions of pluralism. Similarly, the militarisation of industrial plants and the increasing involvement of party commissars in administration and industrial management seems to run against the very principles of socio-economic and political reform announced by the party leaders and suggested by the so called 'Kubiak Report'. This highlights an important dilemma faced by the party elite. The reliance on directives and military discipline assures effective party control and is, undoubtedly, popular in Moscow because of its compatibility with the disciplinary policies of the Soviet leadership. But it also diminishes the likelihood of long-term improvements in the economy, raising the standard of living and, consequently, restoring political stability.

Despite the frequently repeated slogans of 'reforms' and the solemn promises of 'no return to the pre-1980 situation', there are no signs of genuine transformation of the socio-economic system towards decentralisation and restoration of market mechanisms. In fact, as Kuczynski (1983) has recently observed, the changes in the economic management system introduced by the party-military leaders seem to go in exactly the opposite direction. They aim at transforming the economic system into a 'gigantic hierarchical government office geared to administrative steering'. This undoubtedly facilitates central management and gives an illusion of full control over the economy, but only at the expense of increasing departure from the principles of the promised reforms.
The second point we have raised concerns the internal power balance within the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP). Some commentators have described the 1980-82 events in Poland as 'a collapse of the party'. Such a judgement was partly justified by the dramatic fall in membership and the assault on the party's hierarchical command structure. Between mid-1981 and February 1982 the PUWP lost 850,000 members or 26 percent of its total number. The decline has slowed down, but, because of the nature of resignations, it is hard to assess the size of the present membership. Those who quit the party face real (or imagined) risks to their careers, and, consequently, many party members choose not to pay fees as the safest way to being struck off the party list. However, as Kostecki (1983:11) has observed:

...this practice was rarely effective, since, according to regulations, a delay of up to three months is tolerated, but in practice authorities were more liberal. Even those who returned their membership cards were not struck off membership lists immediately. According to instructions, a representative of the basic party organisation executive should interview a person who returns his membership card. According to the PUWP Central Committee Organisational Department, of the 143,500 persons who handed back their membership cards from July 1, 1980, until March 31, 1981, about 100,000, i.e. 70 percent were struck off records... It was an open secret that executives of some basic party organisations kept the news of members' resignations to themselves so as not to risk negative assessment of their activities by superior authorities.

There were also clear signs of rank-and-file revolt within PUWP directed against the party's 'establishment'. In a survey conducted days before the July 1981 Extraordinary PUWP Congress, more than half of the respondents evaluated negatively the activities of the party's Central Committee, and only less than 10 percent judged the performance of the top party bodies as good and very good. By contrast, only 6 percent extended such negative assessment on the rank-and-file party members, and nearly half judged the attempts by rank-and-file members to reverse the crisis as good (Kostecki 1983:12). This revolt of the lower party echelons, together with the increased activities of the grass root party organisations (the so called 'horizontal structures'), as well as the increased inflow of Solidarity members and supporters to various party bodies and growing signs of dissent in the party-controlled front organisations, posed a real threat to the party decision-making establishment.

This embattled core of the party apparatus, however, was much less affected by the grass roots 'revolt' and was ready to defend its position. Even during the 9th Extraordinary Congress none of the Solidarity supporters managed to enter the party Secretariat and, at the time when over nine million Poles joined the free trade unions, only one Solidarity member was co-opted to the Political Bureau. Moreover, immediately after the congress, the Politburo approved of introducing into the Central Committee (and its 13 specialised commissions) many persons defeated in party elections, as well as outsiders (e.g. full-time voivodship secretaries) who had not been elected and had not won a congress mandate. At the same time the party-controlled mass media started a massive campaign directed against these Solidarity-party
'connections', as a result of which, even before the state of war was declared, most of the Solidarity members in the Central Committee had been forced to quit the union (Kostecki 1983:12-13).

After 13 December the party elite's counter-attack reached full swing. Massive purges and 'verification' campaigns, directed mainly against the advocates of decentralisation and members of the 'horizontal structures', started in the party and government organisations. As in the post-World War II period, the local party organisations which refused to follow central directives were among the first victims of these campaigns. As one commentator has noted:

[F]actory and other local PUWP organisations which did not prove totally obedient were radically restricted in their activities; a special instruction issued on 10 December 1981 suspended their statutes, introducing [or rather, re-establishing] unlimited power to each and every higher authority over a lower level organisation, including the right to dissolve it, of which the authorities availed themselves in a few cases; in many other cases it was enough to dismiss the secretary. (Kostecki 1983:21).

The reaffirmation of the monopolistic power of the party establishment, conducted under the slogan of 'return to the Leninist principles of democratic centralism', led also to the renaissance of the nomenklatura. The struggle with the system of political appointment to higher administrative and managerial positions became a central issue in the Solidarity reform program. The disastrous effects of the nomenklatura which includes a list of about 300,000 top administrative, managerial and technical positions, as well as the names of persons eligible to fill these positions, were mentioned by all social and economic analyses, including the party-commissioned Kubiak Report. The incompetence of party appointees, political servility and the endless circulation of discredited 'professional directors' became proverbial, especially during the 1970s, and drew strong opposition, even from the party ranks.

Defence of the nomenklatura also became a central issue in the party's counter-attack. As Marian Wozniak, Secretary of the PUWP Central Committee, observed:

The preservation of the party's nomenklatura in industry is synonymous with the preservation by PUWP of its dominant position in industry and - to a large extent - generally in the state. The personnel policy, the shaping of which the nomenklatura serves, is an obvious and well known key attribute of the PUWP as the ruling party... The party cannot resign from directing economic life, from shaping socioeconomic policies by means of entrusting important positions in the economy to people whom the party trusts, thus, first of all - but not only - to its members. (Aneks 1981:40).
This counter-attack gained momentum after 13 December 1981. As a result of what was euphemistically called 'verification campaigns', the majority of directors and managers in industrial enterprises and the government administration who were known as Solidarity supporters or who were appointed as a result of union pressures were suspended, transferred or, as it was enigmatically announced, 'have lost their managerial credentials'. These cleansing operations have been gradually extended to other public institutions, including the judiciary and the teaching professions.

The two elements of the party's tactic mentioned above: the selective use of force and the centralisation of decision-making associated with purges, match closely the takeover pattern applied during the 'liberation period' of 1944/45. The third important element of this pattern: an assault on voluntary organisations which, during the 15 months of Solidarity's existence, managed to shed a considerable part of the party's political control, had also been present during the 1980s.

The imposition of martial law on 13 December 1981 coincided with the suspension of all non-party voluntary associations (with few exceptions like the nationalistic and anti-Semitic 'Grunwald'). During the following months almost all suspended organisations formed during the 'revolt' were disbanded and outlawed. The remaining bodies, especially the intellectual and artistic associations, found themselves under special supervision. To regain permission to operate, they had to modify their charters and statutes in line with government policies and select leaderships acceptable to the party. Those which refused to do so faced de-registration or were soon replaced by splinter groups, which were formed and led by people loyal to the authorities. All these organisations, together with the Patriotic Movement of National Rebirth (PRON) - an exact copy of the discredited Front of National Unity (FJN) - became important tools of party control. Like 'concessional' parties and numerous facade organisations created in 1944/45, they serve as a means of channeling social initiatives, rewarding and co-opting supporters and, generally, extending control over vast areas of social life.

All these steps, undertaken under the slogan of 'return to Leninist principles' and 'national reconciliation', signalise another dilemma faced by the party leadership. The cleansing operations, the strengthening of central control over the activities of local party organisations and voluntary associations, the rebirth of the nomenklatura, and the formation of an extensive network of facade organisations, have undoubtedly strengthened the party leadership's grip, but they have done so at the expense of increasing isolation of the political leaders and a growing divergence from the principles of the promised reforms. They have led to the further atrophy of authentic initiatives and autonomous social bodies and, consequently, to an increasing communication gap between the rulers and the ruled. This very gap, euphemistically referred to as the party's separation from the masses, has been diagnosed by all political analysts, including the Experience and Future (DiP) and Kubiak Commission experts, as one of the major causes and elements of sociopolitical crisis. In that sense, the effective re-affirmation of party rule also forms a formidable obstacle to the process of effective normalisation.
Perhaps the most striking parallels between the 1944/45 takeover and the recent events in Poland are apparent in the legal framework imposed by the authorities and in the form and content of propaganda campaigns launched by the embattled party establishment.

The way in which the war legislation was imposed on 13 December 1981 shows a curious mixture of legalism and lawlessness. Martial law - the most suitable framework for a party 'coup' - could not have been formally introduced. The 1952 Polish Constitution does not envisage such a form of regulation; but it does mention (Art. 33.2) the possibility of introducing a 'state of war' under conditions of 'external danger' or 'threatened security of the state'. This last condition served as the official excuse for the military crack-down and required many propaganda efforts to demonstrate the existence of an alleged 'plot' by 'Solidarity extremists' to forcibly overthrow the government. But the harshness of the war legislation, hastily adopted by the State Council on 12 December 1981, seems to be out of proportion, even considering these accusations of an 'extremist plot'. Even the 1939 bill on the state of war did not allow, unlike the 1981 legislation, for unlimited confinement, blockade of all information and communication and compulsory employment. After the German attack in September 1939 the restrictions were fewer and less austere; unless it was destroyed, communication functioned normally, and newspapers, including the socialist opposition organ 'Robotnik' (The Worker), appeared regularly. Above all, there was no law against 'spreading false information weakening the defensive potential of the Peoples' Poland' (Art. 48.1) and 'spreading rumours which may cause public unrest' (Art. 48.2). These two articles, copied from Soviet law, at present serve as a basis for political harassment in much the same way as similar regulations served during the post-World War II period.22

It must also be noted that, as in 1944/45, the war regulations were not formally lifted until they were transformed into an equally harsh 'peacetime' legal framework. This transformation occurred gradually in a series of laws passed between January 1982 and July 1983. They included 'The Teachers' Charter' (26 January), the 'Higher Education Law' (4 May), the 'Law on Trade Unions' and 'On Social and Professional Farmer Associations' (8 October), the notorious 'Law on Persons Avoiding Work' (known as the 'parasite law'; 26 October), the 'Law on Special Regulations During the Suspension of the State of War' (18 December), and the whole package of bills and constitutional amendments adopted on 14-28 July 1983.23

The new regulations (referred to by people as 'lawbeating') repeat, almost verbatim, many of the articles of the notorious Small Penal Code introduced at the end of 1945. They limit civil freedom, dramatically increase the executive powers of the non-representative state organs, and introduce so called 'special procedure' in dealing with what may be broadly termed 'political crimes'. The State Council, whose members are subject to nomenklatura appointment, acquired the right to supervise and in certain cases even to dissolve National Councils. The new legislation introduced the concept of 'martial law', which could be imposed by the (appointed) Chairman of the State Council on the whole Polish territory, or in some regions, without the approval of the Parliament (Sejm). The autonomy of educational institutions has also been curtailed. The Minister of Education, and in some
cases even the wojewoda or city mayor, can nominate and dismiss rectors and deans of tertiary schools, suspend all academic collegial bodies and suspend, transfer or expel any student or staff member.

Similar treatment was applied in relation to representative workers' bodies - trade unions and workers' councils. They can be suspended or dissolved by special commissions appointed by the State Council. In addition, the Council acquired the right to veto the registration of any new trade union. It must also be remembered that the 'criminal law bill', which was passed on the same day, introduced a new crime threatening with imprisonment (for up to three years) anyone who becomes a member of a non-registered organisation. The right to strike, while formally honoured, is subject to so many exceptions and limiting conditions that it practically ceases to exist. It excludes many categories of employment and bans 'political' strikes, without defining the term 'political'. The law also stipulates that every trade union must recognize the leading role of the party and support the 'socialist system' and Poland's 'international alliances'. If the authorities decide that a strike endangers the 'defence potential and security of the state', they can force its organizers to cooperate with the 'administrative organs of the state and the appropriate military authorities' (Report 1983:5).

The list of offences subject to the jurisdiction of military courts has been extended, and state administrative officials - wojewodzie - acquired the right to decide about the application of special procedure trials (by so called kolegia), which seriously limit the rights of the accused to prepare their defence.

The new legislation has also tightened government control over the dissemination of information. Censorship has been extended on scientific publications, internal newsletters, and even photographic exhibitions; and the Polish Press Agency (PAP) became a state organisation, thus limiting the rights of its workers to strikes and industrial action.

The formation of the National Defence Committee (Komitet Obrony Kraju) in December 1983 signalized a further increase in centralized political control. The membership of the Committee (except for its Chairman, General Jaruzelski and his Deputy, Florian Siwicki) remains secret, and it is not subject to any public control. As the Committee's Chairman, General Jaruzelski acquired almost unlimited (potential) dictatorial powers allowing him, among other things, to further limit civil freedoms, fire all government officials, including ministers, and introduce martial law without consulting even the Chairman of the State Council.

Altogether the 1983 legislation shows two striking features: it copies the 1945 regulations, and it is clearly incompatible with the declared aims and spirit of promised reforms. It makes it virtually impossible for any individual or organisation to act legally as a critic or independent controller of the party-state apparatus. It also strengthens government control in the area of the labour market and working conditions. Thus the 1982/83 law introduces forced labour camps (for 'parasites') and the possibility of forced employment for certain categories of workers and in some
Whenever they become inconvenient for the ruling party elite. The 1983 legislation, for example, as well as the way in which the state of war was introduced in 1981, appear to be incompatible with the Polish Constitution. The new rules and regulations are important in a different way; they serve as rough indicators of the rulers' intentions and the tactics they adopt. Looked at from that perspective, the new laws show a reversal of the reformist programs. It is hard to see how such a system of austere regulations could promote market rationality, improve the performance of the economy by stimulating initiative or increase the party's 'contact with the masses'. In fact, there has been no sign of improvement in economic performance and no sign of bridging the communication gap between the rulers and the ruled. Although the decline in industrial production has slowed down (-2.3 percent in 1982, compared with -10.8 percent in 1981), that was achieved mainly through militarisation of mines and some industrial enterprises and through the elimination of free Saturdays. Such measures, although effective in the short run, increase the rate of accidents (especially in the mining industry), fuel workers' dissatisfaction and lead to open expressions of discontent.

The pattern of government propaganda, which has been synchronised with military and political steps, follows closely the paradigm established in the post-World War II years. One of its key features is an attempt to project an image of the opposition in which all political differences are replaced by one simple gradation of guilt. The opponents are divided into foreign-inspired, ruthless, power-hungry and ambitious manipulators (KOR members, Solidarity advisers and underground leaders), and naive, misguided followers. While the former, who allegedly took over the workers' movement and carry the blame for political 'excesses', are to be destroyed, the latter may be forgiven provided, of course, they confess and repent their sins. The corollary of this divisive tactic was the abortive trial of KOR members and (some) Solidarity leaders charged with attempts to overthrow the regime. Behind these accusations lie two important aims: first, to drive a wedge between the two strategically and politically most important social categories whose coalition resulted in the Solidarity reform program: industrial workers and the intelligentsia. The second aim was the re-establishment of some (even minimal) social support by appealing to what has been officially called 'patriotic sentiments', and what is, in fact, a mixture of traditional nationalism, primitive egalitarianism and anti-intellectualism. The core element of these appeals is a simple equation: the nation = the state = the party leadership. Such an equation, also underlying the post-World War II campaigns, allows the presentation of criticism of top party officials as foreign-inspired subversion, which is incompatible with patriotic pride and national interests.

The extensive use of patriotic rhetoric and national symbols has been accompanied by frequent and thinly veiled threats of Soviet invasion. The use
of military force has been justified as 'the protection of national integrity', 'the prevention of bloodshed' and the 'internal solution'. The words 'national' and 'patriotic', in all grammatical forms, permeate the propaganda vocabulary and enter the names of almost all facade organisations: the Military Council of National Salvation (WRON), Patriotic Movement of National Rebirth (PRON), Citizens' Committees of National Revival (OKON), etc. Such language and such arguments, bearing some resemblance to the well known slogans of the pre-war National Democracy, are undoubtedly popular among many Poles. But they can easily backfire, since the positively valued national elements are implicitly contrasted with the internationalist Soviet-communist tradition. This tradition, employed in the overt legitimizing appeals, seems to be increasingly discredited in the eyes of the majority of Poles, especially the young generation.27

It is hard to assess the effects of propaganda. The credibility enjoyed by the government controlled mass media is undoubtedly very low. But to be effective, propaganda does not need to be believed. The images projected by the media have indirect effects - they convey the clear message that the costs of active dissent are high. This may lead to compliance, but such compliance is not based on legitimacy and reflects simply helplessness and fear of repression. Without effective rewards inducing mass subordination, such compliance is as precarious and as socially and politically expensive as rule by force.

To summarise, the recent crisis in Poland has led to what may be seen as 'political regression'. The communist authorities are 'back to square one'; as in 1945 they rule by threat, deception and vague promises of a better future. But, in certain respects their situation seems to be even more difficult than after World War II. People's tolerance for hardship is lower, and their expectations, especially after the consumer boom of the 1970s, are higher. Moreover, these expectations are less likely to be satisfied in the near future than they were in the late 1940s. As we have argued, the chances of prompt and effective economic and political reforms are rather slim. Due to capital and labour force shortages and depressed agriculture the authorities cannot initiate new development programs based on massive transfer of unskilled rural workers to industry. They also cannot rely on support stimulated by the subjective feeling of contentment which accompanies massive social mobility. Poland, together with other 'peoples' democracies', has completed the stage of industrialisation characterised by frequent and rapid upward social mobility caused by industrial development and swelling state bureaucracies. Moreover, faced with the grim reality of economic depression, the party rulers run out of credible excuses. They cannot distance themselves from the mistakes of their predecessors, and they cannot 'explain' the failures as problems of reconstruction or as remnants of a pre-socialist past. On the other hand, as the history of the Kubiak Report seems to indicate, they are also unable to admit that the real causes of the present crisis involve certain systemic, structural faults. This inability to accept a correct diagnosis leads, in turn, to pseudo-therapy and sham reforms masked by nationalistic rhetoric. Such a configuration makes the prospects of effective normalisation rather remote. What is more likely to occur is a continuation of the present precarious balance, punctuated by eruptions of mass protest.
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Gierek's teams. As was revealed by recently published documents, General Jaruzelski approved the use of firearms against the workers in 1970, was among the top leaders responsible for the disastrous policies of the 1970s, and was involved in corrupt practices investigated by the Supreme Chamber of Control (NIK) (Survey 1982:87-107, Dokumenty 1983:191).

Such attempts were reported in each AS (Biuletyn pism zwiazkowych i zakladowych) - the information bulletin published by Solidarnosc (e.g. AS 1981:206).

AS bulletins also reported numerous cases of Solidarity members (even civilian) having been fired from various enterprises and organisations subordinated to the Ministry of National Defence. Organizing free trade unions was forbidden in all militarised plants and those which qualified as 'war industry' (e.g. AS 1981:203).

Wanda Wasilewska and Zygmunt Berling, the prominent leaders of the Moscow-based Association of Polish Patriots (ZPP), boasted openly in 1943 that the new Polish army would shape the political future of the country and 'secure radical social and political reconstruction'. This was later confirmed by Gomulka who saw communist control over the army as 'a central issue of democratic Poland' (Zenczykowski 1983:62).

This army was formed in the second half of 1941 out of Polish POWs and refugees. Despite Soviet pressure, it remained loyal to the Polish Government-in-Exile in London, and was finally forced to leave Soviet territory in July 1942.

Another three principal components of the apparatus of coercion - the Internal Security Force (KBW), the Citizen's Militia (MO), and the notorious Security Police (UB) - were subject to even more stringent political control, and were regularly purged of 'unreliable elements' (see Pakulski 1984).

The first clear lesson that the army cannot stand above the party was learned in 1943 when a group of high army commanders (including Jakub Prawin and Zygmunt Berling) published a political manifesto known as 'Thesis No.1'. It envisaged a system of 'organized democracy' in a liberated Poland whereby the army would play a dominant political role. The project was promptly condemned by Wanda Wasilewska as 'fascist', and its authors were dismissed and/or severely reprimanded (Zbiniewicz 1961:110-116). Since the end of May...
1945 the political reliability of the army has not been questioned during party meetings and conferences. There were instead increasingly frequent transfers from the army to the Internal Security Forces (KBW) and joint operations involving army and security units. In 1946 regular army troops, together with KBW and MO units, conducted massive 'mopping-up operations' in Eastern Poland. During these operations over 1000 people were killed and over 36,000 arrested (Socha 1980a, 1980b; Nowacki 1966:90-158).

10 According to unofficial data over 90% of army officers, and 100% of senior officers are party members. Appointments of senior officers (generals) are decided by the Politburo and the Secretariat. The recently published secret nomenklatura 'Guidelines' (issued in October 1972) list among 'party cadres' appointed by the top party bodies the following posts: chief of the General Staff and his deputies; chief of the Main Political Directorate (GZP) and his deputies; general inspector of Territorial Defence; chief inspector of army training; quartermaster-general; commanders of military regions and their deputies; commanders (and their deputies) of the airforce, navy, air defence and border guard troops; commander of Internal Military Forces; chief of the personnel department in the Ministry of Defence; chief of Training Inspectorate; chief of the Territorial Defence Inspectorate; etc. This includes, in fact, almost all senior military positions (Aneks 1981:38-58; Szafar 1983).

11 It was not an isolated case of misperception. It must be seen as a spectacular achievement of propaganda, and a curious mixture of ignorance and wishful thinking on the part of the general public in Poland, that the possibility of military intervention was, despite persisting rumours, firmly rejected. In the survey of public opinion conducted in May 1981 the army appeared as the third most trustworthy organisation (behind the Church and Solidarity) with over 90 per cent of respondents professing trust in it, and only less than 10 percent expressing a lack of trust. Also a large majority of Solidarity members expressed trust and confidence in the military force (the party took last position, far behind the police force; Kostecki 1983:fig.9, 10). The myth of the 'impartial army' and the 'neutral third force' was skillfully employed during the December 'coup' (e.g. see the observations of Mazowiecki 1982); even after the military intervention, when the myth has been largely destroyed, many people perceive the army as 'a lesser evil' (compared with the party and the Soviet forces).

12 W. Jaruzelski, F. Siwicki, T. Tuczapski, T. Hupalowski, C. Piotrowski and J.W. Oliwa graduated from the Voroshilov General Staff Academy; E. Molczyk and L. Janczyszyn completed courses in other Soviet academies. See also Jones (1981) for further details concerning the extent and forms of Soviet control over military forces of the satellites.

13 Among the major causes of the recent crisis the Report mentions 'the utopian conviction that society could be managed centrally by means of directives that were to be interpreted as orders' and 'the growth of centralism and bureaucratic control'. In its recommendations the Report suggested far reaching decentralisation, democratisation and increasing participation in decision-making (Survey, 1982:87-107).
Waldemar Kuczynski, the prominent Polish economist and one of the Solidarity advisers, is the author of perhaps the best analysis of the economic aspects of the Polish crisis (*Po wielkim skoku*, PWE, Warsaw, 1981). In a recent article he gave the following assessment of the 'reforms':

There has been no reform of the central economic institutions. The ministries have remained with practically the same authority vis-a-vis enterprises. Although 106 industrial associations (zjednoczenie) had been eliminated, their place has been taken by 103 newly created combines (zrzeszenie); joining them has been formally voluntary, but, in fact, it is compulsory. They enjoy considerable power to intervene administratively in the activities of enterprises. The extensive system of directives (wskazniki dyrektywne), transmitted to the enterprises for various reasons, has been maintained. The main source of these directives are the so-called operational programs and government orders. They mask the direct, central decisions about the volume of production of a considerable proportion of all goods produced in the country and, consequently, the central disposition of the means of production. To this we must add a wide range of informal instructions issued through the combines and ministries. Company directors cannot neglect them even if the instructions contradict the reform legislation, because the government bureaucracy controls personnel policies and, consequently, the careers of the directors. (Kuczynski 1983:53).

A similar assessment of the economic effects of the state of war was presented by Fallenbichl (1983, 1983b).

The figure of 26 percent is most certainly an underestimate. Considering the fact that a large majority of the resignations (i.e. 500,000 out of 850,000) occurred after 13 December 1981, and that the internal party information quoted by Kostecki (1983:24 ff) shows that already at the end of 1980 the proportion of resignations in the large industrial plants reached 30 percent, the real proportion of losses might be well over one third.

It is also important to note that the majority of the losses were in the large industrial centres and included mainly young skilled workers. Among those who remained in the party there is an increasing proportion of pensioners, white collar workers, policemen and professional soldiers (82 percent of whom belong to the party) (Kontakt 1983:44).

From the very start of the Solidarity movement there was a considerable overlap between the union and party membership. But the inflow of union members to the central party bodies started during the 9th Extraordinary Congress in June 1981. During the congress a considerable number of Solidarity members entered the Central Audit Commission (17 percent), the Central Party Control Commission (19 percent), and 20 percent of the Central Committee members and alternate members were affiliated with the free unions (Kostecki 1983:12-13).
There were also local 'revolts' in the party's major front organisations: the United Peasant Party (ZSL), the Democratic Party (SD), the Sejm and, above all, the old trade unions which have practically collapsed, losing nearly 90 percent of their members.

The drive towards centralisation and strict subordination of the local party organisations started in summer 1944, when, during the conference in newly liberated Lublin, Gomulka outlined a new party program. It was soon followed by practical steps: the formation of a full-time apparatus and strengthening of the hierarchical chain of command between the central leadership and local party cells. The main thrust of these 'reforms' was explicitly stated by Gomulka: 'Now, [the party organisation - J.P.] must be subordinated to central control and expanded ... it is our task to build an ideologically strong, cohesive and disciplined party... The party demands from us discipline and unqualified commitment.' (Polonsky and Drukier 1980:52, Gomulka 1962 Vol I:222, 230). On 25 April 1945, during the meeting of the Central Committee Secretariat, it was decided that, in order to increase party discipline, all party members should be instructed to report in writing all incorrect and censurable actions of their comrades (Polonsky and Drukier 1980:423-428).

It is worth quoting in extenso the passage from the Report devoted to nomenklatura:

The harm done was further increased by the fact that in practice (whatever the official statements say) the assessment of cadres was conducted according to a system under which compliance and obedience to one's superiors counted for more than ability and qualifications.

The simplistic interpretation of the meaning of the Party's leading role could also be seen in the much altered system of nomenklatura, the subject of universal criticism, which resulted in a routine known as the 'jobs roundabout'. The system freed a privileged group from having to seek the support of either the workers or of the Party organisation. Instead, they were able to rely on their personal connection with high Party and government officials. (Survey, 1982:97).

The best insight into the operation of the Polish nomenklatura was provided by the documents published by Aneks (1981) and Thomas Lowit (1979). They demonstrate the extent of political control over appointments of administrative and technical personnel by the central and local party committees. In fact, the nomenklatura system includes three separate lists of positions and eligible officials: (i) the Central Committee list (decided by the members of the Politburo, the Secretariat, individual secretaries and directors of the C.C. Department); (ii) the Voivodship (District) Committees lists (subject to decisions of all party executive members and secretaries); and (iii) the local (regional, city and suburb) Committees lists (controlled by the local party executive's members; Aneks 1980:41).

As the little known results of Szaban's (1979) sociological studies of
the managers in the large industrial organisations in Poland show, all the top managerial positions are subject to nomenklatura appointments. Consequently, 95 percent of the directors and deputy directors of the largest industrial associations (zjednoczenie) and combines (kombinat) held PUWP cards, and a further 1.5 percent were members of the 'allied' Peasant Party (ZSL) (Szaban 1979:15).

The history of 'administrative takeover' in 1944/45 has been presented in Kostecki (1982) vols. iii and iv. The analysis of takeover tactics, with special emphasis on the formation of the 'concessional' parties, neutralisation of National Councils, achieving control over trade unions, and subordination of industrial management, can be found in Pakulski (1984).

Despite the government's efforts to improve the image of facade organisations, their popularity seems to be rather small. The data on membership of the new (party controlled) trade unions in the Gdansk region, published in 'Solidarnosc Gdansk' No.20/83 in March 1983 (and re-published in 'Voice of Solidarnosc' No.61, on 13 May 1983), show, for example, that out of 71,480 workers employed in that region only about 4,500 (i.e. about 6 percent) joined the new unions. This compares with over 90 percent membership in free trade unions.

The state of war imposed in Poland on 1 September 1939, was maintained by the communist authorities long after hostilities had ended. But because of the liberal nature of the 1939 legislation, it could not serve as an effective framework for political takeover and was informally suspended and replaced by more suitable Soviet law, introduced as a result of an agreement signed in Moscow in June 1944. According to this agreement, revealed in Poland in 1954, the total authority on liberated Polish territories was in the hands of the Red Army's Supreme Commander. He could act in accordance with Soviet law, make arrests, use Soviet military courts, order curfew, and control transport and communications. Moreover, because of the very vague formulation of the agreement, it was open to arbitrary interpretations by Soviet and Polish-communist authorities.

Before these laws and the official state of war were finally lifted in November 1945, the major regulations underlying them were incorporated into the so-called Small Penal Code. This Code, notorious for its harshness in dealing with political crimes, was used throughout the late 1940s, 1950s and 1960s (including the suppression of the 1956 workers' revolt and the quashing of the 1968 protests). The Draconian measures of the Small Penal Code were finally changed in 1969, nearly a quarter of a century after the end of the war. For a review of the content of the Small Penal Code and a summary of the effects of its application, see Socha (1980a, 1980b) and Kostecki (1982iii, iv). A detailed summary of breaches of the law which the December 1981 war legislation involved can be found in Szawlowski (1982:200-212) and Report (1983).

The July 1983 regulations included, among others, a highly controversial 'Law on the Ministry of Internal Affairs which stipulated conditions for the use of force and live ammunition by the military and police
forces. The law permits the police to shoot people who threaten them with unidentified 'dangerous objects', and it allows the Ministry of Internal Affairs, to use armed forces without consulting the government or even informing the Parliament. (For more detailed comments on the new laws see 'The Lifting of Martial Law and Human Rights in the Polish People's Republic; A Report Prepared by the Committee in Support of Solidarity in New York' issued on 28 September 1983. It is referred to in the present paper as 'Report 1983').

24 The 'parasite law', which calls for forced labour camps for those who 'avoid work', can be applied against people dismissed from work for union activities. The 'Law on Special Regulations' stipulates that people who 'abandon' their jobs, or are dismissed, be given 'the lowest wage provided for their line of work'. It also allows the Council of Ministers to introduce compulsory recruitment in some industries and seriously restricts the employee's right to change employment. Managers in industries 'of fundamental importance to the national economy' are authorised to abolish free Saturdays (one of Solidarity's main achievements) and extend the work week to 46 hours. These measures have, in fact, been introduced in about 1800 enterprises, including all coalmines (Report 1983:7).

25 As the Polish journal 'Sprawy i ludzie' (Events and People) revealed (17 February 1983, p.12), there were 1400 fatal work accidents in Poland in 1982. It was also revealed that more than half a million people work in what was described as 'hazardous conditions'. Every year about 10,000 people are pensioned due to work-related illness and injury. It must be remembered also that the average Polish miner works 46 hours per week.

26 When it takes place the process could be seen as a close analogy to the famous trial of sixteen Polish underground leaders in Moscow in June 1945. They were kidnapped in March 1945 and charged with subversion, attempts to abolish the regime and crimes against the state (Socha 1980a).

27 Observing propaganda attacks, it is sometimes difficult to resist an impression that the negative connotations which the terms related to the communist tradition evoke among most Poles are consciously used by the authorities to discredit their political opponents. Thus attacks on dissidents never fail to mention their past political involvement and their past party membership, and the military newspaper 'Zolnierz Wolnosci' (Freedom Fighter) has recently quoted with approval attacks on KOR members by the Extremely nationalistic and anti-communist emigre paper 'Mysl Polska'.

28 According to the data from sociological survey conducted in 1984 among the students of Warsaw University, 85% of respondents (compared with 50% in 1978) rejected the present socioeconomic system in Poland and were ready to get involved in illegal activities. The data, reported in the London journal Na Antenie and Wiadomosci Polskie (Sydney, 21 January 1984, p.7), show also a marked increase in students' religiosity.

29 According to the labour force projections presented by Fallenbuchl (1982:5), the number of people at working age will decrease in Poland in
1980-90 by more than 50 percent compared with the previous decade. The problem of labour shortages has been further aggravated by the unfortunate decision to allow for early retirement of workers over 60 years of age.

30 See Andorka and Zagorski (1979, 1980). The data from Poland and Hungary reported in these studies seem to indicate a decline in social mobility throughout the 1970s.

31 General Jaruzelski himself belonged to the discredited Gierek 'team'. Since 1970 he has been a member of the top decision-making group and he shaped, or at least approved, all important political and economic decisions which led to the recent crisis. All his colleagues are also senior party officials who advanced to their positions during the 'Gierek period'. They cannot condemn the previous leadership without undermining their own position and/or implicating their colleagues. This makes the promised trials of corrupt predecessors so difficult and embarrassing. (In fact, most of the arrested party officials, with the exception of a few less important scapegoats, have been either released, or charged with some trivial offences and given suspended sentences or fines.)
PART II

ECONOMICS, CULTURE AND SOCIETY
IN PRESENT-DAY POLAND
CHAPTER FOUR

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN POLAND:
FROM REASONABLE PAST PERFORMANCE TO STAGNATION, AND
HARDSHIPS AHEAD IN A NATURALLY WELL-ENDOWED ECONOMY

BY

JOZEF WILCZYNSKI

The Growth and Decline of National Income

Until the present crisis the Polish economy had not performed badly by world standards. The figures in Table 1 show annual percentage increases, or decreases (-) in National Income at constant prices over the period 1951-1982. To place Polish developments in a meaningful comparative context, corresponding data for Australia and the World as a whole are also cited.

Table 1: ANNUAL PERCENTAGE INCREASE OR DECREASE IN NATIONAL INCOME, 1951-1982, IN CONSTANT PRICES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>World</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951-60*</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-70*</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-75*</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
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<td>-6.0</td>
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<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>-12.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>-8.0</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Ten or five-year annual averages
.. Not available

Sources: Gospodarka planowa, Warsaw, 6/1980, p.320; Quarterly Estimates of National Income and Expenditure, Canberra (different numbers); Rocznik statystyczny, Warsaw, Central Statistical Office (different years).

It will be noted that Polish economic development was quite impressive up to the mid-1970s. But since 1978, Poland's economic performance can be described only as disastrous, and production in 1982 was less than three-quarters of the (modest) 1978 level. It is significant that the economic troubles had well ante-dated the emergence of Solidarity in late 1980 by at least two years, and it is demagogic and simplistic to blame the latter for the country's economic predicament.
The two main branches of the economy are industry and agriculture, and they deserve special mention in this presentation. In its developmental strategy, as in any communist country, the regime in Poland has given strong priority to industrialisation, with concomitant planned neglect of agriculture - guided by a mixture of ideological and practical considerations. In effect, the rates of growth of industrial production achieved in the past were quite high, with those in agriculture being miserably low. This is brought out by the official annual rates of growth for 1951-1982 (Table 2).

Table 2: RATE OF GROWTH OF POLISH INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, 1951-1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Industrial Production</th>
<th>Agricultural Production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951-60*</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-70*</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-75*</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>-11.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>-4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Ten or five-year annual averages

Sources: Rocznik statystyczny (different years); East-West Fortnightly Bulletin, Brussels, 1 March 1983, pp. 8-10.

As a result of those policies Poland was transformed from an agricultural country into a semi-industrialised economy with a solid industrial base. In 1981 her estimated ranking in world industrial output was fifteenth; in the output of black coal she ranked fourth, sulphur - fourth, shipbuilding - seventh, steel - eighth, passenger cars - eleventh, trucks - twelfth and electricity - also twelfth. Since the Second World War the proportion of the country's working population engaged in industry has been doubled (from 15 to 30 percent) whilst in agriculture it has been halved (from 60 to 30 percent).

The structural policies followed have produced certain organic features relevant to the present and future economic problems. Industrial development was largely divorced from competitive cost structures in world (capitalist) markets, being geared mostly to the absorptive and undemanding markets at home and in other member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Comecon). In general, the membership of CMEA, dominated by the USSR, has had a primitivising effect on the Polish economy both via exports and via imports, especially in relation to quality, technology and know-how. Thus, the country's capacity to earn hard currencies in highly competitive capitalist markets has been narrowly limited, and its legacy will keep on vitiating Polish economic recovery.
At the same time, the neglect of agriculture - in respect of investment, rural amenities, manpower and industrial inputs (agricultural machinery, fertilisers and other chemicals) - has prevented the growth of agricultural output in a country otherwise very well endowed by nature. Compounding this neglect, there has been blatant discrimination against private farming (which represents 85 percent of the cultivated area), and favouritism of state and collective farms - particularly in regard to supplies of equipment, fertilisers and credits. A country which was traditionally a large exporter of agricultural products has been reduced to one which cannot feed itself, as reflected by prevalent food shortages and the need for large imports of agricultural products. These imports, paradoxically, come mostly from industrialised capitalist countries, absorbing valuable foreign exchange.

Prices and Inflation

Traditionally, communist leaders and economists have maintained that inflation was a peculiarity of the capitalist market economy and did not appear under socialist central economic planning. As evidence, they quoted the official price indexes which, of course, did not take account of shortages, queues, long waiting lists and black markets. This situation came to be known among Western specialists as 'socialist inflation' - a special systemic kind of suppressed inflation.

But since the late 1970s, even the official price statistics have revealed unusually large price increases - and not only in Poland but also in most other socialist countries. Further, equilibrium prices or roughly prices prevailing in unofficial free or black markets, are usually much higher (about 2-3 times the official levels). According to some estimates the 'inflationary overhang' (the excess of available spending power in the hands of the consumers over the goods and services available in the market) in 1983 stood at 500 billion zlotys.

The overall evidence and the degree of inflation in Poland are to some extent demonstrated in Table 3, where, in addition to official data black, market figures are also given.

More specifically, price increases in the last three years have been as follows:

1. July 1980 - increases in the prices of food ranging from 20 to 100 percent - which provoked widespread dissatisfaction and the emergence of the 'Solidarity' trade union organisation.

2. 1981 - the cost of living rose by at least 25 percent.

3. At the beginning of 1982 price increases were announced ranging up to 400 percent (effective 1 February 1982). On the average food prices rose by 150 percent and industrial consumer goods by 80 percent.
Table 3: OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL INDICATORS OF PRICES AND THE VALUE OF THE CURRENCY IN POLAND, 1970-83

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Official Index of Retail Prices 1960 = 100</th>
<th>Official Exchange Rate: Zlotys to US$1.00</th>
<th>Black Market Rate: Zlotys to US$1.00</th>
<th>Degree of Currency Inflation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>110.3</td>
<td>24.00</td>
<td>180.00</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>109.3</td>
<td>24.08</td>
<td>85.00</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>108.9</td>
<td>22.08</td>
<td>88.00</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>112.5</td>
<td>19.92</td>
<td>83.00</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>118.3</td>
<td>19.92</td>
<td>88.00</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>122.4</td>
<td>19.92</td>
<td>129.00</td>
<td>548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>127.3</td>
<td>19.92</td>
<td>128.00</td>
<td>543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>133.0</td>
<td>19.92</td>
<td>116.00</td>
<td>482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>144.2</td>
<td>33.20</td>
<td>113.50</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>154.8</td>
<td>33.20</td>
<td>111.75</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>168.0</td>
<td>33.20</td>
<td>300.00</td>
<td>904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>198.9</td>
<td>33.20</td>
<td>525.00</td>
<td>1,481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>88.00</td>
<td>450.00</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983(July)</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>95.00</td>
<td>700.00</td>
<td>637</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

.. Not available


4. In 1983 the cost of living rose by at least 15 percent.

5. More price increases (to average some 15 percent) were planned, to be announced in early 1984.

There has also been considerable de-control of prices. There are three categories of prices in this respect: (i) state-fixed over longer periods, (ii) regulated by some authority, and (iii) free-market prices. As reported at the end of 1982, the free market covered 30 percent of agricultural procurements by the state, 50 percent of retail sales and 75 percent of supplies to productive enterprises.

The Standard of Living

The commonly accepted starting measure of a country's standard of living is per capita national income. Using the Western basis of the concept, the
level for Poland in 1979 worked out (in US dollars) at $5,000. This was before the industrial and political upheavals since that time. The Polish figure was well above the world average of $1,900 and above Hungary ($4,900), Spain ($4,800) and Israel ($4,060), but below Italy ($5,130), Australia ($8,530), USA ($9,480) and Switzerland ($14,040). Table 4 on the following page indicates the position of Poland on the world scene, in the context of selected socialist and capitalist countries.

However, the standard of living is not merely the level of income earned, but rather the amount of goods and services consumed and the conditions of earning that income and of living in general. Thus the per capita income figures have to be qualified by a number of other variables - and the latter may operate with different effects in the capitalist market economy and under socialist central economic planning. Those detracting from the standard of living in a country like Poland are:

1. relatively high saving and investment;
2. relatively high defence expenditure;
3. the small range of goods and services in the market;
4. shortages, waiting lists, queues;
5. poor quality of goods and commercial service;
6. high proportion of women at work;
7. long working hours;
8. restricted human rights and freedom.

On the other hand, the following peculiarities of the socialist economic system, comparatively speaking, enhance the standard of living in a country like Poland:

1. continuous full employment;
2. smaller income inequalities;
3. lower income tax;
4. generous social welfare benefits;
5. cheap (subsidised) housing.

When all these variables are taken into account, the rank order indicated in Fig. 2 for 1979 was, on the whole, still the same. But it must be pointed out that in the USSR, owing to the very heavy defence expenditure, the standard of living was almost certainly below that of Spain.
Table 4: PER CAPITA NATIONAL INCOME OF POLAND AND OF OTHER SELECTED SOCIALIST AND CAPITALIST COUNTRIES IN 1979*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socialist countries</th>
<th>In US Dollars (Not to scale)</th>
<th>Capitalist countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>German DR</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLAND</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>FR of Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>4,900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1,950</td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Average</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Average</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>Korea (Sth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea (Nth)</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Panama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kampuchea</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*The Western concept of the National Income at Market Prices applies to all
countries. The figures are rounded, to avoid a misleading impression of the possibility of precise measurement.

Since 1979, the situation in Poland has, of course, drastically deteriorated, and it is estimated that real output has dropped by about one-third - in spite of several governmental measures.

In 1982 wage increases of 60-70 percent were granted, together with higher social welfare benefits. Nevertheless, it was officially acknowledged that in real terms personal income dropped by 15 percent. It was envisaged that in 1983 wages would increase by 16 percent and official retail prices by 15 percent.

Although rationing ensures some orderliness and confidence in distribution and it protects the minimum standard of living, it is a solution of last resort. It interferes with the individual's consumer preferences and the maximum satisfaction that could be attained from a given level of income. There have been periodical or perennial shortages of such products as butter, meat, sugar, tobacco, vodka and washing powder. The government introduced formal rationing in early 1981. But it has been relaxed substantially since then, and at the end of 1983 it involved only flour, meat and sugar.

**External Debtedness**

Since 1970, Polish external debts (owed to the Western countries and to a lesser extent to the oil-exporting countries) have risen from US$1,200m to over $27,000m, or from $37 to $750 per head of population. By the end of this century the total figure may rise to $51,000m (at current prices). Although Poland is the most heavily indebted socialist country, some less-developed countries of the Third World are in a more difficult position. This is particularly so in the case of Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, South Korea and Venezuela. The growth of Polish debts and Poland’s position in relation to some other socialist and capitalist countries are set out in Table 5.

The impact of the Polish debts has been unusually severe, which can be explained partly by inept governmental policies and partly by the economic situation in capitalist countries. Factors adversely affecting Poland’s position on foreign debts include:

1. unduly short terms - mostly for three years;
2. concentration of repayments in the early 1980s;
3. almost all debts are in hard currencies, a commodity of which Poland has been perennially short;
4. credits largely used for the import of non-productive purposes (e.g. grains $25,000m);
5. poorly developed export capacity, especially to the highly competitive Western markets (with hard currencies).

The burden of foreign debts on the country's economy can be measured by the so-called debt-service ratio. It is expressed as the percentage ratio of interest plus current repayments of the principal falling due to the value of exports (visible and invisible) to hard-currency areas. In the case of Poland in 1982 this ratio stood at 200 percent - in other words, foreign borrowings and the rescheduling of debts were essential as exports could not cover even half of the current liabilities.

To cope with the immediate emergency some successful attempts have been made to 'restructure' the debts. In 1981, by agreement with the creditor countries, 90 percent of the government-guaranteed debts were shifted from 1981 to 1986-89, and a possibility was created for more lending to Poland. In the following year 5 percent of the debts falling due was shifted to 1983 and 95 percent to 1986-89. In June 1983, negotiations were begun on rescheduling the debts owed to the Western banks (at least 500 of them) over 20 years, with an initial grace period of 8 years.

Table 5: THE GROWTH OF POLISH HARD-CURRENCY INDEBTEDNESS 1970-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total in US$m</th>
<th>Per Head in US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>4,900</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>7,800</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>11,500</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>17,800</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>21,100</td>
<td>596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>25,400</td>
<td>714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>25,300</td>
<td>704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>27,200</td>
<td>751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>37,000*</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>48,000*</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>51,000*</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Projected, at current prices
Table 6: THE MOST INDEBTED OTHER SOCIALIST AND CAPITALIST COUNTRIES IN 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socialist Country</th>
<th>Total US$m</th>
<th>Per Head US$</th>
<th>Capitalist Country</th>
<th>Total US$m</th>
<th>Per Head US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>20,500</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>1,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German DR</td>
<td>13,200</td>
<td>789</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>1,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>10,300</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>Korea(Sth)</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>8,800</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cz'Slovakia</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>6,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


But the problem of the debt repayment in the future still remains. It is estimated by some Polish economists that 2 percent of the Polish National Income each year can and will have to be sacrificed for the repayment of the debts and current interest. The period will depend on the growth of the Polish National Income and the interest rates. Depending on these conditions, this period will be at least 15 years and may be as long as 40 years, or even more.

When in Warsaw in late 1983, the author was told by some economists that socialist as well as Third World debtor countries were considering the creation of a debtor bloc or bargaining association that could negotiate with Western creditor nations. Such an association might effectively press not only for the rescheduling of debts, but perhaps also for the cancellation of some and the reduction of interest payments. The ultimate weapon hinted at was the threat of repudiation en masse of the debts altogether, something which could very well lead to the collapse of the Western financial and monetary system.

Foreign Trade

Since 1970 there has been some re-orientation of Polish foreign trade towards the capitalist world, partly to the West and partly to the Third World. The figures in Table 7 represent the percentage share of the three world divisions in the Polish foreign trade turnover (exports plus imports) over the period in question:
Table 7: POLISH FOREIGN TRADE TURNOVER 1970-1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>With the Socialist bloc</th>
<th>With the West</th>
<th>With the Third World</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>66.2%</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>52.2%</td>
<td>41.3%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>55.7%</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>62.2%</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
<td>31.7%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Poland's trade balances with the three world divisions in 1982 were as follows:

Table 8: POLAND'S TRADE BALANCES 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Exports to (In million foreign exchange zlotys)</th>
<th>Imports from</th>
<th>Trade Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Bloc</td>
<td>507,800</td>
<td>547,100</td>
<td>- 39,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>308,800</td>
<td>265,000</td>
<td>+ 43,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third World</td>
<td>130,800</td>
<td>49,900</td>
<td>+ 81,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>947,400</td>
<td>862,000</td>
<td>+ 85,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Rynki zagraniczne, 19 March 1983, Insert, p.3.

The trade deficit with the Socialist Bloc partly reflects economic aid received by Poland in the form of deferred payments. In contrast to the 1970s, when Poland had substantial trade deficits with the West (financed by the large foreign credits), the government's policy of domestic austerity has reversed the balance, and this situation will have to continue for many years to come. The Third World as a source of trade surplus is significant, and it appears that there is scope for further growth in this respect.

The foreign debts predicament imposes very stringent requirements on the country's foreign trade policy, with consequent implications for the popular living standards in the years ahead. On the one hand, exports must be sharply increased, especially to the hard-currency areas, and on the other, imports must be kept down to the indispensable minimum.

In pursuit of these objectives, the economic reforms (see the following section) provide for various incentives to step up exports and, of course, the
most desirable consumer items (competitive enough in world markets) will have to be sacrificed in exports to capitalist countries. In imports, priority will be given to indispensable categories viz. food, medical supplies and raw materials and equipment essential for export production. Imports of industrial consumer goods and other luxuries will have to be strictly limited. There will probably be a continued predisposition towards import-replacement production, which usually leads to lower efficiency, a smaller range of goods on the market and to higher prices.

It may be of interest here to mention that joint ventures with capitalist partners are seen as one of the solutions to the foreign debts problem. As a result of legislation passed in 1976, Poland allows foreign ownership of Polish territory. Since that time, there have been several laws and regulations (of 1977, 1979, 1981 and 1982) designed to attract further capital and technology from the West. (Bulgaria, China, Cuba, Hungary, Romania, Vietnam and Yugoslavia also allow foreign ownership on their territory.) Joint venture legislation is mainly addressed to investors of Polish descent living in capitalist countries (with hard currencies), and they are allowed up to 100 percent of the share capital.

The export and import policies needed to meet the foreign debt liabilities will continue to have depressing effects on the popular living standards. In 1983, $12,260m was due for debt servicing. As this sum represents 217 percent of Polish exports to hard-currency areas, rescheduling of the debts and further borrowings are essential. Some 2 percent of the Polish National Income will have to be forgone over the next 15-40 years for interest and the repayment of the debts.

Economic Reforms

In contrast to the brilliance and impact of Polish economic thought on the international scene (as exemplified by O. Lange and M. Kalecki), in practice the functioning of the Polish economy has left much to be desired, even in comparison with some other socialist countries. The economy has neither achieved the high rates of growth of Bulgaria and Romania, nor has it delivered as much to the consumer as in Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary or even Yugoslavia. There were several attempts after 1955 to improve the system, but in each case it tended to gravitate back to the old bureaucratised and unwieldy Stalinist model. Its ineptitude, waste and, in particular, its indifference to technological progress have become increasingly evident since the mid-1970s.

Under the pressure of public opinion and prodded by the industrial upheavals and economic disasters since 1980, the government appointed a Reform Commission to formulate suitable proposals. The Commission produced its report in June 1981, and after various modifications it was to come into effect by 1 October 1983. The main elements of the reforms are as follows:

1. the liberalisation of central economic planning (with less detailed and fewer directives);
2. greater independence of enterprises - the so-called '3S' basis (self-management, self-reliance, self-financing);

3. greater price flexibility, including a greater role for the market mechanism in price determination and the phasing out of some subsidies and inefficient enterprises;

4. emphasis on financial incentives and disincentives (as distinct from mandatory directives), viz. variable interest rates, credit terms, price mark-ups for quality and novelty, taxes;

5. drive for the rationalisation of employment, higher labour productivity, better utilisation of fixed productive assets, economies in the use of raw materials, components and energy, quality improvement and adaptation of the structure of exports to foreign markets, especially the capitalist countries.

The reforms, in terms of policy objectives, look quite impressive on paper and were well meant by the original scholarly proponents. The reforms as spelled out appear to be tediously repetitious of previously attempted reforms (at least on three occasions), before their implementation was frustrated by Stalinist hardliners opposed to 'economic revisionism' and by power-hungry bureaucrats. As Marx once said, 'The road to hell is paved with good intentions'. There are many economists who are highly sceptical as to the scope and prospective effectiveness of the present widely advertised reforms. One of them, Z. Bartnicki (now in the West) has concluded:

There is no room for the automatic operation of market forces, there is still administrative decision-making, voluntarism still calls the tune, and the old underground struggle of wits between the enterprise and the central administration continues. ... In its practical applications ... it is obvious that the economic reform - solemnly prepared and widely publicised - is in fact superficial, partial and pretentious, not providing real solutions ... The reforms tolerated are not likely to extricate the Polish economy from the crisis.'

This conclusion appears to be well supported by current developments.

2 E.g. see, B. Minc, Ekonomia polityczna socjalizmu, Warsaw, PWE, 1961, p. 351.


'The Polish revolutionary upheavals ... are of world historic importance, yet there is considerable confusion about exactly why it is so.' This remark, made in the publisher's preface to S. Starski's (1982) book 'Class Struggle of Classless Poland', reflects very well the state of mind and the feelings shared in the West by social scientists, politicians, journalists and the public.

The aim of this paper is not to give an answer to the question 'why'? There is not, and cannot be, one answer for everybody irrespective of his or her political attitudes. I would like only to focus attention on one important aspect of the Polish situation which, surprisingly, has been neglected in the majority of analyses done from many angles both in and outside Poland — namely, class type relations.

I intend to prove that the revolutionary situation in Poland was caused by a deeply rooted structural conflict of class-type interests. I will argue, however, that neither the attempt to prove the existence of the 'new class' consisting of intellectuals and workers, nor one including the intellectuals in the same 'ruling class' as the party political elite, helps us to understand Polish events and reflects properly the real social configuration, in spite of the opinion of some sociologists.

The notion of 'class-type relations' is used purposefully here instead of 'class structure', since the analysis will concern only some relations which are attributed to social classes in the Marxist tradition. I will make no attempt to define precisely classes or class boundaries existing in Poland or other state socialist societies, since such definitional exercises seem to me almost always very arbitrary, at least in the form presented by some contemporary writings, although there are not enough of them in any case.

The Starski book, which provides much valuable information and interpretation concerning the recent Polish situation, is a good example of such neglect. In spite of its promising title, in which both class struggle and 'classlessness' are mentioned, it only touches the very surface of class related problems. This opinion is not intended as criticism of the author. Such criticism would be unfair, since Starski did not intend to write a theoretical book on class relations but rather to present and interpret basic facts in the course of a 'committed study'. His relative avoidance of a class approach is, however, typical of most Polish sociologists.

I. Szelenyi has properly stated that currently there are no sociologists in East European countries writing seriously about class structure in that part of the world. The literature devoted explicitly to class is almost non-
existent except for ideological propaganda or some very abstract considerations not pretending to describe particular class relations in particular societies.

In less 'liberal' state socialist countries the first type of writing prevails, while in more 'liberal' ones (to which, contrary to the popular image in the West, Poland still belongs even today, or at least surely belonged in the past)... 'one is simply no longer supposed to talk about classes' except on a highly theoretical level.2

Among the most significant Polish contributions to modern class theory is the widely known and appreciated book by S. Ossowski, finished in 1957. It expresses a viewpoint which is far from being Marxist. J. Hochfeld's book, presenting an unorthodox, or simply more modern, interpretation of general Marxist class theory was published in 1963 and the book by W. Wesolowski, containing both general discussion on Marxist class theory and the chapter on class structure of socialist societies, very recently translated and published in English (Wesolowski, 1979), appeared for the first time in Poland as early as 1966. (This should be remembered by those foreign readers who claim today that Wesolowski's book is a little outdated.) All three books constitute both the milestones and the dead end street signs of the modern Polish theory of class structure. They are dead ends not because they fail to provide a good basis for further serious consideration or discussion, which they actually did provide, but because they marked the end of such considerations in Polish sociology. Marxist sociologists did not seriously try to apply their theoretical approach to analyse class relations in their own society, and non-Marxist ones were unfortunately not interested in classes at all. They perceived this problem as biased by official Marxism and did not try to discuss it as such or to apply a different perspective.

Neither side should be blamed. Marxist sociologists engaged in serious analysis of Polish class structure could expect only a very negative reaction from party ideologists and authorities, an accusation of betrayal or, at least, of revisionism. And why expect a non-Marxist to do somebody else's job? The necessity of doing this job was acknowledged by both more modern and even relatively orthodox Polish Marxists, but they never decided to take one consecutive step more in order to bring their postulates to life. It was left undone, for, as the readers may suppose, such an enterprise is difficult and dangerous in the existing situation.

Polish sociology should be praised in this situation for achieving a relatively good mapping of other social differences, inequalities, socio-occupational structure and social mobility. These important aspects of social structure were investigated in Poland to a much greater extent than in the other East European countries, except, perhaps, for Hungary. I would not agree with Szelenyi's (1978) criticism that such investigations only conceal more important social class cleavages. (This is actually the same, though inverted, accusation which orthodox Marxists direct against modern Western analysts of social stratification and mobility.) Nor do I agree with those who deny any value of such surveys and analyses because the majority of them do not reveal the situation of extreme elite groups, on the one hand, and poverty or social pathology, on the other. True, these problems and other
aspects of social structure should be examined, most probably by other means, but it does not mean that the knowledge already accumulated is without significant heuristic and social value.

This knowledge does not provide, however, a sufficient basis to answer the question: how was it possible that in the course of a few months the great majority of Polish society, irrespective of education, occupation, age and other social features, joined the nation-wide Solidarity movement in a fight for a substantial reshaping of the whole social system?

The scale of this mass involvement and the scale of socio-economic and political changes demanded by the movement allow one to speak about a revolutionary situation. However, this revolution was 'self limiting' to a great extent, although not sufficiently so, for the regime and its foreign guardians. J. Kurczewski wrote that the peculiarity of a revolutionary situation, as compared to other social protests, lies in uniting - often for only a particular period of time - the interests of a majority of social groups in a given society which normally are very separate and different from each other, and often of a contradictory character.

If this is supposed to be the definition of a revolutionary kind of protest, the situation in Poland since 1980 was, and still is, revolutionary. This revolution has been forcibly suppressed but not eliminated, because the reasons unifying or linking the interests of various groups still exist.

Was the Solidarity movement of a class character? In Kurczewski's opinion it was born as an expression of the interests of the 'new middle class', consisting of intellectuals and a 'workers' aristocracy', although he does not like the latter term and speaks about 'people who are more educated or have bigger earnings as compared with truly proletarianised social strata and classes'. I am not convinced by his argument, which suggests that these two groups constitute the new class because of the congruence of their social and political interests. Such an opinion is not fully consistent with his own statement that during revolutionary periods the interests of very different segments of the society may be temporarily united, though such unification does not necessarily create one social class from these different groupings.

Even less convincing are the opinions of Gouldner, Konrad and Szelenyi. That intellectuals constitute the new class gaining the dominant position in East European societies, together with the political bureaucracy. Even before 1980, witnessing only the very beginning of the consolidation of Polish workers' and intellectuals' opposition to the existing regime, Szelenyi could not explain this phenomenon by his frame of reference and was forced to ask the question, logical for him, but indicating misunderstanding of ongoing processes: 'Why do we find intellectuals who are prepared to 'betray' their class, and why does the dominating class allow them to do so?'

Szelenyi's answer was that the ruling political elite of the new class, exercising immediate political power in a relatively unstabilised new type of society, can behave quite oppressively against its own class, namely, against the rest of the intellectuals, causing their counteraction. If so, however,
the same scheme can be applied to explain the clash between the party, or wider political bureaucracy, and the working class, which according to official interpretations, this bureaucracy is supposed to represent.

I would not like to take part in the discussion of whether the ruling elite, which is in East European countries equivalent to the political bureaucracy (since both administration and economy are highly politicised there), should be considered an elite as such, or as a new ruling class. In Szelenyi's opinion 'The power of the intellectual class could be exercised only through the medium of the ruling elite'. This power is supposed to be used to strengthen the system of 'rational redistribution' in which 'productive' workers and peasants are dispossessed of their surplus product by the intellectual class. This class in turn, has the right to dispose of it according to its own criteria of rationality, as defined by long term development aims. Actually, however, '...the functions of central redistribution in the strict sense are carried out not by the intelligentsia as a whole but by a narrower segment of it - the state and party bureaucracy, which we shall call the ruling or governing elite ...'.

It seems that there is an inconsistency in this theory. If the role of the governing political elite is to secure the existence of the socio-economic system of 'rational distribution', in which intellectuals are supposed to perform a redistributive role, but this role is actually performed not by all of them but by the political elite, the same elite serves as both the guardian of the system and the dispossessing-disposing (redistributive) body. So what is left for the remaining intellectuals? Szelenyi says that they also occupy a privileged position in receiving material rewards in the course of unjust redistribution.

Again the question can be raised, who actually receives the unjustified portion of the consumption fund? Are those intellectuals who do not belong to the political elite really privileged? True, there are some movie stars, top writers, top scientists, pop singers and musicians who do very well, though not so well as their counterparts in the West. But the great majority of intellectuals in Poland, such as doctors, lawyers, teachers (both in schools and universities) and middle ranking clerks, are underpaid, and their material situation is worse than the situation of many workers, especially those in skilled and profitable occupations (like miners, shipyard workers or skilled construction workers). The work of intellectuals is considered unproductive by official economic doctrine, and all their activities are counted on the side of expenses instead of as a contribution to the national income. In consequence they are very far from being favoured by a real redistribution of the nation's wealth. On the contrary, because of their assumed nonproductivity and because they are continuously under the party elite's suspicion of political unreliability, a semi-conscious, not fully determined, policy is exercised not to reward them above a necessary minimum. They produce symbols, not things, and symbols not only do not constitute part of the GNP but are politically dangerous.

Some of the technical professionals who contribute directly to material production and managers of great industrial enterprises are the exceptions to this rule. The latter however, may be included in the governing elite, since they are very strongly intertwined with the political administration.
All analyses indicate that in Eastern Europe the material situation of the average member of the intelligentsia now differs much less from that of the average worker than before World War II. Some time ago M. Pohoski gave convincing evidence that the lowering of the intelligentsia's standard of living, both in relative and absolute terms, was a deliberate policy after the war, aimed at redirecting the part of 'surplus production' previously consumed by this group, in order to accelerate industrial development. So the so-called 'socialist industrialisation' was made partly at the expense of the intelligentsia, which was deprived of its relatively privileged position by the redistribution of national wealth, rather than being specially privileged by this redistribution, as Szelenyi suggests. Though inequality, drastically levelled in the early fifties, increased later on, to some degree, it is still only the top elite that may be accused of really excessive gain. It is not the case that the line between intelligentsia and workers delineates the most substantial social differences in East Europe.

Neither Szelenyi nor other sociologists would say that the Polish intelligentsia has joined the Solidarity movement to modify the redistribution pattern in order to gain an economic advantage over other social classes or strata. Such modifications were demanded by both intellectuals and workers, but they were more concerned with subsidies to the underdeveloped Polish health service, educational system and culture, which were unable to satisfy widespread and fully justified basic social needs. The improvement of material conditions for employees in these branches was meant to be linked with substantial qualitative and quantitative improvements in the services provided for the whole nation in the frame of a welfare-type system. (An interesting analysis of the reasons for the inclusion of postulates on the health service in the August 1980 agreements alongside more purely political and economic items, is presented by M. Sokolowska.)

I. Szelenyi, concentrating his attention on the redistribution pattern, sought to include it among class delineating criteria, avoiding the use of formal criteria based on the legal ownership of the means of production or the form of this ownership. In his opinion ownership implies the right to dispose of the products. Such an approach is much more sensible than the formal one expressed in the writings of Stalin and his followers but still seems to be somewhat one-sided. There is probably no serious sociologist today who would advocate the use of formal ownership status as a criterion of class differentiation. Most tend to speak about broader relations to the means of production rather than the right of possessing, or they assume a much broader meaning for the concept of ownership than the purely legal one. The definition by J. Hochfeld may be recalled here. He understood class ownership as '...a sovereign, though somewhat qualified, control over the process of work and the distribution of product rather than a formal title to possession'. While Szelenyi pays attention to redistribution, many others emphasise the relations of authority, i.e. control over labour processes, as the important dimension of class configuration. E.O. Wright may serve as a good example here, though he is more interested in peoples' control over their own labour than in the organisation of work on a social scale.

Let us look at the intellectuals from this angle. All over the world they, and especially - though not only - that part of them which can be called
Individual talent and knowledge are not equally important in all kinds of jobs. They are obviously (and perhaps unfortunately) more important for the creative intelligentsia than for assembly line factory workers. Moreover, they are the main 'means of intellectual production', while tools and machines are the main means of material production.

Subordination to political and administrative authoritarian ruling bodies, especially when such bodies do not have enough social legitimacy for their power, is always felt by intellectuals to be an element of oppression. Control over the 'means of intellectual production' is a key problem when we consider the political or administrative dependence of the intelligentsia.

Even if we agree that Poland before 1990 was the most liberal, or at least one of the most liberal, state socialist countries, party and state control over intellectual 'production' was always something to complain about. Relative liberalisation during the Glierek era contributed to expectations in this respect rather than to an enhanced feeling of satisfaction.

There is also the redistributive aspect to be considered. Distribution of cultural symbols differs substantially from the distribution of material products. The latter has to be taken from the producer to be distributed, be it for individual consumption or further investment. To give it to somebody is equal to depriving somebody else. It is not so with artistic, social or even technical ideas. Giving away is the essence of intellectual work and giving to everybody enriches everybody without creating losers.

The sense of free intellectual work is thus seen in the free distribution of its product, but the totalitarian type of system controls the distribution of intellectual products very much more tightly than their production. The wider the distribution, the more strict the political, ideological and administrative control over the content of communication. In such a situation, from the point of view of a correction to the system, but not of individual gain, underground intellectual production in the sphere of broadly understood culture and ideology is an exact equivalent of 'moonlighting' in the sphere of the economy; and underground publications are equivalent to a
'secondary market' in the economy. The former indicates the social inadequacy of the political system to the same extent as the latter indicates the inadequacy and pathology of the economic system.

To summarise, the class character of intellectual interests, irrespective of whether intellectuals constitute a class or not, concerns three issues. The first one, namely, control over the rest of the society in order to assure the redistribution of the national product according to their own needs or ideological (technocratic?) preferences, is far from being the most important one. Evidently, it was not so during the Polish summer. Much more important are the attempts to regain control over their own work and over the redistribution of their own 'product'. Only the first aim can be reached in alliance with an authoritarian political bureaucracy, and only as far as the first aim is concerned can this bureaucracy be considered a 'representation' of the whole intellectual group, though this is also very doubtful in the light of East European experience. Since the other two aims require a limiting of authoritarian power and an enlarging of the sphere of relative freedom, there is, and must, be a structural conflict of interest between an intellectual group and an authoritarian elite, so long as this elite is an authoritarian one attempting to strengthen the totalitarian features of the whole system. Moreover, these interests place intellectuals in opposition to the political elite, but not to workers.

To limit the political elite's control over social life is also in the interest of the workers, who have learned that without this, and without gaining social control over the political and economic bureaucracy, other aims, such as a decent material situation and material progress, are very difficult, if not impossible, to attain.

The most direct impulses leading to the eruptions of determined worker's protests in Poland were always economic ones. It was so in 1956 in Poznan as well as in 1970 in the port cities and also in 1980. These economic 'sparks' were, however, always falling into a barrel of political 'gun powder' accumulated in the workers' minds in the course of their whole historical experience.

One thing must be made very clear, like it or not: it is not true that the Polish workers' and the whole nation's protest, even in the latest stage when it was organised and channelled to a great extent by a strong and militant Solidarity structure, was aimed at a restoration of the capitalist socio-economic system. Such an accusation by the party establishment was a conscious lie, and any such hopes among the very few extreme Polish conservatives at home and abroad were unjustified and unrealistic.

One of the striking features of Solidarity's ideology (ideology in statu nascendi, since there was not enough time for its crystallisation) was extreme egalitarianism. (This is, by the way, also an argument against the opinion that it was ideologically a movement of the 'worker's aristocracy'.) While it is true that the Solidarity revolution was a self-limiting one, it would have without doubt erupted in a most extreme form, if anyone had imposed private ownership (shareholding) of industrial and other enterprises on a societal
scale. The accusation of a pro-capitalist ideology is not only false but inconsistent with the simultaneous accusations of Trotskyism or anarcho-syndicalism, also levelled by the government and by some emigre circles. Both are equally ridiculous. (Nobody says, nota bene that there is anarcho-syndicalism in Yugoslavia because of the great role of workers' self-management in that country, though it is probably also not a model country for socialist states.)

The ideology of Solidarity was still very uncrystallised. Its crystallisation followed the revolutionary upheaval rather than directed it. It was a fascinating process of the acquisition of social consciousness in the course of political struggle, though it is much too early to call this real consciousness. Such labels as 'reactionary' or 'progressive', 'anti-socialist' or 'true socialist', 'nationalist' or 'international', not to mention identification with particular ideologies like 'Christian democracy', 'anarcho-syndicalism', 'social democracy' or 'labour movement', are equally unjustified. None of these elements was the dominant one, albeit traces of all of them could be found. So what was the common denominator?

So far as their most direct aims were concerned, all earlier workers' protests in Poland had been successful only in a short-term sense. However, the workers learned two important things in the course of these protests. The first was that they are powerful and that the establishment is afraid of them much more than of anything else. The second was that neither the withdrawal of particularly disliked economic decisions, nor even changes in the top posts (the party-governmental 'merry-go-round'), would bring long-term economic development. It became obvious that no serious economic problems could be solved definitely so long as the party-governmental bureaucratic establishment exercised authoritarian power and was able to make more and more politically sanctioned nonsense, effective only in reassuring its own privileged position and its paternalistic relations to the rest of the society.

I will not discuss whether economic or political aims were more important during the workers' 1980 strikes and later on. Much more important is the fact that workers understood the direct linkages between both. They realised that no more substantial economic aim can be reached without gaining control, not only over their own work and factory, but over the whole economic system and the state bureaucracy. The implementation of social ownership of the means of production, which is supposed to be the main feature of socialism, became the main aim of the workers' political action. This process was evidently class-integrating. I recall a very private chat with a leading Soviet party sociologist who told me in the summer of 1982: 'We don't have enough information in the Soviet Union to understand what is going on in Poland, but one thing seems to be sure for me, namely that you have got a real working class, which we still do not have'.

Real exercise of working class ownership of the means of production is impossible without limiting the omnipotent control by the political bureaucracy, and this is the most important point linking deeply rooted interests of workers and intellectuals in opposition to the state apparatus, be each of them a class or not.
This apparatus has tried from the very beginning to legitimise its own existence and its way of governing society by a supposedly greater efficiency in economic development and the satisfaction of human needs, among other things. It appeared to be entirely untrue as early as the mid-fifties or even slightly earlier, immediately after the central direction of a massive under-educated and underpaid labour force proved to be an insufficient measure for more complicated economic development, though earlier it relatively successfully assured the fundamental reconstruction of wartime damages and the beginning of a basic, relatively primitive 'socialist industrialisation'.

The workers, as well as the rest of the society, who were told that they should sacrifice their fully justified needs in order to assure the full, or at least a decent, satisfaction of the needs of the next generation, realised that this beautiful future would never come as long as the whole system was not substantively changed.

The Polish communist political elite always attempted to be very paternalistic. Its members perceived, and still perceive, Polish society (workers included) as ideologically and politically backward, unable to discern what is good and what is bad. The long lasting propaganda did the trick in this respect. Relatively many people began to believe this, or at least to feel some uneasiness concerning the image of Poles as a people who were childishly romantic, idealistic and unreliable, individualistic, unrealistic, susceptible to foreign propaganda influences and anarchistic. This image, even if partly true, was purposely strengthened, not in order to change society or the system reinforcing such features, but in order to legitimise the omnipotence of the political apparatus by its superior knowledge of what is required for the proper direction of social development.

Such a paternalistic approach was exceptionally strong during both the Gomulka and Gierek periods. But both political teams failed to perform the desired paternalistic functions, being unable to act efficiently in almost any field. Conflict was inevitable in such a situation, especially because there was actually one field in which Gierek's group turned out to be extremely efficient and successful, even in the period of growing economic crisis, namely, in gaining personal material privileges.

These were the main reasons why the workers realised that control over the administration, the introduction of self-government mechanisms into the socio-economic system and the limitation of the omnipotence of the political bureaucracy may be the only way to solve Polish problems. These reasons made the class-type alliance between workers and intellectuals a logical and inevitable one, placing both groups in opposition to the political establishment.

A brief description of the situation in Polish agriculture is necessary in order to present the whole configuration of class-type interests involved in mass scale political activity. The distinctiveness of Polish agriculture stems from the fact that it is still dominated by private ownership, contrary to other East European countries, where almost the whole rural economy is collectivised. Many writers interpret this fact as a remnant of the
capitalist system and an element of the 'capitalist mode of production' in Poland's supposedly socialist economy. This ownership, though legally granted, is however very limited.

One of the main aims of Rural Solidarity was to reassure the right to private agricultural ownership. According to legal regulations the right of selling or buying land was, and still is, very restricted, as was the right to inherit it. The farmer is formally an owner of his farm but with limited rights of disposal. Only under very strong pressure from Rural Solidarity, backed by workers and the Church, were some legal regulations granting family agricultural ownership introduced. The most important was a constitutional warranty prepared before martial law. The government of General Jaruzelski has decided not to postpone the new legislation in order not to disturb agricultural production, even though Rural Solidarity was banned.

This is, however, only the legal side of the problem. Private Polish agriculture has been subjected for a very long time to a determined state policy of dispossessing it of its entire surplus product. There was some rationale behind this.

Agriculture in Poland remained the only relatively intact part of the economy after World War II. After the war it was not agriculture but industry and the rest of the urban economy which created great problems for the government. Everything outside agriculture suffered because of very heavy war damage. There was also a shortage of the capital necessary to rebuild the ruined economy and to start accelerated industrialisation. The only potential, but not readily available, capital was in agriculture. This capital was of two kinds: human, in the form of rural overpopulation, and a limited existing agricultural surplus product.

Overpopulation would not be sufficient to assure the transfer of population from agricultural to non-agricultural branches of the economy. The market was disorganised and the urban population generally too poor to buy agricultural products at prices which would allow rational taxation of farmers in monetary terms. Moreover, the situation was similar to that in many developing countries nowadays, where the transfer of surplus population from agriculture to the non-agricultural economy is not associated with a sufficient parallel transfer of agricultural production from villages to cities, since diminished rural families tend to consume more food rather than sell it on the market.

This was avoided in Poland in very specific forms of farmers' taxation. They were administratively obliged to sell to the state agencies, for very low official prices, precisely defined quotas of specified agricultural products.

The prices were so low that the gap between costs of agricultural investment in machinery or other means of production supplied by industry, as well as the costs of industrial consumer goods, on the one hand, and the farmers' income, on the other, was growing very rapidly. This created very unfavourable conditions, not only for agricultural development and intensification, but even for a simple reproduction cycle of agricultural production.
It had, however, a temporarily positive impact on the rest of the economy. The supply of cheap staple agricultural products satisfied the basic needs of the non-agricultural population growth that resulted from the beginning of socialist industrialisation. It may be said that private agriculture provided in that way the capital necessary for socialist industrialisation in Poland.

The whole mechanism may be described as 'socialist exploitation of private agriculture', but the farmers were not only exploited or deprived - they were also unable to decide what to grow on their farms. Although nominally the owners, they controlled neither the disposition of their products nor the process of production. Legally limited ownership was limited even more by actual state control over production, exercised through arbitrarily imposed quotas.

The system of farmers' taxation in kind instead of money, obsolete from many view-points, was not replaced by more market-like mechanisms and fiscal taxes until as late as 1970. This change contributed to the temporary growth of optimism among farmers. Very soon such optimism proved to be premature. The system of administratively set quotas on agricultural products was replaced by a system of contracts with state agencies. In order to get the necessary machinery, fertilisers, fodder, coal and other means of production, produced and distributed entirely by state organisations, it was necessary to sell the state increasing quantities of precisely specified products. The situation soon became very similar to that before, with the only difference being that administrative coercion was replaced by economic necessity dictated by the state. Taxation in kind was replaced by exchange in kind, though the latter may be treated as such only metaphorically, to some extent, since the mechanism was much more complicated. Anyway, the terms were set by the state bureaucracy which again controlled both the prices and the kinds of agricultural production.

The prices for agricultural products were substantially increased, but the prices of industrial products necessary for farming were increased even more. Moreover, for a long time nobody paid serious attention to private agriculture other than to extract money and manpower from it, on the assumption that it would remain self-sufficient or be collectivised. Industrial branches supposed to work for agriculture were neglected in the state economic plans and remained absolutely underdeveloped as a result of such an approach. Poland is probably the only country in the world in which home-made tractors are really visible in some regions on farmers' fields. Industrial products necessary in agriculture became very scarce and extremely expensive. Additionally, they were distributed by the state on the basis of centrally decided, but frequently changing and unpredictable, preferences.

In recent years the number of farmers complaining about the arbitrariness and corruption of local administration, especially concerning agriculture, had been growing very rapidly. In such a situation the most important socio-economic interests of Polish farmers - similar to those of intellectuals and workers - were to regain control over their own production and to limit the arbitrary and often irrational control by state agencies of almost all everyday economic activities. It was necessary to gain some control over
them, as well, to assure not only efficient operations on the local level but also the rational shaping of agricultural policy. The whole attempt to organise genuine farmers' self-government, independent of both local and central authorities, and to organise the all-national farmers' representation by Rural Solidarity had these aims in mind.

Actually, only one group did not take part in the whole national movement, namely small private businesses outside agriculture. This sector is very marginal in the Polish economic system, employing about two percent of the total labour force. The main way in which the state controls small private business in Poland is by imposing heavy, often arbitrary and unpredictable, taxes and by issuing licenses. It is, however, the only part of the Polish economy in which, once a license is granted, individual incentives, intelligence and flexibility really influence the outcome. Small Polish producers and owners of various small service enterprises can employ only a few workers and must pay very high taxes, but they are really self-dependent, and the margin of freedom in their work is much greater than in other economic sectors.

They are much more dependent on what remains of market mechanisms, so growing market shortages were and still are only very advantageous for them. I do not have the latest figures, but it seems that the private non-agricultural sector is the only one really growing and even flourishing in the circumstances of the present economic crisis. Economic interests have produced a situation where this group, which was theoretically supposed to be the one most interested in changing the state-controlled economic system and in political evolution or revolution, actually emerged as the most passive and unpolicised element in the entire Polish society. Most recently, contrary to former declarations, the party and the state have launched a new political campaign against the private non-agricultural sector, accompanied by severe economic measures. The officially given reason is the undeservedly high economic gain by this group in the currently difficult situation. It confirms that, besides the top bureaucracy, it is the only prosperous group in Polish society today. Only private taxi drivers constituted an exception to this pattern, having been very active during the Solidarity period, but they were never well situated in the Polish economic system.

All of the above arguments support the opinion that the basic class-type interests of all the main groups in Polish society, namely, intellectuals, workers and peasants were, and still are, highly congruent. The drive toward regaining (or gaining) control over their work and, to some extent at least, over the state bureaucracy, which is impossible without a substantial reduction of its controlling functions, is the common denominator here. This main common denominator locates all three groups in the deeply rooted structural opposition to the political governing elite.

The first great battle has been lost. The question may be posed, however, how long the alliance and congruence of interests would have lasted if history had taken another course. My opinion is that after reaching its primary aim, namely the substantial limitation of central political and administrative control, differences in other aims and interests would have reached the surface. Quite another paper would be necessary to elaborate this problem.
The last question concerns the prospects for normalisation. There are people who still see the chance that military rule in Poland after some time may be closer to a dictatorship, which is limited to the principal issues of the system, but which leaves alone very substantial margins of uncontrolled social and, especially, economic life, than to a totalitarianism which tries to control everything more or less efficiently (in many cases very inefficiently). Without its own real self-limitation, the ruling elite will always be opposed to a more or less united society, and no oppressive measures or attempts to 'buy' one or another group by minor concessions can change this situation. Is such a self-limitation psychologically and socially possible? I do not know. At least it does not seem possible now. Most of the new legal regulations concerning various domains of economic and social life introduced after the declaration, and even after the suspension, of martial law give some consultative or supervisory rights to various social bodies, which are themselves always subject to state supervision, but reinforce the decisive executive power of state authorities. Not one domain of social or economic life has been freed from subordination to that power. The whole system still requires real reshaping. It is impossible to say who can do that now. It seems that nobody can in the near future.


8. I. Szelenyi, *op.cit*. p.82


10. ibid. p.147.


Although the focus of the present book is on 'the search for "normalisation"', I would like to deal here with those components, or rather effects, of the Polish events of 1980-1981, which will resist official attempts at 'normalisation' and may survive as lasting achievements. They provide a sense and significance to those two years beyond their retention in popular memory as the latest tragico-heroic pages in Polish history, i.e. beyond their symbol-producing significance.

I shall argue that such effects do exist and shall attempt to identify them as the elements of the constitution of a new civil society in Poland. My analysis, therefore, will be confined to this particular aspect of the Polish events and will leave aside a number of otherwise important problems which do not belong strictly to the process of the self-constitution of civil society.

Such a formulation of the task of this essay, however, demands a few preliminary definitions, even if a complete conceptual clarification cannot be attempted here.

First of all what do I mean by 'civil society'? It is certainly not an unambiguous concept with a clearly defined meaning. Not only has the concept changed historically, but the term is used even today in application to different social systems to designate quite different social phenomena. It is, therefore, appropriate to ask whether the term itself has any constant meaning, whether the social sphere designated as civil society has in each case at least some similar functions. It is not possible to deal here with a systematic clarification of the concept. Let me therefore restrict myself to a very broad description of the main features of civil society as I understand it. This will also permit me to indicate those features or functions which 'civil societies' in different social systems and environments commonly share.

First of all I use the concept of 'civil society' in its distinctly modern meaning, as opposed to the traditional concept of societas civilis which from Cicero to Kant essentially designated a politically articulated society, a society recognised within the institutional framework of some state. Naturally, 'civil society' does not mean society without the state. The political organisation of the state and the basic assumptions underlying this organisation are in a sense pre-conditions for a more or less autonomous

* A somewhat modified version of this chapter is also appearing in Bronislaw Misztal, ed., Social Movement versus the State: Beyond Solidarity (Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, forthcoming).
civil society. On the other hand, 'civil society' cannot be identified with the private sphere, in opposition to the state-organised public one. It is a public sphere, a structure of self-organisation of society located outside, though not disconnected from, the institutional framework of the state. Formal equality of civil and social rights, conscious acceptance of (or at least tolerance for) a plurality of interests, and publicity in the sense of openness and non-secretiveness in its functioning - these are the most important features of civil society, whatever other historically concrete characteristics it may display.

Its function is above all to connect, to link the goals of the activity of the state with those of the structured population through different concrete mechanisms of mediation. This function thus involves: 1) the elaboration of those normative social structures through which group identities and the encompassing collective identity of the given society are defined, including the definition of its traditions, its hierarchy of values and norms of social behaviour; 2) control over state policies from the viewpoint of their consistency with the socially constitutive systems of value; and finally, 3) the self-defence of the society in cases where the above-mentioned consistency is violated.

These functions may be treated as generally fulfilled by all the types of historically existing civil societies, though the concrete mechanisms through which the functions were performed varied greatly.

Civil society was constituted in its classical form in the West during the 17th and 18th centuries. It was, above all, a basically homogeneous sphere, encompassing mainly the ascending bourgeoisie, acting as a 'universal class', and therefore - despite its firm embeddedness in the institution of private property - able to formulate without great difficulties the demands of equality of individual rights and general accessibility of the public sphere. When, however, the extension of the franchise, of education, the press, and other means of mass communications were implemented in the actual expansion of this public entity, it lost its homogeneity and became a field for competition of interests and often violent conflicts, which could gain their resolution or mitigation only through the increasing institutional interference of the state.

The civil society of contemporary Western mass democracies has been organised, therefore, essentially according to the principle of competition among a larger number of formal organisations, all acting separately and in potential opposition to each other as pressure groups upon the state, which - in its terms - realises their 'compromise', ideally in the form of social consensus. This latter is in principle possible, because, on the one hand, each individual - according to the variety of social roles she/he fulfills - participates in several such organisations, and perhaps more importantly, because, on the other hand, there are effective mechanisms of hegemony ensuring a significant degree of 'artificial' homogenisation of the public. As a result of such a structure, there has been as a historical trend toward the significant weakening of the critical function of the public sphere. (This process has been convincingly demonstrated by J. Habermas in his early work on the changing structure of public opinion.)
The most recent tendencies in the reconstruction and restructuring of civil society in the West, pointed out by several writers (e.g. C. Offe) address, therefore, a set of quite different problems from those created by the attempt to constitute a civil society in Poland. The differences are defined, first of all, by the fact that - despite the increasing role and interference of the state in the West - the formal-legal structure of the state itself was shaped here, to a degree at least, by the principles formulated within the civil society itself. Therefore, the possible conflicts between the state and society are in a sense pacified by the institutionalised legal structure of confrontation and compromise. In central Eastern Europe the present 'mono-organisational' state structure was introduced actually from 'outside', excluding any mediating mechanisms between the political state and the almost completely atomised private sphere.

All this means that the Polish social movement for the establishment of an independent public sphere, of which the events of 1980-1981 represented only the latest, but neither the first nor, let us hope, the final stage, had no real models to follow. It had to be innovative, both theoretically and practically; it also had to readjust its strategies and aims constantly in accordance with the changing internal and external circumstances and pressures.

From the middle seventies the majority of groups within the Polish democratic opposition had already pointed to the absence of civil society as one of the most problematic features of the post-Stalinist regime in Poland. Civil society was understood by them not as a conglomerate of 'egoistic individuals' and competing formal organisations but as the self-organisation of all segments of society generating a collective support for all initiatives regarding both the representation of interests and the defence of civil rights. It was understood as a mediating structure between the closest circle of family and friends on the one hand, and the state on the other. Such a diagnosis was already present in the paper of L. Kolakowski 'Theses on Hope and Hopelessness' and was repeated or rediscovered by a number of other authors. Similar ideas can be found, for example, in the report of the so-called 'loyal oppositional group' Experience and Future, criticising the absence of civil society in Poland as the main cause of social schizophrenia. The same point was made by S. Nowak, by Wnuk-Lipinski, and others.

The program of action from this time on has been concentrated on the democratic self-organisation of social solidarity and co-operation outside the institutional framework of the state. Such organisations as KOR, the Student's Solidarity Group, The Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights, Solidarity and Rural Solidarity, not to mention the earlier initiatives of Samizdat, the Free University etc., were all the results of this conscious attempt at the constitution of a civil society as 'structures of social solidarity and participation, bypassing state power altogether or relating to it only on the level of negotiation and compromise'.

In this process of the emergence of a Polish civil society one can distinguish three basic aspects, which at the same time constituted the main sources of internal disputes and conflicts. These three practically closely interconnected, but analytically separable, aspects were:
1. the principles of organisation of the new public sphere;

2. the main areas of its concern and activities;

3. the forms and means of the institutionalisation of the relationship between the state and civil society.

Owing to a number of specific circumstances, among others the acceptance by the movement in Poland of so-called 'political realities', the very organisational principles of civil society became one of the most important issues. The main principles of this organisation were: solidarity, plurality, 'undistorted' communication and participation. It was accepted that, while the existing institutional structure of the society as organised by the party-state apparatuses is oppressive to the whole society, it does not create an identity of interests between the different social groups. It was also acknowledged that this diversity may easily be conflict-creating and that therefore there exists a constant need for the rank-ordering of social demands and for a compromise between competing interests, a compromise reached on the basis of mutual social solidarity. It has been further assumed that such a compromise should and can be reached only if it is possible for the different social groups to organise themselves, to formulate their needs and to negotiate some consensus among themselves. Solidarity was thus envisaged and operated not according to an imposed formula but as a voluntary act of mutual understanding. Solidarity as an organisation itself (true, it never was a really homogeneous organisation of one particular social group) constantly and by all available means supported the legalisation of other organisations representing different structures of interests. This attitude has produced a number of extremely impressive examples of mutual solidarity, as, for example, the support for the legalisation of farmers' and students' organisations, or the participation of white-collar Solidarity members in actions for free Saturdays - though for the majority of them the achieved agreements were not advantageous.

Among the most important factors which made possible such a 'bracketing' or suspension of the important social tensions between and within different groups and strata and which facilitated their mutual practical understanding, perhaps the following two were the most influential:

1) The fact, already emphasised, that civil society in Poland was constituted, not purely around the structures of economic interests, but even more around shared moral and cultural values. Solidarity's program included, among other things, the concept of 'moral renewal'. This provided a basis for agreement and co-operation between different groups. One can also refer here to such common goals as the establishment of an independent structure of information, an autonomous system of social education, etc.

2) The state's monopoly of control over the economy in Poland and in Eastern Europe in general means that the primary stratification is created within the institutional framework of the state and this permits a common solidary action even in a case of otherwise conflicting interests, as far as they are articulated as demands directed towards and against the state. B. Galeski demonstrates this point well, emphasising that under the specific
conditions of Poland the conflicts of interests which occur among all the elements of the social structure are directed or channelled against the 'main centre of power' which is held responsible for producing them. The sharp conflict between farmers, on the one hand, and the urban population, on the other, concerning the relative prices of agricultural products may, for example, be easily and justifiably rationalised as an effect of political-administrative decisions which define these prices without any reference to the real costs of production and other economic factors, and also without any respect for the social sense of justice. The primary conflict is in this sense (at least temporarily) superseded because it is seen as the consequence of a purely political manipulation of the distribution of privileges, producing insecurity and dependence in both those privileged and those under-privileged.

The first of these 'homogenising' factors formed the basis of social solidarity through the active participation of the members of the public in the creation of informal social networks and bonds, that is, as a part of the emancipation of society; the second acted in a rather 'negative' way, through the identification of the 'common enemy', the common source of the different forms of social deprivation of all the major groups of the population, stipulating forms of unity 'against', rather than 'for'.

The principle of solidaristic pluralism, whatever its undoubtedly numerous merits, however, from the very beginning also faced a number of difficulties and, therefore, also produced inconsistencies. Firstly, there existed an 'objective' asymmetry among the participants in the movement created by the mass character and popularity of Solidarity. The latter - partly as a result of its relatively early legalisation and the lack of legal rules for the organisation of other autonomous groups - obtained the position and prestige of a primus inter pares. Secondly, since there was a recognised necessity to effectuate some practical integration of the existing movements in order to present the state power with unified demands, the role of such an 'integrator' was automatically assigned to Solidarity. Thirdly, there was also a need to limit certain social initiatives which could have endangered the chosen strategy.

All these tendencies, on the one hand, made problematic from the very beginning the 'particularistic', limited formula of Solidarity as a 'pure' trade union; and, on the other, produced a number of unresolved internal tensions, which kept increasing with the growing complexity of the situation. As J. Staniszkis points out in her extremely interesting analysis of the different stages of the development of Solidarity and its changing strategy, the principle of solidarism prevented the differences existing within the movement from being clearly articulated, discussed and either resolved or smoothed out by negotiations. The fact that this solidarism was often formed mainly in opposition to the actions of the authorities meant that it did not resolve, but more often only silenced, the existing internal splits and conflicts.

Another set of difficulties connected with the realisation of the principle of plurality in practice was produced by the absence of any institutionalised, legally sanctioned forms of negotiation between the state
and self-organised civil society. This often created an opportunity for the state to decide whom it is going to consider as the representative of the society, with whom it is prepared to negotiate (if at all). Apart from other negative effects, this situation led to violations of the democratic principle of organisation of civil society, and, not less importantly, also to the violation of its principle of non-secretiveness and openness of the decision-making process. In this way, the serious internal conflicts were, in a sense, created externally.

The question of the main terrains of social activity centered on (though it cannot be reduced to) the important issue of participation versus non-participation in the existing power structures. It is well known that the Polish movement did not aspire to state power as such. Even if declarations concerning the 'non-political' character of Solidarity were at least partly dictated by strategic or tactical reasons, the refusal to participate in state power, and even more so to replace it by a new monolithic structure, was consistently built into the general conception of social self-organisation and self-defence which accepts plurality as a fundamental societal characteristic and value. This is not to say that under the condition of a state power organised on totally different, monolithic principles, it was a 'realistic' alternative. It is even less to negate the existence of differences of opinion in this respect within the movement itself. But the desire to build up and to maintain the duality of the state and civil society, whatever other tactical or strategic conceptions were linked to it, seems to be one of the most important theoretical and practical issues formulated by the recent movement in Poland. The commitment to such a duality was clearly formulated by a number of the Solidarity leaders and advisers, by Kuron, among others, pointing out that 'when a social movement becomes a party, and that party gains state power, society loses its organisation and defence'. However, the question where the dividing line between participation and non-participation should be drawn remained unresolved. Whether democratic participation in the newly emerging civil society means above all participation in the functioning of informal social networks it was supposed to create, or whether it should be extended to include different forms of self-governing or controlling bodies within the state-organised sphere of the economy (and some other areas); whether civil society should undertake responsibility for the working of the society or only to formulate its needs and demands - these were problems which generated perhaps the strongest controversies and conflicts and an even greater number of inconsistencies, or at least 'switches', in the movement's own strategy. It is clear that even if the idea of a political 'take-over' (understood as the abolishment of the existing state structure altogether) was more or less consistently rejected throughout the whole period by the main core of the Polish movement, attitudes towards participation in power not only changed gradually, but also created the main dividing line between the different factions within this movement from its very beginning.

The range of alternatives formulated was wide and extended from those of an essential reconstitution of the party-controlled monolithic system to proposals for a liberal democratic type of social arrangement. However, putting aside these two extreme poles, which in the given circumstances did not generate significant social support, at least three other alternative models of the organisation of civil society and its relationship with the
state were formulated during this period. The basic differences between these models were concentrated around the level of 'politicisation' of civil society, on the one hand, and the combination of pluralism with different forms of corporatism, on the other. A. Arato analyses the different combinations of the basic elements of these models in his paper 'Civil Society versus the State', demonstrating that they extended from a state corporatist model to a basically syndicalist one, not leaving many functions to the party-state in its present form, but not challenging its existence.

The state-corporatist solution, favoured at some stage by the so-called reformist elements in the party, originally represented an attempt at the cooptation of the autonomous social organisations in a camouflaged form. This model was revitalised (on the initiative of PAX) in a somewhat modified form in the idea of a 'Front of National Understanding', which was supposed to consist of representatives of certain basic social organisations and institutions. Though this proposition gained some support among certain elements in Solidarity during the last months before the imposition of martial law, as an 'emergency' solution, and some official negotiations were even entered into on this topic between the government, Church and Solidarity, it never moved beyond the stage of a vague idea. There were many reasons for its failure. In all probability the most fundamental was the fact that it was used by the government mainly to conceal its preparations for the imposition of martial law, since any serious negotiations on this subject were entered into only in late November, 1981. But it encountered very serious difficulties, even independently of this. Insofar as it was acceptable to Solidarity, or at least to some part of it, the 'Front' would have had to take the form of a 'coalition' between equal partners representing actual social forces. The government, however, wanted to use it as a form of state corporatism, including as nominal partners a number of socially insignificant but party-controlled organisations (old trade unions, the Peasant Party, the Democratic Party etc.)

The second option formulated represented a kind of 'social corporatism' consisting of a pluralistic structure of civil society organised into a co-operative network and opposed to the monolithic structure of the state. This option assumed communication between the two structures in the form of continuing negotiations under the control of a critical public sphere. A number of concrete variants of such an organisation were proposed. All of them, however, shared one and the same 'weakest point' - the unresolved question of the concrete forms of arbitration and of the guarantees of the fulfilment of the compromises and agreements attained.

Finally, there existed two other, quite opposite, tendencies: one oriented toward the total depoliticisation of the civil society and at the concentration of its activities on the re-organisation of the 'basic social structures', meaning first of all the different forms of cultural and educational activities; and the other, which aimed just in reverse at the total re-politicisation of Polish civil society and envisaged either the redefinition of Solidarity as a political party or the organisation of a Labour party on the basis of the existing structures of Solidarity, but without their abolition. Neither of these propositions, however, clearly articulated the relationship between these new principles and forms of social organisations and the old structures of the party-state.
Concerning the general framework of the relationship between the state and civil society, the whole 'opposition' essentially conceived it as the creation of some kind of new 'social contract'. The 'moderate' elements in the party leadership at times seemed to agree, at least in principle, with such an idea. But the predominant core of the party apparatus and its pinnacle regarded any attempt at the establishment of a dual structure as an intolerable provocation, which could only be answered, at the opportune moment, by force. Whether this last outcome could in principle have been avoided is difficult to say. The often heard opinion that it was avoidable provided Solidarity restricted itself to a role similar to that of Western trade unions, does not really help to clarify this point since it envisages an impossibility. On the one hand, the social conditions of the establishment of Solidarity were totally different from those in which the activity of Western unions is organised. Therefore, even putting aside the point (quite convincingly made, among others, by Staniszki) that the trade-unionist formula was too narrow from the very beginning, simply as a trade union Solidarity necessarily had different tasks and functions; namely, because it was confronted by the state as the principal, virtually monopolistic employer. On the other hand, it is clear that under the political, legal and cultural conditions of an unreformed state socialist society such a restriction would practically mean in the long run the co-optation, integration and assimilation of Solidarity; that is, the liquidation of its achievements gained as a trade union, too.

What, then, are the possible lasting effects of this tragically suppressed Polish movement which attempted to create and to legalise a new civil society? First of all, while Solidarity suffered a defeat, it was not destroyed. The formal network of a democratic mass organisation has disappeared, but the informal one, both in its legal and illegal forms, has remained. It continues its activities in the fields of communication, culture and information, even if their scope is drastically reduced. Publishing activity has resumed, and despite the lack of reliable figures, all present visitors to Poland report visible signs of these activities. In this way some elements of the organisation remain, though forced into illegality; and, as their effect, a regained sense of collective self-dignity among the population constitutes a lasting achievement of the movement for the emancipation of Polish society, even if its organisational core has been shattered. The legally published but illegally distributed volume III of Sisyphus (published by the Polish Academy of Science in 1982) contains a number of analyses extremely relevant to this point. I. Bialecki, for example, traces the changes in the stereotype and auto-stereotype of the Polish worker as an effect of the events of 1980-81. 'A new image of a worker has thus emerged,' - says Bialecki, 'That of a man socially committed, conscious of his own power, solidarity, capable of unselfishness and sacrifices.' Bialecki himself is not overly optimistic concerning the longevity of this change under the pressures of the elementary everyday difficulties of life, but he also assumes that 'the promotion of solemn values as formulated in the slogans of the 'movement of moral renewal' will leave some permanent traces in social memory ...'. I would go even further and assume that these effects will survive, not only as elements in the historical recollection of the people, that is, in a purely symbolic manner, but also in their social psychology, as factors influencing future actions as well.
The Solidarity movement effectuated, also, another chain of effects which should not be underestimated either. These are the effects upon the formal institutional structures of both the party and the state. It is usual to say that the Polish events left these structures untouched, even if paralysed. This is at best only a half truth, however. We have already dealt with the extremely complex problem of the 'programmatic' relation of the movement to these formal structures of power. There is, however, another aspect of this question - the identity crisis produced by these events within the apparatuses of the state and the party, and within the party membership in general. This crisis makes it necessary to introduce some kind of formal changes into their functioning. In one of my earlier papers I have attempted to analyse briefly the process of ideological 'de-authenticisation' or 'ritualisation' in Eastern Europe and its consequences for the process of legitimation of power. I pointed out that even a purely verbal adherence to Marxist ideology involves the indispensability of certain theses, among which the historical role of the proletariat and its representation by the party play the central role. The mass character of Solidarity and the involvement, or even the leading role, of the proletariat in it has created an identity crisis, or at least deep ideological difficulties for both the sincere and the not-so-sincere adherents of this thesis, leading to the necessity of certain structural modifications. It is also obvious that any stabilisation of the post-martial law regime will also require some modification in the structure and the status of the 'official' trade unions, etc., etc.

What concrete forms these changes will take are difficult to predict. It is, however, clear that even if a merely limited 'normalisation' is going to occur, it must somehow respond to the lasting effects created by the short-lived existence of a civil society in Poland. Therefore, it seems to me that the often posed dilemma: the Czech or the Hungarian model of normalisation, is a false one. Probably neither. As we have learned from the recent history of Eastern Europe, there is hardly any possibility to step outside the basic Soviet model, but the post-Stalinist period is one of ongoing differentiation of this model, of the creations of its hybrids. Among them is undoubtedly the Hungarian one, which seems to be the most attractive to both sides: to those in power and those subjugated to power. Putting aside the specificity of the economic and political conditions under which the Hungarian 'solution' historically had been introduced, it is hardly a solution for the problems posed by the Polish movement. Neither has it created a new relationship between the political and the economic spheres, nor has it introduced any kind of built-in mechanisms for social control or influence from below. Any kind of genuine social participation is as non-existent in this sub-model as it is in any other variant of the Soviet model. The totally paternalistic structure of usurpatory 'representation' is maintained untouched; it only functions in a much more orderly and 'enlightened' way in comparison with the majority of other East European societies. The liberalisation of the regime means basically the 'neutralisation' of the population through the depoliticisation of everyday life, on the one hand, and through the generation of a complex system of achievable, but not safeguarded, concessions and 'liberties', on the other.

This means that Polish history has yet to create its own compromise, based on its own potential and expressing its own relation of 'social forces'.
If it were not so dangerous and senseless for a social scientist to play the role of a prophet, I would say that it will probably be a compromise much less comfortable economically and more flexible politically than its Hungarian counterpart.

Has the Solidarity movement in Poland then created any model for the self-organisation of a non-bourgeois civil society? Even if not a model, I do think (and I hope that I have succeeded to some degree in demonstrating this point) that the Polish movement did anticipate a number of characteristics that a civil society of a new type may possess. But the Polish events demonstrated also that such a civil society cannot be stabilised without basic changes in the structure of the political state. The Polish movement of emancipation was, from its very inception, tragically faced with just this paradox.


3 A. Arato, 'Civil Society versus the State: Poland 1980-81', Telos, 47, Spring 1981.


7 Telos, 47, Spring 1981.


10 Ibid.

CHAPTER SEVEN

"NORMALISATION" AND POLISH CULTURE: PROSPECTIVE AND RETROSPECTIVE VIEWS

BY

JANINA FRENTZEL-ZAGORSKA

This essay discusses the role of culture in the series of post-war upheavals and subsequent 'normalisations' in Poland as well as the different ways in which culture itself has been 'normalised'. At the outset the two key terms used in the title - 'culture' and 'normalisation' - should be defined to avoid misunderstanding.

Culture has been defined in the scholarly literature in a great variety of ways. The concept used here is a narrower one than the anthropological notion; it is based on a definition developed by the Polish sociologist Antonina Kloskowska. Culture is understood here as semiosis or symbolisation, that is, the transmission and reception of significant messages in the course of the communication process. It gives special attention to processes of communication that do not have directly instrumental functions, but a more or less distinctly autotelic character. Within the realm of culture so defined I have in mind mainly the arts of all kinds and levels, science, the humanities, religion, ideologies, part of the content of the mass media, at least some forms of 'signifying' entertainment, art criticism and the social reception of all these communications. The boundaries of culture so conceived are not, of course, sharply defined. For example, the status of information and persuasive communication and some forms of entertainment is not clear. Moral and religious values, as well as ideologies, are not analysed in this context per se but rather as the content of works of art and the humanities, positively or negatively 'valorised' and transmitted to the wider society in artistic or scholarly forms. The stress on the autotelic function is not to say that culture so defined has no impact on society's views, beliefs and even ways of life. It also does not mean that cultural communications are not often used for instrumental purposes. It is only to say that this instrumental function is a secondary one, built upon the autotelic function. This conception of culture has been adopted because of its important historical role in Polish history and in the post-war life of Polish society. This role has been grasped by the majority of the Polish population, if only intuitively. Extensive sociological research has shown that the popular conception of culture resembles that outlined above, though it is less sophisticated and strongly evaluative in contrast to the descriptive academic definition.

'Normalisation' is a purely East European concept referring to the situation in countries of 'really existing socialism' after each crisis or overt outburst of social dissatisfaction. At least three meanings of the term can be distinguished.

Short term 'normalisation' from the point of view of the ruling elite. This consists of the restoration of the basic elements of the political status quo ante, reinstatement of the monopoly of power of the communist party. The
further development of the 'normalisation process' is not a salient consideration, and the lack of overt political crisis is treated by the ruling elite as evidence of 'normalisation'.

Long term functional 'normalisation' - in the Mertonian sense of the term. This implies the long-term process in which the main causes of the crisis are, if not removed, then at least diminished or neutralised. Society accords the authorities at least partial support; and the tacit consent of the majority of the society enables political life to function comparatively smoothly. Such normalisation may be preceded by a violent short term normalisation, with subsequent economic reform and 'liberalisation' - as in Hungary. It may also - at least theoretically - be the outcome of an overt agreement between society and the ruling elite, as was vainly attempted in Poland in August 1980.

Long term dysfunctional 'normalisation' - often used in an ironic sense. It implies the arresting of social and political dissent by violence or a 'palace revolution,' raising some hopes (as in Poland during the Gomulka period) of improvement in the economic situation without essential economic reform. The economic, social and political causes of the crisis are not neutralised and the economy stagnates or declines. Exhausted, threatened, or both, the population withdraws from the system; the cleavage between the ruling elite and society does not diminish but grows; everything becomes 'normal' as before; and the powder for the next explosion accumulates. Such normalisation may involve a gradual, conscious 'tightening of the grip' - as in Husak's Czechoslovakia; or it may be the outcome of failure to secure 'functional normalisation' - as in Gomulka's and Gierek's Poland.

Symbolic culture has always played an important role in Polish upheavals, and it has influenced the course of each 'normalisation' process and has itself been 'normalised'. These 'normalisations' have varied according to the nature of the upheaval and the policy of each leadership team, but symbolic culture and its role have always developed and reshaped themselves under the influence of both historical tradition and the conditions of Polish society under "really existing socialism."

The aim of this work is to analyse the specific logic of these developments. It attempts to show how the interplay of systemic factors, the actions of each post-war ruling elite and traditional cultural factors have led to building all-national unity vis-a-vis the alienated ruling elite, a unity in which symbolic culture serves as an important integrating factor. The first part of the study is devoted to an historical analysis; the second part to the prospects for the role of culture under martial law and beyond.

The Traditional Role of Polish Culture

The modern Polish nation took definite shape in the course of the 19th century while Poland was partitioned between Russia, Prussia and Austria. Thus, Polish national integration was based on a community of language and culture rather than on economic and political unity. The teachers, writers, and certain composers and painters, as well as the clergy played a decisive
role in this process, winning social recognition and great prestige and developing a sense of their important social and national mission. These sentiments reached their peak in the romantic period and the 19th century Polish insurrections. The interwar period of independence was too short to bring about lasting changes in the social consciousness formed during the partitions, and the Nazi occupation enormously strengthened these traditional attitudes. Further strengthening and reshaping occurred in the post-war period.

In contrast to most Western countries Polish symbolic culture was never a real class culture - neither in the intentions of its creators nor in the broad social consciousness, though its social basis resided in the small stratum of the intelligentsia. High culture and the cultural elite were never connected in the public mind with wealth and power. The intelligentsia was by no means an economic elite either between wars or in the postwar period. The great prestige of the writer, painter, scholar and - later on - the film director was based on his or her treatment as a spokesman of the society's and nation's aspirations, rather than as an exponent of a ruling social class.

1945-1956

Immediately after World War II cultural life in Poland was vivid, authentic and rapidly developing. This trend was halted with the beginning of the Stalinist period (1948-56) during which time attempts were made to turn the entire culture and the educational system into a crude propaganda edifice and an instrument of indoctrination. Because of the passive opposition of society and the relative 'liberalism' of the Polish ruling elite the success of this policy was not total, though it was considerable.

The 'Great thaw' and the First 'Normalisation'

The 'Polish October' of 1956 was a most important landmark in the cultural life of postwar Poland. During the 'great thaw' and the subsequent normalisation, Polish symbolic culture regained its traditional role of integrating the society and serving as a vehicle of 'substitute' social communication. The basic principles of the ruling elite's cultural policy - the manipulation of culture and the cultural elite and the neutralisation of its influence on the wider society - were established. Cultural circles developed; methods of self-defence and the basic attitudes of the society towards culture were shaped. In spite of many differences all these processes remained basically in force during all future upheavals and 'normalisations'. The typical Polish pattern of the 'dysfunctionalisation of normalisation' emerged.

High culture immediately began to flourish after the withdrawal of Stalinist oppression, despite the limits imposed by the censorship, which was still strong but less omnipotent than before. A popular culture of some authenticity developed, part of it located somewhere between high and popular culture (satirical plays and students' cabarets, for example). The humanities and social sciences began to flourish. The first 'short term normalisation'
in Poland was a success, and the socio-psychological, as well as the cultural basis for 'functional long term normalisation' had been set.

But the limited civic liberties obtained during this period were quickly withdrawn, and the promised economic reform was not realised, thus preparing the scene for 'dysfunctionalisation'. Yet the symbolic culture remained relatively free in comparison with the other 'Peoples' Democracies'. The possibility of expressing ideas in symbolic artistic form considerably exceeded that of direct articulation of political, social and economic ideas and interests.

Under these circumstances symbolic culture not only regained its traditional role of integrating society but established specific ways of performing this role under 'really existing socialism'. Because most channels of social communication were strongly limited or blocked, symbolic culture served as a platform for the exchange of ideas on forbidden political, social and economic issues.

Many writers and producers of high and popular culture used the so-called 'smuggling strategy,' which consisted in smuggling into a novel, play or film some half- and quarter-truths containing subtle allusions to social, political or economic issues. It was often done in such a way that the censor was afraid to admit that he had understood the allusion, while the public understood and applauded. A good example of such a strategy are the satirical drawings by S. Kobylinski which appeared on the front page of Polityka, the relatively liberal party weekly edited by M. Rakowski, the present 'liberal' Deputy Prime Minister.

With the 'dysfunctionalisation' of the 'normalisation process,' and the gradual withdrawal of limited public support, a typical vicious circle was set in operation. It involved repression of the growing dissatisfaction which only stimulated its further growth to the point of overt dissent. That, in turn, given the authoritarian attitudes of the ruling elite, engendered further repression.

Culture, as the only active exponent of public dissatisfaction was the first thing to be repressed. The cultural policy of the ruling elite - always a matter of 'carrots and sticks' - came to employ fewer carrots and more sticks (prison sentences for 'antisocialist propaganda,' the denial of passports, searches and detentions, the blocking of the careers of disobedient intellectuals and students, etc). That, in turn, pushed more and more intellectuals into opposition, thus eliminating the chance that their actions would serve 'functional normalisation'.

Intellectual communities defended themselves by tacit opposition and by (tacitly) transforming state institutions and state-controlled associations into enclaves of relative independence. Many university chairs and scholarly institutions turned into havens of substantially free research and platforms for the exchange of ideas. Some artistic and scientific associations became more genuine representatives of their milieu and carried out policies of their own. The institution of 'umbrellas' evolved. It consisted in tacit consent
to have as president of an association, head of a department or editor-in-chief a person who was trusted by the authorities but who posed no threat to his or her institution and was concerned to preserve its relative freedom. Such was the case of the Polish Writers Union under the long serving presidency of J. Iwaszkiewicz. This 'umbrella business' suited not only the majority of oppositional intellectuals but also the minority of government supporters who were concerned about their prestige in the professional community. Such tacit agreement made them feel less alienated from the majority of their colleagues. Many scientific, cultural or socio-cultural journals founded by the government to foster the party line turned out, under the pressure of their staff, to be much more liberal than was intended. Individual party members, sent to 'restore order' in the disobedient scholarly institutions, became indoctrinated in their genuine norms and started to act as 'umbrellas' instead of policemen.

A few cultural institutions, especially periodicals like Tygodnik Powszechny or Wiez, connected with the Catholic Church, were always enclaves of independence, despite heavy censorship and were less 'auto-censored' than the non-Catholic press. Even the quasi-Catholic publishing house of the state-supported and morally suspect association 'PAX' played some positive role in undermining the state cultural monopoly.

The society's demand for 'substitute' cultural communication was growing, but more and more channels of this communication were blocked, sometimes by the determined actions of the ruling elite to divide and atomise society, sometimes by the notorious inefficiency of the system (expressed, for example, in shortage of books, handbooks and journals).

1968 and 'Crushing Normalisation'

The lack of discursive social communication and the inadequacy of the 'substitute cultural communication' may be considered one of the causes of the isolation of the next two upheavals - by the intellectuals and students in 1968 and by the workers in 1970.

In contrast to the 1956 upheaval, which was initiated and to some extent controlled by a liberal party faction, the 1968 student riots were purposely instigated by party and police hardliners seeking a 'palace revolution'. To provide the spark they banned from the Warsaw 'Polish Theatre' the national romantic play 'Dziady' by A. Mickiewicz, one of the most significant pieces of Polish patriotic literature. The authentic riots and unrest quickly overstepped their expected scope and turned into a broad students' and intellectuals' movement for the emancipation of culture, the autonomy of scholarly life and the liberation of the whole society from official manipulation, provocations and lies. Two slogans inscribed on the movement's banners were: 'The Press Lies' and 'There is no Bread without Freedom'. The propaganda in the party and state media strongly controlled by the hardline faction was anti-Semitic and 'anti-revisionist', smearing, 'along the way', dissident intellectuals who were neither Jews nor revisionists, such as the great historian Pawel Jasienica.
The response of the broader society to this propaganda was weak, but among the party apparatus, motivated by a desire to fill posts vacated by Jews, revisionists and others, it was considerable. The riots and protests were quickly and violently repressed. The palace revolution had been a failure, but normalisation in the intellectual, and especially the scholarly, world was the most severe and devastating in postwar Polish history after the Stalinist period. From the very beginning it was meant to be a conquest, not a 'functional normalisation'.

It was directed against Jews, revisionists, dissidents (actual or potential) and all other intellectuals suspected of being 'disloyal'. People of Jewish origin were allowed (or pushed) to emigrate; non-Jews were arrested or fired without the possibility of gaining other academic posts. Some were denied passports.

Institutional measures were undertaken to tame and disarm the cultural world. The structure of the universities was changed by inserting 'institutes' in between chairs and departments in order to undermine the influence of independent professors. Individuals supporting the government were nominated to the posts of institute directors. The famous institution of 'March-docents' was introduced by a legal regulation authorising the nomination for the post of 'docent' (professorial fellow) persons without 'habilitation' (veniam legendi), or even completed Ph.D. theses, which had hitherto been obligatory for such a post. This resulted in crowding the academic world with hundreds of mediocrities, many of them 'moles' of the governing elite. This massive 'negative selection' became a conscious device to bring the academic world to heel.

Polish Marxism - hitherto starving on a diet of disbelief in official doctrine (in 1958 only 2 per cent of Warsaw students considered themselves Marxists) and repeated 'antirevisionist campaigns' - became almost completely moribund. Persons accused as 'chief revisionists' emigrated; others fell silent.

Polish culture as a whole suffered irreparable losses from the emigration of many of its outstanding members and many brilliant young people. The intellectual world was at least temporarily crushed, and the wider society threatened and disoriented. The lack of information and total confusion were the main cause of the failure of the workers to back the intellectual upheaval, not hostility toward the intelligentsia, something the ruling elite was trying to promote. Nevertheless, the 1968 upheaval and the subsequent fierce and total 'normalisation' created an intellectual opposition. There were many oppositional intellectuals before, but the 1968 experiences added to the consolidation of the opposition around such persons as Adam Michnik, Jacek Kuron and many others. Like every social process, this consolidation needed time to mature.
The Gierek Era

The 1970 workers' outbursts in the Baltic shipyards may be treated as a second, delayed, part of the 1968 upheaval. They were not overtly backed by the intellectual and cultural world and were suppressed by violence involving the deaths of many workers. They resulted in a 'palace revolution' and the repetition of the typical Polish scenario of the 'dysfunctionalisation' of a long-term normalisation originally intended to be functional. The separation of these two upheavals negatively affected the situation of culture. The '1968 problem' was tacitly assumed to be over. There were no personal comebacks or reparations for damages; but tacit permission to participate in liberalisation was granted to those intellectuals who had somehow survived.

The main difference between Gomulka's and Gierek's normalisations may be attributed to three factors: 1) the depth and scope of the economic crisis produced by the unprecedented inefficiency and corruption of the ruling elite; 2) the specific traits of Gierek's 'negative liberalism;' 3) the repetition of the past scenario, which enabled society to learn by experience.

The 'creeping crisis' after 1974, which the leadership was unable and unwilling to control, caused an occlusion in every realm of social, political and economic life. People could not control their own work process and were unable to satisfy their basic needs. The 'propaganda of success' developed into an enormous network of official lies that could not be challenged by the public. It deprived almost every state institution, including cultural ones, of the last remnants of authenticity; the people, debarred from any chance of self-realisation, felt cheated, frustrated and helpless in the face of the approaching catastrophe. The only possibilities of self-realisation were outside the system.

The society responded by self-organisation. The workers created the Movement for Free Trade Unions in Gdansk (with Walesa) and cultural self-education groups in Warsaw (with Bujak). The intellectuals established an independent unofficial culture, first of all through 'alternative' publishing houses, which attracted the best authors.

The Gierek regime could be considered the most liberal of the post-war ruling groups. This liberalism had, of course, some positive effects. The most important and consequential was the toleration of an unofficial, though not necessarily underground, culture and of oppositional intellectuals. The second, in the realm of socio-cultural communication, was the popularisation, through TV, theatre and film, of Polish romantic and neo-romantic plays considered treasures of the national culture, concentrating on the 19th century fights for independence. Sociological research has shown that the reception of these plays was widespread and contributed to the reinvigoration of ties with the national culture and historical traditions and, thus, to social unification.

But Gierek's liberalism was basically negative. It stemmed from the ruling elite's weaknesses and reflected a strategy of 'buying social peace' by channelling money or privileges to social groups perceived as threatening. It
involved appeasing the workers, especially in large enterprises, by opening shops on the premises to sell goods not available on the market, raising wages in particular branches of industry, granting privileges to some occupational groups. In the cultural world it involved raising honoraria, allowing special rights to travel and earn money in the West and offering high positions on 'committees of experts' or 'cultural councils' whose role was purely decorative. On the whole, such 'liberalism' merely added to the aura of corruption, deepening the crisis and chaos.

In such a situation, there emerged groups of intellectuals, committed to the self-defence of society. The first and most important of these was the Committee for the Defence of the Workers (KOR), founded to assist workers who had suffered in the 1976 riots in Radom and Ursus.

Thus a new, very important channel of communication between the culture-producing world and society had been opened: direct contacts between the intellectuals and students of KOR and the workers, whom the intellectuals sought to assist. These contacts built up mutual trust, enhanced a feeling of unity in the society and demonstrated that the efforts of the ruling elite to divide society and awaken hostility between intelligentsia and workers were a conscious manipulative device.

The role of KOR in building all-national unity before the 1980 upheaval is a salient issue and should neither be over- nor under-estimated. It may be said that without KOR's activity the unity of the workers and intellectuals, rapidly followed by the rest of society, would perhaps not have been achieved so swiftly. On the other hand, no action by intellectuals would have succeeded without the workers' readiness and willingness to unite with the intelligentsia, or without the workers' sense of the genuine unanimity of interests of the entire society against the alienated ruling elite.

This brief and simplified historical analysis provides the basis for certain generalisations. Polish symbolic culture has played an important role in the preparation of each upheaval. It articulates the aspirations of society during its course. And it serves as a guardian of regained freedom in the first phase of each normalisation, when there is still hope that it will be 'functional'. But the force of society against the ruling elite is supplied by the workers. The role of culture lies in the preparation and communication of a unifying platform and in the preservation of this unity during the subsequent dysfunctional normalisation. It is never of much help to the ruling elite in taming and 'negatively normalising' society: not because there are no intellectuals and artists who support the ruling elite or simply serve it, but because the broader society - consciously or intuitively - distrusts the official culture, while independent culture is intuitively trusted. Thus, in the course of the 'dysfunctionalisation of the normalisation process' attempts are made by each ruling faction to subjugate culture, to block its communication with the wider society and to incite the workers against the intelligentsia.
The reaction of the cultural world during the first normalisation after 1956 was tacit opposition; during the second one, after 1968, it was to create opposition; during the third after 1970 and - especially - after 1976, it was self-organisation and the building of direct communication with the workers. Such developments are the product of experiential learning (avoiding the mistakes made during previous normalisations) and of understanding the mentality and actions of the successive ruling elites, mentality and actions so constant that they may be called a systemic factor. The refusal by the ruling elite to treat society as the subject (not the object) of social, economic and political life, as well as its paternalistic, authoritarian attitudes inevitably result in the creating of a 'spurious reality' (rzeczywistość pozorna). Every realm of official life is deprived of its authenticity; its members, of motivation to act. Most organisations and institutions are turned into decorative or simply rotting bodies, with which almost no one identifies.

In such a situation the only possibilities of self-defence and self-realisation lie outside the system. The Church and independent culture are the only institutions outside the system that are able to evoke identification on a mass scale. No persuasion or good will of individual ruling elite members can change the situation. Thus every 'dysfunctional normalisation' increases the meaning of the Church and culture in the society's life, increases their unity and, at the same time, deepens its own further 'dysfunctionalisation'.

The Solidarity Period

Two great powder kegs for the 1980 explosion were filling up separately - among the workers and among the intellectuals. That of the workers was especially dangerous. The detonation of the former immediately set off the latter. Very soon other, smaller kegs exploded throughout the society. The link between workers and intellectuals was established immediately.

Here we are concerned primarily with the cultural aspects of the Solidarity phenomenon. The new popular culture which originated in the 1980 strikes had three basic features: 1) a call for authenticity of cultural manifestations as opposed to the imposed official state culture; 2) a reinvigoration of national and religious traditions connected with a high sensitivity to national and religious symbols; 3) a return to national high culture as the incorporation of the whole nation's wisdom and an expression of its genuine aspirations.

The specific culture of the August strikes was religious and patriotic. Workers all over Poland sang religious and patriotic songs, began strike days with Catholic services, built altars on the factory premises and displayed national flags and symbols. As the literary historian M. Janion recounts: the symbolic culture of the strikes was a spontaneous repetition of the cultural pattern developed in the romantic period during the 1831 Polish November Insurrection. This living literary tradition, unique to Poland, is transmitted from generation to generation in the form of 'important quotations'. One young worker interviewed by a sociologist said: 'You see,
Madam, there is a beautiful poem, by Milosz perhaps, I am not sure if it is by Milosz, "It is better to die erect, than to live on your knees"—that is what we all feel. In the leading strike factories (e.g. in the Gdansk shipyards) the intermingling of popular and high culture appeared very strong. Poetry was used as an ideological weapon. (The peculiarity of this situation stands out if one attempts to imagine Australian or British workers reciting Byron during their strikes.) Verses from poems by Milosz and others are engraved on the monument erected in 1980 in memory of shipyard workers killed by the militia during the 1970 strikes. Citations from other Polish writers, from the 18th century to the present, are engraved on numerous monuments built all over the country in honour of heroes and historical events that have been banned from Polish history and culture by the state censorship. These citations were also used on posters and as mottos in newspapers published by Solidarity.

Many professional theatre performances and 'poetry evenings' were given on factory premises during and after the strikes. Writers, especially those whose works were officially banned, were invited to meetings with workers. Most of the regional Solidarity branches founded 'Social Councils for Culture' consisting mainly of artists and intellectuals.

The other trend in popular culture that originated during the strikes was in music. Protest, political-satirical and sentimental songs were composed and sung by workers during the strikes. These and other 'unofficial' songs were presented in the 1981 'Genuine Songs Festival' organised under the auspices of Solidarity.

A new professional popular culture also emerged. This was represented mainly by professional cabarets, some of which had existed for a long time but had been forced into silence in the mid-seventies. These were enthusiastically applauded by the workers and the society as a whole and even appeared on television. Musicals featuring protest songs were presented in musical theatres and won the enthusiasm of the working-class public. Many professional theatres gave performances based on recent historical events (for example, the workers' protests of 1956). Some very interesting films were also produced. Wajda's 'Man of Iron' is the best example.

Most of the popular Solidarity culture was produced and presented outside of the official mass media, though some of its products appeared in the press, radio and even on the strictly controlled television. The mass media, especially television, were strongly attacked by Solidarity as a tool of manipulation and misinformation. The union fought for access to the official media.

Artistic and intellectual circles, in addition to participating directly in the life of Solidarity, also organised themselves outside the Union, but all their organisations cooperated closely with it.

The unity of goals, interests and traditions among the intelligentsia, the workers and other social groups, which had hitherto been only potentially or temporarily realised, was strengthened during the Solidarity period and
instilled in the mass social consciousness, thus reinforcing the 'revolution of consciousness'. This 'revolution of consciousness' during the Solidarity period transformed Polish society and will exert an influence on its life, whatever the future brings.

In pluralist societies differences between classes, strata or groups come to the fore and are dealt with by negotiations between various bodies or representatives. In mono-party-ruled societies the situation is different. Especially in Poland, where almost the entire society has lived for nearly 40 years in conscious or intuitive opposition to the system and where the cleavage between the alienated ruling elite and society had recently become so enormous, the objective basis for such a unity of interests certainly exists. As K. Zagorski has stated: 'the basic class-type interests of all the main groupings in Polish society - intellectuals, workers and peasants - have been and still are highly congruent. The drive towards regaining or gaining control over their own work process and, at least to some extent, over the state bureaucracy (the latter being impossible without substantially reducing the bureaucracy's power) underlies the interests of all three groupings.'

The drastic limitation of civil rights experienced by everybody, regardless of social position, the lack of freedom of expression, the blatant manipulation of the national culture and the feeling of entanglement in a network of official lies all add to the consciousness of this unity.

Psychologically, Polish society is divided into 'we' and 'they'. The boundary between these two is volatile, but the 'they' is always the ruling elite, more broadly or narrowly conceived. Even members of the ruling elite point to 'them' above in the higher ranks. Every Party First Secretary, be it of factory, Voivodship or Central Committee, has some 'they' above him.

This is not to say that the structural and psychological unity of Polish society is eternal. It is rather to say that this unity is an outcome of a socio-political situation which has already lasted for 40 years and looks like lasting well into the future. The unity has a structural and not only a psychological or cultural basis. The patriotic tradition of national unity in the fight for independence, with 'God and Motherland' on its banners, is active not only because it is a tradition, but because it is basically relevant to the present situation and provides a well known traditional form of expression of actual needs and goals. It should not be attributed - as some analysts do - to the 'Polish national character' but rather to systemic factors and their interplay with the cultural tradition. If this tradition has some obsolete and even anachronistic traits, this is due to the fact that people living for decades in an unauthentic and alien socio-political world resort to something they remember as authentic and their own. So the system itself adds to the freezing of traditional ideas, attitudes and sentiments, which the system's exponents fiercely criticise. In the long run such a situation is dysfunctional both for the society and the system.

Martial Law and Beyond

The introduction of martial law on 13 December 1981 was aimed at securing a 'short-term, normalisation' by violent means. It may be symbolically
significant that among the activities of society interrupted by martial law was the first post-war independent 'Congress of Polish Culture' in Warsaw.

After nearly two years of constant unrest in Poland, this short-term violent normalisation must be considered only a partial success. Any overt outburst, however, will probably not soon occur. Thus, a kind of superficial 'short-term normalisation' may be predicted in the not too distant future. General Jaruzelski made clear at the very outset that his team seeks 'positive' or 'functional' normalisation following the Kadar model in Hungary. Such normalisation is the aim not only of the ruling elite but, given the geopolitical situation, also of the overwhelming majority of society. But there are many important factors in the Polish situation which make such a development, if not impossible, then highly improbable. The first is the disastrous state of the economy. But there are also systemic and socio-political factors which are as real, 'objective' and consequential as the economic ones.

The most important of them is the total mutual distrust between the ruling elite and almost the whole of society. A strengthening of the 'we' and 'they' division has occurred and is continuing. The declarations of a willingness to seek an agreement with the authorities by Walesa, the Underground Solidarity leaders and its 'above-ground' supporters seem to be much more the expression of a genuine goal than mere tactics or rhetoric, but have been flatly rejected by the government. Poles are basically not against an agreement: they simply no longer believe it possible. Their suspicion that they will be cheated again (as they have already been on three occasions) makes it highly improbable that the whole population can be persuaded to trust the team which imposed martial law after 16 months of freedom. In such a situation, given the role of culture in Poland, the ruling group needs culture and the intellectuals badly to secure any kind of normalisation.

The military dictatorship strives, under the logic of 'short-term normalisation', to eliminate all forms of pluralism by suspending and then dissolving every independent or semi-independent organisation. The elimination of pluralism, however, is by itself dysfunctional and offends and antagonises society.

The second aim - typical of every normalisation - is to cut social communication between different groups and strata, especially between intellectuals and workers, and to arouse the hostility of the workers against the intelligentsia. The sharp differentiation of conditions of internment of workers and intellectuals was one of the means to this end. Another was to smear the intellectual Solidarity advisers and other oppositional groups as CIA agents, greedy for foreign currency and manipulating the workers for their own ends. But the workers seem not to believe these charges, as they have rarely believed official propaganda.

The first line of the government's 'cultural policy' resulted in the dissolution of all artistic unions (except that of the musicians) and certain other professional associations. The 'Association of Polish Journalists' came first, followed by those of the film-makers, actors, painters and writers.
The committee coordinating artistic and scientific associations was also dissolved, as was the 'Conference of Rectors' of Polish tertiary educational institutions. The dissolution of each association was preceded by a public smear campaign and by attempts to find a group which would 'take over' the organisation from inside. No such 'take over' was successful. Candidates for internal 'coup d'état' were too scarce, too weak and too frightened. In some instances (e.g. the journalists and the writers) immediately after the dissolution of an association, a new one was 'spontaneously' founded (sometimes the same evening). Comparing the lists of founders of a new association with lists of dissenters in the same profession (often published in various contexts in the media), the lack of famous names in the former and their abundance in the latter are striking.

Attempts were made to use 'negative selection' to undermine the unity of artists and professional communities and to replace boycotting artists by artists from provincial communities, who have often waited for many years for a chance to appear on television. For a while the TV schedule was packed with plays transmitted from provincial theatres and interviews with provincial artists and intellectuals whom no one had ever heard of before. But this resource did not last long, and their artistic and intellectual level was very low. The better artists and intellectuals living outside the great metropolises declined to take part in this game.

The scholarly world has not been attacked so strongly as the artists, though the situation in the smaller provincial academic centres is much worse than in the more prestigious ones; and there have been many dismissals. Scholars are, however, not so visible to the wider public as are actors or even writers, and there is no such urgent need to win their public support.

The journalists have suffered most. Many of them were fired, and many journals and magazines were banned and replaced by new ones run by groups of government supporters.

It may be conceded that the military dictatorship of Jaruzelski's team is comparatively humane and liberal for a military dictatorship. Violence and killing, although they occur, are comparatively rare. The Jaruzelski group do not want to be seen as assassins of Polish culture. But the logic of 'normalisation' would probably result in silencing some cultural figures, corrupting others and pushing the rest into the opposition. Nevertheless, some elements of 'liberalism' do exist in the present team's cultural policy. In some respects the censorship is looser than under Giełek. A few books by prominent dissident authors were officially published during martial law (like 'Miazga' by Andrzejewski, 'Rondo' by Brandys and selected poems by Baranczak). Some books by emigre writers (mostly deceased) previously banned - including works by Milosz - are also appearing in Polish bookshops (and disappearing very quickly as do all good books in substantial demand). The 'sentences to silence', rigorously applied under Giełek to dissident intellectuals, are no longer in use. The censorship authorities concentrate on the work to be published, rather than the person of the author. There is always a chance for any artist and intellectual to be published officially (and given an honorarium as well as wide publicity) if he or she produces a work that is at least neutral.
It is sometimes said\textsuperscript{12} that the cultural policy of Jaruzelski's government is situated between the death sentence for Zdzislaw Najder - the literary historian and critic who became a director of the Radio Free Europe's Polish Section - and the publication in 1983 of a book by one of the chief oppositionists, the KOR member Baranczak. That seems to suggest the kinds of sticks and carrots that are still available. But the situation is much more complicated than that. The death sentence for Najder in exile in Munich (later changed by act of clemency to life imprisonment) was an unusual and clumsily excessive use of intimidation. If Najder were in Poland, the sentence would in all probability be 6 or 7 years imprisonment (judging from other similar cases). The publishing of Baranczak's or Andrzejewski's books was, on the other hand, a demonstration of the leadership's 'liberalism'. The carrots and sticks in everyday use are more moderate. Nevertheless, the entire liberalism of the leaders is put in brackets by the constant threat of coercion. This systemic feature of 'really existing socialism' has always existed in post-war Polish history. The Jaruzelski team, before lifting martial law, enacted a package of laws giving the authorities powers of direct intervention in every social activity and institution. Many of these laws are directed specifically against culture, science and education. The authorities are empowered to suspend or dissolve editorial boards and any association, to fire academics and school teachers and to expel students without any formal restrictions. The laws are said to be temporary - some of them expire in 1986 - but the society has a well founded suspicion that they are meant to operate as long as the society needs to be tamed and kept in subservience.

In spite of all these measures, the dissent of the cultural and intellectual world to martial law was, and still is, deeper and more conspicuous than had been predicted. The suspension of martial law has not changed the situation very much. The actors are still boycotting television, though in a less organised way and less consistently. Many journalists avoid television and state and party newspapers. Painters, photographers and other artists refuse to exhibit their works in state-owned galleries, scholars have withdrawn to their offices (which are in any case mostly located in their homes because of the shortage of office space) and appear in public only to protest in various ways or to take part in 'independent' cultural life outside the systems. Writers, scholars and journalists are publishing in underground journals and publishing houses and in the West. The intellectual world strongly supports Underground Solidarity. Many intellectuals and artists who have been active in committees helping the interned and arrested are now active in Church-connected committees to help the poor and distribute goods sent from the West.

In the first days of martial law, when workers (and some intellectuals) were tried by military courts on charges of violating martial law by organising strikes, the courtrooms were packed with intellectuals and artists. Faces 'known from television' reminded judges (who were operating under military law procedure) of their duty to conduct fair trials. They were a conspicuous symbol of the unity of society - a continuation of the KOR tradition.

Polish symbolic culture continues to flourish in underground conditions. Paris \textit{Kultura}\textsuperscript{13} has published a list of 138 underground newspapers appearing
in 1982-83, as well as 61 books published by underground publishers. There are numerous artistic exhibitions in churches and private galleries and concerts in churches and private homes. Scholars hold many discussions on the present Polish situation in their 'enclaves'. Some underground sociological surveys have even been conducted and reports published in the underground press and abroad. The role of the Church as a shelter for unofficial culture has increased greatly, though many people criticise the conciliatory policy of Primate Glemp and even that of the Pope.

Socio-cultural communication is continuing through the underground press, foreign broadcasts (despite the jamming) and through publications smuggled from the West. Arrested publishing groups and confiscated equipment are soon replaced by new ones. Nevertheless, the situation of social communication seems to be deteriorating rather than improving. More and more channels are blocked, and the 'silent majority' increases.

The situation of symbolic high culture is different. As M. Danilewicz-Zielinska states, we are witnessing the birth of a united Polish culture created in Poland and in the West, resembling the situation of the 'great emigration' of the romantic period. However, the role of culture created within the country is much the greater. Books, poems, scholarly analyses and statements written in Poland are published in the West and smuggled back. Underground publications are regularly smuggled to the West. Several Polish publishing houses run by 'old' 1968 and Solidarity emigre groups are now operating in the West, as are unofficial political and cultural journals formerly active in Poland under Gierek and during the Solidarity period. All contribute to the resistance of the cultural world within Poland.

The ruling elite seem well aware of this situation. The official press is full of accusations of alleged 'Western sponsors who try to lure the Polish culture to emigrate'. Conciliatory approaches to some cultural circles appear from time to time. There is much manipulation, often more skilful than in the past. One such manipulative device is to play on patriotic feelings, the ruling group seeking to identify itself with 'Polishness'. People or groups opposed to the regime are more often called anti-Polish than anti-socialist. But the vast majority of the population prefers to associate genuine 'Polishness' with Solidarity, the Pope and the Polish Catholic Church. The intermingling of national and religious symbols during the Solidarity period helped to distinguish the society's 'Polishness' from that of the ruling elite. Thus official patriotism is treated with distrust and does not seem to affect popular attitudes.

Hypotheses about future normalisation 'in' and 'of' culture must take two factors into account: The 'revolution of consciousness' that occurred in Polish society during the Solidarity period and the new, unprecedented situation of Polish symbolic culture.

The post-Solidarity society is different: much less atomised, much more united and aware. The new consciousness includes a broad awareness of the real identity of interests of the basic social groupings in a radical diminution of the power of the ruling elite and the bureaucracy and in the
introduction of at least some elements of pluralism. It also includes a recognition of the role of culture and the so-called 'creative intelligentsia' as spokesman of society's needs and aspirations - especially under mono-party rule. What in the cultural tradition and the preceding post-war periods was only intuitively felt by the majority has come to the surface and become consciously understood on a mass scale. The intelligentsia itself has also undergone a 'revolution of consciousness' and consciously strives to maintain and rebuild the channels of communication with the wider society in order to perform its traditional role.

During the Solidarity period a considerable part of the society acquired a new identification. They identify with Solidarity as an organisation and as a myth - one more Polish heroic myth. After decades of helplessness and atomisation and a lack of anything to identify with besides primary groups and the idea of the Polish nation, such an identification has proved very strong. It seems to be strongest among workers and intellectuals. Many intellectuals found meaning for their lives and professional activities and a new basis for self-respect and self-realisation in the traditional role of serving the national cause. Such attitudes will be very difficult to eradicate. Opposition to military rule and underground activities only strengthen them.

Underground cultural activity may be considered not only as opposition but as a corrective to the inefficient official system, along with the 'black market', the second economy and 'moon-lighting.' But in contrast to these other kinds of 'corrections', underground political and cultural activity does not generate corruption, cynicism and bad conscience. It is a source of pride and self-respect. It strengthens and reinvigorates the traditional 'insurrectional-conspiratory ethos' so typical of the Poles. This ethos is to some extent dysfunctional for the nation in a historical perspective, but in the present situation it is useful because it preserves the unity and self-consciousness of the society gained during the Solidarity period. It is also functional for the development of symbolic culture itself. The activities of the ruling political bureaucracy, by pushing intellectuals and other groupings of Polish society into opposition and by depriving official life of authenticity and the possibility of self-fulfilment, create the need for alternative ways of social communication, which underground symbolic culture can provide at lower risk than underground political activity proper.

The dysfunctional mechanisms employed by the authorities offer little hope of 'normalising' Polish culture. Forcing artists and intellectuals to emigrate will merely increase the Western base of Polish culture. Prosecutions and prison sentences create heroes and evoke protests all over the world. Persuasion is unlikely to be effective, the more so since the Church and the Pope are on the scene - no matter how much 'anti-clerical' propaganda appears in the public media. Ironically enough, the role of symbolic culture might decline only in a pluralistic Poland. It might have diminished if Solidarity had survived. But for the ruling elite and the system that would have been unacceptable.

Thus, functional normalisation seems impossible under present circumstances. Indeed, a new dysfunctional normalisation - probably more dysfunctional than any other before it - is on the horizon. An independent
culture seems to be almost the only realm of authentic activity that one could predict will survive in the long run. That will be enough, as historical experience shows, to store up powder for the next explosion. But it is far less than enough to secure a genuinely 'normal' life for Polish society.


5. Ibid.

6. S. Nowak, 'Values and Attitudes of Polish People,' *Scientific American*, vol. 245, No. 1, (July 1981), p.27

7. J. Frentzel-Zagorska, Uwagi o... (op.cit.)


11. "See above, p.102".


PART III

INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
CHAPTER EIGHT

POLAND AND EASTERN EUROPE

BY

ROBERT F. MILLER

Introduction

The periodic outbursts of unrest in Poland have always produced strong reverberations in the other socialist states of Eastern Europe. Naturally, the responses have varied in different countries. Moreover, within each country reactions have differed among different strata of the respective populations. Many intellectuals and technocrats close to the regimes and influential in policy matters have often at least tacitly supported the initiatives of their Polish colleagues for greater freedom to experiment with alternatives to the dominant Soviet model of 'really existing socialism'. The hope has been, of course, that Moscow's assent to changes in Poland, as in 1956, could be applied in their own cases. Others, primarily technocrats, for example in Hungary, where indigenous reforms were already under way, have been more ambivalent toward Polish restlessness. Their fear is that a Muscovite crackdown would force the termination of their own timid reforms. It is probable that reform-minded Soviet intellectuals and technocrats have tended to cluster more solidly in the former camp - among those who welcomed the periodic Polish challenges - since the opportunities for home-grown reform in the USSR itself have been virtually non-existent, at least since the Khrushchev era. It is well known that the crushing of the 'Prague Spring' in 1968 put an end to liberalising experiments in the arts and the economy in the USSR.

Within the East European regimes, however, Polish (and Czechoslovakian) reformist stirrings have, with few exceptions, evoked little such ambivalence. Except in Yugoslavia and, for a time in Romania, the ruling communist elites have had few illusions about gaining genuine popularity with their peoples. The best they have been able to hope for is a kind of grudging popular tolerance for themselves as the best overseers possible under the circumstances of Soviet hegemony. That seems to be the case in Hungary and Bulgaria and possibly in East Germany as well, although there the constant presence of the West German alternative must further reduce the possibility of popular legitimacy of the communist rulers.

All of these countries are characterised by monopolistic, one-party rule in which, by virtue of the nomenklatura system of personnel appointments, the communist party leadership dominates all institutions and organised groups in society. That system is the sine qua non of 'really existing socialism'. It is something the Soviets insist upon. It exists in Yugoslavia as well, although Soviet endorsement is not required or sought there, since Yugoslavia is not a member of the Soviet Bloc. Its rigid application in Romania under Ceausescu is generally conceded to be the major reason for the grudging toleration of his maverick behaviour in international relations by Moscow.
Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, outside of these two countries, the top political leaders are effectively on the nomenklatura of the CPSU Central Committee. That is to say, Moscow exercises a de facto veto over the appointment of the leading political figures of the Eastern European regimes.

Thus, the East European leaders are beholden to two sets of masters: the Kremlin leaders and their own political establishments. The former is the more important, but the Soviet leaders, in return for their 'fraternal support', expect the East European leaders to be able to run their own countries more or less effectively. This requirement ultimately implies the establishment of a certain rapport, or at least a modus vivendi, with the domestic population. That, in turn, has meant a tacit deal between the East European leaders and their peoples: in return for the latter's political quiescence, the former must provide a tolerable, and hopefully improving standard of living, including enjoyment of the fruits of tolerated petty corruption. The details of the bargain are slightly different in each country, but the principles are the same throughout the region.

This system of arrangements has, of course, applied in Poland as well. However, Polish practice has always been further from the totalitarian asymptote than in any other Bloc country. The homogeneity of the Polish population, the historical tradition of national self-consciousness and solidarity in the face of oppression, particularly that emanating from Russia and Germany, and the strong position of the Roman Catholic Church, which is dialectically linked to the other two factors, have combined to limit the effectiveness of Soviet-type rule. There, the stakes of the accommodation between communist rulers and ruled have been correspondingly higher. The integrative force of Marxist-Leninist ideology on the Polish working class was exhausted earlier than in the other countries, so the bonds of performance have been that much more important. That is, the ability of Polish party leaders to 'deliver the goods' in a material sense has been a more important condition of social stability than elsewhere.

For the leaders of the other East European countries what seems to be the peculiar anarchy of Polish society cannot be simply dismissed as an aberration and contained by placing relations with Poland under quarantine - although that turns out to be the principal tactic in practice. They know too well that the 'Polish disease' is endemic to their own societies as well. In that sense they realise that Poland is a kind of bellwether of the social tensions existing in all countries of 'really existing socialism'. That applies to the USSR as well. Even Yugoslavia, where a quite different brand of socialism - based on worker self-management - formally exists, presents similar symptoms of economic and social malaise. Thus, all of the leaders of the Marxist-Leninist regimes in the region have an interest in seeing the periodic Polish disturbances repressed as quickly as possible. For all but the Yugoslavs and Romanians - and, of course, the Poles themselves - the manner in which this is done is immaterial. Indeed, for some of them the direct use of Soviet armed intervention would represent a welcome 'educative' experience for their own populations as well as the Poles. For the Yugoslavs and Romanians, determined to avoid Soviet intervention in their own countries, the mode of reconciliation in Poland is far from immaterial.
This, then, is the essential background for understanding the complex attitudes of the East European regimes to the rise of the Solidarity Movement in Poland and General Jaruzelski’s imposition of martial law. In the remainder of the chapter I shall attempt to illustrate and further analyse the similarities and differences of the East European regimes’ responses to the Polish situation, especially since martial law.

**Attitudes on the Eve of Martial Law**

Within a year of the emergence of Solidarity the lines on its reception and on the irresolution of the Gierek and Kania regimes’ attempts to deal with it by the various East European parties were already fairly clear. Some, like the East Germans and the Czechoslovaks, placed reports on Polish events under virtual embargo. Others, like the Hungarians and Yugoslavs, and, surprisingly enough, the Bulgarians, gave them fairly broad coverage. The Romanians, following Ceausescu’s customary practice of not commenting on the internal affairs of fellow socialist countries - so as not to give the latter a justification for making judgments on Romania’s internal situation - generally limited themselves to the publication of terse official Polish government reports.

Thus, by mid-1981 there were already some fairly well established regional trends. These tended to follow traditional patterns of the respective countries’ relations with Poland, their specific domestic and international orientation, and, one suspects, the different editorial policies and journalistic capacities of the media in these countries. Given the strict party control over the media in Eastern Europe and their ultimate subordination to CPSU ‘headquarters’ except in Yugoslavia and Romania, one should probably not place too much emphasis on this last factor. Nevertheless, anyone familiar with the press of the different East European countries is invariably struck by the differences in quality and style of coverage from country to country.

One other discriminating factor deserving of mention here concerns the attribution of ‘blame’ for the disorders in Poland. Although even the Soviets were willing to admit that certain ‘mistakes’ by the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP) leadership had contributed to the collapse, the general line laid down for the Bloc at the 26th Congress of the CPSU in February 1981 was that ‘imperialist subversion’ was the main cause. Dissident forces in Poland – KOR and Solidarity itself – it was alleged, were wittingly or unwittingly being used by Western governments to undermine the unity of the socialist commonwealth. This allegation was employed to justify a crackdown and whatever intervention might eventually be necessary to ‘save’ Poland and defend the ‘higher’ interests of socialism.

At the 26th Congress the East European leaders followed this general line, but with significant differences. Thus, GDR leader Erich Honecker, probably the most rigidly anti-Solidarity leader in the Bloc, made no mention of Poland at all. Another hard-liner, Gustav Husak, of Czechoslovakia, simply condemned ‘international reaction’ for attempting to ‘violate the unity of the countries of the socialist commonwealth and, moreover, to tear one of them away from the family of socialist states’.
Janos Kadar, the Hungarian leader, by contrast, expressed some understanding of Polish problems and Kania's efforts to solve them, while generally praising Soviet leadership in foreign policy. Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov confined himself to fulsome praise for Soviet leadership and example both at home and abroad, never mentioning Poland.

Clearly worried over the interventionist implications of the Soviet-sponsored Bloc line, Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu and the head of the Yugoslav delegation, Dušan Dragošavac, stressed in their speeches to the Congress the right of each communist party to solve its own domestic problems. Both condemned external interference from whatever quarter.

As the drama in Poland unfolded during 1981, a fairly clear split developed in the official attitudes of the respective parties, as expressed in the media coverage of internal Polish events. On the one hand were the Moscow-loyalists who took a highly critical position, not only on the events themselves, but on the ineffectiveness of the PUWP leadership's efforts to deal with them. This line was set forth most clearly in a Letter from the Central Committee of the CPSU to its Polish opposite number on June 5th, 1981, five weeks before the 9th Extraordinary Congress of the PUWP. The letter was extremely harsh in condemning the weak, concessionary behaviour of the Polish authorities toward challenges in the labour movement, toward the control of the mass media, and toward the disintegration of the Polish party itself. Emphasising the imperialist exploitation and aggravation of these weaknesses and the attendant threat to Bloc security, the letter bore a scarcely veiled warning of Soviet intervention if the Polish comrades did not restore order effectively and swiftly. These charges were repeated in a particularly hectoring tone by the Bulgarian press on July 11th, three days before the opening of the Polish Congress. The presumably pseudonymous author, Ivan Petrov, laid particular stress on ideology and the need to reestablish the PUWP's 'leading role', without which there could be 'no socialism' in Poland. In general, the Bulgarian coverage remained close for the rest of the year, and its content was uniformly critical of the activities of Solidarity.

As is their custom, the Romanians said almost nothing, while the East Germans maintained their virtual blackout on Polish affairs. Czechoslovakian media coverage was spotty but always critical. Rude Pravo ridiculed the 'Katowice Forum', and on the eve of the 9th PUWP Congress, played up the imperialist danger and its influence on Solidarity. One notable feature of the Czechoslovak coverage was the readiness to draw parallels with the course of events in Prague during 1968 and 1969. Solidarity and KOR were compared with 'K231' and 'KAN', both for their pernicious, anti-socialist essence and the degree of Western influence on their activities. Czech commentators particularly stressed the continuing weakness of ideological work in Poland as a contributing factor in the decline of Polish socialism.

On the other hand, Hungarian and Yugoslav coverage of Polish events before martial law was notable for its factual and often sympathetic character. This was especially true of the Yugoslav commentary, for the Hungarian line evidently changed sometime before the 13 December declaration, as Budapest fell into step with the hard-line position, probably under considerable Soviet pressure.
The Yugoslavs were thus alone by the end of the year in giving Solidarity and the reform efforts a sympathetic hearing. They alone continuously emphasised the popular enthusiasm and mass character of Solidarity. For obvious reasons, they encouraged Solidarity's efforts to move toward worker self-management. For not so obvious reasons, Politika reporters gave sympathetic treatment to efforts to democratise the PUWP itself and bring in fresh, young cadres. This was conceivably an attempt to apply pressure, via Polish developments, for reform in the Yugoslav system back home. To be sure, the Yugoslav coverage was careful to lend support only to moderate forces in Solidarity and the PUWP, but that was to be expected, given Yugoslavia's internal problems. On the vital international dimension, too, the Yugoslav reporters gave a generally balanced picture of the situation. While emphasising the internal social causes of the rise and development of Solidarity and its tense relations with the party-state leadership, Politika noted the existence of external pressures and influences. However, its commentators made clear that such pressures were emanating from both sides of the East-West divide.

On the very eve of the declaration of martial law Politika's new correspondent, Ilija Marinković, stressed the desire of the majority of Poles to protect the achievements of the 1980 Gdansk Agreement and avoid extremist positions on both sides leading to confrontation. He expressed the growing fear that party and government hard-liners were actively seeking to provoke Solidarity as a pretext for adopting 'extraordinary measures' to repress strike action and other dissident activities.

One other vital factor requiring consideration in any analysis of the developing isolation of Poland from its friends and neighbors - a factor which produced virtually unanimous disaffection among them - was the serious decline in Polish economic performance during the period. Poland's failure to deliver promised shipments of coal, sulphur, industrial goods, and food hurt all of its COMECON trading partners, including the USSR, forcing them to go to the West to make up the shortfalls. Actually Poland managed to increase its exports to Romania and Bulgaria slightly in 1981, while decreasing them to all the other East European COMECON countries (see Table 1) which may explain the marginally more sympathetic treatment of Polish events in the former two countries. The main victims of the cutback were the USSR, East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Indeed, the Soviet Union and East Germany became the main underwriters of the Polish economic deficit during this period, East Germany evidently consenting under considerable Soviet pressure. This burden must have lessened some of the 'freude' in the schadenfreude with which the Honecker regime seems to have confronted Poland's social and political malaise. In any case, the combination of Poland's indebtedness to the West and her difficulties in meeting delivery commitments within COMECON has had the effect of shifting Polish economic dependence further to the East, and within COMECON, to increase her dependence on the USSR (see Table 2). The economic factors undoubtedly increased the pressure from her allies to take decisive measures to restore domestic law and order.
### Table 1: POLISH FOREIGN TRADE WITH EUROPEAN COMECON COUNTRIES, 1979-1981

(in millions of foreign exchange zlotys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Polish Exports FOB</th>
<th>Polish Imports FOB</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMECON TOTAL:</td>
<td>export 29,034.6</td>
<td>import 28,088.8</td>
<td>+945.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>balance + 945.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>export 17,745.5</td>
<td>import 16,984.0</td>
<td>+761.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>balance +761.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BULGARIA</td>
<td>export 994.0</td>
<td>import 1,008.5</td>
<td>-14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>balance -14.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUNGARY</td>
<td>export 1,557.0</td>
<td>import 1,526.6</td>
<td>+30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>balance +30.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>export 3,639.6</td>
<td>import 4,176.6</td>
<td>-537.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>balance -537.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROMANIA</td>
<td>export 1,075.5</td>
<td>import 975.9</td>
<td>+99.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>balance +99.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZECHOSLOVAKIA</td>
<td>export 3,619.0</td>
<td>import 3,166.6</td>
<td>+452.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>balance +452.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: SHARE OF EUROPEAN COMECON COUNTRIES IN POLISH TRADE WITH COMECON, 1979-1981 in %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COMECON - Total</td>
<td>export</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>import</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>export</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>58.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>import</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>62.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>export</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>import</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZECHOSLOVAKIA</td>
<td>export</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>import</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUNGARY</td>
<td>export</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>import</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BULGARIA</td>
<td>export</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>import</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROMANIA</td>
<td>export</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>import</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mink and Tiraspolsky, op.cit, pp.30-31.

The Declaration of Martial Law

Consequently, it was with a feeling of no little relief that all the East European regimes, with the partial exception of Yugoslavia, greeted General Jaruzelski's declaration of martial law on December 13th, 1981.

The Yugoslav reaction was obviously one of shock over the sudden change in Poland. From the initial statement issued by the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs two days after the Jaruzelski declaration, it is clear that the Yugoslavs' main fear was of Soviet intervention and the implications for European and world peace:

The latest events in the Polish People's Republic are a result of the great difficulties and contradictions in which society and the economy have found themselves in Poland. These events are a Polish internal matter. We still consider that the Polish people, the Polish working class, the Polish United Workers' Party and other Polish political forces alone are called upon, within the framework of the full sovereignty of the country, to find a way out of the crisis in which Poland has found itself.
The statement went on to express the hope that 'democratic methods' would still be used to seek the kinds of reconciliation and reform necessary to solve Poland's economic and political problems. This implicit criticism of the martial law approach was stated more elaborately in an editorial comment in the Belgrade Politika by Djordje Radenković a few days later, where the vigorous condemnation by the Western Eurocommunist parties with which Yugoslavia often identifies herself, is simply reported and juxtaposed with the more moderate official Yugoslav position. The latter is set forth in terms of four essential postulates:

1. the need to resort to martial law is a direct consequence of the contradiction in the Polish economy and society;

2. that only the Polish people, workers, party members and others are entitled to work out a solution;

3. that the solution must be sought through democratically determined socialist renewal, national reconciliation, socio-economic reform;

4. that only such a solution is conducive to peace and stability in Europe and the world.

For the rest of the period immediately after the declaration of martial law the Yugoslav media coverage made it clear that the Polish government's troubles were far from over. Continuing resistance was treated with a good deal of sympathy, and not simply condemned as anti-socialist and imperialist-inspired - the official Polish government line upheld by most of the East European media. Thus, one report on Christmas Eve opined that:

The strikes by the Silesian coalminers, the Katowice steelworkers, the shipyard workers and several other collectives do not have only a protest character, they are also an expression of the freedom-loving, democratic tradition of the Poles, who, after 15 months of almost unlimited liberalism, have found themselves overnight in the severe conditions of martial law.

Such sympathetic treatment was not easy to find in the rest of the East European press. The East German media were particularly supportive of the Polish crackdown. A report in Neues Deutschland at the New Year alleged, by way of justification, that the US had been preparing to foster civil war in Poland. In the same issue an ADN report noted encouraging signs in the Polish economy and society as a result of martial law. The people feel more secure', the report asserted, and it claimed that factory workers and miners were being 'inspired' to increase production. A few days later the economic results continued to receive optimistic coverage, and various sectors of society, such as university students and staff, were said to be responding positively to the explanations being given by the martial law authorities. Nevertheless, two days later the same paper found it necessary to repeat Trybuna Ludu's more sober appraisal of the economic situation: 'In order to lead Poland out of the economic chaos and destruction into which the country has fallen as a result of the wave of strikes long-term dynamic work is
necessary'. The article continued with the observations that, 'The progressive stabilisation of the economic situation must be considered realistically; one cannot allow oneself to be led by wishful thinking'. This skeptical attitude toward Polish efforts to pull the economy together remained a feature of East German coverage for several months, not without substantial material reasons. As we have seen, the economic stakes for East Germany were considerable.

The Czechoslovakian response was likewise standoffish. On the eve of martial law the CSSR Government issued a decree abrogating a 1977 PPR-CSSR agreement eliminating visas for Polish citizens wishing to visit Czechoslovakia and vice versa. To enforce the quarantine against the 'Polish disease' and its economic consequences Poles would henceforth require special authorisation for border crossings, and Czechoslovakian citizens were similarly restricted. Rude Pravo greeted the imposition of martial law with expressions of broad support from the citizens of the CSSR. Like the East Germans, the CSSR adopted a wait-and-see attitude until the visit by Jaruzelski in the spring of 1982.

The Hungarian response was ultimately similar, although perhaps coloured by a slightly greater understanding of Jaruzelski's difficulties. As noted earlier, Hungarian reporting changed abruptly from relatively objective coverage of Polish social conditions to sharp condemnation of Solidarity on the eve of martial law. The declaration itself was greeted approvingly, and official Polish versions of the subsequent resistance were regularly repeated. Martial law was justified as 'the only way' to save Polish socialism. An editorial in Nepszava, the trade-union organ, concluded with the assertion that:

Hungarian workers honestly hope that the Polish people will successfully pass this hard historical test. We declare our solidarity with the Polish communists and with every true patriot, who, with decisive action, blocks the road of every trouble-making, harmful activity, thereby insuring order, tranquility, and a socialist development in his country.

Later in January Nepszabadsag, the Hungarian party daily, condemned the Italian Communist Party's attitude to the martial law regime in Poland. The Italians had asked for a purely domestic Polish solution to the crisis. Yet now that this had taken place, the CPI was still dissatisfied, ignoring the fact that U.S. actions had been aimed precisely at forcing the USSR to intervene. Nepszabadsag particularly objected to the CPI's conclusions that martial law was a sign of the repressive nature of the existing socialist regimes and the claim that the developmental forces unleashed by the October Revolution had clearly exhausted themselves. The article concluded by recalling the situation in Hungary in 1956, which it likened to the present Polish crisis. Hungarian development since 1956 had shown that the forces of 'really existing socialism' were far from exhausted.

Romanian commentary as the crisis came to a head continued to be sparse and limited to the repetition of brief official Polish statements. Bulgarian
coverage, on the other hand, was thorough but totally biased against Solidarity. Its tone was increasingly alarmist as December 13th approached. Lech Walesa was portrayed as an unvarnished extremist, threatening general strikes over governmental efforts to restore order. Angel Bonev, the BTA correspondent, blamed Solidarity, allegedly acting under Western influence, for creating an 'atmosphere of fear' in Poland. The declaration of martial law was hailed as the only possible way out of the crisis and of avoiding civil war. The previous economic chaos had represented a threat not only to the survival of socialism in Poland but a danger to Bloc security and to the stability of the East-West balance in Europe. The results of martial law were said to be immediately favourable. 'Everywhere people are relieved by the return to order.' One week after the declaration, Bonev admitted that there had been incidents of resistance, but these, he said, had received little popular support. In subsequent weeks the BTA reported continuing progress toward normalisation and growth in the authority of the PUWP. On the whole, the Bulgarians were perhaps the most optimistic of all the East Europeans on the salutary effects of martial law. As the most genuinely committed partisans of 'really existing socialism' outside the USSR, the Bulgarian regime was perhaps the most prone to wishful thinking on the benefits of the crackdown for 'normalisation' in Poland.

The winter of 1981/82 was a time of trial for General Jaruzelski. Whatever one may think of the quality of his patriotism in standing in for the Soviet Army in the pacification of his country, there was certainly an element of pathos in his position. He had to 'deliver the goods' to his Warsaw Pact allies by 'normalising' the political and social situations in Poland and restoring the productive performance of its economy. Yet he knew that the only way to do so effectively in the longer run was to avoid the massive use of terror against the population which most of his East European colleagues favoured. For this reason they continued to hold him at arm's length, perhaps not willing to endorse him too enthusiastically lest he, too, fall by the wayside like his predecessors, and Soviet intervention prove ultimately necessary. Hard pressed by the U.S. economic embargo, Jaruzelski desperately needed more than the lukewarm support they were giving him thus far.

The first signs of greater understanding and more complete endorsement of his policies came in the course of a series of visits to the East European capitals in the spring of 1982. The order of these visits provides a useful indication of the relative economic and political importance of the various countries in the official Polish view, although the Soviets may have had a hand in establishing the sequence (see Table 3).

Table 3: VISITS OF GENERAL JARUZELSKI TO THE EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AFTER MARTIAL LAW

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-2 March 1982</td>
<td>USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 March</td>
<td>East Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 April</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 April</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 May</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 June</td>
<td>Romania</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
General Jaruzelski's visit to Moscow, naturally the first in order of importance, set the tone for his other visits. The final joint Soviet-Polish Communiqué likewise set the agenda for the communiqué's with the other countries visited. Among the issues covered were a pledge by the Poles to proceed with 'normalisation', to re-establish the PUWP's 'leading role' in Polish society and strengthen its links with the working class and the people, to complete the struggle against counter-revolutionary forces, and to restore the Polish economy as a reliable partner of the fraternal socialist economies. Poland would pursue further economic development within the framework of the 'international socialist division of labour' under COMECON. The Soviet Union, in turn, promised to continue economic assistance for Poland's struggle to overcome the economic crisis. Both sides condemned the USA and other, unnamed, capitalist countries for 'economic blackmail' and other acts of unacceptable interference in internal Polish affairs. In general, the Soviet reception of Jaruzelski was cordial. He had done a good job under difficult circumstances, helping the Soviets to avoid the embarrassment of direct intervention. And they recognised their obligation to bear a major share of the economic burden. In Brezhnev's words of greeting:

"Beyond the complicated present a better future day can already be seen. We have done everything we could to help socialist Poland. And we shall continue to help. These are not just words."  

East German leader Erich Honecker's welcome was somewhat more restrained. He expressed sympathy for the PUWP's struggle to pull Poland together and implicitly lectured Jaruzelski on the need to give economic regeneration top priority. Honecker laid special stress on the salutary effects of martial law on the 'enemies of the Polish people' and supported its continuation as the 'important pre-condition for overcoming the political and economic crisis of the country.'

These sentiments were repeated in the official communiqué on the visit. Most of the communiqué was devoted to the standard condemnation of Western economic and arms policy in Europe and to expressions of support for Soviet initiatives on disarmament and the reduction of international tensions. Both sides pledged to work for improved economic relations and long-term cooperation in the development of energy and raw materials supplies and selected engineering and consumer goods production for bilateral exchange. Honecker's commitment to seek further economic development in close coordination with the USSR and COMECON was notably not repeated by Jaruzelski, however. It was clear that Jaruzelski remained preoccupied with internal political problems and the procurement of whatever immediate economic assistance he could from the GDR without committing himself to broader integrationist measures which he might not be able to carry out.

This pattern was repeated in his visit to Czechoslovakia the following week, although on this occasion Jaruzelski joined his host, Gustav Husak, in pledging to seek further economic development through intensified integration and cooperation within the COMECON framework. On bilateral economic relations the Czechoslovakian side expressed interest in utilizing 'free production capacity' in Poland, especially in the construction, electrotechnical,
metallurgical, and chemical industries. They pledged themselves to explore possibilities for further joint production ventures. 37

In his welcoming speech Husak was cordial but reserved. He had told Jaruzelski that 'toiling Czechoslovakia had followed the growing crisis in your country with great alarm.' "The anti-socialist, reactionary forces in Poland, allied with the forces of world reaction, were undermining the socialist strength of the Polish people and state and (threatening) the political stability and peace in Europe.38 He expressed understanding and sympathy for the decision on martial law and encouraged efforts to restore the leading role of the PUWP. But what seemed to interest Husak most was concrete economic performance. While Jaruzelski spoke of bold new trans-frontier ventures, Husak called for stable, long-term cooperation based on existing industrial installations and raw material sources. The latter view evidently prevailed in the final communique.

Jaruzelski's reception by Janos Kadar in Hungary a fortnight later was somewhat more cordial. Unlike Honecker's and Husak's protestations of their people's long-standing friendship for the Polish people, Kadar's similar claims had a solid historical foundation. This intangible factor gave the atmosphere of the welcoming speeches and the final communique a different colouration, although the themes covered fit the standard pattern. Thus, while recounting the alarm with which the 'Hungarian people' had observed the deterioration of the socio-political situation in Poland, as had the other leaders, Kadar stressed the 'sovereign' nature of Jaruzelski's martial law decision. In reply Jaruzelski praised Hungarian experience as a model of rapprochement between party and people and of facilitating 'the harmonious development and high effectiveness of the socialist economy' and noted Hungary's strong international reputation.39 There is little doubt that Jaruzelski would, indeed, be very happy with a Kardist-style outcome of the Polish crisis.

The only noteworthy element of the comparatively brief joint communique was a pledge, presumably by the Hungarian side, to 'consider carefully Polish proposals directed at the utilisation of existing productive capacity in Polish industry.'40 As in the conversation with the USSR leaders, Jaruzelski was evidently trying to obtain orders, investments, and supplies for idle Polish plants as a strategy for paying off debts, covering past shortfalls, and re-establishing Polish credentials as a fully fledged partner in the international socialist division of labour. As far as specific aid was concerned, the visit to Hungary was not a notable success, but that was surely not its main purpose.

The atmosphere of the dialogue between Jaruzelski and Todor Zhivkov in Bulgaria a month later was different still. After warmly supporting and backing the results of martial law in his welcoming speech the Bulgarian leader found it necessary to lecture Jaruzelski on the need to press further in mopping up the remnants of the anti-socialist, counter-revolutionary forces. Zhivkov, as usual, went out of his way to praise Brezhnev and the USSR for their efforts for peace and to condemn the 'imperialists' for inciting the forces of anarchy in Poland.41 The final Polish-Bulgarian communique, unlike that with Hungary, which had endorsed only the internal
Polish efforts to overcome the crisis, stressed the need to rely, as well, on 'the assistance and support of the entire socialist community' for that end. The communique also noted an invitation to Bulgaria to invest in the Polish economy and to make use of 'spare Polish productive capacity' in the general framework of COMECON integration.

Jaruzelski's last visit in his campaign for Bloc endorsement was to Romania a fortnight later. As might have been expected, the tone of these conversations was unusual. After accepting 'with understanding' the decision to invoke martial law and the associated 'special measures to restore public order and assure the development of socialism' in Poland, Ceausescu went out of his way to reiterate that only the Poles themselves have the right to solve their problems. He conspicuously failed to mention the USSR or the Warsaw Treaty Organisation in his remarks. Jaruzelski, evidently discomfited by his host's orientation, just as conspicuously praised the USSR and the other socialist countries for their aid in overcoming the Polish crisis. And he pledged continued allegiance to the WTO.

The final Polish-Romanian communique was also somewhat different in detail. Although pledging further cooperation in economic development bilaterally and in the framework of COMECON, there was evidently no offer to the Romanians to use Polish industrial capacity. Both parties endorsed peace and disarmament proposals by the Political Consultative Committee of the WTO, but also other measures of a more neutral origin aimed at the same purpose. Jaruzelski was evidently induced to give some support for Ceausescu's quasianaligned position on a number of international issues. The visit was probably something of an embarrassment to Jaruzelski, however much he may secretly have envied Ceausescu's independent stance. But it was a necessary conclusion to his sequence of pilgrimages. Ceausescu's endorsement was hardly an unmixed blessing, but he could certainly not be left out.

To all intents and purposes the cycle of visits had accomplished its purpose, and Poland and its leaders were once again accepted as more or less adult members of the socialist community. However, Jaruzelski's problems were far from over. The longer the complete 'normalisation' of internal Polish life was delayed, the more impatient his allies became. The removal of the immediate threat of Soviet intervention relieved some of the pressure for drastic repression, which would, as Jaruzelski well knew, render economic recovery and a political modus vivendi impossible. Yet his caution in handling the still widespread domestic opposition and his continued talk of economic reform made some of the East European leaders reluctant to go beyond the formalities of endorsement.

Direct or indirect criticism of Polish internal policy continued to appear in the Soviet and East European press from time to time. The unique status of the Roman Catholic Church, even after martial law, drew unfavourable comment. In June 1982 the Soviet cultural affairs weekly, Literaturnia gazeta, complained that Polish Catholic churches were being used as coordinating centres for strikes and other protest activities. A TASS commentary on August 20th criticised Polish church authorities for allowing the annual pilgrimage to Czestochowa to be used as a vehicle for political demonstrations. Undoubtedly the Soviet objective was to maintain pressure on
Jaruzelski not to yield too much in his dealings with Jozef Cardinal Glemp, who had done the Polish leader some service in preaching non-violence to the supporters of Solidarity's continuing protest actions.

The Hungarians gave an indirect vote of no confidence in Jaruzelski by prohibiting at the last moment a privately organised summer holiday for some 2600 Polish children in Hungary. There was some speculation that the cancellation was due to the fears of the security authorities that the previous year's experience of Polish children wearing Solidarity badges and associated behaviour would be repeated. So the quarantine on Poland was at least partially maintained. Earlier the Hungarian media had reported on the continuing tense atmosphere in the Polish economy. The new official trade unions were said to be moribund; the workers were bitter, and there were predictions of layoffs of over a million workers, of agricultural failures, and of insecurity in the dominant private agricultural sector. The reports were indeed accurate, but their appearance represented an implicit criticism of the tempo and tactics of normalisation.

Moscow, too, was becoming uneasy over the stalemate in Poland. The day after a visit to the Soviet capital by Polish Foreign Minister Stefan Olszowski, on 14 September, Pravda saw fit to warn the martial law authorities that the only way out of their difficulties was to follow Soviet advice.

The East Germans were, not surprisingly, in the forefront of the proponents of a hard line against continued opposition. An ADN report in late October cited with approval the observations of the consistently repression-oriented military newspaper Zolnierz Wolności that martial law was succeeding despite the efforts of Western-supported dissident intellectuals to incite the working class. Subsequently SED leader Honecker assured Olszowski of continued East German support for the crackdown on 'counter-revolutionaries'. However, he also foreshadowed assistance of a more material kind.

A number of events toward the close of 1982 in Poland's internal and external situation seem to have prompted her allies to rally around her again with greater understanding and support. U.S. President Reagan's termination of Poland's most-favoured-nation trading status on 27 October was certainly one of these. Another was the evident Soviet approval of Jaruzelski's decision to release Lech Walesa from detention in November and to 'suspend' martial law by the end of December. These two decisions must have been closely coordinated with the Kremlin leaders, and probably were the object of heated discussions at the time. It is conceivable the topics were raised during Olszowski's visit to Moscow in September, occasioning the Pravda 'lecture' already mentioned. Whatever the case, Jaruzelski presumably convinced the Soviet leaders that a prolongation of the existing situation and the continued detention of Walesa made further progress toward normalisation impossible and needlessly complicated Poland's and the Bloc's international relations. The decision in mid-December 1982, to 'suspend', rather than abolish, martial law was probably in part a concession to Soviet fears, as was, perhaps, the de-registration of Solidarity on the eve of Lech Walesa's release. Indeed, as the momentum for these decisions mounted, it is difficult not to agree with the assessment of Ilija Marinković, the Warsaw correspondent of Politika and NIN, when he wrote in the latter publication in early November:
The situation of General Jaruzelski today is more complicated than it was at the end of last year. His methods are too brutal for the West, which is strengthening its economic sanctions, but they are also too 'soft' for Poland's allies, for whom the 'baltic syndrome' is causing an even greater headache. This dividing line extends to Polish society as well: a significant part of the working class considers that its rights and hard-earned freedoms have been abolished by martial law, while the bureaucratic and dogmatic forces see in Jaruzelski's reformist course a weakness in the party and indulgence on the part of the military regime. 52

By this time the Yugoslav media seemed alone among the East European countries to be presenting a more or less objective assessment of the Polish scene. Yugoslav coverage, while sympathetic to Jaruzelski's efforts at reform and 'socialist renewal', treated the grievances of the Polish workers and citizens and the continued economic stagnation of the economy with almost equal sympathy and realism. 53

Among the other East European regimes the attitude toward Jaruzelski and his colleagues continued to blow hot and cold, albeit on a rising curve of acceptance. The all-important relations with East Germany seemed to be progressing favourably, with a steady increase in the number of official contacts following a visit by Foreign Minister Olszowski in November. A significant indication of the lifting of the East German quarantine was the announcement on 29 March 1983 of plans for the exchange of holiday visits by 100,000 Polish and 35,000 East German children during the summer of 1983. 54 When the visits began in July, they were treated with a great deal of pomp and ceremony in the East German media. 55

The fact that all was not sweetness and light in relation to Polish internal affairs, however, was amply demonstrated by an argument between Soviet critics of Polish policies and Polish defenders of those policies on the pages of Novoe vremia, Kommunist and Polityka, respectively, in May. Among other things, the Soviets complained of the flaccid state of the PWP's ideological work. 56 In these attacks the Soviet critics were said to be supporting charges by hard-liners in the Polish party itself. It is possible that Soviet fears were aggravated by the impending visit to Poland of Pope John Paul II, scheduled for June.

A wide range of concerns were expressed at about the same time in the Bulgarian party press in a four-part series on 'Poland Today', by Radoslav Radev, a 'special observer' of Rabotnichesko delo. Radev noted, among other things, that the Polish economy was still operating at well below capacity, largely because of Western sanctions. The only real accomplishment in 1982 had been the prevention of a further decline in production. 57 For 1983 the goal was merely to halt the disastrous fall in living standards. 58 Many of Poland's problems, he argued, are a result of the previous reliance on economic ties with the West. The economic difficulties, Radev predicted, can be overcome in a few years, but the ancillary ideological and spiritual damage will require decades to repair. That is the most striking feature of the present Polish malaise in Radev's view. The laxity of the PWP's ideological work was evidently difficult for the super-orthodox Bulgarians to comprehend.
When one looks attentively at various publications, he cannot still but wonder at the situation in the spiritual sphere in Poland. It is true, hostile propaganda from Western centres operates unhindered, the illegal press still here and there makes its appeals and impedes the process of stabilisation and normalisation ... It can still be said that the attitudinal training of young people - especially pupils in the higher forms, students, part of the working youth - suffers from serious shortcomings, and it might be more accurate to say that it is only just being organised.

Radev concluded his series of preachments with the assessment that the main danger in Poland still came from the right. He warned that the lessons of the Polish crisis extend beyond the frontiers of Poland itself. The 12-year cycle of unrest in Eastern Europe, he said, is a direct result of consciously planned imperialist subversion. Polish comrades had better pull themselves together - economically, politically, and ideologically - in the shortest possible time. When the Bulgarians express themselves so forthrightly, there can be little doubt that they have Moscow's full endorsement.

The Pope's visit to Poland in June was a calculated gamble by Jaruzelski and represented a major test of his ability to maintain control over the internal situation in the country. If the visit were to go reasonably smoothly, it would constitute a tacit endorsement of the results of martial law by the Vatican, which would undermine Western arguments for the maintenance of economic sanctions. At home it would further call into question Solidarity's claims of the illegitimacy of the regime. In the East it would strengthen Jaruzelski's arguments that a flexible, but firm response to antagonistic social forces in Poland, namely the Church, was a viable, indeed, the only strategy for managing the party's way out of the prolonged crisis.

Bloc reaction to the visit was extraordinary in its superficiality. Pravda carried only two brief reports by TASS - actually citations of AP reports - on the visit. The first noted laconically that 'the visit bears a religious character'. The second merely noted that Pope John Paul II had had a meeting on the 11th of June with 'The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the PPR, W. Jaruzelski'. The fiction that the Pope's visit was purely a religious matter, and therefore, of no governmental or party-political interest as far as media coverage was concerned, was apparently a coordinated position among the Bloc propaganda authorities. Only the Yugoslavs saw fit to publicise the visit and did so more or less even-handedly.

Subsequently there were some mild recriminations. Prague's weekly Tribuna castigated the Polish Catholic bishops and other 'right-wing' clerical and lay forces for having taken advantage of the Pope's recent visit to raise their voices against normalisation and social calm. Nevertheless, the presumption must be that Jaruzelski had passed the test. On the 5th of July he was decorated with an Order of Lenin on his 60th birthday by an Edict of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and hailed for his services to socialism in Poland and to strengthening Polish-Soviet relations.
This ringing endorsement was undoubtedly an important factor in Jaruzelski's ability to proceed with the next stage of normalisation, the abolition of martial law on 22nd July 1983. It was also a signal to the other Bloc leaders that the Polish government and its policies were now to be considered essentially legitimate expressions of 'really existing socialism'.

East German leader Erick Honecker's visit to Poland from 16-18 August represented another important symbol of the official return of Poland to the ranks of the faithful. It was the first such visit to Poland by a Bloc leader since before the outbreak of the 1980 crisis. The fact that it was Honecker who made the initial pilgrimage was of special significance because of the particular importance of Polish-East German economic and political relations for the vital 'northern-tier' security component of the Bloc. The editorial commentary on the visit and on the final Polish-East German communique in Neues Deutschland promised concrete measures to ensure bilateral economic cooperation and coordinated economic planning for 1984 and 1985.

Other evidence of rapprochement with Poland would soon appear, as the frequency of visits by Bloc officials increased. Nevertheless, there was still widespread unease in the region that the situation in Poland was far from normal. As the Czechoslovakian condemnation of Polish church activities mentioned above suggests, Poland alone among Bloc countries remained a target for fraternal criticism. As the process of normalisation continued, following the abolition of martial law, it was clear that General Jaruzelski and the PUWP were still on trial before the court of the 'socialist commonwealth'.

Conclusions

The periodic 12-year cycle of rebellion against Soviet domination in Eastern Europe since Stalin's death is ample evidence that the maintenance of Soviet control is a dynamic process, not a static one. It requires continual adjustment and adaptation on both sides of the relationship with each regime. Poland, Hungary, and Romania are the most obvious examples of this pattern of mutual accommodation. Although clearly one should not exaggerate the extent of possible divergence from the basic Soviet model, the fact remains that the political culture of each country has been an important factor in setting the tone of its relationships with Moscow and the other states of the Bloc.

In each of these regimes, as we have seen, the top party and state leaders are forced to operate in two spheres of legitimation: their own society and the 'High Court' of CPSU leaders and their coterie of subordinate loyalists from the Warsaw Pact states. In order to 'deliver the goods' to their own people and to their economic partners within COMECON the leaders of the individual countries must obtain at least a modicum of rapport with their societies. The proven capacity to do so, while maintaining sufficient organisational and political orthodoxy to satisfy Moscow, is the hallmark of the successful Bloc leader. The task is obviously easier in some countries than in others; it is clearly hardest of all in Poland.

In the eyes of the ruling communist party elites in the region Poland has been the 'sick man' of Eastern Europe since the middle 1950s. Internal Polish
arrangements between the party and society have always had an aberrational quality: e.g., the special status of the Roman Catholic Church, the survival of private agriculture, and the relative freedom of dissident intellectuals, etc. All of these concessions were once viewed by Moscow and the PZPR leadership as temporary - to be whittled away in 'salami' fashion when conditions were favourable. But as time passed, they came to be seen, and tacitly accepted, as permanent features of the 'Polish road to socialism'. As long as the challenge to the party's 'leading role', to the sanctity of state ownership of the means of production and to the security obligations of the WTO were not too overt, then the Polish authorities were allowed to run their own affairs, suitably quarantined from the other Bloc states and subject to occasional criticisms and preachments from the 'fraternal' elites.

But once the virus of the 'Polish disease' had spread to the working class, as evidenced by the burgeoning forth of Solidarity in the fall of 1980, this tacit toleration of Polish aberrations came to an end. The material damage to Bloc economic relationships caused by the ensuing collapse of the Polish economy was certainly a major triggering factor in the demand for intervention. But the evidence of political collapse was undoubtedly the crucial factor. Martial law, proclaimed and implemented by the Polish authorities themselves, was viewed by the Bloc as the ideal solution to the Polish crisis. For Moscow, the advantages of the avoidance of direct intervention, after the experience in Czechoslovakia and most recently in Afghanistan, were obvious. Martial law by Poles against Poles partly blunted the Western propaganda campaign against repression. For the Eastern European regimes martial law was advantageous because it avoided calling attention to the subordination to Moscow which kept each of them in power and hence undermining the modicum of legitimacy they had achieved in their own societies.

However, the actual content of the evolving social relationships in Poland under martial law was not quite so satisfactory. It was clear that Jaruzelski had no intention of going beyond the pre-Solidarity settlement in 'normalising' the situation in Poland. He was realistic enough to understand that he could not, even if he had the desire to do so. In time the majority of East European leaders have probably come to understand his dilemma. Even Moscow seemingly accepts the need for some restoration of economic ties between Poland and the West, since the USSR is in no condition, alone or in concert with her COMECON partners, to take up all of the slack. Nevertheless, Poland continues to be regarded as a 'sick man' by her East European allies. They will continue to criticise the policies of her regime and to quarantine their own societies against infection by the 'Polish disease'.

Of particular interest throughout the Polish crisis has been the ambiguous position of the Yugoslavs. Yugoslav commentary has invariably been the most objective and informative on the forces involved in the crisis and their respective standpoints and grievances. The Yugoslavs obviously favoured many of the demands of Solidarity for greater worker participation in economic decision-making and for decentralising economic reforms. They also resisted any suggestion of the need for Soviet intervention - for obvious reasons. Nevertheless, Belgrade was always cool to some of the political demands of the Solidarity leadership, particularly where the 'leading role' of the communist
party was concerned. Thus, although the Yugoslav media continued to report sympathetically on the morale and status of Polish society after martial law, they were undoubtedly relieved at its declaration. The Solidarity experiment with a genuinely free and powerful trade-union movement was always viewed with ambivalence by Yugoslav authorities. An LCY Central Committee Plenum on the eve of the abolition of martial law in July 1983, thus, while approving changes in the Polish system, came out strongly in favour of the preservation of socialism and the PUWP's leading role. Earlier, when a group of Belgrade intellectuals attempted to demonstrate publicly against martial law and the repression of Solidarity, they were arrested, and one of their leaders subsequently served a month in prison for his efforts.

This episode, perhaps better even than the Polish crisis itself, illustrates the difficulty of genuine popular reform in countries under one-party Marxist-Leninist regimes, even where direct Soviet pressure is not a factor.
1 For a general overview of the nature of current Soviet-East European politics and the exceptional cases of Yugoslavia and Romania see Robert F. Miller, 'The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: An Introduction', *World Review*, vol.22, No.2 (June 1983), pp.6-19.


4 Ibid., p.209.


6 Ibid., pp.211-212, 259-260.


17 Ibid.


22 'Ministerrat Polens zog zuversichtliche Bilanz: Anarchie in Gesellschaft und 'Wirtschaft wurde beseitigt', Ibid., p.5.


26 See, for example, 'Na strane polskeho lidu', Rude Pravo, 15 December 1981, p.1.

27 S.P. 'Media Coverage...', RFE, Hungarian SR/19/81, loc.cit.

28 (ADN) "Nepszabadsag" über die Haltung der IKP zur Lage in Polen', Neues Deutschland, 22 January 1982, p.2.

29 (BTA) "Solidarnost" t"rši sbl"skvane', Rabotrichesko delo, 5 December 1981, p.5.


32 Angel Bonev, 'V"zvr"shchat se red"t i spokoistvieto', Ibid., 21 December 1981, p.5.

33 'Sovmestnoe sovetsko-pol'skoe kommunike', Izvestiia, 4 March 1982, pp.1, 4.


40. 'Wspolny komunikat o wizycie delegacji PRL w WRL', Ibid., 23 April 1982, p.9.


42. 'Wspolny komunikat', Ibid., 22-23 May 1982, p.8.

43. 'Toastul tovarasului Nicolae Ceausescu', Scinteia, 5 June 1982, pp.1, 3; 'Toastul tovarasului Wojciech Jaruzelński', Ibid.

44. 'Comunicat comun Romano-Polonez', Scinteia, 5 June 1982, pp.1, 5.


46. 'Nepravomernye deistviia', Izvestiia, 22 August 1982, p.3.


49. The context was a long article on the 100th anniversary of the Polish workers' movement and the constant attention and advice devoted to it by Lenin. P. Rodionov, 'Slavnye traditsii', Pravda, 14 September 1982, p.4

50. (ADN), 'Es gibt keine Ruckkehr zur Vergangenheit', Neues Deutschland, 26 October 1982, p.5.

52 Ilija Marinković, 'Pat pozicija', NIN, 7 October 1982, p.44.

53 See, for example, Ilija Marinković, 'Stanje bez rata', Ibid., 19 December 1982, pp.41-43.

54 Ronald D. Asmus, 'A Further Step in the "Normalization" of East German-Polish Relations', RFE Research, RAD BR/73, 8 April 1983.


61 (TASS), 'Vstrecha v Varshave', Ibid., 18 June 1983, p.5.

62 See, for example, the reports by Ilija Marinković in Politika, 16, 17, 18, 21, 24 and 26 June 1983.


CHAPTER NINE
DILEMMAS OF THE WESTERN RESPONSE: THE ROLE OF WEST GERMANY

J.L. RICHARDSON

The response of the Western governments to the imposition of martial law in Poland revealed a state of disarray which marked a low point in the coordination of the policies of the NATO allies. The previous great crises in Eastern Europe, in particular the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, had tended to unite the Western governments, even though their immediate response had been limited to verbal protest and a spontaneous halting of tentative endeavours to break out of the impasse which characterised East-West relations during the Cold War and was only beginning to be overcome in 1968. In 1956, chastened by the paralysis of Western diplomacy resulting from the Suez crisis, the NATO governments sought to devise new procedures for political consultation which restored the morale of the alliance by the following year. In the months after the invasion of Czechoslovakia they were able to agree on measures to strengthen NATO's military capabilities, which reversed the trend of the previous years. This chapter inquires why the Western response in December 1981-January 1982 was so strikingly different, and in particular whether the divergences among the Western governments were the inevitable consequence of diverging interests in the context of changes in East-West relations during the previous decade, or whether they reflected more transient circumstances such as accidents of personality and specific policy choices.

West German policy was at the centre of these controversies. West Germany's protest was less vehement than those of France and the United States. Its caution was roundly condemned in the Western media; commentators deplored alleged German neutralism or commercialism, or pondered 'Bonn's identity crisis', and a widely-reprinted cartoon depicted Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in servile posture towards Leonid Brezhnev. Large sections of the Western media appeared ready to hold West Germany responsible for the ineffectiveness of the Western response to the crisis. One focus of the present discussion is, therefore, West German policy and Bonn's differences with its allies. The Ostpolitik pursued under Chancellors Brandt and Schmidt had placed West Germany in a central position in East-West diplomacy in Europe, ensuring that its role in any crisis would be important, but its sudden isolation came as a shock to West Germany policymakers and public opinion.

The chapter will first discuss the changing context of East-West relations in the 1970s and the development of distinctive West German interests within the new context, before turning to the policy objectives of West Germany and its allies in the year preceding the crisis, and their responses to it. It will inquire whether the controversy between West Germany and its two principal allies, the United States and France, reflected genuine options for Western policy towards Poland, whether the conflict was merely over the appropriate symbolic response, or whether in reality Poland provided no more than the occasion for pursuing an ongoing conflict over the conduct of East-West relations.
The Soviet invasion of Hungary marked the end of the first stirrings of the hope of detente in Europe, following the temporary 'thaw' in East-West relations after the death of Stalin. Western abhorrence of the invasion of Czechoslovakia was genuine, but by 1968 the momentum towards detente was such that within a short time West Germany and the United States stepped up their efforts to negotiate the agreements which were to establish a new pattern in East-West relations.

Chancellor Brandt's government negotiated treaties with Poland and the Soviet Union in 1970, followed by the Basic Treaty with East Germany in December 1972, 'normalising' relationships which had been frozen since the post-war partition of Germany. These agreements, together with the four-power and intra-German agreements on Berlin in 1971, provided the mutually negotiated political framework within which a new phase of expanded relationships between the two adversary blocs in Europe could be undertaken. The Helsinki Agreements of 1975, intended to mark a further step towards normal relations in Europe, proved on the contrary a focus of contention, drawing attention to continuing abnormalities, in particular to limits imposed by the governments of the East on contacts and on basic freedoms of expression and movement. Superimposed on these relationships, the strategic arms limitation agreements provided an image of stability at the super-power level, while the protracted negotiations on arms control in the European theatre, although showing little prospect of success, at least signified a willingness in principle to accept negotiated restraints, thus tending further to reduce tensions.

Economic relations between East and West also expanded during the 1970s, but with the exception of U.S.-Soviet relations, much more gradually. Trade between Eastern and Western Europe was much less a product of the 1970s detente than is generally recognized. As early as 1964, West Germany's trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as recorded by the United Nations, was 3.4% of total West German trade; in 1972 it had risen to 3.9% in 1980 to 4.6%. The following table, drawn from OECD data, shows how slight was the expansion of trade with COMECON on the part of the main Western states during the 1970s: indeed it declined as a proportion of total trade in the case of Italy and the UK. The year 1976 marks the peak in East-West trade for most of the Western economies. An increase in the exports of some Western countries during the 1970s was financed through loans, the accumulation of which created the debt repayment problems of certain COMECON countries, notably Poland, and led to a significant contraction of East-West trade in 1981-82.
Thus the context of the December 1981 coup differed from that of the earlier crises, primarily due to the new pattern of agreements in the political and security fields, and the ensuing East-West negotiations on a wide range of issues; secondly, but less prominently, due to the gradual intensification of economic contacts, the latter being associated with the detente by public opinion far more than was justified. West Germany's special interest in preserving the gains of detente was also much less governed by economic considerations than is often assumed. It was indeed COMECON's largest Western trading partner, by a considerable margin, but this was also the case before Brandt's Ostpolitik and the 1970s detente. The gains of detente which were especially important to West Germany were the reduction in the perceived military threat in Europe, the consolidation of West Berlin's position and above all the relative normalisation of intra-German relations, permitting extensive personal contacts, the most tangible outcome of the Ostpolitik to the average West German citizen. This perspective on detente, so different from that of Washington in the 1980s, has continued to influence West German policy under Kohl, despite the latter's determination to support the U.S. on major security issues.

The Immediate Context

The first year of the Reagan Administration, 1981, witnessed a sharp divergence between the United States and most of its European allies with respect to the conduct of East-West relations. Initially security issues dominated public discussion, differences over trade remaining latent. The Reagan Administration, believing that the strategic balance had tilted against the U.S. during the 1970s to a dangerous extent, was primarily concerned to strengthen America's strategic capability and was in no hurry to resume negotiations on arms control. This stance was deeply alarming to public opinion in Western Europe, especially in West Germany, where statements by members of the U.S. Administration on the need for a nuclear war-fighting strategy created general unsettlement and powerfully reinforced the appeal of the peace movement. Chancellor Schmidt's government, which had initiated the 'two-track' policy of agreeing to deploy Pershing and cruise missiles in Western Europe unless a satisfactory agreement could be reached on nuclear arms control in the European theatre, saw its position undermined from both sides, by the apparent loss of American interest in the one track and mounting pressure in the Social-Democratic Party against the other.
The Schmidt government's principal foreign policy concern in 1981 was therefore to restore the East-West dialogue on arms control: by November it appeared to have succeeded, and its political prospects had improved dramatically. Responding to pressure from Europe and from the nascent peace movement in the United States, President Reagan announced the resumption of arms control talks in Geneva and propounded the superficially attractive formula of the 'zero option'. In the same month Leonid Brezhnev visited Bonn, the principal Western government which had sought to keep alive the top-level dialogue. All reports suggest that arms control dominated the agenda, and Schmidt was credited with some success in his efforts, through what was termed the role of interpreter, to reduce the mutual suspicions of the Soviet and American leaders. Once again, Schmidt's success in foreign policy staved off an impending crisis for his government coalition. According to a typical headline, 'The Chancellor sails into better weather', and a typical comment reads as follows:

Germany's domestic political scene has changed fundamentally ... The foreign policy successes of the SPD/FDP coalition have stabilised the government so much that the opposition decided in a Bundestag debate to avoid direct attack. Instead it concentrated on emphasising common ground ... Helmut Schmidt has been confirmed in his policy of patiently exerting his influence on the super-powers. Now he can reap the fruits of his labours.

One area in which the West German government sought to benefit from the new situation was its relationship with East Germany. A meeting between Schmidt and East German Chairman Erich Honecker, scheduled for early 1982, was advanced to December 11-13. Relations had deteriorated since August 1980, when Schmidt had at short notice cancelled a projected meeting with Honecker, because of the tension in Poland. In October 1980 East Germany virtually doubled the minimum foreign exchange payment required of West German visitors (from DM13 to DM25), and Honecker formulated new demands affecting the basis of intra-German relations, notably West German recognition of separate GDR citizenship. East German statements increasingly linked progress in intra-German relations with the issue of NATO missile deployment. These developments reflected not only the general hardening of East-West relations but also the particular East German sensitivity to developments in Poland, i.e. the desire to limit potentially disruptive external influences, which reinforced the traditional East German policy of Abgrenzung, the setting of limits to the development of close relations with West Germany.

The West German government had the strongest of incentives to seek to reverse this trend in intra-German relations, which threatened to erode one of the principal gains of the Ostpolitik, the increase in personal contacts between West and East Germans. Although it was not stated as an explicit goal of policy, it was in West Germany's interest to seek to decouple intra-German relations from the wider East-West conflict, including adverse developments in Poland. While little progress on concrete issues was reported from the Schmidt-Honecker summit meeting, subsequent developments especially after the change of government in Bonn in 1982 suggest that this decoupling had been substantially achieved.
The coincidence of timing - the Polish declaration of martial law taking place on the morning of the final day of Schmidt's visit to East Germany - has encouraged speculation, but no definitive account has yet proved possible. Richard Spielman argues plausibly that the Soviet government had no interest in discrediting Schmidt; East Germany's interests were more ambivalent, but it is unlikely that Jaruzelski would have consulted the East German leader on so delicate a matter. Spielman's further suggestion that Jaruzelski's timing as an 'expression of disdain for Schmidt, Honecker and those who benefit from their contact' may be correct but may overstate the extent to which external calculations, as distinct from urgent internal pressures, entered into Jaruzelski's decision.

The Immediate Response

Schmidt's initial reaction to the news of the Polish coup was to earn him much criticism. He concluded the meeting with Honecker as planned, commenting on the good-neighbourly atmosphere and was photographed exchanging pleasantries with the East German leader. Five days later, however, the Bundestag, the first Western parliament to react, passed unanimously a resolution expressing solidarity with the long suffering Polish people, denouncing the use of force to suppress the free will of the people and demanding an end to martial law, the release of internees and the resumption of talks between the Polish authorities and Solidarity and the Church. Schmidt subsequently acknowledged that Germany had a special obligation towards Poland, but declined to join in the vehement denunciations by other NATO governments of the Soviet Union as responsible for the imposition of martial law.

Comment in Britain, France and the United States focussed on what was perceived as German timidity or indifference: Schmidt's meeting with Honecker and his reluctance to condemn the Soviet Union, the silence of German intellectuals and the peace movement, the smallness of pro-Solidarity demonstrations, all this culminating in a cartoon in L'Express depicting Schmidt kneeling before Brezhnev. No mention was made of the Bundestag resolution or the mass of individual gifts of food and clothing sent to Poland. American officials expressed disquiet over Schmidt's concept of an interpreter role between Brezhnev and Reagan, and as the differences came to narrow down to the issue of sanctions there were hints that the Germans could not see beyond economic self-interest - 'business as usual'. Unsavoury exchanges of charge and counter-charge ensued in the media, e.g. the comment of a German diplomat:

It was the French who went to the Olympic Games ... It was the French who picked up on U.S. high-technology contracts after Afghanistan ... We have no lessons to learn from them.

Most German comment on economic sanctions began by discounting U.S. moral claims by reference to Reagan's lifting of the grain embargo imposed by Carter in response to the invasion of Afghanistan, and France stood finally discredited in German eyes when it chose late January as the time to sign the contract for its share in the natural gas to be supplied by the notorious Soviet pipeline. (West Germany had signed its contract in November 1981.)
The recriminations expressed in the media in January 1982 created an impression that the Polish coup had precipitated a crisis among the NATO allies. On the one hand, West Germany was pilloried for the alleged pusillanimity of its response. But cutting across this new cleavage, longstanding differences between the U.S. and its European allies over restrictions on East-West trade threatened to erupt, as they were to do in the bitter pipeline dispute later in the year. That a crisis at the governmental level was avoided, was due in large measure to the temporary ascendancy of Secretary of State Alexander Haig in Washington, but was also assisted by West Germany's unwillingness to risk isolation and the readiness of Britain and France to oppose the Soviet Union at the strategic and diplomatic level while resisting U.S. pressures at the economic level.

It was reliably reported that the NATO governments had agreed on extensive economic sanctions for the most serious contingency, a Soviet invasion of Poland which, it was generally accepted, would lead to a breakdown in the current East-West negotiations and imperil many of the existing East-West links. But NATO had no plans for lesser contingencies such as that of 13 December, and some commentators regarded this as an understanding that economic sanctions would not be imposed in such a contingency. In the event, the United States announced sanctions unilaterally in December, the Europeans following reluctantly in January and February.

In relation to the gravity of the issue, the vehemence of the rhetoric and the bitterness of the debate, the sanctions were extraordinarily limited. In relation to Poland, the United States suspended food aid, export credit insurance, fishing rights in American waters and certain aviation privileges. In relation to the Soviet Union President Reagan, provoked by an 'exceptionally offensive' Christmas letter from Leonid Brezhnev accusing the U.S. of meddling in Polish affairs, announced the following sanctions on 29 December: the suspension of Aeroflot services, the closing of the Soviet Purchasing Commission in New York, reduced Soviet access to American ports, further restrictions on high technology exports, the prohibition of sales by American firms of oil and gas equipment, the non-renewal of eleven exchange agreements and a postponement of negotiations on a new long-term grain sales agreement. Grain sales under the existing agreement, however, were not restricted, and even before Helmut Schmidt visited Washington on 5 January it appeared unlikely that the U.S. would withdraw from the Helsinki review talks in Madrid or call off the Geneva negotiations on arms control in Europe or a meeting planned between Haig and Gromyko.

On 11 January the European members of NATO joined the U.S. in ending government-guaranteed credit to Poland for goods other than food and suspending negotiations on the rescheduling of payments on Poland's official debt. Later in January the European Community suspended official food aid to Poland and, like the U.S., agreed that assistance would be provided only through approved charities to those directly in need. In February the Ten agreed in principle to restrictions, mainly on luxury goods, amounting to four per cent of total imports from the Soviet Union which, in the view of The Economist, 'should exert pain roughly comparable to President Reagan's own sanctions'. By 15 March, however, when the final package had been approved, the total sanctions had been reduced to less than half this amount.
opposite lines of criticism in West Germany and the United States indicate the pressures to which each government was subject: while most German commentators argued that sanctions were irrelevant or self-defeating, influential voices in Washington called for drastic cuts in trade and lending to the Soviet bloc, or for declaring Poland in default of its debts rather than agreeing to the further rescheduling of payments.\textsuperscript{28}

The Issues at Stake

It is clear that the conflicts among the Western governments did not reflect differences over fundamentals with respect to Poland. Had the Soviet Union invaded Poland, the West would have reacted as in 1956 and 1968: it would not have contemplated war, as was recognized and accepted even by the 'neo-conservative' Right.\textsuperscript{29}

The disputes over economic sanctions in January-February 1982 did not lead to the definition of real options for Western policy towards Poland, and pointed to the limits of potential Western influence on the new Polish government rather than ways of exercising influence through economic leverage. The sanctions on Poland were manifestly inadequate to induce a change in policy on the part of a government which had taken the drastic step of imposing military rule with a view to suppressing Solidarity as an independent political force. Yet it would be going too far to regard them, like the sanctions imposed on the Soviet Union, as purely symbolic. The halting of governmental food aid and export credits had significant consequences for the Polish economy. But the former was only to be expected in relation to the new Polish regime, more especially as its policies towards Solidarity became clear; and there was mounting pressure for the latter for purely financial reasons, indeed Western governments and banks were restricting credit and rescheduling debt repayments in the case of most East European governments in 1981-82. Unlike the sanctions on the Soviet Union, the Polish sanctions (if indeed they were correctly so described) were not a major source of controversy among the Western governments.

The apparently more drastic sanction of refusing the further rescheduling of debt repayments and declaring Poland to be in default was advocated by some commentators, primarily as a way of making the Soviet and Polish governments pay a high price for the suppression of Polish independence. It would indeed have been a high price if Moscow had been willing to pay Poland's debts. But this seemed so unlikely that the Western governments were deterred from taking this step, presumably because of the risks and uncertainties noted by its critics, which included the immediate losses of certain major banks, the uncertain repercussions on the whole precarious structure of international credit, the adverse effects on East-West trade and the increase in Poland's dependence on the Soviet Union. But if the advocates of stronger sanctions did not identify a credible option, nor did those advocating the use of credits as a 'carrot', at least in the short run. Even if the Western governments had been prepared to override the financial disincentives against further credits to Poland, it appeared unlikely that the Jaruzelski régime could afford measures sufficiently 'liberal' to justify special economic favours from the West.\textsuperscript{30}
The differences among the Western governments were not primarily over Polish issues, but over the general conduct of East-West relations, especially economic relations. These differences had been handled cautiously in NATO discussions in 1981, came more clearly into view in response to the Polish coup and were to cause one of the NATO's most serious crises, the pipeline dispute, later in 1982. With respect to these issues West Germany was not isolated, but in virtue of its Ostpolitik was one of the most determined spokesmen for the European standpoint as against that of Washington.

The European perspective in the early 1980s might be summed up as follows. Although earlier optimistic expectations concerning détente had been abandoned, the Europeans sought to retain the hard-won gains of that period - in trade, personal contacts and a continuing dialogue on East-West security issues. Trading links were seen as advantageous in themselves - markets for manufactures and a means of diversifying Europe's energy imports - and as likely, other things being equal, to favour political moderation. Economic and financial links with Eastern Europe were regarded as offering Western Europe a means of influence, and may have done so initially until the excessive lending after 1973 produced a level of indebtedness at which the creditors appeared at least as vulnerable as the debtors.

From Washington the perspective on East-West relations in the early 1980s was completely different. The failure of détente in the Third World and with respect to the strategic balance loomed far larger than the modest gains in Europe: unreasonably high expectations that East-West trade could be used to exert political leverage on the Soviet Union had led to a questioning of the value of that trade. Once questioned, it was widely held that high-technology exports, in particular, were of disproportionate benefit to the Soviet Union as a military power, and should be restricted on strategic grounds. European business and governments, however, the chief participants in this trade, were not easily persuaded by this argument. The task of persuasion was rendered even more difficult by the views of some of the argument's more extreme advocates, who emphasized the weaknesses of the Soviet economic system and held out a prospect of crippling the Soviet super-power through a strategy of economic denial.

Conflict between the adherents of such different perspectives was inevitable. That it should disrupt NATO unity to the extent that it did, overshadowing the substantial agreement on what was practicable in response to the military coup in Poland, was not. The reason for NATO's disarray was not the stand taken by West Germany but the unresolved tension within the Reagan Administration between 'pragmatists' and 'ideologues', between those like Secretary Haig who were ready to adapt to the constraints of alliance and super-power relationships, and those more committed to the unyielding anti-Soviet stance articulated by the President. In the Polish crisis the concrete policies towards the Soviet Union were those of the pragmatists - symbolic sanctions - but the rhetoric was that of the ideologues, whose access to the media maintained pressure on the European governments on such issues as the pipeline as well as seeking to discredit the Schmidt government by depicting it as bent on appeasement. This kind of charge, with its implication that 'stronger' policies might have been effective in preventing moves such as the Polish coup, is indicative of the illusions fostered in the public debate by the more irresponsible of the ideologues.
Schmidt's differences from his major European allies were not over concrete policies, sanctions, but were at the rhetorical level. His preference for a low-key response can be traced to several sources: the personal style which he had developed as Chancellor, the importance which he ascribed to keeping open East-West communication in times of tension, and the delicate state of intra-German relations; also, one may surmise, distaste for the hypocrisy which becomes evident when the gap between rhetoric and practical policy becomes as great as was unfortunately the case with respect to many of the NATO governments in reaction to the events in Poland.

The confusion in NATO's response to the Polish crisis, then, was not an inevitable consequence of the changing context of East-West relations, nor of the different perspectives of its members in the early 1980s. The differences were not over fundamentals, which is not to say that they could have been easily overcome, but they were of the kind that the NATO consultative machinery had been designed to cope with. It was the neglect of this machinery and above all the unresolved tensions within the Reagan Administration over its basic stance in East-West relations which explain the inadequacies of NATO's response to the Polish crisis.


The Economist, 7 January 1984, pp.60-61; 7 April 1984, p.65.


The German Tribune, 13 December 1981, p.3.

Translated from Stuttgarter Zeitung, the German Tribune, loc.cit.


These developments included extensive political contacts during 1983, the granting of new credits to East Germany on the initiative of CSU leader Franz Josef Strauss, the transfer to West Berlin of sections of the city's S-Bahn and an easing of restrictions on the emigration of East Germans to West Germany.

13 Ibid., p. 29.


19 Newsweek, 18 January 1982, p.15.


21 Ibid.


26 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, loc.cit., p.31463.


29 E.g. Walter Laqueur, 'What Poland Means', Commentary, 73, 2, March 1982, pp.25-30 ('That no one intends to launch a war over Poland in the nuclear age goes without saying', p.29).

30 For discussion of Western options, see Spielman, loc.cit.; Charles Gati, 'Polish Futures, Western Options', Foreign Affairs, 61, 2, Winter


CHAPTER TEN

THE METHOD OF SOVIET INTERVENTION:

THE CASES OF POLAND AND AFGHANISTAN

BY

AMIN SAIKAL*

The two countries of Poland and Afghanistan are historically, culturally and politically distant from each other, so much so that at first glance they would seem improbable candidates for a comparative study. These states, however, share a number of features in their relationships and experiences with the Soviet Union which provide, in certain ways, a fruitful basis for studying them together. In this essay I propose, first, to look at those common features which have led Poland and Afghanistan to experience similar problems in their relations with the USSR; second, to highlight the differences between the two in order to explain the variation in and the methods of Soviet responses to developments in the two countries; and third, to note briefly the implications for Soviet policy in each country of the continuing crisis in the other.

Poland and Afghanistan are located in what the Soviet Union regards respectively as its Western and Southern zones of security and interests. While sharing long borders with both, the Soviets, like their Czarist predecessors, have been traditionally sensitive to developments in these zones. They have persistently cited outside infiltrations and intrusions in the past into Soviet territory from and through these zones; and the growing activities of their Western adversaries, mainly Great Britain before and the United States after World War II, within and in the vicinity of these zones in order to substantiate their sensitivity. Consequently, with their emergence as a world power with global ambitions, they have become increasingly convinced of the immense value of these zones for the Soviet Union. They have perceived it as natural and desirable to influence and, if possible, even subjugate certain key states of these zones, of which Poland and Afghanistan have happened to be the two central foci. To this end, they have not failed to exploit developments and opportunities which may have become available to them on either a short or long-term basis.

It is not surprising that the underlying objectives of Soviet policy behaviour towards the two zones, in general, and Poland and Afghanistan, in particular, have been traditionally hegemonial in one form or another. While Czarist Russia finally settled for a policy of 'spheres of influence' with regard to the two zones, Soviet Russia has no effort, particularly since World War II, to transform this policy into one of 'spheres of domination'. It can

*The author wishes to thank Mr Paul Dibb for commenting on an earlier draft of this chapter
be argued that by the end of the war Stalin's intentions to dominate certain states in the Southern zone were as resolute as his determination to subjugate Eastern Europe. Clear evidence in this respect was provided by the Soviet occupation of northern Iran in 1941 and the subsequent setting up of pro-Soviet autonomous socialist republics under the Iranian Communist Party (Tudeh), and the reluctance to withdraw its forces immediately after the termination of the war, as Moscow had agreed to do with the Allied powers. Under pressure from the United States, which now found a new importance in Iran as an oil-rich frontline state against Soviet communism, and given the Kremlin's own urgent need to subjugate Eastern Europe first, the Soviets withdrew from Iran by mid-1946. Moscow may have not forgiven itself for this in the long-run. The rapid drift of Iran, Turkey and Pakistan into the Western camp and Afghanistan's growing hesitation to go much beyond maintaining diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union in the following years heightened Moscow's anxiety about its future in the region. This prompted it to seek a more viable policy to combat these developments. The approach to the advancement of Soviet interests in the Southern zone, consequently, was necessarily to take a different form from its strategy concerning its ambitions in Eastern Europe.

There were several important differences between the Western and Southern zones generally and Poland and Afghanistan specifically which proved to be influential in determining the different character of Soviet policy approaches. First, while the Red Army had entrenched itself as the army of 'liberation' by the end of the war in Eastern Europe, the Soviets lacked such leverage in the Southern zone, except in Iran for a brief period. Second, in contrast to Eastern Europe, where local communists were few in number but nonetheless organised in fairly coherent and developed cells, in the case of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia with some popular following, the Southern zone states (except Iran, where the pro-Soviet Tudeh had some strength but was crushed by the Iranian government following the Soviet withdrawal from northern Iran) provided little fertile soil for the development of effective communist cells. Third, the West had conceded Eastern Europe, particularly through the Yalta negotiations, to the Soviet Union. This was not so with regard to the Southern zone, where the United States moved swiftly and forcefully to strengthen its position in Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, although it left Afghanistan largely to its own devices to maintain its traditional position as a buffer state between the Soviet Union and Western interests. Fourth, while the East European states were relatively advanced and cohesive, the Southern zone states were by and large backward and polycentric, suffering from serious ethnic, tribal and linguistic divisions. Fifth, in geographical terms, Eastern European states were easier to occupy and seal off from the outside world than the Southern zone states, which had and still have inhospitable terrains, but permeable borders with the outside world because of the difficulty of establishing frontier controls. Sixth, and more specifically, while Poland was vulnerable to Soviet encirclement once the Soviets had turned its neighbours into their satellites, Afghanistan was and still is less open to such a development, given its eastern, southern and western borders with the non-Communist world, providing the Afghans with strong leverage against an invading force.
Consequently, the Kremlin evidently decided, with regard to Eastern Europe, on a strategy of 'aggressive imposition and domination', punctuated by a degree of tactical flexibility whenever necessary; and with respect to the Southern zone, on a policy of 'gradual penetration' with a view to exploiting any opportunity and development which might arise. It pursued its strategy of 'aggressive imposition', which was not challenged by the West in any serious way, regardless of the national conditions in Eastern European states, reflecting the Bolsheviks' experiences with respect to the pacification of the Soviet Union itself. This strategy, which was implemented largely through the salami tactics of local pro-Moscow communists, backed by the Red Army and the Soviet security apparatus, and the forceful political, economic and military integration of the East European states, except Yugoslavia and Albania, with the Soviet Union, enabled Moscow to build rapidly an elaborate system of 'internal mechanisms' of control under the leaderships of the local communists. In subsequent decades it hoped and expected through these 'internal mechanisms' to ensure and maintain the socialist transformation and integration of the East European states into a Soviet-dependent socialist Bloc. By virtue of its geographical centrality and human and non-human resources, Poland was to assume a pivotal position in this Bloc and therefore became essential to its viability and continuity. The Soviets allowed the 'internal mechanisms' to be adjusted to different national conditions of the Bloc states only within limits acceptable to Moscow. However, the role of the Soviet Union as the central power in relation to the Bloc became dependent on the success and failure of the 'internal mechanisms' in handling the national situations and problems. This has resulted in a set pattern in Moscow's relationship with the Bloc states: the Soviets, first of all, do everything possible to control opposition and crises through the 'internal mechanisms' and by bringing about acceptable changes, including leadership changes; but when they feel that they are about to exhaust the potential of the 'internal mechanisms' they intervene directly, by themselves or in conjunction with other satellites, to enforce their control over the particular Bloc country. The Soviet military interventions in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 as well as the Soviet handling of periodic crises, particularly those of 1956, 1970 and 1980-81, in Poland fall within this pattern.

In the case of the latest crisis in Poland, it is evident that while holding out the threat of direct intervention, the Soviets have largely relied on their use of 'internal mechanisms' in handling the crisis. If one traces the Soviet verbal and physical responses to the developments in Poland, it becomes apparent that the initial Soviet reaction to the Polish strikes and the emergence of Solidarity in the northern summer of 1980 was a relatively calm and restrained one. The Soviet press reported the formation of Solidarity and its recognition by the Polish Government under the Gdansk Agreement of August 31, 1980 as a major change in Poland's 'social life'. Pravda quoted the official Polish Information Service to the effect that the crisis situation had been caused by 'the improper functioning of a number of structures, which in turn gave rise to dissatisfaction among the population in the economic and social fields', and that the Gdansk Agreement was a result of 'reason' gaining 'the upper hand over emotion in the settlement of the crisis'. As the crisis persisted the Kremlin apparently not only consented to the replacement of Gierek by Kania and to other high-level changes in the Polish Government and communist party but also expressed its conviction that the 'Polish people will in short order solve the complicated problems and overcome the difficulties that confront the country'.
However, when Solidarity gained mass strength as a pluralistic organisation, backed by the traditional source of opposition to the Soviet imposition, the Catholic Church, formulated a wide range of conflicting demands and received offers of help from Western governments and trade unions as well as world-wide publicity, the Soviets could neither understand the pluralistic nature of Solidarity, arising from the peculiar national conditions of Poland, nor view Solidarity as an acceptable organisation. When certain extremist members of the Solidarity leadership advocated a total break with the Soviet Union, Pravda drew ominous attention to all the fraternal help of the Soviet Union to the Polish people and warned that 'every person who recognises his full responsibility should have an idea of the boundary that separates just demands from demands that threaten the interests of the State'; and that 'Poland occupies an important place on the European continent and in European politics and ... it is a member of the Warsaw Treaty ... and of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid'.

In a subsequent commentary on the first congress of Solidarity, held in Gdansk in September 1981, Pravda wrote:

'Solidarity extremist circles turned the congress ... into a real antisocialist and anti-Soviet orgy. The organizers of this assemblage, which was dubbed a "trade union congress" as a diversionary tactic, proclaimed a campaign against the Polish United Workers Party and against Socialism in Poland. Counter-revolutionary organizations such as KSS-KOR (Committee for Social Self-Defence), KPN [Confederation of Independent Poland] and other antisocialist splinter groups, which are known for their ties with reactionary emigre circles and imperialist special services, used the Gdansk congress as a kind of review of the forces that are preparing for a struggle for power in the country and for the restoration of capitalism. ...The Soviet working people want to believe ... that the workers and working Poland will find strength, courage and determination to defend the gains of socialism and to stop the class enemy ...'.

Implicit in all this was that the Soviet Union would not allow Poland to drift away, whatever the cost. From then on, Moscow labelled Solidarity as 'counter-revolutionary', seeking to enforce a 'dual system' in Poland, although it refrained from criticising Lech Walesa by name until the imposition of martial law. In a fashion reminiscent of its behaviour prior to its intervention in Czechoslovakia, it maximised pressure, by using the threat of intervention, on the Polish 'internal mechanisms' to become more assertive against Solidarity. When Kania failed to do so, it warmly approved of Kania's replacement by General Jaruzelski. With dissension spreading into the Polish parliament and government, the Soviets in all probability worked very closely with Jaruzelski to activate the 'internal mechanisms' to the maximum possible level in preparation for playing possibly their last card short of direct intervention, the imposition of martial law. It is evident that the Kremlin decided on martial law after a considerable period of deliberation and examination of options, and reportedly a shake up of the top command structure of the Soviet armed forces, which supported immediate intervention, when Jaruzelski finally imposed martial law and outlawed Solidarity, Moscow applauded the action as a victory against the enemies of socialism in Poland. Pravda concluded:
'The steps taken by the Military Council (of Poland) will lead to the further isolation of the instigators from Solidarity, who are acting on the instructions of Western subversion centres. The country's public security forces, acting in conjunction with the committees of national salvation that have been set up at the local level, are rebuffing the activities of counterrevolutionary groups and ensuring the strengthening of socialist law and order in the country.'

It became apparent that once again, in the case of Poland, the Soviets had succeeded in containing a major crisis through 'internal mechanisms' in that country. Had the Soviets run out of 'internal mechanisms', it is very likely that they would have intervened, as they had in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, irrespective of the regional and international repercussions.

In the Southern zone, particularly Afghanistan, the Soviet Union started with a different approach to pursuing its interests but ended up applying largely the same strategy as it has followed in Eastern Europe. In the 1950s, after the drift of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey into the Western camp, the one country which remained very vulnerable to the Soviet policy of 'gradual penetration' was Afghanistan. Although Afghanistan, as a predominantly Islamic-tribal and underdeveloped state with a traditional monarchy, had been subjected to periodic Russian pressure and infiltrations but had managed to maintain a neutral position in world politics, it faced new challenges after World War II. The post-War pressure for modernisation and the Afghan monarchy's desire to strengthen its position against the tribal powers and against Pakistan, with which it had become locked in a serious border dispute, prompted the Afghan leadership to look for outside economic and military aid. It was initially reluctant to ask the Soviet Union for such aid, given its suspicion of Soviet intentions. However, once its request for military aid was turned down by Washington, which had developed close ties with Pakistan and Iran, for want of another patron it turned to the Soviet Union in the mid-1950s. Moscow's readiness not to let such an opportunity slip out of its hands resulted in gradual but massive Soviet economic and military aid to Afghanistan. Within the next two decades, consequently, the Soviet Union penetrated not only the Afghan economic planning infrastructure but also the Afghan armed forces, which became largely Soviet trained and equipped, thereby enabling Moscow to gain increasing influence in Afghan politics. Although Washington became conscious of the danger of this development and tried to counter it by providing some economic aid, this aid proved to be insufficient to reduce Afghanistan's dependence on the Soviet Union. With the Soviet aid, under the slogans of 'peaceful co-existence' and 'good neighbourly relations', came Soviet economic and military experts in their hundreds and Soviet support for the development of two pro-Moscow groups, Parcham (Banner) and Khalq (Masses), which appeared on the Afghan political scene in the second half of the 1960s. Parcham, headed by the current Soviet-installed President of Afghanistan, Babrak Karmal, emerged with support largely from urban based Dari speaking activists; and Khalq, led by the Afghan communist Presidents of 1978-79, Noor Mohammed Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, drew support mainly from rural Pushtoon activists. Since the two groups were antagonistic mainly over personality differences and neither ever had more than a few hundred committed supporters, their existence was largely overlooked by the government.
However, with the overthrow of the monarchy and the declaration of Afghanistan as a republic in 1973 by the former Afghan Prime Minister, Mohammed Daoud, who was reportedly the patron of the Parchamis and was initially supported by this group, and with Daoud's subsequent inclination to reduce Afghanistan's dependence on the Soviet Union and therefore his regime's vulnerability to Moscow's dictates, the Soviets became unhappy, and the Parchamis and Khalqis felt threatened. Consequently, the two groups, probably encouraged by Moscow, joined forces in a shaky alliance and re-formed the pro-Soviet People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in 1977. As Daoud sought to clamp down on their opposition and moved to arrest the entire leadership of the alliance, the PDPA's supporters in the armed forces toppled the Daoud regime in a bloody coup in April 1978, declaring Afghanistan a 'Democratic Republic', with 'unshakeable fraternal ties' with Afghanistan's 'selfless northern neighbour', the Soviet Union. Moscow was the first to recognise and declare its full support for the PDPA regime. Although Moscow would have preferred its most trusted ally, Babrak Karmal, to head the new regime, Taraki and Amin, by virtue of their influence with the armed forces, emerged as President, and Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, respectively, and Karmal was given the nominal position of deputy to Taraki.

It was clear, however, from the very outset to the PDPA leaders, and probably to Moscow as well, that the new regime could not survive for very long without massive Soviet support. The PDPA clearly lacked an effective party base, historical legitimacy and popular support in Islamic-tribal Afghanistan, where Islam stood supreme against communism, and tribalism had prevented the creation of a coherent national power structure. Within three months of the PDPA's coming to power the old differences between the Parcham and Khalq factions of the party resurfaced. In a close alliance with Taraki and the major cells of the armed forces, Amin, who emerged as the most cunning strong man of the regime, outmanoeuvred Babrak Karmal and other top Parchamis and secured their despatch as ambassadors, mainly to East European capitals, and their dismissal a few weeks later on charges of embezzling embassies' funds. This resulted in factional fighting between the Parchamis and Khalqis, which continually weakened the already narrow party base of the PDPA, and which persists to the present day.

The Soviets were clearly unhappy about these developments. Nonetheless, while looking after Karmal and his colleagues as possible alternatives for the future, they could not forego the opportunity which was available to them to transform Afghanistan into one of their satellites. They therefore persevered with their all-out support for the PDPA under Taraki and Amin, who appeared to be as committed as Karmal to Moscow. With communists in power, Moscow immediately changed its past policy of gradual penetration of Afghanistan into one of domination of the country. Its policy actions followed a pattern very similar to its policy behaviour towards Eastern Europe after the war, except that in Afghanistan it did not have the same leverage and opportunities as it had had in the war-torn East European states. In responding to requests by the PDPA leadership for aid, Moscow set out resolutely to build through the PDPA the necessary 'internal mechanisms' of Soviet control in Afghanistan. It forcefully embarked on a process to indoctrinate, train and control PDPA personnel and to tie Afghanistan's military, security and administrative structures, as well as its economic and social development and foreign policy
objectives and priorities, to the Soviet Union. To this end, within the next twenty months, it despatched to Afghanistan some 10,000 economic, military and security personnel, provided the country with millions of dollars in economic and military assistance, and recruited thousands of young Afghans to be trained in all fields in the Soviet Union. It supported Taraki and Amin, particularly the latter (who rapidly emerged as the man of power) in their attempts to liquidate just about all alternatives except Parcham to the PDPA regime and silence anyone suspected of opposition. They instituted what at best can be described as a 'reign of Stalinist terror', at the cost of thousands of lives.

The Soviets, however, could neither stop the growing factional fighting within the PDPA, nor induce Taraki and Amin, who were, indeed, little more than naive and short-sighted Stalinists, to pursue the type of reforms which could realistically be attempted given the prevailing conditions in Afghanistan to widen their base of support. Nor could they prevent an overwhelming majority of the Afghan people from viewing the PDPA regime quite reasonably as 'Godless' and 'murderous' and from supporting the Islamic resistance groups (the Mujahideen) as the only alternative capable of waging an armed opposition to the PDPA and their Soviet backers.

The situation became increasingly critical for the Soviets. As was also the case in Poland, the Soviets could neither understand the nature of the factional fighting within the PDPA, a blood feud which in the Afghan cultural value system could be resolved only through bloodshed, nor comprehend the pluralistic nature of Afghan society, where Islamic and tribal codes militate against any foreign imposition and oblige Afghans to defend their religion, property, tribal values and country at all costs. The Soviets, nevertheless, persisted with their efforts to secure political reconciliation between Parcham and Khalq and to strengthen the PDPA as a prerequisite to building an effective system of 'internal mechanisms' and achieving a forceful pacification of the Afghan people. When by mid-1979 they realised that they were not getting far with their efforts, they resorted to the same tactic of leadership and party changes which were tried in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The Kremlin invited Taraki to Moscow and urged him to restore unity within the PDPA and broaden the power base of his regime by appointing Karmal as Prime Minister in place of the hard-headed Amin, who was to be given safe conduct to the Soviet Union for asylum, thus re-integrating the Parchamis into the government. This plan backfired, however, since Amin had become aware of the plan. Upon Taraki's return to Kabul, in a shootout at a Cabinet meeting in the presence of the Soviet ambassador, Pusanov, who was there to arrange the transfer of Amin to the Soviet Union, Amin killed Taraki and declared himself the head of the PDPA and government. In the meantime, he demanded the withdrawal of the Soviet ambassador and became highly suspicious of the Soviets. He found it necessary to open a dialogue at least with an Islamic opposition group and to flirt with an unreceptive United States in order to reduce his dependence on Moscow. From then on, as there was no trust between Amin and the Soviets, it became clear to Moscow that it was running out of means short of intervention to contain the crisis in Afghanistan, although it declared its full support for the Amin regime. After the commander of the Soviet ground forces, Pavlovsky, had been sent on a fact finding mission to Kabul and reported that the PDPA regime was on the verge of
collapse, the Kremlin decided on 'direct intervention'. Its tactics after September 1979 paving the way for this intervention were very much reminiscent of similar tactics it had used prior to its intervention in Czechoslovakia. They ranged from despatching top military investigators to Kabul to praising Amin's leadership and massing some 50,000 Soviet troops along the Afghan-Soviet border in the pretense that they were ready to help whenever Amin needed them. Although Moscow had planned its intervention for November, the Iranian militants' holding of over 50 Americans as hostages in Tehran from November 4, prevented Moscow from carrying out its plan. But as the hostage crisis subsequently created a more favourable regional and international climate, the Soviets began their invasion of Afghanistan on December 27. They claimed that they had been invited by the Amin regime under the Afghan-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, a treaty which had been concluded between the Kremlin and Taraki and Amin in late 1978. However, the first leading figure they killed was Amin himself, whom they replaced with Karmal.

It must be stressed that the Kremlin acted after four months of deliberation and examination of options. Brezhnev subsequently stated: 'It was not a simple decision for us to send Soviet military contingents into Afghanistan. But the Party Central Committee and the Soviet government acted in full awareness of their responsibility and took all circumstances into account'. He also affirmed that the 'military contingents', amounting to over 100,000 heavily equipped troops, would be withdrawn from Afghanistan only when 'the factors that made the Afghan leadership request their introduction no longer exist'. Moscow has alleged 'the factors' to be 'the U.S., Chinese, Egyptian, Pakistani and Iranian backed imperialist aggression against the 1978 socialist revolution and the territory' of Afghanistan. This indicated that from the Kremlin's vantage point its decision to invade was rational, was made with an eye to its possible consequences, and constituted a firm commitment to deploy Soviet troops in Afghanistan for as long as necessary. In retrospect, it seems that the Kremlin's short-term objectives were to save PDPA rule, to pre-empt the rise of a hostile Islamic government in Kabul (which in cooperation with the Islamic fundamentalist regimes of Khomeini in Iran and of Zia al-Haq in Pakistan could affect the Muslim population of the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union) and thus, to protect Soviet investments in Afghanistan and initiatives in Afghan politics. In the long run, however, its goal was to transform Afghanistan into a pro-Soviet 'socialist state'.

Of course, the Kremlin expected reactions to its invasion, both from within Afghanistan and from the international community, particularly from the regional Islamic states, China and the West, led by the United States. All of these condemned the invasion and demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops and the restoration of Afghanistan's sovereignty as an independent, non-aligned state. The United States, whose intelligence services had been predicting a Soviet invasion since early November 1979, even led the West in imposing limited political and economic sanctions against the Soviet Union - an action which it repeated subsequently following the imposition of martial law in Poland. However, given the fact that it had not arrived at its decision to invade in a vacuum, the Kremlin appeared confident in its judgement and in its ability to ride out such adverse reactions. While hoping to present its troops to the Afghan people as forces of liberation - something very much reminiscent of what Stalin had tried to do in Poland and
as a whole after World War II - the Kremlin had reason to believe that the post-Shah revolutionary turmoil in Iran, serious political problems and uncertainties in Pakistan, growing divisions within the Islamic world, declining credibility of the United States in West Asia, President Carter's proven record of indecisiveness in world affairs and the persistent fragility of the Western alliance would prevent decisive regional and Western responses to its invasion.

As it turned out, the Kremlin was correct in its assessment of the likely regional and Western reactions, which indeed proved to be quite ineffectual. However, it overestimated its chances of presenting its troops and its puppet, Karmal, to the Afghan people as forces of liberation and as a bulwark against 'imperialist aggression from Pakistan'. Like the Poles, the Afghans have traditionally rejected foreign attempts to dominate them and have accorded no mercy to collaborators. Consequently, despite the weakness of regional and Western reactions, the Soviets, after four years of massive military presence, are today evidently in a worse position than they were at the start of their occupation of Afghanistan. The Afghan popular resistance to the Soviets and the beleaguered Karmal government, spearheaded by various Islamic groups (the Mujaheddin) has proved increasingly effective. This and the growing blood feud between Parchamis and the Khalqis, who feel that the Soviets and Parchamis have betrayed them by killing their leader, Amin, and by wresting top governmental positions from them, have reduced the PDPA to a skeleton, preventing the Soviets and the Parchamis from building an adequate security-administrative apparatus and expanding their shaky hold beyond Kabul. In the process, the Afghan people have suffered tremendously, with half a million of them killed and four million of them forced to seek refuge in Pakistan and Iran. But this has not been without considerable cost for the Soviet Union. The war in Afghanistan has been costing the Soviets some $15 million a day and, according to most conservative estimates, on average 200-300 men a month. Although it would be an exaggeration to suggest that Afghanistan has become the Soviet Union's Vietnam, it is clear that the Soviets are bogged down in Afghanistan, with no military or political solution in sight. This cost currently outweighs any benefit which Moscow may have gained in the country.

Meanwhile, the Kremlin has achieved little to be cheerful about in Poland. It has so far succeeded merely in containing rather than resolving the Polish crisis. Although Jaruzelski's government has formally lifted martial law and reduced Solidarity to an underground organisation, it has not redressed the basic grievances of the Polish people or diminished their support for Solidarity and for the Catholic Church as embodiments of their opposition to the government. Given the history of the Polish people's struggle for freedom, religious piety and a pluralistic value system - features which they share with Afghans - it is unlikely that the Soviet use of 'internal mechanisms' will be sufficient to resolve the Polish crisis in the long run. As long as this remains the case, the idea of a Soviet invasion will continue to haunt the Poles; and a Soviet invasion will become inevitable if the Kremlin reaches the same conclusion with respect to Poland as it did with respect to Afghanistan - that is, if the Kremlin sees itself as running out of 'internal mechanisms', and if the Western powers continue to seek accommodations with the Soviet Union in pursuit of their own interests.
There are several basic conclusions which one can draw from a comparative study of Poland and Afghanistan. Perhaps the most important, however, are the following: First, the dealings of the Soviet Union with Poland since the Second World War and with Afghanistan since 1978 help to illustrate a largely consistent, almost predictable, pattern in the Soviet management of domestic crises perceived as threatening to Soviet interests in the countries under Soviet domination. This pattern suggests that in the event of a major crisis, the Soviets at first do their best to contain or resolve the crisis through their 'internal mechanisms' of control, backed by the threat of direct intervention. But when they run out of 'internal mechanisms', they resort to the application of massive military force. Second, although Soviet policy towards crises in the subjugated states is not reached in total neglect of local conditions, nonetheless, Soviet perceptions of the problems to be dealt with are strongly influenced by the common values, experiences and ideological convictions of the key Soviet decision makers, which can distort the Soviet perception of these problems, and also influence the Soviet view of the options available to the Kremlin to deal with them. Because of this the Soviets appear to have laboured under a number of misapprehensions concerning the nature of events and developments in Poland and Afghanistan. To all appearances, the Soviet policy makers have understood neither the pluralistic nature of Polish society reflected for example in the diversity of aims and demands articulated within Solidarity, nor the diversity of Afghan society, underlined by such features as ethnic-tribal divisions and the blood feud between the Parchamis and Khalqis. They seem to have drawn largely on their own experience in dealing with the Soviet people in treating Solidarity as a monolithic organisation under and not outside the PUWP's rule. Consequently, whenever certain individuals or groups dissented from and voiced extreme demands independent of the mainstream within Solidarity, Moscow took such dissension very seriously and interpreted the dissenting demands as the underlying objectives of Solidarity as a whole. As a result, it became more aggressive towards Solidarity and its supporting organisation, the Catholic Church, and pressured the Warsaw authorities to act more forcefully.

Similarly, in the case of Afghanistan, they seem to have perceived the Afghan resistance against themselves and their surrogates, both before and after the invasion, largely as an Islamic resistance, threatening the national integrity of the Soviet Central Asian Islamic republics. They have done this in neglect of the fact that the resistance has progressively taken on a religious character, mainly because Moscow gave full support to the policy of the Taraki-Amin dictatorship to wipe out all other political alternatives, except the Parchamis, and because in view of the Soviets' and their surrogates' desire for an alien and monolithic ideological transformation of Afghan society, Islam has been left as the only ideology of resistance. Further, the Soviets have displayed a considerable insensitivity to the Islamic-tribal values of Afghans and to the blood feud which is a central instrument in the resolution of tribal, group and individual conflicts. They have seen the ethnic-tribal diversity of Afghans as a factor which could prevent the Afghans from mounting a credible resistance. They have tended to overlook the fact that disunity has been a distinct feature of the cultural pattern of Afghans and that, while affecting their collective strength, this may not necessarily prevent them from waging a persistent and effective struggle against forces of occupation.
Third, the cases of Poland and Afghanistan confirm that the Soviet Union intervenes most readily in the internal affairs of those proximate states which the West has more or less abandoned in one form or another, especially if in the prevailing international climate they expect Western protests or sanctions to prove ineffectual. If the United States had based its immediate post-World War II foreign policy goals and priorities on more prudent long-term considerations and had not conceded Poland and abandoned Afghanistan to the Soviet Union, probably these countries would have faced a different future and the United States would have been in a better position to act decisively in the event of the Soviets developing an appetite for these countries.

Finally, in the short run the Soviet Union's problems in Poland and Afghanistan may have little bearing upon each other, for the Soviet Union with its present economic and military capacity, guarded by a closed political system, is capable of coping with such problems without a great deal of strain. But this may not be the case in the long-run. Any significant deterioration of the Soviet Union's position in either country could add fuel to the smouldering anti-Soviet sentiments in the other and constrain the Soviets from dealing with either of the countries effectively, particularly if this would entail an over-extension of Soviet resources in an unfavourable international climate and if the situation were monitored by a vigilant West. Given the salience in both Poland and Afghanistan of religion as the most influential factor unifying the opposition to Moscow, this could be for the Soviets a most disturbing situation.


8 Ibid., p.143.


19 See K. Wafadar, op.cit., pp.174-175.

20 Ibid.


22 K. Wafadar, op.cit.


The purported 75% turnout of the Polish electorate for the June 1984 Local Council elections was acclaimed by the Jaruzelski regime as a victory for 'normalisation'. In the light of the appeal by Underground Solidarity for a boycott of the elections there may be some justification for such a claim, even if the percentage recorded, if reliable, is far short of the usual turnout of well over 95% in Soviet-type elections and there is evidence that the percentages were substantially lower in major centres like Warsaw and Krakow. A substantial portion of the population is evidently simply too exhausted by the arduous conditions of daily life and too fearful of the political consequences of open defiance to have responded more spiritedly to the boycott appeal. For the time being Jaruzelski appears to be firmly in the driver's seat. Nevertheless, it would be absurd to speak now of genuine normalisation except in the graveyard sense of the term commonly used in the USSR and its satellites.

The Polish economy remains in serious crisis. Expected rises in the cost of living are only partially being offset by planned increases in wages, and shortages of all but the most basic consumer items seem likely to continue. This dismal prospect appears to suit Jaruzelski and his Soviet masters very well for the moment. A demoralised population is evidently easier to control politically than one that is not preoccupied with the concerns of daily existence. The days of Gierek's attempts to acquire legitimacy through the 'politics of success' are clearly over: the risk of failure is obviously thought to be too great.

The economic costs of the present strategy are high. Economic efficiency is being sacrificed to the higher imperatives of direct political control. The much publicised economic reform, which Jaruzelski pledged to continue after martial law, has been so bound up by political constraints and conceptual inconsistencies as to have virtually no chance of improving economic performance. And the renewed ideological appeals for greater labour productivity and discipline can hardly be expected to have much of an impact under the present depressed conditions, except, perhaps, to increase popular cynicism, if that is possible.

The regime continues to concentrate primarily on institutional components of normalisation. The trade unions are one major target area. In gross numerical terms the new government-sponsored trade unions have already reached 4.3 million nominal members, almost half the membership of Solidarity at its pre-martial law peak. That is something of an achievement; it is a tribute to the persistency of the regime, if nothing else. However, even these flaccid substitutes for the authentic workers' alliance that was Solidarity have been proving less easy to manipulate than might have been expected, as they insist on badgering the regime for more than lip-service to promises of better working conditions and worker consultation. Obviously the legacy of Solidarity as a model of genuine trade union activity has retained some influence.
The crackdown on intellectuals continues vigorously, if spasmodically. In January 1984 it was extended to the apex of intellectual integrity, the Polish Academy of Sciences, with the removal of its President, Professor Aleksander Gleysztor, an outspoken champion of academic freedom. His successor, Professor Jan Karol Kostrzewski, soon showed himself to be more amenable to government wishes. Still, the special corporate status of the PAS, which has been at least nominally endorsed by the Jaruzelski regime, evidently makes it insufficiently pliable for official purposes, and its responsibility for overall coordination of science policy is to be significantly reduced. Part of its role in this area is to be taken over by a new government agency, the State Committee for Scientific and Technological Progress, which is obviously patterned after the Soviet State Committee for Science and Technology.

Other evidence of this general turn back toward the Soviet Union for economic and political models and material support are a new Polish-Soviet agreement on economic and scientific-technological cooperation signed in May 1984 and Jaruzelski's unusually strong endorsement for the intensification of Bloc integration at the COMECON summit conference in June 1984. Publicly at least, the regime has put an end to assertions of Poland's distinctiveness in the institutions and practices of 'socialist construction'.

How much of this turn toward the East can be genuinely attributed to Western economic sanctions is debatable. The Western, and especially the American, refusal to accede to Polish requests for economic and financial assistance undoubtedly does force the regime to rely more heavily on its Bloc partners. On the other hand, the sanctions are useful to Jaruzelski as a propaganda device for deflecting domestic discontent, for publicly putting Poland on side with Moscow in the current adverse climate of East-West relations, and, perhaps, for squeezing the extra bit of material benefit from an increasingly niggardly Soviet economic partner. Nevertheless, the possibility of a future softening of Western attitudes toward Poland's economic plight probably continues to exert some inhibiting influence on her internal policies. Western public opinion apparently does matter to a certain extent. The repeated postponement of the trial of the eleven leading KOR and Solidarity activists and the subsequent abandonment of the trial after only four days when it finally 'did begin, on the eve of a general amnesty to mark the 40th Anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic in late July, is evidence of this concern for Western opinion. The continuing lip-service paid to economic reforms with an implicitly semi-market orientation and the special status still accorded the Roman Catholic Church can also be looked upon at least partially from this perspective. President Reagan's selective lifting of parts of the US economic boycott in response to the amnesty was certainly not unwelcome - or unexpected - in official Warsaw.

Still, it would be unwise to assign too much importance to this external image factor. There are certainly enough internal problems and constraints to explain most examples of the regime's efforts to appear relatively moderate. Despite frequent expressions of political and ideological bravado by Jaruzelski and his colleagues, they are undoubtedly very sensitive to their lack of legitimacy and credibility among the Polish people. Their delicate handling of church-state relations is a good example of this sensitivity. The
Church under Cardinal Glemp is playing an important, if sometimes uncomfortably ambiguous, mediatory role in the present tension-fraught circumstances. As long as the Church avoids taking too blatantly political positions, there is no point in antagonising by uniformly restrictive measures. By maintaining a dialogue with Church officials, Jaruzelski thus derives a modicum of conciliation of the masses, something which his own party/state agencies are unable to provide; and at the same time he gains a kind of secondhand respectability both at home and abroad. In a similar manner, by permitting a limited amount of public criticism of local practices by selected intellectuals, he conveys an impression of relative liberality.

The overall picture of official policy since martial law is, accordingly, one of striking contradictions, not to say confusion. On the one hand, there is extremely harsh repression of overt dissent, punctuated by violence and the occasional murder of hapless individuals somehow targetted by the police. The object is obviously to terrorise the dissidents and the populace at large. On the other hand, there are repeated appeals for conciliation and hard work in the name of Poland's national honour, often with allusions to the country's precarious geo-political situation - an oblique reference to the bogeyman of Soviet intervention. By such tactics Jaruzelski attempts to portray himself and his regime as the best possible rulers for Poland under the circumstances: that is, as a bulwark against a potentially much worse fate for the nation.

Some commentators in the West consider this contradictory, two-faced pattern of policies as a conscious strategy of the regime, a sophisticated psychological technique for reducing the population to a state of confused submissiveness. That is certainly a possibility, but it may attribute to the regime a greater degree of control over events and more cunning than the evidence seems to warrant. In their official pronouncements on domestic and international affairs regime spokesmen have reverted to the accustomed practice of untruths and half-truths, albeit with more skill and sophistication than in the pre-Solidarity period. The fact that few believe these official distortions and the corrosive effect of the practice on the credibility of the media seems totally immaterial to the current crop of leaders, just as it was to their predecessors. In this respect, too, official Poland has returned to the ranks of the Soviet faithful, for whom conscious disinformation is regarded as a powerful weapon of ideological disorientation and control.

Nevertheless, as recent history has shown repeatedly, Poles are not content to remain passive victims of such techniques for very long. It seems safe to assume that they will eventually express their revulsion again, perhaps after an indefinite period of demoralisation and the 'dirty togetherness' that appears to engulf inter-personal relationships in all Soviet-type systems.

For, as the exiled Czech dissident writer Milan Kundera has suggested, Poland, along with Hungary and Czechoslovakia, is spiritually and culturally an integral part of the West. In religion, in value system, and in national traditions Poland is to a large extent immune to the untruths and ersatz morality of 'real socialism' which has been imposed upon her by brute force from the East. The insidious myth of Slavic 'fraternity' so often manipulated
by Russian rulers of various ideological casts for their own purposes is perhaps attractive to a certain kind of romantic Western intellectual, but it is certainly not accepted by most Poles. Historically, spiritually, and intellectually the Poles have less in common with the Russians than most Western romantics of this persuasion assume. In the end, of course, the overwhelmingly most important factor in keeping Poland within the Soviet orbit is her geographic position. It is a tragedy that the Poles have somehow come to terms with for the past two centuries. But no degree of economic integration, ideological indoctrination, social transformation - or, for that matter, Western indifference - will make Poland morally and culturally part of the East.

General Jaruzelski is certainly well aware of this fact. That he has chosen to further Moscow's interests by imposing the Soviet system on his fellow countrymen while posing as a Polish patriot (albeit of the 'Realist' persuasion) must be a particularly bitter pill for them to swallow. Although personally untainted so far by the corruption of his predecessors, the 'normalised' system of control he is attempting to re-establish ineluctably leads to the corruption of rulers and ruled alike. Polish society has rebelled against such corruption and the senseless inefficiency it engenders in the past. The Solidarity experience demonstrated how quickly the Polish people were able to purge themselves of that corruption and revive the national spirit. Earlier illusions that the system of 'really existing socialism' could reform itself from within are gone forever, making subsequent popular campaigns of spiritual revival that much easier. The ideological component of 'normalisation' will clearly evoke virtually no resonance in the popular consciousness.

Sadly, General Jaruzelski and his cohorts will probably be able to maintain their personal power for some time, but with prospects dim for a real turnaround in economic performance under his graveyard type of normalisation, there is little chance of his obtaining even the 'Kadarist' quasi-legitimacy that he evidently craves. The Solidarity chapter of Polish history is not over by a long shot.
Janusz Bugajski, 'Peoples Councils Election Results', Radio Free Europe Research, Situation Report, Poland, SR/13, 13 July 1984. Underground Solidarity's tallies were consistently 15-20% below the official figures.


See, for example, Casimir Garnysz, 'Polish Stalemate', Problems of Communism, Vol.XXXIII, No.3 (May-June 1984), pp.51-59.

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