Australian Outlook:
A History of the Australian
Institute of International
Affairs

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Institutional histories are apt to be celebratory in style, praising the achievements of the organisation in question, noting the achievements of its office bearers and presenting, primarily for its members, a favourable record of its activities. This one may prove to be no exception, especially as it is written by one who has been for fifty years a member of the institution being studied. The Australian Institute of International Affairs is not a large organisation and, over the sixty-five years that have elapsed since its formation, it has been content to maintain a fairly low profile. To some it has appeared to be essentially a respectable and conservative society, avoiding controversy and engaging in sober and measured consideration of the great forces that have moved nations in our time. The view presented in the following pages is that the Institute has, in fact, been open to a wide diversity of views. (One Minister of External Affairs, after addressing the Victorian Branch during the Vietnam War, and having been subjected to some hostile questioning, was reported to have remarked that the Branch was composed of a bunch of communists!) It has performed a useful role in stimulating discussion of international affairs, in promoting research, in helping to shape unofficial attitudes and, at times, having some influence on the formation of official policy.

In giving an account of these activities, however, the intention has been not simply to write an institutional history in the sense of saying who was President when, but rather to use the subject as a means of examining changes in the way Australians have viewed the world about them over a period. The organisational details must be covered, of course—the way in which the Institute was founded, the development of its central organisation, debates about the way it should govern itself, the relationship of the national body to the branches, the shape of its research and educational programs—but the attempt has been made to combine the treatment of these matters with some consideration of prevailing views, within the organisation and outside it, about foreign policy directions and, more fundamentally, about the attitudes and presuppositions that lay behind them.

The title I have chosen is intended to reflect that aim. It is taken from the name of the journal of the Institute, The Australian Outlook, launched in 1947 and published under that name until 1989 when it became the Australian Journal of International Affairs. As I have suggested below, the original name was a good one in its combination of the idea of Australia observing the world about it with the suggestion that there might possibly be a distinctive Australian view of that world. The following
pages, in a similar way, are concerned in part with conceptual shifts in Australia’s response to the dangers and promises of the outside world. An Australian outlook, if there is one, may be explored at several levels. Some attention is given to issues of policy—to how we have tried to deal with the world about us—but an attempt is made also to consider more deeply rooted perceptions of the general character of international affairs. For the greater part of the period under discussion international relations were seen as relationships between sovereign nation states (noting that nations and states are not necessarily the same thing), some powerful, some weak, some threatening and some to be courted as allies. Within that system, policy, at different times and in varying ways, was concerned with security, balance, containment, to be achieved through agreements, alliances, international organisation as represented in the League of Nations and the United Nations, and was affected by ideological differences, commercial considerations and other factors. In the 1990s, with the final breakdown of a bipolar world, one may sense seismic shifts taking place in the way the world is conceived, changes whose outlines still have to define themselves.

The attempt to strike a middle way between a treatment of institutional detail and broader reflections about policy and perceptions poses considerable difficulties and, at the end, it must be admitted that the consideration of ‘outlook’ attempted here is very much a personal consideration. The issues I have noted as of concern to Australians at different points of the story—during the 1930s, in the postwar Cold War period, during the Australian discovery of Asia—are, necessarily, issues of concern as they have appeared to me. They may fit those of my readers—or they may not. In either case the Australian Institute of International Affairs since its formation has been one forum in which questions of this kind have been explored.

It should be emphasised at the outset that, in at least one respect, this is an incomplete study of the AIIA. The Institute is a federal organisation, founded in 1933 by the agreement of the three existing Australian branches of the Royal Institute of International Affairs formed in London after World War I. A comprehensive history of the Australian Institute would be expected to cover not only the central organisation but also the foundation, development and activities of each of the branches. (These have varied in number from the original three to a total of twelve.) This has not been possible and the focus, after 1933, has been on the national body with the activities of individual branches receiving attention when they throw light on the national picture. (One branch, the NSW Branch, has produced its own history, written by Dr Hazel King and published in 1982 under the title At Mid Century: A Short History of the N.S.W. Branch of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1924–1980. Other branches may be encouraged to follow suit.)

Thanks are due to many people who have helped in the preparation of the present study. Successive Research Chairmen of the Institute, Tony
Milner, Stephen Henningham and John Ravenhill, have been supportive throughout, though the writing has taken a good deal longer than had been anticipated. Thanks are due to the National Headquarters of the Institute, to Lesley Jackman, the last Director and to Bernadette Carmody who has put up cheerfully with many requests for information about particular details and who has helped during periods of work carried out at Stephen House. I am grateful, too, to the staff of the NSW and Victorian Branches. Mrs Marcia Jerath (formerly Ms Marcia Barron), for long the Executive Secretary of the NSW Branch, was able to lay her hands on records dating from the 1920s when that Branch was a Branch of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The staff of the Manuscripts Room of the National Library of Australia have also been most helpful, especially during the period when the Institute’s own records were being transferred to the Library.

I am grateful to the Publications Grants Committee of Monash University for the financial assistance it provided towards the publication. Thanks are also due to the Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, for facilitating the publication of the volume. Special mention should be made of John Ravenhill (head of department), Robin Ward (editor and indexer) and Lynne Payne (preparation of copy).

Others have helped in other ways by drawing on their own memories of various aspects of Institute history. Jim Angel has been of enormous assistance in recalling debates about the constitutional development of the Institute. Bill Hudson put me right on the role of some early members of the Department of External Affairs. Allan Martin discussed with me some of Sir Robert Menzies’ foreign policy excursions. Alan McBriar, Tony Milner, Herbert Feith, David Goldsworthy, David Russell, Reg Stock, Stuart Macintyre, Garry Woodard and Philip McElligott have read and commented on all or part of the text as it has gradually emerged. The usual disclaimer, of course, applies. The responsibility for what has been written is mine. Mention should be made here also of the late Norman Harper, the late Gordon Greenwood, and the late W. Macmahon Ball who were senior figures of the Institute during a good part of my own association with it, and also of the late Tristan Buesst, a member of the Victorian Branch who, in 1960, agreed to begin work on a history of the Institute. Tristan worked through material held by the Royal Institute of International Affairs relating to the formation, and the early years, of the Australian Institute. Though he did not continue with the work his notes eventually passed to the National Library of Australia and have been used in the preparation of the present study.

There is another major debt. Preparing this history would not have been possible for me had it not been for the help given by the former National Secretary and, from 1946 to 1975, Secretary of the Victorian Branch, Miss Nance Dickins. Miss Dickins herself, before her retirement, made a study of Commonwealth Minutes and other records, made notes
on these, and prepared a narrative account of the development of the Institute. I have drawn heavily on her notes and on that draft and have also gained from discussions with her about particular points emerging from my own work. Were it not for her firm resistance to the suggestion this could easily have been a work of joint authorship.

And Jane Drakard bore cheerfully my preoccupation with the work, read and commented frankly on it and, moreover, supplied the computer literacy which I lacked.

John Legge
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Much of the responsibility for the formation of opinion and for the influencing of policy in a democratic society rests with informal bodies of one kind or another, sometimes passionate and propagandist in character, sometimes sober, investigative and argumentative, sometimes overtly political, sometimes formed to lobby for a specific and particular goal, sometimes reflecting a broad moral position with implications for a wide range of issues. The following pages are concerned with the workings of one society active in Australia in the study of international relations and of Australia's position and policies in a changing world. Its activities have been directed in part to providing a forum for the discussion of international affairs by well informed people seeking, perhaps, to influence the shaping of official policy, in part to the promotion of specialist inquiries into aspects of the international scene, and in part to the performance of an educative role by reaching out to a wider public.

The Australian Institute of International Affairs emerged in the years after World War I. It was an outgrowth of the British Institute of International Affairs which was formed in London in 1920 and which obtained a royal charter in 1926 to become the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Australian members of the British body formed branches at first in Sydney and Melbourne, and later in Brisbane, and these eventually came together in 1933 to form the Australian Institute of International Affairs, affiliated to the Royal Institute. The British parentage was important. The period in which the Institute was formed was one in which questions of foreign policy, as far as Australia was concerned, were entirely subordinated to questions about the evolving nature of the imperial relationship. The perspective within which Australian thinking about Australia's place in the world was done was, broadly speaking, an imperial perspective. This focus was to shift over time. An initial concern
with the evolution of dominion status within what was then called the British Commonwealth of Nations changed gradually to a perception of separate national interests and of a practical, as well as a theoretical, independence in matters of foreign as well as domestic policy. The Australian Institute of International Affairs played a not insignificant part in the development of these changing perspectives.

In its origins the Institute comprised a small number of people in Sydney and Melbourne, many of whom already knew each other well and met each other in a variety of different settings. Their ranks included lawyers, businessmen, political leaders, civil servants and academics. Some of them had already taken part in the proceedings of the Round Table, founded in 1909 and well established in Australia and in the other Dominions by the 1920s. The Round Table provided a forum for the discussion of Dominion relationships and of domestic developments within each of the self governing parts of the Empire. Others were active in the League of Nations Union, or in the Australian groups affiliated with the Institute of Pacific Relations, formed in the United States in the 1920s. J.G. (later Sir John) Latham had been an Australian member of the British delegation to the Paris Peace Conference as had F.W. (later Sir Frederic) Eggleston and Robert (later Sir Robert) Garran. These, together with E.C. Dyason, W. (later Sir William) Harrison Moore, Gerald Packer, S.H. (later Sir Stephen) Roberts, Ian (later Sir Ian) Clunies Ross, A.H. Charteris, C.H. Currey, Tristan Buesst, W. (later Sir Walter) Massy-Greene and G.L. Wood, had been members of the Round Table groups in Sydney and Melbourne.

The initial interaction of these people within and outside the framework of the Sydney and Melbourne branches of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and later of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, was a gentlemanly relationship in the tradition, perhaps, of the scholarly amateur. The founders of the groups were, indeed, men, and males remained for a time overwhelmingly in the majority, though they were joined quite early by a number of distinguished women: Dr Georgina Sweet of the Zoology Department and Miss Jessie Webb of the History Department of the University of Melbourne, Miss Persia Campbell, Miss Jessie Webb of the History Department of the University of Melbourne, Miss Persia Campbell,

1 Lord Milner and Lionel Curtis were the leading figures in the foundation of the Round Table. The movement was formed for the purpose of encouraging discussion of the affairs of the British Empire as it then was. Groups in each of the self-governing Dominions met to prepare articles on local developments and on the affairs of the Empire as a whole for publication in the journal of the movement, The Round Table. Initial discussion would be followed by the preparation of a draft article for further discussion by the group. It was the convention that these would not be attributed to any author or authors, but would be presented anonymously. For a full account of the Round Table in Australia, see Leonie Foster, High Hopes: The Men and Motives of the Australian Round Table (Melbourne, 1986). For an account of the Round Table in general, see J. Kendle, The Round Table Movement (Toronto, 1975).
research economist in the New South Wales Bureau of Statistics, Miss Constance Duncan, secretary of the League of Nations Union and others. While some had been associated with the early Fabian Society in Victoria (Latham, Eggleston and Ernest Scott) the outlook of members was broadly liberal or even conservative rather than radical in temper. They represented a measured and, perhaps, 'establishment' approach. But they shared a common interest in the direction of international events and a concern about Australia's isolation and, in the early days of the Institute, one can observe the development of a practice of discussion and inquiry about such matters which, through the links of some participants with government and bureaucracy, could inform official thinking. It is difficult to pin down precisely the extent of that influence, but persons like Latham or Eggleston or Garran were respected public figures whose words carried weight in governmental circles. In a biography of one Institute member, Richard Boyer, Chairman of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and President of the Institute from 1946 to 1948, G.C. Bolton draws attention to the fact that public life in Australia in the 1920s and 1930s 'was on a comparatively small and intimate scale' and comments that, in the area of foreign policy before World War II, 'informed outside opinion was far more influential in advising official policy than it was to become since the professionalization of the Department of External Affairs'. It was indeed so, and it was a two-way process. It was a matter of concern to governments that Australia should have strong representation at conferences of the Institute of Pacific Relations or at British Commonwealth Relations conferences, and support and briefings were given to Institute members for meetings of that kind.

The issues that concerned Institute members were at first, as has been noticed, to do with matters of imperial policy and the place of the Dominions not only in contributing to the development of that policy but, more fundamentally, in determining their independent rights and their obligations within the imperial framework.

The development of what might be called a distinctive and independent Australian approach to the outside world was indeed a very slow growth. The Imperial Act which embodied the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia made specific provision for an external affairs power, to lie in the hands of the federal government, though it was far from clear what that meant. In the circumstances of the time there was no intention of departing from the idea of a single imperial policy and the constitutional provision appeared to do little more than give to the federal government, rather than to the States, the responsibility of maintaining communication with the British Foreign Office and, perhaps, of contribu-

2 See below, chapter 2, for further discussion of the attitudes and views of those associated with the formation of the Institute.
4 ibid. p. 71.
ting to the development of that policy. But there was a continuing concern in the minds of some constitutional theorists about whether, in the end, the existence of such a power could be consistent with the maintenance of the imperial connection. Lord Durham’s distinction between matters of local and those of imperial concern may have served, during the nineteenth century, as a guide in the dilemma posed, on the one hand, by the demands of colonial populations, at least in the so-called ‘colonies of settlement’; for a greater control over their own affairs and, on the other, by the location of sovereignty in the hands of the Crown and Parliament at Westminster; but it offered little help in the early twentieth century in resolving what W.K. Hancock later called the ‘Logic of the Schools’—the doctrine that sovereignty is indivisible and that there could be no halfway house between British imperial sovereignty and complete colonial independence. How could it be possible that a sovereign could be given separate and conflicting advice by separate governments in matters of peace and war? And, constitutional theory aside, in practical terms, if Britain was expected to play a major role in the defence of the Empire and the defence, in particular, of such remote parts as Australia and New Zealand—could she concede with equanimity the possibility of independent acts by the Dominions in the sphere of foreign policy? Was it not at least possible that Dominions might involve the ‘Mother Country’ in conflicts not of her making? And defence could not be a separate responsibility, as Winston Churchill indicated in an oft-quoted speech to the House of Commons on 17 March 1914. ‘If the British Fleet were defeated in the North Sea all the dangers which it now wards off from the Australasian Dominions would be let loose.’ He went on to argue that, while the presence of two or three Australian and New Zealand battleships in the North Sea might turn the scale and ensure victory there, the same two or three ships in Australian waters ‘would be useless the day after the defeat of the British Navy in Home waters’. It followed that colonial navies should be subject to imperial command. And if defence were an imperial responsibility it seemed obvious that the formulation of foreign policy must be so too.

As Hancock pointed out, in what is still the best brief discussion of the constitutional, legal and theoretical issues involved in the evolution of dominion status, these dilemmas were resolved more or less easily in

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5 The distinction between colonies of settlement and other dependencies carried over into the twentieth century when a conventional distinction was made between Empire and Commonwealth, between self-governing dominions and dependencies still under the control of the Colonial Office. But it was only a conventional distinction and even in the early years after World War I it carried the possibility that dependencies might evolve, over time, into self-governing dominions. The reality, in many cases, was to prove not unlike that.


practice. Dominion independence did not necessarily mean separation and the disintegration of the imperial relationship. While self-governing dominions claimed, within the British Commonwealth, a separate responsibility for defence plans, commercial policy and, eventually, the maintenance of diplomatic relationships, in practice that independence was tempered by the existence of a common concern; and imperial and dominion statesmen were happy enough, in the interests of a working reality, to ignore the dilemmas of constitutional theory and to avoid precise definitions of changing constitutional relationships. The attempt of the 1926 Imperial Conference to define the status of the several parts of the British Commonwealth was as close to a working description as could be achieved:

They are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

It was no doubt by intention that this declaration lacked precision. It left constitutional theory to wait upon evolving practice. Hudson and North strike the right note:

Constitutional historians still dispute just how it happened, but sometime between 1919 and 1945 Australia's status altered radically. This change occurred not because of any formal or sudden declaration, but piecemeal, irregularly and informally as part of changing patterns in the structure and relationships of the British Empire.

As far as Australia was concerned, her claim to an independent view was asserted more vigorously at some times than at others and, as Poynter argues, Australia's independence in foreign policy had a long gestation before World War II. But for the most part, those who feared the consequences of complete dominion self government, in the area of foreign policy as in other matters, need not have worried. Though sometimes alarmed at the direction of events in the world at large, and always worried by Australian isolation, Australian governments, for forty years after federation, emphasised the common concern of the dominions as members of the imperial family rather than the separate responsibility of

each. In the nineteenth century, fears of German or Russian interests in New Guinea, or of the consequences of British and Australian settlement in Fiji, had given rise to criticism of Britain’s tardiness in acting to safeguard Australian interests and, in the case of New Guinea, had prompted a Queensland Premier, Sir Thomas McIlwraith, to annex southeastern New Guinea. McIlwraith was acting beyond his powers, and the annexation was repudiated by Britain; but this dramatic intervention did lead Britain in due course to establish a British protectorate over southeastern New Guinea, and, four years later, to annex it. But, that incident aside, there was no question but that these were matters for Britain to decide, though it was hoped that decisions would be taken, in practice, in consultation with the Australian Colonies.

On the eve of federation Australian governments accepted British policy in South Africa—and the resulting Boer War—as imperial policy and, in spite of some principled ‘pro-Boer’ opposition to the war, as well as a suspicion in some quarters of the idea of Australian involvement in other people’s conflicts, the Colonies rallied patriotically to the cause and despatched significant military forces to serve as part of the imperial command in South Africa. And after federation there was no great change in Australia’s preparedness to accept British leadership in the international sphere, and no question but that Australia would come to the aid of the Empire in times of conflict. The idea that Australia ‘came of age’, or became a nation at Gallipoli was to have lasting currency, but being a nation and being simultaneously an integral part of the Empire were not regarded as inconsistent. Mr Hughes may have been a prickly and argumentative customer at the Peace Conference, but he was a loyal supporter of an imperial policy in the Chanak crisis of 1922, though protesting about the lack of prior consultation. And his successors were more ready to accept the idea of a common imperial cause than were politicians in Canada or South Africa.

It is difficult, fifty years after World War II, to recapture the unquestioning nature of that acceptance, and its continuance through the 1920s and 1930s, and the sentimental attachment to Britain which underpinned it. One should not, of course, overstate the homogeneity of the Australian community and its shared outlook. The official claim to be ‘98% British’ was a gross exaggeration. This figure, given in the Year Book of the Commonwealth, comprised those born in Britain or Australia and ignored the fact that the latter category included people of other than British

11 J.D. Legge, Australian Colonial Policy (Sydney, 1956) chapters 2 and 3.
12 For one example of principled opposition to the Boer War see R.M. Crawford, ‘A Bit of a Rebel’: The Life and Work of George Arnold Wood (Sydney, 1975) chapters 10–13. Wood, Professor of History in the University of Sydney, was censured by the Senate of the University for a public criticism of the war of a kind which would appear quite unexceptionable to a later generation. Compare, for example, academic criticisms of British actions in the Suez crisis of 1956 or of Australian involvement in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s.
The Germans of South Australia, for example, had their own homeland and their own sentimental attachments. And amongst those defined as of British origin there were important differences of outlook. The substantial Irish component in the Australian population, in particular, had no great love for an English homeland. At the political level, in the Australian Labor Party, in part reflecting Irish and Catholic feeling, there was some preparedness to question, on occasion, the British connection. But in 1914 it was a Labor leader who pledged Australian assistance to Britain 'to our last man and our last shilling'. From a quite different direction, the influence of the newly formed Communist Party of Australia won some Labor support in the 1920s for the idea that Britain's wars were imperialist wars; but the Communist Party remained representative of only a small minority opinion within a predominantly conservative Labor movement, and the parliamentary Labor Party, in spite of the socialist objective, adopted as part of its platform in 1921, was a reformist and nationalist party with an eye on electoral realities rather than on radical doctrine.

It is possible, then, to speak of a dominant imperial sentiment. Despite the vigour of some expressions of Australian nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for example in J.F. Archibald's *Bulletin* or in the bush legend or in the idealism of William Lane's belief in the possibility of a new society in Australia, freed from the oppression and outmoded conventions of the old world, Britain continued to be 'the mother country' or 'the old country' and even in the 1930s many Australian born, making their first overseas journey, could still refer to themselves as making a trip 'home'. They travelled, of course, by sea—by P&O or Orient Lines, whose very names conjured up an idea of the 'East' lying at the end of extended British trade routes. Their first glimpse of the outside world was at Colombo, seen first from the deck of the ship and then at closer quarters as they passed through on a day trip to Kandy. They may have recalled half-remembered fragments of Kipling as the ship passed the island of Socotra and Cape Gardafui on its way to Aden. They went ashore again at Port Said and maybe also at Gibraltar. In general the journey conveyed a sense of an established order of commerce and power.

14 Note also J.D. Rickard's point that the ethnic divisions within Britain—English, Scottish, Welsh as well as Irish—all contributed to colonial society, but were not reproduced there as territorially separate. The result was 'a kind of “British” amalgam which did not exist in Britain itself'. J.D. Rickard, *Australia: A Cultural History* (Melbourne, 1988) p. 37.
Australian schoolchildren continued to salute the flag—the Union Jack—on Monday mornings, placing their right hands on their left breasts and repeating after the teacher, 'I love God and my country, I honour the flag and will cheerfully obey my parents, teachers and the laws'. There followed three cheers for the King, three cheers for the Commonwealth [of Australia] and three cheers for the Empire. During the great depression the idea of imperial preference, expressed in the Ottawa Agreements of 1932, seemed a natural remedy and in 1936 a similar view led Australia to discriminate against Japanese trade in the disastrous (for Australia) Trade Diversion Policy. The main news in the Australian press was British and European news. Australian perceptions of the world, conditioned by the maps which hung on schoolroom walls, were firmly focused on the 0 meridian and on Britain as the centre, with the Empire coloured in red, Europe to the right of Britain, America across the Atlantic Ocean to the left, and Australia and New Zealand at the bottom right hand corner—on the edge of the world.

For the times this was not, after all, so inaccurate a picture. Sentiment aside, matters which determined peace or war for Australia really were, indeed, European issues: the rise of Mussolini, Germany's remilitarisation of the Rhineland, Italy's Abyssinian adventure, the Spanish Civil War which, it will be argued below, was of considerable importance in crystallising opposing Australian perceptions of the trend of international events. Germany's Anschluss with Austria and, as the 1930s moved to their conclusion, the problem of the Sudeten Germans, the Munich negotiations and, in March 1939, the occupation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia. There seemed, over these years of growing European crisis, to be less reason to be aware of events nearer home. Since the nineteenth century there had been a real sense of Australian isolation, a diffused fear of political threat from the densely populated regions to the north and, in the twentieth century, a more specific concern about the strength of industrial Japan. For the rest, the countries of the western Pacific posed no threat to stability, being either safely under the colonial rule of one of the European powers or, like China, weak and divided.

Japan remained, of course, the exception. Her invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the development of an extreme nationalism illustrated in the assassination incidents of the 1930s and, in 1937, the invasion of China, showed that there were indeed dangers to the north. The dangers were recognised. At an unofficial level, the wharf labourers of Port Kembla refused in 1938 to load pig iron destined for Japan. Before then, at the official level, the Australian Government in 1935 took modest steps, under the cover of its Trade Commissioner service, to establish its own

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17 This was the formula used in Victorian schools.
18 It also attracted a number of Australian volunteers for service in the International Brigade. See Amirah Inglis, *Australians in the Spanish Civil War* (Sydney, 1987).
listening posts in Asia. An officer of considerable intelligence experience was appointed as Trade Commissioner in Tokyo in that year, and similar appointments were made to the Netherlands East Indies and to China. The main function of these officers, it would now seem, was to collect information about political and strategic matters, especially in relation to Japan's intentions, rather than about commercial matters. But, in spite of this awareness, the European crisis posed the immediate threat to Australian security and, for the rest, Britain's naval base at Singapore was regarded as the key to the defence of Australia and New Zealand against dangers from within the region.

Given these basic assumptions underlying Australian attitudes, it was not surprising that Australia should have been slow in developing a greater measure of independence in the formulation of a distinctive foreign policy or even in developing the machinery which might handle it. Though a Department of External Affairs was formed after federation it was not in any real sense a Foreign Office. Its functions were largely administrative, dealing with immigration matters and with the administration of the Northern Territory, Papua and Norfolk Island. The Department was abolished in 1916, re-established in 1921, and then reorganised in 1924 as a branch of the Prime Minister's Department. It was a tiny unit with a clerical staff of three in 1924. Its activities were confined largely to maintaining liaison with the British Foreign Office through a liaison officer in London, responsible to the Prime Minister. (For a time [1924-31] the position of liaison officer was occupied by the young R.G.[later Lord] Casey. Though formally attached to the High Commission, Casey managed to secure an office for himself in the Cabinet Secretariat, from which he was able to develop his own contacts and to maintain a considerable degree of independence. By arrangement with the Prime Minister, S.M. Bruce, he reported directly to him.) A separate Department of External Affairs was not reconstituted until 1935. Sir Paul Hasluck later recalled that when he joined the Department in 1941 it occupied only about ten rooms on the first floor of West Block, one of two administrative buildings close to Parliament House. Some graduates were recruited to staff its senior levels, but it was not until 1943 that steps were taken to establish a systematic scheme of graduate recruitment for a diplomatic service. After a two year training course provided, from

20 See, for example, Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, chapters 1 and 2.
21 For a summary of these changes, see Hudson and North (eds), My Dear PM, introduction.
22 See ibid. for the personal correspondence between Casey and Bruce during those years. Also see W.J. Hudson, Casey (Melbourne, 1986).
23 Paul Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness: Australian Foreign Policy, 1941–47 (Melbourne, 1980) p. 3.
24 See Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, pp. 104 ff.
1944, by the Canberra University College as it then was, the 'diplomatic cadets' entered the Department to become the core of the greatly expanded professional staff of the postwar years.

Australia had no separate diplomatic representation until 1940 when legations were opened in Washington and Tokyo, and a High Commission in Ottawa. (R.G. Casey was appointed as Minister to Washington, Sir John Latham to Tokyo and Sir William Glasgow to Ottawa. A China post followed in 1941 when Sir Frederic Eggleston became Minister to Chungking.) Before then, apart from the separate appointment of a few trade representatives, Australia relied on the British Foreign Office and the British diplomatic service. As far as the substance of policy is concerned, as distinct from the responsibility for making it, though some voices were raised in criticism of Britain's appeasement of the European dictators, neither party in Parliament was prepared to challenge the agreement reached at Munich. The definition of an imperial policy in the last fateful years of the 1930s was the responsibility of Britain and the policies so developed were accepted without too much question. It was significant that, on 3 September 1939, R.G. Menzies, as Australia's Prime Minister, announced to the nation that Britain was at war and that 'as a result' Australia was also at war.

Nevertheless, while Australia viewed the world from within an imperial framework there was continuing and detailed discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of Dominion self government. There was at least some difference of opinion on these issues and a questioning of the whole possibility of a continuing imperial policy. 26 A growing awareness of changing commercial relations in the western Pacific and recognition of the significance for Australia's future of the region of which she was a part may be discerned in the public discussions of the period. The Institute of International Affairs, through its branch meetings,

25 The text of the Prime Minister's broadcast can be found in Department of Foreign Affairs, *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, 1937-1949*, Vol. II, 1939 (Canberra, 1976) p. 221. The constitutional position he adopted was not challenged in Parliament. Speaking on 6 September in the House of Representatives, Mr Curtin announced that the Labor Party stood 'for the maintenance of Australia as an integral part of the British Commonwealth of Nations' and would do its utmost 'to maintain the integrity of the British Commonwealth'. Commonwealth of Australia, *Parliamentary Debates*, vol. 161, p. 37.

26 One student of Australia's attitudes, A.W. Stargardt, has interpreted differing opinions during this period in terms of a debate between conservatives and radicals, the former sheltering behind the Royal Navy and the latter displaying a more 'australocentric' attitude. The divisions within the Australian community to which attention has already been drawn give some point to this judgement but it may be an exaggeration to describe the differences, at least before 1931, as a 'debate'. A.W. Stargardt, *Australia's Asian Policies: The History of a Debate, 1839-1972* (Hamburg, 1977) pp. 111-22.
conferences, research activities and publications, played a part in those discussions. It was an active participant in the international conferences of the Institute of Pacific Relations and in the British Commonwealth Relations Conferences of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Its Austral-Asiatic Bulletin, launched in 1937, was a substantial periodical. Appearing every two months, its object was to stimulate Australian awareness of its immediate environment. In these ways the Institute helped to prepare the climate of opinion in which future departures in foreign policy would be considered.

A survey of these contributions will be given in more detail in the chapters which follow. The point here, however, is that, for all these signs of a changing outlook, informed discussion was set within the broad context of membership of the British Commonwealth, with the sentiment and loyalty which that involved.

World War II destroyed the order of power on which these perceptions had been based. In Europe the defeat of Germany and Italy, the emergence of America as the leader of the western world, the end of the Grand Coalition which had defeated the Axis powers, the coming down of the Iron Curtain and the beginning of the Cold War, created a setting in which the British Commonwealth, even if it were to survive, could no longer be as relevant either to the world at large or even to its individual members as had been the case in the past. These developments were matched by equally dramatic changes in the western Pacific. Civil war in China led, in 1949, to the victory of the Chinese Communist Party and the establishment of the People's Republic of China. In Southeast Asia, Japanese occupation had destroyed the structures of colonial rule and, after Japan's defeat, nationalist resistance prevented the simple restoration of the empires of Britain, France and the Netherlands. Britain was able to take up the reins of government in Malaya and Singapore for a decade, but not in Burma, and within two years was to negotiate her withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent. The Netherlands, after four years of negotiation and struggle, agreed to transfer sovereignty to an independent Indonesia. And France's return to Indochina was followed by a continuing struggle which, in due course, was to become entangled with other issues and to draw in other powers.

Australia had somehow to adjust to the turbulent world at her doorstep as well as to the changed distribution of power in the world at large. Amongst other things, the Cold War framework of the postwar situation gave international affairs a much fiercer ideological dimension than had been the case before.

Changing perceptions

Australia's adjustment had, of course, begun during the war itself. After the fall of Pearl Harbour and the initial Japanese advances in the Pacific,
Mr Curtin's appeal to the United States in December 1941, appeared to mark a sharp change in traditional attitudes. 'Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.' It has been pointed out by Curtin's biographer, Lloyd Ross, that these remarks occurred as part of an article intended, not as an appeal to the United States, but as a call for greater effort and self-sacrifice from the Australian people. Their effect, in symbolic terms, was nevertheless much more dramatic than that would suggest. Indeed the wording itself—the idea of looking to the United States, and doing so without pangs as to our traditional links—conveys a much more deliberate message than Ross suggests; and the article appears to have caused some discomfort in Washington. The incident was followed by the somewhat acrimonious exchanges between Curtin and Churchill over the disposition of the Australian divisions recalled from the Middle East, and by continuing Australian demands for closer consultation and for representation in the higher councils of war. The abrasive, and indeed aggressive, style of Australia's Minister for External Affairs, Dr H.V. Evatt, was itself reflective of a determination to maintain in the future a new independence in the formulation of a distinctively Australian foreign policy. In 1942, the Statute of Westminster Adoption Act was a symbolic expression of his insistence on that independence. The Statute of Westminster had been enacted by the Imperial Parliament in 1931 to remove the application to the Dominions of the Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865 and to provide that Dominion legislation would not be invalidated by future legislation of the United Kingdom. The Statute had thus, in effect, already given full legislative independence to Dominion parliaments. It is significant that Australia did not choose to adopt it until ten years later. There had been some controversy in Australia about the Statute at the time of its enactment. Latham, as Leader of the Opposition, had opposed its adoption by Australia, arguing that it would attempt to give legal definition to a relationship that was best left 'loose and elastic', and that allowed things to be determined by commonsense as particular issues arose. We are asked, he said, 'to express in a rigid legal formula what is perfectly well understood as a practical, political convention, a convention which causes no difficulty or trouble in working'. He added that his own preference was 'very much to leave things as they are'. But it was possible for Evatt to


28 For President Roosevelt's reaction see Hudson, *Casey*, pp. 134–5.

29 For a brief account see Millar, *Australia in Peace and War*, pp. 149–50.

argue, in 1942, that in fact Australia’s Adoption Act made no change to existing realities. The changes adopted had already been granted.

Australian demands for an independent voice were displayed in a variety of ways. In particular, Evatt, supported by a strong Australian delegation (including Sir Frederic Eggleston and W. Macmahon Ball) made Australia’s voice heard at the San Francisco Conference of 1945, at which the preliminary steps were taken to create the United Nations. Australia was present on this occasion in her own right, as an independent sovereign state and not as part of a Commonwealth—or British Empire—delegation as had been the case with Hughes at Paris in 1919. Évatt’s energy, intellectual power and general aggressiveness gave him considerable visibility and enabled him to claim some sort of ‘middle power’ leadership.

Before then, and in anticipation of the ultimate Allied victory, Evatt had begun to develop the principles which he saw as likely to be appropriate for Australia in the postwar world. There was, first of all, a commitment to the idea of an international organisation to replace the League of Nations. ‘First of all’ because the idea of an independent foreign policy pursued within that sort of international framework reduced the sense of Australian dependence on one or more major protectors. The reality, of course, was that prewar dependence on Britain was to be replaced by a dependence on American power and, in consequence, on a broad acceptance of American leadership in the definition of policy. De facto recognition of that leadership was a second principle of Australia’s future—and bipartisan—approach to the world, later to be expressed in Menzies’ occasional reference to ‘our great and powerful friends’ across the Pacific and, more breezily, in Harold Holt’s off-the-cuff ‘All the way with LBJ’ in 1966 and, in formal terms, in the Australia–New Zealand–United States Agreement of 1951. As a third principle there remained membership of the British Commonwealth or, as it was to become, the Commonwealth of Nations. This was no longer so complete or so important as in the past. The ANZUS Treaty was itself a sign of the change. In symbolic terms ANZUS was not merely an affirmation of the new Australia–US relationship. It was also a sign of the new separateness from Britain, and in the early 1950s there was some resentment in London at the exclusion of Britain from the arrangement. But the special British

31 When precisely did Australia become independent? For a lively discussion of the question see W.J. Hudson and M. Sharp, Australian Independence: Colony to Reluctant Kingdom (Melbourne, 1988). The answer given by the two authors is 1931, when Britain conceded legislative independence, not 1942 when Australia incorporated that concession into its own legislation.


33 W.J. Hudson, Australia and the New World Order: Evatt at San Francisco, 1945 (Canberra, 1993).

34 Hudson, Casey, pp. 248–9.
connection remained, nevertheless. Evatt, in speaking during the war of the new courses that Australia intended to pursue in the changed circumstances of the postwar world, was careful to deny that closer ties with the United States would in any way reduce the intimacy of relations with Britain. References to the need for independent action, for 'a positive Australianism' and for close links with the United States were balanced by statements about the continuing importance of the Commonwealth, about our 'strong ties of loyalty with the Throne and the affection that unites us with our British kin'. His remarks on occasion could be as fulsome as those of the most imperially minded statesmen of the past. 'The real tie is the tie of brotherhood and kinship, which transcends all material links and baffles definition.' That said, of course, it was on with the business of charting an independent course, though it was true that some of Australia's postwar initiatives—the Colombo Plan, for instance—were made within a Commonwealth framework.

Finally, the Evatt approach stressed the principle of regionalism, which he saw as sitting neatly within the framework of a future international organisation. A constant theme was that:

...because of our special geographical position and our growing responsibility and power, we can and should make a very special contribution towards the establishment and maintenance of the peace settlement in Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

The Australia–New Zealand Agreement of 1944 represented a preliminary attempt to create arrangements for future regional cooperation, speaking of a regional zone of defence within the framework of a general system of world security. This principle was not implemented in as specific a way as Evatt evidently intended. The ANZAC Pact, as it was called, was less concerned to embody actual agreements on specific points than to define broad goals of policy in such areas as civil aviation, the administration of dependent territories in the Pacific and the establishment of machinery for collaboration in the region, later to be achieved in the South Pacific Commission. But Australia's concern with the affairs of the region, and participation in those affairs, was expressed over the years in a variety of ways: in the fluctuating relationships with the independent Republic of Indonesia, in its adherence to the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty and its participation in the Southeast Asia Treaty

37 H.V. Evatt, article in *The Times* (30 May 1943) in Evatt, *Foreign Policy of Australia*, p. 126.
39 Clause 13.
Organisation (SEATO), in its contribution to the resolution of the Malayan Emergency and later, more dramatically, in its involvement in the Vietnam war.

In this setting the Australian Institute of International Affairs continued to play its part, sponsoring, through the work of its Research Committee, a variety of inquiries into the changing circumstances of the postwar world, making them available through its publications program and, of course, through its branch meetings, special lecture programs and occasional conferences, reaching out to a wider public. After the war, the strengthening of its federal organisation, the creation of a central secretariat and the appointment, with the aid of a grant from the Ford Foundation, of a national Director in July 1963, brought more coordination to the work of the Institute than had been possible before. The particular contributions in these several areas will be examined in their place. At a general level, several introductory comments may be made.

A number of factors combined to change the character of the contribution that a body of this kind could make. An expanded membership was, in itself, a significant development. With branches in Sydney, Melbourne, Canberra, Adelaide, Brisbane, Perth and Hobart totalling approximately 1500 members in the mid 1950s, and with the establishment of smaller 'provincial' branches in Townsville, Armidale and elsewhere, the Institute could no longer be as compact and intimate in its relationships as before. Its academic links were, perhaps, stronger than in the past. Though there had been some academic study of international affairs before the war (Macmahon Ball, for example, had given such a course at the University of Melbourne during the 1930s) the postwar expansion of International Relations as an academic discipline affected the intellectual framework within which the Institute's enquiries were carried out. The political reflections of a Frederic Eggleston, magisterial in flavour though they were, were different in character from the more professional works of T.B. Millar, J.D.B. Miller or Hedley Bull. And the growth of the Department of External Affairs (later Foreign Affairs, and then Foreign Affairs and Trade) quickly provided a professional base for the practice of Australian diplomacy and for the development of official thinking about Australia, its region and the world. Contacts between Institute members and the Department continued and, on occasion, Government found it convenient to call on the services of non-career people, some of whom were Institute members, for diplomatic tasks. The appointments of Casey to Washington, Latham to Tokyo and Eggleston to Chungking have already been mentioned. K.H. Bailey was a member of the Australian delegation to the San Francisco Conference in 1945. Macmahon Ball led an Australian mission to the Netherlands East Indies in November 1945, at the very beginning of Indonesia's struggle for independence and another in May 1948, on the eve of the second Dutch
'Police Action'. And from 1946 to 1947, Ball served as the British Commonwealth representative on the Allied Control Council in Japan. Sir Owen Dixon succeeded Casey in Washington in 1942 and in 1949 he was accepted by India and Pakistan as the United Nations mediator in the Kashmir dispute. Sir Douglas Copland was Minister to China in 1946–48 and High Commissioner in Canada in 1953–56. But the influence of leading Institute figures in parliamentary and official circles was no longer quite as personal as had been the case when the official world was smaller, more amateur and perhaps cosier.

One could also speak, in broad terms, of shifts in the presuppositions underlying Institute perceptions of the world. There was no 'Institute view' as such and the Institute was prevented by its rules from expressing views on matters of substance relating to any aspect of international affairs. But certain common assumptions could be detected. In place of the Eurocentrism of the 1920s and 1930s, Australian observers shared with their American and European counterparts a bipolar view of the globe. Korea, and later Vietnam, made it inevitable that much of the study of international affairs should be conducted within that sort of ideological framework. In due course this framework gave way to notions of a multi-centred world in which western Europe, China (after the Sino–Soviet split of the early 1960s) and Japan, not to mention Third World, and North–South, groupings, tempered the sharpness of the East–West opposition. But for Australian students of foreign policy there was a particular sense of region, and of the present and future importance of eastern and southeastern Asia, which formed a major part of the focus of the conference work and the research programs of the Institute and which found expression in such typical titles of Institute publications as *China and the World Community, Asia and the Western Pacific, Malaysia and Singapore, Vietnam*. There was also an economic basis for this shift of perception. There had, of course, been some commercial contacts before the war, but the postwar years saw these expand rapidly.

The Institute's development of a focus on Asia was no more than a continuation of the trends of prewar Institute thinking but, after 1945, it was to be placed in a much broader context. The rapid expansion of Asian studies at undergraduate and graduate levels in Australian universities, which gradually came to provide a reservoir of knowledge about the immediate environment, was part of a general growth of interest in the western Pacific in the western world as a whole—in the graduate schools and area studies centres in American, Canadian, British and European

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41 For one account of these changing perceptions, see David Walker, 'Cultural Change and the Response to Asia: 1945 to the Present', in Mark McGillivray and Gary Smith (eds), *Australia and Asia* (Melbourne, 1997) chapter 2.
universities. This postwar expansion—one might say explosion—of Asian studies was a natural development in the circumstances of the postwar world, and it differed in character from the way in which western scholars had approached the study of Asian societies in the past. At the cost of some over-simplification it can be said that, whereas traditional oriental scholarship had focused either on the classical civilisations of the past, or on the actions, goals and policies of the European powers in Asia in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the new western students of Asia were concerned, in the main, with the immediate circumstances of the present. Driven by issues of global policy, they were concerned to understand, and so, perhaps, to manage, a new, turbulent and apparently dangerous world, to come to grips with colonial nationalisms and struggles for independence, with conflicts of ideology, with problems of political order and stability, and with economic growth. For these purposes they brought to bear on the study of the contemporary scene the tools of the developing social sciences—politics, anthropology and sociology, economics—rather than those of language, literature and philosophy.42

What must be emphasised here is that these new students of Asia tackled their task in the first decades after the war in a confident, and possibly patronising, way. It was assumed that, given an appropriate commitment to the task, there would be no particular difficulty in unlocking the secrets of other societies. What was called for was straightforward analysis of observable realities—the emergence of new political forces, of new nationalisms perceived as an entirely natural response to the western imperialism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, of changing status systems, of problems of transforming traditional economic patterns. There was, that is to say, a fairly easy assumption that western inquiry could identify and solve the problems of the Third World and an insufficient appreciation of the special difficulties involved in cross cultural analysis. In due course a later generation of students would become a little more alive to the problems of understanding the ‘other’, more sensitive to the way in which the cultural presuppositions of the observer inevitably affected what was observed and more aware of the difficulty of grasping the meanings, codes and sign systems of other societies.43

42 For further treatment of the changes in postwar approaches to Asian studies, see J.D. Legge, 'Asian Studies: from Reconstruction to Deconstruction', in Australian Perceptions of Asia, Australian Cultural History, no. 9 (1990), and 'The Writing of Southeast Asian History', in N. Tarling (ed.), The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, Vol. I, chapter 1 (Cambridge, 1991). A different view of postwar Australian scholarship is given by Rex Mortimer, 'From Ball to Arndt', in Mortimer (ed.), Showcase State: The Illusion of Indonesia's Accelerated Modernisation' (Sydney, 1973).

43 For a treatment of the cultural dimensions of Australian and Asian perceptions of each other, see Anthony Milner and Mary Quilty (eds), Australia in Asia: Comparing Cultures and Australia in Asia: Communities of Thought (Melbourne, 1996). The papers in these volumes were produced by the
The Institute, in its focus on the countries and the political problems of the western Pacific, was no more sensitive to these matters than the general body of western students of Asia. Its members moved in the same intellectual climate and shared with them, in the 1950s and 1960s, a common set of presuppositions about the nature of political alignments, shifting power balances and the forces which shaped the politics of the new states. And, as will be seen, its research programs, publications, conferences and general meetings contributed to the continuing debate on these questions.

This did not mean that there was agreement, either within the Institute or outside it, about the directions policy should follow at any one time. There were many differences—in the aims of Government, in the professional views of the growing Department of External Affairs, in academic circles, within the Institute and in the community at large. How, for example, should Australia respond to the problems posed by the Indonesian struggle for independence from the Dutch? Its referral of the first Dutch ‘Police Action’ to the Security Council in 1947 and its subsequent participation in the work of the UN Good Offices Committee and the United Nations Commission for Indonesia left it still with such questions as whether to hope for a negotiated solution with some concession of autonomy to the Republic of Indonesia or to the constituent states proposed by the Dutch as part of a United States of Indonesia or to expect, and to press for, independence. There were different views within Government on that question and, after the transfer of sovereignty by the Dutch in 1949, there emerged further differences about our dealings with the new Republic. While there were considerable elements of continuity in policy after the change of Government in Canberra in 1949, there were also differences.44 The Colombo Conference saw a new Minister for External Affairs, P.C. Spender, sponsoring what became the Colombo Plan of which Indonesia was to be a beneficiary. At the same time the question of West New Guinea emerged as a continuing issue in Australia—Indonesia relations. The Chifley Government before its defeat had supported the compromise whereby the question of West New Guinea was deferred pending further negotiation between Indonesia and the Netherlands. As Prime Minister, R.G. Menzies was even more strongly committed to the support of the Dutch presence in that last remaining portion of her Netherlands Indian empire until the resolution of the question in 1962. In the 1950s, Australia observed with concern the

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instability of successive Indonesian governments and the signs of regional separatism and, in the 1960s, was alarmed by the apparent increase in the power of the Indonesian Communist Party and by the adventurist character of Indonesian foreign policy as exemplified in the confrontation of Malaysia. The domestic and foreign policies of President Suharto’s New Order were more comfortable to live with but, especially after the incorporation of East Timor in 1975, human rights issues remained a troubling element. Nevertheless, despite the fluctuations in attitude, Indonesia’s importance and proximity made the maintenance of good relations a continuing imperative of Australian foreign policy whatever government was in power, reaching something of a climax, perhaps, in the personal rapport established between President Suharto and Prime Minister Paul Keating, in the obviously easy relationships between the two Foreign Ministers, Ali Alatas and Gareth Evans, and in the negotiation of a security agreement between the two countries in 1996.45 After the fall of Suharto in May 1998 Keating’s successor, John Howard, was concerned to maintain close ties with the new government of President Habibie. And with Indonesia’s shift of position on the future of East Timor, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer has sought to contribute positively to the resolution of that question.

Indonesia was only one example of issues to which Australian governments had to adjust in the postwar situation. While there was agreement about supporting Security Council action in Korea, the development of the Vietnam conflict was the subject of much sharper division—ideological but also pragmatic—within the Australian community. At a more general level, it might be said that the Liberal Government after 1949 displayed a style of conservative realism, placing much less emphasis on the United Nations than did its Labor predecessor and more on ties with the United States, and seeing Australia’s security situation in terms of forward defence. Foreign policy was shaped to a considerable extent by perceptions of security requirements.

It is worth noticing differences within Government during the period of Casey’s tenure of the External Affairs portfolio between 1951 and 1960. Casey was the first Australian foreign minister with a clear and direct interest in Asia arising, in part perhaps, from his service as Minister to the United States where he was in a position to observe the balance of America’s global interests, in part from his Governorship of Bengal, but more directly from his perception of the importance to Australia of East, Southeast and South Asia in the postwar world. It is surprising that at Cabinet level he should have found few to share his judgement of that importance. Chifley in the 1940s had at least had a sense of the significance of Asian nationalism linked of course to a socialist’s proper anti-imperialism. Evatt, too, had been alert to changes in the world balance of

power. But in the 1950s, when the shape of that newly emerging world was clearer, Casey's colleagues were slow to appreciate the practical implications of the change. In particular, he stood in sharp contrast to the Prime Minister who could not escape his sense of being 'British to the bootstraps' and his general nostalgia for a greater British past and for the ambience of cricket in the 'afternoon light'; and all this at a time when Britain had largely lost interest in the Commonwealth as a functioning group of independent states held together by a common experience. Certainly in 1952 Menzies, after initial hesitation, was himself prepared to resist Britain's desire to be formally involved in the ANZUS treaty arrangements. He saw clearly enough that it was more important at that point to fit in with the desire of the United States to limit participation. But he quite missed the realities of Suez, believed that Nasser could easily be dealt with and did not make so much as a passing visit to Indonesia until 1959—and then only under pressure from his Minister for External Affairs.

Casey's contribution was important. It must be added that his perceptions of Asia were comparatively uncomplicated and straightforward. New nations, new forces, new balances, presented technical problems to be handled. There was not much sense of the complexities of cultural difference. But he showed a willingness to accept the changing shape of world order and to deal with the new Asia on its own terms. Sir Garfield Barwick did much the same, in the early 1960s, at the time of the settlement of the West New Guinea dispute and in the difficult circumstances of Indonesia's confrontation of Malaysia. Even before his appointment as Minister for External Affairs, Barwick had adopted a pragmatic approach to the West Irian question, expressing in Cabinet the view that 'it would be foolish to support Dutch colonialism there', and the same detachment marked his official handling of the issue two years later. He was ready to understand the Indonesian position on the question and he persuaded his colleagues to withdraw support for the Dutch and to accept a transfer of the territory to Indonesia if it could be negotiated between the two parties. A similar temper was apparent when Indonesia declared its opposition to the formation of Malaysia. Here were problems to be solved with a careful and proper appreciation of the sensitivities of both sides, with a concern that Australia's role should be seen as independent and not as part of Britain's support of Malaysia and with a recognition of the fact that, because of its proximity and importance, good relations with Indonesia were of paramount importance to Australia.

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46 See Chauvel, 'Nearly a Full Circle', for a comment on Casey's influence, or lack of it, within Cabinet.
Nevertheless, given the general Cold War setting of the time, it was inevitable that the foreign policy debate should acquire ideological overtones. The victory of the Chinese Communist Party, the Korean war, the idea of containing communism in east Asia as elsewhere, the complexity of the issues involved in Vietnam, combined to convey a sense of opposing sides locked in global conflict and, over a period, gave a sharpness to discussions of international policies and helped to create profound divisions within western societies. This was especially so in Australia after the commitment to South Vietnam. Was American action in Vietnam to be seen as a defence of South Vietnam against invasion by a communist aggressor? Was it, indeed, to be interpreted as action taken in defence of the free world? Or was it a matter of supporting one side against another in what should really be viewed as a civil war? Would a northern victory lead to the collapse, one after another, of the neighbouring dominoes? Or were local cultural differences more important in the long run than ideological alignments? The discussion of such questions could not but be linked with the global perspectives of East–West opposition and the values associated with it.

In 1972, Whitlam as Prime Minister brought a new perspective and a new style after the twenty-three years of conservative rule, moving immediately to the ending of the Vietnam involvement and the recognition of the People’s Republic of China, both of which commanded widespread support. With the ending of the Vietnam conflict Australia, under both Coalition and Labor Governments, continued to maintain a pragmatic engagement with the region, placing an emphasis on relations with the United States, on economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region (APEC) and, during Gareth Evans’s period as Foreign Minister, making a significant contribution to the resolution of conflict in Cambodia. In Evans’s words, Australian policy during this period ‘might be broadly characterised as middle power diplomacy with an Asia-Pacific orientation’.49

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The Institute, in observing these various policy directions and contributing to the discussion of them, has always tended to be seen as conservative rather than radical, though many of its members, during the 1960s and early 1970s, were actively opposed to aspects of American policy and, in particular, to the Vietnam involvement. The important thing is that it provided one forum for the serious discussion of international questions and that, during the deep policy divisions of the time, the debate could be

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conducted in that forum in an open and serious way. If it is true that the Institute of the 1930s had glimpses of the coming shifts of power and of the future importance of Asia and the Pacific, and so helped to create the broad framework within which Australians were to view the postwar world, the Institute of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s participated in the continuing scrutiny of that framework.
The idea of a non-official organisation devoted to the study of international relations had its origins in discussions amongst staff members of the British and American delegations to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. It was from these discussions that a British Institute of International Affairs was to be formed, to be followed later by the formation of affiliated bodies in what were then the Dominions. The British origins were important and the formation of an Australian Institute must be set against that background.

A British Institute of International Affairs

The Peace Conference had brought together a wide variety of specialist advisers—academic specialists in aspects of international affairs, lawyers, economists, businessmen, diplomats, civil servants, members of the armed forces—and in the commissions, committees and subcommittees of the Conference these people addressed, with varying degrees of expertise, the complex issues involved in the preparation of an overall peace treaty. They tackled such matters as reparations, the disarmament of Germany, communications in war-damaged Europe, territorial dispositions, the frontiers of Czechoslovakia and Austria, the disposition of Trieste, the partition of Hungary, the future of Albania, of Poland, Danzig and innumerable others. Daily formal and informal contacts between officials and advisers engaged in the study of these questions gave rise to the idea

of a continuing association of informed people, able to study the international scene and to view it from within a broad perspective.

On 30 May 1919, the notion was canvassed at a gathering of some thirty people meeting over dinner at the Hotel Majestic in Paris. Those present included Lord Robert Cecil, Harold Temperley, James Headlam-Morley, Harold Nicolson, Lord Eustace Percy from the British delegation and Colonel House, Professor Archibald Cary Coolidge, Whitney H. Shepardson and James T. Shotwell from the American delegation. An Australian member of the staff of the British delegation, Lieut-Commander J.G. Latham, was also there. The meeting had been suggested by Lionel Curtis, but it was a sign of Anglo-American cooperation that an American, General Tasker H. Bliss, was invited to take the chair. Curtis introduced the after dinner discussion and developed the idea of an institute devoted to the study of international affairs. The details of the proposed organisation were left for further exploration but the initial intention was that it would be a British-American association. Some doubts were expressed about the whole idea by Sir Eyre Crowe, Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, but, in general, those present accepted the view of Headlam-Morley that the conduct of foreign policy would be assisted by 'the informed opinion of people engaged in other branches of public life'.

As reported by such observers as Nicolson and Headlam-Morley, the objectives of the proposed institute were outlined by Lionel Curtis in general terms. That was to be expected in an exploratory meeting, and it left room for some natural differences of opinion about what precisely was intended. At the most immediate level there had clearly been a sense of dissatisfaction amongst officials at the way issues of great moment were being dealt with at Paris. In his diary entry dealing with the 30 May meeting, Harold Nicolson quoted a remark of Robert Cecil: 'There is no single person in this room who is not disappointed with the terms we have drafted...Our disappointment is an excellent symptom: let us perpetuate it.' A continuing body, concerned with longer term considerations, could provide an appropriate forum for the expert discussion of such issues.

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3 This is presented as Headlam-Morley's view by his daughter Agnes in her memoir of her father. Headlam-Morley, A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference, p. xxxi.
Speaking four years later, however, Lionel Curtis himself, the proposer of the scheme, spoke of the importance not just of expert opinion but of a more general 'public opinion' in influencing foreign policy.

It was soon apparent that the issues of the [Peace] Conference would be settled less by the views of the statesmen assembled at Paris than by public opinion in the countries from which they came. And it was clear that, as time went on, governments in their conduct of foreign affairs would come to rely more and more on the support of their citizens. The creation of an informed public opinion on international affairs was thus one of the prime needs of the future.5

Those remarks notwithstanding, it would seem that, in 1919, 'public opinion' was intended in a somewhat elitist sense. Harold Nicolson, on 30 May 1919, wrote of the proposed institute as the creation of a centre of 'authoritative opinion' and compared it to the kind of authority represented in its field by the General Medical Council.6 Headlam-Morley feared the possible effect on foreign policy of 'ignorant popular agitation'.7 His diary entry reports that he and Curtis were in agreement in regarding the Royal Society as a model for the proposed institute of international affairs, and added that 'if the thing is to be effective, admission must be difficult so as to avoid a great mass of incompetent members who are admitted to many other societies in order to get funds'.8 Latham, describing the original discussion in a letter to his wife, remarked: 'The idea is that only persons capable of making original contributions to the serious study of international affairs should be eligible for membership'.9 It would seem that 'informed opinion' rather than a general 'public opinion' was in the minds of those who gathered at the Hotel Majestic. In his later account of the work of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Stephen King Hall described the 'hundred or more experts' attached to the British delegation in Paris as having already been 'almost unconsciously an embryonic institute of international affairs'.10 It is clear from the later accounts of participants that, for all the feeling of dissatisfaction at the way the Peace Treaty was shaping, there was great camaraderie amongst members of the British and American delegations.

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5 Lionel Curtis speaking at a ceremony celebrating the gift of Chatham House to the British Institute of International Affairs, 9 November 1923, cited in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Institutes of International Affairs (New York, 1953) p. 16.
6 Peacemaking, p. 353.
8 ibid. p. 133.
9 Latham to his wife, 2 June 1919. Latham Papers, National Library of Australia [hereafter, NLA], MS 1009/21/1450.
They were mainly housed in two hotels, the Americans in the Crillon and the British in the Majestic. They were constantly in each others’ company, talking shop and exchanging ideas on complex and interrelated questions of policy, and they obviously found the Conference to be an exciting and stimulating experience. ‘Lunch-hour was the great meeting time’, remembered Sir Robert Garran many years later, ‘and we often lunched by invitation at one another’s tables’.  

In the future, the education of an intelligent public opinion did become one of the functions of the Institute but at the beginning the emphasis was very much on the expertise of those involved. More generally, the idea in Paris was that foreign policy, and the diplomacy by which it was carried on, should not be purely the responsibility of ministers and members of foreign offices acting behind closed doors. It should be open to expert scrutiny and be judged, not just according to the diplomatic circumstances of the moment, but in the light of longer term considerations.

Against the background of this kind of thinking the 30 May meeting resolved:

That those present undertake to form an Institute, entitled ‘The Institute of International Affairs, founded at Paris, 1919’, composed at the outset of two Branches, one in the United Kingdom and one in the United States.

That the purpose of this Institute should be to keep its members in touch with the international situation and enable them to study the relation between national policies and the interests of society as a whole.

To this end it was decided to form a small committee to draft specific proposals and Lord Eustace Percy, James Headlam-Morley and J.G. Latham from the British delegation and James Brown Scott, Professor Archibald Cary Coolidge and James T. Shotwell from the American delegation were selected. Lionel Curtis and Whitney H. Shepardson were to be joint secretaries.

Further meetings were held in Paris but the serious organisational task was delayed until the members of the two delegations had returned home. In the event the hopes for a single, joint British–American organisation did not work out. The Americans discovered on their return that there was, in fact, already an unofficial body of an appropriate kind, the Council on Foreign Relations, which had been formed in 1918 as a forum for talks by visitors to New York. The Council had not, at that stage, developed long term plans and, in attracting some support from the New York business community, it represented a somewhat different constituency.  

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from those of the officials and academics who had been present at Paris. Nevertheless, it appeared to provide a basis for the kind of activity canvassed at the Majestic Hotel meeting and, in these circumstances, the idea of a single British–American Institute with separate national branches no longer seemed appropriate. The Council on Foreign Relations was enlarged and its activities adapted to the aims of the Paris meeting, and a new Council to replace the original one was incorporated in 1921. In London the British members moved to form a separate ‘British Institute of International Affairs’ which was formally inaugurated on 5 July 1920.

Over the next two years the two organisations developed along their respective lines. In 1923, the British Institute, which was at first housed temporarily in the Institute of Historical Research in the University of London, was fortunate in acquiring, as a gift from two Canadian benefactors, Colonel R.W. Leonard and his wife, the house at 10 St. James’s Square, Chatham House, which had been home to three Prime Ministers, Chatham, Derby and Gladstone. ‘Chatham House’ became thereafter the short name for the Institute itself. The house was adapted to the needs of the Institute with the addition of a meeting room and provision for a major library. In July 1926, the Institute was granted a Royal Charter, to become the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

The Charter provided the classical statement of the aims of the organisation:

(a) To advance the sciences of international politics, economics, and jurisprudence and the study, classification, and development of the literature of these subjects.

(b) To provide and maintain means of information upon international questions and promote the study and investigation of international questions by means of lectures and discussions and by the preparation and publication of books, records, reports, or other works or otherwise as may seem desirable.

(c) Generally to encourage and facilitate the study of international questions and to promote the exchange of information, knowledge, and thought on international affairs and the understanding of the circumstances conditions and views of nations and people and to do all things necessary or expedient for the proper and effective carrying out of the objects aforesaid.

(d) To encourage and facilitate the formation of branches and committees throughout our Dominions.15

Of importance in the carrying out of these tasks, and, indeed, to the Institute’s very perception of itself as an unofficial body engaged in the

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15 King Hall, *Chatham House*, Appendix I, p. 129.
serious study of international affairs, were two further provisions reflecting the idea of continuing enquiry and the accompanying determination to avoid any conclusive outcome, or the adoption of an Institute position, on questions of substance. The first of these was the provision, reproduced in all Institute publications, that the Institute as such could have no views on international issues:

The Royal Institute of International Affairs is an unofficial and non-political body, founded in 1920 to encourage and facilitate the scientific study of international questions.

The Institute, as such, is precluded by its rules from expressing an opinion on any aspect of international affairs; opinions expressed in this book are, therefore, purely individual.

The second provision related to the conduct of meetings and was designed to give some protection to speakers—often members of governments or senior officials or prominent figures from other countries—who would be more likely to speak frankly if they could be assured of a degree of confidentiality. The meetings rule, known as 'the Chatham House rule' provided that:

Unless otherwise stated, all meetings of the Institute shall be strictly private. Members in using information obtained at meetings may not mention the speaker's name nor the fact that the information was obtained at a meeting of the Institute.

Guest speakers, and members joining in discussion at meetings, could therefore speak in comparative freedom, knowing at least that what they had to say would not be reported in the press or, strictly speaking, would not be attributed to them in private discussions with non-members. And they could also be reassured by the fact that their remarks would be made to a fairly homogeneous audience, composed of reasonably informed people with a serious concern with the subject matter under discussion. (A third basic rule restricted RIIA membership to British subjects. Taken together with the Chatham House rule, this meant that foreign statesmen could address an Institute audience knowing that it did not include their own nationals or nationals of other countries under discussion.)

A permanent headquarters, meeting rooms and a library enabled the Royal Institute to expand its research and discussion activities. Amongst its initial research projects was the preparation of a history of the Paris Peace Conference. The work was funded by a private donation of £2000 and was entrusted to the editorial care of an historian, Dr H.W.V. Temperley of Peterhouse, Cambridge, who had been amongst those present at the Hotel Majestic on 30 May 1919. The History of the Peace Conference of Paris was completed in six volumes in 1924, and its

publication was followed by a decision to produce, as a major work of reference, a continuing survey of international affairs. Professor Arnold J. Toynbee became the editor of the series and the author of the initial volumes. Volume I of the series (published in 1927 and actually the second to appear) covered the years 1920 to 1923, and thus linked the new series of volumes with the history of the Peace Conference. Volume II, published in 1926, dealt with the year 1924, and thereafter the series consisted of annual volumes, each dealing with one year. To sustain the project a private endowment by Sir Daniel Stevenson enabled the establishment of a Research Chair of International History in the University of London, in close association with Chatham House. This was filled in the first instance by Toynbee who combined the position with that of Director of Studies of the Royal Institute. From 1928 the Survey was accompanied by annual volumes of Documents on International Affairs. In 1927, the Institute’s periodical, International Affairs, was launched.

The Institute of Pacific Relations

On the other side of the Atlantic, the Council on Foreign Relations followed a similar pattern of meetings, research and publication and its quarterly journal, Foreign Affairs, founded in 1922, became an authoritative forum for the discussion of international and foreign policy issues. In the mid 1920s the formation of a separate organisation, the Institute of Pacific Relations, represented a new initiative in the same general area. The IPR was concerned, like the Council on Foreign Relations and like the RIIA, with the study of international affairs and with the promotion of research, but with some differences. In addition to the fact that its focus was on the Pacific and especially on the western Pacific, it displayed, perhaps, a stronger idealistic flavour, at least in its earlier years.

The Institute of Pacific Relations was formed at a conference in Honolulu in 1925, called as a result of the initiative of some Hawaii business and professional men, supported by others from the American mainland. On the basis of funding from Foundation and other private business sources it was organised by the national councils of the Young Men’s Christian Association in a number of countries of the Pacific rim. The objectives of its sponsors were mixed. With the YMCA playing the major organising role it was not surprising that the meeting should reflect the strong humanitarian, religious and missionary strains in American society, and the belief in the possibility of promoting human understanding and of contributing to international peace by the application of those ideals. This was very much in the minds of the conveners who pointed to Hawaii’s own success ‘in building a mutually dependent and friendly community from many diverse races and cultures’ and who went on to argue: ‘If such a community is possible in the island world, why not in the larger area...Hence the proposal that representatives of the various
peoples around the Pacific rim should come together to talk over the matter.\textsuperscript{17} Also present, however, was a perception of shifts in the world balance of power and a recognition of the Pacific as being at least as important as western Europe as a zone of international interaction and therefore important as a subject of scholarly study.

Delegates to the first conference came from Australia, Canada, China, Korea, Japan, New Zealand and the Philippines as well as from the United States.\textsuperscript{18} From their discussions emerged the decision to form, first, a permanent Institute in America. This then moved to establish itself as an international body. It set up an International Secretariat, with a permanent headquarters in New York. The American IPR then became the American Council of the Institute and similar National Councils were gradually set up in other countries. The RIIA, already linked to the Council on Foreign Relations, moved quickly to associate itself formally with the international organisation and became the British National Council of the IPR. As will be seen, national IPR Groups were formed by RIIA members in Canada and Australia, their functions being taken over by the Canadian and Australian Institutes of International Affairs when these were formed. A similar process took place in New Zealand. In addition similar constituent bodies were formed in China, Japan, Korea and the Philippines, and later in France (the Comité D'Etudes de Problèmes du Pacifique), Holland and the USSR.\textsuperscript{19}

There were some shifts in the character and direction of the IPR over the years. Even before the war the humanitarianism of the YMCA and the idea of promoting understanding amongst the countries of the western Pacific came to sit somewhat uneasily with the evolution of the organisation as a forum for expert studies of the region. This became the major concern of the IPR, though still within a framework of belief in the possibility of a more rational international order.\textsuperscript{20} The subsequent conferences of the Institute were significant occasions. Looking back thirty years later, the distinguished China scholar, J.K. Fairbank, remembered them with considerable euphoria. 'The triennial conferences were important events, peopled with leading personalities and charged with excitement. Foreign offices, corporations, and the press took them seriously and participants were often profoundly influenced by the

\textsuperscript{18} ibid.
\textsuperscript{19} After World War II, the USSR, China and Korea and also the Netherlands ceased to participate but India and Pakistan became members, leaving a total of ten national councils making up the postwar IPR.
\textsuperscript{20} For a discussion of these changing emphases, see Tomoko Akami, \textit{The Liberal Dilemma: Internationalism and the Institute of Pacific Relations in Japan, Australia and the USA, 1919–1942}, PhD thesis, Australian National University, Canberra.
experience. Together the conferences and the research and publications programs of the Institute, and its journal, Pacific Affairs, constituted a significant addition to the kind of enquiry already being carried out by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

The Australian response

By the mid 1920s the British Institute, the Council on Foreign Relations and the Institute of Pacific Relations constituted a network of unofficial organisations concerned with the study of world affairs and it was as part of that network that institutes of international affairs were established in Australia and Canada.

In both countries the initial steps were taken within the framework of the British Institute itself; but they were taken at different speeds and with different degrees of smoothness. The process was accomplished with much greater dispatch in Canada, as a result of the stimulus provided by the 1st Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1925. On their return home from Honolulu members of the Canadian delegation established IPR discussion groups in Vancouver, Montreal and Toronto. Some members of these groups were already members of Chatham House. (There were some 32 Chatham House members in Canada in 1928.) Rather than preserve the separate existence of two organisations with clearly similar aims and overlapping membership, it was decided to form a single institute affiliated on the one hand to the Royal Institute of International Affairs and on the other to the Institute of Pacific Relations. This was achieved, apparently, with very little fuss and in January 1928 the new body became the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and it acted, as we have noticed, as the Canadian National Council of the IPR.

By contrast, the process of development and consolidation in Australia was more tortuous, and was accompanied by an unnecessary degree of organisational complexity. As with Canada, the first step towards the creation of an Australian Institute was the recruitment of Australians as members of the British Institute of International Affairs. As we have seen, a number of Australians, amongst others Latham, Eggleston and Garran, were members of the British delegation at Paris and Latham was at the Hotel Majestic dinner on 30 May 1919. He was also a member of the committee entrusted with the task of giving organisational substance to the resolution adopted at that meeting. In due course he, Eggleston and Garran became foundation members of the British Institute. Back in Australia they played a major part in attracting other important figures to

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22 King Hall, Chatham House, p. 99.
membership of Chatham House. Together they represented many of the characteristics of the individuals who formed the core of the Australian institute in its early days.

All three were lawyers by training. All three had taken part in the proceedings of the Round Table in Australia. J.G. Latham (1877–1964) was a graduate of the University of Melbourne. He had served as an intelligence officer in the Australian Navy during the Great War and held the rank of Lieut-Commander. He accompanied the Prime Minister, W.M. Hughes, to the Imperial Conference in London in 1918, and in 1919 he acted as Assistant Secretary of the British Empire Delegation at the Peace Conference. He was a founder of the League of Nations Union in Australia and remained a continuing and strong supporter of it. On his return from Paris he resumed the practice of law but also entered the political arena, being elected to the House of Representatives as an Independent Liberal in 1922. He became a member of the Nationalist Party in 1925 and served as Attorney General and Minister for Industry. After the defeat of the Bruce–Page Government and the formation of a Labor Government under J.H. Scullin, Latham became Leader of the Opposition. He surrendered the leadership to Joseph Lyons after the formation of the new United Australia Party in 1931. In 1935, he was appointed Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia and in 1939, when Australia decided belatedly to establish its first direct diplomatic representation overseas—in Japan and the United States—Latham accepted the Tokyo appointment. His other activities included membership of the Council for Civil Liberties and of the Rationalist Association of which he was a founder.

Frederic Eggleston (1875–1954) came to the practice of law not by full time attendance at the University but through the articled clerks' course, which involved the taking of some university subjects while engaged in legal employment. He took these subjects part time while working in his father's office. (He found this very hard work and greatly missed the stimulus of relaxed contact and the exchange of ideas with other students.) He was admitted as a solicitor in 1897. During the Great War he saw service in the AIF and, after the war, embarked on a political career, becoming a Member of the Victorian Legislative Assembly in 1920 and subsequently, in succession, Minister of Water Supply, Railways and Attorney General, until his defeat in the 1927 election. For him, his ministerial experience was not merely a political matter but a matter, also, for theoretical reflection about the contribution that the State, through the operation of statutory corporations, might—or might not—make to public welfare. The result was the publication, in 1932, of State Socialism in Victoria (London, 1932). During the 1930s he

24 See Cowen, Sir John Latham, for a brief account of Latham's career.
25 F.W. Eggleston, 'Melbourne Memoir', NLA, MS 423/16/1019.
was Chairman of the Commonwealth Grants Commission while continuing in practice as a solicitor. Then, like Latham, he was to serve in a diplomatic capacity, being appointed in 1941 as Minister to Chungking, China’s wartime capital, and, in 1944, as Minister to Washington. He still found time, in a busy public life, to engage in other activities—in the Victorian Branch of the Royal, and then the Australian, Institute of International Affairs, in the League of Nations Union, the Round Table and, from the late 1920s, the Institute of Pacific Relations. He was particularly involved in the work of the latter and, according to his biographer, found in its work ‘an emotional and intellectual spaciousness’. He set up and chaired the IPR Group in Victoria and assumed responsibility for communication between all the IPR Groups in Australia—Victoria, NSW and Queensland—and the International Secretariat. And with all this he continued to be an extraordinarily prolific writer. His list of publications extends to over 250 items. Many of these were brief journalistic pieces, but many were significant articles and the list includes his major political and philosophical works, Search for a Social Philosophy (Melbourne, 1941), Reflections of an Australian Liberal (Melbourne, 1953) and the posthumous Reflections on Australian Foreign Policy (Melbourne, 1957).

Eggleston was a large man, physically and intellectually. Forthright and argumentative, he was sometimes a bit cranky in his dealings with others, but all in all he was a major influence in Australian public life.

R.R. Garran (1867–1957), a graduate of the University of Sydney, was a lawyer and public servant. In the 1890s he was active in the federation movement and was secretary to the Drafting Committee of the 1897–98 Convention. After federation he became the first Secretary of the Commonwealth Attorney General’s Department and played a large part in the organisation of the federal civil service as a whole. He became Solicitor-General in 1916 and served in that position until 1932. In 1918, he attended the Imperial War Cabinet with Hughes, and stayed on to serve as a staff member of the British Empire Delegation to the Peace Conference. (One of his contributions in that capacity was his part in drafting the proposal, dear to Hughes, for the creation of C Class mandates.) On his retirement in 1932, he returned to the practice of law in New South Wales, and also to a busy public life. Amongst other things he chaired the federal Government’s Book Censorship Board, was Vice President of the Canberra Musical Society and was prominent in advocating the establishment of a national university concentrating on graduate work. He believed that one task of such an institution should be the study of Oriental and Pacific questions.

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27 See the list provided in ibid. pp. 336–45.
To these figures were added, in the early 1920s, other recruits to Chatham House membership. There were senior academics such as A.H. Charteris, Challis Professor of Law in the University of Sydney, Ernest Scott, Professor of History in the University of Melbourne, S.H. Roberts, later to become Professor of History, and then Vice Chancellor, of the University of Sydney, William Harrison Moore and K.H. Bailey, Professors of Law and D.B. Copland, Professor of Economics at Melbourne and R.C. Mills, Professor of Economics at Sydney. (Bailey later became federal Solicitor General.) There were businessmen such as Tristan Buesst, Gerald Packer (formerly an RAAF officer\textsuperscript{29}) and the Melbourne stockbroker, company director and philanthropist, E.C. Dyason, who was later to be a major benefactor of the Australian Institute. And there were political figures such as T.R. Bavin, later Premier of New South Wales.

It is not easy to pin a label on a group of this kind. They—and others like them—have been variously described as ‘liberal conservatives’, ‘progressives’, ‘middle class radicals’, ‘public intellectuals’, ‘reasonable men’ and, more generally, as members of the ‘thinking classes’.\textsuperscript{30} Clearly they were members of an Australian urban elite. There was a diversity in their views but they had a common interest in matters relating both to domestic and international society and they displayed an element of reformism in the way they approached these questions. Not all were concerned, as Eggleston was, to develop a general social philosophy for Australia but they all shared an interest in ideas and an enjoyment in the discussion of them. They interacted with each other at a variety of levels and their paths crossed frequently in the world of affairs: in business, in the parliaments of the Commonwealth and New South Wales and Victoria, in academia, and in government-related activities such as official


\textsuperscript{30} The individuals studied in Michael Roe's \textit{Nine Australian Progressives: Vitalism in Bourgeois Social Thought} (St Lucia, Q., 1984), were not members of the Australian Institute, but they display a strong family resemblance. The term 'middle class radicals' is used by Race Mathews in his account of the Fabian movement in Australia, \textit{Australia's First Fabians: Middle Class Radicals} (Cambridge, 1993), and he includes Latham, Scott and Eggleston under that heading. Stuart Macintyre, in his life of Scott, \textit{A History for a Nation: Ernest Scott and the Making of Australian History} (Melbourne, 1994), uses the term 'public intellectuals'. And 'reasonable men' comes from the title of Stephen Alomes' thesis, \textit{Reasonable Men: Middle Class Reformism} in Australia, 1928–1939, PhD thesis, Australian National University, Canberra. See also Alomes, 'Intellectuals as Publicists, 1920s to 1940s', in B. Head and J. Walter (eds), \textit{Intellectual Movements and Australian Society} (Melbourne, 1988). The term 'thinking classes' is used by N. Brown, 'Australian Intellectuals and the Image of Asia: 1920–1960', in \textit{Australian Cultural History}, 1990.
delegations to international meetings. There existed, in consequence, a
degree of continuing intimacy amongst many of them. As we have noted,
many of them were already members of the Round Table groups in
Melbourne and Sydney. Some joined the League of Nations Union.
Especially in Melbourne they tended to meet each other in the same clubs:
the Melbourne Club (Buesst, Casey, Latham, Packer and Scott), the
Australian Club (Eggleston, Latham and Buesst), the Athenaeum (Dyason,
Casey and Wood), the Savage (Garran, Eggleston and Buesst). Eggleston
and Latham were foundation members of the Boobooks, a dining and
discussion society founded in 1902, and Garran, Buesst, Clunies Ross,
Copland, Dyason and Scott later became members. 31 And some of the
same names were to be found in the Wallaby Club, a society formed in
1894 for the purposes of gentle exercise, conversation and companionship
through ‘walking in pleasant company’ in the countryside round
Melbourne, and occasionally dining together. The Wallabies, like the
Boobooks, still exist. 32 As ‘public intellectuals’, says Stuart Macintyre,
people of this kind sought ‘to block in the outlines of Australian
circumstances and to lead public opinion to a more informed under­
standing of Australia’s place in the world’. 33

Their differences could be sharp on occasion. At one end of the
spectrum, perhaps, was T.H. Laby, the notoriously difficult Professor of
Physics at the University of Melbourne, who seems to have been a
reluctant recruit to the Chatham House group. Eggleston described him
somewhat contemptuously as believing that organisations other than the
Round Table were unnecessary. 34 Gerald Packer, too, was a man of
vigorously conservative views. At the other end there were people like
Ernest Scott, a member of the Fabian Society as well as of the
Theosophical Society. (His first wife, Mabel, was the daughter of Annie

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31 The society met in a variety of hotels and restaurants, to dine and to hear a
speaker on a topic of broad intellectual concern. By the late 1930s, the
University of Melbourne had become, and continues to be, the regular
meeting place. (Other Institute members—Macmahon Ball, Fred Howard and,
a good deal later, Howson and Legge—also became members of the flock.)

32 Alfred Hart and others, The History of the Wallaby Club (Mont Albert, 1993).
Membership included Harrison Moore, Bavin, Buesst, Clunies Ross, Owen
Dixon, Dyason, Garran, Scott, Wadham and Wood.

33 Macintyre, A History for a Nation, p. 133.

34 F.W. Eggleston to Lionel Curtis, 17 November 1927. Eggleston went on, no
doubt in semi-jocular vein, to say:

In Melbourne we have deliberately chosen one or two Bolsheviks and extreme
Labour partisans and the other crowd will not meet them, or at any rate
discussion before them will not be free and will therefore be of little value...
Personally I am always ready to co-operate with anybody. Possibly my
sympathies are too Catholic, and my energies dissipated.

NLA, MS 2821: Synopsis of Files at Chatham House relating to the history of
the AIIA, prepared by T.N.M. Buesst.
Australia's role would be played within the framework of the British University of Melbourne, who might be described as a left-leaning liberal. It was not until 1924 that the first formally established branch of Chatham House was formed in Sydney. This was the result of the initiative of Professor Charteris. At that stage, in addition to Charteris and Bavin, there were three other Chatham House members in Sydney: Commander R.C. Garsia, a regular officer of the Royal Navy, H.S. Nicholas, a barrister and...
later Supreme Court Judge and A.M. Pooley, a foreign correspondent for Reuters, the London Observer and The New York Times. According to Hazel King, historian of the New South Wales Branch of the Australian Institute, Latham was also living in Sydney at that time and made up a sixth member. (If that were so it would have been a very temporary residence.) Charteris prevailed on others to join the group, including F.R. Beasley (later foundation Professor of Law in the University of Western Australia) who became the first secretary of the group, and A.L. Sadler, Professor of Japanese at Sydney University. Once formed the group affiliated formally as a Branch of the Royal Institute.

Victoria followed suit in the following year when J.G. Latham called a meeting of British Institute members to consider forming a Melbourne Branch of the Institute. The group there included Eggleston, Latham, Professor K.H. Bailey, Professor D.B. Copland, Herbert Brookes, Sir William Harrison Moore, Sir Robert Garran, Professor Ernest Scott and E.C. Dyason, with Tristan Buesst as Secretary. A third branch was to be formed in Queensland in 1932.

These groups developed a pattern of activity of the kind that foreshadowed the Australian Institute of the future: the holding of regular meetings addressed by speakers with special knowledge of some aspect of international affairs, and the beginnings of what would become in the future a regular research program. The latter was developed initially in the course of preparation for international conferences. The formation of the Institute of Pacific Relations provided a particular stimulus to members of the Sydney and Melbourne groups. After the Honolulu Conference at which the IPR was founded, IPR groups were formed in Sydney and Melbourne as they had been in Canada and, as might have been expected, they consisted, in large measure, of the same individuals who belonged to

39 Hazel King, At Mid Century: A Short History of the N. S. W. Branch of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1924–198 (Sydney, 1982) pp. 1–2.
40 Chatham House gives 1925 as the date of the Branch’s formation, possibly because of the delay, natural in the days of sea mail, in the acceptance by Chatham House of the affiliation of the group.
41 Latham on 10 June 1925 sent a circular letter to the other Chatham House members in Victoria (Meredith Atkinson, Ernest Scott, E.L. Piesse, Harrison Moore, Eggleston, Sir James Barrett, Sir Robert Garran, Herbert Brookes, J.D. Lavarack, J.G. Duncan Hughes and Keith Officer) inviting them to gather at the Mitre Tavern on 22 June for dinner to be followed by a meeting to discuss the formation of a local branch of the British Institute. The circular was sent also to Douglas Copland, Dr Henderson, A.D. Ellis and M.L. Gardner. Brookes Papers, NLA, MS 1924, Series 35, Folder 4. The formalities took a little time and the Branch did not become affiliated until 1926. See Keith Officer to Chatham House, 29 March 1926, forwarding Minutes of a meeting of the Melbourne group (Chatham House File 1753. NLA, MS 2821: Synopsis of Files at Chatham House relating to the history of the AI&F, prepared by T.N.M. Buesst).
Chatham House, who were active in the Round Table, and who were involved in the Melbourne and Sydney branches of the League of Nations Union. (The identity was not complete and some members of the IPR groups—R.L. Stock was one—were IPR members first and came to the Royal Institute by that route.) Australia became a regular participant in subsequent IPR conferences, and these members were active in preparing papers for such occasions.

What is striking in all this activity, however, is that, in sharp contrast to the Canadian example, the IPR groups in Australia remained, for the time being, organisationally distinct from the Royal Institute branches in spite of the fact that leadership in both came from the same, comparatively small, group of individuals. The Royal Institute branches, too, retained their own identity with their separate affiliation with Chatham House.

Towards a national organisation

An early attempt was made to establish links between these various bodies. In New South Wales the IPR Group, at the time of its formation, considered associating itself formally with the local branch of Chatham House. At an initial meeting of the Group on 9 March 1926, a subcommittee was formed to consider ways in which the IPR ‘might be linked with other bodies of like character and aims already formed or to be formed in NSW and other Australian States’. The subcommittee recommended, in due course, that the BIIA be the relevant body with which to join ‘if allowable under its Constitution’. The NSW Branch of the Institute, however, was not then prepared to accept the proposal and the IPR Group established itself, at a meeting on 4 May 1929, simply as ‘The NSW Branch, Australian Group, IPR’.43

Given the overlapping membership, and the informality of relations between the principal figures of the RIIA and IPR groups in Victoria and New South Wales, it may not have mattered a great deal whether the groups merged or stayed separate, but it is certainly a matter for comment that a complex patchwork of separate organisations—the Round Table, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the Institute of Pacific Relations and the League of Nations Union—should have persisted for so long. The purposes of the Round Table and those of the League of Nations Union were, of course, different from those of the two Institutes. The Round Table was concerned primarily with the discussion of the domestic affairs of the Dominions and with problems of British Commonwealth relations, and the League of Nations Union was designed to create a climate of public support for the goals of the League of Nations.

42 Minute Book of IPR, Australian Group, NSW Branch. This remains in the possession of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, NSW Branch.
43 ibid.
But the aims of the two Institutes were broadly similar, differing mainly in that the IPR had a narrower geographical focus, and it seems obvious that some kind of organisational link between the two would have been appropriate. Certainly Chatham House thought that the two should come together and Lionel Curtis urged such a course on Eggleston in 1927. 44

There were difficulties, however. Some Victorian members of the IPR group were not British subjects and could not, therefore, become members of a Royal Institute branch. And there were some differences of approach between the two organisations. The IPR, while emphasising its commitment to a ‘scientific’ study of international relations, did not have the prohibition, so central to the charter of the RIIA, against expressing, as an organisation, opinions on any aspect of international affairs. There were reservations about this in both Victoria and NSW. They were expressed in quite specific terms by F.R. Beasley, Secretary of the NSW Branch of the Royal Institute, who wrote to Chatham House in 1926 explaining that the Branch, although prepared to cooperate with the IPR group, was not prepared to amalgamate because this might infringe the rule about the expression of collective opinion. 45 Others complained in more vigorous terms that the IPR approach ‘savourcd of propaganda’. 46 In particular, there was a concern that the IPR represented an American as against a British view of the world. This sentiment was especially strong amongst Round Table members in Australia. Eggleston informed Lionel Curtis that an amalgamation of the RIIA and the IPR groups had been discussed but ‘I find that both in Melbourne and Sydney it is hopeless’. He went on to say, ‘There are some funny people about. First men like Nicholas and Laby insist that the Institute of Pacific Relations is a vehicle of American propaganda.’ 47 There was a further concern that, since the IPR had no equivalent of the Chatham House rule for the conduct of meetings, there was a danger that the admission of some of the local IPR members would compromise the confidential character of the RIIA branches. In 1928, Keith Officer told Margaret Cleeve of the Chatham House Secretariat, that he did not think there was a possibility of the two groups joining, because

44 F.W. Eggleston to Lionel Curtis, 17 November 1927, referred to ‘your idea of amalgamating the branch of the Institute of Pacific Relations with that of the Royal Institute of International Affairs’.
45 F.R. Beasley to F.B. Bourdillon, Secretary of Chatham House, 5 July 1926. (Chatham House File 868 in ‘Synopsis of Files at Chatham House’, NLA, MS 2821.)
46 This phrase was used by Keith Officer in a conversation with Ms Margaret E. Cleeve of the Chatham House Secretariat, 10 August 1928. Memo of conversation, NLA, MS 2821: Synopsis of files at Chatham House relating to the history of the AIIA.
47 F.W. Eggleston to Lionel Curtis, 17 November 1927.
the IPR 'had a number of members which the RIIA could never admit with the feeling that the confidential character could be maintained'.

In spite of such reservations, Chatham House continued to urge closer affiliation. Curtis, in his reply to Eggleston, argued: 'We do not take the view that the IPR was founded...as an instrument of American propaganda...If we were to refuse the cordial invitation extended to take part in its proceedings, the British case would go unstated with the result that the proceedings...would inevitably become one-sided, and to that extent a medium of American propaganda'.

The two States dealt with these differences of opinion in different ways. In New South Wales, after the earlier false start, the RIIA Branch and the IPR group did, at long last, decide to merge. There was a financial difficulty to be overcome. The Royal Institute Branch had a two guinea subscription, half of which was paid to Chatham House to cover the cost of supplying RIIA publications to branch members. The subscription to the IPR group was only ten shillings. As a basis for merger it was agreed that there would be two levels of subscription. Members could choose whether to pay the higher figure or to pay a lower subscription and do without RIIA publications. There was also some feeling that it would be undesirable for either of the two bodies to absorb the other and that the only way to proceed was to form a new body—the Australian Institute of International Affairs. On this basis, at a meeting held on 27 August 1929 in the rooms of the Treasurer of the NSW Branch of the RIIA, Mr A.M. Pooley, it was decided to set up a new Institute which would take over the funds of the NSW Branch of Chatham House and the NSW Group of the IPR. RIIA members and IPR members were to be invited to join. The combined bodies anticipated later developments by adopting the name 'Australian Institute of International Affairs, NSW Division', on the assumption that a similar merger in Victoria would lead to the creation of some kind of national body.

Victoria, however, had already followed a different course of action, as a result of an initiative taken by E.C. Dyason. Dyason had recognised that the five separate organisations with which he was associated, the Round Table, the RIIA, the IPR, the League of Nations Union and another society, the International Club of Victoria, needed secretarial support and

48 Memo of a conversation between Ms Margaret E. Cleeve of the Chatham House Secretariat and Major Keith Officer, 10 August 1928.
49 King, At Mid Century, p. 4.
50 Curtis to Eggleston, 10 January 1928. NLA MS 2821.
51 ibid. pp. 4–5.
52 Letter from Ian Clunies Ross to Lionel Curtis, 12 February 1929, in Chatham House File 3036, 'Australian Institute of International Affairs, Formation of', summarised in NLA, MS 2821: Synopsis of Files at Chatham House.
53 Australian Institute of International Affairs, New South Wales Branch, Minute Book, 27 August 1929 to 23 November 1934. Minutes of first meeting, 27 August 1929.
he formed the idea of setting up a central body which could act as secretary for all. In 1929, he organised, for this purpose, the 'Bureau of Social and International Affairs', and arranged for its incorporation as a non-profit making Company.\(^5^4\) On the basis of financial support obtained from private business sources the Bureau was able to acquire an office and a small secretarial staff.\(^5^5\) The Bureau's services to its members went beyond assisting the work of the participating organisations. Eggleston, for example, was engaged at the time in his study of statutory corporations, and the Bureau was happy to give support for work of that kind as well. Oddly, once established, the Bureau, which might have been expected to provide a basis for the amalgamation of groups with such a high degree of common membership and with closely related aims, appears to have had the reverse effect and actually to have constituted an impediment to the sort of union that had taken place in Sydney. Since the several organisations were so well set up on the basis of external funding, there was less pressure on them to come together.\(^5^6\) There were other reasons, too. Victorian IPR members, like their Sydney counterparts, had been concerned about the difference in subscription rates and for some reason did not accept Sydney's dual subscription solution. And Victorian RIIA members continued to be concerned that some IPR members, not being British subjects, were not eligible to become members of a Royal Institute branch.\(^5^7\) In Sydney that problem had not arisen since all members of the Sydney IPR Branch had in fact been British subjects.

In addition to that technical difference between Melbourne and Sydney, there were other problems standing in the way of the formation of an Australian Institute of International Affairs in place of the so-called New South Wales Division of the Australian Institute and the RIIA group and the IPR group in Victoria. A considerable degree of ill-feeling developed in the early 1930s between the Sydney and Melbourne groups. This was due to a variety of factors, some of them, it would seem, fairly

\(^5^4\) Eggleston, 'E.C. Dyason'.
\(^5^5\) The office was located, from the early 1930s, in Kurrajong House, 177 Collins Street. In 1930, correspondence to and from the Victorian Branch of the IPR and to the Secretary of the Bureau was addressed to Temple Court, 422 Collins Street. See Eggleston Papers, NLA, MS 423/14. The NSW Branch of the AIIA holds a letter, dated 18 March 1933, from P.D. Phillips to V.J. Flynn, Secretary of the NSW Branch, written on the Bureau's letterhead and giving Kurrajong House as the address. In due course this became the headquarters of the Victorian Branch of the AIIA.

\(^5^6\) The point was made specifically by Tristan Buesst in a letter to Chatham House, 24 June 1929. 'There is not much enthusiasm here for [the proposed amalgamation], perhaps for the reason that the secretariat we have established [the Bureau of Social and International Affairs] for the use of the RIIA in common with other societies is a link with the IPR sufficient for our purposes.' Buesst Papers, NLA, MS 2821.

\(^5^7\) King, *At Mid Century*, pp. 4–5.
Honolulu, in the absence of information to the contrary, had been led to
Australian representative on the Pacific Council of the IPR and G.L.
by the Sydney representatives. Sydney reacted sharply, complaining in
pulling its weight. New South Wales, for its part, may have resented the
concentration of IPR Executive members in Victoria—Eggleston as the
Australian representative on the Pacific Council of the IPR and G.L.
Wood as Australian Research Secretary—and believed that this affected
the distribution of research funds. There was a belief in NSW that the
Victorian IPR Group was reluctant to recognise the AIIA (NSW Division)
as the NSW IPR Group and that, in consequence, the IPR Secretariat in
Honolulu, in the absence of information to the contrary, had been led to
regard the Victorian IPR Group as the Australian National Group.

Much acrimony had been generated on both sides in the course of the
selection of an Australian delegation to the 4th IPR Conference, held in
China in 1931. A meeting of appropriate people, including NSW repre­
sentatives, was called by Frederic Eggleston, in his capacity as Chairman
of the Australian Council of the IPR, to nominate members of the
delegation. Eggleston objected to one of the choices made by the meeting
and complained in writing to the Sydney Branch that he had been forced
to accept a delegate ‘whom he could not conscientiously endorse as a
member of the delegation’, and that he had been treated with discourtesy
by the Sydney representatives. Sydney reacted sharply, complaining in
their turn that the discourtesy had not been all on one side. These

58 In 1930, Victoria called on the NSW Branch ‘to define its attitude in regard to
the activities of the Institute of Pacific Relations’ and to make its contribution
of £125 to the International Secretariat. NSW Branch Council Minutes, 25 July 1930. Three months later Victoria expressed the hope that NSW ‘would
now feel able to bear its share of the financial commitments with respect to the
Institute of Pacific Relations’. NSW responded by paying £50 immediately
and requesting further information about amounts ‘said to be owing from this
branch’. NSW Branch Council Minutes, 3 October 1930. Two years later
there was still argument. NSW Branch Council Minutes, 8 June 1932.

59 See Confidential Memo (undated) prepared for the consideration of the
Executive of the Queensland Branch of the AIIA. Correspondence with the
Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu, Carton 3A, Stephen House Papers.

60 NSW Branch Council Minutes, 28 July 1931 and 6 October 1931. The
Council, at its October meeting, considered ‘a mass of correspondence’
between Eggleston and the NSW Secretary. ‘This correspondence, which had
become increasingly acrimonious, culminated in a letter to the Hon. Secretary
from Mr F.W. Eggleston...in which the latter stated that he considered he had
been treated with gross discourtesy by the New South Wales Branch’. Though
Eggleston appeared, on the face of it, to have been at least as much at fault on
this occasion as the officers of the NSW Branch, the joint secretaries of NSW,
Dr Ian Clunies Ross and Mr A. Thyne Reid, decided to resign, a sign, it may
be suggested, of their sense of propriety and of proper procedures.
differences were undoubtedly accentuated by a sense that there was inadequate communication between the Melbourne and Sydney groups. In the circumstances it was not surprising that the two groups wished to retain a large measure of autonomy in any future federal body.61

It is difficult to judge how far these differences related to genuine matters of principle and how far to clashes of personality. Eggleston’s prominent part in all IPR matters since 1927, and especially his position as Chairman of the Australian IPR Group, may have given him a proprietary feeling about Australian participation in its affairs, and there is some evidence to support the view that he did indeed play down the role of the NSW and Queensland groups. In 1930, in a letter to Jerome D. Greene, Chairman of the Pacific Council of the IPR, he remarked that, ‘The Melbourne Group of the Institute of Pacific Relations is functioning for the present as the National Council of the Institute.’62 This casual assumption of primary responsibility for IPR affairs was precisely what NSW and Queensland suspected. It could well have affected his attitude to the process of selecting conference delegates and have flowed over into other matters. There was some dissatisfaction in the early 1930s about the way the £150 annual subscription to the IPR was divided between the Victorian, NSW and Queensland Branches according to a 6:5:2 formula. A long Memorandum from T.P. Fry of the Queensland Branch to Norman Cowper, AIIA Commonwealth Secretary, in 1934, complained that, though Queensland’s share was less than those of NSW and Victoria, it was still out of line with the actual distribution of IPR research funds and with the participation of the branches in IPR conferences. ‘It is untenable, it is submitted, that if one Branch receives all the research grants, and sends all the delegates to the IPR conference, that the other Branches should have to pay most of the Australian contribution to the IPR.’63 Fry had complained earlier to Cowper that Queensland had incurred liabilities estimated at £135 in the preparation of research and conference data papers but ‘has not so far received from the IPR grants either this amount or any proportion of this amount’.64 And another letter from Fry argued that ‘the co-ordination existing between Queensland on the one hand and Honolulu and Chatham House on the other is non-existent in that both Honolulu and Chatham House have completely ignored Queensland, a

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61 ibid.
62 F.W. Eggleston to Jerome D. Greene, 18 September 1930. Eggleston Papers, NLA, MS 423/14/58. In the absence of a General Secretary Greene was, at that stage, effectively in charge of the administration of the International Secretariat of the IPR.
63 Memorandum from the Queensland Branch, 31 January 1934. Stephen House Papers, Carton 4.
64 Letter from T.P. Fry to Norman Cowper, 2 October 1933 in Correspondence 1933, Stephen House.
state of affairs which has, perhaps, been due an absence of notification to
them of Queensland's existence'.

New South Wales felt the same way. Professor S.H. Roberts com-
plained in 1932 of the lack of consultation between Melbourne and the
other branches and pointed out that, though he was the Research Secretary
of the IPR, 'he had not even been informed of the various research
projects which Victoria had undertaken'. In the following year, in a
letter to Norman Cowper, he confessed that, for a time, he 'felt more than
usually fed up with Eggleston and Co'.

That the ill feeling existed was a matter of concern to Chatham House
which remained anxious to see an agreement between Melbourne and
Sydney for an Australian Institute embracing both Branches, and which
was reluctant to give its blessing to the Sydney Branch of the AIIA, NSW
Division, until the differences were sorted out. Finally a determined effort
was made to heal the wounds and to bring the two groups together.

First of all the Victorian Branch of Chatham House agreed to a form of
closer union with the Victorian IPR Group, though the precise nature of
their new relationship remained somewhat obscure. Early in 1932, Mr
Tristan Buesst, Secretary of the Victorian Branch, informed the 'NSW
Division of the AIIA' that the Victorian branches of the RIIA and the IPR
'had now been amalgamated'. In the light of other evidence that appears
to have been an overstatement. In fact, the two groups continued to
preserve their visible and separate identities. As late as 1936, it was
possible for Jack Shepherd, then Secretary to the Commonwealth Council
of the AIIA, to draw attention to the distinction still existing in Melbourne
between the IPR Group and the Institute of International Affairs, and to
contrast it with the situation existing in Sydney and Brisbane where the
two groups were identical. What had happened in Victoria in 1932 was
simply that the two societies, the Victorian Branch of the Royal Institute
and the IPR Group, while retaining their independence, had elected
members to a joint executive which was said to constitute the 'Australian
Institute of International Affairs (Victorian Branch)'. This created an
organisational arrangement of truly Byzantine complexity, in which a
branch of the yet to be formed Australian Institute of International Affairs,
a branch of the Royal Institute and an IPR group continued to exist
simultaneously; but, with the aid of the Bureau of Social and International
Affairs, it seemed to work well enough and it was sufficient to enable
steps to be taken to form a genuine Australian Institute.

65 Fry to Cowper, 28 July 1933 in Correspondence 1933, Stephen House.
66 Minutes of NSW Branch Council, 17 August 1932.
67 S.H. Roberts to Norman Cowper, 4 June 1933 in Correspondence 1933,
Stephen House.
68 Minutes of the NSW Branch Council, 17 March 1932.
69 J. Shepherd to L.F. Fitzhardinge, 11 November 1936. Correspondence of
Commonwealth Secretary, 1935-38, Carton 4, Stephen House.
In August 1932, opportunity was taken of a meeting, at the University of Sydney, of the Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science, to call together representatives of both cities. A representative of the newly formed Queensland Branch of Chatham House was also present. This informal meeting, under the chairmanship of Professor Charteris, led to an agreement to consider a new constitution for a national body. The drafting of the constitution was undertaken by Dr T.P. Fry of Queensland University's Law School and a member of the Queensland Branch. Fry's draft, providing for a President, three Vice Presidents representing the three existing branches, and a governing council also representing the branches, was accepted by all branches in October of the same year and was ratified by a first meeting of the 'Commonwealth Council' of the Australian Institute of International Affairs in February 1933. The Council of the Royal Institute approved the Constitution in June 1933 and accepted the Australian Institute as an affiliated Institute.

Within that framework Victoria remained, for a few years, in a somewhat anomalous position. Separate meetings continued to be held of the Executive of the Victorian Group of the IPR and of the Executive of the Victorian Branch of the AIIA. (On one occasion the two executives met within a week of each other, though their memberships were practically identical, with Eggleston, K.H. Bailey, G. Packer, P.D. Phillips, Ernest Scott, Constance Duncan, Tristan Buesst and Macmahon Ball as the central core of both.) It was not until 1937 that a genuine and final amalgamation was effected. This was achieved by the simple device of a Resolution of the Victorian Joint Executive, moved by P.D. Phillips and seconded by E.C. Dyason, which recommended that 'membership of the Australian Institute of International Affairs (Victorian Division) be open to all Royal Institute members and the British members of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which societies will cease to have their own membership as at present'. This proposal was accepted by the two constituent bodies. At the same time the secretariat of the Bureau of Social and International Affairs was dissolved.

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70 Minutes of Meeting held during the Science Congress, NSW Branch Council Minutes, 17 August 1932.
71 On the question of membership of non-British subjects the Constitution provided that where a branch had previously consisted of members of the RIIA and the IPR it might include other than British subjects, but these could not hold office in the new Institute or attend its meetings except as guests.
72 NSW, Hon. Sec. Correspondence with Victorian Branch, 1936, Stephen House.
73 Circular to members of the Executives of the Royal Institute Group of the Australian Institute of International Affairs and of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 18 November 1937, conveying a Resolution of the Victorian Joint Executive, 16 November 1937. (The absurdity of the pre-existing situation was apparent in the way the recommendation was adopted. The Royal Institute
It was appropriate, in view of his role in establishing the first branch of the Royal Institute, and in smoothing over the differences between New South Wales and Victoria, that Professor Charteris should be elected in 1933 as first chairman of the Commonwealth Council of the AIIA. He was succeeded in turn by Professor S.H. (later Sir Stephen) Roberts (1934–36), Sir Thomas Bavin (1936–41) and Professor (later Sir Ian) Clunies Ross (1941–45). The first secretary, Mr (later Sir Norman) Cowper, a solicitor, was also from NSW. Mr Tristan Buesst of Victoria served as first Treasurer. At that stage the total membership was comparatively small. New South Wales had 44 members in 1929 after the fusion of the Royal Institute and IPR branches and membership figures by the mid 1930s, according to the Annual Report of the Royal Institute for 1934–35, were 58 for NSW, 65 for Victoria and fifteen for Queensland. Victoria had its headquarters, supported, as we have seen, by the Bureau of Social and International Affairs. In 1935, New South Wales, as a result of an appeal for funds, secured secretarial assistance and, through the generosity of the Bank of NSW, acquired office accommodation at a low rental in the Bank’s building at 369 George Street. This remained its headquarters until it acquired accommodation of its own in Paddington in 1971. Queensland enjoyed similar support from the Bank, and had space in the Bank’s chambers at 53 Queen Street, Brisbane. Queensland was the first State to move outside the capital city and by 1938 it had established sub-branches at Bundaberg, Rockhampton, Mackay and Townsville. A Canberra Branch joined the other three in 1936 as the result of a meeting convened by Sir Robert Garran. The Commonwealth Council was able to maintain a small secretariat which operated at first from premises shared with the New South Wales Branch and then from the offices of the Australian Provincial Assurance Association at 53 Martin Place. Norman Cowper served in an honorary capacity as the first secretary to the Council. He was succeeded in turn by Mr P.R. Heydon (1935–36), Mr Jack Shepherd (1936–38) and Dr John Andrews (1939–42), each of whom received an honorarium of £50 per annum.

**Early years of the Australian Institute**

Given the prior existence of the State groups in New South Wales and Victoria it is not surprising that the Constitution adopted for the Australian Institute in 1932 should be strongly federal in character. (Indeed, this was to be expected in a country where federal union had not been easy to
achieve, where States guarded jealously their State rights and where residual powers rested with the States and not the federal government.) The governing body of the Institute, the Commonwealth Council, was, for the time being, essentially a coordinating body, able to discuss matters of common interest and to take some national initiatives, selecting delegations and planning papers for international conferences and administering a small research program but, for the most part, leaving the essential work of the Institute to the branches.

The Commonwealth Council could meet but rarely—at most twice in any one year. Before the days of regular air travel and the simplicity of STD telephone communication a federal body operated under difficulties. Communications were primarily by letter or an occasional telegram and travel to interstate meetings was normally by overnight train. Attendance at meetings was therefore likely to involve interstate members in several days absence from their normal activities and Jack Shepherd, as Commonwealth Secretary, commented in correspondence with his predecessor, Peter Heydon, on the sheer difficulty of convening meetings of the Council, ‘since I can never get Queensland and Victoria to agree to the same dates and Queensland usually takes weeks to reply to any communication’.74 In these circumstances it was in the branches—in meetings and discussion groups—that the Institute’s main activities were carried on. Even the initial research activities of the Institute, expressed primarily, though not entirely, in the preparation of papers for IPR Conferences, reflected local activity as members of a branch cooperated with each other, as individuals or as members of working parties, in carrying out the research for conference papers.

With the formation of an Australian Institute the Chatham House association, so vital when the Sydney and Melbourne Branches were direct affiliates of the Royal Institute—and when some of their individual members were Royal Institute members in their own right—continued to be important. In fact, the affiliation of the AIIA as a whole to the RIIA did not materially change the relationship of individuals and branches to the London centre. As part of their membership subscription to the Australian Institute, members received the Royal Institute journal, International Affairs. The cost of this was covered by the payment of a capitation fee to Chatham House, an arrangement which continued until the AIIA launched its own journal, The Australian Outlook, in 1947. In addition, affiliation with Chatham House carried other privileges for AIIA members. They were able to buy, or subscribe to, other RIIA publications at members’ rates. When they were in the United Kingdom they were able to enjoy visiting membership of Chatham House, which carried the right to attend meetings and to use the library. These visiting membership rights were reciprocal, but the benefit was almost all one way, because many

74 Jack Shepherd to Peter Heydon, 14 May 1936. Stephen House papers, Carton 4.
Australian Institute members did visit England while few RIIA members visited Australia.

The character of the membership of the Australian Institute at the time of its formation has already been described in general terms, though there were some differences from State to State. From the beginning there was a strong academic component in both Sydney and Melbourne. The founder of the Sydney group, A.H. Charteris, as we have seen, was Challis Professor of Law at Sydney and other academics came to join the Branch, amongst them Stephen Roberts (Professor of History, and later Vice Chancellor), Ian Clunies Ross (Veterinary Science), Professors R.C. Mills (Economics), McDonald Holmes (Geography) and F.L.W. Wood (History). In Victoria, academic lawyers, Harrison Moore and K.H. Bailey were active in the formation of the Branch, as were Douglas Copland (Economics) and Ernest Scott (History). But there was also a significant business component in both Branches—Sir Herbert Gepp, Herbert Brookes, Dyason and Buesst in Melbourne and A.C. Davidson, General Manager of the Bank of New South Wales and D.A.S. Campbell, wool buyer, in Sydney. There were also political figures such as Bavin in Sydney and Latham, Eggleston, Casey and later Menzies in Melbourne. And there were professional people of whom probably lawyers were in the majority. Mr Justice (later Sir Owen) Dixon and P.D. Phillips were important contributors to the Victorian Branch and W.J.V. (later Sir Victor) Windeyer, and Norman (later Sir Norman) Cowper to the NSW Branch. The Canberra Branch, when founded in 1936, naturally had a strong public service component represented by such figures as Colonel W.R. Hodgson and Peter Heydon of the Department of External Affairs and the Solicitor General, H.F.E. Whitlam.

The activities of the Institute were constrained by financial considerations and, as will be seen, the history of the Institute as a whole, as well as of individual branches, has been one of strenuous attempts to make ends meet. In the early 1930s, subscriptions were a modest two guineas, which had to cover the capitation fee to Chatham House as well as the cost of maintaining the local program. After the formation of the Australian Institute the branches paid a levy (later a capitation fee) to the federal body to cover the cost of Commonwealth Council meetings and any other activities—necessarily limited—that the Council felt able to support. The levy varied slightly from year to year but was usually in the proportions: NSW and Victoria, one third each, and Queensland and Canberra, one sixth each. A separate levy in the same proportions was imposed to cover the AIIA’s contribution to the IPR, a contribution which was minuscule as compared with those of other national councils.75 To a modern eye the

75 In the early 1930s, Australia’s levy was £250 as against about US$55 000 from the United States, US$20 000 from Japan, US$5000 from Canada, and £1000 from Britain. Only New Zealand was lower, at £100. These were the amounts pledged in 1929. See Akami, The Liberal Dilemma, p. 292.
sums recorded in the annual minutes of the Commonwealth Council, covering such items as the half rental of the NSW Branch’s telephone (16/9), travelling expenses of delegates to Council meetings (£14–17–0), contribution to the rental of a shared room in 369 George St (5/- per week), seem very small. On one occasion, when branches were unable to meet their share of the IPR subscription for the years 1939 and 1940, Mr E.C. Dyason and Lady Scott (Dyason’s sister) made up the difference from their own pockets. In 1935, Jack Shepherd, as Secretary to the Commonwealth Council, was not able to assume, as a matter of course, that his expenses in attending a meeting of the Council held in Queensland (£19–0–0) would be met. The Council resolved formally to approve payment and resolved that, in future, such expenses would be covered. And in 1941, John Andrews, as Secretary to the Commonwealth Council, informed the NSW Branch that, at a recent Council meeting ‘it was suggested that the disconnection of the Council’s telephone would be a worthwhile economy’. The Council suggested sharing the phone with the NSW Branch, paying half of the rental and the cost of its own cables and telegrams. NSW agreed. Until 1939 the position of Commonwealth Secretary was an honorary one though an honorarium of £50 a year was paid. Jack Shepherd carried a quite extraordinary administrative burden made possible only by the preparedness of the University of Sydney to keep to a minimum his duties as lecturer in History.

Financial restraints applied also, of course, to the research activities of the Institute. Given the tiny funds available it was remarkable that any significant research program could be maintained at all. As with other activities of the Institute, research depended heavily on the voluntary efforts of individual members (including members of university staffs) engaged in their own enquiries. Much of the research effort at that time was of an informal and ad hoc kind as interested members of the branches devoted their energies, often in close collaboration with each other within study groups or working parties, in preparing data papers for conferences. The working party approach was similar to the way in which the Round Table worked and was familiar to those Institute members who belonged to both organisations. Indeed, on the basis of the surveys carried out by the Australian Round Table groups and the papers presented by the same individuals to IPR Conferences, one might well wonder whether such people as Eggleston or Latham or Clunies Ross or G.L. Wood, when

76 These figures are taken from the Minutes of the Commonwealth Council, 19 August 1941.
77 Commonwealth Council meetings, 22 February and 9 August 1941.
78 Commonwealth Council Minutes, 18, 19 and 20 August 1935.
79 Commonwealth Council Minutes, 22 February 1941. John Andrews to Secretary of NSW Branch, 5 March 1941. AIIA Papers, NLA, Box NB 1.
engaged in particular pieces of research, were really conscious of whether they were operating as Round Table, IPR or AIIA members.

As far as financial support for research was concerned the role of the Institute of Pacific Relations was crucial. In the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s, research conducted by the Sydney and Melbourne Branches, and by the Institute as a whole after 1933, was heavily dependent on the financial assistance provided by the IPR, in effect, as part of its own research program. Before the formation of the national AIIA, the first publications of the Victorian and NSW groups—P.D. Phillips and G.L. Wood (eds), *The Peopling of Australia* (Melbourne, 1928, Pacific Relations Series, No. 1), F.W. Eggleston (ed.), *The Australian Mandate for New Guinea* (Melbourne, 1928, Pacific Relations Series, No. 2) and Persia Campbell, R.C. Mills and G.V. Portus (eds), *Studies in Australian Affairs* (Melbourne, 1928, Pacific Relations Series, No. 3)—were published with the assistance of grants from the IPR, and similar grants supported other Australian enquiries in the following years. The visits to Australia of the Secretaries General of the IPR, E.C. Carter in 1935 and W.L. Holland in 1939, were of great importance in strengthening the AIIA’s perception of its role as the Australian National Council of the IPR and developing the relationship between the two Institutes. That relationship was expressed especially in the AIIA’s active participation in the conferences of the IPR which were held every two or three years.

IPR funding was intended to be matched by grants from Australian sources. The Commonwealth Council of the Institute after 1932 levied its three branches for contributions to a national AIIA subscription to the IPR, replacing those of the former IPR groups in Melbourne and Sydney, but the Australian Institute lacked funds on the scale required to match IPR research support. The matching was, in fact, secured by computing a proportion of the University salaries of Institute members engaged on IPR research projects. In 1934, for example, the Registrar of the University of Sydney, in response to a request from the Institute, computed the proportion of salary relating to the time devoted by University members to Institute research at £300. This figure, he estimated, represented the work of one calendar month for those staff members, even though the work would in fact be spread over several months. The University of Queensland made a similar computation for the work done by Dr T.P. Fry on the Australian sugar industry. The IPR allowed unexpended portions of its grants to be placed in a consolidated research fund which, with the addition of royalties, could be used to assist subsequent publications.

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81 *The Australian Mandate for New Guinea* was issued for the Victorian Branch of the League of Nations Union.

82 See chapter 3 below for an account of that participation. A list of IPR conferences is given in Appendix C.


84 Commonwealth Council Minutes, 23 February 1934 and 6–7 June 1936.
It was only gradually that the Institute moved to develop a more formal and nationally organised research program. In the mid 1930s, T.P. Fry of Queensland proposed to a Commonwealth Council meeting that a Research Advisory Committee be established to advise the Council on research matters. This was not agreed to at the time, but a subcommittee was appointed to draw up provisional rules to govern the formulation and carrying out of research projects, and, on the motion of Professor Charteris, Dr Fry was asked to correspond with the Research Secretary (then Mr P.D. Phillips of the Melbourne Branch) with a view to securing closer cooperation between the States in research matters. In 1940, W.D. Forsyth was appointed to a new position of Research Director on an annual salary of £400. In 1941, the Council established an Editorial Committee ‘to supervise and direct’ the preparation of research works. P.D. Phillips was appointed as Chairman of the Committee whose other members were W.D. Forsyth as secretary, John Andrews and L.F. Fitzhardinge. The responsibility for research was thus spread over three branches, Melbourne, Sydney and Canberra. Finally, in August of that year the Council resolved ‘that the title of the Editorial Committee be changed to that of Research Committee’. P.D. Phillips was appointed as the first Chairman of the Committee. Thereafter the Research Committee continued as a Committee of the Commonwealth Council and its Chairman, in due course, became ex officio a member of the National Executive of the Institute.

These developments, as will be seen below, were supported by a Rockefeller grant of US$7500 which was intended to assist in the strengthening of the Institute’s research capacity and to place its administration on a firmer basis. Similar assistance came in the 1960s from the Ford Foundation which enabled the establishment of a Commonwealth Directorate of the Institute. But in spite of such contributions, the Institute, throughout its history, has continued to work within tight financial constraints and the maintenance of its central organisation has been achieved only with some difficulty. If the initial level of subscriptions in the early 1930s is compared with the subscription to, say, the Victorian Branch at the time of writing—$60 per annum—it will be seen that subscriptions have declined sharply in real terms. (At a very rough calculation, £2–2–0 in 1932 would be in the region of $200 or $300 sixty-five years later.) Nor, in spite of some considerable private benefactions such as those of E.C. Dyason and his family, and in spite of a number of public appeals for funds, has there been the level of private donation that is often available to sustain education and research activities in the United States. It was not to be expected, even after the creation of a national body

85 Minutes of a special meeting of the Commonwealth Council, 23 February 1934.
86 Minutes of Commonwealth Council, 22 February 1941.
87 Minutes of the Commonwealth Council, 9 August 1941.
and later the building of a national headquarters, that the Australian Institute would be able to maintain a central organisation and a substantial library on the scale of Chatham House. As with Canada, the object was to establish a network of branches and contribute through the national organisation to the work of those branches. Canada, however, did manage, by the early 1950s, to establish a national headquarters with a full time staff of twelve persons,\(^88\) an achievement that was well beyond Australian resources.\(^89\)

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The formation of the Australian Institute of International Affairs came appropriately at a time when fundamental changes were asserting themselves in the order of power which had emerged from the Great War. During the 1920s, the League of Nations offered the hope that future conflicts between nations could be resolved without war; but the failure of America to join the League and the absence of clear procedures for arbitration of disputes or for the application of force to deal with breaches of the peace evoked continuing fears that the new machinery was not likely to be effective in a major crisis. Attempts to stiffen the League system for western Europe in the form of a protocol to the Covenant prescribing compulsory arbitration of disputes (the ‘Geneva Protocol’, rejected by Britain and the Dominions) and subsequently in the form of the Locarno Treaties of 1925, were still without teeth; and the Kellogg Pact of 1928, in which the signatories renounced the use of war, was no more than a self-denying ordinance. The first serious challenge to the League system, Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in September 1931, demonstrated the validity of the existing doubts about it.

Before and immediately after the Manchurian Incident informed Australian opinion, as reflected in the thinking of Institute members, focused on questions of collective security, certainly, and on aspects of Australia’s position as a member of the British Commonwealth, including the role of separate naval forces; but rather more emphasis was placed on what might be considered domestic issues: immigration, the ‘peopling of Australia’, tariffs and the future of Australian primary products. There was

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\(^89\) The formation of an Australian Institute in 1933 was followed by the formation of Institutes in other British Commonwealth countries: South Africa in 1934, India in 1936 and New Zealand in 1938 (also by amalgamation of IPR and RIIA branches). After the partition of the Indian subcontinent a Pakistan Institute was formed in 1948, and the Indian Council of World Affairs, formed in 1943, became the effective Indian centre for the study of international relations, with its headquarters at Sapru House. For details of these developments see T.B. Millar, ‘Commonwealth Institutes of International Affairs’, *International Journal*, vol. 33, 1977-78, pp. 1-27.
still hope for the League of Nations, and a concern that Australia’s special interests should be protected in any collective security arrangements, and there was a continuing demand for effective consultation between Britain and the Dominions in matters of international policy. This could be expressed to some extent through participation in Imperial Conferences. But as yet there was no desire for the development of a separate and independent foreign policy and, the Depression notwithstanding, there remained a sense that the world of nations was stable and that British power and influence was the main safeguard for the Dominions.

The Institute was formed on the edge of a period of more rapid change and growing threat. The first seven years of its existence may be seen in terms of a response to those changes and of an attempt to shape appropriate Australian perceptions of the more uncomfortable world of the future.
3 The Critical Thirties

From the vantage point of the 1990s, the 1930s appear as one of those watershed periods in which the shape of the international system undergoes a profound transformation, a transformation not only of the realities of power but also of the way the system is perceived, described and analysed. For a comparable shift one might think, perhaps, of the upheaval of the French revolutionary wars leading to the establishment, at the Congress of Vienna, of a new order of power in Europe which was to last in its main outlines for a century. There were important changes within it. The unification of Italy and of Germany, for example, represented significant shifts in the distribution of national power. So did the expansion of the European empires in Asia and Africa. But these developments did not change the main shape of the Vienna system which could be said to have remained in place at least until 1914.

The Great War destroyed the balances of that system and appeared to contemporaries to mark the end of an era and the beginning of a new one. So at least it seemed to the statesmen who gathered at Versailles in 1919 to determine the outlines of the new international order, and also to those like Leonard Woolf who, in a somewhat apocalyptic way a dozen years later, saw the Great War as ‘the deluge’—one of those ‘great events’ which ‘dislocate the framework of the society in which we are doomed to live’ and ‘compels us to find a new mould or matrix which will stamp its character upon the rest of our lives’.¹ The changes were indeed very great. The defeat of Germany, the imposition of reparations, the redistribution of her colonies and the dismemberment of the German and Austro-Hungarian empires in Europe rearranged the respective positions of

victors and vanquished. New states—Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the Balkan states—emerged from the diverse peoples of the old empires, though without obliterating existing feelings of ethnic identity. The League of Nations constituted a bold new experiment in international organisation. The Russian Revolution of 1917 foreshadowed the appearance of a new type of actor on to the international stage and added new ideological elements to the relations of the powers. In what was called the Far East the slow process of revolution continued in China.

Nevertheless, at a more general level there is a sense in which the Great War did not immediately alter either the nature of the international system or the way observers described it. Initially at least, most analysts continued to think in terms of balances of power on which peace depended and which, it was hoped, could be preserved in the face of threats by collective action, possibly through the League. And for most observers the states system of western Europe remained, without question, at the centre of world events. Developments there continued to be seen as shaping the international system as a whole. It took some time for adjustments to be made to these perceptions. In retrospect, the 1930s rather than the immediate post Great War years appear as the critical period of change in the dominant images of international order. After the comparative stability of the 1920s, the consolidation of fascism in Italy and the rise of nazism in Germany, the changing role of Japan, no longer since the Washington Treaties of 1922 the valued ally of Britain, and, in general, the inability of the League to maintain the order of power established in 1919, were clear by the early 1930s. The rise of the European dictators was accompanied by the probing of the constraints imposed at Versailles: the remilitarisation of the Rhineland, the rearmament of Germany, Italy's Abyssinian adventure, Japan's establishment of her colony of Manchukuo and her subsequent invasion of China. These events presented themselves as part of an inevitable slide to the cataclysm of the second world war. They also eroded some of the analytical categories of the past. During the 1930s, of course, there were still those like Winston Churchill who dealt in fairly traditional terms with the shifts in power relationships when he attacked the appeasement policies of governments of which he was not a member, and called for the rearmament of a weakened Britain in order to redress a balance that was increasingly tipped against her. He later described Munich as 'a defeat without a war', 'an awful milestone in our history, when the whole equilibrium of Europe has been deranged'. Against such 'political' perceptions, however, were analyses which no longer accepted the concept of nation states as discrete and autonomous actors, which sought to discern deeper currents below the surface of western society and which attempted to characterise the situation, not in terms of rival nationalisms and changing balances but rather as reflecting a more profound crisis of western civilisation, a crisis

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for which the remedies of the past were inadequate. And following those shifts of perspective was to come a recognition of other regions of international interaction, reducing the central role of western Europe.

Watersheds, of course, are made by historians and not by the events themselves. In looking back on the 1930s it is important not only to consider the shape of events and the way in which they were seen by contemporaries, but also to remember that judgements about them now are made from the vantage point of the 1990s and are shaped, no doubt, by the experience of a much later process of international change and realignment. With that warning it is worth surveying the ideas and the changing perceptions of the period in which members of the AIIA were pioneering a new discussion of Australia’s place in the world. Australian observers were not central to this reshaping of perceptions of the international scene but those who founded the Australian Institute of International Affairs did their thinking, and formed their judgements of the world about them, against that background.

**Changing perceptions of international order**

An early challenge to traditional perceptions of the nature of international conflict and the idea of the ultimate sovereignty of the nation state was Norman Angell’s *The Great Illusion*, which had appeared in the lead up to the Great War but which enjoyed a renewed vogue as the war clouds gathered in the 1930s. Angell attacked the assumptions that peace could be secured by building up superior power and that victory could achieve economic gain. The ‘great illusion’—that there was a necessary conflict between our own ends and those of others—prevented Britain before 1914 from seeking an accommodation that could include Germany. His solution was the creation by collective action of a common procedure for the settlement of disputes. In spite of its somewhat naïve belief in the ultimate compatibility of competing national interests and the possibility, therefore, of rational solutions to international problems, Angell’s book appeared sufficiently relevant thirty years later for an abridged version, supplemented by some newly written chapters, to be published as a Penguin Special, under the title, *The Great Illusion—Now.*

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3 *The Great Illusion* was first published at the author’s expense in 1908, as a pamphlet entitled ‘Europe’s Optical Illusion’. It appeared as a book in the following year, enjoyed enormous public success and went through a number of editions. See Angell’s autobiography, *After All* (London, 1951), for an account of the difficulties encountered in finding a publisher and of the book’s subsequent reception. See also J.D.B. Miller, *Norman Angell and the Futility of War* (London, 1985).

4 Penguin Specials were a sub-series of the Penguin paperbacks, printed with distinctive red and white covers and dealing primarily with international issues.
At this distance its confident idealism makes it appear something of a curiosity, though the idea that national interests can ultimately be reconciled in a harmonious international order is still alive and well. But since Angell’s basic formula depended on the possibility of mobilising collective power to impose peaceful solutions to disputes, it was still operating essentially at a purely political level and was not, after all, so very different from standard perceptions of shifting power relationships. Less optimistic, and more representative of the changing perspectives of the 1930s were analyses which went beyond considerations of power and political rivalry and sought explanations of the worsening situation in terms of the broader processes of history and which linked international developments with developments in domestic social and economic order.

The perception of such links was not new. It was the economic liberal, J.A. Hobson who, in 1902, found an explanation of imperialism, and therefore of international conflict, in the under-consumption of industrial societies and who therefore provided a point of departure for Lenin’s very different account of imperialism in terms of monopoly capitalism seeking external avenues of investment.5 Hobson had argued that, except for a small group of self-interested financiers and others, there was no economic advantage in empire and that the adoption of different domestic policies could ease the drive for external markets and avoid international conflict. Whereas Hobson thus allowed for the possibility of different, and rational, choices by governments, Lenin’s Imperialism saw the choices as rooted in the nature of monopoly capitalism and therefore as systematic and inescapable. Imperialism was thus a necessary and inevitable process. It was significant of the preoccupations of the 1930s that Hobson’s 1902 book should appear in a new edition in 1938.

What was new in the 1930s was not the perception that the roots of international conflict lay in domestic social and economic developments, and the currency of one version or another of the crisis of capitalism, but the growing disposition to accept views belonging, at least in a general way, to that genre. There were, of course, analyses of a strictly Marxist character. Lenin’s view of imperialism as the product of the highest stage of capitalism was restated in such works as R. Palme Dutt’s Fascism and Social Revolution: A Study in the Last Stages of Capitalism and Decay (1935), his World Politics, 1918–1936 (London, 1936), and Maurice Dobb’s Political Economy and Capitalism (London, 1937). But such views were certainly not confined to those who espoused a frankly Marxist position. It appeared appropriate for W.K. Hancock, for example, to include in the second volume of his conservatively magisterial study of British Commonwealth relations (1940), a contributed essay on ‘The

5 J.A. Hobson, Imperialism (1902); V.I. Lenin, Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism (1917).
Communist Doctrines of Empire'. For H.N. Brailsford, one of the ‘New Liberals’ of the early years of the century and later a member of the Independent Labour Party, the rise of fascism was indeed related to the deeper tensions of capitalism in crisis. In the same general vein were E.H. Carr’s *The Twenty Years’ Crisis* (1939), which sought a basis for international order in a compromise between morality and power, a compromise involving a large element of economic reconstruction, and the social and political analyses of Harold Laski at the London School of Economics and Political Science. In *The State in Theory and Practice*, Laski, who had already probed questions of liberty and equality in *Liberty in the Modern State* (1930), considered the role of the state in the international community and concluded that war was ‘the expression of an unequal society which is seeking...to defend its privileges from invasion’. And one could cite other examples from the political literature of the period.

These emerging orthodoxies might not unreasonably be described as ideological in character, though the nature of that ideology is difficult to pin down. The term ‘ideology’ may indeed suggest too coherent and systematic an outlook for what was really a varied, if loosely connected, body of ideas. What is in question might better be regarded as a general flavour or style of thinking rather than as a coherent doctrine, though the linking of capitalist evolution, domestic tensions and class conflict, the relation of liberty and authority, the nature of state power and international rivalries, and the sense of a sweep of history moving towards an inevitable cataclysm did, in a very general way, constitute a systematic kind of approach. Its Marxist overtones did not mean that it was schematically and dogmatically Marxist in character. That was very much a matter of degree. Marxist categories, terminology and idiom at this time provided a framework and a vocabulary for social and political analysis which had an appeal extending far beyond the parties of the left. The flavour of much of the international affairs literature of the time was anti-fascist rather than communist or even socialist, and it was accompanied by idealistic aspirations for a new world order which, it seemed, might be attained through rational, enlightened thought and action.

Within this framework there was present a sense of continuing and systematic debate about the nature of the international order, about the inevitability or otherwise of a second world war and about the particular policies pursued by the powers. Victor Gollancz’s publishing venture, the

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Left Book Club, launched in 1936, was one vehicle of debate. Subscribers to the series received automatically the book chosen for the month. Additional books could also be purchased. With an assured subscriber market it was possible to publish cheaply works written specifically for the series or reprints of works originally published elsewhere. Brailsford’s *Why Capitalism Means War*, to which reference has been made, appeared in that series.\(^\text{10}\) Apart from political and economic studies, and a fair mixture of frankly polemical pamphlets, the series included historical works\(^\text{11}\) and literary works\(^\text{12}\) and even anthropology.\(^\text{13}\) Allen Lane’s paperback empire also contributed to political discussion, especially through Penguin Specials.\(^\text{14}\) Many of these were influential works and the mere listing of titles captures much of the mood of the period.

The broad disposition to see the unfolding of events in Europe as reflecting the predictable operation of underlying social forces formed part of an intellectual ferment that included the so-called ‘New Writing’ movement.\(^\text{15}\) It flowed across national boundaries and had a political counterpart in the optimism of the Popular Front.\(^\text{16}\) It would be a mistake, of course, to perceive a single orthodoxy in the discussion. Attitudes were complex and varied. Some of those who can be seen as part of the New

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\(^{10}\) Others were Gaetano Salvemini’s *Under the Axe of Fascism* (1936), John Strachey’s *The Theory and Practice of Socialism* (1936) and *The Coming Struggle for Power* (1937), Stafford Cripps’s *The Struggle for Peace* (1936), C.R. Attlee’s *The Labour Party in Perspective* (1937), R.H. Tawney’s *The Acquisitive Society* (1937), Edgar Snow’s *Red Star Over China* (1937), Sidney and Beatrice Webb’s *Soviet Communism: a New Civilisation* (1937), Leonard Barnes’s *Empire or Democracy?* (1939) and Hewlett Johnson’s *The Socialist Sixth of the World* (1939).


\(^{13}\) Tom Harrisson, *Savage Civilisation* (1937).


\(^{15}\) See, for example, John Lehmann, *New Writing in Europe* (London, 1940).

\(^{16}\) The Popular Front of the late 1930s sought cooperation between ‘progressive’ forces (liberal, socialist, communist, democratic and so on) in resistance to the rise of fascism. The pattern varied in the countries of western Europe. Popular Front governments were elected in Spain and France in 1936. In communist theory the idea of a popular front stood in contrast to that of a ‘united front’ in which European communist parties sought affiliation with other parties of the Left with an eye to influencing them from within. In Britain (and also in Australia) the Labour Party rejected such affiliation.
Writing movement believed in the essentially political role of art and, like John Cornford or Julian Bell, found it necessary to join the International Brigade in Spain. Others, appalled by the apparently inevitable slide towards catastrophe, believed, like Aldous Huxley and others in the Peace Pledge Union, in non-attachment and non-resistance. Others again, though wishing to remain separate from the flow of events, were forced to face the counter-argument that an attempt to maintain a personal neutrality was itself an activist position. By not resisting one was aiding the enemy. But amidst the complex of views there was certainly a sense of the inter-relation of international conflict and domestic order and of an acute crisis of conscience for the individual.  

The Spanish Civil War provided one focus for these attitudes, appearing to some as a fusing of Spain’s domestic social conflict with international conflict. The volunteers in the International Brigade saw themselves as defenders of a democratic republic against a right wing, authoritarian challenge from within Spain and from outside it. There were others, of course, who saw Germany and Italy as resisting, in Spain, a communist challenge to Christian civilisation. Either way, there were perceptions of major historical forces in motion and a sense that questions of peace and war were not determined by the details of political or diplomatic manoeuvre. Arguments about the efficacy of policies of appeasement, or about whether the unchallenged German reoccupation of the Rhineland marked the point of no return in the international politics of the 1930s, or about whether the Munich agreement could be justified as an attempt by Britain and France to buy time for rearmament, were minor by comparison.

While much of the debate was focused directly on Europe, a global dimension was also present, a perception that the threat to the peace of Europe posed by the ambitions of Germany and Italy was linked to changes elsewhere, and particularly in eastern Asia. Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the subsequent Lytton Commission and the failure of the League of Nations to resolve the conflict was the first and most decisive exposure of the impotence of the League. In the following years the development of an extreme militarism in Japan illustrated not only in the invasion of China in 1937, but, before then, in the extraordinary assassination incidents of 1932, 1935 and 1936, appeared to link Japan’s domestic polity with those of the Axis powers in Europe; and her elaboration of the idea of a Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere indicated the nature of her ultimate ambitions in East and Southeast Asia and provided the basis on which European conflict was to become global conflict in 1941. Continuing revolution in China, Chiang Kai-shek’s attempt to purge the Kuomintang of communist influence, the Long March and the establishment of a communist regime in the north–west, gave hints

that a new order of power was in the making there. If one can perceive
strong ideological elements in western thinking about international affairs
in general the Chinese situation could be fitted neatly into that pattern.
The reports of the journalist, Edgar Snow, and of the communist writer,
Agnes Smedley, emphasised the authoritarian tendencies of Chiang Kai-
shek and gave sympathetic accounts of the Chinese Communist regime
which influenced western liberal observers. As far as the European
dependencies of Southeast Asia were concerned, these, despite the emer-
gence of new nationalist movements, were still, it seemed, safely under the
control of their imperial masters, but in India constitutional developments
appeared to be moving towards self-government and dominion status,
foreshadowing major changes in the Asian balance.

These general perspectives, it might be noted, had considerable sur-
vival value. World War II, when it came, resolved some of the issues of
the prewar years through the defeat of the axis powers and created images
of a new international order which were to last in their main outlines until
the end of the 1980s, though again with considerable shifts and changes.
The Grand Alliance of the war years was quickly replaced by the divisions
of the Cold War, the continuing rivalry of the super powers, the construc-
tion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the maintenance of a
new European balance. For Europe the changes were dramatic. European
powers had once seen themselves as the principal actors on the inter-
national stage. Their rivalries and their overseas expansion had appeared
to set in motion forces which determined the direction of international
cooperation and conflict. In the postwar world, as one AIIA observer
remarked in 1955, ‘From being prime movers in world politics, European
nations had become the pawns in someone else’s game.’ For forty years
it was to be a Cold War game. In East Asia the final victory of the Chinese
Communist Party in 1949 created similar oppositions and was followed by
the drawing of firm lines of division in Korea and Vietnam. The dis-
memberment of the European colonial empires and the emergence of the
new states of Africa and Asia were fitted, to a considerable extent, into the
same pattern. The sharpness of East–West tension was modified in many
ways—by alternating periods of démarche and détente, by negotiations
and understandings on such matters as strategic arms limitation, by the
Sino–Soviet split and by the dramatic economic recovery of western
Europe and Japan. By the 1980s, perceptions of a multicentric world had
replaced those of sharp and simple bipolar conflict. But, in spite of the
magnitude of the changes that had occurred, the categories of the late
1930s, with their ideological dimensions, still provided a framework for
the analysis of the alignments of the powers, whether in terms of policies

18 Fred Alexander, reviewing W.H. McNeill’s America, Britain and Russia:
Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941–46, RIIA Survey of International
Affairs, 1939–46 (1953), The Australian Outlook, vol. 9, no. 3 (September
1955).
designed to achieve the containment of communism or in criticism of such policies and, in either case, for the linking of analyses of international relations with considerations of domestic economic and social order.

**Australian attitudes**

The assessments of informed Australian opinion during the 1930s followed, in broad terms, those of British observers of the international scene. Australia at the beginning of the decade still tended, as we have seen, to see the world from a British—or at most a British Commonwealth—point of view rather than from a local and regional one and the course of events in Europe remained in the foreground of its line of vision. As was pointed out above this was not, at the time, an obviously unrealistic view of the world. The rise of the axis powers, in threatening the peace of Europe, did constitute the major threat to Australian security also. Italy’s thrust across the Mediterranean appeared especially to endanger the lines of communication and commerce. In the Pacific, where Japan’s invasion of Manchuria gave a sign of things to come, British naval power was still seen as central to Australia’s defence.

As the decade progressed there were signs of changes in these perspectives, changes which embraced a recognition both of the importance to Australia of the region to her north and, perhaps in consequence, of the possibility of differences between Australian interests and those of Britain and the Commonwealth. For these reasons there were some who were beginning to voice a desire for a less complete dependence on British foreign policy and diplomacy and to foreshadow the emergence of an independent Australian approach.

In 1934, the Queensland Branch of the Australian Institute of International Affairs made Australian foreign policy the subject of a weekend conference at Southport, at which a number of speakers argued for a shift of Australian interest from Europe to its nearby region. The title of the published proceedings of the conference, *Australian Foreign Policy, 1934,*19 itself carried something of an assertion, to be repeated four years later in the title of the proceedings of an Australian Institute of Political Science Summer School, at which attention was given to Australia’s voice in imperial affairs, to the changes surrounding her in the Pacific region and to the possibility of a distinctive Australian foreign policy.20

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19 H. Dinning and J.G. Holmes (eds.), *Australian Foreign Policy, 1934* (Melbourne, 1935).
20 W.G.K. Duncan, *Australia’s Foreign Policy* (Sydney, 1938). See also, J.D.B. Miller, ‘The Development of International Studies in Australia’, *Australian Outlook*, vol. 37, no. 3 (December 1983), in which attention is drawn to a widening gap between those seeking to draw closer to Britain and those seeking a separate Australian approach to the world.
The growing awareness of Australia’s special position in the southwest Pacific included a perception of opportunities as well as dangers. In 1935, a study group of the NSW Branch of the Institute prepared a discussion of the prospects for expanding trade with East Asia. A series of papers considered in turn the opportunities provided by Japan, Netherlands India, Malaya and China. The prevailing opinion of the group was conveyed by E.R. Walker, Lecturer in Economics in the University of Sydney, who concluded that, provided political factors did not intervene, ‘it would appear inevitable that Australia’s trade with the Far East should expand as the latter’s population grows and her industries develop’.21 A similar view was expressed by Ian Clunies Ross who, in his paper on Japan, argued that Australia’s future prosperity would increasingly depend on that of Japan. (Clunies Ross had had the unusual experience for an Australian of having lived for a year in Japan in 1929–30 and his contribution to the study group was enlivened by observations on Japanese institutions and culture.22) These views constituted something of an emerging orthodoxy within the AIIEA during the 1930s. In 1938, J.G. Crawford drew the attention of an Institute of Political Science Summer School to the changing patterns of Australian trade, to the development of a favourable balance of trade with Pacific countries and to the limited opportunities for Australia in European markets.23 He also questioned the effectiveness of the Singapore naval base for Australia’s defence and pointed to the political benefits likely to flow from trade with Japan. A similar emphasis on the prospects for Pacific trade was to be seen in a documentary history of Australian trade policy published in 1937.24

At an official level, some years earlier—in 1934—Sir John Latham, Deputy Prime Minister in the Lyons Government, had led an Australian mission on a wide sweep through the Netherlands East Indies, Singapore, Malaya, French Indochina, the Philippines and China and Japan and, in the following year Trade Commissioners were appointed to China, Japan and Korea.25

For the most part, however, the voices urging a greater degree of Australian initiative in her dealings with the outside world were still minority voices. The trade initiatives of 1935 were to be followed by the


23 Duncan, Australia’s Foreign Policy, chapter 3.


disastrous—from Australia’s point of view—Trade Diversion Policy which sought to direct trade away from Japan and to protect Australian markets for British exports.26 Even the separation of the External Affairs function from the Prime Minister’s Department and the re-establishment of a separate Department of External Affairs in 1935 did not, in itself, indicate a readiness to formulate an independent Australian policy. Indeed, R.G. Menzies, as Attorney General in the Lyons Government, continued to take the view that, while Dominion Governments might express their views in London and seek to influence imperial policy, the determination of a foreign policy for the Empire was properly the responsibility of Britain.27 That view was accepted even by some of those advocating ‘A Foreign Policy for Australia’. D.A.S. Campbell, editor of *The Australian Quarterly*, speaking on that subject at the 1938 Summer School of the Institute of Political Science, saw new policy directions as being obtained by working through the Commonwealth.28 The role of the new Department of External Affairs was the processing of information received from London rather than the establishment of Australia’s own diplomatic representation and the formulation of a separate policy. In 1937, an Australian official, Keith Officer, was appointed as Counsellor in the British Embassy in Washington and this was the first Australian diplomatic appointment until those of Casey to Washington and Latham to Tokyo in 1940 and Eggleston to Chungking in 1941. (Though Casey was a Senior Clerk in the External Affairs Branch of the Prime Minister’s Department at the time of his appointment, in 1924, as Liaison Officer in Britain, this was not a diplomatic appointment.)

Australia’s preoccupation with the drift of events in Europe displayed some of the same ideological dimensions as those already noticed in British debates. For Australians the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War appeared of particular importance. It was a point at which alternative political forces, and alternative ways of regarding them, appeared sharply opposed in a way that aroused strong emotions within the community, and in retrospect it was much more divisive in Australia than was Munich. That this should be so was not merely a matter of opposing political viewpoints. It was due in part to the composition of Australian society

26 The Trade Diversion Policy aimed to increase primary exports and to expand secondary industry by restricting the imports of certain goods and diverting trade from ‘bad customers’ (especially the United States) to ‘good customers’. It was not aimed specifically against Japan which was indeed Australia’s second best customer, but in order to protect British textiles it imposed high tariffs on non-British textile imports—a move which led Japan to adopt countermeasures, especially against Australian wool. For a full account of the Policy, see Jack Shepherd, *Australia’s Interests and Policies in the Far East* (New York, 1940).


28 Duncan, *Australia’s Foreign Policy*, p. 203.
with its significant Irish and Catholic component. Whereas in Britain, Franco’s challenge to the Spanish Republic was seen primarily in terms of political and social philosophies—for the liberal, a democratically elected government facing rebellion, for the Left, a fascist attack on a socialist government, for conservatives a possibly justified resistance to a communist threat—in Australia there was considerable preparedness to accept Franco’s claim to be defending a Catholic society from atheistic communism. The picture was more complicated than that, of course. Within the Labor Party, in addition to the Catholic element which followed the reluctance of the hierarchy to pronounce against Franco, there was a strong isolationist element, anxious to avoid the spilling of Australian blood in European wars, resistant to the imposition of sanctions against Italy, and content enough with the Government’s preparedness to accept the course of events in Spain. There were others again, like Maurice Blackburn, who did see in Spain the danger of policies of appeasement of aggressors, who did support sanctions against Italy and whose willingness to join the Victorian Council of the Movement Against War and Fascism earned him his first expulsion from the Labor Party in 1936. The Australian Communist Party, of course, was vociferous in its support for the Republic, and on the Left a surprising number of Australians—not all from the Communist Party—volunteered for service on the Republican side in the International Brigade. But the differences were not simply between Left and Right. Various brands of liberal opinion—represented by academics, Church leaders from several non-Catholic denominations, writers and others—were aroused to speak in support of the Republic. Their ranks included R.M. Crawford, newly appointed to the Melbourne Chair of History, Herbert Burton, Senior Lecturer in Economic History, W. Macmahon Ball, Lecturer in Political Science at Melbourne, Professor Walter Murdoch, Professor of English in Perth, Archbishop Head, Anglican Archbishop of Melbourne, Father Maynard of St. Peter’s, Eastern Hill, and writers Vance and Nettie Palmer.

The formation of attitudes on Spain was expressed in a dramatic way at a famous debate held in the Public Lecture Theatre of the University of Melbourne on 22 March 1937. Three Catholics, B.A. Santamaria, Kevin Kelly and Stanley Ingwerson faced two Communists, Gerry O’Day and Jack Legge together with Nettie Palmer before an audience, according to Santamaria, of between 750 and 1000. There are a number of accounts of

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29 He was subsequently readmitted but was expelled again, and finally, in 1941, on a similar count—his support for the Australia–Soviet Friendship League.


the event, many of them stressing the dramatic conclusion to the meeting when, amidst uproar, the Catholic section of the audience, orchestrated by Santamaria, rose and shouted 'Viva Christo Rey: Long Live Christ the King'. It was indeed a significant occasion, crystallising intellectual positions which were still visible decades later. Santamaria's judgement, given in his autobiography, that 'much more than a debate was involved: attitudes, philosophies, policies were being fixed and positions hardened', applied as much to his opponents as to his Catholic allies. For him it was 'a watershed in the thinking of our time' and the beginning of 'the long fight against communist influences within Australian Labour'.

The son of Italian migrants, and now a fresh graduate in Law from the University of Melbourne, Santamaria had already been involved in the establishment of the Catholic Worker and some months after the Spanish Civil War debate he was invited by Archbishop Mannix to join the Secretariat of Catholic Action, a new lay movement about to be founded within the Church. There followed the establishment, in the early 1940s, of the Catholic Social Movement which came to be known simply as 'The Movement', and of its paper, Freedom, later News Weekly. These steps were accompanied by the launching of a campaign against communist influence in trade unions by means of the Industrial Groups, modelled on the Communist Party's own methods of infiltration, a campaign which in due course had its outcome in the Australian Labor Party split of 1955 and the formation of the Democratic Labor Party. The Movement eventually became an issue of contention within the Church itself and lost much of the episcopal support it had enjoyed initially; but Santamaria stuck to his position that communism was the main issue and he remained an influential publicist with a coherent outlook on the international as well as the domestic scene. His National Civic Council, formed in 1957 essentially as a successor to The Movement, was formally free from ecclesiastical ties. Through this forum he continued to advocate positions on all aspects of public policy. He had links also with the Congress for Cultural Freedom which, largely through its journal Quadrant, provided an intellectual forum for an orthodoxy of the Right to fight against what Santamaria termed 'the fashionable intellectual orthodoxies of the anti-Vietnam movement'.
Santamaria’s allies over a thirty or forty year period were more diverse than might appear from his own account. In his varied activities, extending from struggle within trade unions, through national politics by way of the DLP, to the work of the National Civic Council, he was able to mobilise support at different times from different sectors of opinion. On the other side of the ideological divide there was a similar diversity and complexity. From his point of view his long struggle was against a communist enemy and against those who were allies, fellow travellers or dupes of the communist movement, those whom he identified, looking back to the days of the Spanish Civil War, as representing ‘the confused complex of liberal–Marxist ideas which have been dominant in the West since the days of the French Enlightenment’.38 His autobiography is full of contemptuous references to his opponents—to the ‘tawdry edifice of sophisticated unreality’ surrounding the Whitlam Government,39 or to the ‘Communist, Trotskyite, anarchist, feminist and other “liberationist” forces’ which opposed Australia’s Vietnam commitment on university campuses.40 The reality, of course, was not so simple. Those whom Santamaria saw as a connected and threatening movement were, in fact, very diverse in outlook and origin and included not only communists but anti-communist liberals, both secular and religious. Manning Clark, in a similar over-simplification, but one made with much more respect for their seriousness of purpose, thought of them as representatives of the Enlightenment. But in spite of that diversity on both sides, there was certainly a divide of an important kind, visible in the opposing passions of the mid 1930s and extending from then until, perhaps, the 1970s. The passions aroused on the issues of western policy in eastern Asia in the 1960s and 1970s reflected attitudes which were shaping themselves in the 1930s, with the Spanish Civil War as a crucial catalyst.

Contribution of the AIIA

This was the setting in which the new Australian Institute made its first contributions to the Australian discussion of international affairs. To what extent is it possible to discern an Institute view of Australia’s place in the world or a distinctive style of approach to the consideration of such questions?

38 ibid. p. 37.
40 ibid. p. 329. A similar blanket description of what were really very diverse elements is conveyed in the title of one study of the intellectual flavour of this whole period—Patrick O’Brien’s The Saviours: An Intellectual History of the Left in Australia (Richmond, Vic., 1977). A view of the period from the Left is provided by Robin Gollan, Revolutionaries and Reformists: Communism and the Australian Labor Movement, 1920–1955 (Canberra, 1975) chapter 2, ‘The Popular Front’.
To speak of 'the new Institute' is, of course, a little misleading. Though the final creation of the AIIA took place in 1933, it will be apparent that there was already by then a substantial record of achievement. In the RIIA Branches, in the IPR Groups and in the NSW 'Division' of the AIIA the same people had already engaged in a sustained study of Australia's international position, and the final formation of the AIIA did not lead to any marked change in outlook or attitude. As we have noted, the Institute was prevented by its Charter from expressing views on matters of substance relating to international affairs. That was for individual members, and the self-denying ordinance of the Charter was intended to safeguard freedom of inquiry by enabling individual opinion to be expressed without committing the organisation as a whole. That suited its leading members. Eggleston was later to express some uneasiness about what he saw as a tendency of the Institute of Pacific Relations, on occasion, to take up a position on international questions. The AIIA was conscious of the need to have a diversity of opinion within its membership. The Commonwealth Council, at its annual meeting in August 1935, adopted a recommendation to branches 'that each branch should take steps to see that its membership was representative of all shades of opinion'.

In spite of that recognition, it could be said that the Institute was pluralistic, reflective and liberal-conservative in temper rather than radical. And, in spite of its Charter, there did emerge, over a period, some shared perceptions of the nature of Australia's position in the world and the rudiments of what could be described as an Institute view.

These ideas were, for the most part, of a practical rather than a theoretical nature. Institute members did not engage, to any great extent, in the kind of theoretical debate about the nature of international conflict, the crisis of western civilisation and so forth, that was such a marked feature of British and European writings mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. Macmahon Ball and Herbert Burton were, as we have noted, active in the debate about Spain and Ball did attempt to probe the causes of war in his Possible Peace in terms that reflected some of the ideas of European theorists. He agreed that the roots of conflict lay in the class divisions, the injustices and the economic inefficiencies of the capitalist organisation of industry. His solution lay, not in the overturning of that system but in the rational application of collective security: collective security based not on the building up of armaments but 'based on a sense of justice'. It would be possible also to discern some ideological elements in the lecture programs of the branches as they discussed Spain, Germany and Italy, the role of the Soviet Union and the future prospects

41 Commonwealth Council Minutes, Meeting of 18, 19 and 20 August 1935, Stephen House Papers.
42 W. Macmahon Ball, Possible Peace (Melbourne, 1936) p. 163.
43 Ibid. p. 177.
for a 'new China'. But Australian thinking was directed much more to practical matters of trade and security.

The Institute's contribution to debate was conducted in a fairly low key manner but was not the less influential for that. It was made in a number of ways—through regular branch meetings at which members gathered to hear and discuss addresses on various aspects of international affairs, through occasional conferences (the 1934 conference on Australian foreign policy organised by the Queensland Branch was the first of these), through participation in IPR conferences and British Commonwealth Relations conferences, and through the maintenance of a modest research program.

International conferences were of particular importance to the Australian Institute during its early years. IPR conferences, traditionally identified by number and by the location of the meeting, were held every two or three years after the initial Honolulu conference of 1925. The 2nd conference, again in Honolulu, was held in 1927, the 3rd in Japan (Kyoto and Nara) in 1929, the 4th in China (Hankow and Shanghai) in 1931, the 5th in Canada (Banff) in 1933, the 6th in America (Yosemite) in 1936 and the 7th, also in America (Virginia Beach) in 1939. (The latter was held after the beginning of the war in Europe and was called a 'Study Meeting' rather than a conference. A further conference—number eight—was held during the war at Mont Tremblant in Canada in 1942 and the 9th, in America [Hot Springs, Virginia] in 1945.)44 British Commonwealth Relations conferences, held under the auspices of the Royal Institute, were different in focus from the IPR conferences, and were held at less frequent intervals, but they were of comparable importance. The first of these was held in Toronto in 1933 and the second at Lapstone, NSW, in 1938. The Australian Institute also sent delegations to the meetings of the International Studies Conference, held in London in 1935, Paris in 1937, and Prague in 1938. (The International Studies Conference was a standing body established by the League of Nations' International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation. It was intended as a means of securing continuing collaboration between institutions concerned with the study and teaching of international relations.45)

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44 As will be seen below (chapter 6) the IPR came under attack in the United States during the McCarthy era. It continued to hold conferences during this period, but the 13th conference, held in Pakistan (Lahore), proved to be the last. The Institute was wound up in 1960.

45 Chatham House collaborated actively in the development of the Conference, 'seeing in its machinery the most practical means of establishing co-operation with institutions for the scientific study and teaching of international relations in other countries'. RIIA, Annual Report, 1934–35, p. 52. See also Stephen King Hall, Chatham House: A Brief Account of the Origins, Purposes and Methods of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London, 1937) pp. 67–74.
The unofficial character of these conferences was attractive to participating bodies like the AIIA. It provided an opportunity for the expression of different views within the same delegation, and members were able to speak more frankly than was possible when Ministers, diplomats and officials met at an inter-governmental level. At the same time participating countries could benefit from delegates’ reports on their return home. In Australia, at least during the 1930s and in the early postwar years, the Department of External Affairs sought sets of conference papers and welcomed briefings on proceedings. The AIIA’s delegations to these meetings were remarkably strong. They included many of the central figures of Australian public life—political figures, businessmen, senior academics and others. Eggleston led a delegation of five to the 2nd IPR Conference in Honolulu in 1927 and Australian contributions comprised ‘The Viewpoint of Australia on Pacific Affairs’ (Eggleston), ‘Australian Immigration Laws and their Working’ (Charteris) and ‘The Resources of Australia’ (Griffith Taylor, the Sydney geographer, at that time a member of the Victorian IPR group). Two years later, in 1929, a much larger delegation, again under Eggleston’s chairmanship, attended the 3rd IPR Conference at Nara and Kyoto. Australian participants on this occasion numbered eleven and papers reflected the cooperative work of a greater number of writers. Themes which concerned Australian contributors included the future of the Australian wheat industry, immigration and Australia’s New Guinea mandate, a particular interest of Eggleston’s. The 4th Conference (Hangkow and Shanghai) in 1931, and the 5th, at Banff in Canada in 1933, attracted similar strong delegations.

These gatherings played an important part in maintaining the continuity of the Australian connection with the IPR and the RIIA. Their importance in the eyes of Australian participants was illustrated by the time commitment involved in preparing papers and in sea travel to and from the meetings. A conference in mainland America or in Japan or India could require an absence from Australia of perhaps six to eight weeks. That, and the size of Australian delegations, reflects a more leisurely age than that which has followed on the heels of air travel.

46 Recollection of Miss N. Dickins, former Commonwealth Secretary of the AIIA.

47 The delegation to the 5th IPR Conference in Banff, Canada, 1933, was led by Professor Ernest Scott and included Alfred Stirling, and Associate Professor Georgina Sweet; that to the 6th Conference in Yosemite in 1936, was led by Eggleston and included Professor D.B. Copland, and E.C. Dyason; and that to the 7th Conference at Virginia Beach, USA, was led by J.G. Crawford and included Jack Shepherd and H. Duncan Hall. The 1st BCR Conference was held in Toronto in 1933, the same year as the Banff Conference of the IPR, and Ernest Scott and Alfred Stirling attended both.

48 An extraordinary example of the point is to be found in the decision of Professor Sir Ernest Scott to resign his Chair of History in the University of
The Institute came especially into its own when its offer to host the 2nd BCR Conference in 1938 was accepted. This was held at Lapstone, NSW, in September of that year and it attracted a range of distinguished participants including Lionel Curtis, Ernest Bevin, British trade union leader, later to become Foreign Secretary in the postwar Labour Government, Lord Lothian, Sir Alfred Zimmer, Professor of International Relations at Oxford, Professor W.K. Hancock from Britain, Professor Alexander Brady of the University of Toronto, Professor F.H. Soward of the University of British Columbia, and Professor P.E. Corbett of McGill University from Canada, S.H. Frankel and G.R. Hofmeyer from South Africa, and many others. The Australian delegation included Professor K.H. Bailey, Sir Thomas Bavin, R.J.F. Boyer, Senator J.S. Collings, Professor Charteris and Dr C.H. Currey. Sir Thomas Bavin chaired the conference and Mr Ivison Macadam, Director of Chatham House, was its secretary. Altogether ninety delegates attended. (The Australian data papers ran to some 500 pages.)

The mounting of a meeting on such a scale placed enormous strains on the slender resources of the Institute, and was made possible only by significant financial assistance from the Federal Government and the Government of NSW. The arrangement of accommodation for visitors, the negotiation of free rail travel (complicated by the separate State railway systems), and the coordination of arrivals and departures placed considerable administrative burdens on Jack Shepherd as the organising secretary. Eggleston described it as a ‘brilliant’ conference, and it certainly brought the AIIA clearly to public attention. Its timing was especially significant. It happened to coincide with the Munich crisis. The Chamberlain–Hitler agreement fell in the middle weekend of the two-week conference, and gave an unexpected edge to proceedings as delegates debated their reactions.

Participation in conferences was important not only for the contacts it provided with leading figures from other countries and for the exchange of ideas on matters of international relations and policies, but also, as we

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Melbourne in order to travel to Canada to attend the IPR and BCR Conferences in September 1933. In his letter to the Chancellor, Sir John MacFarland, he said that he and his wife had decided to attend these meetings 'and I think that my proper course will be to resign my Chair'. Scott to MacFarland, 15 October 1932. Scott Papers, NLA, MS 703/3/12-13. The University, however, decided to deal with the matter by granting him leave of absence to attend the conferences and asked him to remain in his Chair until 1936.


51 For one memory of this aspect of the meeting, see W.D. Forsyth, 'The Pre-War Melbourne Group of the AIIA: Some Personal Recollections', Australian Outlook, vol. 28, no. 1 (April 1974).
have noticed, for the stimulus it gave to the research activities of the Institute. Those of the Institute of Pacific Relations were particularly important. They provided the occasion for cooperation between branches in the management of study groups and working parties engaged in the preparation of conference data papers and in other ways, a cooperation which was consolidated and organised more effectively when the Research Committee of the Commonwealth Council was formally established in 1941. In these activities the nature of Institute perceptions of Australian interests was displayed.

Branch meetings provide some indication of the preoccupations of Institute members during the 1930s. Topics discussed in those settings ranged from the role of the Dominions in shaping imperial foreign policy, through considerations of Australia’s commercial policies, discussions of the domestic situation in individual countries—Britain, Germany, the Soviet Union, India, Japan, China, the Middle East—to questions of the distinctive interests of Australia. For most of the decade, though attention was occasionally given to Japan’s territorial ambitions and to commercial possibilities for Australia in the Pacific, the focus was mainly on the imperial relationship and on European developments. Typical topics of papers were ‘Germany under Hitler’, ‘Italy’s Territorial Aspirations’, ‘Civil War in Spain’, ‘The Imperialistic Ambitions of Germany and Italy’. In these areas the Institute’s concerns marched with those of the surrounding community.

A similar focus was to be seen in the subject matter of Australia’s contributions to international conferences over the decade. At the early conferences of the IPR—Honolulu in 1927 and Japan in 1929—Australian contributions centred on questions of trade and migration, and at later meetings, following the onset of the Depression, there continued to be a strong emphasis on economic questions—‘the peopling of Australia’, the future of primary industry, trade, markets and tariffs. At meetings of this kind it was natural that Australian delegates should see their task as discussing the problems facing Australia rather than more general issues of international affairs. As Eggleston remarked to the 1927 Conference of the IPR: ‘The main problem before the Australian people is an internal one: that of the development of our continent’, and Australian conference papers continued to give attention to similar themes. But there was some criticism of that outlook within the Institute. In 1935, it was suggested at a Commonwealth Council meeting that the research program of the IPR ‘should have a greater bearing on international politics and economics and less bearing on national economics and politics’. And in

53 Minutes of Commonwealth Council meeting, 18, 19 and 20 August 1935.
subsequent IPR and BCR conferences there was indeed a growing Australian concern with the territorial ambitions of Germany and Italy, with questions of collective security and with the capacity of the League of Nations to preserve peace. The Manchurian 'Incident' of 1931 had already accentuated these concerns, though Australian involvement in the 'Far East' as elsewhere continued to be seen in terms of a British Commonwealth rather than an individual Australian role. An Institute member, Sir William Harrison Moore, for example, contributed a paper to the 1931 IPR Conference in China on 'The Dominions of the British Commonwealth in the League of Nations' and another on 'Plans for Co-ordinating British Empire Foreign Policy' to the 1st British Commonwealth Relations Conference in Toronto in 1933. 'The Empire and the League' was P.D. Phillips' contribution to the same conference. There was some questioning in Institute ranks of the appropriateness for Australia of Britain's Far Eastern policy (for example W. Macmahon Ball and E.J.B. Foxcroft of the University of Melbourne contributed a paper, 'The Australian Attitude towards British Policy in the Far East', to the 1936 IPR Conference at Yosemite National Park). And there was a growing recognition of the problems posed by Japan. But even so it would seem at first glance that the general approach, in Institute discussions, did not seriously challenge the emphasis on a British Commonwealth, rather than an independent, posture. As late as 1937, one leading Institute member, Ian Clunies Ross, followed Harrison Moore's theme of four years earlier when he chose to address a branch meeting on the topic 'Can Australia Influence Empire Foreign Policy?'

Nevertheless, there were signs of important shifts in perspective. Individual members of the Institute had developed a closer interest in the region of which Australia was a part. Frederic Eggleston, in particular, had, from the early 1930s, seen the importance for the future of Australia's commercial relationships with Japan. He returned from the 1929 IPR Conference in Kyoto greatly impressed by the speed of Japanese industrialisation and thereafter emphasised the significance for Australia of political developments in the region. His concern at Japan's invasion of Manchuria, and at subsequent political developments in Japan, was accompanied by recognition of Japan's raw material shortages and the opportunities that Australia might find in the Japanese market. He opposed the Trade Diversion Policy of 1936.

These views were shared by others in the Institute who believed that deliberate efforts should be made to reshape Australian perceptions of her region. In 1936, the Victorian Branch, with the aid of E.C. Dyason, established an 'Austral-Asiatic Section'. Dyason had managed to secure outside financial support which made it possible to appoint a full time

55 ibid. p. 183.
person at an annual salary of £450 to serve simultaneously as secretary to the new Section and as research secretary of the IPR. W.D. Forsyth was appointed to the position. And then, in the following April, the Section launched the Austral-Asiatic Bulletin, a two monthly review, edited in the first instance by R.L. Curthoys and subsequently by Frederick Howard (both journalists and members of the Victorian Branch), and designed to address problems of the western Pacific in general. The very title of the journal gave a new twist to the notion of ‘Australasia’, hitherto applied to Australia, New Zealand and Oceania, but now extended by a kind of play upon words to the relations between Australia and Asia. The editorial of the first issue introduced the journal as being concerned ‘to review and comment upon current opinion regarding the Orient’. Its task was not to express the opinion of the Institute—that was prevented by the Institute’s constitution—but to provide a forum for the presentation and discussion of ‘informed personal opinion’. ‘Only thus can Australia become better acquainted with and more curious about the Orient, of which she is part. Only thus can the neighbour nations understand her better.’ An unsigned article, ‘Wanted—An Australian Policy’, opened with the words ‘Australia’s place is in the Pacific’ and proceeded to emphasise the need to formulate ‘a national policy suited to Australia’s position’. ‘Europe is an entanglement, and those who have responsibility for national policy in that area have little time for anything else.’

The Austral-Asiatic Bulletin was a substantial publication, running to twenty-four pages, and able to draw upon a high level of contributions from Australia, and overseas observers. In its first couple of years articles by C.A.S. Hawker, Ian Clunies Ross, D.B. Copland, F.W. Eggleston, Ernest Scott, P.D. Phillips, Georgina Sweet and others were interspersed with contributions from outside scholars, journalists and public figures. The list included G.E. Hubbard, member of the staff of Chatham House, W.H. Chamberlin, Tokyo correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor, Yusuke Tsurumi, member of the Japanese Diet, Owen Lattimore, then editor of Pacific Affairs, C. Hartley Grattan, Carnegie Research Scholar and Guenther Stein, Tokyo-based journalist. Attention was given to economic issues, trade rivalry, questions of immigration and to domestic developments especially in China and Japan but with occasional reference also to the colonial dependencies of southeast Asia. Most issues had a section at the back entitled ‘Trade Winds’ containing notes on trade and on economic developments. There was a more or less equal balance over those two years between articles on Australia (43), China (41) and Japan (35). There was some notice of America and of Britain and the Commonwealth. Each issue had a substantial book review section in

which were covered the major works of the day in the field of international relations. There was room, too, for a 'Letters to the Editor' section.

The *Austral-Asiatic Bulletin* was a landmark in the development of Australian thinking about the world at large, not only in its focus on the region but in the shifts in attitude that it displayed. In 1936, in the aftermath of Italy's invasion of Abyssinia, Institute member Richard Boyer (a Queensland grazier, later to become President of the Institute and Chairman of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation) had spoken of the need to educate Australian opinion about world problems, about collective security and international organisation in order 'to fight a narrow nationalism aggravated by geographical isolation'. In the *Austral-Asiatic Bulletin* the emphasis was different. The range of its preoccupations reflected less a fear of isolation than a more positive appreciation of Australia's future relationships with Japan, China and Southeast Asia and a preparedness to explore how they might be developed. This was what was meant by the affirmation that Australia was 'a part of the region'. There were limits to these changes of attitude. In exploring the potentialities of new relationships with the region, the contributors to the *Bulletin* did not see a need for a modification of Australia's immigration policy. In 1927, the Secretary of the NSW Branch of the Institute, F.R. Beasley, in a letter to the Secretary of Chatham House, had remarked that immigration was one subject on which there was almost complete accord in Australia. 'All parties are determined to develop Australia by means of a purely white population'. In the 1930s, that was still the received view. The NSW study group which, in 1935, considered the future of Australia's commercial relations with East Asia, included amongst its papers a defence of a restrictive immigration policy on social, political and economic grounds. Those attitudes would alter in due course, but only in the changed circumstances of the postwar world; and Institute members were to be amongst those who argued for the modification of traditional policy.

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58 F.R. Beasley to Chatham House, 16 July 1927. Synopsis of views of a committee of Melbourne members of the RIIA, NLA MS 2821/1.
60 In 1959, some thirty-six individuals were brought together by J.A.C. Mackie and Kenneth Rivett to prepare an argued case for the modification of an immigration selection policy based on race or colour. The group proposed a flexible system of selection of migrants based on bilateral agreements and occupation rather than nationality. Change should be gradual and should be conducted with 'adequate safeguards against the strain and friction of initial assimilation', but it should aim to admit non-Europeans as permanent settlers 'without any taint of colour bar or differential treatment for Europeans or non-Europeans'. See Immigration Reform Group, *Control or Colour Bar: A
A good deal of the Institute's interest in the Pacific, as expressed in the pages of the *Austral-Asiatic Bulletin*, was pragmatically commercial in character. A similar temper was apparent in the study of Australia's interests and policies in the Far East, prepared at the end of the 1930s by the Secretary of the Commonwealth Council of the Institute, Jack Shepherd, at the request of the Institute of Pacific Relations. In his concluding chapter Shepherd drew a distinction between the Great Western Powers and the Small Pacific Countries, pointed out that Australia belonged to the latter group and argued that, in many respects, its position was like that of the Philippines, Netherlands India, Indochina and Siam, rather than Britain, France or the United States. Unlike the Great Western Powers the Small Pacific Countries had no significant financial stake in East Asia, were themselves fields for investment and 'they look upon the Far East as an important market, but for foodstuffs and raw materials rather than for the products of secondary industry; and Japan for them is a useful supplier of cheap manufactured goods instead of a dangerous competitor'. He argued from this that the development of those complementary commercial interests would also contribute to the peace of the region, an argument which, as we have noticed, had also been developed by J.G. Crawford's Political Science Summer School paper of 1938.

At the more radical edge of the Institute spectrum of opinion, such commercial and political considerations were augmented by at least some awareness of social developments and nationalist movements in China and within the colonial regimes of southeast Asia. The *Bulletin* carried regular reports of the progress of the fighting in China, going often into considerable detail. It was interested in the Sian Incident of 1936 when Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped by Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and released after reaching an understanding with leaders of the Chinese Communist Party about the need for united resistance to Japan. Most of

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*Proposal for Change in Australia's Immigration Policy* (Melbourne, 1960). As a result of changing attitudes in the community reflected in gradual policy changes (a process described by Mackie as 'modification by stealth') the policy was effectively abolished by the early 1970s. For a later reflective consideration of the Group, see Nancy Viviani (ed.), *The Abolition of the White Australia Policy: The Immigration Reform Movement Revisited* (Griffith University, 1992).

62. ibid. p. 182.
63. See, for example, an editorial, 'The Fighting in China', no. 3 (1937) p. 4; P.D. Phillips, 'The Sino-Japanese Conflict', ibid. p. 6; James Bertram (a China-based freelance journalist), 'What the Sian Revolt Meant for China', ibid. p. 7; 'War in China: A Military Survey' by 'A Military Correspondent', no. 4 (1937) p. 8; W.V. Pennell, 'War of Endurance in Asia', no. 2 (1938) p. 15; and an extensive review article by the distinguished China specialist, Owen Lattimore, entitled 'China is Going to Win', no. 1 (1939) p. 20.
these articles touched on the underlying social dimension of the Chinese resistance to Japan. They accepted the fashionable liberal view that the Chinese Communists were not ‘real’ communists but were essentially agrarian reformers and they pointed to the influence on Kuomintang policy of Chiang’s conservative and financial backers. This helped to explain the success of the communist forces in basing guerilla warfare on peasant support. Space was given, for example, to an article by Edgar Snow, ‘The Communists’ Role in China’s Fight’, in which he argued that the prospect of Japanese penetration even of all China ‘does not unduly alarm [the Communists] but implies the extension of mass revolutionary struggle in which the final victory will be theirs’.64 He contrasted this approach with that of the KMT in which efforts at mass political and military training were suppressed.

The book review section occasionally featured radical analyses of particular issues. Macmahon Ball, for example, gave predictably favourable treatment to Edgar Snow’s Living China, commenting on the repressive character of the KMT regime.65 P.D. Phillips welcomed the interpretation of Japan’s domestic problems—in terms of the necessary contradictions of monopoly capitalism—in Freda Utley’s Japan’s Feet of Clay, though perhaps without a full appreciation of the Marxist underpinnings of her argument.66

What emerged most clearly from the pages of the Austral-Asiatic Bulletin, however, was a sense of region. This was something new. There had, of course, for long been an awareness of possible dangers to the north. What was new by the end of the 1930s was the close and detailed nature of the attention given to the area. In 1928, Keith Officer, in a discussion with Ms Margaret Cleeve of the Chatham House secretariat about the possible formation of an Australian Institute of International Affairs, touched on the differences of approach to be discerned between the IPR and the Royal Institute. He criticised, in particular, the focus of the IPR on the Pacific arguing that ‘the idea of the Pacific as a whole was an incorrect one as Australia and New Zealand tended much more towards Europe-Asia than to the eastern shores’.67 Ten years later such views would have seemed very much at odds with the dominant perceptions to be found in the Australian Institute. There was by then a recognition of processes of change which could affect Australia’s traditional ties and provide a quite different context in which to trade and to interact with neighbours. And there was an attempt to identify more precisely than

64 Austral-Asiatic Bulletin, no. 1 (1938) p. 11.
65 ibid. no. 3 (1937) p. 21.
67 M.E. Cleeve, Memo of a conversation with Major Keith Officer, 10 August 1928. NLA, MS 2821.
before what those processes were. The changes were subtle and complex and there is a danger of describing them too sharply. For Australia the British connection remained important and in the late 1930s western Europe was still the power house of world events. But the acceptance of Australia’s place within the British Commonwealth now went along with a strong perception of special interests, created by the dynamics of her geographical location.

These changing views—one might almost speak of a paradigm shift, of a fundamental change in assumptions about the way in which the international order was constructed—filtered into the consciousness of those with a general interest in international relations and influenced, too, the thinking of those responsible for the formulation of policy. In a radio address in April 1939, on the occasion of his becoming Prime Minister, Mr Menzies remarked: ‘What Great Britain calls the Far East is to us the Near North’, and he went on to say: ‘Little given as I am to encouraging the exaggerated ideas of Dominion independence and separatism which exist in some minds, I have become convinced that in the Pacific Australia must regard herself as a principal providing herself with her own information and maintaining her own diplomatic contacts with foreign powers.’68 (He was careful to qualify this by adding that it did not mean that Australia must act as a completely separate power. ‘We must, of course, act as an integral part of the British Empire.’) In a public address a month later the Prime Minister returned to his theme, describing Australia ‘as one of the Pacific Powers’ and adding that ‘as a Pacific Power, we are principals, we are not subordinate; we have no secondary interest in the Pacific; we have a primary interest in it’.69 In expressing these views, however, Mr Menzies was speaking of risks, danger and threat. In the discussions taking place within the Institute a different—and more optimistic—outlook was strongly represented, one which saw opportunities rather than threat. And these evolving views offered a base for the construction of a different type of relationship with the region in the future. It would not be too much to say that Institute members, in a rethinking of Australia’s place in the world at large and in the Pacific in particular, had helped in the 1930s to influence the general climate of opinion and to prepare for the acceptance of a new foreign policy orthodoxy for the post World War II world.

68 Quoted in Watt, _The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy_, p. 24.
69 Quoted in Shepherd, _Australia’s Interests and Policies in the Far East_, pp. 198–9.
The 1940s: War and Postwar Expansion

The war years

In spite of the difficulty of maintaining the activities of the Institute during the war, the 1940s as a whole proved to be an important period of development.

The difficulties were indeed significant. The work of the four branches suffered as some of their leading members were drawn off into war-related activities, whether serving in the armed forces or in other forms of government work, and the capacity of the Commonwealth Council to maintain a national program of research and publication was affected accordingly.1

The Victorian Executive noted in 1942 that a normal program of meetings had become impossible, partly because of the unwillingness of members to come into the city under blackout conditions, partly from the absence of suitable speakers. The Branch reconciled itself to a much curtailed program of meetings attended perhaps by half a dozen members and held

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1 Latham had been appointed to Tokyo in 1940 and Eggleston to Chungking in 1941. Alfred Stirling, former secretary of the Victorian Branch, had been appointed External Affairs Officer in London in 1937 and remained there until 1945. Gerald Packer, a former Air Force Officer and a member of the Editorial Board of the Austral-Asiatic Bulletin, joined the Army and then returned to the RAAF as Director of Air Intelligence in 1940, rising to the rank of Group Captain. For a biography of Packer, see C. Coulthard-Clark, Edge of Centre: The Eventful Life of Group Captain Gerald Packer (Point Cook, Vic., 1992). Commonwealth Secretary John Andrews and Queensland Branch member T.P. Fry joined the Army in 1942. Miss Margaret Weigall, former Assistant Secretary of the NSW Branch, served in the Women’s Auxiliary Air force.
frequently in each others homes.\textsuperscript{2} The Queensland Branch, at the end of the same year, suspended its activities altogether and decided to go into recess for the duration of the war. It had suffered especially from the death of one of its leading members, A.C.V. Melbourne, Associate Professor of History at the University of Queensland. Efforts were made to keep it in existence and it was in fact reconstituted towards the end of 1943.\textsuperscript{3} The Victorian Branch was forced to discontinue regular publication of the \textit{Austral–Asiatic Bulletin} in 1942, though it kept open the possibility of an occasional special issue.\textsuperscript{4}

Nevertheless, in spite of these difficulties the Institute did manage to maintain some visibility and, as the war drew to a close it was in a position to plan a more vigorous local and national existence. By the end of the war membership reached over 700 (NSW, 508; Victoria, 125; Queensland, 66; and Canberra 20.)

The decade opened with two significant developments. The first was the incorporation of the Australian Institute of International Affairs as a non-profit-making body under the Companies Act, 1936, of New South Wales. (This was distinct from the NSW Branch which was already an incorporated body.) The incorporation was registered on 13 December 1939 and was reported to a meeting of the Commonwealth Council on 27 January 1940.\textsuperscript{5} The Articles of Association, following the practice developed over the previous seven years, provided for an unambiguously federal body. The autonomy of the several branches, some of which were themselves to become incorporated bodies in their own right, was clearly affirmed. At the national level the Commonwealth Council, effectively the governing body of the Institute, was to consist of the President or Chairman of each branch and voting was to be by branches, with each branch having one vote. The Commonwealth Council reported to the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{2} Memo from P.D. Phillips to Victorian Branch Executive, 4 March 1942.
  \item \textsuperscript{3} Minutes of Commonwealth Council, 22 August 1942 and 11 March 1944.
  \item \textsuperscript{4} Commonwealth Council, 22 August 1942. There were, in fact, to be two special issues, one in 1943 and a second in 1945.
  \item \textsuperscript{5} There is some confusion in the Minute Books about whether this was the first meeting of the incorporated body, as it was described in the Minutes of that meeting and in the Minutes of the General Meeting of the Institute held on 1 March 1940, or the last meeting of the Council of the unincorporated body as it was described in the Minutes of the next Commonwealth Council meeting on 10 August 1940. From the business transacted it appears clear that the meeting of the 27 January was the first Commonwealth Council Meeting of the incorporated body and the meeting of 1 March was the first General Meeting of members. The first ‘Annual Meeting’ of the Commonwealth Council was held on 10 August 1940, and the first Annual General Meeting of the Institute was held on 1 November 1940.
\end{itemize}
Annual General Meeting which, however, was attended usually by a handful of people most of whom were Commonwealth Council members. Its proceedings were essentially formal—the receipt of the report of the Commonwealth Council and of the annual balance sheet, statement of accounts and the Auditor’s Report. The real business of the Institute was done by the Commonwealth Council.

The general pattern of meetings over the following years was for the Annual General Meeting to be held in November—in Sydney between 1940 and 1945 and in Melbourne in 1946 and 1947—and for the Commonwealth Council to meet twice each year, normally in February or March and in August, with a rough alternation between Melbourne, Sydney and Canberra. The March meeting was described in the Minutes simply as a meeting of the Commonwealth Council and the August meeting as the ‘Annual meeting of the Commonwealth Council’. These comparatively simple constitutional arrangements worked well and apparently were in accordance with the requirements of the Companies Act. They are worth setting out here for it was later to prove difficult to draft new articles of association under a later Companies Act, in such a way as to describe the manner in which the Institute actually worked. And later still the nature and functions of the Commonwealth Council was to be a matter of some controversy as the Institute attempted to adapt itself to a changed environment. These developments will be discussed below.

The Commonwealth Council of the Incorporated Institute, at its first meeting in January 1940, appointed its first office bearers. The Governor General, Lord Gowrie, accepted an invitation to become Visitor and this tradition has continued ever since. Sir Thomas Bavin was elected as President of the Institute and the four Vice Presidents, equal in number to the branches, were Mr David Maughan, KC (NSW), Frederic Eggleston (Victoria), Dr T.P. Fry (Queensland) and Mr H.F.E. Whitlam (Canberra). Dr John Andrews became Secretary and Professor T. Hytten, Treasurer. These were appointed to hold office until the August meeting of the Council, when they were all confirmed except Dr Fry, as Queensland was not represented at that meeting. Sir Thomas Bavin died in 1941 and was succeeded as President by Professor Ian Clunies Ross.

The second development in 1940 was the receipt of a grant to the Institute from the Rockefeller Foundation. This had been the subject of preliminary discussion and of further negotiation carried out over the preceding few years and indeed it was the possibility of such a grant that led to the decision to incorporate. The Commonwealth Council, at a meeting in Sydney in November 1936, was informed that an application had been made to the Foundation on its behalf by Mr E.C. Dyason. The Foundation had responded positively to this initial inquiry and had indicated its willingness to consider a formal request from the Institute for

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6 Meetings of the Commonwealth Council, 27 January 1940 and 10 August 1940.
financial assistance to support a general secretary, to be based in Sydney, and to secure some expert assistance for the Austral-Asiatic Section which Dyason was already engaged in establishing in Melbourne. The Foundation sought an assurance that these were the things most needed by the Institute and that, at the end of a three year period, the Institute would be ready to meet these developments from its own resources. The Council replied in the affirmative but, in further exchanges in the following year, it emerged that Rockefeller assistance could only be given to an incorporated body. At that point the Institute was heavily engaged in the arrangements for the mounting of the British Commonwealth Relations Conference to be held at Lapstone in the following year, and nothing further was done to meet the Rockefeller requirement. With the Lapstone Conference successfully out of the way the Council proceeded to satisfy that condition and the initial Commonwealth Council meeting of the newly incorporated Institute was able to inform the Rockefeller Foundation of its readiness to accept a grant on the terms already arranged.

The grant consisted of a sum of US$7500, to be spread over three years. The sum was spent roughly in the manner proposed by Dyason four years earlier. A sum of £200 was devoted to strengthening the secretariat in Sydney under John Andrews as Commonwealth Secretary, and £400 to assisting the research program of the Institute through the appointment of a salaried Research Director. (The title was subsequently changed to Research Secretary.) As we have noticed, W.D. Forsyth was appointed to that position in January 1940 and, in the following year, the Research Committee was formally established with P.D. Phillips as Chairman and Forsyth as Secretary. Though the Rockefeller grant met Forsyth's salary no part of the grant went to particular research projects. For these the Institute continued to rely, as before, on voluntary effort and on assistance from the IPR.

At the beginning of 1940, then, serious wartime pressures were yet to be felt and the Institute appeared to be entering a new and more active phase of its existence. When the Rockefeller grant was confirmed the Institute already had a number of projects completed or in the pipeline. Apart from the substantial significance of the Austral-Asiatic Bulletin and the Australian contribution of data papers to IPR and BCR conferences there was a study by Professor S.M. Wadham and Professor G.L. Wood, both of the University of Melbourne, entitled Land Utilization in Australia and another on Australian Standards of Living by Eggleston, E.R. Walker, G. Anderson and J.F. Nimmo both of which had appeared in 1939. A project on tropical Australia, led by M. Wynne Williams and supported by a grant from the IPR, was nearing completion. And Professor S.H. Roberts of the University of Sydney had completed a study of colonial depen-

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7 Commonwealth Council Meeting, 14 November 1936.
8 Commonwealth Council, 8 May 1937.
9 Commonwealth Council, 27 January 1940.
dencies in the South Pacific. The latter two projects were not published, however. A pamphlet series, ‘World Affairs Papers’, had also been launched. The first paper, *The Dutch East Indies*, appeared in 1940. In addition, reference should be made to substantial works by Institute members, though not sponsored or published by the Institute. Jack Shepherd’s *Australian Interests and Policies in the Pacific*, published in the IPR Inquiry Series in 1940, was one of these. Another was *The Myth of Open Spaces*, a work for which W.D. Forsyth had received Melbourne University’s Harbison-Higginbotham Prize and which was published by Melbourne University Press in 1942.

In 1940, as Research Secretary of the Institute, Forsyth prepared for the consideration of the Commonwealth Council extensive proposals for a continuing research program. Attention should focus, he argued, on the collection of material relating to wartime changes—economic, social and political—in Australian public affairs, on changes in her external relations, on problems of domestic postwar reconstruction and on Australian views of possible forms of postwar international organisation. He suggested, secondly, that specific inquiries under these several heads should be undertaken by means of the study group method already well developed by the Institute in preparing data papers for international conferences during the 1930s. And finally, the Institute should perform an educational role in bringing the fruits of such inquiries to the notice of an interested public.

By the end of 1941 it was possible for him to report considerable progress. A press cutting file, drawn from five leading daily papers and classified under about sixty headings, had been established. It covered such topics as industrial disputes, substitutes, aliens, home defence, radio, and it was supplemented by official statistical material. A classified bibliography of articles dealing with wartime developments was in course of preparation. And a number of study groups were at work. Two groups had been formed in Melbourne, one under Professor K.H. Bailey of Melbourne University’s Law Faculty, to consider problems of international organisation, and one under Professor G.L. Wood to study

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10 P.D. Phillips as Research Chairman did not regard the Tropical Australia manuscript as of sufficient quality to justify publication by the Institute and the Commonwealth Secretary, John Andrews, was asked to revise and edit it. Andrews suggested as an alternative, that the material in hand be complemented by a number of expert contributions and be published in symposium form. In the event he was not able to bring together such a team. Commonwealth Council Minutes, 10 August 1940, 22 February 1941, 9 August 1941 and 21 February 1942. And Professor Roberts believed that the time was not appropriate for the publication of his Pacific study and suggested that it be held over until after the war. Commonwealth Council Minutes, 22 February 1941. That proposal was accepted but in fact the western Pacific was to be an important Institute focus over the next few years.

11 Commonwealth Council Minutes, 22 February 1941.
Australia’s economic interests in a postwar settlement. In NSW groups were proposed to consider Australia’s political interests in a postwar settlement and problems of postwar reconstruction in the dependencies of the southwestern Pacific. And in Brisbane a group had been formed to focus on problems of Australian security.

The Institute’s success in educating an interested public was, perhaps naturally, much less marked. The Austral-Asiatic Bulletin had already performed such a function and Forsyth proposed that it be supplemented by a quarterly Newsletter. He brought out the first of two issues of such a periodical in mimeographed form in 1941 and a second number appeared in 1942. These contained contributions from F. Alexander, Geoffrey Sawer, Forsyth himself, and others, and covered such diverse topics as Australian reactions to the Soviet Union’s entry into the war, constitutional developments in Australia, the press and external affairs and a survey of Japanese propaganda. The second issue, however, was to be the last.

These promising developments received a severe setback when Forsyth resigned from his position at the end of 1941 to become Liaison Officer between the Commonwealth Department of Information and the Services. Though an acting research assistant, Miss Denise Dettman, was appointed on a part time basis to work in the Victorian Branch the Commonwealth Council decided that it would be impracticable for the time being, given the outbreak of the Pacific conflict, to seek a full time replacement for Forsyth and the position of Research Secretary remained vacant. Mrs Helen Wright, then Victorian Branch Secretary, served as assistant research secretary for some months in 1944 and 1945. But these were stop gap measures. Without an enthusiastic person able to give full time attention to an Institute research program much of the drive, direction and authority was lost. The second issue of Forsyth’s Newsletter appeared after Japan’s entry into the war and it was not possible to continue it in the changed circumstances of 1942. And, as we have noticed, the Victorian Branch felt unable to carry on the publication of the Austral-Asiatic Bulletin. A similar fate attended the World Affairs Papers. Paper No. 1 was followed in 1940–41 by three further papers dealing with French Indochina, the Middle East and China respectively, but the Series ended with Paper No. 4.

Even so there continued to be some positive achievements. In 1943, the Victorian Branch took up P.D. Phillips’ suggestion that the Austral-Asiatic Bulletin might be revived from time to time in the form of an occasional special issue, and produced in that form a selection of the data papers which had been prepared in 1942 for the IPR Conference held at Mont Tremblant, Quebec, in December of that year on the theme ‘Problems of War and Peace in the Pacific’. Eleven papers were selected including a study by K.H. Bailey of the effect of Australia’s membership

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12 Commonwealth Council Minutes, 21 February 1942.
of the British Commonwealth on her postwar role in the western Pacific, two papers on the future of the Pacific and Australia’s role in the region (H.J. Timperley and W.D. Forsyth), two on the Atlantic Charter and its implications for the White Australia policy and for Australia’s relations with Southeast Asia and the southwest Pacific (W.G.K. Duncan and Julius Stone). G.L. Wood contributed a paper on the position of Australia’s economy in the postwar situation in the Pacific—a spin-off from his study group on this subject—and S.M. Wadham a paper on likely Pacific markets for Australia’s primary products. In 1945, a second special issue presented papers from the IPR Conference held in Hot Springs, Virginia, in that year and the British Commonwealth Relations Conference held in London. Papers covered a similar range of topics and reflected a similar focus: economic matters including the future of Australian primary products, western Pacific developments and Australia’s future role as a Pacific power. A paper on the latter subject by W. Macmahon Ball considered the Australia–New Zealand Agreement as an experiment in regionalism and it was accompanied by papers on postwar Anglo–Australian relations and on Australian–American relations. The subtitle of the former, by Herbert Burton of the Department of Economic History of the University of Melbourne, gave an indication of the kind of shift that had been taking place in Australian perceptions of its future international role: ‘Anglo–Australian Relations after the War: Latch Key or Leading Strings?’

There were other continuing initiatives in the way of contributing to public discussion. In 1942, work began on a number of papers which appeared over the following three years under the series title ‘Australia in a New World’. These focused firmly on problems of the western Pacific. Six such studies appeared between 1943 and 1945. Five of these came from the NSW Branch: H.I.P. Hogbin and Camilla Wedgwood, Development and Welfare in the Western Pacific, A.H. McDonald, Fact and Fiction in Japanese Imperialism, R. Ormsby Martin, Tradition and Transition in Chinese Politics, Julius Stone, Colonial Trusteeship in Transition and J.W. Burton, Brown and White in the South Pacific. A Melbourne study group contributed Post War Defence of Australia. A listing of the titles indicates the growing maturity of Australia’s perception of her interests in the region in which she was placed. Altogether the record suggests that Forsyth’s comment at the time of his resignation was more than justified: ‘The surprising thing is not that our plans for research cannot be fully implemented, but that a modest amount of constructive work has been achieved and there is promise of future development.’

So, for all the difficulties imposed by wartime conditions on the ability of an unofficial body like the Institute to carry out its planned program of activities—the absence in the services of many of its leading members, or their engagement in other forms of governmental work, the consequent curtailment of its research and publications program, the problem of finding speakers or attracting audiences to its meetings—it managed to
survive and to promote some public discussion of the international scene as it affected Australia. And it was, of course, the war itself which made such a contribution especially important. The war posed questions about Australia's place in a possible postwar world and shaped perceptions of what that world might be like. To a considerable extent discussions within the Institute, in the work of study groups and in the preparation of papers for international conferences, resulted in a confirmation of general views which were already emerging in the 1930s in the face of the approaching conflict; but by the mid 1940s the gradual definition of changes in global balances of power and of developments in the countries closest to Australia gave a specific character to what had been the more general perceptions of, for example, articles published in the Austral-Asiatic Bulletin and in other works. In 1945, the Institute prepared to resume and to expand its role as a body concerned to promote the study of international affairs both amongst its own members and amongst a wider public.

Postwar development

That so much had been done during the war years was due in part to the initial stimulus of the Rockefeller grant and the creation, albeit temporarily, of a research secretariat. Its two years of effective functioning enabled the planning of a program which then carried on under its own steam after Forsyth and Miss Dettman had stepped down. Since the grant had been directed to the maintenance of the secretariat rather than to the support of particular research projects, a consequence of the resignations, and of the Institute's decision not to fill the positions after the outbreak of the Pacific War, was that it was not possible to spend fully the sum which had been granted. At the end of 1942, an approach was made to the Foundation, outlining the research activities of the past three years and asking that the Institute be allowed to retain the unexpended portion of the grant and to use it to support current research projects. The Foundation agreed to the request, and the funds were directed in part to the maintenance of the Commonwealth secretariat, in part to recouping the NSW Branch for the expenses of group research already carried out and in part to the support of further group research. In agreeing again to a similar request in 1944 the Foundation congratulated the Institute on 'the splendid showing it had made during the past year in spite of the difficulties imposed by wartime conditions', a comment which must

14 Reported to Commonwealth Council, 7–8 August 1943. The Institute was allowed to retain a sum of £680 and the remaining balance was to be returned to the Foundation. That balance came to £8–12–3!
15 Commonwealth Council, 7–8 August 1943.
16 Commonwealth Council, 26 August 1944.
have raised hopes for the success of a further application to Rockefeller made earlier in the year. And in October 1944, the Foundation did approve a further three year grant of $7500 to assist in the establishment of a central secretariat for the Institute. It was made clear that, after the expiry of the grant in 1948, the AIIA would be expected to pick up the tab for the maintenance of its central organisation. There would be no further Rockefeller support.

This grant made possible the appointment of a full time executive officer to undertake the administrative work of the Institute, and to be responsible, as secretary of the Research Committee, for the organisation and coordination of research activities. This was indeed a significant development. Until the appointment of a salaried research secretary on the basis of the first Rockefeller grant, the Commonwealth body of the Institute had operated on an almost completely voluntary basis. All positions—President, Vice Presidents, Secretary, Treasurer and Auditor—were honorary, except that the secretary received an honorarium of £50 per annum. Jack Shepherd’s work as Commonwealth Secretary, as we have noticed, was, in effect, supported by the History Department of the University of Sydney. After his departure his successors—John Andrews and W.D. Borrie—had handled the work of the Council on a part time basis. In these circumstances much of the administrative support had perforce to be supplied by the branch offices of New South Wales and Victoria, and at best a fairly loose cooperation was maintained between autonomous branches. As far as the research program was concerned, everything depended, after the office of research secretary had lapsed, on the voluntary efforts of such people as Phillips, Wood and Bailey in Victoria and Stone, Duncan and Ormsby Martin in Sydney. With the second Rockefeller grant there was, for the first time, an opportunity to create a functioning national AIIA office, staffed by a full time national executive officer. At the same time, the Institute of Pacific Relations agreed to make available $1000 for research on specific topics related to that Institute’s broader research program. This grant had originally been made for 1944, but was not expended in that year and was set aside by the IPR for work to be done in 1945.

At its meeting on 3 March 1945, the Commonwealth Council resolved to advertise the full time position at a salary of £600, giving preference to applicants from one of the armed services, and with the intention that the successful applicant be ready to take up the position immediately on demobilisation. The successful applicant was Miss Molly Kingston, a Sydney lawyer currently serving with the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force. She took up her position in October 1945, and established her headquarters in space provided by the NSW Branch at 369 George Street.

17 Commonwealth Council, 3 March 1945.
18 Commonwealth Council, 18 August 1945.
Sydney. (It was very basic accommodation. It consisted of a desk at one end of a large room the remainder of which constituted the office of the NSW Branch secretary, a situation which did not make for the easiest of working relationships.) From here Miss Kingston launched herself with great vigour into the task of reorganising the central administration of the Institute, establishing branches in the States where the Institute was not yet represented and breathing new life into the cooperation between the four existing branches.

The formation of new branches—in South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania—was high on her agenda. In each of these States there was a handful of individuals who were either members of one of the existing branches of the Institute or who held Chatham House membership, and these could be drawn on, together with other people with appropriate interests from universities, government, the professions or business, to form a nucleus of members of new branches. In Western Australia, for example, the Professor of Law in the University was F.R. Beasley, who had been first secretary of the NSW Branch of the Royal Institute when it was formed in 1924. And in Adelaide there was J.L. Preece, a long-standing member of the NSW Branch. To take the initiative in the three States Sir John Morris, Chief Justice of Tasmania, Professor G.V. Portus, Professor of History in the University of Adelaide and Professor F. Alexander, Professor of History in the University of Western Australia, were asked to bring such groups together. And in 1947, Miss Kingston visited the three States to address meetings of the groups and to arrange the details of forming the new branches. The branches were formally admitted to the Australian Institute of International Affairs at the August Commonwealth Council meeting.20

A second development was the launching of a new Institute journal. This arose from a proposal by the then Commonwealth President, Mr P.D. Phillips, on behalf of the Victorian Branch at the January meeting of the Commonwealth Council in 1946. Victoria suggested that the Austral-Asiatic Bulletin be revived as a regular publication but that it become a Commonwealth publication, though Victoria was prepared in the first instance to continue the responsibility for bringing it out and for bearing any financial loss.21 The suggestion was that members of all branches would receive the Bulletin as part of their membership subscriptions. This would provide a secure and expanded subscription list and would, in due course, ensure financial viability. The proposal was referred to branches and it was adopted in its main outlines at the August meeting of

20 An informal report of Miss Kingston's visits to Adelaide and Perth is given in a letter to Richard Boyer, then national President of the Institute, 23 February 1947. Boyer Papers, National Library of Australia, MS 3181/10 NB. In Perth she remarked: 'Again the difficulty will be to find an active and efficient secretary.' The present writer hopes that he filled the bill adequately.

21 Commonwealth Council, 27 January 1946.
Council. But here were important modifications. It was agreed that the Council should publish a journal but, rather than leaving responsibility for it to the Victorian Branch, it appointed Professor A.H. McDonald, Professor of Ancient History in the University of Sydney, as its first 'editor in chief. And though the first number stated that the journal incorporated the *Austral-Asiatic Bulletin*, the adoption of a new name, *The Australian Outlook*, emphasised the fact that it was a fresh departure, not just the revival of the earlier journal. The term 'Australian Outlook' was a happy choice of words, containing as it did a nice ambiguity. It combined the idea of Australia looking out on the world about it and also the idea, perhaps, of there being a distinctive Australian perspective on that world. The journal was to be different, too, in format and character from the *Bulletin*. It was to be more academic in style and content, and less a vehicle for the regular reporting of events than was its predecessor. And its geographical scope was less narrowly focused. While it would, no doubt, display a special interest in the region the journal was intended to be concerned with the discussion of international affairs in general and not merely those of the western Pacific.

The first issue of *The Australian Outlook* appeared in March 1947. It was at first a quarterly but in 1960 it dropped to thrice yearly and in 1991 to twice a year. In 1959, it discarded the definite article from the title as it appeared on the cover, becoming simply *Australian Outlook*, known more familiarly to members as the *Outlook*. (The definite article remained, however in the front matter inside each issue.) The name remained until 1989 when the Commonwealth Council agreed to the proposal of the then editor, Dr John Ravenhill, that the name be changed to the *Australian Journal of International Affairs*. This change, it was thought, would remove the possibility of the Journal being regarded as representing a specifically Australian view or as open only to Australian contributors.

The establishment of an Institute presence in each state and the launching of the *Outlook* were significant developments but perhaps more important in Miss Kingston's view of her task were matters relating to the organisation of the Institute as a whole. It was her view that the federal structure of the Institute inhibited its effective working. In May 1946, in a document entitled 'Suggestions for the Reconstruction of the Institute', she argued that the Institute would operate efficiently only when control and direction were centralised and when branch activities as such were limited to purely domestic matters and the carrying out of a general

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22 Oddly enough, in spite of its Victorian origins, the proposal was not universally acceptable to the Branch. Some argued that Victoria had founded the *Bulletin* and established its character, and should not be asked to hand it over to some hitherto unidentified editor. The Executive, however, took the contrary view that the *Bulletin*, "being potentially a "national" activity", should be the responsibility of the Commonwealth Council. Minutes of the Branch Council, 2 May 1946 and Executive, 6 May 1946.
policy. A situation where direction and policy lay chiefly with the branches meant 'that long and often unsuccessful negotiation is necessary to obtain even a modicum of agreement'. She envisaged instead an arrangement whereby the Institute would be composed of its members throughout Australia (who were currently members of branches) and where the division into branches was merely a matter of geographical necessity. Members of branches should be primarily members of the Institute as a whole.

In arguing in this way Miss Kingston was putting her finger on a central issue of policy which was to reappear in different contexts from time to time and which, indeed, remains a matter of contention at the time of writing. Should the central organisation reflect the views of the branches reached through 'long and often unsuccessful negotiation' or should it be the central and policy making level of the whole organisation? Should the Institute aim at a more coherent, centralised and perhaps more public, role than had been the case during the 1930s and early 1940s? If so, some changes would be necessary, if not in the constitution of the Institute (that is, the Articles of Association) at least in constitutional convention. Miss Kingston envisaged the possibility that, instead of effective direction lying with the Commonwealth Council, with its two meetings a year, a smaller executive, meeting more frequently, perhaps monthly, should exercise 'wide discretionary powers' and have the right 'to initiate as well as carry out policy'. At the moment there was in fact no executive at all except by ad hoc arrangement. At the Commonwealth Council meeting in August 1947, for example, it was agreed that 'in matters of urgency which may arise between meetings of the Council, the President, Secretary and Treasurer be empowered to take decisions, notifying branches of the decisions made'.

In the event Miss Kingston's vision of an efficient central organisation was not to carry the day in 1946. Financial constraints alone were enough to prevent that. At the very least it would have required an adequately staffed central office, able to administer Institute policy, arrange research programs, handle publications and their distribution, receive membership subscriptions and maintain the ties with the Royal Institute and the Institute of Pacific Relations. At the moment, even with the second Rockefeller grant and the IPR research monies, the Commonwealth Council only had at its disposal the comparatively small sums received by way of levies imposed by the branches, but these were quite inadequate to support the kind of central secretariat envisaged by Miss Kingston. Other possibilities would be considered in due course. Substantial subscriptions from corporate members were a possible source of future income and a general

24 ibid.
25 Commonwealth Council, 16 and 17 August 1947.
appeal to business and to the public for donations to the Institute was another. But for the moment it was clear that the foundations of a national organisation would have to be laid in a more modest way.

It was not, however, just a matter of money. There was within the Institute some resistance to—or at least a degree of hesitation about—the actual desirability of greater centralisation. When the branches came to consider Miss Kingston’s Memorandum in 1946 Victoria was more disposed to accept the idea of a stronger centre than was NSW, but, even there, doubts were expressed as to whether a federal organisation would justify the costs of its administration.26 These doubts were soon to be expressed even more clearly. As a means of placing Commonwealth Council finances on a better basis Miss Kingston, in 1947, pursued one of the proposals set out in her ‘Suggestions for Reconstruction of the Institute’ of the previous year—that the levy by which branches had supported the work of the Commonwealth Council since 1933 be replaced by a capitation fee whereby a fixed amount of the membership fees of all members should be used to support the Commonwealth secretariat and provide for the issue of The Australian Outlook to all members. This was a limited and sensible proposal which stopped far short of the idea for a greatly strengthened executive, but it became the subject of extended discussion in branches and by the Commonwealth Council and was not adopted finally until 1948.

When the proposal was first considered by the Council in February 1947 sharp differences of opinion emerged between representatives of the several branches. The President, then R.J.F. Boyer, pointed out that the two Rockefeller grants had been made to provide an impetus for the establishment of a permanent secretariat. In accepting those grants the Institute had placed itself under a moral obligation to maintain as effective a secretariat as possible within the limits of its own finances.27 It was argued that, as a matter of principle, the branches should support the Commonwealth Council from that part of their own finances arising from membership subscriptions. Only if they were prepared to do that could approaches reasonably be made to outside organisations and corporations for additional financial support. But the point was also made that the establishment of a central organisation for the Institute would be of less benefit to the larger branches, Victoria and NSW, than to the smaller branches. Victoria and NSW were each able to maintain a central office with a paid secretary, and this must have seemed to Queensland and Canberra to represent untold wealth. There was naturally, therefore, some difficulty in securing branch agreement about the level at which a capitation fee might be struck. The Queensland Branch reported itself to be in financial difficulties and unable to meet the kind of figure being

26 Minutes of the Victorian Branch Executive Committee, 8 August 1946 and 5 March 1947.
suggested. New South Wales wished to include a proviso that, if a capitation fee were adopted, it should include the supply to members of the Royal Institute journal, *International Affairs*, as well as *The Australian Outlook*.\(^2^8\) A final decision was delayed until the following meeting and a subcommittee consisting of Professor K.H. Bailey of Victoria, Dr T.P. Fry of Queensland and Mr Hermann Black of NSW, together with Miss Kingston, was appointed to draw up a firm proposal. After further discussion a capitation fee of £1-1-0 was agreed to as a voluntary contribution from the branches for the current year. In order to meet Queensland’s difficulties a grant of £40 was to be made to that branch to assist it to get back on its feet.\(^2^9\) The interim capitation fee was to be allocated to *The Australian Outlook* (8/-), the IPR levy (6/-) and to travel expenses (2/-).

The discussion reflected the fundamental conflict in the Institute to which reference has already been made, the conflict between the branches’ perceptions of the need for a strong, central, coordinating body and their own immediate needs. And indeed that was in line with a situation where the founding branches were, by the mid 1940s, firmly established and autonomous and where the federal principle was accepted as part of the natural order of things. This was natural in a country with strong States’ rights feelings and with considerable distances to be covered. The latter was especially an issue for this Institute at the time when it was becoming established and before the introduction of regular air travel. It was reinforced by the way in which the Institute came into existence—through the formation of separate branches which then came together to form a national body, rather than, as in Canada, through the formation of the national body first and the branches later. Certainly in Australia there has continued to be a strong perception in many quarters that the real life of the Institute is to be found in the work of the branches, and that the centre’s function should be a coordinating and facilitating rather than an organising and directing one. Be that as it may, the next Commonwealth Council meeting made no changes to the compromise decision of 1947 and thus, in effect, confirmed the temporary and voluntary arrangement reached at that time. Thereafter the capitation fee became a permanent feature of Institute financing. The amount of the fee was a matter of contention from time to time and one branch or another, when faced with financial difficulties of its own, would strenuously resist any proposal to raise the fee in order to keep pace with living costs. There has also been a hope that funds from other sources—outside grants, donations or bequests from members or a continuing income from a national headquarters—might enable the fee to be dispensed with, or reduced to a nominal level.

In the meantime the idea of branch support of a national secretariat, based

\(^{2^8}\) Ibid.

\(^{2^9}\) Commonwealth Council, 16 and 17 August 1947.
on the membership numbers of individual branches, has been generally accepted.\textsuperscript{30}

While these organisational and financial developments were being negotiated, the Commonwealth Council, facing the challenges of the post-war international scene, gave its attention to a new research program. The Council took the view that the Institute should not concentrate on short term projects—the preparation of conference papers, for example—to the exclusion of long term research.\textsuperscript{31} Not that the distinction was always clear. Data papers had still to be prepared for IPR and BCR conferences and these were often, in fact, substantial studies directed to topics which the Research Committee regarded as appropriate for long term research. Two Council meetings in 1945 attempted to identify questions which were of continuing importance for Australia and drew up a list of seven subjects which, it believed, should form the core of the research effort over the next few years. These show a heavy emphasis on questions of international organisation in the postwar world and on problems of trusteeship, administration and development in the dependent territories of the western Pacific. The listed topics were: the machinery of international collaboration in the light of the Bretton Woods Conference; the coordination of world and regional organisation, including British Commonwealth organisation and defence; trusteeship in the Pacific; agricultural rehabilitation in the western Pacific; an Australian study of immigration; air transport; Australian attitudes to claims for Pacific islands.\textsuperscript{32} These, of course, were among the areas to which attention had been given during the war years and which had resulted in some publication in the ‘Australia in a New World’ series. The western Pacific focus was to appear also in preparations for the 10th IPR Conference held at Stratford on Avon in 1947. For this conference a Sydney study group chaired by A.H. McDonald, and consisting of J.M. Ward, T. Inglis Moore and James McAuley, prepared a paper on ‘Dependencies and Trusteeship in the Pacific Area’ and a Victorian group chaired by Professor S.M. Wadham, and consisting of N.D. Harper, Professor W. Prest, Geoffrey Sawer and Miss Dorothy Crozier, worked on ‘Australia’s Interests and Policies in regard to Problems of Economic and Social Reconstruction in the Pacific’. And a similar group of papers was prepared by W.D. Borrie, H.A. Wolsohn,\

\textsuperscript{30} The decisions of 1947 and 1948 to adopt the principle of a capitation fee made the differences in size between branches and, in particular, the greater size of the NSW Branch as compared with that of Victoria, a matter of some significance. At the time, NSW had a membership of approximately 470 while Victoria had a mere 172 members. Queensland and Canberra had 84 and 27 respectively. The Commonwealth Council meeting of August 1947 recommended that efforts be made to double the ordinary membership of the Victorian Branch and to secure additional corporate members in both Victoria and NSW.

\textsuperscript{31} Commonwealth Council, 18 August 1945.

\textsuperscript{32} Commonwealth Council, 3 March 1945 and 18 August 1945.
N.D. Harper and E.E. Ward for the 11th IPR Conference held at Lucknow, India in 1950. These covered population problems, Australian foreign policy and the Indonesian dispute, the Peace settlement with Japan and Australia's economic interests in the Far East.

In devising a long term program the Council entertained the possibility that Institute research might benefit from deliberate cooperation with research going on in other institutions—in the Army's Directorate of Research and Civil Affairs, for example, and in the School of Civil Affairs already established by the Army for the purpose of training administrators for the Army's Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU). That School was shortly to be moved from Canberra to Sydney as the civil School of Pacific Administration.33 Given the western Pacific interests of the Institute there were special opportunities here for fruitful interaction. John Andrews, former Commonwealth Secretary, Ian Hogbin, Camilla Wedgwood, James McAuley and T.P. Fry had all served in the Land Headquarters Directorate of Research and the School of Civil Affairs. But more generally the idea of linking Institute research initiatives with those of other bodies was a useful way of proceeding, given the strong academic component in AIIA membership. Two years later it was suggested that, where possible, the research program of the Institute should be linked with research already in progress in the Universities and this has remained a continuing thread in the work of the Research Committee.34

Some of the seven topics listed in 1945 reflected the special interests of particular Institute members. The control of international air transport had for long been an interest of Group Captain Gerald Packer of the Victorian Branch. While serving in the RAAF during the war he had prepared a paper on the subject for the 1945 BCR Conference and as Victorian Vice President and occasional Victorian representative on the Commonwealth Council he was able to argue that attention be given to that subject. The work was taken up as a group project, led by Tristan Buesst. The subject of migration was central to the interests of W.D. Borrie, John Andrews' successor as Commonwealth Secretary until Miss Kingston's appointment in 1945, and then Research Chairman, 1946-47. These areas, together with the continuing interest in Pacific dependencies, represented a significant research program and led to some substantial publication. The work of A.H. McDonald's Sydney study group for the IPR Conference was published in 1948 as Trusteeship in the Pacific. W.E.H. Stanner, Reader in Anthropology in the University of Sydney and for a time a member of the Army Directorate of Research, was invited to prepare a general study on social change in Pacific societies and completed a manuscript on the subject in 1947. Publication difficulties delayed its appearance but it was eventually published in 1953 as South Seas in Transition under the joint auspices of the AIIA and the IPR, the

33 Commonwealth Council, 3 March 1945.
34 Commonwealth Council, 16 and 17 August 1947.
latter body having contributed financially to the costs of its preparation. Borrie's migration study appeared (though not under AIIA auspices) as *Population Trends and Policies* in 1948 and *Air Transport* by Hocking and Haddon Cave was published in the same year. *Security Problems in the Pacific Region*, by Buesst, Macmahon Ball and Packer followed in 1949. Institute publications were not limited to these, however. A second edition of the successful *Land Utilization in Australia*, by Wadham and Wood, was published in 1950 (a third edition followed in 1957) and in 1948 the Institute sponsored Macmahon Ball’s account of his service as British Commonwealth representative (representing the United Kingdom, India, Australia and New Zealand) on the Allied Council for Japan, which appeared as *Japan: Enemy or Ally?* The same author’s influential survey of the western Pacific, *Nationalism and Communism in East Asia*, was published under the joint auspices of the AIIA and the IPR in 1952.

The Institute’s ability to maintain a steady volume of works on matters of general public interest gave rise to the question of modes of publication. Until the later 1940s, publication contracts had been arranged on an *ad hoc* basis. The early publications of the Victorian and NSW Branches of the Royal Institute—The Peopling of Australia, The Australian Mandate for New Guinea and Studies in Australian Affairs—were all published by Macmillan in association with Melbourne University Press. Shepherd’s *Australia’s Interests and Policies in the Far East* had been published in the distinguished ‘Inquiry Series’ of the Institute of Pacific Relations. But with the appearance of A.H. McDonald (ed.), *Trusteeship in the Pacific*, the Institute entered into an agreement with Angus and Robertson for the publication of a series of volumes, and Angus and Robertson became, in effect, the Institute’s publisher for a time. The same policy continued after the lapse of that agreement, with F.W. Cheshire and Nelson becoming in turn the Institute’s publisher, until new technology and the development of desk top publishing changed the setting in which publishing took place and led again to a variety of publishing methods rather than a commitment to a regular publishing house.

With the publication of *Security Problems in the Pacific Region* in 1949 and with Stanner’s *South Seas in Transition* following a little later, it could be said that the major part of the research program adopted in 1945 had been completed. It is worth considering whether, in these works or elsewhere, it is possible to discern the emerging perspectives of the Institute at the point at which the main outlines of the postwar world were settling into place. What were the underlying assumptions of Institute members about how the world was constructed, and what were the leading themes in their discussion of Australia’s place in that world?
Changing perceptions

Apart from the emphases placed by the Research Committee, the pages of *The Australian Outlook* give some indication of what appeared to be important in AIIA circles. The initial issues of the journal, between 1947 and 1951, covered a broad range of topics—Australian foreign policy in general, her defence policy, her future role as a member of the British Commonwealth, America’s postwar role in Europe and the Pacific, the prospects for the political and economic democratisation of Japan, and the implications for Australia of postwar developments in Southeast Asia. Some attention was given to European developments—in Germany, in Yugoslavia and in eastern Europe in general. But perhaps the main focus during this period was on Japan and Indonesia. There were concerns about the thrust of Allied Occupation policy in Japan and doubts about whether the new Constitution adopted in 1947 would really guarantee a peaceful and democratic future for that country. And for Indonesia there was sympathy for the Republic in its struggle for independence from the Dutch.

The Dutch–Indonesian dispute was, of course, of overwhelming importance since it provided the occasion for Australia’s first significant postwar exercise in the development of an independent foreign policy. Towards the end of the war, Dr Evatt had entertained the possibility that the principle of trusteeship might be applied to the administration of the former European colonies in Southeast Asia, and that Australia, with her position in New Guinea and her proximity to the Netherlands East Indies, might share in the exercise of these responsibilities.35 However the events of 1945, and Indonesia’s proclamation of independence, created a totally new situation to which Australia had to respond. The ban placed by the Waterside Workers’ Federation on the loading of Dutch ships carrying supplies to the Indies drew public attention to the emerging conflict.36 In November 1945, the Australian Government appointed W. Macmahon Ball to make a first hand assessment of the situation.37 Over the next eighteen months the Government watched closely the negotiations between the Republic and The Netherlands, leading to the Linggajati Agreement of November 1946. In July 1947, when the Dutch launched their so-called ‘Police Action’ and attempted to recover control of their

36 See Rupert Lockwood, *Black Armada* (Sydney, 1982) for an account of this industrial action.
former colony by force, Australia brought the conflict to the notice of the
Security Council. The Security Council called for a ceasefire and
subsequently established a Good Offices Committee to facilitate negotia-
tions. Each side nominated a representative to the Committee. The
Dutch chose Belgium and the Republic nominated Australia.

Australia’s support for the claims of the Republic during this period
was not unqualified. There were ambiguities and tensions within the
Government and within the Department of External Affairs on particular
matters and probably a significant shift of attitude between 1947 and
1949. Some looked to the possibility of a negotiated solution which
allowed for greater Indonesian autonomy within a Dutch framework rather
than full independence. And there were some differences between Evatt,
with his preoccupation with the United Nations, with defence and security
issues and with Australia’s more general regional role, and Chifley’s
greater disposition to sympathise with Indonesia’s national aspirations as
represented by the Republic. Nevertheless, Australia’s overall support
of the Republic and the sympathetic approach of the Australian representa-
tives on the Good Offices Committee, and the UN Commission on
Indonesia which succeeded it, Judge Richard Kirby and T.K. Critchley,
provide good grounds for the claim made in the Introduction to the
relevant volume of Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, 1937–49
that, while Australia was not alone in supporting Indonesia’s fight for
independence ‘she was the Indonesian Republic’s most active and effect-
tive diplomatic ally’. The experience was of enormous importance in
laying the foundations for Australia’s future relations with Indonesia and
in confirming a significant Australian adjustment to a new order of power
in the western Pacific.

Contributions to the Outlook recognised the significance of Australia’s
care with this issue and regularly surveyed, in an analytical way, the

38 India had also referred the dispute to the Security Council but she did so
under the Chapter of the UN Charter dealing with the Pacific Settlement of
Disputes. Australia’s referral was made under Article 39 of the Charter
dealing with ‘Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of
Aggression’ and therefore took precedence. See Department of Foreign affairs
and Trade, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, 1937–49, Vol XI,
published as Diplomasi: Australia and Indonesia’s Independence: Documents
1947 (Canberra, 1994) for relevant documents.

39 George, Australia and the Indonesian Revolution, pp. 4 and 156–8.

40 For a discussion of some of these differences, see J.A.C. Mackie, ‘1945–1950:
Critchley, ‘View From the Good Offices Committee’, in John Legge (ed.),
New Directions in Australian Foreign Policy: Australia and Indonesia, 1945–
1950 (Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1997).

41 George, Australia and the Indonesian Revolution, pp. 165–6.

42 Diplomasi: Australia and Indonesia’s Independence, p. viii.
unfolding of events.\footnote{See, for example, R.A.D. Egerton, 'The Indonesian Dispute', \textit{The Australian Outlook}, vol. 3, no. 2 (June 1949); J. Leyser, 'Australia and the Post-War Settlement in South-East Asia', vol. 3, no. 3 (September 1949); H.J. Benda, 'Indonesia', vol. 4, nos 1 and 2 (June and September 1950). See also H.A. Wolfssohn, 'Australian Foreign Policy and the Indonesian Dispute', Data Paper for the 11th Conference of the IPR, Lucknow, 1950.} What is interesting in these contributions, and in others published in the journal over the same period dealing with a wide variety of topics, is the competence of non-specialist commentary in a diversity of fields. F.W. Eggleston was used to pronouncing magisterially on a wide range of topics, of course. Macmahon Ball was well qualified to comment on developments in Japan, having represented the British Commonwealth on the Allied Council. Gerald Packer had made a study of Australian defence policy over a number of years. W.D. Borrie was established as a demographer and could speak with authority on migration and population matters. And there were others who had expertise in the subjects on which they wrote. But, for the most part, the specialist study of Asia had yet to be established in Australia and many of the articles in \textit{The Australian Outlook} about the region to the north were written by what might be called lay observers. Norman Harper contributed articles on Japan and India, J.M. Ward on Japan, and A.H. McDonald on Japan and on Southeast Asia in general, including the Philippines, Burma, Malaya, Indochina and Indonesia.\footnote{See, for example, N.D. Harper, 'Australian Policy Towards Japan', vol. 1, no. 4 (December 1947); A.H. McDonald, 'Political Developments in South-East Asia', vol. 1, no. 4 (December 1947) and vol. 2, no. 1 (March 1948); and J.M. Ward, 'A New Constitution for Japan', vol. 1, no. 3, September 1947.} Looking back over forty years later, it is interesting to see how closely these commentators were monitoring events as they occurred and how well their judgements have stood the passage of time. A.H. McDonald, as Professor of Ancient History in the University of Sydney, brought a keen mind to the observation of the modern world as well, and other younger academics tested their developing expertise in the pages of the \textit{Outlook}.

Broadly speaking, the approach of contributors represented a confirmation of the kind of analysis of international affairs that members of the Institute were reaching by the end of the 1930s. Hugo Wolfsohn, in a general article on Australian foreign policy, still found it necessary to tease away at the old question of whether membership of the British Commonwealth required a common Commonwealth foreign policy—in practice if no longer as a constitutional requirement—and to point out that, though the Dominions could not claim an independent role, and though Australia had already asserted a claim to leadership in the western Pacific, so far the special interests of all of the Dominions had proved compatible with their membership of the Commonwealth. Where Australia did take a marked independent initiative, as in the signing of the ANZAC Pact with New Zealand in 1944, she might be seen, especially after the
change of government in 1949, as acting less as an independent power than as 'an agent of the Commonwealth in the Pacific'. But overwhelmingly the view of contributors was an acceptance of the need for a consideration of specifically Australian interests and, in consequence, for an independent foreign policy approach and, more particularly, an awareness of the special problems of the region and of the changes going on within it. L.F. Fitzhardinge, reporting on the 10th IPR Conference (Stratford on Avon, 1947) gave a clear statement of that perspective. ‘Australia is now, as never before, “in the Pacific”, not merely in the obvious geographical sense. Our adaption of an ancestral culture to an environment foreign to it, our development of a national identity and outlook, imperfect as they are, have gone far enough to give us points of contact, small maybe, and often unexpected, with our neighbours who are trying to adapt their ways of life, based on an ancient traditional culture, to the pressures of international demands and western technology.’ ‘The ferment in Asia’, he added, ‘must not be seen merely negatively, as “disorder”: rather is it a dynamic process, the birth throes of a new “order”.’45 Interacting with that process offered a justification for Australia’s claim to an independent voice in world affairs. That comment was very much in line with the prevailing views of the Austral-Asiatic Bulletin, views which had been given a high degree of official authorisation during Dr Evatt’s period of assertive foreign policy making.

It was suggested above that there were four main elements in Australia’s external policy as it emerged during the war years and in the immediate postwar period: an emphasis on the construction of an appropriate international organisation to replace the League of Nations, an acceptance of American leadership and a reliance on American protection, continued cooperation with Britain and other members of the British Commonwealth, and a claim to a leadership role in the affairs of the immediate region.46 These elements could be combined in different ways and be given very different emphases from time to time and from situation to situation. For the Chifley Labor Government—and for Dr Evatt in particular—the United Nations component was of great importance because it was believed that it might provide a framework for independent Australian initiatives (as, for example, in the case of the Indonesian struggle for independence) and reduce the sense of dependence on one or other of the major powers. The Liberal Government, when it came to power in 1949 was much less disposed to view the UN in that light and indeed entertained some reservations about the likely effectiveness of the United Nations as a peacekeeping organisation. And the Menzies Government was more disposed than was its predecessor to emphasise, at least in its rhetoric, the importance of Commonwealth ties and of acting within the framework of the Commonwealth rather than emphasising—to some it

45 The Australian Outlook, vol. 1, no. 4 (December 1947).
46 See above, chapter 1.
seemed it had almost been for the sake of emphasising—Australia’s claim to independent action. But the importance of the region remained central in Australian thinking. It was a Liberal Minister for External Affairs, Mr P.C. Spender, who played a major part in launching the Colombo Plan in 1950. (This was, of course, an occasion where concern for the needs of the region could be expressed within the framework of Commonwealth cooperation.) Also central was a recognition of the need to rely on American protection against the dangers presented by the region. Throughout the long period of Liberal ascendancy, the ANZUS treaty remained, as Menzies described it, the cornerstone of Australian foreign policy.47

Discussion of the varying emphases to be placed on different aspects of foreign policy was conducted to a considerable extent, in Institute circles and outside them, in pragmatic terms. The general concern was with considerations of security arising from Pacific power changes. Attention was drawn, for example, to the threats posed by new Asian nationalisms, and to the protection formerly provided by the colonial empires of friendly European powers. ‘Australia’s basic interest in the post-war as in the pre-war Pacific is in security’, wrote Norman Harper, and he drew attention to the loss of the ‘protective screen’ provided formerly by the Dutch in the Indies.48 Mr Menzies, as Leader of the federal Opposition in 1949, spoke on the basis of a similar assumption when he criticised the Chifley Government for its hostility to the Dutch. He expressed the view that the whole Indonesian dispute fell within the domestic jurisdiction of the Netherlands. ‘In plain terms, we have been assisting to put the Dutch out of the East Indies. If we continue to do that the same process will, no doubt, in due course, eject the British from Malaya and the Australians from Papua and New Guinea.’49 Against that kind of view was the argument, also couched in pragmatic terms, that Australia must adapt itself to the inevitability of political change in Southeast Asia and that a friendly relationship with newly emerging nations offered a better guarantee of Australian security than a necessarily futile attempt to resist the course of change. This was the kind of assumption that underlay A.H. McDonald’s 1947 survey of political development in Southeast Asia.50 A similar pragmatism marked discussions about Australia’s acceptance of the peace treaty with Japan. It was viewed in terms of the extent to which it was necessary to follow American leadership in this matter as a price for American protection against a

47 See, for example, F.A. Mediansky, ‘The Conservative Style in Australian Foreign Policy’, *Australian Outlook*, vol. 28, no. 1 (April 1974).
50 *The Australian Outlook*, vol. 1, no. 4 (December 1947) and vol. 2, no. 1 (March 1948).
future resurgent Japan and against other possible future dangers in the western Pacific.\textsuperscript{51}

But of course these prudential considerations were mixed with a good deal of moral, and perhaps, ideological, commitment. Australia's action in bringing the Indonesian dispute to the notice of the United Nations was inspired at least in part by the idealistic strand in a Labor Government's foreign policy—its advocacy of regional cooperation in social and economic matters, its appeal to the general principles of the Atlantic Charter, its emphasis on the principle of trusteeship in Pacific dependencies and the acceptance of independence as a goal for colonial peoples. Chifley and Evatt were prepared to support—on principle as well as for pragmatic reasons—the Indonesian Republic's resistance to the Dutch.\textsuperscript{52} By the same token, Mr Menzies' concern about putting the Dutch out of the Indies was not just a matter, in his terms, of political realism. Beyond that was his commitment to the values of an imperial past. His remarks showed no sympathy whatsoever with the aspirations of emergent nationalism but reflected, rather, his more general views about the value of European empires. In Institute circles the same sort of preferences were visible in Gerald Packer's assessment of security problems in the region. Packer noted that the national movements in Southeast Asia were fundamentally anti-European and he feared, in particular, the possibility of Indian domination of the Indian Ocean.\textsuperscript{53}

With the development of the Cold War and the foreshadowed emergence of a bipolar world, developments in East and Southeast Asia were, of course, viewed by Australian observers in Cold War terms. Korea, the Malayan Emergency, the course of domestic politics in Indonesia, the Indochina conflict would, in turn, be slotted into that kind of framework. The Institute provided one forum in which opposing views about these developments could be canvassed. While it avoided developing any view of its own, it is probably true to say that its framework of discussion reflected the prevailing assumptions of Australian society not in the sense of adhering to one side or another in assessing the peripheral conflicts of the Cold War, but in the sense of accepting the global opposition of East and West as the fundamental fact. In maintaining its own detachment as an organisation it was more fortunate than its partner, the Institute of Pacific Relations, which did become embroiled in the oppositions of the McCarthy period in America and, in consequence, failed to survive.

\textsuperscript{51} W. Macmahon Ball, \textit{The Australian Outlook}, vol. 5, no. 1 (September 1951).
\textsuperscript{52} For a presentation of these elements, see H.A. Wolfsohn, 'Australian Foreign Policy', \textit{The Australian Outlook}, vol. 5, no. 2 (June 1951).
\textsuperscript{53} Gerald Packer, 'Security Problems in the Indian Ocean', \textit{The Australian Outlook}, vol. 1, no. 4 (December 1947). See also a letter to Norman Harper in which Packer argued that, 'It would be naive to imagine that Australian action to preserve good neighbourly relations would therefore be a guarantee of political and military security' nor would it be likely to produce gratitude. Packer to Harper, 16 October 1957. Packer Papers, NLA, MS 780/3, Box 4.
These developments, however, were still to come. At the beginning of the 1950s the Institute, after recovering from the difficulties of the war years, having achieved some strengthening of its central administration and having carried out a quite effective research program, found itself facing problems in maintaining itself as a genuinely national organisation.
In 1948, the second Rockefeller grant came to an end (with an unexpended balance of £1-10–0 at 31 January of that year!). In spite of the efforts of Miss Kingston to secure, from the branches, a regular contribution sufficient to maintain the central secretariat, her own salary and the modest administrative arrangements which serviced the work of the Commonwealth Council, including the sharing of accommodation in the NSW Branch headquarters at 369 George Street, Sydney, had depended on the money provided by Rockefeller. In 1947, with the impending expiry of the grant, it was necessary immediately to seek funding from elsewhere. An approach was made to the Carnegie Corporation of New York, stressing the fact that the future of the Commonwealth Secretariat was dependent on such assistance.\(^1\) The President, Mr R.J.F. Boyer, was able to announce, to the January meeting of the Council in 1948, that the request had been successful. Carnegie had agreed to provide $7500 over three years, payable on a sliding scale with approximately £1000, £770 and £550 to be paid in December 1947, 1948 and 1949 respectively. But this time the foreign provider stipulated that the funds were made available on the firm understanding that, during the currency of the grant, the Institute would raise from local sources an amount equal to the decrease in the yearly payments after the first year, and would be able, at the end of the three years, to provide annual support equivalent to the first year’s instalment.\(^2\)

Nineteen-forty-eight also marked the term of Miss Kingston’s initial appointment. The Council recorded its satisfaction with her service and invited her to accept a year’s extension of her appointment, by which time

\(^{1}\) Commonwealth Council, 16 and 17 August 1947.
\(^{2}\) Commonwealth Council, 31 January 1948.
it hoped that funds would enable the position to be placed on a more secure footing. Miss Kingston chose not to accept the offer and returned to the practice of law in Sydney. She was succeeded after advertisement by Mr (formerly Major) George Caiger, a man with a varied experience. A teacher of English in Japan during the 1930s, he had engaged in some freelance journalism and had published books and articles on aspects of Japanese life. Amongst other things, he had written for the Austral-Asian Bulletin. His war service had been with Army Education. At the time of his appointment as Commonwealth Secretary of the Institute he was conducting the National Forum of the Air for the ABC.

As Secretary of the Institute Mr Caiger was less concerned than was Miss Kingston with organisational problems and more with the public side of the Institute's work, speaking at meetings and on radio, organising what he hoped would be an annual 'International Affairs Week' during which Institute people and publications would be brought to public notice, and encouraging the establishment by branches of discussion groups to consider particular problems, rather than to prepare more specialist papers for international conferences. And he edited The Australian Way of Life, the Australian contribution to a series on 'National Ideas and Values' sponsored by UNESCO. Mr Caiger's public ventures achieved only moderate success, partly because they didn't receive wholehearted support either from the Commonwealth Council or from branches.3

In the event his appointment was to be comparatively short. Efforts were made to raise Australian funds to meet the stipulation of the Carnegie Corporation that, over three years, the Institute would raise from local sources enough to enable the progressive replacement of the Corporation's grant. In 1948, a subcommittee of the Commonwealth Council, consisting of T.N.M. Buesst, R.L. Stock and A.R. Davidson of Victoria and N.L. Cowper of NSW, was appointed to consider ways of increasing corporate membership, both for the individual branches and for the support of the Commonwealth Council itself.4 (Corporate member subscriptions were at a much higher level than those of individual members and were, in effect, intended as a kind of donation to the work of the Institute.) Attempts were made also to secure additional individual donations. Mr Dyason, with his customary generosity, donated £150.5 (This followed an earlier contribution to assist in the foundation of The Australian Outlook.) As part of this drive for funds, application was made to the Government for tax deductibility for corporate subscriptions and donations. On this occasion the application was rejected and the efforts of the subcommittee produced disappointing results. Dyason excepted, Australia lacked the tradition of private giving to bodies like the Institute.

3 Recollections of Miss Nance Dickins, former Secretary of the Victorian Branch and Secretary to the Commonwealth Council.
4 Commonwealth Council, 31 January 1948.
5 Commonwealth Council, 31 January 1948.
As R.G. Casey pointed out in his Roy Milne Lecture in 1952, 'You have had little of the encouragement which helps similar societies in other countries... You do not benefit from the patronage which traditionally has supported the budgets of learned societies in Britain and on the Continent'. And the financial climate of the steeply rising inflation in the early 1950s made it, in any case, not the best time for raising funds. Though the drive for corporate membership met with some success it was not on a scale sufficient to support the continued appointment of a salaried general secretary. At the Council meeting of 24 February 1951, it was resolved that 'in view of the financial position of the Institute the General Secretariat cannot be continued in its present form' and Mr Caiger was informed that it would be necessary to terminate his appointment at the end of May.

With his departure the Institute was forced to fall back on ad hoc arrangements for the day to day running of its affairs at the national level.

The secretariat moves to Melbourne

First of all, as an interim measure, secretarial work was divided between the offices of the NSW and Victorian Branches. In Sydney, Miss Noni Ward, who had been secretary to George Caiger, did some general secretarial work for the Executive Committee of the Commonwealth Council while in Victoria Miss Nance Dickins did the secretarial work connected with research and publication. This division of responsibility was cumbersome and, at a meeting of the Commonwealth Council in August 1951, it was decided to transfer the secretariat to Melbourne. The Victorian Branch was to be paid for the secretarial services performed on behalf of the national body. The payment enabled the Branch to appoint a senior assistant for Miss Dickins to help her to cope with Commonwealth Council matters as well as those of the Branch. At first a 'Commonwealth Committee' (the old Executive under a new name) was set up with four members appointed by the Victorian Branch, and with Mr K.A. Aickin as Honorary Secretary. This arrangement lasted until 1959 when Miss Dickins was formally appointed Honorary Secretary and Secretary of the Company, a position she retained until her retirement in 1975.

During this period when national affairs were handled from the office of the Victorian Branch an important administrative role was played by the national Presidents, in turn Mr T.N.M. Buesst (Victoria), Mr D.A.S. Campbell (NSW), Dr John Andrews (NSW) and Professor Gordon Greenwood (Queensland). They were in regular contact with Miss Dickins and played a large part in the organisation of national activities. But the central administrative tasks and the maintenance of administrative continuity fell to the Secretary.

6 See chapter 9 below for the Roy Milne Lecture Series.
Miss Dickins had become Secretary of the Victorian Branch in 1946. A graduate in Arts of the University of Melbourne, she had served with the Red Cross Society as Secretary of the Blood Transfusion Service and then in the Commonwealth Public Service where she had worked with the Production Executive of Cabinet and then with the Disposals Commission. This variety of jobs was no doubt a preparation for the diversity of duties that fell to her lot in the combined positions of Secretary of the Victorian Branch and Commonwealth Secretary. She was responsible for the preparation of agendas for Council meetings, the keeping of accounts, the maintenance of correspondence with other branches, the correspondence relating to the Institute’s research program and for seeing *The Australian Outlook* through the press. In general, in circumstances where Commonwealth Council members, meeting only twice a year, would canvass a wide range of matters concerning the initiatives and character of the Institute, it was the Secretary’s job to take up decisions made and see that they were carried to a conclusion. She was the one continuing element in the work of the national organisation. Even after the appointment of a national Director, based in Canberra, the secretariat remained in Melbourne until after Miss Dickins’ retirement in 1975, when it was finally transferred to Canberra. Looking back over those years, Miss Dickins has referred to the occasional observation of members that, for years, she was the Institute, and commented ‘This was very far from the truth’. But there was, nevertheless, considerable point in the observation. In an Association like the Institute, whose members in varying degrees take part in its activities but do so in the midst of other interests and activities, the role of Secretary provided the necessary focus for the Institute as a whole. In her twenty-four years of devoted service Miss Dickins certainly performed that function. During the 1950s, by combining, in effect, the roles of secretary and executive officer, she enabled the Institute, within its very severe financial constraints, to maintain a national presence. Writing in 1977, a former Victorian Branch Chairman, Professor W. Macmahon Ball, summed up the matter: ‘I think it would be hard to overestimate the worth of what Nance Dickins did for so many years—overworked and underpaid.’

During this period, indeed, the Institute had become much more visible as a result of the Dyason Lectures, a public lecture series planned by Mr E.C. Dyason in 1949. These lectures, given annually by individuals of international eminence, became a major event in the Institute’s calendar and drew the attention of the community at large to the existence of the Institute.

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8 W. Macmahon Ball to T.B. Millar, 31 May 1977. Macmahon Ball Papers, NLA, MS 7851.
The Dyason Lectures

A mining engineer by training and then a Melbourne stockbroker and company director by later occupation, Edward Clarence Dyason was a quite unusual figure in the Australian scene. He possessed a keen interest in, and a profound moral concern with, many aspects of public affairs: economic policy, international affairs, the psychology of conflict, domestic and international, and problems of conflict resolution. He had been a conscientious objector during World War I and had suffered a brief period of detention as a result. He had been a founding member of the Economic Society and a member of the Editorial Board of the *Economic Record*. He played an important part in the work of the Round Table, and was a founding member of the Victorian Branch of the League of Nations Union, of the Australian Institute of International Affairs and of the Victorian Group of the Institute of Pacific Relations. In a country which lacked the American tradition of establishing private foundations for public ends, Dyason was unusual in his willingness to donate some of his not inconsiderable financial resources to good causes. We have already noticed his initiative in establishing the Bureau of Social and International Affairs. He provided financial assistance for the establishment of the Austral-Asiatic Section within the Victorian Branch of the AIIA, and the launching of the *Austral-Asiatic Bulletin*. He gave similar assistance to the establishment of *The Australian Outlook* ten years later. And in 1940, he began to develop plans to provide permanent funds to support objectives of this kind.

Dyason’s initial desire was to provide an endowment to encourage the study of the psychology of conflict and in 1942 the Dyason Foundation was established for this purpose. The trustees were old friends—Professor K.H. Bailey, Dr David Rivett, Professor L.F. Giblin and Professor A. Boyce Gibson. Dr Kurt Singer, a former Professor of Economics of the

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9 For a brief biography, see Leonie Foster, *High Hopes: The Men and Motives of the Australian Round Table* (Melbourne, 1986) p. 206. See also P.W. Eggleston, ‘E.C. Dyason’, *The Australian Outlook*, vol. 4, no. 2 (June 1950). Foster’s reference to Dyason’s detention as a conscientious objector raises a question since there was no conscription in Australia during World War I. He described himself as a ‘militant pacifist’ throughout the war (*Australian Dictionary of Biography*, Vol. 8, p. 391) and it may be that he was caught, as was John Curtin, by Hughes’ military service proclamation, issued before the defeat of the first conscription referendum in 1916, calling all single men into camp. Curtin failed to enlist, was arrested and sentenced to three months imprisonment, but was released with others after three days. See Lloyd Ross, *John Curtin: A Biography* (Sydney, 1977) pp. 51–3, Geoffrey Serle, ‘John Curtin’, *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, Vol. 13, p. 551 and Serle, *For Australia and Labor: Prime Minister John Curtin* (Perth, 1998) p. 7.

University of Hamburg, was appointed as a Research Fellow in 1943 to prepare the ground for a long term study. Some of his work appeared in article form and a collection of papers was then published by Melbourne University Press in 1949 as *The Idea of Conflict*.11 But by the late 1940s, Dyason was moving to the idea of bringing to Australia a number of overseas scholars recognised as outstanding authorities in their respective disciplines to give public lectures, to make contact with appropriate people in the Universities and generally to stimulate public awareness of the issues that concerned him, and to break down what he saw as Australia’s isolation from currents of thought elsewhere in the world.

Writing to Professor Giblin in January 1949, Dyason gave an indication of the way his thoughts were tending. ‘My own ideas are gradually crystallising toward the view that to have a cumulative and lasting effect there should be a series of such visits and activities over a period of say ten years.’ Such a plan, ‘given the right selection and appropriate backing in finance and preparation, would be a really invigorating contribution to the social and intellectual life of Australia’.12 A little later in the year he spoke of the need for new concepts which might ‘shake the world’. ‘I conceive of the project as a double barrelled attempt to increase both public and scholastic interest in the schism in human affairs which has been increasing for so long and is now possibly at its climax.’13 As a general title for the lecture series he suggested ‘Ideological Differences and World Order’ and he looked to finding people of distinction in the fields of Philosophy, History, Psychology, Literature and Art, Anthropology, Economics, Natural Science and—not covered by these—an ‘international pundit’. What mattered, however, was not so much the particular disciplines as the calibre of the people who might be persuaded to come and whose ideas, conveyed through an extended lecture series, ‘will ultimately have a real impact on thought, opinion and politics in Australia’. Such speakers, he believed, might achieve a synthesis ‘not only between the special sciences but also between the sciences and the humanities’ and help to establish ‘a better mutual appreciation between public and Universities’. More generally he believed that ‘a series of public appearances such as we envisage, if persisted in over a course of

11 Singer, in a Report to the Foundation in 1944, described his assignment as ‘studying conflict in its fundamental aspects and free of those restrictions that specialist disciplines like political science, economics, international relations, necessarily impose’ and spoke of it requiring ‘intimate collaboration between biologists, sociologists, psychologists, psychiatrists, philosophers and others’. Dyason Papers, Group 5/1–3, University of Melbourne Archives. One can see why his approach appealed to Dyason.

12 Dyason to L.F. Giblin, 8 January 1949. Taken from extracts made by Miss Dickins from Dyason’s letters to Giblin, reported to Commonwealth Council, August 1953. The copies are held at Dyason House, Melbourne, filed under ‘Donations—International Affairs Research and Lecture Fund’.

13 Dyason to Giblin, 6 June 1949.
years, will do a little to make the Australian public more conscious of the value of scholastic endeavour and will also stimulate it'. For this purpose he set up in New York a new Trust, the Platus Trust, to fund a lecture series for a period of ten years.14

The quotations from Dyason's letters display very clearly the excitement he felt in planning the enterprise, his belief in the power of ideas to influence human relations and his sense of Australia's distance from the main centres of intellectual development. There was a strong apocalyptic element in it all. In an article in The Australian Outlook, surveying the approaches of Toynbee, Mannheim and Northrop, he wrote:

These three apostolic visions, made in the twilight of what seems to be the approaching end of an epoch, bespeak a Trinity, joined by a single creative purpose, which, if it can but reach men's understanding, may engender a new legitimacy in their hearts. Without this the people perish.

The creative purpose in each is the 'desire and pursuit of the whole' but there are many ways to understanding.15

This catches something of the concerns he hoped would be addressed in the proposed lecture series. Unfortunately, he did not live to see his plans carried out. He died in 1949 on his way back to England after chairing the Australian delegation to the 1949 British Commonwealth Relations Conference which had been held in Canada. He had, however, arranged the first lecture tour, undertaken in 1949 by Professor F.S.C. Northrop, Sterling Professor of Law and Philosophy at Yale. This was paid for out of his own pocket rather than through the Platus Trust. And he also had secured the agreement of Bertrand Russell to make the second tour in 1950.

Northrop's visit, though limited to a month which gave little opportunity for contact with universities, was a tremendous success. Macmahon Ball, reporting on the tour as Chairman of the Victorian Branch, described 'the enormous impact' of the lectures on those who heard them, and the excitement they generated would indeed be seen as a measure of Australia's isolation at the time. Russell's visit also attracted great public notice and in succeeding years a series of other distinguished figures brought the Institute itself to public notice in a way that has not quite been matched since then: Salvador de Madariaga, member of the Spanish Academy of Letters (1951), Clyde Kluckhohn, Professor of Anthropology at Harvard and Director of Harvard's Russian Research Center (1952), the biologist, Sir Julian Huxley (1953), Justice William O. Douglas of the United States Supreme Court (1954), Kenneth Younger, former United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (1955), Professor Arnold

Dyason was by this time living outside Australia. In 1940, he settled in Argentina and then, in 1947, he moved to England. But he remained identified with Australian society and with the discussion of its problems.

Toynbee, formerly Director of Studies at Chatham House and, of course, widely known for his monumental *Study of History* (1956), Gunnar Myrdal, Swedish economist and author of *The American Dilemma* (1957) and Kingsley Martin, Editor of the *New Statesman* (1958).

The lecturers, where possible, visited all branches and gave in each centre either one or two public lectures as well as speaking at closed meetings of the branch. In differing degrees they were also brought into direct contact with the universities and with professional communities as Dyason had intended. Not all were good speakers and not all devoted great effort to the preparation of the lectures, though most did take the responsibility seriously. The honorarium offered was, of course, very small by American standards and, in accepting the invitation to come, most of the visitors clearly believed that they had a message to convey to their audiences. All were significant figures and once the series was fairly launched the distinction of the early lecturers provided a benchmark for those who came after. (Kingsley Martin remarked of his own acceptance that the list of his predecessors was of such calibre that he did not have the hide to refuse the invitation to him to make the 1958 tour.16) In pre-television days members of the public continued to be ready to turn out on a winter’s evening, often in their hundreds, to hear a lecture by a visiting celebrity; and audiences over the years came to expect something of a fresh slant on the topics addressed and a viewpoint containing a strong moral component. Neither individually nor collectively did they achieve the new vision for the world that Dyason had hoped for but there was no doubt that, in different ways, they provided an intellectual stimulus for those who heard them.

For the lecturers themselves there was, perhaps, the enjoyment of travel and the experience of seeing a country they might otherwise have been unlikely to visit. Toynbee was fascinated by the emptiness of the Nullarbor Plain, the ebullient Gunnar Myrdal was so interested in local problems that he was still offering advice as he boarded his return plane and Douglas, the adventurer, expressed in advance his desire to see something of the interior—the new oil wells and the uranium mines, 'the mountains and the bush country, the rivers and the reefs'.17 This involved much changing of his itinerary and confusion about whether he was coming across the Pacific to Sydney or by Europe to Darwin.18 Huxley

16 Conversation with the writer during Martin’s visit to Perth.
17 Douglas to Tristan Buesst, then President of the Institute, 14 May 1954. Commonwealth Secretariat Files, NB 7, NLA.
18 At one stage Douglas planned to travel overland from Darwin to Adelaide, leading a harassed Commonwealth Secretary to say: ‘If necessary, I suppose, we could plan the tour to start Adelaide and not try to pin him down to saying which way he is coming.’ (Nance Dickins to Tristan Buesst, 21 May 1954.) The final compromise was an overland trip from Darwin to Alice Springs, and from there by air to Adelaide where the tour began. (Buesst to Douglas, 13 July 1954 and Douglas to Nance Dickins, 21 July 1954.)
also wanted to see the Northern Territory, to have a full week on the barrier reef and to see Western Australian wildflowers.\(^{19}\) To accommodate such requests tours were sometimes extended. Their duration varied from six weeks to three months.\(^{20}\)

As the series proceeded the ABC came into the picture, helping to finance the tours after 1956 and using the visitors in their ‘Guest of Honour’ program. And the Australian National University contributed to the costs of the Toynbee visit. So successful was the series that, before the end of the ten years of lectures funded by the Platus Trust, the Institute, at the suggestion of Mr R.L. Stock of the Victorian Branch, had moved to establish an International Affairs Research and Lecture Fund to enable the series to continue.\(^{21}\) The University of Melbourne agreed to assist in the administration of such a fund and a committee of seven was set up consisting of three members appointed by the Institute and four by the University. This arrangement had the advantage of enabling donations to the fund to be regarded as gifts to the University and thereby to be tax deductible.

Mr Campbell (NSW), Mr Buesst and Mr Stock (Victoria) were together the driving force in seeking donations to the fund which reached approximately £25,000. And there were other sources of assistance. The ABC’s contribution has been mentioned and the Department of External Affairs also contributed to several tours from its Asian Visitors Fund. And in 1961, the Dyason Foundation, which had supported originally the Bureau of Social and International Affairs and the activities of its constituent bodies, was wound up and the Victorian Branch received the sum of £43,618 from the distribution of the capital of the Trust. From this bequest, the Branch helped to supplement the amounts received from other sources in order to enable the series to continue. (The terms of the Dyason bequest did not require the Branch to use the money in that way. It was for the general purposes of the Branch, but the Branch felt, nevertheless, that it had an obligation to help to keep the lecture series going.\(^{22}\) By these devices the lectures were able to continue for another seventeen years. (They were now officially named the Dyason Memorial Lectures, but continued to be known simply as the Dyason Lectures.)

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19 Huxley to Buesst, 11 May 1953.
20 Some lecturers—Kluckhohn and Toynbee, for example—converted the first class air fare to economy and brought their wives with them. Some of them used the occasion of the visit to travel elsewhere afterwards. The Toynbees, for example, took in the Northern Territory and then went to Indonesia, ‘Persia’ and Israel. Huxley went to India.
21 The proposal was canvassed initially in meetings of the Victorian Branch Council, and was then raised at a Commonwealth Council meeting on 20 August 1955. The Commonwealth Council left it to Mr Stock and other members of the Victorian Branch to explore the question further.
The list of lecturers shows that the tradition of quality which formed part of Dyason’s original plan was maintained: Dr V.K.R.V. Rao, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Delhi (1959), Margaret Ballinger, former member of the South African House of Assembly (1960), Alastair Buchan, Director of the London Institute for Strategic Studies (1962), Professor Merle Fainsod, Director of the Harvard Russian Research Center (1963), Professor Shigeto Tsuru, Professor of Economics at Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo (1964), Sir Robert Scott, formerly Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom (1965), Raul Manglapus, Senator of the Republic of the Philippines (1966), Soedjatmoko, Indonesian intellectual and publisher and later Indonesian Ambassador to the United States and Rector of the United Nations University, Tokyo (1967), Robert A. Scalapino, Professor of Political Science of the University of California at Berkeley (1968), Claudio Veliz, Director of International Studies, University of Santiago and later Professor of Sociology at La Trobe University (1969), Leo Mates, Director of Yugoslavia’s Institute for International Politics and Economics (1970), Lord Trevelyan, former British Ambassador and a diplomat with extensive experience in the Middle East, and currently Director of the Royal Institute (1971), Ali Mazrui, Professor of Political Science at Makerere University, Uganda (1972), S. Rajaratnam, Foreign Minister, Singapore (1973), Rajni Kothari, Director of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi (1974), Helen Suzman, Member of the Progressive Party in the South African Parliament (1975), Akira Matsui, former Japanese Ambassador to the United Nations and a member of Japan’s Atomic Energy Commission (1976), Eugene McCarthy, United States Senator and former Presidential candidate (1977), and James Callaghan, former Prime Minister of Great Britain (1981).

By the mid 1970s, however, the situation was changing. Academic visitors of distinction were no longer a rarity and Australian academic contacts with the rest of the world were close and regular. The Australian university scene had been transformed by the work of the Murray Committee of Inquiry in 1957 and the entry of the Federal Government into university funding through the establishment of the Australian Universities Commission. Universities had increased in number and were integrated into the global university scene in a way that had not been the case at the end of World War II, and the isolation which Dyason had sought to remedy had long disappeared. So much so that it is now difficult to recall how real that isolation was. In the changed circumstances of the 1970s Dyason visitors were no longer an event and audiences no longer flocked to hear them. But during the 1950s and into the 1960s they performed an important function and gave the Institute a new visibility and a sense of purpose that helped to sustain its other activities.

That expanded visibility, however, came at a cost. The increased administrative burden imposed by the lectures underlined the shortcomings of the arrangements made in 1951 for the conduct of the
Institute's affairs at the national level. The task of coordinating the Dyason lecture tours fell primarily on the shoulders of Miss Dickins. The names of prospective visitors were canvassed at Commonwealth Council meetings and, after short lists were made, successive Presidents of the Institute had played their part in making initial approaches and in negotiating the timing of the tours. But Miss Dickins, in her combined roles of Secretary and Executive Officer of the national body, had to work out the final details of the tours, negotiate with individual branches and make the arrangements for travel and accommodation, in addition to providing the normal secretarial and executive support to the Commonwealth Council. Such a combination of functions was not an ideal arrangement, especially as Miss Dickins had to carry the secretarial work of the Victorian Branch as well. (The Victorian Branch, of course, derived some benefit from the fact that the Directorate made a contribution to its administrative costs, but the burden remained substantial.) By the early 1960s, the Commonwealth Council was moving to the view that more positive steps must be taken to strengthen the central organisation of the Institute.

Before turning to these developments, however, some attention should be given to the ideological setting within which the Institute conducted its activities during these years and to the consequences of that environment for its long standing partner, the Institute of Pacific Relations.
The efforts of the AIIA to strengthen its national organisation and to embark on an extended research program took place against the background of a rapidly changing world and there were consequential changes in the way its members perceived those developments. It was essentially a Cold War background. In chapter 3 it was argued that, while there was not, and could not be, a single Institute view of the international scene, some broadly accepted perspectives were emerging in the years leading up to World War II. Perceptions of international relations as based on a comparatively stable system of sovereign states, bound by alliances and divided by rivalries, and with the driving force located in the states system of western Europe, were gradually giving way, in the inter-war years, to views which sought the causes of conflict in underlying economic and social structures and which placed the rise of fascism within that framework. The ideological undertones of those perceptions were consolidated in a new context after the defeat of Germany, Italy and Japan, the disintegration of the 'Grand Alliance' of the war years, and the communist victory in China in 1949.

In the broad prewar opposition between the Axis powers and the western democracies, the European left and the Soviet Union were necessarily in the anti-fascist camp, and in the Far East it was the concern of the Chinese Communist Party to make common cause with the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek against the Japanese attack in 1937. In the postwar period it was the Soviet Union, patently authoritarian and repressive in character, which, in ideological unity with China, appeared as the enemy of the West. Whereas in the late 1930s there had been disagreements amongst western observers about the viability of Nationalist China and about the character of the CCP, now, with com-
munist victory complete, China came to be seen (wrongly as it was later to appear) as a part of a monolithic communist force. The postwar world was thus a bipolar world in which, over almost a forty year period, the opposing alignments of East and West were perceived as constituting the dominating framework of world events.

There were modifications to the sharpness of that perception. Conflicts in particular parts of the globe did not always fit neatly into the framework. New nationalisms, and new states emerging with various degrees of difficulty in various parts of the world were examples. For Australia, the anti-colonial movements of Southeast Asia were of direct and immediate relevance. The Republic of Indonesia, proclaimed by Sukarno and Hatta two days after Japan’s surrender, fought a four year political and military struggle against the efforts of the Dutch to re-establish control over their colony. This presented immediate and pressing dilemmas for Australia, which had received Dutch and Indonesians escaping from the Japanese advance in 1942, and prisoners from the Dutch prison camp at Boven Digul in New Guinea, and had played host to the NEI Commission (later the NEI Government in Exile) during the war. How was the Government to respond to the wharf labourers of Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne who struck against the ferrying of arms to help the Dutch to re-establish their control in Indonesia? How was it to respond to the Dutch ‘Police Action’ launched against the Republic in July 1947? By then the Chifley Government was clearly moving to an acceptance of the legitimacy of the Republic’s aspiration to independence and, as we have seen, took the initiative in bringing the dispute to the attention of the United Nations Security Council as a breach of the peace. In due course Australia’s role as a member of the UN Good Offices Committee (later reconstituted as the UN Commission for Indonesia) enabled it to play a direct part in facilitating negotiations between the Dutch and the Republic and laid a foundation for good relations with Indonesia after the transfer of sovereignty by the Dutch in 1949.

If Indonesian anti-colonialism presented the most immediate challenges to Australia, developments in colonies further north had similar implications for the shape of the new international society that Australia was entering. Burma secured her independence more painlessly than Indonesia, as a by-product of Prime Minister Attlee’s bold decision to grant independence to India and Pakistan. For the Philippines, a timetable for the granting of independence in 1946 had been agreed to by the United States Congress before the war. In Malaya the passage was less smooth. Postwar proposals for a Malayan Union, with a common citizenship, embracing Chinese and Indians as well as Malays, were resisted by the Malay rulers, the Malay community and by former members of the Malayan Civil Service, and were dropped in favour of a federation of Malaya, to include all nine states but with more restrictive citizenship provisions than would have been provided by the Union, as a vehicle for the transition to independence. The process was interrupted by a communist-
led anti-colonial movement which the British dubbed the ‘Emergency’, but the guerilla challenge was largely defeated by 1955 when elections were held. Independence was proclaimed in August 1957.

The communist victory in China in 1949, the Korean war of 1950–53 and the subsequent long war in Vietnam, were, however, more significant in helping to shape Australia’s general perception of the region as a whole and to place it in a Cold War context. For forty years from 1950, the particular and local developments in the new states of Southeast Asia tended, at least for some observers, to be fitted into the bipolar framework of global politics, and to have meaning only insofar as they could be interpreted as bearing in one way or another on the broader Cold War alignment. Certainly there continued to be persistent questioning of those perspectives by observers who insisted that the anti-colonial and ‘North–South’ dimension of world politics was as important as the East–West one and who held that the politics of the new states of the ex-colonial world had to be understood in relation to a differing set of challenges to do with underdevelopment, poverty and marginalisation. Others again, shared George Kennan’s pragmatic view of the Cold War, seeing the Soviet Union as simply another world power, to be dealt with in a practical way, not as the ‘evil empire’, to use President Reagan’s later formulation. Even these counter views, however, tended to be set within a Cold War framework.

North Korea’s invasion of South Korea in June 1950, was clearly an act of aggression and, by the accident of a Soviet boycott of Security Council proceedings, it was possible for counter action, led by the United States, to take place under United Nations authority undeterred by a Soviet veto. But in spite of China’s support of North Korea, there was international concern at the way in which General Macarthur, as UN Commander, sought to extend the conflict into a confrontation with China and relief eventually at Truman’s action in dismissing him. In Vietnam the issues were less clear-cut. In 1954, an international conference at Geneva proposed nation wide elections, to be held within two years, as a means of achieving the unification of Vietnam. The United States, however, feared that unification would turn out to be on the terms of the communist North and moved gradually to a position of intervention in support of the Ngo Dinh Diem government in the South, replacing, in effect, the French military presence. In these circumstances issues of interpretation of the nature of the conflict were entangled with issues of policy in a way that affected Australia’s perception of the region as a whole. What was the essential character of the conflict and in what way did it bear on Australian interests? Was it an example of a strategic communist advance in the western Pacific, with Vietnam as the first in a series of potential dominoes whose fall would extend communist influence throughout Southeast Asia, and therefore constitute a clear threat to Australian security? It was certainly seen in those terms by the Menzies Government after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Given the importance of
the United States alliance as expressed in the ANZUS Pact of 1951 and the Southeast Asia Treaty of 1954, it seemed necessary that our support of America in the western Pacific should be expressed in clear terms. These were the considerations which led Australia in 1962 to solicit an invitation to support American action in defence of South Vietnam by supplying thirty military instructors, a token support which became much more substantial over the years. In 1965, Australia agreed to contribute ground troops, initially a battalion but augmented by a further two battalions with naval and air support and thus rising by stages to a force of over 8000. In announcing the 1965 decision in the House of Representatives, Sir Robert Menzies referred both to the importance of the American alliance and to a perceived threat from China. The possible take-over of South Vietnam by the north, he said, 'must be seen as part of a thrust by Communist China between the Indian and Pacific Oceans'.

But the Government's critics saw it very differently. For them it appeared that, in the complex circumstances of the end of World War II, the communist leadership of Ho Chi Minh had emerged as the authentic expression of Vietnamese nationalism. In these terms, the escalating conflict of the late 1950s and early 1960s was less a case of 'aggression from the north' than of an essentially nationalist regime in the north resisting first of all the return of French imperialism and later the 'neo-imperialism' of the United States exerted through a series of reactionary puppet regimes in the south. Alternatively, it appeared from some angles as a civil war within Vietnam itself between opposing social forces and with outside actors supporting one side or the other.

The Geneva Accords of 1954, in dividing south and north Vietnam, did not create a political boundary between two states. Rather they looked to the proposed nation wide elections as a means of resolving that division. That procedure was accepted by Ho Chi Minh's government, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, in the north. The DRV entered into that agreement, however, not with the French-protected government of Ngo Dinh Diem, and not with the United States, but with France. And before the end of the two-year period France was no longer there. The wording of the Accords claimed to bind any successor government in the south but in fact Diem's government did not accept that obligation, holding that it had not been a party to the agreement and was not bound by it. In this it was to

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2 It is worth noting that, in the course of drafting the Prime Minister's statement, Sir James Plimsoll, Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, had suggested that the danger from China should be presented not as a direct military threat but as 'exploiting weaknesses in the multi-racial and economically underdeveloped countries of the region'. Menzies, however, dropped that clause from the statement and thus heightened the bipolar character of his view. See Edwards, with Pemberton, *Crises and Commitments*, pp. 372–4.
be supported by the United States, now in the process of moving to direct intervention. For almost twenty years thereafter, the character of the conflict and the rightness or wrongness of American—and Australian—involvement was a matter of intensive and divisive debate in both countries.

Throughout this whole post-World War II period, then, any consideration of questions of security and foreign policy tended to be considered as much in ideological terms—East versus West, communism versus democracy—as in terms of strategy, international balance, national interest and national prudence. Attitudes to independent Indonesia, for example, were affected adversely in the early 1960s by the apparent surge in the position of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and positively in the later 1960s by the elimination of that party after the attempted coup of 1965. (Though the degree of PKI involvement in the so-called coup remains very much an open question, the killings which followed were on a massive scale. The indifference to those events on the part of Australian observers, in common with those of the western world in general, was extraordinary and was no doubt due to the fact that it was an anti-communist massacre.) The Sino-Soviet split of the early 1960s may have dented the image of a monolithic communism arrayed against the democratic west, but did not fundamentally change it, and sharp conflict between communist and anti-communist powers continued to be seen as a key feature of the international system. In considering the alignments and shifts of position in this bipolar context the Australian Institute of International Affairs managed to preserve its institutional neutrality. Its long-standing partner in the study of international affairs, the Institute of Pacific Relations, was not so fortunate. Long before the drawing of firm lines of American commitment in Indochina, the IPR had been caught up in the bitter American domestic debate of the late 1940s and early 1950s about America's inability to stop the Chinese Communists from coming to power and it became, in the end, a Cold War casualty.

From their formation, the American Council and the International Secretariat of the IPR had played a major role in developing American scholarship about Asia and in bringing its findings to a wide academic and general readership. Its two periodicals, *Pacific Affairs* and the *Far

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5 For a consideration of these events see Robert Cribb (ed.), *The Indonesian Killings, 1965–1966* (Monash Papers on Southeast Asia, No. 21, Melbourne, 1990).

6 In the early years of the IPR it is possible to discern an element of tension between the idealistic motivation of those who believed that its main function should be to promote international understanding, and to contribute in this
*Eastern Survey*, were important vehicles for the continuing study of the Pacific region. *Pacific Affairs*, under the editorship of Owen Lattimore from 1933 till 1941, and of W.L. Holland after 1943, appeared quarterly and became a respected academic journal, presenting serious studies of aspects of Pacific developments and with an authoritative book review section. The *Far Eastern Survey*, a monthly publication, was more a journal of reportage, though it did publish articles of comment and analysis and it also reviewed works on the Far East as they appeared. The conferences of the Institute were also of importance in bringing together scholars, political leaders and diplomats from member countries and enabling the public discussion of a wide range of issues. But perhaps the most important contribution of the IPR was the publication of significant works of analysis, the products of a newly developing scholarship in America and elsewhere directed to the study of current problems of Asia and the Pacific. There is no room for a full listing of IPR publications but a few examples of standard works may indicate the role of the Institute in developing the scholarly study of the region and in publishing the results. Owen Lattimore's *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (1941) and E.H. Norman's *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State* (1940) were classics in their way. The former provided a new perspective on the structure of Chinese history and the latter an analysis of the Meiji Restoration and its aftermath that later studies of Japanese modernisation had at least to consider. R.H. Tawney's *Land and Labour in China* (1932) and J.L. Buck's *Land Utilization in China* (1937) were important studies of China's agrarian society. Political and economic developments on the eve of the Pacific war were the focus of Miriam Farley, *American Far Eastern Policy and the Sino-Japanese War* (1938), G.E. Taylor, *The Struggle for North China* (1940), C.B. Fahs, *Government in Japan* (1940), G.C. Allen, *Japanese Industry* (1940) and G.E. Hubbard, *Eastern Industrialisation and its Effect on the West* (1935), an IPR project, though published by the Royal Institute in its capacity as the British Council of the IPR.

There was some coverage also of Southeast Asia, though the emergence of nationalist resistance to European empires was visible only to a few before 1945. In *The Structure of the Netherlands Indian Economy* (1942), the Dutch scholar, J.H. Boeke, gave a statement of his 'dual economy' theory of colonial economies, Rupert Emerson, L.A. Mills and Virginia Thompson surveyed political developments in the region as a whole in *Government and Nationalism in Southeast Asia* (1942) and the latter's *Thailand, the New Siam* (1941) was also an IPR publication. A way to world peace, and those who saw it as a scholarly organisation devoted to developing expertise about the countries of the Pacific. The distinction, which should not be made too sharply, is discussed in detail in Tornoko Akami, *The Liberal Dilemma: Internationalism and the Institute of Pacific Relations in Japan, Australia and the USA, 1919–1942*, PhD thesis, Australian National University, Canberra.

Some of the works appearing under IPR auspices had been initiated by the Institute or had emerged from the research undertaken in the preparation of data papers for conferences. The IPR’s ‘Inquiry Series’ was one vehicle for the presentation of a series of studies covering different parts of the region and appearing in a regular and recognisable format. Norman’s *Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State* appeared in that series as did T.A. Bisson’s *America’s Far Eastern Policy*, Kate Mitchell’s *Industrialisation of the Western Pacific* and Emerson, Mills and Thompson, *Government and Nationalism in Southeast Asia*, to name but a few. Others were works of mature scholarship whose authors were happy to find in the Institute a congenial publisher.

Like all works in history and the social sciences, these studies reflected the particular values and angles of vision of their authors. It would have to be admitted that, in spite of the IPR’s emphasis on mutual understanding amongst the countries of the Pacific, its research program was dominated by American scholarship and, as Tomoko Akami points out, the ‘Orient’ was an object to be studied rather than an equal partner in the enterprise.7 Certainly there was an awareness of a region with its own internal dynamics and IPR publications represented a general challenge to what might be described as Atlantic-centred views of international order. In many cases, since they were dealing with the current scene, these works carried implied recommendations for current policies. Collectively, however, they displayed considerable diversity of viewpoint. Edgar Snow’s writings about China, like those of Agnes Smedley, were sympathetic to the cause of the Chinese Communists but that cannot be said of Lin Yutang’s *History of Press and Public Opinion in China* (1936). Nor were there expressions of sympathy for Soviet communism in Harriet Moore’s *Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1931–45* (1945.)

Despite this diversity, the IPR became a victim of the McCarthy era in the United States. For Senator McCarthy and his followers, the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949 was seen not as the outcome of complex social and political forces but as the result of a failure of America’s China policy in the late 1930s, during the war and in the immediate postwar years. It was claimed, in the House Un-American Activities Committee, that the failure was no accident but the result of disloyalty and conspiracy. Central to the argument were charges that the State Department itself contained disloyal Americans who had played their part in bringing about that American defeat. In America’s agonised

7 ibid. p. 301.
consideration of the reasons for the 'loss' of China, the Institute of Pacific Relations became a conspicuous target.

The burden of the charges against the Institute, which were taken up in 1951 by the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security (known as the McCarran Committee after its Chairman, Senator Pat McCarran of Nevada), was that the IPR, in its publications and other activities, had taken a pro-communist line with regard to developments in China, that communists had in fact infiltrated the organisation and that they had used it to influence public and official opinion in a way that ran counter to American interests. At this remove, the excessive nature of the charges and their all-embracing assumption of a communist conspiracy appear clearly to reflect the hysteria of the times. There may have been individuals in the organisation with communist leanings. This was alleged to be the case with Frederick V. Field who had been Executive Secretary of the American Institute from 1934 until 1940, and who was requested to resign from its Board of Trustees in 1947, though Holland argued that he had been 'scrupulously correct and impartial in his research work and administration' and commanded the respect of many of its conservative members. Similar allegations were made about Owen Lattimore who had been named by McCarthy in 1950 as the 'top Russian espionage agent' in the United States. Charges against him and others were made by innuendo rather than on the basis of specific evidence. Indeed, no serious evidence of disloyalty or conspiracy was advanced to support them, and little of substance was established. The scholarly standing of people like Lattimore was sufficient in the end to withstand the allegations of the McCarran inquiry, but not all victims of the Committee’s accusations were to emerge unscathed. Some six years later—in 1957—similar allegations of disloyalty were revived in the Internal Security Subcommittee against E.H. Norman. Norman, by then Canadian Ambassador to Egypt, committed suicide in the wake of the charges, an outcome which, in the view

8 For the McCarran inquiry, see J.N. Thomas, *The Institute of Pacific Relations: Asian Scholars and American Politics* (Seattle, 1974). For an influential treatment hostile to the IPR see Freda Utley, *The China Story* (Chicago, 1951) and for a defence of the Institute see the statement presented to the McCarran Committee by the then Secretary General of the International IPR, William L. Holland, 'Fact and Fiction about the Institute of Pacific Relations', 10 October 1951.

9 Holland, ‘Fact and Fiction about the Institute of Pacific Relations’, p. 25.

10 Owen Lattimore, *Ordeal by Slander* (Boston, 1950) p. 3. See also Robert P. Newman, *Owen Lattimore and the 'Loss' of China* (Berkeley, 1992), which gives an exhaustive account of the charges made against Lattimore and of his ultimately successful efforts to clear his name. James Cotton, *Asian Frontier Nationalism: Owen Lattimore and the American Foreign Policy Debate* (Manchester, 1989) examines Lattimore’s theoretical writings and considers these in relation to the loyalty hearings.
of a *New York Times* editorial, 'has brought shame to the Government and people of the United States'.

Leaving aside the extreme accusations of communist infiltration and conspiracy, the attempt to identify a pro-communist orthodoxy in the published work of the IPR cannot be sustained. It is true that Edward C. Carter, the energetic Secretary General of the International IPR from 1931 till 1946, trod on the toes of some of his IPR associates in urging a focus on current political developments in the Pacific rather than on more general cultural matters, and that he was happy to see some controversy to emerge in such work. That is very different, however, from pursuing a consistent ideological line. *Pacific Affairs*, under Lattimore's editorship was happy to follow Carter's view that controversial issues should not be ignored and, for a time in the 1930s, Lattimore apparently toyed with the idea that the journal should adopt an editorial view on some of these issues. In particular, he would have liked to develop a line of support for policies of collective security against Japan. This idea was dropped and perhaps the worst that could be said about the editorial policies of *Pacific Affairs* by its later critics was that it offered hospitality in its pages to a wide variety of perspectives, including what might be described as broadly Marxist analyses. But there were occasions when observers felt that the IPR was not quite as non-partisan on all questions as it claimed to be. For British observers, a principal grievance was that Americans associated with the IPR were too strongly anti-colonial. Both Chatham House and the AIIA, on occasion, complained that at IPR conferences there were consistent American criticisms of Britain's colonial record, reflecting, no doubt, a general American view. This was particularly apparent at the IPR conferences at Mont Tremblant in 1942 and Hot Springs in 1945, where Chatham House delegates were strongly resentful of an American pressure for the application of trusteeship to existing colonial dependencies.

Such leanings, however, did not constitute an observable ideological standpoint in Cold War terms. The same could be said of IPR studies of the civil war in China, the area to which the charges of the McCarran Committee and others were specifically directed. Many IPR observers

14 See, for example, notes of a conversation between M.E. Cleeve, member of the Chatham House Secretariat, and Keith Officer in August 1928. Buesst Papers, NLA, MS 2821, Synopsis of files at Chatham House. The notes refer to Officer's view that 'the IPR savoured of propaganda'.
were critical of China’s Nationalist Government during the late 1930s and in the war years and the immediate postwar period. And some did see the Chinese Communist Party as not ‘real’ communists—as a nationalist rather than as an orthodox communist movement, or as ‘agrarian democrats’ or ‘agrarian reformers’ rather than communists. This view was presented, for example, in a celebrated 1943 article by T.A. Bisson, which drew a distinction between ‘democratic’ and ‘feudal’ China. But the opposite view also found its place in the publications of the Institute. Works by W.H. Chamberlin, J.B. Condliffe, C.B. Fahs, P.M.A. Linebarger and G.E. Taylor, all published by the Institute, presented very different perspectives.

Of importance, too, was the simple fact that the Institute of Pacific Relations, as an international body, was not a single organisation but a loose confederation of autonomous national councils. This point was made clearly by W.L. Holland, Secretary General of the International IPR, from 1946 until the decision was finally taken to dissolve the organisation in 1961. Holland argued to the McCarran Committee that the International IPR was a non-partisan organisation, international but non-official, and ‘not a unitary, monolithic organisation with national “branches” controlled by a central headquarters’. The autonomous national councils were not even a group of like-minded societies on the pattern of Rotary International or the YMCA. They differed in their programs and had a wide diversity of interests and attitudes amongst their members.

In 1957, a wide range of American and other scholars, including such distinguished figures as Edwin O. Reischauer of Harvard (later US Ambassador to Japan), Knight Biggerstaff and Lauriston Sharp of Cornell, Sir George Sansom and Hugh Borton of Columbia, and dozens of others gave testimony in support of the IPR. As far as the influence of the Institute on Government was concerned, Dean Acheson, Truman’s Secretary of State and J.W. Ballantine, Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, denied any attempts on the part of the Institute to influence policy. The Department’s massive White Paper, *US Relations with China*, issued in 1949, gave much more considered reasons for the so-called ‘loss of China’ than a conspiracy within the United States.

In spite of the strength of the defence, the damage was done. In 1955, the Institute was informed by Internal Revenue that its tax-exempt status had been revoked. As a consequence of that decision the crucial financial support of the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation and the Carnegie Endowment, and that received from other private sources within the United States, came under review. In 1960, the Institute won an appeal from the US District Court of New York against the ruling of the Internal Revenue Service, but this came too late to prevent the withdrawal of

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17 Holland, ‘Fact and Fiction about the Institute of Pacific Relations’, p. 3.
financial support from the Foundations. The financial crisis led finally to
the winding up both of the American Council and the International
Secretariat. Fortunately it was possible to preserve some aspects of the
Institute’s work. The University of British Columbia agreed, in 1960, to
take over the journal, *Pacific Affairs*, whose publication continues to the
present, and it also offered to Mr Holland a Chair in Far Eastern Studies.
And in 1961, the University of California at Berkeley assumed respon­sibility
for the *Far Eastern Survey*, which continued under a new
name, *Asian Survey*, and in a new format. But the IPR as such had
vanished from the scene.

The Australian Institute of International Affairs watched these deve­lopments with concern. There were some critics of the IPR within the
AIIA. Gerry Packer was one who was glad to see it disappear.18 Even
Eggleston, the central figure in IPR activities in Australia and the initial
Chairman of the Australian national council of the IPR, had some
reservations. He disliked Lattimore and did not think he had been a good
editor of *Pacific Affairs*, but he added, ‘I certainly do not believe that he
was a Communist or willing to conspire on their behalf.’ Eggleston also
thought that Carter had been ‘quite unfit to be the head of the organi­sation’ but, again, was certainly not a Communist.19 He was critical, too,
of the IPR’s research performance. In spite of such trenchant comments,
tossed off in Eggleston’s typically magisterial manner, he remained to the
end a supporter of the Institute. In any case the Australian Institute had no
option but to accept the dissolution of the International Secretariat, and
consequently of its own role as the Australian national council of the IPR.
Its own activities were pursued in a much less divisive environment.
Australia, too, had its Cold War divisions, of course, reaching their
climax, perhaps, in the years of Vietnam protest; but the antagonisms they
generated managed to be less corrosive.

The lines of ideological division that manifested themselves in
Australia in the 1950s and 1960s were closely linked to those whose
origins we have already noticed in the 1930s.20 The debate about
Vietnam, indeed, meshed with existing political divisions, divisions within
the Labor movement and between it and its traditional opponents outside
it. There is no space—and perhaps no need—to rehearse here the details
of the conflicts of the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. The Communist Party
Dissolution Bill was enacted in 1950 but was challenged in the High Court
and found to be unconstitutional. The subsequent referendum, designed to
give the federal Government the necessary powers to pass such legislation
was defeated. Even during the height of the referendum campaign the

18 Personal recollection of the author.
19 Confidential ‘Notes on the Future Policy of the Institute of Pacific Relations
for consideration by the Melbourne Committee’, undated, but apparently
written in the late 1950s. Eggleston Papers, NLA, MS 423/14/132.
20 See above, chapter 3.
passions aroused by the debate were curiously muted, perhaps because many anti-communists sided with the opponents of the ban on civil libertarian grounds. Nevertheless, though Australia escaped the extreme features of the McCarthy period in the United States, it was not entirely without its own examples of guilt by association and discrimination against those regarded as fellow travellers or communist dupes, in academia and elsewhere. The decision of the Council of the New South Wales University of Technology (later the University of NSW) to reject on ideological grounds the unanimous recommendation of a selection committee to appoint Russel Ward to a lectureship in history in 1955,21 the intervention for similar reasons by External Affairs Minister, R.G. Casey, in appointment procedures at the Australian National University in the same year,22 the continuing surveillance by ASIO of ANU appointments23 and the controversy surrounding the 1959 Melbourne Peace Conference24 may be seen as examples. And, of course, at a practical political level the struggle between communists and anti-communists for the control of key trade unions, the rise of the 'Industrial Groups' as a means of countering communist influence in union affairs, and the activities of B.A. Santamaria and his 'Movement' within the ALP were profoundly divisive. Conflict was aggravated by the personality of the erratic and obsessive H.V. Evatt as leader of the Labor Party. The complicating effects of the Petrov defection in 1954,25 the subsequent Royal Commission on Espionage and Labor's defeat in the 1954 election led Evatt to challenge his adversaries at the Hobart Conference of the ALP in 1955 in such a way as to bring about the long-lasting split in the Party and the formation of the Democratic Labor Party whose existence effectively kept Labor out of office for another seventeen years.

If Santamaria's Movement was one dimension of the anti-communism of the 1950s, the Congress for Cultural Freedom (established in Europe in 1950 and in Australia as the Australian National Committee of the Congress, in 1954) was another. The Australian Committee (subsequently Association), largely through the efforts of its energetic organiser, Richard Krygier, attracted a number of influential figures from business, academic and public life, including Sir John Latham who was persuaded to become

23 ibid. pp. 121ff.
its first President. Its journal, Quadrant, under the successive editorships of James McAuley and Peter Coleman, became a major contributor to Australian intellectual life to an extent unparalleled by any previous conservative journal of ideas. The left, by contrast, was deeply divided. Two events of 1956 presented it with the elements of a major crisis: Khrushchev’s revelations of Stalin’s crimes at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the use of Soviet force to crush the uprising in Hungary in 1956.

The debate about Australia’s participation in the Vietnam conflict must be seen against this sort of backdrop, though it drew support from across the usual ideological boundaries and developed its own momentum in the unexpected breadth of popular participation in the moratorium marches. Of importance, too, was the surge of student unrest in the late 1960s and early 1970s which had its own causes only partly related to Vietnam, whose function was to serve as a visible issue of student protest rather than as a cause of it.

These developments, and the ideological oppositions they generated, were more complex than this summary outline suggests. Considered as a continuing debate at an intellectual level they included shades of differing opinion which cannot be captured in a simple picture of binary opposition. It is a common stereotype, in the 1990s, that Australian intellectual discourse from the early 1940s was dominated by the Left, a term used to cover not only communists and fellow travellers, but also many liberals. This is very much the burden of Robert Manne’s The Shadow of 1917, except that Manne prefers to speak not of Right versus Left, or conservatives versus radicals, but of anti-communists versus ‘anti-anti-communists’. He identifies the latter as those intellectual observers of the battle between communists and anti-communists who cried ‘a plague on both your houses but especially on yours’—the anti-communists. As post-Cold War editor of Quadrant (from 1989 to 1997), Manne looks back, in this essay, over the intellectual battles of the Cold War period and claims that, from the late 1940s and during the 1950s and 1960s the anti-anti-communists resisted with considerable success the efforts of anti-communists to expose the inherent authoritarianism of Marxist theory and to tell the truth about political repression in the Soviet Union and in eastern Europe. Even after the overthrow of communist rule in the Soviet Union and in eastern Europe the Left, and their fellow travelling anti-anti-communists, remain erroneously complacent. ‘It seems,’ says Manne, ‘that

26 For a consideration of the place of the Australian Association for Cultural Freedom in the cultural life of the time, see John McLaren, Writing in Hope and Fear (Melbourne, 1996) chapters 4 and 5. See also Peter Coleman, The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe (New York and London, 1989). The Congress was reorganised in 1967 after it became known that it had received CIA funding, and became the International Association for Cultural Freedom.

the complacency of part of the left runs so deep that it believes that it was right to be wrong about communism and that the right was wrong despite being right." 28

This would seem to be too sharply drawn a picture. The battle between the communists and their anti-communist enemies was waged fiercely enough. And in the debate about Cold War politics and international affairs, communist intellectuals were important, operating from such bases as the Melbourne University branch of the Communist Party and Stephen Murray Smith's *Overland*, at least until 1956. 29 Their momentum was checked somewhat by Khrushchev's speech to the 20th Congress of the CPSU. Until then the turns and shifts of the domestic and international Party line—the authoritative and infallible voice of democratic centralism—could be explained either by the failure, or perhaps treachery, of individual leaders or by changes in objective circumstances. Khrushchev's speech, in conceding that under Stalin the Party had erred, and that its senior members knew that it had erred, destroyed at one blow the basis of Party infallibility which had been so attractive to Marxist intellectuals. This contributed to the disillusionment of many members of the Australian Party, who took advantage of Soviet intervention in Hungary to leave the Party.

If many Melbourne intellectuals wore pro-communist hearts on their sleeves, the base of their opponents was not only in Melbourne, in Santamaria's Movement, but also in Sydney where followers of philosopher, John Anderson, provided leadership for anti-communist intellectuals, some of whom were grouped about Donald Horne's *Observer*. Nevertheless, the oppositions were not clear-cut.

The sense of crisis in the debate is, first of all, overdrawn in these stereotypes. Not even in the 1940s or early 1950s, whatever the hopes of the left or the fears of the right, and whatever the role of the Communist Party in the strikes of the 1940s, did communism in Australia pose any real threat to basic social stability. Nor did the elements of Soviet espionage revealed in the Report of the Espionage Royal Commission. The Australian revolution was never just around the corner. And the lines of ideological division in Australia were never as sharp as in the United States. In the debate itself, many anti-anti-communists, to use Manne's term, were, at the same time, genuinely anti-communist. Indeed, after the McCarthy era in America and the Menzies attempt to ban the Communist Party in Australia, there were grounds for liberals to fear that anti-communism constituted a greater threat to individual freedom in Australia than the communism it opposed. Finally the intellectual argument itself was carried on in a more complex way than Manne's dichotomy suggests.

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28 ibid. p. 28.
29 For a lively memoir touching on the Melbourne University branch of the Communist Party, see Amirah Inglis, *The Hammer and Sickle and the Washing Up* (Melbourne, 1995).
On the one hand McAuley's Quadrant and The Observer of Horne and Coleman, and on the other Stephen Murray-Smith's Overland and Tom Fitzgerald's Nation, displayed a more varied range of intellectual streams on both sides of the ideological divide. Peter Coleman, for example, had a perception of a need to challenge a liberal conspiracy and saw his paper, the Observer, as drawing its ideas and contributions from a variety of very different sources—'old free thinkers, former Marxists, ex-Trotskyists... Central European refugees from Hitler or Stalin...and Catholics of the Pope Paul formation'. But at the same time he described himself as 'a fellow traveller of secular liberalism, making what I could of its resources'.

The AIIA as an organisation stood aside from these currents of intellectual debate to the point, in the eyes of some, of becoming irrelevant to the discussion of urgent issues of international concern, avoiding ideological commitment and thereby displaying, paradoxically, an inherent conservatism. Nevertheless, it contained within itself representatives of a broad spectrum of views, and it provided a forum for the measured consideration of diverse and opposing views. It was an essential part of its character that it should avoid identification with any particular position.

This approach was apparent in the consolidation of the central organisation of the Institute and in its research and publication program during the height of the Cold War and beyond.

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30 For an discussion of this variety see McLaren, Writing in Hope and Fear.
31 Peter Coleman, Memoirs of a Slow Learner (Sydney, 1994) p. 121.
32 ibid. p. 151.
By 1950, the Institute had established the organisational arrangements and the constitutional conventions that were to serve, essentially unchanged, for the next forty years and beyond. There were many significant developments to be observed, of course. New branches were established. To the original three (NSW, Victoria and Queensland) had been added Canberra in the late 1930s and Western Australia, South Australia and Tasmania by 1948. There followed New England at Armidale (1958), North Queensland at Townsville (1966), Riverina at Wagga Wagga (1976), Northern Territory at Darwin (1982) and Central Queensland at Mackay (1992). New Articles of Association defined the relationship of members, branches, Commonwealth Council and National Executive in terms somewhat different from those of the original Articles. Miss Molly Kingston’s goal of strengthening the central organisation of the Institute, though not realised at the time, was at least partially achieved with the appointment, in 1963, of the first national Director. And after a couple of false starts, money was eventually raised for the erection of a national headquarters building. But these developments occurred within the federal structure established in the 1940s and the pattern of autonomous branches (some of which were incorporated bodies in their own right), represented equally on the governing body of the Institute, and supporting its national program, remained essentially unchanged. It will be convenient to survey the central organisation of the Institute from 1960 to the building of

1 New England ceased being a separate branch in 1979, becoming a sub-branch of NSW and Riverina followed suit in 1987.
Stephen House in 1987 before turning to a more detailed examination of the Institute’s activities during that period.

The appointment of a director

The Australian Institute could never hope to operate on a scale comparable with that of the Royal Institute which had a total income in the 1940s of £82,000, to which individual membership subscriptions contributed only about £12,000. The remainder came from corporate subscribers, endowments and from continuing grants from both Rockefeller and Carnegie. This enabled it to employ a staff of 143 at Chatham House, including a senior Director of Studies (at this time, Professor Arnold Toynbee), to develop a significant library, to maintain a wide-ranging research program and to support two major series of publications—the *Survey of International Affairs* and *Documents on International Affairs*—and two periodicals—*International Affairs* and *The World Today*. One might add such significant general contributions as Toynbee’s *Study of History* and W.K. Hancock’s *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*, both published under Chatham House auspices. The central organisation of the Canadian Institute of International affairs may have seemed more within reach of the Australian Institute. Its central office in Toronto consisted of a Director and a staff of four departmental heads, plus clerical assistance. Even this, however, was clearly beyond Australian ambitions. In 1964 the visit of the Director of the Canadian Institute, John Holmes, underlined very clearly the gap between the apparent affluence of his organisation and the poverty of its Australian counterpart. In the early 1960s, the Commonwealth Council was thinking more modestly of appointing one person as a national executive officer.

The key to the creation of a Directorate—even a Directorate of one—was, of course, money. Molly Kingston and George Caiger had been supported by Rockefeller and Carnegie funds and Mr Caiger’s appointment was terminated when the Carnegie grant expired. As we have seen, the funds available to the national organisation from the Institute’s own resources were meagre. The capitation fees paid by the branches in respect of their members could not do more than meet the most basic of administrative costs. And the Institute had failed to secure outside funds to match the Carnegie grant. The only significant private support had been that of Dyason through the Bureau of Social and International Affairs, his individual gifts for specific purposes and the establishment of the Platus Trust. His generosity had its final expression in the bequest to the Victorian Branch when the Platus Trust was wound up in 1961. That bequest, apart from assisting in the continuation of the Dyason lectures,

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enabled the Victorian Branch, in due course, to acquire premises of its own through the purchase and renovation of a Victorian house in Jolimont, East Melbourne, and it was appropriate that the building be named Dyason House.

There were no other benefactors on that scale. One should notice the hidden subsidies that came to the Institute from the universities whose staff members contributed to the national research program, subsidies in the form of research support, secretarial assistance, postage and other small costs associated with the normal conduct of academic research in the humanities and social sciences. Some financial assistance came from the Social Science Research Council (later the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia) in the form of a subsidy to the production of *The Australian Outlook*. But if an executive officer was to be appointed it was clear that additional funds would have to be secured.

The Commonwealth Council, under the presidency of Professor Gordon Greenwood of the University of Queensland, decided on a dual strategy: it would make a further bid for Foundation funds, this time in the form of an application to the Ford Foundation, and it would launch a national appeal within Australia. These plans were discussed at Council meetings in 1962, and were part of an overall reconsideration of the role of the organisation. If funds were to be solicited, whether from Ford or from Australian sources, the Institute would need to be clear about its goals and about the specific uses to which grants and donations would be devoted. The search for funds was therefore linked to the development of an ambitious plan for future activities.

Discussions began in February 1962, when a memorandum—'Special Appeal on behalf of the Institute'—was presented by the President to the Commonwealth Council and was accepted in principle. Professor Greenwood argued that, though the times were not propitious for a big appeal, planning for an appeal should nevertheless begin immediately, in order to put the finances of the Institute on a better basis so that funds would be available for publications, conferences and lecture series as well as to provide for a 'more elaborate secretariat and research staff'. And the possibility was raised of an approach to an American Foundation. At the following meeting, in August, a long discussion took place. A NSW Branch subcommittee, under the chairmanship of Mr Alan Manning, proposed that funds should be sought for a major conference designed to gain publicity and public support for the Institute. This did not find favour with the Council which preferred an appeal of the kind discussed at the

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3 This consisted of £200 in 1959, £150 in 1960 and £100 in 1961, granted on the understanding that the Institute would contribute £150 for each of these years over and above the £1219 paid for printing, wrapping and posting the journal in 1957–58. This subsidy was extended for a further three years, until 1964.

4 Commonwealth Council, 10 February 1962.
February meeting, devoted to securing a better financial basis for what might be called the more regular research, publication and general information purposes of the Institute. It was envisaged that it might be possible to appoint a national director of the Institute and that a general and long term research program might be developed based on commissioned projects and on closer liaison with work already going on in university departments. An appeal subcommittee was appointed consisting of the President, the Treasurer, the Secretary, the NSW President, the Victorian Chairman and one member each appointed by the Victorian and NSW Branches. At the same time the meeting authorised the President to discuss the possibility of financial assistance with the Assistant Director of the Ford Foundation, Mr Joseph E. Slater, who was to visit Australia in the following month. A further application was to be made to the Government seeking tax concessions for donations to the Institute.5

These moves reflected a new sense of optimism within the Institute, expressed not only in the hopes of Professor Greenwood as President, but also in the confidence of the Research Chairman, Professor Norman Harper, that it would be possible, given adequate funds, to mount a coherent and well planned research program. Mr Slater's visit gave further colour to the hopes of the Commonwealth Council that a new era of stability and expanded activity was about to begin. In initial discussions it seemed that, while the Ford Foundation would be prepared to consider an application for financial assistance, such funds would be limited to support for a research program. However, Mr Slater took the view that, in the special circumstances of the Institute's current planning, it was urgently necessary that the central organisation of the Institute must be strengthened. And so it came about. At the Commonwealth Council meeting of 2 March 1963, Professor Greenwood was able to report the success of the Ford application. In a letter of 23 January 1963, the Foundation announced that it had approved a grant of $75,000, spread over a three year period, for the development of an expanded program of research and study of international relations. The grant was to be used for the specific research projects listed in the Institute's submission and the development of more adequate international exchanges but also for the strengthening of the Institute's federal organisation; and it was made on the understanding that an appointment would be made of a full time Director.6

5 Commonwealth Council Minutes, 18 August 1962.
6 Commonwealth Council, 2 March 1963. There had been some differences of opinion within the Institute about the exact role of the Director. Gordon Greenwood and Norman Harper were vigorous incumbents of the offices of President and Research Chairman respectively. They enjoyed their Institute work and were interested especially in its research and publications. Their preference might therefore have been for a Research Director. The Ford Foundation, however, insisted on a Director with general administrative responsibility.
The Council moved immediately to appoint a committee consisting of the President, Treasurer and Research Chairman, the President of the NSW and Canberra Branches and the three past national Presidents, Mr Buesst, Mr Campbell and Professor Andrews, to seek a Director. The kind of person they were looking for, as required in the Ford letter, was one 'who has already achieved recognition as an expert in the field of international relations'. In view of uncertainties about the future of the position it was unlikely that it would appear as an attractive career path for an ambitious academic expert in mid-career and the committee began to think in terms of either a senior academic or a diplomat approaching retiring age and likely to be drawn to this as a post-retirement occupation. Proceeding along these lines the committee made an approach to Sir Alan Watt, who fitted well the criteria developed by the Council. He had been for twenty-five years an officer of the Department of External Affairs and had served successively as Ambassador to the USSR, Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, Australian Commissioner for Southeast Asia, Ambassador to Japan and Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany. Sir Alan was currently a Visiting Fellow in the Department of International Relations in the Australian National University, and the initial negotiations had included discussions with Sir John Crawford, then Director of the ANU’s Research School of Pacific Studies in which the Department of International Relations was situated. As a result of the discussions between Sir Alan, the ANU and the AHA subcommittee it was agreed that the appointment of a Director of the Institute would be part time for the first year to enable Sir Alan to complete the study of Australian foreign policy on which he was engaged as a Visiting Fellow,7 that his salary would be shared between the ANU and the Institute and that he would retain his room in the Coombs Building at the University. The ANU also provided a room for his secretary at a nominal rental. The Secretariat of the Institute remained for the time being in Melbourne.

Sir Alan Watt took up his position in 1963, and quickly assumed responsibility for the administration of the affairs of the Institute, visiting branches, writing for the press and speaking on radio and television, and he was able in these ways to contribute to the Institute's perception of itself as a national body. His remuneration, even after the first year, remained that of a part time appointment, but he served, to all intents and purposes, as a full time Director. He was working, of course, within the improved financial position created by the first Ford grant. The main impact of the grant, apart from the contribution it made to the establishment of the Director’s position, was in the area of research. The preparation, by the Research Chairman, Professor Harper, of a wide-ranging and coherent research program had been central to the application made to Ford in 1962. In the following years the continuing production of

7 Published in 1967 by Cambridge University Press as The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, 1938-1965.
a series of works on a variety of aspects of international affairs provided a further sense of identity underpinning the role of the national Director. The details of the research program during this period will be examined more closely in chapter eight.

When Sir Alan’s term of appointment came to an end in 1969 the Institute was still not in a position to establish a full time position on the basis of its own funds. Indeed, the only way in which the position of Director could be maintained was through an extension of the arrangement with the National University. After further discussions with Sir John Crawford, by then Vice Chancellor of the University, an arrangement was reached similar to that under which Sir Alan Watt’s appointment had been made possible. Dr T.B. Millar, Professorial Fellow in International Relations, was willing to accept appointment as Director on the basis of a shared appointment with the University. He retained his position as Professorial Fellow and was permitted to combine it with the Directorship. Since the concerns of the Institute and those of the host ANU Department ran so closely in concert it appeared to the Vice Chancellor that the shared appointment was an appropriate use of University funds and, from the Institute’s point of view, the arrangement made it possible to do what could not otherwise have been done—maintain a visible central organisation with a Director appointed formally on a part time basis and with a comparatively small honorarium but in fact working effectively on very much more than a part time basis.

The arrangement meant that, in effect, the ANU, between the appointment of Sir Alan Watt in 1963 and the end of Dr Millar’s second term in 1976, became an unofficial headquarters for the Institute, with the University providing accommodation and a share of the administrative costs of secretarial work as well as a share of salary. The Institute provided its own administrative support in the form of a part time Assistant Director (in turn S.L. Graham, Frank Buckland and Phillip Hurst) and a Secretary (the outstandingly efficient Jean Robertson).

Dr Millar was a vigorous Director. Miss Dickins, indeed, was later to remark that it was fortunate for the Institute that, at the end of Sir Alan’s term, it still lacked the funds to make a full time appointment since Dr Millar could not have accepted such a position. As it was he gave his full energies to the Institute. He combined his predecessor’s program of talks and writing and developed other activities. During his two terms he organised two international conferences and five national conferences. He took an active part in the work of the Research Committee, negotiating publishing contracts and setting clear guidelines for contracts with authors,

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8 Notes prepared by Miss Dickins for a history of the Institute, ‘Administration’. In the possession of the Victorian Branch.
9 See chapter 9 for the background to the establishment of a national conference program, which had been under discussion since the early 1950s. It was Dr Millar who made it happen.
hitherto reached in the most informal fashion. He took part in the fund-raising efforts of the Institute and he developed plans, not to be realised at this time, for a national headquarters building in Canberra. In 1971, he developed machinery to enable closer contacts with the Department of External Affairs. This took the form of a small Foreign Affairs Club. As he reported to a meeting of the Commonwealth Council in September 1971, the Club, which was self-financing, 'was designed to bring officials, academics and parliamentarians together'. It was not intended to be limited only to residents of Canberra, though these were bound to predominate. 'Its chief purpose was to provide a representative group which could meet for frank discussion with overseas visitors who would otherwise talk only with ministers and officials.'

After the first two Directors the close link with the ANU in the form of a shared appointment could no longer be maintained and the Institute was forced to return to the idea of a more senior person with either a diplomatic or an academic background who might accept a part time appointment as a retirement interest. The next appointments were, in fact, of retiring diplomats. Sir Laurence (Jim) McIntyre, former Ambassador to Indonesia and to Japan and subsequently Deputy Secretary of the Department, succeeded Dr Millar in 1976. Though not a shared appointment with the ANU it was agreed that he should retain the use of a room in the Department of International Relations.

In 1979, Sir Patrick Shaw, former Ambassador to Indonesia, Secretary of the Department of External Affairs and then Ambassador to the United States until his retirement in 1978, accepted an invitation to become Director but he died before taking up the position and his place was taken by Mr Ralph Harry, former Ambassador to Belgium, South Vietnam, Germany and to the United Nations, who carried the Institute forward until 1981 and who continued the search for a more permanent home for the national headquarters. In 1981, Dr Rafe de Cresigny of the ANU’s Faculty of Asian Studies acted briefly as Director pending a search for a successor. The appointment went to another ex-public servant, Mr Philip McElligott, formerly Deputy Official Secretary to the Governor General and before then in turn a member of the Department of Treasury and of Prime Minister and Cabinet. Under his Directorship, and aided by the President of the day, Sir Russel Madigan, the Institute sought to develop closer links with the business community. (In 1983, the Institute celebrated its 50th anniversary and the Director used the occasion of a Jubilee Conference to raise the visibility of the organisation.)

After the completion of Mr McElligott’s term, at the end of 1987, he was succeeded by Dr Richard Higgott whose appointment represented a departure from the pattern of senior civil servants able to accept a part time position in retirement, and a return to something like the arrangement that had operated in Dr Millar’s day. Dr Higgott was a Fellow in the Department of International Relations and his part time appointment to the Institute was accepted by the ANU as complementing his academic work.
Dr Higgott returned full time to the University in 1989 and, after a period of three years, during which an Executive Secretary, Ms Susan Allica, held the fort, he was succeeded for a very brief period by Mr James Ingram, another former member of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and senior officer of the United Nations. After his resignation, Mr Bob Lowry, a retired military officer who had served for a time as Military Attaché in Jakarta and was currently a Visiting Fellow at the ANU’s Institute of Strategic Studies and Vice President of the Canberra Branch of the AIIA, acted as Director until the appointment in 1994 of Dr Lesley Jackman.

A New Zealander by birth, Dr Jackman was educated at the University of Otago and then at the University of Cambridge (Sidney Sussex College), where she took a PhD for a thesis on British Strategy and Diplomacy in Afghanistan, 1919–41. She then joined the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, serving as Second Secretary (Political) in the New Zealand High Commission in Canberra and later as Senior Public Affairs Officer in Washington. While on posting in Canberra she married an Australian citizen and in due course took Australian citizenship and accepted a position as Development Manager in the National Gallery of Australia Foundation. Whereas the Institute in the past had sought either academic or diplomatic experience in its Directors, and had found these qualities either in academics on part time leave from their normal positions or from the ranks of retired diplomats, Dr Jackman combined both types of qualification and the Institute was fortunate that it did not have to wait for retirement to secure her services. After four years as Director, during which she was involved in a number of new initiatives including the development of the Young Diplomats Program (see below, chapter 9), Dr Jackman resigned to take up a position in the Australian National Audit Office. She was succeeded by Ross Cottrill, a former member, in succession, of the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Trade (with diplomatic experience in a number of Asian posts and in Washington), Prime Minister and Cabinet and Defence. In the latter position he headed the Division of the Department responsible for strategic and international policy and he went on to become the Foundation Director of the Australian College of Defence and Strategic Studies.

This is to look ahead. Long before this important changes had been made in the Institute’s central secretariat. In 1975, Miss Dickins informed the Council that she wished to retire at the end of that year. This was obviously the time for the secretariat to move to Canberra. In spite of the efficiency and the devoted commitment of Miss Dickins there was much inconvenience in having the Directorate in Canberra and the secretarial support in Melbourne. It was possible for the Institute to appoint a second part time assistant to the Director which enabled the transfer of the Secretariat to be made.
The search for financial security

It will be apparent from this brief survey of the successive Directors from 1963 until the present that the Institute has always been constrained by a very tight budget. Its longest serving Treasurer, David Russell of the NSW Branch (Treasurer 1974–92), was to remark somewhat ruefully on the occasion of his retirement from the position after eighteen years devoted to keeping the organisation afloat, ‘I believe the Institute is not well capitalised. It has been leading a hand to mouth existence for most of the time I have been Honorary Treasurer...And yet it has survived’.10 And from time to time special efforts were made to relieve the situation. One such attempt followed the appointment of the first Director in 1963, when the need for a more stable financial base for the central organisation appeared particularly urgent. Indeed, the acceptance of the Ford grant imposed on the Institute at least a moral obligation to raise funds from within Australia. While Ford assistance enabled the initial costs of appointing the Director and establishing a central office to be met, it was clear that this assistance was temporary and, since the Institute could not, in the long term, hope to finance a Directorate or a research program on the basis of capitation fees on membership subscriptions paid to the branches, it was necessary to seek a more substantial basis for future stability.

This was not easy. While the general public might give generously enough to humanitarian causes it was less likely to support a body like the Institute, and Australia lacked the kind of Foundation assistance that was available for such purposes in the United States. Nevertheless, in view of the Ford Foundation’s willingness to depart from its usual practice by allowing a proportion of its grant to be used to strengthen the central organisation, the Institute was morally committed, by its acceptance of the grant, to an attempt to find ways and means of keeping the Directorate going after the expiry of the grant. As we have noted, it had already been decided in 1962, simultaneously with the approach to Ford, to launch a public appeal for funds.11 An Appeal Committee was appointed in February 1962 to develop proposals for the branches to consider and a second application was made to the federal Government for donations to the Institute to be tax deductible. On this occasion a direct approach was made to the federal Treasurer, then Mr Harold Holt, who received the President and Research Chairman in March 1963.12 This time the application was successful and, with public support from the Prime Minister, Mr R.G. Menzies, and the Minister for External Affairs, Mr Paul Hasluck, both members or former members of the Institute, and from the Leader of the Opposition, Mr A.A. Calwell, the appeal was finally launched in 1964. An ambitious target of £100 000 was set and an Appeal

12 Memo to Branches from Miss N. Dickins, 21 March 1963.
leaflet described the objects of the appeal: the strengthening of the national organisation of the Institute; the expansion of its research program and its publications and educational programs and the provision of greater support to the activities of the branches. The branches established local appeal committees to work in cooperation with the Director and the national appeal committee.

In spite of this brave start the appeal raised only a little over a quarter of the target figure.\textsuperscript{13} In the event, the Institute could only fulfil a small part of its plans for expansion. Because of its perceived obligation to the Ford Foundation the Council decided to make the maintenance of the Directorate, at least at its present level, overwhelmingly its first priority. Most of the funds were earmarked for that purpose and a mere £2000 was provided for the support of Institute publications, \textit{Australian Outlook}, the \textit{World Review} (published by the Queensland Branch) and \textit{Australia's Neighbours} (published by Victoria), and for a contribution to the travel costs of speakers to individual branches.\textsuperscript{14}

The appeal remained open, but no significant additional funds came in after 1965. The Council therefore gave thought to other sources of funds for the research program and for other aspects of the Institute's work.

At the meeting of Council in February 1966, the President, then Professor N.D. Harper, noted that though the Ford Foundation, in making its first grant, had made it clear that a grant for administration was exceptional, and was not likely to be repeated, it did not rule out the possibility of a second grant for research. It was agreed that a fresh submission for that purpose should be prepared and the President was empowered to make a preliminary proposal to the Foundation during a visit to New York. The signs were favourable and by early the following year a tentative submission had been prepared by the Research Committee under the chairmanship of Professor Brian Beddie of the ANU. At the February meeting of Council in 1968, the Director was able to report that Ford had agreed to make a 'terminal' grant of US$100,000, ninety per cent of which was to be devoted to the costs of specific research projects and ten per cent to administrative costs.\textsuperscript{15}

Ford's generosity looked after the needs of the research committee and enabled the maintenance of a strong research profile. There remained the problem of sustaining the Directorate, supporting branch activities and fulfilling the public information role of the Institute by way of conferences, special visitors, and so on. In August 1968, a 'ways and means'

\begin{itemize}
  \item[13] The bulk of the amount was raised in Victoria. By 1966, Victoria had raised approximately £17,000 of the approximate total at that point of £22,000.
  \item[15] Commonwealth Council, 24 February 1968. The President, Professor Greenwood, reported that he had been asked if the Institute would prefer a matching grant, but he had opted for a straight out terminal grant because of doubts about the Institute's ability to raise funds sufficient to draw a significant matching grant on a dollar for dollar basis.
\end{itemize}
committee consisting of the President, Director and Treasurer together with Professor Bramsted (NSW), Mr R.L. Stock (Victoria) and Professor Greenwood, was formed to consider how the Directorate might be continued after the comparatively meagre appeal funds had been exhausted. The Committee made clear its view that the most important need of the Institute was the maintenance of a national image of the kind which had been gradually built up during Sir Alan Watt’s term as Director and which was supported by the international standing acquired by *Australian Outlook* under the successive editorships of Professors Beddie, Arthur Burns and J.D.B. Miller. It proposed that the Executive be empowered to approach the federal Government for assistance.16

The Council agreed, with some reluctance, to adopt that course of action. Considerable concern was expressed that the receipt of financial assistance from government might endanger—or might be thought to endanger—the independence of the Institute. It was argued on the other hand that the Social Science Research Council and the Humanities Research Council (later to become respectively the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia and the Academy of the Humanities in Australia) received grants without strings from the federal Government. So, of course, did the universities. With an eye to these concerns the Council, in deciding to approach the Government, chose its words carefully and resolved ‘that the Institute should retain its independence and autonomy whatever financial arrangement might be made for the continuation of the Directorate’.17

The application was successful. The Minister for External Affairs, on 13 August 1969, informed the Institute that the Government had agreed to the provision of an annual subvention, ‘essentially as a contribution towards the cost of the Institute’s directorate in Canberra’, and was made on the understanding that the Institute would not seek additional government grants, as it had done in the past, for such purposes as the Dyason lecture program. The first year’s grant was for $12,000 and this was increased from time to time, roughly in line with the rising cost of living. For the first time the Institute now had at least a basic level of continuing financial stability.

A second line of assistance came from a private source. The Institute was asked in 1966, by a Melbourne Foundation which wished to remain anonymous, whether it would be willing, if funds were provided, to administer a two way grant program for Australian parliamentarians to visit countries abroad and for parliamentarians from overseas to visit Australia. The proposal was modelled on the Ariel Foundation in London through which private funds were also used to support a reciprocal exchange program. In the Institute case the proposal was not so much a

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17 ibid.
The Institute agreed to the request and a Committee was appointed under the chairmanship of Sir Robert Menzies and consisting of the President and Director of the Institute, three other senior members (Dr Andrew Fabinyi and R.L. Stock of the Victorian Branch and Professor Thomas Stapleton of the NSW Branch) and two parliamentarians, one from each side of the House. These also happened to be Institute members (Mr Frank Crean and Mr Peter Howson). The Committee was to select the grant recipients and the general idea was that it would choose people who had not held ministerial office but who were thought likely to do so in the future.\(^\text{18}\)

In administering this exchange program the Institute was able to use its expertise and its official and non-official contacts to achieve the aims of the donor whose identity, in spite of the initial desire for anonymity, came to be known in due course. It was the Potter Foundation whose Chairman, Sir Ian Potter, took a close interest in the carrying out of the program. After the initial provision of funds to sustain the program for four years the Foundation made a second grant to extend it for two years until 1975, by which time it was agreed by the Institute and the Foundation that the program, like the Dyason lectures before it, had served its purpose. There was, by then, no lack of means to take Australian parliamentarians abroad and to bring visitors to Australia.

**The Articles of Association**

While the Institute was establishing the Directorate and seeking a more stable financial basis for its activities, it gave its attention, also, to the drafting of new Articles of Association to replace the original Articles which had remained essentially unchanged since 1933. This proved to be a prolonged process spread over a number of Commonwealth Council meetings as successive drafts, received from the Institute's honorary solicitors (Messrs Davies, Bailey and Cator of Canberra) and later from Miss Aline Fenwick of the NSW Branch, were debated, amended and redrafted. The first steps were taken in 1964 but it was not until 1969 that revised Articles were eventually adopted.\(^\text{19}\) The process was difficult because it focused attention on the continuing problems, to which

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\(^{18}\) The scope of the scheme may be indicated by a list of those who received grants. Australian recipients were Frank Crean, Kevin Cairns, Anthony Street, D. McClelland, Neil Brown, Manfred Cross, Ralph Willis and Ian Viner. Foreign recipients included Ivor Richards (UK), Lalit Sen (India), J.B. Naisara (Fiji), Tom Moraea (PNG), H.C. Templeton (NZ), M. Rata (NZ) and Mr Ishii (Japan).

\(^{19}\) Commonwealth Council, 12 September 1964 and 22 February 1969.
attention has already been drawn, of the relationship between the central organisation and the autonomous branches.

The central issues which emerged during the drafting process concerned the position and powers of the Commonwealth Council, its formal relationship to the branches, the role of the Executive and the nature of Institute membership. The original intention was that the new Articles should not disturb, in any significant way, the conventions by which the Institute had come to manage its affairs, and that the changes would be largely technical in character. The Commonwealth Council should consist of the Commonwealth President and the Presidents or Chairmen of the several branches, all as voting members, and the Director, Research Chairman, Treasurer and the Editor of Australian Outlook as non-voting members together with ‘as at present’ up to five additional members of each branch, also as non-voting members. (The practical effect of the last convention was that, with Council meetings rotating between Sydney, Canberra and Melbourne, the host branch was likely to have the five additional members attending, while the other branches would each be represented only by their voting delegate.) The principle of one branch one vote was thus to be retained, but with the addition of the President as a voting member.20 There was, further, to be an Executive consisting of the President, Director, Research Chairman, Treasurer and two other members elected by the Commonwealth Council.

These proposals appeared to present no problem. The Commonwealth Council would remain the governing body and the Executive would be concerned merely to carry out Council decisions between Council meetings. (The weakness of the Executive as against the Council according to past practice may be seen in the original decision to constitute an Executive. This was taken in August 1947, when it was agreed ‘that in matters of urgency which may arise between meetings of the Council, the President, Secretary and Treasurer be empowered to take decisions, notifying branches of the decisions made’.21)

The other main technical change put forward, however, did raise difficulties. This was the proposal that provision in the current Memorandum of Agreement and Articles for a Commonwealth membership of the Institute separate from the Commonwealth Council be deleted. The Council, that is to say, would become, by definition, the Institute.

At a series of meetings between 1965 and 1969 this proposal caused much confusion and misunderstanding.22 It was a consequence of the first draft of the amended Articles that the Commonwealth Council would cease to exist as such, becoming ‘The Australian Institute of International Affairs’ whose members were the individual branches. Members of the

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20 Commonwealth Council, 12 September 1964.
21 Commonwealth Council, 16 and 17 August 1947.
It proved difficult for the Institute's old hands to accept the new terminology. At a meeting in Canberra in February 1966, Commonwealth Council members had great difficulty in coming to terms with the idea that individuals were no longer to be 'members' of the Institute when common usage held that they obviously were. The honorary solicitor in attendance at the meeting saw no substance in these objections. It was merely a matter of definition. Others were concerned with the relationship between the role of 'what was now the Commonwealth Council, that is the body now meeting, and that of the Executive'. It seemed odd that the meeting then in progress was in future to be a general meeting of the Institute rather than of its governing body. Professor Legge (Victoria) argued that the draft should describe the organisation of the Institute as it now was, with the Commonwealth Council, the governing body, being comparable to a Board of Directors. Dr Millar asked why the Articles could not describe the kind of situation existing at the branch level where the Annual General Meeting was composed of the individual members of the branch, and where the Council of the Branch, elected by the general meeting, was the governing body. The solicitor's view was that such a structure at the national level would make it virtually impossible to hold a genuine general meeting. Making the branches, rather than individuals, 'members' removed that problem. But he made the further point that, unlike each of the branches, the national organisation was a coordinating body and therefore it was appropriate for the branches rather than the general body of individuals to be the 'members'.

Nevertheless, it began to appear that the draft was, in effect, proposing a switch in power from what was now the Council to the Executive, and this was something about which Council members were uneasy. Professor Greenwood asked whether, under the proposed Articles, the 'Institute' as defined (that is, the general meeting of 'members') could carry out all the functions of the Council 'as it now is'. He was assured by the solicitor that it could. The Executive was responsible to the Institute (= General Meeting) and that meeting could determine policy and exercise a close control over its Executive.

This did not, however, reassure all members and the Council returned to the question a year later, when it was presented with a further draft. On this occasion Mr R.L. Stock (Victorian Branch) put the central point very clearly. From his own discussions with the solicitor it was clear, he said, that the solicitor had been thinking of the Institute as a body like a company which had a general meeting and a Board of Directors, the latter body being in effect the governing body. However, in the Institute the Council was the

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24 ibid.
governing body, however important the Executive might be in carrying out the business of the Institute between Council meetings.

The solicitor, he believed, had now accepted the view that the Council was analogous to the Board of Directors of a Company and would redraft the provisions accordingly.25 Later in the year, however, a redraft had still not appeared and the Council decided instead to ask one of its members, Miss Aline Fenwick, a lawyer and a representative of the NSW Branch, to prepare a revised draft.26 This was presented finally to a Council meeting in August 1968. The Minutes do not make clear whether it was for technical legal reasons relating to the Companies Act, or for reasons of policy, but in fact Miss Fenwick's draft did not adopt the understanding of the previous year. On the contrary, it followed the earlier drafts in making the incorporated branches, and delegates of unincorporated branches the 'members' of the Institute, and in making the meetings of the old Commonwealth Council the General Meetings of the Institute, with the Executive being, in effect, the Board of Directors. By this stage the Council was, perhaps, worn down by the discussions of the last four years and gave way without further argument. With only minor amendments the draft was accepted by the Commonwealth Council and was adopted by an Extraordinary General Meeting of the Institute held on 22 February 1969.27

Nevertheless, in resolving to that effect, the members of Council were firmly of the view that this need not change the way in which the Institute actually conducted its business. While they were prepared at long last to be persuaded that the draft might have to be in its present form in order to meet the requirements of the Companies Act, they had noted the view expressed two years earlier that, under the new Articles, the AGM could, if it chose, carry out all the functions of the Council 'as it now is' and believed that future practice would be as it had been in the past. The 'Institute' (AGM or EGM) would continue to take policy decisions and, indeed, most matters of detail would still be resolved at that level also. Since the AGM was small—the number of branches plus one—it was possible to follow that course. And so it was to be, at least until the question was revived in a new form in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, when it seemed to a much later Executive that a more centralised direction of the Institute's affairs was desirable.

The second appeal and the building of Stephen House

The idea of acquiring a physical headquarters for the Institute was, as we have noticed, an ambition of Dr Millar. During his period as Director he

26 Commonwealth Council, 12 August 1967.
inquired, through Government channels, about the possibility of acquiring a site in Canberra and in 1970 he secured the agreement of Council to proceed with the preparation of plans for a headquarters building.\textsuperscript{28} This was not a completely uncontroversial proposal in Institute circles. Professor Macmahon Ball of the Victorian Branch, for example, saw no need for a building even, as had then been suggested, a modest one such as a rented house in a Canberra suburb. He felt that this would represent a pretentious claim to status, that, for a financially strapped organisation, it would be too expensive to acquire and maintain and that it would divert the attention of the Institute from its proper activities which he saw as taking place at branch level.\textsuperscript{29} These doubts were shared by many who emphasised the coordinating role of the Directorate and who did not think that a Chatham House kind of centre was appropriate in a federal country like Australia.\textsuperscript{30} Others, however, saw an established headquarters as necessary to the development of the national organisation, giving it a presence in the national capital and enabling it to provide a better coordinating role for the branches and a wider range of distinct, centrally organised activities. As far as the expense of acquiring and maintaining a headquarters was concerned there was the argument that, through renting space to tenants, the Institute would acquire a continuing source of income which would enable it to reduce capitation fees and, perhaps, even avoid dependence on the government grant.

The proposal to explore the possibility of obtaining a site and erecting a building was at first considered independently of the continuing search for funds, but clearly a building could only be envisaged if substantial funds were raised, and a decision, taken in 1972, to launch a second appeal, with a target of $250,000, quickly became fused with the headquarters plans to the extent that the appeal became known as ‘the building fund’, though in fact that was only one of its objectives. Other goals were the provision of greater financial support for the Directorate, the extension of the Institute’s research program and support for the activities of the branches.\textsuperscript{31} Objections were again raised by Macmahon Ball who

\textsuperscript{28} Commonwealth Council, February 1970.
\textsuperscript{29} Author’s recollection of discussions within the Victorian Branch. The phrase used when speaking of the possibility of renting a suburban house was ‘a small house in Northbourne Avenue’. These words were tossed about in discussion, paying no regard to the fact that there were no longer any small houses in Northbourne Avenue! See also Minutes of Special Meeting of Commonwealth Executive and Commonwealth Council, 27 March 1972, at which Queensland opposed the building of a headquarters.
\textsuperscript{30} Notes prepared by Miss Dickins.
\textsuperscript{31} In February 1973, the Institute adopted a statement on the objectives of the appeal, stressing that it was not just for a headquarters. ‘The Appeal is for funds for the Institute as whole. The Institute’s present needs include a secure source of income so that there shall be a minimum, if indeed any, reliance on Government subsidy. Such a source of income would be provided through the
strongly opposed making a headquarters building the 'paramount purpose of the appeal' without first getting expert business advice. He described the decision as 'grandiose to the point of craziness'. Majority opinion, however, was against him.

In February 1973, it was reported that a site had been offered by the Government in the Canberra suburb of Deakin. The offer was accepted in February 1974 and a lease signed in August 1975. However, as was the case with the first appeal, the response—in spite of the efforts of a professional fund-raising body (The National Fund Raising Council of Australia)—fell far short of the target figure. Donors were allowed to earmark their donations for branch activities or for the building fund rather than for general Institute purposes (including the building) if they so desired, and some did so, though the great bulk of donations were not earmarked. By 1975, the appeal balance was only $65 000. In these circumstances any hope of proceeding with the building was gone and the headquarters proposal was shelved for some years.

Though Sir Laurence McIntyre, as we have seen, was able to enjoy the continuing hospitality of the ANU Department of International Relations, it was not intended that this arrangement would go on indefinitely. Under the Presidency of Sir Garfield Barwick, former Minister of External Affairs and then Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, the Institute next acquired accommodation in the old Hotel Canberra, at that time being refurbished as offices for the staff of Parliamentary committees. As Director, Ralph Harry established his office and a meeting room there, and enough space existed to accommodate the collection of books on international affairs left to the Institute by Lord Casey. This became the nucleus of a library collection for the Institute under the name, the Casey Library. Another move took place in 1983, when the Government decided that the Canberra should revert to its previous status as a hotel, and the Institute (together with public servants and Parliamentary staff) had to vacate the building. Alternative accommodation was eventually found in the National Bank building in the Jamison Centre in the Canberra suburb of Macquarie. It was not, however, until 1987 that the Institute acquired at last a permanent home.

A third appeal for funds, led by Sir Garfield Barwick's successor as President, Sir Russel Madigan, and supported by the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and the Chairman of the Australian Business Council, was launched in September 1984. It was directed more specifi-
cally to business than had been the case with the earlier appeals. As a
fund-raising device the Director, Philip McElligott, developed the idea of
creating three classes of donor: 'National Sponsors'—those contributing
between $10,000 and $25,000; 'National Donors'—those contributing
between $25,000 and $50,000; and Institute Patrons—those contributing
over $50,000. His personal efforts persuaded Esso Ltd to lead off with an
initial donation and later to become a National Donor. The Government
made a contribution of $400,000 (representing almost a third of the
estimated cost) and sums from other commercial and private sources
(including a gift of $10,000 from the President himself), money raised by
the several branches, and a mortgage arranged by the President through
The National Mutual Life Association of Australasia did make it possible
to erect a substantial headquarters in Deakin, though on a different site—in
Thesiger Court—from that offered earlier to Dr Millar.34

After much discussion about a name for the building and some
disagreement amongst branches (Victoria, for example, would have liked
to see it named after Sir Frederic Eggleston) it was agreed to name it
Stephen House, after the then Governor General and Visitor to the
Institute, Sir Ninian Stephen, who had given his public blessing and his
support to the appeal for funds.

The acquisition of Stephen House bore out both some of the hopes and
some of the fears of those who had argued about a headquarters in the
1960s. To bridge the gap between the funds raised by the appeal and the
cost of erecting the building involved going into debt, serviced by the
letting of space within the building. While the expectation was that, as the
debt was reduced, the income from tenants would be available for Institute
activities, by the early 1990s it appeared to David Russell that this would
be a much longer process than originally envisaged, given the state of the
Canberra market for office space. Nevertheless, the corner will pre-
sumably be turned in due course and the building should stand ready to
provide the centre for the next stage of the Institute's activities.

34 In addition to the Commonwealth Government, the CRA Group of Companies
and the National Life Association became Institute Patrons. National Donors,
in addition to Esso Ltd, were G.J. Coles Ltd, Telecom Australia and Westpac
Banking Corporation. The ANZ Banking Group, APV Holdings, Australian
Anglo-American Ltd, Sir Russel Madigan, News Ltd, South African business-
man H.F. Oppenheimer, Pioneer Concrete Services Ltd and the Utah Foun-
dation were National Sponsors.
Even before the formation of an Australian Institute of International Affairs as a national organisation, the members of the NSW and Victorian groups affiliated with Chatham House, and the closely related, but formally separate, IPR groups, saw themselves as concerned not merely with the study and discussion of international problems, but also with the publication of material for a wider, though still no doubt fairly select, audience. From the mid 1920s they sought, in various ways, to report developments in a rapidly changing international setting and, more broadly, to reflect upon them and to analyse them for an intelligent public. The earliest publications, as we have seen, appeared under IPR auspices and dealt with Australian affairs as much as with the external scene; and the preparation, by individuals and study groups, of papers for international conferences also focused on questions of economic development, trade and immigration.¹ In the 1930s, the focus of the new AIAA widened to include discussion of the imperial relationship, the possibility of a distinctive foreign policy and developments in the western Pacific. The latter emphasis became especially important after the founding, in 1937, of the Austral-Asiatic Bulletin in whose pages reporting of a more or less journalistic kind sat side by side with scholarly articles. The formation of the Research Committee in 1941 reflected the emphasis the Commonwealth Council wished to place on serious study and the Austral-Asiatic Bulletin’s successor, The Australian Outlook, was intended to be a scholarly vehicle. Only with the two Ford grants, however, was it possible for the Institute, for the first time, to mount a major, centrally directed and coordinated research program.

¹ See above, chapter 2.
It did so in a favourable environment, and its research contribution during these years marched closely with changes taking place in fashions of academic scholarship. It was a period of enormous expansion in Australian academia. By the late 1950s, following the Murray Committee of Inquiry into Australian Universities,2 and the injection of federal funds into tertiary education, Australia was on the brink of a massive growth in tertiary education, manifested in the first instance in an expansion in the number of universities. In that environment there was room for experiment in the redrawing of disciplinary boundaries and for fresh approaches in established disciplines, affecting the humanities and social sciences as well as other areas. One development that is relevant here was the strengthening of political science as a discipline, illustrated in some institutions by its separation from Departments of History with which it had commonly been associated in the 1930s. Another was the development of ‘international relations’ as, in effect, a sub-discipline and, at the ANU, its establishment as a separate department within the Research School of Pacific Studies. The academic study of the international scene became, in consequence, more professional and less amateur than it had been.3 And the expansion of other social sciences—anthropology and sociology in particular—affected the methods brought to the study of politics whether on the domestic or international scene.

Also of importance during this period, as has already been noticed,4 was an increasing focus on the study of Asia in relevant disciplines in all universities, and with special Centres or Schools in some of them. The University of Sydney had had a Department of Oriental Studies from 1918. In accordance with the academic preoccupations of the time it was ‘orientalist’ in approach, focusing on the study of classical language, literature and philosophy rather than on the contemporary world. In the University of Melbourne a non-degree course in Japanese was established in 1919. But with these exceptions, university studies in the humanities were directed to British history, English literature and to European languages, literatures and history, with only an occasional nod to other areas. Even Australian history received little attention at tertiary level. In the aftermath of World War II, universities began to make up the lost ground, introducing Asian studies in various forms and focusing to a considerable extent on the current scene. Immediately after the war new courses of a general kind were introduced in Canberra University College,

2 The Committee, under the chairmanship of Sir Keith Murray, then Chairman of the United Kingdom University Grants Committee, had been appointed by the Government, essentially on the initiative of the Prime Minister, Mr R.G. Menzies.


4 See above, chapter 1.
as it then was (a college of the University of Melbourne), Tasmania and
Western Australia. A few years later Departments of Indonesian Studies
were established in Sydney, Canberra and Melbourne and, in due course,
the Australian National University organised its Asian studies offerings in
a Faculty of Asian Studies. Monash set up a Centre of Southeast Asian
Studies in 1964, concerned especially with coordinating the supervision
of graduate students in a number of disciplines. Griffith, Flinders and
Western Australia also established Centres or Schools of Asian Studies
and other universities followed suit in a variety of ways.

The Asian focus was, to a considerable degree, a policy-oriented
focus. The Pacific War had brought Australia sharply into contact with
Asia and one of the urgent problems in this postwar situation was to come
to know the region more closely and to come to terms with it. In a world
of newly emerging states, poverty and underdevelopment, ideological
conflict and social change, it seemed obviously appropriate to mobilise
the available conceptual tools of political science, anthropology, econom­
ics and other disciplines to understand the changes taking place and to
accommodate to them.

The Institute had links with these developments both through its
academic members and through the research it sponsored directly, much
of which was undertaken by those members as part of their own scholarly
inquiries.

Periodical publications

The Australian Outlook remained the Institute's main avenue of regular
publication—the Institute's 'flagship', to use the term commonly employed
in Commonwealth Council discussions.

It reflected the preoccupations of much contemporary scholarship by
placing considerable emphasis on developments within the region. A
rough count of articles over its first two decades shows about a third of the
articles given to developments in Indonesia and other parts of Southeast
Asia and rather less than that to Japan and China. But regular treatment
was also given to western Europe, the USSR and Africa as well as to the
Middle East. (One writer in the mid 1960s went so far as to wonder
whether Australian observers had not concentrated too much on Asia, and
whether more attention should be given to Europe 'than has been
fashionable of late'.5) Some articles gave political analyses of domestic
developments in particular countries. It was not surprising that Indonesia,
during the upheavals of the late 1950s and the subsequent years of Guided
Democracy leading up to the coup attempt of 1965, should be the subject
of continuing speculation in Australia about the balance of domestic

5 J.D.B. Miller, 'Future Australian Security', Australian Outlook, vol. 18, no. 2
(August 1964) p. 137.
forces and the likely direction of events. Other articles considered more strictly international issues, whether relating to great power dominance, the international roles of the United States and the USSR, the operations of the United Nations, and the changing role of the Commonwealth. Vietnam, American intervention and the Australian commitment commanded a good deal of attention from the mid 1950s to the early 1970s. And, of course, there was continuing discussion of the changing imperatives of Australian policy, both at a general level and in relation to such particular issues as Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Colombo Plan or the ANZUS Pact.

There were some differences of opinion in the discussion of these questions in the pages of the *Outlook*, but one can see, nevertheless, a high degree of consensus about central issues. Contributors were, by and large, in agreement, for example, about the principal determinants of Australian foreign policy: the central character of relations with the United States and Australia's membership of an American-Pacific security system, ties with the new Commonwealth, obligations arising from United Nations membership, the acceptance of the demands imposed by our proximity to the new, and old, states of eastern and southeastern Asia, and especially a recognition of the benefits of engaging with the accelerating Asian economic revolution. Different emphases were apparent about the weight to be given to these elements. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, there was a tendency to place greater emphasis on the Commonwealth than would be the case later and it was considered to be important that Australia's role in launching the Colombo Plan was taken within the Commonwealth framework. V.C. Fairfax, a member of the NSW Branch, looked optimistically to the possibility that a changing Commonwealth could remain a continuing force in the international arena.6 And a Victorian Branch study group, described Australia as 'a dependent polity' and listed the main determinants of policy, apparently in order, as 'Commonwealth, American, Asian and United Nations' associations, recognising that these sometimes pulled in different directions.7

As an example of the difficulty of reconciling these different elements, there was some uneasiness about the extent to which the obligations accepted by Australia under the ANZUS and SEATO Pacts might outweigh the benefits. Macmahon Ball, writing about ANZUS as the price paid by America to secure Australian acceptance of the Peace Treaty with Japan, drew attention to the differences in wording between the ANZUS Agreement and the North Atlantic Treaty. The latter contained a reference to the possible use of armed force to resist an attack on a party to the agreement, while the former merely called on each party to act to meet a

common danger 'in accordance with its constitutional processes' and without specifying the nature of the action to be taken. The American commitment was thus clearer and stronger in the case of NATO than in the ANZUS agreement. Ball suggested further that, while Australia was unlikely to be attacked by Asian communist forces except in a situation of general war—in which case she could rely on American assistance with or without a treaty—it was possible that she might be called on to support American forces in the Pacific in pursuit of policies made in Washington.8 This position was called into question by Fred Alexander who, in the circumstances of the postwar world, saw the American connection as crucial to Australian security and who welcomed SEATO precisely because it carried further the American commitment to the southwest Pacific, even if it was couched in weaker terms than the commitment to NATO. Alexander rejected Ball's view that the United States would protect Australia even without a treaty. And he argued that Australia's choice, in this instance, of placing an emphasis on military security rather than on political cooperation with Asia, did not mean that the two elements were inconsistent with each other in the long term.9 However, though strongly argued, these differences were not as great as their protagonists made out. Both accepted, in general terms, the main directions of Australian policy and, in Institute circles, these issues were more or less sorted out by the end of the 1950s. In the broader community, too, despite continuing criticism from the left, the importance of the American connection was never to be seriously challenged.10 (These were to be long-standing perceptions of Australian interests. The themes of foreign policy would be phrased differently in the post-Cold War world of the 1990s—region, trade, security, being a good international citizen—but the content was not, perhaps, so very different from that to be seen forty years earlier.11)

8 W. Macmahon Ball, 'The Peace Treaty with Japan', The Australian Outlook, vol. 5, no. 3 (September 1951). The point was amplified a little later by D.C.S. Sissons who noted that the ANZUS Pact referred to assistance in the case of attacks made not only on the territory but on the armed forces of either party, and suggested that attacks on American ships in the Formosa Straits could not be regarded as a remote possibility. Sissons, 'The Pacific Pact', The Australian Outlook, vol. 6, no. 1 (March 1952).

9 F. Alexander, 'Australia in World Affairs: Post-War Australian Foreign Policy vis-a-vis the United States, with special reference to South-East Asia', The Australian Outlook, vol. 10, no. 1 (March 1956).


11 See the mission statement adopted by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in 1994, as described by David Goldsworthy, 'Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy, 1995', Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 50, no. 2 (July 1996).
At other times the focus of contributors to the *Outlook* was less on the broad character of foreign policy than on particular points of crisis, such as Indonesia's 'confrontation' of Malaysia in the early 1960s, the coup attempt of 1965 and the New Order which succeeded it. Vietnam also commanded continuing attention. From time to time the *Outlook* addressed such questions by means of a special issue, with contributors invited to cover different aspects of a problem. In 1969, for example, a special issue on Vietnam included sharply opposing views about American intervention. In 1971, 'Australia and the Pacific in the 1970s' was the subject of another special issue, and 'American Influences on Australia's Defence' was discussed in 1984. While many of these contributions were essays of reportage and analysis there were occasional articles, too, of a more theoretical kind, whether dealing with international law, the nature of international balance in the nuclear age, the viability of non-alignment or, at a more general level, alternative modes of analysis of international relations.

Local contributors were mainly academics writing from the Politics and History departments of the expanding universities, but there were contributions, too, from political figures (Kim Beazley Snr, J.J. Dedman, Arthur Fadden, Gough Whitlam, Bill Hayden, to name but a few). As the *Outlook* established its reputation as a scholarly journal it drew contributors from outside Australia as well as from within and it was partly the desire to underline that international character which led, eventually, to the decision to change its name to the *Australian Journal of International Affairs*. It was also felt in academic circles that the new name emphasised more strongly the scholarly nature of the journal, in contradistinction to the views of other members who believed that it was already too academic and that it should be directed as much to a lay audience. The change thus confirmed the policy of successive editors in maintaining its serious quality.

The other main vehicle of regular Institute commentary on events was provided by a series of volumes under the general title, *Australia in World Affairs*. This was developed with an eye to the kind of thing done in a

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13 See, for example, Arthur Burns, 'Recent Approaches to International Relations', *Australian Outlook*, vol. 20, no. 2 (August 1966) and Bernard Schaffer, 'Recent Writings on War', vol. 19, no. 2 (August 1965).
much more extensive way by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in its series, *Survey of World Affairs*. Volumes in that series appeared annually. While the Australian Institute lacked the resources to produce an annual survey of developments it appeared possible, in a more modest way, to maintain a systematic and regular coverage by working on a five year basis. As the Preface to the first volume put it, the aim was to produce a series of volumes "in which at regular intervals Australian scholars would attempt to measure the problems of the Australian position, present the actual course of policy, and appraise the record". Each volume would attempt to be "both a record and an interpretation, a record sufficiently comprehensive to be of continuing use and an evaluative analysis which would have its own worth as a judgment of policies and procedures as seen at that time".

The first volume, edited by Gordon Greenwood and Norman Harper, appeared in 1957. It covered the years 1950 to 1955, beginning, that is to say, with Australia's involvement in Korea. Unlike the Chatham House model it was decided to adopt a multiple authorship approach. Given the demands on Australian students of international affairs, it seemed that the only way by which the Australian record could be presented 'with any immediacy' was to divide up the task among a number of scholars. Nine authors contributed to the first volume, writing under three broad headings: the Australian Community, the International Community (covering the Commonwealth, the United Nations, the major powers and general economic issues) and the Pacific and Asian Community. This pattern was retained for the following three volumes.

The original hope of the Institute was that each volume would be published hard on the heels of the period with which it was dealing. That did not prove to be easy. Greenwood and Harper continued as editors for the first four volumes of the series, and they attempted to discipline the contributors and to secure their chapters on time, but there was some slippage, volume by volume. If 1950–55 appeared within two years, subsequent volumes took a little longer. 1956–60 was published in 1963, 1961–65 in 1968 and 1966–70 in 1974. At that point the original editors handed over the editorial task to W.J. Hudson whose volume, 1971–75, was published in 1980. The period 1976–90 was dealt with in two volumes, one covering five years and one covering ten years, under the joint editorship of P.J. Boyce and J.R. Angel, and the years 1991–95 were dealt with in one volume edited by James Cotton and John Ravenhill. These three departed in one respect from earlier contributions to the series in that *Australia in World Affairs* became a subtitle for volumes each of which carried a separate and individual title indicating the main themes of the period: *Independence and Alliance—Australia in World Affairs*,


**Monographs**

In addition to the *Outlook* and *Australia in World Affairs* the Institute was able, after 1963, to sponsor individual inquiries and to develop a broadly conceived research program covering a wide range of specialist topics and calling on the work of a number of members. The submission made to the Ford Foundation in 1962, though including a request for assistance in strengthening the central organisation of the Institute, was framed primarily in terms of the Institute’s research role. The outlines of a sustained research effort were hammered out in discussions between the Research Chairman, Norman Harper, and the Ford Representative, Mr Joseph Slater, during the latter’s Australian visit. It emerged in the course of those discussions that the Foundation was less interested in studies of Australia’s external policy in relation to specific countries than in a more general reconsideration of Australian policy. The resulting plan, presented to the Research Committee in May of the following year, was for a comprehensive program arranged under five broad headings: ‘Immigration Patterns and Attitudes in Australia and Southeast Asia’, ‘Strategic Problems in Southeast Asia’, ‘Australian Foreign Policy in Crisis’, ‘Australian Trade Patterns’, and ‘The Role of Middle Powers in International Relations’. In addition, it was proposed to publish two series of pamphlets, one dealing with specific problems (the Chinese in Southeast Asia was one suggested topic) and a regional or ‘Countries’ series, dealing, for example, with individual countries of Southeast Asia and with individual Commonwealth countries. It was proposed to invite appropriate individuals to be responsible for particular projects under these headings and for the editing of the two pamphlet series. Financial assistance was available to support individual research projects. This could be used to meet the travel costs of field work or of consultation with other workers, the appointment of research assistants or the provision of secretarial help. It was envisaged that there might be a need also for a contribution towards the cost of publication.

On confirmation of the grant, the Research Committee was able to move quickly to implement the program and had little difficulty in recruiting suitable people to accept responsibility for various parts of the overall operation. C.A. Price and R. Appleyard agreed to prepare work on immigration patterns and attitudes in Southeast Asia, A.L. Burns on arms control and strategic problems confronting Australia, J.A.C. Mackie on international relations in Southeast Asia, a Victorian study group on the

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changing role of the British Commonwealth, B.D. Beddie on a history of Australian foreign policy. And F. Alexander agreed to edit the 'Countries' series of pamphlets or small books, and L.J.L. Wilson the 'Problems' series. (They were later succeeded by Derek Whitelock and Hedley Bull.) As is common in broadly conceived research programs the results were uneven. Some authors found, as work proceeded, that their focus of interest changed and, with the agreement of the Research Chairman, they adjusted their projects accordingly. Mackie's study, to give one example, became in the end a major work on the Indonesia-Malaysia dispute, published eventually under the title *Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute, 1963-1966* (Kuala Lumpur, 1974). The Immigration project emerged as a study of the origins of the White Australia policy, *The Great White Walls are Built* (Melbourne, 1974). Some other authors found themselves over-committed in one direction or another, and failed to deliver, but most projects were carried to completion and the Institute was able to bring out a series of significant works. The Countries Series began with K.G. Tregonning's *Malaysia and Singapore* (1967), C.P. FitzGerald's *The Third China* (1967) and Peter Hastings' *New Guinea: Problems and Prospects* (Melbourne, 1969). In the Problems Series were Alastair Lamb's *Asian Frontiers* (Melbourne, 1968) and, a little later, Bruce Grant's study of Australian foreign policy, *Crisis of Loyalty* (Sydney, 1972).

The success of the research program under the first Ford Grant provided a basis for a second approach to the Foundation in 1967. The projects proposed in the second submission were similar in general character to those of the first program, especially in maintaining a strong Asia focus, but perhaps with a sharper definition of topics as a result of the experience with the first grant. Such questions as the diplomatic machinery of the newly emerging states of Asia and Africa (P.J. Boyce), the political position of the Chinese minority in Indonesia (J.A.C. Mackie), the development of non-communal politics in Malaysia (R. Vasil), were amongst the topics listed for specific attention. The Countries Series and the Problems Series of volumes were to continue also.

Affairs

letters between the Institute and the researcher, rather than in a more
research funds by topping them up from this source.

formal contract, usually provided for a sharing of royalties. In this way the

Indonesia case to case but the normal arrangement, embodied in an exchange of

Grimshaw, was published jointly by the Australian Institute and the Royal

Institute of International Affairs.

Institute was able, for a considerable period, to maintain the level of

Director of F.W. Cheshire, was a member of the Victorian Branch (he was

member also of the Research Committee. It was a reflection of that close

association that the Institute used Cheshire’s as its principal publisher for

a number of years. The Australia in World Affairs volumes were brought

out by Cheshire’s. Thereafter Angus and Robertson and Nelson were, in

turn, the regular publishers. The arrangement with Angus and Robertson

ended in 1974 when the firm sold its Educational Books section, and a

similar agreement was then made with Nelson. Within a year, however, a

change in Nelson’s management led to a review of the situation and, in
due course, to a revision of the agreement. The new management was of

the view that the print runs considered realistic for Institute books were
too low to permit the fixing of an attractive price and, under the new

agreement, the Institute agreed to pay a subsidy. After the final withdrawal

of Nelson in 1979, it became the practice to consider volumes on an

individual basis rather than seeking a contract with one publishing house.

Since then a variety of publishers, amongst them Melbourne University

Press, the ANU Press, Allen and Unwin, and Longmans, have accepted

responsibility for particular works.

Taken together the period of the two Ford grants marked the high point
of research activity initiated directly by the Institute and carried out under
its supervision, and its published contributions were considerable both in
number and quality. During the 1970s, however, changes were becoming
apparent in the social sciences and humanities research scene in
Australia, of which the Institute’s research programs were merely a part,
and these were to affect the contribution it was able to make through its
own direct initiatives. Whereas in the 1960s the Institute, with the aid of
the Ford Foundation, was a not insignificant provider of research funds,
by the mid 1970s the establishment of the Australian Research Grants

18 See Appendix F for a list of the principal publications of the Institute.
Scheme had greatly reduced the need for such a role. Good researchers could now get better support from that source and were no longer so attracted by the assistance that could be given by the Institute. In the new situation there was less opportunity for the Institute to be the initiator of its own research programs.

The new circumstances called for a new approach on the part of the Research Committee. In 1972, the Research Chairman (Professor Hedley Bull) had noted that, when the Institute was founded, there were no university courses in international relations. That had now changed and it might now be more appropriate to leave most of the commissioning of research in depth to the universities. In the following year his successor, Professor J.D. Legge, in his report to the Annual General Meeting, remarked that 'rather than plan and carry out its own research program, cajoling unwilling authors to tackle subjects not of their own choosing and to write books that they might not really want to write, the Institute should seek to assist work that is already in progress, offering scholars additional grants for travel or research assistance for work they want to do'. There would still be a sponsoring and financing role for the Institute to play in identifying relevant projects already under way and in providing supplementary contributions to the conduct of that research, and sometimes providing some financial assistance towards publication. The advent of computer technology and of desktop publishing, and the ability to provide camera-ready copy to a publisher, also changed the environment in which the publication program of the Institute could be conducted. The initiating of research through the commissioning of volumes and the development of long-term arrangements with publishers were no longer central to the Institute's perception of what it could do.

There were some exceptions to this emerging policy of supporting existing research activity. In 1977, the Research Chairman proposed that the Committee commission and publish a 'Discussion Series' of short books, each of which would focus on a particular issue of current controversy and present opposing views prepared by authoritative people. A number of subjects were suggested: the uranium debate, the question of an Australian republic, security questions in the western Pacific and the significance of the American alliance, relations with Indonesia. Only the first of these appeared. Uranium: Energy Source of the Future? was published by Thomas Nelson in 1979, with Professor Sir Ernest Titterton, Professor of Nuclear Physics at the Australian National University, presenting 'The Case Against'. Similarly opposing essays were prepared for the debate about the American alliance.

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Unfortunately, the publishing problems already mentioned prevented the continuation of the series.

By the end of the 1970s, then, the research operation of the Institute was entering a new phase. On occasion the Research Committee might recommend the commissioning of a new project, but this was no longer done on the scale made possible by Ford’s financial assistance. More often it was a matter of sponsoring proposals submitted to it or identifying and supporting work already in progress in one or other of the universities. Sometimes it was able to provide a subsidy to the publication of completed work which might not otherwise have been acceptable to a commercial publisher.21

The idea of giving Institute sponsorship to works other than those commissioned by the Research Committee was illustrated in the acceptance, for publication under Institute auspices, of a number of already completed books. W.J. Hudson, *Billy Hughes in Paris* (Melbourne, 1978) appeared in this way, as did Alison Broinowski (ed.), *Understanding ASEAN* (London/Canberra, 1982) and Peter Edwards, *Prime Ministers and Diplomats* (Melbourne, 1983). A study of the Round Table, *High Hopes: The Men and Motives of the Australian Round Table* (Melbourne, 1986) by Leonie Foster, was a case of a book published with the aid of a subsidy from the Institute. In the case of Margaret George’s *Australia and the Indonesian Revolution* (Melbourne, 1980), which was published after the author’s death, the Institute arranged for the manuscript to be edited for publication under its auspices. The Series ‘Regime Change in Asia and the Pacific’, edited by R.J. May and administered by the ANU’s Department of Political and Social Change, was an example of the Institute associating itself with a project initiated elsewhere. The Series, ‘International Issues in Asia and the Pacific’, edited by Professor Nancy Viviani of Griffith University was a new project initiated by the Institute. And the Cambridge University Press Series, ‘Asia–Pacific Studies’, was a publishing program in which the Institute was associated with the ANU’s Research School of Pacific Studies, with the aim of presenting works dealing with contemporary processes of change in the Asia–Pacific region. The editor of the series, Dr John Ravenhill, was a member both of the Department of International Relations, ANU, and the AIIA. During the 1980s, the National Headquarters, on Philip McElligott’s initiative, launched a new Occasional Papers series which provided an additional vehicle for the discussion of contemporary topics. These included, ‘Of Business and Foreign Policy’, a group of papers by Sir Russel Madigan (1985), ‘Trends in International Trade and Australia’s Performance’, by

21 The Research Report of 1978 described the main function of the Research Committee as ‘winding down the Ford programme, bringing as many as possible of the works on the stocks to completion, writing off the hopeless cases and limiting new commissions to works of genuine quality that might not otherwise find a publisher’.

A further publication of the Institute in 1986 was 'Diplomacy at the End of the Twentieth Century: Challenges and Options for the Department of Foreign Affairs in its Fiftieth Year', edited by A.C. Milner and T.D. Wilson. This comprised a group of papers arising from a conference convened by the Canberra Branch in the previous year. The conference itself was of immediate practical importance in that it provided a forum for the discussion of organisational choices facing the Department at the time. Members of the Department, including the Secretary, Stuart Harris, took an active part in the conference and used it as a means of canvassing outside opinion about structural changes which were already under consideration and which were carried through in 1987 when the Department became the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

The changing role of the Research Committee

In the late 1980s, in spite of what might have been regarded as an impressive research and publication record, there were some signs of dissatisfaction within the organisation about the way the Institute was fulfilling its educational role. It was argued in some quarters that the Institute should be concerned not merely to support advanced research in the field of international relations but to make available the fruits of that research to a much wider public. That might be done, it was suggested, by publishing in a more accessible and popular form than was represented in academic studies or through the pages of *Australian Outlook*. At the same time, other members of the organisation, especially after the building of a national headquarters, looked to a research role directed more effectively than before to the business sector and to government. The two views were not necessarily alternatives, and both were given forceful expression in 1987. In July of that year the Director of the time, Mr Philip McElligott, wrote to the Research Chairman, Dr J.R. Angel, suggesting that, as the Institute was now looking more to the private sector for support, it might be desirable to think in terms of changing the direction of its research planning so that Government and business would get 'the message that the AIITA is on the move'. Two months later Mr Andrew Farran, President of the Victorian Branch, proposed to the Research Committee the
introduction of a new periodical—'a less academic journal'—that would reach a wider readership than was served by *Australian Outlook.*

These views were discussed at a later meeting of the National Executive. No firm policy decisions were reached but the feeling that it was time for a change of direction was reflected in the resolution of the Executive that 'the role, structure, terms of reference, modus operandi and responsibilities of the Research Committee, including its relations with the National Executive, be reviewed at the next meeting of the National Executive with a view to making appropriate recommendations to the next Annual General Meeting'. The National Executive, at its next meeting, took no drastic action but merely resolved that the Research Committee and the National Directorate 'review and define their respective roles and responsibilities' with respect to Institute publications. The exchange, however, revealed the existence of a certain amount of friction between Executive and Research Committee, and, for a time, opposing views of the Institute's task became a matter of some controversy on the two bodies and in the Annual General Meeting. These differences of opinion became associated with arguments of another kind—arguments which were foreshadowed in chapter 7—about the whole structure of the Institute and about how its affairs should be conducted. As these matters touched central questions relating to the nature of the Institute it is necessary to examine them in some detail.

It will be remembered that, with the adoption of new Articles of Association in 1969, the Commonwealth Council of the day took the view that, while the old Articles had required revision to bring them into line with Company law, the practical consequences of the change should be minimal. It was intended that the Commonwealth Council, now composed of all 'members' of the Institute as defined in the Articles, and in effect, therefore, a General Meeting of the Institute, should be the governing body, and the forum in which matters of detail as well as of general policy would be discussed and decided on a regular and continuing basis. And so it continued to be. For the time being, the details of conferences, lecture programs, publication arrangements and other detailed matters formed the substance of its agendas. The Research Committee reported to it. Elections of office bearers were negotiated, usually in a consensual way, at its meetings. And, for the time being, the Executive was limited to the execution of the decisions made at general meetings and to consultation with Branches between General Meetings. Executive discussion was normally by a series of telephone conversations rather than by the convening of an actual meeting, except when the members of the Executive were present immediately before a General Meeting. On those occasions the Executive acted as a steering committee, preparing business and proposing resolutions for the consideration of the General Meeting on the

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23 Research Committee, 16 October 1987.
following day. This was sometimes irritating to Executive members who objected to going through the same business twice. But there was no alternative as General Meetings were by no means prepared to act as a rubber stamp for the Executive and often, after discussion, rejected proposals brought forward by the Executive.

In time, and especially after the election of Presidents whose experience was in the business rather than the academic world, and who saw the Executive as analogous to a Board of Directors (which in law it was), the emphasis began to change. Under Sir Russel Madigan, Deputy Chairman of CRA, and President of the Institute from 1983 to 1988, the Executive began to meet more often and, on occasion, was prepared to take firm decisions and report them to a much later General Meeting. His successor, Mr Bob White, Managing Director of Westpac and President from 1988 to 1991, continued that policy.

In 1989, the Director of the time, Dr Richard Higgott, responded to the changing circumstances in a 'Discussion Paper for the 1990s' which he presented to a meeting of the National Executive. He made a number of specific suggestions: that the Chairperson of the Research Committee be renamed 'Director of Studies', that the National Director become, ex officio, a member of the National Executive, that the Executive be directly elected rather than being appointed by the Annual General Meeting and that, in addition to the office bearers—President, Vice President, Treasurer, Director of Studies and the Chair of a new fund raising committee—the Executive be expanded to include three 'members at large' and that the Directorate should explore the possibility of a more direct approach to the corporate sector. In advancing these suggestions, however, Dr Higgott indicated his own view that, in the changed circumstances of the 1990s, the Institute 'is in need of reform, not revolution'. Its role 'needs to be seen in modest, but not inconsequential terms'. It should not aim to be 'a flashy, high profile organisation' but should continue its traditional role of public education.

In response to the paper the President proposed to the Executive that it set up a Committee of Review, to inquire into the administrative structures of the Institute and consider how they might best be reformed to meet the challenges of the 1990s. Dr Higgott's paper, and the formation of the President's Review Committee, did not lead immediately to any fundamental restructuring but they stimulated active discussion and served as a focus for the consideration of the gradual changes that had been taking place in the practices of the Institute.

Discussion came to focus especially on the role and performance of the Research Committee and was stimulated by the alternative views of the

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25 Executive Committee, 27 October 1989. The paper was re-issued for more general discussion within the Institute under the title: 'The Australian Institute of International Affairs: An Agenda for Consolidation and Change'.

26 Executive Meeting, 27 October 1989.
Institute’s research role to which reference has already been made. In the past the initiative in research matters had normally been taken by the Research Committee and its Chairman, though proposals for new projects, publication arrangements and financial agreements with authors and publishers were always fully reported to General Meetings and were often discussed by them at some length. As we have seen, this was the way in which the two Ford programs were developed and administered. The Research Committee was also responsible for the general oversight of _Australian Outlook_. The editors reported first to the Committee and through it to the General Meeting. And the Committee was closely involved in discussing themes and arrangements for Institute conferences and workshops. By and large this had worked well, but now one of the changes in the Executive’s perception of its role was a desire on its part to become much more directly involved in the shaping of the Institute’s research program. On occasion it became prepared to act on its own initiative without consultation with the Committee or its Chairman and this gave rise to some resentment on the Committee’s part. There were issues of principle as well as practice involved here and in 1989 Mr White, as incoming President, decided that it was time to address these matters directly. He therefore recommended to the Executive that the place of the Research Committee be one of the matters to be considered by the President’s Review Committee.

In 1990, in advance of a response from that Committee, the Executive moved to a more direct criticism of the Research Committee’s performance and made a number of suggestions. It proposed that the membership of the committee be changed to include non-academic membership, that, when the vacant position of National Director was filled, the Director should become Chairman of the Research Committee, thus bringing it more directly into the area of headquarters administration, and that the editorship of _Australian Outlook_, normally the subject of recommendation by the Research Committee, be changed in order to give the journal a less academic flavour. It happened that the current editor, Dr Ravenhill, was about to step down, and it seemed to the President’s Review Committee that this might be an opportune moment to replace him by a person with experience in the area of business journalism.27

The Committee reacted strongly against these proposals. On the question of its own membership it pointed out that it did not consist entirely of academics, but noted that its academic members had relevant expertise and experience in research and publication. It was opposed emphatically to the suggestion that a National Director, when appointed, should assume the Chairmanship of the Committee. The Director was, ex officio, a member of the Committee but the functions of Director and those of Chairman were quite different and called for different qualities. The role of the two positions, indeed, ‘forms part of the balancing process in the

27 Research Committee Minutes, 4 May 1990.
Institute’s overall programme’. And the proposed change in the character of the editorship of the *Outlook*—and the implied change in the nature of the journal—could undermine the established standing of the Institute in the eyes of professional students of international relations. The Committee saw the character of the journal as representing the character of the Institute itself.28

In the following year the differences between Executive and Research Committee sharpened. In a letter to Dr A.C. Milner, Research Chairman, the President expressed his dissatisfaction with what he saw as the deeply rooted conservatism of the Institute, a long-established body settled in its ways and comfortable with its traditional method of conducting its affairs. In his own words, Mr White was ‘anxious to lift the profile of the Institute in the general debate on international affairs’ but he had had ‘no appreciation of the established barriers to be overcome’. He had come to the view that the Institute was reluctant as an organisation ‘to recognise the extent of the changes which had taken place between the 1930s and the 1990s’ and that it was out of touch with the needs of the present.29

In particular, the President felt that much of the difficulty lay with the Research Committee. He believed that something of a gulf had opened up between the Executive and the Committee and he asked the Committee to undertake a review of its role and structure, addressing the composition of the Committee, the method of appointing its members and its view of its function, and the question of whether there should be a geographical spread of members. The Committee’s reply, in effect, reaffirmed the views it had expressed a year earlier. It emphasised that the appointment of members was made formally by the AGM but usually emerged from a consensus about who was available and appropriate. It was mainly, but not exclusively, academic for the reason already given, and suitability rather than geographical spread was the important criterion. There was currently a strong Canberra component (seven Canberra members as against four from NSW and one each from Victoria and Tasmania), but this was a means of reducing the cost of meetings. It also drew attention to the vigour of its current program which, as we have noted, included the establishment of two monograph series, the development of arrangements with Cambridge University Press for a third series, and which foreshadowed the possibility of joint publication of papers dealing with Australian-Asian relations arising from a research project carried out

28 ibid. A further indication of the Executive’s lack of confidence in the Research Committee was illustrated in the fact that it had begun negotiations to host a forthcoming ‘Williamsburg Conference’ held under the auspices of the Asia Foundation, without involving the Committee, though this was the kind of activity about which the Committee would normally have been consulted. Minutes of Annual General Meeting, 29 September 1990.

29 Mr White to the Research Chairman, Dr A.C. Milner, 6 May 1991.
under the direction of the Australian Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia. However, while the Committee was responding in this way to the President’s request, Mr White was also, in fact, giving independent consideration to a new research initiative without reference to the Committee, thus reflecting his view that the Executive should play its own direct role in the formulation of research policy.

The project in question was a study of Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation. It arose out of an earlier proposal that had been considered, and adopted, by the Research Committee in 1989. In its original form, as developed by Associate Professor Fedor Mediansky of the University of New South Wales, it had been entitled the ‘Pacific Century Project’. Its aim was to monitor the forces shaping the Asia-Pacific region and to promote a national awareness of regional change and its implications for Australia. These aims were couched in very general terms and the details of specific investigations to be carried out in the pursuit of those aims were still to be developed. Such questions as the economic and political implications of China’s modernisation program, the prospects for Sino-Soviet reconciliation, the implications of South Korea’s rapid growth, were suggested as possible topics for substantial study. It was intended that the project, once approved, would seek funds from a small number of corporate donors for the appointment of a director and for the commissioning of regional specialists to conduct research on particular topics, and that the project as a whole would be carried out under the joint sponsorship of the University of New South Wales and the Institute. An approach was to be made to the Business Council of Australia seeking its endorsement.

On the understanding that sponsorship carried no financial commitment, the Research Committee recommended to the AGM that the Institute become an institutional sponsor of the project.

The development of the plan was kept under review by the Committee but it was eventually decided not to proceed with the proposal when it failed to obtain the endorsement of the Business Council of Australia or to attract the corporate funding that had been anticipated. In its new form in 1991 the proposal was directed to a general consideration of alternative security structures of the post-Cold War Pacific, the relative decline in the American role in the region and the rising influence of the major regional powers, China and Japan. Obviously these were important questions. In Institute terms the unusual features of the proposal, both in its original

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30 Research Committee, 10 May 1991. The Committee’s views were conveyed to Mr White in a letter from Dr Milner, written in advance of the minutes of the meeting. The wording of the letter had been circulated to Committee members and approved by them.

31 Professor Fedor Mediansky to Dr Richard Higgott, 14 August 1989 and Mr Bob White to Dr Higgott, 25 August 1989. Research Committee Minutes, 27 October 1989.
form and in its revived form, were its scale, involving the appointment of a full time director of the project, the cooperation of a wide range of academic and other specialists working on a paid consultancy basis, and an expenditure in the region of $250 000 to $300 000. The new proposal was developed within the National Headquarters and was only referred to the Research Chairman at a late stage, when the Executive and the Research Committee were asked to give a quick response so that an application for financial assistance could be made to an international foundation (the Macarthur Foundation).32

The Committee's general review of its role and structure became entangled in this way with its consideration of the specific research plan proposed by the President. The emerging differences about the functions and structure of the Committee were explored more fully in a special meeting called in response to the President's request for a decision on the Asia-Pacific Security Project proposal. Held on 20 July, and with the President attending, the Committee's discussion ranged over matters touching the role of the Committee as well as the merits of the specific research proposal. In the discussion members of the Committee expressed concern that no use had been made of its expertise in the initial consideration of the revised proposal. The Committee nevertheless agreed to endorse the proposal in principle, though regarding it as not yet ready to go forward as the basis of a submission for financial assistance. It considered that much more preparation was needed, including the identification of those who would actually carry out the work and the development of appropriate academic and official support. It also believed that the proposed time span for the execution of the project—approximately eighteen months—was unrealistic. It recommended, therefore, the appointment of a steering committee to prepare the proposal in greater detail and to assume, in due course, the overall management of the project. Its own support would depend on that procedure being adopted.33

The President was obviously unhappy about the proviso and in due course the Executive sought to resolve what had clearly developed into a disagreement between itself and the Research Committee, both about the general role of the Committee and about its consideration of the specific proposal before it. At the July meeting the Committee had drawn attention to the fact that it was responsible, not to the President or to the Executive, but to the Annual General Meeting of the Institute. The President responded by noting that, while the Research Chairman was mentioned in the Articles of Association, and was an ex officio member of the Executive, no reference was made to a Research Committee, and he informed the Committee that he proposed to pursue the matter further with the Executive.

32 Mr White, National President to members of the National Executive and the Research Committee, 28 June 1991.
This point was examined in some detail in a subsequent memorandum by the Treasurer, Mr David Russell, who was of the view that, since the Articles did not refer to the Committee, it should therefore be regarded as a subcommittee of the Executive. After noting that 'the executive includes the Research Chairman; which is not the same as the Chairman of a Research Committee', Mr Russell went on to say, 'I believe that this means that members of the Research Committee are appointees of the National Executive and not the general meeting.' This, however, would seem to ignore the overriding power of the General Meeting. From the fact that the Research Committee had no constitutional status in the sense of being mentioned in the Articles of Association, it did not follow that the Committee was a subcommittee of the Executive and that its members were appointed by the Executive. We have already noticed the creation of the Committee by the Commonwealth Council (= General Meeting) in 1941 and thereafter it reported to the Commonwealth Council and its members were always appointed by the Commonwealth Council. Its existence was not, in fact, a constitutional matter but a result of decisions by the General Meeting.

In addition to the disagreement about the constitutional status of the Committee there was also present an increasing degree of tension between the Research Chairman and the National Headquarters of the Institute, arising in part from the different interpretations of the Research Committee's standing but flowing over into matters of practical administration. Disagreements emerged over such matters as the administration of conferences and workshops, and over the breakdown in communication on the matter of the Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation Project. It was the view of the Research Chairman that the problem was essentially a structural problem, arising from a lack of clarity in the definition of responsibilities of the Research Committee on the one hand and the National Headquarters on the other. The President and the Treasurer however had, by this time, come to the view that the fault lay with the Research Chairman rather than with the Executive Director of the Institute, and that the tensions had the potential to threaten the stability of the Institute's administration. The President decided, in consequence, to

34 Paper by Mr Russell entitled 'The Australian Institute of International Affairs', 8 August 1991.
35 This view was argued forcefully by a former Research Chairman, Dr J.R. Angel, who pointed out, in a letter to the following President of the Institute, that AGM minutes would show that the Committee's members were always appointed by the AGM and that the Committee always reported to the AGM. 'It may be argued', he said, 'that it would be preferable for the Research Committee to be appointed by and be responsible to the National Executive rather than the AGM but there must be no doubt that this is not the case at present.' Dr Angel to Garry Woodard, 31 January 1992. Stephen House files.
36 Mr White to Dr Milner, 15 August 1991.
bring the whole matter for resolution to the notice of the National Executive.

The Executive considered the question at a meeting on 1 November 1991, and resolved to recommend to the Annual General Meeting that the Research Committee be suspended pending the review of its structure and functions. (The President was not able to attend that meeting, and in any case was intending, for personal reasons, not to offer himself for re-election as President, but his recommendation that the Committee be suspended was conveyed through the Treasurer, and was adopted.) The Annual General Meeting, held on the following day, did not accept that recommendation and the Committee remained in existence. A year later, under the Presidency of Mr White's successor, Mr Garry Woodard, the National Executive decided to take no further action. In the intervening period Mr Woodard had sought to play a conciliatory role and, with the help of a new Director, Mr James Ingram, had succeeded in restoring the somewhat fragile lines of communication between the Research Chairman and the Headquarters. The Executive was able, in consequence, to note that:

The Institute was now working satisfactorily and the President's view was accepted that further discussion of the contentious matters that arose at the 1991 meeting would be unproductive. It was unanimously agreed that the Chairman of the Research Committee and the Director must work closely together and keep each other fully informed of developments.37

The Research Committee since then has continued to perform its customary role. The question of the Asia-Pacific Security project was resolved at a later date when, after the withdrawal of the proposed director of the project, the proposal was allowed to lapse.

It is not easy to judge these issues, especially for one who was involved in the discussion of them.38 There were personal difficulties in the interaction of President, Executive Director and Research Chairman during this period and, in the absence of a Director, the Institute lacked an authoritative hand at the centre of its administration. There were differences of opinion about particular proposals. But there were also deep and genuine differences in perception of what the Institute should be. There were those who wished to preserve the measured and scholarly traditions of the past and who believed that the Institute should represent and serve a comparatively small and informed constituency. There were others, including some members of the Research Committee, who shared the desire of the National Executive for a more positive role, establishing contacts with business and government, but who did not accept the Executive's view of how that might best be done. Others again, as we

38 The present author was a member of the Research Committee during this period.
have seen, looked to the creation of a more popular image, with glossier publications aimed at a much wider general public. Some would have liked to see the Institute assume more of a Brookings Institution type of role, acting as a 'think tank', pronouncing on questions of policy and performing also something of a consultancy function for business. In practical terms, the Institute could not, for financial reasons, appoint research staff of its own and offer an extended consultative function, though its interaction with officials in earlier days had had something of that character. Given the deep seated nature of these alternative perceptions about the goals of the Institute, they could not easily be resolved, and could only be discussed and to some extent negotiated through the organisational structure provided by the Articles of Association, and in the light of a no doubt desirable tension between past practice and current needs.

One might see, in the story of sharp disagreement between Executive, Research Committee and Headquarters, a clash of different traditions. Dr Angel saw it as reflecting tensions between exponents of change and traditionalists:

This was not merely a collision between two committees of the Institute. Nor was it simply a disagreement between the more business-oriented and the academics. The Institute has seen many similar disputes over recent years...Such disputes, whether within committees of the Institute or between them, must be resolved by the AGM...It is the AGM which must decide on basic policy and resolve disputes.39

Certainly it was clear by the mid 1990s that the Institute was not a body that could be taken by the scruff of the neck and made over into a new image. Mr White was quite right about the established barriers to be overcome if radical change were to be effected.

39 Dr Angel to Garry Woodard, 31 January 1992.
The educational role of the Institute from the 1960s was conducted at several levels. Some of its efforts were directed to producing works of record and interpretation—the 'Australia in World Affairs' series, for example—while others sought to present to a general audience discussions of particular areas or particular problems. The 'Countries Series' and the 'Problems Series' of volumes fell into that category, as their titles indicated. So did reflective essays such as Bruce Grant's *Crisis of Loyalty*. Others again, such as Mackie's study of Indonesia's confrontation of Malaysia, Jukes's study of the East Asian policies of the USSR, Alexandrowicz on the law-making functions of United Nations agencies or Boyce's study of the foreign policy-making activities of the new states, were more specialist in character and were part of the developing academic study of international relations. While the Research Committee, in overseeing this range of research activity, was concerned to play its part in the latter development and to encourage advanced work in the field, it saw this as contributing to the Institute's broader educational function. Its publications program could be said to have complemented the continuing study of international developments conducted in the meetings programs of the branches, in their own periodicals and occasional papers, in branch conferences which were held from time to time and in other ways.

**Branch publications**

Two branches of the Institute produced their own periodicals, *Australia's Neighbours*, produced by the Victorian Branch from 1949, and *World Review*, launched by the Queensland Branch in 19622. The latter was
published professionally under the auspices of the Branch first by Jacaranda Press (1962–67) and then by the University of Queensland Press. More recently the Branch found itself unable to carry the costs of maintaining the journal at this level and it was produced in a cheaper version published by the Branch itself.

**Australia's Neighbours** grew out of a 'Survey of Press Opinion on Foreign Policy' that the Victorian Branch had issued in mimeographed form from 1945 as an information service for members. Originally compiled by Mrs Helen Wright, then Branch Secretary, the Survey was subsequently produced by the voluntary labour of individual members of the Branch, Mr T.N.M. Buesst and then Mr L.G. Churchward, and later single-handedly by Mrs Wright's successor, Miss Dickins. Professor Macmahon Ball, then President of the Branch, exercised a general supervisory role. Though its format changed from time to time, it aimed to present a summary of events and a survey of editorial opinion of the major Australian papers. In 1949, it was replaced by **Australia's Neighbours**, which was at first still a summary of news and editorial comment from the Australian press but which quickly became a more substantial publication presenting background notes on developments in East and Southeast Asia together with a couple of articles of substance. It began as a monthly publication but this became ten times a year and then once every two months. Issues varied in size from between four and eight pages and were therefore expected to be concise and mainly factual. Its name was changed in 1974 to **Dyason House Papers**, after the name of the headquarters of the Victorian Branch and in 1985 it changed again to **Asian Pacific Review**, appearing two or three times a year until 1988. At that point the Branch decided it could no longer carry the burden of regular publication and chose to put its efforts instead into an Occasional Papers series.1

**Australia's Neighbours** and **World Review** were directed towards a more general readership than the more academic **Outlook**. As its name indicated, **Australia's Neighbours** focused on the western Pacific while **World Review** cast its net more widely. Both aimed at the senior years of secondary education as well as at a more general public. At its peak,

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1 **Australia's Neighbours** and its successors were edited by members of the Branch. Its first editor was W. Macmahon Ball, then President of the Branch. He was succeeded by Frederick Howard, journalist with the Melbourne Herald and formerly editor of the Austral-Asiatic Bulletin, J.A.C. Mackie, Department of Indonesian Studies of the University of Melbourne and later Director of Monash University's Centre of Southeast Asian Studies (till 1977), John Dalton (1977–81) and Andrew Perry (1981–88) of the Politics Department, Monash University. **World Review**'s editors were drawn similarly from the Department of History and Political Science of the University of Queensland—Charles Grimshaw (1962–68), Christopher Fkuskus (1968), D.J. Murphy (1969–72), Denis A. Wright (1972–76), Marion Nothing (1976–77), Martin Stuart-Fox (1978–80), Nancy Viviani (1981–82), Edmund Fung (1983–84), Joseph Siracusa and Glen Barclay (1984–88).
Australia's Neighbours had a circulation of over 4000, including over 2000 to non-members of the Institute. Both publications managed to achieve a quite remarkable coverage of events as they occurred. A survey of Australia's Neighbours and Dyason House Papers from 1950 to 1980 shows a regular treatment of developments in East Asia, Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Taking two years as an example, the issues for 1965–66 dealt with Philippines politics, Malaysia, economic development in the region as a whole, two contrasting views of Australian defence policy, the record of the United Nations, the 1965 coup attempt in Indonesia, the Japanese economy, Kashmir, Portuguese Timor, and political development in Papua and New Guinea. Over the same period, World Review published articles dealing with Vietnam, Indonesia, New Guinea, Australia–New Zealand relations and Commonwealth questions (for example, 'The Commonwealth Does Not Answer' dealing with Commonwealth responses to the Sino-Indian hostilities of 1962). But it also included treatment of American politics and American foreign policy, and articles dealing with developments in Germany, Austria and France. Some of its offerings were historical in character. Attention was given, for example, to changing explanations of World War I.

The Occasional Papers Series of the Victorian Branch, which replaced Dyason House Papers, sought to address more general issues of international relations. The initial paper, by Professor Joan Beaumont, provided a model by covering The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, 1901–1945 and though some papers did focus more narrowly on a particular question (Namibia: International Dimensions to its Decolonisation by David Dorward, The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Beyond Brazil, 1992 by Sir Ninian Stephen, Some Thoughts on Mabo by Reg Stock and Small Potatoes? Students and Teachers in Shanghai by Joan Grant) others dealt with such questions as Managing Australian Diplomacy: Three Views from the Top by three former secretaries of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Peter Henderson, Stuart Harris and Richard Woolcott, Human Rights in Australian Foreign Policy with special reference to Cambodia, Burma and China, by Garry Woodard, Key Concepts in International Relations: Competing Perspectives on the State, the National Interest and Internationalism by Andrew Linklater and Australia's National Interest in the 1990s by Scott Burchill. Some of these were specially written for the series. Others emerged from papers originally presented to ordinary meetings of the Branch. All of them, like Dyason House Papers and World Review, were published with a view to reaching a general audience beyond the Institute.

Branch conferences

The pattern for Institute conferences was set quite early in the Institute's history. The Queensland Branch of the Institute, for example, was acting
as a pioneer when, in October 1934, it held a weekend conference at Southport to consider, in a general way, problems of Australian foreign policy. Topics included a discussion of Australian commercial representation abroad, policies of the Government of Great Britain to affect Australia and cultural relations between Australia and ‘Oriental countries’, but the centre piece was a forum on ‘A Foreign Policy for Australia’ at which Professor A.C.V. Melbourne was the speaker and Mr Malcolm MacDonald, Member of the House of Commons (and later to be UK High Commissioner in Southeast Asia) and Dr T.P. Fry and Mr J.B. Brigden of the Queensland Branch of the Institute were the discussants. The Proceedings of the Conference were published under the title *Australian Foreign Policy, 1934*.

That was a special event, though a similar exercise was repeated from time to time by one or other of the branches. The Victorian Branch held a weekend conference at Marysville in September 1940 to consider Australian policy in the Pacific, another in October 1952 for the purpose of discussing papers prepared for publication in *The Australian Outlook* and a third, again at Marysville in 1957, to consider Australia’s relations with countries of South and Southeast Asia. At the latter, papers were presented by Norman Harper, C.P. FitzGerald and R.G. Neale on Southeast Asia, China and India, respectively. The NSW Branch organised a conference on ‘Living With Asia’ in 1963, and in 1968 the North Queensland Branch, in conjunction with what was then the Townsville University College (later the James Cook University of North Queensland) had a conference on Australian foreign policy in the 1970s with papers by Gough Whitlam, Hedley Bull and Max Teichmann. From time to time advantage was taken of the presence of Dyason Lecturers or other distinguished speakers who could be made the centre pieces of one day or weekend conferences. NSW used Sir Robert Scott, Dyason Lecturer in 1965 and Soedjatmoko (1967) in this way.

Meetings of this kind offered a variation from the normal round of branch meetings and often published proceedings were issued. However, in spite of the success of these *ad hoc* meetings, the idea of regular AIIA conferences, organised on a national basis, was slow in coming, and it was not until 1971 that a national conference program was launched.

**National conferences**

As long ago as 1949, a Canadian visitor to the Institute, Dr Gwendolen Carter, author of works on the British Commonwealth, the role of the Dominions, and the government and politics of South Africa, drew the attention of the Australian Institute to the conference model developed by its Canadian counterpart. In Canada, national meetings had become an

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2 Victorian Branch Council Minutes, 15 July 1952.
might be an appropriate example for Australia to follow. On the face of it there were obvious similarities between the circumstances of the two Institutes. In both countries the federal structure of the nation was reflected in the federal structure of the respective Institutes. And in both cases the Institute branches were widely separated, geographically, from each other. But there were important differences. In Canada, a national headquarters had already been established and the role of the national body was much greater than was the case in Australia. In the 1950s, the Center for International Affairs (CIA), with a Director and a specialist staff of four departmental heads supported by an adequate clerical staff, was in a better position to mount genuinely national conferences with sufficient drawing power to ensure that they would be attended by members of all branches.

Dr Carter’s suggestion bore no immediate fruit. It was raised from time to time at subsequent Commonwealth Council meetings: in August 1952, February 1959, March and August 1960, again in February and August 1962 and in September 1964. In September 1969, after the appointment of Dr T.B. Millar as Director, the idea was finally agreed to ‘in principle’. Much would still depend on the capacity of the Directorate to make it happen and it was important that in Dr Millar the Institute at that time had a Director whose own inclinations were firmly in the direction of a national conference program and who was able to draw to some extent on the secretarial back up of the Australian National University.

During the discussions that had taken place at Council meetings there had been some differences of opinion about the form that conferences might take. Should they be directed primarily at Institute members, and conducted strictly within the terms of the Chatham House rule, or should they be made occasions at which the Institute might raise its public profile and make a bid for the attention of a more general audience? Possible models were the broadly based annual conferences of the Australian Institute of Political Science on the one hand and the more limited academic-type meetings of the Australasian Political Studies Association on the other. The idea of the larger public gathering won the day and, when the first National Conference was held in June 1971, the arrangements adopted established a format for subsequent years. The standard arrangement has been for a weekend conference (initially held on the Queen’s Birthday weekend), open to the public and opened by a Minister or other distinguished keynote speaker, and addressed by other leading speakers from within Australia or from overseas.

The 1st National Conference was held in Sydney, at the University Law School in Phillip Street. There were 350 registrations—a number limited by the capacity of the hall. (At subsequent conferences numbers attending have varied from about 250 to over 700.) The theme of the conference was ‘Japan and Australia’. The Prime Minister, Mr William McMahon, opened the conference and speakers included academic students of Japan–Australia relations and representatives of the business
community. The conference on this occasion extended over three days and the proceedings were later published in book form.3

This first ‘national conference’ set the pattern for those that were to follow. In Melbourne a year later the gathering addressed the topic ‘China and the World Community’. The Foreign Minister, Mr Nigel Bowen, opened proceedings and China experts drawn both from Australia and overseas examined the relations of China with the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia and Africa. For the latter topic the conference was able to take advantage of the presence of that year’s Dyason Lecturer, Ali Mazrui, to give an authoritative treatment of the relationship from an African point of view. Proceedings were again published.4

For the next few years conferences were held annually but, in 1976, in view of a financial shortfall in the mounting of the 6th National Conference in Sydney in the previous year, the Annual General Meeting decided that conferences would in future be held every two years.5 After 1981, however, it appeared possible to return to more frequent meetings and since then conferences have been held at yearly or eighteen month intervals. The location of conferences has rotated mainly between Sydney, Canberra and Melbourne but, on occasion, other branches have been willing to accept the role of host. In 1984, the 12th National Conference, on ‘Australia and Asia in the 1980s’ was held in Adelaide, the 16th Conference, on ‘Antarctica’s Future: Continuity or Change?’, in Hobart in 1989 and the 18th Conference, on ‘The Future Pacific Economic Order: Australia’s Role’, in Brisbane in 1992.

Conference themes have been varied. They have included economic aspects of Australia’s foreign relations, relations with Papua New Guinea, Japan and Southeast Asia, Soviet policies east of Suez and problems of the Middle East. Most had fairly specific themes—‘Recent Trends in World Trade’ (Sydney, 1987), ‘The New Europe, East and West’ (Melbourne, 1991), Indonesia (Canberra, 1994)—but sometimes they tackled wide-ranging subjects. ‘Australia and Asia in the 1980s’ (Adelaide, 1984) was one of the more open-ended topics and for the 1983 Conference, held in Canberra, the topic was ‘The State of the World’!6

The 1983 Conference was, of course, a special occasion, a Jubilee Conference, this being the fiftieth anniversary of the foundation of the Institute. The Conference was opened by the Prime Minister, the Hon Robert Hawke and the Keynote Address was given by the Secretary General of the Commonwealth, Shridath Ramphal. An exceptionally wide range of speakers—from Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Mexico, Britain, the United States, the USSR, Norway, France, Fiji, Japan, Nigeria and

3 J.A.A. Stockwin (ed.), Japan and Australia in the Seventies (Sydney, 1972).
5 Minutes, Annual General Meeting, 27 August 1976.
6 See Appendix D for a list of National Conferences and topics.
South Africa—addressed the theme of the Conference, which carried the subtitle ‘A New International Anarchy?’ And many representatives of sister Institutes around the world had accepted the invitation to be present. Australia's bicentennial year, 1988, provided the occasion for another special event. The 15th National Conference, scheduled for that year, was hosted by the Canberra Branch and was held in conjunction with The Asia Society of New York on the topic 'Threshold Issues in Asia for the 1990s'.

An important feature of the national conference program has been the intense involvement of the host branch. While the Director and the National Headquarters always take a major part in planning and in arranging the details of a conference, it does so in consultation with the host branch, and the branch and its rank and file membership carry the main responsibility for seeing to the smooth running of the meeting and gain, in consequence, a sense of property in the event.

**Public lectures**

The National Conference program has been accompanied by public lectures either on an occasional and *ad hoc* basis or as part of an established lecture series. An example of the former was provided when the Institute hosted a public lecture in Melbourne, delivered by the Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, during his visit to Australia and New Zealand in 1965. Mr Lee’s visit was made against the background of Indonesia’s ‘confrontation’ of Malaysia, a matter in which Australia was directly involved and which embodied her growing concern about her relations with Indonesia under President Sukarno’s ‘guided democracy’. The purpose of the visit was to enable Mr Lee to promote the idea of Malaysia and, in providing a public platform for him, the Institute was performing a service on behalf of the Department of External Affairs. On other occasions the Institute, in a similar if less public way, offered the Department a link with universities and with other sectors of the

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7 This Conference was sponsored by CRA and was largely organised by the former Director of the Institute, Mr Philip McElligott, who, as Director, had been responsible for the initial preparations and who carried on this work while his successor, Dr Richard Higgott, was settling into his position. Report of the National Director to the National Executive, 30 September 1988.

8 Mr Lee’s tour had a considerable impact in both Australia and New Zealand. However, a comment in the New Zealand Herald that ‘when President Sukarno of Indonesia set out on his bare-faced campaign to “crush Malaysia” he obviously underestimated the cool, determined defiance of men like Mr Lee Kuan Yew’ proved over-optimistic when Singapore, a few months later, was forced to withdraw from the Malaysian federation. See *Malaysia: Age of Revolution* (1965), a pamphlet issued by the Singapore Ministry of Culture as a report on Mr Lee’s tour.
community, and was able to arrange seminar programs or other small gatherings of interested people for official visitors to Australia. Arrangements made for a Chinese delegation in 1978 was a case in point. On that occasion the Institute acted as the host of the delegation and was funded by the Department to enable it to perform that role.9

Of the established lecture series of the Institute, the Dyason lectures were the most important and, as we have seen, by bringing distinguished international figures to Australia they did much to maintain a public profile for the Institute as a whole and for local branches which handled the local arrangements for the lectures. While the main function of the lectures appeared, by the 1960s, to have been fulfilled, a different function was performed by the Roy Milne Memorial Lectures. This series was established in 1949 on the basis of a gift to the Institute by Mrs Roy Milne. Roy Milne had been a prominent businessman in South Australia and he and his family had been active in the affairs of the South Australian Branch of the Institute since its formation in 1947. (His nephew, Mr Lance Milne, later South Australian Agent General in London, was secretary of the Branch for a time during its early years.) Mrs Milne’s gift of £2000 was to establish a series of public lectures to be given annually, under the auspices of one of the branches, on some aspect of international affairs. Mrs Milne later added to the original gift, bringing the capital of the fund to £5000, and the lectures, sometimes with assistance from other sources, have continued ever since.

Unlike the Dyason Lectures, the Roy Milne Lectures have not attempted to bring figures from overseas but have been given by prominent Australians, able to speak with authority on matters of foreign policy. (The only exception was the lecture given in 1974 by Michael Somare, Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea.) Lecturers have been drawn from the ranks of politicians, judges, diplomats, administrators and academics. The series was launched in Adelaide in 1950 by the Prime Minister, Mr R.G. Menzies, who spoke on ‘The British Commonwealth of Nations in International Affairs’. Other lecturers have included people like Sir John Latham, then Chief Justice, Sir Ian Clunies Ross, Sir Douglas Copland and Professor W. Macmahon Ball, who had played an important part in the foundation and the early years of the Institute. Foreign Ministers have sometimes accepted an invitation to speak and have sometimes used the occasion to make significant policy statements.

The Roy Milne Lectures have been given in different centres each year, in no fixed rotation. The idea has been that branches would take it roughly in turn to host the lectures, but the location each year depends on the interest of an individual branch to accept the responsibility for the lecture that year. (See Appendix E for a list of the lectures since 1950.)

In 1969, the Queensland Branch launched a lecture series of its own—the Heindorff Memorial Lectures founded in memory of Mr E.W.

9 See below, chapter 10.
Heindorff, formerly Secretary of the Branch and especially the Townsville Branch—occasionally registered at Commonwealth Council meetings a sense of its remoteness from the centre of Institute affairs and a feeling that it was likely to miss out on national events, such as the Dyason Lectures. It is true that Townsville was not always included in Dyason tours. The Heindorff lectures were proposed as a means of redressing the problem a little, and in 1968 the Commonwealth Council, with some reluctance, was persuaded to allow the Branch to retain $500 of the national appeal funds raised in Queensland. The Branch raised a further sum for the series. Heindorff lectures were given either in Brisbane or Townsville, the initial lecturers being Professor C.P. FitzGerald and Professor Zelman Cowen, then Vice Chancellor of the University of Queensland.

Schools programs

A lecture series of quite a different kind—the Arthur Calwell Memorial Lectures—was launched in 1984 when a member of the Victorian Branch, Mr Paul Morawetz, provided funds to be used for the videotaping of lectures for use in schools. Cassettes were also to be available for general sale but the principal purpose of the proposal was to provide serious discussion of international affairs for the benefit of secondary students. Two lectures were given in this form, the first by Dr Hugh Collins on the subject ‘Australian States and the External Affairs Power’ and the second by Sir Zelman Cowen on ‘The Press: Freedom vs Responsibility’. (Sir Zelman also travelled to branches to take part in the discussion of his taped lecture.) The Institute had for long been concerned to arrange lectures, seminars and mini-conferences for senior secondary students taking International Affairs as part of the Higher School Certificate. The Victorian Branch was especially active in this area, initially as a result of the initiatives of Professor N.D. Harper of the University of Melbourne and Mr Morris Williams and Mr Alf Sampson who awakened the interest of those they taught at Wesley College and encouraged them to join the Institute and attend meetings. Later Mrs Prue Myer, for a time President of the Victorian Branch, and then Ms Pat Smith and Mr Rob Cargill, members of the Branch Council, accepted responsibility for continuing this schools program. The Calwell Lectures were intended to complement that aspect of the Institute's educational activity.

In 1994, a quite different initiative was planned by the North Queensland Branch of the Institute to extend the AIIA's public education role by involving high school audiences with its work. Called the ‘Young Diplomat Program’, this sought to enlist the help of secondary teachers, especially history and geography teachers, in developing activities specif-
fically tailored to the interests of their students. In 1995, an organising committee composed of representatives of the Institute, James Cook University and the Regional Department of Education arranged a briefing of teachers in a meeting which focused on the United Nations and Australia’s UN interests. This was followed by a symposium in which members of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and members of the Consular Corps took part. In 1996, eleven schools participated in team projects to consider important issues in modern diplomacy. The Victorian Branch made a similar bid for the interest of younger members in 1995 when it formed its ‘Global Forum’, a discussion group organised by younger members of the Branch and aimed at a senior school and undergraduate constituency.

There have also been other initiatives at tertiary level. In 1985, the then Director, Philip McElligott, and the Research Chairman, Dr Victor Prescott, proposed to the Research Committee the introduction of an Institute Prize to be awarded annually to undergraduate students of international affairs. These might be found in Departments of Politics, or History, or in Faculties of Law or Economics. The prize was to be awarded to the author of the best final year Honours thesis, and the Research Committee proposed a system of rotation between States, giving the more populous States a proportionately larger share. A prize was to be awarded annually in NSW and Victoria and in the remaining States including the ACT in alternate years. A local panel in each State would judge the essays from different Departments.

Study tours

Another of the Institute’s educational initiatives has been the provision of study tours for members. These have been an occasional rather than a regular feature of the Institute’s work but, for a time in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, tours to countries of East Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia, were conducted every two or three years. The idea of a study tour was advanced initially by Mr Leonard Lambourne of the NSW Branch. Mr Lambourne was an officer of Trans Australia Airlines, and was in a position to relieve the organisation of the task of handling the details of travel arrangements. The Institute planned the itinerary for each tour and set up meetings with individuals and groups—where possible through sister organisations in the countries to be visited—and air and accommodation bookings were handled by the airline. The emphasis was on the study of the countries concerned. The first visit—to Southeast Asia in

11 In the first year prizes were to be awarded in NSW, Victoria, ACT, Queensland and Tasmania and in the following year in NSW, Victoria, Northern Territory, Western Australia and South Australia.
12 See Research Committee Minutes, 18 October 1985.

Visitor’s workshops

As a variation on its programs of conferences and seminars, the Institute has arranged a number of small workshop discussions under the patronage of the Governor General. It has become an established tradition of the Institute that the Governor General should be invited to be Visitor to the Institute, a tradition duplicated in some States where the State Governor has often agreed to accept a similar role. The duties of Visitor have not been defined and have never been onerous, but the Visitor has sometimes been willing to host a reception for the Institute on the occasion of a conference, or to open a new building and to assist in other, largely ceremonial ways. During the appeal for the building of a national headquarters Sir Ninian Stephen, as Visitor, allowed Government House to be used for meetings related to the appeal. In a more positive way Sir Ninian and his successor, Mr W. Hayden, have lent their name to the convening of small conferences known as ‘Visitor’s Workshops’. These were suggested by Mr McElligott as a means of bringing together businessmen and other leaders of the community for the discussion of significant themes. The Workshops have been held at irregular intervals either at Government House in Canberra or Admiralty House in Sydney.

The inaugural Visitor’s Workshop was held on 6 and 7 October 1984 at Yarralunla, with fifteen invited participants not all of whom were Institute members, to deliberate on ‘The World Debt Crisis—Cause and Effect: The Impact on International Development Assistance’. In addition to the President, Sir Russel Madigan, they included Professor Fred Gruen, Professor of Economics in the ANU’s Research School of Social Sciences, Dr J.R. Argel of the Department of Government, University of Sydney, a number of businessmen including Sir Rupert Clarke of Cadbury-Schweppes Dr K. Carpenter of Westpac and Mr W.J. Henderson, Director General of the Confederation of Australian Industry, others with a public service background, including Mr J.O. Stone, formerly Secretary of the Treasury, Mr M.R. Casson of the Australian Development Assistance Bureau and Mr C.F. Teese, Deputy Secretary of the Department of Trade and the economic journalist, Mr Max Walsh.

This mixture of business, academic and civil service participants set the pattern for later workshops which were held at the Governor General’s Sydney residence, Admiralty House, rather than in Canberra. In June 1985, a Workshop was devoted to ‘Education: An Element in Foreign Relations’. In February 1989, the subject was ‘The European Single Market and its Implications for Australia’. In December 1989, a workshop
on 'Australian–United States Relations: an Agenda for the Future' was held in conjunction with the Pacific Forum. In July 1992, the subject was 'What Australia Wants from an Increasingly Powerful Japan and a Diminishing United States', and in August 1993, 'Democracy, Human Rights and Australia's Position and Role as an Asia-Pacific Nation'.

In these various ways, and working always within narrow financial constraints, the Institute was able, in some degree, to reach beyond its normal membership to a wider public. In doing so it sought to fulfil the second of the goals of the Royal Institute as set down in its Charter in 1926: to provide and maintain means of information on international questions and to promote the study and investigation of such questions by lectures and discussions as well as by research and publication.
International conferences

During the 1930s, the international conferences of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (British Commonwealth Relations Conferences) and the Institute of Pacific Relations, in which the newly established Australian Institute of International Affairs had taken a regular part, were major events calling for months of preparation of specialist papers and able to draw on the participation of major figures in the worlds of government and business as well as academia. Data papers were prepared by study groups as well as by individuals, and these were often extended and serious studies of aspects of the international scene. It was a limitation of the conference model that, while data papers served as a basis for discussion at the conference, only a few were published separately and made available to a wider public. As already indicated, the importance of these occasions was reflected not only in the effort devoted to the preparation of data papers but also in the time commitment which delegates were prepared to make by travelling long distances by sea in order to be present.

The IPR and BCR conferences continued in the early postwar period. The 9th IPR conference was held in America (Hot Springs, Virginia) in 1945, the 10th in England (Stratford upon Avon) in 1947, the 11th in India (Lucknow) in 1950 and the 12th in Japan (Kyoto) in 1954. By then the McCarthyist attacks on the Institute were taking effect and the 13th conference at Lahore in Pakistan in 1958 was the last to be held. Five

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1 The library of the Victorian Branch of the Institute, at Dyasson House, holds an extensive collection of papers from each of the BCR conferences and from the 4th (1931) to the 13th (1958) IPR conferences.
Commonwealth Relations Conferences (the term 'British' was dropped after 1945) were held after the war—in London in 1945, Canada in 1949, Pakistan in 1954, New Zealand in 1959 and India in 1965. (The AIIA was also represented at a conference conducted by the Royal Institute in Lagos in 1961, but this was not part of the Commonwealth Relations series.) As with the prewar conferences, much serious preparation went into the production of conference material. Over the years, members of the Institute, acting either as individuals or as members of study groups, produced over a hundred data papers for IPR and BCR conferences, of which about half were for conferences in the postwar period. Common themes addressed by Australian participants at these meetings were Australia's economic development (the 'peopling of Australia', resources and trade prospects), British Commonwealth relations and Pacific island questions. (The latter were emphasised especially at prewar conferences and in the immediate postwar period.)

It is worth noting that, in spite of Australia's continuing participation in these meetings, and in spite of its role in hosting the 2nd BCR conference in 1938, it never acted as host for an IPR conference. In 1948, an offer by the Commonwealth Council of the Institute to hold the 1950 conference in Australia was accepted by the IPR but, in January of the following year, the Council was taken aback to learn that the Pacific Council of the IPR had voted to re-admit Japan to full membership of the organisation unless two or more National Councils were to object. There had been no advance warning of this proposal, and only two months were allowed for objections to be lodged. At that stage no peace treaty had been

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2 This figure was supplied by Miss Dickins from the holdings of conference papers in the Victorian Branch Library, Dyason House. As an example of the work undertaken, the Australian papers prepared for two of these meetings—the 9th IPR Conference held at Hot Springs, Virginia in 1945 and the 12th Conference held in Kyoto in 1954—may be cited. Papers for the 9th Conference included Professor L.F. Giblin, 'The Australian Balance of Payments', P.D. Phillips, 'Australia's Attitudes to the Post War Government of the Pacific Dependencies', W. Macmahon Ball, 'Australia as a Pacific Power', Geoffrey Sawyer, 'Some Effects of Japanese Occupation on Southeast Asia', G. Schneider, 'Australia and Latin America', and five papers listed as written by unnamed members of the Institute, 'Requirements of an Expanding Economy for Australia', 'A Security System for the Pacific', 'Australia's Interests in Post War Air Transport', 'Australian Agriculture in the Post War World' and 'Australia's Potential Contribution towards Economic Reconstruction and Development in the Pacific'. Those for the 12th Conference included R.H. Greenwood, 'Geographical and Economic Aspects of Nationalism and Security in the Orient', G.C. Greenwood, 'Australia, the Commonwealth and Pacific Security', N.D. Harper, 'Australia and US Pacific Policy, 1951–54', W. Macmahon Ball and H.A. Wolfsohn, 'Australia's Relations with Japan since 1945', R.G. Neale, 'Australian Interests and Attitudes towards Economic Assistance to Asia', C.P. FitzGerald, 'China, Korea and Indo-China' and R.F. Holder, 'Australia's Trade Relations with the Far East'.
signed with Japan and, in view of its heavy responsibility for the holding of the forthcoming conference, and because of possible opposition in Australia to the admission of Japanese delegates, the Commonwealth Council decided that further time was needed to consider the re-admission proposal. At its next meeting, the Council learned that India had, in the meantime, issued an invitation to hold the 1950 conference and, while renewing its own invitation, the Council made it clear that it might not be possible for Japanese participants to secure permits to enter Australia and indicated that it was prepared, in these circumstances, to stand aside in favour of India if that fact was likely to 'create undue embarrassment'. And so it was resolved. The 11th conference was held at Lucknow, and no IPR conference was held in Australia.

The Australian Institute did, however, act as host to one later international meeting. In 1972, some consideration was given to reviving the Commonwealth Relations type of conference, though on a more modest scale than those of the past. The Institute was in no position to repeat a meeting on the scale and complexity of the Lapstone Conference of 1938. After informal discussions with Chatham House, the Canadian and New Zealand Institutes of International Affairs and the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, a conference was held in Canberra in 1973. Its purpose was to examine the major changes and problems within the region—from Pakistan to Japan. Delegates came from Bangladesh, Canada, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States. It was not, however, a public conference. Local participants were limited and some criticism was expressed at Institute Council meetings about the lack of participation of AIIA members.

In their hey-day the IPR and Commonwealth Relations conferences derived some of their significance for the Australian Institute from the mere fact of their regularity. At successive meetings senior members of the Institute renewed old contacts and made new ones and, in the 1930s, the late 1940s and the early 1950s, these were important ways of reducing Australian isolation. There were other international meetings which fell outside the IPR and RIIA frameworks. The AIIA was represented, for example, at a conference of leaders of Institutes of World Affairs, sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in New York in 1953. This conference was concerned less with aspects of international affairs than with the role of bodies of this kind in shaping public opinion and influencing official policy. Such goals were, of course, potentially at odds with the RIIA and AIIA prohibition on the expression of Institute opinions on matters of substance and on the advocacy of particular lines of policy. The conference was also concerned, however, with the functions of Institutes in promoting the academic study and teaching of international

4 Minutes of the Commonwealth Council, 13 August 1949.
relations, and it took place just as the development of international relations as a recognised and independent discipline was expanding in Australia.⁵

An example of a quite different kind was to be seen in an AIIA presence at the Asian Relations Conference, sponsored by the Indian Council of World Affairs and held in New Delhi in March and April 1947. As a conference of Asian nations held at an early stage of the national liberation process in South and Southeast Asia following the war, this was a meeting of great political importance at which newly independent countries and nationalist leaders from countries still fighting for independence could exchange views on the problems of nationalist struggle and emergent nationhood. Australia was not, in the view of the Indian sponsors of the Conference, an Asian nation, and therefore could not send delegates to the Conference, but it was allowed two observers and, for this purpose, the Department of External Affairs called on the assistance of the Institute and of the Institute of Political Science. Gerald Packer of the AIIA and J.A. McCallum of the Institute of Political Science were in due course selected.⁶ Mr Packer’s nomination was at once a sign of the standing of the Institute in the eyes of the Department of External Affairs and an example of the way in which the Institute might, on occasion, assume a role on behalf of the Department without surrendering its own autonomy. When the proposal was first made the President of the time, Mr R.J.F. Boyer, was hesitant. He sought advice from the IPR and Chatham House before recommending to the Commonwealth Council that the invitation be accepted, and in negotiating the selection of an AIIA member as Australian observer he was careful to insist to the Department that the Institute must have the right to choose the person.⁷ In the event, the Australian High Commission in India reported that ‘Messrs Packer and McCallum constituted a most pleasant and capable pair of observers. It is no exaggeration to say that they stood out in a rather mixed gathering and it was notable that their company was frequently sought by delegates of all groups.’⁸

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⁶ In his inaugural speech to the Conference, Mr Nehru specifically welcomed the observers from Australia and New Zealand, because these countries had problems in common in the Pacific and Southeast Asian regions. See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, 1937–49*, Vol. XII: 1947 (Canberra, 1995) Documents 514 and 516.
⁷ Boyer Papers, NLA, MS 3181, File 20 NB. See also Memo from Mr Boyer to Commonwealth Council members, 16 October 1946, in which he indicated his hesitation. File in ‘Overseas Conferences’ held in the papers of the Victorian Branch of the Institute.
By the 1960s, the large international conferences, held on a regular basis, no longer seemed as appropriate a way for an unofficial body like the Institute to maintain its international contacts. This was partly a result of the demise of the IPR, but to a greater extent it reflected changes in the methods of travel and the growth of a multitude of other ways of knowing, and keeping in touch with, relevant individuals and institutions in other parts of the world. Such contacts were now established and maintained in the ordinary course of expanded and regular international travel. Australia was no longer as isolated from international contacts as it had been only a few years earlier. For academic students of international affairs the provision of study leave from universities enabled periods either of field work in relevant countries or of extended residence in appropriate metropolitan centres. (The idea of metropolis and periphery still remained, of course, but the gap between the two was now easily bridged.)

The same circumstances, however, made possible the development of international contacts of a different kind. It was now possible for Australian scholars to attend brief overseas conferences or seminars which were smaller in size and more specific in subject matter than the broadly based assemblies of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Such meetings could be organised more rapidly and could draw on a small number of specialist participants who might be away from their desks for no more than a few days. From the 1980s, contacts of this kind became a feature of the Institute's activities.

**Symposia, seminars and other international contacts**

The new circumstances enabled the Institute, through cooperation with similar bodies elsewhere, to join in the discussion of major themes in a seminar type of setting. Such meetings were usually of brief duration, running, perhaps, for two or three days and attended by a comparatively small number of participants.

One such meeting followed a suggestion from Admiral Lloyd Vasey, President (and Founder) of the Pacific Forum, based in Hawaii, that the Institute join with the Forum and the Australian Studies Center at Pennsylvania State University, in co-sponsoring a seminar on Australian-US-New Zealand relations. The Institute responded warmly and the seminar, under the title 'Strategic Imperatives and Western Responses in the South and Southwest Pacific' was held in Sydney between 9 and 12 February 1986. The Minister for Defence, the Hon. Kim Beazley, gave the keynote address. A similar occasion was an Australia-Japan colloquium on Australia-Japan relations, held in Tokyo on 23 and 24 March 1988. On this occasion the initiative had come from the Australian Embassy in Tokyo, which asked the Institute to coordinate the meeting at the

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Australian end, and it was an example of a possible Institute role in what was coming to be called 'second track diplomacy'. A further Australia—Japan colloquium was held in Australia during the visit of the President of the Japan Institute of International Affairs, Ambassador Nobuo Matsunaga, in April 1992. Once again the Institute was acting in conjunction with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Mr Matsunaga's visit was the result of an invitation from the Department and the Institute was happy to provide a forum for him in the form of a seminar in Melbourne, and a National Conference in Brisbane, as well as the more limited colloquium in which business leaders were involved. The Ambassador's visit was followed in the following month by a visit from the Acting Director of the Japanese Institute, Mr Itaru Umezu, again at the invitation of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Between 1988 and 1990, the Institute joined in a different international venture—a three-year conference program with the New Zealand Institute of Policy Studies and the East-West Center, Hawaii. The first conference was held in Honolulu in August 1988. The second followed in Wellington in August 1989 and the third in Canberra in December 1990. The three meetings brought together representatives of government, business, the universities and the media, and aimed to cover different aspects of the relationship of the three countries concerned. The first meeting considered the society, politics and national image of each of the three countries, the second economic structures and relations and the third their regional roles.10

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10 While the three seminars were mounted successfully, problems arose about the papers to be included in the third of the three volumes reporting the proceedings of the three meetings. One of the Australian papers, jointly authored by M. McKinley and G. Cheeseman of the Australian National University, was critical of US policy in the Pacific and was deemed unsuitable for publication in the official conference volume. It was replaced by another, commissioned for the purpose by the Editor in Chief of the series. This gave rise to concern on the Research Committee and the National Executive of the Australian Institute. The Research Committee, the National Executive's professional advisers, took the view that the handling of the matter raised an issue of principle, the free expression of scholarly opinion. See Memo of Research Chairman to members of the Research Committee, 7 April 1992. The National Executive further considered that the nature of the trilateral co-sponsoring arrangement justified institutional involvement in a widening dispute, despite the recorded sovereign rights of the editor and publisher. Attempts on the part of the National President to resolve the matter with the East-West Center were unsuccessful. The National Executive then negotiated with the East-West Center a statement in the final volume that the commissioned paper was not that presented at the Conference and that the Australian Institute of International Affairs, as the Australian co-sponsor of the project, regretted that the editor had deemed it necessary to make a substitution. See National Executive Minutes, 10 and 12 April 1992. In the event, the other Australian
Other examples could be given. In 1991, the Institute accepted an invitation to host the 19th Williamsburg Conference in 1991. The Williamsburg Conferences were established in 1971 by the Asia Society of the United States, and aimed to bring together representatives from the Asia-Pacific region to exchange views on the affairs of the region. On this occasion the conference, composed of delegates from the United States, Canada, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, the USSR, Taiwan and Vietnam as well as Australia, focused on future American-Japanese relations, and the prospects for economic reform in the Soviet Union, China and Vietnam. Australian representatives included the Foreign Affairs Minister, Senator Gareth Evans, Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Richard Woolcott, Shadow Attorney General, Andrew Peacock, and a number of business and academic members. In the same year, the Institute cooperated with the International Commission of Jurists and the Australia-Tibet Council in hosting a conference, 'Tibet in Context', which explored steps that might be taken by the international community to ease or resolve the conflict in Tibet. This expansion in the Institute’s conference program owed much to the energy and organising ability of Susan Allica as Executive Director.

One of the features of the Australia-Japan colloquia, and indeed one of the objects of the exercise, had been to establish direct relations with the Japan Institute as a body similar in kind to itself. The Williamsburg Conference had enabled similar cooperation with the Asia Society. Different steps were taken to establish links with the People’s Republic of China. In 1974, a ten person delegation from the Institute visited China at the invitation of the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA). This was the first of a number of exchanges between the two countries. The 1974 delegation invited its hosts to make a return visit. It was some years before that could be arranged but the return visit eventually took place in 1978 when a strong Chinese delegation visited Queensland, NSW, South Australia and Victoria as guests of the Australian Institute. The AIIA was assisted by the federal Government to the tune of $20 000 to enable it to arrange the tour, and the visitors were given a strenuous itinerary in the course of which they met business leaders, academics and political leaders at State and federal levels. (The authors decided to withdraw their contributions also, so that the volume was left without the Australian papers.

11 Hugh Morgan of Western Mining, Mark Rayner of Comalco, Sir Russel Madigan, Chairman of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Committee, R.J. White, Managing Director of Westpac and President of the Institute, Professor Stuart Harris and Professor Ross Garnaut of the Australian National University.

exchanges with the visitors were no doubt sharpened by the fact that the 'Democracy Wall' developments began in China when the delegation was here.) In 1987 and 1992, further exchanges took place. Sir Russel Madigan led a small delegation to China, again as guests of CPIFA in March and April 1987, and in August and September 1992, Garry Woodard as President led a similar delegation. On that occasion the China visit was followed by a visit to Korea.

In November 1994, the Institute was invited by the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre of the Australian National University to serve on the Australian National Committee of the recently formed Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region (CSCAP). CSCAP was launched in 1993 and is based on national committees intended to be established in all of the countries of the region. The national committees are intended to be broadly based in character and are composed of a wide range of participants: scholars, government officials acting in their personal capacities, business representatives, journalists and others. The Australian National Committee, which had its first formal meeting in 1995, is thus part of a much wider network of similar bodies. CSCAP in effect constitutes another vehicle for second track diplomacy and, as such, offers a forum for the discussion of regional security issues, both within national committees and with representatives of other national committees, in a way which does not commit governments, or the officials included in the national committees, but which enables the exploration of alternative policies and the sounding out of unofficial opinion. For the Australian Institute of International Affairs, participation in CSCAP offers an opportunity to enhance its profile both within Australia and internationally as a contributor to regional security dialogue. It also offers a means of engaging with foreign policy institutes in other countries which, like the AIIA, are included in their respective national committees: the Japan Institute of International Affairs, Indonesia's Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Singapore's Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Thailand's Institute of Strategic and International Studies and others. (Unlike the AIIA, many of these bodies had close links with the governments of their respective countries and some of them had already come together in an Association of ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies, set up before the formation of CSCAP.) At the time of writing, the Australian Institute, in partnership with other AUS–CSCAP participants, is exploring ideas for projects which will advance that dialogue. One possible subject for discussion is the question of environmental security.

Through activities of this kind the Institute developed its international contacts and did so in a way which enabled it to perform something of a national function. Attention has been drawn to the way in which it responded to the request of the Australian Embassy in Tokyo to assist in arranging the Australia–Japan colloquia. That it should be able to play such a role was important. There were issues of principle at stake and no
doubt some dangers in adopting too close a link with government, but with the establishment of the National Headquarters in its new building in Canberra—a move carried out with substantial government assistance in the form of the provision of a site and the granting of an exemption from the payment of rent—it was to be expected that the Institute would be more in a position in the future to contribute to the development of links with similar bodies elsewhere and, in general, to play more of a national role. There were, however, some practical difficulties of a kind with which the organisation was only too familiar. The costs of establishing a headquarters were high, and while the new building promised, in the future, to be a source of revenue, for the time being there were difficulties in securing tenants to fill all the available space. The Institute's ability to live within the constraints of its regular income continued, as in the past, to be something of a hand to mouth operation and this affected its ability to play the part expected of it. In the first issue of a Stephen House Newsletter, launched by Mr Garry Woodard as a means of informing members of the activities of the National Headquarters, the President showed himself concerned about perceptions in Canberra of the limited relevance and the low national profile of the Institute and anxious that this might affect the continuance of its Government subvention.\textsuperscript{13}

In fact, it will be apparent that its contribution had not been insubstantial. In addition to the activities already outlined, the Institute administered a 'Special Visitors Program' funded by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

**Special Visitors Program**

As an unofficial body the Institute was well placed to act as host to figures from other countries whom the Department was anxious to bring to Australia, but whose current position did not bring them into the normal category of official visitors. It was intended to invite people who, because of the nature of the interest group they represented or the views with which they were associated, would be, in some measure, controversial figures. The program was directed to individuals—scholars, journalists, officials and others—who were regarded as having some influence or potential influence in forming opinion in their own countries. As the Director of the time, Dr Richard Higgott, commented, 'The Institute, by inviting controversial figures, would not be providing recognition for their causes but, rather, fulfilling its obligation to promote discussion on international affairs.'\textsuperscript{14} This was something that the Department itself could not easily do. Through its network of branches and its contacts with

\textsuperscript{13} Stephen House Newsletter, vol. 1, no. 1 (February 1992).

\textsuperscript{14} Report of the National Director to the National Executive, 30 September 1988.
universities, the Institute could offer appropriate platforms for visitors of this kind, sometimes arranging public meetings, or seminars or small conferences through which their views could be explored. Visitors were selected by a small committee of the Institute consisting of the President, Director and Research Chairman, but in consultation with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The Department was given an opportunity to suggest visitors and to comment on those put forward by the Institute, but with an understanding that the final choice lay with the Institute.

The first visitor, Ms Lee Kimball, arrived in November 1989. She was Executive Director of the Council on Ocean Law and Director of the Antarctic Program at the World Resources Institute in Washington. She visited Sydney, Canberra and Melbourne before going on to Hobart where she took part in the Institute's 16th National Conference, which was hosted that year by the Tasmanian Branch and was devoted to a consideration of Antarctica's future. (The Conference was enlivened by an interesting departure from the normal conference program. Arrangements were made for a speech by the Prime Minister to be followed by a dialogue, via satellite link, between Mr Hawke and the French oceanographer, Jacques Cousteau.) In 1990, there was a brief visit from Utula Hyun Paik (Korea). As a journalist writing on Burma for the Asia and the Pacific and, as Chairman of the Iran Foreign Relations Committee, he was an appropriate keynote speaker. The seminar attracted business as well as government representatives.

In the following year, Dr Chai-Anan Samudavanija (Thailand) participated in a workshop on Comparative Perceptions of Human Rights in Australia and Asia, held under the auspices of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, under its major 'Australian-Asian Perceptions' research project. In the same year, Professor Tien Hung-mao, Chairman of the Taiwan Institute of Policy Research, addressed several branches and a lunch held by the Victorian Branch in conjunction with CEDA (Committee for the Economic Development of Australia). And others followed in succeeding years.15

15 In 1993, the Hon. Vincent Cheng, MLC, Hong Kong, Professor Joseph Cheng, Hong Kong City Polytechnic, Akilisi Pohiva, a member of the Tongan legislature; in 1994, Dr Maria Diokno, Professor of History in the University of the Philippines, Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar of the Indonesian Institute of Arts and Sciences, General Rudini (retired) from Indonesia and Professor
The conference activities of the late 1980s and early 1990s—the Australia-Japan colloquia, the conferences held in conjunction with the Pacific Forum and the East-West Center and the Williamsburg Conference—placed very heavy demands on an understaffed National Headquarters and especially on Ms Susan Allica, Acting Director and then Executive Director between the end of Dr Richard Higgott’s term of office in 1989 and the appointment of Mr James Ingram in 1992. It was clear that, until the debt on the building had been cleared and it had become a significant source of income for the Institute, the burden of arranging seminars and conferences, administering the Special Visitors Program, providing services to branches and maintaining a publications program would have to be carried out with minimal resources. In fact, the Institute managed to achieve a good deal within those constraints.

In the mid and late 1990s a new Director continues to face the same problems of stretching limited funds to cover a wide range of activities, including the maintenance of its international links.

Narayana, Dean of the School of International Studies, Jawarhalal Nehru University, New Delhi; and in 1995, Diane Ying, editor of Taiwan’s Commonwealth Magazine. All of these played some part in public discussions, conferences and seminars. Akilisi Pohiva, for example, conferred with Pacific studies scholars in the University of Sydney and the ANU and took part in a conference on ‘Tradition and Modern in Pacific Island Politics’. Dr Anwar and General Rudini participated in the National Conference of the Institute, held in Canberra on the subject of Indonesia.
The membership of the Australian Institute of International Affairs has changed gradually over the years but it is not easy to indicate with any degree of precision exactly what those changes have been. Reference has already been made to the mix of members in the early days of the Institute—political figures, professional people, academics from a variety of disciplines, businessmen—and attention was drawn to the somewhat patrician character of the founders and to their close relationships with each other. In the early days, the community of interest and the close interaction of such figures as Latham, Eggleston, Dyason, Harrison Moore and Scott in Melbourne, Charteris, Bavin, Roberts, Davidson and Boyer in Sydney, A.C.V. Melbourne in Brisbane and Garran in Canberra, gave a certain stamp to the organisation and made it an important part of the intellectual life of those cities. The standing of some of these figures gave them a considerable degree of influence in governmental circles, an influence that was especially effective when the official world was smaller and more intimate. Nevertheless, a later observer might wonder whether the picture of a tightly-knit and influential body has not been exaggerated. It is a natural tendency to look back to the giants of the past and to cast a romantic glow over the work of the Institute in its early days. Some later members, who themselves came in due course to attain elder statesmen status in the Institute, have tended to see the 1920s and 1930s as the great days of the organisation, forgetting that not every member even then was an Eggleston or a Latham, a Charteris or a Bavin. Professor Macmahon Ball was one who, in the 1960s, was apt to deplore what he saw as a decline in the quality of membership from the good old days before World War II, not noticing that, to his juniors, he was a figure of comparable magnitude to the earlier members. Professor Ian Clunies Ross also
confessed to a similar feeling—that the current generation of people in high office was of lesser stature than its predecessors—but he had an answer. When he was young he had looked up to such people but now those positions were occupied by his contemporaries, by people he had grown up with, or who were his juniors or even former students.1

In attempting to assess such perceptions much must depend on whether one is thinking of the more prominent members of the early Institute or of the rank and file of members. Appendix A, listing those who were members of the newly formed Australian Institute of International Affairs in 1934, shows a broad range of types, many of whom would be comparable with the general membership of branches at the time of writing. And, conversely, prominent names continue to be found amongst later members. Perhaps, however, there was then a thicker sprinkling of people who could be described as leaders of their professions than has been the case in more recent decades. In the smaller Australian world of the 1920s and 1930s some of the genuinely prominent figures of the time do seem to have demonstrated a greater commitment to the Institute and to have played a more active part in its affairs than have their later counterparts. For many the Institute provided an important focal point for the discussion of public questions. There were then fewer competing organisations in the area of public including international, affairs and, for specialist students of history and politics, fewer professional bodies through which their concerns could be expressed. Perhaps for those reasons a significant number of senior members made the Institute a major interest and gave time and effort to it. This was true, for example, of Eggleston, Davidson, Cowper, Charteris, Bavin, Boyer, Phillips, Wood and others. It was also true, a little later, of Stock, Packer, Ball and others. Such individuals did research for it, wrote for it, and for those who were university teachers, encouraged their students to join. R.L. Stock, for example, came to the Institute through the influence of Macmahon Ball. Others were drawn to it by Norman Harper and by Gordon Greenwood.

As the Institute became established, and grew in numbers, it attracted a broader membership and, in the changing circumstances of the times, these were necessarily less influential than their predecessors, less likely to have the ear of policy makers and, in many cases, less qualified. In the 1930s, the Australian Institute, following the example of the Royal Institute, had led to the ideal that it should be a forum for the expression of expert opinion—or at least informed opinion—rather than a more general ‘public opinion’. Reference has already been made to Latham’s sense of the original meeting at the Hotel Majestic in Paris—that only persons capable of making original contributions should be eligible for membership.2 An ‘original’ contribution set the standard high, and that ideal was never maintained either by Chatham House or its Australian

1 Recollections of Miss N. Dickins.
2 See above, chapter 2.
affiliate. But an informed membership or, at the very least, a membership with a genuine and a serious interest in international affairs was a possible and more modest goal. And for many, including younger members drawn from the ranks of the rapidly expanding universities in the early postwar years, the Institute offered a framework within which they could do things—argue their views in a systematic way, extend their intellectual contacts, participate in the meetings and publication programs of the branches and, in general, have a sense of playing an active part in the shaping of attitudes on major questions.

After the war all branches made an effort to attract a larger membership and met with some success. In 1934, immediately after the formation of an Australian Institute of International Affairs, total membership of the three founding branches, NSW, Victoria and Queensland, was 118 (NSW, 53, Victoria, 60 and Queensland, 5). At the end of the decade, though exact figures are not available, the number had risen to approximately 600. After the war, though numbers tended to fluctuate as a result of occasional membership drives, the negative effect of subscription increases and the positive effect of popular public lectures or conferences (the Dyason Lectures, in particular, drew the existence of the Institute to public attention, and attracted new members) there was a steady increase, the total figure quadrupling by 1975.

Corporate membership increased also. In seeking the support of business interests the Australian Institute followed the model set by Chatham House, though necessarily at a more modest level. In 1948, the Royal Institute drew nearly a third of its total income—£31 000 out of £96 000—from 250 corporate subscribers. In Australia, as already noticed, the attempt to raise additional funds in 1948 in order to match the grant of the Carnegie Corporation was based in part on the search for additional support from business concerns whose subscriptions represented, in effect, donations to the Institute. This was again a feature of the subsequent appeals in 1962 and 1972. Corporate members were recruited primarily at the branch rather than the national level, but their subscriptions contributed to the work of the Institute as a whole. By 1975, the corporate total reached 133, distributed amongst all branches. (By far the greatest number were to be found in Victoria which, after the 1972 appeal, had raised its corporate membership from 52 to 69. The number later peaked at 93, but has since dropped sharply to 10!) Though figures of ordinary membership are not available for every year, the following give a fairly clear picture.

3 See Appendix A.
4 Figures based on calculations made by Nance Dickins.
6 The figures for 1947–75 were calculated by Miss Dickins on the basis of distribution figures of The Australian Outlook which was supplied to ordinary members as part of their membership subscription.
These were not massive numbers, but the Institute did not aim at anything approaching a mass membership. Even when actively seeking to attract a wider constituency, branches required applicants for membership to be nominated and seconded by existing members. Branch councils, in considering those applications, did look for evidence of some ability to contribute to the study of international affairs either in academic qualifications or in some relevant experience. As the years passed, that scrutiny became less rigorous and increasingly a matter of form. This trend was noted by the Commonwealth Council which changed its rules to conform to changing practice. In 1972, it reaffirmed its view that 'The Institute could not and should not become a mass organisation' but recognised that there was considerable scope for expanding membership 'within the present framework of academics, businessmen, professional people, teachers and others with an interest in international affairs'. The meeting went on to propose that the only criterion for membership should be 'an interest in international affairs'. In the following year the Council approved 'an interest in international affairs' as the only criterion for membership. The rationale behind the decision, expressed in a somewhat patronising way, was that, while some members, by reason of their professional qualifications or experience, might have more to contribute than others, those with merely 'an interest' in international affairs still had a function to perform, making use of information gained through Institute meetings in discussions with their colleagues and others.

In one respect the expansion in the size of the Institute in the postwar years brought it up against an original Chatham House restriction: that which limited membership of the Royal Institute, and of affiliated bodies like the Australian Institute, to British subjects. (It will be remembered that this was an issue in Victoria in the 1920s when the fact that some members of the Victorian IPR Group were not British subjects prevented an easy amalgamation of the IPR Group with the Victorian Branch of the RIIA.) The restriction was originally part of the British Institute’s perception of itself as an elite group of informed people, able to have frank discussions of international matters at a high level. It was felt that, if

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7 Minutes of Special Meeting of the Commonwealth Executive and the Commonwealth Council, 27 March 1972. The emphasis placed on 'interest' is in the minute.
10 See above, chapter 2.
other nationals were present at Chatham House meetings, frank exchanges would have been impossible. The rule also gave some protection to speakers of other nationalities who were able to express views knowing that nobody from their own country would be present. With the transformation of the British Empire into the British Commonwealth, the Royal Institute modified the restriction to allow British Commonwealth citizens to become members and the AIIA followed suit. This proved, however, to be an insufficient relaxation. As migrants from Europe and later from Asia came to form part of the Australian population there was pressure for further liberalisation. The expanded immigration of the post World War II period had indeed changed the patterns of Australian society, affecting many features of life from cuisine through art, literature and scholarship, to the population make up of Australian cities. The Institute’s response to these developments may have been slow and indirect but by the 1960s the sense of the Australian Institute as being an extension of Chatham House had faded and the time had come to recognise that. In 1952, the NSW Branch had proposed a category of ‘visiting membership’, to be open to non-British subjects, who could attend meetings but who would not have voting rights or be entitled to the reciprocal rights offered by Chatham House. At the time this was strongly opposed by the South Australian and Victorian Branches and the proposal lapsed. The matter remained, however, on the agenda of the Commonwealth Council and was discussed from time to time. Eventually, in 1966, Dr Millar again brought the question to a head. He argued to the Council that the time had come when the Institute should have some form of membership for persons who were not British subjects or citizens of a Commonwealth country but who were permanent residents of Australia and who were considered to be worthy of membership. He therefore proposed the establishment of a category of ‘associate members’ to cover such persons.

This compromise proposal was based on the practice of the Canadian Institute which, because of its proximity to the United States and the number of American companies operating in Canada, wished to make provision for Americans normally resident in Canada to become associate members, enjoying the right to attend meetings and other privileges of

12 Commonwealth Council Minutes, 17 March 1956. The Chatham House provision stated that ‘Members of the Institute shall be confined to British subjects or Commonwealth citizens and to the Rulers and Subjects of States and Territories in permanent connection with the British Commonwealth and Empire as the Council may from time to time determine.’ The Australian Institute’s amended Article provided that members must be ‘British subjects or Commonwealth citizens’.
13 Commonwealth Council, August 1952.
membership, but without the right to vote. After some discussion the Commonwealth Council went a little beyond the Canadian compromise by agreeing in principle to make provision for branches to admit 'to full or associate membership' persons who were not British subjects or Commonwealth citizens. The proposal was referred to branches which considered the matter during the course of the year. Finally, at the Council meeting of 4 August 1967, it was decided that membership of the Institute be confined to British subjects or Commonwealth citizens, bodies incorporated according to the laws of any State or Territory of Australia and 'such other persons who are normally resident in Australia who by reason of their special qualifications or other special circumstances are accepted by a three-fourths majority of the Council present'. (It was accepted that, because of the different rules of the Royal Institute, persons admitted under the terms of this resolution would not necessarily have visiting rights at Chatham House.) This decision allowed sufficient latitude to meet the needs of changing circumstances and it was embodied in the 'Common Practices and Procedures' of the Institute, adopted in 1973 which, in effect, conflated the two questions—that of the general qualification for membership and the question of foreign nationals—in the simplified provision that membership of branches should be available to any individual who has been nominated by two Branch members and approved by a majority of the Branch Council who is 'normally resident in Australia, [and] who has an interest in the work of the Institute'.

In this somewhat protracted discussion the attitude of the Department of External Affairs was expressed through some of its members who were members of the Canberra Branch. In 1966, that Branch held the view that unless the private character of Branch meetings was retained, and unless membership was limited to Commonwealth citizens, officers of the Department who were members of the Branch would not feel free to take part in frank discussions of international problems. The private character of meetings would be lost, it was argued, if official representatives of foreign countries could be admitted. But within a few years the Canberra Branch had come to see virtues in a non-restrictive membership structure.

There were changes over time not only in the membership of the Institute but also in the environment in which it was working which affected its perceptions of its past and modified the kind of contribution it could make in the present. The growth in the complexity of public affairs, the transfer of the apparatus of government to the national capital, the gradual expansion of the federal public service and, as far as foreign policy was concerned, the re-establishment of the Department of External Affairs and the development within it of professional expertise of a kind which might, on occasion, find stimulus from contact with unofficial opinion but, for the most part, was increasingly self-sufficient and

detached from outside influence, all combined to reduce the sort of impact that a body like the Institute had made in the cosier world of the past.

There was professionalism, too, in the expansion of the academic study of international affairs. In the 1930s, the study of 'political science' was normally carried out within University departments of History or Philosophy rather than in free-standing departments of Politics or Political Science, and was devoted to a study of domestic political institutions and political philosophy rather than to a study of international relations. Macmahon Ball’s course in modern political institutions, taught within the Melbourne University’s Department of History and Political Science, was unusual in having an international relations component. In the postwar situation, international relations in some form or other was a regular offering within separate political science departments and, in the case of the Australian National University, was established as a separate department within the Research School of Pacific Studies. As part of the same postwar scene was the emphasis within universities on the study of Asia which took place in departments of History, Anthropology, Economics and Language, in some area studies departments such as the Departments of Indonesian Studies established in the 1950s in the Universities of Sydney and Melbourne and Canberra University College and in Monash University’s Centre of Southeast Asian Studies established in 1964. The development of new professional associations—the Australasian Political Studies Association and the Asian Studies Association of Australia, in particular—also provided, through conferences and publications, a visible international affairs community.

Many members of these new academic enterprises were active members of the AIIA, and indeed provided a good deal of the muscle of the Institute’s expanding research program in the 1960s and 1970s. And we have already noted the direct support given by the Australian National University to the Institute when it played host to the AIIA’s Director and when, for two periods, it permitted members of its Department of International Relations to serve part time as Directors of the Institute. In these ways the development of a new reservoir of expertise strengthened the Institute. In another way, however, the professional academic study of international affairs reduced the distinctiveness of the Institute as a body concerned with the study of the international scene, though its role in promoting public discussion and in providing an avenue of public education remained very much its own. Indeed, it could be said that it has been precisely the non-professional nature of the Institute, and the presence within it of a variety of occupations and interests, which distinguished it from academic, professional or business groups and helped to give it a special character and a special role as a forum for the exploration and discussion of the international scene.

The postwar expansion of Institute membership certainly brought vitality and diversity to the branches and gave them a base for sustained activity at the local level.
Attention has already been drawn to a prevalent view within the Institute that, even after the appointment of a Director, the establishment of a national headquarters and, eventually the acquisition of a headquarters building, the main activities of the organisation—meetings, public lectures, educational initiatives and to some extent even the research programs—have been carried out at branch level. It was at that level that members knew each other, saw each other regularly at meetings and played a direct role as Institute members in the communities about them. The headquarters function was largely a coordinating one, though in some areas—the production of The Australian Outlook, the management of the publications program, the planning and organisation of national conferences and the development and maintenance of international links—it had its own agenda and could take its own initiatives.

These remarks point to a further important difference between the Institute and the newer specialist organisations. With such bodies as the Asian Studies Association of Australia or the Australasian Political Studies Association the structure was unitary, not federal, and the emphasis was much more firmly placed at the national rather than the branch level. The organisation of these bodies was much more like the arrangement Molly Kingston had in mind in her suggested reconstruction of the Institute in 1946.\(^\text{15}\) As the ASAA and APSA were primarily professional organisations, their members were largely engaged in university teaching, school teaching or research. They needed no state branches to maintain their engagement and indeed, though there were local activities from time to time, the idea of a branch as the main manifestation of the organisation would have meant more meetings to attend and would have represented a distraction. They found their regular and continuing contacts amongst their colleagues. The AIIA, by contrast, attracted a different constituency and for many of its members the activities of the branch constituted the primary attraction of membership. Occasional conferences, the receipt of the Outlook and the ability to purchase other publications—all national activities—were added benefits, but not the principal reason for belonging.

One could envisage changes to these perceptions in the mid 1990s, as more emphasis was placed on the importance of a national role for the Institute and as some branches had difficulty in maintaining membership levels and in providing an active program.

Notwithstanding the developments that have been outlined—the increase in the number of members, and the growth of a more broadly based constituency within each branch, and the possible decline in the proportion of prominent figures ready to give time and energy to Institute activities—it would seem that the general character of Institute membership has not changed dramatically over the years. Short of a thorough-going analysis of members at different times a conclusion must be, to a

\(^{15}\) See above, chapter 4.
considerable extent, impressionistic, but surveys carried out by the former Commonwealth Secretary suggest that categories of membership have remained fairly stable. A survey of the 1946 membership of the Victorian Branch identified fourteen categories: business/accounting; home duties and voluntary work; secretaries, librarians and people in administrative positions; politicians; school teachers; farmers and graziers; university and other tertiary academic staff; medical, science and engineering; journalists, writers and publishers; ministers of religion; public servants; armed services; lawyers; students. The latter tended to join for a short period when preparing for Higher School Certificate studies. Of the remainder the larger categories were business (29), home duties and voluntary work (22) and academics (24). Later surveys suggested that these proportions remained fairly stable.\(^\text{16}\)

There were possibly some differences from branch to branch but these, too, are not easy to document. Townsville had been founded by members of James Cook University and had a predominantly academic membership. Canberra had a large university and public service membership and, in the circumstances of the capital, this was a particularly fruitful combination. South Australia had a much lower academic membership and prided itself on the strong business participation in the work of the Branch.\(^\text{17}\) The larger branches, NSW and Victoria, had a broader mix.

There were also differences from time to time in the part played by different constituencies in the activities of branches and the national organisation. If the 1920s and 1930s were the days of 'men of affairs', and the 1940s and 1950s were a period of pragmatic consolidation and reorganisation of the national body, the 1960s were a time of greater academic leadership expressed especially in the work of Norman Harper of the Victorian Branch and Gordon Greenwood of the Queensland Branch.

Norman Harper, Senior History Master at Melbourne Boys' High, as it then was, had moved to a Lectureship in History at the University in 1940, bringing with him the meticulously prepared notes he had used in the teaching of Ancient History at the secondary level.\(^\text{18}\) At the University his scholarly interests moved to nineteenth and twentieth century history and he pioneered the introduction of some east Asian and south Asian content in the course of teaching in this area. He later established himself in the field of American History and was appointed to a Chair of American

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\(^{16}\) Later surveys were based on retirement figures over a period. Notes prepared by Nance Dickins, and held at Dyason House.

\(^{17}\) Commonwealth Council, 15 August 1975. Mr Fry, the South Australian representative, in responding to a remark of the Director, Dr Millar, that the Institute was looked on by people outside it as an organisation of academics for academics, pointed out that the South Australian Branch was 90 per cent non-academic.

\(^{18}\) Before 1940, Norman Harper had combined a part time lectureship at the University with his work at Melbourne High.
History in 1966. For a time he was well known as an ABC commentator on international affairs. Gordon Greenwood, a graduate of the Universities of Sydney and London, was appointed, after a period as a member of the Sydney Department of History, to the Chair of History and Political Science in the University of Queensland in 1949. He gave his department a strong international affairs emphasis and, as a vehicle for that, he launched the *Australian Journal of Politics and History* in 1955. He published the first volume of a general survey of European expansion, *The Modern World: A History of Our Time*, in 1964. A vigorous head of department he was also a convivial figure and was never happier than when breasting the bar with colleagues at the end of the day. In the 1950s and 1960s, these two appeared almost to alternate in the positions of President and Chairman of the Research Committee of the AIIA. The Institute, indeed, constituted for both of them a major interest. They enjoyed running it, they worked hard at it and they worked closely together. They deserve most of the credit for the negotiation of the first Ford Grant and for the administration of the initial stages of the research carried out under it. The appointment of a Director in 1963 added a new dimension to the administration of the Institute, but the strong academic presence continued under the Presidency of Professor T. Stapleton (NSW Branch), 1970–72, and the Research Chairmanships of Brian Beddie, 1965–68 and 1970–71, Hedley Bull, 1968–70 and 1972–73, John Legge, 1973–78, Victor Prescott, 1978–85, Jim Angel, 1985–88, Tony Milner, 1988–92, Stephen Henningham, 1992–95, Ron May, 1995 and John Ravenhill, from 1995 to the present. Academic links had, of course, been strengthened earlier by the fact that the second Director, Dr T.B. Millar, continued to hold his University position during his period of office.

After 1972, the long Presidency of Sir Garfield Barwick marked a move towards the creation of a more prominent public image for the Institute and in due course this was carried forward by the election to the Presidency of distinguished business figures in Sir Russel Madigan, Mr Bob White and Mr Richard Searby, all of whom came to the position from outside the Institute rather than from within its ranks as was the case with the Presidents of the 1950s and 1960s.

This attempt to discern successive periods, however, remains impressionistic, and it would seem that, as far as the character of the broad body of members was concerned, this has not altered significantly. How far there were changes over the period in the Institute’s objectives and in its perception of its role will be examined in the next chapter.

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19 Professor Harper was Research Chairman in 1949–50 and 1961–65, and President in 1965–70. Professor Greenwood was Research Chairman from 1952 to 1961 and President from 1961 to 1965.
The goals of the Institute, and the kind of influence it might hope to exert in the community at large, have been the subject of some soul-searching in the deliberative bodies of the organisation from time to time. Should it seek directly to affect the formation of official policy? Should it aim at a consultative role, performing research and related services for government or private business? Or should its role be more indirect—the provision of a forum for unofficial debate and the creation of a better informed public? The provisions of its constitution, which prevented it, as an organisation, from holding or expressing any opinion on any aspect of international affairs would seem to rule out the first of these possible goals, quite apart from the practical difficulty of reaching any agreed position on any issues of policy. The lack of adequate financial resources places the second beyond its reach. The third possibility, of course, left open the question of how positive the Institute should be in promoting enquiry and discussion, and the extent to which its activities might command attention, change attitudes and perhaps affect, in an indirect way, the formulation of foreign policy.

Questions of this kind were the subject of discussion at a special joint meeting of the Commonwealth Executive and the Commonwealth Council in 1972. On that occasion the Institute’s purpose was defined as ‘to stimulate interest in, discussion of, and understanding of international affairs and foreign policy, both among its members and the general public’. In the subsequent discussion, one member expressed the view that the aims of creating an informed public opinion, and consequently a

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1 Minutes of Special Joint Meeting of the Executive Committee and the Commonwealth Council, 27 March 1972.
more intelligent debate about foreign policy, 'necessarily implied an objective on the part of the Institute of influencing the formation of foreign policy'. The meeting as a whole, however, took a different view—'that there was no such implication and no such intention: the Institute must hope that better public debate would lead to better policy, but not to particular policies'.

A consideration of these questions, and of how effectively the Institute has performed over the years in pursuing the goals it has set itself, raises once more an issue that has surfaced several times in the preceding pages: the question of whether the Institute should be seen primarily as a national organisation with the state and regional branches operating within that structure or whether the branches should be seen as the principal level of activity, with the national body—the Commonwealth Council or Annual General Meeting, the National Executive and the Research Committee—performing a limited coordinating role. This is partly a constitutional matter. As a federal organisation, with the Annual General Meeting representing the branches (the 'members' of the Institute under the Articles of Association as described in chapter 7), the ultimate authority rested, in the last analysis, with the branches. But it was also a question of practical substance. As one observer has remarked, 'A federal or branch structure was an important feature at the time of establishment in building a strong membership and support base.'

This was especially an issue after the creation of a Directorate and the establishment of a national headquarters. To what extent did branch activities depend on the guidance and stimulus of the Directorate and the National Executive? To what extent could it be said that the life of the Institute, as a matter of regular practice rather than of constitutional structure, lay in the work of the branches?

One cannot give a precise or quantitative answer to these questions. Obviously both central and local activities have had their part to play and the present history, in focusing on the national organisation, is very conscious that it has been dealing with only a fraction of the Institute's work. It has not been possible here to give an account of the history of each branch, but in addressing the question of the influence of the Institute some sort of judgement has to be made, even if only in impressionistic terms, of the ways in which Institute activities and discussions have had an impact in the political and official circles responsible for the formulation of national policies and of the effect of those activities and discussions in shaping public attitudes more generally about the world and about Australia's place in it.

2 ibid.

3 Diane Stone, 'A Think Tank in Evolution or Decline? The Australian Institute of International Affairs in Comparative Perspective', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 50, no. 2 (July 1996) p. 125.
The first of these areas of influence might seem to be properly the province of the national body and the second might appear to be the specific function of the branches. But such a neat division of responsibilities is too simple. The research activities of the Institute, for example, so central to the carrying out of its educational role, were conducted both at branch and national levels. Before the formation of an Australian Institute of International Affairs in 1933, the individual Chatham House branches in Sydney and Melbourne, in close conjunction with the IPR Groups in those cities, were entirely responsible for the conduct of a research program. It was their members who formed study groups for the exploration of particular problems and who prepared the extensive data papers for IPR and BCR conferences. In due course, with the foundation of The Australian Outlook and the launching of a coherent research program under the two Ford grants, the national body assumed the major responsibility for research and publication. But even then, the branches, as we have seen, maintained their own periodicals and occasional paper series and, of course, those who participated in the national research programs were members of local branches. Similarly, though the maintenance of links with government and bureaucracy may have appeared to be a responsibility of the national Directorate, individual members of branches had their own official contacts and exerted their own influence. The roles of centre and branches were closely interlinked.

Before 1933, individual members of the Melbourne and Sydney groups kept contact with each other and made their views known, individually or collectively, without feeling any urgent need for a national body. After 1933, the regular meetings of the Commonwealth Council enabled those contacts to be maintained more formally and those meetings were the point at which branch activities and national projects came naturally together. In the 1930s, the preparation for successive IPR and BCR conferences were matters of national concern and this was, of course, especially so in the run up to the BCR conference at Lapstone in 1938. The appointment of an executive officer and the deliberate steps taken to form new branches in the 1940s were again the result of joint planning by the existing branches. The branches participated directly in the planning of the Dyason lectures in the 1950s, both in proposing lists of possible lecturers and in making the local arrangements for individual visits. And in the 1960s, the preparation of the Ford submissions, the decision to appoint a Director and the selection of the incumbent were questions on which representatives of the branches, meeting in Melbourne, Sydney or Canberra, played their part in discussion and in the making of decisions. In this way there developed over the years well established conventions of deliberation which enabled branches to maintain contact with each other and, through the Commonwealth Council, to reach collective decisions and to develop an agreed national role which was a continuing element in official and unofficial consideration of foreign policy issues.
The Institute’s impact no doubt fluctuated over the years. Leaving aside the intimate contacts of some of the senior members of the RIIA branches in Sydney and Melbourne with governmental circles in the 1920s, there developed after 1935 an easy informal relationship between AIIA members and officials of the newly-reconstituted Department of External Affairs, some of whom were themselves Institute members. W.D. Forsyth, the Institute’s Research Officer in 1938, and then a member of the Department of External Affairs from 1942 until his retirement in 1969, recalled the warmth of those contacts in an article for *Australian Outlook* in 1974. At the time of his appointment as Research Officer, he worked on the *Austral-Asiatic Bulletin*, preparing a survey of western Pacific news for publication in the *Bulletin* and writing some background papers on matters of general interest, the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina amongst others, in the course of which he had contact with other members such as Trevor Pyman, who was subsequently to be a colleague in the Department and Kenneth Bailey, then Solicitor General, with whom, in 1945, he was to prepare for Dr Evatt a paper on the future of the colonial system and in 1946 a draft of the Trusteeship Agreement for New Guinea. In the Australian delegation to the San Francisco Conference were a number of Institute members: Eggleston, Macmahon Ball and Bailey as well as Forsyth himself. And, of course, Latham, Eggleston, Copland, Bailey and Ball all held diplomatic positions in the 1940s—Latham in Tokyo, Eggleston in Chungking, Copland in China and Canada, Bailey in Canada and Ball as British Commonwealth representative on the Allied Council for Japan.

Wartime circumstances were especially favourable to that closeness of cooperation between official and non-official circles as use was made by Government of scarce intellectual resources and as individuals crossed easily from non-official to official roles; but the foundations had been laid earlier. For Forsyth, ‘much of the definition of Australia’s place in the world that has emerged more clearly in this generation derived from [the] serious, though rarely solemn, mutual inter-changes’ that took place within the Institute in its early days. In the postwar situation, and especially with the expansion and professional development of Australia’s diplomatic service, the interaction was less close, though it continued in some degree. During the days of IPR and BCR conferences, the Department was concerned to obtain copies of Australian data papers for its own use and for distribution to its overseas posts. The appointment of an Institute member as an observer at the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in 1947 has already been mentioned. There were other links, especially in the Canberra Branch of the Institute which had a higher proportion of members drawn from the Department. This was reinforced during Dr

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5 Commonwealth Council, 5 March 1945. Also recollection of Miss Dickins.
Millar’s period as Director, through the ‘Foreign Affairs Club’, in which distinguished overseas visitors were invited to speak to a private and limited gathering, held under Institute auspices and consisting of senior officials, parliamentarians interested in foreign affairs and professional people, including press representatives. The one requirement for membership of the Club was membership of the Canberra or some other Branch of the Institute.6 The occasional use of an Institute member as an ‘academic in residence’ in the Department, a position filled by Dr Millar for a time, was another mode of interaction. Many of the new diplomatic cadets recruited to the Department had been students of academic members of the Institute and did not altogether lose contact with their academic roots. And after 1963, the occasional appointment of former diplomats to the position of Director of the Institute—Alan Watt, Jim McIntyre and Ralph Harry—provided ready lines of communication.

In the early 1960s there was some discussion in the Institute about the possibility of developing some kind of continuing special relationship with the Department. In 1962, Norman Harper wrote to former Dyason Lecturer, Kenneth Younger, now Director of Studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, asking him about Chatham House’s relationship with the Foreign Office. Younger replied, saying, ‘Our relations with the Foreign Office are quite straightforward and not, I think, particularly delicate to discuss.’ As he described it, it appears to have been an effective informal relationship. Chatham House would not expect to see classified material but its senior members might receive confidential briefings from officials ‘for background information only and not for quotation’. Officials also participated on occasion in Chatham House study groups. They would use their discretion about what they might say indicating ‘whether we are going off the rails’. Harper passed this letter on to Ralph Harry, still a Member of External Affairs but also President of the Canberra Branch of the Institute, suggesting a similar kind of association in research and preparation of data papers. Harry, in turn, and wearing his Institute hat, raised the question of cooperation in a personal letter to the Secretary of the Department, Arthur Tange. The matter was discussed within the Department and received some favourable comment mixed with some doubts. The Department’s historian, J.S. Cumpston, conceded that Institute research could be of value to the Department but warned of the difficulties facing even informal Departmental cooperation with the Institute. Public servants, he pointed out, could only supply information from official sources at their peril. ‘Any promise of cooperation on an unofficial basis is quite improper.’ As a minimal proposal, Harry’s letter to Tange urged that members of the Department might be encouraged to join the Canberra Branch of the Institute and asked him to give a lead by doing so himself. In particular, he argued that the Institute

6 See above, chapter 7.
‘provides “neutral ground” for meetings with the Australian National University, and could do this more effectively if it included in its membership, and indeed among its Office Bearers, a greater number of senior officers’. 7

There appears to have been no very specific outcome from these exchanges and perhaps none was to be expected. There was some general discussion of the question at a Council meeting in August 1962, but the Council referred to ‘the satisfactory informal relations which already exist between prominent members of the Institute and senior members of the Department of External Affairs’ and noted that these could, perhaps, be strengthened ‘along the lines of the informal co-operation existing between Chatham House and members of the Foreign Office’. 8 The informality of the relationship continued and, at times, when particular issues were the subject of public concern, there might be close discussion between Institute members and members of the Department. This was the case, for example, during Indonesia’s ‘Confrontation’ of Malaysia in 1963, when Departmental officers took an active part in discussions with academics, journalists and others at a series of seminars held under the Chatham House rule at Monash University, and when there was contact, too, at Embassy level in Jakarta with Institute members visiting Indonesia in the course of research into aspects of current Indonesian politics.

After the formation of the Directorate there continued to be some reconsideration of the Institute’s role and some heart-searching about whether it was fulfilling it adequately. Tom Millar, at the end of his period of office as Director, gave fresh consideration to these questions in a paper designed to stimulate discussion on the Council. He argued that there should be a much larger membership and envisaged it establishing itself not only in the major centres of population but in smaller country towns, in much the same way as Rotary operated. He recommended departing more frequently from the practice of private meetings held under the Chatham House rule and the opening of most meetings to a wider public. (This recommendation has, since then, won gradual acceptance and the Chatham House rule is now rarely applied.) And he had a number of ambitious suggestions to make—a visiting Institute fellowship, for example, or the production of a regular current affairs report enabling in-depth coverage of events of importance to Australia—but recognised that funds did not permit their implementation. In general, however, he defended the lecture format which represented the staple fare of the branches and the existing mix of goals whereby the Institute sought on the

7 Part of this correspondence is in Stephen House Papers in a file labelled ‘Canberra Branch’. The letter from Harper to Younger, 13 June 1962, is not on the file but Younger’s reply, 21 June 1962, is there together with Harper to Harry, 25 September 1962, Cumpston to Harry, 9 October 1962 and Harry to Tange, 25 May 1963.

one hand to provide a forum for professional and informed discussion of international affairs and, on the other, to maintain a broader public education program. A later Director, Dr Richard Higgott, struck much the same note in 1989 when, as we have noticed, he spoke of the Institute needing ‘reform, not revolution’ and added that its aim should be to play a ‘modest but not inconsequential’ role.

Discussion of this kind continued from time to time. Reference has been made to the proposals made, in particular, by the President of the Victorian Branch, Andrew Farran, in 1987, that the Institute needed a new style of publication to reach out beyond the readership at which the more academic Australian Outlook was aimed. Though circumstances prevented the adoption of that proposal it remained in the minds of members of the Research Committee and the Commonwealth Council, and figured in later considerations of the Institute’s role. At the same time, however, it was necessary for the Institute to recognise that its ability to play that more visible role was necessarily affected—and indeed reduced—by the changes already noticed in the environment within which it was working. The expansion of the academic study of the international scene, conducted not only in university departments of politics and the ANU’s Department of International Relations but in special centres such as the ANU’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre and its Peace Research Centre, the Division of Asian and International Studies at Griffith and others, reduced the distinctiveness of the part the Institute could play. Such bodies as the Asian Studies Association of Australia, too, provide a forum for the expert probing of the problems of the region. And the expansion and expertise of the professional bureaucracy gave Government itself its own unmatched sources of expertise. These developments, while not removing the importance of the contribution that might be made by a separate and independent body like the Institute, certainly contributed to its sense of marginalisation.

In the 1990s, the concerns of the Institute about its future appeared to acquire a more urgent tone as some members expressed a feeling that the organisation was in need of some kind of major renewal. We have noticed the concern of Mr Garry Woodard, as President in 1992, that the Institute was perceived in Canberra as of limited relevance. A little later Mr James Ingram, in his Director’s Report to the Annual General Meeting, referred to the decline in branch membership over the last fifteen or twenty years and remarked: ‘Outsiders tend to think of the Institute as a club of older people who are interested in foreign affairs. They do not see

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9 A version of this paper appeared in Australian Outlook, vol. 30, no. 1 (April 1976).
it as a body which affects policy. The Institute was in fact in decline.  
An outside observer expressed a similar view. In an article for the *Australian Journal of Political Science*, Diane Stone considered the Institute ('the venerable AIIA') as one amongst other 'independent policy planning institutes' or 'think tanks' and, judged in those terms, she doubted its contemporary relevance.

When established it had no competitors. Indeed, a federal department addressing foreign policy did not yet exist. It consequently filled a gap by providing a forum for the discussion and analysis of Australia's external interests. Since the 1970s, however, the institute's role has diminished with the growing policy strength of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade...and the growth of International Relations as an academic discipline.13

She went on to refer to its dispersed federal structure, its slender resources, the federal directorship—'an unpaid, part time position subject to rapid turnover, promoting a directionless course for the Institute'—and the ""stuffy"" establishment image compounded by the age of its membership'.14

Institute members may be able, ruefully, to recognise their organisation in such a description. But certain points can be made by way of rejoinder. It may be wondered whether the notion of a 'think tank' is appropriate for the role that the Institute has played or has sought to play over the years. In Dr Stone's view, 'The AIIA is out of step with an increasingly ideological mode of policy discourse that makes no pretence to value neutrality.'15 'Out of step with' carries its own value judgements, and raises the question: who is out of step with whom? A think tank, it would seem, is an organisation with a staff engaged in research, often within a particular ideological framework and often concerned to reach particular policy conclusions. Certainly there have been voices that have argued for such a role from time to time and have considered ways and means of securing the funds which could sustain the Institute as a significant 'think tank'. This has never been the dominant view, however. The AIIA's charter, expressly forbidding the expression of opinion on any aspect of international affairs, in itself rules out any attempt to seek agreement about foreign policy. This choice was made at the time of the Institute's foundation and if it involves having a lower profile than, say the Institute of Public Affairs, the Sydney Institute or the Tasman Institute (examples cited by Dr Stone), so be it. And it will be apparent from what

13 Diane Stone, 'Old Guard Versus New Partisans: Think Tanks in Transition', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 26 (1991). See also Stone, 'A Think Tank in Evolution or Decline?', which focuses more directly on the AIIA and presents at greater length a further statement of the same view.
14 'Old Guard versus New Partisans'.
15 'A Think Tank in Evolution or Decline?'.

has already been said that the Institute has always valued the diversity of opinion to be found within its ranks and has recognised the damage to its aims that would follow any attempt to persuade it, as a body, to reach conclusions or to lobby for the adoption of particular policies. It may be argued, further, that this detachment is precisely what has given the Institute its standing, such as it is.

Dr Stone, in effect, casts the Institute in a role which it has never claimed to perform and then criticises it for not performing it effectively. Taking it on its own terms, perhaps the record is a good deal more substantial than she suggests. Dr Higgott’s words, ‘modest but not incon­sequential’, would seem to be a fair enough description of its influence. Its contributions to the tasks of ‘second track diplomacy’, as illustrated in the Australia–Japan colloquia or the establishment of links with the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, its administration of the Special Visitors Scheme, the success of its Visitor’s workshops and, of course, the continuing publication of the major Australian journal dealing with foreign affairs, are all part of what might be called a ‘national role’, as distinct from the meetings, discussions and other programs conducted at branch level. The interaction with the Department which formed part of that role, and which was illustrated in 1985 when the Canberra Branch provided a forum in which members of the Department could discuss organisational matters with a select group of outside people, reflected the kind of informal relationship which Norman Harper and Ralph Harry had sought in 1962.

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that, in the 1990s, there is a sense of being at some kind of crossroads, and a concern about how the Institute can adapt to the changed circumstances of the present. Successive Presidents from Sir Garfield Barwick to Richard Searby have been concerned to raise the Institute’s profile and there have been consequential, though gradual, changes in the way the organisation has conducted its affairs. These were changes of practice and convention rather than formal constitutional changes. Their character have been touched on already but they are worth further consideration since they will bear on the way the Institute responds to the needs of the future.

Until the establishment of a physical headquarters it was the custom to rotate Council, Executive and Research Committee meetings between NSW, Victoria and Canberra. The meetings would be held in turn at the Sydney headquarters, then in Rennie Street, Paddington, at Dyason House in Melbourne and in a seminar room in the Coombs Building at the Australian National University. The pattern was for the Research Committee and the Executive to meet on a Friday afternoon and evening and for the Council to convene on Saturday morning and continue until plane time at the end of the afternoon. At Council meetings, though each branch had only one vote, it was open to up to five additional members of each branch to attend and, by convention, to speak, propose motions and generally to take a full part in discussion. It would normally be only the
members of the host branch at each meeting who would be in a position to avail themselves of the opportunity to attend, but occasionally members of other branches might be in, say, Canberra, Melbourne or Sydney at the time of a Council meeting and be free to be present. Counting office bearers, voting members (usually the President of each branch) and additional members, a Council meeting might have an attendance of twenty or twenty-five people.

The rotation of meeting places meant that members of the three 'metropolitan' branches had continuing contact with each other and, over time, would know the regular attendees from the other branches as well. Office bearers of all branches changed from time to time, but there was, nevertheless, considerable continuity and stability of membership as terms of office overlapped. In these circumstances, a substantial proportion of members came to know each other well, and could participate in discussion against the background of shared conventions and remembered debates at earlier meetings.

The physical setting of Council meetings contributed to that atmosphere of continuity and understanding. All members sat around the same table with no separation of voting members from the rest. This sometimes made for some crowding. While Victoria and Canberra could provide adequate space for those present to spread themselves and their papers with reasonable comfort, a Council meeting at Rennie Street, Paddington, was apt to be more than a little cramped, but that contributed, perhaps, to the good-humoured character of such meetings.

Over time there have been some shifts in the balance between branches, Commonwealth Council (=AGM) and Executive, reflecting changes in perceptions of the character and purposes of the Institute as it adjusted to changing circumstances. In some quarters there has been a feeling that, while the autonomous branches carried out their own programs in their own way, and while the Institute as a whole made its mark through the Outlook and Australia in World Affairs, through its research and publication generally, and through its program of national conferences, there was still room for the national body to establish a more visible public presence, with more popular kinds of publication and a more sharply directed research effort. Some thought ambitiously of the Institute acting as a kind of think tank, or being able to provide a consultancy type of role, of use to business and government. Such ambitions would require a greater flow of income than the Institute had commanded in the past, but it might be possible to move modestly in that direction in the first instance.

These hopes appear to have been accompanied by a strengthening in the position of the Executive as against the General Meeting and its component branches, which has been of concern to some of the older and, perhaps, more conservative members. Under the tradition of Institute government, as described above, the Executive met rarely and was conceived of as carrying out Council or General Meeting decisions and, in
some cases, making small scale decisions between Council meetings. As has been mentioned, the original wording of the Council when it set up an Executive Committee was that ‘in matters of urgency which may arise between meetings of the Council, the President, Secretary and Treasurer be empowered to take decisions, notifying branches of the decisions made’.\textsuperscript{16} The role of the President, in that context, was to preside, while policy was determined, sometimes in a ‘muddling through’ fashion, by the Council. And the custom was that Presidents would be elected from within the membership and from amongst members who had long experience of the organisation and its ways. There was a departure from that tradition when Sir Garfield Barwick accepted an invitation from the Council to become President. Sir Garfield came to the position from outside the regular activities of the Institute, but as a former distinguished Minister for External Affairs he brought considerable lustre to the office. In fact, his style fitted well with existing practice. Like his predecessors, he ‘presided’ over its affairs but he maintained for the most part a ‘hands off’ posture with regard to the day to day handling of its affairs. He did not seek to direct them. A move towards greater centralisation came later, and very gradually, as later Presidents attempted to develop a more visible role for the Institute, and as the Executive, in consequence, began to assume a more directing role. Whereas once it had served rather as a steering committee, preparing business for Commonwealth Council or Annual General Meeting, it now began to meet more frequently and to accept its position as a board of directors.\textsuperscript{17} Constitutionally that was, indeed, its function within the structure of the Institute under its Articles of Association but, as we have seen, the Institute, after the adoption of new Articles in 1969, had chosen to behave as though the Council was the board of directors. That was no more than a convention but, as such, it was not inconsistent with the Articles and, in the eyes of some, it was more suited to the consensual methods and the federal structure of the Institute. It may be that, in the changed circumstances of the 1990s, that style had become an impediment to the playing of a more positive role within the Australian community.

Visibility, higher profile, greater influence, considered as goals for the Institute at the end of the twentieth century, pose certain problems of definition. Taking as given the principle that the Institute must not be an advocate for particular policies, the ideas of visibility and influence must refer to the ability of the Institute to inform its members and the community in general through its meetings, conferences and publications.

\textsuperscript{16} Commonwealth Council, 16 and 17 August 1947.
\textsuperscript{17} With new premises in Stephen House there were changes, too, in the format of General Meetings. Instead of crowding in round the one table, the President, Treasurer and Director sit at a table facing the serried ranks of voting and other members attending the meeting. The new Executive Committee (the Board of Directors) knows what an Annual General Meeting should look like!
and its promotion of discussion about Australia's place in the world. To be influential the discussion it promotes must be seen as relevant to the issues of the day and this in turn requires, in practice, some degree of consensus within the Institute about the nature of those issues. The extent to which such a consensus exists is likely to vary from time to time, depending on the changes taking place in the international scene and on differing perceptions of those changes.

It is possible to discern, from time to time, the outlines of shared perceptions of the international system. In the 1920s, acceptance of imperial leadership combined with ideas of collective security and a belief in the possible effectiveness of the League of Nations in reconciling international differences and in resolving conflict were strong amongst the Institute's founders. And as part of that view there was, of course, universal acceptance of the international order as based on sovereign states whose dynamic centre lay in western Europe. In the 1930s, the threats to the League system posed by Japan's invasion of Manchuria and by the rise of fascism in Europe dominated Australian perceptions of the way events were tending, but to these were added a new sense of region, and a recognition of Australia's special position in the southwest Pacific and of her special interests. The world as seen in the pages of the Austral-Asiatic Bulletin was very different from that perceived in the 1920s and in many ways the discussions in those pages looked forward to the further changes to come.

Certainly World War II changed the outlines of the world order as seen from Australia as the old European empires were challenged and as new states came into being. Indeed, some analysts have offered the concept of 'decolonisation' as a paradigm for the interpretation of postwar international politics. It is argued that the international order during the high imperialism of the late nineteenth century had depended to a great extent on agreement among the European powers about the boundaries of the colonial empires. When this consensus was destroyed by the two world wars the process of decolonisation constituted a framework within which a new order emerged.\(^{18}\) This may, however, place too great an explanatory burden on the concept of 'decolonisation'. The process was complex and it may be questioned whether it was one process or many. For a time there were expectations that the new Commonwealth might provide, for its members, a significant informal grouping of nations softening the sharpness of the East-West, North-South lines of division, but, in spite of some examples (the Colombo Conference of 1950, for instance), these hopes failed to materialise in a continuing and important way. In fact, for the greater part of the postwar period it was the opposing

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18 See, for example, John Darwin, 'Decolonisation and World Politics', in David Lowe (ed.), Australia and the End of Empires (Geelong, 1996).
alignments of the Cold War which provided the general framework for debates about policy.

These debates, as we have noticed, were vigorously pursued, and were indeed, for a time, seriously divisive. Nevertheless, policy differences were not of such a fundamental character as to disturb the shared perceptions of the international scene to which reference has been made. At least there was a common language for discussion. Whether accepting the Government’s reasons for involvement in Vietnam or rejecting them, seeking recognition of Communist China or opposing it, accepting or deploring the development of the Timor occupation, discussion moved broadly within a Cold War framework. With the fall of the Berlin wall, the transformation of the USSR into the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the series of upheavals in eastern Europe the clarity of that defining framework has dissolved and it would be a rash observer who would attempt to predict a future way of envisaging the world. There would seem to be no emerging perceptions of world order comparable to those of the past: the European balance, the threat of fascism, the polarities of the Cold War, the North–South divide. These, in different ways, involved the construction of broad theoretical positions and were accompanied by more or less agreed responses: the liberal internationalism of the supporters of collective security, the political realism of the Cold War years, reinforced, of course, by ideological underpinnings, or the mixture of self-interest and idealism to be observed in the idea of engagement with the new Asia.

Perhaps it is closeness to the scene, and the rapidity of change, which make it difficult to identify new underlying assumptions about the shape of world order and about appropriate responses to it. European union has affected power alignments in what was once seen as the centre of world politics. New centres of power have emerged in East Asia and old ones are undergoing dramatic changes. China will clearly be an increasingly dominant element in any future pattern as she moves towards becoming perhaps the world’s largest economy and Australia’s major trading partner. Australia is attempting to adapt to these changes though her new found enthusiasm for engagement with Asia will not necessarily find easy acceptance amongst Asian powers themselves, some of which see Australia as not really part of the region and certainly not as ‘part of Asia’ to use one slogan which still has considerable currency.20 At the same time, transnational economic groupings, aided by technological development and the communications revolution, are, perhaps, eroding the very concept of the sovereign nation state as the basic unit of international relations. Convergence and globalisation are the new buzz words. In this situation it is far from clear what framework will emerge to replace such concepts as political balance, the containment of communism or even the

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idea of a foreign policy driven by perceptions of national security. Trade rather than security may be the new force behind policy formation. (Nor is it merely a matter of international relations. Globalisation could well be accompanied by unforeseeable consequences for domestic autonomy, social order and civil institutions of varying kinds. Democratic institutions and notions of citizenship, vulnerable as these may be, emerged, after all, within the framework of nations states. Can they survive the erosion of that framework or are we likely to face new forms of authoritarianism?)

There have been some bold attempts to catch a sense of new ways of looking at the world. Francis Fukuyama has spoken of ‘the end of History’, by which he seems to mean, at least in part, the end of ideology, or of views which purport to discern long term processes in history and which have shaped the oppositions of the past. Samuel Huntington points to major cultural differences as likely to mark the important conflicts of the future. Somewhat more conservatively, Richard Bernstein and R.H. Munro continue to think still in terms of balances of power and strategical alliances but in those terms look to continuing rivalry in the Pacific between China and the United States as constituting the defining conflict of the future. Do any of these suggest the outlines of a new paradigm?

Fukuyama rejects the Hegelian notion of a ‘directional History’—history as a ‘single, coherent, evolutionary process’. Welcoming what he sees as the sudden collapse of authoritarian rule, whether of the left or the right, he looks to liberal democracy as ‘the only coherent political aspiration that spans different regions and cultures around the globe’, and avoids the conflict of absolutist demands for rank, power and belief which have been the stuff of the conflicts of the past. He allows that this view may appear to be the resurrection, in a new form, of a coherent and directional history. He also wonders whether liberal democracy can sustain itself and whether a liberal democratic world will satisfy those who live in it. Will peace and prosperity produce boredom? Or will new struggles emerge for esteem, power, rank, hierarchy, and so ‘restart history’? This leaves a further question: how would such struggles, if they emerge, be described and justified? But, having allowed himself that moment of doubt, Fukuyama pins his faith on the ‘twin pillars of rational

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24 Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, pp. xii and xiii.
desire and rational recognition' which combine to make liberal democracy 'the best possible solution to the human problem'.26

For Huntington, by contrast, history has not ended and his identification of differing civilisations, and of oppositions between them, is the basis of his argument that these oppositions are more fundamental than those between nations or between ideologies and will underlie the dynamics of the international system of the future. He states the proposition in uncompromising terms:

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental sources of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural...The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.27

At first glance this argument appears to have echoes of that presented in Toynbee's *Study of History*, and suffers from some of the same problems. Working at such a high level of abstraction, Huntington faces difficulties in defining cultural coherences and of discerning the inner workings of disparate cultures. He nominates some seven (or eight) candidates for civilisation status—Western, Slavic-Orthodox, Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Latin American and maybe African. These overlap to a considerable extent with those of Toynbee, even to the point of allowing, in one case, a nation—Japan—to be a civilisation, distinct from its Chinese and Korean neighbours. Apart from that, Western, Orthodox, Islamic, and Hindu make both lists. But with Huntington, as with Toynbee, these groupings have dubious internal coherence and their opposition to other candidates on the list is less than precise. One is left with questions about what future conflicts, if they occur, would demonstrate the validity of his analysis or refute it. For Bernstein and Munro there are no such fundamental shifts. International rivalries will continue as before. The changes to come will not be changes in the nature of the international system but merely in the relative strengths of the powers that compose it.

In spite of the confidence with which such forecasts are made, it seems likely that, as in the past, perceptions of world order are likely to follow rather than to shape the events of the future.

How the Institute will meet the challenge of changing perspectives remains to be seen. The study of them will continue to be important. Whether it will allow the development of the same kind of consensus within its ranks as has been present in the past must emerge in practice. In the 1930s, and again in the 1950s and 1960s, the international setting was,

27 Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?' p. ??.
in a way, more visible to Australians than is the case with the world of the 1990s. The rise of fascism and nazism appeared close and threatening and to carry a sense of the tides of history flowing in a way that might engulf us. In the 1950s, the urgency of the Cold War appeared to pose a similar threat. With the withdrawal from Vietnam some of that sense of immediacy evaporated and it is in that situation that there has been discussion about the nature of a future role and an uncertainty about future directions for the Institute. Australia's engagement with its region, however, remains—sharpened by the currency crisis of the late 1990s and by the political instability that accompanied it—and there continues to be a need for unofficial study, discussion and debate about the character of that engagement.
Appendix A

List of Members of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1934

New South Wales Branch

F. Aarons
A. de R. Barclay
Lena Bates
Hon. T. R. Bavin
F. A. Bland
Ruby Board
W. Bowie
E. J. Bryce
D. A. S. Campbell
E. F. Campbell
Brig.-Gen. G. R. Campbell
Capt. I. R. Campbell
Professor A. H. Charteris
Joyce Cocks
C. W. D. Conacher
Norman Cowper
C. H. Currey
C. Darvall
A. C. Davidson
A. H. D. Fitzhardinge
V. J. Flynn
Cdr Rupert Garsia
Sir Roger Goldfinch
T. S. Gordon
J. M. Hardie
H. L. Harris
Professor McDonald Holmes
A. A. W. Hooper
Brig.-Gen. H. W. Lloyd
N. H. MacNeil
Gladys H. Marks
David Maughan
Mrs Maughan
R. S. Maynard
P. A. Micklem
Professor R. C. Mills
H. S. Nicholas
B. R. Nolan
Fr. Eris O'Brien
Miss Macarthur Onslow
Capt. J. R. Patrick
A. Thyne Reid
Professor S. H. Roberts
Dr Ian Clunies Ross
Professor A. L. Sadler
Mrs H. C. Sheller
Dr J. Gower Stephens
R. C. Teece
E. R. Walker
Raymond G. Watt
F. H. Way
W. J. V. Windeyer
F. L. W. Wood

Queensland Branch

E. A. Bacon
H. A. G. Crawford
Dr T. P. Fry
L. R. Macgregor
B. H. Molesworth.

---

1 List compiled by Miss Nance Dickins, from Chatham House lists. The list does not include IPR members if those groups were not already merged into the AIIA as was the case in NSW. The list gives a clear indication of the character of the organisation in the first year of its existence as a national organisation.
Victorian Branch

Professor K.H. Bailey
W. Macmahon Ball
Clive Baillieu
Lt.-Col. Sir James Barrett
Kenneth Binns
General T.A. Blamey
A.L. Brient
Herbert Brookes
Tristan Buesst
Major R.G. Casey
Miss Nora Collisson
G.S. Colman
Professor D.B. Copland
J.R. Darling
Mr Justice Owen Dixon
Miss Constance Duncan
Senator J.G. Duncan-Hughes
E.C. Dyason
F.W. Eggleston
Senator R.D. Elliott
Major R.E. Fanning
Theodore Fink
W.K. Fullagar
Dr M.C. Gardner
Sir Robert Garran
Sir Herbert Gepp
Squadron-Leader J.E. Hewitt
J.G. Latham
R.T.E. Latham
Mr Justice C.J. Lowe

Wing-Commander F.H. McNamara
R.G. Menzies
Professor Sir William Harrison Moore
Sir Keith Murdoch
J.F. Murphy
John Oldham
T. Oldham
Flight-Lieut. G. Packer
A. Patkin
Professor G.W. Paton
P.D. Phillips
E.L. Piesse
Sir Lennon Raws
A.B. Ritchie
A.B. Robinson
Rev F.W. Rolland
Professor Ernest Scott
Mrs Ernest Scott
J.T. Vinton Smith
J.A. Spicer
A. Spowers
Alfred Stirling
Miss Loma Stirling
Russell Stokes
Geoffrey Street
Dr Georgina Sweet
Miss Jessie Webb
H.L. Wilkinson
Air-Commodore R. Williams
G.L. Wood.
Office Bearers

Before the formation of an Australian Institute of International Affairs in 1933, Branches of the Royal Institute were formed in NSW (1924), Victoria (1925) and Queensland (1932). Office bearers of these Chatham House Branches included such figures as Professor A.H. Charteris, Sir George Julius, A.R. (later Sir Alfred) Davidson, F.R. Beasley, A.M. Pooley, Dr I. (later Sir Ian) Clunies Ross in New South Wales, J.G. (later Sir John) Latham, F.W. (later Sir Frederic) Eggleston, T.N.M. Buesst in Victoria, and Dr T.P. Fry and Associate Professor A.C.V. Melbourne in Queensland. Many of these continued to bear office in the AIIA after 1933. The following were the principal office bearers after the formation of the Australian Institute.

Presidents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1933–34</td>
<td>Professor A.H. Charteris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934–36</td>
<td>Professor (later Sir Stephen) Roberts</td>
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<tr>
<td>1936–41</td>
<td>Sir Thomas Bavin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942–45</td>
<td>Professor (later Sir Ian) Clunies Ross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945–46</td>
<td>P.D. (later Sir Philip) Phillips</td>
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<tr>
<td>1946–49</td>
<td>R.J.F. (later Sir Richard) Boyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949–50</td>
<td>Sir Norman Cowper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951–54</td>
<td>T.N.M. Buesst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955–58</td>
<td>D.A.S. Campbell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958–61</td>
<td>Professor John Andrews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961–65</td>
<td>Professor Gordon Greenwood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965–70</td>
<td>Professor Norman Harper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970–72</td>
<td>Professor Thomas Stapleton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972–83</td>
<td>Sir Garfield Barwick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983–88</td>
<td>Sir Russel Madigan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988–91</td>
<td>R.J. White</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991–93</td>
<td>Garry Woodard</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993–98</td>
<td>Richard Searby</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998–</td>
<td>Neal Blewett</td>
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Secretaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>1933–35</td>
<td>Norman Cowper</td>
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<tr>
<td>1935–36</td>
<td>P.R.Heydon</td>
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<tr>
<td>1936–38</td>
<td>Jack Shepherd</td>
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<tr>
<td>1938–39</td>
<td>Ormsby Martin</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acting Secretaries</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Professor T. Hytten)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1939–42</td>
<td>Dr John Andrews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943–45</td>
<td>W.D. Borrie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945–48</td>
<td>M.C. Kingston</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948–51</td>
<td>George Caiger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951–59</td>
<td>K.A. Aickin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959–75</td>
<td>Nance Dickins</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
With the appointment of Sir Alan Watt as Director in 1963 the administrative and secretarial responsibilities of the former secretaries were absorbed into the new position.

**Directors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963-69</td>
<td>Sir Alan Watt</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969-76</td>
<td>T.B. Millar</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976-79</td>
<td>Sir Laurence McIntyre</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979-81</td>
<td>Ralph Harry</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981-82</td>
<td>Rafe de Crespigny (Acting Director)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982-87</td>
<td>Philip McElligott</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988-89</td>
<td>Richard Higgott</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989-92</td>
<td>Susan Allica (Executive Director)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992-93</td>
<td>James Ingram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-94</td>
<td>Robert Lowry (Acting Director)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-98</td>
<td>Lesley Jackman</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998-</td>
<td>Ross Cottrill</td>
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**Treasurers**

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<td>1933-34</td>
<td>T.N.M. Buesst</td>
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<td>1934-36</td>
<td>Gerald Packer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936-40</td>
<td>T.N.M. Buesst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-47</td>
<td>Professor T. Hytten</td>
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<td>1947-49</td>
<td>A.R. Henderson</td>
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<td>1949-53</td>
<td>Russell Stokes</td>
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<td>1953-55</td>
<td>A.R. Henderson</td>
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<tr>
<td>1955-57</td>
<td>T.N.M. Buesst</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957-70</td>
<td>D.F.A. Simpson</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970-74</td>
<td>T.N.M. Buesst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-92</td>
<td>D.J. Russell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-93</td>
<td>Russell Trood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-95</td>
<td>A.G. Field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-</td>
<td>F. Milburn</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Research Committee and Research Chairmen**

The Research Committee, formally established in 1941, has had a wide variety of members. The Committee has always had a large academic component, though professional and business people also served on it. As examples of its membership, John Andrews, K.H. Bailey, W. Maomahon Ball, A.H. McDonald, A.C.V. Melbourne, G.W. Paton and G.L. Wood served on it during the 1940s, J.R. Angel, P.J. Boyce, Ernest Bramsted, Hedley Bull, Arthur Burns, Rafe de Crespigny, Andrew Fabinyi, G.C. Greenwood, Norman Harper, Owen Harries, W.J. Hudson, J.D. Legge, J.A.C. Mackie, R.G. Neale, R.J. O'Neill, J.R.V. Prescott during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, and Cherry Gertzel, Stephen Henningham, R.J. May, A.C. Milner and John Ravenhill during the 1980s and 1990s. The following were Research Chairmen:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940-43</td>
<td>P.D. (later Sir Philip) Phillips</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943-46</td>
<td>Professor G.L. Wood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-47</td>
<td>Professor W.D. Borrie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947-49</td>
<td>Professor W. Prest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949-50</td>
<td>N.D. Harper</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1950–51  T.N.M. Buesst
1952–53  H.D. (later Sir Hermann) Black
1953–61  Professor G.C. Greenwood
1961–65  Professor N.D. Harper
1965–68  Professor Brian Beddie
1968–70  Hedley Bull
1970–71  Professor Brian Beddie
1971–73  Hedley Bull
1973–78  Professor J.D. Legge
1979–85  J.R.V. Prescott
1985–88  J.R. Angel
1988–92  A.C. Milner
1992–95  Stephen Henningham
1995–  John Ravenhill

Editors of the *Australian Outlook* and the *Australian Journal of International Affairs*

1947–53  J.M. Ward
1953–58  Hermann Black
1959–60  B.D. Beddie
1961–62  A.L. Burns
1963–69  J.D.B. Miller
1969–70  T.B. Millar
1970–72  J.L. Richardson
1973–77  P.J. Boyce
1977–82  David Goldsworthy
1982–84  Ian Clark
1984–88  Richard Higgott
1988–90  John Ravenhill
1991–93  James Cotton
1994–97  Stephanie Lawson
1998–  Ramesh Thakur
International Conferences

A. Institute of Pacific Relations

1. 1925 Honolulu
2. 1927 Honolulu
3. 1929 Nara and Kyoto, Japan
4. 1931 Hankow and Shanghai, China
5. 1933 Banff, Canada
6. 1936 Yosemite, USA
7. 1939 Study Meeting, Virginia Beach, USA
8. 1942 Mont Tremblant, Canada
9. 1945 Hot Springs, Virginia, USA
10. 1947 Stratford upon Avon, England
11. 1947 Stratford upon Avon, England
12. 1950 Lucknow, India
13. 1954 Kyoto, Japan
14. 1955 Lahore, Pakistan.

B. British Commonwealth Relations

1. 1933 Toronto, Canada
2. 1938 Lapstone, NSW, Australia
3. 1945 London
4. 1949 Bigwin Inn, Canada
5. 1954 Lahore, Pakistan
6. 1959 Palmerston North, New Zealand
7. 1965 New Delhi, India

C. International, Studies Conferences

1935 London
1937 Paris
1938 Prague

D. Other Conferences

1947 Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi
1953 Conference of Leaders of Institutes of World Affairs, New York
National Conferences have been held on a regular basis from 1971. Initially conferences were held annually. After the 6th Conference, held in Sydney in 1976, they have been held at intervals of 18 months or two years. They have been held in different centres, and have been mounted by the joint efforts of the National Headquarters and the local Branch. Attendance has varied but national conferences have attracted from 300 to 500 members.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Location and Date</th>
<th>Theme</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sydney, June 1971</td>
<td>Japan and Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Melbourne, June 1972</td>
<td>China and the World Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sydney, June 1973</td>
<td>Australia’s Foreign Relations: The Economic Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Adelaide, June 1974</td>
<td>Advance Australia Where? Foreign Policy in the 1970s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Melbourne, May 1975</td>
<td>Australia, Papua New Guinea and Southeast Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Sydney, August 1976</td>
<td>Soviet Policies East of Suez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Canberra, April 1978</td>
<td>New Directions in United States Policies in the East Asia and Pacific Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Canberra, March 1980</td>
<td>The Middle East in World Politics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Melbourne, March 1981</td>
<td>Australian Foreign Policy: The Resources Factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Sydney, May 1982</td>
<td>Australia in the New Power Balance: Asia and the Pacific Basin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Adelaide, August 1984</td>
<td>Australia and Asia in the 1980s</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Melbourne, March 1986</td>
<td>The Australia–Indonesia–Papua New Guinea Triangle</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Sydney, June 1987</td>
<td>Recent Trends in World Trade</td>
</tr>
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<td>15</td>
<td>Canberra, 1998</td>
<td>Joint Conference with the Asia Society of New York, Threshold Issues in Asia for the 1990s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Hobart, November 1989</td>
<td>Antarctica’s Future: Continuity or Change?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Melbourne, March 1991</td>
<td>The New Europe: East and West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Brisbane, April 1992</td>
<td>The Future Pacific Economic Order: Australia’s Role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Sydney, October 1993</td>
<td>Australia and the Greater China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Canberra, November 1994</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Melbourne, 1995</td>
<td>India</td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Brisbane, 1996</td>
<td>Australia and the United States into the Next Century</td>
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</table>
National Lecture Series

Dyason Lecturers

1949  Professor F.S.C. Northrop, Stirling Professor of Law and Philosophy, Yale University
1950  Earl Russell, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge
1951  Salvador de Madariaga, Member of the Spanish Academy of Letters and of Moral and Political Sciences
1952  Professor Clyde Kluckhohn, Professor of Anthropology and Director of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University
1953  Sir Julian Huxley, Biologist
1954  William O. Douglas, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States
1955  Kenneth Younger, Formerly Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom
1956  Arnold Toynbee, Formerly Director of Studies, RIIA, Emeritus Professor of History, University of London
1957  Gunnar Myrdal, Economist
1958  Kingsley Martin, Editor, The New Statesman
1959  V.K.R.V. Rao, Vice-Chancellor, University of Delhi
1960  Margaret Ballinger, former Member, South African House of Assembly
1962  Alastair Buchan, Director, London Institute for Strategic Studies
1963  Professor Merle Fainsod, Director, Harvard Russian Research Center
1964  Shigeto Tsuru, Professor of Economics, Hitosubashi University, Tokyo
1965  Sir Robert Scott, former Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Defence, United Kingdom
1966  Raul Manglapus, Senator, Republic of the Philippines
1967  Soedjatmoko, Indonesian journalist and publisher
1968  Robert A. Scalapino, Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley
1969  Claudio Veliz, Director, Institute of International Studies, University of Santiago, Chile
1970  Leo Mates, Director, Institute for International Politics and Economics, Yugoslavia
1971  Lord Trefryelyan, Director, RIIA, (former British diplomat)
1972  Ali Mazrui, Professor of Political Science, Makerere University, Uganda
1973  S. Rajaratnam, Foreign Minister, Singapore
1974  Rajni Kothari, Director of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi
1975  Helen Suzman, Progressive Party Member, South African Parliament
1976  Akira Matsui, former Japanese Ambassador to the United Nations
1977  Eugene McCarthy, United States Senator and former Presidential candidate
1981  James Callaghan, former Prime Minister of Great Britain
<table>
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<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Adelaide</td>
<td>Rt Hon R.G. Menzies</td>
<td>'The British Commonwealth of Nations in International Affairs'</td>
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<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Melbourne</td>
<td>W.R. Crocker</td>
<td>'Can the United Nations Succeed?'</td>
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<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Brisbane</td>
<td>Rt Hon R.G. Casey</td>
<td>'The Conduct of Australian Foreign Policy'</td>
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<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>Rt Hon Sir John Latham</td>
<td>'Open Diplomacy'</td>
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<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Adelaide</td>
<td>Sir Ian Clunies Ross</td>
<td>'Prerequisites for the Establishment of Democratic Institutions in Southeast Asia'</td>
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<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Canberra</td>
<td>Lord Lindsay of Birker</td>
<td>'Scientific Method and International Affairs'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Perth</td>
<td>Hon. Paul Hasluck</td>
<td>'Australia's Task in Papua and New Guinea'</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Hobart</td>
<td>Sir Douglas Copland</td>
<td>'Australia and the Changing World in Asia'</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Adelaide</td>
<td>Sir Kenneth Bailey</td>
<td>'Australia and the Law of the Sea'</td>
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<td>1959</td>
<td>Brisbane</td>
<td>Hon. A.A. Calwell</td>
<td>'The Australian Labor Party and Foreign Policy'</td>
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<td>1960</td>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>Hon. A.R. Downer</td>
<td>'The Influence of Migration on Australian Foreign Policy'</td>
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<td>1961</td>
<td>Melbourne</td>
<td>Sir John Crawford</td>
<td>'International Aspects of Feeding Six Billion People'</td>
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<td>1962</td>
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<td>Hon. Sir Garfield Barwick</td>
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<td>'The Changing Margins of Australian Foreign Policy'</td>
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<td>'Australia's Role in Asia'</td>
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<td>Townsville</td>
<td>Hon Mr Justice J.R. Kerr</td>
<td>'Law in Papua and New Guinea'</td>
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<td>1969</td>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>Mr Bruce Grant</td>
<td>'Foreign Affairs and the Australian Press'</td>
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<td>1970</td>
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<td>Sir Henry Bland</td>
<td>'Some Aspects of Defence Administration in Australia'</td>
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<td>'Changing Directions of Chinese Foreign Policy'</td>
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<td>Hon. Peter Howson</td>
<td>'Australia in the World Environment'</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Hon. E.G. Whitlam</td>
<td>'Australia's Foreign Policy: New Directions, New Definitions'</td>
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<td>1975</td>
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<td>Rt. Hon. Malcolm Fraser</td>
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<td>Hon. Andrew Peacock</td>
<td>'Australia and the Third World'</td>
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<td>Melbourne</td>
<td>R.L. Harry</td>
<td>'A National Foreign Policy for Australia: The Search for Consensus'</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Adelaide</td>
<td>Sir Keith Shann</td>
<td>'The Modern Commonwealth and Zimbabwe'</td>
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<td>Brisbane</td>
<td>Hon. A.A. Street</td>
<td>'Alliances and Foreign Policy'</td>
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<td>1983</td>
<td>Townsville</td>
<td>Patricia Lovell</td>
<td>'Australian Film: The Fragile Industry'</td>
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<td>1984</td>
<td>Canberra</td>
<td>Sir Gordon Jackson</td>
<td>'Australia's Foreign Aid'</td>
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<td>1985</td>
<td>Darwin</td>
<td>Stuart Harris, 'The Interlinking of Economics and Politics in Foreign Policy'</td>
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<td>1986</td>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>Mr Nicholas Whitlam, 'Self-Reliance, Nationalism and Australian Business'</td>
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<td>1988</td>
<td>Hobart</td>
<td>Hon. John Kerin, 'Australia: Farm and Quarry?'</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Melbourne</td>
<td>Senator the Hon. Gareth Evans, Australia's Foreign Policy: Priorities in a Changing World</td>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>No Lecture</td>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>Brisbane</td>
<td>E.G. Whitlam, 'National and International Maturity'</td>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>Adelaide</td>
<td>Dr John Hewson, 'Australia 2000'</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>Townsville</td>
<td>Professor Henry Reynolds, 'Ethnicity, Nation and State in Contemporary Australia'</td>
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<td>1994</td>
<td>No Lecture</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Perth</td>
<td>Helen Hughes, 'Australian Trade Policy in the Indian Pacific Region'</td>
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Appendix F

Publications

The following list is not exhaustive. With the exception of the first three items, prepared in the 1920s by members of the NSW and Victorian Branches of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and published with the assistance of grants from the Institute of Pacific Relations, it is confined to publications of the national AIIA, formed in 1933. It does not attempt to cover the wide variety of publications of the branches, nor does it include periodicals published by the Institute and its branches.

Persia Campbell, R.C. Mills and G.V. Portus (eds), *Studies in Australian Affairs* (1928).

World Affairs Papers, (1940–41):
1. *Dutch East Indies*.
3. *The Middle East*.
4. *China Today*.

Australia in a New World (Pamphlet Series, 1943–5).
1. Ian Hogbin and Camilla Wedgwood, *Development and Welfare in the Western Pacific*.


Peter Hastings and Andrew Farran (eds), *Australia's Resources Future* (1978).


Alison Broinowski (ed.), *Understanding ASEAN* (1982).


Select Bibliography

AIIA RECORDS

With the acquisition of a national headquarters building in 1987 it became possible for the Institute to bring together, in one place, the records relating to its national operation: correspondence of the Commonwealth secretariat, papers dealing with the relations between branches and between branches and the Directorate, papers dealing, for example, with arrangements for Dyason Lectures and Roy Milne Lectures, the planning for national conferences, the administration of *The Australian Outlook*, Research Committee activities, the publications programme and many other matters. Till then these had been widely scattered. During the period when the Commonwealth secretariat had been located within the NSW Branch the Institute’s national files had been housed there. When the secretariat was transferred to Melbourne a similar collection of records accumulated there, covering the period 1951–1975. Successive Directors had their own filing systems after 1963 and the individual branches, of course, had their own archives. And some material had remained in the hands of individual office bearers. (The present writer, for example, retained a number of files relating to the research program during his period as Research Chairman until the new headquarters was ready to receive them.)

After the opening of Stephen House the then Director, Mr Philip McElligott, attempted to recover as much as possible of this scattered material with a view to establishing proper archives for the Institute in its new headquarters. Some of the material formerly held in Sydney had been examined by Dr Hazel King when preparing her history of the NSW Branch and these were sent to Canberra in a number of cartons. The files held in Melbourne, relating to the years 1951–75, represented the most extensive collection of records. These arrived in Canberra in seven very large cardboard containers. The Directorate’s own files were already on the spot.

To receive this material was one thing. To give it proper archival attention—to sort it, classify it and arrange it in accessible form—was quite another. The Institute lacked the expertise and the staff to enable this to be done. The papers therefore remained, unsorted, in the cartons in which they had been transferred and were put away in a small, outside room at the back of Stephen House until they could be given proper
attention. They remained there until 1993, when they were offered to the National Library of Australia. The National Library accepted them but had its own staffing problems and, at the time of writing, the material remains in the original boxes and has still to be arranged and classified.

Much, though not all, of this material has been consulted in the preparation of this history, first of all in the totally unsuitable circumstances of the back room of Stephen House and, more recently in the National Library where, through the cooperation and the tolerance of the staff of the Manuscripts Room, I was able to have access to it in its unclassified state. However, it will not be surprising, in view of the above story, that there have been difficulties in giving adequate reference to particular items cited. I have used the term 'Stephen House Papers' to indicate material transferred from Stephen House to the National Library and where possible I have given a carton number, using either the numbers written on the cartons transferred from NSW or numbers written on subsequent cartons by myself. These will, in due course, be rearranged when the papers are catalogued by the Library. In the case of the material transferred from Victoria the boxes, numbered NB 1 to NB 7, are too big for adequate reference and here I have given merely the date of correspondence. I hope that this, together with an indication of the general category into which it falls (correspondence with Queensland, correspondence with Victoria, Dyason Lectures etc.) will enable later researchers to find their way to it. A very broad indication of the contents of these cartons is provided by the following rough list.

**Stephen House Papers**

1. Five red and white cartons numbered 1, 2, 3, 3A and 4, carrying a note to say that they had been consulted by Dr Hazel King in 1981.

- **Carton 1**: NSW Branch Council Minutes; Meetings of Joint Committee to organise the 1938 British Commonwealth Relations Conference held at Lapstone, NSW; General Correspondence with Queensland Branch.

- **Cartons 2 and 3**: Correspondence with the Royal Institute of International Affairs about the Lapstone Conference, Commonwealth Council correspondence, 1943–45, Correspondence between Victoria and NSW, 1936–41, correspondence concerning the visit of IPR Secretary, E.C. Carter, 1935.

- **Carton 3A**: Reconstruction of the Institute during Miss Molly Kingston's period as Commonwealth Secretary.

- **Carton 4**: A wide range of material relating to the work of the Commonwealth Council, relations with the three existing branches—NSW, Victoria and Queensland—and the formation of a fourth—
Canberra. There is also correspondence with the Institute of Pacific Relations and the distribution of the national subscription to the IPR between NSW, Victoria and Queensland. Much of this correspondence is that of the Commonwealth Secretary—in succession Peter Heydon and Jack Shepherd—in the 1930s. Heydon and Shepherd operated initially from the NSW Branch, sharing an office at 369 George Street. Shepherd then established a Commonwealth Office in APA House, 53 Martin Place. The Shepherd letters contain some informal letters between himself and his predecessor, now in the Department of External Affairs, about general problems of the Institute, and between himself and L.F. Fitzhardinge about the formation of a Canberra branch.

It will be apparent that much of the material in the five cartons is haphazardly arranged. Carton 2 contains material from the 1940s as well as the 1930s. Carton 3A relates to 1946–48. Carton 4 relates mainly to the 1930s.

2. ‘Files 1938’. Material relating to International Studies Conferences, 1935 and 1939. In spite of the label on the box, it contains some correspondence of 1944 and 1948. It includes material relating to the appointment of George Caiger as Commonwealth Secretary.

3. ‘Files, Commonwealth Council, 1945–51’. Correspondence with P.E. Lilienthal, Editor of Pacific Affairs, Press cuttings relating to Dyason Lecturers, correspondence with other organisations such as the Royal Empire Society, World Affairs Council of Northern California, American Academy of Political and Social Science, etc. Research Committee, assorted papers, 1952–66.


5. ‘AGMs 1978. Correspondence 1940’. In fact contains Commonwealth Council Minutes, 1961–67 and also ‘Correspondence, 1933’ including correspondence on IPR matters. Four files labelled ‘General, ND [= Nance Dickins].

6. Seven Large Cartons containing files of the Commonwealth Secretariat, 1951–75. Being the records of the Secretariat when it was located within the Victorian Branch, they are composed of originals of incoming correspondence and carbons of outgoing correspondence. The following list gives only a rough indication of the contents of each carton.

NB 1. Correspondence of Molly Kingston, Commonwealth Secretary, 1945–47 and George Caiger, 1948–50. Correspondence with NSW

**NB 2.** Correspondence with other national bodies of a similar kind: Indian Council of World Affairs, Japan Institute, Indonesian Institute, Nigeria Institute etc. Correspondence relating to a number of individual research projects. File relating to F.W. Eggleston’s *Reflections on Australian Foreign Policy* and obituaries of Eggleston. Files relating to the visit of Mr Slater of the Ford Foundation in 1962.


**NB 4.** Miscellaneous files, including further correspondence with Gordon Greenwood as President.

**NB 5.** Articles of Association. Correspondence with editors of *Australian Outlook*—Arthur Burns and J.D.B. Miller. Correspondence with NSW and New England Branches.

**NB 6.** Correspondence relating to the Institute of Pacific Relations, much of it dealing with the attacks of Senator McCarthy and the subsequent investigation by a Senate Committee.

**NB 7.** Dyason Lectures. Commonwealth Council Papers. Correspondence with Canberra and NSW Branches.

**New South Wales Branch Records** (Glover Cottages, Kent Street, Sydney)

The Branch holds an IPR Minute Book (small diary size) which records the formation of the IPR Group in New South Wales in 1926 and its mutual, unsuccessful, negotiations with the British Institute Branch in Sydney.

Day Book, 8 October 1935–3 March 1950. It begins with the move into the George Street premises in October 1935 and records daily events—meetings, purchase of furniture, visitors etc.

Annual Reports of the Branch, 1933–1962.
**Victorian Branch** (Dyason House, East Melbourne)

Much of the earlier material held in Victoria was included in the transfer of Secretariat Papers referred to above. Victoria also holds material relating to Branch conferences, Branch publications etc. The Branch also retains Minutes of the Branch, 1937–46.

**PRIVATE PAPERS**

National Library of Australia

The following collections of private papers contain references to the Institute.

- W. Macmahon Ball (MS 7851)
- Sir Thomas Bavin (MS 1670)
- Sir Richard Boyer (MS 3181)
- Sir Herbert Brookes (MS 1924)
- T.N.M. Buesst (MS 2821)
- Sir Frederic Eggleston (MS 423)
- W.D. Forsyth (MS 5700)
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