Lombok: Conquest, Colonization and Underdevelopment, 1870-1940

Alfons van der Kraan

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LOMBOK: CONQUEST, COLONIZATION AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT, 1870-1940

ALFONS VAN DER KRAAN

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PREFACE

Before the arrival of the Europeans, island Southeast Asia consisted of a bewildering variety of large and small states, tribes and communities at different levels of economic, social and political development and possessing widely divergent (though related) languages and cultures. These states and societies varied from the powerful kingdom of Mataram, based upon wet-rice (sawah) cultivation, and the great trading emporiums of Aceh, Malacca and Macassar, to the more primitive tribes of agriculturalists and hunters like the Dayaks of Borneo and the Torajas of Celebes. In the course of the colonial era this great, extremely heterogeneous multitude of states, tribes and communities, largely through the activities of the Netherlands, Britain and Spain, were welded together into the political and administrative units now known as Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. The formation of this state system was a development of the utmost significance. It enabled the European nations to make increasing use of state power in the exploitation of the human and material resources of island Southeast Asia, and by doing this, it profoundly and lastingly affected the lives of the peoples of the area.

This study focuses attention on the Balinese region (comprising the islands of Bali and Lombok), which in a political sense constituted a ‘world’ by itself. Mainly because the literature on Bali and Lombok has tended to emphasize culture and religion, it is not commonly known that this region was one of the areas in Asia offering the most determined and effective resistance to European colonialism. Balinese resistance did not, as in West Sumatra from 1803-37, take on the form of a social movement with revolutionary overtones (padries), nor did it, as was the case in Aceh from 1873-1904, assume the character of a popularly based movement led by religious figures (ulama). Rather, Balinese resistance had a far more conservative, traditional character. It derived its strength from the fiercely independent attitude of the Balinese princes and, above all, from the willingness of their followers to come to their assistance. Partly due to the effectiveness of this aristocracy-led resistance, the Balinese region was one of the last areas in the Indonesian archipelago where indigenous rulers managed to retain their independence. In fact, it was not until 1908, when the Dewa Agung of Klungkung — who had never given up his claim to be the Emperor (Susuhunan) of Bali and Lombok —
with hundreds of his most loyal followers died in a final, desperate suicide-attack (puputan) upon the Dutch forces, that the Balinese region could be said to have been fully colonized.

In the history of the colonization of the Balinese region three phases can be distinguished. The first began in the 1820s, when Dutch colonialism had not yet outgrown its mercantile character. Motivated in part by concern over British competition and in part by a desire for commercial advantage, the Netherlands Indies Government made increasingly determined bids for political influence, culminating in the Bali War of 1846-49. This conflict had two important political consequences. First, although the Dutch failed to attain their objective of forcing the Dewa Agung into submission, they did succeed in gaining a measure of political influence in North Bali, in the principality of Buleleng and its dependency of Jembrana. And second, taking advantage of the war situation, the Raja of Lombok allied himself with the Dutch and succeeded in conquering his ancestral land on Bali, the principality of Karangasem, thereby forming the largest and most populous of the Balinese kerajaan, the state of Lombok/Karangasem. The second phase in the colonization of the Balinese region began in the late 1880s, when Dutch colonialism had already acquired its imperialist character. Now interested mainly in the region’s agricultural potential and reputed mineral wealth, the Netherlands Indies Government again actively sought more political influence. This endeavour led to the 1894 military expeditions against Lombok, and the Dutch annexation in that year of the state of Lombok/Karangasem. The final phase began in the early 20th century when the Netherlands Indies Government, increasingly anxious to consolidate its political control over the archipelago, decided to end the ‘anomaly’ of having independent potentates within its sphere of influence. This policy culminated in the Bali War of 1906-08, which led to the annexation of South Bali, the principalities of Gianyar, Badong, Tabanan and Klungkung, the realm of the Dewa Agung.

This work is concerned specifically with the second phase in the history of the colonization of the Balinese region, with the Dutch conquest of Lombok/Karangasem, the socio-political setting in which it occurred and the resistance it engendered. While this is the main focus of the study, an attempt is made to place the subject-matter within its proper historical context. This means that the ‘development’ of Lombok/Karangasem is traced from its status as an independent Balinese kingdom, through the process of colonization, to its submersion within the Netherlands Indies empire. This ‘evolutionary’ approach has the advantage of permitting a comparison between a traditional Indonesian state and the same region under Dutch colonial rule. Partly because Lombok/Karangasem was a typical example of an Indonesian state based upon wet-rice cultivation, belonging to the same general category as the Javanese kingdom of Mataram, and in part because the colonial administration was fairly represent-
ative of Dutch rule over agricultural regions, this comparison is relevant not only to Lombok/Karangasem, but to Indonesian history as a whole.

This study concentrates attention on the period from 1870 to 1940. These dates delineate a distinct era in the history of Lombok/Karangasem. Around 1870 Ratu Agung 2 Ngurah Karangasem, who was fated to be the last of the Balinese Rajas, came to the throne, while in 1940 the Dutch colonial period was drawing to a close. The intervening decades saw the flowering of the state of Lombok/Karangasem, a broad revolt against Balinese rule by the Sasaks of East Lombok, the intervention in this conflict by the Netherlands Indies Government, the armed resistance by the Balinese and consequent defeat of the first Dutch military expedition, the establishment of Dutch rule and resulting conflict between the Netherlands Indies Government and segments of the East Sasak population, and finally a period of Dutch rule characterized by latent peasant unrest. These historical themes are described and analyzed by way of answering the following seven questions:

1. What was the nature of Balinese rule on Lombok?
2. Why did the Sasaks of East Lombok rise in rebellion?
3. Why did the Dutch begin to behave aggressively towards Lombok/Karangasem?
4. Why did the Balinese opt for an unequal armed struggle?
5. Why did the East Sasak revolt continue during the first years of Dutch rule?
6. What were the reasons for the declining level of material well-being in the colonial period?
7. What was the character of peasant anti-colonial resistance?

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And finally, this work would have been the poorer but for the help of my wife, Inês.

May 1980

A. v.d. K.
Canberra
'The Princes... of Karangasem and those of Lombok must not become separated from each other... Your father, the Raja, is firmly convinced that Lombok and Karangasem are to be compared to the two birds from the Ujoga Parwa, that have been caught in a snare with two nooses... As long as the two birds fly alongside each other, as long as Karangasem and Lombok go together, the one to whom the snare belongs... slowly walks with them. He then... startles the birds with the aim that they shall fly off in different directions. When... Karangasem and Lombok are thus separated from each other his trick has succeeded. The birds will no longer fly in harmony; they will pull and tear, begin to fight, seize each other by the neck and break their legs. It cannot fail or they will be caught by the one who has set the snare, whereupon he can pluck them to his heart's content.'

The Raja of Lombok to his vassals, the Princes of Karangasem. 1887
MAP 1: MAIN GEOGRAPHICAL FEATURES OF LOMBOK IN THE LATE 19TH CENTURY
CHAPTER I
THE OLD REGIME

Lombok (referred to by the indigenous population as Selaparang or Tanah Sasak)\(^1\) is the second of the Lesser Sunda islands from west to east. It is separated from Bali by the rather wide Lombok Strait, and from Sumbawa by the narrow Alas Strait. The island occupies an area of 4700 km\(^2\) (slightly smaller than Bali), and consists of three quite distinct regions: (1) the northern mountain complex, (2) the southern mountain range, and (3) the central plain.

North Lombok is dominated by an impressive volcanic mountain complex which culminates in the Gunung Rinjani (12 221 ft). The highest part of the complex consists of a caldera with a crater lake, Segara Anak (6588 ft).\(^2\) This crater lake is surrounded by very high and steep slopes, of which the slopes of the Gunung Rinjani and the Gunung Baru (7795 ft) are the most imposing. At first, the Rinjani range slopes gradually to the east. About halfway to the east coast the slope is interrupted by a mountain complex of which the Gunung Nangi (7644 ft) is the highest peak. The western slopes of the Rinjani complex initially descend gradually. These slopes, however, are interrupted by the Punikan mountain range, with Gunung Punikan (4888 ft) as its highest peak. The northern slopes of the Rinjani complex descend gently towards the coast, while the southern slopes merge gradually into the central plain.

South Lombok consists of a lower, non-volcanic mountain range, culminating in the Gunung Mareje (2350 ft). On the western peninsula, hills rise steeply to a height of 1000 to 1450 ft. These hills continue in a north-easterly direction and gradually merge into the Mareje mountain complex. To the east, the Mareje mountains descend steeply and continue toward the eastern peninsula as a hilly belt approximately five miles wide. The southern slopes of the Mareje mountain complex descend gently towards the coast, while the northern slopes descend steeply into the plain.

The central plain, where the vast majority of Lombok’s population was (and is) concentrated, extends from east to west for about 56 km., and has an average width of approximately 25 km. In a south-easterly direction the plain rises gently to approximately 350 ft in the vicinity of the village of Mujur, descending again in a very gentle slope towards the east coast. The central plain is divided into two distinct parts. The smaller north-eastern part is the well-watered, fertile region of West Lombok (Bal.: Dawuh-Juring). The larger south-eastern part, which is less well-watered and somewhat less fertile, is East Lombok (Bal.: Dangin-Juring).\(^3\) These two regions, which in the late 19th century were still separated from each other by an extensive forest,\(^4\) are also quite different in an ethnological sense. While West Lombok is the home of the island’s Balinese minority, East Lombok is the land of the Sasaks.
Since the Balinese rulers of Lombok did not hold censuses, it is impossible to determine precisely how large the island’s population was in the late 19th century. The only information on this subject consists of a number of widely varying estimates by contemporary Dutch observers. The highest estimate was made in 1891 by Willemstijn, who placed the island’s population at 656,000 ‘souls’, of whom some 600,000 were Sasaks, some 50,000 Balinese and the remaining 6000 ‘a hodgepodge of foreigners, like Buginese, Mandharase, Arabs and Chinese’. The lowest estimate was made by Ten Have, who in 1894 placed the population at 405,000, of whom 380,000 were Sasaks, 20,000 Balinese and 5000 Buginese and Chinese. The reality in the late 19th century is likely to have been about half-way between these two extremes, that is about 530,000 people, of whom 35,000 were Balinese, 490,000 Sasaks, and 5000 of other ethnicity.

Early History and Late 19th Century Society

In the early history of Lombok three major external influences may be distinguished. These influences which, in interaction with the Sasak people, gave rise to Lombok society of the late 19th century, can be conceptualized as follows: (1) a strong Javanese cultural influence, probably dating from the 15th and 16th centuries; (2) a combination of Balinese and Macassarese political influence in the 17th century; (3) the consolidation of Balinese political control from the beginning of the 18th century onwards.

The Javanese influence appears to have been primarily in the areas of culture and religion. It cannot, at any rate, be conclusively demonstrated that there has ever been any direct political control from Java over Lombok. There are, however, at least two indications which seem to point to this possibility. First, Lombok is mentioned in the Nagarakrtagama as belonging to the empire of Majapahit. Second, Dr R. Goris, in his study of the inhabitants of the Sembalun valley (an isolated group of villages high up in the Rinjani mountain complex), pointed out that the inhabitants of this valley believe themselves to be descended from the Hindu-Javanese and also believe that a relative, a ‘brother’, of the Raja of Majapahit, lies buried near the village of Sembalun. These two indications of close contact between Java and Lombok could easily be dismissed as fancy if it were not for the fact that Dr Goris in the same study demonstrated a strong and unmistakable Hindu-Javanese cultural influence on the people of this valley. This influence was found primarily in various art-forms, like music and dance, and also in the language, in particular the names of mythological persons and holy objects.

Another major Javanese influence has been the Islamization of the island, about which the Babad Lombok has the following to say:
The Susuhunan Ratu of Giri ordered the new faith to be brought to the islands. Dilembu Manku Rat was sent with an army to Banjer-masin, Datu Bandan was sent to Macassar, Tidore, Seram and Galeier, and a son of the Susuhunan, Pangeran Prapen, to Bali, Lombok and Sumbawa. Prapen sailed first to Lombok, where by force of arms he converted the people to Islam. After having accomplished this, he sailed on to Sumbawa and Bima. During Prapen’s absence, however, mainly because the women continued to profess the pagan faith, the people of Lombok largely reverted back to paganism. After his victories in Sumbawa and Bima, Prapen returned, and, aided by the Raden of Sumuliya and the Raden of Salut (Sasak), he organized a new campaign which this time met with success. A part of the population fled into the mountains. Another part was subjected and converted and a third part was only subjected. Prapen left the Raden of Sumuliya and of Salut in charge of maintaining Islam and moved on to Bali, where he began [fruitless] negotiations with the Dewa Agung of Klungkung.10

This account of the Islamization of Lombok has a ring of authenticity. As a number of 20th century sociological studies (notably those by Van Eerde11 and Bousquet12) have shown, three different religious groupings may be observed among the Sasaks: the so-called Bodhas, the Waktu-telu and the Waktu-lima. The Bodhas, of whom small communities could still be found at the beginning of the 20th century, lived in the northern mountain complex as well as in a few villages in the southern mountain range. The Bodhas, who according to Van Eerde were Sasaks by ethnicity, culture and language but professed a wholly pagan faith, may well have been the descendants of the people who, according to the Babad, fled into the mountains in order to escape Islamization. The fact that the Bodhas pointed to villages in the central plain as their places of origin, as well as the fact that all their religious shrines, to which they made yearly pilgrimages, were located in the plain, seems to indicate that the Bodhas had once migrated from the interior into the mountains, perhaps at the time of the Islamization of Lombok. Similarly, the people who according to the Babad were only subjected but not converted may well have been the ancestors of the so-called Waktu-telu Sasaks, who like the Bodhas live in the northern and southern mountain ranges as well as in the central plain, and who practise a religion which can best be described as pagan with certain Islamic influences. And finally, the people who according to the Babad were both subjected and converted were naturally the people on whom the Islamic influence had been strongest, the Waktu-lima Sasaks. About the religious orthodoxy of the Sasak people, opinions differ. But it appears that here, unlike many other parts of the Indonesian world, it has been the Sasak aristocracy (perwangsana) who have acted as defenders and upholders of the faith (Waktu-lima), while the Sasak peasants
continued to be strongly influenced by pagan religious conceptions (Waktu-telu).\textsuperscript{13}

For the greater part of the 17th century Lombok became the 'bone of contention' between the Balinese Raja of Karangasem and Macassarese operating from Sumbawa. Initially, the Balinese and Macassarese spheres of influence extended over different parts of the island. In the beginning of the 17th century Balinese from Karangasem crossed the Lombok Strait, founded a number of settlements and established political control over West Lombok. At around the same time Macassarese from Sumbawa — which had been subjected to Macassar in 1618 — crossed Alas Strait and established a measure of control over East Lombok.\textsuperscript{14} The Sasak societies encountered by the Balinese and Macassarese differed considerably. Although the Balinese found an established Sasak society in West Lombok, there is no evidence of the existence of a Sasak aristocracy, or anything resembling a court. In East Lombok, by contrast, there did exist an indigenous aristocracy as well as a Sasak court, the court of Selaparang.\textsuperscript{15}

The first large-scale conflicts between Balinese and Macassarese occurred in 1677. In that year Balinese troops crossed the forest separating West from East Lombok, and assisted by sections of the Sasak aristocracy defeated the Macassarese in a number of skirmishes. When the Balinese in 1678 laid waste the court of Selaparang the Macassarese had been completely routed.\textsuperscript{16} This victory, however, did not mean effective Balinese control over East Lombok. In fact, it was to take about 150 years before Balinese rule was firmly established in this region.

During the period 1678-1849 the Balinese consolidated their political control. Their principal antagonists were the Sasak aristocrats who, wherever possible, strove to exercise power at the local level of district or group of villages. In general the autonomy of the Sasak aristocrat appears to have varied in accordance with the degree of unity — and therefore power — of the Balinese. In the long Balinese-Sasak struggle four distinct phases can be distinguished. In the first phase from 1678 to 1740 the Balinese continued their eastward movement. They appear to have advanced as far as Sumbawa, where, however, they failed to gain lasting political influence.\textsuperscript{17} They did, however, succeed in establishing their supremacy in Lombok. The Babad Lombok relates of this period:

The brother of the Datu of Pejanggi had been insulted by the Datu. To take revenge on his brother, he invited the Balinese into the land. He went to the Raja of Karangasem, whose power was already established in Ampenan [West Lombok]. The Sasaks except insofar as they fought as allies of the Balinese, as the districts of Praya and Batukliyang did, were defeated. The commander of the Raja's army ordered: All those within the districts of Pejanggi, Lanko and Parwa must pay tribute in money (pada apeti picis); all those within the
districts of Sokong and Bayan must pay tribute in cotton (apeti kapas); all those within the districts of Praya and Batukliyang must pay tribute in blood (pada apeti getih).\textsuperscript{18}

This passage from the Babad paints a picture of feuding Sasak aristocrats, one of whom invited the Balinese into East Lombok. The Balinese, with the assistance of some districts, overcame all the others, but finally also established political control over their allies. The fact that they could order their allies, the districts of Praya and Batukliyang, to pay ‘tribute in blood’ (i.e. conscription) is sufficient indication that the independence of these districts had also come to an end. It is very likely that the establishment of Balinese political control over the Sasak districts occurred in this fashion, and that this took place shortly before 1740.\textsuperscript{19}

The second phase that can be distinguished is the period when Gusti Wayan Tegah ruled Lombok, from about 1740 to 1775. During these decades the Balinese appear to have maintained their ascendency over the Sasaks. The Balinese were united so that there was little opportunity for the emergence of independent Sasak districts. There is, at any rate, no evidence of any significant opposition to Balinese rule in this period.

The third phase from 1775 to 1838 was a period of disunity among the Balinese. Shortly after the death of Gusti Wayan Tegeh in 1775 disputes over the succession led to the formation of two rival principalities. Around 1800 further dynastic arguments caused these states to split again, so that at the beginning of the 19th century four antagonistic principalities existed in West Lombok – the main kingdom of Cakranegara (also called: Karangasem-Lombok), Mataram, Pagasangan and Pagutan. During these decades Balinese control over East Lombok weakened, thus allowing the Sasak aristocrats to regain a measure of independence in their districts.

In the final phase from 1838 to 1849 the Balinese were reunited. In 1838 the long-standing enmity between the rival principalities came to a head. In January of that year the Raja of Mataram, Gusti K’tut Karangasem, assisted by troops from Karangasem, the English trader King and the Buginese bandar Ismaila, began hostilities against the Raja of Cakranegara, Ratu Ngurah Panji, who was assisted by Pagasangan, Pagutan, the Danish trader Lange and a number of Sasak aristocrats. The war, both on land and at sea, lasted for about six months. Partly because the trader Lange was unsuccessful in his attempts to stop the steady supply of Balinese troops crossing the Lombok Strait, Mataram – whose Raja died in the fighting – gradually gained the upper hand. In June 1838 the issue was decided. Troops from Mataram conquered the puri of Cakranegara, and Ratu Ngurah Panji with about 300 of his followers died in a final suicide-attack (puputan). The Raja of Mataram was succeeded by his eldest son, Ratu Agung 2 K’tut Karangasem and in the settlement that followed the Dewa Agung of Klungkung, the nominal Balinese overlord (Susuhunan),
placed his nominee, Ida Ratu, upon the vacant throne of Cakranegara. This settlement was not to last, however. In 1839 Ratu Agung2 K'tut who, since the end of the war had held *de facto* power in West Lombok, removed Ida Ratu from the throne, thereby invoking the lasting enmity of the Dewa Agung. Not long after the unification of the Lombok Balinese under the Mataram branch of the Karangasem dynasty, Ratu Agung2 K'tut staged a series of military campaigns in East Lombok whereby this region was once again brought under Balinese rule.20 Finally, in 1849, the Raja brought about the unification of Karangasem and Lombok. Making skillful use of the conflict between the Netherlands Indies Government on the one hand and the Dewa Agung and the Rajas of Buleleng and Karangasem on the other, Ratu Agung2 K'tut sent his troops across the Lombok Strait, overthrew the rival branch of the ruling dynasty and placed his nominee on the throne.21 The 18th century state of Karangasem/Lombok had been completely reconstituted. There was only one difference. Whereas Gusti Wayan Tegeh had been the vassal of the Raja of Karangasem, Ratu Agung2 K’tut was his overlord.22

The most outstanding feature of Lombok society of the latter part of the 19th century was the strong power-political position of the Balinese. As a result of the conquest the Balinese aristocracy, the *triwangsa*,23 headed by the Raja, had become Lombok’s only ruling class. With few exceptions, all officials (*punggawa*), whether they filled positions in the administration (*bautanda punggawa*), in the judiciary (*pedanda*) or in the supervision of irrigation and taxation (*sedahan*), were recruited from this class. The highest office a member of the defeated Sasak aristocracy, the *perwangsa*,24 could attain was that of village chief or tax collector for the Balinese district chief (*punggawa*).25 But while the Balinese aristocrats were unquestionably Lombok’s rulers, the social foundations of their dominant position were quite different in the western and the eastern part of the island.

In West Lombok, where Balinese power had been established since the early 17th century and where a Sasak aristocracy did not exist, the relations between the Balinese rulers and the ruled Sasaks were relatively harmonious. The Sasak peasant, who adhered to the Waktu-telu version of Islam, participated in Balinese religious festivities and worshipped at the same shrines.26 Intermarriage between Balinese and Sasaks was a frequent occurrence.27 For purposes of *sawah*-cultivation Balinese and Sasak peasants were organized in the same irrigation associations (*subak*).28 All in all, it is clear that a process of social integration was taking place. In East Lombok, where Balinese power had been reestablished only in the 1840s, and where a frustrated Sasak aristocracy did exist, the relations between the *triwangsa* and the Sasak population were less harmonious. The Sasaks, particularly the *perwangsa*, adhered to the Waktu-lima version of Islam which condemned the Balinese as unbelievers (*kafir*). The Sasak peasant continued to regard the *perwangsa*, with whom he had strong cultural bonds, as his ‘natural’ leader. But nevertheless East Lombok was also firmly
under Balinese control. About 50 punggawas maintained Balinese power from their fortified establishments (puri), where they were surrounded by their followers and armed retainers.29

The System of Land Tenure

Although direct information on the system of land tenure before the Balinese conquest is not available, on the basis of what is known about conditions in the latter part of the 19th century and with the assistance of Professor van Vollenhoven’s model of Indonesian land rights, it is possible to reconstruct this system in broad outline. In pre-Balinese Lombok there was little supra-village political organization, but within the village a class structure had already established itself: (1) the aristocracy (perwangsa) — originally the core-villagers; (2) the ‘free’ peasants (kaula); (3) the serfs (panjak).30 The formation of classes led to the erosion of the communal right of disposal (beschikkingsrecht)31 — vested in the village community — by individual rights to the land. Two types of individual rights had emerged: (1) those exercised by the peasant (beklemd bezitrecht) and those exercised by the aristocracy (vrij bezitrecht). While the peasants’ small-holdings remained very much ‘restricted’ by the communal right of disposal, the larger holdings of the aristocracy had ‘freed’ themselves from communal restrictions. The most important communal restriction on peasant land-holding were the following: (1) the community had the power to dispossess the peasant if his land was needed for some common purpose; (2) the community had the power to dispossess the peasant if he was negligent in his duties towards the village (i.e. desa services); (3) the community did not allow the peasant to alienate his land outside the village.32 Mainly due to their position of power within the village none of these restrictions applied to the land-holdings of the aristocracy. The aristocrat had become master over his land, he could dispose of it as he saw fit; he could sell it, pawn it or give it away. The only communal restriction that remained was that the aristocrat could not leave his land uncultivated. In such an unlikely event the community could repossess it.33

Thus, the main features of the system of land tenure before the Balinese conquest were:

(1) The communal right of disposal remained very strong with regard to the uncultivated land within the area of disposal (beschikkingskring) of the village. This meant that the community itself and its members individually (but not outsiders) had the right freely to use uncultivated land. The village community and its members had the right to bring uncultivated land under cultivation, to gather the products of the forest, to hunt, to pasture animals and so on.

(2) The communal right of disposal continued to restrict the land-holding of the peasant. The right to the land exercised by the peasant can therefore be referred to as restricted ownership (beklemd bezitrecht).
(3) The communal right of disposal had ceased to place any serious restrictions on the land-holding of the aristocracy. The right to the land exercised by the aristocracy can therefore be referred to as unrestricted ownership (vrij bezitrecht).

The conquest and the resulting strong power-political position of the Raja and triwangsa had far-reaching consequences for the system of land tenure. The most important of these consequences was that the communal right of disposal — once vested in the Sasak village community — was transformed into an all-pervasive domain right in the hands of the Balinese Raja. The usurpation of the communal right of the Sasak village gave the Raja such extensive powers that he became the effective owner of all the land on Lombok, cultivated as well as uncultivated. What were the Raja’s powers?

A. Uncultivated land

The right of the village community and its members freely to use the uncultivated land within the area of disposal of the village had been drawn towards the Raja. This meant that peasants wishing to bring uncultivated land under cultivation had to obtain the Raja’s permission. The Raja could dispose of the uncultivated land as he saw fit. Many tracts of forest were reserved as hunting-grounds (larangan) for the exclusive use of the court and privileged punggawas.\(^{34}\) To hunt in these forests without the Raja’s permission was a punishable offence. Other tracts of land were reserved for pasturing the Raja’s extensive herds. To pasture animals on these lands without permission was likewise a punishable offence.\(^{35}\)

B. Cultivated land

The power of the village community to place restrictions on the land-holding of the peasant had also been drawn towards the Raja. It was no longer the village but the Raja who could dispossess the peasant if he needed the land for some purpose or if the peasant was negligent in his duties towards him (i.e. land tax and corvée). Similarly, it was no longer the village but the Raja who prevented the peasant from alienating the land he was cultivating.

In practice, there were two main categories of cultivated land: the druwe dalem and the druwe jabe lands.\(^{36}\)

The druwe dalem lands were those held directly by the Raja, by the power inside (dalem) the palace (puri). Since the Raja was the owner he could dispose of these lands in different ways. The three most important categories were:

a) The pengayah lands. These were lands cultivated by peasants (pengayah) on condition of regular payment of the land tax (pajeg, upeti) and performance of corvée labour. The alienation of these lands was forbidden.

b) The pecatu fields. These were small apanages, free from the land tax but not from corvée labour. These lands the Raja granted to his favoured
subjects, Balinese peasants (suдра) and reliable Sasaks. They were held by minor officials, the Raja’s bodyguard, artisans and so on. Alienation of these lands for more than one year was forbidden.

c) The wakap fields. These were small apanages free from both land tax and corvée. The Raja granted these lands to institutions such as temples, mosques and irrigation associations. The products were used for the maintenance of the institution. Alienation of these lands was forbidden.

The druwe jabe lands were those not held directly by the Raja but by persons outside (jabe) the puri. They were of two types:

a) Druwe jabe Bali. These were large apanages the Raja had given in ownership to Balinese aristocrats. The Raja did not collect land tax or use the corvée labour of the peasants (sepangan) cultivating these lands. Rather, the Balinese aristocrats collected the tax and used the corvée labour of his sepangans for his own purposes.

b) Druwe jabe Sasak. These were lands over which Sasak aristocrats — with the Raja’s approval — had retained ownership. Also on these lands the Raja did not collect the land tax or use the corvée labour of the sepangans. The land tax and corvée came to benefit the Sasak aristocrat.

This system of land tenure had three important consequences for Lombok society. In the first place, it seriously undermined the autonomy of the Sasak village. Fundamental to the existence of the village as an autonomous socio-political organization was the communal right of disposal over the land within the area of disposal of the village. The right of disposal constituted the very substance of village autonomy. The Raja’s usurpation of his communal right affected the Sasak village in both East and West Lombok. In West Lombok, where Balinese power had been established for more than two centuries, the village had ceased to exist as the basic form of socio-political organization. The notion of an area of disposal was unknown; there no longer was a village government or village chief exercising certain powers over the entire village. The peasant of West Lombok, depending on whether he was cultivating druwe dalem or druwe jabe lands, was ruled directly by the Raja or by the landowning Balinese aristocrat.\textsuperscript{37} In East Lombok, where Balinese power had only recently been re-established, the village still existed to some extent as the basic form of socio-political organization. The notion of an area of disposal (paer desa) still existed; there still was a village chief who was always a member of the Sasak aristocracy. But the power of the village government had been severely curtailed. The village chief’s main function was to keep order and to make sure that the peasant paid his taxes and performed corvée. The village chief in East Lombok had been reduced to little more than a tax collector for the Balinese district chief, the punggawa.\textsuperscript{38}
Secondly, this system of land tenure meant a substantial reduction in the social position of the Sasak peasant. Basic to the status of the ‘free’ peasant in the Indonesian world was ownership (either restricted or unrestricted) of the land he cultivated. But since the Raja had acquired a domain right over all the land on Lombok the Sasak peasant was left only with a right of cultivation. This right was not a right to the land, but only a conditional right to a share of the product of land and labour. It was conditional on the peasants’ payment of the land tax, performance of corvée labour and observance of the restrictions on land alienation. If the peasant was negligent in any of these respects his share of the land could be taken from him. He then became a peasant without access to land and therefore dependent on the charity of his relatives. Due to the down-grading of land rights, the peasant lost such freedom as he had once enjoyed. All power over his fate passed to the landlord, i.e. the Raja, the Balinese and Sasak aristocracies. The peasant, for instance, was obliged to follow the land in any transaction between landlords. Whenever the Raja granted lands to one of the Balinese aristocrats the social status of the peasants cultivating these lands changed from pengayah to sepangan. From having been the Raja’s direct subordinate the peasant became the subordinate of the Balinese landlord. Sometimes transactions concerned the peasant only. For instance, whenever the Raja was in need of more peasants to cultivate his extensive lands, he simply bought them from a Balinese or Sasak landlord. Since the peasant had lost all power over his fate, since he was obliged to follow the land and could himself be the subject of exchange, it is clear that his social position had declined to that of a serf.

Thirdly, this system of land tenure clearly favoured the Balinese over the Sasaks. For a number of reasons land-holding among the Balinese aristocracy (druwe jabe Bali) could only increase, while land-holding among the Sasak aristocracy (druwe jabe Sasak) could but decline. First, the Raja granted druwe jabe lands only to members of the triwangsa and not to the perwangsa. Second, the Raja issued a law which ensured that Balinese aristocrats would sell their land only within the triwangsa. Third, with regard to the Sasak aristocracy the Raja enforced the law of camput. This law stipulated that the Raja inherit all possessions — land and sepangans, wives and daughters — of a man who died without leaving a male heir. And fourth, the Raja did not place any restrictions on the sale of land by members of the perwangsa to the triwangsa. Also the position of the Balinese peasant was more favourable than that of his Sasak counterpart. In exchange for services around his palaces and pleasure-gardens the Raja granted tax-free pecatu-fields to virtually all of the Balinese sudra. The Sasak peasant (particularly of East Lombok), generally did not receive these fields, but was obliged to cultivate the druwe dalem or druwe jabe lands on condition of the payment of land tax and the performance of corvée labour.
Thus, the Balinese conquest led to the almost total suppression of Sasak land rights. By means of drawing the communal right of disposal towards himself, the Raja assumed a domain right over all the land on Lombok. Exercising his great powers, the Raja was able to undermine the autonomy of the Sasak village, to reduce the social position of the Sasak peasant to that of a serf, and to ensure Balinese dominance over the Saks. For these reasons, Balinese rule on Lombok must be regarded as having been quite oppressive.

The System of Taxation

The Raja of Lombok was almost certainly the wealthiest indigenous ruler in the eastern part of the Indonesian archipelago. His great riches did not arise from his economic activities, but rather from his political power which enabled him to levy taxes on the island’s peasant population. His principal sources of income were threefold: trade, the land tax, and corvée labour.46

The Raja’s income from trade resulted from his control over trading activities. This control dated from the 1850s when he succeeded in centering all commercial activity on only two ports — Ampenan in the west and Labuan Haji in the east.47 Each of the mainly Chinese and Arab traders (Bal. bandar) who was permitted to remain in these two ports was granted a trade-monopoly in a particular commodity or set of commodities. In exchange for the trade-monopoly, which included the right to levy import and/or export duties, the bandars paid the Raja the following amounts shown in Table I on p.12. Thus, the Raja derived a total of about 50 650 rijksdaalders, or fl. 126 625, annually from his control over trade.

The Raja’s most important source of income was the land tax (pajeg and upeti). This tax, however, was not collected on all the cultivated land on Lombok, but only on part of the domain lands (the druwe dalem lands). In order to estimate the Raja’s income from this source it is therefore first necessary to establish the extent of the cultivated land area subject to taxation. In the latter part of the 19th century the total area of land under cultivation in West Lombok was about 15 170 ha. of irrigated sawah, 1680 ha. of rain sawah and 4370 ha. of tegalan/gardens; and in East Lombok about 10 750 ha. of irrigated sawah, 44 400 ha. of rain sawah and 20 110 ha. of tegalan/gardens.49 Calculated in the Balinese measurement, the tenah (5832m²), Lombok’s total cultivated land area was as shown in Table II on p.12.

The apanages held by Balinese and Sasak aristocrats (the druwe jabe lands) were exempted from the land tax. The proportion between the two main categories of cultivated land, the druwe dalem and the druwe jabe lands, is known precisely for West Lombok and approximately for the East. In West Lombok 64.1% of the irrigated sawah-area, 78.2% of the rain sawah and 76.5% of the tegalan/gardens-area belonged to the Raja’s domain, while the remainder consisted of apanages held by Balinese aristocrats.50 In East Lombok about two-thirds of the sawah-area (both irrigated and rain) and three-quarters of the
### Table I: Royal Revenue from Trade about 1890

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Type of Trade</th>
<th>Amount in rijksdaalders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>Export</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>Export</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opium</td>
<td>Import</td>
<td>4,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hides</td>
<td>Export</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles/petrol</td>
<td>Import</td>
<td>3,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kepengs</td>
<td>Import/Export</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambir</td>
<td>Import</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small articles</td>
<td>Import</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coconuts/oil</td>
<td>Export</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pigs</td>
<td>Export</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>Import</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandy</td>
<td>Import</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arak</td>
<td>Import</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matches</td>
<td>Import</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kempiri/Kapok</td>
<td>Export</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mengkudu</td>
<td>Export</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal bones</td>
<td>Export</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>50,650</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table II: Cultivated Area in Lombok in tenah

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Irr. Sawah</th>
<th>Rain Sawah</th>
<th>Tegalans/Gardens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Lombok</td>
<td>26,012</td>
<td>2,883</td>
<td>7,493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Lombok</td>
<td>18,433</td>
<td>76,132</td>
<td>34,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>44,445</td>
<td>79,015</td>
<td>42,147</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
tegalan/garden-area were druwe dalem lands, while the remainder consisted of druwe jabe lands held mainly by Sasak aristocrats. The Raja’s direct domain therefore comprised:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table III: Direct Domain of Raja of Lombok, in tenahs (rounded)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Lombok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Lombok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Several categories of druwe dalem lands were exempted from the land tax. The low productivity tegal-fields, which constituted about 24% of the tegalan/garden-area, were not deemed important enough to be taxed. The pecatu-fields (held by Balinese sudras, favoured Sasaks and minor officials) and the wakap-fields (held by institutions), which together comprised about 18% of the irrigated sawah-area, were likewise ‘free’ from the land tax. Thus the area of land subject to taxation was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table IV: Land Subject to Taxation, in tenahs (rounded)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Lombok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Lombok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Raja collected the pajeg (payable in padi) only on the irrigated sawahs, and the upeti (payable in kepengs) on the rain sawahs and the gardens. The level of the pajeg and upeti varied roughly in accordance with productivity and distance from the centre of power. While in West Lombok the pajeg amounted to 150 bundles of padi (each weighing 1200 kepengs) per tenah of irrigated sawah, in East Lombok only 75 such bundles were collected per tenah of sawah. And while in West Lombok the upeti was 1000 kepengs per tenah of garden and 500 kepengs per tenah of rain sawah, in East Lombok this tax was only 200 kepengs per tenah of garden and 100 kepengs per tenah of rain sawah. The Raja’s pajeg income was therefore: \((13 670 \times 150) + (10 080 \times 75) = 2 806 500\) bundles of padi. Since one bundle of 1200 kepengs in weight
equals 0.08 picok, this quantity was equivalent to 224 520 piculs of padi. And the Raja’s upeti income was \( (4350 \times 1000) + (2250 \times 500) + (19 \times 750 \times 200) + (50 \times 750 \times 100) = 14 \, 500 \, 000 \) kepangs. In view of the exchange rate between the rijkstraalden and the kepeng of 1:1000,\(^{55}\) this amount was equivalent to 14 500 rijkstraalders, or fl. 36 250.

While it is not possible to precisely quantify the value of the corvée (Bal. *jahan drwene*) which the Raja enjoyed, there can be no doubt that this constituted an important source of income. Since the Raja called up one corvée labourer (*pengayah*) per tenah of irrigated sawah or garden (which was regarded as providing adequate subsistence for a peasant and his family),\(^{56}\) he had approximately \( 28 \, 960 + 31 \, 720 = 60 \, 680 \) (see Table III) corvée labourers at his disposal. Aside from maintaining the Raja’s sizeable court (a task performed mainly by the Balinese pecatu-holders of West Lombok),\(^{57}\) the pengayahs were put to work on a variety of projects. Over the period 1850-90, Mataram and Cakranegara were transformed into magnificent towns, with several spacious palaces (*puri*), public drinking fountains and illuminated main streets. In West Lombok a number of paved roads were constructed, including a wide, shaded road from Ampenan through Mataram to Cakranegara. The corvée labourers further laid out the pleasure gardens of Narmada, Lingsar, Gunung Sari, Bogowati and Suranadi, complete with terraced hills, ponds and fountains.\(^{58}\) These projects, which involved considerable quantities of labour, greatly enhanced the splendour of the Raja’s court.

Although much of the Raja’s great wealth was unproductively hoarded in his treasure chambers, a substantial part came to benefit the Balinese aristocracy. The main sources of punggawa income were the apanages (sometimes measuring as much as 100 tenah of irrigated sawah)\(^{59}\) the Raja had granted them. They gave these druwe jabe lands in cultivation to their sepanangs against half of the padi harvest and the performance of services of various kinds. But if the punggawas were in need of additional income, they could usually rely on the Raja. Not infrequently, the Raja would give permission for some of his corvée labourers to be used to build them a house or to lay out a pleasure garden. Also the domain padi that was left after the needs of the court had been met, was used to dispense benefits. The Raja either gave them grants in padi or sold them quantities for a very low price, thus enabling them to realize a profit in the rice trade.\(^{60}\) By sharing his wealth in this way the Raja ensured the continued loyalty of the Balinese aristocracy, the social class upon which his political power was based.

Thus the only taxes of any significance were the import and export duties, the land tax and corvée. The burden of the most important tax (the land tax), while uneven, was not very great. The level of the upeti (the tax on rain sawahs and gardens) was moderate in West Lombok and quite low in the East. Partly because the pajeg was levied only on irrigated sawahs, and in part because several important categories of land-holding were exempted (the
druwe jabe lands, the pecatu and wakap fields), this tax also was not very heavy for Lombok’s population as a whole. Out of a total rice production of about 2,980,000 piculs of padi,61 the Raja appropriated some 224,520 piculs in pajeg, not more than approximately 7.6%. In comparison with what was to come under the Dutch (see Chapter VI), Balinese exploitation of Lombok’s peasant population was of quite moderate dimensions.

* In summary, while Balinese rule on Lombok was rather oppressive, it was not unduly exploitative. For this reason, the high level of tension which characterized Lombok society of the latter part of the 19th century is to be attributed more to socio-political factors than to economic deprivation. The most important factor was the existence in East Lombok of a class of Sasak aristocrats, whose power, wealth and influence was on the decline. The perwangsa presented the Raja with an almost insoluble problem. Remembering the time when they had constituted Lombok’s only ruling class, the Sasak aristocracy was hostile to Balinese rule. The Raja, in his turn, did not trust them and therefore sought to exclude them from positions of power, took steps to reduce their land-holdings, and did not grant them the material benefits he so generously bestowed upon the Balinese aristocracy. This, however, served to increase perwangsa resentment. Mainly because the East Sasak peasant remained tied to his traditional leader by strong cultural bonds, this was an extremely dangerous development. The loyalty of the peasant enabled the Sasak aristocracy to raise the flag of rebellion. The tension in Lombok society flared into open revolt in 1855, 1871 and finally in 1891. While the Balinese succeeded in suppressing the revolts of 1855 and 1871, due to special historical circumstances the 1891 revolt proved to be fatal for the House of Karangasem.
CHAPTER II
THE EAST SASAK REVOLT

In Chapter I some of the underlying reasons for the East Sasak revolt have been touched upon. These long-term factors, however, while illustrating the inherent instability of Balinese rule, do not provide sufficient explanation for the outbreak of revolt. The event which served as the ‘triggering mechanism’ was the war between the Raja of Lombok and the Dewa Agung of Klungkung. This war started a development which led first to a local revolt in the district of Praya and, some time later, to a general revolt in virtually all of East Lombok.

Although the great majority of Ratu Agung2 Ngurah’s subjects were Sasak by ethnicity and culture, the Raja continued to see himself as belonging to the Balinese world and remained vitally concerned with political developments in his homeland. The most outstanding feature of his relations with Bali was the contest with the Dewa Agung for hegemony over the Balinese region. Ratu Agung2 Ngurah resented the Dewa Agung’s claim to be the Emperor (Susuhiwan) of both Bali and Lombok,1 and therefore his overlord. He repeatedly made a point of denying this. ‘From the earliest times onwards, we have never been under the Dewa Agung’s command.’2 No doubt Ratu Agung2 Ngurah felt that he, as by far the wealthiest and most powerful of the Balinese Rajas, had a much better claim to be the Susuhunan. Be this as it may, his resentment led him to disapprove strongly of territorial gains by the ruler of Klungkung. When the Dewa Agung annexed the principality of Gianyar in 1885, Ratu Agung2 Ngurah nearly went to war with him.3 But when the Dewa Agung, in 1891, made fresh territorial gains, this time at the expense of Mengwi, the Raja decided that the time had come to curb the growing power of his rival. On 22 June 1891 he issued the fateful order for several thousands of East Sasak troops to be sent to Karangasem, in preparation for an invasion of Klungkung.4

The call to go to Bali was extremely unpopular in East Lombok. This is not surprising. Unlike the peasants of West Lombok, those of the East lacked cultural or religious bonds with their Balinese rulers, and could hardly be expected to feel strongly about a war on Bali. Moreover, for people whose horizons were limited to their own and a few surrounding villages, the journey to Karangasem must have appeared a jump into the unknown. Military service was a form of corvée labour. As in other types of corvée, the peasant was expected to provide his own means of sustenance. And finally, aside from the obvious danger to life and limb, it was time for the harvest. The widespread resentment this order produced caused tension in Lombok to rise far above its ‘normal’ level. That something was amiss is indicated by the circulation of two politically important rumours. First, rightly or wrongly, it was widely held that the troops sent to Bali had been perishing in large numbers. In 1894 an
East Sasak leader recalled: '... to be ordered to go and fight in Karangasem brought the people nothing but wretchedness. They knew that many of those who had obeyed the order had succumbed to hunger and exhaustion'. 5 Second, it was rumoured that the Raja intended to execute all Sasak aristocrats as soon as circumstances would allow him to do so. Late in 1891 a group of East Sasak leaders wrote:

The Raja had let it be known that he knew of the plans of some Mohammedans to rebel against him, but that owing to the complications connected with the war on Bali he was unable to do anything. He promised that after the war all those who had wanted to rebel as well as all notable Mohammedans [i.e. Sasak aristocrats] would be put to death. 6

When the Raja, early in August, issued orders for a second levy of troops to be sent to Bali, the atmosphere became quite explosive. Peasants in the Praya district refused to obey. In an effort to enforce discipline, the Balinese district-chief (punggawa) ordered the execution of a Sasak aristocrat, a religious leader, whom he held responsible. 7 This action proved to be entirely counterproductive. Instead of restoring obedience the execution spread panic among the Praya aristocracy. Believing that the rumour which had been circulating for some time was now materializing, a group of Praya aristocrats, led by Mami Bangkol, one of the gurus of the tarekat Nakshabandiya, 8 decided: '... not to await further punishment, but to call upon the people to rise in rebellion at once'. 9 The peasants of Praya and surrounding villages responded. On 7 August several thousand insurgents attacked and burnt the puri of the Balinese district chief. 10

Ratu Agung2 Ngurah reacted swiftly. On 8 August he instructed his eldest son, Anak Agung Made, to restore order. 11 To this end the prince mustered a force of about 3000 West Lombok troops and advanced on Praya. In addition, he instructed some of the Balinese district chiefs in East Lombok to call up the corvée labourers in their resorts. Some 6000 to 8000 East Sasak troops began closing in on Praya from the East. By 11 August the town had been surrounded and Made ordered the attack. Although his troops succeeded in burning part of the town, in killing a large number of rebels and in taking scores of them prisoner, the insurgents stood their ground. 12 Mainly due to the growing unreliability of his East Sasak troops, the prince was unable to stage a second attack, but had to be content with maintaining an increasingly precarious encirclement.

When it became apparent that Made had difficulty crushing the revolt in Praya, the Raja ordered the crown prince, Anak Agung K’tut, to join him. On 25 August K’tut advanced with several thousand West Lombok followers. Like Made, he instructed some of the Balinese district chiefs in East Lombok to call up the corvée labourers in their resorts and to advance from the east. With the
arrival of the crown prince on 28 August, the forces surrounding Praya grew to some 20,000, enabling Made and K’tut to take the offensive. Their troops attacked, killed many of the insurgents, burnt the mosque in the centre of the town, but were again unable to overcome the determined resistance.\textsuperscript{13}

After the failure of the second attack on Praya, social tension began to accelerate rapidly. To a large extent Made and K’tut were themselves responsible for this. If they had used only reliable troops from West Lombok, they may well have succeeded in putting down the Praya revolt. By mobilizing thousands of unwilling East Sasaks, they not only reduced the effectiveness of their West Lombok troops, but also increased the chances of the revolt spreading. Aside from the fact that the East Sasak peasant regarded military service as a particularly hateful type of corvée, these thousands of troops came into close contact with the Praya insurgents who continually appealed to them to cease fighting and to join them in their struggle. Their displeasure at being called up and growing sympathy for the rebels made them increasingly reluctant to fight in a serious way. This produced a conflict situation between the West Lombok and East Sasak troops around Praya. East Sasak ambushes of small parties of Balinese troops moving along the trail to and from Cakranegara became a common occurrence. Incidents became frequent in which Balinese riflebearers, who were kept in the rear, shot and killed unwilling East Sasaks.\textsuperscript{14}

In the midst of this explosive atmosphere, Made and K’tut made another miscalculation. Realizing that ‘... the reason why the revolt in Praya had not been crushed sooner was that all Mohammedans secretly agreed with these people and therefore did not fight more forcefully’,\textsuperscript{15} they resolved to enforce discipline. On 18 September they ordered the arrest of 12 prominent members of the perwangsa, including the head of the village of Batukliyang and 450 of their followers. On the same day the Sasak aristocrats were executed, while their followers were tied and taken to prisons in Mataram and Cakranegara.\textsuperscript{16}

These events sent shock waves through East Lombok society. Believing the rumour to have come true that they would all be put to death, various groups of Sasak aristocrats decided: ‘... no longer to allow their fellow countrymen to be butchered like chickens and to rise in rebellion’.\textsuperscript{17} Nearly everywhere the peasants heeded the call and attacked the puris of the Balinese district-chiefs. Faced with this massive revolt and fearful lest they and their West Lombok troops be surrounded, Made and K’tut abandoned the siege of Praya and withdrew to the west.\textsuperscript{18} By 22 September 1891 Balinese rule had been overthrown almost everywhere in East Lombok.

Throughout the course of the revolt the line-up of forces was to remain fairly constant. The Balinese and Sasak populations of West Lombok (approximately 140 000) remained loyal to the Raja, while the Sasak population of the East (approximately 390 000) remained rebellious. This ‘fixed’ geographical polarization reveals the predominant character of the revolt. It was
not a conflict fought strictly along ethnic or religious lines, nor was it, at its outset, a class struggle in the sense of a conflict between the peasantry as a class and the aristocratic landowners. Although the revolt was to acquire elements of this type of class conflict, its initial character was overwhelmingly that of a struggle between an aspiring aristocracy (perwangsa) and an established one (triwangsa), a struggle in which both parties were supported by their respective peasant followings.

The Struggle for Power

Shortly after the outbreak of the East Sasak revolt, the Netherlands Indies Government started on a policy of intervention towards Lombok. The nature of this policy will be discussed in detail in Chapter III. Here it should suffice to point out that Dutch activities affected the struggle for power. By directing their policy of intervention exclusively against the Raja, the Dutch weakened the triwangsa party in relation to that of the perwangsa. Dutch attempts to prevent the importation of war materials into Balinese-held Lombok, and their seizure of two Lombok steamships, to a large extent nullified the military advantage the Raja could have derived from his great wealth. And further, Dutch efforts to cut all communications between Bali and Lombok prevented the Raja from obtaining adequate reinforcements from Karangasem. But in spite of this interference the triwangsa party remained the more powerful of the two. This was chiefly due to better organization. Whereas the East Sasaks were led by a large number of territorial chiefs who operated quite independently of one another and often at cross purposes, the West Lombok troops fought under a far more unified command. Largely for this reason the Raja was not only able to hold his own against insurgent attacks, but came quite close to crushing the revolt.

Mainly because there was no great qualitative difference in the way the two parties were armed (both sides used rifles as well as traditional weapons, i.e. the lance and the kris), the fighting assumed the character of positional warfare. The pattern of the war was one in which the Raja, by repulsing the initial East Sasak attacks on the defensive positions of West Lombok, by staging three offensives enabling him to construct new defensive positions far into East Lombok and by again repulsing East Sasak attacks on these new positions, came to a stalemate with the insurgents. This, however, was clearly to his advantage.

When East Lombok rose in revolt, Ratu Agung Ngurah took personal charge of military operations. He had every reason to be concerned. The East Sasak rebels were far more numerous than the troops he could possibly raise among the loyal population of West Lombok. According to contemporary estimate the strength of the two parties was as follows:
Table V: Strength of Two Parties in East Lombok Revolt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>West Lombok</th>
<th>East Lombok</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Followers of the punggawas of:</td>
<td>Troops belonging to the districts of:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cakranegara</td>
<td>8 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mataram</td>
<td>6 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pagasangan</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pagutan</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pamenang</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pringgabaya</td>
<td>3 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batukliyang</td>
<td>3 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jro Aru</td>
<td>3 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanasaba</td>
<td>2 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KaliJaga</td>
<td>2 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apitai</td>
<td>2 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pegading</td>
<td>2 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since the troops of the Raja were outnumbered by almost 3:1, the threat of an East Sasak invasion of West Lombok was certainly a real one. To counter this threat, Ratu Agung Ngurah ordered a number of emergency measures. He instructed his nephew, Anak Agung Jilantik, the ruler of Karangasem, to come to his assistance with a force of 4000 Balinese auxiliary troops. He stipulated that all exports of rice and other foodstuffs be halted, and ordered the construction of three lines of defence. The first was built along the Babak River (which separates West from East Lombok), where at several strategic points — Tanahbea, Narmada and Kediri — fortified positions were erected. A second line of defence was constructed along the two roads leading from the Babak River to the main Balinese towns of Cakranegara and Mataram and to the pleasure gardens at Lingsar and Gunung Sari. These roads were closed off at several points by heavy wooden fences and guarded by troops armed with rifles. The third line of defence was constructed around the towns of Mataram and Cakranegara. These towns were encircled by double bamboo walls, the two-metre space between them filled with thornbushes and protected by cannon at places where the enemy would be most likely to attempt a breakthrough.

After these measures had been implemented, Ratu Agung Ngurah, accompanied by the princes, his punggawas and thousands of troops, took up his position along the Babak River where he awaited the inevitable East Sasak
assault.  

This soon came. It was not, however, a single, co-ordinated effort, but consisted of at least three separate attacks carried out by different groups at different times and places. On 25 September rebels from the districts of Rarang, Masbagik and Pringgabayal attacked the defensive positions at Tanahbea. Although they overran the village, they were unable to cross the Babak River and had to be content with constructing their own defensive positions on the river’s east bank. On 27 September the fortifications around Narmada were attacked by insurgents from the districts of Kopang and Batukliyang. They failed to take any these positions and were forced to withdraw across the Babak where they began constructing their own fortifications. On 2 October rebels from the districts of Praya, Sakra and Jro Aru attacked the defensive positions around Kediri. They too were forced to withdraw towards the village of Pakukling, just east of Kediri.

By 3 October 1891 the East Sasak assault on West Lombok was spent. Its failure to penetrate even the first of the three Balinese lines of defence had shown that the insurgents were incapable of staging an invasion. From this time onwards the East Sasaks never again posed a serious threat to West Lombok. On the contrary, despite the fact that they were heavily outnumbered, the West Lombok troops took the initiative and the theatre of war moved ever further to the East.

As soon as the rebel attacks had abated, Ratu Agung2 Ngurah went on the offensive. On 5 October he crossed the Babak River with thousands of West Lombok followers and about 800 auxiliary troops recently arrived from Karangasem. Unlike the insurgents, he launched a well-organized assault against a single point. His troops attacked Pakukling, overran the village and burnt it to the ground. Upon breaking through the East Sasak line of defence, the Raja continued the offensive in the direction of Praya. However, on account of the high degree of popular resistance the advance was very slow. Everywhere the population refused to submit, forcing the Balinese to fight for each and every village. The Raja left a trail of desolation behind as crops and irrigation works were destroyed, as village upon village was burnt. By 29 October the town of Batujai was reached. After a fierce battle in which 200 rebels and 40 of the Raja’s troops were reported to have died, the town was taken. Wishing to escape total destruction, Batujai offered its submission, enabling the Balinese to entrench themselves behind strong fortifications.

On 9 December Ratu Agung2 Ngurah, who had now been joined by about 3000 auxiliary troops from Karangasem, resumed the offensive. He drove the rebels from the town of Sukarara and obtained its submission. With the rainy season rapidly approaching, the Raja offered the East Sasaks a truce. Their reply was an attack on the newly conquered town of Sukarara which, however, was easily repulsed. This forced the Raja to continue the offensive into the rainy season. By 22 December he reached and took the village of Kau. Like Batujai and Sukarara this village also offered its submission. On 7 January 1892 he
reached the town of Mujur. After a battle in which 130 insurgents were reported to have died, the town was taken. Also, Mujur offered its submission, allowing the Balinese to construct defensive positions. Here, however, the offensive came to a halt. The rain which made such roads as existed virtually impassable, the increasing number of casualties among the troops due to dysentery and fevers, the necessity to cultivate the land in West Lombok, all combined to prevent a continuation of the offensive. After leaving forces of occupation in Mujur, Kau, Batuurai and Sukarara, the Raja withdrew to West Lombok where his troops could recuperate and work the fields.

Although the first offensive had fallen a long way short of restoring Balinese rule over East Lombok, it had not been without results. Ratu Agung Ngurah had devastated a considerable part of the rebellious region and had reconquered the southern part of Central Lombok. Nevertheless, since the most populous part of East Lombok had escaped destruction or reconquest, the East Sasaks were as yet far from defeated and remained capable of staging attacks. In order to defend West Lombok and the newly reconquered region against such attacks, a considerable number of troops were needed. In Mujur and Kau the Raja left occupation forces of about 1000 troops each. Sukarara and Batuurai were held by the auxiliary troops from Karangasem, who by this time numbered around 2500. It was further necessary to man the defensive positions along the Babak River at Kediri (500), at Narmada (1000), and at Tanahbea (500). This meant that just for purposes of defence approximately 4000 West Lombok troops had to remain in the field at all times. Since the total number of West Lombok troops was around 17 000, a Balinese or West Sasak follower of the Raja was required to man the fortifications for approximately one month in each period of four months.

A few weeks after Ratu Agung Ngurah had withdrawn to West Lombok, the East Sasaks made an attempt to regain the territory they had lost. Like the assault on West Lombok, this one too was badly co-ordinated and lacked a common purpose. Instead of concentrating all their forces against a single point in the long line of Balinese fortifications, the East Sasaks staged two separate attacks. On 30 January insurgents from the districts of Praya and Sakra attacked the village of Kau. Although they succeeded in overrunning some of the fortifications and in burning part of the village, the Balinese defenders were able to drive them out. And on 6 February rebels from the districts of Kopang, Batukliyang and Rarang attacked the town of Batuurai. They were unable to penetrate the town’s defences, but did succeed in closing it off on three sides so that it retained a line of communication with Kediri only. On 9 February reinforcements from West Lombok arrived in Batuurai, enabling the Balinese to stage a counter-attack which drove the insurgents away from the town. This unsuccessful attempt to regain lost territory was to be the last major effort on the part of the East Sasaks. From this time onwards their actions became mainly defensive.
MAP 2: SITUATION ON LOMBOK AT THE END OF THE SECOND BALINESE OFFENSIVE: SEPTEMBER 1992

- Unpopulated Mountain and/or forest region
- Held by East Saaks
During the next six months, until September 1892, the fighting subsided. Fighting was limited to skirmishes near the fortifications and Ratu Agung2 Ngurah attempted to end the conflict by peaceful means. In April 1892 he began a policy of reconciliation. East Sasaks who went over to the Balinese side were well received, given presents of food and clothing and sent back to their villages with the message that all those willing to submit would be equally well treated.37 In May and June the Raja released the prisoners of war still detained in [Mataram and Cakranegara.] They too were given presents of food and clothing and sent back to their villages in small groups of 10 to 2038. This policy, however, failed to overcome the walls of suspicion and fear which separated the two parties. The East Sasaks, by and large, remained unresponsive. In July the Raja attempted to come to a settlement with Mami Bangkol, who by this time had become the most influential of the East Sasak leaders. He sent him a letter in which he proposed that peace be concluded under conditions to be agreed upon at a later date. The letter was accompanied by a gift of 1000 rijksdaalders.39 Mami Bangkol did not bother to reply, but did accept the money with the comment that he regarded it as a partial repayment of what the Raja in previous years had stolen from the Sasaks.40 By August it had become clear that Balinese rule over East Lombok could not be re-established by persuasion or by a settlement with Mami Bangkol. For this reason the Raja decided on another offensive aimed at crushing the revolt once and for all.

On 29 August Ratu Agung2 Ngurah attacked the East Sasak positions near Narmada with all the troops he could muster. Since the attack came unexpectedly, the Balinese had little trouble in breaking through.41 On 1 September they took the East Sasak positions at Tanahbea.42 This meant that the insurgents had now been driven from the east bank of the Babak River and that the road towards Lombok’s interior had been opened. The troops proceeded to lay waste to the countryside. Villages were set on fire, rice fields, gardens and irrigation works were destroyed. The population fled to the east and south, towards Masbagik and Praya.43 On 7 September the Raja took and burnt the town of Batukliyang. Kopang followed on 10 September, and Rarang two days later.44 By 18 September the Raja reached the town of Kotaraja which had never participated in the revolt, having remained loyal to its Balinese district-chief.45 Probably believing that these conquests would be sufficient to bring the East Sasaks to their knees, the Raja did not press the offensive any further, but allowed his troops to recuperate in Kotaraja.46

The second offensive came quite close to restoring Balinese rule over East Lombok. The East Sasaks were driven from the Babak River, a large region was devastated, the districts of Kopang, Batukliyang and Rarang were reconquered, and contact was re-established with the loyal district of Kotaraja. The only districts of importance still in rebellion were Praya, Sakra, Masbagik, Pringgabaya and Jro Aru (see Map 2). The offensive spread panic throughout East Lombok. The leaders of the revolt sent envoys to the Dutch Resident in
Buleleng (Bali) with an urgent request for assistance.\textsuperscript{47} Thousands of refugees from the devastated region fled to Sumbawa.\textsuperscript{48} The bandars on Lombok’s east coast, who since the outbreak of revolt had neglected to pay the Raja his fees, likewise fled the island.\textsuperscript{49} The panic was, however, premature. The East Sasaks had not been totally defeated and, while lacking the power to stage large-scale attacks, remained capable of conducting raids. To defend Balinese-held territory a continued manning of the fortifications was required. Aside from the defensive positions of Sukarara, Batuaji, Kau and Mujur, it was now necessary to man fortifications also in Batukliyang, Kopang, Rarang and Kotaraja. Since Batuaji and Sukarara were still held by auxiliary troops from Karangasem, whose numbers had dropped to about 2000, troops from West Lombok had to hold the other six positions. This meant that a force of about 6000 had to remain in the field at all times. Since the total number of West Lombok troops was around 17 000, each one of the Raja’s Balinese and West Sasak followers were now required to man the fortifications for approximately one month in every three.

During the next eight months until June 1893 the fighting abated. Apart from occasional East Sasak raids on Balinese transports of food and war materials,\textsuperscript{50} no hostilities of significance took place. Ratu Agung Ngurah again made several attempts to settle the conflict by peaceful means,\textsuperscript{51} but when it became clear that the East Sasak leaders remained unresponsive, he decided to stage yet another offensive. On 2 June the Raja moved from his base at Kotaraja against the district of Masbagik. This district was the only region of importance between Balinese-held territory and the east coast. If Masbagik fell it would not be very difficult to advance to the coast and cut communications between Pringgabaya and the districts of Praya, Sakra and Jro Aru. Again the Balinese troops proceeded to lay waste to the countryside. On 9 June they reached the town of Masbagik, stormed its defences and occupied it.\textsuperscript{52} The road towards the east coast had now been cleared. The Raja, however, advanced no further; leaving a force of occupation, he retreated to Kotaraja.

The reason for the discontinuation of the third offensive was not the magnitude of East Sasak resistance, but rather rising discontent in West Lombok. In his efforts to crush the revolt, Ratu Agung Ngurah had made increasingly heavy demands on West Lombok’s manpower. Aside from having to man the growing number of fortifications, the West Lombok peasants were required to provide the bulk of the troops necessary for the repeated offensives. When the Raja, in June 1893, issued orders for yet another levy of troops to be called up, discontent flared into active resistance. West Sasak peasants from the village of Sekarbelja refused to obey and began constructing defensive positions.\textsuperscript{53} Sekarbelja was located near enough to the Balinese towns of Mataram and Cakranegara to cause alarm. The Raja sent several thousand Balinese troops from East to West Lombok, which deprived him of the manpower to continue the offensive.
During the next year, until June 1894, no large-scale fighting occurred. While the East Sasaks lacked the power to attack the Balinese fortifications, Ratu Agung2 Ngurah, possibly because he had been frightened by the revolt of Sekarbelia, refrained from ordering further offensives. The situation during this year was, therefore, one of stalemate. Yet it was an unequal stalemate which, had it continued, would almost certainly have resulted in the eventual re-establishment of Balinese rule over East Lombok.

The reason this assertion can be made is that the economic situation in West Lombok was a great deal better than in the East. The Balinese had succeeded in keeping the East Sasaks out of West Lombok. Accordingly, there had been no destruction and the productive process had not been interrupted. Every year the harvests had been reaped. Although no exports of rice took place, there was no shortage of food. In East Lombok the situation was different. Almost half of the region which had originally risen in revolt had been reduced to an absolute wasteland (see Map 3). A contemporary observer described the destruction:

I travelled from Sakra to Kopang and went through an area of utter desolation. Burnt villages. Walls, standing up or fallen down or broken to bits. Alang-alang with weeds in between. And lonely in those broad mainstreets and narrow sidestreets. Uncultivated rice fields on which only grass and alang-alang grows. Naked hilltops where the grass has been scorched. No water. Dry and hot are the surroundings. The irrigation-works have been destroyed.54

The entire region of Central Lombok, from the Babak River in the west to Masbagik in the east, from Kotaraja in the north to Mujur in the south, had been devastated. The population of this region, which must have amounted to some 100 000 people, had fled towards the south and the east, towards the districts of Praya, Sakra and Pringgabaya. Food production in the areas of East Lombok which had escaped destruction was insufficient to feed the normal population as well as the many thousands of refugees. The result was a severe shortage of food. ABuginese spy for the Dutch wrote in February 1894:

At many places [in East Lombok] there is insufficient food. Rice, *jagung* and other valuable foodstuffs are very scarce so that a large part of the population has to eat the trunks of banana-trees.55

A continuation of this unequal stalemate would have resulted in a further deterioration of the economic situation in East Lombok, which in the long run would have been fatal. But this did not eventuate. In June 1894 the Dutch colonial army landed in West Lombok. Faced with this new danger, Ratu
Agung Ngurah recalled all his troops from the East, thus allowing the insurgents to reoccupy all the territory he had gained at such great cost.

**Class Conflict in East Lombok**

In order to assess the social and political consequences of the prolonged struggle for power, it is necessary to turn to East Lombok. In the West, aside from certain emergency measures intended to further the war effort, no significant changes occurred. The Raja remained firmly in control, and the Balinese and West Sasak populations (with the exception of the village of Sekarbeloa) continued to work the fields, pay their taxes and perform such corvée labour (including military service) as was required of them. In East Lombok, on the other hand, the revolt had far-reaching consequences in (1) the emergence of a East Sasak political elite; (2) the improvement in the social position of the East Sasak peasant; (3) the development of a conflict situation between the new East Sasak political elite striving for power and the East Sasak peasant seeking to retain his improved social position.

The collapse of Balinese rule over East Lombok in September 1891 caused the disappearance of all supra-village political organization. This meant that the Sasak aristocrats who had occupied the position of village chief (kliyang) became independent rulers, free from all supra-village political control. This situation, however, did not last long. Shortly after the outbreak of revolt, the heads of the largest, most populous core villages began filling the political vacuum at the supra-village level. By late 1891 a definite pattern had emerged. A small group of Sasak aristocrats had succeeded in assuming positions of leadership over a number of loosely defined districts. These aristocrats were Mami Bangkol and Mami Sapian of Praya, Mami Mustiaji of Kopang, Mami Nursasi of Saka, Mami Ginwang of Batukliyang, Raden Wiranom of Pringgabaya, Raden Melayu Kusuma of Masbagik, and Raden Sribanom of Rarang.

The collapse of Balinese rule over East Lombok also brought a great improvement in the social position of the East Sasak peasant. The Raja's ownership of all the land in East Lombok evaporated together with Balinese political power. Not surprisingly, this led to significant changes in the system of land tenure. The uncultivated lands reverted to the communal right of disposal by the village. This meant that the village as a community and the peasants individually were again able to use these lands for their own purposes. And this they did. For instance, the village as a community took possession of the Raja's herds and exported them in exchange for war materials. Similarly, peasants as individuals gathered the products of the forest, pastured their animals and freely brought under cultivation such lands as were suitable to be made into rice fields or gardens. Further, all cultivated lands belonging to the Raja's direct domain (the druwe dalem lands), all the apanages of Balinese aristocrats and part of those belonging to Sasak aristocrats (the druwe jabe lands), reverted to the
ownership of the peasant. This meant that the peasant was no longer required to pay land tax to the Raja or a share of the harvest to the landlord. Nor was he any longer required to perform corvée for the Raja or services for the landlord. The peasant had become his own master; from the status of a serf he had risen to that of a ‘free’, landowning peasant. This significant improvement soon came under attack, not only from the Raja, who sought to restore Balinese rule over East Lombok, but also from the newly emerged East Sasak political elite, which sought to consolidate its power over the peasants. The intentions of the district chiefs are evident, for example, from the meeting they held early in 1892. The outcome was a written agreement (mufakatan), intended to provide the principles upon which their rule was to be organized. East Lombok was to be ruled by ‘Raja mufakatan’. What did this agreement entail? First, it included a territorial agreement between the seven main districts. The mufakatan stated which villages belonged to which districts and stipulated that peasants who left the authority of one district chief in favour of another (menilas) were to be punished with eviction from their land. Secondly, the mufakatan stated that peasants negligent in paying taxes (to the district chiefs), or negligent in performing corvée (for the district chiefs), were to be punished by forced labour at a place away from their villages (pongor) and by eviction from their land. The district chiefs were attempting to make the peasants’ access to the land conditional on the payment of land tax and performance of corvée. The powers they were trying to assume were exactly those held previously by the Raja. If they had succeeded in implementing this mufakatan, they would have drawn the ownership of the land towards themselves. The peasant’s newly won ownership of the land he worked would again have been transformed into a very limited, conditional right of cultivation. From a ‘free’ and independent peasant, he would again have been reduced to a state of serfdom.

This mufakatan, however, remained a dead letter. The main reason the district chiefs were unable to implement their ‘agreement’ was that the territorial settlement between the seven districts did not hold. Their own greed proved to be their undoing. None of the district chiefs could resist the temptation of accepting the peasants of a village or part of a village when they offered to place themselves under his authority. The ease with which the peasant could change his district chief ensured that the improvement in his social position was not taken away. The East Sasak peasant made extensive use of this possibility.

The district chiefs’ power over the peasants remained very limited. In fact, such powers as they possessed resulted from their leadership role in the war and not from the subjection of the peasants. This role included the power to collect contributions in kind and in labour from the peasants. But, throughout the prolonged revolt, the district chiefs remained unable to give these contributions the character of land tax and corvée. The crucial difference was that the peasants’ material and labour contributions were not exacted on pain of eviction from the land, but were entirely voluntary. The contributions in kind collected
by the district chiefs from the peasants in their resorts were in the form of voluntary donations (*zakat*), to be used strictly for purposes of war, that is, as food supplies for the troops manning the fortifications or for purchasing arms and ammunition. Contributions in labour necessary for the conduct of war, that is fighting the Balinese troops, the construction and manning of the fortifications and so on, were likewise strictly voluntary.

The district chiefs were not happy with this state of affairs and increasingly looked towards the Dutch for assistance. In October 1892 they formally invited the Dutch to come and rule Lombok. Their letter of 30 October 1892 to the Resident of Bali and Lombok indicated that their motives were not solely their setbacks in the war, but also their inability to consolidate their power over the peasants:

> ... we have all agreed, the notable as well as the lowly, to declare with all sincerity that we deliver the land of Selaparang into the hands of the Governor-General ... When with his help, the Balinese have been driven from this land, and their name has disappeared, so that the land has been cleansed of Balinese, we shall all joyfully obey your commands. [That the Governor-General should assist us] is also necessary in order for us to have one head, ruling over both the notable and the lowly, so that we can be of one mind and end the situation in which everyone is his own master.

In 1894 Raden Wiranom of Pringgabaya revealed his motives for inviting the Dutch even more explicitly:

> A strong hand is necessary to control our [the district chiefs’] foolish lust for power, to settle our borders [between districts], and to discipline our subordinates.

The new East Sasak district chiefs, in their pursuit of wealth and power, were prepared to surrender their people to the Dutch. After the fall of the Raja late in 1894 they, together with the Balinese punggawas in West Lombok, were to be the most loyal allies of the Dutch on Lombok, allies who diligently assisted the new overlords in their efforts to take away from Lombok’s peasant population the gains resulting from the Balinese fall from power.
CHAPTER III
THE ESCALATION OF DUTCH AGGRESSION

During the 17th and 18th centuries European contacts with Lombok were irregular and infrequent. Unlike the Banda Islands, the Moluccas or Timor, the island did not produce spices, sandalwood or any other commodities of interest to the Dutch East India Company, nor did it (like Portuguese Malacca or Macassar, for instance) present a challenge to Dutch ambitions to achieve a monopoly in trade. Mainly for these reasons, it was not until 1843 that the Netherlands Indies Government established official contact for the first time. Fearful of British expansion in the area, the Dutch approached the Raja of Lombok, Ratu Agung 2 K’tut, and proposed that a political treaty be concluded. The Raja agreed to this proposal, chiefly because he saw the Netherlands Indies Government as a valuable ally in his struggle to regain control over Karangasem (see above p.6). The 1843 treaty consisted of only seven articles, the first of which established a purely formal Dutch sovereignty over the island. Article 1 read:

I, Ratu Agung 2 K’tut, Raja of Mataram at present sole ruler over the island of Selaparang and dependencies, acting for myself as well as for my successors, declare that island to be the property of the Netherlands Indies Government.

Article 2 was intended to exclude the British from political influence. It read:

I, Raja, therefore promise never to surrender the aforementioned island, or any part thereof to any white nation, of whatever name. I further promise never to enter into an alliance with any such nation.

Article 3-6 dealt with some relatively unimportant matters such as the ‘right of jetsom’, the exchange of representatives and so on. But Article 7 stipulated that the Dutch would never attempt to annex the island:

The Netherlands Indies Government declares that as long as the Rajas of Selaparang faithfully carry out the foregoing Articles, it will make no attempt to establish itself on the island, nor interfere with the internal administration thereof, which administration shall, on the contrary, be left entirely under the control of the Rajas of the country.¹
In the course of the 19th century, particularly after about 1850, the character of Dutch colonialism underwent a fundamental change. Due to industrialization in the Netherlands, a process which gained momentum with the victory of Thorbecke’s liberals in 1848, the emphasis in the Indies changed from control over trade to plantation agriculture and mining. Sometimes motivated by a desire to appropriate agricultural or mineral resources and sometimes by the fear that other colonial powers would establish political control, the Dutch began expanding into the so-called ‘Outer Islands’. For instance, in 1845 they conquered Pontianak in southwest Borneo, in 1856 they moved into the Lampong districts in Sumatra, in 1859 the revolt in Banjermasin in southeast Borneo was crushed, and in 1860 Bone in South Celebes was subjected. With this change in economic emphasis and the resulting territorial expansion into the Indonesian archipelago, it was only a matter of time before Lombok also would attract Dutch attention.

In the early 1880s rumours began circulating that Lombok was rich in mineral resources. For instance, in 1883 a Dutch visitor to the island commented: ‘Lombok is very rich in minerals, especially tin. It has happened more than once that people bathing in the river found pieces of almost pure tin.’2 A few years later, in 1886, the Colonial official Controleur F.A. Liefrinck — who was headed for a very successful career3 — was sent to the island to investigate these rumours. In his report he unreservedly confirmed their truth:

The aids with which nature has provided the people of Lombok consist of fertile rice fields . . . of lands admirably suited for the cultivation of coffee . . . and further of great quantities of ore, among which both precious and other metals occur.4

The reason why the Dutch had had little previous knowledge of the island’s extraordinary economic possibilities was, according to Liefrinck, that the Raja, fearful of arousing Dutch interest, had consistently endeavoured to keep this secret. He had forbidden coffee to be cultivated other than for direct consumption of the producer, and had restricted the exploitation of the mineral deposits to himself, the princes and a few privileged punggawas. To remedy this situation and to release Lombok’s economic potential, Liefrinck advised that the island be brought under Dutch rule as soon as possible. This, he argued, need not involve sending a military expedition. The same result could be accomplished in a gradual fashion by stationing a colonial official on the island, who through his moral example would gradually convince the Raja of the superiority of a Dutch administration and draw political power towards himself. Liefrinck concluded by recommending that: ‘... as soon as a favourable opportunity presents itself, the Government must place a representative on Lombok’.5
Liefrinck's report, which was accompanied by a few samples of Lombok iron and tin ores, and which hinted at the possibility that gold might be found on the island, fell upon willing ears in Batavia. His analysis and recommendations were accepted, with the result that Dutch policy towards Lombok underwent a drastic change. The policy of 'benevolent indifference' was abandoned in favour of a course of action aimed at establishing political control.

The Dress Rehearsal of 1887

Not long after Liefrinck had issued his report, an opportunity for gaining political control presented itself. In August 1887 three followers of the Chinese opium bandar of Karangasem fired a few rifle shots at the crew of a Dutch opium patrol boat. This bandar had good reason to feel hostile towards the Dutch, who continually harassed him in their efforts to enforce a monopoly on the production and distribution of opium. When asked for an explanation, the Raja replied that his investigations had shown that the shots had not been fired with hostile intent, but as part of a religious ceremony. Whatever the case, the then Governor-General, O. van Rees, decided to make this a casus belli for a show of force. Before the necessary naval vessels became available, a second incident occurred. In October 1887 the Raja interned a bankrupt Ambonese trader named Pattiwaël, the agent on Lombok of the Netherlands Indies Stoomvaart Mij. The Ambonese was placed under house arrest pending trial for his debts under Balinese law.

By November 1887 a sufficiently large force had been assembled, enabling Van Rees to issue instructions to the Resident of Bali and Lombok, Van Zutphen:

... I deem it urgently necessary that you make serious representations in person to the Native Raja concerned, in order to bring him to a de facto recognition of Dutch rights and to the honouring of whatever is deemed necessary by the Government to maintain these rights. I leave it to your prudence to bring the necessary regulations into being and I trust that you shall lack neither calmness nor the necessary energy and persuasiveness. In order to add force to your representations I have invited the Commander of the Navy to direct HMSS Prins Hendrik, HMSS van Speyck, HMSS de Ruyter and two other warships to Balinese waters.

On 20 November 1887 the fleet of five warships, carrying Van Zutphen and Controleur Liefrinck, arrived in the roads of Ampenan, where — with the intention of impressing the Raja — the Dutch conducted a target-shooting practice. Two days later the Resident and Liefrinck were received by Ratu Agung2 Ngurah in the palace of Mataram. At this conference Van Zutphen made two basic demands: (1) the immediate release of Pattiwaël; (2) the concluding of a supplementary treaty stipulating:
that the Raja should not admit ‘Europeans and those of equal status’ into Lombok or Karangasem without permission from the Netherlands Indies Government

(b) that ‘Europeans and those of equal status’ committing an offence in Lombok or Karangasem be surrendered for trial to the Netherlands Indies Government

(c) that the ports of Karangasem be closed to the export of opium

(d) that the Raja deposit a sum of 12 000 rijksdaalders as a guarantee that no further incidents would occur

(e) that the Raja recognize the right of the Netherlands Indies Government to place a representative on Lombok.

Ratu Agung2 Ngurah’s response was well described by Van Zutphen himself:

... the Raja of Lombok ... wishes to place himself on an equal footing with the Netherlands Indies Government and to negotiate ‘de puisance a puisance’. When his position is respected he is quite co-operative and usually willing to be of assistance ... But as soon as the Government attempts to place itself in the position of Sovereign, he at once begins to protest, either in words or in deeds.11

While the Raja agreed to release the Ambonese trader, he refused to conclude a supplementary treaty. But wishing to oblige the Dutch as much as possible, Ratu Agung2 Ngurah agreed informally to the first three stipulations of the proposed supplementary treaty. However, he declined the fourth stipulation, arguing that it was beneath his dignity to pay a sum of money as a guarantee of a promise. He likewise rejected the fifth stipulation, well aware that the stationing of a colonial official on Lombok would mean encroachments upon his political independence. After making these decisions, Ratu Agung2 Ngurah closed the conference. Although Van Zutphen and Liefrinck made several attempts to arrange a second meeting, the Raja refused to receive them, giving the polite excuse that he was ill-disposed. Finally, on 7 December, the Resident abandoned his efforts and returned with his party to one of the warships off the coast. There Van Zutphen sent a telegram to the Governor-General requesting permission to present Ratu Agung2 Ngurah with an ultimatum and in the event of his still refusing to conclude the supplementary treaty, to proceed immediately with a naval bombardment of Ampenan and Mataram.12
During the next few days frantic deliberations were held in Batavia. The Council of the Indies — the advisory body to the Governor-General — gave the following hawkish recommendation:

The Council is of the opinion that the Government cannot put up with the attitude adopted by the Native ruler of Lombok... It is now necessary to act forcefully so that it will not appear as if the war in Aceh has broken our power elsewhere in the Netherlands Indies since this could be fatal to us.¹³

The Governor-General was confronted with a difficult dilemma. Was he to insist on the demands he had made, take the advice of the Council and resort to armed force, or was he to accept the Raja’s refusal and withdraw the warships as gracefully as possible? Van Rees opted for the latter course of action. On 10 December he wired Van Zutphen instructing him to inform the Raja that he was satisfied with his promises.¹⁴

In his letter to the Minister of Colonies in The Hague, the Governor-General explained in defensive, almost apologetic terms what had motivated his decision to back down:

Suppose that the ruler of Lombok did not heed the ultimatum and that the naval bombardment of Ampenan and Mataram was carried out. What would have been gained thereby?... After the destruction of his possessions and those of his subjects, the Raja would probably be even less inclined to conclude the desired supplementary treaty. An unbridgeable gap would have been created, and a peaceful solution would no longer be possible.¹⁵

This was quite true. The naval bombardment would itself have constituted an act of war from which no retreat would have been possible. Van Rees was aware that, if after the naval bombardment the Raja should still refuse to submit, there would be such a clamour both in the Netherlands Indies and in Holland that pressure for the sending of a military expedition would become irresistible. And it was precisely this the Governor-General wished to avoid at all costs:

From the fact that a numerous Mohammedan population is ruled by a relatively small number of Hindus... it is inferred that the state of Selaparang is very weakly constituted and that it will probably dissolve as soon as a great danger threatens from the outside... Lombok’s military forces are estimated at 20 000 men, armed with rifles, including 1000 Beaumont and Snider rifles... The Raja can recruit about 100 000 men among the Sasak population... This is sufficient to indicate that in the event of war Lombok would be an enemy it would be wise not to underestimate. It is not advisable to
jump rashly at the possibility that Selaparang will burst asunder at the approach of our navy; an illusion which was held with regard to Aceh, and which there has been so sadly belied by reality.16

The Governor-General’s decision was almost certainly influenced by the fact that since 1873 the Dutch had been fighting a difficult and bitter war in Aceh. No doubt he felt that while this war was continuing it would be unwise to enter into conflict with an enemy as powerful as the Raja of Lombok. Van Rees did not change his view. For as long as he remained Governor-General there were to be no further moves against Lombok.

While these events had taught the Dutch that the sending of a few warships was not sufficient to frighten the Raja into submission, the Raja had learned to be wary of Dutch intentions. Shortly after the warships had departed from Lombok’s coast, Ratu Agung2 Ngurah promulgated an edict in which he honoured the promises he had made and issued a warning to the princes and punggawas.17 Not unrealistically, he argued that the unity between Lombok and Karangasem must be preserved at all costs, as this was the best possible protection against Dutch aggression:

The princes and punggawas of Bali-Karangasem and those of Sasak [i.e. Lombok] must not become separated from each other. When one prospers, all will prosper; when one experiences misfortune, all will share therein. Your father, the Raja, is firmly convinced that Sasak and Bali-Karangasem are to be compared to the two birds from the Ujoga Parwa that have been caught in a single snare with two nooses. The treaty is the snare. As long as the two birds fly alongside each other, as long as Bali-Karangasem and Sasak go together, the one to whom the snare belongs follows them with his eyes in their flight, and slowly walks with them. He then uses a new trick and startles the birds, with the aim that they shall fly off in different directions. When the lands of Bali-Karangasem and Sasak are thus separated from each other, his trick has succeeded. The birds will no longer fly in harmony; they will pull and tear, seize each other by the neck and break their legs. It cannot fail or they will be caught by the one who has set the snare, whereupon he can pluck them to his heart’s content.18

The Raja warned that the 1843 treaty and the edict be observed strictly so as not to give the Dutch as excuse to attack Lombok:
It is the desire of the Raja of Sasak that his children on Bali and on Sasak as well as their descendants shall at all times behave in accordance with the considerations contained in this Edict and punctually adhere to the content of the treaty . . . Nothing is to be changed therein. With the blessing of the gods, this will serve to ensure a good course of events.19

But not only did Ratu Agung2 Ngurah indicate that he was fully aware of Dutch intentions, he was also determined to be well prepared in case war should come. In the same edict he advised the princes and punggawas:

Take care to be well-provided with the four necessities of war; namely, weapons, food, troops and the means of transport. These make the land come alive; they are like medicine that can bring well-being when illness and worry come.20

Growing Dutch Pressure

In 1888 Van Rees stepped down as Governor-General to be succeeded by C. Pynacker-Hordijk. A few years after the latter had assumed office, another opportunity for gaining political control over Lombok presented itself. On 7 August 1891 East Sasaks from the Praya district rose in rebellion against Balinese rule, to be followed on 18 September by virtually all of East Lombok (see chapter II). For the Raja this was an extremely danerous development. The main considerations dissuading the Dutch in 1887 from resorting to armed force had been the war in Aceh and Lombok’s apparent military power. The Aceh war was still continuing, but it could no longer be argued that Lombok constituted a formidable opponent. The revolt not only seriously weakened the Raja’s military power, but also gave rise to the possibility of a Dutch-East Sasak alliance. The newly appointed Resident of Bali and Lombok, M.C. Dannenburgh, was quick to realize the implications of the revolt. Although stopping short of making a formal proposal, he began making strong suggestions that the time was now ripe for a military expedition. For instance, he concluded his report of 14 August 1891, in which he informed Batavia of the outbreak of the Praya revolt, with the following observation:

I should like to note that the latest developments on Lombok have given me the firm conviction that, in the event of a conflict with the Raja of that island, we will be able to count on the support of the overwhelming majority of the non-Balinese population.21

And in his report of 11 September he went a step further:

My informer argues that there is a great deal of unrest among the Mohammedan population of Lombok, so that in the event of armed intervention by the Government, a very small force would be sufficient to put an end to Balinese domination.22
Pynacker-Hordijk's reaction was somewhat ambiguous. While, largely as a matter of routine, he ordered two warships — the HMSS Java and HMSS Van Speyck — to Balinese waters and gave permission for these ships to be used to prevent the importation of war materials into Balinese-held Lombok, he refused to commit himself to a military expedition. On 7 October he informed the Resident:

In view of the efforts still demanded of Army and Navy to curb the resistance in Aceh, I wish to avoid armed intervention. Care should be taken that Hindu rule on Lombok is not overthrown without the Government's permission. I have serious misgivings about the possibility that a Mohammedan state should independently come into being on Lombok, a state with which it might be difficult to settle our relations properly without resort to force of arms.

Resident Dannenburgh — a typical colonial representative — was disappointed by this decision. It was more than he could bear that the Dutch should neglect to take advantage of the opportunity which the East Sasak revolt so clearly afforded them. Therefore he resolved to present his case more forcefully. On 23 October he began the preparatory work. Without having received any instructions to this effect, he left Buleleng for Lombok in order to demand from the Raja that he hand over three small principalities on Bali (Babatu, Sukawati and Albian Base) to his rival, the Dewa Agung of Klungkung. On 25 October the Resident arrived in the roads of Ampenan where he demanded an audience with Ratu Agung2 Ngurah who at that time was in East Lombok leading the first Balinese offensive (see above, p.21). Since it would take a few days before the Raja could be expected in Mataram, Dannenburgh decided to use this time to sail around Lombok in order, as he put it: '... to gain some information about the current political situation'.

The Resident stopped in various ports of East Lombok, including Piju, Labuan Haji and Lombok, all held by the East Sasak insurgents (see Map 2). Although he did not actually go ashore, he did make an effort to ascertain whether the leaders of the revolt were 'approachable'. Through the spies he sent ashore (a standard practice) and through the coastal village chiefs he invited aboard the ship, he let it be known that he would like to receive a statement of the reasons for the revolt. The first letter from the East Sasak leaders indicates that he did drop hints to this effect. On 13 November they wrote: 'If you should wish to be of assistance to us, then come yourself or send an envoy so that we, entirely in accordance with your wishes, can provide you with information.'
By 2 November Dannenbargh had completed his trip around the island and arrived back at Ampenan. There he was informed that Ratu Agung2 Ngurah ‘wished to be excused for not coming to Mataram to meet him . . . as his absence from the scene of the fighting would inevitably have unfavourable consequences for the war operation’.28 He was further told that the Raja could not possibly relinquish sovereignty over the three principalities on Bali. This would be contrary to established custom because ‘the populations of Babatuh, Sukawati and Albian Base had voluntarily placed themselves under the protection of the ruler of Karangasem’.29

The Resident’s journey to Lombok had provided him with the material he needed to put a strong case forward. On 21 November, after receiving a letter from the East Sasak leaders indicating that these leaders were in fact ‘approachable’, he wrote a lengthy report. He raised the bogey of the expansionist ambitions of the Raja of Lombok on Bali and even went so far as to suggest that Ratu Agung2 Ngurah could become a threat to the Netherlands Indies Government. To substantiate this argument he gave an account of the Raja’s refusal to relinquish sovereignty over the three principalities on Bali:

I have serious misgivings about the fact that the Raja of Lombok now regards these principalities as standing under his protection and sovereignty. Through the addition of these principalities to his territory he has become so strong that later, when the revolt on Lombok is crushed, none of the Balinese states will be a match for him. His power in relation to these states, and in relation to the Government, will then have grown too great.30

The time had come for a change in Dutch policy towards Lombok. Very carefully he asked:

With the utmost modesty do I raise the question of whether it will be possible in the long run to maintain the policy of non-intervention with regard to the complications on Lombok. Would it not be advisable to take notice of the grievances of the Sasak population against Balinese rule so that an attempt can be made to bring about a compromise, and at the same time guarantees can be obtained that these grievances will be alleviated?31

Although he did not spell out what policy he felt should be adopted, he concluded his report by stating that should the Governor-General so invite him, he would be glad to put forward a comprehensive proposal for a new policy towards Lombok.

Pynacker-Hordijk could not very well reject Dannenbargh’s reasonable-sounding suggestions. On 11 December the Resident was informed that: ‘Also in the opinion of the Governor-General it has now become desirable to take
notice of the grievances of the Sasak population against Balinese rule, and that 'The Governor-General would welcome your proposals concerning the policy to be adopted in relation to the existing complications on the island'.

Before submitting his proposal, Dannenbargh awaited the statement of grievances of the East Sasak leaders against Balinese rule. On 9 January 1892 he put forward a lengthy report, accompanied by this statement. The basic features of his proposal were as follows:

We must do everything in our power to induce the rebellious heads and population to submit to Balinese rule. If they are willing to submit, it will be necessary for us to demand guarantees from the Raja that the just grievances of the Sasak population will be alleviated. These guarantees shall have to be formalized by supplementary treaty, whereby the Native ruler of Lombok pledges:

1) To grant a general amnesty to all those who have participated in the revolt;
2) That the Sasak population will henceforth be ruled with moderation, justice and observance of their religious laws and institutions;
3) That Anak Agung Made be surrendered to the Government so that he, in the interest of law and order, may be offered a place of residence outside Bali and Lombok;
4) To allow that the Government place a representative on Lombok who will safeguard the faithful observance of the existing treaty and this supplementary treaty, as well as of all further Agreements concluded between the Government and that Native ruler;
5) To allow that this Official reside at the place of domicile of the Raja and that he be free to travel on the island at all times.

The Resident concluded with some sabre-rattling:

If the Raja should refuse to conclude the supplementary treaty, the dignity of the Government would demand that we take the Sasak population under our protection and that we bring the Raja of Lombok to his senses by force of arms. In the interest of our prestige, I consider it urgently necessary that we act firmly, and if need be, forcibly; particularly because a breach of the peace in the long run will be inevitable anyway and because the present situation is extraordinarily favourable to us.

Dannenbargh's report caused quite a stir in Batavia. For the first time Pynacker-Hordijk could not avoid asking the advice of the Council of the Indies. Not surprisingly, the Council, with Jonkheer C. van der Wijck as its vice-president, rose in support of the Resident. On 19 January the Council
advised the Governor-General to present the Raja of Lombok with an ultimatum demanding that he conclude a supplementary treaty. In the unlikely event that the Raja should not heed the ultimatum, ‘forceful measures should be taken’. The members of the Council unanimously gave this advice because, they said, ‘... under the present circumstances we are in complete control of the situation on Lombok and need not fear that armed intervention on our part will have detrimental consequences’.38

Pynacker-Hordijk was not convinced. In his letter to the Resident of 19 February (a full month after the Council had submitted its recommendation), he reiterated his earlier position:

... if the political situation outside Lombok allowed for a sufficiently large force to be set aside for military operations on that island, a lot could be said for your proposal. But as long as a measure of effort is still required from Army and Navy to keep the situation in Aceh under control, it is a commanding duty to think in the first place of the Netherlands ... and not to undertake expeditions of considerable size other than in the most extreme circumstances.39

Dannenburgh, who was well aware that he had the firm support of the Council of the Indies, remained undeterred. Shortly after he had received the Governor-General’s decision, he informed Batavia that a delegation led by a certain Haji Abdulrachman had left Lombok for Singapore with a large sum of money. He suggested that the purpose of this mission was likely to be a political one:

Haji Abdulrachman’s mission has not without reason aroused suspicion ... I deem that Lombok ruler who of course does not have the slightest notion of the relations between European Colonial powers, to be quite capable of taking the foolish step of requesting the assistance of the Straits Settlements Government.40

From the Dutch point of view this was a serious allegation. The Raja was now suspected of having broken the second Article of the 1843 treaty, by which his predecessor had committed himself not to enter into alliance with any other power than the Netherlands Indies Government. This allegation was precisely the sort of thing the ‘hawks’ in Batavia needed for an argument proving the necessity of a military expedition. The Governor-General could not ignore this and instructed the Dutch Consul in Singapore to find out all he could about the activities of Haji Abdulrachman.41 The Consul set his spies to work, but was only able to report that the Haji had purchased two steamships, engaged English crews and had paid a visit to a lawyer to draw up the necessary papers.42
Despite this negative result, Pynacker-Hordijk came under strong pressure from the Council of the Indies. At its meeting on 22 April, the Council urged that the Resident be instructed to proceed to Lombok to demand an explanation from the Raja. And should the Resident deem the explanation unsatisfactory, he could deliver an ultimatum in which the Raja would be given the choice of concluding a supplementary treaty or of having a military expedition sent against him. For the first time the Governor-General gave in. On 26 April he instructed Dannenburgh:

An adequate explanation will be necessary ... If it should not be answered, or if the answer should be unsatisfactory ... I authorize you to threaten with a chastisement, and if the threats are to no avail, to proceed with a naval bombardment.

To this extent did Pynacker-Hordijk accept the Council’s recommendations. He shrank, however, from authorizing a formal ultimatum or a military expedition. As if he regretted having given in at all, his instructions concluded with the following caution: ‘... although I deem it advisable to be prepared for the possibility that no adequate explanation will be given, I hope and trust that it will not be necessary to take such extreme measures as a naval bombardment.’

Before the necessary naval vessels became available, Dannenburgh initiated another incident. Early in May one of the two steamships Haji Abdulrahman had purchased in Singapore arrived in the roads of Ampenan. When on the 12th of that month the Sri Mataram under the command of Captain W. Bruce brought some 600 Balinese auxiliary troops from Karangasem to Lombok, the Resident ordered the ship to be seized. A boarding party was sent from the HMSS Java. After a minor incident with Captain Bruce, who demonstrated his displeasure at Dutch harassment by threatening the naval officer in charge, the Dutch took possession of the ship. In his report of 14 May, Dannenburgh requested that his action be upheld. This was necessary, he said, not only because the ship had been used for purposes of war, but also because Captain Bruce had behaved in an ‘improper manner’. He wrote: ‘... the circumstance that the Commander of the Sri Mataram adopted a most provocative and impolite attitude constitutes, in my modest opinion, sufficient ground to sanction the embargo’. Again, Pynacker-Hordijk acquiesced. On 18 May he wired the Resident informing him that he upheld the embargo on the steamship and that he authorized him also to demand an explanation concerning the behaviour of Captain Bruce.

On 26 May Dannenburgh and Controleur J.H. Liefrinck arrived in the roads of Ampenan with a fleet of five warships. Four days later Ratu Agung2 Ngurah received the Resident and Controleur in the palace of Mataram. Dannenburgh raised the issue of alleged political contact with the Straits Settlements Government. Naturally, he presented this not as a possibility about
which he requested further information, but as an accusation.\textsuperscript{50} He pretended that the Dutch Consul in Singapore had produced evidence that Haji Abdulrachman had in fact made an attempt to obtain British assistance in the war against the East Sasaks. The Raja categorically denied that he had given Abdulrachman such instructions and maintained that the sole purpose of the mission to Singapore had been to purchase a number of steamships. The following day the Resident was given a formal written denial of his accusation.\textsuperscript{51} A second meeting was held in the afternoon of 1 June. Dannenburgh demanded an explanation of the ‘improper’ behaviour of Captain Bruce. Ratu Agung2 Ngurah replied that this incident was a purely personal matter (\textit{perkara di luar}) between the Captain and the naval officer involved, and that therefore he should not be asked for an explanation. In his turn the Raja asked why warships were checking all imports and why his steamship had been seized. Dannenburgh gave the standard argument, namely, that these measures were the result of Government regulations which had to be observed by all the rulers of ‘self-governing’ areas within the Netherlands Indies. Ratu Agung2 Ngurah pointed out that these regulations were not mentioned in the 1843 treaty, and protested that these measures had been taken only after the outbreak of the East Sasak revolt. The discussions had thereby reached a deadlock and were broken off, whereupon the Resident and his party returned to the warships lying anchored off the coast.\textsuperscript{52}

Not surprisingly, Dannenburgh regarded the Raja’s explanations as unsatisfactory. He had failed to obtain an ‘admission of guilt’, which was essential if he was to realize the purpose of his mission. Only if the Raja humbly admitted his guilt could it be argued that a supplementary treaty was necessary to prevent such things from recurring in the future. In his report of 7 June, the Resident summarized the results of his mission:

\ldots due to lack of evidence, I thought it necessary for the time being to accept the denial of that Lombok ruler that he has instructed Haji Abdulrachman to obtain the assistance of the Government of the Straits Settlements. But the explanation of Captain Bruce’s behaviour was not only insufficient, but also most improper. In the interest of the Government’s prestige, I have deemed it necessary not to put up with that.\textsuperscript{53}

In the absence of a better reason, the Raja was to be punished because an English Captain had lost his temper! On 7 June Dannenburgh sent Ratu Agung2 Ngurah a threatening letter:

\ldots I must inform my friend that I am satisfied neither with your attitude towards me, nor with your answers to my questions \ldots I sincerely hope that my friend shall repent in time, and come to an awareness of his obligations as a vassal of the Netherlands Indies.
Government. I therefore seriously advise my friend to give me within the time limit of 3 x 24 hours an adequate explanation with which I, as a representative of the Government, can be satisfied. If my friend does not comply with my wish, the consequences will be his responsibility.  

The Raja again refused to budge. In his reply he rejected the allegations and repeated his requests: (1) that the warships stop checking all imports; (2) that the transport of troops from Karangasem to Lombok and vice versa, not be interfered with; (3) that the embargo on the *Sri Mataram* be lifted. He likewise ended his letter with a threat — unless his requests were granted he would send a delegation to the Governor-General in Batavia.  

This was not what the Resident had expected or hoped for. What particularly infuriated him was that Ratu Agung Ngurah, probably considering it too insignificant to discuss further, had not mentioned the incident with Captain Bruce for which he had wanted him to ‘repent’. Dannenburgh gave orders that the second of the Lombok steamships, the *Sri Cakra*, be seized, and wired Batavia advising that:

> If he had not within two days received a completely satisfactory reply, containing 1) an expression of regret concerning the behaviour of Captain Bruce and 2) an acceptance of the coercive measures the Government had taken, he would give orders for the naval bombardment of Ampenan and Mataram to commence.

This telegram startled the Governor-General. Realizing that a naval bombardment, should it fail to lead to the Raja’s immediate submission, would inevitably escalate into a full-scale armed conflict, he went back on his previous decision. On 13 June he sent an urgent telegram to the Resident which read: ‘Since the results of a naval bombardment of Mataram are highly uncertain, I request you not to proceed with the threat of bombardment until further notice.’ The danger of war between the Netherlands Indies Government and the Raja of Lombok had again been narrowly averted. There was not much Dannenburgh could do but withdraw the five warships to Buleleng.

Although Resident Dannenburgh might have known by this time that the Governor-General was unwilling to authorize a military expedition, he continued his campaign to bring this about. In his report of 20 June he once again presented his pet argument that the prestige of the Netherlands Indies Government necessitated that political control be established over Lombok, which could be achieved most quickly with a military expedition:
... it appears to me that without losing in dignity and prestige the Government cannot put up with the attitude adopted by the Lombok ruler. It is on the basis of this consideration that ... I regard it as my duty to respectfully suggest that Your Excellency proceed with ... a naval bombardment of Mataram, and if this measure should not succeed, with more drastic steps ... Our aim can be achieved most quickly by way of sending a military expedition ... This will enable us to end the murderous war between Balinese and Sasaks and to obtain guarantees for ... a good and pure relation between the Lombok ruler and the Government.  

Pynacker-Hordijk did not reply to this suggestion. His silence encouraged the Resident to proceed. In his report of 30 June he held out the bait that an expedition against the Raja of Lombok would surely be a walk-over:

When I consider that during my mission to Mataram not a single fortification had been erected against us and that most of the Balinese troops were in Narmada, Kediri and Batuaji ... in order to repel possible attacks by the insurgents; then it is clear that under the present circumstances there can be no question of any serious or prolonged resistance against our troops.

Again the Governor-General did not react, encouraging Dannenbargh to continue his urging and prompting. In his report of 11 July he belittled rumours about a cholera epidemic on Lombok. These rumours had originated from the Governor of Celebes and Dependencies who had argued that the disease had spread from East Lombok to West Sumbawa. But the Resident could find no evidence for the existence of cholera on Lombok. The few deaths that had occurred were due to ‘gastric fevers’ caused by immoderate eating at the Balinese New Year festivities. He suggested that these rumours had been spread intentionally by the Raja in order to discourage an expedition and warned that if the Governor-General waited too long the Dutch might lose their opportunity for an easy political takeover:

In my opinion it is not possible to put a stop to the extremely arrogant attitude of the Raja other than by sending a military expedition ... If we wait too long, the circumstances which at present are still favourable to us will very probably change to our disadvantage. In the first place, the time of year suitable for military operations will pass. Secondly, the possibility exists that the Sasak heads, realizing that they cannot expect assistance from us, will give up their struggle and accept the Raja’s tempting offers to submit. If the Lombok ruler should succeed in bringing about this submission
without first having been brought to his senses by us, he will have scored a moral victory over the Government. Having become reckless by this moral victory, he will adopt a more and more presumptuous attitude . . . The end result will be that we, compelled by the force of circumstances, shall have to begin battle with Lombok under much less favourable conditions than at present.\textsuperscript{60}

It was not until 17 August 1892, and after several further urgent reports by the Resident, that the Governor-General finally responded. He had waited all this time for an indication of support from The Hague. This support came in the letter from the Minister of Colonies, Dr W.K. baron van Dedem, of 7 July (received in Batavia in the second week of August), in which he expressed tacit approval of Pynacker-Hordijk’s attempts to avoid a military expedition. In response to the Governor-General’s argument that in view of Article 7 of the 1843 treaty, by which the Netherlands Indies Government had undertaken neither to interfere with Lombok’s internal administration nor to make any attempts to establish itself on the island, it was impossible for him to authorize a military expedition, the Minister advised not to worry too much about legalities. He wrote: ‘The question of whether we must interfere in the complications on Lombok is not a legal question, but one of power and of politics.’\textsuperscript{61} But, nonetheless, the Minister did not disagree with Pynacker-Hordijk’s cautious policy. This was sufficient encouragement for the Governor-General to drive his views home to Dannenburgh:

While from your earlier report concerning the complications on Lombok I gathered that you were inclined to the point of view that these complications could be resolved only by armed action on our part, . . . the reports you have written since your latest visit to that island bear witness to an endeavour to provoke an expedition at all costs.\textsuperscript{62}

He went on to say what he thought would have happened if he had accepted the Resident’s suggestions:

Even though the reports about cholera should have inspired caution, . . . you were inclined to dismiss them as fabrications spread by the Lombok ruler in order to discourage us from armed intervention . . . If I had given in to your pressure to proceed with the sending of troops there would have been no end to the misery.\textsuperscript{63}
Pynacker-Hordijk informed Dannenburgh in no uncertain terms that he was not going to order a military expedition:

That I did not authorize an expedition is not only due to the reports about cholera, but is also a consequence of my conviction that armed action on that island is not inevitable ... The question is whether ... the attitude the Hindu ruler has adopted towards us warrants the sending of troops. There is no doubt that the attitude of the Lombok self-government leaves much to be desired. But also in this respect it is necessary to guard against exaggeration. In my opinion you are entirely unjustified in speaking of a ‘moral victory’ the Lombok ruler would score if he were to succeed in subjecting the Sasaks without having been brought to his senses by us ... I cannot understand of what this ‘moral victory’ you speak of is supposed to consist ... The self-government had strongly denied that it called for the intervention of a foreign power to curb the revolt ... And as far as the improper attitude of the Commander of the Sri Mataram is concerned ... the embargo placed on the Lombok ships can be regarded as sufficient punishment.64

Pynacker-Hordijk concluded his letter with the warning: ‘I strongly advise you to work in the direction I have indicated.’65

Only after receipt of this angry letter did Dannenburgh abandon his efforts to provoke an armed conflict. Like his predecessor, Pynacker-Hordijk had decided against military involvement. He too considered it unwise to enter into conflict with Lombok as long as the war in Aceh was continuing. Although he did not lift the naval blockade of Lombok’s west coast, and did not return the steamships to the Raja, Dutch aggression did not escalate further while he remained Governor-General.

The Interlude

For the remainder of Pynacker-Hordijk’s term in office (until October 1893) there was little change in the relations between the Netherlands Indies Government and the Raja of Lombok. The coercive measures the Dutch had taken remained in force: (1) the ban on the importation of war materials into Balinese-held Lombok; (2) the ban on the transport of troops from Karangasem to Lombok; (3) the embargo on the two Lombok steamships. For this reason, relations continued to be strained; a state of neither war nor peace prevailed. During this time two developments took place which deserve mention. First, Pynacker-Hordijk’s unsuccessful but probably sincere attempt to defuse the tense relations, and second, Ratu Agung2 Ngurah’s reaction to the coercive measures.
A. Attempted Reconciliation

On 20 September 1892 Pynacker-Hordijk informed Dannenburgh that he had conceived the idea of offering the Raja his services to mediate in the Balinese-East Sasak conflict:

I request that you give advice concerning the idea that I send a letter to the Raja of Lombok in which he is informed that . . . since I deeply regret the present situation, I am willing to offer my services to bring about a compromise agreement between the Raja and the Sasak people by which, through the submission of the latter and the re-establishment of Balinese rule over the whole island and through the alleviation of the legitimate grievances of the Sasak people, order and peace will be permanently restored.66

Not surprisingly, the Resident was less than happy with this initiative. Particularly disappointing was the fact that the Governor-General's offer of mediation was not intended as a stepping stone for establishing political control. The Raja was not asked to make any other political concession than 'to give in to the legitimate grievances of the Sasak people'. Since this ran counter to everything he had been working for, Dannenburgh advised against the idea:

I believe that Your Excellency's offer, however disinterested and well-intended this may be, shall be received by the Raja with suspicion. He shall answer Your Excellency very politely, express gratitude for the interest shown, and say that he is very well able to put down the revolt if only the Government would allow him to use freely the resources at his disposal i.e. if the Government would permit him to bring troops and war materials with his steamships to Lombok's east coast.67

He went on to argue that even if the Raja accepted the offer, it would be unlikely to bring satisfactory results: 'Having successfully resisted the Raja for over a year, the insurgents will not wish to submit unless the Government declares itself responsible for the fulfilment of the promises made by the Lombok ruler.'68 The Resident concluded:

As long as circumstances do not allow for forceful action against that island, I would be more inclined to advise Your Excellency to consider our political relations with Lombok as broken off, rather than advise the implementation of Your Excellency's idea, the good intentions of which shall be mistaken for weakness and from which in my modest opinion no satisfactory results are to be expected.69
Pynacker-Hordijk was not convinced and he went ahead with his plan. On 22 April 1893 he sent under cover to Dannenburgh the letter containing his offer to the Raja, and instructed him to see it was delivered. Once again he warned: ‘... since the reasons why we must restrain ourselves from armed action against Lombok still prevail, ... everything must be avoided which could give rise to difficulties’. The letter to the Raja was itself feudal in form and paternalistic in tone. While stopping short of promising the removal of the coercive measures, it contained no specific threats and made no demands for political ‘guarantees’. It was purely and simply an offer to mediate in the conflict between the Raja and the East Sasaks. The crucial passage was the following:

Although up to now we have abstained from interfering in the internal administration of the island Lombok, we greatly regret the situation that prevails there at present. Since we are deeply concerned with the fate of our friend as well as with that of the Sasak people, we inform our friend that we are prepared to render our mediation in order to bring an agreement into being between our friend and the people, whereby the authority of our friend over the Sasak people will be restored, and whereby our friend will alleviate the people’s legitimate grievances, so that the people’s fate is properly safeguarded; whereafter the heads, who will have again submitted, can be granted complete forgiveness.

The Resident waited a full month before obeying these instructions. On 22 June he finally wrote to the Raja informing him that Controleur J.H. Liefninck would be sent to Lombok with orders to deliver a letter from the Governor-General. About two weeks later the Raja replied: ‘When Controleur Liefninck comes here ... to settle matters dealt with in our letters of 11 and 17 June 1892 we shall receive him in the customary manner.’ Apparently Ratu Agung2 Ngurah did not expect the letter to contain an offer of mediation, but assumed that it concerned his requests to have the coercive measures lifted.

Liefninck arrived in the roads of Ampenan in the morning of 24 July, and was informed that word of his arrival would be sent to the Raja. The following day he was told that he could deliver the letter on 27 July when, in accordance with custom, two punggawas would come to Ampenan to accompany him to the royal palace in Mataram. The punggawas, however, failed to arrive. Two days later, on 29 July, the Controleur was informed that because revolt had broken out in the village of Sekarbelu (see p.25), Ratu Agung2 Ngurah was unable to receive him within the foreseeable future. Liefninck was advised to return to Buleleng and there to await word as to when it would be possible for him to deliver the letter.
The revolt in Sekarbela was not the real reason for the Raja’s refusal to receive the Controleur. Contrary to what Liefirnck was told, this revolt did not break out during the time he was waiting in the roads of Ampenan, but had been going on since early June. Moreover, the uprising in Sekarbela, while serious enough to prevent the Raja from continuing his third offensive, never even remotely threatened Balinese rule in West Lombok. The strongholds of Mataram and Cakranegara, as well as a number of others, were impregnable for these badly armed rebels, as indeed they were for the East Sasaks. What really motivated Ratu Agung2 Ngurah was suspicion. During the time the Controleur was waiting, the Raja learned that Pynacker-Hordijk refused to receive the representative he had sent to Batavia. This no doubt convinced him that the Governor-General did not wish to discuss lifting the coercive measures, and that therefore his letter was likely to deal with other matters. Be this as it may, by refusing to receive Liefirnck, Ratu Agung2 Ngurah unwittingly rejected a sincere attempt to defuse the tense relations between the Netherlands Indies Government and Lombok-Karangasem.

B. Resistance

In his letters to the Resident of 11 and 17 June 1892, the Raja had warned that if the coercive measures were not lifted he would send a delegation to the Governor-General. Dannenbargh was worried about the possibility of direct contact between Ratu Agung2 Ngurah and Pynacker-Hordijk. For instance, in his report of 2 August 1892 he complained: ‘... this delegation is actually directed against me who have always acted on orders from and in the interest of the Government’. Much to his relief, the Governor-General informed him on 15 August 1892: ‘You can tell the Raja that in view of his attitude, I will be unable to receive his delegation’. Despite this rebuff, Ratu Agung2 Ngurah continued his diplomatic effort. He sought legal advice from a Singapore solicitor by the name of J.C. Mitchell. This solicitor, who was gratuitously described by Dannenbargh as ‘an Englishman of dubious reputation’, was invited to come to Lombok. Shortly after his arrival in November 1892, probably at his advice, the Raja issued strict orders that nothing whatsoever was to be sold to the crews of the Dutch warships off the coast. Early in December 1892 Mitchell left for Singapore, where he made an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the British to pressure the Netherlands Indies Government into lifting the coercive measures. The solicitor returned to Lombok and advised Ratu Agung2 Ngurah that the only possibility now open to him was to make direct representation to the Governor-General. He took it upon himself to sail to Batavia and argue the Raja’s case.

Mitchell’s journey to Java proved to be a frustrating experience. He arrived in Batavia in the beginning of June 1893, and wrote a letter to the Aide-de-Camp of the Governor-General in which he requested an audience ‘in order to deliver a
letter which has been addressed to Your Excellency by the Raja of Lombok or Selaparang and which has been entrusted to my care, and also to offer any explanation touching the subject matter of the letter". Pynacker-Hordijk chose not to reply and, seeking to avoid meeting Mitchell, left Batavia for his palace in Cipanas. After waiting several weeks, the solicitor was finally informed that the Governor-General could not receive him because: 'His Excellency cannot recognize any other intermediary between himself and the Raja than the Resident of Bali and Lombok.' Thereupon Mitchell returned to Lombok, where he arrived on 29 July 1893. The Raja's refusal in the afternoon of the same day to take delivery of the Governor-General's letter was almost certainly influenced by the solicitor's experiences on Java.

After the failure of Mitchell's mission, Ratu Agung2 Ngurah abandoned his efforts to have the coercive measures withdrawn by diplomatic means. Instead, he began an attempt to circumvent the ban on the importation of war materials. This was by no means a simple matter. The Dutch had two warships permanently stationed in the Lombok Strait, which maintained a quite effective blockade of Lombok's west and north coasts, and they were assured of the co-operation of the British authorities in Singapore. The Raja, however, found the right man for this dangerous mission in the young Russian subject W.P. Malygin.

Malygin first came to Lombok in October 1893 as a passenger aboard the steamship Ban Poh Gwan. Dannenburgh was aware of his arrival since, as a matter of routine, he kept a check on all Europeans visiting the island. He was not unduly worried and did not question Malygin's remark to the Captain of the Ban Poh Gwan that 'he was a mining engineer on his way to Lombok to obtain a concession from the Raja for the exploitation of gold and other metals'. But when Malygin came to Lombok for a second time in the beginning of December 1893, the Resident became suspicious. On 6 December he wired the Dutch Consul in Singapore and requested him 'to enquire into the antecedents of this person and to find out, if possible, the purpose of his journeys to Lombok'.

Malygin stayed on Lombok from the beginning of December 1893 until the end of January 1894, when he left for Singapore on board the steamship McAlister. During this stay he undertook the hazardous mission of supplying the Raja with war materials. Realizing that the Dutch were likely to be suspicious of him and would probably watch his every step, he made an attempt to gain their confidence. On 27 January 1894, when the steamship McAlister had anchored in the port of Buleleng, he paid Dannenburgh a visit, 'in order', as he told him, 'to provide some information about the current situation on Lombok'. Malygin informed the Resident that the Raja had succeeded in putting down the revolt in Sekarbelu and that he was again so well provided with war materials that he had recently sent back a sailing boat loaded with rifles and
ammunition. Not surprisingly, Malygin was unable to give Dannenbargh any details as to how this ‘smuggling trade’ in war materials was organized. Although greatly pleased with this voluntary information, the Resident remained somewhat suspicious. Referring to Malygin’s visit, he wrote in his report of 27 January 1894:

... it will be unnecessary to point out that the information, coming from a person who has been described by the Consul-General in Singapore as a seedy adventurer, must be accepted with the necessary reservation.91

Nevertheless, he wired the Consul-General in Singapore requesting him to make an effort to gain more information from Malygin.

Upon his arrival in Singapore on 2 February 1894, Malygin went into a hospital where he stayed for several weeks. In an attempt to gain more precise information about ‘the smuggling trade’ in war materials, the Dutch Consul-General visited him several times. Malygin, however, remained non-committal. He repeated his assertion that the Raja was more than adequately supplied with rifles and ammunition. When pressed to reveal how these war materials were shipped to Lombok, Malygin argued that: ‘... since he still wished to obtain a mining concession, he wanted to retain good relations with the Raja, and therefore it was impossible for him to go into details about this matter’.92 Like the Resident, the Consul-General was also rather suspicious: ‘I regard Malygin as a cunning, intelligent person who enjoys intrigues and is easily persuaded by monetary rewards.’93 But the Consul-General had no inkling of the real purpose of Malygin’s mission.

Upon his release from hospital, Malygin bought a Chinese junk (a so-called tongkang) and enlisted four associates: a Dane by the name of Danielson, two Englishmen named Holmes and Paige, and another European who was to serve as a cook.94 To cover their activities, Malygin and his associates founded a ‘pearl-fishing Company’, for which papers were drawn up at a lawyer’s office. The junk was, however, loaded with rifles, ammunition and explosives and set sail for Lombok at the beginning of April 1894.95

The journey from Singapore to Lombok was a most arduous one. The men suffered deprivations; there were storms, during one of which the European cook was swept overboard; there were quarrels and fights. It took about three months for the small craft to reach Bali. It was there that Malygin made a nearly disastrous error. Mistaking the coast of Buleleng for that of Karangasem, Malygin and his party landed on 13 July in Dutch-controlled territory at Teja Kula, not far from the border with Karangasem.96 The punggawa of Teja Kula wasted no time in informing the Dutch, who were quick to move. The same evening, Danielson, Holmes and Paige were arrested and taken to Buleleng. The Dutch also seized 12 cases of rifles and ‘a large quantity of small boxes
containing cartridges. Malygin, however, had escaped. Realizing that the Dutch were not far away, he loaded part of the cargo on pack-horses and crossed the border into Karangasem. Shortly afterwards, the rifles, ammunition and explosives which Malygin had been able to rescue were taken to Lombok by prahu.

The Military Expedition

In October 1893 Pynacker-Hordijk stepped down as Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies, to be succeeded by Jhr. C. van der Wijck. It would be hard to imagine two men of more dissimilar backgrounds holding this powerful, almost autocratic office. Whereas Pynacker-Hordijk was a liberal intellectual who had been sent to the Indies as Governor-General after a successful academic and political career in the Netherlands, Van der Wijck had made career in the Indies. Prior to his appointment, he had served in the Colonial administration for some 30 years. He had climbed through the ranks slowly but surely; from a humble Controleur (1863) to Assistant Resident (1873), Resident (1880), Member of the Council of the Indies (1888), Vice-President of the Council (1889), and finally Governor-General (1893). In the course of this long career he had established a reputation for ruthlessness. As Assistant Resident of Buitenzorg (1876-80), he had ‘distinguished’ himself by taking a leading role in crushing a peasant rising on the estate Citrap, and later, as Resident of Tegal (1880-84), he ‘settled’ the often violent disputes over irrigation water between the sugar factories and the peasants of the surrounding districts. Van der Wijck was a Colonial official from top to bottom who, unlike his predecessor, had no compunction whatever about using armed force.

Soon after assuming office, Van der Wijck took the first steps towards the sending of a military expedition. In the beginning of 1894, before officially announcing his intention to annex Lombok by force of arms, he made three preparatory moves.

I. In view of the protracted war in Aceh, it was necessary to ascertain whether an expedition of the required size was militarily feasible. To this end Van der Wijck requested a report from the Commander of the Army in the Netherlands Indies, Lieutenant-General Gey van Pittius. On 17 January 1894 the General submitted his report. He optimistically argued:

Never before has an expedition taken place under such propitious circumstances . . . The Balinese possess no artillery to speak of, while their firearms are of all types, which greatly reduces their effectiveness in battle . . . There are no fortifications to be taken . . . The road to Mataram is well-known and lends itself to the transport of troops and artillery.
The General concluded:

... we are quite capable of sending an expedition... In the unexpected event that we should encounter difficulties at our first attack, we will be able to continue fighting at full strength for a period of four months.101

II. Once reassured on this crucial point, Van der Wijck moved to provide an argument for home-consumption. On 26 February 1894 Dannenburgh received instructions to send Controleur Liefrinck to East Lombok to investigate the rumours about famine conditions.102 In sharp contrast to his behaviour with regard to Pynacker-Hordijk's letter of reconciliation, the Resident hurried to carry out this order. Liefrinck left Buleleng on 27 February, visited the East Lombok districts of Sakra and Pringgabaya, met the East Sasak district chiefs Mami Kertawang, Raden Melayu Kusuma and Raden Wiranom, and returned to Bali on 10 March. Apparently well-aware of the political significance of his mission, Liefrinck went to great lengths to dramatize the famine conditions he had witnessed. His report was full of phrases like 'walking skeletons', 'little children with swollen stomachs', 'parents selling their children into slavery for as little as f0.80, while they normally received as much as f2.50' [sic], and stated as a general conclusion that '... the rumours concerning the situation [in East Lombok] are not in the least exaggerated'.103

This report was precisely what the Governor-General needed. It could now be argued that the expedition was necessary to put an end to the deplorable conditions of the East Sasak people. Despite its fine humanitarian ring, this argument was one of blatant political expediency. The Dutch (albeit indirectly) were themselves responsible for the famine in East Lombok. The three-year-old blockade of Lombok's west and north coasts, the seizure of the Raja's steamships, and the ban on the transport of troops from Karangasem to Lombok had hampered the Raja in his war effort and had thereby served to prolong the war, as a result of which famine had come to East Lombok. This 'humanitarian' argument, however, was admirably suited for propaganda purposes. When, in the beginning of June 1894, it became known in the Netherlands that an expedition was imminent, the Minister of Colonies, J.H. Bergsma, was able to silence opposition in Parliament (led by Pynacker-Hordijk, who had become a member) by producing Liefrinck's report and the letter from the East Sasak chiefs of December 1891.104 These two documents painted Balinese rule in the darkest colours possible, enabling Bergsma to present the expedition as a kind of crusade to deliver the oppressed Sasak people from their Balinese tyrants.105

III. Once in possession of this report, Van der Wijck called Dannenburgh to Batavia to formally advise on political strategy. Shortly after his arrival, the Resident submitted two lengthy reports in which he recommended that the Raja be presented with a six-point ultimatum. Ratu Agung2 Ngurah was to agree unconditionally:
1. ‘To punctually obey all commands by the Netherlands Indies Government.’¹⁰⁶ In support of this stipulation, the Resident wrote: ‘In view of the improper attitude of the Lombok ruler, it is necessary to demand that he punctually obeys all commands, even if these commands are not in so many words stated in the 1843 treaty.’¹⁰⁷

2. ‘To send a delegation of prominent punggawas to the Governor-General in order to beg forgiveness for the Raja’s recalcitrant attitude.’¹⁰⁸ The most plausible explanation for this curious stipulation is that Dannenbargh, for personal reasons, sought to humiliate the Raja. He probably wished to obtain some sort of personal satisfaction for the years he spent vainly trying to establish Dutch political control over Lombok.

3. ‘To accept that the Government settle the confused situation on Lombok as it sees fit, and that Ratu Agung ² Ngurah abdicate in favour of the Crown Prince Anak Agung K’tut.’¹⁰⁹ This point consisted of two stipulations with a view to the political settlement on Lombok after the Dutch had gained control. The first indicates that the Resident was aware that a Dutch-backed restoration of Balinese rule over all of Lombok was likely to run into opposition on the part of the Sasak district chiefs. Therefore he did not wish the Netherlands Indies Government to commit itself on this issue. He wrote: ‘Although we must strive to restore Hindu rule over all of Lombok, we must not give the Lombok ruler any guarantees to this effect, since the realization of this aim may be difficult to accomplish.’¹¹⁰ Dannenbargh insisted on the second stipulation because he considered the Crown Prince best suited to Dutch purposes. He realized that Ratu Agung ² Ngurah who, ever since he came to the throne in 1872, had been striving to retain his independence, was an unlikely candidate for the position of puppet ruler. The Resident evaluated the Raja’s possibilities as follows: ‘As far as the old Raja is concerned, … nothing can be expected from him for the improvement of the relationship between Lombok and the Government.’¹¹¹ But of Anak Agung K’tut he had a more favourable opinion:

The Crown Prince has been described by Controleur Liefrinck and by other people who have met him as a good-natured but insignificant personality … Providing he is supported by the most prominent punggawas and led by wise advisors, some good may be expected from him as Lombok’s ruler.¹¹²

4. ‘To conclude a new, more up-to-date treaty’.¹¹³ This stipulation was intended to ensure that the relationship between Lombok and the Netherlands Indies Government be regulated in detail. Dannenbargh considered that strict observance of ‘the new, more up-to-date treaty’ could only be guaranteed by stationing Colonial officials (i.e. the wise advisors) on the island. He wrote: ‘I consider the stationing on Lombok of one or more European representatives
necessary to ensure observance of the treaty and to combat harmful influences to our rule."114

5. "To extradite Anak Agung Made, as well as any other person the Government may deem harmful to law and order on Lombok."115 This point, like the third, was intended to regulate the political settlement after Dutch control had been established. The Resident correctly perceived that Anak Agung Made was the most forceful and capable of the Lombok princes. Dannenbargh had met Made during his unsuccessful mission to Lombok in May 1892 and knew from experience that he, perhaps even more than his father, was opposed to surrendering political independence to the Dutch. The Resident evaluated Made as follows:

The Raja's illegitimate son, Anak Agung Made, is a forceful personality, but has made himself hated due to his domineering personality and his cruelty. . . . He realizes that he has everything to lose by our intervention. He can therefore be expected to fight our troops tooth and nail.116

6. "To pay the costs of the military expedition."117 In support of this stipulation the Resident wrote: 'Since the Raja of Lombok is very rich, there cannot be, in my opinion, any objection to demanding the restitution of the expenses the Government has been obliged to make."118

Dannenbargh concluded his reports by advising on the political settlement by which Lombok could be ruled most effectively. In view of the nearly three year-old East Sasak revolt, the question was whether the Dutch should rule the island through a Balinese Raja or through the Sasak district chiefs. As is indicated by the ultimatum, the Resident thought that preference should be given to a restoration of Balinese rule over the whole island, with Anak Agung K"tut on the throne as a puppet ruler: 'From a political point of view it is desirable that, after the necessary guarantees have been given for a good relationship with the Government, Balinese rule over all of Lombok be re-established."119 However, he did not rule out the possibility that the Sasak district chiefs, after having resisted the Balinese for almost three years, should categorically refuse to recognize Anak Agung K"tut. In this case he argued:

. . . it would be necessary either to compel the Sasak district chiefs by force of arms, or to create a Balinese and a Sasak region. . . The Balinese region could then be ruled by Anak Agung K"tut, while the Sasak region could be administered by a council of the most prominent district chiefs.120
These three preparatory moves enabled Van der Wijck to officially announce his decision to annex Lombok by means of a military expedition. That he waited until the end of May was probably not unrelated to the fact that Bergsma (previously a member of the Council of the Indies of which Van der Wijck had been Vice-President) had become, on 19 May, Minister of Colonies. Only a few days after Bergsma assumed office the Governor-General presented the case he had so carefully prepared over the last few months. He wrote to the Minister of Colonies and sent him the reports by General Gey van Pittius, Controleur Liefrinck and Resident Dannenbargh. His argumentation was wholly based on these reports. Quoting General Gey van Pittius, Van der Wijck argued that from a military point of view there could be no objection to an expedition. He went on by making the most of Liefrinck’s report. Grossly exaggerating the famine conditions in East Lombok, he wrote: ‘According to the report by the Controleur . . . the entire population of the island is in danger of perishing.’

He almost literally adopted Dannenbargh’s favourite argument. Like the Resident, he maintained that in view of the Raja’s ‘improper attitude’ it was necessary for the prestige of the Netherlands Indies Government that ‘he be brought to his senses’. The Governor-General concluded by stating: ‘Under these circumstances it is the compelling duty of the Netherlands Indies Government . . . to forcefully intervene.’

On 27 May, Van der Wijck issued simultaneous orders for the expedition to be prepared and for an ultimatum to be delivered. The first order instructed the Commander of Army and Navy to hold in readiness the necessary troops, convicts, war materials, warships, transport ships and so on, so that the expedition could be underway at a moment’s notice. The second order instructed the Resident to proceed to Lombok to deliver an ultimatum and to inform the Raja that if he did not submit at once an expeditionary force would be sent against him. The ultimatum, based entirely on Dannenbargh’s proposal, was worded as follows:

**Demand I:** The solemn assurance the the Raja of Lombok shall henceforth obey all the commands of his Excellency the Governor-General.

**Demand II:** A profession of sincere regret for the improper attitude adopted towards the Netherlands Indies Government and its representatives.

**Demand III:** The acceptance of the mediation of the Resident of Bali and Lombok and the promise to abide by whatever settlement the Resident may deem appropriate.

**Demand IV:** The immediate extradition of Anak Agung Made who is responsible for the present situation.
In case these demands are not accepted, His Excellency the Governor-General shall regretfully be obliged to forcibly put an end to the intolerable situation.\(^{123}\)

On 3 June 1894, Resident Dannenbargh and Controleur Liefrinck arrived in the roads of Ampenan aboard the frigate HMSS *Koningin Emma* — the largest warship in the Dutch navy — which it was hoped would not fail to impress. The Resident sent a messenger ashore demanding a meeting with Ratu Agung2 Ngurah. The following day Dannenbargh was informed that the Raja was in East Lombok and would probably be unable to come to Mataram. The Resident, however, repeated his demand for a meeting with Ratu Agung2 Ngurah. But his protestations were in vain. On 6 June he was told that:

\[\ldots\] the Raja regretted that, due to illness, he was unable to travel to Mataram and that therefore he had instructed his two sons, Anak Agung Made and Anak Agung K’tut, to conduct the negotiations.\(^{124}\)

Dannenbargh had no option but to accept the Raja’s decision and hold the meeting with the two princes.

The conference was held in the morning of 9 June in the palace of Cakranegara. The Resident read the ultimatum and told the princes and assembled punggawas that if a favourable reply was not forthcoming within the time limit of three times 24 hours, the ultimatum would be considered as having been rejected. Anak Agung Made, who had listened impassively to the demand for his extradition, registered protest. He argued that the time limit was too short because in important matters such as these all the punggawas would have to be consulted. Since many of the punggawas were in East Lombok fighting the insurgents, it was impossible to give a reply within this time limit. To the Resident’s question of how long he thought it would take, Anak Agung Made replied that this could not possibly be determined. When Dannenbargh asked Anak Agung K’tut for his opinion, he answered that he was in complete agreement with his brother. The meeting had hereby come to an end. In the afternoon of 9 June the Resident and his party returned to the HMSS *Koningin Emma*. When the three-day time limit had expired, Dannenbargh wired the Governor-General informing him that the ultimatum had been rejected.\(^{125}\)

To Van der Wijck, who had cherished hopes that the threat of violence would be sufficient, the outcome of the Resident’s mission was a great disappointment. After having threatened with violence he had no choice but to authorize the military expedition. However, before actually issuing the order, he made another move. On 13 June he wired Dannenbargh instructing him to send Liefrinck to East Lombok in order to conclude an alliance with the East Sasak leaders.\(^{126}\)
On 19 June the Controleur arrived on Lombok’s east coast aboard the SS *Sperwer*. With the assistance of the head of the Pringgabay district, Raden Wiranom, Liefrinck convened a meeting of all East Lombok district chiefs. The meeting was held in the village of Dasan Lekong on 24 June. Aside from a large number of subordinate heads, five of the eight district chiefs were present, namely Raden Melayu Kusuma of Masbagik, Raden Sribanom of Rarang, Mami Mustiaji of Kopang, Mami Ginawang of Batukliyang and Raden Wiranom of Pringgabay. The heads of the Sakra district, Mami Nursasi as well as the two heads of Praya, Mami Bangkol and Mami Sapian, did not attend, but instead sent representatives. Liefrinck told the meeting that within the next few days a military expedition would leave Batavia to help the Sasak people in their war against the Raja. He said:

... the Governor-General, after taking cognizance of the complaints by the Sasak heads, ... had decided to intervene and put an end to their sufferings ... Very soon a strong military force will be sent to Ampenan to compel the Raja of Selaparan to obey the will of the Government.\(^2\)\(^2\)

After this dramatic announcement Liefrinck instructed the Sasak heads ‘... to guard the territory presently held by them, and to take care that the Balinese do not escape’.\(^2\)\(^8\) The Sasak heads, who had listened to Liefrinck’s remarks ‘with great interest’, promised their co-operation.

While Controleur Liefrinck was in East Lombok arranging the alliance with the East Sasak leaders, Van der Wijck put the final touches on the official order for the military expedition. He appointed Major-General J.A. Vetter Commander-in-Chief and assigned Resident Dannenbargh to him as political advisor. General Vetter, however, had the command over both military operations and political strategy. He appointed Major-General P.P.H. van Ham second-in-command, and gave Captain H. Quispel (the Captain of the frigate *HMSS Koningin Emma*) command over the naval forces. The expedition, which left Batavia on 30 June 1894, consisted of seven warships, 12 transport ships, three battalions of infantry and a squadron of cavalry. Excluding the naval personnel, the expeditionary forces numbered 110 officers, 2300 soldiers and about 2000 convicts, a total of approximately 4400 persons.\(^2\)\(^9\)

In summary, the Dutch began behaving aggressively towards Lombok because they had been led to believe that the island had great economic possibilities. More specifically, they believed that iron, tin and possibly gold were to be found on the island. Although the Dutch would have preferred to gain the necessary political influence in a gradual and peaceful manner, this was not possible in view of the Raja’s consistent refusal to surrender any part of his sovereignty. It became increasingly clear to the Dutch that if they were to gain political control and exploit the island’s resources they would have to resort to armed force. But since two successive Governor-Generals shrank from taking this step, there was an interval of a number of years between the ‘discovery’ of Lombok’s economic potential and the sending of a military expedition.
CHAPTER IV
THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF KARANGASEM

The expeditionary forces led by General Vetter and Resident Dannenbargh arrived in the roads of Ampenan on 5 July 1894. A messenger was sent ashore to deliver a second ultimatum consisting of the following seven demands and threat:

Demand I:  The solemn assurance that the Raja shall henceforth punctually obey the commands of His Excellency the Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies.

Demand II:  A profession of sincere regret for the improper attitude adopted towards the Netherlands Indies Government and its representatives as well as the promise to repeat this expression of regret by means of a delegation to the Governor-General.

Demand III:  The immediate extradition and banishment to another island of Anak Agung Made Karangasem, who is responsible for the present situation.

Demand IV:  The acceptance of the Resident’s mediation in the confused situation on Lombok and the promise to abide by whatever settlement the Resident may deem appropriate.

Demand V:  The abdication of Ratu Agung2 Ngurah Karangasem in favour of the legal successor to the throne Anak Agung K’tut Karangasem.

Demand VI:  The promise to conclude a new political treaty in accordance with the wishes of the Governor-General.

Demand VII:  The payment of the costs of the military expedition in gold or in silver.

If a reply, satisfactory in every respect, has not been received before sunrise of 6 July, hostilities will commence.¹

A few hours before the time limit expired a Balinese delegation came aboard the Dutch flagship. The punggawas told Vetter and Dannenbargh that since Ratu Agung2 Ngurah was not expected back in Mataram within the next three days, a decision concerning the ultimatum could not be made at such short notice. They requested that the troops stay aboard the ships until a reply could be given. Not surprisingly, Vetter and Dannenbargh rejected this, stating that because the Raja had not given ‘a satisfactory reply in every respect’, the landing of troops would commence in the morning. The first Dutch troops began landing on the beach at Ampenan early in the morning of 6 July. They lowered the flag of Selaparang (red-white-blue-white-red) and replaced it with the Dutch flag. Throughout the
MAP 3: SITUATION ON LOMBOK AT THE LANDING OF THE DUTCH COLONIAL ARMY: JUNE 1894
day the landing of troops, war materials and supplies continued without incident, so that by nightfall the expeditionary forces had firmly entrenched themselves in Ampenan.2

In the evening of 6 July, a second Balinese delegation came to Ampenan. The three punggawas stated that the landing of troops had caused great unrest among the population, and requested that the troops be ordered back on the ships where further negotiations could take place. Vetter and Dannenbargh responded in a hostile manner. They told the punggawas bluntly that they wanted to receive no more delegations, but only a written reply to the ultimatum from the Raja himself. After this announcement Vetter issued orders that the punggawas be detained in the Dutch camp. During the night of 6-7 July fire broke out in Ampenan. Possibly set by followers of the detained punggawas, it caused considerable confusion. In the belief that a Balinese attack was imminent, General Vetter ordered all the troops on the alert. Although the attack failed to materialize, the fire laid waste a sizeable part of Ampenan and it took the Dutch troops and convicts several hours to bring it under control. Probably fearing a recurrence, Vetter released the punggawas.3

On 8 July the Dutch scored a significant success. Anak Agung Jilantik, the ruler of Karangasem, who was on Lombok with a force of about 1200 of his troops to assist the Raja in his efforts to put down the East Sasak revolt, established contact. The following day Jilantik came to Ampenan with a small following and submitted to General Vetter. He promised obedience and offered his services as a mediator in the negotiations with the Raja. Vetter and Dannenbargh were delighted. Not only had the Balinese party been weakened by about 1200 troops, but the Dutch had also gained an influential advocate at the Lombok court. They instructed Jilantik to proceed to Mataram and urge the Raja to accept the ultimatum.4

On 9 July Ratu Agung2 Ngurah returned to Mataram from Kotaraja (East Lombok) and ordered Anak Agung K’tut to go to Kotaraja to replace him. That evening he called a meeting in the palace of Mataram, attended by Anak Agung Made and Anak Agung Jilantik as well as a large number of punggawas. According to an eyewitness, Jilantik argued in favour of acceptance of the ultimatum. He pointed out that the only alternative was a war with the Dutch which could not be won, whereas it would be possible finally to defeat the East Sasaks with Dutch assistance. Made, however, argued in favour of a total rejection of the ultimatum and asked the Raja for permission to attack the Dutch troops. But Ratu Agung2 Ngurah agreed with Jilantik that a war against the Dutch was likely to have disastrous results and had to be avoided at all costs.5

The following day the Raja replied to the ultimatum. He informed the General that he accepted all the demands except the demand for the extradition of his son:
In so far as the demand for the extradition of our son, Anak Agung Made, is concerned, we hope that the Government will give us some respite. Later, when peace has returned to the land of Selaparang, we, together with the Government, will consider his guilt. If the banishment of our son were to occur now at a time when we still have many enemies, our troubles would increase even further. If he and his followers were to resist us, the enemies we would have to fight would greatly increase in numbers. We therefore hope for a just decision by the Government.  

But Vetter and Dannenburgh were unwilling to make ‘a just decision’. On the same day they wrote to Ratu Agung Ngurah insisting that this demand too be accepted. The Raja should place himself under Dutch protection and order his ‘loyal followers’ to leave Mataram so that the Dutch troops would be able to deal with Made and his party. They concluded their letter by threatening to march into Mataram ‘to carry out this demand by force of arms’.  

The rejection if his request placed Ratu Agung Ngurah in an extremely difficult position. If he delivered his son to the Dutch, he would alienate a large section of the Lombok punggawas, who would be certain to resist the extradition. Should this happen, war against the Dutch would be unavoidable. If he refused the Dutch demand, he would likewise be involved in war. Wishing to avoid an armed conflict at any cost, the Raja opted for the only way out of this very difficult dilemma, namely Made’s death.  

Shortly after the rejection of his request, Ratu Agung Ngurah took steps to arrange for his son’s death. He instructed a priest (pedanda) to investigate a rumour that Anak Agung Made had an illicit love affair with his unmarried niece Anak Agung Ayu Made Rai, the daughter of Made’s deceased older brother Anak Agung Wayan. The priest went to see Ayu Made Rai, confronted her with the rumour, and obtained her confession. Since a love affair of this type was regarded as incest, a capital offence under Balinese law, it was now possible for the Raja to resolve the dilemma in which he found himself by pronouncing the death sentence over his and son and grand-daughter.  

Ratu Agung Ngurah made one more attempt to save the situation. Early in the morning of 11 July, when the Dutch troops had just started on their march to Mataram, General Vetter received another letter. The Raja informed him that he accepted the demand for the extradition of Anak Agung Made, but requested that he be allowed to banish his son himself. Should this request also be rejected, Made would lose his life:
Considering that our friend has strongly insisted that this demand be accepted also, we acquiesce in it. We propose that we ourselves banish him to Culih or Tianyar on Bali. If others than we ourselves take this measure against him, our land will experience difficulties, and he will lose his life this very day. We inform our friend of this so that we will be able to receive a written reply this very day and so that the troops will not have to come to Mataram and Cakranegara. We propose that we ourselves settle this matter today in order to prevent troubles coming over the land.9

Vetter and Dannenburgh remained unmoved. Realizing full well that they were signing Made’s death-warrant, they told the delegation of punggawas who had brought the letter that they insisted on the extradition and that there could be no question of halting the Dutch march on Mataram. Accepting the Raja’s statement that Made would lose this life, they instructed Kontroleur Liefrinck, who had met the prince on various occasions, to accompany the Balinese delegation back to Cakranegara in order to identify the body.10

Ratu Agung 2 Ngurah now had no choice but to pronounce the death sentence over Anak Agung Made and Anak Agung Ayu Made Rai. When Made was informed of his father’s decision, he resigned himself to his fate but strongly denied being guilty of the charge of incest. F.A. Liefrinck obtained an account of Made’s reaction from Made’s house-priest, who was an eyewitness to the scene. In 1900 he summarized the priest’s statement as follows:

Although Made was not unprepared for what awaited him, he was deeply hurt when a number of punggawas informed him that the death sentence his father had pronounced over him would be carried out immediately. He asked them: ‘What have I done to deserve this?’ He answered their respectful reply alluding to the allegation of incest with a shrug of the shoulder. After thinking for some moments he turned to the punggawas and his relatives that were present and said: ‘Brothers, if I must die, I shall adorn myself with herbs from the fern and with flowers from the turi-tree. This means: I have nothing to confess, for I am innocent.’11

Preparations for the execution were made in accordance with the Balinese adat for aristocrats. This adat demanded that the convicted person take a bath, have the hair anointed, dress in white, and be adorned with flowers. The herbs from the fern and the flowers from the turi-tree chosen by Made had a symbolic significance. There is a dual meaning in Balinese for the word ‘turi’ which means both ‘turi-tree’ and ‘true’ or ‘genuine’, and a similarity to the ear
of the word ‘paku’ (fern) and the combination of the pronoun ‘apa’ and the verb ‘ngaku’ (to confess). The significance of the flowers was therefore: the herbs from the fern — what is there to confess? And the *turi*-flowers — I am innocent.\textsuperscript{12}

The execution was delayed for a few hours because no one could be found willing to act as Made’s executioner. When Liefrinck arrived at the palace, he was met by Anak Agung Jilantik who informed him that Made was still alive, and requested him to ‘have some patience’.\textsuperscript{13} While Jilantik disappeared into the palace and the Controleur waited outside, the Raja repeated his order several times. Eventually someone was found willing to obey, and Anak Agung Made was executed in the traditional Balinese manner, by a knife-thrust in the heart.\textsuperscript{14} Minutes after the execution, Jilantik came out of the palace and told Liefrinck that Made was dead. The Controleur was led to the body and duly identified it. Shortly afterwards General Vetter, Resident Dannenburgh and the Dutch troops arrived at the palace in Cakranegara. While the Dutch troops stood in formation in front of the palace, Made’s body was carried outside.\textsuperscript{15} Later in the day the bodies of Made and his niece were taken to Ampenan in stately procession. In accordance with the custom concerning those executed for incest, the bodies were thrown into the sea, at a distance of about 300 metres from the coast.\textsuperscript{16} Legend has it that Made’s body was washed ashore three times in succession, because so the story goes, ‘the sea knew him to be innocent and refused to accept his body.’\textsuperscript{17}

*The Search for a Political Settlement*

The Dutch had good reason to be satisfied with both their political and military situation. The execution of Anak Agung Made had conveniently resolved Ratu Agung2 Ngurah’s only objection to the seven-point ultimatum. The Dutch troops had also been able to occupy the Balinese strongholds of Mataram and Cakranegara without having to fire a single shot, without suffering a single casualty. After Made’s death the possibility of Balinese resistance seemed remote. It appeared as if the expedition had already fully accomplished its objective of bringing Lombok under Dutch rule. All that remained was to settle the details of the ultimatum — to collect the indemnity (Demand VII), to invest Anak Agung K’tut as Raja (Demand V), and to arrive at a political settlement to be formalized by the conclusion of a political treaty with the new Raja, Ratu Agung2 K’tut (Demands IV and VI).

Vetter and Dannenburgh were optimistic about the chances of a quick settlement. On 12 July, the day after their occupation of Mataram and Cakranegara, they took their first steps in this direction. They sent a letter to Anak Agung K’tut in Kotaraja ordering him to return, and instructed Liefrinck to sail to East Lombok to bring the rebel leaders back with him to Cakranegara. The intention was to convene a conference of Balinese punggawas and East Sasad
leaders at which Anak Agung K‘tut would be invested as Raja of Selaparang and the new political treaty would be concluded. Seriously underestimating the difficulty of achieving a satisfactory settlement on an island where a rebellion had been raging for the last three years, General Vetter could write:

As soon as the heads of the insurgents have arrived here, they will be told that . . . they must submit to Anak Agung K‘tut and that they must recognize and honour him as the legitimate ruler of the land . . . Under the present circumstances I expect that their submission to Balinese rule will be accomplished without great difficulty.  

The Balinese position on a political settlement on Lombok might not have been irreconcilable with the initial Dutch position. Although the Balinese rulers did not leave any detailed policy statement, it is possible to ascertain what type of political settlement they had in mind. Ratu Agung 2 Ngurah indicated the Balinese position in his letter to General Vetter of 10 July 1894. He phrased his acceptance of the Dutch demand for payment of the costs of the expedition (Demand VII) as follows: ‘. . . we are prepared to pay for all the costs incurred by the Government in order to properly maintain the troops which assist us in putting an end to the complications on Selaparang.’ In another letter a day later the Raja wrote: ‘. . . when our son Anak Agung Made moves to the island Bali or when he dies, we very much hope that our friend shall put an end to the unrest in the land of Selaparang without delay.’ A similar position was taken by Anak Agung Jilantik, the ruler of Karangasem, in a letter to the leaders of the East Sasak revolt:

Mami Anom, receive this letter as a token of my favourable disposition towards you! The reason why I send you this letter is that . . . a decision has been taken. I have settled matters with the Resident of Buleleng and the General of Batavia. What I inform you of is therefore no mere rumour. I participated in the meeting at which it was decided to send Controleur Liefrinck to Labuan Haji. From Labuan Haji the Controleur will go to Sakra, where a meeting will be convened of the various heads of the Sasak territory. The heads shall be taken aboard the ship and be brought to Ampenan and from there to Cakranegara. The Resident of Buleleng and the General of Batavia want those heads to submit to my younger brother K‘tut Karangasem. My younger brother Made Karangasem had been put to death on orders of my father [i.e. Ratu Agung 2 Ngurah]. Now that Made Karangasem is dead there can be no reason why the heads of the Sasak territory should disobey the decision by the Resident and the General. [If some of you should
refuse to obey] the General and his soldiers shall compel those recalcitrants. This has been the decision! I inform you of this so that you and the other heads can deliberate on how you wish to act.\textsuperscript{21}

In return for acceptance of the ultimatum and thus Dutch overlordship, the Balinese rulers expected as a matter of course that the Dutch would assist them in putting down the East Sasak revolt and in restoring Balinese domination over all of Lombok.

The initial Dutch position was not fundamentally different, as is evident from the unrevised version of the treaty which was to be concluded with Anak Agung K’tut and his punggawas. Drafted by Resident Dannenburgh and approved by the Governor-General, the treaty was long and detailed, comprising 36 articles in all. Articles 1-12 regulated the various aspects of Dutch political domination. These Articles established the complete sovereignty of the Netherlands Indies Government, regulated the succession to the throne, established the superiority of the Resident over the Raja, and stipulated that the Raja pay the yearly sum of 10 000 rijksdaalders to maintain the Dutch administration on the island. Articles 12-20 regulated the various aspects of Dutch economic domination. These Articles were intended to open the island to Dutch trade and commerce, to safeguard Dutch mining and plantation interests, to secure for the Netherlands Indies Government an income through taxation, and to establish Dutch currency as legal tender. Articles 20-28 contained various regulations concerning Lombok’s civil administration. These Articles stipulated the categories of Lombok’s population residing under the direct jurisdiction of the Netherlands Indies Government and regulated various aspects of the administration of justice, police, punishment of criminals, and so forth. And Articles 28-36 contained a variety of regulations on such matters as the importation of war materials, the slave trade, piracy and ships wrecked off the coasts.\textsuperscript{22}

Although the treaty was undoubtedly harsh and left no doubt whatsoever who were to be Lombok’s rulers, it is possible that, had it been presented in this form, Anak Agung K’tut and the punggawas might have agreed to sign it. In two important respects the treaty was not entirely unfavourable to the Balinese. First, with the exception of a few small categories of people such as ‘Europeans and those of equal status’, Chinese and Arabs, who were to be placed under direct Dutch jurisdiction, all other inhabitants of the island were to reside under the jurisdiction of the Raja and punggawas (Articles 20 and 21). The only allowance the treaty made for Sasak political aspirations was the stipulation that, insofar as marriage and inheritance law was concerned, the Mohammedan population was to be subject to its own priests and heads (Article 27). With this exception, the treaty aimed at a full restoration of Balinese political domination over the East Sasaks. And secondly, the treaty restored the system of taxation — with the land tax as its most important aspect — and corvée labour, as they had
existed before the outbreak of the East Sasad revolt in 1891, to the immediate control of the Raja and punuggawas (Article 17). The only exception to this was the Dutch intention to appropriate the revenues derived from import and export duties (Article 17). Since the treaty made no allowance whatever for Sasad economic aspirations, it is clear that it also aimed at a nearly complete restoration of Balinese economic domination over the East Sasad. In short, the terms of the treaty would have meant that the East Sasad rebellion against Balinese rule had been in vain.

The treaty, however, was never presented to Anak Agung K’tut and his punuggawas in this form, because in the weeks following the occupation of Mataram and Cakranegara the Dutch significantly changed their position. Vetter and Dannenburgh came to realize that the East Sasad leaders were so bitterly opposed to a return of Balinese rule that their submission to Anak Agung K’tut could not be attained by persuasion. The first indication that something was amiss came when Controleur Liefrinck returned from East Lombok without any of the Sasad district chiefs.

Liefrinck had left Ampenan for Labuan Haji (East Lombok) on 14 July aboard the armoured vessel HMSS Prins Hendrik. Upon his arrival in the afternoon of the following day, he sent a letter ashore informing the head of the Sakra district, Mami Kertawang, that he had instructions to convene a meeting of all prominent East Lombok district chiefs in the village of Sakra. He requested Kertawang to send messengers to the various district chiefs. On 16 July the meeting was held, with only three of the eight principal East Sasad leaders present, namely Mami Kertawang of Sakra, Raden Melayu Kusuma of Masbagik, and Mami Ginawang of Batukliyang. The heads of the districts of Rarang, Kopang, Pringgabaya and Praya all asked to be excused and contented themselves with sending representatives.

Liefrinck, who was careful not to reveal that the Dutch intended to bring about their submission to Anak Agung K’tut, informed the meeting that Made had died, that Dutch troops had occupied Mataram and Cakranegara, and invited the district chiefs to come back with him to Cakranegara in order ‘to discuss matters of great importance to their people’. The East Sasad leaders, who had already learned from Jilantik’s letter what the real Dutch intention was, reacted with extreme suspicion. They all asked to be excused on various pretexts such as pressing matters at home, fear of the sea and illness.

The Controleur did not give up. The following morning he set out for Praya to meet the heads of that district. Since Praya was the most populous and powerful of the East Lombok districts, the presence of Mami Bangkol and Mami Sapian at the planned conference was much to be desired. At a village about halfway between Sakra and Praya, Liefrinck encountered Mami Sapian who had travelled some distance to meet him. This chief was also less than enthusiastic about going to Cakranegara. He told the Controleur that as he had never before travelled by sea, he simply dreaded having to take this journey. When Liefrinck
suggested that he travel overland, Mami Sapian objected that if he did this he would be sure to be butchered by the Balinese.

Liefrinck then travelled to Pringgabaya, where on 19 July he met the head of the district, Raden Wiranom. This chief, too, refused to travel to Cakranegara, but unlike his colleagues he gave frank expression to his fear and hatred of the Balinese as well as to his suspicion that the Dutch might be making common cause with them. In his report the Controleur recorded of Raden Wiranom:

> With emphasis he asked me whether the call to come to Cakranegara emanated from the Commander-in-Chief or from the Raja of Lombok. If the call came from the Raja he would definitely refuse to go, because he never again wished to meet that Raja. He continued by saying that he would prefer to die rather than submit to the Balinese Raja.\(^{25}\)

After Wiranom’s refusal, there was nothing left for Liefrinck but to return to Ampenan.

The Controleur arrived back in Ampenan on 21 July. The failure of his mission made it impossible for the Dutch to hold the conference to reach a political settlement. Although it had now become apparent that the East Sasak leaders were extremely suspicious of Dutch-Balinese collusion, Vetter and Dannenbargh resolved to try again. On 22 July they ordered Liefrinck to travel overland to Praya. In the event that the East Sasak leaders should still refuse to come to Cakranegara, they authorized him to offer an armed Dutch escort and a guarantee from General Vetter of their safety in Cakranegara.\(^{26}\)

In the morning of 23 July Liefrinck set out again. The Controleur crossed from Balinese into East Sasak territory at Sukarara and arrived at the fortifications of the village of Praya in the afternoon of the same day. There Mami Bangkol, the most influential of all the East Sasak leaders, told him that he would immediately send messengers summoning all district chiefs to Praya. Liefrinck waited four days, but none of the East Sasak leaders appeared. In the evening of 27 July he again met Mami Bangkol who told him that he had received word that the chiefs did not wish to leave their respective districts because they feared a Balinese attack at any moment. Liefrinck asked Mami Bangkol whether he himself was prepared to accompany him to Cakranegara. Bangkol made two objections. Like the other district chiefs, he argued that the Balinese would be sure to take advantage of his absence and launch an attack on Praya. Secondly, he argued that there was no point in his travelling to Cakranegara because even if he went he would certainly refuse to submit to Anak Agung K’tut. When the Controleur asked him why he thought that the purpose of the planned conference was to effect the submission of the East Sasak leaders to Anak Agung K’tut, Bangkol produced Jilantik’s letter. Liefrinck recorded him as stating: ‘He said quite bluntly that Anak
Agung Jilantik's letter had made him and the other Sasak leaders afraid to obey the call to come to Cakranegara. Whatever might happen, he and the other Sasak chiefs would never agree to place themselves again under Balinese rule. This frank statement served notice that if the Dutch insisted on restoring Balinese rule, they would first have to overcome the opposition of the district chiefs. Now realizing that he would be unable to persuade Mami Bangkol or any of the other East Sasak leaders to come to Cakranegara, Liefrinck left Praya early in the morning of 28 July.

This failure finally convinced Vetter and Dannenbargh that a restoration of Balinese rule could not be accomplished 'without great difficulty'. Faced with the likelihood of East Sasak resistance, they had to make a choice. They could either uphold the initial Dutch plan and compel the East Sasak leaders to submit to Anak Agung K'tut, or they could change the plan sufficiently to gain their co-operation. The choice they made was based upon power-political considerations. Whereas after the quick attainment of their objectives in Mataram and Cakranegara, Vetter and Dannenbargh did not in the least expect resistance from the side of the Balinese, the East Sasak opposition suggested that the district chiefs would be likely to resort to arms if pressed to submit to Anak Agung K’tut. They chose what appeared to be the easiest way out. The new plan was to travel to East Lombok, to convene a conference with the East Sasak leaders, take note of their objections to a return to Balinese rule, and make a number of political concessions to them. In a letter addressed to the district chiefs, General Vetter wrote:

I have become convinced that particularly your fear of the Balinese rulers has prevented you from obeying my calls . . . In order to remove your apprehension of the Balinese rulers and to give you the opportunity to communicate all your grievances to me, I inform you that early in the morning of 4 August I, the Resident and the Controleur, without any of my troops, shall arrive in the roads of Labuan Haji. I desire that you be present in that village so that I can settle matters with you which will be to the benefit of yourselves, your districts and your subordinates.

The reference to 'your districts' and 'your subordinates' was deliberate. In their report of 31 July, Vetter and Dannenbargh indicated the type of concessions they were now prepared to make:

... the Controleur Liefrinck has not succeeded in bringing the prominent Sasak heads to Cakranegara. Apparently they are so afraid of the Balinese they they are absolutely unwilling to have any dealings with them . . . In judging the attitude of the Sasak heads, it should not be forgotten that they will relinquish the independent
position they occupy at present only in the greatest of necessity. In order to achieve the aim of again placing the Sasaks under Balinese rule, it will be necessary to guarantee them that the Sasak people will be ruled as much as possible by their own heads, instead of being ruled exclusively by Balinese punggawas who, generally speaking, cared but little for the needs of the Sasak people.30

In the morning of 4 August the conference with the East Sasak leaders was convened in Labuan Haji. All the prominent district chiefs were present, namely Mami Bangkol of Praya, Raden Wiranom of Pringgabaya, Raden Widana of Jonggat,31 Mami Kertawang of Sakra, Mami Ginawang of Batukliyang, Raden Sribanom of Masbagik, Raden Melayu Kusuma of Masbagik and Mami Mustiaji of Kopang. Vetter and Dannenbargh asked the East Sasak leaders to state their objections to a return to Balinese rule. In response to this invitation, Raden Wiranom and Mami Mustiaji, occasionally supported by other district chiefs, voiced the following eight grievances:

I. Taxation: The share of the harvest taken by the Balinese landowner on the druwe jabe lands was too great. Although the share of the punggawa amounted officially to 100 bundles of padi on an area of rice-field with a productivity of 400 bundles, in reality it had been much greater. The bundles of padi to be paid to the Balinese punggawa were of greater weight than those left to the cultivator (sepangan). While the former had weighed about ten kati, the latter had weighed only about five kati. Moreover, the punggawas had also demanded 100 bundles of padi on rice fields with a productivity much lower than 400 bundles. And further, the punggawas had not infrequently demanded a share of the harvest twice a year.

II. Corvée labour: The demand for corvée had been exorbitant. Apart from the ordinary corvée to be performed for the Raja and punggawas, much labour had been demanded to build and maintain the many palaces, such as Narmada, Lingsar, Gunung Sari and so on. The people had been obliged to travel long distances and had been required to work on these projects for days on end, sometimes for as long as a month. During all this time they had to provide their own food. And when someone asked to be allowed to go home because his food had finished, the standard reply was: ‘If you have no more rice, you can eat sand’.

III. Income of Sasak heads: The Sasak village heads had received no income. They had not been allowed to collect taxes for themselves or to use the corvée labour of their subordinates for their own purposes. Their only privilege had been exemption from land tax and corvée labour.

IV. The Balinese adat of camput: This adat entailed that when a man died without leaving a male heir, all his possessions, including his wife and children, were appropriated by the Raja. Sometimes the women thus taken became
concubines of the Raja or of one of his punggawas. However, more often than not these women ended up as prostitutes who were required to pay the Raja a monthly sum, the amount of which depended on their age and beauty.

V. The Balinese adat concerning twins: This adat entailed that when twins of the same sex were born, the children were taken by the Raja, who raised them in the palace.

VI. Marriage: Although Balinese youths, even sudras, has been permitted to marry a Sasak perwangsa girl, the reverse had not been permitted. If a Sasak youth, even if he belonged to the perwangsa, married a Balinese triwangsa girl, he was put to death.

VII. The administration of justice: This had been entirely in the hands of the Balinese punggawas. They judged all matters in an extremely arbitrary fashion. If someone did not wish to confess to a crime he was tortured until he did, and thereupon executed. The Sasak village heads had no say whatsoever in the administration of justice.

VIII. The import and export duties: These had been farmed out to the bandars. If a Sasak wished to buy or sell a particular commodity, he was obliged to go to the bandar who had the monopology on trade in this commodity. If a Sasak traded with someone else, he had to pay the disadvantaged bandar a fine of 12,250 kepengs plus one-eighth of the estimated value of the commodity. The result of this system was that the bandars had the power to fix the purchase price as well as the sales price of a commodity.32

The following day the conference was resumed. Realizing that to gain the co-operation of the East Sasak leaders it was necessary to make political concessions, Vetter and Dannenbaragh gave them the following guarantees:

Guarantee I: Although Anak Agung K’tut shall be invested as Raja of Selaparang, the Sasak people shall be ruled by their own heads.

Guarantee II: The Raja shall not have the power to dismiss the Sasak heads. Instead, they will be directly responsible to the Assistant-Resident who will be permanently stationed in Mataram.

Guarantee III: In the treaty to be concluded with Anak Agung K’tut it will be clearly stipulated which taxes and what corvée labour the Raja may in fairness demand from the people. It will further be clearly stipulated what the mutual rights and obligations of the Balinese rulers and the Sasak people consist of.

Guarantee IV: The Balinese adat of campput shall be strictly prohibited.
Guarantee V: The Raja shall respect the religious laws and institutions of the Sasak people.

Guarantee VI: Two or more prominent Sasak heads shall travel to Cakranegara in order to represent the interests of the Sasak people in the discussions preceding the conclusion of the new treaty, and in their capacity as prominent Sasak heads shall also affix their signatures to the treaty.33

These six concessions went a considerable way towards alleviating the grievances and meeting the ambitions of the East Sasak leaders. The first two guarantees ensured that the district chiefs, who before the outbreak of revolt had only been heads of villages, would retain the positions of power to which they had risen in the course of the revolt. The third guarantee, although vaguely worded, was intended to ensure that the East Sasak leaders would also have some economic power over their subordinates. To the district chiefs, who had been unable to assert their authority sufficiently to make their subordinates pay land tax or perform corvée labour, this was a tempting offer. The fourth and fifth guarantees were meant to ensure that the most hateful of the Balinese laws would be abolished. And finally, the sixth guarantee secured for the East Sasak leaders a voice at the conference at which the treaty was to be concluded. These six guarantees meant that the district chiefs were promised a redress of nearly all of their grievances against Balinese rule. The only grievance which had not been mentioned was the one concerning import and export duties. Vetter and Dannenburgh were in no position to make concessions on this point, as it had already been decided that the Netherlands Indies Government would take over the revenues to be derived from this source.34

The East Sasak leaders were quick to realize the advantages of these concessions. On behalf of all the district chiefs, Raden Wiranom told Vetter and Dannenburgh that there remained only one obstacle to a return to ‘Balinese rule’. Shortly after the outbreak of revolt, when the East Sasak leaders concluded their mufakatan (see pp. 28–9), they had sworn an oath never to submit to the Balinese Raja. This obstacle, however, was not insuperable. Vetter and Dannenburgh argued that: ‘In view of the fact that the circumstances are entirely different from those when the oath was sworn, it is now no longer of any value.’ A penghulu present at the meeting agreed with this point of view and released the district chiefs from their oath. After each of the East Sasak leaders had signed a statement declaring their willingness to recognize the overlordship of Anak Agung K’tut and after they had chosen Mami Mustiaji, Raden Melayu Kusuma and Raden Sribanom to represent them at the negotiations in Cakranegara, Vetter and Dannenburgh closed the conference. On 8 August the Dutch party and the three district chiefs sailed for Ampenan.35
Upon their return to Cakranegara on 9 August, Vetter and Dannenburgh began redrafting the political treaty. Vetter strongly urged the Governor-General to approve the concessions: 'Since the Resident and I are both firmly convinced that without these guarantees the Sasak heads would have been unwilling to accept Balinese rule, whereby an extremely difficult political situation would have been created, I trust that Your Excellency will approve these guarantees.'

In his report of 16 August, Dannenburgh spelled out the revisions to the treaty required by the concessions. The first and second guarantee needed the addition of the following clause to Article 20: 'The subjects of the Raja of Selaparang shall be ruled by their own heads of the same ethnicity whose appointment and dismissal is subject to the approval of the Resident of Bali and Lombok.' Since Dannenburgh made no distinction between East and West Lombok, this clause went further than was strictly necessary from the point of view of the concessions made to the district chiefs. It meant that the Balinese punggawas were also to lose political control over the West Sasaks who had never risen in revolt against Balinese rule. The third guarantee necessitated the inclusion of the following clause in Article 17: 'The Raja and punggawas agree to abolish or change the existing system of taxation and corvée labour whenever the Government should deem this necessary. They further agree to effect these changes in consultation with the Resident of Bali and Lombok and to abide by whatever decision the Governor-General might take.' This clause gave the Dutch the power to alter the system of taxation and corvée labour at will, and thus to honour their promises to the East Sasak leaders. The fourth guarantee required the inclusion of the following clause in Article 29: 'The Raja and punggawas agree that the custom known by the name of camput shall be strictly prohibited in the principality of Selaparang.' This clause, too, went further than what was strictly needed from the point of view of the concessions. Its wording meant that this adat would be abolished not only for the East Sasaks, but for the West Sasaks and the Balinese population as well. And finally, the fifth guarantee necessitated that Article 27 be rewritten to read: 'The Raja and punggawas of Selaparang promise to take care that everyone in that principality will be free to profess his religious beliefs. They further promise that the religious laws, customs and institutions of the people shall be respected.'

On 23 August, Van der Wijck telegraphed approval of the revisions to the treaty. He also officially authorized the conference at which Anak Agung K'tut was to be invested as Raja of Selaparang.

Vetter and Dannenburgh had changed the Dutch position on a political settlement. Instead of aiming at an effective restoration of Balinese rule over the East Sasaks as had been the initial intention, they now sought to restore Balinese rule only nominally, leaving effective power over the East Sasaks to the district
chiefs. The East Sasak leaders stood to gain much from this change. The Dutch now intended to confirm them in their newly won status as chiefs over large and populous districts. The Balinese punggawas, the former rulers of East Lombok, stood to lose much. Ever since the outbreak of the East Sasak revolt in 1891, the punggawas had fought to re-establish their authority over East Lombok. The Dutch now meant to deny them the possibility of ever attaining this objective.

An Unacceptable Treaty

Immediately after their return from East Lombok on 9 August, Vetter and Dannenbarth convened a series of meetings with Anak Agung K’tut and the punggawas to inform them of the contents of the treaty they wished to conclude. The officers of the General Staff, the officials and the three East Sasak leaders (who served as Dutch informants39) took up quarters in that part of the palace complex of Cakranegara normally occupied by Anak Agung Jilantik. From 10 August onwards meetings were held there every day.40 K’tut, who came to the meetings ‘walking like a man condemned to death’, was invariably silent, and with a brief ‘patut’ agreed to each and every Article of the treaty. The punggawas also spoke little and raised no objections.41 At the meeting on 12 August, Vetter and Dannenbarth encountered not the slightest opposition to their demand for a huge indemnity of 400 000 rijksdaalders, to be paid before the departure of the military expedition. Similarly, at the meeting on 14 August the Balinese did not register any protest to the demand that the Raja pay 10 000 rijksdaalders annually to finance the Dutch administration on the island.42 Because K’tut and the punggawas did not object to anything, the meetings appeared to proceed very smoothly. By 20 August the one-sided discussions had largely been completed — all that remained to be done was to collect the indemnity, invest Anak Agung K’tut as Raja of Selaparang, and officially conclude the treaty with the new Raja. However, on that day an unforeseen difficulty arose. Anak Agung Jilantik, who had attended all the meetings, pointed out to Vetter and Dannenbarth that since the ‘discussions’ had been held in Malay, a lanaguage K’tut and most of the punggawas did not speak, they had not fully understood the meaning of the treaty. Not in the least alarmed, Dannenbarth instructed Lieftrinck to prepare a Balinese-language copy of the treaty to distribute among the punggawas.43

While the ‘discussions’ with the Balinese were in progress, General Vetter took a step which was to have disastrous consequences for the Dutch. Confident that the treaty would soon be concluded without trouble, he decentralized his forces. On 16 August Vetter ordered two Dutch columns to be sent into Lombok’s interior in order to ensure: (1) that Jilantik’s 1200 auxiliary troops were withdrawn from Sukarara and Batuaj and brought back to Karangasem; (2) that the Balinese and East Sasak fortifications were dismantled; (3) that the thousands of East Sasaks who had fled the war zone could return to their villages. The first column, under the command of Colonel van Bijlevelt, consisting of
about 350 officers and men and 190 convicts, left for Sukarara on the 17th. The second, similar column, under the command of Colonel Lawick van Pabst, left for Batukliyang the following day. The result was that by 20 August the Dutch forces on Lombok were divided between five places: Ampenan, Mataram, Cakranegara, Sukarara and Batukliyang.

On 20 August Liefrinck began translating the treaty into the Balinese language. After he had finished the first sheet a copy was given to Anak Agung K’tut who immediately convened a meeting with his father, Ratu Agung2 Ngurah, and the punggawas. Just how carefully they considered the opening Articles of the treaty is indicated by a remark Jilantik is reported to have made to Liefrinck. On the 21st he told him that there was no need to rush the translation because ‘they are still debating the first sheet’. The Controleur nevertheless continued with his task at a fairly rapid pace and completed the translation the following day.

As the translation became available and the full meaning of the treaty began to sink in, the Balinese attitude towards the Dutch underwent a marked change. Whereas since the Dutch landing the Balinese had endeavoured to appease the Dutch in every respect, after 20 August they became distinctly less co-operative. This change was so obvious that even the confident General Vetter noticed it. On 24 August he wrote: ‘During the last few days certain phenomena have manifested themselves which point to a degree of passive resistance on the part of the Lombok rulers.’ These phenomena, Vetter went on, were the following: (1) Although Anak Agung Jilantik’s 1200 auxiliary troops had been pulled back from their positions in East Lombok to Cakranegara, the Lombok rulers had raised all kinds of objections to their return to Karangasem; (2) an order to a number of punggawas to deliver 70 transport horses to supply the Dutch troops in Sukarara had not been obeyed; (3) after having paid 80 000 rijkstaalders on 20 August and 100 000 rijkstaalders on the 22nd, the Raja had asked for a postponement of 20 days before making the next payment of the 400 000 rijkstaalder indemnity; (4) after 20 August no further meetings with Anak Agung K’tut and the punggawas had taken place because K’tut pretended to be seriously ill and refused to see any of the Dutch officers and officials.

The connection between the treaty and the change in the Balinese attitude had not escaped the attention of Vetter and Dannenburgh: ‘It is worthy of note that these phenomena have manifested themselves after the treaty had been discussed with the successor to the throne and the punggawas and after they had been issued with a translation.’ Rather understating the issue, Vetter wrote: ‘The Resident and I believe that the Balinese punggawas are not at all pleased with the new treaty and that especially the Articles dealing with the government over the Sasks are like thorns in their sides.’ But although Vetter and Dannenburgh were aware that the Balinese were unhappy with the treaty, they were not seriously alarmed. They could not imagine that the Balinese would dare to resort to armed resistance. Vetter suggested that the worst that
could happen was that K’tut and the punggawas would categorically refuse to sign the new treaty: ‘I do not believe that the displeasure of the Balinese punggawas will give rise to any serious difficulties. But with a view to the measures to be taken in case the Lombok rulers should be unwilling to conclude the treaty, I considered it my duty to bring these matters to Your Excellency’s attention.’

The Raja and punggawas were more than unhappy with the treaty. On 23 August, when they had fully grasped its meaning and realized that they were to lose not only their independence but also their political and economic domination over both the West and the East Sasaks, they held another meeting in the palace of Cakranegara. It was decided that an attempt should be made at negotiating. Ratu Agung2 Ngurah, probably realizing the futility of negotiating with Dannenburgh, resolved to send a delegation to the Governor-General to persuade him to revise the treaty. In accordance with Article 9 of the treaty, which required the Raja to consult the Resident before sending a delegation, Ratu Agung2 Ngurah informed Dannenburgh that: ‘In view of the fact that several Articles in the treaty are contrary to the customs of Selaparang, we request to be allowed to send a delegation to the Governor-General to discuss these Articles.’ Dannenburgh predictably refused this request, telling the messenger that: ‘Since General Vetter and myself are the legitimate representatives of the Government, all matters have to be settled with us.’ It now became clear to the Raja and punggawas that there was no possibility of negotiating a revision to the treaty. Immediately after Dannenburgh had rejected this request, a number of punggawas, seeing no alternative, began planning armed resistance. No doubt realizing that Ratu Agung2 Ngurah would be certain to refuse permission for an attack on the Dutch forces, the dissenting punggawas left the palace of Cakranegara for Mataram. In the evening of 23 August these punggawas convened a meeting in that part of the palace normally occupied by Anak Agung K’tut. As well as the Crown Prince, the following punggawas were present: Gusti Nyoman Dangin (alias Gusti Komang Pengsong), Gusti K’tut Gusa, Ida K’tut Gelgel, Gusti Bagus Kaler, Ida Bagus Putu, and Gusti Bagus Buntu. Gusti Komang Pengsong argued that if the treaty were concluded ‘they would lose everything’. Therefore, he continued, it was necessary to attack the Dutch troops and drive them from Selaparang. Gusti K’tut Gusa argued that because the Dutch troops were dispersed they could easily be defeated. And if the Dutch should send another expedition they would conclude an alliance with the East Sasak leaders and fight the Dutch together with them. While the other four punggawas at once expressed their agreement with this plan, Anak Agung K’tut had to be persuaded. After unanimous agreement had been reached, they decided to carry out a surprise attack on the Dutch forces. The date of the attack was fixed for the following night, 24-25 August. Thereupon K’tut and the punggawas began making the necessary preparations.
By this time Vetter and Dannenburgh had become somewhat apprehensive about the change in the Balinese attitude. This uneasiness led them to question Anak Agung Jilantik. This was not as strange as it may seem. Ever since his submission shortly after the landing of the military expedition, Jilantik had assisted the Dutch in their dealings with the Balinese. It was natural for Vetter and Dannenburgh to turn to him in this case also. On the evening of 24 August, Dannenburgh and General van Ham, the expedition’s second-in-command, went to see Jilantik in the palace of Cakranegara. They told him about the change in the Balinese attitude and asked whether this was likely to result in a refusal to conclude the treaty. Jilantik told them that although the Raja and punggawas did not like certain Articles in the treaty, he was certain they would agree to sign it and promised to do all in his power to persuade them. Set at ease, Dannenburgh and Van Ham left his quarters.51

The night of 24-25 August passed without a Balinese attack materializing. Due to the death on the 24th of a ksatriya woman from Cakranegara, which the punggawa was regarded as a bad omen, the attack was postponed until the following night.52 This delay increased the chances that the Dutch would receive prior warning. In fact, the following afternoon the head of the West Sasak village of Sukaraja (in the vicinity of Ampenan) approached Captain Schmidthamer in Ampenan. He told the Captain that he had reason to believe the Balinese were planning to attack the Dutch troops. Questioned as to why he thought so, the West Sasak head replied that the previous day he had been ordered to appear before Gusti Komang Pengsong. The punggawa had told him that in case something should happen in Mataram and Cakranegara, he, Pengsong and his followers, would come and occupy the village of Sukaraja. The punggawa told him further that Gusti K’tut Gusa and his followers would occupy the village of Otok, likewise in the vicinity of Ampenan. Schmidthamer was astute enough to realize that an occupation of these two villages by hostile Balinese would effectively cut the communication between the Dutch troops in Ampenan and those in Mataram and Cakranegara. Considering that this information might well be reliable, he rode to Cakranegara on horseback and reported to General Vetter.53

When Vetter and Dannenburgh received this specific warning around 5.30 p.m., they finally did become worried. General Vetter, realizing the strategic weakness of his dispersed troops, ordered back to Mataram the troops in Cakranegara and the army columns in Sukarara and Batukliyang. Meanwhile Dannenburgh endeavoured to establish the truth of this alarming report. He and General van Ham once more asked Jilantik for his opinion. Jilantik told them he had no knowledge of a plan to attack the Dutch troops, and promised to warn them at once should anything come to his attention.54 Partly reassured, Dannenburgh and Van Ham went to the part of the palace complex occupied by Anak Agung K’tut. They were received by a group of punggawas who told them that K’tut was still too seriously ill to receive visitors. Thus Dannenburgh was unable to give any positive confirmation of the report.55
At about 6.30 p.m. Vetter, Dannenbargh and Van Ham held council to
decide whether to proceed with the withdrawal of Dutch troops from
Cakranegara. They agreed that it was unlikely that a Balinese attack would
take place. This view was based on the following four circumstances: (1) The
report by Captain Schmidthamer was the only specific warning that had been
received. Dannenbargh’s spies, who included a few punggawas from Buleleng
and the three East Sasak leaders, had not reported anything of the sort. (2) There
has been no indication at all of hostility on the part of the population. This was
particularly evident from the fact that women and children had continued to
visit the markets in Mataram and Cakranegara as usual. (3) Anak Agung Jilantik,
who could be expected to be well-informed, had no knowledge of a plan for an
attack. (4) That very morning the Raja had paid another 100 000 rijkdsdaalders
of the indemnity. Vetter, Dannenbargh and Van Ham also believed that even
if the report were true and the Balinese attacked, the Dutch troops would be
more than a match for them and make them pay dearly for their boldness. They
therefore decided to keep the troops in Cakranegara.

At about 7 p.m. General Vetter cancelled his earlier decision to this
effect. Nevertheless, he was cautious enough to order headquarters to be
moved from the palace complex to the troops’ encampment in front of the
palace and an additional company (about 150 officers and men) to be sent
from Mataram to Cakranegara to reinforce the Dutch garrison there. While
Vetter issued these orders, Dannenbargh wrote a letter to Ratu Agung2
Ngurah and Anak Agung K’tut in which he informed them that he had
received a report that the punggawas Gusti Komang Pengsong and Gusti
K’tut Gusa planned an attack on the Dutch troops. He ordered them to
investigate the matter and to send a reply before 8 a.m. the following
morning.

At about the same time as Vetter, Dannenbargh and Van Ham were
concluding that a Balinese attack was unlikely, Anak Agung K’tut and the
six punggawas made the final preparations. Shortly after nightfall they called
their Balinese and West Sasak followers to the palace of Mataram, provided
them with rifles and ammunition and ordered them to take up positions around
the Dutch encampment in Cakranegara. Shortly after the soldiers had gone to
sleep at about 11 p.m., the signal for the attack was given.

The first shots were fired into the Cakranegara camp (approximately
550 officers and men and about 350 convicts) over walls and from trees.
Due to the camp’s location, surrounded by complexes of mud-walls varying
in height from 1.5m – 4m, the Dutch were extremely vulnerable. Although
Balinese fire was not intensive at first, the Dutch suffered considerable
casualties. Shortly after the attack had started, the tong-tong was sounded
calling all Balinese to battle. As more and more heeded the call, the fire on the
camp grew in intensity, becoming particularly murderous after the Balinese
had succeeded in boring holes through the walls of adjoining buildings,
enabling them to fire on the camp while remaining under cover. The Dutch were caught in a trap. They were unable to do effective battle with an almost invisible enemy. Even their 7cm. cannon had little effect on the walls behind which the Balinese remained hidden. Firing continued unabated throughout the night, causing mounting casualties among the Dutch troops. Shortly before dawn, at 5 a.m. on 26 August, Vetter realized that his position was hopeless. Fearing that if he attempted to hold his ground his troops would be further decimated by daylight, he gave orders to abandon camp. The evacuation was carried out in reasonably good order. Taking their dead and wounded, their ammunition and artillery, but leaving all their supplies, the Dutch retreated into a nearby temple-compound (pura). At about 6 a.m. the retreat was completed. Since the Balinese lacked mortars, the Dutch troops were relatively secure behind the temple’s four-metre high walls.

Soon after this success, the Balinese turned their attention to Mataram. At about 6 a.m. on 26 August they began converging on the Mataram camp (likewise consisting of approximately 550 officers and men and about 350 convicts) and initiated their attack. The position of this camp was also extremely vulnerable. Since it was located in an open field on the outskirts of Mataram, it was possible for the Balinese to fire into the camp while staying under cover behind walls. Here, too, the Dutch were trapped. By 2.30 p.m. their position had become so difficult that the commanding officer, Major van Blommestein, decided to abandon camp. Like General Vetter, he gave orders to retreat into a nearby temple-compound. This retreat was not carried out in such an orderly manner. Leaving behind all their supplies, a large part of their ammunition and one of their two 7cm. cannon, the Dutch completed their ‘hasty retreat’ at about 3 p.m.

While the Balinese drove the Dutch from their camp in Mataram, the situation of the troops trapped in the temple in Cakranegara steadily worsened. There was no food, no water and ammunition was in short supply. As all medical supplies had been lost, the wounded could not be given adequate medical attention. Vetter, probably aware that under these circumstances it would not be long before lack of water, food and ammunition would force him to surrender or perish, decided to abandon the temple and retreat to Mataram. Before leaving the temple the Dutch buried their dead (16) and made tandu to carry the gravely wounded (40). At 3 p.m. Vetter issued the order to retreat to Mataram.

The Dutch retreat from Cakranegara became a complete rout. As soon as the troops left the temple, they drew an intensive fire which caused a large number of casualties including General van Ham. Balinese fire coming from behind walls continually harassed the Dutch as they moved through the streets of Cakranegara. This intense and accurate fire by an invisible enemy caused a total breakdown of discipline. Leaving behind their artillery, even their dead and wounded, the demoralized troops fled in the direction of Mataram. Upon arrival
they discovered that the camp there had also been abandoned. Only after 
suffering further casualties did the troops succeed in establishing contact with 
those trapped in the temple in Mataram. At about 5 p.m. Vetter, Dannenbargh 
and the remnants of the troops from Cakranegara entered the relative security of 
the temple.

Early in the morning of 26 August, as the battles raged in Mataram and 
Cakranegara, the column under Colonel van Bijlevelt received Vetter’s order to 
withdraw to Mataram. The troops began their march from Sukarara at 9 a.m. 
When Kediri was reached at about 1 p.m., rifle-fire was heard from the direction 
of Cakranegara. Van Bijlevelt gave orders to go to the rescue. Upon crossing the 
Babak River, their troops came under fire, a number of casualties resulting, 
including the Colonel. The Dutch, however, continued their march and entered 
the town at about 4.30 p.m. As soon as the troops entered Cakranegara they 
drew intense rifle-fire from Balinese hidden behind walls. Although the Dutch 
initially held their ground (due to the 20cm. mortars which did succeed in 
breaching the walls), they were unable to advance to the already abandoned 
camp in the centre of the town. At about 7 p.m. they decided to give up the 
attempt to rescue the troops in Cakranegara and to retreat to Mataram. Leaving 
behind their dead (16), all their supplies, but taking their wounded (35) and the 
artillery, the Dutch retreated in reasonably good order. At about 8 p.m. the 
column reached the other troops trapped in the temple in Mataram.

During the night of 26-27 August the condition of the Dutch troops holed 
up in the Mataram temple steadily deteriorated. There was no water, no food, 
no medical supplies and little ammunition. General Vetter, aware that his 
position was quite hopeless and that further delay would almost certainly mean 
the complete annihilation of the military expedition, decided to break through 
the Balinese encirclement and retreat to Ampenan before lack of water 
completely incapacitated his troops. At about 6 p.m. on 27 August, Vetter 
ordered the retreat. Making use of their remaining artillery pieces, the Dutch 
were able to keep the Balinese riflemen at a distance. The troops, moving in a 
southerly direction through the Balinese village of Pagasangan, retreated in 
reasonably good order. The Balinese pursued the retreating troops and were able 
to inflict another 20 casualties upon the Dutch before they safely reached the 
coast at Tanjong Karang. From there the troops marched along the beach to the 
camp in Ampenan, where they arrived at 12.30 p.m. on 27 August.

The second column in Lombok’s interior, under Colonel Lawick van 
Pabst, received the order to withdraw to Mataram only late in the afternoon of 
26 August. At about 5 p.m. the troops started on their march from Batukliyang. 
Like the first column, these troops came under fire when they attempted to 
cross the Babak River the following morning. Using their 20cm. mortars, the 
Dutch succeeded in driving the Balinese from the other side of the river so that 
the crossing could take place. The troops continued their march to Cakranegara, 
where they arrived at 3.30 p.m. As soon as they had entered the town they came
under intense rifle-fire. Numerous casualties ensued, including the Colonel, whereupon discipline broke down. Leaving their supplies and artillery, their dead and wounded, the troops fled in two directions. One group sought refuge in a temple, while the other escaped into a walled enclosure. The first group, under Captain Christian, was able later in the day to break out of the temple and leave Cakranegara. This group succeeded in reaching the coast near Ampenan, where it arrived at 10.30 p.m. The second group, under Captain Lindgreen, was not as fortunate. Unable to break out of their enclosure they remained trapped. After holding out for four days, lack of water forced them to accept an offer from Anak Agung K'tut to surrender their weapons in exchange for their lives.60 Thus, early in the morning of 1 September, three officers, 61 soldiers and 20 convicts handed over their weapons to the Balinese and were led away in captivity. With the exception of the forces remaining in Ampenan, all Dutch troops on Lombok had thus been defeated.61

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During the night of 27-28 August the Dutch expected a Balinese attack on their last foothold on Lombok, their camp in Ampenan. Panic reigned among the demoralized troops. An eyewitness gave a vivid description of conditions in the Dutch encampment:

Ampenan was not fortified at all. Our soldiers were dead-tired, weakened and demoralized. They were so nervous that they fired madly if as much as a leaf fell off a tree. If as few as 1000 Balinese had stormed the camp that night, we would surely have been lost. Our guards fired their rifles, the troops were put on the alert time and again, and the trumpets rang out. All this, however, was only the excitability of our own troops. The Balinese did not attack.62

By 30 August the Balinese had lost the opportunity to drive the Dutch from Lombok. During the course of the 29th, the remaining troops and convicts had been frantically working to clear a large area around the camp. The same eyewitness gave a description of the operation:

The first work in the morning was to tear down all the houses [around the camp] . . . Everything in the vicinity was torn down; household effects worth thousands of guilders were smashed, thrown into the sea or burnt. The trees were cut down. Around the camp there had to be a large open space without buildings or trees where the treacherous Balinese could hide.63
After the Dutch had succeeded in clearing the area around the encampment, it was no longer possible for the Balinese to dislodge them. The Balinese victories in Mataram and Cakranegara had, to a large extent, been due to the physical character of these towns. Both were constructed in typical Balinese fashion, with palace complexes, temples and numerous yards, all surrounded and subdivided by walls varying in height from 1.5m. – 4m. The abundance of walls, by providing the Balinese with excellent cover, had enabled them to fight the Dutch at close quarters, thereby negating to a large extent the superiority of Dutch weaponry. Whereas Balinese rifle-fire had been quite effective at close range, the cramped conditions had prevented the Dutch from taking advantage of their artillery. However, after the Dutch had cleared an area around their camp, it was no longer possible for the Balinese to fight them at close quarters. Moreover, the open space enabled the Dutch to take full advantage of their superior weapons – repeating rifles and particularly artillery. As the troops became aware that they were no longer in immediate danger, the panic subsided and the Dutch regained some of their badly shaken confidence.

On 30 August order had been sufficiently restored to enable Vetter and Dannenbargh to take stock of their losses. Vetter gave the following list:

Losses in men killed, missing or so seriously wounded as to be unfit for continued service: 37 officers, 524 soldiers and 414 convicts.

Losses in material: 4 cannon of 7cm.; 2 mortars of 20cm.; all medical and topographical equipment; 50 cases of ammunition; 35 transport-wagons; the clothing and equipment of the remaining officers and men; the arms of those killed, wounded and missing; 181 horses; the archive of the General Staff; the archive of the Resident.64

From these figures it is evident that the Balinese had scored a great victory. Considering that the strength of the expedition at the time of the attack had been 112 officers, 2290 soldiers and 1382 convicts (400 convicts had been sent back to Java on 12 August),65 the Balinese had put out of action about 33% of the officers, 23% of the soldiers and 30% of the convicts. Some of the highest-ranking officers had been killed — General van Ham, several officers of the General Staff and the two commanders of the army columns sent into the interior, Colonel van Bijleveldt and Colonel Lawick van Pabst. Since the number of artillery pieces in the possession of the Dutch at the time of the attack was six cannon of 7cm. and six mortars of 20cm. (the two cannon of 12cm. had been sent back to Java on 18 August),66 the Balinese had captured half of the Dutch artillery. They had further captured at least 561 repeating rifles, large quantities of ammunition as well as of military supplies of various types.67
This great victory nevertheless marked the beginning of the end for Balinese rule on Lombok. The outbreak of war against the Dutch meant that the Balinese had to do battle not only with the East Sasaks but also with the Netherlands Indies Government. After the victory over the Dutch, the Raja’s enemies had become so numerous and powerful that his fall from power was only a matter of time.

The Dutch Take Revenge

In the morning of 28 August 1894, Governor-General van der Wijck received an urgent telegram from General Vetter. Its complete text was as follows:

In the evening of 25 [August] Cakra attacked. Firing continued the following day. On 26 August already 14 dead and 85 wounded. No water. Impossible to supply troops, increasing losses; at three in the afternoon withdrawn to Mataram. Supplies left behind to transport wounded. Suffered severe casualties. In Mataram situation even worse. Abandoned camp. At eight in the evening column Van Bijleveld returned from interior; also severe casualties. No food. Impossible to reach camp, communications with Ampenan cut, closed in between Cakra and Mataram, impossible to take offensive. Due to many wounded situation untenable; at six in the morning withdrawn in southerly direction to Ampenan. During withdrawal losses relatively slight. Killed 4 officers, 63 soldiers, missing 6 officers, 148 soldiers. Four field-cannon were left behind in Mataram. Nothing known about column Lawick. Expedition must be completely reconstituted. Large amount of artillery necessary. Even with additional battalion doubtful if possible to take offensive.68

According to an eyewitness Van der Wijck was visibly shaken by this Job’s news.69 This was hardly surprising. The expedition which he had ordered, for which he had taken responsibility, was all but destroyed. What was to be done? Was he to accept Vetter’s hint and withdraw what remained of the expedition to Java, or overrule the General’s hesitation and order an immediate offensive? To resolve this question the Governor-General ordered an emergency meeting of the Council of the Indies.

That afternoon the Council met. Van der Wijck’s opening statement reflected his vengeful mood: ‘It is not now the time to debate who must bear responsibility for what has occurred. At present we must consider how best to cleanse our weapons of the shame which has befallen them.’ But the Governor-General was not sure whether the revenge exercise should occur the following year after the expedition had been reconstituted on Java, or at once. He only
pointed out that General Vetter’s view was expressed at a time when he was in a depressed state of mind due to his recent defeat. Although several members argued in favour of the dismissal of General Vetter and a withdrawal of the troops from Lombok, after lengthy deliberations they decided to retain Vetter as Commander, to send strong reinforcements in men and materials, and to take the offensive as soon as possible.70

The first reinforcements began arriving in Ampenan on 2 September. The build-up continued until 16 September when, besides large quantities of ammunition and military supplies, 82 officers, 1899 soldiers and 1108 convicts, as well as 20 cannon and six mortars had been landed.71 The total number of Dutch troops on Lombok had now risen to 157 officers, 3707 soldiers and 2076 convicts, a total of 5940 persons. To this figure should be added the sailors aboard the naval vessels, reasonably estimated at about 750 (some 250 of whom participated in the military operations ashore).72 The total size of the expeditionary force was now approximately 6700 persons equipped with 28 cannon and ten mortars. With this considerable force General Vetter began the offensive.

Only hours after the Balinese attack on the Dutch troops had started, Anak Agung Jilantik disassociated himself from the cause of the Raja and punggawas. In the early morning of 26 August he left Cakranegara with his 1200 troops. Jilantik, who had always been anxious to avoid armed conflict with the Dutch, refused to be drawn into a hopeless war. He led his followers via Gunung Sari, across the mountain range to a village on Lombok’s west coast (Telok Komba) located in the vicinity of the Balinese village of Pamenang. Ignoring repeated commands by Ratu Agung2 Ngurah to return to Cakranegara, he began making preparations to cross the Lombok Strait to Karangasem. From Telok Komba he wrote to Vetter and Dannenburgh, informing them of his desire to return to Karangasem and requesting to be provided with two steamships. But Vetter and Dannenburgh, considering that Jilantik must have known of the plan to attack the Dutch troops and therefore blaming him for failure to warn them, refused to send the ships. They angrily instructed the Commanders of the warships off the coast to arrest Jilantik and his followers in case they should attempt to make the crossing by prahu. They intended to hold them hostage in order to obtain concessions from the Raja. Perhaps suspecting as much, Jilantik gathered a number of prahu and made the crossing under cover of darkness on the night of 5-6 September. For Jilantik the war on Lombok had come to an end.73

The desertion of Anak Agung Jilantik further weakened the Raja’s military power. The troops still at his disposal were now solely drawn from Lombok’s loyal Balinese and West Sasak populations. While Ratu Agung2 Ngurah could still count on some 15 000 troops (partly armed with rifles),
the East Sasaki leaders could bring some 50,000 into the field (also in part armed with rifles), and the Dutch were building up their well-equipped forces to some 7,000 officers, men and convicts. The Balinese military situation had become hopeless. The Raja’s troops were far too few to perform the dual task of holding the advanced positions in East Lombok against the insurgents and of protecting the Balinese towns in West Lombok from attacks by the Dutch. Since the defence of Mataram and Cakranegara was of greater importance, Ratu Agung Ngurah on 27 August ordered all Balinese troops in East Lombok to withdraw to the west. Hereby he gave up the entire part of East Lombok which had been reconquered at such great cost in the three-year-old war against the insurgents. By 30 August all Balinese troops had been withdrawn west of the Babak River. Close behind them came thousands of East Sasaki who quickly occupied the territory abandoned by the Balinese. The East Sasaki advance was halted at the fortifications along the Babak River. The area of Lombok still under Balinese rule had become small indeed (see Map 3).

On 1 September Ratu Agung Ngurah made an attempt to save the situation. He wrote to Dannenburgh informing him of what his punggasas had told him, namely that war had broken out because the Dutch troops had suddenly opened fire on his palace to which his guards had answered in self-defence. He wished to live in friendship with the Netherlands Indies Government and therefore wanted the war to be ended. He advised that he held 80 prisoners whom he promised to release unharmed on condition that the Dutch troops depart from Ampenan.

Vetter and Dannenburgh, who by this time knew that the Governor-General wanted an offensive and that reinforcements were on the way, did not bother to reply. Instead they continued the political and military preparations for the offensive. On 30 August Dannenburgh sent Lefrinck to East Lombok to urge the East Sasaki leaders to attack the Balinese. On the same day Vetter telegraphed the Governor-General outlining the strategy he planned to use:

It is my intention to construct artillery batteries and by means of an overwhelming bombardment of Mataram, and later of Cakra, to make life impossible in these places... I shall not take the risk of entering Mataram with infantry before all the walls have been cleaned up.

The first objective of the Dutch offensive was the town of Mataram. On 30 August General Vetter ordered two of the warships to open fire. Although causing some damage, the cannon-fire was not very accurate due to the considerable distance (about 10 km.) and the sea-swell. It soon became clear that it would take a long time to destroy Mataram by way of a naval bombardment alone. In order to hasten the process, Vetter decided to construct a number of artillery batteries within close range of
the town. As the first site for a battery he chose the village of Arung-Arung, about 4 km. west of Mataram. After a preliminary bombardment, Vetter ordered an infantry attack. In the morning of 6 September the Dutch troops took Arung-Arung without encountering resistance. By 8 September an artillery battery had been constructed enabling the Dutch to intensify the bombardment of Mataram.

Ratu Agung2 Ngurah began to realize that instead of leaving the island, the Dutch were preparing to attack Mataram. He therefore ordered all his Balinese and West Sasak troops to retreat from the fortifications along the Babak River. The Raja concentrated his loyal troops in Mataram and Cakranegara and the region immediately surrounding these towns containing the Balinese villages of Pagasangan and Pagutan and the pleasure-gardens of Narmada, Lingsar and Gunung Sari. Thousands of East Saks, mainly from the Praya district, but also from districts as far away as Sakra and Masbagik, began pouring into West Lombok proper. What the insurgents had failed to accomplish in their three year war against the Raja, they accomplished now. Burning and pillaging the West Lombok villages, they made their way to the coast. On 9 September East Saks from Praya joined forces with the Dutch to the north and to the south of the Balinese-held enclave.

Ratu Agung2 Ngurah knew that he could not win a war against the Netherlands Indies Government. He therefore made a gesture which he hoped would ward off the impending disaster and bring the Dutch to the conference table. On 7 September he allowed the 81 Dutch prisoners to return to Ampenan. The senior officer, Captain Lindgreen, was given a letter in which the Raja informed Vetter that he had released the prisoners as a token of his desire to end the war. He did not repeat his request for the Dutch to leave Ampenan, but confined himself to urging that his letter and his request for peace be brought to the attention of the Governor-General.

Again, Vetter and Dannenburgh did not bother to reply, but intensified the military operations. Vetter decided to construct two more batteries to the southwest and southeast of Mataram. To accomplish this it was necessary to conquer the Balinese village of Pagasangan. In the morning of 13 September, after an artillery barrage lasting five days, about 2000 Dutch infantry attacked the village. The supporting column — about 600 officers and men — attacked from the west. These troops were halted by Balinese rifle fire. Unable to penetrate Pagasangan’s defences, the troops withdrew after suffering nine casualties. The main column — about 1400 officers and men — was more successful. Advancing on the village from the north, the troops were able to gain a number of footholds including a temple. After suffering only four casualties the Dutch entrenched themselves in the northern part of Pagasangan. Since many of the walls were still standing in the village, the careful General Vetter thought it unwise to continue the attack. He gave orders to postpone the final assault until the village had been completely demolished.
Accordingly, 14, 15 and 16 September were spent laying waste to Pagasangan. Thousands of East Sasaks were persuaded (with some difficulty) to tear down walls and houses in the part of the village under Dutch control. The captured temple was converted into an artillery battery and was named 'Pagasangan West'. This battery kept up an intensive barrage of shells on the rest of the village. When hardly a house or wall remained standing, General Vetter decided that the time had come for another infantry attack.

On the morning of 17 September, two Dutch army columns (totalling some 1900 officers and men) attacked the part of Pagasangan still occupied by the Balinese. Although the defenders put up a determined resistance, they were forced to yield after a fierce battle lasting about two hours. Some of them retreated north to Mataram and some were cut down by the Dutch troops. Immediately after the village had been taken, it was burnt to the ground. While the Dutch suffered only two casualties, the losses on the Balinese side were very much higher. An eyewitness estimated that the Balinese lost about 250 men (including Anak Agung Putu, the son of the late Anak Agung Made) in the defence of Pagasangan, while another 50 who had stayed behind perished in the flames.

The Dutch immediately began constructing a third artillery battery named 'Pagasangan East'. On 19 September the bombardment of Mataram began in earnest. The batteries at Arung-Arung, Pagasangan West and East each fired shells into the town at irregular intervals. Fires broke out repeatedly. In the night of 22 September a gunpowder storage dump was hit. It exploded with such force that tremors were felt as far away as Ampenan. The bombardment continued unabated until 29 September. During these ten days the three batteries fired a total of 3200 shells of 12cm., 1000 shells of 17cm., and 750 of 20cm. into the town.

Ratu Agung2 Ngurah, who had watched the battle for Pagasangan from a distance, made another attempt to save the situation. Realizing that his only chance now lay in an alliance with the East Sasak leaders, he gave his consent to a proposal by GUSTI K’tut Gusa (one of the six punggawas who had planned the attack on the Dutch troops) to negotiate a settlement. The Raja instructed Gusa and three other punggawas—Gusti Gongsar, Ida Doda and Gusti Sapi—to travel to Praya and urge Mami Bangkol and Mami Sapian to join forces with him. He gave them a letter addressed to the leaders of the Praya district which read: ‘... the great enemy has come, the kompanie, who makes war against us but who shall also make war against you when we are defeated. Also you shall be brought under its yoke. Let us forget our feud and let us fight this great enemy together’.83

The punggawas and their followers arrived in Praya on 18 September. Their mission was not a success. East Sasak hatred for their erstwhile masters proved to be an insurmountable obstacle to an anti-Dutch alliance. After treacherously persuading the Balinese to surrender their arms, Mami Sapian
ordered the whole party to be put to death. The four punggawas and their followers were seized and decapitated. The heads of the punggawas and the Raja’s letter were sent to General Vetter as proof of East Sasak loyalty. This rejection of Ratu Agung2 Ngurah’s proposal more than anything else sealed the fate of Balinese rule on Lombok. Whereas Balinese and East Sasaks together might have been able to muster sufficient force to at least make the Dutch think again about continuing the war, the Balinese did not stand a chance again the combined power of the Netherlands Indies Government and the East Sasaks. Yet, despite the overwhelming odds against them, the Balinese and a large part of the West Sasak population continued to fight in defence of the Raja.

Shortly before dawn on 29 September, General Vetter gave the signal for the infantry attack on Mataram. Two columns of Dutch troops and thousands of East Sasaks advanced on the town from two directions. While the main column — approximately 1250 officers and men — attacked from the direction of Pagasangan, the supporting column — about 500 officers and men — attacked from Arung-Arung. Vetter held another column of about 800 officers and men in reserve to be thrown into battle at a moment’s notice. At dawn, the main column succeeded in gaining a foothold in the southern part of the town. At the same time the supporting column entered from the west. Upon gaining entry, the two columns proceeded to fight their way towards the palace in the centre of the town.

The fighting in Mataram assumed a new character. Whereas previously battles had been between Dutch and Balinese troops, now the Dutch were compelled to fight the town’s entire population. Non-combatants such as priests, women and children joined in the struggle to expel the invader. The Dutch were forced to fight for each and every house. Some of the punggawas killed their wives and children before rushing the Dutch troops in a final suicidal lance attack. The Dutch, realizing that they were fighting the entire population, did not spare anyone. Shooting men, women and children, they advanced slowly. By 11 o’clock Balinese resistance had grown so fierce that the two columns were unable to continue their advance. Bogged down at a distance of about 150 metres from the palace, it seemed as if the Dutch would be forced to retreat. But at this moment Vetter ordered his reserves into battle. This additional force cracked Balinese resistance. At noon, after a fierce battle for the palace in which Anak Agung K’tut, five of his punggawas and many of his most loyal followers were killed, the Dutch hoisted their flag over its ruins.

Although the assault on Mataram had been successful, the Dutch had conquered only about half of the town — the entire eastern part remained occupied by the Balinese. In spite of the overwhelming superiority of Dutch armaments, it had not been an easy victory. The Dutch had suffered 79 casualties in the attack, of whom 18 had been killed. Casualties on the Balinese side were very much higher. At the palace alone 67 bodies of Balinese and West Sasak followers of Anak Agung K’tut were found. In all, some 300
bodies of men, women and children were buried in a mass grave. The total number of casualties suffered by the Balinese was almost certainly higher. Adding those killed in the artillery barrage which preceded the infantry attack and those taken to the eastern part of Mataram and Cakranegara, the total number of Balinese killed in the battle for Mataram was probably around one thousand.

On the morning of 30 September, the Dutch began working towards the completion of their conquest of Mataram. Like Pagasangan, the town was systematically destroyed. Covered by artillery fire, thousands of East Sasaks and convicts were put to work on the demolition of all that had escaped destruction. Walls that had somehow remained standing were torn down, the temples were demolished, the palace was razed, even the trees were cut down. In short, everything which could possibly provide the Balinese with cover was destroyed. The razing of Mataram did not take place without incident. On the afternoon of 30 September the Balinese ambushed a Dutch army unit which had unwisely ventured into the eastern part of Mataram in search of a gunpowder storage dump. The army unit was decimated by riflemen hiding among the ruins. In this encounter the Dutch suffered 23 casualties of whom 13 were killed. But notwithstanding this Balinese success, the demolition of Mataram continued at a steady pace.86

On 11 October, when the complete demolition of Mataram had made a Balinese counterattack impossible, the Dutch began preparing for the bombardment of Cakranegara, now the last remaining Balinese stronghold. Two new batteries were constructed amidst the ruins of Mataram. These two batteries and that of Pagasangan East (which could reach Cakranegara and had intermittently fired at the town) opened fire. Vetter, who had been unpleasantly surprised by the fierceness of Balinese resistance in Mataram, resolved that the bombardment of Cakranegara should be even more intense. In the one month from 19 October to 19 November these three batteries fired a total of 6575 shells of 12cm. and 1950 shells of 20cm. into the town. Unlike that of Mataram, the bombardment of Cakranegara did not cause outbreaks of fire. The Balinese, who by this time had learned to cope with the mimis kompenti (hail of the Company), had taken the precaution of removing the inflammable rooftops from their houses87

The political ‘pay-off’ of the conquest and destruction of Mataram was a great disappointment to Vetter and Dannenbargh. Their expectation that the Balinese would abandon their hopeless struggle and surrender en masse proved illusory. Even though Vetter and Dannenbargh had let it be known that the lives of those who surrendered unconditionally would be spared, the total number of Balinese who accepted the offer was a dismal 146. This group, which consisted for the most part of homeless women and children, was placed under guard in the specially prepared village of Takun in southwest Lombok. In the
weeks following the fall of Mataram this group of Balinese and their guards remained the sole inhabitants of the village because no further surrenders occurred. The Balinese remained remarkably united and determined to fight to the last in defence of the Raja.

During the course of October it became clear to the Dutch that, despite the destruction of Mataram and the unprecedented bombardment of Cakranegara, the Balinese were not abandoning their struggle. In order to defeat the Raja it would be necessary to stage an infantry attack on this last remaining Balinese stronghold. In view of the fierce resistance encountered at Mataram this prospect did not appeal to General Vetter. In a report to the Governor-General, he warned that the conquest of Cakranegara would surely be even more difficult and costly than that of Mataram:

The population of Pagasangan, Pagutan and Mataram has fled towards Cakranegara so that the entire Balinese population is now concentrated in this town... Since the Balinese are surrounded on all sides by hostile Sasaks, the Raja and punggawas cannot escape. Therefore, they have no choice but to fight to the last.

Towards the end of October, Vetter and Dannenburgh became quite pessimistic about the possibility of achieving a military victory:

There can be no question of conquering Cakranegara in a single attack. Even by European standards it is an important town. The male population is well-armed and the complex of walls presents such a favourable opportunity for defence as will not be found anywhere else... Since the conquest of Cakranegara must occur in the same manner as that of Mataram [i.e. by way of the town's systematic destruction] it will be a matter of weeks, perhaps months, before it will be completed. This would not present insurmountable problems if we had sufficient troops and if the rainy season was not approaching.

Vetter recommended that the war be settled not by military means, but by way of negotiation:

In view of these circumstances the Resident and I are of the opinion that it might be desirable to present the Raja and punggawas with acceptable conditions. The Resident and I are convinced that if the Government should insist on extraditing the Raja, his closest relatives, and the prominent punggawas, they will resist until the bitter end. This demand would be absolutely unacceptable to them. But if the Raja and punggawas were promised combined rule over West Lombok's population, they might abandon their resistance.
General Vetter had given his warning and made his proposal. It was now up to the Governor-General to either accept his advice and negotiate a settlement, or to reject it and push for total victory.

The Raja’s Last Stand

The Governor-General was not pleased with Vetter’s proposal. What he wanted was a military victory, not a negotiated settlement. Instead of immediately calling a meeting of the Council of the Indies – as was standard practice in important matters such as these – he issued orders for fresh reinforcements to be sent to Lombok. On 13 November a force of about 1200 officers and men and 900 convicts left Tanjong Priok and Semarang.92 Considering that since the beginning of their offensive the Dutch had suffered about 475 casualties (125 in battle and 350 due to illness of various sorts),93 these reinforcements increased the effective strength of the army on Lombok to approximately 4550 officers and men and 2900 convicts. Adding the sailors aboard the warships (about 750), the military expedition had grown to approximately 8200 persons. Van der Wijck could now feel that he had sufficiently met General Vetter’s complaint that he lacked sufficient troops for an attack on Cakranegara.

On 14 November, the day after the reinforcements had left for Lombok, the Governor-General finally submitted Vetter’s proposal to the Council of the Indies. In an emergency session held on the same day – which Van der Wijck did not attend – the members of the Council unanimously accepted Vetter’s proposal:

Although the Council would prefer to hold on to the demand for the unconditional surrender of the Lombok Balinese, the military situation appears to advise against this course of action. Even though the strongest possible military effort has been made, it cannot be ruled out that we may fail to reach our goal . . . Under these circumstances the general interest of the Colony must weigh heavier than the feeling of indignation at the treachery of the enemy.94

For this reason the Council recommended that the Governor-General authorize Vetter to negotiate a settlement on the basis of the following 12 points:

1. The Raja must report to General Vetter and beg forgiveness for the treachery which has been committed.

2. The Raja will be promised that the Lombok dynasty will be restored, under one of its younger members, over that part of the island inhabited predominantly by Balinese (i.e. West Lombok).
3. The Netherlands Indies Government reserves the right to settle as it sees fit the government over Karangasem, the Sasak districts (i.e. East Lombok) and the Buginese settlements along the coast.

4. Ampenan and its environs will remain Government territory where only the Government will levy import and export duties.

5. The surrender by the Lombok Balinese of their firearms and ammunition, with the exception of such quantities as may be deemed necessary for their safety.

6. The payment of a war indemnity.

7. The Netherlands Indies Government reserves the right to levy a yearly tribute to pay for the expenses of the administration and occupation.

8. The Raja must promise that he and his successor shall abide by any regulation concerning Lombok’s relations with the Government which may be implemented at a later date.

9. The Raja must establish himself at a location chosen by the Government, preferably not too far from Ampenan. The Raja is forbidden to fortify his place of residence.

10. The construction of walls around villages and around component parts of villages is prohibited.

11. The Government will choose a place of residence for the Raja on Lombok.

12. The punggawas and other heads who have participated in the attack on our troops shall not be prosecuted.95

In view of the desperate military situation of the Balinese, there can be little doubt that Ratu Agung2 Ngurah would have accepted this ‘settlement’. Not only did it ensure the survival of the dynasty, but it was at least in two respects more favourable than the ill-fated treaty Vetter and Dannenburgh had presented to Anak Agung K’tut.96 In the first place, while the treaty had left the Raja and punggawas with political control only over West Lombok’s Balinese population, this settlement ensured that they were to remain the rulers over virtually the entire population of West Lombok. And secondly, whereas the treaty had assigned political control over the East Sasaks to the district chiefs, the settlement did not specifically do so. It merely stipulated that the Government reserved the right to pronounce judgement over this delicate matter at a later date. The members of the Council had good reason for this stipulation:

To reserve the right to settle the government over the Sasak districts as we see fit, can be a useful weapon in our hands. In case we should encounter too many difficulties in East Lombok we can threaten the Sasaks with a return to Balinese rule, and if need be, we can implement this.
The Governor-General, however, refused to accept the Council’s proposal. Determined not to let outright victory slip from his fingers, he wrote to the Minister of Colonies:

Since this recommendation from the Council amounts to an acceptance of a serious political defeat, I cannot agree with it... My principal objection is that if we do not demand the enemy’s unconditional surrender to the Government’s will and begin negotiations, the Raja and punggawas will demand still more concessions. I have therefore deemed it unadvisable to provide the Commander-in-Chief with the instructions recommended by the Council.98

Instead of authorizing General Vetter to negotiate an end to the war, Van der Wijck urged him to attack Cakranegara. In his telegram of 10 November in which he announced that additional reinforcements would be sent, he told Vetter: “With these additional battalions your complaints are regarded as having been alleviated.”99 Similarly, on 16 November he telegraphed: “I hope that with the considerable force now at your disposal, you will succeed in conquering the palace and in pursuing the enemy.”100 General Vetter had no choice but to begin making the preparations for an attack on Cakranegara.

On the same day (31 October) that Vetter presented his proposal for a negotiated settlement, Resident Dannenburgh, no doubt believing that the proposal would be accepted, established contact with Ratu Agung2 Ngurah. He sent three East Sasad envoys to Cakranegara where they were received by a delegation of punggawas. The envoys told the Balinese that the Government was now interested in the peace proposals the Raja had made earlier.101 Considering his desperate military situation, Ratu Agung2 Ngurah’s reaction was remarkable. With the Dutch army before Cakranegara, with almost the entire island overrun by his rebellious East Sasak subjects, the Raja fell back on the 1843 treaty:102

I have never even thought of committing hostilities against His Majesty the King of the Netherlands. I have always been friendly disposed towards the Government, as is prescribed in the treaty. Nothing may be added to or deleted from the treaty; also the descendants who shall rule may not change it. The treaty has been approved by the Government and by his Majesty the King of the Netherlands; it has been signed and sealed. I therefore hold on to the treaty, which I dare not change.103

Since the 1843 treaty had entailed that in exchange for a purely formal recognition of Dutch sovereignty, the Netherlands Indies Government promised never to establish itself on the island, Ratu Agung2 Ngurah’s letter amounted to a request for the Dutch army to leave Lombok.
This reply, needless to say, was unacceptable to the Dutch. On 6 November Dannenbargh wrote a threatening letter. He accused the Raja of having had prior knowledge of the plan to attack the Dutch troops and informed him that: '... due to the improper behaviour of Your Highness, the Government's troops have destroyed the village of Pagasangan and the town of Mataram. The troops have already started on the destruction of Cakranegara.' The war could only be ended after Ratu Agung Ngurah had 'begged forgiveness':

The Commander-in-Chief and I have pity for this land and for Your Highness' subjects. But there can be no question of ending the war if Your Highness does not beg forgiveness... and if Your Highness does not fully obey all the demands of His Excellency the Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies.

It was extremely difficult for the Raja to comply with this demand. Not until 18 November, when the infantry attack on Cakranegara was about to begin, did his desire to avoid a disaster for himself, his dynasty and the Lombok Balinese overcome his pride. Ratu Agung Ngurah wrote to Vetter and Dannenbargh, protesting his innocence. Not unreasonably, he asked whether he would have been likely to have agreed to pay the indemnity of 400,000 rijksdaalders if he had planned to attack the Dutch troops: 'Although this is only a small island... we paid 269,000 rijksdaalders and 2000 gold-pieces... If we had had evil intentions we would surely not have paid such a large sum.' But while professing his innocence, he complied with Dannenbargh's demand and begged forgiveness:

We feel ourselves small and incapable of resistance... Because we are stupid may matters be settled in the manner the Government and Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands see fit. If we, or our punggawas, have acted improperly, we beg forgiveness for ourselves and for our punggawas. We hope that our friend shall remember that we are stupid, shall have pity on us, and shall end this war.

General Vetter, who had been instructed to obtain the unconditional surrender of the Balinese, ignored the Raja's plea. Instead, in the morning of 18 November he gave the signal for the assault on Cakranegara. The attacking force of 3600 officers and men, 1500 convicts and several thousands of East Sasaks (who had been provided with 2000 firearms) was divided into four columns, one of which was held in reserve. At 5.00 a.m. three columns succeeded in gaining footholds in the north, west and south of Cakranegara, and proceeded to fight their way to the palace in the centre of the town. As in Mataram, Balinese resistance assumed a popular character. Groups of men,
Plate 1: Ratu Agung Ngurah in captivity. (Batavia, 1895)

Plate 2: Anak Agung Jilantik, Raja of Karangasem. (Lombok, 1894)
Plate 3: Part of the Cakranegara palace. (Lombok, 1894)

Plate 4: Part of the pleasure gardens at Narmada. Note the terraced hills. (Lombok, 1894)
Plate 7: *The sole survivors of the House of Karangasem – Ratu Agung Ngurah, two sons (standing) and two grandsons. Note the soldiers behind the gate.* (Batavia, 1895)
women and children staged repeated suicidal lance attacks, only to be cut down by rifle and artillery fire. Due to desperate Balinese resistance, the Dutch advance was very slow. Only at 1 p.m. — after eight hours of fighting — did two of the columns reach the palace. The third column, which advanced from the north, had been halted.

The palace of Cakranegara — a complex about 500 x 250 metres in size, and consisting of 16 major compartments, each surrounded by walls about four metres high — was the centre of Balinese power. Here Ratu Agung2 Ngurah, his 150-man bodyguard, the punggawas and their most loyal followers, prepared themselves for a last struggle. At 1.30 p.m. the two Dutch columns began their attack. Using gelatine-mines the Dutch blew holes in the palace’s outer walls and entered in the west and south. As the troops advanced towards the centre of the palace, Balinese resistance grew so fierce that the Dutch were halted. Realizing that the Balinese were holding their ground, Vetter ordered the third column — which by this time had succeeded in reaching the palace — and the reserve column into battle. These reinforcements enabled the Dutch to penetrate deeper into the palace complex. Fighting desperately, the defenders were increasingly forced to retreat towards the palace’s inner compartment, which contained the Raja’s quarters as well as his treasure chambers. At 4.00 p.m., after several hours of bitter hand-to-hand fighting, the Dutch reached the inner compartment where the Raja’s most loyal followers had gathered. Using fixed bayonets and hand grenades, Dutch infantry stormed Ratu Agung2 Ngurah’s quarters three times in succession, to be driven back each time. Also a fourth attack, following on an artillery barrage of about 50 shells fired from a distance of only 20 metres, failed to dislodge the Balinese defenders. At about 5.00 p.m., Vetter realized that his troops were unable to overcome this determined resistance. Fearing a Balinese counterattack during the night, he gave orders for his troops to retreat from the palace. Thus, although the Dutch had conquered part of Cakranegara and had penetrated deep into the palace, they had failed to put down all resistance.109

During the night of 18-19 November, Ratu Agung2 Ngurah decided to give up the hopeless struggle and abandon what remained of his palace. With his relatives and a small group of punggawas he retreated to the village of Sasari in the vicinity of the pleasure gardens at Lingsar. When early in the morning of 19 November the Dutch cautiously approached the palace, they found it abandoned by its defenders. The palace complex was quickly occupied by Dutch troops and by hundreds of East Sasaks.110 An orgy of official and unofficial looting followed. Disliking competition in this activity, the Dutch soldiers drove looting East Sasaks from the palace, killing a number of them. The Raja’s treasure chambers — one room of about 3 x 5 metres, filled 60cm. high with silver rijksdaalders, and a smaller room filled with gold coins, precious stones and valuable ornaments — were quickly emptied of their contents. Part of the Raja’s wealth was appropriated by the Netherlands Indies Government.
On 19 November the Dutch shipped 230 kg. of gold and 3810 kg. of silver to Batavia, while the following day another shipment of 3389 kg. of silver and three cases filled with precious stones and ornaments were sent. Months after the conquest of the Cakranegara palace, soldiers offered precious stones and valuable ornaments for sale in the garrison towns of Java.

The Dutch paid a heavy price for their conquest of Cakranegara. In the attack of 18 November they suffered 166 casualties, of whom 51 were killed, and on the 19th another 15 were killed due to booby-traps in the palace. But while Dutch losses had been heavy, the Balinese had suffered grievously. In many houses 20, 30, even as many as 40 bodies of men, women and children were found. In the palace where the decisive battle had been fought, the dead lay scattered in groups — 37 bodies in a single room — totalling about 450. When, a few days after the conquest, an area of Cakranegara measuring 150 x 1200 metres had been demolished — ‘cleaned up’, as it was euphemistically described — more than 500 bodies had been taken from the ruins. In view of these facts, the total number of casualties suffered by the Balinese in their desperate defence of Cakranegara may conservatively be estimated at about 2000.

Having lost their last major stronghold, and surrounded on all sides by hostile East Sasaks, the Raja and surviving punggawas had to choose between surrender to the Dutch or death fighting their enemies. But in spite of the hopeless position of the Balinese, there was no mass surrender immediately following the fall of Cakranegara. In fact, on 19 November only one of the punggawas surrendered to General Vetter. This punggawa, moreover, had good reason for his action. Being in charge of the defence of the Raja’s pleasure garden at Narmada, he submitted because thousands of East Sasaks had massed on the east side of the Babak River. By surrendering he sought (and found) Dutch military assistance against the East Sasaks.

Since a mass Balinese surrender did not take place, it was necessary for General Vetter to make an attempt to capture Ratu Agung2 Ngurah. On 20 November he ordered a strong army column to march on the village of Sasari. The troops arrived at the village at 10 a.m. without encountering resistance. After Sasari had been surrounded, the Raja was summoned to surrender on pain of the destruction of the village. Ratu Agung2 Ngurah hesitated for two hours in deciding between the traditional death of a defeated Balinese Raja in a suicide attack (puputan) and obeying the Dutch summons. Although his relatives and followers had already dressed themselves in white (the colour of death) and were ready to perish, the Raja at the last moment changed his mind. Probably motivated by a faint hope that the total downfall of his dynasty might thus be averted, Ratu Agung2 Ngurah, accompanied only by his son Anak Agung Made Jilantik and his grandson (son of the late K’tut) Anak Agung Oka, surrendered to the Dutch at 12 p.m. While the rest of the Raja’s relatives
remained in Sasari, Ratu Agung2 Ngurah, his son and grandson were taken to Ampenan where they were placed under guard.117

Contrary to Dutch expectations, even the capture of the Raja did not lead to a mass Balinese surrender. In the afternoon of 20 November only two submissions took place — those of Anak Agung K’tut Jilantik (nephew of the Raja) and of the prominent punggawa, Ida K’tut Ggel. The great majority of the Raja’s relatives and punggawas, while no longer offering active resistance, stayed away from Cakranegara. Anxious to formally end the war, Vetter resolved to obtain the submission of the Raja’s relatives who had stayed behind in the village of Sasari. He ordered Ratu Agung2 Ngurah to instruct them to come to Ampenan. Accordingly, on 21 November the Raja addressed a letter to his nephew Anak Agung Nengah — after the Raja’s surrender, the senior person among the members of the House of Karangasem — in Sasari. Nengah, who was paralysed from the waist down, had never played an important political role. Nonetheless, in the days that followed, he became the focal point of the refusal of the House of Karangasem to submit to Dutch rule. To Ratu Agung2 Ngurah’s letter he replied that since he was too ill to travel and, since none of his relatives and followers wished to leave him, no one would be coming to Ampenan.118 Since this amounted to a refusal to surrender, Vetter issued orders that the submission be obtained by force.

On the morning of 22 November an army column marched on Sasari. At 9 a.m. the village was surrounded and Anak Agung Nengah, his relatives and followers were summoned to surrender. No reply came from the Balinese. Finally, at 11.30 a.m., the Commanding Officer ordered the artillery to open fire. This was the signal for the puputan. When the first shells were fired into the village, a large group of Balinese men, women and children, dressed in white, wielding short lances, staged a fanatical attack on the Dutch troops. As the group approached, more and more of the Balinese fell under a hail of bullets. None of them managed to reach the troops; all were killed. In the puputan of Sasari several hundreds of Balinese men, women and children perished. The dead included the Raja’s four daughters, at least three of his grandchildren, and at least two of his great-grandchildren.119

After this heroic feat, the Dutch troops advanced towards the village. They were met by rifle fire from a group of Balinese who had stayed behind. In the ensuing battle the Dutch suffered 15 casualties of whom two, including the Commanding Officer, were killed. When the troops overcame the resistance and entered Sasari, an unknown number of Balinese, preferring death to surrender, blew themselves up with two gunpowder storage-dumps. The explosions set the village ablaze. The Dutch were forced to retreat, enabling Anak Agung Nengah (who had not participated in the puputan) and a small group of followers to escape from Sasari.120
The puputan of Sasari signalled the long-awaited mass surrender of the Balinese. This was the event the Balinese population had been waiting for. It meant the downfall of the House of Karangasem which released the punggawas from the oath of loyalty towards the Raja and enabled them formally to abandon the struggle. In the afternoon of 22 November the inhabitants of Cakranegara returned to the town and began to co-operate with the Dutch. Without protest they carried out Vetter’s order to surrender their firearms and to tear down all walls that remained standing. More and more punggawas came to Cakranegara to offer their submission. In the afternoon of 22 November Gusti Wayan Jilantik Gewar (the commander of the Raja’s bodyguard), Ida Wayan Pidada Togog, Dewa Nyoman Rentang, Gusti Bagus Kaler, Gusti G’de Jilantik, Busti Nengah Jilantik and Ida K’tut Wanasari (head of the Brahman caste in Cakranegara) surrendered to General Vetter. In the morning of 23 November Gusti Komang Pengsong, Ida Wayan Jilantik and about 40 other punggawas offered their submission. Now that almost the entire House of Karangasem had either been captured or killed and virtually all the surviving punggawas had surrendered, the Dutch-Balinese war had come to an end. Save for the fact that Anak Agung Nengah had failed to come to Cakranegara, the Dutch victory was complete.

Immediately after the bloodbath in Sasari, Nengah had left for the nearby village of Topati, where with a small group of followers he awaited his fate. The day following the mass surrender, Vetter instructed the prominent punggawa Ida K’tut Gelgel to proceed to Topati in order to persuade Nengah to offer his submission. It was to no avail. On 25 November Vetter again ordered Gelgel to Topati. And once again Nengah refused. Determined to crush this last symbolic Balinese resistance, Vetter thereupon issued orders for Nengah to be captured dead or alive.

The following morning a Dutch army column marched to Topati. At 9 a.m. the village was surrounded. At 10 p.m., after Anak Agung Nengah had refused the Dutch summons to surrender, the artillery opened fire. As had been the case in Sasari, this was the signal for the puputan. The paralysed Nengah, carried in a sedan-chair by a few of his followers, staged a suicide attack on the Dutch troops. As in Sasari, all were shot down before coming within reach. In the puputan of Topati, Nengah perished together with 8 men, 12 women and an unknown number of children. When the troops entered the village, they came under fire from a few of Nengah’s followers who had stayed behind. After suffering six casualties, of whom one was killed, the village was taken and burnt down. With the death of Anak Agung Nengah, the last Balinese resistance had been overcome. The Dutch had now attained total victory.

On the morning of 23 November Ratu Agung2 Ngurah, the four other surviving members of the House of Karangasem and a small group of followers were in all secrecy taken aboard the naval vessel HMSS Prins Hendrik. Before boarding the ship which was to take him to his place of exile, the Raja
ordered one of his followers to fill a basket with sand from the beach on Lombok. This basket of sand was about all he had left. Only four years earlier a powerful ruler, Ratu Agung II, Ngurah had lost everything. A combination of internal rebellion and external aggression had undermined his power and had caused him to lose his throne, his wealth and most of his family. Mercifully, he did not long outlive his disgrace. Ratu Agung II, Ngurah died in Batavia on 20 May 1895.

The Dutch military victory over the Raja had the same effect [as the fall of the Raja of Lombok], but the danger was not over. The idea that the Sultan was an absolute ruler, the notion of the Sultan's infallibility, the belief in the Sultan's invincibility, these ideas had satisfied the Dutch. The Dutch had expanded their power over the Sultan's realm, but they had failed to undermine the Sultan's power. The Sultan's power was still intact, but it was now under Dutch control.

The Dutch had taken over the Sultan's army, the Sultan's navy, the Sultan's finances, and the Sultan's government. They had destroyed the Sultan's power, but they had failed to destroy the Sultan's empire. The Sultan's empire was still intact, but it was now under Dutch control. The Dutch had expanded their power over the Sultan's empire, but they had failed to undermine the Sultan's empire. The Sultan's empire was still intact, but it was now under Dutch control.

During the four weeks between the fall of the Raja and the fall of the Sultan, the Dutch had taken over the Sultan's army, the Sultan's navy, the Sultan's finances, and the Sultan's government. They had destroyed the Sultan's power, but they had failed to destroy the Sultan's empire. The Sultan's empire was still intact, but it was now under Dutch control.
CHAPTER V

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DUTCH RULE

The two most fundamental problems confronting the Dutch in their attempts to establish an effective colonial administration were the absence of a ready-made political system through which they could rule, and the existence of various types of conflicts over the appropriation of the products of land and labour. Both these problems (which may be referred to simply as the political and the agrarian problem) were the aftermath of the Balinese fall from power which had left Lombok society severely disrupted. What was the nature of these problems?

The political problem the Dutch encountered differed in West and East Lombok. In the West the power of the Raja had been so great that the village had ceased to exist as a basic unit of socio-political organization. Assisted by officials of various types, the Raja had ruled his subjects (the pengayahs, i.e. those working the druwe dalem lands) directly, without the intermediary of a village chief. The Balinese aristocrats had done the same on a small scale. They, too, had ruled their subjects (sepangans, i.e. those working the druwe jabe lands) without the intermediary of a village chief. The Dutch-Balinese war caused this political system to collapse. Since all political organization in West Lombok had been of a supra-village character, the result of the Balinese fall from power was that no political organization remained, either on the village or on the supra-village level.

In East Lombok the Balinese invasion had encountered an established Sasak society which it had been unable to destroy completely. The village had continued to exist as a basic unit of socio-political organization. The conquered Sasak lands had been administered by Balinese punggawas who ruled over small districts, each comprising a number of villages. The punggawa had ruled his district through the intermediary of a Sasak village head. With the outbreak of revolt this territorial political system collapsed. During the years of revolt from 1891-94 the East Sasak population not only successfully resisted the repeated Balinese attempts to reimpose their rule, but also succeeded in preventing the newly emerged Sasak district chiefs from taking the places vacated by the punggawas. The situation in East Lombok was, therefore, that while there did not exist any effective supra-village administration, the village remained as a basic form of political organization.

The agrarian problem was similar in West and East Lombok. In both these regions the most outstanding feature of the system of land tenure had been the Raja’s domain right, which enabled him to do with the land — and the peasants thereon — as he saw fit. Since this system of land tenure had come into being as a result of the Balinese conquest, as a consequence of superior power, its continued functioning was dependent on coercive power. When the revolt in 1891, by causing the Balinese political system to collapse in East Lombok,
removed the Raja’s coercive power, structural changes occurred in the system of land tenure. The peasants working the druew dalem lands (the pengayahs) stopped paying the land tax to, and performing corvée labour for, the Raja, while most of those cultivating the druew jabe lands (sepangans) did likewise with regard to the land-owning Balinese and Sasak aristocrats. Thus, by breaking the power of the Raja, the great majority of East Sasak peasants had acquired de facto individual ownership of the land they were cultivating. And since in the years 1891-94 all the efforts of the Raja and punggawas as well as of the Sasak district chiefs to repossess the land had failed, the East Lombok land tenure system in December 1894 was a system characterized by widespread individual ownership of land.

The Dutch military victory over the Raja had the same effect on the land tenure system in West Lombok as the revolt had had in the East. The Raja’s defeat resulted in the disintegration of the Balinese political system and the removal of coercive power. The peasants working the druew dalem lands stopped paying the land tax, or performing corvée. They did this not because they had risen in revolt, but for the simple reason that the Raja no longer existed as a political power. Similarly, because the defeated punggawas were no longer able to exercise authority, the peasants working the druew jabe lands stopped recognizing the ownership rights of the punggawas. Thus, in December 1894, West Lombok was also characterized by widespread individual ownership of land.

Not long after the Dutch conquest it became clear to the officials and officers on Lombok that serious problems existed with regard to the island’s political and agrarian relations. For instance, in the first week after the Raja’s defeat, the punggawas registered hundreds of complaints with the new authorities. All their complaints concerned the fact that their sepangans no longer recognized their power over them and refused to pay the land tax or perform corvée. These complaints prompted General Vetter to inform the Governor-General that: ‘The greatest difficulty on Lombok is ... that many Sasaks claim sawahs and gardens which up to now were used [i.e. owned] by Balinese heads ... Another problem is that many Sasak slaves [i.e. sepangans], taking advantage of the changed political circumstances, regard themselves as completely free people and refuse to perform services for their Balinese masters.’

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During the four weeks between the Raja’s final defeat in late November and the official disbanding of the military expedition in late December, General Vetter and Directeur Scherer busied themselves laying the basis of Dutch colonial rule on Lombok. The most important of their activities during this period were: (1) the formation of an alliance with the two dominant classes, the Balinese and Sasak aristocracies (2) the formulation of the basic principles upon which Dutch rule was to be organized. It is no exaggeration to say that the
nature of these decisions foreshadowed — and in a sense even made inevitable — the manner in which Lombok's political and agrarian problems were eventually 'settled'.

The formation of an alliance proceeded smoothly. The Balinese punggawas without exception quickly rallied to the Dutch cause. Faced with the refusal of their sepangans to recognize their ownership of the druwe jabe lands, which had constituted their major source of income, they were threatened by the prospect of a complete loss of their erstwhile wealth and power. From having resisted the Dutch tooth and nail, the punggawas suddenly became loyal and diligent servants. Their political 'about-turn' followed so quickly on the heels of the Raja's defeat that as early as 10 December (about two weeks after the end of the Dutch-Balinese war), Vetter and Scherer were able to report that: 'The Balinese punggawas do not give any indication of hatred or bitterness against our troops. Every morning they come to Cakranegara to ask our commands for the day which they always obey quickly and punctually. Their whole attitude indicates that they accept their defeat as a fait accompli.'

The Sasan district chiefs, again without exception, were equally quick to rally to the Dutch cause. Like the punggawas, the Sasan leaders had good reason for this course of action. Although they had emerged as leaders of large and populous districts, they had been unable to give substance to their authority. In fact, their leadership was largely nominal. For their income they depended mainly on the revenues derived from collecting the import-export duties on Lombok's east coast and on holding cock fights and horse races. Due to the intense rivalries among them — which provided the East Lombok villages with the opportunity to easily change their allegiance — they had been unable to retain all their landholdings, let alone increase them. In the hope that, backed by the Dutch, they would gain in wealth and power, they reaffirmed their support. Vetter and Scherer observed: 'The attitude of the Sasan chiefs proves beyond doubt that they regard the Government as master of the island. This gives rise to the hopeful expectation that the Sasan people will soon become quiet and obedient subjects.'

After various details of the alliance had been formalized in a series of separate meetings with the most prominent of the Balinese punggawas and the Sasan district chiefs (who had come to West Lombok for this purpose), Vetter and Scherer were ready to put forward their proposals concerning the manner in which Dutch colonial rule would have to be organized. Quite openly establishing the 'right' of conquest as the legal basis of Dutch rule on Lombok, they made a number of recommendations of which the three outlined below were the most fundamental.
PROPOSAL I: The Political Separation of the Balinese and Sasak Populations

Rationalizing this suggestion Vetter and Scherer wrote:

In view of the fact that the Raja and all his living relatives have surrendered [sic] and have been taken to Batavia, the Netherlands Indies Government has inherited all his rights. The Balinese and Sasak heads and population therefore owe us the same obedience they formerly owed the Raja ... It seems to us that the best solution will be to place the Balinese population under the authority of the punggawas, and the Sasak population under that of the district chiefs ... The boundaries of each Sasak district as well as those of the Balinese territory, ... shall be fixed definitely at a later date. Pending this decision, we have advised the district chiefs to observe strictly the written agreement they concluded shortly after the outbreak of revolt [the mufakatan] in which subjects changing their allegiance from one chief to another were threatened with punishment [eviction from the land].

This proposal, at least in part influenced by the fact that the political separation of ethnic groups was standard practice all over the Netherlands Indies, was very favourable to the Sasak district chiefs. Before the outbreak of the East Sasak revolt only heads of their respective villages, they were now promised jurisdiction over large and populous districts (up to 75,000 inhabitants). Before the revolt the rulers of Lombok, the Balinese punggawas (numbering about 50) were now to retain jurisdiction only over the numerically small Balinese population (after the war, not more than 30,000). The Sasak district chiefs were to be raised to positions of political dominance, while the punggawas were to be reduced to political obscurity.

PROPOSAL II: The Assumption of Ownership by the Government of the druwe dalem Lands

Explaining this suggestion, Vetter and Scherer wrote:

Now that the Raja has been defeated and now that we have inherited his rights ... the population on Lombok is obligated to pay the land tax and so on to the Government. In view of the fact that ever since the outbreak of revolt the Sasaks [of East Lombok] have been completely free from taxation and corvée labour, it will not be an easy matter to make our point of view clear to them ... But it seems to us undesirable to continue this situation of a complete absence of taxation any longer, because the longer we wait, the more difficult it will become ... By giving the Sasak district chiefs adequate
material rewards, we will probably be able to ensure their co-operation. Providing we gain their co-operation it will be a relatively easy matter to make an example of recalcitrant elements among the population.  

This proposal had the most far-reaching consequences for Lombok society. It meant nothing less than that the Netherlands Indies Government was advised to assume ownership over the lands formerly owned directly by the Raja (the druwe dalem lands). As had been the case under the Raja, Vetter and Scherer intended to turn these lands into ‘domain lands’ and make the peasant’s access to the land again dependent on his payment of the land tax and his performance of corvée labour. From the point of view of the Sasak peasants working these lands (pengayahs), this meant a complete restoration of the old order. The de facto ownership of land, which the pengayah of West Lombok had acquired in the course of the Dutch-Balinese war and which those of East Lombok had acquired at the outbreak of revolt, was to be taken from them. The legal, economic and social status of the pengayah was to be drastically reduced. His right to the land was to be reduced from unrestricted ownership (vrij bezitrecht) to a right of cultivation (bewerktungsrecht); his economic status from an independent, land-owning peasant to a share-cropper; and his social status from that of a ‘free’ peasant to that of a serf.

PROPOSAL III: The Restoration of punggawa Ownership of the druwe jabe Lands

The necessity of this suggestion Vetter and Scherer explained as follows:

The most important source of income of the punggawas was their apanage-fields [druwe jabe]. The Raja gave each of them a certain number of fields from his domain . . . The punggawas had their fields cultivated by their serfs [sepangans] . . . It is important that we maintain this situation in order to avoid the punggawas becoming dissatisfied.

Thus, while Vetter and Scherer intended to severely curtail the political power of the punggawas (Proposal I), they were careful enough to advise the preservation of their economic power. The recommendation to restore punggawa ownership of the druwe jabe lands in both West and East Lombok likewise had the most far-reaching consequences for Lombok society. It meant that the second major category of peasants (sepangans) also was to be dispossessed of the land they had recently acquired. It meant that sepangan access to the land was again to be made dependent on his surrendering a share of the harvest and his performance of services (for the benefit of the punggawa), that his right to the land was to be
reduced to a mere right of cultivation, his social status to that of a serf, and his
economic status to that of a share-cropper.

These three proposals, as well as a number of others,\(^8\) were accepted and
given official sanction by Governor-General van der Wijck.\(^9\) Although implement-
ed in somewhat modified forms, they nevertheless came to constitute the basic
principles of Dutch colonial rule on Lombok. Their implementation was not an
easy matter. In fact it was not until 1906, when Governor-General van Heutsz
introduced the notorious ‘Agrarisch Reglement voor Lombok’,\(^10\) that the
disruptions caused by the East Sasak revolt and the Dutch-Balinese war were
completely ‘settled’.

**Dannenburgh’s Settlement: 1895-96**

With the disbanding of the military expedition late in 1894, immediate
authority over Lombok passed from General Vetter to Resident Dannenburgh.
From January 1895 until he stepped down as Resident of Bali and Lombok in
July 1896, Dannenburgh endeavoured to implement the basic principles of
Dutch rule laid down by Vetter and Scherer. He set about his task with
characteristic disregard for all interests other than those of the Netherlands
Indies Government. Almost as if he consciously sought to punish the Balinese
for their resistance, he took a number of measures harmful to Balinese interests
and did nothing to alleviate the increasing desperate material conditions of the
Balinese community. Furthermore, anxious to maximize Government revenues,
Dannenburgh devoted most of his energies to carrying through the introduction
of the land tax on the druwe dalem lands (Proposal II). The result of his
heavy-handed approach was that his successor, F.A. Liefrink, inherited a situ-
ation in which the Balinese community faced total socio-economic disintegration
and the East Sasaks were once again on the verge of rebellion.

*\(^11\) Dannenburgh’s first step was to organize the coercive power necessary for
the establishment of Dutch rule. In addition to the two battalions of Dutch
troops which remained on Lombok as a force of occupation,\(^11\) stationed in
fortified camps in Ampenan and Mataram, he organized police forces for the
*Onderafdelingen* East and West Lombok respectively. On 1 January 1895 he
issued an order whereby the 65-man strong police force (*prajurit*), which had
been recruited on Java, was placed under the command of the Controleur of
East Lombok. On the same day he officially took over control of the two
Balinese police forces — the *langlang* and the *roban* — for police duties in West
Lombok. The langlangs (numbering 86 men) had been used by the Raja for
watch duties in the villages. The robans (likewise numbering 86 men) had been
used for guard duties around the palaces, for transporting prisoners and so forth.
These two Balinese police forces Dannenburgh placed under the command of the
newly appointed Assistant Resident of the Afdeling Lombok, K.H. Roos.\(^12\)
With these forces at his disposal, the Resident could make a start with the establishment of the Dutch administration based on the principle of the political separation of Balinese and Saks. In East Lombok, where the population was homogeneously Sasak by ethnicity, where the village still existed as a basic form of socio-political organization and where the district chief exercised at least nominal authority over certain regions, the establishment of the Dutch administration did not present very great problems. There Dannenburgh confined himself to a recognition and strengthening of the existing situation. He instructed the Controleur of East Lombok to ‘persuade’ the district chiefs to settle their territorial disputes and come to definite agreement on the boundaries of their respective districts. This the Controleur succeeded in accomplishing. On 27 April 1895 the Resident convened a meeting to formalize the territorial settlement. The *Onderafdeling* was divided into eight districts, namely:

(1) Pringgabay a under Raden Wiranom
(2) Rarang under Raden Satraji
(3) Masbagik under Raden Melayu Kusuma
(4) Praya under Mami Bangkol and Mami Sapian
(5) Sakra under Mami Kertawang
(6) Batukliyang under Mami Ginawang
(7) Kopang under Mami Mustiaji
(8) Jonggat under Raden Widana

At the meeting Dannenburgh provided each of the district chiefs with a list stating the names of all the villages and hamlets under his jurisdiction. The district chiefs promised to abide by the settlement. They agreed to punish peasants seeking to transfer allegiance from one head to another by additional corvée labour and, should this be to no avail, by eviction from the land.\(^{13}\)

In West Lombok, where the population was ethnically part Balinese and part Sasak, and where the village had ceased to exist as a basic form of socio-political organization, the establishment of the Dutch administration presented greater problems. The principle of the political separation of Balinese and Sasaks laid down by Vetter and Scherer (Proposal I) ruled out the possibility of reinstating the punggawas in positions of authority over the West Sasak population. On 16 May 1895 Dannenburgh found a solution. On this day he took an administrative decision by which four districts were established, namely: (1) Ampenan and Surroundings; (2) Bayan; (3) Tanjung; (4) Gerung. A punggawa from Buleleng (Bali) was appointed district chief over Ampenan and Surroundings, and three prominent West Sasak chiefs over the remaining districts. These four district chiefs were expected to exercise jurisdiction over West Lombok’s entire population, except the small Buginese settlements on the coast and the 30000 Balinese who, living under increasingly miserable conditions, remained massed
together in the section of Cakranegara which had escaped destruction. Needless to say, these four districts were entirely artificial creations. Unlike their colleagues in East Lombok, these district chiefs had not participated in the revolt against Balinese rule; they had not gained status as rebel leaders and therefore did not even enjoy the nominal support of their subjects. In short, the West Lombok district chiefs had no popular basis of power, but were entirely Dutch creations.14

After the establishment of a rudimentary administration, Dannenburgh was ready to take the first steps towards the realization of the second principle laid down by Vetter and Scherer: the assumption of ownership by the Government of the druwe dalem lands. A very fortunate circumstance for the Resident was that the Raja’s sedahan-agung, Ida Wayan Alit — the official bearing ultimate responsibility for the collection of the land tax — had survived the war and had succeeded in rescuing all the records pertaining to the druwe dalem lands from the burning palace of Cakranegara. Since Ida Wayan Alit was willing to serve the Dutch, there was no great problem in ascertaining which sawahs, tegals and gardens had belonged to the Raja’s direct domain (druwe dalem)15

On 16 May 1895 Dannenburgh ordered the pajeg (land tax on sawah) to be collected on the druwe dalem lands in East and West Lombok. The tax demanded by the Resident was the same as that levied by the Raja, namely: in West Lombok 150 bundles of padi (each weighing 1200 kepings) per tenah of irrigated sawah (5832 m²) and in East Lombok 75 such bundles per tenah of irrigated sawah. On 3 June 1895 Dannenburgh ordered the upeti (land tax on gardens and rain sawahs) to be collected on the druwe dalem lands. Again, the demand was the same as that of the Raja, namely: in West Lombok 1000 kepings per tenah of garden and 500 kepings per tenah of rain sawah, and in East Lombok 200 kepings per tenah of garden and 100 kepings per tenah of rain sawah.16

But although Dannenburgh did not increase the rate of land tax, he did increase the total revenue to be derived from the druwe dalem lands. The land tax was to be paid on: ‘all lands formerly the property of the Raja’.17 This meant that he extended the land tax to two important categories of landholding which formerly had been exempted, the pecatu fields and the wakap fields. The pecatu fields were sawahs, tegals or gardens (usually irrigated sawah) which the Raja had granted to his Balinese subjects, to favoured Sasaks, to artisans, to minor officials and so on. The whole point about the pecatu fields was that the Raja did not demand the payment of land tax, but contented himself with the service (corvée) of the pecatu holders. Similarly, the wakap fields were granted by the Raja to groups, such as temple, mosque or irrigation associations, on the same principle of corvée rather than land tax. Dannenburgh’s decision to abolish the pecatu and wakap fields meant a significant impoverishment to the Balinese community, which had been the main beneficiary.18
On 9 November 1895 the Resident fixed the system of collecting the land tax on much the same basis as under the Raja. In West Lombok the land tax had been collected by the head of the irrigation association (pekasih), who was responsible to the head of the irrigation area (sedahan), who in his turn was responsible to the sedahan-agung. Dannenbargh changed this system only insofar as he placed ultimate responsibility in the hands of the newly appointed district chiefs. The land tax in West Lombok was now to be collected by the pekasih, responsible to the sedahan, responsible to the district chief. In East Lombok the land tax had been collected by the village heads, responsible to the punggawas. The Resident changed this system only insofar as the village heads were now made responsible to the district chiefs. The lower officials and the district chiefs in both West and East Lombok were to be ‘interested’ by a 4% and a 6% commission respectively.19

The first Dutch effort at collecting the land tax on the druwe dalem lands was based on the records of the sedahan-agung. According to these records the money value of the land tax (calculated by valuing a bundle of padi at 40 kepengs and by an exchange rate of 2000 kepengs to fl.2.50) was f.l90.123 in West Lombok and fl.62.045 in East Lombok.20 The money value of the land tax the Dutch were actually able to collect in 1895 was fl.87.533 in the West and fl.10.716 in the East.21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount of land tax demanded in 1895</th>
<th>Amount of land tax actually collected in 1895</th>
<th>% Collected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Lombok fl.90.123</td>
<td>fl.87.533</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Lombok fl.62.045</td>
<td>fl.10.716</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total fl.152.168</td>
<td>fl.98.249</td>
<td>65%</td>
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The high collection rate in West Lombok seems to indicate that there was little resistance by the peasants cultivating the druwe dalem lands (pengayahs). Probably this was due to the fact that the pengayahs of West Lombok had been released from the obligation to pay land tax for only a single season (1894) and had therefore not yet come to look upon the fields they cultivated as their individual possession. That the collection rate in West Lombok did not reach 100% was probably due to some passive resistance on the part of the holders of pecatu and wakap fields, who no doubt did regard the demand for
land tax as an infringement upon their rights. However, the very low collection rate in East Lombok, while partly due to the destruction of fields and irrigation works during the Balinese-East Sasak conflict, does point to a significant degree of passive resistance. This is hardly surprising. For four successive years, ever since the outbreak of revolt against Balinese rule in 1891, the pengayahs had been released from the obligation to pay land tax, so that they had had ample time to come to regard themselves as masters of the land they were cultivating.

But even though the overall collection rate was only 65%, the f.98.249 collected was well in excess of what had been expected. In a report to the Governor-General, Directeur Scherer had argued that the most favourable results ‘in these times of transition’ would be a collection rate of 50%, and had tentatively estimated the proceeds of the land tax in 1895 at f.83.750.22 Largely for this reason, Dannenbargh refrained in 1895 from pressing the collection of land tax to the point of using armed force.

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In the period from January 1895 to July 1896, Dannenbargh had succeeded in establishing a rudimentary political administration and taken the first step towards Government ownership of the druwe dalem lands. However, he had failed to implement the third basic principle laid down by Vetter and Scherer: the restoration of punggawa ownership of the druwe jabe lands in both East and West Lombok. His regime had a drastic effect on both the Balinese and the East Sasaks.

The Balinese community (the triwangsa as well as the sudras) were in quite desperate straits. Everything Dannenbargh had done (or had failed to do) had been damaging to their interests. By implementing the proposal of the political separation of Balinese and Sasaks, he had excluded the punggawas from all political influence. By neglecting to restore punggawa ownership of the druwe jabe lands, he had also denied them economic power. And by arbitrarily extending the land tax to the pecatu and wakap fields, he had dealt the Balinese sudras (the main beneficiaries of the pecatu fields) and Balinese community life (the temples, banjars and subaks) a very serious blow. The result was that the Balinese community faced complete social and economic disintegration. In January 1897 (some two years after the end of the Dutch-Balinese war), Resident Liefvink reported on the plight of the Balinese:

... on my journeys through the Balinese settlements it became apparent that the situation has remained precisely the same as at the end of the war. Although some of the inhabitants have returned to Mataram, they live in miserable huts. Even the living quarters of the most prominent punggawas consist of nothing more than some primitive protection against the elements. The part of Cakranegara which was destroyed has not been rebuilt; the part which escaped
destruction is utterly neglected, the houses with their walls half torn down look like ruins. Also the temples, burnt down during the war, have not been rebuilt . . . The Balinese, still shocked by the heavy blows they have suffered, seem to be of the opinion that they have only been granted their lives and that their punishment will last for ever.23

In addition, the East Sasaks were once again on the verge of revolt. Dannenburgh’s attempt to reintroduce the land tax and corvée amounted to an effort to rob the East Sasak peasant of the gains the revolt had brought him. The bombshell came at the beginning of June 1896, when the Dutch began their second attempt at collecting the land tax. Determined that the collection rate for East Lombok should this time be higher than a mere 17%, the Resident issued orders to the Dutch officials and district chiefs to use force if need be.24 Accordingly, when a group of peasants from a village in the Praya district (where the revolt against Balinese rule had assumed its most radical character) refused the demands by Mami Bangkol and Mami Sapian to pay the land tax, the district chiefs called on the assistance of the Controleur of East Lombok, who at once sent a patrol of his police force to the rebellious village.25

On 8 June the police conducted a surprise raid on the village. Although one of the rebels was captured and a small quantity of weapons (including two rifles) were seized, the majority of rebels (about 15-25 in number) managed to escape into the forest between the towns of Praya and Batukliyang.26 For several weeks the police made daily patrols around and through the dense forest (about 25 km. in circumference), without being able to find a trace of the rebels. The daily patrols continued until 24 June when the two principal leaders of the resistance, named Mami Ocet Talib and Haji Ali Dewa, wrote a letter to the Controleur of East Lombok informing him of their grievances. They boldly declared that they had left their hideout in the forest for the town of Praya and that: ‘. . . if he was tired of them, he should come to Praya to kill them’. The Controleur regarded this letter as something of a declaration of war. He at once marched on Praya with the larger part of his police force and fell into an ambush. In a brief skirmish the policemen suffered three casualties, of whom one was killed, while the rebels retreated into the forest, apparently without suffering any casualties themselves.27

This incident, although minor in scale, was nonetheless of considerable significance. An armed band now roamed through East Lombok bidding defiance to both the district chiefs and the Dutch. The Controleur convinced Roos, the Assistant Resident of Lombok, that the disturbance was beyond the capacity of his police force and that it was necessary to call in the army. On 27 June two army patrols — each numbering about 50 officers and men — left the garrison at Mataram to capture the rebels dead or alive.28
In his last report as Resident of Bali and Lombok (written only two days before Liefrinck took over), Dannenbargh informed the Governor-General of the unrest in East Lombok.

In view of the insignificant dimensions of the resistance, which is probably directed more against the district chiefs than against us, it seems to me that the name 'insurgents' which the Controleur used to describe the gang, is rather exaggerated. It seems to me that what we have here is only a gang of evil-doers and recalcitrants.29

Dannenbargh was wrong. The movement which had erupted in the Praya district was criminal only on a superficial level. Since the members of the band had to provide themselves with the necessities of life, they occasionally resorted to acts of brigandage, whenever villages in the surrounding region did not voluntarily provide them with food. They sometimes rustled cattle, appropriated rice supplies, and probably even murdered and robbed travellers. In spite of this, on a more fundamental level, the movement was social in nature. It expressed the aspirations of the East Sasak peasant to retain possession of the land he was cultivating. For this reason the rebels enjoyed a much higher degree of support among the East Lombok population than a mere criminal band could ever have attained.

When Liefrinck took office as Resident of Bali and Lombok on 1 July 1896, the two most serious problems confronting him were: (1) the desperate condition of Lombok's Balinese population, (2) the unrest in East Lombok. Not surprisingly, Liefrinck considered the latter the more urgent. As will be indicated below, he was very much aware of the social character of the movement and therefore of the possibility of its growth into a general peasant revolt. For this reason, Liefrinck began his term in office by doing everything in his power to prevent this possibility from materializing.

**The Continued East Sasak Revolt**

Unlike his predecessor, the new Resident — a representative of the 'ethical' school — did not underestimate the rebel movement. Shortly after taking office he reported to the Governor-General:

...the leaders of the resistance boast of their activities. By means of messengers to various regions [of East Lombok] they tell the people that they intend to free East Lombok of all domination so that it will be possible to fully enjoy the fruits of the Balinese fall from power, which, they maintain, has been brought about primarily by the Sasak people themselves... Although the resistance has not yet assumed large proportions, it cannot be denied that the situation is serious. The boasting of the leaders has had the
result that everywhere on the island people speak of the revolt of Praya against Dutch rule ... Also the tactics of the leaders have not been without results as is apparent from the slow but steady growth in the numbers of insurgents ... The possibility that the resistance will spread cannot be ruled out ... The events in Praya have given many persons in East Lombok the hope that ... they will yet be able to escape from the authority of the district chiefs which has been forced upon them. With great interest they listen to all they are told about the events in Praya: they hesitate, they should like to join, but lack of enterprise and fear still hold them back.\textsuperscript{30}

On the basis of this assessment, Liefdrinck developed his counter-insurgency strategy. Aware that a policy of indiscriminate repression against the wavering population of East Lombok would be likely to lead only to the growth of the movement, he developed a strategy characterized by three features: (1) reliance on the district chiefs; (2) selective repression; (3) welfare measures.\textsuperscript{31}

I. Liefdrinck sought to combat the rebel movement as much as possible through the district chiefs. In the first place, he used them for intelligence-gathering purposes. The district chiefs were asked to keep the Dutch informed of which persons had at one time joined the rebels or had given them active assistance. Secondly, Liefdrinck used the district chiefs to fight the rebels. He made extensive use of troops supplied by the district chiefs for the pursuit of the rebel bands. Only in cases where the rebels had clearly become too strong for these often unreliable troops did he call in Dutch army units from the occupation force.

II. Aside from pursuing and seeking to destroy the rebel bands, Liefdrinck was very careful to take coercive measures (arrest, eviction from the land and a term of forced labour)\textsuperscript{32} only against persons who were suspected of having actively joined the rebels at one time or another. Anxious to avoid indiscriminate repression, he refrained from using coercive measures against mere rebel sympathizers.

III. The welfare measures were intended to dispose the hesitating population favourably towards the new state of affairs. Liefdrinck issued orders that all irrigation works destroyed during the East Sasak revolt be repaired.

The whole thrust of Liefdrinck's policy was to obtain 'the isolation of the rebel bands from the rest of the population',\textsuperscript{33} and then their destruction. Although this strategy was almost certainly the most effective that could be devised, on three occasions the endemic unrest in East Lombok society nevertheless threatened to grow into a general peasant revolt. These instances were: (a) the Praya district from July to September 1896; (b) the Sakra district from September to October 1896; (c) the Praya district from September to November 1897. The uprisings in the Praya district ( (a) and (c) ) differed in
character from the rising in Sakra. While the movement in Praya assumed a protracted character, the rising in Sakra (b) was a spontaneous expression of popular discontent.

(a) The Praya District, July-September 1896

Liefrinck’s first action as Resident was to change the strategy by which the Assistant Resident of Lombok, Roos, sought to defeat the insurgent band. Wishing to involve East Sasak rather than Dutch forces, Liefrinck ordered the withdrawal of the two Dutch army units which since 27 June had been searching for the rebels. He limited direct Dutch involvement to establishing a military fortification manned by about 100 officers and men in the town of Praya. He ordered the district chiefs of Praya, Jonggat and Batukliyang to take steps to destroy the rebel band. The district chiefs obeyed: each of them sent about 100 of his followers to search in and around the forest between Praya and Batukliyang.34

These searches did not meet with success. On the contrary, the rebels, led by Mami Ocet Talib and Haji Ali Dewa, took the initiative. On the night of 10-11 July the insurgents attacked the Dutch prison in Sisi (in the Sakra district), killed three of the guards, set the building on fire and released about 40 prisoners who, naturally enough, at once joined the band. Emboldened by this success, the rebel band, which had now grown to some 60-70 persons, on 17 July entered the town of Praya, the centre of Dutch power in East Lombok. In a skirmish with an army patrol a European soldier was stabbed to death, while the insurgents, apparently without suffering any casualties themselves, managed to disappear by mingling with the population. This incident, regarded as all the more serious because the victim had been a European, caused considerable confusion in the Dutch camp. The Assistant Resident — in Liefrinck’s absence the highest-ranking official on Lombok — became extremely suspicious of the loyalty of Praya’s entire population. In his report to the Resident he wrote: ‘The population of Praya supports the insurgents, they provide them with food and give them shelter. To place a price on the heads of these recalcitrants would be to no avail because all of Praya is like one large family.’35 This suspicion led the Assistant Resident to strengthen the military garrison in Praya to about 200 officers and men, and to order the walls in the town torn down.36

Hearing of all this, Liefrinck hurried to Praya where he arrived on 22 July. Since the Assistant Resident’s decision to tear down all the walls ran counter to his policy of selective repression, Liefrinck gave orders for this to be discontinued. Instead, the Resident persuaded the district chiefs of Praya, Mami Bangkol and Mami Sapian, to provide him with specific information as to which persons were known to be members of the insurgent band. Two days later Dutch army patrols conducted a series of surprise raids in the town of Praya where many of the rebels had been living right under the noses of the Dutch authorities. In these raids one person was killed, three were wounded and 89 were taken prisoner without offering resistance. To prevent these prisoners being released
by what remained of the rebel band, Liefarkinck ordered them taken to Labuan Haji on Lombok's east coast and from there by ship to the Dutch prison in Buleleng (Bali).

Although the insurgents had suffered a severe blow, the rebel band was far from destroyed. The two leaders, Mami Ocet Talib and Haji Ali Dewa, had escaped. They retreated with what remained of their following to the comparative safety of the forest between Praya and Batukliyang. Here the band not only continued to evade the daily patrols by Dutch army units and district troops, but also steadily increased its membership. By 12 August the rebels again felt themselves strong enough to come out of the forest and attempt to enter the town of Praya. Their plan, however, was discovered by Mami Bangkol who sent word to the Dutch. The insurgents were met by Dutch troops, and after suffering serious casualties (they left eight dead behind) were forced to retreat. But the rebels did not give up. They next struck at Batukliyang. On 14 August they entered the town, killed six followers of the district chief Mami Ginawang and set fire to his house. The district chief himself managed to escape.

These attacks on the district chiefs of Praya and Batukliyang provided the Dutch with an opportunity to deal with the insurgents. As long as the band stayed in the forest it was extremely elusive. It could only be effectively attacked on open ground. When the Dutch military commander heard that the rebels had again left the forest and were attacking Batukliyang, he sent 100 men to intercept them. On 16 August one of the army patrols (consisting of one officer and 20 men) engaged the rebel band. The insurgents, however, succeeded in surrounding the patrol and, in a gun battle lasting about three hours, managed to inflict eight casualties (three killed) upon the Dutch. The army patrol would almost certainly have been destroyed if the other patrols had not come to the rescue. When the rebels saw the Dutch reinforcements approaching they retreated towards the forest, leaving four dead behind.

For several weeks the Dutch continued their daily patrols around and through the forest without, however, being able to locate the rebels. The arrests of suspected persons were continued. From 16-20 August another 55 arrests were made in the town of Praya and in surrounding hamlets. This did not deter the rebels from staging yet another attack on Praya on 24 August. But the Dutch were again forewarned and managed to drive them back to the forest, killing at least nine while suffering only two casualties themselves.

On 7 September the Dutch finally scored a significant victory over their opponents. An informer led an army unit to one of the rebel hideouts deep in the forest. In a surprise attack 12 insurgents were killed, including the leader Mami Ocet Talib. In part due to the death of the foremost leader, and in part to the approach of the rainy season when agricultural work started, the band began dwindling in size. Realizing that circumstances favoured a negotiated settlement to the conflict, Liefarkinck gave orders for the army patrols to be
halted and made the remaining rebels an offer of amnesty. Through the intermediary of the penghulu of Praya, the Resident informed Haji Ali Dewa, now the principal leader of the rebels, that if he and his men would cease their activities and settle in the town of Praya (no doubt so that the Dutch could easily keep an eye on them), they would be given complete ‘forgiveness’. This offer was accepted. On 20 September the Haji and 85 rebels came out of the forest, surrendered a small quantity of weapons (no firearms), went to Praya and began cultivating their rice fields.\textsuperscript{42}

Shortly after order had been restored, Liefrinck put forward his proposal concerning the repair of irrigation works destroyed during the East Sasak revolt. On 9 January 1897 the Governor-General officially approved the idea and allocated the sum of f.50,000 for this purpose.\textsuperscript{43}

(b) The Sakra District, September-October 1896

Only a few days after Liefrinck’s return to Buleleng, a fresh disturbance broke out in the Sakra district. On 28 September a Dutch official visited the village of Gandor and ordered the inhabitants to pay the land tax (which had been due for some time) within the next few days. This demand caused a popular uprising in Gandor and in the surrounding hamlets of Apitai and Teros. On the night of 28-29 September a crowd numbering several thousands moved in the direction of Sisi, where the Dutch maintained their establishments. The crowd burnt down the house of the Koninklijke Paketvaart Mij, who barely managed to escape with his life, and attacked the centre of Dutch power, the residence of the Controleur of East Lombok. This house and the adjoining prison — where the European women had fled — were defended by about 50 policemen, who succeeded in keeping the crowd at bay throughout the night with riflefire.\textsuperscript{44}

Early in the morning of 29 September Dutch officials in the beleaguered establishment managed to send a messenger to the Assistant Resident, Roos, in Praya. The following morning half a squadron of cavalry (about 75 officers and men) arrived in Sisi where, supported by the policemen, they charged the crowd. The East Sasaks were defenceless against a cavalry charge. More than 30 people were cut down, while the Dutch suffered only three casualties, of whom one was killed. On the morning of 1 October the Assistant Resident arrived at Labuan Haji aboard the warship HMSS \textit{Atjeh}. Ignoring Liefrinck’s policy of selective repression, he decided to stage what he euphemistically called a ‘chastisement’ against the rebellious villages.\textsuperscript{45}

The same morning a naval detachment of about 125 officers and men went ashore. Together with the cavalry and the police force (250 officers and men), Roos marched to the village of Gandor. The population fled. The troops found the village abandoned and burnt it to the ground. After this heroic feat the Dutch marched on to the nearby hamlet of Teros. Although the people waited with a white flag and at once agreed to surrender the leaders of the uprising, the
troops nonetheless caused considerable damage to the village. The soldiers went through the village smashing furnishings, shooting cattle and looting anything of value. The same fate awaited the village of Apitai. Here, too, the inhabitants did not resist, surrendered the leaders of the rising, and watched passively while the troops went on a rampage. In the afternoon the Assistant Resident considered his task completed and returned with the troops and 23 bound prisoners to the warship. With some surprise a Dutch officer noted: ‘Groups of men, women and children sat alongside the road, apparently completely indifferent to the imprisonment of their leaders.’

As soon as Liefrinck learned of this ‘expedition’ he sailed to East Lombok. He was furious. This action was precisely the sort he rightly feared would push the wavering East Sasak population into a general revolt. Upon his arrival on 5 October he relieved Roos from his office of Assistant Resident. Liefrinck also informed the inhabitants of Apitai and Teros, but not those of Gandor, that they would be compensated for the material losses they had suffered. He managed to convince the Governor-General of the necessity of compensation and on 16 November 1897 was allocated about f.8700 for the purpose.

(c) The Praya District, September-November 1897

Early in January 1897 one of the leaders of the uprising in the Sakra district — a low-ranking member of the perwangs by the name of Lalu Badil — managed to escape from the Dutch prison in Sisi where he had been awaiting transportation to begin a 15-year sentence of forced labour in chains. After his escape he simply returned to his native village, Teros, only two miles from the Dutch establishment at Sisi. Obviously enjoying the protection of the population in the region, Lalu Badil lived quietly in his village for several months. Only in the beginning of April did the Dutch authorities in Sisi accidentally discover that the man so high on their wanted list had all this time been living in the immediate vicinity. The Controleur of East Lombok then sent three policemen to arrest him. But Lalu Badil, understandably having little inclination to begin his term of forced labour, resisted arrest. After cutting down one of the policemen with his kiewapp, he escaped to the Praya district where, in the course of the month of April, he gathered a following of about 20 to 30 people.

For a number of months the band roamed around the countryside in Praya and adjoining districts, committing various acts of brigandage. In June alone 19 cases of cattle rustling, 11 robberies, two woundings and five killings were attributed to Lalu Badil’s band. Probably realizing that such banditry reduced the possibility of the rebels gaining a mass following, Liefrinck refrained from stern repressive measures. He stopped short of calling in the Dutch army, but confined himself to occasional, ineffectual pursuit of the band by district troops and the East Lombok police force.
By August-September the activities of Lalu Badil's band underwent a significant change. From banditry it moved into the realm of politics. On the night of 30-31 August the rebels staged a daring raid on the town of Praya. Entering under cover of darkness, they attacked the Dutch prison, killed two of the guards, set fire to the building and released all the prisoners. As a result of this action Lalu Badil's band was considerably strengthened; it now numbered from 100 to 120 persons. On 6 September the rebels staged a raid on a Dutch road-building project. Probably intending to disrupt work, they killed three corvée labourers and a Javanese overseer (mandur). Not surprisingly, this action caused many corvée labourers to abandon the project. Faced with these political actions, Liefrinck gave orders for military measures.

On the morning of 7 September a Dutch army column of 150 officers and men approached the rebels' hideout in the fortified village of Batu Menek on the north side of the forest between Praya and Batukliyang. Here Lalu Badil made a serious tactical error. Instead of withdrawing his band into the forest and avoiding the better-equipped Dutch troops, he decided to meet them head-on. The Dutch stormed the village and after a fierce battle managed to penetrate its defences. Probably believing themselves to be invulnerable, Lalu Badil and a number of his closest associates staged a lance attack. The troops shot the attackers, entered the village and set it on fire. In this battle at least 20 rebels were killed, while the Dutch suffered eight casualties including three killed.

Although this was a major Dutch success, the end to resistance had not yet come. Some 70 to 90 rebels had managed to escape into the forest. These men made their way to the village of Panabang on the west side of the forest and joined forces with Haji Ali Dewa, the same person who had played a leading role in the resistance of the previous year. Some time earlier the Haji had disregarded his agreement with Liefrinck of September 1896, and left the town of Praya for Panabang with about 15 followers. Here he had kept himself aloof from Lalu Badil's band. No doubt wishing to avoid a joining of forces between Lalu Badil and Haji Ali Dewa, Liefrinck had not pressed the issue, but had left him undisturbed. But now that Lalu Badil was dead and his band scattered, the Resident decided that the time had come to try to eliminate this band as well. The day following the Dutch success at Batu Menek he sent a messenger to the Haji ordering him to return to Praya within the next two days. When Haji Ali Dewa had failed to appear by 10 September, Liefrinck again ordered military action.

Unlike Lalu Badil, the Haji did not await the Dutch attack, but withdrew into the forest with his followers. No doubt realizing that with the approaching rainy season there was little likelihood of a sudden growth in the level of resistance, Liefrinck decided that the time was ripe for a concerted effort to destroy the rebel band. He issued orders to the Dutch garrisons, the district chiefs and the East Lombok police force to step up their patrols around and through the forest. The district chiefs were to call up several thousands of
peasants for a clearing operation. These corvée labourers, protected by Dutch army units, were put to work cutting broad paths through the forest. Occasionally the rebels attacked peasants working on the clearing operation. On 15 September three peasants were killed, and another four on 18 September. Nevertheless, the insurgents were unable to halt their progress. On 25 September the clearing operation paid off. Dutch troops discovered a hideout and staged a surprise attack in which seven rebels were killed, without suffering any casualties themselves.\textsuperscript{56} Not yet defeated, the insurgents ambushed a Dutch army patrol on 27 September, inflicting four casualties of whom two were killed.\textsuperscript{57} On the night of 28 September they left the forest and staged a raid on the town of Praya, during which they burnt down a house belonging to Mami Bangkol. Although two of Bangkol’s followers were killed, the former insurgent leader himself escaped unharmed.\textsuperscript{58}

For several weeks sporadic fighting continued in the forest. But since the paths began to facilitate the movement of Dutch troops, the rebels’ position grew more desperate with each day. Finally, on 18 October, the decisive encounter took place. Dutch troops discovered and surrounded the last of the hideouts, and in a brief battle killed 15 rebels, including Haji Ali Dewa and some of his closest associates.\textsuperscript{59} The death of the last prominent rebel leader as well as the setting in of the rainy season marked the end of significant forms of opposition to Dutch rule.

Shortly after ‘order had been restored’, Liefrinck requested more funds for the repairing of irrigation works. On 14 January 1898 the Governor-General approved the request and allocated a grant of f.30,000.\textsuperscript{60}

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From the preceding narrative it is apparent that the unrest in East Lombok in 1896-97, while sometimes growing to significant proportions, nevertheless failed to develop into a broad peasant revolt. The question arises: why not?

There were at least three factors. First, the collaboration of the East Sasak district chiefs with the Dutch. The district chiefs, who had risen to prominence in the course of the revolt against Balinese rule, did not desire a rebellion against the Dutch. And why should they? The Dutch had not only recognized the former village heads as chiefs over large and populous districts but, by backing them in every conflict with their subjects, had considerably strengthened their positions. The Dutch had further granted them a 6\% commission on the collection of the land tax and, in addition, had promised them substantial salaries (see p.121). The district chiefs chose to support the Dutch against the rebels quite simply because they were more interested in securing personal wealth and power than in safeguarding the gains which the revolt against Balinese rule had brought to the East Sasak peasant. Since the district chiefs did enjoy widespread respect as former insurgent leaders, their
collaboration prevented many peasants from joining the rebel bands and inhibited the growth of anti-Dutch resistance. Moreover, without the intelligence they provided and the troops they made available, it would have taken the Dutch much longer to destroy the rebel bands.

Second, Liefrinck's counter-insurgency strategy. By using a policy of unrestrained repression against the East Sasak population at large – of the type the Assistant Resident began to implement in July 1896 in the Praya district and actually did implement in October 1896 in the Sakra district – the Dutch would probably have succeeded in driving the mass of the peasants into open rebellion. But Liefrinck did not resort to this crude strategy. Instead, he consistently carried through a policy characterized by reliance on the district chiefs, selective repression and welfare measures.

Third, the tendency of the rebel bands to engage in banditry. Although the population continued to give at least passive support to the bands, the relations between the rebels and the peasants could have been better if it had not been for this unfortunate tendency. There can be no doubt that the acts of brigandage, which were much more in evidence in the bands of 1897 (particularly in the one led by Lalu Badil) than in the larger movement of 1896, served to alienate the peasant population from the rebels. This tendency therefore helped the Dutch to attain their objective of 'effecting the isolation of the bands from the rest of the population'.

The combination of these three factors led to the demise of organized resistance to Dutch rule. Although a high level of social tension remained endemic in East Lombok society, the resistance never again assumed truly significant dimensions. It is possible to say that with the destruction of the last rebel band in October 1897 the Dutch had become the undisputed masters of the island.

_Liefrinck's Settlement 1896-1901_

In the course of his five-year term as Resident, Liefrinck succeeded in resolving the political and agrarian problem which Lombok had inherited from the period of rebellion and war. His methods were somewhat different from those of his predecessor. Unlike Dannenburgh, Liefrinck was a great admirer of the Balinese people. During his years as an administrator on Bali (1874-78 and 1882-89), he developed a scholarly interest in the Balinese language, society and culture, which he retained throughout his life. It is very likely that the sympathy he felt for the Balinese was one of the driving forces behind his determination to prevent the disintegration (and possibly the complete disappearance) of Balinese society on Lombok. But although he was more 'liberal' than his predecessor, Liefrinck was not for that reason any less of a consistent colonialist. Like Dannenburgh, his overriding concern was to establish a workable administration and to maximize Government revenues.
A. The Political Settlement 1896-97

During his first 15 months as Resident (July 1896 – October 1897), Liefринк endeavoured not only to avoid a general East Sasak revolt, but also to arrive at a definitive settlement of Lombok’s political problem. He sought to improve and finalize the rudimentary political system established by his predecessor. In East Lombok all that was necessary was to implement a more effective administrative division. Shortly after he took office he issued an order by which Onderafdeling East Lombok was divided into two parts. The districts of Praya, Batukliyang, Jonggat and Kopang were to comprise the Onderafdeling Central Lombok, while the districts of Sakra, Pringgabaya, Rarang and Masbagik were to constitute the Onderafdeling East Lombok.61

In West Lombok Liefринк encountered much greater problems. He was critical of Vetter and Scherer’s decision to enforce the political separation of Balinese and Sasaks (Proposal I) and thereby to exclude the punggawas from all significant political influence: ‘The reconstruction of a specifically Balinese-rulled district has remained a fiction . . . In order to make West Lombok truly Balinese, the punggawas would have had to be appointed as heads [over the West Sasak population] . . . For reasons unknown to me, this has not happened.’62 But Liefринк thought it imprudent to reverse the decision. In the same report he wrote: ‘Since in the last few years the Sasak population has grown unaccustomed to the idea of a return to Balinese rule, I am of the opinion that it is now too late to place the administration of the region entirely in the hands of the punggawas.’63

The Resident soon became aware that if he was to uphold the principle of the political separation of Balinese and Sasaks he would be obliged to establish both an administration on the village level and an administration over the Balinese population. In the beginning of 1897 Liefринк began the first of these two tasks. He arranged for a Dutch surveying team to be sent to West Lombok to establish the most ‘rational’ boundaries of the largest West Sasak villages. On 30 June 1897 a meeting was held at which the decisions of the surveying team were formalized. At this meeting a total of 36 West Sasak village heads (pemusangan kliyang) were appointed. Each of them was given jurisdiction over all West Sasaks living within the newly established boundaries of their village territories.64 Two days later, Liefринк held a meeting at which the administration over Lombok’s Balinese population was set up. Wishing to satisfy the ambitions of as many punggawas as possible, he appointed 12 of them as chiefs over the following Balinese ‘districts’:65 (1) Cakranegara North; (2) Cakranegara Northeast; (3) Cakranegara East; (4) Cakranegara Southeast; (5) Cakranegara South; (6) Cakranegara Southwest; (7) Cakranegara West; (8) Cakranegara Northwest; (9) Pagutan; (10) Pasasangan; (11) Mataram; (12) Pamenang. In addition to these ‘district chiefs’, Liefринк appointed one of the most prominent punggawas as ‘head of the Balinese population of Lombok’, with the title of pepatih.66
On 6 July 1897 the Resident put the finishing touches to the political system. He advised the Governor-General that the time had come to grant salaries to the Balinese and Sasak district chiefs. He proposed that the East Lombok chiefs be paid f.1800 a year, the West Lombok chief of Ampenan and surroundings likewise f.1800, the chief of Gerung f.900 and those of Tanjung and Bayan f.600. 67 The Balinese ‘district chiefs’ were to be paid f.900 per year and the so-called pétatih f.3000 per year.68

On 27 August 1898 the Governor-General officially approved all of Liefrinck’s proposals.69 The Balinese and Sasak district chiefs were granted their salaries and were thereby transformed into paid officials of the Netherlands Indies Government. With this event the Dutch administration can be regarded as having been fully established.

B. The Agrarian Settlement 1897-1901

With the defeat of the last rebel band in East Lombok and the definitive establishment of the Dutch administration, it was possible for Liefrinck to turn his attention to his second major task: the resolution of the agrarian problem. This task consisted of two parts: (1) the implementation of Vetter and Scherer’s third proposal concerning the restoration of triwangsa ownership over the druwe jabe lands, (2) the implementation of a definite land tax regulation involving a revision of the rudimentary regulation introduced by his predecessor.

On 24 October 1897 – just six days after the destruction of the last rebel band – the Governor-General gave his approval to Liefrinck’s proposal to begin the restoration of triwangsa land-ownership. In his characteristic style Van der Wijck wrote:

I agree that the restoration to the Balinese of their individual landholding is the best, simplest and most just manner to end the disputes over land. That the Balinese will approve of this decision is of course quite certain. But it is to be expected that the Sasaks will only reluctantly part with their illegally acquired possessions. It is possible that they will resist and that we shall have to use force to compel the recalcitrants.70

On 20 November 1897 Liefrinck informed the Balinese punggawas that they were to receive back all the druwe jabe lands they had owned in the region west of the Dalem River, i.e. in all of the Onderafdeling West Lombok and in part of the Onderafdeling Central Lombok.71 The lands owned by punggawas who had died in the war would be restored to their closest relatives. Not surprisingly, the punggawas were very pleased. Since their land-ownership in the region east of the Dalem River had not been very extensive, this decision meant that the greater part of their druwe jabe lands would be restored to them.72 Three days later the Resident constituted a committee of a Dutch Controleur,
two Balinese punggawas and two West Sasak heads to pass judgement in cases where West Sasak peasants disputed the claims of the punggawa.\textsuperscript{73}

Not until May 1899 was the whole process of restoring triwangs\a land-ownership completed. Although in the great majority of cases the West Sasak peasant succumbed to the pressure exerted upon him and reluctantly relinquished ownership, there were a total of 1354 cases in which the judgement of the committee was called for. In the great majority of these cases the committee ruled in favour of the punggawa.\textsuperscript{74} By May 1899 a total of 8073 tenah (one tenah = 7200m$^2$) of sawah and 1435 tenah of tegalan and garden had been transferred to the ownership of the punggawas.\textsuperscript{75} Calculated in tenahs of 7200m$^2$, the situation in the region west of the Dalem River had become as follows:

\begin{center}
\textbf{Table VII: Land ownership in May 1899}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Total Sawahs & Druwe dalem lands. & Druwe jabe lands. & Druwe jabe \\
Measured & Owned by N.I.G., & Owned by punggawas & Per cent \\
 & cultivated by & cultivated by & of Total \\
 & pengayahs & sepangans & \\
\hline
23 406 & 15 373 & 8 073 & 34.5 \\
\hline
Tegalan/ & & & \\
Garden & & & \\
\hline
6 072 & 4 637 & 1 435 & 23.5 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

During the years 1895-99 the Sasak aristocracy also succeeded in repossessing the druwe jabe lands east of the Dalem River. Since the power of the Dutch-backed perwangs\a was much greater than that of the defeated triwangs\a, they had been able to accomplish this without direct Dutch assistance. Dutch political support had been sufficient. Thus, by May 1899, virtually all druwe jabe lands in both East and West Lombok had largely been restored to their prewar owners.\textsuperscript{76} This meant that the second large category of peasants also (the sepangans) had lost their recently acquired ownership over the land they cultivated.

Shortly after the restoration of triwangs\a landownership, Liefrinck began working on the second aspect of the agrarian problem, the implementation of a more ‘up-to-date’ land tax regulation. On 21 June 1899 he issued an order by which the collection of the land tax on the druwe dalem lands was changed drastically. Dannenburgh and the Raja before him had demanded in pajeg (payable only on irrigated sawahs) 150 bundles of padi — weighing each 1200 kepens — per tenah (5832m$^2$) in West Lombok, and 75 such bundles in East Lombok. In upeti (payable only on rain sawahs and gardens), 1000 kepens
per tenah (one tenah = 5832m$^2$) of garden and 500 kepangs per tenah of rain sawah had been demanded in West Lombok and 200 kepangs per tenah of garden and 100 kepangs per tenah of rain sawah in the East. Liefrinck extended the pajeg to the rain sawahs (previously subject to upeti) and stipulated that, depending on the sawah’s location and productivity, 100, 90, 80, 70 or 60 bundles of padi — weighing each 1200 kepengs — per tenah (one tenah = 7200m$^2$) be paid in both East and West Lombok. He further extended the upeti to the tegalans (previously tax-free) and stipulated that, depending on the tegalan or garden’s productivity and location, 1200, 800 or 400 kepangs per tenah (7200m$^2$) be paid in both East and West Lombok. These changes in the collection of the land tax amounted to a reduction in West Lombok, an increase in the East, and, due mainly to the extension of the pajeg to the rain sawahs and the upeti to the tegalans, a significant overall increase in Government revenue.

In the same order of 21 June, Liefrinck overruled Dannenburgh’s decision to extend the land tax to all the druwe dalem lands. He re-established the pecatu and wakap fields as forms of land tenure. The Balinese sudras were the main beneficiaries of this decision. A large number of sudras, who before the war had held tax-free pecatu fields on condition of performance of corvée in and around the Raja’s palaces and pleasure gardens, were given back their fields on the same condition as before. Although not required to pay the land tax, they were obliged to look after and maintain what was left of the Raja’s palaces and pleasure gardens. A second group of beneficiaries were the lower officials like the Balinese heads of subaks (pekasih), the West Sasak heads of village (pemusungan kliyang) and hamlets (kliyang), who received these fields as the main remuneration for their services. A third beneficiary were institutions such as subaks, temples and mosques, which received back their wakap fields, the proceeds of which were intended for their maintenance.

The re-establishment of pecatu and wakap fields free of land tax meant a drop in the revenues the Government could have derived from the island. No doubt realizing that he was sure to be criticised on this point, Liefrinck sought to increase revenues by extending the land tax to the druwe jabe lands. His order of 21 June stipulated that the Balinese and Sasak landlords be required to pay half the land tax demanded from the pengayahs cultivating the druwe dalem lands. This meant that the Balinese and Sasak landlords were required to pay in pajeg — depending on the sawah’s productivity and location — 50, 45, 35 or 30 bundles of padi (each weighing 1200 kepengs) per tenah (7200m$^2$), and in upeti, 600, 400 or 200 kepangs per tenah of garden or tegalan.

Shortly before stepping down as Resident, Liefrinck put the finishing touches on the agrarian settlement. On 12 February 1901 he issued two important regulations concerning the alienation of land. All those working the druwe dalem lands (pengayahs, pecatu and wakap holders) were forbidden to alienate
the land they were cultivating. Since the alienation of druwe dalem lands had also been forbidden under the Raja, this prohibition was familiar to the peasants of Lombok. It amounted to a formal recognition of the fact that the Government had replaced the Raja as the owner of the druwe dalem lands. And secondly, Liefninck stipulated that the Balinese owners of druwe jabe lands were forbidden to alienate their land to any non-Balinese. This regulation was also a familiar one. As the Raja had done before him, Liefninck sought to safeguard the considerable land ownership of the Balinese punggawas.

Liefninck had hereby fully resolved Lombok’s political and agrarian problem. He had granted salaries to the higher Balinese and Sasak officials (district chiefs), and tax-free pecatu fields to the lower officials (village heads). He had restored triwangsa landownership in West Lombok and that of the perwangsas in the East. He had restored many of the pecatu fields to Balinese sudras and many of the wakap fields to institutions of various kinds. To make up for the loss in revenue he had introduced a moderate land tax on the druwe jabe lands held by Balinese and Sasak landlords. And finally, he had sought to ‘stabilize’ his settlement by prohibiting the alienation of all druwe dalem lands as well as the alienation by Balinese punggawas of their druwe jabe lands to non-Balinese.

This settlement, which firmly tied the Balinese and Sasak aristocracies to Dutch rule, soon came in for criticism. Officials in Batavia, even more concerned with maximizing Government revenue than Liefninck, favoured drastic revisions. The officials won the day. In the years immediately following Liefninck’s term as Resident, his agrarian settlement was once again changed beyond recognition.

**The Final Settlement: 1901-06**

Since Liefninck’s settlement had been implemented entirely at his own initiative, his decisions still needed the official approval of the Governor-General. It was to take five years and three different ordinances before its various aspects had finally been ‘approved’. Governor-General Rooseboom issued an ordinance regulating the land tax (1904), and his successor Van Heutsz issued two ordinances, one regulating corvée labour (1905) and the other the rights to the land (1906). The latter ordinance was the first of its type for the Outer Islands (*Buiten Gewesten*) and came to be known as ‘Het Agrarisch Reglement voor Lombok’. As a result of these three ordinances, the Dutch colonial system on Lombok acquired its basic character, which was to remain virtually unaltered until the introduction of reforms in 1935 and 1936.

*The principal reason why the officials in Batavia failed to appreciate this settlement was not, as Professor van Vollenhoven argued, their inability to understand the complexities of the indigenous forms of land tenure which*
LiefRinck had sought to preserve. The cause of opposition was purely that this settlement was still regarded as providing the Government with insufficient tax revenue. That this was uppermost in the minds of the Batavian officials is evident from the fact that LiefRinck's restoration of the pecatu and wakap fields was first to come in for criticism. Both the Department of Finance and the Council of the Indies raised objections.\textsuperscript{83} Summing up these criticisms, the Directeur of Binnenlandsch Bestuur, Van Rees, recommended to Governor-General Rooseboom in November 1903: 'With the Council, I am of the opinion that it is possible to increase the revenues derived from the land tax on Lombok. It is highly desirable that we put an end to the privileged position with regard to the payment of land tax of certain categories of land holding.'\textsuperscript{84}

Rooseboom accepted this advice. On 1 June 1904 he issued an ordinance extending the land tax to all cultivated land on Lombok. The crucial passage was the following: 'From lands which . . . were not at all or were only partly subjected to the payment of land tax, half the amount of tax is required this year. The tax on all these lands shall be increased by one fifth each year until it has been doubled.'\textsuperscript{85} Rooseboom's successor, Van Heutz, took the step which had now become inevitable. In March 1905 he brought corvée labour into line with the land tax. Just as the payment of land tax was now demanded on all categories of land tenure, the performance of corvée was now required from all categories of persons. The ordinance simply stipulated that all indigenous adult male inhabitants, including therefore the Balinese and Sasak aristocracies,\textsuperscript{86} were obligated to perform corvée labour.\textsuperscript{87}

These two ordinances had far-reaching consequences for Lombok society. What did they mean to the holders of pecatu and wakap fields, and to the owners (the Balinese and Sasak aristocracies) and cultivators (sefangs) of the dâuwe jabe lands?

I. The pecatu fields

Since the sole distinguishing feature of these lands had been that they were 'free' from taxation, the extension of the land tax — at the same level as that on the dâuwe dalem lands cultivated by pengayahs — meant that this category of land tenure had been abolished. The pecatu holders had lost their privileged status. Like the pengayahs, they were now obliged to pay the land tax as well as perform corvée labour.

II. The wakap fields

Although the extension of the land tax to these fields did not mean that this category of land tenure was abolished — these fields remained distinguished from the other dâuwe dalem lands by the fact that they were held in common by groups of people united in institutions — it did mean a considerable material loss to the institutions concerned. The people belonging to these institutions were now required to pay the land tax, so that less revenue was available, and they were required to perform corvée labour.
III. The druwe jabe lands

Under the Raja these lands had been held by Balinese and Sasak aristocrats. The land tax and corvée labour came to benefit the Balinese or Sasak landlord. Liefrinck had restored the druwe jabe lands to the landlords and had stipulated that they pay half the land tax required on the druwe dalem lands. The doubling of the land tax and the introduction of corvée labour on this category of land holding had very harmful consequences for the peasants cultivating these lands (sepanangs). It gave rise to a situation in which the landlord continued to demand tax and corvée from his sepanangs, while the Government demanded land tax from the landlord and corvée labour from both landlord and sepanang. The Government’s demand for the land tax was harmful to the sepanang mainly because it gave the landlord additional incentive to extract as much tax and as many days of corvée from his sepanang as possible. And since the landlord was completely free to determine the conditions under which the peasant was allowed access to his land, the Government’s demand for land tax resulted in a tendency towards the increased exploitation of the sepanang. But this was not all. The Government’s demand for corvée was harmful to the sepanang. It meant that in addition to the unpaid services he had to perform for his landlord, he was now required to perform corvée for the Government. It is clear, therefore, that the Dutch demand for land tax and corvée resulted in a deterioration in the condition of the sepanang.

On 10 October 1906, Governor-General van Heutsz issued an ordinance dealing with the rights to the land.88 It is of some significance that this ordinance was issued last. The sequence indicates that instead of basing the land tax and corvée regulations on the existing rights to the land (as Liefrinck had tried to do to some extent), the land rights were based on the land tax and corvée regulations. That this was one of the objectives of the ordinance is indicated by the way in which the druwe dalem lands were defined. In the ordinance these lands were referred to as: ‘Lands owned by communities – the former pengayah lands – by irrigation societies and by other institutions of a public or religious nature.’89 Thus, only two distinctions were made: (1) ‘the former pengayah lands’, i.e. that part of the druwe dalem lands cultivated by pengayahs, and (2) ‘the lands of irrigation societies and other institutions’, i.e. that part of the druwe dalem lands known as the wakap fields. No mention was made of the third component part of the druwe dalem lands, the pecatu fields. The reason for this ‘oversight’ is obvious. The introduction of the land tax on the pecatu fields had made this category of land tenure indistinguishable from the pengayah lands. The pecatu fields had been abolished and the ordinance recognized and ‘legitimized’ this fact.90

But aside from seeking to bring the land rights in line with the land tax and corvée regulations, the ordinance also aimed at ‘finalizing’ Lombok’s agrarian settlement. An important stipulation in this respect was the one concerning the legal status of the pengayah lands. As was already noted in the
definition of the druwe dalem lands above, the ordinance referred to the pengayah lands as: ‘Lands owned by communities’ [gemeenschappelijk bezit]. That is, following the example of Java, the ordinance referred to the pengayah lands as lands owned by the village community. This was an entirely artificial legal construction because by demanding the payment of land tax, the performance of corvée and by forbidding alienation (see below), the Government had drawn the ownership of these lands towards itself. The pengayah lands had become Government domain. For this reason there simply were no ownership rights to be granted to the village community. Not surprisingly, this construction remained a ‘legal fiction’. In a survey on the legal position of the pengayah lands conducted in 1935, the following conclusion was reached:

The ordinance of 1906 considered the druwe dalem lands as owned by the desa. The owner was not the individual cultivator (pengayah) but the collective community. It is clear that this stipulation has remained a dead letter. The people have no knowledge of this stipulation. At the 16 conferences on which this survey is based, at which more than 4000 druwe dalem users have been heard, not one replied to the question ‘Who owns the druwe dalem land?’, with ‘the desa’; they all replied ‘the Government’.91

Another important aspect of the ordinance was the restriction on land alienation. Not only did the ordinance uphold the two measures taken by Liefrinck, but it added a third. Following Liefrinck, the ordinance stipulated that those cultivating the druwe dalem lands (now only the pengayahs and the wakap holders) were forbidden to alienate their share of the land. Similarly, the ordinance stipulated, as Liefrinck had, that in West Lombok the Balinese punggawas were forbidden to alienate their druwe jabe lands to any Sasak person. And finally, in order to give this measure — which had been taken by Liefrinck solely to protect the land holding of the Balinese aristocracy — at least the appearance of impartiality, the ordinance stipulated that in East Lombok the Sasak aristocrats were forbidden to alienate their druwe jabe lands to any Balinese person.

*  

As a result of the ordinances of 1904, 1905 and 1906, Dutch rule on Lombok assumed its basic character. For a period of about 30 years there was to be little structural change in the system. A significant reform was introduced when the Dutch dropped the prohibition on the alienation of the druwe dalem lands in 1935,92 and of the druwe jabe lands in 1937.93 But in all other respects the colonial system did not undergo any structural change. By exercising their domain right, based on the ‘right’ of conquest, the Dutch continued to demand the payment of land tax on all the cultivated land, and the performance
of corvée labour from all indigenous male inhabitants, until the Japanese invasion of 1942 ended their rule.

There can be no doubt that Dutch colonial rule was far more oppressive than rule by the Balinese Rajas. In fact, in comparison to the Dutch, the last Raja of Lombok, Ratu Agung2 Ngurah, appears as a kind of ‘benevolent dictator’. In their desire to maximize Government revenue, the Dutch not only took over the Raja’s pretensions to ownership of all the land, but carried these pretensions much further. Like the Raja, the Dutch exercised direct ownership over the druwe dalem lands. The Dutch, however, enforced their ownership much more rigidly than the Raja had ever dared to. While the Raja had demanded the payment of land tax on the pengayah lands, he had left the pecatu and wakap fields ‘free’ from this tax. As has been shown above, the Dutch were not as generous. They demanded the land tax, at ever-increasing rates (see pp.143-57), on all druwe dalem lands, on the pengayah, the pecatu and the wakap lands. The result was that the pecatu holders were reduced to the status of ordinary pengayahs and that Lombok’s institutions enjoyed considerably less revenue. Similarly, like the Raja, the Dutch exercised an indirect ownership over the druwe jabe lands. Here, too, the Dutch enforced their ownership much more rigidly. While the Raja had neither demanded land tax nor corvée labour — which had, rather, come to benefit the Balinese and Sasak aristocracies — the Dutch had not been able to resist the temptation to make these lands also subject to land tax and corvée. This measure had as a consequence that the peasants working these lands (sepagans) were forced into a position in which they had two satisfy two masters, the landlord and the Government. It is clear, therefore, that the establishment of Dutch rule was not an improvement for the vast majority of Lombok’s population. In fact, it was a giant step backwards. As will be shown in the next chapter, the outstanding feature of Dutch colonial rule was the island’s subjection to unprecedented economic exploitation, resulting in the impoverishment of a majority of the peasants, an increased concentration of landownership in the hands of Balinese and Sasak landlords, and a worsening of the food situation for Lombok society as a whole.
CHAPTER VI
THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT

In most analyses of colonialism there is agreement that both economic development and exploitation were features of colonial rule. There is less agreement, however, on how much weight should be given to each; that is, which of these two aspects must be regarded as the predominant. Insofar as Lombok is concerned, it is undeniable that the period 1900-40 brought a measure of development. Nevertheless, it would be inappropriate to select this aspect of colonialism as the most characteristic. In fact, such development as did take place did not in the least negate the exploitative character of the colonial relationship. In order to substantiate this claim it is necessary to examine briefly the three principal aspects of development in the colonial period, namely: (1) the increase in total agricultural production; (2) the construction of a network of roads; (3) the improvements in the standards of health and education.

I. The increase in agricultural production

Since the Dutch had tied the land tax (by far the most important of the numerous taxes) to the productivity of the land, it was also in their interest to increase agricultural production. In theory, three strategies could be followed to achieve this aim. The Dutch could either increase the productivity of the land already under cultivation, they could extend the area of land under cultivation, or ideally, they could do both. The first option involved raising the productivity of agricultural labour (by way of improved farming techniques); the second option involved the improvement and extension of the irrigation system; and the third involved a combination of these two strategies. Throughout the colonial period the Dutch endeavoured to increase production by attempting to increase labour productivity as well as by extending the irrigation system. Their efforts, however, were only partially successful. Towards the end of the colonial period the Assistant Resident of Lombok, Bosselaar, summed up the results of the development strategy:

The Agricultural Information Service has for years been busy demonstrating chemical fertilizers and better cultivation methods. From a theoretical point of view these demonstrations may be regarded as successful, but practically they do not amount to much. The tani is not favourably disposed towards fertilizers. The price relation between padi and fertilizer is such that the increased product resulting from fertilizer is only barely sufficient to pay for the costs of fertilizers. And further, we should not forget that on sawahs which are not fully irrigated even the crops to which fertilizers have been applied can fail. Also, better methods of cultivation — the
iron plough — although resulting in increased production, have not been adopted by the population. Since nothing is to be expected either from fertilizer or from better cultivation methods, it remains necessary to place the emphasis on providing better irrigation.2

This is precisely what the Dutch did. In view of the failure to raise the productivity of labour, the Dutch effort to increase agricultural production came to rely exclusively on extending the irrigation system. Unlike improved farming techniques, improved irrigation was welcomed by the peasants of Lombok. In 1939 the Assistant Resident, Horst, noted: 'The population often takes the initiative in improving irrigation. They are very pleased with the assistance we give them so that we can always count on their full co-operation and on contributions in the form of labour and materials.'3

The irrigation projects which the Dutch undertook consisted of two distinct types: the small-scale and the large-scale. In the course of the colonial period the Dutch carried out hundreds of small-scale projects. These consisted mainly of 'making permanent' existing dams, of constructing small canals and so on. These projects were carried out entirely under the auspices of the local government in Mataram. They were constructed at local initiative and did not require any funding from the Central Government in Batavia. These projects were constructed by means of the unpaid subak or desa labour of Lombok's peasants, and insofar as it was necessary to purchase certain materials, the costs were covered by the local fund (Afdelingskas).

The Dutch further constructed a number of large-scale projects which did involve the Central Government. Although these projects were also constructed by means of unpaid subak or desa labour, it was necessary for Batavia to make some funds available to cover the costs of some materials, to pay the salaries of the surveyors and engineers, etc. The first of these projects, the Swangi Dam in East Lombok which irrigated 770 ha., was completed in 1919. In the period 1920-34 another seven large irrigation works were constructed, namely:

1. The Lendang Ketiri Dam 987 ha. Central Lombok
2. The Sakra Dam 1302 ha. East Lombok
3. The Gebong Dam 4446 ha. Central Lombok
4. The Keru Dam 869 ha. West Lombok
5. The Prawira Dam 210 ha. West Lombok
6. The Medas Dam 175 ha. West Lombok
7. The Rugah Dam 95 ha. East Lombok

And in the closing years of the colonial era the largest project of all, the Jurung Sate Dam — which involved changes to the Gebong Dam — irrigating 10 970 ha., was constructed in Central Lombok.4 The completion of this project in 1941 virtually ended the possibility of further extending the irrigation system on Lombok.5
How successful was the Dutch irrigation effort in increasing agricultural production? To judge by the phenomenal growth in the irrigated sawah area, it would appear that the Dutch were very successful indeed. The extent of this increase is indicated by the following table:

**Table VIII: Area Brought under Irrigation, 1900-40**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Irr. Sawah</th>
<th>Rain Sawah</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>±550 000</td>
<td>25 920 ha.</td>
<td>46 080 ha.</td>
<td>72 000 ha.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>618 000</td>
<td>42 846 ha.</td>
<td>37 588 ha.</td>
<td>80 434 ha.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>701 000</td>
<td>54 229 ha.</td>
<td>37 288 ha.</td>
<td>91 517 ha.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>±790 000</td>
<td>67 785 ha.</td>
<td>29 185 ha.</td>
<td>96 970 ha.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows that over the period 1900-40 the irrigated sawah area increased by 161.5%, the rain sawah area — due to progressive conversion into irrigated sawahs — declined by 36.5%, whilst the total sawah area grew by 34.7%.

This significant growth in the total sawah area (and in the proportion taken up by the more productive irrigated sawahs) did result in increased agricultural production. But for Lombok's most important crop, padi, this increase was not as great as might have been expected.

**Table IX: Average Yearly Rice Production, 1900-40**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Approximate Sawah area</th>
<th>Average yearly rice production in piculs of dry padi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900-04</td>
<td>72 000 ha.</td>
<td>2 980 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916-20</td>
<td>80 434 ha.</td>
<td>3 225 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936-40</td>
<td>96 970 ha.</td>
<td>3 565 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table indicates that the increase in rice production was not proportional to the growth in the total sawah area. While the sawah area expanded by 34.7% over the period 1900-40, rice production rose only by 19.6%. This discrepancy was not very much in evidence during the first 20-year period. From 1900 to 1920 the total sawah area grew by 11.7%, while rice production increase by 8.2%. But in the second 20-year period the discrepancy was far more pronounced. From 1920 to 1940 the total sawah area grew by 20.5%, while rice production rose only by 10.5%.
This phenomenon was the manifestation of what is popularly called ‘the law of diminishing returns’. That this ‘law’ could operate was first and foremost the result of the fact that, as was pointed out above, the expansion of the sawah area was not accompanied by improvements in the productivity of agricultural labour. Secondly, it was due to the circumstance that, for obvious reasons, the best possibilities for irrigation had already been utilized before the arrival of the Dutch. This meant that attempts to expand the irrigation system, while encountering increasingly difficult technical problems, would progressively pay lower dividends in terms of increased productivity. And finally, it was the result of an insurmountable ecological problem, namely, the absolute shortage of water. Of the 96 970 ha. which constituted the total sawah area in 1940, only 42 785 ha. (44.1%) could be permanently irrigated. Some 25 000 ha. (25.8%) had to make do with occasional irrigation (the so-called sawah *air paling*), while 29 185 ha. (30.1%) could not be irrigated at all. Thus, in spite of the concerted Dutch irrigation drive, the majority of sawah remained either wholly or partially dependent on the whims of nature.

II. The construction of a network of roads

Since from a political as well as an economic point of view it was in the interest of the Dutch to establish a good communications system, they gave the construction of a network of roads high priority. By 1911 a total of 525 km. of roads, numerous bridges and 114 km. of tracks had been completed, while in the remainder of the colonial period various improvements were made. As this system of communications was constructed, improved and maintained by means of the unpaid corvée labour of Lombok’s peasants, no significant capital investments on the part of the Netherlands Indies Government was required. In fact, the unpaid labour expended on the construction and maintenance of the roads, bridges and so on represented a significant saving to the Netherlands Indies Government. In order to estimate the magnitude of this saving it is necessary to ask: what capital expenditure would have been required if the communications system had been constructed and maintained not by means of corvée labour, but by paid coolie labour? In order to make this estimate it is necessary to know the average number of corvée labourers, the average number of days each of them worked, and the average local market price of a day’s labour by a paid coolie. These data are listed in the table below.

**Table X: Corvée performed in Lombok, 1900-40**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Population at beginning of period</th>
<th>Average No. of corvée labourers</th>
<th>Average No. of workdays per year</th>
<th>Price per day of coolie labour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900-20</td>
<td>±550 000</td>
<td>85 780</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>fl. 0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-30</td>
<td>618 000</td>
<td>107 580</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>fl. 0.315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-40</td>
<td>701 000</td>
<td>120 540</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>fl. 0.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Three observations should be made about this table. In the first place, the table shows that the average number of registered corvée labourers was well below the number it should have been theoretically. On Lombok, all adult males (over 16 years of age) belonging to the indigenous population were required to perform corvée labour: the peasants, the menial tasks such as working on the roads; and the Balinese and Sasak aristocracies, the non-menial tasks such as delivering letters, performing guard-duty and so on. As the entire adult male population must have constituted about one-fifth of the total population, the average number of corvée labourers should have been about 110,000 in the period from 1900-20, about 123,600 in the period 1920-30, and about 140,000 in the period 1930-40. These figures indicate an under-registration rate of 22% in the period 1900-20, of 16.2% in the period 1920-30, and of 14% in the period 1930-40. The fact that the under-registration rate (which, of course, was nothing but an expression of collective resentment against the performance of corvée) declined as the colonial period progressed, is indicative of the increasing efficiency of the Dutch administration.

Secondly, it should be pointed out that the figures for the number of days each corvée labourer worked per year are averages based on such evidence as is available. Cases were reported of peasants labouring as many as 39 and even 46 days per year, thereby greatly exceeding the official maximum of 30 days. It should further be noted that the average number of days worked per year declined as the colonial period progressed. This was due to a combination of two factors, namely: (1) The roads and bridges were constructed in the period 1895-1911, whereas they were only improved and maintained in the remainder of the colonial period. Therefore, the amount of work to be done decreased. (2) The number of corvée labourers increased with the steady growth in population and with rising Dutch efficiency. For this reason, more and more workers became available.

And thirdly, the prices of coolie labour are the average prices on Lombok. About these prices it should be noted that they appear to have declined as the colonial period progressed. Whereas in 1912 a coolie was able to sell a day’s labour for an average of 33 cents (against 25 cents on Java at this time), in the mid-thirties the rice mills on Lombok paid their coolies between 20 and 40 cents per day, only 30 cents on average.

From the figures listed in Table III, it is apparent that the Netherlands Indies Government extracted 33,454,200 labour days over the period 1900-20, 16,674,900 labour days in 1920-30, and 7,237,220 labour days in 1930-40. Against the average market value of a day’s labour of 33 cents in 1900-20, of 31.5 cents in 1920-30, and of 30 cents in 1930-40, the total number of labour days represents a value of about f.21,464,000. It was roughly this amount of capital which the Netherlands Indies Government saved by having Lombok’s communications system constructed, improved and maintained by means of the unpaid corvée labour of Lombok’s peasants.
III. The improvements in the standards of health and education

Another area in which no significant investment on the part of the Central Government in Batavia was required was that of improvements to health and education programmes. The construction and running of the hospital, clinics and schools was financed by the local fund (Afdelingskas). In the area of preventive medicine, the principal Dutch achievement was the elimination of smallpox. This, however, was not accomplished until 1912 when, after an epidemic which killed several thousands of people, renewed mass vaccination finally brought this disease under control.\(^\text{18}\) The Dutch were less successful in the prevention of other diseases. An influenza epidemic in 1918 killed no less than 36,042 people (about 5.9% of the total population);\(^\text{19}\) in spite of the draining of some swamp areas near Ampenan and Labuan Haji, malaria was not eradicated;\(^\text{20}\) and, mainly because no improvements were made in sanitary conditions, dysentery and cholera epidemics continued to occur frequently.\(^\text{21}\) In the area of therapeutic medicine, too, the Dutch accomplished little. Apart from the leper colony (established in 1925),\(^\text{22}\) there was until 1928 only one small hospital (Mataram) and one qualified doctor for the entire island.\(^\text{23}\) In 1928 a clinic was opened in Selong (East Lombok) and another doctor was stationed on the island.\(^\text{24}\) In 1931 a second clinic was established in Praya (Central Lombok) and another doctor appointed,\(^\text{25}\) so that when the colonial era drew to its close there were three doctors, one small hospital and two clinics to cater for the medical needs of a population of about 790,000 people.

With regard to education, also, the Dutch record was far from impressive. In the entire colonial period not a single educational institution above the primary level was established on Lombok. Among the primary schools three different types could be distinguished, namely: (a) the Hollandsch-Indische School, attended by the children of European, Balinese and Sasak officials, large landlords and so on. This school offered a seven-year course of study with Dutch as the medium of instruction; (b) the Gouvernement Inlandsche School, attended by the children of village heads, minor officials, landlords, etc., offering a five-year course with Malay (Indonesian) as the language of instruction; (c) the Volkscholen (desa schools), attended by the children of peasants, offering a three-year course with the local language (Balinese or Sasak) as the medium of instruction. Of these three types of school only the H.I.S. provided education of a good quality, the G.I.S. ensured literacy in Malay, while the Volkscholen produced only semi-literates in the local languages. The first (and only) H.I.S. was established in 1923,\(^\text{23}\) the first G.I.S. in 1902,\(^\text{27}\) and the first Volkscholen about 1910.\(^\text{28}\) The following table illustrates the growth and the limitation of primary education on Lombok in the colonial period.

From the figures in Table XI it is clear that while the number of schools and pupils rose steadily, the Dutch were far from realizing universal primary education when the colonial period drew to its close. It should not be overlooked that in a rural Asian society such as Lombok, the school-aged children
Table XI: Growth and Limitation of Primary Education, 1900-40

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>H.I.S.</th>
<th>No. of Pupils</th>
<th>G.I.S.</th>
<th>No. of Pupils</th>
<th>Desa Schools</th>
<th>No. of Pupils</th>
<th>Total No. of Pupils</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1057</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1092</td>
<td>2149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1609</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>3142</td>
<td>4948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>7389</td>
<td>9535</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(between six and 12 years of age) constitute at least 17% of the total population.\(^3\) This means that in 1920 only 2%, in 1930 only 4.1%, and in 1940 not more than 7.1% of the school-aged children received some form of primary education.

The very limited development that took place on Lombok occurred with a minimum of expense to the Central Government in Batavia. The small-scale irrigation projects, the materials needed for the construction and maintenance of roads and bridges, as well as the cost of the health and education programmes were all financed by the local fund (Afdelingkas). What were the main sources of income for this fund? When Lombok was brought under Dutch rule, three local funds were established, one for each of the three Onderafdelingen into which the island was administratively divided. Originally, the principal sources of income for these three funds were only twofold, namely: (a) the market tax, a tax on sales taking place in all Lombok’s markets; and (b) ‘voluntary’ peasant contributions, i.e., the payment by peasants of one cekel (6.17 kg) of dry padi per tenah \((7200\text{m}^2)\) of sawah for the costs of the health programme, and later (around 1910) the payment by peasants of another cekel of dry padi per tenah of sawah for the education programme (the so-called padi sekolah).\(^3\) But since the income these three funds derived from the market tax and the ‘voluntary’ peasant contribution always exceeded total expenditure, the funds gradually began to accumulate capital. When in 1929 the three funds were merged into a single fund for all Lombok (Afdelingkas), a capital of about f.1 000 000 had been accumulated.\(^3\) And since this capital had been invested in various properties, such as toko, houses, buildings and an abattoir, rent on capital came to constitute the third main source of income for the local fund. The following table indicates the amounts of revenue the fund received from each of the three main sources, as well as the total amount of revenue spent on all forms of development in each year of the last complete decade of Dutch rule:
Table XII: Total Revenue Received, 1930-40

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Market tax</th>
<th>Peasant contributions</th>
<th>Rent on Capital</th>
<th>Total Income</th>
<th>Total Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>101 610</td>
<td>13 694</td>
<td>82 004</td>
<td>197 308</td>
<td>168 211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>88 515</td>
<td>19 872</td>
<td>73 231</td>
<td>181 618</td>
<td>137 128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>74 347</td>
<td>14 208</td>
<td>82 879</td>
<td>171 434</td>
<td>121 784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>62 563</td>
<td>12 900</td>
<td>90 533</td>
<td>165 996</td>
<td>120 405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>60 233</td>
<td>17 027</td>
<td>94 905</td>
<td>172 165</td>
<td>117 548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>57 818</td>
<td>17 482</td>
<td>105 444</td>
<td>180 744</td>
<td>148 071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>62 542</td>
<td>16 047</td>
<td>99 575</td>
<td>178 164</td>
<td>131 105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>68 187</td>
<td>14 990</td>
<td>100 633</td>
<td>183 810</td>
<td>148 673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>71 867</td>
<td>14 925</td>
<td>102 660</td>
<td>189 452</td>
<td>156 789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>75 923</td>
<td>15 532</td>
<td>104 253</td>
<td>195 708</td>
<td>163 252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>81 403</td>
<td>16 821</td>
<td>104 856</td>
<td>203 080</td>
<td>171 383</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Four observations should be made about this table. In the first place, the income derived from the market tax declined steadily from 1930 to 1935 (by about 43.1%), to gradually rise again from 1935 onwards. This decline in market tax revenue reflects the diminishing volume of trading transactions in Lombok’s markets as a consequence of the world economic depression. Secondly, the income derived from the ‘voluntary’ peasant contributions to cover the cost of the health and education programmes do not show any particular pattern. This was due to the fact that these contributions were not voluntary at all, so that the amount of revenue derived from this source depended entirely on the degree of determination with which the Dutch set out to collect them. Thirdly, the income derived from rent on capital increased consistently over the period 1930-40. This was due to the fact that the fund accumulated more capital each year, which led to more investments and therefore increased rent. And fourthly, and most importantly, each year the fund’s total income greatly exceeded total expenditure. In fact, over the entire 11 year period from 1930 to 1941 this excess was no less than f.435 130. This meant that the income derived from the market tax, the peasant contributions and the rent on capital more than adequately covered the expenditures which the local fund made on all forms of development.

As was indicated above, the only expenditure the Central Government made on development on Lombok was that necessitated by the large-scale irrigation projects. The total construction costs of each of the nine projects carried out in the colonial period were as follows:
Table XIII: Construction Costs of Large-scale Irrigation Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Year Completed</th>
<th>Total Construction Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Swangi Dam</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>fl. 104 549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Lendang Ketiri Dam</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>fl. 304 954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sakra Dam</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>fl. 18 859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gebong Dam</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>fl. 86 259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Keru Dam</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>fl. 38 888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Prawira Dam</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>fl. 44 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Medas Dam</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>fl. 6 791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Rugah Dam</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>fl. 5 313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Jurung Sate Project</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>fl. 419 425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>fl. 1 029 238</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to demonstrate that this 'development effort' cannot in any way be regarded as fundamentally characteristic of Dutch rule, it is sufficient to compare this expenditure to the total amount of revenue the Government derived from only one of its numerous sources of income, namely, the import and export duties.

It is impossible to quantify precisely the amount of revenue the Netherlands Indies Government collected in Lombok from import and export duties. The main problem is that exact figures are only available for the years 1900-03. This is because in 1904 the customs offices in Ampenan and Labuan Haji were closed, and the Lombok duties were brought under a central administration in Batavia. An additional problem is that the level of the duties was not constant throughout the colonial period. Like most other taxes, the import and export duties increased sharply as the colonial period progressed. That is, the ad valorem percentage (the percentage of the exchange value of imports and exports which was collected in duties) was frequently raised. The most important increases came as a result of ordinances issued in 1910, 1921, 1931, 1932 and 1934. In view of these difficulties it is only possible to make a reasoned estimate which, however, can only claim to be a rough approximation.

A. Period 1900-10

Throughout this period the ordinance issued on 31 August 1895 (Stbld 188) — which pertained only to Lombok — was in effect. Concerning import duties, the ordinance stipulated that commodities coming into Lombok from outside the Netherlands Indies — principally from Singapore, on which the Lombok trade
had traditionally been centred — were to be subjected to an *ad valorem* percentage of 4%. Concerning export duties, rice, copra, cattle, horses, pigs, hides, tobacco, cotton, wood, coffee, coconuts, coconut-oil, *kacang*, *kemiri*, *mengkuudu*, onions and wax — when shipped to destinations outside the Netherlands Indies — were to be subjected to an *ad valorem* percentage of 5%. The value of the commodities listed in the ordinance, based on a random sample of years in the colonial period, constituted 93.2% of the total value of Lombok exports.

As was pointed out above, the only years in the colonial period for which reliable figures are available on the amount of revenue collected in import and export duties are the years 1900, 1901, 1902 and 1903. During these four years the total value of imports into Lombok was f.1 950 000, f.1 982 000, f.2 014 000 and f.2 046 000 respectively, while f.68 000, f.64 000, f.74 000 and f.70 900 was collected in import duties. Considering that over these years an import duty of 4% was levied, these figures indicate that from 1900 to 1903 an average of 86.6% of the total value of imports into Lombok concerned commodities which came from outside the Netherlands Indies and which therefore were subject to import duties. During the years 1900-03 the total value of exports from Lombok was f.2 850 000, f.2 904 000, f.2 959 000, and f.3 013 000 respectively, while f.27 000, f.29 500, f.31 300 and f.30 500 was collected in export duties. Bearing in mind that under the terms of the 1895 ordinance about 93.2% of the total value of exports was taxable, and that an export duty of 5% was levied, these figures indicate that from 1900 to 1903 an average of 21.5% of the taxable value of exports pertained to commodities which were shipped to destinations outside the Netherlands Indies and which therefore were subject to export duties. With the assistance of these average percentages, it is possible to make an estimate. Assuming that over the whole period from 1900 to 1910 approximately 86.6% of the total value of imports was subject to duty, and that approximately 21.5% of the taxable value of exports (93.2% of the total value of exports) was subject to duty, the Netherlands Indies Government collected the amounts shown in Table XIV on page 139.

**B. Period 1910-20**

The ordinance of 1910 (*Stbld* 79), which was applicable to the entire Netherlands Indies, increased the level of import and export duties. The *ad valorem* percentage on imports was placed at 12% for luxury items and between 6% and 10% for other commodities. Since the average *ad valorem* percentage may be placed at 8% (a low estimate), this meant that the import duties had been doubled. The *ad valorem* percentage on exports was fixed at 10%, but the ordinance stipulated that only petrol, petrol products, hides, tobacco and birds’ nests were to be subject to duty. Since the value of these commodities constituted only about 13.4% of the total value of Lombok exports, only this percentage was taxable under the terms of the ordinance.
### Table XIV: Revenue from Import/Export Duty, 1900-10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Value Imports</th>
<th>Total Value Exports</th>
<th>% Imp. Duty</th>
<th>% Exp. Duty</th>
<th>Import Duty</th>
<th>Export Duty</th>
<th>Total Imp. &amp; Exp. Duty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>1 950 000</td>
<td>2 850 000</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>68 000</td>
<td>27 000</td>
<td>95 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>1 982 000</td>
<td>2 904 000</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>64 000</td>
<td>29 500</td>
<td>93 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>2 014 000</td>
<td>2 959 000</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>74 000</td>
<td>31 300</td>
<td>105 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>2 046 000</td>
<td>3 013 000</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>70 900</td>
<td>30 500</td>
<td>101 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>2 078 000</td>
<td>3 068 000</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>72 000</td>
<td>30 800</td>
<td>102 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>2 110 000</td>
<td>3 122 000</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>73 100</td>
<td>31 400</td>
<td>104 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>2 142 000</td>
<td>3 177 000</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>74 200</td>
<td>31 900</td>
<td>106 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>2 174 000</td>
<td>3 231 000</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>75 300</td>
<td>32 500</td>
<td>107 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>2 206 000</td>
<td>3 286 000</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>76 400</td>
<td>33 000</td>
<td>109 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>2 238 000</td>
<td>3 341 000</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>77 500</td>
<td>33 500</td>
<td>111 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>2 282 000</td>
<td>3 738 000</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>103 300</td>
<td>37 500</td>
<td>140 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1 177 600</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table XV: Estimated Revenue from Import/Export Duty, 1911-20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Value Imports</th>
<th>Total Value Exports</th>
<th>% Imp. Duty</th>
<th>% Exp. Duty</th>
<th>Import Duty</th>
<th>Export Duty</th>
<th>Total Imp. &amp; Exp. Duty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>2 679 000</td>
<td>4 634 000</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>186 200</td>
<td>13 300</td>
<td>199 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>3 186 000</td>
<td>4 728 000</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>220 700</td>
<td>13 600</td>
<td>234 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>2 839 000</td>
<td>4 392 000</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>196 700</td>
<td>12 700</td>
<td>210 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>3 085 000</td>
<td>4 734 000</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>213 700</td>
<td>13 600</td>
<td>227 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>3 331 000</td>
<td>5 076 000</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>230 800</td>
<td>14 600</td>
<td>245 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>3 578 000</td>
<td>5 417 000</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>247 900</td>
<td>15 600</td>
<td>263 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>3 824 000</td>
<td>5 759 000</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>264 900</td>
<td>16 600</td>
<td>281 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>4 070 000</td>
<td>6 101 000</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>282 000</td>
<td>17 600</td>
<td>299 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>4 317 000</td>
<td>6 442 000</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>299 100</td>
<td>18 600</td>
<td>317 700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>5 400 000</td>
<td>7 054 000</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>374 100</td>
<td>20 200</td>
<td>394 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2 673 500</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Assuming that there was no significant change in the pattern of imports and exports, it is possible to make an estimate. If over the decade from 1910 to 1920 again approximately 86.6% of the total value of imports originated outside the Netherlands Indies, and if again 21.5% of the taxable value of exports (13.4% of the total value of exports) was shipped to destinations outside the Netherlands Indies, the Central Government collected the amounts shown in Table XV on page 139.

C. Period 1920-30

Even though, due to the steady increase in the volume of trade, the revenues derived from the import and export duties were continually rising, the Dutch were not satisfied. By an ordinance issued in 1921 (Stbld 890), applicable to the entire Netherlands Indies, the duties were again increased. The *ad valorem* percentage on imports was fixed at 12% for luxury items, and between 8% and 12% for other commodities. Since the average *ad valorem* percentage may be placed at 10% (again, a low estimate), the ordinance meant that the import duties had been increased by 2%. The ordinance further stipulated that aside from petrol, petrol products, hides, tobacco and birds' nests, also copra, pepper and coconut-oil were to be subject to an *ad valorem* percentage of 10%. By extending the export duties to copra, pepper and coconut-oil, the ordinance raised the taxable percentage of Lombok's exports to about 30.6%. Again, assuming that over the period from 1920 to 1930 approximately 86.6% of the total value of imports was subjected to duty, and that approximately 21.5% of the taxable value of exports (30.6% of the total value of exports) was likewise subject to duty, the Netherlands Indies Government collected the following amounts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Value Imports</th>
<th>Total Value Exports</th>
<th>% Imp. Duty</th>
<th>% Exp. Duty</th>
<th>Import Duty</th>
<th>Export Duty</th>
<th>Total Imp. &amp; Exp. Duty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>5 600 000</td>
<td>7 925 000</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>485 000</td>
<td>52 100</td>
<td>537 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>6 116 000</td>
<td>8 446 000</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>529 600</td>
<td>55 600</td>
<td>585 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>4 889 000</td>
<td>9 092 000</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>423 400</td>
<td>59 900</td>
<td>483 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>5 627 000</td>
<td>8 359 000</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>487 300</td>
<td>55 000</td>
<td>542 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>6 257 000</td>
<td>8 422 000</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>541 900</td>
<td>55 400</td>
<td>597 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>5 988 000</td>
<td>6 625 000</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>518 600</td>
<td>43 600</td>
<td>562 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>6 521 000</td>
<td>7 445 000</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>564 700</td>
<td>49 000</td>
<td>613 700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>6 935 000</td>
<td>8 523 000</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>600 600</td>
<td>56 000</td>
<td>656 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>6 243 000</td>
<td>8 278 000</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>540 600</td>
<td>54 500</td>
<td>695 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>6 735 000</td>
<td>8 746 000</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>583 300</td>
<td>57 500</td>
<td>640 800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 913 600
D. Period 1930-40

In 1931 the world economic crisis hit the Netherlands Indies. Faced with a drastic drop in the value (not necessarily the volume) of trade, and consequently a sharp decrease in revenues derived from import and export duties, the Dutch responded by increasing the level of import duties. The increase occurred in three stages. First, the ordinance of 1931 (Stbld 535) stipulated that a surcharge of 20% be levied on import duties. This brought the average ad valorem percentage to 12%. Second, the ordinance of 1932 (Stbld 321) increased the surcharge to 50%. This brought the average ad valorem percentage to 15%. And thirdly, the ordinance of 1934 (Stbld 1) increased the surcharge to 100%, which brought the average ad valorem percentage to no less than 20%. Throughout the depression, no doubt fearing that their products would remain unsold, the Dutch did not increase the export duties.

Once more assuming that over the period from 1930 to 1940 approximately 86.6% of the total value of imports originated from outside the Netherlands Indies, and that approximately 21.5% of the taxable value of exports (30.6% of the total value of exports) was shipped to destinations outside the Netherlands Indies, the Government collected the following amounts:

Table XVII: Estimated Revenue from Import/Export Duty, 1931-40

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Value Imports</th>
<th>Total Value Exports</th>
<th>% Imp. Duty</th>
<th>% Exp. Duty</th>
<th>Import Duty</th>
<th>Export Duty</th>
<th>Total Imp. &amp; Exp. Duty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>3 500 000</td>
<td>4 500 000</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>363 700</td>
<td>29 600</td>
<td>393 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>1 993 000</td>
<td>3 134 000</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>258 900</td>
<td>20 600</td>
<td>279 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>1 471 000</td>
<td>2 560 000</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>191 100</td>
<td>16 800</td>
<td>207 900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>1 573 000</td>
<td>2 854 000</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>272 400</td>
<td>18 800</td>
<td>291 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>1 615 000</td>
<td>2 493 000</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>279 700</td>
<td>16 400</td>
<td>296 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>1 744 000</td>
<td>2 693 000</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>302 100</td>
<td>17 700</td>
<td>319 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>1 901 000</td>
<td>2 935 000</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>329 300</td>
<td>19 300</td>
<td>348 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>2 004 000</td>
<td>3 093 000</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>347 100</td>
<td>20 300</td>
<td>367 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>2 252 000</td>
<td>3 253 000</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>390 000</td>
<td>21 400</td>
<td>411 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>2 578 000</td>
<td>3 572 000</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>446 500</td>
<td>23 500</td>
<td>470 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 385 200
It should be pointed out that the four estimates presented above are more likely to be too low than too high. In the first place, the excise duties on such commodities as opium and opium products, matches, tobacco products, petrol and petrol products, have not been taken into account. Secondly, in view of the fact that Lombok rice found a market in Europe around 1910, the percentage of taxable exports shipped to destinations outside the Netherlands Indies was probably higher than 21.5% from 1910 to 1940. But although the estimates may be too low, they nonetheless serve to illustrate that the very limited development which took place cannot be considered the most fundamental characteristic of Dutch colonial rule. The estimates indicate that over the entire period 1900-40, the Central Government collected about f.13 150 000 in import and export duties. The Netherlands Indies Government’s only significant expenditure on development — the financing of a number of irrigation projects at a total cost of f.1 029 200 — pales into insignificance in comparison with the amount of revenue the Government derived from this source alone.

If the market tax, the ‘voluntary’ peasant contributions and the rent on capital (which benefited Lombok’s local fund), and the import and export duties (which benefited the Central Government) had been the only taxes collected by the Dutch, it would have been possible to say that Dutch exploitation of the island was of moderate dimensions. As was pointed out above, the local fund (Afdelingkas) covered much of the cost of such development as took place. These funds were more than adequate to finance the small-scale irrigation projects, the materials needed for the construction and maintenance of roads and bridges, as well as the health and education programmes. And further, the substantial revenues derived from the import and export duties were not only more than sufficient to finance the large-scale irrigation projects, but were also sufficient to cover total Government expenditure on the island’s political administration. The administration costs, that is, the salaries of a small number of colonial officials stationed on the island, the salaries of the small office staff of Lombok’s Assistant Resident and three Controleurs, and the cost of maintaining a small police force, were estimated in 1934 at about f.200 000 per year. Assuming this figure to have been constant over the 40 year period from 1900 to 1940, total Government expenditure on Lombok’s political administration would have been about f.8 000 000. Thus, if these taxes had been the only ones, the Dutch would still have derived a profit of about f.4 000 000 from their political control over the island. However, the taxes discussed above constituted only a fraction of the total amount of revenue the Netherlands Indies Government collected. As will be shown in some detail below, the Government derived such enormous sums from Lombok that Dutch exploitation of the island must be regarded as having been of staggering proportions.
The Land Tax, its Magnitude and Burden on the Population

The land tax (pajeg and upeti) was by far the most important of the many taxes levied by the Netherlands Indies Government. In the first place, the Dutch collected more revenue from this tax than from all others combined. As the colonial period progressed, ever larger amounts flowed into Dutch coffers. In 1900 the Government collected about f.150 000, in 1914 about f.400 000, and by 1930 about f.880 000 per year. Furthermore, the land tax — more than any other — was a burden on Lombok’s population. This burden became heavier as the colonial period progressed. In 1940 the peasant paid a far larger part of his agricultural product in land tax than he had done in 1900. In view of the fact that the level of the land tax was increased in the early twenties and again in 1930, it is necessary to analyse the magnitude and burden on the population in three stages, namely: the periods 1900-20, 1920-30 and 1930-40.

A. Period 1900-20

Throughout this period the level of the land tax was not increased. The tax on irrigated and rain sawahs (pajeg) and on gardens and tegal fields (upeti) was collected at the rates set by Resident Liefrinck in 1899. Calculated in hectares, these rates were as follows:

| Table XVIII: Tax Rates for pajeg and upeti Taxes, 1899 |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                               | Pajeg            | Upeti           |
|                               | Class of rice-   | Class of tegal  | Class of gardens |
|                               |     fields       |     fields      |     gardens     |
| Class of rice-     | Piculs of dry padi | Kepengs | Kepengs |
| fields per ha.     |                 |                 |                 |
| I                  | 11.1             | I               | I               |
| II                 | 10.0             | II              | II              |
| III                | 8.9              | III             | III             |
| IV                 | 7.8              | —               | —               |
| V                  | 6.7              | —               | —               |

But even though the level of land tax was not increased, the amounts of revenue collected by the Netherlands Indies Government rose dramatically. The pajeg (collected in kind) and the upeti (collected in kepengs) provided the Government with the following amounts of revenue (Table XIX p. 144).

The great increase in land tax revenue occurred over the period 1900-14, from about f.150 000 to about f.400 000 (some 265%), to stabilize around the latter figure from 1914 onwards. What were the reasons for this phenomenal increase in revenue?
The most obvious reason was the extension in 1904 of the land tax to all categories of land tenure. It should be recalled that in 1899 Resident Liefvrink had demanded the full payment of land tax only on the pengayah lands. He had left the other two component parts of the druwe dalem lands, the pecatu and wakap fields, ‘free’ from this tax, while demanding only half payment on the druwe jabe lands (see pp.121-4). However, in 1904 the Government decided to collect the full land tax on the pengayah lands and half the tax on the pecatu, wakap and druwe jabe lands. The Government further decided that from 1905 onwards the tax on the pecatu, wakap and druwe jabe lands was to be raised by one-fifth each year until by 1909 the tax on these fields had reached the same level as that on the pengayah lands (see pp.124-7). These decisions meant that by 1909 the level of land tax (see Table XVIII) had become uniform on all categories of land tenure on Lombok.

Since the extension of the land tax occurred over the years 1904-09, it cannot explain why land tax revenues were already increasing before the 1904 ordinance and continued to rise after the ordinance had been fully implemented. A second factor was at work — the growing efficiency of the Dutch administration. Shortly after Lombok had been conquered, the Dutch began collecting more reliable information about the land. In 1896 surveying teams measured the land on the basis of subaks and villages. This project was completed in 1899 in West Lombok, in 1901 in Central Lombok, and in 1903 in East Lombok. Although the first land measurement effort was still rather inexact, the information that became available nevertheless was a considerable improvement on the often inaccurate records of the sedahan-agung. In 1909 the Dutch again
sent surveying teams to the island. This time the land was measured on a topographical basis. Maps were drawn, the size of each field was measured, ownership or otherwise was registered, trial harvests were held to estimate productivity and so on. By 1914 this second land measurement had been completed for the whole of Lombok. From this time onwards the Dutch administration was in possession of such accurate information that there was little or no chance for any peasant to escape paying the land tax.

In order to ascertain the severity of the land tax on Lombok’s population in the period 1900-20, it is necessary to establish the average percentage of the total agricultural product the peasant had to pay in land tax. This percentage can be calculated for the pajeg (the tax on sawahs) which constituted some 80-85% of total land tax revenues. Since the pajeg was collected in kind in the period 1900-20, this calculation does not present very great difficulties. Aside from having to know the level at which the pajeg was collected (see Table XVIII), it is only necessary to determine the actual productivity of Lombok’s rice fields. What was this productivity? In 1930 — after trial harvests had been held for a number of years — the Dutch estimated the productivity of Lombok’s sawahs at:

Table XX: Dutch Estimates of Productivity of Sawah Land, 1930

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class of rice-fields</th>
<th>Productivity of the rice crop in piculs of dry padi, Per ha.</th>
<th>Total number of ha. in 1930</th>
<th>Total rice production in piculs of dry padi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>4,671</td>
<td>350,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>9,580</td>
<td>615,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>12,917</td>
<td>661,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>21,409</td>
<td>909,882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>42,940</td>
<td>1,442,784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>91,517</td>
<td>3,980,335</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This ‘scientific’ estimate was far too high. According to this estimate, Lombok’s rice harvest around 1930 should have been 3,980,335 piculs of dry padi. This quantity, however, was never reached. The Assistant Resident Bosselaar commented in 1934: ‘The official land tax figures indicate that the harvest should be about 4 million picul of padi in a normal year. But, in 1930 the harvest was only 3.40, in 1931 — 3.60, in 1932 — 3.30, in 1933 — 3.45 and in 1934 — 3.25 million piculs.’ In view of the fact that the rice harvest around 1930 was on average only 3.40 and not 4 million piculs of
padi, it is clear that the official Dutch productivity estimate was about 15% too high. The actual productivity of Lombok’s rice fields can therefore be estimated as:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class of rice-fields</th>
<th>Productivity of the rice crop in piculs of dry padi. Per ha.</th>
<th>Total number of ha. in 1930</th>
<th>Total rice production in piculs of dry padi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>4,671</td>
<td>297,543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>9,580</td>
<td>524,026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>12,917</td>
<td>561,889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>21,409</td>
<td>772,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>42,940</td>
<td>1,228,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>91,517</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,384,407</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the basis of the figures in Tables XVIII and XXI, it is possible to ascertain the average percentage of the rice harvest which the peasant was forced to pay in pajeg in the period 1900-20. This percentage was 17.4% in Class I, 18.3% in Class II, 20.5% in Class III, 21.6% in Class IV and 23.4% in Class V. Assuming that the proportions between the number of hectares in each class was the same in the period 1900-20 as it was in 1930, the average percentage of the rice harvest which the peasant surrendered to the Dutch — after the collection of the land tax had become effective from 1914 onwards — was about 21.2%.

**B. Period 1920-30**

Even though the amount of revenue which the Government derived from the land tax rose consistently from 1900 to 1914, to stabilize at around f.400,000 from 1914 onwards, the Dutch were far from satisfied. Anxious to increase revenue still further, the Dutch raised the level of land tax in three stages. The first increase was introduced by means of a Resident Decree of 11 March 1920, stipulating that the pajeg was no longer to be paid in kind, but in Netherlands Indies currency. Rice fields in Class I were taxed at f.12.50 per ha., in Class II at f.11.10 per ha., in Class III at 9.60, in Class IV at f.8.35 and in Class V at f.6.95. The transformation of the pajeg into a money tax did not fail to pay dividends. While in 1919 total land tax revenue had amounted to f.393,000, in 1920 the Government collected f.494,000, an increase of about 23.5% over the average level in the years 1914-20.
The second increase came with the Resident Decree of 20 April 1921, stipulating that the level of the upeti was also to be raised. Class I gardens were now taxed at 4 450 kepengs per ha., Class II gardens at 3 350 kepengs, Class III gardens at 2 200 kepengs and Class IV at 1 100 kepengs. The tegal fields were now taxed at 2 200 kepengs per ha. in Class I, at 1 650 kepengs in Class II, at 1 100 kepengs in Class III and at 550 kepengs in Class IV. The Decree further stipulated that the upeti remain payable only in kepengs. The Dutch had a very good reason for this. In a report to the Directeur van Binnenlandsch Bestuur, the Resident wrote: "While the official exchange rate [between the kepeng and Netherlands Indies currency] is 8 to one cent, the actual exchange rate fluctuates between 3.8 and 4.2 kepengs for one cent. Considering the condition of the country’s finances, it seemed better to me to continue to collect this tax in kepengs." This Decree caused another steep increase in revenues. While in 1920 land tax revenues had amounted to f.494 000, in 1921 the Government collected f.552 000, which meant an increase of some 38% over the average level in the years 1914-20.

But in spite of these sharp rises, the Dutch were still dissatisfied. In 1922 the Governor-General overruled the Volksraad and approved a bill by which a 25% surcharge was levied on the land tax. This measure brought the land tax on Lombok to the following level:

Table XXII: Rates of Land Tax, 1922 (rounded)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pajeg</th>
<th>N.I.</th>
<th>Upeti</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Currency per ha.</td>
<td>Class of Gardens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class of Sawahs</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>15.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>13.90</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>12.10</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>10.40</td>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>8.70</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Over the period 1920-30 the land tax provided the Government with the following amounts of revenue:
Table XXIII: Total Revenue from Land Tax, 1920-29\textsuperscript{57}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total amount collected</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total amount collected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>fl. 494 000</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>fl. 736 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>fl. 552 000</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>fl. 698 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>fl. 696 000</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>fl. 729 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>fl. 721 000</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>fl. 736 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>fl. 704 000</td>
<td></td>
<td>fl. 742 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>fl. 6 808 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures in Table XXIII indicate that when the three-stage increase had taken effect by 1923, land tax revenue stabilized at around fl.724 000, some 81% over the average level from 1914 to 1920.

In order to ascertain the severity of the land tax burden in the period 1920-30, it is again necessary to establish the average percentage of the total agricultural product which the peasant had to pay in land tax. This percentage can be calculated for the pajeg — the tax on sawahs. However, in view of the fact that this tax had been transformed from a tax in kind into a money tax, it is no longer sufficient to know the level of the pajeg and the productivity of the rice fields; it is also necessary to know the average price the peasant received for his padi. The starting point for calculating the price the peasant received should not be the average local market price over the whole year — as the Dutch were accustomed to do — but the average local market price over the months May — August, the harvest months. It was during this time of year — when prices were lowest — that the Dutch demanded the payment of the land tax, thereby forcing the peasant to sell part of his product to the Chinese-owned rice mills.\textsuperscript{58} Assistant Resident Horst stated this quite clearly: "The population sells its padi surplus to the rice mills immediately after the harvest. Therefore, the only prices of importance to the population are the prices for the months of May-August."\textsuperscript{59} Thus the only prices which concerned the peasant in the decade 1920-1930 were the following:

Table XXIV: Padi Prices during Months May-August, 1920-29\textsuperscript{60}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Price per picul of dry padi May – August</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Price per picul of dry padi May – August</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>fl. 1.24</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>fl. 2.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>fl. 1.54</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>fl. 2.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>fl. 1.93</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>fl. 2.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>fl. 2.32</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>fl. 2.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>fl. 2.51</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>fl. 2.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These, however, were not the prices which the peasant received for his product. Assuming that the peasant was not indebted and obligated to sell his padi against credit before it was harvested, there were still at least two reasons why he received considerably less than the average local market price over the months May-August. In the first place, the method by which the rice mill owners bought the padi was extremely disadvantageous to the peasant. When the time for harvesting came, the Chinese rice mill owners hired a number of traders. After informing these traders of the price they would pay, the rice mill owners sent them to the villages to purchase the padi. Since the traders received no salary, their income depended entirely on being able to buy below the price they knew the rice mill would pay them. It was in their interests, therefore, to pay the peasant as little as possible. A 1928 report on this practice stated the following as a general conclusion: 'The rice mills set the price and the trader makes a profit by buying for a lower price. According to the tani that were interviewed, the traders' profit is between f.2.50 and f.5.00 on every f.25.00, that is, between 10-20%.' Thus, on account of this practice, the peasant received an average of 15% less than the price at harvest time. And secondly, the rice mill owners deducted the transport costs from the village to the mill from the price they paid the peasant. These costs varied widely with the location of the village. But, according to Assistant Resident Horst, the rice mill owners deducted an average of 12% for this reason. Thus, as a result of these two factors the peasant received an average of some 27% less than the price at harvest time. The actual padi prices which the peasant received in the twenties were therefore:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Price per picul of dry padi received by peasant</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Price per picul of dry padi received by peasant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>fl. 0.91</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>fl. 1.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>fl. 1.12</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>fl. 1.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>fl. 1.41</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>fl. 1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>fl. 1.69</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>fl. 1.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>fl. 1.83</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>fl. 1.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Considering the level of the pajeg in the periods 1920-21 and 1922-30 (Table XXII), and bearing in mind the actual padi prices (Table XXV), the peasant had to sell the following quantities of padi in order to be able to pay the pajeg:
Table XXVI: Amount of padi Sold by Peasants to Pay pajeg, 1920-29 (rounded)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class of Sawah</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1922</th>
<th>1923</th>
<th>1924</th>
<th>1925</th>
<th>1926</th>
<th>1927</th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>Average 1920-29</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the basis of these average quantities of padi over the entire decade 1920-30, and the figures on the actual productivity of Lombok’s rice fields (Table XXI), it is possible to ascertain the average percentage of the rice harvest which the peasant had to pay in pajeg. The necessary data are listed in the table below:

Table XXVII: Percentage of Rice Harvest Sold to Pay pajeg, 1920-30 (rounded)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class of rice-field</th>
<th>Number of ha. in 1930</th>
<th>Actual productivity of main rice crop, in piculs of dry padi per ha.</th>
<th>Average quantity of padi sold by peasant 1920-30, in piculs of dry padi per ha.</th>
<th>Percentage of actual rice product sold</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>4 671</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>9 580</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>12 917</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>21 409</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>42 940</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>91 517</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assuming that the proportions between the number of hectares in each Class were roughly the same in the period 1920-30 as in 1930, the average percentage of the rice harvest which the peasant had to pay in pajeg was about 17.9%. Since this percentage was 21.2% in the years 1914-20, it is clear that — due to the relatively high rice prices — the pressure of the pajeg on Lombok’s population diminished somewhat in the twenties.
C. Period 1930-40

Although the Government collected the considerable sum of approximately f.720,000 annually in land tax revenues, this amount was still regarded as insufficient. Realizing that the relatively high rice prices of the twenties created an opportunity to increase revenues even further, the Dutch went ahead with a new land tax ordinance. After the ordinance had been introduced on Bali in 1925, the preparatory work was begun on Lombok. All cultivated land was remeasured on a topographical basis; ownership or otherwise was re-registered; new, more ‘scientific’ productivity estimates were made, and so on. By 1930 this work had been completed and the ordinance came into effect on Lombok.

There is no doubt that the main purpose of the 1930 ordinance was to effect yet another rise in Government land tax revenues. With regard to the upeti — the tax on gardens and tegalans — the ordinance laid down the following rates:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Level of upeti Per ha.</th>
<th>Number of ha. in each class, 1930</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>fl. 15</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>fl. 10</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>fl. 7</td>
<td>2,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>fl. 5</td>
<td>6,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>fl. 3</td>
<td>8,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>fl. 2</td>
<td>12,473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>fl. 1</td>
<td>22,841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>fl. 0.50</td>
<td>27,718</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These new upeti rates meant an increase in Government revenues for two reasons. In the first place, the 1930 ordinance extended this tax to virtually all lands used for some purpose. Whereas prior to 1930 the upeti had been levied only on reasonably productive gardens and tegalans, the new ordinance stipulated that all so-called ‘dry lands’ (land other than sawahs) were to be subjected to this tax. In fact, Classes VI-VIII comprising some 63,032 ha., consisted for the most part of land which had never before been taxed. These ‘dry lands’ were peasants’ yards, distant gardens and tegalans, poor fields which could not be planted each year, alang-alang fields, salt pans and so on. Thus, the worst type of fields, yielding produce only once in every eight or ten years,
isolated gardens and tegalans, the vegetable gardens in the peasants' yards, all became subject to a tax of f.2.00, f.1.00 or f.0.50 per ha. And secondly, the 1930 ordinance significantly raised the upeti on the lands which had previously been taxed. In order to appreciate the extent of this increase it is necessary to point out that from 1923 onwards the level of the upeti had steadily declined. This was due to the fact that the actual market exchange rate (as distinct from the official exchange rate) between the kepeng and Netherlands Indies currency had gradually changed in favour of the latter. While this exchange rate had been about four kepengs to one cent about 1923, it was about seven kepengs to one cent by 1929. This meant that against the 1923 upeti rates (Table XXIII), the Dutch collected on the gardens only f.7.93 per ha. in Class I, f.6.00 per ha. in Class II, f.3.93 per ha. in Class III, f.3.93 in Class IV; and on the tegalans only f.3.93 per ha. in Class I, f.2.93 per ha. in Class II, f.1.97 per ha. in Class III and f.1.00 per ha. in Class IV. The 1930 ordinance 'solved' the problem of the declining upeti level by stipulating that this tax was henceforth to be paid only in Netherlands Indies currency, and by reclassifying all lands which had been previously taxed in Classes I-IV, so that all these gardens and tegalans became subject to taxes of f.15.00, f.10.00, f.7.00, f.5.00 or f.3.00 per ha. respectively.

The 1930 ordinance also increased Government revenue derived from the pajeg. The following table on p.153, indicates the method by which the new pajeg rates were established.

The table shows that the ordinance divided Lombok's rice fields into eight classes and that the pajeg was calculated on the basis of the estimated total productivity of the rice fields. The total productivity was arrived at by adding the value of the secondary crop (polowijo) — calculated in piculs of dry padi — to the estimated volume of the main rice crop. The money-amount of the pajeg was established by taking an average percentage of 9.4% of the total product and multiplying this figure by the fixed price of f.3.00 per picul.

There were three reasons why the new pajeg rates meant an increase in Government revenue. In the first place, by including the value of the secondary crop in the total productivity estimate, the total taxable product of the great majority of Lombok's rice fields was increased. And secondly, the 1930 ordinance greatly extended the total sawah area on which the pajeg was to be collected. The taxable sawah area was increased from 67 849 ha. in 1929 to 91 517 ha. in 1930, by not less than 23 668 ha. The fields to which the pajeg was extended were for the most part the lands in Classes VII and VIII. These non-irrigated fields — mainly in Central Lombok — with an actual productivity of only 21.3 to 27.5 piculs of padi per year, and unsuitable for the cultivation of a secondary crop, now became subject to a tax of between f.7.05 and f.9.14. And thirdly, the ordinance significantly raised the pajeg on the sawahs which had been previously taxed. The pajeg on sawahs in Class I was raised from f.15.60 to f.24.70, in Class II from f.13.90 to f.18.75 or f.22.05,
Table XXIX: Method for Establishing New pajeg Rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part I</th>
<th>Class of rice-field</th>
<th>Number of ha. in each class</th>
<th>Est. productivity main crop piculs padi per ha.</th>
<th>Est. productivity secondary crop piculs padi per ha.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>4 512</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>4 928</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>6 858</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>11 148</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>13 711</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>21 871</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>23 137</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>5 352</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>91 517</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part II</th>
<th>Class of rice-field</th>
<th>Total taxable product piculs padi per ha.</th>
<th>Average tax %</th>
<th>Price picul padi per ha.</th>
<th>Average money-amount pajeg per ha.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>fl. 3</td>
<td>fl. 24.70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>fl. 3</td>
<td>fl. 22.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>fl. 3</td>
<td>fl. 18.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>fl. 3</td>
<td>fl. 16.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>fl. 3</td>
<td>fl. 14.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>fl. 3</td>
<td>fl. 11.42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>fl. 3</td>
<td>fl. 9.14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>fl. 3</td>
<td>fl. 7.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in Class III from f.12.10 to f.16.21, in Class IV from f.10.40 to f.14.01 and in Class V from f.8.70 to f.11.42.
Not surprisingly, the 1930 ordinance caused Government land tax revenue to jump from an average of about f.720 000 in the twenties to f.879 000 in 1930 and f.888 000 in 1931, by some 22.1%. Land tax revenues would probably have stabilized at around f.890 000 per year if it had not been for the circumstance that the world depression set in shortly after the ordinance came into effect. But despite the depression the Dutch continued to collect substantial amounts of revenue:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total amount collected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>fl. 879 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>fl. 888 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>fl. 853 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>fl. 672 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>fl. 618 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>fl. 625 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total amount collected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>fl. 626 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>fl. 644 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>fl. 623 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>fl. 657 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>fl. 667 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

fl. 7 752 000

The total land tax revenues remained at a very high level over the years 1930-32, but dropped considerably in 1933, stabilizing at around f.641 000 for the rest of the decade. This pattern reflected Dutch policy. Although the depression had led to a drastic fall in the price of agricultural products, as a result of which peasant income was greatly reduced, the Dutch were slow to respond. During the two years when the depression was most severe, 1931 and 1932, they continued to demand the land tax at the very high level set by the 1930 ordinance. Only in 1933, when the absolute money shortage made it virtually impossible to collect the land tax in full, did the Dutch reduce its level by 25%. But since this percentage was far lower than the actual drop in price of agricultural products, and therefore in peasant income, the burden of the land tax on Lombok’s population remained extraordinarily severe throughout the thirties.

The severity of the land tax burden can be estimated by ascertaining the average percentage of the agricultural product the peasant had to part with in order to be able to pay the land tax. Once again, this percentage can be calculated for the pajeg, the tax on sawahs. The following table indicates
the average local market price of padi during the months May-August (harvest time) as well as the actual padi price (some 27% lower) which the peasant received in the thirties:

Table XXXI: Padi Prices 1930-40 – Market Price and Price Received by Peasant

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Price per picul of dry padi May – August</th>
<th>Price per picul of dry padi received by peasant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>fl. 2.02</td>
<td>fl. 1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>fl. 1.67</td>
<td>fl. 1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>fl. 1.22</td>
<td>fl. 0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>fl. 1.14</td>
<td>fl. 0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>fl. 1.23</td>
<td>fl. 0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>fl. 1.47</td>
<td>fl. 1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>fl. 1.54</td>
<td>fl. 1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>fl. 1.85</td>
<td>fl. 1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>fl. 1.79</td>
<td>fl. 1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>fl. 1.58</td>
<td>fl. 1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>fl. 1.83</td>
<td>fl. 1.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Considering the level of the pajeg in the periods 1930-32 (Table XXIX) and 1933-40 (when it was reduced by 25%), and bearing in mind the actual padi prices (Table XXXI), the quantities of padi the peasant had to sell for pajeg purposes can be calculated. These quantities for each class and for each year were as follows:

Table XXXII: Amount of padi sold by Peasant to Pay pajeg, 1930-40 (rounded)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class of Sawah</th>
<th>Number of piculs of dry padi per ha. which the peasant had to sell for pajeg purposes</th>
<th>Average 1930-40</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On the basis of these average quantities and the figures on the actual productivity of Lombok’s rice fields (calculated in eight classes), it is possible to ascertain the average percentage of the rice harvest the peasant had to pay in pajeg over the period 1930-40. The relevant data are listed in the table below:

**Table XXXIII: Percentage of Rice Harvest Sold to Pay pajeg, 1930-40 (rounded)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class of rice-field</th>
<th>Total no. of ha. in 1930</th>
<th>Actual productivity of main rice crop in piculs of dry padi per ha.</th>
<th>Average quantity of padi sold by peasant 1930-40, in piculs of dry padi per ha.</th>
<th>Percentage of actual rice-product sold by peasant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>4 512</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>4 928</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>6 858</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>11 148</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>13 711</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>21 871</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>23 137</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>5 352</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>91 517</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again assuming that the proportions between the numbers of ha. in each class remained constant throughout the period 1930-40, the average percentage of the rice harvest the peasant had to sell for pajeg purposes was 26.4%. Since this percentage had been 17.9% in the twenties, it is clear that the burden of the pajeg on Lombok’s population – due to the increase in its level and the drastic drop in rice prices – became very much greater in the thirties.74

The preceding exposition shows that over the entire colonial period 1900-40 the land tax provided the Netherlands Indies Government with a total revenue of f.6 264 000 (1900-20) + f.6 808 000 (1920-30) + f.7 752 000 (1930-40) = f.20 824 000. Since all Government expenditure on all forms of development as well as the administration was already more than adequately covered by other taxes, these millions were sheer profit to the colonial Government. The burden of the land tax on Lombok’s population must be regarded as having been quite severe. For no other purposes than to pay the
pajeg, the peasant had to surrender an average of 21.2% of his rice harvest over the period 1914-20, an average of 17.9% over the period 1920-30, and an average of 26.4% over the period 1930-40. The land tax was not, however, the full extent of Dutch exploitation of Lombok's peasant population. As will be shown in some detail below, the Government had several other important sources of income which — together with the land tax — placed such a heavy burden on the population as to have the most far-reaching consequences for the 'development' of Lombok society.

Other Taxes and the Function of Taxation

Before discussing the function of taxation, a few comments should be made on a number of other taxes levied by the Netherlands Indies Government. Apart from the land tax, the Dutch had four other significant sources of income: (1) the income tax; (2) the slaughter tax; (3) the tax on ladang; (4) buying off corvée labour. Since these four taxes were quite different in nature, it is necessary to discuss them separately.

I. The Income Tax

Throughout the colonial period the Netherlands Indies Government sought to increase revenues derived from income tax. This was done primarily by extending this tax to ever wider categories of people. The first step towards the introduction of an income tax was taken shortly after the conquest. The ordinance of 1895 (Stbl'd 290 and 291) levied a 4% income tax on Lombok's non-indigenous (other than Balinese or Sasak) traders and shopkeepers. However, since this tax affected only a handful of people — mainly Chinese and Arabs — revenues from income tax were not very high. Over the period 1900-09 (when a new ordinance was introduced), the Government collected the following amounts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total income-tax revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>fl. 9 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>fl. 10 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>fl. 11 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>fl. 10 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>fl. 10 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>fl. 92 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total income-tax revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>fl. 11 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>fl. 10 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>fl. 10 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>fl. 11 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>fl. 11 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>fl. 92 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Dutch took their second step in 1909. The ordinance issued in that year (*Stbld* 120) extended the income tax of 4% to Lombok’s indigenous population (Balinese and Sasaks) insofar as they were not engaged in agricultural production. This meant that Balinese and Sasak traders and shopkeepers were for the first time required to pay income tax. The 1909 ordinance caused some increase in revenues:

**Table XXXV: Total Revenue from Income Tax, 1909-13**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total income-tax revenue</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total income-tax revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>fl. 13 000</td>
<td>1912</td>
<td>fl. 14 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>fl. 14 000</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>fl. 16 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>fl. 15 000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>fl. 72 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1914 the Dutch took their third and by far the most drastic step. The ordinance of that year (*Stbld* 130) extended the income tax to ‘all persons belonging to the indigenous population’. The ordinance stipulated that the Chinese, Arab, Balinese and Sasak traders and shopkeepers were to continue paying an income tax of 4%, and that Balinese and Sasaks engaged in agricultural production (the peasants, the vast majority of the population) were to pay a tax of 3% with a minimum payment of fl.1.50 on income ‘not derived directly from agriculture’. Since peasant income from keeping chickens, from helping others at harvest time and so on, rarely exceeded fl.50 per year (in which case the peasant would have had to pay more than fl.1.50), the great majority of Lombok’s population ended up paying the minimum amount of fl.1.50. Not surprisingly, the 1914 ordinance caused a phenomenal increase in income tax revenues:

**Table XXXVI: Total Revenue from Income Tax, 1914-30**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total income-tax revenue</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total income-tax revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>fl. 82 000</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>fl. 117 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>fl. 104 000</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>fl. 113 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>fl. 153 000</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>fl. 110 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>fl. 143 000</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>fl. 107 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>fl. 139 000</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>fl. 102 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>fl. 135 000</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>fl. 99 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>fl. 130 000</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>fl. 97 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>fl. 126 000</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>fl. 96 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>fl. 122 000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>fl. 1 975 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The table shows that it took two years before the Dutch succeeded in fully implementing the 1914 ordinance. Income tax revenues rose from fl.16 000 in 1913 to fl.82 000 in 1914 and fl.104 000 in 1915. After reaching the all-time high of fl.153 000 in 1916, revenues declined steadily. To a large extent this was due to peasant opposition. More precisely, in view of the fact that income tax was deeply resented by the peasant, it became increasingly difficult for the Dutch officials to collect the tax in full. In 1931, when the drastic drop in the prices of agricultural products caused a money shortage, it became virtually impossible to collect the tax. Mainly for this reason, Dutch administrators on the island decided to adopt a more lenient approach:

The income tax is extremely unpopular with the native population. They do not understand that someone who does not own land, who in their eyes does not possess anything, can be subject to taxation. The collection of income tax always presents the greatest difficulties. Ninety per cent of this tax is paid by the minimum contributors, who in fact do not possess anything... In order to arrive at a more just tax assessment, a careful investigation into the real income of these minimum contributors has been held. With the very low standard of living — especially in East Lombok — it is not surprising that a large number of them did not reach the minimum legal subsistence level of fl.120 per year. These people could therefore be exempted... The income tax has thereby declined, but it has become much easier to collect.

Income tax revenues did indeed decline. Over the period 1931-40 the Government collected:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total income-tax revenue</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total income-tax revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>fl. 71 000</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>fl. 56 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>fl. 46 000</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>fl. 53 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>fl. 59 000</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>fl. 51 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>fl. 52 000</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>fl. 57 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>fl. 48 000</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>fl. 52 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>fl. 545 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, over the entire period from 1900 to 1940 the Netherlands Indies Government collected fl.92 000 (1900-09) + fl.72 000 (1909-14) + fl.1 975 000 (1914-31) + fl.545 000 (1931-40) = fl.2 684 000 in income tax.
II. The Slaughter Tax

The slaughter tax was a tax on the consumption of meat. The history of this tax illustrates to some extent the declining level of material well-being of Lombok's population. The first slaughter tax ordinance, introduced in 1916 (Stbld 210), stipulated that the tax on slaughtering a head of cattle was to be f.2.50; a pig f.1.25; and a small pig f.0.50. From 1916 to 1922 the Government collected:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total slaughter tax revenue</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total slaughter tax revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>fl. 141 000</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>fl. 103 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>fl. 136 000</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>fl. 73 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>fl. 128 000</td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>fl. 44 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>fl. 625 000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows that revenues declined drastically from f.141 000 in 1916 to f.44 000 in 1921, by some 68.8%. Since the level of the slaughter tax was constant over this period, this decline in revenue reflected the fact that fewer and fewer cattle and pigs were butchered.

The Dutch reacted to the decline in revenues in two ways. First, in 1922 a new ordinance was introduced (Stbld 254) which doubled the slaughter tax so that it became f.5.00 for a head of cattle, f.2.50 for a pig and f.1.00 for a small pig. And secondly, in 1924 — when it had become apparent that Lombok's population had been switching to the consumption of horse meat — another ordinance was introduced (Stbld 213) which placed a tax of f.5.00 on the butchering of a horse. These two ordinances remained in force for the remainder of the colonial era. Over the period 1922-40 the Government collected the revenue shown in Table XXXIX on the following page.

Initially, the 1922 and 1924 ordinances caused a rise in Government revenues. The 1922 ordinance increased revenues from f.44 000 in 1921 to f.70 000 in 1922 (by 59.1%), and the 1924 ordinance increased revenues from f.65 000 in 1923 to f.93 000 in 1924 (by 43.1%). Yet, after these increases, the downward trend again reasserted itself. From 1924 to 1933 revenues declined from f.93 000 to f.48 000 (by 48.4%), stabilizing around the latter figure until the end of the colonial period.

The sharp decline in slaughter tax revenue reflected the fact that Lombok's population was consuming less and less meat. For example, if the f.141 000 the Dutch collected in 1916 were derived entirely from the slaughtering of cattle, 141 000 ÷ 2.5 = 56 400 head of cattle were butchered that year.
Table XXXIX: Revenue from Slaughter Tax, 1922-40

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total slaughter tax revenue</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total slaughter tax revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>fl. 70 000</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>fl. 60 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>fl. 65 000</td>
<td>1933</td>
<td>fl. 48 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>fl. 93 000</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>fl. 47 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>fl. 91 000</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>fl. 43 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>fl. 89 000</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>fl. 43 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>fl. 86 000</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>fl. 56 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>fl. 82 000</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>fl. 47 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>fl. 80 000</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>fl. 52 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>fl. 64 000</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>fl. 49 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>fl. 55 000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total fl. 1 220 000

On a population of about 618 000, this would have meant consumption of one head of cattle per 11 inhabitants per year. And if the average of fl.48 000 which the Dutch collected from 1933 to 1940 was derived entirely from the slaughtering of cattle, 48 000 ÷ 5.00 = 9 600 head of cattle were butchered each year. On a population of about 701 000 this would have meant a meat consumption of one head of cattle per 73 inhabitants per year.

But despite declining meat consumption, the Dutch collected a considerable amount of revenue. Over the period 1916-40 the Government derived fl.625 000 (1916-22) + fl.1 220 000 (1922-40) = fl.1 845 000 from this source.

III. The Tax on Ladangs

Although the ladang tax was not important from the point of view of revenue, it illustrates Dutch enthusiasm for taxation and provides an example of popular reaction against an oppressive tax. It was first introduced in 1927 (Stbld 225). The ordinance stipulated that the ladangs in Lombok's northern and southern mountain ranges were to be taxed at fl.3.00 per ha. Over the period 1927-35 the Government collected the revenue shown in Table XL on page 162.

Table XL shows that the area of land occupied by ladang cultivation and, consequently, the amount of revenue the Government collected, declined drastically after this tax was introduced. Over the period 1927-31 the ladang area declined slowly, but after the depression set in it declined at a much faster rate. It is not difficult to find the reason for this phenomenon. Assistant Resident Horst expressed it quite clearly: 'The ladang tax is far too high in relation to the value of the products these fields yield and in relation to the economic position of the cultivators, who are among the poorest people on
Table XL: Revenue from ladang tax, 1927-34

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total number of ha. each year</th>
<th>Total amount of ladang tax</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>6 379</td>
<td>fl. 19 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>5 809</td>
<td>fl. 17 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>5 379</td>
<td>fl. 16 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>4 792</td>
<td>fl. 14 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>4 379</td>
<td>fl. 13 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>1 619</td>
<td>fl. 6 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>1 080</td>
<td>fl. 3 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>753</td>
<td>fl. 2 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>fl. 90 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lombok. The ladang cultivator reacted to this exorbitant tax by simply abandoning his fields. Realizing that if they continued to demand the tax at this high rate there would soon be nothing to collect, the Dutch decided in 1935 to reduce it to fl.1.00 per ha. Over the period 1935-40 the Government collected:

Table XLI: Revenue from ladang tax, 1935-40

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total number of ha. each year</th>
<th>Total amount of ladang tax</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>fl. 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>1 609</td>
<td>fl. 1 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>fl. 900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>fl. 1 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>1 767</td>
<td>fl. 1 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>2 075</td>
<td>fl. 2 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>fl. 8 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After the tax had been reduced, the ladang area began to increase again. But due to the very low prices of agricultural products in the thirties, the reduced tax was still far too high. For this reason the ladang area failed to reach the extent of the twenties. While in 1927 some 6 379 ha. had been under cultivation, in 1940 the ladang area comprised only 2 075 ha. — a reduction of some 67.3%.
However, in spite of the fact that the ladang tax was so crushing as to seriously damage this type of agriculture, the Netherlands Indies Government derived about £.90 000 (1927-34) + f.8 000 (1935-40) = f.98 000 from this hitherto untapped source.

IV. Buying off Corvée Labour

In 1929 the Dutch made an attempt to transform corvée labour from a tax in labour into a money tax. The people were told that instead of performing corvée they could pay f.5.00 per year. Over the period from 1929 to 1933 the Government collected:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total amount of corvée money</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>fl. 304 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>fl. 249 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>fl. 158 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>fl. 70 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>fl. 781 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows that after collecting a substantial amount in 1929 — indicating that 60 800 persons, some 56.5% of the registered corvée labourers, had paid the tax — Government income from this source diminished rapidly. This decline was due to a combination of two factors. First, whereas in 1929 the Dutch officials had pressed hard for the collection of this tax, in 1930 and 1931 less pressure was applied. For this reason Lombok’s population became aware that the payment of f.5.00 was not compulsory, and that instead of making this payment, it was possible to perform corvée as usual. And secondly, the drastic drop in price of agricultural products in 1931 greatly reduced peasant income. In 1931 and 1932 it became increasingly difficult for the great majority of Lombok’s population to pay this tax.

The Dutch reacted to this drop in revenue by lowering the amount of money for which corvée could be bought off. In 1933 it was decided that the payment of f.3.00 would be sufficient to be ‘free’ from corvée labour for one year. Over the period 1933-40 the Government collected:
Table XLIII: Revenue from Tax in Lieu of Corvée, 1933-40\(^91\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total amount of corvée money</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total amount of corvée money</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>fl. 22,000</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>fl. 14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>fl. 7,000</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>fl. 9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>fl. 6,000</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>fl. 13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>fl. 7,000</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>fl. 11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>fl. 89,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reduction in corvée money failed to persuade the mass of the population to buy off corvée labour. In 1940 only some 3700 people – the larger landlords – were able to make use of this opportunity.

Even though the attempt to transform corvée into a money tax was unsuccessful, the Government had collected f.781,000 (1929-32) + f.89,000 (1933-40) = f.770,000.

V. The Function of Taxation

Apart from the obvious function of providing the Government with revenue, taxation served the additional purpose of promoting the export of agricultural products. As the colonial period progressed, the Government increasingly demanded the payment of taxes in Netherlands Indies currency: the income tax in 1914, the slaughter tax in 1916, the pajeg in 1920, the tax on ladangs in 1927, buying off corvée labour in 1929, and the upeti in 1930. By demanding these taxes in Netherlands Indies currency, the Government created a largely artificial demand for Dutch money in Lombok society. The mass of the population continued to use the kepeng as the medium of exchange in everyday transactions, and used Dutch money primarily for tax purposes.\(^92\)

The only way in which the peasant could obtain the money he needed to pay his taxes was by selling part of his product to the Chinese-owned rice mills, which also served as export firms. Assistant Resident Horst recognized the rice mills’ crucial role in export when he admitted: ‘The export of Lombok’s products would be impossible without the rice mills.’\(^93\) The rice mills sold the surplus product to the Dutch Trading Corporation (particularly: De Nederlandse Handelsmaatschappij), which brought the products to market inside and outside the Netherlands Indies.

The relation between taxation and exports is graphically illustrated by the figures on the volume of rice exports. Over the two decades 1921-40 the following quantities of rice were exported from Lombok:
### Table XLIV: Total Amount of Rice Exported, 1921-40

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total rice export in piculs of beras</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total rice export in piculs of beras</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>214 000</td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>242 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>183 000</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>310 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>369 000</td>
<td>1933</td>
<td>287 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>305 000</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>457 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>286 000</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>352 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>290 000</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>369 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>292 000</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>395 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>319 000</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>413 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>281 000</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>425 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>235 000</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>411 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows that in spite of considerable fluctuations from year to year — due to market demand and the success or otherwise of the rice harvest — exports of beras rose fairly consistently. The average annual rice export over the decade 1921-30 was 277 000 piculs, compared with 366 000 piculs over the period 1931-40, an increase of some 32.1%. The circumstances under which this increase occurred indicate clearly that taxation was the driving force behind exports. In the twenties, when rice prices were high, the peasant sold a smaller part of his product to the rice mills/export firms than in the thirties, when prices were very low. The reason is clear. The peasant parted with his padi not to maximize his income, but only to obtain the money he needed to pay his taxes. For this reason the peasant was able to sell less when prices were high, and was obliged to sell more when prices were low.

*The preceding discussion shows that the taxation system was the instrument by which the Dutch exploited Lombok. Over the whole of the colonial period 1900-40, the Government derived f.2 684 000 from income tax, f.1 845 000 from the slaughter tax, f.99 000 from the tax on ladangs, and f.770 000 from buying off corvée labour. This meant that in addition to the f.20 824 000 in land tax revenues, the Government collected f.5 398 000 in other taxes — a total of f.26 222 000. Since all Government expenditure on the island was already more than adequately covered by other taxes, the Netherlands Indies Government extracted these millions from Lombok’s peasant population without giving anything in return.*
opportunity for the realization of commercial profit by the Chinese rice mill owners and the Dutch Trading Corporation. The great losers in the whole system were the peasants of Lombok, the vast majority of the population. As will be shown in more detail below, Dutch exploitation had the most disastrous consequences for Lombok society in general and for the peasant in particular.

The Consequences of Exploitation

The three most important consequences of Dutch rule were the impoverishment of the peasantry, the increased concentration of landownership in the hands of the Balinese and Sasak landlords, and the worsening of the food situation for Lombok society as a whole.

I. The Improverishment of the Peasant

Because the Dutch failed to increase the productivity of agricultural labour, and thus failed to raise per capita production, the unprecedented exploitation to which Lombok was subjected inevitably meant a decline in peasant income. That peasant income did in fact decline is evident, in the first place, from a comparison between the conditions under which the peasant was allowed access to land under Balinese and Dutch rule.

Dutch rule brought a sharp deterioration in the conditions under which the peasant was permitted to cultivate the land. With regard to those working the druwe dalem lands — the pengayahs and wakap holders, to whom the Dutch referred as "landowners" — this deterioration was the direct result of the heavier land tax burden. Because the Raja had demanded the pajeg only on the irrigated sawahs belonging to his direct domain (druwe dalem), and because large numbers of peasants and many institutions had been exempted (the pecatu and wakap fields), the average percentage of the rice harvest which peasants cultivating the domain lands paid in pajeg was about 11.3%. Partly because the Dutch extended the pajeg to the rain sawahs and to the pecatu and wakap fields, and in part because they repeatedly raised the level of the land tax, this percentage rose to 21.4% over the period 1914-20, 17.9% from 1920-30 and 26.4% over the period 1930-40. Whereas the Raja had left those working the druwe dalem lands with an average of about 89% of the rice harvest, in the last complete decade of Dutch rule these peasants were left with an average of only 74.6%.

With regard to those cultivating the druwe jabe lands — the se pangans, referred to by the Dutch as penyakap or sharecroppers — the deterioration was the indirect result of the heavier land tax burden. Ultimately, it was due to the fact that the Dutch — unlike the Raja — demanded land tax from the Balinese and Sasak landlords. By demanding land tax, the Dutch placed the landlords in the position of having either to curtail the consumption of their own households or to pass the land tax on to their se pangans. Not expectedly the great majority of landlords opted for the latter course of action. Under the
Raja the standard arrangement between landlord and sepangan had been that the peasant surrender half of the rice harvest. The peasant, therefore, was allowed to keep the other half as well as the secondary crop. Under the Dutch two different arrangements came to be practised. The first arrangement involved the payment by the sepangan of two-thirds of the rice harvest, while the landlord and the peasant each paid half the land tax. This meant that the sepangan was left with one-third of the rice harvest and the secondary crop, out of which he had to pay half the land tax. The second arrangement involved the payment by the peasant of half the rice harvest, while the sepangan undertook to pay the whole land tax. This meant that the peasant was left with half the rice harvest and the secondary crop, out of which he had to pay the whole land tax. Thus, while under the Raja the sepangan had been allowed to keep half the rice harvest as well as the secondary crop, during the last complete decade of Dutch rule the peasant was left with an average of only one-third minus 13.2% equals 20.1% of the rice harvest and the secondary crop, or alternatively, with one-half minus 26.4% equals 23.6% and the secondary crop.

Not only did the conditions under which the peasant was allowed access to the land deteriorate, but his further financial obligations also became more pressing. Aside from the land tax and import and export duties on various commodities, the Raja had not levied any other taxes of significance (see Chapter I). The Dutch, however, introduced a host of other taxes, most of which had to be paid by Lombok's peasant population. There was little the peasant could do without meeting the tax collector. If he made some transaction at the market, he had to pay a market tax; if he butchered an animal on a festive occasion, he was obliged to pay a slaughter tax; if he undertook to cultivate a distant ladang field, he had to pay a ladang tax. The peasant was further expected to pay the cost of the limited Dutch health and education programmes. And, because the Batavian officials were convinced that 'all peasants must have some side income', he was also required to pay an income tax.

In view of the much heavier tax burden, it is clear that peasant income decline drastically during the course of the colonial period. This phenomenon had far-reaching consequences for the peasant, including the downward social movement from pengayah to sepangan and from sepangan to pauper.

Due to declining income, the material position of the pengayah became increasingly precarious. Any number of factors, such as excessive subdivision of the land, repeated crop failure, illness, unforeseen expenses and so on, could cause him to lose the land he was cultivating. The pengayah's troubles began in earnest on the day he was unable to pay his taxes. He was then forced to approach one of the Chinese rice mill owners for credit. The arrangement between the Chinese and the pengayah usually took the form of an agreement that the latter sell the former a certain part of the next rice crop for a price some 48% lower than the local market price around harvest time. Since the Dutch did not take the indebtedness of peasants into account, this meant that in
order to pay his taxes the pengayah was forced to sell a far larger part of his harvest than would otherwise have been necessary. Needless to say, the following year the peasant's troubles would increase even further. Although the pengayah might hold on for a few years, inevitably the day would arrive on which he had to part with his land. The peasant then approached a Balinese or Sasak landlord and concluded a permanent pawn contract with him (gade gegem). The pengayah, who was usually kept on by the landlord to cultivate the land, had thus become a sepangan. Now he not only had to pay land tax, income tax and so on to the Dutch, but he was also obliged to surrender half or even two-thirds of the rice harvest to the landlord.

The process described above was a frequent occurrence in the colonial period. Even though the Dutch had forbidden the alienation of druwe dalem lands (see pp.121-4), it was no secret among colonial officials that this stipulation was widely evaded and that for this reason the number of sepangans was on the increase. For instance, Resident Damste wrote in 1921: 'On Lombok there are ever more farmers who do not possess a piece of land, and who are therefore forced to become sharecroppers on someone else's sawah.' And similarly, in 1933 Controleur Vissers wrote: 'An increasingly large part of the inhabitants of Lombok do not possess any sawahs or other land. The number of landless farmers may conservatively be estimated at about 40% of the population. For the most part the landless farmers are sharecroppers who work the land of the Balinese and Sasak landowners.' These observations are confirmed by the figures on the area of land cultivated by sepangans. Whereas under the Raja, out of a total sawah area of 123,460 tenah (5872 m²), some 41,500 tenah (33.6%) had been worked by sepangans (see pp.11-15), the 1940 land survey showed that out of a total sawah area of 96,970 ha., not less than 53,720 ha. (55.4%) were cultivated by sepangans.

There was also the downward movement from sepangan to pauper. Due to the very unfavourable conditions under which he was permitted to work the land, and the many taxes with which he was burdened, the material condition of the sepangan was even more precarious than that of the pengayah. If he, through any number of circumstances, was unable to pay the landlord half or two-thirds of the rice harvest, or if he was negligent in the performance of services, it was possible for the landlord to evict him. The peasant then lost access to the land, which, in view of the very limited, indeed negligible, employment opportunities, was virtually identical with pauperism.

It is clear that this process, too, occurred with increasing frequency as the colonial period progressed. The first indication of the formation of a class of paupers dates from 1924. In that year Resident Moolenburgh sounded the alarm. 'The average Sasak is a small farmer, very often a sharecropper. There is an increasing number of destitute Sasaks. There can be no doubt that a class of paupers is gradually developing on Lombok.' Mainly because officials in Batavia attempted to play down his warning, Moolenburgh instructed the
administration on Lombok to conduct an investigation into the prevalence of pauperism. Summing up the results he wrote: 'The investigation held on Lombok has shown that about 40% of the males over the age of 18 do not possess any land. While about 90% of these landless adult males derive some income from working as sharecroppers, some 10% are without regular means of subsistence.' Thus, in 1926 the Resident estimated the number of paupers at about 4% of the adult male population.

During the remainder of the colonial period the number of paupers increased sharply. While there is no evidence of the existence of a class of paupers under Balinese rule, towards the end of the colonial era it was common knowledge among Dutch officials that about one-third of Lombok’s population was destitute. For instance, in 1934 Controleur Leyds commented: 'About one-third of the population consists of landless, propertyless paupers... These people find a means of subsistence by vegetating on family or acquaintances. The income of this group is far below the minimum [f.120 per year]. In general we can say that they have just sufficient to feed themselves albeit poorly and irregularly.'

It is clear that declining income led to the impoverishment of the peasant and that this impoverishment had far-reaching consequences. Whereas under Balinese rule about 66% of Lombok’s sawah area had consisted of druwe dalem lands (for the most part cultivated by pengayahs) and about 34% of lands cultivated by seangans, towards the end of the colonial period these percentages were about 45% and 55% respectively. Moreover, while under Balinese rule a class of paupers does not appear to have existed, by the end of the Dutch period not less than about one-third of the population had become pauperized. In short, in the course of the colonial period the social status of a majority of Lombok’s peasants declined to that of seangpan or pauper.

II. The Concentration of Land Ownership

Another development which characterized Dutch rule on Lombok was the increasing concentration of land ownership. To the extent to which the pengayahs were forced to become seangans, the landholding of the Balinese aristocracy in West Lombok and the Sasak aristocracy in the East increased. It was inevitable that these groups should acquire the land. In the first place, since the Dutch had restricted landownership to the indigenous population, only Balinese and Sasaks could own land. And secondly, among the indigenous population only Balinese and Sasak aristocrats possessed the economic means to conclude permanent pawn contracts (gade gegem) with indebted pengayahs.

The extent to which landownership became concentrated in West Lombok is indicated by the following comparison. In 1899 when the Dutch forcibly restored the landownership of the punggawas, out of West Lombok’s total sawah area of 16 852 ha., an area of 5 812 ha. (34.5%) was given to Balinese aristocrats (the druwe jabe lands), while the remaining 11 040 ha. (65.5%) were left to the pengayahs (the druwe dalem lands). These two forms of land tenure
were of a quite different character. Whereas pengayah lands consisted of small-scale units of one tenah (about ¾ ha.) or less, punggawa land-holding was usually of a large-scale nature of several tenahs or more. Due to the considerable size of many of the holdings, the Balinese landlords gave 4,398 ha. (26.1% of West Lombok’s total sawah area) in cultivation to sepanangs. Towards the end of the colonial period the pattern of ownership had changed greatly in favour of the landlords. The 1938 land survey of West Lombok stated the following as a general conclusion: ‘Large land ownership is very widespread, particularly among the Balinese population. There are three triwangsas families who own 325,550 and even as many as 760 ha. of sawah respectively. Sawah holdings of 20-40 ha. are quite common among the Balinese aristocracy.’ More precisely, out of West Lombok’s total sawah area of 18,060 ha., only 7,188 ha. (39.8%) was still cultivated by pengayahs, while the remaining 10,872 ha. (60.2%) was held mainly by Balinese landlords, who gave 9,590 ha. (53.1%) in cultivation to sepanangs.

In East Lombok the same development took place. Although no precise figures are available on land ownership at the beginning of Dutch rule, it is clear that by 1940 land ownership was even more concentrated here than in the more fertile region of West Lombok. The 1940 land survey of East Lombok stated: ‘Large land ownership is very widespread, particularly among the perwangsa. Many of them have holdings so large that they do not even know the hundreds of sharecroppers who cultivate their fields. Many of them also do not know how much they receive at each harvest.’ More specifically, out of the total sawah area of Central and East Lombok of 78,910 ha., an area of only 27,934 ha. (35.4%) was still held by pengayahs, while an area of 50,986 ha. (64.6%) was held mainly by Sasak aristocrats, who gave 44,132 ha. (55.9%) in cultivation to sepanangs.

Thus, while at the beginning of the colonial period the pengayahs had cultivated some 65% of the total sawah area, by 1940 they were left with only 36.1%. At the same time the landholding of the Balinese and Sasak aristocracies increased. While at the beginning of Dutch rule they had held about 35% of the total sawah area, by 1940 they held 63.9%. It is clear, therefore, that the concentration of land ownership was one of the consequences of Dutch rule on Lombok.

III. The Worsening of the Food Situation

It has already been pointed out that the consumption of meat declined drastically under Dutch rule. However, much more serious for the food situation was the fact that the consumption of rice also declined. The average per capita rice consumption can be ascertained by the simple method of subtracting the volume of rice exports from total rice production and by dividing this figure by the total population figure. This method is adequate because it can safely be assumed that all the rice which remained on the island was eventually consumed.
The data for the period 1900-20 are listed in Table XLV. The table shows that annual per capita rice consumption was subject to considerable fluctuation. While in 1902 an average of 4.9 piculs of padi was left for each inhabitant, in 1910 this was 4.3 and in 1920 only 3.9 piculs. These fluctuations depended on two things: (1) the success or otherwise of the rice harvest, (2) the volume of rice exports. However, by taking an average over a whole decade it is possible to eliminate these annual fluctuations. From 1900 to 1910 average annual rice consumption per capita was 4.68 piculs of padi. Since two piculs of padi are equivalent to one picul of beras, average per capita rice consumption was 2.34 piculs of beras, or, 2.34 x 61.7 kg. = 144,378 kg. This amount gives an average daily rice consumption of 144,378: 365 = 395 grams of rice.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total rice production in piculs of padi</th>
<th>Total rice export in piculs of padi</th>
<th>Total rice consumption in piculs of padi</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Consumption per capita: piculs of padi</th>
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The following table lists the figures for the period 1921-40:

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Total rice production in piculs of padi</th>
<th>Total rice export in piculs of padi</th>
<th>Total rice consumption in piculs of padi</th>
<th>Population</th>
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<td>754 400</td>
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<td>1937</td>
<td>3 575 000</td>
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<td>2 785 000</td>
<td>763 300</td>
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<td>772 200</td>
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<td>822 000</td>
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<td>790 000</td>
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</table>

From 1911 to 1920 average annual rice consumption was 4.55 piculs of padi, or 2.75 piculs of beras, or 140.367 kg. This amount indicates an average daily rice consumption per head of the population of 140.367 kg.: 365 = 384 grams. These figures indicate that the average annual per capita rice consumption over the period 1921-30 was 4.18 piculs of padi, or 2.09 piculs of beras, or 128.953 kg.; while over the period 1931-40 this was 3.55 piculs of padi, or 1.775 piculs of beras or 109.518 kg. These amounts mean an average daily rice consumption per head of population of 128.953 kg: 365 = 353 over the period 1921-30, and 109.518: 365 = 300 grams from 1931-40.

It is clear that average rice consumption per capita declined consistently as the colonial period progressed. It fell from an average of 395 grams per day over the period 1900-10, to 365 grams in 1911-20, to 353 grams over the period 1921-30, and to only 300 grams over the decade 1931-40. This meant that in the thirties average daily rice consumption was about 24% less than it had been from 1900 to 1910.
Declining rice consumption was caused by a combination of two factors. In the first place, Dutch development efforts were very limited. Although by extending the irrigation system the Dutch were able to increase overall rice production, they did not succeed in raising the productivity of agricultural labour whereby per capita production would have risen. For this reason, the increase in overall rice production failed to keep pace with, let alone exceed, the increase in population. While average annual rice production over the period 1900-10 was 3 013 000 piculs of padi, in 1931-40 this was 3 505 000 piculs, an increase of 16.4%. Population, however, rose at a much faster rate. While the average population level over the period 1900-10 was 567 000, in 1931-40 it was 749 950, an increase of 32.3%. And secondly, declining rice consumption was caused by the intensification of Dutch exploitation. As the colonial period progressed, the tax burden on Lombok’s population became heavier and heavier. In order to obtain the money necessary to pay his mounting taxes, the peasant was compelled to sell an increasingly large part of his harvest to the rice mills/export firms. For this reason, the volume of rice exports grew not only in absolute terms, but also in relation to total rice production. Whereas over the period 1900-10 an average of 361 000 piculs of padi were exported each year, in 1931-40 an average of 732 000 piculs were exported. This means that from 1900 to 1910 an average of 12% of the total product was exported, while from 1931 to 1940 not less than 20.9% of the total product was exported. Thus, due to the limitations of the Dutch development effort and the intensification of exploitation, per capita rice consumption fell drastically in the course of the colonial period.

* *

Under these circumstances it was inevitable that Lombok would experience increasingly severe food shortages, and ultimately famine. The first indication that something was amiss came in 1938. In that year Dutch officials on the island requested Batavia to provide ‘urgent financial assistance’ to combat the growing shortage of food. The request, however, was ignored. The Government did not respond until 1940, when the food situation had deteriorated to the point where widespread hunger-oedema and numerous cases of death by starvation were occurring. Faced with this situation, Batavia accepted the advice of the Directeur van Economische Zaken, H.J. van Mook, and ordered a number of relief measures to be taken. Peasants who had been forced to eat their seed grain were provided with new grain, an attempt was made to encourage the cultivation of secondary crops, and so on.\(^\text{120}\)

However, since the causes of the deteriorating food situation were rooted in the colonial system itself, these relief measures did not provide a lasting solution. Large sections of Lombok’s population continued to hover on the brink of starvation. In 1949 hunger-oedema and death by starvation again occurred on a large scale.\(^\text{121}\) In their half-century of rule the Dutch had succeeded in transforming an island described by F.A. Liefrinck in 1887 as ‘a rich land, blessed by nature,’\(^\text{122}\) into a region of endemic famine.
CHAPTER VII
FORMS OF PEASANT RESISTANCE

In view of the drastic decline in the level of material well-being during the colonial period, it is not surprising that social unrest was a permanent feature of Lombok society under Dutch rule. Even though truly large-scale opposition came to an end in 1897,¹ hardly a year went by without a disturbance of some sort. While all categorization is necessarily somewhat artificial, for purposes of analysis it is useful to divide the numerous expressions of peasant discontent into different types. The great majority of peasant movements on Lombok can be grouped, by criteria which will be explained below, into three distinct types: (1) the so-called datu2ans; (2) the ‘mystical’ risings; and (3) the tax rebellions.

The datu2ans were very similar to the Ratu Adil movements on Java. They, too, were messianic movements centred around an individual with unusual personal characteristics. The leaders of the datu2ans (often called: Guru) professed either to be a reincarnation of a Balinese or Sasek ruler (Datu), or to enjoy a special mystical relation with one or more of these powerful figures from the past. The Gurus, who never had much difficulty gaining a following, told the population that they had been called upon to restore the just society that had existed in earlier times. But despite this feature, many of the datu2ans remained predominantly spiritual movements. The ‘mystical’ risings, while possessing many of the characteristics of the datu2ans, did move away from the purely spiritual sphere. These movements combined the messianic aspect of the datu2ans with certain economic and political demands. The tax rebellions, on the other hand, cannot be said to have had any of the characteristics of the datu2ans. In these movements the spiritual element had been largely superseded by a strong secular demand for the redress of specific economic and political wrongs. The tax rebellions were purely and simply spontaneous, popular reactions against intolerable oppression and exploitation.

While it would be pointless to deal with all the expressions of peasant discontent in the colonial period, some of the more characteristic disturbances deserve to be analysed in some detail. One example of each of the three forms of peasant resistance will be given below,² namely: (1) the datu2ans led by Guru Dane, 1906-18; (2) the ‘mystical’ rising at Telaga Bage, 1906; (3) the tax rebellion at Bukit Limbungan, 1907.

The Datu2an of Guru Dane 1906-18

During the first decades of the 20th century, the Dutch were not sure how to deal with the frequent datu2ans. While these movements were undoubtedly a potential danger to ‘law and order’, it was not possible (at least not officially!) to prosecute the leaders as long as they did not break any law and their movements did not acquire an overtly political character. In 1920 the
Dutch found a solution. In that year they made it an ‘adat-offence’ for anyone to merely proclaim the imminent restoration of a ‘golden age’. This abuse of the adat made it possible for the Dutch to act quickly and have the aspiring Datu punished by the local courts before his following could grow to significant proportions. But despite the increasing vigilance of the Dutch administrators, the district chiefs and the village heads, datu2ans continued to occur regularly. Although this list cannot claim to be complete it is certain that one or more datu2ans took place in the years 1902, 1910, 1914, 1918, 1920, 1923, 1924, 1925, 1927, 1930, 1935 and 1938. Some of the more interesting movements were the following:

(a) The two datu2ans of the year 1910 included one led by a Balinese sudra from Cakranegara. He had travelled to Sakra in East Lombok where he quickly gained a following among the peasants. He told them that although Anak Agung K’tut had been buried under a wall of the Mataram palace, he had not been killed but had changed into a garuda (the mythical bird who carries the Hindu God Vishnu). He further told them that K’tut had revealed that he would soon return to his pleasure gardens at Gunung Sari. He would return in a human appearance and lead the Balinese, supported by the Sasaks of Praya and Sakra, into battle against the Kompenie, which would be driven from Selaparang.

(b) The datu2an of 1920 also occurred in the Sakra district. This movement was led by a Sasak woman who had adopted the title of ‘Dewi Anjani’. She too quickly gained a following among the peasant population. Her followers paid homage to her, brought her presents of food and clothing and even began building her a suitable palace. She promised the peasants that after she had been formally invested as Queen, the ancient Sasak kingdoms would be restored, justice would prevail and the Kompenie would be driven from Selaparang.

(c) The datu2an of 1927 occurred in the district of Jonggat. The movement was led by a Sasak peasant by the name of Ama Sumikir. He told his followers that his real name was Datu Jayeng Rana, that he came from Mecca and that his house was the real Mecca (Mekka-Muliasejati). He further told the people that although at present he was still old and crippled he would soon take on the appearance of Jayeng Rana. After this had taken place the Kompenie would either recognize him as Datu of Selaparang and leave voluntarily or be driven away. In case the Kompenie should refuse to go he had a good medicine. He was in possession of 20 gold cartridges (mimis mas). If one of these cartridges fell upon a mountain, the mountain would be pulverized, if one fell into the sea, the sea would dry up, if one fell on land, everything would burn. To drive the Kompenie from Selaparang all his 20 cartridges would be necessary. These movements, like most of the other datu2ans, did not result in armed resistance against the colonial order. Usually the offenders and some of their leading followers were quickly arrested. Yet, despite growing Dutch efficiency in nipping the datu2ans in the bud, the peasants of Lombok remained highly
susceptible to messianic appeals of this kind. A characteristic example, both of
this type of movement and of the way the Dutch dealt with it, was the case of
Guru Dane.
Dane, described as ‘a Sasak of lowly origin’, was born around 1870 in the
West Lombok village of Kuripan. He spent his youth travelling from village to
village selling tuwak, an alcoholic drink. Gradually, however, he gained a wide
reputation for supernatural powers. In part, this reputation was based upon his
alleged descent. Dane adopted various high-sounding titles such as Lalu
Nurlimbu Dusta Pendita and Dewa Mas Panji Kimalan, and professed to be none
other than the ancient Sasak Datu of Selaparang, risen from the dead. And in
part, his reputation was based upon his powers of healing. Dane sold
medicines — consisting of ‘holy’ water, sacred objects and potions — for all
kinds of ailments and problems. By 1906 his influence on the peasant popu-
lation had grown to such proportions that he came to the attention of the
Dutch authorities. The village head of Pujut in Central Lombok, seeing his
authority undermined, contacted the Dutch and requested that Dane be
removed from his village. Although he had not broken any law, the Dutch
nonetheless decided to ‘teach him a lesson’. In April 1906 Dane was convicted
on a completely false charge of vagrancy and sentenced to a term of six months
at forced labour.

Upon his release in October 1906 Dane returned briefly to Pujut, eloped
with a perwangsia girl and settled in the village of Tempos in West Lombok.
Although normally it was strictly forbidden for a peasant to marry a member
of the aristocracy, the girl’s family raised no objections. On the contrary, the
family was so pleased with the match that they sent Dane a substantial
dowry of 20 head of cattle. This unusual precedent was soon to be repeated. A
few weeks later two other perwangsia families gave him their daughters in
marriage and sent him valuable dowries. But Dane’s prosperity was not to
endure. Due to the fact that his influence on the peasant population continued
to grow, it was not long before he again ran foul of a village head. In November
1906 the head of Tempos complained to the Dutch authorities that Dane’s
presence in the village was causing the people to disregard his commands. The
Dutch were quick to move. Dane was arrested for the second time and placed
in ‘preventive’ custody. When he was finally brought to trial in February 1907,
he was accused of ‘deception of villagers, pretending to be an aristocrat,
professing to be endowed with supernatural powers and . . . being a danger to
law and order’. Not surprisingly, he was found guilty and convicted to a term
of one year at forced labour.

Dane was first put to work in the pleasure gardens at Narmada. But since
he received many visitors there, who revered him ‘like a saint’, the Dutch
decided to transfer him to the prison in Mataram. When it was discovered a few
months later that the prison guards treated Dane with distinction and allowed
many people to visit him, the Dutch transferred him to the prison in Praya
where he was placed in solitary confinement.14 When Dane’s sentence expired in February 1908, the Dutch authorities on Lombok refused to release him. Instead, they kept him in jail and made an attempt to obtain the Governor-General’s permission to have him banished from the island. In his report of 23 September 1908 (written some six months after the official expiration of Dane’s sentence), Assistant Resident Kalff stated his case:

Dane is a man who behaves like a lunatic, without being a lunatic. He is a dangerous fanatic. He is all the more dangerous because here we have a people [i.e. the Sasaks] who, while submissive by nature, are very easily stirred to all kinds of evil deeds. Precisely in people like Dane they place a tremendous trust. Marriages between peasants and aristocratic girls are strictly forbidden. Whenever there are such cases, the courts are informed at once so that they can punish the offenders without delay. But here we have a peasant who is voluntarily given aristocratic girls in marriage. This can only be explained by the fact that they regard him as a supernatural being. While such people must be regarded as highly dangerous nearly everywhere in the Indies, on Lombok they must be put out of harm’s way as soon as possible... If Dane were to be released from prison he would within a very short time gather such a large following of people around him that law and order would be seriously threatened. This is the opinion not only of the European administrators, but also of the Native chiefs... I therefore recommend that Dane be extradited from Lombok and be given a place of residence on Ambon or Banda.15

Resident de Bruijn Kops endorsed this recommendation and sent the report to the Governor-General. Largely as a matter of routine, Van Heutsz asked for the advice of the Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken G. Hazeu. In his report Hazeu rightly pointed out:

As far as can be ascertained Dane is neither an apostle for some new teaching nor a propagandist of some political ideal. Up to now, there has not been a single indication that Dane has himself a religious or political aim. We only know that certain elements among the population regard him as a supernatural being... and that a few members of the aristocracy have given him their daughters in marriage... The question seems justified if the danger Dane presents is of such a serious nature as to warrant the extreme measure of political banishment.16
The Governor-General accepted this advice, informed the Resident that there were insufficient grounds to banish Dane and implied that he should be released from prison.17 After Dane at long last had been set free, he established himself in the village of Pejanggi in Central Lombok. Possibly because his nearly three-year imprisonment had raised him even higher in popular esteem, he now became widely known as Guru Dane. Daily, large numbers of people visited him seeking cures for ailments and advice with problems. His grateful customers rewarded him for his services with presents of food, clothing, cattle and so on. As the Guru prospered, the Dutch kept a suspicious eye on him. In 1910, when a rumour went around that Anak Agung Made had risen from the dead18 and would soon lead the Balinese and Sasaks into battle against the Kompenie, Dane was arrested. Although held in ‘preventive’ custody for three months, the Dutch authorities were obliged to release him for lack of evidence. In 1914, when it was rumoured that a ‘new Raja’ would soon arise and compel the Kompenie to leave Selaparang, the Guru was again arrested, held in custody for six months, and once more released for lack of evidence.19

Probably in order to escape this harassment, Guru Dane left Pejanggi and settled in the village of Anjani in East Lombok. Here also he soon became the centre of attention. His followers, who even built him a large house, grew so rapidly in numbers that he invoked the enmity of no less a personage than Raden Nuraksa, the district chief at Rarang. In October 1917 Nuraksa informed the Dutch that he was losing authority because ‘the Guru has more influence over the people of my district than I have myself’. This report prompted the Dutch to conduct a surprise raid. On 25 October a force of 50 policemen surrounded Dane’s house in Anjani and, without encountering resistance, arrested the Guru along with 30 of his followers. The prisoners were taken to Mataram, where on orders of Resident van Stenis they became the subjects of an intensive investigation.20

The testimonies of all the people questioned were alleged to have demonstrated:

(1) That due to his powers of healing Guru Dane is widely regarded as a supernatural being;
(2) That Guru Dane is widely regarded as the Datu of Selaparang, risen from the dead;
(3) That Guru Dane sees himself as the Datu of Selaparang;
(4) That Guru Dane had ordered his followers to begin collecting wood and building materials for the palace that was to be constructed at the site of the ancient keraton of the Datu of Selaparang;
(5) That Guru Dane had told his followers that as soon as the palace was ready he would allow himself to be invested as Datu of Selaparang;
(6) That Guru Dane had promised his followers that after he had been invested as Datu, Selaparang could be freed from foreign domination and the old way of life would be restored;

(7) That Guru Dane had told his followers that they need not fear anything because he was in possession of a miraculous lance which would break all enemy resistance;

(8) That jewels and valuable clothing were kept in readiness to dress Guru Dane when he became Datu;

(9) That in the village of Pejanggi the house where Guru Dane used to live had become an object of veneration;

(10) That Guru Dane has thousands of followers in Central and East Lombok who have complete faith in him and who would follow him wherever he should lead them.21

In view of these findings the Resident considered it unsafe to leave Dane on Lombok. In January 1918 the Guru was taken by ship to Buleleng (Bali), where he was placed under house arrest. Van Stenis ordered a psychiatric examination to be held. Much as if he were examining an interesting animal, the doctor noted in his report: ‘Guru Dane is strongly built: his muscles are well-developed; his skin is moist; his eyes are slightly bulging and often turn upwards; his pupils are enlarged, but respond well to light.’ The doctor continued by observing: ‘Often he does not give a direct answer to a question and without finishing a sentence begins to speak of different matters’, and concluded by stating: ‘Guru Dane suffers from megalomania but is not dangerous to his surroundings.’22

This examination provided Van Stenis with the material he needed. Determined that Dane should be permanently removed from Lombok, he informed the Governor-General:

To prosecute Guru Dane before a court of law would probably result in a conviction for inciting the population to overthrow the existing government. But I do not, however, consider a trial a satisfactory solution of the present difficulty. Even if the witnesses should not retract their statements (which for fear of convicting their teacher and future king they are all too likely to do), the population would still regard Guru Dane as a martyr, and, after the expiration of his sentence, his following would be greater than ever . . . We could then be confronted with an event for which we cannot be prepared. Although, in my opinion, this would be unlikely to assume very great proportions, it would necessitate armed action by the police force as a result of which blood would certainly flow . . . , while the possibility cannot be excluded that the lives of
Government officials and Native chiefs would be endangered. To avoid this, I consider it urgently necessary that Guru Dane be banished from Lombok. I have had him observed by the doctor who stated in his medical report that Guru Dane suffers from megalomania . . . This leads me to suggest that he be committed to an institution, in Lawang or in Buitenzorg for instance, where he can be under the constant medical care of nerve specialists.23

This time the Governor-General accepted the recommendation. For political reasons Guru Dane was not granted a trial. On the doubtful evidence of a single doctor he was committed to an mental asylum and never saw his homeland again.

The 'Mystical' Rising at Telaga Bage 1906

Although risings of the 'mystical' type did not occur nearly as frequently as the datu2ans, they nonetheless took place with some regularity. Risings which appear to have had this character occurred in 1902 in the village of Songa (East Lombok), in 1912 in Pancor (East Lombok), in 1935 in Dasan Bele (East Lombok) and in 1938 in Loko Kranggan (West Lombok).24 A fairly representative example of this type of rising and of the manner in which the Dutch dealt with it was the disturbance at the village of Telaga Bage in 1906.

On October 4 1906 the Dutch authorities in Mataram received word that the inhabitants of Telaga Bage in the West Lombok district of Bayan refused to pay their taxes, refused to obey their village head, and had let it be known that they did not wish to have another village head. As was usual in such cases, the Dutch instructed the district chief of Bayan to see to it that the peasants of Telaga Bage paid their taxes and, should they still refuse, that the 'ringleaders' be brought to Mataram to explain themselves. A number of followers of the district chief went to the village, but received a hostile reception. They were told that the inhabitants of Telaga Bage refused to recognize the authority of the district chief and were not inclined to send representatives to Mataram.25

When the Dutch received this message they ordered the district chief to visit the village personally. Probably with the intention of intimidating the rebellious peasants, they further instructed the Chief of Police (none other than Gusti Nyoman Dangin, a former punggawa who had played a leading role in the Dutch-Balinese war) to accompany the district chief. Upon arrival the two chiefs discovered that four peasants, two of whom were named Kodak and Ningrawang, had assumed positions of leadership. Contrary to the usual deference with which the population treated powerful aristocrats, the four peasants remained seated when their visitors approached. The district chief and the Chief of Police were obliged to take their seats beside the peasant leaders, whereupon the village's adult male inhabitants, numbering about 40, squatted down around them26
Gusti Nyoman Dangin succeeded in gaining the peasants' confidence. In answer to his question as to why they had refused to obey the district chief, the peasant leaders replied that they could no longer recognize his authority because, they said, the arrival of Datu Bini was imminent. An old man in the village — the father of one of the peasant leaders — had regular contact with the Queen and had revealed her commands. She had instructed her people to burn the administration office for the collection of import and export duties and to plant red flags along the coast. When this task had been accomplished Datu Bini would be very pleased and would descend from the sky. She would be able to recognize her loyal followers by several distinguishing marks. Her followers were to arm themselves with a *kris*, a cudgel made of *glumpang* wood, and a spear with a tip of cattle bone. And if, in addition, her followers made signs of red *sirih* spittle on their cheeks, forehead, throat and chest they would enjoy the Queen's special protection and be invulnerable. When Datu Bini ruled Selaparang all taxes would be abolished and rice, coconuts, sugar and *sirih* would again have specific, fixed prices.²⁷

When the Dutch authorities, on 27 October, learned of the character of the movement they acted swiftly. The Assistant Resident of Lombok, a Controleur and the Chief of Police with a force of 35 armed policeman marched on the rebellious village the same day. Early in the morning of 29 October — when the people of Telaga Bage were still asleep — a raid was carried out. The peasants were taken by surprise. Two men who attempted to resist were cut down, while the others — about 45 in number — were taken prisoner. Later in the day the Dutch assembled the village's entire population and publicly burned the magical *kris*-sheaths, cudgels and spears 'in order to destroy all the things which could help to keep the idea of resistance alive'.²⁸

The following day the prisoners — virtually all adult males of Telaga Bage — were taken to Mataram. Here the court quickly settled the matter. The four peasant leaders were accused of incitement to rebel and convicted to terms of five years at forced labour. Although the other peasants were not brought to trial, they did receive terms of two months at forced labour (*pongor*) as a warning. In December 1906 Resident de Bruijn Kops noted with some satisfaction: ‘The energetic action in Bayan has left a good impression. The whole land tax of Telaga Bage has now been received and was paid without protest.’²⁹

*The Tax Rebellion at Bukit Limbungan 1907*

Uprisings of this type occurred with about as equal regularity as the 'mystical' risings. Disturbances which appear to have had this character took place in the village of Karang Jangkong (Central Lombok) in 1917, in Swangi (East Lombok) in 1932 and in the district of Bayan (West Lombok) in 1933.³⁰ The rebellion at Bukit Limbungan may serve as a fairly representative example of this type of disturbance and of the way in which the Dutch dealt with it.
In the beginning of November 1907 the district chief of Pringgabay, Lalu Ayub, contacted the Dutch authorities in Selong (East Lombok). He complained that, even though he had repeatedly insisted, the inhabitants of the village of Bukit Limbungan persisted in their refusal to pay the land tax or perform corvée labour. As usual, the Dutch replied that it was his responsibility to ensure obedience and suggested that he should bring the ‘ringleaders’ to Selong. Lalu Ayub attempted to carry out these instructions. On 7 November he sent a few of his followers to the village with orders to bring the two principal peasant leaders, named Ratnayu and Mertasih, before him. Probably suspecting that the district chief intended to surrender them to the Dutch, the peasant leaders refused. They told the messengers that the people of Bukit Limbungan no longer recognized Lalu Ayub’s authority, and called upon the peasants to arm themselves and march on the town of Pringgabay.31

When, early on the following morning, an angry crowd of peasants — numbering about 150 — armed with a few old-fashioned muzzle-loaders, klewang, kris and spears, appeared in Pringgabay, Lalu Ayub gave orders for the tong-tong to be sounded to call the population to the rescue. Significantly, the only people to heed the call were about 35 members of the perwangsa. The Pringgabay peasant, unwilling to risk their lives for the district chief, ignored the call and adopted a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude. After a brief battle in which the attacking rebels suffered ten casualties (five killed) and Ayub’s followers nine (three killed), the perwangsa party was forced to yield and retreated into Ayub’s fortified residence. The rebels laid siege to the building and made attempts to persuade the Pringgabay peasants to join them. With the situation rapidly becoming critical, the district chief anxiously awaited the arrival of the Dutch police force.32

Later in the day the Dutch in Selong were informed of the events in Pringgabay. Early on the morning of 9 November the Assistant Resident of Lombok, a Controleur and a police force of 50 men went to Lalu Ayub’s rescue. Upon entering Pringgabay a brief gun battle ensued in which five rebels were killed. The remainder, realizing they were no match for the much better equipped police force, abandoned the siege of the district chief’s residence and retreated in the direction of Bukit Limbungan. Before pursuing the rebels the Dutch rounded up 180 Pringgabay peasants, accused them of “failure to assist their district chief”, and placed them under guard.33

In the afternoon of the same day the police force reached Bukit Limbungan. Expecting an attack, the rebels had taken precautions. As the policemen approached they came under fire from a few riflemen hidden among the rocks. After suffering two casualties, the Assistant Resident decided that the force at his disposal was insufficient to capture the village and ordered a retreat. Trying to justify this setback he wrote: ‘Neither the Controleur, who during his long stay on Lombok has come to know the Sasak as cowardly, nor I, had expected that the people of Bukit Limbungan would be capable of developing such determined resistance.’34
The Dutch retreated to Selong and wired Mataram for reinforcements. On the morning of 11 November the Assistant Resident, a Controleur and 100 policemen again marched on the rebellious village. This time the attack met with success. In a gun battle lasting several hours the police killed six riflemen, while suffering one casualty themselves. Upon entering the village another 20 rebels were shot down. After taking 60 peasants prisoner, including the leader, Mertasih, Bukit Limbungan was put to the torch. Except for the fact that the second leader, Ratnayu and about 20 of his followers had escaped, the Dutch victory was complete.\(^35\)

In the weeks that followed, the Dutch authorities conducted an intensive investigation into the causes of the rebellion. In reply to the questions: 'Why did you people wish to kill the district chief?' and 'Why did you people resist the Assistant Resident and his soldiers?', the prisoners listed the following eight grievances:

1. That they had to pay pajeg instead of upeti;\(^36\)
2. That the taxes were too heavy;
3. That they had to maintain too large a part of the road between Pringgabaya and Lombok;
4. That the district chief had forced them to build houses for him;
5. That the district chief had ordered them to cultivate his sawahs first so that a month was lost and they began cultivating their own sawahs too late;
6. That the district chief had forced them to deliver wood for the house of the district clerk;
7. That three years ago the district chief had forced them to deliver 30 piculs of nutmeg for which they had never received payment;
8. That recently the district chief had again demanded 30 piculs of nutmeg.\(^37\)

The Dutch considered it prudent to demonstrate their 'magnanimity' by meeting some of the rebels' grievances. Not surprisingly, the complaints concerning taxation and corvée labour (1, 2 and 3), which affected the colonial order directly, were deemed groundless. But the Dutch did take some steps against the rapacious district chief, Lalu Ayub.\(^38\) Although they did not dismiss him (which was done only in exceptional circumstances), they did order him to pay the peasants of Bukit Limbungan f.915 for the nutmeg and told him to stop making excessive demands.\(^39\) Late in December 1907 the court in Selong pronounced judgement. The 180 Pringgabaya peasants who had been arrested for failure to assist the district chief were punished with terms of two months of forced labour (pongor). The surviving rebels of Bukit Limbungan received terms of six months of forced labour. And, with a view to the favourable strategic position of the village — which made it relatively easy to defend — the
population was forbidden to rebuild Bukit Limbungan on the same site. And finally, the two principal leaders of the resistance, Mertasih and Ratnayu — who had been captured on 9 December — were made examples of: they were sentenced to death and were duly hanged.

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The above exposition has shown that the great majority of the expressions of peasant discontent took the form of datu2ans (i.e. either datu2ans pure and simple, or ‘mystical’ uprisings). The frequency with which these movements occurred indicates that the belief in the return of a just ruler who would drive out the Dutch and restore the ‘golden age’ was a constant feature of peasant spiritual life. It is hardly surprising that the peasants of Lombok should so stubbornly cling to expectations of this kind. As was shown in Chapter VI, it is objectively true that the peasant’s level of material well-being deteriorated in the course of the colonial period. The real basis for the persistence of a collective longing for the return of a just ruler was not some peculiarity of an alleged Sasak ‘national’ character, but rather, was the peasant’s awareness — ensured through oral tradition — that in the past life had in fact been easier.

The exposition has further shown that the degree of violence with which the Dutch reacted to each of the three types of disturbances was quite different. This was not the result of inconsistency, but was due to the differing challenges each of these movements presented to the colonial order. The datu2an of Guru Dane, although at least potentially subversive, remained a predominantly spiritual movement and therefore did not constitute an immediate threat. To control this expression of popular discontent it was sufficient for the Dutch to arrest, imprison and, as a final resort, to banish the movement’s leader. The ‘mystical’ rising at Telaga Bage, while displaying many of the characteristics of a datu2an, had moved beyond the purely spiritual sphere. Although very naively, the messianic expectations had been linked to certain political and economic demands. The latter brought the movement into conflict with the colonial order with the result that the Dutch, seeing their interests threatened, resorted to armed force. The tax rebellion at Bukit Limbungan was a predominantly secular movement centring around specific, clearly defined political and economic demands. Because of its ‘modern’ character, this movement presented the greatest threat to the colonial order. Panicked by this direct challenge, the Dutch reacted with extreme harshness, drowned the uprising in blood, relocated the survivors and executed the leaders.

And finally, it should be pointed out that the remarkable thing about Lombok in the colonial period was not the frequency with which uprisings and disturbances occurred. Far more astonishing was the fact that the Dutch, with a second-rate police force never numbering more than about 250 men, were able for a near half-century to subject more than half a million people to unprecedented oppression and exploitation. How was this possible?
There can be no doubt that the fundamental reason was the fact that Dutch rule had a firm social basis. It is very significant that in each of the three cases presented above, the Dutch authorities upheld the power of the aristocrats in the face of peasant aspirations. Guru Dane first attracted Dutch attention when a village head saw his power and influence eroded. The Dutch punished Dane and upheld the aristocrats' power. When the peasants of Telaga Bage refused to obey their village head and district chief, the Dutch crushed the rising and upheld the power of the aristocrats. And when the peasants of Bukit Limbungan attacked their corrupt district chief — who would almost certainly have been killed — the Dutch came to the rescue, punished the peasants and upheld the aristocrats' power. In short, the Balinese and Sasak aristocracies had no reason to complain of the Dutch. Due to unwavering Dutch backing, their power over the population — which found its economic expression in the steady growth of their land ownership — was much greater than it otherwise could have been.

The fact that the Balinese and Sasak aristocrats were the twin pillars upon which Dutch rule rested had an enormously restraining influence upon the growth of the anti-colonial struggle. This is for two reasons. In the first place, since the peasant's main interest was (and is) security of subsistence — for which the goodwill of the aristocrat/landowner was essential — he was, generally speaking, reluctant to turn against him. In practice, the peasant's fear of being evicted from the land, and thus losing whatever little security he had, acted as a tremendous bulwark protecting Dutch rule. And secondly, in such cases where the peasants, driven to desperation, overcame their fear and did turn against the aristocrat/landowner (Telaga Bage and Bukit Limbungan), they obviously could not count on aristocrats to lead them, but had to conduct their struggle under their own leadership. This was an extremely limiting factor because the peasant, due to his necessarily restricted horizons, was ill-equipped to provide the all-important co-ordination at the supra-village level. For this reason, peasant-led uprisings (all of the uprisings and disturbances in the colonial period) always assumed a purely local character. Needless to say, as long as the risings remained purely local, the Dutch — assisted by the aristocrats — had little difficulty in 'restoring order'.

The Indonesian war of independence, which in the end has succeeded only in replacing the Dutch authorities by mostly Javanese rulers, has had no appreciable effect on Lombok's social structure. Now, as in the colonial era, the island's peasant population is oppressed and exploited by and through the Balinese and Sasak aristocracies. The tendencies described in Chapter VI have continued unabated. The peasant is becoming still further impoverished, land ownership is becoming ever more concentrated, and the food situation is still worsening. It is clear, however, that the continuation of this neo-colonial order is gradually leading to fundamental changes in the 'traditional' relations between the peasant and the aristocrat/landowner. In 1949 Ir. A. Perk made the following astute observation:
In most regions [of Lombok] there used to be a certain tie between the landowner and the cultivator . . . This tie gave the cultivator at least some security that his right of cultivation would not be arbitrarily taken from him. Unfortunately, I cannot escape the impression that relations between landowners and cultivator have changed basically. These relations have increasingly acquired a purely business-like character. The relative security of the cultivator has disappeared to a large extent . . . What all this means is that the cultivator has lost much.

There can be no doubt that the increasing 'hardening' of relations between peasant and aristocrat will bring the day closer when the peasant, abandoning all illusions, will become aware that he can attain a decent livelihood only through conscious revolutionary action. In the final analysis, it will only be when the Lombok peasants, as an integral part of an Indonesia-wide movement, crush the power of the Balinese and Sasa aristocracies, that the socio-political conditions will be created which will enable them to begin working towards their emancipation.
RETROSPECT

In the preceding pages an attempt was made to answer some of the central questions in the history of Selaparang. It has been shown that fundamental to the character of Balinese rule was the fact that the island had been conquered from the outside. The conquest placed the Raja and Balinese aristocracy (triwangsa or punggawas) in a much stronger power-political position than would have been the case if they had been a ruling class constituted naturally out of the indigenous Sasak people. Since successive Balinese Rajas did not hesitate in using their political power to further the interests of the House of Karangasem and the triwangsa, the land rights of the indigenous people were almost completely suppressed. It was primarily because the communal right of disposal which had been vested in the Sasak village had been transformed into an all-encompassing domain right in the hands of the Raja, that Balinese rule on Lombok must be regarded as having been oppressive.

The underlying reason for the outbreak of the East Sasak revolt was the fact that Balinese rule was unsatisfactory to both the East Sasak peasant and the Sasak aristocrat (perwangsa). The peasant was unhappy because, due to the suppression of indigenous land rights, he had descended from the status of a 'free' farmer, restricted only by the village community, to the status of a pengayah, or worse, to that of a sepangan. The perwangsa was unhappy because his political and economic position became increasingly inferior to that of the punggawas. Primarily because the perwangsa, the traditional leader of the East Sasak peasant, was more and more inclined to lead a rebellion against Balinese rule, social tension in East Lombok mounted steadily. The immediate reason for the outbreak of rebellion was the war between the Raja of Selaparang and the Dewa Agung of Klungkung. In an effort to settle accounts with his traditional rival, the Raja gave orders for several thousands of East Sasak corvée labourers to be sent to Bali. When a second levy of East Sasak troops was called up in August 1891, the district of Praya rose in rebellion, to be followed six weeks later by virtually all of East Lombok.

By 1891 the Dutch had already become interested in Selaparang. This interest had been stimulated by an 1886 report from the then Controleur F.A. Liefrinck in which it was argued that iron, tin and possibly gold were to be found on the island. This report marked the turning point in the relations between the Netherlands Indies Government and the Raja of Lombok. While for most of the 19th century the Dutch had practised a policy of 'benevolent indifference', after 1886 they resolved to make a bid for political control as soon as a favourable opportunity presented itself. The first 'opportunity' came in 1887 when an Ambonese trader was to be tried on Lombok under Balinese law. Although Governor-General van Rees used this incident as a casus belli for a show of force, the Raja refused to give in. But due to the Governor-General’s
reluctance to order a military expedition, an armed conflict was narrowly averted. The second ‘opportunity’ came in 1891 when the East Sasaks rose in rebellion. Governor-General Pynacker-Hordijk authorized a number of coercive measures which, however, failed to bring the Raja to his knees. Like his predecessor, Pynacker-Hordijk was reluctant to order a military expedition. For this reason it was not until 1894, when Van der Wijck had taken office, that the expedition was actually authorized. While the Dutch no doubt would have preferred to gain the necessary political influence in a gradual and peaceful manner, this was not possible in view of the Raja’s consistent refusal to surrender any part of his sovereignty. After the failure of the show of force in 1887, it became increasingly clear to the Dutch that if they were to gain political control and exploit the island’s promising resources, they would have to resort to armed force. But since two successive Governor-Generals shrank from taking this step, there was an interval of a number of years between the ‘discovery’ of Lombok’s economic potential and the sending of a military expedition.

The reasons for Balinese resistance were to a large extent rooted in the internal war situation on Lombok. In view of the fact that the initial treaty, while leaving no doubt as to who were to be Lombok’s rulers, did not seriously undermine triwangsa domination over the Sasak people, it is possible that the Raja and punggawas might have agreed to conclude it. The treaty, however, was never presented to the Raja and punggawas in its initial form. Faced with the categorical refusal of the East Sasak leaders to return to Balinese rule, the Dutch made a number of changes. It is clear that these last-minute revisions were a bitter pill to the Balinese rulers. The revised treaty meant that they stood to lose not only their independence, but also their positions of political and economic domination over the Sasaks. These prospects produced such discontent and anger that the Crown Prince and a number of prominent punggawas opted for an unequal armed struggle in defence of their power and privilege.

The reasons for the continuation of the East Sasak revolt were rooted in the Dutch attempt to undo the gains which the revolt had brought to the peasant. The collapse of Balinese rule over East Lombok in 1891 had led to significant changes in the system of land tenure. The pengayahs — who worked the druwe dalem lands — had stopped paying land tax (and corvée) to the Raja. Similarly, many of the sepangans — who worked the druwe jabe lands — had stopped paying a share of the harvest (and services) to the Balinese or Sasak landlord. This meant that the East Sasak peasant had acquired _de facto_ ownership over the land he was cultivating. Shortly after Balinese resistance had been overcome, the Dutch, basing themselves on the ‘right’ of conquest, assumed ownership over the druwe dalem lands. For political reasons the Dutch further decided to restore the druwe jabe lands to the ownership of the Balinese aristocracy in West Lombok and to that of the Sasak aristocracy in the East. These measures meant that peasant access to the land was again to be made
conditional on his payment of the land tax (or a share of the harvest) and performance of corvée labour (or services). The implementation of this policy led to widespread social unrest in East Lombok. However, mainly due to the fact that the Sasak aristocracy sided with the Dutch, the unrest failed to develop into a general revolt.

This drastic decline in the level of peasant well-being in the colonial period was the result of a combination of two factors. First, although the Dutch development effort which centred almost exclusively on improving and extending the irrigation-system was successful in increasing overall agricultural output, the Dutch failed to raise the productivity of agricultural labour. Since for Lombok’s most important product, rice, the increase in output was lower than the rate of population growth, per capita rice production declined. And secondly, as the colonial period progressed, the Dutch steadily increased the tax burden. In order to obtain the money needed to pay his mounting taxes, the peasant was compelled to sell an ever larger share of his product to the rice mills/export firms. These two factors resulted in a significant drop in peasant income, increasing landlessness and a gradual worsening of the food situation.

And finally, in the colonial period, hardly a year went by without a disturbance of some sort. In general, the peasant movements on Lombok took one of three forms:

(1) datu2ans, messianic movements of a predominantly spiritual character;
(2) ‘mystical’ risings, datu2ans in which specific political and economic demands were made;
(3) tax rebellions, predominantly secular movements centring around political and economic grievances.

Despite their frequent occurrence, these disturbances did not present a serious threat to the colonial order. Due to the collaboration of the Balinese and Sasak aristocracies — the traditional leaders on the supra-village level — the uprisings were always peasant-led and therefore of a purely local character. This was the principal reason why the Dutch — assisted by the aristocracies — usually had little difficulty in ‘restoring order’.
APPENDIX I

LETTERS FROM THE EAST SASAK LEADERS

This appendix contains English translations of six letters from the Sasak district chiefs to the Resident, written in the years 1891-94. These letters are strikingly different in tone from those written by the Raja. Whereas the Raja wrote in a proud and always dignified manner, the East Sasak leaders wrote humbly and respectfully; while the Raja addressed the Resident as an equal, the district chiefs made a point of addressing him as their superior. This contrast reflects profoundly different interests. The Raja was the ruler of the state of Lombok-Karangasem and was not inclined to become a Dutch puppet. To him the Dutch were unwelcome visitors with whom it was best to have as few dealings as possible. The East Sasak leaders, on the other hand, were originally only the heads of large villages. To them the Dutch were a welcome ally who could stave off their otherwise inevitable defeat, and who could assist them to consolidate their power over the peasants. The letters of the district chiefs bear witness to their growing desire for Dutch military assistance and their increasing readiness to place Lombok under colonial rule.

The first letter (A) of 13 November 1891 was written during the first Balinese offensive, at a time when the East Sasaks were losing ground in the south of Central Lombok. This letter probably came in response to feelers put out by the Resident, who had just completed a trip around Lombok. The sentence: ‘... if you should wish to be of assistance to us then come yourself or send an envoy so that we, entirely in accordance with your wishes, can provide you with information’, seems to indicate that the Resident had let it be known that he would be pleased with information as to why the East Sasaks had risen in revolt.

The desired information was soon forthcoming and took the form of the lengthy statement of grievances of 9 December 1891 (B). This letter has played an important political role. Almost three years after it was written, in June 1894, it was used by the Minister of Colonies, Bergsma, to silence the liberal opposition in the Dutch Parliament (led by the ex-Governor-General Pynacker-Hordijk) to the military expedition against the Raja of Lombok. The liberal opposition was defeated and this letter became the official Dutch justification for the annexation of Lombok. It was, needless to say, ideally suited to such an ideological role. The letter purported to show how cruelly the Sasaks had been oppressed, which was precisely what was needed for the conclusion that the Dutch Colonial Army had been entirely justified in defeating the Balinese ‘tyrants’.

The next three letters of 1 October, 30 October and 12 November 1892 (C, D and E), were written during and shortly after the second Balinese offensive. The East Sasak leaders had been frightened by the Balinese reconquest of
the districts of Batukliyang, Kopang, Rarang and Kotaraja and frantically sought Dutch assistance. These three letters differed from the two previous ones in that the district chiefs no longer limited themselves to asking for Dutch help in the form of war materials, but went so far as to invite the Dutch to take possession of the island. While in Letter C they asked the Resident: ‘... to take the people under his protection’, in Letter D they were more explicit. In this letter they wrote: ‘... we declare with all sincerity that we deliver the land of Selaparang into the hands of the Governor-General’.

The last letter of 18 April 1894 (F), was written shortly before the landing of the Dutch Colonial Army, at a time when the economic situation in that part of East Lombok still controlled by the district chiefs was rapidly deteriorating. It is worthy of note that the three East Sasak leaders who signed this letter styled themselves ‘Your Subject’.
LETTER A

Translation of a letter from Raden Mawah, Jero Mustiaji and Mami Bangkol, to the Resident of Bali and Lombok

13 November 1891

This is a letter from us, poor and stupid people by the names of Raden Mawah residing in Rarang, Jero Mustiaji of Kopang, and Mami Bangkol of Praya, and further from all the Radens, Jeros and Pambekels who live in Selaparang to the East of the palaces of the Raja.

To you exalted Lord Resident of Buleleng do we address ourselves and to you we send our regards.

Further, do we inform you that when you visited the Eastern ports of Selaparang we had gone off to war so that we were ignorant of your arrival. We only learned this from Said Ibrahim, who fled from Ampenan to Buleleng. He informed us of this. We became very angry with the people residing on the coast for not inviting you to come ashore to meet us, since this would have been most agreeable to us.

Also, in former times when we were still under Balinese rule we already wished to meet you. How much more do we wish this now, so that we could inform you of the way in which the Balinese ruled and for which reasons the revolt, which has already taken the lives of so many, has broken out.

For these reasons we should like so much to meet you. And if you should wish to be of assistance to us then come yourself or send an envoy so that we, entirely in accordance with your wishes, can provide you with information.

We also wanted to write you about the relations between the Sasaks and Balinese in former times, but we are unable to do this; we are only inhabitants of the interior and on top of that we are very stupid.

Also this letter is not as it should be. But we hope that you will nevertheless accept it.

Also we wished to ask for your assistance because we particularly lack rifles and ammunition. If you, Lord Resident, take pity on us, then you will surely buy us rifles, gunpowder, lead and percussion-caps.

Again we ask to be forgiven for all that is wrong in this letter, but we do not know the form and are very stupid.

If it is at all possible then answer this letter or send an envoy.

Written at Kopang, at a great meeting of heads on the 10th of the month of Rabingulahir 1309 (13 November 1891).

Raden Ratmawa of Rarang
Jero Mustiaji of Kopang
Mami Bangkol of Praya
LETTER B

Translation of a letter from Mami Mustiaji,
Raden Ratmawa, Mami Bangkol, Raden Wiranom, Mami Nursasi,
Raden Melayu and Jero Ginawang to the
Resident of Bali and Lombok

9 December 1891

This letter is from us, poor and stupid people, by name: Mami Mustiaji,
Raden Ratmawa, Mami Bangkol, Raden Wiranom, Mami Nursasi, Raden Melayu
and Jero Ginawang, respectively residing at, and ruling over, Kopang, Rarang,
Praya, Pringgabaya, Sakra, Masbagik and Batukliyang.

We also write in the name of the inhabitants of all the villages and hamlets
in this land and we convey our most respectful greetings to the Resident in
Buleleng.

We hope you have received our previous letter. We now want to provide
you with some information concerning the relations between the Mohammedans
and Balinese.

In the first place we bring to your knowledge that the land of Selaparang
originally belong to the Mohammedans; from generation to generation have our
ancestors owned this land. The Balinese, coming from elsewhere, have taken
possession of the royal dignity by force and have brought the whole land under
their rule.

We have recognized them in their royal dignity, have become their
subordinates and have always, to the best of our knowledge, obeyed all their
commands; and yet we have been cruelly treated and exploited.

In accordance with their commands we have always paid the taxes on
rice-fields and gardens and have always raised sufficient padi, kepings and rice.
We have never failed in this because we were the subordinates and they were the
masters who ruled the land.

We have always punctually obeyed their commands when we were ordered
to construct houses or other buildings, to lay out pleasure gardens and roads.
When appearing for such labour we brought our own food, which was very
difficult especially for those who had come from afar. Not only did we have to
perform such labour for the Raja, but also for the subordinate Balinese heads,
and still, as has already been mentioned, we were harshly treated. Putting people
to death was also taken very lightly and occurred without any previous investi-
gation; the same was true with drowning people in the sea. When someone was
in disfavour, then he would simply be found guilty of some crime and sentenced;
we did not dare to rebel against this. Often our possessions, such as rice fields,
gardens, buffaloes and cows were taken from us without any compensation,
even though, as has already been mentioned, we did not fail to pay our taxes.
They frequently made slaves of our sons, while the girls, especially those of good family, were taken by force; some they then took for themselves, while others were treated badly and ended up as prostitutes. Sometimes grown-up girls were taken, sometimes children at the youthful age of seven. It has happened that the parents went mad, but what was to be done? No one dared to even talk about it.

Every year the taxes were raised by more than what was reasonable. We had planted coffee, but after the harvest the Raja’s men came to seize the whole product so that we did not even have sufficient left for our own use. When a quantity of only two or three kati of coffee was found in someone’s house, it was immediately seized and, in addition, the owner was fined; the same occurred with the coffee we received from Buleleng or Sumbawa.

If the Raja or punggawas desired something, be it people, horses or pieces of clothing, they simply took it without giving any compensation.

By order of the Raja, cock fights and dice-playing had to take place continuously; those who possessed something lost everything, while others were driven to theft. The Rajas wanted this because they levied taxes on these games. The people, however, became poverty-stricken. When these games were not held regularly in any village, the head of the village was punished.

The regulations concerning the inhabitants of the coast were of such a nature that it was very difficult for them to provide the necessities of life; import and export duties were levied and some types of commodities, which ought not to have been farmed out, were nevertheless farmed out.

The taxes and duties mentioned above were increased exorbitantly. The Raja did not care in the least about the prosperity of the land or about the interests of the people of the island.

We have further learned that in Ampenan the Rajas have introduced a tax on kepangs; when someone pays off debts or collects them, one per cent of that amount has to be paid in tax. This tax also applies to people from the interior who come to buy commodities. The bandar of this tax is a certain Enci Umar, as you might already have learned.

We have obeyed these commands of the Raja since we were their subordinates. But in respect to the matters mentioned above, the injustice became too great as you can judge for yourself.

Further we inform you that when the war broke out between Karangasem and Klungkung we were ordered by the Raja to hold weapons and food in readiness. Soon after, the inhabitants of some districts were called up and they obeyed the command. Those who possessed something took this with them to provide for their sustenance. But those who did not possess anything were very badly cared for in Karangasem. Finally, those who had sufficient food left, fled and returned here. But there are also those who stayed behind, and even now we do not know whether they are dead or alive. In this way we have always obeyed the commands of the Raja.
Further we inform you that when a Mohammedan dies without leaving a male heir, all his female relatives as well as his estate, his movable and immovable property, is appropriated by the Raja. The girls will come to no good, they end up as prostitutes. If the deceased has brothers, they do not receive anything either. When Balinese from Karangasem are banished here they receive the lands left by the deceased in order to oppress the Sasak population as much as possible.

Perhaps you have already learned what has happened to the Chinese bandar Kecu who died in Ampenan. He only left a wife and a brother, he did not have sons. We are treated in the same way.

The people are often not allowed to bring under cultivation lands which are suitable to be made into rice fields or gardens. These lands are turned into hunting grounds and are used exclusively for the pleasure of the Raja. One finds such grounds everywhere because the Raja says he does not have to take pity on the Mohammedans, for if he does they will only rise in rebellion against him.

From this you can judge how badly we are treated by our rulers. The Raja had let it be known that he had heard that some Mohammedans planned to rebel against him, but that owing to the complications connected with the war on Bali he was unable to do anything. He promised that after the war all those who had wanted to rebel as well as all the notable Mohammedans would be put to death. The Balinese punggawa Ida Bagus Gama Oka had said this in the house of Haji Abdulrahman in Ampenan in the presence of many people.

Several young people who served in the palace had heard the same thing and told us about it. There was no cause whatsoever for the Raja to make this decision. Many times we heard that Mohammedans, especially from Praya, would be put to death. A young man from Praya, serving in the palace, had also heard it and told the people of his village. Shortly afterwards a Mohammedan was put to death on the orders of the Balinese punggawa of Praya on the pretext that he had stolen padi. However this was not true.

Guru Bangkol went to see the punggawa three times but his complaints were not heard. He therefore returned to Praya and informed the people of his village what had happened together with the fact that the Raja had said they would put them all to death. Immediately the people of Praya went to war. This occurred on the second of the month Muharam (8 August).

When the revolt broke out in Praya, other Mohammedans did not know anything about it and therefore obeyed the order to move against Praya, which was then surrounded and many hamlets belonging to it were burned. People of that village who surrendered because they did not wish to take part in the revolt were, nevertheless, immediately put to death. Amongst these were many old people, women and children. We obeyed the Raja’s command to fight against Praya, and there were also some dead and wounded on our side. However, our sustenance was not provided and we had to look after ourselves. Those who came from afar suffered privations.
In this way we obeyed the commands of the Raja and yet we were not trusted. He said the reason why the revolt in Praya had not been crushed sooner was because all Mohammedans secretly agreed with these people and therefore did not fight more forcefully.

The head of Batukliyang together with his children and followers, 13 in all, were called from Pujan to Sakra and on arrival they were all murdered. The same fate befell Mami Arduna of Praya. A son of the murdered head of Batukliyang has also signed this letter. When this happened the Raja was in Puyong, near Praya, and all the Radens and heads of the district of Timur Juring were present. Mami Nursasi, head of Sakra, was ordered to bring a cannon to Mataram, and after leaving he learned that he was to be taken prisoner. He immediately fled back to the village of Sakra. The same day 150 inhabitants of Sakra, 150 from Jro Aru and 150 from other villages, altogether numbering 450, were taken prisoner and tied up. When the Mohammedans heard that all these people were to be put to death they also decided to rise in rebellion. They could no longer allow their fellow countrymen to be butchered like chickens. The Raja also said he would put to death all the haji because they had incited the Sasaks. The haji have never done this; no one incited us. We decided to rise in rebellion for the reasons stated above.

We are but poor people; what is to be done? We have endured all the things of which we have informed you and that is not even a tenth of everything we have had to endure. We only hope that you will wish to meet us. We can then inform you of all that has bearing on our unhappy state. We have not been able to do this in our letter because we are stupid and ignorant people who do not know the forms. We hope also that you will consider all the things of which we have informed you as though it concerned yourself.

If we have been lacking in our expression or in any other respect we hope you will not be offended.

We further remind you of what we asked in our previous letter concerning weapons and we express our wish that you will be kind enough to reply to this letter.

This letter has been written by Jero Mami Mustiaji of Kopang with the approval of all the Mohammedans of this land and also of those whose villages are not separately listed.

We offer our most respectful greetings and hope to receive an answer.

Written in Kopang on the 7th of the Month Juma-dilawal 1309 (9 December 1891).

Jero Mustiaji of Kopang
Mami Bangkol of Praya
Mami Nursasi of Sakra
Jero Ginawang of Batukliyang
Raden Wiranom of Pringgabayu
Raden Melayu Kusuma of Masbagik
LETTER C

Translation of a letter from six Sasak heads to the Resident of Bali and Lombok

1 October 1892

This is a letter from Raden G'de Ratmawa of Rarang, Mami Bangkol of Praya, Raden Melayu Kusuma of Basbagik, Raden Wiranom of Pringgabaya and Mami Mustiaji of Kopang, who live in Selaparang.

Instead of having and audience with you we present you with this letter in order to inform you that because of the war we are experiencing great difficulties.

We only hope for your assistance and your pity. We place the people under your protection and shall act entirely in accordance with your views and shall carry out your plans.

Further, we hope that you will travel to Lombok in order to conduct a personal investigation in the districts ruled by us. We send our relative, Raden Kertasih, as our envoy and from him you will be able to obtain all necessary information. We fervently hope you will grant our request.

This letter is provided with our signatures and our seals.
Written today the 9th of the month Rabulawal 1310 (1 October 1892).

Raden Ratmawa of Rarang
Raden Melayu Kusuma of Masbagik
Mami Nursasi of Sakra
Raden G'de Wiranom of Pringgabaya
Mami Mustiaji of Kopang
LETTER D

Translation of a letter from Sasak heads to the Resident of Bali and Lombok

30 October 1892

Reverently presented to the Lord Resident in Buleleng by Jero G’de Sekar, Raden Ratmawa and Mami Bangkol.

The three of us have again deliberated with one another and decided to once more put forward our earlier request in the hope that we may soon receive a favourable reply. If we do not soon receive a favourable reply we fear that, in the meantime, all our people will be killed, for the Balinese are vigorously continuing the war using firearms and we do not possess these and have to defend ourselves with hatchets.

Therefore we have all agreed, the notable as well as the lowly, to declare with all sincerity that we deliver the land of Selaparang into the hands of the Governor-General and we all count on his assistance.

When, with his help, the Balinese have been driven from this land, and their name has disappeared, so that the land has been cleansed of Balinese, we shall all joyfully obey your commands. It is also necessary in order for us to have one head, ruling over both the notable and the lowly, so that we can be of one mind and end the situation in which everyone is his own master. This is the reason why the war has lasted such a long time; there is no co-operation; everyone wants to elevate himself to be Raja.

Further we beg your indulgence if the form of this letter is not as it should be and finally we hope to receive a reply soon concerning our request to be allowed to become the subjects of the Government.

Written on the 8th day of the month Rabigulahir 1310 (30 October 1892).

The three of us have signed the letter.

Jero G’de
Raden Ratmawa
Mami Bangkol
LETTER E

Translation of a letter from Sasak heads to the Resident of Bali and Lombok

12 November 1892

Reverently presented by the Sasak heads residing on the island of Selaparang, by name: Raden Ratmawa of Rarang, Mami Bangkol of Praya, Raden Wiranom of Pringgabaya, Raden Melayu Kusuma of Masbagik, Mami Nursasi of Sakra, Mami Mustiaji of Kopang.

We ask respectfully and urgently to be given a reply to our letter of the 9th of Rabuilawal 1310 (1 October 1892) and to the request we made. We hope you will take pity on your Mohammedan subjects on Lombok and will grant our prayer. Exalted Lord Resident, we are in great distress and are very disheartened because we do not have rifles and gunpowder. We hope you will send us a written reply.

We have all signed this letter, provided it with our seals and send it with our envoy Raden Sukra.

We wanted to bring this to your notice.

Written on the 21 Rabingulahir 1310 (12 November 1892).

Raden Ratmawa of Rarang
Mami Bangkol of Praya
Raden Wiranom of Pringgabaya
Raden Melayu Kusuma of Masbagik
Mami Nursasi of Sakra
Mami Mustiaji of Kopang
LETTER F

Translation of a letter by the heads of the insurgents on Lombok to the Resident of Bali and Lombok

18 April 1894

We, the heads of the Sasak population of Selaparang, by name: Raden Satraji of Rarang, Mami Bangkol of Praya, Raden Wiranom of Pringgabaya, Raden Melayu Kusuma of Masbagik, Mami Kertawang of Saka, Mami Mustiaji of Kopang, present you with a written petition in order to inform the Governor-General in Batavia of the two requests we have made, which we have also communicated to the Controleur who on the 30th of the month of Saban came to investigate the conditions under which your subjects live. There is famine in our land and because of this people have become ill and died. The Controleur already knows of this.

We shall be brief in our request and express the hope that we shall soon receive help in the war, as only you can grant our prayers. We are unable to wage war because your subjects suffer great deprivations, and it is for this reason that we request your assistance before the rice harvest in the coming month of Sawal.

Of the above-named heads who have all been heard, only three shall sign this letter. We hope you will grant our request and we send our envoy to present you with this letter.

Written at Pringgabaya the 12th of the month of Sawal 1311 (18 April 1894).

Your Subject Melayu Kusuma of Masbagik
Your Subject Wiranom of Pringgabaya
Your Subject Satraji of Rarang
APPENDIX II
LAST LETTERS FROM THE RAJA OF SELAPARANG

This appendix consists of English translations of six letters from Ratu Agung2 Ngurah written during the weeks immediately prior to his fall. In contrast to those from the East Sasak chiefs, all these letters were drawn up according to a set format with standard introductions and conclusions. The first letter (10 July 1894) came in response to the second Dutch ultimatum. This letter indicates just how anxious the Raja was to avoid a war against the Netherlands Indies Government. He accepted all the demands of the ultimatum, except the demand for the extradition of his son, Anak Agung Made. Arguing that in view of Made’s large following among the Lombok punggawas, it was not within his power to surrender Made, he requested that this demand be dropped.

The second letter (11 July 1894) was a last minute effort to save Made’s life. In this letter Ratu Agung2 Ngurah requested that he himself be allowed to banish Made to Karangasem, and indicated his intention to sentence his son to death should this request also be rejected. But Vetter and Dannenburgh once more insisted on the extradition and again threatened with violence. Upon receipt of this message the Raja had little choice but to pronounce the death sentence over Made. As is indicated by this letter, Vetter and Dannenburgh knew that their rejection of Ratu Agung2 Ngurah’s request would have this consequence. For this reason they must be regarded as Made’s actual executioners.

The third letter (1 September 1894) was written a few days after the outbreak of the Dutch-Balinese conflict. The Raja informs Dannenburgh that war has broken out because Dutch troops began firing at his palace, to which his followers were forced to reply in self-defence. The Raja’s explanation was incorrect. It was not the Dutch, but the Crown Prince and a group of dissatisfied punggawas who began the war. After hostilities had commenced, these dissenting punggawas were joined by most of the population of Mataram and Cakranegara. It is, however, more than likely that Ratu Agung2 Ngurah believed the Dutch to have begun firing, as this, no doubt, was the explanation his punggawas gave him. The Raja continued by expressing his wish to live in friendship with the Netherlands Indies Government. Seeking to capitalise on the Balinese victory, he made the release of the 80 (actually 81) Dutch prisoners conditional on the departure of the military expedition from Lombok.

The fourth letter (7 September 1894) from the Raja to General Vetter was brought to Ampenan by the released Dutch prisoners. This letter was written after it had become evident that the Dutch, instead of leaving the island, were building up their forces. Again, Ratu Agung2 Ngurah expressed his desire to live in friendship with the Netherlands Indies Government. As a token of his sincere desire for peace he announced the unconditional release of the Dutch prisoners.
The fifth letter (1 November) from the Raja to the Resident was written after the Dutch conquest of Pagasangan and Mataram, when the entire Balinese population of Lombok had become concentrated in the town of Cakranegara. This letter came in response to Dutch overtures for a negotiated settlement to the war. (These overtures, it should be noted, emanated from Vetter and Dannenburgh and had not been approved by the Governor-General.) In the belief that the Dutch sought a compromise settlement, Ratu Agung2 Ngurah defined his bargaining position. In view of his desperate military situation, it is remarkable that the Raja told the Resident that he 'held on to the treaty with His Majesty the King of the Netherlands', which 'has been signed and sealed' and which he 'dared not change'. The treaty Ratu Agung2 Ngurah referred to was the one of 1843 (see Appendix 3: Part 1), by which, in exchange for a purely formal recognition of Dutch sovereignty, the Netherlands Indies Government had promised 'never to make an attempt to establish itself on Lombok, nor interfere with the internal administration of the island'. The Raja's reference to the 1843 treaty meant that he sought a settlement on the basis of the withdrawal of the military expedition and an end to Dutch interference in the Balinese-East Sasak conflict.

The sixth letter (18 November), the last Ratu Agung2 Ngurah ever wrote, was written only hours before the Dutch began their infantry attack on Cakranegara. It came in response to a threatening letter from Vetter and Dannenburgh of 6 November, in which they told the Raja that there would be no question of a return to the 1843 treaty, accused him of having had prior knowledge of the plan to stage an attack on the Dutch troops, and informed him that the war could only be ended if he 'begged forgiveness'. In his somewhat belated reply, the Raja denied the accusation. Not unreasonably, he asked Vetter and Dannenburgh whether, if he had planned to wage war, he would have agreed to pay the indemnity of 400 000 rijksdaalders, of which he had already paid 269 000 rijksdaalders and 2000 gold pieces, when the attack occurred. But in spite of his denial, Ratu Agung2 Ngurah 'begged forgiveness for himself and for his punggawas'.
LETTER A

Translation of a letter from the Raja of Selaparang to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy

10 July 1894

This sincere letter, proceeding from a clear conscience and accompanied by greetings and homage, is presented through the assistance of the Lord of all Worlds, by me, the exalted and beloved Ratu Agung2 Ngurah Karangasem, who has the power to rule over the lands of Selaparang and Karangasem and who is seated in greatness upon His throne in the palace in Mataram, to Major-General J.A. Vetter, Knight in the Military Order of William, 4th Class, Knight in the Order of the Netherlands Lion, endowed with the Sabre of Honour, who has the supreme command over the Netherlands Army and Navy in Selaparang and resides aboard the steamship Maetsuycker in the Roads of Ampenan.

May the life of our friend and those of his relatives be prolonged in well-being and prosperity.

Further do we send this letter in order to inform our friend that we have received his letter written in the Roads of Ampenan on 4 July 1894.

In his letter our friend informs us that we have refused to accept the demands made by the Resident of Bali and Lombok in the name of His Excellency the Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies. We have fully understood everything mentioned in the letter and therefore will not enlarge upon it. We accept the intervention of Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, which will be beneficial to us, so that there soon may come an end to the unrest in the land of Selaparang. In the first place, we hope that his Excellency the Governor-General and Her Majesty the Queen may forgive us for our improper attitude and actions. In the second place, we promise to obey the commands of His Excellency the Governor-General, which will be to our benefit. In the third place, we are prepared to accept the mediation of our friend the Resident of Bali and Lombok in order to settle the confused situation on Selaparang. In the fourth place, we are prepared to abdicate in favour of our son Ratu Agung2 K’tut Karangasem. In the fifth place, we are prepared to conclude a new treaty according to the views of the Government. In the sixth place, we are prepared to pay for all the costs incurred by the Government in properly maintaining the troops which will assist us in putting an end to the complications on Selaparang. In the seventh place, insofar as the demand for the extradition of our son, Anak Agung Made, is concerned, we hope that the Government will give us some respite. Later, when peace will have returned to Selaparang, we, together with the Government, will consider his guilt. If the banishment of our son were to occur now, at a time when we still have many enemies, our difficulties would increase even further. If he and his followers were to resist us,
the enemies we would have to fight would greatly increase in numbers. Therefore we hope for a just decision by the Government and we trust that the Government will not be unjust in this matter. We further beg the Government’s forgiveness for being somewhat late with our reply.

May the life of our friend be long and prosperous.

Written in the palace in Mataram on the sixth day of the month of Moharam of the year 1312.
LETTER B

Translation of a letter from the Raja of Selaparang
to the Commander-in-Chief of the military expedition
to Lombok

11 July 1894

Further do we inform our friend that we have duly received his letter of 10 July and that we have fully understood its contents. We shall be brief in our reply. Considering that our friend has strongly insisted that the demand for the extradition of our son, Anak Agung Made Karangasem, also be accepted, we acquiesce in it. We propose, however, that we ourselves banish him to Culi or Tianyar on Bali. If others than we ourselves take this measure against him our land will experience difficulties, and he shall lose his life this very day. We inform our friend of this so that we will be able to receive a written reply today and the troops will not have to come to Mataram and Cakranegara. We propose that we ourselves settle the matter this very day in order to prevent trouble coming over the land.

Further do we inform our friend that when our son Anak Agung Made moves to the island Bali or when he dies, we very much hope that our friend shall without delay put an end to the unrest in the land of Selaparang.

Written in Mataram on the seventh day of the month Moharam of the year 1312.
LETTER C

Translation of a letter from the Raja of Selaparang
to the Resident of Bali and Lombok

1 September 1894

[Usual introduction]

We send this letter to inform our friend that on the 22 of the month of Safar of this year, when the troops resided in front of the palace in Cakranegara and when we were just consulting with our son Anak Agung Jilantik, a number of rifleshots were heard coming from the front of the palace. One of our people came to tell us that without any reason the troops had begun firing at our subjects and at our mantries who stood on guard. Alarmed hereby, our followers went outside to defend themselves against the troops. The result was that many of our followers and many of the troops lost their lives.

In spite of this we intend to confirm our friendship with our friend, with His Excellency the Governor-General and with Her Majesty the Queen. We do not at all wish to live in enmity. We therefore ask for this war to be ended and we request that our friend and the troops shall soon depart from Ampenan. We further hope that the friendship between us and our friend, between us and His Excellency the Governor-General and between us and Her Majesty the Queen, will remain as it has been so that the people will not be obstructed in their efforts to find the means of sustenance.

Further, the column our friend has sent east of the mountains returned from the east. When the troops returned they attacked the villages west of Narmada, managed to enter the town of Cakranegara and fought the people until they were taken prisoners. We hold 10 Europeans, 50 Javanese and 20 convicts prisoner and have provided them with quarters and with food. If you should wish to end this war and return home and not again begin battle we shall release the prisoners. We wish to grant them their lives, and wish to send them back. We hope that you will reply to our letter.

[Usual end]

Written in the palace in Mataram on the 29th of the month Safar of the Mohammedan year 1312.
LETTER D

Translation of a letter from the Raja of Selaparang to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy

7 September 1894

[Usual introduction]

Further do we inform our friend that we have taken prisoner 11 Dutchmen, a Captain by the name of Lindgreen, a doctor by the name of Uljaki and a Lieutenant by the name of Van der Plank, as well as 50 Javanese soldiers and 20 convicts. These troops our friend had sent to the eastern part of the island.

When they returned from the east they attacked a village. This is how the war started. Later they were taken prisoner by our subjects; whereupon they asked for their lives to be spared. We have granted them their lives, have given them adequate quarters within our palace and have provided them with food.

Now we allow all these people to return to Ampenan. The reason why we send them back is that we have never intended to live in enmity with our friend, with His Excellency the Governor-General or with Her Majesty the Queen. If our friend acknowledges this it will be best to end the war so that not too many people will die. It is the wish of our friend to put an end to the unrest on Selaparang in a peaceful manner. We have agreed to this wish and shall implement it so that the friendship between our friend and us shall be confirmed and be continued by our descendants. We further request that this letter be sent to our friend His Excellency the Governor-General. We very much hope that our friend the Governor-General shall be notified.

[Usual end]

Written in the palace of Mataram on the 6th of the month Rabulawal of the year 1312.
LETTER E

Translation of a letter from the Raja of Selaparang to the Resident of Bali and Lombok

1 November 1894

[Usual introduction]

We send you this letter because my punggawa Ida K’tut Gelgel has told me that envoys have come from Ampenan. These envoys by the names of I Jamat, I Gilih and Mahkmudin requested my punggawa to inform me that the letter written on paper which we gave to a Captain and a doctor and in which we requested that the war be ended was regarded as not received because the letter had not been delivered by an envoy. They further requested our punggawa to inform us that if we really wished the war to be ended we would again have to write a letter which would then be received. For the above reason we have written this letter and request that the war be ended. We have never even thought of committing hostilities against the Government or against His Majesty the King of the Netherlands. We have always been friendly disposed towards the Government, as is prescribed in the treaty. Nothing may be added to or deleted from the treaty; also not by the descendants who shall rule.

This treaty has been approved by the Government and by His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, has been signed and sealed.

We therefore hold on to the treaty which we dare not change. When revolt broke out in the land of Selaparang, we experienced much resistance from the Islamites of the village of Praya. We went deep into the land to the place of the enemies. When an emissary arrived from the Government we were not able to speak to him personally, but did appoint someone to receive him. How could it be taken amiss that we, overburdened by pressing matters, did not sufficiently value the interest the Government showed?

We now request our friends that our intentions will be brought to the knowledge of the Government. If the Government has pity on us it will cease the war.

The reason why the war has started we do not know. We were informed that the soldiers during the night fired at the walls of our puri so that the buildings were damaged by cannon fire and one of our subjects was mortally wounded by a bullet. As a result unrest came over the land. Our subjects fired back so that it was no longer possible to put an end to the fighting.

We, however, trust in the justice of the Government and the Queen of the Netherlands. We trust that the friendship which always existed between us shall be renewed, so that friends will no longer wage war against friends, the land be saved from destruction, and many be saved from death.

[Usual end]

Written in the palace of Cakranegara on the 2 Jumada-al-aula of the year 1312.
LETTER F

Translation of a letter from the Raja of Selaparang to the Resident of Bali and Lombok and the Commander-in-Chief

18 November 1894

[Usual introduction]

We further inform you that we have received the letter from our friends the Resident and the General written in Ampenan on 6 November 1894, and that we have fully understood that letter. Because our friends' letter differed from our earlier letter, we shall not discuss it any further. In the letter which Anak Agung Jilantik brought us we were informed that you had received information that the troops in Cakranegara would be attacked. That letter was not clear about the names of the persons who wished to commit hostilities. Just as we wanted to reply to that letter, rifle and cannon shots were heard outside. As we have already informed our friends, we believed that it was only slander. After the firing had started, we have questioned all our subordinates. There was not one who confessed to have been the first to fire. We were not aware that there were persons with evil intentions. Our own intentions were none other than those we informed you of in our earlier letter. We have never even thought of acting in an evil way; not against anybody, let alone against the Government or against Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands. We feel ourselves small and not capable of resistance. We have never planned to do something improper. Because we are stupid, may matters be settled in the manner the Government and Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands see fit. If we or our punggawas have acted improperly we beg forgiveness for ourselves and our punggawas. We hope that our friend will remember that we are stupid, will have pity on us, and will end this war.

When the General and an army came to the island of Selaparang, we were informed that this occurred on orders of the Government to end the unrest and re-establish peace and prosperity on Selaparang. Because we had faith in this we accepted the treaty in good grace. Before an end had been made to the unrest in Selaparang we were informed that the Government demanded compensation for the costs of troops. We also agreed to this demand. Although this is only a small island and we were unable to pay the large sum in silver and gold, we have nevertheless tried to do this as much as possible. We paid 269,000 rijksdaalders and 2000 gold pieces. That much had already been received by the envoy of the Resident and the General. If we had had evil intentions, we would surely not have allowed the General to bring troops and we would surely not have paid such a large sum. Since we are stupid in thinking, we hope that the Government will take pity on us and will take everything into consideration. Perhaps it was slander which has changed the friendly feelings of the Government towards us. We hope that our friends will take this letter into consideration. Whatever the decision of the Government may be, we hope to receive a reply.

[Usual end]

Written in the palace of Cakranegara on the 19 Jumada al-aula of the year 1312.
APPENDIX III
POLITICAL TREATIES BETWEEN THE NETHERLANDS INDIES GOVERNMENT AND THE RAJAS OF SELAPARANG

This appendix consists of three parts.

Part I is an English translation of the treaty concluded in 1843. The main reason why the Dutch were anxious to conclude a treaty at that time was their fear that the island might come under the domination of another European power, particularly Britain. The 1843 treaty, which was concluded without coercion on the part of the Dutch, was not very exacting to the Raja. Although Ratu Agung2 Ngurah K’utut Karangasem (the elder brother of Ratu Agung2 Ngurah) by Article 1 declared Selaparang to be under Dutch sovereignty (since the word ‘sovereignty’ was unknown in the Balinese language, the word ‘property’ was used), this was a mere formality because by Article 7 the Dutch promised never to establish themselves on the island.

Part II of this Appendix is an English translation of the treaty the Dutch wished to conclude when they sent the military expedition in July 1894. However, due to revisions prompted by the opposition from the East Sasak district chiefs, the treaty was never presented to Anak Agung K’utut and the punggawas in this form. It is possible that had the treaty not been revised at the last moment, it might have been acceptable to the Balinese. The main reason for this supposition is that the treaty, although harsh, was in some important respects not unfavourable to the Balinese. What should be noted about this treaty is that while it ensured that overall political and economic power would pass to the Dutch, it did not greatly affect Balinese domination over the island’s Sasak population.

Part III of this Appendix consists of English translations of the four Articles which were revised as a consequence of East Sasak opposition. The treaty actually presented to Anak Agung K’tut and the punggawas was the treaty of Part II in which Articles 17, 20, 27 and 29 had been superseded by the revised versions of Part III. This revised treaty was the immediate cause of the Dutch-Balinese war on Lombok. It was totally unacceptable to the Balinese punggawas. The treaty ensured not only that Dutch power would be firmly established on Lombok, but also that the punggawas would lose their position of political and economic domination over the Sasaks. Rather than sign this treaty the Balinese chose to engage the Dutch colonial army in a desperate struggle in defence of their power and privilege.
PART I

Complete Text of the Treaty of 1843

Agreement, reached by Mr Hendrik Jacob Huskus Koopman, commissioned plenipotentiary of the Netherlands Indies Government, and His Highness Ratu Agung2 Ngurah K‘tut Karangasem, Raja of Mataram, at present sole ruler of the island of Selaparang and dependencies.

Article 1

I, Ratu Agung2 Ngurah K‘tut Karangasem, Raja of Mataram, at present sole ruler over the island of Selaparang and dependencies, acting for myself as well as for my successors, declare that island to be the property of the Netherlands Indies Government.

Article 2

I, Raja, therefore promise never to surrender the aforementioned island, or any part thereof to any white nation, of whatever name. I further promise never to enter into an alliance with any such nation.

Article 3

I and my successors shall send a delegation to Batavia every three years to pay homage to His Excellency the Governor-General, who is the representative of His Majesty the King. A delegation shall be sent for the first time in this current year of 1843. During the delegates’ stay on Java they shall be maintained at the Government’s expense. The delegates shall further enjoy the Government’s special protection.

Article 4

If the Government should think fit, for any reason, to send a representative to Selaparang from time to time, the representative shall enjoy the same privileges there as those guaranteed in the foregoing article to the delegates from Selaparang.

Article 5

The Commissioner and the above-named Raja consider that an end should be put to the barbarous practice on the island of Selaparang known by the name of tawang-karang (right of jetsom), by which the cargo of ships and vessels wrecked off the coast of this island ceases to belong to the passengers and crew — who, besides losing their property, are exposed to the most cruel ill-usage. To this purpose, the following regulations are laid down:
(a) Ratu Agung2 Ngurah K’tut Karangasem declares that in compliance with the desire of the aforesaid Government, he makes an irrevocable renunciation for all time of the right known as tawang-karang as described above.

(b) The Raja promises that, in future, any ship or vessel unfortunate enough to be wrecked off any part of the coast within his dominion, together with the passengers and crew, shall receive all possible help, such as is given in all the lands under the Netherlands Indies Government.

(c) Salvage money for goods saved shall be calculated at between 15 and 50 per cent of the value of the saved goods. The minimum of 15 per cent shall be accepted only on goods which have been saved with very little trouble or danger. The maximum of 50 per cent shall be paid when, for instance, there is need for deep diving involving danger to life and the incurring of heavy expenditure. The amount of salvage money shall always be fixed by an arbitration committee in accordance with the above-mentioned scale. In all cases the amount shall be fixed in accordance with the danger to life, the trouble and expense incurred in the recovery of the goods. The Committee shall consist of:

one member representing the Netherlands Indies Government,

one member representing the Raja of Selaparang,

one member representing the wrecked vessel.

The member elected to represent the Netherlands Indies Government is George Pocock King, merchant, at present residing in Ampenan.

Article 6
The Raja further promises that the most active protection shall be afforded to all trade in general.

Article 7
The Netherlands Indies Government declares that as long as the Rajas of Selaparang faithfully carry out the foregoing articles it will make no attempt to establish itself on the island, nor to interfere with the internal administration thereof, which administration shall, on the contrary, be left entirely under the control of the Rajas of the country.

Concluded at the palace of Mataram in the island of Selaparang, on this the seventh day of June eighteen hundred and forty-three.

Signed: H.J. Huskus Koopman
By decree of the Commissioner of the islands of Bali and
Lombok, the accredited envoy to the islands,

Signed: W.H. Brouwer

The preceding signatures, written in Balinese characters are of the ruling Raja:
Ratu Agung 2 Ngurah K’tut Karangasem, and the Raja’s younger brother, the
probable successor to the throne: Anak Agung Ngurah Karangasem, as well as
the following five punggawas:

Gusti G’dé Wanasari
Dewa Anom
Gusti G’dé Rai
Gusti Ninga Paguyangan, and
Gusti Nyoman Tankeban

I, the undersigned, declare that I was present at the concluding of this treaty
and respectfully accept the appointment as a member of the arbitration
committee.

Signed: G.P. King

Appendix

The present treaty is confirmed on this the 28th day of August 1843,
but only on the express condition that the wording of Article 6 shall
be understood to mean, that if any Dutch subjects should wish to
establish themselves in business on the island, the Raja shall allow
them to do so, and that they shall be permitted to place themselves
under the Dutch flag in such a manner as to feel that they are secure
in their places of abode.

The Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies,

Signed: P. Merkus
PART II

Complete Text of the Unrevised Political Treaty

TREATY

Subject to the approval of the Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies, concluded between the Resident of Bali and Lombok, acting in the name of the Government of the Netherlands Indies and Ratu Agung2 K’tut Karangasem, Raja of Selaparang and his punggawas.

Since it has been found desirable to regulate again the mutual rights and obligations of the Netherlands Indies Government and the Raja of Selaparang, M.C. Dannenbargh acting in the name of the Netherlands Indies Government and Ratu Agung2 K’tut Karangasem and his punggawas, have today . . . 1894 agreed as follows:

Article 1

Like their predecessors, the present Raja of Selaparang and punggawas of Selaparang declare that this principality belongs to the territory of the Netherlands Indies and that for this reason they recognize Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, who is represented by the Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies, as their legal sovereign.

They therefore promise loyalty, obedience and submission to the Government of the Netherlands Indies and its representatives.

Article 2

The territory of the principality is understood to comprise the lands and islands described in the list affixed to this treaty.

Article 3

The principality of Selaparang is given in fief to Ratu Agung2 K’tut Karangasem under the express condition of punctual and faithful observance of the obligations described in this treaty.

The Raja declares to accept the fief under this condition.

Article 4

Neither the Raja of Selaparang nor his punggawas shall ever surrender the principality to any other nation but the Netherlands. They shall never conclude an alliance or an agreement with any other Power, be it of the East or of the West, or with any subject of such a Power. They shall never maintain correspondence or exchange presents and representatives with any other Power, be it of the East or of the West, or with any subject of such a Power. They shall not allow their children, other relatives or their subjects to contravene the above stipulations.
Article 5
The Raja and punggawas of Selaparang as well as their subjects shall fly the flag of the Netherlands both at land and at sea. They shall not allow any other flag to be flown in its place, or beside it.

Article 6
If there be no successor to the throne, the Raja and punggawas shall, in consultation with the Resident of Bali and Lombok, designate as soon as possible the prince whom they wish to succeed.

The designation of a successor is subject to the approval of the Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies, without which it is null and void.

In the event of a difference of opinion among the Raja and punggawas or between these and the Resident of Bali and Lombok, the choice of a successor to the throne is subject to the decision of the Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies, to which the Raja and punggawas must unconditionally submit.

In the event of the Raja’s death, the designated successor, after taking the solemn oath of loyalty to Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands and His Excellency the Governor-General of the Netherlands, shall inherit the throne.

The same shall occur when and for as long as the Raja is temporarily incapacitated to rule himself.

Article 7
In the event that the designated successor should be called to the dignity of Raja during his minority, the principality of Selaparang shall be ruled by one or more persons to be chosen by the Governor-General, until the time of his majority. The temporary ruler or rulers must take the oath of loyalty as described in paragraph 4 of Article 6.

Article 8
No proclamation, presentation to the people, or investment of the person designated to become Raja is valid except by virtue of a deed signed by the Governor-General.

Article 9
The Raja and punggawas of Selaparang shall recognize and honour the Resident of Bali and Lombok as the Representative of the Netherlands Indies Government. They shall consult with him on all matters of mutual interest.

They shall not, without his knowledge or without previous consultation, send letters or delegations to the Netherlands Indies Government.
Article 10
The Raja and punggawas of Selaparang shall always live in peace with the Netherlands Indies Government. Whenever necessary, they shall support that Government with all the means at their disposal. They shall supply auxiliary troops, workers, rowers and coolies, weapons and vessels, against such compensation as the Government may deem reasonable. They shall also live in peace with the rulers of other principalities belonging to the territory of the Netherlands Indies. Therefore, they shall not, without the knowledge and approval of the Government of the Netherlands Indies, commit hostilities against such rulers, nor give instructions or make preparation for such hostilities. They shall not construct fortifications in the principality of Selaparang.

Fortifications which have been constructed with the approval of the Netherlands Indies Government in Selaparang shall be dismantled at the Government’s first notice.

Article 11
The Netherlands Indies Government reserves the right to station one or more European officials as well as the necessary personnel in the principality of Selaparang. The Raja and punggawas promise to also honour these officials.

By way of compensation of the costs incurred by the above, the Raja shall pay the Government the yearly sum of f.25 000.

The Government reserves the right to decrease or entirely drop this payment when its expenses for the principality of Selaparang are sufficiently covered in other ways.

Article 12
The Raja and punggawas shall not only allow, but shall give every assistance to the Government, should it wish to place a garrison, construct fortifications or establishments in the principality of Selaparang. For each of these garrisons, fortifications or establishments, they shall make available a terrain of one square mile (paal) or as much as will be necessary. The terrain shall be made available free of charge and at places to be chosen by the Government.

The terrains which have been placed at the disposal of the Government shall be properly mapped and fenced off.

Article 13
The Raja and his punggawas shall rule with justice, promote the well-being of the people, of agriculture, of industry, of trade and commerce. They shall protect all useful sources of the people’s existence. They shall
protect all those who have established themselves in the principality of Selaparang with the permission of the Government. They shall protect without distinction all traders who have come to the principality for purposes of trade.

All customs detrimental to trade shall henceforth be abolished. In the event of a difference of opinion between the Resident and the Raja, the decision of the Governor-General will be called for.

The Netherlands Indies Government guarantees the traders of the principality the same rights as those enjoyed by subjects of the Government concerning trade on Java and on all other lands ruled by the Netherlands Indies Government.

Their ships must be provided with either a sea-letter or with a year-pass. The ships fitted in the European manner must be provided with a sea-letter to be issued directly by the Netherlands Indies Government. The ships fitted in the indigenous manner must be provided with a year-pass to be issued by the Raja of Selaparang and signed by the Resident of Bali and Lombok or the European official designated by him.

**Article 14**

The Raja and punggawas of Selaparang pledge not to hand over any land to Europeans and other Eastern or Western foreigners and not to allow them to settle outside the ports of their principality without the knowledge and permission of the Resident or the European official designated by him.

Traders shall be permitted to settle in the ports of Selaparang without the knowledge and permission of the Resident as long as they do not disturb law and order. If traders stay in a port of Selaparang for more than three months continuously the Raja and punggawas must notify the Resident or the European official designated by him.

The Government of the Netherlands Indies reserves the right to issue at any time such regulation concerning the admission and settlement of Chinese and other foreign Easterners, as may be necessary in the interest of the Netherlands Indies in general or of the principality of Selaparang in particular.

The Raja of Selaparang shall under no circumstance tolerate in his principality persons who have left the Government's military or naval service without permission, escaped convicts and such like. The Raja of Selaparang shall surrender such persons to the Government without delay, even if their extradition is not in every case explicitly demanded.
Article 15
The right to grant licences for mining exploration and for concessions to exploit mines rests entirely with the Government. The Government shall always consult with the Raja and punggawas in advance and shall always investigate the rights to the land of third parties. If the lands are necessary for mining exploration or for mine-exploitation, the concessionaire shall pay a reasonable compensation.

The Raja and punggawas shall receive half of the tax which the Government will levy on the granting of concessions for mine-exploration.

The Government further reserves the right to initiate and continue, at its own expense, mining explorations and mine exploitations in the territory of Selaparang.

The Raja and punggawas promise to always protect such enterprises as much as possible.

Article 16
The Raja and punggawas shall not grant concessions for agricultural enterprises, rent or sell land to any person not belonging to the indigenous population of Selaparang, without the approval of the Resident of Bali and Lombok and permission from the Government.

The Netherlands Indies Government reserves the right to initiate and continue, at its own expense, agricultural enterprises in the principality of Selaparang, or to grant licences for such enterprises to private individuals. When there is occasion, those concerned will be reasonably compensated.

The Raja and punggawas promise to protect such enterprises as much as possible.

Article 17
Without the permission of the Netherlands Indies Government, the Raja and punggawas of Selaparang shall not raise any taxes other than those already existing. Without permission they shall not increase these taxes, be they in money, in kind or in labour.

The Raja and punggawas of Selaparang promise to take care that no immoderate or illegal taxes, of whatever name, are demanded from the people.

The Government reserves the right to take over, against compensation, the existing import and export duties.
Article 18

The right to levy taxes, other than those intended by the previous Article, rests with the Government. All ordinances and regulations issued by the Netherlands Indies Government concerning duties and taxation, of whatever name, shall be legally binding to the inhabitants of Selaparang.

With regard to its immediate subjects, the Government has the right to introduce any tax it may deem necessary.

Article 19

All coins issued by the Netherlands Indies Government shall be valid in the principality of Selaparang against the legal rate of exchange.

Article 20

Subjects of the Raja of Selaparang are all persons who live in the principality and who do not belong to any of the categories described in the next Article.

Article 21

The immediate subjects of the Netherlands Indies Government in the principality of Selaparang are:

1. All Europeans and those of equal status.
2. All servants of Europeans and those of equal status, insofar as these do not belong to the indigenous population of the principality of Selaparang.
3. All persons, irrespective of ethnicity, who reside within the boundaries of the Government's establishments.
4. All persons, irrespective of ethnicity, who are in the service of the Government.
5. All former servants of the Government, insofar as these do not belong to the indigenous population of Selaparang.
6. All Chinese, Arabs and other foreign Easterners.
7. All persons residing on the sites of agricultural and mining enterprises, insofar as these persons do not belong to the indigenous population of Selaparang.

All these categories of persons are subject to the Government’s administration of justice.

When any of these persons is arrested in the principality of Selaparang on suspicion of some crime, the Raja must surrender him to the Resident of Bali and Lombok or the European official designated by him.
Article 22
Subjects of the Raja of Selaparang shall be tried by the courts of law of the Netherlands Indies Government if:

1. they have committed a crime together with subjects of the Netherlands Indies Government;
2. they have committed a crime against the Government, its officials, soldiers and other subjects or against the property of the Government and its subjects;
3. they have filed a law-suit concerning matters of trade and industry or concerning other matters of civil law in which subjects of the Government are involved;
4. they are guilty of contravention of the stipulations of Article 13 concerning the obligation to carry a sea-letter or a year-pass;
5. they are guilty of contravention of the stipulations of Article 28 concerning the import and export of fire-arms, gun-powder and ammunition in the principality of Selaparang;
6. they have committed a crime with regard to the telegraph lines and cables, whether inside or outside the territory of the principality of Selaparang.

The officials of the Government are authorized to investigate the above-named crimes. The Raja and punggawas shall assist them as much as possible.

The Raja and punggawas shall always respect the verdict in the above-named cases.

Article 23
When one of the subjects of the Raja of Selaparang must appear before a court of law of the Netherlands Indies Government, the Raja shall be entitled to let his views be known either by attending in person or by sending a representative.

Article 24
The Raja and punggawas are responsible for policing the principality of Selaparang. They are responsible for law and order and must take care that crimes are solved, except insofar as these occur within the boundaries of the Government’s establishments.

The Raja is entitled to call on the assistance of the heads of Chinese and other foreigners who live in the principality of Selaparang if a crime has occurred within these communities.
Article 25
With the exception of what is stipulated in Articles 22 and 27 of this treaty, the inhabitants of Selaparang are subject to the administration of justice of the Raja and punggawas.

Every criminal shall be punished in accordance with the existing laws and customs of Selaparang. Torturing and maiming as punishments, including whipping with a cane, are forbidden. The Raja and punggawas promise to replace these punishments by more humane ones in consultation with the Resident of Bali and Lombok.

Capital punishment may only be carried out after the accused person has been convicted in accordance with the laws and customs of Selaparang and after the Resident of Bali and Lombok has given his permission.

Executions shall occur in the manner customary in the Netherlands Indies.

When the Resident of Bali and Lombok does not want to give his permission for an execution, the decision of the Governor-General will be called for. The Raja and punggawas shall abide by the decision of the Governor-General.

The Resident of Bali and Lombok, in consultation with the Raja and punggawas, shall determine the place where those convicted to forced labour for less than one year will undergo their punishment. The Government shall determine the place for those convicted for more than one year.

Article 26

The right to banish persons deemed dangerous to law and order from the territory of Selaparang rests entirely with the Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies.

The Raja and punggawas retain the power to banish persons convicted of crimes from the territory of the principality of Selaparang.

These banishments are subject to the approval of the Governor-General, who shall also determine the place where these persons shall reside.

Article 27

The Mohammedan inhabitants of Selaparang shall be subject to the administration of justice of their own priests and heads, insofar as marriage and inheritance law is concerned.

Article 28
The importation and exportation of fire-arms, gunpowder and ammunition can take place only with written permission from the Resident of Bali and Lombok.
The Raja and punggawas promise to surrender to the Netherlands Indies Government any person who contravenes this stipulation, as well as the weapons concerned.

**Article 29**

The slave trade and the importation and exportation of slaves are forbidden in the territory of Selaparang. The Raja and punggawas shall not allow these criminal practices within their territory, but shall oppose them with all means at their disposal. They promise to co-operate with all measures which the Netherlands Indies Government shall take to achieve a total abolition of slavery in their territory.

To ensure the rights of persons who have given themselves in pawn as a security for a debt incurred, the Raja and punggawas promise to take care that the stipulations of the Netherlands Indies Government concerning pawnship be adhered to as much as possible. They promise to oppose all illegal and unreasonable detention of people as pawns. They further promise to co-operate in every measure taken towards the gradual abolition of the institution of pawnship.

**Article 30**

The Raja and punggawas of Selaparang shall oppose piracy with all means at their disposal. They shall not harbour pirates or give them assistance of any kind, nor allow this to occur. Depending on whether the guilty fall under the jurisdiction of the Government or the Raja and punggawas, they shall either surrender them to the Resident of Bali and Lombok or themselves bring them to trial.

**Article 31**

The Raja and punggawas promise to give every assistance to ships and vessels in distress off the coasts of Selaparang. They further promise to care for shipwrecked persons and not to allow anyone to take their property.

The Raja and punggawas promise to safeguard ships, vessels and commodities which may be found along the beaches of Selaparang.

The Raja and punggawas shall immediately notify the nearest Government official when a ship is wrecked off the coasts of Selaparang.

**Article 32**

The Raja and punggawas of Selaparang promise to further the education of the people with all means at their disposal.

**Article 33**

The Raja and punggawas of Selaparang promise to promote the smallpox vaccination among their subjects.
Article 34
The Raja and punggawas promise to maintain the existing roads in their land. They further promise to construct new roads whenever this is deemed necessary by the Government.

Article 35
The Raja and punggawas shall encourage the cultivation of useful crops as much as possible. In particular, they shall not restrict the free cultivation of coffee.

Article 36
The Raja and punggawas acknowledge that the earlier treaty between the Netherlands Indies Government and the Raja of Selaparang, insofar as it is contrary to the present treaty, has expired.

It is further agreed that whatever may later appear to be in the interest of land and people shall be settled by way of negotiation.

The Government of the Netherlands Indies shall maintain the Raja and punggawas of Selaparang and their successors in their dignity as long as they obey the stipulations of this treaty faithfully and punctually. Apart from the stipulations of this treaty, the Government of the Netherlands Indies shall not interfere in the internal administration of the island.
PART III

Revisions to the Political Treaty

Article 17

Without the permission of the Netherlands Indies Government, the Raja and punggawas of Selaparang shall not raise any taxes other than those already existing. Without permission they shall not increase these taxes, be they in money, in kind or in labour.

The Raja and punggawas of Selaparang promise to take care that no inmoderate or illegal taxes, of whatever name, are demanded from the people.

The Raja and punggawas agree to abolish or change the existing system of taxation and corvée labour whenever the Government should deem this necessary. They further agree to effect these changes in consultation with the Resident of Bali and Lombok, and to abide by whatever decision the Governor-General might take.

The Government reserves the right to take over, against compensation, the existing import and export duties.

Article 20

Subjects of the Raja of Selaparang are all persons who live in the principality and who do not belong to any of the categories described in the next Article.

The subjects of the Raja of Selaparang shall be ruled by their own heads of the same ethnicity, whose appointment and dismissal is subject to the approval of the Resident of Bali and Lombok.

Article 27

The Raja and punggawas of Selaparang promise to take care that everyone in the principality of Selaparang be free to profess his religious beliefs. They further promise that the religious laws, customs and institutions of the people shall be respected.

Article 29

The slave-trade and the importation and exportation of slaves are forbidden in the territory of Selaparang. The Raja and punggawas shall not allow these criminal practices within their territory, but shall oppose them with all means at their disposal. They promise to co-operate with all measures the Netherlands Indies Government shall take to achieve a total abolition of slavery in their territory.
To ensure the rights of persons who have given themselves in pawn as a security for a debt incurred, the Raja and punggawas promise to take care that the stipulations of the Netherlands Indies Government concerning pawnship be adhered to as much as possible. They promise to oppose all illegal and unreasonable detention of people as pawns. They further promise to co-operate in every measure taken towards the gradual abolition of the institution of pawnship.

The Raja and punggawas agree that the custom known by the name of camput or manjing shall be strictly prohibited in the principality of Selaparang.
CHAPTER I

1 Selaparang and Tanah Sasak are the indigenous names of the island Lombok, used interchangeably by Balinese as well as Sasaks. The most plausible explanation of the name ‘Lombok’ is that 16th century Portuguese navigators, visiting the village of Lombok on the east coast, applied the name of this village to the whole island.

2 The Gunung Rinjani and the crater-lake Segara Anak played an important role in Balinese and Sasak religious life. The Rinjani was regarded as the place of domicile of the gods. Under the Balinese Rajas yearly pilgrimages were organized to win the favour of the gods and thereby ensure a good harvest. On these occasions golden ornaments – usually in the shape of fish – were deposited in the crater-lake. The last Raja of Lombok, probably wishing to avoid the hazardous journey up the mountains, had a pond constructed in his pleasure-garden at Lingsar, shaped exactly like the Segara Anak. Van Affelen van Saemfoort, ‘De Heilige Rindjani’, De Locomotief, 20-30 April 1907.


4 The forest (Bal.: Juring) separating West from East Lombok no longer exists. In the course of the Dutch colonial period virtually the entire central plain was brought under cultivation.


6 J.J. ten Have, Het eiland Lombok en zijne bewoners (Den Haag, 1894), p.16.

7 The figures on the number of troops listed in Chapter II, The Struggle for Power, provide corroborative evidence for the relative accuracy of this estimate.

8 The Nagarakrtagama was one of a number of lontar saved from destruction by Dr Brandes, who accompanied the second Dutch military expedition against the Raja of Lombok in 1894. No doubt many other priceless lontar were destroyed in the fires which raged through the puri of Cakranegara.


13 Goris, pp.197-8.

14 Very little is known about the nature and extent of Macassarese domination over East Lombok, except that there must have been some political influence because the VOC records of the period refer to Sumbawa and East Lombok as one ‘kingdom’ standing under the authority of Macassar. H.J. de Graaf, ‘Lombok in de 17 e Eeuw’, Djawa 21 (1941), pp.362-3.
Notes

15 Ibid., p.365.

16 Ibid., pp.359-61. Apparently the Indonesian aristocrats had long memories. When the Dutch in 1894 waged war against the Raja of Lombok, the Raja of Goa (Macassar) offered to assist the Dutch with troops. It is possible that he sought revenge for the Macassarese defeat in the 17th century.


18 De Roo de la Faille, p.140.

19 Around this time the records of the VOC begin acknowledging de facto Balinese domination over the whole of the island, and references to warfare and opposition to Balinese rule cease. W.G.C. Bijvanck, ‘Onze betrekkingen tot Lombok’, *Gids* 4 (1894), pp.134-57.

20 An interesting description of these events can be found in W.R. van Hoevell, *Reis over Java, Madura en Bali, in het midden van 1847* (The Hague, 1851) II, pp.167-83. See also, C. Lekkerkerker, ‘Het Voorspel der Vestiging van de Nederlandsche Macht op Bali en Lombok’, *BJT* 79 (1923), pp.289-309.

21 Willemstijn, pp.25-8.

22 Ratu Agung2 K’tut died in 1872 and was succeeded by his younger brother, whom he had adopted as his son, Ratu Agung2 Ngurah. The latter ruled Lombok/Karangasem until his fall in 1894. See Chapter IV.

23 The Balinese aristocracy (*sangtriwangsas*) were the members of the three castes: the Brahmans, the Ksatriyas and the Wesiyas, with the titles of Ida, Dewa and Gustri respectively. Some 20% of Lombok's Balinese population of 35 000 (i.e. about 7000 persons) belonged to these castes. This percentage is much higher than on Bali, where it varies from 4-7%. Memorie van Overgave [henceforth M.v.O.] Damste, 1923.

24 Within the Sasak aristocracy of East Lombok three ranks could be distinguished: the Radens, the Mamics and the Lalus. About 4% of East Lombok's Sasak population of 380 000 (i.e. some 15 000 persons) belonged to these social strata. T. Nieuwenhuyzen, *Sasaksch Adatrecht* (Den Haag, 1932), p.35; M.v.O. Damste.

25 M.v.O. Damste.


28 The typically Balinese institution of the irrigation-association existed only in West Lombok. See, A. Groothoff, ‘Studie over het Inlandsche Waterschapwezen (soebakwezen) op Bali en Lombok’, *Adatrechtbundel* 15, pp.308-73.


30 Under Balinese rule the *kaula* came to be referred to as *pengayah* and the *panjak* as *sepangan*. Aantekeningen Engelenberg, 7 September 1895. Mailr. 233/96.

31 Van Vollenhoven defined the communal right of disposal by the following six characteristics:
(a) The community itself and its members have the right to freely use the uncultivated land within the area of disposal of the community. This means that the community itself and each of its members individually have the right to bring uncultivated land under cultivation, to gather the products of the forest, to hunt, to pasture their animals, etc.;
(b) Strangers, i.e. people not belonging to the community, may use the uncultivated land within the area of disposal of the community only with the permission of the community;
(c) A certain payment for the use of uncultivated land must sometimes be made to the community by its members, but must always be made by strangers;
(d) The community is responsible for certain offences, including those committed by strangers, that occur within its area of disposal;
(e) The community cannot permanently alienate (i.e. give in permanent pawn, give away, sell) any part of the uncultivated land within its area of disposal;
(f) The community maintains, to a greater or lesser extent, the right to place restrictions upon the individual right of its members to the cultivated land.

C. van Vollenhoven, *De Indonesiër en zijn Grond* (Leiden, 1932), pp.3-11.

32 These are the most common communal restrictions upon individual land-holding (characteristic (f)) in van Vollenhoven’s model. In the absence of significant supra-village political organization in pre-Balinese Lombok, the communal right of disposal — of which remnants still existed in the late 19th century — must have been strongly in evidence. It is therefore highly probable that these common communal restrictions pertained to the small-scale individual land-holding of the peasant.

33 In pre-Balinese Lombok there was already large-scale individual land-holding in the hands of Sasak aristocrats. This is evident from the fact that in the late 19th century two types of large-scale individual land-holding existed: (1) the holdings of the Balinese aristocracy (*druwe jabe Ball*) and (2) that of the Sasak aristocracy (*druwe jabe Sasak*). Since the Balinese Rajas did not grant lands to Sasak aristocrats but, on the contrary, sought to reduce their holdings, it is evident that *perwangsaa* land-holding predated the Balinese conquest.

34 Many of these forests were located in the foothills of the northern and southern mountain ranges. The last Raja of Lombok, Ratu Agung 2 Ngurah, who ruled 1872-94, had at least 32 of these private hunting grounds, all of which were guarded by a special police force (*langlangs gawah*). In West Lombok the Raja possessed the hunting grounds of Rewantake, Suranadi, Nadane Wade, Awang Madi, Jong Biru, Gunung Sari, Giri Strengge, Pringge Rate, Bojomine and Bogowati. In East Lombok the Raja had Bega, Pengoros, Bikan Pait, Jangeweane, Kliu, Barebali, Pao Renge, Sundil, Lendang Bongkok, Tekoh, Silung Blanak, Empol, Sukeraje, Bungbungsii, Bulang, Gawag Jepun, Gawah Sekaruh, Suradadi, Selong, Koko Prape and Tababan. J.C. van Eerde, ‘Het Grondbezit op Lombok’, *Verslagen der Algemeene Vergadering van het Indisch Genootschap* (1904), p.200.

35 Ibid., pp.198-204.
37 Nieuwenhuyzen, pp.20 and 160.
40 *Adatrechtbundel* 1, p.175.
41 The Raja had stipulated that not more than 5000 *kepeng* was to be paid for a peasant. Since this amount was far below the real market value, he ensured that Balinese aristocrats would not be tempted to sell the seangangs he had granted them to Sasak aristocrats. Van Eerde, ‘Het Grondbezit’, p.208.
This law stipulated that Sasaks (both perwangs and peasants) as well as Balinese sudra were not allowed to pay more than 2,5000 kepeng for a tenah sawah, whereas members of the triwangs could freely agree on the price. Since this amount was far below the real market value of a tenah sawah, no land-owning Balinese aristocrat would consider selling his land to a Sasak or to a sudra. This law, therefore, was aimed at keeping land ownership out of the hands of Sasak aristocrats and the Balinese and Sasak peasantry. Lieffrinck, *Landsverordeningen*, Vol.III, p.211.

The law of camput was one of the major Sasak complaints against Balinese rule. See Appendix I, Letter B.


The Raja had two other sources of income: (1) the suwinih and (2) fines. The suwinih was a tax on irrigation water. The level of this tax, however, was very moderate: 5 bundles of padi, weighing 1200 kepengs (about 4.9 kg.) each, per tenah (5832m²) of sawah. This tax, moreover, was only levied in West Lombok and there only on a minority of the Raja’s pengayahs. The suwinih was paid only by those pengayahs who, while benefiting from irrigation water, did not assist in the maintenance of the irrigation system (subak-labour). Mainly because income from this tax was negligible, for which reason it was dropped by the Dutch, it can be left out of consideration. The Raja further collected at least 55 different fines—all payable in kepengs—on a variety of misdemeanors and offences. Partly because these fines were usually very small amounts, and partly because fines belong to the judiciary rather than taxation, this source of income also can be ignored. De Roo de la Faille, pp.151-3.

Rapport Vetter, 8 December 1894, V28 November 1896 kab V19; Mailr. 1120/6.

In the late 19th century there was no export of coffee, horses and cattle. Mainly because he feared undue Dutch interest, the last Raja of Lombok, Ratu Agung2 Ngurah, had forbidden coffee to be cultivated other than for the immediate use of the cultivator. (See Appendix I, Letter B). And, because he wished to avoid depletion of Lombok’s livestock, the Raja had placed a prohibitive export duty of 24 rijksdaalders on the export of a horse or a head of cattle. The information in this Table has been abstracted from a statement by the punggawa I Komang Dega, tax-collector of the Raja, as quoted in Rapport Scherer, 10 December 1894, V22 April 1896 No.47; Mailr. 1145/95.

This was the land area under cultivation in the year 1900. It is almost certain, however, that this area was roughly the same in the late 19th century. The damage done to the irrigation system in the Balinese-Sasak conflict (see Chapter II) had by 1900 been repaired. And further, by the year 1900 the Dutch had not yet started on their irrigation programme (see Chapter VI). These figures have been abstracted from: J.C. van Eerde, ‘Rapport over de Regeling der Agrarische Toestanden in West Lombok’, IG 1 (1901), pp.391-36; *Adatrechtbundel* 1, pp.156-7; Onderzoek Economische Toestand Lombok, Landbouwconsulent Affourtit, 11 Juni 1925, Mailr. 1065/25; Rapport Lulofs 8 Januari 1911, as quoted in Rapport Moolenburgh 6 June 1926, Mailr. 644/27.

Van Eerde, ‘Rapport Regeling Agrarische Toestanden’.

De Roo de la Faille, pp.154, 174.

In 1930 the tegal-fields constituted 24% of the total tegalan/garden-area. There is no reason to believe that this proportion was greatly different in the late 19th century. Landrentemonografie, West Lombok, 1938; Landrentemonografie, Midden Lombok, 1939; Landrentemonografie, Oost Lombok, 1940.
53 According to the records of Ida Wayan Alit, the Sedahan Agung under the Raja, about 10% of the irrigated sawah-area was given out as pecatu-fields and about 8% as wakap-fields. Rapport Scherer, 10 December 1894, op.cit.

54 Statement by Ida Wayan Alit, Sedahan-Agung, as quoted in Rapport Scherer, 10 December 1894, op.cit.

55 Shortly after the conquest the Dutch "fixed" the exchange rate at one rijksdaalder for 2000 kepengs. This measure, which was intended to encourage the use of Netherlands Indies currency, was largely unsuccessful. In the 1920s the actual exchange rate in trading transactions on Lombok itself was still one rijksdaalder for 1000 kepengs (see Chapter VI).

56 De Roo de la Faille, pp.144-5, 160.


58 For a good description of West Lombok in the flowering of Balinese rule, see J. Jacobs, Eenige Tijd onder de Baliers (Batavia, 1883), pp.142-65.

59 Rapport Dannenburgh, 13 November 1895; Mailr. 323/96.

60 Ibid.

61 This was the average yearly rice production over the years 1900-04 (see Table IX). Since in the late 19th century the area of land under cultivation was roughly the same as around 1900, and since there had been no improvement in the technological level of agricultural production, total rice outputs in the last decade of Balinese rule must have been at around this level. Rapport Lulofs 8 Januari 1911, as quoted in Rapport Moolenburgh, 26 Juni 1926; Mailr. 544/27.

CHAPTER II

1 This claim on the part of Klungkung was based on the view that the Dewa Agung had once been the sole ruler of Bali, represented in the various districts of the island by his vassals, over whom he exercised effective control. It is uncertain, however, whether this view has a factual basis. The claim could be justified if Klungkung were (as the Dewa Agung almost certainly believed) the continuation of the earlier kingdom of Gelgel. But this is difficult to maintain if continuity is understood, not in a spiritual or moral sense, but politically or dynastically. The kingdom of Gelgel, which fell in 1650, did in fact exercise hegemony over the entire island; but Klungkung, which around 1686 emerged from its ashes, was able to take Gelgel's place for only a very brief period. Towards the late 17th century it was the Raja of Buleleng who was the most powerful of the Balinese princes. H.J. de Graaf, 'Gusti Panji Sakti, vorst van Buleleng', TBG 83 (1949).

2 Brief van den Vorst van Lombok, 11 Juli 1891. V4 April 1892 W4; Mailr. 652.

3 Rapport Liefwinck, 16 Juli 1891. V4 April 1892 W4; Mailr. 652.

4 Brief van Said Abdullah, agent der Koninklijke Paketvaart Mij. te Ampenan, 25 June 1891. V4 April 1892 W4; Mailr. 551. The Arab Said Abdullah was one of the few non-Balinese to occupy an influential position at the Lombok court. Mainly because he had travelled widely and spoke a number of languages, including English and Dutch, the Raja valued his advice, particularly in matters concerning his relations with the Netherlands Indies Government. As a token of his appreciation, Ratu Agung2 Ngurah had granted him extensive druwe jabe lands. The Arab, however, played a very dubious role. Not only did
he act as an informer for the Dutch, but, after the outbreak of revolt, for the East Sasak leaders also. In December 1891, after some incriminating letters from Said Abdullah to the leaders of the revolt had been intercepted, he paid the price for his dangerous game. The Raja ordered his execution on a charge of treason. The death sentence was carried out with all the ritual afforded in such cases to Balinese aristocrats.

5 Notulen Conferentie Sasaksche Hoofden, 7 Augustus 1894. V4 September 1896 W15; Mailr. 757.

6 See Appendix I, Letter B.

7 Brief Sech Abdat, Agent der Nederlandsche Handels Mij. te Ampenan, 8 Augustus 1891. V4 April 1892 W4; Mailr. 681. Sech Abdat was another Dutch informer. After the execution of Said Abdullah he fled to East Lombok where he joined the insurgents. When Balinese troops conquered the town of Masbagik on 9 June 1893, Sech Abdat was taken prisoner and executed on a charge of treason.

8 The tarekat Nakshabandiya was a Moslem mystical order, introduced into Lombok by returning Hajis in the 1880s. The Indonesian word tarekat is derived from the Arab tarika, meaning road, way or path, while Nakshabandiya is derived from the name of the 14th century founder of the order, Baha ad-din Nakshabandi. The religious purpose of this order was to attain a mystical union with God. This was to be achieved by means of a strict observance of Moslem religious duties and by way of a number of mystical practices (such as continuous reciting of dikir), prescribed by the guru of the tarekat. Mainly because this order strongly condemned the Balinese rulers as unbelievers (kafr), which made it conducive to perwangsa political aspirations, it quickly gained a following among the Sasak aristocracy. For instance, all important leaders of the East Sasak revolt (see Chapter II, Class Conflict in East Lombok), were members of the tarekat. After the establishment of Dutch rule and the acceptance of the new state of affairs by the Sasak aristocracy, this religious order disappeared as quickly as it had arisen. Stibbe, Vol.IV, p.281. Rapport Engelenberg, 28 October tot 4 November 1894. V28 November 1896 V19; Mailr. 1074.

9 Notulen, op. cit.

10 Nota, bevattende Mededeelingen aangaande den Opstand op Lombok van Mohamad Amir, aldaar verbleven van 9 tot en met 21 Augustus 1891. V4 April 1892 W4; Mailr. 747.

11 Made was born from a union between the Raja and one of his concubines who belonged to the low wargi caste, a category below the third caste, the wesiyah, but above those outside the castes, the sudras. Since caste position was in part inherited through the female line, the child born from a concubine was of lower status (but still of caste), than that born from an official wife. For this reason Anak Agung Made, although the eldest surviving son, had no claim to the throne and addressed his younger half-brother Anak Agung K’tut with the respectful ‘ratu’, while K’tut addressed him simply with ‘bli’, meaning ‘older brother’. Liefrinck, Landverordeningen, Vol.I, pp.11-12.

12 Brief Sech Abdat, 31 Augustus 1891. V4 April 1892 W4; Mailr. 751.

13 Brief Sech Abdat, 17 September 1891. V4 April 1892 W4; Mailr. 773.

14 Nota Hadji Ismaia en Mohamad Amir, 30 September 1891. V4 April 1892 W4; Mailr. 799. Since the prisons in Mataram and Cakranegara were already filled to capacity, the Raja interned about 350 East Sasak rebels on Trawangan, a small uninhabited island off Lombok’s west coast.

15 See Appendix I, Letter B.

16 Brief Sech Abdat, 28 September 1891. V4 April 1892 W4; Mailr. 799.
17 See Appendix I, Letter B.
18 Brief Sech Abdat, 28 September 1891, op. cit.
19 Disunity among the Sasak aristocracy was not a new phenomenon. The Balinese conquest of East Lombok in the mid-18th century had been greatly facilitated by their ability to take advantage of rivalries within the perwanga.
20 Rapport Dannenbargh, 7 April 1894. V28 Juni 1894, No.37; Mailr. 898. Dannenbargh mentioned Raden Kertashih, an East Sasak leader, as the source of these figures. They correspond roughly to the population estimates. On a population of approximately 140,000 in West Lombok about 17,000 troops were raised, while on a population of approximately 390,000 in East Lombok there were some 49,000 troops, in both cases a ratio of about 1:8.
21 Rapport Frackers, Commandant HMSS Java, 1 October 1891. Mailr. 832.
22 Nota Haji Ismaila en Mohammad Amir, op. cit.
23 Rapport Liefcrinck, 16 October 1891. V4 April 1892 W4; Mailr. 885.
24 Nota Haji Ismaila en Mohammad Amir, op. cit.
25 Brief Sech Abdat, 2 October 1891. V4 April 1892 W4; Mailr. 815.
26 Rapport Liefcrinck, 16 October 1891, op. cit.
27 Rapport Dannenbargh, 19 November 1891. V4 April 1892 W4; Mailr. 962.
28 Rapport Commandant HMSS Van Speyck, 28 November 1891. V4 April 1892 W4; Mailr. 962. According to this report, 800 troops arrived from Karangasem on 2 October, while another 600 arrived on 22 November. All these troops were taken to Lombok by SS MacAlister.
29 Rapport Commandant HMSS Java, 31 December 1891. V4 April W4; Mailr. 52. According to this report Anak Agung Jilantik arrived on Lombok on 29 November with 1,500 troops. Another 500 arrived on 9 December. All these troops were brought to Lombok by SS Teresa.
30 Rapport Liefcrinck, 31 December 1891. V4 April 1892 W4; Mailr. 52.
31 Nota Frackers, 4 January 1892. V4 April 1892 W4; Mailr. 52.
32 Rapport Commandant HMSS Java, 31 December 1891. V4 April 1892 W4; Mailr. 52. In this report the Captain mentioned that on 16 December about 300 disabled troops suffering from dysentery and fevers left for Karangasem.
33 Nota Frackers, 3 February 1892. V4 April 1892 W4; Mailr. 139.
34 Ibid. It is mentioned in this report that on 1 February ‘several hundreds of sick and wounded troops’ left for Karangasem by sailing prahu.
35 Rapport Frackers, 12 February 1892. V4 April 1892 W4; Mailr. 173.
37 Brief Sech Abdat, 30 June 1892. V24 Januari 1893 Bl; Mailr. 641.
38 Rapport Frackers, 2 May 1892. V7 Juli 1892 A10; Mailr. 466.
39 Brief Sech Abdat, 30 June 1892, op. cit.
40 Rapport Liefcrinck, 30 July 1892. V24 Januari 1893 Bl; Mailr. 748.
Rapport Commandant HMSS Koningin Emma, 29 Augustus 1892. V24 Januari 1893 B1; Mailr. 880.

Idem, 7 September 1892, V24 Januari 1893 B1; Mailr. 880.

Idem, 15 September 1892. Mailr. 968.

Verslag Raden Kertasih, een der Hoofden der Opstandelingen, 12 October 1892. V24 Januari 1893 B1; Mailr. 1054.

Unlike most of the punggawas, the Balinese district chief of Kotaraja, Dewa G'de Pinatih, was related to the local Sasak aristocracy by various family ties. Largely for this reason, the Kotaraja aristocracy did not join the revolt. On the contrary, throughout the district's isolation from West Lombok, the local perwangsa led the peasants in repulsing East Sasak attacks. J.C. van Eerde, 'Lombok onder het Nederlandsch Bestuur', Gids 4 (1905), pp.66-103.

Verslag Raden Kertasih, 12 October 1892, op cit.

See Appendix I, Letter C.

Rapport Vetter en Scherer, 10 December 1894. V22 April 1896, No.47; Mailr. 1145.

Rapport Secretaris Residentie Bali en Lombok, 16 November 1892. V24 Januari 1893 B1; Mailr. 1173.

Rapport Liefrinck, 12 Maart 1893. V13 October 1893 Z12; Mailr. 509.


Rapport Engelang, 30 September to 6 October 1894. V28 November 1896 U19; Mailr. 1029.


One of these measures was the restriction on elopement, the method used by Balinese and Sasaks alike for concluding a marriage. Since this involved a lengthy period of seclusion and therefore an absence of the young man from military service, the custom was detrimental to the war effort. In 1893 the Raja issued an Edict which forbade elopement for his Balinese subjects and which limited the time Sasaks could stay in a hiding-place to three days. Liefrinck, Landsverordeningen Vol.I, no.31, pp.201-7.

Rapport Engelenberg, 24-29 September 1894. W28 November 1896 U19; Mailr. 1029.

In the districts of Praya, Saka and Masbagk all seangpangis stopped paying the Sasak landlord his share of the harvest. In the other districts of East Lombok, at least some of the seangpangis continued to fulfil their obligations. Rapport Dannenburgh, 13 November 1895. Mailr. 323.


In his reports from East Lombok covering the period from October to December 1894, Controleur Engelenberg mentioned countless examples of villages or part of villages changing district chiefs.
CHAPTER III

1 For the full text of the 1843 treaty, see Appendix III, Part I.
2 Jacobs, p. 156.
3 F.A. Liefrinck entered the colonial service in 1873 at the age of 20. In 1896 he was appointed Resident of Bali and Lombok, and in 1904 he became a member of the Council of the Indies, the advisory body to the Governor-General. During his career he wrote outstanding pioneering essays on Balinese society. After his retirement in 1910 he devoted himself to scholarly work. Among other things, he published two volumes of edicts by the Balinese Rajas of Lombok.
4 Rapport Liefrinck, 30 December 1886. V4 April 1892 W4; Mailr. 52.
5 Ibid.
6 The interest which Liefrinck’s report aroused is indicated by the frequency with which it was quoted in official correspondence. For instance, Governor-General van Rees referred to it in his report to the Minister of Colonies of 12 December 1887. The report was further quoted by the Resident of Bali and Lombok on 9 January 1892 and by the Council of the Indies in its Advice of 19 January 1892. V5 Maart 1888 K3; Mailr. 87: V4 April 1892 W4; Mailr. 52: V4 April 1892 W4; Mailr. 22.
7 On Lombok itself the consumption of opium (and therefore also its production and/or import) had been forbidden by the Raja, who in view of his great wealth could afford to be somewhat moralistic about this issue. This regulation, however, did not apply to Karangasem. Since the ruler of Karangasem, Anak Agung Jilantik, did not collect land tax, the farming-out of the trade in opium constituted an important source of income. Resident van Zutphen estimated that the fee the opium-bandar paid Jilantik was 12 000 rijksdaalders annually.
8 Rapport Van Zutphen, 1 October 1887. V5 Maart 1888 K3; Mailr. 87.
9 Jacobs, p.156.
10 Brief Van Rees, 24 December 1887. V5 Maart 1888 K3; Mailr. 87.
12 Ibid.
13 Advies Raad van Nederlandsch-Indie, 9 December 1887. V5 Maart 1883 K3; Mailr. 87.
14 Rapport Van Zutphen, 24 December 1887, op. cit.
15 Rapport Van Rees, 12 December 1887. V5 Maart 1888 K3; Mailr. 87.
16 Ibid.
Notes

18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Rapport Dannenburgh, 14 Augustus 1891. V4 April 1892 W4; Mailr. 651.
22 Rapport Dannenburgh, 11 September 1891. V4 April 1892 W4; Mailr. 651.
23 Besluit Gouverneur-Generaal, 14 October 1891. V4 April 1892 W4; Mailr. 815.
24 Brief Gouverneur-Generaal, 7 October 1891. V4 April 1892 W4; Mailr. 885.
25 Early in 1891 the populations of these three principalities had voluntarily placed themselves under the ‘protection’ of the Raja of Karangasem. This dispute was one of the reasons for the outbreak of war between Klungkung and Lombok in June 1891.
26 Rapport Dannenburgh, 19 November 1891. V4 April 1892 W4; Mailr. 962.
27 See Appendix I, Letter A.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Brief Gouverneur-Generaal, 11 December 1891. V4 April 1892 W4; Mailr. 1014.
33 Ibid.
34 See Appendix I, Letter B.
35 Rapport Dannenburgh, 9 Januari 1892. V4 April 1892 W4; Mailr. 52.
36 Ibid.
37 Van der Wijck succeeded Pynacker-Hordijk as Governor-General and ordered the expedition against Lombok. See Chapter III, The Military Expedition.
38 Advies Raad van Nederlandsch-Indie, 19 Januari 1892. V4 April 1892 W4; Mailr. 22.
39 Brief Gouverneur-Generaal, 19 Februari 1892. V4 April 1892 W4; Mailr. 22.
40 Rapport Dannenburgh, 6 Februari 1892. V4 April 1892 W4; Mailr. 139.
41 Brief Gouvernements Secretaris, 16 Februari 1892. V4 April 1892 W4; Mailr. 120.
42 Rapport Vice Consul to Singapore, 29 Februari 1892. V7 Juli 1892 A10; Mailr. 214.
43 Quoted in Brief Gouverneur-Generaal aan Minister van Kolonien, 29 April 1892. V7 Juli 1892 A10; Mailr. 46.
44 Brief Gouverneur-Generaal, 26 April 1892. V7 Juli 1892 A10; Mailr. 119.
45 Ibid.
46 Rapport Dannenburgh, 14 Mei 1892. V7 Juli 1892 A10; Mailr. 487.
47 Ibid.
48 Quoted in Rapport Dannenburgh, 21 Mei 1892. V7 Juli 1892 A10; Mailr. 487.
J.H. Liefarkin was the younger brother of F.A. Liefarkin. He too was headed for a successful career in the Colonial Service. He entered the service in 1884, at the age of 22. In 1909 he was appointed Resident of Jogjakarta and in 1917 he became a member of the Council of the Indies.

That the Resident presented this issue as an accusation is indicated by the Raja’s letter of 11 June 1892. See Van der Kraan, pp.315-16.

Ibid., p.314.

Rapport Dannenburgh, 7 Juli 1892. V24 Januari 1893 B1; Mailr. 539.

Ibid.

Brief Resident aan den Vorst van Lombok, 7 Juni 1892. V24 Januari 1893 B1; Mailr. 565.

See Van der Kraan, p.316.

Telegram Dannenburgh, 13 Juni 1892. V24 Januari 1893 B1; Mailr. 539.

Telegram Gouverneur-Generaal, 13 Juni 1892. V24 Januari 1893 B1; Mailr. 539.

Rapport Dannenburgh, 20 Juni 1892. V24 Januari 1893 B1; Mailr. 598.

Rapport Dannenburgh, 30 Juni 1892. V24 Januari 1893 B1; Mailr. 641.


Brief Minister van Kolonien, 7 Juli 1892. V24 Januari 1893 B1; Mailr. 81.

Brief Gouverneur-Generaal, 17 Augustus 1892. V24 Januari 1893 B1; Mailr. 81.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Brief Gouverneur-Generaal, 20 September 1892. V24 Januari 1893 B1; Mailr. 904.

Rapport Dannenburgh, 6 October 1892. V24 Januari 1893 B1; Mailr. 904.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Brief Gouverneur-Generaal, 22 April 1893. V13 October 1893 Z12; Mailr. 509.

For the full text of the letter see Van der Kraan, pp.321-2.

Ibid., p.323.

Ibid., p.324.

Ibid., p.325-6.


Rapport Liefarkin, 31 Juli 1893, op. cit.

See Van der Kraan, pp.315-18.

Rapport Dannenburgh, 2 August 1892. V24 Januari 1893 B1; Mailr. 748.

Telegram Gouverneur-Generaal, 15 Augustus 1892. V24 Januari 1893 B1; Mailr. 767.
81 Rapport Dannenbargh, 26 August 1893. V13 October 1893 Z12; Mailr. 1037.
82 Rapport Dannenbargh, 24 November 1892. V24 Januari 1893 B1; Mailr. 1193.
83 Rapport Dannenbargh, 2 Januari 1893. V13 October 1893 Z12; Mailr. 110.
84 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Rapport Dannenbargh, 6 December 1893. V4 September 1896 W15; Mailr. 1396.
88 Statement by Captain Stratton, Commander SS Ban Poh Gwan, quoted in Rapport Dannenbargh, 6 December 1893, op. cit.
89 Telegram Dannenbargh, 3 December 1893. V4 September 1896 W15; Mailr. 1396.
90 Rapport Dannenbargh, 27 Januari 1894. V4 September 1896 W15; Mailr. 147.
91 Ibid.
92 Rapport Consul-Generaal in de Straits Settlements, 2 Maart 1894. V4 September 1896 W15; Mailr. 262.
93 Ibid.
95 Malygin and company must have left Singapore at the beginning of April 1894 because, according to his own testimony, the journey to Bali took about three months. He landed in Buleleng on 13 July 1894. Telegram Secretaris Residentie Bali en Lombok 14 Juli 1894. V4 September 1896 W15; Mailr. 661.
96 Verhoor van Malygin, afgenomen door Controleur Engelenberg, 11 Januari 1895. Mailr. 661.
97 Telegram Secretaris . . . , 14 Juli 1894, op. cit.
98 Verhoor van Malygin . . . , 11 Januari 1895, op. cit.
99 Biographical information from Stibbe, Vol. III and IV.
100 The General’s report was discussed at Buitengewone Vergadering van den Raad van Nederlandsch-Indie, 26 Mei, 1894. V4 Juli 1896 Kab./4C.
101 Ibid.
104 See Appendix I, Letter B.
105 The Parliamentary debates on the Lombok issue were published in IG 2 (1894), pp.1054-81, 1165-71.
106 Nota betreffende den Opstand der Sasakse Bevolking van het eiland Lombok tegen aldaar gevestigd Hindoegezag en de daaruit voortgevloeide Moeilijkheden, 7 April 1894. V28 Juni 1894, No.37; Mailr. 828.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
CHAPTER IV

1 Ultimatum aan de Vorsten van Lombok. V4 September 1896 W15; Mailr. 683.
2 Extract Journal Opperebevelhebber, 6-7 Juli 1894. V4 September 1896 W15; Mailr. 669.
4 Rapport Opperebevelhebber, 14 Juli 1894, op. cit.
5 Testimony of Anak Agung Made Jilantik, the only son of Ratu Agung2 Ngurah to survive the war, as told to the Dutch parliamentarian H.H. van Kol. Published in H.H. van Kol, *Driemaal dwars door Sumatra en zwerftochten door Bali* (Rotterdam, 1914), pp.361-77.
6 For the full text of this letter see Van der Kraan, p.334.
7 For the full text of this letter see Van der Kraan, p.335.
8 That Ayu Made Rai acknowledged the truth of the accusation is confirmed by two separate sources: (a) by Anak Agung Made's house-priest as quoted by Liefrinck, *Bali en Lombok*, p.471; (b) by Anak Agung Made Jilantik as quoted by Van Kol, *Driemaal*.

9 For the full text of this letter see Van der Kraan, p.336.

10 Rapport Opperevelhebber, 14 Juli 1894, op. cit.


12 Ibid., p.471.


14 Although it is not known who acted as Made's executioner, there is strong circumstantial evidence pointing towards Jilantik. In view of Made's substantial following at the Lombok court, it is improbable that a Lombok punggawa would have been willing to perform an act for which many of Made's followers might have sought revenge. It is known that Jilantik was present in the palace at the time of the execution. It is also known that Jilantik's policy of appeasement was directly opposed to Made's policy of resistance. For these reasons it is probable that it was Jilantik, or one of his personal followers, who obeyed the Raja's order.

15 Extract Journaal Opperevelhebber, 10-14 Juli 1894, op. cit.

16 Ibid.


18 Rapport Opperevelhebber, 14 Juli 1894, op. cit.

19 See note 6 above.

20 See note 9 above.


22 For the complete text of the treaty, see Appendix III, Part II.


24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.


28 Ibid.


31 Although at this time still under the nominal control of Praya, the head of the Jonggat district, Raden Widana, began to play an increasingly independent role.

32 Notulen der Conferentie met de Sasaksche Hoofden, 4 Augustus 1894. V4 September 1896 W15; Mailr. 757.
34 See Appendix III, Part II, Article 17.
35 Notulen der Conferentie, op. cit.
36 Rapport Opperbevelhebber, 11 Augustus 1894, op. cit.
37 Rapport Dannenbargh, 16 Augustus 1894. V4 September 1896 W15; Mailr. 765.
41 Cool, p.286.
43 Cool, p.291.
44 Rapport Vetter, 24 September 1894, op. cit.
45 Cool, p.296.
47 Ibid.
48 Testimony of Anak Agung Made Jilantik, op. cit.
49 This rejection of the Raja's request to send a delegation to the Governor-General is not mentioned in the Dutch records. There are, however, at least two reasons why Made Jilantik's testimony is likely to be accurate. First, after the disastrous defeat of the Dutch forces, Vetter and Dannenbargh had every reason to hide anything which might be interpreted as a 'political mistake'. Secondly, Made Jilantik's testimony is credible because everything else can be verified with Dutch sources.

Ali Rentjong was accused of spying (something only the Dutch were allowed to engage in) and — together with several other prisoners — was publicly hanged in the market-square of Ampenan on 1 October 1894. Rapport Chef van den Staf, 5 October 1894. V28 November 1896 U19; Mailr. 945

51 Rapport Opperbevelhebber, 25 September 1894, op. cit.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Although the Dutch later blamed Jilantik for his 'failure to give advance warning', it is likely that he did not know of the plan to attack the Dutch troops. There is no evidence indicating that he was present at the meeting of Anak Agung K'tut and the six punggawas at which this decision was taken. Moreover, due to his friendly relations with the Dutch, Jilantik was not trusted by the Lombok punggawas. It stands to reason that the punggawas who intended to carry out an attack in which the element of surprise was all-important, would have made every effort to withhold this information from him.
55 Uittreksel Dagboek Scherer, 2-4 September 1894. V13 October 1894 No.18; Mailr. 14.
56 Ibid.

57 The Directeur Binnenlandsch Bestuur Scherer was sent to Lombok at the beginning of September 1894 to investigate the reasons for the Dutch military defeat. In his secret report he stated the following as the principal reason: 'They [i.e. Vetter and Dannenbarth] felt themselves, if not altogether safe, certainly strong enough to be able to repulse any attack . . . Apparently they had no reason to expect that the strength of a well-armed native enemy would be so great . . . They were of the opinion that a few companies, well equipped with artillery, would be too strong for any native enemy. But as the results have regrettfully shown, this was not the case.' Rapport Scherer, 31 October 1894, op. cit.

58 Rapport Opperbevelhebber, 25 September 1894, op. cit.

59 Ibid.

60 The text of Anak Agung K’tut’s offer to Captain Lindgreen was as follows: ‘Captain and Lieutenant, I grant you and your followers your lives, but only your lives. The rifles must be surrendered to me. What further my will shall be, shall be made known to you.’ Rapport Vetter, 24 September 1894. op. cit.

61 The description of the fighting has been derived from the following sources, (a) Bijlagen Rapport Vetter, 24 September 1894, op. cit.; (b) Cool; (c) J.W.F. Herfkens, Oost-Indische Krijgsgeschiedenis, De Expeditie naar Lombok (Breda, 1907).

62 Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch-Indië, 2 de Deel, 1894. Quoted from De Locomotief.

63 Ibid.

64 Mainly because the Dutch rarely issued statistics on losses among convicts, the figure of 414 convicts killed, missing or gravely wounded is somewhat unique. The reason a figure on convict losses is available here is that General Vetter issued this list in response to an offer from the Governor-General to restore the expedition to its original size. In order to do this Van der Wijck had to be informed of the exact losses in troops, convicts and materials. Telegram Opperbevelhebber, 30 Augustus 1894. V28 November U19; Mailr. 922.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid.

67 The high figure of losses among convicts may in part be due to their understandable propensity to escape. The high casualty rate among officers may suggest that the Balinese consciously sought them out.

68 This telegram became known as ‘The Lombok telegram’. The Ministry of Colonies in The Hague censored the last three sentences. One can only guess at the reason for this omission. The most likely explanation is that the Minister of Colonies, Bergsma, did not want it publicly known that General Vetter had hinted that the troops best be withdrawn from Lombok, and had expressed doubts with regard to the possibility of staging an offensive. Telegram Opperbevelhebber, 27 Augustus 1894. V28 November 1896 Kab; Mailr. 22.

69 This eyewitness was Mrs Gey van Pittius, the wife of the Commander of the army. Ten years later, in 1904, she wrote in a letter to the Queen: ‘When the telegram arrived that morning with the news of the total destruction of the expedition, the Governor-General was so disturbed that . . . it was difficult to calm him down.’ Collectie Gey van Pittius, No.102.

70 Notulen Buitengewone Vergadering Raad van Nederlandsch-Indie, 28 Augustus 1894. V28 November 1896 U19; Mailr. 22.

71 Herfkens, p.57.
Ibid., p.62.

Afscrift Dagboek Scherer, 10-17 September 1894. V13 October 1894, No.18; Mailr. 14.

Uittreksel Dagboek Scherer, 2-4 September 1894, op. cit. According to Scherer the East Sasaks reached the Babak River on 3 September.

See Appendix II, Letter C. There is no evidence that Ratu Agung2 Ngurah was involved in or knew of the plan to attack the Dutch troops. Since his punggawas no doubt told him that the Dutch had been the first to begin firing, it is likely that he gave this interpretation in good faith.

Uittreksel Dagboek Scherer, 2-4 September 1894; op. cit.

Telegram Opperbevelhebber, 1 September 1894. V28 November 1896 U19; Mailr. 805.

Dr. S. Ujlaki, Gevangenschap van de colonne Lindgreen bij den Radja van Lombok (Rotterdam, 1894). The author of this booklet, a medical officer in the Dutch Colonial Army, belonged to the group led by Captain Lindgreen which was taken prisoner by the Balinese. He reported that the bombardment caused considerable consternation in Mataram and that on 2 September a number of shells exploded in the palace of Mataram.

Afscrift Dagboek Scherer, 6-9 September 1894. V28 November 1896 U19; Mailr. 828.

Ibid.

See Appendix II, Letter D.

This description of the Dutch conquest of Pagasangan has been derived from Herfkens and Cool.

Rapport Engelenberg, 21-27 October 1894. V28 November 1896 V19; Mailr. 1045. Engelenberg, who was stationed in East Lombok in September 1894, obtained a copy of the Raja's letter.

Telegram Opperbevelhebber, 19 September 1894. V28 November 1896 U19; Mailr. 851. According to Vetter, it was Mami Sapian who ordered the execution of the Balinese party. His order to bring the punggawas to Ampenan alive reached Praya too late.

According to Made Jilantik, K'tut's body could not be found. It was either too mutilated to be recognized or had been buried underneath the ruins of the Mataram palace. Testimony of Anak Agung Made Jilantik, op. cit.

The description of the Dutch conquest of Mataram has been derived from the following sources (a) Herfkens (b) Cool (c) Afscrift Dagboek Scherer, 28 September-2 October 1894. V28 November 1896 U19; Mailr. 923 (d) Telegram Opperbevelhebber, 30 September 1894. V28 November 1896 U19; Mailr. 896 (e) Rapport Chef van den Staf, 15 October 1894. V28 November 1896 U19; Mailr. 945.

Afscrift Dagboek Scherer, 28 September-2 October 1894, op. cit.

Afscrift Dagboek Scherer, 3-7 October 1894. V28 November 1896 U19; Mailr. 941.

Rapport Opperbevelhebber, 14 October 1894. V28 November 1896 U19; Mailr. 964.


Ibid.

Van der Wijck was able to send these reinforcements because additional troops had arrived from the Netherlands. Rapport Gouverneur-General, 19 November 1894. V31 December 1894 F25; Mailr. 20.
93 Rapport Opperbevelhebber, 31 October 1894, op. cit.
94 Advies Raad van Nederlandsch-Indie, 14 November 1894. V31 December 1894 F25; Mailr. 20.
95 Ibid.
96 See Appendix III, Part II.
97 Advies Raad van Nederlandsch-Indie, 14 November 1894, op. cit.
99 Telegram Gouverneur-Generaal, 10 November 1894. V31 December 1894 F25; Mailr. 20.
100 Telegram Gouverneur-Generaal, 16 November 1894. V31 December 1894 F25; Mailr. 20.
101 See Appendix II, Letters C and D.
102 See Appendix III, Part I.
103 See Appendix II, Letter E.
104 Brief Resident Bali en Lombok aan den Vorst van Selaparang, 6 November 1894. V31 December 1894 F25; Mailr. 20.
105 Ibid.
106 See Appendix II, Letter F.
107 Ibid.
108 Afschrift Dagboek Scherer, 28 September-2 October 1894, op. cit.
109 This description of the Dutch attack on Cakranegara is based on Herfkens and Cool.
110 Telegram Opperbevelhebber, 20 November 1894. V28 November 1896 V19; Mailr. 1057.
111 Telegram Opperbevelhebber, 21 November 1894. V28 November 1896 V19; Mailr. 1061.
113 Telegram Opperbevelhebber, 20 November 1894, op. cit.
115 The surrender of the punggawa named Gusti Made Getas saved Narmada from destruction. These pleasure gardens, consisting of two large ponds, numerous fountains, terraced hills and spacious buildings, remain to this day one of the most impressive monuments to the period of Balinese rule. There can be no doubt that if the East Sasaks had succeeded in taking Narmada, these pleasure gardens would have suffered the same fate as those at Gunung Sari, that is, they would have been completely destroyed.
116 Testimony of Anak Agung Made Jilantik, op. cit.
117 Telegram Opperbevelhebber, 21 November 1894, op. cit.
118 Dagboek Scherer, 20-24 November 1894, op. cit.
119 Telegram Opperbevelhebber, 23 November 1894. V28 November 1896 V19; Mailr. 1074.
120 Dagboek Scherer, 20-24 November 1894, op. cit.
The Balinese probably did not surrender all the rifles in their possession. In all, they surrendered some 950 rifles, of which only 300 were modern repeating-rifles. Telegram Opperebevelhebber, 25 November 1894. V28 November 1896 V19; Mailr. 1074.

Telegram Opperebevelhebber, 24 November 1894. V28 November 1896 V19; Mailr. 1074.

Telegram Opperebevelhebber, 27 November 1894. V28 November 1896 V19; Mailr. 1074.

Dagboek Scherer, 20-24 November 1894, op. cit.

CHAPTER V


2 Rapport Opperebevelhebber en Directeur Binnenlandsch Bestuur, 10 December 1894. V22 April 1896 No.47; Mailr. 1145.

3 The import and export duties were divided between Raden Wiranom, Raden Satraji, Mami Bangkol, Mami Sapian, and Mami Kertawang. In addition to this Raden Wiranom, Raden Melayu Kusuma and Mami Kertawang derived some income from holding cock fights and horse races. Only the chiefs of the districts least affected by the war against the Balinese were still able to collect a share of the harvest in their druwe jabe lands. These chiefs were Raden Wiranom, Raden Melayu Kusuma and Mami Kertawang. In late 1895 the Dutch estimated the total income of the district chiefs expressed in monetary terms at:

   Raden Wiranom of Pringgabaya  = f.395 = per month,
   Raden Satraji of Rarang        = f.292 = per month,
   Mami Bangkol and Mami Sapian of Praya = f. 94 = per month,
   Mami Kertawang of Sakra      = f.190 = per month.

The remaining district chiefs, Mami Ginawang of Batukliyang, Mami Mustiaji of Kopang and Raden Widana of Jonggat, whose districts had been most deeply affected by the war, claimed to have no income at all. Rapport Dannenburgh, 13 November 1895. V14 April 1898 N16; Mailr. 323.

4 Rapport Opperebevelhebber en Directeur Binnenlandsch Bestuur, 10 December 1894, op. cit.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Other proposals included the levying of an export duty of 5% and an import duty of 4% as well as the introduction of the opium monopoly for Lombok’s non-indigenous (i.e. neither Balinese nor Sasak) population.

9 Extract uit het Register van Besluiten van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 31 Augustus 1895. V22 April-1896 No.47; Mailr. 41.

10 Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië, 10 October 1906, No.431. This ordinance attained notoriety mainly due to Prof. van Vollenhoven’s criticism in De Indonesiër en zijn Grond (Leiden, 1932), pp.37-43.

Notes

12 Rapport Dannenburgh, 13 November 1895. V14 April 1898 No.16; Mailr. 323.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
16 Rapport Liefrink, 3 Augustus 1900. Mailr. 1898.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Rapport Dannenburgh, 13 November 1895, op. cit.
21 M.v.O. Eschbach, 1905.
22 Rapport Scherer, 5 April 1895. V9 Mei 1895 No.50; Mailr. 673.
23 Rapport Liefrink, 13 Januari 1897. V9 Februari 1899 No.44; Mailr. 1194.
24 Rapport Liefrink, 3 Augustus 1900, op. cit.
25 Rapport Engelenberg, 8 Juni 1896. Mailr. 394.
26 Ibid.
31 This strategy was very similar to that advocated, around the same time, by Dr C. Snouck Hurgronje with regard to Aceh.
32 There were two types of sentences at forced labour: with chains or without chains. In either case, it was virtually a death sentence. The great majority of convicts were sent to Aceh where the mortality rate was appalling.
33 Rapport Liefrink, 31 Augustus 1896, op. cit.
39 Ibid.
40 Rapport Liefrink, 31 August 1896, op. cit.
42 Ibid.
43 Register Besluiten Gouverneur-Generaal, 9 Januari 1897, No.9.
45 Rapport Militaire Commandant, as quoted by Neeb, Naar Lombok, p.271.
Liefrinck’s decision to dismiss Roos was later given official sanction by the Governor-General. Extract Besluiten Gouverneur-Generaal, 23 November 1896, No.17.

Extract Besluiten Gouverneur-Generaal, 16 November 1897, No.65.

Rapport Liefrinck, 17 Mei 1897. V19 Januari 1899 No.48; Mailr. 507.

Verslag Controleur Oost Lombok, Juni 1897. Mailr. 614.

Rapport Liefrinck, 28 September 1897. Mailr. 571.

Telegram Liefrinck, 7 September 1897. Mailr. 507.

Ibid.

Telegram Liefrinck, 9 September 1897. Mailr. 507.

Rapport Liefrinck, 28 September 1897, op.cit.

Ibid.

Telegram Liefrinck, 30 September 1897. Mailr. 559.

Verslag Controleur Oost Lombok, September 1897. Mailr. 614.

Geheim rapport Commandant van het leger over excursie verdrijving rooversbende in Midden Lombok van 7 September tot 7 November 1897. V30 Maart 1898 R5; Mailr. 13.

Extract Besluiten Gouverneur-Generaal, 14 Januari 1898, No.1.

Liefrinck divided East Lombok into two administrative units primarily because it facilitated the anti-insurgency operations. Rapport Liefrinck, 6 Juli 1897. V15 Juli 1898 No.84; Mailr. 112.

Rapport Liefrinck, 15 September 1896. V14 April 1898 No.16; Mailr. 431.

Ibid.

Rapport Liefrinck, 6 Juli 1897, op. cit.

The Dutch, always anxious to save money, gradually reduced the number of punggawas in later years. They simply failed to appoint a successor when one of them died. By 1942 there was only one Balinese ‘district chief’, the punggawa of Cakranegara.

Rapport Liefrinck, 6 Juli 1897, op. cit.

The lower salaries of the West Lombok district chiefs (except the head of the very important district of Ampenan and surroundings), reflect the fact that they were totally dependent on the Dutch, that they were Dutch creations. Since they had little influence, prestige or power of their own, the Dutch did not consider it necessary to grant them the same salaries as the district chiefs of East Lombok.

Rapport Liefrinck, 6 Juli 1897, op. cit.

Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indie, 27 Augustus 1898, No.252.

Brief Gouverneur-Generaal, 24 October 1897. Mailr. 736.


The Dutch decided against restoring punggawa landownership in East Lombok mainly because by this time these lands had been appropriated by the Sasak district chiefs. In compensation for their loss, the punggawas were granted some lands in West Lombok which had recently been brought under cultivation. Van Eerde, ‘Rapport Regeling Agrarische Toestanden West Lombok’. 
Ibid.

The restoration of punggawa landownership did not take place without incident. In 1898 an angry crowd of peasants attacked two Dutch officials, resulting in the death of Controleur Van der Hout and the wounding of Controleur De Roo de la Faille. In revenge, the Dutch military, on the same day, laid waste to the village where the incident had occurred. In this attack a few Dutch soldiers and an unknown number of peasants were killed. Liefrinck, *Bali en Lombok*, p.509.

Van Eerde, ‘Rapport Regeling Agrarische Toestand West Lombok’.

In November 1899 Liefrinck formally announced that the agrarian problem had been ‘solved’ in both East and West Lombok. Rapport Liefrinck, 7 November 1899. V20 Februari 1901, No.41; Mailr. 11.

The Dutch increased the size of the tenah from $5832m^2$ to $7200m^2$. (See Weights, Measures and Currencies.) Rapport Liefrinck, 3 Augustus 1900. Mailr. 1898.

Van Eerde, ‘Rapport Regeling Agrarische Toestanden West Lombok’.

Ibid.

Rapport Liefrinck, 3 Augustus 1900, op. cit.

In later years Liefrinck came under repeated criticism for having sought (at his own initiative) to protect Balinese landholding by issuing restrictions on land alienation. Besluit Resident Bali en Lombok, 12 Februari 1901. Mailr. 1556.

Van Vollenhoven, *De Indonesië*, pp.37-43.

Advies Raad van Nederlandsch-Indië, 27 Juni 1903. V7 Juli 1904 No.88; Mailr. 1220.

Missive Directeur Binnenlandsch Bestuur, 24 November 1903. V7 Juli 1904 No. 8; Mailr. 1220.

Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië, 1 Juni 1904, No.275 en 276.

The Balinese and Sasak aristocracies always and consistently refused to perform corvée, particularly if this involved manual labour. Most of the colonial administrators did not enforce the letter of this ordinance and made no attempt to compel them. In an ordinance of 1922 (*Stbld 168*) the Balinese and Sasak aristocracies were formally exempted from corvée involving manual labour. Henceforth they were only required to perform tasks ‘befitting their dignity’, such as delivering the occasional letter, guarding prisoners and so on.

Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië, 18 Maart 1905, No.203.

Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië, 10 October 1906, No.431.

Ibid.

Although the pecatu fields were never again officially recognised as a legitimate category of land tenure, successive Dutch administrators nonetheless strove to reinstate these fields on an *ad hoc* basis. In the 20s and 30s some of the officials succeeded in doing this on a minor scale. While the Balinese sudras – the principal beneficiaries under Balinese rule – continued to be excluded, a number of minor officials such as village and subak heads were again granted tax-free pecatu fields. By 1940 a total of 1824 ha. of irrigated sawah and 675 ha. of garden were again held as pecatu fields by these lower officials. Landrente *Monografieën van West Lombok* (1938), Central Lombok (1939), en Oost Lombok (1940).

C. Lion Cachet, Onderzoek Rechtstoestand droewe daelem Gronden op Lombok, 1935. Korn Collectie; No.920.
CHAPTER VI

Development is understood here in a wide, non-technical sense. If development were defined as Paul Baran does in his book, *The Political Economy of Growth*, as ‘an increase over time in per capita production of material goods’, this statement would not be correct. For instance, the increase in rice production (Lombok’s most important product by far) failed to hold equal step with the growth in population, so that per capita rice production must have declined.

2 M.v.O. Bosselaar, Lombok, 1934.


4 M.v.O. Bosselaar, Lombok, 1934; M.v.O. Horst, Lombok, 1939.

5 As early as 1934 Bosselaar wrote: ‘After the completion of the Jurung Sate project there is only one other area of about 1253 ha. which might possibly be irrigated. This cannot yet be said with certainty because the feasibility of this project depends on the available water supply.’ M.v.O. Bosselaar, Lombok, 1934.

6 The information in this table has been derived from the following sources (a) Rapport Lulofs 8 Januari 1911, as quoted in Rapport Moolenburgh 26 Juni 1926. Mailr. 544 (b) Onderzoek Economische Toestand Lombok van den Landbouw consultant Affourtit, 11 Juni 1925. Mailr. 1065 (c) M.v.O. Bosselaar, Lombok, 1934 (d) M.v.O. Horst, Lombok, 1939 (e) Landrente Monografie West Lombok, 1938 (f) Landrente Monografie Midden Lombok, 1939 (g) Landrente Monografie Oost Lombok, 1940.

7 The information in this table has been abstracted from (a) Rapport Lulofs 8 Januari 1911, as quoted in Rapport Moolenburgh 26 Juni 1926, op. cit. (b) Onderzoek Economische Toestand Lombok van den Landbouw consulent Affourtit, 11 Juni 1925, op. cit. (c) M.v.O. Bosselaar, Lombok, 1934 (d) Rapport over de Voedselsituatie in het economisch zwakke gebied Lombok, Ir. Perk, 12 Juli 1949. Korn Collectie No.24.

8 This means that the increase in rice production was far lower than the growth in population. Whereas rice production increased by 19.6% over the period 1900-40, population increased from about 550 000 to 790 000, by some 27.8%.

9 This was true particularly for West Lombok. Here, an extensive irrigation system had already been constructed under the Balinese Rajas. Virtually all possibilities had already been utilized so that there was little the Dutch could do to extend the system. In the whole of the colonial period from 1895-1940 the irrigated sawah area of West Lombok expanded from 16 852 ha. to 18 060 ha., by only 7.2%.

10 M.v.O. Horst, Lombok, 1939.
11 M.V.O. Veenhuyzen, Bali and Lombok, 1914.
12 The information in this table has been derived from (a) Nota Regeling Grondlasten Residentie Bali en Lombok, V5 Augustus 1912 No.69; Mailr. 859 (b) M.V.O. Veenhuyzen, Bali and Lombok, 1914 (c) Onderzoek Druk Belastingen en Heerendiensten Residentie Bali en Lombok, 4 Juni 1918. V29 Maart 1929 No.6; Mailr. 1662 (d) M.V.O. Beeuwkes, Bali and Lombok, 1932 (e) M.V.O. Bosselaar, Lombok, 1934 (f) M.V.O. Bakker, Oost Lombok, 1938 (g) M.V.O. Horst, Lombok, 1939.
13 Staatsblad van Nederlandsch Indie, 18 Maart 1905, No.203; Stbld. 4 December 1913, No.682; Stbld. 31 Maart 1922, No.168.
14 The Dutch usually estimated the adult male population at one-fifth of the total population.
15 Onderzoek Druk Belastingen en Heerendiensten Residentie Bali en Lombok, 4 Juni 1918, op. cit.
16 Nota Regeling Grondlasten Residentie Bali en Lombok, op. cit.
17 It should be pointed out that the wage of 20-40 cents per day was the wage of the male coolies. The female workers employed by the rice mills received as little as 5-15 cents per day. O. Horst, 'De rijsthandel op Lombok', KT (1939), pp.251-2.
18 M.V.O. Veenhuyzen, Bali and Lombok, 1914.
19 M.V.O. Stenis, Bali en Lombok, 1919.
20 M.V.O. Schreuder, Lombok, 1931; M.V.O. Vissers, West Lombok, 1933.
22 M.V.O. Oudkerk Pool, Lombok, 1927.
23 M.V.O. Schreuder, Lombok, 1931.
24 Ibid.
25 M.V.O. Beeuwkes, Bali en Lombok, 1932.
26 M.V.O. Moolenburgh, Bali en Lombok, 1926.
27 Van Kol, Uit Onze Kolonien, p.168.
28 M.V.O. Mann, Midden Lombok, 1916.
29 The information in this table has been abstracted from (a) M.V.O. Eschbach, Bali en Lombok, 1905 (b) M.V.O. Mann, Oost Lombok, 1916 (c) M.V.O. Damste, Bali en Lombok, 1923 (d) M.V.O. Moolenburgh, Bali en Lombok, 1926 (e) M.V.O. Oudkerk Pool, Lombok, 1927 (f) M.V.O. Caron, Bali en Lombok, 1929 (g) M.V.O. Schreuder, Lombok, 1931 (h) M.V.O. Beeuwkes, Bali en Lombok, 1932 (i) M.V.O. Fonteine, West Lombok, 1936 (j) M.V.O. Leyds, Midden Lombok, 1934 (k) M.V.O. Bakker, Oost Lombok, 1938.
30 Of a total population of 17 328 800 for the Outer Provinces in 1941, some 5 953 000 were listed as 'able to walk but not yet fully grown'. This means that around 1940 some 34.3% of the total population of the Outer Islands was between the ages of three and fifteen years. In view of this statistic, an estimate of 17% of the total population for the age group six to 12 would seem reasonable. The Statistical Pocketbook of Indonesia (Batavia, 1941), p.10.
31 M.V.O. Schreuder, Lombok, 1931; M.V.O. Leyds, Midden Lombok, 1934.
The information in this table has been derived from (a) M.v.O. Schreuder, Lombok, 1931 (b) M.v.O. Bosselaar, Lombok, 1934 (c) M.v.O. Horst, Lombok, 1939.

For instance, in 1934 the Controleur of East Lombok complained: ‘... The raising of the padi sekolah always causes the greatest of difficulties’. M.v.O. Leyds, Oost Lombok, 1934.

M.v.O. Bosselaar, Lombok, 1934; M.v.O. Horst, Lombok, 1939.

The Dutch kept the import duties low in order not to encourage a ‘smuggling trade’ with South Bali, which at this time had not yet been brought under Dutch rule.

The average percentages (taken over the years 1912, 1925, 1933 and 1938) of the total value of Lombok exports of each of the principal commodities were as follows: rice 47.3%, copra 11.1%, tobacco 8.8%, coconut oil 6.1%, cattle 6.0%, kacang 5.4%, hides 3.2%, onions 2.3%, eggs 1.4%, birds’ nests 1.4%, kapok 1.2%, pigs 1.3%, coffee 1.2%, corn 0.6%, tamarind 0.5%, kemiri 0.5% and miscellaneous items 1.7%. M.v.O. Veenhuyzen, Bali en Lombok, 1914; M.v.O. Oudkerk Pool, Lombok, 1927; M.v.O. Bosselaar, Lombok, 1934; M.v.O. Horst, Lombok, 1939.

Van Eerde, 'Lombok'.

The figures on the total value of imports and exports are from the following sources (a) M.v.O. Eschbach, Bali en Lombok, 1905 (b) M.v.O. Veenhuyzen, Bali en Lombok, 1914. The figures for the years 1906, 1907, 1908 and 1909 have been estimated in accordance with the trend.

The figures on the value of imports and exports are from (a) M.v.O. Veenhuyzen, Bali en Lombok, 1914 (b) M.v.O. Damste, Bali en Lombok, 1923. The figures for the years 1915, 1916 and 1917 have been estimated in accordance with the trend.

Import and export figures are from (a) M.v.O. Damste, Bali en Lombok, 1923 (b) M.v.O. Oudkerk Pool, Lombok, 1927 (c) M.v.O. Beeuwkes, Bali en Lombok, 1932.

While the volume of exports increased during the depression years (1931-35), the volume of imports was about halved. M.v.O. Bosselaar, Lombok 1934.

Import and export figures are from (a) M.v.O. Schreuder, Lombok, 1931 (b) M.v.O. Bosselaar, Lombok, 1934 (c) M.v.O. Horst, 1939. The figures for 1940 have been projected forward in accordance with the trends.

Since there is no information available either on the quantities or on the value of these imports into Lombok, it is impossible to estimate how much revenue the Netherlands Indies Government derived from this source.

Horst, p.244.

M.v.O. Bosselaar, Lombok, 1934.

Rapport Liefrinck, 3 Augustus 1900. Malir. 1898.

The information in this table has been abstracted from (a) Van Eerde, 'Lombok' (b) M.v.O. Veenhuyzen, Bali en Lombok, 1914 (c) M.v.O. Damste, Bali en Lombok, 1923 (d) Nota Regeling Grondlasten Residentie Bali en Lombok, op. cit. (e) Onderzoek Druk Belastingen en Heerendiensten Residentie Bali en Lombok op. cit.

Nota Regeling Grondlasten Residentie Bali en Lombok, op. cit.

Onderzoek Druk Belastingen en Heerendiensten Residentie Bali en Lombok, op. cit.
For instance, the 1917 land tax revenues of f.409 000 consisted of f.336 000 in pajeq and f.73 000 in upeti. Onderzoek Druk Belastingen en Heerendiensten Residentie Bali en Lombok, op. cit.

52 All figures in this table have been abstracted from the land survey which was completed in 1928 in West Lombok, in 1929 in Central Lombok and in 1930 in East Lombok. This survey — on which the 1930 land tax ordinance was based — divided the land in West Lombok into eight classes, in Central Lombok into nine classes, and in East Lombok into eight classes. Since all these classes had different productivity estimates, the rice fields of Lombok were divided into $8 + 9 + 8 = 25$ different productivity classes. These 25 productivity classes have been divided into five subsequent groups of five. The five productivity estimates in this table are averages of each group of five, while the figures on the number of ha. are the sum totals of the number of ha. in each of these groups. Landrente Monografie West Lombok 1938. Landrente Monografie Midden Lombok 1939. Landrente Monografie Oost Lombok 1940.

53 M.v.O. Bosselaar, Lombok, 1934.


55 Rapport Damste, 11 Februari 1922. V16 Februari 1923 No.8; Mailr. 2302.

56 Rapport Damste, 5 Mei 1922. V16 Februari 1923 No.8; Mailr. 2303.

57 The information in this table has been abstracted from (a) M.v.O. Damste, Bali en Lombok, 1923 (b) M.v.O. Schreuder, Lombok, 1928 (c) M.v.O. Bosselaar, Lombok, 1934.

58 The close relationship between the taxation system and the rice mills is illustrated by the history of the establishment of these mills. Not long after the Dutch had introduced income tax — payable in Netherlands Indies currency — in 1914, the first rice mill was opened (1915). Shortly after the transformation of the pajeq from a tax in kind into a money tax — payable only in Netherlands Indies currency — in 1920, another five such mills were established (1920-24). During the remainder of the colonial period only two more mills were opened, so that by 1940 there was a total of eight on the island. See (a) Rapport Moolenburgh, 20 Juli 1924. V12 Maart 1925, No.47; Mailr. 2883 (b) M.v.O. Horst, Lombok, 1939.

59 Horst, p.254.

60 The prices in this table have been derived from (a) Nota Landbouw consultant Bali en Lombok, 1 November 1928. Mailr. 147 (b) Landrente Monografie, West, Midden en Oost Lombok, op. cit.

61 If the peasant had the misfortune to become indebted — which occurred with increasing frequency from about 1920 onwards — he was forced to sell his padi to the Chinese rice mill owners against a money advance before it was harvested. The price he then received appears to have been at least 25% lower than under normal circumstances. Nota Landbouw consulent Bali en Lombok, 1 November 1928, op. cit.

62 Nota Landbouw consulent Bali en Lombok, 1 November 1928, op. cit.

63 M.v.O. Horst, Lombok, 1939.

64 The ordinance was drafted in 1922 (Stbld 812).

65 Landrente Monografie, West, Midden en Oost Lombok, op. cit.

66 Ibid.

67 M.v.O. Bosselaar, Lombok, 1934.
The land survey on which the ordinance was based divided the sawahs in West Lombok into eight, in Central Lombok into nine and in East Lombok into eight classes. Since all these classes had differing productivity estimates, the rice fields on the whole of Lombok were actually divided into $8 + 9 + 8 = 25$ different productivity classes. The productivity estimates of Classes I-VII in the table are averages of subsequent groups of three (Class VIII in the table of a group of four), while the figures on the numbers of ha. are the sum totals of the number of ha. in each of these groups. Landrente Monografie West, Midden en Oost Lombok, op. cit.

This tax percentage is the average for all of Lombok. It was arrived at in the following way. The land survey divided the 194 subaks of West Lombok into six so-called 'economic circles'. Circle I, consisting of 81 subaks, paid 10%, Circle II, consisting of 50 subaks, paid 9%, and Circles III-VI, comprising the remaining 63 subaks, paid 8%. Assuming that all the subaks were roughly of the same size, the average tax percentage for West Lombok was 9.1%. The 35 subaks and 25 village areas of Central Lombok were also divided into six 'economic circles'. Circle I, consisting of the 35 subaks, paid 10%, Circle II, comprising ten village areas, paid 9%, Circles III and IV, consisting of eight village areas, paid 7%, and Circles V and VI, comprising the remaining seven village areas, paid 6%. Again assuming that the subaks and village areas were roughly of the same size, the average tax percentage for Central Lombok was 9.0% The 61 village areas of East Lombok were also divided into six 'economic circles'. Circle I (32 village areas) paid 11%, Circle II (12 village areas) paid 10%, Circle III (9 village areas) paid 9%, Circles IV and V (7 village areas) paid 8%, and Circle VI (one village area) paid 7%. Once more assuming that the village areas were roughly of the same size, the average tax percentage for East Lombok was 10.1%. Bearing in mind the proportion between the sawah areas of West, Central and East Lombok, which in 1930 were 18 523, 43 394 and 29 600 ha. respectively, the average tax percentage for all of Lombok was 9.4%. Landrente Monografie West, Midden en Oost Lombok, op. cit.

The price of f.3.00 per picul was much higher than what the peasant received for his product. It was based on the highest local price quotations (in January) in the twenties. Resident Caron pointed out that this price was unrealistic and ordered an investigation to be held into the real price the peasant received. Although the investigation proved that the peasant received some 27% less than the average local market price over the three or four lowest months (May-August), the officials in Batavia were not convinced and upheld the wholly unrealistic price of f.3.00 per picul. Rapport Caron, 21 December 1928. Mailr. 147.

According to the 1929 land tax figures the pajeg was collected on 4 671 ha. in Class I, 9 580 ha in Class II, 12 917 ha. in Class III, 21 409 ha. in Class IV, and 19 270 ha. in Class V. The total taxable sawah area was therefore 67 847 ha. Landrente Monografie, West, Midden en Oost Lombok, op. cit.

The information in this table has been abstracted from (a) M.v.O. Bosselaar, Lombok, 1934 (b) M.v.O. Horst, Lombok, 1939 (c) Landrente Monografie West, Midden en Oost Lombok.

Landrente Monografie West, Midden en Oost Lombok, op. cit.

The figure of 26.4% is an average over the entire 11-year period 1930-40. Since padi prices began to rise again in 1935, this average percentage to some extent obscures the magnitude of the pressure of the pajeg in the depression years, particularly in the year 1932. The average percentage of the rice harvest which the peasant had to sell for pajeg purposes over the years 1931-34 was 33.2%, while in 1932 it reached its all-time high of 40.4%.
The information in this table has been derived from (a) M.v.O. Eschbach, Bali en Lombok, 1905 (b) M.v.O. Veenhuyzen, Bali en Lombok, 1914.

M.v.O. Veenhuyzen, Bali en Lombok, 1914.

Tax-conscious Dutch officials advanced some curious arguments in support of the minimum income tax levy. The Directeur van Financien wrote: 'The reason for the minimum payment is . . . that each native who is capable of work is duty-bound to contribute to the State's economy, even if he, out of sheer laziness, contents himself with a minimum existence.' A second argument was succinctly summed up by the Member of the Council of the Indies, J.H. Liefvink: 'The reasoning behind the minimum payment is the view that every cultivator must have some side income. Every peasant will keep some pigs, ducks or chickens or will earn something extra because he or his wife assists others at harvest time. The result of the minimum payment is that people are taxed not for what they have actually earned, but for what is believed they could have earned.' V.E. Korn, 'De Belasting op de Bedrijfs- en andere Inkomsten', TBB 53 (1917), p.472. Onderzoek Druk Belastingen en Heerendiensten Residentie Bali en Lombok, op. cit.

According to Assistant Resident Schreuder, some 90% of the income tax was paid by minimum contributions of f.1.50 per year. M.v.O. Schreuder, Lombok, 1931.

The information in this table has been abstracted from (a) Onderzoek Druk Belastingen en Heerendiensten Residentie Bali en Lombok, op. cit. (b) M.v.O. Damste, Bali en Lombok, 1923 (c) M.v.O. Schreuder, Lombok, 1931.

In 1930 a Controleur noted: 'The income tax has always been very unpopular here. The ordinary Sasak resists this tax and attempts as much as possible to avoid paying it.' M.v.O. Rijnstra, Oost Lombok, 1930.

M.v.O. Schreuder, Lombok, 1931.

The information in this table has been abstracted from (a) M.v.O. Bosselaar, Lombok, 1934 (b) M.v.O. Horst, Lombok, 1939 (c) Landrente Monografie West, Midden en Oost Lombok, op. cit.

The information in this table has been derived from (a) Onderzoek Druk Belastingen en Heerendiensten Residentie Bali en Lombok, op. cit. (b) M.v.O. Damste, Bali en Lombok, 1923.

Information in this table comes from (a) M.v.O. Schreuder, Lombok, 1931 (b) M.v.O. Bosselaar, Lombok, 1934 (c) M.v.O. Horst, Lombok, 1939 (d) Landrente Monografie West, Midden en Oost Lombok, op. cit.

It may be objected that this striking decline in slaughter tax revenue was due not to declining meat consumption, but to the increasing skill of Lombok's population in avoiding the tax. However, for at least three reasons this does not appear very likely. First, the slaughter tax was not particularly difficult to collect. The Dutch had an effective method of checking on this tax: they simply kept an eye on the export of hides. Secondly, since the Dutch administration became more efficient as the colonial period progressed, it is not reasonable to suppose that the collection of the slaughter tax would have been an exception. And thirdly, even if there was a certain amount of 'illegal' butchering, there is no reason to suppose that this would have occurred more frequently in the thirties than in 1916, when the slaughter tax was first introduced.

The information in this table comes from (a) M.v.O. Schreuder, Lombok, 1931 (b) M.v.O. Bosselaar, Lombok, 1934.

M.v.O. Horst, Lombok, 1939.
The information in this tables comes from (a) M.v.O. Schreuder, Lombok, 1931 (b) M.v.O. Bosselaar, Lombok, 1934.

The Assistant Resident Schreuder commented that when the corvée money was first collected in 1929, most of the population was not aware that it was possible to refuse paying the tax and perform corvée instead. M.v.O. Schreuder, Lombok, 1931.

The only Dutch coin which was in demand on Lombok was the rijksdaalder (f.2.50) which, however, was unsuitable for the small-scale transactions of the peasant populations. Smaller Dutch coins, such as the one cent, the 10 cent, the 25 cent and f.1 pieces were not readily accepted. Dutch officials frequently complained about this state of affairs. See for instance G. Vissering, Muntwezen en Circulatie in Nederlandsch-Indië (Amsterdam, 1920), p.252; M.v.O. Caron, Bali en Lombok, 1929; M.v.O. Beeuwkes, Bali en Lombok, 1932; M.v.O. Horst, Lombok, 1939.

The information in this table comes from (a) Rapport Moolenburgh, 26 Juni 1926. Malir. 544 (b) Horst, p.244.

The fact that Lombok was exploited did not escape the attention of some of the more astute of the colonial officials. For instance, Resident Damste wrote: 'In 1922 income from Lombok exceeded expenditure by f.1 175 822.' Similarly, according to Resident Moolenburgh: 'Lombok provides us with an annual profit of around f.1 000 000. This amount will probably increase even further when more irrigation works are constructed.' And Assistant Resident Bosselaar commented: 'Lombok's contribution to the country's finances is hundreds of thousands of guilders more than what is expended on the island. In 1932 we received 1.1 million more than we spent, while in 1933 profits were around 0.8 million. H.T. Damste, 'Balische Splinters', KT (1924). Rapport Moolenburgh, 22 Juli 1924, V12 Maart 1925, No.47; Malir. 2883. M.v.O. Bosselaar, Lombok, 1934.

The pengayahs were the peasants who under Balinese rule had cultivated the land belonging to the Raja's direct domain. In view of the fact that the Government had simply assumed ownership over the druwe dalem lands (see Chapter V: The Establishment of Dutch Rule), and like the Raja, had made access to the land conditional on the payment of land tax and the performance of corvée labour, it is inappropriate to refer to the pengayahs as 'landowners'. It was the Government which owned the druwe dalem lands, not the peasant. In reality, Dutch rule brought little change in the social position of the pengayah. While under Balinese rule he had been a 'tenant farmer' on the Raja's land, under Dutch rule he became a 'tenant farmer' on the Government's land. For this reason it is more accurate to continue to refer to this category of peasants by the Balinese name 'pengayah'.

Out of a total rice production of some 2 980 000 piculs of padi, the Raja collected about 224 520 piculs in pajeg, some 7.6% (see Chapter I: The System of Taxation). Since the sawah area belonging to the Raja's direct domain (81 960 tenah) constituted about 66.4% of Lombok's total sawah area (123 460 tenah), rice production on the druwe dalem lands is likely to have been about 66.4% of the total, some 1 978 720 piculs. The amount the Raja collected in pajeg (224 520 piculs) was about 11.3% of the rice production of the domain lands. This means that the average percentage of the rice harvest which the peasants cultivating the druwe dalem lands (the pengayahs, the pecatu and the wakap holders) paid in pajeg was likewise about 11.3%.
The se pangans were the peasants who under Balinese rule had cultivated the land belonging to the Balinese or Sasak aristocrats (the dr uwe jabe lands). Although the Government in 1901 declared the se pangans 'free' from their masters (Stbld 287), it is clear that this law was never enforced. The actual, existing social relations could not be changed overnight by a purely formal decision. In reality, the se pangans continued to be serfs and did not become 'free' sharecroppers. Apart from having to surrender part of the harvest (like a sharecropper), they continued to be required to perform all kinds of services for their landlords, and continued to reside under the jurisdiction of their masters. For instance, in 1921 Resident Damste wrote: 'The conditions under which the sharecropper cultivates the land are most unfavourable. Not only must he surrender two-thirds of the rice harvest, but he also has to work for his landlord. All kinds of domestic chores are performed by him: repairing mud walls, making atap, house cleaning, cooking, weaving, etc. etc.' And similarly, in 1938 Controleur Nieuwenhuyzen could write: 'The category of se pangans still exists on Lombok. They still cultivate the land of their masters. Although they are supposed to be free and are therefore called penyakap, they still have to perform services for their masters. Many of the se pangans do not even reside under the jurisdiction of the village head. One can only give them orders through the intermediary of their masters.' In view of the fact that the actual social position of the se pangans changed but slowly, the term 'sharecropper' is not satisfactory. It is more accurate to continue to refer to this category of peasants by the Balinese name of 'se pangan'. Rapport Damste, 25 Juni 1921. Mairr. 3821. M.w.O. Nieuwenhuyzen, Midden Lombok, 1938.

Landrente Monografie West, Midden en Oost Lombok, op. cit.

Because the se pangan received such a small share of the rice harvest, he was obliged to pay the land tax and other taxes from proceeds obtained from selling his secondary crop. In view of the fact that towards the end of the colonial period the se pangans had greatly increased in numbers, Dutch tax officials in 1938 suggested that it might be easier to collect the land tax immediately after the harvest of the secondary crop, instead of after the rice harvest as had been the practice: 'In the sharecropping system half or more of the padi harvest must be surrendered to the landowner. Since the sharecropper is left with only a small part of the main harvest, the rice is used almost exclusively for his own consumption. It is impossible for the sharecropper to meet his fiscal obligations from his share of the rice harvest. Because the sharecropping system is very widespread, the land tax could be more easily collected immediately after the harvest of the secondary crop.' That this suggestion could be made at all provides additional proof for the fact that it was the se pangan rather than the landlord who paid the land tax. Landrente Monografie West, Midden en Oost Lombok, op. cit.

This view was one of the main arguments in favour of an income tax levy on the peasants. Onderzoek Druk Belastingen en Heerendiensten Residentie Bali en Lombok, op. cit.

The Chinese rice mill owners fulfilled several economic functions. They not only bought rice and other products from the peasants, but also acted as exporters and as money lenders. The Dutch forbade money lending by Chinese, but were unable to enforce it. In 1924 Resident Moolenburgh admitted: 'Although it is forbidden to provide credit against unharvested crops, there can be no doubt that the Chinese will have his illegal ways.' The Dutch attempt to replace the Chinese money lender and provide credit to the peasant (De Balische Volksbank) was unsuccessful. The reason for this failure was that in spite of exorbitant interest, the peasant placed greater trust in the Chinese than in the Dutch. This is not surprising if it is remembered that while the Dutch could seize the peasant's land in case of default, the Chinese had no such powers. Rapport Moolenburgh, 20 Juli 1924. V12 Maart 1925 No.47; Mairr. 2883.
When the peasant was not indebted he normally received a price some 27% lower than the local market price at harvest time. Since the indebted peasant received about 35% less than other peasants, he received only about 48% of the local price around harvest time.

Since the Dutch, following in the Raja's footsteps, had forbidden the alienation of druew dalem lands, sales of land on Lombok assumed a hidden character. That is, land sales took place under the guise of pawn contracts (gade gegem). However, in view of the fact that these pawn contacts had a permanent character, they were virtually indistinguishable from outright sales. The only difference was that the sepangan had the right to buy back his pengayah-status in the unlikely event that he would be able to raise sufficient money to pay the pawn sum. Landrente Monografie West, Midden en Oost Lombok, op. cit.


M.v.O. Vissers, West Lombok, 1933.

Landrente Monografie West, Midden en Oost Lombok, op. cit.

On Lombok there were few opportunities for a peasant who had lost access to land to earn some income. Since there was an abundance of corvée labourers, the Dutch did not buy coolie labour. The rice mills employed from 200 to 600 coolies in the thirties, too few to have any influence on the employment situation. Horst, p.251-2.

Rapport Moolenburgh, 20 Juli 1924, op. cit.


Under Balinese rule, peasants negligent in the performance of corvée and payment of land tax could be punished by eviction from the land. It is doubtful, however, that the number of peasants thus punished was ever large enough to have constituted a distinct class of landless paupers.

M.v.O. Leyds, Midden Lombok, 1934.

Van Eerde, 'Rapport Regeling Agrarische Toestanden West Lombok.'

This meant that three Balinese families owned 1 635 ha. of sawah. Since in 1938 West Lombok's total sawah area comprised 18 060 ha., three landlords owned about 9% of all the sawahs. The great wealth represented by this type of holding is evident when it is remembered that about 3/4 ha. of reasonably productive sawah is sufficient to adequately provide food, clothing and shelter for a peasant and his family. Landrente Monografie West Lombok, 1938.

Ibid.

Landrente Monografie Oost Lombok, 1940.

Landrente Monografie Midden en Oost Lombok, op. cit.

The information in this table is from (a) M.v.O. Eschbach, Bali en Lombok, 1905 (b) M.v.O. Veenhuizen, Bali en Lombok, 1914 (c) Nota van Toelichting Economische Verhoudingen op Lombok, 16 Maart 1925; Mailr. 456.

The information in this table is from (a) Nota van Toelichting Economische Verhoudingen op Lombok, op. cit. (b) Rapport Moolenburgh, 26 Juni 1926, op. cit. (c) M.v.O. Bosselaar, Lombok, 1934 (d) M.v.O. Horst, Lombok, 1939 (e) Landrente Monografie West, Midden en Oost Lombok, op. cit.

CHAPTER VII

1 In 1897 the Dutch defeated the last rebel band in the Praya district. See Chapter V: The Continuation of the East Sasak Revolt.

2 This choice has to a large extent been influenced by the availability or otherwise of adequate documentation.

3 Kort Verslag Residentie Bali en Lombok, November 1920.

4 Korte Verslagen for these years.

5 This story is at least in part based on fact. Anak Agung K’tut was killed in October 1894 defending his palace against the Dutch Colonial Army. Since the retreating Balinese were unable to find his body, it is very likely that he was buried under a collapsing wall of the palace. Testimony of Anak Agung Made Jilantik as quoted by Van Kol, Driemaal, pp.361-77.

6 Politiek Verslag Veenhuizen. VI0 Augustus 1911, No.18; Mailr. 1272.

7 Kort Verslag der Residentie Bali en Lombok, October 1920.


10 Ibid.

11 The question may well be asked how Dane could possibly have been a vagrant if it is true – as the report states – that the population honoured him and regularly brought him presents of food and clothing. Rapport Assistant Resident Lombok, 23 September 1908, op. cit.

12 Elopement was the usual method by which both Balinese and Sasak arrived at a marriage.

13 Rapport Assistant Resident Lombok, 23 September 1908, op. cit.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.


18 In June 1894, Anak Agung Made was executed on orders of his father on a charge of incest. See Chapter IV, The Fall of the House of Karangasem.


20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

23 Rapport van Stenis, 26 December 1918, op. cit.
24 Korte Verslagen in these years.
25 Kort Verslag der Residentie Bali en Lombok, November 1906.
26 Kort Verslag, November 1906, op. cit.
27 Ibid. That the peasants should express a desire for stable prices of basic agricultural commodities is hardly surprising. An important consequence of the establishment of Dutch rule was that Lombok became well and truly integrated into the world market. This meant, among other things, that the prices of agricultural commodities became subject to considerable fluctuation.
28 Kort Verslag, November 1906, op. cit.
29 Rapport de Bruijn Kops, 20 December 1906. V1 Mei 1908 No.52; Mailr. 15.
30 Korte Verslagen for these years.
31 Telegram de Bruijn Kops, 10 November 1907. V1 Mei 1908 No.52; Mailr. 1719.
32 Rapport Controleur Oost Lombok, 13 November 1907. V1 Mei 1908 No.52; Mailr.52.
33 Rapport Assistant Resident Lombok, 24 November 1907. V1 Mei 1908 No.52; Mailr.52.
34 Ibid.
35 Rapport de Bruijn Kops, 9 December 1907. V1 Mei 1908 No.52; Mailr. 1719.
36 This grievance must have concerned rain-sawahs. While under Balinese rule these rice fields had been subject to upeti (a less heavy tax), Resident Liefrinck in 1897 made the rain-sawahs subject to pajeg. This measure was one of many aimed at extracting the maximum out of Lombok's peasant population. See Chapter V: Liefrinck's Settlement.
37 Rapport de Bruijn Kops, 9 December 1907, op. cit.
38 The Resident described Ayub as follows: 'Although unquestionably loyal towards the Government, this chief seems to be somewhat greedy by nature, which has aroused the dissatisfaction of part of the population.' Rapport de Bruijn Kops, 9 December 1907, op. cit.
39 Kort Verslag der Residentie Bali en Lombok, April 1908.
40 The fact that the inhabitants of Bukit Limbungan were forbidden to rebuild their village at the same site is not mentioned in the official records. However, in 1920 – some 13 years after the rebellion – the Controleur of East Lombok wrote: 'Although it was as clear as daylight that the rebellion of Bukit Limbungan was prompted by the vexation of Lalu Ayub, he was not dismissed. The people of Limbungan were forced to move to a barren, infertile place close to the road from Pringgabaya to the village of Lombok. Out of revenge this district chief (who died in 1918) has always made sure that these people could not return to their original settlement.' M.v.O. Mann, Oost Lombok, 1920.
41 The fact that the leaders of the rebellion were hanged is likewise not mentioned in the official records. It is impossible, however, to draw any other conclusion from all the vague references to severe punishment. For instance, in 1910 the Resident gave the following reason for the relative quiet during the past few years: 'It seems that the people of Lombok have learned a lesson from the sad fate of the rebel leaders.' M.v.O. de Bruijn Kops, Bali en Lombok, 1910.
42 This was the usual Dutch explanation for the propensity for revolt of the Lombok peasants. The Sasaks were described as: 'easily stirred-up', 'easily misled', 'unbelievably credulous' and so on. To realise that the datu2ans cannot have had their origin in any particular 'national' character, it is sufficient to remember that this type of movement was by no means characteristic of Lombok alone. Similar movements occurred regularly on Java and in many other oppressed and exploited peasant societies.

43 This police force, so courageous in shooting virtually unarmed peasants, surrendered without firing a shot when the Japanese invaded.

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GLOSSARY

adat  customary law
afdeling  Dutch term for an administrative division
Anak Agung  title of a Balinese Prince
atap  roofing thatch
babad  indigenous epic
bandar  merchant who paid the Raja an annual fee for a trade monopoly in a particular commodity
Baudanda  title of a prominent punggawa
beklemd bezitrecht  Dutch term for restricted ownership of land
beras  husked rice
beschikkingskring  Dutch term for the area of disposal
beschikkingsrecht  Dutch term for the communal right of disposal
bewerkingsrecht  Dutch term for the right of cultivation
Brahman  the highest of the three Balinese castes
campot  a Balinese law stipulating that when a man dies without leaving a male heir, the Raja inherits all his possessions, including his wife and children
Controleur  title of a lower-ranking Dutch colonial official

datu  Sasak term for ruler
datu2an  Messianic movement in which the return of a just ruler is envisaged

dewa  title of a member of the second Balinese caste, the Ksatriya
dewa Agung  title of the ruler of Klungkung on Bali
druwe dalem  lands belonging to the Raja’s direct domain
druwe jabe  lands owned by Balinese or Sasak aristocrats
gade gegem  permanent pawn contract
garuda  the mythical bird which carries the Hindu God Vishnu
glumpang  a hard type of wood
Guru  religious teacher
Gusti

title of a member of the third Balinese caste, the wesiya

Haji

person who has taken the pilgrimage to Mecca

Ida

title of a member of the first Balinese caste, the Brahman

jagung

corn

jahan drowene

Balinese term for corvée labour

Jonkheer

Dutch aristocratic title

kafir

infidel or unbeliever

kaula

Sasak term for 'free', landowning peasant

kerajaan

pre-colonial Indonesian state ruled by a Raja

keraton

palace

klewang

sword

kliyang

village head

Kompenie

indigenous term for the Dutch

kris

large knife

Ksatriya

the second of the three Balinese castes

ladang

planted clearing on dry ground

Lalu

title of a member of the third rank within the Sasak aristocracy

langlang

Balinese guard

larangan

extent of uncultivated land reserved for the exclusive use of the Raja and the court

Mami

title of a member of the second rank within the Sasak aristocracy

mandur

overseer of corvée labourers

Mufakatan

agreement

Onderafdeling

Dutch term for an administrative subdivision

padi

rice in the husk

paer desa

Sasak term for the area of disposal

pajeg

under the Raja, land tax on irrigated sawahs; under the Dutch, land tax on irrigated and rain sawahs

pekasih

head of an irrigation-association or subak
panjak  Sasak term for a slave
pecatu  an extent of land free from the land tax, but not from corvée
pedanda  Balinese priest
pengayah  peasant cultivating *druwe dalem* lands
penghulu  Muslim priest
penyakap  sharecropper
pepatih  Dutch-appointed head of the Balinese population of Lombok
perwangsa  Sasak aristocracy
polowijo  secondary crop
pongor  punishment involving a term at forced labour at a place away from the home village
pраhu  sailing craft
praJurit  Dutch policeman
punggawa  member of the Balinese aristocracy exercising a particular function
puputan  mass-suicide of a defeated Balinese dynasty
puri  Balinese term for palace
Raden  title of a member of the first rank within the Sasak aristocracy
Ratu  title of a Balinese Raja
roban  Balinese policeman
sawah  irrigated or rain-dependent land cultivated with *padi*
sedahan  head of a group of irrigation-associations or *subak*
sedahan-agung  head of all irrigation-associations or *subak*
sepangan  peasant cultivating *druwe jabe* lands
subak  irrigation-association. This typically Balinese institution existed only in West Lombok
sudra  Balinese peasant
Susuhunan  Balinese ruler
tandu  stretcher
tarekat  Muslim mystical order
tegalan  dry field
tongkang  sea-going junk
tong-tong  a tube of wood or bamboo struck with a knocker to sound alarm
triwangsa  Balinese aristocracy
upeti  under the Raja, land tax on rain-sawahs and gardens; under the Dutch, land tax on gardens and tegalan
vrij bezitrecht  Dutch term for unrestricted ownership
wakap  land free from land tax and corvée, held in common by a group of people united in an institution
Waktu-lima  Orthodox Islam
Waktu-telu  Islam, with strong animistic influences
wargi  Balinese who no longer belonged to the castes (triwangsa) but who still considered themselves raised above the peasantry (sudra)
wesiya  the third of the three Balinese castes
zakat  Muslim religious tithe
WEIGHTS, MEASURES AND CURRENCIES

Weights:

- 1 cekel = 6.17 kg
- 1 kati = 0.625 kg
- 1 picul = 61.7 kg

Measures:

Prior to 1894:

- 1 dipa agung = ± 2.7 m
- 1 tenah = 800 dipa agung = ± 5832 m²

After 1894:

- 1 dipa agung = 3 metres
- 1 tenah = 800 dipa agung = 7200 m²

The Dutch rationalized the dipa agung. Under Balinese rule this measurement was based on the body measurements of the person holding the office of Sedahan Agung and was therefore subject to considerable variation.

Currencies:

- kepeng = a small, bronze coin with a square hole in the centre. Imported from China, this coin was the principal means of exchange in the Balinese era. It continued to be used for small-scale transactions throughout the colonial period.

- guilder = basic unit of Netherlands Indies currency. Symbolized by the signs “f.” or “fl.” Unknown in the Balinese era. In the colonial period used mainly for taxation purposes.

- rijksdaalder = large, silver coin worth f.2.50. In the Balinese period this coin was used primarily as a measure of value, and was hoarded by the Raja. In the colonial era it was used for large-scale transactions and taxation purposes.

- ringgit = Balinese and Sasak term for rijksdaalder.
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Between 1870 and 1940 Lombok was transformed from one of the more powerful pre-colonial Indonesian states into an almost forgotten region of the Netherlands East Indies. This book evaluates Balinese rule in the last decades of the nineteenth century and discusses the 1894 Dutch conquest. It shows that both Balinese and Dutch rule were based upon superior military force and examines some of the effects of Balinese and Dutch political power on the socio-economic relations among the indigenous Sasak people.

Dr van der Kraan argues that the Sasak peasants have been the great historical losers. Conquered by the Balinese, betrayed by their own aristocratic leaders, and once again conquered by the Dutch, they continued to be the victims of on-going and increasing oppression and exploitation.

Alfons van der Kraan is a graduate of Carleton University (Ottawa) and the Australian National University. He currently lectures in Economic History at Murdoch University in Perth.

The cover photograph shows the Raja of Lombok, Ratu Agung2 Ngurah Karangasem, and his son the Crown Prince, Anak Agung K’tut (Lombok, c. 1885).