

THE UNACKNOWLEDGED CONSENSUS

A GENEALOGY OF POLITICAL SECURITY

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STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY

I declare that the entirety of the research presented in this Thesis is original work, carried out during my candidature at the Australian National University.

Signed,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'James Mortensen', written in a cursive style.

James Mortensen

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I would like to thank many, many people – both those that helped, and the hindrances that taught me to improve – however for the purposes of this single page, I will acknowledge only a single individual. Certainly not the only person, nor necessarily the most important, but simply the one who to my mind and in this moment encapsulates how it was that this thesis came into existence at all. To all others, I still thank profusely, endlessly, though I beg you to be content with my unfortunate face. If you think you deserve acknowledgement, you probably do.

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ABSTRACT

As a political concept, security must emerge from the circumstance, context and identity of a political group; it is a function of a practical political environment, rather than an innate constituent, attribute or ingredient of logic or reason. Despite this, philosophical treatments of security have been prosecuted with the assumption that security simply is - that security is a given state within political considerations, rather than a concept that emerged as a result of concrete circumstance.

This thesis seeks to redress this by examining the various cultural and political considerations that have come to shape the emergence of security as a political consideration in the Anglo-Western tradition. By first finding the point at which security emerges as a systematically employed political concept, and then examining the various points in political and cultural history that are invoked in that usage, we build a picture of the various streams of thought that coalesced into the term 'security' as it was used in the modern era. As such, the study examines the political pamphlets of the English Civil War, as well as works by ancient Athenians, Romans, theologians and Saxon kings, all to create a cultural landscape on which various key themes and consequences can be identified.

Identifying these inheritances will not provide us with a definition, nor a 'right answer' as to what security is today, but can instead identify the political conditions in which the term was used, as well as identify the political needs inherent in that condition that gave security its utility. This will simultaneously enrich our myriad understanding of the term whilst also providing needed direction in regards to the contestability of the term as it is used today. As a concept borne out of political need, by understanding that need as it was will at the very least allow us to ascertain to what degree that need is being met by the word today; further, understanding the practical need it satisfied might inform how we might proceed if we find its current utility wanting.

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INTRODUCTION

Despite its huge importance in political discourse both in English speaking nations and around the world, when employed politically, the word 'security' remains an extremely vague but powerful term. The study of security has no broadly accepted definition and is riven with methodological impasses, no governments have a consistently stated notion of what 'security' is helping them achieve, and even the Oxford English Dictionary has managed to contradict itself as to when the term even arrived as a political notion. As critical security studies scholar James der Derian points out, "No other concept... packs the same metaphysical punch nor commands the disciplinary power of 'security'".¹

However it is this power that means it is imperative that the ambiguity of security is extensively interrogated. Indeed, the power of the term may well be a by-product of its own ambiguity; its "...almost universal appeal" security may "...name very different arrangements of order and possibility for different groups of people."² This combination of political power and definitional ambiguity is self-reflexive; as the word is co-opted in significant events, acts and institutions, such uses demand analysis, however these disparate employments further enshrines the ambiguity the term is beholden to. Given this feedback loop of use, investment and reappraisal, focus on what security 'means' is broadly assumptive – the result of an unacknowledged consensus regarding a set of practical concerns.³ This assumption both facilitates a lack of clarity and limits exploration of security's inherent value and possible future value; in the words of philologist John Hamilton, by presuming what security is, we "exclude whatever else 'security' may be."⁴

¹ James der Derian, "The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard," in *On Security*, ed. Ronnie Lipschutz (Columbia University Press, 1995), 25.

² Anthony Burke, "Aporias of Security," *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 27, no. 1 (2002): 7.

³ Michael Sheehan, *International Security: An Analytical Survey* (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 2.

⁴ John T. Hamilton, *Security: Politics, Humanity, and the Philology of Care* (Princeton University Press, 2013), 13.

This thesis seeks to redress this issue by providing a genealogical account of political security.⁵ In examining the various political, philosophical and lingual considerations that have coalesced to create the modern notion of political security, this thesis will uncover how security came to be indicative of a political value, as well as identify how that value was informed by the political considerations of a wider cultural history. This will allow us to sharpen our understanding of security as a term in its own right, as well as allow us to appreciate its historical role in political life. As a word, security was first invoked to serve a particular political purpose, context or desire. In reclaiming this point of arising, this thesis seeks to deliver three main outcomes.

The first is to clarify the degree to which the specific word ‘security’ stands as indicative of a broad ubiquitous concept, and to what degree it is a word for a particular set of circumstances. If ‘security’ as a term of political value is allowed to remain timeless, abstract and ubiquitous, then any polity can be seen as being subject to it. If however security is found to be a function of a concrete moment in history, and the result of particular political identity, security can be invoked as a point of comparison or consideration, rather than as a necessary or matter-of-fact constant in all political constructions. By examining the historical emergence of security as a word, as well as the conceptual values that went into its creation, this thesis will provide insight into the degree to which security stands as a word specific to political context, or as indicative of a deep political value. Failing to appreciate these two different notions of security risks a form of ideational violence in which the considerations of a particular political identity become ubiquitous, with the now ubiquitous value being imposed on those that come after.

⁵ By ‘politics’, ‘the political’ and ‘political concept’ we mean here the broad environment, categories, conceptions and actions in which the social is subject to a hierarchical order that has both the goal and capacity to affect the social space subject to it. Whilst such a view of the political might be broad, it is so designed to encapsulate the important but sometimes antithetical theoretical contributions made in the 20th century, whilst also paying respect to the concept’s own philosophical origin in the notions of Aristotle. For a discussion of both politics as a category of study and of the value of such a criterion, see James Alexander, “Notes Towards A Definition of Politics,” *Philosophy* 89, no. 2 (April 2014): 273–300, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819113000855>.

The second outcome will be the bounding of security. While a historical point of origin will not (and should not) limit the possibilities, evolution or current employment of what security means, it can provide a grounding point of reference for debates and analysis of security as a contemporary political term, as well as provide a basis for any appreciation of security as a ubiquitous quality of politics generally. By assuming the ubiquity and necessity of security without also appreciating its political and historical contingencies, security will remain unbounded within any political discourse in which its discursive power is presumed.

The third objective is to facilitate more effective management, stewardship or refinement of what security is now, or what it may need to be in the future, through the discovery of historical and philosophical details relating to security's current utility. Put another way, the last objective of this thesis is to provide additional insight into the story of security generally; to better understand its philosophical, political and historical inheritance. As we will see, there are many notable omissions from current security scholarship, and this lack of appreciation of the inherent values in its creation, or the political necessities that led to its use hinders our capacity to attend to those values and needs moving forward. It is in this last point that we find our way back to the first issue raised – how security can be clarified given the recursive relationship between its power and ambiguity. By giving the critique of security a concrete basis for inquiry, analysis can move past simply documenting use – it can more effectively understand and advise.

In order to deliver this, the thesis will examine the genealogy of security in the English speaking world from the beginning of its political inheritance to the emergence of our modern notion of political security during the English Civil War. To begin, the first section will outline the major contributions to the understanding of political security, with special focus on the fields of security studies, critical theory, philology and anthropology; it is here we will examine the limited engagement modern political theory has had with the basic value of security as a term, and address the various strengths and weaknesses of extant literature on the subject. The first section will close with a discussion of the philosophical and methodological considerations of the study, concentrating on the deeper philosophical assumptions used to construct the genealogical approach the study will employ.

The second section will concentrate on classical Greece, and especially on a specific political notion prevalent in ancient Athens that is held by modern scholars as having informed the modern notion of security. The study will examine key texts of the period, and draw out the political considerations at the heart of the term's use within Athenian literature and history. What we find in doing so is a word that does indeed figure as an analogue to modern notions of security, however both the nature of that analogue and its position within modern scholarship is problematized and refined.

In the third section we will examine the Roman word that gave the lingual core of the English term, positioning it at the time of its emergence and the political climate of the late Roman Republic. In the first half of this section, we see not only that the term that gave us 'security' was at the point of its creation apolitical, we will also see that the political construction favoured by its creator was such that the word could not possibly have a similar affect than our modern term does today. In the second half of the section, this assertion is further prosecuted in a study of the early Roman Imperial era, in which we find that the shift in political construction gave room for the term to grow into; we will examine the philosophical considerations of the term and the value that it had to the now central and absolute government of Imperial Rome.

Following this, we will turn to important sources of value that would inform the emergence of modern security that stand between the fall of the Roman empire and the beginning of the modern English language. Firstly, examine the use and value of security within the early Christian church, and the way in which the work of the early church fathers who witnessed the fall of Rome would go on to impact the political machinations of modern security at the point of its ascendancy. Secondly, we will turn to the Anglo-Saxon and Danish language and political expectations prevalent in England before the Norman invasion of 1066 and find that before Middle English was created through the Norman Conquest, there existed a Germanic counterpart to modern security that has yet to be factored in to existing genealogies of the concept.

The final section will examine the rise in importance of security experienced during the English Civil War, tying the various genealogical strands created in the previous sections together, and highlighting the points of continuity, contestation, and misappropriation that various elements of the Anglo-western tradition of security involves. We will study Thomas Hobbes' use of the term and its role in the creation of sovereignty, and then compare this security to that of his political antagonists, the radical parliamentarians. In so doing, we will rediscover a word that even at this early stage was hotly contested, however we will also uncover a core consideration that links together the various genealogical threads, as well as shows the common considerations that allowed the word to be used in such radically different political frames.

In doing this, we will track how it was that security gained the value it did in the political language of modern England, as well as how the political inheritance of the interlocutors in the English Civil War affected that value. In practical terms, the end result of this study will be the reclamation of two very different but also very linked propositions regarding how security emerged; firstly, that the word served to identify the necessary mitigation of the inherent risks presented by people organising politically, and secondly that the nature of those risks - and thus the practical content and purpose of the word – necessarily changed across the various political constructions a polity may be subject to.

Regarding the first, we will see that while there was no quintessential statement of security at the time of the English Civil War, the various pamphlets, letters and tracts from the latter stages of the conflict wrestle with the same fundamental problem; how the nation of England might constitute given the fundamental risks the English polity posed to itself that had become apparent through the course of civil war. Further, we will see how security emerged from a practical event -strangely enough, from a pay dispute – that lent itself to an intersection between the 'traditional', colloquial use of security at the time, but also intersected specifically with the risks inherent to the nation. As a result, security emerged as a common consideration in the political treatises of the civil war period, and while it would fall away again in England after the reinstatement of the crown, it would continue in the American colonies.

It is this subsequent ‘forgetting’ of security in England, in spite of its use in the fledgling United States that provides us with tentative insight into the importance of the second proposition; that how security was conceptualised changed across different political constructions. The English Civil War was fought between parliamentarians and royalists – between the supremacy of the king, or of the elected legislature – and while both saw security as an expression of maintenance against the risks inherent in polities, these competing ‘securities’ were not the same. Given the difference in each security, there was also a difference between each in terms of the centrality and complexity of security; put simply, the more democratic or *corporate*⁶ the interlocutors were, the more complex and more central their notions of security were to the practical considerations of their political constructions. For this reason, with the failure of parliamentary democracy following the civil war, England had far less use for the term than did the United States.

PARADIGMS

Through the unfolding of security genealogically we will thus find a number of paradigms that run through the story of security in the Anglo-western frame, the analysis of which will be a new and important contribution to our understanding of security more broadly. Instead of simply concentrating on presumptions of security as a mainly military endeavour, as an aspect of government control, or even as a necessary condition for state survival, we will instead see paradigms that extend across and throughout a slew of related terms and

⁶ I prefer the term ‘corporate’ in the sense that other terms that might be used in this context – namely ‘democratic’ and ‘liberal’ – are both loaded terms in regards to the sort of polities they describe. By corporate I mean simply that the political institution, the practical governance, is in some way constituted on the basis of a common involvement on the part of the citizen, rather than concentrated in the hands of a small group of politically distinct actors (such as a monarchy or oligarchy). There is every attempt therefore to keep these terms distinct – if citizens get widespread, effectual suffrage, they are for our purposes ‘democratic’. If they have features of governance, *including* suffrage, that rely on the corporation of citizens, they are corporate. Liberalism is largely left to speak of the modern democratic turn starting with the revolutions of the 17th century (and the term’s manifold problems are discussed later). This is pitched against ‘absolute’ governance, by which is meant that the government holds a monopoly on political authority and the dispensation of governance. One could broadly – though, very broadly – conceive of these two notions as similar to Oakeshott’s political distinctions of enterprise association (absolutist) and civil association (corporate), however Oakeshott’s categories perhaps reach too far and are too loaded for our purposes, as it is less relevant to us here *why* a polity constitutes than it is *how* they constitute. Michael Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct* (Oxford : Oxford ; New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1990).

political traditions. As above, one of these paradigms is the centrality of 'security' to differing models of political construction. The more governance relies on public assent or legitimacy, the more active a role notions of 'security' played in the basic construction of the polity; comparatively, the more autocratic governance was, the more security became an outcome governance rather than a part of governance in and of itself. As we will see, this distinction is fuelled by a number of considerations, from the change in how risks are constructed by different polities, to the tools available to each political model that can be used to realise their goals.

From this fundamental paradigm comes a number of others. We will also see two distinct paradigms of practical action; two differing practical methods of realising security within that polity. Broadly these two actions can be called responsibility, and provision. In the first, governments and citizens create security through political responsibilities, acts and actions; in the second model of 'provision', citizens are not responsible for security, but are instead passive recipients of provision that can be characterised as 'security'. Thus as we will see, the Anglo-western conception of security has within in it a long tradition of differing *practical realisations* of security, with these differing practicalities forming paradigms that can be traced from Greece to the birth of the modern era.

As stated above, the responsibility of the citizen is one key difference between paradigms of security that we will uncover, and this itself leads to another related paradigm – that of the role of reason within security and politics. As citizen participation and responsibility rises in conceptions of 'security', so too does the role of reason in both determining and maintaining that security. As we will see, some political constructions in the Anglo-western tradition have placed individual reason at the heart of security, especially when those polities are defined by public participation or justified by public assent. In comparison, others have sought to remove it completely, seeing the use of such reason as antithetical to the security they seek to realise.

This varying relationship to reason also ensures a paradigm of *contestability*, especially in modes of security in which public assent and responsibility feature. Not only is security

broadly contestable between more democratic and autocratic conceptions, there also exists contestability within more democratic operations based on the role of reason within those conceptions. Thus we will see examples of what might be roughly equated to 'securitization' within polities both ancient and modern, as well as see how polities in which public responsibility features have dealt with the inherent contestability of their own notion of security.

Lastly, we will identify a paradigm of necessity – that is, how necessary security is to the construction of that polity, and to conceptions of politics more generally. While security has often been seen as a necessary condition for political life, we will see that this has not always been the case. Further, we will see that the necessity of notions such as security to the creation of politics are once again linked to the nature and 'method' of that polity – its notions of responsibility, power and authority. Further, we will also see how security, especially when it is foundational to politics, also holds the distinct possibility of being 'anti-politics', or the suspension or abrogation of the sae politics it seeks to facilitate.

In order to track these paradigms, we will extend our scope beyond the traditionally examined points of the Anglo-western tradition, and incorporate historical analysis that has so far been under-explored in considerations of security up until this point. Thus another major contribution this work seeks to make is the incorporation of this new interpretation into concerns of security. The study of Anglo-Saxon and Danish governments of pre-conquest England, more rigorous theological analysis of certain key issues within security, the role of the Roman government under Nero, and the thematic explosion of security during the English Civil War itself will all stand as crucial new data points in the appreciation of security as it is expressed into the modern world.

Taken together these paradigms hold the potential to achieve a number of important things. In regards to Security Studies and Political Theory, the reclamation of how security came to be an important political term within English can provide some level of stability to what is a fractious field of study. This is especially important given that this explanation confirms the contestation of security as a concept, rather than contradicts, but yet at the same time

provides a value to the political space that can reach beyond that contestation. With this in hand, theorists of security can step back from debates of an absolute essence, and instead reengage with security in terms that simultaneously provides room for its value across ideological perspectives, as well as for its own reimagining.

For the community at large, this reordering of security gives a simple but effective tool for critiquing discourses of security as they occur in the public space. In recapturing the concrete political considerations that formed security, we can better judge the word as a tool used to achieve political ends; if security emerged in regards to a particular consideration, then does it still speak to that consideration today? How does the manner in which security is used now compare to this formative account, and how does our own political context inform any similarities and differences?

Lastly, the clarification this study brings attention to the total and fundamental separation notions of security must have across divides of political constructions – especially those of a ‘liberal’ nature against those in which power and authority are vested in a single entity. Given the word’s political emergence in the context of a struggle between absolute and more liberal forms of rule, we can see with more clarity the few ways in which security is applicable to different political constructions, as well as the many ways it diverges. Given the relative ubiquity of security in modern political discourse, and the methodological presumption of some schools of thought within Security Studies that security is indeed a universal concept, an awareness of the deep divides between these ‘securities’ can allow for a more nuanced understanding of security in the international space both academically and practically.

PART I

METHODOLOGICAL

CONSIDERATIONS

CHAPTER ONE

THE LITERATURE OF MODERN SECURITY

In the opening pages of Collins' *Contemporary Security Studies* sits this reassurance to those beginning their education in international relations and security studies;

*"...since you are about to embark upon a study of [Security Studies], no doubt you would like to start with a definition of security.... The good news is that a consensus has emerged on what security studies entails – it is to do with threats and survival..."*⁷

Little more is said by Collins on the matter, though it is followed by a gamut of quotes by other scholars on what they might mean by security, presumably to demonstrate the ways in which security's focus on 'things to do with threats and survival' may be differently construed. With a few exceptions,⁸ these snippets of what security is do not contain any standalone definition or fundamental principle, in fact many do not speak of threats or survival alone. Instead most examples are statements of certain caveats or perspectives pertaining to security's use.

The focus of each example is vastly different from the last, and presumably this is why Collins chose to include them – to demonstrate and acknowledge the plurality in application

⁷ Alan Collins, ed., *Contemporary Security Studies*, Fourth edition (Oxford, United Kingdom ; New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016), 2.

⁸ Ken Booth and Arnold Wolfers both go some way to providing a substantive and free-standing definition, although both fall short for their own reasons. Booth claims that "Emancipation, theoretically, is security... Emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from the physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do." This claim is made not from any objective or methodologically inclusive position, but is rather a claim based on a particular outlook on the use (and apparent misuse) of political institution. In comparison Wolfers' 'definition' is, in context, less an attempt to catalogue the term and more an attempt to provide it with a higher degree of nuance; "Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked." For the original texts, see Arnold Wolfers, "'National Security' as an Ambiguous Symbol," *Political Science Quarterly* 67, no. 4 (December 1952): 150, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2145138>; Ken Booth, "Security and Emancipation," *Review of International Studies* 17, no. 4 (1991): 319.

of this core term. Ultimately, the absence of any fundamental formulation of the term is proof positive of Collins' statement; regardless of where one sits in the traditional realms of security studies, there is little need to make any core statements on what it is that you are actually studying. We are left then with a word that is constantly qualified and contested, yet at its heart is also taken as a given quantity. After only a few pages, Collins departs the topic, assumedly satisfied that regardless of how many more scholars might create, apply and communicate specific considerations or caveats to the term 'security', some broad category of threat will continue to shine through the cracks and crevasses that have run their course through Security Studies.

However all this is not to suggest that this apparent 'consensus' is uncritically accepted within Security Studies. There have been a steady stream of articles and book chapters that have questioned the definition of security since the early 1990's,⁹ as well as some all-out assaults on the notion of a definition at all. Most influential of the latter has been championed by the Copenhagen School of thought, typified by the work of Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver. Published in 1983, Buzan's *People, States and Fear* quickly became the touchstone for many scholars and disciplines in the field, introducing W. B. Gallie's notion of the 'essentially contested concept' to security studies.¹⁰ At its core, Buzan's assertion is that security is unable to be resolved by factual or empirical analysis, owing to its inherent moral and emotional component. Whilst Buzan went on to give a different (or perhaps additional) conception of security in his work with de Wilde and Wæver,¹¹ his assertions have not only

⁹ See for example Emma Rothschild, "What Is Security?," *Daedalus*, 1995, 53–98; Burke, "Aporias of Security"; der Derian, "The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard"; David A. Baldwin, "The Concept of Security," *Review of International Studies* 23, no. 1 (1997): 5–26; Jonathan Herrington, "Philosophy: The Concepts of Security, Fear, Liberty, and the State," in *Security: Dialogue Across Disciplines* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 22–44; Matt McDonald, "Securitization and the Construction of Security," *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 4 (2008): 563–587; R. B. J. Walker, "Security, Sovereignty, and the Challenge of World Politics," *International Security* 146 (2007); Holger Stritzel, "Security, the Translation," *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 4–5 (August 2011): 343–55, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010611418998>.

¹⁰ Barry Buzan, *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2. ed, ECPR Classics (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2007), 7.

¹¹ While it is fair to point out that the work is co-authored and achieving different aims, I would need to be convinced that security could hold both the status of essentially contested and the operational, practical definition given in *A New Analysis* - "Security' is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics." Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Pub, 1998), 23.

become the foundational account of security for a large number of scholars, but crucially have been instrumental in underwriting the basic assumptions of much of the critical literature that sought to stand against traditional conceptions of security.

While the force and importance of these two positions shift between schools and scholars, consensus and essential contestation capture the balance of the attitudes towards definition found across the major theoretical divides in the discipline. On a basic level, schools can be seen to adhere to one of these positions - for the International Relations (IR) realists of various stripes, while there may be debate regarding from where it originates, security and the study thereof is comfortable with the broad consensus definition offered by Collins, or the likes of Stephen Walt.¹² In contrast, just as anarchy is what states make of it, to constructivists, so too must be security.¹³ Yet these two positions do not stand against each other, but instead coalesce, each providing justification to the other. With the establishment of the essentially contested nature of security, the broad consensus of threat and conflict becomes an understandable – even necessary – capitulation to circumstance; in the face of the failings of the consensus, essential contestation ensures that it is free from sustained critique.¹⁴ Further, while a large segment of the discipline claims that security is essentially contested, they still stand within a school, a discipline and subject area – presumably there is something more that contestability to the security they critique.¹⁵

¹² Walt defines security studies as the “...study of the threat, use and control of military force.” Stephen M. Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (June 1, 1991): 212, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2600471>.

¹³ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 391–425.

¹⁴ Ken Booth provides us with an extremely clear example of how despite appearances, these two perspectives are not mutually exclusive. Writing in 2005, he claims that “While there is a consensus on the standard definition of security – to do with *being or feeling safe from threats and danger* – security in world politics can have no final meaning.” Ken Booth, ed., *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, Critical Security Studies (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 13. My concern is not that these two points might coalesce as much as it is that in so doing scholars might be able to take the perceived dichotomy as licence to be selective in their categories and concepts – such as saying that security *is X*, and defining X instead. See Booth, “Security and Emancipation,” 319.

¹⁵ McDonald, “Securitization and the Construction of Security.”

One key attempt to take stock of this situation is Sheehan's *International Security: An Analytical Survey*, a sustained and systematic examination of security as a term across the various methodologies of security studies. Sheehan's work opens with a brief history (or account of the absence) of the study of security as a term itself, with Sheehan exclaiming that given that the nature and definition of security is of central interest to the discipline,

"It might be expected therefore that, given the traditional academic obsessions with precision and definition, the core concept of 'security' would have been analysed and defined *ad nauseam* over the decades since 1919. Curiously, this has not been the case."¹⁶

Looking back through the history of International Relations and Security Studies, Sheehan prefaces his enquiry into the meaning of security with the claim that with the exception of Arnold Wolfers' work on objective and subjective security dating back to 1952,¹⁷ for the vast majority of the discipline's history the definition of such a central term as security has "patently failed to be subjected to such debate."¹⁸ Whilst this lack of debate has obvious repercussions for security studies and IR theory, it also has a major effect on the social and political actions that such disciplines have informed. As Sheehan explains:

"Despite its willingness to agonise over the possible definitions of other concepts such as sovereignty, limited war, and nationalism, and to explore alternative interpretations, the meaning of 'security' was treated as a given. Security theory became based on an unacknowledged consensus about what constituted legitimate knowledge about the social world. This had implications both for the way the subject was thought about, and for the policy prescriptions that could flow from it, and these in turn had fundamental consequences for people in the real world."¹⁹

¹⁶ Sheehan, *International Security*, 1.

¹⁷ Wolfers, "'National Security' as an Ambiguous Symbol."

¹⁸ Sheehan, *International Security*, 2.

¹⁹ Sheehan, 2.

While in the end Sheehan attempts to posit a tentative and cautious way forward in better understanding security, his suggestion is to essentially let the dichotomy between consensus and contestation stand (with a dash of Booth's emancipation added).²⁰ What Sheehan certainly does *not* do is attempt to "produce a final synthesis" based on his findings²¹ (an endeavour he believes is impossible,²²) nor does he make any definitive statement on each methodology's limitations in regard to the employment of 'security', nor include any exploration of the term outside of the methodological context of each school of thought within Security Studies. In accepting this 'impossibility', Sheehan contends that a major contributing factor has been the failure of the dominant traditions of international relations to operate outside their own methodological assumptions. Sheehan surmises that it is security's foundational role in the political space that ensures that the resultant methodologies take its nature and existence for granted.²³

GENEALOGIES

As stated above, Sheehan's study did little to reach beyond the specific concerns of Security Studies and International Relations. However there have been a small number of studies that have introduced methodological considerations from outside that discipline in their attempts to elucidate the understanding of security in some way. The most straightforward of these attempts come from history; studies by the likes of Ronald Krebs²⁴ and Andrew Preston²⁵ have concentrated on security as it was historically expressed in the United States specifically. While these studies have each contributed to the historical picture of security as it is in the United States, they have not so much elucidated *how* security arrived at the

²⁰ Sheehan, 177.

²¹ Sheehan, 3.

²² Sheehan, 177.

²³ This is a view shared by R.B.J Walker. Sheehan, 176; Walker, "Security, Sovereignty, and the Challenge of World Politics," 8.

²⁴ Ronald R. Krebs, *Narrative and the Making of US National Security*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 138 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

²⁵ Andrew Preston, "Monsters Everywhere: A Genealogy of National Security*," *Diplomatic History* 38, no. 3 (May 13, 2014): 477–500, <https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dhu018>.

position it did within American politics. Instead, these works interpret security as it has been used throughout American history.

While the historical focus of these texts will be important to the conclusion of this thesis, in order to gain an understanding of the *how* of security, historical considerations must be held in tandem with philosophical considerations. Political philosopher Michael Dillon's *Politics of Security* is a prime example of such a work. In it, Dillon attempts not to define the term security, but instead to "make a contribution towards rethinking some of the fundamentals of International Relations" through what he calls "the political philosophy of contemporary continental thought."²⁶ For Dillon it is not an exercise in definition so much as an exploration on the deep essence of the constitutive elements of the political. In this way, he also diagnoses the lack of substantial discussion on the meaning of security as a matter of foundational blind spots;

"... security became the predicate upon which the architectonic political discourses of modernity were constructed; upon which the vernacular architecture of modern political power, exemplified in the State, was based; and from which the institutions and practices of modern (inter)national politics, including modern democratic politics, ultimately seek to derive their grounding and foundational legitimacy."²⁷

But whereas for Sheehan this foundational role of security has put it beyond the scope of debate, for Dillon it is precisely its foundational aspect that demands it be interrogated.²⁸ In order to do this, Dillon goes beyond Security Studies, drawing on Foucaultian genealogy and continental philosophy, attempting to use these two modes of enquiry to clarify the role and purpose of security, sovereignty and the political.

²⁶ Michael Dillon, *Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 2.

²⁷ Dillon, 13.

²⁸ Dillon, 14.

However in its execution, Dillon's study is left wanting. Although genealogical work is done – work that is drawn on in this present study – it is piecemeal, and is largely confined to jumping between classical Athens and 20th century philosophical considerations. The genealogical work also stands in isolated chapters with little linkage between the philosophical and genealogical elements. The end result of this methodological juxtaposition is a deep confusion over the essential nature of the object of study, something that then jeopardises the conclusions that can be drawn. With the role of each methodological element poorly defined and the link between them not defined at all, they can at times even be seen as antithetical. Dillon can at various points be seen advocating for security as an abstraction that is a creation of language and time,²⁹ yet is also a transformative act with concrete, practical ramifications, something that once applied to an object makes it "... certainly no longer whatever it once was."³⁰

Beyond standing contrary to Sheehan's appraisal of the state of the discipline, this lack of definition muddies the goal and method of Dillon's work. Arguing that security is a foundational concept of both politics and metaphysics (two things he sees as co-emergent)³¹ Dillon then chooses to examine security metaphysically, chiefly by posing the question of whether one needs to secure security.³² Separating this endeavour from the realm of tautology is difficult given that security's foundational role in politics must grant it some concrete attributes or identifiable conceptual substance, but yet these are not supplied, even as security is then used to examine itself.

These is one other important contribution in this space from the perspective of Critical Theory, in which security is positioned as a function of liberal governance; specifically, as liberalism's central tenet, its 'key concept', security serves to manage and limit the insecurity that liberalism seeks to embrace within its systems of capital and institution.³³

²⁹ Dillon, 16.

³⁰ Dillon, 122.

³¹ Dillon, 18–19.

³² Dillon, 23.

³³ Mark Neocleous, *Critique of Security* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 2008), 7.

Such is the view offered by Mark Neocleous' work *Critique of Security*,³⁴ in which Neocleous argues that from Liberalism's genesis with John Locke, security was the "...supreme concept of bourgeois society."³⁵ Tracking through the 18th and 19th century, Neocleous also accounts for security's emergence in modern liberalism, detailing the rise of security language in the Roosevelt administration through the New Deal and the 'social security' it entailed.³⁶

Neocleous' *Critique* stands as the most promising in offering insight into the value of political security thus far. While Dillon's work makes security central on the basis of its relationship to insecurity, Neocleous goes an important step further by rationalising how and why it appeared, and offering a deeper understanding of what security achieves in its operation. Further, Neocleous' genealogical inspection of the concept has a clear start and end, both of which have a clear connection to each other and to the central concept uncovered by the study.

However while Neocleous' study is of value, it suffers from a number of serious issues. Firstly, Neocleous rests his genealogy on the notion that Liberal governance has a point of origin in the work of John Locke, however the assumption that Locke was a 'liberal',³⁷ that his ideas were the first expression of 'liberal' ideas, or even that his ideas were considered to have political value at the time he wrote them³⁸ are all unfounded. Secondly, the study only critiques security as Neocleous conceptualises it within modern liberalism, and thus fails to offer any insight into why the word and its accompanying values arrived in that liberalism at all. Thirdly, this confinement of security to liberal configurations of politics

³⁴ Neocleous, *Critique of Security*.

³⁵ Neocleous, 7.

³⁶ See also M. Neocleous, "From Social to National Security: On the Fabrication of Economic Order," *Security Dialogue* 37, no. 3 (September 1, 2006): 363–84, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010606069061>.

³⁷ Duncan Bell, *Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire* (Princeton University Press, 2016).

³⁸ At the very least, Locke was writing in response to Robert Filmer's work which, while published posthumously in Locke's time, was written decades before. For more information (and a more sustained critique), see Mark Goldie, ed., *The Reception of Locke's Politics*, The Pickering Masters (London ; Brookfield, Vt: Pickering & Chatto, 1999); J. G. A. (John Greville Agard) Pocock, *John Locke : Papers Read at a Clark Library Seminar, 10 December, 1977 / by J. G. A. Pocock, Richard Ashcraft, William Andrews Clark Memorial Library Seminar Papers.*, Accessed from <https://nla.gov.au/nla.cat-vn1502611> (Los Angeles: William Andrews Clark Memorial Library, University of California, 1980).

gives the work little insight or applicability outside that same context. Lastly, Neocleous' critique of security's role in liberalism remains largely a function of notions of perceived bourgeois and capitalist configurations, rather than also as a function of the specific method of governance. As we will see in this thesis, such a restriction fails to appreciate a key feature of security within liberal institutions of governance.

Despite this, Neocleous' contribution remains important to the space, and to this study in particular. Like Neocleous' *Critique*, it will be argued here that security as it is generally understood in the modern political space is indeed a liberal concept, and that the concept of security is central to liberalism itself. Further, despite its various issues, the genealogical consideration of Neocleous' work provide an upper boundary for this thesis – happy as we are with Neocleous' broader work on security within the context of western politics since Locke, we can instead turn our focus to that which came before.

ANTHROPOLOGY

While scholars like Sheehan, Dillon and Walker *theorized* as to why international relations and political philosophy has failed to examine such a crucial term, by stepping outside the frame of these disciplines the issue can be seen in much more relief. The work of anthropologists examining the role of security outside the western context produces a fine example of how the lack of clarity surrounding security can impact our understanding of politics and culture, especially the politics and culture of groups outside the western liberal space. When the unacknowledged consensus is brought to bear in consideration of wider cultural traditions, "... it becomes apparent that 'security' as a political problem is neither unchanging nor semantically homogeneous."³⁹ Not only can notions of security shift between social and cultural contexts, but several contexts can be in operation at any given time.⁴⁰ In interrogating the role and meaning of security in the modern, global setting,

³⁹ Nils Bubandt, "Vernacular Security: The Politics of Feeling Safe in Global, National and Local Worlds," *Security Dialogue* 36, no. 3 (September 1, 2005): 276, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010605057015>.

⁴⁰ Alexandra Kent, "Reconfiguring Security: Buddhism and Moral Legitimacy in Cambodia," *Security Dialogue* 37, no. 3 (September 1, 2006): 343–61, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010606069179>; Bubandt, "Vernacular Security: The Politics of Feeling Safe in Global, National and Local Worlds."

anthropologists such as Kent, Bubandt, and Hönke and Müller have concentrated on the differences between the assumed western perspective and subaltern accounts of political security, positing that the concept of security and methodological assumptions that come with it “...may appear to be a neutral, analytical tool”⁴¹ but instead might actually “...perform as a kind of cultural colonialism” through its displacement and de-legitimation of culturally specific conceptions built on deep value systems.⁴²

Not only is security’s lack of precision inductive of ‘cultural colonialism’, it also highlights the discursive power of allowing security to remain an ‘essentially contested concept’ – something that allows western scholarship to hide behind a double standard. Although the term may indeed shift and change, in order to make the claim that security differs across contexts, we must first give an account for security before we can appreciate the challenges and deviations that are possible between accounts. It is simply unthinkable that while the dominant western notion of political security impinges on the existing concepts of other cultures and societies – concepts that are founded on deep cultural institutions and knowledge systems – that it is simultaneously culturally insubstantial itself.

Security should therefore be examined with the expectation that it was subject to the same considerations of culture, society and identity as any other anthropological concept. In so doing we will uncover a far richer account than the ‘unacknowledged consensus’ of Security Studies. This assertion need not completely demolish either the consensus or the contested concept, rather it is simply to suggest that they both skirt on the periphery of a far more complicated, deep seated concept that has thus far seen precious little direct attention. As Kent writes, in the anthropological frame “notions and practices of security are ultimately cultural and embedded in deeply cherished and often unquestioned value systems,”⁴³ a

⁴¹ “...scholars, pursuing their own research agendas, created categories and measures that has a profound impact on modern international relations and the modern world. These categories – including measurements of food supply, population growth, and economic activity – are so powerful because they seem to be natural and neutral yardsticks rather than human creations.” David C. Engerman, “Bernath Lecture: American Knowledge and Global Power*,” *Diplomatic History* 31, no. 4 (September 1, 2007): 600, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.2007.00655.x>.

⁴² Kent, “Reconfiguring Security: Buddhism and Moral Legitimacy in Cambodia,” 344.

⁴³ Kent, 344.

perspective that goes some way to explaining how such a complex concept such as security can also be subject to an unquestioned, unacknowledged consensus.

PHILOLOGY

In order to strike at the heart of the concept of security, then, it is these deeply embedded concepts and value systems that we must elucidate. Whilst the study of these value systems has been patchy within Political Theory, a key piece of scholarship has emerged from outside the discipline. Philologist John T. Hamilton's work *Security: Politics, humanity, and the philology of care* is a full length treatment of security as a western term employed in various texts: theological, philosophical, works of literature, as well as some political usage. Hamilton's intent is twofold; firstly, to examine security philologically in order to uncover, as Paul De Man would suggest, how its meaning is produced,⁴⁴ and secondly, to prove philology's continued use and relevance to the wider academy.⁴⁵

Spurred by the import and power the word has in our modern setting, Hamilton sets about plotting its role and attributes from ancient Athens to the early post-war period. From a methodological perspective, Hamilton's justification for his reliance on philology comes precisely from the nexus of vagueness and power that has irked the IR scholars mentioned above. For Hamilton;

“...what this ambiguity reveals is that the problem is also philological, if only because the word continues to be bandied all too casually – formulated, medialized, preached and promoted despite, or rather perhaps precisely because of, its frustrating vagueness.”⁴⁶

He holds, therefore, that it is only through a placement of a word throughout its cultural continuum that its core elements can be revealed and the presumably surreptitious

⁴⁴ Paul De Man, *The Resistance to Theory*, Theory and History of Literature, v. 33 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).

⁴⁵ Hamilton, *Security*.

⁴⁶ Hamilton, 12.

invocations of our modern usage uncovered. In this regard Hamilton's work goes a long way to showing how these core elements have evolved over time, making it a fantastic resource that illuminates security as a concept in the wider western tradition. However its impact on security studies and political theory specifically is somewhat limited by the breadth of his enquiry, the lack of specifically political nuance and the unashamed (and certainly intentional) insistence on a purely philological approach.

As stated above, the broad literary focus of the philological approach limits its ability to uncover and critique the specifically political force of the concept. While security's foundational role in political theory has hamstrung attempts from within the discipline to critique the concept effectively, to remove the term from that role completely is to lose sight of the rationale of analysing it in the first place. While it has had a plethora of meanings throughout our cultural history, it has also enjoyed a recursive and creative relationship with our core political expectations. If we are to appreciate the full import of security therefore, we must understand where and how it has fit within the political tradition it both defines and serves.

However the lack of examination given to the political aspect to security is unsurprising when considered next to the fact that even within the most exhaustive philological study ever produced in the English language, the political value of security has a rather confused (and confusing) history. Founded by the Philological Society of London in 1857, the philological effort that would become the Oxford English Dictionary was specifically instigated to track the common uses of English words –that is to say the uses that would be valuable to an informed layperson (rather than a specialist or academic) on any particular topic - throughout the history of the language. Continuing to this day as a rolling genealogical project, the definitions, senses and meanings found in the OED have been the result of methodical and methodological research conducted by an army of researchers; texts both historical and contemporary are scoured for uses of words, with the inference of those terms recorded, collated and codified to create a vast body of research that goes to provide the basis of the dictionary proper. For this reason, while the content of the OED might not give a full and rich account of how a word came to appear, how it may be used or

how it has changed, it most certainly can give a brief but reliable account of when a word or specific sense appeared, and from where it came.

However not all words are created equal, nor can the methods of (or therefore the content of) the OED always be sufficient to adequately represent a word or its senses at all points in time. In both these regards, the OED's definition of security poses a rather curious case; across the three main editions of the OED, security - or more specifically, the political sense of security - is given three notably different entries. In the most recent edition, published online in 2011, security has among its senses the following;

“The safety or safeguarding of (the interests of) a state (or, sometimes, a coalition of states) against some internal or external threat, now esp. terrorism, espionage, etc.; the condition of being so safeguarded. Sometimes with modifying word, as public, state, etc. collective security, homeland security, national security”

Such a definition is unlikely to cause concern, however it is not so much the definition that is the issue here so much as the first date of attestation for such a usage given by the dictionary; the third edition cites the above use as being found as early as 1577.

This early attestation is problematic not so much due to the source material as it is due to the OED's own history; in the second edition, finalised in 1989, security is cited with a very similar definition, but with its first attestation being 1941. Basically, while the definition is functionally consistent between 1989 and 2011, where the 1989 edition sees political security as only having entered common usage in the 20th century, the latest edition presumes security being a political term for almost half a millennia.

This incongruence between attestations within the two most recent editions of such a genealogical work leaves us with an obvious need for an explanation. Luckily, a closer inspection of the attestations of both editions gives the strong impression that the genealogical distance between them is caused by editorial decisions of the third edition, rather than a lack of evidence in the second. This is made plain by the fact that while the

attestations given by the Third edition from before 1941 are new to the particular political definition, they are not new to entry for security itself; basically, several of the pre-1941 attestations given in support of the 'safeguarding the state' definition in the third edition are found as attestations of other definitions of security in the second edition.⁴⁷ At best, this would suggest that while the attestations of the third edition may well be 'correct' in the sense that they are a reflection of a politically valuable use before 1941, the sense was not considered sufficiently common or sufficiently novel by the editors of the Second edition.

These is enough reason to suspect that the decision of the editors of the second edition was more a reflection of common use and importance rather than a failure to properly identify some grand tradition of political security, and that reason is to be found in the first edition of the OED, finalised in 1933. In the entry for security in the first edition there are three main demarcations of meaning ("the condition of being secure", "a means of being secure" and as an attributive, in the sense of an object that performs a securing function), with eleven different specific definitions, each with several examples of use.

However none of the eleven definitions specifically deal with the safety of a state or organisation, and indeed none of them overtly allude to the political sensibilities found in the successor editions at all. This absence is notable on its own terms – that the most complete lexicon of the English language to date, having taken eighty years to reach its final format, would omit a sense that according to the 2011 revision had been used since 1577 must lead us to believe that the sense was sufficiently niche or uncommon as to be excluded from the first edition. Taken together, a comparison of the various editions of the OED also suggests that while 'security' as a descriptor for acts or policies that safeguard a state might not have been first used of 1941, it is likely indicative of the point at which such a use rose to be relevant enough to considered common speech. Thus when considered against the last century of the OED, the Third Edition's claim that security could specifically

⁴⁷ For ease of comparison, see the digital OED, which allows quick comparison between editions; "Security - Oxford Reference," accessed February 2, 2017, http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199571123.001.0001/m_en_gb0748730.

describe the safety of a state can be seen as an oversight at best and an unfortunate case of historicism at worst.

CONCLUSION

We have ascertained that when it comes to the meaning of security within political theory and International Relations, there is not only a lack of definition or rationale, but indeed a lack of debate at all. In its place stands the twin concepts of an ‘unacknowledged consensus’ and ‘essentially contested concept’ both of which discourage debate by presuming that none is needed (in the case of the former) or that anything more than contextual evaluation of what security is impossible (in the case of the latter). Sheehan’s survey ultimately crystallises the International Relations scholar Arnold Wolfers’s seminal claim of the ‘ambiguous symbol’⁴⁸ of national security – it demonstrates that this lack of debate has resulted in a broad notion of security in which the term acts as a sort of shorthand for a field of action and theory that is undefined but prosecuted nonetheless.

However as we have seen from anthropology, security must have some inherent political value underwriting its employment. The question then becomes how this value is derived, a question suited to the philological and genealogical approaches of Hamilton, Dillon and Neocleous. However each of these approaches have been fraught by particular pitfalls. Hamilton’s lack of focus on the political aspects of his genealogy ultimately stymies his attempt to derive a political value from the modern term. For Dillon, the genealogy itself is incomplete, and for Neocleous it begins with the modern arrival of the word, rather than encompassing how it was the word arrived at all. This is not to downplay the importance of these studies; each attempt has contributed extensively to this study and were all extremely valuable on their own terms. However the question remains as to how it was that the political notion of security gained a value within the English speaking world; indeed, even the most complete attempt at English genealogical lexicography has been subject to confusion regarding the historical prevalence of the term.

⁴⁸ Wolfers, “‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol.”

CHAPTER TWO

METHODS AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

“First, words are our tools, and, as a minimum, we should use clean tools: we should know what we mean and what we do not, and we must forearm ourselves against the traps that language sets us. Secondly, words are not (except in their own little corner) facts or things: we need therefore to prise them off the world, to hold them apart from and against it, so that we can realise their inadequacies and arbitrariness, and can relook at the world without blinkers. Thirdly, and more hopefully, our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connections they have found worth marking, in the lifetimes of many generations: these surely are likely to be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably practical matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up in our armchairs.”⁴⁹

In order to properly frame our theoretical problem (and therefore provide a suitable proposal to solve it), I will begin by viewing security through the lens of Austin’s speech-act theory, using Austin’s three propositions as quoted above as a guide. The first assertion – that words are tools to maintain, not traps to be snared in, will provide us with the theoretical traction to unpick the consensus/contestability dichotomy using basic speech-act theory. For the sake of narrative clarity, we will then jump to the third assertion – that words are based on generations’ worth of distinctions – which will lead us to the selection and refinement of a genealogical approach. Lastly, we will consider Austin’s second premise – that words should be ‘prised off the world’ and problematised. This will be our final step in

⁴⁹ J. L. Austin, “A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address,” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 57 (1956): 7–8.

outlining the theoretical foundation of this study, covering how it will go beyond simply providing a history of security and will instead explain how security came to have a history at all. Once the values that guide our understanding of security are uncovered, we can gain an appreciation for what role the word plays in our practical cultural experience – what space it demarcates, what concepts it assists and what, if any, it harms.

“First, words are our tools, and, as a minimum, we should use clean tools: we should know what we mean and what we do not, and we must forearm ourselves against the traps that language sets us.

For Austin, words are tools in the sense that any utterance is rarely for its own sake, nor is a statement, phrase or word monolithic in its meaning or import. Instead, words and their employment are a means to a communicative end, with their possible communicative meaning/s ascertained by a number of factors spread across the speaker, the audience and the context in which the communication was attempted. The study of these factors generally begins with an assessment of three basic elements of a communicative act;

- 1) its locution, being the semantics and literal formations of the speech-act,
- 2) its Illocution, being the meaning or intention of the speech-act, and
- 3) the perlocution – the speech-act’s actual effect on its audience.

To Austin, an appreciation of these elements was necessary in order to liberate philosophy from the notion that a word is simply a name for a certain truth or value and can thus be simply deemed true or false, real or unreal. While the name ‘speech-act’ implies the spoken word, Austin’s framework is equally valid for the written word – indeed much of the impetus for his formulation of the theory was as a response to the work of positivist

philosophers to whom Austin attributed the misuse of words as a major source of theoretical misunderstanding in their written work.⁵⁰

While Austin is far more interested in providing a framework for the examination of specific utterances, speech-act theory's appreciation of the separation between what is said, what is meant and what is accepted by the audience opens the way for us to define more precisely how the 'unacknowledged consensus' of security works, and further, how it can be overcome. To be clear, this is not to propose the use of speech-act theory to critically evaluate every utterance of 'security'; instead, for our purposes the key use of speech-act theory is its methodological conception of words as communicative tools rather than as statements of a certain truth or value.

While the school of securitization has also utilised speech-act theory to de-reify security, the end result of this utilisation is the reconfiguration of the term; for securitization scholars, the 'thing' security becomes the 'process' of security. In short, security becomes the speech-act process itself, albeit one that is utilised in a specific setting.⁵¹ What remains unresolved in this reconfiguration, however, is how the 'process' of security can be demarcated without an appropriate understanding of the values inherent in its demarcation; in terms of Austin, it has traditionally lacked an awareness of knowing "what we mean and what we do not", instead focussing on how the utterance of security has been used and utilised in the moment of its invocation. While this is a valuable perspective, it ultimately fails to furnish us with a 'how' – how did security arrive, and what distinction did it seek to over and above the other words in the corpus?⁵² While security might well be a process described by securitization, how that process is demarcated from any other process is still unclear.

Thus the conception of speech-act in this genealogy is quite different from the use it finds within traditional securitization approaches. The most marked difference is how the

⁵⁰ For example, see Austin's criticism of A. J. Ayer in John L. Austin and Geoffrey James Warnock, *Sense and Sensibilia*, Repr (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 2010).

⁵¹ Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security*, 26.

⁵² McDonald, "Securitization and the Construction of Security."

contestable nature of security is internalised. By concentrating on each specific process, securitization gives valuable insight into how security is used in a concrete case, but in so doing holds the possibility of confirming a plethora of meanings, each building to maintain a core understanding of security's contestation. However by using speech-act to elucidate the communicative aspect of the word, the genealogical approach employed here places these contestations into greater paradigms; such contestations thus becoming the sum total of security's employments. By seeing security as a communicative tool rather than a word already subject to a specific value or function, we can better guard against the historicising of our genealogical evidence; in short, we can better defend ourselves against transposing our own notions of security into the communicative acts of the past.

Words, therefore, are tools by which meaning is transmitted between actor and audience, and the use of the term 'security' in the political space is certainly no different. But, as Austin says, we must maintain 'clean' tools, and avoid the traps that unclean language can bring. On this point, while Sheehan, Collins and others might accept the dichotomy of consensus and contestability, I do not believe that such an approximation of the definitional landscape is necessarily true, or perhaps more importantly, helpful. This study does not reject the various contestations of security, as it also holds open the possibility of a deep core concern of 'security'; however in either case security must still be subject to a point of arising, as well as some broad values that give the word communicative power. Whether essentially contested, subject to a broad consensus, or both, we can still find how security arrived to hold the discursive power it now does.

To study security as a concept only in as much as it is employed, defined or enacted in a specific setting is to leave a term of such power as ultimately mutable, unknowable and inherently ethereal. It matters not whether the research is an analytic, objective study of a practical problem, or a personal, theoretical construction on what we as scholars view as 'security'; to assume consensus and contestability without grounding either in a concrete tradition is to give ourselves over to chance at best, and malevolence at worst. For while the lack of clarity is certainly indicative of a failing of academic rigour, it also perpetuates a lack of political accountability. In the above section, we have already touched on the close

relationship between political theory and governments, as well as the role of ‘security’ in legitimating political discourse in contemporary society. Crucially we have seen that a number of scholars have drawn the link between security’s lack of definition and its perennial re-tasking in political discourse, citing a negative relationship between security’s malleability and its immunity from essential examination. Lacking a clear awareness of how security has gained the immense value it has within Anglo-western thought allows the term a level of plasticity that facilitates political abuse; we know that it is crucial to governance and politics, but we must take for granted why. This dichotomous relationship perpetuates its utility as a highly politicized catch-all term, providing both the possibility of use and the freedom from scrutiny required to ensure the term stays viable across countless contexts.

However we must recognise that its usefulness as a term across contexts is also indicative of its value to a wide variety of actors in a wide variety of situations. For the term’s selection by a speaker to be viable, it must have established value; for the audience to appreciate its use, at least some of that value must be shared with the audience. This state of affairs – the necessity of some established, core value or utility – is not diminished, but rather it is simply obscured by the fact that the word has remained under-examined. In the words of Hamilton, “By means of semantic malleability, ‘security’ could name a desire that everyone admittedly shares, transhistorically and transculturally, even if there remains vast disagreement on what the word means, what it expresses, and how it performs, that is, even if we can never be sure what “security” is concretely doing for us or to us.”⁵³

“...our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connections they have found worth marking, in the lifetimes of many generations.”

⁵³ Hamilton, *Security*, 8.

In order to realise our goal of uncovering the values at play in security, we should then consider the gamut of its use throughout our political history. As such, I propose a genealogical study of security; a study of historical discourse concentrating on what would broadly considered the Anglo-Western tradition. From ancient Greece and Rome, through to the British Isles, culminating in the post-war 'west'.

I confine the study to this tradition for two reasons. Firstly, as ignorant of the nuances of other traditions as I am, I am certainly not qualified to venture outside the context of my own tradition. I am in no position to judge the suitability, effectiveness or viability of such a study in, for example, a Chinese context, nor a Russian one, nor really any other. I do however deeply hold that such an endeavour would be a worthwhile one, especially considering the contemporary interplay between political cultures and the role that security has played in those interactions, especially since 2001. Secondly, and related to the former, given the hegemony of the United States and the English-speaking world for better or worse the 'western' notion of security is the dominant narrative in the global political space – across non-western contexts, the political notion of security as it has been used within Anglo-American discourse has found its way into the political discourse of other nations, especially after 2001.⁵⁴ The study of it is, therefore, the most poignant to understanding the current global climate of 'security'.⁵⁵

Further, this study must also be confined to an overwhelmingly patriarchal space; the inclusion of any sustained critique of gender issues, especially and immediately the issue that security logic has been historically defined by and for male gendered actors, sits beyond the source material necessary for our genealogy. By concentrating on concrete political events and historical texts and considerations, the study is at this stage a hostage of cultural reality. Women were not citizens in Athens, had little purchase in the political machinations

⁵⁴ Kent, "Reconfiguring Security: Buddhism and Moral Legitimacy in Cambodia"; Daniel M. Goldstein, "Anthropology/ies: Moving beyond Disciplinary Approaches to Security," in *Security: Dialogue across Disciplines*, ed. Philippe Bourbeau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 45–61, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316227671.003>.

⁵⁵ I am painfully aware of the catch-22 that this presents – such hegemony of western ideas is greatly enshrined by the codification (and legitimation) of said ideas.

of Rome (with some included notable exceptions) and even at the time of the English Civil War, were seen as political extensions of their husbands and fathers. As a result, a historical discussion of the political issues that have constructed security over these periods stands as a monolithically masculine endeavour. However, all this said, I have attempted to highlight where possible the political and social realities that allowed this state of affairs both in the text and in footnotes. It is hoped that at best these acknowledgements can enrich further study into what ramifications this male-centric construction of security may have had, and at worst will maintain awareness of the extremely gendered nature of political history and philosophy, an exceedingly problematic state of affairs considering that this issue affects society as a whole.

PARTICULARS OF GENEALOGY

The genealogical approach of this thesis will broadly follow the framework of Giorgio Agamben's philosophical archaeology,⁵⁶ itself indebted to Foucault's own approach, especially that outlined in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*.⁵⁷ Beyond the examination of

⁵⁶ The most famous employment of this methodology was Agamben's *Homo Sacer*, in which Agamben claims that "the power that is assumed to found and legitimate the factual existence of government and law, is itself a product of that law." William Watkin, "The Signature of All Things: Agamben's Philosophical Archaeology," *MLN* 129, no. 1 (2014): 143. While I appreciate the broader points of his method, I feel it necessary to point out that I find the specificities of Agamben's study to be based on misunderstandings and misreadings. My impression is that such a view puts me at odds with many others, who largely see his methods as a weakness of an otherwise illuminating study, however there are some succinct and cogent accounts of the various strengths and failings of Agamben's work that I have relied upon in making my conclusions. For an exploration of the historical ideas Agamben relies on for his thesis, see James Gordon Finlayson, "'Bare Life' and Politics in Agamben's Reading of Aristotle," *The Review of Politics* 72, no. 1 (2010): 97–126, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034670509990982> and Frederiek Depoortere and DePaul University, "Reading Giorgio Agamben's *Homo Sacer* with René Girard:," *Philosophy Today* 56, no. 2 (2012): 154–63, <https://doi.org/10.5840/philtoday201256234>. Obviously, for the cogency of his method, see Watkin, who is extensively quoted here.

⁵⁷ The most crucial difference between the two is the basic philosophical prepositions on which their cogency is based, a difference that is of some importance to our present study. Where Agamben draws his methodological stock from a deep ontology and epistemology, Foucault draws his conclusions from the formulations of discursive rules through which discourse is examined. Given that I do not find his discursive rules amenable to a study of this nature, I have instead chosen to appropriate Austin's framework and rely instead on Agamben's philosophical basis. Michel Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, Routledge Classics (London ; New York: Routledge, 2002).

historical discourse, Agamben's approach relies on three main elements; paradigms, signatures, and the *archē*, the 'moment of arising.'

Within the frame of philosophical archaeology, paradigms form "a particular mode and function of historical examples"⁵⁸ that can be drawn from historical and philosophical enquiry. In practise, these paradigms are constituted by trends and correlations uncovered by the research. While paradigms are at their heart notional and philosophically constructed, in practical terms paradigms are accessed through historical enquiry – by cataloguing and comparing concepts as they have been enacted or reacted to throughout history in order to form a basis of comparison to other concepts, identifying continuities, similarities and differences. While the events themselves remain self-contained, through their comparison a paradigm is created that "standing equally for all others of the same class, defines the intelligibility of the group of which it is a part and which, at the same time, it constitutes."⁵⁹

However the comparison of paradigms provides only a history – it does little to give reason or purpose, to uncover the driving force behind such events. The identification of these driving forces is made through the identification of *segnatura* – signatures. These *segnatura* are again not themselves objects or events, but are instead the ideas or trends that allow the objects and events to be known and understood.⁶⁰ Where paradigms are a collection of events as comparison, the signature, once identified, puts these events in relation to an event, concept or subject.⁶¹ Therefore whilst paradigms make up the bulk of the research content, it is through the identification and interpretation of signatures that the theoretical work is done.

⁵⁸ Watkin, "The Signature of All Things," 140.

⁵⁹ Giorgio Agamben, *The Signature of All Things: On Method* (New York : Cambridge, Mass: Zone Books ; Distributed by the MIT Press, 2009), 17.

⁶⁰ Agamben, 42; Watkin, "The Signature of All Things," 140.

⁶¹ Agamben, *The Signature of All Things*, 70.

It is Agamben's notion of signatures where the benefits of combining philosophical archaeology with the theoretical underpinnings of Austin's work is most pronounced. Where Agamben's signatures remain somewhat vague, Austin's rigorous engagement with words and their use provides insight not clearly gained through Agamben's own framework. In his attempt to give a theoretical substance to the notion of signature, Agamben turns to the role of language as a signifying vehicle. In Agamben's words, "...language is the archetype of the signature, the signatory art par excellence..."⁶² As the communicative vehicle of our distinctions and correlations, our understanding of language is also our understanding of signatures. To this end, signatures are not 'things' but rather the sum total of correlative and distinctive qualities - "immaterial similarities" that make paradigms and events intelligible.⁶³ Thus there is a reflexive appreciation between the two theoretical frames; both hold language as the signifier of intelligible precedents, paradigms and understandings, but where one first seeks to understand the signature through paradigms, the other seeks the paradigm through the signature of language.

Whilst paradigms and signatures guide what is studied and how that information is processed, the *archē* (Greek for *beginning*, or *source of action*) provides both the philosophical rationale for a genealogical approach, as well as further refining the way in which paradigms and signatures are understood. At its heart, the notion of *archē* is the 'moment of arising' - an exploration of the impossibility of identifying a point of origin for any idea or subject,⁶⁴ juxtaposed with the necessity of historical enquiry to understand the present.⁶⁵ The *archē* is not 'archaeology' as a simple exploration of the past, but is instead a concept that seeks to make sense of the relationship between events across time. Instead of looking at 'now' as the sum total of 'then', the *archē* paints the present times as the most immediate representation of an endless stream of present times, each contingent on those that came before.

⁶² Agamben, 36.

⁶³ Agamben, 36.

⁶⁴ Agamben, 94.

⁶⁵ Agamben, 103.

Thus in order to understand a particular historical moment we must also understand the sum total of the 'then' that contributed to its creation. In our case, this means that we will not simply identify a point of arising for security, we will also examine the various elements that allowed that point to function. With each new now, the past is not only elaborated on, it is also forgotten, re-imagined or re-evaluated – thus any given present is not only the sum total of its precedents, it is simultaneously obscuring, re-evaluating or elucidating the events on which it relies. In this way the *archē* is not a tool of genealogy, but an awareness that allows genealogy to mitigate dangerous assumptions philosophical and historical assumptions.

This awareness of the constant re-imagining of concepts can, in Agamben's view, help uncover the ideas and beliefs that formed the concept, ideology or institution in question.⁶⁶ In comparison to constructivist approaches in International Relations, it is not enough for Agamben to assume that institutions guide actions, knowledge, events and expectations; instead there is a constant and recursive relationship between these elements that, through their interaction, constitutes the reality from which those same elements operate. Put another way, instead of examining an idea or institution as an epistemological force sitting within the ontological world, philosophical archaeology seeks to understand the reflexive relationship between our existing institutions and our understanding of reality.

It is this recursive relationship that is the defining factor in utilizing this genealogical methodology, and a necessary move in order to maintain our appreciation of security through the lens of communicative act rather than contestable concept. As a tool of communication, security's employment is framed by context and intention. However these elements do not form some absolute value for the word, nor even for any particular utterance, as they must still be understood by an audience. It is this final step that ensures that past utterances are constantly relevant in each successive utterance – meaning that each successive utterance is also contingent on the context of its forebears. In this way we reach a strange aporia – the *archē* - where the socio-cultural realities of the past are

⁶⁶ Watkin, "The Signature of All Things," 140.

embedded in security, just as the new realities of each successive use redefine the word and the past uses embedded in it.

However where Austin leaves this recursive interpretation vague, Agamben is rigorous in his treatment of the underlying philosophical mechanisms that make this possible. Eschewing external objectivity, Agamben denies the possibility of “...the emergence of the fact without at the same time being the emergence of the knowing subject itself...”⁶⁷ As such, philosophical archaeology hinges on a process in which the object of study is related ‘to the *archē* or moment of arising’; if the synthesis between epistemology and ontology is presumed, a ‘historically inscribed concept is only accessible through the contemporary moment of it being accessed’.⁶⁸ Put another way, instead of being the quest for an absolute and static knowledge of an object, when viewed in its epistemological synthesis, ontology becomes a form of knowledge rooted in the recursive exploration of the world of things performed by a knowing subject. As Watkin explains:

“In a radical revision of the Kantian revolution, yes, the objective realm exists for the subject who has a set of concepts which it uses to make sense of this realm; only this does not happen once and for all, but more than once over periods of time where the world of things is composed by subjective positions which can only be taken up by virtue of the very realm of things that they have composed.”⁶⁹

⁶⁷ Agamben, *The Signature of All Things*, 45.

⁶⁸ Watkin, “The Signature of All Things,” 141.

⁶⁹ Watkin, 153. In a tangential recursion back to Austin, I would argue that what Watkin describes as a ‘radical revision of the Kantian revolution’ is also seen in Austin’s Cambridge ‘ordinary language philosophy’ counterpart, Ludwig Wittgenstein – in fact, as his very first and most fundamental claim. Wittgenstein opens his *Tractatus* with the claim that the world is the totality of “facts, not things”. Wittgenstein then recursively defines facts - a fact being “the existence of a state of affairs” and a state of affairs being “a combination of objects (things)”. Ultimately the claim is the same – that what is is what is known, but what is known is formed by what is. As a further aside, this conception also found a voice in Marxist philosophy, expounded by Hungarian philosopher György Lukács in his 1922 work *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*, Nachdr. (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2013) – “it is true that reality is the criterion for the correctness of thought. But reality is not, it becomes – and to become the participation of thought is needed.”

This epistemological-ontological synthesis provided by Agamben's conception of *archē* is the linchpin by which paradigms and signatures can provide meaningful data that transcends the single case. Ontology for Agamben is "not a determinate knowledge but the archaeology of every knowledge, which explores the signatures that pertain to beings by virtue of the very fact of existing, thus predisposing them to the interpretation of specific knowledges."⁷⁰ While all this might smack of the esoteric or arcane, this is to simply make the claim that seen in this way, the study of the outside world is not the study of things on their own terms, but the knowledge that we create regarding them – usually expectations based on routine, reproducible or expectable objects and outcomes. Our ontology, then, is in a very real sense also our epistemology.

This synthesis breaks down the distinctions between the paradigm of social enquiry and the paradigm of scientific enquiry, as no knowledge can claim to be purely derived from objective experience.⁷¹ However this is not to destabilise traditional science, but rather to demonstrate the particular process by which knowledge – any knowledge – is created. By refusing to allow the distinction between reality and knowledge to stand, Agamben identifies the point at which the two contact, claiming that it is only at this point that any enquiry – whether social or scientific – can become actually intelligible.

Armed as we are with a clear conception of security as a tool of communication, we have thus combined it with a method of enquiry that can take the tool of security and draw out 'all the distinctions men have found worth drawing.' Furthermore, we have bolstered this synthesis by giving a theoretical framework that allows those distinctions to interact beyond their own specificities without succumbing to a subjective paralysis. We therefore turn to our last guiding point – what we can do with the distinctions once gained.

⁷⁰ Watkin, "The Signature of All Things," 151.

⁷¹ Agamben, *The Signature of All Things*, 12.

“...words are not (except in their own little corner) facts or things: we need therefore to prise them off the world, to hold them apart from and against it, so that we can realise their inadequacies and arbitrariness, and can relook at the world without blinkers.”

To leave the study at this point would be, in a way, to succumb to the theoretical falsehood of treating security as a self-contained concept – armed with how security is used across contexts, to fail to ask *how* or *why* it is used is to fail to account for its status as a tool. Put another way, simply recording a use of the word with deference to its context does not in and of itself help us understand why in that particular moment, security was the best instrument by which a certain set of intentions or distinctions could be voiced. We can identify a use of the word, and we can identify how the use of the word in that context might have been taken by an audience, but we must go one step further and ask why in that moment the concepts contained within security were the chosen vehicle; what value did security have as an act of communication?

Further, the explanation of why a tool is used necessitates a focus beyond that tool; it demands a critical engagement with the context that sits beyond its use. Finding specific uses of security, even if positioned within their historical and social context, tells us only what we may already assume of the term; we search for a known quantity, and understand it in terms of already established use. Instead, if we are to find security’s purpose, its instrumentative value, we must appreciate the wider context of what it is trying to achieve, not simply catalogue or appreciate its immediate effect in its use. To say that a hammer is a lump of steel on a stick is obviously unhelpful, but to say that it is a tool used for hitting nails is not much better. Instead, we must on some level engage with the context of carpentry, its needs and preferred outcomes. In a sense, we must remove hammers from our focus and consider a world in which hammers are yet to appear – where timber remains unfastened, and where glue, screws and bolts are unserviceable. Only in so doing can we understand the tool in its context, and grasp at its necessity and utility.

Such an approach necessitates an amount of understanding of the context in which the tool operates, a necessity that holds the possibility of garnering further insights into that world, especially inasmuch as it impinged upon by the tool in question; to enquire into the use of a hammer is to gain an insight into carpentry. Such a possibility is even more pronounced in the case of security given the widely held 'unacknowledged consensus', as the uncritical employment of such an important and widely used word has obscured its role and status as a tool for a specific set of purposes. To understand the hammer is to understand its role in building the house, and to limit our understanding of the hammer is to ignore what is being built. Limiting our understanding of security to a term - even a term used within a historical concept - is to leave unexamined what it is that security is achieving; how is security used within political construction, and why is it a suitable tool for the jobs for which it is used?

In practical terms, our understanding of why security has found such utility in the western political context will be gained through proper examination in our genealogical approach. Through our genealogical engagement, we can grasp not only at the way security has been used to communicate specific values, we can also compare and contrast the situations, contexts and environments it was employed in. This is in essence the work of philosophical archaeology; making sense of paradigms through the signatures that present themselves across moments of arising. At the risk of torturing the analogy further, instead of providing the insight that hammers are used to strike nails, and instead of demonstrating when, how and why nails were struck, we can compare the striking of nails and note the similarities and differences that the paradigm of striking nails has across contexts. We can note that certain joins and certain structures are more likely to be nailed, whereas others might be screwed or glued instead. We might see that complexity of construction, time available to the builder, or the length or material of the nail changes when, how and to what degree the hammer is utilised in construction. We might find that as technology moves forward, nails are used less, more, or more specifically, and in so doing identify not simply what a hammer is, nor simply how or when it is used. Crucially, we can draw conclusions as to *why* the hammer might be used – why this tool, and not another? To the carpenter's apprentice, knowing which tool to use to hit nails is not as useful as knowing which joins on which constructions require nails, and which should be affixed in some other fashion.

We have already seen how this process is not the identification of what a concept is, but rather how it has been imagined and re-imagined; instead of simply collecting a set of uses and identifying paradigms common in each use, a properly understood genealogical study must also compare the context of each employment in order to identify paradigms across contexts. This process is also the mechanism by which we can identify the space in which the tool operates, as well as its aims and purpose, and it is these factors that can demystify the word itself, and allow us to examine the world without the blinkers of our inherent presuppositions.

This work is especially poignant in the realm of political theory. In the words of Duncan Bell, language is “central to the construction of social existence and vital in shaping and legitimating political action,”⁷² and thus it is imperative we appreciate the language required to construct the political. The recursive nature of language and the political thus in essence compounds both the necessity of the study and its subsequent pay-off, illuminating security as a political tool in its own right, as well as giving clarity to how our politics can be formed and reformed with such a tool.

Thus by combining the concerns of Austin with the foundations of genealogy we can attempt to understand security in twin senses. As a word, it is subject to the concerns of Austin, as a word tool arising from the distinctions of generations and applied to a specific act of communication. In this way we can grasp at how the word came to occupy the space it did. However through philosophical archaeology we can also explore more deeply the distinctions of generations, and in so doing attempt to uncover the various values that have coalesced in security’s utility.

⁷² Duncan S. A. Bell, “Language, Legitimacy, and the Project of Critique,” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 27, no. 3 (2002): 344.

GENEALOGY IN PRACTISE

In actually completing this research, it was the known and the ancient that was first explored; it would make little sense to attempt to jump to a conclusion. However the end result is of course that an 'answer' was found; in our case, that we arrived at a historical point at which security was used in English to demarcate a political value or practise. In this case, that point is the English Civil War, and the desire a broken England had for political stability and a redesigned and strengthened polity to ensure the bloody and brutal tragedy that had befallen them was not repeated. In the context of a full scale war had appeared a full scale propaganda effort, with political pamphlets, open letters and analyses trading blows over current events and points of contention. Of one of these points so contested, 'security' was to be one – the word making the leap from the contexts of finance, business and theology to the arena of governance and politics.

We will revisit security's specific point of arising in the civil war in the last section of the thesis, however for the moment what concerns us is the fact that while this point of emanation came as the end result of years of study, it also gives us a poignant and direct way to understand the genealogical method that created it. Because in scratching the surface of this emanation, we see that the debates of security in the civil war speak specifically, emphatically and directly to a larger set of concerns that transcend the English distinction and stretch throughout the greater political inheritance that had informed both sides of the conflict.

THE CIVIL WAR AND SECURITY

Used as a broad label for a series of conflicts spanning from 1642 till 1651, the English Civil War was the outcome of a complicated web of social, religious and ethnic tensions across the British Isles. While the immediate cause of conflict was the efforts of King Charles I to circumvent his obligations to the English parliament, deeper underlying tensions between king and parliament, as well as tensions between various stakeholders across Charles' kingdom (which included Scotland and Ireland) were instrumental in the devolution into war.

In Scotland, a decade of Presbyterian revolts and upheavals had put pressure on English power in the country, and especially on the authority of the King; a zealous current of Protestantism had firmly established a paradigm of spiritual authority that stood separate from, and greater than the authority of Kings. Additionally, in 1641 Catholic sympathisers in Ireland had attempted rebellion – Catholicism being illegal within the realm at the time. The King wished to reassert the crown’s authority upon the ‘heretical’ rebels, however Protestants in England and Scotland suspected the king of Catholic sympathies, and thus refused to grant him an army. The sporadic response on the part of English led to the conflict taking on an ethnic dimension, with Gaelic Irish fighting against English and Scots colonisers.

As we will see, the dimensions of religious, social and political conflict inherent in these events would run through the debates surrounding England’s own turmoil – the source of authority, how it was enacted, and who should respect it would be central questions underpinning the war and the debates it sparked. However an exhaustive account of the English Civil War and its causes is outside the scope of this thesis – instead, it is the substance and intention of the debates, pamphlets, speeches and decrees that concerns us here. While the historical setting and causes of the conflict are crucial to understanding the speech that it caused, the cursory scene we have set here will be sufficient for the moment;⁷³ instead, we will now turn to illustrating how the speech surrounding the English Civil War is indicative of deeper philosophical traditions of politics and security.

In the last days of October, 1647, just outside the town of Putney, the Parliamentary army had mustered after overcoming its royalist opposition. With the King in custody, the Parliamentarians saw themselves in a position to dictate the terms of a new England; from the ashes and blood of a catastrophic war, the victors sought to constitute the ruling authority of the nation along new lines. For almost a decade the forces of Parliament had

⁷³ To call this overview of the Civil War ‘cursory’ would be an overstatement; however if the reader wishes to acquaint themselves with the complex causes and factors involved, the following sources are recommended. For information on the Irish context, see Jane Ohlmeyer, “A Failed Revolution? The Irish Confederate War in Its European Context,” *History Ireland* 3, no. 1 (1995): 24–28; for a broader overview of the English and Scottish considerations, see Tim Harris, “Revisiting the Causes of the English Civil War,” *Huntington Library Quarterly* 78, no. 4 (2015): 615–35; Lawrence Stone, *The Causes of the English Revolution 1529-1642* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2002).

sought the power to instate their authority over the hereditary monarchy, and now that it had been achieved it was crucial they codified how that authority would be expressed.

However how this authority was to be expressed emerged as a contentious question among the soldiers of the parliamentary army. Even worse, a deep divide had emerged not simply on how Parliament's authority might become the sovereign in England, but how that parliamentary authority was to be constructed. In order to settle these questions, representatives of the two main factions that had emerged among the soldier's ranks met to debate the issues in depth. On one side stood the Grandees, high ranking officers of the army and members of the nobility; on the other, stood 'agitators', elected representatives of various regiments, who stood as members of a wide social movement known as the 'Levellers'. While both sides had fought to gain political primacy for parliament, once their victory was achieved it became clear that what that primacy looked like was fundamentally different. For the Levellers, a parliamentary victory meant the sovereign ascendancy of the popular assembly by completely removing the King and aristocratic House of Lords, the institution of universal male franchise regardless of wealth or status, and a legal system founded on equality before the law for all citizens of the nation. In comparison, the Grandees had fought for a far more modest shift – while they had proposed the expansion of social justice and welfare, ultimately the Grandees had aimed to maintain the authority of the King and the House of Lords over the popular assembly, albeit with additional oversights.

With the army on the brink of mutiny, the Grandees called the debate to settle tensions, the proceedings recorded by a team of stenographers. Lucky for us, the efforts of those present have survived to this day, giving us a candid view not only of the issues raised, but also how each side went about presenting their cases. While the details of the debate and the political and philosophical implications implicit in the disagreement will eventually stand as important parts of our story, for now it is more *how* the interlocutors spoke (rather than what they sought to achieve) that concerns us.

Much of the argument of both sides of the debate were underpinned by historical events and philosophies that for us today may seem worlds apart from civil war England, but were for the soldiers of the day very prescient considerations. Chief among these was the issue of the Norman Conquest – the invasion of England by William of Normandy in 1066. Despite occurring almost six hundred years before, this event was seen as a pivotal moment that had in many ways precipitated or necessitated the civil war.

However what is even more curious is that how the events of 1066 were spoken about differed wildly across the divides of the debate. While the invasion was an important event for both the Grandees and the Agitators, their conception of the event (and what should be done with that conception) was fundamentally different between the two parties. As the arguments regarding suffrage and kingship unfolded, the conquest formed a major element of the rhetorical battleground, a strategic point that both sides sought to control in order to prosecute their case.

For the Levellers, the Norman Conquest signified the beginning of subjection for the common people of England – the end of the sovereign power of the people, and the institution of a system of law that entrenched inequality and servitude. After debating the philosophical underpinnings of common suffrage leads to disagreement, the agitator Nicholas Cowling invokes the Norman Conquest specifically as the point at which the woes of the commons began; it was the Norman monarchy that had lead to the current wretched state of the English commons, and it was high time this ‘foreign’ influence was cast off.⁷⁴

Not simply attempting to paint the conquest as one of subjugation, Cowling also contrasts the tyranny of the Normans with the righteous governance of Alfred the great, the paragon example of the Saxon kings that Norman rule replaced. According to Cowling, in Alfred,

⁷⁴ A.S.P. Woodhouse, *Puritanism and Liberty, Being the Army Debates (1647-9) from the Clarke Manuscripts with Supplementary Documents* (University of Chicago Press, 1951), 53.

England had a government under which “...the commons had all the power”,⁷⁵ and it was this investment of power in the commons that was destroyed with the introduction of the Norman yoke. For Cowling, it was only right that the laws and authority of a foreign king should be expunged by the victory of the common Englishman over the royalist forces – here, the removal of king and revision of the law was a reclamation of a common sovereignty that had spent six hundred years in exile.

Cowling’s assertions were met head on by the Grandees’ chief spokesman, Henry Ireton. In reply to the vision of conquest put forward by Cowling, the aristocratic Ireton contests that William’s arrival in 1066 was not to conquer and rewrite English laws, but rather to confirm and uphold them.⁷⁶ Suggesting a view typified by the legalist Edward Coke some fifty years earlier, Ireton sees the conquest as having little effect on English laws; William did not create the common law, he only transposed the existing laws of the Saxon kings into the French speaking bureaucracy he instated. Further, the conquest itself was an act that confirmed English laws rather than challenged them – William was upholding the legally recognised succession against an illegal usurpation

Beyond simply refuting Cowling, Ireton’s response pitched the conquest as evidence of the fundamental legality and authority of a monarch; to invoke the conquest was to make plain that England was subject to Kings long before the conquest, and further, at least one of those Saxon kings was guilty of tyranny, given his obvious disregard for the laws that governed succession. In a nutshell, for Ireton the conquest did not support popular sovereignty, it undermined the claim that it had ever existed; “If subjection to a King be a tyranny, [we had a King before the Norman Conquest]; the question was between him and the Conqueror who had the right to the crown.”⁷⁷

⁷⁵ Woodhouse, 120.

⁷⁶ Woodhouse, 120.

⁷⁷ Woodhouse, 120.

Cowling was not alone in his view of England before the Norman Conquest – it was a view of history that was to continually surface throughout the democratic literature of the English civil war,⁷⁸ and would continue to be invoked in similar arguments by the likes of Thomas Paine over a century later.⁷⁹ Nor was Ireton alone in his views. Philip Hunton’s treatise on the benefits of monarchy defends against the charge that the Normans conquered to subjugate, and goes one step further by claiming that the conquest was welcomed by the common people.⁸⁰ As mentioned earlier, such a view was essentially invoking the politician and jurist Edward Coke who wrote some fifty years earlier, himself like Ireton and the other Grandees a member of the nobility who found himself acting to constrain the power of the monarchy. That those on the same side of a debate might find themselves sharing a common view of divisive issues is not itself any great insight, however of interest to us is the fact that even considering the great bloodshed and upheaval of a decade long civil war, the historical events of half a millennia ago would emerge as a source of authority and contestation. In the aftermath of the bloodiest conflict ever to take place in England, the victors thought it prudent to debate the merits of history.

The Norman invasion was not the only source of historical polemic. Cicero, Caesar, and ancient Athens were all battlegrounds on which the war of ideas was fought. Indeed, these historical battlegrounds are present from the earliest stages of the conflict. Before hostilities between parliament and king had begun, members of the parliament issued the King with Nineteen Propositions which sought to redress issues of taxation, power and royal prerogative. The King’s failure (or rather, unwillingness) to acquiesce to these propositions

⁷⁸ Richard A. Gleissner, “The Levellers and Natural Law: The Putney Debates of 1647,” *Journal of British Studies* 20, no. 1 (1980): 87; Samuel Dennis Glover, “The Putney Debates: Popular versus Élitist Republicanism,” *Past & Present*, no. 164 (1999): 50; RACHEL FOXLEY, “Levellers and the Army: England’s Freedom, Soldiers’ Rights,” in *The Levellers*, Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Manchester University Press, 2013), 162, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1mf71wj.11>; R. B. Seaberg, “The Norman Conquest and the Common Law: The Levellers and the Argument from Continuity,” *The Historical Journal* 24, no. 4 (December 1981): 791–806, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X00008207>.

⁷⁹ Paine uses the word especially in relation to the recent political shift in France in both his *Rights of Man* and *agrarian Justice*. Thomas Paine, *Rights of Man*, The Penguin American Library (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England ; New York, N.Y., U.S.A: Penguin Books, 1984); Thomas Paine, Michael Foot, and Isaac Kramnick, *Thomas Paine Reader*, Penguin Classics (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England ; New York, N.Y., U.S.A: Penguin Books, 1987).

⁸⁰ David Wootton, ed., *Divine Right and Democracy: An Anthology of Political Writing in Stuart England* (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub. Co, 2003), 198.

would lead to the civil war, however while the King failed to deliver the requests of parliament, he still gave them the dignity of a written response.

Charles' response to the nineteen propositions hinged in no small part on his argument that the political constitution of England was such that it was already an embodiment of the venerated 'mixed constitution' – a perfect balance of democracy, oligarchy and tyranny, and thus to change it would be to err from best practise and the wisdom of the ages. The mixed constitution was a vision of a perfect state put forward by the likes of Polybius and Aristotle, though it is with Cicero that it finds its most powerful and influential expression. To Cicero, it was republican Rome that embodied this 'mixed constitution', one in which common people had common guarantees, a single man held sway over all other affairs of state, but both were facilitated – or prorogued – by a powerful aristocracy. As fate would have it, both Charles and his constitutional touchstone would find themselves on the wrong side of a civil war, and both executed for the trouble; at the time of his response to parliament, however, Charles was not yet broken. Accompanying his response to parliament was the short Latin phrase "*nolumus leges angliae mutari*" - we are unwilling to modify the laws of England).⁸¹

Unsurprisingly, Charles' use of Cicero's ideas to justify the ruling monarchy was but one invocation of the great Roman jurist; those on the other side of the war would invoke the same man and the same works to very different ends. Most spectacularly, Edward Sexby would draw on Cicero directly in his argument for the execution of the same king that claimed the justice of the mixed constitution. In his pamphlet *Killing No Murder*,⁸² Sexby appeals to the righteousness of Cicero through the latter's support for executing a tyrannical autocrat. Sexby sought to justify the execution of the English king by pitching Julius Caesar as an example of a tyrant whose killing was justified in enlightened antiquity, and Cicero as the main agent for the effort to do so.⁸³ Further, Sexby argues that the polity

⁸¹ Wootton, 171–74.

⁸² The authorship of *Killing* is not definitive, and its attribution problematic - especially considering its publication was made under a pseudonym – however we will attribute it to Sexby here. The various claims of the two main suspects are discussed in C. H. Firth, "*Killing No Murder*," *The English Historical Review* 17, no. 66 (1902): 308–11.

⁸³ Wootton, *Divine Right and Democracy*, 376.

that Caesar sought to control – that of Republican Rome – was one in which men like Cicero had conversely ensured equal representation and the rule of law.⁸⁴ Essentially, to the likes of Sexby, Cicero was the champion of a people on the brink of tyrannical subjection.

Cicero, it would seem, could be found at both the first and the last acts of the English civil war, but what his vision of Rome and the constitutions of states meant seemed to largely depend on the perspective of those who sought to invoke his ancient authority. To the King, Cicero's theories justified the position of the monarchy and a continuation of his rule; to others, the same man represented a new sort of government and the killing of the king.

This highly contested state of affairs continues into the other great source of classical western political philosophy, democratic Athens. Where the democratic 'Allen' sees the Athenian polity as one that safeguarded rights at the expense of tyrants⁸⁵ and Plato as an author that justifies the killing of an unjust ruler,⁸⁶ the monarchist Robert Filmer rejects Greece as a source of evidence or authority altogether; the heathen mob had no purchase in an enlightened Christian world. Other monarchists were not so quick to dismiss the evidence of the Greeks, however; most famously, the monarchist Thomas Hobbes translated Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* into English specifically so that it might show the people of England what a terrible plight democracy was, with Hobbes translating the work in a way that the words of 'Thucydides' painted a picture of the Athenian people such that any sensible reader would loathe to be subject to the rule of the mob.⁸⁷

As well as the historical battlegrounds, there was also a spiritual element to this civil war of ideas. The English Civil war had a strong element of denominational tension, with the King's Catholic sympathies (and devoutly Catholic wife) being the source of anxiety among his

⁸⁴ Wootton, 373.

⁸⁵ Wootton, 375.

⁸⁶ Wootton, 383.

⁸⁷ Todd Bulter, "Image, Rhetoric, and Politics in the Early Thomas Hobbes," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 67, no. 3 (2006): 479; Robin Sowerby, "Thomas Hobbes's Translation of Thucydides," *Translation and Literature* 7, no. 2 (1998): 165. For the original text from Hobbes, see his autobiography *Thomae Hobbessii Malmesburiensis Vita*.

largely protestant subjects. Further, even among the Protestants of England there stood further denominational and scriptural divides; the protestant but highly ritualistic Church of England was subject to an internal movement that sought to expunge what they saw as a ‘Catholic’ tendency to ritual practise and iconography from the nominally protestant church. As a result, the Civil War is often characterised as being a conflict drawn on religious lines, with Catholics largely supporting the monarchy, and puritans fighting for the Parliamentary forces.

However this characterisation is too simplistic. Neither the Catholics nor the Puritan movement was monolithic either in theology or demography, and as a result there were divisions in how religious concepts and scriptural lessons should be applied to the political realities of the day. Indeed, the political lessons gained from scripture were rather unsurprisingly better understood along partisan lines than religious ones. Many protestants sided against the king on the basis of protestant theological issues (such as the Church’s support for Arminian doctrines), for example. The puritan Cromwell used scripture to justify the prohibition of vices (such as alcohol and theatre) after the parliamentary victory, where others had argued for toleration along theological lines. Where the protestant scholars of Oxford ordained that it was the divine right of kings that granted monarchs a God-given position as absolute sovereigns, the reformist movement rejected the notion of anything being ‘ordained’ that was not expressly given in scripture. On the most extreme end of this rejection of traditional forms of scriptural justification were New Agents like Thomas Rainsborough whose belief in ‘Fifth Monarchism’ – the idea that Christ’s arrival was immanent and would lead to a government of godly (rather than aristocratic) men – allowed him to challenge the notion of nobility and aristocracy altogether.

While not all of these ideological battlegrounds were vocalised in the Putney debates, those who pleaded their cases at the debate did so draped in the long shadows these ideological touchstones cast. To a degree the relevance and importance of these issues are unsurprising; as an island nation subject to successive conquest, as an inheritor of Greco-Roman influence, and the Christian faith, the politics of England could not help but be defined by such events. However these ideological battlegrounds were not only historically

relevant to English political identity as a whole, they also shared a common paradigm that spoke to the specific issue the debaters at Putney, and indeed all those affected by the English Civil War were preoccupied with – how a polity might best mitigate the inherent risks of its own constitution and association. The debaters at Putney were not there to simply decide the fate of a crownless king, nor simply to resolve the pay dispute of the common soldiery – at their core, the debates were framed around two competing conceptions of how the future of a war-torn and fractured national could be made secure; how the people of England could reconstitute their polity while minimising the risks their shared life would create.

The history of Greece, the politics of Rome, and the events of the Norman Conquest had all shaped to some degree how the English nation conceived of itself; however on top of that, each of these shards of political consciousness were riven by the same question of risk. Did the demos of Athens provide prosperity and stability to the people, and strength and force to good government, or was it as ineffectual and corrupting as Hobbes suggested? Did Cicero's mixed constitution fall victim to the grip of a tyrant, or were the emperors that followed extensions of an already autocratic aristocracy? Both the laws and institutions brought in with the Norman Conquest, and the force and interpretation of scripture provided even more immediate sources of contestation; both were legitimating authorities that were subject to intense scrutiny on the basis of their capacity (or inability) to stop or resolve the breakdown in the English polity.

It should be unsurprising then that we find that upon closer inspection of these historical fragments that the issue of 'security' is at the fore not only as it impacted the consciousness of the debaters at Putney, but how the moments themselves were defined by what we might consider aspects of security today. Further, by tracing the flow of these events we can see how they have impacted the story of security itself; in each of these events we find a sort of matrix by which the myriad of concerns latent in contemporary notions of security dwell. The most obvious and powerful of these is easily within the work of Cicero; the same author cited as justification for both Kings and their executioners, is the first author known to us today to ever use the word '*securitas*' – the Latin forebear of the modern word today.

To the Athenians, we find the same historical text Hobbes used to prove the follies of democracy has as one of its central themes that of *asphaleia* (ἀσφάλεια) – a word attributed by scholars as being the cognate term for our modern notion of security, and indeed having its modern equivalent (ἀσφάλεια) used in regards to the modern Greek state’s national security apparatus.

This lingual linkage carries through our other two historical cases. The Latin word *securitas* is carried through to romance language via the church, the term gaining a relevance to scripture and theology. This theological link provided a carrier upon which the word to travel from the Roman empire to France, however it was not until the Norman Conquest that this romance word would find its way into English speech; with the conquest, the Anglo-Saxon speaking people of England were suddenly subject to a ruling class and legal system that spoke not English, but French. Thus security as a modern English term is such that it owes its very existence to the particulars of Norman rule and the way in which their authority was stamped onto the British Isles.

Labelling any one point in time, or any single idea, as the point of origin, or defining moment of a concept’s creation is indeed disingenuous, however it is for this reason that the debates and considerations of the English Civil War are of particular interest to us. Each of these historical battlegrounds feature relevance to the issues of the conflict not simply through some cultural accident, but because of fundamental considerations sitting at their cores; a consideration that shapes and defines how one construes a notion of ‘security’. As we will see, it was from the considerations of the English Civil War that the modern concept of security would be given its substance, though that substance would take another three centuries to be practically realised. In order to understand how security might have been construed this way, as well as to appreciate the possibilities and considerations that might otherwise change or redefine this result, we will also examine each of these historical cases; from each, we can build a picture of the paradigms that link them, and appreciate the signatures of security that sit both within and between each case.

However to be clear, all this is not done in order to define 'security' as a concrete term, nor attempt to provide parameters by which a definition of security might be judged. Ultimately the aim of this study is not simply to provide a historical reality of security's creation, but rather to identify what social and political needs the words associated with the concept fulfilled. Put simply, we are here to ensure that we understand the purpose, not the definition, of security. In looking through ancient Greece, Rome and England, we are seeking not necessarily what security, *asphaleia* or *securitas* meant, but rather why it was used; what purpose it served in the political space, and what conceptual issues it tried to identify or resolve. By doing this we furnish ourselves not with a historical understanding of definitions, but instead with an appreciation of the various issues and concerns that a polity might face that 'security' might have been used to identify and overcome.

Such an appreciation is of great relevance to us today, given that when employed politically, security has slipped into a state of ambiguous import. Where a simple appreciation of definitions might stand as yet another entrant to a contested and fraught space, the appreciation of needs has the capacity for us to take stock of usage and ascertain whether the term is meeting the social needs that gave rise to its usage. Such an endeavour goes beyond attempting to quantify some broad consensus of meaning or qualify the degree to which the word is a contested concept; it instead allows us to ascertain whether security still satisfies the linguo-political needs it originally served to fill, and if it does not, identify if those needs are satisfied by other more modern terms.

PART II

ANCIENT GREECE

CHAPTER THREE

THE SECURITY OF ATHENS; WRESTLING, POETRY AND THEATRE

For the debaters at Putney, questions of democracy, liberalism and the right of conquest began with the Greeks, and in this they were in agreement with the modern academy. The concept of security in the western tradition is often seen as beginning in ancient Athens, as much of our political, philosophical and social concepts do; in his account of the Peloponnesian war, Thucydides, the ‘father of history’ speaks of competition and cooperation of a plethora of city-states, of the political machinations of individuals, political groups and foreign agents, and the realities of war both human and strategic. In so doing, Thucydides employs a term that, while it has not survived into modern English, is seen by many scholars as the progenitor of our modern concept of security.⁸⁸ Indeed, beyond being the ‘father of history’, Thucydides can also claim patrimony of the political realism that supplied the foundational conception of security in International Relations today, often being cited as the first text in the western tradition that outlines a ‘security dilemma’,⁸⁹ and still (perhaps reluctantly) lending his name to popular concepts dispensed by adherents to the school.⁹⁰

However this continued appeal to the work of a historian almost 2,500 years old is far from unproblematic. It might seem too obvious to warrant a mention, but Thucydides did not formulate the language of his history with translation into modern English in mind, nor were the expectations and concerns of the social and political world that he was documenting mesh cleanly with our own. Such an obvious observation is necessary however, given the readiness of other imposing figures in political philosophy to gloss over this fact; the

⁸⁸ Burke, “Aporias of Security”; J.F.M. Arenas, *From Homer to Hobbes and beyond - Aspects of “security” in the European Tradition*, vol. 6, 2009; Hamilton, *Security*; Dillon, *Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought*; Herrington, “Philosophy: The Concepts of Security, Fear, Liberty, and the State”; Rothschild, “What Is Security?”

⁸⁹ Arenas, *From Homer to Hobbes and beyond - Aspects of “security” in the European Tradition*, 6:226.

⁹⁰ Graham T Allison, *Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?*, 2018.

labelling of Thucydides' account as the 'security dilemma' is in itself indicative of a tendency to appropriate the events of the Fourth century BC to the causes and concepts of contemporary political philosophy.⁹¹

It is made all the worse by the fact that such appeals are not a modern invention. The lineage of the misreading of Thucydides can go back at least as far as the work of Thomas Hobbes, an author that in his own right has cast an exceedingly long shadow on the political theory of the English speaking world. Hobbes' work – including that of *Leviathan* – was by Hobbes' own account greatly influenced of his appreciation of Thucydides' history.⁹² Unfortunately, that appreciation of Thucydides work has since been found to be extremely problematic on several counts,⁹³ something that not only bodes poorly for the rigour of Hobbes' own work, but also for those modern scholars who see a continuation between the 'security' of Thucydides and the 'security' of Hobbes, and build on that continuation their own extensions on this realist tradition.

Further, Hobbes' interpretation of Thucydides was hugely influential on his political theory, and specifically his disdain for parliamentarians in the English Civil War. Hobbes' conception of democracy was informed by his reading of the *History of the Peloponnesian War*, a text he saw as illustrating the fundamental failures of democracy. In this way, while the ancient Greek language itself did not inform modern notions of security directly, the political inheritance of Thucydides and other Athenians was relevant to the creation of the political reality of sixteenth century England; as we will see in later chapters, these political considerations would in turn shape the relevance and usefulness of security later on.

This chapter seeks to problematize existing notions of 'security' as it is presented in Thucydides in order to achieve two distinct but interrelated goals. Firstly, the chapter will use Thucydides' text as a guide for the way that concepts of 'security' were used politically

⁹¹ John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 2, no. 02 (January 1950): 157–80, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2009187>.

⁹² Sowerby, "Thomas Hobbes's Translation of Thucydides."

⁹³ Peter J. Ahrens Dorf, "The Fear of Death and the Longing for Immortality: Hobbes and Thucydides on Human Nature and the Problem of Anarchy," *American Political Science Review* 94, no. 03 (September 2000): 579–93, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2585832>; Bulter, "Image, Rhetoric, and Politics in the Early Thomas Hobbes."

in ancient Greece, so that the conceptual history of security can be better understood. Secondly, the chapter will better understand Thucydides' own use of and claims around security, so that the current assumptions of continuity claimed within International Relations (and especially realism) can be critiqued.

To be clear, this is not a challenge to the assumption that there is commonality between modern political theory and Thucydides' account; rather, it is more to engage with the crucial notion that owing to its formulation in a different language and a very different set of conceptual considerations, any genealogical considerations flowing from the Greek term in Thucydides' work likely requires more careful consideration than has been offered previously. Given this fact, it is important that we not only assess those intervening years in Anglophone political history, which will be addressed in subsequent chapters, but also that we appreciate Thucydides' notion of what we may now broadly identify as security. Indeed, the fact that within Thucydides' work there is a notion even remotely congruous with modern political philosophy is in itself worthy of great attention; taking our assumption that words as tools for societal needs, such a congruence is on face value suggestive of similar needs in two very chronologically distant set of circumstances.

In this section, we will explore this Greek word in the context of Thucydides' work, the Athenian polity for which he wrote, and for the Greek world in general. In so doing, we will find a concept intimately tied to contestation, especially the contestation of ideas and the people who created them. We will see how *asphaleia* is indeed an important analogue for modern notions of security through examining the congruity of its general employment, and by identifying examples of *asphaleia* being subject to the process of securitization. Further, we will map the relationship of Athenian 'security' to reason and rhetoric, and ultimately qualify the purpose and effect the term had on Athenian society. In so doing we will not only help appreciate the complex concerns of the debaters of Putney, we will also identify elements of security that we still live with today, as well as go some way of dispelling some misapprehensions within current scholarship.

OUTSIDE OF WAR – THE LANGUAGE OF THUCYDIDES IN CONTEXT

With this in mind, we will begin by examining what we know of the origins of the word that Thucydides used in his History, with a view to then turn back to the text itself and appreciate the meanings and distinctions that the people of classical Athens might have instilled in the word and the context in which it was used. This in turn will furnish us with an appreciation of why the word and the concepts it contained might have been suitable for its employment by Thucydides in the first place; what metaphors, analogies and imagery the word invoked within the political space of ancient Greece. Such an understanding will not only ground our exploration of the concept of security in the western tradition, but will also come to form an important point of comparison with modern understandings of security.

In order to understand what Thucydides meant by the term that the Anglo-western world has since appropriated as ‘security’, it is necessary to travel back to the beginning of classical antiquity; more specifically, to the ancient Greek games and the *stremma* – the wrestling arena. Similar to modern Olympic wrestling (albeit with the vastly different dress code), wrestling in the ancient games was a contest between two wrestlers, with each attempting to use grapples, holds and pins in an attempt to make their opponent submit - all while preventing their opponent from doing the same to them. A wrestler that conceded three falls or submissions lost the match, an eventuality arbitrated by a referee who also enforced rules (such as a prohibition of striking or grabbing of the genitals) through whipping any wrestler found breaching them.

It is in the contests of the arena that we best understand the word at the core of Greek ‘security’ – that of σφάλω (*sphallo*), meaning to throw or to cause to fall. Its use in the context of wrestling is immediately obvious; as the contestants grapple for dominance, each would be aiming to ‘*sphallo*’ the other. It is here also that the privative of *sphallo* is derived, a term to denote when a wrestler whose opponent had sought to throw them had successfully maintained their stance regardless. In this context, *asphalos* (ἀσφαλής, made by attaching the negative prefix ἀ) became an adjective that described one that had successfully defended against an opponent’s efforts, and the noun *asphaleia* (ἀσφάλεια)

denoting a state in which the combative efforts of an opponent could be or had been resisted.

While this wrestling heritage has been acknowledged by authors such as Arenas, Dillon and Hamilton, a more substantial engagement with the concepts at the core of the employment are important to properly understanding how and why *asphaleia* was used throughout subsequent Greek literature. *Sphallo* did not conjure up the simple act of falling, nor was it the act of throwing in and of itself; instead, these words held within them the inherent tension of the situation – it was to throw in the sense that it was to upend that which was otherwise stable, it was to fall despite the best efforts of stability. In sum, *asphaleia* was a term of opposition and conflict – it signified antithetical forces, and the stability of one against the other.

Operating on a metaphor of maintenance against an antithetical effort, *asphaleia* found its way into the social and political lexicon of classical Athens – initially wherever similar antithetical forces were in play. Over a number of centuries, the concept was applied to new arenas – to travel, to speech, and to poetry, long before it was eventually applied to politics by Thucydides. In order to understand what dilemma was facing the states recorded in the pages of the *History of the Peloponnesian War*, we must pay deference to the centuries of *asphaleia* in Greek language stretching back to the Homeric epics, written circa 700 BCE.

The notion of *asphaleia* appears several times in each of the two Homeric epics, finding employment in a variety of different contexts. In the *Iliad*, we see Hector, hero of Troy, crashing through the Greek forces like a boulder rolling down a mountainside, only ‘not-falling’ once it reaches level ground (presumably in the case of Hector this ‘level ground’ would be running out of Greeks to kill).⁹⁴ In a later passage, we see the concept used in the context of leaping on the back of a moving horse.⁹⁵ Even more intricate equine employments of the metaphor follows; in book seventeen the horses of a fallen charioteer

⁹⁴ Hom. Il. 13.141. All subsequent quotations are taken from the following translation unless otherwise stated. Homer, *Iliad*, trans. T Murray, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1924).

⁹⁵ Hom. Il. 15.683

resist whippings, remonstrations and threats to get them to move, but instead remain 'secure', as 'surefooted' as pillars marking a tomb (here the *asphales* metaphor is used alongside *empadon*, literally 'strong footed')⁹⁶ and in book twenty three we are told that a good charioteer keeps the reins taut at first, but then 'secure' as he lets the horses run their course while the driver looks ahead to the race leader.⁹⁷ These highly poetic uses all operate on a basic level of resisting momentum, gravity or force – of maintaining one's posture despite the opposition of circumstance. The last example especially hammers home the importance of an inherent passivity on the part of the subject in the functioning of the metaphor. Where one would be forgiven that a 'secure' grip on the reins would be tight or firm, instead an '*asphales*' grip is *contrasted* with a taut hold. Where at the start the horses are led with a strong hand, they are later presumably given a measure of 'free reign' without the driver ceding control – they are held with an assured balance, rather than an iron grip.

Notably, the *Odyssey's* use of the concept is far more nuanced – and far less horse related, with the breadth of its uses setting the tone for *asphaleia* in the works of the historians, dramatist and chroniclers of the 4th and 5th centuries. In book thirteen we see another example of sure-footedness, when Odysseus stands firm despite being kicked by an assailant,⁹⁸ but the three other uses in the text are demonstrative of other senses for the *asphales* metaphor that carry on through to the classical period; safe travel, trustworthy speech, and cities free from the ravages of adverse circumstances.

TRAVEL, TALKING, TOWNS

Of the most immediate analogy to falling in a bodily sense is the notion of travelling with '*asphaleia*'. In book thirteen of the *Odyssey*, Odysseus' ship moves 'securely' over the waves – interestingly, the ship is also 'surefooted' (*empadon*), just as the tombstones were in the

⁹⁶ Hom. Il. 17.436

⁹⁷ Hom. Il. 23.325

⁹⁸ Hom. Od. 17.235 All subsequent quotations are taken from the following translation unless otherwise stated. Homer, "*Odyssey*" (Harvard University Press, 1919), <https://doi.org/10.4159/DLCL.homer-odyssey.1919>.

Iliad metaphor. There is a close alliance between surefooted and being ‘unthrown’, however it should also be noted that they remain distinct – one an attribute held by the subject itself (to be surefooted), the other an attribute held by the subject in the context of an external circumstance or actor (*asphaleia*). While being surefooted was an attribute one could gain for themselves, being ‘*asphales*’ expressly required an antithesis – an active force to be secure against. One could be both, but being one did not necessarily make you the other.

The use of the metaphor as an attribute of travel can also be found in later historical works, albeit instead of the oppositional force being the restless sea, it is often the human element. In Herodotus’ *Histories*, a traveller is told to ask the king of the Arabians for ‘secure passage’,⁹⁹ and in Xenophon’s *Hellenica* similar ‘safe conduct’ is assured in numerous places.¹⁰⁰ *Asphaleia* here speaks to the inherent danger of travelling through hostile or uncertain territory – across a stormy sea or through a foreign land. *Asphaleia* still refers to an individual or specific referent (such as a ship), and at least in that way does not depart too far from the original metaphor; what is more interesting to us, however, is the fact that this usage has relaxed the qualifications of the threat. It is less a specific act, the threat posed by the hostile territory or foreign authority instead more general. Through the application to travel, we are starting to get to a notion of *asphaleia* that speaks less to a specific instance of threat, and more to a provision against threat as a hypothetical force in itself.

Another use for the concept in the *Odyssey* is in speaking about speaking itself – in describing speech, speakers and the ideas they propound. In 8.171 we see Odysseus mistaken for a low born sailor, dismissed on account of his appearance by a handsome but (at least in Odysseus’ view) arrogant young man. By way of reply, Odysseus says;

⁹⁹ Hdt. 4.33. All subsequent quotations are taken from the following translation unless otherwise stated. Herodotus, “The Persian Wars,” trans. A. D. Godley (Harvard University Press, 1920), https://doi.org/10.4159/DLCL.herodotus-persian_wars.1920.

¹⁰⁰ Xen. Hell. 2.2.2, 5.2.6, 5.4.11. All subsequent quotations are taken from the following translation unless otherwise stated. Xenophon of Athens, “Hellenica,” trans. Carleton L. Brownson (Harvard University Press, 1918), https://doi.org/10.4159/DLCL.xenophon_athens-hellenica.1918.

“Stranger, you have not spoken well; you seem like a man blind with folly. So true is it that the gods do not give gracious gifts to all alike, not form, nor mind, nor eloquence. For one man is inferior in looks, but the god sets a crown of beauty upon his words, and men look upon him with delight, and he speaks on *unfalteringly* with sweet modesty, and is conspicuous among the gathered people, and as he goes through the city men gaze upon him as upon a god. Another again is in looks like the immortals, but no crown of grace is set about his words. So also in your case your looks are preeminent, nor could a god himself improve them, but in mind you are stunted....”¹⁰¹

The inference of *asphales* in this passage is not immediately clear – certainly speaking with *asphales* is desirable, and Odysseus is obviously suggesting that such speech is fit for a man that would be seen ‘as a god’ by his fellow citizens.

We get a clearer picture when we contrast the passage to the other great foundation of ancient Greek literature, Hesiod. Writing about the same time as Homer (around 750 BCE), Hesiod gives an account of the blessings the Muses grant princes upon their birth;

“Whomever among Zeus-nourished kings the daughters of great Zeus honour and behold when he is born, they pour sweet dew upon his tongue, and his words flow soothingly from his mouth. All the populace look to him as he decides disputes with straight judgments; and speaking publicly *without erring*, he quickly ends even a great quarrel by his skill.”¹⁰²

Both texts use the phrase ‘ὁ δ’ ἀσφαλῆως ἀγορεύων’ – to speak publically in an ‘*asphales*’ manner - as an attribute of rulers, however Hesiod provides a clearer picture of what that looks like. Faced with a quarrel amongst the people, Hesiod’s prince can form a judgement, speak it to the people and end the dispute through the security of his words. The

¹⁰¹ Hom. Od. 8.171.

¹⁰² Hes. Th. 77. All subsequent quotations are taken from the following translation unless otherwise stated. Hesiod, “Theogony,” trans. Glenn W. Most (Harvard University Press, 2007), <https://doi.org/10.4159/DLCL.hesiod-theogony.2007>.

oppositional force in this use of the metaphor is interesting, in the sense that it is a compounding of another struggle – it is not the struggle between the people that gives the metaphor meaning, but the resistance of being involved in the struggle that the prince is defending against. For Hesiod and Homer, then, ‘secure speech’ is speech that risks being contentious, but succeeds in being accepted regardless of the dangers it may face.

This notion of secure speech carried throughout the classical period. In his *Memorabilia*, written around 371 BCE, the philosopher and historian Xenophon references specifically Homer’s use of ‘secure speech’ when describing how the great philosopher Socrates expounded the truth of a matter so clearly.¹⁰³

In so doing, Xenophon gives Socrates’ reading of the Odyssey passage above, in which the notion of ‘secure speech’ is affirmed and expanded. The basis of the Homeric tale is affirmed, in the sense that a secure speaker is one that speaks on a contentious topic but is ‘believed’ by their audience, however the idea is taken further in the sense that Xenophon’s Socrates also gives a practical directive on how this would occur. The ‘security’ of Odysseus’ speech (and by extension Socrates’) is found in their ability to lead the discussion from truth to truth.

It is unsurprising to find that the idea of ‘rhetorical wrestling’ would be carried over to classical Athens when we consider the political and legal construction of the city-state. Run by a participatory democracy in which political decisions were argued in an open forum, Athens required rhetoric to operate; issues were raised, debated and voted on amongst sometimes *thousands* of voters.

Further, rhetoric was hugely important to the justice system of Athens.¹⁰⁴ Compared to modern notions of litigation, Athens had no ‘criminal’ courts, nor did it have judges; instead,

¹⁰³ Xen. Mem. 4.6.14-19. All subsequent quotations are taken from the following translation unless otherwise stated. Xenophon of Athens, “*Memorabilia*” (Harvard University Press, 2013), https://doi.org/10.4159/DLCL.xenophon_athens-memorabilia_2013.2013.

¹⁰⁴ Jennifer Tolbert-Roberts, *Athens on Trial* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); James A Colaiaco, *Socrates Against Athens* (New York: Routledge, 2001).

all cases before Athenian courts were 'civil', in the sense that they were prosecuted by private individuals against their peers, rather than by the state against alleged perpetrators. Private Citizens had to accuse others of criminal liability, and once approved by the bureaucracy, the case would be heard before the court. Lacking a distinction between judge and jury, the case would be decided by *five hundred* private citizens, with the group first voting on guilt, and then if guilty, voting on one of two proposed punishments. Rhetoric was decisive at every stage in this process, from successfully having the case heard, to prosecuting the case, to appealing for a specific sentence. Thus 'rhetorical wrestling' and 'safe speaking' was a crucial part not only of Athenian political decision-making, but of legal proceedings as well.

BEYOND INDIVIDUALS – SECURITY AND THE THEATRE

Given the nature of relationship between individual citizens, the public life they shared, and the political decisions of the Athenian state, such 'security' of speech was of huge importance to Athenian political life; as such, *asphaleia* could also be applied to the wider *politeia*, to the state as a whole. While in its original wrestling context *asphaleia* dealt with two individuals, once the word found its way into socio-political speech the scope of its application changed. Employed in this way, the metaphor of 'slipping up' - and the maintenance of surefootedness, despite obstacles - was taken as an effective term not just for the circumvention of uncertainties caused by the actions of another, but for the avoidance of slipping up because of the repercussions of any act antithetical to the referent.

In the earliest extant Greek literature, the word was awarded to the only *politeia* that could claim to be truly secure – that of Olympus itself, the home of the gods. Homer ascribes the 'unfalling' attribute to the heavenly community in the *Odyssey*,¹⁰⁵ detailing how the lofty peak of Olympus was cloudless, sunny and free from concerns of inclement weather. Hesiod goes one step further, prescribing the notion to the foundational nature of the earth itself; the secure basis for all.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ Hom. Od. 6.42

¹⁰⁶ Hes. Th. 117, 128

Another good source of this sort of corporate security comes from Athenian theatre. We can see this metaphor at work in one of the earliest extant Greek tragedies; Sophocles gives us a fine example in *Oedipus Tyrannus*, written sometime around 429 BC. In the opening scene, a priest exhorts Oedipus, king of Thebes, to save the city from a disease epidemic. He urges his ruler:

“Let us not remember of your reign that we were first restored and then cast down: lift this state so that it **falls no more!**”¹⁰⁷

While the shift from individuals under bodily threat to states under circumstantial threats is easy to see, it is important to recognise the subtle shift this signifies in the word’s focus. In its individual foci of wrestling and public discourse, *asphaleia* is still very much privative; the focal point of the word is the act being negated, the throw being neutralised or lie being dismissed. In this sense, the word is equally shared by both the ‘thrower’ and ‘throwee’, and the term itself is as transient as the act; both the aggressor/speaker and the defender/listener are required, and the ‘security’ is determined in relation to an interaction between the two agents.

However this specificity is absent in the exhortation of Oedipus’ priest. Obviously the ‘aggressor’ in this instance is not an actor but a circumstance, and as such the concept is no longer ‘shared’ by the aggressor and defender – the aggressor in this case has no intentionality or agency to claim the act in the first place. This matters because it shifts *asphaleia* from being a response to the act of an aggressor, and instead makes it wholly an attribute of the defender. While this usage of *asphaleia* is still the efforts of a beleaguered

¹⁰⁷ Line 50. Jebb translation. In the greek text, the word used for ‘cast down’ – πεσόντες, (*pesontes*) – is a different word entirely from the root word of security - ‘to fall’, σφαλλω (*sphallo*). Whilst I lack the background to make the claim conclusively, I would like to think that this would suggest that *asphaleia* was a self-contained concept at the time, and that Sophocles and his audience were well aware of the metaphor that sat at its heart. Interestingly (or perhaps understandably) while the first section of the line is routinely translated in broadly analogous terms, there seems to be some confusion about whether *asphaleia* is a continuation of the falling metaphor in the text, or as security/safety. Mulroy renders as “set the city right!”, however Storr has it as “Uplift us, build our city on a rock.” Greene cuts a path through the middle, “Raise up our city, save it and raise it up.” Sophocles, *Oedipus Trilogy*, trans. Francis Storr (Auckland, N.Z.: Floating Press, 1912). ProQuest Ebook Central.

agent faced with an antithesis, we can see the first glimmer of the concept becoming untethered from the specificities of a particular act, and instead standing as a condition, a constant state of affairs.

It is important to remember, however, that while the uncoupling of the term from a specific act liberated it from limitations imposed by speaking only of two combative actors, the notion of an oppositional force remained absolutely necessary to the central metaphor of the term. While it could express a condition enjoyed by a single actor, whether famine or invading forces, *asphaleia* was something enjoyed in the face of an opposing possibility.

The *asphaleia* from Oedipus speaks much more closely to our modern notion of security than the other uses that have preceded it, however it is still not quite the concept upon which political theory and international relations find their basis. The priest of Zeus speaks of the collective 'city' in a passive context, rather than resisting the machinations of another actor, and as such while we could see this *asphaleia* as security in the sense of 'national security', we would be harder pressed to extrapolate from its use the sort of 'security' that forms the basis of international relations.

While the Sophoclean usage appeals to an understanding of security as a state of affairs that one would seek to maintain against a sort of threat, it falls short of modern notions of *activity*. Not only is the city beset by circumstance (rather than a strict IR realist notion of hostility), but it is also passive in its plight – Oedipus the tyrant must act to secure the city, it is not the city acting for itself. The wrestling bout is between Oedipus and the circumstances of the city, performed on the city's behalf to restore to it a condition of stability. This stands in contrast to a bout between the city and its problems, and certainly not the city and its rivals; where in the former case security remains a passive attribute, in the latter cases it could be seen as an active condition in which actions achieved a certain state.

This extensive exegesis on the Sophoclean passage is important not simply because of the details of the word's usage within the text, but because of its direct relevance to the Athenian audience to which it was delivered. The play was first presented to the public in 429 BCE, only the year after Athens had become gripped by a plague epidemic that would

last for four years. It would be unthinkable to assume that the devastating circumstances the city was enduring would not be transposed to the events unfolding on the stage – that the call for *asphaleia* for Thebes would not resonate as a call for the same for Athens. Such would suggest that at least in the rather more prosaic setting of the theatre, the cogency of the metaphor and its relevance to such a situation would not be lost on the audience.

It was certainly cogent enough to be repeated a decade later in Aristophanes' comedy *Birds*, which premiered in 414 BCE. In the play, two Athenians fed up with the politics of Athens search for the king of the birds in the hope of escaping their life in the city. Upon finding the kingdom of the birds, one of the friends inadvertently presents to the bird-king an idea – to let the birds no longer fly on a whim, but instead to channel their efforts to build a city in the sky. The Athenian then creates from scratch a tenuous mythology in which the birds were once a great force to justify the act, and argues that such a move would allow the birds to sit above the human world, as well as blockade the realm of the gods from the earth, essentially starving the gods into submission and reclaiming their deserved place in the cosmos.

The bird king declares the plan to be a stroke of genius, and hurries the two men to stand before the birds themselves and pitch the idea. Initially the presentation doesn't go as planned – once the birds find out that the king has brought humans to the event, they fly into a rage; speaking to humans is forbidden, and the king has placed them all in jeopardy by bringing them. The king manages to convince them to hear the proposal, however, claiming that what the men have thought of would do much good work for the birds' 'common security' (κοινὸν ἀσφαλῆ).¹⁰⁸

Beyond being a corporate application of the term, again the political situation of Athens is at play in the value of the turn of phrase to the audience. Only two years earlier, despite being under terms of truce with Sparta, Athens had subjugated the island of Melos, ancestrally tied to the Spartans, but officially a neutral state throughout the Peloponnesian war. Using

¹⁰⁸ Aristoph. *Birds* 316. All subsequent quotations are taken from the following translation unless otherwise stated. Aristophanes, "Birds," trans. Jeffrey Henderson (Harvard University Press, 2000), <https://doi.org/10.4159/DLCL.aristophanes-birds.2000>.

its naval power, the Athenians besieged the island, starving it for at least six months before the island kingdom was subdued – the Athenians slaughtered all the adult males, and sold the women and children into slavery.¹⁰⁹ The Athenians then set their sights on another colonial asset, the city of Syracuse. But while Melos had been a relatively minor conquest, Syracuse was a much larger prize, and despite launching a prodigiously large force for the expedition, the attempt ended in abject failure in 413 BCE.

As with Oedipus' plight resonating with current events, it would be hard for audiences to remove the actions of the birds to starve the gods into submission, given under direction of men of Athens, from recent events. The irony of the politically disenfranchised Athenians portrayed in the play, sick of the constant bickering and arguments (such as those discussing the decision to invade Syracuse) appealing to a public congregation of birds for the arbitrary expansion of their hegemony was not lost on the audience. Aristophanes plays this social analogy off against the fantasy it conjures, ending the story just as fanciful as the world of birds it inhabits. By the conclusion of the performance, the more vocal of the Athenians claims the sceptre of Zeus, as well as his mistress, *Basileia* – sovereignty, or authority of law – who it is said in the play is the real source of Zeus' power. Watching the once apolitical and utopian protagonist leave the realm of the real and ascend to a fantasy world in which he becomes lord of all through thinly justified conquest, it is safe to assume that many Athenians looked on with a healthy dose of social self-reflection; indeed it is telling that while one of the two Athenians in the play becomes ruler of the cosmos, the other leaves in disgust once he realises the disturbing ramifications of their hastily hatched plan and the hypocrisy in instigating it.

It is for this reason that the initial declaration of the Bird King that the act would be for the 'security' of the birds is of import to us – given the congruity between the events of the play and the actions of Athens, the manner in which the concept is invoked give us an insight into its value. The concept as used in Aristophanes' play is on a basic level much the same as the Sophoclean usage - security here is a passive attribute that the Bird King ascribes to the

¹⁰⁹ In the play, the example of Melos is used directly by the Athenians as an example of what the new bird city could achieve against the Olympians, blockading the sacrifices sent to the gods from the earth. (186)

kingdom of the birds, it is something affected by circumstance but not an act or circumstance unto itself. Further than simply demonstrating that the metaphor could be applied to a corporate application as Sophocles had done, Aristophanes also gives the impression that the term had some value in public political rhetoric. In the play the Athenians have already convinced the bird king of the plan, but as the bird king stands before the common birds he must convince them to listen to the idea presented by the humans (which they fear). That the king opens his exhortation to his fearful subjects with the appeal to security is likely telling of the force of the idea in Athens at the time; that the plan ends in hostile action and a degradation in the quality of both the bird kingdom's political situation and the friendship of the two Athenians is likely telling of how the rhetoric of security could be abused.

Placed against our appreciation of the Sophoclean usage of the term, this abuse is plainly apparent, offering us a view of *asphaleia* that confirms its meaning through its ironic use. Where Thebes is beset by a genuine antithesis, the birds create their own antithesis; basically, the Bird-King's choice of words are part of the greater political satire. His call for security stands hand in hand with the extensive mythology their new human advisor makes in regards to the bird's fall from primacy, as well as the subsequent abuse of the bird's superior circumstantial position for the sake of their own edification (and the profit of their new leader). Aristophanes' politically relevant comedy thus suggests to us that the metaphor of *asphaleia* was not only politically valuable, but that its value was such that it could be co-opted, extended and abused.

In this way, Aristophanes' play is not simply relevant in that it demonstrates the political value of *asphaleia*; it is in a very real way an indicator of the capacity for securitization present within Ancient Athens. Both the specific words of Aristophanes' Bird King referenced above, as well as the overall plan introduced and executed by the Athenians are examples of securitization. In the former, the executive power of the Bird King allows an exceptional act (allowing humans to speak to the congregation), however the act is successfully justified to the audience through the lens of 'security'. More fundamentally, the play as a whole can be seen as a statement on securitization as it is commonly understood today; a narrative of threat and necessity is created to justify an exceptional case, with all

subject to (the ultimately successful) appeal to the audience for acceptance. The birds accept a fundamental change in the political life of their kingdom on the basis of a narrative presented to them by their king and his new advisors – a narrative that operates as the Bird King said, on the basis of ‘common security’.

As we will see, *Birds* is not the only extant example of securitization within Classical Athens – Thucydides will give us a far less fantastic example. The fact that such examples exist should not come as too much of a surprise; given the corporate decision-making present in Athens at the time, the mechanisms required for a securitizing act – namely a securitizing actor, an audience, an a referent threat – were all readily available. If anything, the existence of securitization in ancient Athens demonstrates a conceptual proximity between the *asphaleia* of the ancient period and the security of modern liberal states; regardless of the shift in technology, scope and scale, issues of a state’s constitution (their governance and the involvement or role of the populace especially) are key contributors to how security can be used and expressed.

However the ancient Greek experience of securitization also brings into the sharpest possible contrast the relationship between words and act, and the importance of that relationship within political security. While we have seen (and will continue to see over the next chapter) that the role of *asphaleia* is largely congruous with modern notions of security, the terms themselves and the mode of their operation are markedly different. This difference provides avenues for understanding elements of the *concept* of security that might be obscured by the term used to denote it; in this case, the applicability of *asphaleia* to rhetoric and truth being exceptionally poignant. Understanding *asphaleia*, especially as it is explored by Aristophanes (and later, as we will see, Thucydides) is to appreciate the link between speaking the truth, identifying the truth, and realising that truth in the political realm.

While the term could be used to describe a state of affairs (such as in Sophocles’ play), Aristophanes highlights the link between speaking with *asphaleia*, and the practical realisation of *asphaleia*; of security as a policy rather than just an ideal. Within a demos like

Athens, 'secure speech' was not simply instrumental in deciding what course policy should take, it was fundamental in deciding whether a policy would live and breathe at all. Put another way, the security of speech could decide the security of the state not simply on the basis of its ability to enact a policy, but in its capacity to create the need for the policy in the first place. In this way, the two seemingly different forms of *asphaleia* – that of rhetoric, and that of politics – were essentially connected; a connection that goes beyond notions of political spin or rhetoric, but to the construction of threat, of action and of necessity.

Security need not be decided by circumstance, says Aristophanes – instead it can be imagined into truth through assent. In short, security must itself be spoken securely – the *asphaleia* of state is subject to the *asphaleia* of rhetoric; further, in this way the speaking of security can bring *insecurity* if performed uncritically, through brash action, wasted resources or created enmity. In this way we can see a critique of security itself within Aristophanes' commentary; the transposition of the ideal of security into the political space can be an exercise in fantasy - the risk must be real, or the security we have construed is a risk in itself. Exactly how poignant this critique was (at least, in the view of Thucydides) will be seen later on, but to foreshadow somewhat, it is worthwhile considering the response of the Melians to the Athenian justification of the same sort of conquest portrayed in Aristophanes' play. As the Athenians justify their conquest on the basis of gaining security by impressing their power on the strategic space,¹¹⁰ the Melians respond;

“How can you avoid making enemies of all existing neutrals who shall look at our case and conclude from it that one day or another you will attack them? And what is this but to make greater the enemies that you have already, and to force others to become so who would otherwise have never thought of it?”¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ Thuc. 5.97. All subsequent quotations are taken from the following translation unless otherwise stated. Thucydides, Richard Crawley, and Robert B Strassler, *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War : A Newly Revised Edition of the Richard Crawley Translation with Maps, Annotations, Appendices, and Encyclopedic Index*, 2008.

¹¹¹ Thuc. 5.98

While the kingdom of the birds enjoyed success, Thucydides suggests that the ‘security’ of Athens suffered the fate the Melians forewarned of. On its second (and far more ambitious) campaign against a neutral state, Athens was not only crushed militarily, but it lost the support of many smaller states in the region. Other neutral states, as well as allies of Athens declared against the nation that had demonstrated its contempt for the regional commons, and the weight of the great war fought alone dragged Athens to an overall defeat.¹¹²

CONCLUSION

The above texts – from Hesiod and Homer to the theatrical and historical usages of the 5th century – give us feel for the wide breadth of use that *asphaleia* enjoyed in Athenian use both in the centuries leading up to and contemporary with Thucydides writing his report of the events of the Peloponnesian war, 431-401 BC. Starting with the notion of wrestling, the idea of stabilisation in the face of an oppositional force came to be applied to those resisting the will of others outside the wrestling arena, then to safety in travel, to rhetoric, and to the circumstances of a city. The oppositional force remained key to the experience and application of *asphaleia*, however in the case of a polity that force could be beyond the realm of intentionality – to disease, to the weather, or to an even more nebulous construction of possibilities.

Interestingly, Thucydides himself uses the term in all of these ways himself; for avoiding a fall, for safe travels, for trustworthy speech or conduct, and for the safety of a polity. However it is for a different usage of *asphaleia* that he is held in such esteem by modern political theorists; one that on face value combines the notion of the wrestling arena with that of the wellbeing of a polity, but as this thesis argues, has a far more nuanced construction. In comparing Thucydides’ usage and positioning his work within the context of Athenian literature both thematically and lingually, we can reconstruct the underlying concept that the word invoked and how that concept related to the political environment that Thucydides was writing both from and to.

¹¹² Thuc. 8.2

In so doing, we will also be unlocking a major piece of the puzzle in our own time. Not only is the work of Thucydides crucial to the mythology and history of western political theory, but we will also have the opportunity to compare and contrast our own notion of security – whatever it may be – to a concept that has obvious congruence and appeal to academics and statesmen. As part of our attempt to see beyond the consensus/contestability nexus, by better appreciating how *asphaleia* operated in classical Athens, we can gain important clues regarding the purpose the word serves for us today. Beyond being hugely influential as a historian and historical figure, Thucydides has been routinely expressed as part of the tradition of Security studies, strategic studies,¹¹³ and International relations,¹¹⁴ as well as being read closely by influential figures of the 20th century.¹¹⁵ The use of Thucydides in these modern settings is testament to the richness of the work and the value his writings have continued to hold throughout the ages, however if we fail to appreciate the nuances of Thucydides' *asphaleia* compared to our modern use of security, we may fail to appreciate the true value of this important work.

¹¹³ Theodore George Tsakiris, "Thucydides and Strategy: Formations of Grand Strategy in the History of the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404 B.C.)," *Comparative Strategy* 25, no. 3 (June 1, 2006): 173–208, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495930600956195>.

¹¹⁴ Laurie M. Johnson Bagby, "The Use and Abuse of Thucydides in International Relations," *International Organization* 48, no. 1 (1994): 131–53.

¹¹⁵ Perhaps the most famous example of this would be Woodrow Wilson, who not only lectured on the work as a university professor, but also was said to have read the text on his way to the negotiations at Versailles in 1919 Tsakiris, "Thucydides and Strategy: Formations of Grand Strategy in the History of the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404 B.C.)."

CHAPTER FOUR

SECURITY IN THUCYDIDES

As it stands, the concept of not-falling appears to be one that greatly appealed to Thucydides as a commentator and theorist. *Asphales* and *asphaleia* are used throughout the text in all the key senses listed above, as well as applied to some novel usages and contexts, the most famous of which gives rise to the fundamental importance of the text itself to modern notions of security. This raises the fundamental rationale for the current task of re-examining the Peloponnesian history; the concept at the core of the Melian dialogue is not held there exclusively, and as such we must appreciate the full gamut of inference open to the concept that permeates it. The value of *asphaleia* on some level transcends the grand game of state power for Thucydides, and we must discover how, why, and to what degree if we are to properly understand the passage, and the Greek legacy to security more generally.

As such, we can hope to glean some more insight into the precision of our modern reading of the ‘security dilemma’ articulated by Thucydides through a reengagement with the term in the wider text – we are essentially refocussing the security dilemma into an *asphaleia* dilemma. This is not so much to problematize or reinforce any modern claims, but rather to appreciate the role of the metaphor to the dilemma presented by Thucydides, and thus interrogate the degree to which the metaphor might speak to the unacknowledged consensus that modern theory is faced with.

As briefly stated above, many of the uses of the metaphor within Thucydides’ text are straightforward applications that sit in line with earlier and contemporary texts. On the most basic level, despite the clash of states we typically ascribe to Thucydides, we see that *asphaleia* could also be realised by lightly equipped soldiers wearing a shoe only on one foot to prevent them from slipping in the mire,¹¹⁶ by well-prepared and protected travellers¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶ Thuc. 3.22

¹¹⁷ Thuc. 8.39, 8.41

or by speakers attempting to methodically argue to convince their audience.¹¹⁸ While these uses reinforce the underlying concept of *asphaleia* and its tradition of use in Greek literature, it is worth noting that there are few examples in the *History* that lend themselves to such a clean demarcation. Given the extremely specific area of focus that the *History* has – on the political considerations instrumental to domestic conflicts within states, as well as the conflict between states – identifying any particular use of the concept as neatly slipping up, traveling safely over and against a specifically political use is problematic.

This dynamic is not so much a problem as simply an added layer of consideration – indeed, the political nature of the work is precisely what lends it to modern readership and relevance, as well as makes it the premier text for this study, concentrating on political use as it does. With that in mind, appreciating the prevalence of a political dimension to the traditional metaphorical applications does not diminish the groundwork we have laid in regards to the Homeric and theatrical uses, but rather gives the opportunity to identify the ways in which the more conventional uses might have been useful in interpreting the political concerns expressed in the text.

COMPETING VOICES

There are two other considerations that must be made in dissecting Thucydides' work in this way - both can be easily illustrated by considering a use in regards to a city that at first glance seems a straightforward appeal to the sense given in Sophocles;

“Yet you who are still of an age to beget children must bear up in the hope of having others in their stead; not only will they help you to forget those whom you have lost, but will be to the state at once a reinforcement and a **security**; for never can a fair or just policy be expected of the citizen who does not, like his fellows, bring to the decision the interests and apprehensions of a father.”¹¹⁹

¹¹⁸ Thuc. 1.37

¹¹⁹ Thuc. 2.43. Also to note here is that Pericles specifically states ‘father’ – the decision-making of women was of no relevance to the Athenian polis. Women were barred from the assemblies where decisions were made, from holding office, they were excluded from courts of law, and could not vote. Indeed, Athenian women were expected to limit themselves to their domestic life – being seen in public, or interacting with men outside the family was considered scandalous. (William J. O’Neal, “The Status of Women in Ancient Athens,” *International*

This quote is taken from Thucydides' account of Pericles' famous funeral oration, in which the leader of the Athenian polis extolls the city's virtues and acknowledges its challenges at a mass funeral for the victims of plague. Beyond being an example of the sort of the Sophoclean use of *asphaleia*, it also gives us a glimpse of some additional considerations that the *History* requires; considerations that will in the end be crucial to our final conclusions of how it was that Thucydides' *asphaleia* operated. Firstly, we must remember that unlike the decidedly more matter-of-fact chronicling of history that dominates today, Thucydides was, as a writer, willing and able to dramatize the events he sought to record. In the case of the above, he delivers the details of Pericles' speech through a reconstruction in which the words are not simply ascribed to Pericles in the third person, but are given in the text as if from Pericles himself.

This is no minor detail, as it introduces into our study the idea that in some instances Thucydides may not be using the word as he personally would see fit, but rather in a way he ascribes to another. The text is rife with monologues and debates perpetrated by envoys, diplomats, statesmen and generals from across the Greek world, and as such it is important that in our study of the metaphor of *asphaleia* we monitor the many voices present in the text for any trends or differences.

The second consideration Pericles' oration highlights is the notion of audience – just as the speaker will likely affect the choice of words in the text, so too will the audience. In the above case, Pericles' core claim to how Athens will realise security is through the strength

Social Science Review 68, no. 3 (1993): 115–21.) As such, where we refer to 'citizens' or Athenian politics generally, we are strictly speaking about Athenian male citizens.

Interestingly, the laws and expectations around female 'metics' – legal resident aliens – were notably more generous. Such women could not only act in court, but could instigate legal action (both rights Athenian women did not have). Also, while Athenian women were likely educated in the keeping of the house, (ibid.) high-class courtesans in Athens (often drawn from the *Metics* were expected to be highly educated and erudite. (Apollodoros and K. A Kapparis, *Against Neaira* (Berlin; Hawthorne, N.Y.: Walter de Gruyter, 1999), 6, <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110809862>.) It would seem that whatever reason Athenian men had for excluding the political efforts of women were, they did not extend such expectations to all women.

Ultimately, regardless of the reason for the exclusion of women in Athens, we must remember that the construction of the Athenian polis – as the construction of Athenian 'security' – is a masculine affair.

and sobriety of decision-making that a man invested with the interests of a child will bring to public discourse. Regardless of the details of the plague or other current events, it is important that in broad strokes we keep in our minds the audience context across the different audiences present in Thucydides work; it is unlikely, for example, that a citizen of a state in which political decisions were invested in a small group of individuals rather than the wider population would have found much value in Pericles' words, and especially not in the need or value of the sort of '*asphaleia*' that would have been realised by sound public decision-making.

The notion of audience is a complicated one in the case of Thucydides not only because specific orations are likely written with a degree of deference to their audience, but because ultimately that audience is unlikely to be the audience of the work itself, a fact of which Thucydides was acutely aware given that his stated goal was the documentation of an event he saw as being of great importance to the world and history¹²⁰ Thucydides did not leave us with any methodology or explanation for how these different audiences might be managed in the voice of the text – to what degree any given passage might attempt to stay true to its original audience, and to what degree it might change to ensure its relevance to its new one – however this does not excuse us from ignoring the tension the text presents.

ATHENIAN USAGE

The above example of Pericles using *asphaleia* as a state of affairs for the nation gained by certain acts or attributes is, as we will see, the touchstone example of the notion of 'security' that the political environment of Athens strove for, however it is not the only example of the metaphor Athenians could find. Of all the speakers in Thucydides' work, it is the Athenians that have the widest breadth of use. In one passage detailing the Athenian debate regarding whether to launch an invasion of Syracuse, the general Nicias reluctantly appraises how many ships would be required to make the expedition 'secure'.¹²¹ In another

¹²⁰ Thuc. 1.1

¹²¹ Thuc. 6.24

passage, the same general speculates as to the most '*asphales*' way to report the failure of the expedition to the Athenian assembly,¹²² weighing up the benefits and detriments of being honest in his account of the war and the reception of the message by the audience. In the case of Nicias, we see two uses on the cusp of the traditional (travel and rhetoric), but in the case of both a political or military flavour permeates.

A moderate aristocrat, Nicias uses *aspahleia* in largely 'traditional' ways, generally following notions of travel and debate; however the political dimension of Athenian use is on full display in the various orations of the envoys and archons that address the people of Athens and the envoys and rulers of other nations. Of special note are two dialogues between the representatives of the Athenians and their soon-to-be enemies; the address of the Euphemus to the Sicilian colonies, and the more famous Melian dialogue. In both, the Athenian orators use the word liberally, the context often settling in familiar territory for modern scholars and politicians, betraying a conception of Athenian foreign policy and their notion of how their country's actions fit within a strategic context.

The importance of the Melian dialogue to western conceptions of security has already been well established, as has the importance of remembering that the dilemma the dialogue typified was not a 'security' dilemma in the terms of Thucydides, but rather one of *asphaleia*. This is not simply a matter of replacing one word for a more appropriate ancient analogue, but rather a justifiable consideration of the word as it is employed in the text – as we will see, the concept of *asphaleia* is clearly identified as the driving force in Athenian actions, as well as a source of appeal for the Melians. Before we see just how *asphaleia* guides the dialogue, though, it is also important for us to do some historical housekeeping in regards to the text to ensure that we can properly appreciate the term and the setting in which it was used.

The contemporary issues surrounding the Athenian siege of Melos were touched on in the previous section in our discussion of Aristophanes' *Birds* – Athens had essentially taken initiative during a time of relative peace to subjugate a neutral state through blockade and

¹²² Thuc. 7.14

the threat of invasion, however they found that the Melians were less enthusiastic to declare Athenian hegemony than they anticipated. The dialogue presented by Thucydides takes place as the Athenian fleet first arrives on the island and demands the Melians subject themselves, with the two sides discussing at length the merits of forced subjection and peaceful neutrality.

Of note, however, is that while much of Thucydides' history is likely a dramatized account based on second hand accounts, the facticity of the Melian dialogue is likely even more tenuous. By Thucydides' own admission the meeting occurred in a closed session away from the general public and the few Melians present were later besieged and subsequently slaughtered, leaving only a small number of Athenian diplomats as being actually witness to any dialogue that took place. To make this plain is not to call into question the event itself, nor to speculate to what degree the events described reflected historical fact, but rather to make plain the issue of attribution – of all the major dialogues or addresses detailed by Thucydides, the Melian dialogue is perhaps the least reliable in regards of its proximity or authority in relation to the events it records, and as such we should take any conclusions regarding the use of language in the passage with an appropriate amount of qualification.

The 'closed' nature of the session is actually the dynamic that gives us the first use of the metaphor in the dialogue. Thucydides claims that the Melians refused to have the Athenian demands received in a public forum lest they manage to use rhetoric to sway the hearts of the common people of Melos, and in response the Athenians suggest to their reluctant hosts that instead of the Athenians presenting their message unchallenged, that the Melians might appreciate a more 'secure' hearing (καθήμενοι ἔτι ἀσφαλέστερον) in which they are free to interrupt and debate the Athenian proposal rather than sit passively.¹²³

This rather traditional usage of the term – an inversion of the notion of speaking 'safely' in regards to the audience – sets the tone of the dialogue to come, however it does not set the tone of the metaphor itself moving forward. Quickly we see the Athenian delegates make plain what they hope to gain from the subjugation of Melos – security – specifically by

¹²³ Thuc. 5.85

making sure that a small independent nation does not 'succeed in thwarting the masters of the sea' and thus challenge the appearance of Athenian hegemony.¹²⁴ Such a use stands comparable to the security of the city as laid out in the theatre of Sophocles and Aristophanes, however in the context of the dialogue the source of that security involves directly another actor. This development is, as we will see, a common feature in the usage of the Athenians in the work, as well as regularly used by the narrator himself.

While the Athenian invocation of *asphaleia* in their rationale for their actions began with their use of the term in the rhetorical sense, it moves (and subsequently remains) in the realm of the political. Upon realising the Melians will not be acquiescing to their demands, the Athenians remark that the Melian leaders obviously '... do not adopt the view that expediency goes with security...' ¹²⁵, instead relying on honour and justice despite the danger such a course poses. For the Athenians, the dialogue culminates in a Melian choice between 'war and security', ¹²⁶ with the Melians choosing the latter.

The Athenian voice in the Melian dialogue seems comfortable in expressing the metaphor of *asphaleia* in both rhetorical and political terms, however these two employments fulfil different functions within the dialogue itself; the first, rhetorical use is an adjective, describing the manner in which the dialogue itself might proceed, whereas the following employments demarcate a state of affairs for the two sides. In these political employments, *asphaleia* stands as the foundational concept of the dialogue from the Athenian point of view; it provides the rationale for Athenian aggression, and forms the binary by which the Melian outcomes are judged. Just as war might be the state of affairs a nation could find itself in, 'security' stands then as the alternative in which the nation is free from its ravages.

Similar uses are present in the Athenian Archon Euphemus's address to the Sicilian cities. As the Athenians arrive to conquer Syracuse, a now independent colony founded by disenfranchised Spartans, the Athenian leader rebuts the Syracusan accusation that Athens

¹²⁴ Thuc. 5.97

¹²⁵ Thuc. 5.107

¹²⁶ Thuc. 5.111

has come purely to conquer Sicily, and exhorts the leaders of other free cities on the Italian peninsula to join with Athens in the invasion of Syracuse - first by reminding the audience that Athens deserves to be hegemonic through past services to the Greek people, and then by appealing (in classical realist terms) that despite their fears and suspicions, they will in time follow the rational interest of their states in working with Athens;

“We make no fine professions of having a right to rule because we overthrew the barbarian single-handed, or because we risked what we did risk for the freedom of the subjects in question any more than for that of all, and for our own: no one can be quarrelled with for providing for his proper **safety**. If we are now here in Sicily, it is equally in the interest of our **security**, with which we perceive that your interest also coincides. We prove this from the conduct which the Syracusans cast against us and which you somewhat too timorously suspect; knowing that those whom fear has made suspicious, may be carried away by the charm of eloquence for the moment, but when they come to act follow their interests.”¹²⁷

As well as the above, it should be noted that once again the Athenian voice claims that their outward expansion is in the interests of their own ‘security’, and as with the Melians (albeit in far less forceful terms) invite other Sicilian cities to join in that security both in the above, and again later in the address.¹²⁸

While all this may seem in-line with modern concepts of security (and certainly in broad strokes, it is), on a finer level this usage raises an interesting question. Given *asphales*’ beginning as a wrestling metaphor and its conceptual core as a statement of antithetical forces, in what way is the absence of war ‘*asphales*’? Where our modern term is based on the Latin term ‘*securitas*’ (literally ‘care-lessness’, being free from concerns), the Athenian conception of being ‘secure’ in the political space instead seems to nominate a state of affairs where the cares are still present, but are instead resisted, balanced or maintained in relation to each other. This difference might seem minor in the sense that both words fill

¹²⁷ Thuc. 6.83

¹²⁸ Thuc. 6.87

the same 'space' with a concept that on face value performs the same function, however despite sharing a paradigm, the signature of each term suggests politically relevant differences. In one, the cause of concern, danger or threat is removed or ignored (and carelessness is achieved); in the other, danger or threat is not removed, but accounted for and actively managed.

The difference between removing threats and managing them has been the focus of debate within security studies in recent years,¹²⁹ and while the Greek context has light to shed on that debate, for our purposes now it is enough to highlight that the Athenian term was focussed on the maintenance and management of danger rather than the removal or destruction of that danger.¹³⁰ This focus has been demonstrated inasmuch as the metaphor of *asphales* itself has been explored and cited within relevant texts, but this in itself does not answer *why* the term arrived to be used as it did. In order to answer that, and to further the case that the 'why' will resonate with our modern liberal societies, we must turn to the use of the *asphales* metaphor by other Greek states in Thucydides' *History*.

OUTSIDE ATHENS

Given its central role in framing 'security' on the international stage and the primacy of *asphales* to the Athenian acts as expressed in their various addresses, it is interesting to note that those that they address rarely use the word in the same way. The exception to this is the voice of the Syracusan interests at a negotiation preceding the Athenian invasion of Syracuse. In his rhetorical attack on Athenian intentions in Sicily, Hermocrates of Syracuse uses the metaphor twice in the sense of safety and balance in regards to 'foreign affairs';

¹²⁹ This can be largely characterised as the 'security/resilience' dichotomy – see Jon Coaffee and Pete Fussey, "Constructing Resilience through Security and Surveillance," *Security Dialogue* 46, no. 1 (2015): 86–105; Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Mareile Kaufmann, and Kristian Sjøby Kristensen, "Resilience and (in)Security: Practices, Subjects, Temporalities," *Security Dialogue* 46, no. 1 (February 1, 2015): 3–14, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010614559637>.

¹³⁰ Some readers may draw the understandable connection between the emerging difference between 'resilience' and 'security' in post 2001 political theory, however I would see this very debate as indicative of the lack of clarity and thoughtlessness that has surrounded security since the 40's. That *asphaleia* stands as similar to the issues raised by the resilience debate is not indicative of modern theory being on the right track, but instead that we were on the wrong track to start with, and are only now trying to re-evaluate a concept we've taken from granted.

that attacking a common foe with an ally makes the attack more ἀσφαλέστερον, and that the smaller Sicilian states wanting to see Syracuse, the largest of the Italian colonies, humbled might also want Syracuse to survive for the sake of the smaller states' *asphaleia*.¹³¹ The Syracuseans appear in the text only in regards to the Athenian invasion, so there is little more to glean from this aligned usage. However it is worth noting that the city was a perennial democracy, with Thucydides suggesting in a separate section that of all their contemporaries Syracuse was most like Athens in institutions and character; given the political values attached to the usage, this proximity in meaning might well be a function of the political necessities of the city for which it was employed.

In contrast, there is a distinctly rhetorical flavour to much of the uses of the term both as it is employed in dialogues with Athens and on its own terms in speeches by foreign leaders more generally. The Melian reply to the Athenian's rationale, for example, also employs the *asphales* metaphor, though it returns the terms to a rhetorical grounding;

“But do you consider that there is no security in the policy which we indicate? For here again if you debar us from talking about justice and invite us to obey your interest, we also must explain ours, and try to persuade you, if the two happen to coincide.”¹³²

While the response deals with the tenuous strategic and political situation facing the island, the metaphor itself relates not to the tactical situation but to the Melian ability (or possibility) of arguing their case on the terms laid out by the Athenians. Given that there are no other uses of the metaphor by the Melian leaders in the dialogue, such limited and specific use of the term would suggest that the Melians (or at least the Melians of Thucydides' conception) had little use for understanding of or appreciation of the political notion the Athenians relied on so heavily. Given the Melian power structure (which by the nature of the calculations they made regarding the private hearing of the delegates would suggest was at least somewhat oligarchic), and given the fact that Melos was culturally and

¹³¹ Thuc. 6.78

¹³² Thuc. 5.98

financially tied to Sparta, this divide of meaning between the Melians and Athenians, whether manufactured or reflected by Thucydides, could be fairly assumed to have a socio-political core. On this it is worth remembering that the debate between Athens and Melos was itself private expressly so the rulers of Melos could make their deliberations free from the people's awareness – the popular will was something to be avoided, not edified or engaged with.

SPARTA

Early in book two, we get to see the word employed by the Spartan general Brasidas, the audience being the troops under his command. Wishing to both inspire and discipline his troops, Brasidas employs the idea of *asphaleia* three times in his address, with the first two being in quick succession;

“Therefore, numerous as the invading army may appear to be, and **certain** as some may think it that our adversary will not meet us in the field, this is no sort of justification for the least negligence upon the march... Not that confidence is out of place in an army of invasion, but in an enemy's country it should also be accompanied by the precautions of apprehension: troops will by this combination be best inspired for dealing a blow, and **secured** in receiving one.¹³³

Of these two uses, the first is only a small step away from the notions of reliability in speech and thought prevalent in other texts of the period; while there is no overt argument, the *asphales* is expressive of a certainty in a speculation that is ultimately still up for contestation. A similar use is also found in an address given by a Spartan envoy in book four who is seeking to negotiate a treaty with Athens, in which the envoy, once admitting the error of judgement made by the Spartans (expressed in terms of *sphallo*) then claims that sensible men who have *asphales* (perhaps best expressed as ‘reliably think’¹³⁴) are “less

¹³³ Thuc. 2.11.

¹³⁴ Hobbes has “Such wise men as safely reckon”, Jowett says “The wise ensure their own safety”, “Indeed sensible men are prudent”

likely to come to grief” when they are “...not being puffed up by confidence in military success.”¹³⁵

Brasidas here presumably uses the term in a decidedly laconic, almost ironic manner, in the sense that he labels an expectation held by the audience that he rejects as ‘secure’. The second, however, fits closer, on face value at least, with an aspect of ‘security’ we might claim some affinity with – the fostering of strategic capacity. For Brasidas, the first and second use of the metaphor are connected in the sense that the troops’ rejection of the ‘secure’ idea that they will not be challenged by the enemy that is integral to their realisation of ‘security’ in the moment of an attack; that confidence must be tempered with precautions of apprehension, of a readiness for the destabilising antithesis.

It is the third use, delivered at the end of the passage, that illustrates exactly what that precaution of apprehension looks like for Brasidas;

“Considering, therefore, the power of the state against which we are marching, and the greatness of the reputation which, according to the event, we shall win or lose for our ancestors and ourselves, remember as you follow where you may be led to regard discipline and vigilance as of the first importance, and to obey with alacrity the orders transmitted to you; as nothing contributes so much to the credit and **safety** of an army as the union of large bodies by a single discipline”¹³⁶

It is *eunomia* – good order, or discipline – that concerns Brasidas in this context; especially the nexus between disciplined thinking regarding the enemy, and the maintenance of order within the army. Indeed Marchant makes the claim that the core theme of the oration is the beauty of order, with the last phrase κάλλιστον καὶ ἀσφαλέστατον – perhaps better translated as ‘nobility and dependability’, serving as the capstone to the claim.¹³⁷ Being *asphales* in this context would therefore be the practical outcome or benefit to the realisation of certainty through good order and right thinking; by divesting themselves of

¹³⁵ Thuc. 4.18

¹³⁶ Thuc. 2.11

¹³⁷ 2.11, E. C. Marchant, *Commentary on Thucydides* (London: Macmillan & Company, 1891).

‘certain’ expectations and following orders, the troops can realise the twin and complimentary goals of noble thinking and noble behaviour.

Placed against our earlier examination of Pericles’ appeal to security through the measured decision of individuals, we can draw a tentative inference that the uses of Brasidas and the Athenian democrat are in a way antithetical; where Brasidas is challenging the value of individual judgement to maintain the *asphaleia* of the army, Pericles is appealing to individual judgement as a source of *asphaleia* for the city. This is not to suggest that the word *means* different things – ultimately it is still the same metaphor of instability overcome, of a successful management of an antithesis – but rather that the context, speaker and audience might well impact the use and purpose of that metaphor. Just as the Periclean *asphaleia*, asking as it was for individual judgement, might not be realised to an audience in which the common people were not integral to the political process, so too might Brasidas’ idea that a single discipline creates *asphaleia* be incongruous to democrats, or outside the context of an army.

This context is reinforced by other uses in the text; whilst there are no other instances of Spartans using the word, there are several examples of orators addressing Spartans, and these work towards a specific mode of operation for the *asphales* concept – namely the notion of dependability in speech, thought and act. After being defeated by a Spartan-led army, the men of Plataea surrender on the promise of a fair trial regarding the latter’s conduct in the war; however the Spartan judges levelled no concrete charges, instead asking the Plataeans to account for what service, if any, they had done for Sparta in the war. Thucydides then assumes the voice of the defence speech delivered by the Plataean representative who begins by acknowledging the questionable ‘justice’ that such skewed proceedings could achieve, and suggesting that;

“...if we may argue from the fact that no accusation was first brought forward for us to answer, but we had ourselves to ask leave to speak, and from the question being put so shortly, that a true answer to it tells against us, while a false one can be contradicted. In this dilemma, our **safest**, and indeed our only course, seems to be to

say something at all risks: placed as we are, we could scarcely be silent without being tormented by the damning thought that speaking might have saved us.”¹³⁸

Such a use has an air of self-preservation given the circumstances, however this is ultimately an expression along the lines of Homer’s Odysseus – to speak securely. Later in the defence, the metaphor again is employed when the speaker invokes the assistance Plataea rendered Sparta in the Persian war;

“...there were few Hellenes who would set their valor against the strength of Xerxes, and when greater praise was theirs who preferred the dangerous path of honor to the **safe** source of consulting their own interest with respect to the invasion. To these few we belonged”¹³⁹

Again, the metaphor is expressive of a correct line of argument, thinking or act, however the quality of the thinking has ramifications for the state. In this way we can see how the more ‘Odyssean’ use of *asphaleia* might still have political relevance, however ultimately the referent of the phrase is still the reason, rather than the polity itself.

While the speaker in this instance was not a Spartan but a citizen of the democratic Plataea, we could reasonably expect that they would speak (or Thucydides would recreate the address) in terms that would be reflective to Spartan use and sensibilities. This is certainly strengthened by the fact that Thucydides tells us that the citizen chosen to verbally represent the Plataeans was the city’s Spartan *proxenus* – a citizen of one city (in this case Plataea) who is known to be closely allied with, sympathetic to and a practical supporter of the interests and visiting citizens of another city (in this case, Sparta). The speaker, Lacon son of Aeimnestus was certainly aware of Spartan culture, expectations, and their use of language, and we should expect he would use the metaphor in line with these considerations.

¹³⁸ Thuc. 3.53

¹³⁹ Thuc. 3.56

CORINTH

Of all the supporting players in the Peloponnesian war, it is the Corinthians that are the most influential. Large enough to stand on its own terms, but less powerful than either Sparta and Athens, Corinth was in realist terms a strong middle power with no grand power ambitions, but a vested interest in balancing; a stance that in the context of the Peloponnesian war resulted in its pressuring for war to limit the rising Athenian power.

Corinth first uses the metaphor in an address to the Athenians, in which the Corinthians appeal to the sensibilities of the Athenians to refuse an alliance with Corcyra, the enemies of the Corinthians. The Corcyraeans, concerned with a growing Corinthian navy, had sent envoys to Athens to ask for an alliance; the Corinthians, having learned of the envoy's intentions, sent their own to plead the case of Corinth. In the Corinthian reply to the Corcyraean appeal, we see the term used several times. At first, the Corinthians invoke the metaphor in a way largely reminiscent of the classic rhetorical use from Hesiod;

“These Corcyraeans in the speech we have just heard do not confine themselves to the question of their reception into your alliance. They also talk of our being guilty of injustice, and their being the victims of an unjustifiable war. It becomes necessary for us to touch upon both these points before we proceed to the rest of what we have to say, that you may have **a more correct idea** of the grounds of our claim, and have good cause to reject their petition.”¹⁴⁰

However the word is quickly used twice again in a different way, when the Corinthians place their concerns in the context of the inter-state relations between Athens and the two warring nations;

“As to their allegation that they wished the question to be first submitted to arbitration, it is obvious that a challenge coming from the party who is **secure** in a

¹⁴⁰ 1.37. against deception, persuasion. Hobbes has ‘safest demands’ Charles D. Morris, *Commentary on Thucydides Book 1* (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1891).

commanding position, cannot gain the credit due only to him who, before appealing to arms, in deeds as well as words, places himself on a level with his adversary. In their case, it was not before they laid siege to the place, but after they at length understood that we should not tamely suffer it, that they thought of the specious word arbitration. And not satisfied with their own misconduct there, they appear here now requiring you to join with them not in alliance, but in crime, and to receive them in spite of their being at enmity with us. But it was when they **had security**, that they should have made overtures to you, and not at a time when we have been wronged, and they are in peril”¹⁴¹

The above three uses hold within them an interesting gradient; from a rhetorical use, to the prescription of ‘*asphaleia*’ to the state of affairs of a nation in the context of its foreign affairs. In between the two extremes sits the idea of the Corcyraeans’ affairs being judged in a sort of hybridized use – their ‘security’ being a function held both in the context of an arbitration, as well as being a statement on their strategic position as a state within the context of the matter at hand. Such employments fit within the spectrum of the Athenian use of the metaphor for the form and outcome of politics.

However, in a later passage, as the Corinthians (ultimately spurned by the Athenians) petition the Spartans to take up arms against Athens, *asphaleia* appears again in a much more Spartan use. Decrying Sparta’s lack of action, the Corinthians call into question the Spartan identity as defenders of the Hellenic world;

“You, Lacedaemonians, of all the Hellenes are alone inactive, and defend yourselves not by doing anything but by looking as if you would do something; you alone wait till the power of an enemy is becoming twice its original size, instead of crushing it in its infancy. And yet the world used to say that you were to be **depended upon**”¹⁴²

¹⁴¹ Thuc. 1.39

¹⁴² Thuc. 1.69

The Corinthians again use the term when again petitioning the Spartans to commit to war later in the book, at which point they qualify their suggestions with the following;

“The confidence with which we form our schemes is never completely justified in their execution; speculation is carried on in **safety**, but, when it comes to action, fear causes failure.”¹⁴³

While the first use is more direct, both instances speak to the notion of reliability in action, in line with the use of the word by Brasidas in his address to the Peloponnesian troops. Here, the wrestling match is a question of one’s reliability in the face of the threats of circumstance – the actor in question keeping their footing despite the conditions in which they operate.

THE NARRATOR’S VOICE

When speaking in his own voice as the narrator, Thucydides employs the metaphor within the bounds of the traditional functions of rhetoric, travel (especially in regards to naval expeditions)¹⁴⁴ and just plain old slipping over¹⁴⁵ as above, however he could also use the metaphor in regards to the personal bodily safety of individuals. In his account of the Spartan siege of Plataea, Thucydides writes that the defenders constructed earthworks to maintain the ‘security’ of the workers in the city against the missiles of the Spartan forces,¹⁴⁶ later, the deposed oligarchs of Samos search for any way they can to remove themselves from the island in ‘security’ now that their grasp on power has unravelled.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴³ Thuc. 1.120

¹⁴⁴ Thuc. 8.39, 8.41

¹⁴⁵ Thuc. 3.22

¹⁴⁶ Thuc. 2.75

¹⁴⁷ Thuc. 8.89

The term was used strategically – often to describe retreat,¹⁴⁸ though also in terms of a specific location or action being jeopardised by enemy action¹⁴⁹ as well as a policy or action bringing a positive benefit to a certain state of affairs.¹⁵⁰ By far the most common ‘strategic’ use by the narrator, however, speaks to the acquisition (or hope of acquisition) of a position of strength by a specific group of people over another, with the antithetical groups involved in these examples always being citizens of the same city.¹⁵¹ Despite the numerous battles and military engagements, the metaphor is more reliably employed when speaking of the intrigue present within cities on the brink of internal strife, being found in every account of civil unrest found in the text.

In each example it is the democratic and oligarchic factions of the city that serve as the targets of the metaphor; whether the factions are judging when is the best time to strike at their opposition, or are enacting efforts to maintain a favourable position within the city, it is often the notion of *asphaleia* by which we understand their success or failure. In these uses, there seems to be no distinction between the oligarchic and democratic factions as far as their suitability to be described as *asphales*, nor is there constancy in what it is the target is ‘wrestling against’ – in some cases, it is circumstances exterior to the city,¹⁵² sometimes each other directly,¹⁵³ and sometimes it describes the personal safety of the conspirators inasmuch as the competing factions might threaten the lives of those that take part.¹⁵⁴

In what is perhaps his most illuminating use of the metaphor, Thucydides gives as a concrete notion of the term by giving us a perversion of the term; in essence, Thucydides gives an *incorrectly construed notion of asphaleia*. When discussing the horrors of the revolution of Corcyra in 427 BCE, he notes that *asphaleia* was one of several words that ‘changed their meaning’ due to the political climate at the time;

¹⁴⁸ Thuc. 3.105, 7.38, 7.77

¹⁴⁹ Thuc. 7.24

¹⁵⁰ Thuc. 8.1

¹⁵¹ Thuc. 4.68, 4.71, 6.56, 8.24, 8.66

¹⁵² Thuc. 4.71, 8.24

¹⁵³ Thuc. 8.66

¹⁵⁴ Thuc. 6.56, 8.89

“Frantic violence, became the attribute of manliness; *to form a hostile design*, a justifiable means of **self-defence**.”¹⁵⁵

On face value, this subversion of *asphaleia* speaks to a violent state of affairs that maps well to notions present in the contemporary ‘unacknowledged consensus’; one in which instead of securing interests against external factors, one is instead actively pursuing interests at the expense of others. While this is certainly the case in this instance, it is not the only factor at play, something that Thucydides next claim makes clear. After detailing the shift in *asphaleia*, he immediately describes a *rhetorical* environment that would seem to allow this inversion in meaning to materialise;

“The advocate of extreme measures was always trustworthy; his opponent a man to be suspected. To succeed in a plot was to have a shrewd head, to divine a plot a still shrewder; but to try to provide against having to do either was to break up your party and to be afraid of your adversaries.”¹⁵⁶

As such, Thucydides not only gives us an example of how *asphaleia* would be subverted in its direct use, he also shows us how that subversion occurs rhetorically and practically, the circumstances in which it would occur and the social mechanisms that precipitate the change.

In this way, we can see the deeply socio-political value of *asphaleia* as a metaphor to Thucydides, and as much as we can trust his account of the events and intentions of the Corcyreans, the value of the word to those of whom he speaks. Further, we can see how this value speaks to the balance of the polis as an entity – no longer maintaining their own claims within the context of democratic debate (or in terms of the text, to ‘try to provide against’ the need to make or discover plots), the parties in Corcyra instead use, as Marchant

¹⁵⁵ Thuc. 3.82

¹⁵⁶ Thuc. 3.82

puts it in his commentary “the specious pretence of fending off enmity” to justify their actions as being for the sake of *‘asphaleia’*.

While this does not give us an absolute definition of the term (though by now it is clear that just as would be the case today, such a definition does not likely exist), it certainly gives a strong indication as to the values and expectations the metaphor should have held within a stable Corcyra (in Thucydides’ expectations, at least). We can certainly take that the plotting of extreme measures stands against ‘measured’ action in which one would seek to not perpetrate or be the victim of such plots, and given that the subversion of *asphaleia* is the formulation of hostile plots, we can draw a strong link between the absence of such subversion and the ‘right’ meaning of security.

Such a view of *asphaleia* can easily tack to the ancient core of the metaphor – that it is the wrestler who stands firm, not the wrestler who seeks to ground (or in this case, plot to kill) their opponent that is *asphales* – but it also stands in relation to the ‘Athenian’ usage within the text, especially inasmuch as that usage stands as an extension of the Hesiodian use of ‘safe speaking’. The framing of *asphaleia*’s subversion as a term through the public discourse that features it is noteworthy – Thucydides explains the shift in meaning in terms of the political discourse taking place within and between the political parties fighting for control of the polis. Unlike the more Spartan usages in which *asphaleia* is reaching for ‘reliability’ as a positive value against a rather abstract negative, Thucydides here invokes a concept that not only has a distinct political value, but a value that could be reconfigured to suit political needs or goals.

This political aspect can also be seen in Thucydides’ treatment of the oligarchic insurrection on the Isle of Samos. In the opening stages of the saga, when the oligarchs have initially seized control of the island, a common distrust grants the oligarchic conspirators *asphaleia* against the intentions of their democratic opponents;

“Indeed all the popular party approached each other with suspicion, each thinking his neighbour concerned in what was going on, the conspirators having in their ranks persons whom no one could ever have believed capable of joining an oligarchy; and

these it was who made the many so suspicious, and so helped to **procure impunity** for the few, by confirming the commons in their mistrust of one another.”¹⁵⁷

While less direct, the link between political discourse and *asphaleia* is strong here – the concept sits at the nexus between the rhetorical and the practical necessities of political struggle. While the two parties of Samos clash with violent results,¹⁵⁸ the oligarchs ‘procure their impunity’ through the circumstances of the polity; as the two parties wrestle, the numerically weaker oligarchs are confirmed in political and physical safety through a function of public discourse.

In the examples of both Corcyra and Samos, the *asphaleia* metaphor sparks across the gap between the public, political reality and an accompanying physical threat. It is important because it shows the connection between discourse and outcome, it is in a way a final realisation of the metaphor introduced by Hesiod and Homer in which the wrestlers move from the arena to the agora, where being ‘safe’ was a rhetorical rather than a physical reality. Coming full circle, the ‘safety’ that correct speech or thought could realise has a physical manifestation precisely because it is by words and thoughts that the political was created, politics itself being the deciding factor in the physical circumstance of the city-state and those who constituted it.

Secondly, though intimately related to the first, the use of the metaphor in this way clearly shows that in the mind of Thucydides, the two parties involved in these political struggles are the wrestlers that seek *asphaleia*. While such a point might seem obvious (it certainly is on face value) it is important to state in this sense in order to remain cognizant of the fact that such a usage suggests that even in the context of the great game of states and decades of war, Thucydides could further atomize a state.

Put another way, it is important to note that the narrator does not speak about Samos wrestling itself, or gaining security for itself against its turmoil, but rather the political

¹⁵⁷ Thuc. 8.66

¹⁵⁸ Thuc. 8.64-65

parties themselves. While modern readers happily situated in liberal democracies may take this for granted, Thucydides' willingness to do this is important given that the Hellenic world in which he lived (and indeed much of the history of the world before and after his writing) did not give conceptual space to such a notion. The Spartans that supported the oligarchs certainly did not 'enjoy' party politics, nor the monarchic Persians or as we will see, the Romans that came after.

This is important in the sense that it suggests a difference in how words are used in the political space depending on how those polities are construed. The applicability of *asphaleia* is different between the political homogeneity of state determination in an oligarchy, and the necessity of (or the necessity to tolerate) 'wrestling' within the determination of a democracy. In the former, it is extremely unlikely that the notion of *asphaleia* could occupy an expressly political conceptual space, an assumption borne out by the typically 'Spartan' use of the metaphor in Thucydides' text as compared to the use of Athenian speakers such as Pericles and of Thucydides himself. Within Sparta's tightly controlled political arena, the *Apella* – the voting citizens – could not debate issues, nor hear from foreign dignitaries or supplicants themselves; instead, they could only select from a number of alternatives handed down by the ruling council of around 30 men. In such an environment, the 'rhetorical wrestling' of *asphaleia* had no role to play.

As such, while the notion of 'wrestling' in inter-state relations is simple enough, the applicability of the metaphor domestically is different between the political homogeneity of state determination in an oligarchy, and the necessity of (or the necessity to tolerate) 'wrestling' within the determination of a democracy. In the former, it is extremely unlikely that the notion of *asphaleia* could occupy an expressly political conceptual space, an assumption borne out by the typically 'Spartan' use of the metaphor in Thucydides' text as compared to the use of Athenian speakers such as Pericles and of Thucydides himself. On the other hand, given the fundamental link between rhetoric, political decision and physical outcomes in the democratic context, the employment of the word in such domestic situations makes sense both conceptually and from the point of view of the traditional use and evolution of the word.

On the other hand, given the fundamental link between rhetoric, political decision and physical outcomes in the democratic Athenian context, the employment of the word in such domestic situations makes sense both conceptually and from the point of view of the traditional use and evolution of the word. That *asphaleia* found use in a domestic, partisan context outside the confines of vicious civil conflict is demonstrated by Thucydides' lamentations on the Corcyrean affair – that *asphaleia* 'became' the specious pretence of violence necessitates that it had some more agreeable meaning to begin with. As we have seen previously, Thucydides does not give any concrete definition to the term as it was used in more peaceful times, however taking into account the Periclean notion of sound public decision, the widespread use of *asphaleia* as an indicator of strong public speech and the obvious inversions that can be identified from the Corcyrean example, we can form a reasonably clear picture of *asphaleia* being indicative of the balance between a variety of equally valid political claims.¹⁵⁹

CONCLUSION

While the concept of *asphaleia* could be broadly used as an analogue for modern notions of security, it was also subject to interpretation through context and culture, at least in the mind of Thucydides. It would be irresponsible to draw the conclusion that Thucydides' recreations of various addresses are in and of themselves absolutely and completely indicative of regional uses across the ancient Greek world, however given the clear separation in use throughout the text - especially in comparing the Athenian and Spartan voices - it would also be remiss of us to assume that regional divides had no bearing on how the *asphales* metaphor was used. Accepting the fact that there is no hope of knowing for certain how reflective of the realities of speech Thucydides' recreations were, it would seem reasonable to assume that the distinction is intentional on the part of Thucydides, and seeks to either reflect his own impressions of the speakers, or to appeal to broader sensibilities held by an audience. This breadth of meaning across speakers and nations, combined with the narrator's own use of the phrase in a wide variety of contexts for a variety of different

¹⁵⁹ Equally valid in the sense that any claim could occupy a position of validity within the political discourse.

inferences, leaves the notion of 'security' in Thucydides' *History* likely as complex a concept of any we might seek to understand today.

As such, this interpretative nature should give us pause in our assumption of any clean extrapolation of 'security' out of the text. At the very least the variety of ways the word could be interpreted should push us to acknowledge the contested nature of the word in Thucydides' own time, and the impossibility of ascribing to the text a set view of how 'security' was envisioned in any absolute sense. Drawing a set view of the 'security' at stake over the course of the text is almost certainly impossible, and I would be extremely sceptical of an attempt to ascribe a specific notion to even to the author himself given the many contexts the narrator employs the metaphor. As well as this, the varying uses of the metaphor between Athenian and Spartan speakers suggests that if Thucydides did have a particular view of the phrase, it didn't get in the way of the specificities of the account – that he was more invested in how his speakers were perceived in the account than he was in getting his own voice to rise to the top.

While this does not preclude the idea that Thucydides had a personal conception of 'security' as we would understand it (and indeed, I believe that in broad strokes, he certainly did), it is to say that the metaphor as it is employed in the text is more reflective of an attempt to recreate or catalogue events and attitudes generally. The most noticeable aspect of this attempt is found in the clear distinction between the breadth of political utility in Athenian employments and the rather narrow, generally rhetorical use by other speakers, especially those of Spartan origin.

For the modern scholars that see the Melian or Miletian dialogues especially as indicative of the 'security dilemma', the above does not necessarily preclude that reading – it is certainly not read as such because of the equation of *asphaleia* with security, but instead on the nature of the political construction the narrative presents. However even if the comparison is made based on the circumstances and the nature of the political actions taken in the text, the acceptance of a multivalent *asphaleia* does challenge the assumption that the dialogue is indicative of a specific type of security in the sense that we can no longer unquestioningly

assume that a reader in Thucydides' time (or even Thucydides himself) would have accepted such a reading.

Firstly, in regards to the concept itself, we must be open to the idea that the Athenian security and the Melian security are not only different, but that the dialogue is written to highlight those differences. Where the Athenians see security as a value their state acquires and maintains through its actions, the Melians ascribe security as an attribute to policy as Xenophon would give to a speech or speaker – that the policy itself is 'secure' in the truth, and can be appreciated by an audience. Crucially in this comparison, in the case of the dialogue the Melians believe on this metric the Athenian policy has patently failed; they propose that the Athenian policy of security is itself insecure, which while being a rhetorical use of the term engages with the Athenian use on a policy level. After declaring that the policy of Athenian expansion at the cost of neutral parties has no 'security', the Melians ask the Athenians;

“How can you avoid making enemies of all existing neutrals who shall look at our case and conclude from it that one day or another you will attack them? And what is this but to make greater the enemies that you have already, and to force others to become so who would otherwise have never thought of it?”¹⁶⁰

This not only calls into question the validity of Athens' actions in regards to their intentions, but also challenges the very logic of the assumption at the heart of the security dilemma as it is classically constructed. To the Athenian conception that the strong do as they will, the Melians suggest that while that might be the case, the misuse of that strength devalues it beyond considerations of morals or values; it challenges the nature of that strength in a practical and strategic manner.

In the text, the dialogue has no resolution – no agreement is reached, and each side holds true to their original intentions. The text, however passes a tacit judgement on the exchange later on; while in the short term the Athenians are successful, their experience in

¹⁶⁰ Thuc. 5.98

Melos not only emboldens them to a tenuous expedition against Syracuse in Sicily, but even in trying to gain support from the neutral Sicilian states for the action, some Sicilian cities side with Syracuse despite extensive existing animosity. The abject failure of the Sicilian expedition was seen as the turning point in the war between Athens and Sparta, with Thucydides remarking that in light of the failure it was not surprising that Athens fell, but rather that it took so long to fall after such a loss.

While Thucydides himself does not overtly link the two dialogues, their parallels are plainly apparent – the Sicilian states would be hard-pressed to appreciate an exhortation to fight for freedom if it was being delivered by the conquerors of Melos, especially considering how far they had sailed (and with so many soldiers in tow) to request it. The apparent hypocrisy of the Athenian proposition – that any sort of security could come from destabilising others – is drawn out by Hermocrates in his address to the other Sicilian states,¹⁶¹ and seems to find its Athenian expression in Aristophanes' *Birds*, itself giving the impression that there were at least some in Athens to which the version of security espoused by the Athenian diplomats of Thucydides' *History* was considered misguided.

As for Thucydides himself, while he does not pass judgement on the policy overtly, there is another passage that seems to suggest he did not approve of the Athenian decision to clamour for security against fear at the expense of others. When speaking of the fact that during the Corcyrean revolution “words had to change their ordinary meaning”, Thucydides ends the passage by noting that “the use of fair phrases to arrive at guilty ends was in high reputation”, with the end result that any citizens who remained neutral in the conflict were slain, “either for not joining in the quarrel, or because envy would not suffer them to escape”.

While the passage speaks of a domestic, rather than regional context, there are clear analogues between the passage and the Athenian actions at Melos and Sicily, from the ‘with-us-or-against-us’ mentality to the invocation of security as a pretence for offensive

¹⁶¹ Thuc. 6.78

action. This is plainly obvious in the claims made by the Athenian Spokesman when attempting to justify the Sicilian expedition to the neutral states;

“Now, as we have said, fear makes us hold our empire in Hellas, and fear makes us now come, with the help of our friends, to order safely matters in Sicily, and not to enslave any but rather to prevent any from being enslaved.”¹⁶²

As with every address recorded in the *History*, it is impossible to tell to what degree Thucydides is recording, recreating or dramatizing, but regardless of how ‘honest’ an account is given, from the point of view of how we as readers should construe the political value of *asphaleia* in Thucydides’ work, the claim that fear is the force that compels the expedition is important when seen against the nature of the word as articulated in regards to Corcyra. Thucydides’ claim that there was a bastardization of *asphaleia* cites a cause and an effect; that it was effected through the fear of the parties, and that the bastardization resulted in unjustified attacks on neutral parties. For Thucydides’ address to lay plain the rationale of fear obviously conforms to this model, and for the address itself to result in the failure of the spokesman to convince a democratic city that was meant to be aligned with Athens of the Athenian goal of liberation speaks to the outlook that neutral parties should reasonably take given the events of Melos. Put simply, the neutral states saw in the Athenian call for security not the properly construed notion of self-defence, but the ‘specious pretext of fending off emnity’, and the killing of neutrality on the altars of fear and jealousy.

Thus there is a consistent conception of an *incorrectly construed asphaleia* drawn out at key points of the text, in which fear propels an actor that should be invested in hedging, balance or maintenance into acting aggressively rather than reactively. This in itself is obviously indicative of the fact that there is a *properly construed asphaleia*, in which balance is maintained—at least in the eyes of the author. Thucydides seems to support this through his appeals to the violence of Corcyra, and the proximity such a negative construal of the value of *asphaleia* has to both other examples in the *History* (such as Pericles’ speech) and

¹⁶² Thuc. 6.84

to examples in other contemporary texts (such as Aristophanes' *Birds* or Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus*).

The above also highlights the possibility of what we might now broadly call securitization; that acts or events might be labelled as pertaining to *asphaleia* even if the practical circumstances do not warrant such an appraisal. Just as Aristophanes' *Birds* invoked the possible abuses of *asphaleia* in inculcating action counter to realities of a situation, the improperly construed notion of *asphaleia* in the Corcyrean revolt showed that the term did not simply label a situation, but instead had an instrumentative value within political speech. Put another way, while security certainly demarcated a certain state of affairs in real terms, it also held the capacity to invoke or inspire a political act, notion or desire in a way that could be utilized in the political space. In this way, we can see perhaps the most important aspect of *asphaleia* that resonates with modern notions of security- its capacity to serve as a political instrument essentially disconnected from a context or state of affairs that might otherwise be necessary to give it legitimacy.

Lastly, given the divergent uses of the term across the political context of speakers in the text, we should assume that both the correctly and incorrectly construed notion of *asphaleia* is likely contingent on a specific political reality – at least in the view of Thucydides. As previously stated, the use of *asphaleia* by speakers within the text can be reliably demarcated based on the nation that speaker was representing, with especially divergent uses by Spartans and Athenians. As such, any appreciation of *asphaleia* as a conceptual ancestor of modern notions of security should come with a caveat – it is, especially in the case of Thucydides' text the *Athenian* notion of *asphaleia* to which we could most helpfully compare.

There are three important considerations that come from our appreciation of the specifically Athenian notion of *asphaleia*. The first is simply that given the fact that the vast majority of classical Greek texts still extant today come from Athens, it should not be surprising that it is the Athenian notion of any word that more heavily permeates our speech today. This is especially true of international relations and notions of security, where Thucydides has a practical monopoly on modern readership.

Secondly, it is clear that from the archaic use of Hesiod, the exhortations of Pericles to the childless, and to the examples of securitization given by Aristophanes and Thucydides, that *asphaleia* was much more invested in matters of reason than of material. While it would be foolish to completely decouple the rationality of political actors to the practical considerations of their decisions (indeed in all the above examples it is precisely the interaction between the two sides that creates them), the basis for *asphaleia's* political value is in its statement to the role of 'truth', reason and rhetoric in the creation of the political. But while for the Athenians this reason was politically constitutive, Thucydides and Aristophanes are plain enough in the destabilising effect of reason either when incorrectly construed (such as Corcyra), or used as justification against a practical reality (such as in *Birds*). As we will see, this notion of reason as being the source of security – whilst also holding the capacity to be fundamentally insecure – can be traced all throughout Anglo notions of security.

The third consideration is the fact that this differing use of the term across Greek city-states invites speculation as to why such divergent notions of this concept existed. As previously discussed, this divergence just be tempered by the fact that these uses are the product of a single author, however I would argue that this fact still gives credence to the idea that appreciation of *asphaleia* was different among different Greek polities – if the product of a single author, it would be strange for that author to use a variety of employments for different nations for no reason. With this in mind, the question remains as to why this disparity of use is given to the speakers in the text.

Given the small amount of classical texts that remain to make such comparisons with – including an almost total absence of written record from Sparta, we cannot easily provide an answer to this question. That said, there are two key considerations that may together account for this difference. The first is ethno-cultural; while the Ionian Athens used the Attic dialect, as a Doric city, Sparta likely spoke in the Doric dialect. To what degree this difference in language and cultural identity mattered by the time of Thucydides is a matter of debate, however given the evidence it is reasonable to assume that some difference remained between the two groups – especially between those of Athens and Sparta.

However a lingual difference would only supply us with an immediate justification for the *existence* of the discrepancy, rather than a *justification* for the discrepancy; it would do little to explain why the same metaphor could demonstrate a different value and use case across the polities. On that account, the simplest answer lies in the nature of those polities themselves – the concentrated, conservative oligarchy of Sparta, against the comparatively progressive, expansionist democracy of Athens. Such an assumption certainly marries with the focus of Thucydides' own writing, with the Spartan uses highlighting constancy and moral standing, and the Athenian uses often hinging on the values and actions of the polis.

As a hypothesis, we could take these two divergent attitudes of *asphaleia* as a function of the political outlook of the society that used it. In the Spartan case, it could be seen as a word that detailed a positive attribute of a correctly construed action, a desirable quality of right action. Such a notion fits well within the needs of a society famed for its discipline, rigour and consistency. In comparison, an *asphaleia* that demarcated a stable tension between two forces would have obvious value to a polity that lived with such tension day to day; and with the expansion of Athenian power throughout the region, it would seem that in Thucydides' account that same idea was conferred to international relations.

Ultimately, the above must remain a hypothesis at this early stage given the lack of evidence, however moving forward, we will see that many of the signatures present in the Attic and Ionic notion of *asphaleia* – communal speech and decision, tension between interests and the preservation of a status-quo – are common features within polities that share paradigms with the Athenian democracy – communal law and justice, group decision making, and decentralised political power. Conversely, we will also see how the absence of such signatures and the prevalence of what we may call counter-signatures – things such as authoritarian rule, of dispensationary (rather than consensus-led) justice and limited political franchise eschew the use of words and concepts such as the Athenian notion of *asphaleia*.

Put in practical terms, we will turn to the next great source of contention in the political inheritance of security – that of the Roman Empire. While democratic Athens survived for a

number of years after their defeat (and temporary subjugation) at the hands of the Peloponnesian league, the monarchical Macedonians would conquer the city in 338 BCE, only to be replaced by the Romans a few centuries later. As we will see, by the time of the Roman occupation, the use of *asphaleia* would change in the face of this new political reality. First however, we will examine the Romans in their own right, in order that our comparison (made in the third section) might be better appreciated.

PART III

ROME: EMPIRE AND

REPUBLIC

CHAPTER FIVE

THE SECURITAS OF CICERO AND REPUBLICAN ROME

The Roman statesman, lawyer and philosopher Cicero has one of the most powerful and enduring legacies in Anglo-Western history. As an author, his many works have been read and reread by philosophers and statesmen that followed, as well as being edified as key examples of Latin prose. This vast cultural and political inheritance was well established by the time of the English Civil War, and unsurprisingly the value of this inheritance to the various political forces at the time was subject to contestation. In his response to the demands of parliament that would cast the country into turmoil, King Charles the First invoked the theories expounded by Cicero in defence of the English status quo; the 'mixed constitution' championed by the Romans was already alive and well in England, and as no greater constitution existed, there was little need to change it now. On the other side, Cicero was held up as a champion of the commons, a statesman that recognised the importance of equality before the law, and political representation for all members of the polity. As such, in understanding the political inheritance that defined the emergence of security as a political concept in the early modern period, we can expect that Cicero has a part to play.

The importance, depth and complexity of that part goes well beyond his use in the English Civil War, however. Most fundamentally, Cicero's writings give us the first extant use of the word *securitas*, the Latin root for the English 'security'; in a very real way, the lingual tradition of security begins with Cicero.¹⁶³ Further, as we will see, the engagement of both monarchists and democrats with the thought of Cicero is cursory in comparison to work he himself does in building Anglo-western conceptions of security. In this chapter we will both unpick the contested nature of Cicero's work in early modern England, as well as see how

¹⁶³ For more on the origins of *securitas* in Cicero's work (especially its apolitical nature) see Hamilton, *Security*, 114.

Cicero's own political works lay the foundation for a core understanding of security – the notion of provision for the commons by a ruler.

The end result of this exploration will garner us an appreciation of the practicalities of politics in late republican Rome, as well as bring to the fore the rather aristocratic notion of 'liberty' that Cicero argued for in his own works. We will explore the lack of a comparable term to *asphaleia* within both the practical or idealised Roman polity, and the relationship such a lack has to issues of contestability and reason. We will also see that Cicero the champion of the common people was more myth than reality, and that *securitas* as Cicero envisaged it was indicative not of a political necessity, but rather an individual, emotive state. Finally, we will see how all of these considerations relate to the deeper foundations of Cicero's political philosophy; we will see that properly appreciating Cicero's frameworks of security, liberty and constitution require an appreciation of his conception of human nature and political purpose.

THE POLITICAL-HISTORICAL SETTING OF REPUBLICAN ROME

To understand the political value *securitas* had – or rather *could* have had – at the time of its formulation, we must of course appreciate the political reality in which it was coined. In one of its earliest known appearances, Cicero uses the term in *De Officiis*, a book of moral instruction. In striving to be moral, Cicero held that one must (among other things) cultivate a mind free from troubles; a “...*tranquillitas animi et securitas adsit*”.¹⁶⁴ This early utterance stands as indicative of Cicero's conception of *securitas* more broadly – a concept less suited to war or sovereignty, and more suited to a state of mind – to peaceful thoughts and temperate mood.¹⁶⁵

At the time of writing *De Officiis*, Cicero was in his sixties, having spent decades as a senator of the republic, and as a legal representative and orator. Even more important for our purposes, Cicero was a prolific writer who was highly invested in the contemporary political

¹⁶⁴ Cic. Off. 1.69. Taken from Cicero, “De Officiis,” trans. Walter Miller (Harvard University Press, 1913), https://doi.org/10.4159/DLCL.marcus_tullius_cicero-de_officiis.1913.

¹⁶⁵ Hamilton, *Security*, 120–21.

issues of the day, as well as being a political theorist in his own right. Given his role as the likely originator of the word *securitas*, his relevance to practical politics of the day *and* his standing as the most prolific and enduring political theorist of the Roman age, much of our analysis below will be an engagement with the works of Cicero – of the Rome he lived and worked in, as well as the ideal to which he strove. The remainder will rely on other primary and secondary sources to flesh out the Roman polity to attempt to draw distinctions with polities that hold the primacy of individual rights and political determination - Athenian democracy and modern liberal democracy - and in so doing begin to construct a notion of why the metaphor of *asphaleia*, if not the word itself, was left by the wayside.

However we must at the outset acknowledge that despite occurring over 2,000 years ago, there is still a great deal of contested scholarship on the fundamental makeup of Roman political life, and much of that contestation is relevant to some degree to this study. Scholars such as Millar and Wiseman have worked to establish the importance of popular assent and party ideology in Roman scholarship, two notions crucial to an understanding of the political landscape generally. However that these scholars must work to rehabilitate such fundamental political concepts is indicative of the state of critical academic consensus on the nature of the Roman polity; though luckily for us, we may still draw some important conclusions regarding the political environment in which *securitas* was formed, both by examining what is uncontroversial, as well as through the details of ongoing debates.

ISSUES OF DEMOCRACY

From the outset, what is certainly uncontested is that the Roman republic was not at its core 'democratic' in an operative sense, either in the vein of the Athenian democracy or by our contemporary standards. In comparison to systems in which sovereign authority is derived from the outcome of broad and equal suffrage, Roman franchise was not universal even amongst native born males, nor was the value of votes equally distributed amongst

eligible citizens.¹⁶⁶ As well as this sporadic suffrage, political office was almost universally reserved for an enduring aristocracy, and the formulation, interpretation and execution of laws was entirely in the hands of such officials. However that there *was* voting and franchise at all is, in the grand schema of western political history, an important issue. Likewise, Roman orators, politicians and historians also lauded the lack of tyranny within the Roman system – the notion of unchecked power being abhorrent in itself. While it would be foolhardy to trust political rhetoric, just as it would be to assume that Roman notions of power, tyranny or dominance are congruous with our own, that the arguments were made at all would suggest that concentrated or unchecked power was on some level undesirable to large sections of the population.

Sitting between the ‘extremes’ of Greek participatory democracy and the archaic tyranny of the kings of old, the Romans possessed what Cicero described as a ‘mixed constitution’,¹⁶⁷ featuring popular assemblies, the largely aristocratic senate and executive offices, held for short periods, in which imperium – power of command – could be wielded. On face value such a system used these separate forces as balancers, with the executive’s reliance on the senate, and the senate’s reliance on the people and the people’s reliance on the other two to keep the component parts of the system in check. To what degree this happened in practise is the point of contention in classical scholarship, with the focus being the degree to which the popular will was expressed and heeded in Roman politics; were the people an effective balance to the senate, or were they simply held in check by an aristocracy that controlled the means of real power? Two notable points of contention on this question are

¹⁶⁶ Once again, though the public life of Roman women was considerably less regulated than those of Athens, women could not vote, be magistrates, nor hold any political office. (Bruce W. Frier and Thomas A. J. McGinn, *A Casebook on Roman Family Law*, Classical Resources Series / American Philological Association, no. 5 (Oxford [England] ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 31–32.) As such, the discussion of political construction, as well as the use of *securitas* in that construction (to whatever small degree it was used) is largely a discussion of men.

There are, however, notable examples of women (invariably wealthy women) using influence to broker negotiations, educate, and advocate for political decisions. Indeed in the next section on the Roman Empire, we will see how the emergence of *securitas* as a political tool can be largely attributed to the efforts of Agrippina the Younger, sister of Caligula, wife of Claudius and the mother of Nero.

¹⁶⁷ Cic. Rep. 1.45. All subsequent quotations are taken from the following translation unless otherwise stated. Cicero, “De Re Publica,” trans. Clinton W. Keyes (Harvard University Press, 1928), https://doi.org/10.4159/DLCL.marcus_tullius_cicero-de_re_publica.1928.

1) the role of democratic assemblies in the republic, and 2) the degree to which the categories of *optimates* and *populares* – labels given to senators in the late republic acting in the interest of the senate’s traditional role and senators acting in the interests of the popular will, respectively – can be seen as parties, policy platforms or simply political shorthand to describe people or issues in specific circumstances.

Below we will deal with these two issues briefly, given that the ability of citizens to express themselves politically and the existence of competing and contradictory elements within political discourse are two fundamentally important dynamics to the Athenian polis and thus the environment in which *asphaleia* was used. We will first briefly touch on the highly influential work of Ronald Syme, the authority on the subject for much of the 20th century, before exploring the competing claims, dealing firstly with the existence (or non-existence) of competing political parties, then the role of the people in political discourse in the years leading to and immediately following the coining of the term *securitas*.

SYME, WISEMAN AND POLITICAL PARTIES – AGAINST ROMAN DEMOCRACY

The English inheritance of Rome and of Cicero was contested at the time of the English Civil War, however that contestation remains to this day. From the English Civil War in the 16th century till the 20th, Imperial Rome was largely seen as a necessary step to save the Roman inheritance from a failing republic; however for much of the 20th century, Ronald Syme’s history of the late republic *The Roman Revolution* dominated conceptions of Roman popular authority, its rather cynical conclusion being that “the Roman constitution was a screen and a sham”, a fabrication used to justify the rule of a select few not only after the rise of the empire, but even during the republican years.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁸ Ronald Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 15. Syme’s work relied on the tracking of familial and political ties throughout generations of powerful Romans in order to develop political capital, a process then applied to the rise of Octavian and the success of his takeover. Writing in the 1930’s Syme’s work challenged a view of Octavian as a saviour of Roman order acting against the degenerating anarchy of republican Rome; while Syme still saw the republic as dysfunctional (and Octavian still saved it), Octavian was a malicious autocrat working within an oligarchy, rather than a benevolent dictator acting within a liberal republic.

However scholarship has emerged in the early 21st century challenging the assertion that the late republic was such a cynically oligarchical affair. T.P. Wiseman's work on the nature of competing political ideologies within the late republic challenges Syme's vision of an autocratic, oligarchic republic. Wiseman characterises Syme's cynicism regarding the strength (or lack thereof) of civic motivations over and above the personal gain of its aristocratic families as the result of Syme's contemporary environment; Wiseman calls Syme's conclusions the result of a preoccupation with autocrats and *Machtpolitik* resulting from the political realities of the 1930's.¹⁶⁹

For Wiseman, the political landscape of republican Rome was subject to two clearly identifiable camps; the *Optimates*, who represented the traditional senatorial hegemony, preferring the dignity and benevolence of the senatorial classes, and the *populares*, political actors that were broadly speaking popular reformists. The existence of these two political categories is in itself nothing new (the terms being used in Rome itself in the republican era), however where Wiseman departed from other scholarship is his insistence that these two camps were fully formed political platforms, concentered by specific policy aims, rather than factions or modes of operating that were (in comparison to modern conceptions of political parties) largely fluid.¹⁷⁰ However while Wiseman rightly challenged some of Syme's more brash assumptions, there are issues with his equation of certain policies with political 'parties' in any sense approaching a clearly delineated set of partisan platforms.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁹ Timothy P. Wiseman and British Academy, eds., *Classics in Progress: Essays on Ancient Greece and Rome*, Paperback ed (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2006), 308.

¹⁷⁰ Wiseman and British Academy, 309.

¹⁷¹ It would certainly be foolish to assume that the century-long debates surrounding the nature of grain subsidy for the poor, or land ownership reforms, were not able to be viewed on a binary of preference for commoners versus preference for the rights of the ruling classes, however if these issues could be ascribed to specific ideological forces, the historical facts surrounding the politicians that espoused them fundamentally challenges any prescription of the modern concept of political parties to their practical execution. The number of senators that drifted between these two ideals would suggest that construing them as antithetical sources of power would be unwise. The sheer fact that men such as Cicero could so publically, and with such force, shift 'sides' and retain their positions demonstrates that while certain people might consistently support actions that fall into a certain category, those categories were not absolute, nor were they definitional.

ON COMPETITION, ANTITHESIS AND POLITICS

The debate over the level of partisan separation in Rome is important to us in the sense that depending on the answer, it may explain why the notion of *asphaleia* – the wrestling of the polity – was not found in the Latin of the time. The presence of such competition would draw into constant question the proper form of political authority and outcome, and like the oligarchic and democratic factions of Athens, legitimate two oppositional, incongruous but necessarily coexistent political forces. In short, partisan conditions in the Republic might create the conditions for a fair bout of wrestling.

However the partisan outlook offered by Wiseman seems unlikely, especially in the context of more recent scholarship. While not the hollow facades of Syme, the factions were more likely categories for explaining to whom and from whom one might be deriving power and authority from in a given time, rather than two competing sources of authority each attempting to reshape the polity against the other. Put simply, rather than being competing sides wrestling over control of the polity, they were two notions of authority that enabled one to take part in controlling that polity. Far from being two competing claims, Morstein-Marx suggests that the *optimates* and *populares* were ultimately in close proximity, neither view being necessarily exclusive of the other, but rather both attempting in their own way to appeal to the same authority – that of *Res Publica*.¹⁷² While the *optimates* invoked the benefits of senatorial *auctoritas* and *dignitas* for the lot of the *Res Publica*, the *populares* chose a more direct approach – ultimately each arguing for essentially the same thing; the boon of Rome to her people as embodied by the republic.¹⁷³ In real terms, it was not to which party one belonged that determined which side would carry the day, but as Morstein-Marx claims, the distance between the two camps was small enough that it was up to the skill of the speakers as to who was believed.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷² Robert Morstein-Marx, *Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic* (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

¹⁷³ Alexander Yakobson, "TRADITIONAL POLITICAL CULTURE AND THE PEOPLE'S ROLE IN THE ROMAN REPUBLIC," *Historia: Zeitschrift Für Alte Geschichte* 59, no. 3 (2010): 293.

¹⁷⁴ Morstein-Marx, *Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic*, 194.

But whilst there might not have been competing claims to the role and form of government, or competitive paradigms on how the polity might operate, the existence of the two vectors firmly demonstrates that as well as the senate, the popular will had a major role to play in the construction of the Roman polity. As Yakobsen writes, “if a sober opportunist treats the ‘multitude’ as worth pandering to, this is a sure sign that the multitude is far from powerless.”¹⁷⁵ Despite the myriad of limitations on political speech and activity placed on common citizens, the wider population must have in some fashion and to some degree provided energy to the Roman machine; and so while we might not see liberalism in the form of competing ideologies, we might still see some glimmer in the expression of popular will contra to the established system.

POPULAR WILL AS AUTHORITY

In comparison to the notion of political ‘parties’ in Rome, the question of whether (or to what degree) Rome could be called a democracy has been subjected to more forceful scrutiny. Lead by Fergus Millar’s 1998 work *The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic*, discussions have moved from a rather straightforward view of the mixed constitution being subject to aristocratic hegemony, to a more nuanced exploration of the realities of political life and expression for the masses of republican Rome. Such exploration has brought about contestation of the extent to which popular assemblies could impose their collective will on the senate at forum gatherings, the enabling role of popular appeal in elections, the limits of Rome’s client-patron culture and the effect such culture had on ‘democratic’ structures and concepts.

These contested issues will be (inasmuch as they are relevant) dealt with in a moment, but first we may start by building a foundation with what is ‘uncontroversial’ in scholarly understanding of the democratic limits of the Roman Republic.¹⁷⁶ Firstly, there was voting in

¹⁷⁵ Yakobson, “TRADITIONAL POLITICAL CULTURE AND THE PEOPLE’S ROLE IN THE ROMAN REPUBLIC,” 285.

¹⁷⁶ Yakobson, 283.

the republic, though it was not as we would know it in 21st century democracy. Voting was extended only to those who met certain property requirements (owned a certain amount of land). Further, the suffrage that was extended was unequal – votes were weighted based on the property held by the individual. Another complicating factor in our understanding of ‘voting’ in Rome was that casting a vote was reliant on participation in the immediate proceedings – put another way, one could only vote if one was present in the forum at the time of decision. Also uncontroversial is that achieving high office was for those outside the aristocracy an extremely remote possibility. The ability to stand for the senate was reliant on their being previously appointed as a magistrate, itself a position from which the lower classes were largely excluded from.¹⁷⁷

Given this ‘uncontroversial’ information, it is clear that the common people had a role in the Roman polity, however the extent of that role is the focus of debate. In recent years some scholars – notably Fergus Millar – have challenged Syme’s notion of the Roman people as passive clients in a largely oligarchical system.¹⁷⁸ While the Roman system excluded political speech from all but a handful of the common people, Millar argues that the nature of the Roman voting system meant that everything had to be ‘under the gaze’ of the people,¹⁷⁹ with the aristocratic office holders held to account by the corporate power of the plebeians. Such visibility and presence in decision making meant that every edict issued by the senate or its representatives had the real possibility of being condemned by the crowd, an outcome that in some cases might have put the senator delivering the edict or the senate itself in jeopardy. As Morstein-Marx puts it, the force of the mob in the late republic meant that a senatorial ruling would have been ‘nearly impossible’ to deliver if it was counter to popular opinion.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁷ There were however a small number of plebeian offices closed to the patrician and equestrian classes, whose role was to check the power of the senate through a power of veto, as well as a limited ability to propose law, however by the first century these were largely a mockery of their initial intention – in 59BCE, for example, a patrician was ‘adopted’ by a plebeian family in order to assume the office and censure his political opponents.

¹⁷⁸ Fergus Millar, *The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic*, Jerome Lectures 22 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002).

¹⁷⁹ Millar, 9.

¹⁸⁰ Morstein-Marx, *Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic*, 126.

BUT WERE THEY DEMOCRATIC?

Millar's revision to the pessimistic view of the Roman polity is an important one, however there is still a fundamental barrier to considering the late republic in any way 'liberal', democratic, or in assuming that the capacity to lynch the ruling class constitutes a political reality in which ideas and values could compete for legitimacy. While it might seem a rather thin distinction, the ability to vote on an issue is not the same as the ability to *speak* or *act* on an issue, to identify with competing conceptions of political authority, or to make a meaningful choice that is both free and politically valid. As we will see later in this chapter, the voice of the common people was indeed a consideration in the construction of Roman political life, however it was not one of *value*, but rather one of *force*; the people had power, but they did not have legitimacy as political actors.

The lack of value placed on the political will of common citizens is demonstrated by the unequal nature of the voting system, as well as the physical realities of casting votes. Franchise was "...heavily loaded" in favour of the upper classes through an unequal distribution of votes – put simply, the upper classes got considerably more votes per person, based on their class and wealth.¹⁸¹ Further, there was a "practical impossibility for the great majority of citizens to attend the assemblies",¹⁸² a state of affairs that limited greatly the capacity of most commoners to make their will known, given the system required a physical presence in the forum to vote. Further, Historians of the day suggest to us that as the popular assembly grew as a source of political capital and contra-senatorial authority in the late republic, it also became far less representative of the average citizen, with violence, intimidation and financial inducement ensuring only a 'small fraction' of people were able to attend and vote.¹⁸³

¹⁸¹ J. A. North, "Democratic Politics in Republican Rome," *Past & Present* 126, no. 1 (February 1, 1990): 5, <https://doi.org/10.1093/past/126.1.3>.

¹⁸² Yakobson, "TRADITIONAL POLITICAL CULTURE AND THE PEOPLE'S ROLE IN THE ROMAN REPUBLIC," 283.

¹⁸³ Yakobson, 283.

Finally, as well as controlling the process of political action, aristocratic control over positions of social authority was not restricted to political office – the upper classes also “provided the lawyers, orators and historians”, maintaining a hegemony across the social, military and legal spheres. “Above all...” writes North, “...they exercised an exclusive control as magistrates, senators and priests over the ceremonial of public religious activity, and hence over access to the gods and to divine legitimation of all human activity.”¹⁸⁴ For North, the reliance of the lower classes on the elite necessitates a view in which “the popular will of the Roman people found expression in the context, and only in the context, of divisions within the oligarchy.” Put simply, while there might be distinctions between *populares* and *optimates*, in public will and senatorial desires, ultimately there was no truly public debate – instead, the elite spoke and the masses listened.¹⁸⁵

ON CICERO

Till this point, our considerations of the late republic’s political environment has rested on the practical, historical reality, however we must also appreciate these practical considerations on the basis of their theoretical justification; we must identify what justifications underpinned its various interactions in order to grasp at what paradigms, signatures and word-tools were present within the Roman polity. In answering this set of questions, we turn to the work of Cicero, and through an examination of his key political texts gain an insight into an important interpretation of the Roman polity. Further, by reading Cicero closely, we can better understand how it is that he might be subject to the contestation of monarchists and democrats over a millennia later.

Additionally, Cicero’s primacy as both a Latin political theorist and as an author in the Latin oeuvre is unrivalled. Cicero was himself the likely originator of the term *securitas*, and as such gaining an understanding of his thought specifically can go some way to clarify (or at least to make certain of the fact) that modern conceptions of ‘*securitas*’ are not at all

¹⁸⁴ North, “Democratic Politics in Republican Rome,” 17.

¹⁸⁵ North, 18.

present in its original formulation. Further, as an eminent thinker and dedicated and diligent translator of Greek political and philosophical thought, there is no doubt Cicero was acquainted with Greek terms such as *asphaleia*; by understanding Cicero's political schema, we can ascertain to what degree Cicero's Rome had a role for *asphaleia*, for modern security, or failing the presence of any comparable idea, a reason for that absence.

Rightly remembered as a defender of Roman republicanism, Cicero gave express consideration to the importance of the *populus* in the construction of the state and the maintenance of liberty.¹⁸⁶ However these considerations of popular will, franchise and liberty cannot (or should not) be taken on face value by modern readers. While modern republicans (such as Philip Pettit) place Cicero as part of a tradition of a 'non-domination' notion of liberty, scholars such as Kennedy demonstrate that a more systematic understanding of Cicero's political theory shows that such is not the case. For our purposes, after assaying how one might take Cicero as an orthodox liberal in our modern sense, we will then follow the critique levelled by Kennedy, adding to it wider considerations regarding the role of the 'free' people of Rome – and thus the 'liberal' nature of the Roman state, at least in the eyes of Cicero.

Certainly on a cursory reading, Cicero is forthright champion of liberty. Writing in *De Officiis*, he said that "...in defence of liberty a high-souled man should stake everything";¹⁸⁷ In *De Legibus* that a state should "the safety of the people shall be their highest law",¹⁸⁸ and that all should have equality before state laws regardless of class.¹⁸⁹ The man had challenged the dictatorship of Caesar, and had eventually died for his outspoken criticism of the emerging Tyranny at the end of the republican age. Viewed in isolation, these acts certainly create an image of a liberal champion; Cicero's calls for liberty, as well as his opposition to Caesar's

¹⁸⁶ For example, see Cicero, "De Re Publica"; Cicero, "De Legibus," trans. Clinton W. Keyes (Harvard University Press, 1928), https://doi.org/10.4159/DLCL.marcus_tullius_cicero-de_legibus.1928; Cicero, "De Officiis." All subsequent quotations are taken from these translations unless otherwise stated.

¹⁸⁷ Cic. Off. 1.20

¹⁸⁸ Cic. Leg. 3.3

¹⁸⁹ Cic. Off. 2.42

tyranny made him an inspiration to those in the English Civil War that fought for equality before the law,¹⁹⁰ especially considering he defends the importance of plebeian tribunes.¹⁹¹

However a closer look at Cicero's policies and philosophy starts to challenge this liberal image. The tribunes should be protected, but due to his belief that the will of the people was more easily controlled if there was a leader sympathetic to the senate to shape their desires.¹⁹² Cicero also argued *against* secret ballots (a system introduced by the plebeian tribunes themselves to prevent aristocratic control of elections),¹⁹³ argued *for* the holding of absolute power by the consul¹⁹⁴ and for, perhaps most importantly, the maintenance of distributing franchise based on asset. Such unequal representation was, he contended, a major strength of the Roman system; that 'the greatest number should not have the greatest power'¹⁹⁵ was a right reflection of the dignity of the upper classes and an effective hedge against the mob.

It was this 'fair' distribution of power that Asmis argues formed the basis of Cicero's *res publica*, a system that included all citizens, but did so with a predetermined value and goal.¹⁹⁶ As we shall see, Cicero's vision of politics was a decidedly Roman one – his political philosophy based on the state in which he was raised – and one in which modern notions of freedom of expression, equality before the law and equal opportunity was not simply alien, but antithetical. In Cicero's writings we will see a cogent expression of the values that sat at the heart of Roman political construction; values of unity over contestation, of the maintenance of privilege, and the ascription of power, rather than legitimacy, to the common people of Rome.

¹⁹⁰ Such as John Warr and Edward Sexby

¹⁹¹ Cic. Leg. 3.22

¹⁹² Cic. Leg. 3.24

¹⁹³ Cic. Leg. 3.34

¹⁹⁴ Cic. Leg. 3.8

¹⁹⁵ Cic. Rep. 2.39

¹⁹⁶ Elizabeth Asmis, "A New Kind of Model: Cicero's Roman Constitution in De Republica," *American Journal of Philology* 126, no. 3 (2005): 284–85, <https://doi.org/10.1353/ajp.2005.0036>.

While his desire to see the common people tamed by a tribune, the maintenance of the economic and political hegemony enjoyed by the upper classes, and a notion of free speech that decried the Athenian “license in the abuse of statesmen allowed in comedy.”¹⁹⁷ is far from what many today would consider liberal, comparing such acts themselves profits us little. As a thinker and statesman, Cicero’s theory and action enjoyed a consistency of method and reason, and as such can be better understood in the context of that reason. Understanding this theoretical consistency will also then be helpful in appreciating the political expectations of the man who coined the term *securitas*, and help explain why it was that despite his extensive knowledge of Greek language, history and philosophy, he had no use for *asphaleia* – or more directly, on no level tied *securitas* to the concept of *asphaleia*.

CICERO AS A STATESMAN

Cicero’s two major political works – *De Officiis* and *De Res Publica* – are notable in their close proximity to the extant Roman system in which Cicero wrote; in these works that espouse his ideal laws and constitution, Cicero confirms the political framework of Rome, making only minor modifications. However both Cicero’s limited revisions to, and general confirmation of Roman political construction share a source; underpinning Cicero’s political philosophy is a deeper philosophical concept. To Cicero, the ‘mixed constitution’ of Rome was not strong simply through its own virtue, but rather it was strong due to its appeal to a more fundamental truth – a natural law. As such, understanding the form and scope of this natural law allows us to make sense of why his conception of the Roman laws departed from and confirmed the norm in each case; further, his conception of natural law allows us to better appreciate the ‘liberty’ that scholars and politicians in both the 16th and 21st centuries have attributed to Cicero’s Rome.

WHY STATES CONSTITUTE - PROPERTY RIGHTS

Luckily for us, Cicero hands down with great clarity his theoretical considerations of natural law, and thus of the state. Far from Rome being the result of a mythical birthing at the

¹⁹⁷ W. W. How, “Cicero’s Ideal in His de Republica,” *The Journal of Roman Studies* 20 (1930): 28, <https://doi.org/10.2307/297383>.

hands of a wolf-suckled child, or even a happy accident, Cicero sees the creation of the state in clear and pragmatic terms. Writing in *De Res Publica*, he suggests that “a people is not any collection of human beings brought together in any sort of way, but an assemblage of people in large numbers associated in an agreement with respect to justice and a partnership for the common good.”¹⁹⁸ More than simply being in the same place at the same time, or gathering for any reason, the state begins its constitution by having the people thus collected share a common order and interests. This is a start, but of course begs the question- in the case of Cicero’s Rome, what is that interest?

Cicero clearly articulates his conception of the common interest in his instruction manual for good governance, *De Officiis*; “the chief purpose in the establishment of the constitutional state and municipal governments was that individual property rights might be secured.”¹⁹⁹ While it may seem crass to many liberals today, the major driving force behind Cicero’s republicanism was the maintenance of private property. To be clear, this is not to attempt to sell a vision of Cicero’s thought in which liberty or justice is subsumed by property rights – both liberty and justice will be discussed below as important concepts to the success of Cicero’s Rome. However it is to say that in his theoretical understanding of the state, Cicero viewed the maintenance of property rights as the fundamental reason for constituting, and therefore the protection of those rights as the foremost function of the state.

The reason for this – for the centrality of property rights to the constitution of the state – can be gleaned from Cicero’s understanding of the *unnatural* nature of those rights;

“There is, however, no such thing as private ownership established by nature, but property becomes private either through long occupancy (as in the case of those who long ago settled in unoccupied territory) or through conquest (as in the case of those who took it in war) or by due process of law, bargain, or purchase, or by allotment... Therefore, inasmuch as in each case some of those things which by nature had been common property became the property of individuals, each one

¹⁹⁸ Cic. Rep 1.25

¹⁹⁹ Cic. Off. 2.73

should retain possession of that which has fallen to his lot; and if anyone appropriates to himself anything beyond that, he will be violating the laws of human society.”²⁰⁰

Understanding the conception of natural and unnatural is important to placing why property rights are central to Cicero, as well as why they, despite being the chief reason for constitution, are not in and of themselves the chief mechanism by which that constitution is maintained. As above, Cicero holds that there is no such thing as private property as far as nature is concerned, but that each individual (or group, in the case of a peoples occupying territory) might through a variety of mechanisms claim ownership of land or objects and that said ownership should be respected.

The importance of this distinction is twofold. Firstly, the claims to ownership – occupancy, conquest and due process – are themselves issues of ‘human society’. Property rights are therefore not simply safeguarded by a recognition of common interest, but in practice they rely on the common interest to exist at all. Secondly, and as a direct result of the former, we can be sure that in Cicero’s framework while property rights might be the main reason for constitution, they are not the basis of that constitution in an operative sense. If property rights are granted by human society, then it falls to human society – hopefully through the proper constitution of a state – to protect those rights.

We have arrived at a point of deep distinction between Cicero’s conception of the state and that of both Athens and modern democracies. Not formed out of respect for individual rights, or the reasonable assertion that sovereignty derives from common choice or assent, Cicero’s Rome (and as we will see, all states Cicero would call ‘just’) constitute for the maintenance of the material. Far beyond a differing understanding of ‘liberty’, we can begin to see how little scope there is for the injection of the competitive/cooperative synergy required by *asphaleia* considering that the state is based on an absolute protection of material consideration, rather than the protection of the decision itself. As we will see, this absolute gets even *more* absolute.

²⁰⁰ Cic. Off. 1.21

For if property rights require a state, then it must follow that the state mustn't require property rights, lest it be somehow immaculately conceived. Cicero suggests as much himself, saying that "...although it was by nature's guidance that men were drawn together into communities, it was in the hope of safeguarding their possessions that they sought the protection of cities."²⁰¹ Property rights are therefore the result of a state, rather than their genesis or maintenance – they are the 'why' rather than the 'how'. But if property rights are the chief outcome of human society, by what mechanism is that society formed and maintained?

EQUITY – THE WAY IT SHOULD BE ORDERED

We don't have to go far to find the answer; "...the principle by which society and what we may call its 'common bonds' are maintained" is for Cicero split into two 'divisions', justice and charity.²⁰² We will deal with charity in a moment, but first let us examine justice; Cicero further splits justice into another two categories;

"The first office of justice is to keep one man from doing harm to another, unless provoked by wrong; and the next is to lead men to use common possessions for the common interests, private property for their own."²⁰³

While Cicero sees justice as the 'crowning glory' of the virtues and the single most important directive of human endeavour,²⁰⁴ interestingly he also makes clear that while a state might be best suited to dispense it, it is in itself not unique to the state, nor is it in itself civilised. However this is in itself reason to hold it in the highest esteem – unlike property rights, justice is natural, not a construction;

²⁰¹ Cic. Off. 2.73

²⁰² Cic. Off. 1.20

²⁰³ Cic. Off. 2.20

²⁰⁴ Cic. Off. 1.20

“Its importance is so great, that not even those who live by wickedness and crime can get on without some small element of justice. For if a robber takes anything by force or by fraud from another member of the gang, he loses his standing even in a band of robbers; and if the one called the "Pirate Captain" should not divide the plunder impartially, he would be either deserted or murdered by his comrades. Why, they say that robbers even have a code of laws to observe and obey... Since, therefore, the efficacy of justice is so great that it strengthens and augments the power even of robbers, how great do we think its power will be in a constitutional government with its laws and courts?”²⁰⁵

Justice then is important to the constitution of a state in the sense that, just as in the case of the ‘unjust’ pirate captain, without the provision of justice the state would be deserted. Further, Cicero gives a pattern for justice as it is relevant to organisation – safeguarding the rights each has to their own property, and manage and distribute common possessions for common interests. Thus we can see the immediate realisation of the property rights central to the ratio of the state embedded in Cicero’s conception of justice, and given that justice is a natural phenomenon, it becomes a suitable vehicle by which the human construction of property rights might be upheld.

One would be forgiven for thinking that this rather pragmatic conception of justice might be tempered with the other major aspect of ‘common bonds’ Cicero puts forward - charity. It is key that we consider charity, however this is more due to its confirmation of that pragmatism rather than any refutation or temperance. In regards to charity, Cicero says this (with emphasis added);

“Nothing appeals more to the best in human nature than this, but it calls for the exercise of caution in many particulars: we must, in the first place, see to it that our act of kindness shall not prove an injury either to the object of our beneficence or to others; in the second place, that it shall not be beyond our means; and finally, *that it shall be proportioned to the worthiness of the recipient*; for this is the corner-stone of justice; and by the standard of justice all acts of kindness must be measured. For

²⁰⁵ Cic. Off 2.40

those who confer a harmful favour upon someone whom they seemingly wish to help are to be accounted not generous benefactors but dangerous sycophants; and likewise *those who injure one man, in order to be generous to another, are guilty of the same injustice as if they diverted to their own accounts the property of their neighbours.*²⁰⁶

Thus Cicero makes clear that while charity is a vitally important virtue, he also makes clear that such charity should be in line with key factors. Most poignant to us is his request to see charity restricted to the ‘worthiness’ of the recipient, as well as the crucial proviso that charity cannot be derived from a third party – Cicero is plain in his belief that redistributing wealth is, even in the name of charity, theft. The apparent immorality of property redistribution here is, as we will see, consistent with Cicero’s wider thought, however for the moment it is enough to recognise that the maintenance of property is absolutely central not only to Cicero’s concept of formative politics and the constitution of a state, but even of shared virtue itself.

But what of the common interest? Having made plain the importance of property rights, we are still left with two components of justice – preventing harm to others, and ‘[leading] men to use common possessions of common interests’. The prevention of harm will be dealt with subsequently, however the leading of people in the use of common resources is obviously of direct import to our understanding of property rights and the relationship between citizens in Cicero’s Rome.

We have already seen in some detail the relevance of resource distribution to the political situation of Rome, especially the distribution of grain and land, often represented by the *optimates* and *populares*, however a study of Cicero’s political theory can furnish us with a theoretical understanding of this debate (at least from Cicero’s own perspective). This is especially poignant considering that Cicero, as concerned with liberty and as opposed to tyranny as he was, also rejected absolutely measures of economic equality, especially that

²⁰⁶ Cic. Off. 1.42

of land reforms and means based taxation. Considering his opposition to domination, how was it that he was comfortable rendering exclusive control of resources to an elite few?

Cicero was not as forthcoming about how common resources should be actually managed, nor how common interests should be identified in specifics. What we can find, however, is an insight into his conception of how a people may be 'lead' to manage those interests. It is crucial here to remember that he does not call justice the 'proper use' of common possessions, but rather justice is to *lead* men to use such possessions. This crucial detail in itself begins to tell us a great deal about Cicero's conception of public life in his mixed constitution, however to many optimistic modern liberals it may be the less Cicero says the better. When speaking of the perfect politician, Cicero's mouthpiece in *De Res Publica* likens the statesman to a mahout;

“Well, that Indian or Carthaginian governs a single animal which is gentle and accustomed to the ways of man; but that power which is hidden in men's minds and forms a part of them, and is called reason, controls and subdues not merely one animal, or one which is easily mastered—that is, if it ever does accomplish that which is rarely possible; for that fierce [beast] also must be held in check... [a beast] which feeds on blood; which takes such delight in every sort of cruelty that it can hardly be sated even by the merciless slaughter of men. . . but to one who is greedy and acquisitive and lustful, and who wallows in sensual pleasure . . .”²⁰⁷

Here Cicero equates the role of the politician to that of one who tames and controls wild beasts, with the power of reason being the deciding factor that allows a single man to control the 'beast' that is the common people. Tacit in such an analogy, however, is the notion that the reason of the common people is either devalued or denied in totality – the sum of their reason being the creation of the 'merciless' and 'lustful' beast, whilst the reason of the dignified men of the senate being such that the beast may be tamed. There is no room here for Periclean politics, for Athenian *asphaleia*; reason may facilitate a particular type of political power, but for Cicero it is not in the hands of the polity.

²⁰⁷ Cic. Rep. 2.67

The necessity of a good politician to control the brutish and plainly insensible mob highlights the reciprocal relationship between property rights and the maintenance of justice within Cicero's political theory. Having already established Cicero's support for unequal franchise in favour of the upper classes, we can fully appreciate Asmis' claim that Cicero saw such a conception of political representation as 'fair'. The unequal distribution of wealth and power was an expression of the capacity of reason; more of one obviously begetting more of the other. Further, as the mahouts of the intemperate beast, it was necessary to furnish the upper class with the means to drive the animal forward in an effort to guide effectively the use of common possessions for common interests.

Of course, the cynical might see Cicero's construction as a thinly veiled play at the maintenance of hegemony, but while such is certainly the case to some degree, it would be wrong to assume we have caught him in an act of deception. The honesty with which he puts forward the maintenance of financial, social and political dominance of the few over the many is crucial in adequately reconstructing the Rome that Cicero lived in and ultimately died for. While it is certainly true that such policies favoured Cicero and his friends and family, his maintenance of hegemony had a theoretical (and internally consistent) rationale;

"How conveniently the orders are arranged, the ages, the classes, the knights, among whom the votes of the senators also are included! Too many foolishly desire to abolish this useful system in their search for a new distribution of money through some resolution of the plebs providing for the return of the horses."²⁰⁸

Here Cicero praises unequal suffrages and decries the notion of destroying such a system in order for the multitude to redistribute the holdings of the aristocratic few, a position he also espouses in specifics in *De Officiis*. Speaking of an attempt to redistribute land from rich to poor, Cicero asks "...what more ruinous a policy than that could be conceived?"²⁰⁹ making

²⁰⁸ Cic. Rep. 4.2

²⁰⁹ Cic. Off. 2.73

clear that to do so would undermine the function of the state as a protector of property rights. In the same breath, Cicero also condemns the levying of property tax on the same grounds, but also tempers his rejection of these attempts at equality by reminding us that magistrates must use their advantage to provide for all the bare necessities of life, and to remember that in their dealings “...the chief thing in all public administration and public service is to avoid even the slightest suspicion of self-seeking”.²¹⁰ Regardless of how naive, unscrupulous or ironic it might seem, if we are to give him the benefit of internal consistency (and given his definition of charity already hedges against means based taxation, I think it appropriate), we can see a clear expectation that a polity safeguards the property of individuals – against redistribution, just as much against brigands – so that those with ‘genius’ may guide those without.

We can therefore draw the conclusion that justice to Cicero takes the form of *equity*, and in doing diligence to this conception of justice, ensure we quite purposely set that equity against notions of equality. Where the former renders to each individual the same provision (such as equal liability before the law), the latter actively seeks to abrogate the existing difference between individuals in an effort to make that difference smaller (such as means based taxation, or affirmative action). The gulf between equity and equality is nowhere more pronounced when Cicero speaks of democracy, the system of government universally decried by his interlocutors in *De Res Publica*, not only on the basis of it being inexpedient and prone to tyrannies of both individuals and of the ‘bloodthirsty mob’, but for the unjust nature of the equality on which it relied.²¹¹ Democracy, regardless of its format, stood in opposition to Ciceronian justice; if justice was the maintenance of the personal and the commons, there was no justice in the tempering of one for the sake of the other, a situation unavoidable in a polity based on equality.

CICERO’S STATIST MATERIALISM

²¹⁰ Cic. Off. 2.75

²¹¹ How, “Cicero’s Ideal in His de Republica,” 31.

Cicero's notion of justice is instrumental in his construction of state. Far from being based on what modern republicans might call liberty, Cicero's conception of the Roman constitution is one of pragmatic materialism;

“Thus, between the weakness of a single ruler and the rashness of the many, aristocracies have occupied that intermediate position which represents the utmost moderation; and in a State ruled by its best men, the citizens must necessarily enjoy the greatest happiness, being freed from all cares and worries, when once they have entrusted the preservation of their tranquillity to others, whose duty it is to guard it vigilantly and never to allow the people to think that their interests are being neglected by their rulers. For that equality of legal rights of which free peoples are so fond cannot be maintained (for the people themselves, though free and unrestrained, give very many special powers to many individuals, and create great distinctions among men and the honours granted to them), and what is called equality is really most inequitable.”²¹²

Here Cicero declares that legal equality ‘cannot be maintained’ without the dispensation of protections to men of distinction and honour; such a state is just, fair, and most importantly, stable. It is the eschewing of the ‘violence’ of redistribution, that demonstrates how justice is manifest within a polity; the subsumation of citizen’s interest to their rulers. In order to safeguard the right to property and legal protection, citizens forgo their own reason. In return, rulers “...never to allow the people to think that their interests are being neglected by their rulers.” As we will see, this subsumation of public reason to a sovereign power will prove to be a key paradigm in the story of security, however for our purposes now it is enough to recognise that such a distribution of reason within a polity prevents the sort of contestation key to *asphaleia*. Thus Cicero, through his conception of justice, gives a framework to a system by which difference is overcome and a single will is (theoretically) created – he (in a manner) rejects the wrestling of *asphaleia* for the freedom from concern of *securitas*.

²¹² Cic. Rep. 2.52

The conflict of the classes being a wrestling match between combatants, it was transformed into a shining example of guidance – a beast of burden and its faithful custodian. Driven forward by the honourable mahouts of the upper class, the many can acquiesce to people of means who must ‘not allow the people to suspect their advantages are neglected’. By avoiding the conflict brought about by the redistribution of wealth, and by avoiding the turmoil brought about by unaccountable governance, the best possible outcome is achieved. “For”, to quote the man himself, “there can be little to occasion revolution in a state, in which every person is firmly established in his appropriate rank, and there are but few modes of corruption into which he can fall”; just as “Freedom suppressed and again regained bites with keener fangs than freedom never endangered.”²¹³

LIBERTY – THE MAINTENANCE OF JUSTICE

How then do we explain liberty? From his writing we can be sure that Cicero not only used the term, but it was of vital importance to him – if we are to swallow the elephant in the room that is his preferencing of property over charity, what then does liberty mean to Cicero? Having thus far built a cogent picture of the underpinnings of Cicero’s political theory, we can be sure that whatever form it takes it is not part of the fundamental theory of state. Instead, for Cicero constitution is driven by the natural necessities of justice; humans aggregate and constitute states to extend and better realise that justice, ensuring that individuals and their property are protected. The last step is to understand how these considerations of law both natural and unnatural might look in reality, and it is here that we may glean what liberty Cicero strives for.

For much of the modern engagement with Cicero’s political thought, it is issues of *liberty* that occupy the attention of scholars, however as Scholars such as Asmis and Kennedy have pointed out, there is a large disconnect between what many might wish Cicero’s liberty to be and what it was in practise. While Cicero certainly vested constitutional power in the

²¹³ Cic. Off. 2.24

common people, was concerned with the provision of necessities and opportunities, and sought equality before the law for all citizens in his political theory (and for the most part, his political life), his notion of liberty was not - as Philip Pettit might have it – congruous with modern republican liberalism. More importantly, it was not in itself the basis of a state, nor was it in Cicero’s view a ‘natural’ concept. Liberty was not just, justice or reason, but is perhaps better described as the good and proper outcome of a proper functioning state.

While not overtly labelled as such, this view is largely congruous with Kennedy, who is overt in decrying the optimism (or historicity) required in allowing Cicero to stand as a ‘liberal’. In his study of Liberty in Cicero’s thought, Kennedy highlights the subjugation of liberty to the ‘*auctoritas* of the senate and the *dignitas* of the best men’ over and above any will of or respect of the general citizen.²¹⁴ Such a subjugation leads Kennedy to label Cicero’s notion “a form of ordered liberty characteristic of a conservative an aristocratic word view”,²¹⁵ and the resulting conception of political power as authoritarian, rather than liberal or republican in any modern sense.²¹⁶

While Kennedy interrogates liberty on its own terms, rather than in the context of its order within a wider construction, Asmis instead concentrates on Cicero’s ideal state and arrives at a similar conclusion. Drawing on Cicero’s elitist view of the relationship between aristocracy and proletarians, as well as the specifics of his political theory, Asmis redraws Cicero’s liberty to match his political conception. For Asmis, Cicero’s *libertas* was at its most generously construed an expression of the value gained through the peaceable relations between classes and orders (rather than an end itself).²¹⁷

Combining the above considerations with our understanding of Cicero’s political theory, I think it reasonable to construe Cicero’s liberty as being the result of good politics, rather

²¹⁴ Geoff Kennedy, “Cicero, Roman Republicanism and the Contested Meaning of Libertas,” *Political Studies* 62, no. 3 (May 15, 2013): 492, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12037>.

²¹⁵ Kennedy, 493.

²¹⁶ Kennedy, 496.

²¹⁷ Asmis, “A New Kind of Model.”

than a rule by which good politics was perpetrated. The state, properly constituted, safeguards each at their station, and respects each as their station demands. The result of this maximal justice ensured that all citizens experienced ‘freedom’ in the sense that they enjoyed the insoluble right to live as they were – their property maintained, and equally liable for actions liable to upset the maintenance of others.²¹⁸ Within Roman political discourse, ‘*libertas*’ was almost exclusively the expression of how the government was to operate, not a concrete measure of rights or freedoms enjoyed by the citizenry.²¹⁹

That said, it would be naive to think that this theoretical construction of *libertas* was for Cicero (or any other Roman politician) clean, clear or reliable in the practical act of Roman politics. Both the optimates, who appealed to the authority of the senate, and the Populares, who appealed to the popular will – claimed ‘*libertas*’ as their goal in their public speech.²²⁰ While scholars such as Wirzubski and Morstein-Marx have called into question the wider political clarity of the term, there is little scope here to interrogate to what degree liberty was a clear concept to the Roman polity. What *is* clear, however, is that liberty is not the foundational basis of the state or society, either as a condition or principle.

To put it plainly, there are two crucially important aspects to Cicero’s liberty that are relevant to our understanding of his political psyche. The first is that liberty was not the basis for his political schema, it was a result of that schema; unlike post-enlightenment liberalism, for example, Cicero’s concept of legitimate politics was not ordered around a fundamental assumption of liberty. Given that freedom (whether of expression, association, thought or action) was not the basis of his constitution, the terms and tools needed to express and maintain that constitution would be different to that of Athens or the liberal democratic nations of today.

²¹⁸ Cic. Off. 2.42

²¹⁹ Chaim Wirzubski, *Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome during the Late Republic and Early Principate*, Reprinted, Cambridge Classical Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1968), 66.

²²⁰ Morstein-Marx, *Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic*, 194.

Secondly, even if liberty did constitute the basis of Cicero's politics, the value of that liberty was fundamentally different to the understanding of modern liberals, and as we will see in the next section, to that of the ancient Greeks. Cicero's liberty was not indicative of universal civil rights, free speech or universal franchise - instead liberty was a more nebulous concept, an end-state that was enjoyed by a polity as a whole in its happy subjection to good and proper law, and in its more personal application, a realisation of individual capacity unfettered by outside interference. Liberty was the sum total of the maintenance of order.

At the end of the day, however, in the case of Cicero's conception of politics it is unclear whether the realisation of liberty was through its positive acquisition or as a good and proper tool to be wielded. Regarding his proposals for elections, Cicero concludes that "our law grants the appearance of liberty, preserves the influence of the aristocracy, and removes the causes of dispute between the classes."²²¹ Whether the 'appearance' (*species*) of liberty means it will be brought to be visible, or whether Cicero means that it will simply give an *impression* of liberty is ultimately here nor there – that his politics is ordered not on notions of equal rights and freedoms, but on a concept of natural law and the maintenance of property is important.

ON ABSOLUTE RULE

Liberty was not the basis of Cicero's political theory – in its place sat a notion of natural law of justice that informed his conception of not only liberty, but also charity, politics and the state. That conception of justice demanded that all stand before the law, but it did not operate on the assumption that all members of a polity were equally subject to the law, nor that political franchise was necessary for a legitimate government, and certainly did not contain within its scope for competing political claims. Indeed, far from being liberal, Cicero's

²²¹ Cic. Leg. 3.39

natural law was absolute, unwavering, demanding of adherence – it was, in the words of Loelius in *De Res Publica*;

“True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions...”²²²

But as stated above, this universal and unchanging law was not a law equally applied. However he doesn't lose sight of the domestic perspective – after delivering his treatise on the universality of justice, Cicero has Loelius remind us that equality is not part of justice, but is rather an affront to it; “Tiberius Gracchus continued faithful to his fellow-citizens, but he violated the rights and treaties guaranteed to our allies and the Latin peoples.” The attempt of Gracchus to impart equality onto a hugely unpopular landowning system was “arbitrary violence”.²²³

In this context, the popular will, the call for equality either in political suffrage or in economic terms, is equated with ‘force’; to Cicero such things are expressions of power, but not expressions of fact or right – they are not real. While modern authors might see it as odd for Cicero to enshrine the right of popular assemblies “only to inhibit significantly their law-making power by embedding the fundamental laws and principles of the Roman republican constitution within an absolutist and unchanging conception of natural law”,²²⁴ for Cicero this centrality of natural law was fundamental to the construction of the state, as well as its continued survival. The popular will was not the basis of political right, it was simply a power that needed practical management

CONCLUSION

Cicero's work was the final chapter in the history of a republic that began when the plebeians were first given a tribune to call their own in the early 5th century BCE, and the

²²² Cic. Rep. 3.33

²²³ Cic. Rep 3.41

²²⁴ Kennedy, “Cicero, Roman Republicanism and the Contested Meaning of Libertas,” 496.

issues of representation and equity were formative then just as they were for Cicero. The creation of the plebeian tribune was the birth of Republican Rome, however it was not itself done to honour the notion of liberty or fair representation. Rather, the instigation of the tribune was the result of a popular uprising; with the plebeians being crushed by debt and the pressures of war, they seceded Rome, leaving the city in revolt. Without an underclass, the city ground to a halt; in response the patricians debated on a course of action that would bring the plebeians back to the fold.

To resolve the crisis, Agrippa Menenius Lanatus, an ex-consul well-liked by the common people, made an appeal in the form of an allegory. There were days in the archaic past, he said, when the parts of the body did not know to cooperate. Upon seeing the apparent selfishness of the stomach, the other parts more active parts refused to feed it. The refusal ended with the obvious result; the body starved, and hands and stomachs rotted alike.²²⁵ The plebeians were convinced, and resolved to return to Rome upon the institution of a tribune to represent them – the same tribune that Cicero labelled centuries later a token gesture to appease the mob.

The tension between the classes never disappeared, and as such the story and its purpose was likely never far from the mind of any Roman statesman. It certainly wasn't far from the mind of Cicero – he uses a very similar parable for a similar purpose, though where Lanatus the ex-consul used the parable to appease the plebs, Cicero uses it to guard against them;

“Suppose... that each one of our bodily members should conceive this idea and imagine that it could be strong and well if it should draw off to itself the health and strength of its neighbouring member, the whole body would necessarily be enfeebled and die; so, if each one of us should seize upon the property of his

²²⁵ Liv. 2.32; Livy, “History of Rome 2,” trans. B. O. Foster (Harvard University Press, 1919), https://doi.org/10.4159/DLCL.livy-history_rome_2.1919.

neighbours and take from each whatever he could appropriate to his own use, the bonds of human society must inevitably be annihilated.”²²⁶

While a state might be active in the management of the needs of competing groups, to the Roman conception of constitution, any state that might hope to endure the passage of time must not allow these oppositional forces to contest. From Lanatus to Cicero, the bodily organs must not debate, but must instead operate according to their station. To maintain each in their lot is not oppression, but rather it is just; it is an expression of a natural order, a law of nature. In this way, popular will is a force to manage, not legitimating and certainly not inherently just. The polity, the commons, lack the means and legitimacy of governance, and as such their will cannot be ‘just’ according to natural law; instead, the common lot is safeguarded by those with the means to do so. Just as it is argued in Cicero’s *De Res Publica*, the force of the mob is the beast, and such a brutish animal requires a skilled aristocracy to tame it for the sake of the state as a whole.

Cicero’s republic is not about the maintenance of footing against the constant stresses of contestability, but rather the muting of contestation for the sake of opportunity. In such a polity, reason is the responsibility of a small group of powerful actors, whilst the vast majority of citizens are to forgo their reason in return for protection. As such, the notion of *asphaleia* had no place in the Roman polity, even in the tumultuous years of the late republic. The absence of a need for ‘remaining upright’ in the Roman political vocabulary is even more stark when we consider the language of failure that Cicero himself used in those tumultuous times. In his political works, as well as his orations in response to the Catalinian conspiracy that threatened his consulship, Cicero decried people and forces that would seek to *labefacto* (to cause to fall, to overthrow) the Roman state,²²⁷ just as lies, untruths or damaging ideas were *perversum* (upturned).²²⁸

²²⁶ Cic. Off. 3.22

²²⁷ Cic. Rep. 2.4, 2.7; Cic. Catil 1.1, 4.10 Marcus Tullius Cicero and Charles Duke Yonge, *The Orations of Marcus Tullius Cicero, Literally Translated by C. D. Yonge* (London: Henry G. Bohn, York Street, Covent Garden, 1856).

²²⁸ Cic. Off. 1.5; Cic. Fin. 3.70. Cicero, “De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum,” trans. H. Rackham (Harvard University Press, 1914), https://doi.org/10.4159/DLCL.marcus_tullius_cicero-de_finibus_bonorum_et_malorum.1914.

However while the Athenian demos fell as combatants in the arena of rhetoric, the Roman citizen was the member of a single unified body; it fell not through contest, but through ill-health, through wrong thinking, through deviation from a natural law. Despite the similar metaphors of failure, the Roman idea of a successful state was not one standing upright in safe tension, but was one standing strong in good *salus* – good health. There was no contest of ideas, there was simply the tension between elements of a body; organs that might act selfishly, but ultimately had to work together in line with their natural functions. As such, the body stood or fell not on the basis of the result of competition, but on the basis of avoiding, removing and minimizing that competition. The state was not a contest, it was a body, a machine, each part working in its allocated way to ensure the health of the whole.

CHAPTER SIX

IMPERIAL ROME AND THE SECURITAS OF NERO

Of all the historical inheritances of the English Civil War, that of Imperial Rome is perhaps the most complex. Unlike that of Greece, Republican Rome or the will of God, the Empire is not a battleground contested by both sides; instead, the world of Imperial Rome offers two separate perspectives to democrats and monarchists, with neither perspective challenging the other.

On the democratic side stands the figure of Caesar as a tyrant, the destroyer of good governance, the selfish king. With Caesar's betrayal of the Republic came the tyranny of monarchy, and lost was the civility of the western world. For the monarchists, however, the inheritance of Rome was far more subtle. Not typified by any particular person or event, what the monarchists of sixteenth century England owed the Empire was more a notion, an idea, than it was a specific historical fact. As the democrats rallied against the idea of a single sovereign individual, even one that claimed a divine justification, many of the monarchists of the civil war were, whether they realised it or not, appealing to a system that had its roots in the Roman Empire. The emperor, the 'first Roman', divinely blessed and all powerful, ruled to dispense benefit to the populace, and both monarchists by divine right, as well as monarchists through pragmatic humanism, had nested within their thought the legacy of Imperial Rome.

This chapter will therefore seek to achieve a number of goals. It will elucidate the legacy of Imperial Rome, and highlight the concepts and attributes that would come to inform monarchists over a millennia later. Further, the chapter will also track the shift in meaning of *securitas* between the Republic to Empire in terms of both representation and function, and demonstrate how the shift in governance precipitated a shift in the political value of the term. With a fundamental shift in the needs of the political apparatus and the polity in which it was employed, we can see how a word so recently created is shaped into a politically valent term to be wielded in order to achieve specific political outcomes.

In practical terms, this work will track the emergence of *securitas* on the coinage of Nero and contextualise its formulation and use through comparison to both the events and the literature of the time. This will begin by establishing the value of coins as a medium for political messaging, as well as how the use of coins for such purposes was developed into an imperial hallmark by Gaius Julius and Augustus Caesar. We will then examine existing work on the use of *securitas* and its emergence on Nero's coins, and build a picture as to why Nero's court and administration would use this relatively new and relatively obscure word to advertise itself to the Roman people. While a study of coins may seem an unnecessary sideshow, to fully appreciate the value *securitas* had to the Neronian Empire, it is crucial to understand the role and importance of numismatic imagery in ancient Rome.

Though the advertisement of virtues began with the Greek kings, it was with Nero that it reached its full potential in the Roman world. Guided by his stoic tutor Seneca (himself the inheritor of the Ciceronian legacy of the stoic political philosopher) Nero added to the expansive list of Roman cultic personifications a new but highly nuanced and precise tool with which to encapsulate the service his rule provided to the people of Rome. However beyond simply being the manifestation of the interplay between stoic philosophy and imperial publicity, the emergence of this concept was precipitated by domestic events that demanded a novel political response, a response to which security played as important part. This highly specific (and as we will see, quite serendipitous) turn of events will furnish us with a view of political *securitas* that endures for a millennia after its creation.

FROM REPUBLIC TO EMPIRE

The use and importance of *securitas* in the political life of the Roman Empire has been the subject of very little systematic appraisal.²²⁹ The reason for this small amount of engagement is easy to appreciate – unlike the other concepts listed, *securitas* appears very

²²⁹ A single book, written after this chapter was completed stands alone in this regard. See C. Ricci, *Security in Roman Times: Rome, Italy and the Emperors* (Taylor & Francis, 2018), <https://books.google.com.au/books?id=NBFFDwAAQBAJ>.

late in the history of the Roman story, and enjoys far less use than the concepts that came before it.²³⁰

But while the study of *securitas* in Imperial Rome offers comparably little to dedicated Roman scholars, there has been a small but notable interest in *securitas* on the part of theologians,²³¹ as well as an even smaller and less notable amount of enquiry from modern political theorists. Of the scholars dealing with political theory and *securitas*, these are all brief, and rarely found outside article length treatments. *Securitas* features prominently in the chapter contribution of Arenas (to which scholars such as Herrington²³² and Stritzel²³³ are indebted), however even this short treatment presents numerous issues.²³⁴ *Securitas* is also featured by way of background in the work of Zwierlein,²³⁵ however in terms of representation in full length folios we can once again turn to Dillon and Hamilton, with each

²³⁰ While we will explore the issue in more depth below, for an overview of how prevalent *securitas* was in Roman political messaging see Carlos F. Noreña, “The Communication of the Emperor’s Virtues,” *The Journal of Roman Studies* 91 (2001): 146–68, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3184774>; C. F. Noreña, *Imperial Ideals in the Roman West: Representation, Circulation, Power* (Cambridge University Press, 2011), https://books.google.com.au/books?id=kyiQlv_ZvJYC.

²³¹ Much of this work deals with the interpretation of biblical passages, especially 1 Thessalonians 5:3 (which we will discuss in a subsequent chapter). See Joel R. White, “‘Peace’ and ‘Security’ (1 Thess 5.3): Roman Ideology and Greek Aspiration,” *New Testament Studies* 60, no. 4 (2014): 499–510, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0028688514000162>; Daniel M Yencich, “Peace, Security, and Labor Pains in 1 Thessalonians 5.3,” 2015, 7; Jeffrey A. D. Weima, “‘Peace and Security’ (1 Thess 5.3): Prophetic Warning or Political Propaganda?,” *New Testament Studies* 58, no. 3 (2012): 331–59, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0028688512000045>.

²³² Herrington, “Philosophy: The Concepts of Security, Fear, Liberty, and the State.”

²³³ Stritzel attacks Waever and securitisation on the basis of the fact that if the term’s meaning has changed, the applicability of the framework cannot be reliable, and relies on Arends to demonstrate the shift in meaning of the term. Stritzel, “Security, the Translation.”

²³⁴ Arenas, *From Homer to Hobbes and beyond - Aspects of “security” in the European Tradition*. Arends relies heavily on two German sources, which hampers hugely the applicability to the Anglo tradition. In regards to *securitas*, this reliance poses no methodological problems however issues persist nonetheless. Arends is unclear regarding whether *securitas* is glossing for *ataraxia* or *euthemia*, until admitting that he wants to keep both options open (pages 268–269) This hedging is broadly acceptable, but needlessly imprecise. Cicero meant it to gloss for *apatheia*, but we can (and should assume) that Seneca himself conflated it with *Ataraxia* – especially considering his willingness to borrow from the Epicureans (a school traditionally opposed to stoicism) when it suited him (not as a ‘deserter’, but as a ‘spy’ – See the second letter in Seneca the Younger, “Epistles,” trans. Richard M. Gummere (Harvard University Press, 1917), https://doi.org/10.4159/DLCL.seneca_younger-epistles.1917. Arends also claims that *tutus* and *securitas* are synonyms in *de Clementia* (page 270) something that we will in the present chapter interrogate closely (and find to be false). Lastly, while Arends claims that *securitas* was a ‘key notion’ in the *Pax Romana* (page 270), we will see that while they were indeed related, *securitas* was far from ‘key’.

²³⁵ Cornel Zwierlein, “Security Politics and Conspiracy Theories in the Emerging European State System (15th/16th c.),” 2013, 32. Zwierlein does a good job, but speaks to *securitas* only as much as is necessary to explicate the subject at hand, which for the most part is conspiracies.

having a small amount to say on the matter – although what little they say manages to leave us with a rather confusing picture.

On the one hand, Dillon suggests that after the fall of the republic and rise of Augustus, “*Securitas*... acquired a certain political prominence, occurring in imperial mottos and on emblems and coins.”²³⁶ Dillon doesn’t expand on this ‘certain political prominence’ - in fact he says little more on the subject, focussing instead on a fly-by-night history of the term as an introduction to various philosophical observations, however this brief observation is noteworthy in the context of a comparison to the far more historically minded Hamilton.

Because on the other hand, Hamilton is clear in his appraisal of the political value of security in the empire, writing that while “...the earlier republican distinction between *salus* ‘bodily safety’ and *securitas* ‘peace of mind’ ... started to get less rigorous,”²³⁷ after the rise of Augustus, this shift is not overtly political. Indeed, writing in a later chapter, Hamilton makes clear that “the term *securitas* is not explicitly employed as a political or philosophical concept in any sustained manner before the fourteenth century.”²³⁸ Obviously the claims of Hamilton and Dillon are mutually exclusive, and however cursory each attempt has been in exploring *securitas*, this disparity is notable; not only are they fundamentally contradictory, but as two of the few full length works on the subject of the political value of security, their disagreement should be of concern to us given the present endeavour. While Hamilton’s historical and textual analysis is, on the whole, stellar (as mentioned in the introductory chapter, this thesis is certainly indebted to it); however Hamilton’s two key claims regarding the meaning of *securitas* after the fall of the Republic are flawed, as we will see later in the chapter. To begin with, however, we will examine textual uses of the word from 27 BC to 54 CE, the period between the rise of the Principate and the emergence of the term in clear political use during the rule of Nero.

²³⁶ Dillon, *Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought*, 28.

²³⁷ Hamilton, *Security*, 59.

²³⁸ Hamilton, 137.

PHILOSOPHY, RHETORIC, AND THE LACK OF A POLITICAL *SECURITAS*

Coined as it was as a philosophical term by Cicero, who was on face value hostile to the principate that followed soon after his death, it could be seen that the endurance of the term at all is surprising; however endure it did. While the Republic Cicero fought for gave way to the monarchical rule of the son of the now deified Caesar, *securitas* made its way into the wider language of Rome regardless – the works of Cicero were well respected by the next generation of scholars, and enjoyed a popularity untarnished by the author’s hostility to the notions of the principate. While the way in which *securitas* became part of wider language cannot be known for certain, it is likely that it was through the study of Cicero’s works by the rhetoricians, lawyers and educated nobility that saw the word used in increasingly wider contexts over the next century.

Of these new uses, one of the first comes from the historian Livy; of the thirty-five books still extant from Livy’s *Ab Urbe Condita Libri*, written during the rule of Augustus, the work features *securitas* twice. While both usages have a politico-military context, they are both speaking to a specific individual reaching a point of assurance regarding a concern they have for the future, rather than commenting on the events that those individuals are taking part in. In the first, a general has *securitas* that his enemy would act in a certain way,²³⁹ and in another a prince of Macedon seeks *securitas* for his future against the claims of his brother.²⁴⁰

By the reign of Tiberius - some thirty years after Livy’s history was written, the word finds more varied expression in the work of Valerius Maximus. Valerius’ *Factorum ac dictorum memorabilium libri IX* was a collection of around a thousand short stories and historical anecdotes that served as a sourcebook for orators looking for historical snippets to embellish their speeches. Valerius drew on many Roman authors for his anthology, but it is notable that of all the sources on which he relied, textual evidence suggests that it is Cicero

²³⁹ Livy 36.41; “*Dum haec in Italia geruntur, Antiochus Ephesi securus admodum de bello Romano erat, tamquam non transituris in Asiam Romanis; quam securitatem ei magna pars amicorum aut per errorem aut adsentando faciebat*”. Livy et al., *History of Rome*, trans. John Yardley, vol. X: Books 35-37, 8 vols., Loeb Classical Library 295, 301, 313 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2017).

²⁴⁰ Livy 40.16; “*ego enim ut me mihi tibi que serves precor: ille ut me in securitatem suam occidas postulat*”. Livy, *History of Rome*, trans. John Yardley, vol. XI: Books 38-40, 8 vols., Loeb Classical Library 295, 301, 313 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2017).

and Livy that he relies on the most - reinforcing the idea that it was through the value of Cicero's writing that allowed the word to promulgate. Unlike Livy's massive historical text, Valerius' work was a small and easily digestible text designed for everyday use and reference and as such its use of *securitas* is notable in the sense that we can assume it is either subscriptive or proscriptive – that it is either indicative of use at the time, or that the book's wide adoption made such usage more popular.

While none of the examples of *securitas* present in Valerius' work are political in target, and only a few are tenuously political in context, they are nevertheless important for our understanding of how the word could be used at the time, and how it will be used during the reign of Nero some thirty years later. Still describing at its most basic level a mind without cares, Valerius' *securitas* takes that fundamental mode of operation and applies it beyond the zen-like stoicism to which it was originally attributed. There are of course uses that sit roughly analogous with Livy and the more broad application of Cicero's own conception; relaying a story of a Greek king, he recounts that when the king asked the oracle of Delphi if there was any man happier than himself, the oracle cited a poor man of Arcadia whose 'hut smiling in security' (*securitate ridens tugurium*) was preferable to a palace filled with cares and worries.²⁴¹ Likewise, *securitas* is employed in his treatment of Caesar's refusal to acknowledge an augur's prediction that he was at risk on the Ides of March - 'if only the augur had been mistaken in his prophecy, rather than the father of his nation in his security.'²⁴²

There are two more imaginative uses of the term, however, that merit attention. The first is in regards to sleep – and the assumption that one who did not have *securitas* would be hard-pressed to get any. In a story of two brothers charged with the murder of their father late in the night, there was every reason to convict them – empty save for the man and his two sons, no one else had entered the house and both were to gain from their father's death. They were acquitted, however; when the jury heard testimony that the brothers were found still asleep when the body was found the next day, they dropped the charges.

²⁴¹ V. Max. 7.1. All subsequent quotations are taken from the following translation unless otherwise stated. Valerius Maximus, "Memorable Doings and Sayings," trans. D. R. Shackleton Bailey (Harvard University Press, 2000), https://doi.org/10.4159/DLCL.valerius_maximus-memorable_doings_sayings.2000.

²⁴² V. Max. 8.11

According to Valerius, to sleep under such circumstances was a 'sure sign of innocent security'.²⁴³ Still operating on the same mechanism of individual cares and concerns, the notion that *securitas* could manifest physically is a notable evolution.

Even more shocking however is the developing proximity between *securitas* and death evident in Valerius' usage. Twice in Valerius' work *securitas* appears as an aspect or outcome of death. In the first, when relaying Brutus' state of mind at the battle of Philippi, Valerius says that;

"As he was going into his last battle, someone told him it should not be hazarded. "I go into battle with confidence," Brutus said. "Today either all will be well or I shall not be caring." He must have made up his mind that he could neither live without victory nor die without **freedom from anxiety**."²⁴⁴

Securitas, then, was an outcome of death – something that is incongruous with modern conceptions of security, especially in the political space. Valerius uses the word again in even more emphatic terms when discussing the death of a brigand captured by Roman forces and threatened with interrogation;

"When asked about the strength and enterprises of the runaways, he took some time to collect himself, then covered his head, fell on his knees, and stopped his breath; so in the very hands of his guards and in the presence of highest command he found rest in the **security** for which he yearned."²⁴⁵

Beyond Valerius and Livy, however, there is a use approaching the political penned during (or at least very close to) the reign of Caligula (37 CE), found in a rather strange work of instructional fiction. Seneca the Elder's *Controversiae* was a work in which the author laid out a number of hypothetical legal cases, and then using a variety of characters provided content and commentary on the case at hand. The work itself was written at the request of

²⁴³ V. Max. 8.1; "*innoxiae securitatis certissimus index*".

²⁴⁴ V. Max. 6.4

²⁴⁵ V. Max. 9.12; "*caput operuit innixusque genibus compresso spiritu inter ipsas custodum manus inque conspectu summi imperii exoptata securitate acquievit*"

Seneca's sons, the most famous of which - Seneca the Younger – will be of great relevance to us in the subsequent section. In one of the cases presented in the work, a son is charged with beating his father (punishable by cutting off the hands), however it was at the order of a tyrant that the son subsequently killed. In one of the hypothetical defence speeches mounted by the father of the accused, he says;

“I beg you by the **safety of the state**, by the pleasure we take in the liberty now restored to us, by your wives and children —no-one heard me begging and suppliant like this when I got beaten. —How feeble his hands as he struck me! I shouldn't have supposed him capable of killing a tyrant. These hands have held out food and drink to succour me; but I have never felt them more affectionate towards me than when they flogged me.”²⁴⁶

The usage of the term is obviously appealing to a political sense – the term is clearly applied to the state and its people, rather than any individual – however it is also a complete fabrication. While it is highly unlikely that in a work such as this the author is creating a completely novel usage of the term (and we can therefore assume that such a conception of *securitas* was at least possible in first century Rome), due to its fictitious nature I am reticent to call it a concretely political employment – important considering that it would make it the first in extant texts. Regardless, the application of the term to the '*publicam*' (belonging to the people) would find its way onto coins of the empire (albeit not until the reign of Hadrian, some one hundred years later) and as such we can see this small and fictitious usage as the leading edge of the application of the term to the political space.

BEFORE NERO: THREE SMALL EXAMPLES

While the textual evidence makes clear that *securitas* was not a major part of the early principate's social consciousness, neither was it completely absent. There are two (or perhaps three) small examples of the notion's employment in act and artefact in the years

²⁴⁶ Sen. Con. 8.4; “*Rogo vos per securitatem publicam, per modo restitutae libertatis laetitiam, per coniuges liberosque vestros*”. All subsequent quotations are taken from the following translation. Seneca the Elder, “*Controversiae*,” trans. Michael Winterbottom (Harvard University Press, 1974), https://doi.org/10.4159/DLCL.seneca_elder-controversiae.1974.

before Nero. The first are dual altars erected to the virtues of *pax* and *securitas* in Praeneste, built by order of the local council during the time of Augustus. Standing opposite each other, both altars are essentially identical in design, differing only in their dedicatory inscription.²⁴⁷

There are three key things to identify on these altars.

Firstly, the fact that they stood in concert, similarly adorned, suggests that the two concepts were complimentary. Secondly, and connected to the first, it would seem that the inscriptions of each altar were made to fit the design – that the altars were likely of a generic form, and the inscriptions made after the fact (suggesting that we should take little stock in the design being indicative of contemporary conceptions of the virtue).²⁴⁸ Lastly, after Augustus' death, a third altar dedicated to the now deified emperor was added, replete with a portrait surrounded by cornucopia.²⁴⁹

Taken as a dual construction, it is hard to know whether the use of a generic design was a cost saving measure or was indicative of the importance of the concepts; however when considered alongside the design and placement of the third altar to Augustus himself, the scene seems more straightforward. Lacking complex imagery of their own, the virtues are given the person of the Emperor and the cornucopia, the latter of which conjures notions of plenty and provision, rather than protection and safety. By the portrait of the emperor, the dual considerations of *pax* and *securitas* are now given a point of emanation, their simple design becoming constituent elements of a tripartate godhead; of peaceful body, peaceful mind and the now divine ruler under whose gaze such gifts of provision are delivered.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁷ P. Zanker and A. Shapiro, *The Power of Images in the Age of Augustus* (University of Michigan Press, 1990), 307, <https://books.google.com.au/books?id=pDc2fp73B2oC>.

²⁴⁸ Stefan Weinstock, "Pax and the 'Ara Pacis,'" *Journal of Roman Studies* 50, no. 1–2 (November 1960): 56, <https://doi.org/10.2307/298286>.

²⁴⁹ Zanker and Shapiro, *The Power of Images in the Age of Augustus*, 307.

²⁵⁰ The altars of Praeneste, as the only 'concrete' manifestation of *securitas* available to us today has stood as a rather imposing data point on discussions of the term, and it is interesting to note the variety of different conclusions that have been reached because of, or in spite of it. For example, Ricci argues that we can 'rightly assert' that the altars of Praeneste indicate the eventual integration of *salus* and *securitas*, however there is no substantive discussion on how this occurs (see Ricci, *Security in Roman Times: Rome, Italy and the Emperors*, 46.). Arenas uses the altars to argue that *securitas* "...had become a key notion to designate the *Pax Romana*, the 'Roman Peace', understood as security of public and private life under the emperors" (Arenas, *From Homer to Hobbes and beyond - Aspects of "security" in the European Tradition*, 6:270.) However it is important to note that *securitas* is entirely absent from Augustus' *Res Gestae* and other key discussions regarding the '*pax Romana*'. (RG 3.15). Similarly, Weima uses the altar as evidence that the phrase '*pax et securitas*' (or at least the Hellenistic equivalent '*eirene kai asphaleia*') was a "popular theme or slogan of the imperial Roman

The association between virtues and the divine emperor was no accident, but part of a wider program codified by Augustus in his own lifetime. The most systematic of these efforts can be found on the issuing of coins during his reign; the coinage of Augustus began to pair the face of the emperor not with events or specific scenes, but with virtues – personified concepts held in high esteem within Roman society. *Pax*, *Victoria* and *Virtus* – peace, victory and virtue – graced Roman coinage, often with the inscription ‘CAESAR DIVI F’; the ‘*Divi Filius*’, or son of the divine, being a direct appeal to Augustus’ relationship to the now deified Julius Caesar. While the process of associating specific virtues with prominent was not unheard of in the late Republic, Augustus cemented this new paradigm, systematically attaching these fundamental Roman virtues to the person of the *princeps*, while simultaneously attaching that person to the divine realm.²⁵¹

The second use of political import is a small reference made to *securitas* in the annals of the Arval brethren, an ancient religious order whose spiritual remit had originally focussed on farming and harvests, but by the age of Augustus also involved intercession and sacrifices on behalf of the imperial family.²⁵² In the Brethren’s records of the sacrifices made for the year, they note that they sacrificed to Jove for the ‘*securitatem et salutem*’ (security and safety) of the emperor Tiberius in 37 CE.²⁵³ To my knowledge, this evidence regarding the use of *securitas* has not been cited elsewhere (most notably Ricci’s work), but one could expect that this would, in other hands, be posited as an example of the merging of *salus* and *securitas*; however as we will soon see in both the context of the Arval’s records as well as the greater political climate, such is not the case.

As it stands though, we can certainly take two points from this evidence. The first is that in the decades preceding this use, in their many sacrifices for the emperor, *securitas* was not

propaganda machine” (Weima, “‘Peace and Security’ (1 Thess 5.3): Prophetic Warning or Political Propaganda?,” 332.) However as we will see the claims of Weima, Arenas and Ricci are all tenuous at best.

²⁵¹ Carol Humphrey Vivian Sutherland, ed., *Coinage in Roman Imperial Policy 31 B.C.-A.D. 68* (New York (N.Y.): Sanford J. Durst, 1978), 153.

²⁵² Mary Beard, “Writing and Ritual: A Study of Diversity and Expansion in the Arval Acta,” *Papers of the British School at Rome* 53 (1985): 116.

²⁵³ References to Henzen’s transcription of the Arval records will be made on the basis of year entry – in this case XXXIX.10. See W. Henzen and Fratres Arvales, *Acta Fratrum Arvalium Quae Supersunt* (Georgii Reimeri, 1874), <https://books.google.com.au/books?id=ETQGAAAQAAJ>.

listed as a goal of the proceedings – something that would suggest that it either was not known or not seen as important by those performing and recording the rituals. The second conclusion we can reach, tied to the first, is that for the Arvals in all but one case (which we will explore later) it was *salus* and the genius of the emperor that maintained his wellbeing, not *securitas*. Indeed over the entire three centuries, while *salus* is given as both a goal of a sacrifice and sometimes as the target divinity throughout the history of the Arvals,²⁵⁴ only once more – immediately after Nero’s reign - does the notion feature as the goal of a sacrifice on behalf of an emperor.²⁵⁵ Such sparse usage reinforces the notion that to the brethren, *securitas* had comparatively little relevance to their goal of currying divine protection for the emperor, especially compared to *salus*.²⁵⁶

The last example is a portrayal on a coin minted during the early years of Caligula’s reign.²⁵⁷ Minted around 37 CE, the coin featured the Emperor’s head on the obverse, and on the reverse, his three sisters, with the names of each surrounding the image. While the coin does not feature the word *securitas*, nor have any ancient sources corroborated the theory, modern scholars hold that each sister is styled as a personification of a virtue important to Roman life; Agrippina, Drusilla and Livilla being *Securitas*, *Concordia* and *Fortuna* respectively.

It is interesting to our understanding of the placement of the virtue within the Roman consciousness both with whom Agrippina – the sister of Caligula and mother of the future emperor Nero - was portrayed with, and the symbolism used to create the portrayal. It is not *Securitas* with *Pax* or *Salus*, but instead with concord and good fortune, the three virtues standing at ease and holding each a cornucopia, a symbol of good harvests, good eating and a full bounty. It would be hard therefore to assume that these three earthly

²⁵⁴ CLXXXVIII, Henzen and Arvaes.

²⁵⁵ Actually, twice if we expand out to include ‘secure’; In 213 there is an invocation that Severus Antoninus is ‘...salvo salvi et securi’ (healthy, safe and secure) in year XIII, Henzen and Arvaes.

²⁵⁶ Similarly for the sake of Ricci, tutela is also only used twice by the Arvals, both times during the reign of Commodus – if *securitas*, *salus* and *tutela* were interchangeable, it seems that their choice of coins and sacrifices would suggest that individual emperors were very selective about which term they used and when.

²⁵⁷ It should be noted that this last portrayal, while widely hypothesised as an example of *Securitas* is unconfirmed due to a lack of direct statement from ancient sources

divinities are protecting the emperor from the threats of assassination or attack, or making a statement regarding the military actions of the state.

If the coin did seek to advertise the safety of the emperor, it would have served as quite an embarrassment – approximately two years later, Caligula had Agrippina and Livilla exiled after they were involved in a plot against his life. While the plot itself was unsuccessful, ultimately it was Agrippina that outlasted the Emperor, returning from exile and eventually marrying Caligula's replacement Claudius in 49 AD, and seeing her son from her first marriage - the emperor Nero- ascend to the throne in 54 CE. As we have already forecast, it is Nero that first depicts *Securitas* in both image and script on a coin, and it is hard to discount the importance of his mother's depiction in that story – in fact, as we will see later, his mother's relationship to coins is notable in itself, and likely spurred the young emperor's own interest in the minting of coins and the messages those coins contained.

Before we finally reach the emergence of *Securitas* on a coin, however, there is one last source of insight into *securitas* as a concept, especially as it relates to Nero – one that can we can attribute to the work of Agrippina. Years before Nero ascended the throne, Agrippina had used her influence to appoint her tutor of choice to educate her son; which considering the tutor and his circumstances was a notable feat. The man in question is known to us now as Seneca the Younger, son of Seneca the Elder, discussed previously. In addition to his father being a noted scholar in his own right, Seneca the Younger had been trained in stoic philosophy and rhetoric, and as a member of the senatorial class was no stranger to politics and power. Such credentials had the making of an extremely desirable tutor for an aspiring emperor, and it is testament to Agrippina's power and prestige that she could gain the services of such a man, and not least because to do so she had to negotiate his return from exile – Claudius had banished him from Rome in 41 CE on charges of adultery.

Beyond undoubtedly being influential over the young emperor's education and political sensibilities, Seneca would go on to remain a core part of the Neronian court for a number of years, penning the emperor's early speeches, and credited by ancient authors with the maintenance of the empire in the early days of Nero's rule. As we will see, Seneca drew a clear role for *securitas* in the realm of politics, and further, we will see that later in his rule

Nero used this newly politicised *securitas* in his own political messaging. That Seneca would be recalled from exile by Agrippina, a woman already portrayed in coinage in a manner indicative of *securitas* lends itself to the assumption that Nero's later use of the term was the result of these two influences, however exactly what role they played, especially in the case of Agrippina, is likely lost to history.

THE TUTOR

Seneca's position within the court of Nero is extremely important to the story of *Securitas* because it is hard to believe the virtue having such traction without the presence of the most influential stoic philosopher of the time – remembering of course that *securitas* was penned by Cicero only a century earlier to explain a stoic ideal. Seneca uses the term extensively; of the Roman literature extant today, he is one of the most prolific users of the word, and certainly employed it more than Cicero himself. Interestingly however, the word is used in a variety of ways throughout Seneca's corpus, sometimes holding seemingly antithetical notions in the same work. For example, in *de Beneficiis*, Seneca lists *secutitatem* alongside *dignitatem* (respected social standing) and *sanitatem* (good health) as priceless aspects of life,²⁵⁸ yet in the next book uses it as part of an indictment of inaction, a sort of excuse for laziness.²⁵⁹ To add a healthy dose of confusion into the mix, *de Beneficiis* also treats *securitas* as the absence of concerns gained by a well-built wall around a city,²⁶⁰ as well as a usage reminiscent of a security deposit.²⁶¹

But while this eclectic use spans across his major works, the wide variety of uses should be illustrative of the appeal of the internal metaphor on which it is based only. This is firstly because Seneca's use of the word seems to be tailored to audience to which he was writing, and secondly, because while his use could be eclectic, it is far outweighed in frequency by

²⁵⁸ Sen. Ben. 3.14. All subsequent quotations are taken from the following translation unless otherwise stated. Seneca the Younger, "De Beneficiis," trans. John W. Basore (Harvard University Press, 1935), https://doi.org/10.4159/DLCL.seneca_younger-de_beneficiis.1935.

²⁵⁹ Sen. Ben. 4.13

²⁶⁰ Sen. Ben. 6.15

²⁶¹ Sen. Ben. 7.15

the ‘standard’, more Ciceronian meaning. In order to demonstrate this (and simultaneously start to build a picture of how *securitas* might have been taken publically), we will focus on two works written during Nero’s reign; one philosophical, the other a political work.

EPISTULAE MORALIS

This collection of letters are addressed to Lucilius, a friend of Seneca’s who, according to the text, was proconsul of Sicily; however given the tone of the work it is presumed the letters were designed to be read by a wider audience. The focus of the letters is moral philosophy, dealing with life, death and an appraisal of certain behaviours and in some cases, current events. The text was likely written in stages, and was certainly started by 62 CE. Across the 124 letters, *securitas* is invoked over twenty times in a variety of contexts, however the vast majority of usages directly invoke the sort of peace of mind, or emotional tranquillity that we covered with Cicero in the previous chapter. Throughout letters on a variety of subjects, this ‘peace of mind’ notion of *securitas* is a boon not reliant on money,²⁶² a desirable attribute given by effort or circumstance²⁶³ and given as indicative of a happy life.²⁶⁴

In addition to this very traditional use, there is a use of the phrase ‘*securitas publica*’ worthy of our attention;

“It seems to me erroneous to believe that those who have loyally dedicated themselves to philosophy are stubborn and rebellious, scorners of magistrates or kings or of those who control the administration of public affairs. For, on the contrary, no class of man is so popular with the philosopher as the ruler is; and rightly so, because rulers bestow upon no men a greater privilege than upon those who are allowed to enjoy peace and leisure. Hence, those who are greatly profited,

²⁶² Sen. Ep. 18.7. All subsequent translations are taken from the following translation. Seneca the Younger, “Epistles.”

²⁶³ Sen. Ep. 87.35

²⁶⁴ Sen. Ep. 92.3. See also 87.35, 97.14, 44.7, 18.7, 24.2, 36.12, 75.13, 105.7, 18.6, 20.13, 91.5, 92.3, 95.12, 91.1, 53.12

as regards their purpose of right living, by the **security of the state**, must needs cherish as a father the author of this good..."²⁶⁵

Firstly, we would do well to remember the earlier section on how the virtues of the emperor were to find their 'terrestrial expression', with the *divi filius* acting as a conduit through which such divine concepts could be enjoyed by the commons, as such mechanisms are certainly on show here. Additionally, this passage is useful to us in that it is clearly an example of *securitas* employed in a political context, however it is not done without qualification, allowing us to peer behind the word and glance at the metaphorical machinery that allows it to function. Here, *securitas* is the outcome of good rule and administration, rather than military intervention. While the maintenance of public order is likely integral to such a conception of Seneca's "*securitas publica*", the focus is on provision – the ruler as the supplier of benefits befitting a good life, which others so readily forget and clamour for more.

It would make sense then to see Seneca's '*securitas publica*' less in terms of safety and more in terms of its provision, as preferring the former over the latter calls into question what point Seneca would be making by remonstrating those who had 'forgotten the benefits received.' Again, while the maintenance of good order and freedom from immediate harm would be integral to such a virtue, it would be to contort the inference of the phrase to bring such a sectional, narrow outlook to the fore to the exclusion of the everyday consideration *securitas* encompassed. The 'freedom from care' coined by Cicero and invoked here by Seneca might well have expanded its frame of reference, but it had not lost its mechanism of meaning nor the emotive quality of its focus. This was freedom from care on care's terms, not a freedom from a threat, no matter whether real, imagined, specific or life threatening. This was not a term of protection against an oppositional force or problem, whether specific or general, this was a state in which problems had no place at all.²⁶⁶

²⁶⁵ Sen. Ep. 73.2

²⁶⁶ This could extend to gaining *securitas* at all – in an interesting passage relating to the relationship between 'wise men' and rulers, Seneca claims that an important part of *securitas* is not seeking it, as by avoiding issues you are essentially condemning them (and drawing their ire). Essentially, Seneca counselled the philosopher to not hide from rulers or the problems they bring, as that avoidance created a problem in itself. This dichotomous consideration reinforces the centrality of cares and concerns to the notion of *securitas* – it is not a specific mode of living or a set practical outcome, but the realisation of a personal state of being. (14.8)

We can be sure of the above by looking at the final category of employments of *securitas* in Seneca's letters. Whilst technically falling in the same meaning as the traditional freedom from care, the context of its use hammers home the unilateral heart of *securitas*;

This is the one reason why we cannot complain of life: it keeps no one against his will. Humanity is well situated, because no man is unhappy except by his own fault. Live, if you so desire; if not, you may return to the place whence you came. You have often been cupped in order to relieve headaches. You have had veins cut for the purpose of reducing your weight. If you would pierce your heart, a gaping wound is not necessary; a lancet will open the way to that great freedom, and **tranquillity** can be purchased at the cost of a pin-prick.²⁶⁷

Here, *securitas* is clearly used as an analogue for death, indicating that the term was certainly not a stand in for physical safety, nor was it a matter of maintaining a certain state of affairs. Seneca draws this macabre analogy another two times in other letters in the collection, at one point proclaiming that while life might contain pain, on the other side lay '*alta securitas*' - ultimate security.²⁶⁸ The direct comparison between death and mental tranquillity stands at odds with the assumption that the term could hold the same value as *salus* – health or physical safety. While certain scenarios might lend themselves to a consideration of both (or either) – such as a person at risk of attack being protected from said attack – the fundamental mode of operation at the heart of each term was, just as it was in the republic, different.

It is here we can really appreciate the way in which *salus* and *securitas* remained separate concepts.²⁶⁹ While it was good and proper to offer libations to *Salus* to preserve one's health and safety, even at the destruction of one's life, at the antithesis of health, one found security; once *salus* had evaporated, it was *securitas* that remained. Faced with the

There is also 87.25 immunity (in the case of making sacrilege acceptable I think), straight up normal employment.

²⁶⁷ Sen. Ep. 70.16

²⁶⁸ Sen. Ep. 54.5

²⁶⁹ Hamilton, *Security*, 59.

immanence of death, Seneca asked “*Quid est turpius in ipso limine securitatis esse sollicitum?*” - “At the threshold of security, how base is it to worry?”²⁷⁰

SENECA’S DE CLEMENTIA

Written in the early years of Nero’s reign, *de Clementia* takes the form of a treatise addressed to the young emperor and written in the tone of a mentor. While Nero is clearly given as the recipient of the text, it is unlikely that the work was intended to be read by him alone. Split into three books, the last and part of the second have been lost to time, however in the remaining text, *securitas* is used on six occasions, and it is interesting to note the changes and continuities between the overtly political *de Clementia* and the *Epistae Moralis*. While used sparingly and at no point given any explanatory treatment, *securitas* sits as a key term in the function of the titular topic of the work – *securitas* is an outcome of political importance that stems from and reinforces the need for mercy within Seneca’s treatise.

Seneca’s *de Clementia* opens with the tutor carefully qualifying his address, the essay on mercy he has prepared not being instructional, but rather to ‘serve as a mirror’ so that the already inspiring leader can see his own glory and, if need be, to inspect himself and his subjects thusly;

“...though the true profit of virtuous deeds lies in the doing, and there is no fitting reward for the virtues apart from the virtues themselves, still it is a pleasure to subject a good conscience to a round of inspection, then to cast one’s eyes upon this vast throng—discordant, factious, and unruly, ready to run riot alike for the destruction of itself and others if it should break its yoke—and finally to commune with oneself thus: “Have I of all mortals found favour with Heaven and been chosen to serve on earth as vicar of the gods? I am the arbiter of life and death for the

²⁷⁰ Sen. Ep. 22.17

nations; it rests in my power what each man's lot and state shall be; by my lips Fortune proclaims what gift she would bestow on each human being"²⁷¹

Sitting beyond the flattery and care one might expect to see in a political work directed to an absolute ruler, of interest to us is the clear affirmation of the spiritual dynamic in which the emperor was the vehicle – or vicar, in this case – through which the divine may express itself on earth. Not just the arbiter of life and death through the wielding of earthly power, the emperor utters the proclamations of the divine virtues, and how those virtues might enrich the lives of the many. Put simply, the emperor is not radiating the divine blessings of heaven, he is a mode of action by which those virtues might come to earthly effect.²⁷²

However less illustrious than the divine favour of gods unto lords and emperors is the tradition of the natural order, an order by which those with *dignitas* control those without. In the above quote we see Seneca place in the Emperor's responsibility over the yoke that holds the 'discordant, factious, and unruly' in place; an image reminiscent of Cicero's metaphor of the elephant and mahout penned just over a century before. Just as Cicero's beast relied on men of dignity to provide the guidance and remonstrance to keep it placid, it seems that so too was Seneca's rabble. It was for this reason that Seneca acknowledges that "Great was the hazard that the Roman people faced so long as it was uncertain what course those noble talents of yours would take..."²⁷³ – that when the young emperor ascended, the great beast he was tasked with fretted under its new mahout.

Relevant to *securitas*, however is how the seething mass recognises its good governance, and accepts the yoke of the new Caesar. Faced with the divine expression of virtue in the *princeps*, the Roman people are forced to acknowledge their lot;

²⁷¹ Sen. Cl. 1.1.1-2. All subsequent translations are taken from the following translation. Seneca the Younger, "De Clementia," trans. John W. Basore (Harvard University Press, 1928), https://doi.org/10.4159/DLCL.seneca_younger-de_clementia.1928.

²⁷² It is worth noting that the stoic school (of which Seneca was a part) had an established tradition of expounding the divine favour enjoyed by just kings. J. Rufus Fears, "Nero as the Vicegerent of the Gods in Seneca's de Clementia," *Hermes* 103, no. 4 (1975): 486–96.

²⁷³ Sen. Cl. 1.1.7

“...yet to-day your subjects one and all are constrained to confess that they are happy, and, too, that nothing further can be added to their blessings, except that these may last. Many facts force them to this confession, which more than any other a man is loath to make: a **security** deep and abounding, and justice enthroned above all injustice; before their eyes hovers the fairest vision of a state which lacks no element of complete liberty except the licence of self-destruction.”²⁷⁴

First and foremost, it is obviously important to note that *securitas* is the primary principle on which they base their acknowledgement of their happiness, and the reliance of that happiness on virtuous rule. While *securitas* here remains a personal state, it is realised in a corporate setting, through what is essentially a political mechanism. Therefore while the end result of the term (and its personal focus) remains unchanged from its use in Seneca’s philosophical works, or the works of Cicero, I would argue that this is the first substantive use of the term as an expressly political outcome in literary sources. *Securitas* here is a virtue delivered by governance, an indicator of positive political action that affects the subjects governed by that action.

While invocations of the word in regards to the defensive measures in times of war or as statements on the maintenance of the person of the emperor might sit within the context of political subject matter, the term itself offers only a description of a state of affairs; the emperor maintained *securitas* in the face of an attempt on his life, fleeing soldiers felt *securitas* once they reached the safety of the walls. Although speaking to subject matter that might appeal to modern sensibilities of security, these usages lack the paradigms of politically instrumental speech – a virtue directly achieved by governance, an outcome with an immediate and inherent political value, or a corporate applicability. In contrast, by listing *securitas* as an indicator of successful rule Seneca shapes the concept into a political outcome, gives that outcome a value, and submits the notion that such a value is applicable to the polity at large.

Seneca gives no indication of how this new employment might change the underlying value of the term, and as such we should assume that this means that we can take it as largely

²⁷⁴ Sen. Cl. 1.1.7-8

congruous with its more traditional philosophical sense; the people of Rome have attained a state in which they are free from cares. However while not openly stated, there is one immediate aspect to the *securitas* enjoyed by the people that departs from the stoic ideal formulated by Cicero and largely continued by Seneca; its role in ‘forcing a confession’ (*exprimatur confessio*) of happiness from the populace. Seneca claims that the admission of happiness by the common people is “*qua nulla in homine tardior est*”²⁷⁵ – something that they are extremely slow or reluctant to do, but for extensive evidence.

The first piece of evidence Seneca lists, is ‘*securitas alta*’, their high level of security. This reluctance is important because it serves a dual purpose for our understanding of the term politically – as a constituent part of happiness, it reinforces the psychological core of the term established by the philosophical usage, as well as reinforces the role of the ruler as a deliverer of virtues to the commons. The evidence by which the people are forced to admit their satisfaction is the virtues of state, a vision that is itself evidence for the divine dynamic the ruler possesses.

Of all the virtues that sustain the happiness of the people and the righteousness of rule, however, it is mercy that Seneca gives as the most important (it is, after all, the title of the treatise)²⁷⁶ *Securitas* is not the focus of, nor even a major supporting character in the instruction manual the tutor has prepared for his now near-omnipotent student – however much as it sits just under the surface of the public happiness, so too does it sit beneath the calculations of mercy.

MERCY, SAFETY, SECURITY

After the initial appeal to the ruler and the discussion of his qualities now apparent as those of a true Caesar, Seneca turns to the titular matter of the work, that of mercy. The work as a whole can be taken as a treatise extolling upon the emperor the righteousness (and indeed, necessity) of exercising mercy in his rule. In this aim, Seneca does not at any stage give *securitas* any detailed treatment, however the term is used sparingly and consistently as an

²⁷⁵ Sen. Cl. 1.1.8

²⁷⁶ Sen. Cl. 1.3.2

outcome of the act of mercy. As the application of mercy is, in the context of the work, a political act, it is reasonable we take the outcomes of such an act as politically valuable or relevant. As such, as a noted outcome of a political act, in the context of this work, there are several further uses of *securitas* that qualify as political.

Interestingly through, in the remainder of the text the *securitas* enjoyed by the populace outlined in the opening chapter is simultaneously retained and inverted. This inversion takes the security of the people and returns it to the ruler, who through the function of mercy can enjoy what *securitas* it brings his subjects for himself. This inversion is simple enough in form, but finds several different expressions in the text. In the first, the tutor advises his student that while some might claim that mercy would negatively impact the law and order that safeguards the emperor's rule, mercy is a mechanism by which the emperor might gain security for himself; "...rulers by clemency gain a security more assured, because repeated punishment, while it crushes the hatred of a few, stirs the hatred of all."²⁷⁷

The above is a fairly straightforward appeal to the notion of mercy as necessary in managing the mob – that when driving the beast one cannot use too much stick regardless of whether it deserves the carrot or not. A more complex and fruitful expression follows later in the text, however;

"For if any one thinks that a ruler can abide in protection where nothing is protected (*tutum*) from the king, he is wrong; for the price of **security is an interchange of security**. He has no need to rear on high his towering castles, or to wall about steep hills against ascent, or to cut away the sides of mountains, or to encircle himself with rows of walls and turrets; through mercy a king will be assured of safety (*salvus*) on an open plain. His one impregnable defence is the love of his countrymen."²⁷⁸

On a basic level, the above operates on the same principle – if a ruler wants *securitas*, they need to give it. However here Seneca clearly links the concept of feeling carefree with

²⁷⁷ Sen. Cl. 1.8.7;

²⁷⁸ Sen. Cl. 1.19.5-7; *Errat enim, si quis existimat tutum esse ibi regem, ubi nihil a rege tutum est; securitas securitate mutua paciscenda est.*

protection (*tutum*) and safety (*salvus*), and in so doing allows for the identification of some interplay between the terms, as well as highlighting their differences.

In order to unpick these similarities and differences, it is best to begin with *tutum* and *salvus*. Coming from *tueor* – to watch, examine, guard - in this context *tutum* can be taken as a state of protection; it is the outcome of the turrets, castles and walls listed in the text. The rationale for such works is, at least in this particular example, the maintenance of a state of good health, of being unharmed (*salvus*); however Seneca argues that a merciful ruler can enjoy *salvus* in an open field, guarded instead by a loving populace. This summary serves to highlight the various words at play and the states they demarcate – the state of being protected from a threat (*tutum*), and the state of being free from harm (*salvus*) – both elements that modern users of security might be seeking to invoke.

But what then of *securitas*? The usage here not only affirms its role as a marker of satisfaction, happiness and a carefree existence, but also is the lynchpin by which we can be certain that these three terms (*securitas*, *tutum* and *salvus*) are not simply three aspects of a single concept employed poetically, but three separate notions that share a point of contact in the political psyche of Seneca (and assumedly, his audience.) As with the previous examples, this passage hinges on the concern (or lack thereof) of the ruler for the wrath of the ruled, however it clearly demarcates three elements operating in that equation; the dual concern (*securitas*) of the citizens for their own wellbeing and the reflected concern of the ruler regarding the attitudes of his subjects, the protection (*tutum*) that ruler may then require from his subjects, and the outcome of those measures - personal safety (*salvus*). *Securitas* is thus not a complimentary element to the construction of such fortifications, nor is it analogous with his bodily safety, it is antithetical to the former and concomitant with the latter; whether enjoyed by the people or reflected back on the merciful ruler, *securitas* is still a matter of concern and care rather than defence or physical integrity.

Seneca reinforces this dynamic in another passage, which he states that;

“A king that is peaceable and gentle finds his guards trusty, since he employs them for the common safety, and the soldier, seeing that he is giving his service for the

security of the state, is proud and willing to undergo any hardship as a protector of the father of his country”²⁷⁹

This example clearly operates on a similar level to the statement on mercy (and the security that results from its proper use) being adequate protection in itself; the *securitas* gained through mercy making the guards unnecessary protection who, being put to use for the nation instead, are even better protection due to their love of their leader and country.

What this example makes clear is the reciprocal nature of the sort of *securitas* Seneca envisages in his political schema. Not simply a reflection shared between ruler and ruled, the outcome of *securitas*, properly wielded, holds the possibility of reciprocal benefit in which the *securitas* of the ruled allows a continuous dividend. Freed from fear of reprisal from the people he rules, the guards of the ruler are redeployed in the service of the people. This results in a benefit for both the ruled, who themselves enjoy the services of the redeployed guards, and the ruler, whose guards are now ‘willing to undergo any hardship’ due to their engagement with a just ruler and the common public good.

In sum then, while the underlying mechanism of action for *securitas* does not change between philosophical works and Seneca’s overtly political treatise, we can delineate an important paradigm in its use in the political space. As an outcome of political action, *securitas* is a positive state that can and should be achieved and fostered. Further, the nature of its benefits sit in the gap between ruler and subject, being applicable to both, and with the security of each likely being of import to the other. However it is important to note that *securitas* is an outcome, not a political act in itself. Further, we should note that it is an outcome that arises first with the subjects – at no point does Seneca give an example of it being first enjoyed by the ruler, and I would argue that in its presented format it would be hard to see how it could.

²⁷⁹ Sen. Cl. 1.13.1; Placido tranquilloque regi fida sunt auxilia sua, ut quibus ad communem salutem utatur, gloriosusque miles (publicae enim securitati se dare operam videt) omnem laborem libens patitur ut parentis custos.

And while Seneca provides practical reasons and rationales for his outcomes of security, it is also couched in the theoretical terms between ruler and subject that open the treatise, worth quoting here again as a refresher;

“...it is a pleasure to subject a good conscience to a round of inspection, then to cast one’s eyes upon this vast throng—discordant, factious, and unruly, ready to run riot alike for the destruction of itself and others if it should break its yoke—and finally to commune with oneself thus: “Have I of all mortals found favour with Heaven and been chosen to serve on earth as vicar of the gods...”²⁸⁰

The correlation between Cicero’s conception of good rule and Seneca’s is no coincidence, but is instead the outcome of the stoic conception of the natural order, an order that informs and shaped the ethical, social and political space as seen from the stoic perspective. The novelty here is Seneca’s co-opting of another stoic tool – that of *securitas* – to elucidate how that order was properly realised. Sitting between ruler and ruled, *securitas* was a beneficial force enjoyed by the public, gifted by the good governance of the emperor and enjoyed by him in turn. Like all benefits of rule, it had a divine origin, and like all gifts given by the ruler, it should be employed for the proper management of the great beast of the *Res Publica*.

The conceptual heart of *securitas*, forged by Cicero one hundred years earlier, hadn’t changed to fit into this space – it fit in just fine the way it was. But politically, things had shifted. The beast was the same as it was in the republic, as was the need for the yoke and the mahout; what had changed addition of a deified *princeps*, a focal point of good governance both in theory and (hopefully) in practise to which the taming of this beast was tasked. Whether genuine hope or cynical political tool, security fit in this new space with ease – with its fears removed, an unruly beast can be tamed, and a tamed beast makes a confident rider.²⁸¹

²⁸⁰ Sen. Cl. 1.1

²⁸¹ There are two remaining uses in the text that simply reinforce the above, included here for the sake of completeness. In the first, Seneca which he reminds Nero that the mercy of Augustus “...led him on to safety and security, this made him popular and beloved’ (Sen. Clem. 1.10.2) *Haec eum clementia ad salutem*

PRE-NERONIAN PARADIGMS

Of the role of *securitas* in the dawn of the empire then, we can draw a number of conclusions and ascertain a number of useful paradigms. Chief among these is the sheer breadth of utility the term enjoyed – from its stoic beginning, it quickly became useful as a term of negligence or carelessness. Whilst it still enjoyed its original stoic meaning in some use, it could also apply to more worldly concerns, speaking to a general happiness or satisfaction. In most cases it applied to an individual frame of mind, but could be applied to a group either as a collection of individuals, or in some cases late in the period, as a corporation. Perhaps most dramatically, it could be applicable to those who escaped an early death, or it could be applicable to those who sought a quick end to their existence. Such a wide array of contexts shows a word of great utility, but perhaps also a new word whose utility is not yet known – in an Austinian sense, a tool whose potential was still being ascertained.

We have also seen that it was *more* than a word, though considering that by 70 CE *securitas* would become *Securitas*, glorified on coins and sacrificed to in temples, that there is so little evidence of its glorification is striking. The altar at Praeneste and the elusory depiction of Agrippina suggest that at this early stage there were already those that might elevate the word to a virtue, an elevation that from a Roman perspective took it to the heavens, but these two depictions pale in comparison to what would come. In this way, we can draw both a conclusion and a paradigm – the conclusion that *securitas* held to some the necessary importance and qualities of a divine virtue, and a paradigm to follow in how and to what degree those qualities find their divine expression.

In the political arena, we have far less to go on, however if we take the Seneca's as indicative of the emerging political value of *securitas* (which, with the benefit of history and authorship, I can say we should) then we can also claim a paradigm in *securitas'* role in

securitatemque perduxit; haec gratum ac favorabilem reddidit. While far from emphatic, I believe it reasonable to see this as treating the concerns of the emperor as distinct from his bodily safety – it certainly does nothing to dissuade us from that conclusion. As for the second, the use is not in the context of rulers, society or politics generally, but is rather 'standard' in the established Ciceronian sense; "Vengeance accomplishes usually one of two purposes: if a person has been injured, it gives him either a compensation or immunity (*securitatem*) for the future." (Sen. Clem. 1.21.1)

negotiating between ruler and ruled. The unruly masses, reluctant to admit their happiness are in Seneca the Younger's account, forced to by the evidence of their *securitas*. That *securitas*, essentially gifted by the emperor's virtues, is reciprocal – *securitas* for the ruled means *securitas* for the ruler. The benefits of this relationship (safety and protection for the ruler and happiness and prosperity for the ruled) compound, with emperors free to walk in open fields and the yoked masses benefitting from their free access to the divine emperor and the efficiencies brought about by their harmonious relationship.

We also saw that while some scholars have tied *securitas* to *pax*, others to *salus*, and yet others to *tutela* or *concordia*, given the breadth of use of *securitas*, not all of these hold some of the time, and none of them hold all of the time. We can glean some more meaningful conclusions however – that *securitas* was used with *salus* in many sources, however this tandem usage is best taken as an expression of two separate ideas that were complimentary, not a conflation of two converging notions. We can also conclude that *securitas* and *pax* were related, but found together in only one extant source. I would therefore draw a synthesis of the above and argue that while *securitas* held a political connection to *pax* and shared a somewhat similar conceptual space to *salus*, ultimately the term was too eclectic to label as part of any particular program or subset of concepts.

Of paradigms there are several basic trends – that as the term gets older, its application to groups (rather than only individuals) increases, as does the aforementioned trend of its (re)creation as a virtue in the public space. Also of note, especially in relation to its ascendance as a virtue, is its use in regards to the divine person of the emperor (or in the case of Agrippina, the empress). Starting with the shrine at Praeneste, and culminating in Seneca's treatise on how the emperor's virtues are evidenced by the *securitas* of the people, the concept has an increasing connection to the *Divi Filius* and his work as the first Roman. Lastly, there is the emerging paradigm of *securitas'* connection to provision. Where *securitas* is given a form or presence – such as the altar or coin – these depictions feature cornucopiae. In the textual evidence, Seneca's opening chapter to *de Clementia* lists *securitas* as the primary evidence of a people who want for nothing – that are provided for adequately by their ruler.

These conclusions and paradigms will be of great use as we move forward to study the sudden emergence of *Securitas* as a fully formed virtue employed by the emperor as a term of political importance. However to fully appreciate the nuances of that emergence, we must first set the above aside and turn to a brief examination of the medium by which *Securitas* was promulgated – coins.

NERO AND THE EMERGENCY OF POLITICAL *SECURITAS*

As we have seen throughout the previous section, while *securitas* had made steady ground as a useful philosophical and colloquial term, its use as a political term was limited by comparison. While there were certainly public expressions of *securitas* that were politically relevant, those expressions were few and far between. Nevertheless, a close study of the use of *securitas* (and the lack thereof) in that period is important not only to arm ourselves with an understanding of how the term would soon be received by the Roman polity, but also to hammer home just how sudden its systematic appearance was.

Because around 64 CE, this broad and still quite malleable term would become intimately tied to the imperial machine, clearly personified and systematically represented to every inhabitant of the empire. Up until this point, our only concrete employment of the word in the political space was a small altar in Praeneste; however in a flash the word was not simply inscribed by imperial decree, but done so repeatedly, and in a way that was intimately and publically tied to the emperor. Stamped on coins of a variety of denominations by Nero, *securitas* would from this point on be a near constant feature of Roman coinage for almost two centuries.

Why this occurred when and as spectacularly as it did is of great relevance to our understanding of security as a concept in the western tradition, and the insights gained in the previous section, in concert with further insights from the later rule of Nero will help us complete this picture. Beyond the importance of his tutor's teachings and the established religious-political language of the Julio-Claudian emperors, we will see how Nero was intimately acquainted with the importance of political messaging on coins, as well as how the political realities of Rome in the mid-sixties drove the need for a new virtue in the Roman consciousness, a virtue that the historical consciousness of monarchist writers during the English Civil War; the scholars of Oxford, of Robert Filmer, and most importantly of Thomas Hobbes, arguably the most enduring and important political philosophers of the Anglo tradition. In the writings of these monarchists, the *securitas* of Seneca and Nero would find expression – the tranquillity of good and righteous rule, delivered through provision for the people. Further, the value Nero elevated shares little with modern notions

of 'national security', but is nevertheless extremely reminiscent of the measures of 'social security' or 'human security' first implemented in the depression era US.

WHY COINS?

While in the modern day one might reasonably wonder what value the minting of a coin might have as a pervasive political message, as trite an observation as it might be, in a world before radio, newsprint or photography, there were no better method of transmission of government publicity than the coin. Necessary and desirable for their value, coins could be imprinted with an enduring image to be viewed by anyone who handled it. While monuments and statues would provide the awe-inspiring point of real contact for most citizens, few had the time, funds or capacity to experience the various statues, baths or temples at which the visage and grandeur of the emperor might be felt – instead, the coinage of the empire acted as 'monuments in miniature',²⁸² with their images of the emperor and his deeds, creations and virtues passed from citizen to citizen daily.

While scholars have debated the degree to which coins should be considered propaganda or publicity,²⁸³ as well as to what degree the messages on such coins were generated by the Emperor, the court, or imperial 'middle management' (such as the mint workers themselves), in the case of Nero, it is highly likely that the emperor played a direct role in the minting of coins.²⁸⁴ Further, whether the people of Rome viewed coins as 'propaganda' or not, it would be folly to assume that they were not aware of the messages being conveyed on those coins, or the importance of those messages.²⁸⁵

While the republic used coins as 'portable billboards', it was with the empire that they took the basic attributes that would define the first issue of *securitas* on coinage. The practise of

²⁸² Nathan T. Elkins, *Monuments in Miniature: Architecture on Roman Coinage*, Numismatic Studies 29 (New York: The American Numismatics Society, 2015).

²⁸³ Barbara Levick, "Propaganda and Imperial Coinage," *Antichthon* 16, no. 1982 (1982): 104–16, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0066477400002999>.

²⁸⁴ Andrew Burnett, *Coinage in the Roman World* (London: Seaby, 1987), 25.

²⁸⁵ Burnett, 69.

putting the bust of a living leader on the obverse of coins began with Julius Caesar, and it was in the coinage of Augustus that the face of the emperor was paired not just with events or specific scenes but with virtues and personifications²⁸⁶ (as was the case in the republic), but with concepts held in high esteem within Roman society. *Pax*, *Victoria* and *Virtus* – peace, victory and virtue – graced roman coinage, often with the inscription ‘CAESAR DIVI F’; the ‘*Divi Filius*’, or son of the divine, being a direct appeal to Augustus’ relationship to the now deified Julius Caesar. While the process of associating specific virtues with prominent was not unheard of in the late Republic, Augustus cemented this new paradigm, systematically attaching these fundamental Roman virtues to the person of the *princeps*, while simultaneously attaching that person to the divine realm.²⁸⁷

Beyond the obvious context the above provides to *Securitas*’ emergence on a coin, it is important to note the continuation of the divine aspect of the emperor and the way that divinity finds its expression in Roman political life. Augustus’ simultaneous appeal to the virtues and his divine genealogy was given a common grounding in the Roman state religion, with concepts such as *Pax* being personified and essentially deified with the construction of shrines and temples. The methods and details of such deification is not clear cut, though there is textual evidence to assume it was not unheard of years before Augustus’ ascension; writing in *de Legibus*, Cicero argues against the deification of virtues, with the caveat that if people are insistent on the practise, they should at least make sure they are based on aspirational qualities (such as safety, honour, wealth and victory).²⁸⁸

Thus it is important to note that the concepts advertised on coinage were presentable not simply as aspirational concepts, but as aspects of divinity. Featuring the Emperor on one side and a virtue on the other was in essence advertising two aspects of the divine; the benefaction of the gods adorned two sides of the same coin. More than being simply

²⁸⁶ There is some debate regarding what should be classified as a ‘virtue’ in the Roman world, what is a ‘personification’, and to what degree they are interchangeable, however for the subtle differences between the two, see Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, “The Emperor and His Virtues,” *Historia: Zeitschrift Für Alte Geschichte* 30, no. 3 (1981): 309. For our purposes, as we draw on many different sources holding different opinions on the matter, and given that we are not making any deep statement on the religious or philosophical implication of the line between virtues, concepts and personifications, we can largely use the terms interchangeably.

²⁸⁷ Sutherland, *Coinage in Roman Imperial Policy 31 B.C.-A.D. 68*, 153.

²⁸⁸ From Cic. Leg. 2.2.28. Notably, *securitas* is not on the list of virtues he’d be (cautiously) supportive of.

desirable, these virtues contained an aspect of the divine, and it was only sensible to assume that such heavenly material would be best garnered and expressed in the most holy of citizens. Put succinctly by Mattingly;

“The ‘virtues’ of the emperor are not merely a poetic or artistic expression of prosaic facts – of his having assured peace, won a victory or given a liberality; they are deities, all, in theory of receiving a cult, many of them actually receiving it, deities who reside in heaven but find terrestrial expression in the activities of the first Roman.”²⁸⁹

It is unlikely that all Romans took such a blunt presentation at face value, however it is just as unlikely that the average citizen was not aware of the powerful religious metaphor sitting behind such a display.²⁹⁰ Just as it would be to the scholars of Oxford who stood with the King over a millennia later, the ruler was a divine expression of order – through them flowed divine good to those that are ruled.

Augustus’ used his appeal to divinity to weave together his personal rule with traditional Roman values in a way that united his dictatorship with the restoration of Roman ideals that the now defunct republic had once stood for.²⁹¹ Whilst this program of messianic political messaging found expression in buildings (such as the Ara Pacis) as well as textual sources (Augustus’ own *Res Gestae*), its presentation in coin was perhaps the most enduring, consistent and methodological expression. Monuments could not move, and despite publishing his autobiographical achievements in both Latin and Greek, such efforts were sent into an empire where the literacy rate was likely as low as 10%. Instead, Augustus took the simple symbolism stamped on the ‘portable billboards’ of Rome and used them to reach

²⁸⁹ Harold Mattingly, “The Roman ‘Virtues,’” *The Harvard Theological Review* 30, no. 2 (1937): 111.

²⁹⁰ Wallace-Hadrill, “The Emperor and His Virtues,” 315.

²⁹¹ Burnett, *Coinage in the Roman World*, 72.

the very edges of the empire, his image being pushed onto regional coinage that had previously remained in the control of provincial authorities.²⁹²

While this program of divine publicity continued throughout the life of the Empire, it would take four emperors and over ninety years before *securitas* would be inscribed on a coin. Such a lag in its adoption is understandable given that the word was first penned only forty years before Augustus instituted the principate, but on the same token for a concept to leap from obscurity in such a slim timeframe is noteworthy. This sudden saturation of the term, it will be argued, is no accident, but instead a function of two notable events that occurred in the year of the term's adoption, 64 CE.

The first of these events is the great fire of Rome, often attributed in popular legend to Nero himself. While there are no historical records of the exact cost, the task of rebuilding the broken city would have been enormous – a cost, according to Tacitus, that was at least partly covered by the emperor himself.²⁹³ Tacitus also tells us that the emperor capped the price of grain, arranged for extra supplies of food to be brought up from the port of Ostia, and funded the provision of food to survivors and opened his palace to those made homeless.²⁹⁴ Further, once the flames had subsided the emperor instigated a massive building program, rebuilding houses and roads, and constructing a hugely extravagant palace and gardens.²⁹⁵

The second event of note occurring in 64 CE was a fundamental overhaul of the coinage – an event likely years in the making, but set in motion by the aftermath of the fire.²⁹⁶ The money of Rome changed in three major ways;

²⁹² Burnett, 81.

²⁹³ Tacitus, *Annals*, 15.43

²⁹⁴ Tac. Ann. 15.39

²⁹⁵ Tac. Ann. 41-43

²⁹⁶ Sutherland, *Coinage in Roman Imperial Policy 31 B.C.-A.D. 68*, 163–64.

- 1) The metal content of gold and silver coins was debased; where a pound of silver had yielded 84 coins, it now yielded 96, and while a pound of gold yielded 40 coins, it now yielded 45. The benefits of such a measure are plain to see – there could be made more money for less material, essentially increasing the money supply.²⁹⁷
- 2) Production of coins was recentralised and expanded. Most notably, the minting of lower denominations, once separate from the minting of more precious coins, was not only centralised in the Roman mint but was also expanded to the mint at Lugdunum (modern Lyons) which had previously dealt only with gold and silver, albeit even then only sporadically.²⁹⁸
- 3) The designs on coins became far more varied and considerably more elaborate. Nero's portrait became far more detailed, and his likeness simultaneously more lifelike and more divine in its representation. On the reverse side, the designs were more complex and the themes they dealt with more specific.²⁹⁹ Also, there was further integration between the denominations, with designs and themes across the precious and non-precious metal coinage being more closely aligned.³⁰⁰

It was in the context of these reforms that *securitas* first appeared on a coin in the Roman world. Unfortunately, the dating of coins from the time of Nero – especially those minted from 64-68 CE – is problematic.³⁰¹ As such, while it is highly likely that these coins were minted in response to these events, it cannot currently be known for certain whether *Securitas* was minted before or after they occurred.

²⁹⁷ Mary Elizabeth Kelly Thornton, "Nero's New Deal," *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 102 (1971): 624, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2935958>.

²⁹⁸ Sutherland, *Coinage in Roman Imperial Policy 31 B.C.-A.D. 68*, 164.

²⁹⁹ Sutherland, 164.

³⁰⁰ Sutherland, 165.

³⁰¹ Sutherland, 164.

THE DEPICTION OF *SECURITAS*

Securitas is depicted on the reverse of coins as a female figure reclining in a chair, usually in front of a well provisioned altar. Sitting in obvious comfort and postured to reflect a relaxed countenance, in her left hand she holds a sceptre of rule, her grip relaxed. Such an artefact was indicative of authority and command; her relaxed posture and grip suggesting the relaxed nature of those political necessities. It is also the sceptre that provides us with our best indication of where and how the notion of *securitas* fit within the wider structure of virtues; an enduring feature of its representation, the sceptre was also an enduring feature in the representations of *Pax* and *Tranquillitas*.³⁰² With its inscription – SEVRITAS AVGVSTI S C, how *securitas* was manifest in the Roman world was made clear. In the tradition of Augustus, the genitive '*augusti*' in this context is suggestive of a point of origin – the *securitas* of rule, not in the sense of whether the rule is secure, but that by such rule the virtue of *securitas* is delivered.

Thus we can place *Securitas* firmly in the realm of provision and prosperity – of the satisfaction of earthly needs and freedom from 'undesirable conditions.'³⁰³ From the textual evidence we have explored in the past two chapters, the vast majority of uses of *securitas* in wider literature spoke expressly to the absence of emotional concerns. Whether attained through philosophical musings, negligence or even death, *securitas* was a state that held for its subject comfort and contentment. While allied with notions of *pax* and *salus*, it stood distinct from both, and in its earliest depictions available we see clear illustration of provision and relaxation, both at the altar of Praeneste and the depiction of Agrippina.

With the ascension of Nero and the political use of *securitas* by Seneca, we can assume that it was this provision and relaxation that he saw as evidence as to the emperor's good rule, and that the maintenance of that provision and relaxation was integral to the emperor

³⁰² Noreña, *Imperial Ideals in the Roman West: Representation, Circulation, Power*, 130.

³⁰³ Noreña, 130.

maintaining his position through the happiness of his subjects. Again, used in concert with *tutelo* and *salvus*, *securitas* can be seen as allied but distinct; if a ruler is to be relaxed and prosperous, his people must be relaxed and prosperous, a state of affairs that keeps the emperor safe and protected. Thus it is in light of the above that we should view the likely value *Securitas* held in Nero's Rome, rather than any specific notion of personal safety (whether of the emperor or the people) or systematic attempts to protect or defend Roman territory or property.

Further, a reading of *Securitas* as the personification of a carefree life is supported by the context in which the coin was created – albeit with an amount of (reasonable) speculation. We know that that the great fire of 64 CE had wiped out 70% of the city of Rome, that Nero debased the currency to the tune of around 7%,³⁰⁴ and that the emperor capped the price of grain, Rome's largest and most important import commodity. All three problems would have had made a massive impact on the economic realities of Rome separately, but of course given their proximity we must also consider their effects together.

Under normal circumstances, an increase in the money supply of an economy would result in an increase in inflation (where there were once x dollars per y commodity, there was now x+7%), however these were not normal circumstances. In addition, given the destruction of the fire, we should reasonably assume that there was not only more money in the system, but less commodities, a state of affairs that would sharpen the inflatory effects of such a measure.³⁰⁵

What is interesting in the case of Nero's reform is that despite the bone fide values of Roman coins remaining steady for over a century, the debasement under Nero saw no inflation; put simply, the Roman economy absorbed a noticeable increase in the money

³⁰⁴ That is to say that there was 7% more money in the system overall; see Mary Elizabeth Kelly Thornton, "Nero's New Deal," 624.

³⁰⁵ This assumption relies on an acceptance of basic monetary theory – that the money supply has a direct relationship to inflation, a position put forward in modern economic terms by Milton Friedman and Anna Schartz. See MILTON FRIEDMAN and ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, *A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960* (Princeton University Press, 1963), <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt7s1vp>.

supply despite a drop in commodity availability. In the short term, the cap on the grain price certainly would have helped to prevent wild inflation after the disaster, but assuming the cap was a temporary measure, it is still important to note that the debasement was not – Nero’s new currency remained the standard for many years after. Thus, the lack of inflation in the years following the fire would suggest that once the city had been stabilised, the increased money supply was put to use in production – that the extra 7% was used to employ previously unemployed people to provide previously unrealised economic potential.

It is hard to know to what degree the fire exacerbated or reduced unemployment, but regardless, given the debasement had an enduring effect on the economy that far outstripped the effects of the fire, we should assume that the Roman economy (and people) were suffering from unemployment on a scale and that went beyond the transient outcomes of the great fire. With more money in the system, more people could be paid and more goods and services produced without lowering the value of the wages, good and services already being paid.

By viewing Nero’s debasement as an economic measure (as opposed to simple cost cutting) we can begin piecing together a wider gamut of social policy that Thornton calls ‘Nero’s New Deal’; a suite of policy decisions that amount to an economic stimulus package for a stagnant Roman economy suffering from unemployment and lack of opportunity amongst the lower classes. Nero’s ostentatious building plans after the fire seem less like vanity projects and more like Keynesian public works, and the gifts, festivals, theatre and gladiatorial games that Roman writers such as Dio and Suetonius decry as needless extravagance become vehicles by which the money could be distributed, used and redistributed to the wider Roman populace. Viewed on the merits of these economic actions, Thornton suggests that Nero “...might be considered a conscientious emperor faced with a depression who took drastic and innovative steps to solve his economic problems and to benefit the common man.”³⁰⁶

³⁰⁶ Mary Elizabeth Kelly Thornton, “Nero’s New Deal,” 629.

And despite the extensive criticism of Nero by Suetonius, Dio and Tacitus, it would seem that the common citizens of Rome were much more supportive of the Emperor; even within their texts we can see evidence of Nero's popularity with the common people.³⁰⁷ All three authors attest to rumours of his return as some sort of messiah, and we know of several pretenders – people claiming to be Nero returned or having escaped death – with both facts suggesting that to the popular consciousness being Nero wasn't a bad thing to be.³⁰⁸ Suetonius tells us that for many years after the emperor's death, his grave was decorated with flowers,³⁰⁹ and perhaps most importantly, Tacitus tells us that the emperor mingled freely with the common people.³¹⁰

CONCLUSION

From its philosophical roots the term had grown to speak to a wider clientele, and from its more niche basis of stoic calm, it had become a term expressive of a general carefree existence. While it could be used to denote negligence, or a personal emotional state, with the writings of Seneca the Younger and the marriage of the philosophical concept to the statecraft of the empire, a role emerged in which the *collective* concerns of the people could –and should - be viewed as a political force, with clear value and repercussions. *Securitas* was what let the people know they were ruled well, it was the force that provided the emperor with his own *securitas*, confident in the righteousness and popular support for his rule. It was a value the emperor wished to transmit to his population, especially so that it may be transmitted back to him.

³⁰⁷ Edward Champlin, "Nero Reconsidered," *New England Review* 19, no. 2 (1998): 13.

³⁰⁸ See Tac. Hist. 2.8-9; Cornelius Tacitus and Clifford Herschel Moore, *Tacitus: in five volumes. 2: The histories, books I - III*, Reprinted, The Loeb classical library 111 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2003). Dio. Hist. 64.9.3; Cassius, Earnest Cary, and Herbert Baldwin Foster, *Dio's Roman history: in nine volumes. 8: Books LXI - LXX*, Reprinted, The Loeb classical library 176 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2005). Suet. Cae. 57; Suetonius and John Carew Rolfe, *Suetonius*, Rev, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1997).

³⁰⁹ Suet. Cae. 57

³¹⁰ Tac. Hist. 7.44

Whatever the truth regarding Nero's own countenance or motivations, it is impossible to ignore his actions after 64 CE as being anything other than a systematic attempt to present this *securitas* to the people of Rome. From his emergency assistance after the fire and his commissioning of fire-safe replacement housing, to his economic stimulus of gifts, events, food relief, and monetary policy, Nero's actions can be seen as a cogent platform for the alleviation of recession and the wider distribution of wealth, supplies and services. Further, his publicity as presented on coinage suggests that it is these policies that the emperor wished to be known for – in infrastructure that brought the daily bread, and the virtue of the emperor that allowed the system to function.

Underlining this platform of provision and its presentation to the people is the 'extravagances' of the emperor as a comment on the core concept of *securitas* outlined by Seneca himself. Not only did Nero's 'New Deal' address the material concerns of the people, but as a true '*securitas*' measure it satiated the people's emotional concerns as well. Further, Nero's public performances and his mingling with the common people (another source of derision on the part of historians) are equally hard to ignore; these same events provide a statement of the *securitas* outlined in *de Clementia*. Nero, despite his historical detractors, required no walls between himself and his people; he was not simply safe in an open field, but in the ruins of the city, in a festival crowd, or on the stage.

As we will see in subsequent chapters, many of the considerations present in Roman *securitas* appear in monarchist arguments for governance in the English Civil War; the role of the king in transmitting divine providence to the people, the capacity and responsibility of the ruler in delivering a freedom from concern to the people through provision, the reciprocity of law and order, and the fundamental importance of these issues to a stable and prosperous nation would all feature in the debates of constitution over a thousand years later. Chief among these interlocutors stands Thomas Hobbes, a man more often aligned with Greek thinking than that of Rome, but who as we will see largely follows this Roman configuration of security. Indeed, as we will explore further, Hobbes' formative political work was first published in Latin, the factor so central to delivering a nation from the 'war of all against all' being given as *securitas*.

PART IV

GOD, CONQUEST AND

THE BIRTH OF THE

ENGLISH LANGUAGE

CHAPTER SEVEN

COMMON GREEK AND THE ROLE OF THEOLOGY

While the previous two sections have made it plain that there was a great conceptual distance between the Greek *asphaleia* and the Roman *securitas* in their use by Athens and Rome respectively, there are a number of considerations that require us to look at these two terms with a stronger sense of comparison. Firstly, it is important to appreciate how Greek language and literature interplayed with the political sensibilities of Rome. The use of the Greek language did not end with the fall of Athens; instead, the Macedonian conquests of the fourth century BCE had spread *Koine* (literally ‘common’) Greek throughout the Mediterranean and Near East, and the use of Greek continued when these areas were conquered by Rome from the second century onwards. The use of Greek within the context of Roman power gives us an opportunity to see how *asphaleia* was appreciated within a different political system, and better appreciate how the term related (or did not relate) to *asphaleia*.

Secondly, *Koine* Greek and its relationship to Latin is important in that both languages are fundamental to the emergence of the Christian religion in the western context; the former the language of the original bible texts, the latter the language of the Catholic Church. In particular we will examine a specific New Testament passage in which the Latin speaking church uncharacteristically translated *asphaleia* as *securitas*, this exceptional case demonstrating the nuanced similarities and differences between the two terms. Thus we will seek to bring clarity to this small but important passage, and explain how our Greek political term could be used in such a setting, as well as how the Latin translator could justify glossing that term for *securitas*.

Thirdly, this chapter will track *securitas* and *asphaleia* in early Christian writings in order to show how the theological considerations of early Christian writers would go on to shape the political value of *securitas*. Ultimately, all of these three aims will coalesce – we will see that shifts in political realities precipitate different uses of the same metaphor, we will see that

by positioning the political and social values of *asphaleia* and *securitas* below the transcendent absolute of the Christian God, the use of the terms shifted and diversified again. We will see both why Jerome's use of *securitas* as a gloss for *asphaleia* can be seen as a confirmation of the varied meanings we have already uncovered for both *securitas* and *asphaleia*, as well as seeing how by the time of Jean Calvin's *institutes of the Christian Religion*, written in 1536, *securitas* could be just be used to express a negative state just as much as it could be a positive.

The sum of these issues is crucial to understanding a crucial aspect of the historical and cultural contestation of the English Civil War, and indeed crucial to the development of western political thought more broadly – that of religion. The notion of security that finds expression in 1 Thessalonians 5:3 is a fundamental part of some of the more radical views of political authority and security that will emerge in seventeenth century England. By understanding the relationship between such theological perspectives and the political powers present throughout history, we can better appreciate how issues of faith, translation and politics coalesced to form the notion of security the Anglo world has inherited today.

KOINE GREEK

While our previous explorations of Greek language and politics centred on the Athenian experience of the Peloponnesian war (431-404 BCE), by 338 BCE Athens would be conquered by the monarchical Macedonian Empire. Macedonian rule over Athens, and indeed much of the known world over the next century had two effects relevant to our study; firstly, it ended the democratic legacy of Attic Greece, and secondly it gave rise to a common Greek dialect that was spoken across Macedonian holdings in the Mediterranean

and near-east.³¹¹ The spread of a widely spoken Greek dialect, along with Macedonian hegemony means that *asphaleia* and its political value should be reassessed.

With Macedonian power came Macedonian sensibilities – monarchical government systems, and a language taken largely from the Athenians they conquered. However Macedonian hegemony over Athens and the rest of the Greek peninsula would end with the expansion of Rome; by 146 BCE the Romans had subjugated the Antigonid Macedonians (who had held Macedon and Attica) as well as the Achaean League and Sparta (who held control of the Peloponnese). From this date on, Rome would remain in control of Greece for centuries, though for the majority of the Empire’s Hellenistic subjects Greek would remain the common language, being spoken across not only Greece, but the Levant and much of North Africa as well. This common language, now known as *Koine* Greek, was the language not only of greatly important political authors such as Polybius, Plutarch and Marcus Aurelius, but also the language of the Christian bible – the books of the new testament, as well as a key translation of the Hebrew scriptures that made up the old testament were taken from *koine* Greek sources.

To understand how *asphaleia* was understood in *Koine* Greek, we can first turn to the work of Polybius. The son of an Achaean politician and general, Polybius was one of a thousand Achaean nobles taken as a hostage by a wary Rome in 167 BCE; Polybius’ father had advocated the Achaean League remain neutral between Rome and Macedon in their battle over the Greek Peninsula, however Rome took hostages as security for the League’s assistance in their conquest. During his 17 year captivity in Rome, Polybius enjoyed the favour of prominent Romans, eventually using his skills and experiences to pen a history of the Roman conquest of Carthage, as well as an appraisal of Roman governance and culture. As such, Polybius’ work stands as a prime example of both a politically focussed work, and as an example of *Koine* Greek; and as one would expect from such a work, *asphaleia* appears with regularity.

³¹¹ Vit Bubenik, “The Rise of Koiné,” in *A History of Ancient Greek: From the Beginnings to Late Antiquity*, ed. A.-Ph Christidēs et al., Rev. & expanded translation of the Greek text (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 342–45.

However while *asphaleia* appears in a variety of contexts and is used in nuanced and political ways within Thucydides' history, Polybius' use of the word is narrow by comparison. Overwhelmingly, Polybius' work uses *asphaleia* to speak of matters of physical safety. Throughout the text, *asphaleia* is used in regards to the safety of individuals,³¹² to safe travel or movement (as per Herodotus and Xenophon's usage outlined in a previous chapter),³¹³ and in regards to cities, towns and sometimes even nations.³¹⁴

Such usage is not novel – certainly Thucydides and other earlier authors also use the word in this way – what is interesting is the fact that even in his discussion of political constitutions in book six of the work, Polybius does not employ the word as an expressly political term. Polybius opens book six with a discussion of constitutions – specifically the three core constitutions (monarchy, aristocracy and democracy), as well as their three 'negative' versions (tyranny, oligarchy and ochlocracy). But where we might expect to see *asphaleia* as a term relating to the management of a polis, instead, *asphaleia's* value in Polybius' discussion of how polities might constitute is confined to considerations of practical safety; in fact the word is completely absent in discussions of democracy.

It is, however, used in regards to monarchy – especially in regards to how noble monarchy devolves into an unjust tyranny. Beyond the fact that the usage is indicative of protection, though, the role *asphaleia* plays in the passage is interesting when compared to Seneca's use of *securitas*, *salus* (safety) and *tutem* (protection) in *de Clementia*, discussed in the earlier chapter;

³¹² Cleanly demarcating the following sets of examples is somewhat imprecise, but as a general rule any use that involves an individual (or set of individuals) looking out for their own *asphaleia* or the *asphaleia* of a specific person is featured here, examples that are specifically to do with travelling distances in safety are in the following note, and uses in which a group of people (such as an army or a city) are given security by an act or agent are in note after that. All quotes from Polybius are taken from Polybius, F. W. Walbank, and Christian Habicht, "The Histories," trans. W. R. Paton (Harvard University Press, 2010), <https://doi.org/10.4159/DLCL.polybius-histories.2010>. See Plb. 1.18.2-3, 1.51.7, 1.57.8, 2.60.4, 5.24.6, 5.81.7, 6.33.6, 6.33.12, 8.16.5-6, 9.5.1, 9.14.11, 10.3.1-4, 10.15.7, 10.33.2, 11.34.3, 30.9.6

³¹³ Plb. 1.30.13, 3.44.7, 4.13.4, 5.13.7, 15.2.5, 16.6.11, 21.29.2, 30.9.18

³¹⁴ Plb. 1.44.6, 2.5.5, 3.33.6, 3.34.1, 3.89.2, 3.94.5, 4.80.11, 5.60.10, 6.7.4, 6.42.4, 6.54.4, 8.14.11, 9.35.2, 9.37.9, 11.13.3, 12.12a.3, 14.10.1, 18.13.8-9, 18.14.15, 18.15.1, 27.2.3, 38.3.1,

“...those who were once thus selected [as king]... grew old in their royal functions, making magnificent strongholds and surrounding them with walls and extending their frontiers, partly for the **security** of their subjects, and partly to provide them with abundance of the necessities of life; and while engaged in these works they were exempt from all vituperation or jealousy; because they did not make their distinctive dress, food, or drink, at all conspicuous, but lived very much like the rest, and joined in the everyday employments of the common people. But when their royal power became hereditary in their family, and they found every necessary for **security** ready to their hands, as well as more than was necessary for their personal support, then they gave the rein to their appetites; imagined that rulers must needs wear different clothes from those of subjects; have different and elaborate luxuries of the table; and must even seek sensual indulgence, however unlawful the source, without fear of denial.”³¹⁵

While *asphaleia* is here used in terms of protection, the argument made in the passage – that a monarchical ruler must balance their own protection against the provision of the people – is essentially similar to that which Seneca would make some two centuries later, in which he claimed that a ruler that gave *securitas* to the people would be ‘safe in an open field’. Both outline the same dynamic in monarch-subject relations – that the legitimacy and safety of a monarch is more intimately tied to their ability to provide for their subjects, and that efforts for the monarch’s own protection ultimately run the risk of undermining the same safety such measures are trying to gain.

The proximity of such arguments to those of imperial Rome give us an important insight into the role of *asphaleia*, inasmuch as the basic meaning of protection it had in *Koine* use can be mapped onto Seneca’s thematically similar argument. To Seneca, a good ruler would not need ‘safety’ or ‘protection’ in the form of walls and castles as long as they could provide *securitas* to the people; in Polybius, on the road to tyranny, the monarchy takes care of its

³¹⁵ Plb. 6.7.4-8

own safety (in the form of *asphaleia*) in order to gain a perceived impunity from the same people it should be providing *securitas* for. Put simply, Polybius' *asphaleia* is Seneca's *salus* or *tutum*, and stands against the '*dayileias*' (δαψυλείας, provision) that correlates to Seneca's '*securitas*'.

We can see therefore that in Polybius, *asphaleia* takes on a far narrower conception of safety, rather than its nuanced political conception given in Thucydides' work. While this does not exclude other uses for *asphaleia* generally, it is indicative of the value of the word within the context of political speech. Given the shift from dominant recorded use in a participatory democracy to use in the context of monarchy and oligarchy, the political-rhetorical aspect of *asphaleia* would be less relevant to the aspect of safety against danger. As we will see, appreciating this shift will be important to understanding the subsequent interplay between *asphaleia* and *securitas* both in terms of our biblical example to follow (that of 1 Thessalonians 5:3), but also in regards to later translations of Greek into English – especially that of Thomas Hobbes.

1 THESSALONIANS 5:3

There is one important ancient source where the two are brought together – Paul's first letter to the Thessalonians. In it, Paul pitches the claims of earthly powers against the power and possibility of the divine, specifically in relation to the coming of the apocalypse;

Now concerning the times and the seasons, brothers and sisters, you do not need to have anything written to you. For you yourselves know very well that the day of the Lord will come like a thief in the night. When they say, "There is peace and **security**," then sudden destruction will come upon them, as labor pains come upon a pregnant woman, and there will be no escape!³¹⁶

³¹⁶ 1 Thessalonians 5:1 – 5:3 (New Revised Standard Version)

This passage, originally written in *Koine* Greek in the first century CE, has presented somewhat of a puzzle to theologians. The passage itself is to modern readers somewhat ambiguous – Paul is not explicit who is making the claim, instead using the phrase ‘ὅταν λέγωσιν’, generally rendered as ‘they say’, rather than explicitly naming a speaker of the phrase. As well as the speakers of the phrase being ambiguous, the phrase itself stands as a curious construction. While it reads as a political slogan, there is no evidence that Εἰρήνη καὶ ἀσφάλεια, (peace and security) saw any substantive use in the Roman Empire.³¹⁷ We are therefore left with a passage that suggests a political use for *asphaleia* in the Empire, though essentially stands alone in doing so.

The passage and the issues it presents are further magnified by the fact that when the theologian Jerome of Stridon was asked to translate the biblical material such as this into Latin in 382 CE, the phrase Εἰρήνη καὶ ἀσφάλεια was rendered to ‘*pax et securitas*’; despite the distance between the two terms, well established by the previous chapters, it would seem that Jerome believed that in at least one case the two terms were acceptably interchangeable. Jerome’s translation of the bible provided the basis for the most important document in the western world for the next thousand years – the Latin Vulgate Bible, the sacred text of the Catholic Church. Jerome’s choice of words therefore stands as a rather notable instance that should be accounted for; it calls into question the separation of the two terms, and gives credence to the later equation of the two by more modern scholars.

Most importantly, Jerome’s translation suggests that between the time of Nero’s rule and Jerome’s translation, the two words may have drifted together – such a view certainly stands more in line with the claims of Hamilton and Arenas. The use of *securitas* as a gloss for *asphaleia* in what is most likely the Greek aping of a Latin political slogan gives support to the idea that ‘*pax et securitas*’ was a phrase with political weight, or at least was *presumed* to have political weight by Jerome at the time of Paul’s writing.

³¹⁷ Weima, “‘Peace and Security’ (1 Thess 5.3): Prophetic Warning or Political Propaganda?”

WHO 'THEY' ARE AND WHAT 'THEY' SAID

The Epistle is one of the earliest of Paul's letters, likely penned by the apostle himself and written in *Koine* Greek some time around 52 AD. At one's first glance at the modern rendition of Thessalonians 5:3, one can see the acute importance to this study; in a text written in the last days of the Julio-Claudian dynasty of the Roman Empire, there stands a textual witness to the connectedness of '*eirene*' and '*asphaleia*', of 'peace' and 'safety'. However as we will see, there are several issues that stem from the inconsistent translation of this phrase; further, these issues highlight both the similarities and differences of *asphaleia* and *securitas*, as well as show us a strand of '*securitas*' that was instrumental in forming the notion of security as it appeared in the early modern period of the English Civil War.

To do this, however, we must understand the above passage; to properly understand the phrase, we must attempt to understand what Paul hoped to impart with his words. To do that, however, we must also ascertain who 'they' were – what people or group Paul was representing by penning the phrase, and what sort of 'peace' and 'security' they were invoking. The solution to this problem as offered by biblical scholars can be separated into three broad characterisations. The first of these we may call the 'spiritual' view; Paul's 'They' in this instance are false prophets, and the 'peace and security' they offer is found in their spiritual promises. While this view has traditionally enjoyed precedence, it is increasingly viewed with scepticism due to its lack of engagement with the social realities of Paul's time and ministry.³¹⁸ This view largely ignores the political and historical elements of Paul's writings in favour of understanding the text as a continuation of a narrow theological tradition – put another way, this view sees the epistle as being confined to examining issues of scripture and worship, as opposed to including influence from or examination of political events or concerns.

³¹⁸ Abraham J. Malherbe and Paulus, *The Letters to the Thessalonians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*, 1. trade paperback ed. 2004, [Nachdr.], The Anchor Bible 32B (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 2008).

The second characterisation of the text sees the phrase ‘peace and security’ as the invocation of a Roman political slogan –in this interpretation, ‘They’ are the Roman rulers, and ‘peace and security’ is Paul’s attempt to translate into Greek a classic Latin phrase that invoked the benefit delivered by Roman rule. Just as with works examining the political notions of ‘*securitas*’ during the reign of the Julio-Claudians reviewed in the earlier chapter of this work, while there are several pieces of evidence that ‘peace’ (in the form of the Latin *pax*, rather than the Greek *eirene* written by Paul) enjoyed use in imperial propaganda, its pairing with *securitas* is all but unattested.

The last – and the one most supported by the work in this study – is the view that Paul’s ‘They’ *is* indicative of the Roman Empire, and the phrase *is* an invocation of the Empire’s political promise, however ‘peace’ and ‘security’ are not constituents of a slogan, but are rather to be taken individually. Such a view is deferent to the vast amount of historical and textual evidence that Paul is here pitching Roman political values against the spiritual realities of Christ’s plan for earth, but also respects the fact that there is no evidence that *pax et securitas* was ever used an official Roman slogan. While *eirene kai asphaleia* is no more attested to as an *official* slogan of the empire, Paul would not be the only recorded author to deliver the words in connection with Roman promises; indeed, writing at the close of the first century CE, the Jewish historian Josephus speaks of the safety (*asphaleia*) and the state of happiness and peace (*eirene*) afforded to all humankind by the Roman Empire.³¹⁹

Further, there is no indication in the earliest manuscripts that peace and security should be taken together in the text. While modern styling allows for the demarcation of quotes, phrases and other grammatical devices, the original script of the letter was presented in a format devoid of punctuation or spacing.³²⁰ As such, there is no reason to favour either reading based purely on the presentation of the original text, however based on an examination of both the context of the letter and the use of the terms and concepts by the

³¹⁹ J. AJ 14.247-248; Josephus, “Jewish Antiquities,” trans. H. St. J. Thackeray (Harvard University Press, 1930), https://doi.org/10.4159/DLCL.josephus-jewish_antiquities.1930.

³²⁰ Yencich, “Peace, Security, and Labor Pains in 1 Thessalonians 5.3,” 41–42.

empire at the time of its creation, there is good reason to identify what 'They' say with Roman political ideology.

In the case of *eirene*, this can be assigned to *pax*, but in the case of *asphaleia*, the use of 'security' is likely unsuitable. As we have seen, *securitas* was only subject to widespread 'slogan'-like use for a short time, a time that followed Paul, not preceded him. Further, while *asphaleia* was used to speak of physical safety, at the time of writing *securitas* was focussed on emotive and mental calm. It is therefore far more likely that the *asphaleia* 'They' spoke of in Paul's epistle was aligned with *salus*, rather than *securitas*; not only was *salus* a far more likely candidate in regards to denoting a physical, rather than emotional outcome, but it was also subject to far more use within the political rhetoric of the Empire, and had a long tradition as a core Roman political ideal.

WHY, JEROME?

While the above might demonstrate that Paul's Epistle features a political usage of the Greek term, it does not explain why Jerome would translate that Greek term as '*securitas*' three hundred years later. As we have seen previously, there was nothing at the time of Paul's writing to suggest an analogue between the *asphaleia* and *securitas*. This would reasonably lead one to assume that over the next three centuries, or within the Christian tradition Jerome was a part of, that this state of affairs shifted; that over time, the two words came closer together.

In truth, while the value of each term would shift closer to a degree, this shift would come after Jerome's translation, not before. Instead, Jerome's choice of words can be attributed to a sort of compromise of terminology; two separate and theologically distinct Greek terms shared a Latin translation, and Jerome chose to recast one meaning to preserve the other. In the original Greek, the concept of safety (*asphaleia*) and salvation (*soteria*) are distinct both in inference and in word; one is the physical 'safety' offered by a government, the other the spiritual 'salvation' offered by God. Given that the overall argument of 1

Thessalonians 5 is to pitch these two forces as antithetical – that trusting in the former harms your appreciation of the latter – it would be problematic of Jerome to translate them as the same Latin word. This is a distinct possibility, given that in Latin, both *asphaleia* and *soteria* become ‘*salus*’ – both of these terms, which are here meant to be different concepts beholden to two wholly separate (and even on some level antithetical forces), would be rendered into Latin as the same term.

In the case of 1 Thessalonians 5, not only their close proximity, but the fact that the passage is attempting to put these two concepts in direct opposition, it would make sense for Jerome to purposefully differentiate them. Put simply, I argue that Jerome chose to preserve the intent of Paul’s text by replacing a well-known Roman political buzzword present in Paul’s day for a lesser known political buzzword that had emerged since. Jerome’s motive for doing so is painfully simple – both the ‘safety’ offered by the Empire, and the salvation offered by God can be given in Latin as ‘*salus*’, meaning that careless, clumsy or imprecise reading of Latin thus rendered could conflate the earthly promises of the Empire with the divine promise of God.

There are three reasons to assume this is the case. The first is the fact that a demarcation between what ‘They’ provide and what is provided by God supports the overall intent of the passage. Maintaining separation between the *salus* of the empire and the *salus* of God highlights what governments claim they can provide, as well as the fundamentally different provision of divine power. Mitigation of this confusion is important to 1 Thessalonians 5:3, given that Paul’s intent in the text is to compare false or transient earthly promises with the absolute and eternal promise of God. As we have seen, in the political context, the *asphaleia* of *Koine* Greek was far more allied with the ‘safety’ of *salus* than it was the carefree-ness of *securitas*, and as such, a straightforward translation of the Greek here would have risked confusion in the Latin text.

The second is that Jerome’s other translations of *asphaleia* in the new testament are similarly nuanced, albeit in different ways, and additionally Jerome’s use of *securitas* in his letters is ‘typical’ in the sense that it conforms to the ‘lack of cares’ established in previous

chapters.³²¹ For example, we see *asphaleia* in Luke 1:4 used to speak of trusting in a truthful teaching - “so that you may know the **truth** concerning the things about which you have been instructed.”³²² Here in the Latin, Jerome gives the ‘certainty’ of *asphaleia* as Latin ‘truth’, translating the Greek to *veritas* (literally, ‘truth’ in modern English). Such a translation is certainly in the spirit of the original text, however the ‘truth’ here is not the Greek ‘truth’ *aletheia* (ἀλήθεια) but rather a Latin approximation of Greek notions of certainty.³²³ Similarly, in Acts 5:23, *asphaleia* appears again, and is again translated by Jerome into a suitable Latin analogue, rather than literally rendered; where a prison was made ‘secure’ (πάση ἀσφαλείᾳ), Jerome tells his Latin readers it was locked with ‘all diligence’ (*omni diligentia*).³²⁴ Given his willingness to find suitable Latin analogues that preserve intention, rather than translate Greek terms as literally as possible, it is unlikely 1 Thessalonians is an exception. It would therefore be unlikely for Jerome to conflate *securitas* and *asphaleia* casually or by mistake.

Lastly, Jerome’s translation as a preservation of message, rather than as an attempt at a literal transposition is supported by the use of *salus* and *securitas* by his famous contemporary Augustine of Hippo, as well as the use of *asphaleia* by the Greek speaking early church fathers. Greek writers such as Origen and Eusebius used *asphaleia* in its typical sense – as safety, or as the identification of truth, just as Augustine was wont to use *securitas* as a concept that illustrated a freedom from cares or concerns. As a writer both steeped in and adding to this tradition, it would be odd for Jerome to stray from a convention he held at all other points in time without good reason; further, it makes little sense to consistently employ the word in line with common use in his letters and works, only to depart from that use in his biblical translation.

³²¹ See for example; “No age is safe from lust, yet gray hairs are some security for decent conduct.” St Jerome, *The Sacred Writings of St. Jerome* (Jazybee Verlag, n.d.), 232.

³²² Luke 1:4 (NRSV)

³²³ The issues between Greek subjectivity and the Latin desire for certainty can be explored further in Martin Heidegger, André Schuwer, and Richard Rojcewicz, *Parmenides* (Bloomington; Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998).

³²⁴ Acts 5:23. St Jerome, *Vulgate Bible* (Bible Foundaton and On-Line Book Initiative, n.d.), ftp.std.com/obi/Religion/Vulgate.

To the Greek speaking audience of Paul's letter, the 'They' that said peace and safety (but could deliver neither in the face of eternity) was easily identifiable. In the time of Paul, the Roman Empire was hostile to Christianity, held an immense and increasing amount of power. However to the Latin speakers of the late fourth century CE, the empire had both converted and waned – Jerome himself would provide some of the most vivid accounts of the excesses of Rome, and the effects of its fall. For readers of the newly translated Vulgate, the lack of stark contrast between Rome and the Church meant that who 'They' were, and whether they were saying salvation or safety would not have been so clear. For that reason, it was in the best interests of the translation to eschew literal terminology in favour of a similar but ultimately distinct term that filled a similar niche – used as an imperial slogan by the historically villainous emperors Nero and Caracalla, *securitas* stood as a fine alternative to put in the mouths of the Roman 'They'.

BEYOND THE BIBLE

The way in which *securitas* was invoked by the early church is hugely important to our understanding of security as a concept throughout western history. Beyond the preservation of the author's intention, Jerome's translation of the fifth chapter of 1 Thessalonians is also indicative of a paradigm of security that sought to appreciate not so much the benefits such a state could bring, but rather the detriments it inculcated, especially as they affected Christian believers.

Discussing the negative, negligent aspect of security was not new or unique to the early church – as we have seen as early as Cicero himself, the capacity of *securitas* to inculcate a false confidence, a negligent attitude, or an aversion to risk was discussed by a variety of authors. However by the time Jerome translated the Vulgate bible, the negative capacity of *securitas* was both more forceful and far more prevalent. Jerome's contemporary Augustine of Hippo succinctly expressed the danger of security to the early church; in his *Commentary*

on first epistle of John, Augustine pitches the ‘useful fear’ experienced by a believer in Christ against an ‘evil security’ that would lead an individual to an ungodly state.³²⁵

As well as his disparaging view of security’s interaction with issues of faith, Augustine also extended this negative aspect of security to wider social issues. In his account of the Fall of Rome to the ‘pagan’ barbarians in the early fifth century, Augustine proposed that it was the ‘prosperity and security’ that Rome enjoyed following the defeat of Carthage that corrupted and ultimately weakened the city and its empire.³²⁶ Not simply a matter of personal salvation, security weakened the constitution and disconnected its holder from reality; as Jerome said – *Ubique securitas, ibi libido domnatur* – where there is security, lust dominates.³²⁷

To the ascetic and uncompromising Jerome, there stood a double benefit to placing *securitas* in his translation of Paul’s epistle. In characterising earthly, political power against the totality of God’s capacity, *securitas* not only stood to largely maintain Paul’s intention while dodging the issues of translating the Greek into the (in this instance) less specific Latin, it also enhanced the point that Paul was seeking to demonstrate in the text. It was not simply that the promises and slogans of Rome would fall against the rapture and the coming of Christ, it was that the appreciation of those promises – the peace and security offered by earthly power- were at best obfuscatory, and at worst complicit in drawing attention away from an appreciation of the powers of the divine.

Of course, the social and cultural consciousness that Jerome dealt with are long gone, as is the Vulgate Bible’s dominance of the theological landscape; testament to the temporality of Jerome’s translation, as new translations appeared, the choice of words and phrasing

³²⁵ *Christus ... tollit tibi malam securitatem, viserit utilem timorem*. Augustine, *Homilies on the Gospel According to John, and His First Epistle*, trans. Henry Browne, Library of Fathers of the Holy Catholic Church (Oxford: J. H. Parker, 1848).

³²⁶ City of God against the Pagans 3.21; Augustine, “The City of God against the Pagans,” trans. George E. McCracken (Harvard University Press, 1957), https://doi.org/10.4159/DLCL.augustine-city_god_pagans.1957.

³²⁷ Robert Burton and Holbrook Jackson, *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, New York Review Books Classics (New York: New York Review of Books, 2001), 214–15.

present in the vulgate was often absent in English translations. Early translations (such as the Wycliffe bible in 1395) relied on the Vulgate as a source, and as such aped the latter's manner, however by the early sixteenth century direct translations from the Greek had appeared. In what is generally held to be the first English translation to work directly with the Greek, Tyndale's Bible rendered the passage as "peace and no daunger" in 1535. In later translations such as the Geneva Bible (c. 1565) and the King James Version (1611), 1 Thessalonians 5:3 exchanges 'secureness' for 'safety'.

Beyond the specific words of choice given in 1 Thessalonians, the concept behind security thus expressed would still be forcefully present in the Christian tradition by the sixteenth century and the birth of the modern period. While newly protestant translators in England were busy reclaiming the literal Greek meaning of 1 Thessalonians, the great protestant reformers of the continent still espoused the dangers of security to the soul of the Christian believer. In Germany, Martin Luther proclaimed that *securitas* "...takes away faith and the fear of God"³²⁸ In a nod to the issues facing Jerome as a Latin translator, this understanding was not simply coming from security in isolation, but rather from its antithesis to the emotive needs of salvation; as Hamilton claims, for Luther "...salvation (*salus*) becomes the primary *cura* of one's life, a *cura* that would be fatally relaxed by the privation implicit in *securitas*."³²⁹ Indeed, Thessalonians 5:3 itself was a favourite passage of Luther that demonstrated the way in which *securitas* could lead a believer astray.³³⁰

Much the same conception of security was present in the works of the other great reformer, Jean Calvin. Writing as a French speaker of Swiss descent, Calvin diverged from both Luther and the Catholic Church on many issues, however his notion of *securitas* was not one of them. In his *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, Calvin speaks of the risks of security, especially in its capacity to allow the earthly –or 'carnal', as it is expressed here – to take the rightful place of spiritual concern. In outlining how to educate Christians, Calvin writes that

³²⁸ Luther WA 39.1: 356; Martin Luther, Helmut T. Lehmann, and Jaroslav Pelikan, *Luther's Works (American Edition)*, 75 vols. (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1955).

³²⁹ Hamilton, *Security*, 195.

³³⁰ Hamilton, 194–95.

they should be "... taught to examine themselves carefully and humbly, lest carnal security creep in and take the place of assurance of faith."³³¹ Just as it was for Luther, Calvin's distaste for security came from the capacity of those who were free from earthly cares to ignore spiritual issues; earthly security held within it the risk of divine insecurity.

Thus with the protestant reformation, the marriage between earthly and spiritual authorities became unstuck. Revolts, communes, confederacies and theocracies sprang up across Germany particularly, all seeking to make manifest their spiritual emancipation from the church within the earthly realm. The German Peasant's revolt of 1524 saw widespread civil unrest across much of what is now modern Germany, in no small part fuelled by radical protestant theology. Even worse, entire towns would be taken over by competing conceptions of earthy governance; not only was there little structural authority for the divine right of kings in these new protestant theologies, but indeed there were political alternatives given specific details in God's own word. In 1534, the city of Münster was taken over by Anabaptists, who installed a government which sought to live as a biblically inspired commune; their experiment ended with the execution of the leaders of the movement just over a year later. In 1541, Jean Calvin himself was instrumental in creating a theocratic republic in Geneva.

However unlike the reformation experienced on the continent, the English experience was not one of a clean break between political authority and the church, nor a revolt of a newly protestant underclass and a religiously entrenched nobility.³³² Instead, the English crown was proactive – with varying levels of success – in attempting to retain relevance and

³³¹Calvin Institutes 2.11; Jean Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009).

³³² The exact causes of both the English Civil War, and the English Reformation are endless sources of controversy and debate, and rather selfishly, I seek to sidestep them both completely. In this regard I rely on the fact that the finer points of either do not impinge on the argument here, and as such I have confined my argument to issues of the relationship between the crown and theological sources of crown authority, rather than wider issues that are commonly debated. For a more thorough engagement with the causes of the Civil War in England, see Stone, *The Causes of the English Revolution 1529-1642*; Paul Christianson, "The Causes of the English Revolution: A Reappraisal," *Journal of British Studies* 15, no. 2 (1976): 40–75; Lawrence Stone, "Early Modern Revolutions: An Exchange: The Causes of the English Revolution, 1529-1642: A Reply," *The Journal of Modern History* 46, no. 1 (1974): 106–10; Tim Harris, "Revisiting the Causes of the English Civil War." In regards to the English Reformation, see ROSEMARY O'DAY, *The Debate on the English Reformation* (Manchester University Press, 2014), www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1mf6zr2.

legitimacy in the new post-catholic world. Henry the Eighth finalised his split with the Catholic Church in 1534 and proclaimed himself the head of the English congregation, leaving the largely Catholic nation he ruled subject to a new spiritual authority, however after Henry's death in 1547, his three children, each successive rulers, would each attempt to manage the split differently. Immediately following the King's death, England would first embrace Calvinistic reform under Edward the Sixth, in which clerical celibacy and catholic style mass was abolished. Upon Edward's early death, however, his sister Mary ensued that by 1553 England had returned to the Catholic Fold. However it would take only 5 years before Elizabeth succeeded her sister in 1558, reinstating many of the reforms instigated under Edward by 1559.

It would be wrong to characterise these royal motions as indicative of royal *control* over the religion of England,³³³ however by attempting to proactively manage the religious affairs of the realm, the English crown retained a degree of oversight and influence over matters of the church. With the reign of Elizabeth the First, the English Crown's manoeuvring in regards to spiritual authority was largely stable, with the monarch firmly established as head of the church, but with matters of faith and practise left to the clergy themselves – with one notable exception.

While Henry had left catholic dogma largely intact after the split in 1534, the Elizabethan church set about realigning its theology and practises along roughly Calvinist lines.³³⁴ The notable exception, however, was the revision of church hierarchy. Instead of a stratified church hierarchy, reformers sought to remove the strict hierarchical institutions of Catholicism and reform church governance by instituting councils, elections, and allowing laity to be involved in church decisions. While reforming practises were largely welcomed in other areas of church life, this was not the case when it came to the redistribution of authority within the church under Elizabeth, and as we will see, both the acceptance of

³³³ Peter Marshall, "(Re)Defining the English Reformation," *Journal of British Studies* 48, no. 3 (2009): 564–86.

³³⁴ Diarmaid MacCulloch, "The Myth of the English Reformation," *Journal of British Studies* 30, no. 1 (1991): 14.

Calvinist reform and this rejection of hierarchical change continued under Elizabeth's successor James the First. As MacCulloch writes,

“Looking at nearly a century of established Protestantism before the debacle of the 1640s, we have rediscovered a church establishment of senior clergy which was committed to a Protestant reformation, and which saw that reformation in terms of discontinuity rather than continuity; which did its best to adapt the unreformed structures of the church's government to that end”³³⁵

In this way, both the crown and senior clergy retained their relevance to the spiritual authority of England, and given the role of the dominant political authority in shaping the English church (both as figureheads of the institution and as arbiters of the nation's policies of adoption and toleration). Under such a system, the 'anti-government' notion of security propounded by Paul, Augustine and Calvin himself was not compatible with either the English crown or church; it is easy to see how the identification of earthly power with the negligence of spiritual necessities would not define the 'security' of England. Indeed, as we will see, within a hundred years of Elizabeth's reign, a *positive* notion of security, a security that was eminently desirable became a key political term; as the nation was gripped by civil war, soldiers, citizens, churchmen and academics sought to define what that security would look like.

While the negligent aspect of security certainly found its way to the British Isles,³³⁶ The specifics of the English reformation were such that the decoupling of spiritual and political authority was not as explosive as it had been on the continent – though for the crown, the wolf was not far from the door. Painfully aware of this fact was King James the First of England, who as a boy in Scotland had been tutored by George Buchanan, a Presbyterian humanist who had written a work specifically denouncing the divine right of kings.

³³⁵ MacCulloch, 18.

³³⁶ Again, see Robert Cawdry, *The First English Dictionary, 1604* (Bodleian Library, 2007).

Buchanan's work *De Jure Regni apud Scotos*³³⁷ had been written in 1579 when his pupil James was thirteen years old; in it, Buchanan argued that the king ruled by virtue of the people, and that rulers who reneged in their contract to their subjects could be justly overthrown as tyrants; despite the efforts of his tutor, however, James would reject both monarchical contractualism and Presbyterianism, and as we will see, went to great lengths to retain the connection between kingship and divine authority upon his ascension to the English crown.

SECURITY, AUTHORITY AND PROTESTANTISM

Indeed, by the seventeenth century the English crown had well and truly embraced a reading of scripture that edified the monarch as divinely anointed, and placed the crown not simply above the will of the people and parliament, but of the law itself. Henry the Eighth had split the English church from Catholicism in 1534 and declared the English monarch the head of the English Church with the 1534 Act of Supremacy, however the notion of divinely anointed English kings reached its height with the ascension of the Scottish king James the Sixth (soon to be the first of England) in 1603. Not simply content legislating hegemony over the church, James the First provided theological argument for the claim, and was a fierce defender of crown control in both spiritual and political realms. In his 1598 work *The True Law of Free Monarchies*, soon to be King James the First of England argued that just as the biblical David had refused to injure King Saul of Israel due to the latter's status as the divinely anointed ruler of the nation, so too should modern kings be understood; divinely appointed representatives and leaders legitimized by a sort of apostolic succession. As such, argued James;

“The kings... were before any estates or ranks of men within the same, before any Parliaments were holden or laws made; and by them was the land distributed (which

³³⁷ George Buchanan, Roger A. Mason, and Martin S. Smith, *A Dialogue on the Law of Kingship among the Scots: A Critical Edition and Translation of George Buchanan's De Jure Regni apud Scotos Dialogus*, St. Andrews Studies in Reformation History (Aldershot, Hampshire, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004).

at the first was wholly theirs), states erected and decerned, and forms of government devised and established. And it follows of necessity that the Kings were the authors and makers of the laws and not the laws of the Kings”³³⁸

In inheriting the crown of England, James was all the more assured in his claims of divine succession given that after the secession from the Catholic Church by Henry the Eighth, the Monarch of England also functioned as the head of the national church. James certainly embraced his new role as spiritual head of the nation, writing several theological treatises and sponsoring the creation of a new standardized English translation of the bible; this version, still known as the King James Version was published in 1611.

On a more practical level, James’ English inheritance was confirming of the king’s divine right through its adherence to episcopatism – where his original kingdom of Scotland had fallen to a Presbyterian system of election and council decision making, England still retained a church hierarchy in which bishops and archbishops could express power over lower ministers and the laity. Indeed, even with growing numbers of Presbyterians in England, during his rule James was careful to ensure that the hierarchical system of the Church of England was retained, rejecting Presbyterian petitions to reform the church,³³⁹ and even directing translators of the KJV bible to ensure the episcopal traditions of the Church of England be reflected in the final text.³⁴⁰ James had experienced first-hand the complexities of expressing authority over a Presbyterian clergy and population in Scotland, and had no intention of reducing his claim to authority in England.

Thus while the separation of earthly and divine authority (and the needs that authority satisfied) might have been acceptable to Augustine and Jerome, it was of little benefit to the monarchies that followed the Roman Empire. Instead, the divine right of kings established the connection between the spiritual authority of the church with the earthly authority of

³³⁸ James I, “True Law of Free Monarchies,” in *Constitutional Documents of the Reign of James I 1602-1625*, ed. Joseph Robson Tanner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930), 187.

³³⁹ David H Willson, *King James VI and I* (London: Cape, 1971), 198.

³⁴⁰ David Daniell, *The Bible in English: Its History and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 439.

the crown; if kings were crowned by God, earthly *securitas* was an extension of that divine ordination. As such, Paul's dichotomy between a political authority claiming hegemony over the conduct of humanity and a spiritual reality that no force could overcome was largely unhelpful to both church and crown, and as a result 'security' retained its limited meaning in the English language from its introduction during the Norman conquest till the sixteenth century.

PURITANS, CATHOLICS, WAR AND SECURITY

However crown influence over the divine was not at all absolute, nor was the limited amount of power it did have at all adequate to prevent the English crown from becoming unstuck. James' son Charles would follow in his father's image of divine right, a position that contributed to him losing his head to parliamentary forces in 1649. While the religious motivations of the English Civil War are easily overblown,³⁴¹ the role religion played in justifying various political positions is important, as political claims to authority required a basis on which to be prosecuted.³⁴²

Evidence of this is found in the fact that even well respected 'monarchists' were disavowed by monarchist authorities if their sources of autocratic justification were not in line with the claim of divine right; Thomas Hobbes' justification of absolute monarchy was banned by Oxford University, as it justified kings on the basis of earthly power, not divine right, as was George Buchanan's work.³⁴³ Indeed, while in the present day Hobbes may be thought of as a high-profile monarchist, in his day he was vilified and rejected by much of the monarchist movement.

The reason for this was the due to the nature of his monarchism – itself perhaps determined by the nature of his religious philosophy. Departing from the divine right of kings, Hobbes' support for monarchy was not couched in terms of holy order, but instead from a sort of

³⁴¹ Tim Harris, "Revisiting the Causes of the English Civil War."

³⁴² Glenn Burgess, "Was the English Civil War a War of Religion? The Evidence of Political Propaganda," *Huntington Library Quarterly* 61, no. 2 (1998): 173–201, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3817797>.

³⁴³ Buchanan, Mason, and Smith, *A Dialogue on the Law of Kingship among the Scots*.

humanism – monarchy was the end result of human reason, not divine ordinance.³⁴⁴

Hobbes' relationship to religion – and his use (or lack thereof) in his political works was subject to great controversy in his own day, and continues to be the source of debate even now. Whatever the specifics, while Hobbes was far too cautious to outright deny God's providence over politics (and thus 'security' as he understood it), the Leviathan laid plain his view that monarchy – and governance generally – was not the outcome of God, so much as an effort of human reason.

In contrast to both divine right, and to Hobbes' completely humanistic view, many of the more 'democratic' leaning voices of the day used notions of divine providence as a basis for individual autonomy. For such adherents, divine scripture eschewed hierarchical authority, advocating instead in the spiritual autonomy of the believer. In such circles, while the meaning of the term security might not have departed from the common use in England largely inoculated from an overtly negligent sense, the lessons of Calvin, Luther, Augustine and Jerome were very much present. Taking the connection between earthly and spiritual cares and inverting the calculus, to many the subjection of an individual to an earthly authority at the expense of the spiritual ran the real risk of becoming a subjection of the soul.³⁴⁵ Put simply, if earthly luxury could obfuscate spiritual needs, then surely earthly limitations could also obfuscate spiritual truths.

Thus by the time strife began to befall England in the late 1640's, the political calculus of more radical English protestants often sought both to emancipate the political individual, as well as limit earthly frivolities. For the radical 'Diggers', for example, the illegality of farming common or crown land was directly contra to their interpretation of a scriptural directive to be stewards of the earth, and as such they openly called for disobedience to a crown that could not possibly be justified by the same God that wrote the scripture. To less hungry (and more wealthy) puritans like Cromwell, disobedience to the crown had a far less specific

³⁴⁴ Devin Stauffer, "'Of Religion' in Hobbes's Leviathan," *The Journal of Politics* 72, no. 3 (2010): 868–79, <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381610000228>.

³⁴⁵ "The constitutional concerns of the Puritan pamphleteers were not an alternative to their religious concerns: they were the means of expressing religious concerns." Burgess, "Was the English Civil War a War of Religion? The Evidence of Political Propaganda," 201.

justification; if all individuals were spiritually sovereign, and spiritual needs trumped earthly security, then disobedience to the crown could be justified. Indeed, in matters of spirit it was an absolute necessity.

Cromwell himself typifies this calculus of inverted Christian security best, considering his attempts at manifesting his notion of the 'spiritual realm' into a political reality. His focus on the spiritual health of his troops, on his prohibition of earthly 'pleasures' such as gambling and theatre, and ultimately his belief in the legitimacy of faith, rather than of political authority all served not simply to edify his particular view of Christianity, but to provide political 'security' to the nation. Most illustrative of this point is installation of his 'parliament of saints' following the dissolution of the monarchy; given the opportunity to rebuild the sovereign institution of the country, Cromwell selected a parliament to rule as a sovereign council based on the godliness and faith of the constituent members. Such a parliament, thought Cromwell, would surely deliver righteous and godly rule to a nation that sorely needed stability and security – though of the correct (non-Augustinian) sort. As it was, the parliament of saints lasted less than 6 months before the 'parliamentarian' Cromwell effectively replaced the king as a divinely inspired dictator.³⁴⁶

As we will see in later chapters, the divine right of kings and Cromwell's parliament of saints were but two bridges between the spiritual concept of security and political authority at play during the English Civil War, however at this stage what is crucial is to understand how the early Christian notion of security filtered into the consciousness of the political actors, activists and theorists of early modern England. Whilst the crown might have originally dictated England's shift to Protestantism, it could not control it; with the scriptures up to individual interpretation, it would take less than a century for the divine right of kings – or even more fundamental, any claim of fundamental hegemony – to be seriously challenged.

³⁴⁶ 4 July – 12 December 1653 (5 months and 8 days). Charles Harding Firth, *Oliver Cromwell and the Rule of Puritans in England* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1900), 329–40.

Contained within this shift was the struggle between earthly cares and divine absolution. The Roman Empire had promised temporal security at the cost of divine vigilance – a price that the early Christians had thought was unconscionable. While the alliance between church and state prevalent in Europe in the intervening years essentially negated the tension between physical provision and spiritual vigilance, with the removal of the spiritual authority of Rome and the rise of individual interpretations of scripture, the tension of security within Christianity was laid bare again. No longer could a ruler justify their authority through divine right, but neither could their rule be justified purely by their capacity to provide security for their people.

Instead, for the first time in over a millennia political authority was subject to an ideational challenge from a powerful quarter – that of faith; the role of the individual, suddenly not only the subject of salvation through faith, but also the interlocutor and analyst of what that salvation looked like, undercut social and political life. It was suddenly the individual's responsibility to not simply be spiritually vigilant, but also to negotiate for themselves their relationship to divine authority – a force that stood far beyond any earthly authority. As such, the earthly, the carnal, the political, would need to find a new source and expression of authority, one that made no demands that would prejudice the spiritual needs of its people. Such were the requirements of political authority for this 'reformed' Christianity, a faith that would throw away the *securitas* of the English crown in favour of a new form of state provision, a new form of 'security'; a security that would find form in the texts of the Levellers, of the New Agents, and ultimately in the constitution of the United States of America.

Thus the Christian tradition informed both the conceptual and lingual considerations of security within the Anglo tradition. Through the Latin Vulgate bible, we see the most compelling evidence for the amalgamation of *asphaleia* and *securitas*. However it is through the examination of this exceptional case of translation that we get our first glimpse of how the concept of security was viewed by the early Christian church; how the separation of earthy and divine needs, and the capacity of the earthly to obscure the divine, gave the notion of '*securitas*' a negative connotation within Christian conceptions.

The sharing of authority between the Catholic Church and the feudal monarchies of Europe meant that such a conception of security was ultimately unhelpful, however with the rise of Protestantism in the early sixteenth century, the unproblematic equation of political power with divine power (and therefore earthly provision and divine provision) broke down. On the continent, the '*securitas*' of the early church was recapitulated, and radical protestants saw in the newly liberated scripture an immediate challenge to kings and lords, however the protestant experience of England was tempered by a complex relationship between the crown and the evolution of Protestantism in the country.

Ultimately however, large sections of English believers would come to share in the reformist view of security, of divine authority, and in the fundamental importance of the individual in matters of the soul. Given the choice between earthly submission to the status quo, or divine truth, many in England found themselves at odds with a church and a state that demanded uniform submission – common prayer books, common worship and common doctrine all given weight by the divine intermediary that was the reigning monarch of the nation. While matters of spirituality were not to be the sole, nor perhaps even the most important issue that led to the English Civil War, this tension between *securitas* and politics would be an important factor in the way the war was pursued, as well as how the nation sought to rebuild. As such, in the beginnings of the modern concept of security, we can see elements of the Christian tradition still at play within the perennial arguments of our own day – does security seek the provision of its subjects, or does it seek to protect the subject's right to stand as an individual?

CHAPTER EIGHT

ANGLO-SAXON SECURITY

Of all the historical considerations that undercut the debate at Putney, by far the most contentious – and the most clear-cut – was that of the Norman invasion. Where other historical events had been discussed only tangentially, or invoked in rhetorical support of more pressing concerns, the question of the Norman invasion was actively argued by both sides as a part of the Putney debates.³⁴⁷ Where the agitators saw the invasion of 1066 as a conquest by an unjust foreign power, and as the moment in which the commoners of England would enter into servitude, the Grandees would argue that the conquest was not unjust, but quite the opposite. For them, Harald had usurped William's throne, and the Norman had simply come to safeguard the English crown and its laws.

The battle over William the Conqueror's legacy went further than usurpation, however; indeed in many ways the argument over the legitimacy of Harald's claim obfuscated why the events of 1066 were so contentiously discussed in the debate. For the agitators, just as it was for other democrats at the time, and for Thomas Paine over a century later,³⁴⁸ the Norman invasion represented a major point of departure in the way the ruling authority related to the common people. For them, Saxon kings had been representative of, and beholden to the common people,³⁴⁹ rather than absolute rulers; the Grandees on the other hand, saw no distinction between the kings of old and the Normans that replaced them.³⁵⁰ To understand the historical issues at stake in the political debates of the civil war therefore require us to consider this question

³⁴⁷ See especially Woodhouse, *Puritanism and Liberty, Being the Army Debates (1647-9) from the Clarke Manuscripts with Supplementary Documents*, 120.

³⁴⁸ Paine, *Rights of Man*.

³⁴⁹ Woodhouse, *Puritanism and Liberty, Being the Army Debates (1647-9) from the Clarke Manuscripts with Supplementary Documents*, 120.

³⁵⁰ Woodhouse, 120.

There are however two more reasons to explore the Anglo-Saxon political world. The first reason, despite its simplicity and obviousness, cannot be stated emphatically enough – despite the fact that it was largely the efforts and attributes of the Anglo-Saxons that formed the English nation and language, there have been till this point no examinations of the influence and legacy of Saxon England on notions of security. Despite founding a language, identity and political attributes that have continued throughout history, until now the importance of Anglo-Saxon England as it relates to security has remained unexamined.

Secondly, the Anglo-Saxons used a political concept that in its instrumentative purpose and import is of relevance to our current understanding of security. Independent to their status as the originators of the English language (or perhaps we might even say *despite* their status), the Germanic conquerors of what would become England developed a political concept, called *frip*,³⁵¹ that held no lingual relationship to modern ‘security’ but nevertheless stands as an analogue to the contemporary meaning in key aspects of its purpose.

These two reasons therefore coalesce. We will concentrate on the Anglo-Saxon term *frip* both as an example of how the signatures of security as a political instrument have manifested within the Anglo tradition. We will also trace how this instrumentally similar word could then be relegated to be a curious aberration in the modern story of ‘security’, having no lingual relationship despite its similar language, and having been largely ignored in previous studies of ‘security’ despite belonging to the same lingual and cultural tradition.

In order to unpick how Anglo-Saxon culture might have had a word conceptually similar but largely unrecognised, we will first give a brief socio-political overview of late Anglo-Saxon England. Following this, we will examine the word *frip* and its role in England in the late 10th and early 11th century. Lastly, we will examine the invasions of the 11th century and the end

³⁵¹ The last letter (called a ‘thorn’) is pronounced ‘-th’, giving ‘frith’.

of Anglo-Saxon notions of political control in England, and attempt to draw together how and why this word and the role it played in political life could become largely forgotten.

In so doing we will see how the Anglo-Saxon legacy was important to shaping notions of security as it would later appear in early modern England. As discussed above the nature of pre-conquest England - whether that nature was real or imagined on the part of the interlocutors – would impact the political expectations of those from whom political security would emanate. As such, the greater understanding we will gain of Anglo-Saxon political expectations will help u understand the debaters of Putney, as well as increase our appreciation of the genealogy of political security in English more widely.

In this chapter we will also find another example of how a shift in political environment can determine the value (or lack thereof) of political terms. While Saxon England possessed a term that is given as a cognate for modern security, and fulfils a similar use case within extant pre-conquest literature, that word disappears after the Norman Conquest. We will therefore examine possible reasons for this decline, especially as they may relate to the relationship between political construction and the paradigms of security.

ANGLO-SAXON ENGLAND – BEFORE *SECURITAS*

The history of the Anglo-Saxon culture in England begins with successive raids and incursions beginning in the 5th century CE. Hailing from what is now upper Saxony and lower Denmark, various tribes of Angles, Saxons and Jutes sailed across the North Sea to England in search of new land and opportunities. These were Germanic pagans who had never been subsumed into the Roman Empire, and as such their laws, customs and political expectations stood at odds with the identity the Latin inheritance had stamped on to southern England and much of the European continent.

Unfortunately, the laws, customs and political expectations of the Anglo-Saxons did not include written records; as such, there is no concrete evidence of how the early

communities organised themselves politically day-to-day, nor can there be any conclusive appreciation of how a word like *frip* came to occupy the space that it did. The various Anglo-Saxon, Gaelic and Norse communities that made up the southern half of the British Isles are poorly represented in extant literature – a fact that fuels speculation regarding the nature of the political discourse of its various counties and kingdoms. We could only estimate, therefore, how the word *frip* and the political environment that spawned it evolved.

However while the origins of the society and the word it spawned are opaque, far more literature has survived from the later years of Anglo-Saxon England, preceding the Norman Invasion of 1066. As a result, we can speak with far more certainty regarding the word and how (and in what context) it was used by looking at Anglo-Saxon society in the late 10th and 11th centuries, the high watermark of the original Germanic inheritance that gave rise to the England we know today. Between 1000 and 1100 CE, England went through two conquests, each relating to the traditional character of the nation in fundamentally different ways; this turmoil gives us insight into the political and social expectations of the English people, as well as how these expectations compared to those of the conquerors.

Given our goal of understanding the political realities of the society, especially those that relate to competing public claims, we can search for aspects of the way that group decisions were made, how justice was administered, how political elites and government authorities related to the average citizen, and how homogenous the society was both ethnically and culturally. Of these metrics, it is the plurality of ethnicities, languages and cultural backgrounds that is the easiest to demonstrate. Far from being a single political or cultural entity, by the eleventh century England and the British Isles was made up of a litany of peoples and languages. While the various Anglo Saxon tribes had control of much of the south eastern parts of modern England, the north of England, Wales, Ireland and modern Scotland were for the most part under the control of ethnically and linguistically separate peoples, from pre-Saxon Britons, Gaels, Picts and smatterings of Norse settlers. As well as this, much of the north of modern England was, from 886 to 937, under firm Danish control. The area, legally acknowledged by the Saxon kingdoms under the terms of the ‘Danelaw’, was demarcated as part of the appeasement efforts of the Saxons to prevent further

incursions by Viking invaders. Such areas were still home to extensive Anglo-Saxon populations, but were subject to Viking laws and hegemony.

Even after Viking hegemony was broken over the north of England, it wouldn't be long before Scandinavians would once again invade and settle en masse. After the Saxon king Æthelred the Unready instigated violence against an amount of Danish settlers, the Danish king Sweyn Forkbeard used the killings as a pretence for invasion. By 1016, the various Saxon tribes and the areas of Danelaw were all united under the kingship of Sweyn's son Cnut the Great. Under Cnut, England was part of a great North Sea Empire, which included Norway, Sweden, Denmark and England, as well as making vassals of the Welsh, the numerous Scottish kingdoms held by Pictish, Norse, and Gaelic peoples, and the Irish kingdom of Dublin. Thus the British Isles under Cnut was, in comparison to the general expectations of Western Europe at the time, quite cosmopolitan.³⁵² Trade and travel were free and extensive, and ideas on governance and management flowed freely to the benefit of both England and Denmark.

As well as the ethno-cultural distinctions, England before Cnut's rule was also politically fragmented. Since the Germanic settlement, England had been home to a number of lesser kingdoms, the fortunes of which waxed and waned with the years. While the Kingdom of Wessex had largely come to encompass all of the island south of the Humber, the autonomy and assertiveness of other Saxon and Welsh kingdoms, as well as the complicated and tenuous internal politics of the now expanded 'England' meant that it would be unwise to conceive of tenth and early eleventh century England as a monolithic political entity, just as it would be unwise to assume it was an ethnically or culturally monolithic one.

While one might expect that Cnut's conquest would feature a conflict between invading Danes and established Anglo-Saxons, such was not necessarily the case. Cnut's control of England was brought about both because of and in spite of a comparatively more gradual unfolding of a variety of racial and cultural stakeholders. In the decade before Cnut's final

³⁵² Edward James, *Britain in the First Millennium*, Britain and Europe (London : New York: Arnold ; Oxford University Press, 2001), 264.

victory, the Anglo-Saxon nobility had been riven by infighting, as well as suffered at the hands of Viking colonists who now held significant parts of the isles.

Far more than any notion of 'Danish' or 'English' conflict, the shifting landscape of enmities and alliances across the various political interests played a significant part in Cnut's own efforts to control his initial holdings in England. A prime example of this political, rather than ethnic or cultural divide is that in the early stages of the conflict, opposition to Cnut's rule was given by Thorkell the Tall, a Viking leader in the service of the English king that Cnut was seeking to replace. Likewise, the English resistance was not unified by specifically cultural or national identity; the Mercians fought for Cnut, though like Thorkell's Vikings would later switch sides,³⁵³ and several English nobles (Earl Godwin being a notable example discussed later) remained on the Danish side till Cnut's victory in 1016.

THE LAW

The willingness of these groups to eschew allegiances based on ethnicity or nationality might have been a function of the opportunities for personal gain the invasion represented, however it is worth considering that it is unlikely that the Earls and Theygns of England would have supported a ruler that was not going to guarantee a degree of opportunity and freedom comparable to that which they already enjoyed. Put another way, while a noble might have felt they would have more opportunities for success under a new ruler, if the nature of those opportunities (and that noble's capacity to capitalise on them in the new political environment) were greatly curtailed, they might be far less likely to take the risk. Thus it is unlikely that political or military support would be offered across national or ethnic lines unless those offering the support were confident in the provision of political benefits in return; events of the Danish invasion of England suggest that political necessities were at least as strong as ethnic cohesion.

³⁵³ Pauline Stafford, *Unification and Conquest: A Political and Social History of England in the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries* (London: Arnold, 1989), 71–72.

While the above is an assumption, what we know of the social and political effects of Cnut's rule certainly supports such a view. While the English crown was now held by a Dane rather than a Saxon, the new ruler went to great lengths to ensure a continuity in political, social and legal institutions. English was retained as the language of both the common people and the court, titles and offices, though obviously adjusted to reflect loyalties throughout the conflict, were largely retained, with a mix of Danes and Saxons serving in the nation's highest positions within the first decade of his reign. Indeed an important aspect of Cnut's rule (and one that is notably absent in the subsequent Norman invasion) is that Cnut's laws "...were applicable to both Danes and Saxons, and were designed to encourage the fusion of the two peoples."³⁵⁴

The most stark demonstration of this attempt at continuity, however, is in Cnut's efforts in the legal system. Whether done in order to pacify a recently conquered populace or as a genuine vote of confidence in the existing laws of the nation, Cnut was quick not to change or replace, but rather to confirm and extend the existing laws of the Anglo-Saxons. The new king quickly advertised his legal codes which were not simply built on existing English expectations formulated by previous Saxon kings Edgar and Æthelred, but were likely drafted by the same legal scholar used by his predecessors.³⁵⁵

Thus, far from imposing Danish rule on British subjects, Cnut instead encouraged and improved Saxon legal and political institutions, and rewarded loyal and capable Saxon leaders not simply with domestic political appointments, but with intermarriage alliances and opportunities in other nations throughout his empire.³⁵⁶ The ease with which the

³⁵⁴ George W. (George Williams) Keeton 1902-, *The Norman Conquest and the Common Law / by George W. Keeton*, Accessed from <https://nla.gov.au/nla.cat-vn339981> (London ; Benn ; New York: Barnes & Noble, 1966), 22.

³⁵⁵ The legal codes of both Cnut and his Saxon precedent, Æthelred II were likely drafted by the same man, Wulfstan of York. James, *Britain in the First Millennium*, 262.

³⁵⁶ The most illustrious of which, Earl Godwin, would be the Father of the last Saxon king Harald. James, 265.

Danish king co-opted these English institutions was likely assisted by the fact that the language, law and custom of both Saxon and Viking England shared a Germanic heritage. Contemporary conceptions of law and justice within a medieval kingdom likely revolve around a seat of absolute power, assisted by a small group of landholding nobles who exercised control over their local populations. However the realities of both Anglo-Saxon and Danish ruled England were quite different to this traditional feudal image; instead, many aspects of justice, judgements on both criminal and civil disputes, and political decision making were played out in the public space, giving the citizens of pre-Norman England a degree of political participation not enjoyed by many other societies in western Europe.

SOCIAL COHESION, AUTHORITY AND JUSTICE

For the administration of everyday justice, the settling of disputes and the maintenance of public order, free men would be subject to the rights and responsibilities of a local assembly known in Saxon England as a *hundred*, an assembly of free people roughly determined by their place of residence. Each hundred met regularly to resolve disputes and settle official business, presided over by an earldoman (a royal appointment, tasked with the administrative maintenance of the assembly) with the group itself constituted by both the *theygns* (landholders) and *Churls* (free men). This group had the power to arbitrate between competing claims of its members, punish criminals, and organise maintenance and administration that effected the local area.

While the King held ultimate power within his domain, for the vast majority of his subjects, royal authority was nominal – legal and political authority was, in the everyday experience, to be found in the hundred. Instead, the King granted *theygns* the right to hold land on behalf of their families, of earldomen to collect taxes and raise armies on behalf of the crown, and of all other free men to be protected under the terms of a common law that they both upheld and were subject to. In this way, there was a reciprocal relationship between royal power and the authority of the hundred; these local gatherings served as

both the basis of and the product of Royal power.³⁵⁷ The king would take responsibility for every free man's right to take part in his community, and in turn that community would use that responsibility in line with the king's own rights and authority; essentially, it was through these systems that "...the king stated his rights and guaranteed those of others."³⁵⁸

The dynamic and reciprocal nature of this system can be seen in the comparatively relaxed notion of landowning in Anglo-Saxon England. Unlike the rigid system of land ownership that would emerge with the Norman feudal system, land was not held by an individual or family in perpetuity, but was rather held and administrated (or profited from, as may be the case) as a function of this reciprocal responsibility. While other feudal societies of the period had strict noble expectations in regards to the rights to land, in England "...the notion of a hereditary earldom had not got very far..."³⁵⁹ While there was certainly high expectations (and increased opportunity) for the sons of landed nobles, there was no contractual expectation of inheritance. Further, given the transient nature of land control, what it meant to be a landholder in Saxon England was markedly different to a continental feudal society. As mentioned above, landholders had no special rights over the churls that lived in their holding; indeed those same churls stood in the hundred that would ultimately rule over the political and administrative needs of the land. In this way, the land of a community "...no doubt resided in the freeholders of the township itself... regulated by a long-established custom."³⁶⁰

This more malleable system of administration and social organisation increased the capacity for social mobility (at least among free males), as well as increased the reliance of that society (and its rulers) on the consent of the governed. The importance of reciprocal relationships between the royal authority and the wider population increased the capacity for social mobility; for free men to become thegns, especially, was at least an optimistic

³⁵⁷ Stafford, *Unification and Conquest*, 136.

³⁵⁸ Stafford, 108–9.

³⁵⁹ Battle & District Historical Society, *The Norman Conquest / Its Setting and Impact by D. Whitelock and Others. A Book Commemorating the Ninth Centenary of the Battle of Hastings; Comp. by the Battle & District Historical Society*, Accessed from <https://nla.gov.au/nla.cat-vn842386> (Lond: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1966), 30.

³⁶⁰ Keeton, *The Norman Conquest and the Common Law / by George W. Keeton*, 18.

reality in tenth and eleventh century England.³⁶¹ Without an appropriately compensated group of nobles or bureaucrats or a monopoly on violence as was enjoyed in other nations of the time, Anglo-Saxon rulers had to work with a "...degree of consent, through the structures of society, here local community, lords and kin."³⁶² These two points coalesce in the necessity of the royal authority to respect this large – but far less static or powerful - upper class. The rather ironic result of this was that despite the much larger number of nobles in Anglo-Saxon England as compared to continental powers, there was also a greater centralisation of power at the top of the social hierarchy; put another way, both the number of thegns, and the holdings of the most successful thegns in comparison to royal power, was higher than comparable kingdoms.³⁶³

Given this concentration of power, it is reasonable to expect that hundreds and things were dominated by a group of powerful, rich or otherwise influential individuals, however in charter each free individual had the right and opportunity to vote as they saw fit. Whilst the power and privileged of a higher social status was certainly acknowledged to a point where it would be absurd to suggest that Saxon society was 'equal'³⁶⁴ there existed a body of 'common' law that ensured (or presumably aimed to ensure) that all free men, landed or not, had certain rights regardless of status. Crucially, at a time when in the rest of Western Europe lordships were gaining increasing entitlement to enforcing private jurisdiction over their tenants, in England such jurisdiction never extended over freemen.

Thus while pre-Norman England was certainly far from the guarantees of the rights of law that we enjoy today, the rights of free men to affect the political and legal realities of their lives was far greater than those of their neighbours, their would-be conquerors and indeed greater than many pre-modern societies known in the western world. While holding land brought spectacular benefits, it did not grant free franchise over the free men who dwelt on it, nor did those free men lose protection (or responsibility) under the law. Where the

³⁶¹ Stafford, *Unification and Conquest*, 155–56.

³⁶² Stafford, 135.

³⁶³ Stafford, 155–56.

³⁶⁴ Higher status was officially recognised through the wergild, discussed below.

Normans would use earldoms as rewards or extensions of royal power, earls in pre Norman England were selected by royal appointment, ratified by a high council and subject to the support of the theygns and freemen they presided over.³⁶⁵ Whilst the position of earl was certainly a powerful, prestigious and lucrative position, it did not categorically entail dominion over (either directly or by proxy of the crown) the earldom's subjects in any judicial sense,³⁶⁶ and while being a landless free citizen was less desirable than being a noble, such citizens had their rights, responsibilities and political participation protected by a community based legal system.

POLICING AND ENFORCEMENT

As well as the high level of involvement free citizens had in administration and decision-making, the citizens of the hundred were also key in matters of justice and policing. While traditional feudal models relied on royal authority to both dispense and enforce justice, pre-Norman England instead used the hundred to accuse and convict criminals, settle disputes and ensure enforcement in all but the most extreme cases. Beyond simply ensuring that laws and their enforcement were in line with the desires of the majority, this state of affairs likely contributed to the unique practicalities of Anglo-Saxon justice. Key among these practicalities were the propensity of hundreds to favour settlement over rulings, the preference for fines rather than convictions, and the use of community based policing.

Compared to other nations and traditions more influenced by the Roman conception of law an punishment, in pre-Norman England, fines were a massive part of the penal system, being used extensively in regards to matters both criminal and civil (though it should be noted that such a distinction did not exist in the legal system at the time).³⁶⁷ Fines were payable by free commoners as well as nobles found to be derelict in their duties or community responsibilities; a failure to fulfil obligations of military service, of administration

³⁶⁵ Making of the English nation, 82

³⁶⁶ In 1065, Harold removed his own Brother Tostig from the earldom of Northumbria amidst pressure from the same theygns Tostig had been sent to preside over. Making of the English nation, 82

³⁶⁷ Keeton, *The Norman Conquest and the Common Law* / by George W. Keeton, 19.

and maintenance, or for committing a crime or transgression against other individuals could be addressed by paying a fine to either the crown or the individual wronged by the action.

Far from being a coincidence or quirk, the use of fines was tied to the relational nature of the society of Anglo-Saxon England. This can be seen in the fact that the theygn/churl, noble-commoner distinction is made in the provision of fines and restitution, which is itself then reflected back in the language and culture of the society. By the time of Cnut, free members of English society were classed by their *weregild*, their value and liability in fines and settlements, determined by their holdings and responsibilities. Literally being a 'man-price', fines and reparations were linked to the presumed value of the individuals in question; during the reign of Cnut, a churl had a *weregild* of 200 shillings, whereas a theygn was worth 1200. This price would inform how much restitution they might receive if wronged, but also would increase their liability if they were found to be in breach of the public peace. Importantly, this distinction was presumably common knowledge and a basic understanding of social relations in the community.³⁶⁸

Weregilds are also important in that they also demonstrated who was politically valid in Saxon society – by possessing a *weregild*, an individual could sue for restitution, was protected by the rights of common law, and was subject to fines and punishments. Thus while there was no notion of 'citizen', a *weregild* meant that an individual was both liable to and insured by the community. Slaves and children were not subject to the system, however kings and other royal family members had *weregilds*, suggesting that royalty did not completely transcend the legal system. All free women possessed *weregilds* (at roughly half that of a man of their social standing), and in addition were protected by a suite of laws codified by Alfred the Great around 890 designed to protect women's bodily autonomy, right to property, and right to divorce and remarry. They could however own property,

³⁶⁸ In one of his earliest edicts, for example, Cnut addresses his message to "and all his earls and all his peopleship, the Twelvehundreds and the Twohundreds, the hooded (the priesthood) and lewd (lay)." C. Wight and Eadwius, "A Charter of Cnut, in Anglo-Saxon," Text, c 1017, <https://www.bl.uk/catalogues/illuminatedmanuscripts/ILLUMIN.ASP?Size=mid&IllID=50435>.

slaves, and were able to express themselves in a range of public affairs.³⁶⁹ However, just as it has been throughout our history, women could still not vote – despite having more legal rights than their Victorian era counterparts,³⁷⁰ women in Saxon England were not factored into notions of political power, or the ‘security’ that accompanied it.

Weregilds and hundreds were also integral to the achievement of settlements in what would now be called ‘civil’ disputes. At all levels of society, whether disputes stood between individuals or groups, settlements were the preferred method of resolution in pre-Norman England. The arbitrating capacity of the hundred was prodigious considering that in most cases the complainants were also constituents of that same body. In contrast to civil courts modelled off Roman law, the Saxons and Danes had an “addiction” to resolving legal disputes by settlement rather than punishment.³⁷¹ Settlements were encouraged at all points in disputes, and were ratified and agreed upon not only by the parties, but by the hundred itself, being as binding as any more ‘formal’ litigation.³⁷²

This reliance on local consensus was not confined to the dispensation of law, but also the dispensation of justice. If one was found in contempt of the common law of the hundred, in most cases it was not the King’s authority, or even the earldoman that apprehended and punished, but the friþ-gild; a guild of local volunteers tasked with the maintenance and protection of the common peace. The friþ-gild was tasked with apprehending fugitives, responding to dangers or conflicts in the community and generally maintaining peaceable relations within the community.

³⁶⁹ F. M. Stenton, “Presidential Address: The Historical Bearing of Place-Name Studies: The Place of Women in Anglo-Saxon Society,” *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 25 (December 1943): 1–13, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3678611>.

³⁷⁰ For more information on the rights of Saxon women and how they related to later ages, see Barbara Kanner, ed., *The Women of England: From Anglo-Saxon Times to the Present: Interpretive Bibliographical Essays* (Hamden, Conn: Archon Books, 1979). For more information on Saxon women, their weregilds and role in social life, see Christine E. Fell, Cecily Clark, and Elizabeth Williams, *Women in Anglo-Saxon England* (New York, NY, USA: Blackwell, 1987); Stenton, “Presidential Address.”

³⁷¹ Keeton, *The Norman Conquest and the Common Law* / by George W. Keeton, 19.

³⁷² Stafford, *Unification and Conquest*, 140.

Crucially, it is worth noting that failures of justice were also held in common, and still demanded restitution. If, for example, a member of a neighbouring hundred committed a crime in the area of another, the failure of the perpetrators hundred to deliver them to justice would mean that said hundred would be required to pay restitution to the wronged party, the crown or sometimes both. Thus, the rights and obligations of the common man in pre-Norman England were not only held and enforced by the men themselves in the form of local assemblies, but also stood as avenues for common liabilities designed to ensure community accountability.

The use of fines, settlements and community based policing and judgement show that justice, public peace and law and order was not simply dispensed by the crown or any other arbitrary authority. Instead, it was a state of community that was both the right and responsibility of those who, through their own work, created and maintained it. Ultimately, these elements of justice and judgement show the importance and reciprocal, relational nature of socio-political life in pre-Norman England. By citizens of all classes having autonomy of judgement, but granting that autonomy back to the community and crown, social cohesion and responsibility are created; fines, settlements and community responsibility in punishment then served to preserve that 'social contract' instead of destroying it. By killing, maiming or imprisoning an individual, a household, hundred or king functionally destroys their relationship to the accused, and the capacity of the community is reduced.

FRIP

The relational nature of social and political life in pre-Norman England was not simply an accident of its political and judicial institutions; rather, the institutions themselves were part of a wider social expectation. This social and political value, while abstract in its conception, had a widely identifiable practical aspect; that is to say while the value itself was abstract, its application or achievement had definite real-world ramifications. Testament to its prevalence, its practical ramifications, as well as its widespread importance, this value was

used extensively in relevant political documents, and lent its name to various institutions and instruments.

This concept was related to neither the Greek *asphaleia*, nor the Latin *securitas*. While some learned churchmen were likely versed in the former and certainly in the latter, Greco-Roman influence on Saxon politics was limited. The rest of Western Europe maintained a variety of Roman institutions, as well as the use of Latin, the political and lingual tools of the Empire – including *securitas* – were at their disposal. However the Anglo-Saxons (and the Danes that followed them) brought with them their own tools, and in their limited engagement with the Roman world felt no need to co-opt the notion of *securitas* for themselves.

The tool of interest to us is that of *frip* – best summarized as a state of peaceable relations, or an absence of hostility within a community. Much of what we know of the word comes from the later Saxon period, again largely due to the absence of earlier written record, however from the mid-ninth century onward there exists ample evidence as to the full import of the term through mainly ecclesial writings. The term is used repeatedly in an old English translation of Paulus Orosius' work *History against the Pagans*, likely compiled during the reign of King Alfred, sometime between 870-930 CE.³⁷³ Orosius' work was essentially a historical examination of how the world had improved after the introduction of Christianity – on the iniquity of pagan peoples and the social and political growth that the world had enjoyed as a result of the Christian faith. The translation of Orosius' work was heavily paraphrased and somewhat adjusted in its English incarnation; notably much of the anti-pagan sentiment is subdued, presumably due to the sensitivities of such issues to a society that were comparatively recent converts. However in shifting this Latin work into old English, the now anonymous translator used *frip* to speak of general, more abstract notions

³⁷³ Nicole Guenther Discenza, "Orosius , Old English," in *The Encyclopedia of Medieval Literature in Britain*, ed. Robert Rouse et al. (Oxford, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2017), 1–2, <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118396957.wbemlb123>.

of peace,³⁷⁴ as well as of a state of peace between nations³⁷⁵ and as a label for specific proceedings such as treaties, settlements or agreements.³⁷⁶

Similar usage can be found in various translations of scriptural passages. A translation of Joshua has friþ as an agreement or settlement, and a version of the book of Matthew recorded in the Rushworth gospels gives the more abstract, general notion of friþ in a number of passages, key of which is 10.34; “Do not think that I have come to bring friþ to earth; I have not come to bring friþ, but a sword”. Similarly we see friþ in Matthew 5:9, in which the famous line ‘blessed are the peacemakers’ becomes roughly ‘the friendly and friþsume will be named God’s children’.³⁷⁷ This earthly destruction of friþ outlined in Matthew’s Christ is tempered by its limited use in other places to denote a heavenly, eternal peace found through the Christian faith. In the Junius Manuscripts translation of Genesis 15, for example, friþ features as a state enjoyed by those who had attained righteousness within the faith and now enjoyed eternal peace.³⁷⁸

While the political and legal use of the term would not reach its zenith until the tenth century, friþ is also found in limited use in the laws of Alfred, written around 890 CE. Friþ is found here in the specific context of sanctuary – namely the sanctuary that accused or persecuted persons would receive in churches to ensure that they might get a fair hearing and be subject to proper justice. Those on the wrong side of the law could, if they submitted themselves to a bishop for guidance, discipline and protection, could receive friþ in order that they might be simultaneously protected, and reconciled with God and the

³⁷⁴ These and all subsequent references to the Saxon appropriation of Orosius can be found in Paulus Orosius et al., *The Old English History of the World: An Anglo-Saxon Rewriting of Orosius*, Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library 44 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2016). See Or. 1.10.31.16, 5.1.113.30, 6.13.141.18

³⁷⁵ Or. 4 13.112.27, Or. 6 34.153.1

³⁷⁶ Or. 4 10.107.19, Or. 4 12.111.20, Or. 5 2.116.6

³⁷⁷ *The Macregol or Rushworth Gospels [Microform] / with Introduction by W.O. Hassall*, Medieval Manuscripts in Microform., Accessed from <https://nla.gov.au/nla.cat-vn2492127> (Oxford: Oxford Microform Publications, 1978).

³⁷⁸ Caedmon Manuscript, *The Junius Manuscript / Ed. by George Philip Krapp : [Bibliog.]*, Anglo-Saxon Poetic Records ; 1., Accessed from <https://nla.gov.au/nla.cat-vn556334> (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1931).

community.³⁷⁹ While these early legal uses give on face value a simple meaning of physical protection from persecution, it would be better to see it as the extension of the general state of public life to those from whom the pleasure of friþ has been removed – general citizens enjoy friþ, but criminals do not, unless they conform to these rules.

The extension of friþ even to those accused of a crime is indicative of the centrality of common justice, rather than the maintenance of hierarchies or vested interests. While it might seem that friþ's specific attestation within Alfred's laws suggests the term had a rather specific application, the law itself (and the word that it invokes) is in itself indicative of the wider values that sit as central to both Alfred's legislation, and the notion of friþ generally. Alfred's provisions for the protection for criminals sits within a greater scheme of laws that seek to realise the complementarity between Germanic corporate life and biblical law, a scheme that leads him to exhort those that would uphold his laws as follows;

"Doom very evenly! Do not doom one doom to the rich; another to the poor! Nor doom one doom to your friend; another to your foe!"³⁸⁰

In this way we can see that in creating a friþ sanctuary for criminals, Alfred was granting the accused friþ so much as ensuring that a general expectation of friþ - an expectation grounded in equality in responsibility and judgement – was upheld even on the limits of community. In this way, friþ informed a specific law of sanctuary, but was also indicative of a wider goal of laws generally.

³⁷⁹ These, as well as all other pre-Norman laws are notated by edict type, king, book (where relevant) and number, taken from Great Britain, *Ancient Laws and Institutes of England : Comprising Laws Enacted under the Anglo-Saxon Kings from Aethelbirht to Cnut, with an English Translation of the Saxon : The Laws Called Edward the Confessor's : The Laws of William the Conqueror, and Those Ascribed to Henry the First : Also, Monumenta Ecclesiastica Anglicana, from the Seventh to the Tenth Century and the Ancient Latin Version of the Anglo-Saxon Laws, with a Compendious Glossary, &c*, Accessed from <https://nla.gov.au/nla.cat-vn1864347> ([London: printed by G.E. Eyre and A. Spottiswoode, printers to the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty], 1840). LawAfRb 5, LawAf 1 5, 5.4.

³⁸⁰ Great Britain, 51.

FRIÐ HOLDING

Unlike *securitas* and *asphaleia*, we cannot with any certainty get to the inherent metaphor on which the term is based; given the lack of written record from the earliest times of Saxon culture. On top of this, given that it is not a compound or negation of another core term, we can only hypothesise as to how the values friþ demarcated were to fit in the wider lingual landscape. One of our biggest clues, however lies in the earlier recorded uses of the term (in the 9th century) often being commonly paired with verbs like *hæfde*, *heald* and *gehealden*; all meaning ‘to hold’, ‘holding’, ‘held’, and so on. While certainly abstract in its meaning, it is interesting to note that not only did friþ have practical manifestations and ramifications in a public space, as a concept it was one that was *held* rather than one that, say, stood on its own terms. Put another way, instead of being an abstraction that stood as a self-sufficient ideal, friþ was something that an individual, group or the wider community had to actively possess; for friþ to be enjoyed was not just a matter of that friþ appearing, it was also a matter of the individual or community ‘holding’ it. Crucially, this notion of ‘having’ friþ is present in several uses of the term when used as the goal or expectation of laws and political events. Agreements of clemency, truce or settlement could be ‘held’,³⁸¹ and laws also sought to ensure the peace was ‘held’.³⁸²

By the early 10th century, friþ occupied an important place in English law. In the law codes handed down during the rule of Æthelstan (924-927), the word was used to describe the absence of lawlessness, and a state of good public order; such a state being the goal, state or outcome the laws were seeking to protect.³⁸³ We can see the absolute regard in which the concept is held as a social ideal, as well as once again seeing how friþ was ‘held’ in terms of language in Æthelstan’s revised law code. After a previous attempt to curtail thefts through harsh penalties had failed, the king prefaces the revised code beginning as follows;

³⁸¹ All Anglo-Saxon Chronicle citations will be by their alphabetical demarcation and year- in this case, ChronC 878 (for the year entry of 878 in chronicle manuscript C).

³⁸² LawVIAs 8.9, 10, 11

³⁸³ LawVIAs 8.4, 8.7, 8.9, 10, 11

“I King Æthelstan, declare that I have learned that friþ has not been held to the extent, either of my wishes, or of the provisions laid down at Grately, and my councillors say that I have suffered this too long.”³⁸⁴

This shows that at least during the reign of Æthelstan, friþ wasn't just 'held', but it could be *not* held. Even more important, however, is that in the case of the King's missive, it is given that friþ could be *inadequately* held – 'has not been held to the extent...' This suggests a number of important considerations as to what the word demarcated to contemporary audiences. Firstly, that friþ was not simply present or absent (such as is often the case with the use of 'secure' in the modern sense), and could be viewed as a matter of degrees. Secondly, it also highlights the fact that the 'holding' of friþ, while certainly reliant on individual effort, was in the context of political life something that was held in common.

Thirdly, and related to the previous two, it shows that while the responsibility of guiding the commonly held friþ fell to the king, the capacity and responsibility of 'holding' it did not.

The 'holding' of friþ also features in one of the Exeter book's old Saxon riddles; a use that also demonstrates the limits of the term as an object. In the riddle, the reader is challenged to name something that "grew up in a field" until its fashion was altered and made to fit "a slayer's will" – a spear. Within the latter stages of the text, the riddle challenges with the phrase "*forðweard brece þæt ær frið hæfde*" (*I break forward, that before friþ was had*),³⁸⁵ speaking of a spear's role as an instrument of war, and that its arrival 'breaks' both in the context of its destructive capacity as a weapon, and its breaking of the peace. Key here is the fact that even the abstract and non-specific friþ spoken of in the riddle is still 'had' – possessed – and that that possession was able to be 'broken'. We also see a rather poetic use of this concept employed within fictional narrative; in *Beowulf*, in the narrator's discussion of queenly conduct, the phrase 'friþ-webbe' – peace-weaver – is used as an

³⁸⁴ LawVAsProl 1

³⁸⁵ See KD-73, in *The Exeter Book, Edited by George Philip Krapp ... and Elliott Van Kirk Dobbie*, The Anglo Saxon Poetic Records, a Collective Edition. III, Accessed from <https://nla.gov.au/nla.cat-vn1589884> (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936).

epithet to describe the correct countenance of such a woman.³⁸⁶ While not a legal or political usage per-se, its application to a queen and the nature of the metaphor is demonstrative of a number of considerations; that *frip* was seen as constructed, and that its ‘weaving’ by such a prominent figure in political contexts made it a public consideration.

While identifying the importance of possession to the term does not bring us closer to knowing what core metaphor, connection or distinction gave rise to the word, it does at the very least illuminate the term’s role and relation to the individuals that would seek it. This notion of ‘holding’ prevalent in the earlier uses of the word suggests that *frip* was on some level something that was actively possessed rather than attained or retained as a passive attribute. Instead of being a state of affairs that was either applicable or inapplicable to a certain scenario (as we might use ‘secure’, in modern English for example), in these early uses *frip* seems to indicate a sort of object that required possession. While this notion of possession is simple enough in abstract, poetic or non-specific applications, we will soon see that when used by and for a community, the need for *frip* to be ‘held’ will engender a rather complicated community response.

COMPOUNDS

While the value and efficacy of Æthelstan’s prodigious legal efforts to his contemporary kingdom is debated, the importance of his institutional changes, as well as his focus on written edicts and the holding of *frip* would be felt in the efforts of kings to follow. His institution of the hundred system, as well as his expansion and reliance on the *witan*, or royal council would continue to underpin the making and enforcing of laws until the arrival of the Normans. Where *witans* had before been more intimate affairs, Æthelstan’s efforts to both centralise decision-making and address the alienation of the more disparate and provincial areas of his kingdom led to the expansion of the council to include churchmen, *thegyns* and other noteworthy individuals from distant areas, with these individuals then

³⁸⁶ *Beowulf* / Translated by Seamus Heaney, Accessed from <https://nla.gov.au/nla.cat-vn126898> (London: Faber, 1999), verse 1942.

being party to the laws and charters handed down at these meetings. The political and social realities of the now united nation of England are on full display in these lists of witnesses, demonstrating the cosmopolitan nature of Æthelstan's court and the English people generally, with many of the names present being decidedly un-Saxon, including Danes who presumably retained their positions of authority in governance despite the Saxon reconquest.

Another trend begun by Æthelstan and expanded upon by his successors is the use of *frip* as the basis of compound terms. It is in the law codes of Æthelstan that we see the 'frip-gild' appear in Saxon legal language.³⁸⁷ This association of free citizens was responsible for maintaining the peace and security of their local areas, bringing criminals to justice and protecting citizens from minor threats.

However the use of the word as a compound, as well as its continued systematic use in legal documents more generally goes even further with the laws of Æthelred the Unready (978-1013). As well as using the term more regularly as a guide or expectation for law and social behaviour, Æthelred also both diversified and brought greater specificity to the term through its compounding; *frip* became more widely applied to institutions and actions, whilst also being made more specific in its demarcation of a more particular aspect of social life.

In regards to the base use of 'frip', the word is again used to describe peaceable relations though it takes on a far more official tone, often being the subject of specific treaties or agreements.³⁸⁸ In Æthelred's codes we also begin to see the compound somewhat foreshadowed in the codes of Æthelstan – that of *frip-bræc*, of 'breaking the frip'. In the context of Æthelred's laws, this phrase demarcates a particular breach of the public

³⁸⁷ LawAsVI 8.9.

³⁸⁸ LawAtrII 3, 3.1, 3.3, 7.2 III 15

peace,³⁸⁹ with the specificity of denouncing an act as a *friþ-bræc* likely tied to the greater specificity of what agreements and expectations Æthelred tied to the notion of *friþ*.

This specificity also extended to the maintenance of rights of individuals accused of crimes; essentially a now more technical compounded term for the original legal use by Alfred. In later codes from Æthelred's reign, we see provision made for a '*friþ-bēna*', '*bēna*' being a request – a plea from an individual for protection. Such a plea could be made by an individual who was at risk of retribution or penalty, in order that they might be granted protection by the power of the king to ensure that they were subject to the proper justice.³⁹⁰ This is at its heart similar to the early uses in the judgement book of Alfred almost a century earlier – the guarantee of *friþ*, even for accused persons, within a church, however now that *friþ* was also a clearly stated positive attribute in the law codes, presumably it was necessary now to demarcate this particular action from the wider applications of the term.

The final compound of note used in defining the legal expectations of late Anglo-Saxon England was that of *friþ-bot*; '*bot*' meaning to repair, amend or make good. In this sense, -*bot* pertains to the practical realisation of *friþ* in as much as they must be delivered if a *friþ-bræc* has occurred; the efforts, especially of the king to create and maintain the necessary conditions of *friþ* in the wider community, the reparation of any breaches, and to the specific efforts required to restore or maintain the *friþ*. It is, in a sense, the notion of *friþ* as concrete policy, rather than attribute, adjective or aspiration. The law code of Æthelred, for example, begin with the declaration that the laws it contains have been ordained by the King and the Witan as "*friþes bote*" of all England,³⁹¹ essentially a declaration that the laws constituted the practical maintenance of the common peace. Similarly, in speaking of king Edgar's ascension to the throne Chronicle D praised the new king's love of God, law and "*folces friþ bette*" – his role in maintaining the people's *friþ*.³⁹²

³⁸⁹ LawIIAtr 5, 6

³⁹⁰ LawVAtr 29, VI 36

³⁹¹ LawIIAtr

³⁹² ChronD 959.4

By the end of Æthelred's reign (and continuing in to the reign of Cnut), the frith-bote is referred to in a list of 'botes' that the laws give as basic responsibilities of all free-men. The friþ-bote – the maintenance of friþ through submission to justice, participation in judgements, and the provision of fines against those who were derelict in their duties of policing or justice stands as one of several 'botes' given in the laws; feos-bot (maintaining the coinage and preventing counterfeiting), burgh-bot and bric-bot (the responsibility of landholders in maintaining defences), and the fyrdung (responsibilities to the levy militia).³⁹³

Thus what began as a community expectation of peaceable relations was by the end of Anglo-Saxon England a definite legal responsibility of all English people. Its first use in law was suggestive of the fact that it was something that the entire community might expect to have save for criminals – but that they too could enjoy it if they sought to redress the effects of their crimes. By the end of Anglo-Saxon England, however, while friþ was still a community expectation, its maintenance was far more regulated, being firmly established as a legal responsibility. This shift is not so much one of meaning but of context – from Alfred to Cnut, to speak of friþ was to speak of the same communal and relational expectation, however the methods in which that expectation were realised and maintained had changed. As the political and legislative power of the king rose, so too did the role of crown and law in determining and maintaining the boundaries of community action.

While the shift from protecting criminals to fining free citizens for not doing their part in the community justice system is noteworthy in understanding how the scope and power of law had grown in England since the rule of Alfred, it is important to recognise that there remains a fundamental core that flows through the evolution of friþ as law – that of community responsibility. Sitting behind the protection of criminals in Alfred's early laws is the fact that those found in contravention of the law needed specific protection from common citizens, something that demonstrates that community based justice (such as the friþ-gild) were

³⁹³ LawIICn 8, LawVAtr 26

already extant in some form prior to their reference in later law, and presumably had enough power to require specific provisions to limit their acts against the penitent.

The extremes of this legal evolution are also demonstrative of the relational heart of the concept. In the laws of Alfred, the grassroots maintenance of public peace and security required limitation to ensure that those who disrupted that peace could be reconciled; by the time of Æthelred, not only did that original law still stand (albeit with a change of terminology) but it was joined by an almost antithetical law in which free people in otherwise good standing with the community could be punished for failing to do their part in bringing criminals to justice. While on opposite ends of the timeline of legislation and seemingly opposite in their aims, both the *frip-bēna* and the *frip-bote* share a core concept; *frip* underpinned the purpose and aim of both.

It is here that we can finally synthesise the role of *frip* as a word and paradigm in Anglo-Saxon England. Not simply a specific practical outcome, this concept that required ‘holding’, that was ‘woven’, could be ‘broken’ or ‘maintained’ was something held in common by all free society. In appreciating what it looked like, we can turn to the political and social realities of Anglo-Saxon life; community-based policing and justice, a notion of social responsibility that eschewed the wastage of privilege, and the guarantee of equality before the law. We can then see the maintenance of *frith* in light of these ideals, as both the fines levied against landholders who refuse to help dispense community justice, and the protection of those willing to submit themselves to such justice become measures to safeguard equality before the law.

In this way, *frip* stands not simply as ‘public peace’, or even in a thin, modern sense, the ‘security’ of being free from harm; instead it is a publically held relationship, a community’s efforts leveraged upon itself to maintain the favourable aspects of their association. Whether criminals, landless peasants or powerful thegyns, all had both the right and responsibility to do their part to maintain their own relationship to the community, as well as allow others to do the same. *Frip* was the word-tool that encompassed these rights and

responsibilities, firstly through what was likely local or tribal assemblies, and later in the emerging legal and political framework of the new nation of England.

And while the details, compounds and contexts might have changed over the written history of Anglo-Saxon England, what did not change was the fact that each individual was reliant on others for the *frip* they enjoyed. A *frip-bēna*, a petition by a criminal for peace, was obviously reliant on the acceptance of the king, thegyn, earl and assembly, and the *frip-bote* and *frip-gild* was obviously the immediate manifestation of how this corporate responsibility would be practised. Among the words less used in a legal context this trend continues - a *frith-dom* (a kingdom or community in a state of *frip*) was reliant on the sum of its citizens and neighbours upholding the *frip*, and even specific curios like the *frith-stol*, a stool or chair on which criminals seeking *frip* must be seated to remain free from molestation, remain reliant on the common understanding and active participation of others.

“Judged on eleventh century standards, Anglo-Saxon England must have appeared a comparatively peaceful place.”³⁹⁴

However acknowledging the relationship and responsibility at the heart of *frip* also gives a new appreciation of the realities of Anglo-Saxon society. The role of local assemblies, *frip-gilds* and the capacity for individuals to call for *frip-bēne* showed the importance of the community’s relationship to itself. This importance manifested in the fact that the right to preside in judgement over and against a free citizen was held in common, and the rights of an individual to that judgement were only taken away in extreme circumstances. Close social and geographical proximity was held by those both seeking and granting judgement and this proximity meant that judgements would have a real impact on the community as a whole. The loss of any citizen reduced the capacity of the community. As well as informing how judgements were reached, this also likely affected *what* judgements were reached; the aforementioned tendency of Anglo-Saxons to eschew corporal punishments in favour of fines ensured the commons had maximum capacity at a minimum of cost. Where corporal

³⁹⁴ Battle & District Historical Society, *The Norman Conquest / Its Setting and Impact* by D. Whitelock and Others. *A Book Commemorating the Ninth Centenary of the Battle of Hastings; Comp. by the Battle & District Historical Society*, 32–33.

punishment removed an individual from the commons, fines exacted restitution for either the victim or public purse (and sometimes both), instead increased public capacity while still punishing the transgression and discouraging anti-social behaviour.

This relational notion of the word could also be extended beyond a domestic, legal context. In one of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicles, it is reported that Tostig Godwinson – the disgraced brother of Harold Godwinson who had been removed by Harold as Earl of Northumbria after the people of the earldom had complained of his mismanagement – landed in the north of England with the support of a Norwegian army in order to remove Harold from the throne. After taking York, Tostig and the Norwegians made a proclamation of “full friþ” to all free men of York who would commit to join them in conquering the rest of the country.³⁹⁵

While this offer could be simply construed as offering them ‘peace’, this would not do justice to the offer – certainly, given that the city had already fallen, suing for peace was out of the question. Instead, the friþ offered is essentially relational – those that joined Tostig would be honoured as rights holders, rather than the conquered. Such an offer was not out of the ordinary – Tostig and Harold’s father Earl Godwin had accepted such an offer from Cnut decades earlier, his success such that his son would be the last Anglo-Saxon king of England.

The importance of responsibility to the commons extended to the very foundations of political power. In light of the guiding principles of relations held in common, calls made by kings for equality of liability before the law, all the while demanding a higher level of financial and judicial responsibility of upper-class citizens (such as Cnut and Æthelred’s friþ-bote) suggest that the relationship between rights and responsibilities in maintaining friþ was one in which the ultimate derivative of individual capacity was the commons. The notion that those that enjoyed success did so in the context of the commons is not in itself radical, but when compared to Cicero’s notion of the mahout, of the ‘best men’ of the state driving forward the mass of the plebs, and the notion that redistributive taxation is theft,

³⁹⁵ ChronC 1066.

Anglo-Saxon notions of nobility and social responsibility are far from the commons of the Roman world. While there is no comparable statement in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, it is fair to assume that where Cicero's state constituted in order to safeguard the private property rights of its individual citizens, pre-Norman England saw the role of the state as being the safeguarding of a common interest.

That the role of political power was to safeguard the commons is certainly the view espoused by the English kings of the early 11th century. Cnut's laws for instance hinge on the notion of the king as the holder of certain rights – and especially the right of extra-judicial action – but subject to and guided by his responsibility in ensuring friþ to his kingdom.³⁹⁶ In the words of the historian Pauline Stafford, the laws of Cnut “...are marked by reciprocity. The king stated his rights and guaranteed those of others”,³⁹⁷ with the king essentially codifying the notion of social and political responsibility within a common body of laws; an admirable reciprocity given the nature of those laws and the social realities of England at the time. In wider feudal society in which the crown or its representatives holds ultimate or absolute authority, punishments and rewards are functions of social control; in pre-Norman England where the sovereign stands as in a system in which both power and judicial, military and administrative responsibility is widely spread, any judgement he makes against his subjects could not only challenge his own authority as the maintainer of friþ, but lowers the capacity of the kingdom he rules.

CONCLUSION

Friþ was an expression of domestic order that, while it could be applied to personal circumstances, was at its core a relational term rather than an individual one. Instead of being founded on a notion of an individual's state of being, emotional outlook or personal state of affairs, friþ positioned its subject, whether it was an individual person or an entire nation, in relation to other actors. A nation realised friþ through peaceable relation with its

³⁹⁶ Wight and Eadvius, “A Charter of Cnut, in Anglo-Saxon.”

³⁹⁷ Stafford, *Unification and Conquest*, 108–9.

neighbours the peaceable relations of its citizens; an individual enjoyed friþ through their relation to their community, by following and upholding the laws both secular and religious. Friþ was also a decidedly active, aspirational concept, rather than a state at which one could arrive or realise in any more than a metaphorical or transient way. The King did not realise friþ, he maintained it; likewise, the various compounds show that friþ was something that was not possessed or even given, but rather something that was experienced through the efforts or abilities of others. Friþ-gilds, friþ-iends and friþ-sōcs were institutions, individuals or objects that through their efforts or attributes helped friþ be realised in a community, nation or for an individual.

As such, while it is lingually unrelated to both *securitas* and *asphaleia*, friþ shares far more signatures with the latter than the former. Both friþ and *asphaleia* operate on a relational, rather than an individual basis, and as such both are more heavily reliant on maintenance than on a concrete or achievable state. It is ironic, then, that with the Norman invasion in 1066 and the replacement of English with Latin and French as the ruling and legal languages of the nation, friþ would disappear only to have *securitas* as its successor – though exactly how this occurs will be seen in later chapters.

Where friþ eschews such clear comparison to the two classical terms, however, is in its relationship to its opposing concept. As we have seen, there is a fundamental difference between *asphaleia* and *securitas* in this regard; *securitas* requires a destruction of its opposing concept to be realised, whereas *asphaleia* requires an opponent (real or metaphorical) to be cogent. Friþ, however, does not hold absolutely to either the Greek or the Roman concepts, neither requiring a clear source of opposition, nor functioning in a way that presupposes the removal of its opposing concepts.

Contrary to both the Greek and Roman concepts, friþ then is not definable against a certain act or metric that sits outside itself; unlike *asphaleia*, it does not require an opponent, and unlike *securitas*, it does not require an absence of antithesis. To properly understand the difference, it is helpful to consider the concepts in terms of their ‘positive’ and ‘negative’

outcomes. In the case of *asphaleia*, the concept appears where the positive overcomes the efforts of the negative; the wrestler resists the throw of an opponent, the audience resists the lie, or the city resists the attack. For *securitas*, the concept is in itself the absence of a negative – being ‘without care’. In both these cases, the negative elements define how the concept is realised.

In the case of *frīp*, however, the concept is borne from the aggregate of the positive, rather than any specific relation to a negative force or antithetical concept. Whether created by the mutual respect for law, peace or safety, at its core *frīp* is an attribute defined by what it is, not what it isn’t, nor what it has overcome. Therefore, the concept itself is free from the need to relate in any specific way to any specific negative or antithesis – however in practical use it often must stand against some threat or problem, and in much of its use it once again lies closer to the Greek than the Roman idea.

For while *frīp* stands as a concept with no clear antithesis on a conceptual level, inherent in its operation is a readiness to stand against an act or issue that operates against the maintenance or attainment of *frīp* in a concrete situation. By way of practical example, Cnut claims to have delivered *frīp* (or rather, removed a state of being un-*frīp*) to England through military victories, disbanding his army peacefully, honouring and enforcing existing law throughout the conquest; however in order to *maintain* a state of *frīp* into the future, the oppositional forces the requirements of its maintenance, are far less clear cut. Good judgement, equality in law, and maintaining the public peace against lawbreakers are all efforts that are necessary for a *frīp*-dom, however these are things that hold little possibility of quantification.

This conceptual difference is important to our understanding in regards to how it might inform our own conceptualisation of security today. The necessity of a relationship to an antithesis is one important way in which comparisons to the Greek and Roman concepts fail our modern awareness of security, in that modern political employments of the term have pushed the platform of security as a set of positive attributes, expectations and protections rather than the avoidance or destruction of specific antithetical concept or concepts. The

overtly socio-political roots of the word, in addition to the fact that the word is also closer lingually and chronologically to modern English and Anglo politics, make it a far better analogue for modern notions of security in terms of its conceptual operation.

EPILOGUE - AFTER THE CONQUEST

Despite the many signatures shared by *frip* and modern notions of security, it should be no shock to English speakers to hear that the old English term has not endured into the modern era. While it would be greatly beneficial to this study to explore in detail how this term so central to early England came to be depreciated, unfortunately tracking its decline is even harder than tracking its rise. Despite the increases in recorded use brought by the last Anglo-Saxon and Danish kings, the tradition of *frip* both lingually and conceptually would come to an end with the Norman invasion of England in 1066. With the victory of William the Conqueror over Harald Godwinson at the battle of Hastings, the Anglo-Saxon political culture and language was supplanted by a Norman French system of feudal baronies, with a lingual tradition of both Francophone (for spoken and colloquial use amongst the court and administration) and Latin (for written decrees, laws and agreements).

As such, not only did the social and political realities of England change, but the language of official documents, laws and rulings changed as well. As such, there is little surviving documents from after 1066 in which *frip* could be used, as Norman French replaced English as the language of court, administration and justice. While English would re-emerge as the official language of England several centuries later, by the time this occurred the English language had drastically shifted, especially in regards to the language of politics and governance; regardless, in the intervening period there was no use for a Saxon word that spoke to an increasingly irrelevant political framework.

Indeed, it is in this shift that 'security' first emerged. Before the Norman Conquest, *securitas* had no purchase outside the Latin spoken within the context of church. It was not until the Normans imported the French language, and imposed French and Latin as the languages of

rule and of law that 'securite' found purchase on English soil. Originally used within the context of law and politics to speak of a practical surety for a debt, or deposit or hostage held against a risk, security would go on to become part of the wider English language; by the fifteenth century, it held a meaning roughly equivalent to its colloquial modern meaning of confidence, assurance or certainty.

While the conquest and the lingual upheaval it brought was immediately responsible for the removal of friþ from the political language of England, it would be wrong to blame its disappearance purely on lingual considerations; related words such as 'freo' (free) and 'freod' (friend) have endured to modern times. The likely difference between these examples however is, to invoke Austin's framework, due to a lack of need for the tool – that the meaning or distinction that made friþ useful as a word was no longer relevant or important.

This lack of relevance can be immediately seen in the drastic shift in the political organisation of England. While the changes to English society brought by the invasion – and more specifically, whether those changes were good or bad for the people of England - has been debated since the death of William the conqueror in 1087,³⁹⁸ we need concern ourselves here with the relationship between the citizenry and issues of justice and political power. On these fronts, there are key changes between the political world of the Saxons to those of the Normans, changes that directly impact the usefulness of a word that spoke of community liability and responsibility.

The first is the Norman attitude to land, specifically the relationship between the crown, land and free subjects. Where land title had been used as payment and reward for royal service in Saxon England, the franchise was for land only, not the free men who dwelt on it. In contrast, this distinction eroded under Norman rule, with the invaders bringing with them an expectation that a lord had free and total authority over his land and all that it

³⁹⁸ M. T. Clanchy, *England and Its Rulers, 1066 -1307*, Fourth edition (Chichester, West Sussex, UK ; Malden, MA: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2014), 31–35.

contained.³⁹⁹ Under this new system, common people were no longer the basic political unit – their rights and responsibilities waived by virtue of the fact that they were now subjects to a landed lord. Further, the Normans made large tracts of land ‘off limits’ to common folk, a measure unheard of in Saxon England.⁴⁰⁰ Forest law saw families dispossessed and sometimes entire counties placed under absolute crown control.⁴⁰¹

Secondly, the *delivery* of justice also shifted. Sheriffs replaced the tithing-gild in delivering justice.⁴⁰² The Normans abolished the shire court, ensuring that “justice was in the hands of the Duke and his barons” rather than the common people.⁴⁰³ The Normans repurposed the hundred to institute privileged corporate punishment; if a Norman was killed (or even in some cases, if a body was found that was not proven to be English), then the entire hundred would receive punishment.⁴⁰⁴ Lastly, the number of people able to exercise any degree of social and political control was vastly reduced under Norman rule. As well as removing the capacity of ‘common’ men to involve themselves in local administration, the capacities of the upper classes were greatly constrained. Within ten years of William’s victory, Danes and Saxons were removed from political positions and practically all landowners and political appointments were in Norman hands. This ethnic redistribution also served to consolidate the distribution of political power; where prior to the conquest there were some five to six thousand landholders, after a decade of Norman rule this had been reduced to little more than a hundred and forty, concentrating power in a smaller number of hands more closely allied to the crown.⁴⁰⁵ This centralisation of political and economic capacity was combined with a greater level of crown control over the nobles that held these titles; no longer a function of social rights and responsibilities, titles were clearly dispensed based on the favour of the king.

³⁹⁹ H. R. Loyn, *The Making of the English Nation: From the Anglo-Saxons to Edward I* (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1991), 83.

⁴⁰⁰ Loyn, 98.

⁴⁰¹ At one stage of Henry the First’s rule, the entirety of Essex was subject to forest law. Loyn, 98.

⁴⁰² Loyn, 106.

⁴⁰³ Keeton, *The Norman Conquest and the Common Law* / by George W. Keeton, 23.

⁴⁰⁴ Loyn, *The Making of the English Nation*, 98.

⁴⁰⁵ Jonathan Shepard, “The English and Byzantium: A Study of Their Role in the Byzantine Army in the Later Eleventh Century.,” *Traditio* 29 (1973): 53–92, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0362152900008977>.

Thus justice and the maintenance of social control was shifted from the corporation to the crown; participatory justice and decision-making was decisively replaced with a ruling class that was segregated along ethno-cultural lines. This state of affairs stood in contrast to the Danish conquest half a century earlier, in which the laws and institutions of Saxon society (and the friþ they upheld) was maintained. Where Cnut's conquest was codified by the creation of laws, William's was codified by a survey and redistribution of land;⁴⁰⁶ where Cnut's laws were "...marked by reciprocity" in which "The king stated his rights and guaranteed those of others,"⁴⁰⁷ with the rule of William the only form of reciprocity of rights was the right of secure tenure, a right enjoyed only by a small number of Norman tenants.⁴⁰⁸

We see a statement of what this new England looks like in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle the year of William's death. Here an anonymous author eulogises the dead king in a succinct, direct and often scathing tone. For the most part, the writer is not at all sympathetic to the dead King, who he labels as greedy, callous and overly stern, however he also gives measured praise for his ability as a leader, as well as the;

"...good **peace** that he made in this land; so that a man of any account might go over his kingdom unhurt with his bosom full of gold. No man dared to slay another, had he never so much evil done to the other; and if any churl lay with a woman against her will, he soon lost the limb that he played with."⁴⁰⁹

Interestingly, the author lists other issues with William's reign that he finds unfortunate and remarkable that give a greater understanding of how friþ, as well as the role of royal power, was seen through unsympathetic English eyes. The author marvels at William's

⁴⁰⁶ Stafford, *Unification and Conquest*, 108.

⁴⁰⁷ Stafford, 108–9.

⁴⁰⁸ Stafford, 109.

⁴⁰⁹ ChronE 1086.85.

imprisonment of not only earls and thanes, but of bishops and archbishops as well, of the taxes he levied that were not taken 'by right' but by 'unright', and that the king's brutal punishment of those who hunted wild game suggested that William "loved the tall deer as if he were their father". Perhaps most interesting is that while the author praises William's role in curbing crime, he makes clear that when it comes to justice – and especially the reliability of the King in delivering it – the author is scathing. When it came to the King's own friþ, says the author, there was no certainty; the King's responsibility and capacity to deliver justice and ensure peaceable political relations had no appreciable basis. Instead, the reliability of the king's friþ was entirely determined by one's relation to the king; without adherence to the king's will, no-one could be sure "...if they would live, or have land, or possessions, or even his *peace*"

In this environment, friþ would have little value; as the underlying paradigm of mutual responsibility evaporated, so too did the use and usefulness of the term. Of the related English words that did survive, most telling is that of *freo*. In pre-Norman England, it had been used to demarcate slaves from non-slaves, and as a descriptor for those exempt from taxes, levies or specific responsibilities.⁴¹⁰ This word, which gives us the modern English 'free', not only remained in the English vocabulary, but rose to be a descriptor not only of slaves, but of common subjects; its value of being 'free' from imposition by an arbitrary power no longer of value in narrow circumstances. Perhaps with the retreat of common responsibility and the consolidation of social and political determination with the royal court, the value of being unrestricted by such determination came to fill the gap left by its cousin term friþ. No longer sharing in the responsibility of political life, exemption from the terms of submission became a far more relevant term to the English speakers of post-conquest England.

In this context, we can see how Saxon England may have set the tone for the political arguments and desires of the Levellers of the English Civil War; while by no means

⁴¹⁰ LawAf 1 43, LawICn 11.2

democratic, it would seem that the political fabric of Saxon England was, for much of the English population at the time, notably different from that of the Normans.

Further, in the friþ of the Saxon laws we can see elements of social responsibility, of representation, agreement, and liability. As we will see in later chapters, all of these factors will set the security of the Levellers apart from the largely apolitical security that had come before. Thus despite the disappearance of friþ from the English language after the conquest, the invocation of Saxon political construction in the debates of the civil war suggest that the political considerations that gave friþ meaning in Saxon England were likely kept alive in cultural and political memory. Thus friþ and the Saxon political legacy are important contributions to our understanding of modern security – despite their irrelevance under the ‘Norman yoke’, the early democrats of the seventeenth century would invoke their values, however imperfectly, over half a millennia later.

PART V

CERTAINTY AND THE

LEVIATHAN: THE

POLITICAL SECURITY

OF THOMAS HOBBS

CHAPTER NINE

THOMAS HOBBS, THUCYDIDES, AND THE PRESUMPTION OF SECURITY

Having examined the historical and philosophical battlegrounds invoked in the English Civil War and how they relate to wider conceptions of security, we can now turn to our examination of those issues as they were dealt with at the time of the civil war itself – how the historical considerations and the philosophical ramifications of those considerations played out in the arguments used by various interlocutors to prosecute their own arguments, and to undermine the arguments of their opposition. In order to do this, we will examine first the work of the most famous and enduring political writer of the time, Thomas Hobbes.

As an avowed monarchist, Hobbes wrote extensively against the parliamentary cause, crafting an enduring political philosophy that argued for the necessity of a single source of absolute power. However in order to achieve his dual goals of negating parliamentarians and positively constructing a more robust justification for monarchy than existing claims of divine right, Hobbes drew extensively on the traditions and authors we have examined – especially Thucydides. Indeed, Hobbes' first major written work was the translation of Thucydides' *History* into English, the text previously only being available as a second-hand translation of a Latin version. Hobbes instead committed himself to rendering the original Greek text into his native tongue not simply so that the English people might appreciate the classic text, but also so that they might see the ills of democracy. Writing on the profound effect Thucydides had on his philosophy in his later autobiography, Hobbes exclaimed that Thucydides;

“... showed me how inept a thing democracy is, and how much more wisdom has one man than a crowd. I translated this writer so that he might speak to the English and make them shun the rhetoricians they were about to consult”⁴¹¹

For this reason we will not only study Hobbes’ own work, but also examine his translation of Thucydides. This will not only give us a valuable insight into the way in which ‘historical battlegrounds’ such as Athens and *asphaleia* were appreciated in the context of the civil war, but also allow us to appraise the relationship between *asphaleia*, *securitas*, and security as it was understood in the seventeenth century.

MISSING THE POINT

While it might seem somewhat trite to dismantle the translation of an ancient text, appreciating Hobbes’ translation of Thucydides’ work is crucial to our current study of security for two reasons. The first is that existing scholarship has assumed that Thucydides’ notion of *asphaleia* and Hobbes’ security are largely congruous,⁴¹² however close scrutiny suggests that this is not the case. Instead of being part of a monolithic and unproblematic history of ‘security’, the two terms are unsurprisingly the result of their context and core metaphors; a Greek term for wrestling, and a Latin-based term for an emotional state. Gaining an awareness of the differences between Hobbes’ security and Thucydides’ *asphaleia* will assist us in building a picture of the value both words held within the political environment of 17th century England – at least as Hobbes himself saw it.

It is certainly the case that Hobbes saw himself as continuing in the tradition of Thucydides as both a chronicler and as a political theorist, however Hobbes’ intention does not necessarily make it so. In fact, there are important distinctions and key points of

⁴¹¹ Verse 80 of Hobbes’ autobiography – printed text of this particular work is not readily accessible, however a digital source can be found at Thomas Hobbes, “TOMAE HOBBS MALMESBURIENSIS,” ed. K Maurer, n.d., http://udallasclassics.org/wp-content/uploads/maurer_files/Hobbes.pdf.

⁴¹² Arenas, *From Homer to Hobbes and beyond - Aspects of “security” in the European Tradition*; der Derian, “The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard”; Richard Schlatter, “Thomas Hobbes and Thucydides,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 6, no. 3 (1945): 350–62, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2707297>; Burke, “Aporias of Security”; Hamilton, *Security*.

misunderstanding between the two writers, and these points are hugely important to the way 'security' operates within both; beyond issues of translation or questions regarding the degree to which Hobbes is seeking to co-opt the *asphaleia* of Thucydides, there are fundamental differences in the theory of Hobbes and Thucydides that have direct ramifications for how security and *asphaleia* can (or cannot) relate across their works.

For the most part, much of the theoretical 'connection' between Hobbes and Thucydides has been 'superficial'; the two thinkers have been grouped together in broad strokes rather than compared systematically. Thucydides' honorary position of 'father' of realism has been well discussed in a previous chapter, however the wellspring of tradition that emanates from Thucydides apparently flows to the modern day through Thomas Hobbes.⁴¹³ This tradition generally hinges on at least one of two distinct but often complimentary points. The first is that Hobbes and Thucydides express a pessimistic view of both human nature and values based politics; the second is that Hobbes claimed in his own autobiography that his work was hugely informed by Thucydides, a claim given weight by the fact that Hobbes' first major work was a translation of Thucydides' *History*, the first translation readily available in the English language.

However both the notion of a common 'realism' between Hobbes and Thucydides, nor the uncritical reception of Hobbes' Greek 'inheritance' have been challenged in recent years. In regards to Hobbes' political theory, contextual readings of Hobbes coming from philosopher-historians such as Quentin Skinner, and more recently, Duncan Bell have challenged various aspects of Hobbes' intentions, theories, and ultimately the value of core concepts to modern liberal states.⁴¹⁴ Further, Hobbes' translation of Thucydides – and

⁴¹³ Robert G. Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," *International Organization* 38, no. 02 (March 1984): 287–308, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300026710>; Arenas, *From Homer to Hobbes and beyond - Aspects of "security" in the European Tradition*; der Derian, "The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard"; Burke, "Aporias of Security"; Sowerby, "Thomas Hobbes's Translation of Thucydides."

⁴¹⁴ Duncan SA Bell, "Political Theory and the Functions of Intellectual History: A Response to Emmanuel Navon," *Review of International Studies* 29, no. 1 (2003): 151–160.

perhaps more importantly his appreciation of the political and cultural details of the text – have come under scrutiny.⁴¹⁵

The combinations of these criticisms – and the rather slow appreciation of the challenge they represent to International relations, especially - can be found in the brief but scathing comments of Noel Malcolm, editor of the most recent touchstone edition of *Leviathan* and perhaps the greatest living authority on the work of Hobbes, who said the assumption of Hobbes' role in a realist narrative was;

“...a tradition of interpretation to which both realists and anti-realists have contributed. E. H. Carr called Hobbes the second great realist, after Machiavelli; Michael Walzer located realism "at its source and in its most compelling form" in the works of Thucydides and Hobbes. Yet the theory attributed to Hobbes by modern writers on international relations is so crude and simplistic as to make one wonder why anyone should regard it as great or compelling - or worth bothering about at all.”⁴¹⁶

In order to appreciate to what degree these criticisms apply to Hobbes' notion of security and in what way they might change how we appreciate how that notion of security might fit within a wider theoretical tradition, we will first examine Hobbes as a translator and analyst of Thucydides. Following this, we will then take stock of Hobbes' use of the term in his major political treatises – *De Cive*, *Leviathan* and *Behemoth*, and place his concept of security within the context of his corpus as a whole, as well as within the political environment in which he was writing. Once this is done, we can then reach forward into the late 17th and early 18th century, to Locke, Paine, Burke, and attempt to capture how the political constructions and contestations of the English Civil War would go on to define the value of security throughout the modern era.

⁴¹⁵ Sowerby, “Thomas Hobbes's Translation of Thucydides”; Ahrens Dorf, “The Fear of Death and the Longing for Immortality”; Bulter, “Image, Rhetoric, and Politics in the Early Thomas Hobbes.”

⁴¹⁶ Noel Malcolm, “What Hobbes Really Said,” *The National Interest*, no. 81 (2005): 122.

The Hobbes translation of Thucydides' *History* was the first translation of the work directly from ancient Greek into English, and was also Hobbes' first printed work. In his preface to the translation, Hobbes makes clear that he is well aware of the above facts; that previous English translations had been substandard, from a French text (itself translated from a Latin version), and that Thucydides' *History* was in his opinion a greatly important work, the beauty and utility of which gave him "a desire to communicate him further".⁴¹⁷

Given Hobbes' own claims, it is understandable therefore that modern readers can take for granted that his work stands as a continuation of Thucydides' thought – it would seem that at least in broad terms Hobbes certainly intended such to be the case. However there are a number of issues with Hobbes' treatment of Thucydides, as well as elements of his philosophy that depart vastly from Thucydides' analysis that place limits on the degree to which we can accept Hobbes' position as an unproblematic inheritor of a Thucydidean tradition. Hobbes' view on democracy – as well as Hobbes' assumptions of Thucydides' own view – are at odds with what is appreciable in Thucydides, as are their views on expressions of power and the role of fear and hope within the political philosophy of each. We will examine each of these briefly in order to inform our subsequent reading of Hobbes as a translator of Thucydides, and how all this taken together might garner a more faithful reading of Hobbes' later work, especially as it features security.

FEAR, HOPE AND DEATH

The second is the role of death (and fear of death) as a motivator or dissuader in social action. As we will see, the core value of the *Leviathan's* circumvention of the state of nature is in its ability to minimize or remove the fear of death for its subjects. Further, the *Leviathan* gained this power through itself wielding that same fear as a motivator and

⁴¹⁷ See 'To the Readers' (unnumbered pages) in Thucydides, *Eight Bookes of the Peloponnesian Warre Written by Thucydides the Sonne of Olorus. Interpreted with Faith and Diligence Immediately out of the Greeke by Thomas Hobbes Secretary to Ye Late Earle of Deuonshire*, 2005, <http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A13759.0001.001>.

limiter of individual action – faced with the absolute power of the state, the individual must acquiesce (and enjoy the comfort of knowing that all others must do the same). In this way, a group of individuals are granted ‘security’ and are thus free to flourish.

Hobbes projects this understanding to his supposedly monarchist idol, Thucydides, seeing the *History* as a treatise on the dangers of unfettered personal interest and the importance of removing existential fears from a populace through sovereignty. However Thucydides postulates in no uncertain terms that fear of death or violence is not efficacious – and indeed can be prejudicial – to limiting violent or antisocial action. In Thucydides’ work, people who no longer fear death are volatile, prone to extremes and subversive to common interests and reason,⁴¹⁸ and in cases of self-determination, insurmountable force is ignored.⁴¹⁹ As Peter Ahrensdorf explains;

“...Thucydides does not share Hobbes’ hope that the fear of violent death can lead to humans to master their destabilizing hopes. Thucydides argues instead that human hopes, especially for immortality, tend to overwhelm human fears, even of violent death. Hobbes is hopeful precisely because he believes that the power of hope can be tamed by fear, whereas Thucydides is not hopeful precisely because he believes hope is invisible.”⁴²⁰

Not simply a difference in ideas of hope, fear or human nature, this discrepancy between Hobbes and Thucydides has a huge impact on how each construe how political acts can be performed, limited or encouraged. In Hobbes’ case, his belief that fear has ultimate power over destabilising forces of human nature leads to the *Leviathan*. However if we do not share Hobbes’ belief in the power of fear, the *Leviathan* becomes a hollow proposition – Hobbes’ notion of political organisation is no longer effective, and must be replaced with something else.

⁴¹⁸ Thuc. 3.82

⁴¹⁹ Famously so in the Melian dialogue (see Thuc. 5.112 for example).

⁴²⁰ Ahrensdorf, “The Fear of Death and the Longing for Immortality,” 580.

Rather ironically, it is the Melian dialogue that displays this most eloquently – Thucydides’ account of the negotiations have the Melians stand defiant to their imminent destruction, referencing explicitly the importance of hope (whether in gods or Spartans) in the face of the impossible odds they faced.⁴²¹ It is interesting to note that the removal of the presumed power of mortal fear compliments the more nuanced reading of the dialogue proposed in the earlier chapter; Thucydides’ Melians not only reject the logic that the strong can do as they please and the weak as they must, they also provide an illustration of the futility of the underpinning assumption that fear of death can drive action counter to hopes, desires or values.

This discrepancy is crucial for our understanding of *asphaleia*, security, and the assumption that they are on some level congruous, given that while Thucydides does not explicitly offer an alternative to the *Leviathan*, the difference between himself and Hobbes in regards to the role of fear and power in political life casts doubt on any idea that the two authors would have a similar conception of security or its provision in political life. Where both men see hopes and desires as destabilising, only Hobbes can hope to remove the uncertainty they create through fear; Hobbes’ security can therefore manifest through the application of that fear, and can result in a removal of the destabilising forces it seeks to act against.

However even failing in offering an alternative notion of political organisation, anyone who fails to accept the idea that fear can master hopes and desires cannot ascribe to a model in which security is the removal of uncertainty through the imposition of a greater fear. Further, unless a greater power than individual hopes and desires is offered, a rejection of the *Leviathan* likely induces a situation in which political organisation (as well as any notion of ‘security’ involved in that organisation) will be reliant on the individual actors themselves; if the hopes and desires of individuals are more powerful drivers of actions than violence or imposition of fear, then any management or maintenance of certainty within a political

⁴²¹ Thuc. 5.112

environment would rely on the choices of the individuals holding those desires, rather than any imposition from elsewhere.

While Thucydides does not state outright, it is worthwhile noting that the assumption of such management of hopes and desires on the basis of individual actors stands far more allied with the idea of balance and resilience against competing wills at the heart of *asphaleia* than it does the idea of a guarantee from a higher power given by Hobbes. If it is assumed that individual desires cannot be curbed or controlled by a more powerful entity at a moment of political decision, then desires and hopes must either compete, or be shaped or contrived in a complimentary manner. To this end, the role of *asphaleia* in Athenian political speech makes sense; the polity is 'secure' when the various desires and conflicting tensions are held in stasis.

Considering the above, it should come as no surprise that Hobbes fails to adequately represent the political realities of Thucydides' text, especially as they related to democracies. While Hobbes might well have intended to reflect the import of Thucydides in his translations, careful reading makes it apparent that Hobbes failed at key points to appreciate political and cultural values at play within the text, especially those of the Athenians.⁴²² Given Hobbes' stated disdain for democracy (and conversely, his appreciation of monarchies), it might be easy to assume that this misunderstanding may be more wilful than accidental, however in the appraisal of classicist Robin Sowerby, the issue was that Hobbes lacked a serviceable understanding of these political and cultural values from the outset, and instead posits that Hobbes' confusion was likely due to both his own cultural background and the act of translation itself, rather than any academic impropriety on Hobbes' part.⁴²³

⁴²² Bulter, "Image, Rhetoric, and Politics in the Early Thomas Hobbes"; Sowerby, "Thomas Hobbes's Translation of Thucydides."

⁴²³ Sowerby, "Thomas Hobbes's Translation of Thucydides," 152.

But while we may give Hobbes the benefit of the doubt regarding *why* he might have represented democracy in Thucydides as abysmal, issues still remain regarding the fact that he did it at all; not only does Hobbes misrepresent Thucydides' intention in his translation, he also advertises the idea that Thucydides stands as part of a tradition that the *History* does not necessarily support. Most importantly, given the evidence found in his forewords and his autobiography, Hobbes' own views on political theory were based in no small part off his appreciation of Thucydides and the account of democracy he gleaned from the *History*. Not only did Thucydides show Hobbes how 'inept' democracy was, but Hobbes was also convinced that when it came to how states should be run, Thucydides himself "least of all liked the democracy" (of the life and history of Thucydides)

Regardless of how he arrived at his conclusions regarding Thucydides' text, Hobbes' views on the failures of the Athenian democracy were instrumental in his political theory, and their effects in cementing his stance against popular sovereignty was something he sought to actively recreate in his contemporaries. In his own work, Hobbes' reading of Athenian politics was key in his later political philosophy, especially that of the *Leviathan*.⁴²⁴ This supposed analogue was facilitated by the political realities of Hobbes' own day, realities to which he hoped to speak directly. It is plain from the preface to his work that Hobbes intended the *Leviathan* to provide a framework by which the parliamentarians of civil war England could be defanged and resisted, however in his autobiography he claims that years before *Leviathan*, he had translated Thucydides in order to let the text speak against the rising parliamentary movement. After reaffirming Thucydides' apparent hatred of democracy, Hobbes claims that he "...translated this writer so that he might speak to the English and make them shun the rhetoricians they were about to consult"⁴²⁵

The 'rhetoricians' in this context were of course the parliamentarians – those who sought to destabilise the status-quo with popular appeals to hollow and thoughtless lines of

⁴²⁴ Schlatter, "Thomas Hobbes and Thucydides," 350.

⁴²⁵ Verse 80, Hobbes, "TOMAE HOBBS MALMESBURIENSIS."

argument.⁴²⁶ Put simply, as Sowerby suggests, “the weakness of the Athenian democracy was influential in defining a problem to which the doctrine of *Leviathan* was the solution.”⁴²⁷ For our current purposes, it is imperative to recognise the attempt by Hobbes to connect his own work to the presumed intentions of Thucydides as political commentators, just as it is imperative to recognise that Hobbes was likely in error to presume that such a continuation was reasonable. Hobbes’ mistranslation (and overtly royalist assumptions) of Thucydides’ account of the Athenian fall in 404 BCE is not only questionable thematically, but was a serious misrepresentation of the text.⁴²⁸ Even Hobbes’ assumption that Thucydides’ appreciation of Pericles made him a monarchist is not only problematic in isolation, but is directly countered by Thucydides himself, who labels the rule of the Five Thousand in 411 BCE the best Athenian government he knew in his lifetime.⁴²⁹ While an abridgement of the complete participatory democracy championed by Pericles himself, it is still overtly a-monarchical and even stands as far more expansive than modern representative democracies today.

THE TRANSLATION OF SECURITY

While the above issues call the congruence of Hobbes’ political thought with Thucydides into question, the most problematic aspect of the relationship of Hobbes with Thucydides did not come from Hobbes himself, but was rather predicated on an assumption made by scholars much later – that the ‘security’ of the *Leviathan* was a direct appropriation of the *asphaleia* of Thucydides. Despite the preciously small amount of scholarship on the genealogy of security, key authors have either directly stated that such appropriation is the

⁴²⁶ Bulter, “Image, Rhetoric, and Politics in the Early Thomas Hobbes,” 479; Sowerby, “Thomas Hobbes’s Translation of Thucydides,” 165.

⁴²⁷ Sowerby, “Thomas Hobbes’s Translation of Thucydides,” 156.

⁴²⁸ *Ibid.*, 157.

⁴²⁹ Thuc. 8.97. This, as well as all of the following quotes to Thucydides *History* for the remainder of the chapter are taken from the Hobbes translation as it was republished in 1843; T. Hobbes and W. Molesworth, *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury* (J. Bohn, 1843).

case,⁴³⁰ or by linking *asphaleia* to some larger tradition of ‘security’, not done enough to clarify the relationship (or lack thereof) between the two terms.⁴³¹

Of these two follies of scholarship, it is certainly the former that provides us with the most concern. The idea that Hobbes had appropriated *asphaleia* first came from J.F.M Arenas as late as 2008, but has since stuck fast.⁴³² In his full length treatment of the philology of security published in 2013, John Hamilton follows suit, claiming that “...Hobbes deploys ‘security’ in the sense of Thucydides *asphaelia* – namely, as the stability that follows removal from the worrisome state of nature.”⁴³³ Later, Jonathan Herrington largely followed in Arenas’ footsteps in a book chapter published in 2015, in which he claims that “...for Hobbes ‘security’ (and *securitas*) refer to the Thucydidean concept rather than the Epicurean affect.”⁴³⁴

In none of these accounts, however, is there a systematic appraisal of how this conclusion is reached. This is especially apparent in the case of Hamilton, who claims that the congruence is evinced by the fact that Hobbes’ translation of Thucydides “...consistently renders *asphaelia* as security” – albeit with no examination of where such rendering occurs.⁴³⁵ When the translation of *asphaleia* and the uses of ‘security’ by Hobbes are compared, we find that neither Arenas, Hamilton nor Herrington are justified in their claims; there is no evidence that Hobbes appropriated *asphaleia* in his translation, and as to Hamilton’s claim that the Greek is consistently rendered as ‘security’ there stands overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

⁴³⁰ Arenas, *From Homer to Hobbes and beyond - Aspects of “security” in the European Tradition*; Hamilton, *Security*, 64; Herrington, “Philosophy: The Concepts of Security, Fear, Liberty, and the State.”

⁴³¹ Dillon, *Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought*; Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma.”

⁴³² See footnote 38 in Arenas, *From Homer to Hobbes and beyond - Aspects of “security” in the European Tradition*.

⁴³³ Hamilton, *Security*, 64.

⁴³⁴ Herrington, “Philosophy: The Concepts of Security, Fear, Liberty, and the State,” 26.

⁴³⁵ Hamilton, *Security*, 59.

This is obvious even given a cursory glance at the details. *Asphaleia* and its declensions appear 29 times in Thucydides' text, however Hobbes only uses 'security' as a translation for six of those cases.⁴³⁶ If we allow *asphales* as a related term, of the 53 uses by Thucydides, one is given as 'security',⁴³⁷ and four are rendered as 'secure' by Hobbes.⁴³⁸ The picture is further complicated when we examine the times Hobbes used the word 'security' in his translation, but to gloss for a term *other than asphaleia* – 'security' appears 24 times in Hobbes' translation but as stated above, only six of them correspond to *asphaleia* and two to *asphales*. At best we can then say that Hobbes rendered *asphaleia* as security roughly 20% of the time, and if that is expanded to include *asphales* and secure, that Hamilton's consistency is down to less than 10%. Out of the 24 uses of 'security' in Hobbes' text, there are 16 use cases not related to *asphaleia*, *asphales* or any of their declensions that have been derived from other Greek terms or phrases. This immediately raises two questions – if *asphaleia* is not consistently rendered as security, then how did Hobbes translate the remainder of those cases, and what other Greek terms did Hobbes see as allied to his notion of 'security'?

THE REMAINING CASES

In broad strokes, the answer to the first question is simple enough; for the 80% of instances of *asphaleia* Hobbes doesn't translate as 'security', he instead most often uses 'safe', 'safety' or a similar term. The notion of being 'safe' from physical harm is given in sixteen passages, making it far and away the most 'consistent rendering' of the term.⁴³⁹ Also common is 'assurance', 'assure' and 'to make sure',⁴⁴⁰ as well as a smattering of other uses that deserve more detailed scrutiny; while the two common translations listed above might

⁴³⁶ The following were found using Tufts University online classics tool (perseus.tufts.edu.au), which has searchable texts for both the original Greek and Hobbes' translation (in its 1843 printing). The passages in question are Thuc. 3.12, 3.82, 6.55, 6.56, 6.59, 6.87, 8.66

⁴³⁷ Thuc. 6.24

⁴³⁸ Thuc. 5.7, 6.23, 7.777, 8.2

⁴³⁹ 'Safe', 'safety', or 'save' (the latter in the context of 'saving' from harm) is used in Thuc. 1.75, 1.120, 1.137, 3.13, 3.56, 4.57, 4.68, 4.128, 5.107, 5.111, 6.78, 6.83 and 8.46; 'kept from danger' or similar is used in 2.75 and 6.24, and 'protection' in 1.40.

⁴⁴⁰ Thuc. 2.11, 5.97, 5.98, 8.1

seem roughly congruous with notions of ‘security’, further examination of Hobbes’ more nuanced translations of *asphaleia*, as well as his other uses of ‘security’ in the text for other translations, will demonstrate that it is likely that Hobbes’ understanding of the Greek term is more nuanced than assuming a monolithic political/conceptual instrument suggested by Arenas or Hamilton.

Some of Hobbes’ more unique moments in the translation come when he deals with the more nuanced uses of the word – employments more in line with the older Homeric texts, or regarding political ‘balance’. In 3.22, Thucydides recounts a troop of soldiers removing their footwear to avoid slipping in the mire – a use that Hobbes’ reasonably renders as ‘steadfast’. However in comparison, when speaking of the change in meaning of *asphaleia* during the Corcyrean revolution, Hobbes employs a curious turn of phrase;

“The received value of names imposed for signification of things was changed into arbitrary. For inconsiderate boldness was counted true-hearted manliness; provident deliberation, a handsome fear; modesty, the cloak of cowardice; to be wise in everything, to be lazy in everything. A furious suddenness was reputed a point of valour. To re-advise for the better security was held for a fair pretext of tergiversation.”

While on first glance this might seem like a clear analogue for the sort of ‘security’ that appeals in modern times, the translation falls short. Importantly, Hobbes’ use here is not addressing physical danger, rather it is speaking of *asphaleia* as one might about Hesiod’s Zeus-blessed princes. Read closely, we can see that it is the advice (that is being ‘re-advise[d]’) that is the subject here, with said advice becoming ‘pretext of tergiversation’. Tergiversation can be taken as both subterfuge, as well as being deliberately ambiguous, with both senses being operative in Hobbes’ time. The word that Hobbes is seeking to translate (ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι) is similar in broad intent – to plot or contrive against (ἐπι, ‘over’) the political authority (βουλεύσασθαι, ‘council’) – however unlike more recent

translators, Hobbes does not elevate the text to an appeal of a physical nature.⁴⁴¹ Instead, we are left with a vision of plotting against or stymying political speech on the pretext of advising with a higher degree of certainty – the revolution makes plotters into pretenders, all claiming access to Zeus’ nectar.

Unsurprisingly, the biggest departure from Hobbes’ usual translation of *asphaleia* occurs in his treatment of it within Pericles’ funeral oration;

“yet such of you as are of the age to have children may bear the loss of these in the hope of more. For the later children will both draw on with some the oblivion of those that are slain and also doubly conduce to the good of the city by population and strength (ἐκ τε τοῦ μὴ ἐρημοῦσθαι καὶ ἀσφαλείᾳ). For it is not likely that they should equally give good counsel to the state that have not children to be equally exposed to danger in it.”⁴⁴²

Here, ‘strength’ seems an odd choice for *asphaleia*; it is the only place in Hobbes’ text that it is used in this way. Why this is done is unclear (and likely cannot be made any clearer), but as we will see in Hobbes’ own use of ‘security’ for words other than *asphaleia*, to translate *asphaleia* as such in this passage would have made little sense in relation to the rest of the text. This rendering, out of character both in terms of Hobbes’ usual translation for *asphaleia* and in terms of reflecting the original text, support the view given earlier of how the assumption of fear mastering hope changes how ‘security’ manifests within a society. In Hobbes’ own conception of security, the strength of individual decisions is subordinate to the power of the state, but in a polity that presumes individual hopes and desires are the primary driver of political action, the maintenance of good individual decision-making is imperative; put simply, Pericles’ call for children is a complicated proposition within Hobbes’ notion of security, however in a conception in which individual hopes and desires are the

⁴⁴¹ See Thuc. 3.82. The Crawley translation and Marchant’s commentary both take *asphaleia* in this context to mean ‘self-defence’. See Thucydides, Crawley, and Strassler, *The Landmark Thucydides*; Marchant, *Commentary on Thucydides*.

⁴⁴² Thuc. 2.44

primary vehicle of political action (and the determinants of security) Pericles' exhortation becomes much more powerful and straightforward.

In essence, Pericles invokes a notion of political organisation in which the reason of individuals is fundamental to success; that individual reason is a necessary part of good politics. Pericles hammers this home in a different part of his oration, saying of Athens that;

"We do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business; we say that he has no business here at all"⁴⁴³

As we will see in the next section, this view of individual reason is in absolute contradiction to Hobbes' own conception of political construction, and to his notion of how security is derived within a polity. Where Pericles calls for the exercising of reason on the part of the citizens, for Hobbes it is precisely reason that they must abandon in order to ensure that all members of the polity can live 'securely'. For Hobbes, reason can be only self-serving, and as such it should fall only to the ruler to maintain it; the alternative - the free use of reason by all – can end only in anarchy. As such, we can see that the fundamental basis of political construction for each is different, and so too is their conception of security. Indeed, if Hobbes had used Thucydides' notion of *asphaleia* as an analogue for his own use of 'security', it would have undermined his own political theory; by using a concept that invoked public reason and contestability, Hobbes would have contradicted his own call for a single source of political reason within a polity.⁴⁴⁴

WHAT ELSE COULD SECURITY BE?

⁴⁴³ Thuc. 2.40

⁴⁴⁴ This element of Hobbes' thought will be extensively examined in the following chapter, but for the sake of expediency now, see the quintessential statement of Hobbes's notion of security and the role of reason (or lack thereof) in maintaining it; *Leviathan*, 1.14.23-31)

To understand both Hobbes' translation of *asphaleia* and his employment of 'security' within his translation, we must remember the variety of senses introduced in the chapter on *asphaleia* proper – truthful or eloquent and convincing speech, surefootedness, certainty in thought or action, and the maintenance of or protection of interests against an antithetical action. In our study of Thucydides we saw that this wide gamut of uses were expressed in the *History*, and as such it would be hard to believe that a man as concerned with language, clear speech and the legacy of Thucydides would not attempt to do justice to the translation by ignoring these variety of uses. Indeed, a careful reading of Hobbes' translation shows that he valiantly attempts to express the variety of meanings *asphaleia* held – although to what degree he enjoyed success might be a matter for interpretation.

The most immediate and obvious illustrations of his awareness of the variety of values the *asphaleia* metaphor could have are passages in which *asphaleia* or *asphales* appear more than once – for example when Brasidas addresses the Peloponnesian troops in book two;

“And therefore, though we seem to invade them with a great army and to have much **assurance** (ἀσφάλεια) that they will not come out against us to battle, yet we ought not for this to march the less carefully prepared but of every city, as well the captain as the soldier, to expect always some danger or other in that part wherein he himself is placed. For the accidents of war are uncertain, and for the most part the onset begins from the lesser number and upon passion. And oftentimes the lesser number, being afraid, hath beaten back the greater with the more ease; for that through contempt they have gone unprepared. And in the land of an enemy, though the soldiers ought always to have bold hearts yet for action, they ought to make their preparations as if they were afraid. For that will give them both more courage to go upon the enemy and more **safety** (ἀσφαλέστατοι) in fighting with him.”⁴⁴⁵

It seems that Hobbes was comfortable translating the same core concept in two very different senses. In the first, we see *asphaleia* rendered as 'assurance' in the sense that the

⁴⁴⁵ Thuc. 2.11

soldiers are steadfast in their prognostication that the enemy will not come to face them in the field. However later in the passage, the *asphales* metaphor is rendered as ‘safe’, in the sense that they will be resilient to the risks of combat. To be plain, Hobbes was aware that the term could be used in a variety of senses, and neither time is the concept given as ‘security’.

Even more emphatic is the translation of the Athenian envoy’s speech to the Camarinians, attempting to persuade them to join against the Syracuseans – Hobbes has the speaker justify Athenian aggression through their desire for safety, and then question the trustworthiness of the account given by the Syracuseans;

“Now to seek means for one's own preservation is a thing unblameable. And as it is for our own **safety's** (ἀσφαλείας) cause that we are now here, so also we find that the same will be profitable for you. Which we will make plain from those very things which they accuse, and you, as most formidable, suspect us of, being **assured** (ἀσφαλῶς) that such as suspect with vehement fear, though they may be won for the present with the sweetness of an oration, yet when the matter comes to performance, will then do as shall be most for their turn.”⁴⁴⁶

Given the prevalent use of ‘security’ in English during Hobbes’ day, however, if either was to be rendered as security, it would be the first. As we have seen previously, Cawdrey’s Table Alphabeticall, still in wide circulation at the time of Hobbes, is plain in its appreciation of security as ‘carelessness’, and given Hobbes’ reputation for clarity of language, it is unlikely he would have employed it in a new way without noting the change. With this in mind, we can begin to appreciate that when rendering *asphaleia* in the *History*, Hobbes’ use of ‘security’ is far more allied to his use of ‘assurance’ (being unconcerned or free from doubt) than it is ‘safe’ (free from physical harm).

⁴⁴⁶ Thuc. 6.83

In fact, all of Hobbes' employments of 'security' - both when rendered for *asphales/ia* or rendered for other words - express a notion of assurance in a practical context; where 'assurance' suffices for issues of rhetoric or prediction, Hobbes uses security in regards to the confidence one can have in an event or activity. When used for *asphaleia*, security is often found in regards to plots and plans – of the Mileteans throwing off Athenian hegemony, the 'cautious plotting' of the Corcyrean revolt, and three uses during Thucydides' retelling of the plot of Aristogaton and Harmodius in book six. As well as this, 'security' is used when speaking of Nicias' expedition to Syracuse,⁴⁴⁷ when talking of the chance of victory in Syracuse,⁴⁴⁸ and the greater degree of certainty the oligarchs had in the revolution at Samos.⁴⁴⁹

This leaves us with a role for security in filling a gap between the 'safety' and 'assurance' of *asphaleia* in which it is demarcated by the assurance of practical or physical concerns. Aware of the physical meaning as well as its rhetorical application, it seems reasonable that Hobbes would see room between the two extremes and seek to render it into an English term that might bridge that gap; safety being the practical issues of harm, but security the resultant frame of mind - the 'assurance' that comes with of from a practical or tangible outcome.

The role of 'security' in illustrating a concern (or lack thereof) for a practical outcome is highlighted by the way Hobbes uses security for words *other* than *asphaleia*. Counter to what is put forward by Arenas and Hamilton, not only was 'security' not the most common rendering of *asphaleia* in Hobbes' translation, but it was more often employed to render an entirely different word than either *asphaleia* or *asphales* in Hobbes' translation. Out of the Hobbes' 16 remaining uses of 'security' in Hobbes' translation, the vast majority refer to terms of trust and assurance, especially in regards to treaties, agreements or plans. Five uses are rendered for ἀδειαν (freedom from fear), especially in the context of an agreement

⁴⁴⁷ Thuc. 6.24

⁴⁴⁸ Thuc. 6.87

⁴⁴⁹ Thuc. 8.66

“ἀδείην δίδοναι” – to give a freedom from fear.⁴⁵⁰ Three uses are rendered for πιστὰ (trust, to be trusted or believed), once again in the context of an agreement - πιστὰ παρασχόμενοι (“giving trustworthy assurances”),⁴⁵¹ and three used for moments of ‘strong’ (ἔχυρόν) ‘firm’ or ‘assured’ (βεβαιότητα) confidence.⁴⁵² Finally, there are a number of uses rendered for more formal expressions of such agreements; three for being under terms of truce (ὑπόσπονδοι),⁴⁵³ one for διηγγυημένοι (to post bail),⁴⁵⁴ and one for being ‘without plots’ (ἀνεπιβούλευτον).⁴⁵⁵

This leaves us with the overwhelming sense that for Hobbes’ translation, ‘security’ stands far more as an indicator of certainty than it does as physical safety or as some specific political instrument or concept. Far from being appropriated from Thucydides’ own notion of *asphaleia*, Hobbes instead does what any good translator should- tries to give *asphaleia* the full breadth of its meaning using the common words at his disposal, instead of simply glossing a single term across contexts. Hobbes therefore uses his English vocabulary in a way familiar to the audience he hoped would be reading Thucydides for the first time, sometimes giving *asphaleia* as safety from physical attack, sometimes as assurance of a fact or idea, and sometimes as security - the certainty that comes from an agreement or provision against risk.

‘Security’ in the text is employed not as a neologism, nor as an specific term with political or philosophical grounding coming either from Thucydides or Hobbes himself; instead, security is used precisely as it had been used in English at the time, and is still sometimes used today – the assurance granted by an act, object or pledge to guarantee an outcome, object or incident. It was used in the same terms as Shakespeare some 40 years before (“He saide sir, you should procure him better assurance then Bardolfe, he would not take his band and

⁴⁵⁰ Thuc. 4.14, 4.92, 7.29, 8.76, 8.81.

⁴⁵¹ Thuc. 3.46, 3.60, 3.112

⁴⁵² Thuc. 2.7, 4.51, 5.109

⁴⁵³ Thuc. 1.103, 6.88, 8.98

⁴⁵⁴ Thuc. 3.70

⁴⁵⁵ Thuc. 3.37

yours, he liked not the securitie")⁴⁵⁶ or the sense still imperfectly preserved by stock exchanges, alarm systems and deposits demanded by rental car agencies – something that brings confidence, assurance or certainty to a situation filled with doubt.

Thus the reality of Hobbes' connection to Thucydides is simple and realistic – separated by locale, culture, politics and two thousand years, there were likely few perfect analogues to be had between the two; if there were to be any, it is unlikely that a specific political instrument like security would be one of them. There is nothing unreasonable in taking Hobbes in his word that he had attempted to do justice to Thucydides, nor is there any reason to doubt that he saw his work as a continuation of the political project his idol started two millennia before. However it is unreasonable to assume that Hobbes' reading of Thucydides was perfect, or that as a translator, Hobbes could essentially turn his back on the complexity of the words he sought to make intelligible through the use of simplistic analogues. As it stands, Hobbes' claim that he followed in the footsteps of Thucydides is hampered by a skewed reading of the political ramifications and a lack of nuance, especially around his reading of the Athenian polity.

However while his reading was not perfect, he was largely successful in translating *asphaleia* to the standard use of the English of his day. This should come as no surprise given that Hobbes was famously fastidious in his use of language, and well aware of the challenges offered by translation. Hobbes had previously worked under Francis Bacon as both a note taker and translator, and was a favourite scribe of Bacon due to his clear language and effective translation.⁴⁵⁷

Further, if Hobbes' translation of Thucydides was published so that it may educate the wider English public of the dangers of democracy, it would make little sense to write it in language

⁴⁵⁶ See 2.2.33 in William Shakespeare, *The Second Part of Henrie the Fourth Continuing to His Death, and Coronation of Henrie the Fift. VVith the Humours of Sir Iohn Falstaffe, and Swaggering Pistoll. As It Hath Been Sundrie Times Publikely Acted by the Right Honourable, the Lord Chamberlaine His Seruants. Written by William Shakespeare.*, 2003, <http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A11974.0001.001>.

⁴⁵⁷ Sowerby, "Thomas Hobbes's Translation of Thucydides," 148.

that was not in line with widely held vocabulary of the day. If Hobbes used the opportunity to create, expand or codify some new sense or meaning to security, it seems odd to choose what he hoped to be an instructional text with which to do it. By his own admission that the text was for general consumption, Hobbes has a vested interest in making the text accessible – indeed his efforts in the foreword, as well as his notes testify to the fact that Hobbes was more than happy to expand and expound on issues he thought readers might find unclear.

This nexus between tradition and translation is crucial to understanding how security developed – or rather, how in the moment of contact between Hobbes and Thucydides, didn't develop at all. Appreciating how Hobbes interacted with Thucydides does more than simply demythologise the notion that Hobbes was tapping into a Hellenistic notion of political security; it goes further than offering a critique of Hamilton and Arenas, or of Hobbes himself. Understanding Hobbes' translation of the text allows us to gain greater clarity regarding the use and usefulness of security at the time of his working; it gives us a greater sense of how the term was positioned both in regards to the English public at the time and the Greek world he was seeking to revive.

It shows us that while there was no analogue between security and *asphaleia*, there was some overlap. While *asphaleia* could be used for truth, physical safety or notions of certainty, the security of Hobbes' day was best suited to the uses of *asphaleia* that concentrated on the acquisition of certainty surrounding conflicts – bargaining, truces, agreements or well-laid plans. Such usage is confirmed by the times Hobbes used security to render other Greek terms, terms that spoke of truth, treaties or bail agreements rather than immediate physical threats or military defences.

Most importantly, the systematic appraisal of security within Hobbes' translation of Thucydides is crucial in that it sets up a basis for our reading of Hobbes himself. By Hobbes' own claim, Thucydides stands as a continuing force throughout his life's work – his first printed folio, and a source of inspiration that remained at the fore of his philosophy for the rest of his career. All this has made it easy to assume that there should be some

commonality between the notions of 'security' in each author, and while we have since seen that is not the case, there is still great value in demarcating the differences between them. If we allow the false equivalence to stand between Hobbes and Thucydides' notions of 'security', we run the risk of not taking Hobbes at his word within his own texts; relying as we have on Hobbes' own judgement, the assumption of a conceptual inheritance can allow us to colour the Melian dialogue with Hobbesean overtones, or conversely induce an unnecessarily Aegean perspective of the *Leviathan*.

Having gained a nuanced awareness of the uses of each, we can now be far more precise regarding Hobbes' use of the term within *de Cive* and *Leviathan*, in which Hobbes uses security as part of his political schema. We can now turn to these works and use the comparison between Hobbes and Thucydides in regards to security to see how Hobbes' use of the word fits within the text and its philosophy, within the scope of use in his translation, and within the wider paradigms at play in the genealogy of security. What we will find in so doing will in every way be almost as straightforward as the conclusions reached here – as a man driven by clarity and seeking to convince his nation of the political realities to which he ascribed, Hobbes used language with a disarming consistency; consistent to both his own use, and to the use of the audience to which he was writing.

CHAPTER TEN

SECURITY IN THE LEVIATHAN

In Hobbes' later political theory, security would feature as an important element of a functional polity, however the nature of that security was not illustrative of an amalgam with any Athenian concept, nor was it pre-emptive of modern considerations of national security. In fact, Hobbes' use of security within his political works follows steady, reasonable lines – the word is used just as it was in Hobbes' translation of Thucydides, in line with the language and vocabulary common at the time in England.

But while Hobbes' traditional use of the word precludes any claim we might make today of Hobbes' supposed promulgation or formulation of security as a unique political concept, the study of Hobbes' text is still important to our study of security. As we will see, Hobbes is not alone in his use of the term within political texts in 17th century England; however by comparing Hobbes' use with the use of other writers at the time, we can see that while the concept it demarcates is the same, the way that concept is realised in practical terms differs between political constructions.

Hobbes does not hold a unique claim to security within political theory in the early modern period – indeed, his use of the term is not even exceptional in the year *Leviathan* was published.⁴⁵⁸ In the throes of civil war, England was awash with political commentaries, manifestos and remonstrances, many of which features security as a necessary part of a reconstructed England. In all cases, the term filled the same lingual space as was given in Hobbes' translation of Thucydides; 'security' was the assurance of an outcome, it was the extension of its financial meaning (a form of bond or deposit to 'secure' a debt or risk) into the practical space. On both sides of the civil war, 'security' was most often an emotive state

⁴⁵⁸ See for example the pamphlet 225 in the Thomason collection (T.225) [1651.02.4] (7.10) Anon., A Declaration of the Armie concerning Lieut. Collonel John Lilburn (14 February, 1651).

experienced by individuals, however the enjoyment of that state by the sum total of the populace was a necessary condition for a successful nation.

However how one realises such security changes drastically depending on the political frame in which they operate. As one would expect, the realisation of individual assurance is conditional on what one wants to be assured about, as well as how that assurance can be delivered. As such, while 'security' might have been common across the divides of political literature of Civil War England, its specific value was subject to vast differences across employments.

As such, this chapter will achieve three things. Firstly, it will demonstrate that Hobbes' notion of security has been warped and overblown in modern scholarship. We will see that Hobbes did not create some new political instrument, but instead appealed to a common notion of wellbeing, certainty and assurance brought about by political realities. Hobbes' security was certainly not an inspired precursor to modern notions of the latter 20th century, nor was it an analogue for safety within a political context.

Secondly, we will explore the uses of the word within political writings of those that stood opposed to Hobbes at the time of the civil war, and in so doing we will see that security was used to demarcate the same idea across the political divides. By reading the work of political groups such as the Levellers, we can see security being used in the same way as Hobbes' translation and in his political works – as a term denoting an emotive experience of individuals, as realised through their political reality.

Lastly, we will see that while the word is used to demarcate the same lingual space across such fraught political divides, the instruments required to achieve such security differs wildly between Hobbes and his political opponents. Essentially we will see that while for both monarchists and parliamentarians 'security' meant the assurance of certainty and constancy of a political reality, how that constancy could be realised was fundamentally different. In identifying this difference, we will not simply be ascertaining some sort of

polarity within the political thinking of the interlocutors, but rather we will be identifying an important point of departure in the history of security, one in which the word goes from being chiefly reliant on an individual, to being reliant on a notion of instrumentality. In simple terms, we will see in the comparisons of these competing realisations of the same security a moment in which security moves from being dependent on power to being dependent on instruments; from subjects and rulers, to policy, law and bureaucracy.

Much as his connection to Thucydides has been largely taken for granted in International Relations and Security Studies, Hobbes' notion of 'security' has been broadly and uncritically compared to modern conceptions.⁴⁵⁹ For the most part, this vision of security in Hobbes rests on the assumption that security is the condition of a state free from the anarchy of war. The presumption of such a role for security within the state gives rise to the notion that it is security that stands as the core, primary or fundamental interest of a nation; essentially, within this model, security becomes the foundational 'interest' that nations must pursue.⁴⁶⁰

The presumption of the primacy of security in Hobbes' work is often extrapolated from a famous passage in Hobbes' *Leviathan* in which life without security is described;

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of

⁴⁵⁹ Jörg Spieker, "Foucault and Hobbes on Politics, Security, and War," *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 36, no. 3 (2011): 187–99; Baldwin, "The Concept of Security"; Arenas, *From Homer to Hobbes and beyond - Aspects of "security" in the European Tradition*; der Derian, "The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard"; Burke, "Aporias of Security"; Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism."

⁴⁶⁰ Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reissued (Long Grove, Ill: Waveland Press, 2010), 126; Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," 305.

all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.⁴⁶¹

There is no argument that Hobbes saw a life without security as ‘solitary, poor, nasty, etc.’, however the connection security has to the ‘time of war’ is not sufficiently examined. The assumption that security is found outside the ‘time of war’ is a fair one, but the comparison of war and security in Hobbes’ thought is, as we will see, a false dichotomy. In appreciating that war and insecurity are separate considerations on the part of Hobbes, we problematize an uncritical uptake of Hobbesian security as physical protection from threats, especially those of a political or military nature.

Most instructive to this end is the fact that a close reading makes clear that while the absence of security and the ‘time of warre’ are congruous in outcome, Hobbes actually demarcates them in the text; Hobbes is not saying that in a time of war there is no security (though he certainly would agree in the statement), but rather that an absence of any security beyond what an individual themselves possesses *is of the same consequence* as would follow from a time of war. As we will see, this small distinction between the analogue of insecurity and war (rather than the convolution of insecurity *with* war) will feature throughout Hobbes’ texts, and is the single biggest limiting factor in an unproblematic uptake by modern scholars who hope to find modern security in Hobbes’ thought. Hobbes’ security might well be challenged or destroyed by war, however Hobbes is painfully clear that actual violence, threats or political intrigues are not necessary for security to be destroyed; for Hobbes, security is not an absence of threat or a condition of physical protection, but a separate consideration altogether.⁴⁶²

⁴⁶¹ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 1.13.20-30. (page 192) All quotations will be taken from Thomas Hobbes, Noel Malcolm, and Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, The Clarendon Edition of the Works of Thomas Hobbes, volumes 3-5 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2014), 192.

⁴⁶² In regards to international relations reading the above passage as indicative of the anarchical realities of international politics, it is interesting to note that following the above, Hobbes goes on to specifically declare that the international stage is in fact *not* subject to those same considerations; while Hobbes admits that “Kings, and persons of Sovereigne authority, because of their Independency, are in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators” constantly threatening each other, “...because they uphold thereby, the Industry of their Subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular men.” Essentially, Hobbes argues that while sovereigns suffer from the same deficiencies as

Further, even in the above passage, the historical considerations of the word use can be extrapolated. Especially when considered against our understanding of *securitas*, and of Hobbes' use of security within his translation of Thucydides, there are immediate concerns with reading any 'standard' international relations notions of security out of the passage. While reading 'security' here as physical defence or an absence of threat might make sense in broad strokes, such a reading is far less congruous than one of emotive assurance and certainty that was dominant at the time Hobbes wrote, and is most common in his translation of Thucydides. While Hobbes goes to great pains to list the practical effects a lack of security has on a society, at its head he places effect that is "worst of all" – that being a continual fear of violent death on the part of the individuals that make up that society. It is the primacy of fear in a state of insecurity that betrays the inverse; that 'security' in this context has as its prime consideration the absence not of physical threat, but of that very same fear. Put simply, security is for Hobbes the assurance or certainty that accompanies the absence of fear, not the practical considerations of immediate safety, whether it be the safety of an individual or the nation.

This separation between security as assurance against fear, rather than as practical defensive policies is highlighted in *de Cive*, a work that while less famous than *Leviathan* stands as a more rigorous and constructive statement of Hobbes' political theory. *De Cive* (On the citizen) was first published in 1642 in Latin, forming one part of a trilogy that sought to encompass Hobbes' philosophical thought (the other two works being 'On the body' and 'On man'). *De Cive* had originally been intended to come last in the trilogy, however in his preface to the reader, Hobbes claims that the events of the civil war caused the last part to be "ripen'd, and pluckt" before its intended time.

The correlation between *de Cive* and *Leviathan* are unmistakable, and given that Hobbes republished the book in English in the same year that *Leviathan* was itself released would

common people, their concern for their kingdoms stands as a limiting factor that stops the international system from falling prey to the anarchy that individual wills promises.

suggest that Hobbes saw the works as at least non-contradictory, but more likely as complimentary. A comparison between the texts certainly suggests the latter; while *de Cive* outlines an entire political theory within a systematic construction, *Leviathan* stands more as a directed statement on the specific issue of practical political authority. In forming the two texts along these lines, where *Leviathan* then stands as a remonstrance of the ignorance of political realities, *de Cive* provides constructive and specific analysis of how a state should be constructed; as philosopher Sterling Lamprecht quips, "... *de Cive* indicates by its divisions the essential lines of its author's system of thought; the *Leviathan* indicates rather the intensity of his hates."⁴⁶³

It is chapter 6, article 3 of *de Cive* that gives us the clearest conception not only of the basis of fear and assurance that sits at the heart of Hobbes' security, but also the specific relationship said security has to physical safety and defence. The basis of Hobbes' security requires;

"...that a man be so farre forth protected against the violence of others, that he may live securely, that is, that he may have no just cause to fear others, so long as he doth them no injury. Indeed, to make men altogether safe from mutuall harmes, so as they cannot be hurt, or injuriously kill'd, is impossible, and therefore comes not within deliberation. But care may be had there be no just cause of fear; for security is the end wherefore men submit themselves to others, which if it be not had, no man is suppos'd to have submitted himselfe to ought, or to have quitted his Right to all things, before that there was a care had of his security."⁴⁶⁴

Thus security for Hobbes is related to physical protection, however it is fundamentally distinct from it; provision should be made for the physical protection of citizens to ensure

⁴⁶³ Sterling P. Lamprecht, "Hobbes and Hobbism," *The American Political Science Review* 34, no. 1 (1940): 35, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1948860>.

⁴⁶⁴ Hobbes *De Cive* 6.3. All subsequent quotations will be taken from Thomas Hobbes, *Delphi Collected Works of Thomas Hobbes (Illustrated)*, vol. 9, 10 vols., Delphi Series Ten (United Kingdom: Delphi Classics, 2019).

security,⁴⁶⁵ however it is not the provision itself that brings security, nor is security a state in which the citizen is free from harm. Hobbes makes clear that it is 'impossible' for a state to make its citizens completely safe; instead, because the perfect provision of protection is impossible, security is a necessary but distinct outcome where the imperfectly protected citizen can enjoy a confidence, certainty and constancy despite their imperfectly safe condition. Therefore, the enjoyment of this assurance is 'security' in Hobbes' conception. Just as the dominant English meaning of the word in Hobbes' day, it is a guarantee against a risk – in this case, the guarantee of state power against the risk of individual desires.

With this in mind, we can appreciate the points of separation, as well as the points of contact, between the security of modern times and the security of Hobbes. While the 'freedom from threat' often characterised by the unacknowledged consensus is not incompatible with Hobbes' security, it is certainly not the basis of or even goal of security in Hobbes' framework. The core, constituting role of the *Leviathan* of state is not to ensure the citizens do not come to harm from threats either domestic or foreign (though such provision is still important), but rather to give confidence that harm – specifically the harm that could manifest through the constitution of community in the first place - is unlikely to manifest. Therefore instead of the core business of state being to act against specific threats or to provide safety in and of itself, Hobbes' *Leviathan* instead seeks to demonstrate that it can guarantee each citizen *against the actions of their fellow citizens*. Power is held by the state first and foremost not to express and maintain that state's interests against other states, but rather to stand against the power of each individual citizen, to limit each citizen's interests and most importantly to destroy each citizen's capacity to use their own individual power for any act that may give other citizens cause to fear for their own safety. Security is then the outcome of this power, in the sense that the irresistible force of the state allays concerns that one's neighbour will be a threat to them by demanding (and receiving) their submission.

⁴⁶⁵ Hobbes De Cive 5.6, 6.3

This notion of security – the domestically focussed nexus of power, fear and guarantees – forms the basis of political affiliation and of the practical necessities of Hobbes’ state. While modern notions of security are often placed as necessary to maintain the state, Hobbes’ security is fundamentally *formative*; security is not the imperative of the state it is constitutive. The constitutive role of security is touched on in the above quote - that security is ‘...the end wherefore men submit themselves to others’, an end which, if it is absent, then “...no man is suppos'd to have submitted himselfe to ought, or to have quitted his Right to all things.” Put simply, individuals ‘submit’ and become citizens for the sake of security, and if that security is not forthcoming, those individuals ought not to submit. It is here that we can finally properly strike at the heart of what Hobbes’ security is in practical terms – what the word seeks to encapsulate in the political reality Hobbes’ *Leviathan* is fighting for. Not simply defence from threats, nor even the alleviation of want as it was in the days of Nero, security is for Hobbes ‘secure’ both in the sense of an absence of concern and in the sense of a guarantee held against a risk; the amalgam of these two elements finding expression in the submission to a greater power. The power of the *Leviathan* only keeps the citizen ‘safe’ only as a function of its greater, foundational role as the guarantor in a transaction in which the will of each individual is traded for an absence of fear. Thus in this way security is both the absence of concerns and the assurance or guarantee against the risks posed by other individuals.

The first half of this dual inference has been established in the previous quotes – that security is experienced by the citizen as freedom from fear, especially of violent death at the hands of other individuals. As for the second half – on the role of the state as a guarantor of that freedom from fear – it is more plainly explained in the following;

For the Lawes of nature (as *Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy,* and (in summe) *doing to others as wee would be done to,*) of themselves, without the terrour of some Power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our naturall Passions, that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like. And Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore, notwithstanding the Lawes of Nature, (which every one hath then kept, when he has the will to keep

them, when he can do it safely,) if there be no Power erected, or not great enough for our security, every man will, and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men.⁴⁶⁶

Essentially, Hobbes posits that justice, equity, etc. cannot (or will not) be upheld unless there is “the terror of some power” that ensures they are observed and enforced. This power requires not simply words or covenants, but physical power – the sword. This power must be such that it is irresistible to the sum of individuals it seeks to guarantee; if it is not, then those individuals “...will and may rely on his own strength and art”, rather than on the power of the state, to bring certainty to their lives.

POWER, PUNISHMENT AND REASON

While the *Leviathan* concentrates far more on the argument for Hobbes’ political expectations, in *de Cive* Hobbes provides a clearer vision of exactly what sort of policies and institutions would be required to deliver the sort of security he desires. These policies have as the basis of their creation a nexus between power, punishment and reason; these three elements interrelate to deliver the stability necessary for the polity to be assured, certain and free from fear.

In broad strokes, the relationship works as follows; reason drives individuals to seek security from the violent actions of others, given that the natural equality between individuals ensures that no single person is out of the reach of another’s negative intention. However that same equality ensures that such individuals cannot be secure without the blessing of a greater power – a leviathan, so reason dictates that individuals submit to the power of the leviathan to maintain their security. But while submission might be a sufficient compact between the individual and the sovereign power, it is insufficient guarantee for citizens to remain certain of the submission of others to that same power. In short, trust between the

⁴⁶⁶ Hobbes *Leviathan* 2.17 (page 254)

citizen and the leviathan is irrelevant given that the leviathan is of far greater power. However because the citizen is seeking protection from their fellow subjects, they need a guarantee that those who do not uphold the terms of their submission are held to account. This guarantee is to be given in the form of punishment;⁴⁶⁷

“It is not enough to obtain this security, that every one of those who are now growing up into a City, doe covenant with the rest, either by words, or writing, Not to steal, not to kill, and to observe the like Lawes; for the pravity of humane disposition is manifest to all, and by experience too well known how little (removing the punishment) men are kept to their duties, through conscience of their promises. We must therefore provide for our security, not by Compacts, but by Punishments; and there is then sufficient provision made, when there are so great punishments appointed for every injury, as apparently it prove a greater evill to have done it, then not to have done it: for all men, by a necessity of nature, chuse that which to them appears to be the lesse evill.”⁴⁶⁸

To modern readers, this reliance on punishment might receive a mixed response. On one hand the notion that punishment is required to ensure civic cooperation stands against the positive expressions of liberal social life; that it is fear of retribution and not the belief in and support of equality, social responsibility or mutual success that holds society together could be seen as a degradation of the liberal ideals often cited as the core elements of modern democratic polities. On the other hand, however, Hobbes’ construction may appeal to a realist notion of human action and error; a prudent bulwark against the worst elements of human behaviour and a provision of stability that stands against the most unstable elements of society. However Hobbes’ edification of punishment holds an insight more important than the dynamic between punitive necessity and any affront to free

⁴⁶⁷ Quentin Skinner, “Thomas Hobbes on the Proper Signification of Liberty: The Prothero Lecture,” *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 40 (1990): 135, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3679165>.

⁴⁶⁸ Hobbes De Cive 6.4

cooperation; it demonstrates to us Hobbes' conception of reason, as well as the form and relevance of that reason to security.

Whilst punishment serves as the bulwark against the failure of words and compacts in ensuring individuals give themselves over to the leviathan, it would be too simplistic to characterise Hobbes' construction as one of simple punitive threat. While Hobbes makes plain that submission to the leviathan is the logical necessity of political life, punishment does not stand to induce the submission of those who are too illogical or unreasonable to see the value of the *Leviathan*. Instead, for Hobbes, punishment must feature in the operation of the *Leviathan* precisely *because* of reason, not in spite of it, nor in absence of it.

The necessity of punishment is induced by the nature of reason as Hobbes sees it. While reason is a rationalising force, it is also the same force that induces "partiality, pride, revenge and the like"; the decisions that individuals naturally gravitate towards that destroy peaceable relations. Reason therefore takes on a multifaceted value within Hobbes' conception of political community. On the one hand it provides the basis of peace by rationalising the need and role of the leviathan, but on the other it also induces the preservation of the self. This dual aspect of reason can be seen in the below section, which is well worth quoting in full;

"And because the condition of Man, (as hath been declared in the precedent Chapter) is a condition of Warre of every one against every one; in which case every one is governed by his own Reason; and there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemyes; It followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a Right to everything; even to one another's body. And therefore, as long as this naturall Right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, (how strong or wise soever he be,) of living out the time, which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to live. And consequently it is a precept, or general rule of Reason, *That every man, ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may*

seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre. The first branch of which Rule, containeth the first, and Fundamental Law of Nature; which is, *to seek Peace, and follow it.* The Second, the summe of the Right of Nature; which is, *By all means we can, to defend our selves.*"⁴⁶⁹

We can see that Hobbes believes that if individuals are left to their own devices it is the latter 'rule of reason' – that each individual will defend themselves by all means possible – that will guide human action. For this reason, punishment is required to ensure that in every case of action, the 'lesser evil' available to any individual will be civic responsibility, given that deviation from that responsibility will end with the harm of punishment being visited upon them.

This creates a complex nesting of reason within the security calculus of Hobbes. Reason drives the justification of the leviathan, with the rule of reason dictating people will wilfully strive for the peace it provides. However simply accepting the reason and utility of the leviathan is not enough; the reason of individuals is not necessarily to strive for peace, but it is rather to choose the outcome most likely to benefit the individual at the time. For this reason, the leviathan must have within its power the capacity to punish – not to shape the ethics or decision-making of its subjects, but to provide a very real and tangible material with which individuals can perform their existing calculus of reason; faced with the punitive violence of the state, the same reason that made each citizen accept the leviathan in the first place will then also be forced to act in accordance with the state. Put simply, while reason might induce an individual to see the value of the leviathan, that same reason will also induce an individual to act against the leviathan's interest in any specific case. With the threat of punishment, however, this threat is mitigated by appealing to the very calculus that drives that reason; self-preservation.

If this insurmountable punitive power seems like it might stifle, suppress or destroy the free exercise of reason, then rest assured that Hobbes saw this very issue – and supported it

⁴⁶⁹ Hobbes *Leviathan* 1.14 (page 198-200)

thoroughly. Reason provided the justification for the leviathan, and it also held the capacity to undermine the beast's utility. Power and punishment provided the key by both ensuring the leviathan was worth submitting to, and by enforcing its will onto its subjects. However one cannot charge Hobbes with the oversight that such a framework would destroy the free choice of the citizen, as this destruction was not only appreciated by Hobbes, it was by design. While Hobbes saw reason as the possession of all human beings, its use was not conducive of politics beyond providing the impetus to submit to the state.

This can be seen plainly in the above quote. The natural state of the individual, the "condition of man... is a condition of war of every one against every one"; this condition is defined simply as one in which "...every one is governed by his own reason." Hobbes is therefore not asking individuals to change their reason, nor is he necessarily suggesting that they should forgo it; rather, he postulates a notion of state constitution that allows the presumed self-interest of reason to stand, as long as it is subjected absolutely to a single reason. Citizens are therefore expected to forgo their capacity to choose, to exercise their reason, on the assumption that the leviathan will satisfy the core aim of one's individual reason – each person's preservation of self.

Hobbes makes the need to subjugate the reason of the individual in his explanation of the social contract, in which each individual becomes 'united in one person' by each relinquishing their right of governing themselves. For Hobbes, self-governance is not simply the right to decide one's own political life, but rather the 'governance' of reason (as Hobbes construes it);

*"I Authorize and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like manner. This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in latine CIVITAS."*⁴⁷⁰

⁴⁷⁰ Hobbes *Leviathan* 2.17 (page 260)

The relinquishment of one's reason (here being expressed as the right to 'self governance') is necessary not only for reasons of human nature, but it is necessary due to Hobbes' conception of social contract. The contract, as stated above, is not the coalescing of wills or reason to form a corporate judgement, but rather is the corporate removal of reason in order to safeguard a single judgement, a judgement that as we will see stands separate from the de-reasoned people it presides over.

Given the above, we can see that in Hobbes' thought, anarchy is condition in which there are competing agents of reason, and security is a condition in which there is only one agent of reason (and that agent has unassailable power to compel compliance). While that security might share some symptomatic attributes with security more broadly constructed today (such as a lack of violence), the *cause* of that security, the underlying value that drives it stands hard against the basic values of political organisation inherent in contemporary western democracy. Hobbes' security is a civil attribute founded on the subjugation of will to a single authority, something that is founded on the assumption that individuals cannot and should not have the capacity to cogently express themselves politically. Faced with this fact, it is not enough to say that Hobbes' security is a concept that requires the subjugation of individuals to exist; it must also be made plain that to Hobbes, the expression of an individual's political reason is in itself *insecure*.

Of course it would be unjust to characterize Hobbes as wishing to establish a powerful despotism out of malice – indeed, he makes it plain that such 'security' as is attained by these measures is a requirement for honourable and just human endeavours. Justice, art, invention and industry are all at stake in Hobbes' view; without the subjugation of individual reason, human endeavour is not sufficiently protected from the necessity of self-preservation to achieve the heights of its potential. Hobbes' security is therefore a condition knowable by its symptoms – the knowledge, society, arts, and letters given in 1.13.

These symptoms have a strong correlation to the *securitas* of Nero and the Roman Empire. As well as higher human endeavours, Hobbes lists the 'commodious building', and the importation of goods as important attributes of a secure society, both important and specific parts of Nero's own delivery of *securitas* to the people of Rome. Further, the provision of such benefits in Hobbes' framework also emanate from the sovereign, just as they did in the *securitas* augusti; at various points Hobbes makes clear that the sovereign is bound to deliver such outcomes in return for the investment of the people.

The above similarities should come as no surprise, however, given the direct and indirect invocation of Roman ideas and ideals in Hobbes' work. *De Cive* was written in Latin long before it was written in English, and its language is a direct invocation of Roman political concepts. Even the *Leviathan*, prepared originally in English for a broad English audience, makes direct comparisons to Roman political ideals. A prime examples of this was shown earlier, in which the English notion of 'commonwealth' is directly glossed for the Latin 'civitas'. Given that what constituted the English commonwealth was under direct and violent contestation at the time, to firmly link it to the Roman ideal was not unproblematic.

But nor was that linkage superficial on Hobbes' part. Given our previous study of Cicero's notion of state and the role of authority within political constitution, we can see clear analogues between Hobbes' designs and those of the Roman author. In both, the whims and desires of the people are not to be entertained, but rather to be shaped by a higher political authority, and in both the investment of power is to be held against those same people. The difference comes in how that power and authority are conceptualised between the two; where Cicero sees the people as a great beast that is driven into docility and utility by power and authority, Hobbes sees the sovereign as the beast, a beast whose power and authority can stand against the fragility (and inconstancy) of individuals. These similarities and differences are never systematically explained by Hobbes, but given his clear preference for monarchy it would be unsurprising that he would appreciate Cicero through a lens of

imperium, with the *dignitas* of the best men, the mahouts of the Ciceronian state, replaced by the power and authority of the *princeps*.⁴⁷¹

Of the most import to us, however, is the clear Latin inheritance of security itself. Given that both the *Leviathan* and *de Cive* were written in Latin as well as English, we can appreciate that security and *securitas* were essentially interchangeable. On face value the fact that Hobbes used these terms as glosses for one another might seem unimportant, however this important detail reinforces two crucial details.

The first is that this gloss gives further evidence against the notion that Hobbes' 'security' was an invention or amalgamation informed by Hobbes' reading of the Greek *asphaleia*. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the vast majority of Hobbes' translations of *asphaleia* were given in English as 'safety' and the majority of uses of 'security' in the English translation correlated to terms of trust, guarantees or assurances rather than *asphaleia*. The usage of security in this way is far more allied with *securitas*, and the fact that the English term is routinely glossed with the Latin reinforces this case.

Secondly, and related to the first, this suggests that Hobbes' notion of security was fundamentally congruous with the Latin term. This further reinforces the notion that security in the context of Hobbes' writing is essentially similar to the Latin term, whose pedigree stretches from Cicero to the churchmen who were almost contemporaneous with Hobbes himself. *Securitas*, the freedom from concern and lack of passion, was in Hobbes' work a core referent of the security so crucial to the successful constituency of a state. It was a concept that by virtue of Hobbes' translation efforts, by virtue of the popular language of his time and context, and even by virtue of Hobbes' own admission in his work, was separate from simple concepts of safety, and was instead a term that focussed on an emotive or mental referent; it was the constancy and confidence that came with a freedom

⁴⁷¹ In fact, while Hobbes sometimes uses Ciceronian ideals in his own work (first part, V), he was also quite open regarding the fact that he saw Cicero as far too democratic, with Cicero's classical republicanism being an example of classical notions that had lead his contemporaries astray. See especially the second part, XXI, Skinner, "Thomas Hobbes on the Proper Signification of Liberty," 140–41.

from concern, a freedom that came from an alleviation or mitigation of unknown and uncontrollable external factors.

Thus we can summarize Hobbes' security as broadly indicative of a condition in which the risks of political association – the risks inherent in sharing a political life with others – are mitigated. Stated more specifically, however, there are several important details. For Hobbes this condition is a result of other conditions; namely, the removal of reason from the citizen, and the concentration of power, authority and legitimacy in a single person or entity. Without either of these conditions, Hobbes claims, there can be no 'security' as he understands it.

These conditions are necessary for the realisation of Hobbes' security due to the nature of that security itself. For Hobbes, security is a condition in which individuals have no reason to fear the interests of another individual; as such the exclusion of individual reason from politics is a necessary condition to its realisation. However Hobbes is not so naïve as to think that the exclusion of reason from politics is enough to suppress the conflicting reason he despises so much, and it is for this reason that the second condition is also necessary. By investing power, authority and political legitimacy in a single, all-powerful actor, Hobbes hopes to skew any possible application of individual reason by confronting the individual with what he sees as the most fundamental goal of reason – self-preservation. By threatening all individuals with an absolute cost of following one's self interest, Hobbes hopes to ensure that all self-interest is transfigured into the interest of the sovereign. When individuals make decisions, any decision they might make counter to the sovereign should be not chosen based on the clear and foregone conclusion that choice would garner – punishment at the hands of the *Leviathan*.

Hobbes' security, therefore, retains the characteristics of the Latin *securitas* for more than it conforms to the paradigms of *asphaleia*, *frīb*, or as we will see, the security of his civil war antagonists. Under the *Leviathan*, security is dispensed by the sovereign for the benefit of the individual; like Nero's *securitas*, it is a condition that is determined by an individual's emotive state, rather than an inherent attribute of the polity in which they live. Further, its

dispensation is at the pleasure of the sovereign, rather than a necessary condition for political coherence. Indeed while Hobbes makes clear that civilisation requires security, he is conspicuously silent on its necessity for the sovereign. While Seneca extolls the benefits of *securitas* for Nero, Hobbes instead provides the sovereign with absolute political power but gives no indication that security is necessary for that power to function.

To call Hobbes' security political valuable then is somewhat problematic. While it can be fairly argued that Hobbes clearly sees security as very important to political construction (at least inasmuch as technology, economics, arts and other such endeavours enable politics to thrive), ultimately his model of how that security should be realised – indeed the only way he believes it can be properly realised has on no level a necessity for security. The assumption that Hobbes' use of the term has in some way defined modern conceptions is therefore ultimately problematic, especially in regards to the modern conception of security as a practical act to safeguard the state itself; security as a necessary attribute of the state is certainly no Hobbesian notion, nor does Hobbes' security function as a practical act or corporate activity – it is very much an emotive condition enjoyed by individuals.

PART VI

THE BATTLE FOR

SECURITY

CHAPTER ELEVEN

RADICAL SECURITY

As we saw in the last chapter, the use of security by Thomas Hobbes fit within the meaning typical of the times in which he wrote. On a basic level, Hobbes' use sits in line with the mainstream use of the term in the seventeenth century – as an expression of a certainty or confidence against a risk posed by something outside of one's control. It should come as little surprise then that those who had very different conceptions of political organisation also used the term in much the same way – at least on the surface. What we will see in this chapter is a confirmation of the above – that 'radicals' writing during the war also sought to speak of a guarantee against a risk – however we will also see that how that risk is construed, and what guarantees were necessary, were very different.

Unlike the security of Hobbes, the security of the various radicals in the civil war hinges not on the wielding of power, but on the correct provision of it. Further, we will see that this very different notion of security has a very practical side – essentially that it is not simply an outcome of governance, but that security is in a very real sense particular acts and policies of government. In parallel to its dominant financial and colloquial use, this security will take the form of agreements, covenants and laws designed to maintain the democratic politics these radicals envisioned.

Indeed we will see how security as a word gathered steam through circumstance to make the jump from speaking of contracts specific guarantees, to speaking of the broader guarantees of politics. We will track the use of the word in its general sense in an important pay dispute within the parliamentary army, and how that dispute fed into a larger debate regarding how civil reconstruction was to progress after the cessation of hostilities.

Finally, we will once again see how political construction determines the value of security within that construction, as well as how these various values compete and differentiate when placed in tension. We will see security evolve, and see it be contested, all as a function

of how the political life of England was to be remodelled by each competing faction. In sum, we will see that even at this early stage security was thoroughly contested, that the many historical and philosophical paradigms we have covered previously continue to push and pull security through the civil war, but that those paradigms and the various values they induce are not contestable themselves, and are instead the reliable result of concrete considerations of political constitution.

‘RADICALS’

The critics of absolute political power at the time of the English Civil War sat on a broad spectrum in terms of both their desired practical political outcomes from the war, and the theoretical justifications for those schemas. On one end of this spectrum sat men such as the Grandees, aristocratic generals of the parliamentary armies who sought more power for parliament at the expense of the crown, but who were largely happy with the monarchical-aristocratic system in place in England at the time. Conversely, at the other end of this spectrum sat what would eventually become known as ‘Levellers’,⁴⁷² a broad church of lower class urban labourers and craftsmen, disenfranchised rural gentry and revolutionary soldiers now armed and battle-hardened from war with the royalists.

There were a variety of thematic positions that were described as ‘Leveller’ that operated on very different notions. Where some Levellers sought the ‘levelling’ of society on the basis of property rights,⁴⁷³ others fought instead for the installation for basic rights *regardless* of property rights.⁴⁷⁴ This was a disparate group often defined by their enemies in terms of their common precepts – no king, no political classes, and no exceptions. For the Levellers,

⁴⁷² The term ‘leveller’ is a hard one to state with any clarity given that it includes some self-identified individuals, others to which the term was applied to derogatorily, and was applied across many political temporal and vocational divides. For our purposes, ‘leveller’ will to a degree stand in for the broad party of democratically minded revolutionaries across both civilian and military circles (though sometimes these military writers will also be known more correctly as ‘agitators’).

⁴⁷³ T.103; Richard Overton, *An Appeale from the degenerate Representative Body the Commons of England assembled at Westminster*. (17 July 1647).

⁴⁷⁴ This position will be examined thoroughly below.

the removal of Charles I was not simply the removal of a callous monarch, nor the removal of an out-of-touch catholic one; instead, it had been an expression of a public will, of the desire of the large underclass to finally be released from its subjection and given rights and privileges equal to every other English citizen. As a largely pejorative term not defined by a specific claim to power, determining what ideas or actors were 'Levellers' is a complicated exercise in its own right – as such for our purposes we will refer to the broad democratic stream in Civil War discourse as 'Levellers' to refer to those who sought a democratically elected sovereign government in order to demarcate them from royalist and aristocratic modes of polity.

The political views and desires of the Levellers survive today mainly in the form of pamphlets written during the upheaval of the war and its aftermath; they are short, direct texts in which these soldiers and craftspeople outline what sort of England they want to live in, and why it should be so. These pamphlets were used to rally support across the country, to disseminate ideas and challenge the ideas of the political opposition. The political situation was such that the common people of towns and cities had a real impact on the war effort – London was firmly in control of radical democrats, whereas Oxford and its surrounds provided a safe haven from Royalists. As such, appealing to the broader public was integral to success.

Upon reading the major statements of the Levellers, it is immediately obvious that it is precisely the sort of thinking that Hobbes endorses that many of the Levellers are specifically railing against. The antithesis provided by the Levellers is not simply in their hostility to monarchy, but runs as deep as their conception of reason and the practical framework of public policy. As a result, this chapter will show that while security does indeed have a broad common value throughout the factions of the civil war, the particulars of each case are such that the content of any claim of security is fundamentally different between each political position.

Due to the fundamental shift in political construction, when used by the Levellers the sort of confidence and certainty gained, as well as the sort of risks that require management,

fundamentally shift as well. We will see that in the case of the Levellers, a major difference is the fact that security was expressed in government policy, rather than being the result of individual experiences of government outcomes. At the core of the most famous Leveller tracts sat the notion that “...the Government of *England* ought to be by Laws, and not by Men”,⁴⁷⁵ essentially that the highest political authority should not be a single reason as Hobbes would have it, but rather a common law before which none would be “exempt from the obedience or Justice” that those laws provided and demanded. Hobbes’ empowered sovereign, the investment of a sole reason with the obedience of the people, was to be explicitly rejected in favour of an impartial construction of law and rights.

The result of this fundamental shift in political construction is curious, nuanced, and perhaps the single most illustrative example of how the political schema in which the word is used will determine the value of the term as a political instrument. The word is used consistently throughout the texts of parliamentarians, just as it is in Hobbes; further, the immediate sense of the word – the gaining of certainty or confidence in the face of risk – is retained. As we could now reasonably expect, the pamphlets of the Levellers and others used the language of the day; both the parliamentarians and monarchists like Hobbes were seeking to convince the public, so it was in their interests to use common language in a broadly understood way.

In order to demonstrate this shift in more detail, we will examine the texts of those we may loosely describe as ‘Levellers’, as well as some of those published by the military dictatorship that followed the war lead by Oliver Cromwell. In comparing these texts to the work of Hobbes and in tracking the shift in parliamentary language before and after the ascension of Oliver Cromwell as a military dictator of England, we will see how the differing political outcomes affected this common notion of security; while in all cases security was used as an expression of the mitigation of the risks of political construction, the security of the Levellers demanded certain political outcomes distinct from those who were

⁴⁷⁵ T.250; Anon., *The Leveller: Or The Principles & Maxims Concerning Government and Religion* (16 February 1659).

comfortable with autocratic rule. Further, we will see how practical considerations lead to the word's sustained use, and how the underlying streams of 'security' in Anglo consciousness that we have previously studied (such as Cicero's *securitas* and the Saxon notion of *frip*) underwrote these different conceptions of how security could be achieved.

THE ARMY

To be clear this chapter will not track what might be considered the 'origin' of security in political language – to be sure there were earlier uses of the term both in the context of the English Civil War,⁴⁷⁶ as well as English political writing more generally.⁴⁷⁷ Rather it identifies a period of time in which security, a word that at this stage was still quite novel in political usage, can be seen to shift, its prevalence grow, and the form which would eventually give rise to modern liberal conceptions arise.

This moment would come in 1647; after five years of fighting, the war had calmed. After a parliamentary victory, the king was in custody, and the parliamentary army turned its focus to transitioning to a new peace, with a new political reality. However it was with this new focus that the divides between the desires of the generals, the common soldiery, and the parliament itself became too big to ignore; having won the military victory, many of the common soldiers began to feel that the moderate approach of the largely aristocratic generals – their willingness to accommodate the return of the king to power, and their rejection of the notion of universal suffrage, for example – was not representative of why many had taken up arms in the first place. Further, the army's pay was grievously in arrears; as such, the army's morale, as well as its faith in Parliament was sorely lacking.

Pay in arrears and a lack of faith in the political convictions of the leadership would be detrimental to any army, however given the makeup of parliament's 'New Model Army'

⁴⁷⁶ T.3; John Liburne, *A Worke of the Beast* (1638). T.26; William Prynne, *The Sovereigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes* (15 April 1643).

⁴⁷⁷ Such as Thomas More's *Utopia*

these issues were even more acute. At the start of the war, the parliamentary army was constituted along similar lines to other English and continental armies at the time – soldiers were levied locally, and organised, paid and deployed in regards to their local county. In short, this meant that units levied in London were tied to London, for example, with the soldiers unwilling to fight far from home. This county-based system was strained further when in 1644 the Eastern counties could no longer afford to maintain their levies, the malfeasance of local administration thus placing parliament as a whole in a precarious position. Despite having more money, resources and soldiers than the royalists, Parliament was not enjoying as much success on the battlefield as they expected.

As a result of these concerns, the army was remodelled in 1645. Soldiers were no longer tied to local levies, but instead became full-time professional soldiers, paid a steady wage, and as such liable to fight anywhere within the nation (rather than simply their own county). Further, rank, commission and promotion was to be determined by experience and ability, rather than nobility; while the top leadership remained gentrified, the army was soon replete with captains and colonels taken from humble beginnings. Lastly, parliament passed legislation to separate the army from the parliament itself in an effort to improve army leadership and to separate the military from various partisan interests. The 'Self-Denying Ordinance' forbade men from being both members of government and army officers, requiring anyone who held both positions to resign from one – though several men (Cromwell and Ireton being two) that were allowed to use a loophole to retain both.

The New Model Army quickly found success on the basis of its new organisation, structure and tactics, and after only two major engagements had largely destroyed the royalist army. However this same reorganisation also made the promises (or lack thereof) that came from parliament and the Grandees more fraught. The democratic 'radicals' of the army were empowered by its new leadership and promotion structure. The failure of parliament to pay the troops was counter to one of the main aims of the New Model Army, and the decoupling of soldiers from local concerns likely served only to turn their attention to the affairs as a whole.

Against this backdrop of discontent, a flurry of pamphlets and open letters went back and forth; between the commanding 'Grande'es' and the elected representative 'Agitators' of each regiment, between the army and the parliament, and between various individuals, regiments and institutions. Across the gamut of these pamphlets, however, security makes a consistent appearance.

In the writing of both Grande'es and Agitators, security appears consistently in regards to the material demands of the soldiery – divided on political matters, all of the army was concerned by the fact that parliament might try to disband the army before the soldiers had received their pay, or received any guarantee that they would not be subsequently prosecuted for their actions during the war. In an open letter to parliament likely written by Henry Ireton, a general, Member of Parliament and Cromwell's son-in-law, we see a call for the 'satisfaction and security' for the army's concerns;

“we shall, before disbanding, proceed, in our own and the Kingdoms behalf, to propound, and plead, for some provision, for our, and the Kingdoms satisfaction, and future security... especially considering, that we were not a meere mercinary Army, hired to serve any Arbitrary power of a State, but called forth and conjured, by the severall Declarations of Parliament...”⁴⁷⁸

The phrase 'satisfaction and security' found its way into many army pamphlets; the 'satisfaction' being the granting of sufficient provision for the army's concern, and 'security' being practical guarantees that such satisfaction would continue. Indeed only a week after Ireton's pamphlet was written, we see the phrase again in an Agitator pamphlet addressed to counterparts in the navy; *A Copie of a Letter Sent From the Agitators of his Excellency Sir Thomas Fairfax's Armie, To All the honest Sea-men of England*. (21 June 1647).⁴⁷⁹ In it, the

⁴⁷⁸ T.100; [Signed by John Rushworth, attributed to Henry Ireton], [Declaration of the Army], *A Declaration, or, Representation From his Excellency, Sir Thomas Fairfax, And the Army under his command, Humbly tendred to the parliament* (14 June 1647).

⁴⁷⁹ T.102; [Several Hands, calling themselves "Agitators"], *A Copie of a Letter Sent from the Agitators of his Excellency Sir Thomas Fairfax's Armie, To All the honest Sea-men of England* (21 June 1647).

army Agitators attempt to make clear to their naval counterparts their disagreement with parliament, as well as their intentions and concerns. In so doing, the Agitators make plain “that without such satisfaction and security” for their concerns of pay and indemnity, they will not “...willingly disband, nor divide, nor suffer our selves to be disbanded or divided.”

There is however an added element of the satisfaction and security demanded by the agitators – that of the maintenance of political right;

“That we of our selves, when disbanded, and in the condition of private men, or other the free-borne people of England, to whom the consequence of our case doth equally extend, shall not remaine subject to the like oppression, injury, or abuse, as in the premisses hath been attempted and put upon us...”⁴⁸⁰

As we will see, from this point security makes a consistent appearance in regards to the ability of parliament to guarantee political desires, outcomes and expectations – the guarantee of rights, freedoms, and quality of life, for instance. But while this use is novel, it is by no means revolutionary; indeed, there are justifications for why security would be co-opted in this way and at this point that can be immediately deduced from both the preceding evidence and the basic usage of the term in general discourse at the time of the civil war. Security here can be taken in line with its most enduring meaning – a guarantee or pledge against a risk or liability. Initially the army wanted ‘security’ for its demands of pay, given that once they had laid down their arms they would be powerless to make demands of the parliament. The addition of their political demands to these outcomes they wished ‘guaranteed’ meant that those political outcomes were also made party to the ‘satisfaction’ and ‘security’ the army had requested.

But as the demand for a political outcome is added to what requires security, it would not be long before the term’s suitability for the wider notion of political reliability features in Agitator publications. We can see this shift occur in an Agitator pamphlet attributed to John

⁴⁸⁰ T.98; Anon., *A Solemne Engagement of the Army* (5 June 1647).

Wildman, written four months after Ireton's petition to parliament. In Wildman's tract we see disappointment regarding the lack of 'securitie' for the three core demands of the soldiers – indemnity, pay and political rights;

"No such Indemprnitie, as provideth security, for the quiet, ease, or safety of the Soldiers, disbanded or to be disbanded. No securitie for our Arreers, or provision for present pay, to inable the Army to subsist, without burthening the distressed Country. And in respect to the rights and freedoms of our selves and the people, that we declared we would insist upon, we conceive there is no kind or degree of satisfaction given..."⁴⁸¹

However in a later passage, the Agitators declare that their demands pale in comparison to the effects of parliament's actions on the nation as a whole; specifically the effect on the 'security of common right and freedom'. While subtle, this use is distinct from the above, and the distinction is important to our understanding of security as a political term. While in the above security exists as a function of demands made against a risk (the army's desires against the risk of parliament withholding them), in the below security is used not in regards to the dispute between the army and parliament, but as a blanket attribute of the nation as a whole;

Now we cannot but declare, that these sad apprehensions of mischiefes, dangers and confusion gaping to devoure the armie hath filled our hearts with troubles, that we never did, nor doe regard the worst of evils or mischiefes that can befall our selves in comparison to the consequence of them to the poore Nation, or to the security of common right and freedom⁴⁸²

⁴⁸¹ T.112; [Signed by Several People, but attributed to John Wildman], *The Case of the Armie Truly stated* (15 October 1647).

⁴⁸² T.112; [Signed by Several People, but attributed to John Wildman], *The Case of the Armie Truly stated* (15 October 1647).

Here right and freedom is at risk, however not in the context of the army's settlement. Instead, right and freedom is at risk in a general, national sense, its threat a function of unspecified 'evils and mischiefs' of parliament. Security is therefore still a guarantee of sorts, but it is decoupled from the necessity of an immediate arrangement. This use gives us a window into how security could make the jump from being a function of agreement to a political instrument in its own right; it is here incomplete, but the makings of the shift have begun.

To see how that jump would be completed, we must turn away from the army and settle for a moment on the Levellers more broadly. While there was considerable interplay between the New Agents and the Levellers by this stage of the war, originally those labelled Levellers were for the most part civilian radical democrats centred on London. Whilst previously these Levellers had concentrated on the urban commoners, as the soldiers became more vocal in their concerns, and as the army moved closer to London, Levellers such as John Lilburne and John Wildman began preaching, consulting and writing for and with the army agitators. Thus within a month of *The Case of the Armie Truly Stated*, civilian Levellers approach security along similar lines. Where the *Case of the Armie* left the threats parliament posed to political outcomes as vague and unstated, and in so doing left the particulars of the risk or 'agreement' that the nation might demand 'security' for, the Levellers make it very clear.

Lacking a guarantee to their claim to intrinsic political right and responsibility, the Levellers put forward an 'agreement of the people' – a contract by which the people of England can justify a sovereign authority. Essentially seeking a liberal democratic constitution, the *Agreement of the People* outlined proposed terms for a national agreement by which political right and authority could be based upon. Concerned by the fact that it was the commons, the elected house of parliament that was scuttling their hopes of a new England, the pamphlet pre-empted the criticism that a parliament is adequate to secure the rights of the people;

“But if any shall enquire why we should desire to joyn in an Agreement with the people, to declare these to be our native Rights, & not rather petition to the Parliament for them; the reason is evident: No Act of Parliament is or can be unalterable, and so cannot be sufficient security, to save you or us harmlesse, from what another Parliament may determine, if it should be corrupted; and besides Parliaments are to receive the extent of their power, and trust from those that betrust them; and therefore the people are to declare what their power and trust is, which is the intent of this Agreement...”⁴⁸³

The *Agreement of the People* is important for two reasons. Firstly, it demonstrates a use of security outlined above – no longer in reference to a specific agreement between the army and the parliament, it is here used in regards to the nation as a whole, and applied in general circumstances. The security that is insufficient is one that endures beyond a specific circumstance, a specific parliament or specific issue, and is instead a statement on the condition of the nation at any point in the future. However this shift raises a question - if security is now applied to the nation in generalities, outside the context of a single concrete dispute, then how can it be realised?

This brings us to the second notable feature of the *Agreement*; that it does not simply reference security, it also seeks to serve *as* security. Faced with the above question, the Levellers sought to provide a basis for political constitution and authority in which the stakeholders would have ‘security’ in their acceptance of the terms. As we have already seen, where Hobbes desires the citizen to relinquish individual reason for the sake of individual security, the Levellers sought to constitute on the basis of common reason; the issue arises in proving a ‘guarantee’ for the arrangement; where Hobbes relies on punishment to enforce the singular political will, the Levellers need an instrument by which reason may be guaranteed. In the face of this challenge, they offer the *Agreement of the*

⁴⁸³ T.115; [Several Hands], *An Agreement of the People for a firme and present Peace, upon grounds of common-right and freedome* (3 November 1647).

People, a document that seeks to transcend the authority of parliament and underwrite the freedoms, rights and boundaries of the polity.

In this way security is not so much reconfigured to meet politics, but rather politics is reconfigured in such a way that security becomes a powerful expression of political concerns. As the Levellers reconfigure political authority from one of divine right to one of reasoned consent, political constitution itself becomes a matter of responsibility, contract, of agreement. As an existing expression for the risks and mitigations of agreements, the use of security in the political context makes perfect sense. Thus while the security of Hobbes and the security of the Levellers both speak to the risks of political constitution, the nature of that constitution – and the subsequent risks posed – differ greatly. And as the nature of political construction and risk changes, the way that risk is mitigated changes. In this way, the *Agreement* not simply references security, but is in itself an act of security – in seeking to mitigate political risk, it is a security measure itself.

This last point is crucial in understanding how security - previously a concept that spoke of an idea or emotion – could become a term that might describe a practical political act. Unlike Hobbes' security, which remained an *outcome* of policies and politics, we can see here the beginnings of security as an act itself.

Given the necessity for such 'security' to undergird politics itself, it is unsurprising that the security the *Agreement* reaches for is one that contains – or holds the possibility to contain – the various cultural and political strands that have made up concerns for security. As such, this new notion of security is also notable in its reliance on the full gamut of cultural considerations from similar terms and concepts previously discussed. The efforts of the Levellers and their use of security sits within the synergistic relationship between contestability, peace of mind, social responsibility, and certainty against risk – essentially the considerations of *asphaleia*, *securitas*, frith and security. Such is made clear in their practical justification for their agreement;

“...therefore both necessity for your security in these freedoms, that are essential to your well-being, and wofull experience of the manifold miseries and distractions that have been lengthened out since the war ended, through want of such a settlement, requires this Agreement...”⁴⁸⁴

Here, the agreement itself – the recognition of mutual and total social responsibility – is connected to wellbeing of *securitas*, its necessity being justified by the realities of *asphaleia*, of public contestability (both in the forms of the hypothetical whims of parliament outlined above, and the situation of post-civil war England. In the face of these considerations – the necessity of peace of mind, couched in common responsibility (*frip*) and against the vicissitudes of contestability – the people of England can and should reach for some form of ‘security’.

At the time of the Levellers’ *Agreement* being published, the Grandees called for a meeting with key Agitators in an attempt to defuse the rising tensions between the generals and common soldiery. As well as the additional demands of for political rights, tension also existed regarding the fate of the now captured king – many soldiers were dissatisfied with the news that Cromwell, Fairfax and the other Grandees were negotiating terms with the deposed monarch with which to reinstate him. The debate lasted for around two weeks, and ended not with a resolution, but instead because of the escape of the King from army custody in mid-November. With the threat of war reinstated and one of the biggest bones of contention removed, the debates were suspended and the army mobilised once again.

The escape of the king and the subsequent hostilities that followed lasted less than a year, however the debate was never reconvened; instead, the Grandees and their parliamentary allies changed tack, settling instead for the use of force. In early December, 1648, with the king back in custody and the army back in control of the nation, troops loyal to the Grandees blockaded parliament, removing those who did not support Cromwell and the

⁴⁸⁴ T.115; [Several Hands], *An Agreement of the People for a firme and present Peace, upon grounds of common-right and freedome* (3 November 1647).

army. Thus the design of the New Model Army – its discipline, its power, and its separation from parliament – all would come full circle; the same army that had fought for parliament now came to control it, and the same ordinance that had sought to separate armed force from parliamentary politics and partisan concerns now helped Cromwell (who had been effectively exempt from the ordinance) wield the force of the army against its own paymasters.

However it is not so much the outcomes of the debate or the war that followed that concerns us at this point, so much as the language of the debate itself. Luckily, the debate was recorded by a team of stenographers, and as such we have access to the concerns of the participants, as well as the language they used to engage with these concerns. As previously established, there were perennial issues plaguing the army, with the issue of pay being particularly acute. As such we security used in this familiar way, for example with the Grandee Henry Ireton exclaiming that the king's reinstatement might benefit inasmuch that "...for security for arrears we might have the royal assent."⁴⁸⁵

However much of the debate focussed on the political realities of a new England, both in terms of the king, and in terms of how practical political rights – such as property rights and franchise – might be changed or preserved. It is in this that security makes a reappearance, this time in the mouth of Oliver Cromwell himself. As the Agitators and Grandees argue over the reinstatement of the king and the aristocratic system, Cromwell attempts to sum up the various arguments as follows;

“First of all, on the one part, there is this apprehension: that we cannot with justice and righteousness at the present destroy... the interest [kings and lords] have in the public affairs of the kingdom; and those that do so apprehend would strain something in point of security, would rather leave some hazard —or at least, if they see that they may consist without any *considerable* hazard to the interest of the

⁴⁸⁵ Woodhouse, *Puritanism and Liberty, Being the Army Debates (1647-9) from the Clarke Manuscripts with Supplementary Documents*, 94.

kingdom, do so far [wish] to preserve them. On the other hand, those who differ from this, I do take it (in the most candid apprehension) that they seem to run thus: that there is not any safety or security to the liberty of the kingdom, and to [the] public interest, if you do retain [kings and lords] at all.”⁴⁸⁶

Cromwell’s summation did little to resolve the issue – indeed he implored the factions to trust in God, rather than debate for an outcome. Unsatisfied, John Wildman, a Leveller, though in attendance at the behest of the Agitators, exclaimed in reply that “Now, if after God hath given us the victory over them we shall not declare against them, we give no security for the people’s liberty.”⁴⁸⁷ Indeed, despite the debate only ending on the 11th of November, by the 30th of December Wildman had helped publish a tract decrying the Grandees for their perceived betrayal of the new England the army had fought to create. The pamphlet, its full title being *Putney Projects, Or the Old Serpent in a new Forme. Presenting to the view of all the well affected in England, the serpentine deceit of their pretended friends in the Armie, indeavouring to intoude tyranny and slavery in a new method* is important not only in that it shows the language of security in the context of the war, but also because it gives us a glimpse of how security might be perceived among the wider English community (and how that perception might be abused.) While we see discussion of Parliament’s intentions to “...settle the Militia for the security of the people’s Lives, Liberties and Estates”,⁴⁸⁸ at the climax of the pamphlet we see the ‘new forme’ of the old serpent – tyranny – being unmasked in the actions of the Grandees;

“I could now trace these our expected deliverers, *Pede tentim*, step, by step, in their endeavours at *Kingstone, Putney, Ware, and Windsor*, to establish our old slavery,

⁴⁸⁶ Woodhouse, 105.

⁴⁸⁷ Woodhouse, 110.

⁴⁸⁸ T.124; John Wildman (with William Walwyn), *Putney Projects. Or the Old Serpent in a new Forme* (30 December 1647).

new modelled in their Proposals: and with a new name of Freedome, and security, engraven upon its forehead...”⁴⁸⁹

It is here that *Putney Projects* makes plain the claim that the actions of the Grandees over the previous year amounted to a disregard for an England built on common responsibility, freedom and equality before the law, instead seeking to maintain the social and political framework held previously. The claim is noteworthy in itself – and certainly the fact that Cromwell would become a military dictator of the nation within three years of the Pamphlet’s circulation lends itself the argument after the fact. However of importance to our purposes is the fact that such a use of security – as in, the claim that security would be a concept ‘engraven’ upon the personification of the old serpent of tyranny – betrays the fact that the term could be misappropriated for political effect. This misappropriation is not so much securitization as it is evidence of a similar but distinct factor. Security is something that the Grandees would *want* to advertise – that it was a positive attribute of political construction that by this point had found wide appeal, at least with the pamphlet’s projected readership.

⁴⁸⁹ T.124; John Wildman (with William Walwyn), *Putney Projects. Or the Old Serpent in a new Forme* (30 December 1647).

CHAPTER TWELVE

SECURITY AGAINST THE COMMONWEALTH

Beginning with the unsatisfactory conclusion to the debate at Putney, and escalating to the Army's seizure of parliament in 1648, the tone of political discourse among the parliamentary faction changes. As the Grandees – especially Cromwell – consolidated power, we see a shift in security as it is seen in their pamphlets and propaganda; as the common soldiers and their Leveller counterparts are less hopeful that the security they desire will be realised, so too does their use of the term shift. As Putney Projects had suggested, the emerging Commonwealth government, led by Cromwell and the Grandees, was not averse to using the term 'security'; however as we will see, what they meant by the term was not the sort of security Wildman, Lilburne, the agitators and Levellers had called for. In response, those that continued to publish against the new government had to maintain their calls for security, but in a new political environment. This new environment did not change the nature of the security they sought, however as we will detail below, it did change how the term was employed.

Within a year any hope the agitators had of a new basis of political authority was dashed. In December 1648, the army had assumed power over the parliament, with soldiers arresting or detaining members that did not align with the Grandees' desires. With their newfound solidarity, the 'rump' parliament – so-called it being the 'end of', the 'leftovers' of the legitimate parliament – executed the king in January of 1649, and established the 'Council of State' to rule in his stead in February the same year. The Council of State was a collection of lords and earls appointed by parliament to make executive decisions of state, with Cromwell as the chair. This seizure of political control by the Grandees and their allies, in tandem with the suppression of mutinies and pamphletting by Leveller elements in the army left the cause championed by the Levellers and their agitator counterparts largely toothless, a situation that only deteriorated as time went on.

While the country was no longer subject to full scale war, the only reliable aspect of the governance of the country was the supremacy of the army leadership, itself led by

Cromwell. The Rump parliament and Council of State were unreliable, and as such after the forced dissolution of the Rump Parliament by the army in April of 1653, Cromwell and the Grandees hand-picked a parliament of 'godly' men to replace the parliament as the governing body of the nation. This assembly of around 140 men, most wealthy individuals apparently selected for what Cromwell and his counsel considered to be the quality of their religious beliefs, was known as 'the parliament of saints' to its supporters, but remembered as 'Barebone's Parliament' by posterity.⁴⁹⁰ This attempt at divinely inspired oligarchy failed before the year was out; being able to agree on almost nothing as a governing body, it somehow managed to agree to dissolve itself in December the same year.⁴⁹¹

Despite the flux in governing bodies, the political discourse encouraged by Cromwell in this period is enlightening to our purpose, especially in regards to how security is not only used as a term in its own right, but the underlying paradigms it engages with in its use. A perfect example can be found in the publication of *The Case of the Commonwealth of England* stated, a pamphlet commissioned by Cromwell from the professional propagandist Marchamont Nedham. Nedham had a career on both sides of the conflict during the war – from 1643 he had written against the monarchy, but after a small stint in prison for Libel, then went to publish for the monarchy until his capture by parliamentary forces in June 1649. However by November, Nedham was not only released, but was soon granted a £50 government payment to begin writing a political weekly on behalf of the Commonwealth government.

In one of his early tracts written for Cromwell, Nedham appropriates some familiar logic to justify not simply justify Cromwell's regime, but also to justify public obedience to it. Nedham's *The Case of the Commonwealth of England* stated begins with a chapter

⁴⁹⁰ Critics of the parliament focussed on the political experience of the assembly, with one appointee – named Praise-God Barebone – providing an easy target (hence 'Barebone's Parliament'). Praise-God was a leather merchant with no political experience, though he would prove himself capable enough to be elected to various council positions in London after the dissolution of the Parliament in 1653.

⁴⁹¹ [Woolrych, Austin](#) (1982). *Commonwealth to Protectorate* (Clarendon Press), [ISBN 0-19-822659-4](#). For the holiness (the model was championed by Fifth monarchist Thomas Harrison) see 106-110, for rich membership see 193.

justifying that historically, “Governments have their Revolutions and fatal Periods”⁴⁹², before declaring in the second chapter that “...the Power of the Sword is, and ever hath been, the Foundation of all Titles to Government.” This disavowal of the political basis of the claims of Wildman, Lilburne, the Levellers and Agitators is not surprising, however in so constructing the power of state Nedham essentially follows the logic of Hobbes’ *de Cive* – power creates authority, a relationship both generated and enforced by the sword. Nedham’s Hobbesian justification for the Commonwealth government continues in chapter three, in which Nedham makes the case for public assent to authority so derived. The same sword that wins rule also protects those that are ruled, and as such;

“Protection implies a Return of obedience and Friendship, from the persons protected, to those that protect them; otherwise they put themselves into the condition of Enemies, and by the *Law of Nations*, which indulges a liberty unto all that are in power to provide for their owne security, they may be handled as Publique Enemies”⁴⁹³

Of course, in the context of Nedham’s publication, it is the Government (guided by the army) that is providing said protection, but crucially the security cited here is not for the people (nor the people’s rights or freedoms) but rather for the government itself; it is security for those that are in power. Such a use is also in line with the most common use of the term within John Milton’s *Paradise Lost* – an observation that might sound strange if not for the fact that Milton was likely Nedham’s direct boss at the time *Case of the Commonwealth* was written.⁴⁹⁴ Such security is not founded on the government’s legitimacy as being representative of or beholden to the people as it would be for the Levellers, but rather the ‘Law of Nations’.

⁴⁹² T.220; Marchamont Nedham, *The Case of the Commonwealth of England stated* (8 May 1650).

⁴⁹³ T.220; Marchamont Nedham, *The Case of the Commonwealth of England stated* (8 May 1650).

⁴⁹⁴ John Milton and John Leonard, *Paradise Lost*, Penguin Classics (London ; New York: Penguin Books, 2003).1.261, 1.638, 2.359, 2.399, 6.130, 6.672, 12.620

In this context, we can still see security used in its sense as a guarantee for an agreement or risk – it is simply that the nature of that risk is different to that of the Levellers that championed it. According to Nedham (and presumably the government he is writing for) the agreement that the government is seeking security for is not the agreement of political authority (which is justified by the sword, not the people), but rather they are seeking security regarding the agreement of *protection* – that the government will protect the people, and in return the people will be obedient. Thus in Nedham’s use security is employed in a way that is indicative of the risks of political constitution, however the appraisal of risk on the basis of power and obedience shows that to Nedham and the Commonwealth security becomes far closer to that of Hobbes and Seneca, rather than fripp or *asphaleia*.

Indeed while Nedham does not mention Hobbes in his Case for the Commonwealth, he consistently draws on Seneca, both in the latter’s capacity as a philosopher and as a dramatist. Extending the argument of *de Clementia* (as well as once again demonstrating the historical weight of our previous paradigms to the political language of the civil war, Nedham justifies the use of the sword in establishing political power against tyrants thusly;

“Cæsar hath left it upon Record of himselfe, as Thucydides hath of Euphensus, and Euripides of Estocles: That all Lawes may be violated, to make way to a Domination: That a man may be wicked to obtain, or maintain, an absolute Sovereignty: That a Prince ought to account nothing unjust which is profitable. To which may be added one more out of Seneca, That where a Prince hath no power to doe ought but what is just, he reignes but by Courtesie.”⁴⁹⁵

However with the destruction of both kingly right and the free assent of common people, Nedham must also justify the continued rule of the authority construed by the sword to the subjects of that power. This justification is also to be found in the vein of Seneca and Hoobes; the *securitas* the rule of power brings to the nation. In outlining his reasoning for

⁴⁹⁵ T.220; Marchamont Nedham, *The Case of the Common-wealth of England stated* (8 May 1650).

why monarchic revival is doomed to fail, Nedham suggests that the people of England are unlikely to subject themselves to war again given that;

“every man would be content with things as they are; for, the Common people (as the *Poet* saith); —*Duas tantùm res anxius optat, Panem, & Circenses*⁴⁹⁶— will be satisfied with Bread and Quietnesse, rather than hazard their Ease and Security, to serve the Ambition of others.”⁴⁹⁷

Thus we can see in Nedham’s early propaganda for the Commonwealth these two uses of security. For the ruler, there is security of rule, the result of actions taken to ensure that the authority won by the sword is respected and maintained. By wielding the sword to rule, the ruler enters an agreement of protection, offering peace and safety to their subjects in return for obedience; in this context, security exists for the ruler in the form of assurance that the obedience of the people is forthcoming. For the ruled, security is experienced as contentment – it is experienced in roughly the same terms as Nero’s Rome, or Juvenal’s bread and circuses. Both these notions of security find expression in Hobbes’ *de Cive*, but more immediately to the text both are also allied to Seneca and *de Clementia*. The power of the ruler wielded for the security of the people, while the satisfaction and obedience of the people providing security for the continued rule of the sovereign.

THE ROLE OF REASON AND THE IMPORTANCE OF LAW

For the Levellers, security does not change following the ascension of the Commonwealth, however the way it is positioned within literature does. Faced with an England at peace – though not the peace they desired, those Levellers and agitators that continued to advocate for democratic ideals had to recognised that England had largely acquiesced to the ‘old serpent in new form’, whilst still maintaining their distinction from the hollow ‘security’ and

⁴⁹⁶ From Juvenal – ‘only two things will [the common man] worry about; bread and circuses’

⁴⁹⁷ T.220; Marchamont Nedham, *The Case of the Common-wealth of England stated* (8 May, 1650).

‘freedom’ the Commonwealth government proffered. In order to maintain that distinction, it was crucial that the radical democrats make clear that the security of which they spoke – the security both realised and created through political constitution – was different from the security offered by the Commonwealth.

This maintenance is important to our study in that it reinforces two things. The first is that, once again, a shift in political environment precipitated a shift in the ‘word-tool’ of security. The second reason this shift is noteworthy is due to the *nature* of the shift – as we will see, in seeking to differentiate the security offered by constitutional democracy from that of the Commonwealth, writers made a direct and emphatic appeal to reason, itself a paradigm that has run a course throughout the rest of this study.

This distinction on the basis of reason can be seen most clearly in the writings of John Lilburne, the author of the original *Agreement of the People*. First barred from public office by the new government, then formally banished in 1652, Lilburne had fled to The Netherlands, where he wrote letters and pamphlets imploring the people and government of England to change its course; this call for governmental change found its expression in a specific call for ‘rational security’. For instance, in an open letter to Cromwell, Lilburne says;

“And therefore, by the assistance of God, I will turne all the stones in the world, that it is possible for a resolute man & an industrious man & a man of braines to turne, to make way for my comeing to England againe & for my liveing there, *in a rational security...*”⁴⁹⁸

This rational security was for Lilburne not simply the preferencing of his own security over another, but a refinement of security as a term to highlight the difference between the Cromwell government and the alternative political construction Lilburne was championing.

⁴⁹⁸ T.232; John Lilburne, *As you Were* (May 1652).

The choice of 'rational' security becomes clear when we consider our earlier chapter on Hobbes himself, as well as remember that it was not long after the establishment of Grandee authority over the nation that Marchamont Nedham co-opted a similar political theory to justify the Commonwealth government. As authority is created by power rather than consent, it becomes imperative that those subject to that power relinquish their will to choice – their reason. Thus for Lilburne the security offered by the Commonwealth government was incongruous with freedom, on the basis that it was founded not in a publically derived law, but rather on an absolute law. He continues;

“I assure you my Lord, I groundedly thinke, that I or any man else that will not be your *absolute slave*, can never live in a *rational & probable Safety* in England, so long as your will is an *absolute Law* there.”⁴⁹⁹

Essentially, in the face of the peace that England was now subject to, Lilburne no longer has the luxury of invoking the security of the people without prefacing what sort of security it should be. Lilburne makes his view on this security more clear in an open letter to the newly formed Parliament of saints, in which he highlights the need for a security based in reason due to the rationality of people;

“I apprehend, the honest and rational people of England expect great matters from you, in reference to your assisting in the settling in a rational security of their laws, liberties and freedoms”⁵⁰⁰

But also of God;

“...men being born rational creatures, are therefore left by God in or to the choice of their Civil Government to the principles of reason (all which centers in general in

⁴⁹⁹ T.232; John Lilburne, *As you Were* (May 1652).

⁵⁰⁰ T.238; John Lilburne, *The Upright Mans Vindication* (1 August 1653).

these two, viz. *do as you would be done to; and ye shall not do evil that good may come thereby*) and *to chuse such a government as themselves or their chosen trustees please to impose upon themselves*, under which they may in a rational security live happily, and comfortably, *which the very Charter of Nature doth intayl, or intitles all men under all Civil government unto..*"⁵⁰¹

Thus for Lilburne security built on protection and obedience was counter to the essence of the individual, itself an essence determined by God. To respect reason, and the divine origin of that reason, was to exercise rationality in the public space; that rationality would grant security in the confidence citizens could have in their governance, which in turn would provide the happiness and comfort that Seneca, Hobbes and Nedham promised through the sword.

As to the earthly realisation of that reason, it should come as no surprise that Lilburne places it firmly in an agreement, or contract – as above itself being a practical realisation of that rational security. By enshrining rights and responsibilities in a contract that supercedes parliamentary power, the rational people may enjoy a rational security in the compact between sovereign and citizen, and that their choice provides the basis of that same sovereign authority;

*"there can now (according to your foresaid principles, and the principles of nature and reason) by no power or persons whatsoever in England be summoned, called, or chosen a new Parliament, but by a new and rational contract and agreement of the people of England... And therefore a Parliament called by you in any other way as you pretend, now to be in a Commonwealth, in my shallow apprehension can be no other, but the perfect demonstration of absolute Conquest, which is a title or government fit onely for Beares and Wolves, but not for men (much less for Englishmen) by your own forementioned printed Confession and averment."*⁵⁰²

⁵⁰¹ T.238; John Lilburne, *The Upright Mans Vindication* (1 August 1653).

⁵⁰² T.238; John Lilburne, *The Upright Mans Vindication* (1 August 1653).

The notion of rationality as a necessary category of righteous politics became commonplace in the democratic pamphlets of the 1650's, both in reference to security, as well as more widely. And while Lilburne used the force of the divine aspect of reason in justifying its importance, others attempted to utilise reason in regards to the Commonwealth government's own arguments.⁵⁰³ In an open letter to Cromwell in his capacity as 'his Highness Lord Protector', Colonel Thomas Saunders implores Cromwell to deliver freely elected parliaments and legal equality just as much on the basis of the importance of rational political theory as on the basis of the divine;

“...finding in our apprehensions the Publike Interest of Right and Freedome so far from security, that the first Foundations thereof are unsetled, and the Gates are open, that may lead us into endless troubles and hazards, the Government not being clearly settled, either upon the bottom of the *Peoples Consent, Trust, or Contract*, nor a Right of *Conquest*, the honest People of *England* not being conquered, nor upon an immediate divine designation...”⁵⁰⁴

Here security is once again used in regards to the surety of political rights, however Saunders goes a step further and connects this lack of security to the theoretical justification (or lack thereof) of Cromwell's government. Essentially Saunders makes the case that given the lack of rights and freedoms, and given that Cromwell's government hold no concrete claim to any of the major theories of governance of the day, the country is unlikely to truly settle. While Nedham might have claimed government by the sword, Saunders points out that the people themselves were not conquered (indeed, he is writing as a co-conquerer himself). Further, Cromwell cannot claim the 'divine designation' of the right of kings, nor is there a compact or agreement with the people.

⁵⁰³ “A Government should or ought to be for the conservation of mankind: for as government and Law is nothing else but a rational restraint of absolute Libertie - so it is also a rational restraint of absolutenesse in commanding...” T.236 John Streater, *A Glympse of that Jewel Libertie* (31 March, 1653).

⁵⁰⁴ T.242 Thomas Saunders, *The Humble Petition of Several Colonels* (18 October, 1654).

Saunders is clear, however, which of the three modes of justification should be chosen however; a choice that is not only rational, but also one that is necessary to justify the acts of the army in the first place;

“...we can be deemed no better then *Murderers*, if the integrity of our hearts in the prosecution of the just ends of the War, do not render us justifiable therein... that the whole Publike Interest contended for, may be certainly secured to the People, and our Consciences discharged in that great duty: That a full and truly free Parliament may without any imposition upon their Judgments and Consciences, freely consider of those *Fundamental Rights and Freedomes* of the Commonwealth, that were the first Subject of this great Contest, which God hath decided on our side... That by the assistance and direction of God they may settle the Government of the Commonwealth, and the wayes of Administration of Justice, and secure our dearly-bought freedome of our Consciences, persons, and estates, against all future attempts of tyranny...”⁵⁰⁵

Thus Saunders creates a powerful amalgam of rational and divine arguments, hedges the Commonwealth’s own claims of justification, and also manages to show the full breadth and complexity of what it means to ‘secure’ the rights and freedoms of the people. To give the country over to free elections is rational, as it is divinely justified through the victory granted by God. To now renege on the promises of that divinely gifted victory is not only a holy offence, but leaves the Commonwealth without an earthly justification, given that the people themselves were not conquered to give right by the sword.

Therefore, there can be no security short of that which is brought forth by a ‘full and truly free parliament’, the granting of which will both ensure the public interest is secured to the people, as it will secure freedom of conscience, persons, and estates against tyranny. By arguing thus, Saunders firmly links the security of England to practical policy – elections,

⁵⁰⁵ T.242 Thomas Saunders, The Humble Petition of Several Colonels (18 October, 1654).

parliaments and equal laws, and while an outcome of such policy might well share the absence of cares found in Hobbes, Nedham or Seneca, its source is altogether different.

The distance between the security described in the last chapter and the security demanded by the Levellers reaches its height in the four maxims propounded in an anonymously written instructional text on the politics of the group, published in 1659. As one of the last great expositions of Leveller policy, the pamphlet detailed specific political outcomes – as well as how those specific outcomes related to security. Firstly, they demanded that law, not a sovereign, be the highest authority in England. Instead of an all-powerful sovereign presiding over the people of the nation, they argued that “*English* men ought to fear nothing but God, and the breach of the Laws..”; the Levellers imploring the people “...not to depend upon the will of a Court and their Council, for the security of themselves and their estates.”⁵⁰⁶ Once again, this use of security sought constancy against risk, however the practical achievement of that constancy was fundamentally tied to specific political policy.

The remaining three maxims essentially seek to solidify this first and fundamental one. With the primacy of law over the primacy of a particular reason comes necessary adjustments to the methods and expectations surrounding power and decision. After arguing for the above, the pamphlet follows with its second maxim, a call for a freely elected parliament to make decisions of state. Thirdly, it calls for equality before the law, and lastly, it calls for the army of the nation to be made of free citizens and under the control of parliament, rather than any private individual. Notably, the concept of ‘securing’ the English polity features in three of the four maxims; the purpose of each to ensure the agreement of the people to constitute a nation is upheld.

The first of these ‘securities’ has been quoted above; the primacy of law over a sovereign reason being necessary for the security of the people and their property. In addition, in the third maxim we see that equality before that law is necessary due to the fact that having

⁵⁰⁶ T.250; Anon, *The Leveller: Or The Principles & Maxims Concerning Government and Religion* (16 February 1659).

any individual (such as a magistrate or government official) exempt from the law
“...exposeth all the People to Rapine and Oppression, without security of their Persons and Estates, for which the Laws are intended.” Lastly, in the fourth maxim there is support for the call for a locally sourced army commanded by parliament, in which the pamphlet says that;

“’tis neither prudent nor safe, that the Peoples Armes should be put into Mercenary Souldiers hands; what reason can induce any People to beleieve that their Laws, estates, liberties and lives, shall be more secure in the hands of Mercenaries, than in their own?”⁵⁰⁷

Contra to Hobbes and Nedham, the Leveller use is not concerned with the risks posed by rational self-interest, and instead with the risks of absolute power and authority. As a result, the management of risk that their ‘security’ calls for - the ‘deposit’ required to be held against that risk – is the primacy of and constancy of a general, popular reason, rather than the investment of power in a single source of reason.

GENERAL VS SINGULAR REASON

The conceptual distance between the two notions of political reason is already apparent, however say simply that they are incongruous on the basis of the broader political mores of each is to miss an opportunity to understand just how immediately and specifically these two competing notions of reason (and their resultant notions of security) are, especially in regards to the specific organisation of polities in institution, laws, and the everyday use of power. To illustrate, we turn to Hobbes’ systematic statement of the institution of his ideal state, in which he outlines the legal, executive and punitive necessities of a functioning state in more detail.

⁵⁰⁷ T.250; Anon, *The Leveller: Or The Principles & Maxims Concerning Government and Religion* (16 February 1659).

As we saw in the previous chapter, it is in chapter six of *de Cive* that Hobbes gives his most clear statement on what security is; the feeling engendered within a subject “that he may have no just cause to fear others, so long as he doth them no injury”.⁵⁰⁸ We also saw how Hobbes believed that “to make men altogether safe (*tutem*) from mutuall harmes, so as they cannot be hurt, or injuriously kill'd, is impossible”.⁵⁰⁹ However a sovereign can make their subjects feel secure, an experience that Hobbes saw as the foundational necessity for a subject to submit their reason to a sovereign and form a polity in the first place.

However Hobbes does not stop there; he also lays out how this feeling of security can be given to the subjects of the leviathan. There is required a series of measures put in place by the ruler, as Hobbes believes that “It is not enough to obtain this security... doe covenant with the rest”.⁵¹⁰ Given that we cannot rely on each individual to honour their covenant with the leviathan and each other, the state must also “provide for our security, not by Compacts, but by Punishments”⁵¹¹ so that given the choice between the benefits of breaking the covenant and the repercussions, the scales always tip in the favour of the covenant. Hobbes then specifically denies the utility of a punishment delivered by citizenry, instead arguing that the ‘sword of punishment’ must be in the hands of a ‘man or counsel’ who is “necessarily understood by Right to have the supreme Power in the City”.⁵¹²

So far, Hobbes has not diverged too much from liberal expectations – indeed, by suggesting that a council (rather than a single monarch) can preside over punitive measures, he might be seen as providing for less monarchical models in his philosophy. Where the differences between Hobbes’ leviathan and the England envisaged by the Levellers really emerges in *practise*, however, becomes apparent where Hobbes outlines *how* this punishment is to be delivered and decided;

⁵⁰⁸ Hobbes De Cive 6.3.

⁵⁰⁹ Hobbes De Cive 6.3

⁵¹⁰ Hobbes De Cive 6.4

⁵¹¹ Hobbes De Cive 6.4

⁵¹² Hobbes De Cive 6.6

“But because the right of the Sword is nothing else but to have power by right to use the sword at his own will, it followes, that the judgement of its right use pertaines to the same party: for if the Power of judging were in one, and the power of executing in another, nothing would be done. For in vain would he give judgement, who could not execute his commands; or if he executed them by the power of another, he himselfe is not said to have the Power of the Sword, but that other, to whom he is onely an Officer.”⁵¹³

Essentially, Hobbes demands that the power to punish and the power to decide guilt reside in the same individual (or council). However he does not stop there – Hobbes goes on to argue that this same person should also *make* the laws;

“it belongs to the same chiefe power to make some common Rules for all men, and to declare them publiquely, by which every man may know what may be called his, what anothers, what just, what unjust, what honest, what dishonest, what good, what evill, that is summarily, what is to be done, what to be avoyded in our common course of life. But those Rules and measures are usually called the civill Lawes, or the Lawes of the City, as being the Commands of him who hath the supreme power in the City. And the CIVILL LAWES (that we may define them) are nothing else but the commands of him who hath the chiefe authority in the City, for direction of the future actions of his Citizens.”⁵¹⁴

For Hobbes then, not only does the sovereign as a source of singular reason stand as the instigator of law (rather than the collective reason of the Levellers), but they must also have direct and real control over the dispensation of justice and delivery of punishment. Further, Hobbes also argues that this same domestic control must also be invested with control over

⁵¹³ Hobbes De Cive 6.8

⁵¹⁴ Hobbes De Cive 6.9

war and the army, given that “...no Man can by Right compell Citizens to take up armes, and be at the expences of Warre, but he who by Right can punish him who doth not obey.”⁵¹⁵

While both the Levellers and Hobbes might envisage citizens taking up arms in defence of the nation, in the former they do so as free citizens, whereas in the second they do so as an extension of the leviathan, induced to fight through risk of punishment.

Pieced together, then, Hobbes’ notion of how a state is made secure is through the total investment of all laws, judgements and punishments to a single reason, with that reason *above* the law both in terms of its creation. Hobbes thus displays himself as seeing security as being resultant from a set of institutional expectations that are counter to those outlined by the Levellers; the investment of military power in the hands of individuals, and a legislature invested in the sovereign rather than in the body politic.

The collection of these institutional powers are called by Hobbes the ‘supreme command’, and it is in his summation of the attributes and limits of this supreme command that the distance between his security and the security of the Levellers is most brutally demonstrated. At the last, Hobbes does not simply invest his sovereign with the power to make, enforce, judge and wage war, he also invests this same absolute civic power with the capacity to break laws with impunity;

“...Now the notes of supreme command are these, To make and abrogate Lawes. To determine War and peace, to know, and judge of all controversies, either by himselfe, or by Judges appointed by him; to elect all Magistrates; Ministers, and Counsellors. Lastly, if there be any man who by Right can doe some one action which is not lawfull for any Citizen or Citizens to doe beside himselfe, that man hath obtained the supreme power: For those things which by Right may not be done by

⁵¹⁵ Hobbes De Cive 6.7

any one or many Citizens, the City it selfe can onely doe: He therefore that doth those things useth the Cities Right, which is the supreme power.”⁵¹⁶

Thus while the inference, the immediate sense of security is common between Hobbes and the Levellers, the practical requirements of each are antithetical not only in a broad sense, but in the practical specifics required by their enactment into policy. Not simply a difference of political philosophy, the notions of security fundamental to each account induce a complete separation of practical policy – who is invested with what political authority, and how that authority can act in regards to the polity it is seeking to ‘secure’. Where the Levellers ask for a publically elected and accountable legislature, Hobbes explicitly rejects the notion, calling for the executive, judiciary and legislative arms of governance to be invested in a single source of reason. Most importantly, where the Levellers call for equality before the law, Hobbes goes one step further than simply rejecting it. Read closely, Hobbes’ sovereign is not simply exempt from the law, they are defined precisely because they are exempt; thus the primary objective of the Levellers, the very thing required to deliver security to ‘persons and property’ of every citizen struck at the core of Hobbes’ notion of authority. The practical necessities of security for the Levellers fundamentally undermined the security Hobbes envisaged, and vice versa.

We have seen thus far that security as a word is used in common across the monarchist theory of Hobbes and the ‘radical’ democratic pamphlets of the Levellers, and we have also seen that despite the common inference of the word itself, the practical necessities of each presentation are not simply different, but essentially antithetical. We can now move to ascertain more concretely the why these contemporaneous uses could share the specific similarities and differences they did, and further, compare what we have discovered to our own conceptions of security in the English speaking world of the early 21st century.

After ascertaining that the security of Hobbes and the security of the Levellers is at its core a call for antithetical political practicalities, the question remains as to why this word was so serviceable to both sides despite their wildly varying views of how that security might be

⁵¹⁶ Hobbes De Cive 6.18

achieved. In the previous section, it was briefly argued that given that both sides were seeking to present their views to the English public, it was in their best interest to use the word in a 'typical' fashion, ensuring that the notion they sought to communicate was understood by the widest audience possible. However if such is the case, how could the word remain in line with common understanding, share a common operation across both contexts, stand as a goal of both political schemas, and yet demarcate such wildly different political realities? Could this word really infer the same meaning if the needs and practicalities required for its realisation were so wildly different?

The divergent (or even antithetical) use of words across political divides is in a sense the foundation of politics;⁵¹⁷ concepts and outcomes become battlegrounds, and important terms the front lines on which the decisive manoeuvres are made. It would not be unreasonable to then assume that security was one of those words – an issue or outcome desired by all, but whose use was fraught by the fact that one's appreciation of that issue or outcome was determined more by your political view than anything inherent in the word itself. As we have seen, it is certainly true that what constituted as 'security' for an adherent to Hobbes' political philosophy would be unlikely to satisfy the need for security felt by a Leveller, however this does not in itself necessitate that the word was subject to specific contestation, nor that the core perlocutionary effect – the way it was received by the wider audience – was in any way subject to the same contestation. Essentially, to assume that the differing conceptions of the word is intrinsically linked to a contestation over the meaning of the term is to beg the question inherent in the 'essentially contested concept' model of security; if the word is indeed essentially contested, on what value or leverage can the word rely in its wider adoption or use? Put simply, if the word is to have a political value in the first place, even a contested one, it must have some wider value to the polity first.

⁵¹⁷ As discussed in footnote 4 of this study, 'politics' could speak of a number of somewhat conflicting yet overlapping criterion – though this is in itself the point of this claim. Of the various conceptions of politics that inform this view, specifically here we may speak of Carl Schmitt's notion of the politics as facilitated by the concept of the enemy, or Rancière's notion of disagreement as being the disruptive force of politics; "Disagreement is not the conflict between one who says white and another who says black. It is the conflict between one who says white and another who also says white but does not understand the same thing by it or does not understand that the other is saying the same thing in the name of whiteness." See Jacques Rancière, *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy* (U of Minnesota Press, 1999), x.

In simple terms, that value as exactly as is laid out in the uses shown in the Oxford Dictionary; that of 'freedom from doubt', a state in which one may set aside concern for risks. It is this same core value that also defines security's most enduring use case, that of financial instruments or accounts of value held against a risk (security deposits, for example). In this use as well, the 'freedom from care' is a freedom from the inherent concerns that accompany a known risk. This same core value of operation stands for the two political uses by Hobbes and the Levellers, however just as the specificities of the financial use change the attributes and context of that security, so too are the differing political uses separated by their attributes, context and aims.

Both Hobbes' security and the security of the Levellers are safeguarding against the risks of political association, namely, the maleficent intentions of others within the polity, however the obvious distinction here is the source of risks; where Hobbes identifies the main source as each individual's self-interest, the Levellers see the sovereign as the chief source of risk. Further, this broad demarcation betrays a more nuanced distinction – that of the risks of reason against the risks of power. Where Hobbes sees the competition of reason to be the source of instability to a polity, the Levellers instead see the investment of power in a single reason as being unable to be adequately guarded against.

THEORETICAL DISTANCE, PRACTICAL DIFFERENCE

As we have seen, these different conceptions of power and risk necessitate a different view of security. Hobbes' subjection of individual reason to a single sovereign force stands against the Leveller's checks and balances against the primacy of a central sovereign power, however as well as this divergence on issues of power, there is also a disagreement over authority – or more specifically the relation (or coagulation) between power and authority, and how those forces (or force) manifests in a political system.

The Leveller's notion of security is constituted on an authority derived from the free choice of each citizen – political authority is granted by popular assent given on a free and equal standing, an active use of socially normative values formed through the collection of individual reason within the bounds of a political corporation. Put another way, the political authority (the parliament, for example) wields a sovereign power, however it is one that is formed, formulated and granted authority by the socially normative values of the polity it represents. 'Socially normative' here can be viewed as an amalgam of sociological, legal and philosophical senses, in that popular or socially constructed reason provides a 'norm' or value proposition to the wielding of power and the creation of laws. At the very least popular assent provides normative value to law by appealing to cohesion and representation; we can at least say that a law passed due to popular assent has the value of pleasing the greatest number of constituent members, though more likely is some reasoning that makes the law 'good' that is shared by a proportion of the polity. As an example, individuals may have differing notions of how damaging it is to drive too fast in a car, however the socially normative value of preventing traffic accidents provides a normative force to the creation and enforcement of the law.

In contrast, Hobbes' removal of individual reason from the constitution of polities prevents such an authority from manifesting. This leaves Hobbes in a curious position – sovereigns have authority over subjects due to a social contract in which the public relinquishes their reason for their own good, however that contract must also be enforced by punitive measures due to the practical impossibility of the citizenry from acquiescing in their contract. Put another way, citizens give up the right to rule themselves and grant ruling authority to the sovereign, however the power the sovereign wields and the laws they make can and often should stand in opposition to those same subjects.

The result of this position is easily appreciable, especially considering our earlier discussion of the practical institution of state Hobbes sees as necessary. Sovereign authority is given legitimacy just as much through the capacity to wield power as it is through the social 'contract' made through the acceptance of the subject; citizens should submit to power for the good of the polity, however it is power that determines who they should submit to. Thus

Hobbes' political construction conflates power and authority; the former grants the latter, and the latter is only reliable as long as the former is also held. It is for this reason that Hobbes demands that the ability to make laws is held by the same reason that holds the 'sword of punishment'; authority without power is meaningless.

The reason authority without power is meaningless is because Hobbes is certain that there is only one normative value, one 'good reason' that can underpin human action – that of self-serving action. As we have seen, Hobbes sees one's desire to preserve and further one's interests as the singular goal of reason, and it is to escape the dilemma this causes that a polity must abandon the individual right to reason. While pointing all this out might seem to be repetition of previous points, it is important to identify what this does to the construction of socially normative values. By removing the legitimacy of society to provide reason to political construction, laws and the exercise of power can have no 'good', no normative value beyond the instrumentality of maintaining the power of the sovereign. Put another way;

“The thesis that goods are projections of desire pursued instrumentally undermines the status of these goods as genuine reasons for action capable of providing normative force to laws of nature beyond recognition of the prudential benefits of following whatever *de facto* authority happens to be in place.”⁵¹⁸

To be fair to the Hobbesian notion of security, this difference of values is not the result of security itself, but rather a result of the necessities of Hobbes' framework. By placing rational self-interest - and more specifically the self-interest against untimely death – as the basic and fundamental normative force of laws, policies and political action, Hobbes undermines any hope of these laws, policies and actions from having any normative or widely appreciated value in and of themselves. While the *Leviathan* may have instituted the law for a 'good' reason, in Hobbes' conception the only reliable reason that the law will be

⁵¹⁸ GEORGE DUKE, “HOBBS ON POLITICAL AUTHORITY, PRACTICAL REASON AND TRUTH,” *Law and Philosophy* 33, no. 5 (2014): 626–27.

followed is the fear of punishment that will be visited on a citizen that breaks it. In short, the only reliable reason people will drive at the speed limit is not that of safety, social acceptability or to maintain a cogent community expectation; they will drive the speed limit only to avoid getting a ticket.

Any appeal of this punitive logic gives way to the practicalities of our contemporary liberal expectations; governments spend millions on public awareness campaigns to combat the *ineffectiveness* of punitive measures, attempting instead to appeal to precisely the sort of social forces that Hobbes refuses to trust. One may counter with the fact that citizens are urged to drive to the speed limit for the sake of their own safety, that essentially the appeal hinges on the same Hobbesian assumption of self-preservation. However this does not address the fact that in so doing the government is essentially acknowledging that it is not the punitive power of the sovereign that provides the basis for adherence, but rather that it must invite the citizen to exercise their own reason. While the sovereign may determine the details of a law, in a liberal setting at least, it is the citizens that determine the value of that law.

It is not hard to see how this difference necessitates different practical approaches to political decision, and the practical attributes of policy, law and action across different political schemas. In an absolute state such as Hobbes' *Leviathan*, the 'value' of law is replaced by the sovereign's ability to express power. In such a state the citizens follow the law specifically because they have relinquished their critical capacities for the sake of the *Leviathan*, and if in some instance they do exercise their reason, the threat of punitive action will ensure that they choose the only 'good' that can be envisaged in Hobbes' notion of rational self-interest. In this state, efforts to reduce speeding begin and end with the prescription of a law by a single source of authority and reason, and the vesting of enough power in that same authority to enforce it.

In contrast, a political schema in which reason is invested in the citizen cannot wholly rely on the practical measures that would satisfy the lawmaking of the *Leviathan*. From the outset, the law in question must have as its source a different type of authority – not a

single reason, but a collection of reasons by which the law may be deliberated. Further, while punitive measures may be part of the law's enactment, given that the law is an expression of the collective reason of the citizenry, there must at its core be some normative value that grants the law legitimacy. Put simply, where Hobbes' law can theoretically only have value to the sovereign, liberal laws must have some value to the polity, granting it both force and needs that differ from Hobbes' model.

This means that how the political authority of each relate to the laws are fundamentally different as well. The sovereign of the leviathan wields the power to make the law, control over how the law is enforced, and most importantly the claim to the reason that legitimizes the law in the first place. These three elements provide the sovereign with impunity to the effects of the laws themselves, allowing laws to be selectively made, enforced and legitimized. By contrast, the corporate legitimation of liberal laws dictates that any exception to those laws challenge the authority of the laws themselves – to selectively make, enforce or legitimize a law in a liberal polity is to undermine community expectation on which it is built. Any exception must therefore be itself accepted by the community that serve as the simultaneous subjects and objects of the law; however such an acceptance of the exception makes that exception itself a law, being expressed and enforced with the blessing of the source of sovereign authority.

Thus the democratic political construction of the Levellers both required and enacted a very different notion of security to that of the monarchism of Hobbes. While both invoked security for its broader meaning – that of speaking of certainty against a risk – the political constructions of each were such that what constituted the risk, the provisions of certainty, and thus the actual value of 'security' were not simply different, but essentially antithetical. Given the fundamental difference between these two contemporaneous uses of 'security' in the political space, we can see that even at the very start of the modern political project, security suffered from what may seem to be issues of consensus and essential contestability; it held a broad value, but the realisation of that value was conflicted across political divides.

However to characterise this divergence in the political inference of security simply as an issue of a contested concept or of consensus fails to appreciate the connection and correlation between these differing values of security and the political necessities that accompanied them. This was not simply an argument over the meaning of security, it was a battle over how polities were to be constructed both theoretically and practically. These different views on what political security was in practise could not be divorced from the political schema they necessitated; as such the 'contestability' was not simply over security, but over the realities of civil life itself.

Further to this point, these antithetical notions of security are each illustrative of their own political institutions – to 'contest' the meaning of security in the political space was not to simply contend the word had a different inference, it was to challenge the very real institutions of the state. The security necessary for the realisation of Hobbes' absolutist state required the investment of law and power in a very different institutional apparatus than that of the Levellers' ideal state. Thus while security for both was the confidence against risks inherent in political life and the basis of successful political constitution, the difference in construction of those risks (and the requirements of confidence for each) necessitated that an argument over what security might be was very much a foundational argument of the nature of politics itself.

CONCLUSION

In examining the security of the Levellers, Agitators and New Agents, we see the beginnings of security as being indicative of practical politics – security was realised not simply as a political outcome enjoyed by individuals as it was in Hobbes, but was instead something realised in corporation, and through specific acts and policies. With the reimagining of the English nation as one in which public reason justified politics, the security such a state would provide shifted to being a security of political right, rather than of individual cares. Further, where the security of Hobbes' *Leviathan* would be the outcome of the strong and consistent wielding of power, the security of the democrats was both created by *and* expressed in the agreement of the people; security in such circumstances becoming not just an outcome, but a practical act and necessity of political construction.

While security may well have arrived at this position within democratic discourse all of its own, we have also seen a clear path by which the more general language of security in the seventeenth century was able to take on the role that it did. Where the security of Hobbes relied on the Latin notion of being without earthly cares or concerns, the security used by the agitators and Levellers relied more heavily on the security of guarantees brought in from the Norman French. Through the pay dispute of the army, the guarantees of a particular dispute were put in the relief of English politics as a whole, and the 'security' required in that dispute was broadened to the security required by all people of the English nation.

We have also seen how these events raised what was a previously apolitical word to one of relative importance. The new security championed by the likes of Lilburne retained its value to the democrats even after their failure to change the political environment of England – and we also saw how the military dictatorship that followed attempted to both reclaim and reconfigure security. Wildman's claim that the 'old serpent' of tyranny had slithered back in on promises of 'security' suggest that even at this early stage the term was powerful yet contestable. After Cromwell had seized power, the works of Nedham sought to reclaim security in the context of 'bread and circuses', while Lilburne and others continued to champion security that was 'rational' as opposed to Nedham's appeal to quiet acquiescence.

This battle over the word across ideological divides was indicative not simply of the fact that security was quickly a contestable concept, but also that those contestations were likely extensions of wider political struggles; essentially, we once again see that as political construction changes, so does the role (or possible roles) of security. As many in England envisaged a polity united by consent, rather than fear or tradition, how they understood security necessarily differed from their absolutist counterparts. Further though, the importance of politics on shifting notions of security is magnified by the shift within the parliamentary camp itself. As the possibility of change waxed and waned, and as control over discourse rose and fell, how security was spoken of and how various conceptions were differentiated from each other changed as well.

PART VII

SYNTHESIS

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

SUMMARY

It is the English civil war that gives us our first specific and sustained reference to political security – however while this history has evidently been forgotten, there it would be wrong to assume that this early usage is not directly related to the security that has reached us in the modern day. In England, the Levellers and the security they sought were ultimately unsuccessful, however their use of would still push the concern for security into wider Anglo political language. Though while England itself might not have embraced the political ideals of the Levellers and agitators for many years following, these concepts were much more readily embraced in the United States. At the time of the English civil war, colonists were known to return to support the parliamentary cause, and after the Leveller program failed, many of the disenfranchised left England in favour of America. It is through this American connection that the security of the Levellers would provide the blueprint for what would emerge in political speech and legislation throughout the colonies and the early United States.

It is outside the scope of this thesis to give a detailed account of this process, however luckily the work of scholars such as Preston, Jelly-Shapiro and Neocleous provide some insight into how security was used in the US throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.⁵¹⁹ Further, through these and other histories and genealogies we can see how the political conceptions of the United States had spread globally by midway through the twentieth century.

However while we cannot study in detail the rise of security into the contemporary age, in order to hand over to modern liberalism proper we must consider briefly the realisation of

⁵¹⁹ Preston, “Monsters Everywhere: A Genealogy of National Security*”; Eli Jelly-Schapiro, *Security and Terror: American Culture and the Long History of Colonial Modernity* (Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2018); Neocleous, *Critique of Security*.

security in the accepted canon of modern democratic thought – that of John Locke. The various particulars of Locke’s political philosophy, as well as his relationship to security have already been extensively studied elsewhere; for this reason we will satisfy ourselves with only as much is necessary to position Locke in relationship to our wider genealogy.

This small epilogue will serve two important purposes. Firstly, it will greatly enrich our capacity to identify crucial outcomes of the study. Written thirty years after the Leveller’s pamphlets, Locke’s work provides a bridge between the Levellers and ‘liberal’ thought as it is broadly understood within wider literature. By examining the broad foundation of Locke’s notion of political constitution, how he departed from the Levellers and Agitators, and how he specifically used security as a term himself, we can see the important parts of continuity between the two, as well as some notable departures.

These departures feed cleanly into the second outcome – by more concretely tying the work completed here to previously completed genealogies (especially that of Neocleous, who *starts* his genealogy with Locke), the reader can better appreciate how the conclusions of this study variously confirm and challenge previous work, as well as the opportunity these findings give for future research.

LOCKE

While Locke’s notion of civil government would feature an important (and perhaps dangerous) addition, for the most part the fundamental basis of political constitution for Locke is in line with Leveller expectations. Free association on the basis of reasoned agreement forms the basis of Locke’s politics, a politics that by necessity featured equality before the law, free, fair and open elections, and a prohibition on political subjection. It is the last of these three that is perhaps most interesting – while the lack of an absolute sovereign was a given in Leveller discourse, the context of Locke’s writing was one in which

the rule of a monarch was not in question – instead it was *how* that monarch might rule that was at stake.⁵²⁰

With this in mind, Locke dedicates much effort to arguing against the assumption of any sort of absolute power by any member of the polity, his justification resting on the fact that the assumption of such power was not simply against a civil polity, but counter to the law of nature (that “...no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.”⁵²¹ Indeed where Hobbes suggests that only a single source of authority can bring security and stave off the state of war, Locke suggests that “...he who attempts to get another man into his absolute power, does thereby *put himself into a state of war* with him.”⁵²² Further, any who might put themselves in such a state forfeit the rights of that polity, as they have “...declared war against all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a *lion* or a *tyger*, one of those wild savage beasts, with whom men can have no society nor security.”⁵²³

It is here that we can see Locke’s security come into view – much like the Levellers before him, Locke’s security is an expression of the guarantees required to make operable the free agreement of a polity. Locke’s insistence against an individual assuming absolute power is indicative of this underlying political philosophy, a philosophy in which each individual retained the right to decide, and reason, rather than power or tradition, determined political decision. This philosophy extended to security itself; for Locke, “...reason and common equity” were “...the measure God has set to the actions of men, for their mutual security”,⁵²⁴ and as above, any who reneged from this common reason could “have no society or security” themselves.

⁵²⁰ Richard Ashcraft and John Locke, *Revolutionary Politics & Locke’s Two Treatises of Government* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1996), 592.

⁵²¹ References to Locke’s *Two Treatises* will be by Treatise number, Chapter and passage (for example here 2.2.6). John Locke and Peter Laslett, *Two Treatises of Government*, Student ed, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

⁵²² *Two Treatises*, 2.3.17

⁵²³ *Two Treatises*, 2.2.11

⁵²⁴ *Two Treatises*, 2.2.8

In his quest to deliver security, however, Locke installs within his model polity an additional element – that of prerogative. In order to maintain the security of the polity, Locke empowers the executive arm of government with the capacity for extra-legal action in cases where either the law is undefined, or where “...strict and rigid observation of the laws may do harm...”⁵²⁵ Allowing the executive to act in this manner is crucial to securing the public good, allowing the government to navigate circumstance rather than being beholden to it. However in adjusting his political construction in this way, Locke also alters his security – while it sits upon the same basis as the Leveller security that came before it, as we will see, this preference of the power of government over the abstractions of rights will have an impact on how security is realised.

In prerogative, Locke grants to the government permission to use extralegal power to ensure its own viability, or to maximise the ‘public good’. However Locke’s prerogative is held in check only by the presumption of public discord – that an unjust use of prerogative would result in civil unrest.⁵²⁶ While Locke himself raises the dangers of his prerogative,⁵²⁷ (II 166) and despite the fact that the executive itself is still subject to the liberal constitutionalism (and thus to election),⁵²⁸ this check of public force is insufficient for Neocleous especially, who argues Locke’s prerogative is a function of his desire to see property protected over and against the maintenance of rights. By granting this final and transcendent capacity to the executive, Locke shows that the ‘security’ of his state is the security of property, rather than the rights of the represented. It is this thread that for Neocleous runs through all liberal notions of security; that “...Liberalism’s key concept is not liberty, but security, and this is so because security is the supreme concept of bourgeois society.”⁵²⁹

⁵²⁵ *Two Treatises*, 2.14.159

⁵²⁶ *Two Treatises*, 2.14.168

⁵²⁷ Lee Ward, “Locke on Executive Power and Liberal Constitutionalism,” *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne de Science Politique* 38, no. 3 (2005): 737.

⁵²⁸ Ward, 739.

⁵²⁹ Neocleous, *Critique of Security*, 7.

While Neocleous' critique certainly has value, it is also important to note that for his part Locke does not see prerogative and individual rights as mutually exclusive. Like all acts of government, prerogative for Locke is a function of the assent of the people; it is "...nothing but the people's permitting their rulers to do several things, of their own free choice, where the law was silent, and sometimes too against the direct letter of the law, for the public good."⁵³⁰ While this does not necessarily defang Neocleous' broader assertions regarding liberal values, it does at the least give Locke consistency in regards to his fundamental constructions of polity and security – both being formed on the basis of free association. It is also interesting to note that such a view of Locke's prerogative stands as a configuration of securitization; the exceptional act performed by government on the basis of public assent.

Ultimately, Locke's political project is driven by the primacy of reason and free association, and his notion of security is, like the Levellers, the necessary guarantee for such an association. However Locke's configuration does not put individuals over institutions, but rather focusses on the claim that the authority of institutions are derived from the freedom of individuals.⁵³¹ While this volunteerism separates it from absolute models such as divine right, patriachalism, and even the 'social contract' model of Hobbes,⁵³² it also allows – or perhaps demands – the inclusion of extralegal provision in order to maintain the institutions derived from the otherwise tenuous free association. In this way, Neocleous is right in laying security, rather than liberty, at the centre of Locke's politics. It is the institution of government that safeguards liberty, and while freedom is in the experience of the individual, as we have seen, the security of liberalism is manifest not in the individual, but in the actions of state. In this way, by giving the last word to the agency of the institution, rather than the maintenance of rights, Locke's security becomes the precondition of government.

⁵³⁰ *Two Treatises*, 2.14.164

⁵³¹ Shannon Hoff, "Locke and the Nature of Political Authority," *The Review of Politics* 77, no. 1 (2015): 1–22.

⁵³² A. John Simmons, "Locke's State of Nature," *Political Theory* 17, no. 3 (1989): 449–70.

CONNECTION TO EXISTING GENEALOGIES

However in his critique of security, Neocleous is not right to put Locke's politics as the genesis of liberalism, however construed; nor as we have seen is it fair to ascribe to Locke the beginning of modern political security. The notion that a 'liberal tradition' extends from Locke has been thoroughly critiqued by scholars such as Duncan Bell and J. G. A. Pocock; further, Mark Goldie's exhaustive study on the contemporary reception of Locke's work demonstrates that when the Two Treatises were published, they received very little attention.⁵³³ The fact that Locke published the work anonymously lends itself to the fact that even Locke himself did not think that the work would be particularly popular or palatable.

The work would, by the time of the French and American Revolutions, become influential,⁵³⁴ with Locke being a major influence on Jefferson's thinking especially.⁵³⁵ In this way we can see Locke as part of a greater rise of liberal, republican thinking prevalent in the mid Eighteenth century. While this might destroy the vision of Locke as a patriarch of liberalism, it more concretely ties the security he invokes, a security that shares with the Levellers a basis in reason and free association, to the emergence of the modern democratic United States. In both the colonies and the early United States the language of political security could be found in laws, policies and institutions, as well as in the writings of political leaders and intellectuals.⁵³⁶ A prime example of this continuation is Thomas Paine, who when

⁵³³ Goldie, *The Reception of Locke's Politics*, xxii.

⁵³⁴ He was quoted and invoked during the debates of the Stamp Act, a precursor to American secession; see Goldie, xxxv. Also influential on Rousseau and Voltaire

⁵³⁵ Sanford Kessler, "Locke's Influence on Jefferson's 'Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom,'" *Journal of Church and State* 25, no. 2 (1983): 231–52; "Thomas Jefferson, October 1776, Notes on Locke, Part 1; Virginia Laws and Statutes Covering the Church of England," image, accessed December 31, 2019, <https://www.loc.gov/item/mtjbib000207/>.

⁵³⁶ See for example "Declaration of Independence: A Transcription," National Archives, November 1, 2015, <https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript>. *The Security of the Rights of Citizens in the State of Connecticut Considered. [One Line in Latin from Ovid]*, 24776 (Hudson, Barzillai, 1741-1823, printer., 1792), https://docs.newsbank.com/openurl?ctx_ver=z39.88-2004&rft_id=info:sid/iw.newsbank.com:EAIX&rft_val_format=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rft_dat=0F30195AFACD7398&svc_dat=Evans:eaidoc&req_dat=106B704DEA529B00; Delaware., *Anno Millesimo Septingentesimo et Septuagesimo Octavo. An Act for the Further Security of the Government.*, 43441 (Bailey, Francis, 1735?-1815, printer., 1778), https://docs.newsbank.com/openurl?ctx_ver=z39.88-2004&rft_id=info:sid/iw.newsbank.com:EAIX&rft_val_format=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rft_dat=0F2F82592A92F8B8&svc_dat=Evans:eaidoc&req_dat=106B704DEA529B00; John Henry Hobart 1775-1830., *The Security of a*

speaking to English audiences regarding governance in the American colonies said that their success showed that “The instant formal government is abolished, society begins to act: a general association takes place, and common interest produces common security.”⁵³⁷

The work of Locke, Paine, and the political thought of men like Jefferson, Franklin, Hamilton and Washington would go to define the political environment of the United States; as such, the security first championed by the Levellers in the chaos of the English Civil War is still a feature of our modern political environment. As mentioned above, exactly how security has grown, shifted and been confirmed since its export to the United States is unfortunately outside the scope of this thesis, however there are others that have studied security from its early usage in the United States to the modern day. Mark Neocleous’ work is one such example; the reservations outlined previously regarding Neocleous’ presumption of Lockean origins of security notwithstanding, Neocleous’ work is an enlightening look at how security progresses from the foundation of the US to the cold war period especially. Of special note is his work regarding the introduction of ‘security’ language under F. D. Roosevelt and the ‘Social Security’ of the New Deal, and the role of such an introduction in the ‘National Security’ language that followed the outbreak of the Second World War.⁵³⁸

There are other contributions and continuations of note from a variety of different disciplines and perspectives. Eli Jelly-Shapiro draws on Neocleous’ presumed origins in Locke to build a colonial critique of security and terror as they have been invoked by the US since colonialization, and in so doing shows the colonial value of security as it was configured as a civilising agent in American political discourse.⁵³⁹ While Jelly-Shapiro’s work is predicated on

Nation. A Sermon, Preached in Trinity Church, in the City of New-York, on Thursday, April 13, A.D. 1815; Being the Day Appointed by the President of the United States, and the Governor of the State of New-York, as a Day of Thanksgiving to Almighty God for the Various Public Mercies of His Providence, and Especially for the Restoration of the Blessings of Peace. By John Henry Hobart, D.D. Assistant Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the State New-York., 34926 (T. & J. Swords (Firm), printer., 1815), https://docs.newsbank.com/openurl?ctx_ver=z39.88-2004&rft_id=info:sid/iw.newsbank.com:EAIX&rft_val_format=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rft_dat=104405DB5F9265C0&svc_dat=Evans:eaidoc&req_dat=106B704DEA529B00.

⁵³⁷ Paine, *Rights of Man*, 186.

⁵³⁸ Neocleous, “From Social to National Security.”

⁵³⁹ Jelly-Schapiro, *Security and Terror*.

Lockean assumptions, the reconfiguration of security's origin to the earlier source of the Levellers would present an even more damning aspect of security's colonial value. Created by a specific political identity in relation to a specific event, the appropriation of the term to justify colonial expansion and the subsequent creation of a ubiquitous notion of security through that expansion is an important aspect to the story of security and colonialism both; an aspect that deserves more rigorous study moving forward.

From a more historical perspective, Andrew Preston provides a genealogy of security in the American state and its subsequent spread throughout the world following the 1930's. Robert Krebs also provides a narrative history of security in American policy, however even moreso that Preston concentrates on the early 20th century more than the 19th. In either case, there is enough to see how the early concerns of security as it was configured in the English Civil war and adopted by the likes of Jefferson and Hamilton continued through the political language of the US subsequent.

The concentration on the 1930's in Krebs, Preston and Neocleous (not to mention the OED's ignorance of the term until the early 40's) is in itself indicative of how the prevalence and inference of the term was revolutionised during the administration of FDR and the Second World War. While the attention given to the time by these authors is certainly justified, the justification rests in a contemporary lack of awareness rather than any lack of scrutiny on the part of security at the time. For that reason, we can also read sources from the 1930's to gain an insight into how the political expectations of the Levellers has been continued through the political expectations of the United States.

Arthur Salter's *Security – Can we Retrieve it?* stands as a prime example of such work.⁵⁴⁰ Written on the eve of the Second World War, Salter's book had two main goals. The first was to analyse the global strategic and political situation of the world's major powers as they were in 1938; Salter appraises the major nations, challenges and berates the

⁵⁴⁰ Arthur Salter Salter Baron, 1881-, *Security : Can We Retrieve It?*, Accessed from <https://nla.gov.au/nla.cat-vn796465> (London: Macmillan, 1939).

appeasement movement, and puts forward suggestions for how England might overcome the war that Salter viewed as inevitable. The second goal of the book was to explain just what this 'security' he advocated for was. Salter's work is predicated on the idea that security was an unfamiliar and misunderstood topic to his audience, which considering his audience was policymakers and political analysts of England, is notable in itself.

Salter dedicates multiple chapters to this question, one he sees through the lens of the League of Nations (and its failure), however we can reasonably simplify his argument down to two simple factors; that security was the certainty one could have in rights, freedoms and responsibilities that came with political association, and that the concept that led to such security had been driven by Woodrow Wilson and the American legacy following the First World War.⁵⁴¹ For Salter, 'collective security' as it was to be realised on the international stage was to reconcile "competing and conflicting ambitions" through agreement, law and mutual responsibility – essentially to bring the same sort of domestic security advocated by the democratic tradition to the international stage.⁵⁴²

We can also see the novelty of security, the separation between various political notions on issues of security, and the explosion of relevance the term had more broadly in the compendium of the 1934 and 1935 International Studies Conference, an academic outlet of the League of Nations. The focus of proceedings was consideration of 'collective security'; the exploration of "...what that idea consists and what is its historical and scientific value..."⁵⁴³ That the peak international body of the day asked the question is itself telling, however in the response of the Italian delegate we see why. Given by Francesco Coppola, a long-time fascist and personal academic appointee of Mussolini, the Italian response is a

⁵⁴¹ Salter does not go into great detail on the subject, however he makes clear that the political outlook of the US was informed by the political distance it placed between itself and England on the basis of the impasse between monarchy, aristocracy, and the new democratic order they were trying to create. Salter, 26. On Wilson's role in defining 'common security', see Salter, 111.

⁵⁴² Salter, *Security : Can We Retrieve It?*, 100.

⁵⁴³ 1935 : London International Studies Conference (8th : England), *Collective Security; a Record of the Seventh and Eighth International Studies Conferences, Paris 1934--London 1935, Edited by Maurice Bourquin*, Accessed from <https://nla.gov.au/nla.cat-vn1657269> (Paris: International institute of intellectual co-operation, 1936), 144.

damning indictment of the transposition of security onto a Europe that, in Coppola's conception at least, found the idea alien and unhelpful. Since the end of the World War and the establishment of the League, says Coppola, the "vaguely-outlined nightmare" of security has distorted and paralysed European politics. While Coppola stops short of blaming the US, he is clear that this 'security' that Europe has become beholden to is not the political reality of the continent, but an idea brought in from elsewhere and imposed upon an unwitting European community. For Coppola, security is not a fact of political life, but a 'sentiment', and the assumption that it could provide any 'guarantee' to politics absurd;

"...security, as it has been conceived and proposed thus far, that is to say, security thought of as an objective, absolute, automatic, universal, or at least guaranteed by everybody, by virtue of universal international texts, is a false idea. In the first place, security is not an objective fact; indeed, it is a sentiment."⁵⁴⁴

The above is on no level an exhaustive genealogy of security between the events of the English Civil War and the 20th century; rather it has served to demonstrate the connection between the security uncovered in this study and the security of the 1930's that forms the basis of other genealogical accounts of security. In doing so it is hoped that the findings of this thesis can be legitimated by their connection to more common understandings of security. Further, by linking this work to other genealogies that have focussed solely on the modern period, the findings of this thesis can be more properly positioned within existing scholarship, a state of affairs that should enrich both this study and the research of other genealogies.

Indeed through comparisons and connections to more contemporarily focussed genealogies and more modern conceptions of security, we can better tease out some of the major contributions this study has made to our understanding of security. Chief among those is the role of political identities and specific political constructions in the formulation of security. Far from being an absolute and ubiquitous political category, the specifically

⁵⁴⁴ International Studies Conference (8th :), 144.

English word 'security' was given much of its political value by a group that were, at the time of their writing, a fringe political force. While security featured in the work of their political opponents, the security championed by these radical democrats was reconfigured; it became for them an important concept in justifying and actioning their at the time revolutionary political agenda. While the Levellers were unsuccessful, the political agenda they fought for found much more success in the US – which by 1919 would become the dominant force in international politics. Thus the investment of political meaning in security might now enjoy ubiquity, it was subject to the interests of a specific political identity operating against a very different political force.

This fact should give us a greater appreciation of security's decidedly Anglo character. While it might seem almost tautological to declare an English word as having an Anglo heritage, as we have seen both in presumptions of modern academics and in the remonstrations of Francesco Coppola, security in the 20th century has been subject to a level of ubiquity that has allowed it to escape analysis as a creation of a specific culture or identity. While we do not discount the possibility of a more ubiquitous base concept to which security appeals, until this base concept is properly separated from 'security' in discourse and scholarship, we must acknowledge that security as a term was invested with political meaning by a specific group of political actors; English speaking democrats. It should come as no surprise then that modern genealogies have found security's origin within a polity that share these identity traits.

What should concern us moving forward, however, is ascertaining to what degree we can apply notions of 'security' to polities that do not share these traits. In the opening chapter of this study we touched briefly on anthropological concerns regarding security, with one major example being the displacement of the traditional political concepts of some polities by the appropriation or enforcement of security upon their institutions and societies.⁵⁴⁵ If security can be so neatly linked to a specific political identity, then to what degree it should be expected of other identities should be carefully considered.

⁵⁴⁵ Kent, "Reconfiguring Security: Buddhism and Moral Legitimacy in Cambodia."

Indeed we may find that consideration of the above might be instrumental in separating the word security from the ubiquitous concept that it is presumed to represent. While the word may have been championed by a specific identity, that identity itself - and the concerns to which security appealed – were themselves built by thousands of years of competing identities, philosophies and historical considerations. Within these various polities and events we have seen a variety of different strands, paradigms and constructions that have informed the contestation that brought security to the political, and perhaps through comparing contemporary polities, debates and employments to these considerations (rather than imposing the presumption of a ubiquitous ‘security’ onto them) we might go some way to better understanding those polities, as well as better understanding whatever ubiquity security might betray.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

PARADIGMS AND CONCLUSION

The reconsideration of security as a concept originally specific to a particular political identity is one of the key outcomes of this thesis – through genealogical study, we have found a point at which the English word security is laden with a set of political values, outcomes and actions that it had not previously enjoyed, and its use in this way can be directly linked to a particular political group operating in a specific historical context.

Further, this thesis has shown how historical considerations from various points important to the Anglo-western tradition have influenced the term, both by providing the linguistic, philosophical and political distinctions necessary to give value to the word, and through their role in shaping the political identities who gave rise to political security during the English Civil War. The legacy of ancient Athens, of the Roman Empire, and considerations of theology and feudal rule were not simply instrumental in building a word we now know as security, they were also instrumental in building a political identity that saw a value in the concept so constructed, as well as a value against which they must act.

In this way we can see the value of examining security in both as an Austinian word-tool and as a concept expressed genealogically. As Austin said, words are tool demarcated from one another on the basis of need and distinction; security arrived in the political lexicon because the distinction it made was necessary for the proper communication of those who used it. However that need was not created in a vacuum, but was a function of the situation, concepts and identity in which that communication occurred. The word is a product of necessary communication, and in the context of political conflict, communication is a product of a practical political need. Thus security must be understood as a concept that must be communicated (a word) *and* as a function of the need that induced such communication; considerations that when taken together display the role that specific political interests have played in shaping and contesting security.

Therefore this thesis has made a contribution in its identification of security's political emergence in English, but also in its more complete incorporation of the various values and identities that have shaped that emergence. Chief among these is the use of Anglo-Saxon sources, something previously not done in other genealogical, historical or philosophical studies of security. The incorporation of Anglo-Saxon considerations into the story of security is of vital importance to understanding how the term came to be. English society before the Norman Conquest was often cited by the radical democrats as an inspiration to their political expectation; while their expectation of that time might not be realistic nor their engagement with the old England systematic, the fact that pre-Norman England retained a value to them demonstrates that Anglo-Saxon England was still important to the political conceptions of the English Civil War, and thus to the use of security in politics.

Another important contribution of the thesis has been made in its more complete analysis of the relationship between *securitas* and *asphaleia*. No other genealogical work has yet interrogated the presumed connection between the two words, nor the presumed connection between *asphaleia* and the security of Hobbes, however in so doing here we can see that such interrogation is sorely needed. This thesis therefore has not only shown both terms as they related to the political environment in which they were used, but also compared them. Previous works had failed to properly include theological considerations, and the works of authors such as Polybius, writing across the Greek/Latin divide, have been completely absent from other genealogies of security.

While these inclusions are notable in and of themselves, taken together they assist greatly in the identification of paradigms that have contributed to security as it appeared in modern English. Chief of these is the relationship between differing conceptions and operations of security, and the value of different paradigms those conceptions and operations, and the political constructions of the users. By including England before Norman feudalism, by comparing the role of religion in differing conceptions of security and power, through comparing Athenian *asphaleia* to other Greek states and to the Roman *securitas*, and most importantly, by comparing the security of competing political outlooks present in the English

Civil War, we can see how the value and use of security changes with the aims and justifications of the political construction in which it operates.

We can characterise this difference in broad strokes along lines of 'provisory' security and corporate or 'collective' security, with the former being a feature of autocratic or absolutist political constructions and the latter featuring in polities in which citizens have a stake and responsibility in the maintenance of social and political order. In polities such as the Roman Republic and post-conquest England, the word *securitas* imparted a sense of individual, emotive satisfaction, pitched as an outcome of governance; in the Roman Empire, the term burgeoned into a fully blown notion of a governmental provision for the benefit of its people, a provision both physical and emotive. In contrast, democratic Athens and Saxon England featured concepts that relied on active participation for their realisation, and were manifested not in the individual experiences of citizens, but in a political outcome held in corporate. Crucially, these dynamics are confirmed in the comparative analysis of political constructions in the English Civil War, in the same English word. In comparing the tyranny of both Hobbes and Cromwell to the democracy of the Levellers, we see security employed; in the former, it follows the lines of provisory, absolute security, and in the latter, the corporate security more closely allied with polities in which citizens are active participants.

However this broad characterisation does little to explain how or why security was used in the way it was, how and why its ancestor concepts were used, or how varying political constructions valued differing notions of security. In essence, what the above conclusion lacks is a detailed awareness of how the paradigms present in the anglo-western story of security affect how any particular employment of security is realised within a particular polity. In order to properly conclude this study, then, we will finish by exploring these paradigms. Instead of recapping each historical snapshot, we will demarcate the various paradigms that have arisen in the study and summarize how these paradigms informed security across each polity.

UNDERWRITING POLITICS

One important paradigm that follows closely from our broad characterisation above is the notion of security as a guarantee for a polity. As above, the form of this guarantee shifts depending on the nature of the polity. *Asphaleia*, *frip* and the Leveller's rational security were not in themselves necessary for politics to occur, however all sought to guarantee the political construction in which they were employed, whether through *asphaleia*'s balance to contestation, *frip*'s insurance for responsibility, or through rational security's enshrinement on individual reason as a fundamental part of political organisation. In contrast, the *securitas* of Rome, the security of Hobbes, and the security admonished in Christian theology guaranteed the polity, however the guarantee was less about the political construction than it was about the lived life members of that polity experienced. While Seneca and Plutarch both made the argument that delivery of such a guarantee to the people also brought a sort of guarantee to the ruling authority (in the form of public support and trouble free reign), the fundamental basis of this security was quite different to that of its more democratic counterpart.

Neither were these two differently signified notions of security equally weighted – where security for absolute governments was discretionary on the part of the sovereign, for more corporate polities security was far more necessary. For Hobbes, for example, security is a positive outcome of absolute rule, but for the Levellers it is foundational to the logic of government; if everyone is assumed to be free, then each individual's freedom must be secured by that government. Absolute subjects are simply that – subjects; while the ruler may or may not grant them security, and the people may or may not be satisfied with the provision of security the ruler makes, the polity remains as long as justifying force or forces (military power, divine right, etc.) remains. For modern liberalism however, the polity itself constitutes on the basis of an agreement between freely associating individuals; power is shared to preserve the freedom that sits as a tacit assumption of liberal constructions. As such, as with any important agreement, it is made on the basis of a guarantee – of security. Neither the guarantee nor the agreement can be separated; both are foundational to the other.

This is most powerfully displayed in the early modern expressions of security – in Locke, Lilburne and the agitators – however the function or role of the guarantee of free association is still fulfilled in the Athenian *asphaleia* and Saxon *frip*. In the former, the function of guarantee is configured in the notion of opposition. The reliance on free action and individual reason within the democratic system is underwritten by the concept of balance and stable tension; a speaker is *asphaleia* when their reason stands up to scrutiny, a political party when it withstands the efforts of its opponents, and ultimately the city is *asphales* when the sum of its politics can withstand the challenges of enemies or circumstance. When held separately, these three levels remain different operations of the same word, but viewed holistically, we can see a picture in which it is the sum of these three levels that properly expresses *asphaleia*. Typified by Pericles' call for prudent judgement in the face of the plague, it is *asphales* reason that leads to an *asphales* polity and an *asphales* nation. Contestibility thus is a crucial part of *asphaleia*, with the process of contestation providing the guarantee by which the agreement of the demos can be relied upon.

In comparison, *frip* expressed the need for a guarantee in extremely practical terms – by enforcing what we might glibly call a 'security deposit' today. In a polity defined by corporate responsibility, to ensure adherence to that responsibility each member was essentially 'insured', with the wergilds, fines and hundreds all underwriting the risks of political constitution. By giving each member a value, setting 'premiums' through the institution of fines, and by weaving together 'liabilities' through the hundred courts (especially through holding hundreds to account for failing to bring members to justice), pre-Norman England could build a political construction that featured group assent and decision-making, but was still underwritten by a form of 'security'.

ANTI POLITICS

However the modern notion of security also has within it an almost antithetical possibility that stems from its own perceived necessity to corporate polities – something that

Neocleous calls “anti-politics”.⁵⁴⁶ While security might underwrite the agreed construction of a democratic polity, it also holds the possibility of suspending the same politics it seeks to guarantee. Neocleous uses the term specifically against Locke’s formulation of security and politics, however we can see the signature of this anti-politics reach into our earlier paradigms as well.

In Locke’s conception, security’s possibility of suspending the same politics that it seeks to underwrite comes from both a capacity to do so (the necessity of its power) and its need to do so (executive prerogative). While these two issues coalesce, they arise as separate considerations. The former – the need for governments to have power such that it can police, maintain and regulate political freedom – is a practical matter; a liberal polity cannot guarantee rights and freedoms against arbitrary uses of power without itself having the power to compel. There is then a relationship between the inclusion inherent in liberal polities and the acquisition and maintenance of state power and position; in the words of Arthur Salter, “There must be a system of government, comprehensive enough to include those between whom violence may occur, strong enough to control them.”⁵⁴⁷

However the guarantee provided by such a power grants the capacity to suspend politics to that government. While this may have been less of an issue within participatory democracies such as Athens (in which both domestic punitive efforts and military actions were subject to popular approval), when combined with the perceived need for representative executives within modern liberalism, this power-based guarantee holds the capacity (and in many conceptions, the expectation) to suspend politics. Reliant on representation rather than continuous popular assent, executive government in a liberal context must hold the power to make decisions unfettered by popular debate and counsel, especially in response to ‘exceptional circumstances’. As discussed above, Locke’s

⁵⁴⁶ Neocleous, *Critique of Security*, 185.

⁵⁴⁷ Salter, *Security : Can We Retrieve It?*, 106.

prerogative was designed to allow a representative liberal government to insure itself against circumstance, but this same capacity holds the necessity of illiberal action.⁵⁴⁸

Thus security holds the capacity to destroy the same politics it seeks to underwrite, leading critics such as Neocleous to question whether “...the magic word ‘security’ serves merely to neutralise political action, encouraging us to surrender ourselves to the state in a thoroughly conservative fashion.”⁵⁴⁹ Ultimately, the form of Neocleous’ critique sits within liberal assumptions of politics - that is to say, it seems to assume that politics and liberal politics are one and the same – however a similar critique of security goes back to well before the ‘security culture’ of 9/11, or even the Cold War arrived. Carl Schmitt, political philosopher, one-time Nazi grand jurist and no fan of liberalism levelled a similar criticism at liberalism and representative democracy; when faced with exceptional circumstances, liberalism must choose between reneging on its own construction to venture necessary (but illiberal) action, or risk its own destruction.⁵⁵⁰

The crucial detail of this dilemma is that these two sides – the guarantee security provides to a polity and the ‘anti-politics’ it gives rise to are not two sides of the same coin, or two aspects of the same concept, but simultaneous and contiguous results of a singular mode of a particular political construction. If political agreements, constitutions, and representative governments secure the people and their freedoms, then that governance must itself be secured. In attempting to secure politics from force, for example, greater force must be given to the state than to those that it is seeking to guarantee.

This dilemma is apparent even as security was being realised by the Levellers. Whilst they might ultimately appeal to reason, God or justice, in arguing for the ‘security’ of freedom

⁵⁴⁸ Eli Jelly-Schapiro, “‘All the World Was America’: THE LONG HISTORY OF HOMELAND SECURITY,” in *Security and Terror*, 1st ed., American Culture and the Long History of Colonial Modernity (University of California Press, 2018), 36, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctv6p45s.5>.

⁵⁴⁹ Neocleous, *Critique of Security*, 4.

⁵⁵⁰ Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, University of Chicago Press ed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 14.

through the extension of franchise, rights and fair treatment, the parliamentary army relied on the 'security' of force. In their pamphlets and letters it is clear that the Agitators were happy to underwrite their claims with the fact that the army itself would not relinquish its capacity for force until executive and military power was invested in an entity in whom they trusted not to abuse it. Thus from the very start of the Anglo-liberal project, force underwrote freedom from force; security was both protection-from, and capacity-to.

However while more modern modes of governance display special challenges in this regard, this is not to suggest that such dichotomies are unique to modern liberalism. While the direct participatory nature of Athens prevented some of the above issues, as we have seen, the contestability of '*asphaleia*' held a similar capacity to suspend regular politics in regards to the participatory democracies of Athens and Corcyra. Through the invocation of *asphaleia*, actions that were destructive to the polity that invoked them were justified, such as in the context of civil war; democrats used a term that spoke to the conflict and tension in democratic politics to justify the proactive destruction of those they would have 'wrestled'. Aristophanes showed that the reliance on popular reason and rhetoric in political justification leaves open the possibility of what we now call securitization, in which the reason that is foundational to the political process is essentially reconfigured to deny its original purpose.

We can also see evidence of this dichotomy in pre-Norman England, where the centrality of personal liability both underwrites the polity, but also gives rise to vectors of complexity. Laws such as the *frif-stol* demonstrate the complex dichotomy that such a system create – ensuring for an accused protection from citizen prosecutors that are simultaneously liable to punishment for *failing* to prosecute the same accused seeking protection. Thus the same forces that provide 'security' for the polity hold the capacity to suspend the operation of that polity.

Further, one might see the fall of Danish/Saxon England as indicative of the risks that face a polity that relies on the complex web of responsibility necessitated by the decentralised notion of 'security' that defined *frif*. On a grand scale, this union of mutual responsibility

and decentralised security could be seen (rather romantically and simplistically) as the reason for the system's fall. On the assumption that Harald Godwinson removed his brother Tostig from the earldom of York due to responsibility to common friþ of the kingdom, the fact that this removal ended with Tostig attempting to invade England with a Norwegian army might suggest that adherence to friþ (either in removing him at all, or in *only* removing him) created far less friþ than it otherwise upheld. This is especially true given that Tostig's invasion likely reduced Harald's capacity to repel the Norman Conquest, which arrived only three weeks later.

In this way we can begin – albeit only begin – to better understand the polarising potential of an uncritical discourse of security. By identifying the paradigms that allow security to function in these ways, rather than simply comparing the two outcomes as they are expressed in a modern setting, we can better appraise outcomes against the considerations that drive them; instead of comparing government control to individual rights, freedom to security or protection to opportunity, we can instead consider to what degree an act of security might facilitate or suspend the politics it underwrites. While such an endeavour was not impossible beforehand, an awareness of the historical and cultural values inherent in security widen the scope of examination and broaden the identification of possibilities significantly.

REASON

Perhaps the most fundamental distinction between the nature of security in corporate polities and security in absolute modes of governance is the role of reason and responsibility in realising that security. We have seen that the use of reason and responsibility forms a distinction between various polities within the western tradition; from the importance of individual reason in ancient Athens, the supplication of reason to property in republican Rome, and the centrality of individual responsibility and corporate reason within Saxon England. But just as reason and individual responsibility hold different values to the construction of different polities, so too do they change the nature of the security those polities require.

In the case of Athenian democracy, we heard the Athenian statesman Pericles position the decisions made by the wider citizenry as being matters of *asphaleia*. Specifically, Pericles argued that if citizens had children they would have a greater capacity and likelihood to make decisions that had a positive effect on the future of Athens, as the citizens would be thinking not just of themselves in the short term, but also of their children in the future. That the Athenian state might find 'security' in this way is straightforward – as all decisions of government were made collectively, the more citizens that exercised sober and well-considered judgement, the better the nation would fare.

However in Cicero's conception of the Roman republic, the exercise of reason is reserved only for a small ruling class. For Cicero's common citizen, reason manifested in the metaphor of the elephant and the mahout – the political will of the common class coalesced to form an unwieldy beast, whilst the ruling aristocracy used their reason, authority and power to shape the will of the beast to positive ends. In practical terms, the notion that the reason of citizens was something to be shaped rather than harnessed can also be seen in Cicero's desire to keep the plebeian tribunes so that they may be used to temper and guide the desires of the plebs they supposedly represented. In this context, the reason of the citizen does not grant security as it did in Athens – it instead is a force that is separate from political power, a power that may well destabilise as much as secure.

With the separation of reason from political action comes also the relinquishment of responsibility. Where the Athenian had a responsibility to the polity in their decision, republican Rome limited political responsibility to a small ruling class, and imperial Rome limited this responsibility even further. With this removal of responsibility, however, came an understanding of security that hinged on provision – whether the mahout was an aristocracy or an emperor, the caretaker of the great beast could not simply whip it, they must also feed it. From the fable of Agrippa Menenius Lanatus we see the patrician class as the stomach of the body, receiving the labours of the plebs in order to enrich and redistribute them; in the time of Nero, the divine *genius* of the emperor is granted to the

people in the form of grain, games and gifts, all bringing with them *securitas* – a lack of concern within the people.

But while the removal of reason from the citizenry might remove the configuration of security typified by Pericles' Athens, in its place rises another configuration of security, one in which the provision of the people secures the sovereign. As Seneca implores Nero, an absolute ruler solidifies their position through their provision both material and emotional – generosity, justice and care all ingratiating the population to their benefactor. However while any polity would be more 'secure' with a well provisioned populus, with the removal of reason and responsibility comes the removal of liability; where Thucydides suggested that in times of crisis necessity induces democracies to come together to make prudent decisions, an absolute government might well have to view its domestic polity as another external force to manage given a similar state of affairs.

We see the shift between these two notions of security in the transition of judicial responsibility in England. Where responsibility and judicial reason was in the Saxon context a corporate affair, under the Normans this was replaced by the provision of justice by the Crown. The outcome of his shift can be seen in the eulogy of William the Conqueror, where the anonymous author bemoans the loss of the security of rights and responsibilities offered by the king, but also bears witness to the efficacy of the public security Norman rule imposed on the commons. While William stripped rights from commoners, ordained and aristocrats all, it seems that this was offset at least somewhat by his effective provision of justice.

However the role of reason in security across polities is not simply reactionary, at least within the political conceptions of the anglo-western tradition. The debates of the English Civil War show that reason was not simply passive in its relationship to security in either a liberal or absolute conception of politics; instead, the appreciation and configuration of reason played a constitutive role within the conception of these political systems in the early modern period, something that then went on to determine the configuration of security. The absolute government advocated by Hobbes was absolute precisely because of

reason – Hobbes had little faith that the reason of individuals could be reconciled, and so saw security as being realised in the subjection of reason. In contrast, the Levellers saw little guaranteed in a system in which the reason of individuals was ignored or subsumed, and as such saw security as necessarily protecting, and being constituted by, the reason of individuals. Thus the place of reason has been instrumental in determining and shaping notions of security in the Anglo-western tradition. Though while in basic terms these two configurations are mutually exclusive, there still remains paradigms in which the tension between these two forms of reason in security can be brought together by the state of exception when experienced by corporate polities.

Both in the securitization of Aristophanes' *Birds* and the investment of prerogative in an executive in the theory of Locke, the reason of individuals and the suspension of that same reason coalesces. In the case of securitization, public reason is applied specifically in absolving it of its own necessity. Presented with a request to suspend public reason – debate, common laws, or scrutiny – the reason of the public chooses to absolve itself of its responsibility and accept the act of securitization. Put another way, the polity is faced with an exceptional circumstance and chooses to suspend the necessity of public reason in order to gain security. Even more confusing, security itself is a measure designed to safeguard the same reason that has been suspended.

Similarly, in the case of Locke's prerogative and the power of the executive in a representative democracy, we can see the supplication of public reason to a measure of sovereign reason. For Locke, reason is the driving force that induces people to reduce the freedom inherent in nature and instead form stable (secure) societies – essentially, reason is the driving logic of security itself.⁵⁵¹ Further, whether to overcome the practicalities of liberal government across large populations, or whether to preserve the executive in crises and exceptional cases, the sum total of that popular reason culminates in the capitulation of individual and public reason to a sovereign body. Again, in this case, there arises a

⁵⁵¹ Second treatise 9.123

paradoxical relationship in security itself; the ‘outsourcing’ of reason serves to protect the state, which is built on the authority of the same individual reason it now circumvents.

This paradoxical relationship cannot be resolved here, nor is it likely to be resolved anywhere. However the appreciation of the paradox is important inasmuch as it refines the considerations of security as both foundational to politics and ‘anti-politics’. In a polity constructed on a public reason, security stands to both preserve and circumvent that reason. Beyond simply demanding the practical power to suspend politics, security must also have access to the capacity to short circuit the very thing that grants such polities their authority. Security’s ambivalent relationship to reason is thus worthy of careful consideration; it may be that ‘unsecuritizing’ is just as important to democratic polities as invoking security in the first place.⁵⁵²

INTEREST

An important factor in determining the application and legitimacy of reason in political construction – and which therefore is also important in determining the nature of security within a polity – is that of interest. Indeed, while Hobbes argues for the supplication of individual reason to a single authority, he does so not because of the properties of reason, but rather because reason leads to a difference of interest. Who holds an interest, and what constitutes that interest, has been a core consideration of the Anglo-western political tradition, with each of our examples given in this study demonstrating a different method of construing that interest. Where Athens understood interest in terms of reason and participation, republican Rome justified its political construction based on material interest – only those who owned a certain amount of property were able to vote. Where Saxon England determined interest by participation in justice and defence of civic life, the Normans that came after tied interest to royal favour and the stewardship of property.

⁵⁵² Second treatise on government 9.123

The justification of interest and how that justification can mold security is most visible in the Putney debates, however. On one side, the Grandee Henry Ireton defends the notion of suffrage on the basis of wealth. In his view, votes should go only to those with an annual landed income of forty shillings⁵⁵³ a year or more, on the basis that;

“...no person hath a right to an interest or share in the disposing of the affairs of the kingdom, and in determining or choosing those that shall determine what laws we shall be ruled by here—no person hath a right to this, that hath not a permanent fixed interest in this kingdom”

Essentially for Ireton interest was material; some real property that gave the citizen a liability of property. Against this view, the Agitator Thomas Rainsborough defined interest not as a material holding or affectation of wealth, but as an inherent value of the subject – interest was not financial, but was instead derived from the condition of being ruled;

“the poorest he that is in England hath a life to live, as the greatest he; and therefore truly, sir, I think it’s clear, that every man that is to live under a government ought first by his own consent to put himself under that government”

This argument was not one of wealth and wealth alone, but rather an argument over the value and propriety of reason and decision. Where Rainsborough believed that interest was based on consent – that having to consent to an action demanded that one had an interest in determining the action, Ireton was concerned with the value of the interest - that is to say, the quality, efficacy and capacity of the decision. For Ireton, limiting political reason to those with landed, financial power was to limit it to “...the persons who, taken together, do

⁵⁵³ To give an idea of where this figure sits in practical terms, 40 shillings a year represents just over £82,000 in relative output in 2018 – that is to say that forty shillings a year in 1647 had a comparable influence and purchasing power in the economy as 82 thousand pounds does today. This would put a comparable application of this system today as excluding over 95% of the English public.

comprehend the local interest of this kingdom.” Those poorer citizens should have rights, says Ireton, but they should not be allowed decide.

While the determination of interest is a fundamental question of political construction, rather than of security, the nature of interest within a polity still has an effect on the construction of security for that polity. For Rainsborough, failing to accommodate the interest of the ruled was the invitation of anarchy or abusive subjection; for Ireton, the inclusion of those without the means and experience of power in deciding how such power was to be used was to invite unreason and insecurity. While both desired an elected government, and both wanted to construct that government on the basis of reason, how interest was determined informed both how the government should be constructed, as well as how it may fail – what it required security from.

While it remains nuanced, we can see the effect of interest on security in a number of our examples. In the reason-based interest of Athens, the instability brought by misaligned, misguided or misappropriated interest sits behind important events and texts. For example, while Aristophanes’ *Birds* most overtly deals with issues of securitization, it is telling that the play opens with the two Athenian protagonists leaving the city proclaiming that they are sick of the debates of the agora and the creation of laws, and instead seek to remove themselves from political life. Given that these men ultimately convince, control and rule the fanciful kingdom of birds (which in its actions mirror Athens itself), Aristophanes’ play can also be seen as a critique of Athenian interest, a commentary on the risks of the Periclean virtue of the Athenian; that Athenians “...do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business; we say that he has no business here at all.” If the polity is created on the basis of universal interest in political life, then misconstrued, wasted or malcontent interest, being a necessary constituent part of that life, runs the risk of leading the polity astray.

Thucydides also explores this point, especially in regards to how it relates to circumstance. Indeed one might (as Hobbes certainly did) call much of the History a critique of Athenian decision-making, with special note of the decision to invade Syracuse. Mirroring the later

concerns of Ireton, Thucydides paints a picture in which the decisive moment of the war is determined by a debate in which the majority of voters lack a basic understanding of the necessities of such an expedition. Public reason settles on a course of action that stood counter to the reason of the most experienced and capable leader, with the end result of this is course of action being ruin for the Athenians.

While the Syracusean debate stands as a specific point of example, broad, systematic criticism of such machinations were outside the scope of Thucydides' work, however the issue of interest as it applies to reason appears intermittently throughout the book. On one hand, Thucydides says that while they may be chaotic when they feel secure, there is a propensity for democracies to make prudent decisions when existentially threatened; essentially, that when interests were unified in circumstance, the risks of democracy were few. On the other, he mentions that of all the governments of Athens he ever experienced, the most effective was one of moderately restricted franchise.

Roman and Saxon notions of political interest show how the insecurity created between different configurations between material interest and rights-based interest could be handled. On one hand, a Roman was defined by birth, but deemed political by virtue of property. In this way, much as Ireton would have it, interest was firmly material, and thus reason was dependent on those interests. Such a system sought to mitigate the chaos of democracy and the excess of tyranny, though would also lead to the eclipsing of the republic by the material power of the individuals who created it.

On the other hand, the Saxon system sought to include both material and rights based interest in its system. The material capacities of individuals were reflected in their responsibilities toward the common frip, as was their higher value reflected in their weregild. In this way the risks of disparity between material and rights based interest was meant to be bridged – though the history of invasions and the propensity for sections of the population to pick and choose allegiances suggests that even with such a construction, subjects were likely to align themselves with whatever force they believed could guarantee (or maximise) their level of both interests.

The application and appreciation of interest in modern liberal governance is thus the inheritor of a complex notion of political interest, in which material interest and rights based interest are the main paradigms. To further complicate this inheritance, it would seem that from the start of the modern liberal project, these paradigms were not reconciled, but at best were rather uncritically co-opted. Neither Ireton nor Rainsborough's position prevailed in the Putney debates, and regardless, the government that followed the civil war followed neither's hope for franchise. However although the question of property requirements was not settled, there was a similar proposition that received more agreeance – the provision that servants, apprentices, beggars (and presumably, women) be excluded on the basis that they relied on others, and thus could not exercise their own reason. The incapacity of those without material capability presented a risk to the debaters – that votes could be bought, foreign agents could affect outcomes – presented real risks to the security of the nation. Essentially, even for the Levellers, who above all valued individual freedom and political reason believed that an individual that did not have a basic level of material could retain that reason.

By the time Locke puts forward his government of reason and liberty, the tension between material and right is essentially camouflaged into the single category of 'property'; for Locke argues that while every man is born free, they will use their reason to coalesce in common governance "for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name, property." Thus Locke's state is to provide security for both material and rights, and variously calls for the subjection of all equally to the law, and an absolute prohibition on government transgression of property rights. Thus the materials of power, and rights power grants, are left to be expressed in the security of liberal government.

While interests in and of themselves might not immediately impose on the formulation of that security, as we will see - and have already seen – there exists an ambivalent relationship between security and the authority and mechanisms of liberal politics. This ambivalence is not totally attributable to the value of interest within that polity, however the derivation of interest serves to exacerbate or mitigate aspects of security's ambivalence.

As reason and power both present issues to the liberal logic of security, so the use of reason and material in determining citizen's political interest helps determine the nature and force of security's ambivalence in liberal politics.

EMOTION

The appreciation of the role of political interest and reason in determining political construction and the configuration of security opens the door for an extremely important signature of security; the appreciation of security as a subjective expression, rather than an objective state of affairs. By necessity, the determination of rhetoric, reason, and the value of various elements of political interest is often an expression of an individual or group's personal interest. For example, it should have come as little surprise that the Grandees were largely landowning gentry, while the wider army was generally poor commoners; the disagreement between the Grandees and Agitators regarding how franchise would be awarded thus being able to be seen as an expression of class interests. Viewing political interest as an expression of personal interest does not undo the role of interest outlined above – the interest that impinges on the construction of the polity, regardless of its point of origin, will still have an impact on how issues of security manifest and are expressed.

However the appreciation of political interest as an extension of personal interest does open us to an appreciation of the subjectivity of security. Whether constructed from the interest of a specific person, homogenous group, or collaboration of various individual interests, the core determination of who may be political and on what basis must on some level be a matter of interpretation. Given that the configuration, purpose and concern of security is informed by the construction of the polity it sits within, and given that we have already seen that political interest has real ramifications on how security is expressed, we must also accept that security is similarly subject to individual interests.

But as the positive construction of politics holds within it the subjectivity of the various personal interests that make up the polity, and that construction impinges on security, so

too does security itself hold its own unique capacity for subjectivity. Beyond the above issues of interest within the polity, the word security itself owes its existence to the identification of an individual, emotive concept. The Latin root of the term was one of an emotive value, a subjective condition experienced by an individual; the *securitas* of Cicero denoted an individual, emotive state in which one was free from concerns, while the *securitas* of Seneca denoted the satisfaction and contentment of the citizen with their provision.

In its role as a 'guarantee', security as it appeared in English retained this emotive value – granting peace of mind to the lender, *securité* was a value proposition, an expression of doubt. When carried over to the liberal political space, this dynamic remained firmly in the word's purpose. For the foundation of a government on the basis of agreement, there was needed a suitable guarantee for that agreement. The promise of peace and political stability from freely associating people was not one free of risk, nor one that was certain to be upheld – therefore some form of security was needed.

Thus the English 'security' has at its core the utility of a subjective term, a term that ascribes and describes a value, rather than declares or announces a specific object or artefact. Further, this subjectivity carried over into its systematic political usage. Both in terms of the positive construction of polity through the personal interest or interests of its constituents, and through the fact that the active identification of risks requires a value proposition on the part of the assessor, political security remained at its core an expression of subjective appraisal.

PRACTICAL REALISATION

However both the nature of the subjectivity discussed above, and the lucidity of that subjectivity shifts as security is realised in corporate polities. While security retains a subjective core across absolute conceptions and corporate ones, the expression of that subjectivity changes between modes, as does the immediacy of that subjectivity's

expression. The security of Hobbes and Seneca relies on the emotive appraisal of the citizen; the purpose of the leviathan, or of the imperial provision, is to induce within each individual a 'feeling', a certainty or cordial acceptance of a political reality dictated by a politically distinct sovereign. That sovereign also has an individually derived notion of security – their security of person and of rule.

In comparison, the construction of corporate polities demands a more public appraisal of security as both political risks and political satisfaction is held in common. This demands more than individually appraised emotive states; instead it requires the acceptance of commonly derived norms. These norms themselves induce the creation of some practical measure by which security can be enacted. For the Levellers, these practical measure was to begin with the *Agreement of the People* and the laws said agreement was to enact. Likewise, for friþ to be enjoyed in Saxon England, the social norm of community justice must be accepted, and the friþgilds constituted. For *asphaleia* to be realised in Athens, the debates of the Agora must occur, ballots performed, and decisions executed by the elected officials. In comparison, for Hobbes' *Leviathan*, security is not enacted by any particular edict, law, act or event – it is simply the end result of an absolute sovereign authority.

However much like the dichotomous relationship between politics and anti-politics, security as a practical application and security as a subjective outcome problematize each other in two ways. Firstly, the necessity of a practical outcome to create security in a corporate polity conflates the subjective and objective. For example, if democratic polities demand a commonly held and enforced law on the basis of security, this is a subjective, experiential claim, however practically, this demands legislation and independent policing. From the other direction, we see 'securitization' – the view of individuals within a government induces a practical act of security, which is then appraised by individual citizens. This chicken-egg situation is in itself not so problematic, however it dooms an evaluation of security to always be subject of twin considerations. Put simply neither subjective nor objective security can truly exist within a corporate polity; it must always on some level be appreciated as both.

Secondly, security's reliance on and defence of social norms within liberal polities, like everything else in said polities, invites contestation. Both the social norms being protected, and the formulation of possible risk to those norms is subjectively derived. This interplays with the first consideration, giving a situation in which security has a practical outcome (and can thus be seen as objective or quantifiable), but is derived by necessity from the sum total of a normative – yet subjective - experience. Indeed it is for this reason that Niemeyer calls security both the product of and the protector of normative social concerns, a state of affairs that leads him to conclude that “no objective security exists, then, except with reference to the subjective...”⁵⁵⁴

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Thus in the 17th century ‘security’ emerged for its value in expressing a guarantee against the risks of political construction, and while it was used in a political setting by absolutist political constructions, it was in the liberal operation of radical democrats like the Levellers that it took on its specifically political flavour. Before the civil war there was little use of security in any political context, nor was that speaking of a political acts or practises. It was the use of security in speaking of the practical guarantees of politics first cemented the term as a politically valuable one, and would go on to push security beyond its beginnings in the English Civil War and into the contemporary age – the broad meaning of the term in Leveller tracts being exported to the United States before being pushed into world politics in the 20th century.

The word's shift to a specific political application was therefore the result of a shift in political construction. In redesigning their conception of how polities were justified and organised, the Levellers required language to demarcate and differentiate their political claims. In this way, we see the ascension of security as a political term as a function of the

⁵⁵⁴ International Studies Conference (8th : , *Collective Security; a Record of the Seventh and Eighth International Studies Conferences, Paris 1934--London 1935, Edited by Maurice Bourquin*, 159.

specific concerns of a specific group of political actors. In attempting to redefine the English polity following the civil war, the Levellers had a particular political idea for which security was an effective vehicle. Politics based on power was unjustified and doomed to oppress or fail; instead, England needed a politics based on reason, freedom and assent. But like all important agreements, one should not enter it without a guarantee; security had indicated a guarantee against an economic or personal risk, and so as politics was reconfigured to the form of an agreement, it was applied to political risks in a similar way.

We can – and should – therefore see security as a function of a specific political identity. Security was given a political value as part of the emergence of liberal democracy; its value derived from a reconfiguration of politics, security stands therefore in direct relationship to that reconfiguration. In acknowledging that relationship, we may better understand the conceptual space that it was originally intended to demarcate. Further, by appreciating security as the result of a particular set of political considerations, we can compare and contrast different polities instead of assume a role for security within them. By allowing security to remain an assumedly timeless constant in all political constructions, we unwittingly enforce a category of political action on other political identities and concerns that may be extraneous or ill-applied.

However while security may have been pushed into the political by a specific group with a specific set of concerns, we have also seen that the group and the political concerns that group had were both heavily influenced by a series of historical political identities and the legacies these historical elements left behind. In examining these other moments in history we not only gain a greater awareness of security as it appeared in the early modern period, we also see how the political concerns of the Levellers and their opponents were shared and shaped by a variety of different identities. We can thus see that while security specifically as an English word might have been the sum of a particular collection of these concerns operated by a specific group of people, that the concerns inherent in security can transcend the boundaries of culture and history.

It is through the study of these historical legacies that we identified various paradigms upon which the notion of security was formed. Further, these paradigms allowed us to better understand how we might understand security in other political settings. While *asphaleia* is not security, shared paradigms of public reason can allow us to better understand what we might call Athenian notions of 'security'. Likewise, while *securitas* is not security, the paradigms that suggest its absence allow us to better understand the limits of security, and the conditions of its original inference. For example, the paradigm of interest can be used to compare the security of the Levellers (who determined interest through reason) to the 'security' of those who like Cicero presumed a very limited franchise on the basis of wealth. From these comparisons made within the Anglo-western tradition, we have also found the signatures of the democratic or 'liberal' concept of security. At all points at which the paradigms of reason, interest, emotion, anti-politics and other are configured in a way that is congruous to this 'liberal' security, we see the elements of corporate responsibility in the polity in which the paradigm operates. We have therefore built a picture not simply of security as a solitary concept, but also begun to garner an understanding of how the concept operates within a political environment. Put another way, we have not simply understood security, but how security exists as a political consideration.

Thus this study has not only elucidated the emergence of security as a politically valuable word in English, it has also uncovered a set of paradigms and policies that we may broadly identify as being indicative of a wider concept of 'security' that may extend beyond the context of the narrowly construed political employment by Anglo democrats. In doing so it is hoped that we may speak of 'security' as it is used within contemporary political discourse with more precision and clarity. Further, it is hoped that we may better appreciate the conceptual imprecision inherent in uncritically applying the term to polities that do not fit the anglo-democratic model, allowing the term to retain some specificity, and allowing other polities to define themselves, rather than be given the expectation of the necessity of security.

Therefore it is hoped that this thesis might build the basis of a set of continuing enquiries. Primary among these is the continuation of a methodical methodology; as stated earlier,

many genealogical assessments begin with the 1930's, however this thesis has justified the exploration of a more thorough engagement beginning much earlier. In so doing, it is hoped we can better understand how early uses in the colonies, especially by American politicians and lawmakers relate to the 'collective security' advocated by Wilson in the early 20th century.

It is also hoped that the findings of this study might induce a more systematic study of the relationship between what might now be called domestic security concerns and international security concerns – essentially security as a consideration of domestic politics, against security as a consideration of international affairs. Despite the heavy focus on the international notion of security in 20th century International Relations and Security Studies, this study has found that security and its constitutory paradigms have an overwhelming domestic focus. It may be worthy of further study, therefore to ask whether the 'broadening' and 'deepening' of security within these disciplines after the Cold War is then a function of a shift in 20th century security, or a shift *back* to the traditional core of security after a divergent period following the Second World War.

Lastly, the results of this study provide impetus to correct a number of minor but pervasive historical assumptions regarding security, as well as providing a number of specific insights not yet factored into academic discourse on the subject. Events and paradigms such as Nero's 'new deal', the possible role of Germanic social construction on Anglo political culture, and the relationship between Hobbes and the Greek and Latin languages he dealt with all have the possibility of making small but notable revisions to existing discourses on, for example, human security. In this sense, the appreciation of historical considerations inherent in this study is not simply in aid of recreating a point of origin, but a reclamation of paradigms, of data points by which more precise calculations and constructions can be made for the future.

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