7 The (schizo)analysis of value in the ‘Age of Innovation’

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At a time when a well-branded concept is celebrated as an innovation, it is tempting to consider this the ‘Age of Innovation’. We daily hear talk of innovation nations and innovation economies, and everywhere the value of innovative ideas, technologies, and practices are extolled. Amidst the hyperbolic claims made in the name of innovation, what is evident is that contemporary economies are mining ideas with the same fervour that they had previously mined the earth. New institutions are born – innovation hubs, networks, and virtual ecosystems – with an eye to cultivating the kind of problem-based research that universities are still learning to produce. The conventional bounds set by disciplinary thinking are deemed a hindrance to the innovation paradigm. Such a paradigm recognises experimentation in the production of both ideas and things as value-adding at the level of process, as well as outcome. The interdisciplinary hybrid now familiarly known as ‘Art-Science’ is a case in point, with the meeting of art and science increasingly acclaimed as precisely the kind of cross-perspectival thinking necessary for solving complex problems (Wilson et al., 2014). It is the disparate nature of art and science that is celebrated in popular formulations of such interdisciplinarity, since heterogenous knowledges are identified as the source of the ‘creative leaps’ so crucial to innovation (Hacklin and Wallin, 2013).

Of course, we know how readily such interdisciplinarity can be reterritorialised in line with those uncompromisable social axioms that make the opportunistic mutations of capitalism work. Art finds itself the handmaiden of science; discovery is reduced to the completion of a picture; partnerships in research become synthetic affairs oriented to the transcendent universals of science.¹ And a mere novice in critical thinking can quickly deconstruct the very notion of innovation as the wish fulfilment of laissez-faire entrepreneurialism; that which is innovative is that which is profitable, useful, exchangeable. Yet to the extent that the pseudo-scientific paradigm that has dominated in the social sciences prevails, the evaluation of these new social forms will invariably succumb to either “progressivist illusions or visions which are systematically pessimistic” (Guattari, 1995: 5), missing much about the peculiar economy of desire and value expressed in the notion of innovation and materialised in its emerging social forms.

In seeking to understand the kinds of emerging institutional and social arrangements exemplified in Art-Science, we could learn much from the schizoanalytic

method that Guattari developed in his sole and joint authored work with Deleuze. In the many contexts in which the notion of schizoanalysis is deployed by Guattari and Deleuze and Guattari, the relationship between the psychoanalytic method and capitalism, with its contrary schizophrenic and paranoid tendencies, is at the fore (Guattari, 1995, 2000; Deleuze and Guattari, 1983; Guattari and Rolnik, 2008). In the light of these inharmonious tendencies, schizoanalysis functions as a way of avoiding those “petrified systems of modelisation”, which characteristically refuse such dynamism and err on the side of the paranoid reassertion of obsolete forms (Guattari, 1995: 68). While Guattari’s own context was clearly a clinical one, the method of schizoanalysis represents, more generally, an orientation toward the “chaotic vertigo” which, while it finds its “privileged expression in madness”, is the very engine of ontologically heterogenous reality (Guattari, 1995: 77). Schizoanalysis seeks to make “direct contact with the unconscious in the social field”, which is to say, with the interrelational and intensive fabric of life (Guattari, 2009: 251). In its orientation toward a differential ontology, the schizoanalytic method shares transcendental empiricism’s concern with orienting method, not to the model, but to the encounter with the groundlessness of the ground (see Todd and Hynes, 2017). Or, rather, schizoanalysis is, as Ian Buchanan (2013: 163) notes, a form of ‘meta-modelling’, in the sense that it “tries to grapple with the realm of ‘what might happen’ that constantly dogs the realm of ‘what is happening’”. As such, the schizoanalytic method provides a means of analysing institutional and extra-institutional mutations, mapping their emergent assemblages of enunciation, the processes of subjectification to which they give rise and the fields of future possibility they engender, within and beyond the dominant imperatives of valorisation.

Insofar as innovation involves, firstly, the production of something new and, secondly, the production of something new that has value (Gibson, 2014), what is at stake is how we might generate novel modes and forms of life that can find sufficient context within existing and emerging structures, habits, and refrains to actualise a surplus, which is productive of new territorialisations and subjective possibilities. While the task of innovative capitalism is to extract a surplus from the deterritorialised flows of capital and labour, there is an immanent processual potential that remains strictly irreducible to dominant reterritorialisations. Put differently, while innovative capitalism is oriented to the exploitation of the creativity of the commons, it runs the risk of abetting a potentiality which escapes privatisation and aids liberation (Lazzarato, 2014). And this immanent and irreducible potential might, to the extent that it operates within an ethico-aesthetic paradigm, push beyond the “dominant redundancies” that normalise the production of subjective and objective worlds (Guattari, 1995). For all the stultifying clichés of the innovative paradigm, there will be moments of genuine transversality, in which new universes of reference are created and new existential territories brought into being. These moments of machinic heterogenesis involve flashes of novelty which demonstrate that “the work of capitalism and scientific paradigms – their ongoing attempts to tame affective intensity – will never be completed” (Bertelsen and Murphie, 2010: 154).

Between the scientific and ethico-aesthetic paradigms

Acclaiming the inventive potentials of individuals and the rewards of interdisciplinary collaboration, the innovation paradigm pursues a new image of the institution, promising with it, a veritable unleashing of creativity. While emerging institutions of art-science, for example, have plural genealogies, from public engagement to more ontologically experimental ventures (Born and Barry, 2010), each is fashioned within this undertaking of institutional remodelling and the release of creative potential. But what this discourse of innovative collaboration obscures is the sense in which these emerging institutions are factories in the production of subjectivity. Discourse on innovation describes an objective process of liberating human creativity towards the solution of ideal and material problems. Yet, such discourse is, of course, the effect of a collective assemblage of enunciation – “a collective saying (*dire collectif*) that brings together machinic elements of every kind: human, semiotic, technical, scientific etc.” (Guattari, 1996: 152). And the signs and things associated with the name of innovation ultimately “combine with one another independently of the subjective ‘hold’ that the agents of individuated enunciation claim to have over them” (Guattari, 1996: 151).

While Maurizio Lazzarato (2014) is right that an entrepreneurial mode of subjectivity is the privileged form within this subjective production, Guattari’s schizo-analytic method better grapples with its less determinant dimensions. While it may be true that the processes of capitalist innovation and the associated production of techno-objects serve as routes to the attainment of subjectivity in the social, an understanding of the actuality of intensities and relations of force cannot take refuge in any existing model of the money economy of capitalism. There can be, as Guattari (1996: 51–52) suggests, no analytical unravelling “of the micropolitical conflicts in which the subject is imprisoned” under capitalism, nor does one discover the secret of a primal libidinality, since the unconscious has to be built, albeit within the conflictual tendencies of capitalist society. The method of schizoanalysis, then, is certainly not a romanticisation of the psychology of the schizophrenic, but is an effort to elaborate upon the impact of the quantitative calculations of the market on psychic and social functioning. What is at issue here are the schizophrenic tendencies of capitalism as a semiotic operator. Eugene Holland (1999: 2) writes:

In a first approximation, then, we could define schizophrenia as a form of “unlimited semiosis” – in the psyche as well as throughout society – that emerges when fixed meanings and beliefs are subverted by the cash nexus under capitalism. . . . What is at issue is not the reduction of praxis to cash, but the ways in which the schizophrenic tendencies of capitalism are over-coded by the more paranoid ones. . . . Put differently, the ways in which unlimited semiosis clashes with the resuscitation of obsolete, or traditional, belief-based modes of social organisation.

Of course, many of Guattari’s insights on the transversal relations between diverse social domains stem from his own clinical practice. Indeed, it is here that

he explores pragmatically the tension between the ethico-aesthetic and scientific paradigms that is evident today in the emerging institutions of art-science, while being strictly irreducible to the disciplinary encounter between art and science. With this in mind, I want to pursue the analysis of contemporary innovation economies via a brief discussion of a peculiarly 1960s experiment in the unleashing of creative energies, which Guattari outlines in his short paper “Mary Barnes’ Trip”, originally published as *Le Voyage de Mary Barnes* in 1973.

“In 1965, a community of about 20 people formed around Ronald Laing . . .” (Guattari, 1996: 46). Thus begins Guattari’s fascinating analysis of the events of Kingsley Hall, East London, where R.D. Laing’s anti-psychiatry movement embarked on a radical counter-cultural experiment. Guattari (1996: 46) explains that “over the course of five years the leaders of the anti-psychiatry movement and the patients who, as they say, ‘made a career of schizophrenia’, collectively explored the world of madness”. This was not, he stresses “the madness of the mental hospital, but the madness that dwells in each of us”, and the point of the Kingsley Hall experiments was not to cure such tendencies toward delirium but to liberate them “in order to release inhibitions and symptoms of every kind” (Guattari, 1996: 46). The Kingsley Hall community, as it conceived itself, was not insensible of the significance of its abode. As one of the founding members, psychiatrist Joseph Berke, recorded in his diary, “Kingsley Hall had a long and honourable history as a centre for social experiment and radical political activity”, among which the six-month period in which Mahatma Gandhi shared a room with a goat was considered exemplary (Barnes and Berke, 1973). Happily burdened by this auspicious history, the 1965 residents undertook an audacious ethico-aesthetic experiment, in which the physical state of the three-storey brown-brick building served as the best barometer of the good or bad health of the community. When the kitchen was “clean, or freshly painted, the milk bottles taken down, the garbage removed and food stacked high in the larder, then things were going well”; when “the walls looked like a Jackson Pollock abstraction, but with egg yolks substituted for paint . . . then matters weren’t too good” (Barnes and Berke, 1973: 227–228). Either way, in this adventure into and out of a kind of collective psychosis, led, it seems, by the self-appointed “guinea pig”, Mary Barnes, the variable health of the community was grist to the mill (Barnes and Berke, 1973).

Without evident malice, Guattari registers the shortcomings of this genuinely practical research into the collective dimension of desiring production and the liberation of desire. Despite the efforts of Laing and his colleagues to break with the structures of institutionalised psychiatry, they ultimately fall prey to the paranoia peculiar to the scientific paradigm, within which their own habits of thought and practice had been nurtured. Efforts to disregard the division of labour “among patients, psychiatrists, nurses, etc.” are undermined by the persistence of the interpretative screen that is cast over every thought and action of the residents, which reins the chaos of delirium back into the comfort of the interpretative framework and its orientation to familial structures. Yet, paradoxically, Guattari notes, this very paranoia threatens to unleash the delirium that it aims to manage. Attentive to the necessity of being there with desire in its very unfolding, one of the

psychiatrists regresses with his patient “in a way that is still rare among typical psychoanalysts: he grunts, acts like a crocodile, bites and pinches her, rolls her in her bed” and in doing so almost opens up to the unlimited semiosis that interpretation had aimed to keep at bay (Guattari, 1996: 50).

Ultimately, however, it is not the analysts who held sway at Kingsley Hall, and Guattari makes much of the way that his paper’s namesake, Mary Barnes, has both the other patients and the practitioners running in circles in response to her infantile regressions and the “vampirism of ‘human warmth’” that she cultivates in all her relations. Mary is an artist and whether she covers the wall with paint or with shit, what is important to her is that she be allowed to be expressive, that she not “push her feelings down” (Barnes and Berke, 1973).

Yet, it is the brief mention that Guattari makes of Mary’s brother, Peter, that I find especially catalytic. Guattari tells of how, in response to his sister’s various harassments, Peter settles in Kingsley Hall, but he loathes its “bohemian style”: there is, for him, “too much noise, too much chaos, and besides, he wants to hold onto his job” (Guattari, 1996: 46). Where the rest of the community “seems to live on air”, being more preoccupied with the mad “flows of shit, piss, milk and paint” than with the flow of money, Peter’s madness is considered by Guattari to be “far more disturbing” and ultimately far more radical. Guattari (1996: 48–49) writes:

Here perhaps one can understand the difference between a real schizo trip and a petit-bourgeois style of familialist regression. The schizo is not all that interested in “human warmth”. His dealings are elsewhere, on the side of the most deterritorialized fluxes: the flux of the “miraculating” cosmic signs, but also the flux of monetary signs. The schizo is not unaware of the reality of money – even if it is put to extraordinary uses – any more than he is unaware of any other reality. The schizo does not behave like a child. For him money is a reference point like any other and he needs to have at his disposal a maximum number of systems of reference, precisely to enable him to keep his distance.

Amidst this, at least apparently chaotic, anti-institutional experiment, Guattari (1996) spies in the figure of Peter the possibility of a genuinely schizo-becoming. While the other residents and staff of the hall immerse themselves in the web of essentially familial relations characterising their avowedly anti-institutional enterprise, the “real schizo trip” proves to be a far more singular undertaking. Because of course the anti-institutional stance cannot prevent the emergence of the institution that Kingsley Hall turns out to be, though the manner in which the experimentation with desire is conditioned by this emerging institution must remain opaque to those who refuse its existence.

In his introduction to the *Guattari Reader* in which “Mary Barnes’ Trip” is published, Gary Genosko (1996: 16) discusses the role played in Guattari’s thought by conceptual “lightning conductors”: events, thought experiments, titbits, and tales that spark off connections, strike to the heart of a problem, and energise its transformation into a new form. Fittingly perhaps, Guattari’s account of the

experiments at Kingsley Hall is my lightning conductor. In attempting to consider what kind of analysis the art-science institutions of today's innovation economies demand, the scenario that Guattari describes opens up conceptual possibilities, not through the synchrony of a structural analysis but through the transversality of a machinic one. More on that later. For the moment, let us leave Peter and his fellow residents of Kingsley Hall in history, so as to paint the contours of a significantly different and very 'now' social form, with its distinct enunciative assemblages and panoply of subjectivities.

From the entrepreneurialism of the familiar to experimentation with desire

At an institution already much vaunted for its innovative thought and practice, fantastic forms and plastic possibilities are produced through the meeting of art and science: fully recyclable and multifunctional structures are made out of chitin, the most abundant polymer on the planet, printed with a robotically controlled extrusion system, and used for architectural purposes; new lifeforms, "computationally grown, additively manufactured and biologically augmented", are formed into sustainable clothing suitable for interplanetary voyages (Oxman et al., 2015); sculptural helmets are 3D printed from algorithms modelled on the natural suturing processes in skull tissue; a silk pavillion is spun by 6,500 computer guided silkworms in a "unique hybrid of structural and biological engineering" (Flaherty, 2013); a photosynthetic, wearable digestive system is designed not to mimic nature, but to augment it. Working out of the MIT Media Lab, Sony Corporation Career Development Professor and Associate Professor of Media Arts and Sciences Neri Oxman and her team in the Mediated Matter research group combine the principles of computational design, additive manufacturing, synthetic biology, and materials engineering to produce objects and architectural forms that are biologically informed and digitally engineered "for, with, and by Nature" (Oxman, 2015). In other experimental mergings of art and science, artists use scientific data to create aesthetic works, as a way of converting the objectivity of scientific knowledge into experiential form (Ryiochi Kurokawa; teamLab; Stelarc), communities form to "promote the synergy between art and science for innovation and creativity" (Art-Science Node, Berlin), museums educate on the future potentials of interdisciplinary encounters (ArtScience, Singapore) and work toward "a community of lifelong explorers inspired by art and science" (Louisiana Art and Science Museum), while laboratories give institutional form to the essentially experimental character of art-science innovation (Spektrum, Berlin; Symbiotica, Perth; The Laboratory, Harvard).

Among the diverse claims made for these institutions by those keen to stake a claim for art-science within today's innovation economies, some common themes emerge. In what might well become a watchword of the innovation age, the concept of 'STEAM' represents the recognition of the significance of art (and specifically design) to the crucial work done in the STEM disciplines "to ensure a prosperous future" (stemtosteam.org, 2017). Among art's celebrated potentials

is its capacity to provide a new angle on the solving of complex problems in a dynamic world in which pattern oriented or rote learning are no longer adequate (Born and Barry, 2010). Champions observe in art-science, then, the emergence of a third culture, a “transition between the two, rather than a sharp disciplinary boundary”, which gives rise to a productive discomfort, as artists and scientists push each other beyond their conventional purviews and territories (Milroy et al., 2015: 2–3). The conventional opposition “between the functionality of science and the impracticality of art” is deemed increasingly redundant, since the experimental conditions in which each encounters their problems effectively puts them “on the same footing” in the dynamic, speculative process that is art-science practice (Milroy et al., 2015: 17).

Beyond the obvious and no doubt predictable recruitment of art-science towards techno-design and the production of new realms of consumable objects, there is much that could be said about these acclaimed potentials of the ‘third culture’. Arguments for the complementarity of art and science in the production of innovation characteristically admit little real difference between the two modes of thinking. Artistic “intuition” is rendered a supplement to science’s more “analytic focus”, while the “conceptually multiple” approach of artists is recruited as a corrective to science’s more “singular focus” (Leach, 2011: 153). In any event, the role attributed to art is essentially to add perspective and imaginative problem-solving to problems that are already determined in scientific terms. It is hard not to feel fatigued in the wake of the proliferation of clichéd formulations of the new harmony between art and science, which unashamedly reduce art to a scientific paradigm oriented to the transcendent universals of human subjects and their objects of knowledge and desire (Hynes, 2013). The attribution of a communicative function to art does little to disrupt the dominant “ordinary, bland apprehension of the world” (Guattari, 1995: 77) and recalls Deleuze and Guattari’s (1994: 108) frustrated declaration that “we do not lack communication . . . on the contrary, we have too much of it”. Finally, the idea that art-science can serve as a catalyst for public reason in a changing world rarely shakes the hierarchical ordering of the disciplines, art serving largely as a means of giving “immediate experiential impact” to the ideas of scientific experts (Fraser et al., 2015). In the face of these vertical hierarchies and a generalised scientism, claims to a “special relationship” between the arts and sciences can be as “opportunistic” as they are “reductive” and efforts to highlight the structural homology between the arts and sciences are arguably “well-meaning” forms of “intellectual neocolonialism” (Biggs, 2014: 47).

There is little point, then, in offering prescriptions or even ideal models for an alternative relation between the disciplines, which would have nothing to do with actual relations in any case, the multiperspectivalism of dominant versions of art-science being premised in most cases on the scientific paradigm’s absorption of both science and art into the instrumentalism of the object. More important than the production of ideal models is, Guattari (1995: 61) reminds us, an analysis of the adequacy of existing processes of modelisation and the refusal of “reductionist modelisations which simplify the complex”. More positively, a properly

schizoanalysis works toward “processual enrichment”, with an eye to the “ontological heterogeneity” of complex reality (Guattari, 1995: 61). Schizoanalysis is a *metamodelisation* because it is always more than “pure objective description” (Guattari, 1995: 61). Rather, in seeking out “the degree zero of all possible modelisation” (1995: 63), it explores the chaosmotic conditions of the “mutations of ontological textures releasing new lines of the possible” (1995: 62).

For Guattari, of course, such mutations are principally subjective mutations. And certainly, what is obscured by a focus on the structural homology between the disciplines of art and science in the attempt to drive innovation is the machinic production of subjectivity taking place here. For while the production of innovative ideas and objects is increasingly celebrated as a victory for the human relation to objective nature, what is clearly also being birthed in the institutions of art-science are lines of possibility for the “creative” actualisation of subjectivity. In this respect, diagnoses of a structural inequality between art and science and promises of structural homology are no different; both miss the machinic operations that, as Guattari (1995, 2011, 2015a, 2015b) insists, are always primary with respect to structure. If, from the point of view of structure, we are condemned to an affective polarisation of the engagement with art-science innovation – hope for its potentials or despair at its poverty – a machinic perspective may give rise to a potentiated and less crude grasp of its actuality.

The machine, Dosse (2011: 224) reminds us, is the operator “destined to think the repressed of structuralism”. Where structure is “defined by its ability to exchange specific elements”, the machine is driven by the more primary operations of repetition and difference (Dosse, 2011: 224). In this respect, the discourse of innovation is not without ambiguity. If economic discourse has assumed something of a monopoly over the concept of innovation in recent years, its hold on this notion, as Gibson (2014) notes, is a curious one. On the one hand, innovation is “a kind of entrepreneurialism of the familiar, as distinct from creating the new”, since the value of any innovation derives not from “the creativity of the product” but from “the imagination of the market” (Gibson, 2014: 4). In this sense, innovation is conditioned by its capacity to imprint itself upon the familiar, to embed itself within existing practices in order to meet a need and find a use. On the other hand, “[i]n so far as innovation is a desirable value, it is value not in a product, but in change itself; it is the difference and production in repetition”. In this sense, innovation is “incomparable, indefinable and unrepresentable, recognised only by its effects” (Gibson, 2014: 6). This paradoxical character may not be unique to innovation; what marks the heyday of the discourse of innovation is the dramatic extension of the sense of the term to make explicit its operator as value, sited not merely in “the objectified artefact of creativity”, but in “the hyper-proliferative experience of use” (Gibson, 2014: 7).

As the accounts of Kingsley Hall make evident, even the most radical and seemingly least encumbered experiments in the production of subjectivity can become exercises in the entrepreneurialism of the familiar. But their value as experiments in desiring production is not thereby made redundant. Between and beside their efforts to produce the properly creative individual or to realise the self-realising

community, a machinic unconscious is doing its thing. And the value it produces is too oriented toward the reality of actual situations to be captured by either individual or collective structures. What is needed, then, is an analysis that can be attentive to the production of machinic values, which is to say to those “values of aesthetic and scientific creation, which do not have an immediate effect on exchange values” (Guattari, 2015b: 31). Perhaps through this attentiveness, a matrix of sorts might be laid out, within which new habits and refrains might be possible. The point is not to seek to identify a model for such analysis, at least insofar as a model is understood as an essentially normative pattern or structure that can be transferred from circumstance to circumstance (cf. the Freudian transference). The notion of metamodelisation clearly mobilises a much more transversal and cartographic sense of the model, which is essentially constructive. In this, a silk pavilion constructed through the recognisably ‘innovative’ partnership between the Mediated Matter research group, a computer-numerically controlled machine and 6,500 silkworms belongs among other models, perhaps equally capable of moving from things to events (Roberts, 2014), developing “possible openings on the virtual and onto creative processuality” (Guattari, 1995: 31). Like any mode of experimentation, nothing is given here, and already capitalist refrains have stepped in as the most convincing, most familiar, model by which to measure the machinic values at play. But it may also be within this very same machinery that schizo becomings are made possible. A mutation in one practice or domain can have effects upon another, to the extent that the “virtual line of bifurcation and differentiation” can be given consistency (Guattari, 1995: 60) and an event extracted from it.

Schizoanalysing art-science, or how to maximise points of reference

Faced with these rapidly emerging and patently diverse couplings of art and science, the social scientist might best consider themselves a schizoanalyst, whose cartographies construct rather than interpret their object, for “analytical cartographies reach beyond the existential territories to which they are assigned” (Guattari, 2000: 33). As Guattari insists in *Chaosmosis* and elsewhere, it is the shift from a scientific paradigm to an ethico-aesthetic paradigm that is crucial in the effort to push a budding bifurcation towards the production of new Universes of reference. This is, as Guattari (1995) puts it, the first ethical choice. With the ethico-aesthetic paradigm, it is sensation and creation that are primary; the structures that found the scientific paradigm are denounced as particular modes of expression, which are falsely posited as transcendent universals. If the cries of the innovation economy have become the “neuroleptic ditties” (Guattari, 2015a) of our time, the question here, following Scott Sharpe (2013), concerns what it means to activate the anti-anaesthetising capacities of the aesthetic – its ability to produce, amidst the dominant regimes of sensation, new sensations that operate directly upon the nervous system of the always collective subject in its chaotic mutations. Guattari’s (2000: 131) reference in *The Three Ecologies* to

the “scientistic super-ego”, which has condemned the human and social sciences “to overlooking the intrinsically developmental, creative, and self-positioning dimensions of processes of subjectification” is a timely rebuke to the familiarly pseudo-scientific habits of these modes of thinking. Schizoanalysis, in contrast, surrenders the comforts of the scientific paradigm and its tendency to take the objectal world of functions to which it orients itself as transcendent structures. And “what does schizoanalysis ask? Nothing more than a bit of a *relation to the outside*, a little real reality” (Guattari, 1996: 89).

In an interview conducted in 1980, Guattari (2015b: 31) makes the “utopian” suggestion that machinic values of creation and invention that “do not have an immediate effect on exchange values . . . actually deserve to be financed”, being so poorly recognised in “the societies in which we find ourselves”, which tend to “only valorize a certain form of production”. Financing such values, he suggests, might give us an articulation point from which to “understand and critique the mode of capitalist valorization”. Perhaps this ‘vision’ looks to us less utopian from within the heart of the innovation economy and from the purview of the financing of teams of artists and scientists to experiment in the production, not merely of innovative ideas and objects, but of innovation itself. But the complexity of the answer should not lead us to believe ourselves to be somehow above the money question: “what is at issue is not the reduction of praxis to cash, but the ways in which the schizophrenic tendencies of capitalism are overcoded by the more paranoid ones” (Holland, 1999: 2). For the analyst committed to a structural understanding of the experiments of Kingsley Hall, Peter’s apparent inability to leave behind the economic concerns that characterise ordinary life is readily explicable: guided by the scientific paradigm orienting classical psychoanalysis, we can confidently diagnose his concern with money as an obvious inability to transcend the anal stage of development! But, viewed machinically, economic processes are strictly irreducible to such (psycho)analytic postulates. The exchange of money is (just) one point of reference, which might still play a role in connecting us with the intensive relations of the actual, rather than withdrawing us into the dominant social codings of capitalism.

To suggest that there is no purely extra-capitalist refrain is not a gesture of resignation, but a recognition that the dominant money economy is only one expression of a much more dynamic libidinal economy. Metamodelisation, Guattari insists, does not aim to gain an external grasp on the pure objectivity of the situation, but rather gets into the middle of emergent forces and *tries to maximise the points of reference*. Because metamodelisation is never merely a question of grasping the actual but also points toward the virtual, and here again the ‘economic question’ is crucial. The dealings of “the schizo are . . . elsewhere, on the side of the most deterritorialized fluxes: the flux of the ‘miraculating’ cosmic signs, but also the flux of monetary signs” (Guattari, 1996: 48–49). So “the schizo is not unaware of the reality of money – even if it is put to extraordinary uses – any more than he is unaware of any other reality” and indeed who is to say to what extraordinary uses investment in art-science innovation might give rise? Perhaps, then, the social sciences can play a role in giving the machinic values operating through these

mergings of science and art a point of reference, which can in turn play a role in relativising exchange-value as *the* point of reference. It is a question of seeing money as a “reference point like any other”, a way of keeping “a maximum number of systems of reference” in play, precisely to enable us to keep our distance.

As Guattari insists of the real schizo trip, “*the schizo is not all that interested in ‘human warmth’*” and certainly cartographies of art-science will need to bring about a ‘de-rationalization’ of the group model if they are to map genuine lines of horizontality and transversality. At the very least it is necessary to explode the myth of togetherness underpinning the falsely harmonious group, “through reference to its instinctual, unconscious desires”, which are certainly not the same as the wishes of the human beings within it (Genosko, 1996: 113). Lazzarato (2014) is right that the entrepreneurial model of subjectivity privileged in the discourses and institutions of the innovation economy tends toward a disintegration of the social, though it does not entirely preclude the possibilities of “new complexes of subjectivation: multiple exchanges between individual-group-machine” (Guattari, 1995: 5). But such new possibilities need to be constructed, through cartographies capable of otherwise unfolding the event.

No analysis of these emerging institutions can operate from a point of absolute exteriority; it too is defined by the exclamation mark of innovation in ideas. Still, alongside the diversity of emerging institutions designated by the moniker, “art-science”, a schizoanalysis will construct equally diverse ways of relating the “finite modes” of the materials and problems that are engaged and the “infinite attributes of the Universes of the possible” that are implied (Guattari, 1995: 100). Each will map out its own immanent field of events, its own mutatory effects on other practices and areas of life. And while such mutations will no doubt be subject to the flattening effects of the universalisation of time under capitalism, they will also produce their own peculiar movement “from infinity to the passage of time” (1995: 101) – this is the ‘fallout’ that accompanies any mutation. What makes the logic of innovation so alluringly confusing is that the schizo and paranoid tendencies, the fallout and the desired end, are at once so close, and yet worlds apart. The whole point of innovation in practice is to produce creative effects, yet such creation is at least partly reterritorialised within the very delimited set of Universes of reference peculiar to capitalism, with its efficacy in erecting “a transcendent autonomised pole of reference” (Guattari, 1995: 103) over any multiplicity, and its peculiarly delimited forms of social subjection and machinic enslavement. The point is not that there is no escaping the paranoid tendencies of capitalist and scientific institutional arrangements but that these might also provide the conditions for novel becomings. If an artist’s use of astronomical data to create a synaesthetic experience becomes an occasion for the communication of science, it might also provide “a space of ontological encounter”, opening “a creative interval in disciplinary habits of thought” and a transformation in the fabric of experience (Lapworth, 2015: 1).²

The schizo does not behave like a child (I want an unappropriated, unqualified creativity!). There is no pure desire to be liberated and, in any case, as Mary Barnes’ brother senses acutely, the ‘bohemian style’ of anti-institutional experimentation

is tired. Better to work within the division of labour which will in any event give form to the flows of creativity and value to their machinic operations:

Schizoanalysis neither legitimates the significations of the dominant codes nor accepts the impositions resulting from their overcoding. The schizoanalyst won't, in other words, open a technical consultancy in pragmatics. Still, even schizoanalysts have to make a living at a social pragmatics aimed at detecting micropolitical orientations, freeing them up, and making connections between them.

(Genosko, 1996: 17)

Given the susceptibility of innovation to the paranoid tendencies of the scientific paradigm, the anti-anaesthetising capacities of the schizoanalytic method are critical here. To the extent that the social sciences can orient themselves, not to the dominant codes, but, like the 'real schizo trip', to 'the most deterritorialised fluxes', social scientific enquiry has a role to play in resingularising the present. In their efforts to produce referents for the chaotic forces of the world, the social sciences might be able to provide some sort of context by which the machinic surplus value of the innovation age can find a place within the pragmatics of existence. As Dewsbury (2015) reminds us, after Guattari, the 'place' created by any genuinely transversal movement is at best also a rupture in time, a 'resingularization of existence' in which the vertiginous affirmation of new possibilities is not merely a cliché, but an existential reality.

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Notes

- 1 Barry et al.'s (2008) delineation of the logics and modes of practice characterising contemporary interdisciplinary encounters usefully registers that, while there are forms of practice that productively engage disciplinary differences toward radical ontological enquiry, interdisciplinarity just as likely operates through practices of integration and subordination.
- 2 In this respect, as Lapworth (2016) points out, the art-science practices enacted at an institution such as SymbioticA (University of Western Australia) represent both an enquiry into our ontological constitution and a material reconfiguration of our ontogenetic capacities.

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