Defending the Sultan’s Land: Yogyakarta, Control over Land and Aristocratic Power in Post-Autocratic Indonesia

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of The Australian National University

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Original work

I declare that this thesis is the result of my own individual work and research and has not previously been submitted for a degree at any tertiary education.

Canberra, 5 September 2019

Bayu Dardias Kurniadi
Abstract

The thesis investigates the political economy of the revival of aristocratic politics in post-authoritarian Indonesia. It attempts to explore why some aristocrats have staged successful political comebacks in post-Suharto politics, while others have failed to do so. Using the case of the Yogyakarta Sultanate as my main case study, I argue that those aristocrats who have been the most successful in post-Suharto politics are those who – over time – have developed and maintained their capacity to control land as an essential power resource.

This thesis uses the theoretical framework of land access. According to this framework, control over land is determined not only by legal ownership but can also be established through a web of informal power relations. By opening access to land, it can be used as a resource of power accumulation, just as would be the case if its status was legal property. Subsequently, access can be transformed into legal property, codifying the official control over the power resource of land. Applied to the case of the Yogyakarta Sultanate, this thesis shows how the royal houses’ initial land property rights were first downgraded to land access after 1945; how the sultan defended this access amidst rapid political and social change until the 2010s; and how he ultimately succeeded in re-establishing property rights over land in 2012.

During the colonial period, the Yogyakarta Sultanate gained land control (in the form of property rights) from the Dutch as a result of the system of indirect rule. Tolerated by the Dutch, the Sultanate used land as the basis of its political economy through a land lease and anpanage system. The sultan gave usage rights to his aristocrats in return for loyalty and military assistance. The peasants worked on the land in a crop sharing system under intermediaries.

The socio-political upheaval of the 1940s and 1950s threatened the Sultanate’s land control, as its land property rights were gradually undermined by the Japanese occupation, the revolution and the establishment of democracy. The sultan, however, succeeded in defending land access through a series of political manoeuvres. These manoeuvres also helped him to circumvent the restrictions on aristocratic land ownership imposed by the Basic Agrarian Law of 1960. Even as the New Order regime pressured him to implement the Law in Yogyakarta in 1984, he found loopholes to prevent its full execution.

Thus, when Suharto fell in 1998, the Sultanate had a sound power base built on land and the clients that depended on its usage. From this power base, Sultan Hamengku Buwono X launched a campaign for the full restoration of aristocratic powers. Supported by his loyalists living on and benefitting from traditional land, he succeeded spectacularly: he first regained the position of governor that the Sultanate had lost after Hamengku Buwono IX’s death in 1988; then managed to get approval for the permanent entrenchment of the sultan’s family in that position; and finally was able to restore the Sultanate’s land property rights. Subsequently, he used his governorship to identify, register and certify this land.

After having analysed the Yogyakarta Sultanate in detail, the thesis tests whether the findings derived from this case hold in other areas. It finds that the level of land control also determined the outcome of aristocratic revival campaigns in Ubud, Ternate, Gowa and Palembang. In the first two cases, the aristocracies defended some forms of land control after 1960, allowing them to emerge as moderately powerful actors in the post-Suharto era. The latter two, by contrast, failed to have an impact as the Sultanate’s land bases had been destroyed either during the colonial period or through land reform. Hence, the thesis highlights the central role of land as a political resource available (or unavailable) to aristocracies after 1998. This perspective, in turn, adds a significant nuance to the literature on aristocratic politics that has often been dominated by anthropological studies in the mystical, religious or otherwise spiritual control of royals over their former subjects.
Acknowledgement

A thesis is not only an academic journey but also an adventure of a lifetime. Praise be to God for always showing me the way to completing these journeys and adventures. Over the years, many people have contributed to the completion of this thesis. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my chair and supervisor Assoc. Prof. Marcus Mietzner, whose guidance and knowledge helped me immensely during my candidacy. His prompt responses to my inquiries – ranging from administrative to academic needs – have forced me to continuously pay attention to my thesis. Secondly, I also would like to thank my panel members, Prof. Edward Aspinall and Prof. Robert Cribb. Their inputs were very valuable, and I am thankful to have been supervised by them. I also thank Greg Fealy and Sally White for their support and many insightful conversations.

Above all, my biggest gratitude goes to my family: Erlin Erlina, Jilan Nirmada Rencang Kencana and Rezalinajwa Dara Bening. I have always been amazed how my wife managed the family whilst both of us were writing our thesis at the ANU. I am also very indebted to my son and daughter for their minimal complaints in passing through the ‘thesis years.’ Further, my appreciation goes to other family members who contributed a lot to this thesis: Basar Sumarna, Oom Haromi, Rully Saepul, Aan Rizaldi Kurniawan and Taufan Pamungkas Kurnianto.

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Note on the Spelling

This thesis covers some local Indonesian languages and scripts in Javanese, Balinese, Makasarese, Ternate and Malays. Generally, I follow the Indonesian translation of local spellings, with minor limitation due to different use of scripts. Javanese, Balinese and Makasarese have scripts that are not easily translated into Indonesian or English. For instance, the Javanese has two scripts of ‘e’, ‘o’ and ‘t.’

Note on the Currency

I converted the Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) with the US$ of that year based on the middle exchange rate of the Indonesian Central Bank.
Abbreviations and Acronyms

Abdi Dalem: Servant of the sultan in Javanese aristocracies.
Adat: Customary tradition.
Anak Agung: Balinese aristocratic title.
Andarbe: Right of ownership granted by the sultan for an individual.
Anganggo: Hereditary right to use the Sultanate’s land (especially for agriculture) for an individual.
Anggaduh: Right to manage and gain yield (especially for agriculture) from the Sultanate’s land for a village (communal).
Apanage: The land system in which the sultan gave the usage right of land to aristocrats in return for loyalty and military support.
BAL: Basic Agrarian Law No. 5/1960 (Undang Undang Pokok Agraria –UUPA).
Balla Lompoa: Gowa palace.
Baluwarti: Kasunanan Surakarta palace compound.
Banjar: The lowest administrative units in the system of village organisation in Bali; they are, among others, responsible for upholding traditional law, managing religious ceremonies and administering land sales.
Bate: Gallarang’s leader, normally accompanied with the aristocratic title of Karaeng.
Bate Salapanga: Council of Nine Bates, the highest structure in Gowa Kingdom. Similar to Bobato 18 in Ternate.
Bekel: Broker/bailiff, intermediary person managing the apanage system.
Bendesa: Village head in Desa Pakraman in Bali.
Bobato: A general term for traditional leaders in North Maluku, except for the sultan.
Bobato 18: Council of 18 Bobato, the highest structure in the Ternate Sultanate. Similar to Bate Salapanga in Gowa.
Boki: A title for sultan’s wife in the Ternate Sultanate.
BPN: Badan Pertanahan Nasional (Central Land Office) with branches in province and districts.
BPS: Badan Pusat Statistic (Central Statistical Office) with branches in provinces and districts.
Bupati: Yogyakarta Sultanate’s provincial administrators. The position adopted into the Indonesian government system in 1945 as the head of district/regency (kabupaten).
Cocatu: The Ternate Sultanate’s land certificate.
Cok: Cokorda. A Balinese aristocratic title.
Daerah Istimewa: Special region.
Desa: Autonomous village in Yogyakarta regencies, consisting of several dukuh.
Desa Dinas : Balinese administrative village.
Desa Pakraman: Balinese indigenous village also called Desa Adat.

DPD : Senate, Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (Regional Representative Council).
DPRD : Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Regional People’s Representative Council) at Province level and regency/city level.

Dukuh : Hamlet, the lowest administrative unit in Yogyakarta regions.

Gallarang : Gowa’s satellite units or principalities.

Garebeg : Feast festival in the Yogyakarta Sultanate during the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday, Eid al-Fitr (end of fasting month) and Eid al-Adha.

GBPH : Gusti Bendoro Pangeran Haryo. The fourth highest male title in Yogyakarta Sultanate for the sultan’s son.

GKR : Gusti Kangjeng Ratu. The highest female title for a Yogyakarta sultan’s daughter or a married princess, stratified into Sekar-Kedaton, Pembayun, Maduretno, Bendara, Angger and Timur. GKR is also the title for the queen.

Grand visier : Javanese sultan’s chief ministers, also called patih. Abolished in 1945.

HGB : Hak Guna Bangunan (Building Right Certificate).

HGU : Hak Guna Usaha (Commercial Right Certificate).

HP : Hak Pakai (Usage Right Certificate).

I Gusti : Balinese aristocratic title.

IDR : Indonesian currency Rupiah.

JJLS : Jalan Jalur Lingkar Selatan (Southern Ring Road).

Jongofa : A title for the Sultan of Ternate’s sons and daughters.

Kabupaten : Regency or district, consisting of several kecamatan.

Kampung : Neighbourhood community in the urban area.

Kasultanan : The Yogyakarta Sultanate led by a sultan.

Kasunanan : The Surakarta Sultanate/Sunnanate led by a sunan.

Kawedanan : The ministerial office of the Sultanate of Yogyakarta. Previously also meant a territorial unit of the Sultanate.

Kebekekelan : Bekel’s jurisdiction.

Kecamatan : Sub-district, administrative level between district and village – in Yogyakarta – previously called kepanewonan.

Kedaton : Ternate palace.

Kekancingan : Renewable land usage right from the Kasultanan/Pakualaman to individuals, villages and institutions in the form of Magersari, Ngindung, Andarbe, Anganggo and Anggaduh.

Kelurahan : Non-autonomous village as part of the Yogyakarta City Government.

Kepala Dukuh : Dukuh head.
Kepanewonan: Sub-district, changed to kecamatan.

KGPAA: Kandjeng Gusti Pangeran Adipati Aryo. The title for Paku Alam of Pakualaman Principality and Mangku Negoro of Mangkunegaran Principality.


KNID: Komite Nasionsl Indonesia Daerah (Regional Indonesian National Committee)

KNIP: Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (Central Indonesian National Committee).

Komnas HAM: Komisi Nasional Hak Azasi Manusia (National Commission on Human Right).

KPU: Komisi Pemilihan Umum (Electoral Commission).

KPUD: Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah (Regional Electoral Commission) at province and regency/city level.

KRA: Kangjeng Raden Ayu, title for sultan’s concubine.

Kraton: Javanese palace.

LPD: Lembaga Perkreditan Desa, Balinese adat-based micro bank.

Magersari: Individual right to use the Sultanate’s land especially for building/housing for Javanese.

Maklumat: Sultan’s proclamation.

Mangkunegaran: The Mangkunegaran principality.

MPR: Congress, Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Consultative Assembly).

Ngindung: Right to build a house on the Sultanate’s land. Ngindung also means permission (normally verbal) to build in another party’s land based on the landowner’s gratitude without payment.

Padjeg: Tax from agricultural product during the colonial period.

PAG: Pakualamanaat Gronden/Paku Alam’s Ground, Paku Alam’s land consists of land for cultural and religious purposes (palace land) and land for economical purposes (non-palace land).

Pakualaman: The Pakualaman Principality.

Panewu: Head of kepanewonan.

Panitikismo: Kasultananan’s Land Office.

Patuh: Aristocrats who received land in the apanage system in return for loyalty.

Pelungguh: Part of village land for village officials’ salary. In other parts of Java also called bengkok.

Pemilihan: Demand for elected governor for Yogyakarta.

Penetapan: Demand for sultan as Yogyakarta Governor indefinitely without election.

Pengarem-arem: Part of village land for village officials’ pension.

Perbokel: Head of Desa Dinas in Bali.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perdais</td>
<td>Peraturan Daerah Istimewa (Yogyakarta Special Bylaws) implementing the articles in the YSL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pesisir</td>
<td>Coastal areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pribumi</td>
<td>Indigenous/native population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puri</td>
<td>Balinese palace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Putra Mahkota</td>
<td>Crown Prince of the Yogyakarta Sultanate with the complete title of ‘Kanjeng Gusti Pangeran Adipati Anom Amangku Negara Sudibya Rajaputra Narendra ing Mataram.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>Raden (Java) or Rahdin (Palembang). The lowest title for Javanese and vassal’s male aristocrats after the fourth descendants from a male hereditary line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rijksblad</td>
<td>The decree of Javanese Royal houses (Sultan, Paku Alam, Sunan and Mangkunegoro) during the colonial period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RM</td>
<td>Raden Mas. The Javanese aristocratic title for a male descendent of the Sultan of Yogyakarta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romusha</td>
<td>Forced labour during the Japanese occupation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabdatama</td>
<td>Sultan’s decree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Sultanaat Gronden/Sultanate’s Ground, sultan’s land, consists of land for cultural and religious purposes (palace land) and land for economical purposes (non-palace land).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHM</td>
<td>Sertifikat Hak Milik (Land Ownership Right Certificate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sombaya</td>
<td>King of Gowa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sultan</td>
<td>Sultan Hamengku Buwono. The short title for the Sultan of Yogyakarta. The complete name/title is ‘Ngarso Dalem Sampeyan Dalem Ingkang Sinuwun Sultan Hamengku Buwono Senopati in Ngaloga Sayidin Panatagama Khalifatullah.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunan</td>
<td>Title for leader of Surakarta Kasunanan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syah</td>
<td>The title – in last name – for the Sultans in North Maluku Sultanates (Ternate, Tidore, Bacan and Jailolo).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanah Desa</td>
<td>Village land in Yogyakarta, consists of Tanah Kas Desa, Pelungguh, Pengarem-arem and village communal land.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TKD</td>
<td>Tanah Karangan Desa. Villagers’ land owned by the adat village in Bali.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TKD</td>
<td>Tanah Kas Desa or Titisara. Village endowment land, part of village land for financing of village operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wedana</td>
<td>The rank in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta as the head of kawedanan during the apanage system for minister or head of kawedanan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WNI</td>
<td>Warga Negara Indonesia (Indonesian citizen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YIA</td>
<td>Yogyakarta International Airport</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Map 1 Indonesia
1. Introduction

1.1 Introduction

Scholars of Indonesia’s post-1998 democratisation process have focused on a wide range of actors, structures and institutions that have shaped political outcomes since the end of autocracy. Winters (2011), for instance, discussed the role of oligarchs in influencing, and eventually dominating, Indonesia’s politico-economic arena. Others, such as Aminuddin (2017) debated the significance of the military and its retirees as political actors, while others again highlighted the importance of parties, elections and the ways in which these have been tainted by clientelism, vote buying and illicit fundraising (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019; Mietzner, 2013). But one group of actors that has received less attention are Indonesia’s traditional aristocratic houses. While there have been a number of works touching on their role in post-autocratic Indonesia (Buehler & Tan, 2007; Cribb, 2006; Davidson & Henley, 2007; C. Smith, 2009a; Sulistiyanto, 2009), most had their main focus on a different subject or discussed individual cases only.

One of the reasons for this lack of attention has been the very different outcomes for the various aristocracies. In some areas, aristocracies have revived their political and economic fortunes, and have assumed central roles in their province, regency or city. In those areas, it has become common for aristocrats to compete for positions in the executive and legislative branches of government, become important local brokers, build successful business networks, and fulfil important cultural and religious functions. In other areas, however, aristocrats have failed to become powerful players. At best, they became obscure figures whose only assets are their name, title and a few leftover properties from eras of past glory.

These divergent outcomes give rise to the question of why some Indonesian aristocracies have been successful in their efforts to rebuild and expand their power in the post-1998 democracy, while others have been marginalised further. What are the factors that produce the different results? Have some aristocrats simply pushed harder for their powers to be restored than others? Or are there different historical, structural and institutional conditions that allow one aristocracy to thrive and keep another from succeeding? These are some of the questions that this thesis will engage with, hoping to shed light on the understudied phenomenon of the role aristocrats play in Indonesia’s multi-faceted democracy.
The question of how aristocratic elites adjust, or fail to adjust, to democratic change is not new. For instance, the classic work of Huntington (1968), ‘The Kings Dilemma’, portrayed the democratic trajectory of the monarch in modern society. A national monarch, he argued, had no other option than to centralise power to control his changing polity – which eventually creates a new elite questioning his authority. Only limited reforms are possible to appease critics, as radical concessions would sideline the monarch. But such limited top-up reform increases – rather than decreases – the demand for more fundamental change, eventually leading to the monarch’s overthrow.

However, contrary to Huntington’s thesis, around twenty countries of absolute and semi-absolute political dynasties still exist today, especially in the Arabian Peninsula. Scholars have typically used a political economy approach to explain their continued persistence. The oil-rich states, they argue, have the capacity to buy citizens’ political support, which eventually delays popular reform (Beblawi, 1987). These monarchical rentier states, then, depend on the extraction of natural resources, and their spending patterns aim primarily to sustain political stability and public satisfaction. Thus, apart from presenting a strong impediment for democratic change and long-term economic growth and development (Auty, 2004; Ross, 1999), the continued power of monarchical rulers in rentier states draws from and perpetuates the control of natural resources by a small royal elite. In other words, these rulers mobilised their resources to defend their position before their control over these resources was successfully challenged.

In addition to absolutist and semi-absolutist monarchies, there are also constitutional monarchies that withstood the pressures of full democratisation. Their survival is often explained with reference to their role as ‘a popular symbolic cornerstone of the nation’ (Abell & Stevenson, 2011). In this case, historically powerful monarchies survived political change and found sanctuary in performing a cultural and historical role in countries such as England and Japan, despite – or even because of – the absence of political authority (A. Harvey, 2004; Large, 2007). In a British survey in 2006, for example, 70% of people surveyed said that continuation of the monarchy was ‘quite’ or ‘very’ important (Abell & Stevenson, 2011, p. 477). In Malaysia, similarly, the monarchy is viewed as a protector of Malay and Muslim identity. This is true for both the local Sultans and for the King of Malaysia, who is chosen from among the latter on a rotating basis.
Besides political economy and historical symbolism approaches to explaining aristocratic survival in modern times, some authors have also emphasised the importance of territorial size (Corbett, Veenendaal, and Ugyel (2016); Veenendaal (2015)). Small states with less than 1.5 million population, these scholars argue, have ‘personalised’ politics and thus monarchs have formed close bonds with the people to prevent popular uprising by the elite class. Brunei, Bhutan and Tonga are examples of such small-country monarchies.

In Southeast Asia, some monarchies have survived tumultuous political changes and the tide of democracy and modernisation, while others have faltered. Kershaw (2001) argues that the Southeast Asian monarchies can be distinguished based on their different responses during four periods: colonial, nationalist, decolonisation, and communist revolt. The colonial intervention in Southeast Asia began when the Portuguese conquered the Malacca Sultanate in 1511. From then until the early 19th century, monarchies in Southeast Asia were used by colonial powers as a political instrument to stabilise their rule over uncooperative local populations. Many royal houses fully submitted to their colonial masters, which then ruled directly and indirectly with the help of those aristocrats (Kershaw, 2001).

While Southeast Asian monarchies were – with the exception of Thailand – collective instruments of colonial rule, the responses of the old royal families to the emergence of nationalism and subsequent decolonisation differed widely. The Cambodian monarchy under the rule of Sihanouk for instance, sided with the nationalists and campaigned for independence from France. Sihanouk became prime minister, was ousted by a military coup in 1970, exiled for thirteen years and returned to unite the country in the 1990s, when the monarchy was restored (Osborne, 1994). Hence the ability of traditional authority to adapt to different political settings is the key to their survival. In neighbouring Vietnam, by contrast, Bảo Đại never escaped his image of a colonial puppet, and the Vietnamese monarchy disappeared completely as the French withdrew in the mid-1950s.

As a result of these divergent trajectories, today’s Southeast Asia has existing monarchies in Thailand, Brunei, Cambodia and Malaysia, while they were eliminated in Vietnam, Myanmar, Singapore, the Philippines and Laos. Laos adopted a form of constitutional monarchy from 1947-1975 and has settled into a communist state ever since. In Thailand, the King can intervene in the government and become an arbiter at the time of crisis (Streckfuss, 2013). The Sultan of Brunei, providing welfare through a rentier state, has become the longest-ruling monarch in the region (Talib, 2013). In Cambodia, although the King received significant
political power under the post-civil war constitution, he has rarely exercised it – real authority is concentrated in Hun Sen (Un, 2013). In the elective monarchy of Malaysia, the aristocracy continues to play a role in national and local politics as the symbol of Malay identity (Hamid & Ismail, 2012; Milner, 2012). In Brunei, Thailand and Malaysia, the strict anti-communism of the royal houses played a key role as well in helping them to consolidate – especially in the eyes of the West – in the critical period between the 1950s and 1980s.

Unlike other monarchies in most Southeast Asia countries, where a single ruler typically controlled a majority area that later became a nation state, the East Indies archipelago consisted of hundreds of mostly small and poorly institutionalised sultanates or kingdoms. The Dutch conquered and created forced contractual agreements with the royals, and implemented a system of indirect rule in which sultans and other local kings, or rajas, retained some of their privileges and/or became part of the colonial structure. After the rise of nationalism, many local houses retained their loyalty to the Dutch, while others were ambivalent and only a few openly sided with the independence movement. Partly as punishment for these stances, most local aristocracies were disestablished in the 1950s, with very few – but notable – exceptions, such as Yogyakarta.

After struggling to hold on to some privileges under the authoritarian Guided Democracy (1959–1965) and New Order (1966–1998) regimes, local aristocracies tried to use the opportunities offered by democratisation and decentralisation to re-strengthen their positions. Indeed, Indonesia democratised more rapidly than initially thought, quickly establishing a multi-party system, free and fair regular elections and a free press (Diamond & Morlino, 2005). From 2006 to 2013, Indonesia was even considered ‘free’ by Freedom House, the only country in Southeast Asia to hold that rank at that time. Even though in 2014 and 2015 Indonesia was downgraded to ‘partly free’, its political rights score was amongst the best in Asia (a stable score of 2) (Freedom House, 2015).

Indonesia also has experienced sharing of power to the local level, with fiscal and political authority delegated and local direct elections for executive leaders (Pemilihan Kepala Daerah – Pilkada) since 2005. With a relatively free and fair national system, local elections and decentralised budgets (Mietzner & Aspinall, 2010), old local elites have exploited these opportunities by participating in elections (Buehler, 2007; Erb & Sulistiyanto, 2009; Faucher, 2005; Mietzner, 2010; Pratikno, 2005). Hence, democratisation has created what van Klinken (2007b, p. 160) called the ‘window of change’ for the revival of various sultanates and other local aristocratic houses. Cribb (2006), for his part, argued that the return of some aristocracies
Introduction

to the socio-political stage was a step forward in restoring the rich cultural diversity which had been suppressed under the New Order’s autocracy. In the same vein, Mietzner (2014) emphasised the re-emergence of local identity politics, which favours political candidates with deep roots in the local area, culture and traditions. Therefore, post-autocratic politics has created an arena in which local aristocracies can benefit from their heritage and status.

However, as mentioned earlier, there is a vast difference between those aristocrats who are successful in their return to the political stage, and those who fail. The existing arguments of aristocratic revivalism do not capture the factors that determine this divergence. My thesis aims to address this gap. In exploring factors that shape variations in the post-1998 success and failure of aristocratic families in local politics, this thesis takes a systematic political economy approach. As will be explained below, the primary focus of this political economy approach is on land as a socio-economic resource for aristocratic houses. It is the long-term ability or incapacity of aristocracies to hold on to their land possessions that decides the success or failure of aristocratic revival projects. This novel political economy approach departs from cultural-anthropological explanations which have long dominated writings on the Indonesian aristocracy (Anderson, 1972a; Bubandt, 2014; Moertono, 2009; Mulder, 1978, 2005a; Woodward, 1989). It also differs from scholars who explore the role of land ownership in Indonesian society, but focused heavily on agrarian issue, environmental issues, law, conflict and disputes (Afiff, 2004; Fitzpatrick, 1997; Lucas & Warren, 2003; McCarthy & Robinson, 2016).

1.2 Research Questions and Focus of the Study
As indicated above, this thesis investigates the extent to which Indonesian aristocratic houses have succeeded in bolstering their political and economic positions in post-Suharto Indonesia, and aims to identify the reasons for divergent outcomes in this quest. I propose that control of land, and the specific character of that control, plays a crucial part in determining the success or failure of aristocratic families in seeking political and economic influence. In this section, I explain how I arrived at this hypothesis, and how it led to the formulation of a number of secondary research questions that further disaggregate the main question on the success or failure of aristocratic families in Indonesia’s post-1998 politics and economy. In order to set the context for the research questions and hypothesis, a more detailed description and characterisation of the Indonesian aristocracy is required.
Two distinct characteristics of the Indonesian aristocracy are a high level of fragmentation and, generally, a low level of institutionalisation. First, Indonesian aristocracies are highly localised and fragmented, mostly covering small areas at the regency level or below. This means that the populations under their claimed authority vary in size, from a few thousand to few million people, but tend to be culturally and ethnically homogeneous. Only one of the aristocracies operates at the province level, namely the Sultanate of Yogyakarta — the rest are limited by district boundaries. Secondly, most aristocracies have low levels of institutionalisation. They lost their political capacity significantly in two major waves: after the post-1830 colonial expansion (Ricklefs, 1981, p. 114), and then in the early independence period after 1945. As indicated earlier, aristocratic traditional structures were used by the Dutch in the 19th and early 20th centuries to maintain local stability (Magenda, 1989; Ricklefs, 1981), and their power and influence was reduced further after their traditional role in governance was erased by the establishment of provinces and districts in the 1950s. Their level of institutionalisation continued to weaken after the state took control over trade affairs and the Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) of 1960, which led to the loss of most traditional royal lands.

In this thesis, I follow the definition of aristocracy developed by Lieven (1994, p. xvii), who understood aristocracy as ‘an historical, hereditary ruling class.’ This emphasis on a class, rather than individual rulers, allows us to capture the disintegrated and low-level character of Indonesian dynastic families better than more personalised concepts of monarchy. Indonesian aristocrats, then, are descendants of kings, sultans and their immediate families who exercised power during the pre-colonial and/or colonial period. Even though monarchy shares the similar blood-based hereditary principle with aristocracy, the key difference between aristocracy and monarchy, I argue, lies in its national monopoly and level of institutionalisation. In monarchy, for instance in Thailand, Brunei and the Gulf states, there is only a single royal family, regardless of the size of the country. Monarchy is typically also more institutionalised than aristocracy. Monarchies have a clearer line of command and succession systems, while in the case of the Indonesian aristocracy, the sultan/king is often selected from a competing assembly of family members. Conflicts of succession are common, even before the incumbent ruler’s death, further undermining the aristocracy’s institutional capacity and sustainability.

The number of Indonesian aristocracies during the late colonial period was around 278. Reflecting their involvement with colonial rule, some aristocrats were even part of Dutch
military units, and the Dutch gave them military ranks (Nordholt & Klinken, 2007). Formally, the Dutch co-opted the aristocracy in Indonesia through a web of contracts, giving local royal houses the status of rulers over *zelfbesturende lanschappen*, semi-independent domains. The exact nature of these contracts varied: in some areas, the Dutch took full control, but in others, they left the traditional system of authority largely intact – including the land control regime. These contracts were periodically reviewed and renewed.

From the 1930s until the Japanese arrival in 1942, for instance, the Governor General of the East Indies established fourteen long contracts (*Lange contract*) that contained details of the local aristocracy’s powers, rights and obligations. In Sumatra (*Staatsblad*. 1939/146 jo 761), contracts were issued for Siak Indrapura, Deli, Serdang, Asahan, Kualu and Leidong aristocracies. Further contracts related to the Bima and Sumbawa aristocracies in today’s West Nusa Tenggara islands (S. 1939/613 jo 761); the Pontianak and Kutai aristocracies on Borneo (S. 1939/614 jo 671); and the Surakarta Sunnanate (S. 1939/614 jo 671), Yogyakarta Sultanate (S. 1941/47), Mangkunegaran Principality (S. 1940/543) and Pakualaman Principality on Java (S. 1941/577). In order to regulate the latter, the Dutch created five provinces, including Yogyakarta and Surakarta which represented the two strongest aristocratic houses in Java (Cribb, 2010). Apart from the contracts with larger aristocracies, the Governor General established short contracts (*Korte Verklaring*) with smaller autonomous regions (S.1919/822) that were mostly limited to the formal acknowledgment of the Dutch authority (Kasepuhan Cirebon, 2014). Therefore, prior the Japanese invasion there were 278 autonomous regions and their corresponding aristocratic families that followed orders from Dutch Residents, the leading colonial officials on the ground (Cribb & Brown, 1995, p. 6).

During the Japanese occupation between 1942 and 1945, the new rulers made the previously pro-Dutch aristocrats an integral part of the Japanese ruling elite. This was done to maintain stability in the region. In South Sulawesi, for instance, aristocrats were important partners of the Japanese. Harvey (1985, p. 209) noted that, ‘Working with and through the local aristocracy, the Japanese formed district, municipal, and regional councils composed largely of chiefs and officials.’ But despite their transformation into assistants of the Japanese, most aristocrats retained a conservative and hierarchical political worldview that brought them into conflict with the other large Indonesian actor during the occupation: that is, the increasingly

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2 The Kingdom of the Netherland ordered the Governor General of East-Indies to maintain local aristocracies’ authority through *Koningen Besluit* No.5/6-1855 (Spit, 1911).
assertive independence movement that sought to establish a non-feudal Republic. In Java, therefore, there was an increasing rivalry between the low-ranking conservative aristocrats and the more egalitarian, democratic and Islamic nationalists over the control of the emergent Indonesian state (Berger, 1997, p. 330).

When the Republican nationalists declared independence in 1945, most aristocrats revived their previous allegiance to the Dutch. Returning to the archipelago after a three-year absence, the Dutch approached aristocrats in the Outer Islands to establish their own local states as part of a Dutch-sponsored federal union, while maintaining their aristocratic status. With limited support from their fellow Republicans in Java, some Outer Island Republicans had no choice than to submit to the Dutch, but they hoped for the quick collapse of the web of pro-aristocratic states the Dutch had created (B. Harvey, 1985). In Indonesia’s easternmost Sultanate of Ternate, the 36th Sultan, Djabir Syah, was one of the closest allies of the Dutch and the Allied Forces, and a fierce opponent of the planned unitary state of Indonesia (A. Amal, 2010; Djaafar, 2005). Similarly, aristocrats with modern administrative skills felt comfortable with the pro-Dutch federal union, perceiving it as preferable to the uncertainty of a non-aristocratic, independent Republic (I. A. A. G. Agung & Owens, 1996). Consequently, the aristocrats were mostly seen as Dutch collaborators and thus much ostracized by the populace.

There were only few aristocrats who were not seen as colonial lackeys. Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX of Yogyakarta was among a handful of royal leaders who supported the Republic and mastered both traditional and modern administration skills (Monfries, 2015). Elsewhere, aristocrats were targeted by massive anti-aristocratic (anti-Swapraja) protests, including the then strongest royal houses of Surakarta. In 1945 and 1946, the anti-feudal movement kidnapped and killed two of the King’s grand visiers (Patih) (Setiadi, Hadi, & Trihandayani, 2000). The anti-aristocratic movement also targeted lower-level aristocrats, the priyayi, particularly on the north coast of Java and on Sumatra (Lucas, 1991). In East Sumatra, for instance, Langenberg (1985, p. 132) found that ‘with a few exceptions, the aristocracy had little sympathy for the Republic, given the intensely anti-aristocratic views of the radical movement.’ As a result, young leaders of ethnic Karo and Simalungun, with support from non-elite urban dwellers, challenged the traditional rights and authority of the aristocracy (Langenberg, 1985, p. 118). The anti-aristocratic movement in East Sumatra killed royal family members in Asahan, Kualu, Langkat, Kota Pinang and Bilah and eventually completely destroyed the aristocracy in Sumatra (Gatra, 7 December 2002; Reid, 1979).
While the Dutch arranged during the 1949 Round Table Conference in Den Haag that its transfer of sovereignty would be made to the Dutch-supported Federal Republic of Indonesia rather than the unitary Republic, this experiment did not last long. The collapse of the Federacy in August 1950 was as much caused by the loss of power of the aristocracy as it subsequently further accelerated it (A. Amal, 2010; Nordholt & Klinken, 2007). In early 1950, Sultan Hamid II had been imprisoned due his involvement in a failed coup attempt, strengthening calls for the abolition of the federal structure (Winardi, 2012). After the creation of the unitary state in 1950, the aristocracy, especially in the Outer Islands, deteriorated further, and the rise of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy led to even greater loss of power (Magenda, 1989, 2010). In 1964, when the Sultanate of Bulungan in North Kalimantan leaned toward Malaysia in the Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation due to historical family relationships, most members of the sultan’s family were massacred during a military attack (van Klinken, 2007b). The 1960 land reform also weakened what was left of aristocratic power. Thus, when Suharto took over the presidency in 1968, aristocracies had been mostly disestablished.

Under Suharto, the role of the aristocracy was subdued but not entirely removed. To a certain extent, the authoritarian regime used strategies that were similar to those of the Dutch, integrating some aristocracies into the regime’s three main political pillars – the Golkar party, the military and the bureaucracy (van Klinken, 2004). Yogyakarta’s Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX became vice-president in the 1970s, while Mudaffar Syah of Ternate got involved in Golkar in the 1980s and used this engagement to revive the Sultanate’s adat structure. In Bali, most aristocracies became part of Golkar. In Gianyar for instance, the position of Gianyar’s regent was regularly occupied by a leader of one of the puri (royal houses). In Wajo, South Sulawes, the aristocracy – through middle-ranked local military officers – controlled bureaucratic positions (Bakti, 2007). In other areas, however, aristocracies were inactive. Overall, only around a dozen aristocracies exercised a limited extent of local influence, including the Yogyakarta Sultanate, Pakualaman Principality, the Surakarta Sunnanate, Mangkunegaran, Ternate, Bima, Gianyar, Ubud and Kasepuhan.

From a state of quasi-hibernation under the New Order, many aristocracies revived their fortunes after 1998. Van Klinken (2007b) divided those aristocracies into three categories. First, there are ‘profile raising’ aristocracies that increased their public standing in the media, for instance the Yogyakarta and Surakarta aristocracies. Second, ‘resurrected’ aristocracies, mostly in Kalimantan and North Maluku, where aristocracies were disestablished or sidelined in the 1950s and 1960s and were reactivated after 1998. Ternate and Bulungan fall into this
category. Third, aristocracies have been ‘reinvented’ after having been idle and restricted to serving a symbolic purpose for a long time (such as Jailolo, Sumedang and Palembang). Van Klinken listed twenty-four aristocracies divided into these three categories – but especially in the latter group, there have since been many more.

The proliferation of old and newly resurrected aristocracies has made it challenging to establish the concrete number of aristocracies in the post-Suharto era, and to decide which ones should be considered for analysis in this thesis. The Communication and Information Forum of Archipelago Palaces (Forum Komunikasi dan Informasi Keraton Nusantara – FKIKN) creates nominally strict but loosely applied definitions for its members in the post-1998 era. To become a FKIKN member, an aristocracy must have a definite palace and king/sultan, unbroken lineage, historical regalia, regular aristocratic cultural events and community acknowledgement. In 2002, FKIKN listed fifteen original members that formed the organisation in 1995. Another thirty-three aristocracies joined afterwards, leading to a total number of forty-eight royal houses (eight in Sumatra, ten in Java, six in Bali, two in Nusa Tenggara, nine in Kalimantan, nine in Sulawesi and four in Maluku).3 Complicating matters, a group with less stringent admission criteria was also created, accommodating those unable to meet the FKIKN conditions but exhibiting some features of a past royal house. In a 2017 meeting of that group (Meeting Forum for Archipelago Palaces, Forum Silaturahmi Keraton se-Nusantara – FSKN), around 100 members took part.

Moreover, FKIKN’s list is not consistent in applying its own membership requirements. For instance, the listed Sumedang aristocracy, one of Mataram’s regions in the 18th century, does not exist and has no claimant for its king/sultan. It is merely a foundation which focuses on lineage research, a museum and some assets (Gatra, 7 December 2002). Similarly, during the resurrection of Tidore Sultanate in 1999, Tidore had no palace – it was burned down in 1921. In 2014, however, the local government built a new palace, prepared especially for the ceremony of the new sultan’s coronation. The list also does not distinguish between legitimate and claimant sultans, as discussed by van Klinken. Nevertheless, these lists have been useful to the writer in identifying post-1998 aristocracies and drawing up potential research sites. Based on FKIKN data, Van Klinken’s lists and media research, my own calculation suggests that there are around thirty-five ‘profile raised’, ‘resurrected’ and ‘reinvented’ aristocracies that qualify as relevant aristocracies for further research. From these thirty-five aristocracies, I chose five

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3 The information included in the ‘basic principles’ of FKIKN, issued in 2006.
Introduction

It is important to note that my research does not include smaller adat (indigenous) aristocrats who claim the status of ‘raja’, because their level of institutionalisation is low and their political influence therefore limited. Afiff (2004, p. 2), for instance, considered ‘raja’ in South Tapanuli in Sumatra as the head of a ruling village clan, rather than a local aristocrat. However, these rajas’ informal role at the local level should not be underestimated in social terms, especially when they operate through an umbrella organisation. In her research on Moluccan raja, Brauchler (2011) argued that the pan-Mollucan Raja Forum (Majelis Latupati Maluku – MLM) has played a significant role in the social integration of Moluccan post-conflict society, after the political structure beyond the village level was destroyed. Also excluded from this research are attempts by some kings who have tried to bring together village kings with aristocratic claimants and form the National Kings and Sultans Gathering Forum (Silaturahmi Nasional Raja dan Sultan Nusantara – Silatnas) as a rival to both FKIKN and FSKN (Raja Samu Samu VI, 2015).

As I am interested in a varied outcome (i.e. the success or failure of aristocracies in post-Suharto politics), I initially developed five independent variables for the five case studies under examination (Weisberg, 2004). These five independent variables were drawn from the existing literature, and some of them have already been touched upon above. The first one is the extent to which aristocracies defended their control of land. Second, I included historical events in the late 1940s as a variable because many authors argue that the success of Yogyakarta was mainly due to the pro-Republican stance of Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX (Harsono, 2011; Kurniadi, 2009; Lay et al., 2008; van Klinken, 2007b). By siding with the Republic, it is argued, the Sultanate of Yogyakarta became part of both the Sukarno and Suharto regimes and therefore accumulated power that it used in the post-authoritarian period. Third, the level of institutionalisation, as measured by the degree of sophistication of aristocracies’ bureaucratic structure and responsibilities, is also explored as a potential cause of their success or failure. It could be hypothesised that the successful aristocracies have a more complex structure and division of roles and responsibilities compared with the less successful resurrected and reinvented aristocracies.

The fourth independent variable is government recognition and budget support. It is conceivable that some aristocracies succeeded because they were granted government assistance (for whatever reason), while others weren’t. In this measure, I established how much
money was given in comparison to the size of an aristocracy. The fifth factor is internal conflict. It could be assumed that high levels of internal conflict and contestation weaken aristocracies (as has been the case in Surakarta, for instance), while strong coherence within the noble family is more certain to produce a favourable political and economic outcome for the aristocracy concerned. Subsequently, I examined how these five independent variables related to the different outcomes observed. This required to first establish the level of success or failure of the five examined aristocracies. Based on research that will later be elaborated, I conceptualised Yogyakarta as a successful case of an aristocracy’s attempt to retain its political influence after 1998; Ubud and Ternate as partially successful cases; and Gowa and Palembang as failed cases. I will return to the measurement of success and failure in more detail in the methodology section.

Next, I measured the three independent variables across an intensity continuum of very high, high, medium, low and very low (level of institutionalisation, government support and internal conflict). For the land control variable, I recorded whether such control existed, and whether it came in the form of property or access (this distinction will be elaborated on below). For the stance vis-à-vis the Republic in 1945, I noted a supportive or opposing position. Table 1.1 below shows the result of these measurements.

Table 1.1 Aristocratic success-partial success-failure based on selected factors, 2013-2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Success</th>
<th>Partial Success</th>
<th>Failure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Land control</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Palace Land Control</td>
<td>Yogyakarta Property</td>
<td>Ubud Access</td>
<td>Ternate Access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Palace Land Control</td>
<td>Property</td>
<td>Property (limited)</td>
<td>Access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political stance 1945-49</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic</td>
<td>Yogyakarta Republic</td>
<td>Ubud Republic</td>
<td>Ternate Pro-Federal States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of Institutionalisation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Yogyakarta Very High</td>
<td>Ubud High</td>
<td>Ternate High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government’s Recognition</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Central/Local Government’s Recognition</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Yogyakarta Very Low</td>
<td>Ubud Medium</td>
<td>Ternate Very Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central/Local Government Budgetary Support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Yogyakarta None</td>
<td>Ubud Low</td>
<td>Ternate None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal Conflict/Rivalry</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Yogyakarta Very Low</td>
<td>Ubud Very High</td>
<td>Ternate Very High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In examining the various independent variables, control of land – and the character of that control – emerged as the most compelling explanatory proposition for success and failure of aristocratic persistence. All other variables proved ineffective, and one of them even endogenous in nature. For instance, Gowa was pro-Republic in 1945 but is today considered a failed attempt at aristocratic reinvigoration. The level of institutionalisation, for its part, is endogenously tied to the control of land – and therefore must redirect our attention to that issue. In terms of government recognition and assistance, this is very low or non-existent in the case of Ubud, yet it is a case of partial success – while Gowa and Palembang failed under the same conditions. Finally, internal conflict is very high in all three varied outcomes, ruling this factor out as a possible explanation.

Through this systematic exercise, the research questions for this thesis have been further narrowed down and operationalised. If indeed control over land is the strongest candidate for explaining divergent outcomes in aristocratic campaigns for politico-economic re-strengthening after 1998, then the thesis must ask several follow-up questions: first, how did some aristocracies hold on to their land possessions while others lost them? Second, is there a difference between direct possession of land and access to it? And third, did aristocracies use existing land to consolidate their power, or did some use their power to obtain more land and/or change its ownership status after 1998? In examining these questions – with Yogyakarta as its main case study and the other four aristocracies as contrasting examples to identify commonalities and differences – the investigation produced an overarching argument, which is briefly sketched out in the next section.

1.3 Argument

As previously explained, this thesis discusses the revival of aristocratic politics in post-authoritarian Indonesia. It attempts to explore why some aristocrats have staged successful political comebacks in post-Suharto politics, while others have failed to do so. After testing some alternative hypotheses, I proposed that control of land is the explanator of success or failure of aristocratic families to reinvigorate their standing in Indonesian politics. This is the main hypothesis that this thesis aspires to verify by grounding it in empirical evidence.
But in focusing on Yogyakarta as the main case study and four other aristocracies as control cases, this thesis goes further than just highlighting the importance of control of land. It also suggests that the type of control matters. It will be demonstrated that the Yogyakarta Sultanate has been able to manage and hold onto its land through various modes of control. During the colonial period, the Sultanate received land as full ‘property’ from the Dutch. The mode of land control changed during the period of 1945–1998 to ‘access,’ in which the Sultanate lost ownership but maintained benefits through political influence. From 1998–2012, the Sultanate struggled politically to change the mode of control from ‘access’ into ‘property’ which it finally achieved in 2012. Since 2012, the Sultanate has consolidated its role as the territory’s superior power holder through its land holding capacity. Thus, land control has both allowed the Yogyakarta Sultanate to stay relevant during times of aristocratic marginalisation, and to intensify that control once the end of autocracy offered new opportunities for political lobbying.

The verification of the land control hypothesis through the case of Yogyakarta is subsequently tested by investigating four other cases: Ubud, Ternate, Gowa and Palembang. This exploration, I will argue, confirms the hypothesis by highlighting how different levels and forms of control over aristocratic land produced different political outcomes for similarly situated aristocratic families. With this focus on land control and its different forms, it is important to properly conceptualise them and interpret the Indonesian cases within the frame of these conceptualisations. The following section, therefore, introduces the concepts of land control and its different characteristics as the theoretical foundation of this thesis.

1.4 Theoretical Framework: Property and Access

Historically, control of land has been a major focus of the development of economic and political theory. Adam Smith (1776) posited land in the centre of his theory of rent, and Marx (1872) viewed land as such an important capitalist power resource that he demanded the nationalisation of land as the pathway to overcoming capitalism. ‘The nationalisation of land,’ he wrote in 1872, ‘will work a complete change in the relations between labour and capital, and finally, do away with the capitalist form of production, whether industrial or rural.’ Much of subsequent political economy research has drawn from Smith and Marx, and so does this thesis. However, while grounded in broader political economy paradigms of the centrality of land control, this thesis focuses more intensively on the forms of that control.
Scholarly debates on the politico-economic benefits of land control have generally linked these benefits to two different types of control: that is, property rights or rights of access. The scholars highlighting the significance of property rights to land argue that such rights are crucial in determining the value and volume of the benefits extracted from land. Other theorists, however, maintain that land does not have to be directly controlled through property titles in order to generate profits for the individual or group controlling it. Rather, they argue, the amount of benefits from land is determined by the ability of certain actors to open and sustain access to, and thus control over, land – whether they have property rights or not. I will discuss these ‘rights’ and ‘access’ perspectives in more detail below.

1.4.1 Property

Property is the right to use resources in a way that is accepted by the rest of society. A classical reference by Demsetz (1967, p. 347), for instance, stated that ‘property rights are an instrument of society and derive their significance from the fact that they help a man form those expectations which he can reasonably hold in his dealings with others.’ Property holders have certain rights, obligations, privileges and power to utilise the resources legitimately (Alchian, 2007; Feder & Feeny, 1991). The notion of property, then, needs sanction from socially legitimate institutions, as noted by Sikor and Lund (2009a, p. 1). In their words, ‘Property is only property if socially legitimate institutions sanction it, and politico-legal institutions are only effectively legitimised if their interpretation of social norms (in this case property rights) is heeded.’ The concept of property became an important element in the development of economic theories on resource scarcity and the corresponding need to divide resources in a legitimate way. Moreover, de Soto (2001) argued – in the tradition of many other capitalist economists – that the establishment of a property system produces capital that increases labour productivity and ultimately increases the nation’s economic wealth. As indicated above, Marxist authors disagree, but also believe that the institution of property has been crucial to the establishment of capitalism.

The idea of property originally developed from questions surrounding land possession. Rose (1985) for instance, focused on the act of occupying land and rewards from useful labour on the land as the first indication of possession. This possession was followed by the authorities’ acknowledgment of claims that resulted in the establishment of ‘right.’ What differentiates possession from property is the ‘legal mechanism of adjudication and enforcement’ attached to the latter (Hudgson, 2015, p. 684). Property contains aspects of exclusivity rights and creates a boundary between those who have exclusive rights over land, and those who have not. The
wider the boundary, the less exclusive the property becomes, and the more likely it is that land acquires the status of ‘communal property’ and ‘open access’ land. In differentiating these land boundaries and authorities, Feder and Feeny (1991) therefore categorised four types of land property: private property, state-owned land, open access and communal property.

State property is land under the authority of the public sector, mostly state agencies and national or local governments. In the classic work, Tai (1974) argued that the type of state land tenure reflects the design of political power and, conversely, a specific power pattern mirrors a specific type of land tenure. In China, for instance, the type of land tenure represents the characteristics of the state collective system, in which land owners – at the time – were often limited to villages or small groups. Over time, changes to that system in land tenure signified changes in the overall political and economic system (Brandt, Whiting, Zhang, & Zhang, 2017). In liberal economies, on the other hand, state land is held by local and national authorities, but can be easily privatised to individuals or corporations. As Marx and subsequent neo-Marxist theorists pointed out, such privatisation formed the basis of the modern capitalist systems in the West.

Open access – a concept less relevant to this thesis – is a status in which rights are left unassigned. Scholars have highlighted that open access to land is likely to create a degradation of resources as land can be claimed and utilised by anyone. Stevenson (1991, p. 5) asserted that ‘open access is an undesirable regime under which to exploit a natural resource, at least when extraction becomes intensive.’ In an open access property system, people tend to extract benefit for their own personal interest, at the expanse of the public good (Hardin, 1968). A more regulated system of publicly available yet still officially assigned and bordered land is the common property structure. Under this regime, access is limited to specific collectives, setting up a system of joint land management and use to eliminate open access exploitation (Stevenson, 1991, p. 3).

With the exception of open access, property-based claims on land have generally been the preferred mode of land ownership, whether sought by individuals, states or community groups. Direct possession of land titles provides security to the owner and turns land into a tradeable asset and/or resource of production. This also applies to Indonesia’s aristocracies: as we will see later, gaining property rights over land has been among the strategic priorities of many noble families in Indonesia, from the colonial period to today.
1.4.2 Access

In opposition to the property theorists, scholars advancing the access model of land control (not to be confused with the notion of ‘open access’ explained above) view land control as an institution that transcends the formalities of titled property (Ribot & Peluso, 2003). This is especially true in societies in which modern notions of property overlap with traditional concepts of land control – as in Indonesia. For the proponents of the land access theory, their conceptualisation of access captures the de facto control over land better than legal notions of property (Arruñada, 2018), and better describes the multiple layers of regulatory orders in societies of legal pluralism. In these societies, a wide variety of orders exist, ranging from state codes to customary laws and traditional norms (Griffiths, 2015; Harding, 2015). Moreover, access models can – in the view of their supporters – better take account of political decentralisation and its many socio-legal configurations (Dhiaulhaq, McCarthy, & Yasmi, 2018; McCarthy, 2004). Under decentralisation, claims over land often overlap (Lund & Rachman, 2018), making references to property ineffective.

In their Theory of Access, Ribot and Peluso (2003) go beyond the issue of land property, and focus on the dynamic capacity of certain actors to benefit from things, including material objects, persons, institutions, and symbols – whether or not they have titled rights to them. The access theory transcends legal property relations and draws attention to wider social and political relationships that hinder or facilitate people in benefitting from resources (p. 154). Access is about a ‘complex and overlapping web of power’ (p. 156) which needs to be negotiated in order to gain benefit from an object. Therefore, the difference between access and property lies in the distinction between ‘ability’ and ‘right.’ Ribot and Peluso (2003, p. 156) argued that the difference between property and access is as follows: ‘Access is about all possible means by which a person is able to benefit from things [whereas] property generally evokes some kind of socially acknowledged and supported claims or rights – whether that acknowledgement is by law, custom, or convention.’

The theory of access that this thesis draws from opens a way to better understand the political economy of land. By looking at alternative modes of control in cases of overlapping power relations, a theory of access helps us to illuminate the issue of ‘who does (and who does not) get to use what, in what ways, and when (that is, in what circumstances)’ (Ribot & Peluso, 2003, p. 154). By analysing the ability of actors to derive advantage from things in the context of rival power structures, we can establish that that benefit is not only based on and limited to titled property rights, but also the result of cultural legitimacy and other political-economic
powers. For the context of this thesis, the concept of access helps us grasp the control of aristocracies over land even at times when they did not hold titled rights over it.

Moreover, Ribot and Peluso (2003) further aggregate the political economy model of access into ‘access control’ and ‘access maintenance.’ They define access control as ‘the ability to mediate others’ ‘access’, and access maintenance ‘requires resources or powers to keep a particular sort of resource access open’ (p. 159). To continue having access and benefit from resources, those who have powers of access maintenance must transfer part of the benefit to those who control access. In other words, managing access requires offering rewards to those who assist in maintaining it. However, depending on the power relations, some actors might concentrate both control and maintenance of access. Indeed, as indicated above, it is this merging of control and maintenance of access that aristocrats in Indonesia often aim for in order to achieve their final goal – the eventual change of the mode of land control from access to titled property.

1.5 Methodological Considerations

1.5.1 Case study selection

This research combines one in-depth case study of Yogyakarta with comparative case studies of four other aristocracies. This approach was chosen because the Yogyakarta Sultanate is the best institutionalised and politically successful aristocracy of the post-Suharto era, and thus deserves a deep investigation of the drivers of that success. Equally important, however, are the other four control cases, in which commonalities and differences with the Yogyakarta case highlight trends that hold across the Indonesian archipelago. My thesis follows Yin (2013, p. 13) definition of case study research as ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context,’ or a study of a single case in-depth (Gerring, 2004).

In applying Thomas (2011, p. 513)’s definition of case study research, the Yogyakarta and the control case studies are focused on two elements: the territorially limited ‘practical, historical unity’ of the area claimed by the aristocracies, and land property and access theories as ‘an analytical, theoretical frame.’

One of the strongest debates concerning the value of the single case study is its capacity for generalisation and theory building. Dooley (2002, p. 336), for instance, argued that ‘case study research does not lend itself to generalisation and prediction.’ But this is precisely why this thesis uses the technique of examining possible variations from the primary case study by
controlling through four secondary case studies. Such a mixture of a single case study with cross-case study analysis allows for generalisations (Flyvbjerg, 2006), at least for the study of the political role of aristocracies in Indonesia. Thus, despite some disadvantages inherent in the case study approach, I contend that the specific case study format chosen for this thesis delivers valuable inputs for generalisations about the Indonesian case and, in addition to that, for the comparative discussion about land as a contemporary resource for traditional elites.

The aim to provide generalisable results requires a careful case study selection. I already briefly described above why Yogyakarta was chosen as the primary case study, and that Ternate, Ubud, Gowa and Palembang serve as secondary control case studies. But in the following, I explain in more detail the reasons for that choice. As indicated earlier, there were about 278 aristocracies at the end of Dutch rule, but that number declined to 154 in 1955 (See Appendix II) (Ranawidjaya, 1955). As also hinted previously, thirty-five of these resurfaced in current Indonesian politics (See Appendix III). Given that a study of thirty-five aristocracies was beyond the scope of this thesis, I narrowed down the focus of examination through four parameters: electoral participation, coastal-inland characters, levels of revival and geographical spread. Out of thirty-five aristocracies, nineteen had participated or intended to participate in local, province and national elections from 1999–2014. With political-electoral participation being a key indicator of aristocratic reinvigoration, this approach reduced the number of case study candidates to nineteen.

The second parameter is concerned with the division of aristocracies into inland (or land-based) and coastal aristocracies. This geographic separation has created very different aristocratic characteristics, with coastal aristocracies traditionally putting more emphasis on controlling the seas rather than land. In addition to Yogyakarta as a landed aristocracy, for the four control cases I chose one other inland aristocracy (Ubud), two primarily coastal aristocracies (Ternate and Gowa), and one case in which its low level of institutionalisation made a definitive characterisation difficult (Palembang) (See Map 1 of Indonesia). This selection helps to demonstrate how coastal aristocracies too developed land holdings over time, and how this land acquisition boosted their political and economic standing, especially after 1949.

The third parameter is related to the level of revival following van Klinken’s typology of profile-raising, resurrected and reinvented aristocracies discussed above. I selected two profile-raising (Yogyakarta and Ubud) and two resurrected aristocracies (Ternate and Gowa), as well as one reinvented aristocracy (Palembang). Lastly, in order to increase the possibility
of generalisation and theory building in the Indonesian context, the selection took account of
geographical spread. Cases were selected from the westernmost island of Sumatra (Palembang)
to the eastern province of North Maluku (Ternate), with the central islands of Java, Sulawesi
and Bali represented by Yogyakarta, Gowa and Ubud respectively. Table 1.2 below shows in
more detail the criteria that led to the selection of the five cases.

Table 1.2 Case studies selection strategies 2013–2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yogyakarta</th>
<th>Ubud</th>
<th>Ternate</th>
<th>Gowa</th>
<th>Palembang</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Java)</td>
<td>(Bali)</td>
<td>(North Maluku)</td>
<td>(Sulawesi)</td>
<td>(Sumatra)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main case</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Participation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President/Vice President</td>
<td>Failed to get nominated</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor/Vice Governor</td>
<td>Ex-officio</td>
<td>Win</td>
<td>Failed to get nominated</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor/Regent</td>
<td>Loss</td>
<td>Win</td>
<td>Loss</td>
<td>Loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPR RI</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Win</td>
<td>Loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPD RI</td>
<td>Win</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Win</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRD (Province)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Loss</td>
<td>Loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRD (District/City)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Loss</td>
<td>Loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of revival</strong></td>
<td>Profile-raising</td>
<td>Profile-raising</td>
<td>Resurrected</td>
<td>Resurrected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geographical conditions</strong></td>
<td>Landed</td>
<td>Landed</td>
<td>Coastal</td>
<td>Coastal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s note assessment.

1.5.2 Data collection methods and analysis

This thesis is primarily a study of political elites – in this case, the Indonesian aristocracy.
According to Hoffman-Lange (2006, p. 1), ‘elite research is devoted to studying the
characteristic of politicians and other holders of leadership positions in powerful public
institutions and private organisation who are distinguished by their regular participation in
/political decision-making.’ This elite focus of the research has significant methodological
implications.

The first implication is that elite interviews must form a key element of the qualitative
data collection. To determine who should be become informants, I used several strategies. First,
I established the potential informants’ aristocratic ancestry. Power within aristocracies is
determined by the individual’s ancestral distance from the ruler of the aristocratic house.
Therefore, creating genealogies is essential in locating power relations between royal family
members, especially in conflict-ridden aristocracies. Because most sultans/kings have more than one wife (with stratified positions of each wife), the full-siblings and half-siblings of each wife hold complex positions. In the Yogyakarta Sultanate, for instance, at the time of writing, because the Sultan has no son, there are eleven brothers of the current Sultan competing to inherit the title of Sultan.

The second strategy of informant selection concentrated on the historical aristocratic power relations with society. Thus, in addition to aristocrats, the thesis had to draw information from politicians, bureaucrats, journalists, economic actors, civil society groups and other individuals or collective actors who interacted with aristocracies. The third strategy involved interviewing citizens or low-level officials who held important information on the management of land holdings and the palace complexes themselves (Creswell, 2007). In all of these interviews, I used the semi-structured interview approach, with a list of questions related to the five independent variables listed above serving as the basis of the interview, but follow-up questions developing from the information provided by the interviewee during the session (Vogt, Vogt, Gardner, & Haeffele, 2014, pp. 44-46).

In addition to interviews, I collected data from archives, online and offline news portals and government offices. Of particular importance have been government regulations on land use and ownership, data on land size and shifting boundaries, and other stipulations governing the relationship between aristocratic families and the citizenry.

The field research for this thesis took place from September 2014 to March 2015, with several follow-up trips between 2015 and 2017. In total, I recorded 268 interviews. I started my fieldwork by attending the ninth Archipelago Palace Festival (*Festival Kraton Nusantara – FKN*) organised by FKIKN in the Bima Sultanate in September 2014. On that occasion, I met with kings, sultans and other representatives from most kingdoms and sultanates in Indonesia. The official participants of the festival numbered forty-two aristocratic houses (some of them were claimants) (Radar Tambora, 8 September 2014).

Subsequently, I spent around 30 days to do field research in Gowa, Ternate, Ubud and Palembang respectively, and about six months in Yogyakarta. I also travelled to other sultanates and kingdoms in seven other provinces, fourteen cities/districts and interviewed twenty-two sultans, kings, and leaders of aristocratic houses. In the follow up field research, I focused only on Yogyakarta as the primary case study. I analysed my findings based on the interviews, documents, observations and other written materials, newspapers and social media. Thus, this
thesis uses predominantly qualitative research methods, while drawing from historical and contemporary data sets (mostly related to land ownership) to substantiate its findings.

1.6 Yogyakarta Overview

In this section, I present an introductory overview of Yogyakarta, the primary case study of this thesis. It is particularly important to sketch out some of the main issues related to aristocratic land ownership and conflicts in the province. While many of these issues will be discussed in-depth in later chapters, a brief summary of the main historical and political facts will help the reader to better understand the kind of analytical problems the thesis deals with.

The Sultanate of Yogyakarta emerged from the break-up of the larger and previously dominant Sultanate of Mataram, which had ruled much of Java in the 16th and 17th centuries. In-house conflict and the divide-and-rule tactics of the Dutch VOC (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie) split it into the Surakarta Sultanate and the Yogyakarta Sultanate in 1755, and the Mangkunegaran Principality in 1757. Further internal conflict reduced the Yogyakarta Sultanate territory through the creation of the Pakualaman Principality in 1813. After the collapse of the VOC in 1799, the Dutch Government established a new contractual agreement with each newly enthroned ruler, institutionalising a form of indirect rule over the area. The Dutch claimed key powers for themselves, but left it to the local rulers to run land administration and manage their subject population.

After independence, the Yogyakarta Sultanate and Pakualaman Principality merged to form the Province of the Special Region of Yogyakarta (hereafter: Yogyakarta) in 1950, consisting of four regencies (Bantul, Sleman, Gunung Kidul and Kulon Progo) as well as the City of Yogyakarta. As for administrative arrangements, the Yogyakarta Sultanate had significantly more power over the province compared to the Pakualaman. From 78 sub-districts in Yogyakarta, the former area of the Pakualaman was responsible for only five sub-districts that covered a mere 5.8% of the total territory in Yogyakarta (146.64 km²). In terms of executive leadership, Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX of Yogyakarta became the governor, and Paku Alam VIII became his deputy from 1950-1988. Paku Alam VIII became acting Governor from 1988, after Hamengku Buwono’s death, until his own death in 1998. From 1998 onwards, Sultan Hamengku Buwono X ruled as the Governor of Yogyakarta.

Yogyakarta is the second smallest province in Indonesia (constituting 0.17% of its territory). The exact data on its land size is inconsistent – giving a first hint at the difficulties
involved in managing land in the province. The most commonly used data issued by the Yogyakarta Office of Statistic (Badan Pusat Statistik Yogyakarta – BPS Yogyakarta) states that the total area of Yogyakarta is 3,185.80 km². The biggest regency is Gunung Kidul (46.63%) followed by Kulon Progo (18.40%), Sleman (18.04%), Bantul (15.91%) and Yogyakarta City (1.02%) (See Map 3 of Yogyakarta) (BPS Yogyakarta, 2017, p. 5). However, there are two other different sources of government data. The National Development Planning Agency (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional – Bappenas) land profile data of Yogyakarta in 2015 states that the total area of Yogyakarta is 3,174.13 km² (Bappenas, 2015, p. 17), while the newest Yogyakarta Province Government data shows that the total area of Yogyakarta is 3,133.15 km² (Yogyakarta Province Government, 2018, p. v). Hence, there is a 52.65 km² difference – which is equivalent to 162% of the total area of Yogyakarta City (32.50 km²). This thesis uses the BPS Yogyakarta data (unless stated otherwise), due to its higher level of citation and usage compared with the other two.

The absence of consistent land data and certification is due to the lack of digital mapping, incompetent bureaucrats and political contestation in securing access to and ownership of land. Of the total Yogyakarta area, only 1,980 km² (or 62%) has been digitally mapped (Bappenas, 2015, p. 19). Similarly, at the national level, the government has digitally mapped only 51.6% of the total area of Indonesia (BPN, 2015a, p. 21). At the bureaucratic level, limited personnel and equipment hinder the land administration process. The bureaucratic apparatus in the Yogyakarta Land Office (Badan Pertanahan Nasional Yogyakarta – BPN Yogyakarta) is dominated by administrative personnel rather than surveyors. Of 503 officials in 2013, only sixty-seven were surveyors, while eighty-five additional surveyors were urgently needed to cover the area (Bappenas, 2015, p. 4). Moreover, political contestation to secure land property and access complicated the process of land registration and verification. My fieldwork experience showed that it was hard to access data, and bureaucrats were unwilling to provide data on land in Yogyakarta, particularly if it was related to the Sultanate’s land. Among the obstacles to proper land certification, the latter is of course of the highest relevance for this thesis.

Therefore, I turned to media reports related to Yogyakarta land data. Until December 2017, approximately 444,000 plots had not been certified, and among the uncertified, the Sultanate’s Ground (SG) and Pakualaman’s Ground (PAG) contributed the largest portion of uncertified land (Antara, 27 December 2017). In the City of Yogyakarta, for example, the head of BPN Yogyakarta said that ‘Most of the uncertified land in Yogyakarta City is the Sultanate’s
land occupied by the people’ (Harian Merapi, 15 March 2018). In Gunung Kidul, given the current pace of work, to certify the 48.2% uncertified land would require approximately twenty-eight years. The table below shows the number of uncertified land plots in Yogyakarta.

Table 1. 3 Total certified and uncertified land plots in Yogyakarta 2015-2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Plots</th>
<th>Certified Plots</th>
<th>Uncertified Plots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plots</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Plots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta City</td>
<td>96,690</td>
<td>91,774</td>
<td>94.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantul</td>
<td>567,541</td>
<td>464,202</td>
<td>81.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleman</td>
<td>611,783</td>
<td>512,516</td>
<td>83.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunung Kidul</td>
<td>576,548</td>
<td>298,638</td>
<td>51.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kulon Progo</td>
<td>335,009</td>
<td>311,766</td>
<td>93.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s note assessment.

The issue of land certification has been a political issue not only in Yogyakarta. Since late 2016, Indonesia’s Central Government under President Joko Widodo has adopted land certification for lower-income citizens, mostly Muslims, as a policy priority in an apparent appeal to Islamic voters and organisations (Fealy, 2018; Mietzner, 2018, p. 274). By turning informal access to land into private property, the poor can have access to financial institutions and use the certified land as a bank guarantee. In 2017, from approximately 126 million plots, eighty-six million plots were uncertified. Adding to the less than a million land certificates issued in 2016, the Central Government scheduled the issue of five million certificates in 2017 (and achieved 4.2 million), seven million in 2018 and nine million in 2019. Given these targets, by 2025, the 35.07% of occupied but uncertified land in Indonesia will be certified (assuming that the targets are met) (BPN, 2015a; Detik, 19 January 2018).

Traditionally, Yogyakarta has been an important population centre in Java. In 1930, Yogyakarta was the most densely populated area in Indonesia (Kwartanada, 2002, p. 257). Currently, the population of Yogyakarta stands at 3.6 million, with 96% of them ethnic Javanese. Two-thirds of them live in the urban area. The population density is 1,155 persons per square kilometres, and the most densely populated area is in the City of Yogyakarta, with a population of 12,699 per km². Approximately half of all adults have only primary school

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4 Due to lack of a single available data set, I used government and media reports. However, the number of plots is not congruent to the total land area. For instance, even though 82% of plots have been certified in Bantul, this only covers 59% of the total area (Radar Jogja, 17 November 2015). The data for the various areas were drawn from: Yogyakarta City (Harian Merapi, 15 March 2018); Bantul (Radar Jogja, 17 November 2015; Tribun Jogja, 5 October 2017); Sleman (Sleman District Government, 2016); Gunung Kidul (Tribun Jogja, 24 April 2015) and Kulon Progo (Okezone, 10 July 2017).
Introduction

education (Year 9) or below (BPS Yogyakarta, 2017, pp. 75, 103). Even so, Yogyakarta is the ‘City of Students’, featuring 106 higher education institutions, including nineteen universities, which attract 300,000 students per year to live in Yogyakarta temporarily. Most adults work in retail trade (31%), agriculture (25%) and services (23%). Importantly for our discussion of imbalances in land possession, Yogyakarta has the highest expenditure inequality in Indonesia. The Gini Index in Yogyakarta has risen significantly in the last four years: from 0.39 in 2014 to 0.43 in 2015, 0.42 in 2016 and 0.44 in 2017. This is higher than the national average of 0.39 in 2017 – and contrary to Yogyakarta, the national Gini Index has been declining (Yogyakarta Province Government, 2017a).

Politically and administratively, the Special Region of Yogyakarta differs from other provinces in Indonesia. While local legislative (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah – DPRD) members at the province, regency and the city level are elected every five years, as in other territories, the Yogyakarta governorship has always been in the hands of the two royal families. Initially, this was an informal arrangement, but was institutionalised in 2012. After the deaths of Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX and Paku Alam VIII in 1988 and 1998 respectively, Sultan Hamengku Buwono X became governor for two periods (1998–2008), as post-Suharto legislation limited the terms of national governors to two periods. But the Central Government extended his term twice (2008–2011 and 2011–2013) while working on a permanent solution. In 2012, the new Specialness Law stipulated that the reigning Sultan would be the ex-officio governor and Paku Alam the ex-officio deputy governor of the province, without an election by either the legislature or the populace. By contrast, the Mayor of Yogyakarta City and the Regents of Bantul, Sleman, Kulon Progo and Gunung Kidul are directly elected every five years for a maximum of two terms, as is the case in the other districts and cities of Indonesia.

Unlike in other provinces, the structure of villages and hamlets (dukuh) is controlled by the Sultanate through land dependency arrangements. Village and hamlet heads receive a portion of village land as their salary and pension. Until 1983, the structure in Yogyakarta City neighbourhoods (Rukun Kampung, RK) consisted of several family units (Rukun Tetangga/RT) as an administrative division to organise people in collective action, mutual help and other neighbourhood activities (Guinness, 1986). The New Order transformed RK into Rukun Warga (RW) in 1983, but maintained the RT units below it. However, in the four regencies, dukuhs are more important. Dukuhs are part of the village administrative and political structure, with desa at the top, followed by dukuhs, RW and RT. Since 2014, village heads have been directly elected for a maximum of three six-year terms, and heads of dukuhs (kepala dukuhs) are selected directly.
by the people from candidates and have a compulsory retirement age of 60. These arrangements changed previous traditional practice where both village heads and kepala dukuhan held hereditary office until death, mimicking the Sultan. These administrative hierarchies will turn out to be crucial for the discussion of land management in Yogyakarta in the thesis’ later chapters.

1.7 Chapter Overview

As the primary case study of this thesis, Yogyakarta’s aristocracy and its quest for land control and political influence are discussed in five of the thesis’ eight chapters, while the secondary control cases are the subject of one chapter. Chapter two, then, examines the formation of the Yogyakarta Sultanate and Pakualaman Principality, and explains how the two aristocracies gained their land property from the Dutch during the colonial period. The chapter also discusses how the Sultanate managed its land property in the late colonial period, especially in the beginning of the 20th century, when it established villages and utilised parts of the land for village financing and villagers.

The third chapter discusses how Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX defended his land possessions at the time of the Japanese occupation (1942–1945), during the revolutionary period (1945–1949) and during the formation of the Province of Special Region of Yogyakarta in 1950. Based on Ribot & Peluso’s theory of access, the mode of land control changed from property to access. In the tumultuous period of socio-political change prior to and after independence, when many aristocracies were disestablished, the Sultan and Paku Alam retained their executive positions as the governor and vice-governor indefinitely. The Bylaws of 1954 also secured the royal land holdings against Republican instincts of re-distribution, despite the regulations’ general tendency of making it easier for non-aristocratic actors to obtain land.

Chapter four focuses on the difficulties the Yogyakarta Sultanate faced in maintaining access over land during the autocratic regimes of Guided Democracy (1959–1965) and the New Order (1966–1998). The first challenge to defend access to land was the implementation of the Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) in 1960. BAL stipulates that the aristocracy is not entitled to any hereditary land ownership, and therefore prohibits aristocracies from holding property rights over their traditional land. In most of Indonesia, their land was confiscated, turned into state land, or distributed as part of the land reform policy. During the early implementation of BAL, the Yogyakarta Sultanate maintained access to land through political manoeuvres that were
helped by the Sultan’s position as Indonesian vice president (1973–1978) and governor (1950–1988). In 1984, Suharto abolished Yogyakarta’s land autonomy, and the Sultanate lost the governorship following the death of Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX. Despite these challenges, the Sultanate was able to circumvent the full execution of the BAL after 1984, and it derived benefits from continued land access and the now booming cultural tourism industry.

Chapter five discusses how the Sultanate of Yogyakarta used the new political landscape after the fall of Suharto in 1998 to consolidate its land access and fight for a renegotiated special status. The latter was finally achieved in 2012. Riding the wave of democratisation, Sultan Hamengku Buwono X gained the role of governor in October 1998. From 1998 to 2012, the Sultan’s interests centred on not only defending access to land, but on how to turn land access into private property. Politically, the Sultan campaigned to be bestowed with the right to the governorship without an election and term limit. When his nominal term ended in 2008, support from citizens who were economically dependent on the Sultanate’s land forced the Central Government to extend his governorship. Eventually, it also gave in to his demands for an undisputed hold on the position and endorsed his push for intensified control over the Sultanate’s land holdings.

Chapter six discusses the Sultan’s solidified control over land under the terms of the new law on the special status of Yogyakarta. One of the clauses of the special status law allowed the Sultanate to turn sultanate’s land into private property. Legally stronger than even the previous property regulations during the colonial period, the current property right has given the Sultanate full control of the land as property without any institutional oversight. The chapter discusses the Sultan’s superiority in cases where the Sultanate’s land rights were challenged by higher national laws. Two cases of land contestation are investigated: the takeover of village lands, and land ownership for Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent. In both cases, the Sultan prevailed and thus showed his strengthened position after 2012 vis-à-vis national laws, actors and institutions.

Chapter seven tests whether the findings from the Yogyakarta case (i.e., that the extent of control over land formed the basis for some aristocracies’ post-1998 revival and consolidation) hold in other cases across Indonesia. For that purpose, the control cases of Ubud, Ternate, Gowa and Palembang are examined. As will be shown, although neither Ubud nor Ternate controlled land holdings as large as Yogyakarta’s, they managed to translate their limited land possessions into economic benefits and some political success. In Ubud, this was done by turning limited land property into a profitable business, and in Ternate by maintaining
access over land through the indigenous community. By contrast, both Gowa and Palembang lost their land in previous periods of political upheaval, and were thus unable to use it as a resource in their fight for post-1998 influence.

The concluding chapter, then, summarises these findings, confirming that land control in the form of access and property has been the key to explain the political survival or failure of Indonesian aristocracies in the post-1998 polity. The Sultan of Yogyakarta successfully defended his land, even turning access to land into private property in the process (See Appendix I). He would not have been able to do so, however, had the Sultanate lost its land through the revolution or the 1960’s BAL, as other aristocracies did. Those aristocracies subsequently had no basis from which to launch political reinvigoration campaigns after 1998, while those that held on to moderate amounts of land were able to make corresponding gains as they tried to stage politico-economic comebacks after Suharto’s fall.
2. The Formation of the Yogyakarta Sultanate and its Regime of Land Control, 1755–1942

2.1 Introduction

This chapter begins the discussion of the primary case study of this thesis, namely the Sultanate of Yogyakarta. It explores the formation of the Sultanate and the development of the land control regime, under which the Sultan received land property rights from the Dutch and the British. Contrary to some scholars, who argue that the sultans were under full control of the colonial powers and submitted to their dictate over land (Anderson, 1972b), this chapter offers a more nuanced picture. First, from the 18th to the early 19th century, the sultans of Yogyakarta exercised a significant level of authority over their land and subjects through the apanage system. Even though the colonial powers had the last word in critical political matters such as royal succession, the Sultanate handled the details of land management. Second, the colonial apparatus, following the arrival of the British and their demand for agricultural products, began to significantly intervene in the traditional land management system as capitalist economic structures were introduced in the 19th century. The modern salary system replaced the apanage system in 1918, and some of the Sultanate’s lands were given to newly established villages to manage. Third, however, the Sultanate maintained to control over 17% of village land outside of the capital, which was then used as political capital in the following periods.

This chapter analyses how the Yogyakarta aristocracy initially received and managed its land property to support its economic and political functions. Using the dual concept of ‘access’ (the ability to gain benefits from land) and ‘property’ (the titled right to land) (Demsetz, 1967; Ribot & Peluso, 2003; Rose, 1985; Sikor & Lund, 2009a, 2009b) as an interpretive frame, the chapter illustrates how the Mataram Sultanate received property by force. During the division of Mataram, the Dutch, who had given themselves titled rights to the land, transferred the property to the Yogyakarta Sultanate and allowed its officials to manage it. In the early 19th century, the beginning of ‘the truly colonial period of Javanese history’ (Ricklefs, 1981, p. 114.), the land properties of the Yogyakarta aristocracies were re-granted by the Dutch (Yogyakarta) and British (Pakualaman) as part of an indirect ruling system. Both managed the land using an apanage system of cash, in-kind payments and labour sharing. The exercise of land control during this period is illustrated by the Sultanate’s records of detailed regulations, measurements, and taxes following its separation from the Kasunanan of Surakarta. The Sultanate established rules for landholders (patuh) and intermediaries/bailiffs (bekel) as an
essential part of its land control apanage policy, which was celebrated in the *Garebeg* festival three times each (Javanese) year.

The chapter first gives an overview of the relationships between the key Central Javanese aristocracies that led to the creation of separate royal houses in the 18th and early 19th centuries. Originating from the same 16th-century Mataram Sultanate, the Javanese aristocracy was divided into four principalities in two periods (1770s and 1810s). The chapter will then lay out the administrative and military arrangements governing the Yogyakarta principalities, before providing a detailed explanation of the land regime under the apanage system, which anchored the Sultanate’s titled property rights. Subsequently, it explores the challenges that increasingly industrial production mechanisms posed to the apanage system, eventually leading to its abolishment in the early 20th century. Finally, the chapter analyses the transfer of land to villagers and its consequences for the Sultanate.

### 2.2 The Formation of the Yogyakarta Sultanate

Panembahan Senopati (c.1574–1601), a local Javanese chief, established Mataram by military conquest; this kingdom reached its golden era under the leadership of his grandson, Sultan Agung (1613–45). Sultan Agung controlled large parts of Java, except for what is now Banten, conquering much of western, central and eastern Java (Pigeaud & de Graaf, 1976). Sultan Agung first targeted the northern coastal areas (*pesisir*), seeking to control trade, then moved further inland (de Graaf & Pigeaud, 1989). The last resistance, in Surabaya, fell in 1625 through a series of campaigns and sieges (Ricklefs, 1974, p. 15). After controlling most of Java and expanding to Palembang in South Sumatra, the only remaining threat to Sultan Agung was the establishment of the Dutch East Indies Company, which was headquartered in Batavia (present-day Jakarta) since 1619. This company was established as a trading company with a primary interest in Moluccan spices but evolved into a profound influence on the inner politics of Mataram. Economically threatened by the company’s claim on a trade monopoly along the northern coast, Sultan Agung’s troops marched on Batavia in 1628 and 1629 but failed to occupy it ([See Map 2 of Java](#)). Mataram’s power in Java was thus slowly eroded by the VOC.

Sultan Agung’s deeply divided successors could not benefit from the vast areas they inherited and began to cooperate with the Dutch. Sultan Agung’s son, Amangkurat I, quickly lost control of trade along Java’s northern coast, creating dissatisfaction among the nobility. His harsh approach to governance further added to the discontent. Inside his palace or *Kraton*
in Pleret (present-day Bantul), for instance, continuous public executions occurred; he was also believed to have massacred about 6,000 Islamic clerics during his reign. As a result of the turmoil, aristocrats began to detach their appanages (a provision of land to aristocrats in return for their loyalty to the king) from the kingdom.

In the 1670s, Prince Trunojoyo, a Madurese aristocrat, exploited this widespread dissatisfaction and began a revolt against Amangkurat I, from his stronghold in Kediri, East Java. He emphasised his commitment to Islam, gaining much support from the pesisir (Ricklefs, 1974, p. 20). The Kraton fell in 1677, and Amangkurat I fled to the west with all royal regalia. For the first time, the Mataram rulers asked the VOC to assist them. The Dutch, consequently, helped the royal family to restore its power over Mataram, allowing Amangkurat II to take the throne from his father Amangkurat I, who had died during his escape. To repay his debts, Amangkurat II agreed to surrender his main port, the pesisir, and all of its trade income to the VOC. He then built a new palace in Kertasura (around 10 kilometres from the present-day palace of Surakarta) in 1680.

Already weakened, the Kertasura court was further undermined by a number of revolts. The most important among them, the Chinese War (1740–1745), would eventually lead to the division of Mataram. The Chinese War, as discussed by Remmelink (1994), began with a massacre in Batavia. Many Chinese fled east to Semarang, less than a hundred kilometres from Kertasura. The Chinese laid siege to the VOC post in Semarang, with Paku Buwono II (Amangkurat II’s grandson) supporting the revolt. The Dutch prevailed, however, forcing Paku Buwono II to make a renewed pledge of loyalty to the VOC. This pledge, in turn, triggered a rebellion by other princes against Paku Buwono II, and the palace of Kertasura fell to these rebels in 1742. Paku Buwono II asked the Dutch for military and financial help and built a new palace in Surakarta. A year later, the king repaid the Dutch by releasing most of the ports he held, without prior consultation with the nobility – including his half-brother, Prince Mangkubumi (Ricklefs, 1974, p. 39). This escalated the revolt further and became a serious threat to Mataram and its dynasty.

Increasingly desperate, the ailing Paku Buwono II pledged that whoever suppressed the revolt – led by local nobleman R.M. Said – would be granted control of the latter’s stronghold Sukowati (present-day Boyolali). Prince Mangkubumi (later Hamengku Buwono I) answered the call and stopped the rebellion, but R.M Said remained uncaptured. Paku Buwono II then reneged on his offer, leading Mangkubumi and several other princes to join the rebel they had once been sent to defeat. Mangkubumi even married the daughter of R.M. Said, strengthening
the bonds between the insurgents. In 1748, this rebel coalition boasted 13,000 troops, which
defeated Dutch soldiers in Grobogan and Juwana. It was clear that it was impossible to stop the
rebels without a massive Dutch intervention. On his deathbed, on 11 December 1749, Paku
Buwono II hence signed an agreement to turn over Mataram to the Dutch. Soekanto (1952, pp.
178-179) cited the agreement as follows. ‘[According to] God’s will, I cannot run the Mataram
palace and give the orders [anymore]. To run the Mataram palace, I entrust Mataram and
everything in it to the Kumpeni [the VOC], to be received by Mr Governor and Mr Director.’

Three days later, the crown prince signed another agreement with the VOC, based on
which ‘the Governor-General and the Batavia Council of the Indies installed the Crown Prince
as the new Susuhunan [king]. The Crown Prince acknowledged that he became ruler not
through right of inheritance, but because the Dutch East Indies Company chose him for the
position’ (Ricklefs, 1974, p. 53). On paper, the Dutch had finally taken over Mataram and
gained control of the royal private property, especially the land. However, this agreement had
little bearing on concrete practices on the ground; while the Dutch were now supreme rulers of
Mataram, the royal house continued to issue its own land regulations creating dual societies
(Furnivall, 1967), benefiting from a system of indirect rule in which the aristocracy acted as the
representative of the VOC vis-à-vis the populace. So, although according to the agreement the
Mataram land was transferred to the Dutch, in practice the rulers of Mataram continued to enjoy
both land access and land property in certain areas of indirect rule, while other vast areas of
Mataram were under the direct rule of the Dutch.

Keen to create political stability that would allow for the resumption of normal trade on
Java, the Dutch agreed with Mangkubumi on 13 February 1755 to divide Mataram into two.
Based on this Giyanti Pact, half of the territory was granted to Paku Buwono III and named the
Surakarta Sultanate, with Paku Buwono III and his descendants retaining the status of
‘susuhunan/sunan’ , and the other half was used to establish the Yogyakarta Sultanate under a
‘sultan.’ The construction of the Palace of Yogyakarta began a year later, with Mangkubumi
mimicking the Palace of Surakarta that he had built previously. Both Surakarta and Yogyakarta
received about 100,000 cacah/tjatjah (households) for their control. In this period, two ‘semi-
autonomous’ principalities were created. On the one hand, the Dutch could not impose the direct
rule on these areas, but on the other hand, the rulers were expected to consult with the Dutch

5 The Javanese sentence is ‘…saking karsanning Allah, kawula sangaja saja boten kenging jennenjekkella karaton
Matavis kalajaj parentah kangngapenned, hangih rehnnng hamrih dadosa kapenneddan paparentahhan karaton
Matavis punnika, sartta sawewengkonnipun sadaja sami kahaturraken dumateng Kumpni kangngageng,
ketampan dating Tuwan Gupernur sartitha Direktur kang wahu punnika.’
on almost all matters. Moreover, a new contract would be established every time a new ruler was crowned.

Scholars have expressed different opinions regarding the meaning of *cacah* and its implications for the separation of Mataram. *Cacah* might refer to three things: land area, tax calculation, and military power. First, Suhartono (1991) refers to *cacah* as a calculation of arable land, especially paddy fields, to support a single household or a group of households. According to Setiawati (2011), one *cacah* was equal to 7,096 m². Another source identifies *cacah* as *bau*, *bouw* or *bahu* (shoulder) (Carey, 1992). As such, *cacah* referred to the ability of a household (generally with a single strong man) to work on the land. Second, Moertono (2009, p. 153) argued that *cacah* referred to the tax unit per household, a definition based on colonial reports and traditional calculations that included the same territory in different *cacah* at different times. He argued that, ‘the *tjatjah*-number referred only to the amount of taxation that the ruler expected to draw from a territory given in apanage; how the amount was to be gathered was entirely the concern of the apanage-holder.’ Third, Ricklefs maintained that *cacah* was a household calculated based on its ability to provide military service. Each family was assumed to have one armed man as an immediately available soldier. Ricklefs (1974, p. 423) argued that ‘the number of *cacahs* therefore expressed with some precision the military and hence political power of a given dignitary.’ Therefore, while a *cacah* may have referred to land area, taxation, or military power, it was based on a calculation of households under royal control.

The Giyanti Pact stopped Mangkubumi’s rebellion, but another pact had to be made to end R.M. Said’s revolt – especially after he advanced and defeated some of the VOC’s garrisons. In 1756, he almost burned down Mangkubumi’s newly established palace in Yogyakarta. A coalition of Susuhunan, Mangkubumi, and VOC forces was unable to stop R.M. Said’s revolt (Ricklefs, 2015); conversely, it was impossible for R.M. Said to defeat their combined forces. In 1757, the rebellion ended when the VOC and R.M. Said signed the Salatiga Pact, which gave R.M Said new authority in Surakarta, which had been previously divided. He established the Mangkunegaran Principality – located in Surakarta but autonomous from both the Surakarta and Yogyakarta royal houses. To solidify his claim, he crowned himself Mangkunegoro I. At this point, the revolt and VOC intervention had divided Mataram into three semi-independent royal houses: the Kasunanan Surakarta, the Kasultanan Yogyakarta, and the Mangkunegaran Principality. The separation created significant competition between the three principalities, but their intricate balance prevented further revolts or wars for some fifty years, when the Napoleonic Wars changed the constellation of the power structure in Europe – and,
by consequence, in Java. The occupation of the Netherlands by France led to the last division of Mataram: that is, the creation of Pakualaman.

The establishment of Pakualaman Principality was a gift from the British official Stamford Raffles to Prince Natakusuma (later Paku Alam I) in 1813 – during the European wars that put the Dutch under French rule. As a result of the wars, the French had first sent Herman Willem Daendels to the eastern regions previously colonialised by the VOC (which had gone bankrupt in 1799), including Java. Following a new French–British agreement, the British subsequently occupied the Dutch East Indies (the state-based quasi-successor to the VOC) from 1811 to 1816. As they tried to establish their fragile rule, the British were confronted with a bitter relationship between the Yogyakarta nobles Prince Natakusuma, his brother Hamengku Buwono II, and his nephew Hamengku Buwono III. Prince Natakusuma held Hamengku Buwono III accountable for Daendels’ exile of him and his son for alleged connections to a rebellion in East Java (Poerwokoesoemo, 1985; Suyamto, 1986). Thus, as Ricklefs noted on Natakusuma, ‘As an enemy of Daendels, he naturally became an ally of the British; as an enemy of both Hamengku Buwono II and his son, he exerted every effort to achieve an independent status in the court’ (Ricklefs, 1981, pp. 108-109).

Moreover, the British revealed secret communications between Hamengku Buwono II and Surakarta’s Paku Buwono IV that indicated a plan to attack the Europeans. In June 1812, the British, with the help of both an elite squad of the Mangkunegaran Legion and Prince Natakusuma, stormed, conquered, and looted the court of Yogyakarta (Carey, 1992). In return, the British acknowledged Prince Natakusuma as an independent prince in 1812, and in 1813 they granted him the new principality of Pakualaman, with an inheritable domain of 4,000 cacah. Like Mangkunegaran, Pakualaman received 0.63 km² of land in the city of Yogyakarta for its palace as well as parts of the southern coast of Yogyakarta (see Map 3 of Yogyakarta). In present day Yogyakarta, land owned by Pakualaman covers around 5.8% of the province. The complexities of the separation of Mataram is illustrated in the diagram below, which shows the genealogy of the four royal houses in Java.
The formation of these four royal houses as semi-autonomous principalities was a vital step for Javanese nobles to exercise strong control over land and the populace on it. The principalities were authorised by contracts with the Dutch to use several tools to consolidate their control. They could, first, establish a limited number of military units; second, derive economic benefits from land resources; and third, maintain an administrative structure designed to institutionalise royal control. Although the Dutch had a profound influence on internal court affairs and insisted on picking the future rulers, they often chose not to exercise their land management authority – even in those territories that were nominally under their direct rule. Like elsewhere in Java and outside Java, this was due to political stability considerations and the limited personnel at their disposal. Therefore, the aristocracies largely maintained their traditional administration and land management. The following section will discuss the land management system as a key economic resource for supporting the principalities. As will be the case for much of the rest of this chapter and thesis, the focus is primarily on the Yogyakarta Sultanate.

Source: Poerwokoesoemo (1985, pp. 64-65); Ricklefs (1974, p. 429 Appendix III); Abbreviations: PB = Paku Buwono (Surakarta); HB = Hamengku Buwono (Yogyakarta); PA = Paku Alam.
2.3 Controlling Land Property, 1755–1830

While Mataram had been divided into four semi-autonomous principalities by the early 19th century, the socio-political significance of these royal houses differed immensely. Surakarta’s Kasunanan and Yogyakarta’s Kasultanan were viewed by the Dutch as crucial actors that needed to be kept in check, while Mangkunegaran and Pakualaman were, although independent, only secondary players. The superiority of the first two principalities came from the size of the land they controlled and their immediately available militia. Both Kasunanan and Kasultanan had around 85,000 households (and available militia), while Mangkunegaran and Pakualaman only had approximately 4,000. Table 2.1 below shows the details of the asset distribution between the four former ex-Mataram aristocracies.

Table 2.1 Households, militia and land under ex-Mataram aristocracies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Royal Houses</th>
<th>Palace Location</th>
<th>Number of Households (cacah)</th>
<th>Number of Immediately Available Militia</th>
<th>Total Land in the 1900s (in km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kasunanan</td>
<td>Surakarta</td>
<td>53,100 in Negara Agung, 32,350 in Mancanégara</td>
<td>85,450</td>
<td>3,359.63w</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasultanan</td>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>53,100 in Negara Agung, 33,950 in Mancanégara</td>
<td>87,050</td>
<td>2,935.01v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mangkunegaran</td>
<td>Surakarta</td>
<td>5,000ii</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>2,784.15w</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakualaman</td>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>4,000iii</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>146.42v</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

i. Soekanto (1952, p. 22). Ricklefs (1974, p. 71) estimated that each ruler controlled a population of 690,000 people.
ii. Soekanto (1952, p. 27).
iv. Suharto (1991, p. 195). In 1813, Mangkunegaran received another 1,000 cacah taken from Kasunanan for its support to the British attack to Kasultanan (Carey, 1992).
v. Calculated from present Yogyakarta Province minus the Kasunanan enclaves (Imogiri and Kotagede sub-districts) and the Mangkunegaran enclave (Ngawen sub-district). Pakualaman consists of five sub-districts (Wates, Temon, Galur, Panjatan and Pakualam).

While relatively independent from one another, under Dutch influence these four principalities established a similar pattern of administrative division and land management. But as this thesis’ main interest is the Yogyakarta Sultanate, my discussion here focuses on its concrete structures and practices. During the 18th century, the Sultan received control of the land area from the Dutch. Cultivators had no rights to soil, and landlords could remove them (Boomgaard, 1989, p. 31). The Sultan gave his administrative and military apparatus economic access to land in return for their political support, with the Sultan retaining property ownership

6 Separated from Kasunanan Surakarta in 1755.
7 Separated from Kasunanan Surakarta in 1757.
8 Separated from Kasultan an Yogyakarta in 1813.
within the overall framework of Dutch domination. The political influence of the Sultan weakened the further one went from the centre of power to its geographical and political margins, as shown in Figure 2 below.

**Figure 2 The concentrated circle of the Javanese State, 1755–1830**

![Diagram of the concentrated circle of the Javanese State, 1755–1830](image)

Source: Boomgaard (1989, p. 31); Ricklefs (1993, pp. 6-7); Selosoemardjan (1962b, p. 24); Soekanto (1952, p. 24).

The central dot represents the Sultan and the palace in which he lived together with his immediate family members, with the palace wall as a boundary. The offices of the royal princes and the Sultan’s administration were also located inside the palace. The second circle represents the *Negara*, the capital city, wherein lived the princes and the grand visier/chief minister (*patih*). Both Soekanto (1952) and Ricklefs (1993) describe the first and second circles as the capital city, not distinguishing between the areas within the palace wall and the capital city. But I adopted the work of Selosoemardjan (1962b), who differentiates between the palace and *Negara*, arguing that the palace was under the management of *Parentah Djero* (Internal Affairs) while the latter was under *Parentah Djaba* (External Affairs), led by the grand visier. Moreover, unlike in the capital city, inside the palace strict Javanese norms and etiquettes were practiced. Internal affairs in the *Negara* were divided into four geographical divisions, led by four *wedana*: *Gedong Kiwa* (Left Building), *Gedong Tengen* (Right Building), *Keparak Kiwo* (Left Extension), and *Keparak Tengen* (Right Extension). In addition, the land cultivated to support the Sultan and his immediate family (*Narawita Dalem*) was located in *Negara* and directly controlled by the inner administration (Houben, 1994, pp. 7-8). In the modern era, the dot represents the Palace, while the *Negara* has become Yogyakarta City.

The third circle represents the *Negara Agung* (the greater capital), which covered the surrounds of the Sultanate. It was under the administration of the External Affairs (*Parentah*...
Djaba) unit, which was divided into eight areas: Bumi, Bumijo, Sewu, Numbak Anyar, Siti Ageng Kiwa, Siti Angeng Tengen, Penumping, and Panekar. Each area was led by a wedana, but was under the supervision of two tumenggung. The two tumenggung and four Internal Affairs wedana were the Sultan’s closest confidants, with the largest allocations of apanage land and the highest aristocratic titles after the grand visier and the Sultan’s descendents. These apanage lands were typically in the Negara Agung, where ‘a prince or occasionally a high-ranking priyayi (noble) was granted the right to levy taxes in kind in the name of the Sultan’ (Selosoemardjan, 1962b, p. 25). In the 1950s, the Negara Agung formed the basis for the demarcation of the different districts within Yogyakarta Province.

Lastly, the fourth circle illustrated the mancanégara (foreign lands), which were part of the state but independently controlled by a bupati as the Sultan’s representative in the area. During the first division of Mataram, the Yogyakarta Sultanate created the new palace, capital city, and greater capital in Yogyakarta in distinct demarcation from a similarly structured territorial outreach of Surakarta; the two palaces, however, shared some mancanégara (Cribb, 2010). Before 1755, there were two other areas, called pesisir (north coast) and tanah sabrang (overseas, non-Javanese speaking areas) (Ricklefs, 1993). These later became provinces outside of Yogyakarta Province. Based on this circular division, the Yogyakarta Sultanate largely maintained land control over the area it received in 1755, with the level of its control the strongest in the centre and weakening towards the margins.

The apanage system was the basis for the Sultan’s control over his land, loyalists and subjects. Apanage land was blood-based, with its size and centrality depending on the distance from the Sultan and the position in the Sultanate’s administration (Wiryomartono, 2016, pp. 69-71). Table 2.2 below shows the apanage holders and their position in the royal houses. Almost all of the apanage holders below had blood ties to the Sultan. Some 31,000 cacah were controlled by members of the house of the Sultan; the remainder were under the administration of the grand visier. The grand visier received the highest apanage because he had dual loyalty, to the Sultan and the Dutch; his vast apanage, thus, was a Dutch instrument to control the Sultan. Moreover, from the vast area and authority of the grand visier, it was clear that the Sultan mostly held symbolic power, while the day-to-day government was under the grand visier, similar to other royal houses (such as Japan’s). Moreover, within the house of the Sultan, the Sultan did not have full control of the army, represented in cacah. For example, when the palace fell in 1812, the army of the Crown Prince – which had a strong connection to the British – refused to
defend the palace (Carey, 1977). Nevertheless, the Sultan remained the source of power for all those working under him.

Table 2. 2 Apanage holders and the number of cacah in Yogyakarta in the 1760s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Apanage Holders</th>
<th>Number of Cacah</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patih [grand visier]</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>House of Sultan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adipati anom [crown prince]</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>House of Sultan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratu eyang [Sultan’s grandmother]</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>House of Sultan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratu ibu [Sultan’s mother]</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>House of Sultan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratu kencana [queen]</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>House of Sultan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wedana keparak kiwo</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>Internal affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wedana keparak tengen</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>Internal affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wedana gedong kiwo</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>Internal affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wedana gedong tengen</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>Internal affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wedana bumi</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>External affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wedana bumijo</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>External affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wedana siti ageng kiwo</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>External affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wedana siti ageng tengen</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>External affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wedana sewu</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>External affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wedana numbak anyar</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>External affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wedana panumping</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>External affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wedana panekar</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>External affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kliwon</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>121,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


During the British interregnum of the Dutch East Indies between 1811 and 1816, then Lieutenant-Governor Stamford Raffles attempted to change the land management regime by introducing a new land rent system. Drawing from concepts of colonial rule in India, Raffles’ idea was that cultivators were renters of government land, and therefore had to pay a certain amount of rice and other products, depending on the quality and quantity of arable land (J. Bastin, 1954). This system did not work well due to a lack of preparation, but it highlighted a fast transition towards a new regime of colonial exploitation of agricultural resources. Raffles’ predecessor Daendels had already divided Java into several prefects, imposing a varying degree of direct rule over the parts of Banten and Cirebon in the west, Madura in the east, and some areas of the Yogyakarta and Surakarta mancanégara. This was done to increase agricultural
production. As a result, both Yogyakarta and Surakarta lost most of their Mancanégara areas between 1812 and 1830. The core areas of the Yogyakarta Sultanate were initially not affected by Daendels’ and Raffles’ policies; the area in which Raffles’ ideas were most closely implemented was Kedu (currently the southern part of Central Java province) (Boomgaard, 1989, p. 6).

2.4 The Apanage System and Industry Demand, 1830–1918

The Java War, a series of regional revolts unprecedented in scale (most of them led by Prince Diponegoro in 1825–1830), changed the landscape of Javanese politics. Diponegoro declared himself the Sultan of Mataram and faced the united forces of the Dutch, Kasultanan, Kasunanan, and Mangkunegaran. The war ended after the coalition army cut the food supply of Diponegoro’s troops. There are several reasons for this war’s escalation: anti-European sentiment and an increasing sense of Javanese identity (Carey, 1986a, 2007); the aggressiveness of the colonial power in trying to establish its hegemony in Java; political infighting within the court; and an economic downturn (Houben, 1994, pp. 13-15). In addition to these factors, one reason was directly related to land management issues. Javanese aristocrats had, since 1755, leased land to Chinese and European entrepreneurs, with the fees received serving as an important source of income (Richard Robison, 1986). But Governor-General van der Capellen forbade that practice in 1823, and even ordered the nobles to reclaim their land, forcing them to pay back the lease fees or, in some cases, sale price (Margana, 1997). This required aristocrats to borrow money from the Dutch bank, but they were often unable to repay this money. For instance, after re-taking coffee plantations from former European leasers and paying instalments on his debt for fifteen years, Mangkunegoro III was still unable to repay his debt of more than $f.46,000 by 1843.

After the Java War, the principalities’ military capabilities were significantly reduced, and they reorganised their boundaries. The Dutch took over many Mancanégara regions in Kedu and Banyumas (now part of Central Java province). On 25 September 1830, the territories of Kasunanan and Kasultanan were reorganised to better integrate them. Both royal houses swapped two kabupaten. Yogyakarta received Mataram (Sleman, Bantul, and Kalasan) and Gunung Kidul by trading Pajang (Klaten) and Sukowati (Boyolali and Karanganyar) to Kasunanan. Kasunanan refused to surrender the royal cemeteries in Kotagede and Imogiri, while Mangkunegaran declined to trade Ngawen. Yogyakarta’s boundaries after this reorganisation, as well as the area west of the Progo River, have become the border of the
The current Province of Special Region of Yogyakarta, including three enclaves (which later became sub-districts) in Kota Gedhe, Imogiri, and Ngawen (Houben, 1994, pp. 41-48).

Despite Raffles’ attempts at reforming the land management system; van der Capellen’s interventions (which were later reversed); the war; and the post-war restructuring of the royal territories, the foundations of the apanage system of land control remained largely intact. The following section, therefore, discusses the implementation of the apanage system as the foundation of economic and political strength of the Yogyakarta Sultanate during the colonial period. According to Margana (2000, p. 187),

The apanage system was based on the Javanese concept of sovereignty, that the ruler was the ‘overlord’ of all the lands in his kingdom. His overriding concern was the upkeep of his court, his extensive family, his provincial administrators (bupati), his officials (abdi-Dalem), and the military.

Similarly, Anderson (1972b, p. 348) explained the apanage system as follows.

Traditionally, the royal administration had been financed largely by an appanage system. Court functionaries were assigned rights not to land itself (which was theoretically in the hands of the rulers), but to the so-called padjeg and the limited corvée labor of particular clusters of peasants. The padjeg was essentially a tax on agricultural produce, paid mainly in kind, and collected for the appanage holders by specially appointed bekel (bailiffs) who took a percentage from what they collected. Since the padjeg was based on the actual production, it fluctuated from season to season, and was usually adjusted to the real economic situation of the peasantry.

The Sultan, therefore, received an annual income from the Dutch; rental payments from European and Chinese renters (before van der Capellen’s ban and after its subsequent lifting a few years later); and from the padjeg of land not given to landholders. Indeed, the Sultan’s leasing of lands to European and Chinese renters increased significantly after van der Capellen’s order was reversed, especially after the commodity plantation boom in the late 19th century. The princes and nobles lived inside the capital, but their land was mostly in the greater capital. The Sultan created this system, in part, to reduce the potential that princes and nobles would revolt, as they did not have a direct relationship with the land tillers that theoretically could be transformed into an army.

The patuh, or landholders, received a share of crops under the apanage system, depending on the quality of land (i.e. whether it was arable or arid). For arable land, the patuh received half of the harvest, while the other half was left for the peasants and their families. However, peasants generally received less than half of the produce, because the bekel took their share as well. On top of that, the bekel also received 20% of the land and crops, and could compel peasants to work on their land (both arable and arid). In non-irrigated and barren land, the crop share of the patuh was reduced to a third, because more muscle power and time was
needed. Harvests typically included the fruit from the trees on the property. From both arable and arid land, the *bekel* chose the crop for the *patuh*. Peasants also received a small area on which they could live with their families. The system of distributing the revenues from the Sultan’s land is illustrated in detail in Table 2.3 below.

### Table 2.3 Revenue distribution in the apanage system, 1863–1918

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Harvest on Peasant’s land (80%)</th>
<th>Harvest in Bekel’s Land (20%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peasant</td>
<td>Peasant</td>
<td>Bekel</td>
<td>Patuh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arable Land</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arid Land</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Developed from Selosoemardjan (1962b, pp. 216-218) and Margana (2000).

This system was heavily dependent on the role of the *bekel*, who mediated between the noble *patuh* and the peasants. The *patuh* lacked the mobility to travel to their apanage lands, as they were stationed close to the Sultan, in the capital. Suhartono (1991), in his research on the Kasunanan, for instance, described the *bekel* as functioning not only as economic brokers in terms of land-based production but also in terms of overseeing the military function of the apanage system. It was the *bekel*’s duty to mobilise the ‘immediate army’ based on the orders of the *patuh*. The number of peasants that the *bekel* coordinated depended on their capacity and their loyalty to apanage holders. Therefore, politically, economically, and militarily, the *bekel* had significant roles.

The lands managed by the *bekel* were not necessarily in a single concentrated area; they were sometimes scattered in many sub-districts. *Bekel* were obliged to pay taxes to two *Garebegs* (festivals) based on the Javanese Calendar. For instance, Kartosudiro, a *bekel* in the Kasunanan, had to pay 200 *rupiyah* 75 *duwit* (apart from the crop) as taxes (Margana, 2000, p. 188). The police administration controlled the work of the *bekel*, and peasants could file a complaint if a *bekel* acted inappropriately. Written regulations were established to manage the apanage system, including the *Angger Sepuluh* (ten rules for *bekel*) of 1818, followed by *Angger Gunung* (village police regulation) and *Pranatan Patuh* (landholder regulation) in 1863.
In 1884, a more detailed bekel regulation (Pranatan Bekel) further regulated the bekel in Yogyakarta. This regulation was issued under pressure by the Dutch administration to accommodate peasants’ rights. Margana (2000), for instance, noted that a villager named Surorejo reported Kartosudiro, a bekel in Jatipilang, to the panewu (a head of kepanewonan/sub-district) for 30 transgressions (per the Pranatan Bekel) in 1906. As a result, Kartosudiro had to pay a compensation of f.75 but retained his status as bekel.

The bekel were relatively better off than the peasants; indeed, it was socially unacceptable for a bekel to be less wealthy than the peasants in his area. The largest expense borne by the bekel came from their two annual appearances before their patuh in the capital and their handing over of the taxes during the festivals (Margana, 2007, p. 97). To show their loyalty and ability, the bekel brought with them some of their subjects, using their own funding. These people stayed in the capital for several days to handle the household duties within the patuh’s housing complex or in the palace, as directed by the Sultan. Selosoemardjan (1962b) argued that most bekel delivered harvests, rather than cash, to the patuh because the patuh could immediately benefit from it and save money until the next harvest. Politically, the peasants had no bargaining power with the bekel as it was the bekel’s authority to decide who would work on the land. The bekel could expel peasants at any time without compensation. As a consequence, peasant migration was common in the apanage system, especially when a bekel was replaced by his oldest son. Therefore, peasants had almost no relationship with the land they worked on, because they had no right to it and were only working under the authority of the bekel.

The calculation of the apanage for each patuh was measured in detail. In their translation of the Sultanate’s internal documentation about the apanage system, for instance, Carey and Hoadley (2000 Section II) indicated that the size of the apanage was measured based on manpower. The measurements were jung, wong (person), bau/bouw (shoulder), sakikil, karya (work/person at work), damel (work), pikol, and others. Furnivall (1967) converted some of these measurements into modern calculations. For instance, one hectare is equivalent to 1.4091 bouw or 2.4711 acres or ¼ jung. For example, an 1810s tree-bark paper record of apanage land in Kedu (part of the Negara Agung), showed that Prince Dipakusuma (1760–1822),

9 The translation of Pranatan Bekel and Pranatan Patuh from the Sultanate’s archives was undertaken by Margana (2004, pp. 57-76).
10 See also Setiawati (2011); Suhartono (1991, p. 31).
commander of the Sultan’s bodyguards, had control over 242 jung of land, around 5.98 hectares, with the details as follows:

The place of Dipakusuma, in Medira Karangwuni the work of twenty-five people, in Medana Pargandhon the work of twenty-five people, in Sokapagergunung the work of twenty people, ……., in Karangwungu two jung, in Gereges one kikil, in Kalisat one jung, in Ngarimin two jung, …., in Baratawang three bau, in Gelambeg two jung, in Welahar one jung one kikil, …., the sum of all is two-hundred forty two jung one kikil. (Carey & Hoadley, 2000, p. 151)

The economic regime in the mancanégara adopted the apanage system of the capital at a lower level and scale. It was under the control of the bupati, whose power increased the farther away he was from the capital (Houben, 1994). The bupati were expected to present themselves to the Sultan three times a year during the Garebeg festivals. During these Garebegs, the Sultanate presented military parades and gave mountains (gunungan) of crops to his subjects. Garebeg Mulud (to celebrate the Prophet’s birthday) was the largest of the three celebrations, and the bupati gathered for that occasion to deliver their land taxes, either in money or in kind. They also showed their loyalty to the Sultan by kissing his right knee (Selosoemardjan, 1962b; Soelarto, 1980; Woodward, 2011). A January 1811 record of the apanage of Prince Dipakusuma, the bupati of Madiun (now part of East Java province), showed that he had 10,000 persons (cacah tiyang), 4,600 living and 5,400 dead, under his authority. The record also listed in columns the names of the villages (187 villages), the names of the bekel or demang, and the detailed amount of taxes (1,594 real), as well as the number of individuals (200) and families (394) per village (Carey & Hoadley, 2000, p. 232).

In 1830, van den Bosch’s ‘cultuurstelsel/cultivation system’ was implemented, an enforced planting program aimed at increasing the production of export crops. While both Yogyakarta and Surakarta were nominally outside the direct operation of this policy (Day, 1904, p. 259; Olson, 1984), it nevertheless led to important changes in the apanage system. After van Capellen’s ban on land lease was lifted, renters (all of whom were of Dutch, Eurasian, or Chinese heritage) once again rented land and labour from the apanage holders, often developing plantation businesses. The renters not only acted as ‘super bekel’ to the patuh, but also replaced the patuh in the eyes of the bekel (Margana, 2007). Land leasers, acting as patuh, attended the garebegs and other royal ceremonies, such as the Sultan’s birthday (Bosma, 2007b). These renters’ main business became increasingly industrial in nature, and their focus thus was to ensure that the quality of the sugar cane – which was emerging as one of the key cash crops – met commercial standards. A more complex supervisory structure emerged as a
result, with peasants now supervised by both the factory representatives (called mandor) and the bekel. As explained by Selosoemardjan (1962b, p. 272). ‘Before the agrarian reform of 1918 in Yogyakarta, the sugar companies had replaced the appanage holders and were thus in a position to command the labor force in the village through the bekels.’

With increasing agricultural industrialisation, the relationship between the mandor and bekel become exceedingly unequal. The mandor decided the ‘fate’ of the bekel if the latter was unable to do the required job. The mandor could report to the business, which then forwarded the report to the bupati. The bupati would then typically have sided with the business, afraid of facing pressure from the Dutch officials with whom the business had close relations. Apart from controlling the land, the businesses also benefited from free compulsory labour, as a continuation of the apanage system (Bosma, 2007a). Once the sugar cane was ripe and ready to harvest, it was cut and carted to mills by peasants as soon as possible. During the milling processes, when most muscle was needed, peasants were compelled to work in the factory, thereby creating free labour for the industry. This made Java a major player in the world sugar economy, and 70% of peasant households were involved in the industry (Knight, 1993; 2014, p. 109).

The industrialisation of the apanage system was further accelerated in 1870, when the Dutch introduced their new agrarian policy and opened up Java to private investors. Foreign investors rented land from the Sultan and acted as appanage holders, at first for a twenty-year period but later extended to a (renewable) thirty-year period. Renting out appanage land was soon seen as more lucrative for the royal houses than simply passing it to patuh. In the 1880s, of the 179 sugar factories operating in Java, seventeen were located in Yogyakarta, and twelve were owned by principalities with between forty-three and sixty sugar plantations. Likewise, Yogyakarta and Surakarta’s twenty-seven sugar factories made up 17% of Java’s total sugar exports (Bosma, 2007b, p. 82). Consequently, although three commodities were initially grown in Yogyakarta (sugar, tobacco and indigo), sugar was at the core of the export business.
While the Sultan benefitted from renting the land to investors, much of the risk associated with sugar production was burdened on the bekel and the peasants. It was the responsibility of the bekel to make sure that the peasants delivered industrial-quality sugar cane. Both the bekel and peasants were part of the industrial system, with the plantation company supervising the bekel. In this period of the post-1870 agricultural boom, European administrators and entrepreneurs controlled the apanage system via payments to the Sultan. The following story is derived from the Pakualaman archive, and details Pakualaman land in Sewu Galur that was administered by a Eurasian, J. Hofland. It illustrates the bekel’s insecurity on the one hand and details of the land taxes and compulsory obligations on the other.

On September 1883, Ngabehi Mertadikrama, a paneket (village head) of Kedungdawa, summoned Secodikrama, a 59-year-old widow and bekel of Kalikopek to come to the office of Sumbernila’s administrator J. Hofland. Secodikrama came and kneeled on the veranda waiting for the administrator to come. After having waited for half an hour, Ngabehi Japaprakosa, the police officer of Tambak, came over to her with a message from Hofland. He told her that the administrator had decided to fire her as bekel of Karangkopek and he himself would take over her position. The reason conveyed to her was that she had apparently been unwilling to provide the compulsory workforce for the indigo plantation, an allegation that Secodikrama vehemently denied. After a while, Hofland came out to the
veranda and stood right in front of Secodikrama. Then he called Nagawirya, a jugul (deputy bekel) of Secodikrama, to testify against her. Nagawirya confessed that the area under her supervision was twenty-seven bahu, but that a workforce only sufficient for eighteen or twenty bahu came out to fulfill its obligations. Secodikrama insisted that she had been meeting her obligations. Hoffland became outraged and walked over to her while she was still kneeling; he kicked her right on the face and cursed: ‘bangsat, oblo, londe aku ora caturan karo kowe’ (bastard, whore, hooker, I am not talking to you). Secodikrama fell unconscious for a while. Then she rose up and said that she would not accept this treatment and promised to bring the case to court (Margana, 2007, p. 101).

Adding to the burden on the local populace, sugar cane required an extensive irrigation system – which led to the best rice field areas in Bantul and Sleman being used for the industry. The critical international advantages of the Javanese sugar industry, which stretched from west Java to central and eventually east Java, was the alternation system, in which peasants planted sugar cane and other agricultural products at different times. In the same field, sugar cane would be used as an alternative to rice over the course of the year. In other fields, peasants grew paddy or secondary crops (palawija) such as corn, beans, and onions, in contrast to the monoculture situation in the Caribbean. This crop rotation system created a competitive advantage for the industry – but not for the peasantry, which depended on rice and other staples for their daily food. As Knight (2014, p. 97) wrote, ‘Java sugar’s ability to exploit the land and labor [sic] of a densely settled peasantry was the key source of Java sugar’s international comparative advantage.’

The impact of the sugar industry in Java on the peasantry was described by the Dutch economist van der Kolff as follows:

[the sugar industry’s] effect on Javanese agriculture is of much more direct and far-reaching nature than that of the lease estates. Not only because it obtains its labor [sic] from the rural neighbourhood in a much more extensive degree, but mainly because it has to make use of the actual fields of the people and in a special manner, and its preference in this connection for alternating with rice. For this reason, the sugar cultivation of the estates and the rice and other cultivations of the populations are, as it were, coordinated in one large-scale agricultural enterprise, the management of which is practically in the hands of the sugar factory (Kolff, 1929, cited in Selosoemardjan, 1962b, p. 264).

Poorly compensated and forced to serve the interests of the European agricultural industrialists, the peasants suffered both economic and cultural losses under the post-1870 system. Culturally, peasants lost their dignity at the hands of foreign Dutch companies. Tillers no longer saw compulsory work as part of their duty working the Sultanate’s land (with the patuh as the representative) but as part of the capitalistic colonial system. Padjeg had to be paid to the plantation manager in cash or export products, without any of the traditional restraints
imposed by custom or seasonal fluctuation (Anderson, 1972b, p. 348). Under the old system, the twice-annual journey to the capital and the opportunity to live at the patuh’s mansion had been a cultural and psychological treat for peasants. Meanwhile, the sugar estate valued only the material gain achieved by maximising the use of peasants’ compulsory labour through the use of police force. Landless peasants were treated as coolies, with only a slight difference in their pay compared to working other peasants’ land (a maximum twelve cents compared to ten cents (Selosoemardjan, 1962b, p. 277)). Thus, Margana (2007) noted that the apanage system had shifted from a land tax system into a system of labour relations in which administrators held excessive power.

There were constant battles between peasants and sugar companies over land and water. The crop rotation system did not work as planned, because the sugar plantations required seventeen months to produce their harvests, lasting from the end of April until September of the following year. Although the companies did pay them compensation for five months, the amount was too small, explaining the peasant revolts that typically occurred between May to September.

While peasants grew increasingly dissatisfied, the predominance of the sugar industry made both the Kasultanan and Kasunanan reach their wealthiest point in the early 20th century, marking a period of ‘internationalisation’ of these kingdoms during the rise of Indonesian nationalism. Kasunanan Surakarta not only rented its land, but also participated in the sugar business. Paku Buwono X of Surakarta, for example, built joint-venture sugar mills with the Dutch, including Manisharjo in Klaten. He also built the 500-hectare Jombor Reservoir for sugar cane irrigation, as well as a kilometre-long tunnel from nearby areas and a system for transporting the harvest. He modernised his palace and the city of Surakarta, and ultimately bought the first car in Indonesia in 1894, highlighting the wealth that the Javanese aristocracies had drawn from the land under their control.

The Yogyakarta Sultanate experienced a similar boom.\textsuperscript{11} The palace of Yogyakarta was also further developed in this period, and many of the Sultan’s abdi dalem and descendants were sent to study abroad. In 1890, for instance, Sultan Hamengku Buwono VII sent Ahmad

\textsuperscript{11} Vickers (2005, p. 35) expresses the sultan’s wealth as follows: ’In 1899 he held a four-day spectacular in which the Javanese dance-opera, wayang wong, was watched by between 23,000 and 36,000 people each day, at a cost of f 30,000, equivalent to over US$400,000 in present-day terms.’
Dahlan – the son of the imam of his Grand Mosque – to study in Mecca as preparation for assuming his father’s duties. In 1912, Ahmad Dahlan went on to found Muhammadiyah, which was intended first and foremost to counteract the spread of Christianity and maintenance of local ‘superstition.’ But as pressure for accommodating peasants’ interests grew, and the business community demanded an end to the complex ownership structures created by the apanage system, the government issued a new agrarian policy in 1918 that led to significant social change, but still maintained the central role that the aristocracies played in the management of land.

2.5 The Rise of Village Land, 1918–1942

Pressure to change land policy not only came from peasants and foreign business owners, but also from increasingly educated local elites. Under its ‘Ethical Policy’, implemented from 1901, the Dutch allowed the children of a handful of lower-level administrators to access an education. By 1928, 75,000 natives had completed a Western primary education (Vickers, 2005, p. 41), and by 1939, there were 1,390 native graduates of Dutch secondary schools (Hill & Wie, 2013, p. 139). These new elites, despite their small numbers, began competing with the hereditary elite. As such, the apanage system posed an obstacle to the demand of a slowly rising local elite for fixed land laws.

Thus, on 8 August 1918, Sultan Hamengku Buwono VII issued a regulation abolishing the apanage system in Yogyakarta, following similar developments in other parts of Java. The policy changed the apanage system into a system of land tenure and land rent (Padmo, 1988). The Sultanate’s Rijksblad (Sultanate Decree) No. 16/1918 and Pakualaman’s Rijksblad No. 18/1918 ruled the following: First, the Sultan declared that all land without proof of Dutch ownership was his private property. Second, Kelurahan (later called Desa/villages) were formed as administrative units that had autonomy in their land management. The Sultan owned all land, but its distribution and management were handled by the village. Third, it abolished the position of bekel. However, where geographical boundaries were based on the previous Kebekelan (jurisdiction of a bekel), some bekel became village heads (lurah), a position that was similarly hereditary.

Fourth, the Sultanate divided the land into village land and peasant land. Around 20% of land was provided as salary to the village chief, the village officials, and the village treasurer (or to the former bekel as a pension), while the remaining 80% of the land was distributed to
peasants by the village under hereditary usage rights (*angganggo turun-temurun*). The Sultan established a direct land tax levy (50% of harvest) on peasant land for the Sultanate (Anderson, 1972b, p. 350). Fifth, the former *patuh* – now without apanage but still officials serving the Sultan – received a regular salary, and the Sultanate modernised its treasury, its annual budgets, and its fixed civil lists. Hence, after these reforms, and especially after cutting out the *patuh* and *bekel*, the distribution of the crop between the various actors was as shown in Table 2.4 below:

**Table 2.4 Crop distribution in Yogyakarta, 1918–1942**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kind of Land</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Harvest from Peasant Land (80%)</th>
<th>Harvest from Village Land (20%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Lands</td>
<td>Peasant</td>
<td>Peasant</td>
<td>Villages</td>
<td>Sultanate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Developed from Kasultanan Rijksblad 16/1918 and Pakualaman Rijksblad 18/1918 and Anderson (1972b, p. 350).

The Dutch also further institutionalised the regular annual payment to the Sultanate. The Dutch recorded their budgetary support for the Sultanate in Yogyakarta and other aristocracies in the Indies, but the aristocracies had relative independence in their spending (Encyclopaedisch Bureau Aflevering XIX, 1919). Between 1918 and the Japanese occupation in 1942, two contractual agreements were signed by the Sultanate and the Dutch, during the coronation of Sultan Hamengku Buwono VIII in 1921 and Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX in 1940. The budget issue became the most critical obstacle to the signing of a contract between Governor Lucien Adam and Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX in 1940 (Monfries, 2015). The protracted nature of these negotiations showed how important this annual Dutch payment had become to the financial sustainability of the Sultanate.

Nevertheless, the 1918 decree had confirmed, rather than loosened, the Sultanate’s land property rights. While peasants had gained hereditary usage rights, ownership remained with the Sultan. Article I of the decree stated, ‘I am sustaining order. All lands that have no ownership, except those that are already registered under *eigendom*, are owned by my palace in Yogyakarta.’

12 *Ingsun anglestareake watone, sakabehe bumi kang ora ana tandha yektine kadarbe in liya mawa eigendom, dadi bumi kangungane kraton Ningsun Ngayogyakarta.*
under the Dutch land ownership right (*eigendom*) and the Sultanate’s land. This was despite the fact that *eigendom* was not only for the Dutch and non-native populations; many nobles registered their land under the *eigendom* system as well. But most importantly, the decree established the *Sultanaat Gronden* (Sultanate’s Ground/SG) and *Pakualamanaat Gronden* (Pakualaman’s Ground/PAG), hereafter referred to collectively as SG/PAG. These lands, then, together with all other unregistered land, constituted a separate property category outside of the *Eigendom* regime.

Further, the decree differentiated between palace land and non-palace land. It defined palace land as the land that geographically ‘*sajroning Kraton Ningsun* (is inside my palace).’ Land outside the palace was considered non-palace land. This geographical definition of palace land applied until 2012. In 1988, for example, Suharto gave special cultural rights to the principalities of Surakarta based on this geographic definition. However, as discussed later in this thesis, the Yogyakarta Sultanate expanded this definition after 2012, understanding palace land not in geographical terms but in functional terms. Based on this post-2012 definition, all lands supporting the traditional function of the Sultanate are to be considered palace land, despite geographically being located outside the palace walls and – in some cases – even outside Yogyakarta Province.

Finally, of particular importance was the creation of village land (**Tanah Desa**). As stated above, approximately 20% of the land was not distributed to peasants, but was instead being kept as village land. This village land was owned by the Sultanate and managed by village officials to finance its operations to pay the village head and his associates (*bengkok/pelungguh*); to pay the pensions of the remaining unelected *bekel* (*pengarem-arem*); and for use as communal property. It was therefore also referred to as ‘land of the village treasury’ (**Tanah Kas Desa**, or **Titisara**). The village land used by the *pelungguh* and *pengarem-arem* was generally a prime location for rice paddies and received regular irrigation. The position of village head was hereditary, significantly increasing the influence of village head families over other actors at the grassroots, and the standing of villages in the Yogyakarta Sultanate more generally. Based on the 1932 *Indische Verlag* (in Booth, 1974, p. 135) the percentage of village land in the Yogyakarta Sultanate was the highest in Java, as it was 17.5%, compared to Central Java (14.8%) and East Java (8.7%).

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The different forms of colonial land rights were later converted under the Basic Agrarian Law (5/1960). *Eigendom verpounding* (*eigendom*) was converted mostly into *Hak Milik* (SHM/Ownership Rights); *efpacht* was converted as *Hak Guna Usaha* (HGU/Usage Rights, normally for business purposes), and *recht van opstal* was converted as *Hak Guna Bangunan* (HGB/Building Rights). We will return to this issue later.
In 1925, Sultan Hamengku Buwono VIII issued *Rijksblad No. 23/1925*, which converted hereditary usage rights (*anganggo turun temurun*) to hereditary ownership right (*andarbe*). However, it prevented land from being sold to other parties in the Kotapraja (previously the capital city/Negara Agung, now Yogyakarta City), while in the four other regencies—Sleman, Bantul, Gunung Kidul, and Kulon Progo—peasants only received usage rights, documented by village officials through a system known as Letter C. Thus, outside of the Dutch-controlled property system, two other regimes affiliated with the Sultanate were consolidated: the first was the native land administration system (*Bumiputra Kadaster*), which managed *andarbe* rights in the city. In 1945, this *Bumiputra Kadaster* would be changed into *Penghageng Gana Pratala* under the Sultanate, and in 1954 it was replaced by the *Kantor Urusan Tanah Kota Yogyakarta* under the Yogyakarta City Government. The second important and strengthened regime was the village administration system, that governed land usage in four regencies (Darme, 2016).

While the 1925 decree granted property rights to some peasants, the Sultan was still recognised as the supreme sovereign even over such newly established private ‘property.’ This was expressed in the requirement to pay him land taxes and *eigendom verponding* (paid twice a year, on 1 June and 1 November) of around f2 to f7.5. The non-indigenous population (such as Chinese) could not own land, but could access land under *recht van opstal* (building right) for a thirty-year period. The price of usage rights was 2% of the appraised land value, as determined by the resident, the grand visier, and three committee members. In 1926, the Sultan distributed a total of 6,904.133 m² of land to peasants in twenty sub-districts in Yogyakarta City. Moreover, the Sultanate also set aside land for public services such as schools, hospitals, government offices, and military barracks. In total, between 1900 and 1940, the Sultanate released 1,302,552 m² for these purposes in the entire principality (Setiawati, 2011, pp. 118, 121).

The 1918 and 1925 decrees partly succeeded in addressing the problems they had set out to solve. The first was the burden and high migration rate of peasants because of the land lease policy when the sugar industry was dominant. Nitisastro (2006, pp. 6, 69), for instance, noted a sharp decline in the population of Yogyakarta during the late 1910s. In three years (1917–1920), Yogyakarta’s population decreased from 1,374,165 to 1,282,815. However, after the two decrees, by the 1930 census, the population had risen by 274,000 people, reaching 1,559,027. The second was the demand from European investors for a more flexible land policy. Investment continued to pour into the Sultanate’s lands after the decrees, and the Sultan
received significant income from them. In 1925, for instance, in Yogyakarta City, the Sultanate received 723,180 from land taxes, 43,800 from eigendom verponding, 56,214 from recht van opstal and 28,800 from land leases to sugar estates (Setiawati, 2001, p. 104).

Even though Yogyakarta’s royal houses had given land ownership rights to peasants in the city and land usage rights to rural peasants, this did not change the patron–client structure of their societies. The village heads, village officials, and hamlet heads relied heavily on the land owned by the royal houses, and they remained tied to the sultanates through tax payments and cultural obligations. This created a strong relationship between the principalities and village communities. Village communities became sources of power for the principalities, as previously feudal apanage systems were replaced by more modern forms of land ownership and management across Java and the rest of the Dutch East Indies.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the way the Yogyakarta Sultanate obtained and defended its grip over its land holdings during periods of major political change between the 18th and 20th centuries. Born out of the division of the Mataram Sultanate, which had established its territorial control through military force, the Yogyakarta Sultanate based its claim on large land holdings on contracts with the VOC. The VOC, unable to establish full control over Java or other territories in the East Indies, used Yogyakarta and the other Mataram-based royal houses to establish a system of indirect control. In this system, the Yogyakarta Sultanate, along with Pakualaman, Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran, received relatively independent land autonomy, equal to land property rights. In exchange, the Javanese aristocracies accepted overall political supremacy of the VOC and later, the government of the Dutch East Indies.

From the mid-18th century to the mid-19th century, a feudal apanage system was at the core of the indirect system of colonial and aristocratic land control. Created to provide the Sultan’s dignitaries with income in return for their loyalty, the Sultan sat at the apex of a land system in which his officials were granted land allocations for their use and exploitation. In extracting economic benefits from the land, landholders (patuh) chose intermediaries (bekel) to manage the land and the peasants. The Sultan also leased some land to European and Chinese businesspeople. Under this system, a wide range of different actors had access to the land, but the Sultan owned the plots as personal property. From the perspective of the peasants in
particular, there was no connection between them and the land they tilled. Rather, peasants had traditional and emotional ties to the *bekel*, the *patuh*, and especially the Sultan.

The situation changed after the Java War and the rise of European sugar, coffee, and indigo enterprises during the middle and second half of the 19th century. Beginning with the cultivation system in 1830 and intensifying with the opening up towards private investment in 1870, traditional ties were reduced and transformed into industrial relations that created considerable profit for the elites and industries but were detrimental to the peasants. Because of this exploitative industrial relationship, there was a high rate of peasant migration from Yogyakarta in the early 20th century. The Sultanate’s 1918 and 1925 decrees responded to these pressures by beginning to transfer some property rights to peasants, but it remained in overall control of land use and continued to claim taxes even on those lands for which it had transferred property rights to a third party.

Thus, the chapter demonstrated that despite the rise of Dutch colonialism, the interregnum of the British, the Java War and an agricultural industrialisation boom, the Yogyakarta aristocracy managed to hold on to the vast majority of its land possessions. But this control was soon threatened, ironically, by the breakdown of the colonial regime that had divided Mataram and subjected much of the archipelago to brutal exploitation. The following chapter will discuss the fate of Yogyakarta’s aristocratic land control during the Japanese occupation (1942–1945) and the nascent Indonesian Republic. In particular, it analyses the survival of the Yogyakarta Sultanate and Pakualaman Principality, including the defence of their territories through a political movement that ultimately achieved the formation of the Province of Special Region of Yogyakarta at a time when so many other aristocracies were disestablished.

3.1 Introduction

Having shown how the Sultanate of Yogyakarta was formed and how it defended its control over land through various periods of rapid social change between the 18th and 20th centuries, the thesis now turns to discussing increased threats to that land control in the middle of the 20th century. Against the background of the Sultanate’s loosening property control in the late colonial period, this chapter explores how the Japanese occupation (1942–1945), the revolutionary period (1945–1949) and the first decade of the independent Republic (1950–1960) challenged not only the Sultanate’s control over land, but its existence per se. This is because these challenges occurred during a time when almost all traditional dynastic houses were targeted by anti-monarchy movements as they were seen by educated urban Indonesians as ‘overprivileged servants of the colonial regime’ (Reid, 1974, p. 4) who ‘had little sympathy for the Republic’ (Langenberg, 1985, p. 132). In many parts of Indonesia, sultans and rajas were kidnapped, exiled or murdered, and their palaces looted and burned; other monarchies were simply disestablished (Reid, 1979).

In explaining why Yogyakarta survived the turmoil of the Pacific War, national revolution and anti-feudalism movement, most authors have thus far argued that this was due to Yogyakarta’s special role in the defeat of the Dutch, and particularly the personal contribution of the Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX. In this they highlighted the position of Yogyakarta as the main battleground against the Dutch return to Indonesia following the Pacific War, especially when Yogyakarta became the temporary capital of Indonesia (A. Kahin, 1985; G. Kahin, 1952; Reid, 1974). Yogyakarta gave refuge to Republican leaders and, when Jakarta was occupied by the Dutch, the Sultan offered his territory to host and finance the Republic that had been declared in 1945. Thus, the transfer of authority from the Dutch colonial authorities to the Indonesian government in December 1949 owed much to Yogyakarta’s pro-Republican activism, and it was subsequently rewarded with protection from anti-feudal initiatives.

Beyond this contribution of Yogyakarta as a territory, many scholars specifically emphasised the personal ‘heroism’ of the Sultan, his role during decolonisation and his firm stance in supporting the fledgling Republic (Atmakusumah, 2011; Monfries, 2008, 2015; Pour

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14 Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of this chapter are published in Kurniadi, B. D (2020), Defending the Sultanate’s territory: Yogyakarta during the Indonesian decolonisation 1942-1950, in Monarchies and Decolonisation in Asia, Robert Aldrich and Cindy McCreery (eds), Manchester University Press.
& Adji, 2012; Selosoemardjan, 1962b). In their view, the Sultan personally acted decisively in support of the Republic and refused a Dutch offer that would have made him a leader of a new Javanese state (Ricklefs, 1981, p. 219). Rather, he stood with the nationalists in challenging the return of the Dutch after 1945, and therefore was left untouched by the post-independence social reforms that led to the removal of many of his aristocratic colleagues.

While drawing from these works, this chapter offers a more nuanced explanation for the Sultanate’s post-revolution persistence. I argue that the Sultan’s priority was to defend his traditional territory and ultimately his ascribed status as sultan and, later, governor. His commitment to the Republic notwithstanding, his main goal was to safeguard his territory through the creation of a ‘Special Region’ within the Republic, where he retained executive leadership in the newly formed province. Hence, rather than assuming that the survival of the Sultanate was a by-product of Yogyakarta’s and Hamengku Buwono IX’s fight for the Republic, I contend that it was the strategic goal of securing the survival of the Sultanate that drove many of their actions. Endorsement of the Republic and the initiation of necessary socio-political modernisation measures were, therefore, not departures from aristocratic traditions, but an attempt to protect them. In the same vein, the Sultanate accepted changes to the form of its land control in order to prevent its full erosion.

This chapter, then, describes how the Yogyakarta Sultanate navigated the 1940s and 1950s to maintain its primacy through the creation of the Special Region in 1950. Based on Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) theory of land access, I also demonstrate how the Sultan held on to his lands by tolerating a downgrading of their status from property to access (a process that had already begun in 1925). This meant that instead of holding direct ownership rights over land in the Sultanate as in previous centuries, Yogyakarta’s royal house ‘only’ maintained its access to land. But as it would turn out much later, it was this retention of some land control that made the decisive difference between Yogyakarta’s continued survival as an aristocracy, and the disappearance of many other traditional houses from Indonesia’s social and political map after the modern political system took shape after 1950.

This chapter is structured chronologically, beginning with the enthronement of the new Sultan of Yogyakarta in 1940 and the subsequent Japanese occupation. While recognising the central role of the Sultan, I explain the strategies used by the leaders of the Yogyakarta dynasties to defend their land, including moving the Indonesian capital from Jakarta to Yogyakarta from 1946 to 1949. The chapter then explores how the national positions held by the Sultan of Yogyakarta as Minister of Defence and as an Indonesian representative during the transfer of
authority in 1949 increased his political bargaining power in defending the territory, leading to the creation of the Yogyakarta Special Region as a province, with Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX effectively appointed as governor and Paku Alam VIII as vice-governor for life in 1950. Subsequently, the chapter discusses the 1954 land reform, which created another threat to the existence of traditional land. The conclusion of the chapter discusses the implications of this crucial period for the future of the principalities.

3.2 The Japanese Occupation 1942–1945

Japanese forces occupied the Netherland East Indies, displacing the Dutch, from 1942 to 1945. The Sultan of Yogyakarta and the ruler of Pakualaman used the Japanese occupation of Indonesia to strengthen their legitimacy by implementing reforms that would prove useful during the formation of the Yogyakarta Special Region. First, Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX of Yogyakarta and Paku Alam VIII suspended their traditional rivalry by working together on various projects. The development of the Mataram Canal (Selokan Mataram) not only prevented the out-migration of forced labourers (romusha), but also increased rice productivity in Yogyakarta. Second, the Sultan initiated administrative and bureaucratic reform by simplifying the chain of command. Third, he modernised administrative authority lines by abolishing the position of grand visier. Indeed, Dhont (2012, pp. 338-339) argued that the ability of Yogyakarta’s principalities to survive as a Special Region was rooted in the socio-political capital the rulers invested during the Japanese occupation.

Prince Dorojatun, the future Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, had been living with a Dutch family in the Netherlands since the age of five, with the nickname Hengkie. He attended Dutch schools and was studying for a Bachelor of Indonesian Law and Political Study at Leiden University when his father asked him to return to Java following the outbreak of the Second World War. On 18 October 1939, in Batavia (now Jakarta), the ailing Sultan Hamengku Buwono VIII gave Prince Dorojatun the ceremonial Crown Prince’s dagger Keris Joko Piturun as a sign that the monarch had chosen his successor. Sultan Hamengku Buwono VIII passed away shortly after returned to Yogyakarta. The following year, aged 28, Dorojatun became Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX of Yogyakarta after signing a contractual agreement with the Dutch. The status of the Yogyakarta Sultanate was indirectly controlled by the colonial authorities, with the provision that the son of his official wife would have precedence over any son of minor wives in succession to the throne (Monfries, 2015, p. 77). However, the contract soon became worthless as the Japanese advanced rapidly through Southeast Asia. After the Japanese conquered Singapore in February 1942, the Dutch asked the four Javanese rulers in
Yogyakarta and Surakarta to ‘escape’ via Batavia to Australia. The young Sultan of Yogyakarta soon showed his independence by rejecting the offer. This was a rare case of refusal to comply, as most royal houses sided with the Dutch.

**Picture 1 Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX**

Source: Library and Archival Office, Yogyakarta Province Government.

When the Japanese invaded, 278 traditional dynasties remained in the East Indies (Ranawidjaya, 1955). The Japanese divided the Netherlands East Indies into three regions (Sumatra, Java and Madura, and Borneo and the east), placing Java and Madura under the control of the 16th Army on 7 March 1942. The Japanese continued the Dutch administrative system in Java, which included recognition of the traditional rights of the nobility. Batavia and its surrounding area became a special municipality (*Tokubetu Si*), and the four principalities in Yogyakarta and Surakarta were divided into two governorships or special territories (*Kooti Zimukyoku*), with their leaders summoned to Batavia to swear an oath of loyalty to Japan on 8 August 1942. The head of the *Tokubetu Si* and *Kooti Zimukyoku* were responsible directly to the *Gunseiken*, the highest administrative official in Java. As noted by Aziz (1955, pp. 153-157), the position of traditional rulers underwent significant changes under the Japanese administration as they fell directly under the military command. But as it turned out, these
changes prepared the Yogyakarta Sultanate well in arguing its case for claiming Special Region status after the revolution.

The two governorships created by Japan were *Djokjakarta Gunseibu* for the Kasultanan (the Yogyakarta Sultanate) and Pakualaman, and *Surakarta Gunseibu* for the Kasunanan (the Surakarta Sultanate) and Mangkunegaran, continuing recognition of what had been the four *Vostenlanden* (or ‘princely lands’ under the Dutch). Among the four Javanese rulers, the Sunan of Surakarta acted as *primus inter pares*. These administrative arrangements later led to the creation of the Special Region of Yogyakarta and the Special Region of Surakarta during the revolutionary period, during which time the rulers maintained their traditional power. As such, the Japanese occupation did not disturb the traditional authority of the rulers in controlling their palaces and land. Rather, in administrative terms, it benefited them through the establishment of sultanates as special regions – the widespread violence and starvation during the Japanese occupation notwithstanding.

In the Yogyakarta governorship, Paku Alam VIII served as the deputy to the slightly younger Hamengku Buwono IX, reflecting the much larger size of the territory controlled by the latter’s royal house. The two men worked closely together during the occupation. One example was the Mataram Canal project, an implementation of the Japanese policy of prioritising food production for self-sufficiency. The Japanese saw Indonesia as ‘an indispensable source of much needed raw materials’ (Sluimers, 1996, p. 35), and required that 70% of each crop be delivered to the Japanese military administration (Selosoemardjan, 1962b, p. 46). Sugarcane plants were soon replaced by rice and other food crops (Anderson, 1972b, p. 351), and the Sultan argued that the only way to support the war effort was to build a canal that could optimise rice production. According to the rice delivery targets for 1943, Yogyakarta was expected to deliver 12,619 tonnes of rice. In 1944 and 1945, these levy allocations increased to 14,400 tons and 21,000 tonnes. Early on in the occupation, Yogyakarta had been restricted from importing rice from other areas, increasing the incentives to increase its own production (Sato, 1994, pp. 117-129).

Following the Sultan’s suggestion, then, the major project of building the 31.2-kilometre Mataram Canal (twenty kilometres in the Kasultanan territory (Selokan Mataram)

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15 The word ‘*daerah istimewa*’ was firstly used by the Japanese Army Commander in Java in August 1942 for the written recognition of the Susuhunan of Surakarta and the Sultan of Yogyakarta. It stated that ‘in Surakarta and Jogjakarta special rules regarding the administration were effective since the former times. Hence the Japanese Military Administration has decided to maintain those *daerah istimewa* forever’ (Selosoemardjan, 1962b, p. 62).
and twelve in Pakualaman territory (Selokan Adikarto)) was initiated. Between July 1944 and July 1945, it connected the Progo River in the west and the Opak River in the east. The project cost f. 1.2 million, with f. 1 million covered by the Japanese administration. Ten Japanese engineers worked on the project which required around 358,000 workers, and was designed to prevent floods and droughts and provide irrigation for 13,000 hectares of land (Dhont, 2012, p. 294). Averaging between twenty-six and thirty-two metres in width, the canal was crossed by thirty small bridges. A high-level sultanate official16 claimed that the Mataram Canal was the Sultan’s initiative to prevent local residents from becoming romusha elsewhere and to reduce unemployment (which had been exacerbated by the decline of the sugar industry). Many romusha sent outside Java received harsh treatment, and only a few returned alive after the war ended (Sato, 2003). Thus, by increasing rice productivity through the canal and preventing the out-of-area recruitment of romusha, the Sultan buttressed his legitimacy among his subjects.

A second initiative of the Sultan was a series of administrative reforms intended to reduce the bureaucracy and to promote modern methods of recruitment into the public service. In 1944, the Sultan established a new office (Kyokykyoku) under his leadership to recruit persons with administrative skills, reduce layers of bureaucracy, and establish more efficient government in Yogyakarta. Recruitment for Mantri Pangreh Praja (officers in the city sub-districts) resulted in twelve applicants, while recruitment for Fuku Sontyoo (deputy sub-district officers) attracted three hundred applicants, with sixty of them being recruited. In April 1945, the Sultan cut the bureaucratic layer of Karesidenan, leaving Yogyakarta’s government structure with the Sultan at the top, followed by the Bupati, Panewu and Village Head (Suwanno, 1990, pp. 86-89). He had already reduced the grand visier’s authority in 1944 and kept him inside the court. With his reforms, the Sultan outlined a local governance model that is, for Yogyakarta at least, still in place today.

On 14 July 1945, the Sultan went a step further in his reform effort and dismissed the hereditary grand visier, who had acted as prime minister. Soon afterwards, the Sultan took over all of the grand visier’s political and administrative powers, thereby combining traditional and administrative authority as both the ‘head of state’ and ‘head of government.’ Combining power was a risky political calculation. As Benedict Anderson (1972a, pp. 4-7) argued, the Javanese Sultan, who held power, was perceived as divine, and thus the grand visier acted as an intermediary actor who prevented direct contact between the Sultan and his subjects.

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16 Interview on 13 February 2015 in Yogyakarta.
Accordingly, a change in this arrangement could be perceived as potentially reducing his legitimacy. The Sultan also threw himself into daily political activities, opening himself to criticism and action both from inside the bureaucracy and from the Japanese officers. However, the Sultan soon proved himself very talented in combining traditional and modern administrative authority. In addition, Paku Alam VIII followed the Sultan’s decision by not replacing his ailing grand visier and thus effectively abolishing his position.

The administrative changes under the Japanese occupation gave the young Sultan an opportunity to transform himself from a feudal leader into a modern administrator and politician. The Sultan closed the royal palace to Japanese officials by asking them to meet him in his new office (which was previously the grand visier’s office), thus avoiding the highly ceremonial palace setting. The Sultan also dramatically increased the frequency with his administrative apparatuses and the populace – from only three times a year (during the Garebeg festival) to, theoretically, six days a week. On some occasions, the Sultan visited districts to hold conferences with his dignitaries, drawing huge crowds, as this was rare under his predecessors. For instance, on 4 July 1945, the Sultan’s visit to Gunung Kidul attracted tens of thousands of spectators (Dhont, 2012, p. 266). These visits were all the more important as the economic situation was dire: even before the war, the sugar factories had been significantly hit by the depression of the 1930s (Sato, 2007, p. 84). Subsequently, the occupation brought unprecedented hardship.

While the Sultan consolidated his position, the Republicans used the Japanese occupation to prepare for an independent Indonesia state that was distinctly anti-monarchist. During the first meeting of the Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Independence (Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan – BPUPK) on 28 May 1945, the key issue concerned the formation of a future state as either a monarchy or a Republic. A small group of monarchists, including two of the Sultan’s brothers (Prince Puruboyo and Prince Bintoro), were unable to resist the demands of the Republicans. One reason was that ‘no single ruler had wide recognition and acceptance’ as a potential future monarch for the country (Monfries, 2015, p. 117). However, others were less opposed. Soepomo, a noted nationalist

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17 BPUPK was created by the Japanese occupation authorities following Prime Minister Kuniaki Koiso’s promise of eventual independence for the country on March 1945 (Kusuma & Elson, 2011, p. 196). The committee met in Jakarta (28 May-1 June 1945) and provided the forum for Sukarno’s speech outlining the Indonesian ideology of Pancasila. In its second session (10-17 July 1945), BPUPK drafted the Indonesian constitution (Cribb & Kahin, 2004, pp. 36, 91).
leader, for instance, argued at a 29 May 1945 discussion that the most important point was the capacity of the head of state to lead all the people, regardless of whether the state was a Republic or monarchy (Sekretariat Negara, 1992, pp. 34-35).

In the final vote on the issue, fifty-five members favoured the Republican model, while only six supported a monarchy. This first blow to royal rule challenged the existence of the dynasties. It was clear that the royal houses could no longer count on subservient respect towards their traditional position, and that the only way to defend the sultanates and other princely states was for the rulers to engage in national politics and demand special status for their regions, which would allow them to retain some of their traditional authority.

In sum, despite the upheaval and crises during the Japanese occupation, the period allowed Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX to develop and showcase his skills as a modern leader. His reform of both traditional and administrative matters increased his legitimacy amongst the residents of Yogyakarta, who had known sultans only as feudal lords. The occupation also did not further undermine the Sultan’s control of land. The period of occupation was too short to initiate meaningful change in the land management regime, so Yogyakarta Sultanate emerged from the Pacific War with the status quo of its land control intact. The challenge to aristocratic land would only come from the new Republican leaders, and especially their young militant supporters. But as the Japanese occupation helped the Sultan to transform from a local aristocrat into a national political actor, Hamengku Buwono IX was well prepared for this challenge.

3.3 The Struggle for the Special Region Status During the Revolutionary Period, 1945–1949

After modernising his apparatus and building a stronger relationship with the populace during the Japanese occupation, the Sultan of Yogyakarta had the necessary clout to demand special status for his territory in an independent Indonesia. It was nevertheless clear that the Republicans were apprehensive about preserving monarchies in the new state. Therefore, the best strategy to maintain control over his domain was to ensure that Yogyakarta obtained autonomy within the Indonesian Republic. Achieving this goal, in turn, required participation in national politics in order to directly take on the Republicans, leftists and anti-monarchy activists who wanted to remove aristocracy from the emerging independent polity. The climax of the Sultan’s engagement with the Republic was, eventually, offering Yogyakarta as the de facto capital of the nascent Indonesia. This move paid off, leading to the agreement of
Republican leaders to the formation of the Yogyakarta Special Region. But before that occurred, the Yogyakarta Sultanate had to fight off strong demands for a weakening or even complete removal of its special role in politics and society.

The nationalist leaders Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta proclaimed Indonesian independence on 17 August 1945, two days after the Japanese surrendered to the Allies. The Sultan decided to associate himself with the revolutionary youth as this would enable him to be included within the Republican movement. The youth were the main actors in the anti-aristocracy movements in almost all parts of Indonesia, including Jakarta (Cribb, 1991), northern Java (Lucas, 1985), eastern Sumatra (Langenberg, 1985), eastern Kalimantan (Magenda, 2010), and southern Sulawesi (B. Harvey, 1985). The Sultan received youth support, first from a group calling itself ‘We are the Sultanate’s Youth’ (Pemuda Kita Kesultanan – PEKIK) on 27 September. He had earlier gathered the representatives of the youth movements in his office on 19 August, an opportunity to appraise and control the youth movements, and to confirm his legitimacy as the leader of Yogyakarta. He told the gathering:

We have been occupied by other nations for centuries. We were repressed all that time, and now we are free. Ecstatic feelings have come to the surface. It is this ecstasy that we have to take control of. Let it soar, let it flare up. But don’t let it harm anything unnecessarily. History has shown that whenever a huge and sudden change like this happens, young people always come to the fore. Therefore, I ask you to safeguard the community, in kampongs, companies, stores, and others. Let there be no riots. If something happens, report to me. My deputy in liaison with you is Prince Bintoro (Suhartono, 2002, p. 29).

Initially, however, the engagement with the Republican side did not produce results. Recall that Yogyakarta and Surakarta had been established by the Japanese as Kooti Zimukyoku, or special regions. However, Yogyakarta Kooti and Surakarta Kooti failed to become proper Indonesian regions in August 1945. When the first eight provinces (three in Java) were determined during the Indonesian Independence Preparation Committee (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia – PPKI) meeting on 19 August, the discussion on the issue of Kooti was postponed, and they remained with their ‘de facto’ status. As such, the four Javanese royal houses were not part of the new Central Java Province. During discussions, Prince Puruboyo, the representative of Yogyakarta Kooti, asked for 100% zelfstandigheid (autonomy). The PPKI’s leader, Sukarno, refused, because this would create a state within a state and violate the

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18 The young courtiers of the Sultanate established PEKIK in late August 1945. It claimed 400 members and was led by Prince KRT Probosuprojo (Leirissa, 1990, p. 247; Poliman et al., 1977, p. 375).
19 The PPKI replaced BPUPK on 7 August 1945, and it subsequently developed into KNIP (see below) (Cribb & Kahin, 2004, p. 224).
constitution. Prince Puruboyo replied that independent status would be temporary, lasting only until the government was settled. Oto Iskandardinata, a representative from West Java, proposed a middle road, giving the Kooti the status of special regions, to be regulated later by Presidential Decree. The discussion of the issue, however, was ended by Sukarno, and it was agreed to resume it at a later stage (Sekretariat Negara, 1992, pp. 348-350).

The delay in resolving the status of the Kooti created uncertainty for the royal houses as they were not regulated in newly emerging legislation on local governance in the new Republic. Law No. 1/1945 on Local Government was issued soon after independence, but it remained silent on the status of the aristocracies. Without a governing authority, the traditional authorities were relics of the past in a fast-changing political structure. In addition to having failed at the national level during the formation of the state and the distribution of the provinces, the Yogyakarta Sultanate and its aristocratic allies faced a new challenge: the formation of the Central Indonesian National Committee (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat – KNIP), a key agency with legislative and co-executive powers pushing for Republican reforms in the new post-colonial state.

The KNIP became active on 29 August, and the nationalists established its Yogyakarta chapter, Regional Indonesian National Committee Yogyakarta (Komite Nasional Indonesia Daerah Yogyakarta – KNID Yogyakarta) on 1 September, without prior consultation with the Sultan. KNID Yogyakarta assumed wide-ranging powers, ‘to serve as the leading body, and further, to guide the people in the revolution and to defend the newly proclaimed national independence’ (Selosoemardjan, 1962b, p. 62). This council had eighty-seven members representing people of a wide variety of backgrounds in Yogyakarta, and was led by a Republican, Mohammad Saleh. Among those KNID Yogyakarta members, twelve had high royalty status, with the Sultan’s brother, Prince Puruboyo, sitting on the steering committee (Tashadi, Suratmin, Mulyono, & Poliman, 1987). Thus, while the royal family was represented on the KNID Yogyakarta, the non-aristocratic members held a significant majority.

These rapid political developments made the Yogyakarta Sultan (supported by Paku Alam VIII) realise that he needed to move quickly to push for the status of a Special Region. On 6 September 1945, the Sultan and Paku Alam sent a telegram to Jakarta, containing a decree signed on the previous day confirming that they were part of the Indonesian Republic, with the

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20 KNID was a local committee established at every level of government after the establishment of the KNIP. KNID worked in the absence of direction from KNIP (Cribb & Kahin, 2004, p. 219).
proviso that they retained all powers and were directly responsible to the Indonesian President. Similar statements had been sent by the Surakarta royal houses to Jakarta as well (on 1 September), and their verbatim content showed some coordination among the four dynasties. The new understanding between Yogyakarta and the Republic in Jakarta (which had signalled it would accept the royal status quo in exchange for the houses’ support) served both sides well. The Republic needed allies to support its declaration of independence. Meanwhile, the traditional rulers were facing pressure from leftist uprisings, as well as nationalist and anti-monarchy movements. Siding with the Republic was one step towards protecting their traditional authority and territory.

Having agreed on terms with the Republic, the Sultan launched further manoeuvres to gain control of the fluid situation on the ground. He established a close cooperation with, and nominal supremacy over, the Republican groups in Yogyakarta. On 12 October 1945, the Sultan received the support of the Mataram People’s Army (*Tentara Rakyat Mataram* – TRM) (Suhartono, 2002, p. 52), a Republican militia. With this backing, Hamengku Buwono IX proceeded to forge a deal with the leadership of KNID Yogyakarta that led the creation of the *Lasjkar Rakyat* (People’s Militia) on 26 October. The ordinance establishing the militia was issued by Hamengku Buwono IX, Paku Alam VIII and the head of the KNID Yogyakarta, reflecting a new understanding that all major decisions needed to be announced by these three actors. From the Sultan’s perspective, this constituted an act of cooptation towards the young revolutionaries. In fact, Anderson (1972b, p. 268) described *Lasjkar Rakyat* as being ‘tightly linked with, indeed form[ing] a completely loyal appendage of, the administrative apparatus of the Sultanate.’ Only three days later, the KNID Yogyakarta working committee was formed (a quasi-executive arm of the overall KNID Yogyakarta), its establishment once again announced by the Sultan, Paku Alam and Muhammad Saleh.

With firm militia support and having established themselves as partners of KNID Yogyakarta, on 30 October the Sultan and Paku Alam issued a joint statement regarding local

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21 5 September 1945 has become a sacred date for Yogyakarta. However, there are certain differences in the exact dating. Anderson (1972b, p. 115) wrote that Surakarta’s proclamations were issued on 1 September and Yogyakarta’s on 10 September. Selosseomardjan (1962b, p. 63) argued that Yogyakarta’s proclamations were issued on 9 September. Monfries (2015, pp. 137-138) and (Dhont, 2012, pp. 330-331) write that Surakarta’s proclamations were dated 1 September and Yogyakarta’s were dated 5 September. Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX’s biography (Atmakusumah, 2011, p. 62) and the earliest official source of Kementrian Penerangan (1952) stated that Yogyakarta’s proclamations were issued on 5 September. The difference in date seems to be related to the difference between the date of the proclamations and the date of their publication. I use the dates 1 September for Surakarta and 5 September for Yogyakarta because these dates are more widely used and accepted.
power arrangements during the inauguration of the KNID Yogyakarta working committee. They declared that,

> All powers which were held by the former colonial regimes, in the Dutch time exercised by the Governor and his staff, in the Japanese time by the Japanese Military Government and its staff, have been wrested by the people and handed over to [us] (Selosoemardjan, 1962b, p. 64; Tashadi et al., 1987, p. 68).

This was also the first major document that Hamengku Buwono IX of Yogyakarta and Paku Alam VIII signed as Heads of the Special Region of Yogyakarta, thus expressing their belief that the lack of an opposite directive from Jakarta meant that it had approved of Yogyakarta’s Special Region status. In their 30 October declaration, the two aristocratic leaders noted that in a meeting on 22 October, they had been informed by Jakarta representatives that there was no need to establish ‘sub-commissariats’ in their territories. This was in reference to the appointment in early October of prominent Republican R. Panji Suroso as Governor of Central Java and the Government High Commissioner for the four principalities in Central Java (Simatupang, 1972, p. 67). But the 22 October assurance convinced Hamengku Buwono IX and Paku Alam VIII that this subordination under the Central Java province was not going to be implemented, encouraging them to refer to themselves as co-leaders of the Special Region of Yogyakarta.

Events in the following days revealed how successful the Yogyakarta royals’ manoeuvres had been in comparison to those by their counterparts in Surakarta. On 1 November, Suroso formed a government council in Surakarta, with himself as its head, and both the Susuhunan and Mangkunegoro as his confidants, and five other members selected by KNID Surakarta. In other words, the Governor had placed both rulers below himself, and had them outnumbered on the council by the KNID Surakarta representatives (Dhont, 2012, pp. 332-336). In Yogyakarta, no such body was formed, with Suroso having paved the way for the autonomous co-rule of Hamengku Buwono IX and Paku Alam VIII through the government’s declaration on 22 October. In Yogyakarta, the two aristocratic houses accepted – also in their 30 October declaration – the KNID Yogyakarta as the territories’ legislative body, but that was a small price to pay to escape the kind of subordination to Suroso that Surakarta experienced.

However, the political uncertainty over the Sultanate’s status did not end with the 30 October self-declaration. Anti-monarchist parties started to take root in Yogyakarta. On 13 November 1945, for instance, Amir Sjarifuddin declared the establishment of the Indonesian Socialist Party (Partai Sosialis Indonesia – PARSI) in Yogyakarta. Its initial congress saw
attendees from fifty-one regions and thirty-four bodies as well as 750 observers. On 19 November, the Socialist People’s Party (Partai Rakyat Sosialis – PARAS) was set up in Cirebon, and was clearly intended to oppose ningrat (royals) and feudal mentalities (Anderson, 1972b, p. 202). PARSI and PARAS quickly merged into the Socialist Party (Partai Sosialis) in December, forming a formidable anti-feudal force. With the establishment of increasingly national political structures and institutions, it was obvious that the Sultan had to raise his national profile as well – the only way for the Sultan to maintain his domain to defend the still shaky status quo of self-declared autonomy.

The Sultan did not have to wait long for national recognition. In a meeting held on 12 November in Yogyakarta, the Indonesian army and division commanders chose the Sultan as Minister of Defence and Sudirman (who was not from Yogyakarta) as the army commander. However, the Jakarta political leadership had other ideas. It appointed Amir Syarifuddin as Minister of Defence and Urip Sumohardjo as Army Commander. After six weeks of deadlock, Sudirman and Syarifuddin finally agreed to recognise each other’s positions (Cribb, 1991, pp. 118-119). Both the Sultan and the Susuhunan of Surakarta received the honorary rank of general in recognition of their traditional status. Subsequently, the Sultan established further links with national leaders, including Sukarno, whom he had met briefly during the Japanese occupation. Moving ever closer to the Jakarta elite, the Sultan’s big moment on the national stage finally came in December 1945, when the Dutch advanced to Jakarta and almost assassinated Prime Minister Sutan Syahrir.

With the Dutch certain to occupy Jakarta, on 2 January 1946, the Sultan, Paku Alam, and KNID Yogyakarta offered Yogyakarta as the temporary Indonesian capital. Two days later, Yogyakarta became the de facto capital, a situation that lasted until the transfer of authority when the Netherlands officially recognised Indonesian independence in 1949. With Yogyakarta as the de facto capital, the Sultan benefited greatly in terms of his political aspirations. First, the Sultan had become a vital part of the struggle for independence. Second, he became a national leader without having to leave his palace and subjects in Yogyakarta. Third, he was afforded access to the national stage and able to show his leadership and administrative skills, despite being a relative newcomer compared with other leaders who had been involved in the nationalist movement since the 1920s. Fourth, he was able to protect Yogyakarta – and himself

22 During the Dutch colonial period, the sultan was part of the Dutch military with the rank of Major General (Kraton Yogyakarta, 2002, p. 39). Some sultans were so proud of the Dutch uniform that they wore it during the Garebeg festival (Carey, 1986b). The granting of the honorary rank of General to Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX was finalised in 1950 through Presidential Decree No. 14/1950.
and his sultanate – from the leftist and communist movements that later swept through Surakarta’s aristocracies.

Most importantly, between 1946 and 1949, the Sultan used the status of Yogyakarta as the nation’s capital to further raise his political standing. He became Minister of Defence in 1948, putting him in a key position when the Dutch began to advance on Yogyakarta as well. Following the Second Dutch ‘Police Action’ in December 1948, the colonial power occupied Yogyakarta, and President Sukarno, Vice-President Hatta, and other prominent leaders were captured and exiled to Sumatra. With the Indonesia’s top political elite exiled, it fell to the Sultan and the Indonesian army to organise guerrilla warfare operations in and around Yogyakarta. Thus, the army launched a ‘General Attack’ on 1 March 1949, which reclaimed Yogyakarta for six hours before the Dutch restored their military control. The Sultan refused the Dutch offer to collaborate (Monfries, 2008). He was soon to be rewarded for his stance – the Dutch, under pressure from Washington, agreed to negotiate. On 27 December 1949, the Sultan became an Indonesian representative for the transfer of sovereignty ceremony in Jakarta, the place where 320 years prior his great ancestor Sultan Agung had failed to expel the Dutch.

The Sultan’s consolidated position also gave him increased powers to protect his main interest; his land holdings. With Sukarno residing in Yogyakarta, on 7 June 1947, he signed Law No. 17/1947 about the establishment of the City (Haminte) of Yogyakarta within the ‘Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta’ (Special Region of Yogyakarta). This was the first mention of Yogyakarta’s status as a Special Region by the Indonesian government in law – a big success for the Sultan, whose claim thus far had been self-declared. The law further stipulated that land authority remained with the Sultan, while the Central Government directly controlled other matters. The Sultan was also able to navigate the issues he did not like about the law: as the new capital, Yogyakarta City was formally excluded from the Special Region and put under the Central Government. As a compromise, the Sultan achieved that the mayor was appointed by a joint decree signed by the president, minister of interior and the Sultan. De facto, then, he maintained a veto power over the mayor’s appointment.

His strengthened national standing not only helped Hamengku Buwono IX to convince national figures that his sultanate’s special status needed to be protected – it also allowed him to outmanoeuvre his internal opponents. Within the KNID Yogyakarta, many delegates wanted Yogyakarta to become a ‘normal’ territory like all the others in the Republic. That, of course, would have meant the complete removal from power of the Sultan. A basic law on the governance of Yogyakarta was debated in the KNID in 1946, with the Sultan’s representatives
blocking initiatives to remove the aristocracy’s special authority. When the law was finally promulgated in May 1946, and the KNID dissolved to become the regional council, the most controversial elements of the law had been excluded. But the declaration announcing these decisions referred to the Special Region of Yogyakarta – as the Sultan had always wanted and fought for. It was also important to him to ensure that the Kasultanan and Pakualaman were treated as a single political entity, rather than as separate actors vying for power. In reality, this ‘unification’ evidently meant that Pakualaman would always be subordinated to the Sultanate.

In contrast, the inexperienced leaders of Surakarta’s two principalities had not much political fortune. Even though both Surakarta and Yogyakarta received the status of Special Region in 1945, they had different experiences in their efforts to maintain that status during the subsequent political transformations. Surakarta’s special status was suspended in 1946, and eventually abolished in 1950 when its territory was integrated into the Central Java Province (Setiadi et al., 2000). This sharp contrast between Yogyakarta and Surakarta during the revolution was captured by Simatupang in field notes made in Central Java in March 1949, as follows.

From the first day of my stay in Surakarta area, however, I could feel a difference in the atmosphere of the struggle from that in the Jogjakarta [sic] region. The situation here was far more complicated. In Jogjakarta, the Sultan had publicly refused Dutch offers, and privately had firmly supported and helped our struggle. The entire civil service and the people in that region had followed his example. In Surakarta, the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro had adopted a more ‘refined’ attitude, and the civil service, naturally, had followed suit. In Jogjakarta, all the Regents fought outside the Dutch-occupied towns, but, here in Surakarta, it was said that newly appointed Regents lived in places occupied by the Dutch, such as Klaten and Wonogiri, while our Regents continued their struggle outside these towns (Simatupang, 1972, p. 72).

There were several reasons for these differences. First, the Surakarta rulers did not have adequate experience to handle such complex political situations. Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX ruled from 1939, and Paku Alam VIII from 1937; as such, they respectively had six and eight years of experience. By contrast, Sunan Paku Buwono XII, then aged twenty, took the throne only two months before the proclamation of Indonesian independence. Similarly, Mangkunegoro VIII, of Mangkunegaran, began his rule in 1944, at the age of nineteen. Second, neither ruler of Surakarta had sufficient educational depth to operate with great strategic prowess. Compared with Hamengku Buwono IX, who had received a Dutch education from his early childhood, Sunan Paku Buwono XII left his school in Bandung after the beginning of the Pacific War. The young Mangkunegoro VIII too was thrown from the school bench straight
 onto slippery political terrain. Thus, it was not surprising that they proved much less adept at defending their territories than their more experienced and better educated Yogyakarta counterparts.

The Sultan’s political path was not as smooth as it may retrospectively appear, however. There were significant obstacles, both at the national level and in his own territory, towards the continuation of aristocratic supremacy in Yogyakarta. At times, it seemed as if these obstacles would turn out to be too large. Both anti-monarchist politicians in Jakarta as well as egalitarian activists in the KNID Yogyakarta were determined not to create aristocratic enclaves in the new Republic. But it speaks to the ambition of the Sultan that he was able to overcome these hurdles, and maintain the Sultanate’s authority and land holdings throughout a period of extreme political fluidity. The power the Sultanate drew from its relationship with large populations working its lands, built up since the 18th century, was a significant factor in giving Hamengku Buwono IX the self-confidence to act the way he did during the revolution. Had the Sultanate not been able to access this resource, the outcome of the political events in the 1940s might have been different.

3.4 The Special Region Legislation and New Land Regulations, 1950–1960

After the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch to the independent Indonesia in 1949, the new state once again faced the challenge of how to deal with the former aristocracies. As we have seen above, there was a complicated web of regulations that Yogyakarta drew from to claim Special Regions status, but some of these regulations were indirect references while others were self-proclaimed. As a start to approaching the problem of the old nobilities, the new constitution for the Federal Republic of Indonesia (Republik Indonesia Serikat – RIS), promulgated in January 1950, acknowledged the traditional local governments that had existed before Indonesia’s independence as having self-governing status (Swapraja).23 Literally, Swa- means ‘independent/autonomous’ and praja means ‘governing’, and it was the term the Dutch had used for their system of indirect rule via local nobilities. At the same time, some areas were granted Special Region status. In the case of territories under the Indonesian Republic – which was a part of the RIS – the legal basis for Special Region Status was Law No. 22/1948, which

23 Ranawidjaya (1955, pp. 5-6) noted that there were three reasons of the formation of Swapraja during the Dutch period: a previously independent kingdom/sultanate with a detailed contractual agreement; the secession of a previously independent kingdom/sultanate recognized by the Dutch; and the Dutch creation of a government in the area where there was no kingdom/sultanate through contractual agreement.
preceded the transfer of sovereignty. Under the RIS constitution, then, most former noble houses could claim *Swapraja* status, but not all *Swapraja* could be claim to be a *Daerah Istimewa* (Ranawidjaya, 1955).

It was on the basis of Law 22 of 1948 that Yogyakarta finally received its legislated Special Regions status in March 1950. Through Law No. 3/1950 – issued by the Republic, not the RIS – Yogyakarta was acknowledged as a Special Region that had the right to ‘manage its own affairs.’ For Yogyakarta, the Special Region status was much preferable to *Swapraja* status, although the latter had a basis in the 1950 constitution, while the former did not. First, it was clear that the Republican elite had offered *Swapraja* status to the nobilities only to secure their agreement to the establishment of the RIS in the negotiations with the Dutch. Many nobilities, especially on the Outer Islands, were heavily pro-Dutch, and therefore could only be persuaded to endorse the independent Indonesian state with guarantees of strong autonomy. But in the first few months of 1950, the power pendulum was swinging strongly towards the Republic, and the dissolution of the RIS only seemed a matter of time. Moreover, while Article 65 regulated that *Swapraja* areas could not be disbanded, this was immediately qualified by an exception clause that referred to ‘public interest’ as one reason that could justify disbandment.

Second, Special Region status was a much more modern concept than *Swapraja*, which had colonial connotations. Special Region status, in the eyes of the Sultan, married the ideas of the modern Republic with the idea of preserving traditional power structures that had, in his case, helped to give birth to that very Republic. Thus, not only was Special Region status more promising giving the weakening position of other areas that were based on the *Swapraja* concept, it also appeared to be much more compatible with modern constitutional theory and thus offered a better chance of long-term persistence in the Indonesian state.

Moreover, Law 22 of 1948 – the basis for Yogyakarta’s Special Region status legislation – offered most of what the Sultan desired. Importantly, based on the 1948 law, the head of *Daerah Istimewa* was directly selected by the President, ‘from the descendants of the family that held power in that region before the birth of the Republic of Indonesia and who have continued to hold power in that region’ (Article 18). This article effectively reserved the governorship to the Sultan’s ruling family. Equally attractive was the regulation that enabled

24 The formation of the Province of Special Region of Yogyakarta was further regulated Law 15/1950 and Law No. 19/1950.

25 ‘Kepala Daerah Istimewa diangkat oleh Presiden dari keturunan keluarga yang berkuasa daerah itu dizaman sebelum Republik Indonesia dan yang masih menguasai daerahnnya.’
the provincial legislature to issue its own bylaws to regulate the internal affairs of the area – which included taxation, land holding rights and other issues crucial to the Sultanate’s interests. With Special Status, then, the Sultan could secure the hold on power by his hereditary line and, through working with his local parliament, set regulations that could protect his land holdings against egalitarian demands for further land reform.

The Sultan moved quickly to use his now legally confirmed Special Region powers to re-arrange the territorial composition of the province. In 1950, the newly established Special Region of Yogyakarta consisted of the former four regencies of Kasultanan Yogyakarta (Sleman, Bantul, Gunung Kidul, Kulon Progo) and the city, or Kotapraja, as well as the territory of Pura Pakualaman, based on the boundaries established in 1830. The Pakualaman territory consisted of the palace area, half a kilometre east of the Kasultanan Palace, and the district of Adikarto on the southern coast of Yogyakarta (See Map 3 of Yogyakarta). In 1951, however, Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX and Paku Alam VIII merged Adikarto District into Kulon Progo Regency.26 Afterwards, Yogyakarta had a total area of 3,099.11 km², and by 1951, it had a population of two million people (Kementrian Penerangan, 1952, p. 461; Selosoemardjan, 1962b, p. 7). The Kotapraja consisted of sub-districts (Kemantren) and hamlets (Rukun Kampung), while the regencies consisted of sub-districts (Kepanewonan) and villages (Kelurahan). Table 3.1 below shows the administrative subdivision after the merger of Kasultanan and Pakualaman territories in 1951.

Table 3. 1 Administrative Subdivision of Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, 1951

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative Area</th>
<th>Percentage of Yogyakarta</th>
<th>Sub-districts</th>
<th>Villages/Hamlets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kotapraja/Yogyakarta City</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>14 Kemantren</td>
<td>162 Rukun Kampung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantul Regency</td>
<td>15.91</td>
<td>18 Kepanewonan</td>
<td>75 Kelurahan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleman Regency</td>
<td>18.04</td>
<td>17 Kepanewonan</td>
<td>86 Kelurahan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunung Kidul Regency</td>
<td>46.63</td>
<td>13 Kepanewonan</td>
<td>150 Kelurahan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kulon Progo Regency</td>
<td>18.40</td>
<td>12 Kepanewonan</td>
<td>90 Kelurahan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


But of course, territorial re-distribution was only one aspect of the land management autonomy granted to Yogyakarta. The more important, for the Sultanate, was the management of its own land possessions. It was clear that there would be pressure from Republicans to turn

26 Law No. 18/1951 finalised the geographical boundaries in Yogyakarta.
aristocratic land into state land, or land for distribution to peasants. These pressures existed across the archipelago, and in many cases, aristocracies had already crumbled under it. Especially in the first half of 1950, aristocracies had suffered under the involvement of Sultan Hamid II in a coup attempt against the federal government in January, and the state of West Kalimantan was dissolved over it – as was the state of Pasundan. The dissolution of the RIS in August had been a direct result of these events. While Hamengku Buwono IX had a much better standing with the Republic than many of his aristocratic colleagues, his experience in Yogyakarta with the KNID had shown that this was no guarantee against strong demands for social reforms. Thus, the Sultan had to be prepared for such demands as the political infrastructure of the Special Region was put into place, and the issue of land management was raised.

The first step in this process was the formation of an elected provincial legislature. Yogyakarta held an election in 1951, as a pilot project for the national election scheduled for 1955. Twenty-seven persons were elected to the Yogyakarta Parliament, which was dominated by local parties. A total of 7,268 votes were cast, with 6,807 valid votes. This small number of voters was due not only to the limited capacity of the civil administration, but also the traditional requirement for voters to own land. This policy was a continuation of village-level politics during the colonial period, when only those who owned land had the right to vote for the village head. The Muslim party Masyumi won the election, with 18 seats (2,753 votes). The Indonesian Village Apparatus United (Persatuan Pamong Desa Indonesia – PPDI), came in second at seven seats and 1,115 votes. The peasant party Committee for United Action of Peasants (Pantiya Kesatuan Aksi Buruh Tani – PKABT) had five seats (878 votes). Also represented were the Indonesian National Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia – PNI) with four seats (659 votes); Catholic Party (Partai Katholiek) with two seats (354 votes); Coalition of Working Bureaucrats (Sarekat Sakerdja Pamong Praja – SSPP) with two seats (314 votes); and Greater Indonesia Party (Partai Indonesia Raya) with two seats (313 votes) (Kementrian Penerangan, 1952).

These election results did not favour the Sultanate, as its strongest allies PPDI and SSPP only received seven and two seats respectively. The PKABT was particularly interested in

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27 The Sultan showed support to the Republic by introducing economic and political reforms, which were later adopted by the Republic. G. Kahin (1952, p. 194) wrote that, ‘On his own initiative, he introduced important and far-sighted political and economic reforms in his territory- before they had been adopted in the Republic as whole. His territory came to constitute a sort of “pilot area” for political and economic change and the reforms that he introduced were later introduced into other areas of the Republic.’
pushing for pro-peasant land reforms, and the winning party too, Masyumi, was in favour of eliminating the traditional land that was part of the Sultanate’s property during the colonial period. Thus, in the following three years, the legislature debated over a new land policy that would meet these pressures but at the same time leave some of the Sultan’s traditional claims intact. After heated discussions, the Yogyakarta Parliament issued a progressive land policy in 1954 that weakened the Sultanate’s land rights, but also did not abolish them. In the context of what had occurred in many other aristocracies, that was a remarkable outcome, and laid the foundations for the Sultanate’s continued political influence.

The Yogyakarta Parliament provided detailed land regulations through five bylaws (Bylaws No. 3, 5, 10, 11, and 12 of 1954). These bylaws established a number of key principles to post-independence land policy in Yogyakarta. First, the Sultanate was not identified as the owner of all land in the Sultanate’s territory, as it had been in the 1918 and – to a lesser extent – 1925 decrees. This meant that the Sultan no longer could claim private property rights over much of the Yogyakarta area. Second, Bylaw No. 5/1954 on Land Rights in Yogyakarta ruled that the hereditary right to land use (anganggo turun temurun) under the Sultanate’s Rijksblad would automatically be transformed into private property ownership rights (Article 10). Therefore, land tillers in four regencies were allowed to convert their land into private property. People in the City of Yogyakarta were allowed to retain their traditional ownership rights (andarbe turun temurun) and turn it into private property. In short, Yogyakarta citizens could now register their land directly as their own and sell it – something they had since 1925 only been able to do in the city, and even then they had not been allowed to sell it to other parties.

Third, villages outside the city could use their land property ownership rights to cover the salaries and pensions of the village administration and to fund public needs (Article 6); the villages also had the authority to determine the portion of the land designed as village land and the area designated as private property for peasants and residents. Fourth, private property ownership was only permitted for indigenous Indonesian citizens, expanding the previous parameters that limited land ownership to ethnic Javanese under the 1918 Rijksblad. Lastly, Bylaw No. 12/1954 ruled that the Yogyakarta Land Office (Jawatan Agraria Yogyakarta) had the authority, as part of the Yogyakarta Government, to issue land certificates (Utomo, 1999). On paper, then, the Sultan had surrendered overall sovereignty over most of his former land possessions – with the exception of palace land and other parcels directly owned by the royal family – and made room for a modern land management system. The transformation of land
management in Yogyakarta from 1918 to 1951 was summarised by Selosoemardjan (1962b, p. 215) as follows:

In the period before the agrarian reform of 1918, the peasants had only duties and no rights; between 1918 and 1951 the peasants had both duties and rights, and after the abolition of the land tax in 1951 the peasants had only rights and virtually no duties.

In reality, however, the Sultan sustained informal control over, and thus access to, significant portions of the land and its management system. First of all, Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX was the governor of the Yogyakarta Province, and as such, he headed the government that had the authority – through the Jawatan Agraria – to issue land certificates. Hence, while the land occupants had the legal opportunity to convert the land, the Sultan – as governor for life – controlled the land titling processes not only in the short term, but for decades to come. Second, his own palace land (described as SG in the 1918 decree) was untouched by the 1954 bylaws. As a result, he not only maintained access to that land, it remained his private property. This not only included the immediate palace grounds, but also parcels in coastal areas, in arid land, and in inhabitable land. Such pieces of land included locations at the South Sea as well as vast areas of arid land in Gunung Kidul and Kulon Progo. While these lands had no commercial benefit, on the local village map, most of them were recorded as SG or PAG, marking them as royal property (Astuti, 2012, p. 65)

Third, the land conversion process was cumbersome and time-consuming, providing a disincentive towards fast and wide-ranging conversions. This, in turn, secured an extension of the status quo, which favoured the Sultan. The conversion from traditional land rights to Yogyakarta certificates in four regencies relied heavily on village records regarding land ownership and usage. These records were not complete, and therefore often required prior certification work. Based on Bylaw No. 12/1954, the process of land conversion was divided into five steps (Munsyarief, 2013, pp. 47-48), at each of which the Sultan’s government had rights of approval or rejection. The five steps, each corresponding to the requirement of obtaining an official document (a ‘letter’ or ‘model’), were as follows:

1. **Letter A**: A book recording each plot of land and its characteristics (rice fields, arid/dry land) in the village (*legger desa*).
2. **Letter B**: A book recording the ownership of the land and its mapping, based on the village’s measurement of the land and the village’s identification of the land owner.

3. **Letter C**: A book recording the land ownership per person. It is an expansion of the Letter B. Where Letter B is based on land, Letter C is based on ownership. Some persons may own more than one plot of the land in a village.

4. **Model D**: Land Ownership Certificate, consisting of land owner (subject), land map (object), and the land measurement letter. This was the final product of land certification during the pre-independence.

5. **Model E**: Temporary Land Ownership Certificate, which consisted of a land measurement letter and a copy of Letter C. Model E was a requirement for issuing Model D.

With this complex procedure, many land plots were not converted and registered, and thus remained in a legal limbo. While the 1954 bylaws no longer recognised the Sultan as the owner of all land, if the land did not come under new ownership through conversion, it effectively remained under the control of the government – headed by the Sultan. As shown in Table 1.3 in the introduction, 48% of the land in Gunung Kidul remained unregistered by the 2010s, highlighting what a disincentive the registration process had posed.

The fourth indication of the Sultan’s continued influence over land matters was his success in expanding Yogyakarta’s territory by integrating the enclaves of the disestablished Surakarta and Mangkunegaran royal houses. By 1957, both aristocracies had lost their control over their traditional territory and had no political influence (Reid, 1974; Setiadi et al., 2000). The Surakarta aristocracy had enclaves in two areas: Imogiri, the royal graveyard of the Surakarta and Yogyakarta aristocracies, and Kota Gedhe, the original palace and royal cemetery of Mataram. Mangkunegaran Principality, meanwhile, had an enclave in the Ngawen area. In 1958, these three areas were integrated into Yogyakarta Province, without significant resistance from Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran, after the Sultanate of Yogyakarta agreed to maintain the traditional rights of the Surakarta aristocracies. Imogiri and Kota Gedhe became sub-districts of Bantul and Ngawen became a sub-district of Gunung Kidul. Apart from these three areas, some villages previously parts of Surakarta were also integrated into DIY. As such, the Sultan – as the Governor of Yogyakarta – could increase his access to land.

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29 Emergency Law No. 5/1957; finalised through Law No. 14/1958.
Finally, the Sultan maintained access to the village land. As we have seen above, village land was previously land owned by the Sultan that he had granted to village officials to manage and to distribute to peasants to work on. The 1954 bylaws further loosened the ties between royal and village land by allowing it to be turned into private peasant property. According to village leaders, the area of village land varied depending on the population of the village, from approximately 10%–20% in Bantul and Sleman to up to 50% in Gunung Kidul and Kulon Progo. In densely populated areas, most land was given to the tillers, while in less dense areas the land remained untilled and therefore became part of the assets of the village held as village land. Thus, much of the land was not converted to private peasant property and remained collective village property – with the Sultan seen as the traditional ruler over the territories, despite no longer holding property rights over the village land. Moreover, as the ultimate decision maker in the Jawatan Agraria office, he held the authority to approve land conversions to peasant property, and these were – as the case of other land property conversions – difficult and therefore rare.

In short, land autonomy in Yogyakarta Province, as enshrined in the 1954 bylaws, had two implications. On the one hand, on paper, peasants and other citizens could receive private property rights for the land they previously only had usage rights for. On the other hand, the authority to convert land was given to Sultan as the governor of Yogyakarta, and the Sultan retained control over significant royal private property. Even that latter concession set him apart from other royals in Indonesia who lost not only control over their territory, but also over their own palace land. Moreover, the slow rate of land conversion meant that the old status quo remained in place for many land parcels, with unregistered land under the authority of the Jawatan Agraria controlled by the land. The next challenge for the Sultan, however, was just around the corner. In 1960, the Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) was introduced, being implemented in 1961. The BAL strengthened the 1954’s Bylaws’ affirmation that the Sultanate as an institution did not have land titles. How the Sultanate defended its land access after 1960 will become the subject of the following chapter.

3.5 Conclusion

As part of addressing the bigger research question of why some aristocracies have made a successful return to Indonesian politics since 1998 while others haven’t, this chapter has

30 Interview with village officials on 15 March 2015 in Sleman and Bantul.
discussed the critical juncture when the colonial era ended and the Indonesian Republic was formed. Specifically, this chapter has discussed the transformation of the Yogyakarta Sultanate into the Province of Special Region of Yogyakarta during the revolutionary period. I have argued that the role of Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX during the fight for independence was driven, at least to a significant extent, by his interest in defending the traditional powers of his royal house, and in particular its control over the territory’s land holdings.

While the Sultan of Yogyakarta succeeded in gaining Special Region status during the revolutionary period and the early post-independence era, this phase also constituted a time of transition as far as his control over land was concerned. Under the colonial regime, much of Yogyakarta’s land was the Sultan’s private property, although a 1925 decree had begun a process in which some other citizens could gain ownership rights as well. In the period described in this chapter, this direct property control over land changed into access to land, in a process begun at the end of the Japanese occupation and completed by 1954. This period, in which the Sultanate fought for its survival amidst much pressure to disband Indonesia’s democracy, turned out to be decisive for Yogyakarta’s future. While its control over land was watered down, it was still much stronger than that of other aristocracies that lost it completely, or that even disappeared. The Sultan emerged from the upheaval of the revolution as life-long head of his territory, in charge of managing its land affairs and in direct possession of the remaining palace land.

The following chapter, then, discusses the period following 1960, in which the Yogyakarta aristocracy tried to defend its traditional land during the late Sukarno administration and the New Order period. Its aim is to explain how Yogyakarta’s royal house survived and maintained its access to land following the 1961 implementation of the BAL, which prohibited aristocratic land holdings and limited their ownership of private property. In addition, the next chapter also highlights some strategies that the Yogyakarta royal family used to escape Suharto’s policy of uniformity in local government.

4.1 Introduction

In tracing the origins of Yogyakarta’s post-Suharto ability to consolidate its political influence, the previous two chapters elaborated in detail how the Yogyakarta principalities (Kasultanan and Pakualaman) gained land property during the colonial period and defended their land access during the revolutionary period against societal pressures for the disbandment of aristocracies. From that latter period, the Yogyakarta Sultanate emerged with weakened control over land, but in contrast to many of its counterparts across the archipelago, it held on to its palace grounds, gained authority over managing land affairs in the rest of the province and was able to slow down land conversions, effectively prolonging the status quo. That latter strategy would turn out to be a useful lesson for later periods as well.

This chapter discusses Yogyakarta’s land politics after the passing of the Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) or Undang Undang Pokok Agraria (UUPA) No. 5/1960, which did not allow aristocracies to be land-holding institutions. The period following this land reform and the subsequent coming to power of the authoritarian New Order regime constituted the hardest test for the Sultanate’s land control in its history because its traditional property rights were generally not acknowledged by the state. When the BAL was implemented in Yogyakarta in 1984, the Sultanate lost – in a conceptual sense – its formal legal rights and privileges related to land resources (Alchian (2007); Feder and Feeny (1991); Sikor and Lund (2009a). But as the chapter will demonstrate, the Sultanate was able to obstruct the full implementation of the BAL by remaining in charge of the internal land release mechanisms, both through the palace’s traditional role in managing royal land and through the executive powers of the governorship. Furthermore, the Sultanate built a vast web of business interests and – in later years – gained increasing income from tourism.

The chapter presents these arguments chronologically. BAL brought significant changes to aristocratic land control, and therefore I will firstly elaborate BAL’s regulation of their land. The next section discusses the implementation of BAL in Yogyakarta in 1984 and explains why the Sultanate gave up its land autonomy to the Central Government. The following section examines the general relationship of the Yogyakarta aristocracy with the late New Order regime, but also the ways through which the Sultanate operated within the BAL scheme to retain land access. The chapter than focuses on the royal family’s increasing difficulties after
the charismatic Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX passed away in 1988. It explains the role of
Suharto in the succession process, with Suharto refusing to choose Sultan Hamengku Buwono
X as the Governor of Yogyakarta. The subsequent section discusses Suharto’s strategy to reduce
the aristocrats’ political control and transform them into cultural actors. Despite these
challenges, however, the Sultanate held on to enough resources during the New Order period
to position it well for the struggle for new influence after the autocratic regime fell in 1998.

4.2 BAL in Indonesia and Yogyakarta: Implementation and Avoidance

Prior to the legislation of the BAL in 1960, the government had experimented with some land
pilot projects (Soemardjan, 1962a). Unlike land reform in South Korea and Taiwan, where the
Japanese had administered most of the land during the colonial period (You, 2015), Indonesia’s
reform attempts could not draw from an existing land registry, making land pilot projects the
only realistic option. The first pilot project was the abolishment of the tax free and autonomous
village (desa perdikan) in Banyumas, Central Java Province in 1946.31 These villages’ ruling
families no longer enjoyed their traditional privileges and received monthly compensation
(Rachman, 2011, p. 26). Second, the land formerly used by sugar companies in Yogyakarta and
Surakarta were made available to Indonesian peasants in 1948.32 However, the Kasultanan’s
sugar factory in Madukismo, Yogyakarta, was returned to the Sultanate in 1958 due to being
severely damaged; it continues to generate revenue for the Sultanate today.

The third pilot project was the liquidation of private estates of a size of more than 10
bau or 70,965 m² in some areas in the 1950s. Private estates were seen as sources of trouble and
riots, and as running contrary to the fundamental principle of social justice (Gautama &
Harsono, 1972, p. 6). In 1958, 1,150,000 hectares of land in Java and Sulawesi that had
previously been owned by non-native individuals were converted to land with business usage
rights or state lands.33 Principalities outside of Yogyakarta, especially Kasunanan and
Mangkunegaran, effectively lost their sugarcane areas because of these liquidations.
Accordingly, even before 1960, the principalities in Central Java – excluding those in
Yogyakarta – had been hard-hit by land reform pilot projects.

The government also issued a new land crop policy that favoured the tiller. Law No. 2/1960 regulated crop sharing between peasants and landowners. It required a fifty-fifty share

31 See Law 13 of 1946.
32 See Law 13 of 1948.
33 See Law 1 of 1958.
of crops from irrigated paddy fields. Crops from non-irrigated land, meanwhile, were divided unevenly, with the peasants receiving two-thirds and the landowners receiving one-third (Departemen Penerangan, 1961, pp. 42-46). No intermediary actors were allowed, and a written agreement had to be made in front of the village head (and, in some cases, the sub-district head) for a maximum period of three years. The maximum land permissible for crop-sharing was three hectares. In theory, then, the law gave tillers much more bargaining power with the landowners than in any previous period.

After the land bylaws issued by the Yogyakarta legislature in 1954, which weakened the Sultan’s control over land but gave him a variety of instruments to maintain access to land, Hamengku Buwono IX faced the next great challenge to his land authority with the implementation of the BAL. The law was passed in September 1960, and the Conversion Chapter (Article IX) stipulated that:

A. Rights and authorities on the earth and water of existing swapradjas or ex-swapradjas (princedoms/autonomous regions) at the coming into force of this act are annulled and transferred to the State.

B. Matters relating to the provision in letter A, as mentioned above, shall be further regulated by Government Regulation.

As a princely area, Yogyakarta generally fell into the category of swapraja or ex-swapraja, and therefore its traditional rights over land were set to be annulled and its rights transferred to the state. But as we had seen earlier, the Sultan had pushed for Special Region status precisely because he was anxious about the insecurity associated with the Swapraja category. The BAL confirmed the Sultan’s earlier fears, and the Special Region status would give the Sultan arguments to slow down and obstruct the implementation of the BAL. First, he was able to refer to the 1954 Yogyakarta bylaws, which made Yogyakarta the only province with a complete set of land regulations and bureaucracy for exercising land autonomy. Second, Hamengku Buwono IX used his national prominence to continue to remind the Central Government that Yogyakarta’s Special Region status made the BAL not applicable there. He was particularly successful with this effort during his time as Suharto’s second Vice President (1973–1978). Nevertheless, before discussing the impact of BAL on Yogyakarta’s land politics, it is important to make some general remarks about the law and its goal of pushing for major land reform.

BAL and its subsequent policies had a significant effect on aristocratic land. BAL was intended to create a uniform land law, in which the state, in principle, had rights over all land.
Under this system, the aristocracy as an institution was not entitled to land ownership, and aristocrats as private citizens were limited by the land ownership ceiling policy. With this all-encompassing approach, BAL was intended to abolish the policy of legal pluralism, described as ‘the implementation of more than one legal code in a particular country’, and transform it into a single land law (Afiff, 2004, p. 73). The legal pluralism system had operated based on racial lines during the colonial period but in the absence of new land laws after independence, it continued to be practiced in the post-1949 period. In areas of indirect colonial rule such as Yogyakarta, European land law applied to Europeans, foreign Asians, and other nationals. On the other hand, the Kasultanan land law applied to the indigenous populace, especially the Javanese. The 1954 bylaws superseded these colonial era land ownership systems, but in practice, the old laws continued to regulate who owned what as land registration was slow and fragmented.

Legal pluralism in Yogyakarta’s land law had three reasons: limited Dutch personnel to oversee land matters, Dutch reluctance to transfer land issues to the aristocracy due to their incompetence, and the protection of non-indigenous residents (Ranawidjaya, 1955). As previously mentioned, under the Dutch system, lands were registered primarily as erfpacht (commercial usage right), recht van opstal (building rights), and eigendom verponding (ownership rights). Under the system, meanwhile, land rights were – as previously discussed – divided into andarbe (hereditary ownership rights), anganggo (hereditary usage rights), and anggaduh (non-hereditary usage rights). During discussion of the BAL, proponents of continuing the application of a dual land system were outnumbered by those who supported the unitary land system. A unitary land system was the most fundamental aim of land reform, with the consequence of limiting traditional adat law (Selosoemardjan, 1962a; Soetiknjo, 1987; Utrecht, 1969). Legal pluralism was seen as capitalistic in spirit, as it was used to serve the plantation estates and went against the socialist Indonesian principles of the time (Sukarno, relying on support of the Communist Party, had increasingly adopted Marxist rhetoric for his government’s agenda).

Although the BAL acknowledged adat law, the criteria were so stringent that it was impractical as a subordinate of national law (Afiff, 2004). MacAndrews (1986, p. 20) for instance, characterised adat land as unsurveyed, unregistered, and non-titled, with ownership based on community acceptance of land boundaries, oral and written documents attesting ownership, and claims by individuals or groups. The BAL, meanwhile, rules that the adat law is only applicable if it is not in conflict with national and state interests. The traditional land in
Yogyakarta could not be categorised as adat lands because it was – at least according to the Dutch system and the general ownership claims of the Sultanate – surveyed, registered, and titled. As such, it did not fall under the exceptions granted by the BAL for adat land, and was part of the remaining traditional land that it aimed to re-categorise and, eventually, re-distribute for a meaningful land reform.

After 1960, therefore, land registered under the Dutch land rights system was converted into land with rights provided by BAL. As indicated in Table 4.1 below, BAL converted the Dutch ownership right of erfpacht into commercial usage right (Hak Guna Usaha/HGU), recht van opstal into building right (Hak Guna Bangunan/HGB), and eigendom verponding into ownership right (Hak Milik/SHM), building right or usage right (Hak Pakai/HP). The conversion of eigendom depended on many factors, including nationality, citizenship and ethnicity (Sukaryanto, 2017, pp. 64-66). Land conversion in the Sultanate was akin to the conversion of the Dutch rights. The sultanate land right of andarbe in Yogyakarta City was converted into ownership rights, while the anganggo and anggaduh rights in the regencies were converted into usage rights. Therefore, to some extent BAL created a unified national land law in Yogyakarta, abolishing both the land laws of the Dutch and the Yogyakarta Sultanate – and effectively the latter’s land holdings, unless they were held in the name of the Sultan as a private citizen.

Table 4.1 Land rights in Indonesia based on BAL 1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rights</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Periods</th>
<th>Usage</th>
<th>Relation to land</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ownership</td>
<td>Strongest, full, hereditary</td>
<td>Unlimited</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Ownership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SHM)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building</td>
<td>Not full, non-hereditary</td>
<td>30 years, extendable</td>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Ownership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(HGB)</td>
<td></td>
<td>20 years, renewable</td>
<td>Building</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>Not full, non-hereditary</td>
<td>35 years, extendable</td>
<td>Agriculture,</td>
<td>Non-Ownership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(HGU)</td>
<td></td>
<td>25 years, renewable</td>
<td>plantation, fisheries.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usage</td>
<td>Not full, non-hereditary</td>
<td>25 years, extendable</td>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Ownership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(HP)</td>
<td></td>
<td>20 years, renewable</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Another principle of BAL was giving the state general power over all lands. As Afiff (2004) argued, the state’s superior right to land was an extension of the 1870s Agrarian Land Law, which introduced the concept of ‘Domein-verklaring’ (the state controls all lands [Hak Menguasai dari Negara/HMN]). It was first applied to Java and Madura and extended to
Sumatra (1874) and other outer regions (1875). In direct-rule areas, the Dutch automatically owned land that had no proof of ownership (Afiff, 2004, p. 74). Similarly, the Sultanate’s Rijksblad No. 16/1918 held that land without proof of ownership became the Sultan’s property. The purpose of this concept during the colonial era was claiming enough land for the state to hand it to entrepreneurs for producing commodities and other products (Afiff, 2004, p. 75).

However, Gautama and Harsono (1972) have a different opinion regarding state control, arguing that the state only ‘controls’ (or ‘governs’), but doesn’t ‘own’, the land. This echoes the 1945 Constitution which held that national resources, including land, water, and air, and the wealth contained within are ‘controlled’ (dikuasai) (not ‘owned’/dimiliki) by the state for the prosperity of the people.

Further, land ownership under the BAL was only limited to citizens, several institutions, and adat communities (the latter, as we have seen, under strict limitations). With the passage of the law, therefore, the aristocracy became unable to own land as an institution. For individuals, Article 9 and 21 of the BAL stipulated that only Indonesian citizens can obtain land rights, while foreign citizens are limited to usage rights and lease right (Article 41–44). The aristocracy was not ‘the subject of land rights’ (subyek hak atas tanah). Even though some aristocracies were able to maintain access to land and derive economic and cultural benefits from it, they could not hold land titles – except as private citizens – or transform them into ‘property.’ In this regard, adat communities were put in a much better position, although it was not until the government of Joko Widodo in the 2010s that a major initiative was launched to certify land property and titles for such communities.

Consequently, the only way for the aristocracy to have land property was to claim traditional land as private property. However, converting the Sultanate’s land to aristocrats’ private property raised three major issues. First, the aristocracy would lose its essential material resources, as ‘privatisation’ would divide all of the Sultan’s descendants under the heritage law. Second, it would create internal conflict between family members regarding the distribution of the land. This, in turn, was certain to weaken aristocracies. Third, not all of the land could be converted, because the government limited the maximum area of land ownership based on inhabitancy. The limits differed from region to region, but by 1961, implementing regulations with specific ownership limits had been issued for Yogyakarta and other areas housing old aristocracies, as shown in Table 4.2 below.
Table 4.2 Maximum land ownership in selected regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regencies /City</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Maximum Ownership (in hectares)</th>
<th>Irrigated Land</th>
<th>Dry Land</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta City</td>
<td>Densely Populated</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantul</td>
<td>Densely Populated</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleman</td>
<td>Densely Populated</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunung Kidul</td>
<td>Less Populated</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kulon Progo</td>
<td>Densely Populated</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surakarta City</td>
<td>Densely Populated</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cirebon</td>
<td>Densely Populated</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gowa</td>
<td>Not Populated</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gianyar</td>
<td>Less Populated</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ternate</td>
<td>Densely Populated</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palembang</td>
<td>Densely Populated</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The land ceiling policy forced aristocrats in many regions to divide their land to their families or let the state take it. Consequently, aristocracies were no longer a significant landholder, and lost their economic, social, and political importance in society. Some pro-Republican aristocrats voluntarily surrendered their land to the state. In Bali, for instance, the head of Ubud Puri, Cokorda Sukowati, surrendered 187.78 hectares of land as part of the redistribution and land ownership limitation policy (Land Reform Committee Gianyar No. 39A/XX/203/64, dated 4 January 1964). Others, by contrast, defended their land access through various means by benefiting from the weaknesses in the policy and by exercising traditional power and influence to obstruct its implementation. As we will see below, Yogyakarta was in the latter category. In most cases, however, the government took the ‘surplus land’ of the aristocrats, as regulated in Law No. 56/1960 as part of the land distribution policy (Utrecht, 1969, pp. 75-77).

Having obtained the land from most – but not all – fledgling aristocracies, the government started to distribute it through Government Regulation No. 224/1961 as an integral part of land reform. The concept of land reform in this study refers to a ‘public program that seeks to restructure equitably and rationally a defective land tenure system by compulsory,

drastic, and rapid means’ (Tai, 1974, p. 11). The land came from four sources: aristocratic (Swapraja and ex-Swapraja) lands, ownership of land over the maximum limits, absentee land ownership, and other lands not covered by the BAL categories of legitimate ownership. Absentee land ownership occurred when the land was owned by a person living outside the sub-district where the property was located. Aristocrats, therefore, were only entitled – as private citizens – to land in the sub-district in which they lived – although in the case of larger aristocracies, their land holdings crossed district borders. Against this background, aristocrats were most affected by the land reform programmes as three of the four sources of land distribution potentially came from them. The land was mostly distributed to landless peasants, and the surplus became state land. In Java, from 1961 to 1968, the government redistributed 73,943 hectares of former swapraja lands to 104,274 households. As shown in Table 4.3 below, of the 456,644 ha of land distributed in Java in six years (1962–1968), 73,943 ha was taken from aristocrats’ land.

Table 4.3 Land redistribution in Java (1962–1968)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Land</th>
<th>Distributed Lands (ha)</th>
<th>Beneficiaries (households)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surplus land</td>
<td>59,335</td>
<td>89,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absentee land</td>
<td>148,425</td>
<td>30,331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-swapraja land</td>
<td>73,943</td>
<td>104,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other state land</td>
<td>174,941</td>
<td>288,444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>456,644</strong></td>
<td><strong>512,139</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


However, the Yogyakarta Sultanate obstructed the national land reform in its area by using five major strategies. First, as indicated above, the Yogyakarta government, under the Sultan and Paku Alam, defended its land autonomy legislated with the 1954 bylaws. Even though the bylaws did not benefit the Sultanate, they formed a useful argument against implementation of the BAL in Yogyakarta. The legal argument over whether the 1954 bylaws took precedence over the BAL took many years, but found an initial resolution in 1967, briefly after the New Order came to power. Then, the Ministry of Internal Affairs issued Ministerial Regulation No. 1/1967, titled ‘The Division of Work and Authority of Agrarian Affairs’, which annulled Agrarian Ministry Decree No. SK. 112/Ka/1961 on land registration. Article 2 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ Regulation stated that land registration in Yogyakarta would follow the existing Yogyakarta Agrarian Office (Dinas Agraria Yogyakarta) under the authority...
of the Governor. In this regard, land in Yogyakarta came under provincial authority rather than national authority. In other provinces, agrarian offices were established at the district level to implement the Central Government’s land reform policy. As such, no agrarian office was established in Yogyakarta’s regencies and city until 1984, making it impossible for the Central Government to register land.

Second, the Sultanate argued that the definition of swapraja was ambiguous and not relevant to the Yogyakarta case. The Yogyakarta principalities were semi-autonomous regions during the Dutch colonial period. Most other semi-autonomous regions received the status of swapraja, later being turned into Daerah Istimewa before finally becoming districts. Yogyakarta, however, did not officially receive the status of swapraja, but was transformed directly into a Daerah Istimewa. Ranawidjaya (1955), for instance, did not list Yogyakarta as a swapraja in 1955 because it had become a Daerah Istimewa (see Appendix II). The status of swapraja was essential, because evidence of its non-applicability in Yogyakarta would enable it to avoid the implementation of BAL, as discussed above. As his father, Sultan Hamengku Buwono X, refused to allow Yogyakarta to be categorised as a swapraja because, he argued, it had no transitional local government from 1945 to 1950, Hamengku Buwono X held on to the argument long referred to by the Sultanate in order to explain why his territory was claiming autonomy in land management.

In an interview with the author, Hamengku Buwono X insisted that ‘There was no swapraja ever existing here (Yogyakarta). On 5 September (1945), Suwargi (Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX) and Paku Alam VIII took over Yogyakarta and became Chief and Vice-Chief. A swapraja never existed in Yogyakarta, because we proclaimed our loyalty to the Republic. [However], there were swapraja in Surakarta.’ Moreover, the BAL was not followed up with a government regulation on defining who was covered under the swapraja category and who wasn’t. Therefore, some pro-monarchist agrarian legal scholars agreed that swapraja status was not applicable to Yogyakarta (Sumardjono, 2007a, 2007b; Suyitno, 1998).

Third, the key to land data administration in Yogyakarta was at the village level, and the village leaders did not cooperate with the national government’s land reform policy. Village leaders had received a proportion of the Sultanate’s land as part of their income, and therefore

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the redistribution of the village land as mandated by the 1960 BAL threatened the economic privileges of village elites as well as the interests of the few peasants who already had received village land through the 1954 bylaw reforms. In short, village officials had no interest in engaging with registration and redistribution initiatives after 1960, because the land they used would be of unclear status if it were taken by the government. Consequently, their interests aligned with those of the Sultan, who also wanted to maintain the status quo of the land status, and to whom they felt a traditional sense of allegiance.

Fourth, Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX opposed any concrete initiatives to take over land that he claimed as his own. This included official moves by public officials. For instance, the third Mayor of Yogyakarta City Sujono (who served from 1966 to 1975) attempted to test the implementation of the BAL in the city but failed. In the late 1960s, he gave a Mrs. Minarti and Mrs. Kodyantoro the right to use the land located at Wahid Hasyim Street number eighty-seven and number three. In December 1970, the Sultan accused Sujono of acting beyond his authority as mayor for transferring these particular land rights. The Sultan chose three high-ranking aristocratic advocates to file the case (KRT Notoyudo, RM Praboto Gondokusumo, and Prof. KRT Kertanegoro) in the courts. The Sultan argued that the land issue was part of his authority, per Ministry of Internal Affairs Regulation No. 1/1967. According to the newspaper Kompas, the Sultan accused Sujono of ‘acting against the law to sell and give the right to use some plots of lands in Yogyakarta, which are under the control and authority of His Majesty Sultan’ (Kompas, 18 December 1970). Sujono lost in court, and the land was returned to the Sultan.

Fifth, the BAL stipulations regarding maximum land ownership was ineffectual in Yogyakarta, because the province lacked land offices (then typically under the Ministry of Internal Affairs) in the districts – for which ownership limits had been determined, and where aristocrats who wanted to claim ownership rights had to be located. Instead, Yogyakarta has its agrarian office at the provincial level, as a former part of the Sultanate’s land office. As discussed previously, the Sultan was effectively presiding over this office, giving him the chance to delay the certification and registration measures necessary to move forward with the 1954 reforms or the initiatives regulated under the 1960 BAL. These delays cemented, to a large extent, the status quo.

Finally, the Sultan’s multiple positions at the national level, such as Coordinating Ministry for the Economy (1966–1973) and Vice-President of Indonesia (1973–1978) made it impracticable to challenge his dominant power as a landholder and political and cultural leader.
From 1949 to 1984, the Sultan spent most of his time in Jakarta and Bogor. It was only from 1984 until his death in 1988 that he occasionally returned to Yogyakarta. He held the governorship from 1945 to 1988, but it was Paku Alam VIII who handled the everyday duties of the office (Atmakusumah (2011); Monfries (2015). Therefore, he could directly lobby with Jakarta power holders to desist from pushing for land reforms in Yogyakarta. As a result, most of the traditional land in Yogyakarta remained under the status quo, without rights systematically transferred as regulated in BAL. This status quo benefited the Sultanate, because, as an institution, it could not register land ownership claims as it was not a subject that could own property.

Interestingly, the post-1960 push to split aristocratic land into private property held by individual royals created demands from the Sultan’s family to adhere to the policy. In 1962, the grandson of Sultan Hamengku Buwono VII, Prince GPH Tejokusumo, accused his cousin Hamengku Buwono IX of taking two hectares of his grandfather’s land in the most expensive area of Malioboro Street; the land had been used for the Yogyakarta Parliament since the revolution. Prince GPH Tejokusuma argued that the land belonged to his grandfather, and consequently the land should be divided between Hamengku Buwono VII’s descendants. Hamengku Buwono IX won the case in the Yogyakarta City court, which reasoned that the land belonged to the office of the Sultan, and Hamengku Buwono VII as an individual did not have the right to the property. Prince GPH Tejokusumo appealed to the Provincial Court in Semarang, but lost again in a verdict dated 18 February 1966. The case showed that the reigning Sultan was not only defending land from the national government, but also from family members. As a precedence, the case discouraged other Yogyakarta royals from seeking to turn collective aristocratic land into fragmented private property, as regulated by the BAL.

While the defence of the status quo favoured the Sultanate in terms of delaying the transfer of rights away from it to other entities, it had a negative effect on rent that the state and other land owners could draw from their land. In the 1960s, contributions from rent in Yogyakarta were among the lowest in Indonesia. In 1966, the contribution of rent to Yogyakarta’s RGDP was only 0.9%, much lower than Central Java (4.0%), West Java (2.5%), and Jakarta (3.8%). Three years later, rent in Yogyakarta only contributed 0.8% to its RGDP, lower than Central Java (4.1%), West Java (2.6%), Jakarta (3.5%), and East Java (5.0%) (Arndt, 1973, p. 96). Thus, the lack of clarity in land ownership rights prevented both the state and

35 The verdict was announced five years after it was reached, on 5 May 1971 (Kompas, 9 June 1971).
private owners from gaining a larger income from their possessions. Especially for the state, increasing its income was also a goal that had motivated the creation of the BAL.

This does not mean, however, that there were no changes in land ownership status in Yogyakarta during that period. A significant number of plots of land were transferred to private property status based on the 1954 bylaws – at least for those plots for which land registration existed. Table 4.4 below shows data of land ownership and usage in 1979. Land ownership is divided into private property and village access (i.e., former land of the Sultanate now under the control of village officials), while the land type is divided into paddy fields, non-irrigated land used for agriculture, and courtyard (residential areas). From a total of 245,333.3 hectares of land recorded in 1979, 217,543.4 hectares (88.7%) was private property, while the rest (11.3%) was under village control. Villages retained access to 20.9% of the irrigated paddy fields and 11.7% of the non-irrigated lands. Most of the land to which villages had access was in Gunung Kidul (11,810 hectares or 42.5%). It is important to note, however, that the Sultan’s land in the city was not included in this statistic, and that many land plots remained unregistered and thus uncertified, as discussed in the introduction to this thesis.
### Table 4.4 Land ownership in the Special Region of Yogyakarta, 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regencies/City</th>
<th>Paddy field</th>
<th>Non-irrigated land</th>
<th>Courtyard</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private property</td>
<td>Village access</td>
<td>Private property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total area (ha)</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Total area (ha)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta City</td>
<td>543.0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantul</td>
<td>14,344</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>3,851.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleman</td>
<td>21,599.4</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>6,179.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunung Kidul</td>
<td>6,081.2</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>1,110.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kulon Progo</td>
<td>8,942.8</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>2,479.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>51,510.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>79.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,620.9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Modified from Monograph of the Special Region of Yogyakarta 1979 (p. 94) in (Murniatmo et al., 1989, p. 159).
This situation left the Sultan with direct control of his palace land and indirect access to village land – most importantly, approximately 20.9% of the irrigated fields. Most of the Sultanate’s land that had been given to peasants with usage rights in 1918 was now transformed into private property. However, as discussed, the village officials in control of the village land were aligned with the Sultan, and they defended the status quo in both their own and the Sultan’s interests. Thus, while the 1954 changes did result in some shift towards private property status for ordinary land owners, it also protected the Sultan’s palace land and his indirect access to village land from the full implementation of the BAL. However, after having invested much political capital into the defence of his land in the 1950s and 1960s, the Sultan asked the Central Government in 1984 to implement BAL in Yogyakarta. What caused this tremendous shift, that could have led to the Sultanate losing all of its traditional lands?

4.3 Land Control Threatened: The Implementation of BAL in Yogyakarta in Theory and Practice

In August 1983, five years after his withdrawal from national politics, Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX held a meeting with his officers in Yogyakarta. In the meeting, the Sultan – who had rejected an offer from Suharto for a second term as vice president in 1978 – stressed his authority in his realm, insisting that important issues should be consulted with him and that only he could make decisions about such matters. He said, ‘I stressed here that my staff only record, evaluate, and suggest the outcome of problems that might arise. The final decision is the Governor’s.’ The meeting came amidst complaints even by his loyalists that the Sultan was rarely present in Yogyakarta, and that Paku Alam VIII was effectively running day-to-day government. The Sultan stated that he planned to hold bimonthly meetings, to which the deputy chairman of the Yogyakarta Parliament, Sutardjo Suryoguritno, who had been asking for the Sultan’s return since 1978 (Kompas, 14 March 1978), commented ‘Well, compared to none, a bi-monthly meeting is better’ (Kompas, 9 August 1983).

It was in this context of uncertainty over the Sultan’s manoeuvring between Yogyakarta and Jakarta that he suddenly, in 1984, asked for the full implementation of BAL in Yogyakarta. On 1 April 1984, it was adopted. BAL’s implementation reduced the already declining land access of the Yogyakarta Sultanate and marked its lowest point in its history. This section discusses how Suharto, during the height of his regime in the 1980s (Aspinall & Fealy, 2010, p. 11; Ward, 2010), pressed Sultan Hamengku Buwono X politically and economically to end
his land autonomy. I argue that the end of land autonomy was the result of escalating political contestation between Suharto and the Sultan, which had intensified gradually while they were respectively president and vice-president in the 1970s. After the Sultan’s refusal to be nominated for a second term as vice-president, Suharto pressed Yogyakarta politically and economically, culminating in the de facto blocking of the crown prince having a political position in Yogyakarta.

Indeed, the political and economic pressure on Yogyakarta as a special region started in the early 1970s, when Hamengku Buwono IX was still vice president. The first political pressure occurred during the formulation of the draconian and centralist Law 5 of 1974, through which Suharto wanted to create a uniform government structure in all Indonesian provinces. During the formulation of the law in 1974, Parliament and Suharto planned to abolish the two remaining daerah istimewa, Yogyakarta and Aceh, while maintaining some special autonomy for Jakarta as the Indonesian capital region. Sujamto (1988, pp. 58-60), for instance, explored in detail the preparation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ draft on this issue. He noted that the idea of eliminating Yogyakarta’s special status emerged in the seventh draft, as ‘the specialness was not congruent to the character of the unitary Republic.’

While the Sultan was able to prevent the abolition of the special status for his territory, a transitional regulation in the law indicated that the Central Government objected to the long-term establishment of special privileges for Yogyakarta. In that regulation, Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX and Paku Alam VIII were confirmed as ‘current’ governors and vice governors of Yogyakarta, without term limits or other restrictions. But the law did not mention that the positions automatically transferred to their heirs – which is what the Sultan and Paku Alam intended. Hence, after the death of Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, there was no guarantee that Sultan Hamengku Buwono X would be governor. Suharto’s ambition to impose controls on Yogyakarta as much as he did on other regions was also evident in his placement of military personnel as office chiefs (kepala dinas) in Yogyakarta’s government. These chiefs were the top bureaucrats, and tasked with implementing the sectoral policies of the governor. By 1986, all kepala dinas in Yogyakarta were military personnel, providing a formidable counterbalance to the Sultan (Tempo, 23 August 1986).

Monfries (2015, pp. 187-293) argued that tensions in the relationship between the Sultan and Suharto reached their peak in 1978, when the Sultan was unwilling to be nominated as Suharto’s vice-president for a second term. The rift had started in 1973, but became severe when, in 1976–1977, both leaders were unwilling to meet each other. This was after the passage
of Law 5 of 1974, and their relationship was then beyond repair. Monfries (2015, p. 290) noted that there were two dominant, underlying factors for the tensions: Suharto’s unwillingness to share power and his sensitivity towards personal criticism. For instance, at a routine meeting, Hamengku Buwono IX showed Suharto foreign media coverage about the presidential family’s sharply growing business interests. Suharto’s expression turned sour, and he left the room. As vice-president, Hamengku Buwono IX was thus ‘political nonentity’, or, as Monfries (2015, p. 287) wrote, ‘in office but not in power.’

The climax of this troubled relationship was reached during a full cabinet meeting on 11 March 1978, when Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX refused to be re-nominated as vice-president. As his main reason, he cited his health issues, especially his declining eyesight. The Sultan had had eye problems since his early years as vice-president. On 23 October 1973, for instance, he went to Boston for medical treatment (Kompas, 23 October 1973). In July 1974, he was treated for more than three weeks for the same eye problem (Kompas, 25 July 1974), and in March 1975 he was once again treated in Boston for more than two months. He thus had to undergo routine medical eye check-ups (Kompas, 17 March 1975). Interestingly, however, after his farewell speech, he drove his car out of the palace, creating speculation on his reason to retire (Monfries, 2015, p. 293). He also continued to lead the Sports National Committee (Komite National Olahraga Indonesia – KONI) through 1981, having taken the position in 1966 (Kompas, 22 January 1981).

The most immediate trigger for the Sultan’s decision to request implementation of the BAL in 1984 was a conflict over the province’s leadership of Golkar early in that year. Mangkubumi, the oldest son of Hamengku Buwono IX and expected successor, had been the leader of the Golkar Yogyakarta branch since 1979, while his father was a national Golkar figure with the position of Prime Advisor (Pembina Utama). A few days before the party’s 1984 regional meeting (Musyawarah Daerah – Musda) that was supposed to install Mangkubumi for his second term, Mangkubumi, Paku Alam VIII, and Yogyakarta military commander Colonel Roni Sikap Sinuraya held a meeting at the governor’s office. These three persons were known as the ‘three passages’, as all were needed to approve the Golkar Yogyakarta executive board. During the meeting, however, no agreement was reached on who should appoint the board, with Colonel Roni denying Mangkubumi a key role. The national board subsequently intervened by making Sukardi (one of Golkar’s central board chairmen and the head of the Golkar Faction in Parliament) responsible for determining the Golkar
Yogyakarta’s board structure. Mangkubumi, the incumbent and incoming Golkar Yogyakarta chairman, was given no authority.

The appointed board, unsurprisingly, included few of Mangkubumi’s nominees. Mangkubumi had proposed twenty-eight candidates, which he argued had been agreed upon by the ‘three passages’, but twelve of them were replaced. Moreover, none of Mangkubumi’s candidates held the essential positions of chairmen, secretary, and treasurer. Out of desperation, during the ceremony inaugurating the new Golkar Yogyakarta executive board on 29 January 1984, Mangkubumi gave his hand-written resignation letter to the meeting’s chair, Santosa. However, Santosa chose to not announce it during the meeting, instead reporting to the Central Golkar Board. The following week, Mangkubumi told Kompas that he was prepared to resign from the chairmanship of Golkar Yogyakarta. As his reason, he stated that ‘Because in the reality, during the meeting Musda, the agreement of the ‘three passages’ was betrayed. This has made me very, very disappointed. Therefore, there is no other way, I plan to resign’ (Kompas, 5 February 1984).

However, during the inauguration of the Golkar Yogyakarta executive board members a few days later, he cancelled his resignation plan and said that, ‘I will try to do the job [as the Golkar Yogyakarta Chairman] for the next five years’ (Tempo, 18 February 1984). Sukardi demanded Mangkubumi’s explanation in Jakarta. He denied knowledge of what the ‘three passages’ reference meant and said, ‘I do not understand what Golkar’s “three passages” is and therefore it must be explained [by Mangkubumi]’ (Kompas, 8 February 1984). While it is unclear whether or how Golkar debated this issue further in Jakarta, Mangkubumi remained in office – but with his reputation damaged. After having placed military officers across the provincial bureaucracy, Suharto’s regime now also had intervened in the local affairs of Golkar, which the Sultan viewed as his domain – and as a training ground for his son to gain the kind of national connections that had helped him, Hamengku Buwono IX, to protect Yogyakarta’s interests.

In addition to these political pressures and disappointments for the Sultan, there were several economic and development factors that contributed to Hamengku Buwono IX’s decision to surrender Yogyakarta’s land autonomy in 1984. A 1968 economic survey showed that, although Yogyakarta was ‘by no means the most remote or isolated of the twenty-five provinces of Indonesia’ (Mubyarto & Partdiredja, 1968, p. 46), it was amongst the poorest provinces. It had difficulties providing enough food for residents, lacked significant enterprise, and had no major regional exports. Thus, the Central Government funded 75% of the total
provincial budget in 1968 (p. 32). A 1972 survey portrayed a similar condition, describing Yogyakarta as ‘one of the poorest and most densely populated regions’ and had ‘the seventh-lowest per capita income in real terms and the lowest of the five provinces on Java’ (Hill & Mubyarto, 1978, p. 29). In Yogyakarta, 59% of land was used for agriculture, compared to the average of 46.7% in Java and 11.1% in Indonesia (p. 42). These figures had not changed much by 1984, when the provincial budget reached IDR 30 billion [US$ 30 million] but continued to be highly dependent on national support.

The lack of development was, among other things, due to unclear land regulations, which made it hard to draw investment. Compared to other provinces, which had fully adopted BAL, Yogyakarta was less competitive due to land status uncertainty. Surakarta, for instance, was seen as more attractive than Yogyakarta, and thus some significant investors chose Surakarta instead of Yogyakarta. Land uncertainty also created peaks in land prices. On January 1984, Mangkubumi, then also the chairman of the Yogyakarta Business Chamber, stated that one of the challenges faced by people conducting business in Yogyakarta was the price of land, a scarce commodity in Yogyakarta. He said that ‘the land problem nowadays is already terrifying. It might hinder investment in Yogyakarta if it is not solved’ (Kompas, 24 January 1984). Another obstacle to investment was the land ownership transfer fee (pulasi). Land in Yogyakarta that was managed by the village charged 30% of the land price during ownership transfer, while in other provinces it was only 8% at the sub-district level.

One key precondition for raising economic growth levels was improved education, but this was hindered by the slow development of primary schools in Yogyakarta Province. In 1973, Suharto issued Presidential Instructions No. 10/1973 and No. 6/1974 to build primary schools and facilities to boost the primary school enrolment rate. The funding came from the increased income provided by the oil export boom. Indonesian oil production reached its peak in 1977, reaching 1,685,000 barrels per day or around 2.86% of total world oil production (BP, 2018). This project built more than 31,000 new primary schools, hired 196,000 primary school teachers, and increased enrolment by 32% in four years (from 13.1 million pupils in 1973 to 17.3 million pupils in 1977). The number of dropouts reduced from 23% in 1965 to only 6.5% in 1977 (Heneveld, 1979, pp. 144-145). The project placed the governor as responsible for finding land for school facilities and for teacher recruitment, while the Central Government handled funding and standardisation.

36 Interview, Sultan Hamengku Buwono X, 3 March 2015 in Yogyakarta.
The unclear land regulation in Yogyakarta and the absence of a land agency at the district level made Yogyakarta fall behind other provinces in terms of school development. In 1978, 24,065 primary schools were in operation under the project, but only 443 were operating in Yogyakarta, far fewer than in Central Java (4,718), East Java (5,132), West Java (3,897) and Bali (550) (Snodgrass, Hutagalung, & Dasar, 1980, p. 40). Moreover, a 1978 survey in seven kampungs inside the palace walls showed that the number of people with less than a Year 9 education was 49.29%; 29% only had primary education (Ministry of Public Works, 1978, p. 96). Hence, if Yogyakarta wanted to improve its educational standards by benefitting from the Presidential Instructions scheme, it needed to make state land available for the building of schools. This, in turn, was only possible if the state could officially certify its ownership of land under the BAL regulations.

Pressed politically and economically, in October 1983 the Sultan formed a team to conduct research on agrarian issues in Yogyakarta.37 The Agrarian Team, one member of which was Mangkubumi, weighed the potential benefits and drawbacks of changing the province’s agrarian autonomy into agrarian deconcentration (wherein authority was held by the Central Government). For instance, it calculated that the Yogyakarta government would lose 40% of its income from agrarian registration fees (IDR 743,048,949 [US$ 724,219] in 1983,), and the five districts would also lose agrarian revenue (IDR 364,750,596 [US$ 355,507] in 1983) (Utomo, 1999). Despite these potential losses, however, the team eventually recommended that the Central Government issue a presidential decree to abolish Yogyakarta Bylaws No. 3, 5, 10, 11 and 12 of 1954, which in effect meant that the BAL would automatically be applied to Yogyakarta.

On 18 March 1984, a month after his son’s conflict with Golkar had escalated, the Sultan sent a letter to the Yogyakarta Parliament, explaining that the outdated land regulation in Yogyakarta was not in accordance with the BAL, and expressing his desire to fully implement BAL in Yogyakarta (Kompas, 19 March 1984). This was a remarkable development, given how much the Sultan had opposed the implementation of BAL in Yogyakarta before, including through court action. Responding to the Sultan’s letter, the Yogyakarta Parliament issued two decrees in the same month. Decree No. 3/K/DPRD/1984 acknowledged the willingness of the

Yogyakarta Government\textsuperscript{38} to fully implement BAL. Meanwhile, in Decree No. 4/K/DPRD/1984, the Yogyakarta Government proposed that the President issue a presidential decree for implementing the BAL in Yogyakarta. The legislators argued that a presidential decree would solve the unclear agrarian regulations in Yogyakarta, primarily as related to the multiple interpretations of BAL and the 1954 bylaws.

On 9 May 1984, Suharto issued Presidential Decree No. 33/1984 regarding the full implementation of BAL in Yogyakarta. This short decree had three main points: the complete application of BAL in Yogyakarta; the order that the Ministry of Internal Affairs implement further regulations; and the stipulation that the decree be retrospective, from 1 April 1984. The decree noted Yogyakarta’s autonomy that had hindered the implementation of the BAL, and the willingness of the Yogyakarta Government to implement the BAL. Therefore, administratively, the decree responded to the desire of the Yogyakarta Government to implement BAL and discontinue the previous land regulations. Suharto issued this presidential decree only days after receiving the letter from the Yogyakarta Parliament, and as such implementation came less than two weeks after the Sultan’s letter. This showed Suharto’s eagerness to endorse a proposal that his regime had favoured for some time, and would finally give his regime control of every inch of Indonesia’s land.

Moreover, as a response to Suharto’s decree, the Yogyakarta Parliament issued Bylaw No. 3/1984, published on 24 September 1984. After twenty-four years, BAL was implemented in Yogyakarta. The bylaw, signed by Paku Alam VIII as deputy governor, had several main points. First, it provided for the full implementation of the BAL in Yogyakarta. Secondly, it annulled the previous land reforms of 1918 and 1954 by declaring that all regulations related to agrarian affairs (except for BAL) were no longer valid in Yogyakarta. Thirdly, agrarian issues that were previously part of the Yogyakarta government’s local autonomy per Law 3 of 1950 were changed into a deconcentrated model, under the authority of the Central Government but operationally handled by the provincial government. Thus, the provincial government only followed the rules of the Central Government and no longer had directing authority in land matters. In short, the implementation of the BAL in Yogyakarta was anchored in a parliamentary decree, a presidential decree and Yogyakarta bylaws (Kedaulatan Rakyat, 28 May 1984). However, how exactly was BAL implemented in Yogyakarta, particularly in regard to aristocratic land?

\textsuperscript{38} The Law No. 5/1974 on Local Government stipulated that The Yogyakarta Government is both the Governor and Yogyakarta Legislative.
The priority in fully implementing the BAL was the government restructuring of the land office.39 Five regencies and city-level land offices were established in Yogyakarta City, Sleman, Bantul, Kulon Progo and Gunung Kidul. The absence of such offices had been a major obstacle to BAL implementation in the past. At the province level, the previous Yogyakarta land office, the Dinas Agraria, became part of the new Central Government’s land office, which was similar to other regional land offices in provinces and districts/cities in Indonesia. Therefore, the Sultanate saw a significant drop in its land authority, which it had previously exercised through the provincial government and Dinas Agraria.

Second, the government, through its land office, began to identify aristocratic land possessions with the status of Sultanate’s Ground (Sultanaat Gronden – SG) and Pakualaman’s Ground (Pakualamanaat Gronden – PAG) based on existing village records. The non-palace land of SG consisted of excess land that had not been given to or managed by villages, individuals, and other parties, geographically located in uninhabitable environments such as cliffs and riverbanks.40 SG also included the communal lands located in the village but directly managed by the Sultanate. In 1993, the first identification of the land concluded that there was a total area of SG in Yogyakarta of 3,675 hectares (36.75 km²), or 1.15% of Yogyakarta’s total territory. This area, however, did not include the village land to which the Sultanate had indirect access through traditional linkages with the village, as discussed later. In terms of the types of land, a 1993 survey identified six categories of SG. Most SG was used for ‘other’ purposes or was unused (45%), followed by non-irrigated lands (29.60%), and irrigated lands (6.26%). A further 6.69% of land had unidentified usage. Details of the SG identification in 1993 is presented in Table 4.5 below.

39 Presidential Decree No. 26/1988; (Hearing Second Commission DPR RI with Maria Sumardjono and Siti Zuhro on Yogyakarta Specialness Bill, 2011).
40 Interview with staff of the newly established Yogyakarta Province Office for Land and Spatial Layout (Dinas Pertanahan dan Tata Ruang – Dipertaru Yogyakarta), on 14 January 2016 in Yogyakarta.
Table 4.5 Estimated SG based on usage in 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Types of Land</th>
<th>Area (M²)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Rice fields/Arable land</td>
<td>2,300,133.00</td>
<td>6.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dry land (Tegalan)</td>
<td>10,877,067.00</td>
<td>29.60</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Courtyard (Pekarangan)</td>
<td>2,723,134.03</td>
<td>7.41</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Sport field</td>
<td>67,685.00</td>
<td>2.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Cemetery</td>
<td>1,538,015.00</td>
<td>4.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>16,786,135.50</td>
<td>45.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Unidentified</td>
<td>2,458,461.60</td>
<td>6.69</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>36,750,631.13</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
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Source: Supama (2005, p. 43)

But the identification of the aristocratic land was not automatically equivalent to its immediate transfer to the state or other users. There were two mechanisms through which land could be transferred, but both involved the approval of the aristocratic house from which land was to be transferred. First, the Sultanate controlled the SG/PAG lands through the Sultanate Land Office (Panitikismo). This was the office of the Sultanate in charge of its internal land affairs, and it could issue the Sultanate’s land certificates called kekancingan. Under the now implemented BAL, these certificates could be transferred into usage certificates for private citizens or institutions – but this process needed a permit from the Sultanate. Various conditions were also attached to land conversion processes. For land conversion to private property, for example, the proof of origin of the proposed land was required. Therefore, the practice of private property land conversion from SG/PAG needed the help from inside Kasultanan and Pakualaman, and if they proved uncooperative, the process was certain to be difficult – despite the 1984 BAL endorsement.

Second, the Sultan used his authority as governor to control the process of releasing village land. Through a gubernatorial permit (ijin gubernur), the Sultan could grant land for purposes he supported but obstruct the release of land he did not want to release. In practice, the governor’s permit was needed for any change to village land usage in the four regencies of Yogyakarta. This change included the transfer of ownership for private or public purposes and change for uses other than agricultural purposes. The use of these permits had begun in 1978, when the Sultan’s conflict with Suharto escalated and he was keen to find ways of enforcing

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41 At the time of writing, Yohanes Supama was serving as the head of the BPN Bantul, after previously serving as head of the BPN Kulon Progo and holding other positions in the land agencies in Yogyakarta. As a land office staff member, he had access to data for his 2005 thesis that was hard to access for outsiders.
his autonomy in Yogyakarta affairs. But as we will see below, the usage of the permit for land management issues peaked shortly after the implementation of the BAL.

The institution of the Governor’s Permit had three advantages for the Sultan. First, it reduced the pace at which access to village land was lost. Second, it consolidated his ties to the village apparatus through the continued protection of village land, which served as the primary source of income for most village apparatuses. Third, the permits enabled the Sultanate to survive financially by legally selling some of its lands. As will be discussed later in this chapter, Suharto’s tight budgetary control of the Sultanate forced the royal family to find other sources of income, such as selling some village land to private buyers, most notably for urban housing complexes (Pradoto, 2012). Even though this carried the risk of reducing the Sultanate’s control of land and the loyalty from village officials, the Sultanate only had limited choices to survive. The next chapter of this thesis, however, shows that the Sultanate cleverly calculated the portion of the land it was selling in the New Order while maintaining significant land claims and village loyalty, which gave it the resources it needed to politically thrive after 1998.

In a detailed examination of Governor’s Permits issued from 1978 to 2015, I found that out of a total of 2,453 Governor’s Permits issued, 37% were related to commercial sales and thus included some form of compensation for the Sultanate (Yogyakarta Province Government, 2015). Table 4.6 below shows the number of permits issued each year, and the purposes for which they were issued. Most of the land was released for commercial purposes (37%), followed by land allocated for government and military buildings (30%), land for educational facilities (18%), land for social facilities (12%), and land for health institutions (3%). In 1982, permits for commercial purposes represented forty out of forty-one permits. The highest number of permits issued was in 1986, with 236 permits: 100 permits were issued for government programmed housing (covering 177 hectares of land) and seventy-two permits to build new elementary school buildings under the school programme.
Table 4.6 Yogyakarta Governor’s permits on land issues, 1978–2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Government &amp; Military</th>
<th>Commercial</th>
<th>Education</th>
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Source: Law Section, Yogyakarta Province Government until April 2015 (downloaded from birohukum.jogjaprov.go.id on 15 April 2015) and further clarifications from staff at the Law Section, Yogyakarta Province Government, on 7 April 2016 in Yogyakarta.
The spike in the release of village land for school buildings after 1984, and the drop after 1986, also confirms that this transfer of land to schools under the Presidential Instruction program was indeed one of the key motivations for the Sultan to endorse the BAL in 1984. It was clear that he felt the need to speed up the school building program, and doing so under the Presidential Instructions scheme and the BAL seemed the most rational thing to do. The statistics and the Sultan’s continued control of SG land also demonstrated, however, that while political and economic pressures pushed him to adopt the BAL, he did so in the awareness that he had a ‘safety net’ that protected the Sultanate from the full impact of the BAL. While aristocratic land was identified, it was not transferred automatically, as the letter of the BAL would have required. In reality, then, transfer of aristocratic land to either state institutions or individuals still required the approval of the Sultan, whether through the Panitikismo or through gubernatorial permits.

An analysis of the permits issued under each aristocratic governor also highlights that the BAL did not significantly change the practice through which land was managed and released from the royal houses. Of a total of 2,043 land permits, Sultan Hamengku Buwono X released 1,094 permits releasing village land, followed by Paku Alam VIII (476) and Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX (473). It is, however, necessary to consider the length of governorship. At the end point of data collection, Sultan Hamengku Buwono X had held the governorship for 16 years (1999–2015) compared to the ten years of his father Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX (1978–1988) and nine years of Paku Alam VIII (1989–1998). Overall, Sultan Hamengku Buwono X issued some sixty-eight land release permits per year, compared to the average of forty-seven permits (HB IX) and fifty-two permits (PA VIII) per year of his predecessors. The chart below shows the number of permits issued per governor between 1978 and 2015. It also shows that there were overall 17% of permits that did not relate to land issues.
Apart from regulating village land and occasionally releasing some of it to ‘outsiders’, the permits have also been used to appease royal family members who demanded land as a source of income. In an interview with the author in 2015, Queen GKR Hemas of Hamengku Buwono X admitted that some of the Sultan’s family members used land for their own commercial interests – indeed, that included herself. Permits were given for three purposes: personal use, business development, and institutional use. In 1985, Prince GBP Prabukusumo of Hamengku Buwono IX received a permit to buy 2,500 m² of village land in Catur Tuggal Village, Sleman, for his personal use. In 1992, meanwhile, Queen GKR Hemas received a permit to develop the ‘Green Plaza’ housing and business complex in Bantul. In 1990, similarly, the Sultanate’s building office Wahana Sarto Kriyo received 1,562 m² of village land from Catur Tunggal Village, Sleman, for the relocation of the Ambarukma Primary School. Thus, while the Sultanate overall was under pressure during the early and medium periods of the New Order and had to make compromises with the regime, it retained the ability to use land for its benefits.

42 Interview, Queen GKR Hemas, 11 February 2015 in Jakarta.
43 Governor’s Permit No. 52/IZ/KPTS/1985.
44 Governor’s Permit No. 15/IZ/KPTS/1992.
45 Governor’s Permit No. 46/IZ/KPTS/1990.
The Sultanate, however, was about to face its most difficult period yet: the time between 1988 to 1998, after the death of the charismatic Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX and before the fall of Suharto in 1998. In that period, the Sultan’s family lost its privileged access to the governorship, and the seat remained empty until 1998, as explained in the following section.

4.4 The Sultan’s Passing: Defending Land Access During the Late New Order Regime

Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX passed away on 2 October 1988 in Washington, D.C., after suffering a heart attack. One hundred thousand people escorted his body to the royal cemetery in Imogiri, thirty-two kilometres south of the Palace. *Tempo* magazine published four special editions on what it called ‘the biggest funeral of the 20th century’ (Tempo, 15 October 1988, p. 26; 8 October 1988; 19 November 1988; 22 October 1988). With the death of Hamengku Buwono IX, the Sultanate of Yogyakarta faced additional challenges in maintaining its access to land resources and its political influence during the late New Order period. This section shows that although the new sultan did not serve as governor from 1988 to 1998, he shared his father’s view that land access was crucial for the royal house’s survival, and he used Yogyakarta’s special status to defend it.

Mangkubumi, who would soon be Hamengku Buwono X, fully grasped the threat his father’s death posed to his family and its land holdings. Soon after he received the news of the Sultan’s death, Mangkubumi, who was in Jakarta at that time attending a Golkar meeting, met with Suharto and the State Secretary on 2 October 1988 (Kompas, 3 October 1988). *Tempo*, on 4 October 1988, asked: ‘About the position of governor, is it attached to the individual to whoever becomes sultan?’ Directly mentioning the Sultanate’s land interests, Mangkubumi replied:

> I think it is attached personally [to Hamengku Buwono IX]. As a special region, according to Law No. 3/1950, Yogyakarta has special autonomy. The Central Government gives part of its authority to autonomous regions. What differentiates Yogyakarta from other provinces is that the basis of its autonomy is Law, not Presidential Decree. Another special thing is that, in Yogyakarta, there is no state land, but the Sultanate’s land and other [private] land. In addition, the one who became governor was Hamengku Buwono IX and the deputy governor was Paku Alam VIII, because they had historical roles. They will continue to hold those positions as long as they are physically capable. Now that Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX has passed away, does the new governor get appointed every fifty years, or every five years as in other provinces? I do not know. All that depends on the [Central] Government (Tempo, 8 October 1988, p. 26).

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46 Although the New Order regime used the term ‘autonomy’ and ‘autonomous regions’, the government structure was highly centralised. See, for instance, Erb, Sulistyanto, and Faucher (2005).
Mangkubumi’s answer is insightful, given that it came after meeting Suharto and it is thus plausible to assume that some of the interview’s contents reflect the president’s stance and what Mangkubumi replied in return. First, in insisting that Yogyakarta’s specialness was based on a 1950 Law and not Presidential Decree, he reminded Suharto that the region’s special status was long-standing and could not be revoked by the strike of a pen. Second, he conceded that the position of governor in Yogyakarta was attached personally to Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX and Paku Alam VIII due to their historical contributions during the revolutionary period – hence, he agreed to the position Suharto had taken in the 1974 debates on the new regional government laws. Finally, however, he made an astonishingly strong claim on his land rights by refusing the existence of ‘state land’ in Yogyakarta and, at the same time, emphasising the status of the Sultanate’s land. This was a remarkable statement, because Yogyakarta had adopted BAL in 1984 and consequently the Sultanate’s land should have become state land, nominally at least.

The interview, then, outlined the compromise Mangkubumi was prepared to accept: he would not claim the governorship as long as Paku Alam VIII was alive, but he would fiercely and fully defend Yogyakarta’s special region status and his family’s land claim. Responding to the first element of this compromise, but not necessarily fully accepting the other two demands, Suharto issued Presidential Decree No. 340/M/1988, which appointed Paku Alam VIII as acting Governor of Yogyakarta on 19 December 1988. It was further clarified that the Sultanate and Pakualaman were no longer part of or automatically tied to the provincial government, but limited to the cultural domain of the royal family. During the inauguration, the Ministry of Internal Affairs announced that,

Yogyakarta would retain its special status – but henceforth the coordination of the Special Territory [Sic] of Yogyakarta would no longer correspond with the Sultanate and the Pakualaman. Henceforth, the Sultanate and the Pakualaman would lie solely within the jurisdiction of the royal family (Larson, 1992, p. 140).

Accordingly, Suharto accepted Yogyakarta’s continued special region status, but with important qualifications. It is likely that Suharto had no intention to hand the governorship back to the royal houses once Pak Alam VIII had died. Rather, he sought a complete separation between the realm of governance – the leader of which he intended to appoint directly – and the cultural sphere of the aristocratic families. Nevertheless, Suharto recognised that with power, wealth and charisma, Mangkubumi was a potential political contender in the near future. Hence, one of Suharto’s envoys came to visit the new Sultan Hamengku Buwono X soon after
his coronation and asked for his commitment to Suharto. The Sultan, however, remained non-committal – at least according to his own account. In a later interview, he claimed to have told Suharto’s envoy that,

As a common citizen, I am loyal to Pak Harto [President Suharto] as the Indonesian President. As an individual, I am loyal to the state and the country. As part of the younger generation, I am loyal to Pak Harto as an elder. However, I am hoping that Pak Harto will give the younger generation opportunities to experience the statehood processes and not kill the [potential of] the younger generation (Intisari Online, 10 May 2015).

Whether he actually said exactly this or delivered a moderated version to Suharto’s envoy, the conversation did nothing to improve the relationship between the Yogyakarta Sultanate and the long-time president. As was the case with his father in the 1970s and 1980s, Hamengku Buwono X had a tense relationship with Suharto, and both sides watched each other with suspicion. The compromise outlined above – Suharto keeping the Sultan away from the governorship but recognising the region’s special status and not challenging the royal house on the land issue – formed the basis for an uneasy association between the two, but one that allowed the Sultan to continue pursuing his family’s key interests. This is because his father had left him a sultanate rich in assets and business connections.

At his death, Hamengku Buwono IX was one of Indonesia’s richest persons. The noted business analyst Christianto Wibisono estimated that the Sultan was one of the 100 wealthiest Indonesians; this would increase to the fifty wealthiest Indonesians if the Sultanate’s total assets were included. In one of his assets, Bank Dagang Nasional Indonesia, Sultan had a 49% share with total value of IDR 249.41 billion [US$ 125.5 million] (Tempo, 22 October 1988 p. 33). This wealth came from the dozens of business entities he owned, which he managed through professional managers and that were entangled with the New Order business-politics complex (Richard Robison, 1986).

But transferring this wealth to his successor as sultan was not an easy task. The first challenge was to separate the personal and institutional assets, which were differentiated into three categories. The first were ‘sultanate assets’, the income from which was used to finance the Yogyakarta Sultanate. These included, first and foremost, traditional lands in the form of Sultan’s Ground and, indirectly, village land. All of the sultanate’s assets were received from the previous sultan during the colonial period. Their proceeds were used to fund traditional ceremonies and rituals, and to cover the maintenance and preservation of the existing building and palace. To support those duties, in 1988 the Sultanate had 500 royal soldiers and 2,400
royal servants (*abdi dalem*). The second were the ‘*sultan’s assets*’, the assets of ‘Hamengku Buwono’ as the Sultan, which were used to support the next sultan, the royal family members, and the princes. The Sultanate’s companies and business units were examples of such assets. Dignitaries did not receive a portion of the first two assets, but descendants of the Sultan and other royal family members continued to manage and extract benefits from it. Third, the Sultan’s ‘*personal assets*’, which he collected outside of his position as sultan and which could be divided among dignitaries.

The task of categorising and dividing the assets was made somewhat easier by the fact that many male descendants of the Sultan (he had fifteen living sons from five wives) were already running his some of his businesses at the time of his death. For instance, some of the Sultan’s sons managed what were then the sugar factory PT Madukismo, the Ambarukmo Palace Hotel, the Sri Manganti Hotel, and the PT Tarumartani cigar factory. The land could not be divided among dignitaries as it was owned by the Sultanate as an institution, but its economic benefits were used to finance the Sultanate and the members of the royal family. The Sultan also owned dozens of personal companies, including PT Nusatour Duta Djaja Investment, PT Natour, and Duta Merlin Shopping Complex in Central Jakarta; he also owned 49% of the share of Bank Dagang Nasional Indonesia (Tempo, 22 October 1988 pp. 33-34). As in the cases above, male members of the family were involved in managing them. Table 4.7 below shows the distribution of businesses among the Sultan’s male children in 1988.

**Table 4.7 Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX’s prominent descendants, 1988**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Political and Social Positions</th>
<th>Business</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| KGPH Mangkubumi (42) | • Chairman of Golkar Yogyakarta  
• Member of Yogyakarta Parliament  
• Chairman of Yogyakarta Sports Commission (KONI Yogyakarta)  
• Chairman of Widya Mataram Foundation | • Director of PT Punokawan (construction)  
• President Commissioner of PT Madukismo (sugar)  
• President Commissioner of Bank Dagang Negara Indonesia  
• Chairman of Yogyakarta Business Chamber (Kadin Yogyakarta) |
| GBPH Hadiwinoto (40)    | • Chairman of Golkar, Yogyakarta City  
• Member of Yogyakarta Parliament | • General Manager of Sri Manganti Hotel  
• Vice-Chairman of Kadin Yogyakarta |

47 ‘PT’ revers to *Perseroan Terbatas*, a private or limited liability company. Under Indonesian land law, a company with PT status can only have building, business rights, and usage rights.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Political and Social Positions</th>
<th>Business</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| GBPH Joyokusumo (33) | • Deputy Chair of Yogyakarta Parliament  
• Chairman of Youth Committee (KNPI Yogyakarta). | • CV Aji Buana Perkasa  
• Chairman of Yogyakarta Youth Business Chamber (Hipmi Yogyakarta) |
| GBPH Hadikusumo (42)     | • Rector of Proclamation University, Yogyakarta  
• Chairman of Yogyakarta Scouts (Pramuka Yogyakarta) | • Clove estates in Semarang.                                               |
| GBPH Prabukusumo (36)   | • Chairman of Youth Organisation (Karang Taruna Yogyakarta)  
• Chairman of Yogyakarta Taekwondo and Badminton Clubs | • Construction business  
• Advertising business                                                     |
| GBPH Pakuningrat (31)   |                                                                                               | • PT Aguna Krida Pratama (construction)  
• PT Dawuh Prabu Anom (printing)                                            |

Source: Tempo 22 October 1988; Margantoro et al. (1999, p. 16); Tempo (1988e).

The women in the family, by contrast, were in charge of the domestic affairs of the royal household, but were kept away from the businesses. The fifth wife of Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, KRAy Nindyokirono (Norma), when asked in an interview about the Sultan’s heritage, said, ‘I do not know. I [even] do not know where the Madukismo sugar factory is located. [Having lived in Jakarta], the only parts of Yogyakarta I know are the airport and the palace’ (Tempo, 19 November 1988, p. 30).

In addition to running various corporations, many of Hamengku Buwono IX’s sons were also active in politics. The sons of Windyaningrum, his second wife, were key business and politics actors in Yogyakarta. Mangkubumi, Hadiwinoto, and Joyokusumo were members of the Yogyakarta Parliament and Golkar chairmen, and controlled most of the Sultanate’s businesses. They also dominated the Yogyakarta Business Chamber, which was a useful forum to lobby for projects from the Central Government. The sons of other wives were also businessmen, but were not involved directly in politics during the New Order. Hadikusumo, for instance had his business outside Yogyakarta, in Semarang, Central Java. Thus, despite all the difficulties the family had faced over the BAL and a deteriorating relationship with Suharto, by the late 1980s it remained a royal house far richer and more influential than most other aristocracies in Indonesia.
Beyond the distribution of the inheritance, the succession to the throne was the second major issue arising from Hamengku Buwono IX’s death. Mangkubumi was widely seen as the natural successor, but there was no clear mechanism for him to take the throne automatically. From four of his five wives, the Sultan had sixteen sons and seven daughters (KRT Mandoyokusumo, 1980, p. 79). Theoretically, the candidates to become Sultan Hamengku Buwono X were the eldest sons of the four wives: Mangkubumi, Hadikusumo, Prabukusumo, and Pakuningrat. According to the last agreement between Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX and Dutch Governor Lucien Adam in 1940, the first in the line of succession was the eldest son of the queen, followed by his siblings, before consideration was given to the sons of the other wives (Article 4 of the 1940 Agreement, in Atmakusumah (2011, p. 401)). However, since the late Sultan had not selected any of his wives as his queen, all his eldest sons had, in principle at least, an equal claim to becoming the next sultan. Table 4.8 below shows a list of the Sultan’s descendants.

**Table 4.8 Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX’s children, listed by date of birth, 1980**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Wife</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Kanjeng Ratu Anom</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>KRA Pintokopurnomo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>BRA Murdokusumo</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>KRA Pintokopurnomo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>BRA Riyokusumo</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>KRA Windyaningrum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>BRA Darmokusumo</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>KRA Pintokopurnomo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>KGPH Mangkubumi</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>KRA Windyaningrum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>GBPH Hadikusumo</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>KRA Pintokopurnomo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>GBPH Hadiwonoto</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>KRA Windyaningrum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>GBPH Hadisuryo</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>KRA Pintokopurnomo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>GBPH Prabukusumo</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>KRA Hastungkoro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>BRM Sumyandono</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>KRA Windyaningrum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>BRM Kuslardiyanto</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>KRA Hastungkoro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>BRM Anindito</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>KRA Ciptomurti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>BRM Sulaksmono</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>KRA Hastungkoro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>BRM Abiromo</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>KRA Hastungkoro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>BRM Prasasto</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>KRA Ciptomurti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Unnamed baby girl, died after delivery</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>KRA Ciptomurti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>BRA Sri Kushandanari</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>KRA Hastungkoro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>BRM Arianto</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>KRA Ciptomurti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>BRA Sri Kusuladewi</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>KRA Hastungkoro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>BRM Sarsono</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>KRA Ciptomurti</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Despite the absence of a legal automatism, Mangkubumi, as the eldest son from Hamengku Buwono IX’s second wife, had the best chances of becoming the new sultan. First, Mangkubumi was the oldest, six months older than Hadikusumo. Second, Mangkubumi had held the highest royal title, KGPH (*Kanjeng Gusti Pangeran Haryo*), one level below crown prince, since 1974, while the other sons were given the lower title of GBP (Gusti Bendoro Pangeran Haryo) (Margantoro et al., 1999, p. 24). Third, the late Sultan chose Mangkubumi as the leader amongst princes (*lurah pangeran*) (KRT Mandoyokusumo, 1980, p. 78). Finally, as demonstrated earlier, Mangkubumi’s family line controlled the Sultanate’s resources and dominated Yogyakarta’s political landscape.

Furthermore, during the succession process, Prince Puruboyo – Hamengku Buwono IX’s older brother – strongly supported Mangkubumi becoming successor. He said, ‘if there is no queen, then it goes to the eldest son of any wife. I have no intentions in this matter, but the tradition is like that. If [we’re not] following [this] culture, there should be a meeting to make a new tradition’ (Tempo, 22 October 1988 p. 24). In the same vein, Mangkubumi himself believed that his father had intended to make him sultan all along. During an interview with the author, Sultan Hamengku Buwono X claimed that his father had prepared him for becoming sultan. He said, ‘I was prepared by my father for a long time to become sultan. He asked me to do many things, physical and metaphysical. I knew the meaning after I became sultan that all of those duties were preparations to become sultan.’

These ‘teachings’ notwithstanding, none of the Sultan’s children were particularly close to him, including Mangkubumi. When he was born on 2 March 1946 under the name Herjuno Darpito (Margantoro et al., 1999), his father was already busy with national affairs, and later moved to Jakarta in 1949. Before leaving for Jakarta, Hamengku Buwono IX asked one of his spiritual confidants, Ki Juru Permono, to teach Herjuno twice a week in his hermitage (*padepokan*) in northern Yogyakarta; this lasted until Herjuno’s early adulthood, when his father changed the latter’s name to Mangkubumi. In his youth, Herjuno lived separately, in a special compound in the palace, and spent most of his time with palace servants. Herjuno’s

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48 Interview, Sultan Hamengku Buwono X, 3 March 2015 in Yogyakarta.
education record was far from excellent. He had to repeat a year during primary school, and needed seventeen years to finish his undergraduate studies in law at Universitas Gadjah Mada (Tempo, 19 November 1988).

Indeed, Hughes-Freeland (2007, p. 188) noted that at the time of the succession, ‘Mangkubumi was criticised for his Jakarta-based playboy lifestyle, his intellectual limitations, and, most importantly, his ignorance of Javanese culture and language. There was no sign of charismatic presence, nor any apparent foundation on which to construct one.’ However, there was no doubt Mangkubumi had a pragmatic sense for business and the usefulness of political connections and positions. After his marriage to Tati Drajat Supriastuti (who later became Queen GKR Hemas), he controlled the Sultanate’s primary businesses (including PT Madukismo) and became the chairman of the local Golkar branch and a member of Yogyakarta’s Parliament (Syamsi, 2012).

**Picture 2 Sultan Hamengku Buwono X**

Source: Library and Archival Office, Yogyakarta Province Government.

While Mangkubumi seemed certain to follow his later father, there was some contestation regarding the Sultan’s will. Hadikusumo stated that Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX gave him his will on 5 September 1988, a month before his death. During these weeks, however, the Sultan not only asked Hadikusumo, but most of his eldest sons (from all four wives) to
discuss something important. The key witness was Sultan’s fifth wife, Norma, but she refused to talk about these secret meetings. Rejection of the notion of a last will, as claimed by Hadikusumo, came from Mangkubumi’s side. There was no precedent of a sultan including the issue of succession in his will, and it needed to be clear whether it was written or oral. However, no will was ever found, despite a thorough search.

This lack of a clear-cut succession scenario opened opportunities for Suharto to intervene and gain some political capital from the succession. In mid-October 1988, five representatives of the Sultanate met with Suharto that finalised the succession. They were Prince Puger (the late Sultan’s brother), Mangkubumi, Prabukusumo, Pakuningrat, and Princess Anom (the oldest descendent and an older sister of Hadikusumo). The group represented descendants from the four wives as well as Prince Puger as an elder. Interestingly, it was Princess Anom who represented the Sultan’s first wife, and not Hadikusumo. In January 1989, Mangkubumi was chosen as sultan after a series of internal family meetings. Thus, the decision to select Mangkubumi was a combination of his role as the oldest male descendant, his control of resources, and the support by Prince Puruboyo and Prince Puger. This agreement could only be finalised, however, after being endorsed by President Suharto, who had achieved most, but not all of his goals: he had separated the position of sultan from that of governor; installed a young and much less charismatic sultan; and put Yogyakarta on the path of becoming a ‘normally’ governed province. The new sultan, on the other hand, succeeded in retaining Yogyakarta’s Special Region status.

Though lacking the executive authority of a governor, Sultan Hamengku Buwono X was determined to defend – as his father before him – the Sultanate’s land holdings. As under his father, the use of Governor’s Permits (or the refusal to issue them) was the main mechanism in this regard. As previously stated, the release of the Sultanate’s land needed the authorisation of the Panitikismo, the land office of the Sultanate – which was led by the Sultan’s full brother Hadiwinoto. Because Paku Alam VIII, the new governor, was of inferior status to the Kasultanan, the Sultanate’s land access was under the Sultan’s authority. From 1989 to 1998, the percentage of land release permits out of the total permits decreased from 88.5% (1978–1988) to 70.5% (1989–1998), representing 476 land release permits out of 675 total permits issued. Under the new sultan, the reduction in land releases for educational purposes – which

\[49\] (Tempo, 22 October 1988, p. 24); Kompas, 10 January 1989. John Monfries stated that the role of Prince Prubaya as a family elder was very important in family meetings (interview, 3 May 2017 in Canberra). Another sibling, Prince Prabukusumo, claimed he took a role in leading family succession meetings (interview, Prince Prabukusumo, 24 December 2014 in Yogyakarta).
had spiked in 1986 but then dramatically declined – was also continued (see Table 4.6). In other words, the specific regulations complicating the full implementation of BAL in Yogyakarta remained in place under Hamengku Buwono X.

As discussed previously, the government – now under Paku Alam VIII – completed an identification exercise of aristocratic land by 1993. As explained too, this identification was not followed up by transferring the land to the state – as the BAL normally would have mandated. This was further proof that the death of Hamengku Buwono IX, and the loss of the governorship for the Sultan’s family, did not substantially reduce the royal house’s ability to secure its access to land – the weakened ownership status notwithstanding. The 1993 data showed that SG/PAG land represented 1.38% of Yogyakarta ‘s total area. SG represented 1.15% of Yogyakarta ‘s land area, while PAG made up 0.23% of the province’s total area. Table 4.9 below expands on the previous Table 4.5, which had shown usage status of the combined SG/PAG land holdings.

**Table 4.9 Estimated SG/PAG in 1993**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District/City</th>
<th>Total Area (in km²)</th>
<th>SG in m²</th>
<th>SG per Total Area (%)</th>
<th>Total SG (m²)</th>
<th>PAG in m²</th>
<th>PAG per Total Area (%)</th>
<th>Total PAG (m²)</th>
<th>SG/PAG per Total Area (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta City</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>800,495.63</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>26,556.14</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantul</td>
<td>506.85</td>
<td>16,697,531.00</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>45.43</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleman</td>
<td>574.82</td>
<td>3,061,610.00</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>8.33</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunung Kidul</td>
<td>1,485.36</td>
<td>5,814,976.50</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>56.04</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kulon Progo</td>
<td>586.27</td>
<td>10,376,018.00</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>28.23</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>99.64</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,185.80</strong></td>
<td><strong>36,750,631.13</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.15</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,358,277.94</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.23</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.38</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The 1993 survey also gave better insights into the types of SG/PAG lands. In principle, there were two major kinds: palace land (keprabon) and non-palace land (bukan keprabon). Palace land supported the Sultanate’s fundamental cultural and religious functions, including the royal palace, markets, mosques, cemeteries, squares, gardens/parks, meditation sites, and other sacred and historical sites. A significant amount of palace land was concentrated inside

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the palace wall. Non-palace land supported the economy and politics of the Sultanate, the villages, and the people. It consisted of areas outside the palace compound and mostly outside of Yogyakarta City, including village lands that had been transformed into business areas, government buildings, and social/community facilities and communal property. The 1993 survey recorded village land that had been released for social, government, and community facilities, but excluded the village land that was directly managed by village officials. Had the latter been included in the calculation, the percentage of SG/PAG lands would have been larger. The proportion of village land varied, but records of Tirtomulyo Village in Bantul showed that, out of 260 hectares of rice fields in the village in 1994, 20 hectares (or 7.7%) were managed by the village government (Hudayana, 1996, p. 31).

Unsurprisingly, this first identification of SG/PAG land in 1993 experienced many technical difficulties. One major problem was the method of calculating SG/PAG land based on village maps and village data as the primary sources of identification. Not all villages had kept their data intact, making registration difficult. Second, due to their limited budgets and personnel, much of the identification process was done using desk study rather than field research. This limitation also forced the government to issue the identification even though the process had not been finished by the deadline. Third, limited equipment hindered the accuracy of the field assessment. These problems persisted during the next attempts at identification in 2002, 2004, 2010, and 2014, as will be discussed in Chapter Five.\footnote{Interview, BPN Yogyakarta staff, 24 March 2015 in Yogyakarta and Yogyakarta Province Government’s staff, 14 January 2014 in Yogyakarta.} But as we have seen previously, land registration problems were actually not detrimental to the Sultanate’s interests – they allowed the royal house to extend the status quo despite the BAL pushing for more land transfers and redistribution. While delays in land registration was an obstacle to investors, it was not necessarily to the Sultan’s family; it controlled the release of land through its relevant institutions, and as the long list of royal investments showed, it enjoyed its dominant position in the Yogyakarta economy.

### 4.5 Co-optation, Culture and Economic Survival in the Yogyakarta Sultanate

As we have seen above, Suharto tried to deal with the Yogyakarta Sultanate through a mixture of pressure, co-optation and compromise. He integrated members of the royal house into Golkar and the New Order business complex, separated the Sultanate from the governorship and held...
up the Special Region status as leverage to keep the aristocratic leaders in check. For much of the New Order period, this approach worked. The Yogyakarta royal family was allowed to engage in business and effectively hold on to its land possessions, despite the implementation of the BAL in Yogyakarta. In return, the royal family refrained from open challenges to Suharto’s rule – although its cultural power over the Javanese heartland was significant.

For all of his successes in taming the Yogyakarta aristocracy, however, Suharto always understood that he could never fully control it. The 1978 refusal of Hamengku Buwono IX to serve a second term as vice-president, and the lukewarm endorsement of the New Order by his successor in 1989 were strong reminders of this failure. Thus, Suharto’s attempts to draw legitimacy from Javanese aristocracies was much more centred on Surakarta than in Yogyakarta. According to (Kristof, in New York Times 17 May 1998), Suharto was the son of a Javanese peasant, but viewed himself as a Javanese king and therefore used aristocratic symbols to co-opt Javanese legitimacy. Especially after Hamengku Buwono IX left government in 1978, Suharto turned to the Surakartan aristocracy through his wife, Raden Ayu Siti Hartinah (Tien Suharto, 1923–1996), a fourth-generation descendant of Mangkunegoro III. As an instrument of co-optation, he bought the ruins of an aristocrat’s 9,000 m² building in Solo and developed it into his royal house, called the Kalitan House (*Ndalem Kalitan*) (Kompas, 28 January 2008). In the late 1970s, Suharto also built the Astana Giribangun family mausoleum on Mangadeg Hill, opposite the royal cemetery hill of Mangkunegaran (Kompas, 22 November 1977).

Suharto’s co-optation of the Surakartan aristocracy was further strengthened after a fire turned the 200-year-old palace of the Surakarta Sunnanate into ash on 31 January 1985. To start the two-year rebuilding process, Suharto gave half of his presidential salary to the palace for five months. He also set up a renovation committee led by the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security Suyono, Military Commander L.B. Moerdani, and Minister of Forestry Soedjarwo. Suharto’s support for the rebuilding of the Surakarta palace met two objectives at once: first, it tied the royal house further to him; and second, it helped framing his new approach to aristocracies in general: namely, that they were cultural, rather than political actors. To this end, Suyono explained the rebuilding of the palace as ‘preserving the centre of cultural development’ (Tempo, 16 February 1985, p. 13). The ailing Sunan Paku Buwono XII responded as expected from him, saying, ‘I am really grateful to President Suharto, and those who are concerned about the future of the Surakarta Palace’ (Tempo, 16 February 1985, p. 13). Thus,
Suharto’s ‘Surakarta Episode’ consolidated his relations with Surakarta, counterbalancing his difficult ties with Yogyakarta.

Suharto followed up on his support for Surakarta’s aristocracy by granting it privileges while clearly limiting it to the cultural realm at the same time. In 1988 and 1991, Suharto acknowledged Kasunanan Surakarta’s partial land access through Presidential Decrees No. 23/1988 and No. 7/1991. Decree 23/1988 recognised Kasunanan Surakarta as a national historical heritage, and it acknowledged its palace land as including its royal mosque and both its north and south squares (Article 1). Therefore, the Kasunanan was entitled to around ninety-seven hectares of palace compound land, or Baluwarti.\(^{52}\) Further, the Sunan could use the palace compound for traditional cultural ceremonies. Finally, to promote the Kasunanan palace as a tourist attraction, independent government bodies would be established, and the Kasunanan was granted permission to sell tickets to tourists, with the money being used for the palace maintenance budget. Through the decrees, Suharto partially returned some extent of access to the palace land to the aristocracy. On the other hand, the policy also cemented Surakarta’s nobility as mere local cultural players without political power, whose main function it was to serve the ‘cultural’ segment of the regime’s broader developmental agenda.

Kasunanan Surakarta received access to palace land, but could not turn it into property. As discussed, the BAL stipulated that aristocratic houses were not the subjects of any land rights. As the Surakarta royal family was nevertheless in charge of the palace grounds, a complex legal issue emerged. In her thesis on this topic, Princess GRAy Koes Isbandiyah, a daughter of the late Sunan Paku Buwono XII, argued that these legal complexities hindered Kasunanan’s regulation and control of people’s use of lands inside the Baluwarti, as ruled by the 1988 decree (GRAy Koes Isbandiyah, 2008). On the other hand, the Surakarta municipality could not conduct projects inside the Baluwarti complex. As a result, many houses in the complex fell into disrepair, with neither the royal family nor the city government believing that they had the authority to address the matter. Hence, while Suharto’s decrees had handed some land control to the Surakarta house, it was much less firm than that enjoyed by its Yogyakarta counterpart. In the same vein, although the new focus on cultural significance and tourism income helped Surakarta’s aristocracy to revive its fortunes after decades in obscurity, the extent of that revival was limited.

\(^{52}\) Interview, GKR Koes Moertiyah, a daughter of Sunan Paku Buwono XII and the head of the Kasunanan’s State Secretary (Sasana Wilopo), 9 January 2015 in Surakarta Palace. She claimed that total area of Baluwarti is ninety-seven hectares while the official area of Kelurahan Baluwarti is 40.7 hectares.
However, Suharto’s cultural approach to Surakarta also had repercussions for Yogyakarta. Hamengku Buwono X too began to frame his role as that of a defender of cultural heritage. In his 1989 coronation speech, the new sultan stated that (Marwito, 1995, pp. 63-65), ‘The position of a sultan within the Republic of Indonesia is a reality, which is based on the determination of people to conserve the nation’s cultural values, which implicitly and explicitly manifests in the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.’ He further expressed his hope that his mission as the sultan ‘to create the Kraton as a centre for developing harmonic culture, with the support of many parties, hopefully, will be achieved.’ Evidently, the new sultan had adopted much of the New Order’s language on defining aristocracy in largely cultural terms, with Surakarta leading the way.

The new rhetoric on the cultural role of the aristocracy was not only a forced concession to Suharto, however. It also had significant economic implications. In the 1980s and 1990s, Yogyakarta became a major cultural tourism site for both domestic and international tourists, supported by the national government (Wood, 2005, pp. 65-66). Both the Yogyakarta and Surakarta houses began organising annual cultural festivals and cultural ceremonies. Each year, both sultanates held three Garebeg Festivals, a Silent Reflection during the Javanese New Year, and gave offerings to the south sea and to Mount Merapi and Mount Lawu. Dahles (2001, p. 65) argued that the 1990s were the era of ‘Pancasila Tourism’, and that Yogyakarta played a key role in this concept as the symbol of Javanese tradition that served Suharto’s ideology. She cited the government-issued travel guide Discover Indonesia, which described Yogyakarta as the ‘cradle of Javanese culture’ (Dahles, 2001, p. 65). For Suharto, then, placing Javanese culture – seen as hierarchical and authority-focused – at the centre of Indonesia’s politico-cultural image was beneficial in many ways, but it also delivered economic advantages to Yogyakarta itself.

Tourism, therefore, became an important additional income source for the Sultanate. The Sultanate controlled four essential tourist sites inside the palace. The military office (Tepas Keprajuritan) managed tourism at the Pagelaran, the front part of the Kraton, and the central part of Kraton. The Water Castle (Taman Sari) was operated by the Sultanate’s office of tourism (Tepas Pariwisata), while the royal carriage museum was controlled by the Sultanate’s museum.

53 ‘Kedudukan seorang sultan di lingkungan Republic Indonesia adalah realita, yang didasarkan atas tekad rakyat melestarikan nilai-nilai Budaya Bangsa, yang telah tersurat dan tersirat dalam Pancasila dan UUD 1945.’
54 ‘Cita-cita menjadikan Kraton sebagai pusat kegiatan pengembangan kebudayaan dalam harmoni tradisi adiluhung, dengan dukungan semua pihak, mudah-mudahan dapat tercapai.’
office (*Tepas Museum*). Every year, the *Tepas Keprajuritan* was responsible for the *Garebeg Festival*, while the *Tepas Museum* was responsible for royal carriage cleaning ceremony. From 1989 to 1995, the number of foreign tourists visiting the Kraton increased by 76%, from 120,126 to 211,590. Similarly, the number of domestic tourists significantly increased, from 280,887 tourists in 1989 to 347,992 in 1995 (Dahles, 2001, p. 237). These tourists channelled large amounts of funds into the Sultanate’s offers, and while much of it was spent on the maintenance of the Kraton, it essentially helped to preserve one of the royal family’s most valuable assets – the palace itself.

The New Order’s tourism policy has continued to give the Sultanate revenue until now. In 2015, 1.2 million tourists visited Pagelaran, 601,000 visited the Kraton, 400,000 visited Taman Sari, and 22,000 visited the Royal Cart Museum. Pakualaman Museum, however, only attracted 2,800 visitors in 2015 (Yogyakarta Province Tourism Office, 2016). In addition, a survey of tourists conducted in 2016 showed that the Kraton was the major cultural tourism destination in Yogyakarta, attracting students in the form of study tours. According to the study, 67.5% of domestic visitors came from outside Yogyakarta, and 34% had visited the Kraton more than twice, pointing to the ‘intense curiosity about the distinct artistic and cultural experience offered by the Sultan’s Palace’ (Wijayanti & Damanik, 2018, p. 7). Thus, while designed by Suharto as a strategy of domesticating the Javanese aristocracy, the framing of the royal houses as cultural – rather than political – icons had an unexpected but important economic side effect.

Suharto did not seem to mind. Indeed, in order to further support the advancement of ‘royal’ Javanese tourism, Suharto appointed a member of the Javanese nobility, Prince GBPH Poeger, as Director of Culture at the Ministry of Education and Culture, serving from 1988 to 1993. During his time in office, Prince Poeger not only placed the Javanese royal houses in the centre of the government’s cultural promotion strategy, he also published anthropological research on the cultural aspects of the aristocracies in Indonesia. Towards the end of Suharto’s rule, Hamengku Buwono X himself seemed to have internalised this new emphasis on cultural identity and expression rather than political power. During the ceremony commemorating eight years of his rule as sultan in 1996, a reporter asked about the Sultanate’s succession, because he had no son. In response, the Sultan said,55

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About the crown prince, for me, there is no problem. My wife is still able to give birth. Thank God if, in the future, God gives me a son. But not only that, I have a lot of brothers. Who knows if, in the future, the people can accept a woman [as sultan] because of [cultural] changes? We will leave it to history. History will decide. What matters is that the format is no longer about power, but the cultural format (Margantoro et al., 1999, p. 37).

Of course, this apparent political ‘abstention’ by the Sultan did not last long. Only two years later, Suharto would fall, unleashing not only democratisation after decades of authoritarianism; Suharto’s resignation also triggered new political ambitions in Indonesia’s aristocratic houses, and as the country’s most significant, the Yogyakarta royal family was no exception. Indeed, after what it perceived as a period of limitations and humiliations suffered under the New Order, the Yogyakarta Sultanate embarked on a major – and ultimately successful – project of political restoration.

4.6 Conclusion

The period between 1960 and 1998 was full of difficult challenges for the royal house of Yogyakarta. It first faced Sukarno’s left-leaning Guided Democracy regime, which issued the BAL and thus disempowered most aristocracies across the archipelago by taking over their remaining lands. This was followed, in 1966, by the coming to power of the right-wing, military-dominated New Order regime, which – although it initially integrated Hamengku Buwono IX into its government – tolerated no other sources of political power than Suharto’s personal claim on full control. Complicating the situation, these challenges occurred at a time in which the Yogyakarta’s Sultanate’s contribution to the independence struggle of the Republic began to weaken as an instrument of political leverage.

Consequently, the Sultanate experienced a weakening of its political standing during this period. This had primarily to do with its loosening control over land in Yogyakarta, but it went beyond this. While the Sultanate was initially able to soften the impact of the BAL in Yogyakarta by citing the land autonomy it had legislated in 1954, the politico-economic pressures of the 1970s and 1980s led to the full implementation of the BAL in Yogyakarta in 1984. As we have seen, this was something Hamengku Buwono IX had fought his whole life to prevent, so consenting to it was not an easy move for him. Endorsing the BAL meant, in theory, that the aristocratic houses of Yogyakarta could lose their claim of land control to the

*serahkan pada sejarah. Sejarahlah yang menentukan. Karena dalam hal ini formatnya bukan lagi kekuasaan, melainkan pada format budaya.*
state. We have also seen, however, that the Sultanate continued to control access to its land by presiding over the cumbersome process through which royal land could be released to the state or other actors. By remaining in charge of this land release mechanism, the Sultanate effectively could decide when to release land and when not to. Hence, while land was no longer the Sultanate’s nominal property (at least according to the BAL), the royal family still dictated the terms of accessing it.

But the New Order’s pressure on the Sultanate also affected areas outside of the land control issue. Having weakened the Sultanate’s standing through the implementation of the BAL in 1984, Suharto followed up on this in 1988 by separating the position of Yogyakarta Sultan from the governorship. While Hamengku Buwono X publicly claimed that he did not object to this separation, it undermined the pride, reputation and power of his family. As demonstrated above, separating the sultanship from the governorship was the price the royal family had to pay for the continued acknowledgment of Yogyakarta’s Special Region status, and for the regime’s acquiescence towards the Sultanate’s ongoing de facto control of land management. There were also other humiliations: the regime’s interference into the affairs of the local Golkar chapter, then led by Mangkubumi, was only one of the constant reminders by Suharto of who was really in charge.

It would be misleading, however, to describe the Yogyakarta Sultanate as a victim of the New Order regime. In some of his statements, Hamengku Buwono X has attempted to portray the relationship between his house and the regime in this way – his recollection of him refusing to swear allegiance to Suharto is part of this self-styled narrative of victimisation. It is true, as pointed out above, that the royal house lost some of its privileges; but it still did very well under the New Order, developing a vast web of political and economic connections that not only made the Sultan one of the richest persons in Indonesia at that time, but also provided a basis from which to launch a campaign for even greater influence after 1998. This was particularly significant as most other aristocracies in Indonesia eroded further or entirely disappeared under Sukarno’s, and subsequently Suharto’s rule.

The following chapter, accordingly, illustrates how the Yogyakarta Sultanate used its resources preserved under authoritarianism to not only defend its assets against the social reform pressures triggered by the post-1998 democratisation process. Far from being in the defensive, the Sultanate launched a massive campaign to regain the governorship; restore its previous direct property control over land; and institutionalise Yogyakarta’s Special Region status for generations to come.

5.1 Introduction

Since its inception in the 18th century, the Yogyakarta Sultanate had based its political power on either direct ownership of, or access to, land resources, as theorised by Ribot and Peluso (2003). The previous chapters have elaborated how the Sultanate acquired land property during the colonial period, and how it defended its access to land from decolonisation to the Suharto period – despite a gradual weakening in its formal land control. In its defence of land access, the Sultanate relied heavily on the status as a Special Region that it had claimed during the revolution and which was formalised in 1950. This special status of the Yogyakarta Province allowed the Sultanate to legislate land autonomy in 1954 and obstruct the implementation of the BAL until 1984. Even after the formal execution of the BAL in Yogyakarta in 1984, the Sultanate used the special status to circumvent the substance of the land reform regulations, thus successfully holding on to many of its land possessions. This awareness of the importance of the special status also led Hamengku Buwono X to ‘trade’ the governorship after his father’s passing for the continuation of that very status. Under pressure from the Suharto regime, this deal in the years of 1988 and 1989 protected the special status of Yogyakarta, while Hamengku Buwono agreed to not immediately seek the governorship.

Nevertheless, it was no secret that Hamengku Buwono X felt that under a fully executed Special Region status, the governorship should be in the hands of the Yogyakarta Sultanate. He also did not hold back with his opinion that the Sultanate still ‘owned’ most of the land in the territory – the BAL and subsequent regulations notwithstanding. In his 1988 interview, cited above, he had made it very clear that there was no ‘state’ land in Yogyakarta, only the Sultan’s land – a blatant act of ignoring the spirit and letter of the BAL. Thus, by the end of the 1990s, as Suharto’s regime entered its political twilight and Hamengku Buwono X had spent a decade as sultan but not governor of Yogyakarta, it was apparent to everyone that if the opportunity arose, he would push for an expansion of the Special Region status and, in particular, a revision of the ambiguous land status regulations.

This opportunity presented itself in 1998 with the resignation of Suharto. Suddenly, the autocratic pressures on the Sultanate were lifted. To be sure, there were new pressures, this time from students and other new social forces demanding full democratisation and reform of old socio-political structures. But the Sultanate had collected some experience in dealing with such
democratic actors in the 1940s and 1950s, and had emerged from this challenge with some bruises yet with most of its possessions and influence intact. Indeed, the blueprint of Hamengku Buwono IX’s dealings with the Republic in the 1940s and 1950s served as a good guide for his son in his interactions with Indonesia’s new democratic rulers: Hamengku Buwono IX had assumed the executive leadership of the province amidst radical political change; had shown great support for the Republic and claimed significant rewards for that support; had built strong networks with national elites in Jakarta; and he had pushed through Special Region regulations in order to cement the position of the Sultanate. His son, as it turned out, would drive a similar approach to the post-1998 reformers, with similar success.

This chapter discusses Hamengku Buwono X’s campaign to regain the governorship for the Sultanate, and to make that arrangement permanent through a new Special Region law. At the same time, he sought to revive the direct ownership of vast land resources that the Sultanate had last enjoyed in the colonial period. In essence, the Sultan wanted to legislate his view that there was no state land, and only sultanate land in Yogyakarta. That he was successful in that effort was due to two main factors: first, the loyalty of many royal supporters, including those who benefited from the Sultanate’s traditional land in the villages and elsewhere; and second, the Sultan’s vast network of national political connections – despite his failure to obtain high national office for himself. Especially in comparison with other Indonesian aristocracies that also tried to revive their fortunes after 1998, the ability to rely on a foundation of land resources – and a large group of people who depended on them – made a decisive difference for the Yogyakarta Sultanate.

The chapters starts with a description of the role of Sultan Hamengku Buwono X in the 1998 reform process and its aftermath, drawing comparisons to his father’s role in the 1940s. Hamengku Buwono X’s pro-reform stance made it easier for the Sultan to reclaim the governorship for his family in 1998 – something Suharto had been trying hard to prevent. I will then explore the formation of the new specialness law, in which the position of governor, and the way it was supposed to be filled, were subject to heated debates. While the Central Government wanted the governor to be elected, the Sultan and his supporters insisted on automatic appointment. I will subsequently demonstrate that the success of the new specialness law was a combination of local support from those who depended on the Sultanate’s land and the Sultan’s political networks at the national level. Finally, I show how the Sultan continued, in this pre-2012 period, to defend the royal houses’ land possessions, which were eventually transferred into direct property in 2012.
5.2 Suharto’s Fall and Gaining the Governorship

The Reformasi (lit. ‘reform’) movement that pushed for the fall of the autocratic New Order regime in 1997 and 1998 gave the Sultanate the political opportunity to return to improve its political, social and economic standing. It offered the chance to leave the cultural paradigm Suharto had imposed on the Javanese aristocracies, and to engage openly in politics once more. While Sultan Hamengku Buwono X did not participate in the early Reformasi movement, he became one of the leading Reformasi figures shortly before and after Suharto’s resignation. He quickly gained the governorship of Yogyakarta, drawing from his new reformist reputation and the land-based support of village clients. However, the new decentralisation laws, passed in 1999, limited his governorship to two terms (1998–2008). This section discusses how the Sultan managed to entrench himself in the governorship beyond these two terms, consolidating his power and that of the Sultanate in the process.

The Indonesian economy began to implode in 1997 (Sadli, 1999, p. 16). The crisis had begun in mid-1997 with the Thai government’s decision to stop pegging the baht to the US Dollar, which sent that currency into a freefall. Other Southeast Asian currencies were soon affected as well (Pepinsky, 2009). The Indonesian rupiah fell the most, from IDR 3,500 per US$ in October 1997 to IDR 10,000 per US$ March 1998. Inflation skyrocketed from 11% in 1997 to 77.6% in 1998, creating a severe economic crisis that led to riots in Jakarta. GDP shrank by 13% (Pepinsky, 2009, p. 1) – a massive decline by international and historical standards. As a result, student protests began to form, the elite started to abandon Suharto, and the military ultimately told Suharto it was unable (and unwilling) to defend him against the rising unrest (Mietzner, 2009). At the end, Suharto had no other option but to declare his resignation on 21 May 1998.

In the late New Order period (around 1995 and 1996), Yogyakarta had become a centre of student reform activism, but Hamengku Buwono X was not seen as being particularly supportive of it. Even as the protests swelled in 1997 and 1998, the Sultan was reluctant to join them. This was despite the fact that Amien Rais, the chair of the Yogyakarta-based Muslim organisation Muhammadiyah and an academic lecturing in the city, was able to rally many Yogyakarta students against Suharto. Even one week before Suharto’s resignation, on 13 May 1998, the Sultan was still weighing his options, saying he would reduce his already minimal public commentary and instead focus on ‘spiritual means.’ He said, ‘During this critical situation, I cannot comment too much. Because what I say will have an impact on the public. So, I must reduce myself. But I will act (spiritually) more’ (Kompas, 14 May 1998). It was only
when Suharto’s departure had become inevitable that the Sultan positioned himself clearly in favour of the student movement. When the movement reached its peak, on 20 May 1998, students decided to hold a large rally in Yogyakarta, which was concentrated in the Sultanate’s North Square. The Sultan seized the momentum by giving a speech together with the acting Yogyakarta Governor Paku Alam VIII. They issued a joint proclamation, or Maklumat, similar to that released on 5 September 1945, and asked Suharto to resign (Kompas, 22 May 1998).

From this basis, Hamengku Buwono X was able to style himself as a leader of democratic reform. He became a member of an informal quadrumvirate overseeing the reform process, which also included Amien Rais as well as Megawati Sukarnoputri (Sukarno’s daughter and leader of a small nationalist party under the New Order regime) and Abdurrahman Wahid, the leader of the country’s largest Muslim organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Parallel to this national engagement, the Sultan – quietly but effectively – campaigned to become governor of Yogyakarta. It only took three months for the Sultan to gain the governorship, from May to late August; he was formally inaugurated on 3 October 1998. Kompas recorded the Sultan’s initial comment on governorship as coming on 8 August (Kompas, 10 August 1998), and his candidacy as being proposed by Yogyakarta Parliament on 20 August (Kompas, 21 August 1998). The Central Government approved his sole candidacy on 24 September.

The following factors led to the governorship selection being so speedy.

First, the Central Government was concerned with maintaining regional stability. There was the potential for massive regional discontent in many parts of Indonesia, with some even fearing the break-up of the nation (Aspinall & Berger, 2001; Booth, 1999). Therefore, ensuring the stability of Yogyakarta – a province with traditional influence and now a sultan seen as a voice for democratic protest – was among the key priorities of the Central Government. Granting the concession of the governorship to the Sultan – and to the many loyalists demanding this transfer of executive authority – was therefore a way for Jakarta to neutralise a potential source of unrest on Java. This was particularly important as communal conflicts in other parts of the country were already building up (van Klinken, 2007a, p. 4; Wilson, 2008).

Second, local factors in Yogyakarta also led to the rapid decision to inaugurate the Sultan as the governor of Yogyakarta. To begin with, the position of governor had been vacant since 1988. Paku Alam VIII, the acting governor, gave his full support for the Sultan becoming

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56 Interview, Sultan Hamengku Buwono X, 3 March 2015 in Yogyakarta.
governor. The ailing Paku Alam VIII, already eighty-eight years old, had held de facto governorship since 1949, but had never felt that the governorship was his right. Paku Alam VIII realised Pakualaman’s inferior position compared to Kasultanan. In 1992, three years after he began serving as acting governor of Yogyakarta, he rejected the Central Government’s plan to nominate him as a governor, saying ‘I am a deputy governor. The Central Government should choose a governor for Yogyakarta’ (Kompas, 14 September 1998).58 Moreover, at a cultural seminar in 1992, he said,

We realise how small we [Pakualaman] are [compared to Kasultanan]. Our area is small. We are not in the position to be compared to Kasultanan, because Pakualaman is much smaller than Kasultanan (Kompas, 14 September 1998).59

By August 1998, Paku Alam VIII was on his death bed, and it was evident that the succession would have to occur soon one way or the other. Either his death would trigger the formal succession procedure, or a successor would be determined before his demise. As it turned out, Paku Alam VIII died in the middle of the process. He passed away on 11 September 1998, when the negotiations over Hamengku Buwono X’s ascension to the governorship were ongoing.

Furthermore, the Sultan could rely on the Yogyakarta Parliament to push the Central Government to accept his sole candidacy. The legislature, which included many loyalists of the Sultan, helped him to navigate the legal quagmire of his nomination to the governorship. Three local government laws were relevant and cited in this regard: Law No. 22/1948, which was no longer in practice but ruled that the governor and deputy governor of Yogyakarta were the descendants of the Sultan of Yogyakarta and Paku Alam of Pakualaman, respectively; the law on the formation of Province of the Special Region of Yogyakarta No. 3/1950, which neither elaborated on specialness nor the governorship; and Law No. 5/1974 on Local Government, Article 16 of which stipulated that the governor selection began with the provincial parliament and was finalised by the Central Government. According to this law, the provincial parliament would nominate two candidates to be submitted to the Minister of Interior Affairs, chosen from three to five candidates proposed by the parliamentary factions. In 1998, these factions were the joint military and police caucus, Golkar, PDI, and PPP (as the first post-Suharto elections

would only take place in June 1999). The Central Government would then choose one of the two candidates.

In this legal jungle, the Sultan insisted that the determination of the governorship of Yogyakarta should follow Law No. 22/1948, Article 18, which stated that leaders in the Daerah Istimewa at the provincial, district, and village level would be chosen from the descendants of the autonomous leaders that ruled before independence. The Sultan said, ‘I had never been asked to discuss the matter (governorship) with the Central Government, and suddenly arose the issue of Law No. 5/1974 for Yogyakarta, that is special.’ He further said, ‘I have no intention to become governor for life, but the status of Special Region cannot be eliminated’ (Kompas, 12 August 1998) – a clear expression his belief that the Special Region status of Yogyakarta and the unified position of sultan and governor were inseparably linked. Significantly, this statement contradicted his speech in 1988, when he had conceded that the governorship was tied to his father, not to the Sultanate institutionally. Legally, however, the Sultan’s opinion was weak. Law No. 5/1974 had made it clear that only the ‘current’ governor and deputy governor (that is, Hamengku Buwono IX and Paku Alam VIII) were exempt from the normal appointment regulations. Consequently, the Minister of Interior Affairs stated that the gubernatorial succession in Yogyakarta must follow Law No. 5/1974, rejecting the usage of Law No. 22/1948 and Law No. 3/1950 for this case.

In this situation, the Yogyakarta legislature played the key role in effectively circumventing Law No. 5/1974. While the 1974 law was formally used, the parliament made Hamengku Buwono X the sole candidate submitted to Jakarta. The Sultan refused to be selected from several candidates, which might harm his cultural and political legitimacy. In the Yogyakarta Parliament, three factions (Golkar, Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia –PDI) and the joint military and police caucus) nominated the Sultan. However, the Islamic party, United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan –PPP) chose the PPP politician and university lecturer Alfian Darmawan. After several delays in the Yogyakarta Parliament and a series of demonstrations, on 21 August 1998 the Yogyakarta Parliament nominated Sultan Hamengku Buwono X as the sole gubernatorial candidate for Yogyakarta to the Minister of Interior Affairs (Kedaulatan Rakyat, 2 September 1998). The three other factions easily outnumbered PPP during voting; in a ballot among the leadership figures in the Yogyakarta Parliament, Alfian received four votes while the Sultan had ten (Gatra, 24 August 1998, p. 42). In exchange for the concession of being sole candidate, the Sultan agreed not to be inaugurated by the President, as would be the case with most other
governors. He was inaugurated by Minister of Interior Affairs Syarwan Hamid on 3 October 1998 – three weeks after Paku Alam VIII’s death – in a short session in Yogyakarta (Kompas, 1 October 1998).60

The success of this complicated legal campaign was only possible, however, through considerable public pressure. In this public pressure, actors tied to the Sultan’s interests played a crucial role. In early September, for instance, the village leaders (Pamong Desa) – the village head, village officials, and kepala dukuh – in Kulon Progo threatened to resign if the Central Government refused to inaugurate the Sultan as the governor of Yogyakarta (Kedaulatan Rakyat, 4 September 1998). As explained previously, Pamong Desa had directly benefited from the Sultan’s land, and agricultural products had been their main income as village officials since 1918. Village leaders wanted the Sultan to become governor for several reasons. First, the continued nominal ownership of village land by the Sultan favoured them. Formally, village leaders were users of the Sultanate’s land, but they did not pay rent for it. Instead, they managed it to support their income. The full implementation of the BAL in Yogyakarta would have made these village lands vulnerable to demands for take-over by the state as well. The Sultan, as expressed in his 1988 statement, was of the view that there is no state land in Yogyakarta – only the Sultan’s land. Village leaders, therefore, could be confident that he would protect this status quo as governor.

Second, the Pamong Desa hoped that the Sultan would re-strengthen the role of the Yogyakarta villages in the overall administration. The kepala dukuh in particular had been frustrated that many of their traditional roles had been lost over time as the state modernised its bureaucratic apparatus. For instance, the dukuh were no longer part of the administration, and their role was reduced to ‘creating harmony’ within the community. If the Sultan were to become governor again on the basis of claims of local tradition – rather than modern political and administrative processes – the villages expected that their own claim on such traditions could be strengthened at the same time. Thus, their support for the Sultan was partly born out of cultural allegiance to the royal leader, but it also had significant implications for their own material, political and administrative interests.

Village leaders also had a hand in mobilising other social groups for the Sultan. Unlike the protests against Suharto, the demonstrations for the Sultan were not driven by middle class students, but by supporters with low levels of education and income. The message of the action

was that the ordinary people (kawula) wholeheartedly supported the Sultan. On 10 August 1998, for example, 200 becak (pedicab) drivers, representing the poorest of the poor, stormed the busy Malioboro Street and demanded that the Sultan be made the sole candidate for governor. Similarly, on 26 August, a group of people calling themselves the Yogyakarta’s People’s Assembly (Dewan Rakyat Yogyakarta) rejected the implementation of Law No. 5/1974 and unilaterally inaugurated the Sultan as governor within the Yogyakarta Parliamentary complex. Extraordinarily, the Sultan attended, showing the extent of organisation behind the protests. In his ‘inauguration’ speech, the Sultan in effect issued an ultimatum to the legislature to endorse his ‘appointment’ quickly:

I hope that the leaders who declare themselves members of the Yogyakarta Parliament, representatives of the people, really listen to the aspirations of the people. Do not claim [to be] on the people’s side, but in fact oppose the aspirations of the people (Ismoyo & Sumitro, 1998, p. 87).

The Sultan, then, was able to frame his quest for the restoration of aristocratic power as a part of the democratisation process (in which he saw himself as both a local and national leader). While prominent authors of democratisation put their main emphasis on the need for the institutionalisation of democratic procedures such as elections (Diamond, 1994; Huntington, 1984), the Sultan interpreted his rise to power without a direct election as meeting the democratic demands of the people. To be sure, other governors in this early period of the post-Suharto transition came to power in the same way. The governors of West, Central and East Java (all retired military officers) were installed in August 1998 through the same mechanism as the one practiced in Yogyakarta – the old Suharto era parliaments voted, and the winner was automatically selected as governor. In other words, the Central Government in effect surrendered its right (granted by Law No. 5/1974) to pick from two candidates submitted by the local parliaments. In this sense, the Sultan’s ascension to power was a product of a democratic transition in which old rules became fluid and new ones had not yet been put in place.

The beneficiaries of this early democratisation period, therefore, were political figures who had amassed political capital in previous decades and cashed it in at the time of the transition. In Yogyakarta, this was the Sultan – in other key provinces, it was military officers. The Sultan, using his vast resources of land, wealth and traditional power, was able to grab the

61 ‘Maka saya berharap kepada para pemimpin yang menyatakan diri anggota DPRD Yogyakarta, wakil rakyat, betul-betul mau mendengar suara rakyat. Jangan mengatakan memihak rakyat, tapi faktaanya menentang aspirasi rakyat.’
opportunity presented to him quickly. But unlike the military officers in other governorships, whose power was likely to wane as democratisation progressed, the Sultan had a long-term desire and plan to remain in power beyond the transition. As such, the Sultan both shared features with, and was different from, other ‘oligarchic’ actors (Fukuoka, 2013; Hadiz, 2004; Winters, 2011). For Hadiz (2004, pp. 711-712), for instance, the local-level beneficiaries of Suharto’s fall were ‘individuals and groups who had earlier functioned as the local operators and apparatchik of the previous New Order – small to medium-sized, but politically well-connected business people with big ambitions, as well as an array of the regime’s former henchmen and enforcers.’

To begin with, the Sultan was not a henchman or enforcer of the New Order regime. Rather, he – and his father before him – had made deals with Suharto in order to protect the centuries-old privileges of his family and royal house. As the case of the 1984 Golkar crisis in Yogyakarta showed, it was not the Sultan who ruled the political apparatus in Yogyakarta, but military officers and their associates. At the same time, the ambitions of the Sultan in 1998 were much larger than those of the ‘local operators and apparatchik’ of the New Order. The latter wanted to enrich themselves as much and quickly as possible, knowing that democratisation might eventually threaten their practices. The Sultan, however, wanted nothing less than to entrench the traditional power of his family in the political infrastructure of the post-1998 state, well beyond his own governorship and rule as sultan. Hence, while the Sultan was part of the broader oligarchy competing for power in post-Suharto Indonesia, his source of power and influence was more stable and durable than those of many other oligarchic actors. Having obtained the governorship in 1998, he quickly moved towards realising the next goals on his agenda.

5.3 Permanent Governorship: Election versus Appointment

In most areas of Indonesia, the mechanism of electing governors underwent a transition between 1999 and 2005. In 1998, as shown above, governors were selected by the old Suharto parliaments established in 1997, with Law No. 5/1974 still serving as the legal basis, but the Central Government no longer choosing between two candidates. Subsequently, governors were elected by the local legislatures formed after the 1999 elections, with Law No. 22/1999 on Local Governance laying out the regulations. However, under this new regime of voting by democratically elected legislatures, many rich nominees bribed legislators to support them, leading to the election of oligarchic figures and the erosion of party discipline in the
parliaments. Thus, through the 2004 revisions of the 1999 decentralisation law, it was decided to conduct direct elections for governors, district heads and mayors. These elections started in 2005 (Aspinall & Fealy, 2003; Erb et al., 2005; Faucher, 2005; Mietzner & Aspinall, 2010).

In Yogyakarta, however, developments went in a different direction. Encouraged by the Sultan, many elites and voters rejected direct gubernatorial elections, while still supporting direct mayoral and district-level elections. The following sections explore the process through which Sultan Hamengku Buwono X transformed his 1998 election into a permanent governorship anchored in national legislation. Based on this legislation, the governorship and deputy governorship of Yogyakarta are not contested but hereditary, following the traditional succession lines of the Sultan of Yogyakarta and Paku Alam of Pakualaman Principality. The Sultan’s success in securing this arrangement – which he had aimed for all along – challenged a wide range of democratic achievements since 1998. For example, a constitutional amendment in 2002 had limited executive officeholders to two terms, and subsequent legislation determined that all executive leaders (president, governor, mayor, and regent) must be democratically elected. Thus, as in 1945, the Sultan of Yogyakarta faced the challenge of fighting for the aristocratic rights of his family within a new democratic framework that sought significant socio-political change.

I argue that Sultan Hamengku Buwono X was able to entrench himself in the permanent governorship due to two factors. First, he mobilised the same groups that had already pressured the Central Government to make him governor in 1998. At the centre of these groups were loyalists from the villages and other traditional institutions who were dependent on the Sultan, either because they used his land or were tied to him through long-standing relationships of allegiance. Second, the Sultan was able to create a national political network that lobbied for his cause. While his attempt to seek the presidency in 2009 was unsuccessful, his political weight was sufficient to win him remarkable political concessions as a result, the Sultan was able to maintain his governorship from 1998 to 2003; 2003 to 2008; 2008 to 2011; and 2011 to 2014. After 2012, the Yogyakarta Specialness Law enabled the Sultan to hold the governorship indefinitely.

The Sultan’s campaign for an expanded specialness law for Yogyakarta occurred at a time when other regions demanded similar concessions. The abovementioned Law No. 22/1999 (which annulled Law No. 5/1974) had been issued to appease regions seeking a greater say in policymaking and a greater share of revenues. But beyond these laws applying to all regions, special arrangements were made for Aceh and Papua. Aceh received more autonomy to
implement Islamic Law and a larger share of oil and gas revenue (first through Law No. 44/1999, which was then expanded by Law No. 18/2001). Also, indigenous Papuans were given leadership of the province, enabling them to receive 2% of total local transfers to accelerate primary services (Law No. 21/2001). In his research on the first gubernatorial elections in Papua and Aceh, Mietzner (2007) argued that, even though the winners of local elections in both regions were local leaders unfavourable to Jakarta, these laws have in the long term eroded separatist demands because these new actors have access to resources provided by Jakarta. The cases of Papuan and Acehnese Special Autonomy fuelled similar demands in Yogyakarta.

In other parts of Indonesia, however, demands for ‘Daerah Istimewa’ status failed. In northern Maluku, the Ternate, Tidore and Bacan Sultanates’ demand to become Daerah Istimewa failed to bear fruit, except for the formation of an ordinary new province called North Maluku in 1999 (C. Smith, 2009a). In a focus group discussion with the author, the supporters of a Daerah Istimewa Tidore discussed their inability to form a regional coalition between the various royal houses. Rather, each sultanate demanded its own Daerah Istimewa status at the district level, seeking to mirror their successes in the 1950s.62 These demands were later accommodated through the splitting of districts, but not under Special Autonomy regulations. Even without such status, district-level governments enjoy wide-ranging powers in budgeting and administrative matters.

Similarly, the Balinese demanded a special status to protect their cultural and religious practices and tourism industry, creating a movement called ‘Ajeg Bali’ (lit vigorous, upright, or resilient Bali) in 2002; their demand for a Daerah Istimewa Bali failed, however (Dwipayana, 2004; Nordhold, 2007). Why have other areas and aristocracies failed in seeking Special Autonomy, yet Yogyakarta has prevailed in expanding its already existing arrangement? Before shedding light on this matter by outlining the Sultan’s two strategies to achieve his goals, we first need to explore some technical terms governing the debate, especially the difference between Otonomi Khusus and Daerah Istimewa in the post-authoritarian era.

The existing literature on special central–provincial relations in the post-Suharto era often has not clearly differentiated between Special Autonomy, or Otonomi Khusus (Otsus), and Special Region, or Daerah Istimewa (Aspinall & Fealy, 2003; Erb & Sulistiyanto, 2009; Erb et al., 2005; Lay, Karim, Ma'sudi, Pamungkas, & Syarifudin, 2009). There are, however, some significant differences between those concepts. While Aceh and Papua received Otsus

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62 Focus Group Discussion with Daerah Istimewa Tidore activists on 5 November 2014 in Tidore.
status, other provinces including North Maluku, Bali, and Yogyakarta demanded *Daerah Istimewa* status. The 1945 Constitution, Article 18, included these two words without any further explanation. However, the common understanding has been that *Daerah Istimewa* – given its historical context when the term was created in 1945 – was specifically accommodating regions headed by traditional rulers. The application of this status to Yogyakarta in 1950 seemed to confirm this notion.

Special Autonomy, by contrast, is a post-Suharto concept of granting wider autonomy to provinces that have distinct histories but are not necessarily led by traditional rulers. In the 2001 Papua law, *Otonomi Khusus* is defined as ‘special authorities (kewenangan khusus) acknowledged and given to Papua Province to govern the community based on the Papuans’ aspirations and basic rights.’\(^{63}\) In the case of Aceh, it once held *Daerah Istimewa* status under the Sukarno and Suharto regimes, and Law No. 18/2001 described Aceh as *Provinsi Daerah Istimewa Aceh*, which received *Otonomi Khusus*. Removing this conflation of the two terms, the latest Aceh Special Autonomy Law, Law No. 11/2006 on the Government of Aceh, described Aceh as a ‘Special Law Community (masyarakat hukum yang bersifat istimewa) given special authority (kewenangan khusus).’\(^{64}\)

In this complex web of legal terms, the Sultan sought an expansion of the *Daerah Istimewa* status, not Special Autonomy – the latter being associated with the goal of appeasing formerly separatist movements (Aspinall, 2009; Viartasiwi, 2018). Hence, the *Keistimewaan/Specialness in Yogyakarta* granted in 2012 was defined as a ‘specialness law arrangement owned by Yogyakarta based on its history and initial rights.’\(^{65}\) Based on this special arrangement, the Yogyakarta government received special authority (*Kewenangan Istimewa*) outside of that regulated by the local government law. Importantly, since 2012, the term *Daerah Istimewa* has exclusively referred to Yogyakarta. No other area formerly ruled by an aristocracy gained this status, and other special autonomy regulations (for Jakarta, Aceh and Papua) have adopted different terms for their arrangements.

Debates about a new specialness deal for Yogyakarta began in the Sultan’s first term as governor, and first drafts for a law circulated by 2002. The key issue in the discussion was whether the Sultan should automatically become governor (which is what the Sultan wanted), or whether the position should be open to democratic election – a position defended by pro-

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\(^{63}\) Law No. 21/2001 Article 1 point b.  
\(^{64}\) Law No. 11/2006 Article 1 point 2.  
\(^{65}\) Law 13/2012 Article 1 point 2 and 3.
democracy reformers. The debate reached a high point in 2005, during the first round of direct local elections in Indonesia, including at the district level in Yogyakarta which 198 regions participated, with mixed results. Indeed, both camps could refer to arguments to reject or endorse direct elections – a division also reflected in the scholarly community. Some scholars argued that the 2005 direct elections strengthened local democracy, while others argued the opposite. Those who focused on the negative aspects of direct elections argued that they displayed the inability of political parties to democratise themselves and bring about participation at the grassroots level (Pratikno, 2009); that they led to the emergence of political dynasties (Hidayat, 2009); and accelerated the weakening of political parties (Buehler & Tan, 2007).

Significantly, Pratikno (2005, p. 32) argued that ‘Local autonomy also provides the space for the revival of local aristocracy. There is an indication that new political arrangements of local politics are also bringing the old feudal structures back into local politics.’ What Pratikno meant as a criticism, however, was a positive feature for the Sultan and his supporters. By contrast, they were less enthusiastic by the assessment of those scholars who viewed the direct elections as a largely positive phenomenon, suggesting that they ended the corruption of elections by local parliaments; empowered voters; led to the rise of new types of elites; and put pressure on candidates to offer voters benefits in the form of public policy initiatives, such as improved healthcare (Aspinall & Fealy, 2003; Mietzner, 2007).

Yogyakartans’ ability to judge these issues through first-hand experience was limited, as direct elections only took place at the district level. The Sultan had begun his second term in 2003, before the switch to nationwide direct gubernatorial elections in 2005. Thus, the next juncture at which to decide if and how to extend the Sultan in office would only be in 2008. But some of the district level contests in Yogyakarta in 2005 were highly insightful as far as the influence of the Sultan was concerned. In Bantul, for example, the incumbent Idham Samawi won easily because of the support of the Sultan. The Sultan and Idham had been friends since the 1970s, and he had protected the interests of the Sultanate in Bantul (Sulistiyanto, 2009, p. 201). In his campaign, Idham used a quotation by the Sultan (‘vote for a regent candidate who will be useful for the people’) that was widely understood as a recommendation to vote for Idham. This was significant as Idham’s opponent was the Sultan’s stepbrother, Prince Yudhaningrat, who was allowed to use the royal elephant as a symbol of the Sultanate for his campaign (Lindsay, 2009, p. 222). The Sultan’s support for Idham was, first and foremost, a
sign of his determination to secure his own interests and those of the Sultanate as an institution – even if that meant ‘sacrificing’ his brother.

For the Sultan, the much more important question was the expansion of the Special Region law and his campaign for the permanent governorship. As indicated above, there were two camps in the debate on how the governor should be selected under a new specialness legislation. The first camp, consisting of the Sultan and his loyalists, wanted an automatic and permanent inauguration of the sultan (penetapan), regardless of who that sultan was at any given time. The second group, made up of anti-monarchist and pro-democracy activists, argued that Yogyakarta should follow the rest of the nation in directly electing its leaders, both for the sake of democracy and national consistency. The Central Government, while being cautious about not triggering a conflict with the Sultan and Yogyakarta more broadly, tended to support the second camp.

Both camps had their justifications. The pemilihan group argued that Yogyakarta should follow the pace of democracy, with an elected governor and the Sultan and Paku Alam playing a symbolic role. It modelled the governorship on the basis of the role of grand visier under colonial rule (albeit elected, of course), while the Sultan was seen as a sacred leader who should not be included in worldly matters. Moreover, they pointed to the revised 1945 Constitution, Article 18, point (4), which holds that ‘governors, regents and mayors, respectively as heads of regional governments in the provinces, regencies, and cities, shall be elected democratically.’

On the opposite side, the penetapan camp insisted that no one except the Sultan and his descendants had led Yogyakarta since its establishment in 1755. In the reign of Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, although the Sultan held national positions (from minister to vice-president), he officially served as governor of Yogyakarta at the same time. Moreover, they argued that the revised 1945 Constitution, Article 18B, point (1), states that ‘the State recognises and respects units of regional authorities that are special and distinct, which shall be regulated by law.’ In this context, they asserted, the automatic political position of the sultan is the very essence of Yogyakarta’s keistimewaan, and protected by the constitution.

Evidently, the debate on the appointment or election of the sultan was not new. Since 1945, this issue had been subject to various regulations, responding to the fluidity of regime changes. Table 5.1 below shows the evolution of the selection regulations regarding Yogyakarta’s governor from 1945 to the renewed and intensive debate in the early 2000s:
Table 5.1 The rulings on Yogyakarta governorship, 1945–2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Law</th>
<th>Ruling on Yogyakarta Governorship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. 1/1945</td>
<td>Yogyakarta and Surakarta were excluded from the formation of the Regional National Committee (Komite Nasional Daerah/KND), which acted as the temporary local government (Article 1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 22/1948</td>
<td>The president selected local leaders from the descendants of pre-independence rulers who were still in control of the area (Article 18, point 5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 3/1950</td>
<td>Unregulated, but used Law No. 22/1948 as a consideration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 1/1957</td>
<td>The President selected local leaders from the descendants of pre-independence rulers who were still in control of the area (Article 25).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>The President selected local leaders from the descendants of pre-independence rulers who were still in control of the area (Article 6).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decree No. 6/1959</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 18/1965</td>
<td>The current Yogyakarta Governor and his deputy are not subject to the five-year term limit (Article 88, point 2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 5/1974</td>
<td>The current Yogyakarta Governor and his Deputy Governor are not subject to the five-year term limit (Article 91).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 22/1999</td>
<td>Special Region status maintained but mechanism regarding the governor selection unregulated (Article 122).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 32/2004</td>
<td>Special Region status maintained but mechanism regarding the governor selection unregulated (Article 226).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by author from the abovementioned laws.

The penetapan camp’s main supporters were the village head association (Ismaya), the hamlet leader (kepala dukuh) association (Semar Sembogo), and the village officials in all four districts (villages in Yogyakarta City are not independent and part of the city government). They were associated with other pro-royalist activists, creating a large mass of Sultan’s supporters. As its members, Ismaya claimed 392 village leaders in four districts in Yogyakarta, while Semar Sembogo claimed to include 4,539 hamlet leaders. Ismaya was founded in 2000 with the sole purpose of securing the permanent governorship for the Sultan (Gatra, 7 April 2001). Semar Sembogo, meanwhile, declared the same sole purpose in 2009 at a meeting attended by 4,000 kepala dukuh (Harian Jogja, 1 February 2009). They supported the

66 Ismaya coordinates village leaders’ organisations in four districts: Gunung Kidul (Semar), Sleman (Suryo Ndadari), Bantul (Tunggul Jati), and Kulon Progo (Bodronoyo).
67 Semar Sembogo coordinates kepala dukuh organisations in four districts: Gunung Kidul (Janaloka), Sleman (Cokro Pamungkas), Bantul (Pandu) and Kulon Progo (Madukoro).
Sultan becoming the governor and planned to boycott any gubernatorial elections, as warned by Mulyadi, the head of Ismaya:

If there is a [gubernatorial] election in Yogyakarta, village leaders, hamlet leaders, village officials, and the people of Yogyakarta will boycott [the election]. There will be no [gubernatorial] election. It will be boycotted down to the roots [the people].

As during the earlier campaign to make the Sultan governor in 1998, village and hamlet officials were afraid that under a governor other than the Sultan, they would lose their right to access village land, which was technically part of the Sultan’s grounds. Under a full implementation of BAL (which the Sultan obstructed), this was a realistic scenario. As previously described, since the village reorganisation of 1918, village and hamlet leaders depended on access to the Sultan’s land in the form of village land. According to the founder of Semar Sembogo, Sukiman Hadi Wiyono, the village leaders and officials (village head, village secretary, staff, and kepala dukuh) received income from the village land, which in the 1930s covered 17.5% of the total village area. For them, keistimewaan meant that the Sultan served permanently as governor; that there were no direct elections; and thus, no change in the status quo of their land. In an interview with the author, Sukiman explicitly said,

“We only support the Keistimewaan [with the Sultan automatically appointed the governor]. We will fight until the end to support the penetapan [camp] because village leaders, village officials, and hamlet heads live from pelungguh, [which is] from the Sultan’s grounds. The Sultanate owns the Sultan’s grounds. We believe that, if the Sultan automatically becomes the governor, there will be no change in land policy.’

Given how important the income from the Sultan’s land was in shaping the support of village officials for the Sultan’s demand for automatic appointment, it is necessary to explore the extent of this income in more detail. The common traditional calculation formula for the distribution of village land has been 7:5:4:3; that is, if a village head receives seven hectares of land, then the village secretary gets five hectares, the six village officials get four hectares, and each of the kepala dukuh three hectares. For instance, Sukiman Hadi Wiyono, the kepala dukuh in Kwagon, Sidorejo Village, Godean Sub-District, in Sleman received 12,000 m$^2$ as his salary in 2017. The village head, meanwhile, received around 28,000 m$^2$, the secretary received around 20,000 m$^2$, and the officials received around 16,000 m$^2$. The quality of the rice paddies is likewise proportional, with the village head receiving the best quality land in the village.

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69 Part of the village land for village officials’ salaries.
70 In his understanding, Sultan’s Ground includes village land. In this thesis, I distinguish between Sultan’s Ground and village land, following the government’s identification of traditional land.
71 Interview, Sukiman, the founder and the leader of Semar Sembogo, 15 March 2015 in Sleman.
72 Whatsapp communication with Sukiman, the founder and the leader of Semar Sembogo, 7 July 2018.
Using Yogyakarta’s average production (2011–2015) of 5.85 tonnes of rice hulls (gabah) per hectare (Ministry of Agriculture, 2015, p. 28), with three yields per year, Sukiman would receive at least twenty-one tonnes of hulled rice per year. Based on 2017 prices (IDR 4,500 per kg or [US$ 0.32]), this represents a gross income of IDR 94.7 million/year [US$ 6,820].

Assuming that production costs represent 40% of the total, this provides a net annual income for the kepala dukuh of IDR 56.82 million or IDR 4,735,000 [US$ 341] per month. As such, the financial incentive that Sukiman received from his pelungguh land was three times higher than Sleman’s minimum salary for 2017 (IDR 1,448,385 [US$ 104] per month) and 3.6 times higher than the Sleman District government’s official incentive for kepala dukuh (IDR 1,300,000/US$ 93). Accordingly, the village head, with his seven land portions, could make seven times the minimum salary, or around IDR 11 million [US$792] a month. This was, and continues to be, a significant amount of money in the village. For comparison, the lowest echelon of public servant receives an income of IDR 2,017,000 [US$ 145] per month.

Certainly, there are many factors that could lead to a lower income from the land than the abovementioned figures. The kepala dukuh, whose family members often use the allocated land as peasants themselves, face high levels of uncertainty. They even might end up with a loss if the crop fails due to crop disease or pest problems, creating significant debt. The best plots in the village are also typically considered to be the most vulnerable to pests, especially rats. Moreover, peasants normally borrow money with a high interest to start the season, reducing their income. Last but not least, they sell the paddy to intermediary traders for a price that is below market value. To overcome such uncertainty, another – but less profitable – option for kepala dukuh such as Sukiman has been to rent their pelungguh land to the Sultanate’s Madukismo sugar factory for IDR 7,600,000 [US$ 547] per hectare/year for the planting of sugarcane. For this, they would receive a clean IDR 9,100,000 per year or IDR 760,000 [US$ 54] per month.

While the case of Dukuh Kwagon is a modest example, it is important to keep in mind that the overall number of villages and their officials in Yogyakarta is significant. The four districts in the province of Yogyakarta consist of sixty-four sub districts, 392 villages and 4,504 dukuh (Yogyakarta Province Government, 2018). If we use the Kwagon numbers as examples and project them to calculate the overall income village officials in Yogyakarta derive from their land, the picture of the political economy of village land in Yogyakarta becomes clearer. For instance, the annual income by all officials from the land – if rented out to the Madukismo sugar factory – would be IDR 65,995,465,752 [US$ 4.7 million], and the alternative from crop
cultivation would be almost eight times that amount. Table 5.2 below provides an overview over these projections of the overall income that Yogyakarta village officials derive from the land still under the authority of the Sultan.

Table 5.2 Estimated potential income from rent and crops of pelungguh land in Yogyakarta, 2017 (in IDR), based on Dukuh Kwagon estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officials in Yogyakarta</th>
<th>Rent Income</th>
<th>Crop Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rent/IDR</td>
<td>Total/IDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Head (7)</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>17,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Secretary (5)</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>12,666,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Officials (4)</td>
<td>1,960</td>
<td>10,133,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kepala Dukuh (3)</td>
<td>4,504</td>
<td>7,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>65,995,465,752</strong></td>
<td><strong>493,500,640,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations. Rent and income calculated using the village land (pelungguh) distribution principle of 7:5:4:3.

Another reason that drove village apparatuses to support the Sultan’s quest for penetapan was fear of investigations in land corruption cases. Village land access had been highly regulated through gubernatorial regulations (Peraturan Gubernur/Pergub), despite this contradicting the BAL. Village land – under anggaduh right – could only be used for agricultural purposes, and any other usage would require direct permission from the Sultan as governor (at the same time, conversion of land ownership often needed the approval of the Sultanate’s land office). However, rapid urban development, especially in Sleman and Bantul, made farming less profitable than structures built on village land. Therefore, many village officials sold village land directly to other parties, or rented/transformed village land for commercial buildings without prior gubernatorial permission.

In 2014, for instance, Tugiran, the village head of Purwomartani Village, Kalasan, Sleman, was sentenced to a year in prison because he rented 7,000 m² of village land and kept the money for himself without prior gubernatorial approval. Moreover, many village officials became actors in illicit land sale by swapping more strategic and developable village land for less strategic agricultural land. The new owner paid the difference to village officials, under the

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73 In 2013, five new shopping malls were built in Sleman, including the Hartono Malls, with an area of 220,000 m² and 7,000 parking slots.
74 Case No. 7/Pid.Sus-TPK/2014/Pn.Yyk.
table (Pradoto, 2012, p. 187). In interviews that the author conducted with some village heads and kepala duku in Sleman and Bantul, they admitted that ‘many if not all’ village officials would spend time behind bars if their village land cases were openly investigated.75 One kepala duku said that ‘many kepala duku depend on the Sultan’s mercy.’76

In his research on village land commercialisation in Sleman, Pradoto (2012) found that investors targeted village land both legally or illegally. Given the complex land regulations in Yogyakarta – with the Sultanate in the centre of them – many obstacles hindered property developers’ acquisition of significant areas of land from individuals. As such, turning to village land, especially the village’s endowment land, was seen as a solution. The process of illegal land transformation was explained by one respondent as follows.

[...] many plots of Tanah Kas Desa are being purchased by investors without any approval from relevant parties, including the local community as well as vertical institutions like the district government and provincial government. The transactions are done on the basis of an agreement between the head of the village and the investors. [...] Somehow, the land is recorded in the land ownership certificates as property that belongs to the head of the village and is later renamed for the new owner when land is purchased (Pradoto, 2012, p. 188).

Despite its importance in making village officials dependent on the Sultan, contemporary data for village land is hardly available – except for estimates in 2010 and 2015. The Sultanate, Yogyakarta Land Office (BPN Yogyakarta), and Yogyakarta Government have relied on village records as the basis for land identification, and the village head has been the key source of data. Therefore, to avoid lawsuits, some lurah have been able to whitewash cases of corruption by creating village regulations justifying the misuse of village land. For instance, in a case where a previous lurah turned a paddy field from his pelungguh land into a student dormitory and received monthly rental fees, the current lurah and the village representative body (Badan Permusyawaratan Desa – BPD) issued a regulation that made the dormitory a village asset and switched the land upon which it was built with reserve land. The lurah claimed that, ‘only the lurah knows the exact boundaries of village land, therefore we can shift the troubled land plot to another village reserve land plot and save the previous lurah from prosecution.’77 Given this labyrinth of shadowy regulation, most village officials believed that the Sultan was best suited to protect their interests as governor, while a democratically elected head of the province was likely to question the status quo.

75 Interview, 4 March 2015 and 15 March 2015 in Sleman.
76 Interview, 15 March 2015 and 13 January 2016 in Sleman.
77 Interview, 15 March 2015 in Sleman.
Against this background, village officials intensified their campaign whenever the public debate on the election or appointment regulations heated up. Several drafts of the Yogyakarta Specialness Law (Rancangan Undang Undang Keistimewaan Yogyakarta – RUUK) were prepared. Harsono (2018, p. 176) counted ten different drafts that emerged between 1999 and 2012. But four drafts received particular attention. The Department of Politics and Government at Gadjah Mada University (UGM) developed the most crucial draft based on an academic monograph it had produced in 2007 at the request of the Ministry of Home Affairs (Lay et al., 2008); three other drafts were written by the Yogyakarta Parliament in 2003; the Sultan’s own government team in 2005; and the Regional Representative Assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah – DPD) in 2010 (DPD RI, 2010). GKR Hemas, the Sultan’s queen and the deputy chair of the DPD, tailored the council’s draft but it was not taken up by parliament. Rather, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, with minor changes, proposed the UGM draft to the parliament in 2008 – the year when the second term of Hamengku Buwono X as governor expired.

The various drafts of the Yogyakarta Specialness Law (YSL) had different rules regarding Yogyakarta’s permanent executive leadership. The most comprehensive draft of YSL, from UGM, was challenged by royalists because it ruled that the governor should be elected democratically, like in other provinces, and limited to two terms, while the Sultan and Paku Alam would play a symbolic role of provincial leadership and culture as a supreme institution called ‘Pengageng’ (Supreme Leaders) (Article 11–20) (Lay et al., 2008). Purwo Santoso, a team member, explained the rationale behind the creation of this supra-political position: ‘We came up with the idea of establishing a new institution, which would allow the Sultan [to be] the most respected person in the province, but he would not be subject to election, and then someone else would serve as governor, and he would be the one elected in accordance with the Constitution’ (Kuhn, 2010). The drafts by the Yogyakarta Parliament and the Sultan’s gubernatorial office as well as that by the DPD, by contrast, proposed direct and permanent appointment of the Sultan.

While the debate on the issue ebbed and flowed, it was particularly intense at the end of the five-years gubernatorial terms in 2003 and 2008 (and, as explained earlier, during the 2005 district elections). In 2003, the Central Government inaugurated the Sultan for a second term (after an ‘election’ in the Yogyakarta Parliament without any opposing candidates). This
extended the Sultan’s term until 2008. According to Law No. 32/2004 on Local Government, local leaders were only allowed to hold executive positions for a maximum of two terms (10 years). Therefore, legally, the Sultan could not retain his governorship after 2008. The Sultan’s expectation was that at the end of that second term, the new YSL would have been passed, allowing him to transition into the new regime. However, by 2007, the bill had showed no sign of being finalised. Out of frustration that his political struggle to maintain his governorship was producing no results, at his 61st birthday celebration, held on 7 April 2007, the Sultan stated in front of hundreds of spectators that,

I have to take a firm spiritual-cultural stance that I cast in a historical statement as follows:

1. With all my heart and soul, I sincerely declare that I am no longer willing to hold the office of Governor/Regional Leader of the Yogyakarta Special Province after the period of 2003-2008 is completed.
2. Furthermore, I entrust the people of Yogyakarta to the next Governor/Regional Leader of the Yogyakarta Special Province.79

In making this serious political decision, the Sultan had prepared his written speech accordingly. On the previous day, the Sultan had called his wife and his five daughters to inform them of his political decision not to make himself available for the next gubernatorial term. According to Queen GKR Hemas, his daughters could understand his choice. She said, ‘My daughters said, if that [the resignation] is His Majesty’s choice, we understand. We believe that His Majesty had deep contemplations before making the decision’ (Kompas, 20 April 2007).

At least in public, then, it appeared that the Sultan had a solid intention to withdraw from the province’s executive politics. Two days after his speech, he told a Kompas journalist that,

I am certain I do not want to be available [to become governor] again. The people really have the right to say that they support me, but I have the right to reject [that support] (Kompas, 10 April 2007).

Ten days later, on 18 April, more than 50,000 residents of Yogyakarta met with the Sultan in the North Square for a ‘Pisowanan Ageng’ (great gathering with the Sultan). After listening to the representatives’ demand that he be available for governor, he said, ‘Sabda Pandhita

Ratu’, or what has been said cannot be revoked. Invoking Javanese culture and tradition, he portrayed himself as a consistent ruler who stood by his already made promises.

But while the decision seemed firm, it occurred in a very fluid political landscape and served more purposes than one. First, quite clearly, the Sultan hoped that his statement would pressure the government into action on the YSL. As it turned out, this pressure was partly successful: although the government and parliament did not move on the YSL, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono began to prepare an extension of the Sultan’s term as governor. Eventually, Yudhoyono would issue a three-year extension for the Yogyakarta Governor and Deputy Governor, from 2008 to 2011, through Presidential Decree No. 86/P/2008. Second, however, it emerged that the Sultan had ambitions that went beyond just serving as governor: in 2007 and 2008, he began to drop hints that he planned to run for president, and that the governorship therefore was too small for him.

5.4 National Politics and Local Loyalists: Hamengku Buwono X’s Quest for the Presidency

Of course, it was hardly surprising that Hamengku Buwono X would enter national politics. In many of his previous ventures, he had copied his father’s approach. He had endorsed the 1998 regime change as his father had endorsed the Republic; he had claimed the governorship for the royal family as his father had; he had defended the Sultanate’s land as its most important power base, as his father had; and he fought for an ever-expanding Special Region status for his province, as his father did before him. It was only logical then, that he would also use his father’s strategy to seek national office in order to, minimally, lobby from Jakarta for the interests of Yogyakarta and the royal family – or, maximally, gain leadership positions to dictate the course of the nation itself.

Even prior to 2007, there had been signs that the Yogyakarta aristocracy wanted a larger national role. In 2004–2009, the Sultanate’s family had expanded their political participation to Jakarta. In 2004, for instance, Queen GKR Hemas secured a seat at the DPD representing Yogyakarta (she was later re-elected in 2009, 2014 and 2019). Indeed, Hemas was a deputy chairwoman of the DPD in her first term. Moreover, the Sultan’s stepbrother Prince GBPH Prabukusumo was the chairman of Yudhoyono’s Democrat Party Yogyakarta branch, giving the family a crucial link to the president’s party in the capital. Prior to that, the Sultan’s younger brother GBPH Joyokusumo had been defeated in the race for the Golkar chairmanship of
Yogyakarta – a role the Sultan had held himself for many years. Hamengku Buwono X, for his part, had shown his national aspirations early on by joining the pro-reform quadrumvirate in 1998, and by retaining a national role in Golkar. In 2004, he expressed interest in becoming Golkar’s presidential candidate, but that campaign sank quickly.

Initially, however, it appeared as if the Sultan was using the ‘threat’ of a larger national role only as leverage to extract concessions from the Yudhoyono government on the issue of the governorship. Adding weight to his 2007 announcement that he would not serve as governor beyond 2008, the small and newly founded Party of the Archipelagic Republic (Partai Republika Nusantara – RepublikaN) nominated the Sultan for the presidency in late September 2008. Not coincidentally, the Sultan’s governorship ended on 8 October 2008, and the government at the time had not yet made a decision on his extension. Clearly influenced by the Sultan’s pressure, agreed to the extension and issued the decree in early October – going against the legal stipulations on term limits and leaving open the question of whether future governors should be elected or appointed. Facing his own re-election campaign, Yudhoyono obviously wanted to avoid an open conflict with the Sultan, who had significant influence in the Javanese heartland. Thus, he seemed to hope that an extension as governor would prevent the Sultan from running for the presidency himself, against Yudhoyono. All this fit well with Yudhoyono’s notoriety for cautious and consensus-seeking decisions (Aspinall, Mietzner, & Tomsa, 2015).

But to the surprise of many, the Sultan did not stop his campaign for the presidency after having received his gubernatorial extension. While he accepted the extension – and hence acted against his 2007 announcement – he even stepped up his presidential campaign. On 4 December 2008, only weeks after his extension, the Sultan’s campaign team was launched. Calling itself the Pelangi Perubahan (rainbow of change), it consisted of various activists and was led by the noted political strategist Sukardi Rinakit. Members of the team included Moeslim Abdulrahman (Islamic activist), Garin Nugoro (film director), Franky Sahilatua (musician), Benny Susetio (Catholic Clergyman), Marisa (women’s activist), J Osdar (Kompas journalist), Saifullah Yusuf (NU activist and politician), and Budi Kuncoro (community development activist) (Vivanews, 3 December 2008). Pelangi Perubahan intended to approach PDIP, Golkar, and middle parties to lobby for the Sultan’s nomination (Soempeno, 2009, pp. 47-50). The team acknowledged that the most critical deficit of the Sultan was that he had no backing from political parties outside of RepublikaN, which had no prospect of winning the parliamentary elections and nominating the Sultan on its own.
It is not entirely clear why the Sultan proceeded with his candidacy although the Central Government consented to an extension of his term as governor. One possibility is that he saw this concession as insufficient and wanted to keep up the pressure on the Central Government until it had passed the YSL in a form and with the content he wanted. Indeed, given his previous dismissive statements on a governorship without proper legislation, it is plausible that this was his strongest motivation to pursue the campaign. It is also not impossible, however, that he truly believed in his calling to become president. Many within the Pelangi Perubahan had instilled in him the flattering impression that he was the only candidate not tainted by the dirty politics of the capital Jakarta. Combined with his family’s traditional sense of historical mission, the encouragement by his political inner circle may have strengthened his belief that he could actually win.

Whatever the true motivations for his campaign, opinion polls showed that the Sultan was – contrary to his team’s protestations – not a strong contender for the presidency. In June 2007, for instance, the Indonesian Survey Institute (Lembaga Survey Indonesia – LSI) found that only 1.7% of respondents endorsed the Sultan as president (Tempo, 3 November 2008). In October 2008, this had only risen to 4%, and to 5% by December of that year. While there had been some fluctuations in mid-2008, when Yudhoyono was down in the polls over a fuel price increase, and the Sultan did better in normative questions on alternative political figures (Tempo, 2 February 2009), his electability overall remained poor. In the December 2008 LSI poll, he was 38% behind Yudhoyono. This left him, at best, as a candidate for the vice presidency – the same position his father had held under Suharto from 1973 to 1978. While not his primary goal, that position still seemed attractive enough for him to secure the interests of his family and province, as his father had done.

The most likely candidate to team up with as vice president was Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle’s (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan – PDIP) Megawati Sukarnoputri. While the Sultan was formally still a member of Golkar, he made it clear that this would not deter him from accepting offers from other parties. Former president Megawati, for her part, had lost to Yudhoyono in 2004 but maintained significant support for a new candidacy and was looking for a vice-presidential candidate for the 2009 election. There were several potential candidates, including the Sultan, Prabowo Subianto Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerakan Indonesia Raya – Gerindra), Hidayat Nur Wahid Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera – PKS), and Jusuf Kalla (Golkar). Up until early 2009, the Sultan was the strongest vice-presidential candidate for Megawati. During the PDIP National Meeting (Rapat Kerja
Nasional) in Surakarta on 28 January 2009, the Sultan received support from all 33 PDIP provincial branches, while Prabowo and Hidayat only won support from 28 and 15 branches respectively (Tempo, 2 February 2009). At the grassroots level, the tagline ‘MEGA-BUWONO’ – which translated in Javanese as a combination of ‘the Sky’ and ‘the Earth’ – became commonly used.

But the Sultan’s chances weakened significantly after the 2009 parliamentary elections. The result of these elections was crucial in determining which party (or parties) could nominate a candidate for the subsequent presidential elections, with the threshold set at 20% of parliamentary seats or 25% of the overall votes. The elections went badly for the Sultan in two ways. First, the party closest to him, RepublikaN, only received 630,780 votes (0.64%) and thus failed to meet the parliamentary threshold (not to mention the presidential nomination threshold). During the campaign, RepublikaN had promoted the Sultan as the future Indonesian president. Moeslim said, ‘We wanted the Sultan as a presidential candidate who had high integrity and had not commercialised himself on television’ (Republika, 6 July 2012). With this result, his hopes for a nomination rested on PDIP.

Second, however, Megawati’s party did not do well either. PDIP came only third with 14.3% of the votes. Therefore, it could not nominate a presidential candidate by itself; only the ruling Democrat Party was able to do so. Others, including PDIP, had to form coalitions to meet the minimum requirement for proposing a candidate for the presidential election. After long negotiations, PDIP eventually formed an alliance with Gerindra (which had obtained 4.46%) to back a Megawati–Prabowo ticket for the 2009 presidential election. Golkar, the Sultan’s party, nominated party chair and incumbent vice president Jusuf Kalla, in alliance with the party of former military commander Wiranto. Yudhoyono, for his part, picked Boediono, a non-party bureaucrat, as his running mate. The Sultan, after much lobbying and campaigning, stood there with empty hands.

There were several reasons for the Sultan’s failure to secure a nomination for the presidential election. To begin with, he was used to mobilising support in his home province through networks that were unique in the Indonesian context. Supported by village officials dependent on his land and other royalists benefitting from or feeling emotionally tied to the Sultanate, Hamengku Buwono X had mastered the art of controlling Yogyakarta politics – but was inexperienced in political contestation outside of it. As thousands of royalists assembled to show their support in the Sultanate North Square on 28 October 2008 and asked the Sultan to seek the presidency, Indonesians in other provinces remained unimpressed. To be sure, the
Sultan had briefly risen to the level of Amien Rais, Megawati and Wahid in 1998, but had subsequently withdrawn to Yogyakarta while the other three went on to acquire high political office in Jakarta. This long absence from Jakarta – a decade since those days of the quadrumvirate – was not easy to compensate for as the Sultan seemed to prepare to a return in 2008 and 2009.

Moreover, although the Sultan was wealthy, his resources did not match those of other oligarchs who could afford to found well-organised political parties and hire professional campaign staff. The Sultan’s resources were mostly tied up in land and businesses built on it. His businesses were medium-sized companies, and although his father was listed as one of the richest men of Indonesia in the 1980s, the economic boom since then had seen many tycoons moving past the Yogyakarta royals in terms of assets. Thus, unlike Prabowo and Wiranto, who had used their wealth to establish parties that enabled them to secure nominations in the 2009 race, the Sultan only relied on a local power network, a micro party without resources and a Pelangi Perubahan team made up of political amateurs.

But while the Sultan did not gain executive office in 2009, it is debateable whether this constituted an overall political failure. Recall that the Sultan arguably had a minimum and a maximum goal. The minimum goal was to increase his political standing in Jakarta in order to strengthen his hand in the negotiations with the Central Government over the YSL. Now extended in the governorship until 2011, the raised national political profile after the campaign was certain to help him in pressuring Jakarta for a better YSL deal. The contacts he built with politicians – in PDIP and other parties – to promote his candidacy would now come in handy as he needed to engage with legislators on the YSL. Accordingly, while he had missed his maximum targets (the presidency or vice presidency), he returned to Yogyakarta with a larger web of political connections than he had before, and he was determined to use it to defend his sultanate’s interests.

The Sultan would soon be in need of his newly acquired connections. On 26 November 2010, President Yudhoyono opened a limited cabinet meeting by stating that ‘It is impossible for there to be a monarchy system, as it contradicts the constitution and democratic values’ (Detik, 26 November 2010). The ‘monarchy system’, quite obviously, referred to the ex-officio position of the Sultan and governor without term limit. Meant as a commentary on the YSL draft bill, Yudhoyono’s statement opened a new round in the conflict over the best way to select the Yogyakarta governor. But contrary to what he had intended, Yudhoyono weakened the supporters of direct gubernatorial elections. This was because it turned an intra-Yogyakarta
debate into one between Yogyakarta and Jakarta, and between the Sultan and the Indonesian President. This shift in the debate’s dynamics was further accelerated by what many Yogyakartans viewed as insensitive timing on the part of the president: just a month earlier, Mount Merapi – in the vicinity of the city – had seen a series of eruptions, claiming 353 lives. The seriousness of the tensions was underlined by the resignation of Prince Prabukusumo, the chairman of the Yogyakarta branch of the Democrat Party and the Sultan’s stepbrother, shortly after Yudhoyono’s statement.

One element of Yudhoyono’s statement sparked particular controversy in Yogyakarta: the reference to the term ‘monarchy.’ Yudhoyono had used the Western term monarki, rather than the Indonesianized version kerajaan or the Islamic concept of kastulan. The latter is how the Yogyakarta Sultanate had referred to itself for centuries. Yudhoyono’s invocation of monarki raised the issue of whether Yogyakarta’s contemporary situation could really be compared to the structures of other monarchies, whether in the Islamic kingdoms of the Middle East (Minucheher, 2009, p. 390), Southeast Asia’s monarchies (Kershaw, 2001) or Europe (Brazier, 2007; von Daniels, 2016). The way the Yogyakarta Sultanate had conceptualised itself after 1945 was as a special region within a Republic, not as a traditional monarchy. Further, both Hamengku Buwono IX and Hamengku Buwono X had been legitimised by legislation, the provincial parliament and presidential decisions, rather than by monarchical self-appointment – at least that’s how the royalists saw it. For them, therefore, Yudhoyono’s statement was an insult on multiple levels, distorting the history of the Sultanate and its contemporary legitimacy.

Yudhoyono’s comment triggered massive protests that benefited the Sultan. Pro-royalist activists soon found an opportunity to challenge the opposing camp and gain the momentum. At the same time, after the failure of his national candidacy, the Sultan was more determined than ever to defend a version of the YSL that would entrench his family in the post of governor. In 2011 and 2012, massive and organised protests orchestrated by village leaders and royalists happened almost every week in Yogyakarta. The protesters formed an umbrella organisation called the Specialness Secretariat (Sekretariat Bersama Keistimewaan Yogyakarta – Sekber Keistimewaan). Yudhoyono became its primary political target, with his initials ‘SBY’ mockingly spelled out as ‘Sumber Bencana Yogyakarta’ (Source of Yogyakarta’s Catastrophes). This linked the president to Merapi’s eruption, and all other misfortune experienced by Yogyakarta. Additionally, the royalists held protests on historically significant dates. Widihasto Putro, the coordinator of Sekber Keistimewaan, explained this strategy as follows:
We combined current and historical political events and used those dates as the themes of our demonstrations. For instance, we made a massive rally on 5 September, remembering the sacrifice of Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX to integrate Yogyakarta into Indonesia. We wanted to remind Jakarta of the need to acknowledge Yogyakarta’s historic contributions to Indonesia.

These massive protests in Yogyakarta accelerated the discussion on the draft of the YSL. In 2011, SBY extended the Sultan’s governorship for another three years, as the deliberations in parliament continued. In a parliamentary meeting on 17 February 2012, the option of having local parliament select the Sultan as governor was discussed, with specific limitations and regulations. First, both the Sultan and Paku Alam would run for election as sole candidates, with other aristocratic family members prohibited from challenging the Sultan. Second, in the case that the Sultan and Paku Alam did not run for governor and deputy governor, they would receive special rights, including veto rights, land control and cultural privileges. In this scenario, the gubernatorial and deputy gubernatorial candidates were required to receive written permission from both the Sultan and Paku Alam before being selected by the Yogyakarta provincial parliament (DPR RI, 2012).

While this proposal in effect would have given the Sultan the right to opt for becoming governor or not, with election guaranteed, Hamengku Buwono X still rejected it. This suggested that he felt that the momentum was in his favour, and that he could demand full automatism in the appointment of the Sultan as governor. Thus, on 10 May 2012 the Sultan issued a proclamation called Sabdatama, proclaiming that his political position was inseparable from that of the Paku Alam (dwitiunggal). In the Sabdatama, the Sultan also stated that ‘Mataram’ remained an independent state with its own law and government – although the state of that name had been both broken up and its subsequent parts colonised by the Dutch and, temporarily, the British. Most importantly, the Sultan insisted on appointment to permanent, indefinite governorship. Two weeks later, on 23 May 2012, an ad hoc organisation called Yogyakarta Government Watch asked for a hearing with Parliament’s Commission II that dealt with government issues and deliberated the bill. In the hearing, the delegation emphasised Sabdatama and asked for the direct appointment of the Sultan to prevent horizontal conflict (Jogja Government Watch, 2012). This was accompanied by further protests and campaigns in Yogyakarta (see Picture 3 below).

80 Interview, Widihasto Wasono Putro, 29 December 2014 in Yogyakarta.
The local and national political constellation had now shifted solidly in the Sultan’s favour. Locally, almost every Yogyakarta delegation that visited the national parliament in Jakarta expressed support for the direct appointment regime, giving the impression of a unified Yogyakarta society on this matter. The proponents of elections, on the other hand, fell increasingly silent. Nationally, the Sultan’s close contacts to PDIP built up during the 2009 campaign began to pay off. PDIP was a vocal opponent of the direct election proposal for
Yogyakarta, and supported automatic appointment instead (Harsono, 2018, p. 178). PDIP chairwoman Megawati Sukarnoputri, bitter over her two defeats against Yudhoyono in 2004 and 2009, viewed the YSL as good opportunity to triumph over the president on a policy issue that he had openly declared as important. In a series of meetings between Yudhoyono and the Sultan, the president was still trying to find a compromise, but the Sultan held on to his position. In the final meeting between the two, in late May 2012, Yudhoyono eventually relented, and instructed his Democratic Party to vote for the direct appointment solution, as it had been proposed in the 2003 draft of the Yogyakarta Parliament (Harsono, 2018, p. 187). The Sultan had prevailed.

The long debate over the governorship had overshadowed other issues of the YSL, but the status of the Sultanate’s land was inseparably linked to the contestation. Indeed, royalists tended to label those who were questioning the status of the land in this period as not supporting the people’s struggle for Yogyakarta’s specialness. As a result, some activists faced social and legal repercussions. For instance, on 31 January 2011, scholar George Junus Aditjondro published an op-ed in Sinar Harapan entitled, ‘SG and PAG are free riders of YSL.’ In this article, Aditjondro asserted that the focus on the appointed governorship in the YSL debate had been misplaced. Much more important, he emphasised, was the status of the Sultan’s land, which was supposed to be formalised through the YSL. As a consequence, he stated, there was a threat that feudalism would be consolidated in Yogyakarta much more deeply than just through the Sultan’s confirmation in the top executive post.

Following the article, in a rare seminar on the topic of SG and PAG at Universitas Gadjah Mada, Aditjondro made a word play mocking the Sultanate. He said that ‘Keraton Yogya itu hanyalah kera yang ditonton’ (Kraton Yogyakarta is only a monkey being watched). On the next day, a Yogyakarta People’s Forum (Forum Masyarakat Yogyakarta) reported Aditjondro to the police for harassing the Sultanate as a traditional institution. Intimidated by this threat, Aditjondro asked the Sultan for forgiveness, but the Sultan refused to meet with him. Social pressure even caused him to flee Yogyakarta (Kompas, 7 December 2011). The incident showed that, as Aditjondro suggested, the issue of the appointed governorship had only been one mosaic in a much larger puzzle depicting power relations in Yogyakarta. At the heart of these power relations was, and remained, control over land. Therefore, the following section

81 Golkar chairman Aburizal Bakrie mediated between Yudhoyono and the sultan. Interview, Sultan Hamengku Buwono X, 3 March 2015 in Yogyakarta.
will discuss the debate over the traditional lands of the Sultan and Paku Alam, including village land, at a time when the local and national audience was focusing primarily on the governorship element of the YSL.

5.5 Regaining Property Rights: Real and Imagined Land

Purwo Santoso, one of the members of the UGM team that drafted the home ministry’s version of the YSL, recalled to the author in 2015 that ‘we presented our draft to the Sultan three times. The only thing he asked about was his traditional land.’ This demonstrated again just how essential the control of land was for the Sultan’s idea of power over Yogyakarta. The governorship was important to him, but it seems that even this was merely a way to further cement his land control. Conversely, as we have seen, his already existing access to land allowed him to mobilise groups in his support that were dependent on this land. Thus, land control was both a source of the Sultan’s power and something he wanted to further advance with the power and resources he already possessed.

As discussed in previous chapters, the Sultan’s mode of land control changed over time. For much of the colonial period, the Sultan had – following the terminology developed by Ribot and Peluso (2003) – property rights over land. These began to weaken somewhat after 1918, and after 1945, the Sultan’s direct ownership rights transitioned into access to land, a lower level of land control. This access to land was subsequently threatened by the democratic period in the 1950s and two authoritarian regimes (1959–1998). Having held on to his land access, democratisation after 1998 offered the chance to the Sultan to not only maintain the land access he still enjoyed, but also regain the land property rights his family had under colonial rule. In this section, therefore, I discuss the contestation overturning land access into property rights over land. One major problem was, however, that there was no complete data on the Sultan’s traditional lands. Paradoxically, then, lawmakers were regulating ‘imagined’ land, the exact location and area of which was unknown, referring to unclear definitions of SG/PAG and village land.

Recall that the traditional understanding of SG/PAG recognised two different kinds of land associated with the Sultanate: palace land (keprabon) and non-palace land (bukan keprabon). Generally, palace land supports the fundamental cultural and religious functions of the Sultanate, while non-palace land assists with the commercial and political activities of the

83 Interview, Purwo Santoso, 5 January 2015 in Yogyakarta.
royal houses. Palace land *per se* did not lead to protest or contestation, because it was socially and culturally acceptable as the Sultanate’s property. Rather, critics questioned the understanding of the Sultan that all land in Yogyakarta not explicitly owned by private citizens was the direct property of the Sultanate – and the Sultan’s quest to have that legal interpretation formalised in the YSL.

During the drafting of the YSL, intense debates occurred over the SG/PAG. This included both palace and non-palace land – and the question of what exactly was included in them. Regarding palace land, the debate concentrated mainly on the Sultanate’s claim to all cultural and religious sites (mosques, cemeteries, and sacred sites) inside and outside Yogyakarta, especially those in East and Central Java that had previously been under its authority during the colonial period but were subsequently transferred. The Sultanate argued that the mosques remained an integral part of the Sultanate’s culture and religion. An 1825 agreement between Kasunanan and Kasultanan did not include the separation of these sites. This meant – according to the Sultan’s interpretation – that the sacred place of worship in Magetan, nominally part of East Java Province, belonged to the Kasultanan’s area. Similarly, the Royal Tomb of Imogiri and the original Mataram palace in Kota Gedhe were partly owned by the Kasunanan of Surakarta, but were also potentially part of the Yogyakarta Sultanate’s claim. These assets had become lucrative tourism sites that attracted many pilgrims. As such, they constituted a potentially significant source of income for whoever controlled and managed them properly.

Debate over non-palace land primarily dealt with the issue of what was included in this category and what wasn’t. Most importantly: was village land part of non-palace land or a different entity? How was village land regulated? Was village land part of SG or independently managed by villages? Recall that village lands had been part of the Sultanate’s land, but the management of it had been distributed to villages by Sultan Hamengku Buwono VII in 1925; as previously discussed, this land represented 17.5% of Yogyakarta’s total area in 1932 (Booth, 1974, p. 135). We also saw that village lands were divided into village endowment land (*Tanah Kas Desa* – TKD) for village financing, *pelungguh* for village officials’ salaries, and *pengarem-arem* for village officials’ pensions. From 1925 to 2010, according to interviews with village officials and high-ranking bureaucrats, the proportion of village land in Yogyakarta had been reduced to approximately 10%. 84 This was due to the land conversions that began in 1918,
accelerated in 1954 and were further formalised with the nominal implementation of the BAL in Yogyakarta in 1984.

The previous chapter also highlighted anomalies in the implementation of the BAL in Yogyakarta. In practice, the Sultanate continued to firmly control access to palace lands and some non-palace lands, and from this it derived financial income, especially from the booming tourism industry in the 1990s (see Chapter Four). Both the government and the people of Yogyakarta needed to ask permission from or give compensation to the Sultanate if they wanted to use or convert non-palace and village land. Maria W. Sumardjono, for instance, examined the development of a training complex in Bantul, where construction commenced only after a Governor’s Permit was issued. On 15 November 1994, the governor issued Governor’s Permit No. 43/IIZ/KPTS/1994 to release SG No. 24 and SG No. 51 (a total of 5.8 hectares of land) in Kasihan Sub-district, Bantul, for the development of the training complex. For Sumardjono, this showed that ‘Legally, Kraton land has been erased and became state land, but sociologically its existence is respected by the society’ (2007b, p. 41). In other words, the law was not implemented.

After the regime change in 1998, and after taking over the governorship in the same year, the Sultan initiated further measures to circumvent the BAL. The first step in this campaign to consolidate his land control was to stop the land titling process. On 22 September 2000, the Sultanate’s coordinating office that dealt with land issues (Wahana Sarta Kriyo) sent Letter No.138/WSK/2000 on ‘Controlling the Sultanate’s Land’ to the head of Yogyakarta’s Land Office. In it he asked the office to postpone the titling of uncertified land and granting property ownership rights over land suspected to belong to the Sultanate. Such postponement, it argued, was necessary because the Sultanate and the land office were identifying the Sultanate’s lands in Yogyakarta. This letter shows how the Sultanate consolidated its land after 1998, and it also reflected the informal power hierarchy in Yogyakarta. The Sultanate, which was not a legal entity recognised under the Indonesian legal system, could dictate the behaviour of government institutions.

In 2009, the Sultan’s land consolidation strengthened further after the Yogyakarta Land Office refused to issue any land certificates on contested SG/PAG without prior permission from the Kasultanan or Pakualaman. In effect, this formalised an earlier practice in which – despite the BAL implementation of 1984 – the Sultanate’s land office still had to cooperate with land conversions; if it refused to cooperate, the conversion could not take place. In 2009,
the Yogyakarta Land Office followed the recommendation of Kasultanan/Pakualaman officials regarding the certification. One Land Office staff member said,

"The issuing of land certificates, whether they are HGB (building right) or Hak Pakai (usage right), depends on the recommendations of Kasultanan and Pakualaman. We are just following [the advice] of Kasultanan and Pakualaman (Kompas, 15 May 2009)."

Therefore, from 1998 to 2012, the Sultanate tried to prevent further land conversions, in preparation of its campaign to turn land access into private property. While the BAL and the 1984 Presidential Decree on the implementation of the BAL in Yogyakarta were ineffectual from the beginning, the 2000 and 2009 decisions froze any further movement in this regard. Moreover, the Sultanate and government upheld the prohibition for ethnic Chinese and Indian residents to own land in Yogyakarta, which I will discuss in the next chapter.

The incompleteness of the SG/PAG data benefited the Sultanate – it served as an argument to delay further land conversions until the YSL clarified the overall ownership status of land in Yogyakarta. As shown previously, the Yogyakarta Government and Land Office had issued data on SG/PAG land in 1993, estimating that 1.38% of the total area of Yogyakarta was SG/PAG. But it was clear to everyone that these numbers were rough calculations rather than hard facts. After 1993, and until 2015, there were five further identification projects on SG/PAG and two on village land, with varying results. A 2002 survey found that SG/PAG covered 1.19% of Yogyakarta’s land area and provided detailed data for each district, as shown in Table 5.3 below. In 1993, the total amount of SG/PAG was 44,108,909 m²; in 2002, the number had decreased to 37,781,941 m². But there were significant variations by district. SG/PAG had increased in Yogyakarta City, Bantul, Sleman, and Gunung Kidul, while it had decreased in Kulon Progo. The most striking increase was in Yogyakarta City, where SG/PAG had grown by 148.48% in 2002.

Table 5.3 Estimated SG/PAG in 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District/City</th>
<th>Total Area (in km²)</th>
<th>SG/PAG (in m²)</th>
<th>SG/PAG per Total Area (%)</th>
<th>Total SG/PAG (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta City</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>2,055,089</td>
<td>6.32</td>
<td>5.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantul</td>
<td>506.85</td>
<td>18,433,375</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>48.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleman</td>
<td>574.82</td>
<td>2,520,414</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>6.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunung Kidul</td>
<td>1,485.36</td>
<td>6,398,135</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>16.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kulon Progo</td>
<td>586.27</td>
<td>8,374,928</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>22.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,185.80</strong></td>
<td><strong>37,781,941</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.19</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In 2004, the Yogyakarta Government and Land Office measured traditional land again, although this project was left unfinished due to financial and workforce limitations (and because it occurred at a time when the YSL was already under discussion). The incomplete data, as shown in Table 5.4 below, indicated that SG/PAG constituted 1.24% of Yogyakarta’s total area, a slight increase from both 1993 and 2002 data. But unlike in the previous surveys, there was ‘estimated’, ‘verified’ and ‘unverified’ data on SG/PAG. The comparison with the previous data is thus based only on the verified numbers. The data clearly suggests that the Land Office believed there was more land that potentially needed to be classified as SG/PAG, but it did not pursue the issue – believing, at the time, that a new YSL was imminent (the Yogyakarta Parliament had just produced its draft a year earlier).

### Table 5.4 Estimated SG/PAG in 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District/City</th>
<th>Total Area (in km²)</th>
<th>Estimated SG/PAG in m²</th>
<th>Verified SG/PAG in m²</th>
<th>Unverified SG/PAG in m²</th>
<th>SG/PAG per Total Area (%)*</th>
<th>Total SG/PAG (%)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta City</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>82,000</td>
<td>718,000</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantul</td>
<td>506.85</td>
<td>16,700,000</td>
<td>21,187,329</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>53.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleman</td>
<td>574.82</td>
<td>3,060,000</td>
<td>936,868</td>
<td>2,123,132</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>2.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunung Kidul</td>
<td>1,485.36</td>
<td>5,810,000</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>5,410,000</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kulon Progo</td>
<td>586.27</td>
<td>21,755,523</td>
<td>16,755,523</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>42.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,185.80</strong></td>
<td><strong>48,125,523</strong></td>
<td><strong>39,361,720</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,251,132</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.24</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*From verified land.

Following the aborted 2004 land identification project, and in the midst of the discussions on the YSL, the Sultanate became increasingly assertive in its push for the acknowledgement of its land control as property rights. The Land Office, which was part of the province’s administrative infrastructure but since 1984 had reported to Jakarta, faced a dilemma. On the one hand, it had to follow the 1984 Presidential Decree and the BAL, while on the other hand it confronted constant demands from the Sultan – who was governor at the same time – to legalise his claim on lands that the BAL would have categorised as state land. Facing this pressure, the Yogyakarta Land Office asked the Central Land Office for guidance
regarding the ownership status of traditional land. In his reply, dated 21 October 2005, Joyo Winoto – the head of the Central Land Office – said that there had been no further instruction regarding the SG/PAG land and therefore SG/PAG land could not be certified under the name of Kasultanan or Pakualaman. This, in turn, strengthened the belief of the Sultan that only the YSL could bring final certainty to his land claims.

One case in particular showcased how important the issue was for the Sultan: that is, the development of the largest shopping mall in Yogyakarta and Central Java, Ambarukmo Plaza, and the restoration of the Ambarukmo Palace Hotel, both located on SG. The seven-storey mall was expected to have a total area of 120,000 m² and was sited on 15,000 m² of land, while overall the complex would use 40,410 m² of the Sultanate’s land. The Sultanate’s long-term business partner, Tjia Edi Susanto, built the plaza using a thirty-year build-operate-transfer business model that required an investment of IDR 250 billion (US$ 18 million) (Swa, 7 July 2005). According to business actors with knowledge of the case, the money from the contract was planned to finance Sultan Hamengku Buwono X’s campaign for a national political role. However, the legality of the land was in question; based on a certificate published in 1995, the land was under the name ‘Hamengku Buwono’, without the sequence, and thus did not refer to any individual. Under the BAL, it was not clear who owned the land, and therefore the certificate could potentially be annulled (Radar Jogja, 21 April 2003). The legal dispute did not prevent the mall’s opening in 2006, but the Sultan had a strong interest in removing any doubt about his ownership.

Trying to move closer to this legal certainty through means under his control, the Sultan, as governor, directed the Yogyakarta Government to issue Bylaw No. 7/2007 on the Authority of Yogyakarta Province. In Article 3, the bylaw listed land issues as a ‘mandatory authority’ of the Yogyakarta Government – implicitly questioning the BAL, which had given that authority to the centre. But the bylaw did not stop at an implicit challenge to the BAL. Rather, it openly declared that the BAL did not have authority over the SG/PAG – whereas one of the BAL’s key goals was to assume precisely this authority. The bylaw stated that:

On land with the ownership right of the Yogyakarta Sultanate and Pakualaman Principality (SG/PAG) that has yet to be released [to the people/institutions], it is still the Right of

---

86 Interview, members of the ethnic Chinese business community, 6 January 2016 in Yogyakarta.
Ownership under the authority of the Kasultanan/Pakualaman and until now has not been affected by the BAL (Yogyakarta Bylaw No. 7/2007; Rationale).88

Strengthened by the bylaw, the Sultan issued Gubernatorial Regulation (Pergub) No. 11/2008, which specifically regulated village land. Based on the regulation, another land identification attempt was launched in 2010. The 2010 data, resulting from cooperation between the Yogyakarta Government and the Yogyakarta Land Office, again showed different results from previous studies. The 2010 identification introduced the new concept of ‘Crown Domain’ (CD, English in original), referring to palace land, while SG/PAG (in that year’s survey) referred to non-palace land. In addition, the 2010 identification project calculated – for the first time since Suharto’s fall in 1998 – village land. SG/PAG was identified as the land that had been owned by the Kasultan and Pakualaman based on the Dutch colonial registration (Kadaster/cadastre) and that had never been transferred to the people or state institutions.89 Table 5.5 below shows that, in 2010, the total amount of SG/PAG and palace land (CD) was 2.02%, significantly higher than the 1.38% (1993), 1.19% (2002), and 1.24% (2004). This was largely a result of the inclusion of the new CD category, which boosted the overall size of the Sultan’s land possessions.

Moreover, village land constituted 4.09% of Yogyakarta’s total area, twice that of SG/PAG and CD. The data shows that most traditional land was located in three districts: Sleman (34.66%), Bantul (32.39%), and Kulon Progo (26.36%). The Sleman numbers were particularly interesting: they explained why strong support for the Sultan’s governorship and the YSL came from this district. The leader of Semar Sembogo, for instance, was a kepala dukuh in Sleman. Sleman has become the most developed district in Yogyakarta, and its land value has increased not only for agricultural purposes but also for urban development. In 2010, around 11.20% of Sleman’s total area was village land, higher than Yogyakarta City (0.50%), Bantul (6.42%), Gunung Kidul (0.39%), and Kulon Progo (4.03%). Sleman thus became an essential district for the power maintenance of the Sultanate and Pakualaman, with its village land providing a strong incentive for officials to defend the royal houses.

88 ‘Namun demikian, terhadap tanah-tanah Hak Milik Kraton Kasultanan Yogyakarta-Kadipaten Pakualaman (SG/PAG) yang selama ini belum dilepaskan, masih Hak Milik atau merupakan domain bebas dari Kasultanan Yogyakarta-Kadipaten Pakualaman dan hingga kini belum terjangkau ketentuan-ketentuan UUPA.’
89 Interview, civil servant in the Yogyakarta Government and BPN Yogyakarta City, 14 January 2016 and 5 February 2015 in Yogyakarta.
Table 5.5 Estimated SG/PAG and village land in 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District/City</th>
<th>Total Area (in km²)</th>
<th>Expected SG/PAG Area (in hectares)</th>
<th>Expec ted SG/PAG Area (%)</th>
<th>SG and PAG (in hectares)</th>
<th>CD, SG and PAG per Total Area (%)</th>
<th>VL per Total Area (%)</th>
<th>CD, SG, PAG and VL per Total Area (%)</th>
<th>Total CD, SG, PAG and VL (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta City</td>
<td>32.50</td>
<td>80.05</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>21.89</td>
<td>80.05</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>104.94</td>
<td>16.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantul</td>
<td>506.85</td>
<td>1,669.75</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2,081.34</td>
<td>962.62</td>
<td>3,053.96</td>
<td>3,247.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleman</td>
<td>574.82</td>
<td>306.16</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>306.16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>307.86</td>
<td>6,435.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunung Kidul</td>
<td>1,485.36</td>
<td>581.50</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>581.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>581.50</td>
<td>1,163.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kulon Progo</td>
<td>586.27</td>
<td>1,037.65</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,051.99</td>
<td>330.62</td>
<td>2,382.61</td>
<td>2,746.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,185.80</td>
<td>3,675.11</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>33.59</td>
<td>5,101.04</td>
<td>1,296.24</td>
<td>6,430.87</td>
<td>13,026.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Basic data from Munsyarief (2013, p. 43), modified for this study’s purpose.90

90 Similar to Yohanes Supama, Munsyarief works for the Land Office’s Research Centre Unit, and thus could access data on SG/PAG, CD, and TKD. The Head of the Land Office, Hendraman Supanji, wrote the preface to his book.
The next initiative to register the Sultan’s land came in 2014, two years after the implementation of the YSL through which royal land access was turned into the Sultanate’s private property (more detail on this will be presented in the next chapter). In 2014, the Yogyakarta Provincial Government – now under Hamengku Buwono X as automatically appointed governor – issued the ‘SG/PAG Grand Design.’ This Grand Design had been mandated by the YSL, and it included another identification survey of the SG/PAG land. (The survey no longer included a distinction between CD and SG/PAG). It found that SG/PAG represented 1.59% of Yogyakarta’s total area, covering 50,632,394 m². Similar to the previous identifications, most SG/PAG land was located in Bantul and Kulon Progo. Table 5.6 below shows in detail the SG/PAG measurements in 2014.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District/City</th>
<th>Total Area (in km²)</th>
<th>SG/PAG (in m²)</th>
<th>SG/PAG per Total Area (%)</th>
<th>Total SG/PAG (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta City</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>82,000</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantul</td>
<td>506.85</td>
<td>22,767,859</td>
<td>4.49</td>
<td>44.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleman</td>
<td>574.82</td>
<td>928,338</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>1.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunung Kidul</td>
<td>1,485.36</td>
<td>402,950</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kulon Progo</td>
<td>586.27</td>
<td>26,451,247</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>52.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,185.80</strong></td>
<td><strong>50,632,394</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.59</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The last identification so far, in 2015, provided an estimation of SG/PAG and village land. In combination, it showed the Sultanate’s growing superiority in land affairs after 2012. The 2015 identification was intended to promote discussion of the special fund allocation for traditional land management that was planned to be issued in 2016. Moreover, to secure village land, the Sultan issued two gubernatorial regulations, in 2013 and 2014, to protect land owned by the village, based on Village Law No. 6/2014, which I will discuss in the following chapter. The 2015 identification was more detailed, because certification of the Sultanate’s private property land had begun in 2013, and this included both certified and uncertified plots. Out of 13,226 SG/PAG plots, 2,867 (21.7%) had been granted property titles under the name of the Kasultanan or Pakualaman; the rest, 78.3%, would be titled in the following years following the issuance of the special fund. The pace of certification was fast, because in two years (2013–
2015) the Yogyakarta Land Office issued an average of six SG/PAG land certificates every day. As Table 5.7 below shows, SG/PAG covered 1.83% of Yogyakarta’s total area in 2015, a significant increase over 2014, the first post-YSL survey that had taken place.

### Table 5.7 Estimated SG/PAG in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District/City</th>
<th>Total Area (in km²)</th>
<th>SG/PAG (in m²)</th>
<th>Plots Certified</th>
<th>Uncertified Plots</th>
<th>SG/PAG per Total Area (%)</th>
<th>Total SG/PAG (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta City</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>613,345</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantul</td>
<td>506.85</td>
<td>7,031,574</td>
<td>3,074</td>
<td>1,447</td>
<td>1,627</td>
<td>1.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleman</td>
<td>574.82</td>
<td>7,465,502</td>
<td>4,486</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>4,180</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunung Kidul</td>
<td>1,485.36</td>
<td>26,656,191</td>
<td>4,046</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>3,530</td>
<td>1.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kulon Progo</td>
<td>586.27</td>
<td>16,452,534</td>
<td>1,281</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>969</td>
<td>2.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,185.80</strong></td>
<td><strong>58,219,146</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,226</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,867</strong></td>
<td><strong>10,359</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.83</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Office for Land and Spatial Layout (Dipertaru), Yogyakarta Government (2016).

However, the most remarkable increase in the 2015 identification project was in the area of village land. In 2010, a total of 13,026.87 ha of village land had been identified, covering 4.09% of Yogyakarta’s total area. In 2015, this number rose dramatically, to 24,208.38 ha, and constituted 7.60% of Yogyakarta’s total area. Even though the 2015 identification might be more accurate than 2010, because it recorded in detail 31,804 plots of village land, the increase of 11,182 ha of village land after the 2012 YSL was notable.

There were several reasons for this increase. First, now that the YSL had clarified land ownership rights in the Sultan’s favour, his government pushed for a speedy registration process. This approach differed from previous periods in which the Sultanate obstructed registration because it preferred the status quo over land reform initiatives. After 2012, by contrast, there was significant budgetary support for identification and registration purposes. The Land Office and the Yogyakarta Provincial Government allocated special funds (Danais) for land identification. In 2013, the special funds budget for land specialness was IDR 6.3 billion [US$ 575,270]; this increased significantly to IDR 23 billion [US$ 1.8 million] in 2014 (see Table 6.2 in the next chapter). In 2015, the land identification budget for the Yogyakarta Government was IDR 2.6 billion [US$ 187,158]; this rose significantly to IDR 9.3 billion [US$ 673,553] in 2016 and IDR 13.6 billion [US$ 979,535] in 2017 (Bappeda Yogyakarta, 2016, 2017). Moreover, every district/city also budgeted for its own land identification process. For
example, in 2015, Yogyakarta City allocated IDR 598 million [US$ 43,046] for SG/PAG identification.92

The second reason for the expanded proportion of identified village land, and its inclusion into the Sultanate’s land portfolio, was the availability of advanced technology. There was special software for such purposes, and the government spared no expense to use it. In 2017, the budget for software maintenance was IDR 1.1 billion [US$ 79,227]. Third, village officials were mobilised to help map village land. These village officials were willing to support the programme because they expected that they could gain (or maintain) access to land (*pelungguh* and *pengarem-arem*). After their campaign to have the YSL passed and the Sultan was installed as permanent governor, the village leaders were confident that the status of their land would be protected. Thus, they no longer objected to, or actively obstructed, identification and registration of village land. Table 5.8 below shows the village land estimate in 2015, documenting the near doubling of village land between 2010 and 2015 (in other words, after the 2012 YSL).

### Table 5.8 Estimated village land, 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District/City</th>
<th>Total Area</th>
<th>Village Land</th>
<th>Plots</th>
<th>Village Land per Total Area (%)</th>
<th>Total Village Land (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(in km²)</td>
<td>(in m²)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta City</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantul</td>
<td>506.85</td>
<td>32,619,338</td>
<td>8,630</td>
<td>6.44</td>
<td>13.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleman</td>
<td>574.82</td>
<td>159,959,518</td>
<td>17,031</td>
<td>27.83</td>
<td>66.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunung Kidul</td>
<td>1,485.36</td>
<td>21,837,555</td>
<td>2,737</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>20.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kulon Progo</td>
<td>586.27</td>
<td>27,667,389</td>
<td>3,406</td>
<td>4.72</td>
<td>11.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,185.80</strong></td>
<td><strong>242,083,800</strong></td>
<td><strong>31,804</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.60</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


What, then, is the pattern of SG/PAG data from 1993 to 2015? Table 5.9 below shows a compilation of SG/PAG and village land percentages from six available data sources, in 1993, 2002, 2004, 2010, 2014, and 2015. It demonstrates that the percentage of SG/PAG relative to the total area of Yogyakarta was inconsistent and fluctuating, ranging from a low of 1.19% in 2002 to a high (almost double) of 2.02% in 2010. Despite this fluctuation, however, several patterns stand out. First, while there was a slight decrease in royal land between 1993 and 2002,

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this needs to be read against the BAL stipulation that there should be no aristocratic land at all. In effect, therefore, this comparison of the 1993 and 2002 numbers shows how successful the Sultanate was in holding on to its land even after it agreed to the nominal implementation of the BAL in 1984. Second, there was a significant trend of increased SG/PAG land after 1998, when the Sultan took over the governorship again. Aristocratic land increased from 1.19% in 2002, 1.24% in 2004, to 2.02% in 2010.

Third, there was a trend of increasing land identification after the implementation of YSL in late 2012. Subsequently, the percentage of Yogyakarta territory identified as SG/PAG increased from 1.59% to 1.83%, while the amount of village land increased from 4.09% to 7.6%. Especially this second number underlined the significant impact of the YSL on the ability of the Sultanate to claim more land for itself in the post-Suharto era.

### Table 5.9 Percentage of estimated SG/PAG and village land relative to total district area, 1993–2015 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta City</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>6.32</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantul</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>6.03</td>
<td>4.49</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>12.43</td>
<td>7.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleman</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>11.73</td>
<td>29.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunung Kidul</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>3.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kulon Progo</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>8.75</td>
<td>7.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.38</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.19</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.24</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.02</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.59</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.83</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.11</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.43</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s note assessment.

Finally, the chart below shows the fluctuation of SG/PAG land as a percentage of the total area in each district/city of Yogyakarta. First, the chart shows different patterns in each district/city. Yogyakarta City, Bantul, and Kulon Progo had highly fluctuating trends, while Sleman and Kulon Progo fluctuated less. Like in the above table, the peak of SG/PAG in each district/city was in 2010, during the discussion on the YSL, and in 2015, when the land was turned into the Sultanate’s private property. Second, the total amount of SG/PAG land in Yogyakarta City has fluctuated from a low of 0.25% in 2004 to a high of 6.32% in 2002. This is the area where land is of the highest commercial value, and thus contestation over it is highest. Similarly, in Bantul, there was a fluctuation from a high of 6.03% to a (much more realistic) 1.39% in 2015, thus showing the contestation in the area, in which most of the Sultanate’s sacred places are located. For instance, it includes places related to the Sultanate’s origins along the south coast and the royal tombs in Imogiri.
The YSL, then, was the both the temporary climax of the Sultan’s campaign to consolidate his land control and a launching pad to further expand it. The YSL was in line with the wishes of the Sultan and his royalist supporters who had argued that the Sultanate should be allowed to own and manage its traditional lands (DPD RI, 2010; Maria S.W & Zuhro, 2011; Sumardjono, 2007a, 2007b; Suyitno, 1998; Thontowi, 2007). Moderates and anti-royalists, who consisted of three groups that advanced different views, had lost out. The first group supported granting land rights to the Sultanate, but with the government strictly controlling land management, and with traditional lands only being used for social benefits (Lay et al., 2008; Luthfi, 2009; Rozaki & Hariyanto, 2003). The second argued that the state should formally possess royal land and that the aristocracies should only receive management rights (Ismail, 2007). Lastly, anti-royalists maintained that Yogyakarta should fully submit to the BAL, and that therefore – like with other aristocracies in Indonesia – the state should confiscate traditional land and re-distribute it to the poor (Antoro, 2015; Huda, 2013). As the statistics presented above demonstrate, the moderates and anti-loyalists lost this struggle, while the Sultanate emerged from the post-1998 democratisation process in a stronger position than at any other point after independence.
5.6 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the Yogyakarta’s Sultanate’s politico-economic consolidation from Suharto’s resignation in 1998 to the implementation of YSL in 2012, and has explored which role land played in that process. The success of the Sultan in gaining the governorship in 1998 and making it permanent in 2012 was due to two major strategic approaches borrowed from his father’s political legacy. First, he prioritised the status of the Sultanate’s land, both as a resource to be used and as a resource to be further expanded. The most vigorous defenders of the Sultan’s political rights were people who depended economically on the Sultanate’s land. Village heads, who received income from village land that had been handed to their village by the Sultanate in 1918, threatened to shut down the village bureaucracy if the Central Government did not accommodate their demand for the Sultan to become governor for life. As a result of this conservative grassroots pressure, the Yudhoyono government saw no other choice than to legislate the Sultan’s hereditary claim on the governorship. This was despite opposition from pro-democracy activists in Yogyakarta and from Yudhoyono himself, who had earlier insisted on an open election.

The second strategy was to engage in national politics to protect the Sultanate’s interests. This approach expressed itself in the Sultan’s joining of the reform quadrumvirate in 1998, after having shown little prior interest in such reform; the Sultan’s wife taking up a position in the DPD; the Sultan running for the presidency in 2004 and, more seriously, in 2009; and his building up of a close relationship with PDIP, which would prove to be the fiercest proponent of the Sultan’s direct appointment as governor in the YSL deliberations in national parliament. Hamengku Buwono X also had learnt from his father that having a tense relationship with the incumbent president was not necessarily bad for the interests of the Yogyakarta royal family. As his father had previously experienced with Suharto, Hamengku Buwono X fell out with Yudhoyono, and yet was able to achieve what he wanted against the latter’s opposition. The Sultan apparently had concluded that much more important than unquestioned loyalty to the president were anxiety-instilling demonstrations of the Sultanate’s power. It was the protests of the Sultan’s loyalists in 2011 and 2012 – ironically triggered by Yudhoyono’s remark that Indonesia could not accept a ‘monarchy’ in its midst – that persuaded the president that rejecting the Sultan’s demands came at a greater cost than giving in to them.

In all of this, the issue of land was crucial. Indeed, as reported by one of the drafters of the YSL, it was the Sultan’s priority. And he acted in that way too: once he had gained the governorship in 1998, he issued local regulations that in effect tried to overturn the BAL in
Yogyakarta. Subsequently, the land statistics showed not only a successful defence of existing royal land holdings, but an expansion. Once the YSL was enacted, the Sultan’s grip over village land – which had been essential in getting the YSL through parliament in the first place – strengthened further, with the amount of the Sultan’s village land almost doubling between 2010 and 2015. The YSL, it turned out, had accommodated the Sultan’s maximum demands: it gave the Kasultanan and Pakualaman private property ownership of SG/PAG lands, annulling the BAL regulation that former swapraja could not institutionally hold land. Through this, the Yogyakarta Sultanate was able to transform its continuous land access to SG/PAG into stable, sustainable property rights.

Building on this narrative of the Sultan’s pre-2012 fight for political and economic power, the following chapter discusses the early implementation of YSL in Yogyakarta. I argue that the Sultanate used its newly confirmed private property ownership rights to further consolidate and expand the Sultanate as the province’s politico-economic hegemon. It discusses in detail the ‘specialness’ of Yogyakarta and its capacity to shield Yogyakarta from national laws that did not promote the interests of the royal houses.

6.1 Introduction

Having shown how the Sultan led his successful campaign for the YSL, and having given early indications on how this success affected his control over land, the thesis now turns to a detailed examination of post-2012 Yogyakarta. This chapter, therefore, explores the early implementation of the YSL from 2012 to 2017, and its political and economic effects. Broadly, the YSL gave Yogyakarta five special powers. First, the YSL reserved the position of governor and deputy governor for Sultan Hamengku Buwono and Paku Alam, with the positions being hereditary and without term limits. Second, the YSL turned the royal houses’ traditional land into private property for both Kasultanan and Pakualaman, with the government even bearing the cost of the land titling processes. Third, it granted the Sultanate autonomy to regulate the spatial layout (tata ruang) on its lands, which is of great cultural importance to them. Fourth, it allowed Yogyakarta to create a unique bureaucratic structure. Fifth, the YSL allowed the Yogyakarta Government to develop the region based on the Javanese culture. To support that specialness, the Central Government provided Yogyakarta with special funds (Dana Keistimewaan – Danais).

In this chapter, I argue that while the YSL gave the Sultanate significant material resources that further boosted its superior political power in Yogyakarta, it also created vertical conflicts between the people and the royal houses. These conflicts related primarily to land, with the Sultan now even more assertive in insisting on his land rights than before. Similarly, there were new horizontal, internal disputes between members of the royal house that threatened the future of the Sultanate. Although the Sultan was now the undisputed centre of power, his succession was not regulated in the YSL. As a father of five daughters and thus no obvious heir, Hamengku Buwono X became vulnerable to ambitions from other family members to succeed him after his death. Hence, the five years since the passage of the YSL successfully returned the quasi-feudal power of the Yogyakarta aristocracies and strengthened the clientelistic relationships based on dependency on traditional land – but it also brought new tensions that usually accompany increases of power.

The chapter proceeds as follows. It first describes in detail the five areas of special powers that Yogyakarta (and the Sultan) enjoyed through the 2012 YSL. Subsequently, it explains the use of the special funds, showing how they allowed the Sultan to verify his land claims – and to sell the Sultanate’s land to his own government for infrastructure projects.
financed under the special funds’ regime. The third section, however, shows how new land conflicts emerged as a result of the Sultan’s strengthened superior over land. In the fourth section, I highlight one particular group suffering under the cemented quasi-feudal authority of the Sultan: that is, the ethnic Chinese, who were not allowed to own land, all national anti-discrimination protections notwithstanding. Finally, the chapter analyses how the Sultan’s powers over village land clashed with national legislation on villages issued in 2014, and how citizens residing on SG/PAG land faced new uncertainty as a result of the Sultan’s consolidated land claims.

6.2 The Specialness of Yogyakarta

The 2012 created a hybrid, semi-democratic enclave in Indonesia’s post-1998 democracy. Surrounded by democratically elected governments at the national and local level, Yogyakarta was turned into an executive monarchy with some democratic controls. The YSL produced no constitutional monarchy as in Malaysia or in Western Europe; in Yogyakarta, the Sultan now holds executive power, and has a claim on that power being passed on to his heir. Thus, the executive leader of the province is not determined by the will of the electorate, but by blood right – violating major principles of democratic organisation (Diamond, 1994, 2010; Diamond & Morlino, 2005; Tan, 2006). At the same time, the Yogyakarta polity retained some democratic features. The provincial and districts/city parliaments continue to be democratically elected, as are the mayor of the city and the regents of the regencies. In some ways, this hybrid between monarchism and democratic contestation fits within descriptions of Indonesia as a deeply defective patronage democracy (Ufen, 2008; Webber, 2006). And yet, the case of Yogyakarta remains unique, with the province’s royal family gaining rights no other Indonesian territory or ruling elite could claim.

As indicated above, the YSL – passed by parliament on 31 August 2012 as Law No. 13/2012 – granted five types of special authority: reserved governorship; aristocratic land; authority over spatial layout planning; government structure; and culture. To support these authorities, the government gave Yogyakarta special budgetary support (Danais). In the first area of special rights, the Sultan and Paku Alam reign, respectively, as the ex officio Governor and Deputy Governor of Yogyakarta, without elections. This is the strongest legal basis for the Sultan’s claim to the governorship since Indonesia’s independence in 1945. As demonstrated in prior chapters, the Sultan had drawn his legitimacy as governor from a series of laws and regulations, but none had been as clear and permanent as the 2012 YSL. Unlike previous regulations, YSL did not limit the governorship to the incumbent Sultan (as Law No. 5/1974
had), and it did not specify time periods after which the president would have to extend the Sultan’s period (as had occurred in 2003, 2008 and 2011). Thus, the YSL regulations on this issue were extraordinarily strong, and fully accommodated the Sultan’s demands.

A particular victory of the royalists in the YSL deliberations was the lack of a palace succession regulation. The ministry’s initial drafters had deliberately included no stipulations on this issue as in their concept the Sultan held no executive power, and it was thus considered politically irrelevant who succeeded a deceased sultan. When the overall concept was changed in the last minute to institutionalise an executive monarchy, the problem of succession was not revisited. With this, the Sultan had even more autonomy than during the co-ruling arrangements during the colonial period. The last Dutch–Yogyakarta Sultanate contractual agreement in 1940, for instance, included details of on the succession, limiting it to male descendants of the previous two sultans. The sons of the most recent sultan from his Queen (garwa padmi) had more rights than the sons of the concubines (garwa ampeyan) (Atmakusumah, 2011, p. 366). This tradition had been followed since 1755 (Harjono, 2012). By contrast, the 2012 YSL made no such arrangements.

Second, the royal houses received – for the first time since the colonial period – private property rights over their land holdings. The YSL held that SG/PAG land, palace and non-palace lands, belongs to the royalty (Article 32) – in effect annulling the BAL stipulation that the aristocracy can’t possess land. Indeed, the government integrated Yogyakarta’s traditional land into the national land certification system, and thus stipulated that the central and provincial government must bear the cost of the land titling process (Article 44). Further, any party that would like to receive access to the land should receive written permission from the Sultanate (Article 33). But as the regulations on the governorship, the YSL benefitted the Sultan both in what it guaranteed and what it left out. Most importantly, the law did not specify clearly what fell into the category of ‘non-palace land.’ In the elucidation of Article 32, the YSL stated that,

Non-palace land is divided into two kinds: first, land that has been used by the people/institutions with rights (for example, magersari, ngindung, usage rights, forests, campuses, hospitals, and others); and land that is used by people without any rights (Elucidation of Article 32; point 4, Law No. 13/2012).

In its most expansive interpretation, this regulation confirmed the Sultan’s 1988 stance that there was no state land in Yogyakarta, but only the Sultanate’s land. The listing of campuses and hospitals in particular suggested that even land granted to the ‘state’ for the building of
schools and hospitals after 1984 was now re-categorised as the Sultanate’s property. Further, the addition of ‘and others’ meant that there was much room for the governor-cum-sultan to expand his land claims as he saw fit. This related especially to village land, which was not listed in the YSL but which the Sultanate traditionally included under its non-palace land possessions. Hence, while the YSL in principle strengthened the Sultan’s land claims, it also planted the seeds for further (and new) conflict as the multiple interpretations of what exactly was included in the Sultanate’s land made overlapping claims inevitable. Another – probably deliberate – omission concerned possible obligations normally associated with land ownership, such as land taxes. No such obligations, unsurprisingly, were imposed on the Sultanate and its affiliated agencies.

The de facto tax-free status of the Kasultanan and Pakualaman was particularly generous because they were classified as *badan hukum* (legal entities) at the same time. This was done in order to justify their holding of land possessions, but when it came to the legal obligations normally attached to a *badan hukum*, the YSL fell silent. The status of the sultanates as *badan hukum*, and hence as a private enterprise, also appeared at odds with their many public roles and privileges as the guardians of tradition and culture, among others. There have been wide-ranging discussions in academia about the boundaries of public and private entities (in the case of political parties, for instance), with each classification carrying a host of legal, social and political implications (Bozeman & Kingsley, 1998; Cornforth, 2003; Jurkiewicz, Massey, & Brown, 1998). But the case of the Yogyakarta royal houses was, once again, unique in its maximalisation of the privileges associated with private status and the minimisation of its obligations.

Third, the YSL gave the royal houses authority to regulate the spatial layout of their lands (Article 34). This was important for two major reasons. First, given the potentially broad definition of ‘land owned by the Sultanate and [Pakualaman]’, the authority to determine its spatial planning was – if the maximum definition was applied – affecting much of Yogyakarta’s land that was not in the hands of private owners. Second, the spatial layout of the province has been of great cultural importance to the Sultanate. That layout follows an imaginary philosophical line from South to North, with Kraton as the centre. This axis is symbolised by five landmarks: Parangkusumo Beach, Panggung Krapyak, Siti Hinggil in Kraton, Tugu, and Mount Merapi. Also, there are four mosques in the four compass directions of Yogyakarta, called *Pathok Negoro* (nails of the state), which are centred on the Sultanate’s grand mosque.
Mallany (2016, pp. 32-39) argued that those symbols were important in the Islamic proselytization in Yogyakarta.

Beyond the spread of Islam, spatial layout in the Sultanate’s land also reflected its philosophical concept of power. In its traditional layout, the Sultanate’s land features the Kraton as the centre of power, as shown in Chapter Two. The Kraton, according to Behrend (1989), was built mimicking the Kraton of Batara Indra in the Hindu Junggring Salaka. Aryanti (2013, p. ii) has also argued that the layout in three of the Sultanate’s mosques and two mosques near the palace complex constitute ‘a disciplinary mechanism of spatial and visual segregation that privileges men and posits the mosque as a space for men.’ Moreover, comparative research by Purwani (2017, p. 81) in Yogyakarta and Surakarta finds that ‘the cosmological layout in urban scope in both cities shows that the layouts […] are a practice of power.’ By controlling the spatial layout of their land, then, the aristocracies maintained their power to turn their cultural narrative into architectural reality.

Fourth, the provincial government received the authority to create a different administrative structure, reflecting the format of traditional institutions. Even though decentralisation had been implemented nationwide since 2001, government structures at the provincial and district/city level have followed strict guidelines from the Ministry of Interior Affairs (for villages, different names and formats for institutions were allowed, however). For instance, in 2008, the Minister of Interior Affairs issued Decree No. 20/2008, setting a uniform structure of licensing offices in the districts and provinces. This came on top of other nationwide institutions regulated in legislation – such as the Dinas (lit. service) offices across Indonesia that carry out decentralisation functions and establish a link to the various ministries in Jakarta. Against the background of the Central Government’s uniformity policy on provincial and district/city institutions, the authority of the Yogyakarta Provincial Government to form its own unique government structure was a significant concession.

However, this ability to form unique government structures was limited to the provincial level. Yogyakarta City and the districts had to follow the decentralisation law in arranging and naming their institutions. This mismatch between provincial and sub-provincial institutions made policy coordination difficult. It also created capacity problems, as the province now had ‘specialness’ funds that it wanted the city and districts to spend – but they often did not have the staff to manage the money and implement the relevant projects. For example, prior to the passing of the YSL in 2012, only four or five officers had dealt with cultural programs at the district level, handling a small budget. This changed after the province began receiving Danais,
which gave the cultural divisions at the district level up to a hundred times their previous budget. For district officers who lacked necessary training and capabilities, it was better not to ‘touch’ the Danais budget rather than maximising its use, as mismanagement might cause trouble for them. As a result, many ‘specialness’ funds – at least in the early post-2012 period – failed to reach their targets because of bureaucratic bottlenecks at the sub-provincial level.

Fifth, the Yogyakarta Government is mandated by the YSL to maintain the Javanese culture (Article 31). This regulation opened up the opportunity for the aristocracies to claim their own ceremonies and the maintenance of their buildings as part of this cultural mandate, and thus seek funding for them. The maintenance and renovation of the Kraton, for instance, involves special treatments that require more attention to detail (and hence more funds) than the maintenance and renovation of newer buildings. Prince Bimo, who in 2016 became Paku Alam X, said in an interview with the author that he had to turn to costly specialists to fix the kilometres of brass gutters in the Pakualaman palace because members of contemporary society only buy factory-produced plastic gutters. Also, the Queen GKR Hemas explained that the Kraton Yogyakarta requires continuous maintenance. She said, ‘For the whole year, we maintain Kraton from the east to the west. When the New Year begins, we restart again from the east because it already needs more maintenance.’ In short, the financial burden of maintaining the palaces was large, but it was significantly reduced by the YSL’s stipulation that it was the province’s responsibility.

Even before 2012, there had been a boom in the cultural industry in Yogyakarta, indicating its increased importance as an economic and political factor in Yogyakarta’s society. In 2002, there had been 2,856 cultural organisations in Yogyakarta; this number rose to 5,426 six years later. There were also 4,203 art performances and 720 national and international events in Yogyakarta in 2009. Accordingly, the oversight over cultural affairs that the YSL granted to the governor (and, in effect) the Sultan was much more than a folkloristic task. It gave him influence on, and access to, a large segment of the economy. It also provided him with control over the usage of Danais in relation to cultural affairs. Many of the 511 fixed and 746 mobile cultural assets, sixteen cultural zones and thirty-four museums (Yogyakarta Province Government, 2011) that the Danais was set aside to maintain were sites owned by or affiliated

94 Interview, Prince Bimo, 13 March 2015 in Yogyakarta.
95 Interview, Queen GKR Hemas, 11 February 2015 in Jakarta.
with the royal houses. Thus, not only did the YSL help with the maintenance of the Sultanate’s palaces, but it promised to cover its other assets as well.

The privileges in the five areas of policymaking and asset control mentioned above were further strengthened by another exception from national rules: the YSL became the only law in Indonesia that does not require a government regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah – PP) for implementation. Instead, it only needed further regulation through special bylaws (Peraturan Daerah Istimewa – Perdais), which would be jointly formulated by the governor and the Yogyakarta Parliament. In insisting on this special right, advocates of the YSL had learnt from Aceh’s experience. There, the necessity to issue government regulations had been used by Jakarta to delay the implementation of the 2006 Aceh Governance law – as demonstrated by the fact that only five out of ten PP had been issued eleven years after the law was passed by parliament. By contrast, in August 2017, four out of five special statuses had been further regulated by Perdais: the governorship, land, spatial layout, and government structure. Thus, Yogyakarta’s ‘specialness’ exceeded even the hard-fought Aceh special autonomy deal, leaving the Central Government with few mechanisms of intervention in internal Yogyakarta affairs.

With the Sultan firmly established as Yogyakarta’s political hegemon, other institutions have seen little point in exercising the limited control functions that the YSL gave them. Most importantly, the democratically elected parliament rarely criticises, let alone challenges, the Sultan. This can be seen in two examples. First, significant decisions are made by the Yogyakarta Parliament primarily based on consensus rather than voting. This means that dissenting voices and potential critiques of the Sultan are suppressed before they can be represented in a vote. Second, during the discussion of the Perdais on the governorship, which was issued in 2015, all 40 members of the Yogyakarta Parliament went to the palace to receive an audience with the Sultan.96 This was the reverse of normal legislative processes, in which the executive attends parliament for the deliberations. The YSL law, it appears, not only consolidated the Sultan’s power, but emasculated other political actors that previously would have made an effort to control him.

96 Interview, Prince KPH Purbodiningrat, Sultan Hamengku Buwono X’s son in law and member of Yogyakarta Parliament (PDIP), 20 February 2015 in Yogyakarta.
6.3 Special Funds and the Commercialisation of Royal Land

One of the most important resources provided by the YSL is the Danais, or special funds. As it would turn out, the Danais would become a major source of direct and indirect income not only for the province, but for the royal houses as well – once again, land played a key role in this. To be sure, special funds have been common in provinces with asymmetrical decentralisation arrangements (that is, decentralisation going beyond the normal decentralisation privileges granted to other territories). Out of the five cases with such arrangements (Papua and West Papua, Aceh, Jakarta, and Yogyakarta), only Jakarta does not receive special funds, given that it is the centre of economic activity in Indonesia and thus has sufficient tax revenue. Aceh, Papua, and West Papua, on the other hand, have been granted Special Autonomy Funds (Dana Otonomi Khusus – Dana Otsus), derived from specific percentages of Jakarta’s total general funds allocation (Dana Alokasi Umum – DAU) to the regions. These regulations were put in place for twenty years – meaning that they are currently nearing their end, and extension negotiations have already begun.97

However, there have been significant differences in the special budgetary allocation for Aceh, Papua, and Yogyakarta. To begin with, there is no time limitation on Danais; the Central Government will continue to offer Danais as long as Yogyakarta enjoys special region status. Second, while Dana Otsus is based on a grant scheme, Danais is a performance-based budget paid out in three phases per year, regulated by the Ministry of Finance. Yogyakarta performed poorly in the early years of Danais implementation, partly due to the bottleneck issues discussed above. As a result, Yogyakarta bureaucrats were incapable of delivering accurate performance-based reports based on Central Government terms of verification (Kompas, 24 February 2015). The problems in the early phase of the funds had repercussions for later periods, as one of the main performance-based criteria was that 80% paid in the previous phase had to be spent before the next funds could be released. In 2015, for instance, the first Danais payment of the year could only be transferred in early March and could, therefore, not be used for financing budget allocations in January and February.98

Based on the experience of the first two years of Danais implementation, in 2015 the Yogyakarta government proposed to change the payment scheduling from 25%–55%–20% (as

97 Aceh received Dana Otsus calculated from 2% of DAU for 15 years and 1% for the remaining five years. Both Papua and West Papua Provinces, meanwhile, receive Dana Otsus from 2% of DAU for 20 years; Papua Province receives 70% while West Papua Province receives 30% of Dana Otsus.
98 Interview, an official of Ministry of Internal Affairs, 6 February 2015 in Jakarta.
in 2014–2015) to 15%–65%–20% (from 2016 onward). In other words, it wanted less money in the first phase so that failure to spend it properly would not negatively impact the disbursement of later payments. Jakarta granted this request through the Ministry of Finance Decree No. 124/PMK.07/2015. Subsequently, the ability of the Yogyakarta government to spend the funds improved, and the opportunity to ask for more funds in the following year grew accordingly. As shown in Table 6.1 below, the total Danais paid out to the Yogyakarta government increased from IDR 547 billion [US$ 39.3 million] to IDR 800 billion [US$ 57.6 million] between 2015 and 2017. After 2015, the government’s Danais expenditure consistently exceeded the 80% mark, allowing it to receive the following payments and request more for the following year. While the approved budget amounts were well below what the Yogyakarta government asked for (usually, it has received about half of the requested budget), this is standard in Indonesian budget negotiations.

Table 6.1 Danais allocation and performance, 2013–2017 (in billions IDR)

A closer expenditure analysis demonstrates how the Danais was used for purposes close to the Sultanate’s institutional interests. Table 6.2 below shows the Danais budget allocation for Yogyakarta’s five special authorities, namely culture, spatial layout, government structure, land, and governorship from 2013 to 2017, as well as the projections to 2022. As hinted in the previous chapter, a significant amount of the Danais was spent on aristocratic land management. In 2013, this allocation was IDR 6.3 billion [US$ 575,270], increasing to IDR 23 billion [US$ 1.65 million] in 2015. Primarily, the budget was used to accelerate the SG/PAG
and village land identification project, which was completed in 2015. Afterwards, the Danais land budget went towards increasing the capacity of the aging and uneducated palace servant (abdi dalem) to maintain the data. For instance, in 2016, Danais allocated a budget of IDR 883 million [US$ 63,951] for a programme called ‘Upgrading the capacity of land authorities for Kasultanan and Pakualaman’ (Bappeda Yogyakarta, 2018). From the IDR 13.9 billion [US$ 1 million] budget for land in 2016, both the Sultanate and Pakualaman received direct benefits of at least IDR 3 billion [US$ 217,000] and indirect benefits of IDR 10 billion [US$ 724,000].

Table 6.2 Danais Allocation per specialness 2013-2022 (in billion IDR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Governorship</th>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Government Structure</th>
<th>Spatial Layout</th>
<th>Culture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>212.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>123.6</td>
<td>375.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>114.4</td>
<td>420.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>352.7</td>
<td>179.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>325.8</td>
<td>439.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018*</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>1035</td>
<td>661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>1138.5</td>
<td>693.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>1252.3</td>
<td>729.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>1377.5</td>
<td>768.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022*</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>111.1</td>
<td>1515.3</td>
<td>808.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*projected

However, a line-by-line budget examination reveals an even more complicated picture. As it turned out, the government spent much of the Danais on infrastructure projects (many of which benefitted the Sultanate) by labelling them as ‘cultural’ and ‘spatial layout’ spending. Table 6.1 shows that more than 95% of Danais between 2013 and 2017 was allocated for culture and spatial layout (96% in 2013; 95% in 2014; 97% in 2015; 97% in 2016; and 95% in 2017). The labelling of infrastructure projects under ‘culture’ had its origins in the abovementioned

Details of budgetary allocation for Danais was accessed from http://monevapbd.jogiaprov.go.id on October 2017.
problems of spending the allocated budgets. In 2013, the Yogyakarta Government allocated 92% of Danais for culture, but was only able to spend 23% of the money. The large amount of unspent funds obstructed requests for an increased budget for the following year. Therefore, to address its limited spending capacity, the Yogyakarta government found ways to quickly spend the Danais by creating infrastructure projects under its ‘cultural’ and ‘spatial layout’ special authorities.

To facilitate this spending under a different label, the Yogyakarta Provincial Government argued in 2014 that ‘culture’ should be defined in a broad sense that goes beyond traditional Javanese music, dance, or other performances. Culture, it asserted, includes all human creation and development. The Ministry of Finance subsequently approved this new definition, with the requirement that the new spending ‘does not exceed the limit of the Danais budget.’

The government immediately began spending money under the revised definition. In 2014, for example, IDR 41 billion [US$ 3.3 million] was spent buying land to develop the 125 kilometres Southern Ring Road (Jalan Jalur Lingkar Selatan – JJLS) (Harian Jogja, 5 November 2015). JJLS is a new road, stretching 123 kilometres along the south part of Yogyakarta, which links to a similar route in Central and East Java Provinces (see Map 4 of JJLS). Conveniently for the Sultanate, a significant amount of the land needed for the road is SG/PAG land. The chairman of the Land and Spatial Layout Office in the Yogyakarta Government, Hananto Hadi Purnomo, acknowledged this in 2017: he pointed out that the land release process for the JJLS project was unlikely to face any obstacles because ‘most [lands] are located on SG land’ (Solopos, 13 September 2017).

This meant that Danais funds were spent – through the government headed by the Sultan – to purchase land from the Sultanate. Between 2013 and 2017, the Sultanate received IDR 393 billion [US$ 28 million to US$ 35 million] for the release of its land for infrastructure projects, including the JJLS road (see Table 6.3 further below). Indeed, purchasing land became one of the main items in the Danais budget. In 2017, for instance, the Yogyakarta Government allocated 64% of Danais to release lands in thirteen areas, including those affected by the JJLS project (Pikiran Rakyat, 22 Maret 2016). In 2018, the Yogyakarta Government spent IDR 300 billion [US$ 20.3 million] (30% of Danais) to release eighteen plots of land for JJLS along the Plajen–Baron–Tepus route (13 km) and Tepus–Jerukwudel route (17 km). From these sales, the Yogyakarta royal house benefitted in multiple ways: first, by receiving straight profits from its

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100 Interview, a high-ranking Yogyakarta Government bureaucrat on 30 December 2014 in Yogyakarta and staff of the Ministry of Finance, 4 February 2015 in Jakarta.
traditional land, and second, by seeing the long-term value of the remaining land in the vicinity of the road increasing as it was now located near a strategic asset.

Map 4 Yogyakarta Southern Road Project (JJLS)


Moreover, the Yogyakarta government has started to plan the Jogjakarta Outer Ring Road (JORR) in the western and northern part of Yogyakarta. This planned road project, to begin in 2019, would offer more opportunities to the Sultanate to sell SG land to the government. Before construction can begin, the project needs to release 373,735 m\(^2\) of land in Sleman and 153,215 m\(^2\) of land in Bantul to produce a total of 110 km of road. JORR is intended particularly for the transport of goods, so that large trucks will not enter Yogyakarta’s urban area (Yogyakarta Province Government, 2017b). While it is not known at this point just how much of this land is on the Sultan’s grounds, it is likely to be a significant percentage.
The volume of sales of the Sultan’s land to his provincial government has increased over time. Table 6.3 above shows the trend of Danais allocation for infrastructure projects on SG land, and the release of this land for them, from 2013 to 2017. In 2013, only 2% of the Danais money was spent for projects in SG areas (if infrastructure spending and land sale figures are combined). This number rose to 33% in 2014, reached its peak of 63% in 2016, before declining to 49% in 2017. The percentage only decreased in 2017, however, because the total Danais budget recorded a big rise – in total numbers, the investment on SG land still increased. In total, between 2013 and 2017 IDR 657 billion [US$ 53 million] was allocated for infrastructure projects on SG land, while IDR 393 billion [US$ 31 million] was spent to release the Sultan’s land. Thus, roughly IDR 1 trillion [US$ 80 million] of the Danais budget has been directly and indirectly benefited the Sultanate over the last five years – either in the form of direct payments or by building infrastructure that increased the value of remaining aristocratic land around it.

Another key example of this trend is the New Yogyakarta International Airport, a project pushed by President Joko Widodo as part of his national infrastructure program. Opened in May 2019, the estimated cost of the construction was IDR 10.8 trillion (US$ 777 million), taken from the national budget. Out of the 587.2 ha of land in Kulon Progo set aside for the project, 160 ha (27%) was PAG; as such, Pakualaman received IDR 701.5 billion ($50.8
million) in early 2018. In an interview with the author, Paku Alam X, the reigning aristocrat and Deputy Governor of Yogyakarta, acknowledged the money will ‘be used to buy land in Yogyakarta. If we cannot find an entire single plot, we will buy separate plots until all the money is fully spent.’ In other words, the sale allowed Paku Alam X to turn the sandy, rural area of Kulon Progo into monetary resources, which he subsequently used to buy plots of land in Yogyakarta in prime locations. Moreover, the deputy governor could register this new land as the private property of Pakualaman.

The sale of royal rural land to the government, while purchasing other land closer to the city, has been a sound commercial strategy on the part of the aristocratic houses. Yogyakarta has seen one of the highest increases in land prices in Indonesia as its society has rapidly shifted from rural to urban life. Research by Suparmono (2012), for example, showed that from 1995–2011, land prices increased by 370%. In addition, BTN Bank, which specialises in property credit, released the House Price Index of 2018 that placed Yogyakarta as the province with the seventh highest property price increase in Indonesia, with a 13.7% increase in 2017. Against this background, maintaining land for agricultural purposes is no longer economically profitable – much higher profits can be generated by land that can be used for business and development projects. In addition, developers have shown great interest in peri-urban land for the construction of housing complexes, as Yogyakarta’s city population is rapidly expanding beyond the city’s actual boundaries (Pradoto, 2012). It is this peri-urban area where much of the SG/PAG is located.

In sum, the Danais constituted a significant benefit to Yogyakarta’s royal houses. Not only did it allow them to verify their land claims at the state’s expense and train its own staff in maintaining the records crucial to those claims. It also provided funds for cultural events that boosted their legitimacy and helped them to manage their buildings and other assets. Most importantly, however, the funds were used to purchase land from the aristocracies to develop infrastructure projects – flushing cash into the Sultanate’s coffers and increasing the value of its remaining land holdings. In other provinces or districts, such sales would have been considered a conflict of interest, given that the Sultan as head of the government directed state funds to be used for the acquisition of his own land. In Yogyakarta, however, this has been widely seen as part of the province’s ‘specialness.’ Indeed, the use of ‘cultural’ funds for

infrastructure projects is set to continue. From the allocated budget for culture in 2018, 54.9% was planned for physical projects, including the development of cultural centres in fifty-six villages (Yogyakarta Province Government, 2017c). Not coincidentally, of course, villages have been a crucial power base for the Sultan, as the successful campaign for the YSL compellingly demonstrated.

6.4 Land Titling and Conflicts
The key to turning land access into land property, as discussed by Alchian (2007); Demsetz (1967); Feder and Feeny (1991); Ribot and Peluso (2003) is obtaining land certification that indicates private property ownership. In Indonesia, this is known as the Ownership Right Certificate (Sertifikat Hak Milik/SHM). As previously explained in Table 4.1, SHM is the strongest proof of land ownership, and can be passed by its owner to descendants without any time limitations. There are also few restrictions on how the land can be used, including leasing it to others. After 2012, the Sultanate gained the firm legal right to give usage rights (hak pakai/HP) to certain individuals/institutions, both private and public, and thus derive economic benefits from land. The difference with the previous period of ‘access’ (1945–2012) lies in the legal status of the land. While during the ‘access’ period the Sultanate had formally lost its property rights and was only able to defend its land holdings through political interventions, the post-2012 ‘property’ period gave it permanent and even legislatively anchored land rights.

Studies in other countries have shown that land titling creates land security. Studies in China, for instance, suggest that land titling increases the amount of land transferred to enterprises and households, and improves the efficiency of the market for land rentals by helping to establish formal rental contracts (Cheng, Xu, Zhou, He, & Zhang, 2019). Similarly, it has been pointed out that land titling initiatives can help the urban poor to access credit and reduce poverty (Galiani & Schargrodsky, 2010). As I will show in this section, however, if land titling is under the control of a party with vested interests – in this case, the Sultanate as a major land holder – land titling programs can create tensions and establish certainty only for one party involved: the dominant actor in the land titling process whose own land holdings achieve firm legal status. Other parties, on the other hand, often lose out in their claims of ownership and usage rights.

Post-2012 regulations strongly entrenched the Sultanate’s privileged position both as a landholder and as part of the governmental infrastructure. For instance, Special Bylaw No. 1/2017 on the Management of the Sultanate’s and Pakualaman’s Lands, ordered each section
of the Yogyakarta Government to ‘facilitate’ (that is, assist) the Kasultananan and Pakualaman in exercising their private property rights (Chapter VI). Accordingly, government offices at the districts/city level and in the villages became the Sultanate’s subordinate assistants, helping it to secure its traditional land rights. In Article 24, point (1), this bylaw rules:

In order to exercise the authority to manage and to use the lands owned by the Sultanate of Yogyakarta and the Pakualaman Principality, the district/city governments are to facilitate the Kasultananan and the Pakualaman.

The bylaw further specified the type of ‘facilitation’ that local governments should provide, ranging from land identification, document control to land conflict resolution. The regulation also detailed how citizens and institutions could require permission to use the Sultanate’s land, including in the form of magersari, ngindung, anganggo, and anggaduh (Article 8) that related to village land. For this process to be completed, land titles had to be obtained – both for the royal houses and entities seeking usage rights. The government covered the titling cost through Danais, although the royal houses gained the benefit of legal certification.

In helping the Sultanate to certify its land claims, the YSL extended a significant favour. This is because land certification and mapping have been a major problem for land owners (and other occupiers) nationwide. The first hurdle, as indicated previously, is the institutional dualism of land administration and registration. At the time of writing, the Land Office’s jurisdiction only covers around 35.07% of Indonesia’s land area (67.08 million hectares), while the Ministry of Forestry manages the remaining 64.93% (124.19 million hectares) (BPN, 2015b, p. 4). This dualism, in many cases, has created conflicts and power struggles between the institutions (Bakker & Moniaga, 2010). Since decentralisation, conflicts and overlapping claims have arisen owing to the multiple laws in practice—there are 13 conflicting laws (Wahid, Saebo, & Furuholt, 2015).

Second, the use of information and geospatial technology has been limited and thus unable to reduce land conflict (Wahid et al., 2015). The computerisation of the Land Office (Komputerisasi Kantor Pertanahan – KKP) began in 1997; it had spread to 124 offices by 2008 and was fully adopted nationally (430 offices) by 2010. But in 2013, of the 191.09 million ha of land area in Indonesia, only 53.64% had been captured by satellite mapping, and only 13.31% (25.43 million hectares) had been processed for primary mapping (BPN, 2014). Consequently, land conflicts in Indonesia have remained widespread, with some 3,906 cases reported in 2014.
In this context, the special services provided by Yogyakarta’s government institutions to the royal houses in terms of land mapping, verification and certification were significant. As part of the national bureaucracy, the Yogyakarta Land Office was tasked with delivering both the national targets set by the Central Land Office in Jakarta and provincial targets (including aristocratic land certification), as stipulated by the YSL.

The program to register Kasultanan and Pakualaman Land started in 2014 and is expected to finish in 2024. Three parties have been involved in the process: the Yogyakarta Provincial Government (including district, sub-district, and village governments), the Yogyakarta Land Office (provincial and district branches), and both Kasultanan and Pakualaman. Between 2014 and 2016, 13,226 plots were identified, with a total area of 58 km² or 58,000,000 m². SG/PAG data is based on village maps drafted in 1838 and land registration data collected during the colonial period (Koran Sindo, 9 August 2015). Kasultanan has SG in every part of Yogyakarta, except for the four sub-districts in Kulon Progo that are owned by Pakualaman and three sub-districts that were previously enclaves of Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran. Pakualaman controls 321 plots, or 1,182.578 ha, of land, consisting of 359.16 ha in Panjatan, 315.42 ha in Temon, 287.97 ha in Galur, and 220.01 ha in Wates (Tribun Jogja, 5 March 2018). In 2016, the chairman of the Land and Spatial Layout Office in the Yogyakarta Government, Hananto Hadi Purnomo, stated ‘We have identified around 90% of total SG/PAG land’ (Koran Sindo, 5 November 2015). From 2016 to 2017, a total of IDR 23.3 billion [US$ 1.6 million] had been spent to help both institutions identify and integrate their lands into the national land certification system.103

Several rigorous processes are needed to identify SG/PAG before private property certificates are issued. Typically, the used method includes geospatial analysis and social and historical confirmation. One of the most critical but smoothest processes of identification is the acknowledgment of land users. Villagers have mostly supported the identification of SG/PAG and acknowledged that land is not theirs. The acceptance of SG/PAG, I argue, is due to the long-standing loyalty of village officials towards the Sultan, and the Sultanate’s constant and continuous campaign to defend its land. One part of this campaign has been the systematic use of the Javanese idiom ‘Sadumuk bathuk, sanyari bumi, ditohi mati’ (Even one touch of the forehead, one finger length of land, will be defended to the death). In the context of the

104 The forehead, for the Javanese, is a symbol of pride and dignity. Touching someone’s forehead, therefore, is a symbol of abusing one’s dignity.
Indonesian Revolution, this proverb represented nationalism in defending every inch of land from the Dutch. However, in the current polity, it was widely seen as referring to the Sultan’s land. For example, the photo below was taken at the newly built provincial library in Yogyakarta. On each wall, the proverb is inscribed.

**Picture 4 Javanese proverb on the wall of the provincial library**

Table 6.4 below shows the process of SG/PAG identification and registration from 2013 to 2017. It shows that 14,044 plots of SG/PAG land were identified, consisting of 13,688 plots of SG land and 356 plots of PAG land. SG was found in all districts of Yogyakarta as well as in Yogyakarta City, with most being found in Gunung Kidul and Sleman, while PAG was only identified in Yogyakarta City and Kulon Progo. From the 14,044 identified plots, 7,388 (52%) are still in the process of land registration at the time of writing, and 3,196 private
property certificates have been issued for SG/PAG plots. The remaining 48% will be certified in later years, following the administration and technical requirements set by the Danais budget, and is expected to be finished by 2024. The registration process reached its peak in 2015, with 2,170 plots being registered; in 2016 and 2017, 1,140 and 1,270 plots were registered respectively.
Table 6.4 Number of SG/PAG certificates issued (2014–2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District/City</th>
<th>Identification</th>
<th>Registration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SG</td>
<td>PAG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta City</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,432</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4,486</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4,046</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,286</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13,688</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grand Total 14,044 7,388

Source: Governor Decree No. 31/2018 p. 138.
But precisely because the Sultanate now had such a strong role in land certification, old land conflicts re-emerged and new conflicts broke out. The YSL had given the Sultanate a vague yet potentially very expansive definition of what qualified as Sultan’s grounds, and concurrently provided it with a key role in the certification process. This was certain to impact on the claims of other land owners and users. Thus, the certification processes created horizontal conflicts between members of the aristocracy on the one hand and vertical conflict between the Sultanate and society on the other. These conflicts acquired a particular intensity as they occurred during a new real estate boom in Yogyakarta, fuelled by big infrastructure projects and the abovementioned process of urbanisation. In the following, I discuss cases of land conflict that show how the claims of the established aristocratic regimes received challenges from both inside and outside the royal houses. Kasultanan and Pakualaman, however, have remained strong and emerged as winners in these conflicts due to their hegemonic control of land.

The first case is one already touched upon in Chapter 4. Recall that a descendant of Sultan Hamengku Buwono VII, who issued the *Rijksblad* of 1918, demanded to be given land as an inheritance after the passing of the BAL in 1960. In a highly controversial case, Prince GPH Tejokusumo, a grandson of Sultan Hamengku Buwono VII, accused his cousin – the then ruling Hamengku Buwono IX – of taking two hectares of his grandfather’s land in the most strategic spot of Malioboro Street, which had been used as the office for Yogyakarta Parliament since the revolution. Prince GPH Tejokusumo argued that the land privately belonged to his grandfather, and therefore should be divided between all of Hamengku Buwono VII’s descendants. In 1962, the Yogyakarta City court stipulated that the land belonged to the reigning Hamengku Buwono and not to Hamengku Buwono VII as an individual. Prince GPH Tejokusumo appealed to the Provincial Court in Semarang, but lost again in a verdict dated 18 February 1966 (*Kompas*, June 9, 1971).

In 2003, a great-great-grandchild of Hamengku Buwono VII, a former police intelligence officer named RM (*Raden Mas*) Triyanto Prastowo Sumarsono,105 started a personal initiative to reclaim SG for himself. Unlike his grandfather in the 1960s, who challenged the Sultan only through legal means, Triyanto also created his own version of land administration. He issued his own SG certificate (*Kekancingan*), and has derived economic benefits from the land since 2010. He argued that the land had belonged to Sultan Hamengku

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105 The exact bloodline of Triyanto was Raden Mas Triyanto – Raden Ayu Siti Sri Muryani – Raden Mas Trusthodjumeno – GBPH Hadinegoro I – Sultan Hamengku Buwono VII.
Buwono VII as his private property, and therefore it was his right to claim this ‘heritage’ land. Sultan Hamengku Buwono VII, he insisted, had ruled for forty years during the early land registration period (1839–1931), and much of the property registered as SG was his personal private property.

Triyanto launched his first legal challenge in 2010, when he failed to officially gain ownership of the land upon which Ambarukmo Plaza was built. However, the court concluded that Triyanto could not act as the descendant of Hamengku Buwono VII, because he could not provide evidence of agreement by other descendants. Undeterred by the verdict, Triyanto – who had spent his childhood in the palace with sons of Hamengku Buwono IX – established his office 100 metres from the complex of the Yogyakarta Sultanate Palace (see Picture 6 below). The proximity to the palace was designed to give him further legitimacy in the eyes of parties potentially interested in leasing or busting land from him. In total, he claimed to manage around 1,000 ha of land, including 200 ha in Parangtritis Beach and 141 ha in Samas Beach (both in Bantul), as well as 141 ha in Gunung Kidul.

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106 Yogyakarta Administrative Court Decision No. 02/G/2010/PTUN.Yk.
107 Interview, RM Triyanto Prastowo, 4 July 2017 in Yogyakarta.
Triyanto’s efforts to portray himself as a legitimate distributor of royal land titles proved partly successful. Peasants who tilled land that had yet to be certified by the Land Office, or new peasants who wanted to till the soil, turned to RM Triyanto to furnish them with his version of *Kekancingan*, or royal land certificate. In early 2017, for instance, Triyanto sub-divided 6,000 m$^2$ of SG land in Tanjungtirto Village, Berbah, Sleman, into plots measuring 8x10 m$^2$ each, renting them for IDR 25 million [US$1,800] per plot without a clear time limit. The hamlet community reported the matter to the Sultanate shortly after the incident (Kompas, 9 May 2017). As it turned out, Triyanto not only claimed land in Yogyakarta, but also in the adjoining province of Central Java. In February 2017, he claimed land used by the Indonesian Railway Company (*PT Kereta Api Indonesia* – PT KAI) in Magelang. Triyanto placed a steel sign in front of the PT KAI sign, claiming to be the owner of the land (Radar Jogja, 8 February 2017).

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108 Triyanto’s emblem features the slogan ‘Tanah Saya, Istana Saya’ [My Land, My Palace], with the symbol of Sultan Hamengku Buwono VII, his great-great-grandfather.
The Sultanate aggressively denied Triyanto’s claims, and mobilised the legal apparatus against him. For instance, a legal representative of the Sultanate, Achiel Suyanto, stated in 2017 that ‘Triyanto is not one of Hamengku Buwono VII’s beneficiaries, because his great-grandfather passed away before Hamengku Buwono VII’, while showing a 1958 court certificate that listed Sultan Hamengku Buwono VII’s beneficiaries (Tribun Jogja, 11 May 2017). Moreover, Hamengku Buwono X publicly threatened Triyanto with police action. In a 2012 media interview, he made his stance very clear, stating that ‘I asked that the police hold him [Triyanto] in custody if necessary. I asked that [Triyanto] be dealt with because he is using his letterhead version [and not the Sultanate’s]’ (Solopos, 5 March 2012). Eventually, Triyanto was sentenced to sixteen months in jail in 2018. His verdict, issued by the Supreme Court, was specifically related to the PT KAI case in Central Java. However, there was little doubt that the Yogyakarta Sultanate was pleased to see that his sentencing in the neighbouring province weakened his other claims as well.

The quarrel with Triyanto was representative of a new wave of post-2012 intra-aristocratic tensions. After the YSL was passed in 2012, the increased power of the Sultanate had encouraged many royal family members to seek a share of that new power. Hence, they tried to become part of, or change the rules on, the Sultanate’s internal power distribution mechanisms. These mechanisms are traditionally overseen by a variety of royal advisers. The Sultan has two advisory boards, with experts in various fields gathered in the Expert Advisory Council (Pandhite Aji) and aristocratic advisors in Javanese Advisory Council (Sri Palimbangan). Highlighting the overlap between the Sultan’s role as head of the royal family and as governor, some advisors sitting in Pandhite Aji have also become members of the governor’s advisory team on specialness affairs (Parampara Praja). Further, Sultan Hamengku Buwono X issued a decree in 1999 that divided the Sultanate’s government into four ‘coordinating ministries’, called ‘Kawedanan Ageng Punakawan’, which control four to seven offices separated into technical/operational (kawedanan) and administrative (tepas) offices (Katon & Sapala, 2014). It is these positions that have been highly sought after by competing members of the royal family.

In order to satisfy the power ambitions of his closest relatives, the Sultan initially gave the four top positions to his full brothers and a half-brother from his father’s third wife, KRA Hastungkoro. Under this power distribution scheme, the Sultan’s full brother KGPH Hadiwinoto was given the job of controlling the Sultanate’s assets and the Sultanate Land

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Office (*Panitikismo*), while his full brother GBPH Joyokusumo was put in charge of the Sultanate’s financial matters. His half-brother GBPH Yudhaningrat, for his part, was given the Sultanate’s arts and religious activities portfolio as well as the post of commander of the ceremonial military unit. The elder brother of GBPH Yudhaningrat, GBPH Prabukusumo, was made responsible for ceremonies, library, museum, and tourism. In addition, lower-level aristocrats lead lower-ranking offices. By distributing offices to family members closest to him— but also to those with the greatest ambition—the Sultan hoped to balance the various forces within the royal house while staying in control at the top of the power pyramid.

But the Sultan’s specific family situation led him to introduce personnel changes that, over time, disturbed this carefully calibrated power balance. Hamengku Buwono X has five daughters and no sons, and there is thus no obvious heir to the Sultanate—if the succession process were to follow the traditional rule of privileging the oldest male son from a legitimate wife. The Sultan, however, has apparently decided to push for his eldest daughter GKR Pembayun to succeed him. He has also begun to appoint other daughters to key jobs, marginalising other relatives. GKR Pembayun, for instance, has become the deputy of KGPH Hadiwinoto and is currently controlling the Sultanate’s businesses. The second daughter, GKR Condrokirono became the head of *Panitra Pura* (the Sultanate’s secretariat) after GBPH Joyokusumo’s death in late 2012. This inclusion of women in the Sultanate’s power structure has been a new phenomenon. Previously, women’s participation was limited to the Operational Office of Women (*Kawedanan Kaputren*).

This privileging of the Sultan’s daughters, against long-standing traditions, created dissatisfaction among other relatives excluded from the newest structure of power distribution in the royal house (see Figure 4 below). For instance, Prince GBPH Hadikusumo, the son of Hamengku Buwono IX’s first wife, KRA Pintokopurnomo, was not included in the system. He was only a few weeks younger than the current Sultan, and became a serious contender during the succession in 1988 (*See Chapter 4*). Despite his senior standing, he was marginalised. Another son of KRA Pintokopurnomo, Prince GBPH Hadisuryo, was also excluded from the Sultanate even though he lives near the Sultan’s palace. Moreover, six of the Sultan’s half-brothers from his father’s fourth wife, KRA Ciptomurti, have not taken part in the Sultanate’s affairs, mostly because most of them live in Jakarta— but also because Hamengku Buwono X made no serious effort to include them.

However, it was not only members of the broader family who were disgruntled over their exclusion from power. Even Hamengku Buwono X’s direct siblings began to express
discontent after he issued three proclamations in 2015 and 2016 that in effect nominated his eldest daughter as ‘crown princess.’ For the first time, all the thirteen sons and three daughters of Hamengku Buwono IX gathered together in 7 July 2015 to challenge the Sultan’s decision. In the view of many of the Sultan’s relatives, the declaration violated the Islamic sultanate’s fundamental principle (paugeran) of honouring the male bloodline. Hidden behind this stance was, of course, fear of losing their influence should Princess GKR Pembayun ascend to the throne. I have argued elsewhere that this succession conflict reduced the capacity of Sultan Hamengku Buwono X to control his regime, even though the YSL stipulated significant material support for the Sultanate as an institution (Kurniadi, 2016). Thus, the land conflict with Triyanto came at a very inconvenient time for the Sultan – it added to other tensions threatening to divide the royal family.

110 A letter from descendants of Hamengku Buwono IX to the Indonesian President Joko Widodo dated 7 July 2015.
Figure 4 The Yogyakarta Sultanate’s structure in 2017

Source: Decree of Sultan Hamengku Buwono X (Dawuh Dalem) No. 01/DD/HB X/EHE-1.
Other cases not only involved intra-aristocratic conflict, but vertical conflicts between the royal houses and land users as well. One such conflict with both facets was the YIA project mentioned above. Recall that 587.2 ha of land was released for the YIA project, with 160 ha (27%) owned by Pakualaman. Pakualaman was thus paid IDR 701.5 billion [US$50.8 million], out of a total IDR 4.1 trillion [US$296.9 Million] allocated for land release purposes (Kedaulatan Rakyat, 20 January 2017). Soon after the government announced its budget for the land release, several parties filed legal claims over part of the money. The first represented the eight descendants of Gusti Raden Ajeng Mursudarina, a daughter of Hamengku Buwono VII who had married to Surakarta Sunan Paku Buwono X in 1916. They claimed that the Pakualaman lands belonged to their great-grandmother, having been given as a wedding gift by Sultan Hamengku Buwono VII. During the legal process, other claimed descendants of Mursudarina reported and sued the first eight claimants, arguing they had fabricated their lineage, and asked for their own portion of the money. While none of these familial lawsuits were successful, they highlighted the continued potential for internal rifts within the royal houses over land certification issues.

But not only distant family members wanted parts of the Pakualaman payment. All 885 PAG tillers also demanded a share. These tillers not only accepted compensation from the project (IDR 67 billion, US$ 4.85 million), but also asked for another payment from Pakualaman. They argued that the increased value of the land after an independent appraisal was due to their role in tilling the PAG soil. The ground had previously been barren sand dunes, but became productive agricultural land as a result of their cultivation. They demanded 30% of the total money received by Pakualaman, or around IDR 230 billion [US$16.6 million]. After mediation efforts by village officials, Pakualaman finally agreed to pay IDR 25 billion [US$ 1.8 million] to 848 of the 885 tillers (Republika, 17 July 2016). The money was transferred in February 2019, bringing the case to a close.

In yet another form of land conflict, private citizens sued each other over the status of land claimed by the Sultanate as its property. In one case in Gondomanan, a central sub-district in Yogyakarta city, businessman Eka Aryawan received a certificate (Kekancingan) for 72 m$ of SG land on 28 November 2011. This land was crucial for him as it was needed to open access to his shopping complex. In exchange for the certificate, he paid IDR 230 million [US$}
24,785] per year to the Sultanate. The land, however, had been occupied by five street traders since the 1960s. After they refused eviction, Eka Aryawan sued the traders for IDR 1.2 billion [US$86,910] in 2016 as compensation for the money he had paid to the Sultanate from 2011 to 2016 (Metrotvnews.com, 11 February 2016). The traders lost in court and were ordered to leave the land they occupied, but were not required to pay the money. Interestingly, during the court proceedings, the judges never asked the Sultanate, who issued the *Kekancingan*, about its involvement in this issue.

In a similar case, an investor holding a *Kekancingan* certificate has tried to evict the traditional community living on the land at Watu Kodok Beach in Kemandang Village, Tanjungsari, Gunung Kidul. During the struggle for independence in the 1940s, the village head of Kemandang had ordered six villagers to move to the beach and monitor it for a potential Dutch return via the south sea. However, the six persons settled there permanently, growing into a community. In 2004, the villagers built a road to the beach, which soon become a tourist attraction. This offered considerable financial benefits for the seventy villagers living there, who were relatives of the first six settlers. In July 2013, a Jakarta-based investor named Eny Supiyani claimed ownership of an area of 19,354 m² that included the land the community lived on. This was based on *Kekancingan* No.020/HT/KPK/2013, for which she had paid IDR 1.2 billion [US$109,575] (Antoro, 2016a). The villagers, however, refused to surrender their access to the land, and started to form a resistance group called the Coastal Mataram Populace Organisation (*Paguyuban Kawula Pesisir Mataram* – PKPM). At the time of writing, the case remains unresolved.

Hence, while the Sultanate’s post-2012 hegemony in land matters and other vital socio-political arenas fulfilled a long-time ambition harboured by both Hamengku Buwono IX and Hamengku Buwono X, its concrete application created new conflicts. It triggered splits within the family, with some members wanting profits from the land holdings and others positioning themselves for Hamengku Buwono X’s succession. For society too, the Sultanate’s strengthened dominance did not necessarily clarify matters: with the royal house claiming vaguely defined ‘non-palace land’ for itself, users of that land were negatively affected. As we have seen above, some citizens involved in land disputes with the Sultanate (or investors who bought land from it) began to offer resistance. The societal loyalty towards the Sultan, which seemed so strong during the YSL campaign, began to show cracks – paradoxically, as a result of the very aristocratic hegemony that the YSL established. The following section discusses

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114 Interview, Marno, Rugiati and Tupar, leaders of PKPM, 8 July 2017 in Watu Kodok Beach, Gunung Kidul.
another example of this marginalisation of some citizens by the Sultanate’s exclusive land claims: that is, the ethnic Chinese community, which continues to be barred from owning land in Yogyakarta.

6.5 Victims of the YSL: The Case of the Ethnic Chinese

To be sure, the discrimination against Yogyakarta’s ethnic Chinese population in land affairs (and other matters) did not start with the YSL. As indicated previously, it was part of the colonial legacy. In the early days of colonial rule, the Chinese were given special status. Indeed, in the 1810s, the Sultan helped organise the Chinese community, which was led by the ‘Chinese captain’ or Kapitan Cina. One of the most influential Kapitan Cina was Tan Jing Sing, who was honoured by the Sultan with the royal name KRT Secodiningrat (Carey, 1977). Between 1835 and 1919, however, the Dutch implemented a zoning system (wijkenstelsel), whereby the Chinese were only allowed to stay in the city’s Chinese quarters (Kwartanada, 2002; Susanto, 2011). It was in this period in which the special treatment turned into discrimination. Through their previous privileged position, Chinese had acquired and subsequently traded land – much to the dismay of the colonial power, and of the Sultanate as well. Thus, in 1875, through Staatsblad No. 179, the Dutch government stopped the sale of land to Chinese and similar ‘foreign’ groups. As explained by (Djalins, 2012, p. 232), ‘Popularly known as the Alienation Prohibition (Vervreemdingsverbod), the ruling prohibited permanent transfer of land from natives to non-natives, that is the Chinese, Arab, Indo-European, and European population.’

The Sultan strengthened this rule for his own territory by issuing the Rijksblad of 1918, which also banned the sale, lease, and lending of land to ‘non-pribumi.’

After independence, the BAL of 1960 established that only Indonesian citizens could own land. While it did not distinguish between ethnic origins, this regulation posed a problem to many ethnic Chinese because their citizenship status was still in doubt, or in transition. As both the People’s Republic of China and Indonesia were young states going through lengthy periods of instability in the 1940s and 1950s, the issue of citizenship for ethnic Chinese remained unresolved for a long time. However, as early as 1946, the Indonesian government initiated a process for those ethnic Chinese who wanted to apply for Indonesian citizenship. In the Yogyakarta Government, these applications were handled by the Citizenship Office (Kantor Kewarganegaraan) (Kementrian Penerangan, 1952; Kwartanada, 2002). Government records show that by 1952, 5,097 (61%) of the 8,297 Yogyakartan Chinese peranakan (that is, Chinese who were often born in the Indies and culturally oriented towards the community they lived in) had chosen to become Indonesian citizens (Kementrian Penerangan, 1952, p. 634). Thus,
although these new Indonesian citizens of Chinese origins technically gained the right to own land, there were still significant numbers who had not gained, or not applied for, citizenship.

But even those Chinese who gained citizenship, and hence the right to own land, have generally been unable to exercise it in Yogyakarta. The reasons used by Yogyakarta authorities to deny ethnic Chinese land titles have varied (ranging from references to the 1918 regulation and the 1954 land autonomy bylaw to historical and political justifications), but the policy has been consistently in place since independence. One of the historical justifications was presented by the Sultan’s land advisor Suyitno and the Sultan’s half-brother Prince GBPH Yudhaningrat in a statement to the Yogyakarta Ombudsman in late 2017. They claimed that after the transfer of independence on 27 December 1949, the ethnic Chinese wanted to leave Yogyakarta for Semarang because they had mostly sided with the Dutch while the Sultan had been pro-Republic. According to this narrative, Hamengku Buwono IX then talked to ethnic Chinese leaders and said that he could not guarantee the safety of the Chinese on their way to Semarang if they left Yogyakarta. As a solution, the Sultan offered to guarantee their safety in Yogyakarta in return for them being barred from owning land in Yogyakarta (Ombudsman Yogyakarta, 2018, pp. 18, 23). The ethnic Chinese, so the Sultan’s advisers claimed, agreed. 115

This historical incident has been only one argument used to defend the racial policy. There have been several other explanations. According to Zealous Siput Lokasari, an ethnic Chinese businessman, the late Paku Alam VIII told him in 1993 that Chinese and Indians were limited to HGB (that is, land usage rights) because the government wanted to treat them as companies. This, in turn, would be good for business in Yogyakarta and allow the government to raise extra income. 116 Yet another argument has focused on inequality. Suyitno, the Sultan’s land adviser mentioned above, stated in 2018 that the land policy was a form of ‘positive discrimination’ through which the government wanted to close the wealth gap between ethnic Chinese and the indigenous population. He explained this discriminatory approach with the formation of a poor native class under the colonial regime in the 19th century, which the current Yogyakarta government was determined to overcome. Asked how long the policy would still

115 Interview, Suyitno, member of the Governor’s Advisory Team on Yogyakarta Specialness (Parampara Praja, 26 January 2016 in Sleman.
be in place, he responded that it would be maintained as long as the inequality between ethnic Chinese and natives was not significantly reduced (Kompas, 1 March 2018).

Whatever the reason given, the practice of denying non-native Indonesians the right to own land was codified in 1975. Prior to that, officials had referred to the pre-1945 regulations and the province’s autonomy to legitimate their discrimination of the ethnic Chinese. On 5 March 1975, Paku Alam VIII, as deputy governor, issued an instruction titled ‘The Uniformity Policy of Land Ownership for Non-Native WNI’, in effect targeting the ethnic Chinese and the much smaller community of Indians (See Picture 7 below). The document stated that, as of 1975, the Yogyakarta Government had yet to issue ownership certificates to non-natives and would continue not doing so. Non-natives who bought land from natives were expected to release ownership to the Yogyakarta Government, then ask for land rights other than SHM (generally HGB). Under HGB, for instance, the Chinese could hold certificates for thirty years, which could be extended for another twenty years (See Table 4.1). Paku Alam’s instruction was directed to the provincial parliament as well as several government agencies, including the land offices (that is, the agencies in charge of land affairs before the National Land Office became responsible in 1985).
Despite this 1975 directive, some Chinese residents of Yogyakarta could obtain a SHM legally during the New Order regime through their political, personal, and military networks. An informant living in Kampung Pajeksan stated that she was able to obtain SHM for her plot of less than 100 m² in early 1990 after receiving help from her neighbour in the military (BBC Indonesia, 1 June 2018). In addition, Siput Lokasari also received a SHM for his land in front of Pakualaman Palace in 1993 due to his personal and political connection to Paku Alam VIII.
Willie Sebastian Sanjaya, a small shop owner and martial arts master, obtained a SHM certificate in 1999, but after his house was demolished for a road project, he could not obtain the same title for his replacement residence; he instead received an HGB certificate in the relocation area in 2002.\(^\text{117}\)

While there were loopholes for some Chinese, overall the restrictions on land ownership constituted a disincentive for them to reside in Yogyakarta. Thus, the ethnic Chinese population has stagnated over time, and even decreased substantially as a percentage of the total population. In 1930, there were 12,640 Chinese living in the principality of Yogyakarta (Larson, 1987, p. 2). In 1952, 11,005 Chinese lived in Yogyakarta; half a century later, in 2000, this figure had only minimally increased to 11,545 (BPS, 2010). Thus, while the rest of the population grew over time, the ethnic Chinese did not add to their population base of the early independence period. Accordingly, the number of Chinese as a percentage of Yogyakarta’s population declined significantly, from 0.81% in 1930 to 0.32% in 2000. This small community formed a part of Yogyakarta’s 3.5% non-Javanese population (Suryadinata, Arifin, & Ananta, 2003, p. 81).

In the post-Suharto era, the ethnic Chinese started a new campaign for recognition – both nationally and specifically in Yogyakarta in relation to the land issue. At the national level, many administrative, political and cultural hurdles to equal treatment were removed in the first decade of democratic rule (Freedman, 2003; Hoon, 2006; Suryadinata, 2008). In Yogyakarta, the ratification of the 1965 United Nations Convention on Racial Discrimination (through Human Rights Law No. 39/1999) inspired some Chinese to challenge the land policy. As a result of this increased activism, agencies of the national government began to ask questions about the practice. In August 1999, the Yogyakarta Land Office wrote a letter to the Central Land Office regarding the land policy towards non-indigenous citizens.\(^\text{118}\) In the reply, the chairman of the Central Land Office stated that, first, every Indonesian citizen had the same right to land. Second, the term ‘non-indigenous citizen’ or ‘non-pribumi’ should no longer be used, pursuant to Presidential Instruction No. 26/1998. Third, the Yogyakarta Land Office should give equal public services to every Indonesian citizen. Yogyakarta’s local authorities, however, ignored this reply, and instead continued to follow the 1975 instruction.

More concrete action was taken by the Chinese community in 2001. In that year, the wealthy Chinese-Muslim politician and businessman Budi Setyanugraha filed a case at the State

\(^{117}\) Interview, Willie Sanjaya, 7 January 2016 in Yogyakarta.

\(^{118}\) No. 520/2014/BPN/99, dated 27 August 1999.
Administrative Court (Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara – PTUN) against the Land Office of Bantul for refusing to issue a SHM for his land. Budi had started his business in 1978 and converted to Islam in 1983. He subsequently became the Chairman of the Yogyakarta branch of Indonesian Islamic Chinese Association (Persatuan Islam Tionghoa Indonesia – PITI), serving from 1984 to 2003. From 1999 to 2004, he was a member of the Yogyakarta Parliament, representing National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional – PAN). As a Muslim and well-connected politician, Budi was seen as the ideal pioneer for legal challenges against the discriminatory land policy. Budi won his case at the district court, but lost at the provincial level and twice at the Supreme Court in 2003. While unsuccessful, Budi’s case prepared the path for more legal challenges in the following years, as there was now at least proof that the courts took the issue seriously.

The campaign received a new boost by the passing of the Anti-Discrimination Law in 2008. Law No. 40/2008 was issued primarily to eliminate discriminatory actions against non-native Indonesian citizens. On 23 February 2011, the abovementioned Willie Sebastian sent a letter to President Yudhoyono, asking for equal land rights in Yogyakarta, as ordered by the BAL and Law No. 40/2008. The reply was non-committal. He then complained to the National Human Rights Commission (Komisi Nasional Hak Azasi Manusia – Komnas HAM) in June 2013. Komnas HAM initiated a mediation in August 2013, but the Sultan (as governor) refused to accept Willie’s demand and did not show up during the mediation. In 2014, Komnas HAM issued a recommendation for the Yogyakarta Government to stop its racial policy, as it violated human rights and other laws. Willie then sent a letter to the Sultan and asked him to follow up with Komnas HAM’s recommendation. Having again received no response, he forwarded the letter to Komnas HAM, complaining that the recommendation of the commission had been ignored.

Another year passed before the Komnas HAM issued a second and stronger recommendation in 2015, stating that ‘the disregard shown for the Komnas HAM recommendation has become an indication of systematic human rights discrimination.’ Still, the Yogyakarta Government and Yogyakarta Land Office took no further action. Meanwhile, in 2015 as well, the Supreme Court ruled on a lawsuit filed by an ethnic Chinese lawyer named

122 Komnas HAM recommendation No. 066/R/Mediasi/VIII/2015 dated 7 August 2015.
Handoko that challenged the 1975 instruction. The court rejected the lawsuit, advancing a rather obscure legal argument. The judges stated that the 1975 instruction was not part of the legal system and therefore it could not be challenged in court. The court did not address the question, however, why the 1975 instruction was adhered to as a binding legal instrument by both the Yogyakarta Government and by the province’s Land Office, which was a part of the national state infrastructure.

Indeed, the fortification of the Land Office as a stronghold of loyalism towards the Sultanate was one of the strategies Hamengku Buwono X used to avoid implementing equal land rights for ethnic Chinese. As it previously was autonomous and had close ties to the Sultanate, the bureaucratic culture of the office remained strongly influenced by a sense of duty to serve the Sultan and his family. This sense was re-strengthened after the passing of the YSL in 2012, which defined the management of royal land as one of the special features of Yogyakarta. In line with this revitalisation of its relationship with the Sultan, the head of the Yogyakarta Land Office, alongside with other top leaders in Yogyakarta, has frequently been an abdi dalem (royal servant) of the Sultanate. For instance, Ari Yuriwin, who served as head of the Land Office until November 2016, was an abdi dalem keprajan of the Yogyakarta Sultanate with the title Nyi Raden Riya Kismanggalawati (literally ‘Female Land Hero’) (Antoro, 2016b). She subsequently became a senior official in the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Layout, which also incorporates the National Land Office. From there, she could protect the Sultan’s interests further.

Indeed, maintaining a good relationship with the Minister of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Layout-National Land Office has been an additional strategy of the Sultanate to protect its land practices. In 2015, Ferry Mursyidan Baldan, then the minister, saw the discriminatory policy of land ownership in Yogyakarta as ‘appropriate’ and as part of Yogyakarta’s specialness. He said, ‘The specialness of Yogyakarta cannot be seen using the mindset of the other provinces.’ Regarding the discriminatory policy, he said, ‘It is part of the local wisdom, similar to Bali, [where] people from outside the sub-district cannot own paddy fields’ (Tempo, 3 September 2015). With this, the minister essentially echoed the Sultanate’s position that the practice was protected by the YSL, although the law did not stipulate that the management of private land was part of the autonomy granted to Yogyakarta.

123 Putusan MA No. 13P/HUM/2015.
In practice, ethnic Chinese have been prevented from buying land in Yogyakarta through a multi-stage process. Based on interviews with Zealous Siput Lokasari, Willie Sebastian Sanjaya, Handoko,124 and an officer in the land registration section of one of Yogyakarta’s local land offices,125 it is possible to reconstruct this process. It typically starts with the application for land purchase being screened by Land Deed Officials (Pejabat Pembuat Akta Tanah – PPAT), who may be notaries or sub-district heads (camat). Most ethnic Chinese cannot pass this first screening, because officials investigate their racial background even though they provide documents that are similar to those of other WNI. The second screening is done at the registration section in the district or city Land Office branches. Land Office staff establish the non-indigenous status of applicants purely based on their appearances, names, and dialects. The few ethnic Chinese who pass the first two stages often fail in the third. In this phase, Land Office officers ask neighbours to confirm the ethnic background of the individual. Some ethnic Chinese who passed the first two stages by having their documents processed through Chinese notaries subsequently failed these field reviews.

The ban on ethnic Chinese to own land in Yogyakarta has even extended to their indigenous spouses. Some Chinese had initially passed the process by ‘borrowing’ the identity of their indigenous spouse, but then failed when the ethnic background of husband and wife was discovered. As Siput told CNN Indonesia, the Head of the Kulon Progo Land Office Muhammad Fadhil refused to grant SHM status to Siput’s wife because ‘Your spouse is Chinese’ (CNN Indonesia, 26 October 2016). With this, marriages between ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesian citizens in Yogyakarta are treated even harsher than marriages between Indonesian citizens and foreign nationals. In the latter case, until 2015 it was not possible for Indonesian citizens who married a foreigner to own land. But through Government Regulation no. 103/2015, this rule was relaxed. Now, Indonesians in mixed marriages can own land if there is a written agreement that the land will stay with the Indonesian citizen in case of a separation, and if there is no joint claim to ownership. Thus, ethnic Chinese in Yogyakarta face exclusions from fundamental citizenship rights that even foreign nationals living in Indonesia do not experience.

Since 2012, the opposition against land rights discrimination in Yogyakarta has taken on a more organised form. This meant moving beyond individual lawsuits, and uniting several causes under one umbrella. Concretely, this development has led to the cooperation between

124 FGD with Yogyakarta land activists, 6 January 2016 in Yogyakarta.
125 Interview, staff of Land Office, 5 February 2015 in Yogyakarta.
ethnic Chinese fighting for land rights and peasants evicted from their land. For instance, Siput Lokasari coordinated activist movements, for the first time working with groups protecting the rights of persons evicted from SG/PAG land. As a result, the umbrella organisation Land Forum for Indonesian Unity (Forum Peduli Tanah Demi NKRI – FORPETA-NKRI) was formed in 2012. Members of FORPETA-NKRI include the National Movement Against Discrimination (Gerakan National Anti Diskriminasi – GRANAD), Peasants Coastal Land Organisation (Paguyuban Petani Lahan Pantai – PPLP), and the People’s Coalition Against Eviction (Aliansi Rakyat Menolak Penggusuran – ARMP); the umbrella organisation is supported by activists, lecturers and journalists.

Siput, Willie, and Handoko also launched new legal strategies. These involved engaging the Ombudsman office and challenging the Sultan’s legal stance that the BAL did not apply to him. Siput, Willie, and two other citizens reported to the Yogyakarta Ombudsman office in March/April 2016 that three Land Office branches had refused to register their land under SHM status. The initiative proved ineffective, however. The Yogyakarta Ombudsman issued its final report on 9 February 2018, and while it found the Land Office in violation of existing regulations, it failed to add anything new in this regard. In its report, the Ombudsman stated that ‘Administrative malpractices in the form of service discrimination and procedural negligence have been committed by the head of the Land Offices in Bantul, Kulon Progo, and Yogyakarta City.’ With this, the Ombudsman simply restated the core of the recommendations made by Komnas HAM in 2014 and 2015, and the Sultan found it easy to ignore this new reprimand as well.

Another lawsuit was even less successful. Handoko filed a legal lawsuit against the Sultan for violating the BAL on 10 October 2017, as the Sultan stated unequivocally that the BAL is not applicable to him. This time, the lawsuit was directed against individuals (Hamengku Buwono X as governor, and the head of the Land Office) for using the discriminatory 1975 instruction (recall that in the 2015 case, the instruction itself had been challenged). However, the Yogyakarta City Court refused Handoko’s lawsuit against the Sultan. Indeed, the court went beyond the Supreme Court’s 2015 argument that the 1975 instruction could not be challenged because it was not a recognised instrument of the law; in its 2018 ruling, the Yogyakarta court even defended the 1975 instruction’s goals. The court

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127 Case No. 132/Pdt.G/2017/PN Yyk.
128 ‘Agrarian Law ‘does not apply to me’, claims Sultan’ The Jakarta Post, 17 September 2015.
explicitly endorsed the position presented by the Sultan’s representative during the hearings by finding that the 1975 instruction’s purpose to ‘protect the economically weak, Yogyakarta’s Specialness, the culture and the existence of the Yogyakarta Sultanate, and the equality of development for the future of Yogyakarta province, does not go against the practice of good governance’ (Detik, 20 February 2018).

While winning its cases, the Sultanate showed signs of irritation and awareness that the matter found traction in local and national news. In 2018, after a series of initiatives targeting the policy and the Sultan, Prince KGPH Hadiwinoto, the Sultan’s full brother and the head of the Sultanate’s land office (Panitikismo), bluntly warned Yogyakarta’s ethnic Chinese. He said,

I warn the Yogyakarta Chinese to remember [something]. Do not only ask for [your] rights [to be fulfilled]. You live and die here. If you do not want [the policy regarding the land], you can live outside Yogyakarta (BBC Indonesia, March 2018).

Statements such as this showcase both the sultanate’s increased power after 2012, but also the potential for conflict created by this increased power. On the one hand, the ability of the Sultan to influence national government agencies (such as the Land Office and its Ministry) as well as courts to confirm his positions underlined his legal-political superiority. On the other hand, the increased and newly organised opposition against this hegemony points to growing divisions in Yogyakarta society. As the internal fissures within the royal family described in the previous section, the societal tensions created by the Sultan’s dominance have the potential to undermine that very dominance in the long term.

6.6 The Sultan’s Superiority and Village Land

Another case showing both the Sultanate’s superiority and the potential for renewed conflict is the legal battle over village land. This conflict arose as Hamengku Buwono X refused to implement Village Law No. 6/2014, which aimed to make village government more participatory, strengthen village government autonomy, and uphold cultural diversity (Berenschot & Vel, 2017). In particular, the law increased the powers and obligations of villages in managing village assets, especially village land. In Yogyakarta, however, control over village land has been the source of the Sultanate’s economic power and political support. It constitutes 7.6% of Yogyakarta’s total area. The Sultan’s control over village land collided with Article 76 of the Village Law, which states that: ‘Village assets include village land, indigenous land, village markets, animal markets, ship docks, village buildings, fish and peasant
auction places, village forests, village water resources, public bathing places, and other village assets.’ In other words, the law intensified the already fierce competition over the ownership of village land in Yogyakarta.

Even before the passing of the 2014 Village Law, the Sultan had struggled to stay in control of village land. The Sultan’s attention to the issue of village land is shown in the rapid changes to the Gubernatorial Decree (Keputusan Gubernur – SK Gubernur) and Gubernatorial Regulation (Peraturan Gubernur – Pergub) on the ruling of village land since 1998. In 2003, the Sultan, as governor, issued Decree No. 82/2003, which administered the release, transfer, change of usage, and rent of village land. The Decree used the term ‘tanah kas desa.’ As we have seen in earlier chapters, this was a Javanese concept in which village land was endowed by the Sultanate to village officials to finance their operations. Thus, by using the term, the Sultan restated his claim to overall ownership of village land, despite it being used by village treasuries to sustain their management.

In 2008, the Decree received higher status, being passed as Pergub No. 11/2008 following the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ Instruction on Village Property No. 4/2007. In the Pergub, the Sultan cited Law No. 3/1950, which included land as one of Yogyakarta’s authorities under the then granted Special Region arrangement. However, given the national guidelines, the Sultan acknowledged that village land was the property of the village. While the continued use of the traditional term ‘tanah kas desa’ signified an understanding that the Sultanate was the initial source of the land, the 2008 Pergub stated that ‘Tanah Kas Desa is owned by the village, which consists of bengkok/pelungguh, pengarem-arem, titisara,130 cemetery, village roads, pasture, lakes, village market, sacred places, fields, and other land controlled by the Village Government.’ (Article 1 point 8). This acknowledgement of ownership was significant because the Sultan would later revoke it through a 2014 Pergub, issued in response to the village law.

Nevertheless, Pergub No. 11/2008 left loopholes for the Sultan to control the use of village land through his position as governor. In Article 12, for instance, the Pergub limited the release of village land to only thirty-three public projects, through detailed procedures and permits. Most importantly, the release of village land required the approval of the governor – that is, Hamengku Buwono IX. This article, and other similar stipulations about the use of

129 A Decree is more administrative and is targeted at more specific parties, while Regulation is a ruling with wider and stronger legal impact.
130 Rather unusually, titisari is referred to in this Pergub as a sub-category of tanah kas desa, although the two terms are generally treated as synonyms. See Ministry of Home Affairs Decree No. 4/2007.
village land (that also required the governor’s permission) addressed the long-standing problem that village officials had sold village land for commercial usage (Pradoto, 2012). The Sultan, as governor, therefore continued to hold a crucial role in determining how village land was being used; however, in contrast to his personal views on the matter, the Pergub did not explicitly identify village land as the Sultanate’s land. In fact, it distanced village land from the Sultanate by explicitly declaring it to be village property.

As with many other aspects of governance in Yogyakarta, 2012 was a turning point for the Sultan’s relationship with, and claim on, village land. In 2013, the Sultan issued Pergub No. 65/2013. Unlike Pergub No. 11/2008, the 2013 Pergub no longer identified clearly the village as the owner of village land. Instead, village land was identified as ‘a form of village wealth […] controlled by the village government’ (Article 1, point 13, Pergub No. 65/2013). Thus, the legally binding term of ownership (milik) in the 2008 Pergub had been replaced by the vague word ‘wealth’ (kekayaan), and the use of ‘controlled’ (dikuasai) also suggested that the village government was in charge of, but did not own, the village land. The Pergub established further procedural mechanisms for land release, including the establishment of a land release committee for independent appraisal. Above all, every land release and repurposing for non-agricultural uses had, as in the previous Pergub, to receive the permission from the governor.

The passing of Village Law No. 6/2014 on 15 January 2014 initiated the final step by the Sultan to fully reclaim village land as his property. This law, which came into effect on 1 January 2015, situates villages as quasi-autonomous units with authority over their affairs, including their land. Under the law, village land is a village asset and should be certified under the village’s name. To support the implementation of village autonomy projects, yearly village funds (Dana Desa) are provided by the Central Government. Every village receives up to IDR 1 billion (US$72,000), which it is expected to spend based on decisions made by village communities. The prospect of autonomous villages that have full ownership rights over their land and receive funds from the Central Government, threatened to undermine the centuries-old loyalty bond between the Sultan and village officials. This patron-client relationship was based on the gratitude that village officials owed to the Sultan for using ‘his’ land, and the debts they repaid in the form of political support – as in the run-up to the YSL deliberations. If the villages no longer depended on the Sultan for the use of their land, and the villages owed their gratitude to the Central Government for the funds it offered, their loyalty towards the Sultanate was seriously in doubt.
Thus, three days before the Village Law was implemented, on 29 December 2014, the Sultan, as governor, issued Pergub No. 112/2014 on the Usage of Village Land, directly challenging the Village Law. Citing the YSL as one of the foundations for the Pergub, Hamengku Buwono X claimed – with surprising clarity and directness – traditional village land as the property of the Yogyakarta Sultanate and Pakualaman. Article 2 stated that ‘village land that originates from anggaduh [usage] rights is land owned by the Kasultanan and [Pakualaman].’ With this, the Sultan effectively declared all village land that had not been transferred into private ownership or hereditary usage right as SG/PAG land. Indeed, the Pergub even required that village land with anggaduh status that had been certified in the name of the village government had to be transferred to the ownership of the Kasultanan/Pakualaman (Article 19). In short, Hamengku Buwono X revoked the 2008 classification of village land as the village’s property and transferred ownership to himself. In doing so, he applied the maximum interpretation of the definition of ‘non-palace land’ under the YSL, which had not explicitly stated village land.

As it turned out, the Pergub 112/2014 stopped the certification of village land in Yogyakarta. Until 2014, 8,381 village land certificates had been issued with Use Rights (Hak Pakai – HP) on state land in the name of the village government (that was 26.3% of the 31,804 plots identified in 2015) (Pergub No. 31/2018 p.137). The remaining 23,423 village land plots (73.6%) were under contestation. This was because the Pergub 112/2014 had stipulated that any use of village land now needed a Kekancingan certificate from the Sultanate or Pakualaman, and thus a different process was needed – involving Panitikismo rather than the National Land Office. But by 2018, there had been no certification of village land in the name of Kasultanan/Pakualaman, either by issuing new certificates or by transferring existing certificates. This was due to confusion in all agencies about how this process would work and whether the Pergub was a sufficiently strong legal basis to proceed with such a wide-ranging intervention into the country’s system of regulating land ownership.

For many village officials, the Sultan’s renewed claim on their land was acceptable for several reasons. First of all, while the Sultan challenged the part of the Village Law that related to the ownership status of the land, he did not want to block the payment of the village funds. Had he done so, village officials would have been seriously affected, and had likely turned against the Sultan. The Village Law stipulates that up to 60% of the village funds may be used
to pay the salary of the village apparatuses, as regulated by the regent. Thus, the officials looked forward to a substantial new source of income. Second, the Sultan also guaranteed to village officials that despite the changed ownership status, the proceeds from village land was still theirs. In an interview with the author in 2015, the Sultan confirmed that ‘It is their fortune.’ In giving this guarantee, the Sultan responded to concerns expressed by village officials that they might lose the income derived from the land (Suara Komunitas, 2015). With both the village funds and the land income guaranteed by the Sultan, most village officials were content with continuing the long relationship of loyalty with the Sultan.

This arrangement was further strengthened by Perdais No. 1/2017 on the Management of Kasultanan and Pakualaman Land, issued in January 2017. A Perdais has a stronger legal basis than a Pergub, functioning as a bylaw jointly issued by the governor and province’s parliament. The Perdais provided a detailed and expansive list of the types of lands included in the categories of palace and non-palace land, once again going beyond the YSL. For instance, the category of non-palace land now included not only the land that had been used with or without the Sultanate’s permission, but also contained ‘idle land.’ In essence, therefore, all land not being used for any particular function became the Sultanate’s land. Further, the Perdais confirmed the financial support for the Sultanate’s land certification project. With these funds, the provincial government was expected to manage 7,998 plots of SG/PAG and village land in 2018, expecting to reach 21,877 plots in 2022. The Perdais, then, was the temporary climax of the Sultan’s long-time quest for confirmation of his land rights – which were now stronger than at any point in post-independence history. Arguably, they were even more solid than under colonial rule, when the colonial government had more power to interfere with the Sultan’s land regime than the Indonesian Central Government possesses today.

Using the Perdais as a strong legal basis, the Sultan moved to even further consolidate his position in land affairs. Only a few months after the Perdais, the Sultan – as governor – issued Pergub No. 34/2017 on the Usage of Village Land. In Article 1, point 1, it states: ‘Tanah Desa is the land that originates from Kasultanan and/or [Pakualaman], and is managed by the village government based on the Anggaduh right, and consists of Tanah Kas Desa, Pelungguh, Pengarem-Arem, and communal land.’ To make himself absolutely clear, the governor added Article 7, point 1, which stipulates that ‘Village land is the private property owned by

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131 For instance, see Bupati Sleman Regulation No. 7/2015, 5 January 2015.
132 Interview, Sultan Hamengku Buwono X, 3 March 2015 in Yogyakarta.
133 ‘Tanah yang belum digunakan.’ Article 8, point (1) d. In other provinces, idle land belongs to the state.
134 Governor Decree No. 31/2018 p. 1192.
Kasultanan or [Pakualaman].’ The Pergub further reiterated that village land previously granted Anggaduh rights by the Kasultanan/Pakualaman must be re-certified from ‘usage rights on state land’ into ‘usage rights on land owned by Kasultanan [or Pakualaman]’ (Article 11). This was, thus far, the clearest expression of the post-2012 trend of the Sultan regaining land as private property from what had previously been classified as state land. As mentioned above, there has been no conversion of village land from state land into the Sultanate’s land at the time of writing, but the Sultan has unambiguously stated his claim.

In contrast to his handling of the ban on ethnic Chinese to own land, the Sultan was able to mitigate conflicts over village land by demonstrating willingness to make some concessions. His guarantee that village officials could continue drawing economic benefits from ‘his’ land was crucial in addressing concerns of village officials and prevent them from open dissent. Similarly, he accepted the village funds as part of the Village Law, which he otherwise rejected. He made those compromises to village officials, and refused to make them to the ethnic Chinese, because the former were more important to him than the latter. The village officials constituted the core of his loyalist base. Owning the land on which they depended was crucial for maintaining their loyalty, but so was being careful about not alienating them through excessive demands. Thus, he insisted on formally owning village land, but allowed village officials to make profit from it. The ethnic Chinese, on the other hand, were a marginalised group with little support in Yogyakarta society. For the Sultan, discriminating against them created some conflict, but also brought him silent approval from many ordinary citizens. Thus, he could afford rejecting compromise with them while being open for discussions with village officials.

6.7 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed how the Sultan used the 2012 YSL as the basis for a new campaign to expand his powers. In this sense, the success in getting the centre to approve the 2012 law was not the end, but the beginning of an even more ambitious project. Many of the regulations that the Sultan, as governor, put in place after 2012 expanded the parameters set in the 2012 legislation. This was particularly obvious in the arena of land management, in which the Sultan broadened the categories of palace and non-palace land so that it included almost every land plot not already in private ownership. Similarly, he had the definition of ‘culture’ changed so that special funds could be directed towards infrastructure projects in which the Sultanate had
an interest in – and from which it benefitted through land sales to the government. After several years of YSL implementation, then, the Sultan had tailored Yogyakarta’s legal-political setting to his own needs – and what’s more, to the needs of the royal family for generations to come.

Most importantly, the post-2012 campaign of the Sultan restored his property rights over land that had previously been eroded by seven decades of occupation, war and successive democratic and authoritarian governments. But the Sultanate’s post-2012 conversion of access to land into property rights was only possible because Hamengku Buwono IX and his successor had successfully defended their access to land from the 1940s to the early 2010s. Despite the challenges of revolutionary upheaval, democratic reform and authoritarian pressure, they continuously managed to find ways to cling to their land as a basis of power. Had they not been able to do that prior to 1998, the post-Suharto Yogyakarta Sultanate would have had no foundation from which to launch a project of aristocratic restoration of full property rights and expanded political authority. This is where the difference to many other Indonesian aristocracies has been the most pronounced: most of Yogyakarta’s royal counterparts across the archipelago lost their land possessions at some point between the late colonial period, the revolution, the 1960 BAL and the New Order. When the opportunity for a revival arrived in 1998, they had no foundation from which to initiate a campaign to regain the authority they once had before 1945.

Land, therefore, has indeed turned out to be the key political capital of the Yogyakarta aristocracy, as hypothesised earlier in the thesis. It was an asset that could be turned into money, political loyalty, societal mobilisation and even an instrument of demographic engineering – as in the case of the exclusion of ethnic Chinese. Without his land and the patron-client relations attached to it, Hamengku Buwono X would not have been able to mobilise enough support for his 1998 return to the governorship – nor would the YSL have passed in 2012. To be sure, the instrumentalization of land was complemented by a strategy of lobbying for the sultanate’s interests in Jakarta. But as important as this was, it was only made effective with grassroots pressure from the Sultan’s loyalists in Yogyakarta. Yudhoyono, for instance, only endorsed the direct and permanent appointment of the Sultan as governor after the mobilisation by Hamengku Buwono X’s loyalists – many of them village officials drawing from ‘his’ land – became unstoppable.

The case of the Yogyakarta Sultanate constitutes the most extreme form of successful aristocratic revival in post-Suharto Indonesia. Indeed, the revival was so complete that it expanded the powers the Sultanate had held under colonial rule – during which the Dutch
commanded supreme authority over the Sultanate and even determined who became sultan. But the well-defined features of the Yogyakarta case – with the level of control over land strongly linked to the success of the aristocratic revival – delivers a compelling finding that can be tested against other cases. Only if this pattern of land as the key asset in aristocratic restorations holds in other cases, will it be possible to treat it as a generalisable model. Hence, the following chapter will discuss the revival projects launched by four Outer Island aristocracies: that is, the Puri Ubud (Bali), the Ternate Sultanate (North Maluku), the Gowa Kingdom (South Sulawesi), and the Palembang Sultanate (South Sumatra). As the discussion will show, the ability to control land was decisive in these cases too. Strong land control led to successful revivals, while weak control produced failure. Moderate control over land, finally, led to mixed outcomes.
7. The Political Economy of Aristocratic Land in Ubud, Ternate, Gowa and Palembang

7.1 Introduction

Recall that this thesis set out to explore why some Indonesian aristocracies succeeded in staging politico-economic comebacks after 1998, while others failed to do so. The preceding discussion of the thesis’ main case study, the Sultanate of Yogyakarta, confirmed the hypothesis that the ability of aristocrats to hold on to their land possessions, both before and after 1998, had a major impact on their post-Suharto transition outcome. In this regard, control over land came both in the form of access, or the ‘ability to benefit from things’ (Ribot & Peluso, 2003, p. 153), or legal ownership as the core concept of ‘property’ (Alchian, 2007; Arruñada, 2018; Sikor & Lund, 2009a, 2009b). In the Yogyakarta case, the Sultanate’s success in maintaining land access during times of transition even allowed it to subsequently upgrade its status of land control to property.

But how did other aristocracies fare compared to their Yogyakarta counterpart? As hinted in previous chapters, many aristocracies lost their land after the revolution, while others had to give it up after the BAL in 1960. However, while Yogyakarta was the most successful royal house after 1998, it was not the only one that exercised greater political and economic influence than before the 1998 regime change. This chapter analyses such cases, and investigates whether land played a similar role in their successes as in the example of Yogyakarta. Further, the chapter also discusses cases of failed aristocratic restoration projects, and explores the reasons for that failure. Once again, specific attention is paid to the level of aristocratic land control in each case, and how it interrelated with the transition outcome. As indicated above, the chapter demonstrates that the general hypothesis on this interrelationship holds not only in Yogyakarta, but also in the other selected cases (refer to the introduction for an explanation of the case study selection). High levels of long-term land control lead to success; moderate levels lead to mixed results; while a low degree predetermines failure.

The chapter first turns to two cases of moderate to mixed degrees of success in aristocratic revival campaigns. The first case concerns the Balinese Kingdom of Puri Ubud, where Cokorda Gde Agung Sukawati (1910–1978) adhered to the land ownership ceiling set in the 1960s. Consequently, Puri Ubud lost most of its aristocratic property. However, his son, Cokorda Oka Artha Ardhana Sukawati, was elected as Regent of Gianyar (2008–2013) and as
Deputy Governor of Bali (2018–2023). This moderate success was due to two forms of socio-political capital: first, the transformation of remaining land from unproductive cliff land into profitable tourism sites; and second, the village communities that were tied to Puri Ubud through traditional land-based relationships. The second case focuses on the Ternate Sultanate, the easternmost aristocracy in Indonesia. There, Sultan Mudaffar Syah chaired the provincial branch of Golkar during the transition, but failed to become governor of the newly established North Maluku Province. He then sat in the national parliament and the DPD. The key to his partial success lies in the conversion of Ternate’s primarily coastal aristocracy to a land-based social structure. The land control based on this structure gave the Sultan influence, but as an originally maritime aristocracy, this control remained inherently limited.

The third and fourth cases, by contrast, explore failures of aristocratic revival. The King of Gowa in South Sulawesi failed to gain any political position in the six political competitions in which he participated since the fall of Suharto. Frustrated at these losses, Andi Maddusila declared himself the King of Gowa in 2012, although his father had disbanded the kingdom following the end of the swapraja era in 1958. Without economic support from land, he failed to defeat the Limpo dynasty that had controlled the region since the 1980s. Maddusila tried to reacquire Gowa’s traditional royal land, but was unsuccessful. The fourth case study concerns the Sultanate of Palembang, which was part of the Mataram Sultanate and dismantled by the Dutch in 1823. A retired police officer resurrected the Sultanate in 2003, and a local businessman also claimed the title of sultan three years later. Lacking any socio-political capital, in the form of land or otherwise, they failed to secure support for their bids. However, they gained some personal economic benefits from selling aristocratic status, often to Malaysians.

7.2 Puri Ubud: Limited Property and the Tourism Industry

This section explores the partial political success of Puri Ubud in the district of Gianyar, Bali Province. I argue that the political performance of Puri Ubud in post-authoritarian Indonesia has been rooted in its transformation from a land-based agricultural aristocracy into a land-based tourism/industrial one. Puri Ubud’s significant role in transforming Ubud into a tourism area focused on arts, culture, and natural scenery since the 1950s has benefited its heirs in local politics. Even though Puri Ubud, like the other puri in Bali, lost most of its lands, it has

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135 Puri refers to the palace and the aristocratic community living within it.
maintained indirect land control through its cultural, material, and religious functions in the traditional villages. By building strong ties with the banjar (the smallest but highly influential units in a village), Puri Ubud has effectively escaped the land ownership ceiling imposed in 1960. As tourism generated more and more profits over the years, both the Puri and the banjar drew economic and political advantages. Eventually, Puri Ubud’s influence expanded from Ubud Sub-District into Gianyar District.

Even in the 1950s, Clifford Geertz had captured the beginnings of the transforming role of ‘displaced aristocrats’ in Bali who increasingly mobilised ‘habitual sentiment of loyalty, respect, obligation and trust […] to make ancient custom serve modern enterprise’ (Geertz, 1963, p. 82). In other words, they attempted to exchange their traditional social capital for commercial benefit. In the case of Ubud, other scholars subsequently analysed the sub-district’s transformation from an agrarian into a tourism-based society. The work of MacRae (2003, 2006), for instance, focuses on the changing sociological patterns of the residents of Ubud and the transformation of their land usage from agrarian purposes to tourism purposes. Some peasants have turned to organic rice production to survive (MacRae, 2011). Recently, Graeme MacRae (2016) introduced the concept of ‘cosmopolitanism’ to describe Ubud’s tourism industry, as the border of the tourist and expatriate communities is exceedingly blurred, turning Ubud into an international town. These studies form a useful analytical background that can help illuminate the historical trajectory of the Puri’s political and economic campaigns.

Puri Ubud was founded as a ‘branch’ of the Puri Gianyar in 1782, and Ida Cokorde Gede Putu Kandel was put in charge of it (MacRae, 1997, p. 294). There were many subsequent wars between local royal houses in the middle of the 19th century, however, leaving Puri Ubud at times without a leader. This chaotic period also coincided with Dutch attempts to militarily conquer Bali, which stretched from the 1840s to the early 1900s. The last Balinese resistance only ended in 1908 – which meant that Bali had escaped the Dutch industrial land policies practiced in Java in the 19th century (I. G. N. Agung, Kusa, Sarjana, & Suryawathi, 1989). The 1935 land record in Gianyar shows that there were 15,003 ha of registered land (J. B Bekker, 1937 pp. 63–64, in (I. G. N. Agung et al., 1989, p. 56)). Most of the land was controlled by the local aristocracies, who had often won it in military conflicts with other royal houses in the region. Subjects then borrowed land from aristocrats through an in-kind sharing system of harvests and other proceeds.

In 1958, Bali Province and eight districts were established, following the boundaries of the largest eight Balinese Kingdoms. Ubud (which had been a district since 1922) became one
of Gianyar’s sub-districts.136 Puri Ubud initially controlled twelve traditional villages, or Desa Pakraman.137 They were led by bendesa, or village head, and each Desa Pakraman consisted of several banjar.138 These, in turn, were led by a kelian. From the colonial period, adat villages have been the cultural, religious, and economic centres of the community, and the banjar have been the basis of day-to-day management of the traditional aspects of Balinese life. Given the continued power of tradition on Balinese society, however, the banjar have a strong say in issues such as land sales and residency permits as well. Thus, while the modern government structure of Desa Dinas (service village) led by perbekel was created to manage state administrative matters, they often have to accept the superiority of decisions made by Desa Pakraman or banjar officials.

As the most hierarchically structured community in Indonesia (Warren, 1995), Bali has maintained a caste system that divides the Balinese into Triwangsa (Brahmans, Aristocrats/Satria, Vesia) and Djaba (Sudras, or commoners) (Geertz, 1964, pp. 11-12). This stratification is reflected in, among other things, the naming system in Bali. Balinese aristocrats bear the name of Cokorda, Anak Agung, Gusti, and Dewa. Aristocrats can give their titles to their sons and daughters without considering gender and without further stratification among the aristocrats. The name ‘Cokorda’, for instance, can be given to both men and women, and it is hard to determine whether a ‘Cokorda’ in a puri is of a higher or lower level than ‘Anak Agung’ in another puri. The Gianyar census in 1930 and 1937 showed that the higher Triwangsa caste comprised 17% of the population (Sutaba, Astawa, & Wirawan, 2007, pp. 394-395). Of course, this case system reflects the main religion on Bali: Hinduism. In Gianyar, Hindus represent 98% of the population (BPS Gianyar, 2014).

Before analysing how Ubud’s Puri performed in the political arena of post-Suharto Indonesia, let us investigate how Balinese aristocrats generally fared in the province. Chart 3 below shows the composition of Bali’s provincial parliament from the New Order period to the contemporary era. Aristocrats were identified by their name and title. In 1982, twenty-two aristocrats sat in Bali’s parliament (55%), and the number steadily declined to eleven (20%) in 2014. This showed two important patterns: first, the aristocracy was politically strong under the New Order, as it had been co-opted into the regime’s Golkar party. Second, the aristocracy

137 These were Jungjungan, Bentuyung, Tegallantang, Taman Kaja, Taman Kelod, Padang Tegal Kaja, Padang Tegal Tengah, Padang Tegal Kelod, Ubud Kelod, Ubud Tengah, Ubud Kaja, and Sambahan (I. G. N. Agung et al., 1989, p. 13).
138 Interview, village head (bendesa) and Puri Ubud adat representative Cokorda Raka Kerthyasa, 18 April 2016 in Ubud.
overall lost ground in Bali’s elite politics after 1998. This will make it all the more important to explain why Puri Ubud was able to develop against this trend. Interestingly, like the aristocrats, the number of non-Balinese in the Bali parliament declined from ten (25%) in 1982 to one (1.8%) in 2014, as described in the chart below. This indicates that Balinese society turned increasingly nativist after 1998, but that it did not see aristocrats as the main protectors of Balinese culture.

Chart 3 Members of Bali Parliament, 1982–2014

A similar trend was visible at the executive level, i.e. in the number of aristocrats who held positions as mayors or regents. Examining eight cities and districts between 1975 and 1995, aristocrats occupied between 60% and 75% of all Balinese local-level executive leadership positions. This number declined to 50% at the end of the New Order, and declined further from there. In 2003, the new District of Klungkung was formed; since then, aristocrats have only controlled three out of nine regencies/cities, as shown in Chart 4 below.
However, the pattern has been somewhat different in the district of Gianyar, in which Puri Ubud is located. For instance, the decline in aristocratic members of parliament was slower, and fluctuated more, than at the province level. Indeed, the number of aristocratic legislators increased dramatically in the first post-authoritarian parliament of 1999, before declining to a level that was only slightly below that during the late New Order. This suggests that aristocrats were well positioned to engage in the political arena during the democratic transition, and that even after democracy consolidated, their position did not fall back significantly behind their level of engagement in the late New Order. Nevertheless, Chart 5 below shows that commoners strongly outnumbered aristocrats in parliament after 2009, in line with the trend at the provincial level.

In contrast to the declining trends across Bali, the aristocracy has had a strong grip on the regentship of Gianyar. During the revolution, the Puri Gianyar leader was appointed regent, and the family continued to hold the position until 1964. In that year, the leftist wave under President Sukarno swept a commoner to power. The latter was suspected of being close to the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia – PKI), and he was therefore replaced after the 1965 coup by military commoners. In 1969, aristocrats returned to the regentship, and they defended it throughout the New Order and much of the post-1998 era. Puri Ubud. In 1983, Puri Ubud broke the dominance of Puri Gianyar, and has had three of its members as regents since then (see Table 7.1 below). Indeed, during the 2018 elections, a split within the Puri Ubud occurred: Cokorda Raka Kerthyasa (Cok Ibah), a senior Puri leader, ran for Golkar against a PDIP-nominated commoner supported by his cousin and former regent Cokorda Artha Ardhana Sukawati (Cok Ace), who was a PDIP candidate for vice governor at the same time. Both Sukawati and the commoner won.

Table 7.1 Gianyar Regents, 1945–2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Name of Gianyar Regent</th>
<th>Origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945–1947</td>
<td>Ida Anak Agung Gde Agung</td>
<td>Aristocrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947–1950</td>
<td>Anak Agung Gde Agung</td>
<td>Aristocrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950–1960</td>
<td>Anak Agung Gde Oka</td>
<td>Aristocrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960–1963</td>
<td>Cokorda Ngurah</td>
<td>Aristocrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963–1964</td>
<td>Cokorda Anom Pundak</td>
<td>Aristocrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964–1965</td>
<td>I Made Sayoga</td>
<td>Commoner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965–1969</td>
<td>I Made Kembar Karepun</td>
<td>Commoner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969–1983</td>
<td>Anak Agung Gde Agung</td>
<td>Aristocrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983–1993</td>
<td>Cokorda Raka Dherana (Ubud)</td>
<td>Aristocrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993–2003</td>
<td>Cokorda Gde Budi Suryawan (Ubud)</td>
<td>Aristocrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003–2008</td>
<td>Anak Agung Gde Bharata</td>
<td>Aristocrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008–2013</td>
<td>Cokorda Artha Ardhana Sukawati (Ubud)</td>
<td>Aristocrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013–2018</td>
<td>Anak Agung Gde Bharata</td>
<td>Aristocrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018–2023</td>
<td>I Made Agus Mahayastra</td>
<td>Commoner</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The pattern of regent elections in Gianyar since the end of the New Order, then, has shown two main trends: first, a gradual power shift – starting in 1983 – from Puri Gianyar to Puri Ubud, which initially had been established as a branch of the latter. Second, as the 2018 elections showed, the rivalry between Puri Gianyar and Puri Ubud has slowly been replaced by intra-Puri Ubud competition. As a result of that competition, a commoner was elected, but only with the explicit support of one of the Puri Ubud leaders. This raises the question of how Puri Ubud acquired this strong position, and the answer lies, as in the Yogyakarta case, in the way the royal family was able to utilise land as a resource. This was despite the fact that unlike the Yogyakarta Sultanate, it lost most of its holdings with the BAL.

The Balinese land management system has traditionally been similar to the one practiced on Java, but land ownership ceilings were strictly implemented in line with the BAL. Previously, royals had received a portion of the harvests from puri land (pecatu), tilled by commoners (MacRae, 2003). In 1963–1964, as land was surveyed for re-distribution, Puri Ubud controlled 636.24 ha, and its leader Cokorda Raka personally owned 254.89 ha of land. The twenty-one largest landowners after him owned a total of 1,067.06 ha (MacRae, 2003, p. 184). When the land ceiling policy was implemented in Bali, limiting private property ownership to seven hectares of fertile land and nine hectares of arid land per family unit, the aristocrats were negatively affected. In an informal arrangement, the management of Puri lands (which were traditionally claimed by the Puri but were not officially registered) was given to desa Pakraman and banjar, while personal land (including that of aristocrats) was distributed to landless peasants under the redistribution programme. From 1961 to 2016, the Gianyar Land Office redistributed 4,472.0 ha of privately-owned land, as shown in the table below.

139 Interview, the Head of Gianyar Land Office on January 2015 in Gianyar. See also MacRae (2003, p. 183).
140 There are 546 banjar in Gianyar that are affiliated with the Puri (BPS Gianyar, 2014).
Table 7.2 Land redistribution in Gianyar, 1961–2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-District</th>
<th>Number of Recipients</th>
<th>Land Redistributed (in hectares)</th>
<th>Certified</th>
<th>Not Certified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gianyar</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>122.934</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tampaksiring</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>193.18</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tegallalang</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>126.95</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payangan</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>3,205.345</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ubud</td>
<td>1,513</td>
<td>374.77</td>
<td>1,361</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blahbatuh</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>209.621</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sukawati</td>
<td>929</td>
<td>239.267</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,456</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,472.067</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,041</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,265</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gianyar Land Office, 2016 (personal correspondence).

With the management of Puri lands being transferred to the villages and banjar, and the private property of the Ubud aristocracy reduced by the BAL limits, the challenge for the Ubud aristocracy was to at least maintain ‘access’ to land (Ribot & Peluso, 2003). This was necessary to secure the economic survival of the royal house. As indicated above, there were two main strategies to achieve this: first, turning the land that remained available to the aristocracy into the most effective source of income possible; this was done through converting previously agricultural or unusable land into profitable tourism sites. The second strategy involved cultivating a close religious-cultural relationship with the banjar that were now in charge of the previous Puri land, benefitting both from the land they oversaw but also from the political support they could provide. Let us first turn to the strategy of using tourism as a major income source for Puri Ubud aristocrats.

When the BAL hit the interests of the Puri Ubud in the early 1960s, falling back on tourism was the most plausible compensation for the loss of its land. Long before the 1960s, the Puri had been active in the local tourism industry. In 1925, The Puri’s leader Cokorda Gde Agung Sukawati (r.1931–1950, d. 1978) opened his palace, Puri Saren, and the Royal Guest House in Tjampuhan to host European artists and tourists (Picard, 1996, pp. 83–89). He subsequently collaborated with prominent artists, including painters Walter Spies and Rudolf Bonnet, to form an art community called Pita Maha in 1936 (Sutaba et al., 2007, p. 398).141

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141 In 1937, for instance, Pita Maha had gathered 157 artists and craftsmen, with proceeds reaching $4,005.65 (Sutaba et al., 2007, p. 398) or approximately today’s US$ 38,207 (Herold, 2008, p. 13).
Thus, Ubud had pioneered a form of elite cultural tourism long before Sukarno opened Bali as Indonesia’s top tourist destination in the 1950s.

But the engagement of Puri Ubud in the tourism industry intensified significantly after the BAL and the development of tourism in other parts of Bali. The single Royal Guesthouse was developed into several hotels and villas, making Puri Ubud family members important actors in Bali’s tourism industry. Their remaining land, held in a private capacity, was a key resource in this regard. MacRae (2003, p. 174) noted that:

By the early 1990s, land, along with certain other strategic resources, had become the prime determinant of a household’s ability to compete successfully in the new tourism-based economy. Land can be used to generate profit either by building residential or commercial premises on it, renting or leasing it to others to do likewise, or simply by allowing its value to appreciate.

Puri Ubud opened the luxurious Pita Maha Hotel in 1995, consisting of twenty-four traditionally styled modern villas, and reopened the Puri Ubud Royal Guest House as the Royal Pita Maha Hotel shortly afterwards.142 Puri Ubud’s aristocrats also developed and assisted in the development of street-side art shops and souvenirs kiosks, the total number of which has reached 600 (including 270 kiosks in the Ubud market in front of the palace). They were mostly built on land that was previously controlled by the Puri but is now in the lands of village officials. Puri Ubud leaders have become key officials in Bali’s tourism management as well. Cokorda Gde Agung Sukawati had three sons. The oldest and the leader of Puri Ubud, Cokorda Gde Putra Sukawati (Cok Putra), was chairman of the Gianyar branch of Bali’s key tourism organisation, namely the Bali branch of the Indonesian Hotel and Restaurant Association (Perhimpunan Hotel dan Restoran Indonesia – PHRI), from 1984 to 1992. Currently, he is a member of the steering committee of the PHRI Bali. Cok Ace, the second son, who served as Regent of Gianyar between 2008 and 2013, has been the chairman of PHRI Bali since 2005 (Radar Bali, 18 November 2015). While at PHRI, the Puri Ubud aristocrats oversaw strong growth in tourism across Bali (at about 12% per year) (BPS Bali, 2017). Even more importantly, they grew the tourism industry in Gianyar, which represented 25% of the district economy in 2017 (BPS Gianyar, 2018, p. 386)143; for all of Bali, that number was 22% in 2017 (up from 11% in 1970) (Bendesa & Sukarsa, 1980; BPS Bali, 2018).

143 The “tourism industry” here is the hotel and restaurant sector.
The wealth generated by tourism became an important political resource for Puri Ubud members to participate in electoral contests. When Cokorda Raka Kerthyas, a senior leader of Puri Ubud, ran for the regentship of Gianyar in 2018, he was the wealthiest of the candidates. His total wealth was IDR 38.5 billion [US$ 2.6 million] (Nusa Bali, 21 April 2018). Significantly, IDR 38 billion [US$ 2.5 million] of this amount was in the form of land and building ownership (it was not clear how much of this property portfolio was in the tourism sector, but given the family’s deep involvement in this area, it must have been substantial). The wealth of Cok Ace, who ran for vice-governor in the same year, showed very similar patterns. His total assets stood at IDR 28.4 billion [US$ 1.9 million], and IDR 26.6 billion [US$ 1.8 million] was drawn from land and buildings (Kompas, 16 April 2018). With this, Cok Ace was four times richer than his partner in the elections, PDIP politician I Wayan Koster. It is also important to note that these are only the private assets of two Puri members; more of the Puri assets are spread within the family and related companies.
Beyond using tourism to maximise the value of the remaining private land holdings, Puri Ubud also cultivated the villages and *banjar* as an economic and socio-political power base. In an interview with the author, Cok Ibah stated that ‘in the past, this was all Puri land [...] so there remains a trace of that hierarchical history from the times of the Kingdom.’\(^{144}\) Today, *desa pakraman* control this former Puri land, with its economic benefits mostly used for religious life\(^{145}\) – in which the Puri Ubud leaders maintain an important role. In every *desa pakraman* there are at least two religious sites: *Pura Puseh* as the origin of the village and *Pura Dalem*, which is related to death (MacRae, 2006). One of the most influential shows of *desa pakraman/banjar*’s loyalty in cultural and religious affairs is the royal funeral ceremony (*palebon*). Puri Ubud has held some of the largest funeral ceremonies, as shown in 2004, 2014, and 2018 – in these events, Puri leaders are the highest-ranking participants, and thus symbolically subordinate the villages and *banjar*.

Puri Ubud enjoys its strongest village-based support from the *Desa Adat* Ubud, which has thirteen *banjar*. In fact, Cok Ibah himself has been the *bendesa* of the village for many years, highlighting the strong ties. Because of its influence, forty other *banjar* have also loosely affiliated with Puri Ubud and the village that it is closest to. One reason for this is Puri Ubud’s role in creating economic opportunities for the *banjar*. For instance, Cok Ace has coordinated dance communities recruited mostly from the *banjar* that perform in Puri Ubud Palace every night; with tickets costing IDR 250,000 [US$18] each, the community has a stable income. The Puri has also provided the *banjar* with objects that are crucial to the religious-cultural life of the villagers. The youngest among three brothers of Puri Ubud’s leader, Cokorda Gde Agung Sukawati (Cok De), is one of the finest engravers of *barong*, the most sacred object in the *desa pakraman* and *banjar*. The *barong* is handed to the *banjar*, and serve as symbols of the mutual bond of loyalty based on the history of past Puri Ubud ownership of the village land.

The arrangement of mutual support between Puri and the *bandar* can be seen in the organisation of religious ceremonies. For example, all the sons of the Puri Ubud leader are part of the organisational structure of the religious site of Pura Dalem Alit, which is located in the *Desa Adat Ubud* (Bajra, 2015, pp. 55, 73-76). In return, among other things, the populace does unpaid work for Puri Ubud. For instance, during the cremation of one of Puri Ubud’s aristocrats in 2014, the *banjar* worked in shift for months to prepare for the *palebon* ceremony. Cok Putra said, ‘The *banjar* community members work in shifts to make this ceremony go as planned.

\(^{144}\) Interview, Cokorda Raka Kerthyasa, 18 April 2016 in Ubud.

\(^{145}\) The land now used for religious purposes is called *tanah laba pura*. 
They do it voluntarily.’ But rather than it being ‘voluntary’, the work is part of a remaining system of patron-client relations that ties the local population to the previous owner of the land they live on.

The political and economic importance of desa pakraman is shown in their capacity to control adat land and its use for the tourism-based economy. Apart from privately owned rice fields (sawah) and dry land (tegal), the desa pakraman own or have access to three types of adat land: residential (karang ayahan/tanah karangan desa – TKD), agricultural (tanah ayahan desa – TAD), and other village lands (tanah desa), including land for religious and social purposes (Warren, 1995). Both TKD and TAD have unsalable usage rights, which are transferrable only to descendants. Parker (2004, pp. 50-64), in her research on Brassika village in Klungkung, argues that sawah is the most important type of land in Bali, for social, economic, and religious reasons. Only the rich and wealthy own sawah, she pointed out, and it is religiously connected to the Goddess Sri. However, the case of Ubud is different. The most important land type is the residential land, because villagers have turned their street-side land (amal-amal) into souvenir kiosks, restaurants, and bars. For instance, a businessman interviewed for this study in 2016 rented around 200 m² of land along Ubud’s main road for IDR 20 million [US$ 1,448] per month, with two years paid up front out of a four-year contract.

With this, the status of the village and banjar land in Ubud is similar to that of village land in Yogyakarta before the YSL in 2012. In that period, village land was traditionally the Sultan’s land, but its status had become unclear after independence. Nevertheless, village leaders who drew profit from the land felt a sense of gratitude towards the Sultan as the traditional owner, and reacted by supporting him politically in times of crisis. In Ubud, the process was analogous: control of the land was given from the Puri to the villages after the BAL, and they used it for the benefits of their own management. But their social, religious and cultural lives remained inseparably intertwined with that of the Puri, and thus the benefits collected by the banjar benefitted the Puri as well. In addition, the land generated tax income from occupants, collected by the Gianyar government, which then used the money to increase

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147 See, for instance, Bali Bylaw No. 3/2001 on Desa Pakraman Article 9 and the village rules (awig-awig).
148 In 2016, sawah in Bali was 14% of the land total, less than dry lands and tegalan (48%) and non-agriculture land (37%) (BPS Bali, 2016).
149 Interview, resident of Ubud, 20 April 2016 in Ubud. The kelian refused to answer in detail on the rent price, but admitted that the rent went to the banjar.
service delivery. Tables 7.3 and 7.4 below present land occupancy data from the Gianyar Government (2015), showing that there were 30,358 TKD occupants in Gianyar, 4,655 of which were in Ubud. These land occupants gave the Gianyar government an income of IDR 2.1 billion [US$151,166] per year; IDR 548 million [US$ 39,688] of this amount came from Ubud.

Table 7.3 TKD land taxpayers in Gianyar, 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Taxpayers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gianyar</td>
<td>7,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blahbatuh</td>
<td>4619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sukawati</td>
<td>6195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ubud</td>
<td>4655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tampankor</td>
<td>2362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tegallang</td>
<td>3215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payangan</td>
<td>2290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>30,358</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Revenue Office for the Gianyar Government, 2015 (personal correspondence).

150 In government statistics, TKD land is abbreviated as PKD, but it refers to the same item.
Table 7.4 Total tax income from TKD land in Gianyar, 2015 (IDR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Tax Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gianyar</td>
<td>443,522,339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balian</td>
<td>159,221,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sukawati</td>
<td>6,673,875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ubud</td>
<td>5,983,323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tampaksiring</td>
<td>2,654,199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tegallalang</td>
<td>1,30,544,647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payangan</td>
<td>1,07,712,817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,109,313,655</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The socio-economic ties between Puri Ubud and villages – in particular desa pakraman Ubud – is also reflected in the fact that Cok Ibah has been deeply involved in the affairs of the latter village’s micro-credit bank, or Village Credit Agency (Lembaga Perkreditan Desa – LPD). Initiated in 1984 and regulated by bylaw in 2002, LPD is intended to strengthen the adat village in financing its cultural and religious affairs. LPD has successfully targeted communities without access to formal banks (Siebel, 2008), and in many parts of Bali the agility and flexibility of LPD has made it a threat to established banks. In 2016, 1,433 LPDs in Bali held total assets of IDR 15 trillion [US$1.08 billion] (Suara Dewata, 4 October 2016), a significant increase from the IDR 3.7 trillion [US$ 339 million] held in 2009 (Suartana & Ariyanto, 2012). In Desa Adat Ubud, LPD – first initiated in 1999 – has grown rapidly, with a total number of 7,923 customers managing IDR 44 billion [US$ 3.1 million] of third party saving.151 A year after its establishment, LPD Ubud reported a profit of IDR 110 million [US$ 11,400]; by 2015, this had increased to IDR 1.5 billion [US$ 108,000], as shown in Table 7.5 below.

151 Interview, Ida Bagus Temaja, the chairman of LPD Ubud, 19 April 2016 in Ubud.
The intense engagement of Cok Ibah in the internal affairs of the LPD became clear during my interview with the head of the Ubud LPD in April 2016. The interview took place at Cok Ibah’s residence. The way in which the LDP chair referred to Cok Ibah suggested a relationship between a man of much higher status and his subject. The LDP head deferentially sought policy input and guidance from Cok Ibah, and only allowed me to access the LDP data after Cok Ibah had given his explicit permission. In effect, then, Cok Ibah, as a senior member of the Puri and as the bendesa of Desa Pakraman Ubud, has assumed the supreme leadership role in the LDP. In this role, he has guided LPD Ubud to its current status as the fastest-growing LPD in Bali. Hence, Puri Ubud’s participation in guiding LPD Ubud has strengthened the loyalty felt by villagers towards the Puri. With the LPD functioning as a dispenser of monetary support in the form of credit or interest payments to villagers, the beneficiaries of this assistance feel obliged to repay the debt to the royal house.

One of the ways this debt has been repaid is through political support for members of the aristocracy running for political office. In the 2008 elections, village and banjar support from Ubud was crucial in securing Cok Ace’s victory in the Gianyar regent elections. In 2018, when Cok Ibah ran against a candidate supported by Cok Ace, the support was split. While Cok Ibah could mobilise much loyalty in the Desa Pakraman Ubud that he headed, Cok Ace – as the second son of Puri Ubud’s last King – commanded more reverence in other villages. Partly

![Table 7.5 LPD Ubud net profit, 1999–2015 (IDR)](image)
as a result of his higher status – but also because his role as former regent allowed him to appeal to Gianyar voters outside of Ubud – Ace’s candidate prevailed.

Puri Ubud, then, recorded significant successes in post-autocratic politics by maximising the utility of its remaining land-based resources. The royal house was able to compensate for the loss of most of its land after 1960 by using the rest of the land to generate profits from tourism, and it sustained access to village land by situating itself as the economic, cultural, and religious patron of the desa pakraman/banjar now controlling the previous Puri land. Unlike the Yogyakarta Sultanate, however, the post-1998 Puri Ubud did not succeed in restoring its past land property rights, and instead was limited to exercising land access to former royal territory. Indeed, the villages began in 2017 to apply for the certification of village land as communal land, aiming to end decades of uncertainty over the formal status of the previous Puri land. 152 Despite its failure to reclaim former land possessions as private property, Puri Ubud built much economic and political capital from the land it was left with. Puri Ubud subsequently deployed this capital to install its members as key players in local politics – reaching such high levels of dominance that the 2018 elections for Gianyar regent turned into an intra-Puri contest.

7.3 Ternate Sultanate: Maintaining Land Access Through Adat

Another case of a partially successful politico-economic revival of an Indonesian aristocracy is the Sultanate of Ternate in North Maluku. In exploring this phenomenon, scholars have argued that the source of the Sultan’s political legitimacy is his charisma (Bubandt, 2014), the blend between magical aspects of religion and culture (Hasyim, 2017) and positioning himself as a bridge between this world and the after world (Pettalongi, 2012). Bubandt (2014, p. 85) wrote that ‘unlike his rival, who had been obliged to spend millions, even billions, of IDR to campaign, to secure electoral backing from political parties, to pay demonstrators, and to buy votes, the Sultan’s constituency was guaranteed by virtue of traditional loyalties and spiritual anxieties alone.’ Another researcher argues that the continuity of elite control in North Maluku is a result of their key roles during the communal conflict that broke out following the fall of Suharto (C. Smith, 2009a, 2009b). I argue, however, that the Sultan’s partial political success

152 The Agrarian Minister/Head of BPN Decree No. 276/Kep-19.2/X/2017 stipulated that an Adat Village (Desa Pakraman) which consists of several banjar, has the right to communal land ownership. Communal land ownership has been regulated under BAL; its implementation, however, has only been started since the Joko Widodo presidency.
resulted from his strategy of defending access to land by transforming Ternate’s primarily coastal aristocracy into a land-based one. The Sultanate has maintained its economic power over land access as it escaped the BAL limitations by transferring land management to *adat* authorities while retaining land control. However, the Sultan’s wife and children failed politically, not only because they were not part of the traditional aristocratic structure and had no access to land, but also because of internal conflict.

Ternate, located in the northern part of the Moluccas, has been part of the region’s four historical sultanates (referred to as *Fala Raha*): Jailolo, Ternate, Tidore, and Bacan (A. Amal, 2010, p. 7). Early European explorers and merchants came to the Moluccas for spices, mainly nutmeg, pepper, and cloves. Trade turned into colonisation by the Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch (Burnet, 2011). Under Sukarno and Suharto, Ternate was part of Maluku Province. It became part of North Maluku Province in 1999, following the first provincial administrative division in post-authoritarian Indonesia. Historically, the strongest and most influential sultanate in North Maluku has been the Sultanate of Ternate (Hanna & Alwi, 1990). Its palace is located on Ternate Island, which is dominated by the Gamalama stratovolcano. Of the seventy-seven villages on the island, fifty-six are in coastal areas; no settlement is found more than 500 metres above sea level (BPS Ternate, 2014, p. 9). The forest, which has turned into spice plantations, dominates Ternate.

At the time of the revolution, Ternate remained close to the Dutch. The 47th Sultan of Ternate, Jabir Syah, had been ‘evacuated’ by the Allies to Australia during the Japanese occupation, strengthening his loyalty to the West. After his return, he was a commanding officer in the Netherland Indies Civil Administration (NICA), leading a local detachment of the semi-military organisation NICA under the Dutch, centred on nearby Morotai Island. Sukarno’s appointee as governor of Maluku, on the other hand, was unable to travel to Maluku and was forced to ‘lead’ the province from the national capitals in Jakarta and Yogyakarta (Leirissa, 1975, p. 101). Subsequently, the Sultan promoted a coalition of sultanates in eastern Indonesia (A. Amal, 2010), and agreed to join the State of East Indonesia (*Negara Indonesia Timur* – NIT) in 1946. The NIT, which included Bali, Nusa Tenggara and Maluku, was part of a Dutch

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153 Six population censuses from 1828 to 1885 documented the number of subjects in the Ternate and Tidore Sultanates. For instance, in 1885, the Sultan of Ternate had 71,834 subjects, while the Sultan of Tidore had 31,929 subjects. There were also several minorities: Makasarese (2,044), Chinese (465), Native Christian (583), and Europeans (308) (Clereq, 1890, p. 22).

154 See Law No. 20/1958.
concept to turn a future Indonesian state into a federal union, in which some parts would have a strong affiliation with the Netherlands. This was a position strongly supported by the Sultan.

During the establishment of the United States of Indonesia (*Republik Indonesia Serikat* – RIS) in late December 1949 (as a compromise between the Republic and the Dutch), Jabir Syah became the NIT’s interior minister (Hasyim, 2016). But the NIT soon collapsed under the Republic’s pressure, and Jabir Syah – as a loyalist of the pro-Dutch federal state – was exiled to Jakarta. At the same time, the former area of the Sultanate of Ternate became North Maluku District, and the government dismantled all the Sultanate’s structures. The royal house further lost its political significance when Ternate became part of Maluku Province, with its capital in Ambon, in 1957. In his Jakarta exile, the Sultan held the position of ‘assigned high official’ (*Pejabat Tinggi Diperbantukan*) in the Ministry of Interior Affairs. The Sultan had no power, neither in Jakarta nor at home, and only visited Ternate a few times before he died in 1976 (Djaafar, 2005).

The BAL of 1960 had little impact on the coastal aristocracy of Ternate – it was disestablished at that time anyway, and most land was in the hands of *adat* villages. But Jabir Syah’s son, Mudaffar Syah, built ties to these village communities and their leaders to revive the Sultanate in 1975 and claim the title of Ternate’s 48th Sultan. He rebuilt the ruins of the Sultanate’s palace and reactivated the Sultanate’s structure by appointing *adat* leaders to positions their ancestors had held previously. The centre of that structure was the highest council, called *Bobato 18* (*Bobato Nyagimo se Tufkane*), representing the village *adat* communities and forty-one family clans (*soa*) (Leirissa, 1996; Soelarto, 1977). After Mudaffar Syah’s lobbying, the council elected him as sultan based on the tradition of male hereditary line (Sultan Mudaffar Syah, 2009). The New Order regime tolerated the reactivation of the Sultanate because Sultan Mudaffar made himself available to be absorbed into its political machine. The status of sultan, although lacking political power, helped him gain political access. He served in the Maluku provincial parliament between 1971 and 1977, and became the head of North Maluku district’s Golkar branch in the 1990s. From 1998 to 2002, he represented Maluku at the MPR.

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155 See Emergency Law No. 22/1957.
156 Sultan Jabir Syah’s position in the Interior Minister was not clear. He had no staff and no definite task.
157 The *Bobato 18* council consists of eighteen *adat* communities grouped in three clusters based on their territorial area: five *Kimalaha* (Marsaoli, Tomaito, Tomagola, Tamadi and Payahe), four *fanyira* (Jiko, Jawa, Tolangara and Tabala) and nine *Sangaji* (Tamajiko, Malayu, Limatahu, Kulaba, Malaicim, Tobolen, Tafmutu, Tafaga and Takafi).
After Suharto’s fall, the Sultan became implicated in the bloody 1999 North Maluku ethno-religious conflict. He was widely accused of mismanaging the conflict, which related to land disputes as much as religious differences. As a consequence, he was not nominated as first governor of North Maluku (Burnet, 2011; Duncan, 2014; Wilson, 2008). The conflict started in the Malifut Sub-district, near Halmahera Island, which was part of the Sultanate’s traditional area. Land previously belonging to the Kao ethnic group was now claimed as a new sub-district by the politically and economically powerful Makians, who had resided in the area since the 1970s following a volcanic eruption in the Makian Islands. The land conflict turned into a religious one when the mostly Muslim Makians campaigned against the mostly Christian Kaos, who were protected by Mudaffar. In response, the Makians supported the reactivation of the Sultanate of Tidore to rival the Sultanate of Ternate. Sultan Mudaffar and his troops lost in the fight against the Makian-Tidorean coalition, and the governorship went to a Makian candidate.


The Sultan and his family had some mixed successes at other elections, however. The Sultan consistently won national-level parliamentary seats after 2004, but his family members have had inconsistent results. The Sultan won a legislative seat through the short-lived Party of Unitary Democratic Nationhood (Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan – PDK) in 2004, as well as two consecutive DPD elections in 2009 and 2014. His fourth wife won a DPD seat in 2004, lost in the Ternate mayoral election in 2005, and won a legislative seat in 2009 through the Democrat Party (Partai Demokrat – PD). She failed to maintain her position in the 2014 election. The Sultan’s daughter, Soraya, earned a place in the West Halmahera District legislature in 2004, but all other sons, daughters, and grandchildren lost in both legislative and executive elections since Suharto’s fall. In 2014, seven members of the Ternate Sultanate’s aristocratic family participated in elections with various political vehicles, but only the Sultan won a seat in the DPD. Mudaffar Syah died in 2015, and the position of Sultan has since been disputed, with several family members laying a claim. Partly because of this, there was only one (unsuccessful) family candidacy in the 2019 elections (by contrast, the Sultan of Tidore won a DPD seat). The electoral participation of the Ternate Sultanate’s family in post-Suharto elections is as shown in Table 7.6 below.

Table 7.6 Political participation of the Ternate Sultanate family, 2004–2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sultan Mudaffar Syah</th>
<th>Boki Ratu Nita Budhi Susanti (Fourth wife)</th>
<th>Hidayat Mudaffar Syah (Son-first wife)</th>
<th>Monalisa Mudaffar Syah (Daughter-first wife)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>DPR RI (PPDK) –  Won</td>
<td>DPD RI – Won</td>
<td>DPR RI (PP) –  Lost</td>
<td>DPRD Ternate (PDK) –  Lost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mayor Ternate – lost-second position</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>DPD RI – Won</td>
<td>DPR RI (PD) –  Won</td>
<td>Vice Mayor Ternate – Lost – last position</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>DPD RI – Won</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>DPR RI (PPP) –  Lost</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Political Economy of Aristocratic Land in Outer Islands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year 2004</th>
<th>Year 2005</th>
<th>Year 2009</th>
<th>Year 2010</th>
<th>Year 2014</th>
<th>Year 2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soraya Mudaffar Syah</td>
<td>DPRD</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Daughter - first wife)</td>
<td>West Halmahera (PDK) – Won</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muh. Gozali Mudaffar Syah</td>
<td>DPRD</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Son - first wife)</td>
<td>Ternate (PDIP) - Lost</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iskandar Mudaffar Syah</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>DPR RI (PKP)-Lost</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>DPR North Maluku (Golkar) - Lost</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Son - first wife)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firman Mudaffar Syah</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>DPRD Ternate (PAN) - Lost</td>
<td>DPRD Ternate (PKS)-Lost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Son - third wife)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiriawati Mudaffar Syah</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>DPRD Ternate (PBB) - Lost</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Daughter - third wife)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achita Nurain Zulkarnain</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>DPRD Ternate (Golkar)-Lost</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Granddaughter from Soraya)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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While the current conflict has paralysed the Sultanate, it is a sign of the increased powers of the royal house, especially since Suharto’s fall. The position of sultan, which was mostly ceremonial in the 1970s and 1980s, now carries so much influence that it is contested intensely within the family. This makes it important to ask: why did the late Sultan Mudaffar Syah succeed in his political, national-level campaigns, while his immediate family members failed to follow in his footsteps? I argue that these two divergent outcomes are the result of the Sultan’s personal success in establishing close links with the land-owning adat village communities, which subsequently served as a source of political and economic power for him. Indeed, the adat leaders acknowledged the authority of the Sultan over communal land. In exchange, the heads of these communities felt privileged by being integrated into the Sultanate’s executive structure, and they received certificates from the Sultanate to verify their usage rights over land. However, such authority over land is the Sultan’s privilege, one that his immediate family members do not have.

The source of the Sultan’s power, therefore, lies in the arrangement Mudaffar Syah made with the adat communities in the mid-1970s. In order to secure the support of the Bobato
18 for his election, he reinstated the powers of the council and the social prestige of its members. In return, the adat community handed their control authority over land back to the Sultanate – this was a right the Sultanate had lost when it was disestablished. The main instrument of this control was the right to issue Sultanate Land Certificates (Cocatu), which was restored with Mudaffar’s election. The communities then gained usage rights through these Cocatu, including the right to clear the forest and to manage land at the personal and communal level. Hence, the Sultanate is treated as the historical symbol and apex of the adat community, while the Cocatu acts as evidence of traditional ownership of the Sultanate as well as the concrete usage rights by individuals and communities. Moreover, the Sultan also issued Cocatu for the purpose of turning adat land into land with personal ownership status, based on the adat community’s recommendation. Under this process, land previously used for agricultural and building purposes has been transformed into land with various usages that have higher economic value.

This newly restored control regime over land helped to shift the Ternate Sultanate from a primarily coastal to a landed, or land-based, aristocracy. The sultanates and kingdoms of Southeast Asia have generally been divided into coastal and land-based aristocracies (J. S. Bastin & Benda, 1968; Wolters, 1970). Coastal aristocracies in Indonesia are characterised by their reliance on trade and fisheries products, their placement of the palace facing the sea, their ethnic heterogeneity, and their relatively decentralised political power structures (Siddique, 1977, pp. 15-16). They rely on control of the harbour and its facilities, as well as the flow of goods. Therefore, land property is typically not an essential part of the economic and political power of the kingdom. On the contrary, land-based aristocracies strongly emphasise agrarian production. Siddique (1977, p. 15) mentions the following features of a land-based aristocracy with agrarian structures: social division into court and peasantry, court control over the agrarian economy, absence of substantial non-aristocratic land-owning class, and administrative power channelled through appointive quasi-bureaucratic nobility.

To be sure, the Ternate Sultanate had traditional lands under its control both in pre-colonial and colonial times, so it was never fully landless. But the restoration of its land authority through the Cocatu, and the concurrent decline of the Sultanate’s sea-based core trade, accelerated the transformation of Ternate’s aristocracy from a mostly coastal into a predominantly land-based one. Crucially, Mudaffar Syah gained this control over land without contradicting the BAL. As we have seen, the BAL regulates that ex-aristocratic land must be converted to state land. But it exempts adat communities, which have, under certain circumstances, communal land rights (hak ulayat) (Malut Post, 21 September 2016). Therefore,
as the *adat* communities in Ternate kept their land after 1960, they could use it as leverage in the negotiations with Mudaffar Syah in the 1970s. Subsequently, the privileges of local *adat* communities were further enshrined in local regulations. For instance, Ternate City Bylaw No. 13/2009 on the *Adat* and Cultural Protection on the Ternate Sultanate *Adat* Community (*Perlindungan Adat dan Budaya Masyarakat Adat Kesultanan Ternate*) uses the term ‘*Masyarakat Adat Kesultanan Ternate*’ to highlight the inseparable relationship between the *adat* community and the Sultanate.\(^{159}\)

The 2009 bylaw was an important formalisation of this relationship, and it anchored the Sultan’s land control in a post-independence legal instrument for the first time. With this, it was similar to the YSL and its subsequent regulations – only somewhat weaker. The bylaw acknowledges the Sultanate’s traditional right to *adat* land, and divides the latter into seven categories. The first four include *Aha Kolano* (sago palm tree land), *Raki Kolano* (agricultural land with other products than sago palm trees), *Aha Jou Ou* (land rights for the Sultan’s descendants in sago palm tree areas), *Raki Jo Ou* (land rights for Sultan’s descendants over non-sago palm tree areas). In these four areas, the people of Ternate may till the land if they follow the Sultan’s orders and receive the Sultan’s permission. In addition, the Sultan may give non-saleable community land rights (*Kaha Soa*) and individual saleable land rights (*Kaha Cocatu*) (Taib, 2010, pp. 92-98). Lastly, the bylaw mentions temporary land rights (*Kaha Jorame*), which – according to tradition – can be obtained at the end of a long process of opening up new land (Taib, Soetarto, & Tonny, 2010). Thus, with few exceptions, the Sultan is involved in most land affairs involving the use and ownership of communal land.

However, the bylaw was silent on how exactly land rights were to be acquired and certified. In fact, many of the *adat* terms referred to in the bylaw had multiple possible interpretations, with even scholars researching the subject coming to different conclusions.\(^{160}\)

On dispute resolution in relation to land affairs, the bylaw only stated that this would be handled ‘according to existing adat law’ (Article 6) – but this was, of course, not codified. Moreover, the Ternate Sultanate did not have an experienced land office like its Yogyakarta counterpart, so that the issuance of *Cocatu* was often very informal. Unsurprisingly, then, conflicts emerged. For instance, in 2013 the Ternate City Government reclaimed the beach close to the Sultan’s

\(^{159}\) At the national level, too, the Constitutional Court confirmed in May 2013 the rights of *adat* communities towards their forest areas, effectively giving the sultanate more control of them. See Putusan MK No. 35/PUU-X/2012. At the same time, the Archipelago’s *Adat* Community Alliance (*Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara*/AMAN) has promoted the rights of *adat* communities at the local and national levels, and has supported local governments’ regulation of *adat* bylaws. See, for instance, [http://www.aman.or.id/](http://www.aman.or.id/).

\(^{160}\) For a different interpretation of the different land categories, see for instance Bakker and Moniaga (2010).
palace to develop a Hypermart owned by the Lippo Group. Lippo rented the land from the Ternate City Government for 30 years for IDR 150 billion [US$ 13.6 million]. The Ternate Mayor argued that Hypermart would create 2,000 jobs and improve Ternate’s economy by showing the investment prospects in the post-conflict area. The Sultan, meanwhile, strongly opposed the development. In front of thousands of people during a royal festival in 2014, he said,

I never gave any permission for the development in the area because it blocks the oceanic view of the Sultanate. The land has belonged to adat since a long time ago. The Mayor has made two mistakes. First, he has claimed land not belonging to him, and second he has rented it to another party (Gerdha, 2016).

Responding to this issue, the Ternate Land Office held that the reclaimed land belongs to those who paid for it – in this regard, the Ternate City Government (BPN Ternate, 2014). This land conflict never went to court, but created business uncertainty because of rumours that Hypermart would be stormed by the Sultanate’s troops; this forced Hypermart to close twice in 2014. The Sultanate’s troops are the most loyal militia associated with a royal house in Indonesia, as shown in the 1999 conflict. In another case, a conflict emerged between the adat community and North Halmahera Minerals (NHM) over the 70,610 ha of a mining concession due to the low payment received. The Sultan had initiated the contact between NHM and the adat community in the late 1990s (Kilkoda, 2015, p. 1). Consensus was not achieved, because the adat community wanted a non-litigation process while NHM wanted to settle the case in court (Alting, 2013).

However, in many other cases, the Ternate Land Office has respected the Sultanate’s land rights. In a focus group discussion held by the author with Ternate Land Office staff, for instance, they strongly supported the Minister of Agrarian Affairs Ruling No 5/1999, which acknowledges traditional/adat land rights. They said that the Land Office only processes the conversion of traditional land rights to the national certification system after receiving Cocatu. Even then, some adat leaders and loyalists of the Sultan rejected any role for the Land Office in certification. In 2015, Hamid Kola, the local chief of Afenduma village, opposed the certification of the Sultanate’s land by the Ternate Land Office. Speaking in the local newspaper Malut Post, he said,

161 Interview, Ternate Mayor Burhan Abdulrahman, 3 November 2014 in Ternate.
162 FGD with high level Ternate Land Office officials, 18 November 2014 in Ternate.
I am one of those who rejects (the national certification program – Prona). If the certificate is issued by the Sultanate, we will accept it. However, if the government issues it, wait! No other party can claim this land except the Sultan himself (Malut Post, 16 July 2015).

This land-based patron-client relationship translated into votes for the royal family when its members participated in elections – but only in areas belonging to the Sultanate’s *adat* community and thus in close proximity to the palace. This means the Sultanate could count on strong support from Soa Sio (the palace area) and the entire northern part of Ternate until ‘the back’ of Mount Gamalama. By contrast, the area from Fort Oranje to the south has since the colonial period been home to Tidoreans, Makasarese, and other migrants – and is therefore not part of the *adat* community that is bound through land to the Sultan (C. Smith, 2009a). The more vibrant business areas, from Kampung Makasar to the south (including Ternate Harbour and the markets) have also been dominated by migrants, who have less land dependency on the Sultanate. In addition, the Sultan’s influence spread to West Halmahera district where he supported the resurrection of the Sultanate of Jailolo.

This division is reflected in the electoral results from 2004 to 2014. In the 2004 election, three members of the Sultanate’s family competed at the national level, and three of the Sultan’s children competed for seats in the local parliament. The Sultan won a seat in national parliament, his fourth wife won a seat in the DPD, and Soraya – a daughter from the Sultan’s first wife – won a seat in West Halmahera Parliament. Sultan Mudaffar received 20.8% of total valid votes in Ternate, especially from his main base in North Ternate and Ternate Island (a sub-district covering much of the east of Ternate Island); he only received 9.5% in the more heterogenous South Ternate. Similarly, Boki Nita’s (the fourth wife’s) votes came primarily from the same area as her husband’s, as shown in Table 7.7 below.
In 2009, the Sultan and Boki Nita switched positions. Boki was running for national parliament through then incumbent President Yudhoyono’s Democrat Party (PD), and the Sultan ran for the DPD. One of his sons, Iskandar, ran for national parliament through the short-lived Service to Development Party (Partai Karya Pembangunan – PKP), but only received miniscule support. In 2004, Ternate’s electoral districts were expanded from three to six, each with a relatively similar number of voters. Both Sultan Mudaffar and Boki Nita won the election, and their support came again from the areas in which the sultanate-affiliated adat land was concentrated: that is, Central Ternate and North Ternate (both carved out from the previous North Ternate constituency) and Ternate Island. They received fewer votes in areas without land control, including South Ternate, Moti and Batang Dua. As Table 7.8 below shows, the Sultan received an absolute majority of votes in North Ternate (63%) and Ternate Island (84%), and obtained 40% of the total DPD votes in Ternate overall (from 27 DPD candidates).

163 The total amount of valid votes was drawn from the numbers for the DPD; as Indonesians vote on the same day for all national legislative levels, the number of votes is near-identical for all levels.
In 2014, the Sultan sought re-election to the DPD, while Boki tried to defend her seat in parliament through the PD. Hidayat, another son (who had run unsuccessfully in 2004) competed for national parliament too but changed his affiliation to the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan – PPP). Both Boki Nita and Hidayat lost their contests, but Sultan Mudaffar successfully maintained his seat. The Sultan received 52% of the vote in North Ternate and 79% in Ternate Island, slightly lower than in the previous election. He received 33% of total DPD votes in Ternate and came second in the province-based North Maluku constituency (out of thirty-two DPD candidates). The Sultan’s support came from the same constituency as in 2009, as shown in Table 7.9 below. He also did not use much of his allowable electoral campaign schedule, but instead maximised his traditional visits (Doru Gam) during the island circling ritual (Kololu Kie). The people organised this scared gathering which the Sultan attended with Boki. Therefore, by activating traditional institutions, the Sultan not only received support but also reduced his campaign costs. Boki’s loss can be attributed in part to the decline of her party, PD. With Yudhoyono no longer running for the presidency, it lost half of its electorate, declining from 20.8% of the vote in 2009 (148 seats) to 10.2% of the vote (sixty-one seats).

164 Interview, Soraya Mudaffar Syah, 12 November 2014 and Hidayat Mudaffar Syah, 10 November 2014 and a Malut Post journalist, 1 November 2014, all in Ternate.
The Ternate Sultanate, then, drew its moderate political successes in post-1998 politics from a strong loyalist base in its core constituencies, namely the adat communities. The bond between the Sultan and these communities was land, which the Sultan culturally owned, and the villagers used and sought legal certainty for. In the conceptual scheme of land control used throughout this thesis, the Sultanate turned the loss of land in 1950 (the year of its disestablishment) into access to land after 1975, and into a nominal form of property rights through the 2009 bylaw. This trajectory was similar to that of the Yogyakarta Sultanate, but the political influence of the Ternate Sultan was significantly weaker. While gaining recognition of his land rights, he received nowhere near the concessions made for the Sultan of Yogyakarta in the YSL – in particular, the Sultan of Ternate has no automatic right to political office, whether at the city or province level.

Nevertheless, the internal conflict affecting the Ternate Sultanate can serve as a warning to its Yogyakarta counterpart. After Mudaffar Syah’s death in 2015, infighting within the royal family led to the position of sultan being effectively vacant. Several claimants have emerged, but none has received the endorsement of the Bobato 18. As we have seen, the Yogyakarta Sultanate is at risk of experiencing a similar conflict after the end of Hamengku Buwono X’s reign. Without a male heir, the Sultan has attempted to secure the succession of his eldest daughter, but is opposed by others within the royal house. In both Ternate and Yogyakarta,
therefore, the increased power of the sultanates has increased their institutional standing, but it has also intensified the contest for power within them.

7.4 Gowa Kingdom: Electoral Losses and Struggle for Land

In contrast to Ubud and Ternate, the former aristocracy of Gowa in South Sulawesi failed to revive its political fortunes after 1998. I argue that this is due to the self-crowned King of Gowa’s failure to regain control of the royal house’s land, and to the strong dynastic position of the Limpo family in the region. After Suharto’s fall, the king (or sultan) of Gowa (Raja/Sombaya), Andi Maddusila, lost six consecutive executive and legislative elections to the Limpo dynasty. In the Gowa regent election, he lost to Syahrul Limpo in 1999; to his brother Ichsan Limpo in 2005 and 2010; and to Ichsan’s son Adnan Limpo in 2015. In 1999, he refused Sahrul’s offer to be his deputy, and lost with 30 to 2 votes in the election by parliament. In the following elections, he came second, with a significant voter basis. This section will analyse in detail the reasons why Andi Maddusila lost these elections despite him inheriting Gowa’s loyal traditional supporters.

The Sultanate of Gowa emerged in 1605, when the ruler of the older Tallo-Gowa kingdom converted to Islam. Gowa was a coastal aristocracy, similar to the Sultanate of Ternate, with political power shared with the so-called gallarang principalities that constitute the region’s present-day sub-districts. These gallarang consisted of several villages and were led by local leaders called karaeng or bate (B. Harvey, 1985). The social structure was divided into three levels: high nobility, local nobility and commoners (Rössler, 2000, pp. 541-545). The Kingdom of Gowa consisted of nine gallarang with both the King and bate selected based on a male-line hereditary succession system (Patunru, 1967).165 The council of nine bate (Bate Salapanga) chose a new king from amongst the sons of a deceased king. Unlike Ternate, which depended almost solely on trade, the economic structure of the Kingdom of Gowa relied on the bate using a combination of the feudalistic apanage system and coastal and sea trade, creating what Magenda (1989, p. 548) calls ‘the combination of land and commercial aristocracy.’

The weakening of the Gowa Sultanate had already begun under Dutch colonial rule. After a number of conflicts, much of its territory was placed under direct rule in 1856 (Brown, 2004, p. 224); the Sultan eventually began a guerrilla struggle, escaped into the interior in 1905.

165 The nine gallarangs are: Mangasa, Tombolo, Saumata, Pacellekang, Pattalasang, Moncoloe, Sudiang, Gorisallo, and Manuju.
and died there a year later. The Sultanate was subsequently abolished. Thus, unlike its Yogyakarta counterpart, the Gowa Sultanate was cut off from its land base and its traditional support community for long periods of time. In was only in 1936 that the Dutch resurrected the Sultanate to promote its concept of self-rule, installing Andi Mangi Mangi (r. 1936–1946) as the new King of Gowa (I. Amal, 1992, p. 28). His successor, Andi Idjo, supported the Republic against the Dutch during the revolution, allowing the Sultanate to initially survive the upheaval of the 1940s and 1950s.

But the post-1950 Republic gradually undermined the remaining power of the Sultanate. For instance, the Gowa aristocracy lost control over the port in Makassar, its traditional trade centre. Makassar separated from Gowa and became the capital of Sulawesi Province in 1951 (Kementrian Penerangan, 1953, pp. 161-191). And while Andi Ijo was made the regent of Gowa district in 1957 after Gowa was transformed from a swapraja area into a modern-era district, he only ruled until 1960 (Ranawidjaya, 1955). Like other aristocracies in South Sulawesi, Gowa became a target of land reform in the 1960s. No longer in political office, the Sultan was unable to resist the reform in the way that the Sultan of Yogyakarta had, and Gowa therefore lost most of its traditional land. Without a position in the district structure and without land, the Sultanate effectively ceased to function in 1960.

The erosion of the aristocracy’s land base proceeded rapidly after 1960. The transfer of ownership of Gowa’s traditional land was done under the third regent, K.S Mas’ud (1967–1976), but it took almost forty years for all transfers to be finalised. Andi Ijo, the last Sultan, died in 1978. The family also lost the Balla Lompoa Palace in 1979, which was then certified in the name of the Gowa Government and turned it into a museum after being vacated by noble family members (Rakyatku, 30 May 2016). Andi Idjo’s descendants signed a letter that donated all of Gowa Sultanate’s regalia to the Gowa Government, marking another symbolic end of royal rule.

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166 Andi Idjo’s removal as bupati was probably because of his lack of administrative skills. During this period, noble aristocrats were reluctant to study in Java. No members of the Gowa noble family became influential politicians during the tumultuous period of 1945–1957. See, for instance, (I. Amal, 1992; B. Harvey, 1985; Kementrian Penerangan, 1953).

167 Interview, Ryaas Rasyid, former State Minister for Regional Autonomy and the eldest son of the last Bate Tombolo, 19 October 2015 in Gowa.

168 Interview, staff of Land Office who responsible for ex-swapraja land compensation, 24 March 2015 in Yogyakarta.

169 Interview, Gowa elder and senior politician, 27 September and 14 October 2014 in Gowa.

170 Interview, Malingkai Maknun, who pursued the transfer of ownership, 7 October 2014 in Gowa.
Nevertheless, Andi Maddusila – Andi Ijo’s eldest son – tried to revive the Sultanate, or kingdom, after 1998. He had spent much of the New Order as a low-level bureaucrat in Jakarta, and only returned in 1998 to run for regent. But he did so from a weaker base than the aristocrats of Ubud or Ternate. The bate, as the leaders of the local adat communities traditionally aligned with the Sultan, had grown distant to the former aristocracy, and it took until 2011 for them to warm up to Maddusila and elect him as king/sultan. But by that time, it was already too late to have much of an impact. While many local bylaws in South Sulawesi began to acknowledge the position of adat communities in the 2000s (Tyson, 2008, p. 88), Maddusila had no real powerbase in this constituency. Unlike in Ternate, where local adat leaders had formed an alliance with the Sultan since the 1970s to receive certification of their land from him, much of the Gowa Sultanate’s old land was gone. Most of its plots were in the capital city of Makassar, but were registered as private property after the BAL. Therefore, the reactivation of the Kingdom of Gowa was largely a symbolic act to attract traditional voters.

**Picture 9 Gowa Sombaya Andi Maddusila**

![Andi Maddusila](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Andi_Maddusila_Andi_Idjo.jpg)

Source: Wikipedia Commons

At the time of his ceremonial appointment in 2011, Maddusila had already lost four elections – three for the regent position and one for a national parliament seat. In most races, he failed to prevail against the Limpo family dynasty, which was strong all across South Sulawesi but was particularly well anchored in Gowa. The Limpo dynasty includes the

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171 See Gowa District Bylaws No. 44/2001.
descendants of former military Colonel Yasin Limpo, who was assigned as regent of Gowa and Maros in the 1950s and 1960s but repeatedly failed to become governor of South Sulawesi in the New Order. He dominated Gowa politics during the late 1980s, and his son Syahrul became regent in 1994. The power of the family only began to wane in the late 2010s, coinciding with Maddusila’s death in 2018. In 2018, Ichsan Limpo lost the race for the governorship, and a year later, his brother Syahrul was unsuccessful in his bid for a seat in national parliament after having been governor for a decade. Table 7.10 below illustrates the participation of the Limpo dynasty in local, regional, and national politics.

**Table 7.10 Yasin Limpo political dynasty, 1999–2019**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Current Position (Party Affiliation/Year Elected)</th>
<th>Past Executive Position</th>
<th>Past Legislative Position (Party Affiliation/Period)</th>
<th>Relation to Syahrul Yasin Limpo</th>
<th>Failed Candidacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nurhayati Yasin Limpo</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>DPR RI (Golkar/1999–2009)</td>
<td>Mother</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haris Yasin Limpo</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>DPRD II Makassar (Golkar/2009–2014)</td>
<td>Brother</td>
<td>DPRD Makassar (Golkar/2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adnan Puritcha Ichsan Yasin Limpo</td>
<td>Bupati Gowa (2015–2020)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>DPRD South Sulawesi (Golkar/2014–2015*) DPRD South Sulawesi (Democrat/2009) DPRD South Sulawesi (Democrat/2004)</td>
<td>Nephew (Son of Ichsan)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table: Aristocratic Land in Outer Islands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Current Position (Party Affiliation/Year Elected)</th>
<th>Past Executive Position</th>
<th>Past Legislative Position (Party Affiliation/Period)</th>
<th>Relation to Syahrul Yasin Limpo</th>
<th>Failed Candidacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dewie Yasin Limpo</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>DPR RI (Hanura 2014-2016)**</td>
<td>Sister</td>
<td>DPR RI (Hanura/2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andi Pahlevi</td>
<td>DPRD Makassar (Gerindra/2019)</td>
<td>DPRD Makassar (Gerindra/2014-2019)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Nephew (Son of Tenri Angka)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andi Ishak</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>DPRD Gowa (Golkar/2014-2019)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Brother-in-law (husband of Tenri Olle)</td>
<td>DPRD Gowa (Golkar/2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akbar Danu Indarta</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>DPRD Gowa (Golkar/2014-2019)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Nephew (Son of Tenri Olle)</td>
<td>DPRD Takalar (Nasdem/2019)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Buehler (2013) and writer compilation from media and interviews. *Tenri and Adnan withdrew from the South Sulawesi Provincial Parliament to compete in the 2015 Gowa Regent election. ** The Corruption Eradication Committee (KPK) arrested Dewi on 20 October 2015 and the court sentenced her to eight years imprisonment.

While the entrenchment of the Limpo dynasty in Gowa’s bureaucracy, economy and society made it hard for Maddusila to develop into a strong political actor, the Limpos still viewed him as a threat. After the 2005 local election, in which Maddusila had run against Ichsan, the latter began to create splits in the royal family. He supported the naming of Andi Kumala (Maddusila’s younger sibling), as crown prince of Gowa in 2006, and placed him as head of the Sumba Opu Sub-District, a Maddusila stronghold. Therefore, when Andi Maddusila claimed to be Sultan/King of Gowa in 2011, it resulted in an internal conflict, with each man underlining his own appointment by a Bate Salapang. Indeed, members of the Limpo family soon began to claim the rank of royalty for themselves. In 2008, for instance, Syahrul and Ichsan hosted the Sixth National Kraton Festival (FKN) and positioned themselves as the leaders of Gowa. Moreover, the royal palace and regalia had already been taken over by the Gowa Government. Tellingly, at the annual Accera Kalompoang regalia cleaning ritual, the regent has taken centre stage.

In 2016, Adnan Limpo (Ichsan’s son) went a step further. Sworn in as regent in 2015, he signed a bylaw in 2016 that placed the regent of Gowa as the head of the Gowa’s adat council (Article 1, point 3). On 8 September 2016, in the Balla Lompoa Palace, Adnan Limpo – as regent – was inaugurated as the head of the adat council by the chair of Gowa’s local

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173 At the same time, Ichsan – through his executive power – continued to financially back Andi Kumala as a representative of Gowa Kingdom, as shown during the 2014 National Kraton Festival in Bima.

174 During the Accera Kalompoang ritual held on Ied-Al Adha in 2014, the crown and 27 other regalia were presented to Ichsan Limpo, while Andi Kumala sat as an ordinary spectator.

175 Perda No. 5/2016 on Adat Council (Lembaga Dewan Adat – LDA).
parliament. According to the bylaw, the head of the adat council carried out the functions and role of the ‘sombaya’, a title previously only used for Gowa kings. In explaining this unusual policy (no other territory in post-Suharto Indonesia has bestowed quasi-royal honours and powers on an elected official), Adnan Limpo argued that,

Since a long time ago, the Kingdom of Gowa has acted as the government and the King of Gowa has acted as the head of the government. Therefore, as the Kingdom has changed into a modern government, whoever becomes the Regent is like the King (Rakyatku, 21 March 2016).

Adnan’s self-appointment triggered outrage among Maddusila’s supporters. After a series of protests to annul the bylaw received no response, on 26 September 2016 a pro-Maddusila mob rallied from the Balla Lompoa Palace to the Gowa Parliament and eventually set it on fire.

Adnan Limpo’s appropriation of royal symbols represented the final attempt of the clan to remove Maddusila from Gowa politics. Even though Maddusila never won an election, he always came second, with significant support. In 2005, for instance, he came second to Ichsan, with a margin of 4% (28% to Ichsan’s 32%). Buehler and Tan (2007) argued that the financial capacity of the candidates was crucial in this election, putting Ichsan in a better position to win the election. In 2010, Ichsan received 56% of the vote, while Maddusila came second, with 41% of the vote. In 2015, Maddusila again came second, with 27% of the vote, while Adnan Limpo received 41%. Maddusila did typically very well in the north-western sub-district Somba Opu, where the family’s former palace is located; the neighbouring sub-districts Palangga and Barombong; as well as the northern sub-districts Tinggimoncong and Parigi. The Limpos, on the other hand, were strong in the south. This led Maddusila to occasionally raise the idea of carving out his strongholds as a new district separate from Gowa – but this failed as it required the endorsement of the governor – a Limpo family member as well.

Interestingly, when Maddusila ran for the national parliament (for PKS in 2009 and PD in 2014), his support was very low (see Table 7.11 below). Unlike in the case of the Sultan of Ternate, who did well in national-level elections, it appears that Gowa voters – even those in Maddusila’s strongholds – had no interest in sending a local aristocrat to Jakarta. This tendency of aristocrats participating, and performing well, in local executive elections, rather than in national parliamentary polls, was reflected across South Sulawesi: in 2007, ten out of twenty-eight local leaders had aristocratic links (Haboddin, 2012). Maddusila’s last intervention in politics came in 2018, during the South Sulawesi gubernatorial elections; he confirmed that Andi Sudirman, the vice-gubernatorial candidate to Nurdin Abdullah (Ichsan Limpo’s main
rival) was a direct descendant from Gowa’s kings and sultans (Sulselsatu.com, 18 February 2018). The Nurdin-Andi pair won the elections, defeating the powerful Limpo dynasty. Only months later, Maddusila died at the age of sixty-four.

**Table 7.11 Andi Maddusila’s executive and legislative election results 2005-2015**

![Graph showing election results](chart.png)


The lack of success of Maddusila was primarily the result of the fact that Gowa’s village-based adat communities had a much less intimate relationship with the aristocracy than their counterparts in Yogyakarta, Ubud or Ternate. In these three cases, village communities wanted land certificates, positions, prestige or religious services from the royals, while the latter sought access to land and political support. In Gowa, by contrast, Maddusila could offer very little to the adat communities. After the abolishment of the Kingdom of Gowa, land control was divided between the descendants of the king and the bate, which was then inherited by their descendants. The bate thus had strong authority over land, without the need to have it certified by the Sultan. For instance, some areas of the Balla Lompoa Palace were under the control of the last bate of Tombolo and not the King of Gowa.176 In contrast, the sultan/king did not even possess his own palace anymore.

This constellation was not changed by the circumstance that members of the royal house owned land privately – as was allowed by the BAL. This land was insufficient, however, to serve as a resource that could rival the resources of the Limpo clan. Andi Maddusila tried to sell much of the land he claimed as private property to finance his political quest – but he was often unsuccessful. He insisted that he had inherited 1,273 hectares of Andi Idjo’s land, and his

176 Interview, Ryaas Rasyid, former State Minister for Regional Autonomy and the eldest son of the last bate of Tombolo, 19 October 2015 in Gowa.
team traced it and tried to ‘return’ ownership status through legal means, but mostly failed. For instance, he claimed the ownership of 3,794 m² in a strategic area in Makassar, worth billions of rupiah – potentially enough to finance his campaign in the 2015 election. Maddusila asserted that this land was part of his claim to 5,000 m² of the 14.82 hectares (148,200 m²) of land registered under his father, Andi Idjo. Maddusila won at the Makassar Court, but lost in the higher courts. In some cases, Maddusila received police attention after selling land that he did not legally own (Tribun Timur, 10 February 2013). At the end, he had limited to no access to land; consequently, possessed not enough money to fund a successful campaign; and failed to revive the aristocracy as a result.

7.5 Palembang Sultanate: No Land Access, Some Personal Benefits

While Gowa’s leading aristocrat Andi Maddusila was a credible, albeit losing candidate in elections for almost two decades, other aristocratic revival attempts have been even less successful. This section demonstrates how opportunistic actors tried to utilise the past glory of the Palembang Sultanate for their personal benefits. Without control over land, claimants have been unable to compete in the political arena and therefore tried to create other income-generating opportunities for themselves. One of the main claimants, Prabu Diraja, built an aristocratic title business, mainly for Malaysian customers, while another, Iskandar, tried to establish himself as a celebrity. Thus, the case of Palembang highlights the lack of a political opportunity structure for aristocracies without a land base.

The Indonesian aristocracies, to some extent, were part of the colonial bureaucracy and government, and Palembang was no exception. Palembang was an independent vassal of Mataram, sharing an interest in limiting the influence of Banten in the 17th century. It became more independent following the decline of Mataram’s power and began to cooperate with foreign nations to suppress the power of surrounding aristocracies, such as Jambi (de Graaf, 1986, pp. 283-285). The only well-known Sultan of Palembang, Sultan Mahmud Badaruddin II (hereafter SMB II) (r. 1804–1812, 1813, 1818–1821), came to power with the help of the Dutch

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177 Interview, Andi Maddusila, 9 and 15 October 2014 in Makassar. According to him, his father Andi Idjo only gave 111 hectares of land to the government.
178 Supreme Court Decision No. 147 PK/TUN/2016. This land conflict turned into physical conflict, injuring nine people, on 14 February 2013. See other examples, including Case No. 26/G/2014/P.TUN.Mks; Case No. 42/G.TUN/2011/P.TUN.Mks; Case No. 49/G/2014/PTUN.Mks; and Case No. 138/PLW/2010/PTUN-JKT.
179 During the colonial period, Palembang consisted of what is today South Sumatra Province. In this thesis, Palembang refers to the City of Palembang.
but later became its strongest opponent (B. W. Andaya, 1993; Woelders, 1975). Fierce contestation between SMB II and his brother Sultan Ahmad Najamuddin (r. 1812–1813, 1813–1818) in the 1810s and 1820s spelled the Sultanate’s end. This was because the contestation took place while the Dutch, the French, and the British tried to exert influence in the area – a side effect of the power struggles in Europe (Ricklefs, 1981). In 1821, the Dutch exiled SMB II to Ternate, and two years later emphasised their claim on Palembang by placing it under direct rule (Wargadalem, 2012). The last Sultan, Ahmad Najamuddin III, was exiled to Banda Neira in 1825. However, some aristocratic resistance against the colonial rulers endured until the late 19th century.

After Suharto’s fall, a push to resurrect the Sultanate emerged, following similar trends in other regions (Davidson & Henley, 2007). Raden Muhammad Syafei (hereafter Prabu Diraja), a retired police colonel who traced his genealogy to SMB II, was the first to try reviving the Sultanate. Drawing on genealogical statements from 1931 and 1979, he claimed to be a fifth-generation descendant of Prince Diraja Abdullah, son of SMB II (Habiburrahman, 2016). He had the original seal of SMB II and other sultanate regalia, and thus his genealogical claims were the most convincing. He nominally revived the Sultanate on 3 March 2003, after representing Palembang in the National Kraton Festival (KFN) III in Kutai Kartanegara in 2002. Taking the name Sultan Mahmud Badaruddin III Prabu Diraja, he justified his aristocratic revival attempt by arguing that ‘Other regions have their own sultanate, and we have to have one too.’ When he died on 7 September 2017, his son, Fawwas Diraja, continued his father’s legacy (and claim to the throne), taking the title of Sultan Mahmud Badaruddin IV Fawwas Diraja.

Sultan Mahmud Badaruddin II had 62 children and 20 male descendants. Prabu Diraja is a descendant of the seventh son and has been recognised by other descendants from Ternate (Sriwijaya Post, 20 June 2014). He showed the author a copy of genealogical statements made by local officials in 1931 and 1979, the stamp of Sultan SMB II, and the Sultanate’s Holy Quran.


Interview, Prabu Diraja, 18 January 2015 in Palembang.
But the Diraja family was not the only clan that stated a claim to representing the Sultanate. Rahdin Iskandar Harun (hereafter Iskandar), an ambitious businessman, claimed the title of Sultan Iskandar Mahmud Badaruddin III on Eid al-Fitr celebrations held on 19 November 2006. His inauguration was attended by the Governor of South Sumatra, Syahrial Oesman, as well as other prominent local leaders. There is no clear record of his royal ancestry. He has, however, been willing to spend resources to pursue the sultan’s title – both as a personal vanity project and as a chance to later further his business connections. In an interview with a local television broadcaster, for instance, Iskandar came together with four people carrying his version of the Sultanate’s banners behind him. On many occasions, he was willing to pay for a reserved seat next to government and military leaders. When Jakarta Governor Joko Widodo organised the World Kraton Festival in December 2013, he secured a seat next to Deputy Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama and had a chance to speak with the fifth President of Indonesia, Megawati Soekarnoputri, even though Palembang was not a participant and had not sent a delegate.

184 Governor Syarial Oesman later refused to be associated with Iskandar. He said, ‘I just watched’ (Sumatera Ekspress, 5 December 2006).  
185 Interview, 14 January 2015 in Palembang.  
186 Interview, 15 January 2015 in Palembang.
The early disbandment of the Sultanate during the colonial period meant that the claimants to the throne had no land basis or a strong constituency of *adat* village supporters. Thus, the contenders had to prioritise public relations campaigns based on historical symbolism. Both used anti-Dutch and anti-colonial rhetoric to link up with the public mythos of SMB II, who was listed as one of Indonesia’s national heroes in 1983 for his stand against the colonial power. During the process of making SMB II a national hero, the government borrowed the royal stamp from Prabu Diraja – a fact Diraja later proudly exposed. In 2005, the Central Bank issued an IDR 10,000 note depicting SMB II, further increasing the incentive to both contenders to identify with him. Indeed, they both dressed as similarly as possible to SMB II (as depicted in the portrait on the banknotes) in almost all formal occasions, even though the painter later stated that he had painted the Sultan based on his own imagination without any historical reference.

The reality of the Sultanate was much less inspiring, however. There were almost no physical remains of the Palembang Sultanate when it was resurrected in the 2000s. The Kuto Besak Palace had been destroyed and used as Dutch military barracks; it is currently used as military barracks by the Indonesian Army. In the museum (a former Dutch official residence), a few hundred metres from Kuto Besak, there are no regalia on display. There are stories and pictures of SMB II, but only to attract visitors. Therefore, both claimants created a dummy palace in their houses, using yellowish chairs, umbrellas, and *keris*. Iskandar went even further – he asked painters to draw all Palembang Sultans from the 17th century using his own imagination. While seemingly grotesque, these self-created palaces have helped the men to reap significant personal benefits.

Prabu Diraja started his title business in the early years of his claim. Aristocratic titles in Indonesia are divided between blood titles and career titles. Blood titles are limited to those with direct blood connections to the Sultan at the upper level, while career titles are given to ordinary people based on their loyalty to the sultanate/sultan (*punggawal/priyayi* levels). The former can be passed to titleholders’ children, while the latter cannot (Soeratman, 1989, pp. 18-19). One of the first Indonesian aristocracies to establish a title business was the Surakarta Sunanate, following a succession conflict in 2003. Both Sunans of Surakarta gave titles to notable Indonesian artists and public figures to finance the palace. The Sunan of Surakarta gave royal titles to sixteen national and local politicians, especially those from military and

188 Interview, a Prince of Surakarta, on 8 September 2014 in Bima.
police backgrounds, granting them the titles *Pangeran* (Prince) and *Pangeran Adipati* (His Excellency Prince).

Prabu Diraja based his business model on selling titles to affluent Malaysian customers. Bound by both geographic proximity and joint ethnic Malay origins, Palembang and Malaysia have close business relations. While Palembang traditionally followed the Javanese title system, Prabu Diraja introduced the new titles of *Tengku, Dato’ Sri, Dato’,* and *Datuk* in order to specifically target Malaysian customers. On his Malay-language (not Indonesian) website, Prabu Diraja differentiates between eight family members’ titles, eighteen sultanate family members’ titles, eight ordinary titles for Indonesians, and twenty-four titles for Malaysians. He offered to inaugurate his Malaysian customers through a combined tourism package, with each title costing up to IDR 100 million (MYR 30,000 or US$ 7,200). During interviews, Prabu Diraja refused to disclose the number of his customers, but a modest estimate from his confidants suggests that at least 1,500 titles were sold. To receive the title, as Prabu Diraja explained, one ‘must not have a criminal record.’ For titleholders who had previously been involved in criminal activity, the Sultanate posted a note on its website and revoked their royal titles. Asked about the number of such cases, he said ‘less than ten.’

Prabu Diraja’s business was successful because most Malaysians regard aristocratic titles as important for boosting their social prestige and careers. Malaysia is a constitutional monarchy, with the position of king rotating between the nine Malaysian sultans. In their various states, the sultans also receive certain privileges over land and veto rights over specific policies. In business, politics, society – and even at the village level – those with aristocratic titles ‘will have primacy over ordinary people with no title’ (Osman, 1985, p. 53). As one Malaysian informant who received the title of *Datuk* stated in an interview, a royal title ‘increases the credibility of my business [and] advances the holders’ careers.’

The Palembang title business even acquired a cooperating partner in Malaysia itself. The Malaysia-Indonesia Business Cultural Centre (MBCC), led by Prabu Diraja’s Malaysian business partner Alex Ong, is a larger commercial relations network focused on facilitating interactions between Malaysia and Indonesia. Through the MBCC headquarters in Kuala Lumpur, Alex Ong acted as the Sultanate’s marketing manager in Malaysia. In 2013, the

190 Interview, 23 January 2015 in Palembang.
191 Interview, Prabu Diraja, 12 January 2015 and 29 January 2015 in Palembang.
192 Interview, Malaysian informants, 6 September 2014 in Bima.
Sultanate organised the Malaysian-Indonesian night in Kuala Lumpur, with more than 200 guests in attendance. Alex Ong developed the title business and expanded it to include culturally grounded business relationships. On the Sultanate’s latest website update (accessed in June 2019), the cooperation between the MBCC and the Sultanate claims to have ‘representation offices’ in twelve countries (Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Cambodia, Hongkong, Taiwan, China, India, Australia, Nigeria, Italia and Romania). Even though it is not clear how exactly the business is run, it shows that modern business methods were adopted to support the traditional title selling business.

Picture 11 Rahdin Iskandar Harun (Iskandar)

Iskandar aimed to copy Prabu Diraja’s successful title business, but a lack of Malaysian networks meant that he failed to make similar profits. From 2013 to 2014, Iskandar gave titles to around 100 Malaysian citizens. He started in 2013 with six individuals (Antara, 8 July 2013) and reached a peak of sixty persons in 2014. Titles were divided into eight different levels of

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‘darjah’ (family and friends of the Sultanate).\textsuperscript{195} Iskandar’s title inauguration ceremonies were held in better hotels, with more luxurious and more professional cultural performances than those offered by Diraja. It appears, however, than the higher investment needed for this approach made the business not sufficiently profitable. By 2015, he had simplified his business model, using his newly renovated house to host four Chinese Singaporeans.

But Iskandar was not dependent on the income generated by the title business. He led a shadowy existence at the intersection of politics, business and high society that seemed to produce significant rewards, allowing him to further pursue his quest for acknowledgment as sultan. Iskandar had been a bar singer before he turned to oil and gas-related businesses. In 2004, he failed to gain a parliamentary seat under the short-lived Partai Pelopor (Pioneer Party). He subsequently became a major distributor of subsidised three kilograms household gas tanks in South Sumatra,\textsuperscript{196} and became one of a national oil company’s retailers and transporters of subsidised diesel and gasoline in the province. In 2014, the police arrested three drivers employed by PT Kelantan Sakti Utama, one of the four companies that Iskandar led, for selling subsidised products (reserved for low-income households) to customers not entitled to purchasing subsidised goods (Tribunews, 26 August 2014).\textsuperscript{197} It is unclear whether his claim to the sultan’s title helped him in his business or to protect him from legal investigations, but his business biography is similar to that of many other (non-aristocratic) business players in local Indonesia after 1998.

Iskandar re-invested the money generated from his business into events that highlighted his claimed status as sultan. He regularly ‘donates’ ceremonies, in which he has the privilege of sitting next to military or government leaders. Therefore, it has been common to see Iskandar sit in the front row during ceremonies commemorating – for example – the birthday of the military, which has nothing to do with the Sultanate. He has also made himself influential in the FKIKN. When Diraja failed to attend the sixth National Kraton Festival (FKN) in Gowa in 2008, Iskandar attended and successfully persuaded the other sultans to make Palembang the host of the next festival in 2010. However, the festival did not receive financial support from the governments of South Sumatra Province and Palembang City. As such, Iskandar bore the

\textsuperscript{195} Interview, Iskandar, 20 January 2015 in Palembang. See also local television report retrieved on 21 January 2015 from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EgkRWU5MaDw.

\textsuperscript{196} Iskandar owns Lentera Cahaya Cemerlang, which distributes up to 1,500 gas tanks per day, and might receive a net profit of IDR 1,000 per tank or IDR 45 million [US$ 3,250] per month. (Effendy, 2015).

\textsuperscript{197} Based on an interview with the Pontianak Post, Iskandar is the director of three companies: PT Kelantan Sakti Utama, PT Adi Pratama and PT Gerindo Utama Mandiri. He also owns PT Mercuri Pratama (Pontianak Post, 1 January 2009).
cost of the festival from his own pocket, claiming that it required him to ‘sell [his] farm.’ 198 But during the festival, the spotlight was centred on Iskandar, establishing him as an influential figure in the FKIKN ever since.

The Palembang case, then, confirms the pattern of the earlier case studies. The greater the control of an aristocracy over land, the bigger its political and economic influence. In Palembang, the aristocracy lost its land long before independence – in the 1820s. As a result, there was no traditional resource to draw from when descendants of the last Sultan tried to revive the aristocracy. Similarly, there was no network of pro-royalist adat communities upon which the aristocratic claimants could rely. In the cases of Ubud and Ternate (and, to a much lesser extent, Gowa), such networks were able to compensate for post-BAL losses of land property, granting aristocrats access to land through mutually beneficial cooperation arrangements. In Palembang, all the remaining claimants could do, therefore, was commercialising the former sultanate’s regalia and titles – lifting their own individual status, but having no impact on the overall aristocratic restoration initiative.

7.6 Conclusion

The task of this chapter was to test whether the findings of the Yogyakarta case – discussed in detail in previous chapters – hold in other areas of Indonesia. In Yogyakarta, the sultans obtained their land during pre-colonial and colonial times, defended it through the revolution and the BAL, and used it to launch a campaign for aristocratic revival after 1998. This chapter has shown that different levels of control over land was also crucial in explaining the divergent outcomes of aristocratic restoration campaigns in Ubud, Ternate, Gowa and Palembang. Each case has different historical, cultural, and power relations at the local level, but analysing their trajectory in post-autocratic Indonesian local politics has shown a similar pattern. Those who maintained some form of access to land during the revolutionary, New Order, and post-New Order eras have recorded partial successes in their post-1998 quests to gain political influence and resurrect their royal houses. Meanwhile, those who failed to defend or gain land access experienced defeat or had no opportunities at all to participate in local political contestations.

None of the four comparative cases of aristocratic houses in post-1998 Indonesia reached the level of land control that the Yogyakarta Sultanate achieved. As a result, their political and economic influence was weaker as well. Out of the four cases, only Ternate

198 Interview, Iskandar, 20 January 2015 in Palembang.
succeeded in having its claim to traditional land formally recognised in a bylaw. In Ternate’s case, however, its success was diminished by heavy internal conflict over the Sultan’s succession, and the inability of royal family members to absorb the authority and resources under the direct control of the Sultan. In Ubud, the Puri leaders turned remaining land resources into income-generating tourism businesses, which later funded expensive political campaigns. In addition, they could draw from the political loyalty of voters in the adat communities living on former royal land. This was also the model envisaged by the eldest son of Gowa’s last king, but he failed in implementing it. He had no land-based ties to the adat communities, and no religious or cultural position in their daily lives either. Thus, his alliance with the adat leaders was volatile and unable to serve as a strong power base. In Palembang, finally, not even a porous foundation for an aristocratic revival campaign existed, rendering the remaining royal claimants’ marginal figures.
8. Conclusion: Implications and Recommendations

8.1 Introduction

In this thesis, I have examined the political performance of aristocrats since they resurfaced in post-1998 Indonesian politics and investigated why some aristocrats have succeeded in gaining significant political and economic influence while others have failed. The Indonesian political architecture has significantly shifted from the authoritarian and centralist model of the New Order to the democratic and decentralised polity after Suharto’s fall. Since 2004, the president of Indonesia has been directly elected, and direct elections of local government heads were introduced in 2005. These and other changes have created a political arena for aristocratic revival. Of the 154 aristocracies recorded in 1955, thirty-five have actively participated in political contestation in national and local arenas (both executive and legislative) since 1999, with divergent results. Having presented the case of Yogyakarta (Chapters 2–6) and four comparative examples (Chapter 7), this concluding chapter will sum up the findings of this thesis and state the theoretical and policy implications of the project. It will close with recommendations.

8.2 Summary

The main research question of this thesis is why Indonesian aristocrats have succeeded in restoring political and economic importance in some areas but failed in others. Using Yogyakarta as the main case, in conjunction with four comparative cases, I argue that land control is the key to understanding the different results of aristocratic performance in electoral politics and economic engagement. Using the framework of land property and land access developed by Alchian (2007); Ribot and Peluso (2003); Sikor and Lund (2009a), I have analysed the land holding trajectory of the Yogyakarta Sultanate since the colonial period. Through the theory of access, Ribot and Peluso (2003) focused their research on the capacity of certain actors to extract benefits and material resources from things, despite not holding direct ownership rights. The capacity to extract benefits is not only determined by legal (land) property rights, but also by the overlapping and interrelated powers that enable certain actors to gain access to and maintain access of resources, including land.

The land holding capacity of the Yogyakarta Sultanate has been an interplay between property and access. Even at times when it did not hold direct land property rights, the Sultanate
sustained access to land, mostly through its patron-client relationship with villages. Through this capacity to extract and accumulate material resources from land in different political settings, the Sultanate has used these resources to continuously maintain political control over Yogyakarta. I have chronologically divided the Sultanate’s benefit extraction capacity into property superiority (colonial period), access survival (1945–1998), consolidating access (1998–2012), and restored property superiority (post-2012).

The Yogyakarta Sultanate gained land property from the Dutch following the Javanese succession war in 1755, which divided the Sultanate of Mataram into three separate aristocracies (Chapter 2). Resources were extracted through the apanage system and several layers of land control. First, the Sultan decentralised land holdings to his confidants (patuh) in return for loyalty and the provision of militia personnel. Secondly, the Sultan and patuh rented lands to Chinese and European entrepreneurs. Following increased global demand for sugar and coffee in the late 19th century, the mode of land control changed; sugar companies established contracts with patuh to use the traditional intermediary system to support sugarcane product. The industry transformed the crop system into a seasonal system that burdened peasants while simultaneously creating industrial profits. In response to the peasants’ complaints and to create more business-friendly policies, the Dutch eventually abolished the apanage system, changed the patuh land system and established villages with land-managing responsibilities. But throughout these changes, the Sultan was recognised as the owner of the land.

The Sultanate also defended its land control during the Japanese occupation and the struggle for independence (1942–1949). During the Japanese occupation, the situation was so fluid that no major changes to the land control regime could be achieved, and Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX operated cleverly to protect his position and that of his land possessions. Subsequently, after 1945, he expressed support for the Republic, but always tied this support to the recognition of his powers and his land claims. Thus, throughout the 1950s, the Sultan continued to hold the governorship over the newly established Province of the Special Region of Yogyakarta (Chapter 3). This special status enabled Hamengku Buwono IX to continuously control the usage of land in the region and ensure his lifetime governorship. This was despite the fact that private property rights were expanded through Yogyakarta’s land autonomy bylaws in 1954, undermining the Sultanate’s claim on all land; but the regulations left enough loopholes for the Sultan to be able to continue extracting resources by accessing yet-unregistered traditional lands – and by overseeing the licensing of land as the governor.
Chapter Four discussed the most critical period for the Sultanate, beginning with the BAL of 1960 that barred aristocracies from owning land. This was followed by the power struggles of Guided Democracy and the establishment and entrenchment of the New Order. But by exploiting his political influence in Jakarta, the Sultan was able to stall the implementation of the BAL until 1984 – much in contrast to the rest of the aristocracies. Even after the Sultan conceded to realising the BAL, he in effect paralysed it by creating multiple levels of necessary approvals, many of which involved him as sultan or governor. The Sultanate’s fortunes began to decline somewhat after it lost the governorship with Hamengku Buwono IX’s death in 1988, but it still was able to protect most of its status quo privileges. Indeed, it turned to tourism into an alternative means of accessing monetary resources during this period of limited resource extraction during the end of the Suharto regime.

All this meant that when the post-1998 democratisation and reform created a momentum for aristocracies to reclaim their political and land rights, the Yogyakarta Sultanate was in a strong position to use these opportunities. Unlike other royal houses, it had a significant land base to draw from, and it had ties to users of that land (mostly village officials and their constituents) who could be relied upon to provide political support. Thus, Chapter 5 discussed how Sultan Hamengku Buwono X reclaimed the governorship just a few months after the 1998 regime change, and used his land-based loyal supporters to repossess traditional land from 1998 to 2012. Step by step, the Sultan used his access to land, defended through tumultuous periods between 1942 and 1998, to restore his pre-1942 property rights to significant parts of Yogyakarta’s land. Ultimately, the Sultanate’s consolidation of this access culminated in a new law that restored the land control (from land access into the right to hold land property) in the YSL of 2012.

The success in restoring land rights went hand-in-hand with the permanent entrenchment of the Sultan in the governorship. This was an important milestone for the Sultan, but as observers reported who interacted with him during the deliberations on the 2012 law, he saw this mostly as a means to protect the Sultanate’s land rights. The Sultan had won approval for the 2012 law by mobilising support from the users of traditional royal land, and he understood that further consolidating this land control was key to further strengthening the Sultanate’s overall position. In other words, more than others, he was fully aware of the inseparable linkage between land control and an aristocracy’s political success. The latter was not achievable without the former, but the former could also be further cemented by the latter. Through the 2012 YSL, the Sultanate has become the most successful aristocracy in Indonesia.
(Chapter 6). This new law stipulated that the Sultan of the Yogyakarta is the ex-officio Governor of Yogyakarta, and the Sultanate is the owner of traditional land. These powers have enabled him to even block the implementation of national policies in Yogyakarta, giving him authority that no other governor possesses.

In order to evaluate whether the findings from the Yogyakarta case (especially in regard to the linkage between land control and success in post-1998 elections and other socio-political arenas) hold in other territories, Chapter 7 presented comparative case studies of Ubud, Ternate, Gowa and Palembang. The pattern exhibited in the Yogyakarta case could also be found in the other examples: Ubud and Ternate, which had sustained some form of land access after the revolution and BAL, recorded moderate political successes. The form of land access was similar to that upheld by Yogyakarta in its critical periods: namely, access by forming alliances with village communities that used land historically and culturally tied to the aristocracy. Gowa, by contrast, failed to revive such ties, while in Palembang, they did not exist in the first place. Thus, the two latter aristocracies were unsuccessful in their restoration campaigns.

Hence, while Yogyakarta stands out as the most extreme case of an aristocracy that defended its land holdings and turned it into even increased (rather than just restored) political power after 1998, the same dynamics have shaped the outcomes of other aristocratic revival projects across the archipelago. With this, the thesis has highlighted the importance of land rights defence as an important, and often overlooked, factor in the involvement of royal houses in contemporary Indonesian politics. The cultural, spiritual and historical dimensions raised by many authors are significant, but as I have argued in this thesis, they do not tell the full story of aristocratic politics. Rather, the political economy of land has been inseparably intertwined with these dimensions and has driven many of the political actions of aristocrats, both in the past and today. This finding, then, has not only empirical, but also theoretical implications, which I turn to in the next section.

8.3 Implications

This thesis has theoretical implications for the study of Indonesian aristocracy, but also for the exploration of political power more generally, in Indonesia and beyond. It brings together research on the economic bases of aristocratic politics, cultural and spiritual power, and the dynamics of land disputes – arenas of scholarly inquiry often treated separately, both in Indonesia and in other cases. In the following, I highlight some of the main conceptual and
theoretical contributions of this thesis to the study of Indonesian aristocracy and Indonesian democracy, as well as the broader issue of land and peasant studies.

Research into Indonesian aristocracies has thus far been dominated by sociocultural-anthropological perspectives. In this view, the successful performance of aristocracies is due to people’s support resulting from belief in the divinity of aristocrats. As summarised by Suwannathat-Pian (2011, p. 1) in her research into Southeast Asian monarchies,

Only the few blessed with those extraordinary favors [sic] from the divine and heavenly powers were endowed with the sacred right to rule over lesser mortals who were put under their charge; these selected leaders-rulers commanded absolute loyalty of, and authority over, their people.

This loyalty, which has been transformed into votes and other forms of political support, is derived from local values, faiths, histories, and cultures as shaped over generations. This argument is a continuation of the idea of cultural power presented by early scholars (Anderson, 1972a; Moertono, 2009; Mulder, 2005b; Selosoemardjan, 1962b). In this line of thought, the social understanding of ‘power’—in this case, derived mostly from the Javanese court literature—differs from the modern concept of ‘politics.’

According to Anderson (1972), the Javanese concept of power contrasts with the modern concept of politics. The latter is often conceptualised as abstract and heterogeneous, with moral ambiguity and no inherent limit of accumulation. In contrast, the Javanese idea of power is concrete and homogeneous, at a constant quantum, and does not raise a question of legitimacy. This idea of power is symbolised in and exercised through symbols. During the sultan’s coronation and at other special moments, these sacred objects are presented before the subject to show the owner’s divinity as a means of maintaining loyalty. And while in modern politics legitimacy may come from a specific party, office, population, election or other processes, the Javanese concept of power is homogeneous, coming from the same source—i.e., the Goddess of the Southern Sea (Resink, 1997). Furthermore, power is of a specific quantity, and must be dominated by the Sultan. Exercise of power by others decreases its overall amount and quality, therefore justifying power by hereditary succession.

This approach to studying Javanese aristocracy has often been extended by integrating Islam as a further element of explaining power. In this paradigm, traditional leaders used Islam to consolidate their power – hence the transformation of early pre-Islamic kingdoms into sultanates. Islamic teachings, then, were used to strengthen the aristocracy, creating unique
Islamic teachings such as those described by Woodward (1989). Islam, in this interpretation, was an integral element of a larger mix of spiritual elements underpinning aristocratic rule. In Java, the Sultan has been described as the bridge between the seen and unseen worlds, and therefore his capacity to maintain political legitimacy depends on his capacity to maintain the ties between these worlds (Moedjanto, 1987). To maintain their authority, according to this stream of literature, the four rulers in Yogyakarta and Solo have integrated cultural mysticism (with military, religious, and political elements) into their titles for absolute control (Selosoemardjan, 1962b, p. 17).

But this anthropological approach to explaining aristocratic power, both before and after 1998, has not only been limited to Java. The same arguments have been made for Outer Island aristocracies. Scholars have highlighted the role local myths have played in serving as power resources for aristocrats in North Maluku, South Sulawesi, Bali and other areas (L. Y. Andaya, 1984; Bubandt, 2014; Lay, 2001; van Klinken, 2001). This thesis, by contrast, has emphasised that the politics through which local aristocracies have consolidated their power have been very modern in nature. They may have used traditional power concepts to justify their claim to power, but their true power bases have been control over land. Aristocratic actors, therefore, have situated themselves in the processes of production, wealth accumulation and power expansion of the industrial age. For Marx, land was the core capital of capitalist society. In his tradition, political economy scholars have put such core economic resources into the focus of their analysis. Building on this tradition and expanding it, this thesis has merged an overall political economy approach with strong acknowledgment of cultural factors.

The thesis has also added to the literature on Indonesian democracy – in particular, to the debate on what role oligarchic actors play in it. For authors such as Hadiz (2003); R. Robison and Hadiz (2004), Indonesian democracy has been hijacked by bureaucratic, military, business and political actors groomed under Suharto’s New Order regime. Regardless of whether this is entirely accurate or not, this thesis has shown that aristocratic actors have played a significant role as well. Their power resources have their origins not in the New Order, but in fact reach back into pre-colonial times. In this sense, Indonesia’s aristocrats have been the country’s earliest oligarchs, and while their wealth is now dwarfed by that of modern tycoons, the residual power of that wealth (rooted mostly in land possessions) allowed surviving aristocracies to carve out a niche for themselves in the distribution of power in post-Suharto Indonesia. Without recognising their influence, a portrait of Indonesia’s contemporary democracy would be incomplete.
Furthermore, the thesis contributes to a more differentiated understanding of land disputes in Indonesia. Much of the existing research has focused on such conflicts from an environmental and communal rights perspective (McCarthy & Robinson, 2016). Moreover, most studied cases are vertical disputes between small landowners and the state or powerful conglomerates. This thesis has added a significant nuance to this. It shows that not only do traditional land claimants such as aristocracies and adat communities continue to fight among themselves over ownership rights, they often form alliances to fend off claims by other parties, including the state. In the cases of Yogyakarta and Ternate, the local aristocracies developed land certification systems that operated outside of the state. These systems were attractive to adat communities living on unregistered land, having waited for decades for the state to certify their land. They perceived aristocratic land titles to be superior to no titles at all, and thus entered into agreements with the local sultanates. In exchange for certificates, they offered political support, helping the Sultan of Yogyakarta to obtain the YSL and the Sultan of Ternate to win elections.

The thesis confirms, however, findings often made in an existing stream of peasant studies. Several authors have highlighted the importance of land ownership as a key factor in local economic hierarchies (Booth, 1974, 1985; Sitorus, Wiradi, & Suhendar, 2002). In her early research of rural land ownership in Klaten, Central Java, Booth (1974) noted that 60% of household did not use rice field as the basis of their incomes; conversely, the village officials who received the best land (in terms of irrigation, location, and productivity) as part of their previous salary from the Surakarta royal houses were much better off. Despite representing only 1.3% of the population, they controlled 11% of all rice fields. Recent publications on village land ownership have not shown a significant change in these tendencies (Rachman, 2011; Wiradi, 2000). Similarly, my thesis confirms that it is village officials and adat leaders who benefit the most from rural land certification, whether through aristocratic systems or the official state apparatus. As society figures who can mobilise followers for political purposes, they receive the most attention from aristocratic leaders and politicians, and thus obtain the best land as rewards.

Most importantly, however, the thesis has argued that the focus on legal land ownership can often be misleading. Building on the work of Alchian (2007); Ribot and Peluso (2003); Sikor and Lund (2009a), I have shown that what often matters more is access to land. Such access does not necessarily require certification; instead, it can draw from traditional ties that two or more parties recognise, or can be based on mutual agreements. Of course, certified land
ownership is the goal of all actors – as demonstrated in this thesis, both aristocracies and adat communities (as well as private citizens) seek it, but in relatively young countries such as Indonesia where certification systems remain weak, access to land is often the most widespread mode of land control. Indeed, it is frequently the precondition for later certification. In the Yogyakarta case, the Sultanate systematically defended its land access from the 1940s to the 2010s, and when the opportunity arose, it turned this access into certified ownership. For many of the actors interacting with the Sultanate, the goal was the same: transforming their land usage into land titles. Many accepted titles that still acknowledged overall ownership of the Sultan, but this certification was seen as useful to defend their land against other claims.

The thesis, then, has turned the analytical focus on informal power relations that shape both the outcome of political contests and land disputes in post-1998 Indonesia. In doing so, it does not challenge the validity of other approaches to studying this subject; but it has added to these approaches by analysing the political economy structures that allowed some aristocracies to thrive after 1998 and led others to be unsuccessful. As I argued, the spiritual and traditional authority of local royal houses is not sufficient to explain why local communities supported the revival of an aristocracy or rejected it; neither is the historical explanation of support or opposition to the Republic in 1945 decisive. Instead, I have pointed to the ability of aristocracies to control land as the key factor – both by using it as leverage to extract political support from clients of that land, and by exploiting it directly for economic profit. In the course of this defence of aristocratic land, relationships of interdependence were formed between royal houses and other actors with stakes in the land, and it is from these relationships that the outcome of the quest of aristocrats for restoration of their traditional powers was determined.

8.4. Recommendations

This thesis has covered a lot of ground, analysing five cases in which local aristocracies in Indonesia have tried to restore their traditional powers in the democratic era. But the scope of the thesis was necessarily limited, both in terms of geographic reach and the analysed issues. Hence, this final section of the conclusion (and thesis) makes several recommendations in terms of further research opportunities and policy action.

The first issue that requires further conceptual and empirical research is the existence of Yogyakarta as a quasi-monarchic enclave in democratic Indonesia. Then President Yudhoyono put his finger on the problematic nature of this arrangement, but his public
Conclusion

statement on it triggered outrage in Yogyakarta and accelerated the process towards monarchic structures rather than impeding it. There was also little reaction to this anomaly in the rest of Indonesia or in the scholarly community. Partly, this was because it was seen as a legitimate form of a special autonomy regime. But this approach is misleading. It is true that both Aceh and Papua have special autonomy regulations too; but in both cases, the executive leader is elected by the people, as in the rest of Indonesia. Only Yogyakarta has an executive monarchy in which the leader of the royal house concurrently runs the government. Even in Malaysia, where local traditional rulers are heads of their various states, they have very little influence on the day-to-day business of government. In this sense, Yogyakarta is not only a unique royal enclave in post-1998 Indonesia, but in the entirety of Southeast Asia – with the obvious exception of Brunei.

Thus, there needs to be more discussion on what the case of post-2012 Yogyakarta means for the measurement of democratic quality in Indonesia. How does the existence of a province with monarchic executive leadership influence the overall assessment of Indonesia as an electoral democracy? This question is of particular relevance as other provinces or districts might aspire to adopt arrangements similar to that of Yogyakarta. In Gowa, we have already seen the attempt by the incumbent regent to bestow royal titles and authority on him through a bylaw, and provinces such as Bali have for long requested special autonomy status. A special arrangement has also been sought by the Tidore District (home of the Tidore Sultanate), citing a special historical role, including during the struggle to integrate West Papua into Indonesia in the early 1960s. In early 2019, the Central Government refused this demand for further asymmetric decentralisation. However, this has not stopped the growing demand to ‘protect’ local culture and tradition.

Second, while this thesis has touched upon succession conflicts within aristocracies, they deserve deeper exploration. This is because such conflicts can be both an indication of the growing power of aristocracies (with more power comes an increased number of contenders who want it) and a cause for aristocratic decline. In some areas, the conflicts between royal family members have spilled over into national politics and local community relations. For instance, in the Yogyakarta Sultanate, the Kasunanan Surakarta, and the Ternate Sultanate, internal succession conflicts have dominated local (and sometimes national) news for years. In Yogyakarta in particular, a major conflict is brewing over the succession of Hamengku Buwono X, which has the potential to not only trigger significant tensions in Yogyakarta itself - it may
also encourage the state to intervene and question the entire arrangement of monarchic appointment of the governor.

Third, this thesis has mostly discussed the Yogyakarta Sultanate, and given less attention to its junior partner, the Pakualaman Principality. Separate analysis of the Pakualaman Principality and the dynamics of its relationship with the Sultanate would enrich the study of the aristocracies of Yogyakarta. For instance, there has been almost no research on possible disagreements between the leaders of the two entities. In most writings, it is assumed that both act as a single institution, with the Yogyakarta Sultanate dictating the terms of policy and strategy. This was even true for times when the Paku Alam was in the forefront. For example, during his governorship (1950–1988), Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX spent most of his time in various political posts in Jakarta. The Sultan decided key political matters, but the daily and de facto governor was Paku Alam VIII. After Hamengku Buwono IX’s death, Paku Alam VIII was governor for a decade (1988–1998), and it is not clear how he interacted with Hamengku Buwono X (who was only sultan at the time) when making executive decisions. Indeed, given the succession issue noted above, the current Paku Alam could once again move to the front line of Yogyakarta politics very soon.

The policy recommendations flow from the findings of the thesis, as well as some of the points raised above. As indicated, the thesis has pointed to the incompatibility between the YSL arrangements for direct, hereditary appointment of the governor and core principles of democracy. The most important aspect of democracy is citizens’ capacity to elect their leaders in free, fair and competitive ballots (Diamond, 1994). As shown in Chapter 5 of this thesis, the initial legal draft on the YSL identified the Sultan as the ‘head of the province’ rather than the ‘chief of the provincial government’; in other words, the Sultan would have held only a symbolic role while the governor would have been elected democratically. Such a situation would have been compatible with the concept of constitutional monarchies operating within democratic systems. However, the Sultan was eventually placed as the ex-officio governor of Yogyakarta. This has created an unresolvable tension between democratic principles and the monarchic appointment of the governor.

Thus, future revisions to the YSL should revisit the issue of how the Sultan is appointed to the governorship. Some form of election, whether through the local parliament or through the broader population, is essential in ensuring that the democratic rights of Yogyakartans are protected. The exact mechanism is up to debate, but every citizen has a right to elect their political leader – including those who lobbied for the election of the governor in the 2000s but
were subsequently silenced by the mobilisation of the Sultan’s loyalists. As hinted above, this issue is not only tied to Yogyakarta’s democratic quality – it has repercussions for Indonesia’s classification as an electoral democracy as well.

Similarly, the political developments of 2012 have affected the transparency of government business, concealing potential conflicts of interest. As a dominant land holder, for example, the Sultan – as governor – is at the same time in charge of land affairs, even overseeing deals in which his government acquires land from the Sultanate. This situation is exacerbated by the political dominance of the Sultanate, as a result of which there is no institution at the provincial or national levels that can control possible transgressions. National-level control institutions are often unable to intervene, with Yogyakarta’s special status used as a pretext to shield the province from such interventions. The continued insistence of the Yogyakarta Government to allow ethnic Chinese to own land – which clearly violates the fundamental rights of those Chinese as Indonesian citizens – is one such transgression that remains unresolved because of a lack of a credible mechanisms to hold the Sultan to account. Any revision of the YSL is thus recommended to pay special attention to the creation of powerful agencies that can enforce national laws if basic rights are violated.

Finally, the Sultanate’s dominant political control under YSL has placed the provincial bureaucracy in an ambiguous position. It is not clear whether it serves the provincial government or the Sultanate, or both at the same time. Indeed, in some cases – as in land affairs – provincial bureaucrats (and resources) have been devoted specifically to helping the Sultanate with registration and certification of land. Hence, a clearer demarcation between the Sultanate and the provincial government should be established. However, as explained in this thesis, this may be difficult to achieve without dismantling the entire YSL. The YSL stands out as the most successful and comprehensive case of aristocratic restoration in post-Suharto Indonesia, and it is unlikely that the Sultanate will agree to it being significantly revised down any time soon.
Appendix I

The Transformation of Aristocratic Access to Land into Private Property in Yogyakarta
Appendix II

List of Zelfbesturende Landschappen (Swapraja) in 1955

Ranawidjaya (1955) listed 154 Swapraja that had survived in 1955. This number was significantly reduced from 278 in 1942.

I. Sumatra, 25 Swapraja
7. Swapraja Panai, Short Contract, 9 October 1907.
8. Swapraja Bila, Short Contract, 8 June 1916.
17. Swapraja Raja, Short Contract, 20 December 1907.
18. Swapraja Dolok (Silau), Short Contract, 20 December 1907.

II. Java, 2 Swapraja.

III. Kalimantan, 12 Swapraja.
2. Swapraja Sambas, Short Contract, 30 April 1923.
5. Swapraja Kubu, Short Contract, 7 February 1922.
7. Swapraja, Sanggau, Short Contract, 11 July 1921.

**IV. Sulawesi, 56 Swapraja**

5. Swapraja Sidengrang, Short Contract, 2 May 1906.
6. Swapraja Rappang, Short Contract, 10 November 1911.
7. Swapraja Malusetasi, Short Contract, 2 August 1918.
8. Swapraja Suppa, Short Contract, 10 February 1929.
19. Swapraja Tanette, Short Contract, 4 December 1913.
22. Swapraja Cenrana, Short Contract, 8 May 1919.
29. Swapraja Buton, Short Contract, 26 August 1922.
30. Swapraja Laiwui, Short Contract, 2 August 1918.
32. Swapraja Tawaeli, Short Contract, 4 May 1912.
33. Swapraja Palu, Short Contract, 9 October 1921.
34. Swapraja Sigidolo, Short Contract, 15 November 1916.
35. Swapraja Kulawi, Short Contract, 17 September 1921.
37. Swapraja Moutong, Short Contract, 22 August 1917.
38. Swapraja Tolioli, Short Contract, 10 July 1920.
40. Swapraja Poso, Short Contract, 26 April 1921.
41. Swapraja Lorea, Short Contract, 22 August 1917.
42. Swapraja Unauna, Short Contract, 22 August 1917.
43. Swapraja Bungku, Short Contract, 31 January 1925.
44. Swapraja Mori, Short Contract, 6 June 1909.
45. Swapraja BAnggai, Short Contract, 1 July 1908.
47. Swapraja Bintauna, Short Contract, 12 February 1913.
52. *Swapraja* Manganiitu, Short Contract, 2 May 1914.
53. *Swapraja* Siau, Short Contract, 28 April 1922.
55. *Swapraja* Tagulandang, Short Contract, 17 June 1923.

**V. Maluku, 3 Swapraja.**

**VI. Bali and Nusa Tenggara, 56 Swapraja.**
24. *Swapraja* Umbu Ratu Ngay, Short Contract, September 28th
25. *Swapraja* Anakala, Short Contract, 23 December 1913
34. *Swapraja* Sikka, Short Contract, 1 May 1923.
37. Swapraja Amarasi, Short Contract, 24 April 1917.
38. Swapraja Kupang, Short Contract, 7 April 1919.
40. Swapraja Ampoan, Short Contract, 2m May 1925.
41. Swapraja Rote based on short declaration of villages under Rote.
42. Swapraja Sawu, Short Contract, 21 November 1918.
43. Swapraja Amanuban, Short Contract, 24 February 1923.
44. Swapraja Amantun, Short Contract, 24 February 1923.
45. Swapraja Molo, Short Contract, 10 May 1916.
46. Swapraja Miamaffo, Short Contract, 26 October 1922.
47. Swapraja Bebuki, Short Contract, 23 October 1917.
50. Swapraja Alor, Short Contract, 14 October 1919.
51. Swapraja Barmusa, Short Contract, 14 February 1919.
52. Swapraja Pantar Matahari Naik, Short Contract, 7 April 1919.
56. Swapraja Pureman, Short Contract, 14 October 1919.
Appendix III


1. Kesultanan Deli, Medan, North Sumatra.
2. Kesultanan Negeri Serdang, Medan, North Sumatra.
5. Kesultanan Pagaruyung, Batusangkar, West Sumatara.
7. Kerajaan Siak Sri Indrapura, Bengkalis, Riau.
15. Puri Karangasem, Karangasem, Bali.
17. Puri Pamecutan, Denpasar, Bali.
18. Puri Satria, Denpasar, Bali.
20. Puri Agung Ubud, Gianyar, Bali.
22. Kesultanan Bima, Bima, West Nusa Tenggara.
23. Istana Kadriah Kesultanan Pontianak, Pontianak, West Kalimantan.
24. Istana Amantubillah, Mempawah, West Kalimantan.
27. Kesultanan Kutawaringin, Pangkalanbun, Kutawaringin, Central Kalimantan.
29. Kerajaan Gowa, Gowa, South Sulawesi.
31. Kesultanan Wajo, Wajo, South Sulawesi.
32. Kesultanan Maros, Maros, South Sulawesi.
33. Kesultanan Ternate, Ternate, North Maluku.
34. Kesultanan Tidore, Halmahera, North Maluku.

Aristocracies printed in italics have participated in contemporary electoral politics (1999–2014).
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