PRESENTATION AND LEGITIMACY

DIFFUSE SUPPORT AND DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION IN WESTMINSTER DEMOCRACIES

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DECEMBER 2019

A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY OF THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

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DECLARATION

I, Feodor Snagovsky, declare that this PhD thesis entitled Representation and Legitimacy: Diffuse Support and Descriptive Representation in Westminster Democracies contains no material that has been submitted previously, in whole or in part, for the award of any other academic degree or diploma. Except where otherwise indicated, this thesis is my own work.

Material from a preliminary draft of chapters 2, 3, 4 and 7 was used for a conference paper presented at the International Political Science Association Annual Conference in 2018. The paper was entitled, The Impact of Descriptive Representation on External Efficacy in Australia. While I was the lead author of the paper, the project is a collaboration with Woo Chang Kang, Jillian Sheppard and Nicholas Biddle. All material from the conference paper which appears in this thesis amounts to my contribution to the project. As of this writing, a revised version of the paper is under review at an academic journal.

Except where due reference is made in the text, all other chapters are entirely my own work.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I am grateful to Ian McAllister for his supervision and guidance. Working with Ian has been a real privilege; I cannot imagine a supervisor more generous with his time, clearer with his advice or keener with his insight. Ian taught me a lot about political science, farming and motorcycles; I am still deciding which lessons were the most important.

Keith Dowding and Svitlana Chernykh provided excellent advice and support over my time at ANU. Thanks to Keith for not pulling any punches and to Svitlana for keeping me on track. I feel very lucky to have had a chance to work with both of them.

This thesis would not have been possible without many other people at the Australian National University (ANU). I am grateful to Matthew Kerby, Andrew Banfield, Marija Taflaga, Annika Werner, Björn Dressel, Patrick Dumont, Alexandra Oprea, Darren Halpin, Ben Goldsmith, Katrine Beauregard, Charles Miller and Martin Heskins for their advice, support, kindness and good humour. A special thank you to Woo Chang Kang, Jillian Sheppard and Nicholas Biddle, who helped make the experiment in chapter 7 possible, and as well to Woo Chang and Nicholas for putting up with many more methodological questions than is reasonable.

A number of people outside ANU also helped immensely. I am very grateful to Jerome Black, Joshua Zingher, Benjamin Farrer, Didier Ruedin and Patrick Fournier for providing data for this thesis. Thank you as well to Alex Marland, Anthony Sayers, Lisa Young, Ruth Dassonneville and Steve Quinlan for helping me learn to be an academic and (hopefully) good person at the same time.

A number of organisations made this research possible. I am deeply grateful to the ANU School of Politics and International Relations, Australian Research Council (ARC) and Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) for funding my work as a full-
time researcher. I am also grateful to the Canadian Political Science Association (CPSA), Australian Society for Quantitative Political Science (ASQPS), Australian Political Science Association (APSA) and Southern Political Science Association (SPSA) for funding several opportunities to share my work with other researchers.

I am also grateful to the many collaborators of the Australian Election Study, Canadian Election Study, Ethnic Minority British Election Study, Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, as well as the staff of the Australian Data Archive. This research exists thanks to their hard work in collecting and curating some of the highest quality data in the world and making it available for public use.

Last, but nowhere near least, thank you to my family and friends for your support and encouragement. I am fortunate that there are too many of you to list here.

This thesis is dedicated to Liudmyla, Olena and Viktor.
ABSTRACT

This thesis asks the question: does the descriptive representation of ethnic minorities in legislatures affect citizens’ diffuse support for the regime? While almost every advanced democracy has become more ethnically diverse through the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, ethnic minorities and members of overseas-born communities are dramatically underrepresented compared to their presence in the general population. Democratic theory argues that if a group – especially one that is growing so rapidly – has few legislative representatives, their preferences risk being overlooked while jeopardizing the legitimacy of the representative system.

Descriptive representation takes place when a representative shares the same race, ethnicity, or gender as their constituents. Arguments in favour of increased descriptive representation are broadly made on three grounds: justice and fairness, the substantive representation of ‘minority interests’, and increasing the legitimacy of the political system. The first two arguments – justice and substantive representation – have been widely explored. However, despite compelling theoretical evidence, the claim that representation makes political institutions more legitimate in the eyes of their citizenry has been subject to little empirical scrutiny.

Using cross-sectional data from the Canadian, Australian and British election studies and data from an original conjoint experiment, the study examines how the descriptive representation of ethnic minorities affects voters’ diffuse support for the regime, operationalised as perceptions of government responsiveness. The results show that: (1) candidate-level co-ethnic representation alone is not enough to increase the diffuse support of ethnic minority voters; (2) in some instances, legislator-level descriptive representation does make ethnic minority voters feel like government is more responsive to their demands; (3) certain behavioural and attitudinal factors – such as community-level mobilization and an
explicit preference for descriptive representation – moderate the relationship between representation and diffuse support (4) substantive representation, operationalized through partisanship and ideology, may matter more than descriptive representation; and (5) a significant number of white-Anglo voters are threatened by ethnic minority representation in parliament.

This study contributes to the advancement of knowledge through an empirical test of a commonly held assumption: that representation matters for legitimacy. While the findings of this study broadly support this conclusion, they also show evidence of the tension between striving to make institutions more representative and essentialist approaches which assume the most important thing about ethnic minority politicians, voters and the relationship between them, is ethnicity. The findings also inform policy debates about the reform of representative institutions and how the representation of historically excluded groups may relate to our emerging understanding of white identity politics.
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<td>Australian Election Study</td>
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<td>ALP</td>
<td>Australian Labor Party</td>
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<td>AMCE</td>
<td>Average Marginal Component Effect</td>
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<td>AUD</td>
<td>Australian Dollars</td>
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<td>BAME</td>
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<td>ID</td>
<td>Identification</td>
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<td>Mail-Back Survey</td>
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<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<td>MSS</td>
<td>Most Similar Systems</td>
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<td>New Democratic Party</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>PES</td>
<td>Post-Election Survey</td>
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<td>PR</td>
<td>Proportional Representation</td>
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1 INTRODUCTION: REPRESENTATION AND LEGITIMACY

This thesis examines whether descriptive representation affects voters’ perceptions of system legitimacy. Several recent examples illustrate why the answer to this question matters.

On 24 July 2019, 66 million people were – ostensibly – three months away from the most consequential event in modern British history – Britain’s exit from the European Union. Amidst the turmoil, Boris Johnson stood in Buckingham Palace with the Queen, who had just appointed him Prime Minister. Britain is one of the world’s oldest and most robust democracies; however, its 48 million electors had little to do with Mr. Johnson’s elevation during this critical period. Mr. Johnson became Prime Minister after 160,000 members of the Conservative Party elected him their leader (Rasmi 2019) – a group which was overwhelmingly white (97 per cent), male (71 per cent), upper-to-middle class (85 per cent), and represented just 0.35 per cent of the British electorate (Bale et al. 2019).

Around the same time, two of Britain’s closest allies were also facing criticism for their own institutions’ lack of diversity. In the United States, the Trump Administration had
just lost its only Latino cabinet secretary (Karni, Sullivan, and Scheiber 2019). In a country where 40 per cent of the population identifies as non-Hispanic white, only two (9 per cent) of the remaining 23 cabinet-level officials were non-white (U.S. Census Bureau 2018; White House 2019). In Australia, a new federal Parliament had just been elected – though this one was hardly more diverse than the last. Pietsch (2017a) finds only two individuals with Asian heritage and two individuals with Middle Eastern heritage have been elected to the House of Representatives in the fifteen years between 2001-2016, despite 12 per cent and 2 per cent of Australians being born in Asia or the Middle-East, respectively.

Even Canada, a country with a reputation for diversity, is not immune to criticism on this front. In 2015, Justin Trudeau was widely praised for appointing Canada’s most diverse federal cabinet – both with equal numbers of men and women and a record number of cabinet ministers with ethnic minority backgrounds (MacCharles, Whittington, and Campion-Smith 2015; Wherry 2017). Commentators noted Canada now had the world’s ‘most Sikh’ cabinet, with Mr. Trudeau himself bragging his cabinet had more Sikh ministers than India’s cabinet (Tharoor 2015; The Hindu 2016). It did not take long for commentators to note the underrepresentation of other groups, however. One columnist noted that Trudeau’s cabinet, which “includes no one of Italian or Chinese origin, a cabinet without Arabs, a cabinet without a single black person… is not a true portrait of Canada” (Gagnon 2015). Others argued this approach to diversity “risks becoming ‘a box to check off,’ making us feel better about deep-rooted societal problems while absolving us of actually having to do anything to fix those problems” (Paperny 2015; Holmes 2015).

These concerns are not merely over optics. Each of these three institutions – political parties, parliaments, and executives – have good reasons to care about who has a say in how
they are run. Representation is a hallmark of government legitimacy and a “precondition for justifying governmental action” (Pitkin 1967, 82). If citizens do not see themselves represented in their democratic institutions, they may believe government will not consider their interests and reject those institutions. By contrast, if citizens do see themselves represented in the political process, they should be more likely to think that government has them in mind when making decisions. The corresponding acceptance of political institutions is a critical component of legitimate government.

Despite compelling theoretical evidence, the claim that representation makes political institutions more legitimate in the eyes of their citizenry has been subject to little empirical scrutiny. Thus, the question this study asks is: how does the representation of ethnic minorities in legislatures affect citizens’ diffuse support for the regime? As ethnicity becomes increasingly politicized in public discourse, does the underrepresentation of ethnic minorities in elected office change how members of those communities feel about the regime? Does the representation of ethnic minorities in politics result in a backlash from members of the ethnic majority, who may view representation as a zero-sum game?

This introduction will proceed in five parts. First, I will situate this study in the broader context of democracy in the twenty-first century. Second, I will examine the concept of descriptive representation and why we should expect it to be related to perceptions of legitimacy. Third, I will argue this relationship has theoretical, empirical and policy implications that make it worth examining. Fourth, I will outline the research design this thesis takes. Fifth, I will summarize the main findings of this study and their implications for

---

1 See also: Atkeson and Carrillo 2007; Bird 2005; Childs and Cowley 2011; Phillips 1995
democracy. I will conclude by reviewing the approach each subsequent chapter takes and how they help us understand the relationship between representation and legitimacy.

1.1 The Puzzle: Diversity and Representation

The puzzle which connects representation and perceived responsiveness has three parts: increasing diversity, stagnating representation, and declining legitimacy.

Almost every advanced democracy has become more ethnically diverse through the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. One approach to measuring this diversity is through ethnic fractionalization, which refers to “the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population belonged to different groups” (Alesina et al. 2003, 158–59). Figure 1.1 shows how ethnic fractionalisation in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member-countries has changed from 1985 to 2000. In short, the overwhelming majority of OECD countries have become more ethnically diverse during this fifteen-year period, in part because of increasing immigration (OECD 2018).

Although our societies are becoming more diverse, our representative institutions have largely failed to keep up by electing more members of these groups. In a representative democracy, politicians “decide what citizens must and cannot do, and they coerce citizens to comply with their decisions” (Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin 1999, 1). If a group – especially one that is growing so rapidly – has low electoral participation and few legislative representatives, “there is an increasing risk that the interests of such persons are not part of the electoral preference aggregation mechanisms of modern liberal democracies” (Bird, Saalfeld, and Wüst 2010, 4).
Figure 1.1 Ethnic Fractionalization in OECD Countries, 1985-2000

![Ethnic Fractionalization Graph]

**Note:** Data obtained from Patsiurko et al. (2012). Higher values represent greater fractionalisation.

In most advanced democracies, ethnic minorities and members of overseas-born communities are dramatically underrepresented compared to their presence in the general population. One way to measure ethnic representation is through each country’s Ethnic Representation Score (ERS), which corresponds to the difference between each ethnic group’s representation in the general population and in parliament (Ruedin 2009). Figure 1.2 shows the ERS values for each OECD country as a function of their level of ethnic diversity. The trend is clear: more diverse societies tend to be worse at representing their diversity in formal institutions.
**Figure 1.2** Ethnic Fractionalisation by Ethnic Representation Score in OECD Countries

![Diagram showing ethnic fractionalisation by ethnic representation score in OECD countries.](image)

**Note:** Ethnic Representation Scores (ERS) correspond to the difference between each ethnic group’s representation in the general population and in parliament as of year 2000. Higher ERS values indicate a closer match diversity and representation in a country. Higher fractionalisation values indicate a more diverse population. ERS data from Ruedin (2009). Fractionalisation data from Patsirko et al. (2012). R-Squared: 0.47. Beta-Coefficient: -0.18.

These trends come as diffuse support for democratic regimes is declining. Diffuse support influences the extent to which citizens accept or reject political institutions and public policy (Levi and Stoker 2000, 491). In the worst case, insufficient support for democratic institutions can lead to democratic deconsolidation or a rise in anti-system attitudes. One measure of diffuse support is political trust, which is “a summary judgement that the system is responsive and will do what is right even in the absence of constant scrutiny” (Miller and Listhaug 1990, 358). Political trust – like many indicators of diffuse support – has been declined in many advanced democracies over the last thirty years (Catterberg and Moreno...
2006). Figure 1.3 shows how political trust and satisfaction with democracy have changed over the last fifteen years in Australia. The decline of both indicators should be alarming to proponents of democracy.

**Figure 1.3** Satisfaction with Democracy and Political Trust in Australia, 1996-2019

![Graph showing changes in satisfaction with democracy and political trust from 1996 to 2019.](image)

**Note:** Data obtained from Cameron and McAllister (2019).

What ties these three trends – increasing diversity, stagnating representation, and decreasing diffuse support – together? The obvious mechanism is that as societies become more diverse and that diversity is not adequately captured in democratic institutions, ethnic minority citizens’ diffuse support declines. As a result, the average level of diffuse support in

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2 Though see van Ham and Thomassen (2017) for a more nuanced discussion of this trend, which has not occurred in all advanced democracies.
each corresponding country declines, too. This interpretation is both tempting and plausible – after all, why would citizens support institutions that do not adequately represent them?

The main problem with this mechanism is that it is wrong. Ethnic minority voters, far from being the cause of declining support for the political system, are often its greatest proponents. Immigrants to Australia – both from English-speaking and non-English speaking backgrounds have higher levels of political interest, political trust and satisfaction with democracy than those born in Australia (Bean 2012; Pietsch 2018). This is also true in Britain, where ethnic minority voters have higher levels of satisfaction and trust in major British institutions than their ethnic majority counterparts (A. Heath et al. 2013). So-called ‘visible minority’ voters – a Canadian term that refers to people who are non-white – also have higher levels of political interest, trust and support for democracy (Bilodeau 2014; Gidengil and Roy 2015; Hwang 2017). Further, there is “unambiguous evidence that immigrants generally develop strong positive orientations towards Canada during their first decade of residence” (S. White, Bilodeau, and Nevitte 2015, 302).

These conclusions present a puzzle for scholars of representation: if lower levels of descriptive representation should be associated with lower levels of diffuse support, why do ethnic minority voters and immigrants have higher levels of diffuse support than their ethnic majority counterparts?

1.2 Descriptive Representation and Legitimacy

Representation is a broad, contentious concept with variable meanings. The act of ‘representing’ is often thought of as “acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them” (Pitkin 1967, 209). In a system-level context, “representative government is a system in which citizens choose other citizens to govern on their behalf” (C.
D. Anderson and Goodyear-Grant 2005, 1031). In each case, ‘adequate’ representation is a critical component of government legitimacy (Atkeson and Carrillo 2007).

The form of representation addressed in this thesis is descriptive representation. Pitkin (1967) defines descriptive representation as the act of representatives ‘standing for’ their constituents. Simply put, descriptive representation takes place when a representative shares the same race, ethnicity, or gender as their constituents (Casellas and Wallace 2015, 146).

In practice, it can be very difficult to identify whether two people actually share an essentially-contested concept like ethnicity. Earlier scholarly conceptions of ethnicity were "closely related to colonial ideas of ‘race’ and nationality," and were mainly thought of in socio-biological terms (G. Craig, Atkin, and Flynn 2012, 22). More recent scholarship has focused on the social and cultural dimensions of ethnicity, such as “the social construction of descent and culture, the social mobilisation of descent and culture, and the meanings and implications of the classification system built around them” (Fenton 2010, 3). Others have argued that “ethnicity, culture and community do not refer to fixed or essential characteristics that people ‘have,’ but rather to dynamic processes of self-identity and differentiation involving the negotiation of boundaries of inclusion and exclusion between groups” (Chattoo and Atkin 2012, 23).

The definition of ethnicity I use here has been advanced by Aguirre and Turner (2004), who bring together both observable and socially constructed elements of ethnicity. They use the term ‘ethnicity’ to refer to “shared historical experiences as well as unique organizational, behavioral, and cultural characteristics,” such as “country of origin, religion, family practices, interpersonal style, language, beliefs, values, and other characteristics” (Aguirre and Turner 2004, p. 3). In this context, an ethnic group is “a subpopulation of individuals who are labelled and categorized by the general population and, often, by the members of the group itself as being of a particular type of ethnicity. They share a unique
history as well as distinctive behavioural, organizational, and cultural characteristics, and, as a result, they often are treated differently by others” (Aguirre and Turner 2004, 6). This differential treatment is an important component of social identity theory, which I will return to shortly. However, in addition to the term ‘ethnic minority,’ I use a number of country-specific terms, such as BME (Black and Minority Ethnic) and BAME (Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic) in Britain or ‘visible minority’ in Canada where so-invoked by the literature.

Arguments in favour of increased descriptive representation are broadly made on three grounds: justice and fairness, the substantive representation of ‘minority interests’, and increasing the legitimacy of the political system. The first two arguments – justice and substantive representation – have been widely explored, and there is compelling evidence that descriptive representation is associated with both outcomes.3

Despite our depth of knowledge about these two outcomes, we know much less about whether descriptive representation changes the way citizens feel about the political regime – that is, whether descriptive representation makes political systems more legitimate in the eyes of their citizenry. Measuring perceptions of legitimacy can be difficult. However, if descriptive representation increases perceptions of system legitimacy, one of the most logical observable implications would be increased perceptions of system responsiveness. This measure, also known as external efficacy, represents ‘the belief that the authorities or regime are responsive to influence attempts’ (Balch 1974, 24).

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3 See, for example: Bird 2010; Black 2016; Celis 2012; 2013; Celis and Childs 2018; Childs and Cowley 2011; Dovi 2002; 2007; Lowande, Ritchie, and Lauterbach 2019; Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995; Preuhs 2006; Saalfeld and Bischof 2013; Saalfeld and Kyriakopoulou 2010; Sobolewska, McKee, and Campbell 2018; Uhlraner 2012; Wängnerud 2009.
External efficacy is a key component of the ‘diffuse’ support which underlies the political regime and its institutions, constituting “a reservoir of favourable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed” (Easton 1975, 444). If descriptive representation strengthens the bond between minority citizens and their political system, these citizens should be more likely to think government is responsive to their demands. As such, external efficacy is an important indicator of democratic health (S. C. Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990, 289). Put another way, measuring external efficacy offers ‘a very specific and testable measure of government legitimacy that may provide empirical support to arguments about the value of descriptive representation in elected bodies of government’ (Atkeson and Carrillo 2007, 80).

The link between descriptive representation and perceptions of legitimacy is related to the exclusion of ethnic minorities from the political system. As the outgroup, non-white residents were (and continue to be) discouraged from many aspects of political life by the white-Anglo majority in settler states with a legacy of British rule. This de-facto exclusion creates differentiation within the social system, resulting in a set of ingroups and outgroups. In this sense, individuals can be ascribed to an ethnic or racial group both voluntarily and involuntary, whereby others (especially those in the majority in-group) interact with them as though they were a member of an outgroup (Capers and Smith 2016).

The exclusion of non-white Australians from elected institutions may lead members of excluded groups to be sceptical that their interests are adequately represented within the political system. As Childs and Cowley (2011, 7) note, this creates a compelling case that “the presence of the previously excluded may be necessary to ensure the assertive articulation of their concerns.” Ethnic minority voters may update their perceptions of government responsiveness as a result of descriptive representation because of an increase in ‘potentiality’, the feeling that a representative would defend the constituent’s interests if
those interests were threatened (Uhlaner 2012). For example, Bird (2012, 532) finds Chinese and South Asian voters in Toronto think a co-ethnic MP could “explain [their] cultural heritage to westerners and serve as a bridge to communicate differences” or “bring nuance” to discussions of sensitive issues. From the perspective of voters, “Race as a cue is a low-cost alternative to more detailed information about a legislator’s stands and, importantly, is virtually impossible to manipulate” (Gay 2002, 718).

Group interests can also serve as a heuristic for individual interests if an individual feels close to members of their ingroup or feel like their future prospects are tied to what happens to their group (Dawson 1994). This form of group interests corresponds to the notion of ‘linked fate’ (Gay 2004; Simien 2005). Representing an ethnically diverse electorate has been shown to increase perceptions of linked fate for ethnic minority legislators in Britain, creating an intrinsic motivation to represent the concerns of minority voters (Sobolewska, McKee, and Campbell 2018). From the voter side, prior research has shown black Americans with a stronger sense of linked fate have higher support for African Americans having their own representatives (Avery 2009). There is evidence this also holds true for Latinx voters in the US, where the presence of a Latinx candidate activates linked-fate considerations for Latinx voters (McConnaughy et al. 2010a).

The relationship between descriptive representation and perceptions of legitimacy is far from settled, however. As I will discuss in the next section, much of what we understand about descriptive representation comes from research in the US, which may limit its generalizability to most other democratic contexts. It is possible that when ethnicity is less politicised, descriptive representation also matters less. Pitkin (1967) herself was critical of descriptive representation, arguing it was not only impossible to achieve but also mostly insignificant compared to substantive representation. Further, it is both theoretically and empirically tenuous to suggest the most important thing about a legislator, from the
perspective of the electorate, is that legislator’s ethnicity. Put otherwise, the looming danger of essentialism should not be readily discarded (Abu-Laban 2002).

1.3 Contribution

This dissertation makes three principal types of contributions to the advancement of knowledge: theoretical, empirical and policy-related.

From a theoretical perspective, this study advances our understanding of the relationship between representation and legitimacy. The first way in which it does this is by testing a widely held normative claim that representation matters for government legitimacy. As discussed above, the theoretical impact of descriptive representation on perceptions of legitimacy has been widely explored. However, we have limited empirical evidence this is true in practice. The study also contributes to a broader understanding of the relationship between political exclusion and representation, such as for identities based on race, ethnicity, religion, gender, and sexual orientation. To be clear, this study does not claim to ‘solve’ this problem, nor does it make specific inferences about all above-mentioned mechanisms of political exclusion. However, part of my goal is to make the case for why this question matters, and by extension why we need more data and scholarly attention geared towards answering it.

Second, this study makes several empirical contributions to the literatures on representation, political behaviour and public opinion. Although we know a lot about both descriptive representation and diffuse support, we know relatively little about how one affects the other. Moreover, while diffuse support has been an important and often used measure for political scientists since the 1950s (Niemi, Craig, and Mattei 1991), relatively few studies have tried to explain it as a dependent variable using institutional factors (Merolla, Sellers, and Fowler 2013; Atkeson and Carrillo 2007).
The literature which does exist is full of contradiction. I argue that part of the problem lies in how descriptive representation has been operationalized, differing from study to study with little acknowledgement how this could affect the result. For instance, ‘collective’ descriptive representation refers to how representative a legislature is overall compared to the population it represents. This is usually operationalized as the percentage of seats held by women or ethnic minorities. ‘Dyadic’ descriptive representation refers to whether citizens are represented by a descriptive representative in their district. In this model, the broader composition of the legislature matters less than the identity of a voter’s own legislator (Uhlaner and Scola 2016). Finally, several studies focus on what I call ‘elite’ descriptive representation, which considers whether high-profile leaders such as state governors or presidential candidates are descriptive representatives. By focusing on just one type of descriptive representation – involving dyadic ties – I am able to make meaningful comparisons across cases.

Another problem with the literature that examines the relationship between descriptive representation and perceptions of legitimacy is that it is based almost entirely on the United States. This makes findings from these studies difficult to generalize to other contexts. In the United States, ethnicity is a crucial fault line; politics is highly polarized along racial lines compared to other advanced democracies. Further, findings from congressional systems with high legislator autonomy are not always generalizable to parliamentary systems with high party discipline. By focusing on three cases – described below – which are less polarized along ethnic lines, we can better understand how representation and legitimacy may interact in other types of advanced democracies.

Third, this research has tangible public policy implications. It is my hope that this project will further our understanding of representation, and in so doing help policy makers design representative bodies that incorporate diversity in a meaningful way. Knowing
whether representation increases perceptions of legitimacy is useful for policy makers, regardless of what the answer is. If this study finds empirical evidence that descriptive representation increases perceptions of legitimacy, policy makers will have tangible evidence that increasing representation could help address the decline of public confidence in democratic institutions. In the absence of such evidence, policy makers need not (and should not, I argue) abandon the pursuit of increased descriptive representation. However, they will be able to do so with a better understanding of what they aim to achieve. This idea is important, but also timely, given the stated goals of governments to make the composition of cabinets, courts and even corporate boards more diverse (Canadian Press 2016; Fine 2016; MacCharles, Whittington, and Campion-Smith 2015). The answer also has implications for other aspects of institutional design, such as the implementation of quotas for legislatures and political parties.

So far, I have focused on how the representation of ethnic minorities in politics may affect the political attitudes of ethnic minority voters. This focus is important, but incomplete; if political exclusion creases a set of in-groups and out-groups, we should expect these dynamics to affect not only ethnic minority voters (the out-group), but also white-Anglo voters (the in-group). There is mounting comparative evidence this effect is taking place. In Britain, ethnic minority candidates suffer an electoral penalty from white voters, an effect driven by anti-immigrant sentiment (Fisher et al. 2014; Stegmaier, Lewis-Beck, and Smets 2013). There is also evidence this effect takes place in Canada, especially as minority candidates for right-wing parties are penalized by their own party’s supporters (Besco 2018). More broadly, there is ample evidence from western democracies of white-Anglo majority bias against members of ethnic minority groups – especially those of Asian and Middle-Eastern descent (Gravelle 2018a; Lajevardi and Oskooii 2018; McAllister and Moore 1991; Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 2009). There is also increasing evidence that white-Anglo
voters also experience a form of ethnic group consciousness that is distinct from racial animus – a preference for their own ingroup rather than prejudice towards outgroups (Berry, Ebner, and Cornelius 2019; Jardina 2019; Schildkraut 2017).

Understanding this phenomenon is critical for the future of our democratic institutions. As our societies get more diverse, the representation of previously excluded groups will almost certainly increase. If we find evidence that increased ethnic minority representation is associated with a sharp backlash from the white-Anglo majority, the onus is on us – researchers, policy makers, citizens – to address the consequences head-on. Liberal democracy is poorly served by pretending tensions do not exist, and it is in the ultimate interest of a rights-based, multicultural society to build bridges and increase understanding between the various groups of our cultural mosaic. All citizens must understand that representation need-not be a zero-sum game.

1.4 Case Selection and Research Design

One of the biggest challenges in studying the impact of descriptive representation is data availability. Not only are there few large, high-quality survey samples of ethnic minority voters which can be used to make statistical inferences, there are still relatively few non-white representatives in most Western, advanced democracies. Moreover, there are several mechanisms by which descriptive representation can affect political attitudes, and no single country case can be used to examine all of them.

In order to address these limitations, this thesis takes a Most Similar Systems (MSS) approach, using the case of three advanced democracies: Australia, Canada and Britain. These countries are similar on the basis of their history, political institutions, electoral systems (majoritarian lower house), and party systems. High levels of party discipline make them more comparable to many other advanced democracies. All three countries have seen a
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

decline in political trust since the 1980s (Bélanger and Nadeau 2005; Catterberg and Moreno 2006; Cameron and McAllister 2019). Finally, Australia, Canada and Britain all have large and growing immigrant populations. Figure 1.4 shows the percent of each country’s population born abroad from 1901 to 2016. All three countries have become much more diverse in the last 50 years.

**Figure 1.4** Percent of Population Born Abroad in Case Countries, 1901-2016

![](image)


In addition to their large foreign-born populations, Australia, Canada and Britain all have painful histories of racial and ethnic discrimination. In each country, political elites have contributed to the ongoing exclusion of non-white communities from political life. For example, Margaret Thatcher complained that Britain risked being “swamped by people with a different culture” due to increased immigration (A. Heath et al. 2013, 82). More recently, Britain’s vote to leave the European Union followed a period in which the ‘Leave’ campaign
directed a great deal of hostility to immigrants and ethnic minorities. For example, the now infamous ‘Breaking Point’ poster depicting “lines of darker-skinned refugees, seemingly marching it is inferred, towards Europe or Britain” (Isakjee and Lorne 2019, 9). Since the Brexit vote, the proportion of Black and Asian individuals reporting racial discrimination and the number of hate crimes reported to police have both increased (BBC News 2019; Booth 2019).

Australia has seen similar rhetoric. Arthur Calwell, who was Minister for Immigration and later leader of the Labor Party of Australia, joked in Parliament that “two Wongs don’t make a white” (Brisbane Courier-Mail 1947). Meanwhile, the leader of One Nation, Pauline Hanson, used her 2016 maiden speech in the Australian Senate to call for a ban on Muslim immigration, arguing Australia was “in danger of being swamped by Muslims who bear a culture and ideology that is incompatible with our own” – two decades after she made the same claim about “Asians” in the House of Representatives (Norman 2016).

Even Canada, a country which more recently has prided itself on multiculturalism, has a sordid history of racist elite rhetoric. For example, W.L. Mackenzie King, the longest serving prime minister in Canadian history, used one of his final opportunities in Parliament to argue that his government “clearly recognized with regard to emigration from India to Canada, that the native of India is not a person suited to this country” (Hawkins 1989, 18). More recently, an MP who narrowly lost the race to lead the Conservative Party of Canada started his own party, promising to end official multiculturalism and prevent ‘mass immigration’ (Breen 2019; Levitz 2019). While Canada’s single-member plurality electoral system ultimately ensured – at least in part – that he was defeated, the party garnered outsized media attention during the campaign and was included in the Leaders’ Debate Commission nationally televised leaders’ debates (Quan 2019).
Despite these ongoing signals of exclusion, ethnicity is not a key political fault line in these countries in the same way as in the United States, where the legacy of slavery endures long after the era of abolition and Jim Crow laws. The forced relocation and enslavement of Americans of African descent makes it difficult to compare their experiences to those of voluntary migrants in other advanced democracies. In a similar vein, the exceptional status of an indigenous group like the Maori in New Zealand make it a less comparable case to the experiences of ethnic minorities in other countries.

This study investigates the dyadic relationship between ethnic minority candidates/legislators and the citizens they represent. It does so because the low numbers of ethnic minorities elected in advanced democracies makes collective descriptive representation (i.e. percent of legislature) very difficult to study empirically. Elite descriptive representation (i.e. presidents, prime ministers) is also very difficult to study for ethnic minorities because even in 2018, very few leaders of advanced democracies are from ethnic minority backgrounds.

In this thesis, I use each of my three cases to systematically evaluate the mechanism linking dyadic descriptive representation to diffuse support or address critiques for why there could be a null finding, potential endogeneity, or other forms of bias. No single country can address all of these questions because of country-specific circumstances and data availability. Each country-case is useful for solving a different piece of the puzzle. Moreover, there are theoretical issues with equating ethnic minorities from one country with those in another and measurement issues with how different cross-national data measure diffuse support. As a result, each case deserves to be studied separately.

I use a variety of data to examine these relationships, including large surveys from each country which are analysed through multivariate regression. In the case of Canada and Australia, I use the Canadian and Australian Election Studies, respectively. In the case of
Britain, I use data from the Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES), a 2010 analysis specific to ethnic minorities in Britain. Finally, I also apply conjoint analysis to data from an original survey experiment in Australia, conducted in collaboration with colleagues from the Australian National University. These data are summarised in the Supplementary Appendix (Table A1.1).

The hypotheses I test examine various aspects of the relationship between dyadic descriptive representation and perceptions of legitimacy, and are summarized in Table 1.1. Broadly, this study asks five sets of questions. First, is descriptive representation at the candidate-level enough to change perceptions of legitimacy, or does it take a descriptive representative getting elected? Second, which ties matter? Must voters and representatives share an ethnic background, or is shared status as an ethnic minority enough? Do shared immigrant ties matter? Third, do behavioural moderators, such as voting, matter? For example, is the act of voting for a descriptive representative or being mobilized by a co-ethnic community necessary for voters to update their perceptions of system responsiveness? Fourth, do altitudinal moderators, such as an explicit preference for a descriptive representative matter? Are these changes contingent upon a sense of common fate with one’s group? Finally, does ethnic minority representation only matter for ethnic minority voters, or also members of the ethnic majority? I briefly discuss some of the answers below.
**Table 1.1 Summary of Hypotheses Tested**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Short Title</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H1</td>
<td>Co-minority Candidate Efficacy</td>
<td>Ethnic minority respondents will have higher levels of external efficacy when a minority candidate runs in their electorate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2</td>
<td>Majority Candidate Backlash</td>
<td>Ethnic majority respondents will have lower levels of external efficacy when a minority candidate runs in their electorate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H3</td>
<td>Co-minority Legislator Efficacy</td>
<td>Ethnic minority respondents will have higher levels of external efficacy when a minority legislator is elected in their electorate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H4</td>
<td>Co-ethnic Legislator Efficacy</td>
<td>Ethnic minority respondents will have higher levels of external efficacy when a co-ethnic legislator is elected in their electorate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H5</td>
<td>Majority Legislator Backlash</td>
<td>Ethnic majority respondents will have lower levels of external efficacy when an ethnic minority legislator is elected in their constituency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H6</td>
<td>DR Preference</td>
<td>Ethnic minority respondents with an explicit preference for descriptive representation will have higher levels of external efficacy when a co-ethnic legislator is elected in their electorate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H7</td>
<td>Mobilization</td>
<td>Ethnic minority respondents will have higher levels of external efficacy when a co-ethnic legislator is elected in their electorate and they are mobilized to vote through their ethnic or religious community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H8</td>
<td>Linked Fate</td>
<td>Only voters with a high sense of linked fate will consider co-ethnic candidates better able to represent their interests.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.5 Outcome

Does descriptive representation at the candidate-level change how ethnic minority voters perceive the legitimacy of government? The answer, in short, is no. It is not enough for an ethnic minority candidate to run for office – it takes that candidate actually being elected for co-ethnic or co-minority voters to update their political attitudes. I find evidence that both co-minority and co-ethnic ties can result in changes to voters’ political attitudes, but that co-immigrant ties do not appear to matter. If anything, ethnic minority voters appear to prefer candidates that were born in the country they are voting in.

In terms of behavioural and attitudinal moderators, I do not find evidence that the act of voting for a descriptive representative alone is enough for voters to change their perceptions of government responsiveness. However, community mobilization and an explicit preference for descriptive representation can both moderate changes to voters’ political attitudes.

Finally, the most consistent finding in this study concerns the impact of ethnic minority representation on the political attitudes of white-Anglo voters. This effect was robust across cases and methodological approaches: white-Anglo voters feel like government is less responsive to their demands when represented by an ethnic minority legislator. In the context of Australia, merely the presence of an ethnic minority candidate was enough to make white-Anglo voters feel like the system was less responsive to their concerns. Moreover, while a sense of common fate does not appear to moderate the relationship between representation and external efficacy, white-Anglo voters have a sense of common fate with their ethnic group that is comparable to the levels experienced by ethnic minority voters. I discuss these findings and their implications in greater detail in each subsequent chapter.
1.6 Thesis Overview

This thesis is divided into eight chapters, including this introduction. I start by introducing the main dependent variable of this study – external political efficacy – and how it can help us understand voters’ perceptions of government legitimacy. In chapter 2, I examine why external efficacy – “the belief that the authorities or regime are responsive to influence attempts” (Balch 1974, 24) – is a critical component of citizens’ diffuse support for the political system. The causes and consequences of external efficacy have important implications for the success of democratic institutions.

Following this discussion, I examine the main independent variable of the study – descriptive representation. As I discuss in chapter 3, descriptive representation refers to a shared identity – be it on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, or other characteristics – between constituents and their political representatives. Prior research has focused on the determinants of descriptive representation and how it can affect the substantive policy outcomes of previously excluded political groups. There has also been some scholarly attention to the impact of descriptive representation on certain aspects of political behaviour, such as voting, but much less on how it affects political attitudes. Moreover, while we know much about both external efficacy and descriptive representation, we know much less about what connects them, and why. This chapter discusses that causal mechanism in much greater detail.

I present the first set of empirical results of this study in chapter 4 by examining the case of Australia – a diverse settler society which has yet to elect ethnic minorities to federal office in large number. The presence of compulsory voting also means the relationship between representation and efficacy is unlikely to be moderated through differential voter turnout, since almost everyone votes. Thus, Australia presents an important case study to examine other aspects of the causal mechanism. Using data from the Australian Election
Study, I show that descriptive representation at the candidate-level is not enough to change the political attitudes of ethnic minority voters, but that the same level of representation has a marked effect on the diffuse support of white-Anglo voters.

This thesis then examines the case of Britain, which is unique in this study as a diverse country with robust political institutions, but that is not a settler society in the same way as Australia or Canada. Moreover, the presence of high-quality data on a large sample of ethnic minority voters through the EMBES allows me to dig deeper into the causal mechanism that connects representation and political attitudes. Chapter 5 also finds that candidate-level descriptive representation is not enough to change minority political attitudes. However, it shows that for British South Asian voters, the presence of a co-ethnic or co-minority legislator can increase perceptions of government responsiveness. It also shows that community-level mobilization and an explicit preference for descriptive representation can both moderate changes in voters’ external efficacy.

Next, I examine how descriptive representation in Canada affects voters’ perceptions of system legitimacy. Canada was colonized by two European powers, which means the official recognition of ethnic and linguistic rights is deeply engrained in Canadian political life. Moreover, Canada has an international reputation as a welcoming and inclusive country. As I show in chapter 6 however, this reputation is not always well deserved. Using longitudinal data from the Canadian Election Study, I show that the representation of ethnic minorities is associated with lower external efficacy for white-Anglo/Franco voters. Moreover, since the analysis examines both between-respondent and within-respondent change, it increases our confidence that the relationship is causal, rather than just correlational. However, the analysis does not find evidence that ethnic minority voters in Canada have higher external efficacy when represented by an ethnic minority MP.
The final empirical analysis of this dissertation goes back to the case of Australia. In Chapter 7, I describe the results of an original survey experiment on a probability-based sample of Australian voters. As I discuss, descriptive representation is multi-dimensional, and in practice it is difficult to dissociate the effects of a candidate’s ethnicity, country of birth, language proficiency or general status as an ethnic minority. Using a conjoint design, this chapter disentangles the effects of each of these markers of descriptive representation. Moreover, since Australia has few non-white candidates and legislators, a survey experiment allows us to see what could happen if more non-white candidates ran for office. The results for ethnic minority voters are surprising in that these voters, at least in Australia, do not seem to prefer descriptive representatives – even accounting for their sense of common fate with their ethnic group. However, white-Anglo voters show a similar backlash effect to that which was established in the previous chapters. The analysis also shows white-Anglo and ethnic minority voters have similar overall perceptions of common fate with their ethnic group – calling into question the general tendency of previous research to ignore ethnicity when examining the voting behaviour of white-Anglo voters.

I conclude in Chapter 8 by discussing the broader implications of this study. In particular, I suggest that while there is evidence descriptive representation increases perceptions of legitimacy for some voters, the concerns of an overly essentialist perspective with regards to ethnicity are worth taking seriously. I also examine the implications of white-Anglo voters’ apparent backlash to ethnic minority representation and its consequences in an ever-globalizing world where rhetoric around ethnicity continues to become more divisive. Finally, I discuss potential avenues for future research.
2 THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE: EXTERNAL EFFICACY

This chapter examines the main dependent variable of this dissertation: external political efficacy. External efficacy refers to individuals’ beliefs about the responsiveness of the political system and is a useful indicator of the broader ‘reservoir’ of diffuse support citizens have for the regime. External efficacy and diffuse support are closely related but conceptually distinct: specifically, the former is an indicator for the latter.

I begin by examining the relationship between legitimacy, diffuse support and external efficacy. Second, this chapter examines the social and political determinants of external efficacy. Third, it will discuss the impact of external efficacy on political attitudes and participation, and then turn to the comparatively more recent interest in how participation can beget efficacy. Fourth, the chapter will review how political institutions and other democratic mechanisms affect external efficacy. Fifth, it will consider more recent proposals for how we should think about the various conceptual dimensions of external efficacy, before turning to how it is measured and operationalised. Finally, it will situate the discussion of external efficacy within the broader goals of this dissertation. In this respect, external efficacy offers a measurable way of examining the health and legitimacy of democratic regimes.
Citizens with low external efficacy, who feel alienated by unresponsive political elites or their underlying system, are the “canaries in the coal mine of democracy” (Miller and Listhaug 1990, 357).

2.1 Legitimacy, Diffuse Support and External Efficacy

Democratic regimes require a baseline level of legitimacy – a belief in the “rightness” of rule – to function. The canonical systems literature identifies two types of legitimacy: input-oriented and output-oriented (Easton 1975; 1979; Scharpf 1997; 1999). Scharpf defines input-oriented arguments as those relating to “government by the people”, whereas output-oriented arguments relate to “government for the people” (1999, 6–7). These ideas roughly correspond to legitimacy derived from the quality of the decision-making process versus the quality of the end-results themselves. In this context, it is useful to view the political system “as a means for resolving differences or as a set of interactions through which demands are processed into outputs” (Easton 1979, 153). Both the inputs and outputs of the ‘black box’ of the political system are important for the overall legitimacy of the regime.

While it is difficult to measure all aspects of regime legitimacy, one of its most important aspects is diffuse support. Diffuse support constitutes “a reservoir of favourable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed” (Easton 1975, 444). Diffuse support influences the extent to which citizens accept or reject political institutions and public policy (Levi and Stoker 2000, 491). In the worst case, insufficient support for democratic institutions can lead to democratic deconsolidation or a rise in anti-system attitudes. The difference between diffuse support and specific support, as Easton (1975) defines them, is important: while specific support refers to incumbent authorities and the individual occupants of political office, diffuse support refers to the
offices and underlying systems themselves. In this sense, diffuse support is the bedrock of the regime and political community as a whole. (Easton 1975).

Like legitimacy, diffuse support is difficult to measure. One of the most important indicators of diffuse support is external efficacy, which refers to “beliefs about the responsiveness of governmental authority and institutions to citizen demands” (S. C. Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990, 290). As an indicator, external efficacy offers “a very specific and testable measure of government legitimacy” (Atkeson and Carrillo 2007, 80).

External efficacy is closely related to the concept of internal efficacy, which is “the individual’s belief that means of influence are available to him” (Balch 1974, 24). Internal efficacy is an ‘input’ and concerns an individual’s “competence to understand and to participate effectively in politics” (S. C. Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990, 290). Individuals with high internal efficacy “feel they understand how to take part in politics, and are not intimidated by the challenges, conflicts or disagreements that occur in that arena” (Valentino, Gregorowicz, and Groenendyk 2009, 208).

By contrast, external efficacy is an ‘output,’ which refers to whether those actions will be successful and “introduces the notion of [system] responsiveness” (S. C. Craig 1979, 229). Individuals with high external efficacy “believe the system reacts when pressure is applied by citizens, regardless of whether or not they are willing or able to apply that pressure themselves” (Valentino, Gregorowicz, and Groenendyk 2009, 308). These two dimensions of political efficacy describe different parts of the causal pathway between policy preferences and political outcomes; internal efficacy describes one’s perceived ability to convert political preferences into individual political action, while external efficacy describes the perceived probability those political actions will be converted into political outcomes (Sulitzeanu-Kenan and Halperin 2013, 299). In other words, external efficacy refers to the perceived effectiveness of the ‘black box’ of the political system at translating inputs to outputs (Balch...
1974; Bélanger and Nadeau 2005; S. C. Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990; Iyengar 1980; McEvoy 2016; Miller and Listhaug 1990). Citizens who have more positive perceptions of system responsiveness (i.e. higher external efficacy) believe the government is more likely to care about what they think and have more confidence that individual action can lead to policy consequences. These individuals are more likely to maintain long-term support for the regime’s political institutions, even if their interests are not immediately translated to political outcomes (McEvoy 2016, 1161). Here, the difference between specific and diffuse support is important – “high levels of political efficacy allow individuals to tolerate negative economic and policy conditions in the short term as they believe they are able to influence the system to obtain benefits in the long term” (McEvoy 2016, 1161).

2.2 The Determinants of External Efficacy

The determinants of external efficacy are important for both theoretical and methodological reasons. Theoretically, they enrich our understanding of how external efficacy relates to hierarchy, privilege and individual political realities. Methodologically, the political world is multivariate; thus, it is important to control for a number of factors in trying to establish a relationship between descriptive representation and external efficacy.

Broadly speaking, external efficacy is affected by individual-level and system-level factors. According to Iyengar (1978), research prior to the late 1970s understood political efficacy as the sum of individual-level characteristics – that is, those relating to the personal attributes and experiences of individual themselves. Abramson (1972) and Iyengar (1978) argue that voter-level differences in efficacy can at least partly be explained through individual socialization. According to the ‘social deprivation hypothesis,’ children and adults who are denied opportunities and respect have lower self-confidence and self-competence. As a result, these individuals will develop low feelings of political trust, internal and external
efficacy (Abramson 1972; Iyengar 1978). Differences in socioeconomic status are particularly important according to this theory (Iyengar 1978), but overall this hypothesis ascribes differences in efficacy to individual-level factors.

Under this model, an individual’s level of education is an important determinant of political efficacy (Abramson 1983, 177–82). Formal education equips individuals with skills, values and social networks that are relevant to their political attitudes. Individuals with higher education are more likely to be interested and participate in politics, and have higher levels of cognitive capacity to understand abstract political concepts (Hakhverdian, Van Der Brug, and De Vries 2012, 231). This makes it more likely that individuals will pay attention to and be successful in navigating their political environment.

As levels of formal education increase, individuals also become more likely to be interested in national and international political events and discuss politics with their social networks (Almond and Verba 1963, 121–22). In the Netherlands, some commentators have worried about the emergence of a ‘diploma democracy’ in which the gap between the higher and lower educated is a principal driver of political participation. Indeed, Hakhverdian et al. (2012) show that those with higher levels of formal education are more likely to vote and become members of political parties, have higher levels of political interest, and are less cynical about the political system. Unsurprisingly, these individuals are also more likely to have higher levels of external efficacy, which is reasonable to expect from individuals who vote, join political organizations and are more optimistic about the state of politics. In the United States, those with more education have significantly higher levels of both external and internal efficacy than the less-well educated (Acock and Clarke 1990, 99). They find the internal efficacy gap is especially large; this evidence is consistent with the idea that individuals with higher education are better equipped – and more importantly for the sense of internal efficacy, feel better equipped – to participate in political life.
While the socializing impacts of election campaigns on political efficacy have received relatively little attention, Hansen and Pedersen (2014) show that voters’ political knowledge and efficacy – both internal and external – increase over the course of an election campaign. They identify the news media – particularly through newspaper consumption – as an important factor in this mechanism, where increased coverage of politics and election issues strengthen individuals’ understanding of the political process and their feelings of government responsiveness. By contrast, ‘media-malaise’ and greater consumption of tabloid news actually decreased respondents’ external efficacy. Pinkleton et al. (2012) show that voters who are satisfied with the news media have higher external efficacy than those who are dissatisfied with media coverage. Further, individuals who were more cynical – or less trusting – of the political system were also less likely to be satisfied with the media’s performance and less likely to believe individuals have any influence over government.

Individuals’ social networks also contribute to their feelings of external efficacy. Anderson (2010, 60) argues social forces – “where and with whom we work, live, socialize, an worship – play a crucial role in determining many of the choices we make, including our level of political involvement and political attitudes”. In this context, the density of social networks and intensity of community participation creates social cohesion and shared goals and expectations (M. R. Anderson 2010, 60). She demonstrates respondents’ ‘sense of community’ in terms of their workplaces, religious groups, neighbourhoods, friend groups and other organizations have a positive effect on both their internal and external efficacy. These effects persisted across income, education and gender groups (M. R. Anderson 2010, 79). These social effects may be more difficult to generalize into a cultural explanation for external efficacy, however. Chamberlain (2013) demonstrates that changes in political culture in the United States did not result in changes in the external efficacy of voters from at least 1980 onwards.
System-level factors also affect external efficacy. The ‘political reality’ hypothesis argues that groups who are politically disadvantaged have less reason to trust or expect responsiveness from political leaders because they have less ability to influence them (Abramson 1972). This idea can be extended to political realities that result from unresponsive political institutions; “when the political system is not responsive to citizen demands, individuals are not likely to feel efficacious” (Iyengar 1978, 342). This hypothesis ascribes differences in efficacy to the impact of system-level factors.

Consistent with the political reality hypothesis, gender is an important determinant of political attitudes and behaviours. While gender differences in socialization are at least partly responsible for the political attitudes of men and women (Bennett and Bennett 1989), this explanation is also consistent with the ‘political-reality’ hypothesis as women continue to be politically underrepresented across the democratic world (Caul 1999; Devlin and Elgie 2008; Krook 2010). The ‘gender gap’ in this context can refer to gender differences in voting behaviour, partisanship, attitudes and civic engagement (Inglehart and Norris 2000, 442) – all ideas relevant for the development of political efficacy. In 1963, men in the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and Mexico were more likely than women to agree they can influence government about an unjust local law or join informal groups to try to influence local government (Almond and Verba 1963, 212). However, by 1984, scholarly consensus seemed to suggest gender differences between men and women had disappeared (Acock and Clarke 1990, 99). Gender differences in political interest continue to exist, however; for example, Canadian women continue to be less interested in politics than men (Thomas 2013, 220).

Partisanship also shapes perceptions of elite and institutional responsiveness. Political parties set agendas and compete for elected office by mobilizing their constituents. In a study of 116 political parties across 15 democracies, Anderson and Just (2013) observe differences
between supporters of parties who adopt more positive and more negative positions towards the constitutional status quo. Supporters of more ‘status-quo’ parties tend to adopt more positive views about the functioning and responsiveness of government, compared to partisans of other parties and non-partisans. Further, respondents who were attached to a political party, regardless of which one, had higher external efficacy than those who had no partisan attachment. It is unclear whether this effect is related to partisanship itself, however – all else being equal, individuals who join or support political parties should be more likely to believe elected officials and political parties are responsive to citizens in the first place. Co-partisanship also matters; when partisan control of the US Congress and presidency changes, partisans of the winning party express more trust in those institutions than counter-partisans and non-partisans (Keele 2005).

Factors like income inequality, which form at the crosshairs of the ‘social deprivation’ and ‘political reality’ hypotheses, can also result in lower levels of external efficacy (M. Norris 2015). Income inequality results in greater numbers of people who have comparatively lower levels of educational and financial resources, resulting in lower political efficacy. Income inequality is also related to unequal political representation, and the most obvious way in which this can affect external efficacy is through the adoption of policies that favour the wealthy. This cycle risks becomes self-reinforcing “because the political inequalities arising from increasing income inequality prevent the middle class and the poor from using government to curb economic disparities” (M. Norris 2015, 797).

2.3 The Impact of External Efficacy on Political Attitudes and Participation

External efficacy affects political attitudes, preference construction and political participation. For instance, Sulitzeanu-Kenan and Halperin (2013) show that political
ideology influences policy preference construction when external efficacy is high, and describe two complementary hypotheses for the mechanism by which efficacy conditions voters’ policy preferences and political attitudes. The first is the “efficacy-politicization circle,” which suggests that after an individual starts to believe they can influence public officials on a given issue, the issue is quickly politicized. In this context, the individual’s political identity becomes more salient and they become more likely to view the issue through the lens of their own ideological orientation or partisan loyalty. By contrast, the absence of high external efficacy brings other identities, such as gender, ethnicity and social ties, to the fore (Sulitzeanu-Kenan and Halperin 2013, 300).

The second mechanism is a version of ‘cognitive dissonance theory,’ in which a person holds two attitudes, thoughts or beliefs at the same time that are inconsistent with each other, which creates discomfort. The individual is motivated to reduce this discomfort by resolving the conflict. An individual is “more likely to participate when she believes her actions can make a difference in politics” – that is, when they have high external efficacy (Valentino, Gregorowicz, and Groenendyk 2009, 308). Holding a policy preference that is at odds with a person’s political ideology should produce less cognitive discomfort when they have low political efficacy because they are less likely to extend their political preference into action. The costs of holding a policy preference that contradicts their core identity are small. By contrast, individuals with high political efficacy are more used to acting on their political preferences; as a result, they should be motivated to reduce dissonance by bringing their policy preference closer to their core attitude (Sulitzeanu-Kenan and Halperin 2013, 301). Therefore, “when external political efficacy is high, political ideology will have a much greater influence on concrete policy preferences than when political efficacy is low” (Sulitzeanu-Kenan and Halperin 2013, 295).
External efficacy is also helpful in predicting vote choice insofar as “voters’ broader beliefs about politicians and the political system [shape] their perceptions of candidate authenticity” (P. R. Brewer et al. 2014, 744). Voters with high levels of external efficacy are more likely to see political candidates as authentic, which has implications for arguments that suggest contemporary increases in political cynicism are tied to a perceived lack of authenticity among public officials (P. R. Brewer et al. 2014, 744). Disaffected individuals who do not see public officials as responsive to citizen demands are more likely to support third-party candidates in the United States, while individuals with high levels of external efficacy are more likely to support the party controlling the presidency (Abramson et al. 2000; Abramson 1983) or forming government in parliamentary systems (Bélanger and Nadeau 2005). Voters who have lower level of trust are more likely to vote for third-parties (Bélanger and Nadeau 2005). In Canada, this has partisan implications – smaller opposition parties in the House of Commons benefit more from distrust than the traditional opposition. If “some parties suffer from political malaise, but…other parties might also benefit from it,” (Bélanger and Nadeau 2005, 127), this may give non-mainstream parties an electoral incentive to portray the political system as corrupt and unresponsive, thereby perpetuating the cycle of distrust.

In addition to lodging third-party and protest votes, low-efficacy individuals are more likely to be ‘floating voters’ who are volatile in their party preferences and vote choice (Dassonneville 2012, 34). High-efficacy voters are confident in the value of political participation and tend to be more stable in vote intention. By contrast, ‘institutionally disaffected’ voters, or those “who think their vote makes no difference and has no impact, switch vote intentions more often” both during the campaign period and between elections (Dassonneville 2012, 33).
In addition to determining who to vote for, external efficacy is a strong predictor of whether citizens will vote at all. Grönlund and Setälä (2007) demonstrate that external efficacy is a stronger predictor of voter turnout than other related measures that have been used to explain turnout in the past, such as political trust and satisfaction with democracy. In models including measures of external efficacy, political trust, satisfaction with democracy and satisfaction with the incumbent regime, only external efficacy is a robust and statistically significant predictor of voter turnout. This suggests that voter beliefs about whether public institutions are responsive to their demands are more important for explaining political participation in the form of voter turnout than whether voters trust those institutions or are satisfied with the current regime and democracy writ-large (Grönlund and Setälä 2007, 418).

While most of the above discussion pertains to advanced democracies, there is evidence that the impact of external efficacy on political participation is tempered by democratic maturity. As discussed above, political socialization is important in developing the belief that ordinary citizens are capable of influencing government and public institutions. In established democracies, existing norms and rituals help facilitate this process, creating an atmosphere that is more favourable to developing democratic expectations. By contrast, citizens in emerging or newly democratized countries have had fewer opportunities to develop these orientations and practices during their formative years (Nový and Katrnák 2015, 2). While the impact of external efficacy on voter turnout is strong in established democracies, Nový and Katrnák find that those who have high external efficacy in emerging democracies vote at roughly the same rate as those who have low external efficacy. However, “as a democracy matures, the difference in the proportions of voters between these two groups increases” (Nový and Katrnák 2015, 13). This may suggest that in emerging democracies, voters may be acting in an anticipative or forward-looking fashion, while voters
in more established democracies rely on their past experience. However, more research is needed to fully understand this mechanism.

External efficacy is also associated with non-institutionalised forms of political participation. Citizens are most likely to engage in ‘unconventional’ or ‘nonconformist’ modes of participation when low levels of political trust are combined with low levels of external efficacy; that is, citizens are most likely to engage in protest behaviour when they distrust the political regime and do not think traditional models of participation are likely to bring about change (Pollock 1983). By contrast, when “high internal political efficacy is combined with low external efficacy…the potential for nonconformist participation is optimal” (Pollock 1983, 405). Finally, citizens who are confident in their own political abilities but nevertheless perceive an unresponsive political system are also more likely to engage in conventional behaviour, such as voting. This suggests that “politically competent, mistrusting individuals do not view political action as a simple choice between traditional allegiant participation (voting) and extremist behaviour. Rather, they recognize – and engage in – a broader range of participatory alternatives” (Pollock 1983, 405).

More recent experimental work has strengthened our understanding of the causal mechanism that connects political efficacy with political attitudes and participation. While observational research has highlighted the link between these variables, several studies have been able to exogenously increase citizens’ internal and external political efficacy and observe the resulting changes in policy preference construction and political mobilization. Sulitzeanu-Kenan and Halperin (2013, 303) increased individuals’ external efficacy in a survey experiment by using a “vignette which informed the readers that political science research had shown that public opinion polls have a strong influence on government decisions” in certain policy contexts. Grossman et al. (2017) used text messages to exogenously increase internal and external efficacy in Uganda. These messages suggested
respondents were personally able to participate in politics (targeting internal efficacy) and included encouragements indicating their elected representatives were interested in hearing from them (targeting external efficacy). They find their treatments increased the likelihood that citizens will contact their elected representatives, and that the effect held across gender and partisan lines (Grossman, Michelitch, and Santamaria 2017, 1328). Both studies suggest that political efficacy has an important causal effect on attitudes and participation, but further that they are dynamic attitudes that can be changed (Sulitzeanu-Kenan and Halperin 2013, 320).

In summary, external efficacy can affect both individuals’ attitudes and behaviour. While there are important caveats, high external efficacy is associated with more stable preferences and more robust levels of conventional political participation. By contrast, low external efficacy is associated with more volatility and unconventional participation.

2.4 The Impact of Participation on External Efficacy

Since political efficacy was first introduced as a concept, many researchers “simply assumed that the ‘causal arrow’ runs from efficacy to participation, i.e. from the attitude to the behaviour” (Clarke and Acock 1989, 552). However, it is equally reasonable to expect that political behaviours influence political attitudes. Restricting research on the relationship between efficacy and participation to ‘one-way’ analyses risks missing an important part of the story, but may also result in spurious conclusions by confounding the effects of participation on efficacy with the effects of the reverse (Stenner-Day and Fischle 1992, 283). The ‘mobilization of support’ theory suggests “the individual who votes or participates develops stronger feelings that the government is responsive, which then makes future participation within the system more likely. Conversely, nonparticipation will reinforce the sense that the government is unresponsive, which reinforces nonparticipation, and so forth”
This mechanism is reciprocal, and just “as individuals’ perceptions of internal and external efficacy influence their tendency to participate in politics, equally their participation in different kinds of political activity impacts back on their perceptions both of their own competence to participate [internal efficacy], and of the responsiveness of political institutions and processes [external efficacy]” (Stenner-Day and Fischle 1992, 301).

In the same way that different combinations of political trust and political efficacy can result in different pathways of political participation, various forms of political participation may have different impacts on political attitudes. Stenner-Day and Fischle (1992) find evidence that conventional participation, such as partisan and community activism, increases internal efficacy, while unconventional participation, such as protest activity, weakens it. Further, both conventional and unconventional participation actually decrease citizen confidence in the responsiveness of public institutions (Stenner-Day and Fischle 1992, 302–3). Clarke and Acock (1989) find that neither the act of voting nor campaign participation impacts voter internal or external efficacy. By contrast, Finkel (1985) finds evidence that voting and political participation increase external but not internal efficacy, meaning citizens become more confident in the responsiveness of political authorities but remain stable in their own political confidence.

What explains these apparently contradictory findings? Clarke and Acock (1989) describe three theoretical mechanisms by which elections and political participation affect political efficacy. The first model states that voting and campaigning have ‘pure participation’ effects – that simply participating in the political process increases feelings of regime support and government responsiveness. Just as Valentino et al. (2009) write that cognitive dissonance can help explain why individuals with high efficacy are more likely to adhere to their ideological predispositions, “the belief that voting or campaign activity is meaningless or ineffective is dissonant with performing such acts. Thus, those who vote or
engage in campaign activities will justify their behaviour by strengthening their belief that the political system responds to citizen involvement” (Clarke and Acock 1989, 553). If the ‘pure participation’ model explains the pathway from action to attitude, we would expect individuals who vote or participate in political campaigns to have higher efficacy than those who do not vote or participate.

The second mechanism they describe, the ‘outcome-contingent’ model, suggests individual attitudes are mediated by both participation and outcomes, the latter referring to political outcomes such as an individual’s preferred candidate winning public office. In this case, participation increases external efficacy “because of the belief that elected officials are predisposed to attend to the needs and demands of those who assisted their candidacies” while desirable outcomes increase internal efficacy “because those who voted for or campaigned for winning candidates will tend to conclude that they can influence the political process” (Clarke and Acock 1989, 553). Finally, the ‘pure-outcomes’ model suggests that outcomes alone govern attitudes, and those who “support winning candidates will experience increased external and internal efficacy regardless of whether they actually participated in the election” (Clarke and Acock 1989, 553).

Much of the scholarly attention on this phenomenon has focused on the ‘winner effect,’ though it can be difficult to determine whether this effect supports an ‘outcome-contingent’ or ‘pure-outcome’ conclusion. Many researchers do not distinguish between voting for a political candidate and simply supporting one. Craig et al. (2006, 589) find that those who voted for losing candidates “tend to be less trustful, less certain of the responsiveness of government to popular concerns, less satisfied with the way democracy is working in the United States, and, at least in the 2000 presidential election, less inclined to extend legitimacy to the victorious candidate”. Anderson and LoTempio (2002) also find that those who voted for winning candidates were more trusting than those who voted for losing
candidates. Davis and Hitt (2016) corroborate these findings, but find that the effect of vote choice on external efficacy is not static. Instead, over time, “winners become less enthusiastic about the degree to which they perceive government is responsive, while losers’ external efficacy begins to rebound” (Davis and Hitt 2016, 2).

Supporters of Ross Perot’s 1992 third-party candidacy for the US presidency may also be an example of the ‘loser’ effect, thus challenging Abramson et al.’s (2000) conclusion that external efficacy affects propensity to support independent candidates. Koch (1998) finds evidence that Perot supporters were no more cynical than other voters before the 1992 election, but were much more cynical than those who supported Bush or Clinton after the election, and again when asked two years later. This suggest a picture “of a group of citizens who were generally similar to other voters in 1990 and 1991 in terms of their discontent with the contemporary political process and its leaders, but who became exceptionally more cynical during the 1992 election as a result of the Perot candidacy” (J. Koch 1998, 146). This suggests third-party support may result in decreased trust and external efficacy, and not the other way around. To further complicate matters, Clarke and Acock (1989, 559) find the ‘act’ of voting itself is less important for internal and external efficacy than the outcomes of an election, and the impact of a preferred candidate winning or losing is the same whether or not the citizen actually voted for them. Thus, while the ‘winner’ and ‘loser’ effects seem to be strong and stable across a variety of electoral contexts, more research is needed to understand whether participation and outcomes both matter, or whether one of them is driving the bulk of the relationship.

2.5 External Efficacy and Political Institutions

If external efficacy measures the degree to which public officials and institutions are responsive to citizen demands, the quality and character of those institutions should matter.
One of the main ways that voters can influence their representatives is through elections, and so the rules that govern electoral outcomes may be important for how citizens form judgements about the responsiveness of the political process. While many varieties of electoral systems govern elections across the democratic world, these systems fall into three broad categories: plurality/majoritarian systems, proportional representation (PR) systems, and mixed systems – which combine the two (Karp and Banducci 2008b, 317). Plurality systems emphasize “the directness and clarity of the connection between voters and policy makers but [are] less concerned about minority representation and can even be exclusionary” (Cho 2010, 1653). These systems often result in ‘electoral distortions’ whereby electoral outcomes do not always reflect the percentage of votes a candidate receives, and may “alienate and discourage small or ‘minor’ party supporters who are not fairly represented (Karp and Banducci 2008b, 312–13). By contrast, “PR systems stress the representation of all the factions in society and hence are more inclusive, though sometimes at the expense of a strong government that is clearly accountable to voters” (Cho 2010, 1653).

Proportional electoral systems are more likely to produce party systems with greater numbers of political parties (compared to plurality systems). This leads to conflicting expectations: “On the one hand, multipartism should promote efficacy and stimulate turnout by offering voters more choice. But, on the other hand, voters may also feel less efficacious when coalitions are the norm and governments are determined by party elites” (Karp and Banducci 2008b, 313). In fact, the number of parties represented in government seems to matter more than the number in parliament – while “broad based coalitions depress efficacy, the number of parties in parliament appears to have no effect at all” (Karp and Banducci 2008b, 326). These findings support the idea that while fewer votes are ‘wasted’ in PR systems (which increases the value of a vote), large coalitions reduce the link between voting and who forms government (which decreases the value of a vote). This effect has also been
attributed to the ‘flexibility’ of a party system; multi-party systems are more ‘flexible’ than two-party systems because they are “more conducive to the formation of new parties. Protest parties can be effectively used, therefore, to channel discontent back into the decision-making arena in multi-party systems, whereas this is not possible in a rigid two-party system” (Miller and Listhaug 1990, 363).

While some evidence suggests PR systems are better at fostering more favourable beliefs about the responsiveness of public institutions than majoritarian systems (Karp and Banducci 2008b, 321; Blais, Singh, and Dumitrescu 2014), these broad differences between electoral system types mask important nuances. Majoritarian systems exacerbate the difference between those who prefer large parties and small parties; citizens who prefer small parties have lower external efficacy in majoritarian systems, but this difference is negligible in PR and mixed systems (Karp and Banducci 2008b, 321–24). Ethnic diversity may be another important factor in how electoral systems moderate external efficacy. In sub-Saharan African countries with higher levels of ethnic group fragmentation, proportional systems seem to increase citizens’ external efficacy, while majoritarian electoral systems tend to decrease it. By contrast, in more homogenous societies, majoritarian systems seem to result in greater perceptions of government responsiveness (Cho 2010). Electoral system proportionality may also matter for the ‘winner effect’ described above; while voting for a ‘winning’ or ‘losing’ candidate or party does not seem to decrease external efficacy in highly proportional systems, the opposite is true in systems with large electoral distortions. As a system becomes less proportional, which is to say “when institutional rules manufacture an unequal ratio of votes cast to the percentage of seats won,” the efficacy difference between winners and losers increases (Davis 2014, 130). Finally, federalism is another institution that may moderate the relationship between a party system and political efficacy. In a federal system with “salient arenas of political action” at the national and subnational levels, citizens
may “develop separate feelings of internal and external efficacy” for each level (Stewart et al. 1992, 191). In fact, feelings of government responsiveness in federal systems can have strong regional trends, and the degree to which citizens feel similarly about both levels depends on how similar the national and subnational party systems are to each other (Stewart et al. 1992, 193).

In summary, political institutions can have important implications for both the determinants and consequences of external efficacy. These factors highlight the need to account for institutional variation in comparative analyses, such as using an MSS approach to case selection in order to keep institutional factors constant.

2.6 Theoretical Debates About External Efficacy

Political efficacy evolved as a concept most dramatically between 1954 and 1974: from when Campbell et al. (1954) first introduced it to when Balch (1974) demonstrated political efficacy had two dimensions (internal and external). Since then, there have been a number of theoretical and empirical attempts to build on these concepts. Many of these contributions are very recent, which demonstrates that not only does political efficacy continue to be a theoretically and methodologically interesting and salient topic for political research, our understanding of this concept should also be open to change.

Firstly, while the distinction between internal and external efficacy has been widely accepted by political researchers, the distinction is not without its critics. Wolfsfeld (1985; 1986) argues this distinction has two major problems:
First, it is impossible to separate the individual’s evaluation of him/herself as being capable of influencing the system (internal efficacy) from the citizen’s evaluation of the responsiveness of the system (external efficacy). Second, as indicated, political efficacy was designed to measure the feeling of influence with regard to the more institutional modes of action. Thus the statements refer to beliefs about the effectiveness of voting and the reliability of public officials (1985, 618).

These shortcomings, Wolfsfeld argues (1985, 618), are not “mere methodological artifacts of an otherwise sound political theory,” but fundamental problems with the concept as we define it. Instead of the distinction between internal and external efficacy, Wolfsfeld (1985; 1986) suggests two dimensions of political efficacy based on two types of political influence: institutional efficacy, which refers to political action within the context of the formal political system, and mobilization efficacy, which refers to political action outside of the formal political system. Institutional actions include, for example, voting, working for a political party, and contacting a political representative, while mobilized action includes behaviour such as petitioning, attending demonstrations, or even political violence (Wolfsfeld 1985, 620). According to this framework, individual political behaviour is the result of those individuals’ political attitudes, while those “who feel that no mode of action is effective withdraw from all political activity” (Wolfsfeld 1985, 626). However, while Wolfsfeld’s theoretical and empirical contribution in the Israeli context are interesting and meaningful, his distinction between institutional and mobilization efficacy has not displaced the distinction between internal and external efficacy in mainstream political science.

While external efficacy is most often defined in terms of the perceived responsiveness of public officials and institutions, Esaiasson et al. (2015, 433) argue external efficacy and perceived responsiveness are conceptually and methodologically distinct because they pertain to different reference objects; while the former taps regime responsiveness, the latter
measures incumbent responsiveness. Their empirical findings suggest some limited support for this distinction. However, they note “it should be clear that the differences between [external efficacy] and our suggested measurements [for perceived responsiveness] are not in categories but in nuances. With high intercorrelations between latent constructs, traditional [external efficacy] indicators are a serviceable alternative for many analytical purposes” (Esaiasson, Kölln, and Turper 2015, 442).

Some researchers have argued political efficacy has more than two components. Lee (2006) builds upon the distinction between internal and external efficacy by proposing a third dimension of political efficacy – ‘collective efficacy’ – which may be especially useful for emerging democracies. Collective efficacy, “to a group is analogous to what internal efficacy is to a person” (Lee 2006, 299) and refers to a group’s shared ability to organize and execute political action. However, since individuals belonging to the same group may have different attitudes and beliefs, collective efficacy remains an individual-level attribute. Lee defines collective efficacy “as a citizen’s belief in the capabilities of the public as a collective actor to achieve social and political outcomes” (Lee 2006, 299). This distinction is salient in a place like Hong Kong, a society used to certain democratic protections, but which is struggling to democratize further in the face of an existential authoritarian threat. In Hong Kong, individuals appear to not only hold beliefs about the public as a collective actor, but also appear to believe the public’s collective efficacy is quite high. Further, collective efficacy in Hong Kong is a strong predictor of support for democratization and political participation, and is only weakly correlated with internal and external efficacy (Lee 2006, 312, 306).

De Moor (2016) argues that while the distinction between internal and external efficacy is useful, it is incomplete. In particular, external efficacy as currently defined masks the notion that democratic institutions have both an ‘input structure’ and ‘output structure.’ A state’s input structure refers to “whether authorities are willing to take citizens’ demands into
account” while state’s output structure refers to whether they are able to act on them and “effectively produce political outcomes” (de Moor 2016, 643). The external dimension of political efficacy is therefore best thought of as two separate dimensions that de Moor calls ‘external input efficacy’ – which corresponds most closely to the definition of external efficacy described throughout this chapter – and ‘external output efficacy’ – which has received less attention in the literature. According to this framework, external efficacy can refer to either “the state’s willingness to take citizens’ demands into account, or in other words, to the openness of its input structure,” or “the state’s ability to produce political output, or put differently, to the strength of its output structure” (de Moor 2016, 645). The author measures external output efficacy with a survey question in which respondents are asked to what extent they agree with the statement: ‘Politicians in my country are capable of acting upon problems’ (de Moor 2016, 648).

While de Moor makes an interesting theoretical and empirical argument, this idea has two limitations. The first limitation is methodological: asking whether politicians are able to act upon problems may tap into a state’s ‘output’ structure, but it may also measure the extent to which politicians are competent actors, or even whether the strength of party discipline permits individual legislators to act independently. In the context of the latter, even if individual politicians are not capable of acting upon problems, political parties and governments may well be. The second problem is conceptual: external efficacy refers to citizen’s perceived ability to convert political actions into political outcomes (Sulitzeanu-Kenan and Halperin 2013, 299). It is difficult to believe most citizens are sophisticated enough to factor legislator ability into their core attitudes about their own ability to achieve change.

Finally, there is the matter of the relationship between external efficacy and political trust. Political trust has been operationalized as confidence in public institutions (Catterberg
and Moreno 2006). More broadly, trust is an overall evaluation of the government and public institutions in reference to citizens’ normative expectations – an “assessment of how well the government is doing compared with how well they think it should be doing” (Bélanger and Nadeau 2005). Political trust is influenced by judgements of specific political leaders and their personal qualities – that is, the “trustworthiness” of these actors in particular domains (Levi and Stoker 2000). Catterberg and Moreno (2006) argue external efficacy has a strong, positive effect on political trust in a range of democratic contexts. Ulbig (2008) qualifies this argument by differentiating between citizens having a voice to express their views and having the ability to actually influence government decisions. She finds evidence that having a voice with no influence leads to lower levels of trust, while having an influential voice leads to higher levels of trust (Ulbig 2008, 534).

Some research has argued the relationship between efficacy and trust goes in the other direction – that political trust is “one component of the sense of external political efficacy” (Shingles 1981, 80). By contrast, while trust is part of Chamberlain’s (2012) model of external efficacy, he finds it has no predictive power. Others have argued that while we may draw theoretical distinctions between different reference objects, the two concepts are only empirically distinct in the context of the fairness of democratic procedures and outcomes – that is, the political regime – and not in the contexts of political elites or incumbents themselves (S. C. Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990). In other words, we can draw an empirical distinction between regime-based efficacy (RBE) and regime-based trust (RBT), but not between incumbent-based efficacy (IBE) and incumbent-based trust (IBT) (S. C. Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990, 306–7).
2.7 Measurement and Operationalisation

In addition to debates about how it is conceptualised, the external efficacy literature has been consistently besieged by measurement problems (Chamberlain 2012; Morrell 2003). These difficulties date back to the five original measures for political efficacy introduced by the University of Michigan’s Survey Research Centre (SRC) in 1952, which “were not derived from some overarching theory, but were simply considered interesting and relevant by the SRC group, given the political situation of the time” (Kaid and Holtz-Bacha 2008, 580). These original five items for the unidimensional concept of political efficacy, along with subsequently-developed shorthand names for them in square brackets, were (Badie, Berg-Schlosser, and Morlino 2011, 716–17):

1. “I don’t think public officials care much what people like me think” [NoCare]
2. “The way people vote is the main thing that decides how things are run in this country” [VoteDecide]
3. “Voting is the only way that people like me can have any say about how government runs things” [Voting]
4. “People like me don’t have any say about what the government does” [NoSay]
5. “Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what’s going on” [Complex]

Items 1 (NoCare) and 4 (NoSay) were the elements that drew upon external efficacy. Two other measures for external efficacy appeared subsequently in the 1968 American National Election Study (Morrell 2003):

6. “Generally speaking, those we elect to Congress in Washington lose touch with the people pretty quickly” [LoseTouch]
7. “Parties are only interested in people’s votes but not in their opinions” [VoteOpinion]

Table 2.1 compares the operationalisation of external efficacy for a sample of the studies considered in this chapter.
## Table 2.1 Operationalisation of External Efficacy in Political Behaviour Research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>NoCare</th>
<th>NoSay</th>
<th>Lose</th>
<th>Vote</th>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Other</th>
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<tr>
<td>Acock and Clarke (1990)</td>
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<td>Miller and Listhaug (1990)</td>
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<td>Emig et al. (1996)</td>
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<td>Lee (2006)</td>
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<td>Ulbig (2008)</td>
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<td>Valentino et al. (2009)</td>
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<td>Sulitzeanu-Kenan and Halperin (2013)</td>
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<td>Brewer et al. (2014)</td>
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<td>Davis (2014)</td>
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<td>Esaiasson et al. (2015)</td>
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**Note:** * indicates the question was used with substantial variation to the original SRC wording. The numbers in the ‘Other’ column indicate how many other questions were used.
Generally speaking, the items corresponding to NoCare, NoSay, LoseTouch and VoteOpinion are widely used indicators of external efficacy. As Table 2.1 makes clear however, there is no single ‘accepted’ way to operationalise external efficacy.

2.8 Conclusion

External efficacy is an important part of diffuse system support – and by extension, legitimacy (Balch 1974, 31; S. C. Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990, 289). From a methodological perspective, factors like income, education, gender, partisanship, media consumption, community-level political mobilization, voting and political participation all affect external efficacy. As a result, they are important alternative explanations that must be considered in examining the potential impact of descriptive representation. Moreover, political institutions like the electoral system can be influential sources of variation if not properly accounted for.

From a theoretical perspective, the determinants of external efficacy inform our understanding of how social and political reality shape citizens’ relationships with the political system. In addition to its role as an indicator of legitimacy, we have good reasons to care about whether citizens have high or low levels of external efficacy. External efficacy affects preference formation, vote choice, voter turnout, protest participation, and a range of other dimensions of a vibrant civic culture. However, external efficacy is not without its critics; in addition to debates about its precise meaning, there are concerns about the specific nature of its relationship to variables like internal efficacy and political trust. In practice, disentangling these attitudes can be difficult. Measuring these attitudes can be more difficult still; indeed, this review of the literature reveals considerable diversity in how external efficacy is operationalised in survey research.
External efficacy is the main dependent variable of this thesis and an important outcome in the context of minority interests. As the next chapter will discuss, we should expect the representation of historically-excluded ethnic minorities to be related to whether or not members of those communities believe government is responsive to their demands. Whether or not we observe this relationship will have both normative and public policy implications for how we design representative systems.
3 THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION

In modern democracies, citizens elect representatives to decide the rules by which society is governed. Citizens have good reasons to care about how these representatives act, since elected officials “decide what citizens must and cannot do, and they coerce citizens to comply with their decisions” (Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin 1999, 1). However, citizens also have good reasons to care about who these representatives are. For decades, political scientists have debated the link between candidate and legislator characteristics on one hand and democratic outcomes on the other. These outcomes include how voters cast their ballots, how legislators vote in parliament, and increasingly how these characteristics affect mass political attitudes.\textsuperscript{4} However, much remains to be done.

\textsuperscript{4} See for example: Arnesen and Peters 2018; Atkeson 2003; Besco 2015; Bird, Saalfeld, and Wüst 2010; Krook 2018; Lublin and Bowler 2018; Sanchez and Morin 2011; Saggar 2007; Taylor-Robinson 2014
This chapter will set the theoretical foundations for the remainder of this thesis by examining the relationship between representation and democratic outcomes – in particular, how descriptive representation affects legitimacy and diffuse support for the regime. This chapter will first discuss what descriptive representation is, whether it is desirable in a democracy, and in which contexts we should look for it. Second, it will consider the mechanism by which descriptive representation might affect political attitudes and behaviour in general, and diffuse support in particular. Next, it will discuss what we know so far about the relationship between descriptive representation and political behaviour and attitudes. It will also consider where this literature comes up short and how this thesis will address this gap. Fourth, this chapter will briefly discuss whether the relationship between descriptive representation should be viewed as linking descriptive representation to symbolic representation. Fifth, it will consider how the representation of ethnic minorities in politics may affect members of the white-Anglo majority. Finally, this chapter will conclude with a discussion of how descriptive representation (the main independent variable of this study) links to external efficacy (the main dependent variable of this study, described in the previous chapter).

3.1 Descriptive Representation and Democracy

Nearly every major analysis of descriptive representation begins with Pitkin’s seminal work, *The Concept of Representation*. Pitkin (1967) defines four types of representation – formalistic, descriptive, substantive and symbolic. More than fifty years later, this typology remains among the most dominant ways in which political scientists think about representation. This chapter will consider three of those views – descriptive, substantive and symbolic. As we shall see, many of the critiques discussed in Pitkin’s work remain heavily contested.
CHAPTER 3: DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION

Descriptive representation refers to a shared identity between constituents and their political representatives. ‘Descriptive’ representatives “are in their own persons and lives in some sense typical of the larger class of persons whom they represent,” be it on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender or another identity, such that “Black legislators represent Black constituents, women legislators represent women constituents, and so on” (Mansbridge 1999, 629). In this sense, descriptive representation takes place when a representative shares the same race, ethnicity, or gender of their constituents (Casellas and Wallace 2015, 146).

Pitkin herself was critical of descriptive representation, which focuses on the characteristics of the representative in relation to those whom they represent. Pitkin argues descriptive representation strives to turn the legislature into a ‘map’ or ‘miniature replica’ of the citizenry. While the goal of a legislature which is a ‘microcosm’ of the population may seem attractive, no map can duplicate every aspect of its original. This is not just a practical problem, but also a normative one; as soon as we concede that every aspect of a citizenry cannot be reproduced in a legislature, we are forced to define which types of “characteristics are politically relevant for reproduction” (1967, 87). Others have also been wary of the pursuit of ‘mirror’ representation. Kymlicka (1995, 139) continues Pitkin’s critique, arguing “the idea that the legislature should mirror the general population, taken to its logical conclusion, leads away from electoral politics entirely towards selection of representatives by lottery or random sampling”. Further, democracy may not be best served by mirroring every aspect of a population; put otherwise, “No one would argue morons should be represented by morons.”

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It is true that descriptive representation involves conscious choices about what kinds of qualities or characteristics deserve to be represented. However, simply because doing so is difficult, indeed sometimes arbitrary, does not mean it is not worth doing. Further, it need not be done in a vacuum; as we will see below, there are several compelling considerations which may guide our normative judgements of which characteristics merit further representation. Finally, contemporary arguments in favour of descriptive representation do not advocate a legislature which is a perfect mirror of every aspect of their population, a point Kymlicka himself concedes (1995, 141).

Pitkin’s second major critique is that descriptive representation is a distraction. Thinking of the legislature as a map, she argues, shifts the focus towards the composition of the legislature, rather than its actions (1967, 226). Instead, she argues that a more meaningful view is substantive representation, which occurs when a legislature acts “in the interests of the represented, in a manner responsive to them,” or when a constituent’s policy preferences are put into action (1967, 209). In short, this view holds that what a legislature does is more important than what it looks like.

One of the most prominent defences against this critique comes from Anne Phillips (1995), who advances the concept of a ‘politics of presence’ alongside a ‘politics of ideas’. Phillips writes that she takes many of the arguments against descriptive representation seriously, but contends “they do not engage sufficiently with a widely felt sense of political exclusion by groups defined by their gender or ethnicity or race” (1995, 5). This is, in part, because representatives have considerable autonomy in their duties, and voter preferences do not always “fall neatly into the neat packages of party politics” (1995, 45). If political campaigns could perfectly anticipate every aspect of every issue in the foreseeable future and present those options to voters in considerable detail, it would matter less who implemented those decisions. This outcome is not plausible, however, and the case for a politics of
presence relies to a considerable extent “on outcomes yet unknown” (1995, 56). In these cases, “no amount of thought or sympathy, no matter how careful or honest, could jump the barriers of experience” that a descriptive representative may have in common with a member of their group (1995, 52). Phillips does not argue descriptive representation should form the foundation of representative decision-making; rather, that both the politics of ideas and politics of presence must be taken into account. In other words, it “is in the relationship between ideas and presence that we can best hope to find a fairer system of representation, not in a false opposition between one or the other” (1995, 25).

Kymlicka argues this line of reasoning threatens the idea of representation itself. Quoting Phillips, he writes “If ‘no amount of thought or sympathy, no matter how careful or honest, can jump the barriers of experience’, then how can anyone represent anyone else?” (Kymlicka 1995, 140). This argument points towards the looming danger of essentialism – that is, reducing an individual to one aspect of their identity, discussed in greater detail below. Here again, however, Kymlicka misses the point. Phillips’ argument – indeed the argument of most contemporary theorists – points to the value of shared experiences in contexts of uncertainty. Claiming a representative does not share every aspect of a constituent’s experience is not the same as saying they do not represent them. Nor does it claim that only those who share the experience of every single constituent should be elected to political office – otherwise, electoral competition would be scarce indeed. In the context of previous political exclusion however, shared experience is a valuable quality for improving the representation of political minorities on issues that emerge as part of the representative process.

The argument for descriptive representation in anticipation of ‘outcomes yet unknown’ is an important theme in the literature. Mansbridge argues descriptive representatives are appropriate in several contexts, one of which is where “uncrystallised, not
fully articulated, interests” exist among members of a historically disadvantaged group (1999, 628). Dovi (2007) argues descriptive representation is useful in the context of ‘overlooked’ interests, where members of a political majority are not always aware of how all elements of a policy affect members of a political minority.

Where do these debates leave us? Broadly speaking, there are five arguments on which the case for descriptive representation is usually made: justice, symbolism, legislator influence, broadening the political agenda, and minority interests (Childs and Cowley 2011). The first argument – that the continued absence of women or ethnic minorities from political institutions is, in-and-of-itself evidence of democratic injustice – is rarely contested. The second argument, symbolism, makes the case that the physical presence of historically excluded groups signals they are equal to the members of historically powerful groups. The remaining arguments concern the relationship between descriptive representation and substantive representation. Put simply, party agendas only contain so much, some interests have not yet emerged, and as a result legislator judgement matters (Phillips 1995; Mansbridge 1999; Dovi 2007). Here, the roles descriptive representatives hold – such as whether they are part of the governing coalition, have power over specific policy areas, or control formal leadership positions – will affect the extent to which they can affect substantive outcomes (Preuhs 2006). Further, Dovi (2002, 730) argues some descriptive representatives are preferable to others – in particular, those with “strong mutual relationships with dispossessed subgroups”.

Of these five arguments, the claim that descriptive representation leads to substantive representation is the most contentious. When made crudely, this claim risks being both essentialist and reductive by boiling down all aspects of a representative to their gender or ethnicity. This approach assumes that women or ethnic minorities are a “category who share a set of essential attributes” (Childs 2008, 100). As Mansbridge writes, “Insisting that women
represent women or Blacks represent Blacks, for example, implies an essential quality of womanness or Blackness that all members of that group share” which members of another group cannot adequately represent (1999, 637). Instead, the link between descriptive and substantive representation should be thought of as probabilistic, not deterministic. Women politicians, for example, “are expected to be better equipped to represent the interests of female voters because they, at least to some extent, share the same experiences” (Wängnerud 2009, 61, emphasis added). Women and ethnic minorities do not form homogenous groups with identical experiences and interests. Rather, the nature of political exclusion makes it more likely that members of these groups will have some similar experiences and will act as stronger advocates for those interests.

Even this probabilistic claim, however, has been subject to scrutiny. Specifically, this approach assumes that minorities have ‘interests’, collectively, at all. The idea of ‘minority interests’ is based on the notion that women or ethnic minorities, as examples, have “a fixed, knowable set of interests” that representatives need only seek out (Saward 2006, 301). In this case, constituencies can simply be ‘read off’ for the relevant representative facts, which suggests “groups, individuals or constituencies have a single, undisputed, authentic identity that can merely be received by a political representative as if the flow of meaning was all in one direction” (Saward 2006, 313). Saward (2006) advances the idea of a ‘representative claim,’ arguing political actors create representative claims through the process of representing, rather than finding them somewhere ‘out there’ among those they represent. In this sense, interests are ‘read in’ as opposed to ‘read off’. According to this perspective, representation “is an active, creative process, not the passive process of receiving clear signals from below” (2006, 310).

This alternative perspective has clear implications for how we evaluate the role of descriptive representatives. If representative claims are constructed on behalf of previously
dispossessed subgroups, who is making those claims, and how they do it, matters. The accompanying theoretical shift brings us away from asking whether ‘woman act for women’ or ‘minorities act for minorities,’ but rather how the substantive representation of these groups occurs and the role that descriptive representatives play within that process (Celis 2012; 2013; Celis and Childs 2012). Here again, the presence of descriptive representatives does not guarantee substantive representation; rather, shared experience is more likely to guide representatives in the creation of these claims (Celis and Childs 2008).

As is clear from the above discussion, there is spirited debate and considerable disagreement between theorists on the role and impact of descriptive representation in a democracy. Understanding that descriptive representation is not a guarantee of substantive representation is an important start; however, the value of descriptive representation for democracy is greater than in changing policy outcomes alone. The remainder of the chapter explores the consequences of descriptive representation beyond substantive representation – in particular, how it affects the behaviours and attitudes of individual citizens.

3.2 Theoretical Mechanisms: Descriptive Representation and Political Behaviour

Many contemporary researchers and theorists consider descriptive representation normatively desirable. While it is both interesting and useful to ask how to increase current levels of descriptive representation (as an outcome variable), it is also important to ask what happens when we do so. What are the political consequences of descriptive representation in practice, and how do they come about?

The relationship between descriptive representation and political behaviour is linked to the exclusion of ethnic minorities from the political system, which may lead members of these groups to be sceptical that their interests are adequately represented within the political
system. Even if descriptive representation “does not necessarily guarantee policies that are more sensitive to minority interests, their absence certainly points to the fact that something is amiss” (Bird 2005, 455). To members of historically-excluded groups, a lack of descriptive representation can be interpreted as evidence of discrimination against them. This sends the signal to members of these groups that the political system is not interested in incorporating their interests into the democratic process. As a result, it is reasonable they may believe that “the presence of the previously excluded may be necessary to ensure the assertive articulation of their concerns” (Childs and Cowley 2011, 7).

From the perspective of political psychology, the exclusion of ethnic minorities creates differentiation within the social system, resulting in a set of ingroups and outgroups. In social identity theory, an “ingroup is a set of people who share a common characteristic or social experience” (M. B. Brewer 2001, 117). Individuals can be ascribed to an ethnic or racial group both voluntarily and involuntary, whereby others (especially those in the majority in-group) interact with them as though they were a member of an outgroup (Capers and Smith 2016). Group membership, especially based on race or ethnicity, can be subjective, “arbitrary and, at times, flexible” (McClain et al. 2009, 473). However, even small and arbitrary distinctions between groups has been shown to be associated with ingroup and outgroup bias (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel 1981). Ethnic group identity is influenced by shared social experiences that come about as a result of membership – in this case, exclusion and discrimination (M. B. Brewer 2001). When ethnic in-group identification becomes “politicized by a set of ideological beliefs about one’s group’s social standing, as well as a view that collective action is the best means by which the group can improve its status and realize its interests,” individuals can develop a sense of group consciousness (McClain et al. 2009, 476).
Within the framework of Social Identity Theory, the formation of in-groups and out-groups can link descriptive representation to perceptions of responsiveness in a number of ways (Fisher et al. 2014). First, voters may believe that in-group members would better represent their views if those views were threatened. Second, citizens may develop a sense of ‘linked fate’ with in-group members or use their group membership as a proxy for their interests. Third, mobilization through in-group networks and the act of participating may lead voters to feel better represented. I examine each of these mechanisms next.

3.2.1 Potentiality

Ethnic minority voters may update their perceptions of government responsiveness as a result of descriptive representation because of an increase in ‘potentiality’ or potential responsiveness – the feeling that a representative would defend the constituent’s interests if those interests were threatened (Uhlaner 2012). By this notion, the impact of descriptive representation on political attitudes may be more substantial than even from detailed policy proposals put forward by political candidates, since neither voters nor candidates have any way of knowing what policy interests may need to be represented in the future (Uhlaner 2012, 536). As a result, “the desire for potential responsiveness…makes the average individual’s turn to descriptive representation natural” (Uhlaner 2012, 537).

These theoretical arguments have been born out in empirical research. For example, Bird (2012, 532) finds Chinese and South Asian voters in Toronto, Canada think a co-ethnic MP could “explain [their] cultural heritage to westerners and serve as a bridge to communicate differences” or “bring nuance” to discussions of sensitive issues. In this respect, political elites have incentives to promote a perception that a citizen’s interests may be defended, since “Descriptive representatives, like any representatives, are political entrepreneurs” who must work within existing political opportunity structures to pursue
Chapter 3: Descriptive Representation

Policy, office or vote-related goals (Bird 2003, 28; Müller and Strøm 1999). There may also be intrinsic motivations for politicians to be responsive to those they identify with, regardless of electoral incentives. Indeed, ‘virtual’ or ‘surrogate’ representation of this sort appears to be at work in at least certain legislative contexts (Broockman 2013).

3.2.2 Linked Fate

The idea of ‘linked’ or ‘common’ fate considers the extent to which an individual feels close to others who identify with the same group and to which they feel their life chances or future prospects are tied to what happens to the group as a whole (Gay 2004; Simien 2005). Feelings of commonality may also be related to perceptions of policy closeness or common interests. If an individual feels like their future prospects are tied to what happens in their group, group interests can serve as a heuristic for individual interests (Dawson 1994). Indeed, from the perspective of voters, race “is a low-cost alternative to more detailed information about a legislator’s stands and, importantly, is virtually impossible to manipulate” (Gay 2002, 718). For voters, “candidate demographic characteristics can act as informational cues to voters, giving them a way to judge candidates about whom they may know nothing other than demographic characteristics such as gender or skin color” (McDermott 1998, 897). These “social and political stereotypes” leads voters to assume women and ethnic minority candidates are more liberal than men and ethnic majority candidates.

There is also evidence that polarizing or xenophobic elite rhetoric may trigger linked fate and commonality considerations (Pérez 2015a; 2015b) – a common occurrence in many advanced democracies. Given the enormous diversity of the Latinx population in the United States and the somewhat arbitrary and involuntary nature of ingroup and outgroup categorisation, it remains an open question whether other diverse groups – such as Asian
Australians or non-white Australians writ large, for example – also develop a sense of linked fate. Previous research from the United States suggests Asian Americans can develop a sense of pan-ethnic linked fate, though this may be conditional on other demographic factors such as income (Masuoka 2006).

3.2.3 Mobilization and Participation

Social and community connections can increase the political resources available to voters, even if those connections are not inherently political. Institutions like workplaces, voluntary associations or places of worship, imbue voters with “skills relevant to political activity,” make them more likely to encounter political discussion, and can “become the locus for attempts at political mobilization: not only do those who lead them make explicit attempts to get people involved in politics but at work, in church and in voluntary associations people develop interpersonal networks that serve to bring them into politics” (Verba et al. 1993, 457).

These connections need not be based on ethnicity; however, in practice individuals are often drawn to institutions such as those above based on the degree of commonality that they have with other group members, such as based on cultural or linguistic background. We might reasonably expect, therefore, that institutions like places of worship, ethnic community organizations and ethnic-group-specific media moderate the relationship between descriptive representation and political attitudes. In this way, “community mobilisation generated through social connectedness and community networks, formal and informal, secular and religious,” create the conditions by which in-group candidates can appeal to in-group voters based on a message of shared interests, shared understanding and local community responsiveness (Fieldhouse and Cutts 2008b, 346).
Moreover, according to the ‘mobilization of support’ theory, “the individual who votes or participates develops stronger feelings that the government is responsive” (Finkel 1985, 894). If political candidates successfully mobilize in-group voters through such institutions, their own participation in the political process reinforces the gains in responsiveness derived from in-group mobilization. In this respect, descriptive representation at the candidate-level alone may be enough to result in changes in external efficacy, since a candidate need not be elected to stimulate community mobilisation or reinforce the gains voters reap from participation.

Ethnic minority candidates may also matter in other ways, especially when they are relatively rare. In a series of focus groups conducted by Bird (2015, 263), one discussant noted, “Not that many South Asian or Muslim people, or Sikh people run for office compared to white Canadians. So just if you have the fortitude or the will power to run for office, I will be impressed.” These claims were reinforced throughout her interviews, and “[across] all groups, discussants disclosed that while they were not predisposed to vote for a candidate just because they shared the same ethnic background, they were more likely to notice such a candidate and listen to what he or she had to say” (ibid).

3.2.4 In-Group Dynamics and the Representation Effect

The three mechanisms described above pertain to in-group dynamics, which are usually interpreted in the descriptive representation literature as co-ethnic ties. However, other evidence points to a general ‘representation effect’, where ethnic minority candidates as a general category do better among ethnic minority voters (Zingher and Farrer 2016). This may be because perceptions of common interests and shared experiences may encourage members of historically excluded minorities to take collective action or participate in improving their overall outcomes (Olsen 1970; Verba and Nie 1987). Prior work has shown
that black voters in the US respond to both co-minority and co-ethnic cues (Adida, Davenport, and McClendon 2016). In Canada, Besco (2015) finds experimental evidence of so-called ‘rainbow coalitions,’ where racialized voters are more likely to support both co-ethnic candidates and other racialized candidates over white candidates.

The representation effect is important for both theoretical and methodological reasons. Theoretically, from the perspective of pure ethnic in-group prejudice, “there is no reason why a South Asian voter would be more likely to support a West Indian candidate,” even though both would be coded as ‘ethnic minorities’ in such an analysis (Zingher and Farrer 2016, 695). Evaluating ‘co-minority’ effects is thus a tougher test of the impacts of descriptive representation, as it increases the potential for Type II error (Zingher and Farrer 2016). However, broadened understandings of potentiality and common fate are relevant to co-minority in-group ties; if ethnic minority voters feel like their future life prospects are tied, at least in part, to the state of majority-minority ethnic relations more broadly, they have an incentive to elect co-minority candidates that may stand up for the rights of ethnic minorities writ-large. Mobilisation effects are also relevant; places of worship, workplaces and voluntary organisations are often pan-ethnic in nature, especially in diverse urban centres.

Methodologically, the small numbers of candidates and legislators from any given minority group make studying descriptive representation difficult. For most advanced democracies, “party interest in the votes [and candidature] of ethnic minorities is a newer phenomenon, corresponding with recent changes that have facilitated global migration and the acquisition of citizenship” (Bird 2003, 10). Expectations of a co-minority effect may alleviate the barriers of small samples that prevent many researchers from examining
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descriptive representation. Indeed, the aggregation of ‘ethnic minorities’ into a single

category for sample-size related reasons is prevalent in the literature.⁶

In summary, there are several competing explanations which link the presence or

absence of ethnic minorities in political institutions to voters’ perceptions of government

responsiveness. In the next section, I review the existing evidence that this theory plays out in

the real world.

3.3 Empirical Literature: Descriptive Representation and Political

Attitudes and Behaviour

For decades, party identification has been among the strongest determinants of

political behaviour, such as vote choice (A. Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954; A. Campbell

et al. 1980). However, there is evidence this is changing as part of a long-term trend of

partisan dealignment. Not only do fewer people identify with a political party, but the

strength of partisan attachment among those who remain is growing weaker (Dalton and

Wattenberg 2002). As identity becomes increasingly salient in political life, the descriptive

representation of political minorities, such as women or ethnic groups, may be an

increasingly important determinant of how these groups feel and behave.

3.3.1 Descriptive Representation and Political Behaviour

Much of the existing literature which examines descriptive representation and

political behaviour is based on the United States (US), where there is conflicting evidence

⁶ See for example: Besco 2015; 2018; Bilodeau 2017; Bird 2010; 2016; Black 2016; Black and Erickson 2006;

Gidengil and Roy 2015; Pietsch 2018; Tossutti and Najem 2002; Zingher and Farrer 2016
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regarding the extent to which different ethnic groups respond to co-ethnic cues. For example, the presence of a Latinx candidate in the US has been shown to activate linked-fate considerations for Latinx voters but not Anglo (white American) voters (McConnaughy et al. 2010b). Some Black descriptive representation appears to lower the political participation of white voters while having minimal effect on Black voter turnout (Gay 2001), while other research has shown Black voters respond to co-ethnic cues more strongly than Latinx voters, who have a more muted response (Adida, Davenport, and McClendon 2016). Other research still finds Black descriptive representation only affects the participation of disengaged Black voters, and only because they are more likely to be contacted; this work argues ‘linked fate’ explains little (Clark 2014). Despite all this, when asked, all three groups (Anglo, Black and Latino) indicate they care about descriptive representation, that is, being represented by someone of their own race or ethnicity (Casellas and Wallace 2015). In sum, even in the US, the jury is still out regarding how descriptive representation affects political behaviour.

Research from other countries also finds mixed conclusions. In the UK, Martin (2016) finds Pakistani voters and Muslim voters were more likely to vote in the presence of a Labour Pakistani or Labour Muslim candidate, respectively, while there were no mobilization effects for Indian, Black Caribbean, or Black African voters. She attributes some of these effects to “pressure through social and religious environments” (2016a, 176). In Canada, Goodyear-Grant and Tolley (2017) show that Chinese voters have a strong preference for Chinese candidates, but also demonstrate this effect is not driven by identification with their racial group or a sense of threat. Instead, they demonstrate voting for ‘one’s own’ in the case of Chinese-Canadians is strongest among those who are most sensitive to negative perceptions of their group.

Representing an ethnically diverse electorate has been shown to increase perceptions of linked fate for ethnic minority legislators in Britain, creating an intrinsic motivation to
represent the concerns of minority voters (Sobolewska, McKee, and Campbell 2018). From the voter side, prior research has shown black Americans with a stronger sense of linked fate have higher support for African Americans having their own representatives (Avery 2009). There is evidence this also holds true for Latinx voters in the US, where the presence of a Latinx candidate activates linked-fate considerations for Latinx voters (McConnaughy et al. 2010a).

While the descriptive representation of women is not the primary focus of this thesis, much of the theory on descriptive representation has been developed in the context of gender (Childs 2008; Reingold and Harrell 2010; Wängnerud 2009). The existing literature on how the representation of women affects women’s voting behaviour is equally contradictory, however. Women’s preferences for women candidates may be motivated by gender consciousness, baseline preferences for descriptive representation, and shared preferences regarding social policy (Goodyear-Grant and Croskill 2011). Carson et al. (2019) find a small gender-affinity effect in Australia, whereby women are more supportive of women candidates, all else equal. Campbell and Heath (2017) find a similar effect in the 2010 British election, but only for women who value the descriptive representation of women, and not in the 2005 and 2001 elections. By contrast, Goodyear-Grant and Croskill (2011) and McElroy and Marsh (2010) no evidence in favour of a gender-affinity effect in Canada or Ireland, respectively. To further complicate matters, there is some evidence that the intersection of ethnicity and gender also plays a role in determining vote choice; for example, black women in the US are more likely to vote when a Black woman is on the ballot (Stokes-Brown and Dolan 2010). There is also convincing evidence that women’s representation at the ministerial level has larger participatory consequences than women’s representation at the legislative level across a large number of established democracies (Liu and Banaszak 2017).
All these factors are relevant to how we evaluate the behavioural and attitudinal consequences of descriptive representation.

3.3.2 Descriptive Representation and Political Attitudes

Research on the impact of descriptive representation on diffuse support, or political attitudes in general, has been neglected in favour of studies that measure its impacts on political behaviour. The research that does exist is limited; it focuses predominantly on the US context, uses a small sample of elections, and does not usually evaluate more than one facet of diffuse support. Further, there are important differences in how descriptive representation has been operationalized in each study, which makes comparison difficult.

‘Collective’ descriptive representation refers to how representative a legislature is, overall, compared to the population it represents. Collective descriptive representation is usually operationalized as the percentage of seats held by women or ethnic minorities. ‘Dyadic’ descriptive representation refers to whether citizens are represented by a descriptive representative in their district. In this model, the broader composition of the legislature matters less than a voter’s own legislator (Uhlaner and Scola 2016). Finally, several studies focus on what I call ‘elite’ descriptive representation, which considers whether high-profile leaders such as state governors or presidential candidates are descriptive representatives.

Within this complex research environment, the evidence that descriptive representation affects diffuse support is mixed. Dyadic descriptive representation of African Americans does not seem to increase levels of diffuse support among Black voters; by contrast, the dyadic representation of Latinx voters appears to reduce Latinx political alienation (Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2004; Pantoja and Segura 2003). The only non-US analysis of dyadic descriptive representation shows that Maori voters in New Zealand have higher levels of external efficacy when represented by Maori legislators (Banducci, Donovan,
and Karp 2004). The dyadic representation of women in the US has also led to mixed findings; the presence of Republican women candidates appears to increase the external efficacy of republican women, but the same is not true of Democrats (Dolan 2006). When candidates become legislators however, the dyadic representation of women does not appear to increase levels of women’s diffuse support (Lawless 2004; Atkeson and Carrillo 2007).

While the above findings appear in conflict with research that shows Black voters respond to co-ethnic cues more strongly than Latinx voters (i.e. Adida, Davenport, and McClendon 2016), these patterns may be different when other forms of descriptive representation are considered. The collective descriptive representation of African Americans in the federal judiciary, operationalized as the percentage of Black judges on the US federal bench, appears to increase Black citizens’ diffuse support for the Courts, while reducing White citizens’ diffuse support (Scherer and Curry 2010). The elite descriptive representation of African Americans appears to have an even bigger effect; Black voters’ external efficacy in the 2008 Democratic presidential primary was highest when Barack Obama’s probability of victory was higher, and the election of Obama to the presidency increased the external efficacy of African Americans (but not other minorities) (West 2016; Merolla, Sellers, and Fowler 2013). The impacts of elite descriptive representation can even be seen at the local level; Black citizens in cities with Black mayors have higher perceptions of municipal government responsiveness, and Black representation in municipal offices below Mayor leads to higher levels of incumbent-based trust (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Emig, Hesse, and Fisher 1996).

In terms of political attitudes, women’s collective descriptive representation also appears to increase women voters’ satisfaction with democracy (Karp and Banducci 2008a). By contrast, women’s elite descriptive representation appears to be less influential in changing political attitudes than for African Americans. The same study that found Black
voters’ external efficacy was greater when Obama’s probability of winning the 2008 Democratic primary was higher, found the effect did not extend to Hillary Clinton’s probability of winning the same primary on women’s external efficacy (West 2016). Women governors in the US also do not appear to increase women’s diffuse support; by contrast, some studies show women’s collective representation at the legislature-level does (Atkeson and Carrillo 2007). However, while other studies also find a relationship between women’s collective descriptive representation and diffuse support, they hypothesize this relationship is spurious. Instead, because women voters in the US are more likely to be Democrats, this statistical relationship is actually a reflection of the impact of women’s substantive representation (Lawless 2004). Others argue this is not a spurious relationship, but rather an interaction effect; that is, the impact of women’s descriptive representation depends on both gender and partisan congruence between candidates and voters (Mariani, Marshall, and Mathews-Schultz 2015).

Some research finds a similar relationship between collective descriptive representation and political engagement; as the proportion of women in a legislature increases, the ‘engagement gap’ between men and women decreases (Barnes and Burchard 2012). Other research finds no such relationship (Karp and Banducci 2008a). Reingold and Harrell (2010) argue this relationship involves an interaction between gender and party; descriptive representation only affects engagement when candidates and voters share both a gender identity as well as partisan identity. The competitiveness of the candidate also appears to matter; only “viable” candidates send a cue to women citizens that increases women’s political engagement (Atkeson 2003). Women’s descriptive representation has also been linked to higher levels of political knowledge, political interest and political activity (Dassonneville and McAllister 2018; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007).
Why all this contradiction? One reason concerns the inconsistency within how descriptive representation has been operationalised – that is, as dyadic, collective or elite representation – with little discussion of how this could affect the result. It is difficult to predict which type of representation should lead to the biggest gains in external efficacy. Each form of descriptive representation can theoretically be linked to perceptions of responsiveness through each of the three mechanisms described above (potentiality, linked fate and mobilisation).

Each form of representation should be linked to increases in potentiality, though collective and elite representation may achieve this more powerfully than dyadic representation: collective representation pertains to a greater number of descriptive representatives, while elite representation pertains to those in a more powerful position. Each form should also activate linked fate considerations, though dyadic and elite representation may do so more strongly; here, individuals use in-group status as a heuristic for other presumed attributes, which is more difficult to do in a collective sense. All three should activate mobilisation equally, since they all pertain to increased activity among in-group networks. Thus, while all three have the potential to increase diffuse support, this thesis will focus on dyadic ties alone so as to avoid the confounding effects of differential operationalisation. I make this choice for practical reasons; there are few ‘elite’ descriptive representatives in advanced democracies, and collective descriptive representation limits the sample size of analyses by bringing the unit of observation to the legislature-level.

In summary, the existing literature on how descriptive representation affects political behaviour and attitudes is mixed. The theoretical expectations described above are only sometimes borne out in practice, perhaps because of inconsistency within the level of descriptive representation (i.e. dyadic, collective or elite) considered or the dependent variable of interest.
3.4 Political Attitudes and Symbolic Representation

Some prior research has viewed the relationship between descriptive representation and political attitudes through Pitkin’s (1967) framework of symbolic representation, the third and final of Pitkin’s models this chapter will discuss. However, this framework is not altogether straightforward. Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler (2005, 407) define symbolic representation as “the represented’s feelings of being fairly and effectively represented”; from this perspective symbolic representation is concerned with how representatives are perceived, rather than who they are (descriptive representation) or what they do (substantive representation). Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler (2005, 413) operationalize this concept as the level of citizen confidence in the legislature, whereby “a visible presence of women in the legislature may…enhance women’s confidence in the legislative process”. Barnes and Burchard describe a similar argument, whereby symbolic representation sends “a signal to the so-called ‘described’ that the political arena represents them and is receptive to their part” (2012, 770). Both of these mechanisms are compelling and informative. However, describing the relationship between descriptive representation and perceived responsiveness as a link between descriptive and symbolic representation merits caution for three reasons.

First, measuring the attitudinal effects of descriptive representation from only a symbolic view ignores a host of mechanisms that connect representatives to the represented. Focusing only on how seeing someone ‘like you’ can affect a citizen’s attitudes fails to consider the representative’s actual performance, their desires and incentives to be more responsive to their constituents, or the contextual impacts of the community in conditioning the response of any individual constituent.

Second, Pitkin’s own view of symbolic representation subtly contradicts the mechanisms described above. Pitkin (1967, 96) argues claiming “something symbolizes something else is to say that it calls to mind, and even beyond that evokes emotions or
attitudes appropriate to the absent thing”. Accordingly, “since there is no rational justification for the symbolic connection,” symbolic representation is a process of manipulating affective responses rather than rational influence (Pitkin 1967, 101). Pitkin is careful to describe the processes which drive symbolic representation as irrational and based on affect. However, the mechanism that purportedly connects descriptive and symbolic representation is very rational indeed. Seeing someone ‘like you’ in politics sends a rational signal based on prior experience and personal networks. In this sense, the ‘symbol’ is not arbitrary like a flag (a metaphor both Pitkin and Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler consider), but rather logically consistent.

Third, Pitkin’s views are at odds with contemporary arguments in favour of descriptive representation, particularly the drive to avoid its essentialist dimensions. Treating an ethnic minority legislator or woman legislator as a symbol reduces them to their ethnicity or gender, respectively. The implicit claim, then, is that all voters see of ethnic minority candidates or women candidates is their ethnicity or gender, which is both theoretically and empirically difficult to justify. Therefore, while the models that Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler, and Barnes and Burchard advance are useful, examining them from the perspective of symbolic representation leaves much to be desired. As a result, while this thesis involves the consideration of political attitudes, it will not examine them as a relationship between descriptive and symbolic representation.

3.5 Representation and Ethnic Majorities

In addition to understanding how the representation of ethnic minorities changes the political attitudes and behaviours among the previously-excluded out-group, these dynamics should also affect white-Anglo in-group voters. From a theoretical perspective, members of political majorities are relevant actors in the representative process who may respond to
increased ethnic representation according to their own preferences. From a practical perspective, parties may also be less likely to promote women or ethnic minority candidates if they know they will incur the wrath of majority voters. While negative white-Anglo attitudes towards outsiders used to be broadly defined in the sociobiological terms of ‘old fashioned racism’ (the belief that some races are superior to others), ‘ethnic minorities are no longer viewed as inferior; rather they are differentiated as threats to “social cohesion” and “national unity”’ (K. M. Dunn et al. 2004, 410–11). However, whereas research on implicit bias and attitudes towards race has long been considered important, research in the US in the post-Obama era must increasingly consider the effects of old fashioned racism as a determinant of political attitudes and behaviour (Tesler 2012; Kinder and Ryan 2017). In the UK, ethnic minority candidates suffer an electoral penalty of approximately 4 per cent from whites, an effect driven by anti-immigrant sentiment (Fisher et al. 2015). There is also evidence this effect takes place in Canada, though it appears the penalty ethnic minority candidates face is limited to candidates for right-wing parties by their own party supporters (Besco 2018). More broadly, there is ample evidence from western democracies of white-Anglo majority bias against members of ethnic minority groups – especially those of Asian and Middle-Eastern descent (Gravelle 2018a; Lajevardi and Oskooii 2018; McAllister and Moore 1991; Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 2009).

Despite a previous consensus that white-Anglo identity does not affect political behaviour (i.e. Wong and Cho 2005; Sears and Savalei 2006), there is also increasing evidence that white-Anglo voters also experience a form of ethnic group consciousness that is distinct from racial animus – a preference for their own ingroup rather than prejudice towards outgroups (Schildkraut 2017; Berry, Ebner, and Cornelius 2019). Jardina (2019, 3) argues the increased tendency of white Americans to identify with their majority group is associated with the changing ethnic composition of the United States and the election of President
Barack Obama – signalling a “challenge to the absoluteness of whites’ dominance”. This body of research argues that “Racial resentment and white in-group identity have independent effects; they are not two ends of a single continuum” (Petrow, Transue, and Vercellotti 2018, 217). Berry et al. find “perceptions of linked fate among Whites in 2012 and 2016 were comparable to other racial and pan-ethnic groups,” and that these attitudes are associated with greater political participation (2019, 2). Other work has shown that many white Americans expect black representatives to preference the interests of black constituents over their own, and that identifying as white is associated with a preference to be represented by a white legislator (Goldman 2017; Schildkraut 2017).

3.6 Conclusion

Since Pitkin’s seminal framework was first introduced, the field of descriptive representation has made enormous theoretical advances. Early theoretical work was primarily concerned with the merits of each type of representation and how they compared to other forms. More than fifty years since The Concept of Representation, the debate about whether descriptive representation ought to be pursued is largely over: few contemporary theorists have serious doubts about its merits. Indeed, descriptive representation has significant theoretical implications for the way in which historically disadvantaged groups approach the democratic system, and by extension democracy as a whole. To be clear, however, the argument is not that descriptive representation is more important than substantive representation; descriptive representation is simply no longer regarded as a “poor cousin” of substantive representation – or as a means to a more important end (Uhlaner and Scola 2016, 228).

For all its theoretical significance, the existing literature on descriptive representation, political attitudes and political behaviour is a minefield of contradiction and nuance. While
some studies of descriptive representation and political behaviour point in one direction, others point in the opposite. Nevertheless, this literature is still more coherent than existing research on the impact of descriptive representation on political attitudes. In the first place, this latter literature is extremely limited, having been largely ignored in favour of the former. The literature that does exist is restricted almost exclusively to the case of the United States and to the context of a few elections. Further, descriptive representation is operationalized in a myriad of different ways, making cross-comparison difficult.

This lack of an academic consensus is an important gap because of its potential to contribute to theories of democracy. In particular, the relationship between descriptive representation and diffuse support merits a much closer look. Measuring changes in diffuse support, described in the previous chapter, offers an opportunity to evaluate some of the most logically foreseeable impacts of descriptive representation on political attitudes. Higher levels of external efficacy, one of the most important indicators of diffuse support, promote regime stability and are key indicators of democratic health (S. C. Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990, 289). If the lack of descriptive representation is increasing the alienation of political minorities, or by contrast if increasing descriptive representation can reduce alienation, this should affect the level of diffuse support these minorities feel. As such, measuring external efficacy and political trust offers “a very specific and testable measure of government legitimacy that may provide empirical support to arguments about the value of descriptive representation in elected bodies of government” (Atkeson and Carrillo 2007, 80). Put otherwise, if descriptive representation increases positive democratic attitudes towards the regime among ethnic minorities, we should be able to see it here.

Given the fractious state of the literature, it is incumbent upon researchers to provide a more comprehensive evaluation of this relationship. The next chapter begins this investigation in the context of Australia, a diverse settler-society with robust democratic
institutions that has yet to elect a large number of ethnic minorities to public office. The
results inform our understanding of descriptive representation and legitimacy at the candidate
level while using compulsory voting to control for differential voter mobilisation.
4 DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION IN AUSTRALIA

In the previous chapters of this thesis, I discussed the theoretical foundations of the relationship between descriptive representation and diffuse support (operationalized as external efficacy). This chapter takes the first step in this research agenda by considering the case of Australia – a diverse, settler society with high levels of immigration and robust democratic institutions that has yet to elect ethnic minorities to public office in large number. Australia is also important as a case study because it is one of the few advanced democracies in the world with compulsory voting. As such, if a relationship between descriptive representation and external efficacy exists in Australia, it is unlikely to be moderated through differential voter turnout or mobilization (since almost everyone votes). This advances the overall objective of the thesis in terms of better understanding the potential mechanism between descriptive representation and diffuse support.

As will be described below however, the Australian case presents a challenge for another reason: very few ethnic minorities have been elected to federal office, making it
difficult to evaluate how electing minority representatives affects ethnic minority constituents. Instead, this analysis will evaluate how political candidates can shape the political attitudes of those whom they seek to represent. In this respect, studying Australia presents an opportunity to evaluate whether candidate-based ties alone are enough to change the way citizens feel about the political system. While candidate-voter ties are weaker than legislator-voter ties, examining weaker ties first allows us to better understand what types of inclusion are meaningful enough to change voters’ political attitudes. Moreover, political candidates are highly visible in Australia, so examining descriptive representation at the candidate level tests the idea that non-white elites can signal inclusion to members of historically-excluded communities.

This chapter is divided into six parts. First, it will discuss the history of immigration and multiculturalism in Australia. Second, it will examine existing work on minority participation and political attitudes in Australia. Third, it will discuss the research design of this analysis. Next, it will present an initial look at how the political attitudes and demographic characteristics of ethnic minorities in Australia differ from their majority counterparts. After this, it will examine the main findings of the analysis – that ethnic minority candidates do not make ethnic minority voters feel like the political system is more responsive but are associated with lower levels of external efficacy among white-Anglo voters. Finally, this chapter will conclude by discussing the implications of these findings and examine how this chapter fits into the broader goal of this thesis, which is to understand how the representation of historically excluded groups can change political attitudes.

4.1 Immigration and Diversity in Australian Politics

Immigration has shaped Australia since British colonists first landed in 1788, and its history informs and echoes many of today’s issues regarding descriptive representation. Until
the 1870s, immigration was largely controlled by the British government – first through the process of convict transportation, and then through a system of state subsidies for immigrants (Jupp 2007). A guiding principle of this system was to make Australian society broadly reflective of the United Kingdom – at the time, this meant 55 per cent of immigrants from the UK were English and Welsh, 30 per cent were Irish, and 15 per cent were Scottish (Jupp 2007). This policy did not passively ignore the fact Australia was already home to established Indigenous communities – indeed, it actively tried to erase this reality. In the nineteenth century, so-called ‘scientific’ theories of biological evolution held genetic differences determined cultural, moral and intellectual potential. These theories were used to justify the denial of basic human rights and other atrocities towards Indigenous Australians, including forcible relocation, restrictions on labour and mobility, and the separation of children from their families (Haebich 2007; Vasilev 2007; Jupp 2018). In pursuit of a more ‘British’ Australia, state and federal governments later enforced policies of biological assimilation which were “intended to ‘breed out’ Aboriginal physical characteristics progressively through arranged state marriages between ‘lighter castes’ and whites” (Haebich 2007).

The Australian colonies saw a surge of racism against non-whites as they began the process of federation in the late 1800s (K. Dunn, Klocker, and Salabay 2007). These attitudes were codified into law in 1901 with the Immigration Restriction Act, commonly known as the White Australia Policy. The Act which further restricted non-European migration to Australia and gave preference to British migrants (Bilodeau and Fadol 2011). In political debate, the policy was framed as protecting the interests of the working class. Workers had become increasingly hostile to immigration, pursuing unionization over fears it would lower wages (Jupp 2007; 2018). The 1901 policy pursued assimilation through ‘Anglo-conformity’, requiring new settlers to adopt “Anglo–Celtic social and political institutions, customs, and practices that were firmly imprinted in Australian public culture as a part of its British
heritage” (Jayasuriya 2007). The policy reduced Australia’s non-European residents to approximately 1 per cent of the total population (Jupp 2018, 25).

This policy continued largely unchanged until World War II, a period in which migration to Australia was primarily British. However, post-war security fears about Australia’s isolation led to more immigration from northern and southern Europe and certain Middle Eastern countries (McAllister and Moore 1991). Jupp (2011) identifies four periods of post-war migration: assimilation (1947-1966), integration (1966-1972), multiculturalism (1972-1996), and post-multiculturalism (1996-present). In the ‘assimilation’ phase, the White Australia Policy was broadened slightly under the weight of security concerns to include other Europeans, including settlers of Dutch, German, Greek and Italian origin (Hugo 2011). As a result, the White Australian Policy transitioned to a phase of ‘Anglo-assimilationism’ where British heritage was explicitly promoted and discrimination continued (K. Dunn, Klocker, and Salabay 2007).

These broadly ‘White-Australian’ policies continued until the late 1960s, when organized diversity became more accepted by policy makers, though under a broadly Anglo-Celtic framework (Jupp 2011). This ‘transitional’ phase gave way in the early 1970s, when public opposition to explicit (or ‘old-fashioned’) racism led to policy promoting elements of multiculturalism (Jupp 2011). In this phase, non-white restrictions on immigration were lifted and settlement services were directed towards integrating non-British immigrants (Bilodeau and Fadol 2011; Forrest and Dunn 2007). These multicultural ideals excluded Indigenous Australians, who were considered outside the scope of multiculturalism policies (Berman and Paradies 2010).

In the late 1970s, the end of the Vietnam war resulted a large influx of refugees to Australia, and in the 1980s Australia’s major source of immigration shifted from Europe to southeast Asia (McAllister and Moore 1991). However, while old-fashioned racism largely
fell out of public favour in the 1960s, debates about non-white threats to Australian culture continued into the 1990s (Berman and Paradies 2010). Official multiculturalism ended in the late 1990s when the Howard government required minorities to adopt ‘Australian’ values and traditions (Berman and Paradies 2010). For most of the period since WWII, the major Australian political parties adhered to a consensus to keep immigration off the table as a major election issue (McAllister 2003). However, the rise of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party, the 2001 U.S. terrorist attacks and the Tampa crisis (where Australian special forces boarded a Norwegian vessel carrying asylum-seekers to Australia), forced immigration and border protection into mainstream political debate (McAllister 2003). This phase marked a retreat from multiculturalist rhetoric and a return to assimilation, as well as an increased focus on refugee and asylum-seeker issues (Jupp 2007; Jupp and Pietsch 2018).

4.2 Ethnicity and Political Participation

Prior to the multicultural push of the early 1970s, migrants of Non-English Speaking Background (NESB) almost exclusively abstained from participating in mainstream Australian political organizations (Zappalà 1999). However, as Australian policy moved to integrate migrants in a more limited sense, migrants began organising outside the mainstream political parties with the eventual goal of increased representation in immigrant neighbourhoods (Zappalà 1999). By the time multiculturalism was in full swing, NESB migrants began participating in local party branches to a greater extent – particularly in the Australian Labor Party (Zappalà 1999).
In Australia, the term ‘ethnic’ is usually used to describe immigrants of Non-English Speaking Background (NESB), while ‘ethnic politics’ refers to the representation of ethnic minorities in elected politics (Zappalà 2007). This term has also been used to describe so-called ‘ethnic electorates’ – districts where ethnic minorities comprise a sizable portion of the population (which means anywhere from at least 15 per cent to 25 per cent) (Zappalà 2007; Jupp 2015). While pre-war migrants tended to settle in rural areas, more recent immigrants have settled disproportionately in Sydney and Melbourne (Hugo 2011). Not surprisingly, almost all ‘ethnic electorates’ are based near these two urban centres. Immigrant voters are more likely to vote for the ALP than the Liberal-National Coalition compared to Australian-born voters (Zingher and Thomas 2012; Pietsch 2017a). While up to two-thirds of these electorates are often thought of as ‘safe’ Labor seats, more recent trends suggest this is no longer the case (Zappalà 2007; Jupp 2015; Pietsch 2017b).

The lack of a larger critical mass of ethnic minority voters in so-called ‘ethnic electorates’ may explain, at least in part, Australia’s lack of success in electing ethnic minorities to public office (Pietsch 2018, 94). While candidates in the 2016 election described Australia as “the most successful multicultural country in the world,” Australia lags far behind other advanced democracies in descriptive representation (Jupp and Pietsch 2018, 663). More than a quarter of Australians – 28 per cent – were born overseas, while almost half – 49 per cent – were either themselves born overseas or had a parent who was (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017c). By contrast, only 11 out of 150 MPs of the 45th House of Representatives (7 per cent) were born outside Australia, and only three of those MPs (2 per cent) were born outside of Europe (Parliament of Australia 2016). In addition,

7 This is true despite the fact everyone in Australia can be described as belonging to an ethnic group (or multiple ethnic groups). Thus, this use of the term ‘ethnic’ deserves more scrutiny, as it is both inaccurate and privileges the white-Anglo population as the ‘baseline’.
there were only two Indigenous Australians (1 per cent) in the 45th House, despite the fact 3 per cent of Australians identify as Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islanders (Parliament of Australia 2016; Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017b). Figure 4.1 shows the number of ethnic minority candidates who ran for the House of Representatives from 2004 to 2019, along with the number who were successful.

**Figure 4.1 Ethnic Minority Candidates, Australia 2004-2019**


While descriptive representation in Australia has increased, overall it remains quite low. The biggest increase in ethnic minority representation at the candidate-level happened between the 2010 and 2013 elections, where it almost tripled. However, this increase did not translate to a correspondingly large increase in descriptive representation at the legislator-level. In 2019, only 10 of the 151 members of the House of Representatives (7 per cent) are non-white. By way of comparison, 14 per cent of Canadian MPs are visible minorities.
(compared to 22 per cent of the population) and 3 per cent are Indigenous (compared to 5 per cent of the population) (Tolley 2015; Statistics Canada 2017b; 2017a). It is clear Australia still has some distance to go before the level of descriptive representation in federal parliament reflects Australia’s diversity.

Evidence regarding other forms of minority participation in Australian politics is less clear-cut. Earlier research noted the lack of migrant political participation in communal organizations, and explained these trends as a function of their socio-economic resources and social learning from authoritarian countries of origin (McAllister and Makkai 1992). Others have noted immigrants from repressive regimes are less likely to participate in protest politics than Australian-born voters (Bilodeau 2008). Some studies, however, seem to suggest NESB immigrants are more likely to participate than Australian-born voters, including through persuading others how to vote, supporting or volunteering for a party or candidate, and contributing money (Bean 2012).

4.3 Ethnic Minorities and Political Attitudes

While ethnic minority Australians exhibit similar political attitudes to Australian-born voters along some dimensions, previous research has also observed systematic differences. For example, NESB immigrants appear to have less interest in Australian politics than ESB immigrants or Australian-born voters (Zingher and Thomas 2012). Pre-migration political experience appears to matter. Immigrants tend to have similar levels of political trust to Australian-born voters, though second-generation immigrants from authoritarian backgrounds have lower levels of confidence in Australian institutions (Pietsch and McAllister 2016). Further, while immigrants from authoritarian countries have high levels of support for democracy, they are much less likely than other groups to see democracy as the only game in town (Bilodeau, McAllister, and Kanji 2010). There are differences within groups, however;
for some groups of immigrants, such as those from the Philippines, more respondents indicate they have ‘high’ levels of political trust compared to those born in Australia (Pietsch 2018, 130).

There are also large differences in political efficacy within ethnic minority groups. For example, Indian-born respondents feel like voting has large consequences more strongly than the Australian-born, but immigrants from China, Vietnam and the Philippines tend to be more sceptical (Pietsch 2018, 130). Finally, contextual effects also seem to drive immigrant attitudes and participation; minority voters in electorates with high concentrations other minority voters have higher levels of political efficacy and political participation (Bilodeau 2009).

Few studies have examined the individual-level consequences of descriptive representation in Australia. The most notable of these studies examines the electoral effects of descriptive representation, showing that ethnic minority voters are approximately 10 per cent more likely to vote for Labor when they field an ethnic minority candidate (Zingher and Farrer 2016). According to the theory outlined in the previous chapter, minority voters should feel like the political system is more responsive when they see themselves represented in the political contest in their electorate. As described above, non-white voters have historically been excluded from political life in Australia. These voters may reasonably belief that a lack of descriptive representation can be interpreted as evidence of discrimination against them, or that the political system is not representative of their interests. Political candidates are among the most high-profile elites in the political system – canvasing door-to-door in the lead-up to elections, distributing literature and listening to voters’ concerns. If an ethnic minority voter sees that more candidates in their electorate ‘look like them,’ they may use this as a proxy for how well ethnic minority interests are represented overall. This leads to the expectation that:
Chapter 4: Descriptive Representation in Australia

H1 (co-minority candidate efficacy): Ethnic minority respondents will have higher levels of external efficacy when a minority candidate runs in their electorate.

While minority respondents may update their political attitudes in the context of descriptive representation, it is unlikely white-Anglo Australians will experience the same effect. Almost all candidates for the House of Representatives are white; co-ethnic representation for these Australians is the rule, not the exception. However, it is possible white-Anglo Australians may push back when this rule is violated and exhibit lower levels of external efficacy when a minority candidate runs for either major political party in their electorate. We may therefore expect that:

H2 (majority candidate backlash): Ethnic majority respondents will have lower levels of external efficacy when a minority candidate runs in their electorate.

I use the term ‘white-Anglo’ to refer to the ethnic majority group in Australia. According to the 2016 Census, more than half of Australians have English, Irish or Scottish ancestry – a group Jupp (1995; 2011) describes as those of ‘Anglo-Celtic’ ancestry. By contrast, the term white-Anglo also includes other Australians of European origin, such as Greeks and Italians. While members of these groups were once the subject of intense discrimination, in contemporary Australia these individuals are largely seen as part of the majority group. White-Anglo Australians are not readily identifiable as members of an out-group in the same way that ethnic minority Australians are, and as a result are less likely to signal the inclusivity of the political system to non-white Australians. However, these individuals should also be as likely to feel threatened by those who they perceive as more different to them.
4.4 Data and Methods

This chapter evaluates the extent to which political candidates from 2004-2019 are associated with differences in the political attitudes of constituents in their electorates. Accessing data on ‘culture’ or ‘ethnicity’ is very difficult in Australia. I use data on candidates from Zingher and Farrer (2016), who coded each candidate in the 2004, 2007 and 2010 Australian elections according to whether or not they are of non-Australian descent. The authors examined electoral biographies, news coverage and other sources for mentions of indigenous and non-white immigrant background, coding these candidates as “1” and all other candidates as “0” (Zingher and Farrer 2016, supplementary materials). They use the electorate as the unit of analysis, indicating whether Coalition (Liberal or Nationals) and Labor/Greens candidates (which are combined for sample-size reasons) were of Australian or immigrant descent. As a result, their dataset has 450 observations – one observation for each of the 150 federal electorates in Australia for each of the three election years mentioned above. I supplement these data with my own analysis of candidates in the 2013, 2016 and 2019 federal elections using the same methodology. The final dataset on candidates has 901 observations, corresponding to five elections with 150 electorates (2004-2016) and one election with 151 electorates (2019).

As far as measuring ethnicity is concerned, voter-level data is more limited. For the most part, Australian surveys do not ask about ‘culture’ or ‘ancestry’, instead relying on birthplace to measure ethnic diversity. In addition to this measure, the Australian Election Study (AES) asks respondents to indicate their parents’ birthplaces, allowing this analysis to consider both first-generation and second-generation immigrants who responded to each survey. Further, the AES intentionally samples all federal electorates, ensuring that at least some respondents are drawn from each electorate where a minority candidate may have competed.
The final dataset (which combines the above two elements) uses the individual voter as the unit of analysis. Summary statistics for each variable considered in the regression are shown in the Supplementary Appendix (Table A4.1). The dependent variable is external efficacy, which is measured in each AES survey using two questions, known in the external efficacy literature as *carethink* and *knowthink*. The first, *carethink*, corresponds to the survey question, ‘Some people say that political parties in Australia care what ordinary people think. Others say that political parties in Australia don't care what ordinary people think. Where would you place your view on this scale from 1 to 5?’ Similarly, *knowthink* corresponds to the survey question, ‘Some people say that Federal politicians know what ordinary people think. Others say that Federal politicians don't know much about what ordinary people think. Where would you place your view on this scale from 1 to 5?’ The results of each question were combined into an index to create a single variable.8

The independent variables measure respondent and candidate ethnicity. For voter ethnicity, I follow Pietsch (2018) by coding observations as ‘1’ if the respondent or either of their parents was born in a non-English speaking or non-European country, and ‘0’ otherwise. On the candidate-side, I follow Zingher and Farrer (2016) in using a binary variable to indicate whether either the Coalition, the Labor party or Greens fielded an ethnic minority candidate in a given electorate.

The analysis also uses a number of control variables to account for alternative explanations of external efficacy. External efficacy may have demographic determinants; therefore, the models control for age (both as a raw measure of years and as age-squared, to account for the possibility of a non-linear relationship), gender, household income, and

8 This resulting variable has a Cronbach’s Alpha value of 0.67 indicating an acceptable scale consistency. Cronbach’s Alpha ranges from 0 to 1 and measures the internal consistency of a scale, which is “the extent to which all the items in a test measure the same concept or construct” (Tavakol and Dennick 2011).
educational attainment. We might expect that older, wealthier, more educated and male respondents should be more likely to think government is responsive to their demands, all else equal. Finally, I control for the percent of the electorate that was born outside of Australia in order to evaluate possible contextual effects a respondent may derive from their community.

The analysis also controls for political determinants of external efficacy. I use a binary variable that is coded as ‘1’ if the respondent voted for the winning candidate, and ‘0’ otherwise. In theory, a respondent should think the political system is more responsive if their preferred candidate wins. Further, the models control for respondents’ levels of political interest and the strength of their partisan attachments. I expect respondents who are more interested in politics and have stronger partisan preferences to be more likely to think the political system is responsive to them.

Since the dependent variable is continuous, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is most appropriate for this analysis. Given the low sample size for both ethnic minority candidates and voters, I pool data from the 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016 and 2019 Australian Election Studies. In order to account for inter-election heterogeneity, I follow White (2017) by including a series of binary variables corresponding to each election from 2004-2016 (with the most recent survey, 2019, serving as the reference category).

### 4.5 Descriptive Statistics

How do the demographic characteristics and political attitudes of ethnic minority citizens differ from their majority counterparts? Figure 4.2 shows the countries of birth for ethnic minority Australians. More than three-quarters of ethnic minority respondents are first-generation immigrants from NESB countries. This is not surprising given the relatively short period of time Australia has had a more permissive immigration system. Approximately one-
fifth of the sample comes from ethnic minorities born in Australia, and only 5 per cent were born in an English speaking or European country (recall that, as described above, ‘ethnic minority’ here is operationalized as being themselves born, or having at least one parent born, in a NESB or non-European country).

**Figure 4.2** Country of Birth for Ethnic Minority Australians, Australia 2004-2019

![Graph showing country of birth for ethnic minority Australians](image)

*Note*: Data obtained from the 2004-2019 Australian Election Study. Figures are percentages of each ethnic group in the sample.

Given the increased focus of the Australian government on skilled migration in recent years, we might expect ethnic minority respondents (most of whom are first-generation migrants) to be on average well educated. Indeed, the data support this hypothesis. Figure 4.3 shows the university education status of ethnic minority respondents compared to their white-Anglo counterparts. 42 per cent of ethnic minority respondents have some form of university degree (bachelor or postgrad), compared to only 27 per cent of white-Anglo respondents. A Chi-2 analysis indicates this difference is statistically significant at the 0.001 level.
**Figure 4.3 Educational Attainment by Ethnic Group, Australia 2004-2019**

![Bar graph showing educational attainment by ethnic group, Australia 2004-2019.](image)

**Note:** Data obtained from the 2004-2019 Australian Election Study. Figures are percentages of each ethnic group in the sample. Totals may not appear to add up to 100% due to rounding. Pearson chi²(1) = 155.8950; Pr = 0.000. N for white-Anglo voters: 11,087. N for ethnic minority voters: 1,796.

As we might expect, these differences in education translate to differences in income. Figure 4.4 shows the annual household income of respondents according to their ethnic group status. Ethnic minority respondents are overrepresented in the fifth quintile compared to white-Anglo respondents (34 per cent compared to 26 per cent, respectively). The opposite is true for the second, third and fourth quintiles, where there are more white-Anglo respondents as a proportion of their population than ethnic minority respondents. The differences are significant at the 0.001 level.
Figure 4.4 Household Income by Ethnic Group, Australia 2004-2019

Note: Data obtained from the 2004-2019 Australian Election Study. Figures are percentages of each ethnic group in the sample. Totals may not appear to add up to 100% due to rounding. Pearson chi2(4) = 61.9869; Pr = 0.000. N for white-Anglo voters: 11,271. N for ethnic minority voters: 2,000.

Turning to respondent’s political attitudes and behaviour, Figure 4.5 shows white-Anglo respondents are much more likely to vote for the centre-right Coalition (encompassing the Liberal and National parties). By contrast, ethnic minority respondents are only slightly more likely to vote for the centre-left parties (Labor and Greens), with the balance of ethnic minority respondents voting for a minor party. This difference is statistically significant at the 0.001 level.
Figure 4.5 Vote Choice by Ethnic Group, Australia 2004-2019

![Bar chart showing vote choice by ethnic group.](image)

**Note:** Data obtained from the 2004-2019 Australian Election Study. Figures are percentages of each ethnic group in the sample. Totals may not appear to add up to 100% due to rounding. Pearson chi2(2) = 67.3670 Pr = 0.000. N for white-Anglo voters: 11,492. N for ethnic minority voters: 2,092.

Figure 4.6 shows respondents’ political interest by ethnic group. Ethnic minority respondents are less likely than white-Anglo respondents to say they have ‘a good deal’ of interest in politics (31 per cent compared to 38 per cent, respectively), and are more likely to say they have ‘not much’ or ‘none’. Both groups have similar levels of respondents who indicate they have ‘some’ interest in politics. These findings are significant at the 0.001 level and are in keeping with prior research.
Figure 4.6 Political Interest by Ethnic Group, Australia 2004-2019

Note: Data obtained from the 2004-2019 Australian Election Study. Figures are percentages of each ethnic group in the sample. Totals may not appear to add up to 100% due to rounding. Data correspond to respondents’ answers to the question: ‘Generally speaking, how much interest do you usually have in what's going on in politics?’ Pearson chi2(3) = 97.6220; Pr = 0.000. N for white-Anglo voters: 11,431. N for ethnic minority voters: 2,085.

With regard to external efficacy – the main dependent variable of this analysis – Figure 4.7 shows that ethnic minority respondents are slightly more likely than ethnic majority respondents to have high perceptions of government responsiveness. This, too, is in keeping with previous literature that shows newly arrived migrants have higher diffuse support for the regime at the onset of their Australian experience. However, while these differences are significant at the 0.01 level, they remain substantively small.
**Figure 4.7** External Efficacy by Ethnic Group, Australia 2004-2019

![External Efficacy by Ethnic Group, Australia 2004-2019](image)

**Note:** Data obtained from the 2004-2019 Australian Election Study. Figures are percentages of each ethnic group in the sample. Totals may not appear to add up to 100% due to rounding. Data correspond to an index created from respondents’ answers to the questions: (1) ‘Some people say that political parties in Australia care what ordinary people think. Others say that political parties in Australia don't care what ordinary people think. Where would you place your view on this scale from 1 to 5?’ (2) ‘Some people say that Federal politicians know what ordinary people think. Others say that Federal politicians don't know much about what ordinary people think. Where would you place your view on this scale from 1 to 5?’ Pearson chi2(2) = 10.4391; Pr = 0.005. N for white-Anglo voters: 11,451. N for ethnic minority voters: 1,995.

In summary, while ethnic minority respondents are more educated and slightly wealthier than white-Anglo voters, they tend to be less interested in politics and have similar levels of external efficacy. In the next section, I examine whether these differences are conditional on candidate-level descriptive representation. As described in the hypotheses, I expect ethnic minority voters to have higher external efficacy in the presence of an ethnic minority candidate. By contrast, I expect white-Anglo voters to have lower levels of external efficacy in the presence of an ethnic minority candidate.
4.6 Results and Discussion

The results of the regression analysis broken down by ethnic group are shown in Table 4.1. In terms of the impact of descriptive representation, the analysis finds no evidence that ethnic minority voters feel like the political system is more responsive when an ethnic minority candidate runs in their electorate. As a result, Hypothesis 1 is not supported. By contrast, the results suggest white-Anglo voters feel differently. Table 4.1, specification 2 suggests white-Anglo voters feel like the political system is less responsive to their demands when an ethnic minority candidate runs in their electorate – regardless of whether or not they win. Given the small number of ethnic minority candidates, it is perhaps unsurprising the results narrowly miss the conventional threshold for statistical significance (p = 0.058). Overall, these findings support Hypothesis 2.

The results broken down by vote choice are shown in Table 4.2. The differences between specification 1 (Coalition voters) and specification 2 (Labor/Greens voters) suggest there are partisan differences in terms of attitudes towards ethnic minority candidates. Coalition voters in particular feel like the political system is worse at representing their interests when an ethnic minority candidate runs in their electorate, though the results are only significant at the 0.1 level (p = 0.086).

The political determinants of external efficacy largely support the previous literature. Table 4.1 shows that voting for the winning candidate, having higher levels of political interest and stronger partisan attachments all increase voters’ external efficacy. While political interest and partisan attachment hold as statistically significant predictors of external efficacy in Table 4.2, the results suggest that voting for the winning candidate matters less when party choice is taken into account. Table 4.1 suggests living in a more ethnically diverse neighbourhood is associated with higher perceptions of government responsiveness. While the results in Table 4.2 support this finding, they also suggest this effect is stronger.
**Figure 4.8 Effect of Minority Candidates on External Efficacy, Australia 2004-2019**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ethnic Minority Voters</th>
<th>White-Anglo Voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic minority contested</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>-0.058*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted for winner</td>
<td>0.103**</td>
<td>0.105***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>0.107**</td>
<td>0.152***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID Strength</td>
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<td>0.164***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent foreign-born</td>
<td>0.428+</td>
<td>0.420***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.226)</td>
<td>(0.087)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (years)</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.028***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (squared)</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.235***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 Election</td>
<td>0.185</td>
<td>0.226***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.120)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 Election</td>
<td>0.256*</td>
<td>0.340***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013 Election</td>
<td>-0.058</td>
<td>0.098*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.105)</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016 Election</td>
<td>0.155+</td>
<td>0.199***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019 Election</td>
<td>-0.116</td>
<td>-0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.095)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Quintile</td>
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<td>0.130***</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.087)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Quintile</td>
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<td>0.192***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.088)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
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<td>Fourth Quintile</td>
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<td>0.213***</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth Quintile</td>
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<td>0.289***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.033)</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<td>2.060***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.255)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1264</td>
<td>8997</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Data obtained from the 2004-2019 Australian Election Study.
### Figure 4.9 Effect of Minority Candidates on External Efficacy by Vote Choice, Australia 2004-2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Coalition Voters</th>
<th>(2) Labor/Greens Voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic minority contested</td>
<td>-0.070*</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted for winner</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
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<td>0.157***</td>
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<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party ID Strength</td>
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<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent foreign-born</td>
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<td>0.683***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.115)</td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
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<td>Age (years)</td>
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<td>-0.021***</td>
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<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (squared)</td>
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<td>0.000***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>0.200***</td>
<td>0.256***</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
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<td>Female</td>
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<td>-0.011</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004 Election</td>
<td>0.266***</td>
<td>0.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 Election</td>
<td>0.117*</td>
<td>0.499***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
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<td>2013 Election</td>
<td>-0.201***</td>
<td>0.304***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.055)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016 Election</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.296***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019 Election</td>
<td>-0.201***</td>
<td>0.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Quintile</td>
<td>0.086+</td>
<td>0.094*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Quintile</td>
<td>0.118**</td>
<td>0.114*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Quintile</td>
<td>0.122*</td>
<td>0.126**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth Quintile</td>
<td>0.168***</td>
<td>0.231***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.431***</td>
<td>1.873***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.143)</td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>4826</td>
<td>4581</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note**: Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Data obtained from the 2004-2019 Australian Election Study.
among voters who support left-wing parties (Labor/Greens) compared to those who support right-wing parties (Coalition).

Finally, the demographic predictors of external efficacy also largely conform to theoretical expectations. University-educated and wealthier respondents feel that the political system is more responsive to their demands (Tables 4.1 and 4.2). However, Table 4.1 shows that the effects for income are driven by white-Anglo respondents, while wealthier ethnic minority respondents feel no better represented than poorer ethnic minority respondents. Gender is not significant in any of the models, supporting previous research that has found the gender gap in external efficacy has largely dissipated (Acock and Clarke 1990, 99). Finally, age appears to have a non-linear relationship with external efficacy – first decreasing with age, then increasing.

Overall, the findings for representation are clear: there is no evidence of a descriptive representation effect for candidates in Australia. In other words, the presence of an ethnic minority candidate is not associated with higher levels of external efficacy for minority voters. Perhaps these results are not altogether surprising, given the low number of minority candidates that stand for public office and the even lower number who win. These findings suggest it may not be enough to have descriptive representation at the candidate level – rather, it may take those candidates actually being elected. However, there is evidence of a ‘backlash’ effect for white-Anglo respondents – for them, the presence of an ethnic minority candidate is associated with lower external efficacy. In other words, white-Anglo respondents are less likely to think non-white candidates will be responsive to people like them. These results are more surprising, since the analysis considers candidates, not representatives. Indeed, most of the candidates considered above did not win their elections. This suggests there may be a more deep-seated unease among white-Anglo Australians with being represented by an ethnic minority legislator. This finding is consistent with prior work in
other jurisdictions, which shows the descriptive representation of ethnic minorities sometimes reduces the diffuse support of ethnic majorities (Scherer and Curry 2010). Negative attitudes towards Muslim Australians, in particular, have many parallels with the ‘old-fashioned racism’ of the White Australia era, a fact which does not appear to have changed over two decades of research (McAllister and Moore 1991; K. Dunn, Klocker, and Salabay 2007). Finally, there are partisan differences in these results – Coalition voters have lower external efficacy when an ethnic minority candidate runs in their electorate, while there is no effect for Labor/Greens voters. Overall, only Hypothesis 2 (majority candidate backlash) is supported.

While the results are relatively consistent, it is difficult to be sure of the direction of this relationship. For example, Pietsch (2018) argues the low level of descriptive representation in Australia is, at least in part, a function of discrimination and structural inequality. Political parties in Australia are hesitant to put ethnic minority candidates on the ballot for fear of how the native-born population will react. Thus, as discussed above, these findings could represent some evidence these fears are well founded. By contrast, it is also possible parties are only nominating ethnic minority candidates in areas where they are unlikely to win, and perceptions of responsiveness are already lower. This idea is an extension of the ‘sacrificial lamb’ hypothesis advanced in the context of women’s descriptive representation (Thomas and Bodet 2013), and echoes work in other contexts that shows ethnic minority candidates tend to be nominated in electorates with low winnability (Kulich, Ryan, and Haslam 2014). This possibility will be considered in Chapter 7, where the analysis finds the former explanation – that ethnic minority representation causes white-Anglo backlash – is more likely.

Why is the presence of minority candidates not associated with differences in the political attitudes of minority voters? This finding is at odds with some of the existing literature, which holds that the descriptive representation increases diffuse support (Banducci,
Donovan, and Karp 2004; Pantoja and Segura 2003). There are several possible explanations for why this might be the case. Here, I briefly consider four of them.

First, most of the existing literature on the relationship between descriptive representation and external efficacy is based on the United States, a country that is much more polarized along racial lines than Australia. Race and racial relations are a major focus of American political discourse, which is not surprising given the United States’ long and turbulent history of minority oppression including slavery, laws that both explicitly and implicitly target ethnic minorities, and modern-day tension between minorities and state actors (such as the police). By contrast, while Australia also has a long history of discrimination and bias against immigrants, race-relations are not a major subject in Australian political discourse. Simply put, when ethnic tension is lower, it is possible the power of descriptive representation may be reduced.

Second, most existing literature on descriptive representation and political attitudes measures how voters respond to ethnic minority legislators. By contrast, this study evaluated how voters respond to minority candidates. Australian legislators are overwhelmingly white; it is possible that as more ethnic minorities win elected office, members of these groups will see more benefits to being represented by ‘one of their own’. Future chapters of this thesis will evaluate this point directly; ethnic minority communities in both Canada and the United Kingdom have had more success in securing elected office.

Third, most voters are not likely to know or care how many ethnic candidates are running in other electorates. A candidate-based study is necessarily dyadic in nature – that is, focusing on the relationship between voters and candidates in their electorate. Many of the findings of a positive descriptive representation effect are related to collective (legislature-level) and elite descriptive representation. As discussed above, this may change as more minority legislators win elected office. It is possible the political attitudes of ethnic minorities
may change in response to a certain minimum threshold of minority legislators, beyond which there is a greater likelihood of minority-friendly policy change.

Fourth, this analysis groups all ethnic minorities under one common banner – an inevitable practical constraint related to minimum sample size. Most research on ethnic minorities follows this procedure for the same reason. However, this approach comes with the assumption that these individuals are somehow linked by their ‘otherness’ – their status as standing apart from the ethnic majority. It remains to be seen whether these individuals do not just stand apart from the ethnic majority, but also whether they stand together as a common group. As Pietsch (2018, 130) illustrates, significant differences in external efficacy exist within the broad category of ‘ethnic minority’. Moreover as Zingher and Farrer argue, grouping ethnic minorities together provides a high bar for the analysis, increasing the possibility of Type II error: “[theoretically], there is no reason why a South Asian voter would be more likely to support a West Indian candidate, even though they are both coded as ethnic minorities in our analysis” (2016, 695). Future work should examine these groups as separately as possible, an approach which the next chapter adopts to a greater extent.

4.7 Conclusion

As discussed at various points throughout this chapter, very little research has been conducted on how descriptive representation affects the political attitudes of ethnic minorities outside of the United States. While this not only limits our understanding of other democratic contexts, it also limits our understanding of the mechanism behind this relationship; racial tension in the United States is high, and racial relations are a very salient issue in political discourse. As such, it is difficult to tell whether the two variables are related in contexts where ethnicity is less salient.
Since very few non-white Australians have been elected to the House of Representatives, this analysis turned to the next best option for descriptive representation in Australian federal politics – how political candidates with an ethnic minority background influence those whom they seek to represent. While later chapters will consider how electing ethnic minorities changes political attitudes, Australia provides a unique case of a developed, Western democracy that has very low levels of minority representation. As such, Australia is an instructive example of what a ‘baseline’ might look like – a very diverse society where parties field some ethnic minority candidates, but in which they have yet to win federal office in large number. Alternatively, other unobserved elements of Australian political culture may have led to this result, which in turn mediate the relationship between descriptive representation and diffuse support.

As this analysis demonstrated, minority Australians do not appear to have higher levels of external efficacy when given an opportunity to vote for a fellow minority. This could be due to the unit of analysis – perhaps it actually takes a minority being elected to office for a voter to update their political attitudes. Alternatively, minority representation might be best understood as a collective phenomenon – perhaps it is not just a question of being elected to office, but rather being elected in large number. By contrast, white-Anglo respondents tend to feel like minority candidates will be less likely to care about what people like them think and have lower levels of external efficacy when given an opportunity to vote for a non-white candidate. This finding supports prior work that shows Australian voters are biased against non-white candidates.

In the next chapter, I will evaluate how voters respond to ethnic minority candidates in the United Kingdom, a case of a diverse, advanced democracy very similar to Australia, but where ethnic communities have had more success in winning elected office. This will allow me to test several of the explanations mentioned above for why minorities in Australia
do not seem to have higher levels of diffuse support when given an opportunity to vote for a member of their group.
So far, this thesis has investigated the foundations of the relationship between descriptive representation and external efficacy and has examined the Australian case to see whether our theoretical expectations are borne out in the real world. As the analysis showed, there is limited evidence that candidate-based descriptive representation modifies the way ethnic minority voters feel about the responsiveness of government (Hypothesis 1). By contrast, members of the white-Anglo majority group displayed a negative reaction to this increased diversity (Hypothesis 2).

Why does candidate-level descriptive representation fail to alter the political attitudes of ethnic minority voters? As discussed in the previous chapter, many explanations are possible. This chapter will investigate several of those possibilities; in particular, the potential impact of co-ethnic ties (compared to co-minority ties) and legislator-voter ties (compared to candidate-voter ties). It will also explore whether an explicit preference for descriptive representation and co-ethnic mobilization moderate the relationship between representation and perceptions of legitimacy.
This chapter will first discuss how immigration and diversity inform modern British politics. Second, it will explore how representation interacts with partisanship and consider how this may affect the relationship between representation and political attitudes. Third, this chapter will discuss prior research on political attitudes and behaviour in the British context and examine how this research informs the hypotheses of this study. Fourth, it will outline the data and methods this study will use. Fifth, this chapter will present the main findings of the analysis and discuss their implications. Finally, it will conclude by discussing how these results fit into the broader goals of this thesis by helping further understand the mechanisms which connect descriptive representation and external efficacy.

5.1 Immigration and Diversity in British Society

While non-white communities have resided in Britain for several centuries, “It is clear from even a cursory glance at Britain’s past that it has become a [true] multi-racial society only very recently” (Spencer 1997, 2). Until the 1950s, the total population of those from the Indian sub-continent, Africa and Caribbean remained a tiny fraction of the total population, and “[as] recently as 1939 the permanent Asian and black population of Britain was officially estimated at about 7,000 people” (Spencer 1997, 3). In the post-war period, Britain became one of the first European countries to experience mass migration, especially from Commonwealth countries in South Asia, Africa and the Caribbean (Sanders, Heath, et al. 2014; Saggar 2015). Migration from these ‘new’ Commonwealth countries was driven by post-war reconstruction and labour shortages (A. Heath et al. 2013). By the early 1960s, Asian and black communities represented one quarter of one percent of the British population. After the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, non-white communities grew larger and “quickly began to regard themselves and be regarded by others as a permanent part of British life” (Spencer 1997, 4). As of 1991, approximately 6 per cent of individuals in
Britain identified with a non-white ethnic group. This figure rose to approximately 9 per cent in 2001, and 14 per cent in 2011 (E. White 2012).

The discussion of ‘ethnic minorities’ in Britain broadly refers to immigrants and their descendants from five ethnic groups: Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, black African and black Caribbean (A. Heath et al. 2013; Saggar 2015). These first three groups, along with individuals of Sri Lankan origin, are sometimes grouped into the broader category of ‘British Asian’ (Fieldhouse and Cutts 2008a). Individuals who fall into one of the five groups discussed above are sometimes referred to as ‘Black and Minority Ethnic’ (BME) or ‘Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic’ (BAME) (see A. Heath et al. 2013; Saalfeld and Kyriakopoulou 2010; Saalfeld and Bischof 2013; Thrasher et al. 2013 as examples). Members of these communities face a well-documented set of social and economic obstacles, including unfavourable labour market outcomes, health experiences, racial harassment and housing discrimination (Fieldhouse and Cutts 2008a; Saggar 2015).

Not only is each group identified above quite different from the others, they are also internally diverse. For examples, two individuals of ‘Indian’ origin could have been born in different countries, adhere to different religions, have different mother language and socio-economic backgrounds. Black Africans are the most diverse category of visible minorities identified above, while Bangladeshi migrants are the most homogenous (A. Heath et al. 2013, 25). Nevertheless, there is evidence of ‘pan-ethnic’ patterns and experiences, where the black groups differ from the Asian groups in levels of social capital, economic success and discrimination, among other factors (A. Heath et al. 2013). As a result, examining ‘black’ and ‘South Asian’ communities is a useful point of departure.

Other similarities characterize the British immigrant experience more broadly. Most immigrants in the post-war period came to Britain as the result of ‘positive selection’ – that is, on the basis of valuable, in-demand skills and attributes. In other words, most immigrants
to Britain “were not people coming from the lowest social levels of their societies but were typically exceptional (relative to their non-migrant peers in their countries of origin) in their educational levels, and were probably exceptional in other ways too, such as their drive and determination” (A. Heath et al. 2013, 27). For example, many highly educated Indians and black Caribbeans came to Britain to work as doctors and nurses in the National Health Service (NHS), while others came to work on the London underground. Many black African migrants came to study at British universities. All three East Asian groups had some tradition of military service in the British armed forces or merchant navy. Many have a wealth of experience with British institutions; a large number of Indian and Pakistani migrants were former colonial officials in East Africa, acting as middlemen between British colonists and the African population living under colonial rule (A. Heath et al. 2013). Finally, despite their diversity of primary languages and experience of ‘ethnic penalties’, each of these groups is overwhelmingly fluent in English and now have substantial middle classes (A. Heath et al. 2013).

5.2 Ethnicity and Representation in British Politics

Though Britain has become a true multi-ethnic society only recently, the first ethnic minority representatives were elected to Parliament as far back as the 1880s. Between 1880 and 1930, four ethnic minority Members of Parliament (MPs) took their seats in the House of Commons. However, this initial increase in minority representation was short-lived. In 1987, after nearly six decades of ethnically homogenous parliaments, four ethnic minority MPs were sent to Parliament – all from the Labour party (Saalfeld and Kyriakopoulou 2010; Audickas and Apostolova 2017). Ethnic minority representation rose steadily over the next thirty years, with each successive election resulting in steady gains for ethnic representation. In 2010, ethnic minorities almost doubled their representation compared to the previous
election, with twenty-seven ethnic minority MPs elected compared to fifteen in 2005. As of the 2017 election, fifty two MPs, or 8 percent of the House of Commons, have an ethnic minority background – compared to about 14 percent of the UK population (Audickas and Apostolova 2017). Representation is even lower in the House of Lords, where less than 6 per cent of the chamber is non-white (Browning and Uberoi 2019).

Representation of ethnic minorities in Britain’s devolved legislatures is similarly poor. Devolution arrangements in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and London contained provisions to increase the descriptive representation of women, ethnic minorities and people with disabilities, and each of the 1998-1999 devolution laws passed for all four legislatures contained so-called ‘equality clauses’ (Chaney and Fevre 2002, 900). While women candidates were very successful in the first post-devolution elections, few non-white candidates were nominated for the major parties and none were successful in Northern Ireland, Scotland or Wales (Chaney and Fevre 2002; Mitchell and Bradbury 2004). As of 2019, only 2 per cent and 3 per cent of Members of the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Whales, respectively, come from ethnic minority backgrounds, while none of the Members of the Northern Ireland Assembly are non-white (Browning and Uberoi 2019).

There is some evidence that increases in ethnic minority representation have been associated with more attention to the specific problems and concerns of ethnic minority voters. For example, ethnic minority MPs introduce and contribute to discussions of race-specific topics in Parliament, as well as asking more parliamentary questions about the problems ethnic minorities face (Nixon 1998; Saalfeld and Bischof 2013). However, ethnic minority MPs are not immune to the incentive structures of party politics, and these trends may be more apparent for low-consequence behaviour. For example, existing research finds minority politicians are more willing to make minority-specific interventions in the House than rebelling in division lobbies (Saalfeld and Kyriakopoulou 2010). Ethnic minority MPs
resemble their white-Anglo colleagues in other respects as well. While BAME candidates are typically younger, better educated and more male than candidates as a whole, there is some evidence these candidates conform to certain aspects of an ‘archetypal candidate,’ such as being long-time party activists and members of closed patronage networks. In this way, ethnic minority MPs are ‘acceptably different’ from their colleagues (Durose et al. 2013; Thrasher et al. 2013).

Partisanship forms the subtext of much of the relationship between ethnic minorities and their representatives. The so-called ‘iron law’ of British ethnic minority politics is that ethnic minorities vote for the Labour Party (Saggar 2000). Labour’s success with ethnic minority voters is linked to its support for policies that advance social justice and reduce inequality, such as advancing Britain’s first anti-discrimination laws in the mid-1960s and 1970s (Saggar 2015). Ethnic minority partisans are almost ten per cent more likely to vote for Labour when an ethnic minority candidate is running for their party (Zingher and Farrer 2016). Further, not only are Pakistani voters more likely to vote for Pakistani candidates (Fisher et al. 2014), they are more likely to turn out when given the option to vote for a Pakistani Labour candidate in the first place (Martin 2016).

By contrast, the Conservative Party has a more strained relationship with ethnic minority voters (Rich 1998). As Saggar writes, “the Conservatives continue to be the party of ‘race rows’” because of continuous internal debate about the role of ethnic pluralism in British society and politics (2000, 82). Sobolewska (2013) notes some Conservatives are well aware of their image as out-of-touch and elitist. She cites a report by the party’s biggest donor, Lord Ashcroft, in examining how a lack of descriptive representation contributed to the party’s 2005 electoral defeat. In examining ‘What Happened, and Why’, Lord Ashcroft succinctly summarised the problem the Conservative party faced: “The problem was not that
millions of people in Britain thought the Conservative Party wasn’t like them and didn’t understand them; the problem was that they were right” (Ashcroft 2005, 111).

Despite Labour’s success with ethnic minority voters, debate about whether the party has taken ethnic minority voters for granted goes back to at least the mid-1970s. For example, it was not until the early 1980s that black activists succeeded in placing black representation on Labour’s agenda (Shukra 1998; Saggar 2000). Throughout this period, “the Labour Party was primarily motivated by a need to maintain the support of black voters without alienating white people” (Shukra 1998, 121). This has led some observers to describe Labour’s outlook towards ethnic minorities as “basically supportive, albeit sometimes Janus-faced” (A. Heath et al. 2013, 89).

The 2010 general election saw more ethnic minority candidates nominated for both major parties, albeit through different routes; Labour has formalised a process of trying to select more ethnic minority candidates, while the Conservatives have opted for a ‘colour-blind’ approach (Sobolewska, McKee, and Campbell 2018). The results of these strategies are ultimately evident in the patterns of ethnic minority nominations. High electorate-level diversity is connected to the nomination of Labour ethnic minority candidates, whereas Conservative ethnic minority MPs tend to be nominated in predominantly white electorates (Saggar 2015; Farrer and Zingher 2018). Ethnic diversity can influence candidate nomination in several ways; for example, Akhtar and Peace (2018) have shown biraderi kinship networks to mobilise British Pakistani voters in nominating candidates for public office.

Figure 5.1 shows the number of ethnic minority MPs elected to the British Parliament from 1987 to 2017. The combined effect of differential selection rules and BME voters’ preference for Labour have translated to greater electoral representation for Labour BME MPs; of the 52 non-white MPs elected in 2017, 32 MPs (62 per cent) were from the Labour party. Despite this, there is broader evidence that ethnic minority candidates face measurable
levels of discrimination from voters at the polls (Stegmaier, Lewis-Beck, and Smets 2013; Fisher et al. 2014; Thrasher et al. 2017). At least in part because of this, the overall representation of BME voters in Parliament remains lower than their share of the overall population.

Figure 5.1 Ethnic Minority MPs in Britain, 1987-2017

Note: Data obtained from House of Commons Library – see Browning and Uberoi (2019).

5.3 Ethnicity, Political Attitudes and Behaviour

Ethnic minority voters resemble majority voters in much of their political behaviour and attitudes. In terms of political behaviour, ethnic minorities have similar rates of both electoral and non-electoral participation to their white counterparts (A. Heath et al. 2013). Second generation migrants in particular are closer to their white British peers, with these voters showing similar levels of political interest, political knowledge and sense of civic duty.
Further, ethnic minorities share the ethnic majority’s sense of concern about government performance, and members of both groups are unlikely to indicate they have much real influence on the political process (A. Heath et al. 2013; Sanders, Fisher, et al. 2014). Finally, there is evidence ethnic minority voters share many of the same policy concerns as ethnic majority voters (A. Heath et al. 2013). In this sense, the Downsian logic of voting for the party closest to an individual in ideological space appears to apply to ethnic minority voters to the same extent as to ethnic majority voters (Sanders, Heath, et al. 2014).

Despite these similarities, ethnic minority voters are different in a number of respects. For example, even though both groups of registered voters turn out at the same rates, ethnic minority voters are less likely to register in the first place (A. Heath et al. 2013). Further, broad similarities in attitudes towards the state obscure marked differences; for instance, ethnic minorities trust the police much less than ethnic majority voters – by margins of up to 20 points, while first-generation migrants are more satisfied with democracy and committed to voting than white Britons (A. Heath et al. 2013). There is also evidence ethnic minority voters are distinct along certain important policy domains, wherein many ‘mainstream’ issues matter little in determining how these citizens vote (Sobolewska 2005). For example, even though both groups are concerned about the economy and reducing crime, ethnic minority voters are more likely to prioritize unemployment and protecting the rights of the accused compared to majority voters (A. Heath et al. 2013). Minority voters are also much more likely to care about access to equal opportunities for ethnic minorities, remedies to racial discrimination, and the right to asylum (A. Heath et al. 2013). Further, despite the considerable heterogeneity that exists within the broad category of ‘ethnic minority,’ there is evidence these preferences are shared broadly across most ethnic minority groups (A. Heath et al. 2013). This furthers the case that ethnic minority voters – as a group – are worthy of further empirical examination.
The research on the individual-level consequences of descriptive representation in Britain is limited. Prior research suggests descriptive representation increases co-minority voting in British elections (Zingher and Farrer 2016). The benefits of descriptive representation (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3) should also extend to ethnic minority voters’ attitudes towards the state, especially considering the distinct elements of minority political attitudes and behaviour described above. This leads to the expectation that:

\textit{H1 (co-minority candidate efficacy): Ethnic minority respondents will have higher levels of external efficacy when a minority candidate runs in their electorate.}

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, however, descriptive representation at the candidate level alone may not be enough to affect perceptions of responsiveness. Indeed, it may take actually getting elected to high office for the benefits of descriptive representation to translate to changes in political attitudes. This variant of the co-minority hypothesis may be expressed as:

\textit{H3 (co-minority legislator efficacy): Ethnic minority respondents will have higher levels of external efficacy when a minority legislator is elected in their electorate.}

In their paper on the electoral effects of descriptive representation, Zingher and Farrer (2016) argue that while combining ethnic minority groups is often necessary for methodological reasons pertaining to small sample sizes, this increases the possibility of a Type II error (the researcher failing to reject the null hypothesis of no relationship, when indeed a relationship is present). Indeed, as they write, “Theoretically, there is no reason why
a South Asian voter would be more likely to support a West Indian candidate,” even though both would be coded as ‘ethnic minorities’ in such an analysis (2016, 695). The results of the previous chapter’s analysis reinforce this concern. Therefore, it would be useful to further disentangle the groups that fall into the broad category of ‘ethnic minority.’ We may therefore expect that:

**H4 (co-ethnic legislator efficacy): Ethnic minority respondents will have higher levels of external efficacy when a co-ethnic legislator is elected in their electorate.**

As described in Chapter 3, studies of the benefits of descriptive representation must be aware of the risks of essentialist claims which reduce non-white voters and representatives to their ethnicity alone. In other words, we should not assume all members of an ethnic group prefer to be represented by a co-ethnic legislator, or that ethnic ties bind voters and representatives by default. Instead, it could be that only those individuals with an explicit preference for descriptive representation would incur the benefits of co-ethnic representation. This leads to the expectation that:

**H6 (DR preference): Ethnic minority respondents with an explicit preference for descriptive representation will have higher levels of external efficacy when a co-ethnic legislator is elected in their electorate.**

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9 This argument extends to the relationship between Indian and Pakistani voters and representatives, for example. Potential tension between British Indian and Pakistani communities increase the risk of type II error. However, in so far as an important mechanism between descriptive representation and diffuse support is evidence that non-White Britons have a place in political life, it is reasonable to expect voters’ underlying attitudes towards the state may still change.
Finally, since British general elections are not governed by compulsory voting, it provides a useful case to test the potential impact of differential mobilization on political attitudes. Indeed, existing research suggests this may be an important consideration. For example, there is evidence larger ethnic minority communities are associated with higher rates of electoral registration and voter turnout among ethnic minorities (Fieldhouse and Cutts 2008b; 2008a). Further, co-ethnic discussion networks, mobilization through places of worship, and ethnic organizations all stimulate the political participation of ethnic minorities, most likely through community pressure and increased availability of political resources (Sobolewska et al. 2015; Pilati and Morales 2016; Galandini and Fieldhouse 2019). These contextual effects represent the influence of an individual’s social network – their family, friends, neighbours, and co-workers – on their own beliefs and actions (Mutz 1998; Johnston et al. 2005). As a result, we might also expect differential mobilization to moderate the relationship between descriptive representation and external efficacy:

\[ H7 \text{ (mobilization): Ethnic minority respondents will have higher levels of external efficacy when a co-ethnic legislator is elected in their electorate and they are mobilized to vote through their ethnic or religious community.} \]

The next section outlines the data and methods this analysis will use to examine these five hypotheses.

5.4 Data and Methods

This chapter investigates the extent to which descriptive representation among political candidates and elected legislators is associated with differences in the political attitudes of British voters in their electorates. In most jurisdictions, a national election study
would be a natural source of high-quality data collected using probability-based sampling methods. However, one major drawback of population-level sampling used by most election studies is the small sample of ethnic minority respondents. This limits the possibility of making detailed statistical inferences about members of these groups.

In Britain, one major advance in our ability to understand ethnic minority political attitudes and behaviour comes from the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES), conducted by Fisher et al. (2012). The EMBES uses probability-based sampling methods to collect representative samples of each of the five largest ethnic groups in Britain: black Caribbean, black African, Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi. One important aspect of the EMBES was that respondents were able to answer the survey in a range of non-English languages, which included Punjabi, Urdu, Hindi, Gujarati and Bengali (Fisher et al. 2012). Further, the study was able to ask a range of questions that are specific to the experiences of ethnic minority citizens, which are otherwise unavailable in general surveys of the British public (Fisher et al. 2012).

For voter ethnicity, the EMBES asks respondents to self-identify which term best describes their own ethnic group. This avoids the potential pitfalls of asking about country of birth, a method which undercounts those who identify as a member of an ethnic minority but are second generation migrants and onwards, while overcounting those born abroad but who do not belong to the dominant ethnic group of the country. I use data on candidate ethnicity from Norris (2010), who codes candidates as either ‘white’ or ‘BME’. However, I also consulted candidate websites and media reports to code BME candidates as either ‘Black’ or ‘South Asian,’ further distinguishing between ‘Indian’ and ‘Pakistani’ candidates where
possible. As a result, the final dataset (which combines the EMBES and candidate data) uses the individual voter as the unit of analysis, but notes which voters had ethnic minority candidates compete in their electorates.

The dependent variable is external efficacy, which is measured in the EMBES using a survey question which asked respondents to indicate, ‘On a scale from 0 to 10 where 10 means a great deal of influence and 0 means no influence, how much influence do you have on politics and public affairs?’ The independent variables measure respondent and candidate ethnicity, considering whether a respondent voted for a descriptive representative and whether or not the candidate won. In this respect, I first examine all BME candidates together before looking at black and South Asian candidates separately. As a result, each of these three variables could take on one of four values, which represent whether the descriptive representative won or lost, and whether the respondent voted or did not vote for them.

To examine respondents’ preference for descriptive representation (Hypothesis 6), I analysed respondents’ answers to two EMBES survey questions. These questions asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they agree with the following statements: (1) ‘Black and Asian MPs can better represent Black and Asian interests than White MPs can,’ and (2) ‘Getting more Black and Asian people into Parliament would improve things for ethnic minorities in Britain.’ The results of each question were combined into an index to create a single variable ranging from 1 to 5.

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10 In practice however, the samples of Pakistani voters or Indian voters who had an opportunity to vote for Pakistani candidates or Indian candidates (respectively) are very small, and are not conducive to meaningful statistical analysis.

11 This variable, denoted as pref in Table A5.1 in the supplementary appendix, has a Cronbach’s Alpha value of 0.7, indicating an acceptable scale consistency.
To analyse mobilization effects, I followed Sobolewska et al. (2015) in examining whether a respondent’s local place of worship encouraged members to vote in the election. I also examined whether the respondent indicated they regularly read a newspaper that focuses on their own ethnic or religious community, since this is one major way in which political parties can target specific ethnic groups.

As in the previous chapter, the analysis also uses a number of control variables to account for alternative explanations of external efficacy. These variables are the ‘usual suspects’ in terms of determinants of political attitudes: age (both as a raw measure of years and as age-squared for non-linear effects), gender, household income and educational attainment. I expect that older, wealthier, more educated and male respondents should be more likely to think they have greater influence on politics and public affairs – reflecting the relatively greater privilege of each group compared to younger, poorer, less educated and women respondents, respectively. Finally, the models also account for the respondent’s level of political interest, since those who are more interested in politics should be more likely to think they can influence the political system. A description of these variables with summary statistics is shown in the supplementary appendix (Table A5.1).

The data in this analysis are organised hierarchically, with individual voters clustered in electoral districts. Multilevel modelling is the most appropriate way to account for the shared unobservable characteristics of each cluster, since we would expect voters who live in the same parliamentary constituency to have certain shared experiences. As a result, I specify a series of two-level random intercepts models below.

5.5 Descriptive Statistics

While there is considerable diversity within each of Britain’s five main ethnic groups, the differences between them are both revealing and informative. Starting first with their
respective countries of birth, Figure 5.2 shows the heterogenous origins of Britain’s ethnic minority communities. Here, countries are split across three groupings – Britain, what I have termed a respondent’s ‘country of ancestry,’ and ‘other’. In this context, country of ancestry refers to the country or set of countries referenced in the ethnic group’s name – that is, India for Indian respondents, Pakistan for Pakistani respondents, Bangladesh for Bangladeshi respondents, a Caribbean country for Black-Caribbean respondents, and an African country for Black-Africans.

Of all five groups, only a majority of black Caribbean respondents were born in Britain, which reflects the history of this group as the first to arrive in substantial numbers (A. Heath et al. 2013). Only about one-third of Pakistani and Indian respondents were born in Britain, as these groups began to migrate to Britain in the 1950s and 1960s. As the last of the South Asian groups to arrive in Britain, the vast majority (almost three-fourths) of Bangladeshi respondents were born in Bangladesh. Even this, however, is dwarfed by the 86 per cent of black African respondents who were born abroad. Figure 5.2 also shows that the Indian community is the most internally heterogenous according to country of birth, with 17 per cent born somewhere other than Britain or India. These differences are significant at the 0.001 level.
Figure 5.2 Country of Birth by Ethnic Group, Britain 2010

![Figure 5.2](image)

**Note:** Data obtained from the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES). Figures are percentages of each ethnic group in the sample. Totals may not appear to add up to 100% due to rounding. ‘Country of Ancestry’ refers to the country or region corresponding to respondents’ ethnic groups – specifically, India for Indian respondents, Pakistan for Pakistani respondents, Bangladesh for Bangladeshi respondents, the Caribbean countries for Black-Caribbean respondents, and an African country for Black-Africans. Ethnic groups have been adapted from a more detailed set of options according to the five main groups identified by Heath et al. (2013). Pearson chi²(8) = 379.0062; Pr = 0.000. N for Indian respondents: 587. N for Pakistani respondents: 668. N for Bangladeshi respondents: 270. N for Black-Caribbean respondents: 597. N for Black-African respondents: 524.

Figure 5.3 shows there is considerable variation in terms of educational attainment between the five main groups of interest. Indian and black African respondents are the best educated, with many of the latter originally coming to Britain to study at British universities (A. Heath et al. 2013). These two groups are slightly better educated than the broader British population, 27 per cent of whom have a higher degree qualification (Office for National Statistics 2013). By contrast, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and black Caribbean respondents are less likely to have a university education compared to the general population. The differences between these five ethnic groups are significant at the 0.001 level.
**Figure 5.3 Educational Attainment by Ethnic Group, Britain 2010**

![Educational Attainment by Ethnic Group, Britain 2010](image)

**Note:** Data obtained from the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES). Figures are percentages of each ethnic group in the sample. Totals may not appear to add up to 100% due to rounding. Ethnic groups have been adapted from a more detailed set of options according to the five main groups identified by Heath et al. (2013). Data correspond to the highest completed qualification of each respondent. Pearson chi2(4) = 55.2987; Pr = 0.000. N for Indian respondents: 587. N for Pakistani respondents: 668. N for Bangladeshi respondents: 270. N for Black-Caribbean respondents: 597. N for Black-African respondents: 524.

As we might expect, some of these differences in educational attainment translate to statistically significant differences in household income. Figure 5.4 shows the annual household income for each of our five main ethnic groups. As one of the two best educated groups, Indian respondents also have the highest household income. This group has the smallest proportion of respondents (30 per cent) with a household income less than £15,000 and the largest proportion (14 per cent) making more than £60,001. Interestingly, similar educational advantages seem to translate into less wealth for black African respondents – 44 per cent of whom make less than £15,000 and only 7 per cent of whom make more than £60,001. This could be because members of this group tend to be younger than those who identify as Indian (see Supplementary Appendix Figure A5.1). Nevertheless, Pakistani and
Bangladeshi respondents seem to be worst off in terms of income, 50 per cent and 58 per cent of whom make less than £15,000, respectively. Further, only 3 per cent of Pakistani respondents make more than £60,001, highlighting the dramatic differences in various forms of privilege afforded to members of each of these five groups. Pakistani and Bangladeshi respondents are also the youngest of the five groups, closely resembling the black African demographic but considerably younger than either of the Indian or black Caribbean groups (Figure A5.1).

**Figure 5.4 Income by Ethnic Group, Britain 2010**

![Income by Ethnic Group](image)

**Note:** Data obtained from the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES). Figures are percentages of each ethnic group in the sample. Totals may not appear to add up to 100% due to rounding. Ethnic groups have been adapted from a more detailed set of options according to the five main groups identified by Heath et al. (2013). Pearson chi²(20) = 88.3804; Pr = 0.000. N for Indian respondents: 386. N for Pakistani respondents: 340. N for Bangladeshi respondents: 154. N for Black-Caribbean respondents: 402. N for Black-African respondents: 351.

Figure 5.5 shows that, as consistent with prior research (i.e. Saggar 2000; 2015; A. Heath et al. 2013; Sobolewska 2013), BME respondents in this sample lean strongly towards
the Labour party. On average, 60 per cent of BME respondents prefer Labour compared to any other party. Even among Indian voters, the most Labour-sceptic group, more than half of respondents identify with that party. Black Caribbeans and black Africans are the most supportive of Labour, with more than two-thirds of respondents identifying with that party. By contrast, we see much less support for the Conservatives – from only 15 per cent for Indian respondents, to only 5 per cent among black Caribbean and black African respondents.

**Figure 5.5 Party Identification by Ethnic Group, Britain 2010**

![Party Identification by Ethnic Group](image)

**Note**: Data obtained from the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES). Figures are percentages of each ethnic group in the sample. Totals may not appear to add up to 100% due to rounding. Ethnic groups have been adapted from a more detailed set of options according to the five main groups identified by Heath et al. (2013). Data correspond to respondents’ answer to the question, ‘Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat, or what?’ Pearson chi²(16) = 127.6681; Pr = 0.000. N for Indian respondents: 587. N for Pakistani respondents: 668. N for Bangladeshi respondents: 270. N for Black-Caribbean respondents: 597. N for Black-African respondents: 524.

In addition to being Labour’s strongest supporters, black African voters are also the most politically interested ethnic minority group. Figure 5.6 shows that 47 per cent of black African respondents indicated they had either ‘quite a lot’ or ‘a great deal’ of interest in
British politics, compared to less than half that (22 per cent) among Bangladeshi respondents. This may be due to the relatively lower level of education among members of the latter group. Approximately 40 per cent Indian and black Caribbean respondents also had high political interest, compared to one-third of Pakistani respondents. These differences are significant at the 0.001 level.

**Figure 5.6 Political Interest by Ethnic Group, Britain 2010**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Political Interest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black-African</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-Caribbean</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-African</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-Caribbean</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-African</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-Caribbean</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Data obtained from the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES). Figures are percentages of each ethnic group in the sample. Totals may not appear to add up to 100% due to rounding. Ethnic groups have been adapted from a more detailed set of options according to the five main groups identified by Heath et al. (2013). Data correspond to respondents’ answer to the question, ‘How much interest do you generally have in what is going on in British politics?’ Pearson chi²(8) = 72.9431; Pr = 0.000. N for Indian respondents: 581. N for Pakistani respondents: 665. N for Bangladesh respondents: 267. N for Black-Caribbean respondents: 592. N for Black-African respondents: 519.

Figure 5.7 shows that, on the whole, BME individuals in Britain think they have little influence on politics and public affairs – that is, they have low levels of external efficacy. Only 19 per cent of BME respondents felt they had a lot of influence, while 43 per cent felt they had little. There were statistically significant differences between groups, however.
Black African respondents were the most efficacious, with one-quarter of respondents feeling like they had a lot of influence on politics in public affairs. This coincides with this group’s high level of political interest. Despite being the wealthiest of the five groups, Indian respondents had some of the lowest feelings of political efficacy. Only 17 per cent of Indian, Bangladeshi and black Caribbean respondents felt like they had a lot of influence over public affairs.

**Figure 5.7 External Efficacy by Ethnic Group, Britain 2010**

![Graph showing external efficacy by ethnic group.]

**Note:** Data obtained from the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES). Figures are percentages of each ethnic group in the sample. Totals may not appear to add up to 100% due to rounding. Ethnic groups have been adapted from a more detailed set of options according to the five main groups identified by Heath et al. (2013). Data correspond to respondents’ answer to the question, ‘On a scale from 0 to 10 where 10 means a great deal of influence and 0 means no influence, how much influence do you have on politics and public affairs?’ The answers were grouped into three categories; ‘low’ corresponds to 0-3, ‘medium’ corresponds to 4-6, and ‘high’ corresponds to 7-10). Pearson chi2(8) = 15.8963; Pr = 0.044. N for Indian respondents: 359. N for Pakistani respondents: 377. N for Bangladeshi respondents: 156. N for Black-Caribbean respondents: 376. N for Black-African respondents: 311.

Indian respondents’ low feelings of influence over public affairs should not be interpreted as representing a low level of civic engagement, however. Figure 5.8 shows
Indian respondents had by far the highest involvement in ethnic or religious associations compared to any other ethnic group. By contrast, less than one-quarter of Pakistani respondents participated in the activities of an ethnic or religious association in the last 12 months. These results are significant at the 0.001 level and provide some evidence of the strength of Indian identity in Britain.

Figure 5.8 Participation in Ethnic Cultural or Religious Association 12 Months by Ethnic Group, Britain 2010

![Bar chart showing participation in ethnic cultural or religious associations by ethnic group in Britain 2010.]

Note: Data obtained from the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES). Figures are percentages of each ethnic group in the sample. Totals may not appear to add up to 100% due to rounding. Ethnic groups have been adapted from a more detailed set of options according to the five main groups identified by Heath et al. (2013). Data correspond to respondents’ answer to the question, ‘Have you taken part in the activities of an ethnic or cultural association or club in the past 12 months?’ Pearson chi2(4) = 52.9764; Pr = 0.000. N for Indian respondents: 579. N for Pakistani respondents: 662. N for Bangladeshi respondents: 266. N for Black-Caribbean respondents: 592. N for Black-African respondents: 515.

Finally, Figure 5.9 shows respondents’ overall perceptions of discrimination by ethnic group. Perhaps not surprisingly, more black respondents experienced discrimination or unfair treatment in the last five years than South Asian respondents. In this respect, 51 per cent of
black Caribbeans and 42 per cent of black Africans indicated that they have experienced discrimination. By contrast, less than a third of each of the South Asian groups reported discrimination or unfair treatment in the last five years. These results are statistically significant at the 0.001 level.

Figure 5.9 Experiences of Discrimination in Last 5 Years by Ethnic Group, Britain 2010

Overall, these results paint a picture of a complex and multi-faceted set of relationships between individuals, communities and British society. For instance, while Indian respondents are some of the wealthiest and best educated in the EMBES sample, these benefits do not seem to translate into higher levels of external efficacy. By contrast, while
black Africans in the sample were overwhelmingly born abroad, they have the highest level of interest in politics and feelings of external efficacy. These results begin to paint a picture of the complexity and nuance that underlies the relationships between ethnic minority voters and the political system.

5.6 Results and Discussion

How does the descriptive representation of ethnic minorities in Britain change their perceptions of influence over the political process? Table 5.1 shows the overall effects for co-minority candidate efficacy (Hypothesis 1). As the results make clear, there is no statistically significant change in a respondent’s external efficacy when a BME candidate runs in their constituency. These results are consistent with those from the previous chapter, which show no effect for descriptive representation at the candidate-level alone.

When the results are broken down according to voting outcome (Table 5.2), a different story emerges. When a respondent from an ethnic minority group votes for a BME candidate, and that candidate wins, ethnic minority voters have a statistically significant increase in external efficacy. That is, when a minority voter is able to help elect a co-minority legislator, they are more likely to feel like they have more influence over the political process. These findings provide support for Hypothesis 3 (co-minority legislator efficacy). However, all other combinations of vote choice and electoral outcomes are not statistically significant. It appears that the act of voting for a descriptive representative does not increase external efficacy if that representative loses. Moreover, ethnic minority respondents do not appear to feel like the political system is more responsive to them if a descriptive representative they did not vote for wins. These results suggest the sheer presence of a descriptive representative may not be enough to change ethnic minority voters’ political attitudes – rather, supporting a winning descriptive representative drives the relationship.
### Table 5.1 The Effect of Minority Candidates on External Efficacy, Britain 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minories</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic minority contested constituency</td>
<td>0.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.180)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent is female</td>
<td>0.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age squared</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
<td>0.487***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent voted in election</td>
<td>0.728***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.161)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Household Income</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University educated</td>
<td>-0.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.169)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent electorate foreign-born</td>
<td>0.405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.633)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.617)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Dev. (Constant)</td>
<td>0.476**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Dev. (Residual)</td>
<td>2.759***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>groups</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Standard errors in parentheses. $^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$. Data obtained from the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES). The dependent variable is external efficacy, and corresponds to respondents’ answer to the question, ‘On a scale from 0 to 10 where 10 means a great deal of influence and 0 means no influence, how much influence do you have on politics and public affairs?’
### Table 5.2 The Effect of Minority Candidates on External Efficacy by Voting Outcomes, Britain 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Minorities</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>South Asian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Descriptive Representation (Baseline: No DR ran)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted for DR, and DR won</td>
<td>0.734*</td>
<td>0.278</td>
<td>1.644***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not vote for DR, but DR won</td>
<td>-0.159</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted for DR, but DR lost</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not vote for DR, but DR lost</td>
<td>-0.187</td>
<td>0.633</td>
<td>0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent is female</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age squared</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
<td>0.539***</td>
<td>0.383***</td>
<td>0.757***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Household Income</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University educated</td>
<td>-0.087</td>
<td>0.436*</td>
<td>-0.677**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent electorate foreign-born</td>
<td>0.249</td>
<td>1.183</td>
<td>-0.300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.918</td>
<td>1.368</td>
<td>0.742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Dev. (Constant)</td>
<td>0.505**</td>
<td>0.360</td>
<td>0.324*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Dev. (Residual)</td>
<td>2.759***</td>
<td>2.855***</td>
<td>2.643***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>1670</td>
<td>798</td>
<td>847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>groups</strong></td>
<td>176</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note**: Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Data obtained from the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES). The dependent variable is external efficacy, and corresponds to respondents’ answer to the question, ‘On a scale from 0 to 10 where 10 means a great deal of influence and 0 means no influence, how much influence do you have on politics and public affairs?’
between representation and external efficacy. In this respect, it could be that the act of supporting a descriptive representative that wins provides evidence that political action can affect the broader political system.

How do these results compare when voters and legislators are broken down by co-ethnic ties? Table 5.2 also shows the impact of election outcomes among co-ethnic candidates on external efficacy. The results show a strong and statistically significant relationship for South Asian co-ethnic ties; when South Asian voters vote for a South Asian candidate, and that candidate wins, these voters feel like they have more influence over the political process. Moreover, the magnitude of this effect is greater than the effect for co-minority ties, which could indicate either that co-ethnic ties are stronger than co-minority ties, or that the co-minority effect described above is driven by the South Asian sample. While the coefficient for black respondents and candidates is positive, it is not statistically significant. This could be because of the heterogeneity of countries and ethnicities within this group – encompassing voters from many different countries in two entirely different regions of the world. Perhaps these voters find less in common with each other than do South Asian voters, many of whom speak the same language and have shared historical experiences. Overall, the results support Hypothesis 4 (co-ethnic legislator efficacy) for South Asian voters, but not for black voters.

As discussed in Chapter 3, one of the dangers of investigating descriptive representation is the risk of essentialism. As Mansbridge (1999, 637) argues, “Insisting that women represent women or Blacks represent Blacks, for example, implies an essential quality of womanness or Blackness that all members of that group share,” and by implication, which defines their political experience. We should not expect all members of an ethnic group to consider a candidate’s ethnicity their most important attribute; substantive policy questions and party representation may supersede ethnic considerations for many
respondents. In this respect, co-ethnic ties may not be enough – it may take both co-ethnic links and an explicit preference for co-ethnic representation to change political attitudes.

How do voters with an explicit preference for descriptive representation respond to co-ethnic representation? Table 5.3 shows the results of election outcomes on external efficacy among respondents who think descriptive representatives are better suited to representing the interests of ethnic minorities in Britain. Not surprisingly, the link between representation and attitudes here is both statistically and substantively significant. For minority respondents and South Asian respondents who have a desire for descriptive representation, voting for and electing a co-minority or co-ethnic candidate significantly increases their feelings of influence over the political system. Again, however, the results are not statistically significant for black dyadic representation. As a result, I find support for Hypothesis 6 (DR preference) for South Asian voters, but not for black voters.

In addition to a preference for descriptive representation, we might expect community and mobilization effects to matter. Following Brambor et al. (2005) and Zingher and Farrer (2016), the main results are interpreted through marginal effects (though for completeness, the full regression models are shown in supplementary appendix Table A5.2). Table 5.4 shows the marginal effects for the interaction between two dimensions of mobilization and external efficacy. As the results show, reading ethnic news is a statistically significant moderator of an individual’s external efficacy. Reading ethnic news has a mediating impact on an individual’s political attitudes when they vote for and achieve their preferred outcome (voting for a candidate that wins). This suggests the mobilizing influence of ethnic news, represented through political outreach by candidates geared towards minority communities, matters for how an individual perceives the political system. As a result, the findings support Hypothesis 7 (mobilization). By contrast, it does not appear that being encouraged to vote at a place of worship has similar mobilizing impacts. One possible reason for this concerns the
### Table 5.3 The Effect of Co-Ethnic Candidates on External Efficacy for Voters with a Preference for Descriptive Representation by Voting Outcomes, Britain 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>(1) Minorities</th>
<th>(2) Black</th>
<th>(3) South Asian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voted for DR, and DR won</td>
<td>0.921*</td>
<td>-0.843</td>
<td>1.749*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.518)</td>
<td>(0.988)</td>
<td>(0.731)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not vote for DR, but DR won</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.612</td>
<td>0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.508)</td>
<td>(1.038)</td>
<td>(0.655)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted for DR, but DR lost</td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td>-0.580</td>
<td>-0.279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.421)</td>
<td>(0.807)</td>
<td>(0.637)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not vote for DR, but DR lost</td>
<td>-0.111</td>
<td>-1.400</td>
<td>-0.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.361)</td>
<td>(0.877)</td>
<td>(0.495)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent is female</td>
<td>0.341</td>
<td>0.232</td>
<td>0.471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.243)</td>
<td>(0.356)</td>
<td>(0.339)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age squared</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
<td>0.657***</td>
<td>0.603***</td>
<td>0.749***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td>(0.162)</td>
<td>(0.169)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Household Income</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University educated</td>
<td>-0.090</td>
<td>0.731+</td>
<td>-0.935*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.284)</td>
<td>(0.405)</td>
<td>(0.400)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent electorate foreign-born</td>
<td>0.896</td>
<td>1.005</td>
<td>1.382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.017)</td>
<td>(1.572)</td>
<td>(1.135)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.184</td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td>0.372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.054)</td>
<td>(1.555)</td>
<td>(1.460)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Dev. (Constant)</td>
<td>0.574</td>
<td>0.574</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.243)</td>
<td>(0.411)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Dev. (Residual)</td>
<td>2.722***</td>
<td>2.748***</td>
<td>2.669***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.092)</td>
<td>(0.141)</td>
<td>(0.114)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>groups</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Data obtained from the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES). The dependent variable is external efficacy, and corresponds to respondents’ answer to the question, ‘On a scale from 0 to 10 where 10 means a great deal of influence and 0 means no influence, how much influence do you have on politics and public affairs?’ Preference for descriptive representation was measured with two survey questions that questions asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they agree with the following statements: (1) ‘Black and Asian MPs can better represent Black and Asian interests than White MPs can,’ and (2) ‘Getting more Black and Asian people into Parliament would improve things for ethnic minorities in Britain.’ The results of each question were combined into an index to create a single variable, prefdr, from 1 to 5. The variable has a Cronbach’s Alpha value of 0.7, indicating an acceptable scale consistency. In this model, only those with a prefdr value of greater than 2.5 (more likely to agree with the two statements than not) were used.
### Table 5.4 The Impact of Mobilization on External Efficacy – Marginal Effects, Britain 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) Church</th>
<th>(2) Ethnic News</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Yes vs No) Voted for DR, and DR won</td>
<td>-0.444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Yes vs No) Did not vote for DR, but DR won</td>
<td>0.441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Yes vs No) Voted for DR, but DR lost</td>
<td>0.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Yes vs No) Did not vote for DR, but DR lost</td>
<td>-0.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Yes vs No) No DR ran</td>
<td>0.0147</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. ‘Yes vs No’ refers to the marginal effect of whether or not the respondent was mobilised in a place of worship (‘Church’) or consumes ethnic media (‘Ethnic News’). Data obtained from the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES). The dependent variable is external efficacy, and corresponds to respondents’ answer to the question, ‘On a scale from 0 to 10 where 10 means a great deal of influence and 0 means no influence, how much influence do you have on politics and public affairs?’

Intersection of ethnicity and religion – people of many different ethnicities attend a place of worship, and as a result the mobilizing impact may be less direct than a news outlet geared towards a specific ethnic group.

Turning now to the demographic and political determinants of perceived responsiveness, the above analyses tell a consistent story about the importance of political interest in determining external efficacy. In each of the above models and for all groups – even for black voters, who did not see an increase in external efficacy from descriptive representation – political interest has a positive and statistically significant impact on an individuals’ perceptions of influence. In this respect, the ‘usual suspects’ of political behaviour – age, gender, income and education – matter much less when other factors are accounted for. To be specific, age, gender and income were not statistically significant
predictors of external efficacy in any of the models. This is a surprising result, given the prominence of demographic explanations in studies of public opinion, and speaks to the importance of political outcomes in mediating the relationship between descriptive representation and political attitudes. By contrast, education was statistically significant and in the expected direction for black voters at the 0.1 level (Tables 5.2 and 5.3, specification 2). Education was statistically significant for South Asian voters (Tables 5.2 and 5.3, specification 3), but in the opposite direction. In other words, more educated South Asian voters have lower levels of perceived responsiveness – an unexpected result. While explanations for this are only speculative, it could be that more educated South Asian respondents have a better appreciation of the structural barriers faced by their community in achieving political change.

5.7 Conclusion

As discussed in this chapter, descriptive representation is multi-faceted, and we should expect its relationship with political attitudes to be equally complex. In Chapter 4, I examined the relationship between co-minority representation at the candidate level and external efficacy. While the analysis showed strong evidence of a backlash among Anglo Australians, ethnic minority voters did not change their political attitudes in response to co-minority descriptive representation. This chapter set out to dig deeper into the ties that bind ethnic minority voters with their representatives. In particular, I examined whether both co-minority and co-ethnic candidates who are elected to high office influence the political attitudes of their constituents. I also investigate whether an explicit preference for descriptive representation and differential mobilization affects perceptions of influence.

On the question of candidate-level co-minority representation, the findings of this chapter align with those in the previous chapter – that is, representation at the candidate-level
alone is not enough to make ethnic minority respondents feel like they have influence in politics. Perhaps this should not be surprising – if someone like you runs for elected office and loses, it may reinforce the belief that you have little influence on the political system – or perhaps you might fail to take notice at all. The analysis did show, however, that co-minority representation can matter if a descriptive representative you vote for wins, though this result may be driven by co-ethnic affinity among South Asian voters and candidates. In particular, voting for a co-ethnic winner matters: when a South Asian voter cast a ballot for a South Asian candidate, and that candidate wins, voters feel like they have more influence over the political system. In this respect, voting for a descriptive representative who wins may present a respondent with evidence that political action can affect the electoral process and result in changes to the political system. Moreover, the results appear to be distinct from simply voting for a winner, as those who voted for a different (non-descriptive) candidate who won did not see a corresponding increase in external efficacy. Overall, then, the analysis in this chapter supports the conclusion that for certain groups, the descriptive representation of ethnic minorities increases the external efficacy of ethnic minority voters.

The analysis also showed that a preference for more minority representatives moderated the relationship between voting for a descriptive representative and feelings of influence. Voters who want more ethnic minority representatives feel like they have more of a say in politics when minority representatives are elected. Moreover, the effect for this subset of voters is stronger than for the broader pool of voters from which they derive. While these results may not be surprising, they matter because they indicate these voters ‘walk the walk’ instead of passively wishing for more representation. In other words, when it happens, they take note. This finding also highlights the importance of being conscious of essentialist explanations of the impacts of descriptive representation on various outcomes – not all ethnic
minority voters feel ties with ethnic minority representatives or consider ethnicity the most important link to their political system.

Finally, the results showed that mobilization matters. In particular, consuming ethnic news moderates individual perceptions of influence in politics. Ethnic media is a direct way for potential representatives to speak to specific ethnic groups in their electorates. This chapter found evidence that ethnic news can moderate the relationship between descriptive representatives and political attitudes. This result should be interpreted with caution, however, since the consumption of ethnic news is an imperfect indicator for mobilization. In particular, one alternative explanation could concern ethnic identity – those who read ethnic news are more likely to identify more strongly with their ethnic identity to begin with. Future work should examine this causal relationship more closely.

In the next chapter, I will return to the second set of findings in Chapter 4 – in particular, that the descriptive representation of ethnic minorities can result in a backlash among ethnic majority voters. This will allow me to evaluate whether this finding is the result of endogeneity, or whether policymakers should indeed take note of a worrying trend in the political attitudes of their constituents.
6 DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION IN CANADA

In the previous two chapters, this thesis has investigated the relationship between descriptive representation and external efficacy in Australia and Britain – two diverse societies with a shared history and a similar political culture. In Chapter 4, I presented evidence that candidate-level descriptive representation alone is not enough to make minority citizens feel like government is more responsive to their demands. In Chapter 5, I found evidence to support this claim, but also found that descriptive representation at the legislator level can increase voters’ levels of external efficacy.

This chapter adds the Canadian case to this analysis by investigating whether voters update their political attitudes in response to electing an ethnic minority legislator. Canada fits well into the most-similar-systems design of this thesis as a Westminster-style advanced democracy with high levels of immigration and diversity. Further, despite early and enduring racism and intolerance in the Canadian government’s relationship with its ethnic minority residents, Canada was first among Anglo-American democracies to open itself to increased immigration from non-British sources (Inglis, Birch, and Sherington 1994). Canada has also welcomed large numbers of refugees in the latter half of the twenty-first century, earning it an
international reputation as a welcoming and inclusive country (though, as I will discuss, this reputation was not always well-deserved). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Canada was colonized by two European countries – Britain and France – who regarded themselves as the two ‘founding peoples’ of confederation. While more Canadians can claim Anglo-Celtic heritage than French heritage, the official recognition of cultural differences dates back to the earliest notions of Canadian civic life (Hawkins 1989). As a result, ethnic and cultural considerations have explicitly shaped Canadian institutions in a way they have not in either of Britain or Australia.

All this together suggests that if a link between descriptive representation and feelings of responsiveness – between voters and co-minority candidates (H1), co-minority legislators (H3), or co-ethnic legislators (H4) – should be present anywhere, it should be here. This link is double-edged, however: despite popular narratives of Canada as happily liberal and multicultural, Canada is not immune to racism and prejudice (Gravelle 2018a; Zafar and Ross 2015). As a result, it provides a hard test to the claim that the representation of ethnic minorities can result in a backlash among ethnic majority constituents (H2 and H5). If such a relationship is also present in Canada, the results should make us take pause and reassess the ‘liberal and multicultural’ narrative that forms much of Canadian national mythology.

This chapter will first discuss the history of immigration and diversity that inform the relationship between representation and political attitudes in Canada. Second, this chapter will examine the relationship ethnic minority representatives have had with the Canadian political system in the past century. Third, it will discuss prior research on ethnicity and political attitudes in the Canadian context and examine how this research informs the hypotheses of this study. Fourth, this chapter will outline the data and methods this study will use. Next, it will take a descriptive look at some of the variables of interest before moving on to the main findings of this chapter and discussing their implications. Finally, the chapter will
conclude by discussing how these results fit into the broader goals of this thesis and how they inform our understanding of the relationship between descriptive representation and external efficacy.

6.1 Immigration and Diversity in Canadian Society

In contrast to Britain, which only became a true multi-racial society in the mid-twentieth century, Canada’s history of immigration and diversity begins in earnest almost a century earlier. The presence of the First Nations and Inuit people prior to the arrival of British and French colonists indicates Canada has always been a multicultural society; however, Canada’s modern diversity finds its origins in the discovery of gold in British Columbia in 1858 (Hawkins 1989) and the Canadian government’s pressing ambition to settle the West in light of American designs to claim it as their own (Inglis, Birch, and Sherington 1994). The gold rush fuelled considerable Chinese migration to British Columbia, as did the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) and their associated demands for labour. Some 15,000 Chinese men entered British Columbia from 1881 to 1884 to work on the construction of the CPR, and while a majority returned to China after a few years, many stayed (Knowles 2016; Hawkins 1989). This early wave of migration was substantial – by way of comparison, the entire black and Asian population of the United Kingdom some fifty-five years later was only estimated at 7,000 (Spencer 1997).

Chinese migration to British Columbia was met with opposition by the local European population. Some of this negative sentiment was associated with concerns about cheap labour undercutting the white workforce – however, much of it was also associated with racism and prejudice (Knowles 2016). Many white inhabitants of British Columbia saw Chinese migration as not only alien, but also “evil and dangerous” – these residents “easily absorbed tales of the ‘yellow peril’ which would soon engulf the white countries of the Pacific if...
allowed to do so” (Hawkins 1989, 10). Further, despite crime rates in predominantly Chinese communities being markedly lower than in predominantly European and American communities, “[the] Chinese were seen as having dark and hideous vices; of running, at least in cities, horrible dens and infamous houses where opium-smoking, gambling, rape, prostitution, and other evil practices were rife” (ibid). Opposition to Chinese immigration compelled the government to introduce restrictions through a ‘head-tax’ on Chinese immigrants coming into the country (Knowles 2016). This initial $50 tax each new Chinese immigrants in 1885 was later increased to $100 and then $500 by 1903 (Hawkins 1989). Despite this, immigrants from China – as well as Japan and Southeast Asia – continued to arrive in high numbers, leading to episodes of violence and eventually legislation to curtail all Asian immigration to Canada (Knowles 2016).

While popular pressure resulted in restrictions on Asian migration, the government still felt an urgent need to settle the West for both economic and security reasons (Inglis, Birch, and Sherington 1994). Canada’s population increased by some 43 per cent in the ten years from 1901 to 1911, with approximately 3 million new settlers arriving from 1886 to 1914 (Knowles 2016, 124). While the government had always tried to encourage migration primarily from Britain, by the turn of the twentieth century, “Canadian policy was prepared in part to abandon a search for British immigrants in preference for rural settlers from Eastern Europe and other parts of Europe to develop the Western Provinces” (Inglis, Birch, and Sherington 1994, 13).

While the end of the First World War resulted in intense hostility among Anglo-Canadians towards immigrants – in particular, so-called ‘enemy aliens’ coming from Germany and the former Austro-Hungarian Empire – by 1928, Canadian policy again encouraged immigration from “Britain and from a number of preferred countries designated as Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Switzerland, Holland, Belgium and
France,” as well as agricultural workers from Eastern Europe (Hawkins 1989, 27). This marks a stark contrast with Australia, a country which heavily restricted non-British immigration till after the Second World War. Despite this, the inter-war years were not entirely positive for newcomers. For example, anti-Semitism was prominent in the late 1930s. A well-known case involved the Canadian government turning back a boat of Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi Germany in 1939 (Knowles 2016). Ethnic minorities also faced hardship during World War II; for example, approximately 22,000 Japanese Canadians were expelled from their homes during this period (ibid).

Canada’s immigration policy liberalized somewhat after the end of the Second World War as it accepted a relatively large number of refugees. Most were from Eastern Europe; refugees from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were resettled in Canada as labourers, along with large numbers of Hungarians, Poles, Ukrainians and Yugoslavs in the period from 1945-1957. Not all were from Eastern Europe, however. For example, Palestinian Arab refugees uprooted following the Israeli-Arab war of 1948 were also resettled (Knowles 2016). Despite this, Canada did not abandon formal racial restrictions until 1967, which paved the way for an explosion of multiculturalism in the 1970s. In this decade, Canada accepted some 6,000 Asians following their expulsion from Uganda, 60,000 ‘boat people’ who were “Vietnamese, Laotians, and Kampucheans, who fled Indochina from the Communist regimes established in the wake of Saigon’s fall in 1975,” along with large numbers of Latin American refugees fleeing Chile after Pinochet came to power (Knowles 2016, 213–16).

Along with the policy of official multiculturalism introduced in 1971, the reforms of this period are most clearly linked to Canada’s modern-day levels of diversity. While Asian-born immigrants were only 11 per cent of all immigrants prior to 1978, they made up the largest group of arrivals at 40 per cent by 1986. In the same period, immigrants from the Caribbean, Central and South America, the Middle East and Africa increased considerably as
a percentage of all immigrants. By contrast, European-born migrants declined from 70 per cent to less than 30 per cent in the same period (Knowles 2016). Despite new constitutional provisions in 1982 that prohibited discrimination based on “race, national or ethnic origin, colour or religion,” the sharp increase in the number of ‘visible minorities’ (discussed below) in Canada was associated with a mixed reaction from the general public (Dorais, Foster, and Stockley 1994, 387). This was most clearly apparent in Quebec, where the federal government’s policy of official multiculturalism was received with hostility. This backlash “lay in the concept of multiculturalism itself in which all ethnic groups are seen as equal, thus de-emphasizing if not contradicting the central historical and political fact of the two ‘founding people’ of Canadian Confederation” (Hawkins 1989, 221, emphasis added).

The term ‘visible minority’ itself is unique to Canada and refers to “persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour” (Statistics Canada 2015). In practice, the term conceals considerable diversity but, “consists mainly of the following groups: South Asian, Chinese, Black, Filipino, Latin American, Arab, Southeast Asian, West Asian, Korean and Japanese” (Statistics Canada 2015).12

The visible minority population of Canada has been steadily increasing since the 1981 census, when the term was first adopted for data collection purposes. In 1981, Canada’s visible minorities composed approximately 5 per cent of the population. As of the 2016 census, approximately 22 per cent of Canadians identified as members of the visible minority population (Statistics Canada 2017b). The three largest subgroups of this population are South Asian, Chinese and Black, corresponding to approximately 25 per cent, 21 per cent and 16 per cent of the visible minority population respectively.

12 While the term has been criticised as out-dated, essentialist and misleading (i.e. Grant and Balkissoon 2019; Clare Hennig 2019), it is still widely used in government and academic research. As a result, both the terms ‘ethnic’ and ‘visible’ minority will be used in this chapter.
In summary, while Canada is seen by many today as an inclusive and welcoming country, history suggests this was not always the case. As a result, most of Canada’s contemporary diversity dates back only to the 1960s. However, the presence of two colonising powers has meant the official recognition of ethnocultural difference has been a part of Canadian politics since Confederation.

6.2 Ethnicity and Representation in Canadian Politics

Canada’s first visible minority Member of Parliament (MP), Douglas Jung, was elected in 1957. However, ethnic minority representation in Parliament has only seen significant increases since the 1990s (Bird 2010). Figure 6.1 shows the number of visible minority MPs elected from 1993 to 2015.

**Figure 6.1 Visible Minority MPs in Canada, 1993-2015**

*Note: Data obtained from Black (2013; 2017). ‘Conservatives’ represents the Progressive Conservative Party, Reform/Alliance Party and the Conservative Party of Canada. ‘NDP’ refers to the New Democratic Party.*
From 1993 to 2006, the number of visible minority MPs in the House increased from thirteen to twenty-four, before decreasing slightly in the 2008 election (Bird 2010). Up until this point, the Liberal Party consistently elected more visible minority MPs than any other party. Despite their disastrous showing in 2011 however, the overall level of ethnic minority representation increased in 2011 as the result of the NDP and Conservative Party electing a large number of visible minority MPs for their respective parties. Most of these MPs lost their seats in the subsequent election, however. Nevertheless, the 2015 election resulted in a record 47 ethnic minority and 10 indigenous MPs taking their seats in Parliament, corresponding to approximately 13 per cent and 3 per cent of the total number of Members, respectively (Tolley 2015). While a significant increase over the previous parliament, visible minorities and indigenous people are still underrepresented compared to their shares of the population (Statistics Canada 2017b; 2017a). Further, there are significant differences between parties. Of the total number of MPs elected in 2015, 39 visible minority MPs and 8 Indigenous MPs (approximately 84 and 80 per cent, respectively) were affiliated with the governing Liberal Party (Tolley 2015). It is interesting to note differences between parties were much more muted at the candidate level. Black (2017) estimates approximately 17 per cent of Liberal candidates, 14 per cent of Conservative candidates and 13 per cent of NDP candidates were visible minorities.

Prior research has argued ethnic minority representation in the Canadian House of Commons is associated with more attention to issues important to minority constituents. Both Bird (2010) and Black (2016) examine whether descriptive representation translates into the substantive representation of the ‘minority agenda,’ which Black understands as “matters that are of disproportionate concern to minority ethno-racial and immigrant-based communities. This agenda includes a range of issues and themes touching on immigration and refugee affairs, citizenship rights, multiculturalism, social acceptance and discrimination, and the
socio-economic and political status of minorities and immigrants in Canada” (2016, 201). Bird (2010) finds visible minority MPs made nearly twice as many parliamentary speeches on ethnic-related issues than their non-minority counterparts. Further, this effect was not mediated by whether minority MPs represent highly diverse ridings (the Canadian term for electorate), suggesting there may be an intrinsic motivation to discuss these issues. Black (2016) finds similar results for interventions in Question Period, where minority MPs ask more questions relating to minority issues than non-minority MPs. Further, non-minority MPs who represent highly diverse ridings exhibit similar behaviour by making more speeches and asking more questions pertaining to minority issues than those who represent less diverse ridings (Bird 2010; Black 2016). These conclusions are broadly consistent with prior research that finds a relationship between constituency characteristics and parliamentary behaviour (Soroka, Penner, and Blidook 2009).

Despite the recent increase in ethnic minority representation in parliament, there has been considerable scholarly interest in the sources of minority underrepresentation in the first place. Some research argues voters do not discriminate against non-white candidates at the polls, and that ethno-racial background is not associated with lower vote shares (Tossutti and Najem 2002; Black and Erickson 2006). This suggests there is a supply-side problem, such as difficulty in securing party nominations or a lack of ethnic minority candidates with a desire to run for office (Bird 2016). Other research has argued voter discrimination against ethnic minority candidates does exist, but is limited to the bias of right-leaning voters against candidates running for right-wing parties (Besco 2018). Finally, the distribution of ethnic minority candidates also matters – as candidates are usually drawn from the areas in which they reside, ethnic minority candidates often end up running against other ethnic minority candidates (Bird 2016).
6.3 Ethnicity, Political Attitudes and Behaviour

While ethnic minority voters resemble majority voters according to some measures of political attitudes and participation, important differences exist which may affect how members of these communities participate in political life. Each ethnic community in Canada has its own distinct political culture which affects how its members see and interact with the political system (Lapp 1999). That said, for empirical reasons pertaining to sample size and broader theoretical goals of evaluating the impact of systematic discrimination or shared immigrant experience, most existing research discusses visible minorities or immigrants at higher levels of aggregation. In this respect, much of the Canadian research into visible minority political behaviour has examined the differences between immigrants and the Canadian-born in terms of electoral and non-electoral participation. For example, some research has shown immigrant status is associated with lower turnout (Tossutti 2007; Gidengil and Roy 2015), while others do not find an overall difference between immigrants and non-immigrants (S. White 2016).

The answer to the question of how foreign-born residents differ from their Canadian-born counterparts may lie in the types of regimes immigrants come from. For example, immigrants from repressive regimes are less likely to participate in protests and are more affected by the formative elections they experience in Canada (Bilodeau 2008; S. White 2017). Pre-migration experiences matter in other ways, too; for example, while immigrants from authoritarian regimes have very strong support for democracy, there is consistent evidence they do not see democracy as ‘the only game in town’ (Bilodeau 2014; Bilodeau, McAllister, and Kanji 2010) and have more authoritarian values (McAllister and Makkai 1992). However, these authoritarian inclinations do not always appear to translate to greater deference to MPs in performing their representative duties; visible minorities in Canada – including some from authoritarian backgrounds – strongly prefer the ‘trustee’ model of
representation compared to the ‘delegate’ model (C. D. Anderson and Goodyear-Grant 2005; Bird 2015).

There is growing evidence that descriptive representation has behavioural and attitudinal consequences in the Canadian context. Both qualitative interview data on voters’ explicit preferences and quantitative evidence about how voters actually behave in elections supports the view that ethnic minority citizens value descriptive representation. For example, Bird (2012, 532) finds Chinese and South Asian voters in Toronto think a co-ethnic MP could “explain [their] cultural heritage to westerners and serve as a bridge to communicate differences” or “bring nuance” to discussions of sensitive issues. In terms of revealed preferences, there is evidence ethnic minority voters prefer co-ethnic representatives. Goodyear-Grant and Tolley (2017) find Chinese-Canadian voters prefer co-ethnic candidates to white candidates in hypothetical federal elections, while Bird (2016) finds evidence of affinity between South Asian voters and candidates in hypothetical municipal elections. There is much less evidence regarding co-Indigenous voting in Canada, though Dabin et al. (2019) find the presence of Indigenous candidates increases turnout in predominantly Indigenous electorates. Finally, there is some evidence that a desire for descriptive representation extends beyond co-ethnic ties to more generalized co-minority ties. For instance, Besco (2015) finds experimental evidence that racialized voters are more likely to support both co-ethnic candidates, but also other racialized candidates more broadly, compared to white candidates. These findings lead me to expect the theoretical benefits of descriptive representation (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3) should extend to voters’ attitudes towards the responsiveness of government:

**H1 (co-minority candidate efficacy):** Ethnic minority respondents will have higher levels of external efficacy when a minority candidate runs in their electorate.
H3 (co-minority legislator efficacy): Ethnic minority respondents will have higher levels of external efficacy when a minority legislator is elected in their electorate.

H4 (co-ethnic legislator efficacy): Ethnic minority respondents will have higher levels of external efficacy when a co-ethnic legislator is elected in their electorate.

While prior research regarding co-ethnic voting appears to be relatively consistent, evidence regarding the presence of electoral discrimination against ethnic minority candidates is more mixed. As discussed above, some research suggests ethnic minority candidates do not face electoral discrimination (Tossutti and Najem 2002; Black and Erickson 2006), while others have argued that the effect is limited to right-leaning voters (Besco 2018). However, there is ample evidence of bias more generally towards certain minority groups. For example, Gravelle finds “Conservative Party supporters, those residing in areas with low concentrations of immigrants, and those with heightened perceptions of economic and cultural threat are most likely to express restrictionist attitudes toward immigrants and refugees” (2018b, 461). This effect is particularly pronounced against Muslim Canadians, who are evaluated more negatively than other religious groups (Zafar and Ross 2015). More broadly, we should expect the preference for co-ethnic representatives to extend to ethnic majority voters:

H2 (majority candidate backlash): Ethnic majority respondents will have lower levels of external efficacy when a minority candidate runs in their electorate.

H5 (majority legislator backlash): Ethnic majority respondents will have lower levels of external efficacy when an ethnic minority legislator is elected in their constituency.
The next section outlines the data and methods this analysis will use to examine these three hypotheses.

6.4 Data and Methods

This chapter considers the extent to which the representation of ethnic minorities as political candidates and elected legislators is associated with differences in the political attitudes of Canadian voters in their constituencies. Two sources of data are used for this analysis. First, representatives from five political parties were elected to federal office from 2004-2015 – the Liberals, Conservatives (and their predecessor parties, the Progressive Conservative and Reform parties), New Democrats, Greens and Bloc Quebecois. Data on the population of these candidates (6,654 in total), including their ethnic backgrounds, were provided by Jerome Black, who has written widely on ethnic minority representation in Canada (see for example, Black and Erickson 2006; Black and Hicks 2006; Black 2008; 2009; 2011; 2013; 2016; 2017). The two largest subgroups of visible minority candidates are South Asian and Chinese candidates, which is consistent with the size of these communities in the general population (Statistics Canada 2017b). In order to examine the impact of descriptive representation (candidate-based and legislator-based), I adapt Black’s database from the candidate-level (N = 6,654 candidates) to the electorate-level (N = 1,570 electorates). I consider these two forms of descriptive representation for visible minorities writ-large, and then separately for South Asian representatives and Chinese representatives. The result of this first step is an electorate-level dataset which describes whether a visible minority, South Asian or Chinese representative ran in or was elected in each constituency from 2004-2015.

Second, I combine these candidate-based data with voter-level data from the Canadian Election Study (CES), the most extensive and longstanding survey of political attitudes and
behaviour in Canada. CES surveys are conducted immediately before and after each federal election and consist of three waves – the Campaign-Period Survey (CPS), Post-Election Survey (PES) and Mail-Back Survey (MBS). Each of the CES surveys from 2004-2015 were “designed to represent the adult population of Canada defined as: Canadian citizens 18 years of age or older who speak one of Canada’s official languages, English or French, and reside in private homes in the ten Canadian provinces (thus excluding the territories)” (Northrup 2007, 4; 2010, 3; 2012, 3; 2016, 2). Respondents were selected using a two-stage probability selection process that first selects households and then respondents. As such, the CES is a ‘complex sample’ consisting of both a clustered and stratified selection design (Northrup 2007; 2010; 2012; 2016). Further, the CES followed a subset of their respondents from 2004 to 2011, who comprise the panel component of the study. In order to obtain a large enough sample of ethnic minority respondents for statistical analysis, I pool data from these five election studies (2004, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2015) for the cross-sectional analysis.

The combined dataset (which combines the electorate-level and voter-level elements) uses the individual voter as the unit of analysis, but notes which voters had ethnic minority candidates compete in their electorates. This dataset consists of two elements – the CES cross-section and the CES panel. The panel component of the dataset includes information on respondents who completed multiple CES surveys in different election years. Panel data analysis is very attractive for social scientists because it eliminates many layers of potential unobserved heterogeneity inherent in the analysis of cross-sectional data. As a result, panel data analysis is able to much more closely approach causal inference than the analysis of cross-sectional data (Andres, Golsch, and Schmidt 2013). Regrettably however, the panel component of the CES contains too few ethnic minority respondents who have lived in an electorate with descriptive representation to permit analysis. Thus, I use the pooled cross-sectional data to examine how the political attitudes of ethnic minority voters change in
response to changes in descriptive representation, while I use the panel data to examine the corresponding political attitudes of ethnic majority voters.

The dependent variable in my analysis is external efficacy, which is measured in the CES by asking the extent to which respondents agree or disagree with the statement: ‘I don’t think the government cares much what people like me think’. The independent variables measure respondent and candidate ethnicity, considering whether a visible minority candidate contested the race in the respondent’s electorate, and whether or not they won. While the category of ‘visible minority’ is broad and increases the risk of type II error, this level of aggregation permits meaningful statistical analysis and has been adopted to various degrees in numerous studies (Tossutti and Najem 2002; Black and Erickson 2006; Bird 2010; Besco 2015; Black 2016; Bird 2016; Gidengil and Roy 2015; Bilodeau 2017; Besco 2018). However, I also subset both variables to examine South Asian and Chinese candidates separately.

As in previous chapters, I use a number of control variables to account for alternative explanations of external efficacy. In terms of demographic determinants, the analysis accounts for gender, income and university education. I expect wealthier, male, and university educated respondents to indicate the government cares about what people like them think because these demographic groups have a relatively greater level of privilege in the political system compared to poorer, less educated and women voters, respectively. I also control for the political determinants of external efficacy, such as whether the respondent voted for the winning candidate, their level of political interest, and the strength of their partisan identity. I expect respondents to think the political system is more responsive to their

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13 This exact wording is used in the 2004, 2006 and 2008 CES. The 2011 and 2015 CES use the third person, which is worded as: ‘The government does not care much about what people like you think’.
demands if their preferred candidate wins the election, if they are more interested in politics, or if they have strong partisan preferences. Summary statistics for each variable described above are available in the Supplementary Appendix (Table A6.1).

As described above, I examine ethnic minority respondents through cross-sectional data and ethnic majority respondents using panel data. In both sets of models, the dependent variable is ordinal. Thus, I specify a series of ordinal logistic regressions in the analyses. In the cross-sectional analyses, I follow White (2017) by including dummy variables for the 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2011 elections (with 2015 serving as the reference category) to account for the impact of pooling data from multiple election years. Finally, I include a dummy variable for the province of Quebec, which has a different immigration system, and as described above, a more fraught relationship with multiculturalism than the rest of Canada. In the panel data analysis, I specify a random-effects ordered logistic regression. Finally, while the sample size for the co-minority analysis is large enough to permit multivariate analysis, there are too few instances of co-ethnic representation in the CES data with information on the dependent variable. As a result, these hypotheses are tested with using Chi-2 analysis.

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14 Because of the limited sample size, I do not specify a series of multilevel models to account for the shared unobservable characteristics of each voter that arise from them being clustered in electoral districts. However, the results do not change if these models are specified in this way. I also specify a random-effects model to avoid the well-documented problems with fixed-effects ordinal logistic regression, as “the fixed effects estimator shows a large positive finite sample bias in discrete choice models when \( T \) [number of time points] is very small” (Greene 2004, 144).

15 This is in large part due to the fact that external efficacy, the dependent variable, was asked in the CES mail-back survey, the final survey in the three-pronged sampling approach with the lowest sample size.
6.5 Descriptive Statistics

How do the demographic characteristics and political attitudes of visible minority Canadians differ from ethnic-majority Canadians? Figure 6.2 shows the heterogenous origins of six groups of Canadians. The first three are South Asian, Chinese and Black Canadians – the three largest subgroups of visible minorities as identified by Statistics Canada (2017b). The fourth is ‘Other (Visible Minority)’ which denotes those who belong to a visible minority group other than the three above. The fifth group is ‘Other (European)’ – which corresponds to Canadians who are ethnic minorities but not visible minorities. The final group is ‘white-Anglo/Franco’ – a heterogenous category that represents the descendants of white European settlers who comprise the majority of the population. We might expect those in the ‘Other (European)’ category to more closely resemble the white majority group along several demographic and political variables. This is because those in this group are more likely to be descended from those who hailed from countries that immigration officials found ‘acceptable’ or ‘desirable’ for most of the twentieth century (as described in the first part of this chapter), or because their outward appearance may make it easier for them to ‘pass’ as members of the ethnic majority.

As Figure 6.2 shows, the vast majority of visible minority respondents are first-generation immigrants – that is, were born in a country other than Canada. Of the three major groups of visible minorities, black respondents are most likely to be born in Canada. However, at just over one-quarter of all black respondents, the overall proportion is still relatively low. South Asian respondents are also interesting to examine; at 83 per cent, these respondents are much more likely to be born abroad than their British counterparts (see Chapter 5, Figure 5.2). By contrast, many fewer respondents of European origin were born abroad – corresponding to approximately one-fourth of the total sample. Not surprisingly, these differences are significant at the 0.001 level.
Figure 6.2 Country of Birth by Ethnic Group, Canada 2004-2015


Since the introduction of the ‘points system’ into Canadian immigration policy, immigrants with more education are prioritised over those with less education. As a result, we might expect visible minority respondents to be, on average, better educated than their Anglo-Celtic and Franco-Canadian counterparts. Indeed, this is what the data suggest. Figure 6.3 shows the proportion of each group with university experience. Chinese respondents are the best educated group in the analysis, with almost double the rate of university experience compared to their white Canadian counterparts (69 per cent versus 37 per cent). South Asian and Black respondents are also much more likely to have a university education than their ethnic majority counterparts. Interestingly, even though a quarter of European minority respondents were born abroad, this group has the same levels of education as ethnic majority Canadians. These differences are significant at the 0.001 level.
Figure 6.3 Educational Attainment by Ethnic Group, Canada 2004-2015


While some of these differences in education translate to differences in household income, Figure 6.4 shows the effect is relatively small. In particular, the effect seems most pronounced for Chinese respondents, who have, on average, the highest household income in the sample. However, the differences between all remaining groups, excluding Black respondents, are very small – despite the large differences in educational attainment between visible minority respondents and their white majority and European counterparts. The outcomes for Black respondents stand out most starkly in Figure 6.3; despite this group being much better educated than their white majority counterparts, Black respondents earn, on average, much less. The above differences are statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
Figure 6.4 Income by Ethnic Group, Canada 2004-2015


With respect to respondents’ partisan preferences, Figure 6.5 shows which political parties each group identifies most strongly with. The data are consistent with the trends from Australia (Chapter 4) and Britain (Chapter 5) in that ethnic minority respondents are much more likely to identify with centre-left parties – in particular, the Liberal Party. At least half of each visible minority group identifies with the Liberals, to a peak of 70 per cent for South Asian respondents. By contrast, European-origin Canadians and ethnic majority Canadians are much more evenly split between the two major parties – the Liberals and Conservatives. In fact, between two and three times more European-origin respondents identify with the Conservatives than Black or South Asian respondents. Not surprisingly, these differences are significant at the 0.001 level.
Figure 6.5 Party Identification by Ethnic Group, Canada 2004-2015


Figure 6.6 shows the differences in political interest between members of each group. While the results are statistically significant at the 0.01 level, these differences appear to be primarily driven by lower political interest among Chinese respondents. Almost half (45 per cent) of Chinese respondents have ‘medium’ levels of political interest, compared to less than one-third of each other group. By contrast, approximately 50 per cent all other respondents have a ‘high’ degree of interest in politics.
Figure 6.6 Political Interest by Ethnic Group, Canada 2004-2015

Note: Data obtained from 2004-2015 Canadian Election Study (CES). Data correspond to respondents’ answer to the question, ‘How interested are you in politics generally?’ The answers were grouped from the original 0-10 scale into three categories; ‘low’ corresponds to 0-3, ‘medium’ corresponds to 4-6, and ‘high’ corresponds to 7-10. Totals may not appear to add up to 100% due to rounding. Pearson chi2(10) = 27.8562; Pr = 0.002. N for South Asian respondents: 229. N for Chinese respondents: 174. N for Black respondents: 149. N for Other (Visible Minority) respondents: 457. N for Other (European) respondents: 2,330. N for White-Anglo/Franco respondents: 11,850.

Finally, Figure 6.7 shows differences between each group in perceptions of influence on politics – that is, external efficacy. Consistent with evidence from Australia (Chapter 4) and Britain (Chapter 5), South Asian and Chinese respondents have higher levels of external efficacy than ethnic majority respondents – though the substantive differences are small. Further, and consistent with the British case, Black respondents have the lowest perceptions of government responsiveness among the three largest groups of visible minorities. These differences are significant at the 0.001 level.
Figure 6.7 External Efficacy by Ethnic Group, Canada 2004-2015


Overall, these results suggest the relationship ethnic minority citizens have with the political system is complex and nuanced. For example, Chinese respondents tend to be more educated, wealthier and feel like they have more influence on government than any other group; however, they have the lowest level of political interest. All visible minority groups prefer the Liberals, but European-origin minorities prefer the Conservatives. However, a descriptive analysis alone cannot fully explain the relationships between these many attributes – for example, better educated respondents are likely to be more interested in parties and have greater external efficacy. These results set the stage for our main analysis.
6.6 Results and Discussion

How does the descriptive representation of ethnic minorities in Canada affect their perceptions of government responsiveness? According to Hypotheses 1 and 3, we should expect minority candidates and legislators to increase the external efficacy of minority voters. Further, this effect may be specific to co-ethnic, as opposed to co-minority, ties (Hypothesis 4). By contrast, Hypotheses 2 and 5 suggest minority candidates and legislators should decrease the external efficacy of white-Anglo/Franco voters.

In order to test these hypotheses, Table 6.1 shows the overall effects for co-minority candidate and legislator efficacy. The results are consistent with the data from Australia and Britain – that is, there is no statistically significant impact of having a descriptive representative run in your electorate. However, in contrast to the results from Britain, there is also no effect of having a descriptive representative actually win the election or voting for a winning candidate.\textsuperscript{16} Given the relatively small number of visible minority respondents in the dataset (even after having pooled respondents from five federal elections), these results are perhaps not surprising. While the sample size limits the certainty of the analysis, there does not appear to be evidence of descriptive representation affecting external efficacy in the context of co-minority ties (Hypotheses 1 and 3).

Figures 6.8 and 6.9 show the results for co-ethnic legislator efficacy for South Asian and Chinese respondents, respectively. While there are some interesting descriptive differences for both groups, the results should be interpreted with caution owing to their small sample size.

\textsuperscript{16} The analysis in Table 6.1 includes variables for both candidate-based DR and legislator-based DR. The results do not change if two separate models are estimated (one for each variable).
**Table 6.1** Visible Minority Candidates and Co-Minority Efficacy, Canada 2004-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Minority Voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Visible minority contested</td>
<td>1.417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.363)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visible minority elected</td>
<td>0.733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.247)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted for winner</td>
<td>0.981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.207)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>1.610^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.364)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.160)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income (Ref: First Quartile)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Quartile</td>
<td>1.139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.398)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Quartile</td>
<td>1.382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.473)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Quartile</td>
<td>1.291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.442)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>1.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of Party ID</td>
<td>0.736^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.132)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 Election</td>
<td>1.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.365)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 Election</td>
<td>2.319^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.817)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 Election</td>
<td>0.954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.327)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 Election</td>
<td>0.855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.289)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>0.631^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.170)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Coefficients are odds ratios. Standard errors in parentheses. ^+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Data obtained from 2004-2015 Canadian Election Study (CES) cross-sectional data. The dependent variable is external efficacy, which corresponds to the extent to respondents agree with the statement: ‘I don’t think the government cares much what people like me think’.
Figure 6.8 External Efficacy by Electoral Outcome, South Asian Respondents, Canada 2004-2015

Figure 6.9 External Efficacy by Electoral Outcome, Chinese Respondents Efficacy, Canada 2004-2015


Table 6.2 shows the impact of ethnic minority representation on the political attitudes of ethnic majority voters using panel data from the CES. The results for this analysis are different from the previous models. While there is no impact for representation at the candidate-level, the election of visible minority legislators results in lower perceptions of government responsiveness among members of the white majority. Moreover, given the results use panel data, the findings represent both between-respondent and within-respondent differences as the result of changes in constituency-level ethnic minority representation.
Table 6.2 Visible Minority Representatives and White Majority Efficacy, Canada 2004-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) White-Anglo/Franco Voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Visible minority contested</td>
<td>1.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visible minority elected</td>
<td>0.646*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted for winner</td>
<td>1.123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>1.511***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.171)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.966+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (squared)</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>1.338***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>1.051*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of Party ID</td>
<td>0.975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>0.801+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2477</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Coefficients are odds ratios. Model uses robust standard errors. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Data obtained from 2004-2011 Canadian Election Study (CES) panel. The dependent variable is external efficacy, which corresponds to the extent to respondents agree with the statement: ‘I don’t think the government cares much what people like me think’.

With regards to alternative explanations for perceived responsiveness, the above analyses tell a consistent story about the role of demographic and political factors. In both models, university education is associated with higher perceptions of influence on government. Political geography matters, too; both ethnic minority and ethnic majority Quebecers are less likely to think government cares what they think, though these results are only significant at the 0.1 level. Strength of partisanship does not seem to be very important, and while ethnic minority partisans have lower levels of external efficacy, these results are
also only significant at the 0.1 level. There are also differences between the two groups, however. Wealthier and more politically interested white-Anglo/Franco respondents have higher levels of external efficacy – neither of which appears to be true for visible minority voters. Finally, political context matters. After more than a decade of Liberal rule, the 2006 election saw a change of power to the Conservative Party. As both tables show, ethnic minority respondents appeared to welcome this development – despite the fact the overwhelming majority of these voters identify more strongly with the Liberal Party.

What do these results mean for our understanding of the relationship between representation and political attitudes? With regard to candidate-based efficacy, the analysis supports the finding from Chapters 4 and 5 that descriptive representation at the candidate-level alone is not enough. However, in contrast to the results from Chapter 5, ethnic minority voters in Canada do not appear to think government is more responsive when a co-minority or co-ethnic candidate is elected in their districts. Explanations for this are speculative, but it could be that minority voters in Canada already feel the system represents the interests of ethnic minorities reasonably well. As a result, perhaps these voters do not feel a pressing need to be represented by a co-ethnic or co-minority candidate. By contrast, if ethnic minority voters felt like the political system was unresponsive to their demands, there might be greater pressure to elect ‘one of their own’ to serve as champions for their interests. Alternatively, it could be a question of critical mass – a subject outside the scope of this dissertation. For example, in 2015 the Canadian Parliament had five more ethnic minority MPs than the British Parliament – despite being almost half the size. Perhaps ethnic minority voters in Canada are less worried about dyadic descriptive representation because they know a sizable portion of the House of Commons may share their experiences.

It is worth noting again that these results should be interpreted with caution – even across five elections, the sample of ethnic minority respondents who have lived in an
electorate with a descriptive representative and answered the CES mail-back survey (which contains information on the dependent variable) is small. As a result, the null findings of these analyses could just reflect insufficient data. If so, the findings again underscore the importance of high-quality data for our understanding of civil society and political life. In this respect, Canada would certainly benefit from a study similar to the British Election Study’s Ethnic Minority Survey. However, these findings also highlight the dangers of essentialism in studies of descriptive representation (Mansbridge 1999). Observers should think carefully about why we should expect ethnic minority voters to care about a representative’s ethnic background.

With regard to the political attitudes of ethnic majority respondents, the implications are both different and troubling. Canada is often heralded as a multicultural success story – an example of a country where levels of racism and discrimination are lower than its Westminster-style counterparts. In this sense, the Canadian case is a tough test of whether majority voters respond negatively to ethnic minority representation. The results show white majority respondents have lower perceptions of government responsiveness when a visible minority representative is elected in their electoral districts. Moreover, the analysis uses longitudinal data that examines the effect of descriptive representation among the same respondents over time. This makes the case for causal inference much stronger. In short, the results suggest despite the many advances Canada has made in the domain of multiculturalism, there are limits to white Canadians’ positive attitudes towards ethnic minorities; while the majority group may indeed welcome non-white residents into the ‘Canadian family’, they may become less accommodating when those new Canadians are elected to lead it.
6.7 Conclusion

This chapter set out to examine the relationship between descriptive representation and perceptions of government responsiveness in Canada, a Westminster-style parliamentary democracy with high levels of diversity and robust policies of official multiculturalism. This analysis builds on Chapter 4, where I showed candidate-level descriptive representation alone is not enough to change the political attitudes of ethnic minority voters in Australia but is enough for ethnic majority voters to react with hostility. It also builds on the analysis in Chapter 5, which presented evidence that descriptive representation at the legislator level is associated with higher perceptions of responsiveness for ethnic minority voters.

The results of the Canadian analysis support the notion that candidate-level representation is not enough for ethnic minority voters to feel better represented. However, it does not find evidence consistent with the British case that ethnic minority representation increases minority voters’ external efficacy. As argued above, these results should be interpreted with a degree of caution owing to their relatively small sample size. However, it could also be that Canadian ethnic minority voters feel like white-Anglo/Franco legislators – or the political system more broadly – already represent their interests. The Canadian government has comparatively robust programs and services for newcomers, as well as legal protections through the Charter of Rights and Freedoms for minority language education, freedom of religion and a commitment to preserve Canadians’ multicultural heritage. It is possible these provisions mean visible minority Canadians feel that additional descriptive representation would only bring limited benefits.

That said, the results for ethnic majority voters (which has a much larger, longitudinal sample) support those in Chapter 4. In contrast to Australia, ethnic minority representation at the candidate-level is not associated with hostility among members of the white majority – perhaps because ethnic minority candidates are much more common in Canada than
Australia. However, in line with the Australian results, white voters have lower perceptions of government responsiveness when an ethnic minority representative is chosen to represent their district. Despite Canada’s international reputation for inclusiveness and diversity, these results suggest it may be worth re-examining some of the narratives that form Canada’s national mythology. While Canadian voters appear to be more tolerant than Australian voters, both countries still have some distance to go.
7 EXPERIMENTAL APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION

The previous chapters have shown that the political representation of ethnic minorities can change political attitudes. In chapters 4 and 6, I showed that the presence of ethnic minorities in politics can actually have a negative effect on the external efficacy of Anglo voters in Australia and Canada. In chapter 5, I showed that ethnic minority voters in the United Kingdom have higher perceptions of responsiveness when they elect co-ethnic candidates.

While each of these analyses has high external validity, this comes at the expense of their internal validity. In particular, they are prone to one major problem: it is unclear which element of ‘descriptive representation’ drives changes to respondents’ political attitudes, since in practice attributes like ethnicity, language and religion are all ‘bundled’ together in a single candidate. For example, if a minority respondent is reacting to a minority candidate in their electorate, do they feel differently about them compared to an Anglo candidate because
of shared ancestry, shared cultural understanding, or rather due to the ability to speak in a different language? By contrast, do white-Anglo, Australian-born respondents feel differently about minority candidates because they are prejudiced against those born elsewhere, or because they fear the candidate’s cultural values do not align with their own?

This chapter fills this gap in our understanding of the multidimensional nature of descriptive representation by conducting an original survey experiment of Australian voters. This approach is especially useful in the Australian context, where the limited number of ethnic minority candidates in federal elections limits the statistical power of observational analyses. It finds that, at least in the Australian context, none of the above-mentioned elements of descriptive representation have a positive impact on ethnic minorities’ perceptions of responsiveness. Across almost all groups, voters think Australian-born candidates are more likely to be responsive to them. Further, Australian voters have a particular bias against candidates with Middle-Eastern ancestry. Finally, additional language proficiency does not appear to mediate the relationship between descriptive representation and perceptions of responsiveness.

7.1 Descriptive Representation and Dimensionality

Politicians’ personal characteristics are at the heart of whether descriptive representation affects political attitudes. Much of the literature on this question is based on the case of African Americans in the United States, where a long history of racial prejudice and discrimination permeates almost every aspect of American political life. In this context, what matters is how citizens see politicians. Not only do black voters have an explicit preference for having more representatives from their racial group, they also update their political attitudes and behaviours in response to co-ethnic and co-minority cues (Casellas and Wallace 2015; Adida, Davenport, and McClendon 2016). There is also a gendered element to
these trends; black women are both more likely to vote for black women and turnout to vote when these candidates are present (Philpot and Hanes 2007; Stokes-Brown and Dolan 2010).

In other cases, seemingly simple ties are much more complicated. For example, there is evidence that Pakistani voters in the United Kingdom (UK) are more likely to cast a ballot when there is a co-ethnic candidate running for the Labour party, an effect which extends to ethnic minority voters in the UK more generally (Fisher et al. 2014; Martin 2016; Zingher and Farrer 2016). Aside from mobilization effects, what (if anything) drives the pure preference for descriptive representatives in these contexts? Do Pakistani voters prefer co-ethnic candidates because of shared ancestry, shared religion, or an ability to connect in a different language? Could a shared status as ‘outsiders’ in the political community, symbolized by being born in a different country or visible minorities writ-large, drive changes in political attitudes. Moreover, could these attributes just be a proxy for other assumed characteristics? There is some evidence each of these mechanisms plays a role in the link between attitudes and descriptive representation.

7.1.1 Ethnicity, Culture and Ancestry

Most research pertaining to non-gender-based descriptive representation explores the impact of ethnic, cultural or ancestral ties simultaneously. As discussed in Chapter 1, each of these concepts is contested, and authoritative definitions are difficult to come by. In the context of survey research, the boundaries become more fluid still. This is at least in part due to three reasons. First, existing comparative surveys ask different questions depending on the jurisdiction and local conventions. Some surveys ask about respondents’ ‘cultural groups’ (i.e. Australian Census) while others ask about ‘ancestry’ (i.e. Australian Survey of Social Attitudes, European Social Survey), ‘ethnicity’ (i.e. American National Election Study, Cooperative Congressional Election Study, EMBES), or some combination of the three (i.e.
CES). Thus, researchers are forced to make do with the data they have. Second, is unlikely most respondents are sophisticated enough to accurately separate the nuances between ethnicity, culture and ancestry. Finally, even if they were sophisticated enough to do so, it is unlikely to make a difference since all three are very highly correlated with each other. As a result, while the theoretical differences between ethnicity, culture and ancestry are of great importance, empirical research tends to use them interchangeably in practice.

In addition to the research on African Americans and ethnic minority voters in the UK described above (as well as in greater detail in Chapter 3), there is some evidence of a co-ethnic minority effect in Australia. These trends mirror those in the UK, where ethnic minority voters vote at higher rates for ethnic minority candidates, especially when those candidates run for centre-left parties (Zingher and Farrer 2016). This supports the hypothesis that ties based on descriptive representation depend on shared outsider status, common experience of discrimination, or a commitment to addressing issues affecting these communities. In the US context, prior research has shown endorsements from ethnic-based interest groups can impact the voting behaviour of ethnic minority voters, even when the endorsed candidates are not members of those groups (Boudreau, Elmendorf, and MacKenzie 2019). This suggests signals about a candidate’s commitment to addressing issues specific to these communities may matter more than a pure preference for in-group members. As a result, we should expect this to matter for how ethnic minority voters feel about the political system:

\[ H1 \text{ (co-minority candidate efficacy): Ethnic minority respondents will be more likely to indicate ethnic minority candidates are better able to represent their interests.} \]

As highlighted in the previous chapters, studies of the potential impacts of descriptive representation must also consider the reaction of members of the ethnic majority. Research in
the Australian context has long highlighted tensions between Australians of Anglo-Celtic ancestry and those from other groups. Australians of Asian and Middle Eastern descent, in particular, have the greatest social distance from the white-Anglo Australians (McAllister and Moore 1991). While negative Anglo-Australian attitudes towards outsiders used to be broadly defined in the sociobiological terms of ‘old fashioned racism’ (the belief that some races are superior to others), “ethnic minorities are no longer viewed as inferior; rather they are differentiated as threats to ‘social cohesion’ and ‘national unity’” (K. M. Dunn et al. 2004, 410–11). We should expect these attitudes to affect how Anglo Australians respond to candidates from ethnic minority backgrounds:

\[ H2 \text{(majority candidate backlash): Ethnic majority respondents will have lower levels of external efficacy when a minority candidate runs in their electorate.} \]

7.1.2 Linked Fate

As the above review illustrates, ties based on descriptive representation can take several forms. We can reasonably expect these ties to be conditional, however. As discussed in chapter 2, one such potential moderator is the concept of ‘linked fate,’ which corresponds to the extent to which someone believes their future life prospects are tied to the future prospects of their racial or ethnic group as a whole (Gay 2004; Simien 2005). The evidence regarding this moderator is mixed, but prior research has shown black Americans with a stronger sense of linked fate have higher support for African Americans having their own representatives (Avery 2009). There is some evidence this also holds true for Latino voters in the US, where the presence of a Latino candidate activates linked-fate considerations for Latino voters (McConnaughy et al. 2010a). As a result, we might expect the above hypotheses to be conditional on voters’ sense their future life prospects are tied to those of their ethnic groups:
**H8 (linked fate):** Only voters with a high sense of linked fate will consider co-ethnic candidates better able to represent their interests.

### 7.1.3 Country of Birth

As with religion, there is little research on the impact of a candidate’s country of birth on voter attitudes or behaviour, considered separately from that candidate’s status as a member of an ethnic minority. An individual’s immigrant experience defines political life for many individuals in Western democracies. As outsiders to the political community, immigrants face unique challenges. A first-hand understanding of these challenges may convince immigrant voters that a candidate is more likely to respond to their interests, even if they do not come from their home country. Evidence of this relationship would provide further support to an element of Hypothesis 1 (co-minority candidate efficacy).

By contrast, Australian-born voters may have similar attitudes to foreign-born candidates as to ethnic minorities in general. Bilodeau and Fadol (2011) show that the majority of Anglo Australians have negative attitudes towards immigration, and in other advanced democracies citizens have strong preferences for which country immigrants come from (Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015). These preferences may extend to the political domain, with Anglos more likely to believe Australian-born candidates would be better able to understand them and therefore represent their interests. Evidence of this relationship would provide further support to an element of Hypothesis 2 (majority candidate backlash).

In summary, by differentiating between the various dimensions of descriptive representation, this chapter provides a more nuanced test of Hypotheses 1 and 2 (how ethnic minority and ethnic majority respondents react to descriptive representation, respectively), as well as a test of the ‘linked fate’ hypothesis, which suggests perceptions of common fate
moderate the relationship between representation and political attitudes. In the next section, I describe the data and methods used to test these propositions.

7.2 Data and Methods

Analyses using observational data have difficulty disentangling each of the mechanisms proposed above because, in practice, candidates often present multiple elements of descriptive representation simultaneously. For example, a Chinese-born candidate is – by definition – born outside Australia, but also has a high probability of both being ethnically Han Chinese and speaking either Mandarin or Cantonese. In this case, it is unclear whether the potential impacts of descriptive representation are driven by common immigrant status, ethnicity or language. Moreover, asking someone if they care about a candidate’s ethnicity (stated preference) may, in fact, differ from their actual behaviour in the real-world (revealed preference).

An experimental approach has several advantages in disentangling these effects. Experiments advance the potential for inference in a country like Australia, where the small number of minority candidates who have contested federal elections limits the statistical power of most observational analyses. Experimental designs also allow researchers to manipulate fictional candidate profiles to isolate the impact of specific characteristics. However, traditional survey experiments that rely on vignettes are limited in what they can accomplish in this regard. For example, if a researcher wanted to test whether voters prefer white-collar or blue-collar candidates, presenting respondents with a choice between a banker or a tradesperson would not reveal whether a respondent prefers one candidate over another because of the type of job they have, their likely educational background, or perhaps the level of wealth they have accumulated. Systematically testing each of these mechanisms through a
one-dimensional design is both expensive and time consuming (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014).

Conjoint designs are a relatively recent tool in political science to address the above-described problems, though they have been applied widely in other disciplines (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014). A relatively common conjoint design presents respondents with a series of hypothetical candidate profiles in pairs and asks respondents to choose between them (Franchino and Zucchini 2015; Carnes and Lupu 2016). These candidates’ attributes vary randomly, allowing the researcher to determine the relative influence of each trait. This type of design increases an experiment’s external validity compared to traditional vignette experiments and reduce social desirability bias by creating many plausible reasons (from the point of view of a respondent) for why a candidate might be chosen over another (Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Yamamoto 2015). This is especially important for studies that measure attitudes towards minority groups, where the “pressures of social desirability and the conscious (or subconscious) suppression of attitudes towards racial and ethnic groups make it difficult to identify the political consequences of citizens’ attitudes” (Kam 2007, 344). Moreover, choosing between two sets of candidates – rather than asking a respondent whether they care about that candidate’s ethnicity – allows researchers to move from asking about stated preferences to measuring revealed preferences. As a result of each of these elements, conjoint designs have been shown to have the highest external validity among survey experiments, using field experiments as the benchmark (Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Yamamoto 2015).

This study draws upon a probability-based sample of 943 respondents who were asked to choose between five hypothetical sets of candidates. As a result, the design examines a total of 9430 candidates (943 respondents, with five sets of candidates each, and two candidates per set). The survey was conducted by the Social Research Centre (a survey
research company owned by The Australian National University) as part of the ‘Life in Australia’ panel.\textsuperscript{17} According to the ANU’s Centre for Social Research and Methods, “Life in Australia is the most methodologically rigorous online panel in Australia [because it] … exclusively uses random probability-based sampling methods and covers both online and offline population. Results are generalisable to the adult population living in Australia” (CSRM 2018). This is achieved by recruiting all panel members offline before moving the interview process online and offering small conditional incentives (AUD $10). The sampling process ensures at least 100 interviews take place from each state and territory and is representative across a range of demographic parameters (CSRM 2018; Pennay et al. 2018). The questionnaire for this survey was fielded between 3 and 24 July 2017. A total of 1,885 respondents completed the survey. Half of these respondents participated in the external efficacy experiment described here, while the second half participated in a separate vote choice experiment. In total, 942 respondents participated in the external efficacy experiment – however, demographic and attitudinal variables such as linked fate, which were collected before the experiment took place, were asked for all 1,885 respondents.

As with most conjoint experiments, the attribute combinations were constrained to logical bounds: for example, a hypothetical lawyer with only a high-school education might confuse respondents. Past research has also shown more specific profiles may help prevent respondents from making unintended inferences about candidates. For example, evidence from the US context shows voters judge black candidates as more liberal than white candidates, even when they take similar or even more conservative policy positions (McDermott 1998; Jones 2014; Jacobsmeier 2015). These findings also extend to gender,

\textsuperscript{17} I conducted the survey in collaboration with Woo Chang Kang, Jill Sheppard and Nicholas Biddle, my colleagues at the ANU, who were interested in a separate question relating to vote choice. Our combined resources resulted in us obtaining a larger sample size. The results of this chapter contain only my work.
with voters evaluating women as more liberal than men (McDermott 1998; J. W. Koch 2000). Therefore, if an experiment does not directly indicate the ideological orientation of the candidate, it becomes difficult to understand whether a voter chooses (or does not choose) a candidate because of their race or gender, or rather their perceived ideological position.

To make the profiles more specific, my hypothetical candidates varied across twelve dimensions – a list of these attributes is shown in Table A7.1 (see supplementary appendix). The list of dimensions represents personal attributes voters might care about when choosing their elected representative, such as their gender, age, family background, job and education. It also includes political characteristics, such as the candidate’s ideology and political party affiliation. Finally, three dimensions related to descriptive representation were specified – country of birth (born in Australia or outside Australia), cultural background (Anglo-Australian, Middle Eastern, Chinese, Indian) and other languages spoken (Mandarin, Hindi, Arabic or none). These dimensions were included to determine which aspects of a descriptive representative’s identity drove potential changes in political attitudes. A fourth measure, ethnic minority status, was derived from the cultural background variable to test Hypothesis 1. Here, all non-Anglo candidates were coded as ‘ethnic minorities.’ Finally, respondents’ perceptions of linked fate were measured through whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement: ‘What happens to others in your ethnic group in this country will have some effect on your own life.’

The dependent variable of interest is ‘chosen’, which corresponds to a respondent choosing one of the two candidates according to the survey question, ‘Which candidate do you think is the most likely to care what people like you think?’ This question is distinct from asking a respondent who they might vote for; indeed, there might be many reasons why someone would vote for one candidate but indicate the alternative cares more about what they think (such as the first candidate representing their preferred political party, which is the
Co-ethnic voting is also conceptually distinct from co-ethnic effects on political attitudes; for example, Bird (2015, 263) finds that in a series of focus groups, “[across] all groups, discussants disclosed that while they were not predisposed to vote for a candidate just because they shared the same ethnic background, they were more likely to notice such a candidate and listen to what he or she had to say.” Asking a respondent which candidate is most likely to care about their interests corresponds to what Uhlaner calls ‘potentiality,’ or ‘potential responsiveness’ – that is, an “individual’s well-grounded, reasonable subjective sense that his or her interests would be defended were they expressed or were they at risk even without expression” (2012, 536). In the context of descriptive representation, Uhlaner argues the belief in potential responsiveness is analogous to a belief in political efficacy – “[if] people consider themselves descriptively represented, then they see a representative who is ‘like me,’ and this increases engagement, interest, and efficacy, especially for members of underrepresented groups who otherwise may look at politics as a’ white man’s game.” (2012, 538).

Following Hainmueller et al., the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables is expressed as the Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE), which “equals the increase in the population probability that a profile would be chosen if the value of its $l$th component were changed from $t_0$ to $t_1$, averaged over all the possible values of the other components given the joint distribution of the profile attributes” (2014, 11). Put otherwise, the AMCE of a candidate attribute, such as country of birth, on the probability they will be chosen is the weighted average of the differences of all possible combinations of otherwise-identical candidate profiles that include different values of country of birth. In the context of candidate income, for example, “the AMCE of income represents the average effect of income on the probability that the candidate will be chosen, where the average is
defined over the distribution of the attributes (except for the candidate’s own income) across repeated samples” (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014, 11).

The other variables considered in this analysis are shown in Table A7.2 (see supplementary appendix). Data were collected on the respondents’ own party preferences (Coalition, Labor/Greens, or Other), cultural background (Caucasian, Asian, other), country of birth (Australia, ESB country, NESB country) and other languages spoken (English-only or LOTE-speakers). Due to sample-size limitations, respondents were grouped according to these broad ethnic/cultural backgrounds – as opposed to more specific ones. Languages are also subject to this broad grouping, with all non-English languages falling in the same category. However, prior research suggests these groupings are reasonable, and some researchers have found evidence of a form of Asian ‘pan ethnicity’ in Western democracies (i.e. Pietsch 2018).

7.3 Results and Discussion

How do respondents feel about their life prospects in relation to their ethnic group, and do voters feel like descriptive representatives are better able to respond to their interests? Figure 7.1 shows the extent to which respondents in the survey have a perception of linked fate with those in their ethnic group. An overwhelming majority of all respondents – more than two-thirds – agreed with the notion that what happens to others in their ethnic group in their country will have some effect on their own lives. Moreover, the differences between respondents who identified with an Asian ancestry and those from a white-Anglo background were not statistically significant. This supports findings from prior research that white voters have a sense of group consciousness analogous to ethnic minority voters (Berry, Ebner, and Cornelius 2019; Schildkraut 2017).
Figure 7.1 Sense of Linked Fate by Ethnic Group, Australia 2017

Note: Figures are percentages of each ethnic group in the sample with the given level of linked fate. Data correspond to the percent of respondents who ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ with the statement, ‘What happens to others in your ethnic group in this country will have some effect on your own life.’ Pearson $\chi^2(2) = 3.5818$; $Pr = 0.167$. N for Asian voters: 108. N for white-Anglo/European voters: 1,383. N for Other voters: 131.

The lack of substantial differences between ethnic groups in terms of their linked fate provides one explanation for why white-Anglo voters in Australia (chapter 4) and Canada (chapter 6) react negatively to ethnic minority representation. As discussed in chapter 3, while there is long-standing evidence of white voter bias against ethnic minority voters, white in-group identity can have independent effects in explaining voter behaviour (Petrow, Transue, and Vercellotti 2018).

The results for the conjoint analyses are shown in Figures 7.2 – 7.6. Because of collinearity, candidate party affiliation and the full spectrum of candidate ideology could not be modelled simultaneously. Thus, ideology is represented as degree of polarization – that is, whether the candidate is moderately left/right or hard left/right. Consistent with the political realities of the Australian context, Labor candidates were always classified as left of centre,
while Liberal candidates always right of centre. The results using more detailed categories of ideology (omitting party affiliation) are shown in the supplementary appendix (Figures A7.1 to A7.5) and are substantively identical to those shown here.

Turning first to the overall results, Figure 7.2 shows voters think Middle Eastern candidates are least likely to care about what they think. By contrast, there is no statistically significant difference between white-Anglo candidates and Chinese or Indian candidates. Further, it appears this negative bias towards Middle Eastern candidates is driven primarily by voters who identify with the Coalition, as there is no significant relationship for Labor/Greens identifiers. Chinese and Indian candidates are statistically indistinguishable from White-Anglo candidates for all partisan groups. This is not the case for country of birth – in both the overall analysis and the partisan analysis, voters indicate foreign-born candidates are less likely to be responsive to them.
**Figure 7.2** Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) for Candidate Characteristics by Respondent Political Party Identification, Australia 2017

**Note:** AMCEs are based on the change in probability of candidate selection, according to the question: ‘Which candidate do you think is the most likely to care what people like you think?’ The total N for this analysis is 9,430 candidates (943 respondents with five choice sets of 2 candidates).

Across all three measures of descriptive representation (ethnic minority status, culture, and country of birth), there is little evidence of a positive impact on perceptions of responsiveness. In other words, there is no evidence ethnic minority voters feel like ethnic minority candidates are able to better represent their interests. In fact, the coefficient for this measure is negative, though not statistically significant at the 0.05 level (Figure 7.3). These results are mirrored when examining candidates’ and voters’ cultural backgrounds: while the coefficients for Chinese and Indian candidates among Asian respondents were in the expected direction (indicating stronger perceptions of responsiveness), they were not statistically significant at the 0.05 level (Figure 7.4). As a result, this analysis also fails to find support for that co-ethnic ties increase perceptions of responsiveness.
Figure 7.3 Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) for Candidate Characteristics by Respondent Ethnic Minority Status, Australia 2017

Note: AMCEs are based on the change in probability of candidate selection, according to the question: ‘Which candidate do you think is the most likely to care what people like you think?’ The total N for this analysis is 9,430 candidates (943 respondents with five choice sets of 2 candidates).
**Figure 7.4** Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) for Candidate Characteristics by Respondent Ethnic Group, Australia 2017

**Note:** AMCEs are based on the change in probability of candidate selection, according to the question: ‘Which candidate do you think is the most likely to care what people like you think?’ The total N for this analysis is 9,430 candidates (943 respondents with five choice sets of 2 candidates).

Figure 7.5 shows the results for respondents according to their country of birth. Here, the main quantity of interest is whether foreign-born respondents think foreign-born candidates would do a better job representing their interests. There is little evidence this form of descriptive representation makes foreign-born respondents feel more represented. For respondents born in English-speaking background (ESB) countries, the coefficient for foreign-born candidates is negative – that is, they feel like foreign-born candidates would be less likely to care about what people like them think. Respondents born in non-ESB (NESB) countries see candidates born abroad as statistically identical to Australian-born candidates in terms of responsiveness.
Figure 7.5 Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) for Candidate Characteristics by Respondent Country of Birth Grouping, Australia 2017

Note: AMCEs are based on the change in probability of candidate selection, according to the question: ‘Which candidate do you think is the most likely to care what people like you think?’ The total N for this analysis is 9,430 candidates (943 respondents with five choice sets of 2 candidates).

These results hold when examining the potential moderating impact of ‘linked fate.’

Figure 7.6 shows the results for two groups of Asian respondents, the first of which indicated they believe their future life prospects are tied to members of their ethnic group, and the second which did not. There is little evidence that linked fate moderates the relationship between descriptive representation and perceptions of responsiveness in the Australian context.
Figure 7.6 Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) for Candidate Characteristics for Asian Respondents According to Sense of Linked Fate, Australia 2017

Note: AMCEs are based on the change in probability of candidate selection, according to the question: ‘Which candidate do you think is the most likely to care what people like you think?’ Those with a sense of linked fate ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ with the statement, ‘What happens to others in your ethnic group in this country will have some effect on your own life.’ The total N for this analysis is 9,430 candidates (943 respondents with five choice sets of 2 candidates).

While this analysis does not find support for hypotheses 1 or 8, the results paint a clear picture regarding white-Anglo attitudes towards minority representation. In each of the analyses described above, the results suggest majority voters see minority candidates as less likely to care about their interests. This is especially true for candidates with a Middle Eastern background, who are seen as less responsive in almost every model. This supports prior research that finds Middle-Eastern citizens face considerable discrimination in many Western societies (Gravelle 2018a; Lajevardi and Oskooii 2018; McAllister and Moore 1991; Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 2009). Interestingly, Middle Eastern candidates seen as identical to Anglo candidates for Labor/Greens identifiers and Asian respondents. This supports the
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notion that attitudes towards ethnic minorities in politics may be affected by partisan considerations.

Other markers of minority representation are also associated with lower perceptions of responsiveness. Candidates born in Australia are rated more likely to care about what voters think in almost every model – both among Australian-born and foreign-born voters. Language also seems to indicate outsider status – for example, Anglo respondents think Arabic-speakers (regardless of their ethnicity or religion) are less likely to care about what people like them think.

Turning now to the impacts of other candidate characteristics, respondents think female candidates are more likely to care about what people like them think in most models. The results hold across all cultural groups (Figures 7.3 and 7.4) but not all immigrant groups; only respondents born in Australia think women candidates are more responsive, while foreign-born respondents think it makes no difference (Figure 7.5). There are also partisan differences in terms of gender – only Labor/Greens identifiers and ‘Other’ identifiers, but not Coalition identifiers, think women are more responsive to their interests (Figure 7.2).

In most models, younger candidates are somewhat more likely to be seen as responsive compared to older candidates, while single candidates tend to be perceived as the least responsive of the marital categories. The effects for incumbency are generally not significant. Voters do not seem to find much difference between lawyers, professionals and those working in agriculture, but consistently rate party officials as less likely to be responsive to their demands. Candidates with a postgraduate degree do better among white-Anglo respondents and Labor/Greens respondents, but otherwise candidate education tends not to be important. Partisan calculations play out in other predictable ways – Coalition-identifying voters indicate Coalition candidates are more responsive, while Labor/Greens voters prefer Labor candidates (Figure 7.2). Interestingly, voters’ overall preferences for
Labor candidates appear to be driven by white-Anglo and ESB-born voters, while ethnic minority and NESB-born do not think partisan calculations matter. While prior research has found ethnic minority candidates for left-leaning parties do better among ethnic minority voters (Martin 2016; Zingher and Farrer 2016), these results suggest this does not take place because these voters feel minority candidates will be more responsive to their demands. Instead, the results call for more attention to be paid to other mechanisms.

Some of the strongest and most consistent results in the above models appear for candidate ideology. In almost every model, extremist candidates (those whose profiles indicated they were ‘hard’ left or ‘hard’ right) are seen as less responsive to respondents’ concerns than moderate candidates. This finding is significant because it suggests both ethnic minority voters and white-Anglo voters are much more concerned with what candidates believe than what culture they belong to, where they are born, or what language they speak. One possible mechanism concerns the link between candidate characteristics and their probable behaviour when in office. On the one hand, race “is a low-cost alternative to more detailed information about a legislator’s stands and, importantly, is virtually impossible to manipulate” (Gay 2002, 718). When voters have little information about a candidate, they are more likely to apply “social and political stereotypes” to infer how a candidate will behave based on their demographic characteristics (McDermott 1998, 897). As discussed above, this leads voters to often assume women and ethnic minority candidates hold more liberal views than their white male counterparts – even when they hold similar policy positions (Jones 2014; J. W. Koch 2000; Jacobsmeier 2015). By specifying the ideology of each hypothetical candidate, this experiment was able to control for this mechanism between descriptive representation and external efficacy.

One possible interpretation of these findings is that preference for co-minority or co-ethnic candidates is driven by the inferences voters make about the other qualities they hold,
such as policy positions. In this case, voters value someone who ‘looks like them’ as a stand-in for decisions they would make themselves – an explanation consistent with the finding that ethnic minority voters strongly prefer the ‘delegate’ model of representation, rather than the ‘trustee’ model (C. D. Anderson and Goodyear-Grant 2005; Bird 2015). Therefore, when these positions are directly specified, it could be that the co-ethnic or co-minority effect disappears. In this case, descriptive representation can be understood as an instrumental goal in achieving substantive representation, rather than an end-in-itself. By contrast, it could also be possible voters care more about substantive representation to begin with. Accordingly, in the counterfactual scenario where the ideology of each candidate had not been specified, perhaps there still would have been no effects for markers of descriptive representation. In both cases, the implication is that voters care more about the substantive representation of their policy positions than the descriptive representation of their identities. This finding suggests researchers need to think more critically about whether legitimacy is derived from what a legislature looks like, rather than what it does.

Several other explanations are possible for why the results of this study differ from past work. To start, this is the first experimental examination of the relationship between descriptive representation and external efficacy. It is possible ethnic minority voters do not have a pure preference for members of their own ethnic group. Rather, other factors may moderate this relationship – such as mobilization effects. Second, as discussed in chapter 4, most of the existing literature on this relationship comes from the US context – where racial tension is much higher than in Australia. This explanation is supported by the finding that linked fate does not explain the relationship between descriptive representation and external efficacy in Australia, since we should expect linked fate to matter less when ethnic divisions are less pronounced. Third, even in this experimental context, this study was unable to examine the precise relationship between, say, Mandarin-speaking voters and Mandarin-
speaking candidates or Chinese voters and Chinese candidates. Because of practical constraints, respondents had to be grouped into larger categories. As a result, this approach provides a difficult test of the argument that descriptive representation could increase efficacy, increasing the probability of type II error (Zingher and Farrer 2016). Hopefully, future work will be able to obtain more precise samples to overcome these limitations.

Future work should also evaluate the impact of other marks of representation, such as religion. There is limited evidence of explicit co-religious affinity in Western democracies, though these effects undoubtedly exist in other countries (O. Heath, Verniers, and Kumar 2015; Martin 2016). Instead, much of the research on candidate religion in Western countries has focused on the impact of non-Christian candidates on voter attitudes. While it can be difficult to disentangle the impact of ethnicity from the impact of religion (since they are often highly correlated), there is evidence Muslim candidates in particular face the brunt of discrimination from ethnic majority voters. Fisher et al. (2014) argue electoral discrimination in the UK against ethnic minority candidates is driven largely by white voter reluctance to cast a ballot for Muslim candidates. Other work has also shown Muslim candidates are seen as less approachable, experienced and effective than other candidates, though here too it is difficult to disentangle the effect of religion from ethnicity (R. Campbell and Cowley 2014).

However, these findings align with broad evidence of anti-Muslim sentiment in Western democracies. For example, Sides and Gross (2013) show white Americans see Muslim individuals as more violent and less trustworthy as other groups, while Bansak et al. (2016) demonstrate European citizens prefer Christian asylum seekers to Muslim ones. Muslims in Western democracies are subject to such prejudice at least in part because of their status as religious and cultural ‘others’ (Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 2009), and we should expect this discrimination to extend to the political sphere as voters evaluate potential candidates.
While this study was not able to examine this mechanism directly, the results regarding Middle-Eastern and Arabic-speaking candidates are certainly consistent with this hypothesis.

7.4 Conclusion

Does descriptive representation change voters’ political attitudes? Descriptive representation is multidimensional, and in practice ‘descriptive representatives’ often simultaneously possess several attributes – such as shared status as an ethnic minority or immigrant – that could change their constituents’ attitudes. It is unclear which of these attributes, if any, drives changes to how both ethnic minority and ethnic majority constituents feel about their representatives and the political regime more broadly. Moreover, some of these attributes may cancel each other out; for example, it is unclear how an ethnic minority respondent would feel if they were represented by a co-ethnic candidate from a different religion, or one who speaks a different language.

The purpose of the conjoint experiment used in this chapter was to ‘unbundle’ the various attributes a descriptive representative may have. The results suggest that, at least in the Australian context, shared status as an ethnic minority or immigrant do not make ethnic minority voters feel better represented. In other words, none of these three elements of descriptive representation mediates a change in ‘potentiality’ (Uhlaner 2012). By contrast, several of these attributes provoke a negative response from ethnic majority constituents, who feel that non-Anglo and foreign-born candidates would be less responsive to their interests.

The findings for white-Anglo voters are driven, in part, by negative perceptions of Middle-Eastern candidates and Arabic-speaking candidates – both of which may suggest the candidate is Muslim. This finding is consistent with prior work in other jurisdictions, which shows the descriptive representation of ethnic minorities can reduce the diffuse support of ethnic majorities (Scherer and Curry 2010). It is also consistent with work that shows white-
Anglo voters have a pan-ethnic identity and sense of linked-fate within their group, and calls for greater attention to how these attitudes may affect the other ways members of this group interact with the political system in Australia and abroad (Goldman 2017; Schildkraut 2017; Jardina 2019). Thus, this study only finds support for Hypothesis 2 (majority candidate backlash).

In the next chapter, I will review the overall findings of this dissertation. Each chapter has provided an important part of the overall puzzle, and I now turn to putting these pieces together.
8 CONCLUSION:
REPRESENTATION AND LEGITIMACY, REVISITED

While almost every advanced democracy has become more ethnically diverse through the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, ethnic minorities and members of overseas-born communities are dramatically underrepresented in legislatures compared to their presence in the general population. Democratic theory argues that if a group – especially one that is growing so rapidly – has few legislative representatives, their preferences risk being overlooked while jeopardizing the legitimacy of the representative system. Does it matter if democratic institutions like parliaments, cabinets and political parties have so few members from historically marginalised communities? We have normative and theoretical reasons to believe the answer is yes – that a lack of descriptive representation may lead voters to doubt the legitimacy of their political institutions. This study has set out to examine the empirical case for this claim.

This thesis asks the question: does the descriptive representation of ethnic minorities in legislatures affect citizens’ diffuse support for the regime? The answer is: sometimes. This
study finds some evidence that both co-minority and co-ethnic ties can make institutions seem more responsive to ethnic minority voters, but the looming danger of essentialism cannot be readily discarded. The more concerning trend for advanced democracies pertains to ethnic majority voters, many of whom feel like government is less responsive when more ethnic minority legislators are elected.

Below, I summarize the conclusions of this dissertation in more detail. I then discuss the theoretical, empirical and policy contributions of this study, as well as their implications for democracy. Finally, I examine avenues for future research.

8.1 Does Descriptive Representation Increase Diffuse Support?

This dissertation began by examining the concept of diffuse support, which constitutes a “reservoir of favourable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed” (Easton 1975, 444). Chapter 2 discussed how this ‘reservoir’ underlies the regime’s legitimacy – if citizens have little diffuse support for their political institutions, those institutions will have difficulty convincing citizens that government is acting in their best interests or getting citizens to comply with unpopular policies. Diffuse support is most commonly operationalised as external efficacy, which represents “the belief that the authorities or regime are responsive to influence attempts” (Balch 1974, 24). Here, the so-called ‘reference object’ is the political system itself, rather than any individual incumbent or government (Coleman and Davis 1976). External efficacy – just as all political attitudes – is multi-causal; the determinants of external efficacy include individual socialization, political realities and resources. For example, members of politically disadvantaged groups have less reason to expect the political system to be responsive to them (Abramson 1972). By contrast, those with more political resources – such as income, education, and political knowledge – should feel like government is more responsive to them.
Socialization matters, too; individuals who possess a wealth of political resources when going through the process of political socialization should be better placed to influence the political system (Iyengar 1978; M. R. Anderson 2010). High external efficacy is valuable – especially for members of politically disadvantaged communities – because it is associated with higher levels of political participation, and therefore a greater chance their preferences will translate into outputs in a democratic context (Grönlund and Setälä 2007; Valentino, Gregorowicz, and Groenendyk 2009; Bird, Saalfeld, and Wüst 2010).

One relatively unexplored determinant of external efficacy is descriptive representation, a concept which refers to a shared identity (usually on the basis of ethnicity or gender) between constituents and their political representatives. While descriptive representation is often advanced as a way to increase the legitimacy of the political system, the question of whether it actually does so in the eyes of the citizenry has been subject to little empirical scrutiny. Chapter 3 discussed how examining external efficacy, and through it diffuse support, offers “a very specific and testable measure of government legitimacy that may provide empirical support to arguments about the value of descriptive representation in elected bodies of government” (Atkeson and Carrillo 2007, 80). Descriptive representation can increase feelings of external efficacy because, as the outgroup, ethnic minorities have historically been excluded from many aspects of political life by the ethnic majority group. This exclusion, especially from elected institutions, may lead ethnic minority voters to be sceptical that their interests are adequately represented within the political system. By contrast, ethnic minority voters may update their perceptions of government responsiveness as a result of descriptive representation because of an increase in ‘potentiality’, the feeling that a representative would defend the constituent’s interests if those interests were threatened (Uhlaner 2012).
This study’s first empirical test of this theoretical mechanism came in examining the case the Australian Parliament, which is a useful case study because of the presence of compulsory voting. In Australia, descriptive representation is unlikely to affect political attitudes as a result of differential voter mobilization, since almost everyone votes. However, despite being a diverse, settler society with high levels of immigration and robust democratic institutions, Australians have elected very few ethnic minority representatives to the federal parliament. This presents both a challenge and opportunity: while it is difficult to study the impact of legislator-based descriptive representation in Australia, it is possible to evaluate whether candidate-based ties alone are enough to change how voters feel about the responsiveness of government. Using data from the Australian Election Study (AES), chapter 4 demonstrated the answer is a resounding ‘no’ – candidate-based descriptive representation has no impact on the political attitudes of ethnic minority voters. A different pattern emerged for white-Anglo Australians; for these voters, the mere presence of a non-white candidate – whether or not they win – is associated with lower feelings of external efficacy. This relatively low bar for white-Anglo voters to feel disempowered is a finding that emerged repeatedly in this thesis.

This study dove deeper into examining co-ethnic descriptive representation by examining the case of the British Parliament. Britain is a diverse, Westminster-style democracy, but is not a settler society in the same way as Australia or Canada. However, a much greater number of so-called ‘Black and Minority Ethnic’ (BME) MPs have been elected to the British Parliament than non-white MPs to the Australian Parliament. Further, thanks to the Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES), researchers have a large, high-quality sample of ethnic minority respondents, as well as data on a wide battery of questions specific to the experiences of ethnic minority voters. With regards to candidate-level descriptive representation, the findings of chapter 5 aligned with those of chapter 4:
having an opportunity to vote for a fellow ethnic minority is not enough to mediate changes in the political attitudes of ethnic minority voters. However, the presence of legislator-level descriptive representation does make BME voters feel like government is more responsive to them. Given the richness of the EMBES data, chapter 5 was also able to differentiate between co-ethnic representation among South Asian and Chinese voter-legislator pairings, respectively, and co-minority representation – which groups all BME voters together. There is evidence both forms of representation can increase voters’ feelings of government responsiveness – though in the context of co-ethnic ties, only for South Asian voters. Finally, chapter 5 demonstrated that community-level mobilization – operationalized through consumption of ethnic-group-oriented news – and an explicit preference for descriptive representation can moderate the relationship between representation and external efficacy.

Despite the richness of the AES and EMBES data, chapters 4 and 5 relied on conventional regression methods for examining cross-sectional survey data. As a result, while those chapters provided strong evidence of an association between ethnic minority representation and external efficacy, they stopped short of claiming a causal link. Chapter 6 examined the causal relationship further by examining the case of Canada, an advanced democracy which was colonized by two European powers. As a result, the official recognition – and arguably, celebration – of ethnic and linguistic difference has been a part of Canadian political life for decades. Using both cross-sectional and panel data from the Canadian Election Study (CES), chapter 6 examined both between-respondent and within-respondent effects in response to changes in descriptive representation. The results for candidate-based representation are consistent with chapters 4 and 5: it is not enough for so-called ‘visible’ minority candidates to run in order for visible minority voters to update their political attitudes. The results also support the finding that white majority voters feel threatened by ethnic minority representation in Parliament. The results diverge from previous
chapters in two respects, however. First, it appears white Canadians are not threatened by visible minority candidates alone – perhaps because many more ethnic minority candidates contest federal office in Canada than Australia. However, despite Canada’s reputation for inclusivity, white Canadian voters feel like government is less responsive to them when they are represented by a visible minority legislator. Second, the analysis did not find evidence that Canadian visible minority voters feel better represented by visible minority legislators – findings which diverge from the British case.

The final empirical analysis of this dissertation re-examined the case of Australia. Recall that few ethnic minority candidates run for federal office in Australia, and fewer win. Chapter 7 examined the effects of a hypothetical scenario where more ethnic minority candidates contest federal office by conducting a probability-based survey of Australian voters. Chapter 7 also tried to disentangle the multi-dimensional nature of descriptive representation, since in practice attributes like ethnicity, language and immigrant status are all ‘bundled’ together in a single candidate. In this case, it is not clear which attribute(s) drive(s) potential changes to external efficacy – do respondents feel differently about candidates because of their ancestry, country of birth, or rather an ability to speak in a different language? In the AES data examined in chapter 4, ethnic minority voters did not appear to update their attitudes in response to descriptive representation; however, it could also be that the combination of ethnicity, language and immigrant status wash out real differences in political attitudes based on different types of candidate-voter ties.

Using a conjoint experiment, chapter 7 found evidence this is not the case. At least in the Australian context, ethnic minority voters did not feel like descriptive representatives are better at representing their interests – regardless whether ‘descriptive’ is defined in cultural, linguistic or immigrant terms. However, white-Anglo voters showed a decrease in perceptions of responsiveness similar to the results in chapters 4 and 6. Moreover, chapter 7
showed that white-Anglo voters and ethnic minority voters in Australia have similar overall perceptions of ‘linked fate’ with their ethnic group – a finding consistent with emerging evidence from the United States (Jardina 2019) which I return to shortly.

Overall, the results of these four empirical chapters are broadly consistent. There is strong evidence that candidate-based descriptive representation is not enough to change how ethnic minority voters feel about the political regime. In other words, seeing someone like yourself run for office is not enough; they actually have to win. By contrast, co-minority and co-ethnic legislator ties can increase the external efficacy of ethnic minority voters; however, the relationship appears to only be present in Britain. Further research is needed to understand why this is the case. For example, it could be that ethnic minority voters in Canada are more satisfied with ethnic majority representation. In this case, perhaps visible minority Canadians feel like both white and non-white legislators would take their concerns seriously.

There is evidence that mobilization effects and an explicit preference for descriptive representation moderate changes in external efficacy – findings which are not surprising, but demonstrate that voters’ stated preferences are consistent with their revealed preferences in this regard. There is no evidence that co-immigrant ties change how foreign-born Australians in general, and Non-English-Speaking Background (NESB) migrants in particular, feel about the responsiveness of government.

The strongest findings pertain to the political attitudes of ethnic majority voters. In both Canada and Australia, ethnic majority voters feel like government is less responsive to them when represented by an ethnic minority legislator. In the case of Australia, even an ethnic minority candidate is enough to make white-Anglo voters feel worse off. This is consistent with past work that demonstrates white voters are less likely to vote for ethnic minority candidates, especially for those of Asian and Middle-Eastern descent (Besco 2018;
Fisher et al. 2014; Gravelle 2018a; Lajevardi and Oskooii 2018). However, these findings are also consistent with more recent work that shows white-Anglo voters experience ethnic group consciousness as separate from racial resentment (Berry, Ebner, and Cornelius 2019; Schildkraut 2017). In the US-context, Jardina (2019) argues increases in white identity are associated with the changing ethnic composition of the United States. The findings in chapter 7, which show white-Anglo Australians experience similar levels of common fate to ethnic minority Australians, are consistent with this argument. Table 8.1 summarises these findings with regards to the hypotheses presented in chapter 1.
### Table 8.1 Summary of Findings by Hypothesis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Short Title</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Findings</th>
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<td>H1</td>
<td>Co-minority Candidate Efficacy</td>
<td>Ethnic minority respondents will have higher levels of external efficacy when a minority candidate runs in their electorate.</td>
<td>Not supported (all countries)</td>
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<td>H2</td>
<td>Majority Candidate Backlash</td>
<td>Ethnic majority respondents will have lower levels of external efficacy when a minority candidate runs in their electorate.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>H3</td>
<td>Co-minority Legislator Efficacy</td>
<td>Ethnic minority respondents will have higher levels of external efficacy when a minority legislator is elected in their electorate.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Co-ethnic Legislator Efficacy</td>
<td>Ethnic minority respondents will have higher levels of external efficacy when a co-ethnic legislator is elected in their electorate.</td>
<td>Partially supported (Britain, but not Canada)</td>
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<tr>
<td>H5</td>
<td>Majority Legislator Backlash</td>
<td>Ethnic majority respondents will have lower levels of external efficacy when an ethnic minority legislator is elected in their constituency.</td>
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<tr>
<td>H6</td>
<td>DR Preference</td>
<td>Ethnic minority respondents with an explicit preference for descriptive representation will have higher levels of external efficacy when a co-ethnic legislator is elected in their electorate.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>H7</td>
<td>Mobilization</td>
<td>Ethnic minority respondents will have higher levels of external efficacy when a co-ethnic legislator is elected in their electorate and they are mobilized to vote through their ethnic or religious community.</td>
<td>Supported (Britain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H8</td>
<td>Linked Fate</td>
<td>Only voters with a high sense of linked fate will consider co-ethnic candidates better able to represent their interests.</td>
<td>Not supported (Australia)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8.2 Contribution and Implications for Democracy

This study advances our understanding of the theoretical and empirical relationship between representation and legitimacy. As I argue below, the results have implications for democratic governance and public policy.

First, this study makes a theoretical contribution by testing a common assumption in the political science literature: that descriptive representation matters for the legitimacy of our political institutions. Is this assumption borne out? Yes – but with important caveats. Descriptive representation can make ethnic minority voters feel like government is more responsive to them. However, who qualifies as a ‘descriptive representative’ can vary. Sometimes, it is enough for both a voter and their representative to have an ethnic minority background. In other cases, ‘descriptive’ refers to shared ethnicity or cultural background. It is difficult to know exactly how specific the link between a voter and a descriptive representative need be. For example, there are approximately 56 officially-recognized ethnic groups in China (State Council 2014). Would a Chinese-Canadian legislator have descriptive ties to their Chinese constituents, even if both are not members of the Han majority? Here again, the danger of essentialism should not be readily discarded. These nuances can help us understand the broader relationship between representation and historical forms of exclusion, such as on the basis of religion, sexual orientation and identity, and disability. For example, is a gay man a ‘descriptive’ representative for all LGBTQ+ identifying individuals? Are Sunni and Shia Muslims linked on the basis of descriptive representation? Further research is needed to understand the precise mechanisms that link citizens to descriptive representatives.

This study also makes several empirical contributions to our understanding of representation, political behaviour and public opinion. As discussed in chapters 2 and 3, the literatures concerning descriptive representation and diffuse support are both extensive; however, a small fraction of that research examines how one affects the other. Moreover, the
research that does examine this question is contradictory and focused almost entirely on the US-context. This study focuses on dyadic descriptive representation – that is, concerning ties between legislators and the voters in their electorates – to examine how perceptions of responsiveness change in three Westminster-style democracies. This study also differentiates between candidate-based and legislator-based dyadic descriptive representation. As a result of this study, we have evidence that legislator-based descriptive representation can increase diffuse support, but that candidate-based ties alone have no effect – at least for ethnic minority voters. We now also have evidence that descriptive representation matters in countries where race and ethnicity is less polarized than in the United States – one of the primarily limitations of extrapolating US-based research to other contexts in this field.

Second, this study has implications for democratic governance and informs the relationship between legislators and parliamentary institutions. While this dissertation finds evidence that descriptive representation matters in some contexts – notably in Britain – it did not find broad-ranging, overwhelming support for this hypothesis in all contexts. Especially in Canada, but also in Australia, perhaps this should not be surprising. Former Canadian prime minister Pierre Trudeau once famously remarked that MPs are “nobodies fifty yards off Parliament Hill” (O’Malley 2009). This sentiment is reflected in the conventional wisdom that ‘MPs don’t matter’ in Canada. While I think this concern is overblown, it is true that the Canadian Parliament “does a poor job in allowing members to achieve policy goals specifically, and where those members who prioritize making a personal difference will be least satisfied” (Kerby and Blidook 2011, 622). As a result, scholars need to reconcile their rhetoric on the value of descriptive representation with their regret over the declining role of Parliament in Westminster-style democracies: put simply, if MPs do not matter, why should we expect citizens to care if ethnic minority MPs are elected? Conversely, if we believe descriptive representatives should have more influence, the solution begins with empowering
MPs to enact substantive policy agendas. Indeed, the results in chapter 7 support this case; candidates’ party affiliation and ideological self-placement mattered more to voters than any other attribute – including ethnicity or cultural background. This suggests what an MP believes – and is therefore more likely to do – may matter more to ethnic minority voters than what the MP looks like.

Third, the relationship between descriptive representation and perceptions of responsiveness has policy implications. If representation increases legitimacy, increasing descriptive representation could help address the decline of diffuse support for democratic institutions. If representation does not increase legitimacy, we should turn our efforts towards institutional designs that may do so – such as substantive representation. As discussed above, this study finds some evidence for both arguments; while descriptive representation does increase legitimacy in some contexts – especially Britain – substantive representation may matter more. Thus, while the pursuit of descriptive representation is valuable for addressing the decline of diffuse support, this study finds evidence it alone is unlikely to cause a widespread change in political attitudes without a corresponding focus on substantive representation.

The results also inform ongoing debates about the role of quotas and other descriptive institutions for underrepresented groups. For example, calls for an Indigenous voice to Parliament in Australia and Canada – usually through a dedicated third chamber – have been advanced, in part, on the basis that Indigenous descriptive representation matters for legitimacy. In Canada, this was clearly articulated in the recommendations of the 1996 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, while Australia’s landmark expression came in 2017 with the Uluru Statement from the Heart. It is outside the scope of this thesis to assess the impact this form of representation might have on the political attitudes of Indigenous people in Australia or Canada. However, it does suggest there is a need to be especially sensitive to
pan-Indigenous assumptions about identity which group all Indigenous peoples into one group. There are more than 600 First Nations in Canada who speak 70 distinct Aboriginal languages, while there are more than 500 Indigenous groups in Australia who speak 150 distinct Aboriginal languages (Statistics Canada 2017a; Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017b; Australian Government n.d.). It remains to be seen whether co-Indigenous bonds between representatives and constituents are more analogous to the co-ethnic (stronger) or co-minority (weaker) bonds investigated in this dissertation.

The same can be said about formal and informal quotas for underrepresented groups at the party and parliamentary level. It would be nearly impossible – and probably not normatively desirable – to legislate a form of ‘mirror representation’ into parliamentary institutions. Not only would this approach further promote essentialist assumptions about ethnicity, it is unlikely to make much difference in terms of political attitudes without a corresponding focus on substantive representation or reforms which strengthen the role of individual legislators. These findings also inform discussions about quotas for other groups. For example, some within the Australian Labor Party have called for its model of gender quotas to be extended to a system that incorporates more working class people (Chambers 2019).

Finally, the results of this study highlight that political parties and governments should be increasingly aware of ethnic majority political attitudes in relation to descriptive representation. Across many advanced democracies, the multicultural consensus appears to be eroding. For example, there is mounting evidence that two of the most consequential political events of the last five years – the election of U.S. President Donald Trump and Britain’s vote to leave the European Union – are associated with white ethnocentrism and anti-immigrant attitudes (Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018; Palma, Sinclair, and Esses 2019; Rzepnikowska 2019; Wright and Esses 2019).
Prior research on ethnicity and political behaviour has mostly ignored white identity as a type of group consciousness (Jardina 2019). This body of work has examined the experiences of ethnic minorities by comparing these groups to white voters – effectively treating ‘whiteness’ as the default or reference category. This focus on ethnic minority voters is important, but incomplete. There is increasing evidence that white voters experience ethnic group consciousness in a similar way to ethnic minority voters (Berry, Ebner, and Cornelius 2019; Schildkraut 2017) – a finding supported in the context of Australian voters in Chapter 7. In retrospect, perhaps this is not surprising; if political exclusion creates a set of in-groups and out-groups, we should expect these dynamics to affect not only ethnic minority voters (the out-group), but also white-Anglo voters (the in-group). As our societies get more diverse, the representation of previously excluded groups will almost certainly increase. Understanding how white-Anglo voters see the descriptive representation of ethnic minorities is critical to helping these voters see representation is not a zero-sum game.

8.3 Limitations and Directions for Future Research

This study, like all studies, is subject to certain limitations. First, conventional election studies in Western democracies have relatively small samples of non-white respondents – and even smaller samples of specific ethnic groups. This is one of the reasons that studies like the EMBES are so valuable. This sample size problem increases the probability of Type II error by making it less likely the null hypothesis will be rejected even if it ought to be (Zingher and Farrer 2016). In other words, it could be that a stronger relationship between descriptive representation and external efficacy exists than my results show, simply because the data lack the requisite power to detect it.

As a researcher, I would much rather fail to find a statistically significant result than claim a relationship where none exists. However, even in this case, the result is noteworthy; if
the relationship between representation and legitimacy is so weak that conventional election studies cannot detect it, this should give us pause when making sweeping generalizations about descriptive representation. It is worth noting, however, that in many of this study’s analyses, it was not simply that the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis (p-value) was slightly larger than the conventional threshold for statistical significance (0.05). In many cases, the coefficient itself was in the ‘wrong’ direction as predicted by theory. However, the lack of large survey projects which examine the ethnic minority experience certainly limits our ability to understand these communities, and further research is needed on this front.

Another limitation concerns intersectionality – it could be that descriptive representation of both ethnicity and gender produce substantively different results than either separately. While Canada, Australia and Britain are all robust liberal democracies, they remain rooted in patriarchal traditions. As a result, the intersection of race and gender for political representatives is important. Sample size limitations did not permit an examination of intersectionality in this dissertation – both because there are too few ethnic minority legislators and too few ethnic minority respondents. Future research – especially large survey projects which examine ethnic minority voters, conducted after more ethnic minority legislators are elected – will be crucial for disentangling this relationship.

A further limitation concerns the aggregation of diverse communities under the broad label of ‘non-white’ or ‘ethnic minority.’ While this is the standard approach in the literature because of sample-size limitations\textsuperscript{18}, the approach nevertheless remains crude. Treating such heterogeneous communities as homogenous conceals many of the nuances which underlie theories of descriptive representation. Researchers must take care to avoid essentialist

\textsuperscript{18} See for example: Tossutti and Najem 2002; Black and Erickson 2006; Bird 2010; Besco 2015; Black 2016; Bird 2016; Gidengil and Roy 2015; Bilodeau 2017; Besco 2018
assumptions which contend ethnic minorities are united only by their ‘otherness’ compared to the majority. While this study attempted to overcome this limitation by examining various subgroups of ethnic minority respondents separately, more data are needed to examine this relationship in greater detail.

Despite these limitations, there are clues outside this study which point to the same broad conclusions. For example, ethnic minority voters tend to have higher levels of diffuse support for the regime than ethnic majority voters (Bilodeau 2014; A. Heath et al. 2013; Pietsch 2018). As discussed in the introduction, this “presents a puzzle for scholars of representation: if lower levels of descriptive representation should be associated with lower levels of diffuse support, why do ethnic minority voters and immigrants have higher levels of diffuse support than their ethnic majority counterparts?” Perhaps the answer to this puzzle is that descriptive representation matters less to ethnic minority voters than we previously thought – or at least for different reasons. Again, the danger of essentialism lies heavy – we should not automatically assume voters think the most important thing about a political leader is their ethnicity. Instead, other factors – like substantive representation – may matter more to ethnic minority voters. I explore these implications further below.

While this study makes a number of important contributions to our understanding of the relationship between representation and legitimacy, there remains much to learn. As discussed above, small survey samples and a limited number of ethnic minority representatives make it difficult to examine this relationship using observational data. However, as the representation of historically excluded groups increases in advanced democracies, studies of their impact become both more possible and more important. The first step in advancing this research agenda involves collecting more survey data on the particular experiences of ethnic minority respondents. The landmark study in this field – the EMBES – serves as an important model for future data collection; however, it only covers
one country, and the data are now almost ten years old. In the case of Britain, more ethnic minority representatives have taken office since the study was conducted. Further, the experiences of BME voters are also likely to be different in a post-Brexit Britain. More high-quality survey data on the specific experiences of ethnic minority voters – in Canada, Australia, Britain, but also elsewhere – would also permit deeper examinations of how intersectionality may affect the relationship between representation and legitimacy. Moreover, these kinds of data would allow examinations of co-ethnic bonds which go beyond broad categories such as ‘non-white,’ ‘ethnic minority’ or even ‘South Asian’.

Future research should also examine the effects of institutional design on the relationship between representation and legitimacy. The three countries examined in this dissertation were chosen, in part, because of their similar political systems. However, it remains to be seen whether these results can be generalized outside Westminster-style systems – especially to those where legislators have more autonomy and are less bound by party discipline. One hypothesis worth testing in this regard is that as the power and autonomy of individual legislators increases, so too may the value of descriptive representation as a signal of increased legitimacy. It could be that descriptive representation only matters when a small number of legislators have the ability to enact meaningful change. Otherwise, voters may not see much value in having a descriptive representative that conforms to the same party line as all other representatives.

Further, this study purposely focused on dyadic descriptive representation. It is necessary to study how other forms of descriptive representation, such as collective descriptive representation, might affect perceptions of responsiveness. Here, the ‘critical mass’ hypothesis will be relevant; is there a specific threshold of ethnic minority representation that causes a tipping point where perceptions of responsiveness increase? Figure 8.1 shows how the descriptive representation gap in Australia, Britain and Canada has
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

changed from 1991-2015. Despite all three countries becoming more diverse, in some cases the gap between the percent of non-white individuals in the general population and the percent of non-white individuals in parliament has actually grown larger. Much more work is needed to understand how this gap affects political attitudes and behaviour. Further, the effects of elite descriptive representation also remain relatively understudied, in part because of the low number of non-white executives in advanced democracies. How would we expect ethnic minority voters’ perceptions of responsiveness to change if the prime minister of Canada, for example, was non-white? What about in countries with presidential systems? Each of these questions merits further study.

As time passes, the political consequences of ethnicity also change. In the era of Donald Trump, Brexit, and the spread of far-right nationalism in Europe, it appears ethnicity is becoming more contentious. If this trend continues, the value of descriptive representation in signalling responsiveness could increase. However, as Western democracies have more and more experience with diversity, it is equally plausible that who is seen as an ‘ethnic minority’ will change. In the early twentieth century, Irish Australians were viewed with suspicion; in addition to their ethnicity, their religion was seen as “obscurantist and oppressive”, and Irish Australians were the victims of sporadic violence (Jupp 2018, 25). Italians and those of Slavic origin were viewed as inferior well into the second half of the twentieth century. Today, it is difficult to argue Irish Australians, for example, constitute an underrepresented ethnic minority because of historical political exclusion; those of Irish origin have largely been absorbed into the dominant ethnic majority group. It is not altogether clear whether groups like Italian Canadians are ‘ethnic minorities’ – they are certainly not covered under the Canadian label of ‘visible minority,’ and are not counted as ‘ethnic minorities’ in this analysis. While these groups have the advantage of whiteness, it still begs an important question: when does a group stop being considered an ethnic minority? Is there
a difference between how members of these groups see themselves compared to how members of society writ-large see them, and does it matter? These issues – which have both theoretical and empirical elements – are worth further study.

**Figure 8.1** Descriptive Representation Gap Between Population and Parliament

![Figure 8.1 Descriptive Representation Gap Between Population and Parliament](image)

**Note:** Top line in each country curve represents the percentage of non-white individuals in the general population. Bottom line in each country curve represents the percentage of non-white individuals in parliament. British data on the population only considers England and Wales. Australian data obtained from the Australian Bureau of Statistics. British data obtained from the University of Manchester’s Centre on Dynamics of Ethnicity (CoDE). Canadian data obtained from Statistics Canada.

As described above, there is increasing evidence that white voters experience a form of group consciousness that is similar to what ethnic minority voters experience. Is white consciousness based on British ancestry, or is it based on skin colour alone? What are the political consequences of this form of group consciousness? These questions are becoming more relevant, and prior assumptions about whiteness as the reference category for analysis are becoming harder to defend. Future research should replicate and extend studies of white
ethnic consciousness from the United States to other contexts, like Canada, Australia and Britain. Moreover, if ethnic consciousness translates to ethnic nationalism, the onus is on researchers, policy makers and citizens, to address the consequences head-on.
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<th>Coverage</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Response Rate (Percent)</th>
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<td>2004</td>
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<td>2007</td>
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<td>Fournier et al. 2011</td>
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**Note:** CPS means Campaign-Period Survey. PES means Post-Election Survey. MBS means Mail-Back Survey. NES means non-election survey. *a* re-interview rate, where the denominator is the corresponding campaign-period survey; *b* re-interview rate, where the denominator is the corresponding post-election survey; *c* denominator is panel members only.
Table A4.1: Summary Statistics for Chapter 4

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<th>SD</th>
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<th>Max</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>13446</td>
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<td>0.97</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>Respondent external efficacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethcontested</td>
<td>13609</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.35</td>
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<td>Race has an ethnic minority candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>votewinner</td>
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<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>Respondent voted for winning candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>polint</td>
<td>13516</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>Respondent interest in politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pid</td>
<td>13605</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>Respondent party identification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pidstrength</td>
<td>11414</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>Respondent strength of party identification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age</td>
<td>12951</td>
<td>54.66</td>
<td>16.73</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>Age (years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age2</td>
<td>12951</td>
<td>3267.70</td>
<td>1806.80</td>
<td>169.00</td>
<td>10000.00</td>
<td>Age (squared)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>university</td>
<td>12883</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>Respondent has a university education</td>
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<tr>
<td>female</td>
<td>13224</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>Respondent is female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income</td>
<td>13271</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>Respondent gross annual household income (quintiles)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foreignborn</td>
<td>13542</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>Percent of electorate born outside Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>election04</td>
<td>13609</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2004 Election (binary variable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>election07</td>
<td>13609</td>
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<td>0.34</td>
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<td>Binary variable for 2007 election</td>
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<td>election10</td>
<td>13609</td>
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<td>Binary variable for 2010 election</td>
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<td>Binary variable for 2013 election</td>
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<td>election16</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
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<td>Binary variable for 2016 election</td>
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**Table A5.1: Summary Statistics for Chapter 5**

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<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<td>2669</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>Influence on Politics</td>
</tr>
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<td>ethcontested</td>
<td>2787</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>Ethnic minority contested constituency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>female</td>
<td>2787</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>Respondent is female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age</td>
<td>2787</td>
<td>39.01</td>
<td>14.89</td>
<td>18.00</td>
<td>97.00</td>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>age2</td>
<td>2787</td>
<td>1743.29</td>
<td>1390.67</td>
<td>324.00</td>
<td>9409.00</td>
<td>Age squared</td>
</tr>
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<td>polint</td>
<td>2763</td>
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<td>1.12</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>voted</td>
<td>2695</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>Respondent voted in election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income</td>
<td>1732</td>
<td>5.19</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>14.00</td>
<td>Annual Household Income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>university</td>
<td>2787</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>University educated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foreignborn</td>
<td>2787</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>Percent electorate foreign-born</td>
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### Table A5.2: Mobilisation Effects for Britain (Full Model)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DR Outcome (Baseline: No DR ran)</th>
<th>(1) Church</th>
<th>(2) Ethnic News</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voted for DR, and DR won</td>
<td>0.907*</td>
<td>0.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.488)</td>
<td>(0.352)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not vote for DR, but DR won</td>
<td>-0.466</td>
<td>-0.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.419)</td>
<td>(0.317)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted for DR, but DR lost</td>
<td>-0.149</td>
<td>0.171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.374)</td>
<td>(0.278)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not vote for DR, but DR lost</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>-0.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.355)</td>
<td>(0.236)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No DR ran</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mobilisation (see model number – baseline: No)**

| Yes | 0.015 | 0.766** |
|     | (0.238) | (0.242) |

**Interaction effects (Baseline: no DR ran, no mobilization)**

| Voted for DR, and DR won # Yes | -0.459 | 0.808 |
|                               | (0.651) | (0.633) |
| Did not vote for DR, but DR won # Yes | 0.426 | -0.397 |
|                                | (0.604) | (0.634) |
| Voted for DR, but DR lost # Yes | 0.101 | -0.066 |
|                                | (0.524) | (0.589) |
| Did not vote for DR, but DR lost # Yes | -0.181 | -0.281 |
|                                  | (0.472) | (0.464) |

**Demographics**

| Respondent is female | 0.166 | 0.093 |
|                     | (0.172) | (0.137) |
| Age                | -0.023 | -0.006 |
|                    | (0.033) | (0.026) |
| Age squared        | 0.000  | 0.000  |
|                    | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Interest in Politics | 0.603*** | 0.524*** |
|                    | (0.083) | (0.065) |
| Annual Household Income | -0.012 | 0.006 |
|                     | (0.025) | (0.020) |
| University educated | -0.233 | -0.086 |
|                     | (0.204) | (0.166) |
| Percent electorate foreign-born | 0.980 | 0.153 |
|                         | (0.736) | (0.634) |
| Constant              | 1.138  | 0.836  |
|                      | (0.785) | (0.608) |

lns1_1_1
### APPENDICES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Constant</th>
<th>-0.824* (0.354)</th>
<th>-0.701** (0.236)</th>
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<td><strong>lnsig_e</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.030*** (0.022)</td>
<td>1.005*** (0.018)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1123</td>
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Standard errors in parentheses

*p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, ****p < 0.001
FIGURE A5.1: ETHNIC GROUPS BY AGE, BRITAIN 2010

![Figure A5.1: Ethnic Groups in Britain by Age](chart)

- **Indian**: 24 and under, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to 54, 55 to 64, 65 and over
- **Pakistan**: 24 and under, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to 54, 55 to 64, 65 and over
- **Bangladeshi**: 24 and under, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to 54, 55 to 64, 65 and over
- **Black-Caribbean**: 24 and under, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to 54, 55 to 64, 65 and over
- **Black-African**: 24 and under, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to 54, 55 to 64, 65 and over
### TABLE A6.1: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR CHAPTER 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
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<th>Sd</th>
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>exteff</td>
<td>12388</td>
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<td>0.93</td>
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<td>External efficacy</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
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<td>1.00</td>
<td>Respondent voted for winner</td>
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<td>university</td>
<td>17121</td>
<td>0.38</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>Attended university (binary)</td>
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<td>17299</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>Female (binary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income</td>
<td>14830</td>
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<td>1.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>Gross Annual Income (Quartiles)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Political interest</td>
</tr>
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<td>Strength of Party ID</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2004 Election</td>
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<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2006 Election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>election08</td>
<td>17409</td>
<td>0.19</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2008 Election</td>
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<td>17409</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2011 Election</td>
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<td>quebec</td>
<td>17299</td>
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<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>Respondent lives in Quebec</td>
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### Table A7.1: Attributes of Hypothetical Candidates in Conjoint Experiment

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<th>Permutation 3</th>
<th>Permutation 4</th>
<th>Permutation 5</th>
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<td>Gender</td>
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<td>Female</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Aged 40-49 years</td>
<td>Aged 50-59 years</td>
<td>Aged 60-69 years</td>
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<td>Party</td>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently seated</td>
<td>Yes, currently seated</td>
<td>No, not currently seated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political ideology</td>
<td>Hard &lt;left/right&gt;</td>
<td>Centre &lt;left/right&gt;</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>Widowed</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Children</td>
<td>No children</td>
<td>One child</td>
<td>Two children</td>
<td>Three children</td>
<td>Four children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of birth</td>
<td>Born in Australia</td>
<td>Not born in Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural background</td>
<td>Anglo-Caucasian</td>
<td>Middle Eastern</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>Indian</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other languages</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Mandarin</td>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous occupation</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Party official</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest education</td>
<td>High school certificate</td>
<td>Bachelor degree</td>
<td>Postgraduate degree</td>
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### Table A7.2: Summary Statistics for Chapter 7

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<th>Std. Dev.</th>
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<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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</tr>
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<td>rparty</td>
<td>9430</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>Respondent’s political party preference (Coalition, Labor/Greens, or Other)</td>
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<td>rculture</td>
<td>9430</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>Respondent’s cultural background (Caucasian, Asian or Other)</td>
</tr>
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<td>rminority</td>
<td>9430</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>Binary variable indicating respondent’s ethnic minority status (1 = ethnic minority, 0 = Anglo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rcob</td>
<td>9350</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>Respondent’s country of birth (Australian, ESB, NESB)</td>
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<td>fate_yes</td>
<td>8030</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>Binary variable indicating whether the respondent has a sense of linked fate (1 = yes, 0 = no)</td>
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<td>lote_yes</td>
<td>9420</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>Binary variable indicating whether the respondent speaks a language other than English (1 = yes, 0 = no)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure A7.1: AMCEs for Candidate Characteristics Using Ideology by Respondent Political Party Identification, Australia 2017

Note: AMCEs are based on the change in probability of candidate selection, according to the question: ‘Which candidate do you think is the most likely to care what people like you think?’ The total N for this analysis is 9,430 candidates (943 respondents with five choice sets of 2 candidates).
**Figure A7.2: AMCEs for Candidate Characteristics Using Ideology by Respondent Ethnic Minority Status, Australia 2017**

![Figure A7.2: AMCEs for Candidate Characteristics Using Ideology by Respondent Ethnic Minority Status, Australia 2017](image)

*Note:* AMCEs are based on the change in probability of candidate selection, according to the question: ‘Which candidate do you think is the most likely to care what people like you think?’ The total N for this analysis is 9,430 candidates (943 respondents with five choice sets of 2 candidates).
**Figure A7.3: AMCEs for Candidate Characteristics Using Ideology by Respondent Ethnic Group, Australia 2017**

Note: AMCEs are based on the change in probability of candidate selection, according to the question: ‘Which candidate do you think is the most likely to care what people like you think?’ The total N for this analysis is 9,430 candidates (943 respondents with five choice sets of 2 candidates).
Figure A7.4: AMCEs for Candidate Characteristics Using Ideology by Respondent Country of Birth Grouping, Australia 2017

Note: AMCEs are based on the change in probability of candidate selection, according to the question: ‘Which candidate do you think is the most likely to care what people like you think?’ The total N for this analysis is 9,430 candidates (943 respondents with five choice sets of 2 candidates).
**Figure A7.5: AMCEs for Candidate Characteristics Using Ideology for Asian Respondents According to Sense of Linked Fate, Australia 2017**

Note: AMCEs are based on the change in probability of candidate selection, according to the question: ‘Which candidate do you think is the most likely to care what people like you think?’ The total N for this analysis is 9,430 candidates (943 respondents with five choice sets of 2 candidates).