NEGOTIATION FOR ARMS CONTROL, 1955-60

by G. PETER KING


This thesis is entirely original work.

G. Peter King
PREFACE

The chief negative aim of this thesis is to avoid duplicating the narrative accounts of post-war negotiations already published by certain Western authors.¹ Bechhoefer's book is the most thorough narrative account of post-war negotiations, and also the only account which systematically goes behind the negotiations to study policy debates in the Western camp, and especially in the United States. I have avoided this large subject almost completely in order to focus attention on the more formal elements of the negotiating process.

I have also tried to avoid duplicating the work of Nogee and Spanier in emphasizing the role of political warfare as a function of, or motive in, disarmament.

negotiations. However, in Part Four I have given reasons for doubting whether, as Nogee and Spanier believe, disarmament diplomacy is effective as political warfare, and whether it is inevitably frustrated by the propaganda motive.

Parts Two and Three, concerning proposals and negotiation in general respectively, may be considered an attempt to analyse the practice of negotiation in the interests of establishing a theory of negotiation and suggesting improvements in negotiating strategy and tactics from the viewpoint of effective negotiated control of the arms race. Part Four deals with the theories of other authorities, chiefly academic and Western, which seek to explain the failure of negotiation for arms control and which suggest ways of making it succeed.

Part One is a theoretical analysis of the arms race at a high level of abstraction. It is meant to establish the validity of a method for analysing the arms race which underlies much of the argument of the theis, and also to put forward several strategic analyses employed in the discussion of proposals in Part Two.

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2 The Politics of Disarmament, op. cit.
Choice of empirical material is explained in the Introduction to Part Two, and in Part Three, Chapter 2, where a 'detailed' negotiation is distinguished from other kinds. The period 1955-60 was chosen in order to keep the study close to contemporary problems, without it being submerged by them. Six years of negotiation have been found to provide an adequate selection of proposals and a perhaps excessive quantity of verbal exchange for the purpose of theorizing. It has also been possible to study the vicissitudes of particular proposals over time and to speculate about the long-term effectiveness of negotiating pressure.

'Arms control' and 'disarmament' are terms used to some extent interchangeably in this thesis. It will be clear from the context when I wish to give one or the other a distinct meaning - 'disarmament' having radical overtones and 'arms control' conservative ones. 'Arms control' (and 'disarmament') will be always used in the sense of negotiated, multilateral, formal agreement for limitation on the arms race. There are good conceptual and practical reasons for rejecting the blanket use of the term 'arms control', as favoured by many scholars in the United States,
to cover unilateral and multilateral, formal and informal, tacit and explicit restraints on the arms race.

Here is how Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin of Harvard dissent from 'classical' usage.

...a more variegated and flexible concept of arms control is necessary - one that recognizes that the degree of formality may range from a formal treaty with detailed specifications, at one end of the scale, through executive agreements, explicit but informal understandings, tacit understandings, to self-restraint that is consciously contingent on each other's behaviour....

The essence of arms control is some kind of mutual restraint, collaborative action, or exchange of facilities between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war, the scope of war if it occurs, or its consequences.3

The authors go on to propose 'that limited war itself is a form of arms control'. It is clear that 'arms control' is thus made indistinguishable from strategy and military policy except in the extreme case of annihilating general war - the only case in which 'restraint' would be abandoned completely. Thermonuclear counterforce warfare, for example, would be 'arms control', according to the Schelling/Halperin proposal, and negotiation for arms control would be indistinguishable from day-to-day military activity.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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CHRONOLOGY OF NEGOTIATIONS

A chronology of major, detailed negotiations, 1955-60. Other rounds of negotiation which touched on arms control are mentioned in brackets. The United Nations General Assembly debated disarmament annually and the full Disarmament Commission met occasionally during the period.†

1955 Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission

February 25-May 18 (PV.s 22-49)
July 18-23, Heads of Government Meeting
August 29-October 7 (PV.s 50-68)
October 27-November 16, Foreign Ministers Meeting

1956 Sub-Committee

March 19-May 4 (PV.s 69-86)

1957 Sub-Committee

March 18-May 16 (PV.s 87-116)
May 27-September 6 (PV.s 117-157)

1958 Conference of Experts

July 1-August 21 (PV.s 1-30)
Conference on Surprise Attack

November 10-December 18 (PV.s 1-30)

† See Part Three, Chapter 2, "The Grand Tactics of the Negotiating Powers and Other Preliminaries".
1958-60 Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests
(PV.s 1-273)

1958  October 31-December 19
1959  January 5-March 19
      April 13-May 8
      June 8-August 26
      October 27-December 17
1960  January 12-April 14
      April 25-August 22
      September 27-December 5

1960  Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament

      March 15-April 29 (PV.s 1-32)
      June 7-June 27 (PV.s 33-48)
ABBREVIATIONS USED IN CITING DOCUMENTS

United Nations Documents (Official Abbreviations)

1. General Assembly
   A/ Assembly Documents
   A/PV. Plenary Session, Verbatim Records
   A/C.1/L. /Rev. Resolutions moved in the First Committee, /Corr. plus revisions and corrections
   A/C.1/SR. First Committee, Summary Records*

2. Disarmament Commission
   DC/ Official Records
   DC/PV. Verbatim Records
   DC/SC.1/ Sub-Committee, Official Records
   DC/SC.1/PV. Sub-Committee, Verbatim Records

3. Conference of Experts to Study the Methods of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests
   EXP/NUC/ Conference Documents
   EXP/NUC/PV. Verbatim Records

   GEN/DNT/ Conference Documents
   GEN/DNT/PV. Verbatim Records

* Always given in the third person.
5. Geneva Conference to Study Measures Which Might be Helpful in Preventing Surprise Attacks

GEN/SA/ Conference Documents
GEN/SA/PV. Verbatim Records

6. Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament

TNCD/ Conference Documents
TNCD/PV. Verbatim Records

Document Collections

1. Department of State Publications

Documents on Disarmament,


1960 Pub. 7172 (September 1961)


Cmd.s 9204 (July 1954), 9636 (December 1955), 9770 (May 1956), and Cmd. 333 (December 1957) are Reports on the Proceedings of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, 1954-7 ("Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs by Command of Her Majesty").
Cmd.s 9648-51 (January 1956) contain the Verbatim Records of the 1955 Sub-Committee.

Cmd. 1152 (September 1960) contains the Verbatim Records of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament, conference documents and other relevant documents.
GLOSSARY OF SPECIAL TERMS

freeze agreement not to raise armaments, forces and/or budgets above a level obtaining at some date in the past.

'weapon' cut-off cessation of production of nuclear weapons.

'materials' cut-off cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes.

transfers transfers of past production of weapon-grade fissionable materials to peaceful purposes.

the Two United States and Soviet Union. (the superpowers)

the Three U.S., U.S.S.R., and United Kingdom. (the great powers)


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PART ONE

THE ARMS RACE: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

"A slow sort of country!" said the Queen. "Now here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!"

— Through the Looking Glass
The 'arms race' has not often been precisely defined or rigorously studied by theorists, historians or practitioners. There is not yet a literature of the arms race comparable to the rest of the literature on strategy which has become particularly rich in recent years. In this study the arms race is defined very broadly as competition, stemming from a conflict of interest, between two or more states in all forms of military power. The aim is to analyse in abstract, dynamic terms the principal features of the military competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in the early thermonuclear years. This analysis leads on to a study of the cogency and implications of arms control proposals made during 1955-60 in Part Two.

Huntington has defined the arms race as competition in 'the decisive form of military force'. This approach is not followed here, even though the thermonuclear weapon is a far more decisive form of force than any pre-nuclear weapon. Rather, the unity of all military activity - the fact that

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1 See Samuel P. Huntington, "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results", in Carl J. Friedrich and Seymour E. Harris (eds.), Public Policy, Yearbook of the Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University, 1958, p. 84 ("Bibliographical Note").

2 Ibid., p. 52.
military programmes and weapons reinforce each other's deterrent or war-making capability - is stressed. This study also departs from Huntington's approach in doubting whether an arms race between powers with conflicting interests should be said to 'end' as long as the powers remain in conflict. It may become dormant: one side may temporarily accept an inferior arms ratio; but, especially in modern conditions, military innovation, which incessantly abolishes the significance of existing quantitative ratios, tends to continue irrespective of a nation's relative power. Powers are less likely than ever before to 'give up'; the endless frontiers of technology beckon to weak and strong alike.

Strictly speaking, 'arms' is too narrow a term to cover men and material, active and passive defence efforts, warning and communication networks, etc. as well as armaments proper; but there is no logic for excluding key components of armed strength in the analysis of military competition. Similarly, 'race' conveys well the idea of competitive increase but not very well the idea of competitive innovation (which may be accompanied by a competitive decrease in numbers of weapons and combat

\[\text{Ibid., p. 43.}\]
effectives). However, 'the arms race' is a phrase without a rival.

The arms race may be analysed in terms of the strategic programmes of the competitors. President Eisenhower's Budget Message of 1960 laid down six programmes: 'strategic forces'; 'air defense forces'; 'sea control forces'; 'tactical forces'; 'military assistance'; and 'stockpiling and defense production expansion'. The arms race may be conceived as a series of challenges thrown out by one power to another in terms of strategic programmes rather than particular weapons, although the weapons may determine the choice of programme rather than the programme determining choice of weapon. For instance, the atomic bomb led to the U.S. strategy of threatening massive retaliation to deter Soviet occupation of Western Europe after World War Two; but the hydrogen bomb was fitted into the established programme of strategic retaliation, where it first supplemented and later replaced the atomic bomb.

Strategic programmes may be further analysed. The strategic forces break down into strategic counterforce and strategic countercity components in theory. (In practice the same weapons contribute to both programmes.) Air defence

includes defence of weapons and defence of 'values'.
Tactical capability includes: front-line troops stationed extraterritorially; mobile, alert theatre and central reserves; and reserves which can be mobilized after delay.
'Sea-control forces' enhance tactical capability and protect (or threaten) economic life-lines and sea-mobile strategic forces. Military assistance tends to keep allies loyal and enhance the tactical position of the donor.

Once a programme is established there will be continuous innovation, expansion and phase-out of weapons and facilities in the programme. Particular types of weapons may feature in several programmes (nuclear weapons, for example), although types will usually be developed for special roles required by the programme. A programme may become impossible to sustain for technical or economic reasons. (This has been predicted for active defence against missiles, and for civil defence.) The results of dropping a programme illustrate well the unity of the arms race. If active defence were abandoned by one side, for example, the opponent could either reduce his planned ICBM inventory or cut back programmes for neutralising and evading anti-missile defences (e.g., stand-off rockets, radar jamming, decoys, tortuous trajectory devices, super-powerful warheads, etc.).
With the definition suggested most cases of war and arms control may be regarded as moves in the arms race. In both war and arms control, the attempt to make the opponent's forces obsolete and inferior by outbuilding him is replaced by the attempt to destroy and prevent his military build-up - at the risk of one's own, in the case of war; at the cost of one's own in arms control. In general, both in war and arms control, innovation and expansion will continue in some categories of strength. However, in the limiting cases - annihilating war and general and complete disarmament - the arms race comes to a stop. In all other cases - local war, limited general war, selective arms control - it continues.

Alliance may also be considered a move in the arms race, being a political arrangement designed to achieve for the proposer of the alliance a strategic or tactical increase in military power. However, where disparities of power between allies are very great (as in both the Eastern and Western military blocs in the period 1955-60), it is no great distortion to disregard the contribution of allies of the superpowers to the strategic balance.

'Military power' is not here taken to include such factors as G.N.P., military manpower (as distinct from
trained reserves), spare industrial capacity and so on - which represent potential as opposed to actual military strength. Contemporary strategic doctrine rightly stresses forces in being for both local and general war, and forces which are not quickly able to mobilize carry little power political weight in any kinds of diplomacy, including arms control. Certainly 'the arms race' has never been conceived as a competition in war potential in its widest sense.

As conceived here, the arms race involves subjective factors - competitiveness, hostility and conflict of interest - as well as the objective factors discussed so far. Thus we may continue to speak of an arms race even when the tempo and burden of the competition are decreasing, provided there is a continuing background of political conflict between the nations concerned. We call the arms race latent, although armaments may be increasing, where there is no conflict of interest between powers. International society is only potentially a war of all against all - thanks to alliance and indifference.

Formerly, arms races were a question of quantities. The armament of the sides tended to be of roughly the same quality over long periods; who was 'ahead' depended on who disposed of most weapons and forces in major categories. If
one side could have placed itself one 'technological revolution' ahead of another, that would have been decisive; but in practice new civilian technologies arrived and developed slowly, and their military application was a haphazard, dilatory process.

Theories of the arms race are bedevilled by the difficulty of keeping both quantitative and qualitative changes constantly in mind. The commonest errors seem to flow from language. Words such as 'race', 'increase' and 'ratio' constitute a developed vocabulary for describing quantitative aspects of an arms competition. Constant use of these words leads to neglect of qualitative distinctions. The armaments of the parties to a pure quantitative arms race may differ greatly in quality, making a numerical comparison misleading. Or, if the parties are making innovations, the old and the new in a category like strategic bomber aircraft must not be lumped together as though every unit was qualitatively identical.

On the other hand, theorists who write as though the arms race has become entirely qualitative are guilty of absurdity. In a pure qualitative competition no operational weapon would ever be produced - only theories, blueprints, prototypes and paper modifications.
What feature does make an arms race 'primarily qualitative'? This phrase has often been used without explanation to describe the superpower arms race since 1945. If the analyst is to avoid surrendering to impressions he should probably compare research and development expenditures with production, maintenance and manning expenditures for individual weapon systems and programmes and for the military effort as a whole. He would probably find that the postwar arms race has not been 'primarily qualitative', except in particular weapon systems that have failed.

The level of military effort in an arms race is a function of the general level of hostility between competitors, among other things; but also particular moves in the arms race may be traced to particular increases in tension, to crises, and diplomatic pressures. Often such moves will have little purely military logic, but will be designed to restore a battered prestige, comfort a nervous domestic audience or reassure an apprehensive alliance. (United States I.R.B.M.s in Europe, 1958).

The economizing instinct is also important in the dynamics of the arms race. Nations wish to avoid buying the obsolete, the redundant and the inferior in the light of a given strategy. Of course the given strategy itself will be
dictated in part by economics; by the burden that a strategy will involve for a given set of resources. Economy in an arms race is not just a question of providing rationally for a given strategy; it may also mean taking calculated risks in neglecting expensive but necessary items, and bluffing or relying on the psychological impact of spectacular developments to deter an opponent (Sputnik). In general, risk-taking and bluffing appeal to the nation with smaller, tightly managed resources, rather than the affluent power which finds a high and stable defence budget an attractive alternative to sustaining high public spending of other kinds.

In studying the response of each side to the other's effort, the theorist must distinguish estimates of present strength from projections, predictions and fear of the future strength of the opponent. Each side is busy studying not only the deployed forces, but the planned expansion and innovation of the other, and the likelihood of technological surprise. Surprise may be either a question of some development already conceived suddenly becoming feasible, or of something unsuspected appearing. Each side will not ever have 'perfect information' about the existing capabilities of its opponent, especially if that opponent is politically and technically able to keep important military secrets. How
much less can a nation confronted with an exponentially expanding technology hope to predict the strength of an opponent a decade ahead? Thus arises the tendency to pursue every novelty at least through the research stage.

Nuclear weapons have made it necessary to distinguish quite sharply between tactical and strategic moves in the postwar arms race. The tactical and strategic arms races have been run in considerable degree independently of each other.

Strategically, the fundamental choice is between a counterforce and a countervalue strategy. Various mixtures are possible. Active and passive defence complement both these strategies in various ways. So-called tactical nuclear forces are an important component of the strategic balance; tactical conventional forces seem to matter less and less in the general war equation.

Participants in the tactical arms race worry chiefly about each other's local troop strengths and ability to reinforce. However, one side may opt out of the tactical competition and extend a strategic threat (realistically or otherwise) to deter provocations at the tactical level. ('Massive retaliation', the NATO 'trip wire' concept.) Tactically, a defensive or offensive posture may be assumed; if the former, armament policy is likely to emphasize
conventional weapons; if the latter, nuclear weapons.

The dynamics of the tactical and strategic arms races will be dealt with in turn. The diagram below (Fig. 1) conveys the purely military dynamics of an arms race in strategic weapons between two advanced nuclear powers. It indicates that there is a balance to be struck between the various elements of strategic strength, depending always on the nation's assessment of the opponent's programmes, the state of the military arts, and the need to hedge against uncertainty.

The diagram stresses challenge and response.

**Figure 1**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Blue (Counterforce Policy)</th>
<th>Red (Countercity Policy)</th>
<th>Blue</th>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic Offensive Forces</td>
<td>Retaliatory Force plus:</td>
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<tr>
<td>(stimulate)</td>
<td>Warning (Counter-measures</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dispersal (Force Increase</td>
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<td>Hardening (Greater Accuracy</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of Weapons Counter-measures</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mobility (Detection Offence Innovation</td>
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<td>Alerts Offence Innovation</td>
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<td>Quantitative Increase</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Warning</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Penetration Active Defence of</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aids Cities</td>
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Blue is attempting to maintain a first-strike counterforce deterrent; Red sets himself to preserve a retaliatory capability. A many-faceted qualitative and quantitative arms race develops. 'Red' and 'Blue' are not the United States and the Soviet Union. In the real world of 1955-60 these nations pursued a mixed counterforce-countercity strategy with the emphasis varying from time to time.

For a power bent on being great the need for a countercity force is beyond argument. A counterforce capability is more expensive, more difficult to obtain, and less obviously required. Nations may seek to obtain one for several reasons.

1. It may become possible to neutralize the enemy's deterrent - that is, render it completely obsolete. (Given modern technology, if one side stands still, this development seems likely over any 'long run', say ten years.) There can be a military, a political or an economic motive in building a 'splendid' counterforce capability. Militarily, a successful surprise attack becomes possible. Politically, such a capability is a powerful diplomatic lever. Economically, the opponent may be forced into an expensive rejuvenation and replacement programme.
2. Any degree of counterforce capability may make the threat of massive retaliation less suicidal and hence more credible.

3. Counterforce capability is an insurance against the inadvertent failure of deterrence: it enables some damage to be averted; it affords some prospect of 'victory'.

4. Active and passive defence of cities and the civilian economy - policies which complement a counterforce capability - discourage the exploitation of strategic nibbling tactics by an enemy; they force him to attack in some strength if at all; and, incidentally, they reduce the likelihood of isolated, disastrous accident, since solitary unauthorized attack will be averted by a good active defence.

5. A power possessing some counterforce capability in relation to a major nuclear antagonist inevitably will enjoy almost overwhelming counterforce capability in relation to a minor nuclear antagonist. Thus Nth powers are faced with a permanent crisis of obsolescence if they attempt to join in the strategic arms race.

But, equally, a power in a nuclear arms race has incentives to be moderate, to eschew the counterforce strategy. Not only may the attempt to obtain a counterforce capability be futile and expensive, but it may drive an opponent to building a much larger force than he otherwise
would have. Especially if such a force is poorly controlled and depends on alerts and fast reaction, the situation of the counterforce power will be more dangerous in some respects than it otherwise would have been. By being able to pre-empt to some purpose, a counterforce power whose deterrent is rather vulnerable gives an opponent an incentive to pre-empt if he can in a desperate situation. However, it seems unlikely that America, which pursued a counterforce strategy based on nuclear superiority in the postwar period, was ever in danger of pre-emptive attack: its nuclear superiority was too great.

As defined here, 'moderation' is synonymous with accepting at least temporarily the situation which Thomas Schelling has called 'total exchange of all conceivable hostages'. The implications can be seen by studying Figure 1. A moderate power will play down or abandon industrial dispersal, civil defence, active defence of cities, certain surveillance and detection programmes, programmes for hyper-accurate weapon delivery, programmes for achieving tactical surprise, some phases of anti-submarine warfare, etc. Moderation may be chosen out of

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'goodness' or because the technological situation and the enemy's scale of effort impose it.

Having dealt with the strategic or 'central' arms race, we are in a better position to deal with the tactical arms race. Firstly we shall study the tactical balance as a factor in the strategic balance. In so far as general war is a war of forces, close-in tactical atomic forces have a significant role of pinpoint bombardment to play; and the tactical forces generally might assume an offensive and occupying, or a defensive and holding role in the wake of a thermonuclear exchange. But such an exchange could effectively annihilate the tactical forces or destroy the power of the supporting societies to maintain them.

The tactical arms race is the net effect of a number of contributory programmes, like the strategic arms race; however, there are more varieties of tactical than strategic warfare. The possible forms of tactical conflict range from local nuclear and large-scale conventional war between the superpowers to 'incidents', 'brushfires' and guerilla war involving only one superpower. The tactical programmes include: overseas and extraterritorial forces, including marine deployments; sea and air mobile reserves, centrally based; and the less available trained reserves. Raw material and machine tool stockpiles, spare industrial capacity, etc.
- the so-called 'mobilization base', which might be activated in a Korea-type conflict that was not won or stalemated by forces in being - is excluded from this analysis.

At the tactical as well as the strategic level forces in being have far greater importance than ever before. Not only would tactical nuclear war probably preclude mobilization, but a *fait accompli* becomes a far more serious challenge under circumstances where great concentration of forces may be needed to restore a *status quo*. Such concentration invites deliberate tactical use of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, it appears that the advent of nuclear weapons, especially since they have been adapted to everything from 'city-busting' to close-in battlefield use, has introduced greater uncertainty in the tactical as well as the strategic balance. Before tactical nuclears were made standard equipment there was a chance that conventional tactical warfare would escalate into nuclear tactical warfare by deliberate decision (for example, this could have happened in Korea); with a wide spectrum of tactical nuclears available, not only will some tactical conflicts be vastly more difficult to keep non-nuclear, but chance will be added to deliberation as a factor tending to generate strategic conflict, because the line between tactical and strategic nuclear warfare is thin and blurred. In consequence of
this 'deterrence' has become the principal preoccupation of tacticians as well as strategists.

Just as tactical strength is a factor in the strategic balance, strategic strength is a factor in the tactical balance, as was pointed out earlier: one side may compensate for tactical inferiority by means of strategic superiority.

In reality there is no one tactical balance as there is a strategic balance; or rather such a balance has little operational significance. The statics of the tactical competition must be based first on a theatre-by-theatre analysis of the balance of deployed tactical forces. Of course this must be supplemented by considering: deployed forces of a mobile kind not limited to one theatre, such as carrier-based marines; strategic mobile reserves based on home territory (together with their sea and air lift); and trained, non-mobilized reserves. But even so the upshot of such a supplementary analysis is to add the potential force which can be brought to bear in a given theatre in a given time to the actual force present in that theatre at any time. This potential force is usually only summoned to the theatre in case of war (Korea, for example), or acute crisis (Berlin, 1961). In local war, attrition is accompanied by an intensification of the arms race. This usually involves both
the concentration of mobile forces, mobilization of reserve forces and activation of the war economy.

The competition in tactical forces as a whole has both a quantitative and a qualitative side, but it is on the whole a far more old-fashioned affair than the strategic arms race. This may be true because rather than despite the fact that the decisive forms of tactical warfare under nuclear conditions - short and middle range atomic rockets - are exceedingly difficult to confine to what an enemy will consider tactical purposes. These weapons may seem too decisive to use; they may be withheld in consequence. Thus what Stalin called the 'permanently operating factors' of warfare may well be used decisively at the tactical level, especially in areas where troops have not been extensively equipped with nuclear weapons, or where the withholding of nuclear weapons in tactical conflict is thought possible and likely. Nevertheless, just as tactical strength may be futile without a strategic atomic cover in modern conditions, so conventional tactical strength may be futile without a tactical nuclear capability on call. Such a force must be able to discriminate between populations and troop concentrations, military supply lines and communications, etc., if it is hoped to keep tactical nuclear war limited.
The tactical arms race is thus a mixture of old and new. Especially in offensive nuclear rockets and fighter bombers, it resembles the strategic race very closely. There is the same problem of achieving invulnerability through good warning and mobility: this leads to a strenuous qualitative race in techniques of penetration, detection, interception, etc.; and in methods of achieving weapon compactness and improving fire-power. This race is complicated by the need for delivery vehicles which have dual (nuclear and conventional) capability.

The tempo of innovation in the more traditional components of the tactical balance - such as infantry, mechanized cavalry and non-atomic artillery - has risen, but is well below the tempo of strategic innovation and far less expensive. Conventional weapons such as the rifle still remain in inventory for over a decade rather than for just a few years, and new models are not hundreds of times as costly as those they replace.

The number of men under arms is widely regarded as the key index of both the overall tactical balance and of local tactical balances. The dynamics of the tactical competition are commonly measured by changes in force levels, especially by arms control negotiators. This is understandable, like the simple comparison of long range missile strengths at
the strategic level; but it is equally unsatisfactory. Western disarmament negotiators in the 1950s stressed the importance of a balance of armaments rather than forces, but they found it difficult, for obvious reasons, to produce a formula for armament reduction as compelling as fixed force levels for all powers. There are many fundamental types of tactical armament; the man-to-weapon ratio varies greatly between various countries; and the demonstrable need of countries for various weapons differs greatly.

The diagram below (Fig. 2) conveys the dynamics of a tactical competition between two thermonuclear powers. It takes account of the fundamentals of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Thus one power (Red) is almost exclusively a land power, tactically. It, or its allies, have interior lines of communication with most disputed areas; it has enormous conventional land forces, a tactical air force devoted to the support of these forces, and naval task forces also geared to the support of land operations. This power has the tactical initiative; it has the ability to exert pressure at a series of rapidly changing fronts by manipulating central reserves. It maintains forces at the periphery of its sphere of influence far more cheaply than its sea-air power rival (Blue), which has difficulty in attaining a capability to threaten and apply tactical force.
flexibly and proportionately in (for it) a series of changing, far-flung disputed areas. Hence the sea-air power's preferred strategy, if credible, would be: massive retaliation. This strategy ceases to be safe or effective as the rival land power develops an atomic arsenal; it is replaced or supplemented by the strategies given in the diagram.

**Figure 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Red (Offence)</th>
<th>Blue (Defence)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local and Overall Tactical Force</td>
<td>'Massive Retaliation' Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preponderance</td>
<td>Military Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plus (later)</td>
<td>Conventional Reinforcement Mobile Reserves - local and 'strategic' (i.e. central) Tactical Nuclear Capability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
"I wish you wouldn't squeeze so," said the Doormouse, who was sitting next to her. "I can hardly breathe."

"I can't help it," said Alice very meekly: "I'm growing."

"You've no right to grow here," said the Doormouse.

"Don't talk nonsense," said Alice more boldly: "you know you're growing too."

"Yes, but I grow at a reasonable pace," said the Doormouse: "not in that ridiculous fashion." And he got up very sulkily and crossed over to the other side of the court.

— Alice's Adventures in Wonderland
INTRODUCTION

In Part One I promised to examine the 'cogency' of proposals for arms control in the period 1955-60. The proposals selected for analysis in Chapters 1-2 were all put forward by great powers (sometimes jointly with allies) for negotiation in detail. All of them were in fact the subject of negotiation in some detail; or at least the plans which they modified were. (For example, the Soviet plan, September 20, 1957, ¹ was put forward for negotiation at the Twelfth General Assembly. Detailed negotiation on it did not occur, but its predecessor, the comprehensive partial plan of April 30, 1957, had been discussed in detail during the 1957 Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission. The proposal of September 20 contained changes which reflected Western criticism of the April 30 proposal.) Thus, most of the proposals chosen for analysis were highly evolved or 'mature' proposals: most of them were the end product of much pressure and compromise. The proposals of the period

¹ See Chapter 1. Henceforth, the leading plans, and also the analyses of them in Chapter 1, are referred to in this way.
which have not been analysed were omitted either because they were not submitted to detailed negotiation, or because they very closely resembled some of the proposals analysed. Proposals made by small powers and middle powers (except when co-sponsored by a great power), and proposals made by opposition political parties and private individuals, etc. are entirely omitted.

Since the numerous offers of East and West which constituted the test ban 'proposal' of each at the end of 1960 were first made at varying times between 1957 and 1960, the test ban has been discussed in a separate chapter. The length of that chapter is a tribute to the length and complexity of proposals and negotiations on the test ban, and to the superior possibilities of analysing its military implications.

Of each proposal considered in Chapters 1-2 I shall inquire what sort of military 'world' it envisaged, studying the details provided by the proponent, both in his text and in the negotiating record, and also setting down unstated

implications of the plan. Obviously, not all the materials for the proposed analyses are available, and in any case only sketches of the various military situations are possible in the space available. In Chapter 3 I shall comment on the vagueness, onesidedness and radicalism of most proposals.

Some uncertainty about the effect of a proposal for arms control is inevitable. Even an exhaustively detailed agreement could not possibly control the future of the arms race in fully predictable ways; yet radical proposals are often presented for immediate adoption and indefinite continuation as though they constituted a 'final solution' of the arms problem.

A proposal is not itself (except metaphorically) a military world; rather it is a set of rules put forward to compete with other influences in the world of the future. Any proposal implies not just a succession of different military worlds evolving out of each other in time, but the possibility of many different worlds at any point in the time-span of the proposal, depending on developments in technology, political developments, whether participants are cheating, and many other factors.
Of course no military planner could closely predict the worlds to be expected in the absence of arms control either; nevertheless planners resolutely rejected the control proposals of opponents in the years under study, and the analyses which follow attempt to make a modest contribution to the understanding of this fact. Moreover the proposals studied form the stock-in-trade of thinking about the control of the arms race in the postwar period, and are worth studying also on that account.

Some of the technical nomenclature adopted below is defined in the Glossary of Special Terms. The method of classifying and naming proposals is set out and justified in the Appendix to Part Two.

Table 1 below presents some figures on budgets and force levels for the Soviet Union and the United States in the period 1955-60. The figures on the Soviet defence budget should be treated with caution, because many military items are hidden in other parts of the Soviet budget, notably atomic weapons. Force levels are not a reliable index of strength either - for East or West. As Secretary of State Dulles said in response to news of the Soviet force reduction of 1955:

...the number of men under arms is only one index of military strength. The Soviet Union also maintains very large organized reserves of men
and equipment capable of being mobilized rapidly. And the capacity to utilize modern weapons greatly affects the value of mere numbers in the armed forces.3

### Table 1

#### Budgets and Force Levels:
United States and Soviet Union, 1955-60

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th></th>
<th>U.S.S.R.</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;National</td>
<td>Force</td>
<td>&quot;Defence</td>
<td>Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>Levels</td>
<td>Expenditure</td>
<td>Levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spending&quot;</td>
<td>(billions of</td>
<td>(billions of</td>
<td>(billions of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(billions of</td>
<td>men)</td>
<td>roubles)</td>
<td>men)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>2.935(^2)</td>
<td>112.1(^7)</td>
<td>5.763(^{10})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>2.800(^3)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.123(^{11})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>2.658(^4)</td>
<td>96.7(^8)</td>
<td>3.923(May)(^{12})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>2.582(^5)</td>
<td>96.3(^7)</td>
<td>3.923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>2.545(^6)</td>
<td>96.1(^9)</td>
<td>3.623(^{13})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>2.500(^2)</td>
<td>96.1(^9)</td>
<td>3.623(^{10})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

   (Official rates in 1955-60: 4 roubles=1 dollar)
Notes (cont.):


(This speech revealed Soviet force levels for the first time in the postwar period. The 1960 reduction was to be completed in two years, but it was suspended on July 8, 1961. See *The Communist Bloc and the Western Alliances, The Military Balance, 1961-2*, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, November 1961, p. 2.)

11 Tass statement regarding reduction of Soviet forces, August 12, 1955, in *Documents on Disarmament*, vol. I, p. 496.

(The reduction - of 640,000 men - was to be completed by December 15, 1955. The 1955 force level was not disclosed until 1960.)


(The reduction - of 1,200,000 men - was to be completed by May 1, 1957.)

13 V. Lavrov, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

(Reduction by a further 300,000 men was ordered by the Soviet Government in January 1958.)
CHAPTER 1

PROPOSALS, 1955-60
FEBRUARY 25, 1955¹ (Soviet proposal for a freeze and for total nuclear disarmament, submitted to the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission.)

The Soviet Union marked time from February 25 to March 18 in the Sub-Committee with this perfunctory and traditional proposal. The freeze of budgets, armaments and armed forces (at 1955 levels) was to be applied to 'all States'; the destruction of nuclear weapons was not to be accompanied by a cut-off of any kind. The proposal provided for 'international control over the observance' of the measures, without details.

MARCH 8, 1955² (Western plan for comprehensive and 'complete' disarmament, submitted to the Sub-Committee. First, Anglo-French version: June 11, 1954.³ Anglo-French proposal on force levels added: March 29, 1955.⁴ Timing of nuclear

¹ DC/SC.1/12/ Rev. 1, in Cmd. 9636, p. 18. (Draft U.N. resolution)
² DC/SC.1/15/ Rev. 1, in Cmd. 9636, p. 21. (Joint draft U.N. resolution) Sponsored by Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States.
³ DC/SC.1/10, in Cmd. 9204, p. 31.
⁴ DC/SC.1/20, in Cmd. 9636, p. 28.

- March 8, 1955 -

disarmament modified: April 19, 1955.\(^5\) The United States withdrew its support of March 8 on September 6, 1955.\(^6\)

March 8, 1955 was a proposal for total nuclear and drastic conventional disarmament in three stages, to be followed by 'complete' conventional disarmament if possible.

Stage One provided for 'the constitution and positioning of the control organ', and then a freeze of manpower and expenditure, atomic and non-atomic.

Stage Two provided for the following measures to be taken after the control organ had reported itself able to enforce them:

(a) 'One-half of the agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces'. By the terms of the Anglo-French Memorandum of March 29, 'agreed reductions' were to result in the following force levels: 650,000 men for the United Kingdom and France; and 1-1.5 million men for 'the three other permanent members of the Security Council'. (Since 'China' meant different things to the various Western members of the Sub-Committee it is not clear what was involved in setting and enforcing a force level for her.) 'Considerably lower'

\(^5\) DC/SC.1/24, in Cmd. 9636, p. 30. (Anglo-French Memorandum)

\(^6\) Statement by Stassen. He announced that 'the United States does now place a reservation upon all of its pre-Geneva summit conference substantive positions taken in this Sub-Committee' - DC/SC.1/PV.55, in Cmd. 9651, p. 746.
levels would be reached by other states.

(b) The cut-off in the production of nuclear weapons.

Stage Three consisted of:

(a) The third quarter of conventional reductions.

Then (b) 'A complete prohibition on the use' of mass destruction weapons, and, 'simultaneously, the elimination of these weapons', and 'the final quarter of the agreed reductions...shall begin; and both processes shall be completed within the time-limit laid down in the Disarmament Treaty'.

March 8 expressed the 'hope' that after these reductions states would further reduce their forces and armaments to 'levels strictly necessary for the maintenance of internal security and the fulfilment of the obligations of signatory States under the terms of the United Nations Charter'.

The plan was exceedingly unwieldly. It had to be agreed to as a whole by an indeterminately large number of states, conceivably the entire U.N. membership and other states as well; certainly Communist China. There was no provision for the great powers to do some disarming on

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Proposal of April 19.
their own if others were not willing; there was no suggestion that the earlier, less radical measures provided for by the plan might be taken unconditionally. A treaty was to be prepared by the Disarmament Commission, submitted to the General Assembly and a World Disarmament Conference, and would not enter into force until 'it had been ratified by those of the signatories who would be specified in the treaty'. Dozens of countries might have had a virtual veto power, and at the least it would have taken years to negotiate such a world-wide treaty, especially in view of the failure of the Sub-Committee, the Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly to develop a working body of ideas on world disarmament. No region except Europe and no powers except the Five had ever been the subject of close arms control study in the postwar period, yet the West's plan implicitly set out to end many regional and local arms races.

The plan was lacking in many vital details. Although the Western delegates on the Sub-Committee often declared that limitation of armaments was more important than fixing force levels, they made little effort to develop doctrine or criteria for armament limitation.

Their effort in 1955 consisted of tabling a paper which provided merely that:
The levels and types of such permitted armaments and equipment shall be such as to prevent undue concentration of total permitted armed forces in a manner which might threaten international peace and security.

No time limits were set for the individual stages of March 8. Western delegates merely mentioned a time limit of two or three years for the plan as a whole. In subsequent years they came to oppose setting time limits for a plan as a whole and to favour time limits for individual stages.

The plan was not fully controllable on the nuclear side. The Western delegates often declared that they would not agree to measures which could not be controlled, and yet they firmly proposed such measures. Quite apart from the elimination of chemical and bacteriological 'weapons of mass destruction', for which a control method was not even suggested, March 8 provided for the elimination of nuclear weapons, which the French delegate, Moch, had admitted for years to be uncontrollable by any known inspection techniques.

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8 DC/SC.1/17, in Cmd. 9636, p. 22.
9 For example, the British delegate, Nutting, on March 31, said that 'three years should suffice' - DC/SC.1/PV.35, in Cmd. 9649, p. 323.
The plan implied a far-reaching political transformation of the world, yet it had virtually no political provisions. No analysis of the impact of near-complete disarmament on the various Cold War and other territorial disputes was offered; and in 1955 there was no Western plan for the political structure of a militarily transformed world, apart from an extensive definition of control organ functions tabled separately on April 21.¹⁰

Western views on the political preconditions of disarmament were vague. Nutting said on May 12 that:

We have always held that there must be some relaxation of tension before disarmament can begin, but we have never held and will never hold that there can be no progress towards disarmament until all the problems and issues which cause international tension have been resolved.¹¹

How much relaxation had to occur before disarmament could begin? No precise answer was forthcoming from the West in 1955, but it is quite certain that comprehensive and, especially, total nuclear disarmament would have been unthinkable without a far-reaching détente between East and West. Had a disarmament treaty on the lines of the Western plan been drafted in detail it would have been a dead letter.

¹⁰ See DC/SC.1/25, April 21, 1955, in Cmd. 9636, p. 31.
¹¹ DC/SC.1/PV.48, in Cmd. 9650, p. 638.
MAY 10, 1955\textsuperscript{12} (Soviet plan for comprehensive and 'complete' disarmament, submitted to the Sub-Committee. Foreshadowed in the plan of March 18, 1955.\textsuperscript{13} Reaffirmed in 1956.\textsuperscript{14})

May 10, 1955 was a two stage program (the freeze being part of the first stage) with the same force level goals as March 8, 1955. It also provided for elimination of nuclear weapons and declared that it would be 'desirable' to reduce forces to 'levels strictly necessary for...internal security' after the two stages provided for. These stages were to last one year each.

Stage One (1956) provided for:

(a) A freeze of forces, armaments and budgets within two months, and disclosure of relevant figures within one month.

(b) 50 per cent of conventional reductions (to be worked out in relation to levels at December 31, 1954).

(c) A World Conference in the first half of 1956 to determine levels for 'other States'.

(d) 'As one of the first measures', a ban on nuclear tests.

\textsuperscript{12} DC/SC.1/26/Rev. 2, in Cmd. 9636, p. 33. (Draft U.N. resolution)

\textsuperscript{13} DC/SC.1/19/Rev. 1, in Cmd. 9636, p. 26. (Draft U.N. resolution)

\textsuperscript{14} Statement by Gromyko to the Sub-Committee, April 26, 1956. DC/SC.1/43, May 3, 1956.
(e) Simultaneously with (b), a ban on the use of nuclear weapons except with Security Council approval.

(f) Liquidation of agreed extraterritorial bases.

There would thus have been some reductions of forces and armament by the Five before levels for other powers were set; but unless the World Conference had succeeded in 1956 the agreement would presumably have broken down.

The ban on tests at an early stage was not in the Soviet interest; however there were no control provisions specifically mentioned for it.

The ban on use of nuclear weapons would have favoured the Soviet Union for the period before their elimination, especially in Europe where Soviet conventional superiority threatened the Western Powers, and especially until most of the proposed conventional reductions had taken place.

Stage Two (1957) provided for:

(a) the 'weapon' cut-off.

(b) The final 50 per cent of conventional reductions, and agreed reductions for other states.

(c) After 75 per cent of conventional reductions had been made, a 'complete prohibition' of mass destruction weapons, their elimination from the armaments of states, and the final 25 per cent of conventional reductions.
(d) Complete liquidation of foreign bases.

Wadsworth made it clear in the Sub-Committee that the United States envisaged dismantling some of its bases during disarmament, but would keep a number adequate for its remaining forces and alliance commitments. On the other hand the Soviets called for complete disengagement of the Two in Europe and the withdrawal of the American presence in the Far East, although not for the dissolution of either superpower's alliance system. In a nuclearly disarmed world, with the British and French armies bottled up inside national borders and all American forces confined to the United States, the Soviets could have dictated terms to Western Europe.

The text of May 10 began with a draft General Assembly 'Declaration' which, after reviewing the Cold War and the existing detente over Korea and Austria, called for a withdrawal of occupying forces from Germany to promote 'national unification', and for a settlement of 'outstanding questions in the Far East in accordance with the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity'. The Soviet delegate, Malik, declared under pressure from Nutting in

DC/SC.1/PV.39, April 5, 1955, in Cmd. 9649, pp. 365-6 and 369.
the Sub-Committee that there was a 'direct link' between the
Declaration and the disarmament provisions. The third
section of the plan, 'Concerning International Control',
declared that there could be no disarmament without control
but that

the necessary conditions for the institution of a
control system which would enjoy the trust of all
States and would fully meet the requirements of
international security do not at present exist.

What would create these 'necessary conditions'? The
general review of the control problem ended:

The problem of instituting International Control
and of the rights and powers of the international
control organ must therefore be considered in
close connexion with the execution of the above-
mentioned measures /in the Declaration/ for the
lessening of international tension, the strengthen­
ing of trust between States and the carrying out
of other measures relating to the reduction of
armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

The introduction to the list of control organ rights
and powers for Stage Two began:

The carrying out of the measures provided for in
the Declaration set forth above and of the measures
for the reduction of armaments and armed forces and
the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons
envisioned for the first stage will create the nec­
essary atmosphere of trust between States, thereby
ensuring the appropriate conditions for the extension
of the functions of the International Control Organ.

It seems, therefore, that the Soviets believed that a first stage of disarmament was possible without political preconditions, but that the second stage would have to be preceded by political settlements. Although May 10 was far more specific than any Western proposal on the connection between tension and disarmament, there was nevertheless a rather studied vagueness in its provisions.

Unlike the West, the Soviets proposed firmly that disarmament start in 1956. Thus not only the adherence of an unspecified number of 'other states', but the settlement of a number of hoary Cold War disputes had to be secured by the end of 1956. The program was more utopian than March 8, 1955.

The West's plan probably would have broken down quietly when the control organ found itself unable to report that total nuclear disarmament could be controlled, thus dis-obligating states from proceeding with disarmament, and requiring decisions about how much accomplished disarmament to retain. May 10, on the other hand, provided inflexible time limits for its two major stages, and a breakdown would have been 'illegal' and, no doubt, vituperative. The Soviet position reflected not only concern that the control organization might be Western-dominated, but awareness that
unilateral denunciation of treaties is easier for Soviet diplomacy than for that of any Western democracy. Also, because of its more secret governmental operations, the Soviet Union would be in a better position to cheat in an agreement anyway.

The section of the May 10 plan on control contained the first provisions of any disarmament plan dealing explicitly with surprise attack. During Stage One:

In order to prevent a surprise attack by one State upon another, the International Control Organ shall establish on the territory of all the States concerned, on a basis of reciprocity, control posts at large ports, at railway junctions, on main motor highways and in aerodromes. The task of these posts shall be to see that there is no dangerous concentration of military land forces or of air or naval forces.

The rationale of this proposal was given in the preamble on control:

...preparations for a new war, the danger of which has been greatly increased by the development of atomic and hydrogen weapons, inevitably necessitate the concentration of large military formations at certain points together with large quantities of conventional armaments - aircraft, artillery, tanks, warships and so forth. Such concentration and the movement of large formations of land, sea and air forces cannot be effected except through important communication centres, ports and airfields. Under conditions of modern military technique, the importance of such points in the preparation of an aggressive war has not diminished, but is on the contrary increasing.
In addition to atomic and hydrogen weapons, for all their destructive capacity, armies of many millions and vast quantities of conventional armaments, which are of decisive importance to the outcome of any major war, would inevitably be involved in military operations in the event of the outbreak of war.

As Raymond Garthoff and other authorities have shown, Soviet military science was in process of breaking with the Stalinist past in 1955, although the break was never complete. The above statement reflects new views in so far as it admits a 'greatly increased' danger of war under nuclear conditions. However, the alleged 'increasing' importance of points for the concentration of conventional formations and material harks back to the Stalinist doctrine that war is decided by the 'permanently operating factors' of military strength.

The strategic view underlying the proposal of May 10 overlooks the important possibility that the outcome of a war could be decided by strategic atomic forces alone. There need be no prior conventional mobilization, in which case only airport, rocket site, and, to an uncertain extent, port

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18 These were, in Garthoff's formulation, 'the basic morale, economic-military, command, and military qualitative and quantitative elements', as contrasted with 'transitory...factors such as surprise or advance mobilization'. Ibid., p. 82.
inspection would detect preparations for surprise. Even if it were true that 'armies of many millions...are of decisive importance', this does not mean they would have to be mobilized in time for the opening blows of war. Mobilization would be a sure way to lose surprise, and might lead indeed to unnecessary losses. Dispersal of forces could be vital for their protection during an initial exchange of strategic nuclear strikes.

It is ironical that May 10 proposed measures primarily useful against the type of mass conventional surprise attack which the Soviet Union would have been best equipped to undertake. (The United States soon was to repeat this performance.) Malcolm Mackintosh has suggested that the Soviet military were anxious to obtain more information on the location and operation of U.S. Strategic Air Command bases, and were therefore prepared to trade some of their own secrets. However, it seems more likely that this proposal, like the later American surprise attack proposal, sprang from an uncritical importing of Soviet strategic doctrine into its arms control doctrine, rather than a careful calculation of advantages.

Eden put forward the proposal in these terms:

I suggest that we...set up a simple, joint inspection of the forces now confronting one another in Europe. It should not be impossible to decide that over a specified area to be agreed between us, extending perhaps for a fixed depth on either side of the line which now divides East and West Europe, there should be supervision by inspecting teams appointed by the military commands on both sides.

He called the suggestion a practical experiment in the operative inspection of armaments...which, if it were locally successful, might extend outwards from the centre to the periphery. In this way we might hope to establish a sense of security in Europe and begin the process of reducing tensions here.

The Soviet delegate on the Sub-Committee failed to discuss this suggestion at all in 1955; however it influenced his proposals for 'partial measures' in March 27, 1956, as will be seen. While the Soviets were known to object to schemes of pure inspection for principled and practical reasons, it also became apparent in 1957 that the United States, deferring to West German susceptibilities, objected

20 DC/SC.1/30, August 29, 1955, in Cmd. 9636, p. 53. (Speech by Eden)
to inspection schemes which lent lustre to the East-West dividing line in Europe.\textsuperscript{21}


Faure proposed in his Memorandum at Geneva that there should be 'percentage reductions in military expenditure for a particular budget period in relation to the preceding period' - the figure to be determined 'by agreement between the Governments concerned'.

The percentage cuts would increase progressively from year to year. An 'international secretariat' would draw up 'a common definition of military expenditure'. The plan provided for transfers of savings 'in whole or in part' to international aid projects.

\textsuperscript{21} See discussion of \textbf{August 29, 1957} and \textbf{September 20, 1957} below.

\textsuperscript{22} DC/SC.1/27, in Cmd. 9636, p. 42.

("Draft Agreement on the Financial Supervision of Disarmament and the Allocation for Peaceful Purposes of the Resulting Funds")


("Memorandum...by the French Delegation")
No other method of disarmament was proposed by Faure at Geneva.

The supplementary Draft Agreement tabled in the Sub-Committee on August 29 made further detailed proposals on the method of assessing and executing the percentage cuts. It also provided for a fund to be set up to handle financial resources released for international aid. Unlike the original proposal it seemed to envisage budgetary disarmament being linked to traditional-style disarmament.

...percentage reduction...will be calculated in such a way as to correspond to the reductions in conventional armaments and armed forces and the abolition of the weapons of mass destruction as provided for in each stage of the Disarmament Convention [unspecified].

The French proposal for distributing the savings brought about by disarmament to underdeveloped countries became a commonplace in later proposals of East and West.

Pure budgetary disarmament would be an invitation to governments to use their skill to conceal military expenditures. Unless budgetary inspection was backed up by conventional inspection of men and armaments it would be a simple matter to conceal the budgetary manifestations of massive illegal military preparations under a disarmament agreement, even for those governments not already skilful in such concealment.

At Geneva on July 21, Eisenhower had proposed a three-part plan 'to provide against the possibility of surprise attack' as between the United States and the Soviet Union. The first element of the plan as laid down in the proposal of August 30 was an exchange of 'blueprints' of military establishments. The blueprints were defined as consisting of information on

the identification, strength, command structure and disposition of personnel, units and equipment of all major land, sea and air forces including organized reserves and paramilitary; and a complete list of military plants, facilities and installations with their locations.

Each side was to 'prepare lists of major military forces and establishments showing the deployment of forces and the locations of installations and facilities by geographical co-ordinates'. The proposal listed 'the

25 DC/SC.1/28, in Cmd. 9636, p. 48. ("Statement on Disarmament by the President of the United States")
26 DC/SC.1/36, in Cmd. 9636, p. 64.
elements of information considered essential to preclude surprise attack. These were:

'(a) Weapons and delivery systems suitable for surprise attack.

(b) Transportation and telecommunications.

(c) Armed forces, structure and positioning of armed forces.

(d) Additional facilities as mutually agreed...'

The lists were to be exchanged and verified progressively. This was the second element of the plan. Each side would post 'on-the-spot observers' with the other side's 'operating land, sea and air forces, at their supporting installations, and at key locations as necessary for the verification, continued observation and reporting of each category of information'.

Finally, the third element of the plan (from which its most popular but misleading name derived) provided that:

Aerial reconnaissance will be conducted by each inspecting country on an unrestricted, but monitored basis to augment the efforts of the posted observers...Liaison personnel of the country being inspected will be aboard each reconnaissance aircraft during all over-flights.

Inspectors would employ 'visual, photographic and electronic means'.

This plan's impact on the world military situation has been more thoroughly studied than that of any other
post-war arms control plan except the test ban. It is usually pointed out that the Soviet Union can easily obtain most of the information on the size and general disposition of United States forces that would be needed to estimate the United States' (or the Soviet Union's) prospects in a surprise attack. However, the 'open skies' part of the U.S. plan would have given the U.S.S.R. more accurate and up-to-the-minute information on the deployment and status of U.S. strategic systems than could otherwise have been obtained before the satellite era, and the proposal for on-the-spot observers would have given even more 'tactical warning'\(^\text{27}\) if it had been implemented on a broad scale.

U.S. ignorance of Soviet force sizes and dispositions was considerably greater than comparable Soviet ignorance in 1955. The United States lacked provision for both strategic and tactical warning. 'Legal' arms inspection or a greater 'illegal' espionage effort was required to remedy this lack, and the rejection of 'open skies' was followed by unreciprocated U.S. overflights of Russia.

\(^{27}\) Tactical warning warns of an attack already under way. Strategic warning warns of an attack being planned or prepared. For a discussion of the surprise attack problem in general, see Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* Princeton University Press, 1959, Chapters 7-8.
The whole program of August 30 - exchange of 'blueprints', open skies and on-the-spot observers - was presented as a way of reassuring each side (a) strategically, that the other side had inadequate forces for surprise attack, and (b) tactically, that a surprise attack was not in fact on the way. However, because the extensive inspection would have revealed otherwise secret Soviet weapon locations to U.S. military planners, U.S. ability to make a successful counterforce strike could have been enhanced despite the warning facilities enjoyed by the Soviets.

In 1955 the Strategic Air Command's counterforce capability was a central feature in NATO plans for the defence of Europe, which called for nuclear strikes against military targets in the Soviet heartland in the event of massive and successful ground attack on the Central NATO front. President Eisenhower did not renounce NATO strategy in proposing his surprise attack plan, yet in that plan the United States implicitly foreswore counterforce attack.

Inspection is no threat to a mobile and hardened strategic force of the type it became American policy to develop in the middle 1950s, but this policy was unattractive to the Russians, who seem to have preferred to rely on
geographical secrecy until the observation satellite era. August 30 directly threatened Soviet secrecy.

It is interesting to note that the observers provided for in the plan were to be nationals of the inspecting country engaged in continuous 'reporting', presumably to their own military authorities, since no other authority was mentioned. This situation would have been far more conducive to surprise attack than, say, a situation in which international inspectors reported to an impartial evaluating authority with a right to keep secrets. However the Soviets had no confidence in impartial authorities.

The charge of obsolescence is usually added to those of self-interest and danger in criticism of the Eisenhower plan. It is customary to point out that aerial inspection will detect the massing of bomber aircraft in forward areas but not the readying of missiles for firing. Although such criticism overlooks the provision in August 30 for 'the positioning of on-the-spot observers with operating land, sea and air forces', it is true that the almost instantaneous salvo capability of solid fuel missiles would have made even this provision worthless in relation to them. However, long-range solid fuel missiles did not become operational until 1960, and in any case bomber as well as missile forces
would have been necessary for successful surprise attack well into the 1960s - a point overlooked by perfectionists. Obsolescence problems of surprise attack schemes will be raised again in discussing the more detailed suggestions put forward by the Western delegations at the surprise attack conference of 1958. 28

Under pressure from the Soviet Union in the Sub-Committee, the United States declared in the supplementary memorandum of October 7 that 'the Eisenhower plan is the gateway to agreement' on reduction of armaments, but the American delegate, Stassen, refused to say what lay beyond the gateway in 1955. The memorandum also bowed to the Soviet criticism that the proposal excluded inspection of foreign forces in declaring that an 'agreement...might also provide for the adherence and participation...of designated countries on an equitable basis, once the plan is in operation between the Soviet Union and the United States'. In their turn, the Soviets proposed aerial inspection in 1956, but as an accompaniment to disarmament, not in isolation from it. 29

28 See December 17, 1958.
29 See March 27, 1956.
MARCH 19, 1956 (Anglo-French proposal for comprehensive radical disarmament, submitted to the Sub-Committee.)

This plan 'synthesized' the traditional elements of the Western comprehensive plan of March 8, 1955 with U.S. and Soviet ideas on preventing surprise attack and French ideas on budgetary control and the allocation of savings to underdeveloped countries. For the first time in a Western plan the control of nuclear test explosions was specifically provided for. Total nuclear, chemical and biological disarmament was dropped.

The order of traditional measures in the plan was the same as in March 8, 1955, with two major exceptions. Firstly, there was no provision for transfers of fissionable weapon materials to peaceful uses, but merely a proposal to convene an 'international scientific conference to examine the possibilities of eliminating stocks of nuclear weapons' after Stage Three. Secondly, the general assembly of the International Disarmament Organisation (I.D.O.) (which corresponded to the World Disarmament Conference in March 8) would not determine force levels for states other than the Five until after the entry into force of the treaty; and

these states would not begin their initial reductions until after the Five had begun theirs.

The plan provided explicitly in many places for 'development' of control progressively in anticipation of measures, and it supplied details on the various types of control.

Like March 8, the plan did not propose time limits for its three stages individually or collectively. However, once more Nutting declared informally in the Sub-Committee that I should have thought that one year would be needed and might be sufficient to complete the operations in each stage of the plan.31

Stage One consisted of measures, some of which involved all signatories:

(a) A ban on 'the use of nuclear weapons except in defence against aggression'.

(b) Appointment of a director general and recruitment of the 'first elements' of the control organ.

(c) A freeze, including declaration of levels, submission of blueprints, budgets and accounts, and an undertaking not to increase force levels or expenditures.

(d) Measures against surprise attack, including aerial surveys, control posts, mobile control teams and 'financial inspectors' (sic).

(e) Meeting of the general assembly of the I.D.O. to determine armament and force levels for 'other participating States', which 'should be considerably below the levels fixed for the five permanent members of the Security Council'.

(f) The executive committee of the I.D.O. accepts the reports of the control organ that it is ready to supervise reductions.

(g) 'Initial steps in agreed reductions by the five Powers and consequential reduction in military budgets'.

(h) Establishment of a control branch to supervise limitation of test explosions.

An Annex to the plan described an intricate transition procedure for passage to Stage Two. The transition would not be made unless, on receipt of a report from the control organ, the executive committee unanimously decided that first stage provisions had been carried out, that the control organ was ready to supervise Stage Two, and that 'the necessary conditions of confidence' existed for proceeding.
Failing unanimity there would be a six months interval followed by either Stage Two or a further lapse of up to three months, or, if no unanimous decision for these courses could be reached, reference to the Security Council.

The 'necessary conditions of confidence' were not specified, but political settlements were clearly implied by this phrase in the light of traditional Western policy. Anthony Nutting wildly overstated the case when he wrote later that the Anglo-French plan spelled out the necessary link between the achievement of political settlements and the performance of disarmament.32

The 'necessary link' has never been spelled out by any Western delegation.

Stage Two provided for:

(a) 'Limitation of nuclear test explosions...'

(b) 'Completion of first half of agreed reductions by the Five Powers... A proportion of the savings would be allocated to improving standards of living throughout the world and in particular in the less-developed countries'.

(c) 'Other Powers start on first half of reductions...'

Transition to Stage Three was as for transition to Stage Two.

Stage Three provided for:

(a) Prohibition of tests, and 'simultaneously', the 'weapon' cut-off.\(^33\)

(b) The third quarter of five-power reductions, and on its completion:

(c) '...complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons'.

(d) Start on second half of reductions for other powers.

(e) Start on last quarter of five-power reductions, all states participating complete reductions together.

There was provision for two 'final measures'. As mentioned above, the elimination of nuclear weapons would be discussed by a scientific conference, and the general assembly of the I.D.O. would discuss the 'possibility of further reductions of armed forces and armaments'.

The plan did not specify final force levels for the Five. In the Sub-Committee Nutting said that these were 'a detail' and 'subject to negotiation'.\(^34\) Analysis of

\(^{33}\) In 1957 the West proposed a 'materials' cut-off without a 'weapon' cut-off. See August 29, 1957.

\(^{34}\) DC/SC.1/PV.71, March 22, 1956, pp. 5 and 2.
the military situations envisaged by the plan is therefore
difficult.

The plan was represented as a 'synthesis'. A minor
part of the Soviet plan of May 10, 1955 - measures against
surprise attack, had been joined to American proposals on
the same subject, and attached to a traditional Anglo-French
comprehensive disarmament plan. The national elements of
the synthesis were very unbalanced.

The provision for a five-power veto on transition from
one stage to the next was new in a Western plan: it was
first suggested in a paper on control tabled by the French
delegation late in the 1955 negotiations. The Anglo-French
did not wish to be forced to choose between denouncing a
treaty unilaterally and moving forward to new measures
before they could be controlled, or before opponents had
fully executed previous measures. The veto provision
indicated that West as well as East could distrust a
control organ. The Anglo-French expressed their distrust
by a veto over proceeding from one stage to the next;
the Russians expressed their distrust by a veto over not

("Proposals Concerning the Powers of the Control
Administration")
proceeding from one stage to the next - that is, by proposing an inflexible time limit for the agreement as a whole, and by making suspension of the agreement a responsibility of the Security Council.\footnote{For example, May 10, 1955.}

March 19, 1956 as a whole was far more realistic than its predecessor in having no mandatory provision for complete nuclear disarmament. Although the plan would have limited the nuclear club, France was soon arguing that the cut-off was unacceptable unless the nuclear powers agreed to reduce their weapon stockpiles greatly, which this plan did not propose.

The plan was unwieldy in that it did require agreement in advance by a large number of states to comprehensive measures extending over three stages. The West has not yet conceived the idea of a comprehensive first step to be agreed independently of subsequent steps by a limited number of powers.
MARCH 27, 1956\textsuperscript{37} (Soviet proposal for radical conventional disarmament, submitted to the Sub-Committee.)

The Soviet Union proposed that the conventional and surprise attack provisions of May 10, 1955 be executed in isolation from the atomic and political provisions. May 10 had seemed to accept the Western thesis that radical disarmament must be preceded by political settlements. March 27 made no mention of settlements, and Gromyko stated in the Sub-Committee that it 'can be executed forthwith, without...agreements being reached with reference to any other outstanding problems'.\textsuperscript{38} This line persisted throughout the rest of the period under study in relation to all Soviet proposals.

March 27 also proposed, in isolation from conventional disarmament, a zone of arms limitation in Europe and 'partial measures' which will be described below.

The conventional measures were to be carried out 'in 1956-8', beginning with a three month freeze, during which forces, armament and expenditure would be held below levels obtaining on 31 December, 1955. The control organ would establish local branches and control posts within two of

\textsuperscript{37} DC/SC.1/41, in Cmd. 9770, p. 31. (Draft U.N. resolution)

\textsuperscript{38} DC/SC.1/PV.81, April 16, 1956, p. 32.
these months; and within one month of the entry into force of the agreement states parties would submit complete official figures concerning their forces, armaments and 'expenditure for military requirements' to the control organ. These provisions were identical with those of May 10, except that the provision for local branches and the setting of a time limit for initial establishment of control were both new.

The force levels provided for the Five were not changed, but the 'considerably lower' manpower levels for non-Five participants mentioned in May 10 were now defined as being less than 150-200,000 men. The World Conference to set precise levels was now to meet before initial reductions (presumably in 1956), instead of before the end of the first half of the first year of reductions, and non-Five nations would do their disarming - like the Five - over nearly two full years, instead of entirely in the second year of the disarmament program.

For the first time in a Soviet plan, it was specifically provided, following the Faure Plan, that some released savings would be used 'to furnish assistance to economically underdeveloped countries'.
The surprise attack and control provisions were as for May 10, with three exceptions. Firstly, there was a new provision that 'the agreed system of supervisions shall be...applied...to such armed forces and material as the States parties to the agreement may possess outside their own frontiers'. Secondly, the 'objects of control' mentioned in May 10 were at last defined as: 'military units; stores of military equipment and ammunition; land, naval and air bases, factories manufacturing conventional armaments and ammunition'. Of course nuclear installations were excluded from the list. Thirdly, a very tentative concession to the American demand for aerial reconnaissance appeared for the first time:

At a specified stage of the execution of the general disarmament programme, when confidence among States has been strengthened, the countries concerned shall consider the possibility of using aerial photography as one of the methods of control.

The 'Zone of Limitation and Inspection of Armaments' in Europe was defined as 'including the territory of both parts of Germany and of States adjacent to them'. There were to be ceilings set for the forces of the Four in the area, a ban on atomic weapons, and 'joint inspection' of
- March 27, 1956 -

forces - an idea first suggested by Eden at the 1955 summit conference. 39

The 'partial measures' to be agreed 'independently of ...disarmament' were: an immediate test ban (no control was mentioned); removal of atomic weapons from Germany within three months; and a 15 per cent reduction of military budgets by 'States' (unspecified).

Anthony Nutting has argued that the Soviets proposed conventional disarmament in 1956 because they were anxious to press on towards nuclear parity with the United States.

...it is likely that by 1956 the Soviets realized that they were within measurable distance of catching up on the American lead in nuclear weapon development, and that the moment had therefore arrived to rid themselves of any commitment which might inhibit their nuclear development programme. 40

In fact, the comprehensive proposals of May 10, 1955 were not withdrawn by the Russians; 41 and an immediate test ban which, even if uncontrolled, would have put a brake on the development of Soviet weapon technology, was now

40 Disarmament: an Outline of the Negotiations, op. cit., pp. 24-5.
41 See statement by Gromyko in the Sub-Committee, DC/SC.1/43, 26 April, 1956, in Cmd. 9770, p. 48.
proposed in isolation instead of as an integral part of a comprehensive proposal, as in 1955. In any case, 'catching up' on an opponent in the development of a key weapon when one is within reasonable distance is considerably less important than catching up when one is lagging badly. Why had the Soviet Union put nuclear disarmament first before 1956? Nutting's argument overlooks the key fact that the only type of nuclear disarmament the Soviets had ever proposed was total. It was disarmament which would have wiped out the United States advantage entirely.

Nutting's interpretation assumes that the Soviet proposal was not put forward cynically; that the Soviets thought others might agree to it, and, for their own part, intended to implement it. However even if the Soviets were not sincerely in 1956, March 27 may have been thought a good proposal for a power which wished to preserve 'the spirit of Geneva' by seeming flexible. After all, the West was increasingly opposed to total nuclear disarmament while the Soviets had always objected to the cut-off in isolation from total nuclear disarmament. However, France came out vehemently against an agreement which would have permitted the nuclear arms race to continue, and in any case the

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42 See speech by Moch, DC/SC.1/PV.74, March 28, 1956, p. 36ff.
West had begun to insist more forcibly than ever that low force levels such as those proposed in March 27 were inappropriate to the political condition of the world. Nutting has summed up the British view in his book on the negotiations.

To adopt the jargon of the Sub-Committee, the Soviets were asking the West to accept, for a world political situation that was at best a fairly dark shade of grey, the kind of disarmament which the West had proposed for the world after it had become virtually snow-white.43

The United States was arguing more concretely that its alliance system would be needed until political settlements were made, and that effective alliance arrangements were incompatible with very low force levels. It is interesting to note that in 1957 the Soviets themselves claimed that low, equal force levels for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were more to the Soviet interest than high, equal ones. The preamble to the proposal for comprehensive partial measures of April 30, 1957 stated, inter alia, that:

Whereas a reduction of armed forces to 2.5 million men would not only give the United States security, but also enable it to maintain large armed forces outside its frontiers...the reduction of the Soviet armed

forces to that level would impair the security of the Soviet Union, whose frontiers...are not protected by natural obstacles and are also over a considerable length common with those of countries belonging to.../hostile/ military groupings.

The situation would be different if the United States, the Soviet Union and China agreed to reduce their armed forces at the second stage to 1-1.5 million men.44

Nevertheless, by 1960 the Soviets at least planned to reduce their forces to below 2.5 million men when U.S. forces stood at about the same level. The Soviets probably objected strongly to the 2.5 million level in 1957 because for them it would have meant a reduction of over 1.4 million men, while for the United States the reduction would have been under 200,000.45

It is difficult to decide whether East and West were correct in judging that the situation of high, equal force levels favours the United States, as compared to the situation of low, equal levels. But it is hard to believe that the situation in early 1956, when the Soviets had over 5 million men under arms, compared to the United States'
2.9 million, would have been more favourable to the United States than a situation of 1.5 million men apiece, with the nuclear deterrent to aggression in Europe still intact. (March 27 did not even call for a withdrawal from foreign bases.)

The Soviets were about to reduce their forces by 1.2 million in March, 1956, and probably judged that Soviet nuclear strength would eventually make even further reductions realistic. Nevertheless, even if March 27, 1956 was not seriously intended, it remains remarkable as a plan for abolishing the superior arm of its proponent while leaving the superior arm of a major opponent intact.

APRIL 3, 1956

April 3, 1956 was the first American proposal for disarmament made after the 'reservation' of 'pre-Geneva positions' on September 6, 1955. It provided for 'two preliminary steps', to be undertaken without further

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46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
DC/SC.1/42, in Cmd. 9770, p. 35.
("Draft Working Paper for the First Phase of a Comprehensive Agreement for Disarmament")
commitments, which might be described as examples of joint arms control research rather than arms control. The steps were: 'a limited technical exchange mission for the analysis of problems of control and inspection of conventional armaments', involving all five Sub-Committee powers; and a small demonstration test of control and inspection including ground posts and aerial survey in a limited non-sensitive area in the United States and the Soviet Union of 20,000 to 30,000 square miles, including at least one port, one airfield, and one railroad terminal...

Both steps were supposed to 'facilitate' agreement. 48

The proposal proper provided first for a series of preparatory arrangements and decisions to be made. 'Without delay', 49 the five powers on the Sub-Committee would set up a 'preparatory armaments regulation commission', which would fix force levels for the Four. (China was omitted at this stage.) The proposal listed some force levels 'for illustrative purposes' - 2.5 million for the U.S. and U.S.S.R., 750,000 for France and the U.K.

48 They were explained in detail in two "Working Papers" of March 21, 1956. See DC/SC.1/39 and 40, in Cmd. 9770, pp. 29-31.
49 The Sub-Committee would continue to meet.
- April 3, 1956 -

Armaments were to be reduced according to a new formula. Western proposals had previously been vague on the relation of armaments to force levels. April 3 proposed a potentially very precise method of reduction. Each major category of armament (for example, manned bombers of a given type) would be assessed by the preparatory commission as requiring a certain number of men to maintain and operate. According to April 3, once force levels had been fixed, states could choose which types of armaments and how many of each type they would retain under disarmament:

...the application of the manpower measurement to the composition of the arms of each State shall be at the discretion of the State involved.

Budget reductions would be a 'reflection' of armament and manpower reductions.

The Eisenhower Plan on surprise attack was to be adopted by the Sub-Committee powers. Then, a 'committee of jurists' would draft a treaty covering all phases of the plan. Control and communication would be organized by the preparatory commission, and after that 'the following three

50 See speech by Stassen, DC/SC.1/PV.78, April 3, 1956, p. 20ff.
steps will be taken interdependently and concurrently
by the Sub-Committee powers: exchange of 'blueprints',
as in the Eisenhower Plan, and also of budgetary documents
for 1955; a freeze of forces, armaments and budgets at
December 31, 1955 levels; and installation of inspection
and control. It would become mandatory to notify the
preparatory commission of all force movements.

At this point, the Disarmament Commission of the U.N.
would invite 'other States having a significant military
potential to join in an armaments regulation organization'
(A.R.O.). Force levels below 500,000 men would be set for
these states, with the exception of China (2.5 million).

The A.R.O. would then take over from the preparatory
commission, and, after signatories had reported on their
nuclear capabilities and testing plans, the control system
would prepare to police the cut-off and monitor tests.

Only then, and after a report on control from the
director general of the executive committee of the council
of the A.R.O. had been adopted, would any reductions take
place. They would consist of 'first phase manpower
reductions', 'destruction' of armaments, and reduction of
appropriations.
After a further report by the director, the 'weapon' cut-off would begin, and transfers of 'past production of fissionable materials' to non-weapon purposes would be made. (There was no specific provision for dismantling weapons.) Testing would be 'limited and monitored in an agreed manner'.

Thus ended 'the first phase'. Following it, the A.R.O. Council would be called back into session, and would 'appraise the status of world tensions,...consider the feasibility of further reductions of armaments, armed forces and military expenditures,...study the possibilities for further decreasing the nuclear threat', and recommend further measures.

This American plan was more cautious than the Anglo-French plan of 1956 on the conventional side (assuming that the Anglo-French would have proposed force levels below 2.5 million for the Three). However it was more radical on the nuclear side, since it proposed transfers as well as the 'weapon' cut-off, while March 19 proposed merely the cut-off. It was a less unwieldy instrument than March 19 because, although its draftsman did not stress this point, under its terms the surprise attack proposals and the freeze could have been applied to the five Sub-Committee
powers independently of agreement or action by any other states. Moreover no 'necessary conditions of confidence' (March 19) were required as a precondition for any of the measures.

In the Sub-Committee Stassen commended the plan as follows:

It is my impression...that the effect of our first phase proposal, if an equitable formula was worked out by the military experts, would be, that as regards conventional armaments, the United States would be making the greater reduction, and as regards conventional manpower the Soviet Union would be making the greater reduction.51

This statement seems to imply that, as compared with the Soviet Union, the United States was maintaining a remarkably large surplus of armaments beyond the requirements of the normal military establishment in 1956. Under the U.S. proposal both powers would reduce their forces to 2.5 million men, and that figure would be the basis on which each would claim its quota of armaments under the special arrangement whereby 1,000 men would entitle a state to one submarine, two bombers, or 500 rifles, according to taste.52

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51 DC/SC.1/PV.78, April 3, 1956, p. 20.
52 The figures are imaginary. Stassen proposed no specific formulae.
If the U.S. armament reduction was going to be 'greater' than the Soviet reduction, the United States' 2.8 million men (plus considerable reserves) in 1956 must have had access to far more armaments than the Soviet Union's 5 million men (plus vast reserves).\(^{53}\) The paradox is perhaps explained by the fact that America enjoyed superiority in long range strategic weapons in 1956. Stassen may have counted these, not by adding up their number, but by computing their 'manpower equivalents'.

The proposal for a force level of 750,000 men for the U.K. and France would have meant a reduction of over 100,000 for Britain (who, however, by 1960 planned to reduce her forces to under 500,000), and of over 250,000 for France (whose forces, including militarized police, remained at a level of over one million throughout our period, chiefly because of the Algerian war).\(^{54}\)

China's forces seem to have been over two million strong throughout our period, but poorly equipped.\(^{55}\)

\(^{53}\) See Table 1.


March 18, 1957

provision for 'other States' apart from China (2.5 million) to be restricted to a force level of 500,000 men could have permitted the full rearmament of Germany which was getting under way in 1956. Such U.S. allies as Turkey, South Korea and Taiwan could have retained force levels which were considerably higher than the ceiling set by the Soviet Union in its 1956 plan - 200,000 men.

March 18, 1957

(Soviet plan for comprehensive and 'complete' disarmament, submitted to the Sub-Committee. Expanded and modified a proposal of November 17, 1956, submitted to the General Assembly.)

With this proposal the Soviets turned away from conventional disarmament and back to comprehensive (including total nuclear) disarmament in two stages (1957-8 and 1959). There was a hint of things to come in the phrasing which called for a conference at the conclusion of the second stage 'to discuss...the question of the complete abolition of armed forces and armaments of all types...'

56 DC/SC.1/49, in Cmdn. 333, p. 25.
57 Department of State Bulletin, January 21, 1957, p. 90. ("Declaration of the Soviet Government Concerning the Question of Disarmament and Reduction of International Tension")
March 18 differed from May 10, 1955 in that the U.S. method of executing a first stage now replaced the method formerly agreed between East and West of moving from levels existing before the entry into force of the treaty to final levels by means of two equal reductions. Thus under March 18 first stage disarmament would reduce the forces of the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and China to 2.5 million men, and the forces of the U.K. and France to 750,000 men. The levels for these two groups of powers at the end of the second stage would be as for May 10: 1.5 million and 650,000 respectively. Other powers would be limited to 150-200,000 men, as in the Soviet conventional disarmament plan of March 27, 1956.

First Stage measures included: a three month freeze; conventional reductions; a ban on the use and the extraterritorial stationing of nuclear weapons; abolition of some foreign bases; and a reduction of the forces of the Four in Germany by one-third and in Europe generally by a substantial amount. These measures followed the lines of May 10 closely except that the abolition of bases was now to be spread over two stages instead of being completed in the first stage. Second Stage measures included: further conventional reductions, the 'materials' cut-off and the 'weapon' cut-off -
to be followed by elimination of nuclear weapons when half of the second stage conventional reductions had been completed. The cut-off was thus placed earlier than ever before in a Soviet plan.

Furthermore, in the second stage,

Simultaneously with the elimination of atomic and hydrogen weapons...international control shall be instituted over guided rockets in order to ensure that all types of such rockets which are suitable for use as atomic and hydrogen weapons shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Finally, there came the 'abolition of all foreign military, naval and air bases' and 'measures for a further reduction' of the forces of the Four in Germany and Europe generally.

These final proposals implied that there could be foreign forces in the absence of foreign bases. Although Soviet negotiators have never defined 'foreign bases', Westerners have usually assumed that the term covered all foreign forces.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ See, for example, the speech by the British delegate, Ormsby-Gore, at the Ten Nation talks, June 16, 1960. This expression appears to be defined...as including all units or even groups of military personnel situated in territory of which they are not nationals.

- TNCD/PV.40, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 766.
The control provisions included, in addition to the May 10 surprise attack proposals, a plan for aerial photography in Europe, which will be studied in connection with the Soviet comprehensive partial proposals made later in the year. 59

The proposal of November 17, 1956 had provided for a ban on nuclear tests 'as a first step...immediately', and this was the proposal pushed hardest by the Soviet delegate from the beginning of the 1957 Sub-Committee.

March 18 was dropped on April 30, and probably was intended mainly to assert the continuity of radical Soviet disarmament policy while 'partial' proposals suitable for Sub-Committee negotiations were being formulated. However March 18 also injected two new themes into the disarmament dialogue: a zone of aerial inspection confined to the 'forward' areas of Europe, and special control over guided rockets.

See September 20, 1957.
AUGUST 29, 1957 60 (Western proposal for comprehensive, partial disarmament, submitted to the Sub-Committee. Foreshadowed in a United States proposal submitted to the General Assembly, January 12, 1957. 61)

This plan drew into one system a series of Western (primarily United States) proposals put forward during the protracted Sub-Committee negotiations of 1957, many of which had been cleared one by one with the NATO Council. Its provisions were declared 'inseparable', and it thus crushed speculation which the Soviet Union had seemed to share that some of its parts might be negotiated separately — speculation caused by the somewhat inconsistent presentation of the original proposals, and by dissidence in the Western camp about what form the final offer should take. 62

The plan was to be adopted by an unspecified number of 'parties'. The only way of judging who the parties

60 DC/SC.1/66, in Cmnd. 333, p. 96.  
("Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America: Working Paper: Proposals for Partial Measures of Disarmament")

61 A/C.1/783, in Documents on Disarmament, p. 731.  
("United States Memorandum")

might have been, apart from the Four, is to study the proposals themselves.

The plan consisted chiefly of a separable first stage comprising: force reductions by the Four, to be completed within one year; the 'materials' cut-off, and transfers to peaceful uses; a temporary test ban; and inspection against surprise attack. The only one of these measures which need have involved action by states other than the Four was the surprise attack proposal which called for ground and aerial inspection in Europe.

The first stage force levels were 2.5 million for the United States and the Soviet Union, and 750,000 for France and the United Kingdom. (China was omitted.) In addition to this first stage, and as a partial concession to Soviet insistence, it was promised that the Four would make two further reductions, provided that there had been political 'progress', and that 'other essential States' undertook also to reduce forces. The new levels would be 2.1 million and then 1.7 million for the U.S. and U.S.S.R.; 700,000 and then 650,000 for France and the U.K. In this proposal, for the first time since September, 1955, the United States undertook to reduce its forces below 2.5 million men.
In the first stage, 'specific quantities of designated types of armament to be agreed upon and set forth in lists annexed to the convention' would be placed in 'storage depots'. Thus the Western search for a formula for armament reduction was apparently suspended, and, indeed, disarmament in its literal meaning was dropped.

There was provision for exchange of budgetary information, but no specific provision for budget reductions in the first stage.

The cut-off was to commence one month after the International Board of Control (I.B.C.) reported 'installation of an effective inspection system'. 'The parties which were producers of fissionable material for weapons purposes' would then make 'equitable transfers, in successive increments...to non-weapon purposes'. For the first time a hint appeared that the existing East-West imbalance of nuclear military strength might be partly redressed: the parties would 'fix the specific ratios of quantities of fissionable materials of comparable analysis to be transferred by each of them'.

From the date of the cut-off 'each party undertakes not to transfer out of its control...or to accept transfer to it' of any nuclear weapons, or fissionable material for
weapon purposes, 'except where, under arrangements between transferor and transferee, their use will be in conformity with paragraph III'. Paragraph III provided that:

Each party assumes an obligation not to use nuclear weapons if an armed attack has not placed the party in a situation of individual or collective self defence.

The transfer provision was meant to sanction the nuclear arming (on the 'double-veto' system) of some U.S. NATO allies.

On testing, there would be an initial twelve-month suspension, provided only that there was 'agreement' on a world wide inspection system to be designed by experts. A further twelve-month respite would be conditional on the test ban inspection system's being in effect, and on 'progress satisfactory to each party concerned...in the preparation of an inspection system for the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes...'. After 24 months, 'at the discretion of each party', a further extension would depend on the cut-off having been accomplished and effectively controlled.

This provision implied that inspection for the cut-off might have taken two years to design and install. Much would have depended on how many powers were included in the
cut-off. The West has never proposed definitely whether all powers with an industrial capability for producing weapon-grade uranium or plutonium should be bound by a 'materials' cut-off, or only those planning weapon production, such as France in 1957.\textsuperscript{63}

Immediate expert discussions on the cut-off and the test ban were proposed in August \textit{29}. Also, within three months of the entry into force of the convention, a technical committee would meet 'to study the design of an inspection system which would make it possible to assure that the sending of objects through outer space will be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes'. Finally, the West proposed that a Sub-Committee working group of experts meet immediately to report on safeguards against surprise attack.

Two systems for dealing with surprise attack were proposed in August \textit{29}.\textsuperscript{64} Firstly, the West offered the

\textsuperscript{63} For an analysis of Nth power nuclear production capabilities see The Nth Country Problem and Arms Control, National Planning Association, Washington, 1960.

\textsuperscript{64} For diagrams of the areas involved in Western and Soviet surprise attack proposals in 1957, see William R. Frye, "The Quest for Disarmament since World War II", in Henkin (ed.), \textit{Arms Control: Issues for the Public}, op. cit., pp. 34 and 40.
- August 29, 1957 -

Soviets a choice between inspection of either: the United States, Alaska, the Aleutians, Canada and the Soviet Union; or inspection of

All the territory north of the Arctic Circle of the Soviet Union, Canada, the United States (Alaska), Denmark (Greenland), and Norway; all the territory of Canada, the United States and the Soviet Union west of 140 degrees West longitude, east of 160 degrees East longitude and north of 50 degrees North latitude; all the remainder of Alaska; all the remainder of the Kamchatka Peninsula; and all of the Aleutian and Kurile Islands...

Provided the Soviets agreed to one of these proposals the West further proposed inspection in an area of Europe 'bounded in the south by latitude 40 degrees North and in the West by 10 degrees West longitude and in the East by 60 degrees East longitude...'. Or the West would accept 'a more limited zone of inspection in Europe... but only on the understanding that this would include a significant part of the territory of the Soviet Union as well as the other countries of Eastern Europe'.

'Inspection' included 'aerial inspection, with ground observation posts at principal ports, railway junctions, main highways, and important airfields, etc. as agreed', and also mobile inspection teams and ground posts outside the primary zones. Inventories would be supplied to the Board of Control covering armaments and forces in the inspected areas.
The proposal did not specify who was to participate and how. Would all the powers whose territory was to be inspected have the right to inspect the territory of all other parties to the agreement? Or would only major powers - perhaps only the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., in case no European zone was acceptable - participate?

The structure of the International Control Organization (I.C.O.) was designed to give very wide freedom of action to the parties. In the Board of Control, the affirmative vote of the representatives of the Governments represented on the Sub-Committee and of such other parties as may be agreed will be required for important decisions.

Such a wide distribution of the veto power was new in a Western proposal.

It was also provided that:

Each party will have the right to suspend its obligations, partially or completely, by written notice to the International Control Organization, in the event of an important violation by another party...

In former Western plans the veto had been proposed only for preventing passage from stage to stage. Thus the attempt of 1955 to design a complicated procedure of suspension by an international authority was abandoned in favour of an unfettered unilateral right of withdrawal.
Among commentators, 1957 is widely believed to have been the year when disarmament negotiations became realistic, when proposals were designed for acceptance rather than self-promotion. Secrecy still obscures part of the history of the blunder Stassen made when he revealed new American proposals prematurely to the Soviets in the middle of the Sub-Committee sessions. We do not know what concessions on testing and aerial inspection zones might have been offered, or whether they might have been offered independently if Dulles had not seized firm control and hardened the U.S. position at the behest of some Western allies. The West's final offer, in August 29, shared many of the defects of the sweeping plans of previous years.

The Western proposal was comprehensive and indivisible; it lacked precise timing provisions except for the first stage of conventional disarmament and the test ban; and it was as vague as previous Western proposals on many other key points, such as criteria for armament reduction, extent of nuclear disarmament, degree and nature of control for disarmament, width of participation in the treaty, and so on.

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65 See Bechhoefer, op. cit., pp. 405-6.
66 Ibid., p. 407.
Western delegates defended the 'inseparability' of the four major components of the plan - force reductions, cut-off, the conditional test ban, and measures against surprise attack - on the ground that only their combination would produce a fair and desirable military balance. In fact, each of the measures taken independently would probably have favoured the West one-sidedly.

Zorin, the Soviet delegate on the Sub-Committee, exaggerated a little when he declared that the Western force level proposals for the first stage involved 'virtually no change in the present levels of the armed forces of the Western Powers'. However the Soviet Union's own forces had steadied at a level just below 4 million men in 1957, and the 2.5 million level would have involved a considerable Soviet reduction.

The 'materials' cut-off and transfers alone would not have prevented the United States from continuing to fabricate its very large reserve stocks of fissionable materials into weapons for some time, or from improving

See speech by Moch, DC/SC.1/PV.153, August 29, 1957, p. 9.
Ibid., p. 47.
See Table 1.
designs and refabricating old weapons, or from incorporating improvements in new weapons. It may be significant that the U.S. switched from the 'weapon' cut-off to the 'materials' cut-off in the year that negotiations seemed to be taking a serious turn.

The Soviets remained hostile to all cut-off proposals which were not closely tied to the uncontrollable goal of total nuclear disarmament. They never attempted to work out a doctrine of proportionate transfers to make the cut-off less discriminating against them. In 1957, in so far as they wished to control the spread of nuclear weapons, they seemed to pin their hopes on the test ban, a far clumsier means than the cut-off.

The West's plan to use an arms control agreement to condone the controlled transfer of nuclear weapons did not attract the Soviets. They had no strategic need to transfer tactical nuclear weapons to their allies in Eastern Europe, (nor were these allies trustworthy); and it was becoming increasingly clear that China should not be given or helped to get nuclear weapons from the viewpoint of Soviet interests.

The West's test ban proposal was a unique attempt to graduate a measure and make its various parts a progressively increasing reward for an opponent's good behaviour in respect
of other measures in a plan. By rejecting the Soviet proposal for an immediate ban, August 29 permitted Britain to become a thermonuclear power; however it will be argued in the next chapter that the test ban was not strongly favourable to Soviet interests.

Since provisions for control and for surprise attack inspection in themselves tend to favour the West and damage the East, the East always expects considerable disarmament to accompany considerable control. August 29 may be described (to adapt a favourite saying of Jules Moch) as 'little disarmament with much control', especially since conventional armaments were not to be destroyed but put in store.

The Soviet Union has never favoured aerial and mobile ground inspection 'on principle', but only in order 'to meet these Western Powers half-way'. The zones proposed by the West in 1957 simply covered too much Soviet territory to be acceptable otherwise than in combination with measures strongly favourable to Soviet interests. Moreover, despite the Eden proposal of 1955, the West as a whole rejected an important political 'sweetener' - basing a European zone of inspection on the East-West dividing line.

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70 Speech by Zorin, DC/SC.1/PV.157, August 27, 1957, p. 22.
SEPTEMBER 20, 1957\textsuperscript{71} (Soviet proposal for comprehensive partial disarmament, submitted to the General Assembly. Modification of the proposal of April 30, 1957,\textsuperscript{72} submitted to the Sub-Committee.)

In the Soviet conventional disarmament plan of 1956, the supplementary provisions for a suspension of tests, for a ban on atomic weapons in Germany and for reduction of military budgets by 15 per cent were designated 'partial measures'. By 1957 the Soviet meaning of 'partial disarmament' had broadened considerably.

Under the proposal of April 30, 1957, the final force levels of May 10, 1955 were to be reached in two stages, but in September 20, 1957 the Soviets accepted the Western proposal of August 29, 1957 for reaching somewhat higher levels in three stages - the largest number of stages ever envisaged by the Soviets for conventional disarmament. The Soviets also accepted the Western figures: 2.5 million, 2.1 million and 1.7 million at successive stages for the Soviet Union and the United States; 750,000, 700,000 and 650,000 successively for the United Kingdom and France.

\textsuperscript{71}\textsuperscript{71} A/C.1/793, in Documents on Disarmament, vol. II, p. 87\textsuperscript{4}. ("Memorandum...on Partial Measures in the Field of Disarmament")

\textsuperscript{72} DC/SC.1/55, in Cmnd. 33, p. 43. ("Proposals...on the Implementation of Partial Disarmament Measures")
(They even followed the West in omitting mention of China!)
The new detail, that 'the strength of the armed forces of all States parties to the agreement would include personnel employed by the armed forces in a civilian capacity, but engaged in servicing military equipment and installation', was perhaps meant to compensate for the fact that the Soviets were now accepting higher nominal force levels for a final stage. However, drastic force cuts were not to be linked to political conditions, as in the Western plan.

Budgets and armaments were to be reduced by 15 per cent in the first stage. The Soviets agreed 'in principle' with the United States proposal for mutual submission of specific lists of the armaments to be reduced, but not to the proposal for storing listed armaments. Neither side offered guidance to those who would have to draw up the lists.

As before, in many Soviet plans, a ban on use of atomic weapons was proposed for the first stage; but, for the first time, it could be temporary - lasting five years in the first instance, if the West wished. The other nuclear provisions were a ban on extraterritorial atomic bases and a ban on tests. On June 14, 1957 the Soviets had accepted the principle of control for the test ban,73 and by

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73 DC/SC.1/60, in Cmnd 333, p. 75.
September they were pressing harder than ever for a separate agreement on tests. A more evolved version of the Soviet test ban proposals will be discussed in the next chapter.

On the question of inspection to guard against surprise attack, the Soviet retreated in relation to its 1955-6 proposals. Control posts at airfields were to be excluded until the second stage, and this measure was said, somewhat enigmatically, to require 'correlation with the relevant measures for the final prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and their elimination from the armaments of States'. (That is, apparently, airfield control was made conditional on total nuclear disarmament, which September 20 itself did not propose.) Moreover:

since we are now concerned only with partial measures...at the first stage, control posts should be set up only in the Western frontier areas of the Soviet Union, in the territory of France, the United Kingdom and other States participating in the North Atlantic Alliance and in the Warsaw Treaty, and also in the eastern part of the United States.

September 20 endorsed without recapitulating the proposal of April 30, 1957 for aerial photography, which insisted that a European zone should have the existing East-West border as its bisecting line, and should extend
for 800 kilometres east and west of this line. The earlier proposal also provided, for the first time in a Soviet plan, that large areas of the United States and the Soviet Union should be opened up to aerial inspection. All of the United States west of longitude 90 degrees West, and Alaska; and all of the Soviet Union east of longitude 108 degrees East was to be included.

September 20 repeated the proposals of March 27, 1956 for force reductions in Germany and in Europe.

On the conventional side, September 20 was at once radical and nebulous - radical because it proposed drastic conventional disarmament and nuclear disengagement even in the absence of political settlements; - nebulous because it made no proposal on force levels for 'other Powers' or on the timing of the stages of disarmament, even though new (Western) force levels and three (Western) instead of two (Russian) stages were being proposed.

As for the surprise attack proposal, the provision for confining control posts geographically in the first stage would have affected very little their ability to detect preparations for conventional attack. The exclusion of airfield control until the second stage was more important. Perhaps Soviet military leaders had grown more nervous of
U.S. strategic striking power since the proposal for airfield control was made in May 10, 1955.

Whereas the Soviets 'believed' in the control post concept they never presented aerial inspection proposals except as a way of overcoming United States 'obstacles'. However, Western negotiators argued that the European area to be inspected under the terms of the Soviet proposal comprised areas vital to NATO but marginal for the Warsaw Pact, with its greater ability to maneuver in depth. They further argued that the Siberian zone of inspection had few vital industrial or military centres compared to the zone in the western United States, which in any case was a far greater proportion of the U.S. land mass than was the Siberian zone of the U.S.S.R. land mass.

The ban on extraterritorial atomic weapons was intensely self-interested. The West would have been forced to rely on nuclear bombers operating from Strategic Air Command bases in the United States to deter aggression in

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74 'The Soviet Government maintains its view that aerial photography can neither prevent surprise attacks nor ensure the necessary control over disarmament'. (September 20)

75 Soviet negotiators pointed out in their turn that the Siberian zone was slightly larger than the zone in the western United States.
Europe, while Soviet nuclear arrangements would have been left relatively undisturbed by this proposal.

NOVEMBER 28, 195876 (Soviet proposal for preventing surprise attack, submitted to the Geneva Surprise Attack Conference. Further explained in Soviet bloc proposal of December 12, 1958.77)

The Conference of Experts for the Study of Possible Measures which Might be Helpful in Preventing Surprise Attack and for the Preparation of a Report thereon to Governments was a 'technical' conference supposed to prepare recommendations to governments. While the Western experts wished to exclude discussion of disarmament measures altogether and merely evaluate various methods and instruments for monitoring the weapons of surprise attack, the Eastern experts (from Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania and the Soviet Union) supported the Soviet Government proposal of November 28, which combined measures of inspection to prevent surprise attack with a proposal to reduce all foreign forces 'within the agreed control zone'

76 GEN/SA/7.Rev. 1, in Documents on Disarmament, vol. II, p. 1264. ("Declaration...Measures for Preventing Surprise Attack")

77 GEN/SA/11, in Documents on Disarmament, vol. II, p. 1298. ("Proposal regarding the tasks and functions of ground control posts and aerial inspection")
in Europe by one third, and to eliminate nuclear weapons from German territory.

The preamble of November 28 declared that a 'reliable system' for preventing surprise attack must include drastic disarmament, but that this was being blocked by the Western powers who 'are not prepared to ban nuclear weapons and considerably reduce their stocks of conventional weapons'. November 28 was thus, like all Soviet limited proposals, presented as a 'second best'.

Soviet delegates to the conference had criticized overflights of American nuclear bombers in Europe and elsewhere as a threat to peace. The first measure proposed in November 28 was

the assuming of an obligation by the United States of America not to allow from henceforth any flights of its military aeroplanes with atomic and hydrogen bombs aboard in the direction of the Soviet Union and over the territories of other States...

This was one of the most extraordinary proposals ever made at an arms control negotiation. It applied to only one power and its control would have involved inspecting every major air base of the Western alliances. (It illustrates excellently one political function of most Soviet proposals - agitation against Western military strategy).
November 28 next stated that the 'practical steps' which were possible should be taken on the 'basis' of ground control posts and aerial photography. For the first time the Soviets proposed a specific number of ground control posts and gave details of their personnel, organization and function. Also for the first time Greece, Turkey and Iran were included among the Western powers to be inspected - Greece and Turkey because they were members of NATO and had 'military bases directed against the countries participating in the Warsaw Treaty organization...established on their territories'; Iran because she was a Baghdad Pact member, and 'has recently been getting more and more involved in the military measures carried out by members of this Pact'.

In the Soviet partial plan of September 20, 1957 control posts were to be set up in the United States, France, the United Kingdom 'and other states participating in the North Atlantic Alliance'. In November 28 all NATO countries to be involved were listed specifically: the U.S., U.K., France, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as Greece and Turkey. The Western allies were to share 54 posts, including six on the east coast of the United States. All Warsaw powers were to participate; they would share 28 posts, including
November 28, 1958

six to be confined to the Soviet Union's western frontier zone.

The 'tasks and functions' of ground control were laid down in the proposal of December 12:

- keeping direct visual watch on the movement of troops and the movement of technical and other military equipment through railway junctions, major ports and on main roads.
- keeping watch on the preparations for putting out to sea of naval surface craft and submarines, as well as of troop transports with troops or on any concentration of such ships in major ports.

Eastern and Western personnel were to be equally represented on the control post staffs, which would consist of three or four 'control officers' and two interpreters.

As in early Soviet test ban proposals:

The post commander shall be appointed from amongst the representatives of the side over which control is to be exercised.

The control post staff would have access 'without hindrance' to host country communications, and would 'have at its disposal motor transport, optical equipment for visual observation, and also photographic and cinematographic equipment for obtaining documentary confirmation of the data obtained'.

As in previous Soviet plans, November 28 provided that: 'The mission of the ground control posts...should include
making sure that there are no dangerous concentrations of troops and military equipment.

On aerial inspection, the Soviets repeated, with elaborations and additions, the proposals of September 20, 1957. The European zone extending 800 kilometres each side of the East-West dividing line was increased to include Greece, Turkey and Iran. In addition to the zones in Siberia and the western United States 'all of Japan including Okinawa' would be inspected, because this area contained 'foreign military bases and foreign troops which would be used to carry out a surprise attack' (November 28). Neither of these two additions to the area of the Western zones was matched by additions to the Soviet bloc zones, and in fact the proposal for inspection of Japan and Okinawa was dropped on December 12.

The proposal of December 12 declared that:

The purpose of the aerial inspection is to reveal the concentration of armed forces in the designated zones or the regrouping of such forces and their being drawn up in a threatening manner.

Two 'air groups' - one for each of the blocs - would be formed on the principle of 'self-inspection':

Each air group shall photograph the territory of its side within the limits of the zone designated for aerial inspection. In each air group there must be control officers who are representatives of the opposite side.
The air groups would consist of 'an airborne section and a photography centre': numbers of aircraft and composition of staffs would be determined 'by mutual agreement', subject only to the proviso that representation of the blocs in the photography centres would be equal.

The photography centre of each group shall process, interpret and study the aerial photography material and draw up appropriate reports.

It was provided that the 'results' of this activity 'shall serve as a basis for generalized reports' to the International Supervisory Body, on which the blocs were to be equally represented, and whose functions were to be determined by agreement.

The air groups would have their own transport and photography aircraft, and the host country would 'designate the necessary number of aerodromes and means of communication'.

November 28 reaffirmed the traditional doctrine 'that ground control posts and aerial photography cannot of themselves reduce the danger of surprise attack' and therefore proposed two other measures of arms control. The first, a 'reduction by at least one third of foreign armed forces stationed on the territories of European States lying
within the agreed control zone, was new in Soviet policy. (March 27, 1956 had proposed ceilings - unspecified - for the forces of the Four only in Germany and adjacent states.) The new proposal was also unspecific. Would each individual NATO power (including, for example, Canada) having forces stationed in the control zone be obliged to reduce its contingent by one third? Or would the alliance be permitted to determine the national composition of a one-third reduction?

The second arms control measure was 'an undertaking on the part of States possessing nuclear weapons and rockets not to keep atomic, hydrogen and rocket weapons in either part of Germany'. Apparently neither German nor non-German states would have been permitted to deploy conventionally armed rocket weapons in Germany.

There was no control provision for either of these measures. They were presented as a way of reducing tension in Europe 'where even a minor incident carries within it the danger of grave consequences for the world'.

The inspection provisions of November 28 were entirely in line with those of Soviet proposals in 1957. Missile sites and air bases again were excluded from ground inspection, and aerial inspection was limited. The system
would have detected preparations for massive attack in Europe, but only a small fraction of each side's strategic forces would have been monitored by it, as the French delegate, General Genevey, pointed out at the conference. However, even a little inspection could paralyse part of a strategic force, and near-perfect coordination of all forces is probably required for successful surprise attack. On the other hand, inspection of a limited zone would tend to drive strategic forces out of that zone in the short run, and in the long run would accelerate development of weapon systems capable of being deployed outside the zone - on land, at sea or in the skies.

That there would have been more than twice as many control posts in the West as in the East could have been justified on the ground that the East had more to lose from inspection than the West. In fact, the Eastern negotiators did not attempt to justify this provision.

Like many original Soviet offers at the test ban conference, November 28 contained strong elements of 'self-inspection'. The impact of self-inspection on the

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78 GEN/SA/PV.17, December 1, 1958, p. 12ff.
effectiveness of control arrangements will be examined in the next chapter.

The proposal for a nuclear withdrawal from Germany would have prevented: (a) the nuclear arming of the Bundeswehr by the United States; and (b) a forward nuclear defence of the Central NATO front, which American and especially German strategists were coming to regard as essential to compensate for the West's deficiencies in conventional forces during the period of Soviet 'nuclear plenty'.

The proposal for a one third reduction of foreign forces 'lying within the agreed control zone' was a clumsy one. Several countries lay part in and part outside the zone, which was bisected by the East-West dividing line. However the proposal was much less invidious than an atomic withdrawal from Germany.

Like the original Soviet proposals at the test ban conference, November 28 may have been intended as a stiff 'first offer' to the West (if it was meant seriously at all). The Soviet Government tried hard to have the surprise attack conference continued in 1958, but the West was not prepared to continue discussing disarmament confined to Europe at a 'technical' conference on surprise attack.
DECEMBER 17, 1958\(^7\) (Western 'statement' at the surprise attack conference.)

By a 'technical' conference on surprise attack the Western experts meant one which might make recommendations to governments on inspection systems but not on disarmament measures. Although the Western experts made no concrete proposals at the conference, their exposition had definite implications.

We came to the conference with our own ideas of what might constitute an adequate system, but with an open mind, expecting to reach final conclusions after a joint assembly and examination of the facts.\(^8\)

The chief Western 'ideas' were stated in the statement of December 17, and in what follows they are treated as constituting a proposal.

The Western experts were chiefly concerned to provide against 'a massive initial attack' conducted with weapons having a 'high degree of readiness, of speed and range...and...great destructive power'.

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\(^7\) GEN/SA/12, in Documents on Disarmament, vol. II, p. 1306. ("An explanatory statement regarding certain factors involved in the planning of an integrated observation and inspection system for reducing the possibility of surprise attack: submitted by the Western experts")

The Western delegation comprised three nationals from each of the five powers which later represented the West in the Ten Nation Committee of 1960: U.S., U.K., France, Canada and Italy.

\(^8\) December 17.
Surprise attack seen in this light leads to the inescapable conclusion that land-based ballistic missiles, bomber aircraft, and missile-armed naval forces are those instruments of surprise attack about which one must be especially concerned.

Since total nuclear disarmament had become impossible:

It follows that the only practical step to reduce the danger of surprise attack by nuclear weapons is to monitor the vehicles of delivery...

The first purpose of the monitoring is to keep each side informed when there are no preparations for an attack on the other side...

The second purpose...is to provide reliable warning of preparations for an attack and the quickest possible warning of an attack that has actually been launched.

The Western experts favoured a 'comprehensive and integrated system' with the following 'features':

1. 'Exchange of force data', which would make it 'possible to undertake some verification on a sampling basis'.

2. 'Aerial survey and assessment', employing radar as well as photography. This method would have two purposes: 'initial search for all instruments of surprise attack large enough to be identified by this means'; and 'verification of weapon and force dispositions and strategic or long-term warning of intentions'.

3. 'Ground observers', who would 'verify the information received from aerial search and provide...means of critical
observation of intentions or indications of surprise attack. Ground observers would enjoy: mobility, right of access, and right of residence at some sites.

It appears possible so to define their rights of inspection that the observers do not acquire any detailed information on the military technology of the inspected country...

4. 'Information evaluation centers'.

5. 'Communications', including radio transmitters.

6. 'Logistic and administrative support', including equipment belonging to both the host and the inspecting country.

The Western experts concluded that 'thousands but probably not tens of thousands of personnel' would be needed for 'effective integrated systems'. For political and technical reasons they suggested 'step-by-step implementation', which must be 'very carefully carried out... or there might be such a temporary advantage to one side or the other as to be dangerous'.

The Western experts made an obeisance to disarmament when they concluded that 'inspection systems, especially if complemented by controlled disarmament measures, reduce
the danger of surprise attack*. However, they did not offer to discuss the effectiveness of inspection reinforced by disarmament in preventing surprise attack, thus adopting in effect the American position of late 1955.

A standard criticism of the Western experts in 1958 says that their system could not have adequately monitored what was becoming the weapon of surprise par excellence - the guided long range rocket, both land-based and sea-based. The experts did not even suggest installing observers on missile-firing submarines, but critics have alleged that even observers at missile sites on land - where countdowns are reckoned in minutes (with solid fuels) or tens of minutes (with liquid fuels) - would be unable to communicate warning in time to threatened parties. As pointed out above, however, monitoring of other weapons could embarrass a potential aggressor sufficiently to deter him. Nevertheless it is certain that continuous surveillance of

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81 This part of the Western statement was flatly contradicted by an earlier part already quoted which reviewed the problems of nuclear control and concluded thus:

It follows that the only practical step to reduce the danger of surprise attack by nuclear weapons is to monitor the vehicles of delivery.

82 See November 28, 1958.
the solid fuel missiles of the 1960s would have been futile from the viewpoint of tactical warning. Moreover, comprehensive inspection and monitoring systems would probably have had the effect of hastening the demise of weapon systems with long countdowns and slow speeds - such as liquid fuel missiles and bomber aircraft - unless coupled with measures of arms control to prevent this.

The Soviet delegate at the surprise attack conference opposed the Western 'ideas' on two principal grounds. Firstly, Kuznetsov argued that ground observers would discover information on 'military technology', which the West had denied. Secondly, reversing a favourite dictum of American strategists, he argued that secrecy tended to discourage military rivalry. Curiously, he did not criticize the possibility that inspection would reveal the geographical co-ordinates of fixed strategic bases and thereby facilitate attack. This argument (borrowed from a Western authority on strategy) was first used publicly by the Soviets in 1960.

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83 GEN/SA/PV.30, December 18, 1958, p. 38.
84 Ibid., p. 40.
JUNE 7, 1960 (Soviet plan for comprehensive and 'complete' disarmament, submitted to the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament. Modified and developed the Soviet proposal of September 18, 1959, submitted to the General Assembly.)

The introduction to the proposal of September 18, 1959 claimed that 'general and complete disarmament' was 'a new way of solving the disarmament problem'. The newness of 'g.c.d.', as it came to be called, was supposed to be that it would lead to 'the inability of States to wage war for lack of material means'.

In fact 'new' plan was chiefly old ideas presented in a more radical terminology. In some substantive respects June 7 was less radical than its predecessor, May 10, 1955. For example, nuclear disarmament was complete within two years in May 10; but this measure was to take an indeterminate time of at least two years in June 7. The final goals of the two plans were in fact identical on the military side. June 7 provided for world-wide disarmament of all but militia internal security units within a specific

85 TNCD/6/Rev. 1, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 925.
("Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament") The proposal was originally transmitted by Premier Khrushchev to other heads of government on June 2, 1960.

86 A/4219, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 911.
("Declaration of the Soviet Government on General and Complete Disarmament")
(although actually unspecified) time; May 10 declared 'that the Powers should further reduce their armaments and armed forces to the levels strictly necessary for internal security' after the first two years of disarmament. However, like all Soviet plans after 1955, June 7 was not conditional on a political settlement.

The real novelty of June 7 was twofold. Firstly, with the single exception of conventional disarmament, its measures were not graduated: they had to be completed within the time limit of the stage in which they occurred. Secondly, June 7 enumerated some of the consequences of radical disarmament which were implied by previous radical plans like May 10, although not actually mentioned in them. Thus June 7 called for the abolition of military conscription, military education, war ministries, general staffs and military budgets, all of which followed from reducing forces to levels suitable for internal security according to the Soviet definition of internal security forces as a non-military institution.

June 7 was a three-stage plan to be concluded in 'four years or some other agreed period'. (The West had objected to the fixed timetable of the September 18, 1959
- June 7, 1960 -

proposal.) The time for the first stage alone was specified: 1-1.5 years.

Whereas May 10 provided for a world conference to discuss the adherence of 'other states' during the first six months of its first stage, June 7 called for such a conference to be held before adoption of any measures.

General control provisions were the first listed. A preparatory commission would be formed to set up 'a control organization...within the framework of the United Nations the moment the treaty comes into force'. All 'states parties' to the treaty would form a conference which would elect a 'Control Council'.

Except where otherwise especially agreed upon, decisions in the Control Council will be taken by a two-thirds majority of votes on substantive matters and by a simple majority on procedural matters.

This provision seems to have been meant to modify the great power veto which the 'framework' of the U.N. might have otherwise imposed. However this would have been a very slight difference if equal representation of Eastern, neutral and Western countries had been required in the Control Council (unless, of course, the Eastern bloc representatives proved disunited).
It was specified that:

The Control organization will distribute its inspectors over the territory of States in such a way as to enable them to start discharging their functions the moment States initiate the implementation of disarmament measures.

Stage One (1-1.5 years) would involve the following:

1. 'All means of delivering nuclear weapons will be eliminated... and their manufacture will be discontinued'.

The 'means' were listed:

- strategic and tactical rockets, pilotless aircraft of all types, and all military aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
- surface warships that can be used as vehicles for nuclear weapons.
- submarines of all classes and types.
- all artillery systems, as well as other means that can be used as vehicles for atomic and hydrogen weapons.

No way was suggested of distinguishing aircraft and warships capable of carrying nuclear weapons from those not capable. This proposal in itself must have involved the virtual disbanding of all air forces and navies. It was presented in deference to the views of France; originally (on September 18, 1959) it had appeared in the third stage.

2. All foreign troops, bases and depots are withdrawn. This measure was carefully phased in May 10.
3. Transfer of nuclear weapons and information about them is forbidden; their manufacture by non-possessing countries is also forbidden. Both of these activities would have been permitted under the Western comprehensive partial plan of August 29, 1957.

4. Rocket launchings are permitted for peaceful purposes only.

5. On-site control of nuclear vehicle destruction and production, base and troop withdrawals, and peaceful rocket launchings.

6. 'Joint studies relating to the discontinuance of the manufacture of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and to the destruction of stockpiles'. This proposal was entirely new, in deference to Western demands.

Stage Two would involve:

1. Nuclear prohibition, the 'weapon' cut-off and complete stockpile destruction.

2. Reduction to fixed force levels for all states - 1.7 million for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Weapons 'thus released' to be 'destroyed or used for peaceful purposes'. Expenditures to be reduced correspondingly.

3. On-site control of the two above measures.
The control organization will have the right to inspect all enterprises which extract raw materials for atomic production or which produce or use fissionable materials or atomic energy...[and] unhindered access to documents pertaining to the budgetary allocations of States for military purposes.

4. Joint studies of treaty observance and maintenance of peace in a disarmed world (in deference to Western views).

5. Control organization review and report.

Stage Three would involve:

1. 'The abolition of the armed forces....police (militia) ...will be equipped with light firearms'.

2. Destruction of all other armaments. Termination of armament production.

3. War ministries, general staffs and military training abolished.\textsuperscript{87}

4. End of military appropriations. Funds released to be used for reducing taxation, \textbf{national} economic development and assistance to underdeveloped countries.

5. Inspection of these measures, plus 'where necessary, a system of aerial inspection and aerial photography over the territory of States'.

\textsuperscript{87} The proposal of September 18, 1959, also abolished 'scientific research for military purposes'.
States would supply information on the strength, deployment and movements of their militia, which would be verified.

The control organization would be permanent, and:

The Control Council will have the right to send mobile inspection teams to any point or to any establishment in the territory of States.

Thus for the first time not only 'objects of control' but all 'objects' were made liable to inspection in a Soviet plan, even though the Soviets might have enjoyed a virtual veto in the Control Council.

6. Measures for peace and security 'in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations' enter into effect.

States will undertake, where necessary, to place at the disposal of the Security Council units from the contingents of the police (militia) remaining at their disposal.

**June 7** made no provision for partial measures, although the proposal of September 18 had listed several traditional measures in general terms and 'recalled' the **May 10** partial proposals as a 'sound basis for agreement'.

This omission may have been due to the vulnerability of the West on the question of general and complete disarmament.

**June 7** was the most comprehensive list of measures ever compiled by either side. The Soviets incorporated
specifically all the major measures which the West had singled out as especially important in the previous few years, as well as those which the Soviets had emphasized themselves. This gave an appearance of conciliation to a plan which was uncompromisingly radical. The West was not contemplating radical disarmament before experience of 'initial measures' in 1960, as in 1957.

The fundamental claim made for general and complete disarmament - that it would 'exclude the very possibility of war' - is baseless.

The objection to total disarmament is not that it is impracticable, but that there can be, in principle, nothing of the kind: the physical capacity for organized violence is inherent in human society. Even the most thoroughgoing disarmament treaty must leave nations with the capacity to raise this level, to re-establish what has been dis-established, to remember or to re-invent what has been laid aside...Moreover, the most thoroughgoing disarmament treaty must leave some powers with a greater capacity for war than others...A nation's war potential does not reside merely in its "armaments", but in the whole complex of its economic and demographic resources, strategic position, technological and industrial skill, military experience and ingenuity, morale, commitments and more besides...88

In fact the Soviets implicitly admitted that total disarmament could not put an end to war in their proposal for Security Council forces to 'ensure the maintenance of peace'. Maintenance would not be necessary unless there had been a breach.

The Soviet plan, for all its careful comprehensiveness, would have produced great confusion by comparison with earlier radical plans. The first-stage measures for the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles and foreign forces and bases was not matched by any mandatory force reductions for the affected powers. These began in Stage Two. Enormous forces of the nuclear powers would thus have been deprived of their previous reason for existence. Nothing in the proposal would have prevented them being equipped with conventional weapons of a single-purpose kind; indeed nothing prevented the expansion of forces during Stage One; there were no force reductions until Stage Two.

By the end of Stage One the Soviets would have been in a dominating position in Europe, with their armies and armaments intact in Russia, save for nuclear delivery vehicles, and American forces withdrawn from Eurasia. The only effective Western retaliation to aggression at
this point would have been primitively-delivered nuclear weapons - none of which had yet been destroyed.

As pointed out above, June 7 was not conditional on political developments in any respect, and, apart from the placing of units at the disposal of the Security Council, the 'measures for preserving peace and security' in a disarmed world, which would come into force during Stage Three, were not specified.

This provision was in any case redundant:

All Members of the United Nations...undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces...necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

JUNE 27, 1960\(^{90}\) (United States plan for comprehensive and 'complete' disarmament, containing a separable first stage of comprehensive, partial disarmament; submitted to the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament. Modified the Western plan of March 16, 1960,\(^{91}\) also submitted to the Ten Nation Committee; which was in turn based upon a proposal by the British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, at the General Assembly, September 17, 1959.\(^{92}\)

June 27 was a three-stage plan for drastic disarmament, providing for a separable first stage. Tabling the plan, Eaton, the United States delegate, said:

The Soviets insist that disarmament must be negotiated in detail at this table and approved by all nations of the world at a conference to be called some time in the distant future, before any real measure of disarmament is undertaken....

We have repeatedly sought to have this conference get down to business in drafting not generalities about Utopia, but agreement on specific, controlled measures of disarmament.

\(^{90}\) TNCD/7, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 933. ("Programme for General and Complete Disarmament under Effective International Control")

Eaton said, when introducing this plan: 'I table the paper as a United States document because none of my Western colleagues had had time to consult with his government'. He had expected to table it as 'an agreed Western position' within a week, but tabled it instead on the day the Soviets walked out of the Ten Nation Committee. See TNCD/PV.47, June 27, 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 891.

\(^{91}\) TNCD/3, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 921.

\(^{92}\) A/PV.798, pp. 24-6, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 908.
This would enable us to get started toward the goal of general and complete disarmament, while we then went on and continued our negotiations on later stages...93

The proposal itself declared that the task of the Ten Nation Committee was to draft a first-stage treaty consisting of 'those initial and controllable measures which can and shall be undertaken without delay by the States participating in the Committee'. These measures were listed in Stage One. Taken together, they resembled the Western comprehensive partial proposal, August 29, 1957. The Western negotiators were so fearful of Soviet propagand a, or so sceptical of the chances of agreement, that they did not propose these measures in some detail in a separate document. As it was, the detail provided was less satisfactory than in 1957.

The proposal of June 27 favoured 'each measure being carried out in an agreed and strictly defined period of time'. In traditional fashion the British delegate, Ormsby-Gore, had informally suggested that a limit of 'say one year' might suffice for a first stage.94

93 TNCD/PV.47, June 27, 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, pp. 890-1.
94 TNCD/PV.2, March 16, 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 31.
There would be an International Disarmament Control Organization comprising conference, control commission and director general, but transition between stages was to be a Security Council matter.

The proposal called for joint technical studies during negotiations, and gave priority to the study of the control of nuclear delivery. The Western proposal of March 16 had listed other measures for study 'immediately':

1. Prohibition of orbiting mass-destruction weapons.
2. Prior notification of missile launchings.
3. The cut-off.
4. Transfers.
5. Measures against surprise attack.
6. 'Measures to verify budgetary information'.
7. 'Means of preventing aggression and preserving world peace and security as national armaments are reduced'.
8. 'Timing and manner of extending a disarmament agreement so as to include other States having significant military capabilities'.

The East had agreed, in June 7, to studies on the cut-off and on international security being conducted during disarmament, but not 'immediately'.

- June 27, 1960 -
Stage One of the proposal of June 27 provided for:

1. Establishment of control.
2. Ban on mass destruction weapons in outer space.
3. Measures against surprise attack including: 'prior notification' of force movements; 'a zone of aerial and ground inspection in agreed areas including the United States and U.S.S.R.'; and exchange of observers at bases. Zones were not defined.
4. Declaration and inspection of 'agreed' nuclear bases preparatory to controlling nuclear delivery systems in later stages.
5. Initial force level ceilings: 2.5 million for the U.S. and U.S.S.R.; agreed levels for 'certain other States'. The Western comprehensive partial proposal of August 29, 1957 had set levels for France and the U.K.
6. 'Agreed types and quantities of armaments...shall be placed in storage depots by participating States within their own territories...pending their final destruction or conversion to peaceful uses'.
7. 'Materials' cut-off and transfers.
8. Submission of data relevant to military finances.

The second measure was new, but it anticipated an unlikely development.
Since Stage One was detachable, and would not automatically be followed by a second stage, the fourth measure, on nuclear delivery, was 'control without disarmament' in the most sensitive area of all.

For the first time since it was put forward in 1956, the proposal for a force level of 2.5 million would have borne fairly equally on the forces of the Two. American forces numbered about 2.5 million in the winter of 1960; Soviet forces were declared by Mr. Khrushchev to number 3,623,000 in January 1960 when he announced a reduction within two years to 2,423,000.95

In April 1960 Moch had defended the proposal for placing weapons in storage depots against Eastern criticism.

It is a measure preliminary to the destruction of those materials, and its essential purpose is to assemble them for inventory purposes.96

'But', he went on, 'any other means proposed by the Eastern delegations for eliminating these surplus materials would be seriously studied by us'.

The East continued to advocate immediate destruction of armaments, but the new American plan of June 27 was

95 See Table 1.
96 TNCD/PV.14, April 1, 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 273.
vague about the timing of 'final destruction' after 'preliminary' storing in Stage One. Destruction was not specifically proposed until Stage Two. It is interesting to note that if an agreement on storing armament had broken down, the United States would have been at a disadvantage compared to the Soviet Union because its stored weapons (under the proposal of June 27) would have been in the continental United States and not readily available for action in Europe.

The plan of March 16 had contained the first explicit Western proposal for separation of the two cut-offs. (The 'materials' cut-off came in Stage Two, the 'weapon' cut-off in Stage Three.) However its draftsman seems not to have been keenly aware of this separation. Stage Three provided for:

2. Further reduction of existing stocks of nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction. (Emphasis added)

June 27 made no provision for the 'weapon' cut-off in Stage One, even though it provided for reduction of nuclear weapons in Stage Two.

The provisions of Stage Two were to be agreed in the following way. The Ten Nation Committee would;
after reaching agreement on a treaty on the first stage of the program, prepare for submission to a world disarmament conference an agreed draft treaty on the second and third stages of the program...

One of the tasks of the world conference was to arrange:

A. Accession to the treaty covering stage one by States which have not already done so.

Stage One itself provided that:

After the accession to the treaty of other militarily significant States and after these initial force levels97 have been verified, force levels of 2.1 million shall be established for the United States and the U.S.S.R. and agreed appropriate force levels shall be established for other militarily significant States.

Thus 'Stage One' included a measure which could not be implemented before the beginning of Stage Two.

Stage Two proper provided for the following measures:
1. 1.7 million force level for the Two; 'agreed appropriate levels' for others.
2. 'Quantities of all kinds of armaments...including nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of destruction in existence and all means for their delivery, shall be reduced to agreed levels and the resulting excesses shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses'.

97 That is, 2.5 million for the U.S. and U.S.S.R., etc.
3. Reduction of expenditure.

4. 'An international peace force, within the United Nations, shall be progressively established and maintained with agreed personnel strength and armaments sufficient to preserve world peace when general and complete disarmament is achieved'.

Stage Three provided for:

1. Force levels adequate for internal order and for 'providing agreed contingents of forces to the international peace force'.

2. 'The international peace force and remaining agreed contingents of national armed forces shall be armed only with agreed types and quantities of armaments. All other remaining armaments, including weapons of mass destruction and vehicles for their delivery and conventional armaments shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses'.

3. Further expenditure reduction.

4. Control of armament manufacture.

The American disarmed world would thus have been policed by an international authority having no nuclear weapons in an environment where there could be no certainty that nations had surrendered theirs. The Western proposal of March 16 was more modest on this point. It called for:
further steps, in the light of the latest scientific knowledge, to achieve the final elimination of these weapons.

The United States delegate might well have been asked who was guilty of 'drafting...generalities about Utopia'.

It is interesting to note that in 1960 the Western delegations followed the lead first given by the Soviet Union in 1956 and ceased to declare that radical disarmament must depend on the settlement of political issues. The emphasis of political discussion by both sides in 1960 shifted from settlements to structures, notably an international peace force, which was apparently to be superimposed on a world which would continue much as before, politically. As Eaton put it, the international force would 'prevent disagreements that will always exist from threatening the peace of the world'.98 Negotiators of radical disarmament confront so many deep problems that they should perhaps not be condemned when they seem unable to confront more than one of the problems at a time.

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98 TNCD/PV.47, June 27, 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 890.
CHAPTER 2

THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN, 1960

The method used so far in analysing proposals is dropped at this point; Soviet and Western positions on the test ban will be discussed simultaneously. There is a good reason for this procedure. At the end of 1960 the Three were in agreement on the essential point, that all tests should be banned under international control independently of other measures. They had also agreed formally or informally to a number of treaty articles, and it will be convenient to base a discussion of their differences on a discussion of the accords they had registered.

The justification for analysing the position at the end of 1960 is not only that the main body of this thesis does not deal with developments after that year, but also that the chances of a controlled agreement on the broad basis of the Experts' Report on international control of 1958 were probably best at that time. After the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting in Vienna (June 3-4, 1961), it became clear that the Soviets had withdrawn their endorsement of the Experts'}
principles, and wished the test negotiations to be merged with general disarmament negotiations. When a partial agreement was finally reached in 1963, there was no provision for international control at all.

Donald Brennan and Morton Halperin, in their analysis of the test ban which is a point of departure for this chapter, set out to (a) 'deal with the major policy considerations of a ban on the further testing of nuclear weapons', and (b) 'provide an example of a fairly complete analysis of an arms-control measure'. What they do in fact is to discuss the likely effect of the test ban on American strategy and weapon strength as of about 1960. They also discuss carefully the effect of a ban on the Nth country problem. They consider the danger for the United States of various inspection systems permitting the Soviets to cheat on a ban, but they do not discuss the effect of proposed inspection measures on Soviet security, and their analysis of the effect of the ban on Soviet nuclear military technology is curiously perfunctory. 'American Policy Considerations...'

could have been the title of their chapter. Some other
omissions in their analysis are also taken up in what
follows.

Since Brennan and Halperin believe in general that it
is not in the American interest to turn limited conventional
wars into limited nuclear wars, they reject the argument
that the test ban should be opposed because it would prevent
the refinement of low yield, varied tactical weapons. In
fact, they favour it because it would likely help increase
the conventional emphasis in American defence policy.

The authors state that 'America's NATO allies,
particularly Britain, [sic] France and Germany, are in effect
asked by a test ban treaty to accept a permanently inferior
military position vis-à-vis the United States as well as the
Soviet Union', but they say that the ban, nevertheless, 'may
be of value to all members of NATO'. However, it is almost
certain that if the Europeans do 'accept' inferiority it will
be for reasons other than agreement on a test ban - expense,
the difficulties of obsolescence, and political reasons
which vary from country to country.

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3 Ibid., pp. 235-9.
4 Ibid., p. 240.
5 Ibid., p. 242.
In discussing 'further weapon developments' Brennan and Halperin conclude their detailed technical exposition as follows:

These data...indicate that current yield/weight ratios of large U.S. strategic weapons are in the region of 1 to 3 KT/lb (i.e., kilotons per pound), depending on weight, and that further testing and development might improve these ratios by a factor of 5...

They then reveal the tacit assumption of their chapter - that U.S. and Soviet nuclear bomb technologies were of roughly equal quality in 1960.

If both we and the Soviets abstain from further improvements in efficiency, the situation will remain essentially as it is. If neither we nor the Soviets abstain from further testing, we both may increase the total deliverable yield by something like a factor of 5...6 (Emphasis added)

In fact, since the Soviets had done considerably less testing than the United States at the end of 1958, when all testing stopped, they would almost certainly have had more room for improvement in yield/weight ratios.7 Hans Bethe favoured a test ban in the early years of the negotiations because:

6 Ibid., p. 249.
7 The exact number of tests conducted by the United States and the Soviet Union by the end of 1958 is uncertain. According to Jules Moch at the Fourteenth General Assembly the score for the Three was as follows: U.S.-131; U.S.S.R.-55; U.K.-21. See A/C.1/SR.1043, November 4, 1959, p. 90.
It would have been a great advantage to us to conclude a test ban treaty at the earliest moment because it would have stabilized the technical advantages we had in 1958.8

The Brennan-Halperin view cannot explain the Soviet decision to resume tests in September 1961, or the hardening of the Soviet position on the test ban which became clear early in 1961. Indeed the authors declared in favour of a first resumption of tests by the United States eventually, because 'the domestic political effects and the consequences for future arms-control negotiations would be much too adverse to permit indefinite abstention from testing without any form of agreement'.9

It is likely that the Soviet decision to push hard for a test ban in 1958 was not only a propaganda maneuver, but reflected a confidence in Soviet weaponry stemming from the rocket successes of 1957 and the big nuclear test series which immediately preceded the Supreme Soviet's announcement of a unilateral test suspension on March 31, 1958. Strategists are generally agreed that it would not be in the Soviet Union's interest to introduce nuclear weapons into


9 Brennan and Halperin, op. cit., p. 266.
limited wars because of her superior conventional war-winning capabilities. Probably the Soviet military felt in 1958 that they did not need the varied and sophisticated tactical arsenal which America was developing. For strategic warfare the Soviets had developed multi-megaton bombs which, although very heavy relative to America's, could be delivered by the high-thrust rockets successfully tested in 1957.

Moreover, in 1958 the Soviets may have viewed the test ban as a useful way to put pressure on France and China to forego nuclear weapons, at least temporarily; at any rate a test agreement would have made it politically easier to deny China nuclear military assistance.  

The mood of military confidence was still apparently dominant in Khrushchev's speech to the Supreme Soviet on January 14, 1960, when drastic force reductions were announced. At that time Khrushchev said:

The Government which was the first to resume nuclear weapon tests would assume a great responsibility before the peoples....the Soviet Government will continue abiding by the commitment it has assumed not to resume experimental nuclear explosions. 

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A little over a year later Soviet confidence had evaporated. Bethe says the decision to resume tests was probably taken in about March 1961, and the Soviet position on the test ban definitely hardened in that month with the demand for a 'troika' structure in the control administration.

The explanation for the Soviet shift is complex and obscure. The Russians seem to have found that their giant liquid-fuel rockets were difficult to conceal or protect, slow to react, and very expensive. The relatively primitive warheads available for them were heavier than they would have been with more testing, and it was thus more expensive to land a given number of megatons on target than it need have been. At any rate, production capacity for giant rockets was never fully used. According to U.S. intelligence reports which began to appear in 1961, the Soviet rocket strength was not and had never been several times greater than the American, contrary to widespread belief, but was possibly inferior, and the Soviets were decisively inferior in strategic bombers. Thus by mid-1961, not only was Soviet

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12 Bethe, op. cit., p. 272.
14 This intelligence was summarized in New York Times, November 20, 1961.
weakness exposed, but U.S. satellite observation programs
combined with greatly increased U.S. striking forces
threatened the security of the Soviet's vulnerable
strategic weaponry.

By 1961 it was also clear that France would continue
to brave the storm of criticism aroused by her nuclear
testing. The fierceness of the storm was in large part due
to the voluntary moratorium being observed by the Three.
Would a test ban treaty be a much greater deterrent to
French testing? The Soviets could not afford to stay as
long as the United States in a suspension arrangement which
did not prevent French testing. Soviet planners must have
wondered whether they ought to join one at all if they were
bound to be forced to denounce it quite soon.

From the beginning of the test suspension in 1958,
Soviet strategists must have had doubts about the test ban,
and Soviet policy 1958-60 may have been an aberration
personal to Mr. Khrushchev. Since the Soviets seem to have
had good reasons for disrupting a ban without controls in
1961, it may well be doubted whether it was in their
interest to agree to a ban with controls in 1960.

Brennan/Halperin discuss the effect or non-effect of
not testing on weapons, but not its effect on weapon
laboratories. A test ban would tend to be unstable unless
laboratories were put under surveillance. The test ban treaty as discussed during 1958-60 would not have forbidden weapon research or secret test preparations. Bethe's discussion of the 1961 Soviet tests is interesting in this context.

...the kind of weapons tested show that their laboratories had probably been working full speed during the whole moratorium on the assumption that tests would (might?) at some time be resumed. Our laboratories put their main emphasis on such improvements as could be used and go into stockpile without test.\(^1\)

It is not certain that the Soviets intended to resume tests at some time, nor would test-oriented research during a controlled suspension mean this. The test ban is a clumsy means of controlling the qualitative arms race, and even expensive laboratory 'insurance' against the other side's breaking a test ban agreement might be militarily justifiable. Laboratory work would also be proved useful if it became possible to exploit weaknesses in the inspection net and test clandestinely.

It was notoriously difficult to hold American scientists in weapon laboratories during the informal suspension of testing, 1958-61. For moral and political reasons it would be much more difficult to hold them during a formally agreed test

\(^{15}\) Bethe, op. cit., p. 272.
suspension. The Soviet Government has an advantage in being able to exert greater political pressure on scientists, and in the greater secrecy of its research and development activities which would facilitate clandestine testing.

It remains to discuss the control system as laid down in agreed treaty articles and disputed in East-West policy differences at the end of 1960.\textsuperscript{16} We shall be considering first the nature of the proposed control arrangements for detecting and identifying 'illegal' tests, and afterwards the probable effect of those arrangements on the security of the inspected powers (notably the Soviet Union) as well as the value of possible clandestine testing under the proposed arrangements.

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The Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests between Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States began on October 31, 1958 and was absorbed into general disarmament negotiations in 1962. It met as a

result of a successful technical conference held on July 1, 1958, and the Report of the Conference of Experts to Study the Methods of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests, August 21, 1958,\(^\text{17}\) became the basis of the control systems proposed at the political conference by East and West.

The Experts' Report recommended a world-wide system of land and ship control posts plus aerial surveys to police the test ban. The recommendation was based upon an analysis of five 'methods' of detecting and identifying nuclear explosions.

1. Acoustic Waves, including hydroacoustic waves. This method was found reliable for detecting and locating atmospheric (up to 50 kilometers) and underwater bursts at great distances.

2. Radioactive Debris. Control posts set 3-5,000 kilometers apart would detect one kiloton explosions in the troposphere (i.e., up to ten kilometers) 'with a high degree of reliability'. Aircraft flights over the high seas would be useful for sampling and searching.

\(^\text{17}\) EXP/NUC/28, in Documents on Disarmament, vol. II, pp. 1091-1111. Official expert delegates came from the U.S.S.R. (8), Poland (3), Czechoslovakia (4), Rumania (1), the U.S. (3), U.K. (2), France (1) and Canada (1).
3. Seismic Waves. Control posts could identify one kiloton underground nuclear explosions 'set off in unfavourable conditions for transferring energy' during periods of 'favourable' seismic noise conditions, and five kiloton explosions during unfavourable periods.

Ninety per cent of earthquakes could be distinguished from explosions with a high degree of reliability if the direction of first motion of the longitudinal wave is clearly registered at 5 or more seismic stations on various bearings from the epicentre. And under certain conditions the epicentre could be localized within 'approximately 100-200 square kilometers'. However:

For those cases which remain unidentified inspection of the region will be necessary.

4. Radio Signals. A one kiloton explosion could be detected by its radio signal 'at distances exceeding 6,000 km.', although thunderstorms and lightning might interfere.

5. High Altitude Explosions. (i.e., above 30-50 kilometers). It would be 'possible to use for the detection of nuclear explosions at high altitudes the registration of gamma radiation and neutrons with properly instrumented earth satellites'. Radio and optical techniques might also be

18 Not strictly a 'method'.
used to record ionospheric phenomena resulting from nuclear explosions. The experts announced that they had 'not considered' detection at 'millions of kilometers from the earth'.

The experts 'recommended' the use of the first four methods at control posts, and considered it 'possible' to use the high altitude methods analysed. Their 'conclusions on the question of the technical equipment of the control system' specified apparatus to be installed at land posts, on ships and in aircraft, while their 'conclusions on a control system' recommended 'an international control organ' which would 'ensure the coordination of the various activities of the control system'. They recommended a network of 160-170 land control and ten ship control posts, with 100-110 of the land posts on continents and 60 on oceanic islands. They specified that spacing between land posts would be 'about 1,700 kilometers' in aseismic and 100 kilometers in seismic areas, giving a world distribution as follows: North America - 24; Europe - 6; Asia - 37; Australia - 7; South America - 16; Africa - 16; Antarctica - 4. They recommended: 'about' 30 experts of various kinds for each control post plus 'some persons for...auxiliary servic­ing'; regular and, if necessary, special air sampling flights; and on-site inspection in the following circumstances:
6. When the control posts detect an event which cannot be identified by the international control organ and which could be suspected of being a nuclear explosion, the international control organ can send an inspection group to the site of this event in order to determine whether a nuclear explosion had taken place or not.

It has been estimated on the basis of existing data that the number of earthquakes which would be undistinguishable on the basis of their seismic signals from deep underground nuclear explosions of about five kilotons yield could be in continental areas from 20 to 100 a year. Those unidentified events which could be suspected of being nuclear explosions would be inspected as described in item 6. I.e., on the site.

In their 'communique', the Experts 'noted' that 'the combined use of the various methods considerably facilitates detection and identification', and that detection techniques and knowledge, and hence the effectiveness of the system, would improve with time. They concluded:

The Conference reached the conclusion that it is technically feasible to set up, with certain capabilities and limitations, a workable and effective control system for the detection of violations of a possible agreement on the worldwide cessation of nuclear tests.

Three other supplementary technical conferences and discussions were held between the submission of the Experts' Report and the end of 1960. The first, Technical Working Group I, as it was later called, reported to the political

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conference on July 10, 1959 in favour of a system of
detection satellites - five to six in earth orbit for
detecting gamma rays, neutrons and soft x-rays, one in
earth orbit to detect electrons trapped in the earth's
magnetic field, and four in solar orbit. Special equipment
at ground posts for space detection was also recommended.  

The second supplementary expert conference met at
American insistence on November 25, 1959 to review the
original Expert conclusions on seismic detection in the
light of: (i) new American data which suggested that the
difficulties had been underestimated, and (ii) a technique,
suggested and partly tested by American scientists, for
muffling explosions - the deep-hole 'decoupling' method.
The group agreed on certain technical improvements to the
Geneva Experts' system, but reported 'disagreement' on the
new data and decoupling on December 18, 1959. The expert
delegations of the Three reported in separate Annexes. The
Soviet experts concluded in opposition to their American
colleagues that there were fewer rather than more earthquakes
of given yields than the Experts had originally estimated.

20 /GEN//DNT/63
21 DNT/TWG.2/9, in Documents on Disarmament, vol. III, p. 1558
They questioned 'formal mathematical solutions' to the problem of decoupling, that is, they required experimental data, and they also questioned 'the technical feasibility of carrying out vast underground construction operations at a depth of the order of one kilometer'. The American experts reported that suitable cavities already existed or could be constructed fairly easily for decoupling purposes, and that their 'rigorous theoretical calculations' showed that signals could be reduced 'by a factor of 300 or more'. The British experts agreed substantially with the American.

The third extra meeting of experts was an informal consultation designated 'the Seismic Research Program Advisory Group' which met on May 11, 1960 for two weeks. The experts of the Three reported individually to their delegations without reaching agreement. Their disagreements are discussed below in connection with the treaty.

When the Three began their political conference in October, 1958, they attempted jointly to draft a comprehensive agreement embodying the major recommendations of the Experts.

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22 DNT/TWG.2/9, Annex II.
23 Ibid., Annex IV.
24 Ibid., Annex III.
(As shown above, the Americans developed doubts about some of the Experts' technical conclusions.) In this attempt, they agreed formally on the wording of some draft treaty articles, and disagreed about the wording and the content of other articles. They agreed about the content of portions of some articles but did not establish final wording. Sometimes they agreed on wording, but did not register this agreement formally. On some issues, which it was agreed the treaty must cover, either one side or both did not submit drafts at all.  

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In the description which follows a 'formal agreement' is the result of a text being jointly tabled by the sides, an 'informal agreement' is an agreement about wording not registered formally, an 'agreement in principle' occurs when one side supports generally the draft of the other without proposing any wording itself, and a 'rough agreement' occurs when the two sides submit drafts which are in substantial agreement.

The positions of the sides as described were often reached after several compromises involving 'package offers' - offers in which concessions were made on condition that other specified concessions be made in return. It is not necessary to examine all the contents of package offers. A package offer is not really much different to a 'bare' offer. In proposing a compromise on one aspect of an agreement a side does not thereby withdraw any of its offers on other aspects.

In what follows, if 'the West' is said to have adopted a position it means that either the United States or the United Kingdom or both powers jointly adopted the position. No disagreements of any moment occurred publicly between these allies at the conference.
The formally agreed Preamble of the Draft Treaty on
the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests stated that:

The Parties...
Desirous of bringing about the permanent
discontinuance of nuclear weapons test explosions;
Hoping that all other countries will join in
undertakings not to carry out nuclear weapons
tests and to ensure the satisfactory operation
of that control throughout the world...
Have agreed as follows:27

Article 1 provided for parties to suspend their own
tests, and

(b) to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in
any way participating in, the carrying out of
nuclear weapons test explosions anywhere.28

Articles 229 and 330 provided for a Control Organization
consisting of a Control Commission, a Detection and
Indentification System ('the System'), a Chief Executive
Officer ('the Administrator'), and a Conference of Parties.
Headquarters were to be in Vienna.

Articles 4-6 dealt with the Control Commission. Article
4 made the U.S.S.R., U.K. and U.S. permanent members,
together with 'four other Parties elected by the Conference'

27 DNT/15/Add. 9, April 17, 1959.
29 DNT/15/Add. 1, December 8, 1958.
30 DNT/15/Add. 2/Rev. 1, December 12, 1958. Revised: August
11, 1959.
who would serve for two years.\textsuperscript{31} On July 1, 1960 the Soviet Union formally proposed an overall composition of three Western allies, three Eastern allies and one neutral.\textsuperscript{32} On August 9, 1960 the United States proposed a 3:2:2 formula.\textsuperscript{33} The difference was never resolved.

Under Article 5, dealing with procedure in the Control Commission, there was informal agreement on all but the question of voting on finances. Voting would ordinarily be by simple majority, but under the United States proposal of June 17, 1959 decisions on financial and budgetary matters would be taken by a two-thirds majority.\textsuperscript{34} The Soviet delegate on December 14, 1959 proposed the same formula,\textsuperscript{35} but under the Soviet proposal for the composition of the Control Commission this would have given a united Eastern (or Western) bloc a veto over the budget.

Article 6 was to deal with the functions of the Control Commission. The Soviets wished the Commission to 'direct the System'; the West preferred the formula 'shall maintain

\textsuperscript{31} DNT/15/Add. 3.
\textsuperscript{32} PV.223, p. 41
\textsuperscript{33} PV.240, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{34} PV.97, pp. 5-6.
\textsuperscript{35} PV.148, p. 11.
supervision over the System. Both sides agreed that the concurring votes of the original parties would be required for the appointment of the Administrator; and both agreed that there should be four Deputy Administrators, but the Soviets wanted them appointed by the Commission - 'two... on the recommendation or with the approval of the Government of the U.S.S.R.; and two...on the recommendation or with the approval of' the U.K. and the U.S., while the West wanted them appointed by the Administrator - 'two...with the approval of' the U.S.S.R., and two with Western approval. Under the informally agreed parts of this article the Commission could lay down permanent flight routes for air sampling and the location of elements of the System (including control posts) in consultation with the host country.

There was rough agreement that (in the terms of the Russian draft):

If any location or flight route recommended by the Commission should be unacceptable to the party concerned, the party shall provide, without

36 DNT/71, December 1, 1959.
39 DNT/78/Rev. 1, February 1, 1960 (Soviet Union); DNT/76, January 14, 1960, and DNT/86, April 13, 1960 (West).
undue delay, an alternative location or flight route which in the judgment of the commission meets the requirements of the system.\footnote{DNT/78/Rev. 1, February 1, 1960. For corresponding Western draft see DNT/76, January 14, 1960.}

There was no agreed numbering for the remainder of the proposed articles. Under an article adopted on May 8, 1959 the parties would agree 'to accept on territory under their jurisdiction or control components of the system which is established on the basis of the report of the Conference of Experts'.\footnote{DNT/15/Add. 16.}

The article dealing with on-site inspections was related to a provision on 'criteria' which was to appear in Annex I of the treaty, and which would determine the eligibility of a seismic event for on-site inspection. The West required the Administrator to order on-site inspections in certain cases upon request of one original party suspicious of another.\footnote{DNT/96, July 21, 1960. The Commission would order inspections on the territory of non-original Parties.} The East wanted the Control Commission by simple majority to order them.\footnote{DNT/60, July 13, 1959.} Both sides proposed a limit on the number of on-site inspections, but they disagreed about the necessary formula. The East
proposed a quota of on-site inspections:

...there may be made in each year on the territory of each of the original Parties up to 3 inspections at any place where, according to readings of instruments at control posts, an unidentified event suspected of being a nuclear weapon explosion has occurred.44

The Soviets would thus have enjoyed six inspections per annum on the territory of the Western Two, as against three for the West on Soviet soil. These inspections were to cover all suspicious events.

The West had proposed a 'partial' agreement on February 11, 1960 whereby all tests except underground tests below a 'threshold' of seismic magnitude 4.75 would be banned in the first instance and there would be a moratorium on tests below the threshold. For on-site inspection of seismic events above the threshold during the moratorium the West proposed a complicated formula whereby, at most,

30 per cent of the average annual number of underground events of seismic magnitude of 4.75 or above occurring in territory under the jurisdiction or control of the party to which the number relates and remaining unidentified after the application of...criteria would be inspected on the site.45

44 The number of inspections was proposed on July 26, 1960. See PV.234, p. 3. The wording of the provision was tabled on July 13, 1959.
The West required on-site inspection groups to be on a permanent, stand-by basis with their own base locations. The Soviets insisted that they be formed and equipped for each individual case from a permanent group of inspectors at headquarters.

At this point it is convenient to interrupt the description of treaty articles to portray the conflict over the moratorium on underground testing below the threshold, which only partially appeared in draft treaty proposals. The final Western offer on this subject in 1960 was made in September. The United States proposed a joint research program to improve seismic detection, but if this was not acceptable to the Soviet Union, the United States would begin its own program in any case before the treaty was signed. As for the moratorium, it should become effective, upon the signature of our treaty, for such period as there still remains of the two-year seismic research programme, plus a period of three months to review the results of that programme.

Thus underground testing below the old, or, perhaps, below a new, lower threshold might have become 'legal' at

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48 PV.247, September 27, 1960, pp. 8-10.
the entry into force of the treaty. Strange result of a successful negotiation!

An unmuffled test of roughly 20 kilotons would cause a seismic shock of magnitude 4.75 according to Western calculations. But there was no provision against decoupled testing during the moratorium and a 6,000 kiloton test, fully decoupled, would have been theoretically permissible, although the cavity required would have been prohibitively large and expensive to dig.

The Soviets declared that they agreed to a moratorium on March 19, 1960, and proposed a joint research program (to begin after the signing of the treaty) which would last 4-5 years. The moratorium would continue during this period, and would also 'continue until the United States deemed it possible for itself to agree to a comprehensive treaty prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests without exception'.\(^{49}\) That is, in simpler language, the Soviet 'moratorium' would be permanent!

The article 'concerning cooperation with the System' was formally adopted on April 27, 1959. It provided among other things that parties would facilitate the entry of inspectors into and their travel through national territory,

\(^{49}\) PV.250, p. 7.
and would make transport and communications available to the System.  

Debate on the article dealing with the Administrator and International Staff produced divergent wording on the recruitment of staff. The West favoured 'personnel... acceptable to the Governments of which they are nationals'; the East proposed 'staff...recruited on the recommendation of the appropriate governments concerned'. The sides were roughly agreed (to borrow the wording of the Western draft) that:

The permanent administrative, scientific and technical staff of the headquarters of the organization shall... be composed in equal proportions of nationals of the U.S.S.R., nationals of the United Kingdom or the United States of America, and nationals of other countries;

It was agreed to apply the same formula to the scientific and technical staff of control posts on the territory of original parties and ship control posts. However there was disagreement about the 'third third' - 'nationals of other countries'. The Soviets proposed that

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50 DNT/15/Add. 12.
51 DNT/95, July 5, 1960.
52 DNT/92, June 20, 1960.
53 DNT/89, May 9, 1960.
this third third be itself divided into thirds, recruited in equal proportions from specialists (a) recommended by the U.S.S.R., (b) recommended by the United States of America or the United Kingdom, and (c) specialists of other countries recommended jointly by the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America or the United Kingdom. The West merely proposed that in the appointment of the third third 'preference shall be given...to nationals of parties upon whose territories control posts are to be established'. This provision would have left the Administration free to recruit the third third from among the nationals of any non-original party. East and West were roughly agreed about the leadership of control posts.

The sides disagreed about the leadership and composition of on-site inspection groups. The West wanted them to be composed of opponent nationals with 'one or more observers' designated by the host country. The Soviets proposed 'parity' (equal representation of the U.S.S.R. and

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54 DNT/92.
55 DNT/89.
56 Ibid.
the U.S./U.K.) for teams operating on the territory of the original Three, the chief to be a host country national.\[^{57}\]

Both sides agreed that:

The Administrator shall develop a program of research and development for the continuing improvement of the equipment and techniques used...in all elements of the System, and shall from time to time make recommendations to the Commission regarding improvements to be incorporated in the System.\[^{58}\]

There was disagreement about the appointment of observers from the System staff on special radioactivity-sampling flights (which, it will be recalled, would be conducted by host country aircraft). The Soviets wished the observers to be appointed on a 'parity' basis for flights 'over the territory of the nuclear /sic\(^7\) Powers'.\[^{59}\] For 'non-nuclear Powers' a host national would be added to the observation party. The West proposed that the observers (who would 'verify the execution of the agreed flight plan /and\(^7\) operate the sampling equipment') 'shall not be nationals of any country in whose territories the events under investigation

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\[^{58}\] DNT/59, July 1, 1959 (West); DNT/73, December 3, 1959 (East).

\[^{59}\] DNT/80, February 4, 1960. Within two weeks France became a nuclear power. The Soviets must have meant 'original Parties' not 'nuclear Powers'.

may have occurred. However the host might 'designate a representative to accompany the observers...’ 60 Under Western proposals the Administrator would order special flights (in accordance with the terms of an annex to the treaty); 61 under Soviet proposals he would merely execute them under Commission orders.

An article on the Conference was formally adopted on May 8, 1959. Among other things it empowered the Conference to elect the Commission, 'approve the budget recommended by the Commission', and 'approve amendments' to the treaty. Simple majorities would determine all but budgetary questions and questions which a simple majority made subject to a two-thirds rule. 62

The article concerning nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes was disputed. The sides agreed that there should be such explosions on condition that the nation employing them permitted other original parties to inspect devices externally and internally, and to examine blueprints of them. 63 The

60 DNT/81, March 14, 1960.
61 DNT/87, April 13, 1960.
62 DNT/15/Add. 17.
63 For the United States this would have involved a change in the Atomic Energy Act.
Western plan provided for surveillance of devices and observation of explosions by 'representatives of the system'. The Soviet plan required control with 'mandatory participation of...original parties' on the explosion site.

Neither proposal provided for a veto to be exercised in case any device was judged useful for advancing nuclear military technology. Under the Western proposal the Commission would judge whether the conditions set out above had been complied with. The Soviet proposal did not mention the Commission at all. The West's plan theoretically permitted unilateral weapon development programs; the Soviet proposal left the original parties free to conduct a joint weapons development program!

The Soviets proposed that peaceful explosions would be carried out by the U.S. and the U.K. 'on the one hand, and by the Soviet Union on the other, in the proportion of one to one...' The Soviet delegate never made clear whether this meant that the Western powers would have to wait for a Soviet explosion after conducting one themselves before setting off.

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66 Ibid.
another. The American delegate said that this interpretation would make the Soviet proposal unacceptable.  

An agreed article of March 19, 1959 provided for a review of the System two years after the treaty came into force, and annually thereafter. The Commission would evaluate the System's effectiveness and recommend improvements 'in the light of experience and scientific progress'.

An article on 'Privileges and Immunities' was adopted on May 6, 1959. The Commission, 'with the approval of the Conference', might establish 'an appropriate relationship between the Organization and the United Nations', or with other future disarmament organizations.

An article, 'Definitions of Terms and Units', adopted on July 27, 1960, defined in technical terms a seismic event 'equal to or greater than magnitude 4.75'.

The agreed paragraph of the 'Parties' article established the Three as 'original Parties'. The West proposed that Paragraph 2 provide for membership for

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68 DNT/15/Add. 5.
69 DNT/15/Add. 15.
70 DNT/15/Add. 8, April 16, 1959.
71 DNT/15/Add. 19.
72 DNT/15/Add. 11, April 24, 1959.
any other state or authority which the Commission decides to invite to become a Party in consequence of a finding that its adherence to the treaty is essential in order to achieve the fundamental treaty purpose of a permanent discontinuance of nuclear weapons test explosions on a world-wide basis or that elements of control are required to be installed in the territory under the jurisdiction or control of that state or authority...and which deposits an instrument of acceptance...73

The American delegate explained that the word 'authority' covered regimes not enjoying wide de jure recognition,74 but the Soviet delegate wanted the word removed on the grounds that all true states have equal status, and that the United States might use the article to obtain the adherence to the treaty of a 'usurper' regime, such as that of Chiang Kai-Shek.75

The American delegate interpreted the Western article to mean that if a regime did not respond to an invitation from the Commission other parties 'would then be free to consider whether...they were justified in taking...action under the agreed article...on the duration of the treaty.76

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73 DNT/102, July 26, 1960.
74 PV.234, July 26, 1960, p. 3.
75 PV.238, August 1, 1960, pp. 3-5.
76 PV.234, p. 6. See below for analysis of the article on duration.
The Soviets simply proposed that:

The Treaty shall be open for adherence by all other states which assume the obligations contained therein and deposit instruments of adherence...77

The agreed article dealing with 'Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Entry into Force' provided that the treaty would enter into force 'when all the original Parties have deposited instruments of ratification...78

The 'duration' article, agreed on March 19, 1959, provided that:

This treaty shall remain in force indefinitely subject to the inherent right of a party to withdraw and be relieved of obligations hereunder if the provisions of the Treaty and its Annexes, including those providing for the timely installation and effective operation of the control system, are not being fulfilled and observed.79

There were formally agreed articles on amendments and authentic texts.80 After them three Annexes were to be set out. Final treaty language was agreed for only one of the Annexes. It will be convenient to mention first some of the provisions on the phasing of system installation in Annex I

77 DNT/103, August 4, 1960.
79 DNT/15/Add. 4, March 19, 1959.
80 DNT/15/Add. 7 and 13.
'Detection and Identification System'), since a breakdown of 'timely installation' would have enabled parties to invoke their 'inherent right' to withdraw.

The two sides agreed informally about the timing of the three major phrases of the system's installation, although they differed on the details of control post installation in the various continents. In the words of the informally agreed text:

The first phase shall begin within three months after the treaty enters into force and shall be completed within four years after the treaty enters into force.

The second phase would begin within one year after the treaty's entry into force and be complete within five. The third phase would begin within two years and be complete within six.

According to the Western timetable 'Asia (exclusive of the U.S.S.R.)' was to receive 18 land control posts in Phase II. Since China could have been expected to resist the installation of posts on her soil during Phase II, the West

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81 The Soviet proposal was contained in DNT/104, August 11, 1960; the Western proposal in DNT/105, September 29, 1960.
82 DNT/104 and 105.
83 DNT/105.
might thus have had a strong ground for withdrawal by the end of five years of the treaty.

According to the Soviet timetable 'Africa' would receive two posts in Phase I. Since there would have been little point in putting African posts anywhere but in French territories during Phase I, and since it seems unlikely that the French would have permitted this, the Soviets might have been able to argue that 'timely installation' had broken down before the end of four years after the signing of the treaty.

Nth country testing in itself would not have been a ground for withdrawal under either side's proposals. However the Commission could declare the adherence to the treaty of any power 'essential'. (Since neither side offered a definition of a 'test' explosion, nuclear war waged by parties would presumably have violated the treaty.)

The Soviet proposals for Annex I on the Detection and Identification System were much less comprehensive than the

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84 DNT/104.

Each party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardised the supreme interest of its country. - Sydney Morning Herald, July 27, 1963.
Western proposals, partly because the Soviets made some of the relevant proposals in their draft articles for those parts of the body of the treaty dealing with the functions of the Control Commission and the Administrator. Thus some questions concerning the Detection and Identification System - the procedure for dispatching on-site inspectors, the number of on-site inspections, and the question of staffing - have already been adequately discussed above.

In the consolidated Western draft of Annex I, it was stated that the provisions had been 'derived' from the recommendations of the Experts. The West made detailed provision for System components. The Headquarters would include Administration, Supply, Field Operations and Technical Operations. Technical Operations would include a Research and Development Center, and a Data Analysis Center including a Central Radiochemical Laboratory for sample testing. Field Operations would include a Central Inspection Office to 'organize and maintain inspection groups on an alert basis' and supervise their dispatch, a Communications Center, an Operations Center to control air and water sampling operations, and a Weather Center to forecast air movements to assist sampling operations.86 The Soviets made no structural proposals of this kind.

86 DNT/22/Rev. 1, July 7, 1960. Other provisions of this document were amended later in the year.
In regard to the phasing of system installation the most serious East-West differences concerned numbers of land control posts in various areas and the timing of their installation. The Soviets objected to the Western proposal for 20 posts on Soviet soil, and to the absence of control posts in the Southern Hemisphere during Phase I of the Western timetable. The Soviets proposed 15 posts on their own soil and 20 in the oceanic islands of the U.K. and U.S. in Phase I.87 Under the final Western offer of 1960 Phase I was divided into two subphases of two years each, and there would be 20 oceanic island posts in Part A of Phase I. However their location was not specified. The posts on the metropolitan territories of the original parties would be installed in two subphases in order to permit on-site inspections before the end of the first two years.88

Under the Soviet proposal there probably would have been no on-site inspection before the end of Phase I.

Inspection groups may be formed as required on completion of the construction and entry into operation of the control posts of Phase I.89

87 DNT/104.
88 DNT/105.
89 DNT/104.
The West had proposed that the groups be 'established from the beginning of Phase I'.

The two sides adopted conflicting positions on the question of technical criteria to determine whether a seismic event should be eligible for on-site inspection. Although it is difficult for a non-specialist to grasp the issues, it is clear that the Soviet criteria were intended to minimize the number of seismic events eligible for inspection while the West was anxious to maximize the number to a point where no events which could conceivably be nuclear explosions would be ineligible. East and West also wished, respectively, to minimize and maximize the area which would be subjected to inspection.

Thus the East insisted that 'an event may be regarded as suspicious and subject to inspection only if it is located by control posts...within an area up to approximately 200 square kilometres'. Other criteria had to be also satisfied if an event was to become eligible, and any inspection team sent to the site of a suspicious event would be restricted to an area of 200 square kilometres. The West was opposed to the Soviet location rule being a criterion, and proposed that

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DNT/105.

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PV.172, February 16, 1960, p. 3.
an area of 500 square kilometres should be eligible for inspection if data from control posts were inadequate for locating the epicentre of an event within a 200 square kilometre area.  

The West's article on inspection groups permitted 'low altitude aerial inspection of the site of the [suspicious] event'. Inspectors could employ photography, infrared survey, and other techniques around the selected area, and would be permitted to conduct 'drilling for radioactive samples'. The East made no proposals on these matters.

Annex II concerned privileges and immunities for representatives of the parties and for system personnel. It was informally agreed with minor exceptions. Among other rights it

established, for representatives, the right to import free of duty their furniture and effects at the time of first arrival to take up their posts.

Test ban proposals are less open to the charge of vagueness than other arms control proposals.

Annex III on the Preparatory Commission was formally adopted on November 30, 1959. The Preparatory Commission

\[92\text{ DNT/22/Rev. 1, July 20, 1960.}\]

\[93\text{ DNT/22/Rev. 1.}\]
was to operate from the signing of the treaty by original parties until the election of a Control Commission. It would be composed of one delegate each from the Three. Until the Three had ratified the treaty it would, *inter alia*, make preliminary studies of 'location, installation and equipping' of components of the Control Organization, draw up staffing regulations and invite applications for posts, and arrange the first Conference.\(^{94}\)

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What remains to be said about the military worlds implied by the test ban proposals of East and West at the end of 1960? The common feature of these proposals is clear - they would have divided the world militarily into nuclear sheep and non-nuclear goats had they been widely accepted.

Under the jointly agreed treaty terms Nth powers which became parties could only have attained nuclear status by transfer of weapons from a nuclear power (which was not forbidden). While the agreed parts of the treaty expressed the joint interest of the original nuclear Three in stopping

\(^{94}\) DNT/15/Add. 18.
the spread of nuclear weapons, the Three also proposed to dominate administratively and politically the arrangement which was going to work for their interests. The Three proposed: permanent seats for themselves on the Control Commission; a long list of questions requiring original party unanimity; a large element of 'sides' or reciprocal inspection among themselves; and a dominant position for their experts and administrators in the control organization headquarters. The Soviets even proposed that two thirds of the staff for control posts and on-site inspection groups on the territory of non-original parties should be nationals of the Three.\footnote{DNT/92, June 20, 1960.}

Where the proposals of the Three diverged, conflict of their interests and ideologies lay clearly in the background. In fact, they were wholeheartedly agreed about only one thing, that all tests should stop.

For the Soviets, agreement to any measures of international control was a concession - both in principle, because of Soviet dedication to 'sovereignty', and in practice - because of cherished Soviet secrecy. From time to time between 1958 and 1960 the Soviets threatened to return to their pristine line, that international control
was not necessary. 'After all' said the Soviet delegate, Tsarapkin, to the Western press in November 1959, 'when we let off a bomb...you know about it.'

For the United States, to permit a ban on any tests, no matter how small, which could not be reliably detected and identified, was ideologically repugnant, and may have seemed militarily dangerous. The implications of the U.S. proposal for a moratorium are interesting in this connection. Under this proposal the West would inspect on the site in the Soviet Union a certain proportion of suspicious seismic events above magnitude 4.75 each year during the moratorium. According to the logic of the American proposal, even if the theory and technology of detection and identification had improved during the proposed seismic research program the threshold would not have been abolished at the end of the moratorium, but merely lowered. Parties would then have been free to resume testing below the new threshold unless yet another moratorium was agreed to. The Experts in 1958 had reported that their system would detect five kiloton explosions underground reliably: they did not report that clandestine tests of under five kilotons were militarily insignificant. According to Ciro Zoppo the original goal

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96 See The Times, November 17, 1959.
of the Western experts was a system with a 90 per cent chance of detecting a one kiloton explosion; later in the conference a 90 per cent chance of detecting a five kiloton explosion was deemed satisfactory. However at the political conference, after the Experts' conclusions had been called in question, United States negotiators never said that it would be tolerable for any tests to be undetectable by the control system.

Hanson Balwin had this to say about non-clandestine underground testing in 1963:

Practically, most underground tests are limited to small yields, usually a few kilotons, because of the extensive excavation required. Instrumentation permits collection of data about the explosion itself and its efficiency, and some limited data about the effect the heat, blast and radioactivity may have upon structures or weapons. Scientists can then extrapolate or calculate on the basis of the data gained what a larger explosion might do.

It seems clear that the effect of nuclear explosions on communications and on ballistic missile warheads, for example, could not be effectively tested underground.

What would have been the significance of Soviet tactical weapon tests of a 'few kilotons' in 1960? Brennan and Halperin believe that even a five-fold improvement in weight-to-yield ratios would not be 'militarily significant, whether achieved by both sides, neither side or one side only'.

Presumably improved fission 'triggers' for exploding fusion weapons could be developed clandestinely, but, as Baldwin implies, tests of fusion devices themselves would be ruled out because of the size of the seismic signal resulting. In 1960 U.S. fusion weapons already had been tested in which the fission 'trigger' was responsible for only five per cent of total energy release. The Russians seem not to have tested such 'clean' weapons by 1960, but clean weapons are chiefly of humanitarian interest. Pure fusion weapons were not feasible in 1960, and are not in 1963.

Apart from the low military 'pay-off' for a mature nuclear power in 'illegal' underground testing, there would always be an element of risk - from defection, miscalculation or inadequate secrecy - to deter it. As hinted above, the United States probably insisted on extensive inspection less from any military calculations than because principles were

at stake. The Soviets probably resisted inspection on the Western scale chiefly because it threatened their interests directly. However, they seem to have exaggerated the threat.

The Russians fear foreign inspection for two distinct military reasons - because it may reveal military technological secrets, and because it may reveal secrets about the size and disposition of Soviet forces and armaments. Western diplomats, attachés, tourists and businessmen have opportunities to conduct both types of espionage in Russia greater than those that would have been enjoyed by personnel at control posts living and working under the supervision of Russian nationals in restricted areas. Western on-site inspectors would have been unable to enter industrial installations, but they might possible have been able to observe military dispositions on a small scale, depending upon where inspectable events occurred. However, they too were to be accompanied by host nationals under both sides' proposals.

The West's complicated on-site inspection proposal would have led to inspection of over 20 (and perhaps many more) areas of 200-500 square kilometres in the Soviet Union. The area of the Soviet land mass is 21 million square kilometres.

Unless the Soviets had cheated on an agreement there would have been no on-site inspections in Western Russia
because it is aseismic. Thus the areas occupied by the bulk of the Russian land forces and I.R.B.M. force would not have been disturbed except by two control posts. However in the rest of Russia the West could have selected which suspicious events to inspect with a view to getting inspection groups to areas of military interest. This helps explain the Russian desire to define criteria for on-site inspections very narrowly.

Since there were to be no regular aircraft overflights over parties' territories under either side's proposals, a virtuous Soviet Union would have had nothing to fear from possible espionage by observers on special flights. In any case the aircraft would have been host planes equipped not for ground observation but radioactive sampling only.

At the conference the Soviets were not challenged in their assumption that there would be perfect transmission to unfriendly powers of military intelligence collected in the course of international inspection, whether inspectors were citizens of unfriendly powers or neutrals. By the end of 1960 no provisions had been put forward for outlawing traffic in military secrets by inspectors, although a Soviet draft article of March 12, 1959, which was agreed informally between the sides, directed the Administrator and staff to 'refrain from any action which might reflect on their status as
international officials'. However both sides agreed that original party nationals appointed to the staff by the Administrator must be 'acceptable' to their Governments. As Lawrence Finkelstein says: 'This arrangement was bound to lead to confusion'.

Finkelstein discusses the merits of an 'impartial' staff, defined as one 'composed... of non-nationals of the major parties'. He believes it would be superior to an 'avowedly national' staff, 'provided adequate arrangements could be made for the unimpeded flow of all inspection data to the participating governments'. In fact it was not laid down in the test ban proposals of either side that information emanating from control posts and inspections should be made available to parties by the Administrator. (In the West's proposal the Administrator was only obliged to notify parties that an event eligible for inspection had occurred, and to inform them of the area eligible for inspection.) In any case it is an advantage of an

100 DNT/73.
102 Ibid., p. 74.
103 Ibid.
104 DNT/96, August 13, 1960.
entirely impartial staff that its members would not pass on as much inspection data to governments as a staff of nationals. Impartial staff could filter out sensitive data not needed to reassure governments. The weakness of impartial inspection is that the sides may not trust 'impartial' inspectors to keep adequate watch on, or reveal suspicious information about, opponent activities. The Soviets seem to be infected with such distrust, and, moreover, they discount the impartiality of 'neutral men'. In order to uphold the principle of parity and the principle of thirds they proposed far less impartial control for the test ban than the West.

In point of fact, Finkelstein's two categories - 'impartial' and 'avowedly national' - do not adequately distinguish between the types of staff proposed by East and West at the test conference. 'Impartiality' is really not just a question of nationality but of whether staff of whatever nationality would be obligated to a major party under the terms of their appointment. Only under the Western provision for the 'third third' of control post staff, whereby the Administrator was to make appointments at his own discretion without consulting the original parties, was a fully impartial staff envisaged. East and West agreed that Deputy Administrators - two from each side -
would be both national and obligated. The East required the first two thirds of control post staffs to be recruited in the same way - that is, 'on the recommendation' of the sides, but the West preferred a more impartial national arrangement whereby personnel need only be 'acceptable' to the two sides.

There is yet another way of analysing test ban inspection arrangements. Both sides proposed elements of 'sides' or reciprocal inspection, elements of self-inspection, and elements of inspection by third parties as part of what they called 'international' control. And, as the Soviets so often stressed, there was already a system of informal 'sides' inspection in existence - the national detection and identification networks for monitoring the other side's tests on a routine basis.

The opportunities for obstruction in the control arrangements would have been an important factor in determining their effectiveness. Fred Iklé distinguishes 'external' and 'internal' obstruction of control - the one caused directly by the host government, the other by host country nationals in the control organs.¹⁰⁵

It is also helpful to distinguish 'legal' from 'illegal' obstruction - that which does not violate the letter of the treaty from that which does. Both sides' proposals would have furnished excellent opportunities for legal obstruction. Both proposed an original party veto over the appointment of the Administrator and much of the staff. Opportunities for illegal obstruction would have arisen chiefly in connection with undertakings for 'co-operation with the control system', by which the host country would provide control staff with survey aircraft, transport, communications and right of passage.

A Note on the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963

Until June 14, 1957, the Soviet Union favoured a total test ban policed by national means. The first Western proposal for a ban under pure national control was the Anglo-American proposal of September 3, 1961 for a three-power agreement 'not to conduct nuclear tests which take place in the atmosphere and produce radioactive fallout'. A ban on atmospheric tests alone had been proposed by President Eisenhower on April 13, 1959, but it was to be

based on 'a simplified international control system for atmospheric tests up to 50 kilometers...derived from the Geneva Experts' Report'. The agreement initialled by the Three in Moscow on July 25, 1963 forbids all non-underground testing, and also any test explosion in any other environment, if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted.

Thus the new treaty in effect sets limits to national inspection in the same way as previous proposals set limits to international inspection. It declares 'illegal' national inspection to be irrelevant. The treaty also indicates that the elaborate international arrangements for radio, acoustic, hydroacoustic, high altitude and radioactivity detection recommended by the Experts and negotiated by the Three for over three years were not strictly necessary. It seems in retrospect that, apart from increasing slightly the chances of detecting tests in above-ground environments, the only advantage of these arrangements would have been the impartial gathering of suspicious evidence. However, even

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under the arrangements agreed at the end of 1960 the control organization could not brand violators or recommend sanctions. Self-help has been a basic ingredient of all test ban proposals.
CHAPTER 3

A GENERAL CRITIQUE OF PROPOSALS

In this chapter the analyses of the two preceding chapters are summed up in three broad criticisms, one or more of which can be brought against all of the arms control proposals dealt with. The viewpoint adopted is roughly that of a partisan of arms control who is indifferent to the outcome of any propaganda struggle over disarmament and pessimistic about an early end to the Cold War. This ideal critic is confronted with the major proposals 1955-60 as a body of working ideas to be evaluated for their usefulness in promoting arms control. His bias is for (1) the detailed proposal against the vague, (2) the moderate against the radical, and (3) the conciliatory against the intransigent.

(1) Vagueness

Proposals need not explain to the last dollar and rifle what disarmament involves; there is a fineness of detail in proposals appropriate to the degree of common ground between negotiating powers. If one side refuses to consider comprehensive disarmament it is futile (at any rate in the
short run) for the other to propose a very elaborate comprehensive scheme. However it is not necessary to reach full 'agreement in principle' to negotiate an issue effectively. The United States did not agree in principle to a test ban separate from disarmament until the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests was nearly three months old.

On the other hand there can be too much detail even in a proposal which leads to agreement. As Schelling and Halperin say, it may be

important to avoid freezing detailed answers to very dimly perceived questions in a document that is supposed to guide the participants in their relations to each other through fairly uncharted territory...\(^1\)

These authors also point out that it is simply impossible to lay down 'an exhaustively explicit agreement, leaving no details subject to subsequent interpretations and misinterpretations, leaving no issues unresolved, leaving no intentions inarticulate, and leaving no circumstances unanticipated'.\(^2\) Because they believe that 'the technical and military details of an arms agreement might be subject

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to very rapid obsolescence', \(^3\) Schelling and Halperin suggest that an 'agreement' should set up procedures and institutions for its own interpretation and subsequent evolution'. We have seen that both sides'test ban proposals provided not only for amendment of the treaty but technical improvement of the control system on the basis of research and development by the control organization itself. It is likely that effective control of more traditional disarmament measures would require constant technical improvement of inspection arrangements; however most proposals do not even suggest amending arrangements.

Proposals may be vague about 'ends' or about 'means'. A full statement of the ends implied by a proposal for arms control must mention not only the levels of armaments, forces and defence spending which would be permitted in a disarmed world or on the way to it, but also any mandatory political pre-conditions, the date by which various measures must be implemented, and the number of powers to be involved. It is clear from the analyses of Chapter 1 that most proposals are more like lists of what is to be agreed than proposals for an agreement. Schelling has written a brilliant paper which incidentally shows that even a numerically fixed

\(^3\) Ibid., p. 87.
armament level is difficult to define with precision. He is discussing the problems of a party to an agreement for a 200-missile ceiling -

Does it mean 200 on the average over a year; or the average over a month; or at any given moment ....If he has exceptionally good luck in the production of replacements..and runs over the ceiling, must he destroy them, or can he impound them and use them at a later date when he's under 200?....Spare parts are significant, both in the possibility of putting an extra missile together... and in terms of how many of the 200 missiles are ready to go....The schedule relating missiles ready to the elapsed time from the decision to fire may depend on the spare parts allowance....there must be some trade-off between the spare parts allowance and the number of missiles. 4

Schelling also points out the significance of the following: weapon components in the production process; weapons out of commission; test weapons; and the rate of replacement of obsolete weapons (if replacement is permitted), and of 'run-down' weapons (if replacement is necessary). 5 To be really precise a missile agreement would have to specify the size and nature of the permitted warhead, and the speed, range, accuracy, readiness, mobility and protection of the missile (which is not to say that it should necessarily


5 Ibid., pp. 204-5.
specify these things). It is true, as Schelling says, that:

If for reasons of cost, technology, geography, or sheer preference, we [the Americans] and the Russians develop qualitatively different missile forces, the inspection problems will be very different on both sides...

It is also true that it would be very difficult to negotiate agreement on characteristics of permitted missiles if the sides' forces were 'qualitatively different'.

If a bare proposal for a 200-missile ceiling is vague, the great power proposals of 1955-6, which called merely for armament reductions 'appropriate to', 'corresponding to', or 'in agreed relation to' fixed levels of armed forces, were much more vague. The negotiating record of parties to the 1932 Disarmament Conference was much superior in this respect. The Western and Soviet proposals of 1957 and 1960 to exchange lists of armaments to be reduced were equally unspecific: no guidelines for the list-makers were laid down.

Proposals to reduce armed forces have in general attempted some precision. In 1955, for example, the West laid it down that 'all para-military forces and all internal security forces of a military type would be included in the armed forces'. The Soviets in 1957 required 'personnel

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6 Ibid., p. 207.
8 DC/SC.1/17, March 12, 1955.
employed by the armed forces of all States in a civilian capacity, but engaged in servicing military equipment and installations to be considered part of the armed forces. Problems of definition would not be abolished by these formulae. As an example of a further problem, consider whether active and inactive reserves should be counted as 'armed forces' in making reductions. If reserve training was permitted, but reserves were not counted as 'forces' there would probably be an 'arms race' in reserve training. If reserves were counted as forces there might be considerable pressure put on reserves to become disguised regulars. If reserve training were forbidden conscription would presumably have to be forbidden also.

Proposals for defence budget reductions 'corresponding' to force or armament reductions may also be vague. We may mention here that budget cuts which were excessive in relation to permitted armaments and forces might encourage disguised military spending. If budget cuts were inadequate or not mandatory there might be a build-up of surplus armament production capacity or intense investment in research and development.

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September 20, 1957.
A distinct kind of vagueness is the frequent failure of negotiators to make clear whether the links between the parts of a plan (or the strings binding the package, if that image is preferred) may be broken or not - that is, whether or not the parts may be agreed and implemented separately. We distinguish 'spatial' links (those which join the parts of a stage) from 'temporal' links (those which join the stages together). The West failed to make its insistence on spatial links clear until the end of the 1957 negotiations; and the Western powers have usually failed to explain whether there were temporal links in plans where it seemed to be implied that there were not. For example, in the Anglo-French three-stage comprehensive plan, March 19, 1956, participants were given a virtually absolute right of refusing to proceed at the end of the first stage. Agreement on later stages need not have been kept. Thus there was little point in the Anglo-French insisting on agreement to the contents of the second and third stages. In fact by 1960 the West was using second and third stage proposals purely as a way of avoiding propaganda pitfalls. First stage proposals were declared to be separable.

As a matter of theory a stage itself may consist of measures which succeed each other in time (the later being
implicitly conditional on the performance of the earlier), and are thus linked temporally. In fact if proposal-makers intend such links they rarely make their intentions clear. One case from each side of the Cold War will suffice here to illustrate this type of vagueness. In the comprehensive partial plan, August 29, 1957, the West provided *inter alia* for a first step in conventional disarmament within one year, and for the 'materials' cut-off within one month of a control system reporting itself ready to inspect the measure. The measures of August 29 were declared 'inseparable', but the proposal failed to say what would happen to the agreement on conventional reductions if the cut-off had not been implemented by the end of the first year. On the other hand, the extension of another measure - the test ban - beyond the first year was explicitly made to depend on the cut-off being implemented.

Soviet plans usually call for stages to be completed within strict time limits, but fail to specify the order in which measures will be executed, and the pace at which each will proceed. For example the conventional disarmament plan, March 27, 1956, called for drastic force reductions 'during...1956-8' and for control posts to guard against surprise attack, but it failed to break down or provide for coordination of either of these measures.
About the ends of disarmament the West was more vague than the East. In what might be called a classically vague proposal, March 19, 1956, Britain and France proposed world-wide three stage force reductions without specifying any force levels at all. The Soviets, on the other hand, were vaguer than the West about the 'means' of disarmament - inspection and control. The vagueness in both cases was of course probably rather studied: it is natural to be vague about something which is expected of you but finds you unwilling.

Neither side ever explained how total nuclear disarmament might be controlled, yet both proposed it. The Soviets proposed the abolition of military research and development in 1960 without in the event attempting to define the activities, much less suggest how laboratories might be inspected to determine whether work was peaceful or not. Soviet control proposals tend to be vague about the definition of key terms such as 'objects of control' (May 10, 1955), and about the means by which a control organ is to know that X-A armaments in fact remain when a declared but unverified level, X, has been reduced by a verified amount, A, and no further inspection is permitted.

It is almost a 'law' of disarmament proposals that the more drastic they are the less detail will be supplied about
them. The test ban proposals are a sort of reproach to all other disarmament proposals. Apart from the fact that the test ban was defined more precisely than any other arms control measure (it virtually defined itself), the lesson of the test ban proposals is that the West, at any rate, will not execute even a very modest measure of arms control without elaborate investigation of its inspection requirements, which must be reflected in control proposals.

The political meaning of absence of detail in proposals is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is worth mentioning that omissions may occur for a variety of reasons - government lack of interest or inertia, a temporary hiatus in policy, unresolved bureaucratic conflicts, despair of agreement, propaganda motives or, perhaps, political distaste (as when the United States fails to propose force levels for China).

(2) Overambitiousness

It can also be argued that disarmament proposals are too detailed, in that it is futile to attempt to get agreement on all the stages of a radical plan before a first step has been devised. Proposals may be judged radical not only because they call for drastic measures, but because of their political, geographical and military comprehensiveness.
A few proposals of the period under study— notably May 10, 1955— called for important political settlements; all radical proposals implied them. All comprehensive plans— both radical and partial— of the period, with the possible exception of the Western plan, August 29, 1957, required or implied wide cooperation of middle and perhaps small powers from the beginning. The Russian plan for conventional disarmament of March 27, 1956 set a maximum force level for middle powers— 200,000 men— which would have required intricate extra negotiations if the Sub-Committee negotiations had succeeded. Even comprehensive first-step plans confined to the great powers might be criticized on the ground that coordination of measures for nuclear and conventional armament, force, and budget reduction among five powers was too ambitious as a start.

It is useful to put the case against proposals for comprehensive and near-universal disarmament abstractly. For example, in arranging arms control between two powers only one military relationship has to be ordered, while there are three separate relationships between three powers, six between four, ten between five, and so on. Of course relationships between allies are— usually— easier to order than relationships between opponents, and not all powers in a multi-power system have military relationships
with each other in practice, but nevertheless the chances of agreement clearly tend to decrease the more powers are to be involved. Similarly the attempt to reach agreement on many rather than a few measures tends to reduce the chance of agreement. On the other hand some powers will not consider implementing some measures unless other powers can be involved, and the West has always argued against conventional or nuclear disarmament as opposed to comprehensive disarmament that it would create an imbalance of forces and accelerate the arms race in the uncontrolled category. However experience of the test ban indicates that agreement between a few tends to generate agreement among many and pressure on the recalcitrant, while we shall see in the next section that limited conventional or nuclear disarmament can be made 'balanced' (in one of several senses) as well as comprehensive disarmament.

(3) Onesidedness

All proposals 'ought' to be self-interested in the sense that they should increase the security of their proponent. However, they are unlikely to be accepted if they decrease or do not improve the security of the opponent - unless, perhaps, they benefit him adequately in other ways. Despite the vagueness of proposals they tend to be self-interested in the undesirable manner. Each
party proposes to dismantle the chief elements of its opponent's power first and its own second (if at all). Of course, negotiation may be a bargaining situation in part - in which case selfishness in first offers is to be expected, but the parties tend to change to a new tack in their policy before they make a satisfactory compromise offer on any given tack.

Many examples of onesidedness have been given in Chapters 1 and 2. What follows is a critique of the most common notions of fairness, especially those which lie behind the disarmament proposals and which constitute what might be called ideologies in the mouths of disarmament negotiators. The tactical use of these notions is discussed in Part Three: here our concern will be with their 'objective' merits. To demonstrate that a proposal is fair in that it promotes some form of military-political balance, however, does not mean that it will necessarily be accepted; we shall see in Part Three: that the most effective proposal may be one which is abstractly unjust but becomes acceptable because of political or military pressures applied by its proponent. And of course governments are not swayed merely by military or political considerations in formulating their disarmament policy. There is a continuing but also varying (and 'asymmetrical') economic incentive to disarm - the welfare incentive.
In the quest for disarmament more security, more welfare, an improvement or guarantee of the nation's relative or absolute power position are all possible goals. Nations' views on the requirements of fairness will vary accordingly.

It is only some national interests of military value that are at stake in disarmament negotiations. Disarmament agreements cannot affect the size of the population, the geography and natural resources or the civilian industrial strength of a nation (unless disarmament in the aftermath of conquest includes industrial plunder, as when the Red Army carried off East German factories to Russia in 1945; or unless disarmament would tend to hamstring some 'peaceful' industry with vital military implications, such as missile exploration of space or nuclear power production). Thus in general countries with superior industrial potential and strategic position rather than usable military power would be advantaged by disarmament. The military 'interests in being' of nations also differ - as for instance when one country relies on a standing army and another on a standing air force to deter opposition. Military interests also fade and change over time, especially in a qualitative arms race where the life expectancy of an operational weapon system may be as little as five years. Missile disarmament will disadvantage the first power to deploy missiles.
The impact of the various formulae with a claim to promoting 'fairness' which we shall consider must be very different upon the various powers and must also vary over time. (It is possible to 'balance unfairnesses' over time. Power A's position might be slightly worsened for one year, Power B's for the following year.\textsuperscript{10}) Nevertheless the application of quite rigid formulae seems inevitable if only to make the disarmament problem conceptually manageable. More importantly, as Schelling has pointed out:

In bargains that involve numerical magnitudes there seems to be a strong magnetism in mathematical simplicity.\textsuperscript{11}

We shall now consider some 'magnetically simple' methods of force reduction and control, mainly as applied in two-power situations, because of their simplicity and because all multi-power relationships can be reduced to two-power relationships.

It must not be forgotten that allies as well as opponents may arm against each other. The French atomic bomb is part of a challenge to U.S. foreign policy although

\textsuperscript{10} It will be recalled that the Soviets argued, in their proposal of September 20, 1957, that they could not agree to remain at a force level of 2.5 million because it disadvantaged them as compared to a 1.5 million level.

not intended for use or threat of use against Americans. Or allies may competitively disarm for welfare reasons - as did European NATO members in the later 1950s. It is significant that only twice in the period 1955-60 did a lesser Western ally feel that the U.S. arms control position threatened its interests. Germany in early 1957 objected to arms control confined to Europe; France in 1958 and succeeding years objected to the test ban. The two negotiations concerned are usually accounted the most valuable and realistic of the post-war period. An alliance of independent powers seems to find agreement easier to reach on general and 'complete' disarmament than any lesser measures - probably because 'g.c.d.' is utopian.

The methods of control and reduction which have a claim to be equitable may be ranged on a scale according to the degree of damage that they involve for the security interests of the weaker party.

Most damaging is a method never proposed at the disarmament talks - numerically equal reductions for all powers. The chief advantage of this method (and of other methods which simply call for reductions) is that it does not require a secretive power to reveal its overall force totals and deployments. The method will tend to be futile unless combined with a cut-off - whether of armament
production or of troop production (recruitment), but if the reduction proposed is small, and if national intelligence has a reliable estimate of the opponent's strength, the method may be safe. It would seem to be an ideal way to begin disarmament with the Soviet Union. In fact the West's comprehensive partial plan of August 29, 1957 did not propose that all nuclear bombs and warheads should be subject to inspection, yet it did propose transfers of fissile materials to peaceful uses nevertheless.

Much less damaging to the weak is proportional force reduction, which, in general, tends to preserve the relative power position of parties. Proportional or ratio reduction may, however, seriously decrease the security of the weaker side if the cuts are too drastic. Students of missile duels point out that the higher the level of forces for a given ratio of forces the less the chance of a successful disarming first strike. The same case may apply against drastic conventional disarmament, but it was not the case urged by the West against the Soviet proposal for a one-third cut of all forces in the early 1950s.

12 ...a limitation on the number of missiles would appear to be more stabilizing the larger the number permitted. The Strategy of Conflict, op. cit., Chapter 10, "Surprise Attack and Disarmament", p. 236.
Rather it was held that any ratio reduction would preserve the Soviet's superior capability for land warfare, which was unfair. Fairness is thus identified with the interest of the weaker, as in Christianity and socialism. But it might be argued, in a quasi-ethical way, that the stronger power has 'earned' its right to superiority under disarmament by its peacetime sacrifice of welfare, and that if the weak power felt its inferiority keenly enough it could increase its forces. A proponent of 'negotiation from strength' in disarmament during the early 1950s might have urged that the Communists would never be interested in anything but proportional force reductions. It was often argued that Western conventional rearmament was a necessary precondition of general disarmament negotiations in those years, and even after the Soviet Union dropped the proposal for ratio reductions in 1955.

Closely related to proportional reduction is the freeze, which has never been proposed except as a preliminary to disarmament.13 Like proportional reduction the freeze may be applied to weapons, forces, or budgets — with different effects on the power balance in each

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13 However the Soviet Union did propose a comprehensive freeze as a preliminary to nuclear disarmament only, in February 25, 1955.
case. Only production points need be inspected for the freeze.

The first method which advantages the weak that we shall consider straddles the 'realist' position (which favours preservation of a ratio) and the 'moralist' position (which favours abolition of inequality). As with progressive taxation, under this method nations are penalized for superior 'ability to pay'. The strong disarm a higher fixed proportion of their forces than the weak. Armies over one million might be reduced by ten per cent; those over two million by 20 per cent; and so on. The Faure Plan of 1955 involved budgetary reductions of this progressive kind.

The moralist position in the West seemed to be vindicated in May, 1955 when the Soviets adopted the Western proposal for two tiers of great powers, each power to be permitted the same force level as the other powers in its tier. Since 1955 whenever either side has proposed specific force reductions the U.S., U.S.S.R. and China have been put in one category and the U.K. and France in another. However it is unlikely that the conversion of the Russians was due to Western moralizing; it should be remembered that the Soviet leadership decided in 1955 and again in later years to reduce ground forces substantially. If one side
plans to make most of the reductions the other side is proposing agreement becomes more attractive.

A special case of the demand for equality is the demand for abolition. There have been proposals for abolition of (a) certain categories of armament, (e.g., nuclear weapons), (b) certain modes of weapon deployment, (at foreign bases, in space), and (c) certain development activities (nuclear testing). Abolition is unfavourable to the nations strong in the category to be abolished except in cases such as the test ban, where the relevant assets (knowledge gained from previous tests) cannot be taken away, and abolition favours the strong.  

As we have seen in discussing the test ban, even the components of international inspection can be quantified, and mathematical formulae can be applied to them. East and West clashed early about the definition of equal treatment at the test talks. The East proposed that East and West should submit to the same number of on-site inspections and should enjoy equal representation in the Control Organization. These proposals meant that two great powers (one of which was the greatest in the world) would have

14 Of course, in disarmament proper, the knowledge how to make missiles, for example, cannot easily be taken away from those who have it, although their missiles can be.
been forced to consider themselves as one. The Soviets succumbed to Western 'technical determinism' (as I have called it) in allowing that the number of control posts in Russia should be determined by scientific and not political criteria, thus marring the consistency of their position. It might be said that the West, too, was inconsistent in demanding greater representation than the East on the Control Commission, but acquiescing in East-West equality on the lesser control organs. Since inspection is far more damaging to Soviet than Western interests, the Soviets may be justified in their conception of equality. The small risk the West would take that the Soviets will cheat under hamstrung inspection may roughly balance the small risk the Soviets would take in permitting this inspection. At any rate it is certain that the less inspection needed for control of a measure the fairer it will seem to the Soviets. Unhappily the Soviet Union has built no aircraft carriers, the abolition of which would seem to be as easy to inspect by national means as a ban on atmospheric tests.

Finally we shall deal with formulae for fair compromises gleaned from a study of negotiating records, 1955-60. There are two logically distinct forms of compromise which we shall call qualitative and quantitative.
One type of qualitative compromise - synthesis - is the combining together of disparate elements from rival plans. Synthesis of course suits a situation in which opponents propose plans on different subject matters; quantitative compromise can only be employed if rival proposals concern the same subject or subjects, preferably related. But when Jules Moch announced the doctrine of synthesis in 1955, its obvious weakness was that great power positions were very different. A major policy change by one or more parties was needed. The Americans favoured an isolated agreement for measures of inspection against surprise attack, while the Russians and Anglo-French still favoured a comprehensive and radical agreement.

Another type of qualitative compromise can be employed when two sides have made conflicting comprehensive proposals on several subject matters. Instead of finding a quantitative compromise between the two positions on the several subject matters, the negotiators can adopt one side's proposals on some subjects and the other side's proposals on others. In the test negotiations several complicated bargains of this kind were offered.

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15 See DC/SC.1/PV.53, August 31, 1955, in Cmd. 9651, p. 701.
16 For example, on December 14, 1959, the Soviets dropped their demand for a veto over the budget in the Control
Quantitative compromise is of course never possible unless nations have made proposals on the same subject or subjects. After proposing a quantitative compromise on a subject negotiators often call for an equal step towards agreement by the opponent, but of course this method is bound to advantage the side which makes the most extreme demands in the first instance, as will compromise which halves the difference between rival positions. Despite the obvious inadequacies of these formulae for quantitative compromise and of the methods of qualitative compromise outlined above, it seems that effective negotiation is impossible without the use of simple methods of compromise because of the tendency for expectations to coalesce around them.

Commission, and agreed to the Western proposal for staffing of control posts by thirds, provided that the West agreed to a 3-3-1 composition for the Control Commission.

- Statement by Tsarapkin, GEN/DNT/PV.148, pp. 6-14.
APPENDIX

A CLASSIFICATION OF PROPOSALS

This appendix provides a method for schematic classification of the major proposals and components of those proposals for the period 1955-60. Some proposals made by authorities other than the great powers are included for completeness. The terminology recommended is derived chiefly from the best negotiators' usage.

Three ways of classifying proposals are employed.

A. Type of Control

1. Limitation of Research and Development. (This was specifically proposed in the Soviet plan, June 2, 1960; it would be an indirect effect of the test ban.)

2. Limitation of Testing. (E.g., of nuclear warheads, long range rockets.)

3. Limitation (Freeze) of Material and Weapon Stockpiles, of Forces and of Military Budgets.

Strictly speaking, a freeze is possible without a cut-off - weapons might be replaced at the same rate as they are being scrapped. However, it is usually proposed or assumed that the cut-off of weapon production will accompany

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any freeze. The 'cut-off' or control of production of forces - i.e., of recruitment - has never been proposed except in radical plans.

4. Reduction ('Disarmament') of Forces, Armaments, Materials and Budgets.

Formulae for effecting reductions were discussed in Chapter 3. It should be noticed that the setting of force levels will not mean reduction if some party has a level already lower than the one proposed. (E.g., the Western proposal, June 27, 1960, provided for first stage force levels of 2.5 million for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. In 1960 U.S. forces were below this figure, Soviet forces above it.)

Reduction of armaments may involve either destruction, storage in depots or conversion to peaceful uses. Reduction of budgets has been separately proposed twice - in the Faure Plan of 1955, and on March 27, 1956 when the Soviet Union proposed 'to reduce the military budgets of States by up to 15 per cent as against their military budgets for the previous year' in isolation from disarmament measures.

5. Limitation of Disposal (Embargo, Ban on Transfer, Controlled Transfer.)

These methods of control may be applied to materials

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17 See August 29, 1955.
and techniques as well as weapons. (E.g., the partial test ban treaty of 1963 required parties 'to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in' nuclear tests in the controlled environments. The Soviets proposed a ban on transfer of nuclear weapons in September 20, 1957. The West proposed in August 29, 1957 a ban on transfer except where 'armed attack has not placed the party in a situation of individual or collective self-defence'.

6. Limitation on Deployment. (E.g., arms control in outer space; nuclear free zones; abolition of foreign forces and bases; abolition of extraterritorial atomic overflights.)

7. Limitation of Use. ('Moral Disarmament') (E.g., non-aggression pact, alliance (?), ban on use of atomic weapons, ban on first use, ban on first use except in self-defence.)

8. Monitoring and Notification. (E.g., of weapon tests, troop movements, activity at bases, etc.)

Monitoring and notification have been frequently proposed for safeguarding against surprise attack.

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B. Type of Armament Involved

1. Conventional Disarmament.

2. Nuclear Disarmament. (Control of nuclear delivery vehicles may be specially provided for.)

3. Biological and Chemical ('B and C') Disarmament.

4. Comprehensive (General) Disarmament.

Comprehensive is nuclear plus conventional disarmament, often proposed together with safeguards against surprise attack, arms control in Europe, the test ban, and other measures.

Comprehensive plans may be either:

(a) Partial\(\text{\textsuperscript{20}}\) - involving moderate nuclear control, less than 50 per cent conventional disarmament and no B and C disarmament.

(b) 'Complete\(\text{\textsuperscript{21}}\) - involving total nuclear (and chemical and biological) disarmament together with conventional disarmament to the point where forces are supposed to be adequate for internal security purposes only. ('General and complete' disarmament is always also 'universal' - it is proposed for adoption by all, or all 'militarily significant'\(\text{\textsuperscript{21}}\)

\(\text{\textsuperscript{20}}\) Isolated proposals such as budgetary reductions, a nuclear free zone and the test ban have also been called 'partial measures'.

\(\text{\textsuperscript{21}}\) This word should remain in quotation marks.
states. The word 'general' is sometimes used as though it could do the work of both 'comprehensive' and 'universal'. This is surely unreasonable.22)

C. Number of Powers and/or Geographical Area Involved

1. Number of Powers.

(a) Two. (E.g., the Eisenhower Plan on surprise attack.23)

(b) Three. (E.g., the initial stages of the test ban.)

(c) Four. (U.S.S.R., U.S., U.K., France; e.g. the first stage conventional reductions of the Western plan, August 29, 1957.)

(d) Five. (The Security Council's veto-wielding powers, where 'China' is, presumably, People's China. First stage conventional reductions in most comprehensive plans apply to the Five only.)

22 For example Nosek, the Czech delegate to the Ten Nation talks, on March 17, 1960 declared:

The term general disarmament means that disarmament measures include all States.

He went on:

"General disarmament" means further that it includes all armed forces and all weapons.

- TNCD/PV.3, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 50.

Khrushchev's original General Assembly proposal of September 18, 1959 called for 'complete and general disarmament by all States'. On Nosek's interpretation 'by all States' would be a redundancy in Khrushchev's formulation.

23 See August 30, 1955.
(e) Ten. (The members of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament were to accede 'in the first instance' to a first stage of 'initial and controllable measures', according to the U.S. proposal, June 27, 1960.)

(f) 'States having a significant military potential'. (E.g., U.S. comprehensive plan, April 3, 1956.)

(g) 'All states'. (E.g., Western plan, March 8, 1955. Soviet plans for radical disarmament usually imply the participation of all states.)

2. Area. Geographical areas for which separate arms control agreements have been proposed include:

(a) Germany. (E.g., Soviet proposal for nuclear-free Germany in March 27, 1956.)

(b) Central Europe. (E.g., the Eden Plan for joint inspection, July 21, 1955.)

(c) Balkans. (E.g., Soviet proposal for 'the erection in the Balkans and the region of the Adriatic of a zone free of atomic and rocket weapons', June 25, 1959.)

(d) Europe. (E.g., Soviet proposal for reductions in the European forces of the Four, in September 20, 1957.)

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(e) Middle East. (E.g., Soviet proposal for 'a zone of peace, free of nuclear and rocket weapons', January 21, 1958. 25)

(f) Arctic. (E.g., U.S. proposal for Arctic inspection zone, April 28, 1958. 26)

(g) Antarctica. (The 13-power Antarctica Treaty of December 1, 1959 provided that the area 'shall continue forever to be used for peaceful purposes'. 27)

(h) Asia. (E.g., Chinese proposal for nuclear-free zone in 'East Asia and the Pacific region', April 18, 1959. 28)

PART THREE

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF NEGOTIATING PRESSURE

"It's really dreadful," she muttered to herself, "the way all the creatures argue. It's enough to drive one crazy!"

The Footman seemed to think this a good opportunity for repeating his remark, with variations. "I shall sit here," he said, "on and off, for days and days."

— Alice's Adventures in Wonderland
INTRODUCTION

A GENERAL THEORY OF PRESSURE FOR ARMS CONTROL

The most signal failure of the analysts of disarmament negotiations, and perhaps of the negotiators themselves, is that they have not fitted proposals and negotiating tactics into a theory of the military-political relations between participants. Schelling and Halperin have shown the identity of aims that a particular nation may have in both arms control and strategy;¹ a theoretical enquiry not yet attempted is to estimate the pressure that arms proposals, arms policies, military strategy and political strategy exert on the negotiating opponent. What follows is a theory of pressure in negotiation for arms control. Without the context of a theory of all relevant pressures in negotiation the study of 'proposal pressures' and 'conference pressures', which follows in later chapters, cannot be seen in perspective.

The pressures that nations bring to bear on each other in connection with disarmament are far more diverse than is

¹ Strategy and Arms Control, op. cit.
commonly realized. 'Disarmament of opponents' sums up the most important aim that any foreign policy can have. This may be achieved in whole or part by political victory, by military threats based on superior armament, by war itself, by disarmament agreements, or by some combination of these things. The aims of disarmament negotiation, armament policy and war are identical in so far as the military impotence of antagonists is the most valued outcome. If a nation cannot weaken its opponents; if indeed the degree of its own weakening is at issue - nevertheless, armament, disarmament and war policies may all be relevant in averting a needlessly disastrous shift in power relations. War itself is 'compulsory disarmament' of the opponent; participation in the arms race causes the disarmament of the opponent indirectly, since he must retire his obsolete and worn-out weaponry in order to remain competitive. In both cases there is much pressure but little argument and cooperation. Arms control is diplomacy first and then organized cooperation, but it is also a continuation of war and the arms race by other means, or, rather, these may and to some extent must promote its purposes, and it theirs.

If the mutual destruction of forces in the course of war is a little like partial disarmament (perhaps accompanied by an intensified arms race), then the total
success of one side results in something like general and complete disarmament of the other. This result is commonly brought about or sealed by treaty, and a surrender treaty is in part a disarmament agreement—either completely unilateral, as in the case of Japan in 1945; or with a promise of multilateral disarmament to follow, as at Versailles in 1919. For our purposes war may be regarded as one type of maneuvering in order to obtain as favourable arms control terms as possible. Except in total war (which under modern conditions could produce involuntary general and complete disarmament) the factor of bargaining and negotiation is important: easy terms may permit the wasteful exercise of war to be called off; hard terms may indefinitely delay agreement. Maximum violence in the prosecution of war is not necessarily conducive to early agreement. Restraint may be politically valuable. It has often been argued that the appalling Allied attacks on German cities in 1944-5 hardened the popular will to resist Allied surrender terms, just as the terms themselves are commonly supposed to have delayed agreement.

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'Arms control' after limited war may be merely an agreement to suspend attempts to push forward the area of military occupation. Korea and Vietnam come to mind.
There is even less threatening and promising (bargaining behaviour) in most arms races than in war, and they are less likely to 'end' in an arms control agreement, but once again arms policy not only causes the involuntary, semi-compulsory disarmament of the opponent, it may also be employed in the service of obtaining desired forms of arms control. As in war, restraint or increased pressure may have political value or not, according to circumstances. An increased tempo of armament production by A coupled with a demand for disarmament may decide B either to try to keep up with A or to accept inferiority, depending on B's political and economic calculations and A's terms.

In general arms races are disadvantageous and nations feel impelled to limit or abolish them for three reasons - they are an economic drain, and they involve both physical and political danger. All powers except those enjoying overwhelming military superiority and those with virtually no arms to bargain away must at least consider arms control because of the pressures generated by the arms policies of opponents. Such consideration will be influenced by estimates of what military power the opponent has in the present, what he may have in the future and, in particular, by what he is planning or threatening to have in the near future.
Decisions on 'military magnitude' - the size of the defence budget and force levels - generate pressure for comprehensive disarmament. The details of arms policy - decisions on the number of military missiles to be produced, or whether nuclear testing will be suspended - may generate pressures for particular items of arms control, such as a missile freeze, or a test ban. One nation's arms policy may influence the other's in a desired direction before there is an arms control agreement - as did the Soviet suspension of tests in 1958, which led to a Western suspension in the same year. However it is arguable that there would have been a test ban earlier if both sides had gone on testing instead of stopping for nearly three years.

Before we come to conventional arms control diplomacy we should consider the relation of the pressures generated by political conflicts and crises to arms control. These are generally overlooked. From our point of view Cold War disputes are conflicts about the location or size or loyalty of armed forces. Each side opposes the other's stationing of troops on foreign soil, its build-up of the forces of disputed countries, and its alliances which press lesser countries into hostile military service. Each side's demands are demands for arms control, although only the East habitually includes them in disarmament proposals. (I have
called the negotiated dissolution of military blocs part of arms control. But of course the effect of Cold War demands is to keep the level of armaments high. Arms control - local or general - would be likely to follow if one side either withdrew some of its demands or decided to acquiesce in the demands of the other.

Crisis are created by peremptory demands backed by threat of force; here we find usually not just demands for disarmament but promises to execute it. Sometimes the disarmament proposal is kept in the background - as when the Soviets call for a 'free city' of Berlin and play down their demand for the withdrawal of the Western garrison. However the disarmament demand may be sent naked into the world, as when President Kennedy called for withdrawal of Soviet nuclear delivery vehicles from Cuba in October 1962, and backed the 'proposal' with strong explicit and implicit threats of force. This was a conventional proposal in so far as Kennedy offered to impose a limitation on American forces in return for the withdrawal of the Soviet weapons.

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3 See Part Two, Appendix.
4 The explicit threats forbade only the further import of weapons into Cuba.
However his promise not to invade Cuba was conditional on inspection of the Soviet withdrawal.\(^5\)

This brings us to conventional arms control proposals and negotiations 'proper' (and very proper - and ineffectual - they are in practice compared to some of the activities we have been considering). At this point we shall make a rough distinction, which will be elaborated and modified later, between strategy (proposals) and tactics (negotiation) in arms control diplomacy.

A nation's strategy in arms control may derive its efficacy in promoting agreement from being combined with political and military pressures, as we have seen, but it also will constitute pressure in its own right in so far as proposals for agreement appeal to opponents by comparison with the military worlds to be expected in the absence of agreement. A concession by definition will increase the military appeal of a proposal for opponents. A concession adds to the pressures making for agreement, including those pressures generated by the original proposal.

In Part Two we studied the merits of plans more or less in the abstract; what ought to be stressed here is that the

overall 'appeal' of a plan may depend crucially on how and when and in what context it is proposed; it is always relative. A proposal may be regarded as a way for one side to bring into focus the disparate pressures which are pushing opponents in the direction of agreed arms control. Proposals are invariably presented as promises: 'Disarm on my terms and you will enjoy the following benefits...' But it is equally legitimate to regard a proposal as an implied threat: 'If you do not perform so-and-so, the following deprivations will ensue for you...' 

We have yet to consider conference-room behaviour as a separate pressure for arms control, but we should notice first that it is dispensable; in theory agreement is possible by an affirmative by one side to the other's plan: 'negotiation' might be reduced to proposal-making and acceptance. What can a conference add, in theory?

Firstly, conference enables each side to elaborate and explain its proposals to the other, and to attempt to show that they are in the general interest. In addition, each side may communicate the importance it attaches to the

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6 This is virtually what happened to end the Cuban crisis of 1962, although no document was signed, and the Soviets could not or at least did not make good their acceptance of on-site inspection.
various parts of its plan and the degree of its disapproval of the parts of the opponent's plan. Developments in tactics may thus determine the direction of strategic shifts. Let us call these various types of communication examples of 'intramural pressure'.

Secondly, in so far as conferences are not confidential they may be used in various ways by each side to influence various publics in favour of particular proposals, and in this way increase the pressure on the opponent to accept them. This we shall call 'extramural pressure'. It is taken up in Part Four, Chapter 1, which discusses the propaganda impact of negotiations.

We have now surveyed the pressures - general and particular - making for arms control, and it should at least be clear that 'disarmament' is not one thing. Unless one makes idiosyncratic assumptions it is simply absurd to say that 'X does not want disarmament', or that 'Disarmament assumes...', or that 'Disarmament involves...', as in so much (usually hostile) discussion of the subject. A convenient way to summarize the discussion so far is to list the bargaining assets relevant in disarmament negotiation:

Proposals, in so far as they are revealed, also exert extramural pressure, of course: more than negotiations in some cases.
it is because these are unequally distributed and very diverse in nature that possible disarmament agreements themselves differ so greatly.

The core of these assets is military forces and armaments in being; but plans, possibilities and threatened developments are (intangible) assets too. Secondly, willingness to run risks by threatening the use of armaments is an 'asset' - as we saw in discussing the Cuban missile crisis, and so is the maintenance of a continuing politico-military challenge to an opponent in disputed areas. Finally, a nation's strategic position in war is a potent bargaining lever in determining arms control arrangements for peace, among other matters.

Several qualifications and distinctions flow immediately from this general statement. Firstly, in a sense there are no 'objective' assets in negotiation for arms control: the nation's assets are what the opponent thinks they are. He may err - by being bluffed, or by underestimating - and suffer for his error. It is fairly easy for closed societies to attempt bluff about some components of their existing armed strength - such as numbers of missiles and troops; it is open to all nations to 'bluff' about their future intentions and prospects in the arms race. In fact in the years under study the West
seems not to have attempted bluff of any kind, while the East has persistently since 1957 exaggerated its present and projected long range rocket strength - both at disarmament negotiations and elsewhere - with some impact on Western thinking, at least until 1961. On the other hand the East has consistently denied the higher Western estimates of its overall force level.

Secondly, the value of assets in any negotiation is relative. It depends both on what assets the particular opponent has, and on the issue under discussion. Let us consider a negotiation for missile disarmament. Other things being equal, if one side to the negotiation has no missiles, and especially if it has shown little ability to produce them, an opponent which has missiles will be virtually able to dictate terms, at least for the short run. If both sides to the negotiation have considerable missile forces both will probably have to compromise for agreement. So long as negotiations concern only long range missiles it will be difficult for a nation strongest in ground forces to bring this strength to bear in the negotiation. A credible threat of increased aircraft production would be more useful as an asset.

Thirdly, a basic distinction must be made between assets which are negotiable and those which are not. The line
of this distinction will vary according to the proposal being made, but some assets are not negotiable at all in conventional negotiations. In the missile example above, bomber aircraft were not negotiable, although they would become negotiable in a negotiation about curbs on the means of strategic delivery. Even in negotiations for general and complete disarmament such factors in the power balance as geography, population, industrial potential and morale - while of key importance in bargaining - could not themselves be bargained away. However some of these factors would become 'negotiable' if the side possessing them decided upon backing its proposals with risky behaviour - war or threats of war.

Fourthly, one asset not immediately apparent as such is the intrinsic appeal of certain types of proposals - those that have a quality of simplicity, obviousness or apparent fairness. Of bargaining in general Schelling has written:

It often seems that a cynic could have predicted the outcome on the basis of some "obvious" focus for agreement, some strong suggestion contained in the situation itself, without much regard to the merits of the case, the arguments to be made, or the pressures to be applied during the bargaining.
Furthermore:

...it often looks as though the ultimate focus for agreement did not just reflect the balance of bargaining powers but provided bargaining power to one side or the other.8

We have seen in Part Two, Chapter 1 that the call for round numbers, proportional reductions, equal treatment, abolition and total suspension are common characteristics of the more radical proposals, but it would be difficult to say whether East or West has improved its bargaining power by its choice of radical proposals. In the test negotiations, however, a judgment may be possible. It appears that the most preferred Soviet position, first put forward strongly in early 1957, was 'Ban all tests without [international] control!' The preferred American position seems to have been that reached early in 1959: 'Ban all tests that can be controlled!' Both these positions had simplicity superior to earlier test ban proposals, but most underground tests could not be controlled by national means and many could not be controlled even by international means. The American position, moreover, involved a complicating distinction between underground tests above and below the 4.75 seismic threshold. The

8 Strategy and Conflict, op. cit., p. 68.
partial agreement of 1963 which banned all (or nearly all) tests which can be controlled by national means may be regarded as a compromise sharing in some respects the simplicity of the preferred positions of both East and West.

It is worth stressing finally, once more, that the assets of the parties to a negotiation do not closely determine the pattern of bargaining. In any negotiation there will be an infinite variety of ways of manipulating assets, even leaving aside the use of war and war threats. One side may offer disproportionately sharp cuts in its own strength to induce agreement, or threaten a sharp increase in its arms production unless the opponent agrees to an unfavourable balance. Or agreement may be induced by one side's proposing minimal inspection in order not to compromise its opponent's intelligence advantage unduly. If we consider the test ban we can underline sharply the point that willingness to abstain from doing something one has not done while being in fact able to do it may be a key bargaining asset. France's chief asset in test ban negotiations with the Three would be her clear ability, willingness and need to continue testing. Once she had conducted extensive testing her bargaining position would be much weaker because suspension would no longer so strongly favour her opponents' interests.
The strategy of a negotiating power in its narrowest sense would be its negotiating aims, defined as the achievement of certain military worlds through arms control. Negotiating strategy in its wider meaning would involve the conscious coordination of grand political and military policy to promote arms control aims. This was discussed in the preceding Introduction. The determinants of negotiating strategy were also hinted at there; a complete 'dynamics of proposal-making' would take us too far afield, but a word more is offered here.

A nation's negotiating aims may be expected to evolve in accordance with the following factors (which overlap and interact with each other): changes in the existing and predicted technology of war;\(^1\) shifts in the balance of

\(^1\) Such changes will not necessarily affect the formulation of very general proposals: for example, proposals for 'armament reduction'.

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power; changes in one's own and the opponent's political and military strategy; the pressure of domestic interest groups and domestic and foreign opinion for or against particular kinds of arms control; changes of calculation about the effects of particular measures; and so forth.

It should be noticed immediately that proposals may not represent 'real' aims accurately or at all. Nations have aims apart from agreement (or immediate agreement) when they send proposals into the world. Proposals may be designed primarily to promote various propaganda objectives, some of which are not connected with arms control at all,\(^2\) and since nations are expected to take positions on questions concerning which they have not decided their position, or on which they do not - perhaps for the moment - wish to take a position, it is only to be expected that negotiations will be always clogged with pseudo-proposals. Nations have overlapping 'action' and 'declaratory' policies in arms control as well as military strategy, and the sifting of the two is difficult in both cases. We shall see that the revelation of real negotiating aims and final-offer positions poses important tactical problems.

\(^2\) See Part Four, Chapter 1, "Propaganda and Political Warfare Theories".
In Part Two we studied the military implications of important declaratory policies for arms control in the period 1955–60. 'Suspension of disbelief' was practised there for reasons given in the Introduction to Part Two. To avoid undue complication we shall once again assume that proposals are meant to be accepted, and enquire into the first principles which we should expect to govern strategic decisions in arms control. We distinguish four key questions which strategic decision must answer.

1. Which proposal(s) should one sponsor and for how long? (What attitude should be adopted to one's former proposals?)
2. Which parts of a proposal are essential, which dispensable? (What concessions will be made if necessary?)
3. Should one support one's allies' proposals, oppose them, or reconcile differences before negotiating?
4. How much of the opponent's proposal should one reject? How much accept? (Accepting part of an opponent's proposal may amount to making a separate proposal.)

Let us discuss each of these problems in turn.

1. The most general pattern perceptible in proposal-making is that most nations most of the time have a 'preferred' proposal - usually some variant of 'general and complete disarmament', plus a series of 'second-best' proposals of
which one or two will be negotiated very vigorously from
time to time or perhaps for a long time - as with the test
ban.

The Russians, perhaps because they have always
negotiated in the absence of allies or in the presence of
subservient allies, have usually managed to keep more
proposals afloat than the Western Three combined. However it
has proved difficult or perhaps undesirable for a power to
press hard for more than one plan at one negotiation. The
Russians did achieve this in 1957 and thereby contributed
greatly to the beginning of separate negotiation on the test
ban.

Proposals are usually put forward as though they might
be permanently open for acceptance by opponents. However
few proposals manage to survive more than a year in their
original form, even though very general proposals are not so
prone to obsolescence as detailed ones. To assign a time
limit to an offer may mean that one wishes to accelerate the
opponent's decision-making process, or that the military
situation will be very different after the time limit expires.
For example, the Kennedy-Macmillan offer of a ban on
'fallout' tests in September 1961 was made at the beginning
of a Soviet test series and remained open for only one week. 3

3 See Part Two, Chapter 2, Note.
2. The wording of proposals may indicate the hierarchy among a nation's goals in arms control, and usually does in Russian proposals, but negotiating tactics are a more refined tool for this purpose. Since assigning priorities is a question of strategy, and deciding when and how to communicate them a question of tactics, we may say that even the way proposals are worded is a tactical question, as is the timing and place of their publication and the timing of concessions. Among strategic moves the 'package deal' is perhaps the most precise way of communicating priorities: the essential part of one's plan is explicitly indicated at the same time that a concession is offered.

3. In the period under study the Soviet Union had one independent ally (China), which showed very little interest in the arms control problem, and several subservient allies, one of whom was permitted to cut a seemingly independent figure (Poland), but none of whom could undermine Soviet policy. Unlike France, China did not publicly oppose a test ban during 1955-60, and apart from somewhat nebulous proposals

for atom-free zones in the Far East, her disarmament diplomacy was confined to general support for Soviet policy, and reminders to the world at large that she had not been invited to negotiations.

...any international agreement concerning disarmament, without the formal participation of the People's Republic of China and the signature of its delegate cannot, of course, have any binding force on her (sic.)

The major Western allies were united for three bouts of negotiation in our period - the early months of the 1955

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6 See, for example, the speech by Lin Chang-sheng to the World Federation of Trade Unions in Peking on June 8, 1960, quoted by the British delegate to the Ten Nation Committee. We support the proposal for disarmament put forward by the Soviet Union. It is, however, inconceivable that imperialism will accept a proposal for general and complete disarmament. The purpose of putting forward such a proposal is to arouse the people...

7 Ormsby-Gore invited Zorin to 'say that he does not agree with the...analysis...put forward in Peking'.


Peking has lately - July 1963 - proposed general and complete nuclear disarmament on its own initiative, thereby moving closer to self-confessed cynicism in disarmament diplomacy than any other power.

7 Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, January 21, 1960, in Documents on Disarmament, 1960, p. 25.
Sub-Committee, the later months of the 1957 Sub-Committee, the surprise attack conference and 1960. The U.S. 'reservation' of positions in 1955 produced disunity which disappeared gradually over two years. The test ban negotiations beginning in 1958 never had French support and especially not after the Western Two broke the link between the test ban and disarmament in January 1959. Unity was based on the initiatives of an informal Anglo-French entente in 1955, on protracted detailed negotiations in the NATO Council in 1957, and on conventional diplomatic consultations in 1960.  

Of course it matters profoundly on what program unity is based. Differences with allies may be 'resolved' by being obscured in a general proposal, by being ignored in a search for 'areas of agreement', or by being compromised - either 'quantitatively' or 'qualitatively'.  

4. The acceptance of the enemy's plan means agreement, but there are degress and kinds of agreement. In our period an opponent's plan was never amended in detail to indicate what was acceptable in it. Once - in September 1954 - the

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9 See Part Two, Chapter 3.
Soviets accepted a Western plan as the 'basis' for agreement, and reproduced many of its major elements in a plan eight months later (May 10, 1955). In the test negotiations the sides gradually adopted the key portions of each other's proposals between 1957 and 1960: the dramatic moves occurred when the Soviets accepted the need for control posts, and when the West cut the link with disarmament in January 1959. Much more usual is a virtually root-and-branch rejection of the opponent's plan: his proposal is represented as being an impossible basis for arms control, and so the question of which details are acceptable hardly arises.

The formulation of strategy for a negotiation is not completed in a day, and it is the prospect and process of negotiations which elicits the detail without which 'aims' are little more than pious generalities. The vagueness of

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11 DC/SC.1/PV.121, June 14, 1957.
proposals may be due to inertia; it may be inadvertent; and it may be tactical. In the last case, the motive may be either to keep the proposal simple for propaganda purposes, or to draw an opponent into negotiations by seeming to accept a cherished proposal of his in principle. We might call an example of an 'enticing offer' the Soviet acceptance of the principle of a controlled test ban in June 1957.

^12^ Witness the reference of the American delegate to the test talks to 'problems of whose existence we were originally only dimly aware [which] have moved to the forefront'.

CHAPTER 2

THE GRAND TACTICS OF THE NEGOTIATING POWERS
AND OTHER PRELIMINARIES

The title of this chapter rests on a distinction between detailed negotiations and negotiation or maneuvering to establish detailed negotiations. The 'preliminaries' include the settling of where, when, with whom and sometimes also how (i.e., by what methods and procedures) and about what to negotiate. These last two issues tend to remain contentious in detailed negotiations. 'Detailed negotiations' for the period 1955-60 are taken to have been the following: the Disarmament Commission's Sub-Committee, 1955-6-7; the Conference of Experts on the test ban, 1958; the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, 1958-60; the conference on surprise attack, 1958; and the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament, 1960. With the exception of the surprise attack conference and the Conference of Experts, all these conferences were charged with drafting an arms control treaty, if possible, (in fact only the tests conference began to do so) and all were the occasion for detailed
negotiation of proposals. The surprise attack conference is included in the list because the Eastern experts treated it like any other disarmament conference and the Western experts' 'technical' findings may be treated as an arms control proposal. In the Conference of Experts the Easterners at first attempted to persuade the Western experts to agree to 'recommend' a test ban to governments, but eventually agreed to merely draft 'technical' findings on the design of a control system - which, however, proved to have profound political implications.

Before proceeding it may be wise to justify the somewhat artificial distinction between preliminary and detailed negotiation recommended above. We shall also note several distinct analytical ways of breaking down the process (negotiation) into units (individual examples of 'a negotiation').

Schelling and Halperin may have the first word:

In addition to the deliberate formal and informal communications (public and private) coordinated by the head of government, there is a good deal of activity designed to impress the other side with the firmness of one's own position, the pressures that one is subject to, and the areas in which one is willing to make concessions.... America speaks to Russia not only through its

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1 See Part Two, Chapter 1, where this has been done.
ambassadors, but through Senators and Congressmen of both parties, through pressure groups and lobbyists, through columnists and scholars.²

(The authors go on to argue that in negotiating 'informal understandings...actions speak loudly', and they mention changes in the defence budget, troop withdrawals and new treaty arrangements.³ My Introduction above gives reasons for believing that action speaks just as loudly in the negotiation of formal understandings.)

The present study is focussed on what Schelling and Halperin call 'formal...communications...coordinated by the head of government'; and in the period 1955-60, in addition to the examples of detailed negotiation already listed, there was debate on proposals for arms control 'coordinated' or actually conducted by heads of government annually in the General Assembly, occasionally in the Disarmament Commission, once (in 1955) and almost (in 1960) twice at a heads of government meeting, and once (also in 1955) at a foreign ministers' conference. Heads of state also corresponded about arms control proposals at intervals during the period. However not only the private activity mentioned by Schelling

² Strategy and Arms Contol, op. cit., p. 80.
³ Ibid., p. 81.
and Halperin but all the non-detailed official negotiation is viewed as a post-mortem on, or as a necessary preliminary to, one or other of the detailed negotiations of the period in this study.

The regular U.N. debates were in fact viewed in this way by most participants. The summit meeting in 1955 was too short (July 18-23) to permit detailed negotiation, and the foreign ministers' conference was, like the summit conference, both brief (October 27-November 16) and charged with negotiating matters other than arms control. As for the summit correspondence, it was never expected to reach a disarmament agreement by post.

For this study I have decided on the 'unit' of negotiation in two different ways. (1) I consider each of the three separate bouts (1955-6-7) of Sub-Committee negotiation and also the Ten Nation talks as a unit. (2) I regard as units each of the two expert conferences on specific issues in 1958, and also the 'political' negotiations concerned solely with the test ban, 1958-60.

If the 'issue' method of analysis is applied to the period as a whole the result is worth noticing. Let us say that there was 'negotiation about' a subject when one side (or both) made a proposal on it. In that case the test ban negotiation began on May 10, 1955 when the Soviets proposed
a ban linked to comprehensive disarmament), continued in 1956, intensified in 1957, and achieved independence in 1958. Negotiations on the prevention of surprise attack continued steadily during 1956-7 after a blaze of interest in 1955 was damped by lack of clear agreement on the meaning of the concept, rekindled to achieve brief independence in 1958, and tended to fade away in 1960.

There were negotiations about comprehensive, 'complete' disarmament in 1955, 1956, 1957 and 1960, and negotiations about comprehensive, partial disarmament in 1956, 1957 and 1960. There was negotiation about conventional disarmament in 1956.

Notwithstanding this continuity of effort in certain fields of arms control, each of the units or bouts of negotiation was set up in the wake of elaborate preliminary negotiation - either 'institutionalized' (e.g., the General Assembly and Disarmament Commission debates), or ad hoc (e.g., the exchange of diplomatic notes which established the two expert conference and the 'political' test negotiations). In one case - the Sub-Committee of 1955 - heads of government renewed with fresh directives (which included new proposals) a temporarily adjourned conference.

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4 Years of maximum activity underlined.
Progress in the test ban negotiations was reviewed by the General Assembly in 1958-9-60, but the greatest impact of the Assembly on the test issue occurred in earlier years - that is, in the preliminary phase of the test ban negotiations.

We shall now examine the tactics employed during the preliminaries by the principal powers involved in detailed negotiation, and will go on to discuss the attempts of other powers - particularly the attempts of neutrals in the United Nations - to influence the major conferees by their behaviour in the preliminaries.

I propose to call the preliminary maneuvers of the principal powers a part of their 'grand tactics' in negotiation. Grand tactics lay down the conditions under which a nation is prepared to negotiate and to continue negotiating 'in depth'. Grand tactics need not be sharply distinguished from procedural tactics inside a negotiation. However, for the sake of simplicity we shall regard the whole of a nation's 'preferred negotiating conditions' before a detailed negotiation, whether insisted on or not, as part of its grand tactics, while we shall regard only those conditions which a nation decides to insist on during a detailed negotiation as part of grand tactics. The
intramural procedural struggle is further discussed in Chapter 3.

Nations usually have both a preferred position and a compromise position in preliminary grand tactics. In so far as a nation insists on certain conditions being met before agreeing to negotiate its grand tactics determine whether or not negotiation will occur, or at least whether the nation's representative will be present if negotiation does occur. Thus a nation's grand tactics may range from the absolutely permissive - if it is prepared to negotiate anywhere, at any time, with anyone, in any fashion, about anything, indefinitely; to the absolutely restrictive - if its conditions are never satisfied. For the first three years of our period negotiations succeeded each other almost as a matter of course. We shall glance at these years first and then show how the composition, content, forum, method and duration of negotiations all became hotly contested issues in the later years.

The Soviet Union voted against the Disarmament Commission resolution establishing the five nation Sub-Committee in 1954; it had previously proposed adding

5 DC/49, April 19, 1954.
6 DC/48, April 15, 1954.
China, Czechoslovakia and India to a Sub-Committee consisting of the U.S., U.S.S.R., U.K., France and Canada. However the Soviets tolerated the Western-dominated Sub-Committee with its 'confidential' procedure (of which, as we shall see in Chapter 3, the Soviets also disapproved) until late in 1957.

Neither side attempted to dictate by threats of non-cooperation what was to be negotiated in the years 1955-7. An almost bewildering variety of proposals was negotiated in 1955 and 1956, and there was substantial agreement for only two periods about the kind of treaty which should be negotiated - towards the middle of 1955 and for most of 1957. But at no time did policy disagreement jeopardize the holding of regular negotiations.

In the First Committee of the General Assembly in 1957 the Soviet delegate attacked the Western-dominated structure and the confidential procedure of the Sub-Committee. He submitted a resolution to enlarge the Disarmament Commission in order to include all members of the United Nations. (Since its foundation the Disarmament Commission had comprised current members of the Security Council only.)

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The new, 'permanent disarmament commission' would, on its formation:

(a) be assigned the task of examining all disarmament proposals submitted to the United Nations and of drafting appropriate recommendations for the session of the General Assembly;

(b) function continuously. The meetings of the commission shall be open;

(c) elect a chairman and vice-chairman, whose task will be to direct the current work of the commission and also to assist States Members of the United Nations in organizing consultation, meetings and the like on disarmament problems;  

Gromyko had announced on the first day of the First Committee's session on disarmament that the Soviet Union wished the Twelfth General Assembly to make 'an effort to reach a specific agreement on one or more separate questions', and he mentioned six possibilities: a test ban, a temporary ban on use of nuclear weapons, reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, limited elimination of foreign bases, a ban on extraterritorial nuclear bases, and an agreement on 'control posts'.  

The Soviet delegation had also taken the unprecedented step of tabling in the First Committee a detailed disarmament plan, September 20, 1957. These Soviet

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tactics may be viewed as an attempt to establish detailed negotiations de facto in the General Assembly in line with the policy of radically enlarging the Disarmament Commission and charging it with primary responsibility for disarmament.

The Western delegations, in their draft Assembly resolutions of late 1957, urged the Disarmament Commission to reconvene the Sub-Committee 'as soon as feasible' for the purpose of drafting a treaty based on the Western proposals in the 1957 Sub-Committee,¹⁰ and they proposed an increase of 14 members, including Western, neutral and Eastern countries, in the Disarmament Commission.¹¹ Both Western resolutions were carried in the teeth of Soviet bloc opposition at a plenary Assembly session, and comprehensive disarmament negotiations languished for over two years after the Soviet bloc boycotted the new Disarmament Commission.

The Soviets launched a campaign for a summit conference on disarmament on February 28, 1958, proposing a list of measures similar to those put forward by Gromyko

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¹⁰ Resolution 1148 (XII) A/3805, pp. 3-4, November 14, 1957.
¹¹ Resolution 1150 (XII) A/3805, p. 4, November 19, 1957. Before passing this resolution the Assembly rejected an Albanian amendment adding seven neutral and communist countries to the Western list of new members.

at the Twelfth Assembly. Pressure for a permanent Disarmament Commission was not relaxed. The United States attacked the Soviets in March for refusing to attend the new Disarmament Commission or to heed the Western call for a 'procedural' meeting of the Security Council 'to lead to an early resumption of disarmament discussions through other channels'. According to the State Department a summit was only acceptable

provided prior preparations indicate that it would result in reaching agreements....

The recent Soviet statement in the field of disarmament of February 28 is hardly calculated to achieve these ends.

The Soviets have frequently tried to raise the level at which governments are represented at disarmament negotiations. The Soviets seem to favour summit meetings (and also public negotiation) in line with their theory (which will be taken up in Part Four, Chapter 1), that the masses can be mobilized to exert pressure for policy changes on imperialist governments. At any rate, in rejecting the Soviet proposal of 1958, the United States was employing the

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14 Department of State Statement, March 15, 1958, in ibid., p. 971.
tactic of making negotiation conditional on either a change of disarmament policy or a change of grand tactics by the Soviet Union.

Pressure for general disarmament negotiation relaxed later in 1958 because of the succession of 'single issue' conferences which occurred. However in 1959 Soviet persistence in rejecting the old Sub-Committee structure bore fruit and general disarmament negotiations were revived in 1960 as a result of an agreement among the U.K., U.S., U.S.S.R. and France, announced on September 7, 1959. The Four had agreed to set up a ten-nation committee which would meet outside the U.N., but would report to it.15

With five Western members (Italy being the newcomer) and five Eastern members (U.S.S.R., Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Rumania), the new committee had the same ideological proportions as the two expert conferences of 1958, whose genesis we shall now study. The tactical preliminaries in these two cases were conducted mainly by means of a summit correspondence and diplomatic notes.

15 Four Power Communiqué on Disarmament Negotiations, in Documents on Disarmament, vol. II, p. 1441. The communiqué was foreshadowed in an announcement at the Foreign Ministers' Conference on August 5 that a new disarmament forum had been discussed. See Department of State Bulletin, August 24, 1959, p. 269.
The idea of an expert conference to study the control of a nuclear test ban originated in the Western delegations to the 1957 Sub-Committee. Ciro Zoppo points out that the expert conference was first conceived as following a political agreement to ban tests, and only later as facilitating agreement on a test ban. General Assembly Resolution 1148 of November 14, 1957 had called for 'groups of technical experts to study inspection systems for disarmament measures on which the Sub-Committee may reach agreement in principle', but the United States wholeheartedly adopted the originally British proposal for expert conferences as a preliminary to a political decision early in 1958.

The Soviets insisted on reaching a political agreement to ban tests in isolation from disarmament before participating in expert discussions throughout 1957 and early 1958. On May 9, 1958, Soviet policy finally changed.

17 Ibid., p. 44.
18 A/3805, op. cit.
19 See, for example, letter from Eisenhower to Khrushchev, April 28, 1958, in Documents on Disarmament, vol. II, p. 1006.
20 See, for example, DC/SC.1/PV.132, July 8, 1957, p. 16.
...in spite of the serious doubts on our part /because of the possible delay in reaching agreement which an expert conference might cause/...the Soviet Government agrees to having both sides designate experts who would immediately begin a study of methods for detecting possible violations of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests.21

The Conference of Experts (July 1-August 21) succeeded. On August 22 the United States professed itself 'prepared to proceed promptly to negotiate an agreement for the suspension of nuclear weapon tests'.22

The Soviet Union agreed to begin political negotiation in Geneva on October 31, 1958, but proposed that:

In order to avoid any protraction of the negotiations, it would be desirable to agree beforehand to limit their duration to a definite period. For its part the Soviet Government proposes that the period be fixed at two to three weeks.23

The United States gently demurred,24 but the Soviet delegation appeared at Geneva anyway.

23 Note from the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the American Embassy, August 30, 1958, in Documents on Disarmament, vo. II, p. 1120.
24 American Note of September 10, 1958, ibid., p. 1126.
Thus the political negotiations followed the expert negotiations almost automatically. When political negotiations began the West had held out for expert talks and had succeeded in committing the Soviet Union to an international control system, while the Soviets had failed to commit the Western Two to suspend their tests permanently before reaching agreement. However the West had agreed

unless testing is resumed by the Soviet Union, to withhold further testing...for a period of one year from the beginning of the negotiations.

However, year-by-year extension of this voluntary moratorium would depend on the control system 'working effectively' and on 'satisfactory progress...in reaching agreement on and implementing major and substantial arms control measures'. In fact, the Western Two unlinked the test ban from disarmament on January 19, 1959, and continued their voluntary moratorium until the Soviets broke theirs in 1961. The Soviets may have calculated in 1958 that to begin rather than to refuse to begin expert and

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25 Statement by President Eisenhower, August 22, 1958, op. cit., in Geneva Conference, p. 310. The British Government made a similar statement on the same day. See ibid., p. 311. 26

See speeches by Wadsworth and Armsby-Gore, in GEN/DNT/PV.37, p. 6.
political negotiations might promote these two desired developments.

The preliminaries leading to surprise attack negotiations in 1958 were similar to those leading to the Conference of Experts. The United States urged a technical approach to surprise attack negotiations in summit and diplomatic correspondence early in 1958.27

Khrushchev agreed in a letter of July 2 that it would be useful if in the near future the appropriate representatives - including those of the military agencies of both sides, e.g., at the level of experts - designated by the Governments of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., and possibly by the governments of certain other states, met for a joint study of the practical aspects of this problem and developed within a definite period of time, to be determined in advance, recommendations regarding measures for the prevention of the possibility of surprise attack.28

The United States replied in a Note of July 31 that experts should make a study of the technical aspects of safeguards against the possibility of surprise attack. They should concentrate on the means and objects of control, and on the results which could be secured from these safeguards.

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27 See, for example, Eisenhower Letter of April 28, op. cit.
The Note went on to attack Khrushchev's proposals on inspection zones, which were still substantially the same as those of September 20, 1957. It concluded:

The United States assumes... that the Soviet Government agrees that these discussions would take place without prejudice to the respective positions of the two Governments as to the delimitation of areas within which safeguards would be established, or as to the timing or interdependence of various aspects of disarmament. ... The United States believes, however, that joint technical studies would make it easier to reach agreement later at a political level on the definition of the regions in which the safeguards would apply.29

In its reply of September 15 the Soviet Foreign Ministry declared that

the assertion... that allegedly the Soviet Government agrees that these discussions should not predetermine the corresponding positions of both governments... has no foundation. Moreover, it is clear that the experts will have to give serious attention to such technical questions as means and objects of control. The Soviet Note went on:

Of course... the experts... will only conduct preparatory work. However, the working out by the experts and practical recommendations on concrete ways to prevent surprise attack will necessitate fruitful examination of the question... at a meeting of heads of Government.30

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Thus both sides approached negotiation with policy differences in plain view and with partially conflicting notions of the tasks of the conference. However, neither was prepared to insist on its view to the extent of making participation conditional.\(^{31}\) The Soviets seemed to agree to the main American proposal on the tasks of the conference, but the reference to 'practical recommendations' and other passages in the Note must have made it clear to the sophisticated Note reader that the Soviets would take a position at the conference.

The U.S. stratagem seems to have been to hint that American policy might be made more palatable to the Soviet Union if the Soviets would agree to engage in 'purely' technical discussions of monitoring systems. It is arguable that both sides should have urged their procedural proposals more forcibly until a workable compromise appeared. The conference which did take place - from November 10 to December 18, 1958 - was hopelessly in conflict about method of work.

\(^{31}\) The correspondence continued, with no change of position on either side, through October and November. Participation was settled in this later correspondence. See Documents on Disarmament, vol. I, pp. 1145, 1213, 1219 and 1222.
The Soviets wished to continue the surprise attack conference after it had met for nearly six weeks despite previously having proposed a time limit of 'four to five weeks' on its work.^{32} On January 10, 1959 the Foreign Ministry proposed a resumption on January 15.^{33} The United States in reply said that 'the experts from the two sides were operating under different terms of reference' and opposed resumption 'until governments had resolved these differences'.^{34} The United States might easily have predicted the conflicting 'terms of reference' in advance. Soviet reasons for wishing to continue the negotiation are not clear.

The Soviet Union itself staged the only emphatic walk-out of the period under study at the Ten Nation talks in 1960. On the ground that the negotiations were 'being used as a cover designed to conceal the armaments race that has been unleashed by the Western Powers', the Soviet delegate withdrew 'in order to place before...the General Assembly the question of disarmament and of the situation which has arisen'. Zorin also promised to raise the

^{32} Note of September 15, 1958, *op. cit.*
^{33} Note, in *Documents on Disarmament*, vol. II, p. 1336.
^{34} Note of January 15, 1959, *ibid.*, p. 1337.
question of 'participation... of some other States' in negotiations. Further negotiation was thus made to depend on Western policy changes and a new structure for negotiations. The walk-out heralded a lapse of almost two years in general disarmament negotiations.

We turn to study the attempts of powers not principally involved in negotiation to influence the major negotiating powers. Although some neutral nations attempted to secure representation in the major negotiating forums and also to initiate detailed negotiations in the regular U.N. organs during the period 1955-60, it was not until 1962 that a number of neutrals were actually seated beside the great powers and able to exert a direct influence on a detailed negotiation. Thus neutral and other 'outside' efforts to promote agreement in the period under study are treated as part of the preliminaries.

In the General Assembly, where the Nth negotiating powers carried on most of their efforts, and also in the Disarmament Commission, the United States could almost always command a majority for a resolution on disarmament.

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35 TNCD/PV.47, June 27, 1960, in Cmdnd. 1152, p. 882.
in the period studied. We shall be dealing mainly with
draft resolutions and other moves which failed to obtain
majority support in the General Assembly or the
Disarmament Commission.

The Disarmament Commission met briefly in November 1955
to review the Sub-Committee's work. At a meeting in January
1956 it ordered the Sub-Committee to reconvene. It had its
longest and most substantive series of meetings for the
period under study in July 1956 when it reviewed the 1956
Sub-Committee's work and heard an Indian submission on
nuclear testing. It prepared a report to the General
Assembly in December 1956. It met for one day in September,
1957 for the same purpose and did not meet again until two
years later when the great powers explained the forthcoming
Ten Nation talks to other Commission members. It reviewed
these talks in August 1960.36

The General Assembly's First Committee debated an
increasing number of arms control topics at increasing
length in every session of the period, usually in October-
November. Plenary Assembly sessions on disarmament were
invariably perfunctory and confirmed decisions taken in
the First Committee with rare exceptions.

36 See DC/PV.s 48-70.
A large part of U.N. debate on disarmament was taken up with evaluating the record of negotiations recently held. Powers which had not been directly involved awarded marks to or subtracted marks from those who had, or self-consciously refused to do either. Apart from Communist bloc members the most vociferous supporter of a superpower was the Republic of China. In 1955, for example, its delegate urged 'first priority' for the Eisenhower Plan on surprise attack, and declared that the Soviet proposal of May 10, 1955 on force levels (which had been borrowed from the West) was inspired by 'malicious political motives'. 37 To the delegate of another small U.S. ally, Australia, in 1957:

It seemed...that the Soviet proposals of November 17, 1956 were loaded and had been contrived either for propaganda advantage or as traps in which to catch the Governments of the free world. 38

This tone in attack was never heard in speeches by Western members of the Sub-Committee.

Most neutral delegates leaned now one way and now another, and made occasional original policy contributions, as will be seen. It was a rare example of a neutral attacking both blocs at once when, in December 1955, the

38 A/C.1/SR.828, January 25, 1957, p. 82.
Swedish delegate criticized the U.S.S.R. for having failed to shift its position since May; and the U.S. for causing 'a deplorable uncertainty in the situation' by reserving its former positions in September. 39

Yugoslavia was the most consistent of all powers in urging compromise among the chief negotiating parties. In 1957, for example, her delegate argued that the General Assembly should itself suggest compromises, and proposed 'partial measures' to be adopted alone or together which would reconcile the blocs. 40 Although carried along on the surge of enthusiasm generated by Khrushchev's general and complete disarmament plan in 1959 to the extent of proposing that it become 'a basis for discussions', the Yugoslav delegate in October 1959 still commended the United Kingdom approach, and continued to urge 'as initial steps' the reduction of military budgets, the transfer of fissionable materials to peaceful purposes and measures of disengagement. 41

These proposals nicely combined favourite Eastern and Western measures. However Yugoslav policy had no successes.

40 A/C.1/SR.886, October 31, 1957, pp. 101-2. The specific proposals were contained in the Yugoslav draft resolution A/C.1/L.180.
India interested herself in many aspects of arms control, but the consistency of Indian disarmament policy lay in a single-minded determination to bring about a test ban. In this it was more original than Yugoslav policy, which simply composed and decomposed great power proposals in novel ways; and also more successful. In 1954 the Indian Government proposed that the Sub-Committee negotiate a 'standstill agreement' on tests pending an examination of controls by the Disarmament Commission. The Soviet Union proposed a test ban 'as one of the first measures' in its proposal of May 10, 1955. India proposed negotiation for a test ban by 'all the States concerned' in December, 1955. The test ban appeared in Western proposals in 1956. The Indian delegate, Krishna Menon, was invited to appear before the Disarmament Commission (India being unrepresented there) in July 1956. He supported Indian proposals for a test ban at length. Test ban discussions came near to dominating the Sub-Committee negotiations of 1957. In the First Committee on November 1, India proposed

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44 DC/PV.58, July 12, 1956, pp. 2-27.
a 'scientific technical commission' to 'dispel...doubts' about the control of a test ban, and called for agreement 'without delay'. 45 This approach brought India between the Eastern and Western positions, although much closer to the East, which favoured a ban, had consented to controls, but opposed a technical discussion.

In 1958 when the Three were on the brink of political negotiations for a test ban, the U.S. delegate, Lodge, paid a unique tribute.

United States policy on the question of nuclear tests had evolved considerably in the past year, and one of the important factors in that evolution had been the United States' Government's respect for the opinions expressed in the United Nations, in particular, the minority views. 46

India had been the acknowledged minority leader on the test ban.

Ireland first tried to secure agreement to prevent the 'further dissemination' of nuclear weapons in 1958. A resolution expressing concern at the 'danger' of such dissemination was passed without dissent by the First Committee on October 31. 47 But a more substantial Irish

45 A/C.1/L.176/Rev.4.
47 A/C.1/L.206.
proposal, amending the eventually successful Western draft resolution, was withdrawn on the same day for lack of support. The withdrawn proposal urged the powers negotiating at Geneva for a test ban not to furnish nuclear weapons to other powers, and called on other powers not to manufacture nuclear weapons while negotiations for the test ban continued.

In 1959 the Irish Foreign Minister, Aiken, proposed a less radical variant of the 'non-nuclear club' in his introductory address to the Assembly. Nations 'in certain restricted areas, particularly...where the interests of the two great-Power groups are entangled' would forego nuclear status.

The non-nuclear nations in such an area would undertake,...not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction.

They would submit to U.N. inspection, and the nuclear powers and all U.N. members would guarantee them from attack 'by means of a standing U.N. force'.

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48 A/C.1/L.207.
49 A/C.1/L.205.
50 A/C.1/SR.969, p. 132.
51 A/PV.805, September 23, 1959, p. 130.
However, the Irish draft resolutions of 1959 suggested that the Ten Nations 'consider...the feasibility' of completely closing the nuclear club. It was passed without opposition in the General Assembly, but the Ten did not take it up. Nevertheless the idea of the closed nuclear club, crystallized by Ireland, was one clear motivation of the test ban negotiations.

Neither Indian, Yugoslav nor Irish proposals would have involved important military changes for those countries themselves, and in fact no 'outside' nations made proposals for ending or preventing or even discussing those local arms races which were habitually overlooked by the chief negotiating powers. Indeed Arab powers resisted fiercely a suggestion for arms control by embargo in the Middle East. In 1955 the Syrian delegate called such a suggestion 'intervention in their Middle Eastern states' domestic affairs'.

What authority had they to deal with the balance of arms in the Middle East, the Far East or any other part of the world...?53

52 A/RES/1380 (XIV), November 23, 1959. France and the Soviet bloc were among the abstainers.
Australian delegates were almost alone in worrying about a local balance of armaments under a disarmament agreement. They repeatedly criticized (in Sir Percy Spender's words) one-sided concern with 'the European-Atlantic region'. But no concrete policy proposal emerged from Australia's worrying.

It was a continuous concern of all U.N. delegates to keep negotiations going, although this had its limits. We have seen above that an Assembly majority voted an enlargement of the Disarmament Commission in 1957 which it knew did not satisfy the Soviet Union.

Neutral nation suggestions on the structure of negotiation were of two kinds - to use the larger U.N. organs for substantive negotiation, and to include neutral representatives in detailed disarmament negotiations organized by the great powers. The Soviet Union sponsored India for the Disarmament Commission and as a participant in detailed negotiations repeatedly, but the West resisted neutral participation in detailed negotiation throughout our period. In 1959, when India had at last become a member of the enlarged Disarmament Commission, she welcomed the proposed Ten Nation talks but declared that 'it would

be open to the Disarmament Commission itself to take an
initiative for studies in various fields of disarmament'. However the Commission did not meet again until the Ten Nation talks had collapsed. It is difficult to see what point such studies could have had while the neutrals remained interested solely in measures of arms control chiefly involving the great powers.

\[\text{DC/PV.65, September 10, 1959, p. 15.}\]
CHAPTER 3

THE TACTICS OF NEGOTIATION

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No sharp distinction is possible between strategy (proposals) and tactics (negotiation, including preliminary maneuver). Apart from the fact that quite formal proposals are often not made formally but left embedded in the verbatim records (this was common at the test ban conference), negotiators also convey details beyond the letter of their proposal by what they say to opponents in negotiation. Negotiation is akin to formal proposal-making in several other important ways. Negotiators should in theory hope by discussion to clarify any obscurity in their negotiating position; to convey what are vital and what marginal interests; and to announce their military and political expectations. Negatively, criticism of the opponent's plan informs him what parts of his plan are acceptable and which not, what must be clarified and what must be detailed. Tactics is the sharp cutting edge of strategy's sword, and even when it is not urging strategy's objectives directly, but waging procedural struggle, discrediting the opponent or educating him (showing him that one has 'reasonable ideas', in
Schelling/Halperin's phrase\(^1\)) - even then, tactics is biding its time and easing the way for a renewal of the direct assault.

The theory and practice of pressure resulting from 'intramural' communication will concern us for the rest of Part Three. The relatively confidential and detailed negotiations listed at the beginning of Chapter 2 have been chosen for special study and for furnishing illustrations. Our task in this chapter will be to collect, classify and in some cases evaluate examples of the techniques by which negotiators seem to believe they can influence each other and each other's governments. In the concluding chapter negotiating tactics are evaluated in more general terms, and some suggestions for improving communication are put forward.

The collection of 'examples' has involved drastic selection from a vast body of materials; nor are the examples fully representative of the material. Apart from personal pleasantries, trivial procedural discussion, and other lesser matters, the body of the chapter contains no examples of patriotically motivated discussions with no bearing on the question of an arms control agreement. For example

\(^1\) *Strategy and Arms Control, op. cit.*, p. 82.
United States negotiators often commended the American role in Atoms for Peace during the Sub-Committee years. The Two swore fealty to peace many times, while the East throughout the period often specifically commended its peaceful policy of unilateral force reductions as an example for the Western powers. The Western powers rarely offered to defend their military policies except when they came under Soviet attack. Nevertheless the United States was frequently involved in defence of foreign bases and her nuclear strategy. Often, of course, defence of or attack on a particular proposal leads to or directly involves defence of or attack on a particular strategy. It is interesting to note that seemingly exaggerated rejection of or adherence to a proposal may be motivated simply by a desire to emphasize and justify one's strategic attitude, as when East and West spend considerable time in heated debate about the timing and merits of a ban on the use of nuclear weapons.

The classification used in this chapter does not stress distinctions (1) between national 'styles' in tactics, or (2) between tactics adopted at the various negotiations (or to promote various types of plan), or (3) between the tactics of 'defence' and 'attack'. It will be well to say a word about these distinctions first.
(1) All the techniques we shall discuss were used by East and West, although in varying proportions. Differences of national approach will be made clear in discussing examples of the use of the various tactics.

(2) Basic tactics vary little from year to year or issue to issue, but of course the nature of the proposal being sponsored and the degree of agreement already achieved predetermine much of the case for a proposal, the gist of attack on proposals of opponents, and whether there will or can be close tactical cooperation with allies. However, part of each side's 'structure of justification' (such as basic Eastern and Western views on control) is virtually permanent; and, again, temporary and specialized pleading will be discussed within the broad categories.

(3) The tactics for the defence of one's own plan either determine or at least imply the tactics of attack on the opponent's plan. The arguments used in attack and defence tend to be similar or identical. When we speak of a 'case for' or a 'case against' a proposal, we must remember that there is a case against the case for, a case rebutting the case against, and so on - _ad infinitum_, in theory. In practice the case against the case for is answered by a restatement of the case for; it is a striking feature of
negotiations that the ability (or desire?) to show empathy towards the opponent's view is very limited.

In the body of the chapter no special note has been taken of the personal factor in negotiation. In the negotiations studied the chief Soviet negotiators were professional diplomats in every case except the Conference of Experts. These negotiators displayed virtually indistinguishable styles. All were capable of rehearsing and elaborating the basic arguments (which were usually set out in Soviet proposals) with few personal idiosyncrasies intruding. Variations of tone and emphasis seem to have been almost invariably laid down in Moscow, usually according to the stage of negotiation reached. Even vocabulary tended to be borrowed from the highest authority, as when Zorin announced at the Ten Nation talks that agreement on general and complete disarmament was 'dictated by life'.

Yet 'expert' Y.K. Fedorov, a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., strove skilfully for several days to have the Western experts recommend an immediate agreement to ban all tests - control arrangements to follow. See Ciro E. Zoppo, Technical and Political Aspects of Arms Control Negotiation: the 1958 Experts' Conference, RAND Corporation, RM-3286-ARPA, September, 1962, pp. 31-2.

TNCD/FV.15, April 4, 1960, in Cmdn. 1152, p. 287.
If we take the vague concept 'personal style' to cover differences of intelligence, emotional make-up and ideological commitment, there were considerable differences between the Western negotiators of the period. None of the chief negotiators of the Western Three was a professional diplomat, although several — notably Jules Moch (1951-60) for France, David Ormsby-Gore (1957-60) and Anthony Nutting (1954-6) for the United Kingdom, James Wadsworth (1954-60), Henry Cabot Lodge (1953-60) and Harold Stassen (1955-7) for the United States — were, or became, experienced in arms control negotiation both at detailed talks and in the regular U.N. disarmament forums. Of these men Moch was the most able as well as the most experienced, showing a keener grasp than his fellows of both the negotiating situation and of a number of military-technical and military-industrial questions raised by proposals. However the quality of British representation was consistently high; the chief of delegation was always a Secretary of State at the Foreign Office in the years under study — a promising young Conservative politician. American

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4 The years indicated refer to both types of experience.
5 See, for example, his intervention on budgetary control, DC/SC.1/PV.56, September 7, 1955, in Cmd. 9651, p. 757; and his exposition of the cut-off, DC/SC.1/PV.131, July 5, 1957, p. 2.
representation, apart from Wadsworth, was less impressive. Stassen and the inexperienced lawyer Eaton, who led the U.S. delegation to the Ten Nation Committee, were forensically mediocre and reticent, by comparison with Anglo-French representatives. Americans in general displayed a more ideological style in negotiation than other Westerners. The contrast can be neatly made by studying two speeches in the Disarmament Commission by Lodge and Moch respectively. At the Disarmament Commission meeting of January 1956, convened to reconvene the Sub-Committee, Lodge urged acceptance of the Open Skies plan in these terms:

By agreeing to this plan...we would at one stroke free the world from the fear of its final war.

Gentlemen, let us face it: The world cannot believe that any nation which truly hates war, which harbours no aggressive intent, which is ready to outlaw surprise attack from any quarter, can fail to open up its skies to this peaceful inspection...

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6 Deputy chiefs of Western delegations at the test ban conference frequently were in charge of negotiation. These were Charles Stelle for the U.S., and Sir Michael Wright for the U.K., who often stood in for Wadsworth and Ormsby-Gore, respectively, during 1958-60. Both were able career diplomats.

7 DC/PV.50, January 23, 1956, p. 20.

8 Ibid., p. 22.
Moch, in a speech later the same year, which drew a tribute to its 'eloquence' and 'mastery' from the Australian delegate, displayed typical intellectual flexibility and patriotic and ideological aloofness in evaluating the work of the 1956 Sub-Committee. He began by remarking, wryly, that

"Mr. Lodge...has pointed out the Soviet responsibilities for the failure of the talks with a vigour sometimes polemical but often convincing."

He went on:

"I should like for the moment to pass over the fact that we each represent a Government, and to recall only that we are all men... and that we are all imbused with the same good faith, and with a common desire to build for peace. Hence, it is with the independence of speech of a plain citizen of an old democracy that I tell you...that we have all committed mistakes or errors in the Sub-Committee."

According to Moch, the Soviet Union should not have separated nuclear and conventional disarmament; the United Kingdom and France should have specified final force figures; and the United States had specified force levels

\[\text{9 DC/PV.55, July 10, 1956, pp. 1-11.}\]
\[\text{10 Ibid., p. 11. M. Moch's speeches frequently elicited spontaneous tributes in all negotiations he attended.}\]
\[\text{11 Ibid., p. 2.}\]
In theory the personal qualities of negotiators are important in several ways, especially in the West where negotiators have always played a considerably policy-making role. Negotiators can facilitate communication between governments and help reconcile negotiating positions because of their considerable knowledge of the negotiating opponent. It seems likely that the personal deficiencies of some U.S. negotiators have influenced the course of negotiations, and that, in view of the structure of Executive authority in the United States, the personal qualities of American negotiators may be of key importance in the evolution of U.S. policy towards arms control.

SECTION A. THE CASE: PRO AND CON

'The case' of a negotiating nation consists of the body of arguments put forward at negotiations to justify the nation's own proposals, to criticize the opponent's proposals, and to rebut the opponent's arguments pro and con. 'Argument' for and against ends and means in arms control

\[12\] Ibid., p. 3.

\[13\] This large subject is discussed briefly in Part Four, Chapter 4.
includes adducing and interpreting historical and technical facts, predicting and comparing future situations, and asserting values. Argument is frequently buttressed by the citing of authorities - an activity separately treated here. The tactical attitude of allies to each other is also discussed separately in this section. To anatomize the case vis à vis the opponent we begin by glancing at the use of historical perspectives by negotiators.

All negotiators express anxiety about the arms race, but negotiators pressing for radical measures are perceptibly more anxious than others. This may lead to hyperbole or untruth. Late in the 1957 Sub-Committee Zorin read a Soviet Government statement which attacked, inter alia, the allegedly Western view 'that possession of nuclear weapons by States acts as a deterrent and reduces the likelihood of atomic \(\text{sic}\) war'. He continued:

This is pure illusion. On the contrary history teaches us that every arms race has always resulted in its logical conclusion, war. That lesson is convincingly borne out by the events which preceded the First and Second World Wars.\(^{14}\)

The negotiator of a conservative power inclines to find a different lesson in history. Speaking in the

\(^{14}\) DC/SC.1/PV.151, August 27, 1957, p. 15. Cf. Huntington, "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results", in Public Policy, op. cit.
previous year, Lodge noted 'disastrous failures, marked in history, of efforts at disarmament without inspection'.

...if the United States had not disarmed unilaterally without international inspection after World War I, World War II might not have taken place....A good case can be made for the fact that if we had not disarmed unilaterally and without intentional inspection at the end of World War II, we would not have had the dreadful fighting in Korea.15

Lodge's view is also tendentious as historical analysis for suggesting that the lack of inspection somehow contributed to the outbreak of war.

Negotiators regularly use the history of post-1945 disarmament negotiations to scourge opponents. It would be tedious to recount examples, but all the major powers defend their negotiating record as spotlessly virtuous, especially the Soviet Union. On the Western side, Moch's doubts about the Anglo-French proposals of 1956 have already been mentioned, and the United States did 'reserve' its radical positions in 1955, but these were exceptional events which did not recur, and in any case neither Western power repudiated any of its record.

Negotiators also devote much of their time to analysing the current military and political situation,

15 DC/PV.1, July 3, 1956, p. 16.
especially when introducing proposals. Usually, such analyses are tendentious in one of two ways: either they attack the opponent's military strategy and foreign policy explicitly, or they reinforce the case for the proposal being sponsored by the negotiator.

There is a well-established ritual of deploring international tensions and disputes in the abstract; but negotiators also attribute responsibility for them to opponents. The East's favourite political complaint is against the West's encouragement of the Federal Republic of Germany; the West blames the East for dividing Europe and keeping tension high in this way. However, the West is much less addicted to political complaints than the East, because it has rigidly maintained that political issues (which are defined so as to include arms control arrangements confined to Germany) should be excluded from disarmament negotiation.

The highly armed peace and the nuclear balance of terror are also deplored, but the West is apt to lag a little in this regard when resisting Eastern nuclear proposals. In 1957, defending the link between a test ban and other measures of disarmament, Selwyn Lloyd, then British Foreign Secretary, declared in the Sub-Committee that:
The Soviet Union, with its vast superiority in conventional armies, has consistently sought to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. For geographically small countries such as the United Kingdom, the advent of nuclear weapons has provided greater security and greater sense of equality.16

Wadsworth had shown in the 1955 Sub-Committee that one of the geographically large countries also was not over-anxious for nuclear disarmament.

Nuclear weapons to-day are regarded by some nations as the mainstay of their freedom.... Plain common sense requires that this great asset should not be surrendered lightly.17

At the same meeting the Soviet delegate reacted sharply:

In justifying his position, the United States representative has made a monstrous assertion in this Sub-Committee....Hitherto, atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction have been regarded as weapons for the mass extermination of human beings.... Obviously it will be difficult to reach agreement with the United States representatives if they approach the question of atomic weapons from this angle; for agreement must be difficult with persons who set these weapons on a pedestal....18

American delegates from time to time in the late 1950s defended the existing military balance by implication in

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18 Ibid., p. 372.
order to justify U.S. reluctance to consider drastic force reductions.

It is the United States view that low force levels and drastic reductions in armaments - even though carried out under an armaments agreement - would not, if they were not accompanied by progress in the settlement of major political issues, be in the interest of any country represented at this Subcommittee table. These reductions would increase the danger of the outbreak of war at some point in the world, and of such a war in turn spreading to involve all nations, particularly major nations.19

The Soviet Union is a persistent critic of Western armament policy and military strategy at negotiations. Especially at the beginning and towards the end of negotiations Soviet delegates attack NATO as an aggressive alliance, the United States for maintaining overseas bases designed for nuclear aggression, and the Western powers in general for the existence of an armaments race. Eastern criticism often extends to the details of American military policy, as when Kuznetsov berated the United States in 1958 for

the fact that the danger of a surprise attack is substantially increased by flights of military aircraft with atomic or hydrogen bombs on board over the territories of foreign states.20

20 GEN/SA/PV.2, November 11, 1958, p. 16.
The Western powers presume far less to lay down a desirable Soviet arms policy, and scarcely ever criticize particular Soviet military arrangements or strategy. Western negotiators acknowledge Soviet superiority in ground forces, but it is rare that they question the Soviet right to such superiority. American negotiators occasionally complain that Soviet secretiveness is a force for insecurity and an obstacle to arms control, but in general Western negotiators show a much greater tendency to accept the facts of a hazardous international life: their scolding and moralising are addressed almost entirely to Soviet proposals.

When negotiators come to commend or criticize proposals they must explicitly or implicitly compare the ends laid down in proposals with predicted future situations, and must also show that the means or control arrangements provided in the proposal are appropriate or inappropriate to achieve the given ends. However there cannot be a firm philosophical distinction between ends and means in arms control. Every military-political situation envisaged by a proposal is an end, but also a means, because it is a pre-condition of, and will be superseded by, another situation. Moreover even the armament balance at the end of a disarmament program may be regarded not as an
end in itself but as a means to greater security (or prosperity) for the parties involved. However, for the sake of convenience we shall regard as ends those parts of an arms control proposal which are set as goals - both intermediate and final - in the proposal itself. We shall regard as means those parts which are provided in order to verify the execution of the goals. Surprise attack schemes providing for nothing but inspection present a difficulty, but we shall regard their inspection arrangements as ends rather than means.

1. **Ends in Arms Control**

A proposal for arms control states or implies that a nation prefers a hypothetical military situation to situations likely to continue or emerge in the absence of agreement on the proposal. In so far as a nation rejects the proposals of opponents and allies it exhibits a preference not only for the world of its own proposal, but also for worlds evolving as a result of the arms race, above the worlds proposed by others. Negotiating tactics consist, in the first place, of propagating and justifying these two kinds of preference.

To propagate values is often no more than to assert them, but bare assertion may be made to seem scientific by
elaborate use of tautology and similar kinds of empty expression. This tactic is particularly favoured by negotiators defending radical proposal or attacking an opponent's proposals for inadequate radicalism. We shall consider the tactics of radicalism first of all.

There are three types of empty statement dear to negotiators with a radical brief. The first states: 'If you accept my plan we shall get disarmament.' The second states that: 'The way to achieve radical disarmament is to agree to radical disarmament.' The third and most popular category is of the form: 'X plus Y is greater than X'; or, even more simply, 'X is not Y'.

A frequently repeated example of a truism arose from the Soviet Union's hostility to a nuclear cut-off in isolation from total nuclear disarmament. Zorin declared in 1960 that

the mere discontinuance of the production of fissile materials can contribute nothing at all even from the standpoint of stopping the atomic armaments race. For States will be able to produce atomic and hydrogen bombs by using the huge reserves of fissionable materials that have already been built up and stockpiled by certain States.22

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21 Perfect radicalism is here defined (somewhat arbitrarily) as total disarmament of everyone immediately and for ever without controls or political and technical preconditions.
That is, the cut-off is not nuclear disarmament. In fact the West professed itself in favour of total nuclear disarmament in 1960, but only if a joint scientific study made it possible to detect hidden stockpiles.\textsuperscript{23} For the Soviets this was an unacceptable condition because, in Zorin's words, study 'could be used by the opponents of disarmament...to stave off the practical achievement of disarmament indefinitely'.\textsuperscript{24}

The radical East was also 'concerned' in 1960 that the West refused to assign time limits to its overall disarmament program.\textsuperscript{25} The Soviet Union had proposed 'total' disarmament in four years without any preconditions, and the West could not fault this program on the score of radicalism except by arguing that the Western plan would bring earlier disarmament, because of

\begin{quote}
the apparent \textit{Soviet} insistence that before any measure of disarmament can be undertaken the whole range of general and complete disarmament must be negotiated and agreed... by all the nations of the world.\textsuperscript{26}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{23} TNCD/PV.2, March 18, 1960, in Cmnd.1152, p. 39.
\textsuperscript{24} Speech by the Polish delegate. TNCD/PV.1, March 15, 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{25} Speech by Eaton. TNCD/PV.36, June 10, 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 681.
In general, however, considering the question of radicalism versus moderateness in isolation from questions such as balance, fairness, etc., the proponent of thoroughgoing radicalism is only vulnerable on one flank, whereas the proponent of moderateness is vulnerable on two flanks, unless his proposal is modest enough to defy the charge that it 'complicates' disarmament. The Soviet test ban proposal of June 14, 1957, for example, notably achieved this, where the Western and Soviet comprehensive arms control proposals of 1957 did not.

Before January 1959 there had been argument about ends - first at the technical and later at the political conference on the test ban - whenever the Soviets pressed for a Western commitment to a ban separate from disarmament. Argument stopped when the West dropped the link with disarmament and did not begin again until February 11, 1960, when the United States proposed a partial treaty (with international controls) to cover cessation of nuclear weapon test explosions in those environments where adequate control was possible\(^27\) in the first instance - that is, 'in the earth's atmosphere, in the oceans, and in outer space up to the greatest height with respect to which

\(^{27}\) GEN/DNT/PV.170, February 11, 1960, p. 4.
agreement can be reached on the installation of effective controls'.

Underground tests would be included 'down to the lowest limit of size, or threshold, for which, in our judgment, adequate control is now feasible'.\textsuperscript{28} Tsarapkin objected that no international control was required for tests above the suggested threshold of seismic magnitude 4.75, and that the U.S. proposal 'would lead to the resumption of nuclear weapon tests' in all environments\textsuperscript{29}—presumably because the Soviets were not prepared to engage in a race in underground testing. The later Soviet 'acceptance' of the U.S. proposal for a partial ban plus moratorium on underground tests below the threshold was shown to have been spurious in Part Two, Chapter 2. For the Soviets it was impermissible conservatism to divide the test ban into parts until 1963. Thus during 1957-60 the Soviets were at first more moderate on the tests issue than the West, according to the definition adopted above; while in 1960 roles were reversed. At first the West 'complicated' the test ban by refusing to separate it from disarmament; later the East complicated the question by refusing to separate controllable and uncontrollable tests.

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., p. 5.
\textsuperscript{29} GEN/DNT/PV.172, February 16, 1960, p. 3.
The case for moderateness, of course, always implies a case against radicalism, although a power putting forward a moderate measure is usually careful to re-endorse previous radical proposals simultaneously or after getting into difficulties. Wadsworth, in the speech quoted, declared 'that the United States would much prefer to be able to enter into an agreement for the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests'. In the 1956 Sub-Committee the Soviet delegate reaffirmed the comprehensive proposal of May 10, 1955 after he came under withering Anglo-French fire for excluding nuclear disarmament from the plan of March 27, 1956.

The Western philosophy of comprehensive partial disarmament was first formulated concisely by Moch late in 1955 when he called for:

Neither control without disarmament. Meaning the Open Skies plan
Nor disarmament without control. Meaning Soviet plans
But agreement on disarmament which can really be controlled. Anticipating the Anglo-French plan of March 19, 1956

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30 GEN/DNT/PV.170, on. cit., p. 4.
Later Moch made it clear that the Anglo-French wished all controllable measures included in an agreement. Thus he criticized the Soviet conventional disarmament plan of 1956 because 'it rejects certain measures which are susceptible of control here and now'. 33 (Moch also condemned the proposal as obsolescent and superfluous.

...the reductions that you are proposing...
relate to what I shall call the out-of-date department of military science. You are hastening the scrapping of equipment which will be discarded in any event, as a result of technological progress. 34)

The Soviet position in 1956 was that nuclear disarmament had proved impossible in the past because Soviet nuclear proposals had been called unfair by Western negotiators. 35 Gromyko therefore argued that nuclear measures should be excluded at first in order to obtain agreement 'at the earliest possible date'. 36 The perennial weakness of proposals supposed to produce early agreement is that it requires at least two powers to achieve any

33 DC/SC.1/PV.78, April 3, 1956, p. 5.
35 DC/SC.1/PV.74, March 28, 1956, p. 20.
36 Ibid., p. 18.
sort of agreement. Negotiators are ordinarily too polite to make so crude and obvious an objection.

In 1957 the Soviet Union fitted three strings to its negotiating bow - the plan for comprehensive radical disarmament, March 18, 1957; the comprehensive partial plan of April 30 which reached its final form as September 20, 1957, and the developed test ban proposal of June 14 which provided for international control. Thus Zorin was able to argue that the 'materials' cut-off, the West's favourite nuclear measure, was both (a) not radical enough and (b) too radical, in consecutive paragraphs.

The cut-off of the production of fissionable material for military purposes will be of real significance in eliminating the threat of atomic war only when it is indissolubly linked to the prohibition of nuclear weapons, their elimination from the armaments of States, and the destruction of atomic weapons stockpiles...

The linking by the Western Powers of the cessation of nuclear weapons tests with the cut-off of production of fissionable materials for military purposes shows that they are far from desirous of contributing towards the halting of nuclear weapon tests.37

When Moch criticized the Soviet comprehensive partial plan of April 30, 1957 by saying 'that the Soviet Union must agree to discontinue the production of fissionable materials for military purposes' because it was part of

37 DC/SC.1/PV.151, August 27, 1957, p. 13.
'all the disarmament which can currently be controlled', the Soviets were able to retort that the Western proposals on force levels did not measure up to Western principles because they involved no 'significant reduction' for any Western power in the absence of political settlements.

We have been discussing arguments which boil down to asserting that there should be more or less disarmament than the opponent proposes. We turn to arguments about the fairness and 'balance' of the military worlds implied by a proposal. (Such arguments may of course lead to demands for more or less disarmament, but generally do not.) We have already considered abstractly the merits of the principal conceptions of fairness employed by negotiators in Part Two, Chapter 3. Here we shall briefly study some of these conceptions in action.

Demonstrating that a plan or part thereof is 'fair' may involve: arguments to prove that it is in the proposer's interest (usually not felt to be necessary); arguments to prove that it serves the interests of all implicated parties; arguments to prove that it is in the opponent's interest; and, finally, arguments to show that

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38 DC/SC.1/PV.109, April 30, 1957, pp. 35-6.
39 DC/SC.1/PV.153, August 29, 1957, p. 47.
it is not hostile to the opponent's interest - reassuring arguments. 'Arguments' in this context vary from bare abstract assertion (often spurious or at least superficial) to detailed analysis of plans and prediction of their effects.

The Soviet Union has always been ambivalent about the idea of balance in disarmament; her negotiators regard it sometimes as a dangerous rationalization of the arms race, sometimes as a temporary necessity in judging plans of arms control. They are consistent in denying that the idea is relevant in a fully disarmed world where, they argue, 'advantages' will have been abolished. Malik nicely expressed Soviet ambivalence in the Sub-Committee on May 5, 1955. He rejected the idea of balance and then immediately used it to scourge the West for its comprehensive proposal of March 8, 1955:

The Soviet delegation has never shared the views on the subject of balance propagandized by the Western representatives. We are only speaking about it now, because this is the idea advocated by the Western representatives, and in so far as it is necessary to demonstrate its worthlessness. We all know from the unhappy experience of the League of Nations that...the British and French representatives...tried countless times...to put across the idea of balance....To weight the "balance of forces" in the scales as the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons proceeds would be an extremely complicated task which it would be scarcely feasible to undertake. Moreover, it must also
be quite obvious to any impartial person that there is not a vestige of balance in the programme the Western Powers are proposing... The whole /Western/ purpose... is to take an interminable time over the disclosure and verification of conventional armaments and armed forces, while postponing the prohibition of atomic weapons to the very end...

(Incidentally, this speech suggests that the Soviet delegation may not have been told of the change of policy which was announced five days later, and which accepted the Western timing of nuclear disarmament. At any rate after May 10 the Soviet switched to the tactics of pressing for Western re-endorsement of the provisions of March 8, 1955; criticism of them virtually ceased.)

At the surprise attack conference in 1958 Kuznetsov, the Soviet delegate, attacked the Western powers for regarding the negotiation as a means for attempting to obtain one-sided military advantages for the Western Powers and to weakening /sic/ the defensive power of the countries of the Socialist bloc.

The 'obvious purpose' of Western control proposals 'was to get as much military information as possible about the newest weapons such as, for example, long distance rockets'. Soviet spokesmen at this time were proclaiming

40 DC/SC.1/PV.46, in Cmd. 9650, p. 571.
41 GEN/SA/PV.30, December 18, 1958, p. 39.
Soviet superiority in long range rocketry, but Soviet negotiators never rest their case against Western control proposals on comparison of the impact of inspection proposals on East and West; they simply assert their onesidedness. The West did not attempt to reassure the East on inspection at the surprise attack conference; we shall notice shortly an attempt to reassure at the test ban conference.

In 1960 the Soviets argued that 'a radical solution of the disarmament problem', as Zorin called Khrushchev's plan of September 19, 1959, at the first of the Ten Nation meetings, would cut through the problem of balance.

General and complete disarmament...places all States in an equal situation. It will make it possible to overcome all those difficulties in the solution of the question of control which arose when attempts were made to solve the disarmament problem partially. Zorin was referring to the Soviet objection to 'control over armaments'.

At the 36th Meeting Eaton attacked the first stage provision of the Soviet proposal, June 2, 1960, because it would have caused liquidation of all free world collective security arrangements through the complete and immediate withdrawal of all United States forces from areas overseas.

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42 TNCD/PV.1, March 15, 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 19.
43 TNCD/PV.36, June 10, 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 681.
In reply, at the same meeting, Zorin pointed out that Soviet forces on foreign soil would also be withdrawn, and returned to his theme of the first meeting.

That we have an identical approach here is quite obvious, as is also the fact that identical conditions apply to all. Why this should give military advantage to anyone... is incomprehensible.44

In opposing the Western proposal for an international police force in 1960, the East professed the same doctrine as it espoused at the test talks - that international institutions without benefit of veto will be dominated by the West or its hirelings, and are unfair.

Instead of national armies there would be created an international army, which would in fact be the army of one side directed against the other side.45

Western negotiators have always been dedicated to the ideas of fairness and balance, but at the surprise attack conference the Western experts favoured the overlapping but distinct idea of 'stability' even more strongly, since they were not seeking to recommend any change in the balance of forces. The East denied that inspection would lead to stability.

44 Ibid., p. 687.
45 Speech by Zorin, TNCD/PV.33, June 7, 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 658.
...in view of the mistrust and suspicion among governments, the establishment of a control and inspection system...without the parallel application of disarmament measures, cannot be otherwise regarded than as an attempt to take advantage of the control for purposes of reconnaissance.... In actual fact, a Power, learning in the course of such "universal" control that it is behind its rival, and receiving definite military-technical information, would do everything in its power to catch up. And judging by the policy of the Western Powers this dangerous rivalry can only end in a catastrophe.46

A basic tactic of negotiators defending a first-step proposal is to argue that their limited measure would have such excellent military, political and psychological effects that radical disarmament would become easier to achieve. Coining a famous phrase Stassen declared to the 1955 Sub-Committee 'that the Open Skies proposal of the President of the United States...is in fact the gateway to the reduction of armaments'.47 Sobolev was quick to ask: 'Can we not define more closely precisely what measures for the reduction of armaments are envisaged...?' But the United States' answer did not appear until the comprehensive proposal, April 3, 1956, was made. Usually powers maintain

46 GEN/SA/PV.30, December 18, 1958, p. 40.
a strong tactical position by having radical proposals available if necessary.

Gateways may be declared undesirable in themselves, of course; and it is common to argue that the more remote and disputable effects of plans are undesirable. Nutting argued that one of the Soviet's separable measures in the plan of March 27, 1956 - providing for the exclusion of nuclear weapons from German soil - would tend to seal the division of Germany.

...proposals on European security are... inseparably linked with the reunification of Germany in freedom.48

Perhaps the most daring of all suggestions that one measure might be the key to the whole disarmament problem because of its indirect effects was made by Jules Moch in 1960 when he argued that the control of nuclear delivery vehicles was that key. He had begun to suggest as early as 1956 that the various nuclear controls would make the residual stocks of nuclear weapons which could not be controlled seem 'unnecessary in a world almost completely disarmed where confidence continued to grow'.49 By 1960

48 DC/SC.1/PV.82, April 23, 1956, p. 38.
Moch's argument had become that negotiators should agree to ban

the means of carrying these nuclear weapons - satellites, missiles, aircraft, aircraft carriers, submarines, launching ramps, etc. Once the vehicles have been banned and destroyed, the military stocks will appear worthless.50

The Eastern delegates chose not to dispute this questionable analysis. They perceived the advantages of appearing to defer to French sensibilities by transferring the destruction of nuclear delivery vehicles to the first stage in their revised general and complete disarmament plan of June 2, 1960.

2. Means in Arms Control

Over-simplifying the true position, it might be said that the East wills the end while the West wills the means of disarmament. However the conflict over means was much more sharply focussed and usually more heated than the conflict over ends in the period under study. The two superpowers, and especially the United States, as we shall see, commit their ideologies emphatically to the continuing debate on the control of disarmament. The Soviet Union

50 TNCD/PV.1, March 15, 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 11.
declared in its proposal of May 10, 1955, and Soviet negotiators frequently repeated, that

the necessary conditions for the institution of a control system which would enjoy the trust of all States...do not at present exist...Such a situation makes difficult the attainment of agreement regarding the admission by States to their enterprises...of foreign control officials...

While the political theories incorporated in this proposal were far from clear, they seemed to imply that mere agreement on comprehensive disarmament would bring about sufficient trust for control of a first stage in disarmament, but that political solutions would be required to 'create the necessary atmosphere of trust' for the second stage. The demand for political pre-conditions had been completely dropped by 1960, but the suspicion of foreign control officials continued. It was defended by emphasis on national sovereignty - a key part of Soviet ideology. The argument from sovereignty was employed in the struggle against wide powers for the Administrator and for unanimity of the original parties in important decisions of the control organization at the test talks. 'Legitimate (national) security interests' were often invoked to resist Western proposals for extensive control operations. We

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have discussed Soviet security anxieties aroused by Western surprise attack proposals in 1958.

The Soviet Union declares that the effects of control are more likely to be bad than good unless very carefully established; the United States, faithful to the principles of the 'open society', argues that inspection is bound to be good.

We believe that on the day these two Powers decide to open up to each other and to lay bare their military potential, the security of the whole world will be increased. A climate of greater confidence will surely prevail.\textsuperscript{52}

Arguing the necessity of particular measures of control, the West appeals to facts. Western negotiators regularly deliver lectures on the control problems associated with the various disarmament problems, and move on to defend the quantity and type of inspection proposed in connection with particular problems. At the test talks the United States early in 1959 announced that it had revised its opinion of the reliability of the Geneva System as laid down by the Conference of Experts in detecting and identifying underground tests. Tabling the Report of the Berkner Panel on Seismic Improvement on June 12, 1959, the

\textsuperscript{52} Speech by Stassen. DC/SC.1/PV.68, October 7, 1955, in Cmd. 9652, p. 1011.
U.S. delegation quoted the two most serious findings—that there would be 1,500 rather than 20-100 unidentified earthquakes in the world per annum under the Geneva System, and that there were 'decoupling' techniques for concealing underground tests which could reduce the seismic signal by a factor of ten or more. Moreover, preliminary theoretical studies have shown that it is possible in principle to reduce the seismic signal from an explosion by a much greater factor than this.53

The United States used the Berkner findings54 to demand improvements in the Geneva System and also to defend its proposal for a partial treaty in 1960.

The Soviets responded in two ways. Firstly, Tsarapkin argued that:

We may be sure that there will never be any lack of new data...and we shall never reach a point where no more progress can be achieved either in the concealment of underground explosions or in their ascertain­ment and identification....This is an endless process. The only purpose which can be served by insisting on it is to drag out negotiations endlessly...55

55 GEN/DNT/PV.97, June 17, 1959, pp. 23-4.
Secondly, at the end of 1959, after agreeing to a further expert inquiry into seismic detection, Soviet experts concluded that the U.S. facts and theories were wrong.\textsuperscript{56}

In 1960 both sides proceeded to attack the motives of the other's experts. Wadsworth declared that the Soviet delegation's views 'seem to me to presuppose that science will always be the servant of politics and that objective facts must be subordinated to political aims'.\textsuperscript{57} At the same meeting Tsarapkin accused Wadsworth of 'casuistry' on the ground that 'the United States scientists came to the Meetings with a quite obvious political purpose' - namely, to prove 'that...underground explosions should be deleted from the treaty'.\textsuperscript{58}

The Soviet Union flatly opposed what we may call 'political determinism' to Western 'technical determinism' on one question - the number of on-site inspections to investigate suspicious seismic events. We saw in Part Two, Chapter 2 that the West in 1960 proposed that the number

\textsuperscript{56} See Part Two, Chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{57} GEN/DNT/PV.151, January 12, 1960, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., p. 14.
should be a fixed percentage of unidentified suspicious events. The East counter-proposed a fixed quota. Why?

The point here is that we must reach a sensible political compromise, because any attempt to deal with this question on purely technical lines would lead us down a blind alley.59

At the previous meeting Tsarapkin had explained that 'this Western principle for the despatch of inspection teams would leave the door open to exaggeration, abuse and would without doubt threaten the States concerned'.60

Another variant of Soviet political determinism is that cooperation of parties which have signed an arms control treaty is inevitable. To discuss the problems which might be created by obstruction is 'speculative and imaginary'.

You should not indulge in speculations, because what is important here is co-operation, and if there is no co-operation between the three nuclear Powers there simply will be no control organization.61

Again, arguing for a veto over on-site inspections:

In actual fact you do not really believe that...the Soviet Union, the United States or United Kingdom will carry out secret

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59 Speech by Tsarapkin. GEN/DNT/PV.84, April 28, 1959, p. 11.
60 GEN/DNT/PV.83, April 27, 1959, p. 9.
61 GEN/DNT/PV.58, February 19, 1959, p. 22.
nuclear explosions....The States that sign
the treaty will honour it.62

However, the East was capable of devising pragmatic
Western-style defences for its position concerning on-site
inspection.

The very fact that investigations might
be carried out in areas where instrument
readings indicated events suspected to be
nuclear explosions would restrain any States
or individuals who wished to carry out
explosions in violation of the obligations
they had assumed.63

At the test conference the Western Two made occasional
efforts to demonstrate not only that their control proposals
were necessary, but that they would not upset Soviet
security. Upholding Western staffing proposals in February
1959, Wadsworth argued that:

...we are talking about some twenty to
twenty-four control posts in the entire
Soviet Union, and...a control post staff of
thirty technical people....we can say that
the total of foreign technicians in the
Soviet Union would be well under 500 people.
It seems inconceivable to me that this
group of people...which would be scattered
in small units, often in isolated localities
...could represent a threat to the security
of a Great Power of 210 million people. Not
only would these foreign technicians be
working alongside Soviet technicians and a
Soviet administrative staff which, taken
together, would considerably outnumber them,
but all of the resources of the Soviet State
would be available to ensure that the activities of all personnel were in conformity with the treaty.64

However, Soviet delegates were never drawn into discussing the size of any security threat found implicit in Western proposals: such a threat either exists or does not exist, depending on the proposal. This view emerged clearly at the 1960 negotiations when Zorin at the seventh meeting attacked the Western proposal for 'inspectors...to verify armed forces and armaments which are not subject to reduction or abolition'.65 Zorin had explained at the second meeting that under the Soviet proposal 'States will supply information about their armed forces and conventional armaments' in the first stage.66 Moch had proposed calling the figure supplied 'X', and the figure remaining after reductions 'A',67 Zorin set out to follow68 this terminology at the seventh meeting:

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64 GEN/DNT/PV.119, August 4, 1959, p. 7. (Neither East nor West ever mentioned that the unprecedented social and professional mingling of Eastern and Western experts would have given rise to unprecedented opportunities for mutual corruption.)
66 TNCD/PV.2, March 16, 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 38.
67 TNCD/PV.4, March 18, 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 66.
68 He got it wrong. Moch had spoken of 'putting a quantity X-A in store'.
We will supply the X, and then verify [sic] what is to be deducted (the A).69/Zorin must have meant that the inspectorate would do the verifying.7

According to Zorin the West's wish to verify forces remaining can only be attributed to a desire to learn what those armed forces are, and that cannot be regarded as other than military intelligence or, to use a coarser word, spying.70

Moch objected at the next meeting that we shall be entitled to verify the amounts removed, but...we shall have to rely on simple declarations of the amounts existing before the removal.71

Zorin was once again employing in a concealed fashion the assumptions made explicit at the test conference, that cooperation of the powers is inevitable, that states honour their treaties.

The argument over control in the years of the Sub-Committee (1955-7) had flowed mainly from Western attempts to elicit, and Eastern attempts to resist giving, detailed statements on control. In Section C we shall study the tactical implications of vagueness and clarity in

69 TNCD/PV.7, op. cit., in Cmd 1152, p. 140.
70 Ibid., p. 141.
71 TNCD/PV.8, March 24, 1960, in Cmd. 1152, p. 149.
proposals. In this section we shall examine next a tactic employed in both offence against, and defence of, ends and means - the appeal to an authority.

3. The Appeal to Authority

The appeal to the views of various authorities with an a priori claim to the attention of the opponent negotiator is a highly developed art. We shall consider five varieties of the appeal to authority - (1) appeal to the terms of reference set by the authority which established negotiations; (2) appeal to a more or less binding technical authority; (3) appeal to oneself and authorities on one's side; (4) appeal to neutral opinion; and, most important of all, (5) appeal to views of the opponent or his citizens and to his previous negotiating position.

(1) The chief establishing authority in the years under study was the General Assembly which first (in 1953) moved to establish the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission and later passed resolutions annually which both expressed general hopes and issued directions with substantive implications in advance of detailed negotiations. Controversy about General Assembly resolutions was most keen in those two years of negotiation when the Assembly had
previously passed resolutions agreed to by East and West, but East and West appeared at the conference table with sharply conflicting proposals - 1955 (early) and 1960. However in 1955 the West relied more on an appeal to Soviet policy in 1954 (when the Soviets accepted the Anglo-French plan of June 11 as the 'basis' of agreement) than to the text of Resolution 808 (IX)\(^2\) which called for the measures contained in the Western plan of March 8, 1955.

In 1960 the West defended its proposal by one interpretation of General Assembly Resolution 1378 (XIV) of November 20, 1959,\(^3\) and by an appeal to the Four-Power Communiqué of September 7, 1959,\(^4\) which in fact established the Ten Nation Committee. The Soviet Union favoured another interpretation of the resolution in question and claimed that the communiqué was obsolete. On March 17 Moch defended the Western search for a first stage agreement by quoting a passage from the communiqué.\(^5\)

The four Governments conceive of this committee as a useful means of exploring ...such agreements...as may, in the first

\(^2\) A/2890, in *Documents on Disarmament*, vol. I, p. 441.
\(^3\) A/RES/1378 (XIV), November 23, 1959, in Cmdnd. 1152, p. 920.
\(^4\) DC/144, in Cmdnd. 1152, p. 906.
\(^5\) TNCD/PV.3, in Cmdnd. 1152, p. 54.
instance, be of particular relevance to the countries participating in these deliberations. [Deletions mine]

Zorin replied immediately.

Mr. Moch has made one mistake...on November 20, 1959...the Western Powers voted for the General Assembly resolution in which it is quite clearly stated which tasks...all the eighty-two Member States regard as the most important for the present stage of work...

He then quoted the resolution: 76

The General Assembly,...considering that the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important one facing the world today,

1. Calls upon Governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this problem;

Moch counterquoted part of the conclusion of the resolution, 77 which states in full that the General Assembly:

3. Expresses the hope that measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control will be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time.

In 1958 the two expert conferences and the political conference on tests were established by an exchange of correspondence. Thus each side quoted itself rather than any establishing authority in defending its proposals.

76 Ibid., p. 56. I have filled out this quotation.
77 Ibid., p. 58.
(2) At only one conference has there been an agreed technical foundation for political negotiations. The Report of the Conference of Experts in August 1958 quickly became and remained contentious at the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests which began in October of that year. The United States entered negotiations committed to 'the actual establishment of an international control system on the basis of the experts' report', but as early as January 5, 1959 the U.S. delegation tabled new data at variance with the experts' findings on seismic detection. Tsarapkin refused to agree to a new technical group to discuss the data. He declared that the experts' conclusions 'have been approved by the three Governments...It would not further our work here to revise those conclusions'.

The stage of technical study is behind us; our main test is to work out a political agreement...

If it becomes necessary to obtain more precise scientific and technological data, that should be the task of the control organization.

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80 GEN/DNT/PV.31, January 7, 1959, p. 25.
81 Ibid., p. 27.
As we have seen, the Soviets did agree to discuss the new data in November 1959, but only in order to discredit it and vindicate their preferred authority, the Experts' Report.

There were many disagreements at the test ban conference about the meaning of the Experts' Report and of their debates which led to it. We shall consider one.

At the Conference of Experts the West had proposed permanent stand-by on-site inspection teams, while the East held out for special teams to be constituted for each occasion. The Experts' Report merely stated (in Annex VII) that 'the international control organ can send an inspection group to the site', if necessary.\(^{82}\) At the political conference Tsarapkin claimed that permanent teams 'had been considered and rejected' by the Experts.\(^{83}\) He pointed out that the Report had specified that 'the group would be provided with equipment and apparatus appropriate to its task in each case'.\(^{84}\)

Wadsworth refused to be convinced:

\(^{82}\) EXP/NUC/28.

\(^{83}\) GEN/DNT/PV.57, February 18, 1957, p. 21.

\(^{84}\) EXP/NUC/28.
It was decided that a position would not be taken. We see nothing in the...report which points to a decision in favour of ad hoc working groups.\(^85\)

This issue was not resolved.

(3) The citing of oneself as authority is of course natural and not just a way of emphasizing some point, but also of indicating the continuity of one's view from year to year. Thus the verbatim records are littered with self-quotations often harking back several years, but also with attacks on opponents for proposing 'nothing new' - that is, nothing which was not opposed by the speaker's side in the past. Explicit citing of one's own side's opinion may lead to absurdity, as when Zorin declared in 1960

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\text{that an indication of the realism and feasibility of the Soviet disarmament programme is the readiness of the Soviet Union...to conclude a general disarmament treaty.}^{86}\]

(4) The appeal to neutral opinion is favoured most by the Soviet Union, which enjoyed close working cooperation on disarmament with the leading neutral, India, during the years under study. The Soviet delegate occasionally cited the disarmament provisions of the Bandung Conference

\(^{85}\) GEN/DNT/PV.57, op. cit., p. 21.

\(^{86}\) TNCD/PV.2, March 16, 1960, in Cmdn. 1152, p. 40.
Communiqué of April 14, 1955\(^{87}\) in the 1955 Sub-Committee.\(^{88}\) In 1960 the Soviet delegate claimed the 'support' of the governments of India, Indonesia, Burma and Afghanistan 'for the Soviet proposals on general and complete disarmament ...testified to by...joint communiqués' published during Khrushchev's recent Asian tour.\(^{89}\)

(5) Appeals to the opponent as witness against his own proposal are of two basic types. They cite either (a) his previous suggestions or proposals, or (b) his current or past arguments. We may call the appeal to the opponent's past proposals a demand for strategic stability. The East has exploited this appeal most, especially in the years 1955-7 during which the West retreated increasingly from the radical proposals of 1954-5. In the 1956 Sub-Committee Gromyko criticized the Western delegates because they have tried to make out that their previous proposals on the question of levels were... tied to the solution of political problems.

He claimed 'that no such conditions were put forward previously'. He also reminded the Western powers

\(^{87}\) See Documents on Disarmament, vol. I, p. 455.
\(^{88}\) See, for example, DC/SC.1/PV.44, May 3, 1955, in Cmd. 9650, p. 521.
\(^{89}\) TNCD/PV.1, March 15, 1960, in Cmd. 1152, p. 20.
that they altered their position on the question of levels after the Soviet Union had accepted their proposal for the establishment of ceilings. 90

At the same meeting, Nutting quoted one sentence of his maiden speech in the 1955 Sub-Committee to refute Gromyko's first criticism:

The process of disarmament and the building up of international confidence are inevitably interdependent. 91

He did not dispute the second point.

However the West also quoted the Soviet Union's major 1955 proposal against it in 1956. Opposing the Soviet refusal to make agreement on low force levels conditional on political settlements, Moch cited the provisions of the Soviet plan of May 10, 1955 for easing tension. 92 The Western delegates also cited the May 10 plan in opposing separate agreement on conventional disarmament. Gromyko held that the British Foreign Minister Macmillan had suggested this approach at the Foreign Ministers'...
Conference of November 1955.\textsuperscript{93}

Macmillan had actually said:

I think it is clear that any...preliminary agreement would have to concentrate principally, though not exclusively, on reductions in the size of armed forces and conventional armaments...\textsuperscript{94}

The Soviet interpretation of this statement was clearly tendentious, as Nutting pointed out.

At the test ban talks the East repeatedly pressed for a quota of on-site inspections on the ground that:

This is a political question and must be approached from that angle, as was done by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom when he was in Moscow.\textsuperscript{95}

Macmillan had discussed the quota proposal with Khrushchev early in 1959, and on the day before Tsarapkin's speech of April 28 Foreign Secretary Lloyd had explained it to the House of Commons.\textsuperscript{96} The West eventually adopted the British proposal formally, but the West's negotiators

\textsuperscript{93} Statement by Gromyko at the 86th Meeting, May 4, 1956. DC/SC.1/47, in Cmd. 9770, p. 50.
\textsuperscript{95} GEN/DNT/PV.84, April 28, 1959, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{96} See extract from Lloyd's speech in Documents on Disarmament, vol. II, p. 1400.
professed to base their figure for the number of inspections on technical criteria.97

The demand that the opponent make his proposal conform to the arguments and guiding principles declared unofficially by citizens of his side is possible only for the East in practice, since the Western negotiators seem unable or unwilling to identify unofficial Eastern opinion on military affairs and disarmament. Both sides quote official opinions of the other against the proposals of the other.

The East relies on Western expert opinion for much of the straightforward technical analysis it uses in negotiation. It scarcely ever cites its own experts on such questions as the characteristics and effects of atomic weapons, probably because there is so little declassified Eastern information available on technical military questions. However contentious opinions of Western experts on strategic matters are also frequently quoted. In 1960, attacking the Western proposal for 'unlimited control and gathering of information without the achievement of disarmament measures' the Czech delegate quoted an article

97 See Part Two, Chapter 2.
by General Genevey (who was actually a member of the French delegation) in the *Revue de Défense Nationale*. 98

The quotation read in part:

...the aggressor...by taking the initiative...can be sure of reducing the counter-attack in advance to a very low level. In the war of tomorrow, for a nation which has no aggressive intentions, a prior exchange of information will be a factor not of security but of insecurity.99

Albert Wohlstetter's famous article, "The Delicate Balance of Terror" (*Foreign Affairs*, January 1959), was also quoted in 1960 by the Bulgarian delegate to prove that foreign nuclear missile bases are inherently aggressive because of their 'potent ability for striking first by surprise' (Wohlstetter).100

The most important official Western principle borrowed by the East in the years under study was Moch's famous slogan, 'No control without disarmament', which was used against Western proposals from 1956-60. Moch reissued it in 1960:

We agree with the Soviet delegation that there should be no control without

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No. 11, 1957.
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TNCD/PV.6, March 22, 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 114.
100
TNCD/PV.37, June 13, 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 699.
disarmament just as there should be no disarmament without control.\textsuperscript{101}

At the sixth meeting of the Ten Nation Committee the Czech delegate quoted this statement against the Western proposals of March 18, 1960.\textsuperscript{102} In fact most Western proposals in the period 1955-60, leaving aside 'pure' inspection proposals, made elaborate provision for advance positioning of and preliminary inspection of forces and armaments by control personnel before disarmament, and often did not provide for force reductions at the first stage. Moch's slogan, which was in any case originally directed against the U.S. Open Skies proposal, fitted Eastern requirements perfectly.

The West was as much if not more blessed in being able to use two celebrated Soviet statements of mid-1955 on control. The Western delegates quoted them repeatedly, especially in 1955-6. On August 29, 1955 Nutting actually quoted Moch's quotation of the Soviet doctrine announced on May 10, 1955 that

\begin{quote}
there are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for evading this control and for organising the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons.\textsuperscript{103}
\end{quote}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{101} TNCD/FV.4, March 18, 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 68.
\textsuperscript{102} TNCD/FV.6, March 22, 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 114.
\textsuperscript{103} DC/SC.1/FV.51, in Cmnd. 9651, p. 670.
\end{flushleft}
In the same intervention Nutting quoted the following part of a speech by Marshall Bulganin to the Supreme Soviet on August 4, which also achieved more fame of the wrong kind than its author intended.

As the United States Presidently justly pointed out, "At the Summit Conference in July every disarmament plan boils down to the question of control and inspection. This question is indeed very serious and we must find a solution to it which would be mutually acceptable." 

These two statements, particularly the first, undoubtedly eased (in the case of the United States) and accelerated (in the case of the United Kingdom and France) the fundamental changes which overtook Western arms control policy in and after 1955.

4. The Case Against the Ally

The strategic problems of allied cooperation were mentioned in Chapter 1. It was pointed out there that the Soviet Union negotiated either alone or with subservient allies in the period under study, but that the Western allies were in partial conflict at conferences in 1955-6. We shall study the expression of that conflict in negotiating tactics and also note some minor

\[104\] Ibid.
divergencies of 1957. French hostility to the test ban and 'extra-mural' inter-allied conflict in general is beyond the scope of this chapter on intra-mural tactics.

In the 1955 Sub-Committee Moch came closest to direct criticism of the Open Skies plan in an intervention of October during which he invoked his 'duty to be absolutely frank', and declared of the proposal that

some members of the Sub-Committee do not have a clear idea of its geographical scope and its evolution in time and have not understood whether it was - and, in particular, in what way it might eventually become - a prelude to effective disarmament. 105

Stassen's defence against Moch (and Nutting) - if it should be called that - was to gently deprecate 'pre-Geneva' (summit conference) thinking and proposals in the Sub-Committee.

Although the United States did make a comprehensive disarmament proposal in 1956, 106 Moch was still not fully satisfied. Of the U.S. proposal he said to the Sub-Committee:

I am very happy to see this rapprochement, even though I personally must make a reservation about certain points on which it differs from the Anglo-French plan 107 /i.e. March 19, 1956/.

106 April 3, 1956.
107 DC/SC.1/PV.78, April 3, 1956, p. 5.
Stassen took no position on the Anglo-French plan. However the Western allies joined together on May 4, 1956 to co-sponsor a 'Declaration' of desirable 'measures', which was in fact little more than a summary of general principles common to the two Western plans. The Declaration provided for disarmament by stages, force reductions, the cut-off, transfers, control and aerial reconnaissance, but it settled none of the specific differences between the two plans. 108

In 1957 the Western powers eschewed making formal proposals individually to the Sub-Committee until the British proposed registration and limitation of tests on May 6109 (with U.S. approval), and since the West did not begin making joint formal proposals until July 2,110 the early months of the 1957 negotiations had some of the atmosphere of an academic seminar rather than partisan debate. However clear inter-allied difference appeared in the early months nevertheless. At the first meeting on March 18 Stassen suggested that a comprehensive agreement should provide for 'a first-step reduction in conventional armaments of 10 per cent of each major class' of

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108 DC/SC.1/46, in Cmd. 9770, p. 47.
109 DC/SC.1/56.
110 Proposal for temporary test suspension. DC/SC.1/59.
armament. He also proposed a ten per cent cut in budgets for a first twelve-month stage, citing the Soviet Union proposal for a percentage budget reduction of March 27, 1956. Moch at the meeting of April 10, found it 'illogical to speak of fixed levels for manpower [which was agreed doctrine among the Western Three for a first stage] and of proportional reductions for armaments'.

At the meeting of April 11 Noble, for the U.K., tabled a paper 'on the relation of armaments to manpower', which insisted on armament levels being determined by permitted force levels and not by proportional reduction. In this paper the proposal for 'standard manpower groups' was virtually identical with the American proposal of 1956 whereby (for example) 1,000 men would entitle a power to one submarine or two bombers. Under the British method powers would have complete freedom in determining the composition of their armaments within the limits imposed

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111 DC/SC.1/PV.87, p. 18.
112 Ibid., p. 19.
113 DC/SC.1/PV.100, April 10, 1957, p. 24.
115 See discussion of April 3, 1956.
by manpower levels. Explaining the United Kingdom's objection to Stassen's proposal Noble said that a ten percent reduction of armament 'could not easily be carried out by all of us at this table'.

However the maneuvering inside the Western camp was not over. Stassen announced on 26 June after the recess of the Sub-Committee that his government had noted 'the comments' of his Western colleagues, and he proposed yet another method of reduction.

If...the Soviet Union will present its /comprehensive partial/ proposal of 30 April...in the form of...a specific list of armaments reductions which the Soviet Union is prepared to make in relation to the reduction of military forces to 2.5 million men, the United States will present in return a proposed list of armaments reductions which it would be prepared to make...

Stassen also proposed placing weapons in storage depots, whereas the West previously had always seemed to assume that armaments would be quickly destroyed. It was Stassen's scheme which eventually found its way into the Western comprehensive partial plan of August 29, 1957.

\(^{116}\) DC/SC.1/FV.101, p. 4.

\(^{117}\) DC/SC.1/FV.125, pp. 4-5.
Although Stassen's proposal for a ten per cent budget cut was not directly opposed by other Westerners, Moch's finding of illogicality applied to it by implication, and it was dropped in the final Western offer.

In 1960 no significant differences were allowed to appear among the Western allies. Moch's plea on behalf of France for special control over nuclear delivery vehicles was never made into a formal French proposal or even a specific suggestion. Neither of the two Western plans of 1960 provided for reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles during a first, detachable stage.

SECTION B. TONE AND EMPHASIS

So far we have been studying the structure of rational argument used by negotiators. The 'tone' of a negotiation is inevitably determined in part by which arguments negotiators choose. (There are 'hard' and 'soft' arguments as well as positions; the distinction is well understood by Soviet negotiators.) However in this section we shall be exclusively interested in tone deliberately created by the manner in which arguments and proposals are presented. (Of course chance and personal

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118 TNCD/PV.1, March 15, 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 11.
factors, especially on the Western side, also play a part in creating tone.) We shall also examine the significance of emphasis through repetition, insistence and persistence.

Tone is deliberately created by what we shall call the 'orientation' of a nation's tactics. A nation's tactics in negotiation can in principle be 'placed' on each of the following spectra: (1) flexible - intransigent; (2) amicable - hostile; and (3) optimistic ('accentuating the positive') - pessimistic ('accentuating the negative'). The tone of a negotiation is the resultant of the orientations of the participants. The methods of classification will be briefly explained and discussed in turn.

It should be said immediately that it cannot be simply inferred from the orientation of a nation's tactics whether it 'desires agreement' or not. Whatever the negotiating stance, pressures of some kind for agreement will be set up - directly or indirectly - in the opponent's camp. For example intransigence may persuade the opponent to make his concessions where flexibility would not. We cannot even - except by benefit of hindsight - infer from a nation's stance what its next move is likely to be. For example tactical intransigence may be combined with strategic flexibility. This description fits Soviet
negotiating behaviour from February to May, 1955. On the other hand the West usually advertises its strategic flexibility by 'thinking aloud' well in advance of actual policy changes. Moch's interventions late in the 1955 Sub-Committee come to mind, as well as British activity to promote the idea of on-site inspection quotas at the test talks.

(1) Tactical flexibility is defined as a negotiating stance which professes readiness to find and help enlarge areas of agreement. It puts forward its proposals tentatively and rejects the opponent's proposals constructively. In the 1956 Sub-Committee Stassen's position on his own proposals was a paradigm of flexibility. April 3, 1956 was put forward, according to a note in the text itself, as 'not binding upon any one of the five Governments'. Manpower levels given in the plan were 'for illustrative purposes only'. Introducing a further Summary Memorandum \(^{119}\) on May 3, Stassen said it was 'not intended to indicate any change' in U.S. policy.

Rather it is to be regarded as a further indication that the United States Government is not rigid in its attitude....For example, the summary memorandum...makes no reference to a preliminary armaments regulation

commission. That does not mean that we do not continue to think that some preliminary organisation might be advisable. It does mean, however, that we do not have rigid ideas.  

Stassen's attitude was so flexible as to render U.S. policy nebulous. While the tactical flexibility of France represented by Moch did not lead to all the strategic changes hinted at, it may be said that Soviet tactical flexibility was routine and perfunctory in the years under study. As mentioned before, Soviet policy decisions seem to have been taken in Moscow and often kept secret from Soviet negotiators until publicly announced. 

Intransigent adherence to one's proposal is expressed by declaring that one has made a 'final' or 'maximum' offer on a point, or that one's plan is the only basis for agreement and must be agreed to in toto. Intransigence is intensified by repetition of these formulae, and of arguments in support of the plan. (Repeated resubmission of a plan also enhances intransigence.) We shall consider some examples. 

The original Western staffing plan at the test ban conference proposed that there be only a few 'observers' from the host country at control posts. Wadsworth put 

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120 DC/SC.1/PV.85, p. 4.
forward the plan
tentatively...this is a question which in a working draft form we would be willing to discuss at considerable length in order to arrive at an adjustment...121

However, when the West agreed to one third of the staffs being host country nationals on July 17, 1959, Wadsworth declared that

it must be understood that this is our final offer on control post staffs and that we can make no further concessions.122

Tsarapkin also became intransigent after several Soviet concessions.

Having agreed that one third of the staff ...may be foreign we have now reached our limit.123

Nevertheless both sides moved further together. (They were agreed that one third should be U.S. or U.K. nationals and one third Soviet nationals.) In December 1959 the Soviets proposed that the 'third third' be itself divided into thirds - neutral, Western and Eastern.124 The West did not accept the Eastern division of the third third, but

121 GEN/DNT/PV.25, December 15, 1958, p. 23.
122 GEN/DNT/PV.112, July 17, 1959, p. 12. (Provisional Text)
123 GEN/DNT/PV.118, August 3, 1959, p. 11.
124 GEN/DNT/PV.148, December 14, 1959, p. 11.
its staffing proposal of May 9, 1960 required the Administrator to appoint the third third of the staff in 'such proportions that the legitimate interests of the Parties...including the original parties, will not be prejudiced'.

The remaining distance between Eastern and Western positions on this issue was never bridged.

The other face of intransigence is emphatic rejection of the opponent's proposals. In the previous section we noticed that the Soviet tactical intransigence of February-May 1955 proved misleading. However it was effective in one instance. Malik declared on March 30 that the West's proposal of March 8 to 'relegate' the prohibition of atomic weapons to a 'final, remote and unspecified stage' was 'unacceptable' - a 'pernicious residuum of the "Baruch Plan" which must be removed'. This argument was often repeated. On April 19, bowing to this pressure, the West proposed the '75 per cent arrangement' whereby prohibition of use and elimination of nuclear weapons were to begin not after conventional reductions had been completed, but simultaneously with the beginning of the final quarter of

125 DNT/89.
126 DC/SC.1/PV.36, in Cmd. 9649, pp. 292-3.
armament and force reductions.

The West in general was less tactically intransigent than the East in the period under study; its stance was also less consistent, not only because of inter-allied differences and because the personalities of Western negotiators were more in evidence, but because neither collectively nor individually, except on rare occasion, do the Western negotiators seem to have adopted any stance deliberately. For example Eaton in 1960 wavered between a flexible negotiating stance and outspoken denunciations of Soviet policy. On April 5 he attacked the 'total unreality' of the Soviet plan, but immediately went on -

I hope my remarks will not be treated as destructive criticism. My intentions are ...to point out some of the major differences which exist...127

There is little evidence that tactical intransigence is either (a) believed in or (b) effective in persuading opponents. However it is clearly useful, as we saw in the test ban example, in signalling one's approach to one's final offer. For tactical intransigence to become convincing, its practitioner would have to establish a reputation for sincerity - for example by assigning a

time limit to his offers and refusing to negotiate thereafter. Of course even if the opponent can be convinced that a final offer has been made the chances of agreement will not necessarily improve.

(2) Direct expression of hostility to the opponent is quite rare even though some criticisms and some examples of intransigence imply it strongly. Hostility becomes explicit in such tactics as impugning sincerity, discovering unworthy motives behind a proposal - for example propaganda, espionage or deliberate attempt to gain 'advantages' - and attributing blame for the failure to agree: Amicable tactics are even rarer than hostile tactics except at the beginning of negotiations, or in a period of carefully cultivated détente such as followed the summit conference of 1955. Amicable tactics consist of congratulating the opponent for shunning propaganda, or for the uprightness of the motives behind his proposal.

(3) Optimism about the prospects for agreement appears either baselessly - again, usually at the beginning of negotiation - or on a reasoned basis of agreements noted and emphasized. However the decision whether to add up agreements or disagreements is always really arbitrary, and usually expresses a deliberately chosen tactical orientation, especially on the Eastern side. Pessimism of
course is never permitted to appear without good reasons given, and, although emphasizing of disagreements need not lead to denunciation, it usually does.

The Soviet Union's negotiators use optimism and pessimism as a deliberate tactic, and are capable of sustaining the one or the other for many meetings together. On April 8, 1960 the Soviet delegate tabled a document entitled "Basic Principles of General and Complete Disarmament". It was submitted in order to define a possible common basis for our further work, and for several meetings the Soviet delegate stressed the alleged 'rapprochement' which had taken place, and which the 'principles' were meant to confirm. There had been agreement on the goal ('set by life itself') of general and complete disarmament, on the 'special importance' of nuclear rocket disarmament, on the need for radical conventional disarmament, and on the need for stages, and so on. The list was not impressive, and the West would not be induced to share Soviet optimism or agree to the 'principles', which Moch chose to regard as old proposals in new disguise.

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128 TNCD/4, in Cmd. 1152, p. 923.
129 TNCD/PV.19, April 8, 1960, in Cmd. 1152, p. 368.
130 Ibid., p. 372.
Soviet pessimism tended to appear towards the end of negotiations – notably in 1957 and 1960. It was then coupled with both hostility and intransigence as I have defined them, and was used to justify breaking off negotiation in 1960. Both in 1957 and 1960 the turn to calculated hostility predated major Western proposals – August 29, 1957 and June 27, 1960, respectively. On August 27, 1957 Zorin read a Soviet Government Statement into the Sub-Committee record which declared that there had been no progress in negotiation, that the West was accelerating the arms race, that NATO was increasingly aggressive, and that the talks were a 'cover' for Western misbehaviour. The statement went on to vindicate Soviet policy and attacked Western proposals in detail. A similar statement was read by Zorin on June 27, 1960 before Eaton could table the new United States proposal.

(Deliberately heating up the propaganda cold war towards the end of a negotiation which is clearly not going to succeed must seem natural to Soviet policy makers, but the device was also used sporadically in the test talks by both

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131 DC/SC.1/PV.151, p. 3.
132 Ibid., pp. 3-32.
133 TNCD/PV.4, in Cmd. 1152, pp. 879-83.
sides. The American State Department, for example, in a press release of February 3, 1959, strongly attacked the Soviet proposals of January 30\textsuperscript{134} for extensive use of the veto by original parties in the control organization as making 'a shambles' of the whole project of control.\textsuperscript{135}

SECTION C. THE APPEAL FOR CLARITY : THE USES OF VAGUENESS

Vagueness of proposals may be desirable from the viewpoint of obtaining agreement for two reasons. Excessive detail would clog the work of negotiators attempting to isolate areas of possible agreement, and some issues must be left to the control organization and to future negotiation and adjustment between the parties.\textsuperscript{136} However, the vagueness of a proposal may be inadvertent. The U.S. delegate to the test talks, Popper, has already been quoted in Part Two for his reference to 'problems of whose existence we were originally only dimly aware'.\textsuperscript{137} We shall be chiefly interested in

\textsuperscript{134} GEN/DNT/29, in Geneva Conference, p. 334.
\textsuperscript{135} Documents on Disarmament, vol. II, p. 1361.
\textsuperscript{136} See Schelling and Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control, op. cit., pp. 87-8.
\textsuperscript{137} GEN/DNT/PV.246, p. 26. (Provisional text)
vagueness which is intentional and contentious - that is, which the proponent was probably aware of when he formulated his plan, and which the opponent seeks to have removed.

Vagueness of commitment arises not only in connection with one's current plans, but from avoiding a clear statement of position on one's own past plans and also from resisting the opponent's demand for an explicit response to his own current plans. This section also deals with contentious vagueness which is a result not of a proposal but of military secrecy which makes the effect of a proposal unclear.

First we shall mention vagueness which is not due to lack of detail but to (alleged) ambiguity in proposals. Negotiators, especially Westerners, are fond of adumbrating multiple alternative hypotheses about the meaning of the opponent's plans. In 1955 Moch and Nutting frequently wondered aloud what the Soviet political proposals of May 10 implied. Sobolev merely replied that the Draft Declaration in which they appeared was 'still valid'.

The demand for detail or precision is accompanied by a polite threat - explicit or implicit - not to agree to the opponent's wording because of the offending vagueness.

At the test talks, Tsarapkin refused to agree to the Western draft of an article providing for establishment in parties' territory of 'the necessary elements of the detection and indentification system'. The Soviet draft provided for 'an agreed number of control posts'.

In 1956 the Anglo-French plan, March 19, made no specific proposal on force levels. Gromyko enquired 'whether the former proposal /of March 29, 1955...is still in force'. At the next meeting Nutting replied that force levels were 'subject to negotiation', and later he said they were 'a detail', not to be settled before there was agreement on the 'principle' of a three stage plan. (In logic, any specific proposal for a time limit or a force level, etc. is a 'detail', but some details are more detailed than others. Nutting's was a remarkable claim.)

Whereas the West tends to be non-committal on ends the Soviets incline to regard means - control - as a matter of detail. Western delegates in 1955 repeatedly asked

\[139\] GEN/DNT/PV.33, January 9, 1959, p. 16.
\[140\] DC/SC.1/PV.70, March 21, 1956, p. 3.
\[141\] PV.71, March 22, 1956, p. 2.
\[142\] Ibid., p. 5.
questions about the meaning of the passage in the Soviet proposal of March 18, 1955 which provided for the control organ to possess

its own staff of inspectors having, within the bounds of the control function they exercise, unimpeded access to all objects of control.\textsuperscript{143}

Malik invited the West to devise a formula to establish which objects should be subject to control.

Are we to include everything from private apartments to atomic undertakings?\textsuperscript{144}

Moch improvised a formula concerning the number of kilowatts used by an 'establishment'.\textsuperscript{145} Later in the year the British delegation tabled a Memorandum on 'methods, objects and rights of inspection',\textsuperscript{146} but Sobolev made no response except to ask whether the memorandum was meant to apply to radical proposals like those of March 8 and May 10. Nutting said it was.\textsuperscript{147}

\textsuperscript{143} DC/SC.1/19/Rev. 1, in Cmd. 9636, p. 26. This plan was the precursor of May 10, 1955.
\textsuperscript{144} DC/SC.1/PV.42, April 20, 1955, in Cmd. 9650, p. 463.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., p. 465.
\textsuperscript{146} DC/SC.1/34, September 13, 1955, in Cmd. 9636, p. 61.
\textsuperscript{147} DC/SC.1/PV.60, September 14, 1955, in Cmd. 9652, p. 850.
Only the West seeks to elicit secret military information from the opponent. In March 1955 Moch asked Gromyko whether...he would be good enough to tell us what figures would result for the Soviet and Chinese forces from the one-third cut.  

Gromyko refused, but promised that:

In the event of agreement being reached... all the states concerned will have to furnish the necessary information.

Wadsworth at the same meeting felt 'slightly sarcastic' about Gromyko's demand for a specific timing proposal from the West. He likened the demand to the question -

...how long will it take to get from here to there? -

with the location of 'here' and 'there' being unknown. That is, the West would withhold a specific timing proposal until the Soviets revealed their current force level. Wadsworth also declared that 'if Mr. Gromyko will not tell us what effect his proposal would have on the forces of the Soviet Union, I fail to see how he can ask us to agree to it'. Threats and retorts of this kind can and

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149 Ibid., p. 217.  
150 Ibid., p. 197.  
151 Ibid., p. 216.  
do become a vicious circle. The Soviets did not in fact publicize figures on their force level until January 1960.  

Criticizing the vagueness of the commitment of the opponent to his own past plans is an amicable version of the demand for strategic stability. Malik spent the closing weeks of the 1955 Sub-Committee chiefly in eliciting a response to the question: 'Do the Western powers still abide by their radical proposals?' All the Western delegates except Stassen declared that they did. Stassen refused to go beyond his celebrated 'reservation' of 'pre-Geneva positions' on September 6.

...we are not disavowing any of them. But...we do not now reaffirm them.  

The first and basic reply to the demand for a response to an opponent's proposal is to say that you are still studying it. (To some extent, delaying a response while 'study' continues conveys an image of flexibility and care, and such delay may be genuine. Delay may also have an 'ulterior' motive. The opportune time to attack an unacceptable proposal is not immediately but when it has lost some of its original appeal. Thus the Soviet Union did not reject the Open Skies plan in 1955, but when the

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152 See Table 1.

153 DC/SC.1/PV.55, in Cmd. 9651, p. 746.
Western delegations appeared with similar ideas at the surprise attack conference of 1958 the Eastern rejection was immediate and emphatic.

SECTION D. THE PROCEDURAL STRUGGLE

The question of procedure gives rise to a tactical struggle in so far as the sides attempt to control each other's negotiating behaviour. The struggle may be limited but cannot be abolished by agreement on agenda and method of discussion, for substantive conflicts tend strongly to manifest themselves in procedural disagreements.

Except in the 1957 Sub-Committee there was no explicit agreement on agenda and method of work at general disarmament talks. It was agreed, however, that negotiations should be 'confidential'. The meaning of this in practice varied much from year to year. Its 'minimum' meaning was that the press would not be admitted to meetings. Its 'maximum' meaning was that the secrecy of information and views conveyed at purely private meetings (i.e. those held without benefit of verbatim record) would be preserved. This situation is best explained by tracing the origins of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission and the history of the secrecy rule.
The Disarmament Commission has always held its debates in public. A General Assembly resolution of November 1953 'suggested' that the Disarmament Commission study the desirability of establishing a sub-committee of the Powers principally involved, which should seek in private an acceptable solution and report to the Disarmament Commission as soon as possible. 154

The Sub-Committee was duly established by the Disarmament Commission in April 1954. The procedure agreed to by the five Sub-Committee powers in 1954 was reaffirmed in 1955. Dr. Protitch, the Representative of the Secretary-General, reminded delegates of it at the first meeting of 1955. It had been agreed

that there should be no specific rules of procedure but that all decisions of the Sub-Committee should be taken by general and unanimous agreement...[and] that the meetings should be strictly closed and private, with the possibility that occasionally the representatives of the Sub-Committee might meet even without a record being made by the Secretariat.... In the past no press information has been given except through the official communiqué. 155

Although 'It was so decided' appears in the verbatim record, 156 Gromyko immediately made the following qualification:

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154 Resolution 715 (VIII), A/2630, November 28, 1953. The vote was 54-0-5; the Soviet Union abstained.
156 Ibid.
It sometimes happens that during the discussions on a particular question information about the Soviet Union's position...leaks out to the press; and its position is often considerably misrepresented and described without objectivity....That being so we reserve the right to issue appropriate explanations to the press if need arises.157

The Western delegations promised not to indulge in 'leaks', expressed mild disapproval of the Soviet statement, but acquiesced in it.158 It was always understood that verbatim records and proposals would be released in time for the General Assembly debates towards the end of the year, but it was not understood that proposals would be released as they were made.159 The Soviets broke with convention, according to the West, when reports of the Soviet proposal of February 25, 1955 appeared in various Communist newspapers.160 Mr. Gromyko denied that his delegation had leaked anything, and argued that the reports did not in any case contain matter not already publicized in a Soviet Government declaration of February 18.161 In

157 Ibid., p. 3.
158 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
159 See U.K. delegate's statement, ibid., p. 3.
point of fact, the Western delegations themselves were known to be continuing to support the Anglo-French proposal of June 11, 1945. Moreover, the three new Western proposals introduced and widely publicized at the Summit Conference in July were all taken up in the Sub-Committee in August. The U.S. proposal, in particular, was promulgated very emphatically outside the Sub-Committee during negotiations.

Thus the secrecy which the sides had agreed to was a relative thing - a temporary, but annually renewable moratorium on using disarmament negotiations for propaganda - and when the Soviets eroded it the West felt unable to use sanctions stronger than complaint. The Soviets incurred disapproval again when they released, during Sub-Committee sessions, the entire text of their plan of May 10, 1955, which had not been foreshadowed outside the Sub-Committee at all. Moch declared that the Soviet decision to publish 'signified nothing less than the decline of the

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162 DC/SC.1/9.
Sub-Committee'; but the Western delegations again eschewed sanctions. 164

The secrecy rule was not an issue in the 1956 Sub-Committee; the Western powers had come to accept the impossibility of keeping new proposals completely secret or preventing delegations commenting to the press about the progress and course of the negotiations - whether 'out of the blue' or in retaliation for another delegation's doing so. However even this degree of breach of secrecy apparently did not satisfy the Soviets in 1957. In the closing days of the Sub-Committee Zorin declared that

the Western Powers have compelled the Sub-Committee to work secretly, in private, with the result that public opinion has been kept in ignorance, and has on many occasions been completely misinformed about the true state of affairs in the Sub-Committee. This situation apparently suits the ruling groups of the Western Powers. It enables them to use the secrecy of the Sub-Committee's work as a pretext for evading direct answers to questions about the progress of the talks raised in parliament and by the Press, and to make out that serious talks are taking place, whereas in actual fact the talks are making no progress. 165

165 DC/SC.1/PV.151, August 27, 1957, pp. 28-9.
Despite this statement, and the campaign for open negotiations in an enlarged Disarmament Commission which it heralded, the Soviets entered yet another confidential negotiation - to ban nuclear tests - in 1958, and even the general disarmament negotiations of 1960 were permitted to be conducted under the old rules. There was no controversy on secrecy early or late in the Ten Nation talks. The impact of fully confidential negotiation on tactics will be discussed in the next chapter. The theory underlying the Soviet belief in open negotiation is taken up in Part Four, Chapter 1 concerning disarmament propaganda.

Conflicts, or rather complaints, concerning method and order of discussion occurred throughout the period under study. In 1955-6 Western delegates complained frequently about lack of method in negotiation. In April, 1955 Moch was

not certain that our procedure of flitting from subject to subject is very logical.... However I am not sure that we shall alter our methods.166

Wadsworth agreed on the first point.

...if...we could...take up one subject and exhaust it, and then move in an orderly way to another subject...we would not have either to revert...to what I have termed distortions

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166 DC/SC.1/PV.40, April 6, 1955, in Cmd. 9649, p. 405.
of what we say...or to ask over and over again for the answer to a question which has already been answered categorically.167

Late in the 1955 Sub-Committee Moch proposed several times that the method of *seriatim* discussion of issues be employed to build an agreed 'synthesis' from the conflicting proposals. In 1956, having made a synthetic proposal (*March 19, 1956*) which was not acceptable to the Soviet Union, Moch suggested that the Sub-Committee try the method 'of reaching agreement on each point by itself, subject...to final agreement on the whole' - that is, governments could reject what their negotiators had accomplished.168 Gromyko declined to follow the suggestion on the ground that the question of comprehensive (Western) as against conventional (Soviet) disarmament 'is not simply a procedural one'.169

However in 1957 the Soviet view changed. At the opening Sub-Committee session the British Foreign Secretary, Lloyd, suggested

that when the opening discussions are over the Sub-Committee might profitably consider whether it would be possible to investigate

each of the important aspects of a disarmament agreement in turn. This might be done without rigidly insisting at the outset on the manner in which particular issues under examination would, if agreement were reached, eventually be fitted into the framework of a disarmament treaty.170

This method required rather less commitment of governments during examination of the issues than Moch's suggestion. At the 88th meeting Zorin agreed to it, provided that the year's discussions began with 'an exchange of views on the general problems of disarmament'.

Then, when some progress has been made in our discussions on important matters, our work could become even more detailed, and concrete proposals could be worked out for subsequent incorporation in our agreement.171

The Western delegates acquiesced reluctantly in Zorin's first suggestion, and general debate continued for several meetings. At the 92nd meeting Moch proposed discussion of seven particular items to be considered in turn, beginning with conventional disarmament, because 'this is obviously the item on which agreement would most easily be achieved'.172

Zorin, speaking for the Soviet Union which was pressing for

170 DC/SC.1/PV.87, March 18, 1957, p. 9.
172 DC/SC.1/PV.92, March 26, 1957, pp. 2-3.
separate agreement on tests,\textsuperscript{173} wanted the test ban
discussed first rather than fourth because 'this problem
is stirring up feeling' and 'is the simplest of all'.\textsuperscript{174}
Negotiations on the test ban had begun. The West continued
to resist Zorin's procedure at the 92nd meeting, and at
the 93rd meeting this exchange took place:

\begin{quote}
Moch: ...if we do not accept his point of view,
does Mr. Zorin intend that his delegation
should withdraw and that we should end
this session?

Zorin: ...I explained that the Western delegations
seemed to me to wish to end our discussion
of the question whether we should or should
not examine the problem of tests. I did
say that it would be lamentable if that
were so; that is, if we suspended discussion
of that problem as a result of the position
the Western delegations have taken.\textsuperscript{175}
\end{quote}

Moch had virtually invited Zorin to make a threat, and
Zorin had very nearly made one. Stassen, chairman for the
day, recessed the meeting in order that delegates might
decide 'whether we shall adjourn until tomorrow'.\textsuperscript{176}

Resuming the meeting 35 minutes later, Stassen spoke up to

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[174] DC/SC.1/PV.92, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 9.
\item[175] DC/SC.1/PV.93, March 27, 1957, p. 14.
\item[176] \textit{Ibid.}, p. 15.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
'suggest' a solution of the agenda crisis, which put nuclear tests first. After the test item came:

second, conventional disarmament; third international control organization; fourth, nuclear disarmament; fifth, missiles; sixth, zones of armament limitation and inspection; seventh, other disarmament matters. 177

Zorin, however, refusing to follow the British delegate's plea not to 'look a gift horse in the mouth', 178 succeeded in holding the West to a promise made at the previous meeting that nuclear disarmament would be discussed before the control organization. 179

Subject-by-subject discussion was interrupted by discussion of the Soviet partial disarmament plan of April 30 and resumed again after the recess of May 16-27, with the West injecting the constituent elements of its ultimate comprehensive proposal piecemeal, and the Soviet Union making its first proposal for a controlled test ban on June 14. The formal Western comprehensive partial proposal was not tabled until August 29.

Both the test conference of October 31, 1958 and the surprise attack conference of November 10, 1958 attempted to adopt an agenda, but both failed to register agreement

177 Ibid., p. 17.
178 Ibid., p. 19.
179 Ibid., pp. 25-7.
and proceeded without agenda. However, although no agenda was adopted at the test conference a rational method of work did evolve. This cannot be said of the surprise attack conference.

At the first meeting of the test conference Tsarapkin tabled a draft treaty which was to be discussed and agreed immediately. It provided for an immediate end to tests. The control system was to be agreed later, and separately. The West proposed (in the words of Ormsby-Gore) 'that our first substantive item should be examination of the requirements for a control organization'. Without waiting for agreement on an agenda, the West tabled working papers on control. Finally, on November 29, the Soviet Union capitulated by agreeing 'that the basic provisions regarding control should be embodied in the actual text of the agreement'.

At the second meeting of the surprise attack conference Foster submitted a 'Plan of Work' providing for

\[\text{\tiny 180} \quad \text{GEN/DNT/PV.1, p. 25.}\]
\[\text{\tiny 181} \quad \text{Ibid., p. 11.}\]
\[\text{\tiny 182} \quad \text{GEN/DNT/PV.5, November 6, 1958, pp. 4-5. PV.8, November 13, 1958, p. 5.}\]
\[\text{\tiny 183} \quad \text{GEN/DNT/PV.15, p. 9.}\]
study of 'the objects of control', the 'means of control', 'the application of inspection and observation techniques to the problem of surprise attack', and 'general technical characteristics of systems to reduce the threat of surprise attack'. Kuznetsov proposed 'adoption of the following agenda':

1. Exchange of opinions on practical steps that can be taken now with a view to preventing the danger of a surprise attack and on partial measures to be carried out in conjunction with those steps.

2. Consideration of the tasks of ground control posts and aerial photography.

3. Preparation of the experts' report to...

This time there was no relenting on either side; the conflict over agenda neatly reflected a policy divergence more fundamental than the one revealed early in the tests conference.

The method of work adopted almost de facto at the test conference was for both sides to submit draft articles which would be rejected, amended, or agreed to by the other. Throughout 1959-60 both sides refrained from submitting a

184 GEN/SA/PV.2, November 17, 1958, p. 7.
185 Ibid., p. 22.
draft treaty and slowly built up a substantial part of
an agreement by the method of accretion.\textsuperscript{186}

In 1960, although the Western powers made a
three-stage radical general disarmament proposal on March
16,\textsuperscript{187} the burden of all their procedural suggestions was
as stated by Eaton at the first meeting.

Our most urgent task is...to sort out, to
define and to agree on those initial steps
which will bring increased security to each
nation....When these first steps have been
agreed, we should then proceed to design those
final measures necessary to attain the
ultimate goal.\textsuperscript{188} \textit{i.e.} general and complete
disarmament.

The East insisted that the Committee agree first 'in
principle' on general and complete disarmament.\textsuperscript{189} At the
fourteenth meeting the Bulgarian delegate objected to 'the
fact that each weekend we are asked to consider a measure
in the Western plan, as though we were concerned with one
measure only'.\textsuperscript{190}

\textsuperscript{186}
The Western Two submitted their first draft treaty for
banning tests on April 18, 1961. See \textit{Geneva Conference},
p. 475.
\textsuperscript{187}
TNCD/3, in Cmd. 1152, p. 921. See Part Two, Chapter 1.
\textsuperscript{188}
TNCD/PV.1, March 15, 1960, in Cmd. 1152, p. 25.
\textsuperscript{189}
Speech by Zorin, \textit{ibid.}, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{190}
TNCD/PV.14, April 1, 1960, in Cmd. 1152, p. 279.
At intervals\textsuperscript{191} Eaton listed the steps proposed in the Western first stage as being suitable for immediate agreement, but the West did not make formal proposals for partial disarmament in 1960. Zorin refused to adopt a method which would "divert us" from "the basic task"\textsuperscript{192} (general and complete disarmament).

Western patience began to wear thin towards the recess for the planned summit conference. Moch declared that if a mutually acceptable solution is the Soviet solution accepted with hands and feet tied, then it seems to me pointless to continue these negotiations.\textsuperscript{193}

These were stronger words than he had provoked Zorin to use in 1957 during the incident discussed above, but it was the Soviet delegation which walked out - without notice - in 1960.

The West consistently in our period sought to establish joint technical expert discussions of various kinds in parallel with political negotiations on comprehensive disarmament. The East never agreed. The two expert conferences which did meet were established by correspondence in 1958. However, we shall study some of

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{191}] E.g., TNCD/PV.23, April 14, 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 437.
\item[\textsuperscript{192}] TNCD/PV.25, April 20, 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 459.
\item[\textsuperscript{193}] TNCD/PV.30, April 27, 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 562.
\end{itemize}
the Western suggestions and the rationale of Soviet rejection.

Although expert talks were suggested several times in 1955-6 it was not until 1957 that the West made a concentrated effort to involve the Soviet Union in such discussion. It was this effort which bore fruit in 1958. At the first meeting of the 1957 Sub-Committee Lloyd suggested forming 'technical working groups' to 'investigate in greater detail any issues we might refer to them', while the Sub-Committee continued 'its consideration of matters of principle'. On July 17 Lloyd recalled that various Western delegates in the preceding months had proposed particular working groups on control of fissionable materials production, the relation of conventional armaments to manpower and the definition of manpower. He also recalled the Western proposal of July 2 for a group to study a control system for the test ban. Finally he suggested a technical examination of ground and aerial inspection to guard against surprise attack.

194 DC/SC.1/PV.87, March 18, 1957, p. 10.
195 DC/SC.1/59
196 Lloyd mentioned 'the composition, the powers and the voting procedures of the international control commission' as 'matters of technical detail'! - DC/SC.1/PV.137, p. 8.
197 Ibid., pp. 6-8.
Zorin responded at the next meeting. After surveying the disagreements visible in the Sub-Committee he declared 'that the basic problems before us are unfortunately still unsettled'.

Can such working groups help us to reach agreement on these problems? ... I cannot help wondering whether Mr. Lloyd's proposal is not intended as a response to the continuously increasing pressure of public opinion, which is calling upon us, not to create an illusion of progress, but to come to a genuine agreement on the major questions of a partial disarmament agreement. 198

However, Zorin went on to say that the Soviet delegation 'will also be ready to discuss the technical details of these problems in working committees, as soon as we have achieved genuine agreement on all these problems'. 199

In fact the Soviet Union agreed to expert talks on test ban control before 'genuine agreement' was reached on the questions of principle, but the West's position on the test ban had evolved even further under Soviet pressure by that time (July, 1958). It seems to be a basic Soviet tactic to use the promise of joining in expert talks (that is, also the threat of not joining in) as a lever to force the West

199 Ibid., p. 15.
to change its positions of principle. Except at the political test ban talks (which were, in any case, far more technical than any other political negotiation of the period) the Soviets have never consented to join in expert talks while political talks were proceeding. (Of the two sets of expert talks which they did join, one - the Experts' Conference - seemed likely to promote an evolution of Western policy, while the other - on surprise attack - they treated virtually as a conventional political negotiation.) On the other hand the West, in 1958, encouraged the Soviets to join in technical discussions by seeming to suggest that expert talks would make compromise decisions of principle easier for the West to take. 200

Western proposals for supplementary expert talks and the results of them at the test conference itself were mentioned in Part Two, Chapter 2. It is worth remarking here that the West pioneered a new technique for putting pressure on the opponent to agree to expert talks at that conference. The U.S. delegate simply tabled and publicized technical reports which were thought to indicate

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200 See, for example, letter from Eisenhower to Khrushchev, April 28, 1958, in Documents on Disarmament, vol. II, p. 1007; 'Studies of this kind are the necessary preliminary to putting political decision actually into effect'.

the need for joint discussions. The tabling of the Berkner Report and other data on seismic detection led to the joint discussions of November 1959.

In the 1960 general disarmament negotiations the West continued, although less emphatically, to propose expert working groups in parallel with negotiations, but it had also proposed that joint studies be held before and during the various stages of disarmament in order to prepare for measures to come. On June 14 Martino, the Italian delegate, welcomed the Soviet's agreement to some of these provisions in its plan of June 2. However, he went on to propose a 'working party' to study and recommend which other questions should be studied.201

Zorin replied immediately with a new argument which nevertheless was closely akin to the routine argument he used in 1957.

If the Italian representative regards these studies as a means of settling the question whether disarmament is possible or not, that confirms the impression that certain delegations have come here not to carry out the mandate of the United Nations General Assembly, but for other purposes.202

201 TNCD/PV.38, June 14, 1960, in Cmd. 1152, p. 713.
202 Ibid., p. 721.
While the West strives to involve the East in technical studies, the East occasionally makes proposals which have more political content than a proposal in a disarmament forum should have, according to the West. Western delegates in the 1955 Sub-Committee refused to discuss, while guardedly welcoming, the political portions of the May 10 proposal. It was mentioned in Section A that Nutting refused to discuss the Soviet proposal of March 27, 1956 for arms control in Germany. The plea of incompetence is also used at technical talks to resist discussion of proposals which are held to be appropriate only to disarmament negotiations. At the Geneva Experts' Conference Fisk for the United States at the opening meeting hoped

that this inquiry can be kept exclusively technical. Our side is not empowered to discuss or reach decisions on any political matter. 203

Fedorov for the Soviet Union was not deterred. At the same meeting he declared

that the purpose of our conference...is the all-round cessation of nuclear and hydrogen tests. In our view, only for that purpose is it worth spending time on a discussion of the technical aspects....do you agree that

the work of the experts should and must lead to a solution to the main problem, namely the cessation of tests...204

The Western experts resisted until July 4 when Fedorov signalled defeat by proposing a technical agenda which the Westerners promptly accepted.205

This was not the only example of Soviet efforts to broaden discussion at the Experts' Conference. From July 30 to August 12 the Eastern experts tried, unsuccessfully, to secure agreement that control post personnel be recruited entirely from among nationals of the host country.206

Western procedural resistance to Soviet disarmament proposals made at the surprise attack conference was mentioned in Part Two, Chapter 1. The rationale was the same as Fisk had used. Foster declared that

these proposals in the disarmament field are not within the jurisdiction of this Conference. The Western experts are not political representatives and are not authorized to discuss general disarmament proposals.207

The Western experts might easily have been suspected of cynicism (or naivety) in binding themselves to such

204 Ibid., pp. 31-2.
205 See ibid., p. 32.
206 See ibid., pp. 32-3.
207 GEN/SA/PV.3, November 12, 1958, p. 10.
narrow terms of reference that they were only permitted to discuss pure inspection and monitoring schemes.

So far we have discussed procedural suggestions and proposals which seek to lay down ground rules or modify in some way both sides' negotiating behaviour. To conclude, there are some attempts to secure unilateral changes in the opponent's behaviour which are worth noting.

The attempt to make a substantive gain by a procedural tactic is nowhere more blatant than in the suggestion that the opponent amend the offending parts of one's own proposal, which he can hardly do without accepting the rest of it in the first place. Demands for clarification, for details and for responses, which were dealt with in the previous section, fall in the category of attempts to control the opponent's behaviour, as do criticisms of the content and tone of the opponent's interventions. Tsarapkin at the test conference frequently attacked the West for its pessimistic speculations about possible violations of the treaty and for discussing provisions which would permit parties to free themselves from their obligations. At the thirteenth meeting Tsarapkin complained that:

We have not assumed any commitments here as yet, but we have already spent a fantastic amount of time discussing...under what
circumstances the agreement will have to be annulled...This is what you are talking about all the time.208

The East's desire in strategy to avoid detailed and specific commitment to the means of arms control is paralleled in tactics by a desire to limit discussion of the problems which the means of arms control must confront.

208 GEN/DNT/PV.13, November 25, 1958, p. 21.
APPENDIX

THE SEMANTIC COLD WAR

"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less."

"The question is," said Alice "whether you can make words mean so many different things."

"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be Master - that's all."

— Through the Looking Glass

Semantic disputation seems inevitably involved in negotiations for arms control. Each side strives (a) to appropriate commendatory terms for its own exclusive use and to resist the opponent's attempts to discredit them; and (b) to fasten pejorative terms onto the opponent's policies and to render his favoured terms pejorative if possible.

Although many terms might be considered here, discussion will be confined to usage of two words - 'control' and 'disarmament' - which most acutely reflect substantive conflicts.
'Control'

Soviet policy on inspection for disarmament underwent no dramatic changes in our period. In 1955, as in 1960, the Soviet opposed (a) active inspection by a control organ in advance of disarmament measures; (b) inspection of forces and armaments not actually being disbanded and disarmed. Curiously, in 1955 'control' was defined as (virtuous) inspection of disarmament, while the terms of disapprobation, 'disclosure' and 'verification', were employed to describe (vicious) inspection of armaments. On May 3 Malik attacked the Western disarmament plan in the following terms -

You propose that an international control organ should be established, positioned and brought into operation before any measures begin...We cannot agree to this. On this point it seems to us that you are proposing "disclosure" and "verification" instead of control....Any objective observer must inevitably conclude that this proposal represents not so much control as a plan for obtaining intelligence...209

By 1960 the Soviets still favoured 'strict international control' of disarmament, but Eastern negotiators had perceived the value of making 'arms control' a pejorative expression, perhaps because of its increasing popularity in

209 DC/SC.1/PV.44, in Cmd. 9650, p. 531.
the United States. At the 35th meeting of the Ten Nation Committee the Czech delegate attacked Eaton's suggestions for a first-stage plan because they 'represent nothing but control over armaments which could serve no other purpose than to seek intelligence data'.

Of course 'arms control' in the United States may mean restraint on arms competition as well as verification of armament levels. The Russian 'kontrol', like the French 'contrôle', means checking merely, and cannot mean restraint as well; but since the Russians have denied any merit to such measures as the nuclear cut-off, which are often called 'arms control' in the West, it is doubtful whether the Russians would abandon their hostility to 'arms control' if 'kontrol' had a wider range of meanings.

For the West's negotiators 'control' is entirely a term of approbation and there cannot be too much of whatever it describes. That a measure 'cannot be controlled' condemns it, and it is thus convenient to use the phrase simultaneously in different senses. Opposing the latest Soviet proposal (of April 30) for a ban on the use of nuclear weapons in 1957, Moch declared that

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we cannot place either the prohibition or
the renunciation of use, which cannot be
controlled...on the same footing as
cessation of production which can very
readily be controlled.211

Although nations cannot be physically restrained from
using nuclear weapons without world government, neither can
they be physically restrained from producing them. Both
measures are controllable in the sense that violations of
an agreement on them can be detected — especially violations
of a ban on use!

'Disarmament'

'Disarmament' is a widely accepted term of
commendation in East and West; each side has been anxious
to secure this label for its favourite measures at some
cost to semantic validity. The East has always denied the
title 'disarmament' to the nuclear cut-off, the fixing of
maximum force levels slightly above existing levels, and
other measures favoured by the West as 'partial measures
of disarmament'. That is perhaps reasonable, but at the
height of the campaign to ban nuclear tests Eastern
delegates occasionally bestowed the title 'disarmament' on
the test ban. At the first meeting of 1960 the Rumanian

211 DC/SC.1/PV.109, April 30, 1957, p. 36.
delegate criticized the absence from the Western plan of 'the only concrete measure of disarmament that was included in the former British plan for the first stage - the extension to all countries of the agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests'. In mid-1961, when Soviet ardour for the test ban had cooled, Tsarapkin had this to say at the test conference, rejecting separate agreement on tests:

...the problem of cessation of nuclear weapon tests can be dealt with only in conjunction with that of disarmament.... the Soviet Union will be prepared to sign immediately a treaty on general and complete disarmament and to agree to any control of disarmament...But it will not agree to control separated from disarmament.

That is, the test ban was now 'control separated from disarmament'.

In the negotiations of 1960 semantic disputation almost came to dominate substantive debate many times. At

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212 I.e. Foreign Secretary Lloyd's proposals to the General Assembly of September 17, 1959. See Part Two, Chapter 1, June 2, 1960.
213 TNC/C/PV.1, March 15, 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 17. The new Western plan was not tabled until March 16, although the State Department had released the text on March 14.
first (on March 16) the West sponsored a plan for 'general and comprehensive disarmament'. The East did not accept this form of words. At the third meeting the Czech delegate said:

The omission of one of these terms "general" and "complete" would mean that we should never attain our goal... to rule out forever the threat of war...215

However, the East was anxious to prove that the West was committed to general and complete disarmament nevertheless. At the fifth meeting the Bulgarian delegate quoted a speech of October 28, 1959 by Lodge in the General Assembly, which in turn quoted a speech by the British U.N. delegate, Ormsby-Gore, to the effect that (in the words of Ormsby-Gore) 'this single adjective "comprehensive" has the same meaning for us as the two adjectives "general" and "complete".'216 The East often reminded the West that General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of November, 1959, which was supported by the West, called for general and complete disarmament. And indeed at the second meeting of the Ten Nation Committee Ormsby-Gore had introduced the Western plan of March 16 in these terms:

216 TNCD/PV.5, March 21, 1960, in Cmd. 1152, p. 74.
The first basic principle is that the plan is a complete and comprehensive one...217

Having committed itself to a radical form of words, however, the West still showed uneasiness from time to time. Already at the fourth meeting Eaton had counted 135 uses of the words 'general and complete disarmament' and declared that:

They have... become hollow words, words shorn of all meaning.218

But it was not until the 30th meeting that a Westerner - Burns of Canada - probed deeply into the semantic question.

I would like to point out that in the plain meaning of language the /Soviet/ proposals are not for complete disarmament. Why not? Because they leave arms in the hands of police forces or militia...219

Of course, the same could have been said of the March 16 Western plan, which provided for national and international police forces. Nevertheless the West (or rather the United States) went on to propose, at last, a similar plan (June 2, 1960) actually entitled 'general and complete disarmament'.

218 TNCD/PV.4, March 18, 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 71.
219 TNCD/PV.30, April 27, 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 578.
CHAPTER 4

EVALUATION OF TACTICS:
THE UNSOLVED PROBLEM OF COMMUNICATION

Although the previous chapter made no pretence to be an exhaustive content analysis, it will be granted that the atmosphere of negotiations is more moralistic than realistic. The two test conferences were distinguished by the solid work done on drafting details, but even these negotiations were not remarkable for military realism.

Soviet negotiators are moralistic - more so than Western negotiators - in several distinct ways. They are self-righteous on behalf of their own government's military and disarmament policies - past, present and future, and they blame the West for the arms race and the failure of arms control. They deplore rather than analyse the existing military situation, and they argue for their own disarmament proposals in utopian rather than practical fashion by means of a sometimes almost mindless radicalism. They reject Western plans because they do not meet certain principled desiderata rather than because they would damage certain carefully stated interests. Soviet negotiators are
capable of practical reasoning - as when they claim that the Soviet Union needs a large land army to defend her frontiers, or that the Soviet Union has tested fewer atomic weapons than the United States. However they do not acknowledge Soviet superiority in land warfare or military intelligence gathering. Similarly, Western negotiators do not concede the value of Soviet secrecy in the nuclear balance, and regard the Red Army not as an important Soviet bargaining asset, but solely as a danger to be legislated into a position of equality with the Western conventional forces. Neither side acknowledges Western nuclear superiority.

Although East and West may have ways of establishing an effective dialogue about their military relations it is fairly certain that arms control negotiation is not one of them. The question arises whether this fact affects the chances of effective arms control. It is of course entirely possible that utopian and moralistic negotiation might lead to agreement, but there are reasons to doubt this which will be discussed below.

The questions which will be answered first are these: What is the effect of the quasi-ideological mutual indoctrination which constitutes so much of what is called
negotiations for arms control? What is the political effect of negotiating arguments, of the techniques for emphasizing a case, of the haze of vagueness which shrouds proposals, and of the techniques of procedural struggle?

Chapter 3 accomplished little more than setting out the varieties of negotiating tactics and speculating about the motives behind some of them. Except in a few cases, not enough evidence was presented to permit an attempt to determine the efficacy of these tactics. In any case such an enquiry presents formidable, possible insuperable, difficulties of method which must be mentioned here.

As pointed out in passing earlier,¹ the influences affecting a nation's arms control policy are numerous and varied. To isolate the influence of the tactics of the negotiating opponent would be always a work of considerable delicacy and uncertainty. We might accept a negotiator's account of the matter. For instance in 1955 Moch explained the concession of April 19 (which introduced the '75 per cent arrangement' for the timing of nuclear disarmament into the Western plan) as follows -

I am not at the moment discussing the merits of the Soviet argument with reference to the existence of an imbalance during the process

¹ See Chapter 2, "The Strategy of Negotiation".
of disarmament....But I must frankly admit that the misgivings voiced in regard to the balance of our plan have been so recurrent that they have...induced me to seek to set them at rest.2

In other words the emphatic Soviet tactics of early 1955, which were described at several points in Chapter 3, paid off.

Or one might take examples of a change of policy and investigate the negotiating record to discover how much strategic and tactical pressure, and of what kind, had been exerted by the opponent in favour of the change in question. Ciro Zoppo has described the process by which Eastern and Western policies on the test ban moved much closer together in 1957, and suggests that Russian tactics were highly effective in bringing about the Western shift, which was reluctantly executed.3 On the other hand Western pressure seems to have induced the Russians to propose a controlled test ban in June.

Taking a synoptic view it is clear that much of the time in negotiation there is a sort of gentleman's agreement concerning the type of plan which should be negotiated -

3 The Issue of Nuclear Test Cessation at the London Disarmament Conference of 1957, op. cit.
whether 'general and complete', or comprehensive but partial disarmament, or 'isolated measures' of various kinds, notably the test ban. The events of 1955 seem to have led to the dropping of total nuclear disarmament by both sides at the beginning of the 1956 negotiations. Western pressure for a comprehensive partial agreement early in 1957 seems to have persuaded the Soviet to drop its radical plan, March 18, on April 30. Unremitting Soviet pressure for the test ban in 1958 finally helped persuade the West to drop the link with disarmament early in 1959, as Western pressure persuaded the East to enter technical negotiations and discussions in 1958-9-60. The East jumped back onto the bandwagon of general and radical disarmament in 1959, and all the somewhat half-hearted Western efforts to coax it back to the terra firma of comprehensive but incomplete disarmament in 1960 were of no avail.

Thus the tactics of the opponent seem to influence both sides toward periodic conformity in determining whether a radical or moderate agreement will be sought. There are two other types of change in negotiating strategy which also seem to be influenced by opponents' tactics. These are (a) additions of detail, and (b) compromises at the level which negotiation has reached (as distinct from
compromises which bring both sides' strategies down - or up - towards the same level).

Under pressure and prompting from each other, East and West progressively disclosed policy on scores of issues - some at first but dimly perceived - raised by the controlled test ban from 1958-60. Subtraction of detail has also occurred, as when the Anglo-French failed to propose force levels in 1956, but it does seem unlikely to occur in a sustained negotiation like the test conference, when it is probably easier to hold the opponent to his commitments.

Once the type of issue which will be negotiated has been agreed (e.g. general and complete disarmament or test ban) compromises seem to be elicited by tactical pressure. There were striking examples of this process from March to May 1955 and at the test talks. There were no compromises of this kind in 1956: East and West did not 'find a level' on which to negotiate. In 1957 the Western position on comprehensive partial disarmament was not finally formulated until negotiations were almost over, although the Western negotiators (Stassen in particular) had taken

Although the Soviets virtually tore up the test accords of 1958-60 in 1961, this was not 'subtraction of detail', but withdrawal of principles.
some account of Soviet views in drawing it up - notably
on the questions of surprise attack and the test ban.
Once again in 1960 negotiators did not 'find a level'.
Although both sides made changes of timing in their
radical blueprints, ostensibly in deference to the other,
the West refused to negotiate radical disarmament in
detail before getting agreement to a first stage.

The chief significance of general disarmament
negotiation may be that it gives each side the opportunity
to exert tactical pressure in favour of negotiation for
isolated measures of arms control upon which agreement is
relatively easy. (Only a comprehensive agreement would
refute this interpretation.) Even negotiation about isolated
measures such as the test ban seems likely to generate
pressures for further subdivision of issues which were at
first regarded as indivisible. (This interpretation implies
that any sort of arms control negotiation is probably
conducive to agreement.) Although a sharp distinction
cannot be drawn between negotiation (including proposals)
about what to negotiate about and negotiation to draw up
an agreement, it is clear that the test ban talks of
1958–60 were predominantly of the latter kind, while general
disarmament negotiations are predominantly of the former kind.
An interesting question raised by the 1957 negotiations is whether an opportunity for agreement was lost. The considerable Soviet concessions of September 20, made after the Sub-Committee suspended meetings, were never considered in detail by the West, although they were a response to the Western plan of August 29. It is possible that both sides have had further concessions in mind when negotiation of an issue ceased, or when one side lost interest, although there is no evidence for this. The Soviets did complain that the United States ceased to negotiate radical disarmament after May 1955, but the Soviets did not modify their plan of May 10 in ways acceptable to the West during the closing weeks of the 1955 Sub-Committee. In the test ban negotiations the Western Two moved to meet many Soviet objections to Western proposals in 1961-2, after the Soviets lost interest in an internationally controlled agreement, and it is possible that these concessions might have been decisive had they been introduced in 1959-60. However there is no evidence that the Two had formulated these concessions in 1960.

Although tactics have an important function it is fairly certain that they are not effective in forcing changes in an opponent's policy as compared with concessions in strategy, war threats, arms and foreign
policy, although negotiating behaviour implies great confidence in the efficacy of tactics. There seems to be little point in 'storing' concessions since they will have far greater impact than tactical maneuver. It seems likely that for comprehensive plans, at any rate, Western accord is so difficult to attain that there is an overwhelming case for announcing a final offer early in negotiation, or at least deciding what it will be when the Western position is formulated. The burden of concession-making seems bound to rest more heavily on the Soviets than the West in comprehensive negotiations, because of their greater freedom to display strategic flexibility.

Of course even if it could be settled that a particular tactic was effective in inducing a change in an opponent's strategy, the significance of the change would still be a question. Changes in declaratory policy⁵ are by definition insignificant, and changes of or towards a radical policy have yet to be proved significant. Changes in declaratory policy will usually be made for reasons of propaganda, but so may changes in actual strategy. The 'legitimate' role of the propaganda struggle in producing agreement is considered in Part Four, Chapter 1.

⁵ See Chapter 1.
However we shall turn to study a proposal favoured by the contrary opinion which holds that 'genuine' negotiations are invariably swamped by the rough seas of propaganda. The proposal is for a radical reorganization of negotiations to ensure that what takes place is really confidential. In this way it is hoped that the moralistic atmosphere of negotiation might be overcome by abolishing the propaganda motive, and by permitting utterance of what may not be publicly pronounced. The aim is to improve communication and the possibilities of genuine bargaining between opponents.

A verbatim record ensures that each side knows exactly what the other has said, but the mere withholding of this transcript from the public for several months has done virtually nothing to remove the inhibitions to plain speaking and very little to filter out propaganda. A comparison of speeches at the open U.N. First Committee sessions with those at 'closed' Sub-Committee sessions will show this.

This is surprising at first glance. When the verbatim records are released they have no news value and they receive attention only from writers of books and theses and other specialists. In this they must be contrasted with letters exchanged between heads of state, the record of summit and other high level conferences, regular U.N.
debates, speeches by high government authorities and the like - all of which are better news and hence, a priori, more likely to be the means of making propaganda.

However, apart from propaganda concerns there may be several other inhibitions to plain speaking. Governments wish to appear consistent before world opinion and history, and hence the fact of the tradition of continuous public debate about disarmament means that any negotiation whose records are ever made public takes its tone from the negotiations which are inevitably public. Also, habits established in public may be difficult to break in private, especially if the privacy is only relative. It seems quite possible that unreal negotiation may mesmerize intelligent men. Jules Moch had publicly doubted the possibility of effective nuclear disarmament from the early 1950s, but the routine of French-sponsored proposals for total nuclear disarmament was not broken until after the famous Soviet statement on nuclear control in the proposal of May 10, 1955, which seems to have had a considerable impact on British and French thinking.6

The chief feature of a truly confidential negotiation would be confidential records, which, whether prepared

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6 See the verbatim records of the Sub-Committee, September 14-October 7, 1955, passim, in Cmd. 9652.
officially or by the delegations, would have to remain a guarded secret. Confidential discussion has taken place on occasion, most notably in Stassen's communication of new American proposals to the Soviet delegation in the 1957 Sub-Committee (which, however, ended in disaster for him), and there seems to be no insuperable obstacle to establishing a tradition, especially if the method were to be used merely to 'set up' formal negotiations. The method is not incompatible with a continuation of routine propaganda and even parallel negotiations in public.

The benefits that might be expected to flow from sustained confidential negotiation are both strategical and tactical. In tactics, the compulsion to denounce the opponent from time to time, especially when U.N. debates are impending, would vanish. Secrecy would encourage uninhibited assertion and acknowledgment of military interests, and frank exposition and criticism of arms control policies. The realism of debate in public is severely limited by considerations not only of ideology but of something which can only be called propriety. Moreover, military information which is a secret only to the public could be injected into discussions.

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In strategy, the method of confidential negotiation might promote a speed-up in the rate of proposal-making. Unacceptable proposals with good propaganda value could be quickly dropped if there were no propaganda stake, while acceptable proposals with poor propaganda value would be encouraged. There could be trial proposals and multiple-possibility proposals - neither of which is encouraged by conditions of publicity. Such possibilities presuppose rapt attention by governments to the disarmament problem, but the burden could be lightened by giving great authority to the principal negotiator, and checking his activities after he had reached preliminary understanding with opponents - a proceeding which would be difficult in semi-public negotiation, notwithstanding Jules Moch's espousal of it.8

Under confidential conditions the possibility of secret agreements on delicate (or secret) matters arises.9 Informal agreements are also made possible. Presumably national intelligence would have to monitor such agreements.

While confidential negotiation might curb utopianism and moralism it could not abolish tactical maneuver and

8 See Chapter 3, Section D.
9 See Schelling and Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control, op.cit., p. 86.
the dilemmas which arise from it. However, it could purge
the bargaining process of moralistic clap-trap, and it
might lead to a clear distinction being perceived between
two distinct functions of fruitful negotiation - mutual
education and compromise of interests.

Objections to the confidential method are both
practical and principled (concerned with its undemocratic
character). Harold Stassen did not, unlike his other
Western colleagues in the Sub-Committee, deplore the
continual seepage of information about proposals and
negotiations to the press. Stassen believed in educating
and being educated by the public, but one of his last
remarks at the 1955 negotiations remains puzzling.

...perhaps the greater flow of information
in fact assisted in our not having a
propaganda approach to our problem.10

He also said that the 'spirit of Geneva' was still
abroad in October.11 This latter fact alone suffices to
explain the tone of the 1955 negotiations.

It is clear that if no information (except results)
reached the press, propaganda at negotiations would be
irrelevant. Actually, the public can be educated in

11 Ibid.
arms control without being permitted to eavesdrop on negotiations.

The Soviet objection to private negotiations is that the public ignorance which results tends to damp the pressure of opinion on the policies of recalcitrant governments. Perhaps the only way to appease this Soviet view (which has never been pressed very hard) would be to continue the periodic public negotiations. Confidential negotiations might have a reforming effect on them!
PART FOUR

THEORIES OF NEGOTIATION

"How am I to get in? asked Alice again in a louder tone.

"Are you to get in at all?" said the Footman. "That's the first question, you know."

— Alice's Adventures in Wonderland
INTRODUCTION

Part Two was theoretical in that it investigated the feasibility and fairness of arms control plans. Part Three offered a theory of effective pressure in disarmament negotiation, sought to relate the doings of negotiators to broader diplomatic and military policies, and to widen the notions both of 'disarmament proposal' and 'disarmament negotiation' in order to break down the artificial isolation of 'disarmament' from the rest of international politics. Part Four develops and tests some of this preceding analysis, and also uses it to criticize some of the better known theories and suggestions about the nature of post war disarmament negotiations. We shall discuss the genesis of these theories - their implications, their mutual compatibility and theoretical validity.

What exactly is meant by 'theory'? Theorists of arms control press in two distinct directions conveniently characterized as 'realist' and 'idealistic'. The realists are anxious to determine what the negotiations are 'really' about and to stress the political limitations on governmental maneuver; the idealists wish to show how the negotiations can be made to succeed if only governments will exercise...
their unrecognized freedom. Both realist and idealist have theories why negotiations 'fail' (we shall see that one realist school believes that nothing succeeds like a well-planned 'failure'); both schools believe disarmament may follow a political détente in the world, but only the idealist believes that disarmament negotiation conducted autonomously can succeed. Thus Chapters One and Two which follow are about 'realist' theories; Chapter Three is mainly concerned with 'idealist' theories.

Another distinction to be emphasized at the start is between theories which address themselves to the determination of the negotiating motives of the participants, and those which stress the constraints imposed by the various environments - political, military and social - which surround the negotiating process.
Writers who regard the negotiations as a sham devoted to propaganda usually phrase this by saying that the negotiators of one side or the other (or both) 'do not want disarmament' - an empty accusation. The one meaning this empty phrase can be given (unless 'disarmament' is carefully qualified) is that negotiators think the arms race the best of all possible military worlds - at best an implausible proposition. Clearly, a patriotic leader would prefer the unilateral disarmament of an opponent - with or without controls - to continued military competition with him. Presumably leaders would also prefer their own plans, which usually provide for rather one-sided but mutual disarmament. One might grant that the sort of limited, compromise plan which seems most likely to yield agreement will only sometimes be acceptable to negotiators; and certainly one would concede that nations are not inclined to accept each others' 'first offers' in disarmament; but these contentions are not made explicit in the cant phrase, 'not wanting disarmament'.

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The most ambitious theory of negotiations yet published - that of Joseph Nogee - holds that disarmament plans are designed for broad propaganda appeal, not acceptance, and that non-acceptance is ensured by inserting one or more 'jokers' or unacceptable proposals in plans.

Every plan offered by either side has contained a set of proposals calculated to have wide popular appeal. Every such set has included at least one feature the other side could not possibly accept, thus forcing a rejection. Then the proposing side has been able to claim that the rejector is opposed to the idea of disarmament in toto.¹

Nogee maintains in effect that the will-not-to-agree is constant because he believes that even when the sides have apparently compromised - for propaganda reasons or perhaps out of sheer boredom - agreement is no closer really. Nogee, collaborating with J.W. Spanier in 1962, put the point as follows -

Admittedly, on several occasions during the last sixteen years, the Soviet Union and the United States have appeared to be reconciling their differences on some issues. But this has never meant that the two sides were finally about to achieve some sort of disarmament agreement. For the joker has been an integral part of each set of proposals. And it has always remained unnegotiable.²

In 1960 Nogee wrote that jokers 'may have been intended as bargaining points' or 'may have been reflections of incompletely resolved conflicts within the bureaucracies of the proposing governments'.\(^3\) In 1962 Nogee and Spanier went further and argued that jokers are vital to the national security of the proponent.

...neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has been able to reject disarmament without suffering a severe propaganda defeat - or to accept an agreement without seriously jeopardizing its national security. It is our view that each power has coped with this dilemma by making proposals calculated to have wide public appeal and enhance military posture. But because one side's security could be gained only at the expense of its opponent's security neither side could accept a compromise agreement.\(^4\)

This claim has been examined in relation to particular proposals in Part Two. That analysis suggests that compromise agreements can serve the security of both sides.

Nogee's suggestion that jokers are bargaining points is hard to settle. We might say that a joker is not a bargaining point when the proposing side fails to withdraw it during the course of negotiations on a particular plan. However the proponent may have intended to withdraw a joker until such a move became irrelevant; or a joker which


\(^4\) The Politics of Disarmament, op. cit., p. 5.
does get withdrawn may not have been intended as a bargaining point originally. One weakness of the joker theory, which we shall return to, is that the significance of a joker can only be judged in relation to all other measures in a plan: there cannot be an 'absolute joker', as Nogee seems to imply.

Arthur Burns has pointed out that Nogee's theory may be susceptible to interpretation by game theory, and even if propaganda is only an aspect of the negotiating reality, a game-theory analysis might be worthwhile. Burns' analysis suggests that we should treat the negotiating nations as opponents in a zero-sum game of propaganda where the pay-offs are derived from increments of prestige distributed by a judge - world opinion. However it is not clear that negotiations are a zero-sum game from the viewpoint of propaganda. The 'marks' which the audience of a disarmament negotiation allocates between the sides is not a total fixed beforehand, but may increase or decrease according to the performances of both the sides.

This leads us to a possibility overlooked by propaganda theorists. Disarmament negotiators show every

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6 Ibid., p. 44.
sign of being aware that a degree of cooperation between opponents enables both to score more in propaganda pay-off than they would if both revealed nothing but hostility to each other.

What forms does this cooperation between opponents take, and can we make a sharp distinction between hostility and cooperativeness? It may help to imagine what total hostility and complete cooperation would be like. Opponents would appear totally hostile by disagreeing about both the ends and means of disarmament, by impugning each other's motives; by evidently treating negotiation as nothing but an opportunity for exposing the opponent. Total cooperativeness, on the other hand, would involve wide agreement on priorities and methods in disarmament; mutual attribution of the highest motives, frequent and flexible negotiations striving for the widest area of agreement. Clearly negotiations as we have come to know them are a mixture of these two 'ideal types', with now one, now the other type of behaviour predominating on both sides (and not always simultaneously).

The principle of what we may call mimesis, whereby each tends to adopt in whole or part the other's policy innovations, is of key importance in propaganda
cooperation. For example, the Russians felt impelled to endorse the idea of aerial inspection against surprise attack from 1956-8, while the Americans imitatively adopted the slogan of general and complete disarmament after 1959, despite misgivings in both cases. Three propaganda motives lie behind mimesis. Firstly, there is usually some gain in prestige for seeming to compromise. Secondly, one may fear to oppose a popular policy. Thirdly, unless both sides cooperate to produce a partial consensus about ends and means in disarmament the public may become radically sceptical about the negotiations, especially negotiations for general disarmament. The other aspects of cooperation - such as mutual imputation of 'sincerity', and sympathetic negotiation - may be similarly motivated. It is not necessary to maintain that cooperativeness is entirely cynical or even consciously cynical at all; the sides have some interests in common which are bound to be acknowledged and explored cooperatively. It is merely necessary to notice the propaganda benefits for both in this behaviour, which sometimes goes beyond what joint interests and private convictions would indicate. Actually it is perhaps extraordinary how little cynical behaviour
there is at negotiations. The Soviets conscientiously oppose such measures as the isolated cut-off and extensive control early in disarmament, which could damage their interests; the complete cynic would not. Evidently policy-makers either expect to have to negotiate seriously at some time or find it hard for internal political reasons to venture wholeheartedly into the realms of cynicism.

Now we must examine more closely the motives of propaganda-making. Nogee/Spanier discover one strong and consistent motive behind disarmament negotiation (which for them is almost synonymous with exchange of disarmament propaganda), and that is the desire for the prestige of virtue -

   to portray one's own plans as reasonable and realistic, and those of one's opponent as unworkable and unfair, and to place the blame for the failure of negotiations on the other side.7

Is competition for prestige the chief or sole motive of negotiations; or, to narrow the question, of disarmament propaganda? We have already seen that the quest for

7 The Politics of Disarmament, op. cit., p. 53.
prestige is partly cooperative; which indicates that a reputation for \textit{lonely} rectitude is not the only sort of reputation that interests negotiators.

On the other hand nations are not only interested in the prestige of seeming peace-loving, even in an age of intensive disarmament propaganda. 'Prestige' and 'reputation' are in fact thoroughly ambiguous terms. Coral Bell has suggested that Secretary of State Dulles put a high value on a reputation for bellicosity in his diplomacy.

The \textit{Daily Worker} portrait of Mr. Dulles as the reactionary straining every muscle to unleash a new war, might be said in a sense to have been carefully posed by the subject himself.\textsuperscript{8}

It is doubtful whether Eisenhower's earnest (but erratic) search for disarmament and \textit{détente} detracted from Dulles' efforts to secure U.S. diplomacy a reputation for somewhat adventurous firmness in the 1950s. In the Eastern camp disarmament propaganda itself is regarded by high leaders as an effective means of waging political warfare.

\textsuperscript{8} Coral Bell, \textit{Negotiation from Strength}, Chatto & Windus, London, 1962, p. 91.
In the case of the struggle for peace, this is a question the solution of which can unite not only the working class, the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie, but also that part of the bourgeoisie which sees the real danger of a thermo-nuclear war.

Consequently, the slogan of the fight for peace by no means contradicts the slogan of the fight for Communism. The two go hand in hand, for in the eyes of the masses, Communism appears as a force capable of saving mankind from the horrors of a missile-nuclear war, whereas imperialism is, increasingly, associated with war as a system engendering wars.

The fight for disarmament is an active fight against imperialism, for narrowing its war potential.

A primary condition for progress in disarmament is the mobilization of the people, their growing pressure on the imperialist governments.

Two trends can be observed in the policy of the capitalist camp in relation to the socialist countries - one bellicose and aggressive, the other moderate and sober. Lenin pointed to the need of establishing contacts with those circles of the bourgeoisie which gravitate towards pacifism, "be it even of the palest hue". In the struggle for peace, he said, we should not overlook also the saner representatives of the bourgeoisie.

Of course the question immediately arises whether peace campaigns have reduced or can reduce the war

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potential' of opponents, whether by undermining existing military policies or forcing dangerous concessions in disarmament policy.

It is interesting to note that when the Sino-Soviet split came increasingly into the open in 1963 the Chinese denied the Soviet thesis.

If one regards general and complete disarmament as the fundamental road to world peace, spreads the illusion that imperialism will automatically lay down its arms and tries to liquidate the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed peoples and nations on the pretext of disarmament, then this is deliberately to deceive the people of the world and help the imperialists in their policies of aggression and war.10

On the Western side one Soviet disarmament campaign has been declared successful by a scholarly authority. Ciro Zoppo has argued that in negotiations and maneuvering on the nuclear test issue in 1957-8 the Western position evolved in a direction unnecessarily unfavourable to Western interests as then conceived.

The progressive erosion of the initial Western stand probably led the Soviet leadership to conclude that a unilateral test suspension, aided by public opinion pressures favourable to test cessation, might force the American and British governments to negotiate.

The Soviet unilateral suspension of 1958 was a decisive step in the sapping of the American effort to link test cessation with other arms control measures, specifically a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for military purposes.\(^\text{11}\)

This may be true; but since the test ban was very favourable to the interests of the Western Two, as they eventually came to conceive them, it is not very important. Had Western interests been clearly at variance with a separate test ban, it is very doubtful that Western policy would have evolved as it did. No amount of 'forcing' (i.e. propaganda and maneuver) would then have sufficed to shift the West, or, even if it had, commitments might have been withdrawn later, as the United States withdrew her commitment to general disarmament in September 1955.

There is no example of one side 'forcing' another into an arms control policy position which would be detrimental to its interests by mere propaganda in the post-war period, partly because nothing is easier than to

seem to be 'for disarmament'. Being in favour of goals such as free trade, economic aid and political freedom, for example, requires action to some extent.\textsuperscript{12} No such limitation hampers the proponent of negotiated disarmament; or, at least, in only one case has a particular practice been widely held to be incompatible with a disarmament policy - nuclear testing.

Has political warfare succeeded in the other task mentioned by Khrushchev - undermining the moral basis of the opponent's military policy? Has Western willingness to defend allies, to use nuclear weapons, or to maintain foreign bases been undermined by Soviet propaganda? It seems likely that it has not. Nor has Western agitation against Soviet secrecy had any appreciable effect. However, it is worth distinguishing the various audiences of the negotiations and their differing reactions to them, before we dismiss the question of the political efficacy of disarmament propaganda.

There has been no enquiry by governments or scholars on the nature, the composition, the demands, the attentiveness and the reactions of the disarmament audience.

\textsuperscript{12} However in these fields, also, one's policy may be conditional support for the goal in question.
Most commentators tend to assume that the neutral nations are the major target audience and this view is lent some colour by the passages from Khrushchev's speech quoted above. However, there are two other mass audiences with potential importance - the domestic audience (including allied populations) and the opponent's population. Each of these audiences represent differing threats and opportunities. Khrushchev relies on influencing the 'saner representatives of the bourgeoisie' in the West, as well as the neutrals, and this stratum probably has more influence on government arms-control policy than neutral opinion which, for all its attentiveness, lacks sanctions to influence great power disarmament policy. (It was, however, important in the change of Western policy towards the test ban, and in persuading doubtful Westerners to adopt the slogan of general and complete disarmament in 1959-60.) One of Khrushchev's conceptions is that the peace movement, as the widest of the Communist-inspired political movements, will help ease or accelerate the adherence of the new nations to the socialist camp. But most neutral nations are already considered by Soviet Communists as part of the 'forces of peace' with a role to play. Moreover, 'the
peace forces...have grown all over the world', Khrushchev said in October 1961.

A few years ago there were two opposing camps in world affairs - the socialist and imperialist camps. Today an active role in international affairs is also being played by those countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America that have freed, or are freeing, themselves from foreign oppression. Those countries are often called neutralist though they may be considered neutral only in the sense that they do not belong to any of the existing military-political alliances. Most of them, however, are by no means neutral when the cardinal problem of our day, that of war and peace, is at issue. As a rule, those countries advocate peace and oppose war....

They are becoming a serious factor in the struggle against colonialism and imperialism...13

The Western, or at least U.S. approach to the new nations has been far more defensive. Under Dulles, U.S. diplomacy openly doubted the wisdom and even morality of non-alignment, and membership of a Western military alliance was regarded as the only policy for a new country which could in any way serve the purposes of Western foreign policy. Dulles' attitude corresponded to the Soviet attitude before 1955, the watershed year of military aid to Egypt, the Bandung Conference and the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to India, soon to be followed by aid and credits. Neutralism became respectable in the West more slowly and

there has been little confidence like Khrushchev's that the neutrals could be used to undermine Communist positions. Western policy has been primarily defensive - to save the neutrals from Communism. Certainly disarmament propaganda directed at the neutrals has never been considered part of a program for weakening Communism.

The enemy population, as a target for disarmament propaganda, is of far more significance for Communists confronting democrats than vice versa. Little Western propaganda is heard except on sufferance in the Soviet Union; Soviet propaganda has complete freedom of access in the great Western countries, whose governments are in any case more beholden to public opinion.

What opportunities do these audiences on either side present? Very few, in practice, it would seem. The Soviets may have won some ground among the American population in favour of the test ban from 1957 to 1958 and this may have influenced the change of U.S. policy, but there is no evidence that general and complete disarmament has a high place in the affections of the American people, and the fact that armament spending is one of the most popular forms of all government spending\(^\text{14}\)

suggests that the American public may be, at best, indifferent to the leading theme of Soviet propaganda.

This is a vital consideration when we come to study the approach of the negotiating powers to their own domestic audience. It might be thought that disarmament proposals enable governments to say to their subjects: 'Look, we have done our best to make armaments unnecessary; now you must not mind if we continue to arm'. In fact such a stratagem is probably quite unnecessary in the United States because of the popularity of armaments and the Cold War, and because of the fear that disarmament would bring economic recession. The stratagem is perhaps also unnecessary in the Soviet Union for a different reason - the impotence of the masses. However, the Soviet government is aware of its public's discontent with shortages of all kinds caused by the one-side development of heavy and especially defence industry, and it is much more prone to justify its armament policy in terms of American intransigence on disarmament.

It has been argued so far that propaganda-making may be a competitive or a cooperative activity - or both at once; that it may be directed to winning a good name (prestige), undermining the bases of the opponent's support, or comforting a domestic audience which has to pay for armaments. It should be clear that disarmament propaganda
is the public relations of disarmament proposals and positions, and that negotiations proper as well as U.N. debates, government statements and publicity contribute to it. Negotiation is not propaganda only when it is fully confidential, and this has happened very rarely. Much negotiating behaviour which is usually interpreted as being propaganda-free is, in effect, cooperative propaganda-making. All the varieties of propaganda-making can in theory serve the purposes of agreement, and so Arthur Burns is not necessarily correct when he maintains that the negotiating contest by propaganda for prestige is 'parasitic upon the phenomenon of genuine negotiation'.  

Admittedly he treats both the propaganda contest and 'genuine negotiation' as models of a part of reality, but these parts of reality are inseparable in practice. The greatest propaganda pay-off may actually come from consummation of an agreement, or agreement may be chosen as a way of intensifying propaganda - a possible interpretation of the partial test ban treaty of 1963.

In an important sense negotiators 'know not what they do'. They make propaganda not knowing whether it will lead

to agreement or merely promote the prestige of their nation or the discomfort of opponents.

It is interesting to enquire what sort of proposals have given the best propaganda value to sponsors. In the period 1955-60 there were four outstandingly celebrated proposals or groups of proposals - the Soviet disarmament proposal of May 10, 1955, the Eisenhower surprise attack proposals of 1955, the Soviet test ban proposals of 1957-8, and Khrushehev's general and complete disarmament proposal of September 18, 1959. These proposals achieved fame for different and instructive reasons - the May 10 plan because it was imitative and apparently compromising to a remarkable degree; the Open Skies proposals because of their novelty, their simplicity and their sweeping assault on secrecy; the test ban because of its simplicity, but also because tests were the most spectacular, frightening and intrinsically dangerous symbol of the modern arms race; general and complete disarmament because of its thoroughgoing radicalism.

It should be noticed that none of these proposals was especially altruistic and that perhaps the most altruistic proposal of the period - the Soviet conventional disarmament plan of 1956 - was a propaganda failure. One characteristic shared by most of the celebrated proposals
was novelty, which need only be relative. General and complete disarmament would have caused far less stir in 1956 than it did in 1959.

Nogee's theory is only one of a family of possible theories which assume the 'insincerity' of negotiations. For a start, we should notice that it is not necessary to postulate a joker in the original plan. Proposals generally are so lacking in detail that the negotiation of them affords ample opportunity for prevarication, and the insertion of jokers during the elaboration of details if this ever seemed necessary. Alternatively, reticence about a demanded detail may be regarded as a sort of joker: plans, especially comprehensive plans, are rarely spelt out in satisfying detail, as we have seen in Part Two.

Again, provisions of a plan may be so radical on the military or political side that they may be called jokers even though they would not be clearly damaging to either side's interests. We shall return to this point.

The idea of the self-interested joker provision is in any case hard to make precise. Nogee/Spanier speak of 'two categories': 'those which are riveted into disarmament proposals with full knowledge that the other side will be compelled to reject them', and 'the provision that...is considered to be a necessary safeguard of national
These categories clearly overlap.

We may divide the first category into those provisions which happen to be in conflict with the opponent's policy for the time being but are no threat to his vital interests, and those which pose a clear threat to those interests. Clearly the Soviet proposal for the test ban in 1957 was in the former category, while Soviet proposals to abolish foreign bases in isolation from other measures are in the latter. We may call the first category 'jokers pro tem'; the second 'permanent jokers', but we should beware. Many would have said the Western demand for equal force levels as between Russia, China and the U.S. until 1955 was a permanent joker since it would have abolished the vast conventional superiority of the Soviet Union, and indeed the Soviets vehemently opposed it - until 1955, when they began to reduce their forces unilaterally. In 1956-7 the Soviets accepted the Western demand not only for the world of general and radical disarmament, but for the world of 'partial measures' as well - for a world in which Western nuclear superiority would have continued. Thus the seeming permanency of jokers may be made illusory owing to military (or perhaps political) developments.

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Comprehensive plans commonly contain a mixture of proposals some of which are favourable to one side, some to the other. These individual elements of plans could be described as ranging from 'extremely self interested' to 'mildly altruistic', considered in isolation. Compromise plans for comprehensive disarmament are those which attempt to strike a balance of 'jokers' - ingredients unacceptable on their own but acceptable in combination with others, to both sides. Nogee/Spanier accept the official case against Soviet proposals for low, equal force levels.

...the United States actually needed to keep 2-2.5 million men in uniform to maintain her bases in this Western hemisphere and in Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.17

The 1.5 million force level would clearly be damaging to the West as long as the existing base system had to be kept up. But need the base system have been so extensive if Russia had reduced her forces to 1.5 million men? In fact low, equal force levels would have worked in favour of the West; even in the middle 1950s. They were too radical for the taste of American policy-makers, rather than a threat to American interests.

Nogee/Spanier's discussion of the test ban concludes as follows -

The Soviet position does not...reveal a single-minded determination to consummate a test-ban agreement....The Soviets tended to press the issue the hardest when the United States was opposed to the idea, and they created obstacles when the West appeared to accept the idea.

This is also true, by and large, of the American position....As the Soviet negotiators tended to raise obstacles against implementing a real control system, thereby revealing fundamental objections to a test ban, the United States and her allies (sic) offered more concessions and redoubled their efforts to attain an agreement. They could afford to do so, once Soviet opposition had made this course safe and attractive.18

This interpretation assumes that both sides were strongly influenced in their proposals by (a) the expectation that the other side's position would not change, and (b) strong desire to avoid agreement. (Nogee/Spanier say that U.S. negotiators 'redoubled their efforts to attain an agreement' from time to time, but they strongly imply in fact that the negotiators only seemed - and of course wanted to seem - to be doing this.) That is why the authors liken disarmament negotiations to a 'minnet',19 supposing that when one side was sincerely raising

18 The Politics of Disarmament, op. cit., p. 120.
19 Ibid., p. 200.
obstacles because of doubts about the test ban, the other side cynically began to compromise and appear enthusiastic despite its doubts.

This is a mechanical and symmetrical interpretation with several major flaws. It both assumes that there is a serious danger of being imprisoned in an unwanted agreement, and also that one of the two negotiating nations at any time is prepared to face this danger in the interests of propaganda. Actually there is no proven danger in this behaviour for the reasons given earlier. (One may always withdraw a plan. The Russians did just this in 1961 when they resumed nuclear testing.) It is implausible that one side will be cynical while the other side is being sincere, and that at a given signal (whose?) they will suddenly exchange roles. The test ban negotiations require a far more complex interpretation than this. The Soviets by no means let up in their pressure for agreement when the United States began to show strong interest in the test ban late in 1958; nor did they significantly increase pressure for agreement when the U.S. began to display doubts and indecision based on new technical data early in 1959. The strong American pressure for agreement early in 1961 predated the Soviet retreat on inspection in that year.
It is a purely verbal paradox that the proposals most sincerely put forward - very self-interested proposals - are also those most insincerely put forward - since one cannot expect the opponent to agree. This paradox leads us to distinguish two types of insincerity. The first - which Nogee does not explicitly notice in the initial formulation of his theory - consists in proposing something you are not prepared to carry out. The second consists in proposing something so radical or self-interested that you 'know' the opponent will not be prepared to carry it out. ('Know' is in quotation marks because it is a strong expectation, not true knowledge.) Radical proposals usually involve both types of insincerity, especially when addressed to a conservative opponent. Western negotiators from late 1955 to 1960 made it fairly clear that while they had no overriding objections to negotiating about radical disarmament they did not expect to achieve it in the short run, and wished to agree on and implement a first phase plan for preference. The Soviets may be devoted to radical disarmament in the short run, but this seems doubtful for several reasons.

1. They apparently have not investigated the technical and political problems of a 'totally' disarmed world.
2. They have not reconciled the disarmed world with Marxist doctrine. 

3. Soviet predominance in the Communist bloc and in the world would be undercut by total nuclear disarmament. (However, the spread of nuclear weapons may do this.)

4. Khrushchev has admitted 'ulterior' motives in proposing general and complete disarmament, and he showed little expectation of having to fulfill Soviet disarmament pledges in the key speech of January 6, 1961 already quoted.

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CHAPTER TWO

POLITICAL, IDEOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF DISAGREEMENT

The previous chapter examined the varieties of actual and possible political motivation in disarmament negotiation. In this chapter attention shifts to the environment of political, ideological and psychological conflict surrounding negotiation, but we should remember that this is a resultant of conflicting national purposes. Our problem is to assess the relationship between political conflict and disarmament. We shall be dealing first with terms for two great variables characteristically preferred by modern analysts in describing great power relations - 'tension' and 'distrust'.

Tension is usually discussed as though it resulted entirely from political disputes, but there is a military as well as a political component in tension; or, rather, tension is always a military-political phenomenon, for unless a conflict of arms is possible there can be little tension. Once political claims and counter-claims have been staked out, and once military commitments have been
uttered, purely military moves (including disarmament) can exacerbate (or decrease) tension. For example, the rapid growth of the Soviet rocket threat to Europe after 1957 caused the United States, moved by both military and political anxiety, to station her own rockets in the territory of Soviet neighbours. This action in turn caused the Soviets to bring heavy but ineffective pressure to bear on the countries involved to remove the threat to Soviet security. The Cuban crisis of 1962 was touched off also by a purely military move - a mere re-deployment of armaments.

The arms race can never be a pure expression of political conflict as some theorists would seem to wish or suppose. It must acquire some dynamic of its own, not only because of the vested interests and inertia of habit which it creates, but because participants never find themselves competing with an abstract political entity but always with an individual power, having a unique strategic position, alliance, armaments, resource base and technology, which must be countered in unique and changing ways. Even if military power were all of one kind (say riflemen) it would be impossible to lay down what type, level, ratio or rate of armament would be appropriate to any situation of conflict and tension; yet the feeling that some such
prescription is possible lies behind the assertion that
the arms race is a mere reflection of political conflict.

The overall military tension between the two super-
powers could in theory be arrived at by adding the tensions
resulting from all local points of political conflict to
strategic tension resulting from the fact that strategic
nuclear armament makes possible an attack divorced from any
local military situation which may have arisen as a
consequence of a political dispute. In fact, the strategic
arms race has a dynamic of its own based not only on purely
military calculations but on the fact that two great
societies regard themselves as being in competition in
almost all aspects of technology and production.

Distrust has been treated by theorists as an entirely
dependent variable; it has been assumed to bear a simple
relation to the existence of disputes, and also of tension,
in the rhetoric of disarmament negotiations. Both sides
condemn it without agreeing exactly what it is or how it
might be removed. Diplomats often speak as though it were
pathological, something which they (presumably) suffer from
without being able to help themselves. The word is used to
describe not only fears that an opponent will not adhere to
treaties, tell the truth and keep his word - a justified
usage, but also apprehensions aroused by his stated foreign
political aims - an unjustified usage. ('You can trust
the Communists to be Communists'.) Scholars have come to
the rescue by pointing out that inspection for disarmament
is predicated on the distrust of the parties for each
other, and that this is as it should be. But the point
may be generalized. Distrust, or readiness to suspect and
detect double-dealing, illegal behaviour and unpleasant
surprises, is a prerequisite of order between sovereign
states.

Of neither tension nor distrust should it be said 'the
less the better' in the abstract. A certain degree of
tension is as it were appropriate to the number and degree
of political conflicts confronting a nation, and distrust
is a proper attitude for the nation at all times. Similarly,
political settlements are often discussed by both sides in
the Cold War as though there cannot be too many of them, yet
there is of course deep disagreement about the sort of
solution which would be satisfactory in each case. Treaty
confirmation of the status quo, enforced neutralism,
self-determination, surrender of position - all these
possibilities are potential 'solutions' for divided and

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1 See, for example, Arthur Burns, Problems of Disarmament,
The Australian Labor Party Club, University of Melbourne,
1960, p. 21.
disputed countries. Some of these solutions are immediately available, in the sense that one side's backing down - with or without formal agreement - would reduce tension to the point where one could speak of a solution. In fact each side prefers the costs and tensions of maintaining its position to a solution on the terms suggested by the other.

The analysis above is intended to introduce a discussion of theories about the political obstacles to disarmament. In this chapter only theories which may be considered prima facie as examples of 'political determinism' are discussed. Examples of 'military determinism', which are their chief rivals, will be discussed in the following chapter. There are two emphases in theories of political determinism:

(1) that particular political disputes prevent agreement on disarmament; (2) that the struggle for power in general, independently of particular disputes, prevents agreement.

Walter Lippman's writing furnishes an example of the first view. He believes it unrealistic for the major powers to 'try to negotiate disarmament before they negotiate settlements of the issues which divide them'. 'This cannot be done. The powers will not and cannot disarm while they are in conflict on vital issues'.

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Western negotiators in the period under study usually maintained that a 'first step' in disarmament was possible in the political situation as it existed, but that before major disarmament could occur, there would have to be political settlements, especially in Europe. It was a rare event when a rationale for this point of view was put forward by Stassen (in a speech previously quoted) during the 1956 Sub-Committee. Stassen did not say that disarmament was impossible without major settlements - merely that it was undesirable.

It is the United States view that low force levels and drastic reductions in armaments... would not, if they were not accompanied by progress in the settlement of the major political issues, be in the interest of any country represented at this table. These reductions would increase the danger of the outbreak of war at some point in the world, and of such a war spreading to involve all nations, particularly major nations. 3

Philip Noel-Baker believes that the 'settlements first' argument 'inevitably implies that the armaments are wanted to secure settlements by the use or threat of force; it cannot mean anything else'. 4 In fact, no such drastic interpretation is 'inevitable'.

3 DC/SC.1/PV.86, May 4, 1956, in Cmd. 9770, p. 57.
4 The Arms Race, op. cit., p. 86.
Granted that the motive of armament preparation may be (or become) aggressive, yet a power may dispute control of an area and yet have entirely defensive military purposes there. Since 1956 it has been clear that American armament in Europe is intended to prevent Communist advance into Western Europe, not to alter the East European status quo violently or by threat of violence. On the other hand the United States still clearly hopes that political and economic pressures will cause an evolution of East European affairs favourable to the West.

We turn to theories which attribute disagreement on disarmament to the struggle for power itself, of which disputes may be both a symptom and an example. Hans Morgenthau has concluded from the history of disarmament that only agreements of a 'local' character are possible. Citing the Rush-Bagot Agreement, the Washington Treaty of 1922 and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, he argues that they represent, respectively, 'the absence of competition for power', 'the preponderance, unchallengeable for the time being, of one or more nations over another' (i.e. of the United States and Britain over Japan), and 'a temporary preference on either side for regulated rather than unregulated competition for power'. He continues:
What, then, are the chances for agreements upon a ratio of armaments to be reached when most or all the major powers are seeking general disarmament, while at the same time pursuing their contests for power? To put it bluntly, the chances are nil. All attempts at general disarmament...have not failed primarily because of shortcomings in preparation and personnel or of bad luck. They could not have succeeded even under the most favourable circumstances; for the continuation of the contest for power among the nations concerned made agreement upon the ratio of armaments impossible.\(^5\)

Morgenthau easily shows that French and German proposals for 'general' disarmament in the early 1930s and American and Soviet proposals in the late 1940s were incompatible. However, his attempt to belittle historical examples of disarmament is not altogether convincing: it is incorrect to describe the Washington Naval Treaty as a 'local' agreement: it involved all the great naval powers of three continents. This was surely an example of world-wide (i.e. 'general') great-power military competition being subjected to limitations, even though it did not settle 'the ratio' of armaments among the powers involved. In fact there is never only one but always many ratios to settle (or ignore) in arms control.

Morgenthau's account of the struggle for power is tautologous.

All politically active nations are by definition engaged in a competition for power of which armaments are an indispensable element. Thus all politically active nations must be intent upon acquiring as much power as they can, that is, among other things, upon being as well armed as they can. Nation A which feels inferior in armament to nation B must seek to become at least the equal of B and if possible to surpass B. On the other hand, nation B must seek at least to keep its advantage over A if not to increase it.6

Morgenthau does not say whether the great powers in the historical examples of disarmament which he cites were politically 'active' or 'inactive'. They were in fact mostly active, according to any reasonable definition. But in that case his definition of a politically active nation does not fit Britain, for example, who gave up the attempt to keep her advantage over Germany in submarines in 1935 under the terms of the Naval Agreement - by allowing Germany parity in that weapon.

When Morgenthau calls for a settlement of 'the power conflict' before general disarmament, he artificially isolates politics from military competition, nor does his proposal on disarmament measure up to his theoretical absolute, political determinism:

6 Ibid., pp. 314-5.
Disarmament or at least regulation of armaments is an indispensable step in a general settlement of international conflicts. It can, however, not be the first step—a mutually satisfactory settlement of the power contest is a precondition for disarmament.... Disarmament, in turn, will contribute to the General pacification....by lessening political tensions and by creating confidence in the purposes of the respective nations. 7

This argument is untenable, indeed contradictory. It might be argued that when conflict is very acute there can be no disarmament, but Morgenthau does not so argue: he offers his proposition apparently as valid for all epochs. In Morgenthau's world 'political tensions' would continue despite a 'general settlement', but could be mopped up by disarmament. If disarmament can occur despite political tensions (and even reduce them) it is not clear why it cannot occur during 'international conflicts'. In any case Morgenthau could hardly argue that there had been a general settlement of Anglo-German relations in 1935 when the two nations decided to regulate their naval armaments.

Hedley Bull asserts that 'unless there is a measure of political détente' among powers in a system 'there can be little place for arms control'. 8 This view at least suggests directly that arms control is impossible under conditions

7 Ibid., pp. 329-330.
8 The Control of the Arms Race, op. cit., p. 10.
of acute tension, but a détente is always relative and
Bull does not say how much relaxation in relation to what
degree of tension is necessary. Bull argues correctly,
against the view that all tensions must be removed before
disarmament can begin, that

it is only in the presence of political
disputes and tensions serious enough to
generate arms competition that arms control
has any relevance.\(^9\)

However the attempt to lay down a maximum of tension
beyond which arms control becomes impossible is futile and
erroneous. As shown in the Introduction to Part Three, it
may require precisely a sharp increase in tension, or even
violence, to obtain arms control.

If a case for 'political determinism' in general is
difficult to make good, how can particular failures to
disarm be explained? A group of theories we may call
examples of ideological determinism offer themselves.
Various authorities have argued that disarmament may become
negotiable when particular regimes give up certain foreign
policy goals, or when less aggressive elites become dominant
in them. The Khrushchev speech quoted in the previous
chapter expressed belief in the possibility of fruitful
negotiation with the 'saner representatives of the

\(^9\) Ibid., pp. 9-10.
bourgeoisie'. Richard Lowenthal has argued that Soviet foreign policy moves through distinct phases of political offensive and political détente: disarmament negotiation can only be fruitful in the latter.

Even though the need for relaxing international tension seems to have been recognized towards the end of Stalin's reign, the turn towards a new "breathing spell" was seriously carried out during the interregnum following his death; and it ended... as soon as Khrushchev was in full control.10

Lowenthal believes that this offensive, beginning in 1957, lasted at least until the Cuban crisis of 1962. He argues that negotiation in periods of offensive is undertaken by the Soviets only in the aftermath of crises, and to achieve 'a substantial gain for the Communist cause'.11 If the Russians should abandon their offensive, even temporarily,

it would permit joint diplomatic efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear war, and it would open up a chance to stop the arms race and channel energies on both sides into competition in predominantly constructive rather than military efforts.12

11 Ibid., p. 1.
12 Ibid., p. 10.
On this view disarmament should be possible on the basis of the status quo. The conventional school of political determinists argue that the division of Germany, the existence of satellite states in Eastern Europe and so forth preclude disarmament.)

It is true that Soviet disarmament policy became increasingly radical and intransigent after 1957 - increasingly more like part of a concerted program of political warfare. But the Soviet Union began to penetrate the Middle East in 1955 before Khrushchev's victory over his opponents, and if 1958 was the year of Khrushchev's first Berlin crisis it was also the year of suspension of nuclear tests. Khrushchev's American tour of 1959 convinced the Chinese Communists that Khrushchev could not be relied on as a political warrior. Thus it is doubtful whether the chances for disarmament fluctuate so violently as Lowenthal believes.

In the Communist tradition there is a strong strain both of hostility to disarmament (except in the wake of world revolution) and of scepticism concerning the chances of agreement with capitalist states. Richard Barnet has documented Lenin's agitation against disarmament in the immediate pre-revolutionary period: 'Only after the proletariat has disarmed the bourgeoisie can it...scrap
arms of all kinds'. In our own day it remains a problem for Communists to reconcile 'complete' disarmament with certain parts of current ideology. According to the latest Soviet party program -

The C.P.S.U. and the Soviet people as a whole will continue...to support the sacred struggle of the oppressed peoples and their just anti-imperialist wars of liberation.

If general disarmament is achieved before the oppressed people have all been freed, how is the struggle to be conducted? Since 1955 the Soviets and their Czech ally have given or sold arms to the following nations or movements involved in 'anti-imperialist' struggles: Egypt, the Algerian F.L.N., North Viet Nam (supplier of the Viet Cong and Pathet Lao), Cuba and Indonesia. One is faced with the conclusion that military support of anti-imperialist struggles is not compatible with reducing all arms to levels required for internal security.

However Communist scepticism about the willingness of capitalists to disarm has been much softened under Khrushchev's ideological leadership, especially since 1960,

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when Khrushchev, reporting on his trip to the United States, allowed that capitalist economy might be stabilized even under conditions of general disarmament.

Some people in the West contend that disarmament is fraught with grave consequences for the economy of capitalist countries....

The least one can say about such contentions is that they are utterly unsubstantiated. I had a chance to talk with many representatives of the American business world...who are confident that United States industry could well cope with the task of switching the entire economy to the production of peaceful goods.15

This statement should be compared with one of 1956, when 'militarization of the economy and the arms drive' was portrayed as one of the (temporary) factors staving off the general crisis of capitalism.16 Even in the 1960 speech the traditional party line was also stated.

A thirst for profits makes certain imperialist circles continue the arms race and keep up the state of cold war.17 However presumably 'the saner representatives of the bourgeoisie' can triumph over 'certain circles'.

17 Soviet Booklet No. 64, op. cit., p. 17.
Khrushchev has confidence in the sobering effect of the 'forces of peace' on the imperialists. He argues that the Chinese comrades underestimate the peace forces when they attack or belittle the slogan of peaceful coexistence. It has become the Chinese contention that agitation for 'general and complete disarmament' is precisely the way to weaken the forces of peace and their pressure on the imperialists because (they hold) it sows belief in the goodwill of imperialist statesmen, thus compromising Communist interests. Since 1957 China has attributed far more political significance to Soviet atomic and rocket strength and far less significance to the support of neutralist opinion (whose support is supposed to be obtained by disarmament diplomacy) than the Soviets. The Chinese position, if adopted by the Russians, would constitute not only an obstacle to disarmament, but an obstacle to negotiations.

Incidentally, Coral Bell has suggested that Dulles, like the Chinese, had a lively fear of negotiations quite apart from its consequences in the realm of disarmament.

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The real basis of the case against negotiations, as seen for instance by Dulles, was not so much simply that they were likely to be unproductive, as that they would tend to induce a détente (whether or not they produced results) and that in conditions of détente it becomes impossible for the democracies to maintain a posture of strength.19

However, such a view does not seem to have affected willingness to conduct disarmament negotiations in our period, perhaps because less is expected of them than other negotiations.

Arising out of and merging with the political and ideological impediments to disarmament are difficulties which we may call psychological. 'Tension', 'distrust' and 'fear' describe states of mind supposed by some authorities to hamper sober evaluation of proposals. Jerome Wiesner has put this case very strongly.

Experience indicated that individual projects or proposals, no matter how promising, always will be evaluated in a negative state of mind born of fear... In conflict situations... in which individuals act for nations, statements of antagonists are evaluated not in terms of the intended meanings, but rather in terms of the most threatening alternatives.... When this happens, there can be no meaningful communication. Every proposal by either side is scanned for the hidden purpose.20

19 Negotiation from Strength, op. cit., p. 209.
There are several objections to this view. Firstly, the negotiating nations have shown no reluctance in raiding each other's larder of proposals. The propaganda pay-off for doing this is very high—especially if the other side withdraws what it had proposed. Admittedly this raiding is done piecemeal; neither side has ever accepted the other's plan in toto. But we do have a priori grounds for doubting whether distrust is as acute as Wiesner suggests. Partial acceptance is almost a law of disarmament negotiations, and often acceptance is almost complete—as in the change of Western policy towards the test ban, 1957-62.

Of course, most proposals have deliberately self-interested elements which may have to be opposed. What one should question is the idea that a nation will develop an ineradicable prejudice against a proposal merely because it is sponsored by the opposition, regardless of its merits. This seems to happen in some cases, but there are good reasons why nations should want it to seem that they are distrustful of each other's motives. Firstly, they are engaged in a propaganda battle where points are scored for convicting the opponent of wickedness; and secondly, in order to put pressure on the opponent to modify his position in a desired way, it seems necessary to convince him that his proposals in their presented form are not trusted.
CHAPTER 3

"MILITARY DETERMINISM"

This chapter deals with variants of the theory that some negotiated control of armament is possible without a settlement of political questions. We shall begin by examining the general case for 'military determinism', or, as J. David Singer prefers to call it, the 'armaments-first' approach, which may also be called the optimistic and 'idealistic' approach, in contrast to the pessimistic and 'realist' views examined in the previous chapter.

Philip Noel-Baker argues that it is not only possible to disarm without political settlements, but that:

If...a Treaty for comprehensive and drastic disarmament were prepared...it is extremely probably that public opinion would insist on its being signed and carried out, whether the outstanding political problems had been settled or not. But it is also probable in a high degree that the mere preparation and

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1 Deterrence, Arms Control, and Disarmament, Ohio State University Press, 1962, p. 179.
2 The Arms Race, op. cit., p. 85.
publication of the treaty would do more than all else to advance the settlement of the political disputes.3

Noel-Baker calls the Treaty 'the first and indispensable step to a more peaceful world'.4 This is 'armaments first' with a vengeance. Nations must agree to strip away their entire means of defence before the political shape of the world is clear (except for a lightly armed U.N. peace-keeping force under the Secretary-General5), and this agreement will somehow lead to a political settlement. The argument assumes that nations disagree because they are armed, a neat reversal of the realist position.

Singer pointed out some weaknesses of the realist or 'settlements-first' position. Against George Kennan, a self-professed realist, he urges that European disengagement proposals have a military as well as a political component: they provide for the removal of foreign forces and bases from Central Europe as well as the neutrality of the host powers. However, Singer's

3 Ibid., p. 87.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., p. 549.
'armaments-first' doctrine has weaknesses akin to that of Noel-Baker.

...while accepting the proposition that unresolved conflicts and their accompanying tensions will certainly lead nations into armament programs, the arms-first position also recognizes that between competing nations which are heavily armed, there must be an impressive level of tension. Moreover - and this is the crucial point - once the armament process has gotten under way, tensions cannot be materially reduced and political conflicts cannot be resolved; the weapons have added a new variable to the equation, and until they are removed, the equation remains insoluble.

This perfunctory argument is nowhere expanded to show why the particular 'variable' armament should make 'the equation...insoluble' - that is, Singer does not show why operation on the pre-existing variables, tension and conflict cannot solve 'the equation'.

Most discussion of whether to deal with political problems or armaments first is not only dogmatic but excessively abstract and general. All armaments and all conflicts are lumped together as though negotiators confront only one armaments-conflict problem. In fact each local conflict makes its own distinctive contribution to the arms race, both by dictating what type and quantity of tactical armament will be required for the conduct of that conflict,

6 Deterrence, Arms Control, and Disarmament, op. cit., p. 179.
and also by adding to the over-all tension between the powers involved, which is an important determinant of the scope and intensity of the strategic arms race. In its turn, the strategic arms race, by a sort of feed-back effect, may intensify local (and hence over-all) tension in so far as nations feel impelled to deploy strategic weapons locally. Soviet policy in Cuba, and American policy in Western Europe have provided clear examples of this feed-back effect. The necessary unravelling of the various and complex links between politics and armaments at both the strategic and the local levels is a task which an effective arms control policy must undertake. This task cannot be properly formulated in abstract and general propositions.

We turn to military (as opposed to political) arguments against the view that armaments can (or must) be controlled before disputes are settled. Nogee and Spanier argue simply that the military interests of the two major Cold War antagonists cannot be harmonized; that disarmament proposals must have jokers - 'to protect the proposing nation's vital interest'.\(^7\) Without entering into an examination of this view in relation to particular

\(^7\) *The Politics of Disarmament, op. cit.*, p. 62
proposals, it can be shown that the reasoning about the arms race from which it derives is faulty.

The crucial point...is that no nation can afford to be less strong than a possible opponent. No state can afford not to participate in the resultant arms race if it wishes to protect its vital interests. The nation that considers itself militarily superior can neither relax its vigil nor forget to forge new swords - let alone turn them into plowshares - if it wishes to preserve a favourable status quo and to deter hostile diplomatic pressure or military attack. And the nation that believes itself to be inferior militarily must strive to remedy this status in order to create a more favourable balance.8

This description is based on a vulgar Hobbesian view which colours most writing on international relations. In the real world no such determinism has operated or could operate. The impossibility of disarmament cannot be established by reasoning which ignores historical examples of disarmament, as well as the elementary facts of power disparity and political quiescence (even of potentially great powers).

We should notice that this theory implies much more than that interests are irreconcilable; it would be impervious to a demonstration that, for example, the interests of the United States in inspection can be reconciled with the Soviet interest in secrecy. The theory states categorically that all sorts

8 Ibid., p. 13. (Double emphasis added.)
and conditions of nations will continue the uncontrolled arms race regardless of the existing power situation or the possibility of modifying it in a particular way favourable to all by arms control.

Nogee and Spanier buttress their case against disarmament with a semi-philosophical 'argument from uncertainty':

1) Armaments cannot be precisely defined.
2) Power cannot be precisely calculated.\(^9\)

The two points are familiar in the literature of international relations theory, and are well argued by Spanier and Nogee. But the authors continue: 'One conclusion is therefore clear: namely, that the armed forces of the major powers are not comparable and are consequently not subject to ratio deduction'.\(^10\)

This is a confusion. Forces can be subjected to deductions of any sort, including ratio deductions, whether they are comparable or not. If they are not comparable (i.e. if we do not know how to compare them), all that follows is that force effectiveness may be reduced more for one power than the other, and we may not know which. To effect a ratio deduction all that need be known is the size of the

\(^9\) Ibid., p. 11.
respectively 'forces', be they the total military manpower of
the nation, or the total of strategic nuclear delivery
vehicles. The East proposed a one-third cut in the former
in 1948; the West proposed a one-third cut in the latter
in 1962. The incomparableness of the two sides' forces
and delivery vehicles was well known, yet both proposals
gave rise to bitter complaints. Obviously comparison
occurs even when it cannot lead to precise conclusions.

Theorists who use the argument from incalculability
against disarmament overlook an obvious objection: the
argument works equally well against participation in the arms
race itself. Just as the effect of a decrease of one's forces
on the balance of power cannot be precisely determined neither
can the effect of an increase, and for the same reasons.

Another form of argument from uncertainty stresses the
continuing revolution in modern military technology.
Uncertainty about future developments is supposed to teach
nations conservatism in disarmament policy: 'Better the
devil you know' - the arms race - 'than the one you don't
know' - disarmament. This psychology may operate in fact,

11 Soviet draft General Assembly resolution, A/658,
September 25, 1948.
12 See Wayland Young, "Disarmament: Proposals and
but it is faulty. The future of the arms race is precisely what is not known: disarmament may result in there being less uncertainty about it.

Another theory holds that the interests of the Cold War sides are reconcilable, but that disarmament negotiators must wait for these interests to become alike (which may tend to happen over time) before trying to reconcile them. Actually, 'like' has two distinct meanings: my interest (an atomic force) may be 'like' yours (i.e. you also have such a force), but our interests may also be called unlike in that you are interested in getting rid of my force while I am interested in keeping it, and vice versa. (Of course, it does not necessarily follow that our interests are irreconcilable, since we both may prefer joint reduction or abolition to the status quo, even though the unilateral disarmament of the opponent is the first preference of us both.) It has been argued, by Western strategists,¹³ that the invulnerability of the opponent's strategic force is to the interest of both sides (i.e. that interests in respect of invulnerability may be alike in two senses); but military practice is contrary to

¹³ For example, see Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, op. cit., Chapter 10, "Surprise Attack and Disarmament".
this view: it perpetually strives to render the opponent's force vulnerable where economically possible, particularly in the United States, as pointed out in Part One.

According to P.M.S. Blackett it is the unlikeness of interests in the first sense given above which renders disarmament impossible. In 1956 he wrote that:

During the period of American atomic monopoly the short-range interests of America and Russia were inevitably poles apart. This is the essential cause of the failure of all the early attempts at atomic control. Now with the period of atomic parity approaching, the interests of West and East are coming much closer.¹⁴

Blackett, like the Western negotiators of the Baruch period, here ignored or discounted the possibility that Eastern conventional superiority might have been traded for the Western atomic monopoly. When he said the respective short-range interests were 'poles apart' he probably confused unlikeness of interests, which was a fact, with irreconcilable clash of interests, which had to be proved, since the short-range interests could have been brought into harmony, at least in principle, by a mixture of disarmament measures.

In discussing the situation of 1962, Blackett is still troubled by American atomic superiority and the resulting

unlikeness of American and Soviet interests. He does not actually argue that the United States must surrender superiority in the means of nuclear delivery before disarmament can occur, although he does argue that the counterforce strategy would have to give way to a retaliatory, counter-city strategy in a first-step disarmament agreement. He also maintains that American weapon policies probably made it impossible for the Soviets to accept the West's test ban proposals in 1961 since: 'The obvious Soviet fear of inspection may well have been because they had so little to inspect'.

The analysis and critique of proposals in Part Two was an attempt to pinpoint obvious defects (vagueness, onesidedness, over-ambitiousness). The critique implied theoretical assumptions, which were briefly stated. Here, that discussion will be extended in order to examine suggestions by several theoreticians about the type of proposals most likely to succeed in the absence of political settlements. We might define an 'ideal' proposal

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16 Ibid., p. 161.
17 See Part Two, Chapter 3.
as one which somehow conforms to four partly conflicting desiderata: significance (impact on the arms race); fairness (promotion of the security of all parties); acceptability (conformity to real disarmament policies of interested parties); and feasibility (ease of execution and controllability). The discussion which follows merely compares the case for significant comprehensive disarmament with the case for isolated marginal measures of arms control from the viewpoint of feasibility.

Jerome Wiesner is the most powerful Western advocate of the case for regarding comprehensive radical disarmament as feasible.

There are many reasons why I suspect that a comprehensive system may be easier to negotiate than a series of independent limited measures worked through one at a time. If there exists an agreed upon long-term goal, a plan for reaching it by means of a sequence of arms-limitation measures and a timetable for doing so, there will be an enormous interest in the ultimate objective and individual steps will not have to be as finely balanced as if they were likely to persist for all time. Second, the inspection required to safeguard some limited measures absolutely may appear to be almost as great a breach of Soviet security as the inspection required for a comprehensive system. In fact, really adequate inspection for limited measures may be more difficult to achieve because the various components of an inspection system will reinforce one another. Finally, when extensive disarmament has taken place, there will be no
need for military secrecy, so that the
environment in which the inspection will
have to function will be much more favourable
for effective control. 18

One might add to Wiesner's list of reasons in favour
of comprehensive schemes two others - that they permit the
inclusion of a balance of ingredients favourable to the
various sides, and that they also, in theory at least,
can prevent the extension of the arms race to new areas of
technology, or at least can discourage this development by
sealing off the most tempting avenues of military
expansion. However, it remains a question whether those
'independent' limited measures, such as the test ban,
which require least inspection may not appeal more to the
Soviet interest than comprehensive schemes. Wiesner's
belief that complete disarmament will abolish the 'need'
for military secrecy is certainly not correct: secrecy
would be a vital interest of a signatory who decided that
the agreement could and therefore should be evaded.

The test ban and other measures which Wiesner would
call independent and limited are favoured by many theorists
because they would generate 'confidence' and thus make
drastic measures palatable. Political settlements have

18 "Comprehensive Arms Limitation Systems", in Arms Control,
Disarmament, and National Security, op. cit., p. 201.
been favoured on identical grounds. John Strachey argues more specifically that the test ban might give rise to a special form of 'confidence' - that it is a potential lever which the superpowers could employ jointly to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons:

Their means for inducing the abandonment of the attempt to acquire nuclear capability, or in the case of Britain and France to abandon a small existing capability, would probably prove ample if they could employ them unitedly and determinedly.19

Strachey suggests that the Two, having signed a test agreement, could lead a campaign beginning in the General Assembly and ending, if necessary, with the abrogation of alliance agreements and the imposition of economic sanctions in order to enforce the non-nuclear club. Otherwise the test ban would be 'nugatory'.20

It is a criticism of isolated proposals arranged between the Two that they would not be viable without Nth power cooperation. The way recommended by the 'disarmers' to ensure this cooperation, as opposed to Strachey's political way, is comprehensive disarmament of all the powers. This was above all the way of France, who opposed the test ban, in the years under study.

20 Ibid., p. 167.
Strachey justifies his belief in the possibility and efficacy of joint action by the Two against lesser powers with a reference to the Suez affair. It is an insight to relate disarmament thus to the normal play of political forces instead of treating it in vacuo - the chief weakness of military determinism. But in 1963 it remains to be seen how effective the pressure of the Two will be in closing the nuclear club on the basis of a (partial) test ban. No measures comparable to those taken during the Suez crisis seem imminent, and they would be difficult to undertake in the absence of special provocation by the Nth powers.

Strachey clearly believes that unilateral (or rather bilateral) political action can be a sort of equivalent for un-forthcoming multilateral action on arms control in bringing about a desired result such as the test ban. It is clear that a theory adequate to account for all the factors making for disagreement and agreement on arms control would have to be a variant of 'military-political determinism'. Political determinism, in the extreme forms analysed in the previous chapter, is untenable; military determinism is tenable within limits suggested in this chapter. Political determinism, as conventionally formulated, ignores the efficacy of political pressure in
promoting arms control, and concentrates on the benefits of détente. The conventional versions of military determinism fail to unravel the complex political causes of armament. Both political and military determinists fail to see the compatibility of arms control with a power struggle; the former mostly believe that the power struggle must be liquidated before there can be disarmament (overlooking the military element of power); while the latter incline to believe that arms control is bound to abolish the power struggle.
OTHER THEORIES : CONCLUSION

There are two groups of theories explaining the failure of negotiation which will merely be mentioned here, because they would otherwise carry the argument too far from the negotiating process. One group consists of 'devil' theories, which either identify political groups in the nation as exercising a baneful influence on arms control policy, or which stress institutional factors - such as an economy geared to military output - allegedly obstructing disarmament policy. The other related group consists of theories which argue that the national input of skills, thought and attention at high levels of government is inadequate to sustain serious negotiation for arms control. Theories of these two types have been addressed to the problems of Western policy mainly.

Communist negotiators frequently fall back on the theory that 'reactionary circles' in the West are 'whipping up the arms drive' and obstructing negotiations - that is, that Western governments have been at least temporarily
captured by enemies of disarmament. The circles referred to are occasionally identified as arms manufacturers, reactionary generals, some heads of weapon laboratories, and so forth. Some Western commentators offer a similar analysis of American defense preparations. ¹

It is certainly true that in the United States the groups mentioned have been less flexible than the government on arms control policy. However Samuel Huntington has given good cause to doubt whether such groups can prevail against the civilian officials of the Administration in decisions on the size and nature of the U.S. military effort. ² His explanation of the lack of support for arms control in the United States will be mentioned below. Academic authorities in the West have frequently wondered whether the prospect of the conversion of the U.S. federal budget to peaceful purposes might not give pause to U.S. disarmament policy-makers, but economic considerations could scarcely discourage action on limited arms control measures which would require little if any budgetary adjustment.

There is a considerable literature on the shortcoming of U.S. government organization for disarmament in the

² The Common Defense, op. cit., passim.
Huntington sums up neatly the views contained in that literature, finding a parallel between arms control and civil defence.

For most of the years 1945 to 1960 civil defense and arms limitation were the country cousins of American strategy. The never quite belonged, yet they could not be disowned.... Their "outsider" quality... stemmed precisely from the fact that initially neither seemed directly related to or required by a strategy of deterrence. They were both alternative programs beyond the scope of the foreign policy - strategic consensus.4

According to Huntington, 'few officials...ever strongly supported' the two programs, and both faced a serious 'organizational dilemma', whether they were entrusted to an independent agency or to 'an agency concerned with deterrence'. In the first case they met strong opposition; in the second case they were simply subordinated.5 Arms control began to be a serious influence only when it was 'assimilated' into the major, successful programs of deterrence.6

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5 Ibid., p. 359.
6 Ibid., p. 364ff.
Another explanation of the shortcomings of American negotiation for arms control points to the lack of sustained and intensive technical and policy research into problems of agreement. Jerome Wiesner states the point in a precise and strong form.

Up to the present time, there has not been adequate examination of the technical details of any comprehensive system to make possible a really satisfactory evaluation of it. Unfortunately, in this situation the West has always been suspicious of Soviet proposals, and furthermore has been ultra-conservative in the inspection requirements it places upon any system.7

This explanation, much favoured by scientists, belongs, with Huntington's explanation, in a category which might be called 'theories of inadequate input'.

'Adequate input', in theory, would consist of governmental and diplomatic organization which tended to promote rather than thwart arms control negotiation, continuing interest by high government officials, adequate machinery for co-ordinating policy with allies, and extensive and intensive technical and policy research operations.

A final group of theories worth mentioning stresses not institutional, group or intellectual inhibitions on

policy, but the alleged failure of governments (or of the masses, kept in ignorance by governments) to perceive the gravity of the military situation brought about by modern weapons. There is a sort of Socratic determinism behind this theory: it is supposed that more perfect knowledge must lead to more perfect virtue (disarmament).

A similar view was voiced by a writer in the Economist, commenting on the final stages of the 1957 Sub-Committee.

The main lesson of the summer seems to be that there is still not enough fear about.

Views of this kind are of little value unless they lead on to a demonstration that feasible situations of arms control are safer than situations generated by the arms race. In any case those who hold these views must have difficulty explaining the innumerable government statements on both sides of the Cold War which do show a high awareness of nuclear dangers.

Negotiation for arms control failed in the period which has been studied intensively in this thesis, and

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9 Economist, August 10, 1957, p. 447.
negotiation has only partially succeeded in the period since. (It is noteworthy that the successful partial test ban negotiations were almost fully confidential, and were conducted by a high official apparently enjoying considerable negotiating freedom on the American side.) Failure is a fundamental fact that a theory of negotiations must explain. I have endeavoured to show the shortcomings of the proposals for 1955-60 in Part Two, the weakness of negotiating tactics in Part Three, and the nature of the political and military obstacles to arms control in Part Four. On the other hand I have also drawn attention to the pressures making for agreement on arms control in Part Three, and I have sought to dispel some of the excessive pessimism arising from contemplation of the propaganda struggle, political conflict and power competition in Part Four.

Perhaps the best way to sum up the experience of the post-1955 period is to criticize the intellectual assumptions lying behind disarmament diplomacy as practised, and also the assumptions made by the critics of practice - notably Thomas Schelling - whose influence began to be felt in the West at the end of the 1950s. As Schelling has pointed out, conventional disarmament diplomacy conceived
arms control as an activity in opposition to strategy and military policy; however, the new school of critics in the United States has so defined arms control as to make it indistinguishable from strategy and military policy. Neither conventional diplomacy nor the new criticism has developed a doctrine adequate for relating arms control to political struggle. Moreover, while negotiators during much of the period studied were discussing utopian schemes for which the political preconditions did not exist, their critics often seemed to find difficulty in recommending any changes in the military situation at all. ("...it could be an open question whether we ought to be negotiating with our enemies for more arms, less arms, different kinds of arms, or arrangements superimposed on existing armaments".\(^{10}\) Neither practitioners nor critics seemed able to define the distinctive potential of negotiation for arms control.

It is of course possible to identify specific causes of disagreement in the period studied by methods other than general intellectual criticism. During 1955-60 some of the Western powers virtually excluded the possibility of arms control confined to Europe by their fear of seeming

to endorse the political status quo. Should the West, and Federal Germany in particular, ever become reconciled to the division of Europe, local disarmament might be possible. On the Eastern side, the liberalizing of Soviet society seems bound to work in favour of arms control by making inspection more ideologically palatable, while development of mobile and protected nuclear weapons may greatly weaken the military case against inspection. Now (1963) that both superpowers have consolidated their nuclear technological position, joint action to discourage the spread of nuclear weapons seems more likely, although formal negotiation may be a subsidiary means to this end.

It would be easy to make policy recommendations for the coming period. Perhaps it is more proper and important for the academic outsider to simply insist that the potential scope of negotiation for arms control has not been recognized, either conceptually or in practice. Negotiated arms control should be conceived and treated as a distinctive method of serving the goals of strategy, of arms policy, of diplomacy, and even of war.
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PART ONE

The modern arms race is a resultant of competition in numerous military programs, contributing either to the strategic or tactical balance of power. Innovation and change of programs both determines, and is determined by, innovation in weapons.

PART TWO

Proposals for arms control, 1955-60, with few exceptions, notably proposals concerning the test ban, had the following defects from the viewpoint of achieving agreement: vagueness, overambitiousness, onesidedness. Proposals have never been rationally classified or named.
Part Three

The full range of pressures tending to promote negotiated arms control has not been recognized or analysed. Wars, arms policies, crises, political conflicts, as well as arms control proposals and negotiation generate pressures for agreement. The goals pursued in war, in arms policy, in crisis diplomacy, and in Cold War conflict are arms control goals in part. Arms control diplomacy in turn can promote the wider goals of foreign and defence policy. The bargaining assets of the nation in arms control have gone unrecognized.

Arms control diplomacy consists of a strategy (expressed in proposals), grand tactics (the conditions under which a nation prefers or insists on negotiating), and tactics proper (the negotiating case, tactical 'orientation', and procedural maneuver). 'Intra-mural' tactical pressure is relatively ineffective in practice, and semi-public negotiation inhibits effective communication between negotiators.

Part Four

'Extra-mural' tactical pressure (disarmament propaganda) is probably ineffective in promoting either arms control or wider political objectives. The disarmament
propaganda of East and West is both competitive and co-operative. The propaganda motive need not hinder, and may promote, effective negotiation.

Both theorists who espouse 'political determinism' as an explanation of disagreement on arms control, and those who espouse 'military determinism' as a proof of the possibility of agreement, are inadequate.