ROAD BELONG DEVELOPMENT.
CARGO CULTS, COMMUNITY GROUPS AND
SELF-HELP MOVEMENTS IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA.

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'Cargo cults' have long attracted the scholarly attention as well as the ill-informed curiosity of observers of Melanesia. More recently the proliferation of a variety of spontaneous local movements and the emergence of more specifically focussed interest groups have been the subjects of several studies and a point of departure for investigations into questions of social stratification and class formation in Papua New Guinea.

This volume brings together three papers which have contributed to the recent literature in this area.

The first, by Rolf Gerritsen, was presented to the Canberra Marxist Discussion Group and to a seminar at the Australian National University in 1975. The analysis was extended in a Ph.D. thesis presented to the Australian National University in 1979 but although the 1975 paper has been widely referred to, up till now neither it nor the thesis has appeared in published form. The paper is reproduced here with only minor revisions to the original.

Shortly before Gerritsen's paper was presented R.J. May published a paper ('The micronationalists: problems of fragmentation', *New Guinea*, 10(1) 1975) which commented on the proliferation in Papua New Guinea of locally and regionally based popular movements with broad and often poorly articulated economic, social and political objectives, to which May attached the term 'micronationalist'. This article foreshadowed a more detailed study, by several authors, of a number of these movements, the collected results of which are in press (*Micronationalist Movements in Papua New Guinea*, forthcoming). In 1978 May presented a paper to the Waigani Seminar which drew on some of the earlier material and attempted to assess the significance and achievement of a group of what he described as self-help development movements. The paper was subsequently published in a collection of the seminar proceedings (Premdas and Pokawin 1978) and it is reprinted here.

The third paper takes up some of the questions raised in earlier papers, particularly that concerning the link between 'cargo cults' and
community development associations, and their common revolutionary aspect. The author, Michael Walter, was appointed to IASER in part to continue the work on local movements initiated by May. Since its acceptance for this volume the paper has been published as IASER Discussion Paper 36.
ASPECTS OF THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF RURAL PAPUA NEW GUINEA: TOWARDS A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE TERMINAL PEASANTRY

Rolf Gerritsen

Homo Hierarchicus:

The Melanesian big man seems so thoroughly bourgeois, so reminiscent of the free enterprising rugged individual of our own heritage. He combines with an ostensible interest in the general welfare a more profound measure of self-interested cunning and economic calculation. His gaze, as Veblen might have put it, is fixed unswervingly to the main chance. His every public action is designed to make a competitive and invidious comparison with others, to show a standing above the masses that is product of his own personal manufacture (Sahlins 1963: 289).

The persistence of Homo Hierarchicus:

Old people in Dar-es-Salaam are reported by the Daily News to have told Tanzania's Prime Minister, Rashidi Kawawa, that they do not want to be known as 'ndugu' (Swahili for 'comrade') because it is 'undignified'. The elders have asked the Prime Minister to take the matter up with President Nyerere following approval of the use of the word by the Executive Committee of the ruling TANU. An old person considered himself an 'honourable elder' and not 'ndugu' the newspaper reported. 'Ndugu' was suitable only for the younger generation. The Prime Minister said the word, as used in Tanzania had nothing to do with age or rank but was used to portray equality and human respect within the context of Tanzania's socialist policies (West Africa No. 3023, 2 June 1975).

My Theme:

One of the most striking pieces of evidence that dogmatism is not the exclusive prerogative of Marxists is the extraordinary resistance that still exists to the idea that there are classes and class struggles in Africa, let alone that they may be of central importance (Leys 1975:xii).

The Theme illustrated from Tanzania:

Ujamaa was also introduced as a challenge to the co-operative movement, which had been subject to a special commission of enquiry in 1966. The movement was plagued by mismanagement, and did not even realise the socialist principles of co-operation. These shortcomings in co-operative institutions were the pretext for a radical intervention in the whole movement through the policy of ujamaa. The base of the movement would eventually be ujamaa villages, whose establishment would undermine the power of the petty traders and kulak farmers who had dominated the co-operative unions and societies (Hyden 1975: 55, my emphasis).
To pre-empt the critics:

I decided to publish my provisional findings, partly as a demonstration that provocative socio-economic fieldwork may sometimes be done very rapidly, even where, as in this case, background anthropological material was scanty and where the investigator (who was obliged to work through an interpreter) had no previous experience of the society in question (Hill 1970:30).

Introduction

This paper seeks to provide an explanatory generative framework upon which to evaluate Papua New Guinean rural politics. Broadly it argues that during the 1950s and 1960s there began a process of stratification into a rural mass and a rural elite class of big peasants. This development tied in with the political changes then occurring, as the big peasants utilized externally-introduced political structures to secure their personal advancement. The final products, big peasants\(^1\) in 'interest' associations and (in a certain sense their antithesis) the 'dynamic communal' associations, are important in contemporary politics in rural Papua New Guinea. As a part explanation of this evolution, a particular interpretation of the pre-colonial socio-economic system will be followed. This interpretation of the pre-colonial Melanesian system suggests itself as a logical precondition of the argument for elite evolution.\(^2\)

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\(^{1}\) The usage of 'peasant' may be disputed. I do not use it in the sense of a feudal-originated peasantry as in Ethiopia. The concept is used in the same sense as by Hunter, who first drew attention to the growing tendency for an African peasantry to appear as customary tenure and subsistence economy gave way to individual ownership or 'control' in mixed subsistence and cash economies (Hunter 1969). The 'peasant' of this paper evolved from a tribal rather than a feudal base (for further discussion of this concept see Fallers 1961:108-110; Dalton 1967: 543-544; and Dalton et al. *ibid.* : introduction).

\(^{2}\) This is not very different from Finney's argument that there were certain values in Eastern Highlands society that predisposed people towards entrepreneurial activity (Finney 1973).
The analysis concentrates upon the big peasants as a class and how they emerged and seek to influence government. The interest associations dealt with below are the latest political form the big peasants' class interests have taken. The communal associations are mentioned only insofar as they cast light upon the politics of the development of the big peasantry. 'Vertical' differentiation in political conflict is a worthy object of study (see Brookfield and Brown 1963). But for this paper horizontal stratification and the politics thus created are seen as being of paramount importance for the future of rural Papua New Guinea. This assertion of the importance of class is perhaps iconoclastic, coming at a time when the advent of Papua New Guinea's independence has led to a nationalist suspicion of any suggestion of indigenous social divisions. But the example of Africa is relevant. In the early 1960s 'African Socialists' declared their nations to be classless, while simultaneously perpetuating the colonial-introduced mode of production. Lamb (1974) and Leys (1975) have indicated the consequences of those policies. This paper seeks to prevent a repetition of such developments in Papua New Guinea.

The paper is arranged in two parts. The first sets the scene and outlines the issues. It introduces an international perspective, defines and describes the newly-emergent 'big peasant' class, and then outlines its relationship with the political evolution of rural Papua New Guinea. The second part consists of several case studies to illustrate the theses advanced. These studies are of the Mataungan and Kabisawali Associations, plus interest associations in the Eastern Highlands, the Northern (Oro) Province and the Mekeo area. A quasi interest association, the Damuni Association of Milne Bay, is also described.

THE ISSUES

The international perspective

Recently in Africa and South Asia research has been directed towards the questions raised in this paper. The prolific Polly Hill has asserted that individualistic rural economic enterprise is more prevalent than is generally realized and that rural economies are characterized by significant inequality in the ownership and control of the factors of production,
particular capital goods (Hill 1970). The example of Ewe seine fishermen, like many Melanesian societies traditionally structured along segmentary-lineage lines, is particularly relevant to this paper (Hill 1970:30-53).

Hill has also stressed the social differentiation and stratification of the peasantry (Hill 1968, 1972). This has occurred, not only in countries such as Kenya, where there has been statutory individualization of land tenure (Bernard 1969), but even more surprisingly in areas usually defined as under customary communal tenure. Work in western Nigeria suggests that the proportion of tenants in the rural population is increasing.1 Rural-urban migration increasingly is seen as a consequence not of the attraction of the 'bright lights' of the city, but as due to lack of opportunities and inequality in the rural areas (Temple 1975; Shaw 1974). The upshot of these inquiries is that it appears that rural elites of 'big peasants' are becoming a common developing world phenomenon.

A study of farmers and farmer organizations in Ghana has described this elite (Harris 1974). Harris's 'leader farmers' had greater ownership of or access to (often governmental) mechanized devices. They obtained fertilizer more frequently; 38 per cent of them had obtained some within the year previous to Harris's sampling - this in a country which faces

1 Dr I.H. Vanderdreisen (Department of Economics, University of Western Australia) in a seminar at the Department of Demography, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, gave the preliminary results of a survey carried out in the Ife census division of western Nigeria. Using data collected in the 1940s he compared proportions of farmers by tenure systems:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tenure System</th>
<th>1940s Percentage of Farmers</th>
<th>1960s Percentage of Farmers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>owner-operator</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>permanent lessee</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>impermanent lessee</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

He also discovered that, in the 1960s, 22 per cent of the sample families owned 50 per cent of the land, and 30 per cent of the sample families owned 10 per cent of the land.

The implications of these figures are obvious and point to growing rural inequality in terms of control over that most basic rural resource, land.
perennial and chronic shortages of fertilizer. Compared with about 40 per cent of all farmers who knew their local Ministry of Agriculture assistant, 94 per cent of the 'leader farmers' did so (Harris 1974:92ff.).

This privileged access to Ministry of Agriculture personnel is compounded by extension officers using select 'leader farmers' to be shown new agricultural practices and to pass these on to the other farmers. The elite also possesses a degree of monopoly of organizational activity. The 'leader farmers' are 'elected' to farmers' councils, where these exist. Harris has also shown that they are active group joiners: 72 per cent of them belonged to some form of farmers' organization. Also they see groups to be an effective way of representing their interests; 90 per cent of the Harris sample indicated that they would join or help organize a group to present grievances to the government (Harris 1974:117). Couple this with the fact that 91 per cent of them knew their member of parliament (Harris 1974:113), and obviously they constitute a significant political force on the parochial level. Unfortunately Harris emphasizes the flows from the centre outwards and does not follow up the full political implications of his analysis.

Kenya is rather better served (Bienen 1974; Lamb 1974; Ley's 1975) for carrying this analysis to some worthwhile conclusion. There a similar rural elite emerged, a process intensified by the 'Swynnerton' land consolidation of the 1950s. Through control of the Kenya Farmers' Association, the Kenya Coffee Producers' Union and the Kenya Co-operative Creameries, the Kenyan 'large farmers' were able significantly to effect national policies to their own advantage. On a micro-national level in Murang'a, 'control over the affairs of primary societies, like control of community development committees helped to preserve the dominance of wealthier farmers over the economic and political life of Kandara' (Lamb 1974:140). This determined pursuit of large farmer interests is not unique to Kenya. In 1969 at Ibadan the highly successful Agbekoya rebellion (where farmers actually engaged in gun battles and even stormed a gaol holding tax defaulters) was carried out by 'real' farmers - agbe gidi (William 1974).

Sometimes large farmer and governmental interests coincide. This has been the case recently with the development of the rice industry of northern Ghana. A government trying to end Ghana's dependence on

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1 Another survey (C.K. Brown 1972:39) reported that only 38 per cent of farmers had ever received help from the Ministry of Agriculture, thereby indicating the utility of knowing ministry personnel.
imported rice has provided the machinery required to assist big capitalist farmers in harvesting large acreages by mechanized means (as in the Mekeo area of Papua New Guinea, a case considered below).

In India this development has attained even greater 'maturity', being some ten to fifteen years older than similar situations in Africa (Low 1975). Here village-level politicians have considerable autonomy and even exert some political pressure upwards (Miller 1972). A class of petty landlords and substantial peasants has emerged as the dominant group in Indian agriculture (Bell 1974; Byres 1974). This class monopolizes the benefits of new technological innovations such as improved grain varieties and fertilizer, the so-called 'green revolution'. Though these developments have led to greater total production, the social distribution of that increase has not been uniform. The net result of the last twenty years of Indian agriculture has been that the poor have got poorer (T.S. Epstein 1973; see also Lipton 1975).

It is important to bear these international developments in mind when considering rural change in Papua New Guinea. They do not serve as a model for Papua New Guinea; the previous exposition has highlighted only certain uniformities and overlooked the tremendous diversities between the countries mentioned. But these common features of Third World countries do add perspective to the processes to be described in this paper. Processes seemingly discrete in a purely Papua New Guinean context take on a new meaning when considered within a comparative framework.

The big peasants

To differentiate Papua New Guinean big peasants from the surrounding rural mass is not easy; usually in the superficial aspects of their lives, such as dress, deportment and consumption patterns, they are not obviously unlike the less important small peasants. As discussed below (Appendix A: Q.8(a)) they usually have a higher cash income than the rural masses. But this is not the most important aspect of the situation. The source of the big peasantry's power has been the symbiosis between their control of the principal capital good of any rural community, land, and their privileged access to governmental services. The latter element has meant in effect, as the case studies will illustrate, governmental subsidy of the big peasants. Control of the land has given the big peasants the wherewithal

1 See Chaudhri (1974); Frankel (1971) and Postgate (1974).
to take advantage of this governmental patronage: a patronage consequent upon big peasant cooperation with and usefulness to the colonial and immediate post-colonial governments.

Appendix A illustrates an Eastern Highlands rural stratification based upon economic differentials. The 'non-member' category, which is representative of the mass of the rural male population in the Eastern Highlands, is in control of fewer economic resources. For example, only one of this sample of twenty-five had over 500 coffee trees, whereas the 'member' (big peasant) elite had nine farmers so situated (Appendix A: Q.8(a)). Also only four of the 'non-members' had cattle (and none over five cows), while fifteen of the members had cows, with eight of this number possessing more than five (Appendix A: Q.8(b)). Even in 'traditional' forms of wealth, such as pigs, a gap between the big peasants and the mass suggests itself (Appendix A: Q.8(c)). The arbitrary division of society into these two categories was tailored by the methodology - the desire to see if membership in particular types of political organizations (big peasant political status) had any socio-economic correlates.

The 'member' (big peasant) group comes from those whom Paula Brown has called prominent men and bigmen. These comprise some 25 per cent of the rural population and

are more active and productive than the average, initiate new gardening work, house building, fencing and such local activities, speak up in discussions, make speeches in sub-clan affairs and often have some dependents and followers attached to their household (P. Brown 1971:216).

From these prominent men (or real men as they are sometimes called) are recruited the big peasants. The big peasants are more active than the real men (some of whom show up in my 'non-member' category in the survey). The big peasants have interests in local government, cooperatives, savings and loans societies and other forms of investment (Appendix A: Q.6).

Given the popular image of Melanesian egalitarianism, the question naturally arises as to when and how this class emerged. This popular conception of traditional Melanesian society is of an egalitarianism only slightly impaired by 'bigmen', whose leadership functions were pre-occupied as much with the distribution as with the accumulation of goods.
Supposedly status and prestige were not conferred on heirs but were dissipated upon the death of the bigman, which removed the node of the complex network of debts and obligations which was the bigman's political system.

This idealization has been questioned (Standish 1973:7, 1978); it is possible that greater economic inequality originally existed than is usually supposed.\(^1\) Certainly it is possible that the bigman's role could be more than articulator of consensus or manager of wealth. Strathern (1966), Salisbury (1964) and Watson (1971) suggest that bigmen have been stronger politically than the 'manager-of-wealth' emphasis allows. 'Strength' (innovation coupled with self-assertion) as a distinguishing characteristic of the Melanesian bigman is a more useful emphasis when one is explaining how many of these individuals emerged in a cash-cropping elite.

Together with this emphasis on 'strength', we must take from the 'traditional' Melanesian socio-political system the salient observation that bigman status gave no 'control' over resources, as distinct from ownership of them. Strength was ultimately individualistic. Sahlins' description of the bigman (Sahlins 1963) shows him acting for the community because of a desire for individual prestige. This suggests at least an important qualification to be made to the 'communal-egalitarian' emphasis.

The traditional nexus between production/accumulation and distribution was broken by the introduction of cash and, more importantly, cash cropping. The dual emphasis on 'strength' and 'control' came together to facilitate the emergence of a rural big peasant class. 'Strength' with its attendant power and prestige gave access to land which in turn gave access to cash cropping. Unless one could muster the initial strength within one's community to be able to tie up land with one's own cash crops, then to be part of the rural mass was inevitable. The issues were summed

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\(^1\) For instance, the existence of long-distance trade, it has been argued, presumes marked inequalities of wealth (Hopkins 1973). This observation may be applicable to Papua New Guinea.
Young men are not acting strongly, we old men are from before yet we are still the strongest.

Before I and other men won fights for you, what is up with you men now are you strong?\(^1\)

Some traditional status was useful in securing the initial advantages. The use of money provided the means whereby surplus production could be converted, stored and accumulated rather than necessarily dissipated (Howlett 1973). And what has emerged is an amalgam of 'bigman' and entrepreneur\(^2\) - 'entrepreneurs' in that they are keen innovators, eagerly seizing upon new ideas\(^3\), as the rapid spread of various cash crops, especially coffee and now cattle\(^4\), has shown. Also the big peasants are beginning to show a proper entrepreneurial distaste for the distributive norms their societies traditionally attach to the attainment of wealth (Moulik 1973:chapter 9). But they are not so much individualists that they eschew their fellow clansmen's labour: 'the entrepreneur-producer of course manipulates clan obligations to acquire labour cheaper than the rural wage award permits' (Nicholls 1972:179). Ostensibly 'group' enterprises are in reality controlled by the leaders, not the group per se (Finney 1970:76-77). These latter activities are 'traditional' bigman behaviour!

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1 This in explanation of young farmers' failure to do 'bisnis'. Goroka Farmers' Club, meeting 21 September 1973 Minutes. It should be noted that quoted opinions, where documented, have been extensively used to illustrate the arguments here advanced. These are not isolated instances of such types of opinions but have been cited because they are documented and thus available for reference.

2 The descriptions of Singin and Girik are typical of how modern leaders have successfully adapted bigman activities to entrepreneurial activities (Jackson 1965).

3 For example as soon as they heard of the government's experiments with sheep, Goroka Farmers' Club members wanted information. Goroka Farmers' Club, meeting 6 November 1973 Minutes; ibid. 30 November 1973.

4 Significantly, both coffee and cattle are overwhelmingly individual or father-son projects.
Thus in rural Papua New Guinea an indigenous elite class has formed, a class that is becoming increasingly self-confident\(^1\) and assertive. They are socially and politically active - Morauta reports that her sample of thirty-seven councillors held a total of seventeen other positions distinct from those that were concomitants of being a councillor (Morauta 1974: 137).\(^2\) Finney's sample of Gorokan bisnis leaders shows that, in 1968, of the ten leaders, three were members of the House of Assembly, four had been unsuccessful candidates, and five (two MHAs) had been local government councillors (Finney 1973). Significantly, this class shows signs of being self-perpetuating. The evidence in Appendix A (Q.10) aside, Strathern notes that fifty-eight out of a set of ninety-seven Mount Hagen bigmen in 1964 were the sons of bigmen before them (Strathern 1970: 551). Interestingly, twenty-seven out of his forty councillors were bigmen or the sons of bigmen. Also twenty-seven of the forty councillors had had government service as bosbois, luluais or tultuls, which supports the data advanced in Appendix A. One suspects that contemporary university students would be the sons (and daughters) of these bigmen.

This class's emergence is vital to any explanation of the rural political evolution of Papua New Guinea.

The political evolution of rural Papua New Guinea

The rural political evolution of Papua New Guinea is a process. It proceeded in stages: first the 'administration/missions' phase; then the 'cooperatives/local government councils' phase, and finally the contemporary 'interest associations/dynamic communal associations' phase. As a process it occurred at different times in different places. The stages in different areas were longer or shorter, depending on the circumstances of the locality. Other observers have attempted to put

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1 Perhaps self-important would be a better description. For example, the Goroka Farmers' Club decided to appoint area committee-men in places where there were good-sized cattle projects. For lines where there were only four or five cattle they decided not to bother. Goroka Farmers' Club, meeting 7 September 1973 Minutes.

2 According to official information, twenty-eight of the thirty-nine successful rural ward councillors in the 1974 Goroka Local Government Council elections had stood in the 1972 general elections.
indigenous Papua New Guinea political development into stages, for example Salisbury (1970) for the Gazelle peninsula. Lawrence (1970) has seen two basic periods: the 'colonial', 1884 to 1956, and the 'proto-national', 1956 to 1972. These interpretations have validity for their localities but do not possess more than this localized relevance. My hypothesis seeks a wider framework.

The hypothesis posits two vital interacting variables. The first is the primacy of administration initiative in the first two phases (and thus that indigenous development was largely in reaction to this variable). The second is that from the beginning of administration-cum-mission-cum planter establishment of control, a segment of the indigenous population sought to benefit. This segment, originally an appendage to the colonial system, gradually evolved into the self-assertive big peasant class which dominates rural Papua New Guinea politics today.

The administration/missions\(^1\) (and cargo cult) phase

The establishment of 'control' must have been traumatic socially for those conquered.\(^2\) Almost overnight, indigenous cosmology was overwhelmed. It is for historians (and perhaps anthropologists) to describe this period; for our present purposes what is pertinent is that the establishment of control was closely followed by the emergence of a class of collaborators. These 'herodians'\(^3\) assiduously cultivated the new masters and penetrated the colonial institutions. The luluaís, tultuls, catechists, bosbois, and so on were the beneficiaries of this new world.

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1. The missions and the administration were popularly conceived (and rightly so) as being but two sides of the same coin. Consequently they are regarded for the purposes of this analysis as identical (see P. Brown 1973:122). The advent of white planters, traders and miners in some areas played a similar role.

2. For examples of successful indigenous adaptation to colonial conquest, as well as an indication of the complexities involved in any generalizations about these matters, see Nelson (1975).

3. Toynbee's distinction between Herodians and Zealots is instructive in considering the dynamics of reaction to conquest. The elite herodians sought to utilize the colonial/superior civilization's own mechanisms to remove their disadvantage. The zealots reacted against these values and reaffirmed the traditional value system. The cultists, despite their not infrequent use of western/christian symbolism, correspond to the zealot reaction (Toynbee 1954:Vol.8, 610-621).
One suspects, on the basis of the Eastern Highlands evidence (Appendix A: Q.3, Q.4), that these new officials were men of some status in their own community. Standish (1973:8) certainly argues that initially the administration-appointed officials in the Chimbu were traditional leaders. They, together with the more innovative traditional bigmen, were the groups from which the big peasantry evolved. Development, seen in materialist terms as achieving the same level of ownership of 'cargo' as the whites, was to come from this collaboration. In time it became obvious that development, if it were to come by this method, would be slow at best. As a result a certain disillusionment set in, which produced different reactions - apathy, the transfer of the elite's unrealistic expectations to the second wave of institutions, the local government councils and the cooperatives, or the cargo cult reaction (which was probably the active obverse of the anomic apathy reaction).¹

For Africa the anti-colonial element of millenarian and religious movements has been well documented (see, inter alia, Shepperson 1953, 1954; Rotberg 1965; Ranger 1967), as has their connection to social change and discontent (see Bastide 1961; Mitchell 1970). The multi-facted nature of Melanesian millenarian movements has also been described.² I would argue that the cargo cults were in a relationship that was antithetical to the administration/missions/elite schema, as were Toynbee's 'zealots' antithetical in their response to the 'herodians'. Although the leadership of these movements was from the collaborator group,³

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¹ In the Eastern Highlands of course the three-phase process has occurred within the lifetimes of the older men and is all the more dramatic for that. Nevertheless the process is essentially similar for areas with longer 'contact', as will be seen in the Milne Bay case study.


³ Julius, the government anthropologist claimed that '... at times it seems likely that the leaders are the only people in affected communities who realise that cult beliefs are delusions which can be manipulated towards their own aims in the achievement of power' (Julius 1962:20).
they were different in being mass movements, however confused. As mass movements they were implicitly egalitarian and anti elite (especially anti-the-collaborators, who rightly saw them as a threat to their position - cf. Lawrence 1966:24). These movements also supported development for the 'mass'. But the 'herodian' elite collaborators wanted to control development - its benefits were to be distributed at their behest after they had learned of these things from their colonial masters. They were struggling to maintain a modified Melanesian bigman position, those with the 'control' and 'strength' would dictate the developmental initiatives.

The colonial administration, alarmed by the anti colonial and 'irrational' elements of these movements, usually sought to destroy them. The pattern of politics they represented, however, did not disappear but later resurfaced in the form of the dynamic communal groups. To put millenarianism on a continuum of political expression and to forecast its disappearance before the development of such 'rational' institutions as the cooperative and the political party (Worsley 1957)\(^1\) is partially to miss the point. The superficial aspects of the movements - quasi religious observances, apocalyptic development, etc. - may disappear but the underlying social stresses that created these movements would recur, manifesting themselves in new forms of social protest.

The cooperatives/local government councils phase\(^2\)

During this phase the elite 'matured' and changed into the big peasant class. The change was associated with the increasing development of cash crops. It was also marked by the increasing independence of the big peasants from the government. In the first phase they had been virtual parasites, dependent upon the administration/missions for their

\(^1\) Lawrence (in a postscript to the 1967 paperback edition of Lawrence 1964) also argued that since 1958 many people in the (then) southern Madang District seemed to have accepted development as a satisfactory alternative to the millenarian cult.

\(^2\) 'Cooperatives' is a convenient shorthand for a variety of organizational forms - cooperatives, producers' societies, savings and loans societies, etc. The differences between these was (and is) more apparent and of greater concern to officialdom than it is to the general populace.
positions. Now the semi-autonomy of these new institutions plus cash-crop-induced economic self-sufficiency, began to allow them to make organized demands upon government, a change that reached its full development with the interest groups.

The elite greeted the new institutions with an enthusiasm engendered by exaggerated expectations as to the benefits (to them) that would flow from these structures. By the 'herodian' elite, local government councils and cooperatives were seen initially as an avenue for 'development' (whereas the administration's motives were apparently to outflank potential discontent).¹ Their introduction coincided in many areas with a 'pause' (Fisk 1964) in cash crop development. At the time of introduction of the local government councils in the Eastern Highlands, the first coffee boom was beginning to peak. In Milne Bay copra production was virtually stagnant. In the Mekeo area rice production had slumped again. On the Gazelle the introduction of local government councils coincided with the Tolai Cocoa Project and the introduction of cocoa, a new cash crop.

The cooperatives proved unable to handle the aspirations consequently directed towards them. There was a fatal tension between these aspirations and recruitment based upon community (thus not allowing the elite free rein) and the cooperatives' rigid (unrealistic?) organizational and fiscal structure. The elite became disillusioned with cooperatives as vehicles for their ambitions. Similarly the councils failed to satisfy the great expectations they had aroused. Originally introduced by the administration to begin the process towards self government, they were meant to be essentially political units providing village-level government and the beginnings of intervillage cooperation in the provision of certain services. The recipients however did not view the councils in this way; they were popularly seen as developmental panaceas. The pressures which resulted from such attitudes were too much for the local government councils to handle, given that the local government ordinance hedged many council activities with legal restrictions.

¹ See Legge (1956:218), and the 1972 Report of the Committee of Enquiry into Cooperatives in Papua New Guinea (pp. 58, 125).
This second phase ended with the elite, now a big peasant class, directing their ambitions towards the third phase institutions, the interest groups. It also left a legacy of enhanced functional differentiation of political roles. Misinterpreting the change in the conceptions of what local government was about, and hence its desertion by many bigmen, many observers saw the local government councils in rapid decline. In fact, the tendency of the bigmen to leave council affairs (see note 3 of Appendix A) may be a healthy one for the councils. It may reveal the 'secularization' of the council concept. Local government councils are no longer seen as cure-alls but a more modest role is popularly conceived for them. Economic development for the elite was not to be entrusted to councils alone. Those big peasants who remained involved in councils sought personal political power and prestige rather than personal economic advancement. Councillors have become just one of the types of leadership that increasingly role-differentiated societies are producing (P. Brown 1978: 94ff.). There is still a significant correlation between councillors and bigmen; for example, Morauta (1974:142) reports that half her sampled councillors were bigmen and half her bigmen were councillors.

It is important to make some qualifications to this image of a general process. For instance local government councils and cooperatives have been categorized as denominators of the second phase of political development. This is because they were roughly contemporaneous, whether in the 1950s in the Gazelle or the 1960s in the highlands. Obviously these institutions are very different. They have been bracketed together because the evolving big peasant class reacted similarly to them. The big peasants sought to manipulate both for their own class advantage.

Also in the case studies of phase three interest groups the Lowa Marketing Co-operative will be tied in with the Goroka Farmers' Club. This is an apparent discrepancy, but only in the formal organizational sense. The Lowa Marketing Co-operative comprises a self-conscious, exclusive, big peasant elite, seeking to arrange the production and marketing of certain commodities in a manner serving its own interests. The socio-political similarities between it and the interest group are obvious.
The three-phase analysis is not meant to imply that cooperatives and councils are doomed as useful institutions. The point is that the evolving big peasant class has ceased to see these organizations as a primary means for its own socio-economic development and has moved on to new organizational vehicles. The distinctions between these phase two and phase three organizations are not as clear as appear here. There is considerable overlap in membership. Confusion about their roles still exists. Thus Katagu in the Bena census division is one of the most ardent areas of support for the Goroka Farmers' Club. This is because they are unhappy with the council, and in particular with Ketarovo village, for monopolizing their mutual ward elections to the Goroka Council.

If analysed closely, each area in Papua New Guinea would probably have its qualifications to the general process of political evolution advanced here. For example, the Eastern Highlands would probably require an emphasis on white planters and the role of the Highlands Farmers' and Settlers' Association (HFSA). Finney (1970) has described the 'partnership' between the expatriates and the indigenes. Membership of the HFSA included a number of subsequent Eastern Highlands bigmen: Soso Subi, Bono Azanifa, Sabumei Kofikai, Bepe, Bin, Iyape Noruka, Akepa Miakwe and Sinake Giregire. Nevertheless the model of the process of elite evolution into a big peasant class in pursuit of benefits from and control of new political institutions, remains generally applicable.

The terminal peasantry

Central to understanding the big peasants' move into the phase three institutions is appreciating that this is a response to the pressures generated by 'terminal development' (Howlett 1973). In the past, to apply Fisk's (1964) model, the interaction between different rates of return per unit of labour due to the operation of economies of scale and different levels of utility of money necessarily led to successive points of growth and stagnation. Hence the initial spurts of 'cash crop' activity in the early post-contact period, when the utility of money was high. Later, in some places, there was a renewed spurt as a new cash crop was introduced. However when the utility of money equals or is less than the return per unit of labour then the tendency is towards stagnation. Howlett (1973) has suggested that, in the Eastern Highlands, this
stagnation is 'terminal'. This does not mean that development is finished but that, without massive capital inputs, it cannot lead to any substantial increase in economic output by hitherto-utilized methods. There is a general consciousness of the limitations upon further development and a recognition that something new, in the realm of crops or techniques, is needed. The point is applicable to most of Papua New Guinea, hence the avidity with which cattle projects – the latest 'cash crop' – are sought.

The social reaction to the situation of terminal development has been an increased tendency towards individualism at the expense of communalism. This was predicted by Howlett (1973). The Asaro HFSA, for example, rejected the idea of communal coffee plantations, asserting that each man should stick to his own coffee garden.\(^1\) There has been an increase in rural tensions owing to the difficulties of the development process. These tensions have been expressed in generational conflict and in a recrudescence of sorcery. The generational tensions have been, in the big peasants' terms, problems of 'law-and-order' – problems associated with the consumption of alcohol and breakdown of 'tradition' (albeit very specific areas thereof, usually to do with traditional deference to elders and bigmen). The rural youth, partially educated and aware of the limitations upon economic opportunity for themselves, resent their elders' hypocrisy ('they criticize us for drinking but they drink'). The young men see as greed the bigmen's retention of the profits of endeavours towards which the young men have provided most of the labour. The servility of their elders towards expatriates annoys the young.\(^2\)

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1. Asaro HFSA, meeting 29 October 1970 Minutes.

2. A general observation could be made that 'unfinished' education (in the sense of its not having secured urban wage employment) is the certain criterion of youth consciousness of generational conflict. The conclusions presented here as an unqualified generalization result from conversations with groups of young men in the Eastern Highlands and Milne Bay. One conversation with a group of four young men at Magitu village, in the Bena census division, remains particularly in my mind. See also Moulik (1973).
Sorcery, in this context significant as an expression of social sanctions against the too-successful (individualistic?), is also on the upsurge. Moulik (1973) notes that there seemed to be greater problems associated with sorcery (puripuri) in the Milne Bay Province than in the Eastern Highlands. This alleged imbalance has been reversed in the recent past, but is perhaps best explained in the 'terminal development' context. Milne Bay Province reached the point of terminal development earlier and thus social conflict resulting from the stoppage of economic opportunities came earlier.

The interest associations/dynamic communal associations phase

This phase of rural evolution began with the growing pressures for the decolonization of Papua New Guinea in the late 1960s. It reflects the assertion, gradual in the case of the interest associations, of independence from expatriate dominance. The dynamic communal associations, of course, asserted their independence much more dramatically.

It has been argued that by the mid 1960s a situation of 'terminal development' had set in over much of rural Papua New Guinea. Increasingly, the evolving big peasant class cast about for new developmental opportunities. In the Eastern Highlands, trade store licences increased from 20 in 1963 to 447 in 1967 (Finney 1973:72) and 800 in 1970, and the number of indigenous-owned trucks increased from 5 in 1963 to 68 in 1967 (Finney 1973:73). Cattle have become the latest 'cash crop'.

Politically this development led to two diametrically different types of organization. Both types however mark a shift away from dependence on government initiative. Through the interest associations the big peasants seek to control the provision of government services at the local level. The dynamic communal associations seek to create separate structures even competing with those provided by the government.

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1 There has been an increase in the use of sorcery in the Eastern Highlands recently, insofar as one can gauge from big peasant concern about the subject. Eastern Highlands Area Authority, meeting 17-19 April, 19-21 June 1974 Minutes.
These two types of groups can be analysed in terms of four different criteria: objectives, concepts of 'development', leadership and recruitment of membership.

The interest associations have limited organizational objectives. They seek to represent an 'interest'. This may be coffee growers (Asaro HFSA or Goroka Farmers' Club (GFC)); cattlemen (GFC or the Northern District Cattle Farmers' Association (NDCFA)), or rice growers (the Mekeo Rice Growers' Association). By contrast, the dynamic communal associations, such as the Mataungan Association and the Kabisawali movement (as well as a host of lesser known groups), seek universalistic objectives (May 1975b). They want to organize economic development, cultural regeneration and 'people's government'. No activity is outside their scope.

The conceptions of 'development' of these two types of groups are also different. The dynamic communal associations seek to organize 'mass' development. The interest associations seek to control governmental assistance and channel it into aid to their individual members' endeavours. The leaders of the interest associations tend to be big peasants, only partially educated and true farmers. The leaders of the dynamic communal associations however are younger, better educated and often not farmers in the true sense. The recruitment of members is also very different. The interest association recruitment is 'class' based. They recruit big peasants as a social strata which cuts across clan and often even linguistic boundaries. The dynamic communal associations, as the name suggests, recruit on the basis of 'community' - their recruitment has an ethnic basis. This is probably a consequence of their attempt to replace on a parochial level the centrally-oriented state structure with a political structure based upon 'primordial' sentiment.

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1 For example both John Kasaiwalova and John Kaputin (of the Kabisawali and Mataungan movements respectively) have university training.

2 Interestingly, in Papua New Guinea as in many former colonial countries, the 'tribe' as a self-conscious unit is often largely a reaction to colonial rule and the colonizers' insistence on treating a linguistic-cultural area as one 'tribe'.
The dynamic communal associations are in a sense the spiritual if not the lineal descendants of the cargo cults. Possessing a 'modern' leadership, recruiting on a communal basis, egalitarian in their developmental aspirations and universalistic in their objectives, they have inherited the anti-colonial mantle of the earlier millenarian movements. This is not to attach a synchronic bias to analysis of these groups; some, like the Paliau movement and more particularly the Hahalis Welfare Society, have changed considerably over a period of time.¹

The politics of the interest associations revolves about different sets of questions. Primarily these involve the elite and its interests. Their elitism is seen in attempts at making association membership exclusive and in their desire for symbols of their status and for receiving due deference from politicians and civil servants. Their interests are pursued in attempts to control local government councils and the Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries (DASF)² at the local extension officer level, and pressures for governmental assistance and subsidy. On the national level they are 'nationalists' in a quasi 'national-bourgeois' style. This will be elaborated in the case studies.

The primary concern of the interest associations can be summed up in four words - marketing, extension, land and cattle. As will be shown from the case studies, they seek to obtain preferment in governmental assistance in marketing. They are also the chief beneficiaries of DASF extension services. They were the targets of the philosophy of extension services acting through 'progressive' or leader farmers. DASF has not given much attention to food gardening but has concentrated upon cash crop and livestock production to provide cash incomes.³ This has advantaged the cash-crop-producing class.

¹ See May (1975b:41ff).
² Since this paper was written the Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries has been renamed Department of Primary Industry. To avoid confusion we will retain the original title (abbreviated DASF) throughout this paper.
³ Also see Fisk (1975) and Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries Annual Report 1967-1969 (p. 205 et passim). The whole question of DASF research needs to be reconsidered. For example in the 1960s they were conducting research into coffee in ways that were beneficial to the (expatriate) plantation sector rather than to the (indigenous) smallholder coffee growers. This was probably a reflection of the power of the Highlands Farmers' and Settlers' Association, an expatriate organization then of some considerable political importance.
Latterly DASF has decided to direct rural extension through rural organizations, apparently in the hope of obtaining a wider spread of innovation information. Yet these 'farmer groups' are associations comprised of the former 'progressive farmers', who are still trying to monopolize governmental assistance to their own advantage. Recently DASF personnel have shown an increased understanding of the nature of these problems. But the prospects for change, given the local-level political power of the big peasants, seem remote. DASF officers spend a large proportion of their working time in activities (training farmers, farm visits for supervision of rural credit, conducting farmer meetings) which favour big peasants (McKillop 1974). This is unlikely to change.

Land is perhaps a central issue around which the big peasant politics of the future will revolve. In many areas land is soon to be in short supply. For example in the Northern (Oro) Province land 'bosses' are not allowing the young brothers of cattle project owners to have land for their own projects owing to a shortage of gardening land. If one accepts the terminal development argument (Howlett 1973), then its logical extension is that this will lead to greater competition for such resources as exist. Greater individualism is a natural result of this competition. This could lead to demands for individualization of land tenure (Howlett 1973:269). Such has certainly been the case in the Eastern Highlands. It has been especially marked among members of the Asaro HFSA. There,

1 'Developments have shown that the most efficient means of extension is through group techniques where a specific group of farmers meet regularly to discuss problems, hear of new farming techniques from the extension officer, observe trial plots etc. and to promote the interaction of ideas (and enthusiasm) within the group' (R. McKillop et al. 1968:5). See also Shand and Straatmans(1974:191).

2 Thus Nicholls in discussing 'grass roots' extension mentions favourably the Selznick (1949) study of the Tennessee Valley Authority (Nicholls 1972). Nicholls apparently missed Selznick's point that the original 'clients', the farmer organizations, were eventually able to manipulate the TVA to their own advantage.
under the probable influence of P.J. Leahy, the leaders of the association have obtained tenure conversion on land previously theirs under customary tenure. Leaders of the Lowa Marketing Co-operative also claim to hold their land under individual title, though this is a *de facto* rather than a *de jure* situation.

This is to a degree a reflection of official land policy up to the formation of the national coalition government in 1972 (Grove 1972). In the 1960s administration policy was designed to encourage individualization of land tenure. This was done through the 1962 Land Titles Commission Ordinance and the 1963 Land Tenure (Conversion) Ordinance (see Sack 1974). Though there has been an intention since 1972 to reverse this policy, one wonders if big peasant resistance will be overcome. The expatriate example has proven powerful: Wyirepo (vice president of the Asaro HFSA) told me, 'The white men have fences and business inside, we have to do the same'. The mention of fences illustrates a point that legal tenure conversion statistics do not provide; land tenure patterns are changing in Papua New Guinea as the big peasants seek to render perpetual their control (as distinct from ownership) over their land. This control over land could be seen to be fragile in a personal sense. Some big

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1. Mr Leahy told one Asaro HFSA meeting that over the past years many farmers had expressed the desire to have title to their land, and for the Lands Department to survey their land and put cement markers around it. He also said that the days of clan ownership were over (Asaro HFSA, meeting 25 November 1971 Minutes). At that meeting Sinake Giregire, then a ministerial member of the House of Assembly, spoke in favour of the idea. He subsequently obtained personal tenure conversion on some land.

2. To obtain tenure conversion on their land was one of the stated objects of the Asaro HFSA (*Post-Courier* 4 December 1973).


4. Land is a complex question but generally in Melanesia permanent tree crops - coffee, copra, etc. (rice?) - give the owner thereof rights over the usage of the land while the trees are in use. Many big peasants hope to perpetuate this control.
peasants may lose it or fail to pass it on to their heirs. But most seem determined to be succeeded by their sons - the example of Wyirepo (see Appendix A notes 11, 12) is pregnant with future implications - and it seems likely that the big peasants as a class will continue to have a disproportionate share of this most fundamental rural capital asset. Cattle projects, which require a fence around them, are hence popular, the fence being a symbol of control over the land it bounds.1

Cattle projects began in the mid 1960s. In May 1973 the Papua New Guinea government signed an agreement with the World Bank to implement over three years an $8.3 million livestock project, concentrating mainly on cattle. International experience suggests that World Bank aid is at best a dubious source of capital for development with a communal emphasis (see Leys 1975:chapter 3). In this case cattle were already being developed along highly individualistic lines. In 1965 in Goroka 55 percent of cattle projects (at least) were one- or two-man projects (McKillop 1965:14). Even in ostensibly group-organized projects, dominant individuals will secure a disproportionate return for themselves (see von Fleckenstein 1975). Apart from the attractions of control over land implicit in cattle projects, cattle have an appeal by fitting into traditional socio-religious status systems as a type of 'super pig'. This element of their appeal is probably greater than the minor fiscal rewards associated with smallholder cattle (McKillop 1965:17). Cattle are an important factor in the future development of the politics of the terminal peasantry.

THE CASE STUDIES

This section introduces four case studies in an attempt to elaborate on some of the arguments advanced thus far. The first study is of elements surrounding the rise of a dynamic communal group on the Gazelle peninsula of East New Britain: the Mataungan Association. I have not done any

1 Jackson (1965) disagrees, arguing that though subsistence tenure has been modified by various post-contact changes, it has not been affected by the introduction of cattle and coffee.
fieldwork on the Gazelle but use it for purposes of illustration here because it is a better known situation and is thus well-documented. The Kabisawali movement will also be briefly described as an example of a similar group. Following that, five interest associations - two of the farmer groups in the Eastern Highlands, the Cattle Farmers' Association of the Northern (Oro) Province, the Mekeo Rice Growers' Association of the Central Province, and the Damuni Association of the Milne Bay Province will be considered.

The Gazelle: the emergence of the dynamic communal Mataungan Association

The history of the Mataungan Association is well known (see Stephen 1972; May 1975b) and will not be repeated here. What will be emphasized is the development of the cocoa-growing elite and its interaction with phase two institutions, the local government councils and the Tolai Cocoa Project; the stress situation as terminal development was reached; and the emergence in reaction to this situation of the dynamic communal Mataungan Association.

The political development of the Gazelle has followed the three phase stages here proposed. ¹ In 1950 phase two began with the introduction of the Tolai Cocoa Project and the councils. This was not without its resistance from phase one groups, the missions (A.L. Epstein 1969: chapter 8) and privileged villages. ² The Project and the councils were

¹ There is no space here to deal with Salisbury's theories (Salisbury 1970). I would argue that his first two stages, 1875-1878 and 1890-1950, could be subsumed under my 'phase one' schema. Also his analysis, treating each of the stages as a voluntary indigenous consolidation, overlooks the determining influence of the colonial administration. His insistence upon political consolidation as a prerequisite of successful economic development is, I feel, erroneous. The two factors react together, as the emergence of the 'phase three' Mataungan Association shows. His analysis is also overly optimistic as regards the entrepreneurial role in development. For a fuller analysis see the review of his study by T. S. Epstein (1972).

² Raluana and Navuneram were hostile to the new local government councils because of pique in that they, a 'developed' (in the sense of having more educated people than most villages) area, should be put in a council with a (numerically superior) 'bush' area (A.L. Epstein 1969: 257-258).
popularly associated. By the early 1960s a developmental 'pause', unlike the pre war pauses in that it was 'terminal', had set in. Without expensive capital inputs, land rationalization and large scale farming, Gazelle smallholders could not expect substantial increases in their incomes. This situation of terminal development created stresses that weakened the phase two institutions - the Tolai Cocoa Project in particular. It had handled 60 per cent of cocoa output in 1960 but only 36 per cent in 1965. The drift away from the project was not because of management inefficiencies, but because of the tension between communal-cum-matrilineal social obligations and bigman entrepreneurial individualism (A.L. Epstein 1969: 212ff.). These social stresses led to new political factors such as the emergence of conflict between the bigmen (who might have moved towards the interest association solution in phase three) and educated 'young men', who emerged as the leaders (and some of the mass membership) of the Mataungan Association (and of Kabisawali).

The rest is history. In 1967 the tension became open with the formation of the Multi-Racial Council and the Raniola Plantation incident. In 1968 Oscar Tamur defeated Vin ToBaining, an archetypal bigman, in the House of Assembly elections and, with the boycott of the council elections and the formation of the Mataungan Association in 1969, the 'interest association' alternative was routed and the 'dynamic communal' association established as Gazelle representative of 'phase three'. This movement was

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1 There is some dispute over this. A.L. Epstein (1969) talks about land shortages in the 1950s, while Salisbury claims that up to 1961 there were almost no disputes over land (Salisbury 1970:84).

2 Salisbury indirectly supports this argument by noting that in the post 1960 period, even though there were low cocoa prices, support for the Tolai Cocoa Project was greatest in the areas where the councils were most effective (Salisbury 1970). This supports my argument about the interconnection between phase two institutions.

3 The element of generation conflict in the rise of the Mataungans was discounted by A.L. Epstein (1970:116-117), who argued that they have a generational unity. Yet Scarlett Epstein noted the failure of the older age groups in the Melanesian Liberation Front to desert the council for the Mataungan Association - being established they had a vested interest in the status quo (T.S. Epstein 1970:70-71). Chowning et al. (1971:53-54) also noted the influence of the educated young men. See also Hastings (1969:200) for some comments on generational conflict.
an agency of anti-colonial protest by those who felt disadvantaged by the status quo — either by coming from areas of land hunger or by not having achieved the bigman/entrepreneur status (T.S. Epstein 1972). In its radical egalitarianism, anti-colonialism and call for new roads to development, the Mataungan Association was the heir to earlier cargo cults.¹

The dynamic communal Kabisawali movement

Albeit on a smaller scale and somewhat later, the Kabisawali movement has had a similar history to the Mataungans. The Kabisawali leader, John Kasai pwalova, has even modelled himself upon John Kaputin, one of the Gazelle movement's leaders.

The Trobriand Islands received a surprisingly differentiated experience of the administration/missions phase of my model. This began in the 1880s and on the main island, Kiriwina, primarily affected the communities on the southern, lagoon, side of the island. There the opportunities of cash incomes from pearling, mission employment and copra substantially disrupted the 'traditional' structure of chiefly control. On the north of the island the chiefs, though perhaps reduced in status, managed to retain some of their power. During the second world war they took advantage of the absence of the Europeans to 'punish' the southerners for their arrogance.

The phase two institutions, councils and cooperatives, dominated the 1960s. But economic development proved hard to organize and by the early 1970s a 'pause', seemingly terminal, had settled upon the Trobriands. The Kabisawali movement was organized by Kasai pwalova, a university student radical, and other students and school 'drop-outs'. It soon achieved mass membership through Kasai pwalova's uncle, an important segment chief, who formed an alliance with another important sub clan in contravention of 'traditional' practice. Kabisawali for a period promised economic development, cultural regeneration and a governmental alternative to the council (and even the national government).

¹ I suspect that (without denigrating communal groups) the connection between the cults and the communal groups can be close. The Hahalis Welfare Society is a case in point.
The terminal peasantry stage was reached in the Eastern Highlands in the late 1960s (Howlett 1973). In the Asaro area the attendant uncertainty was expressed by meetings to discuss the problems of the farmers. The 1969/70 coffee flushes were also (significantly) light. The situation crystallized upon the intervention of P.J. Leahy and the big peasants 'decided' to form an Asaro branch of the predominantly expatriate Highlands Farmers' and Settlers' Association. The branch concept was eventually rejected, because it meant turning money over to the HFSA, and by 1972 the Asaro HFSA was an independent interest association composed of big peasants.

The Goroka Farmers' Club (GFC) was a phase three 'interest association' outgrowth from a confused welter of phase two cooperatives and producers' societies.

It originated in the Lowa Marketing Association encouraged by the province's rural development officer (RDO), R. McKillop, in 1968. Contemporaneous with this development was the collapse of the Unggai Trading Society. On the southeastern periphery of the Goroka area, the Korofeigu and Lufa farmers formed the Yagaria Rural Co-operative Ltd. and the Numuyargbo Livestock Co-operative. These two organizations had only brief periods of fulfilment of any of the great expectations of the emergent big peasants, who deserted them for the GFC in 1973. The Lowa Marketing Association split: the sweet potato (kaukau) growers formed the Lowa Marketing Co-operative (LMC) and the 'cattle men' eventually formed the Goroka Cattle Owners' Savings Club. Then in 1973 when the Eastern Highlands District Savings and Loans Society was formed, they decided to opt out and form the GFC. This today is closely allied with the LMC as the big peasants have moved back into tandem rather than go their separate

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1 This study of Eastern Highlands groups is longer than the other studies in order to illustrate the salient features of big peasant interest association politics. The other studies will concentrate upon features particular to each group.

2 GFC, meeting 30 November 1973 Minutes. The chairman of the Numuyargbo Co-operative, Upeguto, became president of the GFC.
'cash crop'-oriented ways. The reunion was in response to 'in unity is strength'-style sentiments, though it may have been an unacknowledged recognition of common class interests.

The politics of these two groups are classic examples of the models of interest associations. This is particularly so in their class consciousness. Membership of the associations has become more exclusive. The LMC repaid the capital of 'members' who had not made up the $100 required for membership. The Asaro HFSA, which started off requiring $10 per village, later changed its policy to introduce individual membership fees. The GFC which originally had a membership fee of $10 increased this to $20. The associations also insist that transport be provided to bring the members to meetings - a recognition of the members' importance. DASF provide the LMC/GFC members with transport - the RDO even having to apologize when it was not available. The Asaro HFSA have transport provided by the Leahy business interests. P.J. Leahy consistently opposed the purchase of a truck by the association, ostensibly because it would waste money but perhaps because he realizes that he would thus lose his grip over the group. The first president of the Asaro HFSA was gaol ed for spending money he had collected for the association's truck. Recently they decided that when their hall was paid off they would purchase a truck, perhaps as a gesture of independence.

The big peasants' desire for prestige often seeks symbolic content. The GFC, after much debate, selected a cow rather than a pig as its symbol. The former it was felt emphasized the nature of their bisnis and that they were 'strong' farmers. Halls are also obligatory. The Asaro HFSA have

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1 The two organizations are so close that it is sometimes difficult to differentiate them. For example, apart from the fact that the GFC haus miting (hall) is on the LMC block, the executives perform their tasks interchangeably. Thus during August 1974 Soso Maniha was involved in collecting labour to build the GFC's hall and yet he was chairman of the Co-operative. At the official opening of the LMC (20 August 1974) Upeguto divided the food at the feast and yet he is the president of the GFC. In this case Upeguto utilized his greater traditional status, whereas Soso's greater activism fitted him for the task of rounding up the labour.

2 There is also in the Eastern Highlands a Kainantu Bulamakau Association, whose main activity to date has been to try to get a rural slaughter house in Kainantu.
built a hall which is clearly related to their desire to prove their 'strength'.

Arpeo of Kabiyufa said that 'old men were the only ones who joined (the Asaro HFSA) and that if they built a rubbish house they (the young men) will say it was built by old men. We have to build a good house'.

Later the Asaro HFSA resolved that when electricity came to Asaro they would install it in their hall.

The Asaro HFSA also have chosen as a badge of membership hats like those worn by the tultuls and luluais. They showed great anxiety about non-members wearing these hats:

Members expressed concern at the possibility of other organisations selling the same type of hat in the Territory. It was suggested that a letter be written to Sinake Giregire MHA ... for mention in the House of Assembly.

The association members take great pride in recognition being accorded any one of their number. They also feel that their public reputation is important: members complained bitterly to me that their meetings were not reported in the Highland News or Post-Courier. Slight against any member of the group are often seen as slights against the group per se. For example, when Merrima, a farmer from Anabosa village, complained that he and the Asaro HFSA had been abused by one Vezano

It was explained to the meeting that the gentleman in question would be reported to the Police and the District Office, and also to his Councillor, namely one Tarka. Farmers were told that incidents of this nature were to be reported, and that something useful would be done by the Farmers and Settlers Association to protect their organisation and their name.

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1 Asaro HFSA, meeting 28 June 1973 Minutes.
2 The meeting that made the decision wanted officers' hats or those like kiaps' hats. Asaro HFSA, meeting 27 August 1970 Minutes.
3 Asaro HFSA, meeting 29 October 1970 Minutes.
4 Soso Maniha is a member of the board of management of the Kamiliki Vocational Centre, which was felt to reflect credit on the GFC and the LMC. LMC Directors' meeting 30 August 1974 Minutes.
5 Asaro HFSA, meeting 27 August 1970 Minutes.
With these attitudes one would expect the big peasants to incur hostility. Trouble, insults and other slurs on the name of the big peasants are endemic in the highlands. When the Asaro HFSA hall was built the windows were broken; a symbolic protest? The big peasants have reacted to put pressure on the government over liquor sales, liquor being seen as the prime determinant of disrespectful behaviour by yanpela (young men). The Asaro HFSA has applied constant pressure for restrictions upon the availability of alcohol within the Eastern Highlands Province.¹

These Eastern Highlands interest associations have pursued their interests most diligently. The primary focus of these interests is DASF.² The LMC 'obtained' from DASF (until August 1974) an RDO adviser, who spent a greater part of his duties on the organization of the cooperative. They also got support from the regional economist in their campaign for a higher price for kaukau. They exerted successful pressure to have their honorary adviser's contract extended. They also sought to have him return to Goroka when we finished his study leave, because 'we do not wish to have too many local officers conducting fieldwork yet, not indeed until local officers become more dedicated to their work'.³

This point merits a digression. At first glance the remark indicates a colonial inferiority complex; in reality it is a shrewd recognition of self-interest. The group realized that the present RDO served their interests and thus did not want him changed. They suspected that 'local' (indigenous) officers would not be so receptive to their claims.

¹ In 1970 they called on the administration to restrict Eastern Highlands liquor sales to the area of Goroka proper (Asaro HFSA, meeting 4 August 1970 Minutes). They told the Committee of Inquiry into Alcoholic Drink that they only wanted sales in the Goroka area (Asaro HFSA, meeting 30 October 1971 Minutes). In 1973 they asked the Minister for Interior to restrict the sale of alcohol to weekends (Asaro HFSA, meeting 28 December 1973 Minutes).

² Other Eastern Highlands interest groups such as the Luvelave Association, the Bena Development Association and the Highland Weavers at Makia have as their focus the Department of Business Development.

³ LMC, Directors meeting 15 June 1973 Minutes.
Significantly the two associations investigated who had indigenous agricultural extension officers in charge were dissatisfied with them.1

The LMC directors desire to control information sent to them and during the 'fresh food episode' (detailed below) became upset when DASF in Port Moresby communicated with them through the District Agriculture Office. The whole of the fresh foods episode indicates how, by sustained pressure, the LMC was able to protect and advantage its interests.

It is not only DASF, however, from whom the LMC have secured services and aid. With the departure of the DASF honorary adviser, the Department of Business Development provided an adviser/manager (a Canadian CUSO volunteer). The Development Bank provided a loan for the LMC to build a store shed. Later with the agency of their 'class' mates on the Goroka Council and through the Eastern Highlands District Area Authority, the LMC obtained $2,500 from Rural Improvement Programme funds. As a result of the 'fresh foods' project run by DASF, the LMC got a guaranteed market for its kaukau. This was all for an organization that had eighty-seven members in October 1973!

Politically, these Eastern Highlands interest associations are potential nationalists of a very special type. Theirs is the nationalism of self-interest:

The expatriates used to say, you Papuans and New Guineans must stand on your own feet and work your way to meet Self-Government. We have considered this strongly and started the Co-op so we don't want other organisations to compete against the Iomega Co-op. Otherwise we call all those organisations who deal with kaukau and decide on fixed prices.2

Nationalist Eastern Highlands big peasants might advocate a return to traditional ways (cultural nationalism?), but it will be to a certain segment of those traditional ways - the haus man (bachelor age set house),

1 These were the Mekeo Rice Growers' Association and the Northern District Cattle Farmers' Association. There were special reasons in both cases and the sample is not big enough to permit deduction of a pattern.

2 LMC, Directors meeting 25 May 1973 Minutes.
so that young men will stop being lazy and troublesome. Nationalism means organizational monopoly for the 'big peasant' interest associations. The big peasants are conscious that self-government and independence represent a turning point in the political evolution of Papua New Guinea. They emphasize the rhetoric of preparedness:

Very soon now we will have self government. It is important that the Co-operative erects its office and store before that date so it is ready.

This preparedness is second nature to the big peasants. In the past they have profited from changes in political organization and forms, and they intend to do so again.

Two political issues in the Eastern Highlands illustrate the dynamics of interest association politics: the fresh food project and the continuing coffee marketing controversy.

The Lowa Marketing Co-operative have long had ambitions to obtain a marketing monopoly of kaukau. In June 1973 they began to press the authorities to get all kaukau producers to market through the LMC. In 1974 the government devised a strategy for fresh foods which involved establishing governmental marketing authorities in various parts of Papua New Guinea. The organizer of the fresh foods project visited Goroka and told the directors that the LMC would be phased out and replaced by a government wholesaler. The directors were horrified.

The LMC counter attack began at the official opening of the LMC building. Soso Maniha gave an impassioned speech urging the members to stand together against the government to protect their cooperative. The campaign gathered momentum. Akepa Miakwe, MHA for Goroka Open, supported the LMC directors and began lobbying on their behalf in Port Moresby.

\[1\] Bigmen such as Sinake Giregire, Sabumei Kofikai and Atau Waukave actually proposed this at a meeting of Ufeto villagers, 1 April 1973.

\[2\] GFC, meeting 21 September 1973 Minutes. See also Ureguto stressing that the GFC and the LMC had to be strong to be ready for self-government (GFC, meeting 30 November 1973 Minutes).
The directors' arguments received national media coverage:

... we made ourselves quite clear that we did not want the Government to establish its marketing authority here because we saw the possibility of competition and yet they have gone ahead with it (Post-Courier 5 November 1974).

The president of the Goroka local government council joined the fray on the side of the LMC:

Mr Pimero said the government was not a business body and should therefore limit its business interests in the country. He said he believed the Government's role in the economy was to safeguard local business interests and negotiate business affairs on the international level (ibid.).

The Minister for Agriculture, Dr (now Sir John) Guise, met the LMC directors in Goroka and capitulated. The agreement reached provided for:

1) the Government to buy LMC surpluses for the Port Moresby and Lae markets;

2) LMC to have a clearly delineated area within which it was the monopoly buyer - the demarcation of boundaries to be done by DASF staff and the LMC Directors;

3) the Government Market would sell wholesale to the LMC if the latter were short of foodstuffs\(^1\) (it had its monopoly of supply to government institutions in Goroka to protect - a monopoly, incidentally, organized by the Government).

In effect the government guaranteed a big peasant interest association a monopoly market.

The big peasants were less successful in attempting to change the government's policy on coffee marketing. The issue here is the government's power to ban the sale of cherry coffee and allow only parchment coffee to be sold to buyers. The big peasants are generally in favour of the latter course. For example, a notice on the door of the Koreipa Erea Haus Miting (Koreipa Area Hall) asserts:

\(^{1}\) National Broadcasting Commission News 5 November 1974. The agreement also provided for LMC to have use of Cottees facilities on a lease basis when the government bought out Cottees.
The 1973 ban on cherry was supported by the big peasants. This was because they own (or control) the village coffee pulpers (see Appendix B). This means that they control the through-flow of marketable coffee and the proceeds therefrom. If the sale of cherry is allowed, independent picking by young men can secure them cash from the roadside buyers.

The big peasants are not the only interest involved. The large-scale expatriate-owned coffee factories prefer to buy cherry. They have been joined by 'super-elite' rural capitalist Papua New Guineans, such as Akunai and Sinake Giregire,2 who have coffee plantations in the expatriate style. These interests argue that the people want to sell cherry (the big peasants of course argue that the people want the opposite). To complicate matters3 the expatriates have involved leading big peasants in their coffee factories. In 1974 the Asaro HFSA did not condemn the allowance of cherry buying, because three of its leaders were trustees of the Asaro-Watabung Investment Corporation and had begun to see the question from the factory-owner point of view. Asaro Coffee Estates Ltd. has (a minority) indigenous shareholding through the Highlands Commodity Exchange. This was used adroitly by them in 1974 to secure the company classification as an indigenous company for purposes of coffee trading.

1 'Coffee Buyers. In Koreipa village the people do not like to sell cherry coffee but like to sell dry (parchment) coffee - that's all.'
2 I do not have time here to analyse these peri-urban rural capitalists. It is sufficient to note that their interests are beginning to diverge from the 'big peasants'. For example, as employers of labour both Akunai and Sinake have argued to Rural Wages Boards against increases in rural wages.
3 The whole question of coffee marketing is much more complex than is indicated here. Those big peasants who are involved with the expatriate plantations are confronted with a conflict of interest.
In 1974 when the government lifted the ban on cherry the big peasants, predictably, protested. On behalf of the big peasants, the Goroka Council appealed to the minister to reverse the policy. Dr Guise had a meeting where Sinake, F.J. ('Fred') Leahy, P.J. ('Pat') Leahy and Barry Holloway MHA persuaded him that there were not enough pulpers to handle the coffee. The GFC was left unsatisfied.

The GFC, however, is preparing for the future. Its members felt they could not press the issue before they had completed their hall (they did not have the 'strength' without a haus miting). When the hall was finished, the farmers told this writer they intended to call Dr Guise and explain to him that the GFC felt that smallholders should make parchment, both to keep more money in the villages and to encourage an improvement in the quality of coffee. They were also unhappy that the vehicles provided under World Bank assistance were being used as general pool transport and not specifically for cattle project work (ignoring the fact that their demand for transport was one of the reasons for its shortage).

The Northern District Cattle Farmers' Association

The Northern District Cattle Farmers' Association (NDCFA) was formed in February 1972 (interestingly the formation meeting was attended by sitting and aspiring MHAs). Despite some pressure to form a company, the association form was chosen. The aims of the NDCFA were:

1 An informant, present at the meeting, tells me that Guise was given the impression that there were only about a hundred pulpers in the (Eastern?) Highlands. This is demonstrably false - see Appendix B.

2 Since this paper was written the Northern District has become the Oro Province. To avoid confusion, however, we will refer to the former Northern District as Northern Province and will refer to the Northern District Cattle Farmers' Association (NDCFA) by its original title.

3 See Schwimmer (1967, 1973) for pertinent background.
i) transport of livestock for a reasonable fee  
ii) to represent the members in marketing stock  
iii) to operate an equipment pool and stock and pastoral supply agency for members  
iv) to collect and distribute information about the cattle industry.¹

This seems unexceptional and the organization has operated in a conventional (according to my model) 'phase three interest association' manner. It is organized into three areas: Kokoda; Barisari, Oro Bay and Buna; and Gona, Kellerton, Saiho and Iegarta - corresponding to the Ilimo, Oro Bay and Higaturu Local Government Councils' areas respectively.

The NDCFA shares the elitist concerns of other Papua New Guinean interest associations. Initially it set membership fees at $150 but eventually reduced this to $6 as a number of cattle project owners had not joined. The reason for the high rate of non membership probably lay in the fact that the Association covered a larger area than is usual in Papua New Guinea; hence the three district branches. In a bid to maintain organizational cohesion, the NDCFA attempted to pressure DASF into removing its services from non-member cattle owners.

NDCFA members have shown the expected concern with their prestige. They advised Radio Northern District for the broadcasting of the outcome of their meetings. They decided to obtain badges so that members would be readily identifiable.² And from the very beginning the Association was interested in obtaining a truck to carry members to meetings and to transport their stock.

The 'interests' expressed by the NDCFA are what one would expect of a cattle association. They put constant pressure on DASF to provide facilities³ and to reduce the costs of transport, etc. Although in common

¹ 'The Northern District Cattle Farmers' Association', n.d. Mimeograph (copy on NDCFA files).

² The rationale originally was to prevent non-members from using the DASF transport arranged for NDCFA meetings (NDCFA, Kokoda Sub-District, Annual General Meeting 16 November 1973 Minutes/NDCFA files, 'Cattle Meetings and Correspondence').

³ For example, the Association wanted pregnancy testing of their stock done (at the Popondetetta Agricultural Training Institute) without charge.
with most of the interest associations analysed here, the NDCFA was 'started' (in the sense that prevailing big peasant aspirations were directed to the interest association form) by expatriate DASF officers, the increasing self- assertion of big peasants is shown by their readiness to complain when felt needs were not being catered for.¹

In common with other interest associations, the NDCFA have good relations with the councils, who usually do whatever the Association requires of them. When the NDCFA failed to get DASF agreement for the establishment of an abattoir (one suspects the prestige of such a big bisnis attracted the cattlemen), they got the Oro Bay, Ilimo and Higaturu Councils to agitate for its establishment. The identity of interests between the Higaturu Council and the NDCFA was facilitated by a prominent NDCFA member (and ex MHA), Edric Eupu, being Higaturu president. This gave the Association good access to council facilities.

Politically, the NDCFA is a centre of some influence. Its president, Stephen Oriiri (see Appendix C) has political ambitions. During the Ijivitari by-election campaign in 1974 he and the Association were embroiled in an attempt to discredit the national coalition government.

The NDCFA had written to Stephen Tago MHA about the problem of mimosa weed. Tago had asked the Minister for Agriculture, Iambakey Okuk, a question in the House of Assembly and the latter had promised that DASF would liaise with the NDCFA about it. However no follow-up action was taken. The NDCFA directors then decided to write to Northern Province MHAs expressing disappointment that the Minister for Agriculture had not visited the province to speak to the people, as promised during a visit by the Chief Minister. During the Ijivitari by-election (caused by the death of Paulus Arek), Stephen Oriiri issued a press statement, which said inter alia:

¹ For example, in 1973 they said that the European DASF officers should spend less time in the office and more time visiting projects (NDCFA Popondetta Sub-District, Annual General Meeting 9 November 1973 Minutes/NDCF A file 'Cattle Meetings and Correspondence'). Significantly, in view of the discussion of the GFC/LMC relationship with expatriate civil servants, the occasion arose because of expressed dissatisfaction with the local officers.
the farmers had expressed that the Government Ministers were still carrying out the attitude of the colonial government of Australia forgetting Papua and concentrating on the development of New Guinea (NDCFA files).

A more aggressive version of the statement was reported on the national news. Since Edric Eupu was the Papua Besena candidate in the election, this report drew considerable attention. When Dr Guise became Minister for Agriculture he promised that growers would be given DASF assistance in demonstrations of weedicide application and that Development Bank loans would be provided for equipment and weedicides. Though the whole affair is of little importance it shows that the big peasants are regarded as influential on the local political level.

In common with the highlands and Milne Bay groups, the NDCFA big peasants proved attractive to the ambitions of expatriate businessmen: in this case Mr H. Kienzle of Mamba Estates (a large cattle concern at Kokoda). In early 1972 Kienzle intended to establish a butcher shop in Popondetta and wanted indigenous participation through an association to be formed from the (then) ninety cattle project owners in the province. When the NDCFA was formed, Kienzle renewed his offer to the Association of equity in the Northern District Meat Supply Ltd. The NDCFA resisted by procrastinating. They were suspicious that involvement would legitimize Kienzle's business interests and would preempt the NDCFA's chances of getting their own abattoir. Kienzle was unpopular because he paid the lowest price in the province for slaughtered beef and charged more than DASF for transport hire.

Eventually Kienzle applied to join the Association, promising to service the NDCFA truck free if the Association paid for the parts. He also promised to allow Mamba Estates to be used for demonstration field days. This episode is again important only in that it illustrates that the big peasants are considered influential and worth winning over. With the advent of independence such episodes must occur even more frequently than in the (very) recent past.
Mono-crop politics: the Mekeo Rice Growers' Association

Broadly speaking, rice has had a three stage history in the Mekeo. The first stage could be called the 'administration-enforced' stage. Rice was introduced into the Mekeo area by the Catholic mission in 1917. By 1931/32 it was grown under the direction of administration personnel under Native Regulations. Each able-bodied male was required to plant half an acre of rice and was paid one halfpenny per pound of padi so produced. Due to the depression prices fell in 1934/35 and when the European supervisor was withdrawn no rice was sold, the people preferring to barter it with the coastal Roros. Production at former levels was reestablished during the war by the use of military patrols. The net outcome of this period was to make the Mekeos unwilling to invest much effort in rice cultivation - particularly since they had seen ANGAU's mechanized efforts during the war (Jeffreys 1968). Covert hostility to the administration and the missions led to millenarian outbreaks in 1941.¹

The second stage was associated with the introduction of rural progress societies in 1948. Rice was grown on a village basis in the much-heralded Mekeo Rice Project. Initially the rural progress societies had been greeted with enthusiasm. But the rigidity of their organization, plus the fact that village units were not the traditional form of communal cooperation, resulted in the failure of this method of increasing rice production. After the 1953/54 reorganization smaller, often 'family' groups began to plant rice (Jeffreys 1968). There was even an individual planting rice in 1954. The trend generally seemed towards smaller labour units (Belshaw 1951). The east Mekeo area was hardest hit by the collapse of the project and virtually withdrew from rice production.²

¹ For an account of this cult activity see Papuan Courier 28 February 1941; W.H.H. Thompson, assistant resident magistrate Kairuku, to the government secretary 9 August 1941 and W.H.H. Thompson, assistant resident magistrate Kairuku, to the resident magistrate Central District 8 October 1941 (both in DDA (Bereina Sub-District office) file 7-3-1). It is interesting to note that in the period 1955 to 1962 the kiaps widely suspected one Alan Natachee of being a cultist. His movement, significantly, followed the collapse of the Mekeo Rice Project in the mid 1950s.

² Adverse seasonal conditions caused the collapse of mechanized cultivation in east Mekeo in the mid 1950s. The extension centre at Inawaia was closed in August 1955. The east Mekeos, suffering perhaps from 'societal trauma', generally withdrew from participation in the cash economy following these events. Even today their cash crop efforts are concentrated upon transport and betel nuts.
In 1968 a Swiss, Critten, in partnership with some people from Aipeana began to grow rice. The next year they grew 120 acres and were joined by Simon Aluofo (see Appendix C) who had managed to gain 'control' of a large block of land belonging to his clan. They were imitated by others; by 1973 there were fifteen rice growers. This heralded the third, contemporary, stage of rice production - the 'individualist' stage.¹

This seemed a reaction to a terminal development situation.²

Early in 1974 these growers and other Mekeo businessmen, mainly tractor and implement owners, held a meeting to decide whether to form a Mekeo Business Men's Association. The move was abandoned - the businessmen were uncertain as to their aims and the probability of a clash of interests between the farmers and the tractor owners was high. The director of DASF, John Natera (himself from the area), privately encouraged the growers to organize. In March 1974 the Mekeo Rice Growers' Association (MRGA) was formed after a public meeting had been held to discuss a projected New South Wales Rice Growers' Association/Papua New Guinea Development Bank nucleus rice estate at Bereina.

Even though the MRGA is the newest of the rural interest associations discussed here, it has moved quickly into a pattern similar to that of the other associations. Virtually before the MRGA had begun functioning, it decided to restrict the membership in 1975 to rice growers (thirteen out of the thirty 'members' at that time were not rice growers).³ Also the

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¹ The extent of individualism per se is uncertain. Some growers, like Simon Aluofo, Victor Ovoi (and perhaps Charlie Maino), are individual growers. Others 'represent' groups, which may or may not mean (one suspects it does) that they 'control' the production of that group.

² Hewlett's (1973) pessimism seems to be justified for Mekeo rice. A UN expert said of Mekeo rice:

The rather rapid increase in rice production during recent years was probably the result of fair to adequate weather conditions, absence of major pests and mechanical harvesting by DASF. As such the Government finds itself in a somewhat awkward position as farmers may wish to expand rice cultivation rather rapidly and the Government becoming more and more involved in a financially risky operation (Have 1974:25)

³ This was an exclusive policy not matched by any of the other groups. Even the NDCFA admitted some pig owners (13 of a total membership of 141 in the Kokoda District in November 1973).
Association appealed to the police for firearms permits so that the members could buy shotguns. These were ostensibly to keep pigs and magani (wallabies) out of the rice but in actual fact had important connotations of prestige. The police replied that they would be willing to give the MRGA three shotguns to be kept at the Mekoe Council adviser's office. Individual members who had licences and wished to use guns could do so. This compromise was not popular as members felt that they should individually have shotguns.

This revealed distrust of group projects - a distrust that is rife in the Mekoe area, probably due to the failures of the producers' societies and cooperatives. It was exemplified by the growers' refusing to allow the executive, as a collective manager, to control the rice industry and their desire that each grower should be responsible for himself.

The most remarkable thing about the MRGA is the rapidity with which it defined its interests and the vigour with which these have been pursued. Its interests can be summed up as 'capturing' the Bereina district office of DASF in order to secure its undivided attention to rice grower problems, and to get DASF at the policy-making level to support (in effect to subsidize) the rice growers. The first aspiration has been completely achieved. The RDO is imbued with a healthy respect for Aluofo and, although he is a general extension officer, devotes most of his time to the rice growers.

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1 This was an important concession, perhaps reflecting the importance of the MRGA members. The normal ratio in rural Papua New Guinea is one shotgun per fifty people. Beipa and Aipeana, the two main MRGA villages, had ratios of one gun per thirty-one people and one gun per twenty-eight people respectively.

2 Only Inawi and Aipeana still have cooperative stores. These are survivors of the dozens of cooperatives that once abounded in the Mekoe area. This distrust of cooperative venture was revealed at a meeting I attended in Inawi village (26 July 1974) with the DASF and Business Development representatives on the Central Province portion of the Fresh Foods Project. The meeting was primarily to introduce the scheme. But when the DASF officer suggested that the Inawi Co-operative store buy their vegetables and sell them to DASF, the people present disagreed. They said the cooperative could only run the store and that DASF should begin the project and when it was well underway hand it over to one of their businessmen (Charlie Maino's and Simon Aluofo's names were mentioned).

3 Engendered in a large part by Aluofo's undisguised contempt for the RDO's lack of expertise in rice growing. Aluofo also (significantly) wanted to have the RDO transferred.
The regional policy-making level of DASF is proving more obdurate. Official policy in the 1973 period was one of benign neglect. DASF felt that Mekeo rice in the past had withered from too much attention and they were determined not to repeat past mistakes. In 1970 DASF tried to move their harvester from Bereina to the Markham valley but were prevented by an outcry from the Mekeos and pressure from Toua Kapena MHA, and then a ministerial member of the House of Assembly. DASF policy began to change in late 1973 and proved receptive to MRGA pressure when the latter was formed.

When Dr Guise became minister, DASF policy became overtly favourable to the MRGA. The rationale behind this lay in the minister's resolve to increase indigenous production of rice for import-substitution. Aluofo has taken advantage of the minister's proclivities and prefers to write directly to him. At the local level threats to complain to the minister serve to galvanize DASF staff into action.

Pressure has been applied to get an increase in the price paid to the growers, to obtain a government mechanic to maintain rice growers' equipment, and to get a project manager for Mekeo rice sent to Bereina. The MRGA have obtained government agreement to take responsibility for the rice after it has been bagged and weighed in the field. This transfers losses incurred by insects, spillage, etc. to the government. Even though the charge for the DASF harvester was doubled to $12 per hour or per acre, despite protests from the MRGA, the rice growers were still receiving what is in effect subsidized harvesting.\(^1\) In 1975 the government purchased a $50,000 harvester for use on Mekeo rice and also established a DASF machinery hire service.

The MRGA has been a highly successful big peasant pressure group because of the coincidence of several favourable factors. Its vigorous leadership applied pressure to DASF at precisely the time that policy became favourable to Mekeo rice. It was assisted by governmental fear of

\(^1\) A senior DASF official told me that in 1974 it cost DASF $16 per hour or per acre to run the header. If depreciation were added the cost would rise to about $25 per hour or per acre.
the strong influence of the Papua Besena movement in the Mekeo area. This rendered the government more than usually susceptible to MRGA pressure. To satisfy big peasant 'influentials' would be to gain political support. Also the emergence of Dr Guise, a strong nationalist, as agriculture minister helped the rice growers in securing further advantages. He promised that the government would market their rice at half the price of imported rice (Post-Courier 23 December 1974), perhaps thereby obviating Mekeo rice's alleged unpopularity with consumers.

When one considers that the basis for a rice industry in the Mekeo is uncertain, the government's policy of massive support is all the more significant an indicator of the advantages organized big peasants can secure for themselves.

*Milne Bay: thwarted development and the emergence of the Damuni Association*

Our final case study is introduced primarily to suggest the qualifications that have to be made to my 'three-phase' evolution-of-the-big-peasant-class model. In Milne Bay a combination of DASF policy and the intercession of an ambitious political elite created the Damuni Association. This prevented the 'normal' development of interest associations based on big peasants. The Damuni Association took the place of 'phase three' interest associations. It is not an interest association but an elite association primarily concerned with the political interests of its leadership, though purporting to represent cattlemen.

Phase one of Milne Bay development followed the pattern suggested above. Accommodating with the colonial administration and the missions, and forced to cultivate copra (Moulik 1973:66-67) a collaborationist 'herodian' elite emerged. Its emergence coincided with a developmental 'pause' (Fisk 1964) in the 1950s. Enthusiasm for development per se remained but enthusiasm for the then extant avenues waned.

In the late 1950s some parts of the province received, as well as the 'phase two' institutions, local government councils and cooperatives, new crops - notably coffee in the southern Massim. However DASF policy intruded into the processes then under way. Mr Cottrell Dorman, regional
agricultural officer, introduced village agricultural committees. These were based on traditional social (clan) patterns and this inhibited the emergence of the big peasant class, particularly in the new coffee areas where this had become possible. The new elite therefore sought avenues through the local government councils and many of them stayed with these institutions. The persistence of council involvement on the part of the new elite (cf. Dibela in Appendix C) marks an important exception to the national pattern.

In the period 1963 to 1968, DASF changed its approach and, utilizing the 'progressive farmer' philosophy, began to encourage the big peasantry.¹

For some time we concentrated our extension activities and resources on those interested individuals and occasional small groups. The majority of Village Agricultural Committees were inoperative so I left them alone. (Interview with a senior extension officer)

By now it was almost too late, the 'strong' men had foregone entrepreneurial status for 'political' business - the local government councils.

After 1968 DASF returned to the idea of village agricultural units and introduced village agriculture clubs. Membership of these was not based on traditional social units but was voluntaristic, and an element of 'strong' (active and innovative) farmer membership emerged. Of this, a by no means atypical example is the report Maclaren, the Divara village club leader, gave of his club's activities (to a Tavara Agricultural Association meeting). In 1967-69 the thirteen member club had planted 5,072 teak trees, 860 new coconuts, 166 cashew nut trees and -

also helped clean the Anglican Mission station at Ukoka, repair church, built club and meeting house. The club also helped build the medical orderly's house and helped the co-operative store work ramming copra (Tavara Agricultural Association files).

¹ I have stressed the primacy of DASF initiative here. It is part of my general case that the big peasants did not achieve 'independence' (from bureaucratic control) until 'phase three'. Indeed the 'phase three' interest groups are the symbols of their independence.
The village agriculture clubs were amalgamated into agriculture associations. These began to develop along the lines of 'phase three' interest associations. They exerted pressure on DASF (instead of vice versa) and their members continued to monopolize extension officers' time. Pressure was put on the government to retain officers of whom they approved. Politicians attempted to sway these groups in a bid to recruit supporters. Dennis Young MHA (Milne Bay Regional) has often attended Tavera Agriculture Association meetings. Prior to his election in 1972, John Fifita MHA (Kula Open) was involved with the Misima Agriculture Association.

Yet the agricultural associations have not branched out into more overt interest association activity. DASF discouraged the associations from collecting money, investing, or buying machinery. DASF insistence on organizational uniformity prevented them from becoming functionally specific along the lines of an 'interest', such as cattle or coffee. One association (Basima, on Ferguson Island) which wanted to call itself a cattlemen's association was dissuaded from this course. District (province) RDO Dave Underwood's prestige within the province prevented any revolt against this intraprovince uniformity.

Even the introduction of cattle projects with, as elsewhere, their overwhelmingly individualistic concomitants, has not broken the pattern of the agricultural associations not evolving beyond the quasi interest association stage. Other organizations have catered for the developmental leadership aspirations of the big peasant elite. The Damuni Association was able to capitalize upon this primarily DASF-created situation.

The Damuni Association grew out of the local government council elite previously mentioned. This elite developed an esprit de corps through the Milne Bay District Councils Conference. Carefully orchestrated from behind the scenes by Dennis Young, the conference revolted against the lack of administration reaction to their ideas for Milne Bay's development. The conference elite (Kingsford Dibela, Vernon Guise, et al.) formed the leadership of the Damuni Association.

Damuni's initial rise was very similar to that of a quasi dynamic communal association, or, more accurately, a congeries of dynamic communal
associations. The membership was created around the parochial influence of each individual leader. Yet the mass membership in 1969-70 contained a good deal of the 'exaggerated expectations'/anti-administration sentiment more usual for a dynamic communal group. From this point on, however, Damuni gradually lost any mass involvement and became more a vehicle for the political ambitions of its two leaders, Kingsford Dibela and Dennis Young. This inevitably attracted the opposition of John Guise MHA (Alotau Open), whose interests were directly affected. The battle took place over a Damuni-inspired scheme for a nucleus cattle estate at Gawanaki in the Rabaraba District - a contest which Young and Dibela lost.

Only time will tell if Damuni can recover as a political force. If it does not, then the big peasants will again seek avenues for expression of their interests. Depending on DASF policy, these could come from particular cattlemen-dominated agricultural associations.

Conclusion

This study has sought to analyse the evolution of the big peasant class. It has attempted to relate such evolution to a three-phase change in the political structures of rural Papua New Guinea. I would suggest that these two things have interacted with each other. The end result - 'phase three' - has been the emergence of the dialectically opposed interest associations and dynamic communal associations.

The interest associations are the logical product of the evolution of the big peasant class. The dynamic communal associations are both a product of this political evolution - in their 'modern' facets, a young educated leadership and a desire for viable economic development - and a reaction against it - in their anti-governmental 'politics of protest' and their ideological egalitarianism.

The case studies indicate the sort of qualifications that need to be made to the model of an ongoing process when it is applied to a particular locality. The international perspective suggests the importance of the developmental issues thus raised. Future agricultural policy in Papua New Guinea will ignore distribution, in favour of a growth in production per se, only with considerable social and political costs.
APPENDIX A
RURAL SURVEY, GOROKA DISTRICT

This appendix presents the results of a survey conducted during a three and a half week trip to Goroka in August 1974. The survey consisted of interviews of between one and two and a half hours with fifty peasant farmers from villages scattered about the Bena, Lowa and Asaro census divisions. It was decided to differentiate the farmers on the basis of whether or not they were members of associations (the Goroka Farmers' Club (GFC) or the Asaro Highland Farmers' and Settlers' Association (HFSA)). That this was a significant basis for differentiation was borne out in the fact that the 'members' generally were revealed to be big peasants. Twenty-five representatives of each category were chosen. The 'members' category was further subdivided by the deliberate selection of six 'leaders' from the two associations. These were Upeguto (president) and Soso Maniha of the GFC (the latter chosen because he was also chairman of the Lowa Marketing Co-operative), and from the Asaro HFSA, Ekehanimo, the president, Atiyaro and Wyirepo, vice presidents, and Aron, a prominent figure in Asaro HFSA affairs.

The survey is meant to be merely indicative; no claim is made for statistical significance. Some attempt was made to ensure that a geographical spread was achieved in the sampling, but the Watabung area, from which the Asaro HFSA draws half its membership, was not included, thereby perhaps detracting from the representativeness of the sample. Also, inhibitions about talking to a (foreign) stranger could have affected the results, though it was hoped that the technique of cross-checking during the extended interview/conversation would reduce the possibility of misinformation. For some questions it proved impossible to get answers. For example, information as to how much land the interviewee 'owned' - as distinct from gardened, had coffee trees upon, or had fenced for cattle -

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1 I must record my thanks to the (acting) district rural development officer for providing me with interpreters during this survey.
was impossible to gather because of the range of conceptions of 'ownership'.
This issue of land ownership, though obviously vital to the argument, is
one that would require extensive and prolonged research more appropriate
to an anthropologist than to one with the limited time available to this
writer. Nevertheless it was generally true that, gardening apart, the
'members' used more land for cash crops or livestock than did the 'non-
members'. Traditional status was, with rare exceptions, also impossible
to estimate quickly.

Question 1: age

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<th>non-members</th>
<th>members</th>
<th>leaders</th>
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<tr>
<td>under 35 years</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1(^{(2)})</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>35-45 years</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 years and</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>over</td>
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The unusual age spread of the non-members may suggest that men of
the 35-45 generation, if they are not making it in bisnis locally, go to
Goroka or further afield in search of wage employment (though Q.7 below
indicates that this may not be so).

Question 2: education

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<th></th>
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<tr>
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<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>nil</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This was a surprising result. One would expect members of an elite
to be better educated. The fact that they were not suggests different
bases for social differentiation. The possession of a certain degree of
education would differentiate the leaders from the mass of a dynamic
communal association.

\(^2\) The only 'member' interviewed who was under 35 was Winis Isamatoole of
Kami No. 1, a director of the Lowa Marketing Co-operative, possessor
of 5,000 coffee trees and, with a father who was a luluai, an obvious
future bigman.
Question 3: mission experience

This was gauged in terms of having worked for or held office (e.g. elder) in a mission, or having been a missionary (or catechist). Mere church membership was not taken into account.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>non-members</th>
<th>members</th>
<th>leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With the members it was the older respondents who had obtained such experience, whereas the younger (under 45) men had no mission involvement other than formal membership. The non-members who had been involved with missions were of no particular age group, suggesting that for some this was still an avenue of social advancement.

Question 4: administration experience

This was counted in terms of having been a luluai or tultul, or having worked in a position of authority within the administration as, for example, a policeman, a bosboi (foreman) or interpreter. I included houseboys for kiaps in this category because of the access it gave them to administration personnel. Kagobois (carriers) or labourers were not included.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>non-members</th>
<th>members</th>
<th>leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question 5: local government council experience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>non-members</th>
<th>members</th>
<th>leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>candidate but not elected</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>successful at least once</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a ward committee man but never a candidate</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This respondent had been a ward committee man.

---

3 The leaders and local government councils:
Soso has never bothered with the council - he just wants to conduct his business; Upeguto was elected but was sacked from the council as a consequence of a fight with a policeman; Ekehanimo stood in the first local government council election in 1964 but was beaten into second place by Sinake and has not stood since; Atiyaro stood unsuccessfully in 1972; Aron has stood three times, successfully the second, but has no intention of standing again; Wyirepo was elected to the first council but resigned after three and a half years to involve himself in his business.
This result is highly suggestive. The more modest status of 'non-members' leads them to content themselves, for the more venturesome, with being a ward committee man. The 'members', as appropriate to their status, are or were more active in local government council politics.

**Question 6: association investment experience**

There seems to be a strong connection between membership of associations, cooperatives, etc. and perceptions of business activity. Involvement in one of these organizations is often seen as a form of *bisnis*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>non-members</th>
<th>members</th>
<th>leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GFC/Asaro HFSA</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>membership (paid up)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowa Marketing Co-op.</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>membership (paid)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(not paid)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other cooperative</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savings and loan society</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>membership</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highlands Commodity Exchange/Asaro Coffee Estates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>investment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asaro Watabung Investment Corp.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 (trustees)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namasu</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other business:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bougainville Copper Ltd.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shares</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goroka Coffee Producers' Ltd.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other associations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bena Cattle Owners</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bena Development Corp.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The difference in levels of activity between 'members' and 'non-members' is readily apparent and obviously significant.

---

4 The distinction between paid up and unfinancial members needs to be made. Frequently people will assert membership of an organization if they have attended a meeting. It assumes extra importance when one considers that there is a trend to make membership of these interest groups more exclusive.

5 Upeguto was chairman of the now defunct Numuyargbo Livestock Co-operative.

6 Three of the 'leaders' had been directors of savings and loan societies.

7 The relationship between the Highlands Commodity Exchange and indigenous politico-business activity will be dealt with elsewhere. It is sufficient here to note that it plays a large part in the story of 'partnership' (Finney 1970) in the Eastern Highlands.
Question 7: wage employment experience

This was non-mission, non-administration 'supervisory' (see Q.4 above) wage employment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>non-members</th>
<th>members</th>
<th>leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>nil</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>less than 5 years</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more than 5 years</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5(9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures suggest that the 'non-members' tended to leave home for wage employment for shorter periods. A smaller percentage of the 'members' undertook wage employment but when they did, did so for longer periods. This suggests greater energy and ambition on their part. The fact that the 'leaders' were in wage employment for long periods may strengthen this argument.

Question 8: cash crops

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>non-members</th>
<th>members</th>
<th>leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>nil</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-500</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500-1000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1(11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This indicates a significant gap between the big peasants and the rural mass, or 'members' and 'non-members' respectively.

---

8 When the respondents were asked about their administration work experience (Q.4 above) many replied with details of their experience of work with private expatriate commercial concerns. This may indicate a significant popular identification of the administration with the private commercial sector.

9 Aron still works as a security officer at the Asaro-Watabung Investment Corporation coffee factory at Poinda Plantation. Atiyaro is a bosboi (foreman) at Kopihaka Plantation. Ekehanimo, for twenty years a policeman, 'looks after' some Asaro Coffee Estates Ltd. coffee next to his own plot.

10 The list of cash crops omits sweet potato (kaukau) because in the course of interviewing it was discovered that virtually all the subjects sold 'vegetables' (mainly kaukau) at the Goroka market or (less frequently) to the Lowa Marketing Co-operative. Frequency of sales would not indicate amounts sold and it was not possible to ask about income so derived. Therefore (reluctantly) it proved necessary to ignore kaukau sales.

11 Ekehanimo is the only leader with a big coffee garden (6,000 trees). Aron has 250 (planted in 1952-1954, thereby making him an innovator), and Atiyaro has 250. Wyirepo would be in the big grower category but significantly has given his trees to his son. Soso and Upeguto (who lost his planting in a flood) also have none.
From Appendix D we can deduce that the per capita income from coffee in the Eastern Highlands is quite low, the highest per capita figure in any of the areas surveyed being only K21.87 for the Lowa census division. Even making the (unsubstantiated) assumption that coffee producers have an average of three dependents (this allows for those who have none), it still gives an average personal cash income from coffee of only about K80 in Lowa. From Appendix D, assuming that 0.75 kg of coffee was produced from each tree at K0.30 per kg, we have a cash income of somewhere in the order of K225 for a man who owns 1000 trees. Thus the cash income gap between Ekehanimo, with 6,000 trees and a cash income of at least K1,350, and those respondents in the 'non-member' (rural mass) category who have less than 500 trees, and thus an income of less than K112.50, is substantial. Generally the 'members' (big peasants) could be said to have a cash income of at the very least double that of the 'non-members'.

Unfortunately the data presented here took a 500 tree cut-off mark. Data presented for the Kere people of Chimbu (Shand and Straatmans 1974) suggests that 85 per cent of the growers had less than 200 trees. This area is poorer than the census division surveyed here, but the only other data for the Eastern Highlands is inconclusive. A recent study (Wilson and Evans 1975) suggests that in the Eastern Highlands 80 per cent of coffee growers have less than 0.2 hectares of coffee (which means approximately a 200 tree cut-off mark).

Whatever one is to make of these figures, there is the incontestable suggestion of a significant income gap between the big peasantry 'members' and the rural masses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(b) Cattle</th>
<th>non-members</th>
<th>members</th>
<th>leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>nil</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again this suggests a substantial difference between the 'members' and 'non-members'.

---

12 Atiyaro and Aron have no cattle. Wyirepo has given his cattle to his son and thus for purposes of the analysis has no cattle. His example is important both for its suggestion of perpetuation of privilege and its illustration of the means of avoidance of distribution of wealth upon the bigman's death.
The significant figure here is that the majority of the 'members' had over five animals (capital and political assets) while the majority of 'non-members' had between nil and five animals. Of the 'non-members', twelve pigs was the largest number owned, whereas several of the members had over that number. One, Apove of Mohoweto No.1 (a 'land boss'), had thirty. (Goats are important here because of the local influence of the Seventh Day Adventist Mission.)

Question 9: Papua New Guinea Development Bank loans

This section reinforces some of the inferences drawn from the data above. However additional questions may have sharpened the thrust of that data - for example, how many of the loan recipients had obtained more than one loan (at least two if my memory serves me correctly). This is significant because the Development Bank hopes to increase the proportion of loans going to people who already have had a loan. It is my thesis that such a policy would intensify the process of establishment of a big peasantry. Another neglected question concerns the proportion of people who applied or initiated enquiries but had not proceeded to the point of getting the loan. The usual reason for such a failure is that the land needed as security for a loan cannot be secured.

---

13 Ekehanimo is the only 'leader' without pigs (he is now a Lutheran but once was an SDA adherent).

14 Three cattle loans and one loan for a public motor vehicle (PMV).
Question 10: activities of male children

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>non-members</th>
<th>members</th>
<th>leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in primary school</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in secondary school</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in tertiary institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td>6(16)</td>
<td>2(17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in wage employment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- white collar and police</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- tradesmen (includes drivers)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- non-tradesmen/labourers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- unspecified</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>children too young to be in primary school</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>children in village</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no children/not married</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>children tend own:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cows</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coffee</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Wyirepo's son

This data is unsatisfactory. Initially the question was intended to ascertain how many of the farmers' sons were receiving tertiary education but as the survey progressed the question was broadened as new avenues of enquiry offered new implications. Accordingly, the data is incomplete. Nevertheless there is some evidence here that privilege is begetting privilege. One suspects that a survey of the parents of students at tertiary institutions would be illuminating.

15 In this section there is no data for Aron or Atiyaro. The data on Soso is incomplete.

16 Samoiyufamuna of Katagu (a 'traditional' bigman) had a son at the University of Papua New Guinea.

17 Ekehanimo had a son at Kerevat and Upeguto a son at the University of Papua New Guinea.
## Ownership of Coffee Pulpers in the Goroka District
*(Asaro, Bena and Lowa census divisions)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Privately owned</th>
<th>Local government councils</th>
<th>Expatriate companies</th>
<th>Communal (family, lineage, clan, grup, etc.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mohoweto No. 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safaiyufa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenimaro</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faniyufa</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kami No. 1</td>
<td>15 (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sigoya</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koreipa (2)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komuniue</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kofoiyufa (Asaro)</td>
<td>2 (3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amaiyuufa (4)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kofaiyuufa (Bena)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katagu (5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ketarobo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notofana</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>50</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td><strong>43</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Kami No. 1 is a special case of a village embracing western forms. For example, the villagers had built, interspersed among their traditionally-constructed homes, brightly-painted weatherboard European-style houses *(Post Courier 15 November 1974)*.

2 Koreipa is the village of Ekehanimo (president of the Asaro HFSA). It is marked by an active community spirit, witness the Koreipa Erea **Mitig Haus**, and yet the people there decided, according to Ekehanimo, that in future they would buy pulpers as individuals.

3 Aron, another leading Asaro HFSA member, has two pulpers but they are used in such a way as to be virtually communal.
The Asaro-Watabung local government council gave this village a pulper. The other is owned by Wyirepo, another Asaro HFSA leader.

The villagers claimed that Bena Coffee Lands, a nearby plantation, gave them four pulpers. There was no check with the Company to see if they ascribed to that view of the situation.

These statistics were gathered during visits to the villages in question in August 1974. They may not be strictly accurate but suggest that about half of the village pulpers are individually owned. There are deficiencies in the figures; many pulpers are not listed (for example, there were at least five more in Kami No. 1 about which data was not obtained; also Moulik (1973:59n.). reports eleven pulpers in Mohoweto No. 1) and the definition of 'privately' owned is open to dispute. Here a pulper is defined as individually owned if it was described by non-owners as belonging to such and such a man (as distinct from such and such a 'line') and if only the nuclear family (and perhaps the father or a senior uncle) could use the pulper without incurring obligation to the owner.
This information was gained mainly through interviews. General pictures of the highlands interest association (Asaro HFS, Goroka Farmers' Club) leaders emerge from the statistics embodied in Appendix A and are not treated here. The three leaders whose profiles are presented here are slightly better educated than the highlands leaders, due in the main to a longer association with missions in their areas. They are not *sui generis* but are sociologically representative of the bigger 'big peasants' in their respective associations. For example, Simon Alufo of the Mekeo Rice Growers' Association could be matched in enterprise and initiative by Charlie Maino of Inawi village; or in worldly experience and ambition by Victor Ovoi of Aipeana village. Similarly Vernon Guise, Billy Tanby, Lebasi Mark, et al. have had careers similar to Kingsford Dibela's.

**Kingsford Dibela of the Damuni Association**

Age: about 45.
Traditional status: head of the Manibolanai segment of the Bouni clan.
Education: received a primary education at Dogura Anglican Mission during World War II.
Mission involvement: 1948-1963 taught at the Dogura Mission School. During this period he was twice chairman of the church guild and in 1966 attended church conferences in Suva and Noumea.
Local government council experience: 1963 elected to the council (inaugural president); defeated 1971; reelected 1972 (president again).
Cash crops: has a cattle project but his primary 'business' is politics. [Dibela subsequently successfully contested next House of Assembly elections and became speaker in the National Parliament.]
Cooperative/association experience: has been a member of various cooperatives. In 1970 he became president of the Damuni Association and chairman of the

---

1 A fuller picture of Dibela will appear in this writer's 'The politics of ambition - Damuni from micro-nationalism to a pressure group' in May (forthcoming).
Damuni Economic Corporation (an association subsidiary). In 1972 he became chairman of the board of directors of Gili Gili Pty. Ltd., a company in which Damuni had 40 per cent interest.

Stephen Oriiri of the Northern District Cattle Farmers' Association

Age: middle to late thirties.
Traditional status: father a village 'leader'.
Education: St. Johns Primary School at Popondetta to standard 6.
Local government council experience: 1961-1963 councillor for Inonda (he claims he then resigned because it interfered with his business ambitions and paid too little).
Cash crop/wage employment experience: 1963 established a trade store (it was unsuccessful because, he claims, there were no cash crops at Inonda and consequently no cash). 1963-1964 'informant' with various Australian National University (New Guinea Research Unit) researchers. 1965 employed with the transport department as a driver (soon promoted as a grade II driver). 1967-1969 established a cattle project. 1974 promoted to operations manager at the Plant and Transport Authority.
Cooperative/association experience: 1972 elected president of the Northern District Cattle Farmers' Association. He has ambitions for national politics.

Simon Alufo of the Mekeo Rice Growers' Association

Age: middle thirties.
Traditional status: son of a sorcerer, uncle (deceased) 'chief' of Aipeana, elder brother now 'chief' of Aipeana.
Education: to standard 6 at Sogeri.
Cash crop experience: 1965-1968 had trade store at Aipeana. He told me that he was the first indigenous Papua New Guinean to charter an aircraft (from Port Moresby to Bereina to carry store goods). 1968 began growing rice (18 acres). Received Development Bank loan for $2,000 to buy a tractor and trailer. He grew kaukau for an army contract for 9 months (gave it up because of transport difficulties). Received second Development Bank loan for $400 for a plough.
1969/70 grew 32 acres of rice
1970/71 grew 50 acres of rice.
1971/72 was sick; he claims an enemy used sorcery on him.
1973 tractor out of action.
1973/74 grew 34 acres of rice.
1974/75 grew 90 acres of rice.
1974 another Development Bank loan for a new tractor.
### APPENDIX D

From: EASTERN HIGHLANDS DISTRICT - A Comparison of Different Areas by R.F. McKillop (DASF Research Section, Konedobu)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>J</th>
<th>K</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of villages</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Area km²</td>
<td>Population/km²</td>
<td>Coffee trees</td>
<td>Coffee production (tonnes)</td>
<td>Coffee income (K'000)</td>
<td>Coffee income per capita (Kina)</td>
<td>Extension Service EO</td>
<td>RDA EO/10,000 people</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowa</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13,689</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>1,411,334</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>299.4</td>
<td>21.87</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bena Bena</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>17,257</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>962,745</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>202.5</td>
<td>11.73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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Sources:  
A-C Village Directory 1973  
E DASF statistical section 'Smallholder statistics, PNG' at 0.75 kg per tree. Note: this is much higher than calculated production per tree, but brings the Eastern Highlands coffee production close to the actual figure (i.e. the census figures for number of trees are obviously much lower than actual).  
F at K0.30/kg average price to grower. Note: columns F and G would probably overstate the production and income of outlying areas and understate production and income for Goroka and Kainantu areas.  
I-K DASF staff posting list 1975

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1 Extension Officer  
2 Rural Development Assistant
SELF-HELP MOVEMENTS:
A NEW MODEL FOR LOCAL DEVELOPMENT?

R.J. May

One of the most remarkable aspects of recent social and political change in Papua New Guinea has been the proliferation of spontaneous local movements differing in origins and specific objectives but sharing a broad concern with the achievement of economic, social and political development through communal action.

In an earlier paper (May 1975b) I attempted, in a preliminary way, to provide a brief survey of these movements and to place them in some sort of social, cultural and historical perspective.1 The term 'micronationalism' was employed in that paper to describe a varied collection of movements which displayed a common tendency, at least ideologically, to disengage from the wider economic and political systems imposed by colonial rule, seeking in some combination of traditional and modern values and organizational forms an acceptable formula for their own development. Since its principal objective was to draw attention to the convergence in objectives and organization of movements with often widely divergent origins, the earlier paper did not attempt to classify the various movements according to their differences. Such a classification might have distinguished between marginal cargo cults, local protest movements, regional separatist movements, and self-help development associations; it might also have been extended to include two categories of movement not included in the earlier survey, namely local interest groups and urban migrant associations.2

1 An expanded version of this paper together with a number of studies of particular movements by various authors is in press (May forthcoming).

2 For a discussion of the categorization of movements see May (forthcoming). Interest groups in Papua New Guinea are discussed in Gerritsen (1975 reprinted in this volume) and urban migrant associations in Skeldon (1977).
In this paper our focus will be comparatively narrow. We will be
concerned only with that class of movements which might be described as
self-help development associations and we will seek to answer the
following questions: why has there been a proliferation of such movements
since around the early 1970s? What are the distinctive characteristics
of self-help movements? What have they achieved to date? How should
government respond to them?

The growth of self-help movements

Before attempting to provide specific reasons for the growth of self-
help movements in the 1970s, it is useful to consider the broad historical
background against which the movements developed.

Before European contact Papua New Guinea's population consisted
almost entirely of small, largely independent communities of subsistence
cultivators. Within these communities social, political and economic
relationships were generally close and fairly well defined. Between them,
notwithstanding some extensive trading networks and enduring political
alliances, relations tended to be limited.

Under the impact of missions, traders and colonial administrators
the situation gradually changed. As tribal fighting diminished and as
plantations and commercial and administrative centres were established
people began to move outside traditional tribal boundaries and to take
up wage employment in the colonial economy. Later, encouraged by the
colonial administration, rural villagers turned increasingly to cash
cropping, producing mostly export crops whose income provided the means
with which to acquire the goods and services of the modern sector and
sometimes also to buy into traditional systems of status attainment.
In time, cooperatives were introduced as a method of promoting collective
local enterprise and later still steps were taken to foster individual
and group enterprises in secondary and tertiary as well as primary produc-
tion. As in other parts of the developing world, a growing proportion of
the population shifted at least temporarily to towns where they became
wage earners or used established networks of kinsfolk to stay on as
pasenda.
Politically, the colonial administration sought to foster participation in the imposed system through local government councils at the local level and through a systematic programme of political education to reinforce the introduction of Westminster style political institutions at the national level.

The early relationship between the colonial regime and its 'subjects' was, however, essentially exploitative. Traditional villagers and those on the periphery of the colonial society sensed an inability to bridge the gap between their own situation and that enjoyed by the *masta*; this in turn generated a sense of deprivation and frustration which manifested itself from time to time in spontaneous local movements which sought, through a variety of means, to remove the blockages to their enjoyment of material wealth and power. Usually such movements were mystical and millenarian in nature but sometimes too they expressed themselves through acts of defiance against government and mission. With rare exception the colonial regime regarded them with suspicion and hostility and frequently they were repressed under the various regulations which prescribed against illegal cults, illegal *singsing* and spreading false reports.

As in other parts of the Pacific, the experience of the second world war stimulated the growth of spontaneous local movements seeking change: it demonstrated the vulnerability of the colonial regime, it diminished at least temporarily the status inequalities between colonizers and colonized, and for many Papua New Guineans who came into contact with large numbers of people from other parts of the two territories for the first time it brought a vague sense of national identity. It also helped to produce a number of men with a broader world view and better understanding of the process of modernization than their elders, some of whom returned to their villages after the war with ambitious plans for social, economic and political reorganization and improvement for their people through communal effort. Among a number of movements initiated by such men the best documented are those founded by Paliau Maloa (Schwartz 1962; Mead 1956, 1964) and Tommy Kabu (Maher 1958, 1961; Oram 1967) but there were many others.

Despite the fact that many of these movements displayed a fairly high degree of economic pragmatism and political moderation (even though a large number of movements sought to break away from existing local
government councils), official attitudes towards them remained, at best, guarded. Other observers, however, recognized in their objectives and organization a change from cargo cult to political movement, a shift from 'from religion to pragmatism, from myth to self-help'.

The record of these early postwar movements was generally disappointing. Some degenerated into prewar-style cargo cults; others simply fizzled out as expectations failed to materialize and popular support gradually dissipated.

During the 1960s and early 1970s there was a pronounced acceleration in the pace of social, economic and political change in Papua New Guinea. Among the important elements of this were a marked increase in the absolute level of Papua New Guinean participation in the cash economy, a belated - and correspondingly rapid - localization of the bureaucracy, and a conscious effort on the part of the colonial administration to promote a sense of national unity. Inevitably, the structural adjustments which accompanied these developments created tensions in the society and the rapid movement to self-government and independence in the 1970s served to focus these tensions, much as Geertz (1963) has described in his much quoted study of primordial tendencies in new states.

It is against this general background that the recent proliferation of spontaneous local movements must be considered. Like the so-called cargo cults of the early colonial period and their counterparts in the immediate postwar period, the micronationalist movements which sprang up from around the late 1960s were a reaction to feelings of deprivation, frustration and insecurity; they were the response of people whose traditional way of life had been undermined but for whom the new order of government, church and business had not brought the benefits expected.

1 See for example Belshaw (1950), Bodrogi (1951), Guiart (1951), Worsely (1957), Mead (1964) and Cochrane (1970). The quotation is from Cochrane (1970:157).
This reaction took different forms. Some groups (such as the Peli Association and Pitenamu) turned to a mixture of mysticism and modern business aspirations, with varying degrees of antipathy towards government. Others emerged as organized opposition to existing or proposed local government councils (the Mataungan Association and to an extent both the Nhaalis Welfare Society and the Nemea Association) or (like Komge Oro and the Purari Action Group) to large scale development projects in the area, but assumed wider objectives. A few, for whom questions of political status seem to have been particularly important, sought to mobilize a broad regional consciousness as a basis for demands for greater autonomy (Papua Besena, the Highlands Liberation Front, Wahgi Tuale and - to the extent it was a coherent group - the North Solomons nationalist movement). The most common response, however, was the formation of organizations, drawing membership from a small number of clans or villages, whose often vague objectives were broadly to achieve social and economic improvement through communal effort. Among the better known examples of such movements are Kabisawali, Tonene Kamokwita, the Hiri Association, Olubus, and the Damuni Association, but information on grants approved by the Office of Village Development up to 1977 suggests that there are probably well over one hundred such movements scattered throughout the country.

The variety of the responses in the 1970s compared with earlier periods can probably be explained in terms of greater complexity of the society in the 1960s, increased involvement of Papua New Guineans in government and the cash economy, and growing sophistication among both rural villagers and an educated elite who act as brokers between the village and the centre. Underlying this variety, however, there is a continuing common preoccupation (at least, as we have said earlier, ideologically) with issues of self-direction and self-sufficiency. In the case of the marginal cargo cults this has partly taken the form of a withdrawal into mysticism; among separatist and local protest movements it is reflected in demands for local autonomy or separatism; in the more development-oriented organizations it has been expressed in the emphasis on mobilizing communal capital and labour. Moreover with the rapid movement to political independence in the early 1970s several groups were
clearly motivated by a desire (most explicit in the case of the Nemea Association) to define and consolidate the position of their group before the withdrawal of the colonial government or to provide an alternative administrative structure against the expectation of a general breakdown in government following independence. At a general level, therefore, the proliferation of self-help movements might be explained simply as part of a modified traditional response of withdrawal in the face of tensions and frustrations created by rapid change.

Turning to more particular reasons for the recent growth of self-help movements, one factor of obvious importance is the intellectual climate of the period. Already in the latter part of the 1960s there was some questioning in Papua New Guinea of the dominant development strategy, endorsed in 1964 by a visiting World Bank team, of concentrating resources in areas of expected greatest short term productivity, and at the University of Papua New Guinea (UPNG) (created in 1966) students were being introduced to critiques of capitalist, urban-oriented development and to theories of small scale socialist development with Tanzania and China as models. There is some evidence of a growing concern with self-reliance and decentralization in papers presented to the fifth Waigani Seminar, on rural development, held in Port Moresby in 1971 (Ward 1972) but at the following year's Seminar, which was dominated by the presence of Lloyd Best, René Dumont and Ivan Illich, these principles were swept forward on a wave of popular enthusiasm. After the seminar the Students' Representative Council endorsed a proposal by its president, John Kasaipwalova, to set up a student vegetable garden and pig farm beside the campus (a garden project was commenced but it was shortlived) and in 1972 and later years, encouraged by their university supervisors (who gave course credits for 'action research' in rural areas during vacations), a number of students returned to their villages to initiate or assist local development projects. In 1973, as an outcome of a workshop of students, staff and recent graduates of UPNG, the Melanesian Action Front was established, with a manifesto which emphasized equality, self-reliance and village development. The following year a joint staff-student Development Investigatory Group was established at UPNG with a view to supporting student involvement in village development projects. Many of these efforts suffered from an excess of rhetoric over action but they exercised a lasting general
influence over village development in a number of areas. 1 Somewhat ironically these 'radical' influences were complemented by the propaganda of the retiring colonial administration, which emphasized the importance of self-reliance as a precondition of effective political independence.

The principles of small scale development and self-reliance were further endorsed in 1972 by a visiting UNDP-sponsored team which reported on development strategies for Papua New Guinea (Overseas Development Group 1973) and following this, in December 1972 Chief Minister Somare announced his government's 'Eight Aims for Improvement', which included decentralization of economic activity and (national) self-reliance.

It may be argued that the announcement of the Eight Aims, and subsequently the embodiment in the Constitution of a sympathetic 'Five National Goals and Directive Principles', merely gave official recognition to already prevalent sentiments and provided no clear basis for action. However Somare recognized the potential importance of local self-help movements as a means of implementing the eight point plan (Somare 1975: 139) and in a number of policy decisions his government gave positive encouragement to them. The most important measures in this context were the creation in 1974 of a Task Force on Village Development (initially headed by Moi Avei), whose purpose was to assist village groups, and the establishment of a Village Economic Development Fund to provide grants for village group (but not individual) projects. Village groups also received assistance through favoured access to the Rural Improvement Programme, through the establishment of a plantation acquisition scheme, the administration of which favoured village groups, and through grants from the National Cultural Council to support local cultural projects. Development Bank lending policy was also revised to favour village self-help movements and requests from them for technical assistance were received sympathetically. In addition, the Somare government adopted a more conciliatory attitude than the colonial administration towards what were primarily local protest movements, seeking to divert the energies of

1 For a more detailed description of the mood of this period, see Ballard (1977) and Standish (in May forthcoming).
such movements from political protest to self-reliant social and economic development. In short, by the early 1970s government attitudes towards spontaneous local movements had shifted all the way from the suspicion which characterized the outlook of the colonial regime to active (and, it seems, sometimes not very discriminating) encouragement. Government policy, therefore, must be listed (not without a little irony) as a second particular reason for the proliferation of self-help movements in the 1970s.

Thirdly, the apparent success of some of the early movements encouraged the growth of others. This happened in two ways. On the one hand, groups in one part of the country emulated movements which appeared to have succeeded elsewhere. Thus, for example, in the early 1970s a number of the young radicals were strongly influenced by the example of the Mataungan Association; Kasaipwalova's Kabisawali Village Development Corporation was closely modelled on Kaputin's New Guinea Development Corporation, as was Avei's Hiri Village Development Corporation, Waiko's Komge Oro, the (Goodenough) Island Development Corporation and a number of other village self-help charters. On the other hand, the success of one group - especially in gaining access to government assistance - sometimes prompted a competitive (one might even say defensive) reaction from other groups in the area. The outstanding instance of this is the Tonene Kamokwita reaction to Kabisawali; the proliferation of local ethnically based movements in Manus (Pokawin 1976) provides another.

The anatomy of self-help movements

So far we have referred rather loosely to 'self-help development movements', 'village groups' and 'spontaneous local movements'. This is partly because much the same factors explain the proliferation of a wider collection of movements than the relatively narrow category of self-help movements and partly because the distinctions we have suggested earlier are neither sharp nor, for particular movements over time, stable. As we have already noted, for example, movements which began as local protest groups often assumed self-help development objectives and in all the groups we have broadly labelled micronationalist there is an underlying psychological tendency towards self-sufficiency. To the extent that

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1 See May (in May forthcoming).
a more precise definition is needed, self-help movements might be described as movements, usually drawing membership from a small number of clans or villages, which have as an important objective the social and economic improvement of their group through communal action. It might be noted that on this definition the category of self-help movements overlaps with the other categories of micronationalism listed on page 61. The definition is not meant to exclude groups which have sought assistance from government but it is intended to exclude the sorts of movements which Gerritsen (this volume) has described as 'interest groups' (and which appear to be included in the government's use of the term 'village group'). The ethos of self-help groups is essentially communal, egalitarian and self-reliant; interest groups, in contrast, tend to be individualistic, elitist and primarily concerned with gaining access to government services. Having said that, however, it must be admitted that the dividing line among rural progress societies, cattlemen's associations, and some other village groups is not always an obvious one.

Listing the characteristics of self-help movements is made difficult by the facts, first, that even within this relatively narrow category there is a great deal of individual variation and, secondly, that for the great majority of movements little or no information is available. The following profile is based on a rather-more-than-superficial acquaintance with some of the larger movements supplemented by a limited and often impressionistic knowledge of a number of smaller movements.

Objectives

The identifying characteristic of seeking social and economic improvement through communal action has already been mentioned. For nearly all self-help movements material improvement appears to be the primary objective though in most cases objectives are broadly, ambitiously, and

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1 This does not necessarily mean that only a few benefit since benefits may be distributed through patron-client types of relations between bigmen and others.

2 In most cases from secondary sources. See the collection of studies and list of references in May (forthcoming).
often vaguely, defined to include political and cultural as well as social and economic objectives. The charter of the Kabisawali Village Development Corporation, for example, empowers the corporation to undertake business and other activities, including traditional kula exchanges, artistic and cultural activities, and promotion of youth and adult education; the Kabisawali movement's political objectives were revealed, at least in part, in the capture and dissolution of the Kiriwina Local Government Council and the establishment of the Kabisawali People's Government. Even where objectives were initially conceived narrowly they have tended to widen.

In those movements with a more coherent ideology (principally those with young educated leadership) there is a common emphasis on improving subsistence living. This is most explicit in the manifesto of Komge Oro (Waiko 1976). However, self-help movements commonly aspire to take over expatriate plantations and businesses - indeed in some cases this appears to be their principal reason for being - and most have been quick to take advantage of government assistance through financial and technical support; moreover probably the most stable of the movements are those, like the Mataungans, the Ahi Association and perhaps the Damuni Association, which have managed to invest in fairly large scale capitalist enterprises.

Among social objectives special importance has frequently been attached to education, including adult education, and to providing useful occupations for school leavers.

Although self-help movements are essentially modernizing in their outlook, many have also emphasized traditional values and some, such as Kabisawali and Komge Oro, actively seek to maintain traditional social and cultural forms. In part the emphasis on traditional values and forms is a symptom of withdrawal and in part it reflects a genuine desire to cull the best from both traditional and western cultures; but it also represents a manipulation, conscious or unconscious, of traditional cultural symbols to legitimate the activities of movements whose main objectives and organization are foreign to the traditional culture and whose leaders frequently lack status within the traditional social framework.
Leadership and organization

In the majority of self-help movements initiative and leadership have come mostly from the younger, better educated and more sophisticated members of the community (though in several cases their main function has been to help articulate demands already expressed by village leaders and to provide the organizational impetus of the movement). As we have already noted (pp. 66-67), from about 1972 university students played a particularly active part in the growth of self-help movements; in a few cases (such as Napidakoe Navitu, the Damuni Association, the Tutukuvul Isukal Association and the Kobe Association) a similar catalytic influence was exercised by local expatriates. Such 'sophisticates' have commonly been instrumental in providing a coherent ideology and organization for the movements; perhaps more significantly they have usually brought a greater awareness of the possibilities of government assistance and a knowledge of the means by which access is gained to it. Young men like Kasaipwalova, Kaman, Avei, Waiko, and even Kaputin owed their leadership largely to their effectiveness as brokers between village people and a central government anxious to encourage local development initiative. This is not to say, however, that educated elites necessarily share the same perception of a movement as the mass of its followers and in more than one instance (including the Mataungan Association, Kabisawali and Komge Oro) the initiative of young people has resulted in clashes between the younger activists and traditional leaders.

Another common characteristic of self-help movements is the looseness of their organizational structure, although this is perhaps becoming less true as a formal constitution seems to have become a necessary precondition of receiving Village Economic Development Fund assistance. Most have some sort of executive though the members of this seem more often to 'emerge' or to be self-appointed or chosen by the leader or patron of the movement than to be the product of a formal election. Frequently these executives seem to be dominated by one or two individuals who act as spokesmen for the movement. The majority of movements have a formal membership core defined by fee paying or shareholding but records are not always rigorously maintained and non-contributors are not necessarily excluded from the movement's general activities. In some instances a broader membership is defined by
village, clan, ethnic or regional boundaries - in a loose sense, for example, all Koiari have been regarded as 'members' of the Koiari Association and until the recent internal dissention all Piblika people seem to have been seen as 'members' of the Piblika Association - but movements are seldom exclusive and even those which appear to have a distinct ethnic basis may admit outsiders.

In most cases self-help movements draw most of their energy from a small number of activists. Next to these is a larger group of members with a fairly strong psychological (and perhaps financial) commitment to the movement. Finally, in most movements there is beyond this a still larger group of 'supporters', who may or may not be fee-paying members, whose attachment to the movement is peripheral. These floating supporters may be quick to let their membership lapse when it appears that material returns are not quickly forthcoming, and this largely accounts for the apparent instability of so many of the movements.

A final organizational characteristic of self-help movements is that they are overwhelmingly a rural phenomenon.¹ Among apparent exceptions are the Ahi Association in Lae and the Etija Association from around Popondetta but the Ahi Association came into being principally to defend the interests of peri urban villages against urban intrusion and the Etija Association regards itself as a village group. In this respect the proliferation of self-help movements does seem to represent a genuine centrifugal element in Papua New Guinea's development.

The achievement of self-help movements

It is difficult to measure the achievement of self-help movements, partly because most of them are only recent phenomena, partly because the vagueness of most movements' objectives makes it difficult to evaluate the extent of their success even in terms of their own stated objectives (and this itself is a dubious criterion), and partly because there is so little information about most of them. Moreover, some have done better than others. However in view of their apparently growing importance and

¹ We have excluded urban migrant associations from this discussion since although some provide welfare services to their members most are social and sporting associations rather than self-help movements.
and of the government's commitment of resources to them it seems highly desirable that some judgements be made even if, like the following comments, these are superficial and tentative.

The first generalization that might be made is that self-help movements have been remarkably successful in quickly bringing together a group of people as members and supporters (see pp.71-72), a group which in many instances has extended across tribal and linguistic divisions and has prevailed over traditional enmities. They have also been notably successful in raising funds from supporters and in many cases have pursued successful applications for financial (and in a few instances technical) assistance from the Development Bank, VEDF, plantation acquisition scheme, and other sources. As against these achievements, in the majority of cases the initial enthusiasm has been shortlived; few self-help movements seem to have been able to sustain the active interest of members for more than three or four years. By way of evidence for this generalization: a list of the larger and apparently more successful of the self-help movements which emerged between about 1970 and 1974 would include the following: Napidakoe Navitu, the Mataungan Association, the Kabisawali movement, Tonene Kamokwita (TK), the Boera and Hiri Associations, the Nemea Landowners' Association, the Damuni Association, the Eriwo Development Association, Olubus, the Piblika Association, the Ahi Association, the Hood Lagoon Association, the Tutukuvul Isukal Association (TIA) and Komge Oro; in 1978 all of these movements appear to be still formally in existence but of the fourteen, seven appear to be more or less inactive, five (Damuni, TK, the Hood Lagoon Association, Ahi and TIA) are still operating but at a substantially reduced level, and one (Piblika) after a spectacular early success appears to be in the process of disintegration; only the Mataungan Association seems to have come close to substantially achieving its economic and political objectives and maintaining popular support. The difficulty of tracing a number of smaller groups which either received publicity in roughly the same period or were early applicants for VEDF grants suggests that this picture holds for a wide range of self-help movements. (The dissipation over the same period of massive support for two marginal cargo cults which incorporated some self-help objectives - the Peli and Pitenamu movements - follows a similar pattern.)
The apparent falling away of support for self-help movements might be largely explained by two factors. In most cases, it would seem, support has declined because the movements have failed to fulfil the expectations which they generated; this will be discussed in more detail below. Paradoxically, a second major reason for decline in support has been the early success of some movements in achieving limited objectives. This applies particularly to small village groups whose immediate objectives have centred on, for example, buying a truck or boat or freezer, or taking over a local plantation; once the immediate objective of the group has been achieved enthusiasm has waned and the commitment necessary to keep the project going has proved difficult to sustain. Other, occasional reasons for decline (which relate to the common importance of individual leadership) have been departure of the initiators of the movement and loss of momentum through internal dissention. Interestingly, considering the history of cooperatives, misuse of funds by movement leaders does not seem to have affected self-help movements on a large scale.

The achievement of self-help movements in relation to broad social and cultural objectives appears to have been modest. A few have initiated adult education programmes though the impact of these is difficult to assess. Some may have encouraged an interest in their traditional cultures but of three proposed cultural centres for which government funds were allocated to self-help movements (Kabisawali, TK and Ahi) none has materialized.¹

Few self-help movements have admitted political objectives. Of those which have, Kabisawali and the Nemea Landowners' Association both proposed to establish their own autonomous 'governments' and both did (after a fashion), though neither seems to have been very effective; several, like the Mataungan Association, Napidakoe Navitu, the Ahi Association and Komge Oro were concerned to protest particular local issues, and seem to have been fairly successful in persuading the Somare government to accommodate

¹ Since this was written (1978) an Ahi-supported Morobe Cultural Centre has been established in Lae.
their demands. However, in a number of instances leaders of self-help movements appear to have used the movement as a base for seeking election to the National Parliament. Those who have done so successfully include the Mataungans in 1972 and 1977, the Napidakoe Navitu treasurer in 1972, and the Damuni president in 1975 and 1977; as against these, however, a number of others (notably the 'young radicals' of the early 1970s) have found self-help movements an insufficient base of political power.

We have suggested above that a major reason for decline in self-help movements has been their failure to fulfil the expectations which they have generated. Often the expectations of supporters have been unrealistic; they have expected radical transformations in village economy and society when, by their nature, the most that the movements could offer was a modest improvement in village conditions. But equally, few movements have returned to their supporters, in terms of continuing material benefits, as much as their supporters have been encouraged to expect. Concern for improving subsistence living (including the introduction of appropriate technologies) has generally produced more rhetoric than action. Komge Oro, which placed particular emphasis on this aspect, planned village pig and poultry breeding centres and sought to organize village youth clubs to clear and plant communal gardens, but these projects do not seem to have made much progress. Olubus established a pig breeding-waste digester project but the project was heavily dependent on the encouragement of a Canadian volunteer and when he left the project ran down. Business ventures, especially takeovers of expatriate enterprises, have probably been more successful; however most seem to have suffered from deficiencies in managerial competence, which is due in part to the inexperience of local managers and in part to ambivalence about pursuing development through orthodox western methods. Where existing outside management has been retained (as, for example, in the case of TK and Piblika) the record seems to have been better, but even then (as recent developments within Piblika suggest) performance can be disrupted by conflicts over the direction of control. In the specific instance of plantation takeovers, poor performance

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1 The Navitu president, Paul Lapun, was also re-elected in 1972 but his presidency of the Navitu was almost certainly incidental to his success.
by local groups seems to have threatened the viability of the government's plantation redistribution scheme. A third 'development' strategy employed by self-help movements has been investment outside the group (for example in real estate or company shares). In general this has yielded steady but unspectacular returns; it is perhaps a useful way of generating income, especially for groups close to urban centres, but it is a dubious form of self-help.

It might be argued that outside observers are prone to overestimate the importance of material returns, that for most village people what has been important is the demonstration of their ability to organize a coherent movement, and that the takeover of foreign owned plantations and businesses is as much a symbolic assertion of independence as an attempt to secure monetary returns. Such an argument, however, will provide little consolation either for those who have been responsible for distributing government resources to self-help movements or for a number of sympathetic observers who have regarded such movements as vehicles for social change in accord with the government's Eight Aims and five National Goals and Directive Principles.

Most positively, self-help movements have done something to shift development initiative from the centre to the village and they have helped to bridge the growing gap between a largely urban-based elite and the predominantly rural masses. Also, movements like Kafaina (Wok Meri) have provided a local focus for women's development aspirations which the government, despite its seventh 'aim', has not provided.

In short, the achievement to date of self-help movements in relation to their broad objectives has been disappointing. At the same time - especially when compared with the record of cooperatives (Singh 1974) and the local government councils - it has not been inconsiderable. The fundamental question remains: are self-help movements inherently poor performers or can their record be improved?

1 The scheme was discontinued in 1980.
Government policy and self-help movements

To some extent the question of how government should respond to self-help movements is preempted by existing government commitments to them. However, the sheer growth in volume of self-help movements, interest groups and other village level organizations making demands on government is likely to force some reassessment of government policy towards them, even if the question of the returns from such policies does not. This will be especially true if, as I suspect, the establishment of provincial governments stimulates the growth of new movements competing for government services.

As we have seen, in the early 1970s government policy shifted rather abruptly from suspicion of self-help movements to encouragement of them, in accordance with the national objectives of decentralization and self-reliance. In the process, existing local movements were able to cash in on the government's enthusiasm for local development initiatives and new groups sprang up to take advantage of it. For some groups, especially those in politically sensitive regions, the ease with which assistance could be obtained was almost embarrassing. One observer commented that the Bougainvillean Navitu Enterprises was 'virtually propped up by the Administration because it cannot afford to have Navitu Enterprises collapse, as this would lead to further alienation of the people' (Griffin 1973:48), and it is arguable that the recent problems of the Kabisawali movement can be traced in part to the ease with which funds were available to the movement from the central government and from business. In some cases, indeed, movements appear to have seen the receipt of government assistance as an end itself; though ideologically self-help movements, in other words, they became in effect narrowly focussed pressure groups. Such a situation raises problems of equity and efficiency in the use of public funds which cannot easily be disposed of given the government's broad policy commitments and the varying capabilities and potentials of local groups. Nevertheless if self-help movements are to play a significant role in a strategy of decentralized development something must be done to improve their performance.

As a first step it seems desirable that government financial assistance to such movements should be subject to a more thorough project appraisal and
a more systematic audit. To minimize the administrative cost of this a distinction might be made between applications for assistance for village welfare projects (such as village water supplies and self-help education projects), which might be processed quickly, and economic projects (such as businesses and plantation acquisition) which might be subjected to closer scrutiny. As an incentive to self-help and a means of directing assistance towards areas of greatest need, financial assistance could be tied to variable group contributions, with larger group contributions required from more prosperous communities. To supplement this, and to improve the modest capabilities of the Office of Village Development Task Force, the central government might maintain a pool or reserve list of consultants, within and outside the bureaucracy, who could assist local groups both in the identification of new projects and through regular oversight of operating projects (areas of consultancy might include, for example, appropriate technology, improved subsistence agriculture, small scale industry, plantation management, food marketing, and tourism development). ¹ Such modifications to existing policies would not overcome existing problems due to such factors as poor resource endowment, unrealistic expectations and unstable leadership but they might encourage a more equitable and efficient use of scarce government resources.

Conclusion

At the beginning of this paper we argued that the proliferation of self-help and other village movements has been one of the most important features of recent social and economic change in Papua New Guinea. Much the same observation has been made by Prime Minister Somare (Somare 1975: 139). Yet to date there has been little systematic study of such movements either by policy makers or academics. Policy towards them has developed on a largely ad hoc basis in a virtual information vacuum.

¹ The recent transfer of the VEDF to the Department of Business Development seems to recognize the need to tie financial assistance to technical advice.
I have always been suspicious of papers and reports (especially papers by researchers) which conclude with a plea for further research. But it is an inescapable conclusion of this paper that there is an urgent need to improve our knowledge and understanding of the two hundred or so local movements which have emerged throughout the country in recent years. Without such an understanding it is unlikely that policies intended to promote self-reliant village development will prove effective.
CULT MOVEMENTS AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATIONS: REVOLUTION AND EVOLUTION IN THE PAPUA NEW GUINEA COUNTRYSIDE

Michael A.H.B. Walter

Introduction

In his study of the political evolution of rural Papua New Guinea, Rolf Gerritsen (1975 reprinted in this volume) demonstrates the emergence of two major types of groupings: the 'interest group' and the 'dynamic community group'. He portrays them as alternative developments mutually exclusive.

Of the two, the interest groups are far more delimited and precise in ambitions. They represent specific commercial interests (coffee growers, cattlemen, etc.) and they seek to control and channel the provision of government services and facilities at the local level. Their memberships are composed of what Gerritsen terms 'big peasants', '... an amalgam of "bigman" and entrepreneur - "entrepreneurs" in that they are keen innovators, eagerly seizing upon new ideas, as the rapid spread of various cash crops, especially coffee and now cattle, has shown' (this volume:9). These men are only partially educated and are true farmers in contrast with the leaders of the community groups who 'are younger, better educated and often not farmers in the true sense' (this volume:19).

Unlike the interest group's class basis, recruitment to the community group is community or ethnic based. Community groups are universalistic and idealistic in their objectives, seeking cultural regeneration as well as organizing economic development, and all within a new frame of local administration of their own making. Gerritsen perceives these groups as the inheritors of the cargo cult legacy (this volume:20).

In this paper I propose to follow up a link Gerritsen has asserted exists between cargo cults and community groups and examine the significance cults may have for the incidence of community groups and what this may tell of the dynamic of rural society in Papua New Guinea today. In relation to
Gerritsen's polarization, my approach is one-sided since I am concerned primarily with his community groups rather than his interest groups. But clearly, given the existence of a dichotomy, what I have to say about the one will be pertinent to the other.

One minor point about terminology. In Papua New Guinea I have been accustomed to use the term 'development association' for what Gerritsen calls 'dynamic community groups'. And though 'development' is probably one of the most mouthed and mauled words in modern English and 'association' has many referents, for practical investigative purposes the term is much less confusing than Gerritsen's. Papua New Guineans, moreover, can easily identify it. However, as an analytical term Gerritsen's usage is superior. I intend to make the best of both worlds by marrying the two to produce 'community development association', with both apologies and thanks to Rolf Gerritsen.

Why look at cults?

Like Gerritsen, May (1975a:27) has posited a close identity between cult movement and development association. In his 1975 paper on the Peli cult he concludes: '... the dividing line between "pure cargo cults" and "economic development associations" is often imprecise'. In his Waigani Seminar paper of 1978 (reprinted in this volume) May identifies the self-help association as the 'lineal descendant' of the cargo cult. Ken Calvert (1976:211) compares Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu in a similar vein and concludes: '... the drive and growth of much rural development today comes from the sap of cargo cult mentality'.

No matter whether cult and association are bracketed horizontally or vertically, if an affinity is acknowledged, then it is reasonable to suppose that a differential incidence of cult movements, or simply a differential strength and local impact, may have cultural and organizational correlates significant for the appearance of non cult development-oriented associations and movements. I propose that an examination of the social contexts in Papua New Guinea in which cults arose and at least temporarily flourished and a comparison with those social contexts in which cults have never flourished (never appeared or never attracted very large support) might well provide an insight into the social function and functioning of secular
and secularized development associations and like movements. Of particular note is that the much cited contrast of cult incidence in the highlands and non-highlands areas seems to be reflected by a similar incidence of community development associations. Thus of the twenty-six such associations May (1975b) cited (I am omitting Papua Besena and the Highlands Liberation Front), twenty-four occur outside the highlands. Of Gerritsen's examples of dynamic community groups, none occur in the highlands.

Sociological analysis of cult movements in Papua New Guinea

Definitions

A further terminological issue concerns the label 'cargo cult'. It has been commonly used in both academic and non-academic literature on Papua New Guinea for some time now. Berndt (1952/53:47-48) quotes Mair: '... a manifestation which used to be known as the "Vailala Madness", but is now more commonly described as the "cargo cult"', and he footnotes various early references in the literature. The definition, however, has not always been clear. The cargo part seems straightforward enough: any cult promising cargo. But here is a surprising revelation: a large number of cult movements labelled 'cargo' have no explicit message about cargo at all.

What seems to have happened is that the term has gained currency among the educated, both national and expatriate, in Papua New Guinea, and applied, disparagingly by the one and perhaps more for convenience by the other, to a much wider category of phenomena. Indeed, the word 'cult' is itself usually employed in an unrestricted and haphazard way that embraces its different shades of meaning - religious and secular - at different times. In effect, we have a situation in which a particular element found in some cultistic movements is used not only to characterize entire cults, but also to embrace and label movements that do not even exhibit it.

Does it matter? For present purposes, yes! For one thing, a false category is set up. But more important, by characterizing the whole by a component - even though for the European observer it is the most noteworthy component - subsequent attempts at analysis are blinkered. I shall therefore use 'cult movement' as the generic term and 'cargo cult' only where the
concept of cargo is quite explicit. The addition of 'movement' will also serve to distinguish these innovatory cults from established, traditional ones.

**Implications of the areal integrative effect**

A prominent feature of cult movements has been their local integrative effect on a countryside notably fragmental. Meggitt (1973:26-27) provides an informative step-by-step commentary on the actual proselytizing and spreading of a cargo cult through a traditionally hostile countryside, and comments upon the phenomenon:

Two general features of this propagation of Ain's cult are noteworthy. First, the rapidity of the process was remarkable. These journeys and the concomitant recruiting of followers occupied only a few months. Second, apart from the setback Wambilipi received among the Waka, this substantial movement of groups of proselytizers and new adherents back and forth between communities possessing different customs and dialects was accomplished relatively peacefully - even though until recently these people had fought each other.

Many scholars have commented upon this integrative function, some practically positing social and political fission as a necessary condition for the emergence of cults. Worsley (1968:228), for example, asserts:

Such highly segmented societies are incapable of offering resistance to the incoming Europeans. When the need arises for large-scale joint action by members of these separate groups, now faced with the same common problems, they cannot act politically and militarily at all .... Since the people have developed new common political interests where previously they had none, so they must create new political forms of organization to give expression to this new-found unity. It is precisely this integrative function which is served by the millenarian cult.

Probably the best example in the general anthropological literature of the process described by Worsley is the Nuer of the nineteenth century. The unprecedented appearance of prophet figures among them was evoked by the equally unprecedented appearance of English soldiery and its superior firepower and so the need for a united nation beyond all segmental opposition.
Like Worsley I am impressed by the obvious functional role of the
cult movements where, beyond a small local area, indigenous forms of
institutionalized cooperation are absent. But as is evident in the quota-
tion, Worsley, and other commentators for that matter, see the significance
of this development entirely in terms of the alien invader and of the un-
precedented measures necessary for opposing him. The implications for the
indigenous polity are ignored. Here are innovative movements receiving
considerable popular support and evincing an appeal way beyond traditional
boundaries. In effect the leaders of these cult movements were attaining
a degree and kind of success that was out of the reach of the leaders of
the customary polity. The significance of this becomes more evident when
we examine the cults as social movements, rather than solely cultural
manifestations.

**Cult movements as social revolution**

Cult movements are typically analyzed in the literature in terms of
their cultural character and import (Reay 1959:194-202; Strathern 1971;
and Meggitt 1973 are exceptional). Cargo belief is reckoned a function
of cultural shock; the magico-religious notions are a function of cultural
incapacity; and the excessive and quite unMelanesian emphasis on regimen-
tation and regularity appear as a function of the impact of European
organizational superiority.

But must the accountability of cult movements lie entirely in a
self-respecting culture syndrome - a reaction to the unpleasant facts of
life revealed by the European's culture?

I certainly do not think that explanations of cult movements can be
divorced from the evidences of these links. Yet our understanding of the
movements must not lie solely with them. It is precisely here that the
emphasis on cargo and associated elements misdirects: the persuasion is
strong that since the cargo belief is the irrational (from an etic view-
point) reaction of a 'have-not' culture to the impact of a 'have' culture,
so 'cargo' cults need to be interpreted exclusively in terms of that
reaction.
But what if the cult is additionally viewed as a religious movement in its own right? Max Weber (1974) in his essay 'Religious rejections of the world', established a close identity between salvation religion and political action. Freund (1968:180) in his commentary on Weber writes: 'A salvation religion nearly always assumes the character of a social revolution, in so far as it aspires to a new community founded on a principle, or on new standards'.

The indigenous cargo concept may be rated in European eyes a magico-religious attempt to resist unpalatable truths presented by an alien culture; but in local eyes, and most particularly in the eyes of the local establishment, it must also appear a revolutionary doctrine, a very real and direct attack on the status quo. Here is some non-achieving fellow emerging from the ranks and preaching a doctrine of realizable equality. He promises a coming state of not only endless wealth but a new kind of wealth, the whiteman's kind. Most notable of all, he also promises an equal distribution of that wealth - anathema to all respectable achievement-oriented societies, which preach equality of opportunity not of wealth, and to all respectable ascription-oriented societies, which preach that wealth is the prerogative of rank, and to all respectable gerontocracies, which preach that young men should be indebted to their elders.

The message carried by the cargo cult is unlikely to evoke delirious enthusiasm from traditional leaders and elders. They would seem highly incongruent persons, indeed, to be carriers of such a message themselves (unless it were refashioned to a more reactionary style). Conversely, where their authority permitted, leaders most likely would try their utmost to suppress all such movements that so patently undermined their authority, status, and prestige.

Strathern (1971:255) believes: '... we may anticipate that indigenous leaders, the self-made big men, will at times be important in either leading or opposing such cults, depending on how the security of their own power has been increased or diminished through the processes of contact'. I think, however, that we should modify that anticipation somewhat. Leaders would presumably be somewhat circumspect towards getting caught up
in such movements, even should they promise initially great advantages. Reay (1959:198) cites a Kuman man who committed suicide because he could not make adequate return for pigs given to him by people to whom he had promised cargo wealth.

If the cargo concept is perceived as a threat to bring the world of the privileged (of achieved or ascribed kinds) crashing down about their ears, then the reports of observers such as Finney about the attitude of privileged individuals towards cargo cults evoke no surprise. Finney (1973:144) writes:

> It is no accident, then, that Gorokan business leaders with whom I discussed cargo cults expressed opposition to them vehemently. They seemed to regard cults as more than just misguided attempts by ignorant villagers to seek cargo. To them, cult activity was both an insult and a threat. Their pride seemed to be wounded by the thought that people might choose cult activities over the commercial activities that they pioneered, and they seemed particularly upset that cult leaders dared to challenge their authority as the modern-day big-men. (Compare Reay 1964:255.)

But what Finney concludes does raise an important query. For Finney 'The message here is plain: work hard, save money, and invest it to be successful. It is a prescription that so far has worked well for the Gorokans and has provided them with a powerful argument against the cargo cult approach to participation in the modern world' (ibid.:145).

Is the message so plain? Finney's concluding statement follows a long quotation from the speech of a bigman businessman to 'the people' in which he exhorts them to hard work. But why the need to harangue if indeed 'it is a prescription that so far has worked well for the Gorokans'? The answer to be gathered by reading between Finney's fluent lines is that there are Gorokans and Gorokans:

> Several of these business leaders have had the chance to express their opposition to cult movements directly, by participating in government patrols sent to put down outbreaks in Goroka and nearby areas (ibid.:144).
The 'liklik man' perspective

Perhaps the western world needs its concepts of the traditional as a measure of its own dynamism (and correlative assurance of its progress) too much to be able to grant an inherent dynamism to tribal societies. The latter must numbly receive their blows of fate and stumble along as best they can until the blessings of European flag, church, and commerce bring the enlightenment of the whiteman's way. My evaluation of cargo cults may not agree with that of the Papua New Guinean scholar, John Waiko (1973), who to me seems as cultural in his interpretation as most foreign scholars. Yet I think we have a common ground in asserting, and not merely lip-serving, the dynamism of Papua New Guinea societies, their potential for organizational change. For me, at any rate, the appearance of cargo cults is its clearest demonstration. (Though it is of no relevance to the immediate context, the Papua New Guinean reader might bear in mind that recognition of this dynamism carries acceptance of a significant corollary: Melanesian values - 'the Melanesian way' - are not fixed and immutable!)

The appeal of the typical cult message is not of an explicit revolutionary ideology. There is no impassioned exhortation to cast off the chains of a class subjection. Chains are indeed to be cast off, but this is solicited implicitly. The direct appeal is rather to the state of 'communitas', the astructural presence to be glimpsed through the ceremonial and ritual rents in the structure of social reality.

Communitas is the state of, or striving for, a situation, often of prescribed duration, of social nondifferentiation in a community. This is not merely in terms of hierarchical ranking. It applies to all social status and so all social identities and identifications. (In the West in recent times probably the most sensational example - for structured fancies - has been the astructural, hippie communes.) The theme of communitas may also be relayed by status inversal (including that of the sexes). Usually attempts to prolong a state of communitas result in its succumbing to structuring, primarily through the growth of routine, the surfacing of personality strife, and the emergence of a leadership to solve the organizational dilemmas of a lack of structure. As the structural element increases, the communitas, the astructural element, decreases, and is likely to shrink to a typical ritualistic incidence and garb.
The revolutionary zeal of the cult movement is for the ideal society - that 'true' society that is adumbrated, though certainly not put into practice, by the local culture. It may be attained by reaching forward to things new or by reaching back to things old. The theme common to all such movements is the ending of conflict among individuals, a kind of cleansing of society that establishes or reestablishes altruism as well as equality. The end of conflict, and reference here is to sorcery and mental images as well as to physical strife, establishes the individual's freedom of action, though the implication of course is of a natural, strong conformity that ensures the lack of all infringement by others. The cargo message with its promise of an equitable distribution of wealth neatly complements the commandment of love thy neighbour.

I believe Marie Reay's few and, in a sense, incidental pages on a cult movement in the Wahgi valley are probably the most insightful of the entire cargo literature. Their relevance and importance to the events and changes occurring in the Papua New Guinea countryside today cannot be exaggerated. Reay (1959:195-197) is primarily elaborating upon the following observation of Reinhold Niebuhr (1945:83):

The primitive community has no freedom in its social structure, not because the individual lacks an embryonic sense of freedom but precisely because he does have such a sense: and the community is not imaginative enough to deal with this freedom without suppressing it .... In so far as freedom has risen to destroy the harmony of nature, the community seeks to suppress it for the sake of preserving the social unity.

Tribal society, in other words, is the toughest of all on individualism. States Frank (1958:385): '... it sees the actions and events of a particular time merely as the bodying forth of eternal prototypes'. For the present work Reay's remarks are especially pertinent since I am in effect contrasting the weakness or failure of attempts at extending communitas beyond customary ritual contexts in the highlands with the strength and success of such attempts in the lowlands and coastal societies, and the implications this has for the contrasting nature of their social organizations.

One objection raised with me against the revolutionary nature of the cult movements has been that in many of them a major objective, framed in
explicit terms, has been the preservation of things traditional. In answer I would use Firth's (1961:110) statement about cult movements that despite their variation in form they have a certain functional similarity.

On the one hand some cult movements have sought an accommodation with the modern world by an explicit rejection of all the paraphernalia and trappings of traditional society, and have abolished rituals and destroyed artefacts with a will. Some have gone to the extremes of destroying their crops and killing their pigs. They have even revolutionized their moral order by making their womenfolk available to all (actions, surely of little appeal to traditional leaders, for whom control over the labour of wives constituted an important if not vital element in their power and prestige, and not to mention leadership preoccupations with respect).

It is true, on the other hand, that some cults have preached a return to the traditional life. But how different in effect is this from a call for for the destruction of the established order? Good old days are never so good than when they are too old to recall accurately. When people speak of a traditional way of life, and even more so when they are calling for a return to one, typically they are referring to some highly idealized version of fraternity or, in the case of ascribed hierarchical arrangements holding sway - to where rank groans beneath the weight of noblesse oblige.

Why should the social revolutionary aspect of cult movements be so obscured in the literature? Or, if not obscured, why should the bias of analysis in terms of cultural shock nearly always permeate attempts at explanation?

The answer may lie in the extensive preoccupation with leaders and leadership that so distinguishes the ethnographic literature on Papua New Guinea. Much is devoted to the bigman, little to the small man. The big-man is a leader, the liklik man tends to be social organization. People

\[1\] I use the term (my own) to refer to the 'ordinary' man (one who is not a leader), the referent is not 'rubbish man'.
may have, of course, a vested interest in a discriminatory social system to which there is no feasible or visible alternative. But why should Papua New Guinea be specially favoured with the assumption that the people possess the same enthusiasm as their leaders for maintaining a traditional but inequitable distributive system? Why can adherence to a new system be only a desperate, almost involuntary, reaction to forces of change rather than reflect the use of the new situation as a means of change? Jocano's (1973:200) observations on Filipino millenial movements represent a typical western type of appraisal: '... these radical movements, to my mind, represent the sum total of the peoples' reactions to incongruities that result from the disparity between the adaptive requirements of modernity and the limitations of available local resources to meet them'.

As a major consequence of the constraints of this approach, explanations of the motivations of cult leaders, and indeed of their own rationalizations of their behaviour, are extended to their followers. This then furnishes the academic mind with the appropriate opportunity for intellectual sophistry about the Papua New Guinea villager's search for 'identity' and 'meaning in life'. Some commentators in their analysis of cultist motivation become as mystical as they reckon the objects of their attentions to be.

The need of an equal awareness of the motivation of the liklik man is indeed noted at times in the literature. The promise, however, is never fulfilled. Sahlin's often quoted article (1963), for example, refers to poor men, rich men, bigmen, and chiefs, and refers to them, moreover, as political types. But while the inclusion of 'poor men' allows the title of Sahlin's paper to jingle satisfactorily, it has little relevance to the content of that paper.

Cochrane (1970) seems continually to be on the point of remedying the bias, but his liklik man is finally revealed as no more than a device to establish a polarity conceptually essential to Cochrane's discussion of cult leadership.

May (1978 reprinted in this volume:71) warns: 'educated elites [do not] necessarily share the same perception of a movement as the mass of its followers', but he makes his warning preparatory only to a statement about clashes between young activists and traditional leaders.
Most promising, most explicit, and most disappointing of all in this regard is Peter Worsley. In the second edition of *The Trumpet Shall Sound* (1968) he provides a new and substantial introduction that for much of its course treats with the insights and concepts of Max Weber.

Worsley emphasizes that charisma 'sociologically viewed, is a social relationship, not an attribute of individual personality or a mystical quality' (*ibid.*:xii). And later he argues: 'Hence, if we permit ourselves to focus our eyes exclusively or even primarily upon the leader element in the leader-follower relationship, our attention is distracted from what is sociologically more important, to wit, the relationship between the two elements' (*ibid.*:xviii). But Worsley is patently not at ease in dealing with 'followers'. He recognizes the possibility of unfulfilled aspirations in people, which by implication are dysfunctional for the status quo. 'Followers ... do not follow simply because of some abstracted "mystical" quality: a leader is able to magnetize them because he evokes or plays upon some strand of intellectual or emotional predisposition' (*ibid.*:xii).

But Worsley is ultimately unable to shift from the leadership perspective:

A more valid model for the analysis of charismatic authority has to be interactionist: one in which followers with possibly utopian or at least diffuse and unrealized aspirations cleave to an appropriate leader because he articulates and consolidates their aspirations. He then specifies and narrows these aspirations, converting them both into more concrete and visible goals towards whose achievement collective action can be oriented and organized, and into beliefs which can be validated by reference to experience (*ibid.*:xiv).

Worsley proceeds to chastise Weber for a fault which in fact looms large in the literature on cult movements in Papua New Guinea:

From a sociological point of view, too, one would expect attention to be devoted to study of the milieu from which the prophet emerges, to the social groups which receive it readily (and those that resist it), and, as we have seen, to the message and its content, since this is the nexus linking leader and follower in one relationship.

None of these issues is seriously tackled by Weber. In contemporary sociology, too, the 'emergency' crisis, conditions, and the 'challenging' quality of charismatic
leadership are too often taken as if given, and, if not as inexplicable, at least are not explained. The discussion stops short of the examination of the situation out of which leadership emerges, and of the social support for the prophet when this is exactly one of the most crucial features demanding explanation (ibid.:xxxviii).

But for Worsley, support for the prophet is essentially linked to the pertinence of his message for the resolution of the conflicts, cultural and psychological, arising from the impact of culture shock. There is no indication that a prophet and his message might be attractive for other than their own sakes - that, in terms of an inherent dynamism, cult movements are expressions of the adequacy of indigenous societies, not a demonstration of their limitations.

I fully realize that this argument may be taken too far, and I wish to make clear that I recognize the trauma of the advent of the European and the claims of the 'relative deprivation' argument. Still, it seems to me that there can be too extreme a swing to the other side as well. Cult movements, I believe, were and are social as well as cultural protests, constituting reactions against established indigenous social systems as well as endeavours to counter the apparent invincibility of the European culture.

For the present study, it is important to expose the bias in the interpretation and assessment of cult movements precisely because of the perception of community development associations as the successors of cult movements. I am concerned lest the misinterpretation or limited interpretation of the popular appeal of cult movements may be arbitrarily applied to the associations and so perpetuate entirely unsubstantiated verdicts on the motivation of the Papua New Guinea villager in situations of rapid change.

Societal implications of the differential incidence and impact of cult movements

Commentators disagree over the distribution of cargo cults. Some insist upon a fairly uniform incidence, but an earlier view is that incidence is considerably less in the highlands than elsewhere. This is depicted with great clarity by Worsley's map (1968:2-3).
Some observers have made more of this division, or made the division more apparent, than others. Lawrence and Meggitt (1965) explain it as a function of a polarization they establish of sacred and secular orientations of coastal and highlands cultures respectively. Finney rejects this opposition as being unfounded in the ethnographic record. He also locates a further weakness of the argument when he points out (1973:138) that it ignores 'the ample evidence of cargo cult movements in the Highlands'.

But Finney himself also omits a major variable. In the first place he can find only five cult movements that have received any attention in the general literature on the highlands (and these all occurred in the 1940s). He continues: 'If one were forced to rely solely on published sources, one might therefore conclude that Goroka has had little cargo cult activity. However, the published record can be deceptive, for there are certainly many cult outbreaks in New Guinea that are never recorded in newspapers, journals and books' (ibid.:14). But what interests me is not the number of cult movements that can be scored, but their social impact locally in the highlands - their strength, in other words. And Finney's strivings to increase his tally are evidence enough that in the majority of cases their strength was inconsequential.

Why should this be so? What are the variables operative in the two areas that might produce this differential effect despite the political fragmentation that characterizes both?

Schwartz's (1963) demonstration of an informal areal integration in Manus reveals a kind of reticulated system of kinship ties that could well have acted as a communication grid for the rapid dissemination of anything innovatory like a cult movement. And this system might well have wider application in coastal area societies in general while being restricted topographically in the highlands. Meggitt's (1973) account of the rapid spreading of Ain's cult among the Taro Enga, a branch of the Enga who are the largest linguistic group in the country, could be an exception proving the rule.

Yet Meggitt's description of this cult movement also provides a clue to the possibility of another variable. Ain's cult spread, and it spread rapidly, but only to those areas where no attempt was made to oppose the
meanderings of its evangelical leaders. An arrow in the leg of one of them brought an abrupt halt to the expansion of the cult in the direction from which the arrow came.

Though Meggitt makes no explicit statement to the effect, the cult movement appears to have embraced those peoples who lacked the strong leadership to organize resistance to it. Significantly there is no mention of any bigmen in Meggitt's account of the diffusion of the cult among the Taro Enga, only the role of Mae Enga bigmen in bringing about its dissolution.

In fact the Taro Enga bigmen are not so big. Referring to Strathern's (1971) paper on a cult at Mount Hagen, Meggitt (1973:123) writes:

The difference between the Ialibu/Mount Hagen and western Enga situations is clear. The Mae Big Men near Wabag were always vastly more influential and wealthy than their Taro and other counterparts further west. The Mae leaders represented (and were supported by) much larger and more powerful clans, they successfully exploited the trade routes along which shells and stone axes came from the east and south-east, and they controlled the elaborate Te ceremonial exchange system (an institution not found among the western fringe Enga - see Meggitt, 1972). The arrival of the Europeans and their wealth from 1938 onwards simply increased the opportunities of the Mae Big Men to deal in goods and people.

Berndt's (1952/53) is another of the few published descriptions of a cult movement in the highlands, in this case located in the Kainantu area. The only evidence of any bigman involvement was a brief - very brief - recollection given to Berndt by a visitor from the Grufi district (1952/53:216). From the introductory comments on social organization it is not clear how influential were traditional leaders. Berndt simply remarks the rivalry of 'village warrior-leaders'.

If they were anything like the neighbouring Fore, their authority could not have been great. Of the Fore, Sorenson (1974:22) comments that they were 'devoid of chiefs, medicine men - patriarchs and the like'. He also notes (1976:236) the '... "cargo-like" movements, which rapidly altered the Fore way of life after western contact' (ibid.).
Reay's (1959) information on a cult among the Kuma is not so clear-cut about the relation between cult and traditional leaders. The cult occurred in 1949 and Reay's fieldwork commenced four years later - a much smaller time gap than in the case of Meggitt's and Strathern's investigations. Reay writes (1959:199):

Isolated 'big men' made a realistic appraisal of the situation, expressed disbelief in the prophets' revelations, and counselled caution which relatively few heeded. Many of the traditional leaders, attracted by the prospect of further wealth, took part in the cult and so gave practical recognition to the prophets' assertions. A few impoverished themselves by giving the prophets and officials most of their pigs and valuables as the less wealthy were doing.

The two individuals who introduced the cult to the Kuma were a young woman and a 'vagrant rubbish man' who was also a thief. As Reay (ibid.: 196) points out: 'They represented, of course, the classes that had to bear the biggest costs of traditional life'. But Reay's is not a detailed study of the cult, nor does it profess to be, and there is no analysis of the attitudes of traditional leaders. Indeed, apart from the quotation given above, little else is said about them in the context of the cult, though Reay states that the rubbish man leader of the cult was pressed by the most powerful traditional leader of his group to take himself and his ideas elsewhere. There is also some confusion about Reay's distinctions between 'big men' and 'traditional leaders' in the quotation given: does this represent Reay's earlier distinction of 'authorized leaders' and 'spontaneous leaders'?

Only Strathern's (1971) account of the Ialibu/Mount Hagen cult depicts highlands bigmen not only participating in some degree but actually originating and organizing the cult. However their actions, according to Strathern, had a specific cause: they were the consequences of a radical shift in the balance of control over the flow of the prized ceremonial shell valuable. The establishment of the European base at Mount Hagen followed by the war with Japan first shifted the flow of trade to the Hagen bigmen and then sharply reduced the subsequent supply to the Ialibu bigmen, who then had recourse to the cult movement in a desperate attempt to stave off the disaster that threatened them:
... the fact that real wealth was obtained by selling the cult to northern groups and that this may have redressed imbalance of wealth between big men in the northern and southern areas explains why the innovators' behaviour was exactly the opposite of what was expected (ibid.:264).

Evidence exists, circumstantial and negative though it may be, to link the incidence of cults in the highlands with weak leadership, whether personal and transitory or institutionalized and permanent.

Clearly there is considerable variation in the nature of the so-called egalitarian societies of the highlands, but I would relate the low influence and lack of staying power of cults to the presence in the most populated areas, the great valleys, of a system of powerful and vigorous leadership. Compared with the coastal areas the system of socio-economic manipulation by bigmen appears to have advanced to a much finer degree. Moreover the environment and impact of warfare has yet to be as decisively routed in the highlands as it has long been in the coastal areas. Both factors, I reckon, are considerations of some weight for the individual villager who would like to 'withdraw' and give his allegiance to a distinct and rival societal form.

If we accept that the local impact of cult movements in the non-highlands areas has been much greater, the above statement about the highlands carries the corollary that the organizational basis of leadership in these areas is correspondingly weak.

Two major types of society are found outside the highlands. These might crudely be tagged the egalitarian and the chiefly, according to their respective emphases on achievement and ascription in status (in practice there was often some mixture of the two: see Morauta (1973) for a particular example; Douglas (1979) for a general survey). In either case it is rare for the qualities and authority of leadership to attain the heights or extent of powerful bigman leadership in the highlands. The egalitarian societies of the coastal areas are certainly much more egalitarian in effect than many of their highlands' counterparts, and the wide prevalence of sorcery belief and practice,¹ especially within the

¹ To what extent this characteristic of coastal egalitarian areas is a function of a long-enduring pacification is difficult to determine. Bill Standish states (personal communication 1980) that after warfare in the highlands was dampened by legislation, Andrew Strathern informed him of his great surprise at the considerable preoccupation with sorcery by Hageners.
local group, is an effective levelling mechanism and an obstacle to economic development: see for example, Connell (1979:46-47); McKillop (1979:37); and Rew (1979:42) on effects in Bogia (Madang), Rigo (Central) and Makamaka (Milne Bay) respectively.

Morauta (1973:145-148) indicates that in the Madang area bigman leaders were in no way typical of the village scene nor indispensable to its organization: their incidence was quite irregular. Not surprisingly, when they did emerge they tended to be very formidable characters (ibid.: 148).

In the lowlands, coastal, and islands areas, as in the highlands, few cult leaders have been able to claim high or effective traditional status and authority. Typically, cult leaders have been insignificant bursting into prominence, or men returning to their village area having acquired some standing in, as well as experience of, the culture of the European. And just as in the highlands women have inspired and led cult movements (Reay 1959:196; Gibbs 1977:19-20), so women have also been prominent in some of the coastal cult movements. Conton (1979) cites cases in the Markham valley, Mekeo and Garia.

One notable example of a cult movement being introduced into a society by a man of traditional rank occurred in Manam. Manam is a chiefly society, and the Yali cult, or a version of it, introduced into some of the villages by a sorcerer 'chief' has from the beginning been a strong bulwark of the indigenous ranking system in some areas there (N. Lutkehaus, personal communication 1979).

In chiefly societies the 'warehouse' distributive system of a chief lacks the emphasis on individual bilateral relationships that characterizes the cumulative system of the bigman. The chief demands of inferiors by right and no matter how careful he may be to practise his obligations also, the contractual element of the relationship between him and his subjects tends to get submerged. The effectiveness of his leadership then rests primarily on the strength of the sanctions he can bring to bear to ensure compliance with his wishes and aims.
But in the coastal societies of Papua New Guinea, while the chief could invoke sanctions, he was yet personally separated from them. Sorcery, his principal medium of social control, and warfare were hereditary occupations and offices wielded by others on his behalf (Chowning 1979:75).

Since this kind of chiefship lacked all the trappings and inherent powers of divine right that might compensate for the diffused nature of its sanctions, it was potentially (that is, in terms of adaptation to new circumstances) a vulnerable institution. Nevertheless, the association of formal institutions underpinning beliefs in ascribed status made it easier for chiefly leaders to entrap a cult movement and turn it to their own use. Cargo wealth did not challenge so directly the integrity of vertical social links of chief and commoner as it did the basis of the horizontal egalitarian network of the bigman.

Comparison of chiefship in Papua New Guinea with the highly stratified societies of eastern Melanesia and Polynesia is instructive for cult movements attained far less prominence in these societies. The complex of divine and sacred beliefs that surrounded their high chiefship, while it might not obstruct the overthrow of a weak or tyrannical incumbent, was yet a solid buttress against overthrow of the institution. And this power and protection was part of the chiefly system permeating even the lowest levels of the hierarchy where 'chiefs' might command little more inherent authority than their peers in Mekeo or Manam. Where introduced disease ravaged societies Polynesian chiefship was certainly undermined, but elsewhere only with the growth of urban society and culture and the extension to the people of a western education system (or at least the opportunities for it) have intellectually founded messages and alien social contexts begun to threaten the traditional stratification of the chiefly system.

If the potential weakness (in adaptational terms) of social control mechanisms was typical of the lowland coastal and island regions of Papua New Guinea, then should there not have been a far greater incidence of cults than has been the case?

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1 Which does not deny there were exceptions. The extent to which these exceptions correlate with the absence of cargo cults I have not determined.
In answer to this we should first of all remember that indigenous societies were no longer independent entities. Colonial administrations (German or Australian), if they could not adhere to quiescere non movere, were quite ready themselves to move to administer the kicks to achieve the quiescence.

Moreover, other alien organizations operated in indigenous society, organizations actively seeking a far greater recruitment to their ranks - the churches. To me it seems highly likely that most of the potentially innovative, radical leadership in the younger generations would have been gathered into the missionary folds, would indeed have been intellectually attracted there. Some, in fact, proceeded from missionary zeal to revolutionary appeal.

It is something of a paradox for the modern western mind that the so-called egalitarian societies of Melanesia should be more susceptible to social revolution than highly stratified societies in Polynesia. But the very fact that leadership in the village was not heavily institutionalized and was a function of personal qualities and achievement meant that any pronounced environmental change provided the potential for challenge from an innovative leadership. It was precisely this situation that the arrival of the European produced. The ease of European control and the severity of the cultural impact, by calling into question the very premises of the indigenous cultures, made local leadership accountable for the relevancy of an enormously expanded range of phenomena.

Colonial endorsement as administrative chiefs, headmen, or whatever had no necessary restitutive or revivifying effect. The power of African and Polynesian chiefs might be braced by policies of Indirect Rule, for though the latter distorted their political position, the formal institutional props ensured the covertness of alien sanctions for most of the time. In Papua New Guinea these props were not available and consequently the strings by which any but an independently effectual headman might operate were wholly visible.

By creating a new societal environment the political and cultural impact of the Europeans had produced not only new criteria of leadership and new means of attaining leadership, but also new means of resisting
leadership. While these additional contexts - the accountability for both the Europeans' presence and their culture - exposed traditional leadership where it was weak, yet they did not provide the compensatory means to make innovatory leadership secure. The obvious solutions (in an emic sense) to problems intellectual (European culture) and political (European conquest) that the first and many subsequent innovative leaders proposed, cargo and suchlike, did not work.

The survival capacity of some cult organizations has surprised many observers, including the young, educated elite of the country. Nevertheless, though I am sure cargo cults will continue to appear, the odds are against their individual persistence without adaptation to the pressures of the changing socio-economic and cultural situations. A major obstacle that cult leaders have to counter effectively is the increasing likelihood of local opposition from their own young men who will try to use the esteem of educational status and knowledge to match and overcome the charismatic basis and millenial message of the cult, often employing derision as a major weapon. Furthermore, not only has the non-appearance of the cargo to be continually accounted for, but also 'development', the rival concept to cargo and millennium, has to be catered for or held at bay.¹ And this becomes an increasingly more difficult achievement given villagers' greater reliance on a cash economy and their much greater mobility.

Some cult movements have challenged the development process head on. Thus the early days of the Kivung at Pomio appear to have initiated the neglect of the cocoa and coconut plantations in the area (according to Tovalele 1977:136; though with the exceedingly poor shipping services they suffer, I imagine many of the people saw their action as a gesture against their neglect). But the cash needs generated by the cult beliefs (not to speak of the ordinary cash needs of the villagers) then meant a considerable dependence upon the remittances of absentees - not the firmest foundation for a cult, no matter how rigorous the segmentation of its active membership.

¹ Some scholars insist that 'cargo' and 'development' are not rival concepts. Etically I agree it could be argued (but only finely) they are not. But in the emic perspective they most certainly always are. All villagers I have talked with, educated and noneducated, have been quite positive in their distinction. Finney (1973) also makes this clear.
In other cases cult movements have tempered their dogma of imminent material return with more pliable doctrines of delayed spiritual return and reward, and have overtly embraced economic as well as social developmental objectives. I see this transformation as an alternative to a severe, rigid regimentalization for the preparation of a cult movement. In effect the cult, often with its membership fairly widely diffused but strong locally, returns to the societal fold as a sectarian way of life. As its revolutionary zeal falls away, it begins to gain partial respectability, or at least acceptance, in the eyes of the authorities and non-members. The Kivung movement (a later stage of the Pomio cult) and the Yali and associated cult movements appear to have undergone or to be undergoing this kind of metamorphosis (see Louise Morauta's 1972 postscript and November 1973 footnote to her book on the Madang area, 1974:163-170), however De'ath (1978:95) points out that the latter still suffer economic discrimination by government.

The most famous sectarian survival is surely the Paliau movement. It suffered from being the first of its kind and from being initially too successful. A worried colonial government destroyed the effectiveness of its secular organization by introducing an official local government and by cleverly causing Paliau to identify with it. The Paliau Church is still quite rigorous in its traditional areas, but the movement's unprecedentedly extensive integrative effect has long been spoiled. (Some of its last vestiges are disappearing now as the Nali people leave the joint Titiannali costal village at Baluan to return to their lands in an interior recently opened up by the new Manus Highway.)

Conclusions: significance of the cult movement analysis for an understanding of present-day rural dynamics

If the community development association is accepted as a kind of functional equivalent of the cult movement, then like the latter its emergence indicates an attempt to replace ineffectual mechanisms of community integration, and possibly a response to development pressures for community coalescence and extension.

Therefore such groups, like cult movements, are unlikely to appear and certainly unlikely to flourish in areas of established strong leadership and vigorous integrative social mechanisms.
Gerritsen's dichotomy is by no means pervasive in Papua New Guinea and this may account for the fact that he fails to develop the implications of the antithesis he discerns (this volume: 2). Few community development associations have so far appeared in the highlands. The best known is undoubtedly that initiated and led by Philip Kaman at Olubus, Minj (Kaman 1975). But a sudden increase in the incidence of these groups would suggest a radical change was taking place in highlands' societies.

The emergence of a big-peasant class institutionalized by the kind of interest groups that Gerritsen describes could itself pose a threat to the structural stability of highlands' societies. Bigmen possessed of the traditional acumen for the manipulation of social relationships that marks the customary achievement style can capitalize upon their followers' customary expectations and establish sometimes considerable business ventures. As Nicholls (1972:179) observes: '... the entrepreneur-producer of course manipulates clan obligations to acquire labour cheaper than the rural wage awards'. But in pursuing cash at the expense of kin there arrives a time of decision between business and bisnis, contract and custom. Cash is dear and no big businessman can attempt to gratify the wants of his followers on the increasing scales demanded and remain in business. Gerritsen cites Moulik's (1973:chapter 9) remark that the big peasants '... are beginning to show a proper entrepreneurial distaste for the distributive norms their societies traditionally attach to the attainment of wealth'. But the longer the big payout is delayed the greater the likelihood that the big peasant's authority and following will wane. So having used custom to establish his ventures, the convinced businessman is likely to succumb to the temptation of converting to contract to perpetuate them, and in so doing to abdicate his natural leadership.

An examination of the present fighting in the highlands might yield some highly informative data on the dynamics of rural leadership. The Post-Courier (6 July 1979) asserts that bigmen are responsible for fostering unrest in the highlands. Yet it is difficult to imagine Gerritsen's and Finney's emergent big peasant and businessman types encouraging the filling in of their followers' labour hours by the widespread vandalism of cash crops (though the recent attempt to put coffee trees out of war bounds fits the scenario a little better). Are emergent leaders using warfare to
divert attention from embarrassing domestic issues? Or does warfare reflect the rise of a rural leadership, new but traditional? Or is it simply a case of warfare occurring in areas where emergent big types have yet to appear on the scene?

Gerritsen has remarked on the already increasing generational conflict in the highlands between big peasants and the educated young. This seems likely to accelerate as the number of baccalaureates disappointed of prestigious government employment, both nationally and provincially, expands annually and individuals seek to put their education to use and prestige in the village. The bigman institution in the highlands appears to have remained viable because it has been readily able to incorporate the young educated returnees of obvious ability. But clearly the institution cannot provide returned students with ex officio membership even if the students wanted it. And certainly many of them do not judge the demonstration effect to be the most appropriate way of helping their people.

The appearance of Gerritsen's dichotomy outside the highlands may well augur an entirely different situation, though it is not clear as yet the extent to which the dichotomy is already in evidence. Two of Gerritsen's interest groups (not counting the Damuni association which he sees as some kind of hybrid) are in Papua: the Mekeo Rice Growers' Association and the Northern District Cattle Farmers' Association. However these do not belong to Gerritsen's unelaborated subcategory of 'classic' interest groups, which from his examples appear to be confined to the highlands. I am unacquainted with both the non-highlands associations he uses as case studies and so cannot negatively infer the characteristics of the classic form to which he refers.

Nevertheless, even the limited appearance outside the highlands of big peasants in organized combinations could be of considerable significance for lowlands and coastal societies. According to Gerritsen both interest and community development groups are functions of a search to escape the stagnation of a situation of terminal development (Howlett 1973) and to seek new developmental opportunities. But the community development associations, which have occurred predominantly in the lowlands, coastal, and island areas, have tended to be short lived and markedly unsuccessful
in achieving their aims. The event of big peasant associations might be, as for the highlands, an indication of a new leadership and social design, but in this case with the promise of greater stability and more effective integration.
REFERENCES


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