

**Rulers of the Sea – Maritime Strategy and Sea Power in
Ancient Greece 550-321 BC**



John Matthew Nash

May 2019

October 2018

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of The
Australian National University

© Copyright by John Matthew Nash 2018

All Rights Reserved

This thesis is the original work of the author.

Word count: 94,843

Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to acknowledge that this research was supported by an Australian Government Research Training Program Scholarship.

There are many people I would like to thank for their support during the last three and a half years. The staff at the Sea Power Centre – Australia, especially Greg Swinden, Dr David Stevens and Dr Ben Herscovitch. The Centre for Classical studies at the ANU, Professor Elizabeth Minchin, Dr Greta Hawes, Dr Paul Burton, Dr Chris Bishop, Dr Sonia Pertsinidis. Much thanks to my fellow PhD candidates, especially my office-mate Adrienne White.

My supervisor Dr Peter Londey provided tireless support, encouragement and advice throughout my study at ANU and especially during my honours year and this thesis. He has guided me well through this thesis, and any errors or omissions remain entirely my own.

A big thanks to my friends and family for putting up with long hours and rants about obscure pieces of scholarship and tortuous passages of Thucydides in Greek.

Finally, my fiancée Adelaide. Her unwavering support and encouragement saw this thesis reach the finish line.

Abstract

The ancient Greeks have always been credited with having a strong maritime and naval heritage, yet little scholarship is devoted to exploring ancient Greek sea power. Works that do exist either focus on naval and technical matters or are focused solely on Athenian sea power. Often sea power is ignored or denigrated in the works of modern scholars. Yet sea power theory has a long and rich history, and the Greeks themselves thought deeply on maritime matters. Using sea power theory as a conceptual framework and examining the actual operations of the ancient Greeks, it can be seen that sea power was of great importance during the period examined.

This thesis examines sea power during the period 550-321 BC. The first half sets the practical parameters by which maritime forces could operate, followed by an exploration of the 'maritime consciousness' of the Greeks. The second part of the thesis examines maritime operations during peace and war. Influenced by contemporary thinking on sea power and strategy, the thesis broadly categorizes these operations into military, diplomatic and constabulary operations and examines how sea power influenced and even decided events ashore and had a strong impact on the course of fifth and fourth century Greek history.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	3
Abstract	4
Notes on spelling, names, and translations	6
Introduction	7
Chapter One – Literature Review	19
Chapter Two – Geography, environment, navigation and fishing	30
Chapter Three – Ships and naval organisation	55
Chapter Four – Maritime Consciousness I: Stories	73
Chapter Five – Maritime Consciousness II: History and philosophy	93
Chapter Six – Fifth Century Military Operations	127
Chapter Seven – Fourth Century Military Operations	169
Chapter Eight – Diplomatic Operations	196
Chapter Nine – Piracy and Constabulary Operations	221
Chapter Ten – Non-hegemonic sea powers	247
Chapter Eleven – Change and Continuity	260
Conclusion	272
Appendix 1 – Database of maritime operations	279
Military Operations	279
Diplomatic Operations	292
Constabulary Operations	294
Bibliography	296

Notes on spelling, names, and translations

I have attempted to be consistent with spelling of Greek names, transliterating as literally as possible. Complete consistency is difficult thus very common names remain in their more familiar form, hence *Thucydides* rather than *Thoukydidos*, and *Athens* rather than *Athenai*.

All translations are my own unless otherwise noted. I have attempted to be as literal as possible, somewhat at the expense of readability.

All dates used throughout the paper are BC, unless otherwise specified.

All ancient references are cited as per The Oxford Classical Dictionary (3rd ed.), with the exception of the Old Oligarch's Constitution of the Athenians, which is cited as 'Old Oligarch' as opposed to [Xenophon] Ath. Pol. or 'Pseudo-Xenophon'.

All distances are measured in nautical miles (nm), all elevations and depths of water in metres (m), and all speeds in knots (kts) unless otherwise specified.

Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the uses of maritime and especially naval forces in Classical Greece and determine to what extent various Greek poleis employed sea power. Although maritime and naval matters are discussed in scholarship on the Classical period, little of the latter deals properly with matters of sea power and strategy. The overwhelming majority of scholarship focuses on naval aspects and concentrates on matters such as tactics, shipbuilding and even the domestic politics of Athens and the 'naval mob' (*nautikos ochlos*). This is all very important, but rarely does the scholarship analyse the bigger picture, with the end result that issues of sea power and strategy are left largely unexamined. Similarly, maritime strategic thought has developed over the twentieth century to consider lessons from history, but rarely stretches back farther than the age of sail (roughly the sixteenth century onwards). This appears to have two primary causes. The first is due to a pessimistic view of ancient technological capabilities and a view that the Greeks were so restricted by technology that little can be learned from maritime warfare of the time. This is a result of the tendency towards a determinist view of history by many scholars examining issues of maritime strategy, seeing naval warfare and subsequent lessons learnt as determined by technology. Secondly, there is a distinct lack of interdisciplinary subject matter expertise by modern scholars dealing with ancient history. This has led to a dearth of works dealing with maritime strategy and sea power in the ancient world. Herein lies a gap in the existing scholarship. Using an adapted theoretical framework derived from modern maritime strategic thought, this thesis aims to explore how Greek poleis used sea power and will examine this use at the strategic level.

The term sea power is a broad one, with many definitions and conceptions built up over the last few decades. The early theorist Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond is the first to explicitly give a definition of sea power:

Sea Power is that form of national strength which enables its possessor to send his armies and commerce across those stretches of sea and ocean which lie between his country or the countries of his allies, and those territories to which he needs access in war; and to prevent his enemy from doing the same.¹

¹ Richmond (1947): ix.

Richmond's definition is simple and timeless and does not reduce the concept to any spatial or temporal restriction, letting it stand as a general theory of sea power. Perhaps the simplest one-line definition of sea power is provided by Geoffrey Till: 'the capacity to influence the behaviour of other people or things by what one does at or from the sea'.² As both of these definitions allude to, sea power is not just naval power, but refers to a state's use of the sea in general. A large part of this thesis will focus on examining the activities of navies. Notwithstanding the above caveat that maritime is more than just naval aspects, navies are usually one of the largest users of the maritime space. This is true of the ancient world, especially inasmuch as ancient sources are notoriously prejudiced towards covering matters of war and politics over social and economic matters. In the modern world, naval operations are commonly divided into three main categories: military, diplomatic and constabulary (or policing).³ These categories will be used as a guide and are not intended to force Greek naval operations into a rigid classification system. They will be used to determine to what extent Greek powers thought of and enacted any kind of 'maritime strategy' and whether or not they took a deliberate approach in the employment of maritime forces over the long term. By examining the operations for which Greek naval forces were engaged, a picture will form of how maritime considerations and actions affected Greek history. A database of these operations has been created, and included at Appendix 1, though it is not intended for use in any kind of statistical analysis. There have been some recent works that look at maritime operations from a quasi-statistical view and conclude that because battle was rarer than say amphibious operations, navies in the ancient world were primarily troop transports and not really warships except only occasionally.⁴ This approach does not analyse the actual operations of naval forces for their impact. It is to assign strategic importance based on numbers rather than on what it is the forces in question accomplished: either tactically, operationally, or strategically.

From the outset it is necessary to offer clear definitions of some key terms. One of the main issues is in the conflation of 'naval' and 'maritime', two terms which do not refer to the

² Till (2013): 25.

³ The span of maritime operations, or tasks. As originally elaborated by Ken Booth and Eric Grove and subsequently modified by different navies. See: Booth (1977): 16; Grove (1990): 234. See Figure 1 below.

⁴ For a recent example, see: de Souza (2017): 413.

same concept and which should not be used interchangeably. However, before discussing the difference between 'naval' and 'maritime', it is first necessary to pin down a general definition of 'strategy'. Lawrence Freedman's book on strategy makes the point that it is a word for which the meaning has become diluted through promiscuous and often inappropriate use.⁵ Both Freedman and Hew Strachan accept and are satisfied with strategy as a term to describe the relationships between means and ends, concerned with identifying national objectives as well as the resources and methods available for meeting such objectives.⁶ Critically, strategy comes into play where there is actual or potential conflict between opposing powers. Strategy is much more than a 'plan' because it is required when an opposing force's own interests and objectives must be considered.⁷ Tactics are not a concern of this thesis, save for how they might have influenced strategy – Athenian tactical superiority leading to bolder strategic manoeuvring, for example. This is not to denigrate tactics, but this is a topic that has been thoroughly covered in the extant scholarship. Too often scholars are liberal with their usage of 'strategy', or especially 'grand strategy' and a detailed examination is required lest the place of sea power within any 'grand strategy' becomes oversimplified or missed altogether. This is often the mistake of scholars who like to take their sweeping studies of grand strategy back to the age of Perikles and the wars of the Greeks in order to give their work *gravitas*.⁸

⁵ Freedman (2013): x.

⁶ Freedman (2013): xi; Strachan (2013): 211.

⁷ Perfectly illustrated by the Mike Tyson quote with which Freedman opens his book: 'Everyone has a plan 'till they get punched in the mouth'. Freedman (2013): ix, xi.

⁸ At the risk of mixing cultural metaphors. A recent example is that of John Lewis Gaddis and his recent work *On Grand Strategy*, based on his teachings at Yale. While it is good and proper to begin discussion of strategy with Greece and the Peloponnesian War, and Rome and Octavian/Augustus, Gaddis' chapters present a very oversimplified narrative and are based on dubious scholarship on the war, notably Victor Davis Hanson's *A War Like No Other* (the faults of which are discussed in the next chapter). Gaddis (2018): pp. 2-62 for Greece, and pp. 63-91 on Rome.



Figure 1: *Span of maritime operations*⁹

Just as strategy and tactics are often confused and conflated, so too are the concepts of ‘maritime’ and ‘naval’. Naval strategy commonly refers to the purely military aspect of naval power: a navy develops a strategy to defeat another navy and thus develops a naval strategy. A maritime strategy on the other hand is ‘the direction of all aspects of national power that relate to a nation’s interests at sea’.¹⁰ As John Hattendorf elaborates, this involves diplomacy, the safety and defence of merchant trade, fishing, and coastal defence.¹¹ Navies obviously have a central role to play in any maritime strategy, but this is not synonymous with naval strategy. A naval strategy is how one navy will defeat another – it is restricted to the military realm.¹² In the Greek context, a maritime strategy such as that of Athens involved many different aspects of national power, from setting up colonies and cleruchies, through to maintaining good relations with Egypt and kingdoms in the Black Sea region from where the Athenians imported grain critical to their food security and thus their very survival. This often involved the use of both hard and soft power, and

⁹ Australian Maritime Doctrine (2010): 100.

¹⁰ Hattendorf (2013): 7.

¹¹ Amongst many other issues related to the modern world such as border security, environmental conservation and the protection of a nation’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Hattendorf (2013): 7.

¹² Not to be confused with ‘military’ in a purist sense of referring only to the activities of armies. This thesis uses military in the broader sense of meaning the actions of any force engaged in armed conflict, be it on land or at sea.

the instrument used was often the navy. At the same time it is important to make the distinction between the navy being used against another seaborne military force (naval) and being used to further the nation's larger goals such as better diplomatic relations or the protection of trade (maritime). A maritime strategy such as Athens' during the Peloponnesian War might involve the conduct of amphibious operations, with the bulk of the fighting on land but supported by a naval force. In such a case, the navy is an enabling force, allowing for the conduct of operations ashore by providing support, cover – protecting the landing force from enemy interference by sea – providing reinforcements, tactical manoeuvrability or even evacuation. This is one way in which a navy can be used in a maritime strategy. This thesis will examine naval campaigns, not as campaigns in and of themselves, but rather as campaigns as part of a larger strategy, determining whether or not these strategies can be considered maritime in nature.

All of this will require a thorough examination of ancient sources, literary and otherwise. Literary sources will be divided roughly into three main categories: historical works, speeches, and dramatic and comedic works. Historical works will provide a great bulk of the evidence used, not only as a record of what happened, but also for the insights and analysis provided by their authors. Herodotos, Thucydides, Xenophon, Diodoros and others all had different purposes in creating their works: didactic, political, moralistic or a combination. As a record of what happened, these works can be examined to see how maritime power was used by varying poleis in the Greek world and they can be used to build a picture of the maritime (or otherwise) nature of their various strategies. Where accounts differ on a particular event, as in Xenophon and Diodoros at many different points, a careful analysis can help reconcile the accounts, as demonstrated by Eric Robinson in the case of the battle of Aigispotamoi.¹³ The motivations and intended audience of an ancient source will be an ever-present consideration in this analysis. The advice of Nicole Loraux with respect to Thucydides will be heeded,¹⁴ and extended to cover all of the ancient authors examined, considering none of them a colleague and questioning all of their methods, sources and purposes.

¹³ Robinson (2014): 1-16.

¹⁴ In her very insightful book chapter entitled 'Thucydides is not a Colleague'. Loraux (2011).

Speeches – political and legal – will be of great utility in determining not just events, but also attitudes, especially Athenian, Athenian and conceptions of maritime and naval matters. Political speeches were delivered to a general Athenian audience, and so the content must have been explicable to them. From this can be gleaned a general Athenian audience's appreciation of maritime matters. A speech such as Demosthenes' *First Philippic* contains a whole host of maritime strategic concepts, from an appraisal of the geopolitical situation in northern Greece at the time (Dem. 4.4-9, 17-18, 33-38), through to a proposal for a ready reaction force stationed forward, with a clear plan on how this force should be manned and funded (Dem. 4.20-29). Demosthenes was a canny speaker and politician who would not have pitched ideas that his audience would have found obscure or inexplicable. Law courts were an important institution in fifth and fourth century Athens and there is much to be learned from speeches given in these courts, especially considering that maritime courts were an independent entity. The very fact of this, and the fact that the cases tried in these courts were seen by subject matter experts in specialised lawsuits such as *dikai emporikai* is important in and of itself.¹⁵ The obvious drawback inherent in using these sources lies in their provenance: they allow for a view of maritime issues and strategy in Athens, but offer little in the way of insights into other Greek powers of the time, aside from incidental information. Nevertheless, they are valuable pieces of evidence which will help build a picture of what maritime issues ordinary Athenians were exposed to over the course of their civic life, including issues that were not just naval but dealt with the broader maritime realm.

Tragic and comedic plays are very valuable sources of evidence, especially with regards to popular knowledge of and attitudes towards naval and maritime matters. Much like political and law court speeches, plays were performed in front of a large audience. In the case of comedy, for a joke to have been funny it must have related in some way to topics well-understood by the audience. As David Pritchard has argued, much of popular Athenian society was reflected in comedies of the day.¹⁶ Comedies are full of nautical imagery and critically these references are not fantastical plot devices, which would throw into question their accuracy, but are key features of Athenian self-identity and experience

¹⁵ For example, Demosthenes 35 – *Reply to Lakritos' Special Plea*. See: Carey (2012): 137-149.

¹⁶ Pritchard (2012): 14-51.

at sea. Aristophanes' *Frogs* is an outstanding example of the use of nautical imagery, most famously a scene in which Dionysius and Charon row a boat across the river Styx, full of jokes about rowing and an allusion to the very recently fought naval battle of Arginousai (Ar. *Fr.* 190-270). This scene is not integral to the plot and therefore not suspect of being exaggeration or a fantastical plot device (which would damage its usefulness), but is presumably intended to be funny, its comedic value derived from the audience's ability to relate to a real-life situation. Tragedies, too, are replete with nautical terms and metaphors. The very first three lines of Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes* have Eteokles talk of himself as the city's leader and as controlling the helm of the city at its stern (Aesch. *Sept.* 1-3), and he is exhorted by a scout to 'be like a good ship's captain and make the city tight, before the squalls of war assail her' (Aesch. *Sept.* 62-64). Sophokles' Kreon in *Antigone* puts the city into a ship – the ship of state (Soph. *Ant.* 185-190) – a metaphor which has endured to the present day. It is in these seemingly casual ways that both tragedies and comedies can provide insight into the everyday Athenians' understanding and valuation of naval and maritime affairs.

An important aspect of source analysis includes a careful examination of the language of the texts, in the original. This will allow for a thorough and deep understanding of the sources and what they actually say. A careful survey of the language used in the ancient sources can help build a picture of how pervasive maritime terms and concepts were.¹⁷ It will be especially important with respect to particular concepts surrounding strategy as well as the nebulous issue of piracy and privateering. The concept of 'piracy' is very fluid and Greek words for the phenomenon are quite general: most of the Greek words used can be used to refer to robbery by land or at sea. As such, context is of the utmost importance when examining the use of such words in describing piracy or privateering in the Greek world, an example of a subtlety in language not apparent to scholars of modern maritime strategy who do not read Greek. An analysis of piracy and privateering, for example, will require a close reading of the language to determine what the sources say happened. More important than what the pirates were *called* is what they were said to have been *doing*. The arguments of Alfred Rubin seem to discount the existence of 'proper'

¹⁷ Aided by the use of resources like the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*.

piracy in the classical period based on the fact that the word '*peirato*' does not appear in Greek before 140 BC,¹⁸ and this linguistic determinism by a non-specialist is deeply unhelpful. Such thinking reinforces the perception of the Greek world as less complex than was the case. This is but one example of why a close reading of the texts in the original Greek is required.

On the non-literary side, epigraphic and archaeological evidence will provide valuable information. Inscriptions can provide a wide range of evidence on all manner of topics: tribute lists, laws (such as the Athenian Grain Tax Law of 374/3), casualty lists and evidence of overseas colonies. These are relevant to Athens, but also to other Greek poleis. Archaeological remains of shore facilities are illustrative of the amount of resources that a polis might invest in their maritime interests. Athens and Syrakousai both had extensive shipyards for their navies, as well as a whole host of smaller poleis. This demonstrates a high level of investment and interest in their maritime pursuits. Underwater archaeology has rapidly evolved to become cheaper and therefore more accessible. This field has helped discover merchant vessels on the seabed and recovered trade and other goods. Aside from information on the design of merchant vessels, these finds build a picture of trade networks, their extent as well as the nature of different cargoes. The wide extent and complexity of these trade networks are helping to wind back any remaining thought that trade in the ancient world was merely opportunistic and devoted to just grain and luxury goods, and therefore of little consequence. Experimental archaeology has also provided information on the trireme type of warship in the form of *Olympias*.¹⁹ Although this thesis is not concerned with questions of ship design or the intricacies of battle at sea, these practical considerations are important when considering the strategic options open to a maritime power.

Thesis structure

There are two main elements in the examination of sea power and maritime strategy in the Classical Greek world. The first is what might be termed 'governing factors in maritime operations'. Before exploring the operations actually conducted by maritime forces, it is

¹⁸ Rubin (1988): 1-5.

¹⁹ For more details see: Morrison et. al. (2000).

necessary to examine the core factors that enabled these operations. To begin with, practical considerations such as environment, navigation, ship design, personnel issues and finance are fundamental to understanding what a polis could or could not do at sea. Secondly, there are the less tangible issues which govern maritime operations – the ways in which poleis thought of the sea and their relationship to it. The development of a ‘maritime consciousness’ – or not – is something for which detailed study is required. These intangibles are, arguably, more important than practical considerations. Maritime operations are complex, capital-intensive endeavours and there must be popular will and/or strong leadership in order to devote large sums of time and capital to maritime and especially naval endeavours. Themistokles’ and Perikles’ lament over Athens’ not being an island, juxtaposed with Plato’s and Aristotle’s view of the sea, or more specifically the navy, as corrupting, demonstrates the complexity of Athenian perceptions of the maritime realm. As briefly mentioned above, speeches and plays form a great body of evidence with respect to determining the extent to which a ‘maritime consciousness’ developed throughout the Greek world.

The second part of the thesis will examine the operations carried out by maritime forces in the Classical period. The best evidence for the presence or absence of maritime strategy is a detailed study of what these forces actually did. It is at this point that modern maritime strategic thought can help inform the study of these operations. There are many general principles that seem applicable to the study of sea power in history. Geoffrey Till in *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century* lists four attributes of the sea: as a resource, as a medium of transportation, as a medium of information, and as a medium for dominion.²⁰ These are not attributes of the sea as applicable to the modern world, but intrinsic attributes which can be exploited – or not – as any nation throughout time might decide. A cursory examination of the Greek world shows that these four attributes are readily identifiable. As a resource the sea provided fish and salt. Vast trade networks across the Mediterranean and into the Black and Red Seas from early history onwards demonstrate the sea’s utility as a medium for transportation, unsurprising given the rough terrain of mainland Greece and its long coastline. Vast numbers of archaeological finds, as

²⁰ Till (2013): 6.

well as written evidence such as from the Athenian law courts, attest to the sea being used prolifically as a medium of transportation. As a means of information, 'network theory' as examined by Irad Malkin and Christy Constantakopoulou helps show how this was the case in Greece.²¹ Greek language and culture spread throughout the Mediterranean basin and the sea was the primary means of basic and complex information dissemination. For example, news of family dramas at home in Athens were able to reach a trierarch on campaign in the Aegean (Dem. 50.62). The wars of the Greeks, from the Ionian Revolt through to the wars of the *diadochoi*, amply demonstrate that the sea was regularly used as a medium for dominion. By using such general principles to examine maritime operations in the Classical period, we are able to view this world in a new light and recognise that the sea played a central and not merely a peripheral role in Greek affairs.

Strategic concepts such as 'sea control', 'sea denial', and 'maritime power projection' are modern terms to be sure, but they are nevertheless eminently useful in discussing what naval forces *actually* do and their impact on the strategic level. The conceptual framework for studying naval and maritime operations in the Greek world is readily available through an adapted model of modern maritime strategic thought. This is not to pose some new theoretical construct on a specific 'way of warfare' for the Greeks in the manner of Victor Davis Hanson,²² or any other such grand concept. Such sweeping generalisations are unhelpful and can only distort the nuances of how wars were fought throughout history. As Cathal Nolan points out in a recent work, 'the practice and history of war in the West, or anywhere else, does not reduce to some Rosetta Stone of a single cultural model'.²³ The Athenians, Spartans and other Greeks fought wars in many different, and many similar ways, throughout the period. Sea power was important in these conflicts, and it was not a 'way of warfare', but an integral part of conflict in either a direct or a supporting capacity.

The chronological limits set by the thesis are somewhat outside the traditional boundaries of the 'Classical' period. A starting point of approximately 550 allows for a brief discussion of the early establishment of state-controlled warships: navies in the traditional sense. This

²¹ For example: Malkin, *Myth and territory in the Spartan Mediterranean* (1994); *Greek and Roman networks in the Mediterranean* (2009); and Christy Constantakopoulou, *The Dance of the Islands: Insularity, Networks, the Athenian Empire, and the Aegean World* (2007).

²² *The Western Way of War. Infantry Battle in Classical Greece*, originally published 1989.

²³ Nolan (2017): 9.

is not to say that they did not exist before this, but as evidence from Athens, Sparta and other places indicate we can trace a solidifying of proper naval organisation in this time period. The Athenian navy did not spring into existence with Themistokles, but had antecedents in the 500s. A chronological end date of 321 has been chosen since the defeat of Athens at sea at Amorgos spelled the end of any Greek polis with the status of major sea power. This naturally raises the issue of Athens as determining the period and the risk of focusing too much on Athens, a criticism I raised at the beginning. Athens provides us with the most evidence and it was the dominant sea power for much of the period, so from a purely practical perspective it is impossible to not discuss sea power without a heavy focus on Athens. Large parts of this thesis focus on Athenian sea power. However, all attempts are made to examine sea power in other Greek poleis as much as possible and many maritime operations from these other poleis are included in the database (Appendix 1), they are used as examples throughout the thesis and discussed in on their own in Chapter Ten. More than this, my aim is to open up a new way of conceptualising ancient Greek maritime operations and by applying this lens to Athens, this potentially allows for smaller navies to be studied in light of this new framework. An examination of Athenian sea power through this new lens will set the example for deeper study of other poleis. Notwithstanding this, it is worth noting that much as with today, sea power in the ancient world was not necessarily a universal. As Till says, sea power 'is a relative concept, something that some countries have more than others.' This is true of the ancient context, where possession of warships or a navy did not necessarily equate to the possession of sea power.

A great deal of theory concerning maritime operations throughout history and in the modern day has developed over the last hundred years. With modification, this theoretical framework can be used to inform the study of naval operations and maritime issues in the Classical Greek world. Modern theorists have been too dismissive of naval history before the age of sail, and Classicists have often been unwilling or unable to use modern maritime strategic thought to inform their study of Greek history. By combining the two fields, I aim to offer new insights into the workings of naval and maritime forces in the Classical period. The sea was obviously an important factor in Greek history, but a deep examination of sea power and strategy remains lacking in the extant literature. Through the methods outlined

above, this thesis will address the gap in the literature and in doing so enhance the visibility of sea power and maritime strategy in the Greek world. It does not seek to prove the dominance of sea over land power, or any such revisionist notions. Rather, it seeks to demonstrate that the sea and sea power should not be viewed as of secondary importance or as a realm on the periphery of events, but of great significance in shaping the events of the fifth and fourth centuries of Greek history.

Chapter One – Literature Review

When considered at all, the sea is usually viewed in abstract or romantic terms or with fascination, fear or incomprehension. - Chris Parry²⁴

The sea is usually viewed as generally important when studying Greek history, yet the sea is still often relegated to the periphery of studies and analyses of the period and especially in analyses of military operations. An examination of the relevant scholarship reveals a clear gap in analysis of maritime matters in shaping the world of the Classical Greeks. ‘Sea Blindness’ is a popular modern term used to describe the state of affairs whereby the importance of the sea to a state’s power and even survival goes unnoticed or unappreciated, both in terms of popular notice as well as in the intellectual realm.²⁵ I would argue that much of classical scholarship has been afflicted by sea blindness.

This sea blindness has two root causes. The first is a lack of understanding about what sea power is as a concept, and how it might have impacted on history. Issues of sea power and maritime strategy have been studied for well over a century now as a focused and theory-rich discipline. From Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett at the turn of the twentieth century through to scholars such as Paul Kennedy, Colin S Grey, John Hattendorf and Geoffrey Till there is a solid foundation of theoretical work and a rich array of ideas about how sea power has been used in the past. Classical scholars have no issue with modern military theoretical concepts elsewhere, such as the famed ‘double envelopment’ of the Romans by the Carthaginians at Cannae,²⁶ or use modern observations of combat in the Highlands of Papua New Guinea to revisit Homeric combat.²⁷ Yet, when it comes to matters of naval and maritime forces, such theoretical and conceptual constructs are predominately absent. Often scholars see ancient poleis as being technologically and conceptually limited in their use of the sea, especially for military purposes. This leads to the second cause of sea blindness, stemming from a focus on technical aspects of ships

²⁴ Parry (2014): 107.

²⁵ Till (2013): 307.

²⁶ This goes as far back as German war planning in the late nineteenth century and the outbreak of the First World War. The German war plan in the east, The Schlieffen Plan, was aimed at securing a Cannae on a strategic scale, and was obsessed over by the German High Command staff. See: Nolan (2017): 340-341.

²⁷ Van Wees (2014): 133, 153-156, 160-162.

while ignoring how they were used in a strategic sense. Much has been written on the design of triremes – arguments over two versus three levels, and so on – and the specific tactics used in battles, but none of it extends into the realm of how states used or did not use these fleets of triremes as part of a strategy. Far too much time is devoted to hoplites and land battles, and too much scholarship uses land warfare constructs to discuss fundamentally maritime concepts. In a recent volume on ancient warfare, the Introduction sets the tone of study by saying that: ‘crucial to the debate about classical warfare is the introduction and nature of hoplite warfare’.²⁸ As for the maritime realm: ‘recent studies have revealed the complexity of the Athenian navy as a sociological, logistical, and financial organization’.²⁹ Essentially, the authors are saying that hoplite warfare is the defining measure for the understanding of all Greek warfare, whereas naval warfare is merely a study in organisation. The sea is a different realm and requires its own language and a different set of conceptual tools in order to understand it. More than this, war at sea had very unique tactical, operational and strategic issues to contend with and were not merely military operations afloat.

While the main focus of this thesis is on Classical scholarship, modern strategic-studies scholars bear some responsibility for almost entirely dismissing out of hand any lessons of sea power that can be learned from this time period. Scholars of modern strategy and maritime history rarely stray beyond the age of sail in their studies, which reinforces the idea that there is little to be gained in the realm of strategy in studying the Classical period. In a negative feedback loop, this is encouraged by the unsatisfactory way in which classicists have written on matter of the sea and sea power.

Classical Scholarship

There are few works dealing specifically with sea power in the ancient Greek world. The only one which claims to do so is Chester G Starr’s 1989 book, *The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History*. Unfortunately, it does not live up to the ambitious claim of its title. The analysis is shallow – it comes in at a scant 84 pages for both Greek and Roman history, with only 20 pages devoted to Athens. Despite the express intention to study the topic

²⁸ Fagan and Trundle (2010): 9.

²⁹ Fagan and Trundle (2010): 13.

analytically, the book proceeds from pre-history through to the Roman Imperial period in a rigid chronological narrative. Starr's work is a generalist account, which makes little attempt to draw on theoretical work later than the nineteenth century. Although it was poorly reviewed on publication,³⁰ it continues to be cited, and Starr's view that sea power was only of 'spasmodic' importance in antiquity has been quite influential among later writers.³¹

In most works by classicists, naval warfare is almost always seen and classified as a sub-discipline of warfare in general. It is never viewed as comprising warfare itself – land warfare is the core focus, synonymous with warfare in general and things like siege warfare and naval warfare play only supporting roles in this narrative. This is perfectly encapsulated in the *Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare*. Chapter 7, 'Battle' has two sections: the first covers land battles and the second section deals with both naval battles and sieges, as if the two are so similar that they can be lumped together. Certain authors are quite explicit in their dismissal of naval warfare as a primary factor in Greek history. Philip de Souza argues that, 'Fleets were always of secondary importance when compared to armies in Greek and Roman warfare.'³² This is a large generalisation across both the Greek and Roman worlds, but also rests on certain misconceptions about the uses of sea power. For example, his comment that, 'No ancient state ever attempted to deploy naval forces without a land objective'³³ does not set the ancient world apart from any other period: people live on the land, so sea power in any period has as its ultimate objective altering the state of affairs on land. The great theorist Sir Julian Corbett in his foundational 1911 work, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, explicitly makes the point that people live upon the land and not the sea, and thus sea power is always aimed at influencing events ashore.³⁴ The further statement that, 'Ancient naval warfare was never about the control of

³⁰ Reviews: de Souza (1990): 506-7; Morrison (1992): 198-9. Despite the book receiving short-shrift in the Classical studies realm, it still appears in the bibliographies of many studies of modern warfare. As the only book with 'sea power' and 'ancient history' in the title, it still gets plenty of attention from those less familiar with ancient history scholarship.

³¹ Starr (1989): 5-6.

³² de Souza (2007): 434.

³³ de Souza (2007): 434.

³⁴ Corbett (1911): 2.

the open sea',³⁵ is open to argument in itself, but is also not that much different from modern times.

Victor Davis Hanson is another prominent scholar who argues for a land-centric view of ancient warfare. Indeed, he argues for the primacy of land warfare throughout history, arguing that it is apparent from the fact that people 'can count on one hand the world's formidable [naval] commanders... in contrast to dozens of great captains...'.³⁶ This in itself is not a strong argument, but Hanson goes on to argue that entire wars have been fought mostly without a decisive sea battle, from the Second Punic War through to the First and Second World Wars in Europe. The problem here is that this equates sea power with decisive battle, ignoring the complexity of the uses of sea power. Hanson needs, for example, to deny the importance of naval blockades in both world wars in contributing to the defeat of Germany,³⁷ ignoring the influence of logistical shortages on the campaigns fought on land.³⁸ Ironically, Hanson himself in another work, *Carnage and Culture*, lists Salamis as the first of nine 'landmark battles in the rise of Western civilisation'.³⁹

Hanson's pervasive thesis on the 'Western Way of War'⁴⁰ has distorted much of the scholarship on ancient warfare, although as mentioned above this has been challenged. However, it is important to engage with many of the works in order to highlight the problems of sea power and strategy discussion. Hanson has edited a work, *Makers of Ancient Strategy*, an attempt to create an ancient-themed sequel to the seminal 1986 work of strategic history, *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*.⁴¹ Although the contributions are for the most part quite good, there is little in *Makers of Ancient Strategy* that covers sea power. Indeed, the chapter that does cover sea power in the most detail is actually focused on walls and fortifications, rooting the concept of all

³⁵ de Souza (2007): 443.

³⁶ Hanson (2005): 265.

³⁷ Hanson (2005): 265.

³⁸ For a recent work on the topic of how the Allies prevailed in the Second World War, see: O'Brien (2015). It is absolutely clear that sea and air power were the defining factors, and that it is land warfare that has been grossly overestimated in its decisiveness.

³⁹ Hanson (2001): pp. 27-59.

⁴⁰ As popularised in his work, *The Western Way of War. Infantry Battle in Classical Greece*. Originally published in 1989 with a revised second edition in 2000.

⁴¹ An extremely influential work still read in military staff colleges around the world, and at over 900 pages in length, a comprehensive study.

ancient strategy as firmly belonging within the realm of the land and placing sea power on the periphery.⁴² It also highlights another key problem in the study of naval and maritime issues in the extant literature – most of it is extremely Athenocentric. While this is understandable given the nature of the ancient sources, which by and large give us information on Athens, it still leaves out a large area of study. Other Greek cities had navies and engaged in maritime pursuits and need to be studied in order to form a more complete picture of maritime strategy in the Greek world. By ignoring the sea power of other states, it further pushes the idea that sea power was not important and was only ever the purview of Athens in the Greek world. It has the effect of obscuring, consciously or unconsciously, the ways in which the maritime realm played a part in all Greek history.

Other scholars' negative contributions to the topic of sea power and maritime matters in the ancient world are subtler. This includes works such as M.I. Finley's on the ancient economy, which is quite dismissive of the importance of maritime trade. When discussing shipping, he makes cryptic reference to 'the peculiar conditions of winds and currents in the Mediterranean'.⁴³ This is a rather vague statement about navigational conditions, since regional variation throughout the world can potentially make any waters 'peculiar'. This is a troubling issue since many others have taken the line that maritime trade was of minimal importance. Other scholars have gone a long way towards showing how untenable this position is, especially Horden and Purcell in their critically important work, *The Corrupting Sea*. They argue that small scale trade and short, intraregional journeys, 'cabotage' in modern parlance, formed the basic modality for all movements of goods and people before the age of steam.⁴⁴ This replaces the notion of maritime trade as unimportant with one of it being integral to society and the economy. More than this, Finley's argument looks less tenable in light of what is known of long distance trade from Athenian law court speeches and archaeological evidence. Athenian law court speeches give the impression of a highly complex and interconnected system of international trade throughout the Mediterranean and into the Black Sea. Edward E. Cohen's survey of the Athenian maritime courts reveals a rigid and powerful system for the resolution of maritime trade disputes in

⁴² Berkey (2010): 58-92.

⁴³ Finley (1977): 130.

⁴⁴ Horden and Purcell (2000): 365.

Athens;⁴⁵ not just for Athenians, but for disputes between foreigners in Athens about trade, as is revealed in a Demosthenes speech.⁴⁶ These law court cases deal with the ever-important Athenian grain trade, as well as with other trade goods such as wine. In one case, Athenians provide capital for a trade journey from Mende to the Black Sea with a return to Athens carrying (presumably) grain and salt fish.⁴⁷ A recent archaeological discovery off the Fourni islands, between Ikaria and Samos, has revealed a large number of merchant vessel wrecks, some dated to as far back as the archaic period. The cargo included amphorae never before found in shipwrecks,⁴⁸ and importantly the islands themselves were not a major trade destination, meaning it was merely a stopping point for north-south and east-west trade. This is revealing of a complex and tightly interwoven maritime trade network across the Mediterranean and especially the Aegean. The recognition that this was the case opens the way to better explore how maritime considerations influenced the strategic landscape.

Another major issue is that the extant literature deals almost exclusively with naval matters, that is, matters of ships and seamanship, technology and personnel aspects such as naval organisation. These fill in important details about what navies could and could not do – capabilities and limitations – but do not approach a study of strategy. At best, these studies get into the operational conduct of navies, and the scholarship often fails to grapple with higher concepts of sea power and strategy. These studies are concerned with navies, limiting their scope to the investigation of *naval* power, not *sea* power.⁴⁹ As a recent example, there is Marc G. DeSantis' *A Naval History of the Peloponnesian War*.⁵⁰ It is essentially a narrative history of the war with more emphasis on naval aspects, rather than an analysis of sea power, and it is focused narrowly on naval aspects of the war. This is not a criticism, but to highlight an extant gap in the scholarship. The idea that Athens did not have a navy or that triremes were not warships are both unsupportable in light of the

⁴⁵ Cohen (1973).

⁴⁶ Dem. 21.176.

⁴⁷ Dem. 35.

⁴⁸ As of October 2018, 58 wrecks have been discovered. This find is so recent that there is no real scholarship on it, only preliminary news-style articles on the find and brief interviews with some of the archaeological team. <https://rpmnautical.org/outing/fourni-survey-2015-2016-field-season/>

⁴⁹ The difference between which has been elaborated on in the Introduction to this thesis.

⁵⁰ DeSantis (2017).

works of Morrison and Coates, Boromir Jordan, Barry Strauss, and John R Hale,⁵¹ all of whose works present a detailed picture of triremes as warships and the navy of Athens and others as complex and powerful organisations.⁵² It is clear that sea power and strategy require further examination and exposure in order to provide a clearer picture of the topic.

A notable problem that arises from many works concerns the practicalities of sea power, elementary matters such as weather and navigation. For instance, Map 11 in *The Athenian Trireme* details a journey from Chios to the Hellespont.⁵³ The route the authors choose is puzzling to say the least, making hardly any navigational sense. It makes unnecessary diversions into two different bays,⁵⁴ based on an apparent assumption that sailing along the coast meant sailing as closely as possible to land despite the obvious impracticality and even danger of doing so. This is repeated again when they describe a journey from Kalpe to Herakleia in the Black Sea, where again they assume a route that hugs the coast rather than cutting across the bay at Mariandynus Sinus.⁵⁵ Herakleia is on a promontory on which there is (roughly) a 1000-metre-high mountain range. A 1000 m mountain can be seen from 63 nautical miles away, meaning a ship could sail straight across from Kalpe to Herakleia without having to sail along the coast, using the mountain edge behind Herakleia as a headmark.⁵⁶ When considering the use of Kalpe as a possible stern-mark for 5-6 nm, the three-mile margin of visibility to Herakleia widens. Detailed and correct analysis of such

⁵¹ Morison et. al. (2000); Jordan (2000); Strauss (2004); Hale (2009).

⁵² That the Athenians did not have a 'standing' navy appears to be based on the idea that there were not full-time personnel crewing ships, but recruited as needed. This may be taking too much from our modern ideas of what a 'standing navy' are. The Athenians had all the material and infrastructure required of navy, and personnel clearly practiced and trained on a regular basis. Combined with their 'maritime consciousness' it is possible to say that in their own view they appear to have had a 'standing navy' as we might call it.

⁵³ Morison et. al. (2000): 97-8.

⁵⁴ Elaitikos Sinus and Adramyttemons/Idaios Sinus as listed in the *Barrington's Atlas*. Talbert (ed.) (2000): Map 56.

⁵⁵ Morison et. al. (2000): 103.

⁵⁶ Using the formula for visibility distances from sea level: Visibility Distance in nautical miles = $3.8\sqrt{\text{Height (m)}}$ This is for conditions of normal visibility. The phenomenon of super-refraction occurs when a visible light or radio wave is bent downwards around the Earth's surface in a duct. Super-refraction is often present over the sea due to Hydrolapse (a decrease in humidity with height), especially in the Mediterranean during the summer months (at least a 20% chance, or 1 in every 5 days). Super-refraction increases the visibility of the horizon. Obviously poor weather conditions can cause visibility to be much reduced – thick cloud or rain being obvious examples. See BR 45 vol. 1, (Admiralty Manual of Navigation), Section 15-7 'Radar Theory and application'.

practical issues does matter when it has a potential to affect the study of strategic issues, such as sailing routes, timings and general fleet movements.

The visibility of land from the sea in the Aegean and Black Sea areas is far greater than scholars seem to credit, and this has huge potential for the ability of ships to navigate even when many miles from land.⁵⁷ Additionally, the assumption that sailing along the coast meant sailing very close to the coast, as many scholars seem to think, needs to be questioned. Louis Rawlings makes the unsubstantiated claim that ‘Ancient ships tended to hug the coastline; the crossing of extended parts of open sea was rare, since there were poor maps and no compasses.’⁵⁸ Visibility of land ensured they could stand off the coast at many miles, and sailing too close to the coast could be extremely dangerous in many conditions, a lee shore being one of the most dangerous positions a ship can find itself in. This was exactly the fate of the Persian naval forces sailing around Euboea during the battle of Artemision.⁵⁹ Seafarers around the world have quite successfully navigated without compasses or charts for centuries. The pilots of modern ports are relied upon for their mariner’s experience in the waters they are responsible for, even with all of the highly sophisticated equipment used by ships of the modern era. Comments like those of Rawlings’ reveal a distinct and critical lack of practical experience in a field where practical experience is of great importance, and this diminishes the impact of an otherwise sound appraisal of naval power.⁶⁰ These practicalities will be covered only briefly in this thesis, but they will be covered in order to establish a baseline of what could and could not be done by naval and maritime forces during the period. This is important in light of what many scholars say about the subject.

Too much of the modern narrative focuses on land-centric aspects of Greek history – agriculture, hoplites and land battles – whilst seeing the sea as a barrier and often minimising, or dismissing entirely, the importance and prevalence of maritime trade and the maritime economy. The view of the Mediterranean as the ‘Corrupting Sea’ still seems

⁵⁷ See Chapter Two for more discussion on navigation.

⁵⁸ Rawlings (2007): 119.

⁵⁹ Hdt. 8.13. A lee shore is where a vessel finds the shore on its lee side, that is, the wind blowing from seaward and driving the ship ashore. This is considered dangerous not only for sailing ships, but for powered vessels as well.

⁶⁰ This is not to say that academics are thus completely unqualified to talk about the subject, but to reinforce the point that subject matter expertise is of great importance when it comes to practical issues.

to hold sway with many Classicists. Strategy in many of these works seems to revolve around the movement and clash of armies and little else. Those works that do delve into maritime matters almost exclusively deal with naval matters, and in particular, Athenian naval matters. This not only excludes other Greek powers, including the Sicilian Greeks and smaller navies, but as highlighted above also focuses on naval rather than maritime strategy.

Modern Maritime Strategy

It should not come as a surprise that modern scholars have largely ignored the Classical Greek period when discussing maritime strategy. The lack of sea power appreciation in Classical scholarship filters down to modern scholars, who treat the topic with disdain or ignore it all together. This is evident in the names of some book chapters dealing with this time period: 'Land warfare afloat' and 'the pre-naval era' – book chapters found in influential and well-regarded works no less.⁶¹ Indeed they are works found on the reading lists of many naval war colleges around the world.⁶² Palmer's work is ostensibly concerned with naval command and control from the sixteenth century onwards, but for unknown reasons he feels the need to address sea power before 1650. His contempt for the study of sea power before this year is made explicit in the second paragraph, where he says that: 'The Impact of sea power on ancient history cannot be compared to its influence on modern events.'⁶³ This statement takes for evidence the work of Chester G. Starr and his aforementioned problematic work. He makes the statement that 'only a fool, unversed in the vagaries of things marine, could believe that wooden ships driven by oar or sail could "conquer" or "command" the sea.'⁶⁴ This would come as a surprise to the ancient Greeks, who absolutely and quite explicitly thought that they could control or rule the sea (discussed in detail in Chapter Five). It is works and arguments such as this that make the

⁶¹ In Palmer (2005): 19-38; and Cable (1998): 15-16 respectively.

⁶² Including the Royal Australian Navy's *Sea Power Compendium 2014*, the newest version of what was the *RAN Reading List*, and edited by the author. These works are distributed throughout military institutions as a guide to what books, journals, blogs and other academic resources are available for the study of strategy, maritime and naval history and contemporary international affairs. Palmer's book appears here, as do other works of James Cable.

⁶³ Palmer (2005): 19.

⁶⁴ Palmer (2005): 20.

study of maritime strategy and sea power in history difficult, and they contribute to the idea that there is little to be gained in studying the ancient world.

The other major issue with modern scholars is a lack of subject matter expertise in the area of Classics. Greek and Latin language skills do matter, but perhaps more importantly is a lack of critical analysis of ancient sources. The otherwise excellent analysis of strategy during the Peloponnesian War by Platias and Koliopoulos is hampered by their blind acceptance of Thucydides' contention that the Sicilian expedition was aimed at the conquest of Sicily.⁶⁵ They put too much emphasis on Alkibiades' role, despite the fact that he played little part in the campaign since he was recalled so early into it. Alkibiades' removal left Nicias and Lamachos free to pursue their own strategies. They make no mention of the possibility that Athens might have more restrained goals in Sicily, such as the power-projection cruise proposed by Nicias. This is the familiar problem of being seduced by Thucydides' narrative and analysis and accepting them at face value. This is not a debilitating issue that prevents modern strategists and sea power theorists from studying Classical history, but it is of significance and has an impact on the quality of the scholarship.

For the most part, scholars of modern maritime thinking limit the scope of their examinations to the time period of the age of sail and later, falling into what might be termed 'technological determinism', a belief that the 'primitive' nature of technology in the Greek world precluded complex military operations. This is paired with what appears to be an assumption that the Greeks did not think deeply on maritime matters, and aside from the obligatory reference to Salamis as a decisive naval battle or Athens as a maritime force, they ignore entirely the other operations conducted by Greek naval forces.

A Contemporary Issue

It is worth reinforcing the point that sea-blindness is a modern term used to describe a modern malady, and the remedy has been to highlight the importance of maritime issues in both the contemporary and the historical world. The problem of sea-blindness in Classical scholarship does appear more explicable considering the prevalence of the

⁶⁵ Platias and Koliopoulos (2010): 55, 64-5, 109-14.

condition when viewed in light of modern maritime strategic concerns. Certainly, the mid to late 20th and the 21st centuries have seen people more divorced from a deep familiarity with sea. This has resulted in many societies losing their appreciation of the necessity of the sea to their lifestyle and even their survival. People now travel long distances by air, going by sea only on short ferry journeys or on pleasure cruises. The sea has increasingly been seen by the majority of people, in the Western world at least, as a source of enjoyment and pleasure; whether on a 'booze cruise', surfing, diving, whale watching, recreational fishing or the consumption of seafood. That modern scholars are more divorced from the maritime realm than was previously the case is a point made by Lincoln Paine in his magisterial *The Sea and Civilisation*.⁶⁶ It is not just that the general population needs to be reminded of the sea's importance to society, but also the scholars who are a product of that society. This is nowhere more evident than in current scholarship, especially as it regards the ancient world. Notions of triremes being glorified transports and ancient navies not actually existing are deeply damaging to the proper study of warfare and strategy in the ancient world, and require vigorous correction. Quite simply there is no comprehensive examination of sea power in Classical Greece in extant literature. This not only damages our understanding of the ancient world, but of the modern world too.

⁶⁶ Paine (2013): 9.

Chapter Two – Geography, environment, navigation and fishing

Practical issues such as geography and environment were key considerations for Greek poleis, in both war and peace. The operating environment for ancient Greek maritime forces varied and encompassed the waters of the western Mediterranean, Adriatic, Aegean and Black Seas. Weather was of the utmost importance in the conduct of maritime operations, from trade and transport through to naval and military operations. In examining the geographic and meteorological conditions with which the Greeks had to contend, a baseline can be established to determine what was and was not possible in the conduct of these operations at and from the sea. This chapter will demonstrate that maritime and naval forces of the period were not as restricted by weather and geography as has often been thought.

This thesis is not concerned with defining the Mediterranean or weighing into the subject of what defines the region or discussing regional history. The idea of the Mediterranean and its own history and identity, important a topic as it is, remains outside the scope of this thesis,⁶⁷ which is concerned with maritime issues during the period.

Geography

A key consideration is how much ancient geography differs from the modern, especially with regard to factors such as sea level change over time. Notwithstanding some local variation, especially silting and erosion, the geography of the Mediterranean as it relates to seafaring has not significantly changed from the late Neolithic period.⁶⁸ From that time, coastlines and island formations would have increasingly resembled the geography of the present-day Mediterranean. It is important to highlight that this is an insignificant change with respect to maritime operations in general. There have been few dramatic changes which would impact the strategic level. While local variation can seem dramatic, such as the silting at Thermopylai, this would have had an impact mostly at the tactical level of

⁶⁷ Examples of which include Braudel (1972 & 2001), Horden and Purcell (2000), Abulafia (2011), and Broodbank (2013). These contributions are invaluable to the study of the Mediterranean and its history. Perhaps most importantly they have helped shift perspective away from viewing the history of the area with the land at its centre.

⁶⁸ Fifth millennium BC onward. McGrail (2001): 88-89.

operations.⁶⁹ The core features of the coastline and presence of islands has not changed so much that geostrategic considerations would have been so different from what we see today.

The Mediterranean extends approximately 2000 nautical miles (nm) from east to west and between 400 and 215 nm north to south, covering an area of some 2.5 million square kilometres.⁷⁰ Within this area are the Adriatic and the Aegean seas, as well as the Black Sea, the latter area covering 461,000 sq. km.⁷¹ It is physically divided into two basins, connected north and south of Sicily by the Sicilian channel in the south and the Strait of Messina to the north.⁷² The two basins have notable geographical and biological differences.⁷³ The continental shelf is quite narrow, between 40 and 5 nm,⁷⁴ and the seabed generally drops off steeply to depths of over 900 metres.⁷⁵

An obvious but often overlooked aspect of Mediterranean geography is the length of its coastline, and just how much of Greece in particular is accessible from the sea, and vice versa. Of particular note is the length of the coastline represented by the Aegean Sea area: one-third of the total length of coastline in the entire Mediterranean, with 9835 islands in Greece alone.⁷⁶ This represents a rich operating environment for maritime and especially naval forces of the period, especially with regard to the availability of landing spots and sheltered areas.

Terrestrial geography is also of significance when discussing Mediterranean maritime operations. This is especially relevant to Greece, which aside from a long coastline has quite mountainous and difficult landward terrain. The fact that Greece has no significantly navigable rivers also increased the importance of seaborne trade for the movement of

⁶⁹ It also has an impact on archaeological finds. Many port facilities and crucially, shipsheds are now underwater through even moderate sea level rise.

⁷⁰ McGrail (2001): 87; Broodbank (2013): 55. Nautical Miles are a precise way to measure distance but are not generally used to measure area, hence km² used here.

⁷¹ Broodbank (2013): 55.

⁷² McGrail (2001): 91; NP 136: *Ocean Passages of the World* (2004): 87.

⁷³ In some cases, the two basins are referred to as a western 'Atlanto-Mediterranean' and an eastern 'Ponto- Mediterranean'. Blondel et. al. (2010): 5.

⁷⁴ Narrow compared to other places, such as Australia, where the continental shelf can exceed 300 nm.

⁷⁵ McGrail (2001): 87.

⁷⁶ 123 of which are inhabited at present day. It is difficult to know how many were inhabited in Classical period. For more on this, see: Hansen and Nielsen (2004): 732-3. Blondel et. al. (2010): 10; Broodbank (2013): 75.

goods and people.⁷⁷ Difficulty was due not just to physical terrain, but also the political geography. Soldiers and merchants going by land faced not only physical obstacles, but also political ones in needing to pass through the land of different poleis with the accompanying negotiations that might require.⁷⁸ The sea provides ready and wide-ranging access, free from the territorial considerations that are present on land. A distinct difference in the ancient operating environment is the lack of maritime borders, in the modern sense. While it is true that a polis would be in control of its ports and harbours, there is little to suggest that any claims over ocean 'territory' were in existence, or anything other than extremely difficult to enforce. Lytle argues that the sea was a 'commons', accessible to all and that poleis had little regulatory reach.⁷⁹ Lytle is mostly concerned with fishing rights and territorial seas, but he points out that states did regulate the passage of ships.⁸⁰ Epigraphic evidence from Athens mentions such regulation.⁸¹ Nevertheless, it was still easier for ships to divert around any maritime claims than it would be for any army to change its route on land, if such a thing was even possible in the given circumstances.

Environmental conditions

There are several environmental factors which are of importance to vessels at sea, especially tides and tidal streams, as well as currents. These factors affect long distance sailing and local operations such as amphibious landings and battles, especially battles in proximity to land as was the case with many naval battles of the period. An example from the Peloponnesian War involves the Athenians capitalising on superior local knowledge of environmental conditions to defeat a Peloponnesian force at the entrance to the Corinthian Gulf (see below).

The rate of evaporation in the Mediterranean basin is approximately three times the rate of inflow, derived principally from the major rivers.⁸² Dynamic equilibrium is reached by

⁷⁷ As Horden and Purcell argue about the basic modality of goods and people in the Mediterranean, discussed in Chapter One. Horden and Purcell (2000): 365.

⁷⁸ Horden and Purcell (2000): 377.

⁷⁹ Lytle (2010): 1-2; 9-24. Others have a different view, arguing for some regulation of local fisheries. See: Bresson (2016): 181-4.

⁸⁰ Lytle (2010): 13.

⁸¹ IG I3 61.18-20; IG I3 63; IG I3 116.3.

⁸² Principally: Nile, Po, Rhone and Ebro. McGrail (2001): 90; NP 136: *Ocean Passages of the World* (2004): 88.

strong inflow from the Atlantic Ocean through the Strait of Gibraltar, and to a lesser extent in the east from the Black Sea into the Aegean through the Dardanelles.⁸³ As a result of this, the predominant currents flow counter-clockwise in the Mediterranean, Adriatic and the Aegean Seas. Due to the Coriolis force,⁸⁴ the main flow from the Strait of Gibraltar runs east along the African coast and then into the eastern basin until it is turned north by the Levantine coast, where it joins the inflow from the Black Sea and circles around counter-clockwise in the Aegean. Part of the Atlantic inflow is turned north near Malta and circles back towards Gibraltar counter-clockwise.⁸⁵ On average the current strength is one knot or less, contingent on local geographic influences.⁸⁶ One knot is a mild force and would have minimal immediate impact on vessels underway by sail or under oars, but would of course have a greater impact over long distance journeys. However stronger forces such as those experienced in confined channels and narrows could have a much more appreciable effect, both positive and negative, on ships sailing in those waters.

The Mediterranean is almost entirely a tideless sea, with only a few regions that experience a tidal range greater than 1 metre, and with most of the Aegean experiencing a range of between 0.3-0.8 metres.⁸⁷ Thus like the predominant currents, the effect of tidal streams on sailing conditions are minimal, with a few exceptions. For example, the strait between the mainland of Greece and Euboea experiences currents of five knots and even up to eight knots.⁸⁸ Diodoros notes this phenomenon when discussing a causeway built in 410 which narrowed it to such an extent that only a single ship could pass through (Diod. 13.47.5). A current of three to four knots would significantly increase the difficulty in rowing against such a stream, and eight knots would be all but impossible for a ship not fitted with propulsive machinery. However, these are tidal streams and thus are present only during incoming and outgoing tides and so navigable during slack water, as well as subject to

⁸³ The Hellespont in ancient times. I use the two names interchangeably, but will always refer to the Hellespont when citing ancient references. The rivers flowing into the Black Sea more than compensate for evaporation. McGrail (2001): 90; NP 136: *Ocean Passages of the World* (2004): 88.

⁸⁴ Blondel et. al. (2010): 8.

⁸⁵ McGrail (2001): 91-92; NP 136: *Ocean Passages of the World* (2004): 88.

⁸⁶ Such as straits and channels and the depth of water.

⁸⁷ McGrail (2001): 92. Compare this with many other parts of the world, for instance northern Australia, where the tidal range can be in excess of 10 metres in certain areas.

⁸⁸ My observations of the narrows recorded currents ranging from 2 to as much as 6 knots (25-27 January 2016). This may have been exacerbated in recent times with modern works, but the existing channel is close to Diodoros' assessment of being wide enough for only one ship.

variation depending on whether it is a period of spring or neap tides.⁸⁹ These environmental conditions are the sort well-known to locals and to mariners who frequent the area. Generally speaking, currents in the Mediterranean would have presented only a moderate help or hindrance to mariners,⁹⁰ both in terms of normal navigation and in instances of battle.

Weather

Climate is a critical factor in seafaring and maritime operations. The Mediterranean is considered transitional between a cold temperate and a dry tropical climate.⁹¹ Just as with geographical conditions, changes in the climatic conditions of the Mediterranean since the late Neolithic have been relatively minor and of minimal significance to the impact of seafaring conditions. It is not therefore unreasonable to use modern data on environmental conditions to determine general sailing conditions experienced by Classical Greek mariners.⁹² Of significance are factors such as wind, current, tide, and visibility conditions. The writings of ancient authors seem to confirm present day observations of climatic conditions, and this thesis will draw on both classical data and modern knowledge and observations.⁹³ These will aid in establishing the parameters within which maritime forces could operate during the Classical period.

⁸⁹ Springs being the highest and neaps the lowest variation.

⁹⁰ Concurring with Broodbank's assessment. Broodbank (2013): 74.

⁹¹ Blondel et. al. (2010): 12.

⁹² McGrail (2001): 89. Not all would agree with this however. James Beresford argues that modern scholars should be wary of superimposing modern climactic data onto the ancient world, and that the period 850-200 BC saw different climactic conditions to today. He argues it would have experienced cooler and wetter conditions, hampering celestial navigation because of poorer visibility. Nevertheless, he generally uses modern meteorological data to inform his own work. Beresford (2012): 68-63.

⁹³ This is the line taken by McGrail in his book. McGrail (2001): 88-89. This is reasonable position, backed up by ancient sources as well as modern scientific data. This thesis will accept this position, with the addition of environmental data I collected in Greece during fieldwork in January-February of 2016. These observations were taken with due consideration to the weather observations most pertinent to naval operations from my experience as an Officer of the Watch in the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). The observations followed standard format used by the RAN and subsequently reported to the Australian Bureau of Meteorology for meteorological reporting and forecasting.

The primary weather factor of significance is the wind,⁹⁴ and especially so in the age of the galleys and sailing vessels.⁹⁵ It was not as prohibitive a factor as later in the age of sail; galleys can be rowed against the wind if need be, albeit with slower progress. Nevertheless, the wind had a defining, though not deterministic, impact on sailing in the Classical period. Wind in the northern areas of the basin are predominately from the north as determined by seasonal temperature differences between the land mass and the sea.⁹⁶ In the summer these northerly winds were highly predictable and thus reliable – the annual (*'Etesian'*) wind – which provided good weather in the Aegean Sea and the Cyclades.⁹⁷ It was this wind that Demosthenes bemoaned for hindering Athenian warships trying to sail north to confront Philip II in the latter half of the fourth century. The wind made it much slower for the Athenians to sail north, especially since there appeared to be no Athenian force ready at short notice. Philip may not have had a strong navy but he knew how to use the weather to his advantage in order to make it more difficult for the Athenians to counter his advances.⁹⁸ This helps demonstrate that such knowledge and calculations with regards to maritime considerations had an impact at the strategic level.

In addition to these seasonal winds, coastal winds (land and sea breezes) are prevalent in the Mediterranean, especially in the summer and can have an impact on vessels from 5 nm up to 20 nm from the shore.⁹⁹ Especially important is the fact that there is much intraregional variation in winds throughout the Aegean, especially amongst the islands. Some locations, such as Chios, record lower risks of encountering strong and gale force winds in winter time than in other places during the summer. Melos averages four times

⁹⁴ Standard convention is that a wind is referred to by the direction in which it blows *from*, not to: a northerly wind blows from the north. Wind speed is either measured directly with knots or by reference to the Beaufort scale of Force 0-12, with 0 describing no wind and 12 describing winds of over 65 knots.

⁹⁵ The term 'galley' is used to refer to ships propelled primarily by oars. Warships of the period were primarily propelled by oars in battle, and while merchant vessels mainly relied on sails they were also commonly fitted with oars for use in less favourable wind conditions, unlike later day sailing vessels.

⁹⁶ Blondel et. al. (2010): 13.

⁹⁷ McGrail (2001): 93; Blondel et. al. (2010): 14.

⁹⁸ Dem. 4.31.

⁹⁹ McGrail (2001): 95. These coastal breezes are the result of a temperature inversion between the land and the sea. A sea breeze occurs in the morning when the land quickly warms up and wind flows from the sea to the land. A land breeze is where the land cools down quickly and wind flows from the land out to sea. A land breeze predominates in the late afternoon and into sunset. A sea breeze predominates in the early hours of the morning until mid-forenoon. The effects of a sea breeze are stronger than those of a land breeze.

the level of strong and gale force winds of Iraklion in Kreta,¹⁰⁰ though they are separated by a mere 85 nm. Aristotle in his *Meteorologica* (363a-364a) described in detail the different winds and offered the first explicit example of the twelve-point wind rose, used throughout antiquity and in later history, though it is probable that his is merely the first *explicit* explanation of the system and that it was used by mariners for some time before him.¹⁰¹ A more practical (from a navigational perspective) eight-point rose was developed in the Hellenistic period.¹⁰² Unsurprisingly, the ancient Greeks and mariners in particular would have been interested in the wind and developed a deep knowledge of both seasonal and local wind patterns.

A topic of great contention is the idea that ships rarely if ever sailed during the winter (see further discussion below). Winds in winter, November to March, are still predominately northerly but with a greater chance of southerlies. Of particular note is the fact that winter sees weather that is subject to rapid change, making it far less predictable.¹⁰³ Winds during winter are likely to reach Force 7 or above on six to nine days of the month in the Aegean and East Ionian Sea;¹⁰⁴ these are hazardous wind conditions for vessels at sea. Nevertheless, the case for ships being shut in during winter has been extremely overstated and rests on shaky evidence (discussed further below).

Another critical weather consideration was visibility, for navigational purposes as well as for tracking the movement of shipping both in and outside of battle. Like the wind, visibility conditions varied with the season. An important fact, often overlooked, is how much of the surrounding land can be seen from a vessel at sea in the Mediterranean and especially in the Aegean and Adriatic, where a vessel would *never* be out of sight of land in normal visibility conditions. The islands of the Aegean can be seen at quite a distance, both from the sea and from the mainland. The Athenian fort at Cape Sounion would have provided an excellent vantage point to the west and south/southeast. The island of Melos, some 58 nm distant, is visible from Sounion on a good day.¹⁰⁵ This a fact probably not lost

¹⁰⁰ Beresford (2012): 68-9.

¹⁰¹ As Beresford reasonably concludes. Beresford (2012): 177.

¹⁰² Beresford (2012): 177-8.

¹⁰³ NP 136: *Ocean Passages of the World* (2004): 88.

¹⁰⁴ NP 136: *Ocean Passages of the World* (2004): 88.

¹⁰⁵ Melos was clearly visible during my visit 9/01/2016, but not visible on a subsequent visit 30/1/2016. These visits occurred at roughly the same time of day (1700 and 1630 local time, respectively). This

on the Athenians voting for the expedition to subdue Melos after the Peace of Nikias.¹⁰⁶ Additionally, the temple of Poseidon would have made an excellent landmark for ships sailing around the cape, a prominent navigational mark visible for many miles.¹⁰⁷ The prevalence of navigational markers and aids in the ancient world is relatively unknown, but there are strong hints that they were used. In the *Odyssey* the Greeks are said to have built a tomb for Achilles so large that it would be seen by men over the sea:¹⁰⁸ obviously not a deliberate navigational mark but clearly a monument that would be useful to mariners. Similarly, Pausanias says that the spearpoint and crest of the statue of Athena *Promachos* on the Akropolis was visible to sailors rounding Cape Sounion (Paus. 1.28.2).¹⁰⁹ Later monumental structures, such as the Pharos of Alexandria in Egypt, demonstrate the clear desire to build even larger and more prominent navigational aids.

For vessels on the sea, optical distance to the sea horizon is calculated by a simple formula: $2.08 \sqrt{\text{height}}$ (metres), where *height* is the distance above the surface of the observer.¹¹⁰ Therefore, an observer on the deck of a trireme (2.5 m deck height + 1.5 m eye height) would have a visible horizon of 4.16 nm. An observer up the mast might have a visible horizon of

highlights the impact of different visibility conditions. Also visible were the islands of Keos, Kythnos, Seriphos and Siphnos as well as the Peloponnesos.

¹⁰⁶ Athenians stationed at Sounion no doubt would have seen Melos and perhaps brooded on its non-commitment to the war; an important point when voting in the assembly. Thucydides only says that Sounion was 'fortified' (Σούνιον τειχίσαντες) after the Sicilian disaster (8.4); this does not preclude the possibility that Athenians were stationed at Sounion before that. It provides such a good vantage point as to have been invaluable. It is likely they only felt the need to fortify the position with walls once the Spartans had fortified Dekeleia and maintained a permanent presence in Attika.

¹⁰⁷ When I sailed past the temple was clearly visible by naked eye approximately 6 nm off the coast. It is reasonable to assume that the fully constructed temple, with a roof and brighter in colour, would have been even more prominent.

¹⁰⁸ ἀμφ' αὐτοῖσι δ' ἔπειτα μέγαν καὶ ἀμύμονα τύμβον

χεύαμεν Ἀργείων ἱερὸς στρατὸς αἰχμητῶν

ἀκτῆ ἔπι προύχουση, ἐπὶ πλατεῖ Ἑλλησπόντῳ,

ὥς κεν τηλεφανῆς ἐκ ποντόφιν ἀνδράσιν εἶη

τοῖς οἷ νῦν γεγάσι καὶ οἷ μετόπισθεν ἔσσονται. Hom. *Od.* 24.80-85.

¹⁰⁹ In his meticulous reconstruction of the statue, Gorham Phillips Stevens concluded that a 25-foot-tall statue would have it rising 158.54 m above sea level, visible for 7-10 km at sea towards Sounion on a clear day. From experience, such an object as a bronze statue would on a bright day be noticeable to the naked eye and a distance of 7-10 km is perfectly feasible. The statue of Athena *Promachos* would thus be a useful navigational mark under the right circumstance. Whether or not this was deliberate on the part of the builders is another matter, and one on which the sources are silent. See: Stevens (1936): 470, 494-499.

¹¹⁰ BR 45 vol. 1, (Admiralty Manual of Navigation), Section 15-7 'Radar Theory and application'.

Alternatively, $2.07 \sqrt{\text{height}}$ (metres): Bowditch, *The American Practical Navigator* (1995): 340. This is the formula for the optical horizon as opposed to the geometric horizon. Obviously, the radar horizon is not applicable in this case.

7 nm.¹¹¹ This is for conditions of normal visibility, and phenomena such as Super-refraction increase the visibility of the horizon. Super-refraction occurs when a visible light (or radio wave) is bent downwards around the Earth's surface in a duct. Super-refraction is often present over the sea due to Hydrolapse (a decrease in humidity with height), especially in the Mediterranean during the summer months (at least a 20% chance, or 1 in every 5 days).¹¹² This is of course a distance to the horizon and ships and other objects on the sea can be seen at greater distances due to their added height above the horizon.

Navigation

Navigation is the art and science of taking a vessel from one place to another, safely. It is rightly called an art and a science,¹¹³ even with modern technology, for technology cannot compensate for experience in navigationally difficult situations.¹¹⁴ The evidence for navigational techniques and practices is patchy at best and comes predominantly from indirect sources and references. Nevertheless, much can be gleaned from these sources and a picture formed of how Classical sailors navigated around the Mediterranean and beyond. There are two different scenarios requiring two different skill sets for navigating in the ancient world, which may be termed 'coastal' and 'ocean' navigation. These are not precise definitions, but serve to make a distinction between navigating with reference to the shore or out of sight of land.

Pilotage can be considered a subset of coastal navigation, in so much as it occurs in sight of land. It refers to navigating in confined waters such as a harbour or channel and should not be conflated with coastal navigation, whereby a ship sails along a coast several miles

¹¹¹ For a 10 m mast + 1.5 m height of eye.

¹¹² See BR 45 vol. 1 (Admiralty Manual of Navigation), Section 15-7 'Radar Theory and application'.

¹¹³ The point made at the very beginning of *The American Practical Navigator*, colloquially known as *Bowditch* after its original author, Nathaniel Bowditch.

¹¹⁴ This section draws heavily from my own training and practical experience as a Maritime Warfare Officer (MWO) in the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). The primary role of an MWO aboard a ship is as the Officer of the Watch (OOB), charged with the safe navigation of the ship and answerable only to the Commanding, Executive and Navigating officers. My navigation training involved all aspects of the practice, including basic navigation theory, coastal navigation, pilotage, ocean passage planning and celestial navigation – all with a theoretical and practical element reinforced by time at sea in ships. Obviously, navigation techniques and technology have changed drastically over the intervening 2500 years, but the basics of navigation and the sea itself are unchanged, and military training accounts for worst case scenarios, foremost of which is the removal of modern technology to a level comparable to the ancient world.

offshore, a trap Beresford and others have fallen in to.¹¹⁵ Pilotage waters are dangerous areas where the primary concern of the navigator is avoiding dangers such as shoals, rocks and indeed other ships, an art that relies on a high degree of experience and local knowledge. Local knowledge is of great importance, even in the modern age with charts and electronic navigation systems; modern vessels still require pilots when entering ports or transiting dangerous waters such as the Great Barrier Reef in Australia.¹¹⁶ So too did the Greeks rely heavily on local knowledge. Polybios, in describing the dangerous waters of Maiotis, says that large ships require a pilot (καθηγεμῶν) to navigate the area (Pol. 4.40.8).¹¹⁷ In 429 the Athenian Admiral Phormio, confronting a superior force of enemy vessels, waited for the usual morning wind to blow up and disturb the enemy formation, which it promptly did and allowed him to attack the disordered enemy (Thuc. 2.84). In a subsequent naval engagement, Peloponnesian vessels ran aground, as Thucydides says, through their ignorance of the local waters (αἰ δὲ καὶ ἐς βράχεια ἀπειρία χωρίων ᾠκειλαν – 2.91.4). Such local knowledge could be critical to the safety of a ship, including in battle as demonstrated in relatively confined waters off the coast of Naupaktos.

Ships sailing in coastal waters other than pilotage waters could use several different aids to navigation. The land itself would provide the most obvious source of information, not just prominent features such as mountains and landmarks but also the contours of the coast itself: capes, bays, inlets, small islets and such. Additionally, human features such as towns and settlements would have provided well-known reference points. James Beresford is

¹¹⁵ Beresford (2012): 175. He references Philip de Souza, whose work on naval and maritime issues is deeply problematic, as discussed in Chapter One. Coastal navigation and pilotage rely on the same skill set, but with a different focus and different dangers and issues to contend with.

¹¹⁶ These pilots provide advice to the ship's bridge crew and control the local tugs; they do not usually steer the ship. Many modern works translate the ancient Greek word κυβερνήτης as 'pilot', which can be a misnomer as the *kybernetes* seems to have steered the ship rather than navigated it. This is not to say that they were not trained in navigation, but that they were not pilots in the sense of specialised navigators for a particular area such as a port. Beresford (pg. 186) falls into this trap when he quotes Herodotus as listing 'pilots' as one of the seven occupational classes in Egypt (Hdt. 2.164). Herodotus uses the word κυβερνήτης and seems to be referring to steersmen of vessels in general, not pilots in the sense of experts of local waters, although those who travelled the same waters would have developed an expertise. For this reason, κυβερνήτης will be translated as 'helmsman' throughout this thesis. For more on the role of κυβερνήτης in the Athenian navy, see: Jordan (1972): 138-143.

¹¹⁷ Silting being the main navigation hazard. Polybios here uses the word καθηγεμῶν which I have translated as pilot and reinforces the point above that a κυβερνήτης was primarily the steersman and cannot be assumed to have been an expert navigator in all of the waters they travelled.

correct in saying that the visible coast has never been superseded as an aid to navigation.¹¹⁸ It is here that Greek navigation differs from the modern in the conception of maritime space itself. For several hundred years mariners have been able to use nautical charts to aid in their navigation. As far as is known, the Classical Greeks did not have such an aid, but perhaps could have used a *periplous* (περίπλους), a written guide to particular sailing routes and waters, although it is possible these documents were aimed at non-specialists and that mariners relied instead on their own professional knowledge.¹¹⁹ In any case, without reference to charts and a compass with which to determine their position, ancient sailors would have relied on a 'dynamic reference to the surrounding environment'.¹²⁰ Kowalski, Claramunt and Zucker describe well how the Greeks sailors would have viewed the sea and maritime space without reference to charts: 'a space of itinerary descriptions rather than a space described'.¹²¹ It can be hard to appreciate how much more familiar Greek sailors would have been with the environment, something which can distort the views and opinions of modern authors who retrospectively dismiss the abilities of Greek sailors due to their own divorce from the maritime environment.¹²² Ancient mariners and navigators were clearly able to visualise maritime space and geography in such a way that allowed them to accurately sail coastal waters without modern equipment such as the compass or nautical charts.

The final form of navigation required by sailors is ocean navigation, out of sight of land – a rarer but nevertheless necessary skill for the ancient Greeks and one practiced from very

¹¹⁸ Beresford (2012): 183, though Beresford again erroneously conflates pilotage with coastal navigation. He draws his information from purely academic sources, but I can confirm this conclusion from practical experience. Only with the advent of GPS and satellite navigation has reference to the visible coastline waned in importance as a navigational aid. Nevertheless, modern navies at least teach and practice coastal navigation, and any good modern mariner would be versed in the skills as well – electronics break, especially in the rough conditions which can be experienced at sea.

¹¹⁹ This is the view taken by Beresford, which has merit. So few *periploi* remain that it is hard to judge them within the context of other works and as their own genre of writing. In my opinion, the details contained within provide insufficient data for a mariner navigating their way from one place to another. There is simply not enough concrete navigation information. Beresford (2012): 1.

¹²⁰ Kowalski et. al. (2007): 48.

¹²¹ Kowalski et. al. (2007): 49.

¹²² This not to say modern scholars are fundamentally incapable of writing about sailing in the ancient world, but to note that technology has divorced many people in the modern world from such things as close environmental knowledge. Beresford makes this point about modern sailors (pg. 185 and note 46), though it is overstated, missing the point that academics like himself are most susceptible to this lack of experience with the sea and navigation and most liable to misunderstand the conditions of sailing and the practice of navigation at sea.

early on. The first point to note is that this kind of navigation may be required when theoretically in sight of land, but where visibility conditions such as rain or heavy cloud obscure the land and coastal navigation features. The wind can be an aid to navigation in this case since, as discussed above, seasonal and local wind patterns were often predictable and well-known by sailors, going as far back as Homer in his description of Odysseus in his wanderings.¹²³ With wind comes swell and this too can be used as an aid to navigation, providing clues as to the presence of land in the refraction of swell patterns.¹²⁴ Other clues to the presence of land include cloud formation over land and the loom generated by the increased reflection of light over land, as well as observations of marine life such as birds, whales and schools of fish. These are methods that have been used throughout the globe by navigators, especially in the Oceania region where sailors were consistently able to find their way to small islands over extraordinary distances.¹²⁵ This is not to say that the Greek *must* have used the same techniques as those in Oceania, but to illustrate the point that there are many different techniques available for long distance navigation across open ocean that do not require any advanced technology, and that it is dangerous to assume a limited navigational capacity on the part of Classical Greek sailors because of their ‘primitive’ technological capabilities.

In addition to terrestrial methods, celestial bodies can be used as navigational aids, especially the sun and the stars. Odysseus in Homer’s *Odyssey* uses the Bear (Ἄρκτος – Ursa Major) to navigate away from Kalypso’s island (5.270-277). He knows that by keeping particular stars in a certain relative quarter to the ship this will allow him to sail in a certain direction – thus by keeping the Bear, and hence the North Pole, on his port beam, Odysseus would be assured of sailing due east.¹²⁶ Further, Homer makes it clear that he and others knew that this was one of the star groups that, in Mediterranean latitudes, did not sink below the horizon: ‘alone has no part in the baths of the Ocean’ (οἷη δ’ ἄμμορός ἐστι

¹²³ Hom. *Od.* 12.285-90; 14.458-60.

¹²⁴ Beresford (2012): 178. Swell differs from sea state in that the sea state is directly caused by the local wind, whereas swell is generated far off by distant wind – swell off the coast of Lemnos could be caused by winds down in the southern Aegean, for instance.

¹²⁵ See: McGrail (2001): 311-345; and Paine (2013): 17-22. These navigational techniques were passed down orally from mariner to mariner, in all likelihood similar to how it was done in the Greek world. The magnetic compass and reliable charts are recent developments in the relative timespan of human seagoing activities.

¹²⁶ McGrail (2001): 101.

λοετροῶν Ὠκεανοῖο – 5.275). Tiphys, the helmsman of the *Argo*, was said to have been an expert in determining a course by sun or star (Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* 108). Stars were especially useful for sailing on an east-west axis and it is possible to use circumpolar and zenith stars to navigate this way, possibly explaining myths that connected the geography of Sicily and mainland Greece.¹²⁷ The ancient Greeks were keen observers of the environment and celestial bodies, and there were many different navigational aids at their disposal for crossing stretches of open sea.

Sailing Season

One of the most contentious issues regarding maritime operations in the ancient world is the idea of a distinct sailing season with the remainder of the year witnessing a ‘closed sea’. The assumption of a highly periodic sailing season has tainted much of the scholarship for maritime activities in the ancient world, and has remained almost entirely unchallenged until recently.¹²⁸ This not only minimises the importance of naval operations,¹²⁹ but also reinforces the ‘minimalist’ view of the ancient economy.¹³⁰ Aside from ignoring the context of the main written sources of evidence used, scholars have often ignored or been ignorant of archaeological evidence which contradicts the idea of a closed sea.

The usual evidence presented to support the idea of a closed sea is actually quite slim: two sources of questionable veracity on the topic. The first is Hesiod and his *Works and Days*, which advises a paltry fifty days of the year as suitable for sailing – but only if Poseidon or Zeus is not opposed to it (663-5). At very best this could tentatively be used as evidence for the Archaic period when he was writing, but even that is a doubtful prospect. By his own admission Hesiod had little to no experience of ships or the sea and had only ever sailed from Aulis to Euboea, a short journey of a mere nautical mile or two.¹³¹ Further, this limited

¹²⁷ Tomislav Bilić makes a good case for this using the myth of Alpheus and Arethusa and the connection between the western Peloponnesos and Sicily. The connection is explained via latitude sailing between the two places using celestial observations. See: Bilić (2008): 116-132.

¹²⁸ Beresford (2012): 1.

¹²⁹ Naval operations were conducted in winter, though seemingly more infrequently and on a smaller scale. The next section of the thesis will explore the different operations undertaken by naval forces and will highlight instances of winter naval operations.

¹³⁰ As seen in Finley, whose minimalist model influenced Starr and his so-called examination of sea power. Beresford (2012): 2.

¹³¹ οὐτέ τι ναυτιλίας σεσοφισμένος οὔτε τι νηῶν· οὐ γάρ πώ ποτε νηί γ' ἐπέπλων εὐρέα πόντον, εἰ μὴ ἐς Εὐβοίαν ἐξ Αὐλίδος – 649-51. This is a body of water which was so narrow that as Beresford points out it, it was spanned by a bridge less than 300 years later. Beresford (2012): 10.

experience is far removed from the Classical period where ship-building and seafaring in general was far more advanced.¹³² More importantly, Hesiod's testimony is contradicted by virtually every Classical source which describes maritime operations throughout the year, as well as archaeological evidence.

The second source is Vegetius, writing much later,¹³³ who had a more realistic appraisal of sailing conditions, considering only mid-November to mid-March as a *mare clausum* (*Res. Mil.* 4.39). The first and most obvious problem with Vegetius as a source is that he is a Roman author writing some 700 years after the Greek Classical period. It would be unwise to transplant the views of a Late Roman author into the minds of Classical Greeks. Importantly, it seems likely that his sailing season was tailored to suit Roman warships and not all seagoing vessels.¹³⁴ Secondly and perhaps most importantly is the fact that this sailing calendar does not take into account the significant diversity in the climactic conditions around the Mediterranean region.¹³⁵ As mentioned above, winds, currents and other weather conditions are not universal around the Mediterranean and seasonal variation does not lend weight to the idea of a universally applicable sailing calendar.

Other written sources paint a very different picture of winter sailing and make it clear that the sea was not closed by the advice of ancient poets. In a speech of Demosthenes, the speaker explicitly states that sailing from Rhodes to Egypt was uninterrupted – ἐκεῖσε [Αἴγυπτος] μὲν γε ἀκέρατος ὁ πλοῦς (*Dem.* 56.30).¹³⁶ In another maritime case, the contract for a voyage to the Black Sea and return to Athens lists different interest rates depending on when the ship left the Black Sea for its return voyage. It sets an interest rate of 22.5% if the vessels departs before the rise of Arcturus, around mid-September, and a rate of 30% for after this time (*Dem.* 35.10). The increase in interest rate reflects the increase in risk for sailing during the latter part of the year, but most importantly demonstrates that financiers were willing to accept the higher risk of sailing at this time rather than not financing a journey at all. Despite the increase in risk due to weather, they still expected to make a return on their investment. Perhaps the most compelling piece of evidence,

¹³² Beresford (2012): 12.

¹³³ Anywhere from 383-450 CE. Allmand (2011): 1.

¹³⁴ Beresford (2012): 15.

¹³⁵ Beresford (2012): 16.

¹³⁶ Although the meaning of ἀκέρατος is disputed.

relatively newly found, is the so-called Elephantine Palimpsest which records a series of customs duties in the Egyptian city. It has been dated to either 475 or 454,¹³⁷ and it records the dates of foreign vessels which arrived and departed from the city, including Greek vessels. It documents Greek vessels arriving at the port in every month except January, with arrival and departure dates in February and December¹³⁸ – months when the sea was supposedly ‘closed’. As Tammuz says, that no ships are recorded during January may reflect no ships entering or leaving, or it may be that the traffic was so light that they could not justify the operation of the customs house during this reduced activity period.¹³⁹ In any case, the document clearly records Greek merchant vessels sailing into and out of Egypt during the winter months, including December and February, and doing so in the mid- or even early fifth century. Further, the cargoes reveal something important. The imports were of a mixed variety and all of the ships took onboard a single cargo of natron (mineral soda), used in textile production amongst other things: cargoes not of critical value like grain but routine, meaning these were not voyages of an extraordinary nature.¹⁴⁰ This paints a picture of routine rather than extraordinary trade during the winter months; a more complex economic environment than scholars have previously argued.

Reinforcing the written evidence that contradicts a closed sea is the vast array of archaeological evidence, including experimental archaeology and ship reconstruction. Shipwreck evidence has grown substantially over the years as underwater archaeological technology and techniques have improved. The number of recorded shipwrecks has increased dramatically even from the 1970s, and many of the wrecks can be dated to the Classical period.¹⁴¹ The recent find in the Fourni islands has vastly increased the number of wrecks known in the Aegean, from all time periods including the Archaic and Classical and demonstrate the diversity of goods traded and the places they were traded.

Experimental archaeology has helped demonstrate the capabilities of ancient seagoing vessels and revealed them to be far sturdier and weather-proof than has been previously

¹³⁷ Tammuz (2005): 151; Beresford (2012): 17.

¹³⁸ Tammuz (2005): 151-2. The table which Tammuz has reconstructed lists the arrival and departure dates from the Aramaic and converted them to modern equivalent dates.

¹³⁹ Tammuz (2005): 151-2.

¹⁴⁰ Horden and Purcell (2000): 149; Beresford (2012): 21.

¹⁴¹ See the tables in Horden and Purcell (2000): 368 and 371.

assumed. The reconstructed merchant vessel *Kyrenia II*, based on a Hellenistic wreck found off the coast of Cyprus, was able to safely sail in weather that included Force 9-10 wind conditions (45-50 knots) and reached speeds in excess of 12 knots, a speed most scholars would have thought ancient ships incapable of reaching.¹⁴² These ship reconstructions have helped demonstrate that ancient sailing vessels were not nearly as fragile as has been thought and they were far better able to weather storms.¹⁴³ A warship such as a trireme would not have weathered such conditions, with a shallower draft and quite long and narrow hull.¹⁴⁴ Nevertheless, archaeological finds demonstrate a wide proliferation of trading vessels in the ancient world, with a huge diversity of cargoes from many different areas of the Mediterranean, and experimental archaeology has demonstrated the great capabilities of ancient seagoing vessels.

An issue which must be raised is the idea of coastal vs 'open sea' sailing, a topic which is much confused in the scholarship. It is mostly a matter of perspective, clouded by a failure to realise that ships sailing around the Mediterranean and especially the Aegean need not stray far from land in any case, and that 'open sea' in the Aegean is a subjective and misleading term. For instance, it is possible to sail from Rhodos to the eastern coast of Attika without venturing further than 13-15 nautical miles from land.¹⁴⁵ The islands of the Cyclades, with very large and prominent terrain, would have ensured visibility of land throughout the journey in all but the worst of visibility conditions. Asserting that vessels would not have ventured the 'open sea' during winter because they would have preferred the close proximity of shelter afforded by the near coast makes little sense.¹⁴⁶ At a pessimistic speed of 2 ½ knots a vessel 15 nm from shore would have no more than a 6-hour journey to reach land. No doubt sailors weighed the risk of sailing during the winter by knowing how far they had to stray from land for a particular crossing, and as highlighted above the risk in winter was statistically greater, but that does not mean there

¹⁴² For further discussion see: Beresford (2012): 120-22.

¹⁴³ Beresford devotes a long chapter to this, which explores in depth the sturdiness of ship construction in the ancient world. Beresford (2012): 107-172. Far less is known about the construction and sea-keeping abilities of warships from the period. See Chapter 3 on ship construction and some of the issues surrounding the accuracy of the reconstructed warship *Olympias*.

¹⁴⁴ This hull shape would have rendered it far more susceptible to issues such as 'hogging' and 'sagging'.

¹⁴⁵ This roughly follows a route north from Rhodes to the Fourni Islands, site of the newly found shipwrecks mentioned above, and from there across to Mykonos and hence through the Cyclades to Attika.

¹⁴⁶ As Beresford asserts in his work. Beresford (2012): 18.

was no good weather during winter. This is obvious from the Greeks themselves, discussing the halcyon days where calm weather supposedly prevailed for 14 days in the middle of winter,¹⁴⁷ as well as from simple modern observation which demonstrates clear and good sailing weather during winter.

During fieldwork in Greece I took a ferry from the Peiraieus to the island of Thera (Santorini) on 1/2/2016. Weather for the duration of the trip was exceptionally good. My notes record the following weather observations at local time 1230 in position off the port of Paros: Wind – West at 5-10 knots; sea state – 1; swell – west at 0.3m; cloud cover – 1/8; visibility – 10+ nm (Figure 2). This is very good sailing weather with the main issue being the light wind encountered in some areas. The sea was as far from dangerous as it is possible to be. Such weather conditions held for three days before deteriorating and ending in a storm on the fifth day, abating slightly on the sixth when I departed. This example neatly highlights the above point: weather was perfect for sailing for a run of days before deteriorating, giving sailors the opportunity to sail as required and seeking shelter once the weather became too dangerous. This is how mariners practice their trade: not by the say so of texts, but by observation and experience and driven by necessity. They would not pass up good sailing weather just because it fell during a particular time of year. Sailing the Mediterranean and especially the Aegean need not have involved straying far from land, even in areas subjectively labelled ‘open sea’, and as such ships need not to have been far from safety if the weather turned. Ultimately, ships in the ancient world were sunk due to poor navigation, weather or a combination of both. Ships sink in the modern world because of these factors. It is a universal truth that sailing the seas at any time in any place is inherently risky.

The implications for naval operations during winter are that they were not entirely curtailed as often argued. Warships would have operated on a shorter leash, more closely tied to the land. They would have probably operated in smaller numbers and operated more conservatively, keeping within reach of sheltered harbours or landing spots. The case

¹⁴⁷ Arist. *Hist. an.* 542b. These days of calm weather were said to occur seven days before and seven days after the Winter Solstice. The phenomenon is named after a bird and its attendant myth, found in Ovid *Metamorphoses* 11.270-748, and must have been grounded in some reality. See: Chronopoulou and Mavrakis (2014): 66-69.

study above involved three full days of good weather, sufficient to make a journey across the Aegean.¹⁴⁸ Thus, naval operation in winter would have included greater risk mitigation, such as operating in smaller numbers and on well-known routes where they could be assured of shelter in the event that the weather deteriorated. There is no reason for naval operation to have ceased in winter.



Figure 2: *Winter sailing in vicinity of Paros*¹⁴⁹

The idea that the sea was ‘closed’ in ancient Greece is of importance not just for naval operations, but for maritime trade and the economy. The argument that weather (among other things) severely curtailed maritime trade has been used by scholars to minimise the importance of international trade and develop a minimalist model of the ancient

¹⁴⁸ Noting the example of the Athenian warship sailing from Athens to Lesbos in a 24-hour period, a distance of 184nm. See Chapter 3 on Ships and ship design for this example. Noting it is at the extreme limit of a warship sailing distance, one might still estimate that in 3 days a warship could cover 300nm. 3 days of good sailing weather in winter is thus more than enough to conduct operations across the Aegean.

¹⁴⁹ Author’s collection. 1 February 2016.

economy.¹⁵⁰ One of the single best pieces of evidence against this view is the Elephantine Palimpsest, which describes a port trading in a single valuable commodity.¹⁵¹ The opportunity for olive oil to be traded as a major commodity was only made possible by maritime transportation, and similarly with wine.¹⁵² The island of Thasos was a great wine producing centre and clearly this was only possibly because of maritime transportation. Space precludes a thorough re-evaluation of the ancient Greek economy, however a recent work by Josiah Ober, building upon the excellent work of Alain Bresson,¹⁵³ goes a long way towards correcting the scholarship. In *The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece* Ober uses comprehensive demographic data to highlight some simple but important facts about the nature of the economy. First is that unless Classical Greece was substantially more productive in its agriculture than 19th century Greece, between 1/4 to 1/3 of the population of classical Greece, 0.7-1.2 million people, would have relied on imported grain.¹⁵⁴ As Josiah Ober says, the Greek world can no longer be entirely defined by subsistence agriculture or local exchange: imported food had to be paid for by commodity exports, manufactured goods or the extraction of rents.¹⁵⁵ Ober's analysis pushes back the premise that ancient Greece was defined by subsistence agriculture rather than possessed of a sophisticated and diversified economy in which many people lived above bare subsistence and where trade in commodities and luxury goods were of great significance.¹⁵⁶ With this view of the ancient Greek economy, the prevalence of maritime trade becomes obvious, a trade that was not nearly as small as has been argued.

In arguing for a highly periodic sailing season, it is unwise to use as evidence two works of literature from different societies and separated by 1000 years given that technological, economic, political, and military developments would have impacted on seafaring strategies.¹⁵⁷ Classical authors and archaeological evidence directly contradict the advice of the archaic poet Hesiod and the Roman military writer Vegetius, and the idea of a *mare*

¹⁵⁰ The most influential of these works is M.I. Finley's *The Ancient Economy* (1973).

¹⁵¹ Horden and Purcell (2000): 148-9.

¹⁵² Horden and Purcell (2000): 212-3; 217.

¹⁵³ Alain Bresson, *The Making of the Ancient Greek Economy* (2016).

¹⁵⁴ Ober (2015): 86. This is based on Ober's population figures, which if one was to take as optimistic and cut in half would still require imported grain for 350-600,000 people.

¹⁵⁵ Ober (2015): 86.

¹⁵⁶ Ober (2015): 88.

¹⁵⁷ Beresford (2012): 13.

clausum should be dismissed as an illusion created by these works. Sailing in the ancient world, as it had been in every age, was a risky business no matter the time of year: the sea is an inherently dangerous and unforgiving environment. However, the idea that the Greeks, so highly dependent on the sea, would not venture to sail in certain parts of the year is unsustainable. There were certainly times of the year where the statistical risk was higher and maritime activities dropped off, but it is untenable to say that maritime activity was suspended altogether. Necessity, whether in war or in obtaining vital food supplies, would drive ancient mariners to risk the sea at all times of the year.

Natural Resources

As discussed in the Introduction, one of the core uses of the sea is as a resource. As far as the Greek world is concerned, this was primarily marine life for consumption, although the sea and sea water also played a role in Greek religious practice and this consideration should not be discounted.¹⁵⁸ Fishing was an important activity throughout the Mediterranean and provided a portion of people's protein intake. It is an activity which does not have great visibility in the records, but this should not lead scholars to discount it. It was and still is not a glamorous activity, but one of profound importance which can have very unexpected and dire consequences. In the modern world, even with modern farming techniques and food abundance, fishing quarrels have led to indirect and direct conflict – the 'Cod Wars' of the 1960-70s,¹⁵⁹ the drastic increase in piracy off the coast of Somalia,¹⁶⁰ and continued conflict between half a dozen different nations in the South and

¹⁵⁸ See Chapter Four.

¹⁵⁹ A dispute between the UK and Iceland over the fertile cod fishing grounds of the north Atlantic. Not a trivial dispute: people were injured and killed and there were strategic ramifications to the conflict, especially regarding NATO. For a recent re-appraisal of the conflict see: Steinsson (2016): 256-275. As recently as August 2018 UK and French fishermen clashed at sea over a scallop fishery.

<https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/aug/28/french-and-british-fishermen-clash-in-scallop-war-skirmish>

¹⁶⁰ Locals forced out of the fishing business by foreign fishing vessels, mainly sailing from the Asian region, led to many Somalis taking up arms and using their fishing vessels to engage in piracy, first against the foreign fishing vessels which had taken away their livelihood and then against international shipping, forcing a reaction from NATO, Australia, the US and even China to protect the vital shipping routes the pirates preyed upon. This illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is of great significance to the modern world and can cause many different problems; demonstrative of the fact that the natural resources of the seas are and have been of great significance throughout history, even in the modern age.

East China Seas.¹⁶¹ Fisheries disputes can have major and far reaching consequences and should not be passed over.

The Mediterranean contains a rich variety of sea life, including many species exploitable by humans. These include fish from sardines and anchovies up to mackerel and tuna, as well as other species such as squid, octopus and eel – the ‘fish filled sea’ (πόντος ἰχθυόεις) of Homer.¹⁶² All of these would have required vastly different methods of fishing to exploit, from both the shore and by boat. Ancient sources concerned with fishing are rare, as with most issues dealing with daily life in the ancient world and beneath the concern of upper-class authors.¹⁶³ The only dedicated ancient work dealing with fishing is Oppian’s *Haliutika* from the second century A.D., a Greek poem in hexameter verse. It therefore seems more reliable as a general source rather than as evidence for specific and technical detail,¹⁶⁴ fitting into the same category as farming manuals by the likes of Varro, with the added caveat that Oppian was clearly not a sea fisherman.¹⁶⁵ Indeed unlike these works on agriculture, economic aspects of fishing are left out in Oppian’s work, with no mention of prices, costs, efficiencies or how fishermen were organised.¹⁶⁶ Bekker-Nielsen points out that the information Oppian uses is almost certainly out of date and parts of it relied on Aristotle, thus making it dangerous to use as a source for fishing in the second century A.D.;¹⁶⁷ however these problems increase its utility as a source for Classical-era fishing and thus for this thesis. Elsewhere in Greek texts the activities of fisherman are mentioned, sometimes in quite an important manner. One of Pindar’s *Odes* speaks of the sweetness of different payment for different work, whether to the shepherd, ploughman, fowler and ‘one whom the seas nourishes’ (ὄν πόντος τράφει) since everyone strives to keep hunger

¹⁶¹ China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Japan, Malaysia and Vietnam all stake claims to various islands, atolls and reefs in the region, often for the oil and gas resources thought to be present but also the important fishing grounds there. Indeed, the conflict is manifesting itself through clashes between fishing vessels of the different countries, and China has been known to arm its fishing vessels in the region.

¹⁶² Hom. *Il.* 9.4; also, the ‘fish-filled ways’ - ἰχθυόεντα κέλευθα. *Od.* 3.177.

¹⁶³ Bekker-Nielsen (2006): 83.

¹⁶⁴ For instance, the vocabulary used by Oppian illustrates the many types of nets used by ancient fishermen, who names but a few of the innumerable (μυρία) types used (3.79-84). For a brief examination of the net types see: Bekker-Nielsen (2006): 91.

¹⁶⁵ Dating aided by the fact that the work is dedicated to the emperor Marcus Aurelius. At line 3 the poet address Ἀντωνῖνε, usually taken to be Marcus Aurelius. See the introduction to the Loeb edition - Mair (1928) xx; Bekker-Nielsen (2006): 83.

¹⁶⁶ Bekker-Nielsen (2006): 83.

¹⁶⁷ Bekker-Nielsen (2006): 84.

at bay (γαστροὶ δὲ πᾶς τις ἀμύνων λιμὸν αἰανῆ τέταται – Pind. *Isthm.* 1.45-50). The implication is that all of these jobs, including fishing, are capable of staving off starvation, thus profitable enough to live off. Later works, especially comedy, make endless reference to fishing and seafood, in the context of rich and poor alike.¹⁶⁸ The fruits of the sea are a topic which come up throughout ancient works.

Little work has been done on fishing in the ancient world until very recently. The few previous works which do exist are inadequate, and the main source in particular is riddled with methodological errors and should be discounted as reliable. This is T. W. Gallant's *Fisherman's Tale* (1985), a deeply flawed work which many modern scholars dismiss for its many errors. It falls into the same category as other 'primitivist' works on the ancient world which assumes a world far less able and sophisticated than was the case.¹⁶⁹ The most succinct criticism comes from Anne Lif Lund Jacobson, who says 'Unfortunately his [Gallant's] work suffered from several severe misunderstandings about ecosystems, the nature of a fishery and its biological interaction with its environment'.¹⁷⁰ Gallant uses nineteenth and twentieth century fishery statistics from the Mediterranean, and he does not actually give many details on the data he uses:¹⁷¹ a deeply flawed methodology. Indeed, one of the most serious mistakes Gallant makes is in assuming that the biological environment of the Mediterranean has remained unchanged over the intervening 2500 years. Ecosystems change over time and in the case of a marine ecosystem this change affects the abundance of fish and therefore the catches made,¹⁷² and as recent works on the Mediterranean point out, human factors such as pollution and overfishing have had major and even dire impacts on fish stocks.¹⁷³ Gallant's work is rife with methodological errors, misusing both ancient and modern sources to pitch a skewed and inaccurate picture of the

¹⁶⁸ Comedy is one of the main genres where the topic of fish comes up a lot, and there are many fragments of works that give tantalizing clues about the topic, not least in the names of some of these works. For instance, Antiphanes' *The Fisherman* (ἡ Ἀλλευομένη - fr. 26) and *The Fair Voyage* (ἡ Εὐπλοίας - fr. 98). For a very detailed and comprehensive survey, see: Wilkins (2000), especially pp. 293-304.

¹⁶⁹ As discussed in Chapter One. See also: Bekker-Nielsen (2006): 84.

¹⁷⁰ Jacobsen (2006): 97.

¹⁷¹ Jacobsen calls the data Gallant uses 'weak and incoherent' and points out that better data was readily available. Jacobsen (2006): 97.

¹⁷² Jacobsen (2006): 97.

¹⁷³ Blondel (2010): 91-94. As an example, eels and sturgeon stocks have been decimated, with sturgeon almost all but wiped out from the Mediterranean due to overexploitation of their eggs for caviar. Almost all species would have been more abundant than they are today, and indeed Gallant does not even mention sturgeon in his Appendix on fish species supposedly caught in the Mediterranean in antiquity pp.49-70.

place of fishing in the ancient world.¹⁷⁴ It has been an influential work,¹⁷⁵ and it is important to highlight its many flaws and that newer works demonstrate that fishing was a key activity in Classical Greece.

Having found the 'primitivist' view of fishing in the ancient world wanting, further examination shows that fishing could be a greatly productive activity, especially when treated properly as a specialist industry rather than as a vague activity conducted uniformly across the ancient world. An oft used example neatly illustrates this principle. Pausanias relates in his account of Delphoi a bronze bull dedicated by the Kerkyraians as an offering for particularly good haul of tuna caught by the city (10.9.3-4). Such a dedication demonstrates how valuable fish were. There are other indications that the fish trade was widespread during the period and had an important place in the ancient economy. Excavations in Korinth revealed a large building clearly engaged in overseas trade, fish in particular. The 'Punic Amphora Building' contained many transport amphorae from around the Mediterranean region, including Spain, Sicily, Chios and possibly even Massalia and North Africa.¹⁷⁶ The early use of the structure is dated to the second quarter of the fifth century and although it was mixed use residential and

¹⁷⁴ Space precludes a comprehensive analysis of Gallant's work. Both Tønnes Bekker-Nielsen (2006): 83-95 and especially Anne Lif Lund Jacobsen (2006): 97-104 do an admirable job of deconstructing and refuting Gallant's poor analysis. Bekker-Nielsen shows that Gallant's assumptions on fishing techniques in the ancient world are untenable. In addition, Jacobsen has other criticisms. She makes the point that fishery data from the 1950s and 60s might show huge amounts of exploitation, but only because of the high levels of sophistication in technology used for fishing. Even when fish stocks are heavily depleted this can be maintained for a period. Thus, it is possible for a smaller fishing effort in antiquity to have produced much larger catch than in the present day. Simply put, there were more fish in antiquity which required less effort and technology to exploit. Another serious issue is Gallant's use of Malaysian fisheries data (p. 12). Aside from the evidence-less assumption that present-day Malaysian fishing does use the same technology as ancient Greeks, he is comparing fundamentally different ecosystems that are divided by a huge span of time and space. Finally, there is Gallant's questionable use of ancient sources. He uses a price list from the Boeotian town of Akraiphia to demonstrate how expensive fish was compared to wheat – a rather dubious comparison to make in itself. A more fitting comparison would be between fish and other sources of protein, not a staple crop food like wheat. That fish was a supplementary food is quite obvious; in the words of John Wilkins: 'If Gallant had paid attention to the texts he would not have tried to prove what they all declare, namely that fish was supplementary.' (Wilkins 2000): n. 154, p.300. Unsurprisingly, fish from the sea was expensive in a small town (Akraiphia) located away from the sea. It also does not account for the fact that the market price was almost certainly for fresh fish, which would be preserved for only 1-3 days. Gallant uses this dubious comparison to draw the conclusion that fish everywhere in Greece was expensive and therefore played only a minor role in their diet – deriving a conclusion about the role of fish in the ancient diet from *one* small source of information. This alone should cast doubt upon Gallant's methodology, and taken with the many and serious other methodological mistakes made in the work, should conclusively dismiss Gallant as a credible source.

¹⁷⁵ For a good recent exploration of the impact of Gallant's work, see: Mylona (2008): 8-11.

¹⁷⁶ Williams (1979): 117.

commercial to begin with, it seems as if the building was then entirely given over to commercial activities and in particular the import of large quantities of fish packed in amphorae.¹⁷⁷ The Black Sea region was considered rich in fish, and a law court speech of Demosthenes mentions a cargo of salt fish from the region, and Polybios' survey of the region mentions the export of preserved fish in great abundance (περιουσίαν...τάριχος).¹⁷⁸ The archaeological evidence for imports of Black Sea fish to Greece is fragmentary but suggestive of some form of trade, though perhaps not as large scale as some have imagined, but also not as negligible as some would have it.¹⁷⁹ Certainly authors of the time, writing in various genres, spoke of fish and seafood products in many different contexts and in such a way as to make it clear that these products were an all-pervasive factor in the daily lives of rich and poor alike. As Horden and Purcell point out, such windfalls as the Kerkyra one serve to demonstrate the most important role of fishing in the Classical world, as a source of income – a resource more valuable as a commodity than as a mere source of protein. Fish can be seen as a cash crop, and cash crops can be considered a 'subsistence' strategy itself.¹⁸⁰ Fishing then was an important industry in Greece and contributed to the economy,¹⁸¹ both in terms of short and long-distance trade and consumption.

Just as with trade, fishing in the ancient world has been minimised by too many scholars, skewing the view of the ancient economy in favour of a minimalist model; a model out of tune with reality. This model relies on maritime trade and other maritime activities like fishing being of minimal importance and of a primitive nature, neither of which is the case. Seaborne trade was far more prolific than many academics have argued. The notion of a 'closed sea' has been wildly overstated and trade by sea was conducted throughout the year, with high and low seasons as naturally befitted sailing conditions. A better reading of the ancient sources combined with archaeological evidence demonstrates this and enables us to reach beyond the now untenable position that the ancient Greek economy

¹⁷⁷ Williams (1979): 111.

¹⁷⁸ Dem. 35.31; Poly. 4.38.4.

¹⁷⁹ This is the position of John Lund and Vincent Gabrielsen, whose view appears somewhat pessimistic, though they readily acknowledge that the archaeological evidence as a whole is scant and very few solid conclusions can be drawn about the nature of Black Sea fish imports into Classical and Hellenistic Greece. Lund and Gabrielsen (2006): 161-169.

¹⁸⁰ Horden and Purcell (2000): 194-5.

¹⁸¹ For a recent, excellent examination of the role of fishing in the Ancient Greek economy, see: Bresson (2016): 175-187.

was small, unsophisticated and based entirely on agrarian concerns.¹⁸² This is aided by the proper placement of fishing and other sea-based economic activities into the wider whole of the Greek world. Aside from being a useful source of food, fish and fish products were a commodity, to be gathered and traded for profit out of proportion to its mere nutritional value. Fishing was an important economic activity, which could also make it a target for pirates and for navies in wartime. The interruption of fishing could thus cause economic loss, including loss of income and less food in the agora. Moreover, in acknowledging the prevalence of fishing it becomes clear that poleis had a larger number of mariners to call upon, in peacetime and war. Fishermen could provide valuable knowledge of local waters, including navigational knowledge and information about shipping in the area, for example. All of these different maritime considerations were important to the Greeks, and as will be seen later influenced maritime strategic calculations.

Maritime activity was far more prolific than has been previously been acknowledged. This includes trade activity and fishing as well as naval operations during winter, when the sea was most certainly not 'closed'. Winter curtailed seaborne traffic, especially warships, which did have inferior seakeeping characteristics to merchant vessels. Nevertheless, curtailed operations do not mean *no* operations and thus sea power was not as temporally limited as scholars have argued. This should relax the conceptual boundaries on what was and was not possible in the realm of ancient Greek maritime operations, in peace and in war.

¹⁸² Criticism of previous scholars should be tempered by the knowledge that many archaeological discoveries have come to light since they have written. Perhaps scholars such as Finley would have written differently about the ancient economy had they know about such finds as the Fourni islands shipwrecks and the Elephantine customs account papyrus. In Finley's time there were around 450 recorded shipwrecks; by the 1990s there were close to 1300 (Horden and Purcell 2000: 368). Alain Bresson's recent work (*The Making of the Ancient Greek Economy*) will hopefully move the scholarship in the right direction, away from the 'primitivist' view of Classical Greece and especially its economy.

Chapter Three – Ships and naval organisation

Aside from geography and environment, human factors were critical in governing maritime operations. Of particular note is the organisation of naval forces, proceeding from private to state ownership of ships and beginning sometime in the last quarter of the sixth century, generally speaking. Ships were the primary asset in maritime operations, both warships and merchant vessels, and their capabilities and limitations are critical considerations. Ships required a large number of skilled personnel to operate, and shortages of rowers and sailors could have negative impacts on naval operations. Finally, infrastructure was of great importance, from ship sheds and port facilities through to such constructions as the *diolkos* of Korinth. This chapter will highlight the material and personnel issues that any polis of the ancient Greek world had to contend with in order to operate a navy. This in turn will illustrate how complex, and expensive, these issues became when scaling up a polis' sea power.

Naval organisation

Even more so than for armies, a resilient system of organisation is required for naval operations. This is especially true when conducting extended operations overseas, as both the Athenians and Spartans did during the Peloponnesian War. This is not only in terms of personnel, but also of the ships and associated equipment. Evidence for the sixth century and the two decades before the Persian Wars is slim, yet the growth of sea power can be observed in many Archaic-era Greek poleis, especially from around 550 onwards. Borimir Jordan seems correct in pointing out the unlikelihood of Athenians becoming master seamen and naval warfare tacticians with a large fleet during a few years of the 480s:¹⁸³ there must have been a robust naval organisation in place long before the Persians attacked in 480. More recent works, especially by Hans van Wees,¹⁸⁴ have illustrated the fact that naval developments stretches back further than has generally been acknowledged and that states took a more active role in naval organisation during the last half of the sixth century.

¹⁸³ All at the behest of a single politician, Themistokles, – even more unlikely. Jordan (1975): 6.

¹⁸⁴ He strongly and convincingly makes the case in a 2010 book chapter, "Those Who Sail are to Receive a Wage": Naval Warfare and finance in Archaic Eretria', and more recently in his book, *Ships and Silver, Taxes and Tribute. A Fiscal History of Archaic Athens* (2013).

An inscription uncovered in 1912 illustrates naval organisation in the Euboian polis of Eretria.¹⁸⁵ The inscription is dated to approximately 550-525:

Those who sail are to receive a wage if they go beyond the Petalai or Kenaion. Everyone must contribute. Those who are in the country...Anyone who took...will not be open to dispute.¹⁸⁶

Despite the inscription having been discovered over 100 years ago, as Van Wees points out it is rarely ever mentioned in modern scholarship, and if mentioned at all it is usually dismissed as obscure.¹⁸⁷ Van Wees thinks this inscription has not gained much traction in the literature because it flies in the face of orthodoxy that naval organisation in Greece was a private and not a public affair before 500.¹⁸⁸

There are other pieces of evidence that point towards naval organisation in the sixth century, including for Sparta. Passing over the curious and probably spurious ‘thalassocracy lists’ found in later writings,¹⁸⁹ it is worth noting that the Spartans had a specific military position of ‘Admiral’ (ναύαρχος). Thucydides only ever uses the word ναύαρχος to describe a Spartan admiral,¹⁹⁰ never for the Athenians had the office of *strategos*, a military leader by land and sea. Aeschylus uses ναύαρχος in his play *Persians* (363), indicating a usage as far back as the Persian Wars.¹⁹¹ Aristotle in *Politics* heavily criticises this office, insomuch as it was so powerful as to be like a third kingship (ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν οὔσι στρατηγοῖς αἰδῖος ἢ ναυαρχία σχεδὸν ἕτερα βασιλεία

¹⁸⁵ IG XII.9 1273.1274, lines 10-16.

¹⁸⁶ Translation Van Wees, following Francis Cairns’ 1991 restoration of the text. Van Wees (2010): 205-8.

¹⁸⁷ Van Wees (2010): 206. Especially note 2.

¹⁸⁸ Van Wees (2010): 210.

¹⁸⁹ In particular, the list found in Eusebius. It places Sparta as the dominant sea power for the very short period 517-515, superseding Samos and in turn superseded by Naxos (Myres, 1906: 99-101). Some scholars have been willing to accept a fifth century origin for the Eusebius list, passed down through Diodoros. It is however a contentious area, and Momigliano was willing to accept it as possible, but without any proof in his time (Momigliano, 1944: 1). Later scholars were still not convinced, seeing it as a ‘scissors and paste work’, in all likelihood an attempt to fill in the gap of thalassocracies between Minos and Athens. Jeffrey (1976): 252-3. The most detailed examination of the lists remains: Myres (1906): 84-130.

¹⁹⁰ In thirteen instances throughout his work: 2.66.2, 2.80.2, 3.16.3, 3.26.1, 4.11.2, 8.6.5, 8.20.1, 8.23.1, 8.24.6, 8.26.1, 8.29.2, 8.50.2, 8.99.1.

¹⁹¹ Accepting the play was written c. 472. Regardless of whether or not Aeschylus actually fought at Salamis, more likely than not considering the manpower mobilised by Athens, it would have been a term familiar to his audience who had fought at Salamis under the supreme command of the Spartan ναύαρχος Eurybiades.

καθέστηκεν – 1271a, 41-42). The position did cause angst for the Spartans near the end of the Peloponnesian War, when Lysandros, having already undertaken the office once, was forced into the position of ‘Vice-Admiral’ (ἐπιστολεύς) since no one could hold the office of ναύαρχος more than once.¹⁹² Xenophon says that Lysandros was really in charge despite not holding the official office, but the existence of a one-term limit to naval command perhaps hints at an appreciation that naval command had very different characteristics to command of armies. All of this helps demonstrate that naval organisation in Sparta was codified back as far as the Persian Wars, if not earlier. While such organisation does not necessarily mean Sparta was a strong sea power – witness their lacklustre performance at sea during the first half of the Peloponnesian War – it is indicative of a military organisational structure that took naval matters seriously. Indeed, as Aristotle’s contention in *Politics* and Lysandros’ conduct indicate, the office of ναύαρχος needed to be rigidly controlled because of its power.

The best evidence of naval organisation is from Athens, and here a large and comprehensive system is found. Hans Van Wees makes convincing arguments for naval organisation in Athens stretching back through the sixth century, much of it governed or at least overseen by the state. This goes back to the Archaic Athenian organisational unit known as the *naukrariai* (ναυκραρία) and the officials in charge of these units, the *naukraroi* (ναυκραροί), mentioned in the *Athenaion Politeia* (8.3). Van Wees sees these *naukraroi* as officials who combined financial and military functions, on both a local and national level.¹⁹³ As Borimir Jordan said above, there must have been a solid naval organization in place long before the Persian Wars. Van Wees puts forward a reasonable and practical explanation for such an organisation, especially in highlighting the naval operations which were conducted by Athens in the period before the Persian wars.¹⁹⁴ Further, others have used coinage to demonstrate evidence for increased expense in Athens during the late sixth century and tied to this the need to pay sailors of a state-owned trireme fleet.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹² On the disquiet in losing a successful Admiral, see: Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.2-6; On Lysandros taking up the position of Vice-Admiral: 2.1.7.

¹⁹³ Van Wees (2013): 44-61.

¹⁹⁴ Van Wees (2013): 57-60.

¹⁹⁵ Aperghis (2013): 1-24.

Naval organisation in Athens during the fifth and fourth centuries was complex and demonstrative of the central role played by the navy and maritime considerations. Borimir Jordan has examined in detail the Athenian Navy in the classical period, including the organisation and administration ashore.¹⁹⁶ All organs of the Athenian government were involved in naval administration, including the *ekklesia* and the *boule*.¹⁹⁷ This ranged from high level strategic decisions about fleet movements, down to very specific technical matters. For instance, an inscription refers to the *boule* making decrees concerning the structural braces (ὑπόζωματα) used for ship construction.¹⁹⁸ Importantly, it was not just a high degree of technical knowledge that helped characterise the democracy's naval expertise, but also the high level of participation. With 6000 people needed for a quorum in the *ekklesia* in the fourth century, 500 sitting on the *boule*, up to 2000 needed as jurors in the law courts and around 700 annual magistracies, the vast majority of citizens in Athens would have had direct experience in decision-making, quite often about naval matters.¹⁹⁹ This is of critical importance when considering the exposure to maritime affairs that was encountered by ordinary Athenians. This participation in government covers all manner of maritime issues, from the strategic positioning of naval assets, naval administration including personnel and equipment, through to maritime trade cases in the law courts. In many different ways, Athenians were involved not just in maritime operations themselves, but also in maritime and naval administration and organisational issues.

A final issue of organisation concerns logistics, for no naval or maritime campaign could be undertaken without a solid logistics plan and infrastructure. This is a very opaque topic, for the ancient authors seem little concerned with the subject. The best evidence comes from Thucydides and the Sicilian expedition. Such a large operation as the Sicilian expedition required a huge amount of support, both local and from mainland Italy and Greece. Nicias realised this, and in his discouraging speech says that the expedition would require a substantial naval and land force, lest they be forced to call for reinforcements (Thuc. 6.21). It is one of the few examples where logistics units are mentioned, albeit briefly.

¹⁹⁶ Jordan (1975): 21-116.

¹⁹⁷ Jordan (1975): 21-30. See also: Rhodes (1972): 113-122; 153-8.

¹⁹⁸ IG II² 1628, lines 231-33; Jordan (1975): 29.

¹⁹⁹ See: Hansen (1991): 313, esp. notes 198-204. On the rotation of personnel through the different forms of participation, pp. 313-314.

An advanced force of vessels, including the allied vessels, were assembled at Kerkyra and this included grain transports (Thuc. 6.30.1). Thucydides goes on to say that the expedition was furnished with troops and ships to be ready for a long or a short expedition (Thuc. 6.31.3). Thucydides lists the forces sent across, of which the logistics train consisted of a horse transport (6.43) and thirty merchant vessels carrying grain as well as various tradesmen, and finally boats and merchant vessels who followed of their own volition for the purposes of trade (6.44.1). In a similar example, the Carthaginians, preparing a large invasion force to go to Sicily, assembled a fleet of 1000 cargo ships, according to Diodoros (Diod. 13.80.5). The number is probably exaggerated, but it is important that Diodoros does mention cargo ships as part of the invasion force. These examples give a glimpse at what might be required for a large amphibious force sent on an overseas expedition. Clearly ancient Greek naval forces had some mechanism in place for the sustainment of their fleets, though of course this might involve no more than plundering the nearby territory, a method also utilised by land forces.

While all of these examples are based on Athens, a hegemonic sea power, we can extrapolate for smaller poleis. All must have had some level of basic naval organisation similar, albeit on a much smaller scale, to Athens'. Navies required the same core personnel, equipment and infrastructure. The logistics forces that a polis could muster would have been a key factor in the reach and sustainment of maritime forces operating away from home territory. Without the ability to keep a maritime force resupplied, a polis would be severely restricted in the scale of expeditionary operations. In a similar vein, poor naval organisation would have led to poorly equipped and crewed naval forces. This is not necessarily a matter of scale but of competency. Smaller poleis may have been quite effective if backed by a rigorous system of crewing and equipping their warships, and major poleis may have suffered from a lack of proper naval organisation. The level of sophistication of a polis' naval organisation may help explain why some poleis were more successful than others.

Ships and ship design

There were many different types and sizes of vessels used by the ancient Greeks, in terms of both civilian ships and warships. The various uses and different operating environments

ensured that ship types varied, and although classes of ships such as the trireme were generally of the same size and construction, this does not indicate a universal design for each particular class of ship. No warships have been found archaeologically; unsurprising since the wooden warships of the period would not have sunk to the bottom of the ocean as in later times. This is an important fact to note, as it tells us that when ships are described as 'sunk' in the ancient sources, they are in all likelihood describing ships that have become severely disabled or broken up, perhaps remaining neutrally buoyant but for all intents and purposes, sunk.²⁰⁰ The primary evidence for the dimensions of triremes comes from the remains of shipsheds, which help indicate the size of the triremes housed within. Much existing scholarship is concerned with ship design and construction, and there is still debate on many of the key issues, especially regarding the trireme. This section is not intended to debate the merits of the different arguments,²⁰¹ but merely to help establish the general capabilities and limitations of ancient sailing vessels and highlight the potential impact upon maritime operations.

Warship design evolved slowly over the centuries, though older designs of ships could still be found in later fleets. The pentekontor (πεντηκόντορος) appears to have been the main warship of the sixth century, a fifty-oared vessel that was designed for boarding and ramming attacks on enemy warships.²⁰² However, Herodotus says that the Phokaians used Pentekontors for trade instead of 'round ships', that is, traditional merchant vessels (οὐ στρογγύλησι νηυσὶ ἀλλὰ πεντηκοντέροισι - 1.163.2). It seems that pentekontors were quite versatile vessels,²⁰³ capable of a range of maritime operations, including as a warship in battle and for the transport of both personnel and cargo. As a smaller vessel with a

²⁰⁰ Wooden ships can be very hard to sink, which would have been especially true of warships that would have held little ballast. They might sink below the surface and subsequently break up but would not really have sunk to the bottom of the seafloor. Ships lost in ancient naval battles in all likelihood would have been in various states of seaworthiness.

²⁰¹ Of all the work done on naval forces in the ancient world, ships and ship design have received the most attention. There have been endless debates over the design and construction of ancient warships and this thesis will not weigh into the debate too far. The central theme of this thesis is sea power and its use during the period. The merits of a two vs a three-level trireme are important, but not to this thesis. Regardless of how many levels a trireme had, or any other such technical detail, they were used in maritime operations in particular ways and that is what the thesis seeks to explore.

²⁰² For more on the development of the ram in naval vessels, see: Mark (2008): 253-272.

²⁰³ For more on pentekontors see: Casson (1971): 53-65; Morrison et. al. (2000): 25-41.

smaller crew, it would also have been a cheaper warship to build and crew – important factors for smaller poleis needing some form of naval capability.

The primary warship of the Classical period was the trireme (τριήρης). Initially combat tactics revolved around boarding actions on other warships, however by the Persian Wars more experienced and trained crews were employing ramming attacks against other warships. According to Thucydides, those using primarily boarding tactics during the Peloponnesian War, such as the battle of Sybota that he describes (1.49.1), were fighting in a more archaic manner than the sophistication of ramming attacks.²⁰⁴ Triremes were also occasionally used as transport ships, even transporting horses as attested by Thucydides.²⁰⁵ The specific characteristics of a trireme are not known for certain and are based heavily on a reconstructed ship, the *Olympias*, supposed to represent an Athenian trireme.²⁰⁶ This is an important distinction to make, as it is unlikely that triremes, or any other warship for that matter, were all of one standard design. Just as modern naval nomenclature talks of ‘destroyers’, ‘frigates’ and ‘patrol boats’, but the size, armament, crew size/makeup and other details of these ships can vary substantially, so too must have triremes differed in detail from shipbuilder to shipbuilder. An ancient Greek trireme, while certainly standard in many core features, should be thought of as a class of ship rather than as one specific design with one set of physical characteristics. The *Olympias* underwent much testing and several underway trials, demonstrating the potential of the design.²⁰⁷ However, not all scholars agree that the *Olympias* accurately represents an ancient trireme.²⁰⁸ Regardless of

²⁰⁴ Thucydides makes an explicit statement that the battle was conducted in the older manner of fighting a naval battle. Athens was not free from such ‘archaic’ combat at sea, and there is good reason to believe that in Athens ramming tactics were seen as a more democratic way of warfare. Firstly, the emphasis on ramming meant that it was the sailors and rowers, not the hoplite-class, that won the most prestige in naval battles. Secondly, boarding actions were costlier in terms of casualties suffered and this could be politically unacceptable to the Athenian *demos*. This can be seen in the reaction to the loss of life after Arginousai in 406, built upon the precedent of Kimon’s boarding tactics at Eurymedon in 467 which also saw the Athenians suffer more casualties than was expected. For a good discussion of this, see: Strauss (2000): 315-326.

²⁰⁵ The first instance of triremes used as horse transports in 430, according to his account. 2.56.2.

²⁰⁶ The *Olympias* was launched a Hellenic Navy ship in June 1987. For details on the history of the reconstruction, see: Morrison, Coates and Rankov (2000): xvii-xxviii.

²⁰⁷ See reports in: Morrison and Coates (eds.) (1989); Shaw (ed.) (1993); and Morrison et. al. (2000).

²⁰⁸ The most vehement critic is Alec Tilley, who argues that triremes never had three levels of rowers. Tilley (2004). However, objections to the *Olympias* design are older. For a very interesting and little-known work on the topic, see: Nellopoulos (1999). Published posthumously by his son, Nellopoulos criticises the *Olympias* in ways very similar to, but predating, Tilley.

how representative of a trireme the *Olympias* is,²⁰⁹ some basic characteristics of the ship can be highlighted from both ancient sources and modern reconstruction and trials. The ship was fitted with a ram and was propelled by oarsmen in battle in order to ram and disable enemy ships, though less trained crews might attempt to come alongside an enemy vessel and take it by boarding. The complement of a trireme appears to have been approximately 200 personnel, comprising 170 rowers, 15 sailors and 15 marines.²¹⁰ The maximum speed appears to have been about 10 knots for very short durations, with a potential cruising speed of between 7-8 knots by sail or under oar.²¹¹ Range is a more contentious issue, and would have depended on weather conditions and the training of the ship's rowers. The most famous example of a long distance dash is that of the Athenian trireme sent from the Peiraieus to Mytilene in order to reverse a previous decision made by the assembly, a distance of 184 nm covered in approximately 24 hours.²¹² It is obviously a stand-out example of what a trireme and well-trained crew could accomplish and should not be taken as the maximum range for all warships of the time, but as an indicator of potential sailing time if the need was great enough. In another example, Xenophon contends that the route from Byzantium to Heraklea on the Black Sea was 'a long day's voyage for a trireme under oars' (καὶ τριήρει μὲν ἔστιν εἰς Ἡράκλειαν ἐκ Βυζαντίου κώπαις ἡμέρας μάλα μακρῶς πλοῦς; *Anab.* 6.4.2). This is a distance of approximately 130 nm.²¹³ Xenophon is speaking generally and not of a specific example like Thucydides, which may indicate that 130 nm is a more realistic figure for a maximum daily range of a trireme.

Sometime from the mid- to late fourth century, larger and more powerful ships than triremes were built, commonly referred to by number: 'four' (τετρήρης), 'five' (πεντήρης)

²⁰⁹ Both sides of the argument make convincing points about the design of the ship, and it is probable that no side is entirely correct. This is not to trivialise the debate or ignore its importance, but to highlight that it is of minimal importance to this thesis. That triremes were used in diplomatic operations, intercepted trade and conducted amphibious operations is not contingent on their being rowed on two or three levels. Clearly ships design could and did have ramifications on the tactical and operational level of war, as in every conflict throughout time, but this thesis is examining the *strategic* level.

²¹⁰ These are approximate numbers, for an Athenian trireme. For a more detailed discussion on crew complement see: Jordan (1975): 153-268; Morrison et. al. (2000): 107-118. For more on *epibatai* and social; status, see: Herzogenrath-Amelung (2017): 45-64.

²¹¹ Morrison et. al. (2000): 102-106.

²¹² 184 nm is given by Morrison et. al (2000: 104) in their calculations, a measurement I concur with in plotting the most expedient course from the Peiraieus to Mytilene (using chart BA 180). This in turn gives an average speed of 7.6 knots.

²¹³ Which depending on how long of a rest break (if any) was taken and depending on how long a 'long day' was, amounted to an average speed of between 7-8.5 knots according to Morrison et. al (2000): 103.

and even larger in the Hellenistic period, often referred to generally as 'polyremes'. The meaning of the numbers is unknown, though scholars agree that it cannot denote the number of decks and must refer to multiple rowers per oar.²¹⁴ There is much speculation on all aspects of their design: dimensions, number of levels and oar system, but no real picture of exactly how 'fours' and 'fives' (and greater) operated.²¹⁵ The most important things to note about these warships is that they were larger and thus represented an even greater investment in resources than triremes, both in terms of materials and equipment and personnel. They required a larger crew and were physically bigger ships to build and maintain. It is also likely that these bigger ships had better seakeeping characteristics than the smaller triremes, and thus could survive more inclement weather. Their use represents a significant escalation in the scale of maritime and particular naval operations conducted in the late fourth century and beyond.

It is important to note that different types of warships could be found in a polis' fleet, not just the predominant model of the time. Even when superseded by larger or more sophisticated types, older and smaller warship designs still had their uses as either combatants or auxiliary vessels. When listing the naval order of battle for Artemision, Herodotus has the Keans and the Opountion Lokrians contributing pentekontors to the fleet (8.1.2). In Sicily, a Carthaginian fleet attacked by the forces of Syrakousai consisted of a mixed force of pentekontors, triremes as well as merchant vessels (Diod. 14.73.2). The Athenian fleet of the late fourth century was of mixed type, with the Assembly in 323 said to have ordered the construction of 40 triremes and 200 'fours' (Diod. 18.10.2).²¹⁶ Athenian naval lists also detail a mixed fleet, before the Assembly's ambitious build program.²¹⁷

²¹⁴ Casson (1971): 97-103.

²¹⁵ Many of the arguments rely on pictorial evidence for very specific details and is extremely subjective. Different scholars and indeed seventeenth century artists have seen the Lenormant relief as representing a two or a three-level ship. Morrison and Coates (1996): 185-7; Tilley (2004): 35-8. It is hard not to see the phenomenon of 'confirmation bias' in arguments over these artistic representations, especially by those who insist the Lenormant relief (and other pieces) clearly show a three-level ship that *must* represent a trireme. Morrison and Coates *Greek and Roman Oared Warships* should be used with caution since much of the evidence they present is subjective and seemingly influenced by their own biases. Their recreations of what 'fours' and 'fives' might have been like is based on an evolution of their imperfect reconstruction of a trireme, and must be used with extreme caution, though it is perhaps useful in its speculation of what they might generally have been like. Morrison and Coates (1996): 267-271.

²¹⁶ Though there is some debate over the reading of the manuscript; some scholars have the numbers reversed to read 200 triremes and 40 'fours'. Morrison et. al. (2000): 48.

²¹⁷ IG II² 1627.24, 1629.801-11; Morrison et. al. (2000): 48.

During Athenian operations near Amphipolis in the 360s, Demosthenes mentions a disloyal mercenary taking some of their light vessels, the 30-oared triakontor (τριακόντορος; Dem. 23.149). Vessels such as triakontors, pentekontors or triremes could fulfil a number of auxiliary roles inside and outside of direct combat. They could potentially be used to finish off disabled enemy vessels, rescue friendly sailors in the water, be used as dispatch vessels, and for general scouting.

Merchant vessels of the ancient world varied wildly in size and construction, ranging from small coastal freighters up to large cargo vessels designed for long distance trade and carrying bulk cargo such as grain. As mentioned above, they were commonly referred to as 'round ships', as opposed to 'long ships' – warships. Inscriptions indicate that their cargo carrying capability varied substantially, ranging from 20 up to 165 tons in the Classical period.²¹⁸ In a law court speech by Demosthenes, the cargo ship in question was contracted to load 3,000 jars of wine (Dem. 35.10). Little is known how many people could be transported in merchant vessels. It seems likely that people who needed to travel by sea went aboard merchant vessels carrying cargo and passengers.²¹⁹ In a law court speech of Antiphon, the defendant mentions the fact that he and other passengers were travelling from Lesbos to Thasos on a ship with no deck, and were forced by bad weather to switch to a vessel that did have a deck.²²⁰ Firstly it indicates that there were several passengers, and secondly it appears to have been a fairly straightforward process to swap boats to something more suitable. It also demonstrates the differences in trading vessels being used around the Aegean. Clearly the original intent was to cross from Lesbos to Thasos in an un-decked ship, and it was only inclement weather that forced them to swap. It seems likely that many of the vessels used for trade and ferrying passengers, in particular local trade, would have been very small vessels and crewed by a very small number. The same is true of fishing vessels, which would have ranged in size from small two-man vessels up to much larger boats used for larger and more migratory fish such as tuna. It is fair to say that different areas would have favoured particular types and constructions of vessels designed and built to local conditions.

²¹⁸ Neatly summarised by Casson in an appendix. Casson (1971): 183-4.

²¹⁹ Casson says as much, but gives no reference. Casson (1974): 66.

²²⁰ Antiphon, *On the Murder of Herodes*, 22.

Personnel

Personnel considerations are a critical factor in maritime operations, not only in terms of the available pool of manpower,²²¹ but also in terms of training and ability. A trireme on average carried 200 crew; thus a fleet of triremes represented a substantial investment in personnel. Thucydides says the largest Athenian fleet deployment of the Peloponnesian War, in 428, saw the Athenians with 250 triremes at sea (Thuc. 3.17): this would represent 50,000 personnel. Not only did they have to be paid and kept fed and healthy, they also represented a large pool of manpower which could not be used in other military roles such as hoplites or light armed troops. Sailors and rowers required a great deal of training and practice in a very particular skill set.

Just as with soldiers, experienced and well-trained sailors and rowers could find work all across the Mediterranean, selling their talents to the highest bidder. Lacking a body of experienced rowers could severely hamstring a polis' naval power, and increasingly became a problem in the fourth century. A law court case of Demosthenes/Apollodoros very aptly demonstrates the personnel problems associated with keeping a trireme at sea.²²² The speech is of great importance for all aspects of the office of trierarchy. It concerns Apollodoros (the speaker) suing Polykles for not replacing Apollodoros as trierarch when he should have, causing the speaker much financial and personal trouble. The first note about personnel was the seeming difficulty in finding enough skilled rowers and sailors. The speaker says that the deme members who actually showed up for service as *nautai* were incompetent (ἀδύνατοι) forcing him to hire his own *nautai* as well as hiring the best seamen (*hyperesia*) he could (50.7).²²³ He speaks of desertion caused by lack of pay or by

²²¹ Women of the time being excluded from Greek military operations. They were however, greatly affected by male relations' absence, as told by the speaker in a law court speech by Demosthenes, who relates the story of his wife and mother besieged by creditors and illnesses in his absence. [Dem]. 50.60-62 (see below).

²²² Oration 50. On the issue of authorship see: Bers (2003): 19-20.

²²³ There is debate over the different terms used, *nautai* and *hyperesia*. *Nautai* seems to refer to the rowers and the *hyperesia* appear to have been the skilled seamen – the helmsman, boatswain, rowing master, piper, carpenter and other roles required for the sailing and running of the ship, outside of rowing. Included in this complement seems to be the *epibatai*, the hoplites and archers who can be termed 'marines' in modern parlance. See: Morrison (1984): 48-59; Gabrielsen (1994): 106; Morrison et. al (2000): 107-126; Van Wees (2014): 210-211. For a different view of the meaning, which argues for a difference in social status as the defining difference between *nautai* and *hyperesia*, see: Jordan (1972): 210-268. Jordan, following L.J.D. Richardson (1943), points out that the etymology of *hyperesia* strongly suggest rowing,

simply pulling into the Peiraieus, the second eventuality forced on him when he took an ambassador back home and forced him to hire replacements for the deserters (50.11-12). He loses more sailors in the Hellespont, where suffering from a lack of pay they are lured away to ships from Thasos and Maroneia (50.14). This is interesting not just because of the desertion, but also because of the fact that ships from Thasos and Maroneia could afford to poach sailors away from an Athenian fleet. Further, he says that the deserters had great confidence in their rowing ability and so could chase after the highest wage (50.16). The speaker goes so far as to accuse the *strategos* in charge, Timomachos, of deliberately keeping Apollodoros on as trierarch because his replacement Polykles would have done a bad job and Timomachos needed Apollodoros' well-crewed and efficient ship for his services (50.43-52). This speech highlights the core difficulties in manning a trireme and keeping it operationally effective on campaign in the Aegean. It gives an insight into the importance of skilled rowers and seaman, who like experienced soldiers could sell out their talents to the highest bidder.

An often-overlooked feature of naval service in particular is the social impacts of overseas service. [Demosthenes] 50 is also useful in this respect, detailing some of the social issues involved in overseas military service. When the speaker mentions desertions when ships return to their home port of the Peiraieus, he says that many refuse to re-embark unless given extra money to cover household expenses (50.11). This is highlighted further by the speaker's own personal difficulties, certainly raised and perhaps exaggerated to elicit sympathy from the jury,²²⁴ but nonetheless a set of circumstances that must not have been uncommon for men serving on overseas campaigns for years at a time. His mother was extremely sick and died on the sixth day after his return, having suffered difficulties in her property and unable to give him as much inheritance as she wanted (50.60). His wife was sick for much of his time away, his children only small, much of his money tied up in his current trierarchy and faced with agricultural difficulties with his land producing nothing for harvest that year (50.61). Interestingly, these worries were apparently not all heaped

connected as it is to the word ἐπέτης. This point of language was also illustrated by my supervisor in the revision of the thesis.

²²⁴ A common courtroom tactic, though such a high-profile speaker must have had enough of a public profile that much of his private life was not so private. There would be a limit to how many details he could lie about or exaggerate. The circumstances he describes were probably verifiable to the jurors, especially the poor harvest and drought that he describes.

upon him on his return, for while he was away he received news from travellers as well as actual correspondence from home (50.62). It seems as if regular news and even correspondence could and did reach people on campaign and is perhaps indicative of a solid and basically reliable level of interconnectedness throughout the Aegean at the level of, essentially, mail services.

Lastly, [Demosthenes] 50 demonstrates how well travelled many Greeks in the Classical period could be thanks to maritime activities. The speaker, as well as his 200 or so crew members, visit many different places in the course of their service: the area of the Hellespont including Hieron and Sestos, Maroneia, Thasos, Styrme and Tenedos. It was the kind of shared experience that could be mentioned in comedy and joked about. In Aristophanes' *Wasps*, the chorus leader reminisces and jokes about sharing guard duty in Byzantion (235-6), and again later on campaign in Naxos (354-5). There is no specific mention of their service as either sailors or soldiers, though the former is suggested in a later passage of the chorus (1091-1100). What this passage demonstrates is the typical nature of service in Athens: on campaign overseas as part of an expeditionary force, not arrayed in a phalanx on the fields of Attica.²²⁵ This is of course an example from Athens, but as this thesis will explore in later chapters, sea power was often utilised by many poleis to conduct overseas campaigning and the experience of campaigning as described by the chorus is perhaps not so far from the experience of many Greeks on military service during the Classical period.

Infrastructure

Infrastructure is a key enabler of maritime operations, both military and non-military. Merchant and fishing vessels require safe harbours and basic port facilities to conduct their business. This includes facilities for loading and unloading cargo as well as the availability of storage facilities for some goods. As seen in the example of the Elephantine Palimpsest, government infrastructure such as customs houses were required. Warships require

²²⁵ Even though this passage comes from a comedy, a notoriously difficult source to use for historical purposes, the nature of the passages makes them credible. They are the reminiscences of the old men of the chorus, not central to the plot and thus not in need of comic exaggeration. Indeed, it is a far cry from the usual trope of having the old men represent the *marathonamachoi* that haunt the comedies. They are describing military operations known to many and probably not far from the audiences' own experiences. See next chapter.

regular maintenance and protection from the elements when not in use, as well as storage facilities for the massive amount of gear (oars, sails and other fittings) required to operate them. Additionally, these facilities often required some form of fortification or protection, from both external but also sometimes internal threats.

The shipsheds of the Peiraeus are perhaps the most impressive of all naval infrastructure projects in Greece, as befitted the supreme sea power of the day. Between the three harbours, Zea, Kantharos and Mounichia, by 323/2 Athens could house 372 ships.²²⁶ Additionally, the harbours themselves were protected zones, with fortification walls and towers protecting them and even a form of access control, with chains positioned to block off the harbour mouth as required.²²⁷ Further, the Long Walls from Athens down to the Peiraeus should be considered essential maritime infrastructure, providing unimpeded access to the sea for both civil and military purposes. Further afield, the two harbours of Syrakousai in Sicily could hold a large number of ships by the beginning of the fourth century, with Diodoros saying the tyrant Dionysios I constructed 160 new and costly (πολυτελής) sheds, most of which could hold two ships, and repaired the existing 150 sheds (14.42.5).²²⁸ Such a large building project represents a significant investment in maritime infrastructure and was a clear statement of intent by a city which considered itself a premier sea power.

It was not just in Athens and the other major sea power cities that shipsheds could be found, and the prevalence of such infrastructure indicates the importance of navies around the Greek world. Remains have been found of four shipsheds at Sicilian Naxos, a city of medium size,²²⁹ indicating possession of a small fleet.²³⁰ For such a medium sized city this

²²⁶ 196 in Zea, the main naval port, 94 in Kantharos and 82 in the smallest harbour, Mounichia, also primarily a naval port. Archaeological remains have been found in Zea and Munychia, but none for Kantharos. These are attested to in epigraphic evidence (along with the others): IG II² 1627.398-405; 1628.552-9; 1629.1030-6; 1631.252-6 for the years 330/29, 326/5, 325/4 and 323/2 respectively. Blackman and Rankov (2013): 437, 476-85.

²²⁷ Blackman and Rankov (2013): 435-7.

²²⁸ For more on the shipsheds at Syrakousai, see: Gerding (2013): 535-41.

²²⁹ It seems to have had a rather large territory, listed as 200-500 square km (Size 4) in *Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis*. Hansen and Nielsen (2004): 218-220. The city itself was of a medium size, as described by the archaeologists who worked in the shipsheds. See: Lentini, Blackman and Pakkanen (2008): 301.

²³⁰ As noted above with Athens and the sheds at Zea, the number of shipsheds does not necessarily reflect the total number of warships operated by the state. Ships might be off on operations/training or alongside or at anchor elsewhere near the city, with the sheds being used for maintenance or longer-term storage. It

represents a significant investment in resources and indicates the importance of such infrastructure. Function dictated the size of the sheds, but the large size of the buildings, not unreasonably called ‘monumental architecture’ by the archaeologists,²³¹ dwarfs other buildings: they were ten times the size of a typical temple in the city.²³² This illustrates how naval infrastructure in even a moderate city of limited naval power was considered important, and it highlights the prominence of the maritime realm in that city.

The *diolkos* that connected the Korinthian Gulf with the Saronic is perhaps the largest and most impressive piece of maritime infrastructure in Greece, a significant asset of potential strategic value. That it was used to transport ships across the isthmus is attested in Thucydides, where in 428 the Spartans and allies made preparations to haul ships from the Korinthian Gulf across the isthmus in order to go to the aid of Mytilene (Thuc. 3.15.1),²³³ and again in 412 to aid Chios (8.7). The *diolkos* was still in use two centuries later, when Demetrios and Philip V of Macedon used it to transport warships (Polyb. 4.19.7-9; 5.101).²³⁴ Unexpectedly, the *diolkos* is mentioned in a comedy of Aristophanes, where Kleisthenes says of another: ‘That’s some isthmus you’ve got there, man. You shuttle your cock back

is not unreasonable to assume Naxos might have possessed 8-12 warships in total, though only having four sheds. Larger and richer poleis, like Athens, may have built enough sheds for all of their ships.

²³¹ Lentini, Blackman and Pakkanen (2008): 354.

²³² A temple being as wide as a single slipway (out of four) but only 1/3 the length. Lentini, Blackman and Pakkanen (2008): 354.

²³³ That the ships were not actually hauled across the isthmus was because of the slowness to react by Sparta’s allies and interference from an Athenian naval operation. Pettegrew calls this example a failure, which is technically correct, but a failure due to slowness of action, not because of any technical failure. It is hard to agree with his assessment that this was merely functioning in the narrative as a preliminary to the later transfer across the isthmus at 8.7 (Pettegrew, 2011: 566). In neither case is Thucydides saying that ships being dragged across the isthmus is some kind of remarkable feat: he is detailing a military operation. Pettegrew is not justified in saying claiming that Thucydides says the Peloponnesians ‘worked hard’ to prepare hauling apparatuses for the ship transfers. Thucydides merely says ‘ὄλκους παρεσκούαζον’ and there is no indication of the ease or difficulty of the operation. This is not the first case of Pettegrew misreading the ancient sources. (see note below).

²³⁴ Again, Pettegrew completely misreads the ancient source when he says that Polybios remarks upon the cost of the operation and the impossibility of moving decked ships overland (Pettegrew, 2011: 564).

Polybios says neither thing in his narrative. On the first point, he only says that Taurion was engaged to meet the cost, δαπάνην, of hauling the ships over. On the second point, at no point does Polybios say it was impossible to haul decked ships over the isthmus. He merely narrates a military operation in which he sends his decked ships to chase a group of Illyrian ships, while he has his undecked ships transported across the isthmus. Polybios does not give a reason for why the ships were split into two groups, but militarily speaking it would have made sense for his larger warships to give chase to the Illyrians and have his lighter ships hauled across into the Korinthian gulf in order to sail out and search for the Illyrians from a second direction. No doubt the smaller warships were easier and quicker to transport overland, but at no point does Polybios say it was impossible for the decked ships to go across, as Pettegrew claims. The language does not support it.

and forth more than the Korinthians!' (ἰσθμόν τιν' ἔχεις, ἄνθρωπ' ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω τὸ πέος διέλκεις πυκνότερον Κορινθίων: *Thesm.* 647-8). This certainly suggests frequent movement across the isthmus via the *diolkos*, and would seem to indicate commercial traffic as well as military.²³⁵ Indeed most scholars think that the *diolkos* was primarily used for commercial traffic, particularly cargo rather than actual merchant ships.²³⁶ The Korinthians' primary intention in building the *diolkos* is unknown and probably unknowable, but it can be said with certainty that it represented a significant investment in resources and was a resource of strategic importance, allowing for the passage of goods as well as warships.

Finance

Navies were a very capital-intensive investment, not just in initial outlay, but in upkeep. This includes the ships, attendant infrastructure, and personnel. The ability to properly finance a fleet was one of, if not the, most important factor in determining a polis' naval power. In Athens the burden of funding the fleet was shared between state and individuals. Athenian state finance in large part relied on the Delian League to provide funds for its fifth century sea power. Sparta, as well as Athens and Thebes at different point in the fourth century, relied heavily on Persia for naval funding.

Like most issues of detail in the maritime and naval realm, the best evidence of fleet finance comes from Athens, although problems of financing the Spartan fleet are well illustrated in Xenophon as well.²³⁷ The first major expenditure was on the ships themselves, both construction and upkeep. Ships seem to have been built as part of a program, as well as during an annual replacement program.²³⁸ Gabrielsen makes the important point that it does not seem likely that there was anything like a standard cost for a trireme, and that so

²³⁵ Salmon (1984): 137.

²³⁶ This is the view put forward in a short article by R.M. Cook. Cook's reading of Thucydides and Polybios is poor and seems to be where Pettegrew derives his poor reading from; he narrates the Thucydides and Polybios episodes just as Pettegrew has done, overstating the difficulties involved with no basis in the ancient sources. Cook (1979): 152-155. Salmon (1984): 136-139; and MacDonald (1986): 191-195 both argue that commercial uses were the primary purpose of the *diolkos*, though not discounting its enduring potential for military use.

²³⁷ For instance, Teleutias in 388 addressing his crews on the issue of money and supplies, specifically, the lack thereof. *Xen Hell.* 5.1.14.

²³⁸ Gabrielsen (1994): 131-136.

much of the cost depended on the availability of the shipbuilding material.²³⁹ Ships could of course be acquired in battle or captured along with a city or other similar military campaign,²⁴⁰ but would in most cases still require maintenance to restore the ship to fighting quality. Still, this was almost certainly cheaper than a new build, albeit an unreliable way of bolstering ship numbers. Additionally, there was much equipment needed for the outfitting of a trireme, including oars, oar sleeves (ἄσκώματα), masts, sails, and rigging, to name a few.²⁴¹ Equipment was also an issue, being not just ‘expendable’ items that wear and tear would eventually lead to replacement, but also easily portable gear that could and certainly in Athens was misappropriated on a regular basis.²⁴² All of this equipment required a variety of different goods, from flax and papyrus for ropes and sails, through to leather for the ἄσκώματα and wood for much of the other fittings. These are the sorts of goods Athens requires for the navy, but does not produce in Attika, hence the control of trade being of the utmost importance, as outlined by the Old Oligarch (2.11-12).

The most enduring financial burden for a navy was personnel. Not just in finding and training a sufficient number, but also in paying them. With a nominal crew complement of approximately 200 per trireme and pay of between 3 obols and 1 drachma per day, this represents a significant monetary outlay.²⁴³ As the Apollodoros speech (above) indicated, rowers could expect good pay while away on campaign, and such campaigns could last for months. The imperative to pay crews was perhaps the primary driving factor behind *strategoí* on campaign collecting money from allies and non-allies in the area of operations. As will be seen later (Chapter Eight), the collection of this money on campaign caused much angst amongst allied and neutral powers alike. Of note too is that fact that pay must have been roughly standardised across the Greek world, otherwise the risk of underpaying would see trained rowers defect in even greater numbers, as seen previously in Apollodoros’ speech on his crewing issues ([Dem. 50]). In this way the burden of financing

²³⁹ Gabrielsen (1994): 139-142. This certainly true of shipbuilding in later ages, especially Gabrielsen’s point about the importance of the state’s relationship with suppliers of critical building material, especially timber.

²⁴⁰ For example, Lysandros’ capture of the Athenian ships at Aigispotamoi. Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.28.

²⁴¹ For more detail see: Morrison et. al. (2000): 161-178.

²⁴² Gabrielsen (1994): 146-169. See especially pp. 153-157 on misappropriation.

²⁴³ On the financial aspects, see: Gabrielsen (1994): 105-125; and for Archaic-era Athenian finances: Van Wees (2015): 63-75.

of a fleet on campaign had not just operational ramifications, but potentially strategic ones as well. The inability of Athens to finance a large fleet in the fourth century, comparable to the fleets of the fifth century, is almost certainly because of a lack of money, money that had earlier been extracted from a strong maritime empire enforced by a strong fleet. This highlights the virtuous circle of money empowering a fleet which in turn allowed for the extraction of more money through trade or direct tribute, enforced by sea power.

All of these practical considerations demonstrate that navies were not a small investment. Great amounts of material and money was required for even a small force of warships. The construction, outfitting, maintenance, and crewing of a warship represented a significant investment for a polis. As will be seen in the following chapters examining maritime operations, the size of a navy was not indicative of its effectiveness. Effective sea power boiled down to more than mere numbers, and the efficacy of a polis' maritime operations relied upon material factors such as equipment, trained crews, and logistics. In the context of strategy and its core elements of means-ways-ends, the practical considerations discussed in this chapter represents the 'means' aspect of how a polis might utilise sea power as part of its wider strategy.

Chapter Four – Maritime Consciousness I: Stories

How much a polis thought about the sea and maritime considerations can, in part, be illustrated by the way its inhabitants discussed such matters and to what extent they developed what might be termed a ‘maritime consciousness’. Whether depicted on stage, in myth or even on display in artistic representation and architecture, this maritime consciousness can help illuminate the extent to which the maritime realm was conceptualised in the Greek world. Myths, epics, tragedies, and comedies are useful in examining this consciousness. This is often seen in the stories themselves, many of which are dominated by nautical themes, from long sea voyages through to overseas expeditions. It can also be seen in the language used, where nautical metaphors and imagery abound. In exploring the stories of the Greeks, one can see how important the sea was to both their practical but also to their conceptual world.²⁴⁴ This chapter will focus on the idea of a ‘maritime consciousness’ in Greece by exploring stories; be they in myth, epic, or on stage.

Myth and Epic

Myths were important to the Greeks and it is necessary to explore, albeit briefly, ways in which maritime topics and themes appeared in myths, and how this might have helped shape a maritime consciousness. The maritime realm and maritime deities feature prominently in Greek creation myth. According to Hesiod’s *Theogony*, the sea (Πόντος) is one of the primeval elements that shapes the world.²⁴⁵ More broadly, the sea connects all parts of the world through a vast hydrological network. From the outer Ocean all the world’s rivers flow inward, through the lands and then into the sea, and eventually outward again into the Ocean.²⁴⁶ Hesiod lists all of the important rivers, ending his short catalogue by naming the most important of them all as the Styx, though there are countless rivers too numerous to name (*Theog.* 337-70). As Marie-Claire Beaulieu points out, this

²⁴⁴ This is certainly a chapter deserving of its own thesis. The material is important for contextualising Greek sea power and maritime thinking but cannot be covered in detail. Therefore, this chapter illustrates important stories, characterisations, myths, and highlights the most important points of consideration. There are many good treatments of myths and the sea, but usually treated in isolation or on a case-by-case basis. Marie-Claire Beaulieu’s recent work, *The Sea in the Greek Imagination* (2016) is a welcome addition to the scholarship on the topic and is used in this chapter frequently.

²⁴⁵ Hes. *Theog.* 131-2; Beaulieu (2016): 1.

²⁴⁶ Beaulieu (2016): 30.

hydrological network connects all parts of the world, 'from the invisible world of the gods and the dead beyond the Ocean, to the underworld, to the surface of the earth'.²⁴⁷ In this view of the world, rivers and the sea may be distinct, but are not viewed as entirely separate as in the modern Western world. Of great importance to those who used the sea, Hesiod also describes the birth of the winds. Interestingly, bad winds that wreck ships and sailors are born from the terrible beast Typhoeos, as opposed to the good winds (θνητοῖς μέγ' ὄνειαρο), Notos, Boreas and Zephyros (869-80). Although he mentions winds destroying things upon the earth as well (878-80), the primary context in which Hesiod describes the winds is with regards to sailors and seagoing activities. The sea and the winds which affected the seas were important features of Greek cosmology and which helped interconnect the Greek and indeed the wider world.

Many of the deities associated with the sea are powerful and just, especially the 'old men of the sea' – Nereus, Phorkys and Proteus – to whom can also be added the goddess Thetis.²⁴⁸ All are knowledgeable and provide advice and aid to mortals. For instance, Proteus is twice described as 'truthful/unerring' (νημερτής – Hom. *Od.* 4.349, 401), and knows the depths of all the seas – ὅς τε θαλάσσης πάσης βένθεα οἶδε (4.385-6). He is described as such while he aids Menelaos in his wanderings (4.349-570). Herakles gains knowledge of the way to the island of the Hesperides by Neleus (Apollod. 2.114). Alternatively, he is given Helios' cup from Neleus in order to sail over Ocean to reach the Hesperides (Stesich. fr. 184a).²⁴⁹ This follows the Titan Okeanos, who is also seen as a force for good in both actions and counsel.²⁵⁰ In Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound*, Okeanos gives counsel to Prometheus as well as trying to convince Zeus to free Prometheus (284-396). Of the Olympians, not only Poseidon but Aphrodite also has a strong connection to the sea, being born from foam arising out of it and being associated with the islands of Kythera and Cyprus (Hes. *Theog.* 192-200). Most people, including scholars, tend to view Aphrodite as a deity concerned with love and related matters. Yet, Aphrodite had a strong connection to the sea from which she was born and had several epithets related to the sea.²⁵¹ Further,

²⁴⁷ Beaulieu (2016): 30.

²⁴⁸ Beaulieu (2016): 36-7.

²⁴⁹ Beaulieu (2016): 36-8.

²⁵⁰ Beaulieu (2016): 38-9.

²⁵¹ Larson (2007): 123.

there are abundant finds of votive offerings made to her by seafarers on her birthplace island of Cyprus.²⁵² Deities in Greek myth with strong connections to the sea are usually viewed in a favourable light.

The sea was a space inhabited or visited by all manner of divine creatures and seawater itself was important to the Greeks and the gods. Seawater is considered pure and incorruptible (ἀμίαντος).²⁵³ This is how Aeschylus describes it in *The Persians* (578), and Euripides has Iphigeneia say that ‘the sea washes away all human evils’ (θάλασσα κλύζει πάντα τὰνθρώπων κακά - Eur. *IT*. 1193). Seawater was particularly useful when dealing with the pollution of death, and purification by seawater in the case of houses polluted by death was legally mandated in Keos during the 5th century.²⁵⁴ What’s more, ambrosia is brought to Zeus by doves from Okeanos (Hom. *Od.* 12.63). The association between ambrosia and Okeanos endured from the time of Homer through to Hyginus, who lists the personified Ambrosia as one of the daughters of Okeanos (*Fab.* 182, 192).²⁵⁵ Like the sea, Ocean is pure and its purity is used by the gods and all the celestial bodies for bathing, with the exception of the Bear (Hom. *Il.* 18.486-89).²⁵⁶

Dolphins have an interesting place in the Greek world from at least the Mycenaean and Minoan periods onward. Early authors describe dolphins as swift and wild, and indeed Achilles in the midst of his rampage against the Trojans is likened to a dolphin corralling terror-struck fish (Hom. *Il.* 21.22-26). Classical authors thought highly of dolphins, who were seen as enjoying music and entertainment, experienced human-like emotions and sympathised with and aided men. This included rescuing sailors and taking an interest in burial rights, not just for other dolphins but for humans as well, most famously the somewhat hydrophobic poet Hesiod.²⁵⁷ Perhaps most interestingly, Plutarch argues that dolphins were the only animal that engaged in friendship with man for no advantage

²⁵² I am grateful to Dr Amelia Brown of the University of Queensland for this information, provided in private correspondence as part of her Australian Research Council (ARC), Discovery Early Career Research Award for her project: ‘Like frogs around a pond: Maritime Religion and Seafaring Gods of Ancient Greek Culture’.

²⁵³ Beaulieu (2016): 33.

²⁵⁴ IG XII 5.593. It seems as if salt could be added to fresh water if needed. See also: Parker (1983): 226-7.

²⁵⁵ Beaulieu (2016): 36.

²⁵⁶ Beaulieu (2016): 34.

²⁵⁷ Beaulieu (2016): 119-20, esp. notes 6-8, 11-14. As mentioned in Chapter Two, Hesiod had extremely limited exposure to the sea and his warnings on sailing and sea travel hint at a strong aversion to the sea.

(μόνος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ἀσπάζεται, καθ' ὃ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι: Plut. *Mor.* 984c-d). Beaulieu sees dolphins as representing man's counterpart in the sea, and her chapter on the subject of dolphins is illuminating, especially in helping to dispel the notion of the Greeks being ever fearful of the sea and its creatures.²⁵⁸

Sea voyages are prominent in myth, featuring in the lives and deeds of heroes such as Herakles, Theseus, Jason and of course Odysseus. The sea plays an active role in the lives of Greek heroes and their mythic journeys.²⁵⁹ These sea voyages are often linked with Greek colonisation and the rapid expansion of geographic knowledge. A good example of this is the case of the 'Clashing Rocks' which feature in the Argo's journey. In early forms of the *Argonautica* story, it appears as if the Argo encountered the Clashing Rocks on the return journey. The *Odyssey* says that the only ship to have passed through the rocks was the Argo, when sailing from Aietes (παρ' Αἰήταο πλέουσα: Hom. *Od.* 12.70).²⁶⁰ The later authors Pindar and Apollonius Rhodius have the Argo sailing through the rocks on the outward journey, and most importantly, the rocks ceased their clashing once the ship has passed through (Pind. *Pyth.* 210-11; Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* 604-6), unlike in the earlier *Odyssey* (12.62-65). It seems as if later accounts required the Clashing Rocks to be tamed as they became more firmly located in the Bosphorus,²⁶¹ a passage regularly sailed through by ships in the time of Pindar. Herein appears to be a rationalising account of myth as Greek geographic knowledge and experience of the Black Sea region increased.

The *Odyssey* is the maritime adventure of the ancient Greek world. No thesis dealing with maritime issues can afford to ignore the *Odyssey*, but discussion here will be necessarily brief.²⁶² Perhaps one of the most intriguing elements of the story is that of the Phaiakians, master sailors and merchants. Instead of being viewed in a contradictory light, Carol Dougherty sees the Phaiakians as playing the role of 'gateway to the ethnographic

²⁵⁸ Beaulieu (2016): 119-144. She has three case studies: Arion, Hesiod and Melikertes. The chapter also looks at the important role of Dolphins in colonization and in the most important of Greek institutions, Delphi. See below for more on dolphins and their association with Dionysos and drinking.

²⁵⁹ For a good examination of sea voyages by Perseus, Theseus and Jason, see: Beaulieu (2016): 59-89.

²⁶⁰ West (2005): 40.

²⁶¹ West (2005): 41.

²⁶² It is a work which can and has generated numerous theses on varying aspects of the maritime world – far more than can be considered in this thesis. This short section aims to illuminate some of the most salient points when it comes the *Odyssey* and the idea of a maritime consciousness in Greece, and how this might have influenced thinking on the topics of sea power and maritime strategy in the Classical Period.

imagination of the world of the *Odyssey*'.²⁶³ Firstly, the Phaiakians form a polarized opposition to the other great seafarers and traders of the time, the Phoenicians, and this 'helps further articulate the problematic notion of overseas trade'.²⁶⁴ In stark contrast to the Phoenicians and other notable maritime traders, the Phaiakians are extremely hostile to outsiders, differing greatly in character with the somewhat cosmopolitan nature of other trading hubs like Phoenicia and Athens.²⁶⁵ Secondly, the Phaiakians in conjunction with the Cyclopes help to imagine the world of overseas conquest and settlement.²⁶⁶ The *Odyssey* has deep roots in the maritime realm and the simple fact is that of the two great Homeric epics, half of them are concerned with the sea. This alone should say a lot about how the maritime realm permeated Greek society from earliest times.

The sea and maritime endeavours are not prominent when first considering Herakles and his deeds, yet he had an important relationship with the sea. Herakles utilised the sea several times for his journeys, including his stint as one of Jason's Argonauts. A quick survey of his exploits includes his expedition against the Amazons, where he sails into the Black Sea, which he names *Euxeinos* (Diod. Sic. 4.16.1); sailing from Kreta to retrieve the cattle of Geryon (Diod. Sic. 4.17.1-3); setting up his Pillars in Gadeira (see below); and sacking Troy with either 18 or only 6 warships.²⁶⁷ Going beyond the mortal realm, Herakles sails across Ocean in the cup of Helios, obtained from either the 'old man of the sea' Nereus or from Helios himself,²⁶⁸ and it was a popular scene depicted in art.²⁶⁹ The sea is an important feature in Herakles' deeds, allowing the hero to traverse the length and breadth of the Mediterranean and beyond. As perhaps the most recognizable and popular of Greek heroes it is of great significance that he has these strong and regular connections to the sea.

As the paradigmatic Athenian hero,²⁷⁰ Theseus naturally had a close connection to the sea. Of particular note is the fact that Theseus supposedly defeated Minos' general Tauros in a naval battle (Plut. *Thes.* 19.2). Although the sea often features prominently in heroic tales,

²⁶³ Dougherty (2001): 103.

²⁶⁴ Dougherty (2001): 103. She examines this topic of overseas trade in a previous chapter (pp. 38-60).

²⁶⁵ On this, see the section discussing the Old Oligarch in the Chapter Five.

²⁶⁶ Dougherty (2001): 103. This is a topic she explores in a subsequent chapter (pp. 122-142).

²⁶⁷ 18 ships according to Diodoros (Diod. Sic. 4.32.2) or 6 ships according to Homer (Hom. *Il.* 5.638-642), an alternate number acknowledged by Diodoros: Diod. Sic. 4.32.3-4.

²⁶⁸ Stesich. Fr. 184a; Pherekydes *FGrH* F18a.

²⁶⁹ For more on this episode see: Beaulieu (2016): 47-53. On art, Beaulieu (2016): 49, n.145.

²⁷⁰ Hawes (2014): 153.

naval battles do not and so this instance adds a sense of retrospective historicity to this version of the story.²⁷¹ An alternative account related by Plutarch comes from Kleidemos,²⁷² whose story revolves around naval matters. He says that there was a general Hellenic decree that no 'trireme' could sail out of port with a crew larger than five men, Jason being the only exception due to the fact that he was clearing the sea of pirates (19.4).²⁷³ Minos defies the decree by chasing Daidalos to Sicily with his warships and after Minos' death his son Deukalion threatens Athens for the return of Daidalos, which causes Theseus to build a fleet in secret and confront and ultimately defeat Deukalion (19.4-6). Indeed, not just Theseus but also his crew members were lauded in Athens after their time. The festival of the *Kybernesia* was celebrated in honour of Theseus' steersmen Nausithos and Phaiax, who had hero-shrines built for them by Theseus in Phaleron (17.6). Of course, Theseus undertook a famous land journey to Athens from Troizen and as Greta Hawes says of the journey, 'The footprints of Heracles are everywhere'.²⁷⁴ In this we can see how Theseus' transformation into an Athenian hero required that he gain stronger connections to the sea in order to reflect an Athenian society increasingly looking towards the sea for its future.²⁷⁵

Myth has an important aetiological function with regards to ships and sailing. The *Argo* was considered either the first ship (πρωτόπλοος πλάτα: Eur. *Andr.* 865) or the first sea-going ship, Diodoros saying that before the *Argo* men put to sea in rafts or small boats: σχεδία or a μικρόν ἀκάτιον (Diod. Sic. 4.41.1). The crew of the *Argo* were exceptional, demigods in their own right who went on to great things, not just Herakles, but the Dioskouroi, Orpheus and Euphamos, whom the rulers of Kyrene claimed as their ancestor and thus stake a claim to part of Jason's story, in Pindar's *Fourth Pythian*. Pindar calls the

²⁷¹ Plutarch actually says it was Demon who tells this version of the story. On rationalisation of the myth, see: Hawes (2014): 163.

²⁷² Which Plutarch acknowledges as 'rather peculiar and eccentric' – 19.4; Hawes (2014): 163.

²⁷³ He does indeed use the word τριήρης in this passage, which clearly cannot be correct for the time period he is discussing. It may however be indicative of just how prominent the trireme was in popular narratives, the quintessential Greek warship of its day, much like 'ship of the line' and 'battleship' became synonymous with big warships in later times, even when describing warships of different size and capability.

²⁷⁴ Hawes (2014): 160.

²⁷⁵ For an excellent look at Theseus in Athens, and Plutarch's biography of the hero, see: Hawes (2014): 149-174.

crew demigods (ἡμίθεος: 211),²⁷⁶ and Diodoros says that no small number of prominent youths were ready to take part in the journey (οὐκ ὀλίγους τῶν ἐν ὑπεροχαῖς νεανίσκων ἐπιθυμῆσαι μετασχεῖν τῆς στρατείας: Diod. Sic. 4.41.1-2). Clearly this was a momentous occasion and budding heroes/demigods approached the expedition and long sea voyage not with fear, but eagerness. Myth is also used to explain the origin of sails in rationalising accounts of Daidalos and Ikaros. Palaiphatos in his fourth century *On Unbelievable Tales* noted the impossibility of the pair actually flying through the air and says that they escaped by boat with a favourable wind which gave the appearance of them ‘flying’ (12). Pausanias in his account says that Daidalos invented sails for his escape ship, previously unknown to sailors, in order to out-run the oared fleet of Minos (9.11.4).

Perhaps the most important aetiological story is that of the Pillars of Herakles. Often seen as boundary markers, including by some ancient authors, they are also said to have been monuments to Herakles’ achievement in making the Mediterranean Sea safe for mariners. Diodoros tells two quite contradictory stories about the Pillars, both of which illustrate Herakles’ key role in maritime endeavours. Either Herakles narrowed the entrance to the Mediterranean Sea and thus prevented monsters from entering, or he cut a channel through what was land and thereby opened up the Mediterranean to the Atlantic Ocean (Diod. Sic. 4.18.4-5). The first explanation seems to pick up on Euripides, who in his tragedy *Herakles* has the chorus sing that Herakles’ adventures to the farthest recesses of the sea had made it safe sailing for men (Eur. *HF* 400-402). This first explanation is obvious in its benefit to mankind, but the second one also indicates a positive aspect to Herakles’ journey and deeds, merely in a different light. This second explanation has Herakles opening up the sea to travel, a contentious issue in modern scholarship,²⁷⁷ though it is hard to accept Diodoros as presenting this story in anything other than a positive light – he is of course praising the deeds of the great hero Herakles. Regardless of which story was more widely

²⁷⁶ Not in the strict sense of mortals with some divine lineage, but in a broader sense to denote distinguished warriors, much like Hesiod’s race immediately preceding the current generation (*Op.* 159-65). Braswell (1988): 77.

²⁷⁷ Some interpreting the Pillars as a barrier, and in some cases postulating it as a rationalising account of the Greeks being cut out from this end of the Mediterranean because of the Carthaginians. It is of course possible that there is a simpler explanation: that by cutting a channel through the land monsters could be driven *out* of the Mediterranean.

believed, they return to the idea of Greek geographic knowledge expanding as waves of Greek colonisers and traders expanded out to the furthest reaches of the Mediterranean.

Myth is not just important in the grand, panhellenic sense, but also on a more local level and this is where much can be gleaned of the maritime consciousness of many Greek cities. Despite losing in the contest for patronage of Athens, the sea-god Poseidon was still very important to the city.²⁷⁸ Poseidon was prominent in many other Greek cities as well. In Troizen Theseus was allegedly born a son of Poseidon, the city's chief deity and god of choice for their coinage (Plut. *Thes.* 6.1). Pausanias describes the importance of Poseidon to the Achaian towns of Helike and Aigai, who worshipped 'Helikonian Poseidon', referenced twice in Homer (*Il.* 2.569-577; 8.198.207), and still worshipped in Pausanias' day (7.24.5-7; 7.25.12). The Boiotian town of Siphai (called Tiphai by Pausanias), lying on the coast of the Korinthian gulf, is said to have had a strong maritime tradition. The helmsman of the *Argo*, Tiphys, is said to have come from this town (Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* 105-6). Additionally, Pausanias says that the town claimed to have the best sailors in all of Boiotia (9.32.4): an interesting thing to claim in a region not usually associated with maritime activities but perhaps indicative of a richer maritime tradition than has been assumed.²⁷⁹ As mentioned above, Pindar's *Fourth Pythian* connects the ruling family in Kyrene to the expedition of the Argonauts and references the colonisation (4.64-69). The rule of Kyrene is thus divinely mandated by Medea and the Delphic oracle,²⁸⁰ and Kyrene then possesses a charter myth connected to a famous sea voyage.

Cult worship could also unite different poleis across a wide geographic area. One of Poseidon's most notable sanctuaries was on the island of Kalaureia just off the coast of Troizen, a city noted above for its strong connection to Poseidon. More than being the place where Demosthenes met his end in 322,²⁸¹ the sanctuary hosted an amphictiony. Little is known about the amphictiony, other than a brief mention by Strabo who names the seven members: Hermione, Epidauros, Aigina, Athens, Prasieis, Nauplieis and Minyan

²⁷⁸ His temple at Sounion perhaps the starkest example of his importance in Attika.

²⁷⁹ The above statement that Boiotia is not normally heavily associated with the sea is fairly uncontroversial, an acceptable view of the region and its history and perhaps a self-perpetuating attitude in modern scholarship. Perhaps all that Pausanias is encountering is nostalgia and some local pride of a distant past, but it is derived from a mythic story with a long life.

²⁸⁰ Beaulieu (2016): 80-1.

²⁸¹ He was also apparently worshipped there too. Paus. 2.33.3, 35.5. Constantakopoulou (2007): 29.

Orchonmenos.²⁸² The dating is also problematic, most likely the end of the eighth or first half of the seventh century.²⁸³ Of particular relevance as concerns the notion of a panhellenic maritime consciousness, it is quite obvious looking at the members of the amphictiony that they are all located on or very near to the sea. It was a community of mariners from around the Saronic Gulf, and it is hard to escape Christy Constantakopoulou's conclusion that this was a religious network defined by its maritime nature.²⁸⁴ Related to this sanctuary is the island of Delos and its rise as a prominent cult centre. In Pausanias' story of the sanctuary at Kalaureia, he tells of how it was originally sacred to Apollo, and Delos to Poseidon, and that the two gods essentially swapped islands (Paus. 2.33.2). Though there appears to have been no formal amphictiony on Delos comparable to the one at Kalaureia, it was nevertheless an important cult site for the Aegean islands and arguably a 'religious centre not of a purely Ionian world, but predominately of a *nesiotic* world.'²⁸⁵ These are to excellent examples of how the maritime realm, through myth, reinforced networks around the Greek world and helped foment and maintain a maritime consciousness.

Dionysos is a deity not normally associated with the sea or maritime concerns, yet there are strong links, especially in Athens. Pastoral images often come to mind when thinking of Dionysos, but the god's capture by pirates is a well-known story. The *Homeric Hymn to Dionysos* tells the story, whereby the god is introduced as standing next to the sea, where he is then taken by Tyrrhenian pirates (1-9). The helmsman alone recognizes Dionysos as a god, naming several and concluding he must be a resident of Olympus, whom they must release lest he raise a storm against the ship (17-24). From this it seems that any one of the gods could reasonably be found near the sea, in striking distance of pirates. The story ends with the pirates diving overboard and transforming into dolphins (51-3).²⁸⁶ This is not necessarily the end for the pirates though, as their transformation into dolphins may

²⁸² Strabo 8.6.14. There is debate about which Orchomenos this is: the one in Boiotia or in Arkadia. For a brief summary of the discussion, see: Constantakopoulou (2007): 31-32.

²⁸³ Constantakopoulou (2007): 32-36.

²⁸⁴ Constantakopoulou (2007): 37.

²⁸⁵ Constantakopoulou (2007): 58; for discussion on the site's activity and its place as a religious network, Constantakopoulou (2007): 38-58.

²⁸⁶ See also Apollodorus *Library*, 3.337.

represent a transformation into worshippers of Dionysos.²⁸⁷ This is not as odd as it first appears, for dolphins have a close connection with Dionysos and revelry, and in particular the symposium. There are numerous examples of wine vessels adorned with dolphins as partaking of wine and revelry, accompanying Dionysos and/or symposiasts, including on pottery depicting land scenes where dolphins still appear.²⁸⁸ Added to this is the metaphor of a symposium as a ship at sea. This is most vividly depicted in a passage of Timaeus, who relates a story in which a group of symposiasts in Akragas came to believe that they were in fact aboard a ship in a storm and as a result became panicked, throwing furniture ‘overboard’ in order to lighten ‘the ship’, as well as some of them hiding under ‘rowing benches’. Afterwards the house became known as the ‘Trireme’ because of this curious incident (FGrH 566 F 149; Ath. 2.37b-d). Two items of Attic black-figure pottery dated to the third quarter of the sixth century found on Thera (Santorini) also show a connection between drinking and the sea. One, a *krater*, has four ships painted alongside the inside rim sailing on a sea, with the added effect that when the *krater* was filled they would appear to be floating on a sea of wine. Similarly, a rather large band cup has six ships with individually detailed helmsmen sailing alongside the inside rim. In the centre of the cup is a scene of Poseidon fighting the giant Polybotes (Fig. 3).²⁸⁹ Euripides in *Alkestis* has Herakles tell a servant to drink and be happy and uses a metaphor involving the drinker and the sweep of oars in the cup moving him from one anchorage to another (μεθοομιεῖ σε πίτυλος ἐμπεισῶν σκύφου: 798).²⁹⁰ Finally, much like the pirates who captured him, Dionysos is at one time forced to dive into the sea. In the *Iliad*, Diomedes relates the story of how Lykourgos harassed and threatened Dionysos and forced him to dive into the sea, where he is embraced by Thetis rather than turned into a dolphin (6.130-37), giving Dionysos an early literary connection to the sea.

²⁸⁷ Beaulieu (2016): 172-3. Beaulieu also devotes an entire chapter to diving into the sea and metamorphosis. Beaulieu (2016): 145-66.

²⁸⁸ Beaulieu (2016): 173-7, esp. notes 26-36 for further details and descriptions of the pottery. The ANU Classics museum holds in its collection an Attic black figure *skyphos* from the 3rd quarter of the 6th c. which depicts eight leaping dolphins on either side of the cup (see Figure 4). ANU Classic Museum, Item 76.10.

²⁸⁹ Author’s collection.

²⁹⁰ A metaphor which could be said to be ‘rowing for Dionysos’: Beaulieu (2016): 181. For more on drinking/rowing and cups see: Davies (1978): 72-90.



Figure 3: *Theran band cup*²⁹¹



Figure 4: *Attic band-skyphos*²⁹²

Stories of Dionysos and the sea were also important on a local level. The town of Brasiaie in Lakonia had a story that Kadmos had put Semele and Dionysos into a chest and cast it into the sea, to eventually wash ashore in their territory (Paus. 3.24.3-4). In Athens the Dionysia was a great festival with a strong connection to sailing, especially in the fact that it coincided with the abating of winter weather conditions at sea and an increase in overseas trade.²⁹³ More than just the timing, there were other elements connecting the

²⁹¹ Held in the Archaeological Museum of Thera, author's photograph.

²⁹² Held in the Australian National University Classics Museum collection, item 76.10.

²⁹³ Though as has been seen in Chapter Two, the argument for the sea being 'closed' during the winter months has been vastly overstated.

festival to the sea. There are several pottery examples that portray Dionysos and Satyrs riding wagons fitted out like ships and it is likely that ship-like wagons were used during the parade in the Dionysia,²⁹⁴ just as they were used during the Panatheniac festival.²⁹⁵ These disparate stories, practices, and visual motifs about Dionysos and the sea at the very least demonstrate that the sea could be found in the lives of those with no obvious connections to the maritime realm, including gods. It is in these less well-known and local stories that we glimpse the all-pervasive nature of the maritime realm in Greek life, on a panhellenic scale.

Tragedy

The sea features commonly in tragedy, both in theme and in language. Of importance is the fact that a tragedy was a performance watched by many and was not just for the literate or privileged: it had a wide audience. The main drawback is obvious in that these are primarily Athenian tragedies for an Athenian audience.²⁹⁶ Nevertheless, an examination of the tragedies helps to expose a maritime consciousness deeply ingrained within Athens and Athenian society, and the audience of Athenian tragedy expanded with time and the genre was no doubt influential in shaping wider views of particular mythic stories. Plutarch in his *Life of Theseus* had some choice words on the effects of 'Athenian chauvinism' in tragedy in the case of Minos, whom he saw as much maligned by the Athenians, saying that:

It is undoubtedly dangerous to incur the wrath of a city which has a tradition of speech and song. Minos always ended up spoken ill of, abused even, in Attic theatres, with no help coming to him from Hesiod, who called him 'most royal', or Homer, who designated him 'trusted friend of Zeus'. The tragedians overruled them and showered down insults from the stage, making him a violent, cruel character.²⁹⁷

²⁹⁴ See: Csapo (2012): 37-39; and Csapo 2013 and 2015 lectures, including to the Friends of the Australian Archaeological Institute in Athens (AAIA), presented in Canberra 2015 and based off his Houseman Lecture at UCL, 20 February 2013.

²⁹⁵ Wachsmann (2012): 237-66.

²⁹⁶ There are of course exceptions. *The Persians* was produced in Syrakousai. See: Garvie (2009): liii-lvii. That such a naval-themed play would be staged in the city of Sicily's greatest sea power is noteworthy.

²⁹⁷ Plut. *Thes.* 16.3. Translation: Hawes (2014): 162.

This is important in examining the multiplicity of mythic stories in ancient Greece,²⁹⁸ but also in its acknowledgement that Athenian tragedy seems to have had more influence on wider Greece than may be imagined.

The ways in which the sea and maritime concerns are portrayed in tragedies range from the overt to the subtle. The most obvious is Aeschylus' *Persians*, dealing with the battle of Salamis. Regardless of the rather contentious interpretation of the play,²⁹⁹ the bare facts are that it is a play concerned with a historical event, and a naval battle at that. Of particular note is the fact that many in the audience, not to mention Aeschylus himself, would have had a direct experience of the battle, as combatants or as civilians whose future rested on the outcome, a mere eight years before the play was staged.³⁰⁰ This context is of great importance when examining the things that are said in the play, especially regarding Athens' maritime character. The play puts precedence on Salamis as the victory that destroyed the Persians, all but overlooking the battle of Plataia. The messenger's speech opens with the lament that Persia, harbour (literally: λιμῆν) of great wealth, has been destroyed in a single blow (ὡς ἐν μιᾷ πληγῇ κατέφθαρται πολὺς ὄλβος: 250-2). The chorus later says that the 'sea-washed isle of Aias holds the power of Persia' (Αἴαντος περικλύστα νᾶσος ἔχει τὰ Περσῶν: 596-7). The disaster is such that Persian defeat at sea is the doom of the land army, when the queen tells the ghost of Darius that, 'The naval force was ruined, and that doomed the land army to destruction' (ναυτικός στρατός κακωθεὶς πεζὸν ὤλεσε στρατόν: 728). Darius' response is even more telling, for he asks if the army was destroyed by the spear (ὧδε παμπήδην δὲ λαὸς πᾶς κατέφθαρται δορὶ: 729), clearly thinking the army has been physically destroyed by war.³⁰¹ The implication is

²⁹⁸ Tragedies often acting as a foil to Plutarch's preferred rationalizations. See: Hawes (2014): 162-3.

²⁹⁹ The two opposing sides viewing the play as either traditionally 'tragic' or as akin to triumphalist victory propaganda. The first view seems more reasonable, as it is a tragedy that fits the conventions of others. That the play is concerned with foreigners is not far removed from other Athenian tragedies, where the action takes place in locations other than Athens. The Persians in Aeschylus' play might be an Athenian projection but it is not so different from the Thebes of Athenian tragedy, for instance: a creation of the Athenian stage. While there is admonishment of the foolishness of Xerxes in the play, it comes not from the Greeks but from other Persians, and indeed not a single Greek is mentioned by name in the play, hardly in keeping with the view that the play is playing up the Greek victory. This is not to say that *Persians* does not allude to Athenian victory – the obvious counterpart to Persian defeat – or that it does not seek to remind the Athenians that they defeated the most feared power of the time, but to illustrate that the play cannot be reduced to a single interpretation and that tragedies in general were not so simple in their message and morality. For a detailed discussion see: Garvie (2009): xvi-xxxii and Kyriakou (2011): 17-35.

³⁰⁰ Kyriakou (2011): 17.

³⁰¹ δόρυ here serving as the usual symbol of Greek fighting: Garvie (2009): 289.

that the defeat of the Persian navy has sealed the expedition's fate. Without naval support the army cannot triumph, and defeat at sea has thus caused the defeat of the entire expedition. Indeed, at the end of the play the chorus laments, cataloguing all of the vast empire and wealth controlled under Darius, giving a brief geographic survey of all the lands and islands over which Persia held sway (852-904) and finishes by saying that it all was in jeopardy because of mighty blows struck at sea (ἄμαθ' ἔντες μέγ' ἄλλως π' ἀλαλαῖσι ποντίαςιν: 905-6).³⁰² The prominence of the maritime world is heavily emphasised throughout the play. This could reflect Athens' maritime character at the time of the battle, or the play itself could be a solidification of this view of Athens. In either case, Athens' place in the Persian Wars takes on a distinctly maritime characteristic from early on in the Classical period.

Various episodes of the Trojan War often feature in tragedy, and as an overseas expedition this involves many maritime features. This is unsurprising since the expedition itself is defined in the *Iliad* by the fleet that sails to Troy in the Catalogue of Ships. In Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*, the titular character is referred to as a commander of ships (νεῶν ἄναρχος: 1227), and again in the next play in the trilogy (ναύαρχος: *Cho.* 723). The Greek force is called a naval force (ναυτικός στρατός: *Ag.* 634) and both Sophokles and Euripides use the comparable phrase ναυτικὸν στρατεύμα.³⁰³ Interestingly, the authors use another phrase to describe the host as a 'seagoing army' (ναυβάτας στρατός: Aesch. *Ag.* 987; στρατεύμα ναύφαρκτον: Eur. *IT.* 1259). With both usages the authors are emphasising the maritime nature of the Trojan expedition, as either a naval force or as a seagoing army – a military force conveyed by and reliant on the sea.

The language of tragedy often evokes the sea and ships, especially in the form of metaphor. Perhaps the most well-known is that of the ship of state, which has an epic antecedent in Pindar, who closes *Pythian 10* with the phrase 'the diligent steering of states' in referring to a city's ruling lineage (κεδναὶ πολίων κυβερνάσιες: Pind. *Pyth.* 10.73).³⁰⁴ The steering metaphor is also expanded upon and used to refer to the steering of one's spirit in

³⁰² For a comprehensive commentary on this episode see: Garvie (2009): 325-36.

³⁰³ Euripides, *Iphigeneia at Aulis* 914; Sophokles, *Philoctetes* 58-9. For more on the language of fleets and commanders of fleets as it was applied by ancient authors, particularly Herodotus and Thucydides, see: Pritchard (1999): 183-4.

³⁰⁴ Beaulieu (2016): 69.

Bacchylides' *Ode 17* (κυβερνᾶις φρενῶν: 21-23). Pindar and Bacchylides are both early examples of this metaphor usage, picked up by the tragedians, and help demonstrate a view of the world in which the maritime related to the mundane. The steering of the ship of state is evocatively invoked by Eteokles in the second line of Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes*, where he talks of steering the city from the stern. Aeschylus' *Seven* is rife with other nautical imagery and the land-locked city of Thebes is portrayed as a ship beset by waves and storms in the form of the Argive army.³⁰⁵ Sophokles in *Antigone* makes constant use of nautical metaphor, especially in terms of Kreon and steering the ship of state, by Kreon himself (τοῦτο γινώσκων ὅτι ἦδ' ἐστὶν ἡ σώζουσα καὶ ταύτης ἔπι πλέοντες ὀρθῆς τοὺς φίλους ποιούμεθα: 188-90), and by Teiresias when referring to Kreon's rule (τοιγὰρ δι' ὀρθῆς τήνδ' ἐναυκλήρεις πόλιν: 994). There are other, more subtle uses of nautical metaphor common to other tragedies as well, such as steering/rowing (σύμπλους: 540-1; ὁμοροθέω: 536-7) and storms (καλχαίνω: 20).³⁰⁶ Nautical language and metaphor was rife in tragedy and this matters in examining how the maritime world and maritime considerations played on the minds of the Greeks in a popular medium.³⁰⁷

A perfect summation of the use of nautical imagery in Greek tragedy comes from Robert Goheen in his appraisal of Sophokles' *Antigone*, and is worth quoting at length:

In part the nautical imagery helps to express the accomplishments of human ingenuity and also some of the need for cooperative endeavour. At the same time the sea with its storms and depth and violence is employed to give concrete embodiment to the workings of the gods as the great and elemental moral forces of the universe, beyond man's complete understanding or control but fundamental to his success and welfare... There is every evidence to believe that for the Greeks these images were not mere clichés but, because of the people's close dependence on the sea, had genuine representational and imaginative value to express feelings of aspiration, difficult achievement, and the existence of greater forces limiting human endeavour.³⁰⁸

³⁰⁵ For further discussion see: Kirkwood (1969): esp. 19-22; Pritchard (1999): 171. Thebes may have been land-locked, but it must be kept in mind that the Thebes of the stage was an Athenian invention for an Athenian audience.

³⁰⁶ For a more comprehensive discussion, see: Goheen (1951): 44-50.

³⁰⁷ For a more thorough survey of the topic see: Pritchard (1999): 163-195. For a survey of political imagery: Brock (2013).

³⁰⁸ Goheen (1951): 44.

Nautical imagery was powerfully evocative and eminently relatable to the Greeks, a core feature of their lives. Hence even tragedies set in land-locked cities and concerned with sieges and their aftermath could be related in terms of the sea and sailing.

Comedy

Much as with tragedy, comedy can be used to explore how the maritime world pervaded contemporary Athenian life.³⁰⁹ The comedies of Aristophanes in particular are of great utility, especially when considering how highly reflective of Athenian life they are.³¹⁰ The comedies reflect many different aspects, ranging from everyday life to issues related directly to contemporary events, most notably the Peloponnesian War. The language of the plays includes a rich variety of nautical imagery,³¹¹ and maritime issues and nautical references are found throughout Old Comedy.

There are many overt references to contemporary events and sea power in Athens which characterise Athens as a sea power and link it closely with the sea. In response to the question of where they came from, two Athenians in *Birds* respond, 'from where the fine triremes come from' (ὅθεν αἱ τριήρεις αἱ καλαί: 107). The Peloponnesian War is characterised as a conflict where maritime issues and concerns are extremely prevalent. Aristophanes' first extant play, *Akharnians*, deals with the Peloponnesian War and the issue of Athenian war strategy, especially Perikles' maritime approach. Dikaiopolis bemoans the money spent on Thracian mercenaries and says that the rowers 'who save the city' (ὁ σωσίπολις) would be unhappy to hear of the expense (162-3). When offered a five-year

³⁰⁹ With the same caveat attached to tragedy: it was Athenian tragedy for a primarily Athenian audience, perhaps even more so considering how dependent these comedies are on the cultural and political context of Athens.

³¹⁰ The issue of using Old Comedy as evidence for popular Athenian culture in the fifth century has been a topic of debate, most notably with G.E.M. de Ste. Croix's contention that Aristophanes' views represented that of the elite ('The political outlook of Aristophanes': 1972: 355-76). Influential for many years, this view no longer seems tenable, and scholars such as Keith Sidwell and David Pritchard view comedy as being of great value for providing insight into popular Athenian culture. See: Sidwell (2009); Pritchard (2012): 14-51.

³¹¹ Space again precludes a thorough examination, but a few examples to illustrate the point: ship of state metaphor *Assemblywomen* 109; *Wasps* 29 (with nautical pun afterwards); a helmet and its ear-holes as 'oarports' *Peace* 1232, 1234; 'rowing two boats with one oar' *Assemblywomen* 1091; 'back-water' or 'reverse oars' (ἀνακρούω) *Wasps* 399, *Birds* 648; a character's name in the play *Women at the Thesmophoria*, Nausimache (Ναυσιμάχη), 'victory at sea', 804; a character like a warship in dangerous waters, and other sailing metaphors, *Akharnians* 95-7. Aristophanes clearly liked to infuse the language of his play with nautical metaphors and language, even in stories with no overt connection to the maritime realm or the sea.

peace, Dikaiopolis says that it smells of ‘pitch and warship construction’ (ὄζουσι πίττης καὶ παρασκευῆς νεῶν: 190), and later on in the discussion of the Megarian decree and causes of the war, the Athenian response and preparations are described in terms of sending out 300 ships (τριακοσίας ναῦς) and other naval preparations (535-556). The number of 300 ships must have been an exaggeration, but the fact is that the default Athenian response is to send out ships and it is the number not the means which appears to be the comic element here.³¹² Further, when the chorus goes on praising the poet of the play, they say that the Persian king when deciding which side to support asks whom the poet has abused, but firstly which side has more ships (649). Finally, when the chorus leader complains about how he and the other old men of the city have been treated he says that their treatment is unworthy of the sea-battles they have fought (677-8). It is clear that discussion of the Peloponnesian War and Athenian power in general was usually centred on sea power and maritime considerations.

Aristophanes was an astute observer of naval and maritime affairs and was able to discuss sea power with an audience in ways that resonated. He clearly understood the critical link between wealth and sea power and how they functioned in a feedback loop – wealth enabling sea power which in turn allowed for more wealth. The Kleon of *Knights* is always asking for swift ships in order to collect revenue (1070-1).³¹³ The chorus of *Wasps* are explicit in their opinion of what made Athens great and rich: their generation, whose skill and power at sea elicited fear in Athens’ enemies, defeated the Medes, and was responsible for the riches flowing to Athens for the younger generations to steal (1091-1100). It is the same wealth which also enabled Athenian sea power. Chremylos asks the god Wealth the rhetorical question of whether or not it was him who filled the triremes (*Plut.* 172), and the Spartan Lampito tells the Athenian Lysistrata that Athens would not give up the war so long as they had triremes and money in their treasury (*Lys.* 173-4). Athenian reach is strong thanks to its sea power, with a character in *Birds* saying that they could not live anywhere

³¹² Indeed, MacDowell sees suitable comic expression in this passage, but nothing that is inconsistent with Thucydides’ account of the issue. MacDowell (1995): 66.

³¹³ It is followed in the next line by a pun/joke on foxes and triremes being swift, further illustrating the use of maritime language throughout Aristophanes.

near the sea, for they would wake up one day to see the Athenian ship *Salaminia* waiting to summon them (145-7).

Finally, it was not enough that Aristophanes recognized and discussed sea power and its enablers and uses, for he gave explicit advice as to Athens' best course of action in the war. In *Peace* he has Hermes tell the Athenians that if they truly want to bring Peace forward that they should retreat towards the sea (506-7). In *Frogs* Aristophanes has the most hallowed of Athenian playwrights, Aeschylus, give the Athenian strategic advice, to not worry about the Spartan occupation of Dekeleia, but to consider Spartan territory their own, their ships as wealth, and wealth as poverty (1463-5). He is telling the Athenians that their fleet *is* their wealth and their power, able to strike the Spartans in their own territory more than the Spartans can theirs, and that money not spent is essentially useless and akin to poverty. He is in essence echoing Periklean war strategy at the beginning of the war.³¹⁴ Aristophanes not only appreciates the maritime realm but explicitly gives the Athenians advice that they should embrace their sea power.

One of the main points to make about these plays is that the source of humour in these situations is not derived from any farcical or outrageous maritime elements. Important plot-points are not reliant on flying triremes or other similarly absurd maritime elements. Instead, the maritime world provides legitimate and relatable context to the play. The maritime references that appear in the plays give the situations real-world grounding. Indeed, as comedy is often used to make serious political or social points, the comedies of Aristophanes demonstrate a keen understanding of maritime issues and sea power in Athens and are demonstrative of a city with a deep maritime consciousness. Aristophanes constantly portrays an Athens that is a sea power, indeed *the* sea power of the Greek and world.³¹⁵

³¹⁴ MacDowell's conclusion, hard to argue with. MacDowell (1995): 296. For more on Perikles' war strategy, see Chapter Six.

³¹⁵ Pritchard (1999): 210-11. For further analysis of Old Comedy and the navy in Athens see: Pritchard (1999): 210-23.

Finally, there is the curious example of Theophrastus' work *Characters*, a work that is hard to place in any specific genre, although possibly qualifying as a work in the comic realm.³¹⁶ The utility of this work is found in the way the sea pervades different aspects of the 'characters' examined. Much like the comic plays, the maritime aspects are often incidental to the main story being told, which means that these aspects are grounded in reality and not just an exaggeration to make a point. Indeed, as Rusten argues, the setting of *Characters* is anything but timeless or idealizing and is unmistakably the last few decades of the fourth century BC in Athens with the customs, institutions and prejudices that formed the backdrop of the characters in the work.³¹⁷ The maritime aspects of the work cover both peace and war, the important and the mundane. The 'boorish man' goes to the market to buy preserved fish (τάριχος: 4.15), and the 'shameless man' also goes to the market for fresh or preserved fish (ἰχθυοπώλιον and τარიχοπώλιον: 6.9), a subtle reference but clear in highlighting the different kinds of fish sold in Athens. Overseas trade is an ever-present concern, both in terms of trade goods and Athenians engaged in trade. The 'Idle-chatterer' discusses the sea-lanes being open (3.3), and one of the other characters lists numerous different trade goods including 'Sicilian pigeons, and dice made from gazelle horns, and oil flasks from Thourioi of the rounded sort, and walking sticks from Sparta of the twisted sort' (5.9).³¹⁸ Interestingly, he talks of this character engaged in the transshipment of goods from around Greece and the Aegean: 'but for foreigners he buys letters of commission for Byzantium, and Lakonian dogs for Kyzikos, and Hymettos honey for Rhodes, and as he does so he tells everybody in town about it.' (5.8).³¹⁹ The man with petty ambition ensures he has an Ethiopian attendant and has a Maltese dog (21.4, 9). The 'fraudulent' man stands on the breakwater and brags to strangers about how much money he has invested in shipping (23.2) and talks of how he turned down an offer to export timber duty-free from Macedonia (23.4). Travel is also evident in the different characters, with the man of 'bad taste' delaying people who are about to set sail (20.3).

³¹⁶ There is no example of virtue in the work, which follows Theophrastus' mentor Aristotle's thought that comedy depicted people who were not to be taken seriously. *Poet.* 1149a32. Rusten (2003): 21. For an excellent recent work on *Characters*, see: Pertsinidis (2018).

³¹⁷ Rusten (2003): 9. On the dating of the work to circa 319 BC, see: Boegehold (1959): 15-19; Rusten (2003): 10-11.

³¹⁸ Translation Rusten (2003).

³¹⁹ Translation Rusten (2003).

War and naval matters get an airing in the different characters as well. The ‘rumour-monger’ discusses people who have won battles by land and sea (πεζομαχία καὶ ναυμαχία νικῶντες: 8.11). The ‘ungenerous’ man is so because he takes the bedding of his helmsman while he serves as trierarch (22.5), and he declines to discuss all of the warships that he has paid for (23.6), while the ‘authoritarian’ man complains about the burden of the trierarchy (26.6). Finally, there is the coward who when at sea is frightened by cliffs, thinking them to be pirate ships. He even goes so far as to take off his clothes (so that he is better prepared to swim) and begs to be put ashore (25.2). This is telling in several respects. It suggests that those frightened of sailing could be considered cowardly,³²⁰ and that swimming was something most Greeks could do. The passage merely says he takes off his shirt (χιτωνίσκος) and hands it to his slave with the assumption that this will make it easier to swim.

This is by no means a comprehensive survey of the sea in Greek myth and culture, a topic deserving of its own thesis. Rather this chapter has aimed at providing a brief survey while illustrating the fundamental point that the sea and maritime themes and language pervaded the Greek and especially the Athenian consciousness. This is important, as it shows a level of interest and knowledge of maritime affairs that is greater than just a passing interest or shallow understanding. This is especially true of Athens, where a large portion of the citizen population would have been making regular military and political decisions concerning sea power. This is not to say that these decision makers were all experts in the application of sea power, though some certainly would have had much experience, but to argue that their exposure to the maritime world was significant and that it is proper to think of many if not most of the Greeks as having possessed a maritime consciousness to some degree, small or large.

³²⁰ What this says about the prevalence of piracy will be explored further in Chapter Nine. At this point it is worth noting that the nature of this work suggests perhaps comic over-exaggeration. Piracy was probably a legitimate concern, but not as much as the character portrayed would suggest; he is after all a cowardly character and the fear he displays is then by definition unwarranted and unreasonable: suitable for mockery.

Chapter Five – Maritime Consciousness II: History and philosophy

It was not just on stage or in the stories of myth that the sea and maritime issues pervaded the consciousness of the Greeks. Politicians, philosophers and historians also had much to say on the subject in their speeches and writings. Just as the dramatic and mythic works show a culture steeped in maritime tradition, so too do the works of historians and politicians reveal the everyday workings of sea power in Greek thought and action. This chapter addresses sea power in Greek thought, and analyses how politicians and writers conceptualised it. The chapter passes over analysing the events narrated, which are covered in later chapters that deal with the maritime operations themselves. Nor is it a thorough historiographical analysis of the ancient sources. The intention here is to dig into the thoughts of the writers and determine the place of sea power in greater Greek thought and to what degree sea power and maritime issues influenced this thought.

Herodotos and Thucydides

Herodotos appears as the first writer to explore ‘thalassocracy’ as a distinct idea in Greek history,³²¹ an idea broadened by Thucydides who highlighted its importance at the very beginning of his work. Both Herodotos and Thucydides catalogue mythic and historical figures who were the first ‘thalassocrats’. According to Herodotus it was Polykrates, tyrant of Samos, who was the first Greek to attempt to rule the sea. He passes over Minos and others before who, he suggests, belong to mythical times (Hdt. 3.122.2). This contrasts with the normally less credulous Thucydides, who lists Minos as the first Thalassocrat in history (Thuc. 1.4).³²² This is unsurprising given that Thucydides from the beginning of his work is emphasising the importance of sea power in history, and by placing Minos as the first ruler of the sea he is able to extend the concept of thalassocracy to predate the all-important Trojan War.³²³ The existence of a Minoan Thalassocracy is debated,³²⁴ but regardless of its

³²¹ Momigliano (1944): 1.

³²² Though as Simon Hornblower points out in his historical commentary, Thucydides uses the word ἀκοή, ‘hearsay’, which Hornblower sees as more sceptical, or more precise than Herodotus. Hornblower (1997): 20.

³²³ Cf. Hornblower (1997): 3.

³²⁴ See: *The Minoan Thalassocracy. Myth and Reality. Proceedings of the Third International Symposium at the Swedish Institute in Athens, 31 May-5 June, 1982.* Robin Hägg and Nanno Marinatos (eds.).

historical veracity the ancient Greek authors like Herodotos and Thucydides gave it credence.

Herodotos is interested in the seas themselves and in describing different maritime areas to his audience. He describes the Caspian Sea, firstly giving a geography lesson on how it is a self-contained sea and does not connect to the Mediterranean. As a side note, he mentions that the Mediterranean is connected to the Erythraian (Red) and Atlantic Seas and that in fact these all constitute a single sea (1.202.4).³²⁵ He then goes back to the Caspian Sea and gives the sailing times for crossing it, both north-south and east-west at the widest point (1.203.1).³²⁶ He briefly describes the dimensions of Erythraian Sea, and makes specific mention of the fact that the level of the sea rises and falls every day (2.11.1-2). This is in contrast to the virtually tideless Mediterranean,³²⁷ and the fact that he leaves this unspoken indicates that the reader will grasp this difference between them. He tells of Egyptians and Persians circumnavigating Africa and sailing down the Indus and west back to Egypt (4.42-44). He also gives details on the dimension of the Pontos, Bosporos, Propontis and Hellespont (4.85-86), a region of increasing importance to the Greeks and especially the Athenians as the fifth century progressed.

Herodotos' narrative at many points shows he has a grasp of sea power and how it influenced the history he writes about. In discussing the Ionians in 546, he says that the islanders were safe from the predations of Persia because the Persians were not seafarers and had not yet conquered the Phoenicians (1.143.1). He does not mention why the Persians having not conquered the Phoenicians is important in this context, leaving the reader to determine that it was because the Phoenicians were the great sea power of the eastern Mediterranean. He is able to establish a connection between wealth and sea power. In the debate at Miletos in 499 on whether they should revolt from Persia, the dissenting voice of Hekataios says they must gain control of the seas: δεύτερα συνεβούλευε ποιέειν ὅκως ναυκρατέες τῆς θαλάσσης ἔσονται (5.36.2). Moreover, they needed to seize the wealth dedicated by Kroisos at the sanctuary of Branchidai in order to be able to afford this

³²⁵ He refers to the Mediterranean as 'the one which is navigated by the Hellenes' - τὴν μὲν γὰρ Ἕλληνας ναυτίλλονται. It is worth noting that to the Greeks the Erythraian Sea included what we today consider the Red Sea and the entire Indian Ocean.

³²⁶ 15 and 8 days respectively, in a sailing ship with oars.

³²⁷ See Chapter Two on points of geography and environment.

sea control (5.36.3). He also relates a story concerning the early combination of wealth, walls, and a fleet to provide security for a polis. The island of Thasos in 491 was said to have been using its great wealth, derived from its mines, to build warships and to enclose the city in a stronger wall (Hdt. 6.47.2). According to Herodotos the island was settled by the great seafarers, the Phoenicians,³²⁸ and had very productive gold mines, both on the island and on the mainland (6.46-47). The Thasians assented to a request by Darius to tear down the walls and give over their ships (6.48.1), but this small episode gives a hint at the potential for a city to combine walls, a fleet, and strong revenue as a strategy.

Sea power was critical to the Persian invasion of Greece in 480, both in terms of the Persian offensive and for the Greek forces in defence and so Herodotus has much to say on the matter. In the Persian discussion over the proposed invasion of Greece, Xerxes' uncle Artabanos cautions the king, warning that if the Persians were to lose a naval battle the Greeks may well sail to the Hellespont and destroy the bridge there, a calamity for the Persian forces (7.10β.2). This fear was almost realised after the loss at Salamis (8.97.1) when Xerxes was forced to despatch warships to the Hellespont in order to guard the bridge (8.107). As it happened, the bridge across the Hellespont was destroyed by a storm and the Persian army was ferried across by boats (8.117.1). Fear of a destroyed bridge seems irrational in light of this, and perhaps the real fear was the presence of a Greek fleet that could block attempts at crossing the Hellespont by boat. However, this is not stated in Herodotos, and his narrative of the events remains somewhat unsatisfying.

Herodotos is clearer when discussing other naval operations of the war. He states that the aim of the King's expedition was not just to punish Athens, but to conquer all of Greece (7.138.1). Crucially, the Greeks who had not submitted to Persia were in great fear because there were not enough ships to confront the invader - ἄτε οὔτε νεῶν ἐουσέων ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἀριθμὸν ἀξιομάχων δέκεσθαι τὸν ἐπιόντα (7.138.2). The pre-eminence he places in ships for the defence of Greece sets the reader up for his next statement. He says he will put forward a controversial opinion and then makes his most important declaration about Greek victory in the impending war.³²⁹ He declares that it was Athens which contributed

³²⁸ On the likelihood of this and arguments around the matter see: Scott (2005): 207-9.

³²⁹ Controversial and flying in the face of Greek popular opinion outside of Athens. Hale (2009): 135.

most to the defence of Greece. He baldly states that if Athens had not opposed Persia, no other Greek power would have opposed Persia at sea (7.139.2). Had that happened, the Persians would have been able to use their fleet to outflank the wall at the isthmus and conquered the states of the Peloponnesos or otherwise convinced them to medize – either way, the Greek would have been defeated (7.139.3-4). Thus, before he even narrates the invasion itself Herodotos makes his judgement on why the Greeks were able to resist Persia. He even has a non-Athenian, a certain Chileos of Tegea, explicitly say that the wall at the isthmus was all but useless without the Athenian fleet. This forces the Spartans to march north to Plataia (9.9.2). J.F. Lazenby in his survey of the Persian Wars has much to say in his conclusion on important factors determining the war but does not mention this passage in Herodotos.³³⁰ He mixes tactical, strategic and moral arguments, and is altogether somewhat confused about higher concepts of strategy, with lines such as: ‘Nevertheless, in a sense, the war may have been won and lost in the strategic sphere.’³³¹ The theory of sea power is absent, evidenced by his belief that tactics barely existed in naval warfare of the time.³³² It is hard to imagine a war in which neither tactics nor strategy play much of a part, as is the implication here. Herodotos and other Greeks had a clear idea of what enabled the Greeks to eventually prevail: Athenian sea power. Salamis would live large in the minds of the Greeks and especially the Athenians,³³³ who never tired of reminding others what they had done to save Greece.

Sea power is a defining factor in Thucydides’ history, not just of the Peloponnesian War, but Greek history as well. As noted above he places Minos in the historical realm and establishes him as the first Greek thalassocrat. Thucydides’ emphasis on Minos as the first ruler of the sea goes beyond mere military considerations. He says that cities were usually built away from the sea due to the predations of pirates (1.7), but that Minos and his sea

³³⁰ *The Defence of Greece 490-479 BC* (1993): 248-61.

³³¹ Lazenby (1993): 253.

³³² Lazenby (1993): 251.

³³³ It even lived on through the architecture of Athens. Samantha Martin-Mcauliffe and John Papadopoulos argue that during the reconstruction of the Acropolis after the Persian invasion, the Athenians deliberately changed the orientation of the Propylaia so that upon leaving the Acropolis one was presented with a direct view of Salamis. In doing this they were ‘framing victory’ and reminding visitors that the wonder of Athena’s sanctuary on the Acropolis was all derived from victory at Salamis which not only freed the Athenians, but enriched them through the Delian League. See: Martin-Mcauliffe and Papadopoulos (2012): 332-361.

power cleared the sea lanes and made communication by sea easier (1.8.2-3). This security led to prosperity, enabling cities to acquire wealth and walls and to become more powerful and eventually grow by subjugating smaller cities (1.8.3-4). Here we have an explicit expression of opinion that sea power and the security it provided for the Aegean was connected to wealth and prosperity, and the acquisition of even greater power. The first glimpse of Thucydides' *realpolitik* follows, when he says that Agamemnon was able to launch the Trojan expedition not because of the oath of Tyndareos, but because of his superiority in strength (1.9.1):³³⁴ a superiority over the other Greeks enabled by his navy, which must have been superior to all others given that Mykene itself was a land power, as Thucydides says (1.9.3-4). After the Trojan War and ensuing turmoil the Greeks grew in power and desired more wealth and 'Greece fitted out fleets and clung more to the sea' – ναυτικά τε ἐξηρτύετο ἡ Ἑλλάς καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης μᾶλλον ἀντείχοντο (1.13.1). Korinth becomes the first city to build triremes (1.13.2-3) and again wealth is connected to a navy, which helps suppress piracy which in turn promotes the growth of more wealth (1.13.5). This is Thucydides highlighting what he thought to be the most important things in war: financial and maritime resources.³³⁵

Thucydides neatly summarises his thoughts on sea power soon after. He says of the early Greek navies that despite their smallness, they were a great power for those who acquired them, both in terms of revenue and power gained over others – χρημάτων τε προσόδῳ καὶ ἄλλων ἀρχῇ (1.15.1). Moreover, wars by land amongst the Greeks were basically non-existent, save for the usual border conflicts (1.15.2). Here Thucydides is speaking on a strategic level, weighing the worth of sea and land power and expressing his opinion that it was sea power which predominately led to wealth and power. It is critical to note that he describes these navies as being of great strength and power despite their smallness (ἐλαχίστην). Where scholars like Chester Starr, Michael Palmer and others seem to think such smallness rendered navies of the ancient world of little importance, the contemporary general and historian Thucydides judged navies, no matter how small, to have been of extreme importance to his world and the shaping of its history.

³³⁴ Hornblower sees Thucydides as not denying the oath motive as relevant, but merely as the public pretext and not the 'true cause'. Hornblower (1997): 31.

³³⁵ de Romilly (2012): 157.

When discussing more recent history like the Persian Wars, Thucydides gives equal precedence to land and sea battles, saying that the war was decided by two sea and two land battles – *δυοῖν ναυμαχίαιν καὶ πεζομαχίαιν* (1.23.1). He does not say which battles were the critical ones,³³⁶ but the important thing to note is that the fighting by land and sea is given equal status. Hence we see at the strategic level that sea power more than land power led to wealth and rule over others, and in the specific example of the Persian Wars both sea and land power together ensured victory. This is sea power on two different levels. In the first instance, it is a force that shapes the geopolitical landscape of Greece and the Aegean. In the second, it is a force that helps decide a war, a smaller part of the whole, leading certain powers in their victory to gain even more wealth and influence. Athens above all in the case of the Persian Wars, but other Greek cities too benefited from victory over the Persians. It is a fine but necessary distinction to make, and cause for many of the misunderstandings which abound in the scholarship.

Sea power as strategy appears in Thucydides when he discusses Athens and the aftermath of the Persian Wars. Athens' decision to rebuild the city's walls caused anxiety in Sparta, though it was Sparta's allies that allegedly goaded the Spartans into confronting Athens, fearing the Athenian navy and the valour which they had displayed against Persia (1.90.1). This is perhaps the first time in his work that he makes a link between sea power and walls, left unspoken in this instance. It is also noteworthy that he says it was Sparta's allies who were most concerned: allies who were nearer to the coast than Sparta and therefore more vulnerable to Athenian sea power. The explicit linking of walls and sea power comes soon after when he tells of Themistokles' efforts to fortify the Peiraieus (1.93.3-7). Thucydides sees Themistokles as the one who spurred Athens into becoming a sea power and as such laid the foundations of the Athenian Empire (1.93.4). Having already related how powerful navies had caused previous cities to become, Thucydides has the Athenians join the club of Thalassocracies.

³³⁶ Gomme presumes Thucydides is talking of Artemision and Salamis, Thermopylai and Plataia, though possibly Mykale instead of Artemision. Gomme (1945): 151. Hornblower understands it as Salamis and either Artemision or Mykale, and Thermopylai and Plataia by land, dismissing Marathon as a possibility. Hornblower (1997): 62. Thucydides either presumes the reader will know which exact battles he means, or will be able to make a judgement call about it. In any case the fact that he does not name the battles puts emphasis on the fact that it was by land and sea equally that the war was decided.

This illustrates the point that the *archaeology* chapters should not be passed over so lightly, as they are integral to understanding Thucydides' thoughts on the factors that controlled his world. From this comes the basis of Thucydides' construction of a model of power, taken first from the two great moments in history before his time, the thalassocracies of Kreta and Mykene,³³⁷ and further influenced by the Athens of his time. It is here that Jacqueline de Romilly has the most incisive insight into 'the mind of Thucydides'. For her the Athenian system represents the model of power on which all the Greek world sits:

*A fleet allows commerce. Commerce brings revenue. Revenue creates a treasury. The treasury, for its part, is tied to stability, which leads to the existence of walls. And these three terms, fleet-treasury-walls, make it possible for a state to group numerous other states under its domination, and to acquire a force.*³³⁸

As she says, Thucydides never gives such an explicit analysis in his work, but the text itself is what establishes the basis for a systematically realistic interpretation of history.³³⁹ Josiah Ober follows this judgement, referring to (Athens') 'perfection of a technology of power', in the form of a 'material' triad of money, walls and ships.³⁴⁰ Athens epitomizes this supreme model of power in Thucydides' age.

The charge that Thucydides' analysis of sea power is limited throughout his narrative, as Chester Starr says, is therefore unsubstantiated.³⁴¹ The narrative itself demonstrates to the audience that sea power played a significant role in the Peloponnesian War, a point de Romilly makes about Thucydides' narrative. To say that Thucydides is not analysing sea power because he does not break it down in the way that Mahan or Corbett did is not only poor historiography, but poor reading of Thucydides. Thucydides' narrative of the Pentekontaetia concludes with the statement that the Athenians had advanced their power to a great height during this period (1.118.2). The interval of the Pentekontaetia as told by Thucydides clearly presents sea power as the crucial element in the rise of this Athenian power. The systematic analysis of the conduct of maritime operations later in this thesis

³³⁷ de Romilly (2012): 165. Her work was originally published in French as *Histoire et raison chez Thucydide*, in 1967.

³³⁸ Emphasis in original. de Romilly (2012): 157.

³³⁹ de Romilly (2012): 157.

³⁴⁰ Ober (2006): 146.

³⁴¹ Starr (1978): 346.

will demonstrate that Thucydides clearly sees and narrates the Peloponnesian War as a war in which maritime considerations are central to its conduct and outcome.

This is also to ignore cases where Thucydides, through the speeches of others, has important things to say about sea power. Perikles' first speech has a clear elucidation of the way in which war was fought and the role of sea power in the impending conflict. He derides Sparta's ability to provide funding for a war, saying they lack public and private funds and are without experience of fighting long wars across sea (1.141.3). The first point is perhaps exaggerated,³⁴² but the second is closer to the mark and the implication is that Sparta would need to conduct long wars across seas in the impending war, a sound analysis since the basis of Athenian power was located almost entirely overseas. He emphasises this by saying that the Spartans were shut out from the sea – προσέτι καὶ θαλάσσης εἰργόμενοι (1.141.4). He returns to the issue of money which will hinder the Spartans in the war,³⁴³ especially since 'the opportunities of war do not wait' – τοῦ δὲ πολέμου οἱ καιροὶ οὐ μένετοί (1.142.1). This is a comment on the character of war as Perikles/Thucydides saw it, not just with respect to the requirement for money, but also that war was not some slow-paced endeavour, but one which could require quick and decisive action to make use of opportunities. As he is about to discuss sea power after this line, it is clear that he believes sea power provides the speed of action necessary for modern wars, sea power which of course required large amounts of capital. He goes as far as to say that Athenian naval skill was of more use on land than Spartan military skill would be at sea – πλέον γὰρ ὅμως ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν τοῦ κατὰ γῆν ἐκ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἄκεῖνοι ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἡπείρου ἐς τὰ ναυτικά. (1.142.5). Once again wealth and sea power are the two poles upon which supreme power rest.³⁴⁴ This forms a virtuous circle, where sea power produces wealth which further enables sea power that helps create the conditions necessary for wealth, and so on.

³⁴² As Hornblower points out it was a common fiction that there were no individually wealthy Spartans. Hornblower (1997): 228.

³⁴³ A sentiment that Cicero would later echo in his famous remark 'the sinews of war, infinite *money*' (*nervos belli, pecuniam infinitam*), a phrase forever after used as a common military aphorism. Cic. *Phil.* 5.5.

³⁴⁴ An observation not lost on Momigliano writing as far back as 1944. Momigliano (1944): 3.

In the final part of his speech Perikles outlines his strategy for the impending war. His strategy is centred on sea power, which he assesses as more capable than Sparta's land power. The Athenians could sail out and attack the Peloponnesos and the ensuing damage would be greater than the result of Sparta ravaging even all of Attika, for the Athenians had territory outside the reach of Sparta, namely the islands (1.143.4). As Perikles himself says, such is the rule granted by control of the sea, μέγα γὰρ τὸ τῆς θαλάσσης κράτος (1.143.5) – one of the core messages of Thucydides' *archaeology*.³⁴⁵ He then makes one of his most famous statements, where he compares Athens to an island and bids the Athenians to think of their city in such a manner (1.143.5). What is important to note is that Thucydides through Perikles is laying down the character of the war which is to follow, a war in which maritime considerations are at the forefront of the war effort.³⁴⁶ More explicitly, when Thucydides eulogises Perikles and assesses his role in the war he deems that Perikles had set the Athenians up for victory, including in telling them to attend to the navy (τὸ ναυτικὸν θεραπεύοντας, 2.65.7), and in not following his advice they lost the war (2.65.1-13). It is, as Hornblower says, an important passage of Thucydides work for the light it throws on his own political views.³⁴⁷

Lastly there is the infamous Melian dialogue, a passage which perhaps more than any other reveals Thucydides' thoughts on the character of Athens at that time. Passing over the arguments on the nature of power and morality in the speech, of significant note is the means by which the Athenians expect to subdue the Melians: through sea power. The Athenian embassy twice refers to Athens as ναυκράτωρ, hammering home the point that islanders could do little in the face of those in control of the seas. The retort by the Melians that the Kretan Sea was so large as to make control of it tricky (5.110.1-2) is easily dismissed by the Athenians (5.111.1-2), who are proven correct by their successful siege, unimpeded by outside intervention. This is a factor which often seems to get lost in discussing the

³⁴⁵ Hornblower (1997): 229.

³⁴⁶ Athenian war strategy will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six.

³⁴⁷ He is also correct in pointing out that Thucydides was wrong in saying there was a radical difference between the policy of Perikles and those of his successors. As Chapter Six will examine, the strategy of Perikles' successors until the Peace of Nikias was not radically different, but a continuation of Perikles' maritime strategy. Hornblower (1997): 340.

dialogue. Sea power put all the islands of the Aegean under threat from Athens in the same way.

The 'Old Oligarch'

One of the most prominent and important works dealing with Athenian sea power is that of the *Constitution of the Athenians* by the unknown author 'the Old Oligarch'.³⁴⁸ In discussing the work and what it says of the nature of Athenian sea power, its provenance is of great importance. Dating the work has a strong bearing on its historical utility, especially if it is dated to the fourth century as it is by Simon Hornblower.³⁴⁹ Hornblower assesses the work as a philosophical or rhetorical tract dated from the fourth century, referring back to a historical past in order to comment on the dangers of Athenian government at a time when Athens' power was rising once again.³⁵⁰ In such a case, the historical significance of the work is diminished as it is most likely exaggerating to make its point. Rather than being a contemporary reflection on Athenian society, it would be a polemic designed to remind readers of the dangers of a resurgent Athenian maritime empire. It would still be important in conceptualising Athenian sea power, but would lack the immediate relevance of a fifth century work. However, a fourth century dating is not as popular as a fifth century one,³⁵¹ and the description of Athens' use of sea power strongly reflects the historical record of Athens in the fifth century and ties in well with Thucydides' narrative,³⁵² and I would favour a fifth century dating.

From the beginning of the work the author is clear about who it is that holds power in Athens: the navy: ὅτι ὁ δῆμος ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλαύνων τὰς ναῦς καὶ ὁ τὴν δύναμιν περιτιθεὶς τῇ πόλει. The steersman (κυβερνήται), boatswains (κελευσταὶ), officers (πεντηκόνταρχοι),³⁵³ lookouts (προῤῃται) and shipwrights (ναυπηγοὶ) makes the city

³⁴⁸ Preference is given to referring to this unknown author as the 'Old Oligarch' rather than as 'pseudo-Xenophon' and all references to this work will be under 'Old Oligarch'.

³⁴⁹ Hornblower (2000): 363-384.

³⁵⁰ Hornblower (2000): 363-384.

³⁵¹ Scholars have overwhelmingly dated it to the fifth century see: Momigliano (1944): 2, especially n2; de Ste. Croix (1972): 308-9; Osborne (2004): 8-9. A discussion and comprehensive list of scholars and their proposed dating of the work is found in: Marr and Rhodes (2008): 3-6; 31-32.

³⁵² I will follow the majority of scholars and place the work in the fifth century, dated somewhere between 430-420 BC.

³⁵³ Leaders of fifty men, whose role aboard a trireme is not entirely understood, though it is safe to assume they were officers of some sort, leading some to translate as 'Lieutenant', as do as Marr and Rhodes (2008): 37. This is a reasonable approximation of the status these officers might have held, at least in the

powerful (1.2). The author returns to Athenian citizens' familiarity with the sea at 1.19, where he says that both they and their slaves have learned to row without noticing it (λελήθασι μανθάνοντες ἐλαύνειν),³⁵⁴ an inevitable result for people who often had to travel by sea (1.19). As he then says, this experience comes from sailing boats (πλοῖα), cargo vessels (ὀλκάδες) and triremes (τριήρεις), a broad experience of sailing (1.20). He shows that the Athenians are very experienced seamen, experience gained in peacetime and translatable when required for service in warships. The Old Oligarch makes quite clear the maritime nature of a large part of the Athenian population.

A large section of this treatise is devoted to the character of Athens' empire, more specifically how maritime power was used to control it. It is quite revealing of Athenian strategy in the fifth century. The first point he makes is about Athenian hoplites and that although they may not be a match for their enemies, they are still stronger than their tribute paying allies, and that was sufficient (2.1). It is a strong indication that the Athenians did not intend to use their land forces to directly confront their enemies in pitched battle,³⁵⁵ making it clear that Athenian grand strategy was a maritime strategy. Their land army only needed to be stronger than any of the allied states. Even then, they could use this inferior force in a superior way. As the author says, the Athenian navy was capable of landing a superior force of troops wherever they wished:

ἔπειτα δὲ τοῖς ἄρχουσι τῆς θαλάττης οἷόν τ' ἐστὶ ποιεῖν ἅπερ τοῖς τῆς γῆς ἐνίοτε, τέμνειν τὴν γῆν τῶν κρείττωνων: παραπλεῖν γὰρ ἔξεστιν ὅπου ἂν μηδεὶς ἢ πολέμιος ἢ ὅπου ἂν ὀλίγοι, ἐὰν δὲ προσίωσιν, ἀναβάντα ἀποπλεῖν...

Since it is possible for the rulers of the sea to sometimes do as land powers do, to ravage the land of the stronger; for it is possible to sail about wherever there is no enemy or wherever they are few, and to embark to sail away as the enemy approaches...³⁵⁶

During the Peloponnesian War this was demonstrated by Athenian raids on the Peloponnesos. Further, Athens exploited geography to its strategic advantage. Quite

context of the Royal Navy of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. In a more modern context, 'officers' seems the most appropriate translation of the word.

³⁵⁴ Very much an odd comment as Marr and Rhodes point out. Marr and Rhodes (2008): 96. In a strong sense, this appears to be a demonstration of how Athens developed a 'maritime consciousness' over time, slowly and almost without the majority of people noticing.

³⁵⁵ Marr and Rhodes (2008): 100.

³⁵⁶ Old Oligarch 2.4.

simply, land powers could easily band together whereas islands were geographically separated by the sea. This sea was controlled by the Athenians, who if failing to prevent the islanders from coming together in the first place could still cut off the islanders from outside supply and starve them out (2.2). The threat levelled against Melos during the Peloponnesian War was made with the implicit – or explicit if the Melian dialogue represents the substance of actual negotiations – understanding that Athens’ navy could cut off and invade the small island without outside interference. As for the mainland cities, Athens ruled over them by fear: αἱ μὲν μεγάλαι διὰ δέος ἄρχονται (2.3). This was not because of a superior land army, but through a combination of Athens being able to control the flow of imports and exports and the superior mobility granted to Athens on account of a strong navy (2.3-5). Control over imports and exports was a consistent feature of Athenian rhetoric and action, as demonstrated here and in Thucydides, where he too talks of non-maritime powers being cut off from trade by Athenian sea power (1.120.2).

The author goes into detail about the economic advantages of sea power in general and how it affected Athens in particular. Firstly, he notes that in times of famine, land powers can be badly affected whereas sea powers can bear it ‘easily’ (ῥαδίως), since bad conditions do not affect the whole earth and therefore it is possible for ‘the rulers of the sea’ (τοῖς τῆς θαλάττης ἄρχουσιν) to import what they need (2.6). Athens is a cosmopolitan place where holding τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς θαλάττης means they have mixed with many different people, and where every kind of luxury can be found: from Sicily, Italy, Cyprus, Egypt, Lydia, Pontos, the Peloponnesos or anywhere else: all can be found in Athens (2.7). It even extends to the cross-pollination of language, diet and dress, a mixture from Greeks and non-Greeks (2.8). Critically, Athens can control the flow of trade, especially timber, iron, copper and flax needed for shipbuilding, and he twice in two lines asks what a city rich in such goods would do ἐὰν μὴ πείσῃ τὸν ἄρχοντα τῆς θαλάττης; (2.11). The Athenians can prevent these goods from being transported and despite the fact that Attika produces nothing of these goods, Athenians possess all of them because the sea (2.12).³⁵⁷

Even the language used throughout highlights the maritime nature of Athens’ power. Athenians are sailing out (ἐκπλέοντες) to bring vexatious judicial charges against citizens

³⁵⁷ A somewhat exaggerated claim. Marr and Rhodes (2008): 119.

within the allied states, who are compelled to sail (πλεῖν) back to Athens: the default way of doing business was by sea.³⁵⁸ All of this was the natural result of their being rulers of the sea, and the *Constitution of the Athenians* is replete with terms such as θαλασσοκράτορες or οἱ ἄρχοντες τῆς θαλάττης when referring to the Athenians.³⁵⁹ As the work makes clear, it is sea power and the control of the maritime domain which allowed Athens to rule over its allies, be it through litigation, control of imports and exports, or the implicit understanding that the Athenian navy could deliver a sufficiently powerful force of hoplites wherever needed, with better mobility than other military forces were capable of.

The most telling and blatant expression of Athens' position as a maritime power is at 2.14-16 where the Old Oligarch compares Athens to an island. The author lays out the different strategic advantages if Athens had been an island. This includes the internal security benefits, namely the need to not fear oligarchs from opening the gates to an enemy (2.15), one of the few guaranteed ways for a besieging force to enter a city. As Marr and Rhodes point out, the section is seemingly a digression but could be seen in light of the popular notion at the time of writing that Athens would be better off as an island.³⁶⁰ It is directly comparable to Perikles' speech in Thucydides (Thuc. 1.143.5) where the 'Athens as an island' topic is broached. Marr and Rhodes reasonably conclude that the Old Oligarch is not necessarily directly quoting Perikles or taking it from Thucydides but echoing a common sentiment in Athens at the time.³⁶¹

The Old Oligarch's *Constitution* not only highlights the maritime nature of Athens as a city, but also several important aspects of Athenian strategy. The Athenians had a realistic appraisal of the capabilities of their land army and what they would use it for, namely raids on continental powers or outright superiority over smaller islands. They used geography to their advantage, carving out an empire of islands and coastal cities, all vulnerable to their superior naval and land forces, and in the position of being directly

³⁵⁸ This refers to the law which made it mandatory for all capital crimes throughout the Delian league to be tried at Athens. Old Oligarch 1.14, 1.16.

³⁵⁹ Old Oligarch 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7.

³⁶⁰ Marr and Rhodes (2008): 121.

³⁶¹ Marr and Rhodes (2008): 121. Of course, this passage is one of the reasons scholars might choose to date the work to the fifth century, seeing it as a reflection of an idea common at that time. Alternatively, it could be used as evidence for a fourth century date, as Hornblower would have it, assuming that the idea is picked up by the author from reading Thucydides at some point later than the fifth century. However, this still seems less likely than the fifth century dating favoured by the majority of scholars.

threatened or starved into submission through blockade. All of this demonstrates a conscious and well-developed maritime strategy on the part of Athens in the fifth century.

Xenophon

Xenophon is not often credited with possessing great interest in the sea or sea power, however they do play a part in his narratives and he does pay close attention to the impact of sea power in his histories and in his other works.

Xenophon's *Hellenika* describes many naval operations and it often assesses the impact of sea power on the events that described. He makes it clear that Athenian defeat at Aigospotamoi was the end of the war for Athens, not just in having Konon express the sentiment (2.1.29), but also in the reaction to the news of the defeat in Athens. No one sleeps that night due to widespread mourning, not only for those who died but also for themselves and the calamitous fate that surely awaited them (2.2.3). Xenophon describes the Spartans in 379 as being in a favourable position, having defeated the Thebans and other Boiotians, humbled the Argives, brought the Corinthians into the fold and having left Athens isolated with no allies and with Sparta's own rebellious allies suitably chastised (5.3.27). Once again allies are identified as the centre of gravity of Athenian power. However, Xenophon hints that not all was as it seemed, for he says that the rule (ἡ ἀρχὴ) of Sparta only *seemed* (ἐδόκει) good and secure (καλῶς καὶ ἀσφαλῶς). Three years later Xenophon has the allies berating Sparta for their timidity, saying they could fit out more ships than Athens and thus to starve them into submission through blockade (5.4.60). As if this was not proof enough of Sparta's neglect of its navy, the sixty triremes they outfit are defeated in battle by the Athenians twice (5.4.61; 65). Xenophon also describes in detail a naval operation under the Athenian Iphikrates, going into his training regime and sailing procedures and praising him for his efforts (6.2.27-32). This shows that Xenophon was not only interested in naval operations, but felt qualified to comment on the training and procedures of a naval fleet in action.

A surprising amount of detail can be revealed from Xenophon's other works, including the *Oikonomikos*. Although it is a work concerned with household management and

agriculture,³⁶² ships and the sea appear throughout. In discussing the proper ordering of a household, he uses a trireme as an example: a frightening sight to enemies and a pleasant one to allies because of its swiftness, a swiftness made possible because the men do not get in each other's way since they are so well-ordered (8.8). Continuing with the ship theme, the speaker says that the best arrangement of equipment he ever saw was a Phoenician merchant ship and he proceeds to describe how well-ordered the ship was and lecture his wife on the subject (8.11-23). The merits of order are once again discussed with reference to a trireme, where the speaker illustrates the point that a well-ordered crew not only sails to its destination faster, but also does not suffer poor morale (21.3). That Xenophon uses such nautical imagery shows that his audience, non-Athenians, non-philosophers and perhaps even women,³⁶³ readily related to such imagery. It is a small, subtle and yet vital glimpse of a society, not just Athenian, that related on an everyday level with maritime issues.

Xenophon's *Poroi* has much to say on maritime matters, particularly with regard to maritime trade and the economy. Xenophon calls the seas around the Attic coast no less productive than the land – ὥσπερ δὲ ἡ γῆ, οὕτω καὶ ἡ περὶ τὴν χώραν θάλαττα παμφοροτάτη ἐστὶ (1.3) – an important point about the productivity of the sea in feeding Athens, and even more salient coming from an upper class figure such as Xenophon. Like Thucydides and the Old Oligarch before him, Xenophon compares Athens to an island, saying that although Athens is not surrounded by sea it enjoys the benefits of being like an island (1.7). However, as Philippe Gauthier astutely points out in his commentary, Xenophon is referring only to the commercial benefits of being like an island, not the military ones as discussed by previous ancient authors.³⁶⁴ Clearly the Athens as an island metaphor could be used both in a commercial and a military context, well into the fourth

³⁶² Some would argue that it is not in fact a simple work on the topic, but a philosophical dialogue. Gabriel Danzig sees it as almost an apology of Socrates' and Xenophon's way of life, saying 'In a sense, then, the *Oeconomicus* is both Xenophon's parting words about Socrates, and Socrates' parting words about Xenophon.' Danzig (2003): 57-76. Categorising the work as primarily philosophical appears to be a minority view and not one I would favour.

³⁶³ Pomeroy is reasonable in seeing the audience as international in character, considering the career of Xenophon and the nature of the work on a universal topic (estate management). On women as an audience, the wife of the speaker Ischomachos appears to have been literate (9.10), and Pomeroy does not seem to be making too much of a leap in suggesting women may have read a treatise on estate management. Pomeroy (1994): 9-10.

³⁶⁴ Gauthier (1976): 51. i.e. Thuc. 1.143.5; Old Oligarch 2.15.

century.³⁶⁵ Xenophon deals heavily with issues of commerce and maritime trade in particular. He discusses Athens' fine shipping facilities (3.2), the importance of magistrates not delaying the sailings of ships (3.3), and the importance of peace for the city's prosperity, especially with relation to the growth of maritime trade (5.1-5, 12). Perhaps most interesting of all is his, seemingly original,³⁶⁶ suggestion that Athens take a cue from its state-owned warship fleet and invest in a state-owned merchant vessel fleet (3.14). It is a controversial idea, in modern scholarship at least,³⁶⁷ but the idea certainly had merit, especially for a state as dependent on overseas trade as Athens. Thus *Poroi* demonstrates a keen interest in the sea and in maritime matters by Xenophon.

Finally there is the *Anabasis*, which has an important point to make about the Greek army and the sea. To the Greek army the sea was seen as their saviour. The ultimate goal of the retreating army was to reach the sea, encapsulated by the most famous of cries when they finally arrive there: the sea, the sea! (Θάλαττα θάλαττα). Xenophon provides his audience with an evocative scene, with the generals and other leaders embracing and weeping, περιέβαλλον ἀλλήλους καὶ στρατηγούς καὶ λοχαγούς δακρύνοντες (Xen. *Anab.* 4.7.25). They were so comfortable with their situation that they dismissed their guide (ἡγεμόνα) and lavished him with gifts (4.7.27). So confident were the Greeks in their safety that it was enough to merely reach the sea. Finally, when confronted by a local group, the Makronians, the Greek reassured them that the meant no harm to them, but only wanted to get to the sea: ἐπὶ θάλατταν βουλόμεθα ἀφικέσθαι (4.8.6-7). To the Greeks the sea represented safety and the promise of returning home. Of particular note is that the Ten Thousand was a mixed force of Greeks. There are not just Athenians and islanders, but Greeks from a variety of poleis. Here is a glimpse of a maritime consciousness that extended beyond Athens and the other well-known maritime poleis.

³⁶⁵ Dating the *Poroi* to 355/4 as Gauthier does. Gauthier (1976): 1.

³⁶⁶ 'proposition originale' Gauthier (1976): 107.

³⁶⁷ 'naïve' in the words of Cawkwell (1963): 64; unnecessary and impractical in the view of G.E.M. de Ste. Croix (1972): 393-6. See also: Gauthier (1976): 107-8.

Later authors – Diodoros, Plutarch and the thalassocracy lists

Diodoros as a source often provokes very strong, usually negative, opinions amongst classical scholars.³⁶⁸ As far as his history is concerned with respect to naval and maritime matters, he is an important source, especially for events in Sicily during the fifth and fourth centuries where Syrakousai and Carthage were engaged in constant warfare, often at sea. Importantly, that Ephoros was one of Diodoros' main sources is of great potential benefit. The harsh critic of historians Polybios wrote that Ephoros possessed sound knowledge of naval warfare and was a useful source for it (Polyb. 12.25f).³⁶⁹ This helps give Diodoros added weight as a historian of maritime affairs during the period.

As for the strategic realm, Diodoros (11.39.2; 41.2-3) reports the rise of Athenian sea power in similar terms to Thucydides, with the additional comment that Themistokles did not see the Spartans as having an aptitude at sea (11.41.5). Critically, Diodoros and no other author reports that Themistokles persuaded the *demos* to approve a continuous building program of twenty triremes a year (11.43.3). Diodoros relates another previously unknown episode, albeit one confusing in nature. In the aftermath of the Spartan general Pausanias' missteps in Asia following the Persian invasion, Diodoros has the Spartans debating war over regaining leadership over the sea, τὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἡγεμονίαν (11.50.1).³⁷⁰ Diodoros seems to be discussing leadership and command, in the sense of military command over forces, using ἡγεμόνεια rather than ἀρχή. However he then implies that Spartan rule, ἀρχή, would be incomplete without one of the two leaderships, δεῖν ἡγεμονιῶν (11.50.4), presumably meaning the land and sea. Further, the debate in the *Gerousia* indicated that the Spartans were willing to go to war over regaining the ἡγεμόνεια (11.50.2), and that the Athenians were building extra triremes in anticipation of a confrontation (11.50.8). This is a deeply confusing thing to say considering that Spartan sea power at this time was in no way capable of defeating Athenian sea power. This is either Diodoros misreading the

³⁶⁸ For a survey of these criticisms, and a hearty rebuttal, see: Green (2006): 1-47.

³⁶⁹ Though he considered Ephoros a poor source for land battles, going so far as to say he provoked laughter on the matter – γελοῖος φαίνεται. Poly. 12.25f. Lazenby relates this but says of Diodoros' account of the battle of Salamis that it is confused, and implies that while others prefer it to Herodotus' account, he does not. Lazenby (1993): 7; 184-5.

³⁷⁰ Diodoros dates the incident to 475, but others are rightfully sceptical, dating it to earlier: 478 or 477. See: Meiggs (1972): 40; Green (2006): 111. Some authors think it may actually be an invented story: Lendon (2007): 264.

military strategic situation at the time, or is an issue of language usage for the different concepts of 'leadership' and 'rule'. However, Diodoros does recognise that in remaining unchallenged at sea, Athens was then able to expand its power (11.50.8).

Elsewhere Diodoros uses language to describe cities in terms of their sea power. The Tyrrhenians are at one point called *θαλαττοκρατούντων* (11.51.1), as are the Athenians in 464 – *Ἀθηναῖοι θαλαττοκρατοῦντες* (11.70.5). The Tyrrhenian example leaves little to analyse, but certainly his assessment of Athens as rulers of the sea in 464 is an accurate strategic appraisal. The Athenian attack on Cyprus,³⁷¹ led by Kimon, naturally featured sea power as a core element. Thucydides gives no more than the basic facts of the campaign, saying only that the Athenian fought and won by both land and sea (Thuc. 1.112). Diodoros gives more detail, and importantly he places greater emphasis on the role sea power played. He begins by saying that Kimon reached Cyprus and established sea control over the area – *ὁ δὲ Κίμων καταπλεύσας εἰς τὴν Κύπρον καὶ θαλαττοκρατῶν* (12.3.3). Diodoros reinforces the point, saying again that Kimon was *θαλαττοκρατῶν* and this allowed him to begin subduing the cities of Cyprus (12.4.1). Kimon targeted the city of Salamis, which Diodoros says would put him in control of the island and deal a blow to the Persians, who would be unable to relieve the city, *διὰ τὸ θαλαττοκρατεῖν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους* (12.4.2). This account of Diodoros' makes it clear that sea power was the defining factor in the fight over Cyprus and is far more explicit about it than Thucydides and Plutarch,³⁷² both of whom give the impression that it was sea power that won the day but are not as explicit as Diodoros, who constantly uses strong language like *θαλαττοκρατέω*. As a final example, Diodoros acknowledges that at the end of the Peloponnesian War the Spartans ruled by both land and sea.³⁷³ This is not a surprise

³⁷¹ Sometime around 451/450. Meiggs dates the opening of the campaign to 451, Green to 450. Meiggs (1972): 124-6; Green (2006): 179.

³⁷² Thuc. 1.112; Plut. *Cim.* 18.5. There are however issues over the chronology of the death of Kimon and other finer points of the narrative in Diodoros. See: Meiggs (1972): 124-6; Green (2006): 179-81. The main point to get across here is the way in which the events are narrated by the different historians, with Diodoros using the strongest language to detail the importance of sea power during the campaign.

³⁷³ The language he uses is, again, cause for some confusion. He says Lysandros bestowed upon Sparta *τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ὁμολογουμένην καὶ τὴν κατὰ γῆν καὶ τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν*. Diodoros is again using the word *ἡγεμονία* in the context of actual power (*ἀρχή*) rather than as in a leadership role. Sparta at this stage not only led the Greeks in the sense of command/leadership position, but were also in the position of being physically the strongest land and sea power in Greece. They were rulers of the sea, *οἱ ἄρχοντες τῆς θαλάττης*, in the sense of how authors such as the Old Oligarch use the term.

judgement itself, but an important point to make inasmuch as Diodoros is acknowledging that Spartan hegemony at this time is based on both land and sea power.

Plutarch has many things to say on maritime issues, especially as it related to Athens. Perhaps most important are his sections on Themistokles, who 'fastened the city to the Peiraieus and the land to the sea' (*Them.* 19.2-3). He is on less steady ground when reporting that the old kings of Athens had discouraged Athens from leading a maritime life, as proven by the story of the triumph of Athena's gift of an olive tree over Poseidon's spring (*Them.* 19.3), two commentaries rightly calling this 'an absurd anachronism'.³⁷⁴ What this story does say is that later historians overemphasised the radical nature of the turn to sea power by Athens in the age of Themistokles.³⁷⁵ He also relates the unreliable story that the Thirty Tyrants in 403 sought to re-orientate the *bema* of the Pnyx so as to face inland instead of facing the sea (*Them.* 19.6). Again, this appears to be an anachronism on the part of Plutarch to over-characterise the divide between sea and land power proponents in Athens during the fifth century.³⁷⁶ Plutarch also tells the story of Kimon before the battle of Salamis, who led his knights up to the Acropolis and dedicated his horse's bridle, and then marched down to the sea saying that at that moment Athens needed people to fight at sea (*Cim.* 5.2-3). It is a good story, which if true demonstrated that the division between sea and land power proponents was not so deep and that even the most aristocratic of Athenians knew when sea power was needed.³⁷⁷ Regardless of the veracity of these various stories, what Plutarch is trying to convey is the high level of maritime consciousness present thought to have been present in Athens during the fifth century.

³⁷⁴ In both: Frost (1980): 120-1; Marr (1998): 177. As Frost points out, the contest between the two deities was considered fitting enough to make up the theme of the western pediment of the Parthenon, built at the height of Athens' maritime imperialism in the 440s.

³⁷⁵ Hans van Wees' recent book elaborates on the growth of Athenian finance in the sixth century and the almost certain existence of a state-run navy in Athens before Themistokles' reforms. Van Wees (2015).

³⁷⁶ Again, as both Frost and Marr say in their commentaries, the Thirty probably did not intend to use the Pnyx at all. Frost (1980): 122; Marr (1998): 178.

³⁷⁷ J. F. Lazenby suspects the story is possibly a family tradition told down the ages, demonstrating the selflessness and moral courage shown by the Athenians as they evacuated their homes before the invading Persians. Lazenby (1993): 154-5. Barry Strauss does not appear to have any problems with the veracity of the story and includes it in his narrative of the Salamis campaign, a credit to the aristocratic Kimon acknowledging Themistokles' maritime strategy and putting country before politics. Strauss (2004): 78-9. True or not, the story did seem to have a long life to it, and may have been considered true enough by the Athenians to have warranted re-telling as an example of unity in the face of adversity and the pervasiveness of Athenian naval pursuits.

Plutarch also had an appreciation of actual maritime operations, relating the details of an Athenian expedition conducted by Perikles in approximately 438-432,³⁷⁸ an example of the use of naval force for diplomatic purposes:

‘...τοῖς δὲ περιοικουῖσι βαρβάροις ἔθνεσι καὶ βασιλεῦσιν αὐτῶν καὶ δυνάσταις ἐπεδείξατο μὲν τῆς δυνάμεως τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὴν ἄδειαν καὶ τὸ θάρσος ἢ βούλοιτο πλεόντων καὶ πᾶσαν ὑφ’ αὐτοῖς πεπονημένων τὴν θάλασσαν...’

He [Perikles] displayed their power to the barbarian tribes living around and to their kings and lords the magnitude of their power and the confidence and impunity with which they sailed where they wished, having made all of the sea subject to their control.³⁷⁹

Plutarch is describing something greater than just the sailing around of a large body of warships. The purpose of the exercise as Plutarch sees it was the Athenian demonstration of sea control. The ships displayed naval and military power in a region distant from Athens and with the implicit implication that Athens could project this power anywhere and at any time – the power (τὸ μέγεθος), confidence (τὸ θάρσος) and impunity (ἡ ἄδεια) of sailing where they wished, πᾶσαν ὑφ’ αὐτοῖς πεπονημένων τὴν θάλασσαν. Plutarch clearly appreciated how sea power was used outside of military operations.

As far as the course of Greek history went, Plutarch is able to place sea power at the core of many events. He says of the Battle of Artemision that it was not decisive of the war at large, but it was valuable in giving the Greeks experience and confidence at sea (*Them.* 8.1), a reasonable point to make. Further, he quotes Pindar in saying that the Athenians at Artemission helped lay ‘the bright foundation of freedom’ (φαεννὰν κρηπιδ’ ἐλευθερίας) for the Greeks (*Them.* 8.2).³⁸⁰ Plutarch is even blunter in his analysis of the Spartan victory at Aigospotamoi and the end of the Peloponnesian War, saying that ‘in a single hour’ (μῦχρονου) Lysandros had ended a war which had surpassed its predecessors in length and calamity (*Lys.* 11.7). Plutarch certainly took cues from earlier historians and so we can infer that he is reinforcing earlier scholarship that the role of sea power in Greek history was of

³⁷⁸ Stadter (1989): 216. His arguments are solid. First is the point that after the loss of the Egyptian campaign, Euxine grain would have grown in importance to Athens. Secondly, according to Diodoros (12.31.1) a new king took power in the Kimmerian Bosphoros region in 438/37; perhaps one of the ‘kings’ Plutarch is referring to.

³⁷⁹ Plut. Per. 20.1.

³⁸⁰ Pindar. Fr. 77. It is quoted four other times by Plutarch, including in his essay *On the glory of the Athenians* (350A) and *On the Malice of Herodotus* (867C). Frost (1980): 108-9; Marr (1998): 90.

great importance. It is thus not an original conclusion on Plutarch's part, but it tells us that in his time the standard narrative was of Greek history had sea power as a fundamental element.

Writers working much later than the above ancient authors went on to develop long lists of thalassocracies, with Eusebius' list, taken from now lost books of Diodoros, listing a continuous line of thalassocracies from the eighth down to the sixth centuries.³⁸¹ It includes Karia on the list, puzzling many scholars,³⁸² as well as Sparta for the sixth century.³⁸³ It is a curious list, but can be taken as revealing of the enduring interest in sea power and how it shaped a possible 'universal history' of Greece. In this sense, it is not what is contained in the list so much as the list itself which is telling of the importance of sea power in Greek history, and how later Greeks thought about their earliest history.

Athenian law courts

Athenian law courts were the scenes of many political battles and in several prominent cases the maritime nature of Athens is explicitly referenced. Indeed, the version of history that the speakers choose to present illustrates how deeply ingrained within the Athenian political consciousness maritime and naval considerations were embedded.

Lysias' most famous and important speech, oration 12 *Against Eratosthenes*, presents a very particular view of Athenian history, one in which Eratosthenes, a member of the Thirty, has helped destroy the maritime power of Athens. There is the well-worn accusation that as part of the oligarchy the Thirty had a hand in actively opposing Athenian efforts in the naval battles of Arginousai and Aigispotamoi (Lys. 12.36), a claim that can be found centuries later in Pausanias.³⁸⁴ Lysias then takes it further, bringing up the issue of

³⁸¹ Many are, rightfully, sceptical of the lists, with L.H. Jefferey calling it a 'post-fifth-century scissors-and-paste work'. Jeffrey (1978): 252. Van Wees calls the lists 'late, impossibly schematic and unreliable in their chronology': Van Wees (2010): 217. For a thorough examination of the list see: J.L. Myres (1906): 84-130. For a more recent discussion, see: Constantakopoulou (2007): 90-99.

³⁸² See: Burn (1927): 165-177; Ball (1977): 317-322.

³⁸³ Anthony Papalás is ready to lend credence to the idea of Spartan sea power in the sixth century. Papalás (1999): 10. I am more sceptical, and while it is probable that Sparta had some form of sea power, given later history it is extremely doubtful that Sparta was ever a 'thalassocracy' in the sixth century. I would conjecture that Sparta's inclusion is a product of the author feeling the need to include such a prominent polis as Sparta in a list of detailing powerful poleis.

³⁸⁴ Paus. 4.17.3-4. The charge is mentioned in the context of explaining how the Spartans were the first to bribe an enemy in warfare, first in the Messenian War and later at Aigispotamoi, and how this

defendants claiming what good citizens they were, representing themselves as good soldiers or as trierarchs who have taken many enemy ships or as conquerors of hostile cities (Lys 12.38-39). These are indeed familiar tactics in an Athenian law court, but what Lysias does is undercut any claim Eratosthenes might have to such good character by asking the jurors to ask him (Eratosthenes) where he has killed as many enemies as he has Athenian citizens or taken as many ships as he surrendered or enslaved as many cities as taken (Lys. 12.39). He shifts into the third person, conflating Eratosthenes with all of the oligarchs who worked for the destruction of Athenian democracy; the ships ‘they themselves surrendered’ (αὐτοὶ παρέδωσαν); the cities ‘they enslaved’ (κατεδουλώσαντο). Eratosthenes and the other oligarchs destroyed Attika’s defences (τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν φρούρια καθείλον) and stripped away the Peiraieus. It is a collective guilt and collective characterisation,³⁸⁵ shifted here onto the shoulders of Eratosthenes.

The second accusation carries a more sinister thread, for he says that the oligarchs did not destroy the Peiraieus at the behest of the Spartans, but under the impression that it would make their own authority stronger – οὐδὲ τὸν Πειραιᾶ Λακεδαιμονίων προσταττόντων περιεῖλον, ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἑαυτοῖς τὴν ἀρχὴν οὕτω βεβαιοτέρων ἐνόμιζον εἶναι (Lys 12.40). Lysias returns to this later, claiming that just as Themistokles worked for the construction of the Peiraieus Walls, Eratosthenes aided fellow oligarch Theramenes in bringing them down. (Lys. 12.63). This is followed by the direct accusation that Theramenes had the walls torn down and the democracy overthrown, not at the behest of the Spartans, but of his own command (οὐχ ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων ἀναγκαζόμενος, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς ἐκείνοις ἐπαγγελλόμενος, τοῦ τε Πειραιῶς τὰ τεῖχη περιελεῖν καὶ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν πολιτείαν καταλῦσαι– 12.70). This illustrates the popular opinion in Athens that oligarchs were very much opposed to the navy and Athenian sea power. This goes back to Thucydides, who mentions ‘a party in Athens who were secretly negotiating with them [Sparta] in the hope of putting an end to democratic government and preventing the building of the Long Walls (Thuc. 1.107). In this we have not just the historian Thucydides linking democracy to the

disreputable act was eventually repaid when the Persians gave money to Sparta’s enemies and kick-started the Korinthian War in the early fourth century.

³⁸⁵ As Thomas M. Murphy puts it, ‘...a generalised character whose guilt everyone acknowledges – rather should acknowledge, if loyal to radical democracy.’; and: ‘They are assimilated in a memorable composite picture of the privileged class which many Athenians held to blame for the recent civil war.’ Murphy (1989): 45.

Long Walls and sea power, but also Athenians themselves reinforcing this idea in the law courts.

Lysias in his speech against Alkibiades the Younger (oration 14) collates all these accusations into one narrative. He first says that Alkibiades the elder surrendered Athenian rule of the sea to the Spartans, which in turn gave the Spartans command of the Athenians themselves (Lys. 14.34). This was accomplished when, in concert with Adeimantos (the general accused by Pausanias)³⁸⁶ he gave over to Lysandros the Athenian ships at Aigospotamoi (14.38). Here Lysias goes on to hold Alkibiades responsible for the death of those at Aigospotamoi, the enslavement of Athenians, the destruction of the walls and the rule of the thirty tyrants – all in one sentence (14.39). Passing over the contentious, and quite frankly outrageous, claim that this was all the fault of Alkibiades, the speech draws a direct line of causation from the loss at the naval battle of Aigospotamoi to the fall of the Athenian empire and the subsequent rise of the Thirty.³⁸⁷ This is not only a sound conclusion from a modern perspective, but clearly a perfectly acceptable conclusion to draw in front of an Athenian audience. It is a curious use of naval history in a case that was really about domestic politics and yet is technically a case against Alkibiades the younger for serving in the cavalry when he was not qualified.

These speeches highlight the use of history in the Athenian law courts. A narrative emerges whereby the Spartans are merely the instrument of Athens' defeat in the Peloponnesian War. The true architects of destruction are figures such as Alkibiades and Athenian oligarchs like Theramenes and Eratosthenes - the enemy within. The law courts are a battleground for the consolidation of Athenian history, a place where they can reconcile the narrative of defeat, linked inextricably from the naval battle and defeat at Aigospotamoi to the subsequent loss of the city's walls and rise of the 30 Tyrants. Thus, Athens' fate in the Peloponnesian War is clearly and unambiguously seen as dependent on sea power and the maritime realm. It is a narrative concerned, not merely with democrat versus oligarch, but with the nature of Athenian power itself.

³⁸⁶ For an examination on Adeimantos' role in the battle of Aigospotamoi and the aftermath, including discussion on Pausanias' accusation, see: Kapellos (2009): 257-275.

³⁸⁷ This can be seen in Xenophon's narration of the end of the war 2.1.29; 2.2.3 (see above section).

The fourth century politician Demosthenes had a definite interest in naval affairs from the beginning of his career. His very first speech to the *ekklesia* (Oration 14) dealt with maritime issues, specifically, the naval boards responsible for the outfitting of triremes. In Oration 24 he is prosecuting Timokrates with a *graphe paranomon* for proposing an illegal decree. Timokrates' two associates had been joint trierarchs and had captured an enemy vessel carrying cargo worth 9 and ½ talents. They kept the money despite a court ruling that the majority of it belonged to the state (24.11-14). Timokrates' proposed law was to give state-debtors a period of nine months in which to repay their debt (24.39-40). Demosthenes launched a vicious attack against Timokrates and this law, and after laying down the legal reasons why Timokrates should be prosecuted for his proposed law, he goes into a moral argument, telling the jury that this law imperilled the state. The state's ability to collect revenue would be severely restricted if debtors had so long to repay money owed to the state.³⁸⁸ This lost revenue would hurt Athens' ability to launch naval expeditions. Not only would this restrict their ability to defend themselves and to react quickly to emergencies, more importantly it would preclude Athens from playing her true part in the world:

ἀνάγκη τὰ τοιαῦτα διοικεῖν ἐστὶ διὰ ψηφισμάτων καὶ νόμων τοῖς μὲν εἰσφέρειν ἐπιτάττοντας, τοὺς δὲ τριηραρχεῖν κελεύοντας, τοὺς δὲ πλεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἕκαστα ποιεῖν ὧν δεῖ

Such successes [throughout Athenian history] could only have been organized by the aid of those decrees and laws under which you levy contributions on some citizens, and require others to furnish triremes; bid some to serve in the navy, and others to perform their other duties. (24.92)

ἢ τὴν πόλιν, αὐτὴν ἐμποδίζοντας νόμους εἰ θήσεται καὶ τὰναντία τῶν συμφερόντων λέγοντας, δυνήσεσθαί τι ποιῆσαι τῶν δεόντων;

If our city enacts laws for her own hinderance, laws exactly contrary to her own interests, do you think she will ever be able to play her true part in the world? (24.94)

Demosthenes in this speech is explicitly referencing the core of Athenian power – its navy. Without money Athens could not put a fleet to sea, and without an active fleet they would

³⁸⁸ Ian Worthington seems correct in his judgement that the amount of money that would be lost to the state would be minor. After all Demosthenes had, only a year earlier (speech 20 *Against Leptines*), argued for the reinstatement of *ateleia*, whereby those who had done great service to Athens were exempt from paying taxes and liturgies, except for the all-important trierarchy. As Worthington points out, Demosthenes says that the revenue lost from the reinstatement of *ateleia* would be of little consequence; yet the money owed by Timokrates' friends was even less than that of a reintroduced *ateleia*. See: Worthington (2013): 78-83; 103-105. For more on *ateleia* see: MacDowell (2004): 127-133.

be unable to defend themselves adequately. Further, they would not be able to project their power overseas in order to protect their interests. Timokrates' proposal would upset the laws which made Athens great: first and foremost, the possession of more triremes than any other Greek power (οὐ τριήρεις ὅσας οὐδεμία πόλις Ἑλληνίς κέκτηται;) This greatest was bolstered by their strength in infantry (ὀπλίτας), cavalry (ἰππέας), revenue (προσόδους), military positions (τόπους), and harbours (λιμένας - 24.216). The first measure of Athens' power was in triremes, which enabled the deployment of infantry and cavalry, supported by good strategic positions and harbours. Demosthenes understands the components of what made Athens powerful, and he implores his audience to remember this and to prosecute a politician who, far beyond proposing an illegal law, is proposing one which imperilled the state itself. That Demosthenes was seemingly unsuccessful merely shows his arguments over how much revenue would be lost were probably, and rightly, considered exaggerated by the jury.³⁸⁹ His speech demonstrates an understanding of the basis of Athenian power and role sea power played in it, presented to a general audience of Athenian citizens.

There are other law court speeches that deal with the maritime realm, from specialised maritime trading cases through to homicide trials. Demosthenes 35 *Reply to Lakritos' Special Plea* offers great insight into some of the trade connections around the Aegean. We are told that the cargo ship that the defendants hired could carry 3000 jars of wine and was fitted with 20 oars (Dem. 35.18). The defendants allegedly put into a place called the 'thieves harbour' (φῶρ λιμῆν) in order to evade customs duty in the Pieraieus (Dem. 35.28). Finally, he highlights the obvious lie in the defendant's story that they loaded Koan wine for the return journey, saying that everyone knows wine goes *to* the Pontos from the Aegean – Peperethos, Kos, Thasos, Mende and others – but it does not come from the Pontos (35.35). It is a useful detail in tracking export goods from around the region, and it also highlights in the context of a law court speech that the Athenian audience would be familiar with such details and know that the defendant's claims were suspect based on a knowledge of

³⁸⁹ That he was unsuccessful seems apparent in the appearance of a Timokrates and his son supporting opponents of Demosthenes in a later case against him in 347 (Dem.21.139). Worthington (2013): 105. On revenue exaggeration see above.

international trade goods, and their origins and destinations.³⁹⁰ Speeches other than about maritime trade are useful in gleaning information about the maritime world. As mentioned in Chapter Three, Antiphon's *On the Murder of Herodes* gives us some insight into travel by sea in the Aegean. In a short speech prosecuting Ergokles for his conduct on campaign revenue raising, Lysias calls the Athenian audience to punish Ergokles to send a signal to the Athenian allies that Athens will not tolerate them being treated poorly (Lys. 28.17). Clearly this is playing on recent history, Athenian treatment of the Delian League in the fifth century, and once again a speech of Lysias highlights the maritime nature of Athens' geopolitical past and present. This is a but a brief survey of the variety of insights that can be gained in examining the law court speeches, often giving us a view of the maritime realm on a practical, every-day level.

Dissenting voices

Aside from the 'Old Oligarch', there were others who did not view sea power in a positive light. These views are important in highlighting how important sea power was in Athens by the vehemence of its opponents. Perhaps the most obvious and vehement example of those who did not favour sea power is Plato.

Two dialogues in particular highlight Plato's contempt for maritime affairs, *Timaeus* and *Critias*. Plato's mythical Atlantis is not only an imaginative fiction,³⁹¹ but one which strongly attempts to warn a contemporary audience of the evils of sea power. It is done by presenting two mythic ideals of Athens. The first is Atlantis, the historical Athens of the fifth century, controlling a maritime empire in the form of the Delian League, and at the time of writing seemingly on the rise again with the Second Athenian League in the fourth century. The second ideal presented is 'the' Athens of the two dialogues, bearing more than just a passing resemblance to Plato's ideal polis of the *Republic*.

The first and one of the most important points to remark upon is the fact that the primary story teller in both of these stories is Kritias himself, in which the titular dialogue contains the most detailed account of the Atlantis myth. As leader of the Thirty in Athens Kritias'

³⁹⁰ Even with the caveat that these types of cases appear to have been held in specialist courts with a more specialist jury, there is a large amount of specialist trade knowledge assumed on the part of the jury.

³⁹¹ For a more thorough exploration of the myth, including into modern times, see: Vidal-Naquet (2007).

opposition to democracy, and by extension the navy, makes it clear that he will not be speaking in its favour. According to Plutarch, Kritias and the Thirty went so far as to have the bema of the Pnyx, which faced the sea, reoriented to face inland (*Them.* 19.4) – such were the steps they would take to distance themselves from the sea and all things maritime.³⁹² The choice of speaker is thus of critical importance.

Athens in Plato's story represents his ideal state of the *Republic*.³⁹³ It is guarded by a military class who lived apart (*Timaeus* 24b; *Kritias* 110c), the 'guardians' (φύλακες) of the ideal state who required freedom from other tasks (*Republic* 374e) and lived apart in a separate camp (*Republic* 415d-e). Plato's preference for hoplites and the agricultural way of life is also revealed. The guardians of Athens are armed with spear and shield, gifts from the Goddess (*Ti.* 24b), presumably Athena. The land of his Athens, unlike the one in which he lives, surpasses all other lands in the excellence of its soil (ἀρετῇ δὲ πᾶσαν γῆν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνθάδε ὑπερβάλλεσθαι: *Kritias* 110e). It is a land rich in trees and pasturage as well as fresh water in springs and fountains (*Kritias* 111c-d). Finally, they have no need for gold or silver (*Kritias* 112c), much like in the *Republic* where the only gold and silver is that of the divine, ever in their souls (χρυσίον δὲ καὶ ἀργύριον εἰπεῖν αὐτοῖς ὅτι θεῖον παρὰ θεῶν ἀεὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχουσι: *Republic* 416e).³⁹⁴ Plato is however aware of the fact that the sea is tempting and powerful, hence his siting of the ideal polis at least 80 *stades* away from the sea.³⁹⁵ Indeed the occupants of the *Republic* would not even deign to eat seafood – the heroes of Homer may have campaigned next to the Hellespont but did not stoop to the level of eating fish (*Resp.* 372; 404c).³⁹⁶ However, these guardians of Plato's protect not only Athens, but all of Greece (*Kritias* 112d). Indeed, it is Athens, standing alone and abandoned by all others, that defeats Atlantis and sets free those living within the boundary of the pillars of Herakles (*Ti.* 25c). For Plato it was of course the battle of Marathon that stood out as Athens' finest moment, when Athens and its farmer-hoplites defeated a great foreign

³⁹² As discussed above in the section on Plutarch: a claim that does not bear much scrutiny.

³⁹³ The city of the *Republic* is 'brought to life' in the *Timaeus* and *Kritias* in the words of Nicole Loraux. Loraux (2006): 370.

³⁹⁴ See also *Laws* (*Leg.* 801b) where no *plutos* of silver and gold should exist within the state.

³⁹⁵ Pl. *Laws* 704 a. Momigliano (1944): 5.

³⁹⁶ The rulers dining on the fruits of the land, not the sea. The speaker mentions Homer but no specific passage. This privileging of cereals and meat over fish is prevalent in literature, especially comedy. See: Wilkins (2000) and Wilkins (2006): 21-30.

enemy and saved Greece. Marathon and Plataea bookend the salvation of Greece, while the naval battles of Artemision and Salamis made the Greeks worse (*Leg.* 707c).

By contrast, the Atlantis of the myth represents Athens of the fifth century and the height of the Delian League – the actual historical city of this tale. The land was taken as an allotment by Poseidon when the gods were dividing the earth (*Kritias* 113c), but not as a result of strife – a direct contradiction to Plato's earlier story (*Menex.* 237c-d) – and neatly excising the story that Poseidon was once even in a position to compete for the status of patron deity of Athens. This is to go even further than those in Athens who disliked sea power and merely highlighted the victory of Athena over Poseidon.³⁹⁷ Plato reaches the stage of casting Poseidon out of Athens and Athenian history altogether.

Atlantis is also a rich city, but in a decadent sense. It has a hot and a cold spring and the land produces food in plenty (*Kritias* 113e). It is a city that possesses wealth so vast it has never been seen before or after that time, and these riches include many imports from overseas (*Criti.* 114d). It has an Acropolis but with a temple sacred to Poseidon and ornately adorned with gold, silver and orichalcum (*Kritias* 116c).³⁹⁸ The most obvious allusion to Athens follows, where he describes the shipyards full of triremes (*Kritias* 117d). Considering this Atlantis existed 8000 years before Plato tells the story, these clearly could not have been triremes and Plato is using the symbol of (actual) Athenian power as a not so subtle signal. Atlantis has a strongly walled outer harbour that is filled with ships and merchants from all over, causing clamour day and night (*Kritias* 117e). Cementing the city as sea power, it is said to have enough men to man 1200 ships (*Kritias* 119b).

That the Athens and Atlantis of Plato's myth represent two different forms of Athens – one historical and one idealised – is not a revelation.³⁹⁹ In examining the myth it shows the extent to which Plato and other opponents of sea power had to go in order to combat a well-entrenched fact of life in Athens: it was and remained in his day a strong sea power. So deeply ingrained is the maritime character of Athens that Plato must change the historical and mythological past. It is for this reason that the myth of Atlantis comes via

³⁹⁷ For instance, as the old kings of Athens supposedly did. Plut. *Them.* 19.3; Frost (1980): 177.

³⁹⁸ Orichalcum being an alloy of copper and zinc and a valuable metal at this time.

³⁹⁹ Vidal-Naquet (1964): 420-444; Morgan (1998): 114.

the most hallowed of Athenian lawgivers and wise men, Solon.⁴⁰⁰ Kathryn Morgan puts it best when she says that: 'Plato's Solon wished to turn the myth of Atlantis into poetry that would rival the heroic and didactic of Homer and Hesiod.'⁴⁰¹ The authority of Solon, as cited by Plato's Kritias, is of critical importance to the authenticity and authority of his story.⁴⁰² So too must he cite Homer in the *Laws* in order to highlight how ships induce men to cowardice in giving them a means to escape danger.⁴⁰³ Plato must invoke the authority of Athens' lawgiver *par excellence* and the great poet of the age in order to begin the fight against a history and a reality which was deeply maritime in character. The great irony of all this is that Plato in his musings in the dialogue *Phaedo* gives us the evocative image of the Greeks living around the Mediterranean 'like ants or frogs around a pond' (*Phaedo* 109b). In the end not even Plato could escape the maritime geography that shaped his world.

Plato's student Aristotle had more mature and practical views on sea power, though he was no fan of the *nautikos ochlos*. Aristotle saw sea power as not only useful for a state, but necessary for one seeking power and influence.⁴⁰⁴ His city would be well-placed with due consideration to the land and the country (Arist. *Pol.* 7.5.2). A state with access to the sea was much better off defensively; land power was fine but stronger when combined with sea power. He even encouraged the state to use the sea for commerce, importing commodities lacked by the state and exporting excess goods (7.5.3). Finally he considered naval force necessary for a polis to engage properly in international affairs and to gain any hegemony (7.5.7).

Aristotle did however have his teacher's disdain for mixing with foreigners and traders and for those whose profession related to the sea. Too much contact with foreigners and people raised under different systems was harmful to the state (7.5.3). He would mitigate against this by ensuring a healthy distance between the city and its port and the proper regulation of citizens' contact with the port (7.5.5). He saw no need for his navy to be

⁴⁰⁰ Pl. *Ti.* 20e-21d; *Criti.* 108d.

⁴⁰¹ Morgan (1998): 109.

⁴⁰² Morgan (1998): 112.

⁴⁰³ Pl. *Laws* 706 d – 707 a. The passage he quotes from Homer refers to Odysseus admonishing Agamemnon for suggesting they bring up their ships and retreat in the face of the attacking Trojans. *Il.* 14.96-102.

⁴⁰⁴ Ober (1978): 124, n. 32.

manned by citizens, and the hoplite infantry would go aboard as marines in command of the vessels and crews (7.5.7), assuming their 'natural' place above the *nautikos ochlos*. So while he had the typical aristocratic disdain for maritime matters and those lowly people which were associated with the sea, he nevertheless saw the utility of sea power, not just as a defensive and offensive military force, but also for maritime trade and communications.

Finally there is Isokrates, rival of Plato, who also took a dim view of sea power and was deeply critical of both Athens' and Sparta's maritime adventures. However, Isokrates' criticisms of sea power fundamentally differ from those of Plato. As discussed, Plato saw sea power and maritime matters as fundamentally corrupting of the state. Isokrates appears to have been wary of sea power because of its effectiveness: so strong a force as to corrupt those who wielded it.

Isokrates fully acknowledges how sea power had been a decisive factor in Greek history. He tells of Athens' glorious history, when they justly held the rule of the sea, 'ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν δικαίως τῆς θαλάττης ἦρξε' (*Paneg.* 20). Not only does he put *δικαίως* next to *τῆς θαλάττης* – something one cannot imagine Plato doing – he implies that rule of the sea can be a just and worthy thing. He credits Athens with saving Greece three times, not only from the Persians at Marathon and Salamis, but also from the Spartans at sea at Knidos in 394 (5.128). Indeed, he reckons that no one is so prejudiced against Athens as to deny the fact that they saved Greece through their instrumental role in victory at Salamis (*Paneg.* 98).⁴⁰⁵ Beyond just military triumph over an invader, Athenian sea power led to the Peiraieus being established as a market at the centre of Greece, ἐν μέσῳ τῆς Ἑλλάδος, where things which were difficult to find in other cities could be found with ease (*Paneg.* 42). This sentiment is a familiar one, spoken by Perikles in Thucydides' funeral oration where the great politician speaks of the greatness of Athens where goods flow from all over the world (Thuc. 2.38.2), as well as in the *Old Oligarch* (2.7-8). He even laments the absence of the merchants (ἔμποροι), foreigners (ξένοι), and metics (μετοίκοι) – or at least the revenue they generated – who were absent from the city because of the Social War (8.21). This is a far cry from the noisome port of Athens/Atlantis in Plato's myth. Isokrates

⁴⁰⁵ Just as Herodotus said at 7.139 (see above).

could even write with pride in his own defence speech that he had three times funded a trierarchy (*Antid.* 145).

Nevertheless, the use of sea power bothered Isokrates greatly, and there is certainly a corrupting influence in his mind. He complains of the softening influence, of how in the 'good old days' citizens fought as hoplites and the fleet was rowed by others, where the reverse was true in his day and that these citizens land in foreign territory with cushions under their arms, ὑπηρέσιον ἔχοντες ἐκβαίνουσιν (8.48). This certainly sounds like a typically upper-class Athenian conservative lamenting the rise of the *nautikos ochlos* over noble hoplites. Yet, it does not fit with what he says in one of his other speeches, where he laments that citizens are forced to draw lots before the law courts for their very existence, while they pay other Greeks to row the fleet for them (7.54). It was perhaps not just Athenian rowers who had become greedy, for he says people will not even participate in military parades without being paid (7.82). Isokrates is the only one of the fourth century orators to make the connection between democracy and the *nautikos ochlos*,⁴⁰⁶ and it is not as strong a connection as the polemics of others such as the Old Oligarch or Plato. Josiah Ober makes the very important point that by the stage Isokrates was writing, especially towards the later part of the fourth Century, Athens' fortunes as a sea power had waxed and waned, but the Democracy had remained strong throughout, diminishing the argument that the democracy was synonymous with the *nautikos ochlos*.⁴⁰⁷

More than just criticising the maritime empire of Athens, he is also deeply critical of Sparta's maritime adventures. In Isokrates' mind sea power is highly potent, giving a state a great degree of power. He even goes so far as to say that no city was as strong by land as Athens was by sea (*Paneg.* 21), a bold but not an outrageous claim. The potency of sea power was especially high when combined with supremacy by land, as in the case with Sparta. To Isokrates it seems as if the problem with sea power was not that it was inherently corrupting, but that it was too powerful, so powerful that it corrupted. As seen above he could say that Athens justly held the rule of the sea (*Paneg.* 20). This was not a bad thing in itself, but it was how Athens, and then Sparta, used this power which Isokrates saw as an

⁴⁰⁶ Ober (1978): 129.

⁴⁰⁷ Ober (1978): 129.

evil. The opening of his *Areopagiticus* makes it clear that this is his line of thinking. He begins with the rhetorical question of why he thinks it is necessary to speak of the security of Athens as if there is a danger. There clearly cannot be a danger since Athens possessed more than 200 triremes, enjoyed peace in its territory and ruled the sea, with many allies ready to lend aid and others paying contributions and following orders (7.1-2). The problem as Isocrates sees it is that Athens' soul is in danger by the wealth (πλοῦτος) and power (δυναστεία) possessed by Athens thanks to its maritime empire, for wealth and power produce and are accompanied by foolishness (ἄνοια) and lack of restraint (ἀκολασία – 7.4).⁴⁰⁸ The Spartans too suffered from this, rising from their humble beginnings and becoming arrogant once they gained control of land and sea (7.7), an arrogance which saw them lose supremacy of both.⁴⁰⁹ He returns to this again in his letter to Philip II of Makedonia, where he takes the well-trodden path of blaming Alkibiades for evils done (5.60-61), and again in *On The Peace*, where he states that the beginning of Sparta's troubles was when they acquired rule of the seas.⁴¹⁰ After discussing the corruption and troubles that befell Athens and Sparta, he asks his audience:

καίτοι πῶς χρὴ τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην ἐπαινεῖν τὴν τὰς τελευτὰς οὕτω
πονηρὰς ἔχουσαν; ἢ πῶς οὐ μισεῖν καὶ φεύγειν τὴν πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ
ποιεῖν ἀμφοτέρως τὰς πόλεις ἐπάρασαν καὶ παθεῖν ἀναγκάσασαν;

How can you praise this empire when it has such grievous results? Or how can you not loath and reject something that induces both cities to commit and compels them to suffer so many terrible wrongs?⁴¹¹

Sea power was the key enabler of this empire (ἀρχή), which led to the fall of both Athens and Sparta, not only a fall from power but a fall from grace as the states themselves were corrupted by the evil they did, not just the evil they suffered. Even the short-term ascendancy of Thebes demonstrated this, for having just defeated the Spartans at Leuktra they embarked upon all manner of exploits, including sending triremes to Byzantium with the intent of becoming rulers over land and sea: ὡς καὶ γῆς καὶ θαλάττης ἄρξοντες (5.53).⁴¹² This demonstrates the Pan-Hellenic nature of the potential and actual corruption.

⁴⁰⁸ He brings in the city's soul (*psyche*) a little later in his speech: 7.14.

⁴⁰⁹ Momigliano (1944): 4.

⁴¹⁰ 8.101. He uses ἀρχή for both beginning and rule in this line.

⁴¹¹ Isoc. 8.105. Translated by T.L. Papillon.

⁴¹² See Chapter Eight on the short-lived Theban navy.

Sea power in Isokrates' eyes is a powerful force indeed. It is not inherently corrupting but allows for an accumulation of power and wealth that leads to a corruption of the state. Isokrates yearns for the 'good old days' when the young did not gamble and cavort with flute girls, and the power of the Areopagus kept in check an excess of lawsuits, taxes, poverty and even war (46-55). Unlike Plato's ideal state, Isokrates' still leaves room for sea power, but as a defensive force protecting Athens and the other Greeks from Persia as they did in the Persian Wars. Otherwise sea power becomes, quite literally in the eyes of Isokrates, tyrannical. He admonishes his audience for listening to him with tolerance on the subject of tyranny, but with intolerance when he speaks about the rule of the sea, despite the fact that the rule of the sea that the Athenians consider the 'greatest good' (τὴν δ' ἀρχὴν τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν) does not differ from one-man rule: τὴν οὐδὲν οὔτε τοῖς πάθεσιν οὔτε ταῖς πράξεσι τῶν μοναρχιῶν διαφέρουσιν (8.114-5).⁴¹³ Just as a tyrant had too much power to do good or ill, sea power had too much potential to corrupt. It is the sort of power that led to incidents such as the destruction of Melos in the Peloponnesian War. Indeed, notable students of Isokrates, Theopompos and Ephoros, had differing views of sea power, the former scornful and the latter supportive of it.⁴¹⁴ From this it appears that Isokrates' views on sea power were complex and changeable, as well as being pervasive in the works of later authors.

These dissenting views are important for two reasons. The most obvious is in exploring an alternative, albeit minority, point of view of sea power and maritime matters in Athens. More importantly, they show how important and deeply ingrained the maritime world was in Athens by highlighting the opposition to it. Plato especially is fighting hard against reality; the reality of a maritime Athens. In examining the opponents of sea power like Plato and Isokrates much can be revealed about the character of maritime Athens and to a lesser extent, wider Greece.

The myriad different sources examined above does not by any means form a comprehensive account of sea power in Greek thought, but it does highlight some of the more important sources on the matter. Sea power and the maritime realm are a central

⁴¹³ He uses the more general word μοναρχία instead of τύραννος. See: Papillon (2004):160, n.61.

⁴¹⁴ Momigliano (1944): 4.

topic for the historians, biographers, orators, and philosophers of the fifth and fourth centuries. From issues of everyday matters such as trade through to higher questions of fundamental state power, the sea loomed large in the minds of the Athenians especially, but also the Greeks in general. Even the Spartans could be a topic of interest when discussing the 'corrupting sea', and ultimately it was not an issue of whether or not sea power was a factor in their world, but a question of how great a factor it *should* be.

Chapter Six – Fifth Century Military Operations

‘With one naval victory against them [Athens] in all likelihood they will be defeated; and if they hold out, we will have more time for practicing naval matters...’

-Thucydides⁴¹⁵

Military operations conducted at and from the sea are the core function of a navy. These operations, across the spectrum, represent the key enabler of other maritime operations. Amphibious operations cannot occur unless a navy is able to defeat in battle another hostile force that might intervene. The ability to conduct coercive (‘gunboat’) diplomacy is predicated on the naval force being perceived as capable and posing a threat. This threat may be that a hostile power can interrupt seaborne trade, directly threaten a state’s naval forces or conduct an amphibious operation. Perhaps not all navies of the Greek world were prepared or even intended for such high-level operations, but instead focused on smaller scale tasks or existed to support a larger coalition. Most large naval operations, and even many small ones, saw contributions made by various smaller poleis. These smaller contributions may not have stood up on their own in the battle line but as part of a coalition, though, it must have been expected that they would be able to fight. For instance, Leukas committed ships to a number of different operations, including the major battles at Salamis, Sybota, and Aigispotamoi.⁴¹⁶ This shows a strong commitment to naval operations over the entire century, first as part of a Pan-Hellenic alliance and then in alliance with Sparta. This commitment would continue in the fourth century (see next chapter) and this is no trivial matter, for it shows a relatively small polis committed not only to building a navy, but operating it as part of multiple coalitions over a span of two centuries. More than just ships, Leukas appears to have invested in infrastructure as well and there is evidence for several shipsheds having been built in the city no later than the middle of the fifth century.⁴¹⁷ The

⁴¹⁵ μιᾷ τε νίκη ναυμαχίας κατὰ τὸ εἶκος ἀλίσκονται: εἰ δ’ ἀντίσχοιεν, μελετήσομεν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐν πλείονι χρόνῳ τὰ ναυτικά Thuc. 1.121.4.

⁴¹⁶ 3 Ships at Salamis (Hdt. 8.45); 10 ships assisting the Corinthians at Epidamnos and Sybota (Thuc. 1.27.2, 1.46.1); 13 ships during operations in 427 (Thuc. 3.69.1); 2 ships manned by the Corinthians in operations around Italy and Sicily (Thuc. 6.104); unknown number of ships under the command of Telykrates fighting under Lysandros at Aigispotamoi (Paus. 10.9.10).

⁴¹⁷ Blackman et. al. (2013): 574-575.

entire polis must have seen an imperative politically, diplomatically and military to maintain a navy.

When it came to the larger navies, battle was the supreme test, however infrequent it may have been. Large-scale battle in the ancient world was relatively rare, by land and sea. When engaged in combat operations at sea, naval forces often engaged in smaller scale battle. The key concept to drive home is that small scale does not mean small in consequence, as some of the operations explored below shall demonstrate.

Warships, initially the trireme but including 'fours' and 'fives' by the end of the fourth century, were often the measure of power of a state. Sea power was measured by the number of warships, much in the way eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth century powers measured power in 'capital ships'.⁴¹⁸ It is a base measure, with no account of the quality of ships and crews, yet it was the way in which sea power was most often measured. Despite proving lacklustre in battle, the sheer size of the Kerkyraian fleet was enough to draw attention from the Corinthians and Athenians at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. This indicates that warships were used as a measurement of a state's power in very tangible terms. Indeed, in many cases it is *the* metric with which a state's power is weighed: not in terms of hoplites or cavalry, but warships.

Military operations at and from the sea

Naval forces conducted combat operations at or from the sea, and often in combination. Examples of combat operations at sea include battle, cover, and the protection or interdiction of trade. Combat operations from the sea primarily consisted of amphibious landings against a hostile or neutral shore. This could be on a large scale, such as the Athenian attack on Sicily in 415, or a much smaller raid such as when Alexandros of Pherai launched a raid against the Peiraieus in 361. An important point is that combat operations at sea were a key enabler of combat operations from the sea. As will be seen in the following two chapters, major power projection operations relied on the attacking force being in possession of sea control, or at least being able to operate in a contested environment.⁴¹⁹

⁴¹⁸ Ships of the Line, Battleships, Dreadnoughts and Aircraft Carriers, for instance.

⁴¹⁹ What might be termed 'working sea control'.

The ability to fight and win at sea is what allowed for the deployment of force ashore, though battle itself could have a definitive effect on the wider strategic situation.

There are several points to note when discussing naval battle, applicable to the ancient as well as the modern world. Combat operations against an enemy's combat or logistics units were and are a key role for navies. These operations can be on a large or small scale and to varying effect, on a strategic or a tactical level. As seen with the battle of Arginousai, not every large-scale naval engagement was the result of a desire to engage the enemy fleet in battle but might come about because of some other maritime operation, a blockade in the above case. Scale is an issue that often obscures the combat role of navies and their effect on events. Large battles such as Salamis or Arginousai (or Lepanto, Trafalgar, Jutland) are rare, and most naval combat operations are not of this scale. Operations by a few ships could have a large impact on a particular campaign, such as the Athenian navy's operations under the admiral Phormion in the Korinthian Gulf in 429 (see below). Just as single ship actions in the modern world of naval combat could be of strategic consequence,⁴²⁰ so too were small-scale combat operations in the Greek world of great importance.

Another issue concerns ships fighting near land. Technological limitations are the standard reason given by scholars for this, and although this was surely a factor, it obscures a key point about sea power. As discussed in Chapter One, sea power is concerned with influencing events ashore and as such it should be expected that naval battles would often take place in close vicinity to land – 'close vicinity' or 'near' being very relative terms. Naval forces often engaged in battle to protect or defend important geographical features such as a strait, gulf, harbour, or landing spot. Key modern naval battles have taken place in close proximity to land, including the Battle of the Nile in 1798 – a battle actually conducted at anchor – Trafalgar, the Dardanelles campaign in 1915, and Midway in 1942.⁴²¹ There are various reasons for this, but the determining factor was not technology – it was strategic or tactical considerations. Though some scholars have recognised modern

⁴²⁰ A good example in the two World Wars are the German commerce raiders, such as *Emden* and *Kormoran*, the former of which tied up vast naval resources in the Indo-Pacific theatre during 1914 until destroyed by the Royal Australian Navy cruiser *Sydney*. This is a topic covered in detail; for an excellent recent examination, see: Stevens (2015): 68-81.

⁴²¹ Proximity being a relative term, as in the case of Midway where carrier and land-based aircraft extended the range at which ships could influence, and be influenced by, land features.

parallels, there is still misunderstanding over the issue.⁴²² Navies, ancient and modern, are not concerned with the control of the open ocean:⁴²³ they are concerned with influencing events ashore and so it is to be expected that naval battles were mostly conducted 'near' land. Battles close to land are not an exceptional feature of ancient naval operations that set them apart from naval operations in later times.

Blockade in the ancient world was a much different and more limited affair than in more recent naval operations. Firstly, there was no legal aspect to it, as there is in the modern world.⁴²⁴ Secondly, technology was a limiting factor in this case and ancient ships did not have the endurance of later ships that would allow for a distant blockade. Nevertheless, despite what some scholars would say there are clear instances of naval forces engaged in a close blockade of a port/city.⁴²⁵ Similar to a blockade is a barrier operation, whereby a naval force uses geography to close an area or passage:⁴²⁶ Phormion's operations to block the entrance to the Corinthian Gulf are an excellent example.

One of the core functions of maritime forces is the ability to project power ashore and conduct combat operations from the sea. This is predicated on the ability to use the sea for this purpose, not necessarily in full control but contested enough to allow for these operations to be conducted unhindered. In order to conduct combat operations from the sea, whether raiding or a large amphibious operation, a naval and military force may need

⁴²² Victor Davis Hanson mentions Trafalgar and Midway and says admirals ancient and modern liked calm seas and nearby refuges (2005: 258), but neither was a key consideration for these battles. A storm the day after Trafalgar proved the nearby coast extremely dangerous rather than any kind of refuge, and the island of Midway was the bait provided by the US Navy to lure the Japanese into a trap. Just as with Classical naval operations, strategic and tactical considerations were of primary importance. The battles of Artemision and Salamis were fought close to land because of the tactical consideration that confined waters would negate the superior numbers of the Persians. An example from Sicily shows that proximity to land and a force of friendly soldiers could be no help at all. In 396 the Sicilians fighting the Carthaginians fought a battle near Katane. Dionysios had his troops arrayed along the shore in case the fleet got into trouble, something Diodoros calls the most important consideration – τὸ δὲ μέγιστον (14.59.6). It was all to no avail, for after the Carthaginians prevailed in the battle they had their lighter vessels range just offshore and kill any Sicilian sailors swimming for shore, the latter 'perished in great numbers not far from land, while the troops of Dionysios were unable to help them in any way' (14.60.5-6). Proximity to land meant little when that shore was hostile.

⁴²³ Again, as discussed in Chapter One.

⁴²⁴ Such as in the First World War or more recently, UN Sanctions and embargoes that allow naval forces to board and inspect all vessels leaving or entering a country. A recent example of this would be against Iraq after the first Gulf War.

⁴²⁵ Hanson completely dismisses the idea that ancient ships could blockade, or even 'voyage' or 'patrol'. He presents no actual evidence to support this position, nor even defines what he means by these terms.

⁴²⁶ For further explanation, see: AMD, 103; Till (2013): 178-83.

protection from enemy interference from the sea. Cover is a key operation conducted at sea in order to protect a friendly land force. Without this cover, it would be possible for land forces to find themselves outflanked from the sea or entirely cut-off. Keeping in mind that sea power is always concerned with influencing events ashore, these operations were of critical importance to the conduct and outcome of many different conflicts. Obviously, in the Classical context the projection of power ashore by maritime forces refers to the deployment, or threat of deployment, of land forces. This ranged from a raid to a large force and in some cases even direct assaults on enemy positions or cities. In some cases, the role of the maritime forces involved was to provide 'sea lift', moving large numbers of troops or supplies. In a few instances their role was as part of an amphibious withdrawal, the evacuation of land forces from a hazardous situation. The vast coastlines of the Mediterranean littoral gave Greek maritime forces a large operating theatre for conducting these sorts of operations.

Pre-Peloponnesian War

It is easy to forget that many of the early conflicts in the Greek world involved the projection of power over the sea. Whether or not it was Peisistratos who did so, the Athenians had influence and perhaps power over the River Strymon and the islands of Naxos and Delos from around 546 onwards (Hdt. 1.64). Herodotus' history of the late sixth century Aegean is littered with examples of Greek poleis attacking others from the sea. Polykrates of Samos is an early 'Thalassocrat' who used his fleet to attack and conquer many different islands and mainland cities. He is said to have possessed a fleet of 100 warships and 1000 archers and captured many mainland cities and islands, including Lesbos, whose forces were themselves absent on an overseas campaign helping the Milesians (Hdt. 3.39). Polykrates was even able to send a force of 40 warships and troops to help the Persian Cambyses in his Egyptian campaign.⁴²⁷ After this the Spartans and Corinthians launched a joint campaign against the Samians for past wrongs inflicted by them. The Spartans went to war over the supposed theft of a bowl, bound from Sparta to

⁴²⁷ Hdt. 3.44-45. Polykrates apparently chose people he most suspected of being liable to revolt and sent them on the campaign. Herodotus gives differing accounts of their fate. He also says the ships sent were triremes, despite him saying earlier that Polykrates' fleet consisted of 100 pentekontors. In one version, the exiles engage Polykrates' fleet in a naval battle upon their return to the island.

Kroisos in Sardis in thanks for the alliance between the two states.⁴²⁸ This interesting because it highlights that Sparta had overseas interests and alliances across the Aegean in the sixth century, requiring a maritime link. Further, the Corinthians had a grievance with the Samians for their help in aiding the enemies of Korinth, their own colony of Kerkyra.⁴²⁹ The Spartans attack and besiege Samos for 40 days, winning a battle but unable to take the city. According to Herodotus, this was the first time the Spartans had ever led an army into Asia (Hdt. 3.54-56). Herodotus does not mention naval actions, which considering that Polykrates possessed a large and powerful fleet is puzzling. It would seem to indicate that the combined Spartan and Corinthian fleet was a powerful one, allowing them to land on Samos unhindered. The traditionally powerful Corinthian navy might have been their key contribution to this force. Regardless of dubious motives, this example neatly illustrates not only the political connections across the Aegean but also the ability of various powers to project power overseas with maritime forces.

Early Greek naval operations were often aimed at engaging the enemy fleet in battle. The Phokaians, having lost their island to the Persians and settling in one of their colonies in Korsika were forced to fight a naval battle with the Etruscans and Carthaginians who had grown tired of their attacks. The Phokaians won a 'Kadmean Victory' and were forced to flee (Hdt. 1.166). The battle appears to have been a set piece, both sides sailing out with the intention of destroying the main fleet of the other. The fact that the Phokaiian fleet lost two-thirds of its strength was obviously enough to render a tactical victory into strategic defeat, and they could not remain secure in their position and were forced to move on. Similarly, in 519 a group of Samians who settled on Kreta at Kydonia were attacked and defeated in a naval battle by a combined force of Aiginetans and Kretans. The Aiginetans attacked because of earlier Samian raiding and the prows of the defeated Samian ships were dedicated to the sanctuary of Athena in Aigina (Hdt. 3.59). That the Aiginetans were able to form a coalition with the Kretans and attack the Samians on Kreta shows a high degree of cooperation and ability on part of the Aiginetans. The Kretans almost certainly provided

⁴²⁸ Herodotus gives two accounts of what may have happened with the bowl. In the first instance, the Samians capture the ship carrying the bowl, and in the second the Samians arrive after Kroisos' defeat and sell the bowl on Samos and then on their return to Sparta claim it was stolen. Hdt. 1.70. In both cases, Samos bears the blame and the Spartans use this as a pretext for war some 20 years later. Hdt. 3.47.1-2.

⁴²⁹ The story is told by Herodotus at 3.48-49. It is perhaps episodes like this which, if accurate, would cause later authors to add Sparta to a Thalassocracy list.

local logistics support, and this example is indicative of complex naval operations being conducted across the Aegean decades before the rise of Athenian sea power. Indeed, this example demonstrates that Aigina possessed a very capable fleet, able to conduct operations far from home and prevail in battle against another capable naval force.

The war between the Ionians and the Persians in the 490s saw two large naval battles, off Cyprus and Lade. In 497 a Persian assault on Salamis in Cyprus drew the Ionians into aiding the Cypriots (Hdt. 5.108). The Greeks were victorious at sea but the Cypriots were defeated on land, causing the Ionians to abandon the island (Hdt. 5.110-115). Three years later the Ionians decided the best way to defend Miletos against the Persians was to assemble as large a fleet as possible and confront them at sea off the island of Lade. Abandoned by the Samians and Lesbians, the remaining Ionian forces, comprised largely of Chian ships, fought on but were defeated, allowing the Persians to besiege Miletos by sea as well as land (Hdt. 6.6-15). In both cases the need for sea control was great. Success at sea in Cyprus was necessary to prevent the Persians from cutting off the island, but with defeat on land and death of the king of Salamis the Ionians were fighting for a dead cause. Victory at sea had been a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the war effort. At Lade, the fate of the campaign against Miletos rested with the fleets. Persian victory allowed them to invest the city by land and sea, whereas a defeat would have allowed the Ionians to reinforce the city against the Persian siege and to perhaps conduct operations against other parts of the Persian Empire and distract them from Miletos. Notwithstanding the defection of the Samian and Lesbian forces at Lade, both operations demonstrate a willingness and ability to assemble large fleets of warships from many different island poleis and put them into battle.

One of the earliest and most well-known examples of a covering force is that at the battle of Artemision, the oft-overlooked naval operation at sea to cover the land forces fighting at Thermopylai.⁴³⁰ The Persian army, covered by their fleet, was the main threat to the Greeks and hence the decision to send a force north to oppose them. J.F. Lazenby somehow sees the decision as demonstrative of the primacy of the army over the navy, clearly

⁴³⁰ Not necessarily overlooked as occurring, but overlooked during appraisals of the operational conduct of the campaign and the strategic ramifications of the battle.

missing the basic operational need for the landward defence to be chosen first before committing the fleet.⁴³¹ Choosing a defensive point inland might not require a covering force, or a naval force positioned differently depending on the geographic situation. Choosing Thermopylai first was necessary before choosing the position for the fleet, a geostrategic decision, not some petty matter of protocol or primacy.⁴³² Having chosen Thermopylai as the defensive position by land, Artemision was chosen as the fleet base, where the ships could defend the strait and protect the seaward flank of the army as well as keeping watch for a Persian move to the south end of Euboeia, an attempt which did indeed eventuate.⁴³³ That defeat for one force would put the other in distress is demonstrated by the fact that the Greeks had a boat ready at both the fleet and with the army at Thermopylai in order to convey news to the other force should things go badly, as happened to the land force (Hdt. 8.21). Although already contemplating withdrawal after their third engagement with the Persians, it was news of Leonidas' defeat that caused the fleet to retire from the area altogether.⁴³⁴ The fleet had done its job, covering the land force by preventing the Persian naval force from turning the army's flank until the latter's destruction. Paul Rahe calls the third naval battle at Artemision a 'technical' victory but 'strategically a defeat', a muddled and confused use of the term 'strategic'.⁴³⁵ He confuses the issue further by saying it was time for the Greek ships 'to reposition themselves and reconsider their tactics',⁴³⁶ a misunderstanding of the different levels of war, the tactical and strategic level. As noted above the discussion about withdrawal to 'interior waters' was a tactical consideration. The strategic effect came from the land army's defeat at

⁴³¹ Lazenby (1991): 118.

⁴³² Lazenby tries to present the matter as if Herodotus gave preference to the army's movement before the navy's because it was more important: much to make out of a very short chapter of Herodotus, a mere 12 lines. Hdt. 7.175. Lazenby misunderstands military operational planning and is searching for some justification to say that the navy was only of secondary importance rather than acknowledging the role the fleet played as a covering force.

⁴³³ All 200 ships apparently wrecked by a storm off the east coast of the island. Hdt. 8.7, 13.

⁴³⁴ Hdt. 8.21.2. At 8.18 Herodotus says that the Greeks were deliberating over a retreat to the interior waters of Greece (δρησμών δὴ ἐβούλευον ἔσω ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα). This implies that the Greek fleet was contemplating moving position further towards Thermopylai and to more confined waters, rather than retreating entirely from their covering position. Such a move would have been entirely tactical in nature, though the tone of Herodotus does imply some urgency, in the rare emphatic use of δὴ with nouns in prose: Bowie (2007): 109.

⁴³⁵ Rahe (2015): 239.

⁴³⁶ Rahe (2015): 239. This example is a good illustration of how even recent scholarship is unable to differentiate between the different levels of war. One can hardly take seriously the author's intent to explore the 'Grand Strategy of Sparta' when he is unable to separate tactics from strategy.

Thermopylai and the fleet's successful withdrawal. That the fleet did so without undue risk or loss ensured that there was a sufficiently large and powerful Greek naval force able to confront the Persians at a later time: Salamis, as it happened.⁴³⁷ Indeed it was the Greek fleet's existence as a 'fleet-in-being' which in a strategic sense acted as a covering force protecting the isthmus of Korinth. It was of paramount importance that the Greeks at all times had a fleet sufficient to counter that of the Persian and so deny the Persians strategic mobility. Thus, the Greeks can be considered to have 'won' a 'strategic' victory at Artemision. Prevailing in battle was not always the metric for 'victory' or 'defeat'. Far more important was how a battle impacted on the strategic situation. In the case of Artemision the Greeks were still in a position to defeat the Persian fleet, and so their strategic situation at sea did not really deteriorate, whereas the loss of Persian ships did unfavourable impact their strategic situation at sea.

As the most famous naval battle of the ancient world,⁴³⁸ Salamis in 480 was a critical turning point in the Persian invasion. Just as with the battle for Salamis in Cyprus, it was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for victory. The Greeks had solid defences across the Isthmus at Korinth that could defend against the Persian land advance, but if the Persians were able to gain sea control their fleet would easily be able to outflank the isthmian defences. Such a move would no doubt fracture the tentative Greek alliance as the different poleis looked to their own defences. In this sense all the Greeks had to do was contest the seas, not win control of them. So long as the Persians did not have the freedom of manoeuvre to land troops on the Peloponnessos the Greek defences at the isthmus could be held. Some Greeks recognised this, but the majority wanted to confront the Persian fleet

⁴³⁷ There are other facets of the battle off Artemision which had a strategic impact, such as the increase in skill and confidence the Greek fleet as a whole gained and the number of Persian ships supposedly lost to storms. Certainly, what the Greeks learned and experienced in these battles contributed to the success of the Salamis campaign and can be considered of strategic significance. See: Strauss (2004): 32-37; Hale (2009): 43-54.

⁴³⁸ Thinking of ancient naval battles, most historians modern and ancient, as well as naval and military professionals, almost always think of Salamis first. From an academic standpoint, the battle is described as 'The Greatest Naval Battle of the Ancient World' (Strauss, 2004); one of the 'Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power' (V.D. Hanson, 2001, pp. 27-59) to name but two. The analysis of the battle and what it did to define western history and other such counter-factuals are far outside the scope of this thesis. So too is the actual conduct of the battle itself. It may seem strange but as said before, tactics and the experience of naval battle are not my concern here. As an analytical rather than descriptive exploration of the battle, the ensuing discussion of the battle of Salamis will seem brief. These details can be found in many other works, the two mentioned above as well as others: Lazenby (1993): 151-197; Hale (2009): 55-74.

near the isthmus, not Attika where they could potentially be cut off (Hdt. 8.49). According to Herodotus this was also clear to some on the Persian side. Artemisia is said to have counselled restraint and let Greek infighting and lack of supplies at Salamis drive them to disperse (Hdt. 8.68), a fear expressed earlier in the narrative by the Athenian Mnesiphilos (Hdt. 8.57). These are both discussions about the operational level: how the campaign should be conducted. Clearly both sides realised the need to fight at sea. The battle itself was a decisive victory for the Greeks and allowed them to establish uncontested control of the seas around the Greek mainland. The victory diminished but did not erase the threat to Greece, with the large army of Mardonios still left to contend with. The upshot was that without the support of the fleet the Persian land army left in Greece was necessarily restricted in size to that which could be supported by the locals and an overland supply chain. Herodotus was not the only one to see the battle as of supreme importance,⁴³⁹ and the judgements of modern scholars on the battle are almost uniformly correct in identifying Salamis as a turning point in favour of the Greeks,⁴⁴⁰ a conclusion that is hard to dispute. The battle is an example of two battle-fleets positioned to compete for control of the sea by pitched battle, a rare but at times necessary operation. The outcome would have had strategic ramifications for the war, no matter who was victorious.

The battle of Mykale which followed in 479 helps illustrate how powerful the Greek fleet must have been and is an excellent example of a naval force being perceived as so powerful that an enemy would cede sea control without a fight. The Persians felt too weak to fight the Greeks at sea and so beached their ships instead (Hdt. 9.97). Nevertheless, the Greeks attacked and Herodotus is explicit in what was considered at stake by both sides: not only the islands but also control of the Hellespont (Hdt. 9.101.3). The Greeks sought a decisive

⁴³⁹ Going back to his famous judgment that it was the Athenians and their sea power which saved Greece, as discussed in Chapter Five.

⁴⁴⁰ Though apparently not always the point of view, with Hignett pointing out that many German scholars did not see Salamis as a battle of any consequence to the war: Hignett (1963): 264, esp. n. 2 and 3. Burn comes to the sensible conclusion that it saved Greece from long occupation but did not put an end to the Persian threat: Burn (1962): 471. Lazenby's conclusion is also noteworthy and hard to surpass: 'Victory was by no means yet assured, for Mardonios' operations prove, if proof is necessary, that the Persian army could operate quite independently of the fleet. But at least the Greeks no longer had to worry about the possibility of defensive positions being turned by sea. Thus, the Peloponnese was safe, so long as the Isthmus lines were held, and although this was to have unfortunate repercussions in 479, it meant that so long as the Greek alliance stood firm, Greece could no longer be conquered. In this sense, Salamis was the turning-point of the war.' (Lazenby, 1993: 197).

battle at sea but were denied by the Persians out of fear of the Greek force. A powerful and proven naval force could, through mere existence, have an impact on the strategic calculations of an enemy. In the example of Mykale it caused the Persians to offer battle on land, but to no avail. The Persians were defeated and lost their ships in the aftermath of the battle (Hdt. 9.106.1), leaving the Greeks with full control of the sea. This allowed the Greek forces to sail to the Hellespont unimpeded in order to destroy the bridges and when they found these already destroyed they were able to blockade Sestos, where a large group of Persians and their allies were holed up (Hdt. 9.114-115). The final battle of the Persian Wars at Eurymedon River followed a similar pattern. The Persian naval force attempted to dodge battle with the Athenian fleet under the command of Kimon, who Plutarch says was prepared to force the issue if the Persians were reluctant (*Kim.* 12.5). The Persians were apparently awaiting 80 Phoenician ships (*Kim.* 12.4), indicating that despite the Persian force being of superior number,⁴⁴¹ they were not confident of victory without the Phoenicians and again indicating how powerful the Athenian navy was perceived to be. The battle progressed from sea to land, with 200 ships captured by the Athenians and the Persians then defeated on land.⁴⁴² In Plutarch's account Kimon goes even further, sailing out to interdict the 80 Phoenician ships on their way to reinforce the Persians, destroying or capturing them all (*Kim.* 13.3-4). The victory is hailed by both Diodoros and Plutarch as a major triumph, not just for Kimon and the Athenians, but also as a great feat in the history of Greece. Diodoros says that to his day there had not been an occurrence of a military force fighting and winning such important actions by both sea and by land (Diod. 11.61.7). Plutarch is even more dramatic, saying that with two battles in the single day he had surpassed Salamis with a land battle and Plataea with a sea battle (*Kim.* 13.3).

An early detailed example of a blockade is the Athenian operation against Samos in 441/0. The island had revolted against the recently Athenian-installed democracy, causing the Athenians to send out an expedition of 60 ships. Sixteen ships were detailed as scouts to

⁴⁴¹ Plutarch gives two numbers for the Persian ships, 600 and the more credible 350 according to Ephoros. 12.5.

⁴⁴² Both Thucydides and Plutarch give the number of captured ships as 200, though Thucydides says that it was the entire Phoenician fleet that was captured: Thuc. 1.100.1; Plut. *Kim.* 12.6-13.2. Diodoros gives a different account, where the naval battle is fought off Cyprus and the Persians fight hard are defeated and the Athenians capture over 100 ships: Diod. 11.60.6-7. After this the Persians are defeated in a land battle at Eurymedon River: 11.61.

watch for the Phoenician fleet, as well as taking orders to Lesbos and Chios for reinforcements (Thuc. 1.116.1). The remaining 44 ships were under the command of Perikles and near the island of Tragia, 13 nm south of Samos, they intercepted 70 Samian vessels sailing from Miletos.⁴⁴³ The Samian fleet included 20 transport ships and so had only a slim numerical superiority, but they were defeated by the Athenians (Thuc. 1.116). Reinforced by 40 more Athenian and 25 Chian and Lesbian vessels, the Athenian-led forces laid siege to the city by land with three walls and blockaded it by sea (κρατοῦντες τῶ πεζῶ ἐπολιόρκουν τρισὶ τείχεσι τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης ἅμα: Thuc. 1.116.2). That this was a proper blockade by sea is clear by examining the next incident. After Perikles took 60 ships to search for and engage a potential Phoenician relief fleet, the Samians made a surprise attack against the Athenian forces and were victorious in a sea battle. This made them masters of their own seas for two weeks and allowed supplies to flow into the city (Thuc. 1.116.3-117.1). Perikles' return caused the Samians to once again be blockaded (κατεκλήσθησαν: Thuc. 1.117.2). This siege demonstrates the complexity of besieging and blockading an island and the different naval operations required, with the same naval forces engaged in different tasks at short notice. Athenian naval force first had to send out scouts to keep watch for the enemy fleet, as well as gather allied reinforcements. The remainder of the Athenian vessels engaged in a fleet action, interdicting the enemy fleet and transport ships. Once these operations were completed, they then laid siege to the city and commenced a blockade.⁴⁴⁴ This required a further sortie by the main fleet and caused the Athenians to lose sea control around Samos. The siege and blockade lasted for nine months (Thuc. 1.117.3) and is a great example of the complexities required of naval forces when besieging and blockading a hostile island. This is an important consideration when examining the Peloponnesian War and later conflicts between Athens and the islands, where such operations were frequent.

⁴⁴³ This example is useful in highlighting the idea of battles being fought 'near' land. Thucydides says that the battle took place πρὸς Τραγία, 'off Tragia'. The route from Miletos to Samos would not need to pass any closer than 8 nm to Tragia: it is not directly on the way. In all likelihood, the Athenian fleet was stationed near the island and it was the closest terrestrial reference point for the battle. It is quite probable that this naval battle did not take place any closer than 4-8 nm to land.

⁴⁴⁴ Although we are given no details, it seems likely that by blockade, it was meant the Athenians were primarily focused on the port, not the entire island. It would have been all but impossible for the Athenians, or any other naval force, to control the entire coastline. It would have been enough to blockade the port and any major landing spots on the island.

Peloponnesian War

Maritime considerations were critical to the calculations of all Greek poleis during the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. Athens began the war with what was regarded as the pre-eminent naval force in the eastern Mediterranean. This did not mean that their enemies failed to contest Athenian sea control. It was only through subsequent battles that the Athenian navy reinforced its reputation. At the outbreak of war, the Corinthians (in Thucydides' account) attempted to convince the Spartans that one large-scale naval battle resulting in the destruction of a large part of the Athenian navy would spell their doom.⁴⁴⁵ This is a sound strategy of how to defeat Athens, but with without regard for the ways or means by which they might accomplish this end state, it was an unworkable strategy. Late in the war, approximately 410, Diodoros says that the Spartans reckoned that for them to lose at sea constituted a setback and no more since they were still supreme by land, but defeat at sea for Athens would see them fighting not for victory, but for their very survival.⁴⁴⁶ The point of this second speech is to reinforce how highly the Spartans thought of themselves, but there is a strong element of truth in the boast. By this stage of the war the Athenians were clinging on to a fragile empire with stretched resources while Sparta's 'centre of gravity', the Peloponnesos, was safe from the depredations of the Athenians. The Spartans and their allies were in no position to fight, let alone win, a decisive naval battle against Athens in 431 or indeed at any point before the Peace of Nikias. The Sicilian expedition changed the balance of naval power when the Athenian fleet was destroyed in the Great Harbour and the original Corinthian strategy of decisive battle was eventually proven sound and, in concert with other maritime operations, eventually led Sparta to victory. Combat operations at sea, especially the large battles around Syrakousai, and at Arginousai and Aigisopotamoi, had a decisive impact on the outcome of the war.

This line of thinking on decisive battle has a striking parallel in the early twentieth century and the First World War. It is reminiscent of German naval strategy under Admiral Tirpitz

⁴⁴⁵ Thuc. 1.121.4. It was perhaps the hope of the Corinthians that they would accumulate enough money from various sources, Delphoi or Olympia for example, and attract enough rowers to man a fleet capable of fighting Athens at sea. Persia eventually provided enough funding to the enemies of Athens for this to eventuate, and Thucydides here is foreshadowing how the Athenians are eventually defeated. At the outbreak of the war the enemies of Athens had the right strategy without the means: by 405 they had the correct strategy and the means.

⁴⁴⁶ Diod. 13.52.6.

of the 'risk fleet': the idea that the inferior German High Seas Fleet could catch a portion of the Royal Navy's Grand Fleet and defeat it, thus altering the balance of naval power in favour of Germany with one grand battle.⁴⁴⁷ The Athenians in 480 were able to erode the Persian fleet's fighting ability at Artemision, admittedly with the help of two storms, and soon after at Salamis were able to defeat the Persians at sea, making Plataia possible and finally eliminating the Persian threat to the Greek mainland.⁴⁴⁸ The Korinthian speech at the beginning of the chapter is an explicit expression of decisive naval battle as a conscious strategy. Taken with the Persian War example, they show that over a 2000-year period the appeal of 'Mahanian' battle at sea in order to determine the outcome of a war remained an appealing strategy.⁴⁴⁹ Nevertheless, it was not always a viable strategy and the increased reliance on its fleet led Sparta to approach war at sea more cautiously during the fourth century.

At the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War the Athenians quickly established control of the seas in the Saronic Gulf, causing the entrance to the Korinthian Gulf to become even more of a strategically vital waterway for the Spartans and their allies, especially the Korinthians. Phormion's operations in 430/29 began as trade interdiction but progressed swiftly into the interdiction of enemy warships and transports. Based out of Naupaktos, Phormion's squadron quickly had an impact on Korinthian operations. Phormion with 20 ships attacked the 47 Korinthian ships which were fitted out primarily as troop transports rather than rigged for battle, who relying on their numbers being a deterrent to attack (Thuc. 2.83.1-3). Rather than keep the enemy ships bottled up, Phormion clearly wished to engage

⁴⁴⁷ This was the essence of the strategy *after* war had broken out. Tirpitz's 'doctrine of risk' (*Risikogedanke*) originally envisaged a German navy that would eventually be strong enough to deter the Royal Navy altogether from war. The outbreak of war in 1914 was earlier than Tirpitz expected the German fleet to achieve this, 1915 being his earliest estimate, and thus the goal for German naval strategy during the war became concerned with whittling down the Royal Navy until parity was achieved. Korinthian thinking, at least as projected by Thucydides at 1.121.4, was that defeating a large Athenian naval contingent would bring the Peloponnesian side closer to parity with the Athenian fleet, thus negating the greatest advantage of the Athenians. For Tirpitz's 'doctrine of risk' see: Halpern (1994): 2-5. It is hard at this point to escape a comparison with the First World War, where it was said of the British Admiral Sir John Jellicoe that he was 'the only man on either side who could lose the war in an afternoon'. This is referring to the potential for him to lose a naval battle and thus cede control of the sea to the Germans, leaving Britain completely defenceless against the German High Seas Fleet, susceptible to attack and blockade. Gordon (1996): 21.

⁴⁴⁸ These battles are discussed below.

⁴⁴⁹ Needless to say, other decisive naval battles which came after, such as Actium, Lepanto, Trafalgar and Tsushima (amongst others) had an influence on German naval strategy. The Peloponnesian War seems to provide the first extant explicit expression of decisive battle as a legitimate naval strategy, no doubt taking as an example the Persian War before it.

in battle and disable as many as possible, for he is said to have watched the ships sail along the coast and wished to engage them in the 'open sea' (Thuc. 2.83.2), i.e. once through the narrowest part of the gulf closer to Patrai. The successful Athenian attack disabled many ships and captured 12 (Thuc. 2.84). A second battle followed and after an initial setback the vastly outnumbered Athenians managed to prevail and the remaining Peloponnesian ships sailed back into the Gulf to Korinth (Thuc. 2.90-92). Reinforced with 20 more ships soon after, the Athenian contingent ensured the maintenance of sea control in the area around Naupaktos and over the important sea lane. This sea control restricted the ability of Korinth to move troops and supplies through this area.

The revolt of Mytilene from Athens in 428 was a major episode in the early years of the war and an event that could have had serious ramifications if successful. The Athenians initially blockaded Mytilene by sea (Thuc. 3.6), with the land siege only put in place before the onset of winter (Thuc. 3.18). The blockade was clearly effective, for Thucydides says that Mytilenean food supplies began to fail (ὁ σῆτος ἐπελελοίπει: Thuc. 3.27.1).⁴⁵⁰ The Spartans failed entirely to relieve the Mytileneans. The Spartan admiral Alkidas refused to even attempt a relief effort or any other operation against the Athenians in the east. Thucydides is very critical of Alkidas and the Spartans, in particular their sloth and inaction. The relief fleet of 40 Peloponnesian ships proceeded in a 'leisurely' manner from the Peloponnesos to Ikaros (σχολαῖοι: Thuc. 3.29.1). After rejecting the proposal for an attack on the Athenian forces at Mytilene,⁴⁵¹ Alkidas rejected the proposal to establish a base in the east from where he could induce Ionian cities to revolt from Athens. Thucydides sees this as a reasonable proposal,⁴⁵² saying that the Ionians would welcome it and such a move would not only deprive Athens of revenue, but also incur additional costs in requiring them to blockade the Ionian cities and possibly convince the Persian governor Pissuthnes to join the war, presumably to Athens' detriment (Thuc. 3.31.1). Alkidas is not interested in any of these proposals and because he had failed to relieve Mytilene was eager to return to the Peloponnesos as soon as possible (3.31.2). Some scholars have tried to

⁴⁵⁰ Diodoros also says that the Mytileneans were running short of food: Diod. 12.55.7.

⁴⁵¹ The proposer of this move, and Elean by the name of Teutaplos, suggested that a night attack would see them successful against the Athenians – Thuc. 3.30.3.

⁴⁵² Using the odd phrasing ἐλπίδα δ' εἶναι.

defend Alkidas' conduct,⁴⁵³ and though it is true that an attack on the Athenians at Mytilene was a high-risk operation, to sail back to the Peloponnesos having done nothing more than kill some prisoners collected along the way was not just a wasted opportunity, but also an action that as the locals pointed out, was not endearing them to the Spartan cause (Thuc. 3.32.1-2). Alkidas' squadron accomplished nothing more than a demonstration that the Spartans had no intention of carrying out the war where it would hurt Athens the most. Pro-Athenian Ionians could rest easy knowing that they were safe from the Spartans, and anti-Athenian factions would see that the Spartans arrived too late to help the Mytileneans and were unwilling to help anyone else. The fault may not have been Alkidas, for he may have been under higher orders to do nothing should he arrive too late at Mytilene. In either case, it clearly demonstrates a lack of Spartan initiative on the strategic level.

The strategy of Perikles and his successors

Athenian strategy under Perikles has been the source of much debate and misconception. It was a maritime strategy and it was a defensive strategy, which is not to say it did not envision offensive actions. Athens as a metaphorical 'island' guaranteed its landward defence and assured its supply lines by sea. This allowed Athens to strike out at Sparta and Spartan allies using superior sea power. Athens' decision to rebuild the city's walls after the defeat of the Persian invasion caused anxiety in Sparta, though it was Sparta's allies that allegedly instigated the Spartans into confronting Athens, fearing the Athenian navy and the valour that they had displayed against Persia (Thuc. 1.91-93). It is noteworthy that he says it was Sparta's allies who were most concerned, allies who were nearer to the coast than Sparta and therefore more vulnerable to Athenian sea power. Perikles' strategy was an evolution of the strategy developed by those who came before him, back to Themistokles and the Persian Wars. The evacuation of the city allowed the Athenians to commit everything to their navy. This attitude is summed up in a story by Herodotos. Before the battle of Salamis in 480, a Korinthian delegate attacked Themistokles' counsel and dismissed him since Athens had been evacuated and thus he did not even have a city to his name. Themistokles replied that not only did he have a city, but he had one even greater than the Korinthians so long as the Athenians had 250 ships fully manned (Hdt.

⁴⁵³ See: Roisman (1987): 385-421.

8.61). It was a story that could be drawn upon in Athens for at least a century and a half afterwards, and even in Rome in the second century AD. In his speech *On the Crown*, Demosthenes invoked the spirit of the Athenians before Salamis and noted their willingness to abandon their land and make their triremes their homes (Dem. 18.204). Appian wrote that during the civil war Pompey gave a speech to his army after they abandoned Rome and reminded them that the Athenians had abandoned their city, knowing that a city consisted not of buildings but of its people (App. 2.50). Clearly Pompey and the runaway Senate were in a far different circumstance, yet they too thought it was enough to have an army and importantly, a navy with which to fight.

The separation of the operational from the strategic level of war aids in clarifying Athenian strategy in the Archidamian War. This requires caution, as there are no definite lines between these two theoretical constructs and the Peloponnesian War has not received such examination from scholars of the classical world or modern military theory.⁴⁵⁴ Nevertheless, it is a useful way in which the war can be examined without conflating policy, strategy and operations. To reiterate, strategy is about ‘maintaining a balance between ends, ways, and means; about identifying objectives; and about the resources and methods available for meeting such objectives.’⁴⁵⁵ Applied to Perikles’ strategy, this was a city protected from land attack, a powerful navy capable of power projection and an empire providing a huge amount of capital with which to fund a maritime war. Athenian policy under Perikles aimed at maintenance of the *status quo ante bellum*. The campaigns which Athens launched against the Peloponnesos can be seen as the operational level of war in action: the precise *ways* in which Athens used its *means* – sea power – for the desired *ends*. The strategy of Perikles did not, as Donald Kagan claims, fail.⁴⁵⁶ The successors of Perikles maintained essentially the same strategy but pursued it more vigorously and more aggressively on an *operational* level. Perikles’ strategy was one of maritime power

⁴⁵⁴ Many scholars and military practitioners see the idea of ‘Operational Art’ as having consumed or confused the relationship between strategy and tactics. The concept of Operational Art as it is known today is a recent one and has provoked much debate, especially after the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq during the beginning of the twenty-first century. For more discussion see: Strachan (2013): 210-234; Kelly and Brennan (2009).

⁴⁵⁵ Freedman (2013): xi.

⁴⁵⁶ Kagan (1994): 41 and (2009): 85. Kagan’s views on Pericles and his strategy have not changed since his four-volume series on the Peloponnesian War of 1969, 1974, 1981 and 1987.

projection as a means of coercing Sparta into peace, a strategy that ultimately succeeded in 421 with the Peace of Nikias,⁴⁵⁷ however imperfect Thucydides thought that peace was.

The opening of the war saw both Sparta and Athens initiate their war plans. Sparta invaded Attika in the hope of drawing out and defeating the Athenian hoplites, while Athens gathered its allies and prepared 100 ships for a raid on the Peloponnesos.⁴⁵⁸ Kagan's summary of the first year of the war has the Spartans doing widespread damage and the Athenians expending considerable time and money for little gain.⁴⁵⁹ H.D. Westlake and J.F. Lazenby also conclude that the Spartans inflicted more damage on Attika than the Athenians did in return.⁴⁶⁰ These are poor assessments of the events of that first year, both overestimating the damage done by Sparta and grossly simplifying and underestimating the damage done by Athens. There is little doubt that the Athenians were greatly upset by the Spartan invasion of Attika and the despoiling of their land: Thucydides says so (Thuc. 2.21-22) and the significance of this should not be discounted. However, the invasion and ravaging of Attika made the Athenians more angry and resolute rather than despondent,⁴⁶¹ and it certainly demonstrated to the Spartans that their ravaging strategy would not induce the Athenians into any rash actions. It also assumes a negligible effort by Athens to defend Attika, which is not the case. As small as it might have been, there was an effort by Athens to defend Attika with cavalry, both boosting morale and limiting the damage that could be done by the cavalry-deficient Spartan army.⁴⁶² The effects of Spartan efforts during the first years of the war have been exaggerated by many scholars, perhaps because the traditional

⁴⁵⁷ John Hale calls the Peace of Nikias a triumph for Athens that would have gratified Pericles. Hale (2009): 184. Platias and Koliopoulos call the peace favourable to Athens, ruined only by the Sicilian expedition (2010): 56.

⁴⁵⁸ Thuc. 2.18-21; Thuc. 2.17.4.

⁴⁵⁹ Kagan (2009): 80.

⁴⁶⁰ Westlake (1945): 81; Lazenby (2004): 253.

⁴⁶¹ The idea that the Athenian population would be so despondent at the destruction and ravaging of their land that it would cause them to capitulate by engaging in a hopeless land battle is reminiscent of the underlying assumption in the early 20th century that the use of strategic bombing in war could bring a nation to its knees. As the wholesale destruction of German and Japanese cities at the hands of Allied conventional bombers showed, this was flawed logic (though this was not the sole aim of the strategic bombing campaign – merely one school of thought on the British side). J.E. Lendon proposes that the actions of the first 6 years of the war were aimed at damaging the honour of the other, striking moral blows more than physical ones. It is an interesting proposal but I do not find it entirely convincing. The fears expressed by Spartan allies during the rebuilding of the Athenian walls do not seem to be concerned with damage to honour, but their livelihoods and property. Lendon does at least seem to concede that Athenian actions included offensive operations rather than pure defence. See: Lendon (2005): 107-283.

⁴⁶² Thuc. 2.22.2. See also: Spence (1990): 91-109.

nature of Spartan land invasion appears more effective in comparison with the more unorthodox Athenian maritime strategy and because of the measurement of damage in material terms, rather than in more intangible strategic results.

On the first point, instances of agricultural ravaging during this time period appear to have been greatly exaggerated in their material effects. In his ground-breaking work *Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece*, Victor Davis Hanson quite convincingly argues that the systematic destruction of crops and ravaging of land is extremely difficult. Grape and olive vines are extremely hardy and difficult to destroy, requiring many hours to do so. Further, grain is only vulnerable to fire and other widespread destruction during a narrow window of time. These conclusions stem from practical experience in farming as well as from close reading of the relevant literature. Of particular importance is a passage in the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, in which the unknown author describes Attica before the Spartan fortification of Dekeleia as the most lavishly equipped part of Greece, having suffered only slight damage from the Spartans in previous attacks.⁴⁶³ Thucydides too describes the fortification of Dekeleia as one of the prime causes of Athenian ruin, in stark contrast to the invasions of the Archidamian War (Thuc. 7.27.3-5). This should not be a surprise, for as Hanson calculates the Spartans spent a total of only 150 days in Attika during the entire Archidamian War.⁴⁶⁴ Even as late as the writings of Polyainos it was said that the first Athenian attack on Lakonia did more damage to the Spartans than was done by the Spartans to Attika (Polyain. 1.36.1). The idea of Sparta having laid waste to Attika is hard to defend and the effectiveness of Spartan strategy overstated. Sparta's original strategy was ultimately a failure,⁴⁶⁵ and it was only when they embraced sea power that they defeated Athens – not in the fields of Attika but on the seas from which Athens derived power.

⁴⁶³ *Hell. Oxy.* (London Fragments), (trans. P.R. McKechnie and S.J. Kern: 1988): 17.4-5; Hanson (1998): 237.

⁴⁶⁴ Hanson (1998): 147. Not everyone is convinced by Hanson's argument. J.A. Thorne argues that the example of the ravaging of Attika is not representative of the economic impact of ravaging in Classical Greece because Athens alone could bear such hardship. If anything, this argument reinforces the effectiveness of Athenian sea power during the war. See: Thorne (2001): 225-253.

⁴⁶⁵ As Kagan finally admits at the end of his survey of the Archidamian War. Kagan (1974): 333. However, Lazenby comes to the strange conclusion that Sparta still did more damage to Athens than Athens did to Sparta with this strategy, a conclusion with no solid foundation. Lazenby (2004): 253.

In contrast, the accomplishments of Athens during the first year of the war were strategically significant as they used sea power to greatly strengthen their position. The Athenians, along with a contingent of fifty ships from Kerkyra and other allies, conducted their own ravaging of enemy territory. This raiding included an attack on the city of Methone in the helot homeland of Messenia, a strike into an area where the Spartans felt particularly vulnerable. Although they did not take the city, it clearly worried the Spartans. Concurrent with this operation, thirty Athenian ships raided further north into eastern Lokris, taking hostages and defeating the Lokrians who assembled there to resist them. Finally, the Athenians secured the islands of Aigina and Kephallenia, the latter taken without a fight.⁴⁶⁶ Occupation of the former island ensured the security of the Saronic Gulf and control of the latter helped secure a base off the west coast of the Peloponnesos and Akarnania. By the end of the first year of the war, it is arguable that the Athenians had done as much material damage to the Spartans as the Spartans had to the Athenians.⁴⁶⁷ Plutarch goes so far as to say that not only did Athenian raids on the Peloponnesos cause more damage than the Spartan ones on Attika, but that if it wasn't for the plague the Spartans would have given up entirely (Plut. *Per.* 34.2). What is far more important, and overlooked by scholars, is the fact that Athens had accomplished far more in solidifying and improving its strategic position in Greece as well as proving the capability and reach of its sea power. By taking the islands of Aigina and Kephallenia the Athenians were even better placed to secure their own sea routes, disrupt those of the enemy and launch attacks against the Peloponnesian seaboard.

The offshore Greek islands were important strategic locations and were targeted by both sides. The Spartans were convinced by the Ambrakiots that the conquest of Akarnania would lead to the taking of the islands of Zakynthos and Kephallenia, possession of which would make Athenian cruises around the Peloponnesos much more difficult (Thuc. 2.80.1). Kerkyra not only possessed a strong navy, it was also situated on the best sailing route

⁴⁶⁶ Thuc. 2.25.1; 2.26; 2.27; 2.30.2.

⁴⁶⁷ Diodoros' account gives the impression that it was the Peloponnesians that suffered most from the raiding of the first year; 'terrified' (κατεπλήξαντο) by the Athenians 'ravaging many places of the coastline' (...πολλήν τῆς παραθαλαττίου χώρας πορθήσαντες...). Diod Sic. 12.42.7-8. B.X. de Wet is one of the few authors who also comes to the conclusion that Athens did more material damage. It is also an early, yet overlooked, example of a scholar arguing for a strong offensive element to Athenian war strategy. de Wet (1969) 103-119.

from Greece to Italy. Athenian and Spartan interference in Kerkyraian affairs were not aimed at conquest, but at establishing a friendly government which would secure the island for their interests, especially control of the critical sea lanes around the island and to Italy. An Athenian attack on the island of Kythera in 424 had a twofold purpose. First, the island was a landing place for merchant ships sailing from Libya and Egypt. Second, the island was in a position from which Lakonia could be secured from attacks by 'privateers', which also made it an excellent position for the Athenians to set up a base and raid the Peloponnesos.⁴⁶⁸ There is also the matter of money, as the Athenians were able to exact a tribute of four talents from Kythera, a non-allied city. This is not a departure from Athens' original strategy, as Kagan says,⁴⁶⁹ but a change in the operational conduct of the war. Athens was still using sea power offensively, attacking the Peloponnesos and wearing down Sparta while simultaneously strengthening its strategic position by further encircling the Peloponnesos.

Perikles' strategy at the opening of the Peloponnesian War required maritime force not just for the projection of power, but also for protection against enemy interference from the sea. Athenian attacks on the Peloponnesos and other places by sea required that these forces be covered against attacks from the Peloponnesian fleet.⁴⁷⁰ Athenian operations were so successful that rather than try to combat these amphibious operations with a maritime force, the Spartans took the unusual step of raising a mobile land force of archers and cavalry (Thuc. 4.55.2). The Athenian naval forces were a powerful covering naval force and the Spartans did not attempt to contest Athenian sea control. The mere presence of the Athenian covering force was enough to deter the Spartans from interfering. Many of the blockades discussed above, and the ones not discussed, saw maritime forces acting in a dual role. Not only was the city blockaded and supply lines cut-off, but outside attempts to relieve the city by attacking the besieging land force were prevented. Whether a short-term raid or prolonged siege, the provision of cover to a land force was vital to that force achieving its objective without interference from the sea.

⁴⁶⁸ 4.53.3; Plut. *Nik.* 6.4.

⁴⁶⁹ Thuc. 4.57.4; Kagan (1974): 261.

⁴⁷⁰ The best and most detailed example is the campaign off Pylos, discussed below.

The culmination of Periklean strategy was the Athenian success at Pylos and the capture of Spartan forces on the island of Sphakteria in 425. The end result is heralded by Thucydides as a stroke of enormous luck. Although luck was certainly part of Athenian success,⁴⁷¹ the matter should not be seen so simply, but as the fruition of Athenian maritime strategy. Once again Kagan is incorrect in calling Demosthenes' strategy a clear departure from previous Athenian strategy.⁴⁷² Although it is true as he points out that Perikles had mentioned establishing fortifications in the Peloponnesos but had never carried it out,⁴⁷³ Perikles' death early in the war means we cannot know whether it was just a vague and empty threat. Even the 'Old Oligarch' spoke of how the availability of headlands and offshore islands gave the rulers of the sea many opportunities to establish bases from which to harm those on the mainland.⁴⁷⁴ Demosthenes' decision to fortify Pylos demonstrates a continued, albeit belated, plan to increase pressure on Sparta through raids and attacks on its territory from the sea. Two modern scholars quite correctly interpret the Pylos campaign as the logical corollary of Periklean strategy.⁴⁷⁵ Although Thucydides writes that it was due to a storm that the Athenians ended up at Pylos, he also says that it was the location which Demosthenes landed to 'do what was wanted there' and to fortify the position, as that was the object of the voyage. This was not a random deserted headland as Thucydides has the two Athenian generals sneeringly say (Thuc. 4.3.1-3), but territory in the heart of Messenia amongst the helot population that was such a constant worry to Sparta. The original Athenian plan as described by Perikles is unchanged, merely more aggressively pursued at the operational level.

The decision by the Athenians to fortify Pylos quickly got the attention of the Spartans. Once King Agis and the Peloponnesians ravaging Attika heard the news they marched back immediately, and once in Sparta they called together allies from around the

⁴⁷¹ This refers to the outcome of the campaign rather than the Athenians landing at Pylos. Luck is a convenient explanation for Thucydides, whose distaste for Kleon is well known. Rather than credit Kleon with a well-earned victory, it seems that Thucydides opted to ascribe the victory to luck as opposed to good leadership by a character he despised.

⁴⁷² Kagan (1974), p. 222.

⁴⁷³ Thuc. 1.142.4.

⁴⁷⁴ Old Oligarch 2.13-14. Though there is the danger that this passage is taking Pylos/Sphakteria as its primary example and thus can lead to a circular argument.

⁴⁷⁵ Platias and Koliopoulos (2010), p. 49.

Peloponnesos.⁴⁷⁶ Once the Spartans attacked the Athenian garrison on Pylos they made the fateful decision to land a force of hoplites on the island of Sphakteria in order to prevent any relieving force of Athenians from establishing a base nearby.⁴⁷⁷ The subsequent naval battle, which saw Athens victorious, also had the effect of trapping the Spartan hoplites occupying Sphakteria. This situation was deemed so dire that the Spartan commanders resolved to conclude a truce on the spot. In fact, the Spartans felt the situation so serious that as part of the truce they temporarily surrendered to the Athenians all of their warships in Lakonia, sixty in total.⁴⁷⁸ The Spartans were willing to gut their naval power, as weak as it already was, in order to retain their small contingent of hoplites. This shows a lack of Spartan confidence with respect to naval matters, and it clearly demonstrates Athenian amphibious capability. Athenian land and naval forces could be used in close concert not just to raid territory, but to deal a serious military blow to Sparta with severe political consequences.

The full magnitude of Athenian accomplishments during the Pylos campaign is evident in Spartan actions after the capture of their hoplites on Sphakteria. Thucydides calls the surrender of the (approximately) 120 Spartiatai the most surprising thing to happen in the war.⁴⁷⁹ The most immediate result of the Spartans being taken prisoner was the Athenian threat to execute them if the Spartans invaded Attika,⁴⁸⁰ thus ending the direct threat to Attika and freeing it up for full use. The Spartans sent envoys to Athens in order to recover both the prisoners and Pylos, for they were seriously alarmed by the Messenian raids being conducted from Pylos into Lakonia, stoking the age-old fear of widespread helot rebellion.⁴⁸¹ But the Athenians did not stop at Pylos with their naval operations in 425. They raided Krommyon in Korinthian territory and established a fortified base at Methana from where they could raid into the territory of Troizen (Thuc. 4.45). In the northwest the Athenians based in Naupaktos made an expedition against Anaktorion, a Korinthian city,

⁴⁷⁶ Thuc. 4.6, 4.8.1-2.

⁴⁷⁷ Thuc. 4.8.3-8. For more details on the conduct of the Pylos campaign see: Lazenby (2004), pp. 67-79.

⁴⁷⁸ Thuc. 4.15-16.

⁴⁷⁹ Thuc. 4.40.1. Hornblower calls this a typical rhetorical superlative. Hornblower (1997): 194.

Nevertheless, the surrender of Spartan hoplites in such a number was unheard of to that point and certainly flies in the face of the vaunted reputation of Spartan hoplites, epitomised by the battle of Thermopylai in 480.

⁴⁸⁰ Thuc. 4.41.1.

⁴⁸¹ Thuc. 4.41.1-3; Diod. 12.63.5.

taking it and settling people from Akarnania there.⁴⁸² This meant that the entire north coast of the Corinthian Gulf from Naupaktos to Ambrakia, with the minor exception of Molykreion, was hostile to Corinth. These widespread amphibious operations demonstrate a powerful Athenian maritime and especially naval capability and a strategy which was aggressively expeditionary in nature.

Thucydides gives a very blunt assessment of the above events and their effects on Sparta. The Spartans split their forces and stationed them throughout the most threatened areas of the Peloponnesos and took the unusual step of raising a force of cavalry and archers to act as a mobile reserve.⁴⁸³ Thucydides describes the Spartans as on the defensive, fearing internal revolution, afraid of another disaster like the one that befell them at Pylos and lacking all confidence in themselves (Thuc. 4.55.1-4). The cause of this anxiety and outright fear was constant Athenian raiding, unimpeded, along the Peloponnesian seaboard.⁴⁸⁴ This was made possible by a strong Athenian navy, able to land a force of troops in hostile territory, protect them from enemy naval intervention, and bring them off again safely or keep them supplied and protected so that they could cause even greater damage.

The use of naval forces to project power from the sea was a defining element of the first half of the Archidamian War. This did at times perhaps go outside the scope of Periklean strategy. The first Athenian expedition to Sicily does not fit with the war plan outlined by Perikles and appears to have been a move to extend Athenian power. The ostensible aim of the expedition was not conquest but to aid Athens' Sicilian allies. Thucydides does give the Athenians a more sinister motive, calling the expedition a test of how vulnerable Sicily might be to Athenian conquest (Thuc. 3.86.3-4), but this should be viewed with caution in light of later events. The first Sicilian expedition was primarily diplomatic in nature and Thucydides perhaps downplays the importance of Athenian attempts at aiding their western allies. After all, the Peloponnesians had strong friends in the west too and for Athens to ignore their allies' call for help would have weakened their position in the west, if not in the other territories where they had allies. Failure to aid their allies would have

⁴⁸² Thuc. 4.49. Salmon (1984): 318.

⁴⁸³ Unusual for the Spartans, who were not known for their utilisation of cavalry or archers.

⁴⁸⁴ Thuc. 4.56. To paraphrase British Admiral Jackie Fisher (or A.K.Wilson, the attribution is disputed), the Athenian army was being used as a projectile fired by the Athenian navy. Halpern (1994): 22.

made Athens look weak and thus the dispatch of a naval expedition to Sicily in 427 can be seen as a response to external events rather than as a radical change in Athenian strategy, if not policy. As the war dragged on it became more complex and these instances highlight the ever-important point that strategy is not practiced in a vacuum. The important thing to note about this expedition is that, although it may have had a diplomatic intent, this was contingent on the naval force's ability to project power from the sea.

The final campaign of the Archidamian War was conducted in northern Greece and relied heavily on maritime forces on the Athenian side. Spartan operations in the Chalkidike region in mark a change in Sparta's strategy and reveals the effectiveness of Athenian strategy up to that point. Thucydides explicitly states that Spartan operations in the northwest Aegean were aimed at distracting Athens and relieving the pressure they were putting on the Peloponnesos and Lakonia especially (Thuc. 4.80.1). Further and even more importantly, Thucydides says that the Spartans were happy to have an excuse to send out helots from the Peloponnesos since the occupation of Pylos was thought to have increased the chances of a helot revolt (Thuc. 4.80.2). It also marks the point at which Sparta abandoned all hope of confronting Athens at sea until well after the Peace of Nikias, for they decided to avoid naval operations in favour of a purely land campaign. It is also a campaign which demonstrates the limitations of naval forces, with sea power a limited factor in the outcomes of the war in Thrake. Brasidas' march through Thessaly into Thrake was a bold move. It was not an easy endeavour and relied on a very careful set of favourable circumstances. This example highlights some of the difficulties in marching overland due to the human geography.

Spartan success in the north-west Aegean presaged a bolder and more successful strategy undertaken during the Dekeleian/Ionian War when Sparta would use Persian money to build a fleet and conduct their own amphibious operations against the Athenians in the Aegean island and Anatolian regions. This was recognition that pulling allies away from Athens was still the most effective strategy, a lesson learned during the successful campaigns in the Chalkidike region but unattainable after the failure of the Mytilinean revolt and Pylos. This strategy relied on the ability of Sparta to project power from the sea, which in turn required the ability to conduct combat operations at sea in order to enable

this power projection. It seems very unlikely that Brasidas' campaign in the Chalkidike could be seen as a serious threat to the Athenian Black Sea grain supply. D.W. Knight in an article on Periklean War strategy does a poor job of assessing the situation. The idea that this campaign could have any link with Periklean strategy is fundamentally flawed. It has nothing to do with this strategy, for as Knight admits just afterwards, it was a campaign forced upon the Athenians.⁴⁸⁵ *Strategy is not conducted in a vacuum*: this all-important fundamental fact is missing in Knight's analysis. For any scholar to take seriously the prospect of Sparta threatening the Hellespont from Thrake in 424 would require a distinct lack of judgement with regard to the strategic situation. It is true the Hellespont could be threatened by land;⁴⁸⁶ it was threatened by Philip in the fourth century but this is far outside of the capabilities of Sparta in 424. The strategic situation for Sparta was very different, and Knight offers no argument as to how it would have been possible for Sparta to threaten the Hellespont from Amphipolis. That Brasidas started to build an unknown number of triremes is certainly not proof, but to ignore the litany of defeats at sea the Spartans had continually suffered before this. Either the triremes were intended for local defence or Brasidas was wildly and hopelessly optimistic about their renewed chances at sea. In either case, this is nowhere near proof of a feasible Spartan move to threaten Black Sea grain. Lastly, it ignores the last stage of the war, when this sea lane was threatened by Spartan maritime forces in and around the Hellespont, not based out of distant Thrake. The Spartans in 425 could not even rescue a force of their own hoplites trapped a mile offshore on an island just off the coast of Messenia. There was virtually no chance of them rebuilding a fleet, having surrendered theirs as a result of Pylos, and then threatening the Hellespont from distant Thrake. Even if the capture of Amphipolis did open the overland route to the Hellespont, Brasidas' force was far too small to hold onto gains in the Chalkidike and threaten the Hellespont. This would require reinforcements and Spartan reinforcements

⁴⁸⁵ Knight (1970): 154. It is also hard to see how this campaign was forced by an 'oversight' of Periklean strategy. Knight does not give any evidence of how this was an oversight, except for the nonsensical statement about Perikles telling the Athenians not to engage Sparta in battle on land; conveniently or negligently ignoring the fact that Perikles was talking about a battle with the full Spartan army, not some detachment of Helots in far northern Greece.

⁴⁸⁶ Knight (1970): 154. In no way did Brasidas' campaign demonstrate 'the possible vulnerability of the Athenian life line to and from the grain fields of the Black Sea area' (157). This is a baseless and faulty appraisal of the strategic situation. Unfortunately, both Kagan and later Hornblower accept this poor analysis of the intent of Brasidas' campaign. Kagan (1969): 186-88; (1974): 288-9, 294; Hornblower (1996):255-6.

had to go by the hazardous overland route through Thessaly, whereas the Athenians could reinforce the area by sea. The loss of Amphipolis was a blow to Athens, for the loss of timber and silver, and as Thucydides says, the fear that other allies might revolt from Athens.⁴⁸⁷ The Spartans were not in a position to threaten the Hellespont, and the campaign in Thrake demonstrates that just as there was a limit to Athenian sea power and what it could accomplish, there was a limit to Sparta's land power and what it could do.

The Sicilian Expedition

The Athenian expedition to Sicily required a long logistics chain for sustainment and reinforcement, as did Spartan efforts to keep Syrakousai from falling. Unlike in the Aegean, Athenian operations in Sicily had far less recourse to reliable local allies. So too for the Peloponnesians, who also relied on reinforcements coming from mainland Greece. This meant that the seas between Greece and Italy and Sicily were of increasing importance, with both sides conducting naval operations to interdict reinforcements. However, the Athenians were slow in their response, and in the beginning of the campaign Nikias did not seem concerned with small numbers of Peloponnesian ships crossing over, ignoring a force of 18 vessels which he dismissed as being out only for raiding purposes (Thuc. 6.104).⁴⁸⁸ That the ships were carrying the Spartan commander Gylippos was probably unknown to Nikias, but it does seem unusual that he would not be concerned with the ships out for 'raiding' purposes, perhaps indicating that at this early stage he was not concerned about his supply line back to Greece, or indeed that the supply-line was non-existent and the expedition was self-sufficient.⁴⁸⁹ However there may still be an element of negligence, at least in the mind of Thucydides who says later that after the arrival of

⁴⁸⁷ Thuc. 4.108.1-3. Thucydides mentions the strategically important position of Amphipolis and that losing it would open the way into Thrake, but it is a big leap to read this as meaning all the way to the Hellespont, as Knight, Kagan and others appear to have done.

⁴⁸⁸ 'Despised' the small number of ships. Hornblower makes no comment on Nikias' attitude or lack of action, but it seems as if Thucydides is characterising Nikias as somewhat arrogant and negligent in attitude. Hornblower (2008): 536.

⁴⁸⁹ Plutarch does mention that ships full of grain were arriving for him from cities all over Sicily, suggesting that food supplies did not need to be shipped from mainland Greece. *Nik.* 18.4.

Gylippos and the setbacks suffered by land Nikias began to pay more attention to the war at sea.⁴⁹⁰ Aside from some fortification works around the Great Harbour Nikias dispatched 20 ships to the vicinity of Lokroi and Rhegion to intercept Korinthish ships on their way to reinforce Syrakousai (Thuc. 7.4.7). However, Nikias lays blame on the Athenians back home for not preventing reinforcements from sailing over, his letter complaining that the Peloponnesian forces mustering to sail over in the spring would elude the Athenians as they had before.⁴⁹¹ After dispatching 10 ships with money during the winter solstice 414/3 the Athenians then sent 20 ships to Naupaktos to intercept reinforcements sailing for Sicily.⁴⁹² The Korinthians prepared a squadron of 25 ships to engage the Athenians and thus allow the transport ships to get through to Sicily safely, an engagement which was successful and allowed the transport ships to get through (Thuc. 7.17.4; 19.5). Far from being temporary, the Korinthish ships appear to have been stationed opposite the Athenian squadron at Naupaktos in order to keep them distracted and unable to intercept Peloponnesian transports (Thuc. 7.34.1). In Italy and Sicily, the Athenians were also unsuccessful, losing transport ships laden with stores (7.25.1-2) and then failing to intercept all but one Peloponnesian transport ship near Megara in Sicily, despite having stationed 20 ships there (7.25.4). As a result of these operations, the Peloponnesians were able to reinforce Syrakousai with supplies and troops and at times interdict and destroy Athenian transports. This not only hindered Athenian efforts to take Syrakousai but also put their plans in jeopardy as the balance of power swung in favour of the besieged Syrakousai, gaining supplies faster than the Athenians. Had the Athenians been able to better protect their own supplies and interdict those of the Peloponnesians, it may have tipped the odds in their favour during the siege.

⁴⁹⁰ Thuc. 7.4.4. Plutarch also paints Nikias as negligent at this stage, saying he did not set an adequate watch for Gylippos' arrival. *Nik.* 18.6. In this he seems to be following Thucydides' judgement.

⁴⁹¹ Thuc. 7.15.2. This puts the blame on the Athenians back home, though it seems at odds with the previous comment by Thucydides that Nikias was not concerned about a few ships which he saw as out for nothing more than raiding. Hornblower is probably correct in seeing the letter as more of a speech where Thucydides is characterising him as he had before. Hornblower (2008): 568.

⁴⁹² Thuc. 7.16.2-17.4; Plut. *Nik.* 20.1. Once again the Athenians sent ships out in the middle of winter, including to Sicily. It seems as if there was no squadron of ships stationed at Naupaktos before these 20 are sent, for when the battle comes (7.19.5) there are only 20 Athenian ships engaged. Hornblower (2008): 571-2. This does reinforce Nikias' above complaint about Peloponnesian ships not being intercepted on their way to Sicily.

The fate of the Athenian expedition to Sicily was sealed by several naval battles in the Great Harbour. The decision by Syrakousai to construct and train a fleet was the surest strategy to enable an effective defence of the city.⁴⁹³ However, according to Thucydides it was not until the Spartan commander Gylippos arrived that Syrakousai was finally convinced to confront Athens at sea. Gylippos convinced them that it was the only way to gain an advantage over the Athenians and that the potential rewards outweighed the risks.⁴⁹⁴ Regardless of whether or not it is Gylippos or Thucydides who speaks, this was the best strategy to pursue. Despite being defeated in the ensuing naval engagement, Gylippos proved a canny leader as he took advantage of the battle to capture the Athenian forts at Plemmyrion,⁴⁹⁵ the promontory at the far entrance to the Great Harbour. Aside from the losses in men and material, this loss had the much greater impact of making it difficult for all but the strongest of Athenian forces to enter the Great Harbour. This seriously jeopardized Athenian reinforcement and resupply operations, a situation that Thucydides calls the first and foremost cause of ruin of the Athenian forces.⁴⁹⁶ In this respect the naval battle was important not as a means of defeating the Athenians directly at sea but as a diversion which enabled Gylippos' attack by land against Plemmyrion, the consequences of which would have a major impact on the war at sea and thus the entire campaign.

Far from being discouraged by their defeat at sea, Syrakousai modified their ships and tactics to more effectively confront the Athenians.⁴⁹⁷ Syrakousai and Athens met again in three more naval engagements,⁴⁹⁸ the final of which saw the Athenians again defeated as they tried to break out of the harbour, forcing them into a hopeless retreat by land.⁴⁹⁹ With

⁴⁹³ Syrakousans training a fleet: Thuc. 7.7.4.

⁴⁹⁴ Thuc. 7.21; Diod. 13.8.5.

⁴⁹⁵ Thuc. 7.22-3. Kagan sees the naval part of the action as only ever meant to be a diversion from the land attack to take Plemmyrion. Kagan (1981): 298. It is wrong to assume that Syrakousai engaged in naval battle without any hope of at least a draw if not an outright victory. Had the Syrakousan forces folded too quickly Gylippos' attack would not have worked. While Kagan is correct in seeing it as primarily a diversionary attack, I do not think the Syrakousan forces would have engaged in battle without intending to challenge Athenian sea control in the harbour.

⁴⁹⁶ Thuc. 7.24; Lazenby (2004): 153-4.

⁴⁹⁷ They modified the prows of their vessels for head-on ramming attacks, the confined waters of the harbour making it nearly impossible for the swifter Athenian vessels to use their preferred tactics of attacking the flanks of enemy vessels, manoeuvres such as the *diekplous* and *periplous*. Thuc. 7.36; Diod. 13.10.2-3. These tactics were tested by the Corinthians off Naupaktos in the battle off Erineos (above, Thuc. 7.34).

⁴⁹⁸ Thuc. 7.37-41; Thuc. 7.42; Thuc. 7.56.

⁴⁹⁹ Thuc. 7.71. Diodoros has some of the Athenians ask retreating crews if they thought they could sail back to Athens by land. Diod. 13.17.1.

no navy to take them off the Athenians were forced to march through hostile territory with no cavalry to screen them and with little hope of finding a way back to Greece. The battles in the Great Harbour of Syrakousai may have been unorthodox but they nevertheless had a tremendous impact on the course of the entire war.⁵⁰⁰ The Athenians never re-gained a measure of sea control around Syrakousai and this was of critical importance, dragging out the siege and preventing them from conducting other operations in Sicily which may have tipped the odds in their favour.⁵⁰¹ Had the Athenians been able to destroy the fleet of Syrakousai in battle their odds of success would have improved substantially. Instead, it was the destruction of their fleet in battle that led to Athenian defeat in Sicily. So too did the failure of Athenian interdiction operations and losses to the same operations conducted by the Peloponnesians contribute to their defeat, allowing Syrakousai to receive supply and reinforcement whilst hindering their own supply line. Finally, the loss of Plemmyrion made it much harder for the Athenians to break out and thus prevented a withdrawal by sea. Such a withdrawal would have saved at least a portion of the Athenian fleet and army, turning a total loss into something less severe. The naval operations at sea in and around Sicily during the expedition had a critical impact on the course of the war, critically weakening Athenian naval power and strengthening Sparta with a new ally equipped with a capable fleet. Further, it demonstrated to the world that the Athenians could be defeated at sea.

Protection and interdiction of shipping

The protection and interdiction of shipping, and in particular trade, was an important role for naval forces, especially when it came to food supplies. Trade here is used to denote ships with cargo bound for cities as well as military forces, supply ships in a sense. The method of supplying expeditionary forces on campaign is largely unknown, however, a few examples seem to show that they often relied on outside trade to obtain at the very least their food supplies. The vast logistics train described by Thucydides before the Sicilian expedition helps demonstrate this (Thuc. 6.31).

⁵⁰⁰ Unorthodox with respect to the fact that they were large scale battles conducted in the confines of a large harbour and involved tactics such as block-ships and even fire-ships.

⁵⁰¹ Lazenby (2004): 167-8.

Having launched operations against the Peloponnesos in 431 and 430, the Athenians dispatched twenty ships under the command of Phormion, who established himself at Naupaktos near the entrance to the Korinthian Gulf (Thuc. 2.69.1).⁵⁰² This was done during winter (τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος), and their role was to keep watch against ships sailing into or out of the gulf. This not only highlights another example of a naval force operating during winter, it demonstrates that there was other maritime traffic, military and/or civilian, operating during winter. Further, a separate force of six ships under Melesandros was sent to Karia and Lykia on the Anatolian coast with the job of securing tribute, but also protecting merchantmen (ὀλκᾶι) from Spartan 'privateers' (τὸ ληστικὸν - Thuc. 2.69.1-2).⁵⁰³ Thucydides names Phaselis and Phoenicia as ports for these merchantmen. This seems to indicate an early Athenian trade connection with these places, and Phaselis in particular is noteworthy considering that a Phaselian appears as the defendant in a trade dispute in the Athenian law courts some 75 years after the above operation.⁵⁰⁴ Phaselis is on the Athenian Tribute lists for the period and although Melesandros was certainly (as Thucydides says) collecting tribute from there, it is made clear that the Athenians were also there to protect the city's trade. Sparta is engaging the services of 'privateers'⁵⁰⁵ to attack Athenian interests in the eastern Aegean and Athens is protecting the interests of one of its tributary cities.

In 412/1 the Spartans again engaged in operations to disrupt trade along the Anatolian coast, this time sending a coalition of 12 Peloponnesian warships to Knidos.⁵⁰⁶ Half the ships were to secure Knidos and half were sent to cruise around Triopion and seize merchant vessels sailing from Egypt (Thuc. 8.35.1-2). The Athenians learned of this plan and dispatched warships from Samos, successfully intercepting and capturing the Peloponnesian warships and almost taking Knidos (Thuc. 8.35.3-4). It is once again worth noting that these operations were conducted during winter. The protection of trade in eastern waters was clearly an important role for Athenian naval forces. Near the end of 410 a force of 15 Peloponnesian ships were intercepted in the Hellespont by 'the nine Athenian

⁵⁰² Called the Krisaian Gulf by Thucydides.

⁵⁰³ For more on piracy and privateering, see Chapter Nine.

⁵⁰⁴ Demosthenes 35 *Against Lakritos*, dated to perhaps 355 or 351. See: MacDowell (2004): 130-133.

⁵⁰⁵ See Chapter 9 on this concept.

⁵⁰⁶ 10 ships from Thourioi, one from Lakonia and one from Syrakousai, under Spartan command.

ships that were always keeping watch there over the merchantmen' (Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.36).⁵⁰⁷ Earlier, in 413/2, the Athenians fortified Cape Sounion to enable grain ships to round the cape in safety (Thuc. 8.4).⁵⁰⁸ This fort helped establish a naval station which could help protect trade at either end of the Athenian supply chain, protecting the vital sea lanes that kept the city fed.

Of all the cargo requiring protection, grain ships were of the utmost importance to Athens in both peacetime and in war. The protection and interdiction of the grain trade, especially through the Hellespont, became a crucial issue during the last years of the Peloponnesian War. The Spartan King Agis, having fortified Dekeleia and cut the land route from Euboia to Athens, is said to have decried the futility of the move:

Ἄγεις δὲ ἐκ τῆς Δεκελείας ἰδὼν πλοῖα πολλὰ σίτου εἰς Πειραιᾶ καταθέοντα, οὐδὲν ὄφελος ἔφη εἶναι τοὺς μετ' αὐτοῦ πολὺν ἤδη χρόνον Ἀθηναίους εἰργεῖν τῆς γῆς, εἰ μὴ τις σχήσοι καὶ ὅθεν ὁ κατὰ θάλατταν σίτος φοιτᾷ.

But Agis, seeing from Dekeleia the many grain ships sailing into the Peiraieus, was saying that it was of no advantage for them to shut out the Athenians from the land for much time already, if they could not hold back the grain imported by sea.⁵⁰⁹

The intensification of the Spartan war effort in the Hellespont region was not only aimed at taking away allies from Athens, but also disrupting the grain supply that kept Athens fighting. It was Lysandros' attacks in the Hellespont and especially the capture of Lampsakos which drew the Athenians into battle at Aigospotamoi (Xen. *Hell.* 2.17.17-21). Black Sea grain was important to Athens, possibly as far back as the late 430s as evidenced by a speech of Isokrates referring to a special relationship with a Bosporan Kingdom.⁵¹⁰ As grain from other locations such as Sicily became harder to acquire, Black Sea grain became critical to Athenian survival. Spartan attacks on grain shipments were a critical feature of

⁵⁰⁷ ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀττικῶν ἐννέα νεῶν, αἱ αἰεὶ ἐνταῦθα τὰ πλοῖα διεφύλαττον.

⁵⁰⁸ The Cape provides exceptional views into the Aegean and the Saronic Gulf. The bay would have provided shelter for several warships tasked with protecting the grain ships. A more contested issue is the dating of the two rock-cut shipsheds present on the site. Some scholars date these sheds to the Hellenistic period, but some including recent scholarship, would date the sheds to the Classical period and perhaps even to 413/2 and the fortification of the site. See: Baika (2013): 525-34.

⁵⁰⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.35.

⁵¹⁰ Satyros, who ruled from approximately 433-392. Isok. 17.57; Garnsey (1988): 124. This was the Kimmerian Bosporus, on the eastern side of the present-day Crimean Peninsula. Kagan identifies the Black Sea as the most important 'granary' for Athens in the fifth century as well as an important source of dried fish. Kagan (1969): 179-80. Some scholars argue that the Black Sea region was an important source of Athenian grain well before the Peloponnesian War. Keen (2000): 63-73.

the last half of the Peloponnesian War. It was Sparta's ability to contest Athenian sea control that allowed for this new strategy to take shape.

It is clear from the above operations that there were several key sea routes across the Mediterranean. Kerkyra controlled the best route from Greece to Italy and Sicily, important for the grain that Sicily provided, as well as military operations. The entrance to the Korinthian Gulf was a chokepoint that Korinth constantly attempted to keep open, and Athens to shut. After the Sicilian expedition, Athens relied on Egypt and especially the Black Sea for the grain that could keep the city fed. Sea routes from Egypt north and west were targets of Athens' enemies. Finally, the Black Sea route through the chokepoint of the Hellespont became the most important and fought over sea route during the Peloponnesian War. It was the Spartan threat to this route that led to Athenian defeat at Aigospotamoi and their defeat in the war.

Spartan Strategy 413-404

Sparta and sea power are not often considered together, yet it was Sparta's ability to transform itself into a sea power that allowed it to defeat Athens in the Peloponnesian War and gain ascendancy in Greek affairs for a short period afterwards. This transformation into a sea power was swift, as was the decline, yet it had a very important impact on events and a defining impact on Sparta itself.⁵¹¹ Arguably, Spartan land power did not increase over the fifth or fourth centuries, and if anything was in decline. Therefore, Sparta's brief fourth century ascendancy can be traced back to its embrace of sea power.

The defeat of the Athenian Sicilian expedition, according to Thucydides, left their allies willing to revolt from Athens.⁵¹² The Spartans were clearly ready to capitalise on this, emboldened by the addition of the Syrakousan navy (Thuc. 8.2.3) but also taking proactive steps and ordering a shipbuilding program to bolster their naval forces (8.3.2). This is clear acknowledgement by the Spartans that the war would be conducted overseas and thus

⁵¹¹ This maritime transformation is neatly summarised in a short chapter by Barry Strauss in a volume on maritime transformations throughout history, focused specifically on China in the twenty-first century. See: Strauss (2009): 32-61.

⁵¹² *Too* willing in Thucydides' opinion, the allies thinking that the Athenians would not last another year: 'misplaced optimism' in the words of Hornblower: (2008): 755. Thucydides seems to be warning the reader of Athenian resilience, and perhaps is indicating that Athens at this point still had a chance in the war if only they could endure and halt Spartan successes until a stalemate arose.

required the mobilisation of maritime forces. Sparta was now committing itself to a maritime war in the Aegean.

A different Spartan attitude and approach to maritime affairs is evident in the later years of the Peloponnesian War. This phase of the war, often called 'The Ionian War',⁵¹³ saw the bulk of combat operations occur in the east around the Aegean islands and the Hellespont region. The Spartans entered the Ionian War with a different strategy from the one with which they began the war, a strategy aimed at stripping Athens of allies. In doing so, they would attack the base of Athenian power, the allies who kept Athens funded and fed. This strategy required sea power and in particular, naval and maritime forces that could project power across the seas to strike at the islands and other overseas holdings of Athens. The Spartans, joined by Syrakousai and their strong navy (Thuc. 8.2.2-3), now had the means by which they could pull these subject cities away from Athens. It is important to note that initially the Spartan plan was not to confront the Athenians in battle, but to launch amphibious operations that would allow the allies of Athens to revolt, much like Amphipolis. As events in the years after the Sicilian expedition would demonstrate, the Spartans often went to great lengths to avoid a naval battle with the Athenians, even when they possessed a numerical advantage. The Athenians' best hope of victory lay in defeating Spartan naval force as well as maintaining the ability to project power in order to dissuade their allies from revolting, or taking back cities that had already gone over to Sparta.

One of the first offensive actions undertaken by Sparta at the recommencement of hostilities in 414/3 was to set up a fortification at Dekeleia in Attika. This move not only opened up a second front for the Athenians to deal with,⁵¹⁴ but more importantly it forced the Athenians to transport by sea what had once been transported from Euboia overland through Dekeleia to Athens (Thuc. 7.27), further stretching Athenian maritime resources and making them even more vulnerable to Sparta. This is not to say that the fortification of Dekeleia on its own was enough. It was the timing of it, coinciding with Athenian

⁵¹³ 413-404 BC, commonly but misleadingly referred to as the 'Dekeleian War' – more appropriately the Ionian War considering that the bulk of the fighting occurred in the Ionian region. This is not to minimise the importance of the fortification at Dekeleia and the Spartan occupation of Attika, for this was critical to Spartan strategy. However, as Kagan (building upon Westlake) noted, Ionian war is still a misleading term and Thucydides seems to be referring to the Ionian war – τοῦ Ἴωνικοῦ πολέμου – as part of the larger war that occurred in that region. Kagan (1987): 41, n.57; Westlake (1979): 9.

⁵¹⁴ Thuc. 7.18.1-2. Literally 'a double war'. Hornblower (2008): 573.

overstretch in Sicily and the subsequent degradation of their maritime power, that was damaging. Merchant ships needed to transport goods from Euboia to Athens and the warships needed to protect them were no longer available to support Athenian operations elsewhere at a time when they were committed to large-scale amphibious campaigns overseas. This extension of supply lines added one more burden and one more weak point. Unlike in the Archidamian War, the Spartans did not need to maintain a large standing army in the Peloponnesos, since the Athenians were not in a position to attack as they had under Periklean strategy. At the beginning of the war the Athenians were fighting a defensive war of *choice*: after the Sicilian expedition it was a defensive war of *necessity*. The difference lies in the Athenian ability to conduct offensive operations as a means of achieving their desired outcomes. The last decade of the war involved the Athenians conducting the majority of offensive operations in order to regain losses suffered at the hands of the Spartans. The best they could hope for would have been a negotiated peace with Sparta after a long war of attrition, rather than the potential settlement like that of Pylos in 425.

From the decision to build a fleet and contest Athenian control in the Aegean until the final battle at Aigispotamoi, the Spartans and their allies conducted numerous amphibious operations aimed at removing allies from the Athenians. An analysis of every operation lies outside the scope of this thesis.⁵¹⁵ Rather, it is worth examining some of the key issues in the conduct of these operations. The Spartans were deliberate in their opening actions, assessing which allies to support first, and in the case of Chios they sent a certain Phrynis to the island to report on the situation and whether or not it was conducive to revolt from Athens and worth Spartan support. A key factor seems to have been the fact that the Chians had no less than 60 ships on the island,⁵¹⁶ demonstrating that the Spartans had maritime and naval considerations at the forefront of their strategy. Preparations were conducted openly, including the hauling of ships across the *diolkos*, since the Athenians apparently had no fleet to speak of at sea (Thuc. 8.8.4). When the Athenians grew suspicious, they

⁵¹⁵ A database of maritime operations conducted in the period can be found at Appendix 1.

⁵¹⁶ Thuc. 8.6. The Spartans planned on sending 40 ships in total, 10 of them Spartan, but only sent 5. This was done during winter, and it was an earthquake which caused them to send fewer ships, not the weather. There must have been some religious reason for the scaling back of the operation: Hornblower (2008): 777.

asked the Chians to send ships across as surety against any disloyalty (Thuc. 8.9.2-3). This seems to have had the purpose of weakening the naval power of Chios in case of revolt while simultaneously adding to the naval power of Athens. Despite several setbacks at sea,⁵¹⁷ the Spartans led by the wily Alkibiades managed to stifle news of the Spartan reversals and convinced Chios, Erythrai and Klazomenai to revolt from Athens (Thuc. 8.14). Soon after Alkibiades and 20 ships arrived ahead of 19 Athenian ships to Miletos and induced it to revolt as well (Thuc. 8.17). The precariousness of the Athenian situation in the east is summed up shortly after, with explicit commentary from Thucydides. The Athenian forces, having defeated the Peloponnesian forces near Miletos, contemplated taking the city when they heard of a Peloponnesian and Sicilian fleet of 55 ships approaching (Thuc. 8.25-6). The Athenian commander Phrynichos is said to have had precise intelligence of this force and decided to retire and preserve his force rather than confront the enemy – a choice Thucydides praises as prudent and no disgrace, considering the danger Athens would be in if they lost (Thuc. 8.27.1-3). Thucydides says the Athenians could not justify offensive action except out of extreme necessity.⁵¹⁸ This is clear recognition by the Athenians that the Peloponnesian threat required a strong naval force to counter, and such a force could not be risked except in dire circumstances or with careful preparation. Even then, offensive actions would be aimed at Spartan gains in the region, and unable to strike at core Spartan interests. This shows Spartan strategy working well, pressuring the Athenians in many places and forcing them to spread their fleet thin as different island and mainland-littoral cities revolted from the empire.

The Spartans were able to use events in the east to launch small but important operations against the Athenians on the mainland. Mobilising five Sicilian and six Spartan ships, they launched a joint land and sea operation against the Athenian-backed Messenian garrison at Pylos, a thorn in the side of Sparta since 425. The Athenian relief force was turned back by bad weather, and the Spartans were successful in retaking Pylos (Diod. 13.64.5-7). This

⁵¹⁷ The Spartan ships that had crossed the Isthmus of Korinth were defeated in battle and blockaded at the disused Korinthian port of Spiraëum. This was an operation that saw a combined sea and land attack on the Spartan forces, a rare but not unheard-of case of naval forces landing troops into a contested environment much like at Pylos. Thuc. 8.10-11. The second defeat was of a squadron of 16 Peloponnesian ships returning from Sicily, intercepted and suffering losses at the hands of 27 waiting Athenian ships near Leukas. Thuc. 8.13.

⁵¹⁸ 8.27.3. A difficult passage summed up well by Hornblower: (2008): 827.

not only removed a key base for Athenian operations, it also removed a potential bargaining tool for future negotiations.⁵¹⁹ It may have been a small-scale amphibious operation, but it had a large impact on the war and was a demonstration of how much abler the Spartans had become at conducting maritime operations from the sea.

The year 406 was pivotal in the war and the Spartan blockade of Mytilene was a key event. In contrast to Alkidas, the Spartan commander Kallikratidas extracted money, willingly, from the Milesians and Chians. He then attacked and took Methymna and then supposedly sent to the Athenian Konon a message which demonstrates how far Spartan strategy and attitudes had turned, telling the Athenian that he would 'put an end to his illicit love of the sea'.⁵²⁰ As Kagan points out, the implication of the word *μοιχᾶω* is that the sea rightly belongs to Sparta;⁵²¹ certainly bluster and a taunt towards Konon as Kagan says, but also insight into how Spartan thinking had changed over the years. Neither Alkidas nor any other Spartan would have said such a thing during the first fifteen years of the war. Konon managed to flee to Mytilene but the pursuing Spartans defeated the Athenians in the city, destroying 30 Athenian ships and allowing Kallikratidas to blockade the harbour and city (*Xen. Hell.* 1.6.16-18). Cut off with little prospect of obtaining food and with no word of his situation reaching the outside world, Konon managed to get word to Athens in a trireme which successfully ran the careless Spartan blockade.⁵²² Diodoros gives a different, more

⁵¹⁹ Kagan (1987): 264. The story is related by Diodoros but not Xenophon, a puzzling omission. A storm prevented the Athenians from rounding Cape Malea, a notoriously difficult cape. However, Diodoros says the Athenian in command, Anytos, was accused of treason and saved himself only through bribing the jury, apparently the first case of a jury being bribed in Athenian history. Kagan is correct in seeing political motives behind this attack on Anytos: Kagan (1987): 264, n. 71. It does seem odd that Anytos appears to have given up so easily in trying to relieve the garrison at Pylos. Diodoros says that they held out for some time and one of the key factors in their surrender was a lack of food. This implies that the Spartan attack was conducted over a sufficiently long time to cause such a shortage. Even a bad storm lasting several days need not have precluded the Athenians from getting relief through in time. Anytos' conduct may not have been directly treasonous, but perhaps incompetent, or perhaps the naval contingent that was mobilised was of poor quality.

⁵²⁰ *Κόνωνι δὲ εἶπεν ὅτι παύσει αὐτὸν μοιχῶντα τῆν θάλατταν.* *Xen. Hell.* 1.6.15.

⁵²¹ Kagan (1987): 334. To translate it simply as 'fornicating' or some other such word misses the core meaning of the word. The word is concerned with adultery, not just sex in general and this is a fine but important distinction to make.

⁵²² *Xen. Hell.* 1.6.19-22. Konon sent two triremes, one sailing out to the 'open sea', presumably sailing directly west towards Attika, and one towards the Hellespont. Xenophon describes the preparations as careful on the Athenian side whereas the Spartans had become careless and they took their meals ashore at midday. Clearly Xenophon is highlighting how a blockade of a harbour should *not* be done. Although the Spartans catch one of the ships sailing out, the other reaches Athens successfully. It is clear that it was not material or technological deficiency that allowed the blockade to be run, but a deficiency in training and proper precaution.

confused account of this episode,⁵²³ although he gives extra detail on the measures taken by Konon to prevent the Peloponnesian ships from forcing the harbour entrance. This included sinking small vessels filled with rocks in the shallows and anchoring larger merchant vessels in the deeper water, armed with stones.⁵²⁴ In both narratives however, it is the Spartan blockade and siege of Mytilene that sets up the battle of Arginousai.

The battle of Arginousai was one of the few large naval battles fought during the war and had serious ramifications at the strategic level. Konon's predicament caused the Athenians to send a relief fleet, scraping together as many ships and men as possible to relieve the ships trapped in Mytilene. The battle which ensued was one of the largest naval battles of the war and indeed of Greek history to that point and saw a decisive Athenian victory.⁵²⁵ In the standard narrative Arginousai was a potential turning point for the Athenians, an opportunity to end the war on favourable terms. According to the *Ath. Pol.*, the Spartans were willing to conclude a peace which included evacuating the fort at Dekeleia,⁵²⁶ with no comparable concession required from the Athenians. However, the peace offer is somewhat suspicious, found only in the *Ath. Pol.* and it may be confusing this offer with the earlier peace offer from Sparta in 411/0 after their loss at Kyzikos.⁵²⁷ Most historians seem to accept uncritically that this peace offer was made, and even when the source is acknowledged as suspect it does not seem to impact on the analysis of the battle's aftermath.⁵²⁸ In accepting that the peace offer was made, Platias and Koliopoulos are correct

⁵²³ Kagan does not favour Diodoros' account and all but ignores it in favour of Xenophon's. Kagan (1987): 335, n.38. Peter Green in his commentary points out one of the key differences in the accounts, that Xenophon portrays the Spartan Kallikratidas in a highly favourable light, whereas in Diodoros it is Konon who appears as the brilliant tactician. Neither account is necessarily unfavourable to the other, but merely places emphasis on the opposing leaders. Green (2010): 235-6, n. 92.

⁵²⁴ The small boats sunk in the shallow water would ensure that those waters were completely blocked off, and presumably the larger ships had stones positioned at the yardarms, to be dropped on the decks of passing enemy ships. A similar tactic was used with effect by the Athenians besieged in the harbour at Syracuse, using merchant vessels with 'dolphins' (pointed lead weights) at the yardarms. Thuc. 7.41.2-3.

⁵²⁵ The details of the battle and subsequent trial of the generals are beyond the scope of this thesis. For more see: Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.22-1.7.35; Diod. 13.97-103. Battle and trial: Kagan (1987): 335-75; Hamel (2015). On the trial: Andrewes (1974): 112-122; Asmonti (2009): 1-21. A view on Athenian casualty aversion as the core reason for the trial: Strauss (2000): 315-326.

⁵²⁶ *Ath. Pol.* 34.1.

⁵²⁷ See: Rhodes (1981): 424-5.

⁵²⁸ Platias and Koliopoulos accept the peace offer at face value (2010: 80) as does Kagan (1987: 353) and Hanson (2006: 282). Tritle says that the Athenians may have rejected the Spartan offer, that the source (*Ath. Pol.*) might have been in error, but it does not affect his analysis of the war. (2010: 213, 221 n.21). Other works fail to mention it entirely: Hale (2009) and Hamel (2015). Lazenby has the most to say on the issue, acknowledging that the offer of peace may be unhistorical. Nevertheless, Lazenby seems to accept

in seeing the Athenian rejection as demonstrative of unlimited strategic aims and the conservatism of Spartan strategy.⁵²⁹ That the Spartans were willing to vacate the fortification of Dekeleia without a corresponding concession from the Athenians is significant. It is hard to agree with the idea that the Athenians were better off rejecting a peace offer. The Spartans had continually demonstrated their ability to recover from losses quickly with Persian help: far quicker than the Athenians could. The Athenians may have won the battle but it did not lead to a superiority at sea, as Lazenby suggests.⁵³⁰ The Spartans were still able to contest Athenian sea control soon after the battle. This is also to view the peace treaty as nothing more than a truce and not an attempt at actually forming a lasting peace. If the peace offer existed then it was overconfidence or unrealistic strategic ambition which prevented the Athenians from taking it, a failure on their part to recognize just how precarious their position was, one loss away from total defeat, as would happen a year later at Aigospotamoi.

What is not taken into consideration is the likelihood of this peace offer not existing at all, absent from the accounts of Xenophon and Diodoros and probably misreported by the *Ath Pol.*, either accidentally or deliberately. This changes the strategic calculations, placing the Athenians in a more desperate situation than is usually recognised. In both scenarios their situation is dire, but with a peace offer they still had a way out and therefore a refusal demonstrates wide strategic ambition and an unwillingness to settle when they were still in possession of a strong fleet and defensible position in the Aegean. Without an offer of peace though, the Athenians are in the same precarious situation but are facing a Spartan command unwilling to settle even after such a loss as theirs at Arginousai.⁵³¹ In this

that the offer was genuine, analysing the aftermath of the battle as if it existed and not considering the strategic ramifications if the offer is unhistorical. Lazenby (2004): 235-7.

⁵²⁹ Platias and Koliopoulos (2010): 80.

⁵³⁰ Lazenby (2004): 235-6. The Athenian fleet was clearly not in a fit state after Arginousai, with serious issues of poor training and especially poor leadership. There was good reason *not* to continue the war, since Athens was still one loss away from total defeat.

⁵³¹ The Athenians of course could have extended an offer of peace to the Spartans. That they did not is perhaps just as indicative of political turmoil and uncertainty in Athens itself as it is of any reluctance for peace. Just as plausibly, the Athenian may have thought that such an offer would be rejected by Sparta. The trial of the Generals in Athens was hugely controversial and tumultuous, and it is not unreasonable to think peace offers were not considered because there was no strong leadership in Athens at the time. The rabid tone which seems to have infected the democracy at the time does not seem to have lent itself to ideas such as offering peace, considering that not even victorious generals were immune from execution. The terrible leadership displayed by the Athenians at Aigospotamoi goes some way to demonstrating that Athens at a military-strategic level was not functioning well. The vigorous pursuit of the war by Lysandros

scenario the Spartans are relying on their ability, with Persian money, to reconstitute their fleet quickly and to keep challenging the Athenians, almost certainly with the recognition that the Athenians were one loss away from total defeat. The vigorous way in which the Spartans pursued the war after their loss at Arginousai demonstrates the shift in strategic thinking that must have occurred in Sparta, a pursuit of the war where the desired end was the destruction of the Athenian fleet. It is perhaps reason enough to disbelieve in the peace offer because the Spartans were still in a strategically superior position after the battle and offering peace with such generous conditions was not at all in keeping with their goal of victory over Athens. The Athenians could not have sustained a loss at Arginousai and were in the same strategic position after the battle. Arginousai saw Athens survive, but did little to increase their near-term chances of victory over Sparta.

Defeat at Arginousai did not prevent the Spartans from conducting further operations in the Aegean, and under the command of Lysandros they were able to keep pressure on Athens. Using Persian money and under orders from Cyrus not to fight a battle at sea until the fleet was larger, Lysandros built up his naval force (*Xen Hell.* 2.1.13-14). This allowed him to attack and take the Athenian-allied city of Kedreai in Karia (2.1.15). After this he sailed to the Hellespont and successfully took the city of Lampsakos (2.1.19), placing the Spartans in a position to choke the Hellespont. It was this move that forced the Athenians to Aigispotamoi and the ensuing disaster. With a concerted campaign of operations against Athenian interests in the Ionian and Hellespont regions the Spartans were able drain the Athenian base of support and eventually, at Aigispotamoi, draw the Athenian fleet into a battle and defeat them. The loss of their allies and their fleet was a devastating blow to the Athenians and one they could not recover from. Lysandros sailed from the Hellespont to Byzantion and thus cut off Athenian ships from the Black Sea (2.1.1-2). From there he sailed around the area with impunity and consolidated Spartan power in the region.⁵³² Lysandros was able to project Spartan power from the sea with impunity and initiate a close blockade of Athens. Within a short period of time, a combination of combat operations at and from the sea crippled Athens and led to their defeat at the hands of Spartan sea power.

after the battle would also have put pressure on the Athenians, forcing them to prioritise their responses. In a sense, the Athenians were overtaken by events.

⁵³² For more on this incident, see Chapter Eight.

After the defeat and loss of their navy at Aigospotamoi the Athenians had no way of protecting their vital sea lanes and were at the mercy of the Spartan fleet. The Athenian populace was intimately aware of this, mourning the news of the loss not just for those Athenians killed, but for themselves as well (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.3), knowing that without a fleet they were left unprotected.⁵³³ The Spartans had the ability to interdict Athenian shipping at will and were able to affect a close blockade of the Peiraeus from Salamis (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.9). Taken with the fortification by land at Dekeleia, the Athens were surrounded and completely blockaded by land and sea. During the ensuing discussions of peace within Athens, they still could not countenance destruction of the remaining essential asset of the city, the Long Walls. They apparently imprisoned a certain Arcestratos who had mentioned such a move in a council meeting (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.15). Unsurprisingly the destruction of Athens' walls was a necessary condition of the peace, as well as the surrender of all but 12 warships (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.20). This left Athens extremely vulnerable, as demonstrated shortly after the war when Lysandros and his brother Libys were able, at the behest of the Thirty, to blockade the Athenian democrats in the Peiraeus by land and sea (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.28-29). The ease with which Athens could be choked off from the outside world is clearly demonstrated in these two Spartan blockades.

While not minimising the importance of military operations by land, it is clear that the Peloponnesian War was decided at sea. At the beginning of the war Athens had a large empire to draw resources from, both materially and monetarily. This fuelled a fleet which was able to conduct expeditionary operations against Sparta and Spartan allies, wearing them down and eventually luring the Spartans into a bad position at Pylos and Sphacteria and opening the way for a peace deal. That the Athenians did not take the peace offered was a reflection of growing ambition and is indicative of how effective they thought their sea power had become. All the while the walls of Athens protected the city and the same navy which attacked Sparta was also able to defend Athenian trade and keep the city fed and supplied. This was all possible due to Athenian ability to gain and maintain sea control. It was loss of sea control in Sicily which doomed the Athenian forces there. Such losses further hampered Athenian efforts to regain control of the seas in the second half of

⁵³³ For an examination of the battle itself, see: Strauss (1983): 24-35; Robinson 2014: 1-16.

the war. Spartan strategy by this stage had shifted dramatically, realising that the only way to defeat Athens was to attack its centre of gravity: the empire. In order to do this, the Spartans needed strong maritime forces to attack the islands and littoral poleis of the empire, a move which proved very successful. It drained Athenian resources and eroded their sea power as they were forced into constant operations. Fuelled by Persian money, the Spartans could absorb losses at sea and eventually place the Athenians in mortal danger at Arginousai and again at Aigispotamoi, the latter of which saw the irrevocable loss of the Athenian fleet.

All of the preceding operations demonstrate the versatility of naval forces. Maritime operations may be broken down but often defy simple classification into one category. The above operations help illustrate an important point: a navy which can conduct combat operations at sea is capable of much less complex operations. This is what allows trade to be protected, amphibious landings to occur and be supported while being protected from interference, and ultimately allowed one navy to gain, maintain or contest control of the sea.

Chapter Seven – Fourth Century Military Operations

The end of the Peloponnesian War saw the rise of Sparta as a power in the wider Aegean region thanks to its burgeoning sea power. Sparta was able to defeat in battle other navies and to project power from the sea. Athens was able to rebuild its sea power reasonably quickly, certainly thanks to the non-naval aspects of its sea power such as maritime trade,⁵³⁴ but it never reached the same strength as it had during the Peloponnesian War. Other powers around the Aegean and the Mediterranean also invested in small and moderate sized navies, to an extent that even Athens could be challenged by a coalition of obstinate island poleis. Sea power continued to play an important role in shaping the actions of different powers during the fourth century, however sea power was more dispersed, and if there were none of the great battles at sea as seen in the fifth century, there were still many combat operations undertaken both at and from the sea. It remained an important, and at times critical, consideration. This chapter considers the end of the Peloponnesian War as the break between the fifth and fourth centuries, in a practical sense defining when the balance of power shifted definitively away from Athens as the main hegemonic power in the Aegean, rather than be bound by simple dates.⁵³⁵

Spartan Strategy 404-370s

The final battle of the Peloponnesian War was at sea and saw the Athenian fleet annihilated at Aigispotamoi after the Athenian leaders put themselves in a terrible tactical position and apparently refused the advice of the exiled Alkibiades.⁵³⁶ Xenophon quite correctly points to this loss as the end of the Athenian cause.⁵³⁷ This also allowed Sparta to gain almost uncontested control of the seas for the next decade, both around mainland Greece and in the Aegean. This control was lost in the Aegean in 394 when Persian forces, partly under the command of the Athenian Konon, defeated the Spartan fleet at Knidos (*Xen. Hell.* 4.3.10-12). This loss had disastrous consequences, leading to a cascade of losses for Sparta

⁵³⁴ For an interesting look at maritime trade in the recovery of Athens post-war, see: Burke (1990): 1-13.

⁵³⁵ Much the same way modern scholars favour constructs such as the 'long nineteenth' and 'short twentieth centuries', using the First World War as an end point for the nineteenth century.

⁵³⁶ Though it was not really a conventional naval battle as many Athenian ships were caught ashore before they could be fully crewed or even launched. *Xen. Hell.* 2.1.22-28.

⁵³⁷ *Xen. Hell.* 2.1.29.

as they were unable to stop Konon's fleet, which was able to sail around to the coastal cities of the Aegean and expel the Spartan *harmosts*, wining the poleis away from the Spartans (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.1-3). Konon was then able to besiege the Spartans in Abydos and win over the poleis of the Hellespont (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.6). Perhaps most damaging of all, the Spartans were left defenceless as Konon took the fleet to Greece and attacked the Peloponnesos and garrisoned Kythera before proceeding to Athens and helping them rebuild the city's defences, including the vital Long Walls (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.7-10). Xenophon has Konon tell the Persian Satrap Pharnabazos that nothing would damage the Spartan cause more than rebuilding the walls of Athens.⁵³⁸ Interestingly, according to both Xenophon and Diodoros, many cities including from Boiotia sent craftsmen and labourers to assist the Athenians in rebuilding the wall, universal acknowledgement that the walls of Athens were of critical importance in resisting Sparta.⁵³⁹ Cities that had once called for and perhaps even aided in the destruction of Athenian walls a mere decade earlier were helping to rebuild them in the hope that, combined with a fleet,⁵⁴⁰ Spartan power could be resisted and defeated. John Buckler does not exaggerate when he calls the restoration of the Long Walls a defeat for Sparta.⁵⁴¹ The nature of the Athenian revival is perhaps best demonstrated in the sudden rehabilitation of Themistokles' memory,⁵⁴² a clear enough indication of how the significance of Konon's restoration was viewed by the Athenians. It clearly had the desired effect, for the Spartans were greatly alarmed by the Athenian build-up of walls and ships and sent envoys to Persia (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.12). This series of events was all set in motion by the erosion of Spartan sea control after their loss at the battle of Knidos.

Before their defeat at Knidos, the Spartans enjoyed a short-lived hegemony in the Aegean region, effectively usurping Athens' empire and focusing on the region for the next decade. The Spartan focus on Asia Minor and the littoral areas demanded a strong maritime force, which at first glance is apparent. They had a strong position in several important coastal

⁵³⁸ Referencing the fact that all Sparta had accomplished would have been for nothing since the walls being torn down was such a critical condition of the peace treaty. Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.9.

⁵³⁹ Diodoros' account: 14.85.1-4. He specifically mentions 500 Thebans, whereas Xenophon says only Boiotians.

⁵⁴⁰ As noted by Tod, in Garland (1987): 40.

⁵⁴¹ Buckler (2003): 138.

⁵⁴² Honoured with a tomb on the Akte Peninsula of the Peiraieus. See: Garland (1987): 40; Hale (2009): 253-4.

cities, especially the fine port at Ephesos, as well as Smyrna, Phokaia, Kyme and Abydos.⁵⁴³ The problem lay in their material resources, and most importantly their strategy, which was weak and incoherent.⁵⁴⁴ Perhaps the primary reason for Spartan strategy being insufficient was the tenuous state of their fleet. As Buckler correctly identifies, the Spartans required a fleet able to provide cover and support to land forces and to contest Persian attempts at sea in the Aegean region.⁵⁴⁵ The Spartan fleet needed to be powerful enough to prevent Persian interference: combat operations *at* sea to sustain combat operations *from* the sea. Another critical issue was that of funding, a constant pressure for any large sea power. The Spartan fleet that had defeated Athens was primarily funded by the Persians, who at this stage had become their adversary. The territories in the east that Sparta controlled provided a revenue, some 1000 talents, but much of this was expended in the maintenance of this rule and Sparta had no large cash reserves.⁵⁴⁶ This was a fragile financial position for sustaining a large naval force away on campaign in the east. Much like Athens at Arginousai in 406, the Spartans were on a razor's edge and one defeat away from losing their position. It is clear that the Persians saw this, for the satrap Pharnabazos gained the support of the king, Artaxerxes, to put the Athenian exile Konon in charge of a fleet.⁵⁴⁷ Without a fleet the Spartans would themselves be open to attack from the sea and unable to maintain their sea lines of communication across the Ionian littoral and back to mainland Greece.

The reign of Agesilaos began with a renewed expedition against Persia upon learning of the Persian naval build-up. According to informants coming from Phoenicia, the Phoenicians and others were building and assembling a force of some 300 triremes (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.1). Lysandros demanded a force to attack the Persians, or in Xenophon's biography of Agesilaos, it is the king himself who demands such a response. Xenophon is

⁵⁴³ Buckler (2003): 41, 45.

⁵⁴⁴ Buckler's criticism is scathing, though not unwarranted. He says of the Spartans that they embarked upon the campaign in the east 'with the far-sightedness of moles'. Buckler (2003): 41.

⁵⁴⁵ Buckler says the Spartans needed to maintain control of the Aegean and to repulse the Persian navy (Buckler, 2003, 43). Strictly speaking, these are the same objective. Repulsing the Persian fleet would be one of the effects of maintaining sea control in the Aegean.

⁵⁴⁶ Diod. 14.10.2. Buckler (2003): 42-3. This of course contrasts with Athens at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, which had both revenue and a large reserve. The massive expenditure strained the Athenian financial system, much harder than the Spartan one.

⁵⁴⁷ Diod. 14.39.1; Buckler (2003): 54-5; Asmonti (2015): 126-129.

unclear, for his *Hellenika* and his biography of Agesilaos say different things about this whole episode.⁵⁴⁸ Plutarch in his biographies of the two men has Lysandros as the driving force for the expedition.⁵⁴⁹ With the exception of Xenophon's encomium to the Spartan king, in which the intent of the work might be explanation enough for the discrepancy, Lysandros appears to have been the driving force behind the Spartan expedition to Asia.⁵⁵⁰ Having once had close relations with the Persians and having operated extensively in the region when fighting Athens, it is hardly surprising that Lysandros would be the driving force for an expedition.⁵⁵¹ In either case, the Spartans launched an expeditionary operation against the Persians in Asia, spurred by a Persian naval build-up. Based on the success of the Ten Thousand, Lysandros thought this skill and daring somehow would transfer to the Spartan navy and believed the Greek fleet would be superior (*Xen. Hell.* 3.4.2). This was, as Buckler says, a miscalculation which events would soon prove to be of disastrous consequence.⁵⁵² In August 394 the Spartans engaged the fleet of the Persians, under the command of the Athenian Konon, and suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the exiled Athenian.⁵⁵³ The loss at Knidos in 394 destroyed Spartan sea power in the Aegean and ended their ability to project power in the region.⁵⁵⁴ Diodoros is quite explicit in his appraisal of the situation, saying that from that time the Spartans lost their rule of the sea: καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν ἀπὸ τούτου τοῦ χρόνου τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν ἀρχὴν ἀπέβαλο (*Diod.* 14.84.4). In the immediate aftermath of the battle, Konon took his naval force and

⁵⁴⁸ Not just in who demands a response. In the biography, the Persians are said to have been amassing a land and naval force, explicitly for attacking the Greeks. Both works give the same number of troops to be assembled and led by Agesilaos.

⁵⁴⁹ *Agesilaos* 6.1; *Lysandros* 23.1-2. In Lysandros' biography Plutarch has him pushing for an expedition to Asia without any claim of a Persian build-up.

⁵⁵⁰ Surprisingly this discrepancy is not mentioned in some modern works. Hamilton in his work on the Spartan king does not mention the differences between Xenophon's own works. Perhaps his conclusion was the same, that an encomium to the king would naturally give him more credit. His conclusion that Lysandros was the driving force is sound, but it is an odd omission. See: Hamilton (1991): 29-31, 90-4.

⁵⁵¹ This may seem like a contradiction, and having close relations might be seen as a reason for Lysandros *not* to encourage an expedition, but that relationship was under King Kyros and so he may have had no compunctions about attacking Artaxerxes.

⁵⁵² Or more precisely as he says, 'a calamitous miscalculation'. Buckler (2003): 59. It is hard to grasp that Lysandros would be so unwise as to think the success of the Ten Thousand meant that a Greek fleet would have as easy a time. Perhaps he would have been more cautious had he known Konon was to be the commander of the Persian fleet.

⁵⁵³ *Xen. Hell.* 4.3.11-12; *Diod.* 14.83.5-84.4. For an examination of the background and lead-up to the battle, see: Asmonti (2015): 131-150.

⁵⁵⁴ Agesilaos marched back to Greece rather than sailed. This happened before the battle of Knidos, but it must have been a sign of how stretched Spartan sea power was at the time that they would not risk a quicker journey home by sea. *Xen. Hell.* 4.3.1, *Age.* 2.1; *Plut. Age.* 16.1.

aided in many cities throwing out their Spartan garrisons, Kos being the first to secede and then the islands of Nisyros, Teos, Chios, as well as the Mytilenaeans, Ephesians and Erythraians, some of them merely expelling the Spartan garrisons and some joining with Konon (Diod. 14.8.3). More than this, as Luca Asmonti points out, this represents not just the death of the Spartan maritime empire, but also the beginning of a new phase in relations between the Greeks and Persia that would lead to the signing of the peace of Antalkidas.⁵⁵⁵ In these respects Knidos represented not just a significant but a decisive naval battle, that had long lasting ramifications for the course of fourth century history.

Spartan sea power was greatly diminished after Knidos but this did not prevent the Spartans from continuing their maritime operations closer to home, and for the next two decades control of the seas around mainland Greece would remain contested. Though not large in scale, some of these operations are demonstrative of experience built over several years. In 391 King Agesilaos attacked the walls of Korinth while his brother Teleutias with 12 triremes simultaneously attacked by sea (*Xen. Hell.* 4.4.19). Such a combined operation is not easy to pull off and its success a credit to the two commanders, and a good example of how armies and navies working together could be a powerful force.⁵⁵⁶ The Spartans launched a raid on the Peiraeus itself in 387, a bold statement of Spartan sea power and lack of Athenian sea control in its own local waters. Under the command of Teleutias, 12 warships sailed overnight and arrived off the port at dawn. Teleutias ordered them to damage and render unseaworthy any warships in the harbour and to capture and tow off any loaded merchant vessels. In the attack a group of Spartans landed ashore on the quayside and captured some merchants and shipowners (*Xen. Hell.* 5.1.19-21). It was the incapacitation of these Athenian warships that probably allowed the Spartans to range down the coast as far as Cape Sounion capturing fishing and merchant vessels along the way, not only damaging Athenian trade but also funding the Spartan naval operations for another month (*Xen. Hell.* 5.1.23-24). These small-scale operations were not just offensive in nature. Not long after their successful joint operation at Korinth and the port of

⁵⁵⁵ Asmonti (2015): 153.

⁵⁵⁶ Buckler does point out that the Spartans enjoyed the element of surprise, since this was not an operation that the Spartans were really known for. Buckler (2003): 116. Of interest is Xenophon's comment that that the mother of Agesilaos and Teleutias could be proud because of the success on land and at sea achieved by the two brothers. Clearly success at sea for the Spartans could be viewed as equally as prestigious as success on land.

Lechaion, the Spartan forces were defeated in a land battle. Some of the Spartans sheltered on a nearby hill and then withdrew to the coastline, where boats had been sent by the Spartans in Lechaion monitoring the battle (*Xen. Hell.* 4.5.17). Thanks to support provided by the fleet the Spartans were able to evacuate some of their soldiers, and this in turn was made possible because of Spartan sea control in the Korinthian Gulf warding off any potential attackers by sea. These examples, although small-scale, are demonstrative of the Spartans actively using their sea power to strike at their enemies and as a means of evacuating soldiers in trouble on land. This shows not only a shift in their military operations in general, but also in their mindset: a more maritime approach to their operations and overall strategy.

The fluid nature of sea control is demonstrated in the years 389-388, where several instances of blockade and barrier operations show sea control being exercised by different naval forces in different places. Campaigning in Akarnania, the Spartan King Agesilaos was forced to march an extra 20 km to cross over to the Peloponnesos at Rhion rather than at Kalydon because of the Athenian ships stationed at Oiniadai (*Xen. Hell.* 4.6.14). Around the same time, Athenians landed a force of hoplites, supported by ten triremes, on Aigina to stop the raids on Attika being launched from there (*Xen. Hell.* 5.1.2). The Spartans drove off the Athenian squadron and left behind 12 of their own triremes to blockade the Athenians in their fort, who were not relieved for four months. The Athenians were eventually able to take off their troops but continued to be harassed by the Spartan ships of Gorgopas (*Xen. Hell.* 5.1.5). It seems that the Athenians were able to maintain sea control at the entrance to the Korinthian Gulf at the same time as the Spartans were in control of the seas in the Saronic Gulf, although the Athenians were able to contest it long enough to evacuate their troops. It is clear that Athenian priorities lay elsewhere, for at the beginning of 388 they were able to muster 32 ships and blockade a force of 25 Spartan ships in Abydos (*Xen. Hell.* 5.1.6-7). This is not to say that the Athenians considered operations around Aigina unimportant, but merely less important than in the Hellespont. Sea control in the Saronic Gulf continued to be contested with the Spartans delivering the next blow by defeating a contingent of Athenian ships in a night battle fought by moonlight.⁵⁵⁷ However

⁵⁵⁷ *Xen. Hell.* 5.1.7-9. The Spartan Gorgopas deliberately set up a night battle, stalking and attacking the Athenian ships on their way from Aigina to the Peiraeus. Of note is Xenophon's description of the Athenian

the final blow was landed by the Athenians, successfully landing a force of troops on Aigina who ambushed and defeated a large force of Aiginetans and their Spartan advisors (Xen *Hell.* 5.1.10-12). After this the Athenians regained control of the sea in the area, not just through victory but also because the Spartan sailors refused to row for Eteonikos (Xen *Hell.* 5.1.13). This was not the end of the matter, and naval operations continued in the region soon after.

The Athenian need for Black Sea grain did not diminish in the fourth century and if anything, they grew more dependent after the loss of their empire and the access it provided. This increased reliance on one sea route was a critical vulnerability and the Spartans continued to interfere with this strategically important route. In 387 the Spartan Admiral Antalkidas with eighty ships was able to establish sea control in the Hellespont, based out of Abydos and this allowed him to prevent ships sailing down from the Pontos from reaching Athens (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.28). Xenophon gives a more detailed account of operations in 376. Disgruntled at Spartan timidity, the allies pushed for more action against Athens, assessing that they could put more ships to sea than Athens and thereby starve them out (5.4.60). The Spartans agreed and fitted out 60 triremes and positioned them near Aigina, Keos and Andros. This caused the Athenian grain ships to shelter at Geraistos in Euboia and the Athenian navy was forced to sail out for escort duty. A subsequent battle saw the Athenians victorious and allowed them to convoy the grain into Athens (5.4.61). Diodoros mentions this incident but says that the grain ships were successfully escorted to Athens without battle taking place (15.34.3). Even landlocked Thebes was forced to send for an importation of grain from Pagasai due to a food shortage. Sending two triremes, these were intercepted and captured by three triremes under the command of the Spartan Alketas (5.4.56). It is a small incident, but a hint that even the Thebans had given thought to maritime concerns.

The King's Peace of 386 marked the height of overall Spartan power in the Classical period, but that power would be tested soon after this peace was made. This dominance can be attributed to Sparta's power on land and sea, even taking into account their defeat at

ships sailing away with the squadron commander's ship 'carrying a light, as is customary' – φῶς ἔχων, ὥσπερ νομίζεται – demonstrating that night sailing was clearly routine for the Athenians.

Knidos a decade earlier. Knidos had destroyed Sparta's hegemonic level of sea power, but in the absence of a rival sea power that could seriously threaten them they remained a capable force at sea. In short, no other power in Greece had the combined weight of sea and land power as Sparta had at that time. Athens was still rebuilding its fleet and the other main power in Greece, Thebes, was isolated from the outside world and surrounded by hostile powers.⁵⁵⁸ Sparta's potent combination of land and sea power was one that, as Isokrates would later comment on, was extremely powerful. Sparta used the peace to strengthen its strategic position in Greece, taking great interest in northwest and northeast Greece and in Thrake.⁵⁵⁹ The Spartans secured their position further afield from Lakonia and the Spartan heartland, a strategy arising out of campaigns in the previous decades and enabled by sea power. Although sea power enabled this expansion, the continued erosion of this power in Sparta was evident in the years after the King's peace. However, this is not to say the Spartans abandoned the maritime realm, but they were faced with a resurgent Athenian sea power strengthened by a renewed Aegean maritime league.

The 370s saw a resurgence in maritime operations around mainland Greece and especially off the coast of the Peloponnesos. Though lacking their own sea power, the Thebans appear to have appreciated its utility and in 375 requested that the Athenians attack the Peloponnesos by sea in order to keep Spartan forces tied up, thus preventing them from attacking Thebes. The most important strategic outcome of the resulting Athenian power projection cruise was the freedom allowed to the Thebans to march against the surrounding hostile powers in Boeotia and subdue them, free from Spartan interference (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.62.-63). That the Spartans responded to the Athenian force of 60 ships with their own fleet of 55 demonstrates that the Spartans may have let maritime matters slip but were not altogether unprepared for war at sea. The subsequent loss at sea at the battle of Alyzeia led to Sparta's weakening and a willingness for peace. This was not the sum of all Sparta's naval efforts, for Xenophon comments that constant raiding from Aigina had worn down the Athenians, contributing to their desire for peace with Sparta in 375.⁵⁶⁰ The nature of this raiding is unclear, other than Xenophon's use of *ληστεία*, implying that it was

⁵⁵⁸ Buckler (2003): 187. It is less the lack of sea power than it is a lack of connections to the outside world enabled by the maritime realm which was a limiting factor.

⁵⁵⁹ For a summary of these events see: Bucker (2003): 195-204.

⁵⁶⁰ Amongst many other considerations, such as the Persian enforcement of the Peace. Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.1.

raiding of the sort pirates would engage in rather than a concerted military campaign. Nevertheless, it appears to have been a drain on the Athenians and illustrates how much of a hazard a hostile Aigina could prove to Athens and Athenian interests in the Saronic Gulf.

The peace was extremely short-lived and saw a renewed set of maritime campaigns in the Adriatic region. The Spartans looked to the ever-important island of Kerkyra and assembled an allied fleet of 60 ships from a large number of allied cities under the command of a Spartan Admiral. Aside from Sparta, ships were contributed by Korinth, Leukas, Ambrakia, Elis, Zakynthos, Achaia, Epidauros, Troizen, Hermione and Halieis (Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.3). This is worth noting as it demonstrates the wide range of cities that maintained warships and could contribute to a maritime campaign, even if only to a small degree. Once again we find Leukas involved in coalition operations by providing a number of ships as they had done in the fifth century. The fleet was dispatched to the area with orders to protect Spartan interests in the region, especially interests on Kerkyra. They attacked the island, 'pillaging' the countryside and besieging the city as well as blockading the port (Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.3-8). As Xenophon says, the Kerkyraians could do nothing since the Spartan fleet was superior at sea, forcing them to send for help. The Kerkyraian plea for help was based on the strategic importance of their island, positioned so that forces based there could not only control the coastal sailing route from Sicily to the Peloponnesos but also could attack the Korinthian Gulf and Lakonia.⁵⁶¹ Having decided to send aid this is exactly what the Athenians did once the Spartans had fled before them. They subdued Kephallenia, consolidated their position on Kerkyra, successfully intercepted a relief force of Syrakousan ships sent to aid the Spartans and prepared to launch attacks against the lands of the Spartans and their allies (Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.33-38). The Spartans had launched an initially successful operation against Kerkyra but failed to exploit this success before the Athenian relief force arrived. This once again proved that Athens had regained its ability to conduct maritime power projection operations, and to greater effect than the Spartans

⁵⁶¹ Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.9. Note Xenophon's uses the word παράπλοος, once again indicating both a coastal and a direct route across from Greece to Sicily. For more on 'coastal' sailing, see Chapter Two. Spartan interests in Kerkyra were much the same as they were during the Peloponnesian war: see previous chapter (page 152).

could manage.⁵⁶² Spartan land power was largely destroyed on the field of Leuktra in 371 and the Spartans lost interest in the maritime realm after this as they focused on a more hostile environment within the Peloponnesos.

Sicily and Italy

By virtue of geography Sicily was the scene of many maritime operations throughout the fifth and fourth centuries, not just between rival Sicilian and mainland Greek forces, but also with the Carthaginians. The major cities of the island lay near the coast and the island itself was readily accessible by sea from mainland Italy and Greece as well as North Africa. The major power on the island, Syrakousai, was at times a strong sea power. In 439 Diodoros says that the city built 100 triremes as part of a program aimed at gaining control of all Sicily (Diod. 12.30.1). That these preparations involved not only the expansion of infantry and cavalry forces but also the building of a fleet helps demonstrate that sea power was considered a necessary component for the conquest of Sicily. Many combat operations conducted at sea were in relation to power projection operations or troop movements around the island and across to mainland Italy.

Much of the conflict that Sicily endured was during endemic war with Carthage at the end of the fifth and into the fourth century. Interestingly, Diodoros says that initial success in Sicily led the Carthaginians to think of conquering the entire island (Diod. 13.80.1). It is striking that the Carthaginians conceived of controlling the entire island. Often thought of as fanciful or even delusional by modern scholars, this idea was apparently around when Athens turned its eyes to Sicily in the 420s.⁵⁶³ Perhaps the idea that Sicily could be controlled as a single entity was considered rational by some of the ancient Mediterranean powers of the time, strong sea powers no less. With its difficult interior terrain, controlling the island favoured a maritime approach and this clearly factored into the strategic considerations of the Athenians and the Sicilian Greeks. The major cities were all located on the coast and this is one of the defining factors of the human geography of the island.

⁵⁶² However, as Buckler points out the Athenian effort reveals that there was great strain on their financial situation and demonstrated that the second Athenian-led League was not nearly as financially stable as the Delian League before it. Indeed, as Buckler says, this financial impediment to maritime operations would plague the Athenians for the rest of the century. Buckler (2003): 266.

⁵⁶³ Thuc. 3.86.3-4, 6.15.2; Plut. *Alk.* 17.2-3.

Controlling Sicily did not necessitate controlling the interior so much as having access to the sea around the island and thus the main cities.

In 406 the Carthaginians attacked the city of Akragas but a reversal saw them besieged in their camp, cut off from foraging and facing a supply shortage (Diod. 13.88.1-2). The Carthaginian general Himilkar somehow learned of an impending shipment of grain to Akragas and summoned forty triremes. According to Diodoros the Syrakousans had become complacent, thinking that the Carthaginians would be too cowardly to man their triremes, especially since it was winter. What followed was a Carthaginian victory, in which they sank eight enemy ships and captured the grain. It was such a great victory that the Campanian contingent fighting for Akragas went over to the Carthaginians for the sum of 15 talents (Diod. 13.88.3-5). This stunning reversal led to the Carthaginians taking Akragas, an excellent example of a relatively small naval action having a decisive strategic effect.

Faced with the Carthaginian threat, the Sicilian poleis and especially Dionysios, the tyrant of Syrakousai, recognised the importance of maritime forces in Sicily. This was not just the utility of naval forces, but a recognition that their primary adversary was always going to be in possession of a naval force that would require countering. The nature of Carthage's attack on Sicily was as an expeditionary operation conducted from Africa and so they would naturally require a fleet to support their operations. In 405 Dionysios launched a counterattack against the Carthaginians. The first part of the attack involved the landing of troops against the Carthaginian camp, drawing off their forces and allowing the Greek forces to attack the camp by land with less resistance (Diod. 13.109-110). Later in 396 Dionysios led another attack on the Carthaginian forces and once again the fleet worked in close concert with the land forces. The Syrakousan ships were too quick for the Carthaginians, who were caught in the process of manning their ships and suffered great loss (Diod. 14.72.1-6). These examples help to demonstrate that Dionysios was very comfortable launching joint attacks on his enemies, using both land and sea forces in concert. Such an operation was complex in both organisation and execution: a deliberate use for sea power for a specific purpose. This joint manoeuvring is quite complex and indicative of how central sea power had become to Syrakousan strategic thinking.

In 396 the Carthaginians under Himilkon laid siege to the city of Syrakousai by land and sea. Impressive as the Carthaginian naval force was, the blockade by sea was imperfect and the tyrant Dionysios and his admiral Leptines took a contingent of warships out to escort some supply ships (Diod. 14.64.1). Seeing a grain ship sailing close by, the Syrakousans who remained in the city manned five warships and seized the vessel (Diod. 14.64.1). The Carthaginians saw this and sailed out with forty warships, which prompted the Syrakousans to man all their remaining ships and in the ensuing battle the Syrakousans captured the enemy flag-ship and destroyed 24 other vessels. Further, the victorious Syrakousans sailed to the Carthaginian anchorage and challenged them to battle, which was declined (Diod. 14.64.2-4). This victory was important in several respects. It allowed for an immediate inflow of food and ensured that the return of Dionysios and Leptines with the bulk of the food stores would be more secure. It also allowed the Syrakousans to thin out the Carthaginian fleet and deal them a blow to morale. Finally, and of great significance was that the victory was achieved without the city's ruler, a fact which did not escape the Syrakousans and led to a debate over the merits of Dionysios' continued reign.⁵⁶⁴ Although Dionysios continued in his rule, it is said to have caused him fear and led him to dissolve the assembly,⁵⁶⁵ and once again demonstrated how a naval operation could have serious strategic ramifications, including in domestic politics. Of note in this example is the seamless transition from a straightforward trade interdiction operation immediately to a battle with an enemy fleet. The ability to conduct low level-operations at sea was still contingent on maintaining fighting prowess.

Dionysios was also comfortable launching amphibious operations further afield, attacking mainland Italy. In 393 he launched a surprise attack on Rhegion with 100 triremes, attacking but failing to take the city and then plundering the surrounding countryside before sailing back to Sicily. A second attack on mainland Italy in 384 proved more fruitful. With 60 ships he attacked the territory of Tyrrhenia, specifically a rich temple in the port of Pyrgoi. He landed there at night and attacked the next day, taking many prisoners and

⁵⁶⁴ Diod. 14.65-70.1-2.

⁵⁶⁵ Diod. 14.70.3.

collecting a sum of 500 talents.⁵⁶⁶ According to Diodoros he put this money to use hiring mercenaries and preparing for a renewed war with Carthage. The attack also acted as a strong demonstration to both the Etruscans and the Carthaginians, representative of the reach of Dionysios and his ability to project power deep into the Tyrrhenian Sea.⁵⁶⁷ This was a highly successful attack by a large force against a hostile shore and shows how Dionysios was able to effectively wield maritime forces to achieve a wide variety of aims, including in the second example economic and diplomatic aims.

Athens, the Second Athenian League and northern Greece

The fall of Spartan sea power coincided with the rejuvenation of Athenian sea power as the Athenians decided the time was right to rebuild their power in the Aegean, especially after the reconstruction of the Long Walls. Athens could once again rely on a strategy of walls, overseas alliances, and a fleet. The strategic situation in Greece favoured such an approach, since Spartan sea power had eroded into nonexistence and the dominant Greek power, Thebes, was entirely a land power.⁵⁶⁸ The Theban general Epaminondas quickly realised his hopes of intercepting the Athenians marching to Mantinea in 362 would not materialise as the Athenians simply decided to go by sea to the Peloponnesos and march from the coast to Mantinea and evading Theban interference.⁵⁶⁹ Athenian participation in the battle of Mantinea was not trivial, and it was thanks to the mobility provided by the sea that Athens could join their allies unhindered. Athenian ambitions in the north, especially concerning the cities of Olynthos and Amphipolis, required a renewed campaign of maritime power projection operations.

In the decade between 371 and 360 Athens was embroiled in campaigns in the northern Aegean as it tried to re-establish its power and influence over the region, especially the city of Amphipolis. Julia Heskell sees Athens engaged in two different wars in the northern

⁵⁶⁶ Diod. 15.14.3-4. According to Polyainos, Dionysios attacked with 100 ships and he made off with 500 talents and his soldiers and sailors collected another 1000, which he managed to retrieve half of. Polyain. 5.2.21.

⁵⁶⁷ Caven (1990): 191-2.

⁵⁶⁸ At least to begin with. The short-lived effort by Thebes to build its sea power is discussed further in the next chapter.

⁵⁶⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.6-7. However, the Athenian cavalry did go via the isthmus of Corinth, though obviously after the Theban army had moved on: Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.15. Buckler (1980: 208) says that Epaminondas was deceived by a false report of the Athenians going by sea, but it seems as if the Athenian army did go by sea and only the cavalry went by land.

Aegean, one for Amphipolis and one for the Chersonese,⁵⁷⁰ and while it was perhaps not so neat a distinction in the eyes of the Athenians, in practice this is a fair appraisal. The Athenians never seem to have gotten over their loss of Amphipolis to the Spartans in the Peloponnesian War and in the years after constantly sought legitimacy for their claim over the city. Amphipolis was an important city, possession of which would strengthen Athenian power. Firstly, it was rich in natural resources, especially silver and gold and also a source of timber, very important for shipbuilding. Secondly, it was in a strategically significant position that would provide the Athenians with a solid base of operations for its maritime forces across the northern Aegean, from Thrake to the Hellespont. A permanent presence in Amphipolis would also give the Athenians a strong position to threaten Thebes from both north and south.

The Athenians launched their campaign in 369, sending the *strategos* Iphikrates and a small force of ships (Aisch. 2.27). The protracted operations in the area were centred around the siege of the city and fighting with the Chalkidian forces on land. Eventually Iphikrates was removed from command and replaced by Timotheos.⁵⁷¹ The new general quickly realised that in order to be successful in taking Amphipolis he first needed to take away its primary base of support: Olynthos.⁵⁷² Timotheos' campaign saw the Athenians taking the coastal cities of Pydna and Poteidaia, which along with Torone gave Athens control of the seaboard and isolated Olynthos.⁵⁷³ Seeing that his operations were having the desired effect of drawing the Olynthians away from Amphipolis, Timotheos sent Alkimachos to the city with a small force. However, Alkimachos became engaged with a force of Thracians and accomplished little. Of note is that Alkimachos was sent by land, not by sea and this almost certainly, as Heskell says, caused his force to become bogged down through lack of supplies or other issue, perhaps a matter of negotiating passage through another polis' territory.⁵⁷⁴ This incident helps demonstrate how stretched Athenian maritime forces must have been that Alkimachos was sent by land, especially considering that there seems to have been no significant naval threat posed by Athenian opponents. Despite this setback the Athenians

⁵⁷⁰ Heskell (1997): 15.

⁵⁷¹ Heskell (1997): 46.

⁵⁷² Heskell (1997): 47.

⁵⁷³ Diod. 15.81.6; Dem. 4.4; Isok. 15.108, 112-113; Bucker (2003): 370.

⁵⁷⁴ The identity of these Thracians is contested, with Heskell assessing them to have probably been Edonians in the vicinity of Amphipolis. Heskell (1997): 48.

continued to push for Amphipolis and sent Kallisthenes with another expeditionary force.⁵⁷⁵ However, it seems as if the Athenians could not muster a strong enough force to successfully take the city, and the constantly changing alliances of different powers such as Makedonia made the conditions for Athenian success unfavourable.⁵⁷⁶ In the end it was a deficiency in land forces that hindered the Athenian siege efforts. Sea power provided the Athenians with the ability to conduct a campaign in the north Aegean around Amphipolis, a notable feat in itself, and one where they were seemingly in absolute control of the local seas. Nevertheless, they just did not have the land forces necessary to carry out a successful campaign against Amphipolis and its supporting poleis. The campaign amply demonstrates the limits of Athenian land and sea power at this time.

At the same time that the Athenians were conducting their campaign to take Amphipolis, they were also conducting a campaign in the Chersonese. This campaign was far more complex, intertwined with the Persian satraps' revolt, and poorly documented.⁵⁷⁷ The campaign begun with the Persian Philiskos' decree that the Persians would recognise Athens' right to the Chersonese along with a large sum of money.⁵⁷⁸ Money was of course key, for such a campaign would require a maritime expeditionary force. The first major operation was an attack on the island of Samos. In 366 under the command of Timotheus the Athenians sent 30 triremes and 7-8000 troops, with strict instructions to avoid breaking the King's Peace.⁵⁷⁹ The siege was successful after 10 months, and the Athenians dubiously installed a cleruchy.⁵⁸⁰ This was a big gain for the Athenians, helping to establish themselves on a strategically important island in the eastern Aegean. After this Timotheus was bogged down in the continued attempt to take Amphipolis, as well as operations

⁵⁷⁵ Heskell (1997): 49.

⁵⁷⁶ For a thorough examination of the timeline and the various changes in allegiances, see: Heskell (1997): 19-52.

⁵⁷⁷ Much of what is known comes from speeches, especially Demosthenes. For an examination of the chronology, see: Heskell (1997): 53-122.

⁵⁷⁸ Heskell (1997): 125. The Athenians reacted in typical fashion by giving both Philiskos and the satrap Ariobarzanes, who he represented, Athenian citizenship. Dem. 2.141.

⁵⁷⁹ Isok. 15.111, who says he had 8,000 troops. Polyainos says 7,000: Polyain. 3.10.9. It was a complicated situation, with the Athenians wanting to help Ariobarzanes, who had given them money for their fleet with the expectation of aid, but not wanting to invoke the ire of the Persian King, who it appear was about to engage in a war with the renegade satrap Ariobarzanes. For a discussion, see: Heskell (1997): 132-135.

⁵⁸⁰ Isok. 15.111; Dem. 15.9; Diod. 18.18.9. It was a dubious move as it could most certainly be seen as breaking the King's Peace term of autonomy for the island. See: Heskell (1997): 136.

against Philiskos in Kyzikos and other places in the Hellespont, especially Prokonnesos.⁵⁸¹ This series of events represented a direct threat to the Athenian grain supply, with ships being forced into Byzantion, Chalkidike, and Kyzikos and causing the assembly to send out ships 'to provide aid to everywhere' (βοηθεῖν ἑκάσταχοῖ: [Dem] 50.6). The Athenians were forced into campaigns across the Chersonese and into the Hellespont, especially in order to protect their grain supply. Athenian ambitions appear to have been too great, and they continued to suffer setbacks, taking and then losing Sestos and all the while unable to take Amphipolis.⁵⁸² The Athenians, having rebuilt their sea power, were able to conduct a multitude of different and often simultaneous campaigns from the Chalkidike to Thrake and into the Hellespont. However, they did not have sufficient forces to hold onto their gains nor to take cities quick enough or consolidate them with sufficient strength to hold onto anything for a length of time. They were simply overstretched and facing too many disparate adversaries in a very fluid geostrategic environment. Their sea power was never as dominant as it had been during the fifth century, and importantly they do not seem to have ever had near enough land forces to successfully conduct all the maritime operations they were engaged in. Their sea power provided them with still unsurpassed local mobility, but it they never had enough land forces to match their ambitions. This highlights the personnel pressures of maintaining a large expeditionary force of naval and land forces. They simply did not have the manpower to crew their fleet and conduct military operations ashore, especially very time-consuming and manpower-intensive sieges.

As a counterpoint to Athenian maritime operations, one of Athens' enemies, Alexandros of Pherai, would prove more adept at launching amphibious operations than Athens could counter. In 362/1 Alexandros sent a force of ships to attack the island of Tenos, deep in the Cyclades, and the island of Peparethos in the northern Aegean. Alexandros' forces successfully enslaved many of the people of Tenos and then surprised an Athenian force, capturing six triremes (of which five were Athenian) as well as 600 men.⁵⁸³ This was followed by an extremely curious episode, in which apparently Alexandros' ships sailed into the Peiraieus unopposed and robbed the merchants along the waterfront before sailing

⁵⁸¹ Heskell (1997) 140, 144-5.

⁵⁸² For a summary of all the different operations, see: Heskell (1997) 140-153.

⁵⁸³ Diod. 15.95.1-3; [Dem]. 50.4-5; Polyain. 6.2.1. Buckler (2003): 371-2. Diodoros refers to Alexander's ships as ληστρίδας ναῦς. This is problematic language, something that will be discussed in Chapter Nine.

off again.⁵⁸⁴ If true, this last incident is an extraordinarily bold example of an amphibious raid, designed for the effect it would have on morale more than any material gain. In all of the above examples Athens' response was desultory or non-existent, demonstrating how stretched their maritime resources had become, and perhaps indicative of the strategic lethargy that Demosthenes would soon bemoan.

Finally, there is the Social War, where a coalition of poleis were able to keep Athenian sea power in check for several years. Chios, Rhodos, Kos and Byzantion conducted a series of maritime operations against the Athenians and successfully attacked Lemnos, Imbros, Samos, and a host of other Athenians-aligned islands (Diod. 16.21.1-2). According to Diodoros, both sides of the conflict wished to decide the war with a naval battle (βουλόμενοι ναυμαχία κρῖναι τὸν πόλεμον Diod. 16.21.1). However, having gathered their forces in the Hellespont battle was averted due to poor weather conditions which saw the Athenian *strategoí* breakdown into petty infighting (16.21.3-4). The war ended with the breakaway poleis gaining their independence from Athens,⁵⁸⁵ demonstrating that Athenian sea power could be resisted by a coalition of poleis in possession of their own sea power.

Athens and Conflict with Philip

The Makedonian King Philip II was the most dangerous enemy Athens faced in several decades. Few in Athens had any plan to deal with the rise of Makedonia, but some tried. Demosthenes delivered his *First Philipic* around the summer of 351, an attempt to spur the Athenians into action with a clear strategy of how to deal with Philip. The context of the work is important to highlight. It is a speech given to the Athenian assembly, not a letter, pamphlet or work of fiction. It was given to the Athenian public, in a political venue, as an actual proposal to be voted on. His strategy must have been comprehensible to the audience; an audience comprised of the general Athenian voting public. It is important to highlight this, for it shows just how much ordinary citizens, not just politicians and military leaders, considered and were exposed to concepts of maritime strategy, and indeed made decisions regarding such matters. Demosthenes begins the speech by giving a brief summary of the geopolitical situation in northern Greece. Cities that Athens once

⁵⁸⁴ Polyain. 6.2.2. The incident is not mentioned anywhere else. Polyainos says that the Athenians mistook the ships for friendly ones, which is plausible if Athenian or other friendly ships were expected.

⁵⁸⁵ Dem. 15.26; Isok. 8.16.

controlled or were influential in had fallen to Philip, namely, Pydna, Poteidaia and Methone, as well as surrounding territories. Philip had won these through a combination of warfare, alliance and friendship – πόλεμος, συμμαχος and φίλος, (Dem 4.6). This was in part because they were willing to give their alliance to someone prepared and willing to do that which was necessary – in this case Philip and not the lax Athenians. This laxness is at the centre of Athenian problems, and he makes a point of saying that those whom Philip has defeated had no recourse because of this (διὰ τὴν ὑμετέραν βραδυτῆτα καὶ ῥαθυμίαν: Dem. 4.8).

Demosthenes then goes into the crux of his speech, a proposal for how Athens could act to counter Philip's advances. He proposes outfitting a force of 50 triremes, as well as transports and other vessels sufficient to carry half the force of Athenian cavalry (Dem. 4.16). Further, the Athenians themselves must be prepared to man these ships. He says this force is necessary to prevent Philip from striking out against Athenian interests, but especially Thermopylai, the Chersonese or Olynthos. In this the force is supposed to act as a deterrent, and he says that it will present in Philip's mind the consideration that the Athenians have shaken off their negligence and are willing to act, and thus he might stay his hand out of fear (Dem. 4.17-18). This is, as he says, possible because there were plenty of people in Athens who regularly report everything that goes on there back to Philip. However, if Philip does act in spite of these Athenian preparations, he will be caught off guard because it will be a force strong enough to cause Philip harm. Demosthenes is very clearly outlining a deterrent force and understands the two key components of deterrence: the will to act and the ability to carry it through. A force of 50 triremes and half of all Athenian cavalry certainly indicates a capable force. That the Athenians themselves should be prepared to go on campaign, not mercenaries, would demonstrate their will to carry through with this threat. One of the key attributers of this plan is the higher than normal readiness level of the force. J.R. Ellis and R.D. Milns criticise this plan as ineffective because it is not stationed in the north where it could react more quickly,⁵⁸⁶ but Demosthenes makes the point that when previous expeditions had been ordered, everything was done from scratch – trierarchs had to be appointed, triremes outfitted and troops mustered – taking

⁵⁸⁶ Ellis and Milns (1970): 20.

considerable time and delaying Athenian action until it was too late. Demosthenes' plan would ensure that most of the preparations were completed ahead of time, greatly reducing the notice for sea of the force. Importantly, there would also be a forward deployed element as part of the strategy. Demosthenes proposes that the Athenians forward-deploy in northern waters a small contingent of troops and ships. It would consist of 2000 infantry, with 500 of them being Athenians, and 200 cavalry, 50 of them being Athenians. They will serve for as long as necessary and would serve in a regular rotation. They would be provided with sufficient transport ships, and for protection, 10 triremes. These are necessary, for he says that Philip does possess a navy, requiring Athenian escort warships (Dem. 4.20-22). This force was designed to carry out harassing attacks against Philip, not to face him in direct battle. Demosthenes uses the word *ληστεύειν*, a word most commonly used to refer to the activities of pirates and brigands (Dem. 4.23). This word describes a general type of activity and should not be taken as synonymous with piracy or brigandage. This would be a state armed-force conducting war against a power that, Demosthenes at least, thinks Athens is at war with.⁵⁸⁷ Indeed Demosthenes emphasises the point that citizens must be part of the force, especially as commanders.

Having addressed the force composition, Demosthenes then dives into the practicalities. First is logistics, and he gives a brief rundown on how much this force will cost: 92 talents a month. He breaks down the costs between the triremes, the infantry and the cavalry – 40, 40, and 12 talents respectively (Dem. 4.28). Shortly after comes a memorandum of ways and means (Dem. 4.30-37) – this proposal has been thought through and all the accounting done before hand. Interestingly, this is about half the pay such a force would normally receive, enough for rations and little else. Demosthenes expects that the force will make up for this by raiding Philip's territory. He is proposing a force that would, in order to survive, be inherently aggressive. Within the memorandum of ways and means, he gets into the second practicality – geography. Philip has very effectively taken advantage of weather to forestall the Athenians, attacking when the Etesian winds (the northerly winds) blow strongly, or during winter when weather was considerably worse for sailing and thus delayed or slowed the transit of vessels (Dem. 4.31). Philip attacks when weather makes

⁵⁸⁷ For more on the concepts of piracy and 'privateering' see Chapter Nine.

the dispatch of a force from Athens unlikely to arrive at a point where it could have an impact. For this reason, Demosthenes has proposed a force to be forward based in the north, and he says that the Athenians have winter bases there ready to support his force – on Lemnos, Thasos, Skiathos and the neighbouring islands, where could be found harbours, provisions and all the things required (Dem. 4.32). From these forward bases they could stand off the coast as required and harass Philip and his allies. Aside from being friendly to Athens, these islands are in strategically significant positions that would allow the force to react speedily to situations across the northern area. Skiathos is 50 nm from the Chalkidike; Thasos is just off the coast of Thrake; and Lemnos is a mere 45 nm from the Hellespont. Demosthenes' grasp of geography is solid, and it is also worth highlighting that this passage reveals just how well Philip understood geography and weather and used them to his strategic advantage. Indeed, it arguable that even if Philip himself did not possess a strong navy, he nevertheless had a solid grasp of maritime and naval considerations and was thus able to formulate an effective counter strategy to the Athenian one.

Having mentioned previously that the forward deployed force would be engaged in raiding, Demosthenes gets more specific about their proposed role. He mentions that Philip's forces have themselves been raiding the Athenian allies and that this forms the principal source of his revenue. More than this, he has caused direct damage to the Athenians, attacking Lemnos and Imbros, and at one point seizing a sacred Athenian trireme from Marathon (Dem. 4.34). Aside from raids on Philip, the forward deployed force would have a vital defensive role, not only protecting direct Athenian interest but also depriving Philip of revenue. This gets to the heart of the matter as Demosthenes sees it, and has already hinted at – Athenian strategy, if it can be called that, had been totally reactive to that point in time. The Athenians had always left it too late to act, going so far as to tell the assembly that the Athenians take their orders from Philip (στρατηγεῖσθ' ὑπ' ἐκείνου: 4.41). Demosthenes has astutely identified Philip's strategy, correctly assessed the problems with current Athenians strategy – or lack thereof – and proposed a workable and well-reasoned counter strategy of his own.

In this speech we see a clear elucidation of strategy by Demosthenes: a maritime strategy. He has clearly and accurately identified the strategic situation in which the Athenian objective would be to halt Philip's advances and check his growing power. Demosthenes proposes the means by which the Athenians can achieve this objective. They must ready a large force – 50 triremes and half of all Athenians cavalry – to act either as a deterrent force, or in the worst case as an amphibious readiness group that could react far more quickly than in previous instances when a fleet had to be outfitted from scratch. They must also send a smaller force to be forward deployed from the islands in the north. From there they could raid Philip's territory, protect trade and thereby reduce Philip's income, and directly protect Athenian interests in the region. This protection is not only direct but also indirect. He has already said that cities have fallen to Philip, in many cases, because of Athenian absence. The presence of an Athenian force, small but active, could potentially have a political affect in the region. This would prove a counter to Philip's strategy, which has involved only striking when Athenian sea power, based entirely out of Athens, would always arrive too late to help. He is very clear about the resources available for this strategy and already has a well-thought out plan concerning funding and logistics. This is a clear example of maritime strategy in play – a direct relationship between means, ways and ends, factoring in the opposition's strategy to that point. Both of the forces Demosthenes describes include warships and transport vessels – the naval component – as well as infantry and cavalry – the land component. They would work in conjunction with one another, and although there is scope for the naval component to conduct independent operations – intercepting enemy trade or engaging enemy warships – the majority of the operations envisaged would be joint, involving both naval and land components. The scope of projected operations included combat operations at sea, combat operations from the sea and diplomatic operations, on the benign and coercive end of the scale. This is a fully prepared and conceived maritime strategy.

The Athenians however did not approve Demosthenes' proposal. Demosthenes was still young and early in his career and the Athenians' indifference to this plan seems to have fit exactly with what Demosthenes admonished them for in his speech: dithering inaction. That Demosthenes' maritime strategy was not enacted is not a sign that the Athenians did

not 'get' it or had lost their sense of maritime consciousness but demonstrates that on a political level the will was lacking for decisive action.

Alexander

Alexander was not a great naval strategist nor did he utilise his fleet in great naval actions. He appears to have had a reasonably basic understanding of sea power. His strategy of containing an enemy's maritime forces involved primarily conducting blockade and barrier operations against the enemy fleet. He was not an able practitioner of maritime operations, leaving that to more skilled subordinates, but he was at least able to grasp the utility of sea power at important junctures, if not all the time.

Sea power played a part during the opening of Alexander's long campaign in the east. The fleet under the leadership of Parmenion took the initiative and occupied the island of Lade off the coast of Miletos in conjunction with Alexander's land troops (Arr. *Anab.*1.18.3-5). The Makedonians thus established a blocking position so that the Persians could not reinforce the city without battle; a position which would have been reversed if the Makedonian fleet had been slower. From Lade the Macedonian fleet then proceeded to initiate a close blockade of the harbour, protecting the entrance from the Persian fleet (Arr. *Anab.*1.19.3). This barrier operation allowed Alexander to conduct the siege of Miletos without the Persians reinforcing the city, despite their attempts to entice the Makedonians into committing to battle and direct attacks on the blockading force.

One of the very few instances of Alexander using maritime forces was during the siege of Tyre in 332. The city was at that time situated on an island and so was only accessible by sea. The incident is curious in setting forth the apparent contradictions in Alexander's attitudes towards sea power. In the first place, he apparently had an astute understanding of the strategic significance of Tyre and of its powerful navy. He tells his men that they could not proceed into Egypt with such a hostile fleet behind them, especially since such a force could shift the focus of the war to mainland Greece (Arr. *Anab.* 2.17.1-2). Additionally, taking the city would, in all likelihood, cause the strongest part of the Persian fleet, the Phoenician contingent, to go over to the Makedonians. This would allow them to take Cyprus, either by treaty or forcibly with a naval attack. This would essentially turn the Aegean into a Makedonian lake, cutting off Persian access to the Aegean Sea and

safeguarding Greece from outside interference (Arr. *Anab.* 17.3-4). This is an astute observation of the strategic situation and demonstrates a keen understanding of the important role sea power could play in his conquest of Persia, namely protecting his seaward flank and preventing an expeditionary force from going over to Greece and opening a second front there, possibly requiring his personal attention if the threat was grave enough. The authenticity of the speech and its content is debatable,⁵⁸⁸ and considering how the siege progressed possibly not an accurate portrayal of Alexander's knowledge and attitude. Bosworth is incorrect in saying that Tyre could have been left in check 'on a coast under Makedonian control'.⁵⁸⁹ Such a strong naval force as possessed by Tyre could have caused great damage to the Makedonian forces along the coast, as well as sailing around the Aegean damaging Makedonian interests and drawing away Makedonian forces. It is also hard to credit his view that the issue of Tyre was subsidiary in the speech.⁵⁹⁰ It is central to the question of campaigning down to Egypt and east to Babylon. What to do about Tyre was a question central to overall Makedonian strategy.

The thalassocracy-heavy speech supposedly given by Alexander seems unlikely to have actually happened, given the way he engaged in the siege. His solution was to build a causeway out to the city so that he could storm it by land, ignoring maritime considerations. Indeed, he has a very different attitude on display in the account of Curtius, where he supposedly told the Tyrians that they might despise his foot soldiers because they lived on an island, but that Alexander would show them that they actually lived on the mainland (Curt. 4.2.5). In short, thanks to the Tyrian navy the causeway tactic was costly and unsuccessful, forcing Alexander to rely on a newly arrived fleet. The arrival of this fleet, especially the defection of Phoenician ships to Alexander's side, was fortuitous. In Arrian, these Phoenician ships defect upon learning of Alexander's control over the coastal cities and the Cypriot ships arrive upon learning of his victory over Persia at the battle of Issos (Arr. *Anab.* 2.20.1-3). Returning to the issue of strategy and where Tyre fit into Alexander's calculations, it is perhaps his decision to besiege Tyre that helped convince the other Phoenician forces and the Cypriots to go over to his side. Had he

⁵⁸⁸ See: Bosworth (1980): 238. Curtius mentions Alexander giving a speech, but without the thalssocracy theme. Curt. 4.2.17-18.

⁵⁸⁹ Bosworth (1980): 239. Worthington says almost exactly the same thing: Worthington (2004): 106.

⁵⁹⁰ Bosworth (1980): 238.

bypassed Tyre, it is possible that these forces could have remained loyal to the Persians, seeing Alexander's army move further south into Egypt. By besieging Tyre Alexander may have been demonstrating his commitment to pacify the entire coastline as well as aiming to capture the Tyrian fleet.⁵⁹¹ In this way, Arrian's narrative makes sense, and is certainly preferable to Curtius' version, where the fleet arrives almost like a *deus ex machina* to rescue Alexander, who is contemplating abandoning the siege (Curt. 4.3.11). In both narratives however, the fleet's arrival is fortuitous and not be the direct designs of Alexander, who did go to Sidon to procure ships but who could not have gained as many as were to arrive from the Phoenician deserters and the Cypriots. Once in possession of a fleet, Alexander was able to successfully prosecute the siege of Tyre from the sea. By all accounts it was a tough and bloody siege, but thanks to the fleet Alexander was able to take the city.⁵⁹² How much of the effective use of sea power during the siege of Tyre can be attributed to Alexander is highly questionable. In many ways, it seems obvious that the authors are attributing a great deal of maritime acumen to a person who most of the time seemed to have little interest in ships and sea power. Whether or not it was Alexander or an advisor, Alexander's campaign at times successfully used sea power in order to project direct force from the sea.

A final example demonstrates that Alexander did not really embrace sea power or the utility of the sea. His decision to march west through the Gedrosian desert was not a brilliant display of leadership, as some scholars inexplicably claim,⁵⁹³ but a demonstration

⁵⁹¹ D.J. Lonsdale also sees Alexander's capture of Tyre as a clear deterrent to other cities. Lonsdale (2007): 115. Lonsdale is on less solid ground when discussing the siege itself, and it is hard to agree with his analysis of the causeway tactic as 'ingenious' (116) considering how quickly and effectively it was countered by the Tyrians. Lonsdale is correct in saying that this illustrated the importance of local sea control, but it is hard to credit Alexander with any tactical acumen for realising that sea power was required to contest or establish sea control. Such a conclusion is self-evident and this demonstrates a woeful lack of generalship on the part of Alexander. That the causeway could be attacked by the strong Tyrian naval forces should have been obvious from the outset. It is far from military brilliance on the part of Alexander and demonstrative of a basic lack of understanding or care of the role sea power could play until no other option presented itself. Worthington's analysis is equally unconvincing (2004: 107), calling the causeway feasible and allowing nothing for the interference of the strong Tyrian fleet. It seems modern authors are as unwilling as Alexander to see the damage that could be wrought by a naval force against an unprotected land force in proximity to the sea.

⁵⁹² The details of the action are detailed and give great insight into how a fleet could be used to attack a city from the sea. However, it once again highlights an inconsistency in Alexander's relationship to ships and sea power, for in the narratives he appears highly skilled at naval manoeuvring and tactics.

⁵⁹³ Engels puts up a weak defence, discussing the great plans that Alexander went through before the journey, and still concludes that despite all his plans falling apart it was still a credit to his leadership. It is

of his arrogance and lack of ability in commanding a joint maritime and land force.⁵⁹⁴ Time need not be spent on the incident, other than to comment upon the fact that Alexander could have used a fleet to move all or most of his soldiers. This is assuming Alexander had built a fleet capable of such a feat, which it appears he did not. Arrian himself gives contradictory numbers for the ships in his Alexander's fleet: either 2000 or 800 ships including warships, horse transports and merchant vessels.⁵⁹⁵ In the *Anabasis*, Arrian says that the fleet consisted of 80 triakontors, an odd choice of vessel for this voyage. They would have been useful as a scouting vessel and light combatant but little else and were a drain on resources since such a small vessel could not carry much in the way of supplies and thus required tethering to the land. The composition of the fleet was not very conducive to transporting a large force. The fleet's journey was not easy, but it was certainly better than the journey Alexander's army endured through the Gedrosia. The simple fact is that a properly constituted fleet could carry more supplies than a land army. Alexander's choice of a triakontor-heavy force negated this potential and in fact added to the fleet's supply problem. If the main supply problem for the fleet was lack of water, a smaller land force could still have accomplished this since the digging of wells did not require the full force of Alexander's army. That Alexander put all his effort into marching through an inhospitable desert rather than taking the bulk of his force by sea demonstrates a clear lack of a maritime consciousness.

Finally, there is the little understood final campaign of Athens against one of Alexander's successors, Antipater, in the Lamian War.⁵⁹⁶ There appear to have been two engagements

baffling that he cannot see the logical conclusion in front of him: that Alexander's plans were totally insufficient. This was a bad plan from the start, based on insufficient geographic knowledge and seemingly without proper scouting on the feasibility of the route. He calls it a tribute to Alexander's leadership that one quarter of his men survived. A good leader would not have overseen the deaths of three quarters of his army for a matter of pride. Engels (1978): 110-118. Worthington is also guilty of being too kind to Alexander, praising his leadership skills in getting the men through a seemingly hopeless situation. He does at least question the cost of it but does not consider that a good leader would not have done what Alexander did in the first place, especially with better (maritime) options on the table. Worthington (2004): 231.

⁵⁹⁴ Arr. *Anab.* 6.24.1-3.

⁵⁹⁵ 800 in the *Indika* (19.7) and 2000 in his *Anabasis* (6.2.4).

⁵⁹⁶ It seems as if the label of 'Lamian War' (ὁ Λαμιακὸς πόλεμος) was given to the conflict in later times, and that in the decades afterwards in Athens it was simply known as the 'Hellenic War' (ὁ Ἑλληνικὸς πόλεμος). The term Lamian War was seemingly popularized by the time Diodoros was writing, perhaps building upon Hieronymos of Kardia, a pro-Makedonian historian. The Athenians no doubt referred to it as the 'Hellenic War' as a means of legitimising their fight for Greek freedom from Makedonia, made clear by

at sea, the first in the Hellespont and the second at Amorgos. However, the primary source (Diodoros) is very confusing in his account and does not specify that the final battle took place at Amorgos, this detail coming from the *Marmor Parium*.⁵⁹⁷ Unfortunately there is not much to be said about this battle or even the naval campaign that led to it. Aside from reliably dating the battle to the Athenian year of 323/2 in the archonship of Kephisodoros and concluding that it was a decisive defeat for the Athenians, it is as Ashton says 'patently clear that no strategic or tactical analysis of the Amorgos conflict is feasible'.⁵⁹⁸ What appears evident is that the Athenians lost an engagement at Amorgos, losing some ships but perhaps not suffering significant losses.⁵⁹⁹ It is clear that 322 marked the end of Athenian hegemonic sea power, and although they appear to have been operating ships in the Hellespont in 321, even scoring some kind of victory,⁶⁰⁰ their sea power was never the same. From that point on it was the navies of the *diadochoi* that would rule the Aegean until their usurpation by Rome.

The fourth century is undoubtedly messy when examining sea power and maritime operations. Aside from a source issue, this can be explained by the lack of a dominant maritime power. Navies were more dispersed in the fourth century, with many different poleis of all sizes embracing a maritime approach to some degree. This can be seen as a direct reaction to Athenian maritime hegemony in the fifth century and the desire for poleis to not be beholden to one sea power for protection, or for any one polis to gain as much power as Athens had during the height of the Delian League. In retaining a sovereign naval capability, smaller poleis were ensuring a measure of their own sea power while simultaneously denying to any larger polis the monetary and manpower contributions necessary for overwhelming naval hegemony. Poleis such as Leukas, Korinth, and Pherai were continued to operate a naval force, as either part of a coalition or in Pherai's case

epigraphic references and the funeral oration of Hypereides, where the war is linked constantly to freedom (ἐλευθερία). For a thorough discussion on the source tradition see: Ashton (1984): 152-157.

⁵⁹⁷ Ashton (1977): 1-2; IG 12.5.444 (+ Add. p. 315 + Suppl., p. 110). As Ashton points out, Diodoros' narrative at 18.5.9 does not make it clear whether there were two or three naval engagements.

⁵⁹⁸ Ashton (1977): 2.

⁵⁹⁹ Ashton does a comprehensive job of painstakingly reconstructing ship numbers for before and after the battle. He concludes that there is nothing to suggest large naval losses around this time. Ashton (1977): 2-10.

⁶⁰⁰ On this see an analysis of a Panathenaic amphora by Hans Hauben: Hauben (1974): 61-64. Ashton quotes Hauben's conclusion, that the victory in 321 meant 'a rehabilitation - meagre, to be sure - of the Athenian navy after the terrible setbacks of 322'. Ashton (1977): 1, n.9.

independently and to good effect against other naval powers. This is a critical point in tracking the use of sea power in the fourth century.

Even at the height of their respective sea power during this time, both Sparta and Athens seem to have been constantly stretched financially. The loss at Knidos was not a death blow to Spartan sea power as a whole but without Persian funding it faded away over the next decade. The Athenians had many ships but were unable to ever bring them all to bear and their campaigns in the northern Aegean, especially around Amphipolis, demonstrate how overstretched they really were. Even without a peer competitor at sea, the Athenian naval resources could not cope with the scale of the demos' ambition to recover Amphipolis, Samos and territory in the Thracian Chersonese. This continued into the period of the Social War where they were forced into compromise and later against Philip, who was constantly able to outmanoeuvre the Athenians: politically, diplomatically and militarily. The poorly resourced Athenian fleet was always on the back foot in trying to counter Philip, and as Demosthenes' proposal in his *First Philippic* demonstrate, even a small naval and military force would have had to rely on plundering Makedonian territory and seaborne trade in order to survive. In this respect it is unsurprising that despite a very large fleet, the Athenians who faced off against the *diadochoi* in the Lamian War had long lost their ability to conduct high-level military operations.

Chapter Eight – Diplomatic Operations

The use of navies as a tool of diplomacy is evident throughout the Greek Classical period. Many different poleis used navies to further their foreign policy interests. Most of the time this was on the coercive end of the scale, what is often referred to as ‘gunboat diplomacy’.⁶⁰¹ Navies were, and are, quite capable of projecting force over long distances while remaining removed from directly engaging in conflict, lying offshore but not encroaching onto a polis’ actual territory. Armies are inherently intrusive whereas navies can remain at a distance, threatening or reassuring as desired without physical encroachment into foreign territory. A key feature that distinguishes this from other maritime operations is the absence of the use of force, although the threat of force is usually implied at some level. This is harder to detect in the Greek Classical world where ancient sources often do not give a high level of detail, and it is possible that many of the diplomatic operations examined below, especially tribute collection, did involve some application of force. Nevertheless, the primary aim of these operations was not to engage in combat or cause widespread harm or destruction. Low-level violence aside, naval forces acting in a diplomatic role demonstrated the potential power that could be brought to bear. Sometimes the mere existence of a navy could be of diplomatic value. The Kerkyra incident before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War is a good example. More than a dispute over who was right and who was wrong over the issue of Epidamnos was the issue of the powerful Kerkyraian fleet, a fleet that could significantly bolster the sea power of either Athens or Corinth. As a ‘fleet-in-being’, the Kerkyraian navy was a powerful diplomatic tool.

An important feature of conceptualising maritime diplomatic operations is that these operations are usually viewed as being on a spectrum, from benign through to coercive. There are no neat boundaries and often the placement of an operation on the spectrum is dependent upon relations between the poleis in question. A fleet appearing in the port of one polis might be a reassuring presence to allies and in the very same cruise convey to a more recalcitrant ally a threat. Likewise, a polis might send a few or many ships depending

⁶⁰¹ Though this term has fallen out of usage in modern parlance, with practitioners, politicians and scholars preferring terms such as ‘coercive’ or merely ‘naval’ diplomacy, or more broadly, ‘sharp power’. ‘Gunboat diplomacy’ perhaps conjures up too many images of western imperialism/colonialism.

on the level of reassurance or threat they wished to convey. The presence of two or three triremes sends a much different message than the presence of twenty. The nature of the operations also slide across the spectrum, where it is clear that sometimes Greek naval forces that were engaged in diplomatic operations were only one step removed from engaging in outright hostilities. In this respect categorising a maritime operation as diplomatic can be subjective.

Another fine yet important distinction is between the diplomatic side-effects of naval operations and naval operations with a diplomatic intent. The decision by Athens to support the Ionian rebellion in 500/499 with 20 ships had far-reaching consequences in the diplomatic realm,⁶⁰² yet the primary goal of this force was to help the Ionians militarily in their campaigns, not provide mere reassurance, though the latter was a side effect. Twenty ships was a significant contribution, especially in the pre-Themistoklean build-up. Military operations obviously have diplomatic consequences, intended and unintended, but what this chapter seeks to explore is how navies were used outside of combat operations for specifically diplomatic purposes to coerce, deter or reassure.

Athens and the Delian League

He [Perikles] displayed their power to the barbarian tribes living around and to their kings and lords the magnitude of their power and the confidence and impunity with which they sailed where they wished, having made all of the sea subject to their control.⁶⁰³

The Plutarch passage above details an Athenian expedition conducted by Perikles in approximately 436 and is a textbook example of the use of naval force for diplomatic purposes. The Athenian fleet's presence off the coast of the Aegean islands and the Black Sea region demonstrated Athens' potential power to friend and foe alike, without actually encroaching on any territory or engaging in any hostile act. Athens demonstrated her preponderance at sea to allies as well as to other neutral or potentially hostile powers throughout the Mediterranean. Perikles' show of force in 436 was aimed at Greeks and

⁶⁰² Hdt. 5.97, 99, 103, 105. Herodotus is quite explicit in his analysis of the long-term consequences, calling these ships the beginning of evils for both the Greeks and the Persians. This is of course Herodotus applying his analysis in hindsight, if not also being dramatic.

⁶⁰³ '...τοῖς δὲ περιοικοῦσι βαρβάροις ἔθνεσι καὶ βασιλεῦσιν αὐτῶν καὶ δυνάσταις ἐπεδείξατο μὲν τῆς δυνάμεως τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὴν ἄδειαν καὶ τὸ θάρσος ἧ βούλοιντο πλεόντων καὶ πᾶσαν ὑφ' αὐτοῖς πεποημένων τὴν θάλασσαν...'. Plut. *Per.* 20.1. My translation.

foreigners alike, including powers with which they were at peace. As Plutarch understands, it is also more than just the sailing around of a large body of warships: the real point of the exercise was in demonstrating Athenian sea control. The ships displayed naval and military power in a region distant from Athens and with the implicit implication that Athens could project this power anywhere and at any time – the power (τὸ μέγεθος), confidence (τὸ θάρσος), and impunity (ἡ ἄδεια) of sailing where they wished, ‘having made all of the sea subject to their control’. It is also quite possible that this cruise by Perikles helped establish Athenian relations with the various cities of the Black Sea, many of which would later appear on the Athenian Tribute Lists. The list of 425/4 offers a tantalizing glimpse at some of the areas Perikles may have visited, and indeed the Black Sea region seems to have featured prominently in Athenian thinking towards the end of the century.⁶⁰⁴ From this it seems as if Perikles’ cruise was very successful as a demonstration of Athenian power and reach, all thanks to their strong sea power.

In addition to the above power projection cruise, Plutarch says that Perikles did many things to please the people of Athens, including ‘sending out sixty triremes each and every year, in which many of the citizens were sailing for eight months being paid’.⁶⁰⁵ Aside from being a manner in which the ‘naval mob’ were kept happy, it acted as an annual demonstration of Athenian sea power to the outside world in both having a well-practiced navy and especially the act of having a substantial force of warships sailing about for a large portion of the year. The training benefit of such a cruise should not be underestimated. This cruise is precisely this sort of naval practice that Thucydides has Perikles laud in his opening speech at the beginning of the war, when he says that the Spartans will not easily pick up skill at sea, for it is a skill that must be practiced constantly and leaves no room for other endeavours (Thuc. 1.142.6-9). The skill in seamanship that Thucydides talks about is not just the skill of rowing well, but clearly referring to the whole range of skills and the practice needed to operate a *fleet*, not just a ship. Russell Meiggs and S.K. Eddy both believe that sixty is too large a number, pointing out that it would have incurred too great an annual cost, but regardless of numbers it remains an example of the

⁶⁰⁴ For example, Euripides’ *Medea* and *Iphigenia in Tauris*. See: Gallo (2013): 159-161. Add to this the fact that the Black Sea region was increasingly becoming a critical area for the supply of grain to Athens.

⁶⁰⁵ ‘...ἔξήκοντα δὲ τριήρεις καθ’ ἕκαστον ἑνιαυτὸν ἐκπέμπων, ἐν αἷς πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ἔπλεον ὀκτῶ μῆνας ἔμισθοι...’ Plut. *Per.* 11.4.

frequent use of Athens' navy for diplomatic purposes.⁶⁰⁶ Meiggs suggests that the main function of the fleet in peacetime was as a police force, with the threefold duty of showing the flag, instilling confidence in the hearts of their friends and suppressing piracy.⁶⁰⁷ Although correctly identifying the roles, he mistakenly identifies the first two as constabulary operations when they are in fact diplomatic ones – the two most prominent and important diplomatic roles undertaken by navies. The ultimate goal of such posturing was diplomatic, to establish in the minds of friend and foe alike the Athenian capacity and will to control the seas.

The Delian League was initially a defensive organisation that existed for the defence of Greece from Persia. The primary means of defence was through maritime power, centred on a strong naval capability. Russel Meiggs is explicit in his analysis: 'the foundation of Athenian power was her fleet.'⁶⁰⁸ From the beginning of the League's formation it was decided which states would contribute money or ships (Thuc. 1.96.1). Thucydides lists the two things most important to the League's power – money and ships – with the understanding that money would help further enable the League's sea power. Importantly, Thucydides relates how the allies became sick of campaigning and so arranged to pay their tribute in money rather than ships, simultaneously strengthening Athenian sea power and weakening that of the allies (Thuc. 1.99.1-3). By the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, only Chios and the cities of Lesbos and Kerkyra were providing ships to the alliance, and the rest contributed money and soldiers. Plutarch is explicit in his description of how this imbalance worked, telling of how the allies stayed at home to become farmers and merchants and causing them to eventually fear those who were continually sailing under arms, reduced to the status of subjects rather than allies (Plut. *Kim.* 11.2-3). Plutarch's narrative has Kimon, as an agent of Athens, deliberately encouraging this course of action and thus establishing it as Athenian policy. This strengthening of Athenian sea power at the expense of the allies led to the situation whereby a force of Athenian triremes could get

⁶⁰⁶ Meiggs (1979): 206; Eddy (1968): 142-155. Though Plutarch's language implies that it was sixty ships under pay for the entire eight-month period, it seems more reasonable to think that a portion of the sixty ships were sent out at times throughout an eight months period. This would ensure a healthy training rotation of ships and crews whilst maintaining a presence throughout the Aegean at a lower cost than having all sixty out at once, though this perhaps might have occurred for certain periods of time.

⁶⁰⁷ Meiggs (1979): 206.

⁶⁰⁸ Meiggs (1979): 205.

its point across without resorting to force: ‘the knowledge that Athenian triremes might appear at any moment...’.⁶⁰⁹ With the erosion of their navies, it was Athenian sea power that guaranteed their security from Persia or other hostile powers. This is the duality of Athenian sea power and the Delian League – the power to either protect allies or withdraw that protection, and the ability to interfere directly in the allies’ business.⁶¹⁰ In these two core ways, the Athenian fleet was used as a powerful diplomatic tool.

Athenian control over allies extended beyond the use and threatened use of military force directly against recalcitrant or rebellious allies. Athenian sea power allowed it to control the allies in other ways. As discussed in Chapter Five, the Old Oligarch neatly lays out ways in which Athens controlled the allies’ trade. The writer asks how cities rich in export material such as iron, copper or flax will be able to export these goods without the consent of the rulers of the sea (ἐάν μὴ πείσῃ τοὺς ἄρχοντας τῆς θαλάττης: 2.11). He claims that other cities naturally do not possess more than one key resource, so those rich in timber do not have local access to flax, and vice versa. However, Athens does have access to all goods through their control of the sea and seaborne trade (2.12). Of note, many of the goods in question, especially timber and flax, were extremely important in shipbuilding. So as the Old Oligarch implies, Athens is not only controlling generally valuable commodities, but commodities essential for a city attempting to build or maintain a maritime force. There are incidences of Athenians specifically regulating the import of grain into allied cities. In one decree, dated to perhaps 429/8, the Athenians granted the city of Methone the right to import a quantity of grain from Byzantium, giving notice to the Athenian Hellespont guards (ἐλλεσποντοφύλακες).⁶¹¹ This shows the Athenians controlling the imports of an allied city, and doing so in an indirect manner. They did not need a garrison or officials in Methone to control the grain imports, but could rely on their officials controlling the strategically important choke point at the Hellespont. In controlling this vital sea route, the Athenians could regulate the Black Sea trade and especially the important grain trade. The revolt of Lesbos in 428 happened earlier than planned, and part of the preparations

⁶⁰⁹ Meiggs (1972): 205.

⁶¹⁰ As de Romilly notes, Thucydides at 1.99 is indicating that he believes that Athens’ subjects were in part responsible for their own subjugation, given that they agreed to pay for their defence rather than make it their own business and thus handing Athens the power needed for hegemony over the League. de Romilly (1979): 311.

⁶¹¹ Meiggs and Lewis (1969): 176-180; Meiggs (1972): 206.

involved importing grain from the Pontos, something made impossible once the Athenians learned of the revolt and closed this route to the Lesbians.⁶¹² In all of these different ways Athens was able to establish more than just military control over allies through a range of different policies, all with a particular maritime aspect. This is Athens utilizing the non-naval side of sea power.

The Peloponnesian War and tribute collection

The Peloponnesian War involved many different protagonists spread throughout the Mediterranean region. The vast majority of these places were within reach of the sea, providing poleis with the opportunity to provide aid or to threaten with their navy as they saw fit, exercising both soft- and hard-power diplomacy. This ranged from the use of warships to transport Spartan sympathisers out of Argos,⁶¹³ through to the overt, and then actual, use of force against neutral islands.

An episode which occurred just before the outbreak of the war neatly demonstrates the diplomatic use of sea power. Athens decided to conclude a defensive treaty with Kerkyra in 433. Both Thucydides and Plutarch say that Athens needed to aid Kerkyra lest their naval power go over to Athens' rival Korinth.⁶¹⁴ Athens sent ten ships to aid Kerkyra and what is especially noteworthy is the inclusion of three *strategoï* to command the contingent (Thuc. 1.45), a high level of command for such a small number of ships. For comparison, a later raid on the Peloponnesos during the first year of the war, involving 100 ships, had the same number of *strategoï* (Thuc 2.23). The three commanders sent to Kerkyra were under very strict instructions not to provoke Korinth or do anything that would lead to a violation of the treaty Athens had with them, but to prevent an incursion into Kerkyraian territory. The ships were under the overall command of Lakedaimonios, the son of Perikles' rival Kimon, and Plutarch sees this, combined with the fact that he gave him 'only' ten ships, as an insult.⁶¹⁵ However this does not bear scrutiny, as Plutarch entirely omits any mention of

⁶¹² Thuc. 3.2.1-3. Meiggs (1972): 206.

⁶¹³ Alkibiades sailed 20 ships to Argos to remove 300 suspected Spartan sympathisers and lodge them in islands throughout the empire: Thuc. 5.84.1.

⁶¹⁴ Thuc. 1.44; Plut. *Per.* 29.1-2. With the caveat that Plutarch is in all likelihood just following Thucydides.

⁶¹⁵ Thucydides omits the μόνας, whereas Plutarch adds it: 'δέκα ναῦς μόνας'. Plut. *Per.* 29.2-3; Hornblower (1997): 88.

the two other *strategoi* and the strict instructions that were given to them.⁶¹⁶ Athens sent out a tightly controlled force of ships to aid an ally, Kerkyra, whilst simultaneously making a show of force and a demonstration of Athenian resolve in the face of Korinthian aggression. Kagan puts it best when he describes this manoeuvre as less a military than a diplomatic one.⁶¹⁷ Hornblower's contention that the Athenian orders were unrealistic misses the point that it was a diplomatic rather than a military use of sea power and the situation was already balanced on a knife edge.⁶¹⁸ It was the presence of Athenian ships to begin with as opposed to their number that was the entire point, and the fact that they were commanded by three *strategoi* shows the delicate nature of the task. From the outset of tensions and the lead up to war, Athens employed naval force as a diplomatic rather than as a purely military tool.

Two decades after Perikles' diplomatic cruise to the Pontos in 436, Nikias would propose a similar show of naval force as a means of cowing Sicilian opposition as well as reassuring their friends and allies during Athens' ill-fated expedition.⁶¹⁹ Nikias thought this plan would be both effective and cheap, and would not 'endanger the state by consuming its home resources' (Thuc. 6.47). The first Athenian foray in Sicily beginning in 427 had also been a naval one, albeit on a significantly smaller scale. The size of the first expedition itself is demonstrative of diplomatic manoeuvring. It was not a full-scale invasion force like the one that followed a decade later. Similar to the Kerkyra incident, the initial force was relatively small but with a heavy command component: 20 ships with two commanders.⁶²⁰ It was an operation that began slowly, but gradually ramped up in intensity and eventually dragged in Syrakousai. Thucydides says from the outset that Athenian appeals to Ionian solidarity were really a cover for a desire to test the possibility of subjugating Sicily in the future.⁶²¹ This is further reinforced by the speech in which Hermokrates of Syrakousai says that the divisiveness of the Sicilians was leaving them open to the menace and ambition of

⁶¹⁶ Diotimos and Proteas were the other two generals. Thuc. 1.45.

⁶¹⁷ Kagan (1969): 244-5.

⁶¹⁸ Hornblower (1997): 90. Though Lazenby does not call it a diplomatic action, he still recognizes that it was a delicate situation which the Athenians took seriously and concludes that the presence of the ships might have been cause to deter the Korinthians. Lazenby (2004): 23.

⁶¹⁹ Thuc. 6.47; Plut. *Nic.* 14.3.

⁶²⁰ Thuc. 3.86.1. Of course, this could be a precaution in case one of them became incapacitated – as happened a few months into the expedition. Thuc. 3.90.

⁶²¹ Thuc. 3.86.3-4.

Athens (Thuc. 4.60). Despite reinforcements, including the replacement of one general with three, and several military successes in their campaign, the disparate poleis of Sicily and southern Italy agreed on peace and the Athenians sailed home to a cold reception. Athens withdrew from Sicily having neither lost nor gained anything significant. However, the Athenian population did not see it this way and banished two and fined one of the generals, thinking that they should have conquered Sicily (Thuc. 4.65). Thucydides calls this as a false hope, saying that Athens' recent successes, almost certainly referring to the decisive victory at Pylos and Sphacteria, meant that the demos were confusing strength with their hopes.

It is perhaps a mistake to see Nicias' proposed plan in 415 as one leading to the capture or subjugation of Sicily. It might have been enough for Athens to undertake such a powerful display of their navy with the aim of demonstrating to the Sicilians just how powerful Athenian reach was. In addition, Thucydides' outline of the forces sent to Sicily and the catalogue of allies illustrates the vast array of different places from which Athens could draw on military resources.⁶²² Just as with Perikles' cruise, it would have demonstrated that no polis on or near the coast was safe from Athens. This had been proven in the Aegean and Black Sea regions and Athens could prove it in Sicilian waters too. Even if this did not win Athens new friends and allies, it might have been enough to dissuade the Sicilian poleis from supporting Sparta. Such a cruise at the very least would have been an overt message that Sparta could do nothing to protect Sicily. Being opposed to the expedition, it is probable that Nicias put forward his power projection cruise as the least costly option, with the highest chance of at least a measure of success.⁶²³ As discussed earlier, the Athenians were certainly adept and successful in using their fleet in overt displays of power as a deterrent to adversaries.

It is perhaps the tendency of many modern authors to take everything narrated by Thucydides as representative of the author's *realpolitik* that causes the diplomatic uses of

⁶²² For an in-depth discussion of the forces sent to Sicily and the catalogue of allies as a Homeric allusion, see: Hornblower (2008): 418, 654-60.

⁶²³ Lazenby seems to agree that of the different plans put forward by the three generals, Nicias' was arguably the best. Lazenby (2004): 139. Kagan and most other scholars agree with Thucydides that the best plan was probably Lamachos' plan to attack Syrakousai directly, though Hornblower thinks that perhaps at this stage Thucydides is refraining from favouring one plan over the others. For Kagan's discussion see: Kagan (1981): 212-17. See also: Hornblower (2008): 423-24.

sea power in such cases to be overlooked. Not just with Sicily: an interesting example regarding Kreta may also illustrate this tendency. The squadron of Athenian ships operating out of Naupaktos under the command of Phormion, having defeated a force of Peloponnesian ships, called for aid in preparation for a second battle (Thuc. 2.85.4). Athens responded by sending 20 ships, directed to sail first against the Kretan city of Kydonia in order to aid the Athenian *proxenos* Nikias (Thuc. 2.85.6). The diversion of ships to Kreta and failure to immediately reinforce Phormion is dismissed by Lazenby as ‘typical of Athenian complacency’ and the incident rates little mention in Hornblower’s commentary.⁶²⁴ Lazenby’s comment is typical in brushing aside this incident with little analysis and no evidence, and Kagan at least in his work surveys the scholarship on the incident and comes to the conclusion that the Athenian decision may have been a mistake, but was not absurd as some other authors claimed.⁶²⁵ The point that Kagan grasps and Lazenby misses is that it was a time sensitive matter, to be accepted or rejected by Athens immediately.⁶²⁶ Clearly the Athenians felt that sending aid to a Kretan *proxenos* was important. According to Thucydides, the hope of the Kydonian Nikias was to help reduce Kydonia but also to intimidate the neighbouring city of Polichna (Thuc. 2.85.5). In this sense, the Athenian fleet was to conduct a military operation directly against one city with the concurrent goal of intimidating an adjacent city through this display of sea power. It was also a move that helped reassure an Athenian *proxenos* and maintain a friendly power in the island. This is a far more complex issue than ‘Athenian complacency’ and is an example of the way in which maritime power could be used in complex diplomatic situations.

The Melos affair is an excellent example of Athenian coercive diplomacy in action and the role sea power played in Athenian policy and strategy. Leaving aside questions of political philosophy,⁶²⁷ the Melos affair demonstrates how Athens could bully and subdue the island poleis of the Aegean, in this case a neutral power rather than a rebellious ally. There

⁶²⁴ I would argue that this is one of the times when Athens was at its least complacent. Lazenby (2004): 46; Hornblower (1991): 367-368.

⁶²⁵ Kagan (1974): 111-113.

⁶²⁶ Kagan (1974): 112.

⁶²⁷ While tempting to dissect questions of Athenian imperialism and the political philosophy of Thucydides, questions of ‘political realism’ and other such concepts lie outside the scope of the thesis. For a more detailed discussion see: de Romilly (1979): 273-310; Hornblower (2008): 216-256.

is not much subtlety in Thucydides' account as he has the Athenians say that the Melians have no hope of outside aid since they are an island and Athens rules the sea (Thuc. 5.109). The Melian response, that the Kretan Sea was large and thus hard for the Athenians to control, is clearly meant to demonstrate just how weak the Melian position actually was. No one hearing this could believe that Sparta or Sparta's allies had much hope of conducting a maritime operation against the full might of Athens at this time. This would only be made possible later by severe Athenian losses in Sicily. The Melians argue a second point, that even if they failed in this endeavour the Spartans could still harm Athens in Attika and elsewhere on the mainland where Athens had interests, bringing up the spectre of Brasidas (Thuc. 5.110). Again, this is a weak argument for as the events of the Archidamian War showed, Sparta could damage Athenian interests on the mainland but ultimately were still at the mercy of Athenian sea power.⁶²⁸ There seems to be no getting away from the fact that Melos was an island, and like the other islands of the Aegean Athenian sea power allowed them to establish control over them. Whatever the reason for Athenian aggression against Melos,⁶²⁹ it was predicated on their ability to wield sea power. Initially the hope appears to have been Melian capitulation based on an overt display of power – the Athenian fleet as an instrument of coercive diplomacy. When this failed, the fleet immediately went into action, besieging and eventually taking the island, free from outside interference. This example demonstrates how the Athenians used their fleet as a diplomatic tool and how, when this approach failed, the same fleet could be put into immediate action and conduct combat operations.

Another diplomatic role of Athenian sea power during the war was the use of warships to collect money. Levying money from allies was one thing, but Athens' decision to send out generals with the warships lent weight to their operations. The Athenians sent out *strategoi*

⁶²⁸ One could also use this particular passage as evidence for the construction of the dialogue post-404, with Thucydides writing the dialogue in full knowledge of how the war played out. The last decade of the war saw the bulk of fighting occur everywhere except mainland Greece and Sparta was only successful by damaging Athenian interests in the Aegean. Thus, the Melian argument looks even weaker since the reader knows that the danger posed by Sparta to Athens as argued by the Melians is far from accurate, at least at that particular point in time. Knowing the outcome of the war, the Melians were ultimately vindicated in their sentiment.

⁶²⁹ Perhaps one of the more compelling arguments being that the Athenians needed to constantly keep their island subjects fearful of them through demonstrations of power. For more on this see: de Romilly (1979): 287-289.

and ships to collect tribute from their allies on several occasions.⁶³⁰ Importantly, the dates of these tribute collection expeditions seem to conform to Athenian reassessments of allied tribute contributions,⁶³¹ and thus the need for some force to back up the collection, in the form of naval fleet. This example demonstrates how diplomatic operations can fit onto a sliding scale between more benign operations – non-reassessment years and fewer ships – and more coercive operations – reassessment years with more ships sent out for collection. Thucydides and Diodoros both mention an incident in which Alkibiades with twenty-one ships levied money from Halikarnassos.⁶³² Xenophon also mentions Athenian ships sent out to levy money, including forty ships on one occasion:⁶³³ a powerful show of force and clearly a coercive use of sea power. It is also of great significance that by the time the Athenians were sending warships to levy money they had ceased to impose a direct tribute on their allies and had moved to a system of taxing 5% of all seaborne imports and exports.⁶³⁴ Several years later the Athenians relied on an even more coercive use of sea power to collect money after they defeated the Peloponnesians at the battle of Kyzikos. Having established control of the Propontis, the Athenians established a ‘customs-house’⁶³⁵ at the city of Chrysopolis on the Bosphoros and taxed all vessels sailing from, as well as into, the Pontos.⁶³⁶ The contingent left behind included thirty ships and two generals to watch over the Bosphoros as well as to damage their enemies as the opportunity arose (*Xen. Hell.* 1.1.22). This policy of tribute collection caused many in the Aegean hardship and caused distrust even decades later. In 340 the Athenians sent Chares to the Hellespont in response to Philip of Makedon’s campaign in the regions and he collected money from allies but was shut out from many places. An Athenian fleet out collecting money appears to have been a harsh reminder of how the Athenians had acted in the fifth century and made the poleis

⁶³⁰ Thuc. 2.69, 3.19, 4.50, 4.75.

⁶³¹ Gomme does not agree with the connection and sees the ships as merely escorts for the ships carrying the tribute. Gomme (1956): 202-3. Meiggs disagrees, and sees the dispatch of larger numbers of warships than normal in assessment years as a deliberate policy. Meiggs (1972): 533. The entire point is that the *strategoí* and ships were sent out during tribute reassessment years, not merely as escorts for the annual collection of tribute, lending greater weight to Meiggs’ assessment of the situation.

⁶³² Thuc. 8.108.2; Diod. 13.42.2-3.

⁶³³ *Xen. Hell.* 1.1.8, 1.3.8.

⁶³⁴ In 413 BC. Thuc. 7.28.4.

⁶³⁵ The Greek word used is δεκατευτήριον, literally a ‘tenths-office’, meaning an office for the collection of one-tenth. *Xen. Hell.* 1.1.22.

⁶³⁶ The incident is mentioned by Polybios when he describes the area. He has the Athenians taxing vessels sailing into the Pontos, ‘εἰς Πόντον πλέοντας’. Polyb. 4.44.4.

in the area unwilling to support them.⁶³⁷ The use of sea power to collect money could be very useful and effective, but it also caused a backlash that could last for decades. The Athenians often used sea power to extract money from allies and neutrals alike, collecting either tribute or donations with their warships or using them to control and tax strategic sea-lanes like the Bosphoros.

The Spartans too realised the potential of using their naval forces for diplomatic purposes, though it took many years to approach the level of Athenian diplomatic naval operations. In 412 when Alkibiades (during his pro-Sparta phase) and the Spartan Chalkideus went to Chios in an attempt to foment a rebellion from Athens, Alkibiades convinced the Spartans to send five ships with him, the presence of which as Kagan quite rightly says surely helped influence the Chian assembly in their decision to rebel.⁶³⁸ After his victory at Aigospotamoi in 405, Lysandros dispatched a certain Eteonikos with ten triremes to 'the lands around Thrake', where he brought the settlements there over to the Spartan side.⁶³⁹ Considering the only naval force that could have been a threat was the Athenian one recently annihilated at Aigospotamoi, the Spartan ships did not need to travel in force for safety, and ten ships seems more than required for simple treaty making, giving the force a distinctly coercive effect. This followed immediately after Lysandros had sailed from the Hellespont to Lesbos, where Xenophon says, rather cryptically, that he 'ordered' the affairs of the cities there, especially Mytilene.⁶⁴⁰ Plutarch is of little help, vaguely referring to Lysandros' sailing around and putting affairs into the hands of his partisans and generally wreaking havoc in the Aegean before sailing across to Attika.⁶⁴¹ Plutarch's account implies violence, whereas Xenophon's rather laconic account does not, though perhaps this is because it was not necessary. Lysandros had 200 ships with him and such a large force in and of itself would have had a profound effect without having to resort to violence. Spartan policy meant that they came to the naval game much later than Athens and was not an established or recognised naval power. This limited the diplomatic options open to their

⁶³⁷ Plut. *Phok.* 14.2-3. As Buckler points out, Philip had done nothing to harm these different places, but they knew the Athenians well. Buckler (2003): 482.

⁶³⁸ Thuc. 8.12, 8.14. Kagan (1987): 45.

⁶³⁹ Xenophon is vague about which settlements or even what area of Thrake. Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.5.

⁶⁴⁰ He uses the verb κατασκευάζω, which in the middle voice (as he uses here) generally means to prepare or arrange. Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.5. Neither Kagan nor Lazenby offer any commentary on this event outside of the bare facts as reported by Xenophon. Kagan (1987): 398; Lazenby (2004): 245.

⁶⁴¹ Plut. *Lys.* 13.4-14.1.

navy, but it did not prevent them from trying, as the use of ships to provide presence and to coerce in the later years of the war demonstrated.

Fourth Century

Once the Athenians had rebuilt some of their former sea power, they continued to use it in much the same way as in the fifth century. In 390 Thrasyboulos was elected as a *strategos* and sent out with 40 triremes. He collected tribute from the allies in Ionia and made alliances with Medokos and Seuthes, Kings of Thrake (Diod. 14.94.2-3). Clearly by sending 40 triremes they were intent on making a statement when it came to collecting tribute and it certainly would have helped alliance negotiations to have been backed by such a strong naval contingent. What is not clear is how coercive this cruise was. It may have been intended to reassure the allies that Athens had returned as a strong sea power, able to fight the Spartans in order to defend them. However, given Athens' track record with the Delian League, it could equally have been a show of strength that Athens could call in its tribute and the navy stood ready to collect. Likewise, with the Thracians, the presence of 40 triremes was a demonstration of Athenian power and reach. The only question was if the cruise was to prove to the Thracian kings that Athens was a worthy alliance partner or an implicit threat that they would be a bad enemy to have. It seems as if the first is more likely as the Athenians were able to conclude a treaty between the warring Thracians and enrol them as allies. Together with the good relations Athens had with Persia, this manoeuvring persuaded cities in the region to aid Athens, especially in helping to secure the vitally important trade route through the Hellespont.⁶⁴² As a flow-on effect of Thrasyboulos' campaign in the area, the Thasians took advantage of the Athenian presence nearby and expelled the Spartan garrison from the island.⁶⁴³ It also seems apparent that he helped win over Samothrake as well, greatly strengthening the Athenian position in the northern Aegean.⁶⁴⁴ All of this was seemingly accomplished with little to no violence. Instead, the force of 40 warships represented a show of force to friend and foe alike, a visible and tangible sign of Athens' renewed power and reach in the region.

⁶⁴² The details of the campaign and alliances are difficult to ascertain, not least because Xenophon fails to give a thorough account. Buckler (2003) 157-159, esp. n. 28. On the alliances see: IG II² 21-22.

⁶⁴³ Dem. 20.59.

⁶⁴⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.7. Buckler (2003): 159; Asmonti (2014): 176.

Success in Thasos and eastern Thrake helped consolidate the Athenian position in the north. It put them into closer contact with their allies in the Chalkidike⁶⁴⁵ and established a strong line of influence from the Chalkidike to the Hellespont.⁶⁴⁶ Thrasyboulos capitalised on this success by sailing to Byzantion, where with local support he replaced the oligarchy with a democracy.⁶⁴⁷ Buckler is astute in observing that this was undertaken with no difficulty, seeing that the Athenians had 40 warships with them.⁶⁴⁸ It seems as if the presence of Athenian ships (and their crews) was all that was required for the change in government, and there seems to be little to no indication that the Athenians needed to engage in serious combat operations. Xenophon merely says that Thrasyboulos 'changed' the government from an oligarchy to a democracy.⁶⁴⁹ Similarly, Demosthenes says that the local supporters Archebios and Herakleides handed over the city to Thrasyboulos, implying no direct Athenian involvement.⁶⁵⁰ Of great import for the Athenian treasury, Thrasyboulos reinstated the 10% tax on vessels passing through from the Pontos. Thus with a force of 40 warships operating in a diplomatic rather than a military manner, Thrasyboulos was able to greatly strengthen Athens' strategic position in the northern Aegean and the Hellespont.

The members of the Second Athenian League were obviously and painfully aware of its predecessor, most notably in the way in which Athenian sea power had granted it such absolute control over the other member states – and reduced them to mere tributaries in most cases. Aside from a list of guarantees and protections listed in the Decree of Aristoteles,⁶⁵¹ a major factor limiting Athenian hegemony was the fact that Athenian sea power was not at the same level as it had been in the fifth century. Further, as the Social War would later prove, this time the allies retained stronger naval and maritime forces with which they could in fact unite and challenge Athens. The allies had clearly learned from their experience of the Delian League. By contributing ships rather than money, the allied poleis were able to protect their own interests by possessing a fleet, and thus retain

⁶⁴⁵ Diod. 14.82.3.

⁶⁴⁶ Buckler (2003): 160.

⁶⁴⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.27; Lys. 28.5; Dem. 20.60.

⁶⁴⁸ Buckler (2003): 160.

⁶⁴⁹ 'μετέστησε δὲ ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας εἰς τὸ δημοκρατεῖσθαι τοὺς Βυζαντίους'. Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.27.

⁶⁵⁰ 'τοῦτο δ' Ἀρχέβιον καὶ Ἡρακλείδην, οἱ Βυζάντιον παραδόντες Θρασυβούλῳ κυρίου ὑμᾶς ἐποίησαν τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου'. Dem. 20.60.

⁶⁵¹ See: Cargill (1981): 14-47, 131-145.

a sovereign maritime defence capability. At the same time, this prevented Athens from monopolising naval skill. Athenian sea power did regenerate after the end of the Peloponnesian War and as examples like Thrasybulos' Thracian cruise help demonstrate, this sea power was effective. This of course was based on other Athenian successes in the 390s and 380s at sea that demonstrated Sparta was no longer ascendant at sea. This in turn reinforced that the Athenian navy remained a potent force, even if not on the same level as the fleet of the Archidamian War.

Just as with the Delian League, Athens in the fourth century took steps to regulate the trade of allies. An interesting example is a regulation on the export of ruddle from three of the cities of Keos. The regulation states that the ruddle is to be exported in whatever vessel the Athenians choose and no other.⁶⁵² It is hard to believe that the supply of ruddle was of great importance to Athens, and it is almost certainly an example of Athens tightly controlling the export of goods from an island as a means of wider control.⁶⁵³ The islands of Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros had been reacquired by Athens in 393 and confirmed as theirs in the King's Peace. They were strategically important as stepping stones to and from the Hellespont and thus vitally important for maintaining this sea lane. Athenian control over these islands was no small matter, and their retention of the islands is indicative of recognition by other powers, even enemies of Athens, that they represented a core interest of Athens, the losses of which might provoke a hostile reaction from Athens. Of further interest here is the Athenian tax of 374/3 on the islands which levied a 1/12 tax on grain.⁶⁵⁴ Athens is controlling the production of a vital resource and ensuring the regular export of grain to Athens. This is a rare but very illustrative example of the non-naval use of sea power.

In a similar vein to the fifth century, the Athenians also collected money in coercive ways. In his oration, *On the Chersonese*, Demosthenes describes the actions of the Athenian *strategos* Diopeithes collecting money to fund his campaign in 341. One measure he took

⁶⁵² IG II² 1128, 12-13.

⁶⁵³ For discussion of this inscription, see: Rhodes and Osborne (2007): 204-209. As the authors point out, it is reminiscent of the Athenian Decree that mandated the use of Athenian weights and measures. Originally dated to the 450s, a later date seems more likely. On the earlier date see: Meiggs and Lewis (1969): 111-117. On 'downdating' the decree, see: Mattingly (1993): 99-102 and (1996): 403-426.

⁶⁵⁴ For discussion on the inscription, see: Rhodes and Osborne (2007): 118-128.

was to force merchant vessels to land (Dem. 8.9), presumably to either take some or all of the cargo or to extort money from the ships. The impression that Demosthenes gives is that it is all above board since the enemies of Athens cannot be arrested. Because of this, Athens has no choice but to send out ships and collect money (8.29). Of note is that he says the Athenians have ways of dealing with their own people who do wrong, including decrees (ψήφισματα), impeachment (εἰσαγγελία) and the *Paralos*, one of the two state triremes. Clearly the *Paralos* was still a potent symbol of Athenian law and reach, unchanged since the plays of Aristophanes almost a century before.⁶⁵⁵ Later in the speech, Demosthenes mentions in general terms the taking of money from different poleis for protection of their merchant vessels: not for protection from the Athenians, but for protection in general (8.25). He says that those who pay do not do so for no reason, but for protection and that those (*strategoí*) with more ships collect more money. It may have been that the ships had little choice but to accept Athenian protection, but it also seems that they could rightly expect proper protection. Who these merchant vessels need protection from is left unsaid: possibly pirates or perhaps the Makedonians, seeing that the speech is another chance for Demosthenes to rally against Philip. In either case, the Athenians are using their sea power to extort resources from neutrals and from allies. It is also possible that the Athenians were providing genuine protection to the trade vessels of other poleis, for as discussed previously maritime trade was a benefit to all and especially to Athens. One need not be completely cynical of Athenian motives, and this very well could be a demonstration of Athens attempting to maintain 'good order at sea'.

The Athenian law courts, in particular those dealing with the *dikai emporikai*, were an important part of Athenian and wider Mediterranean maritime affairs. The courts' first goal was obviously the protection of Athenian trade, but there seems to have been a flow-on effect of better regulated maritime commerce and trade for other poleis as well. Indeed, a key feature of these courts according to Edward E Cohen was their 'supranationality', the appearance of foreigners in these courts and even a case where both parties were foreigners.⁶⁵⁶ In another maritime case, a failed attempt at defrauding a maritime loan led

⁶⁵⁵ *Birds*, 145-7, where the characters joke about being summoned by the other state trireme, the *Salamina*. For more on this, See Chapter 4.

⁶⁵⁶ Euandros of Thespias and Menippos of Karia. Dem. 21.176. Cohen (1973): 59.

to the near sinking of a vessel which managed to safely put into port at Kephallenia. There the local magistrates ruled that the ship should return to its home port, Athens, against the wishes of the Massaliots who had taken out the loan and attempted to sink their own ship, reluctant to face their creditors (Dem 32.8-9). Whether or not the officials in Kephallenia were specialists in this sort of maritime case or just general magistrates, it shows a deferral of judgement to Athens and the specialist law courts there. Further, it may be that the Kephallenians did not want to antagonize the Athenians by unduly interfering in a trade matter, especially one dealing with the all-important grain trade. In these ways there is a duality in the nature of the *dikai emporikai*, a carrot and a stick. That foreigners could access the courts for disputes shows that they must have been an attractive venue for the resolution of disputes, including when the dispute did not directly impact Athens. On the other hand, their existence must have signalled how serious maritime trade was to the Athenians, especially when concerned with the vital grain supply, and that they had a serious mechanism in place to deal with these cases. This is the benign, diplomatic way in which the Athenians sought to protect trade, including the trade of foreigners, and is another example of non-naval sea power being exercised.

Not to be overlooked, Dionysios of Syrakousai, possessing a strong navy, used it for diplomatic purposes. The evidence is again slim and relies on Diodoros' account, but there are some good examples from Sicily. In one instance, having secured a new bride from Lokroi in 398, he dispatched a lavishly adorned quinquereme to pick up his bride and transport her back to Syrakousai. Of note is the fact that according to Diodoros it was the first quinquereme that Dionysios had ever built.⁶⁵⁷ That the marriage itself was designed as a diplomatic move to strengthen ties between the two cities adds to the importance of Dionysios' gesture in sending a powerful warship – the most powerful warship built to that point in Greek history. In a more overt display of power, a year later in 397 he gathered a force to attack the Carthaginians near the town of Eryx. Dionysios commanded a huge combined sea and land force that included 200 warships and 500 merchant vessels (Diod. 14.47.7). The people of Eryx apparently hated the Carthaginians anyway, but it appears as

⁶⁵⁷ Diod. 14.44.7. Caven (1990: 99) believes that the name of this vessel can be known – the *Boubaris*.

if the key point was that this force so overawed them that they joined with Dionysios.⁶⁵⁸ In these two examples we see Dionysios utilizing naval forces in diplomatic fashion, on both the benign and the coercive end of the spectrum.

Epameinondas and the Theban Navy

Once of the most puzzling issues of the fourth century is the short-lived Theban navy. Thebes was never a great or even a moderate sea power and had seemingly little interest in maritime pursuits until Epameinondas came to the forefront of Theban affairs. Somewhat mirroring the rise of Spartan sea power in the second half of the Peloponnesian War, the rise of the Theban navy was funded by Persia in response to the threat of Athenian sea power in the Aegean. Thebes required a navy at this point, for the Athenian alliance with Sparta ensured that so long as Athens maintained sea control around the Peloponnesos they could prevent Thebes from cutting off Sparta from outside aid. As Buckler observes, since the common peace of 366 was not ratified the only way to take Athenian sea power out of the equation was with force.⁶⁵⁹ There were other spurs to Theban desire for a navy. In 368/7 when the Thebans marched into Thessaly to attack Alexandros of Pherai, Alexandros sent to Athens for aid, who duly sent 30 ships and 1000 men to their aid (Diod. 15.71.3). This in itself can be seen as a diplomatic operation on the part of the Athenians, dispatching a force of ships to aid an ally and signalling to the Thebans that the Athenians were willing and capable of sending a relief force. The Thebans, without a navy, could do nothing to prevent this aid from being sent by sea. Neutralising the Athenian navy was a key goal for the Thebans. At first, they tried to do this diplomatically. Sent as an envoy to the King of Persia, Pelopidas asked the King that part of a peace deal require the Athenians to beach their ships (Ἀθηναίους ἀνέλκειν τὰς ναῦς: Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.36). It was clearly aimed at putting a halt on Athens' sea power, just as their request for Messene to be recognized as independent was aimed at neutralizing Spartan land power.⁶⁶⁰ In providing funding to Thebes for the construction of a fleet, the Persians were hoping to

⁶⁵⁸ Diod. 14.48.1. The neighbouring city of Motya did not however join with Dionysios, and there was an apparent rivalry between Motya and Eryx (Caven, 1990: 100). This might demonstrate an opportunistic move by Eryx, but this does not discount the role played by Dionysios' large show of force.

⁶⁵⁹ Buckler (1980): 160-1.

⁶⁶⁰ Heskell (1997): 127.

maintain a balance of power in Greece.⁶⁶¹ It was Athens' continued campaigning around Amphipolis and the Chersonese that spurred the Thebans into building a navy.

Not long after the Alexandros incident, at the urging of Epameinondas, the Thebans instituted a ship-building program of 100 triremes.⁶⁶² Both Diodoros and Isokrates speak of Epameinondas' desire to rule the sea: γῆς καὶ θαλάττης ἄρξοντες (Isok. 5.53) and τῆς κατὰ θάλατταν ἀρχῆς (Diod. 15.78.4). Later authors had a different view of Epameinondas' naval exploits. Pausanias writes that Epameinondas was frightened of the sea because of a Delphic oracle (Paus. 8.11.10) and Plutarch says that Epameinondas feared that the Thebans would go from being steadfast hoplites to degenerate mariners (Plut. *Philop.* 14.2). The rationale behind Epameinondas' naval expansion puzzles modern scholars as much as it seems to have confused the ancient authors. More can be said of what this short-lived naval force actually did than what it was ultimately intended for. For this reason, I have treated it in this chapter, for in essence the Theban navy appears to have acted mostly as a 'fleet-in-being'. It was a force that could threaten Athenian sea power and potentially unite Athenian enemies against the Second Confederacy, but with seemingly limited ability to conduct combat operations.

Diodoros says that the Thebans not only voted to construct 100 triremes and attendant infrastructure, but also to urge the people of Rhodes, Chios and Byzantion to assist them (Diod. 15.79.1). Curiously, Diodoros then says that Epameinondas set out to these cities and the Athenian Laches was forced away and thus these cities went over to Thebes (Diod. 15.79.1). Buckler's analysis of the strategic purpose of this fleet is sound, seeing Epameinondas' strategic intention for the fleet as a diplomatic tool.⁶⁶³ The fact that the important League members Rhodes, Chios and Byzantion are mentioned, especially the

⁶⁶¹ Heskell (1997): 128.

⁶⁶² Diod. 15.78.4-79.3; Isok. 5.53. Stylanou's presumption is that the Boeotian navy was not meant to match the Athenian navy, and that due to their command of the land a moderate fleet would have sufficed. Stylanou (1998): 494. This is a dubious appraisal of the strategic situation, not least because it does not say what such a moderate fleet would suffice for. Would it suffice if it could gain sea control? Contest Athenian sea control? Be able to transport an army to the Peloponnesos? This inexplicably connects supremacy on land to only needing a moderate navy. Supremacy on land did nothing for the Spartan Army against the Athenian navy during the entire Peloponnesian War, despite Sparta having a 'moderate' navy. Navies are not an accessory to land power, but a distinct force in themselves. This short commentary by Stylanou is demonstrative of one of the ways in which sea power theory continues to be misunderstood.

⁶⁶³ Buckler (1980): 162.

strategically important site of Byzantium, indicates a move to separate allies from Athens. Not just this, but these are allies whose maritime resources and sea power could aid Thebes in its rivalry with Athens, both in possessing established sea power and also in the potential aid they could give the Theban navy if Thebes was indeed serious in becoming a sea power.⁶⁶⁴ It was a very similar approach to that of Sparta at the end of the Peloponnesian War, which had proved so successful.

Epameinondas took the fleet to sea, sailing out of Aulis into the Aegean. The Athenians were ready, and the *strategos* Laches was sent to intercept the Thebans. However, as it turned out the Theban fleet was apparently powerful enough to deter Laches, who did not engage the Thebans (Diod. 15.79.1). There is nothing further to go on other than this very short passage by Diodoros. It would appear that the Theban fleet was in some way, either numerically or materially, superior to the Athenian force, so much so that Laches felt disinclined to engage. Likewise, Epameinondas clearly felt uneasy about engaging the Athenians.⁶⁶⁵ As the architect of Thebes' new-found maritime strategy, Epameinondas himself was positioned in the fleet and thus it is unlikely that the fleet failed to understand the strategic rationale for deployment. Either the Athenian fleet was too large for Epameinondas to feel confident of victory, or he intended his fleet as a primarily diplomatic force. Even in the case that it was intended as a diplomatic force with the aim of being strong enough to elicit defections from the Athenian League, the failure to engage the Athenians at any point in the cruise demonstrated that it was not in fact a credible naval force. Isokrates seems to claim that by sending ships to Byzantium the Thebans were aiming at rule over land and sea (Isok. 5.53). In the case that Epameinondas' goal was to more directly challenge Athenian sea power, then avoiding battle with Laches was a poor start. The Athenian fleet remained in play as a dangerous force that could still block or reverse gains made by the Thebans overseas. It does seem more likely that the Theban fleet was

⁶⁶⁴ The early stages of Thebes' maritime transformation clearly show the force intended to play a diplomatic role, but it is unclear how serious Thebes was about becoming a sea power. Buckler seems to think the program was aimed at this goal. Buckler (1980): 162.

⁶⁶⁵ Buckler likens this to the German High Seas Fleet of the First World War not wishing to risk an engagement with the Royal Navy for anything other than the chance of significant gain. He still believes that it was a missed opportunity, and it is hard to disagree with this assessment. By doing nothing the Theban fleet proved to the Greek and Persian worlds that it was a hollow force, incapable of even minor military action. Buckler (2003): 362.

intended as a fleet-in-being, a force large enough to entice Athens' allies into defecting and thus giving opposition to Athenian sea control.

The efforts of Epameinondas and the naval campaign he led accomplished very little and should be considered a failure. Central to the failure of Epameinondas and the Theban fleet's diplomatic efforts is the fact that Theban sea power was unproven. The Theban fleet had conducted no military operations and so its quality was an unknown. There was little reason for the Chians, Rhodians or any other power to throw their lot in with Thebes when their fleet was still unproven in battle. Buckler circles around this conclusion, saying that Epameinondas needed to engage in more military action to prove the fleet in military operations and thus draw in the wavering League members.⁶⁶⁶ The Athenians had been engaged in long maritime campaigns in the Chalkidike and the Chersonese, and certainly the allies would have seen no weakness in Athenian sea power.⁶⁶⁷ Combined with the unproven nature of the Theban fleet, the strategic calculus of the allies was sound in declining to join Thebes against Athens. This returns us to the hierarchy of maritime operations and the fact that it is the ability to conduct combat operations, at and from the sea, which establishes a navy's ability to act as a useful diplomatic tool. It was thus a deficiency in means that caused the Theban failure at sea.

Finally, it is worth noting that we have little evidence of a Theban maritime consciousness in the classical period. By all accounts the Thebans were rigidly continentalist in their outlook and in their strategy. By comparison, even the Spartans at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War appear to have had a greater appreciation of sea power than the Thebans at any stage of the fifth and fourth centuries. This matters not just in resourcing and manning a fleet of warships, but crucially in how to employ these ships. The Spartans at least catered for this with the existence of an 'Admiral' position. The Thebans appear to have had no such office or title and no pedigree of putting fleets to sea in any number. Perhaps the other Greeks also saw this and so expected little out of the Theban navy, an impression reinforced when it failed to do anything other than sail around the Aegean.

⁶⁶⁶ Buckler (1980): 173-4; (2003): 365. This is an astute observation by Buckler, but he is examining the Theban fleet specifically and not formulating a general theory about how naval forces were used in diplomatic operations.

⁶⁶⁷ Heskell (1997): 136.

This was not a small action considering the various places they visited, but neither was it one of great consequence.

The enablers and limits of Naval Diplomacy

From this exploration of diplomatic operations, it is possible to make several observations about the navies and diplomatic operations, in terms of enablers as well as limits.

As the aforementioned Theban example highlights clearly, navies were only useful as diplomatic tools if they were respected or feared as a fighting force. Thebes had no naval tradition; their navy had no record of combat victories and thus was not feared. The Athenian Navy on the other hand was widely feared, with a long history of victory in combat and notoriety in tribute collection across the Aegean. Poleis were rightfully sceptical of throwing their lot in with Thebes when Athens had a proven capability to fight and win at sea. Thus, the first and most important enabler of naval diplomatic operations is a proven ability to conduct combat operations, both at and from the sea.

In the matter of resourcing, naval diplomacy is flexible and very much a matter of scale. Obviously, a larger naval force was capable of threatening a wider range of poleis than a small navy. Athens could bully almost any other poleis in the Greek world save peer competitors, and likewise for Sparta during its short naval ascendancy. The navies of smaller and less capable poleis such as Leukas could still conduct coercive naval diplomacy, just on a smaller scale. They might send a small force of warships and soldiers to conspicuously sail past or land in the vicinity of a bothersome polis as a demonstration, or on the more coercive end of the scale they might detain the fishing or trading vessels of other poleis for 'customs/tax' enforcement. On the other side of the coin, it did not necessarily take a large fleet to provide comfort and/or deterrence. The ten ships sent by Athens to aid Kerkyra at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War were enough to signal Athens' intent, to friend and potential foe alike. Finally, navies could be a powerful bargaining tool on the diplomatic front, and poleis such as Kerkyra could leverage off the existence of a large fleet to gain attention and protection from more powerful poleis.

Naval diplomacy did of course have its limits. Despite the presence of Athenian triremes, with strict non-confrontational orders, alongside the fleet of Kerkyra, Korinth still engaged

in battle and precipitated the outbreak of general war between Athens and Sparta. As in all matters related to diplomacy, sometimes deterrence is not enough and war is the outcome. Another limitation, painfully learned by Athens and Sparta, is that the use of navies for tribute collection may be effective, but it can be extremely abrasive and cause severe resentment on the tributaries. Many Aegean poleis had long memories when it came to the appearance of Athenian ships in their harbours, and long into the fourth century there was widespread mistrust of Athenian fleets on ostensibly peaceful business. Finally, some poleis were simply immune to naval diplomacy, being either isolated from the sea, or with few interests at sea. Thebes is a case in point, and although sea power was not a trivial factor in Spartan and Athenian conflicts with Thebes, the diplomatic aspect of sea power was of no significance when dealing with Thebes. Navies could be powerful diplomatic tools, but there were distinct limits.

Diplomatic or constabulary?

A key point of difference and an important question to ask is whether or not some of the tribute collection activities mentioned above would fall under the diplomatic or the constabulary role (see next chapter). This is especially salient when examining tribute collection by Athens, Sparta or a similar power, where the contribution is being made by a recognised tribute-paying ally. In this case it might be argued that the naval forces collecting the tribute are in fact engaged in a regular activity where their role is to act as a guardian of money rather than as a coercive force. Knowing that tribute is due, the polis being collected from might see the arrival of a trireme or other warship not as a threat but as a routine activity. A warship would be a logical unit to use for such duties, less likely to be attacked by pirates or an opportunistic enemy. In this sense their role is akin to a constabulary force rather than a diplomatic one. It is a role that in more recent times would arguably fall under the purview of law enforcement or para-military organisations rather than the military. Sending triremes and troops to collect from a non-ally certainly falls into the coercively diplomatic category, but the lines are much blurrier when collecting from an ally. Here the neat categories of diplomatic, constabulary and military are less useful: not through a failing in the theory, but because as this example demonstrates, these categories depend on social and political context. It is very likely that the Greeks did not

make a distinction, sending triremes for tribute collection whether allied polis or not. We simply do not have enough evidence to detect any categorisation in the Athenian mind, for example. It may have been as simple as them sending more or less triremes depending on how willing the allies in question were to provide the tribute, and not based only on the polis' mere presence on a tribute list. They may have considered it as routine a matter as any other constabulary task, or it may have been a diplomatic situation every time tribute was collected. I would tentatively argue that collecting from non-allied or reluctant allies could be considered a diplomatic operation while collecting from compliant allies should be seen as a constabulary task, but this is by no means categorical and one might well argue against one or both distinctions.

Viewing ancient maritime operations through the lens of 'diplomatic' or 'constabulary' does provide a difficult view. However, there are operations that are purely diplomatic in nature, as recognisable as 'gunboat diplomacy' as any other example in history. Perikles' fifth century power projection cruise was explicitly aimed at demonstrating Athenian sea power to friend and foe alike, and is acknowledged as such by ancient authors. The Athenians could joke about the diplomatic reach of their sea power, as in *Birds*,⁶⁶⁸ an explicit statement of one way in which they used their navy outside of war. It is therefore possible to extract examples of ancient Greek naval forces used for unambiguously diplomatic operations. These examples are not random nor are they isolated and thus it is possible to classify a range of maritime operations from the period as being 'diplomatic' operations. This is a useful distinction to make, despite the ambiguities that arise out of studying many other operations that could be classified as 'constabulary'. This is not a problem that has been solved by modern maritime strategic thought, where operations are often classified as one or another depending on the subjective judgments of modern observers. Sometimes operations simply can be defined as diplomatic *and* constabulary. For instance, the Royal Australian Navy often sends a warship to the Horn of Africa to aid in the international efforts against piracy and drug smuggling, which helps fund terrorism and organised crime and is considered a transnational threat. The day-to-day operation of pursuing and apprehending drug smugglers is purely a constabulary task, yet the presence of the

⁶⁶⁸ See Chapter 4 for more on this example.

warship has wider implications of a diplomatic nature. It demonstrates Australia's commitment to upholding the 'rules based global order' and contributes to Australia being a good international citizen, a purely diplomatic aim. What is important in the ancient Greek context is to note the potential effectiveness of navies outside of military operations, and that the inherent flexibility of sea power holds as true in the ancient Greek world as it does today.

Chapter Nine – Piracy and Constabulary Operations

Piracy is a phenomenon that has plagued societies for thousands of years and is an enduring topic of concern in many areas of the modern world. It is an activity that has always courted a vague and at times ambiguous definition. In the Classical Greek world, it was certainly a threat to coastal cities and maritime traffic across the Aegean and the wider Mediterranean. Numerous literary sources and pictorial evidence attest to piracy from the time of Homer through the Archaic period and into the Hellenistic and Roman eras.⁶⁶⁹

Piracy and counter piracy are perhaps the most complex and at times confusing issues when examining maritime issues and operations in the ancient world. The problem is twofold. Firstly, the ancient sources can be ambiguous in the language used. This intersects with the second problem, that of modern conceptions of piracy and our own use of language on the topic. In the modern world and especially in the last three decades, piracy has taken on a very specific and well-defined, albeit very narrow, legal definition. International law, such as Article 101 of The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS), very strictly and narrowly defines piracy.⁶⁷⁰ Prior to this 'pirate' was often a pejorative term used to describe any maritime activity a state deemed as unsavoury. No such legal definition was conceived of or used in the ancient world. Examining piracy in the Classical period requires careful analysis of the sources and a close study of the context in which 'piracy' is reported.

⁶⁶⁹ An example of a possible artistic depiction comes from an Archaic-era Attic *kylix* found in Italy. It has been interpreted as probably showing a pirate attack on a merchant vessel, but it is possible that it shows a warship attacking trade in a military context. See Figure 5.

⁶⁷⁰ Of note is the strict delineation of international maritime borders in the modern international legal system. This includes concepts such as Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone and Economic Exclusive Zone. To this add the idea of vessel registration: where a vessel is 'flagged'. With these terms, piracy in the modern world is conducted by stateless vessels outside the Territorial Sea of a state. Inside this boundary it is considered armed robbery, not piracy. UNCLOS even considers when a naval vessel has mutinied and when it can be considered a pirate vessel. See: UNCLOS, Articles 101-107. Other international bodies, such as the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), have a different, and broader, definition of what constitutes piracy. For more on the history of the legal definition of piracy, see: Campbell (2010): 19-32.



Figure 5: Archaic-era *kylix*⁶⁷¹

On the other side of piracy and counter piracy are other maritime operations that can be defined as ‘constabulary’ or ‘policing’ operations. As the title implies, these operations often fall outside the normal realm of military operations and into the realm of police or paramilitary forces. This is far murkier territory when examining such operations in the ancient world and it is here that we find the weakest side of the triangle on the spectrum of maritime operations. This is partly a source issue since many of these operations are low-scale and relatively low-impact, at least as far as an ancient author might consider when writing a history of their times. Many constabulary operations do not rate a mention in the modern world, so it is unsurprising that Xenophon or Diodoros might not mention instances of policing against foreign fishing vessels in a city’s waters or the capture or destruction of individual pirate ships. Any incidents that do get mentioned are almost always concerned with counter-piracy operations. On the legal side, without the strict delineation of legal jurisdictions at sea a polis presumably policed its local seas or fishing grounds as it saw fit, excluding or taxing the activities of foreign vessels.⁶⁷² Certainly

⁶⁷¹ British Museum, Museum no. 1867,0508.963:

https://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/collection_object_details.aspx?objectId=399714&partId=1&images=true

⁶⁷² For more on this see: Lytle (2012): 1-55; Bresson (2016): 181-184. It is hard to disagree with Bresson’s conclusion that cities enforced their claims with whatever sea power they possessed, otherwise not at all.

possession of a few small warships would be extremely useful to a state enforcing sovereign rights in local waters. However, as a few examples demonstrate below counter piracy outside of legal definitions could still have an impact on reducing what was often a ‘transnational’ problem. The suppression of piracy in the Aegean by Athens benefited other *poleis*, despite not falling within the parameters of any international law.

Definition and language

The starting point for examining piracy and counter-piracy in the Greek world is language. This is the first hurdle to overcome, and one which has caused many scholars to stumble. For the Classical period, Greek words usually used when referring to piracy are ληστής, ληστικός, ληστεία (roughly, ‘pirate’, ‘piratical’, ‘piracy’). These words can all be translated as either having to do with robbery or attack either on land or by sea. The verb form, ληστεύειν, is used to denote raiding, plundering and other such attacks, by land and by sea. These words should not be translated as only referring to banditry or piracy. A survey of usage shows that Classical authors used these words in a variety of contexts that indicated what activity was taking place. For example, when Thucydides uses ληστεύειν, in every instance he is discussing what we would call ‘raiding’ and mostly if not entirely refers to raiding by land.⁶⁷³ In the first instance used, Thucydides is referring to the Athenians dispatched to Kerkyra in order to aid the Kerkyraians against the exiles in the mountain who were raiding them (οἱ ἐληστεύοντο ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῷ ὄρει φυγάδων: Thuc. 4.2.3). In the final two instances Thucydides is referring to the Athenian attacks on the Peloponnesos from Pylos.⁶⁷⁴ The first example clearly refers to exiles – φυγάς – conducting the attacks and the final two cases are of Athens engaged in warfare against Sparta. These are different groups of people with different status. One group are ‘exiles’, ‘bandits’, ‘rebels’ or whatever similar term you might apply to describe them, whereas clearly the last two cases refer to a polis. In Xenophon’s work on cavalry he makes the point that a small force of cavalry was not good for engaging a hostile cavalry force, but that they were better used as a force for raiding – ὡς λησταῖς αὐτοῖς χρῆται (Xen. *Eq. mag.* 7.7). The differentiation is not in the language, but the status of the forces. In these examples, the

⁶⁷³ Thuc. 4.2.3, 4.45.2, 4.66.1, 4.76.5, 5.14.3, 7.18.3. The last reference concerns the Athenian raids from Pylos, which quite likely refers to raids launched from there by land and by sea.

⁶⁷⁴ And from Kythera in the first instance: Thuc. 5.14.3 and 7.18.3.

forces in question are conducting ‘raiding’ activities. The legitimacy or criminality stems not from the language used, but from the interpretation of the activity and how people defined the forces in question.

Aristophanes uses the word ληστής on only a few occasions, but the difference in usage is of interest. In *Acharnians*, the first mention comes as a message to the Athenian general Lamachos that the ‘Boiotian bandits/raiders’ (ληστὰς...Βοιωτίους) are going to take advantage of a festival to invade (1077). Soon after this, a third messenger reports that Lamachos was wounded but while this happened, he managed to drive away the ‘bandits’ with his spear – ληστὰς ἐλαύνων καὶ κατασπέρχων δορί (1188). The first use is rather ambiguous, perhaps referring to a force of Boiotians prepared to raid Attika in a military sense, or perhaps using *leistai* in a pejorative sense. This latter usage seems more likely when taken with the second occurrence, Lamachos comically routing the enemy, referred to only as *leistai*. In *Peace*, Trygaios and Hermes curse those that would hope for or engage in further warfare, and at one point Trygaios says of them, ‘let him be captured by *leistai* and eat only barley’ (ληφθείς ὑπὸ ληστῶν ἐσθίοι κριθᾶς μόνας: 449). This is a very general and quite a stock comic-type line: pairing the fate of capture by *leistai* with being forced to eat barley, a fate no doubt many in Athens suffered on a regular basis. Of note is the lack of specific context. It is not said whether or not this first fate should happen on land or sea, thus leaving it an open question as to whether this refers to ‘pirates’ or ‘bandits’. Finally, in *Birds* Peisetairos questions an informer about the need for his wings, and whether it helped him better deliver subpoenas to the islands (1424-1426). In response, the informer says that the wings are so that *leistai* do not bother him – μὰ Δί’, ἀλλ’ ἔν’ οἱ λησταί τε μὴ λυπῶσί με (1427). That the subpoenas are being delivered to the islands strongly suggests that the *leistai* he is seeking to avoid are seaborne and therefore ‘pirates’. In a general sense, *leistai* that appear in Aristophanes are all of a bad sort, in a stereotypical and comic way. Of note is the subtle but distinct difference in usage where *leistai* could refer to raiders: bandits on land or pirates at sea.

Another, later instance also illustrates the different ways in which the term was used. In Demosthenes’ *First Philippic* he outlines his strategy for combating Philip’s advances in the northern Aegean. One of his proposals regards a force of Athenian ships forward deployed

in northern waters and assigned the task of conducting harassing attacks on Philip's forces (Dem. 4.23).⁶⁷⁵ Importantly, Demosthenes uses the verb form, ληστεύειν, in his description of the force's activities. Clearly, he is not talking about piracy, for this force was to be partly comprised of and entirely led by Athenian citizens. What Demosthenes is describing is a particular *way* in which the Athenians would attack Philip: they would be *raiding* Philip. Context is key when examining these sorts of activities. Unhelpful is the language of some scholars who would translate this as 'piratical' rather than as raiding.⁶⁷⁶ Here an analogy with land warfare is illustrative. Armies often conduct raids against an enemy and an enemy's territory, including against economic rather than military targets, such as the regular Spartan invasions of Attika during the Peloponnesian War. This is not called or considered 'banditry', but simply raiding or plundering. The key feature is that it is an army or other such recognised armed force doing the raiding. So it is for maritime forces and navies, who might attack enemy territory and economic targets. This is not 'piratical', but one particular combat operation conducted from the sea, what might be termed an 'amphibious raid' or trade interdiction. Attacking and seizing enemy cargo vessels is not 'piratical' but a legitimate use of force against enemy shipping. To use the modern term 'piratical' is to confuse methods and tactics with the status of the forces in question.

Where context was unclear, ancient authors would use language to help differentiate and make clearer the character of the activity in question. Euripides in his Satyr play *Cyclops* has the eponymous character ask the chorus if pirates or thieves had come to his cave – λησταί τινες κατέσχον ἢ κλωπες χθόνα (223). In his *Cyropaedia*, Xenophon mentions that during the training of Persian youths, those that remained at home were employed for various duties, including hunting down criminals or bandits – κακούργους ἐρευνῆσαι ἢ ληστὰς ὑποδραμεῖν (Xen. *Cyr.* 1.2.12). Lysias uses exactly the same language in a speech, describing a place where criminals and pirates/bandits were executed – ληστήν ἢ κακούργον συλλάβοιεν (Lys. 13.78). In these cases, the *leistai* are being differentiated from 'criminals' (κάκουργος), implying more than just common criminality in the actions of the

⁶⁷⁵ Discussed in Chapter 7.

⁶⁷⁶ For example, de Souza refers to what Demosthenes is calling for in 4.23 as 'piratical methods'. Even worse is his reference to the Ionian revolt as illustrating the 'limitations of piracy as a means of waging warfare'. Piracy is not a method of waging war at sea, just as 'banditry' is not a method of waging war on land: they are both distinct phenomena in and of themselves. De Souza (1999): 36 and 25 respectively.

different groups. They are obviously grouped together in the same negative way, however, the fact that they are differentiated suggests that *leistai* operate on a more serious and perhaps in a more organised way.⁶⁷⁷ Later authors use language that helps us differentiate between pirates and bandits, introducing new vocabulary and a Greek word that, although rare, was used to specifically denote a pirate – καταποντιστής.⁶⁷⁸ Isokrates makes a differentiation between the two, in saying that no one would praise ‘pirates and bandits and others given to injustices’,⁶⁷⁹ and Demosthenes twice in the same speech mentions a place in the Chersonese swarming with ‘pirates and bandits’.⁶⁸⁰ There is a differentiation in these cases, as well as an undertone of disapproval with these activities, though the Lysias and Xenophon examples both still separate *leistai* from the common criminal.

The label of ‘pirate’ or ‘brigand/bandit’ seems to have also been used in a purely pejorative sense in the ancient world, as it has been used in later times. Demosthenes may have called Philip a ‘pirate’,⁶⁸¹ but this does not make it so, especially in the context of the speech, the *Fourth Philippic*. Often this language is used to de-legitimise the actions of an opponent – bandits, pirates, rebels, terrorists – these and other terms have been and still are used in this manner. Sophokles’ use of the word ληστής is also illustrative. Five of the six instances of its use come from *Oidipous the King*, one where Oidipous confronts Kreon as the ‘bandit/robber of my kingship’,⁶⁸² and the others all referring to the death of King Laios on the road at the hands of *leistai*.⁶⁸³ What is interesting and illuminating is the sixth use in his *Philoktetes*, where the eponymous character makes the statement that: ‘There is no such thing as an adverse wind for pirates, when they have a chance to rob and kidnap’.⁶⁸⁴ Aside

⁶⁷⁷ It is worth noting that de Souza fails to mention the Aristophanes, Euripides, Lysias or the Xenophon passages above, further limiting the completeness of his language survey. This is important because they are exactly the mediums – plays and public oratory – that many people would have been present for and thus this language is not restricted to the historians and philosophers.

⁶⁷⁸ Derived from the verb, καταποντίζειν, to throw or plunge into the sea. De Souza covers this, but essentially blames the awkwardness of the word for the dearth of its use (de Souza, 1999: 9). He seems to miss the obvious point, that Lysias and Xenophon are both working in the mid to late fourth century and thus it was probably a newer word.

⁶⁷⁹ ‘τούς καταποντιστάς καὶ ληστὰς καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀδικίας ὄντας’: Isok. *Panath.* 226.

⁶⁸⁰ ‘ληστῶν ... καταποντιστῶν’: Dem. 23.166; ‘λησταῖς καὶ καταποντισταῖς’: Dem. 23.167.

⁶⁸¹ Or a brigand; Demosthenes merely uses the word ληστικός which can be translated either way. Dem. 10.34. See below paragraph. De Souza just translates this passage directly as ‘pirate’ without due consideration of the alternative, and without reference to the context of the speech as one of the highly polemical *Philippics*. De Souza (1999): 36.

⁶⁸² ‘ληστής τ’ ἐναργῆς τῆς ἐμῆς τυραννίδος’: Soph. *OT*, 535.

⁶⁸³ Lines 122, 124, 716 and 842.

⁶⁸⁴ οὐκ ἔστι λησταῖς πνεῦμ’ ἐναντιούμενον,

from the obvious point that the same word is clearly used for bandits and pirates by the same author, the way in which it is used by Philoktetes implies more than simple immorality and criminality on behalf of pirates. There is a gnomic-like quality to the statement, where the pirates are bold and take action despite circumstances. In the context of the play, Philoktetes is ready to make his escape with Neoptolemos, and there is something perhaps archaic yet slightly romantic (in a Homeric sense) in the choice of metaphor used. Though they might rob and kidnap, Sophokles implies the *leistai* are more than just robbers and kidnappers, just as we saw with Euripides, Xenophon and Lysias all making a point of separating *leistai* from other criminals. It is wrong to see the use of *leistai* and its cognates as universally implying disapproval or moral objection to that activity, nor should it be seen as synonymous with mere 'armed robbery'.⁶⁸⁵ The language surrounding piracy is complicated and messy, and word usage certainly changes over time so that the appearance of the language in question require reference to the context rather than an automatic labelling as 'piracy' or 'banditry'.

Piracy

A key differentiating factor of what is termed 'piracy' in this thesis will be the statelessness or otherwise of the forces in question. Forces operating without a polis, or without the support of a polis, are the key defining attribute. This is not a perfect definition, but it is one of the strongest indicators of whether or not certain maritime activities should be considered piracy. Operating in the maritime domain is obviously an important defining feature. In this sense, it need not be that piracy only involved attacks on shipping, but also raids launched against coastal targets as well, something which Thucydides discusses in his history of early Greece (Thuc. 1.5 – see below). They need not have become 'bandits' once they touched land, but pirates who attacked land-based targets as well as shipping.

ὅταν παρῆ κλέψαι τε χάρπάσαι βίᾳ. Soph. *Phil*, 643-4. de Souza fails to mention the Sophokles passages.

⁶⁸⁵ One cannot believe he would say that the Athenians attacking Sparta from Pylos, or the Spartans raiding Attika were engaged in 'armed robbery'. There may be 'inherent ambiguity' in the specific words used for piracy and banditry in Greek, but de Souza appears not to realise that this ambiguity can be mostly resolved by context. (de Souza 1999: 11). There is a difference between military operations that involve raiding or plundering by land and by sea and the very different phenomenon of banditry and piracy. The distinction may have been blurred in the Archaic period and earlier, but by the Classical period the differentiation between warfare and piracy/banditry was far more distinct.

Herodotus only explicitly mentions *leisteia* once.⁶⁸⁶ It is a relatively minor affair, yet quite illustrative of the phenomenon of piracy in the Greek world. A certain Dionysios of Phokaia, upon determining that the Ionian revolt was doomed, decided not to return to his homeland. Instead, he seized three enemy ships and sailed to Phoenicia, where he sank some merchant vessels and collected a large sum of money. From there he sailed to Sicily and set himself up as a ληστής, though he made a point of never attacking Greeks, only Carthaginians and 'Tyrrhenians' (Hdt. 6.17). Herodotus assigns no motive to the selection of targets and the exemption of Greeks, perhaps out of morality not to harm fellow Greeks, or perhaps it was done so as not to invite attack by the Sicilian and other Greeks. The episode shows what might drive someone to piracy a loss of a homeland and exile. It highlights the enablers of piracy, namely, nautical skills and money. It is also worth noting that he had a force of three ships in order to conduct his activity, implying organisation and at least a moderate if not an advanced degree of command and control. Finally, it shows the opportunism of the venture, targeting both Carthaginians and Italians, a general predation with the aforementioned exception of Greek targets.

Another incident related by Herodotus helps demonstrate the difficulty in defining piracy in the period. In approximately 494 the recently exiled tyrant of Miletos, Histiaios, manned eight warships and sailed to Byzantium where he seized ships sailing out of the Pontos, excepting those that were willing to follow him (Hdt. 6.5.3). Herodotus does not use the verb ληστεύειν, but rather than commonly used λαμβάνειν. Yet this seems to be a fairly straightforward case of piracy. Histiaios is no longer the ruler of Miletos or any other city, seemingly 'stateless'. He was given support by Mytilene in the form of ships, yet these ships were not used by him to fight Miletos, but in the service of seizing ships from the Pontos. He did manage to draw quite a bit of support from Lesbos and did gather a formidable force, yet was still forced by food shortage to land at Atarneos on the mainland and attempt to harvest grain (Hdt. 6.28.2).⁶⁸⁷ This seems to indicate that whatever support he was getting from Lesbos, it was not so great that he did not have to worry about basic logistics, a problem he solved by further raiding. In this sense, he is not acting much like an exile or a 'rebel', but opportunistically attacking shipping and raiding coastal

⁶⁸⁶ de Souza fails to mention this passage and this incident.

⁶⁸⁷ For the full story of his activities, see: Hdt. 6.25-30.

settlements. Lionel Scott in his commentary on Herodotus Book 6 suggests that, though Histiaios was effectively acting as a *leistes*, perhaps he was not labelled as such because of his high status.⁶⁸⁸ This is a possibility, but it is hard to evaluate this suggestion. A comparison with Dionysios (above) does not indicate any stark difference, other than Histiaios arguably being of higher status. Perhaps raiding was a means to an end for Histiaios on the road back to power, whereas Dionysios made raiding his living: a difference in raiding as a means and as an end in itself. The case of Histiaios is arguably one demonstrative of piracy, though there is enough ambiguity to argue that his activities may not have been viewed as such by all his fellow Greeks, including the historian Herodotus.

Thucydides has a small but very important section on piracy in the Greek world, forming a key part of his *archaeology* and of central importance to his view of Greek history to his time. Having previously discussed the centrality of maritime affairs in his work, especially at the beginning, piracy is one of the core themes that arises from this examination. Minos is the first to establish a navy, which was used for the two critical roles of enabling colonisation and rule over the Cyclades and the suppression of piracy. This second role was a necessary step in securing revenue for his use, presumably derived from securing maritime trade (Thuc. 1.4). Thucydides then explains this 'piracy', which has two very important implications. The first is related but tangential to piracy, in that he says it was the increase in communication by sea that caused and allowed people to turn to raiding (Thuc. 1.5.1). In Thucydides' world, the opening of maritime communications allowed for the very development of the Greek world, both in terms of increased trade as well as hegemonic ambitions, Minos as a case in point. The second implication is that the 'piracy' Thucydides describes is not really piracy in the strict definition of the term. Thucydides describes these raiders as making the practice their main source of livelihood, but most importantly he says that at the time there was nothing inherently bad about what they were doing, and even something a bit glorious in the eyes of the old poets (Thuc. 1.5.1-2). This raiding was so prevalent that apparently many cities were built away from the sea, regardless of whether they were situated on an island or the mainland, and all coastal

⁶⁸⁸ Scott (2005): 87. See also pp. 71-72.

populations seafaring or not, and even other raiders, were potential targets (Thuc. 1.7). However, Thucydides does say that the raiding was organised by the most powerful men in order to serve their own greed, but also to help the needy (Thuc. 1.5.1). This complicates matters, for it makes this raiding seem like it was organised by individuals and small groups, rather than higher authorities (government or organised rule) and that personal gain was the prime motivation. This seems a lot like piracy as we might define it. The scale of activities and how widespread it was are counter arguments to this view of it as some form of 'institutional piracy'. It seems more like a legitimate way of making a living than an aberration, at least in that time. This takes the topic into debates around political organisation and economy for a period of time where such topics are extremely difficult to be sure about. The important point is that Thucydides says it was the organisation of proper navies and the institution of maritime hegemony, by Minos (1.4) and then Korinth (1.13.5), which made the seas more stable; what is termed 'good order at sea' in modern parlance.⁶⁸⁹ What this shows is that people in Thucydides' time saw the distant past as having been more dangerous, especially on the seas, and that maritime security faced numerous threats from 'raiders', be they pirates or more organised cities engaged in a deliberate campaign of maritime raiding. The implication then is that Thucydides considered sea powers as stabilising forces, able to gain and maintain good order at sea in suppressing maritime crime and piracy.

Piracy in the rest of Thucydides' narrative is very scanty, almost non-existent. Partly this may be due to his focus on the Peloponnesian War. It may also include the fact that the *archaeology* section has set up an obvious theme: powerful poleis with navies such as Minos and Korinth are able to suppress piracy, and Athens is the current example of this phenomenon of 'good order at sea'. Thus, there is not that much piracy in the Greek world at that time for Thucydides to be bothered about. Many of the *leistai* which appear in his history are what might be tentatively termed as 'privateers' (see below). There are hints that piracy was an issue, if only a minor one. For instance, the fact that the Peloponnesians can hire privateers indicates that there are such forces around to be employed. During the Pylos campaign in 425, Demosthenes and the Athenians fortify their position with the aid

⁶⁸⁹ This concept will be explored in more detail below when discussing constabulary operations below.

of a thirty-oared Messenian *leistēs* that happened to be there (Thuc. 4.9.1). A thirty oared vessel is large enough to be considered fit for purpose as a warship and can be considered more useful in combat roles other than just casual raiding. Being Messenian, it probably would not have been a target for the Athenians during counter-piracy patrols, most likely engaged in raiding the Peloponnesos rather than targeting Athenian interests. This is not to say that piracy was not practiced in the fifth century, for it almost certainly was. What it seems to indicate is that it was not a major issue for many of the Greeks, and especially not for Athens. Considering how much of the Aegean and Greece was within the sphere of interest for Athens, this would indicate that piracy was practiced at the margins. The fact of its apparent resurgence during fourth century shows that pirates were active on the margins and awaiting greater opportunities further afield.

Piracy in the fourth century is evident, especially with the breakdown of Athenian sea power. Isokrates in his *Panegyrikos*, published in 380, bemoans the state of Greece and the discord that was rife throughout the Aegean. As part of this, he laments that fact that pirates occupied the seas, using the strong and unusual word *καταποντιστής*.⁶⁹⁰ This is a polemical work and thus quite probably exaggerated in parts to make its point, but we might presume that piracy was enough of a problem in the 380s to make serious comment on it. Some years after this a certain Lykon from Herakleia in the Black Sea sailed from Athens and was captured and killed by pirates in the Argolic gulf – a location not far at all from Athens.⁶⁹¹ Of note is that the speaker refers to multiple ships, not just one. The fact that the attack occurred a mere 60 nm or so from Athens and was conducted by more than one ship indicates that piracy in the region was at a level not seen during the height of Athenian sea power. The Halonnesos affair, discussed below, showed piracy to be an issue of concern in the middle of the century and one that affected not just Athens, but Makedonia as well. As mentioned in Chapter Four, the character of the ‘coward’ in Theophrastos’ work sees every cliff as a potential pirate ship. This must take into account comic exaggeration, but we should still accept that it had to have been based in some reality: the fear of piracy had not become unwarranted, only the chances of being attacked.

⁶⁹⁰ καταποντισταὶ μὲν τὴν θάλατταν κατέχουσι. Isok. *Pan.* 115.

⁶⁹¹ [Dem] 52.5. This speech, traditionally ascribed to Demosthenes, is now thought to have been written by Apollodoros sometime around 369/8 – Lykon’s death being some years before this date. See: Bers (2003): 46-47.

In this sense, the issue of piracy towards the end of the fourth century appears to have been of legitimate concern, but not so much so that it was an ever-present danger to maritime traffic. Another matter of note is the language used. Theophrastos does not use any of the usual words for pirate, but actually uses ἡμιόλιος, a particular type of ship that was frequently, though not exclusively, used by pirates. This in itself is a subtle yet powerful point to make. The reader/listener of this work was obviously expected to know that such a type of vessel was synonymous with pirates and thus helps demonstrate a complex and nuanced understanding of general maritime affairs. This very brief survey of fourth century sources indicates that piracy was of varying concern. The breakdown of Athenian sea power allowed piracy to increase in the absence of the stabilising force and 'good order at sea' provided for by the Athenian navy. At the end of the century, Athens continued active steps to combat piracy in localised areas, and it seems evident from sources such as Theophrastos that piracy was a legitimate concern, but a manageable one.

'Privateering'

Just as piracy is a tricky concept to define in the ancient world, so is that of 'privateering', a concept that has always had a somewhat tenuous nature. In the age of sail, private citizens could be issued with Letters of Marque, papers that employed them by their state to attack the shipping of that state's enemies.⁶⁹² It was often used in cases where naval resources were stretched thin, such as the United States during the War of Independence ,who often turned to privateers since they had only a tiny navy to call upon. Many of those employed as privateers might be of dubious character and loyalty and were often considered pirates by those they attacked and were not always protected by their Letter of Marque. So far as is known, there was no ancient equivalent to a Letter of Marque and independent maritime forces, who otherwise might normally engage in actual piracy, were employed by states in much the same way as mercenaries on land. Additionally, there did exist the concept of reprisals, and private maritime forces could be used to lawfully seize property and/or persons.

In the first year of the Peloponnesian War, Athens fortified the island of Atalante off the Opountian coast to prevent *leistai* from sailing out of Opous and the rest of eastern Lokris

⁶⁹² On privateering and commerce raiding, see: Elleman and Paine (eds.) (2013), esp. pp.1-8.

and attacking Euboia (Thuc. 2.32). It was only with the outbreak of war that Athens suddenly found the need to fortify this particular position, suggesting that piracy was not an enduring regional issue of concern to Athens before this point. In this case, it appears that Sparta may have engaged locals for privateering against the Athenians. The position of Lokris near Euboia, an important island for Athenian support, made it a good base of operations, and the fact that the Spartan navy was weak meant that the Spartans were unlikely to be able to establish their own base there: hence the need to gain the support of *leistai*. In the second year of the Peloponnesian War, when the Athenians sent ships to Naupaktos under Phormion and six ships under Melesandros to Karia and Lykia,⁶⁹³ Melesandros' task was twofold, to collect tribute and to prevent 'the Peloponnesian privateers' from attacking merchantmen.⁶⁹⁴ Both Richard Crawley and Rex Warner translate ληστικὸς in the above passage as 'privateer'.⁶⁹⁵ Labelling them as privateers implies that they were employed by the Spartans to attack only the shipping of Athens and Athenian allies. As Hornblower points out, the options open to Sparta for attacking Athenian shipping were limited, and thus the employment of *leistai* was a useful option.⁶⁹⁶ Other passages indicate that the Spartans were indeed working closely with *leistai* during the war. In 427 Nikias made an attack against the island of Minoa off the coast of Megara, to enable a closer blockade and to prevent both Peloponnesian triremes and *leistai* from sailing out from the island (Thuc. 3.51.2). At the end of the war after the Spartan victory at Aigospotamoi, Lysandros appears to have had *leistai* in his employ, dispatching the Milesian *leistes* Theopompos back to Sparta to announce the news of Sparta's victory (Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.30). These examples indicate that the Spartans employed *leistai* throughout the Peloponnesian War as privateers to attack Athenian shipping.

The fourth century saw Athenian naval forces used in similar ways to privateers, with trierarchs hiring themselves out for work raiding and conducting reprisals. In one speech of Demosthenes, the practice was said to be so widespread and so damaging to Athens' reputation that no Athenians could travel without fear of reprisal for what these rogue

⁶⁹³ Thuc. 2.69.1. See discussion in Chapter Six.

⁶⁹⁴ τὸ ληστικὸν τῶν Πελοποννησίων. Thuc. 2.69.1.

⁶⁹⁵ Crawley (1874) and Warner (1954).

⁶⁹⁶ Hornblower (1991): 355. Antony Keen concurs with this assessment but does not believe that this was the primary mission of Melesandros. Keen (1993): 153-7.

trierarchs for hire had done (Dem. 51.7-9, 13-14). Clearly this is not a straight forward case of privateering, for the commanders in question were state-appointed officials using state-owned assets. The backlash against the Athenians demonstrates that these actions were not seen as those of rogue individuals, but of the Athenian state. It also shows that there was a market for hiring out warships, and great profit to be made by all those involved. However there seem to have been other cases which should be seen as akin to privateering, where individuals hired out ships privately, in ways seemingly no different from mercenaries. In Isaios' speech *On the Estate of Hagnias*, the speaker makes mention of his brother-in-law Makartatos, who had left nothing at all in his estate. This was because Makartatos had sold everything, bought and crewed a trireme and sailed to Kreta where he lost his ship and died (Is. 11.48-49). While some commentators think the purpose of the journey was to raid and act as some sort of 'freebooter', it seems far more likely that he went there in an independent military capacity.⁶⁹⁷ Though it is true that the speaker mentions how the Athenian people knew of Makartatos' departure and feared it would bring Athens into conflict with Sparta, this does not mean Makartatos was acting on behalf of Athens. This seems more a reflection of the poor Athenian practice of the past – trierarchs for hire – and the general suspicion that surrounded private naval forces. It is more likely that Makartatos had hired himself out, or hoped to do so, as a 'privateer' rather than acting for himself as a pirate.

Finally, there is the matter of reprisals. Various sources indicate that there was a fairly standard and accepted regime of right to reprisal in the Classical Greek world, which extended to reprisals at sea. Early evidence comes from an inscription at Oiantheia that deals with an arrangement between this town and the town of Chaleion, dated to approximately 450. In this case, the regulation is very specific about regulating seizure at sea, and not in the harbour of the respective cities.⁶⁹⁸ Reprisals are mentioned by Demosthenes, who gives the sense that it was a common and just custom (23.83-84). This issue is framed as a private one, though regulated by the state as seen in the first case. It seems the concern of private citizens, though it is easy to see how the seizure of property

⁶⁹⁷ Lionel Casson examines this incident and makes several good points against the view of this being mere piracy. Casson (1995): 241-245.

⁶⁹⁸ See: Tod (1946): 34 (pp.63-66).

and/or people, lawful or not, could cause concern and attract cries of piracy. Again, this is an issue which goes some way to illustrating the blurred boundaries which existed between what was considered legal or customary and what might be considered, rightly or not, as piracy.

Constabulary operations – Counter-Piracy

One of the core constabulary roles of navies is in countering piracy, an activity which sits very near to combat operations at sea on the maritime operations spectrum. This can involve both active and passive measures for countering or suppressing piracy. From a source perspective, many instances of piracy related in the ancient sources are mentioned in context of piracy suppression. Supposedly in the time of Peisistratos the Athenians conducted regular or semi-regular sweeps for pirates in the Saronic Gulf.⁶⁹⁹ During the Peloponnesian War the Athenians seemed concerned mostly with *leistai* employed by their enemies, privateers as discussed above. However, throughout the fourth century the issue of piracy would become a matter of concern, to Athens, Syrakousai, Philip and others. Few *poleis* benefitted by piracy and the disruption of trade and fishing.

One of the most debated topics related to counter-piracy operations relates to what in the modern world is termed ‘good order at sea’. In the modern sense, this covers the full spectrum of maritime security threats: illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, people smuggling, arms and drug trade and terrorist activities, to name a few.⁷⁰⁰ In the context of the ancient Greek world, outside of warfare it was piracy that seems to have posed the biggest transnational and regional threat to trade and security. This is the main thrust of Thucydides’ *archaeology*, where it is the stability provided by navies that suppresses piracy and creates stability. This stability enhances trade and allows for powerful *poleis* to become even more powerful. As Bresson rightly points out, the suppression of piracy and guarantee of secure sea travel were preconditions for regular commercial trade.⁷⁰¹

⁶⁹⁹ Polyainos 5.14. If, as Ormerod points out, the story is believable. Ormerod (1924): 96. The mention of counter-piracy is tangential to the story being told and so might be credible.

⁷⁰⁰ For more on this topic, see: Till (2013): 282-317.

⁷⁰¹ Bresson (2016): 303. It should be pointed out that these are preconditions for regular trade in any era. One only has to look at modern counter-piracy operations to see that the protection of trade is of international significance. This is why the US, EU, NATO and other countries such as Australia and China contribute forces for counter-piracy patrols in piracy hotspots, most notably the Horn of Africa.

Regardless of whether or not the pirates of Thucydides' distant past were pirates in the conventional sense, it is clear that the ability to trade widely and in safety was a key enabler of the growth of Greek trade and society. Navies provided stability, allowing the use of the sea as a resource (fishing) and as a medium for both trade and information dissemination, three of the core attributes of the sea.⁷⁰² Certainly tribute paying cities of the Delian League would have expected that the Athenian navy that they funded would protect them not only from hostile powers, but pirates as well. The annual cruise by Athenian ships (as discussed in Chapter Eight) makes it clear that the Athenians regularly had warships out in the Aegean, and although this seems to have been primarily a diplomatic operation, it is hard to see how it could not have dissuaded pirates from operating against Athenian interests.⁷⁰³ Isokrates' lament in his *Panegyrikos* about the pirates infesting the seas (see above) indicates that good order at sea had broken down in the period of the 380s when Athens had yet to regain its sea power and Sparta was unwilling or unable to police the seas. The pessimistic view, that Athenian maritime hegemony did little to help suppress piracy,⁷⁰⁴ is an unsustainable prospect and assumes that the overwhelming might of Athenian sea power was unable to deal with pirates, whose operations would have imperilled the international trade which Athens was heavily dependent on for its prosperity, and in the case of grain, its very survival. The suppression of piracy does not need to mean that piracy was entirely eradicated, but that it was greatly diminished as a threat and pushed to the periphery.

An example which simultaneously illustrates the ambiguity of both the concept of piracy and the idea of providing good order at sea is seen in the Athenian capture of the island of Skyros in approximately 470. The most detailed account is found in Plutarch's *Life of Kimon*, where Plutarch says that the island had become inhabited by Dolopians, who were poor

⁷⁰² Till (2013): 5-23; and as discussed in the Introduction and Chapter 1.

⁷⁰³ The contention by de Souza (1999: 30) that this cruise does not mention piracy and thus was not concerned with piracy does not hold much water. The Athenians need not have been actively fighting pirates to effectively counter them. The regular exercise and demonstration of Athenian sea power acted as a deterrent, a passive measure of counter-piracy.

⁷⁰⁴ As espoused by de Souza (1999): 26-30. Bresson is rightly critical of this position and adopts the view that Athens was the guardian of maritime security. Bresson (2016): 303, 504 n.79. Certainly, de Souza misses the point that whether or not it was Athenian 'policy' to engage in counter-piracy, as if we should expect to find a policy document outlining such a thing, Athenian sea power and strategy allowed them to assert dominance at sea. It stretches belief to think that the greatest sea power of the time, reliant on maritime trade and an entire empire based across the seas, would not actively address the issue of piracy.

farmers and so became pirates – ληϊζόμενοι δὲ τὴν θάλασσαν ἐκ παλαιοῦ (Plut. *Kim.* 8.3). Eventually they became such a threat that some Thessalians won a suit with the Amphictyonic assembly. The people of Skyros were not willing to pay compensation but said that the pirates themselves should do so. Finally, Kimon was called in and he seized the city (Plut. *Kim.* 8.3-5). On the one hand, there is a distinction made between the people of Skyros and those there who were pirates and those who were not. In this sense, it appears that the entire island was not involved in piracy, but only one group. Had it been the entire island involved it would be difficult to view this as piracy, being closer to an entire polis engaged in economic raiding. Plutarch makes it sound as if the other people of Skyros were merely complicit in supporting, or in the very least turning a blind-eye towards the pirates' activities. So, although they might not have been engaged in piracy themselves, their support of the pirates seems to have provided all the justification needed for Athens to seize the island and settle it with a cleruchy.⁷⁰⁵ Plutarch says that Athenian control of the island 'set free the Aegean' – τὸν Αἰγαῖον ἠλευθέρωσε (*Kim.* 8.5). Positioned in the centre of the Aegean, Skyros was certainly in a valuable strategic position. It could provide a base for the monitoring and control of both north-south and east-west trade. The same reason that it made a good pirate base is what made it an excellent base for counter-piracy. Although Thucydides does not mention piracy in relation to the Athenian seizure of Skyros, it is one of the first acts he describes in the ascendancy of the Athenian empire.⁷⁰⁶ Thus, from context we can see how important the island was to Athenian efforts for control over the Aegean and we can conclude that this enables the establishment of good order at sea throughout the region.

Plutarch tells a story in which Perikles tried to convene a council of Greeks to discuss panhellenic matters, one of which was ensuring the safety of the seas: τῆς θαλάττης, ὅπως πλέωσι πάντες ἀδεῶς καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην ἄγωσιν.⁷⁰⁷ In their respective works, Ormerod accepts and de Souza rejects this story.⁷⁰⁸ De Souza bases his scepticism on two articles in

⁷⁰⁵ Diod. 11.60.2-3; Thuc. 1.98.2. These two sources both mention the seizure of the island by Kimon and colonisation by the Athenians but make no mention of piracy.

⁷⁰⁶ There is the distinct possibility that Plutarch is being influenced by efforts to combat piracy in later history, especially Hellenistic Rhodes and Rome. He may be amplifying the issue in a way similar to his own conception of piracy in (relatively) recent history.

⁷⁰⁷ Plut. *Per.* 17.1.

⁷⁰⁸ Ormerod (1924): 109; de Souza (1999): 30.

particular which dismiss the existence of this so called 'Congress Decree'. In the first, Robin Seager highlights the incongruity of this section by pointing out that many of the attendees were 'landsmen' with no interest in maritime affairs.⁷⁰⁹ Firstly, this ignores the fact that maritime matters were only one of three topics up for debate. Secondly, this statement makes no mention of who these supposed 'landsmen' were and makes no consideration of the fact that all Greek poleis might have some interest in maritime affairs. Further, he says: 'But of the freedom of the seas as a theme for diplomatic discussion there is no trace until the fourth century. Indeed, it is hard to see how the subject could have arisen before the development of the notion, if not the name, of the Common Peace.'⁷¹⁰ Now he has conflated two entirely separate and distinct matters: piracy and the concept of a 'free sea'.⁷¹¹ Plutarch only says that the sea should be sailed fearlessly and in peace, not freely. There is no reason to start discussing issues of 'Common Peace' and other such grand diplomatic institutions when it seems clear that Perikles is discussing the safety of shipping. The second article de Souza uses is not so much sceptical of the decree as a valid and historical document, but that it has anything to do with piracy.⁷¹² Brain MacDonald argues that this decree is concerned with the notion of a 'free sea'. MacDonald does make the valid point that a fleet would have been useful in deterring the Persian threat, but then he makes the unreasonable leap that the fleet could *only* be used for such a purpose.⁷¹³ This is based solely of the fact that Plutarch's brief passage does not actually mention piracy, though MacDonald then misses the obvious point that it does not mention Persia either. Both of these scholars go to great lengths to either dismiss the decree as unhistorical or prove that it had nothing to do with piracy. In both cases, they seek to overcomplicate matters and refuse to accept the simplest explanation, that Perikles is almost certainly discussing means by which to

⁷⁰⁹ Seager (1969): 132.

⁷¹⁰ Seager (1969): 132.

⁷¹¹ The concept of a free sea is first espoused by Hugo Grotius in his seminal work, *Mare Liberum: The Freedom of the Seas, or the Right Which Belongs to the Dutch to Take Part in the East Indian Trade*, originally published in 1608. The subtitle is illustrative enough: Grotius is writing at a time when some powers, particularly Portugal and Spain, actively excluded other nations from using the sea even for the purposes of trade. Even at its height there is no indication that Athens as the premier sea power took steps to deny the sea to other cities. Though they did have strategically located customs houses, the one located at the Bosphoros the most notable one; this did not deny the sea to anyone, and certainly not in the ways in which Portugal and Spain did in later centuries. The idea of owning the sea does not appear to have been an idea prevalent in Classical Greek times.

⁷¹² MacDonald (1982): 120-123.

⁷¹³ MacDonald (1982): 121.

preserve good order at sea, including but not limited to the suppression of piracy. It is possible that the decree is not historical, but this is not a universally accepted view and Russell Meiggs makes a reasonable argument for the decree as authentic, as does Philip Stadter in his commentary on *Perikles*.⁷¹⁴ The most reasonable explanation for this decree is Athens seeking leadership on a panhellenic scale, part of which was the desire to help suppress piracy and make the seas safe for themselves and for other Greeks. It certainly could be seen as a move by Athens to strengthen its sea power through the less muscular move of suppressing piracy. Perhaps the failure of the congress illustrates that the other Greeks did see this as a move by Athens to increase its power and hegemony through what was partly an altruistic motive.

Piracy was a flashpoint between Athens and Philip in the 340s. The pirate Sostratos had been using the island of Halonnesos as a base to launch pirate attacks into the Aegean. Little is known about the small island in this period, and it is not thought to have had a city during this time.⁷¹⁵ The island had apparently become a haven for pirates, who were expelled sometime in the mid-340s by Philip.⁷¹⁶ According to the speaker, Philip had considered it a joint burden of Athens and Makedonia to help guard the sea from pirates (Dem. 7.14). The danger in this, as the speaker then says, is that it would be a gateway for Philip's burgeoning sea power ambitions and a direct threat to Athenian sea power (Dem 7.15-16). The speech is of course an anti-Philip polemic, and this should not detract from the core theme of piracy. While it is true as de Souza points out that the speech demonstrates the weakening of Athenian sea power compared with other peer-competitors such as Makedonia,⁷¹⁷ he misses the obvious point that piracy was clearly a threat and one which Athens was less able to deal with. Having disregarded the possibility that Athenian hegemony at sea was a stabilising factor providing good order at sea,⁷¹⁸ he ignores the breakdown in this order that appears to have formed with the weakening of

⁷¹⁴ Meiggs (1972): 512-515; Stadter (1989): 201-206. Stadter also does not go too far in his assessment of the maritime aspect, seeing it as aimed at protecting maritime trade and communications from piracy.

⁷¹⁵ Evidence is slim, and the *Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis* cannot pin it down as having possessed an actual *polis*, though it may have. See: Hansen and Nielsen (2004): 733.

⁷¹⁶ [Dem]. 7.2. The speech *On Halonessos* has been ascribed to Demosthenes, however it appears certain that it was not written or delivered by him, but by another anti-Makedonian politician, Hegesippos. Trevett (2011): 113.

⁷¹⁷ De Souza (1999): 38.

⁷¹⁸ As discussed above.

Athenian sea power and the apparent opportunities presented to pirates. That it was Philip who dealt with the pirate base on Halonnessos and not Athens should indicate how stretched Athens was at sea. Similarly, reference to a decree of Moirokles and a case where the Melians were fined ten talents for harbouring pirates around the same time demonstrates a continuing interest by Athens in doing all it could to suppress piracy.⁷¹⁹ Though it is possible to see this as Athens flexing its political might against a weaker power, this need not be the prime motivation and there is no reason to assume, as de Souza does,⁷²⁰ that this was not primarily about piracy. Maritime trade and the protection of it was of central importance to the Athenians, and it does seem as if the erosion of their sea power and the failure of any other state to take up the position of dominant sea power did allow for piracy to become more of a problem in the mid- and late fourth century. The increasing instability evident in the Aegean during this period surely contributed to the increased threat posed by piracy.

Syrakousai seems to have had regular issues with pirates and on several occasions took steps to combat them. In approximately 453 the issue came to a head, with the Tyrrhenians supposedly practicing piracy at a threatening enough level to force Syrakousai into choosing a certain Phayllos as admiral and sending him to suppress these pirates.⁷²¹ Apparently, he accepted a bribe from the Tyrrhenians and accomplished very little and was exiled upon his return. Apelles was put in command after him and dispatched with 60 triremes resulting in the successful suppression of the pirates (Diod. 11.88.4-5). That he was sent with 60 triremes indicates an active and aggressive strategy of destroying the bases of support for the pirates rather than any passive patrolling. A plundering expedition launched by Dionysios in 383 against Pyrgoi in Tyrrhenia was made under the pretext of suppressing piracy (Diod. 15.14.3). By the mid-fourth century, piracy in the Adriatic seems to have become an issue and provoked a response by Syrakousai. In 359/8 Dionysios the Younger established two cities in Apulia in order to make safe the Adriatic from pirates

⁷¹⁹ The decree is mentioned in another speech of Demosthenes, 58 *Against Theokrines*, 56.

⁷²⁰ De Souza (1999): 39. He goes to great lengths to say that the two examples here were really about rivalry with Makedonia, and that piracy was only a pretext, despite saying that maritime commerce and trade was important to Athens. He even uses these incidents to conjecture how the right atmosphere was formed for the forgery of the Congress Decree, a rather circular way of arguing. He cannot seem to accept that piracy might have been a legitimate security concern, or that Athens could and did take steps to counter piracy.

⁷²¹ Diodoros specifically says they were practicing piracy – ‘ληζομένων τὴν θάλατταν’. Diod. 11.88.4.

who had been attacking merchant vessels (Diod. 16.5.3). Diodoros mentions only that they are 'barbarians', indicating that it was no particular region or city state, but pirates who preyed on merchant vessels in the conventional sense. By establishing two cities, Syrakousai was ensuring a permanent presence in the area and thus conducting permanent counter-piracy activities. A few years later, Dionysios recalled Philistos and his fleet, who at the time were sailing around the Adriatic (Diod. 16.11.3). Diodoros does not say what they were doing, but it seems highly likely that he was conducting a counter-piracy patrol. Certainly, there is no mention of a conventional military operation, and taken with the recent establishment of two cities to guard against piracy there is a good chance that the ships were out patrolling against pirates.

Just as with Syrakousai, the Athenians in 325/4 set up a colony in the Adriatic to protect trade from 'Etruscans'.⁷²² That the Athenians felt the need to set up an outpost for protecting trade against pirates in the Adriatic indicates that it was an issue that affected not just Syrakousai, but other cities with trade interests in the region. Indeed, the inscription indicates that the naval station would protect the trade of other Greeks and even 'barbarians' trading with Athens.⁷²³ The Athenians are not only protecting Athenian assets or land, but international trade. Of note is the timing of the venture, establishing the station at a time when Athenian sea power was stretched quite significantly in the lead up to their losses in the Lamian War. This helps demonstrate that despite the ebb and flow of its sea power, maintaining stable and secure maritime connections was always a priority for Athens. These counter-piracy operations would have provided a stabilising effect in the region, to the benefit of all merchants. This last example helps demonstrate one of the ways in which piracy might have been suppressed by Athens and other sea powers, both on a local or on a wider geographic scale.

There are three main ways in which Athens, and other navies, could have engaged in counter-piracy operations. The first and most obvious way is engaging pirates at sea, either caught in the act or under suspicion of being pirates. This would rely on naval units being

⁷²² The implication being that like all Etruscans in the eyes of the Greeks, they were pirates. IG II² 1629, 48-63.

⁷²³ The exact location of the colony remains unknown. For a brief discussion, see: Hanson and Nielsen (2004): 326.

at sea and happening across pirate activity, most likely in high-traffic areas. The second way is closely related to this: presence. The presence of naval units either at sea or in port nearby could be enough to deter pirates. This presence would significantly increase the risk for would-be pirates. It would drive them to either riskier attacks or drive them to less-risky but less worthwhile targets, or not to attack at all. It would certainly lessen the risk of opportunistic piracy, as a naval presence would require attackers to carefully monitor the situation so that they would not be caught out by a patrolling force. A decree issued by Lykourgos in Athens around 334/3 honoured the *strategos* Diotimos for his efforts in combating piracy.⁷²⁴ Rhodes in the late fourth and throughout much of the third century actively patrolled to suppress piracy, so much so that they had a specialist ships for doing so, a 'guard ship' (φυλακίς ναῦς).⁷²⁵ Finally, there is an offensive approach whereby naval and military units might hunt down pirate strongholds or places sympathetic to or harbouring pirates. The most famous example of this in antiquity comes from Rome and Pompey's command against the pirates, the *lex Gabinia*. What is important to note is that Pompey's authority extended from the sea to 400 stadia ashore.⁷²⁶ This enabled him to go after pirate bases and their support infrastructure. It was recognition of a fact unchanged to the modern day: piracy's root causes arise on land. People are driven to go to sea as pirates because of their situation on land, be it poverty, lack of opportunity, or other such reasons.⁷²⁷ Suppressing pirates at sea is therefore only ever addressing the symptoms and is not itself a cure. This is a key point in the argument that stability led to less piracy. Not only was a hegemonic sea power like Athens able to police the seas regularly, but there were also other economic opportunities at hand. Less conflict allowed for fishing and trade to flourish more openly under the watchful eye of a dominant sea power. This good order

⁷²⁴ τριήρεις αἶδε ἐξέπλευσαν μετὰ στρατηγῷ Διοτίμου ἐπὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τῶν λεισ τῶν. IG II² 1623.276-280. The fact of a decree honouring Diotimos, though not the action it honoured, is mentioned in Plutarch. *Plut. Mor.* 844 A.

⁷²⁵ 'Guard ship': Diod. 20.93.5. On Rhodes clearing the sea of pirates: Strabo 14.2.5. Interestingly, Strabo praises the 'good order' (εὐνομία) of the city and in particular its naval forces that help suppress piracy. Though discussing the city and its navy, it is worth noting that he is using the term *eunomia* in a context very close to how modern theorists describe, as I have, the maintenance of 'good order at sea'. For more discussion of Rhodian piracy suppression, see: Gabrielsen (2013): 73-76.

⁷²⁶ Plutarch uses very strong language in describing the power of Pompey's command, even using the word μοναρχία. *Plut. Pomp.* 25.1-2.

⁷²⁷ To use a well-worn example, the increase in piracy off the coast of Somalia can be traced back to a lack of central government unable to police its waters against foreign illegal fishing. The local fishermen were driven out by the larger fishing vessels and so turned to piracy in order to make a living.

at sea provided stability to flourish as well as less opportunity and more risk for those contemplating piracy.

The difficulty is in the scarce evidence of the ancient sources. As argued above, Thucydides is intent on pointing out the prevalence of piracy in the 'bad old days' while singularly failing to mention the widespread practice, or not, of piracy in his day. The naval station established in 325/4 by Athens points to one aspect of their overall counter-piracy strategy: establishing naval stations in important areas. This certainly provided presence in the local area and would have allowed for offensive operations against pirate bases, should the opportunity arise. At the height of the Delian League, Athens of course had potential bases and naval stations across the Aegean. The annual Athenian power projection cruise (as discussed in the previous chapter) had the diplomatic intent of cowing potential enemies and reassuring or keeping in check allies, and certainly pirates would have taken note of this display of force. Naval presence appears to have been a key way in which piracy was suppressed, mostly as a passive measure although these ships were still capable of action at short notice. The presence of an Athenian or other polis' naval station introduced risk into any pirate's calculation. The protection of shipping and fishing vessels, especially local vessels, from pirates could explain the proliferation of warships in even quite small cities that were not known as major sea powers. The example of Naxos in Sicily is a great example of this. Such a small force probably did not engage in high-end conflict except as part of a coalition but would have been a significant force in maintaining good order at sea in the local area. No coastal state could afford to let its shipping or fishing vessels fall prey to piracy, and even a small naval force would be of value. Reliance on a hegemonic sea power for protection would be risky, and a small but competent force of warships would also pose little threat to such a sea power and thus reduce the potential for tension.

Other Constabulary Operations

Finally, maritime forces may be involved in non-combat operations in roles normally associated in the modern world with police or emergency services work. It is a role that has been increasingly normalised over recent centuries, though it has often been overlooked in examining maritime operations. In the ancient world the evidence is very

thin, but there are a few tantalising glimpses of these sorts of operations being conducted by Greek maritime forces.

In a traditional constabulary role, Athenian naval forces were used to collect tax on vessels sailing into the Pontos. In 410 this was done under the command of two generals with thirty ships. The ships were not just used for collecting the tax from outbound vessels, but a variety of other roles (*Xen Hell.* 1.1.22).⁷²⁸ This again demonstrates the rapid re-tasking and multi-role nature of naval forces during this period. The customs collection was set up again in 390 by Thrasyboulos (*Xen. Hell.* 4.8.27), re-establishing an important point of control not just over trade but also over a critical choke point. Such a customs house could only be effective with the support of warships to physically intercept vessels sailing through the Bosphoros. These need not have been triremes, but smaller warships such as pentekontors. In any case, this represents the use of naval forces in a constabulary role, policing the tax imposed by Athens on passing vessels in a specific region.

On the more benign end of the force spectrum we can observe Greek naval forces used in evacuation operations. The evacuation of Athens in the face of Persian invasion in 480 was a massive undertaking, and it seems that an important part of this was the role played by the Greek fleet. After leaving Artemision, the Greek fleet put into Salamis at the request of the Athenians in order to help the evacuation (*Hdt.* 8.40.1). Referring directly to women and children, it is clear that the evacuation described by Herodotus was of non-combatants. The narrative of Diodoros, though brief, makes clear reference to boats being used to evacuate women, children and useful goods to Salamis (*Diod.* 11.13.3). Plutarch too has Athens being evacuated by sea, albeit in a more emotional and evocative passage.⁷²⁹ Seven decades later in Sicily the Syrakousans used their warships in an evacuation operation. Learning of the approach of the Carthaginians, Diokles decided to abandon the city (*Diod.* 13.61.1-3). As part of the evacuation, half of the populace of Himera embarked by night onto the triremes and sailed the approximately 100 nm to Messene before the triremes continued on to protect Syrakousai (*Diod.* 13.61.4-6). Although not as large a scale as the

⁷²⁸ The details differ in Diodoros' account, though not the core fact that the Athenians set up a customs house and collected tax. *Diod.* 13.64.2. Polybios says the customs house was first set up at the advice of Alkibiades. *Polyb.* 4.44.4.

⁷²⁹ *Plut. Them.* 10.4. See also: Graninger (2010): 308-317.

evacuation of Attika, this was still an impressive feat to evacuate half the city, at night and over a distance of approximately 100 nm. Considering the nasty fate of those who were left behind in Himera,⁷³⁰ the evacuation of even half the population was not a trivial accomplishment.

In both the above cases, warships were used to evacuate the civilian population of a city in the face of an enemy advance. In the first case this was supposedly the entire population of Athens, quite a large body of personnel to move. The real importance of this evacuation is that it allowed Athens to fight on against Persia. This factor is seemingly always overlooked in discussion about the battles that came after the evacuation.⁷³¹ The ability to evacuate the entire population of Attika was a huge enabler of continued Athenian resistance. It is also indicative of how much the Athenians had begun to fully embrace the sea and view themselves as a sea power, willing to go by sea across the Saronic Gulf in order to escape from an enemy and relying on their navy to prevail in battle in order to return home. In the case of Himera, it was obviously important to Diokles and the Syrakousans that they not abandon the Himeraeans and it was their warships which allowed for the safe evacuation of a part of the city's population. These are but two examples, however, it seems likely that warships were used in evacuation operations elsewhere on a much smaller scale. The large scale of the two above examples is what makes them stand out. In the case of the Himera evacuation, Diodoros does not refer to any difficulty or special arrangements for the fleet to conduct the operation, as if evacuating non-combatants was not out of the ordinary. While obviously not ideal, it seems clear that warships in the ancient world could and were used to evacuate civilians from hostile areas. Even the Spartans utilised their navy in this way. In 373, having been defeated by the Kerkyraians and under threat by the imminent arrival of an Athenian fleet, a Spartan force under the vice-admiral Hypermenes decided to retreat from the island.⁷³² He used his transport vessels to load captured slaves and valuables and sent them home,

⁷³⁰ They were killed or taken as slaves. Diod. 13.62.3-4.

⁷³¹ The evacuation itself is mentioned or discussed, but rarely the strategic ramifications. For instance, see: Lazenby (1993): 153-155; Strauss (2004): 72-89; Hale (2009): 56-60. The closest appears to be Victor Davis Hanson, who says that the presence of a large population of Athenians on Salamis allowed Themistokles to pressure the other Greeks in to fighting there in order to protect them: Hanson (2001): 40-43. However, there is no discussion of how evacuation in the first place is what allowed a battle to even be considered.

⁷³² The Spartan leader Mnasippos having been killed in battle.

following soon after with his marines and the surviving soldiers from the expedition (Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.25-26). Considering the utility of naval forces in evacuating military personnel, it is unsurprising that navies were used to evacuate civilians, slaves and valuable cargo. Such an operation would require little to no special modifications for the ships to conduct such an activity. Such operations again display the versatility of maritime forces and the ability of naval forces to conduct a range of different tasks across the spectrum of maritime operations.

Chapter Ten – Non-hegemonic sea powers

Having largely examined major, 'hegemonic' sea powers, it is necessary to look at smaller poleis and their sea power. It is apparent that smaller poleis regularly contributed naval forces to maritime operations across the fifth and fourth centuries. At Salamis in 480 there were ships present from 19 poleis other than Athens and Sparta and from as far away as Kroton in southern Italy (Hdt. 8.42-48). In the 370s, long after their defeat at Knidos, the Spartans were still able to gather a fleet with ships with contributions by Korinth, Leukas, Ambrakia, Elis, Zakynthos, Achaia, Epidauros, Troizen, Hermione and Halieis (Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.3). In the Social War Athens found itself on the wrong end of a coalition of poleis, with Chios, Rhodos, Kos and Byzantion mustering a strong enough naval force to hold off Athenian sea power for several years and eventually win their independence from Athens.

This chapter will be, in large part, necessarily speculative. This is a source issue, the same issue that bedevils much of Classical scholarship. Ancient sources give us but the briefest glimpse of maritime thought and maritime operations outside of the hegemonic powers – Athens, Sparta, Thebes, Makedonia – but it is possible to piece together a basic picture of how sea power may have operated in non-hegemonic poleis. Although not a panacea, the use of archaeological evidence, specifically the presence of shipsheds, can prove valuable. Shipsheds, as discussed in Chapter Three, were a significant investment for any polis. This chapter will give a brief outline of some of the operations conducted by a few maritime poleis, and speculate on how they might have used their sea power across the spectrum of maritime operations. It is by no means an exhaustive discussion of all Greek sea powers, but covers the more notable ones.

Korinth

Korinth was an early sea power in the Greek world, a great early maritime trading polis and prolific coloniser. 'Wealthy' (ἀφνειός) Korinth commanded land and sea trade across the isthmus and pioneered shipbuilding, including of the first trireme, according to Thucydides (1.13.2-5). Indeed, Thucydides sets up the Korinthians as the hegemonic sea power immediately preceding the Athenians. Korinth's position on the isthmus saw it develop maritime interests both to the west through the Korinthian Gulf, and to the south/south-east into the Aegean through the Saronic Gulf. It is this unique position that

surely drove the construction of the *diolkos*, a very large and significant investment in maritime infrastructure.⁷³³

This geography helped define Korinth's diplomatic relations, especially as they pertained to its all-important sea lanes. With respect to the Saronic Gulf, the island polis of Aigina (see below) was in a strong position to threaten Korinthian interests in this area. This rivalry manifested in the years before the Persian War when Korinth aided Athens in the latter's attack on Aigina. Aigina could muster 70 warships, but the Athenians could only manage 50 and so the Korinthians loaned the Athenians 20 ships and the Athenians prevailed in battle.⁷³⁴ As for western waters, rivalry with its former colony of Kerkyra apparently moved into outright hostility from an early time,⁷³⁵ almost certainly over influence at the entrance of the Korinthian Gulf and trade to the west. The entrance to the gulf was a choke point for trade to and from Korinth, and Kerkyra was in a position to threaten the maritime traffic on the most favoured route from Italy and Sicily to the entrance of the gulf. It is notable that by the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides says that the three naval powers of note in Greece were Athens, Korinth and Kerkyra (Thuc. 1.36.3).

The entente between Korinth and Athens did not last, and it is hard to escape concluding that the deterioration in relations was due to the growth in Athenian sea power. More than just a stoush over possession of the large Kerkyraian navy, the fighting at Sybota indicates that the Korinthians saw the Athenians as encroaching into Korinth's sphere of influence in the west. As Phormion's success in the early years of the Peloponnesian War demonstrates, Korinth could be cut off very easily by a hostile power operating in the vicinity of Naupaktos. In Thucydides it is of course the Korinthians at the outbreak of war who call for a direct engagement at sea against Athens. They maintained a fleet throughout the war, rather ineffective in the Archidamian War, though somewhat more effective in the later phases of the war. Some scholars attempt to defend Korinthian naval operations as being unfairly portrayed by Thucydides, referring especially to his rather condescending

⁷³³ As discussed in Chapter Three.

⁷³⁴ They were rented to the Athenians for the very low price of 5 drachmae per ship since, according to Herodotus, they could not be given for free. Hdt. 6.89, 92.

⁷³⁵ See below, section on Kerkyra.

judgement that: ‘The Corinthians believed they were victors if they were only just defeated’ – οἱ τε γὰρ Κορίνθιοι ἠγήσαντο κρατεῖν εἰ μὴ καὶ πολὺ ἐκρατοῦντο (Thuc. 7.34.7).⁷³⁶ Thucydides does not praise Korinthus effectiveness at sea, and in many cases, this is justified. McKenzie and Hannah criticise Thucydides as being overly harsh when referring to the first engagement between the Korinthians and the Athenians under Phormion, where the Athenian *strategos* timed his attack with a favourable wind.⁷³⁷ Yet, Thucydides seems entirely justified in his judgement, for it demonstrates a woeful lack of local navigational knowledge on the part of the Korinthians in a geographic area that was vital to their maritime operations. That the Athenian Phormion knew the pattern of local winds better than the regional sea power is an indictment of the Korinthians and does prove the superiority of Athenian naval operations. Such navigational knowledge was fundamental to naval operations, not exceptional. The Korinthians proved more effective in later engagements, especially during the Sicilian expedition where a force of Korinthus warships engaged the Athenians at Naupaktos and provided cover to a fleet of merchant ships carrying hoplites to Sicily to fight the Athenians there (Thuc. 7.17, 19.5). Korinthus ships were present with the Spartans at Aigispotamoi (Paus. 10.9.10). This loyalty to Sparta did not last long and the Korinthians used Persian money to rebuild their naval forces and contest Spartan control of the Korinthus gulf after Knidos in 394 (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.10-11). However, two decades later the Korinthians realigned themselves with Sparta and contributed ships to a fleet of 60 assembled in 373 by Sparta in order to attack Kerkyra (Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.3), and it may have been that Korinth could not resist joining an operation against their old foe. In 344 Timoleon took a force of ten ships, including seven Korinthus ships, to fight in Sicily (Plut. *Tim.* 8.4-5). These later operations have Korinth contributing to a coalition and even though they took the lead in Timoleon’s campaign to Sicily, it appears as if their capacity for independent naval action was diminished.

Korinth was a sea power during much of the Classical period, and certainly before this in the Archaic period. However, for the polis which supposedly invented the primary warship of the age, little is known of the Korinthus navy or of their sea power in a broad sense. They contributed to many important naval operations in the fifth century, including

⁷³⁶ McKenzie and Hannah (2013): 206-227.

⁷³⁷ McKenzie and Hannah (2013): 209-210.

Salamis, the Sicilian campaign in both Greek waters and in Sicily, and at Aigispotamoi. Despite this, by the early fourth century they were apparently reliant on Persian money to put together a fleet that was still no match for the waning sea power of Sparta (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.10-11). By the time of Timoleon's expedition in 344 they appear to have only been able to send seven ships on an expedition. Nevertheless, these seven ships were sent on a campaign in Sicily and so it is worth noting that they could still send ships on a campaign outside of mainland Greece, and that they still had political and military interests as far afield as Sicily. Korinthian naval power may have waned over the course of the Classical period, but it is still in evidence to some degree throughout.

On a final note, although the naval aspects of Korinthian sea power are often not well-defined, Korinth was undoubtedly an early and prolific coloniser and a trading hub of significance. Both of these are examples of non-naval aspects of sea power. The strong ties that Korinth maintained with many of its former colonies in Italy and Sicily, as well as Poteidaia in the Aegean, and second-order colonies like Epidamnos, might demonstrate a clear policy of maintaining good overseas relations in order to preserve a network of allies or friends to aid in defence and trade. Having defined maritime strategy as 'the direction of all aspects of national power that relate to a nation's interests at sea',⁷³⁸ Korinth is perhaps an example of the non-naval side of 'interests at sea'. This would place the role of the Korinthian navy as an enabling force for these interests, not exclusively as the Peloponnesian War clearly demonstrates, but to a large degree. Thucydides is explicit in saying that the Korinthians suppressed piracy (Thuc. 1.13.5), an activity that certainly required warships. Naval power was still important for Korinth, but its *sea power* was more than just triremes.

Kerkyra

Another polis that is said to have been a strong sea power in the decades leading up to and including the Peloponnesian War was Korinth's erstwhile colony of Kerkyra. Hostility between the two sea powers led not only to the first naval battle in documented history according to Thucydides (1.13.4), but also to further conflict just before the outbreak of war between Athens and Sparta. Yet, the Kerkyraian fleet only ever appears to play a minor

⁷³⁸ As stated in the Introduction: Hattendorf (2013): 7.

role in the war that followed. In fact, the promise of Kerkyra's sea power never seems to live up to reality. Despite mustering 60 ships to aid the Greeks at Salamis, they never make it past the Peloponnesos, blaming contrary weather but according to Herodotus in reality because they did not believe that the Greeks would actually prevail against the Persians.⁷³⁹ The naval battle of Sybota saw the Kerkyraians lose 70 of their 110 ships (Thuc. 1.54.2, a staggeringly high loss rate. Although the island itself remained strategically important, including as the Athenian staging point for the Sicilian expedition (Thuc. 6.42.1), Kerkyraian sea power itself is largely absent as an independent force. Even as late as 374/3 a party of Kerkyraians attempted to leverage off their strategic position and convince the Spartans to send them aid, knowing as they did the importance of the island for those with sea power aspirations.⁷⁴⁰ Nevertheless, just as at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Kerkyra is viewed by rival powers in the 370s as important chiefly because of its strategic position astride the sea route from Greece to Italy. As in the Peloponnesian War, Kerkyra's actual sea power does not figure prominently and is largely ineffective or absent.

This is despite the constant reference to Kerkyra as a naval power. In the mid-fourth century, Demosthenes referred to Athens only having the weakest allies on its side and none of the powerful islanders, including Kerkyra in the list along with Chios and Rhodos (Dem. 18.234). Even Appian at one point refers to Kerkyraian thalassocracy (Κερκυραίους... θαλασσοκρατοῦντας; App. *B Civ.* 2.39). Not just in literary sources, but archaeologically it is also evident that Kerkyra maintained its naval infrastructure into the Hellenistic and even Roman eras. A number of shipsheds dating from the early fifth century through to the Roman era have been found on the island.⁷⁴¹ This upkeep indicates a conscious effort to maintain this infrastructure over several centuries. On the one hand, this would appear to suggest a strong maritime consciousness on the part of Kerkyra.

⁷³⁹ If we accept Herodotos' explanation, then this should really be considered a diplomatic operation. Kerkyra is clearly sending a fleet to appear as if they want to help the Greeks, but without any intention of fighting. They can be said to have been conducting a reassurance operation, if Herodotos is correct in their motives. Lacking any contrary evidence, I have categorised this as a diplomatic operation in the database at Appendix 1.

⁷⁴⁰ οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τὴν Κόρκυραν εἰδότες μεγάλην ῥοπήν ἔχουσιν τοῖς ἀντεχομένοις τῆς θαλάττης. Diod. 15.46.1.

⁷⁴¹ The overall size of the naval facilities is yet to be fully revealed. See: Blackman et. al. (2013): 319-334.

Yet, with all the talk of Kerkyra as a strong naval power, it never seems to play anything other than a supporting role or act as the pretext for conflict. If ever there was a Potemkin fleet in the Greek world, it was the Kerkyraian one.⁷⁴² I am not suggesting that Kerkyraian naval and sea power was entirely ineffective or non-existent, but I would suggest that Kerkyra represents a polis that built ships but not a maritime approach to its strategy.⁷⁴³ Arguably Sparta, a polis that to many represents the land power *par excellence*, had a stronger maritime consciousness than Kerkyra. Sparta may have transformed itself into a temporary hegemonic sea power, but it never really changed structurally to the point where it could support sea power without outside financial aid. Nevertheless, when in possession of a fleet contributed by allies and/or paid for by outside (Persian) aid, the Spartans were able to wield it effectively. In this sense, despite having only a half-developed maritime consciousness, for the Spartans it was certainly enough to rule the Aegean for a short time. The Kerkyraians quite simply never approached this level of effectiveness at sea. At the height of their naval power before Sybota, the Kerkyraians could put to sea almost as many triremes as the Spartans commanded at Arginousai,⁷⁴⁴ and yet they were never in a remotely comparable position to Sparta in terms of hegemonic power at sea. This is a simplification of the relative power of the two poleis, but there is an undeniable difference in attitude that saw the Kerkyraians remain a supporting sea power rather than an independent one.

It is difficult to determine what operations the Kerkyraian fleet engaged in outside of the well-documented examples above. Considering their strong geographic position astride the best sea route from Greece to Italy, one may reasonably assume the Kerkyraians fleet aided in suppression of piracy in the local area. Considering Epidamnos was a Kerkyraian

⁷⁴² To borrow a phrase from Boromir Jordan in his reference to the Athenian Sicilian expedition, in his article that I heavily criticized in Chapter One. Jordan (2000): 63-79.

⁷⁴³ Though I have previously criticised the 'thalassocracy' list, discussed in Chapter Five, that the Kerkyraians are not mentioned at all on the list is of interest. While I do not believe the list is an actual record of hegemonic Greek sea powers, it is notable in perhaps reflecting fifth century Greek attitudes towards historical sea powers. Therefore, the absence of Kerkyra is notable considering that Thucydides, Xenophon, Demosthenes and Appian all refer to Kerkyra as a strong sea power. Korinth does not appear on the list either, and this complicates matters. Considering that Aigina is listed as the final thalassocracy 490-480, it seems likely that the natural successor would be Athens. This is not to make too much of an argument out of this list, merely to highlight this particular observation.

⁷⁴⁴ The Kerkyraians with 110 at Sybota (Thuc. 1.47.1) and the Spartans with 120 at Arginousai (Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.26).

colony, it seems very likely that they had interests on the Illyrian littoral and potentially far into the Adriatic. The frosty reception that the Kerkyraians gave the ambassadors from Epidamnos was seemingly not indicative of the Kerkyraian capacity to act (Thuc. 1.24.6-7), for they were able to mobilise a force rapidly and besiege the city of Epidamnos in relatively short order (Thuc. 1.26.3-4). It was however, a very reactive operation on the part of the Kerkyraians. Perhaps the primary purpose of the Kerkyraian navy was to act as a 'fleet-in-being' and the mere existence of a large number of warships was what influenced other major poleis to continually interfere in Kerkyraian affairs in an attempt to bolster their own sea power with that of Kerkyra. This is not to say they did not conduct maritime operations, but that they may have only conducted operations with a fraction of their navy in all but the direst of circumstances. Knowing almost nothing about Kerkyraian naval infrastructure, it is plausible that putting 110 ships to sea as they did at Sybota was an exceptional circumstance. They may have had upwards of 120 ships, but may not have had adequate personnel and material resources to crew that many on a normal basis.

Leukas

The island of Leukas is not automatically associated with naval power, yet it provides a tantalizing glimpse of sea power in a smaller polis. The city committed to the building of naval infrastructure, and it is strongly suggested that it possessed a number of shipsheds.⁷⁴⁵ The Leukadians were involved early in fifth century naval operations. They provided 3 ships at Salamis (Hdt. 8.45), which is notable considering the distance they travelled and the fact that they were not in immediate danger from the Persian invasion. It is also worth noting that the Leukadian ships made it to Salamis, whereas the ships of their neighbour Kerkyra were apparently held up by bad weather (see above).⁷⁴⁶ Three ships may not have been a large contribution, but it is the fact that they were present at the great panhellenic naval victory of the Classical period that would have mattered to them and the other Greeks.

⁷⁴⁵ Blackman et. al. (2013): 574-575.

⁷⁴⁶ This may lend credence to Herodotos' contention that the Kerkyraians deliberately delayed from arriving in time for the battle, though it is possible that the ships from Leukas departed earlier and so missed the bad weather that supposedly held up the Kerkyraian ships.

Just before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Leukas sent 10 ships to fight with Korinth at Epidamnos and Sybota in 433 (Thuc. 1.27.2, 46.1). They had 13 ships out on operations in 427 (Thuc. 3.69.1) and provided 2 ships for the Korinthians to crew and send to Taras in 414 (Thuc. 6.104). Finally, they and provided an unknown number of ships to fight with the Spartans at Aigispotamoi, under the command of one Telykrates (Paus. 10.9.10). Thus, the Leukadians were present at two of the major naval battles of the fifth century, and on the winning side no less. In this sense, their navy might have been small but it was clearly effective, being present for a number of important battles and consistently called upon by allies to fight. It contrasts with a polis like Kerkyra, which had many ships but no real sea power.

There is less evidence of Leukadian operations in the fourth century, but we do know of a few instances where they conducted maritime operations at different times. They sent ships to fight as part of a Spartan coalition in 373/2 (Xen *Hell.* 6.2.3), and they provided a single ship for Timoleon's expedition to Sicily in 344 (Plut. *Tim.* 8.5). This smaller contribution of a single ship may represent a diminishment in the size of their fleet, or it may represent hesitation at the campaign itself that might be protracted and leave Leukas with less ships for local operations. What is noteworthy is that they were still willing to contribute to a maritime operation as part of a coalition, and an operation in Sicily no less.

All of this adds up to more than just a catalogue of participation in maritime operations by Leukas. It demonstrates the maintenance and growth of sea power over the fifth century. From three ships at Salamis to ten at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War shows a slow but steady growth. The outbreak of war clearly spurred more growth, as they go from contributing 10 at Sybota to 13 in operations during the year 427. An extra three ships built and crewed in five or so years may not seem like much, yet it is important to remember that this represented a significant investment in capital to build and outfit the ships and to find 600 more crew members. It is also the point to make that it is unlikely they sent all of their warships on campaign and surely would have left some in reserve for local defence. Their actual fleet size may have been bigger than the contributions above suggest. Leukas maintained their sea power throughout the war and they were present at the final battle.

More than this, it is highly likely that their ships were in Lysandros' fleet on campaign before the battle and so had been operating in the eastern Aegean for some time.

All this illustrates Leukas' participating in a wide variety of coalition operations, sending warships to fight as part of an alliance. The first point to make is that they were clearly engaged in high-level combat operations. The primary role of their warships was to fight at sea and so we may conclude that even if their navy was intended primarily to operate as part of an alliance force their ships were still expected to fight. So even a polis possessed of a relatively small navy still trained that navy for combat operations. This is not a polis possessing warships for prestige or only for combating piracy, but for combat. This is not to say they did not use their warships for lower level operations such as counter-piracy, for they almost certainly did, positioned in a valuable geostrategic position as they were. A navy capable of fighting in line of battle at Salamis and Sybota was clearly able to fight pirates and lower level threats, and piracy must have been an issue of varying concern to an island that must have been reliant to some degree on maritime trade. Finally, we might hypothesise that there existed in the city a strong maritime consciousness. All of this taken together – two centuries of coalition operations documented by five different ancient sources and maritime infrastructure such as shipsheds – amply demonstrates that sea power was not something that only large, hegemonic powers could possess. That a smaller polis like Leukas maintained a very active navy over hundreds of years illustrates that a maritime strategy could be and was followed by a variety of poleis, large and small.

Aigina

The island polis of Aigina was a sea power from early times. The polis was apparently a subject of Epidauros on the mainland, but Herodotos says that Aiginetan superiority at sea let them essentially break away from Epidauros (Hdt. 5.83). After this began the enmity between Aigina and Athens lasting several decades and leading to a deeply rooted dislike of the island in Athens.⁷⁴⁷ They are listed in the 'Thalassocracy list' for the years 490-480 and are the last polis named.⁷⁴⁸ Again, labelling them as a thalassocracy is a stretch, but

⁷⁴⁷ Hdt. gives details of the hostility 5.83-91. See also: Podlecki (1976): 396-403. Perikles supposedly called Aigina the 'eyesore of the Peiraiæus' (λήμην τοῦ Πειραιῶς), an anecdote related by both Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1411a) and Plutarch (*Per.* 8.5).

⁷⁴⁸ See: Myres (1906): 95-96.

they doubtless had great sea power at this time. They provided 18 triremes at Artemision (Hdt. 18.1.2) and 30 of their 'best' (ἄριστοι) triremes at Salamis, while also maintaining a force of warships to guard their own coast (Hdt. 8.46). This seems to have been an entirely prudent move, preserving some forces to guard the island, not all that far from the Persian threat. Further, after the Greeks prevailed at Salamis it was decided that the Aiginetans had been the 'best of the Greeks' (Ἑλλήνων ἄριστα: Hdt. 8.93.1). This is all indicative of a polis that was strong at sea, having both solid maritime consciousness in realising the need to reserve ships for coastal protection due to the nearby Persian threat, and secondly in possessing warships potent enough to be considered best amongst the 21 other Greek poleis. On the infrastructure side, Aigina had several ports and the remains of several shipsheds have been found just to the south of Kolonna Hill, and are dated to the early fifth century.⁷⁴⁹ Such an early date for shipsheds is very indicative of a polis that took its navy and its sea power seriously and invested serious capital in the fleet and its support.

The decline of Aiginetan sea power was the direct result of Athenian maritime ambitions. The shipbuilding program instituted by Themistokles after the silver strike at Laurion was, according to the politician, aimed at building ships to fight against Aigina before the Persian invasion (Hdt. 7. 144). During the *pentekontaetia*, after a naval battle and a siege the Athenians subdued Aigina and apart from paying tribute to Athens, they were forced to surrender their ships and destroy their walls.⁷⁵⁰ Without walls or a fleet the island was at the mercy of the Athenian fleet and Aiginetan sea power ceased to be a threat to Athens, though the island was used to great success by the Spartans to attack Athens in the Korinthian War.⁷⁵¹ More than just a base of operations useful for attacking Athenian seaborne trade, Aigina itself seems to have flourished as a trading centre in the fourth century. Demosthenes refers to it as a flourishing marketplace (Dem. 23.211) and Aiginetan merchants are specifically mentioned by Aristotle (*Pol.* 1291b). It is reasonable to expect

⁷⁴⁹ Three ports, though the northern most one most likely belongs to an earlier period and was not in use when the others were built. See Blackman et. al. (2013): 284-293.

⁷⁵⁰ Thuc. 1.105.2-5, 108.4-5.

⁷⁵¹ See Chapter Seven. Control of the island was strategically important for Athens, and as the Spartans demonstrated in the fourth century, it could be used to great effect for attacks on seaborne trade around the Peiraieus and down to Cape Sounion. Thomas Figueira discusses this at length, though what he examines is not the naval strategy of Aigina, but of Sparta and Athens and how Aigina factored into this geographically. Figueira (1990): 15-51. It is apparent that in the fourth century the Aiginetans did not possess many warships, if any, and that they provided an effective fleet base for the enemies of Athens.

that they maintained a fleet of some warships during the fourth century after the island's restoration. A fleet of even pentekontors would have been of great utility in protecting near seas against pirates as well as in low-level raiding operations.⁷⁵² As a trading hub in would have been sensible for them to have maintained a small fleet capable of conducting constabulary operations. Such a fleet would also have been unlikely to antagonise its traditional rival Athens.

Chios

The island of Chios was a strong sea power by the early fifth century. As an island known for the export of wine, they required strong maritime trading links and so possession of a large and capable navy is unsurprising. They provided 100 ships at Lade in 494, with a large contingent of marines aboard each ship (Hdt. 6.15.1). Chios was also one of the largest contributors to the Delian League, providing a great number of ships until its eventual revolt in 412. They participated in all of the major Athenian campaigns in the Peloponnesian War until their revolt.⁷⁵³ They were present with Lysandros' fleet at the battle of Aigispotamoi (Paus. 10.9.10) however, two decades after this they formed a renewed alliance with Athens and were a member of the Second Athenian League.⁷⁵⁴ Finally, Chios was one of the four poleis that seceded from the League in 357 during the Social War.⁷⁵⁵ All of these various alliances demonstrate participation in the main naval alliances of the fifth and fourth centuries, both with and against Athens.

That the Chians retained a large and potent navy throughout most of the Classical period highlights that their policy and their strategy had a strong maritime focus. Their experience during the Ionian revolt clearly made them an early candidate for membership of the Delian League, and the fact that they always contributed ships demonstrates that they took an active role in the League. That they made an alliance with Athens in the 380s and joined the Second League also shows a strong commitment to maritime security in the Aegean during the fourth century.

⁷⁵² Of the kind Figueira discusses (above). The sources are vague on Aiginetean naval activity, but it seems as if they may have practiced raiding and against Athens and seizure of their ships, at times.

⁷⁵³ Raiding the Peloponnesos (Thuc. 2.56.2), Pylos (Thuc. 4.13.2), Melos (Thuc. 5.84.1), and the Sicilian expedition (Thuc. 6.43, 7.20.2).

⁷⁵⁴ Alliance in 384/3: Tod 118. Second Athenian League: IG II² 43.24, 79. See also Cargill (1981): 24-25, 52.

⁷⁵⁵ Dem. 15.3; Diod. 16.7.3. See also Chapter Seven.

Of particular note is the fact that Thucydides has Alkibiades call the Chians the wealthiest of all the Greeks (Thuc. 8.45.4). This is important for three reasons. Firstly, as discussed in Chapter Three, wealth was one of the greatest enablers of naval power in the Greek world. Fleets were expensive to build, maintain and operate. This wealth is evident in the number of ships Chios contributed to a vast array of operations before, during and after the Peloponnesian War. Secondly, that Chios was one of the few poleis in the Delian League that contributed ships rather than money is indicative of a strong maritime consciousness. They retained a sovereign naval capability throughout the existence of the Delian League and this must have been part of their overall strategy. It was a strategy that paid off in the fourth century during the Social War, where combined with the fleets of Byzantion, Kos and Rhodos they were able to successfully break away from Athens. It is not just the fact that they had ships, but that they had been operating a navy in the previous century that is important. This means that they retained the capability to conduct maritime operations to a level that was able to prevail against Athenian sea power. Finally, it is worth speculating about how Chios became and stayed so wealthy, and the obvious answer is through the export of wine, a bulk cargo that must have gone by sea. Chian wealth was thus almost certainly built on maritime trade. This again returns us to sea power as a holistic concept and Chios is an example of a Classical Greek polis that had a strong maritime consciousness, a large and capable navy, participation in the predominant maritime leagues of the fifth and fourth centuries, and an economy built on the export of goods (wine) through maritime trade. In the very truest sense of the term, Chios was a sea power.

As stated at the beginning of the chapter, this is by no means an exhaustive list of non-hegemonic sea powers. In exploring the ones that I have, it becomes clear that sea power did not follow a universal model in the ancient world, much as it does not follow one model today. Rather, there is a great variety in the ways in which different poleis approached the maritime domain. Some poleis like Kerkyra and Chios built and maintained large navies, but with very different strategies and outcomes. The Chians remained a potent naval power throughout the Classical period, whereas the promise of Kerkyraian sea power was always greater than the reward. Not all focused on their navy as a central factor in their maritime approach but instead looked to trade, like Aigina. It is not remarkable that

maritime hegemony was only ever achieved by two poleis in the Classical Greek world, Athens and Sparta: there have been few hegemonic sea powers throughout all of history. What must be highlighted here is that hegemony is not the same as sea power. As Thucydides says in the beginning of his great work (Thuc. 1.15.1), navies of the ancient Greek world may not have been large but they were still a source of strength to those poleis that cultivated them. Leukas and Chios may never have 'ruled the waves', but to them at least, their sea power was something they could not live without and it shaped the way they interacted with other Greeks.

Chapter Eleven – Change and Continuity

Having surveyed the spectrum of maritime operations over the period being examined, it is important to examine how these operations evolved – or not – over time. At the most obvious end of the scale is how technological change over time influenced maritime operations. Bigger ships had an impact not only in battle, but also in maritime trade. Political and social issues greatly influenced how these operations were conducted. This chapter will briefly examine change and continuity over time, examining not only technology and attitudes, but also the three main tasks on the spectrum of maritime operations.

Technology

The most obvious change over the late sixth through to late fourth century is that of technology, especially regarding warships. At the start of the fifth century, the trireme had become the premier class of warship in the Mediterranean. By the Persian Wars it was the core warship at the centre of most navies in the region and remained in this position for well over a hundred years. However, by the time of Alexander's reign the trireme was beginning to be superseded as the main warship by the 'four' (τετρήρης) and the 'five' (πεντήρης). With this change in ship type came several different changes to the way naval forces could and did operate. The first and most obvious point is that these larger ships required not only more materials to construct and more effort to maintain, but also required a larger crew. This meant that navies required even more personnel for what was already the manpower-intensive endeavour of crewing a warship. This seems to have been an even greater problem in the fourth century, where sources indicate that experienced rowers were a valuable commodity. It seems that, much as with hoplites and light troops on land, experienced mariners and rowers became increasingly more professional and able to make a good living as mercenaries. An excellent example, discussed in Chapter Three, is revealed in a law court speech of Apollodoros, where sailors left the Athenian ship in question to take up positions with ships of Thasos and Maroneia.⁷⁵⁶ Clearly this put pressure on the ability of Athens to crew its large navy. However, with the larger ships this

⁷⁵⁶ [Dem.] 50, as discussed in Chapter Three.

may not necessarily have entailed the need for more experienced rowers, but only more able-bodied personnel. It is an assumption, though a reasonable one based on galleys in later times, that vessels with multiple rowers per oar need only have had one skilled rower per oar, with the others on the oar merely providing extra power.⁷⁵⁷ Nevertheless, the increase in required rowers was sizeable, almost double from 170 up to 300 for a 'five' while still requiring as many skilled rowers as a trireme. Even taking into account the fact that the extra rowers would not need to be as highly trained as the core rowers, they still would have required a base level of training in rowing and in general shipboard matters to be effective.⁷⁵⁸ Additionally, the sailors of these new vessels would have needed to become trained and accustomed to the new vessel types in order to operate them effectively, especially in battle. Though the basics of sailing and seamanship remained the same, a trireme would have handled differently to a 'four' or a 'five', both in terms of general sailing but especially in battle with changing tactics.⁷⁵⁹

While the increase in size for warships is a marked change, it was also a gradual one. Just as pentekontors could be found in trireme fleets, triremes were often found in the fleets of larger ships. Indeed, during the Lamian War in the Athenian fleet the triremes still outnumbered the larger ships and triremes could still be found in large numbers in the fleets of Ptolemy, Antigonos and the other *diadochoi*. It also seems evident that larger ships, fitted with artillery and able to carry more troops, opened up possibilities in naval siege warfare. That is, these platforms had the potential to make direct attacks against harbour cities less like the bloodbath of Alexander's siege of Tyre and more effective. This is certainly a valid argument for Hellenistic naval warfare and the advent of truly huge warships, ships with numbers above a 'five'. Whether or not this was a consideration when employing 'fours' and 'fives' in the Classical period remains uncertain, but possible after

⁷⁵⁷ Morrison and Coates (2000): 48; Hale (2009): 304-305. Hale accepts fully the idea that this was the rowing arrangement in these larger vessels.

⁷⁵⁸ Things such as timing, rowing and shipboard orders and just the general sense of being at sea aboard a warship, a unique environment not easily replicated ashore or in other contexts. This is not to say such training and experience would have been supremely expensive or time consuming, but when discussing the large numbers of rowers needed, it would represent a large investment in time and state resources.

⁷⁵⁹ Again, tactical considerations lie outside the scope of this thesis. Briefly, it appears that the rise of bigger ships and artillery saw battle at sea take on a new element, reliant less on manoeuvre and ramming and more on artillery and boarding actions. Bigger ships were more stable and hence better platforms for missile weapons, big and small. For more on this see: Morrison and Coates (2000): 47-49.

the Athenian disaster in the Great Harbour of Syrakousai.⁷⁶⁰ Notwithstanding tactical considerations, it appears as if the quest for larger ships in the Hellenistic period had a strong element of a naval arms race to it. Much prestige seems to have been attached to the large ships of the period, and it is likely that as bigger ships pervaded the fleets of Greek navies around the Mediterranean it became an issue of pride to put such ships to sea as part of a fleet, even if triremes formed the core of the fighting force.

Attitudes

As examined in Chapters Four and Five, the sea was an ever-present consideration for the Greeks in general. From stories of the multinational expeditionary operation that was the Trojan War through to the supposed thalassocracy of Minos, sea power affected the different Greek cities to varying degrees. The two main powers of the Classical period, Athens and Sparta, represent neatly the ideas of continuity and change, respectively.⁷⁶¹

Athens began the 5th century as a budding sea power and within two decades was the unquestioned thalassocrat *par excellence*. This was a rapid transformation and certainly reflected an attitude shift at the turn of the century which focused Athens upon the sea for the next two centuries. Obviously, this was not at the complete expense of land forces, which still played a critical role in Athenian strategy. Athens embarked upon a deliberate strategy of sea power beginning before the Persian Wars, wars which solidified its decision to have sea power as preeminent in its strategic calculations. This sea power was central to the creation and maintenance of the Delian League and later Athenian Empire. Setbacks on land during the *pentekontaetia* and the so called 'First Peloponnesian War' reinforced to Athens, and especially to Perikles, that Athens was strongest at sea and could not only defend itself with sea power, but also remain a dangerous adversary to others as well as prosper economically. Perikleian strategy during the Archidamian War proved effective, and despite Athenian arrogance this sea power led to what should have been an acceptable peace. This arrogance combined with its unrivalled sea power saw Athens sucked back into war. Sparta's embrace of sea power meant that this was a different war, one where the

⁷⁶⁰ For a more detailed examination of this theory, see: Murray (2012): 69-128.

⁷⁶¹ Once again noting that we do not get an internal view of sea power from Sparta, only what is projected onto them. Nevertheless, their actions can be interpreted enough to form a rough picture of how they thought of and utilised sea power over the period.

maritime considerations were at the forefront of strategic thinking for *both* sides. Athens' defeat in the Peloponnesian War was relatively short lived and their maritime and naval forces were, relatively speaking, quickly rebuilt. In this we can see that Athenian strategic thinking had changed very little – they went straight back to the sea.⁷⁶² This is apparent even more when they decided to institute the Second Athenian League in the 370s. The mechanics and treatment of cities might have been different – massively and deliberately so – but the strategic rationale was the same as with the Delian League. Athens struggled as a sea power in the latter half of the fourth century and was unable to effectively counter the rise of Macedon. This was due to many different factors, political and military. As for Athenian attitudes, the large number of ships and massive naval infrastructure in Peiraeus demonstrate that Athens still viewed itself as a sea power first and foremost, even if the heady days of Perikles and Konon were long since gone. Athenian activities and attitudes throughout the fifth and fourth centuries show a continuity of general strategic thought, insomuch as they viewed themselves as first and foremost a sea power.

By contrast, Sparta represents a city that clearly and deliberately changed its attitude towards sea power over time. As briefly explored in Chapter Three, Sparta seems to have had some maritime aspirations and acumen in the Archaic period.⁷⁶³ However in the fifth century Sparta was the premier land power, not just in name but in reality. This was reinforced again and again throughout the century, right down to the battle of Mantinea in 418. This is not to say that Sparta ignored the sea or maritime considerations. The Spartans were actively involved in the war at sea during the Persian invasion, having command of the combined naval forces (Hdt 8.42). At the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War they did have a small fleet,⁷⁶⁴ and their interest in Kerkyra along with their alliance to the strong sea power of Korinth demonstrates recognition of the importance of naval and maritime matters. However, it was only in fully embracing sea power as a concept and a strategy in addition to their superior land power that Sparta was able eventually to defeat Athens. This maritime transformation was remarkable, not just in being successful but in

⁷⁶² Though of course this does not mean that they neglected their landward defences, such as the border forts with Boiotia.

⁷⁶³ As mentioned, enough to have had established an office of *nauarchos* by the time of the Persian Wars.

⁷⁶⁴ As Barry Strauss points out, Sparta did not build a fleet *ex nihilo* and they were active at sea in the sixth century. Strauss (2009): 35-39.

its initial conception: the attitude change required to switch priorities from the land to the maritime domain. It was not a perfect attitude adjustment, but it was enough to allow Sparta to confront and ultimately defeat Athens in the Ionian War. Although true Spartan naval hegemony was short lived, from 411 to 394, it took much longer for Spartan sea power to disappear and for the Spartans to return to their roots as a hoplite-centric army.⁷⁶⁵ The rise and fall of Spartan sea power were equally rapid and the rise represents the most dramatic, and large scale, change in attitude and practice in the maritime domain for the Classical Greek world. It is however arguable that the change in attitude was only very shallow and confined to 'up and comers' in the Spartan regime, men like Lysandros who could not hope to win fame and glory in the conventional and very conservative atmosphere of classical Sparta. In this sense his victories at sea, and especially Aigispotamoi, did win him great panhellenic renown. The Spartans dedicated spoils from the victory at Delphoi for all the Greeks to see, including an image of Lysandros being crowned by Poseidon: a not so subtle attack on Athens' image as the preeminent sea power of Greece.⁷⁶⁶ At the same time, Barry Strauss sees Lysandros as almost solely responsible for Sparta's maritime transformation,⁷⁶⁷ and the quick erosion of Spartan sea power after his death helps bear this conclusion out. It is hard to escape Strauss' conclusion that for the austere, inward-looking and continental-power of Sparta the navy was almost always considered a dispensable force.⁷⁶⁸ Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the Spartan establishment embraced sea power as a strategy long enough for it to have been effective.

The defeat of Athens by Sparta and the subsequent Spartan hegemony seems to have spurred a growth in navies around the Aegean, concurrent with a similar growth in the Greek *poleis* of Sicily and southern Italy. In mainland Greece and the Aegean, the rivalry between Sparta and Athens saw the regrowth of Athenian sea power, thanks to Persian aid. The Second Athenian League was a much more egalitarian arrangement, in part because so many of the member states did not cede their right to a navy. It seems apparent that the Delian league taught them a valuable lesson about the efficacy of sea power and

⁷⁶⁵ The loss at Knidos in 394 ended Spartan hegemony but they remained a significant force at sea for another two decades. Strauss (2009): 33.

⁷⁶⁶ Also honoured were Lysandros' 'soothsayer' (Ἀγίας τε ὃς τῷ Λυσάνδρῳ τότε ἐμαντεύετο) Agias and his *kybernetes* Hermon. Paus. 10.9.7-8.

⁷⁶⁷ Strauss (2009): 55-57.

⁷⁶⁸ Strauss (2009): 55.

of retaining their own naval forces so that the island poleis were able to ensure that Athens would not again be in a position to dominate the Aegean by itself. As the Social War would later demonstrate, this approach paid off and the combined sea power of different poleis successfully fought Athens to a standstill. Related to this was the short-lived attempt by Thebes to become a sea power. This further demonstrates that maritime thinking was pervading the poleis of Greece, even the traditionally land-bound Thebans.

In Sicily, Syrakousai built its sea power to become a formidable force. This was firstly as a means of gaining hegemony in Sicily, whose geography made sea power a potent force, and secondly a response to the threat posed by Carthage. On the issue of geography, almost all of the Greek and Phoenician poleis were located on or very near to the coast, with rather unfavourable internal terrain.⁷⁶⁹ Syrakousan sea power, far from being short-lived was quite extensive from the late fifth century onwards. In fact, according to Thucydides the Syrakousans were possessed of the same daring and speed of action as the Athenians, something which made the Syrakousans particularly effective against Athens (Thuc. 7.55.2, 8.96.5). It is of particular significance that naval combat in Sicilian waters spurred the development of new warships and that it was apparently Syrakousai that invented the *πεντήρης* (Diod. 14.41.3). Taken with Syrakousan developments with artillery (Diod. 14.42.1) this demonstrates a forward-looking maritime consciousness on the part of Dionysios and the Western Greeks.

The fourth century marked a distinct shift in attitude, where sea power as a concept was embraced by many Greek poleis, with the result that no one power ever reached the heights of thalassocracy that Athens had in the previous century. I would argue that this had a flow-on effect into the Hellenistic period, where the wars of the *diadochoi*, especially involving the Ptolemies, saw a great deal of naval and sea power at play. The maritime realm was certainly of critical importance in these wars, and the rise of Rhodos as a great

⁷⁶⁹ To briefly illustrate this point, it is worth noting that the Allied invasion of Sicily in 1943 during the Second World War (Operation Husky), the British army landed near Syracuse and the Americans were landed in the Gulf of Gela. The American had an extremely difficult time working their way through the interior terrain, and were only successfully in breaking through to Messina (the ultimate objective) when they landed a force on the north coast and proceeded east along the coast road. Even twentieth century armies had difficulty with Sicily's geography, a problem solved only with maritime manoeuvre.

sea power and maritime trading centre helps demonstrate that there was an enduring aspiration in Greece for gaining and retaining some measure of sea power.

Combat Operations

Combat operations at and from the sea represent some of the most important naval operations in the Classical period. In both these areas we can track a change over time, especially in the scale and sophistication of operations as the fifth century progressed. All of these different types of operations were conducted in the fourth century, to varying degrees.

The first two decades of the fifth century saw three of the largest naval battles of the entire fifth century, Lade during the Ionian revolt, and Artemision and Salamis during the Persian invasion. Lade and Salamis both represent large-scale fleet actions aimed at the destruction of the opposing fleet, a conventional decisive battle engagement. The battle of Eurymedon c.467 marks what might be a change in fleet operations.⁷⁷⁰ The beginning of the battle was set-up like a conventional fleet-on-fleet action, but once the Greeks had prevailed at sea the battle progressed onto land where the Greeks again were victorious.⁷⁷¹ This shows that the same fleet conducted combat operations *at* and *from* the sea in quick succession, and I would argue demonstrates an evolution of the operational conduct of the Athenian fleet towards a force that more resembles that used during the Peloponnesian War than the one used at Salamis. In the same engagement the Athenians are influencing events ashore through action at sea as well as with direct action against the land. There were large-scale fleet actions later in the century, but arguably only the battle of Arginousai fits the description of a decisive battle engagement where the object was the destruction of the enemy fleet, though even this came about because of a blockade.⁷⁷² The battles in the Great Harbour of Syrakousai during the Athenian invasion were large, bloody and of great

⁷⁷⁰ On an operational level, not the tactical level. As seen in Chapter 6, tactically speaking Kimon reverted back to older-style tactics by focusing on boarding actions rather than manoeuvre and ramming.

⁷⁷¹ Plut. *Kim.* 12.4-13.4. Diodoros' account differs significantly in details, with the naval battle occurring off Cyprus and then a land battle at Eurymedon. He does not mention a second fleet action. Diod. 11.60.5-7. Thuc. only mentions a sea and a land battle at Eurymedon and that the Greek under Kimon were victorious and captured the entire Phoenician fleet. Thuc. 1.110.1.

⁷⁷² The confrontation at Sybota off Kerkyra at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War might arguably come under this type, but it is a complicated affair and it could be argued that the Peloponnesians were more interested in capturing the Kerkyraian fleet rather than destroying it.

significance, but were a result of blockade and the Athenian attempts to break a blockade, not deliberate actions to annihilate the battle fleet of the other side. Finally, Aigispotamoi was not a conventional naval battle and Sparta avoided engaging at sea, the canny Lysandros waiting for a more opportune moment to catch the Athenian fleet mostly ashore. All these examples contrast with the battles of Lade and Salamis, where the fleets sailed out for a decisive battle, not terribly different from two land armies marching out onto a field to meet for pitched battle. By the end of the century,⁷⁷³ fleets were still fighting for sea control, but naval operations had become far more complex. Much of this was due to scale and the increasing demands put on fleets: supporting amphibious campaigns, protecting trade and collecting tribute.

This trend appears to have continued in the fourth century. The century was bookended by two large naval battles, both decisive in their own way, but there appear to have been few large-scale engagements in-between.⁷⁷⁴ In a deliberate fleet action at Knidos, the Spartan fleet suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the Persians, led by the Athenian admiral Konon (Diod. 14.83.4-7). Towards the end of the century in 322 at Amorgos, the Athenians sailed out to confront the Macedonians under the command of Kleitos but were defeated.⁷⁷⁵ Both of these examples help to demonstrate that pitched battle could still be decisive, and seen to be so by the major powers, in the fourth century. However, the pattern of the mid- to late fifth century remained, with naval and maritime forces engaging in a wide spectrum of combat and non-combat operations. Battle at sea occurred, but as in the Peloponnesian War not so much as an end in and of itself, but as a core enabler of other operations. Far more common were small scale fleet actions aimed at a blockade or interdicting trade or protecting troops ashore. Much of this appears to be due to the stretched resources of the different *poleis*, insomuch as fleets were expensive and finances

⁷⁷³ This was a trend perhaps originating at the time of Eurymedon and through the *pentekontaetia*, but it difficult to track this trend due to the paucity of sources.

⁷⁷⁴ The Social War seems to be the most logical candidate for a large-scale naval battle to have occurred, yet there is no mention in the sources of anything like this. Surely a large victory or especially a defeat at sea would be something that the orators, particularly Demosthenes, would have mentioned. Diodoros mentions the Athenian *strategos* Chabrias dying in a naval engagement in the harbour at Chios (Diod. 16.7.3-4). Despite the violence of the aforementioned battle, described by Diodoros as a *καρτερός ναυμαχία*, it seems then that the Social War quite probably did not see a large naval battle.

⁷⁷⁵ Details of the engagement are very sketchy, but it appears that the Athenians essentially withdrew without putting up much of a fight. Plut. *Mor.* 338a; *Demetr.* 11.3. See also Chapter 7.

increasingly stretched. This certainly appears to have been a factor in Athens, where it was only the reforms of Lykourgos that helped boost the city's finances, although arguably too late to have been of help.⁷⁷⁶ It is also possible that poleis were more risk-averse and avoided large battles at sea as being too costly. The Athenian *strategos* Laches' decision not to engage the Theban fleet was surely based on a rational assessment of the two fleets' capabilities and could be seen as prudent casualty avoidance. Considering that the Theban fleet quickly reverted to irrelevance this seems all the more prudent and Laches may have seen the need to preserve the Athenian fleet in the face of growing unrest by their allies. Large scale hoplite battles were also rare during the fourth century and so should not be surprising that there were few large battles at sea.

A core task for navies that remained unchanged throughout the fifth and fourth centuries was that of maritime power projection. The ability to project power across the seas was of great importance and was a defining feature of the Peloponnesian and later wars, down to Demosthenes' efforts at containing Philip of Macedon in northern Greece and Thrace. Whereas the projection of power across the seas was very limited – though not absent – in the sixth century and earlier, it was the practice of Athenian sea power from the mid-fifth century onwards that helped define a new way of warfare. In the words of Josiah Ober: 'Wars were fought in far-flung places, by naval forces in close coordination with land armies, and according to complex strategic plans.'⁷⁷⁷ As I have said before, this did not represent the supersession of land armies or other such revisionist ideas, but that warfare became more complex and navies were integral to most of the military operations conducted in the period, even if only in a supporting role. Such supporting roles, like sea lift or providing cover, while not glamorous, still represented a powerful enabler to projecting power. It also remained a simple geographic fact that in order to control the Aegean littoral, especially the islands, the ability to project power with a naval force was the key. Athens, Sparta and Thebes all attempted such control and all developed their sea

⁷⁷⁶ Athenian finances fell to a low of 130 talents annual income, only recovering to 400 in the late 340s. Burke (2010): 394. Burke gives a thorough account of Athenian finances for the era leading up to the Lamian War, which includes an examination of the maritime considerations given to boosting revenue such as encouraging maritime traders with citizenship, for example. See: Burke (2010): 393-423.

⁷⁷⁷ With the caveat that 'strategic plans' mixes two different concepts, admittedly a trifling point but worth noting in light of my previous points about the difference between proper strategy, which accounts for an adversary's potential countermoves, and a plan which does not. Ober (2006): 137.

power to this end, with varying degrees of success. Any major power that had ambitions lying beyond mainland Greece simply had to have a navy.

Diplomatic Operations

Of all the different maritime operations explored, the conduct of diplomatic operations seems to have changed the least over time. The political landscape and diplomatic relations between Greek states varied wildly over the period; however, maritime forces and navies in particular were used in a similar manner throughout. A force of warships was still useful in projecting power and reassuring allies or warning potential enemies, across both the fifth and fourth centuries (and beyond).

Both Athens and Sparta used their navies to collect tribute, both from paying 'allies' and from neutral or even hostile poleis. When collecting from neutral powers, such activity should be viewed as a coercive use of sea power, projecting power to threaten and extort money. More than this, such force projection could be and was used to bring *poleis* into a league or alliance. In the case of a polis that was a contributing member to a league or alliance, such collection activities straddle the line between what might be considered coercive diplomacy and constabulary operations. Warships collecting tribute from allied poleis were really acting as a police force in the absence of such an institution in the Greek world. A warship would ensure that the ally in question complied with the collection and would present a hard target for pirates or enemy vessels. It is here that the distinctions made in the 'spectrum of maritime operations' do not fit neatly with the Classical Greek world. The lines between diplomatic coercion and routine constabulary operation when collecting tribute are often blurry, for instance. This is far from a problem, and illustrates the point that the spectrum is a guide, a useful analytical tool that should not be used prescriptively. It also illustrates how maritime operations have evolved over the intervening centuries, with the constabulary function of navies taking a more distinct role in their operations.

Constabulary Operations

Constabulary operations themselves changed very little over the period examined.⁷⁷⁸ It was rather the political and strategic situation that changed and saw these sorts of operations fluctuate in prominence. Piracy was an enduring matter of concern in the Mediterranean from at least the Bronze Age until the Late Republic and early Principate in Rome when Roman dominance over the Mediterranean littoral was absolute, truly turning it into a Roman lake.

The key factor in piracy was the proliferation of maritime trade. As maritime trade increased in importance from the early Archaic period onwards this significantly increased the number of seaborne targets as well as enriched coastal cities and thus made them potentially lucrative targets for attack. It appears as if one of the first and roles of navies was to help combat piracy, with the larger sea powers seeking to suppress piracy in a broad sense. True piracy, as defined in Chapter Nine, was not very prominent in the ancient sources during the fifth century. This could in part be a source issue, yet by and large piracy seems to have been a minor issue for the most of the Greeks at this time, almost certainly because of the Delian League and the regional stability underwritten by Athenian sea power. Regular Athenian naval patrols were a common fixture, fulfilling both a diplomatic and a constabulary role. The prevalence of piracy waxed and waned depending on the ability of different regional powers to exert some form of stability on the region, from the Delian League and Athenian Empire in the fifth century, to the Second Athenian League and then Macedon in the fourth century.⁷⁷⁹ The Spartans do not seem to have had much interest in constabulary operations during the short period when they were the dominant sea power in the Aegean. This appears to have been a result of what was a tenuous hold on their power, and their navy was often taken up with imperial duties. After their loss to Konon at Knidos it is fair to say that their navy was more concerned with peer-competitors and attacking Athenian trade than in patrolling for piracy. The most notable change over time concerning piracy and constabulary operations was in the prevalence of private naval

⁷⁷⁸ Examined in Chapter 9.

⁷⁷⁹ Although beyond the period examined in this thesis, it is worth noting that the island of Rhodos took up the mantle of piracy suppression at the very end of the fourth century and into the third century. See: Gabrielsen (1997) and (2013).

forces, often engaged in what might be termed 'privateering'. These privateers were used by the Spartans especially in the Peloponnesian war, but in the fourth century they become more prominent throughout the Aegean. This seems to go hand in hand with the increasing professionalization of Greek military forces and their ability to sell themselves out as mercenaries. Experienced sailors and rowers could make a good living off their particular skills.

In the attitudes, technology and the actual conduct of maritime operations over the course of the fifth and fourth centuries we can see both change and continuity. Certainly, by the end of the Classical period and the beginning of the Hellenistic, technology had changed substantially. Warships got bigger, with bigger crews and thus all of the attendant concerns such as increased infrastructure and especially finance requirements. However, this technology change came relatively late and it did not fundamentally alter the strategic uses of sea power. Navies still policed the seas and conducted diplomatic operations, were still potent at reassuring friends and coercing or threatening enemies and recalcitrant allies alike. Ultimately, though pitched battle was rare, navies were still expected to engage in combat operations and two naval battles at either end of the fourth century, Knidos and Amorgos, coincided with the downfall of the two hegemonic sea powers of the period, Sparta and Athens respectively. On a strategic level, the core roles of navies across the spectrum of maritime operations remained relatively unchanged.

Conclusion

The sea was an important factor in the Greek world: geographically, conceptually, politically and especially militarily. The maritime realm was one in which all the Greek poleis had an interest, whether it be through trade, transportation or conquest.⁷⁸⁰ Sea power was not limited to the well-known maritime powers such as Korinth and Athens, but was acquired by almost all of the hegemonic powers of the fifth and fourth centuries including the traditionally land-centric Sparta and Thebes, two poleis not usually associated with sea power or naval pursuits. More than this, smaller poleis often found reason to build a navy and sea power was not limited to larger poleis. Greek settlement across the Mediterranean, from Massalia and Sicily in the west to the Black Sea colonies in the east, was largely littoral in geography and in conscious outlook. The Greeks settled on the sea as they expanded outwards. They were bound to the sea, not just physically and practically, but on a profoundly deep level emotionally and psychologically. They did not only trade and fight across the sea, they also established deep networks based on a strong maritime consciousness, networks that transcended ethnic or political considerations. Sea power is used to influence events ashore and the vast majority of Greeks lived within range of the sea.

Practically speaking, it is not tenable to claim that the Greeks were limited in their maritime pursuits by technology or skill to the extent that has often been claimed. Notions such as 'hugging the coast', not sailing in winter, not sailing at night are demonstrably false. Certainly, sailing during winter or at night increased the risk, but the maritime environment is inherently hazardous and risk is always a factor. Then, as now, need – whether in peace or war – drove mariners to sea. No doubt advances in modern technology will help the field of underwater archaeology uncover even more shipwrecks and further evidence of the interconnectedness of the Mediterranean maritime realm. More than just technology and need, the Greeks were clearly cognitively equipped to navigate their way

⁷⁸⁰ The core uses of the sea: as a resource, as a medium of transportation, as a medium of information, and as a medium for dominion, discussed in the Introduction, following: Till (2013): 6.

across all seas at all times. It is necessary to dispel any notion of the Greeks as using the sea in only the most 'primitive' of ways.

More than just a useful medium for trade, transportation and war, the sea also lived large in the minds of the Greeks. The sea was of immense importance in their myths and stories. Many of the gods and deities and almost all heroes had a connection to the sea, from the minor to the defining. Jason, Herakles, Theseus and the heroes of the *Iliad* all had recourse to the maritime realm, and in the retellings of their adventures the language of the sea found its way onto the stage and into the minds of the Greeks. The sea power *par excellence* of the Classical period, Athens, constantly discussed the sea and the maritime realm: in comedies, tragedies, law court and public speeches and in the writings of historians and philosophers alike. Athens had a clear maritime consciousness, so much so that it could generate rabid opposition from the likes of oligarchs and philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle.

The rich array of sources makes this maritime consciousness clear while highlighting an issue that bedevils much of the study of the period: Athenocentric sources. It is clear that other poleis had a developed maritime consciousness, places such as Korinth, Aigina, and Leukas, all strong sea powers at one time or another. However, we can only infer this third hand from Athenian sources or snippets from later historians and archaeological evidence. Nevertheless, in examining the maritime operations that dominated much of the fifth and fourth centuries it is obvious that places other than Athens had a taste for sea power and a public will to focus on some form of maritime strategy. From the Persian Wars down to the Peloponnesian War, a wide variety of poleis contributed naval forces as part of a coalition. These contributions should not be seen as tokenistic, but rather as vital to interstate relationships and the maintenance of political alliances and leagues. We know how capital intensive even a small navy was, and added to the cost of infrastructure such as shipsheds it is clear that investing in a maritime and especially a naval capability was not done lightly or on a whim. When the polis of Leukas contributed 10 ships to the Korinthian alliance to fight at Sybota (Thuc. 1.46.1), its citizens were in fact making a contribution that represented many talents worth of capital investment and some 2000 or so personnel. Strategic circumstances dictated that many poleis needed to maintain a navy for local

defence as well as for contributing to larger alliances and coalitions. By the fourth century this need was even more acute and we see poleis building and retaining larger navies. This can be seen, for example, in the Social War of the 350s where a group of littoral and island poleis banded together and successfully fought off Athenian sea power, no mean feat and one which must have involved a strong focus on the sea and maritime matters. They certainly learned a lesson from the Delian League and how sea power could be turned into Aegean wide hegemony, and that the best counter to this was to embrace a maritime strategy of one's own.

This thesis is by no means the last word on sea power during the period. It has focused heavily on Athens and Sparta and there is a great deal of room to explore the sea power of other poleis, such as Korinth, Aigina, Syrakousai and Leukas. Clearly there was a strong maritime focus in all of these places (and others) and sea power was a central concern. While I have not explored the sea power of these places in great detail, I have attempted to create a theoretical framework for investigating the sea power of all poleis in the Greek world. This theoretical framework is built upon a rather simple definition of sea power. It is worth returning to Admiral Richmond's definition, one that makes it clear how widespread this phenomenon was in the Greek world:

Sea Power is that form of national strength which enables its possessor to send his armies and commerce across those stretches of sea and ocean which lie between his country or the countries of his allies, and those territories to which he needs access in war; and to prevent his enemy from doing the same.⁷⁸¹

When casting our eye back to the Classical period we can clearly discern this 'national strength' in evidence, across the Greek world and not just limited to the 'great powers'. This becomes more evident when we build upon this basic definition to explore the complexities of naval operations. These operations are conducted across a broad spectrum, in military, diplomatic and constabulary (or policing) roles.⁷⁸² These roles are fluid rather than prescriptive and the inherent flexibility of navies can see them moving from one role to another in quick succession or even simultaneously.

⁷⁸¹ Richmond (1947): ix.

⁷⁸² As elaborated by Ken Booth and Eric Grove. See: Booth (1977): 16; Grove (1990): 234; and Australian Maritime Doctrine (2010): 100.

Military operations, both at and from the sea, were (and always have been) of central importance to the function of navies. It is the base which allows the diplomatic and constabulary roles to function effectively. Combat operations at sea allowed for all other combat and non-combat operations to be conducted. To be able to effectively engage another fleet in battle is what allowed a polis to protect its own interest at sea and to project its power across the seas. This battle at sea could be a deliberate engagement but often came about as the result of other maritime operations such as protecting critical sea lanes or conducting amphibious operations or a blockade, as at Arginousai in 406. The Peloponnesian War, the defining conflict of the later fifth century, was itself defined by the ability of Athens and Sparta to project power across the sea. Athenian sea power led to the Peace of Nikias and it was only when Sparta embraced a maritime strategy itself that the Spartans were able to prevail over Athens. This was not the defeat of a sea power by a land power, but by another sea power, however short-lived. If the fourth century saw less outright battle at sea, this was not due to a degradation of naval power overall but in fact to the diffusion of sea power across the Aegean, so that there was no outright naval hegemon for most of the century. Even the navies of smaller poleis were required to engage in combat operations at a high level, as witnessed by their presence in the battle line at major engagements, like the 19 poleis who contributed triremes and pentekontors to the Greek contingent at Salamis in addition to the Athenians and Spartans (Hdt. 8.45-48). In this example we also see the fluid nature of the spectrum of operations, for the polis of Kroton in southern Italy sent a single ship. This polis, far removed physically from the Persian threat, felt some imperative to send aid to the other Greeks. In the practical, operational sense, this ship conducted military operations by taking up a position in the naval battle at Salamis. At the same time this single ship sent some 450 nm was fulfilling a diplomatic role by showing Kroton's commitment to the other Greek poleis.

Navies remained a powerful diplomatic tool over the period, able to reassure, threaten, or both. Warships especially could be a highly visible signal of a polis' resolve to aid an ally, or they could be a highly visible sign of a polis' displeasure. As noted above, coalition contributions by smaller poleis signalled their commitment to alliances or leagues, while simultaneously being involved in combat or other operations. Larger poleis, such as Athens and Sparta, could use their sea power to coerce others into joining or remaining in

an alliance as well as to extract money short of using force. Tribute collection, from allies and non-allies, could be made easier with the presence of several warships. The mere existence of a powerful navy, a 'fleet-in-being', could be used by a polis as a bargaining tool. The Kerkyrians exercised great influence at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, using the existence of their large navy as a bargaining tool for an alliance. The short-lived Theban experiment with a navy seems to have been entirely diplomatic in nature, a force aimed at convincing members of the Second Athenian League that Thebes was committed to fighting Athens and possessed the capability to do so with a large fleet. This example neatly demonstrates an important fact of maritime operations: without a proven capability to engage in combat operations, a fleet is not effective diplomatically. The Theban fleet did not at any stage prove itself in combat and so allies of Athens were unwilling to join Thebes against Athens. The Theban fleet was an expensive failure in both diplomacy and naval operations.

Finally, navies were quite capable at conducting low-level operations in the 'constabulary' role. In the Classical Greek world this meant primarily countering pirates, an enduring threat of variable significance over the period. Piracy existed for as long as people went to sea, and it was only with the establishment of powerful and willing poleis that it was suppressed. Whether or not earlier thalassocracies, if they really existed, actually made it their policy to suppress piracy, it is obvious that in the fifth century Athenian maritime hegemony was crucial in maintaining 'good order at sea'. The prosperity and even survival of Athens and the Delian League was predicated on the safety of merchant shipping and so the threat of piracy was one that Athens helped suppress. This does not mean an eradication of piracy, but a situation where it was pushed to the periphery and limited in its activities. The frequent turmoil of the fourth century and lack of a maritime hegemon for much of the time seems to have coincided with a resurgence in piracy. Whether they were actively attacking pirates at sea or their bases on land, or were passively patrolling the sea lanes, navies were an invaluable tool in suppressing piracy. On the other end of the spectrum, navies were also useful in more benign constabulary operations such as the evacuation of civilians from a city. This may seem trivial but it certainly would not have been to the civilians of Athens or Himera who in being evacuated by the navy were spared

an unknown and probably violent fate. A well-equipped and trained navy, prepared for high-level operations, could be useful for many tasks outside of combat.

All that remains is to consider whether the modern conceptual framework used to study sea power in the ancient Greek world is useful in its tripartite categorisation of military, diplomatic, and constabulary operations. The use of naval forces for military operations, both at and from the sea is obvious and requires little further comment other than that this dual use of sea power on the military spectrum has changed little. Naval forces conduct operations at or from the sea in order to gain an effect on matters ashore. Whether in battle with another fleet, interdicting or protecting trade, or conducting amphibious operations this is as true about the ancient Greeks as it is about sea power in all the ages that followed. The distinction between diplomatic and constabulary operations is more problematic. As discussed, this is partly a source problem, especially in matters that we would think of as constabulary: there is little written on counter-piracy or other operations of a similar nature. We have little insight into how the Greeks thought about such matters, aside from a general disdain for 'pirates'. In the realm of naval diplomacy, things are somewhat clearer, with unambiguous examples of warships as diplomatic instruments, such as Perikles' mid-fifth century power-projection cruise. Other operations pose a problem of categorisation: was tribute collection diplomatic, constabulary or both? While many cases like this pose a problem, it is not one that exists in isolation, and it can be difficult to categorise naval operations so neatly in the modern world.⁷⁸³ Yet, as imperfect as these categorisations remain, as must any attempt at categorisation, they are still useful as a theoretical framework for the study of sea power during the period. It illustrates the many ways in which the Greeks used their navies for all manner of strategic ends, in peace and especially in war. As I have said, they should not be used prescriptively, but as a guide to the wide spectrum of maritime operations observable in the ancient Greek world.

Having reviewed the role of sea power in the Classical Greek world, it is clear that it was of central importance in defining the period. None of this revision requires us to decide upon sea or land power as 'better', or as more influential. Rather, this thesis has attempted to demonstrate that sea power was often, though not always, a determining factor in many

⁷⁸³ As discussed in Chapter 8, page 223.

of the events of the fifth and fourth centuries. At times it was the defining factor, such as at Salamis, the Great Harbour of Syrakousai, and off the coast of Knidos in 394. Sea power was immensely important, more so than many scholars of the ancient (and modern) world have credited. This does not prove the supremacy of sea power, but rather its great utility, reach and effectiveness, especially when combined with land power. It also demonstrates that land power can be all but useless in the face of overwhelming sea power, under certain conditions. This is not to endorse a sea power/land power dichotomy – a false one – but to say that sea power is not just naval power, and that land power need not refer only to the phalanx.

The sea and sea power should not be viewed as of secondary importance or as standing on the periphery of events, but as of great significance in shaping the events of the fifth and fourth centuries of Greek history. The sea lived large in the minds and everyday lives of the Greeks. They may have been scattered like frogs around a pond, but it was their interactions on and across that pond that defined their world.

Appendix 1 – Database of maritime operations

Military Operations

Year	Area/Location	Notes	Reference
546-528	Thrake, Naxos	Athenian Tyrant Peisistratos establishes Athenian influence over River Strymon in Thrake and conquers island of Naxos	Hdt. 1.64.1-2
548/7	Samos	Samians (allegedly) intercept Spartan vessel on its way to Sardis. Samian motive unknown.	Hdt. 1.70
546	Sparta & Lydia	Spartans prepare a force to sail to Lydia and help their ally Kroesos. Kroesos captured before Spartans can sail.	Hdt. 1.83
545	Phokaea	Phokaeans return to their city and destroy the Persian garrison there.	Hdt. 1.165.2
539	Korsica	60 Phokaeon ships battle combined force of 60 Etruscan and Carthaginian ships. 'Kadmean' victory for Phokaeans.	Hdt. 1.166
525?	Samos	Polykrates Tyrant of Samos conquers many islands and attacks 'everyone without exception'.	Hdt. 3.39
525?	Samos/Egypt	At request of Cambyses, Polykrates sends 40 triremes in aid to expedition to Egypt. Crews consist of citizens of questionable loyalty to Polykrates.	Hdt. 3.44.2
525	Samos	Spartans and Korinthians attack Samos.	Hdt. 3.47-48, 3.54, 3.56
524	Siphnos	Samians sail to Siphnos and request a loan. When denied, Samians ravage the island and defeat the Siphnians in a land battle.	Hdt. 3.58
524	Kydonia, Kreta	Samians settled at Kydonia in Kreta are defeated in a naval battle by combined force of Kretans and Aiginetans.	Hdt. 3.59
511/510(?)	Sybaris, Italy	Spartan prince Dorieus leads expedition to Italy and fight with Kroton against Sybaris.	Hdt. 5.43-45
505(?)	Attika	Aiginetans raid the coast of Attika in an 'undeclared war'.	Hdt. 5.81
505	Aigina	Athens send ships to Aigina. Conflicting story on events.	Hdt. 5.85.86

498	Hellespont & Karia	Ionians sail to the Hellespont and take Byzantion and other cities. Sail to Karia and secure 'the greater part of Caria' as their ally.	Hdt. 5.103
496	Cyprus	Ionians fight the Phoenicians off Cyprus. Ionians sail off after the Persians are victorious on land.	Hdt. 5.108-116
494	Byzantion	Ionian Histiaios mans 8 triremes from Lesbos and sails to Byzantion where he intercepts ships sailing out of the Pontos.	Hdt. 6.5
494	Lade, Miletus	Battle of Lade. 353 Greek triremes vs 600 Persian ships. Persians victorious.	Hdt. 6.7-15
494	Sicily	Dionysios of Phokaea sails to Sicily and becomes a ' <i>leistēs</i> ', but never attacking the ships of the Hellenes.	Hdt. 6.17
490	Attika	Aiginetans ambush and seize Athenian ship carrying religious and political officials.	Hdt. 6.87
490	Aigina	Athens buys 20 ships from Korinth, sails to Aigina with force of 70 ships. Athens wins sea battle, defeated in a second sea battle.	Hdt. 6.89-93
490	Aigina/Attika	Aiginetan exiles settled by Athens at Cape Sounion. From there they launch raids against Aigina.	Hdt. 6.90
490	Paros	Athenian leader Miltiades with 70 ships besieges island of Paros but fails.	Hdt. 6.132-135
496	Lemnos	Miltiades conquers island of Lemnos.	Hdt. 6.137-140
480	Sicily	Gelon of Syrakousai readying force to sail to Greece and aid in their defence against Persia.	Diod. 11.26.4-5
480	Thessaly	Combined naval/land force goes north to defend the pass at Tempe. Navy acts as a 'covering force'. No contact made.	Hdt. 7.173
480	Artemision	Combined naval/land force defends Artemision & Thermopylai. Greek navy holds off Persian force, retreats after Greek defeat on land.	Hdt. 7.175-8.21
480	Salamis	Battle of Salamis. Greeks win decisive victory.	Hdt. 8.84-96
480	Aegean	Greek Fleet begins pursuit of defeated Persian fleet towards the Hellespont. Decides against destroying Hellespontine bridges.	Hdt. 8.108
480	Andros	Greek fleet besieges island of Andros having demanded money and been refused.	Hdt. 8.111
479	Samos & Mykale	Greek fleet pursues Persians who decline battle. Persians land at Mykale and are defeated in battle.	Hdt. 9.90-106

479	Hellespont	Greek fleet sails to Hellespont. Peloponnesians retreat but Athenians stay and besiege Sestos.	Hdt. 9.114-118
478	Hellespont	Pausanias leads 20 Peloponnesian, 30 Athenian and number of allies and subdues most of Cyprus, then take Byzantion from the Persians.	Thuc. 1.94
474	Italy	Cumae in Italy asks Hieron of Syrakousai for aid against the Tyrrhenians, who were rulers of the sea at that time. Tyrrhenians defeated in a great naval battle.	Diod. 11.51.1-2
476-467	Aegean	Delian league takes Eion, Skyros, Karystos on Euboea and retake Naxos after a revolt.	Thuc. 1.98
467(?)	Eurymedon River	Athenians win decisive victory over Persians at Eurymedon River. Entire Phoenician fleet of 200 ships destroyed.	Thuc. 1.100.1
466	Syrakousai	Thrasybulus attempts to gain tyranny in Syrakousai, defeated in a battle and loses a number of triremes.	Diod. 11.68.3
465?	Thasos	Thasos revolts. Athenians win a naval battle and eventually take Thasos.	Thuc. 1.100.2-1.101
461	Syrakousai	Syrakousans fighting against mercenaries in revolt, defeat the rebels in battle.	Diod. 11.76.1
460-454(?)	Cyprus/Egypt	200 Athenian and allied ships on an expedition in Cyprus agree to aid in Egyptian revolt.	Thuc. 1.104
459(?)	Troizen	Athenian amphibious assault on Halieis defeated. Afterwards, Athenians defeat Peloponnesian fleet off Kekryphalia.	Thuc. 1.105.1
458?	Aigina	Athenians defeat Aiginetans and take 70 ships. Athens lands force and begins siege.	Thuc. 1.105.2
457	Peloponnesos	Athenians under Tolmides sail around the Peloponnesos, attacking Gythion, taking Chalcis and attacking and defeating Sikyon.	Thuc. 1.108.5
454(?)	Egypt	Persians defeat Egyptian and Athenian forces, relief force of 50 Athenian ships also defeated in battle.	Thuc. 1.109-110
454	Sikyon	Perikles leads amphibious force and defeat Sikyons, besieges Oeniadai but fails to take it.	Thuc. 1.111.2-3; Plut. Per. 19.2-3
451	Cyprus & Egypt	200 Athenian and allied vessels sail to Cyprus. 60 detached to Egypt. Remaining force defeats Phoenicians, Cyprians and Cilicians by land and sea.	Thuc. 1.112.1-4
444	Sth. Italy	Thurii and Tarantum engaged in constant raiding and skirmishing by land and sea. Inconclusive.	Diod. 12.23.2

441/0	Samos	44 Athenian ships under Perikles defeat 70 Samian vessels - 20 transports - off island of Tragia. 16 other Athenian ships on scouting mission.	Thuc. 1.116.1
441-440	Samos	Athenians reinforced by 40 Athenian and 25 Chian and Lesbian vessels and conduct successful 9-month siege of Samos.	Thuc. 1.116.2-1.117
435	Epidamnos	Kerkyraians send 25 ships to Epidamnos and make demands. Upon being refused, commence operations with 40 ships.	Thuc. 1.26.3-4
435	Epidamnos	Korinthians and allies with 75 ships sail to Epidamnos. Defeated by 80 Kerkyraian ships as remaining 40 ships continue siege of Epidamnos.	Thuc. 1.27-29
435	Ionian Gulf	Kerkyraians ravage Leukas and Kyllene. Korinthians rebuild fleet and sail to Actium to protect and reassure their allies.	Thuc. 1.30
432	Makedonia	30 Athenian Ships operating in the area.	Thuc. 1.59
431	Peloponnesos	100 Athenian Ships, later joined by 50 ships from Kerkyra.	Thuc. 2.23; 2.25; 2.30
431	Lokris	30 Athenian Ships Concurrent with attack on the Peloponnesos above.	Thuc. 2.26
430	Peloponnesos	Perikles leads 100 Athenian ships, with horse transports, plus 50 ships from Chios and Lesbos. They attack 5 different cities in the Peloponnesos.	Thuc 2.56
430	Zakynthos	Sp. and unnamed allies with 100 ships.	Thuc. 2.66
430/429	Naupaktos	20 Athenian Ships intercept trade.	Thuc. 2.69
429	Akarnania	Sp. Combined land and sea attack against Akarnania, with hope of subsequently taking islands of Zakynthos and Kephallenia and hindering Athenian movements in the area.	Thuc. 2.80
429	Krisaian Gulf	Phormion's ships intercept large contingent of Korinthian ships carry troops and routs them.	Thuc. 2.83-5
429	Naupaktos	Vastly superior Sp. fleet challenges Athenian fleet stationed at Naupaktos. Athens victorious.	Thuc. 2.86-92
429/8	Salamis	Spartans with 40 vessels plan attack on the Peiraius, attack island of Salamis instead.	Thuc. 2.94-5
428	Mytilene, Lesbos	Athenians blockade Mytilene, in revolt.	Thuc. 3.6
428	Peloponnesos	Athenians with 30 ships raid along the coast.	Thuc. 3.7

428	Peloponnesos	100 Athenian ships attack Peloponnesos while also maintaining siege of Mytilene as a demonstration of power, explicitly aimed at Sp. But implicitly at Athenian Allies considering revolt.	Thuc. 3.16
427	eastern Aegean	Sparta sends 42 ships to relieve Mytilene. City surrenders before they reach it. Spartan Admiral attacks several different places in the eastern Aegean.	Thuc. 3.26-33
427	Minoa, Megara	Athenians captures and garrisons island to blockade Megara and prevent the sailing out of Sp. privateers.	Thuc. 3.51
427	Kerkyra	Kerkyraians launch disorganised attack against Sparta and are routed. Spartans flee when Athenian relief fleet arrives.	Thuc. 3.77-81
427/6	Sicily	Athenians and 30 Rhegian ships attack Aeolian islands in the winter.	Thuc. 3.88
426	Melos	Athenians with 60 ships attack the island since it would not submit to the Athenian alliance.	Thuc. 3.91
426	Peloponnesos	Concurrent with the attack on Melos, 30 ships attack the Peloponnesos. Reinforced by 15 Kerkyraian ships.	Thuc. 3.91; 3.94
426	Lokroi, Italy	Athenian ships in Sicily take fort on the river Halex.	Thuc. 3.99
426	Aetolia	Demosthenes with allies establishes base at Oineion.	Thuc. 3.95-98
426	Naupaktos	Demosthenes with 1000 hoplites reinforces the city of Naupaktos by sea and saves it.	Thuc. 3.102
426/5	Peloponnesos	20 Athenian ships said to be cruising off the Peloponnesos, no further details given.	Thuc. 3.105
426/5	Himera, Sicily	Athens attacks Himera in Sicily as well as the Aeolian islands. 40 additional ships sent by Athenian to aid the Sicilian expedition and bring it to an end.	Thuc. 3.115
425	Messana, Sicily	Force from Syrakousai & Lokris reinforces Messana at their invitation. Messana revolts from Athens Improves strategic position and enables them to control strait of Messana.	Thuc. 4.1
425	Kerkyra	Both sides send ships to Kerkyra to influence events there. Athenians given permission to use fleet against the coast of the Peloponnesos enroute.	Thuc. 4.2-3
425	Pylos, Messenia	Amphibious campaign by both sides around Pylos and the island of Sphakteria. Sparta offer peace terms, Athens refuses. Athenian victory.	Thuc. 4.3-41
425	Sicily	Syrakousai and their allies attack Rhegion. Naval battle, Athens victorious.	Thuc. 4.24-25

425	Korinth/Argolid	80 Athenian ships attack Korinthian territory and the Argolid.	Thuc. 4.42-45
424	Kythera	60 Athenian Ships attack and garrison island of Kythera.	Thuc. 4.53-54
424	Megara	Athenians land on island of Minoa off Megara and launch combined land and sea attack.	Thuc. 4.67
424/3	Boiotia	40 Athenian ships plan attack on city of Siphos, plan betrayed and operation cancelled. Ships then unsuccessfully raid Sikyonian coast.	Thuc. 4.76-77, 89, 101.3
424/3	Chalkidike	7 Athenian ships under command of Thucydides fail to relieve city of Amphipolis in time from Sp. attack. Athenians save the city of Eion.	Thuc. 4.104-107
423	Chalkidike	40 Athenian. and 10 Chian ships attack and take city of Mende.	Thuc. 4.129
422	Thrace	30 Athenian ships attack Skione and Torone.	Thuc. 5.2
419/8	Argolid	Spartans elude Athenian patrols and transport 300 men to city of Epidaurus.	Thuc. 5.56
416	Melos	38 Athenian and allied ships attack the island of Melos (scene of the Melian dialogue)	Thuc. 5.84
415	The Argolid	30 Athenian ships and force of Argives besiege Orneai.	Thuc. 6.7.2
415	Macedonia	Concurrent with above operation, Athenians and Makedonian allies sail to Makedonia and attack country of Perdikkas.	Thuc. 6.7.3-4
415	Italy/Sicily	Athens launches the Sicilian expedition. Musters in Kerkyra and sails for Rhegion in Italy.	Thuc. 6.42-43
415	Syrakousai	Athenians raid Syrakousai territory.	Thuc. 6.52
415	Sicily	Athenian fleet splits into 2 contingents, sail around Sicily and conduct limited raiding.	Thuc. 6.62
415/4	Syrakousai	Athenians launch first attack on city of Syrakousai by land and sea.	Thuc. 6.65
414	Sicily	Athenians raid along the coast near Katana.	Thuc. 6.94
414	Syrakousai	Athenians launch second attack on Syrakousai.	Thuc. 6.97
414	Peloponnesos	30 Athenian ships go to the relief of Argos, breaking the treaty between Sparta and Athens.	Thuc. 6.105
414	Italy	20 Athenian ships sent to interdict Korinthian ships sailing for Syrakousai.	Thuc. 7.4.7
414	Syrakousai	12 Peloponnesian ships arrive in Syrakousai to reinforce the city.	Thuc. 7.7
414	Amphipolis	Athenians Blockade Amphipolis.	Thuc. 7.9

414/3	Naupaktos	Athenians attempt to interdict Korinthian merchant vessels sailing to Sicily. Korinthians send escorts and successfully prevent the Athenians from attacking the transports.	Thuc. 7.17; 7.19.5
413	Peloponnesos	60 Athenian ships attack the Peloponnesos enroute to Sicily. Concurrent with Argos operation.	Thuc. 7.20
413	Syrakousai	1st naval battle in the Great Harbour of Syrakousai. Athens victorious at sea but Syrakousans capture important land fortification.	Thuc. 7.22-24
413	Italy	11 Syrakousan ships attack and destroy Athenian transports in Italy.	Thuc. 7.25.1-2
413	Sicily	Athenian ships near Megara, Sicily fail to intercept all but 1 ship bound for Syrakousai.	Thuc. 7.25.3-5
413	Peloponnesos	Athenians fortify an isthmus in Lakonia opposite island of Kythera.	Thuc. 7.26
413	Thebes	Mercenaries from Thrake sent back to their homeland by Athens raid along the coast in Thebes on the return journey.	Thuc. 7.27, 29
413	Naupaktos	Athens and Korinth engage in battle near Naupaktos.	Thuc. 7.34
413	Syrakousai	2nd naval battle in the Great Harbour of Syrakousai.	Thuc. 7.36-41
413	Syrakousai	3rd naval battle in the Great Harbour of Syrakousai.	Thuc. 7.52-55
413	Syrakousai	4th naval battle in the Great Harbour of Syrakousai. Athens finally defeated.	Thuc. 7.70-72
413/2	Attika	Athenians fortify and garrison ships at Cape Sounion to protect grain ships.	Thuc. 8.4
412	Saronic Gulf	Athenian intercept and destroy Spartan ships bound for Chios.	Thuc. 8.10-11
412	Leukas	Athenians intercept Spartan ships sailing back from Sicily.	Thuc. 8.13
412	Aegean	Athenians intercept and take small Chian squadron.	Thuc. 8.19
412	Speiraios	Spartans break Athenian blockade and sail out.	Thuc. 8.20
412	Lesbos	Chians and Sparta incite revolt in Methymna and Mytilene on Lesbos.	Thuc. 8.22
412	Lesbos	Athenian counterattack puts down revolt on Lesbos.	Thuc. 8.23
412	Miletos	Athenian forces blockading Miletos attack the surrounding territory.	Thuc. 8.24
412	Chios	Athenians defeat and blockade the Chians.	Thuc. 8.24
412	Miletos	48 Athenian ships sail to Miletos and are victorious; subsequently retire after declining battle with 55 Spartan ships.	Thuc. 8.25-27

412/1	Miletos	Athenian reinforcements allow for renewed blockade of Miletos and to conduct amphibious ops.	Thuc. 8.30
412/1	Chios	Spartan forces sail from Chios and unsuccessfully raid along the Asian coast of Ionia.	Thuc. 8.31
412/1	Chios	Small Athenian forces intercepts and unsuccessfully pursues Chian ships.	Thuc. 8.34
412/1	Knidos	Spartans intercept merchant ships near Knidos. Athenian counterattack and defeat the Spartan ships.	Thuc. 8.35
412/1	Aegean	Spartan ships sail to Melos and defeat small Athenian force. Second Spartan force raids on its way to reinforce them. Another battle off Syme, both sides take losses.	Thuc. 8.39-42
412/1	Rhodos	94 Spartan ships sail to Rhodos and convince two cities of Lindos and Ielusos to revolt from Athens	Thuc. 8.44
412/1	Rhodos	Athenians raid Rhodos.	Thuc. 8.55
412/1	Chios	Chians unsuccessfully attempt to break the Athenian blockade.	Thuc. 8.61
411	Samos	Spartans sail to Samos to engage the Athenian in battle, refuse when they learn of Athenian reinforcements.	Thuc. 8.79
411	Hellespont	Spartans sail to Byzantion and induce it to revolt. Small naval battle.	Thuc. 8.80
411	Euboia	Large naval battle off Eretria, Sparta win decisive victory. Euboia revolts from Athens	Thuc. 8.94-96
411	Lesbos	Athenians Attacks city of Eresos.	Thuc. 8.100
411	Hellespont	Battle at the entrance to the Hellespont. Sparta victorious.	Thuc. 8.102
411	Hellespont	Athenians win decisive victory over Spartans at Kynossema.	Thuc. 8.103-106
411	(Unknown)	Spartans defeat Athenians in a naval battle. Location unknown.	Xen. Hell. 1.1.1
411	Hellespont	2 battles fought between Spartans and Athenians near Rhoiteion and Abydos.	Xen. Hell. 1.1.2-7
411	Hellespont	40 Athenian ships levying money.	Xen. Hell. 1.1.8
410	Hellespont	2 groups of 20 ships levying money.	Xen. Hell. 1.1.12
410	Kyzokos	Athenian defeat Spartans in battle off Kyzikos. Subsequently levy much money.	Xen. Hell. 1.1.16-21
410	Hellespont	Athenians intercepts and destroy 3 Spartan transports.	Xen. Hell. 1.1.36

409	Lydia	Athenians attack the land around Pygela and other places in Lydia.	Xen. Hell. 1.2.1-5
409	Pylos	Spartans land and sea attack retakes Pylos.	Diod. 13.64.5-7
409	Lesbos	Athenians intercept 25 ships from Syrakousai near Methymna.	Xen. Hell. 1.2.11-13
408	Bosporos	Athenians attack and besiege Byzantion and Chalkedon.	Xen. Hell. 1.3.1-22
407	Andros	100 Athenian ships attack and defeat forces of Andros.	Xen. Hell. 1.4.21-23
406	Notion	Athens defeated in battle of Notion.	Xen. Hell. 1.5.11-14
406	Samos	Athenian on Samos reinforced and raid enemy territory.	Xen. Hell. 1.5.18-20
406	Lesbos	Spartans captures Methymna. Defeat Athenians in battle off Mytilene and besiege the city.	Xen. Hell. 1.6.12-18
406	Arginousai	Athenians win a decisive victory at the battle of Arginousai.	Xen. Hell. 1.6.22-35
406	Sicily	Syrakousans intercept Carthaginian invasion force headed for Sicily and capture 15 ships.	Diod. 13.80.5-7
406	Akragas	Syrakousai collects allies and goes to the relief of Akragas, under siege by Carthaginians. 30 ships act as a covering force.	Diod. Sic. 13.86.5
406	Akragas	Carthaginians attack and sink 8 Syrakousan triremes escorting grain ships. Syrakousans complacent in convoying their supplies.	Diod. 13.88.3-5
405	Gela	Dionysios sends relief force to Gela, including 50 ships.	Diod. 13.109.1-5
405	Samos	Athenians raid Persian territory.	Xen. Hell. 2.1.16
405	Hellespont	Spartans sail to Hellespont to intercept trade.	Xen. Hell. 2.1.17
405	Hellespont	Spartans attack and capture Lampsakos.	Xen. Hell. 2.1.18-19
405	Hellespont	Battle of Aigispotamoi. Athenian fleet annihilated.	Xen. Hell. 2.1.20-29
405	Saronic Gulf	Spartans liberate Aigina and raid Salamis. Spartans then blockades Athens by sea.	Xen. Hell. 2.2.9
404	Samos	Lysandros and the Spartans besiege and take Samos.	Xen. Hell. 2.3.6

404	Syrakousai	Syrakousan rebels send to Messana and Rhegion and receive support of 80 triremes to help blockade Dionysios.	Diod. 14.8.2
403	Athens	Lysandros besieges the Peiraeus by land and his brother Libys blockades the port by sea.	Xen. Hell. 2.4.28-29
401	Asia	Sparta sends a fleet to the Persian Cyrus. Unknown numbers.	Xen. Hell. 3.1.1
397	Motye	Dionysios leaves his admiral Leptines with the naval force in command of the siege of Motye.	Diod. 14.48.3-4
397	Motye	Battle between Carthaginian and Syrakusan forces, as skirmishing increases the Carthaginians refuses battle.	Diod. 14.50.1-4
397	Sth. Sicily	Syrakousan admiral Leptines keeps watch for Carthaginian reinforcements sailing to Sicily. Also besieges Aegesta and Entella.	Diod. 14.53.5;54.4
396	Sth. Sicily	Leptines sails out with 30 triremes and intercepts Carthaginian transports, sinking 50 before wind allows others to escape.	Diod. 14.55.2
396	Katana	Battle between Carthaginian and Syrakousan forces. Devolves into boarding action, Greeks defeated and pursued, losing 100 ships.	Diod. 14.59.5-60.7
396	Syrakousai	Dionysios and Leptines sail out with warships to escort supply vessels.	Diod. 14.64.1
396	Syrakousai	Whist Dionysios and Leptines are on escort mission, remaining Syrakousan forces set out with 5 ships and seize a supply ship. Carthaginians sail out with 40 ships and lose 24 in subsequent naval battle.	Diod. 14.64.1-2
394	Knidos	Spartan fleet defeated in battle off Knidos and Spartan admiral Peisander killed.	Xen. Hell. 4.3.10-12
393	Korinthian Gulf	Using Persian money Korinth builds a fleet and confronts Sparta in the Korinthian Gulf but are defeated.	Xen. Hell. 4.8.10-11
393	Rhegion	Dionysios mans 100 triremes and launches surprise night attack on Rhegion. Fails to take city, ravages the land and sails home.	Diod. 14.90.4-7
391	Argos	Combined Spartan naval/land force attacks Korinth and (aprox.) 12 Spartan triremes seize ships and the dockyards.	Xen. Hell. 4.4.19
389	Akarnania	Athenian squadron based out of Oiniadai blockading entrance to Korinthian Gulf, forcing Spartans to cross gulf at Rhion.	Xen. Hell. 4.6.14

390	Samos & Rhodos	Teletias encounters 10 Athenian triremes that were enroute to Cyprus and captures them all.	Xen. Hell. 4.8.24
390	Hellespont	Athenians send 40 ships to the Hellespont and extend their influence, set up democracy in Byzantion. Collect tax from ships sailing in from the Black Sea.	Xen. Hell. 4.8.25-27
390	Rhegion	Dionysios sets out against Rhegion with 120 ships. Italian Greeks send 60 ships to help Rhegion. Battle ensues but storm forces Dionysios to flee, losing 7 ships.	Diod. 14.100.1-5
389	Lipari Islands	30 Syrakousan ships sail to Lipari islands and take 10 ships from Rhegion.	Diod. 14.103.2-3
389	Lesbos	Athenians sail to Lesbos and land a force which defeats the Spartans.	Xen. Hell. 4.8.28-29
389	Hellespont	Spartans with 3 triremes attacks Abydos and gathers 3 more ships. Then attempt to capture boats of the Athenians and their allies.	Xen. Hell. 4.8.33
389	Hellespont	Athenians counter above Spartan force with 8 ships. Athenians utilise ruse involving his ships sailing off as if going to collect tribute, as was a normal practice.	Xen. Hell. 4.8.34-35
389(?)	Aigina	Reciprocal raiding between Athens and Aigina. Athenian naval squadron driven off.	Xen. Hell. 5.1.1-2
389	Aigina	Athenians on Aigina blockaded by 12 Spartan triremes. Athenians outfit ships and rescue the force trapped on Aigina.	Xen. Hell. 5.1.5
388	Tenedos & Abydos	Spartans ravage Tenedos and extract money. Sail to Abydos in the Hellespont where their 25 ships are blockaded by 32 Athenian ships.	Xen Hell. 5.1.6-7
388	Aigina/Attika	Naval battle by moonlight as Athenians sail back into the Peiraius and lose 4 ships.	Xen. Hell. 5.1.8-9
388	Aigina	10 Athenian triremes with 800 peltasts land on Aigina and defeat the Spartans on land.	Xen. Hell. 5.1.10-12
387	Attika	Spartans sail by night and raid Peiraius at dawn. 3-4 triremes escort captured merchant vessels to Aigina. Remaining ships stay and interdict Athenian shipping.	Xen. Hell. 5.1.19-24
387	Abydos	12 Spartan ships ambush and capture relief force of 8 Athenian ships sailing from Thrake to the Hellespont.	Xen. Hell. 5.1.26-27
387	Hellespont	Spartan Antalkidas' force 80 triremes, including 20 from Syrakousai, establishes sea control in Hellespont. Interdicts Athenian trade from the Pontos.	Xen. Hell. 5.1.28

381	Pharos	'Barbarians' attack colony of Pharos. Governor of Lissus sails with triremes and intercepts the light craft of the Illyrians.	Diod. 15.14.1-2
381	Tyrrhenia	Dionysios, in need of money, sets out to plunder rich temple in Tyrrhenia under the auspices of suppressing piracy.	Diod. 15.14.3-4
377	Pagasai/Oreos	Thebans, short of grain, send 2 triremes to Pagasai for grain. Spartans with 3 triremes ambush and capture triremes and grain.	Xen. Hell. 5.4.56
377/6	Aegean	Spartans plan attack on Athenian grain ships. Athenians learn of this and successfully escort the grain back to Athens.	Diod. 15.34.3-5
376	Aegean	Spartan fleet of 60 ships preventing grain ships from reaching Athens. Athenians man fleet and defeat the Spartans, allowing grain ships into the city.	Xen. Hell. 5.4.61
375	Peloponnesos	With Theban encouragement, Athenians open up second front on Spartans by raiding the Peloponnesos with 60 ships.	Xen. Hell. 5.4.62-63
375	Alyzeia	55 Spartan ships engage 60 Athenian ships and are defeated. Athenian fleet then grows to 70 ships.	Xen. Hell. 5.4.65-66
375-373	Attika	Attika still subject to raids from Aigina, wearing them down.	Xen. Hell. 6.2.1
373	Kerkyra	60 ships from Sparta and their allies attack Kerkyra and blockade the port.	Xen. Hell. 6.2.5-7
373	Kephallania & Kerkyra	Athenian force of 70 ships under Iphikrates raid Kephallania, then ambush and capture 10 ships from Syrakousai.	Xen. Hell. 6.2.33-35
373	Kerkyra	Spartans, worried by Athenian fleet, evacuate Kerkyra taking slaves and valuable.	Xen. Hell. 6.2.24-26
372	Kephallania & Peloponnesos	Taking over fleet of 90 Kerkyraian ships, Iphikrates coerces money from Kephallania. Raids Spartan and allied territory.	Xen. Hell. 6.2.38
369	Korinth	20+ triremes with Celtic and Iberian infantry from Dionysios of Syrakousai come to aid of Sparta and allies fighting the Thebans. Return to Sicily after much success.	Xen. Hell. 7.1.20-22
368	Arkadia	Second force from Dionysios of Syrakousai arrives in Sparta and helps Spartans in campaign in Arkadia.	Xen. Hell. 7.1.28
362	Peloponnesos	Athenian reinforcements to the Peloponnesos avoid Epaminondas' force at Nemea by going by sea.	Xen. Hell. 7.5.4-7

368/7	Eryx	Dionysios leaves 130 ships at Eryx and dismisses the remaining 170. Carthaginians attack and are victorious.	Diod. 15.73.3-4
366/5	Samos	Timotheus successfully takes Samos after a 10-month siege.	Isok. 15.111; Polyain. 3.10.9
364/3	Thrake & Hellespont	Timotheos besieges Torone and Potidaia and relieves Kyzikos, which had been under siege by Theban force.	Diod. 15.81.6
361/0	Cyclades	Alexander, tyrant of Pherai, attacks Cyclades. Athens counterattacks.	Diod. Sic. 15.95.1-2
360/59	Thrake/Makedonia	Athens Sends 3000 hoplites and considerable naval force to oppose Philip by restoring Argaeos to the throne.	Diod. 16.2.6
358/7	Aegean	Social War. Athens attack Chios.	Diod. 16.7.3-4
357/6	Syrakousai	Dionysios, short of grain, raids the countryside, being in control of the sea. (But, see below)	Diod. 16.13.3
357/6	Syrakousai	Syrakousans interdicting supplies bound for Dionysios.	Diod. 16.13.3
356/5	Syrakousai	Battle between Syrakousan force of 60 ships and 60 ships of Dionysios. Syrakousans victorious.	Diod. 16.16.3-4
356/5	Syrakousai	Syrakousans interdict supplies bound for Dionysios.	Diod. 16.18.4
356/5	Aegean	Social War. Allies sack Imbros, Lemnos and move to Samos.	Diod. 16.21.2
356/5	Hellespont	Social War. Allies and Athens face off at Hellespont. Weather prevents battle.	Diod. 16.21.3
347/6	Kerkyra	Iphikrates loitering near Kerkyra with a naval force and seizes Syrakousan ship with gold & Ivory statues bound for Olympia & Delphi.	Diod. 16.57.2-3
344	Sicily	Korinthian aristocrat Timoleon sails to Sicily with 10 ships, including 7 from Korinth, 2 from Kerkyra and 1 from Leukas	Plut. <i>Tim.</i> 8.5
322	Amorgos	Naval battle at Amorgos between Athens and Makedonians. Athenians outnumbered and after losing a few ships retreat, conceding defeat.	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 338a; Demetr. 11.3 FrGH 239b, 9

Diplomatic Operations

Year	Area/Location	Notes	Reference
546	Phokaea	Spartans send a pentekontor to Phokaia to warn Cyrus against attacking Hellenic territory.	Hdt. 1.152.2
500/499	Athens/Ionia	Athens sends 20 ships to help the Ionians in their revolt from Persia.	Hdt. 5.97.3
480	Kerkyra & Peloponnesos	Kerkyraians send 60 ships to help Greeks at Salamis. Claim contrary winds kept them back, possible diplomatic posturing awaiting battle outcome.	Hdt. 7.168
480	Aegean Islands	Themistokles threatens other islands and extorts money from the Karystians and Parians.	Hdt 8.112
479	Delos	Greek fleet of 110 ships assembles at Aigina before the army, sails to help the Ionians but refuses to sail further east than Delos out of fear.	Hdt. 8.131-132
479	Sparta	Athenians threaten to sail their fleet away unless the Spartans march north of Isthmus of Korinth to fight. Isthmus indefensible without Athenian fleet.	Hdt. 9.8-11
441/0	Samos	40 Athenian ships sail to Samos and set up a democracy.	Thuc. 1.115.3
440	Byzantion	Byzantion agrees to be subject to Athens as before. No further details given by Thucydides.	Thuc. 1.117.3
436(?)	Black Sea	Perikles with a large force of ships conducts a 'flag-showing' expedition through the Aegean and up into the Black Sea.	Plut. Per. 20.1
433	Sybotia, Kerkyra	Athenian aid to Kerkyra against Korinth, before the outbreak of hostilities. Athens sends 10 ships and 3 <i>stratego</i> i with orders to avoid breaking the treaty with Sparta, hence diplomatic nature of operation.	Thuc. 1.45-55
430/429	Karia/Lykia	6 Athenian Ships sent out to collect tribute and deter <i>leistai</i> .	Thuc. 2.69
429	Kydonia, Kreta	20 Athenian ships bound for Naupaktos as reinforcements diverted to Kreta to aid Athenian <i>proxenos</i> against a neighbour.	Thuc. 2.85
427	Kerkyra	Athens sends 12 ships to help arrange a truce in Kerkyraean civil war.	Thuc. 3.75
427	Kerkyra	Sparta sends 53 ships to Kerkyra, both as a diplomatic gesture as well as winning over the island from Ath.	Thuc. 3.76
427	Sicily	Athens sends 20 ships to Sicily to aid the city of Leontinoi against Syrakousai.	Thuc. 3.86

425/4	Thrake	Athenians collecting allied tribute.	Thuc. 4.50
424	Lesbos	Athenian squadron collecting tribute, diverted to Antandros, Lesbos and defeat Mytilenian rebels.	Thuc. 4.75
416	Argolid	20 Athenian ships take 300 pro-Spartans from Argos to neighbouring islands.	Thuc. 5.84.1
415	Katana, Sicily	60 Athenian ships coast from Rhegion to Naxos then to Katana. Sail to reconnoitre Syrakousai. Athenian ships and men bully Katana into accepting them into the city.	Thuc. 6.50-51
413	Argos	30 Athenian ships sail to Argos and demand a troop commitment from the city in accordance with their treaty.	Thuc. 7.20
412	Chios	Small Spartan fleet persuades Chios to revolt from Athens.	Thuc. 8.12, 14
412	Samos/Teos	Spartan ships sail to Samos and take 1 vessel, sail to Teos and get the Teians to remain silent.	Thuc. 8.16
412	Miletos	Spartan ships sail to Miltos and incite it to revolt.	Thuc. 8.17
411	Hellespont	Athenians sail against Kyzikos, recover the city and levy money.	Thuc. 8.107
407	Karia	20 Athenian ships levy money in the Kerameios gulf in Karia.	Xen. Hell. 1.4.8-9
405	Bosporos	Spartans sail to Byzantion and Chalkedon. The 2 cities surrender to Sparta.	Xen. Hell. 2.2.1-2
405	Lesbos	200 Spartan ships 'order the affairs' of Lesbos. 10 ships sent to Thrake and bring the cities there over to the Spartan side.	Xen. Hell. 2.2.5-6
404	Aegean	Lysandros appointed admiral and ordered out to set up harmosts throughout the Aegean.	Diod. 10.1
399	Sth. Italy/Sicily	Rhegion angered by growing power of Dionysios, sends expeditionary force which gathers aid from Messana - 50 triremes from Rhegion and 30 from Messana. Force eventually turns back but convinces Dionysios to conclude a peace.	Diod. 14.40.1-7
398	Lokroi	Dionysios send lavishly furnished quinquereme to Lokroi to pick up his new bride to be.	Diod. 14.44.7
397	Eryx	People of Eryx awed by Dionysios' forces, including 200 warships and 500 merchant vessels.	Diod. 14.47.7-48.1
396	Syrakousai	Spartan admiral Pharakidas and 30 warships arrive in Syrakousai to aid Dionysios.	Diod. 14.63.4
396	Ephesos	Spartan Agesilaos confronts the Persian satrap Tissaphernes demanding autonomy for the Greek cities.	Xen. Hell. 3.4.4-5

393	Ionia	Athenian Thrasyboulos sent to Ionia with 40 triremes and collects money from allies. Makes an alliance with 2 kings of the Thracians.	Diod. 14.94.1-2
391	Rhodos	Fearful of Athenian influence in Rhodos, Sparta mans 8 ships and aids Rhodian exiles.	Xen. Hell. 4.8.20-22
390	Samos & Rhodos	Spartan Teleutias with 12 ships sails for Rhodos. Stop at Samos and obtain (?) ships that were there.	Xen. Hell. 4.8.23
375	Kerkyra	Athenian fleet sails to Kerkyra and brings it under their influence, favourably.	Xen. Hell. 5.4.64
365	Sparta	Third force of 12 triremes from Dionysios of Syrakousai (the younger) assists Spartans in taking city of Sellasia (inland Peloponnesos city).	Xen. Hell. 7.4.12
377/6	Cyclades	Athenian Chabrias sails to the Cyclades and wins over Peparethos an Skiathos and some of the islands formerly subject to Sparta.	Diod. 15.30.5
368/7	Thessaly	Alexandros, tyrant of Pherai, asks for aid from Athens against Thebans. Athens sends 30 ships and 1000 men under Autokles. Thebans march home without battle.	Diod. 15.71.3
340/39	Byzantion	Athenians vote that Philip's siege of Byzantion breaks truce and sends large fleet, picking up allies along the way. Philip abandons the siege.	Diod. 16.77.1-2
367	Aegean	Theban Navy sent out into the Aegean. Athenians avoid battle.	Diod. 15.78-79

Constabulary Operations

Year	Area/Location	Notes	Reference
c.540/30s	Athens	In the reign of Peisistratos the Athenians conducted regular or semi-regular sweeps for pirates in the Saronic gulf.	Polyaenus 5.14
480	Attika/Salamis	Greek fleet evacuates Athenian personnel and goods from Athens to Salamis before arrival of Persian army.	Hdt. 8.40
470	Skyros	Athenians under Kimon suppress pirates attacking from Skyros.	Plut. Kim. 8.3-5
431	Opous	Ath. Fortifies unoccupied island of Atalanta to prevent 'privateer' raids on Lokris and Euboia.	Thuc. 2.32
410	Bosporos	Athens establishes 'customs-house' on the Bosporos and taxes vessels sailing into the Pontos.	Xen. Hell. 1.1.22

447	Chersonesos	Perikles leads an expedition to the Chersonesos. Takes 1000 Athenian colonists and builds defences against the 'robber bands' in the area.	Plut. Per. 19.1-2
453	Tyrrhenia	Syrakousan admiral Phayllos sent to put down Tyrrhenian piracy. Takes bribe to leave and exiled. Apelles replaces him and sent with 60 triremes.	Diod. 11.88.4-5
409	Himera, Sicily	Syrakousans and Himeraeans forced to evacuate Hiemra. Half the force of triremes present used to evacuate women and children.	Diod. 13.61.4-5
373	Kerkyra	Spartans, worried by Athenian fleet, evacuate Kerkyra taking slaves and valuable.	Xen. Hell. 6.2.24-26
359/8	Apulia	Dionysios the Younger establishes 2 cities in Apulia to make safe the route across the Adriatic from pirate attacks.	Diod. 16.5.3
357/6	Adriatic	Syrakousan Philistus recalled to Syrakousai by Dionysios. Had been cruising the Adriatic - anti-piracy.	Diod. 16.11.3
342	Halonnesos	Pirate Sostratos expelled from the island by Philip.	Dem. 7.14-16
325/4	Adriatic	Athenians set up colony to protect trade against 'Etruscan' pirates.	IG II2 - 1629

Bibliography

- Abulafia, David. *The Great Sea. A Human History of the Mediterranean*. Allen Lane, London: 2011.
- Allmand, Christopher. *The De Re Militari of Vegetius. The Reception, Transmission and Legacy of a Roman Text in the Middle Ages*. Cambridge University Press, New York: 2011.
- The American Practical Navigator. An Epitome of Navigation*. Originally by Samuel Bowditch, prepared and published by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Bethesda Maryland: 2002.
- Amit, M. *Athens and the sea: a study in Athenian sea-power*. Latomus, Bruxelles: 1965.
- Andrewes, Antony. 'The Arginousai Trial', *Phoenix*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (1974), pp. 112-122.
- Aperghis, Gerassimos. 'Athenian Mines, Coins and Triremes', *Historia: Zeitschrift für alte Geschichte*, Vol. 62, Iss. 1 (2013), pp. 1-24.
- Ashton, N.G. 'The Naumachia near Amorgos in 322 B.C.', *The Annual of the British School at Athens*, Vol. 72 (1977), pp. 1-11.
- 'The Lamian War – stat magni nominis umbra', *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, Vol. 104 (1984), pp. 152-157.
- Asmonti, Luca. 'The Arginusae trial, the changing role of strategoi and the relationship between demos and military leadership in late-fifth century Athens', *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*, Vol. 49 (2006), pp. 1-21.
- *Conon the Athenian. Warfare and Politics in the Aegean, 414-386 B.C.* Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart: 2015.
- Australian Maritime Doctrine*, published by the Sea Power Centre – Australia, Canberra: 2010.
- Baika, Kalliopi. 'Sounion', in David Blackman and Boris Rankov (eds.) *Shipsheds of the Ancient Mediterranean*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2013.
- Ball, R. 'The Karians' Place in Diodoros' Thalassocracy List', *The Classical Quarterly*, Vol. 27 Issue 02 (1977), pp. 317-322.
- Beaulieu, Marie-Claire. *The Sea in the Greek Imagination*. University of Pennsylvania Press, Berlin, Boston: 2015.
- Bekker-Nielsen, Tønnes. 'The Technology and Productivity of Ancient Sea Fishing', in Tønnes Bekker-Nielsen (ed.) *Ancient Fishing and Fish Processing in the Black Sea Region*. Aarhus University Press, Aarhus, DNK: 2006.

- Beresford, James. *Mnemosyne, Supplements, History and Archaeology of Classical Antiquity. Ancient Sailing Season*. Brill, Leiden, NLD: 2012.
- Berkey, David L. 'Why Fortifications Endure. A Case Study of the Walls of Athens during the Classical Period.' In V.D. Hanson *Makers of Ancient Strategy: From the Persian Wars to the Fall of Rome*. Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford: 2010. pp. 58-92.
- Bers, Victor. *Demosthenes, Speeches 50-59*. University of Texas Press, Austin: 2003.
- Bilić, Tomislav. 'The Myth of Alpheus and Arethusa and Open-Sea Voyages on the Mediterranean – Stellar Navigation in Antiquity', *The International Journal of Nautical Archaeology*, 38.1 (2009), pp. 116-132.
- Blackman, David; Rankov, Boris; Baika, Kalliopi; Gerding, Henrik; Pakkanen, Jari. *Shipheds of the Ancient Mediterranean*. Cambridge University Press, New York: 2013.
- Blondel, Jaques, Aronson, James and Bodiou, Jean-Yves. *The Mediterranean Region. Biological Diversity in Space and Time (2nd ed.)*, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2010.
- Boegehold, Alan L. 'The Date of Theophrastus' Characters', *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*, Vol. 90 (1959), pp. 15-19.
- Booth, Ken. *Navies and Foreign Policy*. Croom Helm, London: 1977.
- Bosworth, A.B. *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander. Volume I. Commentary on Books I-III*. Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1980.
- *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander. Volume II. Commentary on Books IV-V*. Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1995.
- Bowie, A.M. (ed.) *Herodotus, Histories, Book VIII*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York: 2007.
- Braswell, Bruce Karl. *A Commentary on the Fourth Pythian Ode of Pindar*. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, New York: 1988.
- Braudel, Fernand. *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*. (trans. Siân Reynolds) University of California Press, Berkley: 1995. Originally published in French as *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II* (1972).
- *The Mediterranean in the Ancient World*. Penguin Books, London: 2001.
- Bresson, Alain. *The Making of the Ancient Greek Economy. Institutions, Markets, and Growth in the City-States* (trans. Steven Rendall). Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford: 2016. Original French edition published in 2 vols., Armand Colin, c2007 and c2008.
- Broodbank, Cyprian. *The Making of the Middle Sea. A History of the Mediterranean from the Beginning to the Emergence of the Classical World*. Thames and Hudson, London: 2013.

- Buckler, John. *The Theban Hegemony, 371-362 BC*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1980.
- *Aegean Greece in the fourth century BC*. Brill, Leiden; Boston: 2003.
- Burke, Edmund M. 'Athens after the Peloponnesian War: Restoration Efforts and the Role of Maritime Commerce', *Classical Antiquity*, Vol. 9 Issue 1 (1990), pp. 1-13.
- 'Finances and the Operation of the Athenian Democracy in the "Lycurgan Era"', *The American Journal of Philology*, Vol. 131, No. 3 (2010), pp. 393-423.
- Burn, A.R. 'Greek Sea-Power, 776-540 B.C., and the 'Carian' Entry in the Eusebian Thalassocracy-List', *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, Vol. 47, Part 2 (1927), pp. 165-177.
- *Persia and the Greeks. The Defence of the West, c.546-478 B.C.* Edward Arnold (Publishers) Ltd., London: 1962.
- BR 45 vol. 1 - *Admiralty Manual of Navigation*. 1987.
- Braswell, Bruce Karl. *A commentary on the fourth Pythian ode of Pindar*. De Gruyter, Berlin and New York: 1988.
- Bresson, Alain. *The Making of the Ancient Greek Economy. Institutions, Markets, and Growth in the City-States*. (trans. Steven Rendall) Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ: 2016.
- Brock, Roger. *Greek Political Imagery from Homer to Aristotle*. Bloomsbury, London and New York: 2013.
- Cable, James. *The Political Influence of Naval Force in History*. Macmillan Press Ltd., Hampshire and London: 1998.
- Cairns, Francis. 'The "Laws of Eretria" ("IG" XII. 9 1273 and 1274): Epigraphic, Legal, Historical, and Political Aspects', *Phoenix*, Vol. 45, No. 4 (1991), pp. 296-313.
- Cargill, Jack. *The Second Athenian League. Empire or Free Alliance?* University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1981.
- Campbell, Penny. 'A modern history of the international legal definition of piracy', in *Piracy and maritime Crime: Historical and Modern Case Studies*, edited by Bruce A. Ellerman, Andrew Forbes and David Rosenberg. Naval War College Press, Newport, RI: 2010.
- Carey, Christopher. *Trials from Classical Athens* (2nd ed.). Routledge, London and New York: 2012.
- Cartledge, Paul. *Agésilao and the crisis of Sparta*. Duckworth, London: 1987.
- Casson, Lionel. *Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World*. Princeton University Press, Princeton: 1971.
- *Travel in the Ancient World*. George Allen and Unwin, London: 1974.

- 'Review: STARR (C. G.) The influence of sea power on ancient history.' *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, Vol. 112 (1992), pp. 198-199.
- 'A Trireme for Hire (Is. 11.48)', *The Classical Quarterly*, Vol. 45, No. 1 (1995), pp. 241-245.
- Castex, Raoul Admiral. *Strategic Theories*. (ed. & trans. Eugenia C. Kiesling) Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland: 1994.
- Caven, Brian. *Dionysius I. War Lord of Sicily*. Yale University Press, New Haven and London: 1990.
- Cawkwell, G.L. 'Eubulus', *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, Vol. 83 (1963), pp. 47-67.
- 'Athenian Naval Power in the Fourth Century', *The Classical Quarterly*, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 (1984), pp. 334-345.
- Charles, John F. 'The Anatomy of Athenian Sea Power', *The Classical Journal*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (1946), pp. 86-91.
- Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. (trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret) Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2007. Translation published 1976.
- Cohen, Edward E. *Ancient Athenian Maritime Courts*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey: 1973.
- Chronopoulou, Christina and Mavrakis A. 'Ancient Greek drama as an eyewitness of a specific meteorological phenomenon: indication of stability of the Halcyon days', *Weather, Royal Meteorological Society*, Vol. 69, No. 3 (2014), pp. 66-69.
- Constantakopoulou, Christy. *The Dance of the Islands: Insularity, Networks, the Athenian Empire, and the Aegean World*. Oxford University Press, New York: 2007. Access via ANU: <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.virtual.anu.edu.au/lib/anu/detail.action?docID=415851#>
- Cook, R.M. 'Archaic Greek Trade: Three Conjectures', *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, Vol. 99 (1979), pp. 152-155.
- Corbett, Sir Julian S. *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. Reprinted by Dodo Press, UK: 2009. Originally published 1911.
- *England in the Seven Years' War. A Study in Combined Strategy*, 2nd edition. Longmans, Green and Co., London: 1918.
- Corner, Sean. 'Transcendent Drinking: The Symposium at Sea Reconsidered', *The Classical Quarterly, New Series*, Vol. 60, No. 2 (2010), pp. 352-380.
- Crane, Gregory. 'Power, Prestige, and the Corcyrean Affair in Thucydides 1', *Classical Antiquity*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1992), pp. 1-27.

- Csapo, Eric. 'Parade Abuse, From the Wagons', in *No Laughing Matter: Studies in Athenian Comedy*, edited by C. W. Marshall and George Kovacs, Bristol Classical Press, London: 2012, pp. 29-43.
- 'The Dionysian Parade and the Poetics of Plenitude', *UCL Houseman Lecture, 20 February 2013*. Booklet published by the UCL Department of Greek and Latin, London: 2013.
- Curtis, Robert I. 'Sources for Production and Trade of Greek and Roman Processed Fish', in Tønnes Bekker-Nielsen (ed.) *Ancient Fishing and Fish Processing in the Black Sea Region*. Aarhus University Press, Aarhus, DNK: 2006.
- Danzig, Gabriel. 'Why Socrates was Not a Farmer: Xenophon's Oeconomicus as a Philosophical Dialogue', *Greece & Rome*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (2003), pp. 57-76.
- Davies, Mark I. 'Sailing, Rowing, And Sporting in One's Cups on the Wine-Dark Sea', in *Athens Comes of Age. From Solon to Salamis*. Princeton University Press, Princeton: 1978.
- DeSantis, Marc G. *A Naval History of the Peloponnesian War. Ships, Men and Money in the War at Sea, 431-404 BC*. Pen and Sword Maritime, South Yorkshire: 2017.
- de Romilly, Jacqueline. *Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism* (trans. Philip Thody). Arno Press, New York: 1979. Original French edition, *Thucydides et l'imperialisme athénien*, 1963.
- *The Mind of Thucydides* (trans. Elizabeth Trapnell Rawlings). Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London: 2012. Original French edition, *Histoire et raison chez Thucydide*, 1967.
- de Ste. Croix, G.E.M. *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War*. Duckworth, London: 1972.
- de Souza, Philip. 'Chester G. Starr: The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History (Book Review)', *The Classical Review*, vol. 40, no. 2 (1990), pp. 506-507.
- *Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1999.
- 'The Athenian maritime empire of the fifth century BC' in *The Sea in History - The Ancient World*, edited by Philip de Souza, Pascal Arnaud, Christian Buchet, The Boydell Press, Woodbridge: 2017
- de Souza, Philip and Sabin, Philip. 'Battle' in *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare Volume 1: Greece, The Hellenistic World and the Rise of Rome*, edited by Philip Sabin, Hans van Wees and Michael Whitby. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2008. Access via ANU: <http://universitypublishingonline.org.virtual.anu.edu.au/cambridge/histories/ebook.jsf?bid=CBO9781139054157>
- de Wet, B.X. 'The So-called Defensive Policy of Pericles', *Acta Classica*, 12 (1969), pp. 103-119.
- Dougherty, Carol. *The Raft of Odysseus: The Ethnographic Imagination of Homer's Odyssey*. Oxford University Press, Cary USA: 2001.

- Eddy, Samuel K. 'Athens' Peacetime Navy in the Age of Perikles', *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*, Vol. 9, Iss. 2, (1968), pp. 141-156.
- Ellerman, A. and Paine, S.C.M. (eds.) *Commerce Raiding. Historical Case Studies, 1755-2009*. Naval War College Press, Newport, RI: 2013.
- Ellis, J.R. and Milns, R.D. *The Spectre of Philip: Demosthenes' first Philip, Olynthiacs and speech On the peace; a study in historical evidence*. Sydney University Press, Sydney: 1970.
- Engels, Donald W. *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army*. University of California Press, Berkley and Los Angeles: 1978.
- Fagan, Brian. *Fishing. How the Sea Fed Civilization*. Yale University Press, New Haven and London: 2017.
- Fagan, Garrett and Trundle, Matthew (eds.) *New Perspectives on Ancient Warfare*. Brill, Boston: 2010.
- Figueira, Thomas J. 'Aigina and the Naval Strategy of the Late Fifth and Early Fourth Centuries', *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie*, Vol. 133, (1990), pp. 15-51.
- Finley, M.I. *The Ancient Economy (2nd ed.)*, University of California Press, Berkeley: 1985.
- Freedman, Lawrence. *Strategy. A History*, Oxford University Press, New York: 2013.
- Frost, Frank J. *Plutarch's Themistocles. A Historical Commentary*. Princeton University Press, Princeton: 1980.
- Fuchida, Mitsuo and Okumiya, Masatake. *Midway. The Battle that Doomed Japan, The Japanese Navy's Story*. United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland: 1955. With introduction by the United States Naval Institute, 1992.
- Gabrielsen, Vincent. *Financing the Athenian Fleet. Public Taxation and Social Relations*. The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London: 1994.
- 'Rhodes and the Ptolemaic kingdom: the commercial infrastructure', in Kostas Buraselis, Mary Stefanou, Dorothy J. Thompson (eds.) *The Ptolemies, the Sea and the Nile. Studies in Waterborne Power*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2013.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. *On Grand Strategy*. Penguin Press, New York: 2018.
- Gallant, T.W. *A Fisherman's Tale*. Belgian Archaeological Mission in Greece and State University of Gent, Gent: 1985.
- Garland, Robert. *The Piraeus. From the Fifth to the First Century B.C.* Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York: 1987.
- Garnsey, Peter. *Famine and Food Supply in the Greco-Roman World*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1988.

- Garvie, A.F. *Aeschylus Persae. With Introduction and Commentary*. Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York: 2009.
- Gauthier, Philippe. *Un Commentaire Historique des Poroi de Xenophon*. Librairie Droz, Paris: 1976.
- Gerding, Henrik. 'Syracuse', in Blackmen et. al. *Shipheds of the Ancient Mediterranean*. Cambridge University Press, New York: 2013.
- Goheen, Robert F. *The Imagery of Sophocles' Antigone. A Study of Poetic Language and Structure*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey: 1951.
- Gomme, A.W. *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides. Vol. I*. Oxford University Press, London: 1945.
- Gonzalez Garcia, Francisco Javier and Barja de Quiroga, Pedro Lopez. 'Neocon Greece: V.D. Hanson's War on History', *International Journal of the Classical Tradition*, Vol. 19, no. 3 (2012), pp. 129-151.
- Gordon, Andrew. *The Rules of the Game. Jutland and British Naval Command*. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland: 1996.
- Grainger, John D. *Hellenistic & Roman Naval Wars 336-31 BC*. Pen & Sword Maritime, South Yorkshire: 2011.
- Graninger, Denver. 'Plutarch on the Evacuation of Athens ("Themistocles 10.8-9")', *Hermes*, 138. Jahrg., H. 3 (2010), pp. 308-317.
- Gray, Colin S. *The Leverage of Sea Power. The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War*. The Free Press, New York: 1992.
- Green, Peter. *Diodorus Siculus, Books 11-12.37.1: Greek History 480-431 B.C., the Alternative Version*. University of Texas Press, Austin TX: 2006.
- *Diodorus Siculus, the Persian Wars to the Fall of Athens. Books 11-14. 34 (480-401 BCE)*. University of Texas Press, Austin: 2010.
- Grove, Eric. *The Future of Sea Power*. Routledge, London:1990.
- Hägg, Robin and Marinatos, Nanno. *The Minoan Thalassocracy. Myth and Reality. Proceedings of the Third International Symposium at the Swedish Institute in Athens, 31 May-5 June, 1982*. Svenska Institutet i Athen, Stockholm: 1984.
- Hale, John R. *Lords of the Sea. The Epic Story of the Athenian Navy and the Birth of Democracy*. Penguin, New York: 2009.
- Halpern, Paul G. *A Naval History of World War I*. UCL Press, London: 1994.
- Hamel, Debra. *The Battle of Arginusae. Victory at Sea and Its Tragic Aftermath in the Final Years of the Peloponnesian War*. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore: 2015.

- Hamilton, Charles D. *Sparta's Bitter Victories. Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London: 1979.
- *Agesilaus and the Failure of Spartan Hegemony*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London: 1991.
- Hammond, N.G.L. *Philip of Macedon*. The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore: 1994.
- Hansen, Mogens Herman. *The Athenian Assembly in the Age of Demosthenes. Structure, Principles and Ideology* (trans. J.A. Cook). Basil Blackwell, Oxford and New York: 1987.
- *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes. Structure, Principles and Ideology* (trans. J.A. Cook). Blackwell, Oxford, UK and Cambridge, USA: 1991.
- Hansen, Mogens Herman and Nielsen, Thomas Heine. *An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis*. Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2004.
- Hanson, Victor Davis. *The Western Way of War. Infantry Battle in Classical Greece, 2nd ed.* University of California Press, Berkley: 2000. Originally published 1989.
- *Carnage and Culture. Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power*. Anchor Books, New York: 2001.
- *A War Like No Other. How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War*. Random House, New York: 2005.
- (ed.) *Makers of Ancient Strategy: From the Persian Wars to the Fall of Rome*. Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford: 2010.
- Hattendorf, John B. 'What is Maritime Strategy?', Published by the Sea Power Centre – Australia, October 2013. Accessed at: <http://www.navy.gov.au/media-room/publications/soundings-papers-october-2013>
- Hauben, Hans. 'An Athenian Naval Victory in 321 B.C.', *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*, Bd. 13 (1974), pp. 61-64.
- Hawes, Greta. *Rationalizing Myth in Antiquity*. Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York: 2014.
- Herzogenrath-Amelung, Tristan. 'Naval Hoplites. Social Status and Combat Reality of Classical Greek *epibatai*', *Historia*, Vol. 66, Iss. 1 (2017), pp. 45-64.
- Heskel, Julia. *The North Aegean Wars, 371-360 B.C.* Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart: 1997.
- Hignett, C. *Xerxes' Invasion of Greece*. Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1963.
- Horden, Peregrine and Purcell, Nicholas. *The corrupting sea: a study of Mediterranean history*. Blackwell, Oxford: 2000.

Hornblower, Simon. *A Commentary on Thucydides. Volume I, Books I-III*. Clarendon Press, New York: 1991.

— *A Commentary on Thucydides. Volume II, Books IV-V.24*. Oxford University Press, New York: 1997.

— *A Commentary on Thucydides. Volume III, Books 5.25-8.109*. Oxford University Press, New York: 2008.

— 'The Old Oligarch (Pseudo-Xenophon's *Athenaion Politeia*) and Thucydides. A fourth-century date for the Old Oligarch?', in P. Flensted-Jensen et al. (eds.) *Polis and Politics. Studies in Ancient Greek History Presented to Mogens Herman Hansen on his Sixtieth Birthday, August 20, 2000*. Museum Tusulanum Press, Copenhagen: 2000.

Jacobsen, Anne Liff Lund. 'The Reliability of Fishing Statistics as a Source for Catches and Fish Stocks in Antiquity', in Tønnes Bekker-Nielsen (ed.) *Ancient Fishing and Fish Processing in the Black Sea Region*. Aarhus University Press, Aarhus, DNK: 2006.

Jeffery, L.H. *Archaic Greece. The City-States c.700-500 B.C.* Methuen & Co., London: 1976.

Jordan, Borimir. *The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period. A Study of Athenian Naval Administration and Military Organization in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C.* University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1975.

— 'The Sicilian Expedition Was a Potemkin Fleet', *The Classical Quarterly*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (2000), pp. 63-79.

Kagan, Donald. *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War*. Cornell University Press, New York: 1969.

— *The Archidamian War*. Cornell University Press, New York: 1974.

— *The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition*. Cornell University Press, New York: 1981.

— *The Fall of the Athenian Empire*. Cornell University Press, New York: 1987.

— 'Athenian Strategy in the Peloponnesian War', in Williamson Murray et al. (eds.) *The Making of Strategy. Rulers, States, and War*. Cambridge University Press, New York: 1994.

— *Thucydides. The Reinvention of History*. Viking Penguin, New York: 2009.

Kallet-Marx, Lisa. *Money, Expense, and Naval Power in Thucydides History 1-5.24*. University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1993.

Kapellos, Aggelos. 'Adeimantos at Aegospotami: Innocent or Guilty?', *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte*, Bd. 58, H. 3 (2009), pp. 257-275.

Keen, Antony G. 'Athenian Campaigns in Karia and Lykia during the Peloponnesian War', *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, Vol. 113 (1993), pp. 152-157.

— 'Grain for Athens: the importance of the Hellespontine route in Athenian foreign policy before the Peloponnesian war.' in G.J. Oliver, R. Brock, T.J. Cornell and S.

- Hodkinson (eds.) *The Sea in Antiquity*. BAR International Series 899. Archaeopress, Oxford: 2000.
- Kelly, Thomas. 'Thucydides and Spartan Strategy in the Archidamian War', *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 87, No. 1 (1982), pp. 25-54.
- Kelly, Justin and Brennan, Michael. 'Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy,' Published by the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009. Accessed at: www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=939
- Kirkwood, G.M. 'Eteocles Oiakostrophos', *Phoenix*, (*Studies Presented to G. M. A. Grube on the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday*), Vol. 23, No. 1, (1969), pp. 9-25.
- Knight, Donald W. 'Thucydides and the War Strategy of Perikles', *Mnemosyne*, Fourth Series, Vol. 23, Fasc. 2 (1970), pp. 150-161.
- Kopp, H. 'The "Rule of the Sea": Thucydidean Concept or Periclean Utopia?', in C.R. Thauer and C. Wendt (eds.) *Thucydides and Political Order*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York: 2016.
- Kowalski, Jean-Marie, Claramunt, Christophe and Zucker, Arnaud. 'Thalassographie: Representing Maritime Spaces in Ancient Greece' in Stephan Winter, Matt Duckham, Lars Kulik, Ben Kuipers (eds.) *Spatial Information Theory. 8th International Conference, COSIT 2007, Melbourne, Australia, September 19-23, 2007. Proceedings*. Springer, Berlin Heidelberg: 2007.
- Kyriakou, Poulheria. *The past in Aeschylus and Sophocles*. De Gruyter, Berlin and Boston: 2011.
- Larson, Jennifer Lynn. *Ancient Greek cults: a guide*. Routledge, New York: 2007.
- Lazenby, J.F. *The Defence of Greece 490-479 BC*. Aris & Phillips, Oxford: 1993.
- *The Peloponnesian War. A Military Study*. Routledge, London: 2004.
- Lendon J.E. *Soldiers and Ghosts. A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity*, Yale University Press, New Haven: 2005.
- 'Athens and Sparta and the Coming of the Peloponnesian War' in Loren J Samons II (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to The Age of Pericles*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2007.
- Lentini, Maria Costanza, Blackman David and Pakkanen, Jari. 'The Shipsheds of Sicilian Naxos: A Second Preliminary Report (2003-6)', *The Annual of the British School at Athens*, Vol. 103 (2008), pp. 299-366.
- Lonsdale, David J. *Alexander the Great. Lessons in strategy*. Routledge: London and New York: 2007.
- Loraux, Nicole. *The Invention of Athens. The Funeral Oration in the Classical City*. (trans. Alan Sheridan) Zone Books, New York: 2006. Originally Published in French as *L'Invention d'Athènes. Histoire de l'oraison funèbre dans la cité Classique*, 1981.

- ‘Thucydides is not a Colleague’, in John Marincola (ed.) *Greek and Roman Historiography*. Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York: 2011, pp. 19-39.
- Lund, John and Gabrielsen. ‘A Fishy Business: Transport Amphorae of the Black Sea Region as a Source for the Trade in Fish and Fish Products in the Classical and Hellenistic Periods’, in Tønnes Bekker-Nielsen (ed.) *Ancient Fishing and Fish Processing in the Black Sea Region*. Aarhus University Press, Aarhus, DNK: 2006.
- Lytle, E. ‘Fish Lists in the Wilderness: The Social and Economic History of a Boiotian Price Decree’, *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens*, Vol. 79, No.2 (2010), pp. 253-303.
- ‘Η θάλασσακοινή: Fishermen, the Sea, and the Limits of Ancient Greek Regulatory Reach’, *Classical Antiquity*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2012), pp. 1-55.
- MacDonald, Brian R. ‘The Authenticity of the Congress Decree’, *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte*, Bd. 31, H.1 (1982), pp. 120-123.
- ‘The Diolkos’, *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, Vol. 106 (1986), pp. 191-195.
- MacDowell, Douglas M. *Aristophanes and Athens: an introduction to the plays*. Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York: 1995.
- ‘Epikerdes of Kyrene and the Athenian Privilege of Ateleia’, *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*, Bd. 150 (2004), pp. 127-133.
- Mahan, Alfred Thayer, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783*. Dover Publications, New York: reprint 1987. Originally published 1890.
- Mair, A.W. ‘Oppian, *Halieutica*’, in *Oppian, Colluthus, Tryphiodorus*. Edited and translated by A.W. Mair. Loeb Classical Library 219. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA: 1928.
- Malkin, Irad. *Myth and territory in the Spartan Mediterranean*. Cambridge University Press, New York: 1994.
- (ed.) *Greek and Roman networks in the Mediterranean*. Routledge, London: 2009.
- Mark, Samuel. ‘The Earliest Naval Ram’, *The International Journal of Nautical Archaeology*, 37.2 (2008), pp. 253–272.
- Marr, J.L. *Plutarch Life of Themistocles. Introduction, Text, Translation and Commentary*. Aris & Phillips Ltd, Warminster: 1998.
- Marr, J.L. and Rhodes, P.J. *The ‘Old Oligarch’. The Constitution of the Athenians Attributed to Xenophon*. Aris & Phillips, Oxford: 2008.
- Martin-Mcauliffe, Samantha A. and Papadopoulos, John K. ‘Framing Victory: Salamis, the Athenian Acropolis, and the Agora’, *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians*, Vol. 71, No. 3 (2012), pp. 332-361.

- Mattingly, Harold B. 'New Light on the Athenian Standards Decree (ATL II, D 14)', *Klio*, Vol 75 (1993), pp. 99-102.
- *The Athenian Empire Restored: Epigraphic and Historical Studies*. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor: 1996.
- McGrail, Seán. *Boats of the World. From the Stone Age to Medieval Times*. Oxford University Press, New York: 2001.
- McKechnie, Paul R and Kern, Stephen J. (ed. and trans.) *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, Aris & Phillips, Warminster: 1988.
- McKenzie, Nicholas J. and Hannah, Patricia A. 'Thucydides' Take on the Corinthian Navy. οἱ τε γὰρ Κορίνθιοι ἠγήσαντο κρατεῖν εἰ μὴ καὶ πολὺ ἐκράτουντο, 'The Corinthians believed they were victors if they were only just defeated', *Mnemosyne*, Vol. 66, Iss. 2 (2013), pp. 206-227.
- Meiggs, Russell. *The Athenian Empire*. Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1972.
- Meiggs, Russell and Lewis, David. *A selection of Greek historical inscriptions to the end of the fifth century B.C.* Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1969.
- Momigliano, Arnaldo. 'Sea-Power in Greek Thought', *The Classical Review*, Vol. 58, Issue 1 (1944), pp. 1-7.
- Morgan, Kathryn A. 'Designer History: Plato's Atlantis Story and Fourth-Century Ideology', *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, Vol. 118 (1998), pp. 101-118.
- Morison, Samuel Eliot. *The Two-Ocean War. A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War*. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland: 1963.
- Morrison, J.S. 'Hyperesia in Naval Contexts in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries BC', *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, Vol. 104 (1984), pp. 48-59.
- 'Athenian Sea-Power in 323/2 BC: Dream and Reality', *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, Vol. 107 (1987), pp. 88-97.
- Morrison, J.S., with Coates, J.F. *Greek and Roman Oared Warships*. Oxbrow Books, Oxford: 1996.
- Morrison, J.S and Coates, J.F. (eds.) *An Athenian Trireme Reconstructed. The British sea trials of Olympias, 1987*. BAR International Series 486: 1989.
- Morrison, J.S, Coates, J.F. and Rankov, N.B. *The Athenian Trireme. The History and Reconstruction of an Ancient Greek Warship*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: Second Edition, 2000.
- Morrison, James V. 'Preface to Thucydides: Rereading the Corcyrean Conflict (1.24-55)', *Classical Antiquity*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (1999), pp. 94-131.
- Murphy, Thomas M. 'The Vilification of Eratosthenes and Theramenes in Lysias 12', *The American Journal of Philology*, Vol. 110, No. 1 (1989), pp. 40-49.

- Murray, William M. *The Age of Titans. The Rise and Fall of the Great Hellenistic Navies*. Oxford University Press, New York: 2012.
- Mylona, Dimitra. *Fish-Eating in Greece from the Fifth Century B.C. to the Seventh Century A.D. A story of impoverished fishermen or luxurious fish banquets?* BAR International Series 1754: 2008.
- Myres, John L. 'On the 'List of Thalassocracies' in Eusebius', *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, Vol. 26 (1906), pp. 84-130.
- Nash, John. 'Sea Power in the Peloponnesian War', *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 71, No. 1, (2018), pp. 119-139.
- Nellopoulos, Emmanuel D. *The Greek Trieres*. (trans. Philippa Currie). John Floros Publishing House, Athens: 1999.
- Nolan, Cathal J. *The Allure of Battle. A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost*. Oxford University Press, New York: 2017.
- NP 136: *Ocean Passages of the World*. United Kingdom Hydrographic Office, 2004.
- O'Brien, Phillips Payson. *How the War was Won. Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2015.
- Ober, Josiah. 'Views of Sea Power in the Fourth-Century Attic Orators', *The Ancient World*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1978), pp. 119-130.
- 'Thucydides and the Invention of Political Science', in Antonis Tsakmakis and Antonios Rengakos (eds.) *Brill's Companion to Thucydides*, Brill Online, 2006: pp 131-159. Accessed at: <http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com.virtual.anu.edu.au/content/books/b9789047404842s007>
- *The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece*. Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford: 2015.
- Ormerod, Henry A. *Piracy in the Ancient World. An Essay in Mediterranean History*. Argonaut Inc., Publishers, Chicago: 1967. Originally published 1924.
- Osborne, Robin. *The Old Oligarch. Pseudo-Xenophon's Constitution of the Athenians. Introduction, Translation and Commentary*. London Association of Classical Teachers: London: 2nd edition 2004.
- Paine, Lincoln. *The sea and civilization: a maritime history of the world*. Knopf, New York: 2013.
- Palmer, Michael A. *Command at Sea. Naval Command and Control since the Sixteenth Century*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts: 2005.
- Papalas, Anthony. 'Polycrates of Samos and the First Greek Trireme Fleet', *The Mariner's Mirror*, 85:1 (1999), pp. 3-19.

- Papillon, Terry L. *Isocrates II*. University of Texas Press, Austin: 2004.
- Paret, Peter with Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (eds.) *Makers of modern strategy: from Machiavelli to the nuclear age*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.: 1986.
- Parker, Robert. *Miasma. Pollution and Purification in early Greek Religion*. Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1983.
- Parry, Chris. *Super Highway. Sea Power in the 21st Century*. Eliot and Thompson Books, London: 2014.
- Parshall, Jonathan B. and Tully, Anthony P. *Shattered Sword. The Untold Story of The Battle of Midway*. Potomac Books, Washington, D.C.: 2005.
- Pertsinidis, Sonia. *Theophrastus' Characters: A New Introduction*. Routledge, Milton: 2018.
- Pettegrew, David K. 'The Diolkos of Corinth', *American Journal of Archaeology*, Vol. 115, No. 4 (2011), pp. 549-574.
- Platias, Athanassios and Koliopoulos, Constantinos. *Thucydides on Strategy. Grand Strategies in the Peloponnesian War and their Relevance Today*. Hurst & Company, London: 2010.
- Podlecki, A.J. 'Athens and Aegina', *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte*, Bd. 25, H. 4 (1976), pp. 396-413.
- Pomeroy, Sarah B. *Xenophon Oeconomicus. A Social and Historical Commentary*. Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1994.
- Pritchard, David M. *The Fractured Imaginary: Popular Thinking on Citizen Soldiers and Warfare in Fifth Century Athens*. PhD Thesis, Department of Ancient History, Division of Humanities, Macquarie University: 1999.
- 'Aristophanes and de Ste. Croix: The Value of Old Comedy as Evidence for Athenian Popular Culture', *Antichthon* 46 (2012), pp. 14-51.
 - 'Public Finance and War in Ancient Greece', *Greece & Rome*, 62.1 (2015), pp. 48-59.
 - 'The Standing of Sailors in Democratic Athens', *Dialogues d'Histoire Ancienne*, 44/2 (In Press 2018), pp. 1-21.
- Rahe, Paul A. *The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta: The Persian Challenge*. Yale University Press, New Haven: 2015.
- Rawlings, Louis. *The Ancient Greeks at War*. Manchester University Press, Manchester, GBR: 2007.
- Rhodes, P.J. *The Athenian Boule*. Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1972.
- *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia*. Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1981.
- Rhodes, P.J. and Osborne, Robin. *Greek Historical Inscriptions, 404-323 BC*. Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York: 2004.

- Richardson, L.J.D. 'ΥΠΗΡΕΤΗΣ', *The Classical Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No. 1/2 (1943), pp. 55-61.
- Richmond, Herbert Admiral Sir. *Statesman and Sea Power*. Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1946.
- Robinson, Eric W. 'What Happened at Aegospotami? Xenophon and Diodorus on the Last Battle of the Peloponnesian War', *Historia: Zeitschrift für alte Geschichte*, Vol. 63, Iss. 1 (2014), pp. 1-16.
- Roisman, Joseph. 'Alkidas in Thucydides', *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte*, Bd. 36, H. 4 (1987), pp. 358-421.
- Rubin, Alfred P. *The law of piracy*. Naval War College Press, Newport RI: 1988.
- Rusten, Jeffrey. 'Theophrastus, Characters', in *Theophrastus, Herodas, Sophron. Characters. Herodas: Mimes. Sophron and Other Mime Fragments*. Edited and translated by Jeffrey Rusten, I. C. Cunningham. Loeb Classical Library 225. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA: 2003.
- Sabin, Philip and de Souza, Philip. 'Battle' in Philip Sabin, Hans van Wees and Michael Whitby (eds), *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare Volume 1: Greece, The Hellenistic World and the Rise of Rome*, Cambridge Histories Online, 2008.
- Salmon, J.B. *Wealthy Corinth. A History of the City to 338 BC*. Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1984.
- Scott, Lionel. *Historical Commentary on Herodotus Book 6*. Brill, Leiden, Boston: 2005.
- Seager, Robin. 'The Congress Decree: Some Doubts and a Hypothesis', *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte*, Bd. 18, H. 2 (1969), pp. 129-141.
- Shaw, Timothy (ed.) *The Trireme Project. Operational Experience 1987-90 Lessons Learnt*. Oxbrow Monograph 31: 1993.
- Sidwell, Keith. *Aristophanes the democrat: the politics of satirical comedy during the Peloponnesian War*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York: 2009.
- Slater, W.J. 'Symposium at Sea', *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, Vol. 80 (1976), pp. 161-170.
- Spence, I.G. 'Perikles and the Defence of Attika during the Peloponnesian War', *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, Vol. 110 (1990), pp. 91-109.
- Sprawski, Sławomir. 'Alexander of Pherae: infelix tyrant', in Sian Lewis (ed.) *Ancient Tyranny*. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh: 2006.
- Stadter, Philip A. 'The Motives for Athens' Alliance with Corcyra (Thuc. 1.44)', *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*, Vol. 24, 2 (1983), pp. 131-136.
- *A Commentary on Plutarch's Pericles*. The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London: 1989.

- Starr, Chester G. 'Thucydides on Sea Power', *Mnemosyne*, Vol. 31, Fasc. 4 (1978), pp. 343-350.
- *The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History*. Oxford University Press, New York: 1989.
- Steinsson, Sverrir. 'The Cod Wars: a re-analysis', *European Security*, 25:2 (2016), pp. 256-275.
- Stevens, David. *In All Respects Ready: Australia's navy in World War One*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne: 2015.
- Stevens, Gorham Phillips. 'The Periclean Entrance Court of the Acropolis of Athens', *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (1936), pp. 443-520
- Strachan, Hew. *The Direction of War. Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2013.
- Strauss, Barry A. 'Aegospotami Reexamined', *The American Journal of Philology*, Vol. 104, No. 1 (1983), pp. 24-35.
- 'Democracy, Kimon, and the Evolution of Athenian Naval Tactics in the Fifth Century BC', in P. Flensted-Jensen et al. (eds.) *Polis and Politics. Studies in Ancient Greek History Presented to Mogens Herman Hansen on his Sixtieth Birthday, August 20, 2000*, Museum Tusulanum Press, Copenhagen: 2000.
- *Salamis. The Greatest Naval Battle of the Ancient World, 480 BC*. Arrow Books, London: 2004.
- 'Sparta's Maritime Moment', in Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein and Carnes Lord (eds.) *China Goes to Sea. Maritime Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective*. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland: 2009, pp. 33-61.
- Stylianou, P.J. *A Historical Commentary on Diodorus Siculus Book 15*. Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1998.
- Talbert, Richard J.A. (ed.) *Barrington Atlas of the Greek and Roman World*, Princeton University Press, Princeton: 2000.
- Tammuz, Oded. 'Mare clausum? Sailing Seasons in the Mediterranean in Early Antiquity', *Mediterranean Historical Review*, 20:2 (2005), pp. 145-162.
- Thorne, James A. 'Warfare and agriculture: The economic impact of devastation in classical Greece', *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*, Vol. 42, 3 (2001), pp. 225-253.
- Till, Geoffrey. *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century*. Routledge, New York: Third edition, 2013.
- Tilley, Alec. *Seafaring on the Ancient Mediterranean. New Thoughts on Triremes and Other Ancient Ships*. BAR International Series 1268: 2004.
- Trevett, Jeremy. *Demosthenes, Speeches 1-17*. University of Texas Press, Austin, TX: 2011.

- Tritle, Lawrence A. *A New History of the Peloponnesian War*. Wiley-Blackwell, Malden, MA: 2010.
- Van Wees, Hans ‘“Those who sail are to receive a wage”: Naval warfare and finance in Archaic Eretria’, in Garrett Fagan and Matthew Trundle (eds.) *New Perspectives on Ancient Warfare* Brill, Boston: 2010.
- *Greek Warfare. Myths and Realities*. Bloomsbury, London and New York: Reprint 2014. Original, 2004.
- *Ships and Silver, Taxes and Tribute. A Fiscal History of Archaic Athens*. I.B. Tauris, London and New York: 2015.
- Vidal-Naquet, Pierre. ‘Athènes et l’Atlantide. Structure et signification d’un mythe platonicien.’, *Revue des Études Grecques*, tome 77, fascicule 366-368, (1964), pp. 420-444.
- *The Atlantis Story. A Short History of Plato’s Myth* (trans. Janet Lloyd). University of Exeter Press, Exeter: 2007. Original French edition, *L’Atlantide: Petite histoire d’un mythe platonicien*, 2005.
- Wachsmann, Shelly. ‘Panathenaic Ships: The Iconographic Evidence’, *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens*, Vol.81, No. 2 (2012), pp. 237-266.
- West, Martin L. ‘Odyssey and Argonautica’, *Classical Quarterly*, 55.1 39–64 (2005), pp. 39-64.
- Westlake, H.D. ‘Seaborne Raids in Periclean Strategy’, *The Classical Quarterly*, Vol. 39, No. 3/4 (1945), pp. 75-84.
- ‘Ionians in the Ionian War’, *The Classical Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (1979), pp. 9-44.
- Wheeler, Everett L. ‘Review: A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War’, *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 70, No. 3 (2006), pp. 816-818.
- Wilkins, John. *The Boastful Chef. The Discourse of Food in Ancient Greek Comedy*. Oxford University Press, New York: 2000.
- ‘Fish as a Source of Food in Antiquity’, in Tønnes Bekker-Nielsen (ed.) *Ancient Fishing and Fish Processing in the Black Sea Region*. Aarhus University Press, Aarhus, DNK: 2006.
- Williams, Charles Kaufman. ‘Corinth, 1978: Forum Southwest’, *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 2 (1979), pp. 105-144.
- Woodhead, A. Geoffrey. *Thucydides on the Nature of Power*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1970.
- Worthington, Ian. *Alexander the Great Man and God*. Routledge, London and New York: 2004.
- *Demosthenes of Athens and the Fall of Classical Greece*. Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2013.